

# MODERN SPAIN

## A NEW HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE

---

This series provides stimulating, interpretive histories of particular nations of modern Europe. Assuming no prior knowledge, authors describe the development of a country through its emergence as a modern state up to the present day. They also introduce readers to the latest historical scholarship, encouraging critical engagement with comparative questions about the nature of nationhood in the modern era. Looking beyond the immediate political boundaries of a given country, authors examine the interplay between the local, national, and international, setting the story of each nation within the context of the wider world.

### *Published*

Modern Greece: A History since 1821

*John S. Koliopoulos & Thanos M. Veremis*

Modern Spain: 1808 to the Present

*Pamela Beth Radcliff*

# MODERN SPAIN

1808 to the Present

**PAMELA BETH RADCLIFF**

University of California, San Diego  
LaJolla, CA, U.S

**WILEY** Blackwell

This edition first published 2017  
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at <http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions>.

The right of Pamela Beth Radcliff to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.

*Registered Offices*

John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030, USA

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

*Editorial Office*

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

For details of our global editorial offices, customer services, and more information about Wiley products visit us at [www.wiley.com](http://www.wiley.com).

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats and by print-on-demand. Some content that appears in standard print versions of this book may not be available in other formats.

*Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty*

While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services and neither the publisher nor the authors shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

Name: Radcliff, Pamela Beth, author.

Title: Modern Spain, 1808 to the present / Pamela Beth Radcliff.

Description: First edition. | Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, 2017. |

Series: A new history of modern Europe ; 12 | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016051172 | ISBN 9781405186797 (hardback) |

ISBN 9781405186803 (paper) | ISBN 9781119369936 (pdf) | ISBN 9781119369929 (ePUB)

Subjects: LCSH: Spain--History--19th century. | Spain--History--20th century. |

Spain--History--21st century. | BISAC: HISTORY / Modern / General.

Classification: LCC DP203 .R28 2017 | DDC 946/.07--dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2016051172>

Cover Design: Wiley

Cover Image: © nicolamargaret/Gettyimages

Set in 9.5/11.5pt Palatino by SPi Global, Pondicherry, India

# CONTENTS

List of Maps	xi
Preface	xii
Acknowledgments	xvi
Abbreviations and Glossary of Foreign Terms	xviii
Political Chronology of Spanish History, 1808–2016	xxii
<b>Part I: 1808–1868: The Era of the Liberal Revolution</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 Spain in the “Age of Revolutions”</b>	<b>3</b>
Spain in Europe and the World, 1780s–1820	4
A Snapshot of the Economy: Gradual Growth	7
Uneven Regional Development: Center/Periphery Divide	10
<i>The Mediterranean Regional Network</i>	10
<i>The North Atlantic Regional Network</i>	11
<i>Regional Networks of the Center</i>	12
Demography: A Growth Pattern	14
Characteristics of the Population: Occupation and Social Structure	15
Culture and Community	18
Political Crisis, 1808–1814	20
<i>Dynastic Crisis</i>	20
<i>War and Resistance</i>	21
<i>The Cortes of Cádiz and the Constitution of 1812</i>	22
<i>A Spanish “Constitutional Culture”</i>	23
<i>The End of the Revolutionary Era</i>	25
Conclusion	26
<b>2 Political Transformation: From the Old Regime to the Liberal State, 1814–1868</b>	<b>28</b>
Introduction: The Liberal Revolution in Comparative Context	28
The Major Players	31
<i>Moderate and Progressive Parties</i>	31
<i>The Military and Pronunciamientos</i>	32
<i>The Crown</i>	32
<i>Popular/Local Mobilization</i>	33
<i>Counter-revolution: Carlists</i>	33
<i>The Catholic Church</i>	34

Chronology: From the Restoration of Absolutism to the Construction and Crisis of the Liberal State, 1814–1868	35
<i>1814–1833: The Restoration and Demise of the Absolutist State</i>	35
Restoration of Absolutism, 1814–1820	35
The Liberal “Trienio,” 1820–23	36
Return to Absolutism, 1823–34	38
<i>1833–1845: The Construction of the Liberal State</i>	39
The Carlist War	39
Moderate and Progressive Constitutions and Platforms	40
The Parameters of a Liberal Political, Juridical and Administrative Order, 1833–45	42
<i>1845–1868: The Liberal State: From Consolidation to Crisis</i>	44
Conclusion: Achievements and Limits of the Liberal Political Transformation	45
<b>Part II: 1868–1923: The Emergence of Mass Politics</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>3 Politics on the Margins of the Liberal State: From 1848 to the “Sexenio” (1868–1874)</b>	<b>51</b>
Introduction: Mid-Nineteenth-century Popular Politics in Comparative Perspective	51
The Major Players	54
<i>Carlists</i>	54
<i>Cuban Separatists</i>	55
<i>Democrats and Republicans</i>	56
<i>The Labor Movement and the First International</i>	58
The First Democracy: The Sexenio, 1868–1874	60
<i>The September 1868 Revolution</i>	60
<i>The Democratic Monarchy (June 1869–February 1873)</i>	61
<i>The Republic (February 12, 1873–January 4, 1874)</i>	63
Conclusion	65
<b>4 A New Era of Liberal Politics: The Second Restoration, 1875–1898</b>	<b>67</b>
The Restoration in Comparative Context: State, Nation, Empire and Democracy	68
The Multiple Faces of the Restoration Regime	71
<i>Constructing a New Constitutional Regime: Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and the turno pacífico</i>	71
<i>The Dark Side of the Turno: Electoral Fraud and Caciquismo</i>	74
Evaluating the Constraints and Opportunities of Restoration Politics	75
<i>Constraints on Political Liberties Imposed by the State</i>	75
<i>Political Constraints and Opportunities:</i>	
<i>The View “From Below”</i>	77
The “Disaster” of 1898: The Start of a New Era?	80

<b>5</b>	<b>Restoration Politics: From Fin de Siècle to Postwar Crisis, 1898–1923</b>	<b>83</b>
	Introduction: Early Twentieth-Century Spanish Politics in Comparative Context	83
	1898–1914: Efforts to Reform the Regime “From Above”	85
	The Conservative Party and Antonio Maura	86
	The Liberal Party and José Canalejas	87
	1914–23: From Elite Reform to Mass Mobilization: Alternative Political Projects	90
	<i>The First World War in Spain</i>	90
	<i>From the Turno to Fragmentation of the Liberal and     Conservative Parties, 1913–23</i>	91
	<i>Movements on the Right</i>	92
	Catholic Mobilization	92
	Basque Nationalism (PNV/CNV)	93
	Mauristas/Spanish Nationalism	94
	<i>Movements on the Left</i>	95
	Socialists (PSOE/UGT)	95
	Anarcho-syndicalists (CNT)	96
	<i>Movements of the Center</i>	97
	Republicanism	97
	Catalanism/LLiga	98
	Turning Points in the Crisis of the Restoration, 1917–23	99
	<i>The Democratic Assembly Movement, 1917</i>	100
	<i>The La Canadiense Strike, 1919</i>	101
	A Last Effort at Reform “From Above,” 1920–23?	102
	Conclusion	103
	<b>Part III: The Long View: Social, Economic and Cultural Change, 1830–1930</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Economic and Demographic Evolution: 1830–1930</b>	<b>107</b>
	Spain in the World Economy, 1830–1930	108
	General Economic and Population Trends: Gradual Growth and Structural Evolution	110
	The Agricultural Sector	113
	The Industrial Sector	115
	Uneven Regional Development: Center/Periphery Divide	118
	Conclusion: Missed Opportunities or Inherent Constraints?	120
<b>7</b>	<b>Culture and Society, 1830–1930</b>	<b>122</b>
	Introduction: Social and Cultural Evolution in Comparative Perspective	122
	The Social Order: Evolution and Diversity	124
	<i>A Hybrid Elite</i>	125
	<i>The Urban Middle Classes</i>	126
	<i>The Popular Classes or “el pueblo”</i>	127
	<i>Rural Society</i>	128

Sociability and Identity: A Diverse and Evolving Cultural Landscape	129
<i>A New Urban Culture: Encoding Social Hierarchy</i>	
<i>in the Public Sphere</i>	130
<i>On the Margins of Middle Class Culture: The Avant-Garde</i>	
<i>and the Modern Woman</i>	133
<i>Urban Popular Sociability and Mass Culture</i>	134
<i>The Catholic Church, Religion and Rural Society</i>	136
<i>Local, Regional and National Cultures and Identities</i>	139
Conclusion	142
<b>Part IV: Dictatorship and Democracy, 1923–Present</b>	<b>143</b>
<b>8 The First Dictatorship: The Primo de Rivera Regime, 1923–1930</b>	<b>145</b>
Introduction: The Primo Regime in Comparative Perspective	145
From Coup to “Temporary” Dictatorship, 1923–1925	148
Elements of a New Kind of Dictatorship: The Civil	
Directory, 1925–1929	149
<i>Labor Relations</i>	150
<i>Nationalization Campaigns</i>	151
<i>Authoritarian Development</i>	153
End of the Dictatorship, 1929–1930	154
Political Transition to a Republic, 1930–1931	155
Conclusion	156
<b>9 The Second Republic: 1931–1936</b>	<b>158</b>
The Second Republic in Comparative Perspective	159
Periodization: The Shifting Majority Coalitions	
of the Second Republic	161
The First Biennium (1931–1933): Pursuing	
a Center/Left Majority Coalition	164
What Went Wrong with the First Biennium?	167
<i>Mobilizing against the Coalition</i>	167
<i>A Disintegrating Majority Coalition</i>	169
The Second Biennium, 1933–1935: Pursuing	
a Center/Right Majority Coalition	173
What Went Wrong with the Second Biennium?	175
<i>Mobilizing against the Coalition</i>	176
<i>An Unconsolidated Majority Coalition</i>	178
The Popular Front, February–July 1936	180
<i>What Went Wrong with the Popular Front?</i>	181
Conclusion	182
<b>10 The Civil War: 1936–1939</b>	<b>184</b>
The Civil War in Comparative Perspective	185
From Military Coup to Civil War: The Summer of 1936	187
<i>The Rebel Forces in the Summer of 1936</i>	188
<i>Ideology and Violence in Rebel Territory</i>	190

	<i>The Loyalist Forces during the Summer of 1936</i>	191
	<i>Revolution in Republican Territory</i>	191
	<i>Violence in Republican Territory</i>	194
	Organizing for the Long War: The Republicans	195
	<i>Foreign Aid</i>	196
	<i>Reconstructing a Republican State</i>	198
	Organizing for the Long War: The Nationalists	201
	<i>Constructing a "New State"</i>	201
	<i>Foreign Aid</i>	203
	The Military Stages of the War	204
	Conclusion	207
<b>11</b>	<b>The Second Dictatorship: The Franco Regime, 1939–1976</b>	<b>209</b>
	The Franco Regime in Comparative Perspective	210
	Periodization: The Stages of the Franco Dictatorship	212
	Phase One, 1936–1945: Militarization, Fascist Influence and Extreme Repression	214
	Phase II, 1945–1957: National Catholicism, Monarchist Restoration and International Integration	218
	Phase III, 1957–1969: Authoritarian Development and Institutionalization	221
	Phase IV, 1969–1975: Collapse of the Coalition and Death of the Dictator	227
	Conclusion	229
<b>12</b>	<b>Economic, Social and Cultural Transformation, 1930s–1970s</b>	<b>230</b>
	Economy, Society and Culture in Comparative Perspective	230
	Economic and Demographic Trends	232
	<i>The "Years of Hunger": Deprivation, Disease and Death in the 1940s</i>	232
	<i>From Economic Stagnation to Rapid Growth: 1950s–1970s</i>	234
	Structural shift from Agriculture to Industry and Service Sectors	235
	Consumption and Population Trends	236
	Uneven Benefits	237
	Social and Cultural Trends	238
	<i>Society and Culture in the Years of Hunger</i>	239
	Rupture and Restitution for Winners and Losers	239
	Family and Gender	240
	The Church, Religion and Education	241
	The Public Sphere: Associations and Sociability	242
	<i>Social and Cultural Evolution in the Growth Years: 1960s–1970s</i>	244
	Migration and Social Mobility	244
	Diversification of the Public Sphere	245
	The Decline of "Tradition": Youth, Gender and Religion	247
	Conclusion	248

<b>13</b>	<b>The Last Democratic Transition: 1976–1982</b>	<b>250</b>
	The Transition to Democracy in Comparative Perspective	251
	Origins of the Transition: Favorable Factors vs. the 1930s	252
	Economic Development	252
	Geographic Location: Western Europe	252
	Civil Society Mobilization	253
	Francoist Elites: Reformers and the Bunker	254
	The Institutional Transition: July 1976–December 1978	254
	Elite Actors and the “Push from Below,” 1976–77	255
	The June 1977 Elections and Building Consensus	
	Through “Pacts”	257
	The Constitution of 1978	259
	The Basque Exception	261
	From Transition to Consolidation, 1978–1982	261
	Autonomous Governments	262
	Local Governments	262
	Leadership Crisis and Attempted Coup, 1981	263
	The 1982 Election	264
	Conclusion	265
<b>14</b>	<b>Democratic State and Social Transformation, 1982–2016</b>	<b>266</b>
	The Democratic Era in Comparative Perspective	266
	Democratic government under PSOE leadership: 1982–1996	270
	<i>Institutionalization and European Integration</i>	270
	<i>Neo-Liberalism and Social Welfare</i>	272
	<i>The End of the PSOE Era</i>	273
	From Consolidation to <i>Crispaci3n</i> : PP and PSOE alternation	
	from 1996 to 2011	274
	<i>Political Polarization</i>	275
	<i>State/Regional Polarization</i>	277
	<i>Democratic Society</i>	277
	2008–2016: Crisis and Uncertainty	278
	Conclusion	280
	Notes	282
	Works Cited	314
	Index	336

# LIST OF MAPS

Map I:	The Spanish Empire, 1800	5
Map II:	Terrain and Regions, 1800	9
Map III-1-4:	Stages of the Civil War, 1936-39	188
Map IV:	The State of the Autonomous Communities	271

# PREFACE

Writing the history of modern Spain has been a thorny endeavor since the first “national” histories appeared in the mid-nineteenth century. Battling “national biographies” articulated two versions of Spain’s identity, one rooted in Catholicism and heroic religious conquest and the other drawing on secular liberties as encapsulated in the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz. The image of “two Spains” at war with each other seemed to be confirmed by an apparently unending series of civil wars, beginning with the First Carlist War in the 1830s and culminating with the apotheosis of the more infamous Civil War of the 1930s. During the long dictatorship that followed the Civil War (1939–1975), the victorious Francoists proclaimed the triumph of traditional Catholic Spain while the defeated liberals and socialists reluctantly acceded to this interpretation and vainly tried to understand why modernizing forces had failed to lift Spain out of the dark ages.

From outside of Spain, the failure motif dominated as well, although sometimes with a tinge of romantic admiration of the feisty Spaniards and their colorful if chaotic history. In the Anglo-American historical tradition, a deeply ingrained anti-Catholicism helped create a long pattern of hostility towards Spanish history. Spain was considered the country of the intolerant Inquisition, the empire that raped the Americas, the model for Old World tyranny, as against the liberties of the Anglo-Saxon political tradition. This hostility led to the so-called “black legend,” which was the dominant view of early modern Spain until quite recently.<sup>1</sup> French Enlightenment thinkers like Montesquieu shared this vision of a country held back by religious fanaticism. The flip side of the “black legend” was a romantic vision, beginning with Lord Byron’s celebration of the brave Spaniards fighting the invaders during the Napoleonic occupation. This romanticism was popularized through Bizet’s 1875 opera, *Carmen*, but continued in one form or another in twentieth-century Anglo-American observers from Ernest Hemingway to George Orwell. Whether positive or negative, both of these perspectives viewed Spaniards as somehow different, out of step with “normal” modern European history.<sup>2</sup>

Adding to Spain’s marginalization in the English-language historiography is the historically weak presence of Spanish history in US universities. In 1970, only 13 of the 135 universities with graduate programs had a Spanish historian who could train students. By 2000 the number had risen to 37, but that still only represents one-fourth of the total. More broadly, only about 11 percent of US undergraduate institutions have courses dedicated to Spanish history in their history department.<sup>3</sup> Thus, most students in the United States still learn what little they do about Spain from survey courses, whose textbooks either ignore or employ negative stereotypes in their treatment of Spain.

Inside Spain, the question of why Spain had failed to follow a “normal” path to modernity dominated Spanish historiography in the 1960s and 1970s. There were two versions of the “normal” path in social science literature at the time, the liberal and the Marxist. The liberal “modernization theory” scripted a uniform process of becoming modern with the industrialization, democratization and technological development of the most “advanced” countries as the yardstick.<sup>4</sup> Marxists scripted an equally uniform process in which this transformation was spearheaded by an emerging bourgeois class, whose job was to prepare the ground for the future working-class-led socialist revolution. Liberal Spanish historians viewed Spain as failing to develop a stable liberal political system, while for Marxist historians it was the failure of a bourgeois revolution. Both could agree that the core of the problem lay in economic backwardness, as embodied in the title of a classic study, *The Failure of the Industrial Revolution in Spain, 1814–1913*.<sup>5</sup>

This pessimistic framework of modern Spanish history began to change after the successful transition to democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For historians of Spain, this reference point opened a new set of “origin” questions, but now ones that culminated in “success” instead of “failure.” If Spain had been “backward” and “different” for almost 200 years, how had it so quickly “normalized” into European patterns? This apparent paradox helped generate a revisionist historiography and a new narrative of Spain’s modern history. Instead of failure, the revisionists argued that Spain had followed the same basic path of modernity as other European states, albeit at a different pace. From an economic perspective, David Ringrose argued that Spain experienced a steady trajectory of economic development that was within the range of general European trends.<sup>6</sup> From a political perspective, Isabel Burdiel argued that Spain had indeed experienced a liberal political and juridical revolution in the early nineteenth century.<sup>7</sup>

Contemporaneous developments in the broader European historiography supported this revisionist perspective. The notion of a uniform path to modernity whose deviations had to be explained was also being challenged from other national historiographies. Most famously, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley argued that German historians had to stop framing their search for origins around the apparent paradox between a successful bourgeois revolution and the failure of a liberal revolution. Instead of automatic links between the stock elements of “modernity,” each nation followed its “peculiar” path.<sup>8</sup> Adrian Shubert first incorporated this insight into Spanish history, embracing the idea of “peculiar” paths instead of a ranked hierarchy of most advanced or most backward European countries.<sup>9</sup>

What linked all these peculiar paths together was the broad arc of transformations that defined Europe since 1800. Spain, like the others, went from an agricultural to an industrial country. Like the others, it went from an absolutist to a liberal state in the nineteenth century and from a liberal state to a democratic one in the twentieth century. Again, it was transformed from a rural society to a largely urban society. And finally, Spain experienced the same kinds of political conflicts and tensions that these transformations produced in other countries. Revisionists acknowledged that there were specific elements to the Spanish story, like the prominent place of the Catholic Church, the uneven impact of industrialization, the role of the military in politics, and the specific constellation of political forces, but they insisted that the general framework was a “western European” one.

By looking at the picture this way, we not only transform our perspective on Spain, but on Europe. Instead of seeing the “European model” as equated with Britain or France, we recognize that there was no single path to modernity but “multiple modernities,” none of which constituted the “normal” or the “failed” route.<sup>10</sup> The result is a more complex history of Europe in the modern period and one which gives us a better idea of the diversity of experiences. Instead of a single British “model” with a host of “exceptions,” including Spain helps us recast Britain as the exception within Europe rather than the rule.

While the revisionist narrative has been a welcome corrective to the “failure” paradigm, we need to add another layer of complexity to complete Spain’s integration into a broader European and global framework in the twenty-first century. Thus, just at the moment when Spanish historians were celebrating Spain’s normalization in modern European development, that “normal” path has been subjected to increasing criticism. In the revisionist narrative, the replacement of “failure” with “success” implicitly aligned it with a positive vision of modernity from which Spain was no longer excluded.

But that positive vision of modernity has been increasingly challenged. Within European history, most historians of Nazi Germany finally gave up the effort to explain how Nazism was a product of some deviation from “normal” development and accepted that Nazism and fascism were modern regimes produced by modern forces.<sup>11</sup> From a different perspective, revisionist French historians have argued that the celebrated birth of modern political culture in the French Revolution produced not only democracy but totalitarianism, while Foucault linked the rise of the modern state with new and more repressive forms of surveillance and discipline.<sup>12</sup> From the post-colonial perspective, Europe’s claim to modernity was used as an implement of domination, relegating colonial peoples to permanent backwardness and justifying their subjugation.<sup>13</sup> The “modernity” that has emerged from all of these trends is at once more diverse and plural and more ambivalent in its achievements.

It is within this more ambivalent trajectory that Spain’s modern history can and should be fully integrated. Thus, rather than a long struggle between “two Spains,” one “modern” and the other “traditional,” the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were a period in which Spain constructed its own unscripted path to modernity, with all the “normal” achievements, contradictions and dark consequences. From the official “birth” of modern Spain in the “age of revolutions,” the task of this book is to chart the complex interaction of local, regional, national, European and international developments that produced Spain’s specific version of modern history. In contrast to the often insular narrative of Spain’s modern history, this book foregrounds a comparative perspective that has become an indispensable feature of national histories in a global age.

The other major task of the book is to tell this story from multiple perspectives without abandoning the coherence of a narrative arc. To some degree, this is the challenge of all interpretive synthetic histories, which have to balance a political narrative of chronological events with social, cultural and economic developments that often follow a different rhythm. It is also the challenge of national histories, which carry the risk of folding a multitude of local and regional or global stories into a narrative in which the emergence and coalescence of the nation-state was the predetermined outcome.

---

Without aiming for an impossible and unwieldy “total” history, this book will aim to incorporate historical developments from the local to the regional, national and global while making the case that these perspectives add up to the history of modern Spain. Likewise, without claiming to integrate all of the sub-disciplines of history, it will focus on four important areas and how they interacted with each other: politics, economics, society and culture. As many historians now acknowledge, no one realm of historical activity was the driving force or prime motor of history. Instead, the focus is on complex interactive models, in which different forces could be prime motors at different points, and the balance of elements could change from one society to another. Economic, social and cultural developments are deliberately separated from the political narrative (Chapters 6, 7 and 12) because they can best be viewed from a longer-term perspective.

A final aim of the book is to communicate on different levels so as to reach various audiences: from the undergraduate student, to graduate students and other specialists seeking information on the latest debates and scholarship, and finally as a tool for non-Spanish historians to integrate Spain into a more complex European and global history narrative. Specialists can delve into the endnotes for historiography, non-Spanish historians can focus on the comparative section that introduces each chapter, and undergraduates can choose to read only the political narrative or also the chapters dedicated to social, economic and cultural history, each with plentiful sub-headings to guide the way. The hope is that the book should not only help construct a new history of modern Spain, but contribute to the ongoing efforts to reframe the whole process of social, political and economic transformation that defines modern European and global history.

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

When I first agreed to take on the ambitious task of writing a general history of modern Spain, I only dimly understood what I was getting myself into. After completing two monographic books and teaching for more than 20 years, I was attracted by the thought of stepping back and putting together my version of the “big picture.” Although there was a rich corpus of specialized scholarship, I was dissatisfied with the existing interpretive frameworks and thought it was time for a fresh perspective. It turned out to be a lot more difficult to define my own framework than I had thought, but it finally crystallized in one productive weekend when I sat down and wrote the first draft of the preface. With that overarching trajectory in place, I could dedicate myself to the monumental task of mastering the existing historiography on each of the discrete periods and themes, and mapping the smaller and larger debates that shape scholarly conversations. It is to all the scholars who have participated in this process that I owe the greatest debt. Although it is impossible to thank them all by name, no book like this could be written without relying on the expertise of hundreds of historians who have enriched the historical study of Spain over the previous decades. I have cited some of them in the endnotes of the text, as a guide for specialists who want to dig deeper into particular topics, but they represent only a drop in the bucket of all the books and articles that informed my thinking.

I am particularly indebted to the scholars who generously agreed to read one or more draft chapters on the areas of their expertise: Juan Pro Ruíz, Scott Eastman, Eric Van Young, Chris Schmidt-Nowara, Inmaculada Blasco, Isabel Burdiel, Adrian Shubert, Ferrán Archilés, Florencia Peyrou, Javier Moreno, Julio de la Cueva, David Ortiz, Foster Chamberlin, Nigel Townson, Nick Saenz, Andrea Davis, José Alvarez Junco, Fernando del Rey, Stephen Jacobson, Tim Rees, Carolyn Boyd, Julián Casanova, Sandie Holguin, Sasha Pack, Antonio Cazorla, Juan Pan Montojo, Ismael Saz and Jesus Cruz. I decided to send each chapter to at least two experts, to make sure I had included all the important recent scholarship and hopefully to spot any errors or oversights. Their feedback was invaluable and unquestionably made this a better book. Of course, any remaining errors or oversights are my own responsibility.

More broadly, I want to thank my students, both undergraduate and graduate, who have kept me reading, discussing and rethinking my narrative of Spanish history over the last 25 years. In the summer of 2015, my undergraduate Global Seminar students in Madrid agreed to be guinea pigs by reading the first draft of the book for our History of Modern Spain course, and their responses were very helpful in making final revisions. The Ph.D. students who have worked with me over the years have taught me as much as I taught them, educating me about new areas of research, challenging old assumptions and keeping me engaged in the field.

---

My colleagues in the UCSD History department have always been supportive and encouraging, making it possible to write this book while serving as department chair. Outside the department, members of the Southwestern Symposium of Spanish history and the Association for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies have provided helpful feedback and a community of scholars for those of us dedicated to Spanish history in the US. It saddens me deeply that three of our community's most eminent scholars, who were also dear colleagues and friends, Carolyn Boyd, Chris Schmidt-Nowara and my Ph.D. adviser, Edward Malefakis, have left us in the last year.

I am grateful to Wiley Blackwell and the series of editors who have kept my book moving along, despite changes and consolidations at the press, particularly Tessa Harvey, who recruited me and gave useful feedback on the first chapters, and Haze Humbert, who is carrying it to completion.

My final debt is to my children, Olivia and Lucas. My first book was finished the week Olivia was born, and the second book required bringing both kids to Spain for a year to complete the research. For this book, it is appropriate but bitter-sweet that I finished this project and packed them off to college all at once. Through it all, they have kept me balanced and grounded in the real world as they grew up into wonderful young adults.

# ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS

AAVV	<i>Asociaciones de Vecinos</i> : Neighborhood Associations
ACF	<i>Asociaciones de Cabezas de Familia</i> : Head of Household Associations, 1960s
AC	<i>Acción Católica</i> : Catholic Action
ACM	<i>Acción Católica de la Mujer</i> : Catholic Action for Women
AAC	<i>Asociaciones de Amas de Casa</i> : Homemaker Associations
ACNP	<i>Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas</i> : organization of Catholic intellectuals
<i>afrancesados</i>	supporters of Napoleon's rule in Spain
<i>africanista</i>	officer in the Army of Africa
<i>aliadófilos</i>	supporters of the Allies in the First World War
AMA	<i>Asociación de Mujeres Antifascistas</i>
AP	Alianza Popular: Conservative party, 1977–1989
AR	<i>Alianza Republicana (1926)</i> : Republican Alliance, led by Manuel Azaña
<i>ateneo</i>	cultural center
<i>ateneo libertario</i>	anarchist cultural center
<i>bienio</i>	two-year period, especially the first and second periods of the Second Republic
<i>braceros</i>	landless laborers
<i>caciques</i>	local political bosses
<i>caciquismo</i>	network of political bosses to control elections
<i>casa del pueblo</i>	Socialist workers' center
<i>Caudillo</i>	supreme leader, Franco
CEDA	<i>Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas</i> : Confederation of the Spanish Right, Second Republic
<i>Cenetista</i>	member of the CNT
CCOO	<i>Comisiones Obreras</i> : workers' commissions
CiU	<i>Convergència I Unió</i> Catalan nationalist coalition founded 1978
CNT	<i>Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores</i> : anarcho-syndicalist trade union movement
<i>Confederación Católica de Padres de Familia y Padres de Alumnos</i> :	Catholic federation of parents

<i>consumos</i>	<i>tax on food/basic items</i>
<i>Coordinación Democrática</i>	united opposition coalition (March 1976)
<i>Cortes</i>	parliament
<i>crispación</i>	tension or conflict
<i>curas obreros</i>	worker priests
DLR	<i>Derecha Liberal Republicana</i> : Conservative Republican party, Second Republic
EC	<i>Estat Català</i> : Catalan State, left wing Catalan nationalist party, 1923
<i>encasillado</i>	official list of candidates
<i>ensanche</i>	planned urban extension
ERC	<i>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</i> : left wing Catalan nationalist party (1931–)
<i>Estatuto Real</i>	1834 Moderate Charter
ETA	“Basque Country and Freedom”: armed Basque group (1959–2012)
<i>exaltados</i>	radical liberals in the 1820s
EC	European Community (1958–1993)
FAI	<i>Federación Anarquista Ibérica</i> (1927–): purist anarchist organization
<i>Falange Española y de las Jons</i>	Fascist party, 1933–37
FNTT	<i>Federación Nacional da Trabajadores de la Tierra</i> , 1930s, Socialist rural workers’ union
FRE	Spanish Regional Federation of the First International (1870–1881)
<i>Fuero de los Españoles</i>	Francoist regime “Bill of Rights,” 1945
<i>Fuero de Trabajo</i>	Labor Charter, 1938
<i>fueros</i>	special rights/privileges
<i>Generalitat</i>	Catalan governing body (1932–39, 1978–)
<i>germanófilo</i>	supporters of the Central Powers in the First World War
<i>hidalgos</i>	lesser nobility
HB	<i>Herri Batasuna</i> : Basque nationalist party affiliated with ETA (1978–2001)
HOAC	<i>Hermanidad Obrera de Acción Católica</i> : Catholic Action Workers’ Guild
<i>Indignados/15-M</i>	social movement for the 99 percent
IR	<i>Izquierda Republicana</i> : Republican Left, Second Republic
IU	<i>Izquierda Unida</i> : left-wing coalition of several groups, including PCE (1986–)
JDE	Junta Democrática de España: PCE-led opposition coalition (1974)
JOC	Juventud Obrera Católica: Catholic Workers’ Youth Organization

<b>Junta</b>	council or governing body
<b>juntas de defensa</b>	councils of junior officers post-First World War
<b>juntismo</b>	forming political action groups
<b>latifundia</b>	large estate
<b>liceo</b>	literary cultural center
<b>Lliga Regionalista</b>	Catalanist party (1901–1936)
<b>Mancomunidad</b>	Catalan administrative institution (1913)
<b>Mauristas</b>	supporters of Antonio Maura's sector of the Conservative party
<b>minifundia</b>	tiny plots of land
<b>ML</b>	<i>Mujeres Libres</i> : anarchist women's organization
<b>Movimiento</b>	the unified political organization of the Nationalists formed in 1937
<b>ORT</b>	<i>Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores</i> : Revolutionary Organization of Workers
<b>OSE</b>	<i>Organización Sindical Española</i> : Francoist "vertical" trade union organization
<b>PCE</b>	<i>Partido Comunista de España</i> : Spanish Communist Party
<b>Platajunta</b>	Unified democratic opposition, March 1976
<b>PCD</b>	<i>Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática</i> : PSOE-led opposition coalition (1975)
<b>PNV</b>	<i>Partido Nacional Vasco</i> : Basque Nationalist party (1895–)
<b>POUM</b>	<i>Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista</i> : dissident communist party 1930s
<b>PP</b>	<i>Partido Popular</i> : the renamed AP after 1989
<b>PRRS</b>	<i>Partido Republicana Radical Socialista</i> : Radical Socialist Party, Second Republic
<b>pistolerismo</b>	street gun-battles, especially post-First World War
<b>pueblo</b>	the "people"
<b>pronunciamiento</b>	military-led change of government
<b>PSOE</b>	<i>Partido Socialista de Obreros Españoles</i> : Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (1879–)
<b>PSUC</b>	Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya: Communist party of Catalonia (1936–1997)
<b>PTE</b>	<i>Partido de Trabajadores Españoles</i> : Spanish Workers' Party
<b>Regulares</b>	Moroccan troops on the Nationalist side
<b>renaixença</b>	Catalan cultural renaissance, nineteenth century
<b>reparto</b>	redistribution of land
<b>Requetés</b>	Carlist militia, Civil War
<b>señorio</b>	feudal fief
<b>Sexenio</b>	six-year period, 1868–1874
<b>SEU</b>	<i>Sindicato de Estudiantes Españoles</i> : Francoist Student association
<b>SF</b>	<i>Sección Femenina</i> : Female Section of the <i>Movimiento</i>
<b>Somatén</b>	employer-funded paramilitary units, supported by Primo regime

---

<i>tertulia</i>	discussion group
<i>turno pacífico</i>	peaceful alternation of Liberal and Conservative parties, 1876–1923
<i>trienio</i>	three-year period, especially the liberal period, 1820–1823
UCD	<i>Unión del Centro Democrático</i> : party of Adolfo Suárez, 1977–83
UGT	<i>Unión General de Trabajadores</i> : Trade union movement linked to the PSOE
UP	<i>Unión Patriótica</i> : Primo regime official party
UR	<i>Unión Republicana</i> : Republican Union, Second Republic
<i>vecinos</i>	residents linked by ties of geography and neighborliness
<i>zarzuela</i>	Spanish musical theater

# POLITICAL CHRONOLOGY OF SPANISH HISTORY, 1808–2016

- 1808–1814:** Peninsular war and Constitution of 1812
- 1814–1833:** Restoration of Absolutist Monarchy under Ferdinand VII
  - 1820–1823:** Liberal *Trienio* and Constitution of 1812
  - 1823–1833:** Restoration of Absolutism
  - 1824:** Latin American independence finalized
- 1833–1868:** Liberal Constitutional Monarchy of Isabel II
  - 1833–1839:** First Carlist War
  - 1833–1840:** Regency of Maria Cristina
  - 1844–1854:** Moderate governments
  - 1840–1843, 1854–1856:** Progressive governments
- 1868–1874:** the *Sexenio*
  - 1869–1873:** Democratic monarchy (Amadeo I, 1870–73)
  - 1873–1874:** First Republic
  - 1868–1878:** Ten Years' War with Cuba
  - 1873–1876:** Second (major) Carlist War
- 1874–1923:** Restoration of Constitutional Monarchy
  - 1875–1885:** King Alfonso XII
  - 1885–1902:** Regency of Maria Cristina
  - 1895–1898:** Cuban rebellion and independence
  - 1898:** War with US
  - 1902–1931:** King Alfonso XIII
- 1923–1929:** Primo de Rivera dictatorship
- 1929–1931:** End of monarchy
- 1931–1936:** Second Republic
  - 1931–1933:** First *Bienio*
  - 1933–1936:** Second *Bienio*
  - 1936:** Popular Front
- 1936–1939:** Civil War
- 1939–1976:** Franco dictatorship
  - 1975:** death of Franco

**1976–1978:** Transition to Democracy

**1977:** first elections

**1978:** Constitution

**1978–:** Democratic monarchy under Juan Carlos I

**February 1981:** Attempted coup

**1982–1996:** the PSOE era

**1986:** Joined EC

**1996–2004:** PP government

**2004–2011:** PSOE government

**2014:** Coronation of King Felipe

— PART I —

1808–1868: THE ERA  
OF THE LIBERAL REVOLUTION

# SPAIN IN THE “AGE OF REVOLUTIONS”

To begin the history of modern Spain in 1808 is, as is always the case in periodization, a somewhat arbitrary decision. In the traditional “failure” model of modern Spain, 1808 marked the moment when the tottering old regime, including its vast but poorly managed empire, was delivered the death blow by the invasion of Napoleon’s armies. In this version, because liberal ideas were imported and imposed from the outside, the revolutionary era was more ephemeral in its long-term impact, the opening act in an ongoing struggle between “two Spains,” in which the “modern” sector was always the weaker. In the revisionist version, 1808 was still a crucial turning point, the beginning of a liberal and national revolution that opened Spain’s modern era and demonstrated parity with what was happening in the rest of western Europe.

The year of 1808 serves both narratives because it symbolizes the inauguration of the “triple crisis” of the old regime, including the dynastic crisis sparked by the abdication of the Bourbon king and his heir, the sovereign crisis generated by the invasion of French troops and the constitutional crisis produced by the weakened legitimacy of the Spanish monarchy.<sup>1</sup> The resistance against the French, which led to the convocation in 1810 of a constitutional parliament, or *Cortes*, that claimed its legitimacy from the sovereignty of the nation, unleashed Spain’s version of the political revolution that came to define the period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Even though the “age of revolutions” was followed by an absolutist restoration in 1814, whose founding principle was to return to the status quo ante “as if such things had never happened,” in the words of the new King Ferdinand VII’s decree, there was no going back to the eighteenth-century Spanish monarchy. Thus, the issues raised in this period opened a new political era that defined the parameters of debate and struggle for the next century and a half.

While 1808 marks a convenient opening act of the “modern” era in Spain (similar to 1789 for France), this political turning point was embedded in a longer transitional period, from the 1780s to the 1820s, marked by long-term structural changes and short-term economic crisis. At the global level, this transition culminated in radical changes in forms of government and regulation of the economy, as well as dramatic shifts in the global distribution of power. At the same time, there

were significant continuities across an old regime that was more dynamic than once believed, and an emerging liberal order that took root slowly and unevenly.<sup>2</sup>

In the failure narrative, Spain was thought to be left behind during this era of global transformation, but the revisionist scholarship has painted a more dynamic portrait of an economy and society that embarked on a trajectory of gradual growth and change in the late eighteenth century that continued into the twentieth century.<sup>3</sup>

As a jumping-off point for a book on modern Spain, this chapter will provide a snapshot of the early nineteenth century, from Spain's position in the global order to its economic and social structure, and ending with the political crisis of 1808–1814 that marked the, admittedly porous, boundary between eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The metaphor of a "snapshot" taken from a moving train communicates better than a more static word like "baseline" a non-linear transition from the old regime to the modern era.

## Spain in Europe and the World, 1780s–1820

At the European center of the transitional and tumultuous period of the "age of revolutions" were the major empires of the era, especially the Spanish, French and British, which came into intensifying conflict around an increasingly global network of trade, commerce and consumption.<sup>4</sup> (See Map I.) All the imperial governments responded to this competition with reforms aimed to better capture and channel profits and revenues for their benefit.<sup>5</sup> The need for larger and more secure income streams was in turn driven by the increased military expenditure of overseas empires engaged in global warfare. But such reforms also generated colonial revolts, particularly in the Atlantic empires, which required yet more military expenditure to suppress. The fiscal crisis that afflicted all the major empires also encouraged risky political reforms, most famously the French monarch's summoning of the representative institution, the Estates General, which launched the iconic French revolution.

In contrast to the classic Marxist narrative that interpreted this economic and political crisis as the result of an industrial and bourgeois class revolution that set in motion the unraveling of old-regime Europe in the late eighteenth century, recent scholarship downplays the impact of the industrial revolution in the eighteenth-century political crisis. Scholars now accept that the picture of a European industrial transformation as well under way by the early nineteenth century was greatly exaggerated. Thus, in 1840, 45 percent of the world's industrial production came from Britain, with a second industrial node emerging in Belgium only after the 1830s.<sup>6</sup> From this perspective, there is no failed industrial or bourgeois revolution to explain for the Spanish case.

Apart from the British exception, industrialization trajectories in the rest of Europe only began to diverge dramatically in the second half of the nineteenth century. Even then, national industrialization statistics would still be misleading. That is, most of the nineteenth century continental industrialization would be concentrated in a core area of central Europe that encompassed regions of various countries, including northern Italy and northern France, western Germany and



**Map I** The Spanish Empire, 1800

Belgium, all of which shared the favorable conditions of rich coal deposits, navigable rivers, dense population and fertile land. Furthermore, industrialization was not the only path to economic growth and greater prosperity. Thus, some of the most "successful" European economies based their growth on agriculture and commerce well into the twentieth century, as was the case with the Netherlands and the rest of France. Even in England, the majority of adult workers in the mid-nineteenth century still worked in the agricultural sector, while less than 5 percent worked in factories.

Like industrialization, urbanization also proceeded gradually, at least until the 1870s. Thus, the basic patterns of spatial organization of cities had not changed much from the outset of the sixteenth-century expansion to the 1780s. During this period, the global urban population grew slowly, from 9 percent in 1600 to 12 percent in 1800, a percentage that did not increase significantly until after the 1870s. While capital cities like London, Paris and Berlin doubled in size in the first half of the century, most continental Europeans, including Spaniards, lived in small towns and villages.<sup>7</sup> The point is that the impact of urbanization, like industrialization, was both uneven and fairly limited in scope outside of England in the early nineteenth century.

If most Europeans lived and worked in an agrarian economy and society in the early nineteenth century, there was also tremendous variety within this sector. One model was France, with a majority of commercial family farms and a prosperous peasant class. Another structure dominated in the eastern European countries like Poland and Russia, in which most farmland was divided into huge aristocratic estates worked by serf labor, often with low productivity. A third agrarian reality was small subsistence farming, in which poor peasants still operated on the margins of the commercial economy. In many of the European countries, but especially Spain, this variety of agrarian structures co-existed within their national borders, shaped by landowning patterns, connection to markets, soil fertility and topography, and population density. Thus, just as there was no monolithic transformation to an industrial and urban society, there was no uniform "traditional" agrarian society waiting to be transformed.

What *was* happening across the globe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was a series of "industrious revolutions," powered by rising consumer demand, which reorganized both production and consumption and increased trade as well as specialization, including in the form of the slave plantations of the Caribbean and North America.<sup>8</sup> In the Atlantic world of the Spanish, French and British empires, merchants created links between goods and consumers, bringing tea, coffee, sugar and tobacco from the Americas to European households. In Spain, a burgeoning calico industry in Catalonia fed the fashion trends of well-heeled consumers across the empire.<sup>9</sup> These industrious revolutions produced great wealth, but also dramatic inequalities, within societies and between them. On the global level this inequality inaugurated the "great divergence" in wealth, life expectancy and productivity between western Europe and the rest of the world that became one of the defining themes of the nineteenth century.<sup>10</sup>

At the same time, the hierarchies within Europe, between core and periphery, were also shifting, but in the eighteenth-century economy Spain's future as a European power was still hard to predict. Key to Spain's potential success in the

shifting global economy was building a more effective trading and commercial relationship with its American colonies. The successful reconstitution of empires to meet the challenges of the global economy would be a crucial factor in determining which states emerged from the crisis of the late eighteenth century as great powers in the nineteenth century. By 1820, the future trajectory of European imperialism was not yet clear. In some cases, reconstitution involved losing some colonies and gaining others, as with Britain and France, while Spain took the less advantageous route of colonial contraction (between 1810 and 1825 it lost continental America) and reorganization of its remaining colonies in the Antilles and Philippines.<sup>11</sup>

Still, Spain's colonial contraction was not an inevitable outcome of the eighteenth-century crisis. Thus, the eighteenth-century Spanish monarchy was making a valiant and at least partially successful attempt, with the so-called "Bourbon reforms," to transform itself from a "conquest" empire into an effective commercial empire, an effort which was not by any means destined for failure and dissolution.<sup>12</sup> Although it was true that Spain's position as the old empire put it in the defensive position of having to scramble to adapt to the rapidly evolving commercial and imperial dynamics, the image of a sclerotic and desiccated Spanish empire that was waiting for one straw for the entire edifice to come tumbling down has been convincingly challenged. Transatlantic loyalty to the Spanish monarchy remained strong throughout the Napoleonic period, even as creole and metropolitan elites tried to negotiate a common solution to the crisis of imperial sovereignty. The loss of the American colonies emerged from what one scholar calls a "chain of disequilibria," not the inherent weakness of the empire or the challenge of nationalist movements.<sup>13</sup> Scholars disagree as to the point of no return in American independence, but few would identify 1808 as that moment.

Just as important for Spain's position in the short term was the economic crisis of the Napoleonic era, but the negative effects were also not as uniquely devastating to Spain as once believed. Development was also interrupted in France, and the German lands suffered from French occupation and a dramatic drop in trade. For Spain, the traditional estimate of a 75 percent decline in Spanish trade between 1792 and 1827 has now been revised, leading to a more optimistic reading.<sup>14</sup> While it is true that certain sectors declined, the impact was uneven and recovery and adaptation was relatively quick. In particular, the Atlantic port of Cádiz, which had dominated the Indies trade in the eighteenth century, experienced a virtual economic collapse from which it never fully recovered. But in other cases, goods that had been exported to the Indies quickly found other markets, like Castilian wheat and iron, which went to Cuba, and Catalan textiles, which shifted to peninsular markets and then Cuba.<sup>15</sup> The bottom line is that existing evidence does not support the claim that the world crisis of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries propelled Spain to permanent periphery status in the nineteenth-century world.

### **A Snapshot of the Economy: Gradual Growth**

From the perspective of European economic diversity in the early nineteenth century, economic historians have stopped asking the ahistorical question of why Spain failed to follow the English path during this period, and turned their attention to

what did happen and why. The most convincing "snapshot" of the Spanish economy in the early nineteenth century paints a picture of gradual economic and social change and sustained growth that began in the latter decades of the eighteenth century and continued through the nineteenth, propelled by demographic growth, growing commercialization and specialization, and regional trading networks. Thus, commercialized agriculture developed in the Mediterranean regions, a textile industry took shape in Catalonia and an emerging real estate market opened up more land for exploitation. At the same time, most of these developments remained local and regional in scope and impact, with a clear contrast between a more dynamic periphery and a slower growing center. The result was an uneven and unintegrated economic landscape that didn't add up to a dynamic or national "Spanish" economy in the early nineteenth century.

An analysis of the peninsular economy in the 1770s makes clear that the natural conditions for any sort of English-style agricultural or industrial "take-off" were highly unfavorable. Without arguing for a geographical determinism that leaves no room for human agency, Spain had fewer of the raw conditions that fueled growth in the more successful economies. First, the peninsula was a large expanse of territory with geographical impediments to easy communication of goods and people. In contrast to the small island nation of England, which was also well-connected by rivers, Spain had few navigable rivers to connect its hinterland with the coasts, and was divided by forbidding mountainous ranges, including the one that separated the peninsula from the rest of continental Europe. (See Map II.) It was also one of the most sparsely populated of the European countries, making it even more costly to construct market networks. Equally important, Spain had only small amounts of the coal and iron that proliferated in what would be the core industrial area of Europe. The combination of poor-quality coal and iron and expensive transport meant that, in the early nineteenth century it was cheaper to import British coal to Catalonia than to extract and transport Spanish coal.

In terms of Spanish agriculture, unfavorable natural conditions deserve much of the blame for yields and productivity that were among the lowest in western Europe. Thus, Spain had the lowest rainfall in western Europe, and generally poor soil which was not well-suited to growing crops. These conditions also meant that Spanish agriculture could not take advantage of the technological innovations that had been so successful in increasing yields in England, like the ox-drawn plow.

Beyond natural conditions, there were also historical and political reasons for the unfavorable context for an agricultural revolution. In the English case, the enclosure movement of the late eighteenth century secured a regime of private property at the same time that it freed up a displaced rural workforce for industrialization. In Spain, most land was still tied up in complex ownership relationships that made private investment difficult.<sup>16</sup> Thus, two-thirds of the land surface of Spain was owned either by the Church or held in entail by noble families, which meant that it could not be bought or sold. Furthermore, a good chunk of the rest was common land, owned by the Crown or by cities and towns, either used collectively or leased out to tenants. Even if part of this land was cultivated, tenants had to pay stiff taxes or even seigneurial dues to the owners. Because so much land was tied up in *manos muertas*, literally dead hands, prices for the remaining land available for sale were driven up by the scarcity. As a result, less than 25 percent of the arable land in Spain was under cultivation in 1815.



**Map II** Terrain and Regions, 1800

Adding another layer to the obstacles to agricultural improvement was the seigneurial regime, which divided parts of the kingdom into private fiefdoms, although much more unevenly than in classic feudal societies like France. While seigneurialism was abolished in France during the Revolution, securing property rights for a large number of peasant proprietors, in Spain the seigneurial regime was abolished briefly in 1812–14 and again in 1820, but it was not permanently dismantled until the 1840s. Thus, in 1800, there were over 13,000 intact *señoríos* in Spain, which covered about two-thirds of the territory. About half of the farming population were subjected to the jurisdictional rule of a *señorío*, which in some cases meant that the noble lord had rights to everything from certain services, to taxes and rents, and he served as mayor, judge and local administrator.

One final disincentive to invest in farmland were the traditional privileges maintained by the powerful sheep grazing lobby, the *Mesta*. From the middle ages, the graziers had maintained the privilege of migrating their sheep from summers in the mountains of Old Castile and León to winters in the plains of Extremadura and Andalucía. In 1800 an estimated five million sheep had rights to pass through any properties in their path on their 550- to 900-kilometer journey, and they regularly disrupted farms and trampled crops.<sup>17</sup> The *Mesta's* so-called right of

possession had originated when wool was the center of the Castilian economy, but even after agriculture had surpassed it in importance, the lobby remained powerful enough to maintain its privileges until 1836, when it was abolished as part of the liberal reforms to create more secure private property.

## Uneven Regional Development: Center/Periphery Divide

While all of these natural and manmade conditions meant that dramatic economic transformation was an unlikely scenario, a more fine-grained regional analysis reveals an evolving rather than a stagnant economy and society, with dynamic nodes located particularly on the periphery. The divergence between a more dynamic periphery and a more slowly growing center began in the eighteenth century, when almost all of the important early modern cities of the interior, except Madrid and Zaragoza, declined.<sup>18</sup> Thus, although the total urban population in Spain remained stable from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, peripheral cities like Barcelona, Málaga, Valencia and Santander were expanding, as was the total percentage of the population living in the periphery.<sup>19</sup>

The most dynamic region was Catalonia, where commercial activity from the 1730s deepened into regional economic growth from the 1750s, with investment in commercial agriculture and manufacturing, linked to American silver mining and foreign trade.<sup>20</sup> At the center of this economy was Barcelona, which grew from 30,000 inhabitants in 1717 to 100,000 in 1800. During this period, Barcelona became the most important Spanish Mediterranean port, second only to Cádiz in the volume and value of trade, which quadrupled between 1760 and 1792. While some of this trade involved re-exporting European goods, 90 percent of the Barcelona exports in the 1790s were Spanish goods, about half of them manufactures, especially textiles, hats and paper. By this point there were almost 100 textile-manufacturing enterprises in Barcelona, including spinning factories and calico printing, with mechanization in the spinning sector from the 1790s.<sup>21</sup> The rest of the exports came from Catalonia's commercial agriculture sector, including wine and brandy, as well as its fishing industry.

### The Mediterranean Regional Network

But the Catalan economy was also integrated into a broader regional network that encompassed the Mediterranean coast of Valencia, Alicante, Murcia and Eastern Andalucía, anchored by the port cities of Valencia, Alicante, Cartagena and Málaga. This network coalesced in the early eighteenth century and became increasingly vibrant as the century progressed.<sup>22</sup> In fact, most of Barcelona's trade was carried out along this Mediterranean trade route, with a relatively small percentage destined for the Americas. The second important node in this network was Valencia, which developed a thriving commercial agriculture in citrus and rice from the middle of the eighteenth century, as well as a silk textile industry. Further down the coast, Alicante and Cartagena became entrepôt ports for the Madrid market, trading Valencian rice for Castilian wheat, and Málaga produced wine and raisins, doubling its exports between the 1740s and the 1780s. All of these coastal cities also

developed inland trading routes, from Valencia to Andalucía, Málaga to Granada and Alicante to Madrid, which were intensified in response to the Napoleonic blockade and the disruption in the American markets. While pieces of this Mediterranean trading system certainly suffered from these economic crises, by the 1820s, recovery was under way, fueled by the rapidly growing sugar and slave economy in Cuba as well as a reorientation towards the peninsular market.

The agricultural portion of this regional dynamism was at least partly enabled by land tenure arrangements specific to the region. In Catalonia, many prosperous peasant farmers benefitted from a practice of *emphyteusis*, which gave them inherited rights to farm, even without ownership. And in Valencia, there were fewer forms of interference with private property, especially the rights of the Crown and the towns. While land ownership was not widespread, wealthy farmers who rented land from noble or Church owners had favorable leases that encouraged investment in irrigation and intensive farming for the specialized crops that would define the region's agriculture. In 1785, the Crown strengthened the leaseholders' position with a decree that a leaseholder could only be evicted if the owner wanted to farm himself. While old-regime privileges like entail and tax exemptions still disadvantaged non-noble farmers, when the liberal land sales began in the 1830s, these farmers had accumulated sufficient capital to buy the land they worked, while few of the noble seigneurs were able to convert their privileges into ownership. The result was a growing culture of "agrarian individualism" even within the old-regime constraints.<sup>23</sup> The commercialized and specialized agriculture that developed in this context illustrates the point about the heterogeneity of the Spanish economy as well as the evolving dynamism of specific sectors.

### The North Atlantic Regional Network

The second and smaller peripheral regional network encompassed the northern Atlantic coast from the Basque provinces to Galicia. Although this network did not reach its peak until railways facilitated transport in the second half of the nineteenth century, from the mid-eighteenth century the pieces of a regional commercial economy founded on small-scale commercial agriculture and mining began to come together. Until that point, the northern provinces of Galicia, Asturias and Santander had remained fairly isolated behind mountain ranges, with local and mostly self-sufficient small farms. With a landholding pattern very different from the Mediterranean coast, there were a large number of peasant proprietors but with small plots and less than 25 percent landless laborers. There was still variation within this general framework of small peasant-owned farms. For example, there was a predominance of even smaller plots, or *minifundia*, in Galicia, as a result of the inheritance law that required division of the property among all children. In this context, the hand-made linen industry provided extra income for families whose plots could not sustain a subsistence agriculture. On the other hand, the Basque provinces' culture of primogeniture kept family farms intact over the generations, while extra employment was available in the iron industry. Nevertheless, the common denominator of small plots meant that the rising population of the eighteenth century pushed the limits of a subsistence economy well before the 1830s.

The first node of this regional economic network was Bilbao, where a charcoal and water-powered iron industry was exporting iron in addition to Castilian wool to other Spanish ports as well as to England from the early eighteenth century. The iron industry employed several thousand people, who worked mining the ore, transporting it to the coast, refining it and loading it on ships. Then, from the 1750s, the highway linking Santander to Castile further opened the wheat market from the interior and encouraged regional specialization of products, from nuts to fruits. The road from the Asturian coal mines to the port of Gijón in the 1780s enhanced the east–west trade, making it feasible to ship Asturian coal to the Basque iron foundries. And, when the Crown revoked Cádiz's monopoly on the colonial trade in 1778, Santander and La Coruña (Galicia) became *entrepôt* ports for goods from Europe and the Basque provinces to America, although they remained much smaller than the Mediterranean ports.<sup>24</sup>

While the Napoleonic blockade and loss of the protected colonial market certainly decimated the *entrepôt* trade and induced a crisis in specific exports like Asturian coal and Basque iron, once again the network as a whole recovered and adapted relatively quickly.<sup>25</sup> Thus, in Galicia the decline of hand-made linens was replaced by cattle export and tanning industries, and Santander's port facilities began to export flour made from Castilian wheat in exchange for Cuban sugar. Slower to recover were Asturian coal mining and Basque iron-making, which had to wait for the railroads in the 1840s and 1850s, but by the second half of the nineteenth century these industries had become the vibrant core of a regional network more on par with its Mediterranean counterpart.

Together, these two peripheral regional networks generated a significant proportion of the economic growth and dynamism in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century peninsula. The peripheral economies were hubs of commercial investment, shipping, specialization and mining and manufacturing, fitting the definition of dynamic "industrious" economies. Blessed with favorable conditions, both geographical and historical, these networks were on an upward trajectory that began in the early to mid-eighteenth century and continued through the nineteenth, with a relatively brief hiatus in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Geographically, the access to ports and water transport, with coal and iron located in reasonable proximity to them, provided a huge advantage. In terms of historical context, the relatively high percentage of peasant owners or long-term tenants created more incentives to specialize for a market made accessible by water transport. At the same time, the expense of overland transport and the complex system of internal tariffs kept these dynamic nodes relatively autonomous, separate from each other and the rest of Spain until the last decades of the nineteenth century.

### **Regional Networks of the Center**

In contrast to the periphery, the vast hinterland of Castile, León, Extremadura, la Mancha and inland or western Andalucía, which constituted the other two regional networks, had fewer advantages for economic development, since the demographic collapse of the late sixteenth century devastated the vibrant medieval economy. Sustained mainly by the large consumer market of the capital,

Madrid, the expense of overland transport and the declining and dispersed interior population hindered trading networks and limited specialization. The region mostly produced basic crops, especially wheat but also olive oil and sherry further south in Andalucía. As the other interior cities declined or stagnated, Madrid grew 400 percent from 1700 to 1900, with trading routes fanning out like spokes absorbing products from the surrounding countryside and as far away as Old Castile and Andalucía. In the eighteenth century, much of this trade was controlled by complex regulations and subsidized purchases meant to guarantee the provisioning of the capital, but by the end of the century the trend was towards reliance on market mechanisms with state intervention only in food crises. However, it was not until the construction of the railroads that the internal regional market could flourish, with grain transported cheaply out to the coast as well as in to Madrid.

Another more historical disadvantage to economic development in this part of the country were the distinct landholding and settlement patterns. In contrast to the small peasant properties of the north or the secure tenant leases of the Mediterranean, the center and south of the peninsula was divided into often huge estates. South of a line running from Salamanca to Albacete, only an average of 8 percent of peasants (and as low as 5 percent in some parts) owned their land, while up to 75 percent of the farming population were landless laborers.<sup>26</sup> On the other end of the hierarchy, a small number of often absentee nobles owned huge estates, or *latifundia*, a social and economic structure that dated from the medieval reconquest. In some cases, the Church owned the land—as much as 15–20 percent in Castile. Another chunk of land belonged to municipalities, sometimes maintained as common land and sometimes rented out to provide income for the township. In its efforts to assert its authority over such a vast territory that had been mostly occupied by Moors, the Crown bestowed huge tracts of land to nobles, military orders and the Church to administer.<sup>27</sup> The resulting unequal social structure limited consumer demand and purchasing power, thus compounding the difficulties of building a dynamic market.

While there is no question that all these conditions created an interior economy that was less dynamic than the periphery, it is also important not to paint an exaggerated picture of stagnation.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the fact that this agricultural economy could supply a dynamic Madrid population, in addition to sending increasing amounts of wheat to the periphery over the course of the nineteenth century, indicates a significant level of commercialization and economic growth. The reality of cheap and abundant labor and the poor quality of the soil did not encourage mechanization or capital-intensive farming, with or without equitable land ownership. Thus, even in the northwest, where peasant proprietorship or secure tenancy was higher, crops and farming methods were not significantly different from the *latifundia*-dominated south.

Nevertheless, the expansion of land under cultivation suggests responsiveness to demand and at least some viable land market. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Crown was selling some of its own land and had begun a process of expropriating Church land that led to a one-sixth reduction in ecclesiastical property by 1808. Finally, in 1798 the Crown permitted the sale of some entailed estates, allowing some noble families to sell off pieces of land.

The point is, the process of selling, enclosing and cultivating more land to expand production, which will be the hallmark of Spanish agriculture in the nineteenth century, was already under way before the massive property transfers of the 1830s–1860s.

## Demography: A Growth Pattern

The best evidence for a gradual growth model was the fact that economic growth kept pace with steady population growth. Thus, the population maintained an upward trajectory from the early eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries, stimulating the economy rather than overwhelming it. After the demographic crisis of the late sixteenth to the early seventeenth centuries, the population grew by 50 percent over the course of the eighteenth century, finally reaching sixteenth-century levels in the 1770s. Between the two censuses of 1797 and 1833, the total population continued to grow, from 10.5 million to 12.3 million, despite the crisis of the Napoleonic years. As a result of this crisis, Spain's population growth was weakest during this first third of the century, then picked up steam, adding another 3 million before the 1857 census. Although this growth rate was slower than that of Britain, which doubled its population in the first half of the century, it was on par with that of France, the German states and Italy.

As important as the growth itself was the transition toward a "modern" demographic pattern of permanent growth, replacing the old-regime pattern of growth spikes followed by demographic catastrophes. Across Europe, it was at some point in the nineteenth century that improved agricultural productivity, better commercial networks and industrialization allowed most societies to break the population boom and bust cycle. However, population growth was still regularly interrupted by epidemics and malnutrition, and life expectancy, especially among infants, didn't begin to rise significantly until the 1870s. Thus, millions died in cholera epidemics, and major hungers could still take a toll, most notably, of course, the Irish famine. Equally important, life expectancy for the poor was significantly lower than for the wealthy, with a 12-year differential in mid-century Germany, for example.

If the demographic transition was slower and more gradual across Europe, Spain still ranked near the bottom of most indicators. Thus, Spain experienced deadly outbreaks of cholera into the 1880s and episodes of food crisis into the 1870s, while life expectancy and other health indicators were on the low end of the European spectrum, worse only in Russia and parts of eastern Europe. Although women suffered from epidemics as well, childbirth was still their highest cause of death into the late nineteenth century. At the same time, however, Spaniards themselves lived better than they had a century earlier, and even the poorest landless laborers lived longer in the mid-nineteenth century than in the mid-eighteenth century. Overall, then, the evidence supports the picture of a demographic transition under way, with steady population growth but more slowly improving indicators of standard of living.

## Characteristics of the Population: Occupation and Social Structure

Who were these people and what did they do? Given the portrait of a growing but segmented and diverse economic structure, the characteristics of the population also varied considerably, although the common denominator was a heavily rural and agrarian economy with a traditional corporate social structure.<sup>29</sup> In global terms, about 70 percent of the population worked in agriculture in 1797, while another 7 percent were employed in other occupations, including artisan and industrial manufacture and domestic service for women. Of the 4 million peasants with land tenure, 2.3 million were proprietors and 1.77 were renters, while almost the same number—3.7 million—were landless laborers. Peasant landowners were further divided between those with enough land to hire laborers, those who didn't usually hire but who produced a surplus that supported a family, and those whose property was insufficient to support their family and had to supplement their income through working as a laborer on larger farms.

For all peasant households, the family was the foundational corporate unit in which men, women and children defined their roles. All members of the household worked, in a "family economy" that depended on the contributions of all its members. Women and children performed particular farming tasks, such as olive harvesting, weeding or animal slaughter, and sometimes engaged in domestic production, like spinning, bobbin making and linen weaving. In addition, many peasant men and women engaged in part time artisan labor for their own consumption, including bread baking, food preservation, leather curing for bags and sandals and cloth making for family clothes. Especially in the weakly developed market of the interior agrarian economy, many of these rural households mixed commercial and subsistence strategies.

Under the common umbrella of an agrarian society, the structure of peasant life varied significantly, depending on landholding patterns. Thus, in the northern regions with smaller farms and larger peasant ownership, settlement tended to be in small villages organized around the family homestead. There were few great nobles, or *grandees*, living in this area but a large number of lesser nobles, or *hidalgos*. Rooted in the early phases of the reconquest when entire villages attained universal nobility, in parts of Asturias, the Basque Country and Navarre, as much as 90 percent of the population claimed this status. In the provinces just south, such as León, Burgos, Alava and Rioja, between 20 and 40 percent of the population were *hidalgo* families. However, there could be significant variation even within a small territory, as illustrated in the classic study of Navarre at the start of the nineteenth century.<sup>30</sup> On the one hand was the Montaña, which contained 700 individual settlements, each with an average of 200 residents, many of them *hidalgos*. On the other hand was the dry flat territory of the Ribera, divided into large landholdings worked by landless laborers, who lived in one of 25 agro-towns of between 1,000 and 3,000 residents. This latter pattern of settlement was the dominant one in the south of the peninsula, where these laborers lived in barracks and worked seasonally, employed at less than subsistence wages and surviving on a basic diet of thin gazpacho and bread.

In general, the non-agricultural population was concentrated in the larger market towns and cities. At the bottom of the urban hierarchy were those who lived on charity, often unskilled workers' families who had lost a wage earner, or those who were mentally or physically ill. Single or widowed women were especially likely to fall into destitution (the 1860 census estimated that two-thirds of resident beggars were female). The urban working poor, both male and female, performed a variety of jobs, few of which were unique to the old-regime economy. Poor women worked as laundresses, seamstresses, wet nurses and domestic servants, a category that would increase dramatically in the first half of the nineteenth century. There were also several thousand female factory workers, mostly textile workers in Barcelona and tobacco workers in the state factories established from the end of the eighteenth century in Madrid, Seville, Gijón and other cities. About half of textile workers were men, but the tobacco factories were almost uniquely female factory environments, as immortalized in Bizet's opera, *Carmen*. Outside of Barcelona, most of the textile workers in the linen and silk industries operated hand-loom in their homes, in a "putting out" system run by merchant suppliers, as was the case in Valencia. Another category of urban worker were the port workers, in addition to various unskilled laborers in the building trades and artisan apprentices and journeymen who worked for master shoemakers, bakers, tailors and carpenters, even though the guild system was in decline from the late eighteenth century. The poorest were also most likely to be recruited as foot soldiers in the royal army, which had a reputation for collecting the dregs of society and providing dreadful conditions.

Above the working poor were the middling class of master artisans, public administrators, teachers and the liberal professions, although, with the exception of artisans, this class would not really expand until the 1830s–50s with the growth of the new liberal state, after which they filled expanding jobs in the public administration, education and media. Finally, there was a small class of wealthy commoners, which included merchants, industrialists, financiers, commercial farmers and high officials in the state, Church or army administration, most of whom lived either in the peripheral cities or in Madrid. The industrialists resided mainly in Barcelona, with the merchant and financial elites distributed between that city and the port cities of Valencia, Cádiz, Santander, Bilbao and Málaga. Once again, this was a fairly small group that only began to take shape as a new economic and political elite class after the 1830s and the abolition of the last of the old-regime privileges.

Until then, the elite stratum of society was largely comprised of the first two "estates," that is nobles and clergy, who were well-represented in the population, with about 4 percent in each category (compared with less than 3 percent total in pre-revolutionary France). In 1800, the ratio of regular clergy, which included monks, nuns and friars, to the general population was 1:160, while that of aristocrats was 1:12, and there were 1,300 titled noble families. Both clergy and nobles were exempt from direct taxes and enjoyed special privileges, such as access to high administrative posts and the upper military ranks, judgment by special courts, entailed estates and, for some, seigneurial jurisdiction and rents. These rights included rents for the land and for essential services, fees for butchers and bakers, the right to appoint officials in town and village councils, and sometimes

control over fishing or forestry. In addition to these rights, the Church collected a tithe, which may have constituted as much as half of the net agricultural product in the early nineteenth century.<sup>31</sup> In any case, 60 percent of all land belonged to the Church or the nobility in 1800, most of it tied up in entailed estates, even though most of the wealthy clergy and nobles lived in the cities and towns, not on their land. More present in ordinary peoples' lives were the 16,675 parish clergy, whose wealth, education and status varied widely, depending on the parish. The parish priests not only baptized the general population's children and sanctified their marriages but provided the only charity "safety net" in the old-regime society by caring for the poor.

While this top-heavy social structure would seem to support a picture of a stagnant and feudalized society, in fact this snapshot occludes the long-term decline in the economic and social power of the nobility and the Church even before the liberal revolution of the 1830s. In reality, the power of the nobility had been in decline relative to the Crown since the sixteenth century, but this period was a significant turning point. Even numerically, the proportion of nobles vis a vis the rest of the population had dropped to 1 : 34 by 1826. In addition, the historical authority that rested in Spain's urban centers already opened other pathways to wealth and privilege through municipal posts, which created partly autonomous local oligarchies not integrated into a feudal hierarchy. Finally, the revolutionary war itself provided avenues of advancement for soldiers, who were more likely to be promoted up the ranks, regardless of status. Regarding the Church, the Crown gained more power over Church administration with the Concordat of 1753 and undermined its wealth with the desamortization (expropriation and sale) campaign of 1798. By justifying that expropriation in the name of cultivating national wealth, the Crown was also subtly undermining the regime of inherited privilege, as it did when it lifted the ban against noble "labor" (1783), or when it ennobled businessmen and financiers.

Similarly, from the late eighteenth century enlightened thinkers had begun to defend the virtues of merit over privilege, as reflected in their critique of the Castiglione courtier ideal, an elite code of conduct which had applied only to the nobility and was intended to reinforce caste hierarchies. Instead, a new language of civility and urbanity was emerging, an etiquette that could theoretically be followed by all civilized men and women, although it did not appear in codified form until the first conduct manual in 1829.<sup>32</sup> Likewise, the transformation of the legal profession in the late eighteenth century witnessed a new ethos of professionalism and talent that displaced the older "nobles of the robe," who had been the core of the medieval and early modern profession. From the 1830s, these self-made lawyers would constitute an important chunk of the new liberal political elite.<sup>33</sup>

In addition to the titled nobility, the lower nobles, or *hidalgos*, constituted approximately 13 percent of the population. *Hidalgos* had traditionally been prevented from engaging in labor, but when the Crown lifted this ban in 1783, many of them filled the ranks of the middling class of artisans, public administrators, teachers and the liberal professions. Even several of the most eminent statesmen of the late eighteenth century, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Pedro Rodriguez, the Count of Campomanes and Pablo de Olavide, were born *hidalgos*. However, just as many *hidalgos* remained quite poor, especially in those areas of virtual "universal"

nobility, where privilege meant very little and work was a necessity. In these areas, old-regime privileges were eroding even more quickly.

This snapshot of Spanish society in the early nineteenth century confirms the two basic threads of diversity and gradual change. Thus, while on the one hand it was overwhelmingly agricultural and rural, the specific composition and settlement patterns of that agrarian population varied significantly across the peninsula. And while parts of this agrarian society seemed to be steeped in the immobile confines of the old-regime social order, old hierarchies and power structures were already eroding. In some regions nobles and wealthy clergy retained tremendous social and economic power, while in others a diffused nobility did little to maintain social hierarchy. Beyond the agrarian society new categories of people were also expanding beyond the artisan manufacturer of the early modern economy. From factory workers to industrialists, and port workers to merchants, the outlines of a more variegated social order were already visible.

## Culture and Community

Beyond the basic rhythms of work and survival, how did all these individuals interact with each other and the world around them? For most people, in Spain as elsewhere, their world was constituted by their local community. The combination of poor transportation links and geographical barriers limited physical mobility, while the low literacy rate—about 6 percent in 1797—limited virtual contact via the press as well as any imagined national community for the vast majority of the population. Thus, most cultural transmission was both oral and local, with differences in the urban and rural settings.

In urban settings during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a number of small public spheres emerged in the major towns and cities. Nurtured by a culture of sociability that relied both on physical public spaces like the *plaza mayor* and traditions like the discussion group, or *tertulia*, the mode of transmission was largely oral, the "dramatization of the word" through theatre, songs, images and rumors.<sup>34</sup> From the mid-eighteenth century, the larger towns and cities developed a café culture, where coffee and hot chocolate became the sociable drinks of choice for urban elites.<sup>35</sup> During the brief revolutionary period of 1808–14, these urban public spheres were enhanced with newspapers and broadsides as well as parades and ceremonies invented by local liberal governments to mobilize the populations, but they disappeared with the return of absolutist rule in 1814.

Much more important for the majority of the rural and urban population was the cultural role of the Church in everyday life, which will mark one of the strong continuities across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For many communities, the parish was the center of collective social and cultural, in addition to spiritual (or economic), life. Thus, attending mass was not only a private spiritual affair but a regular opportunity to meet one's neighbors, as well as a site for oral transmission of culture through the pulpit. In the wealthier parishes, masses were elaborate spectacles, as in the Cathedral in Seville, where multiple daily masses

employed a total staff of 234, including 23 musicians, 20 cantors, 19 chaplains, 36 choirboys and a master of ceremonies. For special festivals, like Holy Week or Corpus Christi, they organized sumptuous processions with tableaux of wood and flowers and live performers acting out the events. Beyond the major holidays, there were 90 annual holy days, not to mention weddings, funerals and baptisms. In addition, each community had unique local fiestas, usually linked to the patron saint of the town, and whether they involved some form of bull baiting, dancing or a community picnic, almost every celebration began with a mass. And, while there was a mixture of the profane and the sacred in many of these festivals, by the eighteenth century the Inquisition's efforts to root out popular "superstitions" had resulted in a more homogeneous and channeled religious cultural life. With the Church as the primary generator of collective leisure activity, it was the community institution par excellence of the old-regime society.

While to some degree this status continued through the nineteenth century, the Church's role also began to change in this transitional period. On the one hand, the emergence of other forms of community activities, from the increasingly elaborate bullfight spectacles to the popular militias and the café culture, would begin to undermine the Church's monopoly on cultural life. Increasing competition was also exacerbated by the weakening of the Church's own institutions, especially in poorer areas where the huge wealth gap was manifested in poorly educated or even non-existent priests. Thus, in 1797, there were already 3,000 parishes without priests, most of them in the rural south, resulting in a priest to parishioner ratio as high as 1:1700 (vs. 1:153 in parts of the north).<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, the Church's incorporation into the political struggle between absolutism and liberalism would begin to undermine its unifying role in community life. An important turning point in this process was the 1820–23 liberal interlude, after which the Church increasingly threw in its lot with the absolutists. Confirming this political fault line was the first instance of popular urban anti-clericalism, when crowds burned and sacked religious institutions and forcibly closed monasteries and friaries. After the 1820s, the Church was a primary target of an increasingly mobilized urban working population, all the way through the Civil War of the 1930s.

The evolving and uneven impact of the Church on community life in the early nineteenth century epitomizes the themes of diversity and gradual change. To return to the metaphor of a snapshot of a slowly moving train, the Spanish economy and society was in motion, not a timeless old-regime relic resisting the onset of the modern age. Propelled by a steadily growing population and a more dynamic periphery, the country embarked on a growth trajectory in the mid-eighteenth century that would continue into the nineteenth century. At the same time, the static hierarchies and belief structures of the old-regime society were also loosening, as the influence of aristocracy and clergy declined and the power of wealth was on the rise. However, change was uneven and localized, at least partly due to the weak connecting tissue that kept goods, people and ideas from flowing freely across the peninsula. As a result, there was no uniform or consolidated Spanish economy and society, just an interlinked web of small worlds within the boundaries of a state which was about to undergo a significant political transformation.

## Political Crisis, 1808–1814

In the midst of this slowly evolving society, Napoleon's military challenge opened an acute political crisis of legitimacy for the transatlantic Spanish monarchy, beginning with the coerced abdication of the Bourbon monarchy and the imposition of a new king, Napoleon's brother Joseph, in 1808–1809. The deeply dislocating impact of the Napoleonic wars was not unique to Spain. It has even been argued that the transforming concept of "total war" that is usually assigned to the First World War should in fact be applied here, not as a result of technological innovation but to acknowledge the increased scope and intensity of warfare that may have produced as many as 5 million deaths across Europe.<sup>37</sup>

### Dynastic Crisis

But while the invasion was a powerful exogenous factor in sparking the outbreak of political revolution in Spain, the unfolding crisis and its resolution owed as much to internal factors as to external. Thus, as in France before 1789, the deposed monarch's legitimacy had already been undermined in previous years as a result of a growing financial crisis and its impact on the population, particularly elite sectors. The Spanish monarchy tried to recover revenue with a series of unpopular policies, which included raising taxes on nobles and expropriating some of the Church's vast holdings, but frustration with these measures was aimed at the king's upstart minister, Manuel de Godoy. As in the French version of the crisis, royal financial incompetence was transformed into a moral and then political indictment. In Spain, however, there was a savior within the royal family, the king's son, Ferdinand. With the support of powerful noble and clerical interests, he conspired to oust Godoy, but many, including his father, thought he was plotting to overthrow the king himself.

There is no question that Napoleon took advantage of this sordid dynastic drama to try to bring Spain into his military and political orbit. French troops had been in Spain since October of 1807, purportedly en route to invade Portugal and protect Spain from the British, but in March of 1808 Napoleon ordered 50,000 troops to march on Madrid. At the same time, Ferdinand and his supporters sought to take advantage of the French troops to force his father to fire Godoy. In the so-called "revolt of Aranjuez," at the summer palace of the royal family, an insurrection among royal guards snowballed into the abdication of Charles IV on March 18, 1808.

Ferdinand and his supporters welcomed the French troops, hoping they would endorse his coup, but Napoleon invited both father and son to meet privately with him to resolve their dispute. Rumors that Ferdinand and his father were in fact being held prisoner by Napoleon sparked the first revolt against the French troops in Madrid on May 2, an event immortalized by the painter Goya in his epic paintings, "Dos de Mayo" and "Tres de Mayo," the second of which portrayed the execution of Spanish resisters by a French firing squad. Similar insurrections broke out across the peninsula. On May 20 the rumors of kidnaping were confirmed by the news that Charles and Ferdinand had abdicated their rights to the throne to Napoleon, and on May 24 the first insurrectionary *junta* (council) in Oviedo (Asturias) declared war on Napoleon.

### War and Resistance

What happened after this moment has been subject to varying interpretations, but what is indisputable is that, for the next six years, Spain was immersed in a brutal war that made it the site of the "most merciless conflict in Europe" since the French state crushed a peasant rebellion in the Vendée in the 1790s.<sup>38</sup> No region was spared the direct impact of war, but the most violence against the population was perpetrated in trying to pacify the regions like Navarre, that produced an estimated 40,000 guerrilla soldiers. The guerrillas never confronted the French troops in direct combat but harassed and demoralized them, turning the war into an unwinnable burden on French resources. On the other hand, irregular warfare has a high cost for the civilian population, both in terms of the invading army's retribution against populations perceived to be supporting guerrillas, but also in terms of guerrilla-supported banditry.<sup>39</sup>

But civilians were already being targeted with the pacification techniques that French armies brought from previous European campaigns. Thus, in the city of Zaragoza, local resistance to French troops unleashed a series of attacks and sieges between June 1808 and February 1809 that culminated with house-to-house combat and left a total of 50,000 residents dead, many of them from disease. More generally, over the course of the war, towns and villages could be invaded and liberated multiple times, accompanied not only by more fighting and "pacification," but also destruction of bridges, roads and buildings to prevent their use by the enemy.

Beyond the death and devastation, what was at stake in this war?<sup>40</sup> On one level, it was an international war between France and Britain, the so-called "Peninsular War" starring the Duke of Wellington and his army, in which Spain appears as little more than the territory on which the two foreign giants settled their bid for European supremacy. In this international story, what Napoleon called the "Spanish ulcer" contributed to the shattering of his imperial ambitions by tying down large numbers of his troops and resources in an unwinnable quagmire. The Duke of Wellington and his British-led victories certainly clinched the defeat of the French armies, but most historians now agree that the Spanish guerrilla forces played a key role by dissipating the concentration of the French troops, who were kept busy pacifying guerrilla strongholds.<sup>41</sup>

Within Spain, the motives and identities of guerrillas and other participants were much more varied. In contrast to simplistic interpretations that have identified the uprising against the French as a war of national independence, or, conversely, as the reactionary resistance of backward peasants fueled by fanatical clerics, recent interpretations have argued that the war was not about or between "two Spains," one modern and the other traditional.

Instead, the war opened a liminal moment defined by the weakened legitimacy and defense of the existing social and political order. Some of the actors who flooded into this vacuum were responding to the larger legitimacy crisis, but others were focused on more local issues, either protecting existing interests or expressing discontent with the status quo. Thus, on the popular level, there were anti-tax protests, consumer riots, occupation of land and refusal to pay seigneurial dues. In some regions, tight community bonds and resistance to the

centralizing state provided the resources to mount significant guerrilla armies.<sup>42</sup> Other popular motives included defense of the Church and the Catholic religion against the "atheist" French revolutionaries, as well as a more general hostility towards the French. The brutal pacification tactics pursued by the French occupiers further inflamed this hostility.<sup>43</sup> It is likely that very little of the popular insurrection was motivated either by Spanish nationalism or by political ideology, either liberal or absolutist.<sup>44</sup>

On the elite level, the picture is different but equally murky. While elites may have been more aware of the implications of the legitimacy crisis, they were divided as to how to resolve it. Indeed, in acknowledgment of deep elite divisions, one of the prominent Spanish intellectuals of the time, Jovellanos, called the conflict a "civil" war. In particular, while Jovellanos supported the resistance against the French, other "enlightened" intellectuals, the *afrancesados*, took up positions with the occupying French government, attracted by Joseph's promises of modernizing reforms and public order. Indeed, the new French administration proclaimed the principles of equality before the law in a new constitution approved by a small group of Spanish delegates convoked by the French in Bayonne on July 8, 1808, and, in a series of decrees, abolished feudal privileges and the Inquisition.

### **The Cortes of Cádiz and the Constitution of 1812**

In contrast to the collaborators, the anti-French liberals and reformers, among other "patriots," as they were known, participated in the local and regional insurrections and were key protagonists in the provincial *juntas* that sprang up spontaneously to fill the vacuum of power left by the collapsing Spanish state. In the attempt to coordinate resistance, these local *juntas* eventually transformed into a *Junta Central* (September 25, 1808). In order to resolve the crisis of sovereignty, on May 22, 1809, the *Junta Central* convoked the election of the *Cortes Generales*, or parliament, a representative body that had existed in various medieval kingdoms, including Castile. It was the *Cortes* which convened in Cádiz between 1810 and 1813 that defined the struggle against the French in the name of the sovereignty of the Spanish nation and, as the representative of that nation, abolished the structures of the absolutist regime.

Its crowning achievement was the Constitution of 1812. This document would serve as the rallying cry for the liberal revolution for the next several decades, not only in Spain but in Portugal and Italy and throughout Spanish America. The document established a constitutional monarchy (to be led by Ferdinand VII when he returned to Spain) whose legitimacy lay in the sovereignty of the nation. It mandated a division of powers with significant limits on the executive, and a unicameral Cortes that would be elected by universal male suffrage and would have significant control of such thorny issues as taxation. The basic liberal principle of equality before the law was accompanied by all the civil liberties except freedom of religion, and by the destruction of all corporate privileges. Equality before the law also included a unitary system of courts and tariffs, as well as the reorganization of the state into uniform provinces. In separate decrees, the Cortes also abolished the Inquisition and feudal seigneurial rights, and began to expropriate more lands held by the Church and the nobility for sale to private owners.

### A Spanish "Constitutional Culture"

The sweeping liberal agenda launched by the Cortes of Cádiz and the 1812 Constitution has been at the heart of debates about the "two Spains."<sup>45</sup> In recent years, most scholars have realized that the sterile argument over whether the liberalism of the Cortes of Cádiz was indigenous or imitative was fueled by an ahistorical monolithic view of "liberalism." Once it was evaluated, not as it measured up to the French model, but as a product of its own transatlantic context, or its "constitutional culture," it could be viewed as a regional variant, not a pale imitation, of the original. The unique elements that emerged at Cádiz included the protection of religious unity, a focus on the community rights of the nation rather than the rights of individuals, and the reliance on tradition and history as a source of legitimation.<sup>46</sup> Intellectual sources for this culture can be found in various eighteenth-century currents of thought which, when placed within the particular crisis of 1808, resolve the apparent paradoxes in the Cortes' deliberations and pronouncements.

In particular, the most discussed difference between Spanish and French liberalism was the role of religion. For a long time scholars struggled to understand what seemed to be the incomprehensible defense of Catholic unity in the 1812 Constitution, in contrast to the militant secularism of the "authentic" French version. In fact, liberal historians often tried to square this circle by distinguishing between "pure" liberalism and a tactical acceptance of religious unity to appeal to conservative sectors in the Cortes and a devout population.

What has emerged recently is a more historicized portrait of a transatlantic Hispanic constitutional culture that accepted religion rather than excised it. Thus, this concept of the "Catholic nation" was not unique to Spain's constitutional culture but was present in all the major Hispanic constitutional experiments in the early nineteenth-century Atlantic world.<sup>47</sup> The apparent paradox of the "Catholic nation" is a product of the false dichotomy between the nation as inherently secular and religion as fused to the old regime. In fact liberals embraced Catholicism as a key element of Spanish national identity, and many Catholics, especially among the 30 percent of clerical representatives in the Cortes, embraced this liberal view of the nation. While there were anti-liberal clerics, the "Catholic public sphere" was not united in fanatical conservatism but reflected a plurality of views. The image of a monolithic reactionary Catholic sector that was propagated at the time by Anglophile liberals like José María Blanco White drew more on the trope of Spanish religious fanaticism going back to the sixteenth century than to empirical observation.<sup>48</sup>

Consistent with the 1812 Constitution's harmonizing of nation and religion was its legitimation of national sovereignty in Spanish history and tradition instead of the "rights of man." Thus, the Cortes framed the constitution as a recuperation of medieval liberties that had been lost during the period of absolutist rule. As deputy and historian Francisco Martínez Marina put it, they were "re-establishing laws which had made our ancestors free men."<sup>49</sup> In sum, the legitimation of national sovereignty in tradition was both a response to the practical crisis of 1808 and a product of the Spanish enlightenment.<sup>50</sup>

On a practical level, the historicist claims of the Cortes helped combat the universalist claims of the occupying Napoleonic government. In trying to make the

case that the Napoleonic monarchy was an illegitimate authority in Spain, the Cortes created a "particularist" constitution that was rooted in its own history rather than natural law. Likewise, the Cortes' claim to represent the new sovereign subject of the "nation" can in part be read as a practical response to the abdication of the Bourbon monarch. In contrast to the Napoleonic claim that sovereignty had been transferred from one monarchical house to another, which was not unusual in the early modern period, the Cortes of Cádiz made the claim to independence through creating a new sovereign subject, the nation. Finally, this practical need to justify independence also favored a defense of the nation as a single unit rather than the natural rights of individuals.

At the same time that the 1812 Constitution was a response to the specific crisis of sovereignty, its ideas were also rooted in the intellectual debates of the previous decades, in Spain's version of the Enlightenment. It has been many decades since Spain's participation in the Enlightenment was "rediscovered," but the links between these ideas and the Cortes of Cádiz have not been fully explored until recently.

Even though there was no explicit political theory of the sovereign nation, there were a number of strands of thought in the late eighteenth century that constituted the building blocks of the constitutional debates of 1810–1812. Thus, discussions of political economy, juridical thought, historiography and moral philosophy were all indirectly exploring the relationship between the monarch and society. The ideas of the "political" realm as a site where rights could be defended, and of a "constitution" as a political document articulating those rights, took shape during the last third of the eighteenth century among the enlightened thinkers working within the framework of the absolutist monarchy.<sup>51</sup>

One other crucial aspect of the historical context in which the Spanish liberal and national revolution took shape was the imperial character of the Spanish monarchy and its legitimacy crisis. Whereas concepts of nation and liberalism were once viewed as developing in parallel fashion on both sides of the Spanish Atlantic, recent studies have emphasized a shared transatlantic discourse about sovereignty, nationhood and liberalism that was still focused more on the reform of the Spanish monarchy rather than on its dissolution.

Indeed, perhaps the most striking innovation of the 1812 Constitution was the declaration that sovereignty lay in all Spaniards of both hemispheres who were born free, thus becoming the first European state to extend membership in the nation beyond the metropole. Before then, the *Junta Central* had already issued its famous declaration in January of 1809 that the American territories were not mere colonies but "essential parts" of the Spanish nation, and invited those territories to send representatives. Thus, the Cortes of Cádiz was faced with the double task of transferring sovereignty from the monarch to the nation and of defining the transatlantic boundaries of that nation.

The Cortes hoped it could make the transition from composite monarchy to nation without losing those overseas territories. Indeed, at first most of the American representatives and the elites back home were more invested in articulating how they could be integrated on an equal basis into the new nation rather than in separating from it.<sup>52</sup> It was the failure of this integration that turned American reformers into separatist nationalists who pushed for independence

from Spain, but the question of exactly when this happened is still unresolved. Some have blamed the limits of the Cortes of 1812, while others see the reactionary policies of Ferdinand VII after 1814 as crucial, while still others insist that only during the next liberal revolution of 1820 were the cords cut for good.

Those who lay the blame on the Cortes rightly point out that the 1812 Constitution failed to transform the rhetoric of equality into practice. Thus, the Cortes deliberately excluded African slaves and mixed race people with African heritage, both to ensure a numerical majority for the peninsula and as a result of deeply rooted beliefs about racial inequality. The Constitution was also silent on the question of both slavery and the slave trade, reflecting an implicit agreement with creole planter elites in Cuba not to touch the institution in return for their continued loyalty to Spain.<sup>53</sup> But while it is true that the peninsular Spaniards never really imagined even the creole colonials as equals, let alone the indigenous and African populations, the gap between liberal rhetoric and practice was not unique to Spain, especially when it came to colonial empires. Rather than serving as an example of the faulty or weak liberalism of the Cortes, in fact the contradiction between abstract inclusion and practical exclusion would be one of the defining features of nineteenth-century European liberalism.

As this last point makes clear, the process of situating the Spanish revolution in the specific context of Spanish history does not isolate it from the larger narrative of the "age of revolutions." Thus, while recent scholarship has convincingly situated the Constitution of 1812 at the intersection between Spanish intellectual currents of the late eighteenth century and the specific elements of the crisis of 1808, it was not a uniquely Spanish product. For example, the key role that religion played in national identity was not confined to the Hispanic world. In recent decades, historians of Britain and Germany, among others, have made the case that religion remained an important part of "modern" national identity throughout the nineteenth century, so that religion and nation no longer seem fixed on either side of some arbitrary modern/traditional divide.

Likewise, the appeal to tradition instead of natural rights drew on a significant current of liberal constitutional thought based on the English revolution of 1688, which continued to serve as an alternative pole to the French rupture model in the nineteenth century. In addition, the focus on the community of the nation over the rights of individuals will mark a significant divide, not between Spain and Europe, but between Anglo-Saxon and continental constitutional thought in the coming decades. The point is that there was no monolithic liberal and national revolution that the Cortes and its constitution either measured up to or fell short of.

### **The End of the Revolutionary Era**

Even accepting that the Cortes of Cádiz and its constitution represented an authentically Spanish version of a liberal revolution, there is no question that its authority was precarious from the outset and that the chances of the Constitution of 1812 being implemented were slim at best. The French still occupied most of the peninsula in 1812, with their last major victory in Valencia in January, and even as the French armies were pushed north, the Cádiz government had few resources to restore order, let alone transform institutions, in the "liberated" areas.

Even in the French areas, the situation for local populations was deteriorating rapidly, as Napoleon began withdrawing more troops for his Russian campaign and the remaining ones were increasingly hobbled by guerrilla forays. In the British-led offensive of May 1813, French troops had to abandon Madrid, and, after a significant military victory by Wellington's army at Vitoria on June 21st, only Catalonia remained in French hands by the summer of 1813.

Such chaos helped fuel a revival of absolutist opposition, which was a minority in the Cortes of Cádiz but emerged as a strong sector of the first regular elected parliament that opened in October of 1813. The absolutist cause was bolstered by Napoleon's release of Ferdinand VII, who returned to Spain on March 24, 1814. In Valencia, he was presented with a petition signed by the 69 absolutist Cortes deputies, the so-called "Manifiesto of the Persians," asking Ferdinand to overturn the Constitution of 1812 and restore the pre-1808 political and social order. When General Javier de Elio, a commander in the Spanish army, pledged to support Ferdinand in this task, the king agreed. The royal decree issued in Valencia abolished the constitution and everything promulgated by the Cortes, "as if such things had never happened," and by May Elío's troops had occupied Madrid. With Napoleon's abdication on April 6, it was clear that the revolutionary era in Spain, as well as Europe, had come to a close.

## Conclusion

While marking the closure of the revolutionary era, the reinstatement of absolutism in Spain, as across continental Europe, also opened a new era of political struggle. Within less than a decade in Spain, and a few years later in France, liberalism would re-emerge as the major political challenge and alternative of the first half of the nineteenth century. Between the poles of a central and eastern Europe where absolutist regimes largely survived this challenge, and the British and Belgian model defined by gradual political change, lay the Spanish and French cases of open and discontinuous political struggle in which old-regime absolutism was finally defeated by the 1840s. Even though the liberal revolution that was consolidated in Spain lacked the democratic features of the 1812 Constitution, including any pretense of colonial equality, it was clear that 1812—bolstered by a pre-existing constitutional culture—had changed the terms of political debate, altering the parameters of what could be imagined in Spain's nineteenth-century political culture.

At the same time, the nineteenth-century political transition from absolutism to liberalism that defines the "western" European model did not entail a wholesale transformation from an "old regime" society and economy to a "modern" one. Thus, from the late eighteenth century, there were ongoing tensions between "traditional" structures and hierarchies and emerging "modern" ones that extended well into the nineteenth century, with no unified or predetermined links between the political transition and changes in other spheres. For Spain, as for the rest of Europe, then, the revolutionary era does not mark a clear rupture. Instead of the bourgeois revolution that swept away the old economic, political and social order

---

in one fell swoop, changes in these spheres occurred at different rhythms, followed distinct trajectories and produced a variety of outcomes. With no master trajectory of "modernization," historians have the task of uncovering the specific historical circumstances that shaped the narrative of change and continuity in each country.

Within this murkier narrative of modernity, in what sense does Spain's modern era begin in 1808? While any specific year remains in some ways an arbitrary designation for the beginning of a new historical era, 1808 functions as a useful turning point in Spanish history. Without having to make the case for a complete rupture, it is clear that the broader "crisis of sovereignty" opened a liminal moment in western European and Atlantic history that challenged existing political structures and institutions, introduced new claims into the political vocabulary, and overturned old regimes that, even if "restored," had inevitably lost some of their previous legitimacy. And, while Spain's 1808 crisis of sovereignty was undoubtedly sparked by the external impetus of French invasion, the version of a new politics that emerged in Cádiz was firmly rooted in the intellectual and social currents of Spanish culture and history, as evidenced by its impact in reframing political debates for the rest of the century. If the "birth" of modern Europe is defined by the rupture of crisis rather than definitive or implicitly progressive transformation, then 1808 can serve as Spain's point of entry into the modern world.

# POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION: FROM THE OLD REGIME TO THE LIBERAL STATE, 1814–1868

## **Introduction: The Liberal Revolution in Comparative Context**

The end of the Napoleonic Wars ushered in a new era in European politics, marked in many places by the restoration of absolutist regimes. However, the crisis of legitimacy opened by war and revolution had not been fully resolved, and by the 1830s–1840s, many of these regimes were already under attack from resurgent liberal movements, turning this period into one of protracted struggle between absolutist and liberal forces throughout Europe. By the 1860s, the liberal forces in western Europe had largely succeeded in destroying the political and legal structure of the “Old Regime” and replacing it with a liberal order that in turn opened a new era of struggle against the emerging democratic and socialist forces. While the specific dynamics differed in each national case, there was clearly a broader regional pattern of political change that included southwestern Europe, regardless of the level of economic development, in contrast to Marx’s classic argument that it was a bourgeois social revolution that had precipitated the liberal political transformation.<sup>1</sup> In Britain, this transformation followed an evolutionary trajectory, while in Belgium, Italy, and later Germany, it accompanied the formation of new nation-states, and finally, in France, Portugal and Spain it was implemented through a series of revolutionary ruptures and civil wars. Both in terms of timing and of the basic parameters of this transformation, revisionist historians have convincingly dismantled the old “failure” narrative, arguing that Spain participated fully and achieved comparable results.<sup>2</sup>

Integrating Spain into the regional liberal transformation also requires acknowledging the limits and contradictions of this process. In contrast to an older optimistic view of liberalism as a stage in the expansion of rights and participation that would naturally culminate in democracy, current scholarship has problematized this sunny narrative of “modern” politics as equivalent to “progress.” Instead, post-revolutionary nineteenth-century liberalism was defined by its contradictions, rooted in the inclusive universalist rhetoric of the French Revolution but terrified by the apparent disorderly implications of democracy and the “rule of all.”<sup>3</sup>

Nineteenth-century liberals were thus products of the French Revolution in both senses; they inherited its ideals but also viewed it as a cautionary tale moving forward. In contrast to what Spanish historians call the "first" (*primer*) liberalism of the Napoleonic era, the European liberals of the 1830s and 1840s were a new breed, fighting a war on two fronts, against absolutists on the one hand and democrats on the other. While claiming to stand for future equality of all, they employed a "discourse of capacity" to defend inequality in the present, for the lower classes, colonial subjects and women, and limit the rights of citizenship to a few propertied males. And, while claiming to stand for tolerance, they persecuted Catholics in England, France and Germany and established a conflicted relationship with the Church even in a very Catholic country like Spain. Liberals were, of course, divided among themselves, but in this period elitist, not democratic, liberalism was the dominant strand. The liberal state that took shape during this period integrated more ordinary people through the intensification of policing than the expansion of rights. The mistaken expectation that liberalism should evolve naturally into democracy was in fact one of the sources of the myth of Spain's "failed" liberal revolution, promoted by late nineteenth-century critics disappointed with the lack of democratization.<sup>4</sup>

Instead, during the cycle of European liberal revolutions that opened in France in 1830, Spain experienced a radical political transformation that effectively dismantled the Old Regime in political, economic and legal terms and established one of five liberal constitutional regimes, along with France, Belgium, Portugal, and Britain, later joined in this period by Greece, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark. The basic parameters of this new liberal order remained in place throughout the nineteenth century, and in fact Spain enjoyed more years of constitutional parliamentary government than any other European country between 1812 and 1936. It was true that this constitutional government was rife with instability, but the functional weaknesses were not a result of an incomplete liberal revolution.

The political core of the transformation from absolutism to liberalism was precisely the principle of constitutionalism, which was established in the 1830s and never revoked. The new subject of a liberal political system was the nation, whose citizens were represented through elected positions in the *Cortes* or parliament, although disagreements among liberals and the Crown on the precise location of sovereignty were not resolved until the 1870s. In economic terms, a series of liberal governments created a uniform private property regime, abolishing seigneurial rights and corporatist claims on property by the Church, municipal governments and the aristocracy. In legal terms, the overlapping jurisdictions of the Old Regime were replaced by a centralized and mostly uniform administrative and judicial structure, including a banking and tax system, army and police, and a state bureaucracy that gradually increased the reach of the state throughout the territory. There remains debate about the strength and effectiveness of the Spanish liberal state in comparison to other European states, especially vis-à-vis the power of local oligarchies and institutions, but the recent emphasis has been more on its administrative achievements than its failures.<sup>5</sup> The Progressive wing of the Spanish liberals also introduced more civil rights, including freedom of the press and trial by jury, although the details of these were more contested. All of these changes, however, were consistent with the broader regional pattern.

Also consistent with the western European pattern was the contradictory reorganization of colonial empires that paralleled the political transition at home. In contrast to the old-regime empires that were the patrimony of absolutist monarchs, who ruled over subjects both domestic and overseas, the new empires established dual systems of rule, with the nation of citizens in the metropole ruled by liberalism and the colonial subjects ruled by military governors and special laws. Across Europe, the imperial relationship was reconfigured, in both economic and political terms, with all major colonial powers losing some imperial possessions, like the Spanish and British in the Americas, at the same time that control over existing colonies was intensified, as in the cases of the Spanish in the Caribbean and the Philippines or the British in India. In contrast to an older historiography that viewed the early nineteenth century as a *laissez-faire* parenthesis between the old empires of conquest and the imperial scramble of the late nineteenth century, colonial scholars have reframed this period through the lens of the “imperial meridian,” a term coined to describe how colonial states extended their reach and control into colonial societies with modern forms of authoritarian and racist governance.<sup>6</sup>

Spanish historians have suggested that the Spanish empire of this period could also be considered within this framework of intensified imperial control.<sup>7</sup> Replacing an older narrative focused only on Spain’s loss of the bulk of its American empire in the 1820s, recent scholars have turned their attention to the remaining major colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. While it was true that the losses were more extensive than those suffered by any other major power, in 1870 Spain still possessed the second- or third-largest overseas empire in the world (depending on how the Dutch Indonesian territories are measured). Further, despite the empire’s contraction, it was still vital to Spain’s economic interests and national identity. In particular, Cuba, with its slave-based sugar production, developed into one of the most profitable colonies in the world, but tobacco cultivation in the Philippines was also increasing the value of the Pacific colony from the middle decades of the century. Moreover, the imperial administration in the colonies was developing new, more intrusive mechanisms of discipline and control like those in the other empires.

At the heart of this imperial reorganization was the slave economy. While slavery was once viewed as a vestige of the old empire of conquest, current scholarship acknowledges the vital role played by slave and other coerced forms of labor in the commercial empires of the nineteenth century, even as the British and French moved toward abolition of slavery. In the Spanish case, the reconstitution of empire dramatically expanded the role of slavery and the plantation system.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the number of slaves in Cuba began to rise precipitously during the revolutionary era and peaked in the 1830s; between 1780 and 1867, 780,000 slaves landed there, virtually the same number sent to all of Spanish America between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The expansion of slavery fed the demands of a developing plantation system, following earlier models in Jamaica, the American South, Barbados and Brazil, but which would blossom into the largest plantation economy in Spanish American history. After 1824, the sugar trade in Cuba supplanted the extraction of silver as the cornerstone of the colonial economy. Beyond its economic role, the slave economy also exemplified the dual systems of rule

between the metropole and the colonies, as well as the growing role of racial hierarchies in justifying them. It was in fact the trade-off between racial domination and political rights that united metropolitan and colonial planter elites for most of the nineteenth century and kept abolitionism a minority discourse.<sup>9</sup>

The crucial point is that Spain, like the other European powers, participated in the process of constructing a new political order that was both liberal and imperial. While it was true that Spain was becoming a second-tier empire like Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, increasingly hemmed in by the expanding empires of Britain and France, its trajectory has been redefined as “eclipse” or “retreat” rather than “collapse.”<sup>10</sup> This new terminology acknowledges not only the significant economic contribution of the remaining empire to Spain’s “national” market, but also the continued imperial pretensions of the liberal state, which mounted various, admittedly failed, campaigns in Africa and the Americas in the late 1850s–60s. Finally, acknowledging the continued impact of the empire throughout the nineteenth century highlights its role in the nation-building process, with Spanish elites referring to Cuba and Puerto Rico as “*España Ultramarina*,” or overseas Spain.<sup>11</sup> Both in practice and in mind-set, Spain continued to act like an imperial nation.

At the same time as revisionist scholars have debunked the myth of failed Spanish liberalism, they have also acknowledged that the new liberal order had important weaknesses that undermined its stability and, equally important, the ability to evolve and adapt. Without holding Spain’s liberal revolution up to some later democratic ideal, it is reasonable to evaluate how well the liberal state functioned in its historical context. From this perspective, Spain’s liberal regime shared the common weaknesses of the era, to a greater or lesser degree than other countries, from weakly developed political parties and ambivalent constitutional monarchs, to a lack of broad political incorporation and popular resistance from both sides of the political spectrum. These weaknesses were exacerbated by a particularly acute financial deficit that limited the ability of an impoverished state to fully implement the centralizing and homogenizing project of the liberal revolution. And yet, none of these weaknesses were either unique to Spain or fatal to the consolidation of liberalism, and, equally important, none carried a permanent original sin that foreclosed future democratic evolution or led inexorably to the great political tragedy of the Civil War in the 1930s. Spain’s liberal era began, if not propitiously, then certainly in a comparable position to the other liberal states of the region.

## The Major Players

### Moderate and Progressive Parties

The architects of the liberal political transformation were the loosely structured liberal parties. After maintaining a fairly united front in the struggle against absolutism, from the 1830s the liberal elite divided into conservative (the Moderates) and progressive (Progressives) parties that disagreed as to how much the liberal state should continue to reform and evolve. Thus, each party defended different

visions of the liberal political order, most notably concerning the power of the Crown and the size of the electorate, but also extending into debates on broader forms of citizen participation in local governments, citizen militia and the public sphere. In contrast to an earlier historiography that viewed the liberals as the voice of a specific social class, the “bourgeoisie,” in fact they were a heterogeneous elite of nobles, landowners, merchants, military officers, industrialists and the liberal professions who coalesced around a reformulated but restricted vision of political participation that sought to keep democracy at bay. While old-regime social elites were not absent from the new political class, what seems clear is that they had to adapt to the new rules of the game in order to maintain their predominance.<sup>12</sup> In fact, by the end of the nineteenth century, the old-regime nobility made up a comparatively small percentage of the political class in Spain, except in a few provinces.<sup>13</sup>

### **The Military and Pronunciamientos**

More important than the old nobility were the military officers, many of them from plebeian origins, who were attracted by the opportunities of advancement in a liberal political order.<sup>14</sup> The cycle of military intervention, or “*pronunciamientos*,” in Spanish regime changes is well known, and there is no question that the liberal parties relied on military muscle to maintain their authority, especially in the context of the uncooperative reigning monarch, Isabel II. In the “failure” paradigm, the fact that the military were involved in virtually all changes of government through a series of insurrections provided proof that liberalism lacked real support in the country. The revisionist perspective points out that the *pronunciamientos* did not replace civilian with military rule, but were one of the techniques employed to challenge civilian governments to change policies or personnel. Military leaders were more instruments of the liberal parties, in contrast to the reverse relationship in the military coups of the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, they worked to shore up the liberal system, not replace it with a military dictatorship. Thus, the *pronunciamientos* made possible the alternation between liberal parties when the Crown refused to cooperate, without suspending civilian rule.

### **The Crown**

One of the reasons for the endemic military intervention was to pressure the Crown into adopting or following those liberal principles. From the absolutist Ferdinand VII, to the more pragmatic Regent María Cristina (1833–40) to Queen Isabel II (1840–68), the Crown either openly resisted or subtly undermined the implementation of the liberal system.<sup>15</sup> Throughout Europe, monarchy was considered the natural vehicle for a stable liberal system that could avoid the disorder of republicanism, tainted by the memories of 1793 in France. However, the transformation from an absolutist to a constitutional monarchy, from a monarch who governed to one who reigned, was more difficult, both in theory and practice, than the architects of the system imagined. In addition to the structural problems of this transition was the personality and character of the individual monarch. In the case of Spain, Isabel II was supremely mismatched for the job. A young child when her father died, she came to power at age 13 with tenuous legitimacy and

grew up surrounded by absolutist and clerical advisors. She refused to play the arbitrating role of a constitutional monarch and, equally serious, defied the moral standards expected of her gender with public love affairs. Charged with maintaining the stability of the liberal system, she was, paradoxically, one of its most unstable elements.

### Popular/Local Mobilization

While this elite political class controlled the reins of power, popular politics also played a key role in political transformation, although not in Marx's sense of an irresistible force for "progress." From the first local and provincial *juntas* in 1808, politics in early nineteenth-century Spain had an insurrectionary quality that included popular participation, both in favor of political change and against it. For those in favor of change, this mobilization was sometimes linked to the Progressives but often beyond their control. Recent scholarship has emphasized the ongoing dynamic between parliamentary reform, military intervention and popular mobilization, a "revolutionary practice" that implies a much deeper level of politicization than the old portrait of a liberal revolution that barely reached beyond the doors of the Cortes.<sup>16</sup> Popular mobilization could act, on the one hand, to unite elite liberals against democratization but, on the other hand, local *juntismo* could put pressure on the Progressive wing of the liberals, who desired the leverage it offered in their struggle against the Moderates. In addition, popular politics unleashed a process of at least informal empowerment and democratization, especially at the local level. Thus, while at the national level, liberal politics could look narrowly exclusive, at the local level in cities and even towns, spontaneous *juntas*, popularly elected city councils, secret societies and citizen militia units created a more broad-based culture of political engagement.<sup>17</sup> When the Progressives lost the legitimacy to lead this popular mobilization, democrats and republicans would take up the role, as early as the 1830s–40s in the most radical cities, but more generally in the 1850s–60s. In any case, it was clear that, throughout the nineteenth century, the local level was the site of the most vibrant political culture, pushing the boundaries of the elite liberal system toward democratic inclusion by drawing ever more Spaniards into political life.<sup>18</sup>

### Counter-revolution: Carlists

At the same time as there were various groups pushing for political change in the early nineteenth century, there was also powerful resistance.<sup>19</sup> In Spain, the strength of absolutist resistance peaked in the 1830s, as liberals and Carlists fought one of the most brutal civil wars of the period, with more than 300,000 soldiers or guerrillas in arms and between 150,000 and 200,000 deaths. The war emerged out of a succession crisis when Ferdinand VII died in 1833, with liberals taking the side of the infant Isabel II and absolutists defending the cause of Ferdinand's brother, Carlos. The basic program of the Carlists, in addition to defending Carlos's right to the throne, included the divine authority of the monarch, the enforced Catholic unity of the population, symbolized by a return of the Inquisition, and the defense of traditional *fueros*, or special regional/local privileges.<sup>20</sup> But the stakes for those who defended the Carlist cause were more complex than the succession or even a

simple return to the old order. What anti-liberals in the nineteenth century objected to was the entire liberal centralizing and homogenizing project, including the sale of communal lands to private owners, the elimination of *fueros* and the control of access to local political offices in the name of "national sovereignty." The implicit instability unleashed by these changes, which undermined traditional foundations of local economic and political power and privilege, sparked resistance among a heterogeneous population of nobles, gentry and peasants.<sup>21</sup> Although the end of the first Carlist war in 1839 marked the demise of absolutism as a real threat to the consolidation of the liberal state, it remained a powerful mobilizing force in parts of the country through the Second Carlist War (1872–76) and survived even into the 1930s, outlasting its European counterparts.

### The Catholic Church

The other important protagonist usually identified with resistance to liberalism was the Catholic Church, many of whose officials either joined or sympathized with a Carlist movement which claimed the "defense of throne and altar." In an older "Two Spains" narrative, the Church was automatically linked with counter-revolution and tradition, viewed as one of the main impediments to a successful liberal revolution. More recent studies have pointed out the greater political diversity within the Church, especially at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when there was a strong contingent of liberal Catholics as well as Catholic liberals in the Cortes of Cadiz.<sup>22</sup> In this more complex story, it is precisely during the 1820s and 1830s that the space for liberal Catholicism loses ground, not only in Spain but across western Europe.<sup>23</sup> At this point, the bulk of the Catholic hierarchy, from the Vatican to the national Churches, embraced a frontal opposition to liberalism, embodied by the "Syllabus of Errors" in 1864. This formal rejection lasted until the latter decades of the nineteenth century, when the Vatican under Pope Leo XIII came to a grudging accommodation with what had become the political reality on the ground. The gulf between Catholicism and liberalism was forged through a combination of liberal policies that undermined the wealth and privilege of the Church, most notably the sale of land, the abolition of the tithe, the creation of a financially dependent Church and the more diffuse and sometimes violent anti-clerical sentiment, often encouraged by the Progressives and later democrats and republicans. From the 1820s, the cycle of anti-clerical violence and clerical reaction became a regular feature of political conflict, culminating in the 1930s.

At the same time, it is important to remember that endemic conflict was only one side of religious politics in Spain. On the other side, the Moderate liberals sought and achieved a tenuous early accommodation with the Church hierarchy in the 1851 Concordat, which was later deepened during the Second Restoration of the 1870s. Accommodation was based on the acceptance of the principle of national sovereignty and constitutionalism, as long as it was rooted in Spanish tradition and, crucially, in the unified religious identity of the Spanish nation. In contrast to Catholic-majority liberal states like France or, later, Italy that maintained a clearer division between a secular liberal state and private religious practice, or to Catholic-minority states like Britain and, later, Germany in which liberal nationalism was linked to Protestant identity, in Spain the lines were more blurred. Thus,

instead of a fixed and permanent opposition between Catholicism, or even religion more broadly, and the liberal state, or between “tradition” and “modernity,” there were shifting alliances that expanded or contracted the possibilities for coexistence and cooperation. From this perspective, the First Carlist War of the 1830s probably also represented the height of the nineteenth-century Church’s active political resistance to liberalism in Spain.

## **Chronology: From the Restoration of Absolutism to the Construction and Crisis of the Liberal State, 1814–1868**

### **1814–1833: The Restoration and Demise of the Absolutist State**

#### *Restoration of Absolutism, 1814–1820*

When Ferdinand VII (1784–1833) returned to the throne in 1814, a popular symbol of Spain’s victory over the French intruder, he was also part of a wave of absolutist restorations that made it appear as if liberalism had been eradicated throughout Europe. The Congress of Vienna had supported the return of states led by inherited monarchs, governed by nobles, and with close ties to established churches, whether Catholic or Protestant. In Spain, Ferdinand indeed tried to erase the reforms of the previous period, with an emphasis on restoring the personal power of the monarch. The Constitution of 1812 was revoked, along with the principle of constitutionalism and most of the legislation passed by the Cortes. Even the administrative organization of provinces and local governments was returned to its pre-1808 structure. Repression against the liberals was fierce, and most were either jailed or forced into exile. In contrast, the king sought to repair the close relationship between throne, Church and nobility. Thus, he restored the Inquisition and the Jesuit order, reopened monasteries, and used his power to appoint conservative clerics and purge the Church of liberals. In terms of the nobility, he revoked the Cortes’ efforts to reduce noble entail and restored most old-regime privileges, including the seigneurial system. Finally, he sought to regain patrimonial control of the American empire, and refused to either accept independence or to negotiate any form of home rule.

However, rather than inaugurating a new age of absolutist rule, the restorations ushered in a new period of political struggle between defenders of absolutism and a revived liberal opposition. Thus, the first wave of at least temporarily successful liberal revolutions was unleashed in 1820 in Spain, followed by others in Portugal, Naples and Piedmont, most of which fought under the banner of Spain’s 1812 Constitution. Although none of this first wave of revolutions was ultimately successful, they revealed the difficulty of returning to the status quo ante after the massive upheavals of the revolutionary era. Thus, for example, the Spanish *pronunciamiento* of 1820, spearheaded by Major Rafael Riego and a disgruntled military, was buoyed to success by a wave of local *juntas* that built on networks and traditions established during the French occupation.

In addition, the Spanish restoration was uniquely vulnerable. Unlike in France, whose state had been strengthened during the revolutionary period, in Spain the

structures of royal power and the old-regime state had been virtually destroyed, requiring more of a reconstitution than a restoration. In facing this challenge, the state was completely bankrupt after decades of war and economic blockades and still faced the challenge of suppressing revolt in the American colonies. The result was an “impossible conundrum,”<sup>24</sup> in which Ferdinand absolutely needed to recover the American colonies in order to solve the country’s fiscal woes, but could not do so without more resources at hand, which were in turn restricted by the privileges of the old-regime tax structure. While the challenges were great, Ferdinand also did not have the personal resources to meet these challenges effectively; he was intransigent and unimaginative, more interested in punishing liberals and restoring his own power than in adapting to the realities of the moment. As a result, the liberal revolt was put down, not by Ferdinand, but by the “Holy Alliance” of great powers (without Great Britain) who agreed to use military intervention to uphold the new status quo, first in Naples and Piedmont and then in Spain. The ironic upshot of this decision was that the French army that had deposed Ferdinand and his father in 1808 returned on his behalf in 1823.

*The Liberal “Trienio,” 1820–23*

In the meantime, the military *pronunciamiento* launched by Major Riego on January 1, 1820 and sustained by urban insurrections, had succeeded in forcing the king to accept the reinstatement of the Constitution of 1812, opening what historians have called the “liberal *Trienio*,” a three-year interval of liberal government. Both Riego and the *Trienio* joined the Constitution of 1812 as highlights of the liberal genealogy, celebrated by liberals, and later democrats and republicans, as foundational building blocks of “modern” Spain. In practice, the genealogy was more complex. While it was true that the *Trienio* confirmed that the language of liberalism had become the most convincing discourse of political opposition to absolutism and disseminated that language much more deeply into the population, it also marked the end of the cycle of revolutionary-era liberalism.<sup>25</sup> When the next cycle of liberal revolutions began in 1830 in Paris, those liberal leaders embraced the more elitist and exclusionary version of liberalism that would define its trajectory going forward. And for Spanish liberals, this journey from the democratic Constitution of 1812 to the restricted constitutions of the 1830s and 1840s was propelled as much by the experience of the *Trienio* as of the previous revolutionary era. Thus, it was precisely the specter of broader popular mobilization—spilling over into collective violence—during the *Trienio* that convinced many liberal elites to shift their priorities from participation to public order.

The initial spark for the revolt lay not in popular mobilization but in military discontent. Riego had been in the regular army before the war and fought in the guerrilla forces after 1808. Significantly, he launched his *pronunciamiento* in the city of Cádiz. It was there that conscripts waiting for the next military expedition to reconquer the Americas were billeted, and it was among these men that Riego found his first converts. The discontent of the military nicely encapsulated the weaknesses of the absolutist restoration. On the one hand, Ferdinand’s decision to restore the old-regime army structure and abolish the liberal-style career opportunities of the revolutionary army demonstrated the pitfalls of pretending that the status quo ante could simply be imposed by fiat. On the other hand, the underfunding

of the army and the planned expedition to the Americas demonstrated the impact of the state's financial crisis on Ferdinand's ability to re-establish his legitimacy. The resulting demoralization of the troops waiting in Cádiz did not automatically turn them into liberals, but it certainly made them sympathetic to a language that could claim to address their grievances.

More important to the success of the *pronunciamiento*, however, was the weight of popular participation. Thus, the Riego rebellion was more of a "detonator" for urban insurrections across the country, beginning in La Coruña on February 21. These insurrections were at least in part planned by secret societies of liberals, made up of a combination of civilian and military local elites, who had been pushed into clandestine organization by Ferdinand's vindictive repression but also by his other policies.<sup>26</sup> In particular, non-noble elites were affected by a tax structure that fell inordinately on the middle classes, by the closing of the land market with the reinstatement of entailed properties and by their exclusion from local political institutions. On March 11, Ferdinand capitulated to their demands, declaring that he was "the first" to join the constitutional bandwagon.

The new liberal Cortes went further than the reinstatement of the 1812 Constitution to develop and refine the still-nascent liberal project. In particular, it passed a series of measures designed to fully incorporate the Church into the new liberal state, including the requirement that parish priests explain the details of the Constitution to their parishioners at mass. Most dramatically, an October 1820 decree began an extensive process of monastery and convent closure and sale of Church property for the benefit of the state coffers. By early 1822, 300 monasteries and another 800 religious houses had been shut down, and their property, along with that of the Inquisition and the newly abolished Jesuit order, was confiscated and sold.<sup>27</sup> From the perspective of liberal leaders, the motives were more economic than anti-clerical; i.e., "unproductive" religious orders kept the Church's enormous wealth out of market circulation—and the hands of the state. Nevertheless, the combination of these policies and the anti-clerical rhetoric and actions of some of the radical liberals greatly reduced the space for a liberal Catholic position within the Church. The Cortes also reinstated the abolition of noble entail and the dismantling of the seigneurial regime and began a major administrative reform of the Civil and Penal code, education, and the provincial and local government structure, all prefiguring the transformation of the state and judicial apparatus in the 1830s and 1840s.

In addition to legislative reforms, the *Trienio* unleashed a parallel process of politicization in key urban centers that incorporated broader sectors of the population, through national militia units, patriotic societies, public rituals and the press. The patriotic societies were loosely organized clubs that met in cafés to discuss political developments. It was in these "debating societies" that a new liberal political culture and what we might call a citizen identity began to take shape.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, a growing divide opened between so-called "*exaltado*" or radical liberals, who fed popular mobilization with calls for peasant control over land they cultivated, anti-clerical diatribes against the Church and demands for greater freedom of expression and association, and "moderate" liberals, who advocated a revision of the Constitution of 1812 that would strengthen executive power and reduce the parameters of citizen participation. Even before French troops crossed

the border in early 1823, welcomed by absolutist conspiring within Spain, the internal divisions within liberal ranks did not bode well for the survival of the second constitutional experiment.

The other thorny issue for the constitutional regime was the American empire, still in full revolt. In yet another indication of the *Trienio's* links backward to the more inclusive liberalism of the revolutionary era, the Cortes maintained the 1812 Constitution's embrace of transnational citizenship in a capacious Spanish nation. In contrast to Ferdinand's intransigent refusal to negotiate any reforms in the colonial relationship between 1814 and 1820, the *Trienio* reopened the possible incorporation of the empire into the liberal nation. Still unresolved, however, was the tension between a theoretical transatlantic equality and the metropolitan elites' desire to impose a unified and centralized entity controlled from Madrid, a tension reflected in restrictions on local and provincial autonomy, in the "stacking" of important colonial bodies with peninsular representatives, and in the Cortes' rejection of the American deputies' proposal for a transnational federation.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, the balance of forces in the Americas favoring independence over autonomy had shifted considerably since 1812, further encouraged by Ferdinand's refusal to open dialogue with the latter without having the resources to defeat the former. Whether Spain's share of responsibility for losing most of its empire rested more heavily on the Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century, the disintegration of the monarchy in 1808 or the absolutist reaction of 1814, it was clear that, by 1820, the die had largely been cast.<sup>30</sup> Official military defeat came on January 23, 1826, when the last Spanish troops left Peru, but the battle that sealed it ended in Ayacucho on December 9, 1824.

#### *Return to Absolutism, 1823–34*

When Ferdinand returned to absolute power in 1823, he reversed all of the liberal legislation, abrogated the 1812 Constitution and tried for the rest of his reign to restore the 1814 status quo, with the exception of reinstating the Inquisition. However, as much as Ferdinand claimed to turn back the clock, he was aware of the vulnerability exposed by his humiliating rescue by the French army and began a limited effort to reform the absolutist monarchy. Thus, in contrast to the complete rejection of change in 1814, in this second decade he began to show signs of potential compromise with the liberals, beginning with a partial amnesty, and a few very minor reforms, like establishing a free market in grain.<sup>31</sup> These gestures were not enough to win the loyalty of the liberals, many of whom had gone into exile but continued to conspire. On the other hand, even this slight change of course alienated some of his absolutist and clerical supporters. These disgruntled supporters began to congregate around the childless Ferdinand's likely heir to the throne, his brother Carlos. Although Carlos' political views at this point were never quite clear, by the 1830s his supporters had coalesced into the "Carlists," who would mount the last major armed resistance to liberalism in a brutal civil war (1833–39).

What turned the ideological conflict into civil war was the succession battle that opened when Ferdinand had a child in October 1830 with his fourth wife, María Cristina. Because the child was a girl, succession practices made her potential claim to the throne weak, and the Carlists exploited this weakness to make

the case that Carlos should be the rightful heir.<sup>32</sup> To defend the cause of Isabel, Ferdinand and his wife cultivated the strategic support of moderate liberals, with vague promises to step up the reformist direction of the regime. While Ferdinand was still alive, the turmoil remained submerged, but at his death on September 29, 1833, civil war broke out between supporters of Isabel, led by Queen Regent Maria Cristina, and Carlos. What was nominally a succession crisis in fact opened the floodgates of political conflict, incorporating all the stakeholders hoping to take advantage of this liminal moment to define the country's political future. Beneath the official banner of *Carlistas* and *Isabelinos*, the motives of the participants varied widely, from Carlist peasants defending their traditional social and economic order to radical urban middle classes pushing for empowered local governments, to priests hoping for a return to the theocratic medieval monarchy. But at the level of high politics, the Carlist War marked a decisive turning point in the struggle between absolutism and liberalism, clearing the way for what would be a permanent political transformation.

### 1833–1845: The Construction of the Liberal State

Although only a decade had passed since the liberal cause had been defeated on the battlefield by French armies in 1823, the context for this final phase of the absolutist/liberal struggle in Spain had changed considerably, in favor of the liberals. First, the succession crisis divided the absolutists, weakening their cause considerably. While the Carlist forces mounted a powerful resistance in certain regions, they were never able to organize a successful national campaign that could capture the state. Second, the European context had been transformed by the next wave of liberal revolutions, beginning in France in 1830, followed by Belgium in 1832 and in Portugal in 1834. Britain, following its evolutionary path, passed the 1832 Reform Bill, which opened an era of liberal dominance in that country. These regime changes effectively broke the alliance of international powers that had been willing to intervene to preserve the absolutist restorations, as they had in Spain in 1823. By 1834, Britain, France, Spain and Portugal had signed the Quadruple Alliance, explicitly a non-aggression pact but implicitly a liberal alliance, constituting four of the five liberal states (Belgium was required to be neutral) in Europe before 1848.

#### *The Carlist War*

Despite the more favorable context, violence and conflict permeated the construction of the liberal state. Most obviously, the basic foundations of the new state were hammered out during one of the most costly civil wars of the nineteenth century. The first Carlist supporters rebelled within days after Ferdinand's death, but the insurrection became a civil war in 1834 when some regular army units and their leaders joined the rebel cause. For most of the war, the Carlist regular and irregular troops were confined to the movement's strongholds in the northeast of the peninsula, but during 1836–37, they launched several national campaigns that brought the war as far south as Andalucía.<sup>33</sup> The main Carlist forces were defeated in 1839, when the victorious General Baldomero Espartero signed the *Convenio* of Vergara on August 31, but the last Carlist resistance was not fully extinguished until

May of 1840. While the victory cleared the way for the consolidation of the liberal revolution, the war also had the effect of increasing the power of military officers like Espartero, who rode the public adulation to political careers.<sup>34</sup>

The path from military to politics was facilitated by the divided and weakly organized character of the emerging liberal political class. Thus, the divisions that had opened up between moderates and *exaltados* during the *Trienio* coalesced into nascent political parties, the Moderates and Progressives, neither of which accepted the other as a legitimate opposition. The parties were very loosely structured, with little formal party organization beyond Madrid, no expectation of party discipline in parliamentary votes, and internally divided by factions that were often more associated with individuals than ideas. Thus, the parties did little more than stake out a basic ideological terrain, defined by the major party newspaper and, significantly, dueling constitutions. Perhaps because this formative stage of party construction occurred against the backdrop of civil war, leadership was as likely to be demonstrated through military prowess as previous political experience.<sup>35</sup> While this situation did increase the percentage of military men in the government during the 1850s–60s, they took their place in Moderate or Progressive governments, not military dictatorships.<sup>36</sup>

#### *Moderate and Progressive Constitutions and Platforms*

While the emerging groups were loosely structured, their initial positions seemed to frame an unbridgeable gap that could only lead to more conflict. Thus, on the one hand, the Moderates, in collaboration with the absolutist reformers, approved the *Estatuto Real* in 1834, more of a road map than a constitution, since it was issued as a gift from the Crown. It established two legislative houses, with an appointed and noble upper house and a lower house with very limited suffrage that enfranchised about 1 percent of the male population, and it was according to these restricted criteria that the first elections were held. In response to the perceived inadequacy of the reforms, local *exaltados* mounted insurrections in cities and towns across the country in 1835–36 in the name of popular sovereignty that included demands for the Constitution of 1812, anti-clerical riots that resulted in the deaths of several dozen friars, the formation of revolutionary *juntas* and militia units, the forced closure of monasteries, and administrative decentralization. In Barcelona, one of the most insurrectionary cities, the local revolutionary junta mobilized 13 militia battalions with a total of 12,000 men from all social ranks. Buoyed by the wave of revolution, Progressive liberals were appointed to head a new government and the Queen Regent briefly accepted the Constitution of 1812.

And yet, what seemed like a replay of the *Trienio* quickly diverged towards a new framework of the two liberal parties competing to define liberalism against democracy. Most dramatically, the Progressive government of 1836 dropped the longstanding commitment to the Constitution of 1812 and its universal male suffrage and drafted a new Constitution in 1837, which accepted the two legislative houses, gave more power to the monarch than in 1812, and offered only 5 percent of adult males access to the suffrage. The new Constitution affirmed the principle of national sovereignty, while legislative power was shared between monarch and parliament. The monarch had the right to veto legislation and to convoke new elections, thus defining the new constitutional role of the Crown as moderator in a

party system of government. There were some signature elements that would be associated with the Progressives, including popularly elected city governments, the institutionalization of the citizen militia, a partly elected upper house, a softer version of the defense of Catholicism as the national religion, and an explicit inclusion of some civil rights, particularly freedom of the press. Nevertheless, the Constitution of 1837 signified that the new Progressive Party had effectively joined the ranks of elitist liberalism, disputing with the Moderates over the details but not the substance of restrictive participation.

The Moderates had their turn to define their stance in the Constitution of 1845, which illuminated both the similarities and the core differences with the Progressives. The structure of a strong monarch and two houses of parliament remained, but the upper house and the Crown held even more power than in the 1837 Constitution. The upper house was unelected and largely appointed by the Crown, which also retained the right to initiate legislation, appoint ministers and dissolve the Cortes. The suffrage for the lower house was also further restricted, from 5 percent back to 1 percent, and the crucial articles on the election of local governments and the citizen militia were deleted. In 1844, the Moderate government created the Civil Guard, a national police force that was meant to be a professional (and state-controlled) replacement for the citizen militia. And in 1846, the Moderate government passed a local government law that tried to close down this important site of popular empowerment and mobilization with an appointed mayor, the restriction of suffrage to wealthy taxpayers and the reduction of local government powers from legislative to deliberative. Finally, the Constitution included an uncompromising declaration of the state's obligation to maintain Catholic unity.

Aside from the subtle differences between the Moderate Constitution and the Progressive Constitution, what really distinguished the Progressives' political practice was their contradictory and complex links with the local radical political culture of mobilization that combined direct action with democratic local institutions, especially the popularly elected city councils and militia units. On the one hand, the Progressive Party nurtured this culture by defending these local institutions, and used the pressure provided by grassroots mobilization to pressure the Moderates and the Crown to let them form governments. Thus, all of the major transitions to Progressive governments, in 1835, 1840 and 1854, depended as much on popular insurrection as on military *pronunciamientos*. On the other hand, the Progressive elites shared the Moderates' distrust of the "vigilant people," and thus were always ambivalent about calling on them to back up their authority. This ambivalent relationship with grassroots insurrectionism kept the Progressives from working to channel it into a mass base for the party and, as a result, weakened the coherence and effectiveness of the Progressive Party in the national political arena.

The Moderate Party had more ideological coherence as well as the support of the Crown, which allowed it to control the agenda for much of the period between the end of the Carlist War and the revolution of 1868. In particular, the Moderates and their Constitution dominated the government from 1845 to 1854, and then from 1856. And yet, in practice, Moderate hegemony was less stable than it appeared. First, there were the periodic interludes of Progressive rule, instigated

by a combination of popular mobilization and *pronunciamientos*, as in 1840–43, when the Progressive General Espartero wrested the regency from the Maria Cristina, and again in 1854–56, when Espartero took the reins of government and reinstated the Progressive Constitution. Second, Moderate leadership was paradoxically subordinated by the very force that propped it up, i.e., the Crown. Thus, while Isabel helped the Moderates keep the Progressives out of power, her support of the Moderates was a double-edged sword, rendering them dependent and subservient. The intervention of the Crown was evident in the rapid turnover of governments, which averaged between six months and a year in duration, even when led by the same party.<sup>37</sup> And finally, during the last decade before 1868, the boundaries between Moderates and Progressives began to blur, when elements of both parties came together to form the so-called Liberal Union, whose mission was to preserve an orderly liberal state in the face of an increasingly uncooperative Isabel II and an emerging democratic opposition.

*The Parameters of a Liberal Political, Juridical and Administrative Order, 1833–45*

And yet, none of this inter- and intra-party jockeying for power prevented the implementation of a new political, juridical and administrative order that embodied the basic elements of the classic liberal state. The dynamic that evolved was an awkward and unstable form of dialogue between the two parties that nevertheless pushed forward a permanent transformation that incorporated elements of both parties' platforms. Thus, significantly, much of the fundamental liberal legislation passed by either Progressive or Moderate governments was not reversed, despite the rotating constitutions. While Progressive governments led the way with desamortization and sale of land, and Moderates took the lead in the bureaucratic construction of the state, the effect was cumulative transformation. The reason for this underlying consistency is that both parties agreed about the basic structure of a *liberal* state, while disagreeing about the level of democratization implied in the size of the suffrage, the empowerment of local governments and the existence of citizen militias. The achievement was all the more notable given the vacuum of central authority in many areas as a result of the never fully reconstituted old-regime state under Ferdinand. In other words, it was during this period, particularly the Moderate decade of 1844–54, that the solid framework of a uniform and centralized state was finally put into place, even though limited resources continued to constrain its effective reach.<sup>38</sup>

In terms of a liberal order, both parties accepted the principle that the Crown was subject to the constitution, and that the citizens, defined by wealth as a measure of "capacity," were represented in parliamentary bodies. In economic terms, both parties agreed on the goal of establishing a regime of secure private property that transferred much of the valuable real estate from so-called "dead hands" (*manos muertas*) to the open market. Thus, they definitively abolished noble entail, allowing noble families to sell off pieces of their estates, and confiscated and sold most of the Church lands. In the last phase of land sale under the Madoz law of 1855, the state sold off common lands belonging to the municipalities, all to private and mostly wealthy owners. The fundamental transformation of the old-regime Church, divested of its land, many of its religious houses, its title and its privileges, was eventually accepted by both parties. In the 1851 Concordat negotiated

with the Vatican by the Moderates, the Church had to accept the expropriation and the closures in exchange for state subsidies, although the agreement allowed for the re-establishment of religious schools and some monasteries based on the liberal criterion of “public utility.”<sup>39</sup>

In judicial and administrative terms, the liberals followed the basic principles of uniformity, rationality and centralism that had informed most of the state-building projects since the French Revolution. Thus, they established a set of uniform laws and tax system, through abolishing (again) the seigneuries and their private jurisdiction, and the internal customs barriers and special *fueros* that had been maintained from medieval times.<sup>40</sup> The principles of uniformity and rationality were also apparent in the implementation of standard weights and measures, a new civil and penal code with modern courts and prisons, the professionalization of the bureaucracy, a national army, and the division of the national territory into 49 provinces, each governed by a representative of the state and a provincial governing body, or *Diputación*. Instead of the complex map of old-regime local and regional administrations, the provincial civil governors were supposed to function like spokes in a wheel radiating out from Madrid. Likewise, the establishment of a national police force, the Civil Guard, brought the state into everyday contact with many rural areas for the first time. And, within the limited “discourse of capacity” that defined active citizenship, the principle of civil equality framed the at least theoretical promise of both universal military service and primary education.

The other key component of the new liberal order was a redefined relationship with the empire. The 1837 Constitution marked the major turning point, since it abandoned the claim to integrate colonies and metropole into the nation and instead accepted the nineteenth-century liberal norm of the principle of two sets of rules.<sup>41</sup> However, the Spanish liberals postponed—indefinitely—consideration of the “special laws” that would govern the colonies. Instead, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines would be governed by “exceptional” rule of the military captains-general and the appointed civil governors until their independence at the end of the century. In the void created by the never-defined special laws, on the one hand, and the decline of old-regime competing bodies, on the other, the Captain General emerged as the de-facto despotic authority.<sup>42</sup> The distinction between citizens of the nation and subjects of the empire was a common contradictory feature of all the liberal empires of the nineteenth century, expressed in both political and economic terms. Politically, colonial subjects lacked the right of self-government, and economically, the colonies were protected spaces for economic investment that belied the liberal principles of *laissez faire*.

The Spanish liberal state also mirrored other European colonial powers in expansionist schemes in the late 1850s and 1860s. Thus, by 1861, Spanish armies and navies were in the South China Sea, North Africa and the Caribbean, with various kinds of “micro-militarist” projects in Vietnam, Santo Domingo, Morocco and Mexico.<sup>43</sup> While these small projects in and of themselves indicate a trajectory of imperial eclipse, they demonstrated that Spain was still acting like an imperial power, seeking to build nationalist pride, to negotiate favorable trade agreements through “gunboat diplomacy” intimidation, and to protect existing colonies. Moreover, these mid-century adventures were popular, especially the so-called “War of Africa” in 1859–60.<sup>44</sup> While it is easy to look back and see these colonial

adventures as part of the inevitable decline of Spain's empire, it was really only in the last third of the century that the contrasting trajectories of Spain and the other colonial powers became apparent. In other words, it was only during the period of rapid European colonial expansion after 1870 that Spain's imperial "eclipse" became exceptional among the western European liberal states.

### **1845–1868: The Liberal State: From Consolidation to Crisis**

Although the liberal administrative structure in Spain was consolidated by the early 1840s, the political system itself never stabilized. On the one hand, it was internally undermined by the lack of basic consensus on the rules of the game among its constituent parts, especially the queen and the Moderate and Progressive Parties, abetted by their military allies. On the other hand, its elitist limits were externally challenged by a growing democratic opposition, formally constituted in the Democratic Party in 1849. More important than the platform, which included universal male suffrage, the abolition of consumption taxes and more expansive civil rights, was the Democrats' unambiguous embrace of popular politics and the empowerment of the "people." The combination of internal division and external pressure culminated in the crisis of the regime and the revolution of 1868 that deposed the queen. While there was a specific rhythm to the Spanish case, these tensions existed elsewhere, albeit with different outcomes. Thus, the Second Reform Bill (1867) in Britain confirmed that liberal system's evolutionary flexibility, while France followed its rupture path to the establishment of a democratic Third Republic (1870). While Spain headed down this latter path but failed to sustain the democratic republic, it was not the failure of Spain's republic but the survival of the French one that was exceptional in the 1870s and 1880s.

Thus, in the decades after the 1848 revolutions, the major political issue remained the consolidation of liberal constitutional monarchies, not the transition to democracy. In fact, the lasting impact of 1848 was the creation of new liberal states, in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Piedmont, followed by Italy in 1859–61. But moving from institutional transformation to consolidation was difficult everywhere. Political parties were still weak and elitist, elections were mostly staged from above, the role of the constitutional monarch was never clearly articulated, and the pressure of grassroots democratic, republican and socialist mobilization to open up the system was increasing. In general terms, liberal elites responded to the 1848 revolutions with conservative retrenchment, followed by a wave of reforms and insurrections that began with Spain's 1854 revolution and culminated in the 1868–74 period.<sup>45</sup>

Spain's conservative retrenchment began earlier, in 1843, when the Progressive interlude led by interim Regent General Espartero was ended by a counter-coup spearheaded by the Moderate General Ramon Maria Narváez, who helped the Moderates return to power. Under the new Constitution of 1845, the Moderates began nearly a decade of continuous rule, supported by the queen who, rather than playing the constitutional role of arbiter, aligned her fortunes exclusively with that party.

The 1854 revolution erupted out of the frustration of those excluded from this elite drama, but still unfolded within the framework of consolidating the liberal constitutional monarchy. Thus, at the national level, even the Progressives focused,

not on getting rid of Isabel but on “enveloping” her within the liberal system through a reinstatement of the militia and the elected local governments and a fully elected legislative branch reinforced by the legitimacy of national sovereignty. Due to the blockage in the system, the initiative had to come from the army, but the Progressives continued to benefit from the popular insurrectionary tradition, which was now well established in the urban areas and spreading into the rural hinterlands.<sup>46</sup> It was in fact the raising of barricades in Madrid in July that prompted the queen to plead with Espartero to form a new government. Street politics mingled with the revived institutional channels of popular city governments and militia to promote a dynamic local political sphere that challenged exclusionary liberal rule with formal and informal democratic forms of participation. But, in the end, Progressive elites in Madrid were still ambivalent about institutionalizing and channeling this grassroots political energy, symbolized by Espartero’s refusal to back a second popular revolution in 1856 to prevent a Moderate counter-coup by General Leopold O’Donnell. After 1856, the Progressive Party became increasingly irrelevant in local popular politics, replaced by the emerging Democratic Party (1849) and later the Federal Republican Party (1868), who would lead the next insurrections.

Most liberals of both parties who were invested in consolidating the liberal constitutional monarchy realized that they could not simply return to the era of Moderate hegemony. Thus, O’Donnell took the initiative in carving out a new path, forming a coalition party, the Liberal Union, which aimed to create a centrist space that, with the motto “to conserve while progressing,” would transcend the factionalism and exclusion that had characterized politics since the 1830s as well as reduce the intervention of a monarch whose commitment to liberal constitutionalism eroded considerably over the last decade of her reign. While the Liberal Union survived for a record five years (1858–1863), sustained by a pragmatic politics of economic development and imperial adventures, it could neither unify the political class nor institute a workable party rotation. In the last five years of Isabel’s reign, the regime descended into full crisis mode, exacerbated by the deaths of the two most powerful Moderate Generals, Narváez (1868) and O’Donnell (1867). When Progressives and Democrats finally “pronounced” in 1868, joined by many of the Liberal Union members, the Isabeline monarchy was left with few defenders.

## **Conclusion: Achievements and Limits of the Liberal Political Transformation**

Evaluating the achievements and limits of Spain’s nineteenth-century transition from absolutism to liberalism requires establishing a set of criteria that take into account both the aims of contemporary liberals and the comparative framework of what was possible in western Europe in the early and mid-nineteenth century. From both these perspectives, what seems clear is that the legal, juridical and political framework, as established in the constitutions, legal codes and institutions, corresponded to the general parameters of contemporary liberal transitions.

A monarchist executive, bicameral parliaments with highly restricted suffrage, censorship, a lack of "free and fair" elections and weakly articulated political parties were common features of all the liberal states. Across the liberal systems "representation" was tenuous at best. And in most cases, before 1868 elections in liberal regimes did not determine governmental changes but were staged to confirm them, while party rotation occurred no less often in Spain, with an increase in coalitions like the Liberal Union in the post-1848 period.

At the same time, it is true that there were important weaknesses in the Spanish liberal system as it was designed to function. Perhaps the most obvious internal defect was the inability of the major players to work together to keep the system running, creating an especially powerful role for military intervention and insurrectionism. Most obviously, the Crown did not play the arbitrating role that could have stabilized the conservative liberal order against both absolutist reaction and democratic revolution, as occurred under Queen Victoria in Britain. Partly as a result, the Moderate and Progressive Parties could not develop a working relationship of peaceful alternation in power, with the Crown virtually always favoring the former while increasingly drawn to anti-liberal conspiring after 1854. Thus, when the Progressive Party gained power, it was through the mechanism of military *pronunciamientos*, not elections, thus turning military men into political power brokers, albeit liberal ones. Regime changes were also regularly accompanied by popular insurrections, but the oligarchical basis of both parties limited the effort to channel popular politics into a broader constituency for the regime, and both major parties ultimately rejected popular legitimation of their authority.

While the elitism of the liberal system limited its appeal beyond the narrow political class, the rest of the population was not inert. Popular politicization began during the war of independence and continued to develop and expand over the course of the period, especially during the frequent insurrectionary interludes, in 1820 to 1823, 1835 to 1836, 1840 to 1843, and 1854 to 1856. While it is true that the liberal state put most of its centralizing energy into repressing this political expression, this was an era of broadening political engagement, even though not yet incorporated into legal channels of participation. But again this was the norm everywhere in Europe. Other than the aborted 1848 revolutions, nowhere in western Europe did democracy supplant liberalism before 1868, and after that the French democratic republic was more the exception than the rule. Thus, while it is true that the mid-century Spanish liberal state did not even have a project to integrate the masses as citizens or to create a more equitable division of resources and power, it is anachronistic to call this absence a failure. It was precisely this elitism that strengthened the next generation of democrats, republicans, socialists and anarchists whose struggles for popular empowerment put liberal regimes on the defensive in the following decades. Even the more structural process of nationalizing the masses through roads, schools, military service and other state institutions does not really get underway until later in the century, including in the iconic French case.

Nevertheless, the building blocks for such a project were certainly less solid in Spain, as a result of the state's chronic fiscal poverty. The war of independence, the loss of most of the American empire and the Carlist War had left the Spanish state impoverished, while the elitist foundation of the new liberal regime prevented the

implementation of serious tax reform that could have stabilized the state's finances. Thus, to some degree, the systematic bureaucratic reorganization of the state, with orders passing from the central government to the provincial civil governor to the municipalities, could only be imperfectly implemented due to lack of resources. For many ordinary Spaniards the only arms of the liberal state that effectively reached down to the level of everyday life were the police and military. For the local and provincial elites, the government's presence was mostly felt during elections, when they were bribed, intimidated and cajoled into supporting the government's candidates.

Spanish historians have argued about whether this chronic poverty generated an abnormally "weak" nineteenth-century state. Proponents of this framework have argued that the centralizing mandate of the liberal state was never more than empty rhetoric, while pre-existing local elites continued to dominate political life for their own benefit. The emergence of *caciques*, or local intermediaries between communities and the state, have been linked in this model to the void created by a state that could not fulfill its modernizing mission to conquer "localisms" and absorb the national territory into a uniform and impersonal unit. On the other hand, the recent trend in Spain, as elsewhere, has been to question whether modern political development should be measured by the march of centralization. Thus, in studies on nationalization, historians have demonstrated that local, regional and national identities could coexist and even reinforce one another. Likewise, they have acknowledged that local and personal networks remained important channels of power and influence alongside bureaucratic institutions, and that they were not simply a sign of Mediterranean political backwardness. And finally, historians have increasingly focused on the local political sphere, not as the bastion of tradition and pre-modern political forms, but as a fertile site for modern political identities to develop.

Instead of analyzing the local/center dynamic in terms of a unidirectional modernizing trajectory that Spain failed to implement, we can simply acknowledge that dynamic as a key element of the constitution of the liberal state. Given the reality of state poverty, the state was indeed ineffective in "delivering the goods" in many areas. Reinforcing this reality was the relative unimportance of the capital city of Madrid, which didn't have the economic, demographic or political magnetism of a Paris or London. While the state could be strong in controlling elections or repressing insurrections, in other areas local and provincial governments were left with de facto responsibility to sustain their local economies and education systems, and organize tax collection and infrastructure repair. Because the central state could not really impose its will through the civil governors, who lacked the personnel and resources to carry out their mandate, it did need men on the ground who were embedded in local systems of power. But that emerging *caciquismo* was also a modern product of the liberal revolution, a mechanism that emerged to articulate the new state within the particular local/central dynamic of nineteenth-century Spain. As with the *pronunciamientos* and military intervention, *caciquismo* was another channel through which the liberal state functioned, not prima facie evidence of its failure.

In the end, declaring the "failure" or "success" of Spain's liberal revolution is too crude a historical binary. Spain established the parameters of a liberal state

with all its constituent parts, comparable to those of other liberal countries, but it struggled with consolidating a stable and legitimate imperial nation. In comparative terms, it was certainly less successful at “honing war and statehood” than the wealthier northwestern European countries, just poised for dramatic imperial, economic and industrial expansion. If the period between 1820 and 1860 marked the opening of the significant differential between Europe and the non-West, it also opened that differential within Europe. But differential does not signify failure, and, especially in political terms, the gap between north and southwestern Europe was not so clear in 1868. Thus, Spain’s liberal era began, if not at the head of the pack, then not lagging far behind either, containing sufficient dynamism to imagine various possible futures.

—— PART II ——

1868–1923: THE EMERGENCE  
OF MASS POLITICS

# POLITICS ON THE MARGINS OF THE LIBERAL STATE: FROM 1848 TO THE “SEXENIO” (1868–1874)

## **Introduction: Mid-Nineteenth-century Popular Politics in Comparative Perspective**

During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the liberal regime was besieged from all sides by opposition movements responding to the transformations of the liberal revolution, culminating in the period of political turmoil and experimentation known as the “*Sexenio*.” The opposition movements came from across the political spectrum, from Carlists, to democrats, republicans, an embryonic labor movement, and anti-colonial mobilization in Cuba, but all emerged out of dissatisfaction with some aspect of the moderate liberal state that had been constructed in the 1830s–40s. This mobilization peaked during the “*Sexenio*,” when the conservative Isabelline monarchy was overthrown, replaced first by a democratic monarchy (1869–72) and then by a Republic (1873–74). There was nothing peculiarly Spanish about this political ferment; in the years between the revolutions of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871, populist forces on the left and right struggled against the construction and consolidation of elite liberal regimes that left them on the margins of political, economic and social power. From the right, absolutist and traditionalist forces rejected the loss of divine authority and communal identity, while from the left, democrats, republicans and the socialists and anarchists of the First International pushed for either broader inclusion or revolutionary transformation to a more egalitarian society. In general terms, the outcome of these mid-century struggles was the consolidation of liberal, not democratic, constitutional monarchy, as the dominant form of government in western Europe in the latter third of the century.

Instead of the traditional reading of the *Sexenio* as the moment when Spain failed to make the timely transition from liberalism to democracy (with the exceptional French Third Republic as the “norm”), this chapter will frame it as a window into the variety of political projects that contested elements of the liberal status quo. Along with rejecting the modernization trajectory that assumes a natural progression from absolutism to liberalism to democracy (and socialism, in the Marxist

version), this more open-ended perspective allows us to see more transverse fractures and tensions that did not always run along a single traditional/modern or right/left binary. There were certainly issues that divided political groups along these lines, such as a confessional state vs. freedom of religion, monarchical sovereignty vs. popular, or restricted voting vs. universal suffrage. But there were other equally contentious struggles, particularly over individual vs. communitarian visions of the social order and centralization vs. decentralization of political power, which transgressed these boundaries.

For nineteenth-century European moderate liberals, the central state was the agent of progress, and centralization was viewed as a process that both homogenized the population into individual citizens and rationalized the institutional structure of government. From this perspective, communalisms, localisms and provincialisms were viewed as threats to the modernizing project of the liberal state. The unbending centralism of the Spanish Moderate liberals was also exacerbated by the association between localism and revolutionary movements that had begun during the 1820–23 *trienio* and consolidated over the course of each revolutionary rupture from 1837 to 1840–43 and 1854–56.

Finally, Spanish liberals associated provincialism in part with “backwardness” and, equally important, with political separatism. This link derived from the betrayal of the overseas “provinces,” as they were called, that had separated from Spain in the 1820s. It was kept fresh in the mid-nineteenth century by the ongoing conspiracies among the Cuban creole elites, who vacillated between seeking annexation to the United States in the 1840s and early 1850s, or reform within the Spanish empire, which peaked in the 1860s, or independence, which was declared in 1868 after disappointment with the Madrid government’s latest refusal to enact serious reforms, including representative government. The anti-reformist Spanish Party in Cuba, with its powerful lobby in the peninsula, stoked the fear that autonomy and separatism were two sides of the same coin rather than distinct options.

Resistance to the liberal principles of centralization and individual autonomy were common threads linking the opposition movements of the period across the political spectrum. These basic conflicts about the political organization of society joined other issues, like the social question or religion, to constitute the contested terrain of modern politics. Not surprisingly, much of that contestation in the mid-nineteenth century occurred at the local level. This reality was in part due to the weakly articulated national political networks and structures, from political parties to communication and a just emerging national public sphere, all of which was not unique to Spain. But it was also a paradoxical consequence of the liberal revolution itself, which, despite its centralizing statist mission, also created the need for individual participation, embodied in the very concept of the autonomous citizen and his (not her) rights of free speech, association and the press, however fitfully and reluctantly these were implemented.<sup>1</sup>

This very reluctance in turn created the dynamic that evolved, between periods of relatively flourishing local political mobilization followed by periods when this space was shut down by nervous governments. At the same time, the reluctance of the liberal state to nurture the cultivation of citizen participation at the local level created an image of a hostile state as the enemy rather than the protector of liberty. One response of opponents was to frame the local, not only as the site of popular

politics, but as the theoretical source of alternative political projects. Thus, many of the opposition movements of the period imagined building their new political order from the local to the national, in direct opposition to the top-down project of the moderate liberals.

One final consequence of this dynamic of mutual suspicion was that all the opposition movements adopted a hybrid political culture of legality and violence, publishing newspapers and forming clubs, associations, mutual aid societies and syndicates in the public sphere when that was possible, as during the interludes of 1840–43 and 1854–56, and retreating to clandestine cells that hatched insurrectionary plans, as did both democrats and Carlists in the late 1850s–60s. In other words, there was no clear distinction between “reformist” and “revolutionary” opposition movements, between those that sought peaceful integration vs. those that sought to overthrow the existing system. Indeed, both the Moderate Party and the Progressive Party resorted to violence when they were out of power. Without a consistent path toward peaceful alternation of power, let alone integration of opposition movements, there was as yet no reliable “reformist” option of expanding the parameters of the elitist liberal state.

While the fluctuation between clandestine and legal political space made it difficult to construct stable movement structures at home, it had the paradoxical impact of increasing transnational communication and links, particularly on the left. Because clandestine periods often led to exile for the main activists, groups of international exiles congregated in relatively “free” spaces, such as London in the 1840s and 1850s, where Giuseppe Mazzini, Karl Marx and Louis Blanc, to mention the most famous, debated and published their programs and ideas.<sup>2</sup> Spanish activists were fully integrated into this milieu, both participating as exiles in Paris, London and Italy, and hosting European activists, especially French and Italian, in Spain.<sup>3</sup> A famous case was the 1868 visit of Italian anarchist Giuseppe Fanelli to Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid, where he introduced republican workers’ groups to the “anti-authoritarian” ideas of Mikhail Bakunin, Marx’s competitor in the Workers’ First International.

Another strand of this radical democratic transnational culture was the abolitionist movement, which, during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, connected activists in Cuba, Puerto Rico and Spain who aimed to bring the colonies into the constitutional framework of democratic liberalism.<sup>4</sup> They challenged the double inconsistency of colonial regimes built on enslaved populations and suffering under unrepresentative exceptional rule, which had never been regularized with the “special laws” promised in the 1830s. Colonial reform had been resisted by a dominant alliance of slaveholders and conservative liberals, who feared the disruptive consequences of both abolition and representative government for a “white” minority population. Against this resistance, the transnational Abolitionist Society defended these principles in an emerging “colonial public sphere” in the 1860s, as part of a broader project of expanding the limits of the liberal revolution (without, however, questioning “natural” racial hierarchies). This movement culminated during the *Sexenio*, when Spanish democrats and republicans formally adopted a transatlantic democratic project that incorporated abolition and colonial self-rule.

More important than the probably limited transnational contact was the role of opposition movements in nurturing the grassroots process of engaging ordinary

people (mostly men) in the political issues of the day, creating popular channels into active citizenship even in a regime of limited suffrage. As one local study of three Andalusian towns reveals, networks of sociability revolved around competing political identities. On the one side was the world of Catholic associations, confraternities and religious orders, while on the other side were the militias, cafés, secret societies, mutual aid societies, newspapers and reading rooms.<sup>5</sup> Beginning in the urban centers that were the most fertile breeding grounds for political socialization in the nineteenth century, popular opposition politics extended into parts of the rural world, although it is not clear yet to what extent. From the peasant Carlist organizations to republican vintners in Catalonia to the rebellious farm workers in Andalucía, rural people joined political struggles against specific measures of the liberal state, from religious policy to land sales.

From this wider lens, the *Sexenio* takes shape as the culmination of a long-term process of politicization rather than as a superficial explosion of unfocused energy. While the *Sexenio* brought popular politics of all sorts from the margins to the center, none of the governments were able to either channel, satisfy or silence the multiple voices unleashed by the revolution. At the same time, the unresolved tensions between elitist liberalism and popular participation remained a central feature of European politics, making Spain an example of, rather than an exception to, this broader pattern.

## The Major Players

### Carlists

The oldest popular movement was Carlism, defeated as a serious regime alternative during the 1833–39 war, but revived, especially after the mid-1860s, in the traditional strongholds of the Basque Country, Navarre and parts of Catalonia. In the period between 1838 and the 1868 revolution, Carlists debated over whether to pursue a legal route to power through parliamentary participation, winning several seats in the 1867 election, or an insurrectionary route, exemplified by failed attempts in 1846–49, 1855 and 1860. The insurrectionary route gained traction during the *Sexenio* (the Second Carlist War, 1872–76), when the revolutionary government pursued secularizing policies that undermined the status of Catholic unity in Spain. Thus, the 1869 Constitution recognized religious freedom, the suppression of new religious orders and the expulsion of the Jesuits, and in 1870 the Cortes chose Amadeo, an Italian prince from the House of Savoy, which was an arch-enemy of the Pope, to replace Isabella on the throne. Nevertheless, the two faces of the Carlist movement coexisted throughout the period, together constituting the dominant political force in the region. In the 1871 elections, Carlists joined Republicans in an “anti-Amadeo” alliance, winning 51 Cortes seats in 26 provinces, and, running on their own in 1872, they netted 38 seats in 19 provinces, with absolute majorities in Vizcaya and Navarre. At the same time, by 1873, the Carlist army had mobilized 50,000 men in the Basque Country and Navarre, establishing a virtual insurrectionary state with tax collection and an administrative structure in their strongholds.

In contrast to the older view of Carlism's survival as evidence of the failure of Spain's political modernization, recent scholarship has pointed out that the dynamic between popular revolution and counter-revolution existed across southern Europe in this period, from France to Portugal and Italy.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Carlism was not a static movement, defending "timeless" traditional values, but a flexible and evolving political force that responded to the changes wrought by the liberal revolution.<sup>7</sup> Thus, while there was a general continuity of Carlist ideology, defending absolute monarchy, religious unity, the *fueros* and the priority of community bonds over individual rights, the emphasis shifted over time.

During the *Sexenio*, Carlists focused on the secularizing agenda of the regime, which, in their minds, threatened community life by aiming to replace the hierarchical cohesion of confessional unity with the "anarchy" of unfettered individualism. This threat continued to draw an interclass and popular base, mobilized around a shared way of life more than material interests. Exacerbating the tensions over religious policy was the European context in which the Vatican had declared war on liberalism in its 1864 Syllabus of Errors, after the Savoy monarchy had alienated the Pope in its constitution of the Italian nation-state (1859–60). On a more practical level of religious practice, the *Sexenio* governments proposed a "rationalization" of parish units, which was fiercely resisted in Carlist territory. Although the *fueros* remained as a potent symbol of anti-liberalism, epitomizing the values of tradition, community and local over state power, they were a secondary concern in 1868. It was only in the wake of the Second Carlist War that the Restoration liberals blamed the special privileges of the *fueros* for preventing the integration of the Basques into the liberal state and abolished them for good.<sup>8</sup>

### Cuban Separatists

The other force that mounted a serious military challenge to the Spanish government was the Cuban independence movement.<sup>9</sup> Although the Cuban rebellion broke out two weeks after the September 1868 revolution in Spain, it was not, as in the case of the Carlist rebellion, a defensive response, but a parallel event. Originally planned for a year earlier, the Cuban rebellion symbolized the discouragement of creole elites, who had been advocating over the previous decade for a colonial reform based on the abolition of the slave trade, gradual and indemnified abolition of slavery, tariff reduction and representative autonomous government institutions. Although the Spanish government finally abolished the slave trade in 1867, it did not move toward satisfying any of the other demands, succumbing to pressure by the slaveholding Cuban lobby in Madrid as well as the Spanish business elite who benefited from the protectionist fiscal policies. In response, the balance shifted from autonomy to independence, especially among the creole elite on the poorer eastern side of the island. On October 10, 1868, the separatists issued their "Manifesto of the Revolutionary Junta of the Island of Cuba," modeled on the American Declaration of Independence, framed around its critique of a despotic government that had trampled on the universal rights of Cuban citizens. The coincidence of the revolutions in Cuba and Spain opened a new phase in the colonial conflict, after the provisional government in Madrid promised that it would include the colonies in the democratic revolution taking place in Spain.

### Democrats and Republicans

Within Spain, the popular roots of democratic revolution lay in the opposition movements on the left of the spectrum that had been developing since the 1830s. From the beginnings of the liberal revolution, local militias, secret societies and juntas had been loosely linked to the left wing of the Progressive party, part of an “advanced liberal political culture” that pushed the envelope of liberalism.<sup>10</sup> While there was never a complete split with local Progressive establishments, democratic and republican activists began to desert the Progressive Party in response to a series of perceived betrayals like the restrictive 1837 Constitution. Four democrats were elected to the Cortes in 1841, but local elections in the same year brought victory for republican–democratic slates in several cities, on a platform of the sovereignty of the nation, the abolition of the draft and the regressive consumption tax (*consumos*), and the expansion of political rights, including universal male suffrage. With the Moderate return to power and new restrictions on local government elections and authority in 1844, these channels closed down.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, inspired in part by the 1848 European revolutions, democrats, republicans and disillusioned Progressives came together in 1849 to form the Democratic Party, and in 1856 they founded a stable party newspaper (*La Discusión*), the essential lifeblood of a political organization in this period. Beyond the presence of the press in the public sphere, the unstable legality of party organizing outside the Progressive interlude of 1854–56 led activists to operate parallel secret societies with clandestine committees in almost all provinces. Thus, while the party gained 16 Cortes seats in 1854, these were reduced to one or two after 1856, with the party under constant threat of suspension. Meanwhile, the largest insurrections occurred in 1857 in Seville and 1861 in the Granadan city of Loja, mobilizing a mixed group of laborers, peasants and artisans in the name of a vague platform of democratic rights and land redistribution. Whether they participated for the equitable redistribution of land (*el reparto*), the abolition of *consumos* or universal suffrage, these movements can be framed as part of an emerging heterogeneous democratic and republican milieu that, like Carlism, moved seamlessly between insurrectionism and institutional participation, and old and new repertoires of collective action.

What made this heterogeneous milieu a definable “demo-republican” movement was a broad commitment among activists to certain key principles and to the ideal of a “community of active and vigilant citizens, equal in rights and liberties.”<sup>12</sup> With roots in the “early” liberalism of the Cortes of Cadiz, the mid-century demo-republican movement critiqued the limited application of active citizen rights in practice. Rooted also in the activist culture of local politics during the revolutionary junctures from the *trienio* (1820–23) on, the demo-republican culture prioritized popular participation over institution-building and located the source of emancipation in this local political arena. Most were thus implicit defenders of a decentralized state structure that would locate substantive political life where it was accessible to the ordinary citizen—but, unlike the Basque *fueros*, would be universally applied to all Spaniards. The idea of the democratic municipality also embodied the populist aspirations of an interclass movement that aimed at mobilizing the middling and lower sectors of society.<sup>13</sup>

Through the efforts to implement these ideals in local settings, the demo-republican movement created a range of alternative channels of political socialization. Many groups focused on preparing the popular classes for future citizenship, including cultural centers that combined basic education, libraries and reading rooms, conferences, choral music and political tutelage. The flagship organization in Madrid was the *Fomento de las Artes*, founded in 1859 and boasting 1,400 members and hundreds of adult and child students enrolled in its classes. Most of the important future leaders of the labor movement, including the founder of the Socialist Party (1879), Pablo Iglesias, and the anarchist Anselmo Lorenzo, received their first political education in this setting. Similar institutions, sometimes called *ateneos*, *círculos* or *casinos obreros*, were established in other cities, as well as in Catalan industrial towns like Reús (1859) and Manresa (1864). Citizen militia units were also sites of plebeian mobilization, especially in Barcelona where some units comprised a majority of workers.<sup>14</sup> Finally, democrats promoted cooperative societies for both consumers and producers, and mutual aid societies, which had been legalized in 1839.<sup>15</sup>

At the same time as the demo-republican movement promoted political socialization or "citizenization" for the masses, there were limits on its egalitarianism. Thus, many leaders saw themselves as tutors of the uneducated "people" (*pueblo*) who could not yet be trusted with untethered freedom. They also agreed that, while men could be educated into responsible citizenship, women's dependent status in society made them incapable of the autonomous identity required of an active citizen. Only in 1858 did one of the main activists, Fernando Garrido, defend the need for education and civil rights for women, while the first Association for Women's Education was constituted in 1869, a year after women were admitted into republican political clubs.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, the demo-republican Abolitionist Society operated within an assumption of racial hierarchy, arguing that abolition and individual rights would not produce "race war" but a natural order of free labor with "white" Spaniards and Creoles at the top. The debate between abolitionists and their opponents was thus conducted on a common racial terrain, with disagreement only about the potential impact of abolition on the stability of the existing racial order.<sup>17</sup> The racial contradictions of mid-nineteenth-century democrats were equally apparent among the Cuban separatists who constituted their independent and democratic Republic in 1869 without a definitive abolition of slavery. Thus, the democrats' community of citizens was, as elsewhere, stratified according to class, race and gender categories.

While there was agreement on certain broad issues, there were also serious disagreements within the demo-republican milieu, which exploded when republicans broke off to form the Federal Republican Party just after the September 1868 revolution. Aside from the usual personal rivalries, substantive divisions generally ran along two axes. The first was the form of regime, with Democrats willing to support a democratic monarchy and Republicans insisting that true democracy could only be achieved under a republic. Even republicans disagreed about the institutional structure of the republic, with federalists defending a bottom-up federal structure with significant local powers and unitarists (*unitarios*) proposing a top-down administrative decentralization.

The other line of division within the demo-republican culture was between so-called “individualists” and “socialists,” who debated the always contentious balance between equality and liberty in democratic theory. Socialist democrats like Fernando Garrido supported a range of social reforms that would provide the material base for individual citizen autonomy among the vaguely defined “working classes.” Further elaborated by federalist republican Francisco Pi y Margall, the state would intervene to partly level the playing field, providing cheap credit to small farmers, social welfare for the poor, free education and arbitration of labor conflicts. Not to be confused with Marxist socialism, with its concept of class struggle, socialist democrats and republicans imagined a harmonious and cooperative relationship between employers and workers that was modeled on French “utopian” socialist ideas.

On the other hand, the dominant wing of individualist or liberal democrats like Emilio Castelar defended a concept of individual sovereignty based on maximum autonomy, including unrestricted property rights, free trade and minimal state intervention, within the framework of a “self-regulating” economic and social order. These doctrinal divisions have also been linked to a broader cultural split in demo-republican circles, between a “respectable republicanism” and a plebeian street republicanism that partly overlapped with the liberal vs. socialist wings of the movement.<sup>18</sup> These competing cultures came to the fore during the *Sexenio*, when the gap between an official republicanism and a radicalized base became increasingly unbridgeable, undermining the viability of the democratic project. With the Restoration of 1875, most of the republican leaders other than Pi embraced the liberal and respectable version that would dominate the diminished world of republican politics until the twentieth century, with some, like Castelar, even adopting a “possibilist” attitude to working with the monarchy.

### **The Labor Movement and the First International**

Another, albeit minor, protagonist in the demo-republican milieu of the mid-nineteenth century was an emerging trade union movement, centered in Catalonia, which was the locus of Spain’s initial industrial development.<sup>19</sup> Following the same mobilizing rhythm of expansion during the more tolerant Progressive interludes of 1840–43 and 1854–56 and contraction during the long Moderate periods, the first weavers’ association was formed in 1840 with 3,000 members, linked to the radical wing of the local Progressive Party. Unions reappeared again in 1854, expanding into new trades and increasing the level of coordination. Formed mostly of skilled male workers in a textile industry that was undergoing a transformation of the structure of production that threatened their status, these nascent unions pursued interclass cooperation between employers and workers to create an emerging industrial system beneficial for both parties. The platform that took shape during the two Progressive *bienios* included the civil and political rights of workers to associate, to strike and to vote, as well as the promotion of social legislation around issues like arbitration boards, the length of the work day, safety inspections, free schools and anti-child-labor laws. While the unions focused specifically on workplace issues, the line between these organizations and the broader demo-republican milieu was blurred, as exemplified by the phenomenon of militia

units comprising workers from a single trade or emerging alongside a strike. Until 1868, this reformist unionism was the dominant language among the organized sectors of workers, but the *Sexenio* opened a new phase of competition between competing models of organization, which exploded in the debates at the 1870 Worker Congress.

The competing “workerist” ideology of the Workers’ First International (IWA) reached Spain through Giuseppe Fanelli’s aforementioned visit.<sup>20</sup> Founded in London in 1864, the International brought together heterogeneous strands of radical workers’ movements, but Karl Marx emerged as the dominant theoretician. Instead of the interclass cooperation of the demo-republican milieu, Marx’s theory of irreconcilable conflict between classes required autonomous worker organizations that pursued their own emancipation. The first nucleus of the IWA was formed in Madrid in January 1869, around the group of printers in the *Fomento de las Artes*, including Anselmo Lorenzo, who later published one of the classic primary accounts of the origins of the new movement.<sup>21</sup> The first formal branches were established in Barcelona and Madrid, and in June 1870 the Spanish Regional Federation of the IWA (FRE) was constituted at a conference in Barcelona. About two-thirds of the existing Catalan textile unions affiliated with the organization, bringing 7,000 members, in addition to several hundred from Madrid. In 1871–72, branches were established in other places, especially in the south and along the eastern Mediterranean coast. These included industrial workers in Valencia and Alcoy in the Levante, and agricultural workers in Andalucía and parts of Extremadura. By 1873, the FRE claimed 50,000–60,000 members, a third of them from Barcelona and its industrial belt and over half from Catalonia. More than in its own membership, the FRE’s significance lay in its association with the 5 to 8 million members of the International.

At the same time, the transnational unifying impact of the International was undermined by its internal divisions, which required each national federation to choose sides. Among the heterogeneous groups that constituted the International, the main struggle erupted between supporters of Marx and Mikhail Bakunin’s Alliance of Socialist Democracy. While both Marx and Bakunin agreed that the workers’ emancipation should be carried out by the workers themselves, they disagreed as to how to organize the struggle. For Marx, workers would constitute a political party that would participate in parliamentary politics and eventually take control of the state, while for Bakunin, the workers should focus on direct economic struggle against capitalism, remaining “apolitical,” by which he meant abstention from formal political institutions. In organizational terms, Marx proposed the parallel structure of unions and party, while Bakunin articulated what would become the anarchist position, condemning Marx’s “authoritarian” statism and defending “anti-authoritarian” direct action by revolutionary unions.

The Spanish FRE’s decision to endorse the Bakuninist perspective, first in 1870 and again in 1872, has been viewed as a crucial turning point in the history of the labor movement, sending Spain down the “exceptional” path of anarchism, in contrast to the majority European path of Marxist socialism. Yet another sign of Spain’s failure to modernize politically, anarchism was viewed as the product of a backward and underdeveloped economy, a “primitive” and “millenarian” ideology fit for poor and uneducated agricultural laborers.<sup>22</sup> Since then, many scholars

have successfully made the case that Spain's anarchist tradition was neither pre-modern nor irrational, but made sense in the Spanish context. At the same time, it is important to recognize that anarchism remained a potent force throughout nineteenth-century Europe, from Italy to Switzerland, France and Russia, and that only after the First World War does its continued strength in Spain become more exceptional.<sup>23</sup>

In any case, during the *Sexenio* itself, the FRE remained a heterogeneous amalgam of Bakuninism and federal republicanism, while a significant minority of Catalan trade unions refused to join, remaining committed to the interclass reformist model that had been dominant since the 1840s. The general consensus is that the International as a distinct movement played a minor role in precipitating or controlling worker mobilization, most of which remained embedded in the broader demo-republican milieu.<sup>24</sup> This basic framework of a common or overlapping milieu, in which anarchism and federal republicanism both cooperated and competed, defined the parameters of working-class culture and politics at least until the First World War, and longer in some local contexts.

In the 1860s, all of the oppositional movements identified here operated on the margins of the elite liberal regime that had been constructed since the 1830s. In one way or another, each movement reflected the perceived limits (or excesses, for the Carlists) of the liberal revolution among different constituencies, all of whom felt excluded or overlooked. At the same time, the expansion of these movements was a testament to the ambivalence of mainstream liberalism toward the theoretical principle of inclusion and "citizenization," which generated a schizophrenic lurching between short periods of relative openness (1836–37, 1840–43 and 1854–56) and longer stretches of more restrictive regulation of popular mobilization. Thus, it was during these relatively open periods that the popular movements resurfaced from their clandestine existence, expanding their base and their geographical reach at each juncture, building on surviving local networks. The revolution of 1868 was yet another such opportunity but, at the same time, it far exceeded the scope of the previous ones. The combination of the six-year time frame and the substantive democratic project pursued by all the *Sexenio* governments, which included the right to association as well as universal suffrage, created the most fertile ground for popular politics in the entire century.

## The First Democracy: The Sexenio, 1868–1874

### The September 1868 Revolution

While the 1868 revolution opened a new window for popular mobilization, the instigators intended to carry out a more limited and controlled political transition. Among the Liberal Union and Progressive politicians, led by the Generals Serrano and Prim, the revolution began as yet another *pronunciamiento*, launched from the historic city of Cádiz on September 18, to wrest the government away from a narrow clique of *Moderado* politicians and the queen, who refused to share power even with the other liberal parties. The discontent among excluded political elites was exacerbated in the short term by an economic crisis that created discontent

among all social sectors. As for all revolutions, scholars have long debated the hierarchy of social, economic and political factors in explaining its origins, although most would now probably acknowledge multiple factors. At least in terms of determining initial success, however, the key factor was the defection of significant sectors of the ruling elite and the army, rather than general discontent or the pressure from below.<sup>25</sup>

At the same time, the *pronunciamiento* generated a familiar parallel formation of revolutionary juntas. The resulting revolutionary platform included a mix of Unionist, Progressive and demo-republican demands. In the name of national regeneration, it called for the expulsion of Isabella (the main demand of the Unionists) and the constitution of a provisional government that would implement a full range of political liberties and convoke a Constituent Cortes that included the overseas provinces, elected by universal male suffrage. While the unity of the initial coalition would soon dissolve, there was a basic level of consensus about the necessity of deepening and democratizing the liberal regime and at least tackling colonial reforms.

The dominant partners who led the provisional government were the Progressives and Unionists. Their plan was to replace Isabella with a democratic monarch, who, unlike the deposed queen, would play their proper constitutional role. This plan split the demo-republican ranks, with those refusing to support any version of a monarchy breaking off to form the Federal Republican party, while the rest constituted the Radical party, joining Democrats and Progressives under Prim's leadership. After a long and contentious search, complicated by disagreements and the delicacy of bringing in a new foreign dynasty, Prim's candidate, Prince Amadeo of Savoy, was chosen in December 1870, and inaugurated on January 2, 1871. Meanwhile, the 1869 Cortes elections produced a majority for the government coalition of Unionists and the new Radical party (230 seats), with opposition Republicans and Carlists winning 85 and 20 seats, respectively.

### **The Democratic Monarchy (June 1869–February 1873)**

The Cortes set about composing Spain's most democratic constitution thus far, which was approved on June 1, 1869. It included popular sovereignty, a full range of civil rights, universal and direct male suffrage applied to both houses of parliament, and limited powers for the monarch. It also included the secularizing legislation that, along with the choice of Amadeo, fired up the Carlists, the Church hierarchy and other fervent Catholics against the new regime. In addition, both the provisional government and the Constitution included the promise of finally implementing the long-delayed colonial reforms, extending constitutional rights to the overseas "provinces" once their deputies had joined the Cortes. The 1869 Constitution did not abolish slavery, as Republicans would have liked, but the provisional government declared freedom for as yet unborn slaves and passed the Moret Law in 1870, which laid out a plan of gradual and compensated abolition. Finally, the provisional government promised to satisfy demo-republican demands for the abolition of the military draft and the consumption taxes.

While the opposition Carlists and Federal Republicans were marginal forces in the new government, they created local and provincial power centers through successful

mobilization of the populace and control of local institutions. They mobilized new voters through electoral committees, rallies, their press and electoral propaganda, winning majorities in city councils and parliamentary districts in their strongholds. Thus, in the 1869 Cortes elections, the Carlists won a majority of deputies in the Basque provinces and Navarre, while the Republicans won majorities in cities along the Mediterranean periphery from Barcelona to Valencia, Seville and Cádiz. Beyond elections, both Carlists and Republicans mobilized through the local networks of sociability linked to the Church and Catholic associations, on the one hand, and the demo-republican milieu on the other. In the latter case, it was the popular wing of the Federal Republican party that both fomented and was bolstered by the reconstitution of local militias and the formation of revolutionary juntas, worker associations and republican clubs that exploded into the space opened by the September revolution.

The combination of local strength and national marginalization nurtured the dual strategy of both groups, on the one hand participating in elections and institutions at the same time as they conspired through insurrectionary channels. Through local institutions, Carlists and Federal Republicans attempted to implement pieces of their program from the ground up. For example, from the fall of 1868, the revolutionary city council in Seville made immediate plans to expropriate religious buildings for public use, create public works to provide employment, control the prices of subsistence items and revisit the use of common lands. While some of these goals could be accomplished without support of the central government, many could not. The frustration created by the gap between reform ambitions and the limited powers and resources available to local governments in the centralized liberal state confirmed anti-centralist ideology with real-world experience.

The tension between local mobilizing strength and institutional impotence not only reinforced the demand for decentralization, but convinced some activists, who became known as the "intransigents," of the immediate need to rebuild the state from the bottom up through federal pacts.<sup>26</sup> The most widespread "intransigent" federal republican insurrections occurred in the fall of 1869. In rural Andalucía, the insurrections included occupation of lands and burning of property registers, sometimes carried out with local Federal Republican Party support and at other times apparently spontaneous. The insurrections were quickly defeated, but confirmed the division within republican ranks between the intransigents and the "respectable" sector. At the same time, the insurrections, in conjunction with other multiplying social conflicts, from subsistence and anti-draft riots to strikes, divided the political forces within the new democratic government over the balance between "order," the supreme value under the former liberal regime, and citizen rights, which had been the centerpiece of the new Constitution.

The challenge of integrating or suppressing popular mobilization was only one of the many challenges faced by the democratic monarchy, which included the military insurrections of the Carlists and the Cuban separatists, colonial reform and slavery, fiscal poverty, a conspiracy by the Moderates to install Isabella's son on the throne, and even unlucky events, like the assassination of the new king's main supporter, General Prim, only days before Amadeo's arrival in Spain. In explaining the inability of the regime to successfully resolve most of these challenges,

traditional arguments asserted that a democratic revolution was bound to fail in an underdeveloped country with a weak middle class and illiterate masses. Current democratization theory, however, puts less weight on such structural preconditions and more emphasis on the political context of the transition period.

In the case of the *Sexenio*, it is easy to see how both the long list of unfavorable contextual factors and their negative reinforcement made it difficult to resolve any one of the problems. Thus, the need to draft more than 200,000 soldiers to fight against the Carlists and in Cuba prevented the regime from keeping its promise to abolish the draft, which in turn helped fuel local "intransigent" insurrections. Conversely, the poverty of the government increased its dependence on the pro-Spanish, anti-reform militia in Cuba, which made it extremely difficult to follow through on the promises of abolition and colonial reform, or to do away with the consumption tax at home, another disappointment for local republicans. Likewise, the long and difficult search for a new king fueled both republican and Carlist arguments against the wisdom of importing a new monarch, while the assassination of Amadeo's main supporter was a single unlucky event that exacerbated his already weak position. The weakness of his position, which in turn further destabilized the democratic monarchy, led to a precipitous abdication after only two years on the throne. In the process of trying to put out all these contradictory fires, the democratic monarchy ended up renegeing on many of its promises and principles, including the suspension of constitutional guarantees in the name of restoring order against the republican insurrections. At the same time, these problems undercut the ability of a nascent democratic parliamentary system to stabilize, especially when both of the opposition parties were essentially "anti-system" and the unified governing coalition could not indefinitely sustain a thriving democracy without a loyal opposition party.

### **The Republic (February 12, 1873–January 4, 1874)**

Amadeo's abdication on February 10, 1873, opened the door by default for the next phase of the democratic revolution, the First Spanish Republic. As the "crescendo of political life" during the *Sexenio*, it has also been one of the most maligned moments in modern Spanish history, a symbol of disorder, anarchy and even Spaniards' supposed incapacity for self-government.<sup>27</sup> And indeed, with a divided republican minority in the Cortes, the hostility or indifference of the majority monarchist forces, and the inherited constraints imposed by the ongoing military campaigns in Cuba and against the Carlists, the Republic confronted even more challenges to successful stabilization than had the monarchy. In particular, the Carlist War greatly intensified during the summer and fall of 1873, with new battlefronts, a consolidated rebel army of 50,000 men, and an embryonic state supported by a network of Carlist city governments. The internal divisions among republicans expanded on those already present in the demo-republican milieu. Federal republicans agreed on a decentralized state but were divided into those who wanted to construct it from the top down and the "intransigent" bottom-up federalists who supported building upward from local pacts. There were also non-federalist republicans, and those more committed to social reforms vs. defenders of order.<sup>28</sup> The combination of external (and mostly inherited) challenges and

internal divisions rendered the Republic unable to capitalize on its potential advantages, including winning over Cuban separatists with a serious commitment to abolition and colonial reform and channeling the energies of local federal republicans away from insurrection and toward democratic integration. The Republic faced an uphill battle from the start.

Not surprisingly, the republicans' internal divisions widened as the establishment of the new Republic raised the stakes for competing visions of the future. On the one side, the "top-down" republicans in Madrid followed a deliberate process of planning and holding constituent elections in May, which returned an overwhelming majority of republican deputies (although at the cost of abstention from all other political forces). The new Cortes declared the establishment of a Federal Republic on June 8 and quickly drew up a new Constitution that relied heavily on the 1869 document for its list of rights, but added the complete separation of Church and State as well as a federal structure of the Spanish nation—17 states, including Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Republic made some pragmatic headway on colonial reform in Puerto Rico, where there was less opposition and fewer slaves, implementing a plan for elected autonomous government and definitively abolishing slavery. The government also demonstrated its reformist intentions with legislation to abolish the draft, to exclude common lands from public sale, to distribute uncultivated lands to landless laborers and to establish arbitration boards for worker/employer conflicts, but these bills either were not finalized or implemented as the Republic became immersed in responding to immediate crises.

On the other side of the republican spectrum were the "intransigent" federal republicans, whose impatience with the slow process of change led them to withdraw from the Cortes on July 1. Lacking confidence that the new Republic intended to fulfill the popular federalist platform, local activists across the country unleashed another wave of insurrections, with the general aim of establishing the federal republic from the ground up. The so-called cantonalist movement of July 1873 resulted in the formation of more than a dozen local republics, following the same geographic contour as the 1869 insurrections and the republican voting base, and that lasted anywhere from a few days to several months, as occurred in Cartagena.

Even local federal republicans were divided, however, some in favor of the insurrections and others against, while some adopted platforms that leaned more toward "social," "economic" or "political" goals.<sup>29</sup> Economic goals included the abolition of consumption taxes and, in rural areas, the redistribution of land, political goals focused on the constitution of federal republican local administration, while social goals included labor reforms like the reduced work day. Another cultural category of measures were anti-clerical or secularizing, which ran the gamut from changing street names to demolition of religious buildings to, in a few cases, the forced secularization of nuns or monks. With a couple of famous exceptions (such as Alcoy), the cantonal insurrections did not pursue Marxist or Bakuninist goals such as the abolition of private property or class war, but remained within the demo-republican framework of social reform, private property tempered by community needs and interclass cooperation.

While all republicans shared a basic set of goals, the cantonal insurrections created an unbridgeable rift that seriously undermined the regime's legitimacy.

Pi y Margall, who was president at the outbreak of the insurrections in July 1873 (June 11–July 18), wanted to win over the insurrectionaries while reluctantly sending in troops, but he was forced to step down by republicans who wanted the government to take a harder line. The next president, Nicolás Salmerón (July 18–September 7), redeployed troops which had been fighting in the Carlist wars to the south to defeat the cantonalist revolts with a purely military strategy. He, too, was replaced by a more conservative president, Emilio Castelar (September 7, 1873–January 4, 1874), who openly proclaimed the primacy of order, suspending constitutional liberties and the Cortes and relying even more on the non-republican military to re-establish the government's authority, as 80,000 more reservists were called up to fight. While the military threat to public order was greater in Carlist territory, the cantonalist revolts and their repression had a more devastating political effect on republican legitimacy, dividing republicans, feeding conservative fears of "anarchy" and, at the same time, alienating the republican base. Few were surprised when General Pavía launched another *pronunciamiento* on January 3, 1874, in the name of restoring order. During the following year, a new party under the leadership of *Moderado* politician Antonio Cánovas del Castillo consolidated its support for a Bourbon restoration, and a second coup on December 31, 1874 formalized the transition to a new constitutional monarchy that was meant to be an improved and more stable version of the Isabelline liberal regime.

## Conclusion

With the transition back to an elitist and restrictive liberal regime, the *Sexenio* took shape in official memory as a cautionary tale of the dangers of democracy, the political immaturity of the Spanish population and the need for tight centralized controls on participation. For the next generation, its memory helped foreclose any sustained effort toward democratic integration of the masses, either politically or economically, through workplace bargaining frameworks. Instead, the new regime consolidated a generally militarized approach to public order that made it hard to acknowledge legitimate forms of popular political participation. Conversely, most of the popular movements chronicled in this chapter retreated into conspiratorial, "apolitical" or confrontational modes of action, with little impact beyond their local networks. At first glance, then, the traditional lack of interest in this short and turbulent period of Spanish history makes some sense. Considered more of an ignominious dead end than a "stage" in Spain's political modernization, especially when compared with the contemporaneous French Third Republic, it was not even resurrected as a model or inspiration for the Second Republic more than 50 years later.

Without the baggage of having to be a successful model or stage, in this story the *Sexenio* serves a different purpose, providing a broad window into the political conflicts generated by the transformation from an absolutist to a liberal regime in the mid-nineteenth century. The oppositional movements that emerged on the margins of the liberal regime between the 1830s and the 1870s illustrate the issues and constituencies not addressed by the liberal revolution, as well as the competing

political projects that these generated. While they were limited in their reach into the population, they do demonstrate a more extensive level of political socialization than used to be believed, broadening our understanding of the scope of political activity in the mid-nineteenth century. And while none of these projects succeeded in altering the basic parameters of elite liberalism, which returned to power in 1875, neither the groups nor the issues they raised disappeared from the political arena. Indeed, they would continue to inform the conflicted terrain of modern Spanish politics up to the present day.

# A NEW ERA OF LIBERAL POLITICS: THE SECOND RESTORATION, 1875–1898

The long liberal constitutional regime that was inaugurated in 1875 and survived intact, if battered, until the dictatorship of 1923 is one of the most studied and debated periods of modern Spanish history, but there is still no consensus on how exactly the so-called Restoration regime should be situated in the late nineteenth-century European narrative of state- and nation-building, imperial expansion and the pressure of emerging mass politics on elitist liberal regimes. The end of the nineteenth century was a dynamic period during which the major European powers dramatically expanded or began colonization projects, extended the reach and efficacy of the state, undertook nation-building campaigns to “nationalize” their populations and began an uncertain process of integrating the masses into politics. These processes constituted the vanguard core of historical change, what used to be celebrated as political “modernization.” Even without the cheery positivism of the old “modernization” narrative, we can recognize that these changes were increasingly associated with the most powerful nations in western Europe, part of what defined the widening gap between the “west and the rest.” While it is clear that Spain was no longer one of these powerful nations by the end of the nineteenth century, it continued to participate, more or less energetically, in all of these processes, during the long Restoration regime. Thus, although debates continue about the measurable limits and achievements of the regime, most would now reject the wholesale and inevitable “failure” narrative.<sup>1</sup> This chapter and the following one will examine the political history of the Restoration, divided chronologically by the “disaster” of 1898, which many contemporaries viewed as opening a new era. Instead of the traditional view of the Restoration as a pathetically weak state that was indifferent to nation-building, an impediment to democratization, and limping through the last stages of a century-long imperial collapse, these chapters draw on recent studies to present a more complex portrait of political change and continuity that can be mapped onto the broader European picture.

## The Restoration in Comparative Context: State, Nation, Empire and Democracy

At the same time, the “broader European picture” was more diverse than the old failure narrative allowed. Instead of the contrast between the “weak” Spanish state and an imagined juggernaut west European state that had subordinated archaic local powers and institutions, current scholarship views the reach of the nineteenth-century state as uneven and differentiated.<sup>2</sup> Thus, despite totalizing claims to uniform rights and obligations and a monopoly over violence, there were gaps in the ability to enforce those obligations. Moreover, the experience of “stateishness” took different forms, with distinct dynamics between local, regional and national institutions. With Britain and the United States as the classic models of decentralized states, and France as the quintessential centralist model, in practice there were varying levels of dynamic tension between the different levels of political power and “statelike” activity. Instead of the classic “either/or” argument about whether the state or local interests were stronger in Spain, we can acknowledge the unresolved tension between local, provincial, regional and national power as both a feature of the age and a result of ongoing resistance to the centralizing blueprint that had been dominant since the 1840s, with the brief exception of the *Sexenio*. At the same time, the diffuse and uneven Spanish state-building process that began in the 1840s and culminated during the Restoration followed the same general parameters as elsewhere in Europe, with an increasingly effective bureaucracy for taxing, recruiting soldiers and controlling its territory most of the time.<sup>3</sup>

The nineteenth-century process of nation-building and nationalization has been similarly problematized after a generation of fevered theorizing about the origins and development of modern nation-states. Replacing an older narrative of the “triumph of the nation-state” and its top-down “nationalization of the masses,” recent scholarship recognizes distinct and, once again, more diffuse paths toward a global order of “nation-states” that does not really take shape until after the Second World War.<sup>4</sup> In the late nineteenth century, there were still several distinct trajectories, within and outside Europe. The first category was the relatively small number of countries, such as Japan, France and England, that translated the “raw material” of pre-modern statehood and patriotism into nation-building and nationalism. The second category was the multiethnic empire, which in some cases experienced rising nationalist sentiments after the 1860s, while the last category were those states in which nationalism had not taken form. The Spanish case has generally been classified in the first category,<sup>5</sup> with debates about whether the liberal state squandered its initial raw material by not pursuing active nationalization or whether nation-building and nationalization proceeded through a more diffuse combination of uneven state investment, local and regional identity, and civil society mobilization.<sup>6</sup> With the decentering of even the iconic German and French nationalization processes following the local and regional “turn” in nationalism studies, those in the latter camp have argued convincingly that the state was only one player in a more complex process that, once again, cannot be summed up as a failed version of “normal” European development.<sup>7</sup>

One of the classic red flags in the Spanish nation-building process was the emergence of alternative “peripheral” nationalisms in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In the “weak” nationalization thesis, it was the failure of Spanish nationalism that opened the space for these competing nationalisms that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>8</sup> Some Catalan and Basque nationalists have gone further, either taking the view that these territories were already nations waiting to break free or viewing the various regionalist cultural movements of the nineteenth century as proto-nationalist precursors leading ineluctably toward separate national identities. But most non-nationalist historians agree that, until the end of the nineteenth century, Spanish was the only significant form of nationalism, and that the cultivation of local and regional identities was not only compatible with state nationalism but could provide the most accessible path to nationalization for ordinary citizens.<sup>9</sup> It may in fact have been the strength, or at least the assimilating ambitions, of Spanish nationalism that convinced some regionalists that they could not maintain their “double patriotism” within the framework of the Spanish nation.<sup>10</sup> One of the paradoxes of nationalism was that its assimilationist rhetoric tended to spawn “militant ethnicities” among those who came to resent the homogenizing pressure of the nation-state.<sup>11</sup> Rather than an isolated product of Spanish nationalist failure, Catalans and Basques were joined by Irish, Bretons, Corsicans and Quebecois, all of whom responded to assimilationism in their nation-states with (re)assertions of difference. But the complex story of competing nationalisms that emerged from this dynamic, whether in Spain or elsewhere, belongs more to the twentieth century.

In similar fashion, Spain’s spectacular imperial defeat at the end of the century in the war with the United States in 1898 should not be read backwards too far into the nineteenth century. Although there is no question that Spain had become a second- or third-rate imperial power with the loss of most of its colonies in the 1820s, it was not until 1898 that its path dramatically diverged from that of the major imperial powers, whether land-based or overseas. At this point, only three years after the last Cuban insurrection began in 1895, Spain lost the rest of its overseas empire, making the shift from “empire state” to “nation-state” just at the moment when the expansionist “new imperialism” carved up or redistributed the remaining non-colonized parts of the world.

Until this final loss, Spain remained an active imperial power. Cuba was one of the most profitable colonies in the world, recent investment in the Philippines had increased Spain’s footprint there, and the country had a stable presence in Puerto Rico. Furthermore, Spain’s economy, political system and national identity remained fully intertwined with its empire until the end. Following the general argument that in Europe’s “empire states” the “metropole” and “colony” operated in an integrated system, Spanish scholars have amply demonstrated the intimate links based on trade, immigration, pro- and anti-slavery movements (slavery was not abolished until 1886 in Cuba), military and political leaders, and revolutionary movements.<sup>12</sup> In fact, it was the assumed “colonial vocation” of Spain’s national identity that made the so-called “disaster” of 1898 such a devastating psychological blow, propelling a soul-searching “regenerationist” movement to investigate the “problem of Spain.”<sup>13</sup> One of the solutions was the search for a new imperial space which, in the global context of the “scramble for Africa” and Spain’s limited

means, took shape in new “micro-military” projects in Morocco. Although Spanish intervention in Morocco brought neither economic benefits nor popular approval at home, it did allow Spain to retain a foothold among the select group of “empire states” that continued to conflate national and imperial power and identity in the first decades of the twentieth century.<sup>14</sup>

The final and still unresolved debate about Spain’s comparative position in the late nineteenth century focuses on the Restoration’s role in the history of democratization. In the classic failure model, the Restoration blocked the “normal” transition from liberalism to democracy with a fraudulent parliamentary system in which elites manipulated a passive and demobilized citizenry in corrupt elections managed by local *caciques*, or political bosses. The implicit contrast was with a “Europe” that was undergoing a seamless transition from elitist liberalism to democracy, either through gradual evolution, following the British model, or through revolution, as in the French case.<sup>15</sup>

Once again, the re-evaluation of the Restoration’s constraints and opportunities has accompanied the disaggregation of the homogenous and often romanticized “European” norm. Thus, instead of a uniform trajectory from elitist liberalism toward democracy, the reality was the unresolved tension between the two political discourses and the great variety of forms that it produced. On a basic level, nineteenth-century elections in most western European countries were rarely democratic, often not very representative, and subject to varying levels of fraud, manipulation and electoral engineering. Across the board, liberal politicians were concerned about the impact of expanding the suffrage to the uneducated masses and, in most cases, suffrage either remained limited or its impact was restricted by other checks and balances. Thus, in some cases, the suffrage expanded slowly, as in Italy and the Netherlands, where universal male suffrage came late, in 1912 and 1917. In other cases, the impact of expanded suffrage in the lower house of parliament was limited by the existence of a powerful upper house, as in Denmark, Sweden, Britain and Germany, sometimes coupled with strong monarchs, as in the latter case. In Britain, the House of Lords could veto legislation until 1911, in Sweden the upper and lower houses had equal legislative power, while in Denmark the government was not responsible to the lower house until 1901 and in Germany not until 1918. In Belgium, on the other hand, until 1919 the institution of universal male suffrage in 1893 was neutralized by plural voting for those with more wealth or education. In this context, the French Third Republic, which combined universal male suffrage with a strong parliamentary government and relatively free contested elections, was more the exception than the rule.

In terms of the manipulation of elections, there was also significant variation but widespread efforts to alter the outcome to favor the ruling parties and elites. In most countries, the boundaries of electoral districts set in the early to mid-nineteenth century remained unchanged into the twentieth century, usually resulting in the over-representation of rural districts and the under-representation of fast-growing urban districts more likely to vote socialist. There were also efforts at “electoral engineering,” with governments passing laws with the hopes of benefiting one party or the other. In addition to these efforts “from above,” the influence of local elites or notables in shaping electoral outcomes through patronage networks was widespread. In this broader context, Spanish historians have pointed out that

weakly institutionalized political parties, *caciquismo* and electoral fraud were not aberrations in nineteenth-century liberal political systems, but were home-grown versions of the broader tensions within an elitist liberal political culture faced with transforming the suspect masses into citizens. As a result, the democratization of “Europe” was much more a project of the twentieth than the nineteenth century.

## The Multiple Faces of the Restoration Regime

The question for the Spanish Restoration, then, is not whether its political system lived up to some ideal norm of democratization, but how it functioned in its historical context, and whether it was evolving and adapting to integrate the emerging voices of an expanding electorate or incapable of real reform. There is still no consensus as to whether the regime facilitated democratization, either directly or inadvertently, worked as a practical and functional compromise consistent with the pre-democratic era, or, third, actively retarded potential democratic development through its fraudulent and coercive practices and militarized enforcement of public order.<sup>16</sup> One of the difficulties in evaluating the political impact of the Restoration regime was that it had multiple faces, each of which provides some evidence for the different interpretations. Furthermore, a generation of local studies of political practice in both rural and urban communities around the country reveal a broad range of political cultures with varying levels of participation vs. passivity, contested elections vs. choreographed ones, local elite power vs. central government domination, and public-sphere pluralism vs. violent repression.<sup>17</sup> This variety in itself defies any simple conclusions about how the Restoration system functioned.

The multiple faces of the Restoration regime were apparent from its inception. From one angle, the regime appeared to be an improved version of the liberal constitutional monarchy that had operated in Spain since the 1830s, anchored by competing political parties and a Crown, all of which, unlike before, cooperated to stabilize the system and even to introduce democratizing reforms from freedom of the press to expanded suffrage. Stabilization was aided by the conclusion of the two ongoing military conflicts, the civil war against the Carlists (1872–76) and the colonial war in Cuba (1868–78), in addition to a foreign policy that stressed compromise and the avoidance of conflict in the new German-dominated Europe. But behind the scenes, the mechanisms that kept the regime running included electoral fraud, clientelism, and a militarized public order to keep the popular classes in line. It was in the complex and diverse interaction between all of these elements that the political life of the Restoration regime unfolded.

### Constructing a New Constitutional Regime: Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and the *turno pacífico*

The principal architect of the system, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, sought to resolve the functional problems that had led to the revolution of 1868 and the collapse of the liberal monarchy. With the evidence of the political turmoil generated

by popular politics during the “*Sexenio*” (1868–74), Cánovas, like most late nineteenth-century conservative leaders in post-1848 Europe, viewed a tempered liberalism, not absolutism, as the bulwark against the “disorder” of democracy. Thus, the new regime was intended to retain the basic parameters of liberalism, including a constitution, power-sharing between the monarch and the parliament and limited suffrage. But instead of the fratricidal conflict of the old liberal regime, exemplified by the queen’s inability to act like a constitutional monarch and the political parties’ refusal to play the role of loyal opposition, Cánovas sought to establish a stable regime that could manage peaceful transitions of power between parties without the need for military intervention. While there was a pragmatic aspect to this search, Cánovas also promoted an important liberal principle that had been lacking in Spain’s constitutional system, that is, the “acceptance of the adversary” and their right to hold power in a pluralist system where everyone accepted the “rules of the game.”<sup>18</sup>

To construct this new pluralist party system, Cánovas sought to gather as wide a spectrum of political opinion as possible, from ex-Carlists and Moderates to Progressives and even Democrats. Cánovas himself had been a high-ranking member of the Moderate Party and of the centrist Liberal Union in the 1850s–60s. With the revolution of 1868, Cánovas was in the conservative minority in the Cortes of 1869, and voted against such democratic reforms as universal suffrage. He re-emerged from the political shadows in 1873, when he became the champion of a restoration of the Bourbon monarchy under Isabel’s son, Alfonso, and already began building a coalition around this project before the coups that ended the Republic in 1874. Not surprisingly, Cánovas sought to construct his own Liberal-Conservative Party (later shortened to the Conservative Party), from the remnants of the old Moderate Party. Significantly, however, within a decade, many of the old absolutists, anti-liberal Catholics (known as Integralists) and even former Carlists had accepted that there was no viable position to the right of liberalism and joined the Conservative Party. Thus, after the Carlists’ military defeat in 1876, they were effectively neutralized as an anti-liberal pole of attraction for the remainder of the Restoration (except in the Basque Country and Navarre, where candidates ran and were elected as Carlists or Integralists). By the 1880s, then, Cánovas’s party had incorporated most of the organized political opinion on the right of the political spectrum, consolidating conservative liberalism as the “only (viable) game in town” among these sectors.

For the other main party, Cánovas approached the old Progressive leader, Práxedes Sagasta, to gather a coalition that could reach as far left as possible on the political spectrum. Sagasta had participated in the 1868 revolution, held important ministerial posts in 1869–70, and supported the candidacy of Amadeo of Savoy as the new constitutional monarch. However, Sagasta disapproved of the radical turn of events after 1873 and supported the coups that ended the Republic, which helps explain his willingness to collaborate with an old conservative political adversary. That cooperation with Cánovas was essential to the success of the new party system, since his Fusionist Liberal Party (later called the Liberal Party) was able to integrate most of the coalition that led the 1868 revolution, from Liberal Unionists to Progressives and even some Democrats. Moreover, the price of their integration was the implicit understanding that the Liberal

Party would have the opportunity to implement some of its platform, which included most of the elements of the democratic 1869 Constitution, from freedom of the press and association, to universal suffrage. While the Liberal Party left out most republicans, in addition to Socialists (the Partido Socialista Obrero Español, or Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE, was formed in 1879) and anarchists, during the first decades of the regime these dissident forces remained organizationally weak and divided, still recovering from the devastating collapse of the First Republic.

In sum, Cánovas and Sagasta's plan followed, at least in theory, the British model of a gradually democratizing liberal regime, framed as the sensible alternative to the chaotic democratic revolution of the *Sexenio*. As the framework for this evolutionary model, the Constitution of 1876 was based on earlier Moderate versions, but also contained language that opened the door to legislative reform on important issues, thus obviating the need to write a new constitution with each change of government. In particular, the qualifications of suffrage were to be passed by a law, not embedded in the constitution. The 1876 Constitution preserved the basic Moderate principle of shared sovereignty between the Crown and the parliament, with legislation initiated from either body and the monarch retaining the right of veto. Also like the earlier Moderate constitutions, there were two houses of Congress: an upper chamber that was partially appointed and elected, and a lower, elected house with a restricted 5 percent suffrage. But there were also elements of the Progressive past, with the recognition of basic rights and liberties and even the freedom of private religious practice, although it retained Catholicism as the state religion. In any case, the document was flexible enough to eventually incorporate all of the major democratic demands of the Liberal Party, including the law implementing universal male suffrage in 1890. At least on paper, then, the Restoration was a solidly liberal regime that gradually evolved toward greater political liberty, inclusion and participation.

Furthermore, Cánovas's goal of peaceful alternation between the two parties functioned smoothly until the end of the century and, with more uncertainty, until 1923. A key element to this stability was the role of the Crown, even during a potentially vulnerable period of the premature death of King Alfonso XII in 1885, followed by the Regency of his wife María Cristina (1885–1902) and the ascension of the young Alfonso XIII in 1902. While there is disagreement about how effectively the monarchs played their constitutional role, all three were an improvement on Isabella and none consistently and explicitly sought to undermine the liberal regime as she had done. With a monarch generally willing to support governments from either party, Conservatives and Liberals alternated regularly, with an early period (1875–85) dominated by the former and a later period (1885–99) dominated by the latter, each change of government accomplished without recourse to military *pronunciamientos* or revolutions.<sup>19</sup> Even with the key turning point of the "disaster" of 1898, as it was called, the monarchy, the parties and the regime continued to function with minimal opposition and no direct military intervention until well into the First World War. What became known as the "*turno pacífico*," the peaceful rotation, institutionalized the principle of a two-party system in which conflicting views could be accommodated within a flexible, and at least partly pluralist system.

Another important liberal innovation in the 1876 Constitution that has often been overlooked was the right of the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico to representation in the Cortes for the first time since 1837. After decades of failing to implement the promised “special laws,” in 1878 the first Conservative government approved the establishment of the political institutions of the metropole in the Antilles, formally assimilating Cuba and Puerto Rico into the liberal political system.<sup>20</sup> Cuba was divided into six provinces, with a total of 19 deputies to be elected to the Cortes, in addition to elected positions in provincial parliaments and local municipal governments. The electoral system was not exactly the same as the Spanish one, with an even more restrictive suffrage (about 2.5 percent vs. 5 percent of the (free) population) that was intended to favor the wealthiest plantation owners of the west who favored this assimilationist policy.

Still, the new political system led to the formation of two political parties, the Conservative Union and the Liberal Autonomist Party. As in Puerto Rico, the Conservative Party represented the assimilationist planter interests, while the Liberal Party advocated for autonomous governing institutions along the Canadian model and had more support in the eastern provinces and among smaller farmers and businessmen. Also in both cases, the assimilationist party held the great majority of seats, supported by the restrictive suffrage and the endorsement of the Spanish state. There were some minor electoral reforms, which slightly expanded the suffrage and more than doubled the total number of deputies after the abolition of slavery in 1886, but the basic patterns remained constant until the institution of autonomous governing institutions and universal male suffrage in 1897, during the midst of the Cuban rebellion.<sup>21</sup> While on the one hand, this electoral practice clearly limited the representation of broad sectors of Cuban society, on the other hand, the pluralist two-party system was able to develop many of the features of a competitive liberal political culture, with vigorously contested elections that, moreover, remained remarkably autonomous from the metropolitan parties.<sup>22</sup>

### **The Dark Side of the Turno: Electoral Fraud and Caciquismo**

While there were liberal elements of the Restoration system, the mechanisms required to manufacture the regular party rotation of the *turno* exposed a darker illiberal face of Restoration politics. Feeding the more authoritarian interpretations of Cánovas’s political system, it was clear that he valued stability over representation and distrusted the judgement of the electorate. Thus, the system was rigged to be manipulated from above, with changes in governments to be agreed on between the leaders of the two parties and the Crown. That decision could be linked to specific crisis moments, like 1885, when Alfonso XII died, or when the party out of power was clamoring loudly for their turn. The idea behind this negotiated process was that the parties would feel a sense of fairness and security, weaning them from the culture that had led impatient party leaders to rely on military intervention to return to power. But the flip side was that the government had to manufacture electoral victories whose results were already decided before the elections took place. In other words, the elections were not even liberal, let alone democratic. Instead of being conceived as expressions of the citizens’ will, even of the 5 percent of adult males who could vote, they were exercises of formal legitimation.

After 1890, when all adult males became voting citizens, the goal of manufacturing the results remained constant. Indeed, elections continued to produce mostly reliable results of lopsided victories for the winning party even though the number of voters had increased sixfold (from 800,000 to 4.8 million).

In order to stage elections whose results were preordained, the government relied on its provincial leaders, the civil governors, and on local political bosses called *caciques*. Few figures have been the object of such contemporary and historical disdain as the *cacique*. *Caciquismo* was first condemned by turn-of-the-century regenerationists like Joaquín Costa, who viewed it as both the predominant symptom and source of the “problem of Spain.” *Caciques* had existed during the earlier liberal regime, but the centrality of electoral manipulation to the functioning of the Restoration system made them cornerstones of the new politics in a context in which political parties were little more than groups of notables with limited membership and infrastructure.<sup>23</sup> *Caciques* were powerful individuals with access to economic and/or political resources which they could withhold or distribute. They had a range of available techniques to manufacture electoral results in their district, including bribery and influence-peddling, coercion and intimidation, ballot stuffing and destruction of ballot boxes. Thus, large employers or landlords could intimidate their employees into delivering votes, bureaucrats with connections in Madrid could get permission to build a desired road in return for votes, or local officials could pad the voting lists with deceased individuals. All of these mechanisms worked in part because there were no secret ballots, no confirmation of voter identity and no independent monitoring of polling places.

## Evaluating the Constraints and Opportunities of Restoration Politics

While the two faces of the Restoration are clearly apparent, there is still no consensus as to how to frame the regime as a whole, especially with the deconstruction of the European democratic “norm.” Instead of measuring the regime against an ideal trajectory of democratization, we can evaluate both the constraints and the opportunities for political development that coexisted uneasily and unevenly in the Restoration. When viewed from the top, the constraints clearly overshadowed the opportunities, but when viewed from the local level, the picture is more complex, with surprising spaces for political engagement and agency among a population that was not nearly as passive and demobilized as Costa and his generation believed.

### Constraints on Political Liberties Imposed by the State

For those who emphasize the constraints of the system, the unique degree of electoral manipulation and fraud required by the *turno* system put the Spanish Restoration in a category of its own.<sup>24</sup> Thus, while clientelism may have been widespread elsewhere, the consistent need to manufacture huge majorities generated a uniquely massive effort to choreograph a national network of *caciques* from above. The process began with the government’s construction of the *encasillado*, or

national list of official candidates, with the mandate to secure the election of each candidate delegated to the civil governor and local *caciques*, in a downward trajectory of power. The analysis of electoral results provides ample evidence for this perspective. Thus, the hand-picked candidate predictably won each election from 1890 to 1907 in about 75 percent of all electoral districts, usually with landslide victories that could flip from one party to the other in a single electoral cycle. For example, the number of seats held by Conservatives and Liberals in the 1891 and 1893 elections were virtual mirror images of each other: 253 to 44 for the former and 44 to 281 for the latter. Even though the absolute number of votes for other parties like the republicans and Socialists was growing in urban areas after 1890, their impact was purposely contained through keeping urban districts incorporated in larger rural ones and/or not altering district boundaries based on population change. Thus, as the population of Madrid tripled, its number of deputies only increased from eight to nine.

In contrast to the electoral manipulation in the metropole, elections were relatively freer and more contested in the Antilles, but there were other mechanisms of control, including the more limited suffrage and the greater power of civil governors to appoint mayors and presidents of provincial parliaments and to suspend city councils or provincial parliaments. And, of course, compared to Canada, which had been granted full autonomy in 1867, most Spanish liberals in Madrid remained resistant to any whiff of autonomous institutions, a position consistent with their rejection over the course of the nineteenth century of the various decentralizing projects proposed by Carlists, federal republicans or regionalists.

More evidence for the top-down exercise of power during the Restoration on both sides of the Atlantic can be found in the restrictive version of “public order” that relied more on the coercive apparatus of the state to criminalize and repress mobilization on the margins of the *turno* system than on efforts to integrate it.<sup>25</sup> So as to enforce this public order, in 1878 Cánovas proposed a law that identified the most important mission of the army to be the “defense against internal and external enemies,” and later pronounced in a speech that it should vigorously defend the “current social order” and act as a “dike against the illegal attempts by the proletariat” to overturn it.<sup>26</sup> In 1893, the territory was divided into military districts, each directed by a captain general, who, during “states of war,” could take precedence over the civil authorities. In other words, just as the military was being extracted from one form of politics as a result of the *turno*, it was being mobilized to play another, more unofficial, political role as the enforcer of the social “peace” that made the *turno* possible. The other powerful repressive state policing force was the Civil Guard, most often called on to maintain order in rural areas, where *guardias* (guards) were stationed in permanent posts across the country, located unevenly in areas of unrest, poverty, and/or known worker mobilization.<sup>27</sup>

Similarly, the repressive side of the Restoration regime was evident in the numerous suspensions of constitutional guarantees that were declared over the course of the Restoration. According to one estimate, all or some Spaniards lived under a state of exception (either national or local) during 37 percent of the Restoration era between 1875 and 1923.<sup>28</sup> These periods were uneven, but in some highly conflictive areas like Barcelona, living under a state of exception became almost the norm. Even when Spaniards were formally enjoying their

rights of association and speech, civil governors and mayors retained important discretionary powers to preview, approve or dissolve meetings and groups that they perceived to be a threat to the current social order. What this view of Restoration politics highlights is the degree to which the political elites at the top had access to a variety of formal and informal mechanisms to impose their oligarchic authority within a formally liberal framework. At the same time, Spain has to be placed on a spectrum of liberal states, all of which utilized at least some of these measures—from clientelism to electoral manipulation to repressive forms of public order to suspension of rights—some of the time in their effort to staunch the emerging tide of popular politics.

### Political Constraints and Opportunities: The View “From Below”

While there is no denying the openly anti-democratic and even illiberal goals of the Restoration elites in Madrid, it is also apparent that there was more to political life under the regime than relentless repression imposed on a victimized population. While the *cacique*'s role was intended to extend the capacity for coercion into everyday voting behavior, these local elites were not simply empty vessels of state power. Instead, as many local studies have illustrated, *caciques* and other local elites wielded their own forms of power, based on their patronage networks. From this perspective, there was an “ascending” trajectory of power in Restoration politics, which engaged with the “descending” trajectory epitomized by the *encasillado*.<sup>29</sup> Thus, party leaders in Madrid were forced to negotiate with local elites to gain access to the clientelist networks that formed the foundation of a power grid that ran from the local to the national.<sup>30</sup> Some of these powerful elites were even able to impose their own ongoing re-election, despite the *turno* rotation, in the growing minority of what became known as “*distritos propios*,” or “owned districts.”<sup>31</sup> In Cuban elections, there was no effective *encasillado*, as local candidates almost always triumphed over government-imposed ones, which gave local elites significant leverage.

This “ascending” local power was not necessarily less repressive or more inclusive than “descending” state power. Those who view it as a “constraint,” but from below, argue that the *caciques*' authority both emerged out of and reinforced economic domination and the reproduction of elite power at the local level.<sup>32</sup> For example, *caciques* could use their power to control the life of especially rural communities, making decisions about tax distribution, military enlistment and exemption, the administration of communal goods and the allocation of water for irrigation, in order to benefit elite interests. In contrast to the classic regenerationist stereotype that linked this local elite power to archaic economic interests, it seems clear that most *caciques* were products of the liberal revolution, not aristocratic holdovers, interested in protecting the wealth and privileges they had gained through private property rights. Whether in urban or rural areas, *caciques* tended to be linked to the most dynamic economic sectors in the region. In Cuba, of course, local elites in the modern sugar industry used their economic and political power, first to delay the abolition of slavery and then to maintain a racially hierarchical society. The upshot of this argument is that local elites reinforced and capitalized on the illiberal and undemocratic nature of the Restoration regime in order to protect their own modern capitalist interests.

A contrasting view of the *cacique* system highlights the opportunities for political representation embedded in its networks. From this perspective, the *cacique* could play an intermediary role between the district and the state that was based less on economic domination than on “reciprocal utilization.”<sup>33</sup> Thus, not all *caciques* were landlords wielding direct economic power over voters. Some were political professionals whose skills lay in their ability to manage the bureaucracy and facilitate access to goods and services through patronage networks. In the nineteenth-century liberal state that was still in the process of consolidating control over territory and population, *caciques* could provide the direct channel for local communities which needed access to the centralizing state to get things done. In this intermediary relationship, it was the *cacique's* ability to “deliver the goods,” not only to Madrid, but to his district, that secured his authority and established his legitimacy among voters.<sup>34</sup> In other words, to the degree that the *cacique* needed to satisfy the interests of some of his constituents some of the time, the Restoration functioned as a “representative” regime, channeling the organized interests of the society through his clientelist networks into a parliament that was, as a result, grounded at least in part in the real needs of constituents.

The “ascending” perspective of Restoration politics has also shone a new light on the voter as a participant in the political process. In contrast to the regenerationist view of a passive society “without a pulse,” many local studies have demonstrated that there was real political engagement at the local level.<sup>35</sup> Undoubtedly, the space for formal political engagement in national politics remained limited, between the top-down electoral manipulation, the militarized public order and/or the economic and political domination of local elites. However, more fine-grained analysis of electoral behavior has suggested that the will of the voters could be an independent variable in the election dynamic. For example, it appears that candidates sometimes won elections based on the provision of goods and services for the community. In other cases, it can be demonstrated that parliamentary elections were simply not that important to the community and thus not the best measure of political engagement.<sup>36</sup> Elsewhere, we can see evidence of political contestation and engagement, even if it did not change the outcome of the election. Thus, the authors of one study of the 1907 election argue that over a third (62 of 155) of the districts they examined qualified as “competitive,” meaning even the official candidate had to fight for his seat through active campaigning, publicity and rallies.<sup>37</sup> From another angle, the widely reported rise in the recourse to the more coercive *cacique* tools after 1890 further undermines the picture of a passive electorate blindly following orders.

More importantly, the global picture of the electoral geography of the Restoration confirms significant variations in the space for politicization across districts, with 1890 as a watershed moment. One classification identifies five types of districts, defined by the nature of voting: passive, purchased, violent/imposed, mediated by *caciques*, and free, but of course there could be multiple methods within a single district.<sup>38</sup> Not surprisingly, universal male suffrage seems to have increased the number of both violent and free districts, each category indicative of growing mobilization, especially through non-*turno* parties. In 1901, Barcelona became the first important “free” district to elect a majority of non-*turno* deputies, after which not a single *turno* candidate was elected again. More cities followed this trend of

“free” voting, although the large rural–urban parliamentary districts could still often neutralize the impact of non-*turno* urban votes on the outcome.

Where universal suffrage really increased the number of “free” and contested elections was at the level of municipal government, where republicans immediately began to win seats. Thus, by 1893, republicans had won three times as many seats on city councils (16 percent) as in the Cortes (6 percent), and by the first decade of the twentieth century municipal councils in many cities had republican majorities, creating something close to republican “fiefdoms,” as with Lerroux’s Radicals in Barcelona, Melquíades Álvarez’s Reformists in Oviedo and the Blasquistas in Valencia.<sup>39</sup> In fact, the growing gap between national and municipal electoral results in some areas illustrates both the emergence of independent political opinion and the effectiveness of the manipulation of national elections. In paradoxical fashion, as universal suffrage could lead to more coercion and violence in national elections as *cacique* efforts were intensified, at the same time it could open the door to political apprenticeship in local contests.

It was not only the urban milieu that nurtured a growing political engagement in electoral politics. Thus, studies of peasant communities have argued that they were undergoing a process of politicization that was not so far behind the famous French case.<sup>40</sup> To flesh out this argument, some authors emphasize the increasingly contested nature of elections, even in rural communities, marked by active campaigning, electoral rallies and press debates. And once again, it was in local elections where contestation was first likely to appear, not only because the municipality was more accessible but because it controlled many more of the important aspects of peasant life than did the Cortes, from the repair of infrastructure, to public health and subsistence crises, the zoning of land and the regulation of the labor market, the uses of common lands, the collection of taxes, including the unpopular consumption tax, and the management of the military draft.<sup>41</sup> Thus, a greater interest in municipal over national elections was not necessarily an indication of lesser political engagement or socialization.

Beyond electoral politics, which was still a restricted arena of politicization under the *turno* system, the (admittedly imperfect) implementation of the liberal freedoms in the 1880s opened the space for a growing public sphere, an intermediate realm where private citizens come together and organize themselves as collective participants in the body politic.<sup>42</sup> As the backbone of an increasingly dense public sphere, the local and national press expanded dramatically after the press law of 1883 was enacted.<sup>43</sup> Likewise, especially in urban centers around the country, vibrant sub-cultures in which republican, socialist and anarchist ideas intermingled took shape toward the end of the century, organized around secularist schools, recreational societies, trade unions and worker centers.<sup>44</sup>

Once again, a growing public sphere was not exclusively an urban phenomenon. Peasant men (and women) took to the streets around local issues like the consumption tax and the draft, in “riots” which have often been mischaracterized as “traditional” forms of mobilization. Instead, they should be viewed as forms of viable political engagement with the local authorities that addressed important issues using the collective resources at hand.<sup>45</sup> Some peasants also engaged in other forms of mobilization more often associated with modern politics, such as associations. In peasant communities those associations were likely to be linked to

the Catholic Church, as in one study of Gallegan agrarian syndicates in the first decade of the twentieth century. Once again, historians no longer automatically dismiss Catholic mobilization as “backward” or mere “channels of elite domination.” Instead, they facilitated the peasants’ integration into a larger political fabric that either paralleled or provided an alternative to the *cacique* networks, whether or not they altered electoral results.<sup>46</sup>

As should be clear by this point, it may be impossible to construct a single grand narrative of the nature of political life under the Restoration, even during the relatively smooth decades before the turn of the century. There were strands of authoritarianism, illiberalism and anti-democratic resistance, as well as liberalism and opportunities for democratization on both sides of the Atlantic. From one angle, the Restoration leaders imposed a fraudulent electoral system that confirmed hand-picked government candidates without a pretense of representation or consultation of the population. From another, they implemented a set of liberal freedoms that included universal male suffrage in the metropole, which provided spaces for political apprenticeship for many Spaniards, both elites and ordinary people, especially at the local level. The result of these paradoxical and sometimes contradictory processes was a diverse political landscape with a shifting balance between constraints and opportunities, across districts and regions, and over time. What this complexity implies is that different paths were still open to the Restoration regime as its leaders confronted its first major crisis at the end of the century, with the second half of the regime marked by contingency rather than the inevitable decline and collapse that was embedded in the traditional failure narrative.

### **The “Disaster” of 1898: The Start of a New Era?**

In that old narrative, the humiliating military defeat to the United States in 1898, in which Spain lost the remainder of her overseas empire, was the turning point on the downward slope toward crisis and dictatorship over two decades later. The significance of 1898 has been downgraded in recent years, shifting the debate to whether or not the early twentieth-century Restoration showed signs that it was adapting and evolving to meet the emerging demands of mass politics. Nevertheless, the turn of the century did mark a turning point, after which the Restoration was faced with growing challenges that tested the limits of the *turno* system and its restrictive rules of the game.

The new challenges did not emerge suddenly after, or as a result of, the war with the United States, but “1898” has served as a convenient “before and after” marker in the Restoration’s development, denoting Spain’s version of the broader *fin-de-siècle* European crisis of confidence.<sup>47</sup> Thus, for example, the increasing challenge of mass political mobilization officially starts with the passage of universal male suffrage in 1890, with conflict intensifying after the turn of the century and, of course, especially in the Spanish version of the post-First World War European crisis. The defeat of the *turno* parties in Barcelona in 1901 was the most visible manifestation of this new challenge, raising the question of whether the Restoration system was capable of integrating the new forces that displaced them, like the

Radical Republican Party or the *Lliga Regionalista*, formed that same year. In addition to symbolizing the emergence of new political forces outside the *turno*, the Catalanist *Lliga* represented a turning point in the relationship between nationalism and regionalism, opening a new more conflictive era of competing state and peripheral nationalisms.

With new forces emerging outside the governing parties, the internal stability of the *turno* system received a blow when its major advocates were all replaced within a six-year time span: Cánovas, assassinated in 1897, Sagasta, who died in 1903, and the Crown, which shifted from the Regent María Cristina to the young Alfonso XIII in 1902. Since both the Conservative and Liberal Parties had implemented most of their objectives during the first 25 years of the regime, new leaders struggled both to take charge of their parties and to redefine their goals in a European context of the declining legitimacy of liberalism. Under these pressures, the carefully manufactured consensus of the Cánovas–Sagasta years began to unravel, opening a new era of intra-elite conflict defined by competing reform projects designed to solve “the problem of Spain.”

The so-called regenerationists who helped define this “problem” were key contemporary figures in marking 1898 as a “before/after” national moment, and the most famous text was Joaquín Costa’s “*Oligarquía and Caciquismo*,” published in 1901. Beginning with the critique that “Spain was not a free and sovereign nation,” Costa presented his theory of the Restoration as a false liberal democratic system: “not a parliamentary regime corrupted by oligarchs, but an oligarchic regime served by apparently parliamentary institutions.” Instead of the legalistic liberalism of the Restoration, he advocated a new “substantive, organic and ethical liberalism.” While this message had limited dissemination beyond the educated circles of philosophers, novelists and poets, it shaped the agendas of the next generation of Restoration politicians, who faced a very different set of questions than had Cánovas and Sagasta in 1875.

Part of what defined that difference was the 1898 defeat itself, which, lamented the new Conservative Party leader, Francisco Silvela, put Spain’s “destiny as a European people” [read imperial people] at risk.<sup>48</sup> The short war with the United States came at the end of a long and dirty colonial war against yet another Cuban insurrection that had begun in 1895.<sup>49</sup> The insurrection came after several decades during which the Restoration elites had been unable to agree on significant political and/or economic autonomy legislation that would liberalize the Cuban economy and convince the creole elites of the benefits of remaining as “overseas” Spain. In the meantime, the independence movement, under the capable leadership of José Martí, gained increasing popular support with its inclusive language of nationalism, racial equality and democracy. When Cuban nationalists launched their rebellion, the Spanish government cracked down hard, with a brutal “pacification” campaign that included massive uprooting of populations, concentration camps and the deaths of up to 200,000 civilians. The carrot of self-government that was passed in 1897 was too late to gain much traction. By 1897, and after tens of thousands of Spanish casualties, the war had stalemated, but the United States was increasingly drawn into the conflict, for a variety of complex motives, from its growing economic investment in Cuba to its own ambivalent imperialist ambitions. The war began on May 1, 1898, and, anchored by stunning naval defeats,

ended quickly in the surrender of Spain to the United States in mid-August, with a peace treaty signed in December. While it was once thought that Spanish leaders foolishly miscalculated their ability to stand up to the United States, most now agree that they knew defeat was certain but believed it was politically impossible not to go to war, for fear that the monarchy itself would collapse.

The monarchy, of course, did not collapse, but the Restoration entered a new era, not of inevitable decline but of shifting constraints and opportunities. Given the multiple faces of the Restoration regime, its political development could have followed various paths. What was clear, however, was that the system that Cánovas had designed in 1875 as a solution to the problems of the previous liberal era, guaranteeing stability with limited suffrage, narrow elite consensus and manipulated elections, was going to be increasingly more difficult to sustain. In the late nineteenth century, the Restoration system had solved some of those earlier problems, pushing the military out of electoral politics, creating a functional two-party system and keeping the Crown within its constitutional mandate. But the dark side of the system, which flouted the principle of representation, repressed popular participation and relied on illiberal mechanisms of electoral control, limited the regime's ability to expand its base and incorporate new voices in the era of universal male suffrage. In the early twentieth century, the various efforts of elites to reform the system "from above," in addition to the impact of new mobilizing forces "from below," created a new dynamic of constraints and opportunities that shaped the trajectory of the Restoration regime after 1898.

# RESTORATION POLITICS: FROM FIN DE SIÈCLE TO POSTWAR CRISIS, 1898–1923

## **Introduction: Early Twentieth-Century Spanish Politics in Comparative Context**

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, Spain's international trajectory diverged dramatically from that of the major European powers. After the loss of her remaining overseas empire in 1898 during a period of great power imperial expansion, Spain stayed neutral in the all-consuming conflagration of the "Great War," thus bypassing the formative opening event of the "short" twentieth century. And yet, Spain's internal political evolution during this period shared the same general features as the rest of the European countries, undergoing a troubled and rocky transition from the elite liberal politics of the nineteenth century to the mass politics of the twentieth, which erupted in a transnational postwar crisis of the old liberal model that was not fully resolved until another brutal war closed this tumultuous epoch. Virtually all the European countries participated in the first stage of this crisis after the First World War, with each case differentiated both by its intensity and by its short-term outcome in the early 1920s. This chapter will chart Spain's own path from the turning point of 1898 to the postwar crisis, highlighting the factors that shaped its particular form and outcome.

In some cases, like France and Britain, the existing liberal regimes restabilized and democratized around a renovated and more inclusive political party structure. But in many cases, the old elitist regimes collapsed, beginning with the weakest, the barely liberalizing Russian empire, to the constitutional monarchies in Imperial Germany, Italy and Spain. Each of these political crises led to a distinct outcome by the early 1920s: from a new democracy in Germany, to a fascist regime in Italy, a communist one in Russia and a hybrid authoritarian regime in Spain. The common thread was that the old elitist liberal politics was either reformed or swept away in the new political climate populated by a larger and increasingly powerful cast of characters who jostled each other to make their voices heard. And while the specific identity of these groups varied across national frontiers, there were remarkable similarities. On the left there were both moderate and revolutionary

mass movements of socialists, communists and anarchists, debating whether they should collaborate in building democratic regimes or head straight for the workers' utopia. On the right there were Catholic parties and traditionalist movements and business organizations, mixing conservative demands with modern mobilizing strategies. Then there were the nationalist movements, including fascists, but also minority-language nationalisms, some of which cut across the spectrum in complex ways and tried to attract supporters from all sides. And in the middle were liberal and liberal democratic parties, the only ones unconditionally committed to strengthening the representative systems of government that constituted the status quo in prewar Europe.

This maelstrom of mobilized political identities unleashed more than two decades of ideological struggle that some have called a "European civil war."<sup>1</sup> In this struggle between the major ideologies of democracy, communism-worker revolution, and ultra-nationalism/fascism, the outcome was not obvious or preordained. The democratic tradition in Europe was much less entrenched in 1914 than modernization theorists once assumed.<sup>2</sup> The history of "Europe" in the twentieth century used to be written as if the interwar period was a mere interlude, an aberration on a generally progressive democratization that began with Magna Carta and gathered steam with the French Revolution. The implication was that fascism and communism had no real roots in European culture and that democracy and Western civilization were consubstantial. At the same time, such a narrative bracketed huge swaths of Europe, in the south and east, which followed other paths in the twentieth century. If we take the interwar period not as an aberration but as a turning point, we can see that the grand political struggles were not just the result of a few strong personalities, like Hitler, Mussolini, Franco and Stalin, but of an authentic "crisis of meaning" in which Europe became a laboratory for rethinking the parameters of the "good society" for the first time since the liberal revolution. Once again, it is only by demystifying and disaggregating the "European model" that Spain's version of the crisis, which culminated in a literal civil war in the 1930s, can be placed in a more accurate comparative perspective.

But where did this crisis of meaning come from? Historians have argued for decades about whether there was a more or less inevitable collision course between elite political regimes and emerging mass societies, or whether it was the war that set in motion a powerful set of conflicts that destabilized political systems, but the truth probably lies in some dynamic between the two. While structural transformation was occurring at uneven rates, across Europe and around the world, from 1890 there was a "great acceleration" in the decades before the war that was unsettling the status quo across the continent.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the agricultural depression of the late nineteenth century undermined the power of the landed elite and squeezed the poor peasants and landless laborers. Urbanization and the communication revolution were reaching critical levels for both political organizing and the new force of public opinion. And the old elite parties that had led the liberal revolution in the nineteenth century were increasingly on the defensive, squeezed between popular conservative movements, fueled by nationalism and/or Catholicism, and populist anti-clerical republicans, social democrats and workerist parties and movements on the left. The increase in nationalist mobilizing opened the age of "hyperactive" nationalism that included anti-colonial nationalisms, populist state

nationalisms and minority language nationalisms from Austria/Hungary to Ireland and Spain. Whether or not these changes were leading inexorably to war and crisis is an open question, but there is evidence that there were other imaginable paths than those taken.

In the Spanish case, the question of whether there were other possible paths after 1898 is central to historical debates about the period. The older “failure” narrative simply assumed that a corrupt Restoration system, product of a backward society, was incapable of democratization and thus was bound to collapse in the face of mass mobilization. Recently, the period from 1898 to 1923 has been re-examined through the lens of greater historical contingency.<sup>4</sup> While no one would disagree that Spain experienced a severe version of the postwar crisis, provoked by a range of factors, from the indirect impact of the war, to the fracturing of the dynastic parties, the pressure of mass mobilizing on the right and left, the stalling of institutional reforms and the reinsertion of the army in political life, most no longer view it as a unique product of Spanish backwardness.

Scholars disagree on the “point of no return” for the regime, as well as how likely or unlikely other potential paths were.<sup>5</sup> But, in general, they have turned their attention to a number of turning points and opportunities that were either missed or blocked by the decisions or actions of one or more of the players rather than inscribed into the DNA of the Restoration. From this more open perspective, we can see a surprisingly dynamic political context, in which elites proposed reforms to open up the system and new political movements from the Catalanist to the Socialist Parties experimented with ways of engaging with the Restoration regime. The fact that none of these initiatives succeeded in transforming the Restoration into a more broadly legitimate democratic regime doesn’t mean they were empty gestures. Without the weight of inevitable decline, we can better understand how Spain’s own contingent path toward crisis and dictatorship unfolded, step by step.<sup>6</sup>

### **1898–1914: Efforts to Reform the Regime “From Above”**

The political era that began in 1898 was dominated by the broad agreement that reforms were necessary to shore up the constitutional monarchy and “regenerate political life,” in the words of Francisco Silvela, the post-Cánovas leader of the Conservative Party. Whether or not those projects had a realistic chance of succeeding, the reform culture of the second half of the Restoration distinguished it from the late nineteenth century, with its emphasis on stability. And while there was no consensus about the solution, the reform culture generated a range of ideas, projects and discourses that opened up new opportunities and injected new life into the Liberal and Conservative Parties, demonstrating that the Restoration elites were not simply resistant to change, fiddling while Rome burned. Instead, they pursued a modernizing agenda that they hoped would incorporate more voices into the political system and increase its legitimacy, at home and abroad. At the same time, we can see in retrospect that many of their reform ideas seem either inadequate or contradictory, struggling to keep pace, especially after 1914, with competing plans for regenerating political life that were being articulated by

increasingly mobilized autonomous groups, including Catholics and anti-clericals, republicans, Catalan and Basque nationalists, socialists and anarcho-syndicalists, and the army.

Both Conservatives and Liberals agreed with Silvela's famous pronouncement that Spain was "without a pulse," and they shared many points in common about what had to be done to achieve political regeneration. In general, both parties agreed that Spain's national prestige abroad and nationalist loyalty at home had to be shored up. They also agreed that some sort of electoral reform was necessary to transform the fraudulent system into one that represented and incorporated broader interests. Likewise, they acknowledged that the "social question" required some level of state intervention beyond repression, both to protect workers and to convince them that the state could serve their interests better than anti-system movements. And finally, they understood that religion was re-emerging as a divisive question in the debates about what constituted the "problem of Spain."

It was on the religious issue that their analysis of what had to be done differed most dramatically. For the Conservatives, Spain remained a fundamentally Catholic country, in which the protection of religious unity was tantamount to strengthening the nation. In contrast, the Liberals were split, but increasingly blamed the Church for holding Spain back from modernizing. Thus, they charted a new path aimed at reducing the influence of the Church on political life and adopted a secularizing and anti-clerical discourse that had been muted in official politics since the *Sexenio* (1868–74). But the two parties also differed in their approach to the national question, with Conservatives more open to negotiating decentralization with peripheral nationalists and Liberals committed to the centralist modernizing state.

## The Conservative Party and Antonio Maura

The Conservative reform effort is most associated with the so-called "revolution from above" initiated by Silvela's replacement, Antonio Maura, after 1904. Consistent with the Conservative conviction that most Spaniards were deeply religious, Maura thought that opening up the political system to more voices would create a conservative democracy that would stabilize the constitutional monarchy. Following the evolutionary path taken in Great Britain and Belgium, Maura envisioned popularizing the monarchy, with more symbolic and visible links between the young Alfonso XIII and his people. In order to cut through the intervening layer of *cacique* corruption, he also proposed a decentralization that would, he claimed, put power in the hands of ordinary Spaniards who would finally step up to their role as citizens. His electoral reform law of 1907 was supposed to "dynamite" the roots of the corrupt system and clear the way for new voices. The law contained measures to reduce fraud, including the review of contested vote counts by the courts, the creation of independent committees to draw up the census rolls and the replacement of mayors with independent election monitors. Maura also aimed to reinvigorate a local political life that had been stifled, he argued, by decades of centralization, thus turning municipalities into "schools of citizenship." He proposed giving local governments more money and introduced the idea of

“corporate,” or group voting in local elections, with the intention of engaging the organized interests of the local community, from business associations to Catholic organizations.

So what happened to undercut the intended results of these reforms? On the one hand, there were certainly problems with the conceptualization of the “revolution from above.” Thus, as critics have pointed out, Maura’s electoral reforms had little impact on *caciquismo*, which continued to produce overwhelming victories for the dynastic parties in all but a handful of “free” districts. The law also made it more difficult to become a candidate, increasing the obstacles for non-elites to enter the system, and it did not institute the crucial reform of a secret ballot.<sup>7</sup> It also did not consider an important democratizing measure adopted by many European democracies in this period, which was proportional representation.<sup>8</sup> And finally, it did not tackle the lopsided districts that overrepresented rural areas. Maura also undercut his own reforms with an authoritarian leadership style and contradictory aims. Thus, he inaugurated his reform government by orchestrating an exceptionally fraudulent electoral victory that gave him the super-majority he needed to pass his anti-fraud electoral reform, but alienated Liberals. And, at the same time that he sought to open up the system to what he viewed as “authentic” conservative voices, he also strengthened measures to silence other less welcome voices, as in the anti-terrorist bill, which empowered the government to shut down anarchist centers and periodicals at will.

As evidenced by the resistance to this latter bill, Maura’s reform project also generated ideological opposition from the Liberal camp, which rejected more than his high-handed leadership style. From the Liberal perspective, Maura’s reforms violated important principles that guided their vision of the “problem of Spain.” On the one hand, they viewed his anti-terrorist law and the corporate local voting as in conflict with the liberal rights of the individual, in terms of free speech but also of one man/one vote. On the other hand, Liberals viewed his decentralization plans as shifting power away from the centralized state and encouraging the dangerous centrifugal dynamic of regional nationalisms. The tension between corporatist and individualist conceptions of modern political life will become one of the key lines of fracture in the “European civil war,” and Spain was no exception. While dynastic politics was no doubt rife with the usual petty power politics, there was also a substantive dimension to political reform debates.

## The Liberal Party and José Canalejas

The Liberals had been the party of reform in the Restoration, but their platform of basic civil and political rights had been implemented by 1890, creating the need to reinvent themselves as a reforming party with new goals. In general terms, the Spanish Liberal Party followed the trend of European liberalism, which was shifting away from the “laissez-faire” doctrine of the nineteenth century toward a more interventionist role for the state. Building on the traditional Liberal attachment to the centralist state, the “new” liberalism demanded expanded powers and obligations to enhance the state’s role as modernizing and democratizing agent.

It was in this context that at least some leaders of the Liberal Party took up the banner of anti-clericalism and secularism, which had been confined to the margins of the political spectrum since 1875.<sup>9</sup> The future Liberal leader, Canalejas, set the new tone in his 1902 campaign tours, in which he equated a democratized monarchy with freedom from clericalism. In an era of revived popular mobilization around the religious issue, with Catholics defending the role of religion in schools and public life on one side and republican and anarcho-syndicalist anti-clericals on the other, Canalejas and other Liberal leaders situated themselves in the moderate wing of the latter camp, presumably hoping to increase their popular base. Between parliamentary debates, press coverage and street demonstrations, the religious question was the first major public-sphere debate of the twentieth century, and by the end of the first decade anti-clericalism would consolidate as the pre-eminent unifying issue of the “left,” albeit with various positions along a spectrum from mild secularization to separation of Church and State to violent expulsion, exemplified during the so-called “tragic week” in Barcelona in July 1909, when several days of anti-clerical riots torched about a third of the religious buildings in the city.

Under Canalejas’s leadership, the Liberal Party attempted to craft a coherent policy of mild secularization that would subordinate Church institutions to the civil power of the state as well as guarantee a stronger “freedom of conscience” for non-believers. Canalejas and most other Liberals were practicing Catholics who had no intention of expelling the Church from Spanish society and public life, or even to separate Church and State, but simply wanted to further enhance the primacy of the latter in political affairs. The key reform that the Liberal Party introduced was aimed at bringing the greatly expanding religious orders under the control of the general 1887 Law of Associations, which would force them to register with the state.<sup>10</sup> The Concordat of 1851 had given the state the right to limit the number of religious orders in the country, but it had never been fully implemented, so registration was viewed as the first step in this direction. In addition, he intended to present legislation that promoted “religious freedom,” in terms of civil marriage and burial, as well as in voluntary rather than mandatory religious classes in state schools. In broad terms, this secularizing agenda would have opened the door to a new relationship between Church and State, somewhere between the extreme secularization of the French case and the uniquely privileged Church that Catholic associations in Spain wanted to preserve. Thus, the Liberal legislation pointed toward a Church that would take its place as one institution among many in Spanish public life.

Another main thrust of Liberal reform efforts was directed at the “social question,” although here Liberals shared the field with the Conservatives. In response to the first major strike wave (1899–1903), including the first general strike in Barcelona (1902), both parties saw the need to move beyond an exclusive “public order” approach to resolving social conflict. Thus, the first social reforms were passed by Conservative governments around the turn of the century, including legislation protecting female and child laborers, holding employers responsible for work accidents, regulating the right to strike and establishing a national institute to set up worker pensions, as well as mandating an obligatory Sunday “rest.” Under Canalejas’s government, the Liberals passed two popular measures

intended to reduce the extra burdens that the state laid on the poorest Spaniards. The first abolished the flat consumption tax (*consumos*) on basic foodstuffs (1911) and the second instituted obligatory military service for all Spaniards (1912), in theory abolishing the loophole that had allowed wealthy families to “buy out” their sons’ obligations. Canalejas also raised the possibility of land reform and opened the door to government arbitration of strikes, as occurred successfully in a miners’ strike in Vizcaya in 1910, which ended with a new law reducing miners’ working day to nine hours. With these policies, Canalejas hoped to integrate workers into a more democratized monarchy and wean them from more radical parties and movements.

The last focus of Liberal Party efforts to regenerate political life was the pursuit of a colonial policy in Morocco, although all the Restoration elites, and especially Alfonso XIII, shared the basic goal of improving the country’s damaged prestige at home and abroad by keeping Spain’s foot in the door of imperial rule. In the “great power” negotiations with Britain and France about how to divide up Morocco, Spain was granted a “sphere of influence” over about a fifth of the territory in the 1906 Treaty of Algeciras. At first there were some optimistic plans for “peaceful penetration” of Spanish business and investment, maintained by a light military presence on the ground and sustained by popular patriotism. But the combination of growing resistance in Morocco and the perceived need to “keep up with the French” occupation of their territory pushed governments toward increasing the Spanish footprint, both in terms of military budgets and manpower. While in retrospect, the colonial policy seems like an obvious miscalculation and waste of scarce resources, for political leaders the link between empire and national prestige was so strong that the temptations offered by a low-impact colony in Spain’s backyard would have been hard to resist.<sup>11</sup> By the time of Canalejas’s government (1910–12), however, hopes for “peaceful penetration” had been replaced with an increasingly desperate shoring up of the Spanish presence after the colonial army’s first major defeat in 1909. Maura’s decision in 1909 to call up reservists and send them to Morocco had been the spark that set off the “tragic week” in Barcelona and precipitated the fall of the Conservative government. Although Canalejas tried to keep from sending more reservists to Morocco, his and subsequent governments were saddled with an increasingly unpopular, as well as economically draining, colonial presence.

The unpopularity of the colonial policy was one element of the defeat of Liberal reform efforts, in that it symbolized the party’s inability to broaden its own, as well as the regime’s support base. There was also Canalejas’s untimely and tragic assassination in 1912, which removed the most creative modernizing leader in the Liberal camp. And yet, even in the midst of his reform efforts, Canalejas had made more enemies than friends, so it is not clear how much of a “lost opportunity” his death was. On the one side, Catholic associations viewed him as no different than church-burning anarchists, while on the other side, republicans and worker organizations viewed him as no better than the Conservatives, with a mixed record of both protecting and repressing labor, an unpopular colonial war and no more than timid secularization measures. Partly bogged down by the Moroccan war, many of his proposed reforms were deferred by the need to keep the elites united behind the colonial policy.

Whatever the limits of Canalejas's reform project, the Liberal initiative in "regenerating political life" faded away after his death. Canalejas was replaced by Count Romanones, a more old-style politician, whose power base rested in clientelist networks, not popular campaigns. At this point, the party split into factions, which undermined any credible effort to implement the reforms that remained in its platform, including agrarian reform, proportional suffrage, the democratization of the Senate, religious freedom and limits on the government's right to suspend constitutional rights.

## 1914–23: From Elite Reform to Mass Mobilization: Alternative Political Projects

### The First World War in Spain

Using 1914 as a turning point on the road to political crisis is more symbolic than precise in Spain, both because of the uneven and gradual nature of political change and the fact that Spain was not a belligerent in the war. A more precise turning point for elite politics might be 1913 or perhaps 1917, both important moments in the gradual collapse of the *turno*. In terms of the growing strength of alternative movements, there was the massive general strike and the democratic assembly movement of 1917, or the explosion of trade union membership in 1918, but the roots of these movements extended back to the post-1898 crisis. Nevertheless, 1914 serves as a convenient pivot, linking the Spanish crisis with the rest of Europe, and acknowledging that the wartime period produced similar consequences in Spain, from the exacerbation of economic and social tensions, to the growth of mass mobilization, nationalism and political polarization.

Even in a neutral country, the war was a powerful catalyst in disrupting the status quo.<sup>12</sup> The effects on the economy were both stimulating and troubling. On the one hand, there were expanded opportunities for trade and capital investment as a result of the disruption of the belligerents' economies. On the other hand, the greater demand for exports increased prices at home, which outstripped wage increases for the poorest Spaniards. In addition, the image of "nouveau-riche" businessmen raking in huge fortunes stoked class resentments and provided fuel and new supporters for working-class movements.

In more general political terms, despite the unquestioned neutrality, the war divided both public opinion and the political class, deepening and expanding the heated public debates about Spain's future into a "civil war of words."<sup>13</sup> Over the course of the war, supporters lined up in favor of the Allies (*aliadófilos*) or the Central Powers (*germanófilos*), reinforcing opposing positions from the religious debate of the first decade. That is, the *germanófilo* public overlapped considerably with the Catholic public, both defending a traditionalist, religious, nationalist and authoritarian monarchist Spain that, they argued, made them natural allies with the German empire and equally natural enemies of "atheist" and republican France. Likewise, the *aliadófilos* generally assembled a left-wing coalition, including most of the major intellectuals of the so-called "generation of 1914," which identified precisely with the secularist, republican and democratic France

against the German and Austro-Hungarian empires. The Spanish political elites never seriously considered military intervention, which undoubtedly saved the Restoration from immediate postwar collapse, as occurred in Russia and Germany. However, the “civil war of words” amplified existing ideological divisions and undermined the efforts of the dynastic parties to lead the country through the unfolding political crisis.

### **From the *Turno* to Fragmentation of the Liberal and Conservative Parties, 1913–23**

The wartime divisions reinforced an internal disintegration of the *turno* rules of the game that undermined both the legitimacy and the leadership of the ruling parties. The controversial Maura took the first step in 1913 when he refused to participate in a “turn” with a Liberal Party he viewed as having betrayed him. While the king appointed another Conservative leader, Maura’s decision violated the principle of “acknowledging the adversary,” which had been one of the foundations of *turno* stability. Stability was further undermined by the fragmentation of both parties into rival camps.<sup>14</sup> With no strong leadership by either dynastic party, the small opposition parties played mostly obstructionist roles, and it was difficult for the Cortes to pass significant legislation. Thus, for example, the Cortes was not able to approve one budget between 1914 and 1920. The impact on the legitimacy of parliamentary government was reflected in declining voter participation, which dropped from 76 percent in 1910 to 48–60 percent in 1922.<sup>15</sup>

As parliament became increasingly fragmented and paralyzed, the king’s and the army’s political intervention expanded. Without the consensual tripartite framework of the *turno*, Alfonso made more independent political decisions. Although it is not fair to blame him for the fragmentation of the party system, he became an increasingly unpredictable wild card whose political opinions were shifting from an early sympathy with liberal regenerationism toward more militarist and clericalist positions, reflected, for example, in his shift from an *aliadófilo* to a *germanófilo* position over the course of the war.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, since the 1898 defeat, the military had been gradually reinserting itself into domestic politics, aided by the lack of constitutional subordination of the military to civilian authority and propelled by its damaged reputation. Defending its reputation provoked the first major conflict between military and civilian authorities, when the army demanded retribution for what it viewed as a disrespectful cartoon in a Catalan satirical magazine, *Cu Cut*, in 1905. Bowing to the army’s pressure, the government passed the “Jurisdiction Law” in 1906, which gave military courts the right to try anti-army crimes. Tensions continued to grow between civilian and military authority, especially as the colonial project in Morocco devolved into a struggling military operation. From *Cu Cut* to Morocco, Alfonso increasingly supported the military position, and in the end, it was his decision to endorse General Primo de Rivera’s 1923 coup against parliamentary rule. Whether that decision was the final “point of no return” of a constitutional system that was bruised but still viable,<sup>17</sup> or whether it merely finished off a regime already past repair, it is clear that the king played an increasingly destabilizing role as the regime slipped into crisis.

As the Liberal and Conservative Parties lost the initiative in proposing solutions to the “problem of Spain,” other groups mobilizing on the margins of the *turno* represented a range of alternative political projects, some of which were designed to reform or transform the Restoration regime and others to replace it, but all critical of the elitist liberal status quo. The movements spanned the political spectrum, including Catholics, *Mauristas*<sup>18</sup> and nationalists, both Spanish and Basque, on the right, and on the left, anarcho-syndicalists (CNT) and Socialists (PSOE/UGT), as well as loosely defined centrist democratic movements like the republicans and the Catalanist Lliga (although the latter shifted to the right). During the last years of the regime, these political projects competed and sometimes collaborated in the public sphere, as articulated in the press, street demonstrations, strikes, riots, petitions and proposals.

Was there a lost opportunity for the democratization of the Restoration in the integration of at least some of these movements and their political projects? Recent scholarship has emphasized a less “either/or” dynamic, with uneven willingness to incorporate new forces on the part of the elite parties, a process made more difficult but not impossible by the diversity of ideological projects among those forces. It is generally agreed that the fractured and often localized nature of mass mobilization made it unlikely that any one of these alternative projects would carry the day, but that does not mean a military coup was the inevitable resolution of Spain’s “crisis of liberalism.” Explaining that final outcome requires a dynamic understanding of the relationship among all the major players, in a European context of an unraveling postwar crisis, from Moscow to London, that framed a set of options and choices for Spanish protagonists: from the democratic and Bolshevik revolutions in Russia, to the workers’ and soldiers’ councils in Germany, to the creation of new nation-states out of multinational empires and finally, to fascist takeover in Italy.

### Movements on the Right

#### *Catholic Mobilization*

As the leadership of the dynastic parties faltered, political initiative began to shift from inside the *turno* to its margins. Almost all the opposition groups had roots in the late nineteenth century, but broader mobilization began to advance after 1898. On the right, perhaps the best example was the re-emergence of a Catholic movement around the turn of the century, dedicated to defending the Church and the Catholic nation against the revival of anti-clericalism, both in the streets and in Liberal policies.<sup>19</sup> Through both traditional channels, such as the devotional movements dedicated to Mary or the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and the emerging forms of a mass society, including an expanding local Catholic press, secular associations like Catholic Action, Catholic agrarian syndicates and “worker circles,” many Catholic men and women were mobilized into a new form of politics that confronted anti-clerical opponents on their own territory. As one Catholic newspaper proclaimed, “protest has burst through the walls of the sanctuary and out into the streets.”<sup>20</sup> Given the local scope of mobilization, its extent outside a few well-studied cases is still unclear, although the geography of clerical mobilization seems to track closely with zones of their anti-clerical opponents. This Catholic mobilization

used to be viewed as simply the mouthpiece of the Church hierarchy and/or as an obstacle to “modern” political development. Recent studies, however, point out that this mobilization marked a rupture with *cacique*-style politics and opened a path to grassroots politicization that was no less modern for being anti-liberal and anti-democratic.<sup>21</sup>

What is significant for Restoration politics is that some proportion of self-identified Catholics had decided that they could no longer count on the *turno* parties to defend their interests. Instead, they had to take direct political action themselves, even if mostly at the local level. In a few cases, like Valencia, the conflict between anti-clerical republicans and a newly formed Catholic League (1901) came to dominate local politics throughout the remainder of the Restoration. Certainly, in urban republican strongholds from Barcelona to Gijón, left-wing city councils established battle lines over everything from street names to official celebrations, battles which often hit closer to home for believers than the policy disputes in Madrid. In rural Catholic areas, Catholics and Carlists began competing directly with dynastic parties in local, provincial and even national elections, winning some seats.

What kept these movements from coalescing into a state-wide Catholic political party, such as existed in Germany or Italy, was the continued division among Catholics. Some Catholics, especially the Church hierarchy, continued to support the Conservative Party, or the *Maurista* segment of it, while a modernizing but also divided Carlist movement revived its own forces in its traditional strongholds with new associations, youth organizations, recreational centers and press, and finally, the new Basque Nationalist Party began to absorb much of the Catholic vote in that region. Perhaps the lack of a nationally coordinated assault on Catholicism, especially after the defeat of the Liberal secularization efforts by 1913, created insufficient incentive for Catholics to overcome their differences.

#### *Basque Nationalism (PNV/CNV)*

The dispersal of Catholic politics is exemplified by the Catholic-based Basque Nationalist movement that evolved into the most important grassroots conservative political force in the Basque region by the end of the Restoration.<sup>22</sup> The movement had its roots in the late nineteenth century, fueled by the disappointment over the loss of the *fueros* in 1876, the defeat of the Carlists and the economic and social transformation wrought by industrialization. Founded in 1895 by Sabino Arana, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) defended an independent Basque nation which he called Euzkadi (uniting the four Basque provinces), based on Catholic and racial identity, ruralism, anti-capitalism and anti-immigration. But the opportunity for expansion came after 1898, when the PNV incorporated more moderate autonomist elements, constructing a pragmatic program in 1906 based on the recovery of the *fueros*, while not abandoning its separatist rhetoric. With this compromise, the PNV (renamed the CNV in 1913) was able to build the sort of mass conservative party in at least parts of the region that the Catholics could not manage on the national level. With a social base that included native Basque workers (integrated into a PNV trade union federation formed in 1911), rural and urban lower middle classes, professionals and industrial elites, the PNV/CNV was the first party in Spain to capitalize on the cross-class mobilizing potential of nationalism that was occurring throughout Europe.

The opportunity to integrate this mass base into the Restoration system came with the 1917–19 campaign for an autonomy statute, mounted by the CNV, which had become the dominant force in the province of Vizcaya and was expanding in the others. With the defeat of that campaign, the CNV split, with a young, radical urban splinter group breaking off to form a new party, once again called the PNV. A successful autonomy campaign would have helped strengthen the moderate integrationist wing of the CNV and thus expanded the social base of the Restoration regime, but at the same time its non-Spanish nationalism would have made alliances with other conservative forces difficult.

#### *Mauristas/Spanish Nationalism*

In fact, the emergence of regional nationalism provoked competing forms of Spanish nationalist mobilization on the right of the political spectrum. From 1914, it was the Catholic version of Spanish nationalism that was gaining strength, against a liberal nationalism that was losing ground, following the European trend of the conservative drift of nationalism.<sup>23</sup> One of these groups was the *Mauristas*, a socially diverse collection of middle- and upper-class professionals and white-collar workers, at first more closely linked to the Conservative Party and electoral politics, but increasingly autonomous after the war. Historians have argued about whether they constituted a lost opportunity to form a mass Spanish conservative party with a popular base, similar to the British Tory Party, or whether they represented the embryo of a fascist “radical” right. During the war, the *Mauristas* were one of the key *germanófilo* groups, holding massive public rallies and engaging in other forms of modern political activity, from propaganda to youth organizations. The movement seemed to have had competing tendencies, one of which could have remained within the parliamentary framework to which Maura himself was committed, and the other, especially prominent in the youth organization, which shared the anti-parliamentary, ultra-nationalist and militarist characteristics of other “radical” right groups across Europe. It was this latter tendency that came to dominate the postwar period, when *Mauristas* shared the streets with other ultra-nationalist organizations like the Liga Patriótica Española, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country, where they confronted regional nationalist movements in the name of an eternally united Spain.<sup>24</sup>

As with the Catholic movements, the Basque and Spanish nationalist parties and leagues constituted a new genre of conservative politics that was popular instead of elite, middle or lower-middle class instead of aristocratic. And, as in other European countries, this conservative politics erupted at the borders of traditional parties, at times collaborating with them and at others destabilizing them. Spain had the full range of modern conservative movements, whose ideas and organizational forms would be incorporated into the two dictatorships. However, the “radical” wing of this “new” right politics was not strong and unified enough to call the shots, as did occur with Mussolini’s blackshirts in Italy. The ultra-nationalist movements were localized and unevenly distributed, concentrated in regions like Catalonia and the Basque Country, which had strong worker and regional nationalist movements, and without the fortification of large numbers of angry returning veterans, as in Italy. As a result, an Italian-style fascist revolution was unlikely.

Alternatively, could Maura have incorporated the *Mauristas* and Catholics into a modern conservative party that stabilized the parliamentary system around a base of the Catholic middle classes? If there was such a moment it was in the summer of 1917, when Maura had the opportunity to join the democratic assembly movement, but decided against it. The Tory Party demonstrates that this scenario was a real-world possibility, but there were many factors mitigating against such an outcome in Spain, including the authoritarian instincts of Maura, which made him ambivalent about leading a mass party, and the anti-liberal convictions of many Catholics. From a comparative perspective, while Catholics did constitute mass conservative parties in postwar Italy and Weimar Germany, in neither case were they able to save the parliamentary regimes from collapse, in part because of their own ambivalence toward democracy and in part because they could never form coalitions with left-wing parties. When push came to shove, the traditional conservative parties either enabled or became subordinated to the energized forces of the radical right. For most of Europe, it was not until after the Second World War that the unconditionally democratic mass conservative party became the norm.

### Movements on the Left

On the other side of the spectrum, the post-First World War “left” was equally divided and ambivalent about parliamentary democracy, torn between a “maximalist” wing pursuing immediate class revolution and a “reformist” wing focused on socializing liberal democracies. These divisions, famously embodied in the Spartacists vs. the Social Democrats (SPD) in Germany, or the Syndicalists vs. the Socialist Party in Italy, were replicated in the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) vs. the anarcho-sindicalist union federation (CNT). At the same time, these organizational distinctions do not fully capture the complexity of left positions within and across groups.<sup>25</sup> Thus, all of these groups shared, to some degree, the long-term vision of replacing “bourgeois” democracy with a worker-led egalitarian regime, and thus none had fully made the transition to the unconditionally social democratic parties of the post-Second World War period. At the same time, all of these groups also engaged in internal debates about the degree of collaboration and investment that they should make in reforming the current “bourgeois” regimes, so there were some opportunities for, on the one hand, at least partial incorporation of working-class movements into a democratizing project, or, on the other, a workers’ revolution. In the Spanish case, the opportunities for either of these options were relatively weak but not absent. Once again, it is in the dynamic interaction between the different left-wing groups and the other political actors that shaped the role of the “left” in the postwar crisis of liberalism.

#### *Socialists (PSOE/UGT)*

Both of the worker organizations had their roots in the nineteenth century, but both made qualitative leaps in the postwar period that made them significant political actors for the first time. Before the First World War, the Socialist Party (1879) and its trade union branch, the UGT (*Unión General de Trabajadores*) (1882), had remained much smaller than their European counterparts, both in terms of

union-organizing capacity and political weight. Thus, in contrast to the Italian Socialist Party, which had 33 elected deputies by 1900, in Spain the first Socialist was elected in 1910, as part of a Republican–Socialist coalition, with a peak of seven seats in 1923, when the party won major victories in Madrid. The UGT had more success, growing from 6,000 members in 1898 to 100,000–200,000 at its peak in 1918, but was still relatively small in European terms. The Socialists were most successful in industrial centers in Asturias and the Basque Country, where they came to dominate entire mining communities. The limited national reach of the UGT can partly be explained by the uneven industrial development, but the Socialists also restricted their appeal by not yet vigorously pursuing the mobilization of agricultural workers, who were marginal in orthodox Marxist theory.

The limited national reach of the PSOE may explain why it was less invested in integrating into the “bourgeois” political system than other European socialist parties, occupying the other end of the spectrum from the “reformist” social democratic position of the electorally powerful German SPD. Given the constraints of the manipulated elections, as well as competition from both republicans and anarcho-syndicalists for worker support, it is not surprising that the PSOE chose to channel most of its resources into union organizing rather than electoral competition. In the postwar period, however, the PSOE/UGT extended feelers in both the reformist and “maximalist” directions, participating in the democratic assembly movement as well as a revolutionary general strike, so its role was both fluid and unstable.

#### *Anarcho-syndicalists (CNT)*

Key to the Socialist Party position in postwar politics was its relationship with the competing worker organization, the CNT (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajo*). The CNT had its roots in the nineteenth-century “apolitical” anarchist movement, but its establishment in 1910 opened a new phase, both in terms of structure and ideology. Instead of the earlier unstructured idea of a spontaneous popular uprising, the CNT adopted the new French syndicalist strategy of the revolutionary general strike. Thus, the revolution would be triggered by a massive general strike that would bring the country to its knees, spark a political crisis and pave the way for a new egalitarian society. In the present as well as the future, the organizational framework was syndicalism, the constitution of broad trade unions which would manage both economic and political affairs in voluntary federations instead of a state. The merging of apolitical anarchist goals and syndicalist organization created anarcho-syndicalism, which provided a more permanent structure for worker mobilization. From an initial 40,000 members in 1910, the CNT ballooned to about 800,000 at its peak in 1918, far outstripping its UGT counterpart.

Whereas the continued strength of anarchism in the twentieth century was once seen as yet another indication of Spain’s backward politics, the greater appeal of the CNT over the PSOE/UGT had little to do with a modern/traditional binary. Thus, the refusal to participate in electoral politics made sense in a context where elections produced few victories, its focus on local authority and horizontal pacts built on the strong federal republican tradition, and its recruitment of agricultural workers, especially the landless laborers (*braceros*) of the south, made it more inclusive. Moreover, there was a complex local and regional geography of

the two movements that crossed “modern” and “traditional” social and economic contexts.<sup>26</sup> Thus, the CNT developed urban industrial strongholds in Gijón and Barcelona, while the UGT built urban industrial strength in Madrid and Bilbao (among non-Basque immigrant workers). Likewise, the CNT rural strength among *braceros* in western Andalucía was matched by smaller pockets of UGT rural support in Extremadura and eastern Andalucía.<sup>27</sup> Rather than viewing the CNT as a unique element of Spain’s underdevelopment, it is more helpful to see it as Spain’s “maximalist” left, an important player in all the continental European postwar crises. From this perspective, the fact that Spain’s revolutionary left was anarcho-syndicalist instead of communist did make a Bolshevik-style revolution less likely. The decentralized and apolitical CNT was both incapable of, and ideologically opposed to the sort of centrally planned revolution launched by the Bolsheviks in October 1917.<sup>28</sup>

At the same time, it is too simplistic to see the CNT as simply a failed revolutionary force and the implacable enemy of any democratization project. Thus, even within the CNT there were debates over the short-term possibilities of “reformist” positions, with syndicalists hoping to establish a collaborative set of industrial relations within which workers could defend their short-term interests, while anarchists defended “maximalist” insurrectionary direct action.<sup>29</sup> In practice, the tension between syndicalist and anarchist goals waxed and waned, on the local, regional and national levels, depending on the opportunities provided by the immediate context of a rapidly evolving postwar crisis.

### Movements of the Center

#### *Republicanism*

Further complicating the shifting dynamic between revolution and reformism among the working-class organizations was the competition for worker support from interclass democratic parties, which sought to mobilize them in broad coalitions that could democratize the elite Restoration system. The most successful of these were the various republican parties. Situated on the center-left of the political spectrum, they tried to mobilize workers and middle-class Spaniards into a cross-class democratic and anti-clerical alliance, modeled on the successful French Third Republic. Republicanism also had its roots in the nineteenth century, with its apogee during the short-lived First Republic, but, as with other popular movements, it entered a new phase after 1898. Marked by the creation of a new generation of republican parties, including the Radical Party of Alejandro Lerroux in Barcelona, the Blasquistas of Blasco Ibáñez in Valencia and the Reformist Party of Melquíades Álvarez in Asturias, the new republicanism mobilized through the techniques of mass politics, from rallies to poster campaigns, to charismatic leaders.<sup>30</sup> Aiming to capture the new voters enfranchised by the 1890 law, the new republican parties succeeded in transforming local politics in their urban strongholds, constituting majorities of city councils in a number of strongholds before the war.

Perhaps more impactful than winning elections were the republicans’ broader efforts to mobilize and politicize mostly urban populations. Through a thriving republican press, as well as thick networks of associations, secular schools, recreational

activities and worker centers, the local republican parties constructed a vibrant milieu in which workers and other lower-class Spaniards could become educated and informed citizens, creating a “culture of mobilization” that contrasted with the demobilization of the early Restoration. Significantly, in the period before the war, this popular milieu was a “big tent” in which republicans, anarcho-syndicalists and even socialists mingled, all drawn by the institutional resources and basic shared values, from opposition to the elite Restoration system to popular education and anti-clericalism.

And yet, the republicans’ democratic political project struggled to make an impact in national politics.<sup>31</sup> Similar to the Catholic mobilization of the period, it remained largely local in scope and unevenly rooted across the country. Because only a small number of republican deputies were ever elected to the Cortes, with their numbers declining over the postwar period, republicanism used to be dismissed as marginal until it seemed to burst out of nowhere in 1931. But there is no disputing a generation of local studies that have revealed the impact of republicanism as a grassroots mobilizing force in this period.

At the national level, the most visible republican group was the Reformist Party, but only after its leader had declared that he would accept a democratic monarchy. The Reformist Party then became the second non-*turno* party to enter into a coalition government (in 1922, after the Catalan Lliga in 1917). This moment has often been identified as an important opportunity for democratization and incorporation of new voices. For the optimists, it was an opportunity cut short by the military coup; for the pessimists, it would not have been enough to transform the unrepresentative Restoration system, and as always there is some evidence for both positions.

### *Catalanism/Lliga*

The other main centrist opposition group that seemed to have the potential to reform the system from within was the Catalanist party, the Lliga Regionalista, although it moved increasingly to the right in the postwar crisis. The Lliga was formed in 1901 by Francesc Cambó and soon became a major political force in Catalonia.<sup>32</sup> Catalan regionalism had been developing over the last third of the nineteenth century, following a “modernizing” rhetoric that was the complete opposite from its traditionalist Basque counterpart. Catalan regional identity developed through the so-called cultural renaissance, which sought to both recover and create the symbols and artefacts of a unique Catalan identity, including a linguistic recovery of Catalan as the language of cultural production. The first Catalanist centers emerged in the 1880s, forming a federation in 1891. In 1892 this *Unió Catalanista* formulated a program, the *Bases de Manresa*, which defended the principle of a separate Catalan identity, an official Catalan language, the adoption of Catalan law, and regional autonomy, with control over finances, tax collection and public order. By 1896 there were 16 local branches with between 2,500 and 5,000 members, divided between a more apolitical regionalist wing and a nationalist wing that wanted to create a Catalanist political party.

All the pieces came together for a viable political Catalanist movement after 1898, when the blow to Catalonia’s economy from the loss of the colonial markets increased disillusionment with the existing dynastic parties. In this sense, and in contrast to the PNV, the Lliga emerged out of the same regenerationist milieu as

many of the other new voices that were critical of the existing system's ability to right the ship of state. The Lliga brought together the intellectuals of the *Unió* with elite businessmen to form a party that was reformist, regionalist and nationalist, but not separatist. From a position of autonomy, Catalonia would lead the regeneration of the rest of Spain, becoming, in the Lliga's business-oriented vision, the engine of a modern economy and society. There was also a republican version of Catalanism, rooted in the strong federalist tradition in the region, which joined the Lliga in the *Solidaritat Catalana* coalition between 1906 and 1909. *Solidaritat* won 67 percent of all votes in the 1907 elections and 41 of 44 seats in the Cortes. But the coalition came apart after the "tragic week," when the Lliga supported the government's repression of the left. The republican Catalanists formed the *Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana* in 1910, but it was Lerroux's anti-Catalanist Radical Republican Party that made huge inroads among the lower (often non-Catalan immigrant) classes.

Although republican Catalanism did not disappear, the elitist and center-right Lliga became the dominant Catalanist force for the remainder of the Restoration. In fact, of all the new non-*turno* parties, the Lliga probably came the closest to unsettling the two-party system. In Catalonia it decimated the *turno*, surpassing the number of seats held by both dynastic parties from 1918 to 1923.<sup>33</sup> With its growing leverage, the Lliga had negotiated the first recognition of Catalan political identity, the *Mancomunidad* (1913), which was an administrative entity based on the medieval Catalan state. In 1917, the Lliga became the first non-*turno* party to join a government, and from this position angled to get an autonomy statute passed in 1918.

But in the end, a combination of factors undermined the Lliga's ability either to democratize and reform the system, or to achieve its autonomy aims. Throughout the period, the Lliga juggled to balance its goals of democratization and Catalan autonomy with its business members' desire for public order, but it proved increasingly difficult to keep all the balls in the air. It was difficult to lead a campaign for democratization of the Spanish state from Catalonia, since anti-Catalan sentiment was strong even among opposition parties. It was equally difficult to lead a campaign for Catalan autonomy in Madrid, given the centralist proclivities of Spanish liberals, although the government did draw up a draft of a plan that was tabled when labor conflict moved to the top of the agenda. And finally, as reaction to the sharpening labor conflict demonstrated, it proved challenging for the business-oriented Lliga elites to lead a broad democratic movement, since, when push came to shove, they came down firmly on the side of social order and repression. From 1917, when the Lliga stood at the head of a democratic reform movement, it moved increasingly to the right, culminating in 1923 when it did not oppose the military coup.<sup>34</sup> It would not be until the 1930s that a republican Catalanist coalition was able to construct a broader cross-class democratic movement.

### Turning Points in the Crisis of the Restoration, 1917–23

As should be obvious by the range of political actors and alternative projects that have been introduced thus far, the chronology of turning points and potential missed opportunities for reforming the political system was neither linear nor

straightforward. For the path of democratization, there was no one missed opportunity but at best a potential sequence of mutually reinforcing decisions or events that could plausibly have led to this more desirable resolution of Spain's postwar crisis. Nevertheless, across a landscape of multiple and intersecting opportunities, there are several important turning points in the postwar period that steered the country further from, rather than closer to democratization.

### The Democratic Assembly Movement, 1917

The first major turning point was the democratic assembly movement of the summer of 1917.<sup>35</sup> For a short period of time, almost every important centrist and left-wing movement in Spain, from the Catalanists and republicans to the PSOE/UGT and (indirectly) CNT, rallied behind a call for democratic transformation that was to begin with a "clean" election for a constituent Cortes which would draw up a new constitution. The Catalan Lliga initiated the movement by convoking an assembly of all parliamentary deputies in Barcelona in July 1917. Although only the 20 percent of non-*turno* representatives showed up, there was broad optimism among opposition forces that Spain was on the brink of a democratic revolution, following on the heels of the first Russian Revolution. Increasing the optimism was the initial support of a sector of the army, junior officers who had recently formed defense councils (*juntas de defensa*) that began as professional lobbying groups but joined the broader attacks on *caciquismo* and calls for regeneration. There were even efforts to recruit conservative political forces, from Maura and his followers to the king, which could theoretically have brought left and right together in a new party system that incorporated Catholics, regional nationalists, republicans and the moderate sectors of the working-class organizations.

However, by the end of the summer it had collapsed, crushed by a plethora of missed opportunities. First, none of the existing dynastic elites, including the king and Maura, agreed to support the movement, which foreclosed the possibility of a "top-down" transformation of the regime. Second, the movement could not hold its heterogeneous class and ideological base together in an era of rising labor militancy. The cross-class alliance was immediately tested in August 1917, when, for a complex set of reasons (which may have included government provocation), the UGT felt forced to declare a general revolutionary strike. Even though its demands mirrored those of the democratic assembly, as a revolutionary general strike it was harshly repressed by the army and condemned as a mistake by the Lliga. The combination of revolutionary rhetoric and moderate demands exemplified the often mixed messages sent by European socialist movements, trying to balance the more radical demands of their base with a pragmatic desire to support democratization, at least in the short term. The Lliga's response is also exemplary of the ambivalence of a mainly "bourgeois" party faced with the perceived conflict between democratization and social order.

And finally, the decision of the army to follow orders and break up the strike rather than fraternize with the workers was crucial to maintaining the status quo. As comparative scholars have demonstrated, revolutions are not likely to prosper if the forces of order remain loyal to the regime. But more than simply remain loyal to the status quo, after this brief flirtation with political reform the military began

to play a more self-serving role in Restoration politics, with the *juntas de defensa* returning to their role of corporate pressure groups to secure favorable legislation or prevent unwanted military reforms. To add to this trend of increasing army influence in politics, the military governors and their garrisons, especially in conflictive cities like Barcelona, gained more power over civilian authorities, declaring “states of war” that suspended constitutional guarantees for months on end and implemented authoritarian law and order policies.

### The La Canadiense Strike, 1919

The next major turning point involved the missed opportunity in 1919 to incorporate a rapidly expanding labor movement through social reform and a functional labor relations system.<sup>36</sup> This was a crucial moment to set new parameters for labor relations, after the CNT and UGT unions had ballooned almost overnight to about a million members. Not surprisingly, the number of strikes and labor actions had risen dramatically, both in urban centers, with Barcelona as the epicenter, and in the rural countryside of Andalucía, where an unprecedented level of social agitation lasted into 1920. Since the CNT had mobilized the vast majority of these workers, it was the main labor-movement protagonist in a three-part dialogue between employers, workers and the state (although in practice there were subdivisions of all three categories). But instead of institutionalizing labor relations, the dialogue collapsed, devolving into militarized repression, terrorist violence, hundreds of deaths and the disarticulation of the trade union movement, not to mention the indirect impact of torpedoing negotiations on Basque and Catalan autonomy statutes, another missed opportunity linked to this turning point.

In Barcelona, the upward trajectory of the CNT was consolidated with the organization of industry-wide syndicates in 1918 that could wield significant leverage against employers. Although the CNT retained an unstable mix of insurrectionary anarchists and union-building syndicalists, the latter were moving into a dominant position under the capable leadership of Salvador Seguí. Seguí’s strategy culminated in a successful strike over working conditions in February 1919, called by the workers of the La Canadiense electricity plant. After 100,000 workers joined in solidarity with the original strikers, the government agreed to negotiate a settlement that granted the workers most of their major demands, including higher wages and the eight-hour day.

After this high point, the path toward institutionalized collective bargaining began to unravel, with competing narratives about which of the players bears the most blame for what devolved into a terrorist war of *pistolero* (gun battles) on the streets of Barcelona, between anarchist “action groups” and the paramilitary forces of the right-wing *Sindicatos Libres*, often hired by employers. One version places primary blame on the radicalizing spiral of the CNT, in which the balance of power began to shift from the Seguí camp to the insurrectionary anarchists. Another argues that the radicalization of the CNT was a consequence of employer intransigence and unwillingness to accept a strong and integrated labor movement. Finally, a third emphasizes the weakness of the state’s resolve and capacity to guarantee a terrain on which workers and employers would feel safe to negotiate, instead of inconsistently veering between conciliation, passivity and repression,

passing social legislation like the eight-hour day but not enforcing it. Clearly, a destructive dynamic between these three players gained traction, with a point of no return probably reached sometime in late 1919. Another element that fed this dynamic was the powerful reverberation of the Bolshevik revolution, which increased the paranoia of employers and the state at the same time that it encouraged “maximalist” elements in the labor movement. By the time Seguí was assassinated in 1923, it was more of an individual tragedy than a lost opportunity for the CNT, which had lost two-thirds of its membership.

If democratic integration of the labor movement was foreclosed by this destructive dynamic, what prevented a Bolshevik-style revolution in 1918–19? From Leon Trotsky’s perspective at the time, Spain was the most likely place for such a revolution to occur, and both the CNT and the PSOE initially supported the Communist Third International in 1919. On the ground, there seemed to be the foundation for the sort of urban/rural alliance between industrial workers and poor peasants that had anchored the Russian Revolution. The CNT jumped from a few thousand to 100,000 members in Andalucía from 1918 to 1919, and the southern countryside was wracked with increasingly coordinated protests demanding increased wages, the end of piecework, preference for hiring local workers and more regular employment in a seasonal industry, but with rhetoric laced with larger ambitions for land redistribution, or the *reparto*. While this rural protest wave was labeled the “Bolshevik triennium,” in reality there was little chance of such a revolution succeeding. In addition to the key obstacle of an intact military repressive apparatus, which proceeded to disarticulate the rural labor movement, there was the disunity between the CNT and UGT, the lack of synchronicity among strike waves and labor actions across the country, and the absence of a centralizing revolutionary party like the Bolsheviks to take charge. Despite appearances to the contrary in 1918–19, the obstacles to a successful workers’ revolution were probably greater than for a potential democratization of the political system.

### **A Last Effort at Reform “From Above,” 1920–23?**

Were there any more missed opportunities for democratization during the last several years of the Restoration, between 1920 and 1923? While some would argue that the point of no return had already passed, in 1917 or 1919, there is a case to be made that the government had one last chance to stabilize along a path of gradual reform “from above.” With labor movements across the country disarticulated, the Catalan and Basque movements divided and subdued, and, ironically, a wave of national patriotism in the aftermath of another military defeat in Morocco at the Battle of Annual in July 1921, parliamentary leaders had the ball in their court.<sup>37</sup> In particular, as deputies discussed how to assign “responsibility” for the Annual defeat, they seemed more willing than ever to embrace the idea of reforming the regime, and openly discussed the many problems, from political corruption to the social problem to tax reform, that they agreed needed to be addressed. The parliamentary debates foregrounded new actors, like the PSOE, which almost doubled its number of deputies (4 to 7) in the 1923 elections on a platform of assigning “responsibilities,” and were open to the scrutiny of public opinion as never before.

Governments even proposed measures to increase civilian control over military authorities, from dissolving the *juntas de defensa*, to the establishment of a civilian administration in Morocco, to ending the state of exception in Barcelona.

But if there were opportunities for reform in dealing with the “Moroccan quagmire,” it also exacerbated existing problems, including divisions among and between political parties (after a short national unity government), the tension between military and civilian authority, and the already weak legitimacy of the regime and its titular head, King Alfonso, who was intimately implicated in the colonial policy. It is difficult to know with certainty how the balance between obstacles and opportunities would have unfolded if not for the rupture of the September 1923 military coup. The question remains as to whether there was viable life remaining in the parliamentary regime when it was finally snuffed out.

## Conclusion

Most scholars would at least agree that the path to the 1923 coup should be framed as a contingent process that reflected the dynamic interaction between all the major players, from the dynastic parties to the new mass movements, and the events they had to interpret, from the world war to the Bolshevik revolution or the Moroccan quagmire. Viewed through a series of turning points and missed opportunities, we can track the evolution of the regime from the 1898 crisis through the reform efforts of the dynastic parties, to the democratic assembly movement, the trade union expansion and the colonial crisis. None of these turning points hinged on a single action or decision, but on the complex interplay between various forces which had simply not been important protagonists in national politics during the first 25 years of the Restoration. As a result, on one level, the second half of the Restoration was brimming with vitality and alternative political projects for transforming political culture and practice. But on the other hand, the legitimacy of the regime faltered under the competing and often contradictory demands made by revolutionaries, regional nationalists, Catholic organizations, republicans or democratic monarchists. While the regime had some success in incorporating new forces, the basic structure of *caciquismo* and manufactured elections that undercut more representative democracy remained stable until the end.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that Spain’s failure to make the transition from liberalism to democracy in the postwar period was not unique or abnormal. What *was* normal was the troubled transition from nineteenth-century elitist politics to twentieth-century mass politics, with democratization as only one of the road maps out of the crisis. Moreover, the democratic road map was largely untested and experimental. Thus, while many new democracies were founded across Europe during this period, most of them did not survive the European civil war of the next two and a half decades.

—— PART III ——

THE LONG VIEW: SOCIAL,  
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL  
CHANGE, 1830–1930

## ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC EVOLUTION: 1830–1930

The two chapters in Part III step back from the more precise chronology of the political narrative to present a longer view of economic, social and cultural evolution from the liberal revolution to the Second Republic of the 1930s. Instead of embedding bits and pieces of this story within the political narrative, these chapters will highlight the overarching trends that followed their own rhythm. While political events, especially the major catastrophes of the Napoleonic Wars on the one end and the Civil War of the 1930s on the other, did have an impact on economic, social and cultural developments, the overall pattern was of gradual and sustained evolution and structural transformation. This chapter focuses on the economy and population, which consolidated a pattern of gradual and sustained but regionally uneven growth and development.

In contrast to the old “failure,” or the softer “lagging,” paradigm, revisionists have argued that this growth pattern fit within the broader European model of economic development, which included rising incomes and health indicators, industrialization, a favorable balance of foreign trade, and food production keeping up with population growth. Success should be measured not by how well an economy replicated more developed parts of the world, but by its flexibility, adaptability and innovation.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, this period consolidated a growing gap within Europe, between the most wealthy and fast-growing economies of northern and western Europe, the slower-growing southern European economies and the scarcely developed eastern European economies.<sup>2</sup> This picture is further complicated by the significant regional disparities within national economies, although the national economic unit became increasingly meaningful with the general “protectionist turn” at the end of the nineteenth century. Within Spain, the growth picture bifurcates significantly if the statistics from Catalonia, the Basque Country and, to a lesser degree, Asturias, are disaggregated from the “national” trends.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, by the early twentieth century, these more developed regions and their economic networks had become firmly incorporated into a national market that established the parameters for future growth.

Within this framework of gradual but uneven growth, scholars have turned from criticizing what didn’t happen to explaining what did. There is consensus that the balance of resources and constraints made it unlikely that Spain would

have joined the ranks of the fast-developing economies. High on the list of constraints was the physical and geographical nature of the peninsula, which was extremely arid, lacking in navigable rivers, and not flush with the raw materials that drove the first industrial revolution or, partly as a result, the intensive capital accumulation that bankrolled the second. These constraints limited the potential expansion of both agriculture and industry, although debate still continues on whether one of these sectors was more important in dragging the other one down, and on whether the state made the best decisions possible, or whether there were reasonable “missed opportunities,” especially in terms of state investment, reliance on foreign capital, fiscal policy and protectionism vs. free trade, that would have significantly improved economic performance. Undoubtedly there is some balance between the two positions, but in general the Spanish state seemed to have acted within the parameters of other states with similar levels of development.<sup>4</sup> The goal, then, is to understand how the Spanish economy functioned and developed within the European and world economy, explaining why some problems were resolved while others remained as major challenges for the later twentieth century.

### **Spain in the World Economy, 1830–1930**

One of the central realities of the world economy during this period was the widening gap between the haves and the have nots, which picked up steam in the second half of the nineteenth century and took off during the “great acceleration” in the decades before the First World War.<sup>5</sup> In contrast to an older narrative that located the key turning point in the late eighteenth century, based on the precocious transformation of the English economy, the current consensus dates the widening of the “great divide” from the 1860s. Until that point, Britain was the outlier, not the norm. Europe’s industrial geography began expanding in the 1830s into Belgium, due to its proximity to English ports and its deposits of coal and iron, and then into central Europe from the 1850s, adding regional nodes in Lyon, Piedmont and Bohemia, as well as Catalonia (the 1840s), Asturias (the 1860s) and the Basque Country (the 1870s).

By the 1870s, the vanguard economies were being driven by the “second” industrial revolution, in which steel produced by the Bessemer converter replaced cotton and iron as the launch-pad of economic take-off. The epitome of accelerated growth after 1890 was Germany, which bypassed Britain in steel production by 1900 and produced three times as much by 1914. A key element of economic growth in these rapidly industrializing regions was the transformation in agriculture, enabled by the new machines and chemical fertilizers produced by the second industrial revolution. Those countries whose agriculture could both afford and utilize the new technology were closely correlated with advancement in the industrial sector.<sup>6</sup>

Also closely correlated with growth was the demographic transformation that had begun in the late eighteenth century and spread to include most European countries, including Spain, by the early twentieth century. The population of Europe began to grow steadily from the late eighteenth century, speeding up after the end

of the Napoleonic Wars to more than double over the course of the century (187 to 435 million). The sustained rise in population consolidated what scholars call the modernization of demographic patterns, in which declining mortality, increased life expectancy and improved living conditions were followed by declining birth rates from the 1860s, as families gained more confidence that their children would live to adulthood. Although there were a few dips resulting from cholera outbreaks or the Irish famine, the premodern roller-coaster of dramatic population expansion and catastrophic decline had been derailed. At the same time, these trends took root unevenly, both within countries, where the mortality among the poor only started to decline at the end of the century, and between them, with eastern and southern Europe following a slower trajectory of demographic transformation.

The picture of a widening gap between haves and have-nots within Europe is complicated by a range of regional and national trajectories across the continent. Until the twentieth century, rapid industrialization was largely a regional phenomenon, concentrated in a core area of central Europe that included parts of northern Italy and France, western Germany and Belgium, as well as northern Spain, areas linked in a mutually reinforcing web of fertile land, natural resources, access to external markets and expanding internal markets. A second path to economic growth and prosperity well into the twentieth century relied on agricultural and commercial wealth with only gradual industrial growth, as was the case with most of France and the Netherlands. A third group, identified by some as the southern European model,<sup>7</sup> followed a slower trajectory of both industrial and agricultural development, disadvantaged by various common factors, from poor growing conditions to the distance from the core industrializing regions, but with the caveat of regional unevenness, especially in Italy and Spain. A final group of countries in eastern Europe and Russia only began to develop at the end of the century, hampered by even greater distances, transportation issues, huge, often absentee, landed estates and subsistence farming. This latter group, along with the poorer agrarian regions of southern Italy and Spain, occupied the bottom of the wealth and health pyramid, epitomized by the miserable conditions endured by their population of landless agricultural laborers.<sup>8</sup>

While the widening wealth gap within Europe did not break down neatly along national lines, by the early twentieth century state boundaries increasingly mattered. Scholars have argued that states played a larger role in the second industrial revolution than in the first, providing capital, building infrastructure and, equally important, nurturing human capital through public education. While there is no clear hierarchy of ingredients, it seems clear that late nineteenth-century economic dynamos like Germany invested significantly more in developing a skilled and educated population than southern European countries like Spain and Italy.<sup>9</sup>

More generally, the nation-states of western Europe became ever more invested in building and protecting national economies, not simply removing the obstacles to economic growth, as the mid-nineteenth century liberal dogma advocated. By the 1870s and 1880s, European liberals were deeply divided as to whether free trade or protectionism was the best path to national prosperity, but the balance tilted towards the latter in the decades before the First World War. The turn towards protectionism was sparked by the agricultural crisis of the 1880s, when one European country after another, including Spain, increased tariffs on food

imports in the face of cheaper foreign foodstuffs. In the context of growing nationalist competition, reinforced by powerful producers' lobbies, protectionism fit the new climate of economic nationalism. Imperial markets were part of this calculation, but they contributed less to European economies than once believed.<sup>10</sup> With the onset of the First World War, the unit of the national economy coalesced even further, with neutral countries like Spain benefitting from the reduction in trade between belligerent countries. By this point, the national economy had consolidated as a key protagonist in the trajectory of economic growth and development.

## General Economic and Population Trends: Gradual Growth and Structural Evolution

The long-term economic trend in Spain between 1830 and 1930 was gradual growth and structural transformation, although a closer look reveals fluctuations.<sup>11</sup> The period from the 1830s to the 1880s was one of economic take-off, enabled by the consolidation of the new liberal state and fueled by the recovery of the textile industry in Catalonia and the expansion of the mining and metallurgy industries. The decades before the First World War witnessed a slowing of growth, precisely during the period when the vanguard economies were accelerating. The last sixteen years, from 1914 to 1930, charted the most rapid growth of the entire period, along with a significant structural alteration of the Spanish economy.<sup>12</sup> During this period, the Spanish economy did begin to narrow the gap with the European economy, increasing from a rate of around 60 percent per capita PIB (*producto interno bruto*—Gross National Product, GNP) to over 70 percent of the European average. By the end of the civil war in 1939, however, it had dropped to just above 40 percent.

The parallel shift in occupational structure during the first three decades of the twentieth century followed the pattern consolidated in western Europe during the last decades of the previous century. The 70 percent employed in agriculture in 1797 dropped only slightly to 66 percent by 1877, where it remained stable until 1910. Between 1910 and 1920, it dropped to 57 percent, and by 1930 it had decreased to less than half of the working population (45 percent). At the same time, the proportion employed in industry rose gradually, from 14 percent in 1877 to 16 percent in 1910, 22 percent in 1920 and 26 percent in 1930. The service sector witnessed a more gradual increase until 1920, when it jumped from 20 to 28 percent during that decade. These numbers put Spain on the lower and later end of the western European development pattern, but close enough to belong inside that pattern.<sup>13</sup>

The trajectory of growth after the 1830s was both enabled and limited by the gradual formation of a national market, one of the important economic developments of the nineteenth century.<sup>14</sup> The governing liberals agreed on a set of basic principles, which included the free circulation of goods, creating a uniform regime of private property and taxation that would stimulate investment, and building the connective tissue that would enable circulation. The new liberal regime began by removing internal tariff barriers and special jurisdictions in the 1830s (with the partial exception of the Basque *fueros*), and initiated the construction of a foreign-financed railway system in the 1840s and 1850s, completing a basic national network

by the 1880s with significant progress on a secondary network by 1914. By 1914, the state had also approved the construction of some 35,000 miles of roads, a telegraph network and a functioning national postal service. These improvements in the transport network dramatically reduced the cost of internal domestic trade, increasing the incentive to send Castilian wheat to the periphery and Catalan textiles to Castile. The liberal consensus broke down in the 1860s over the issue of free trade vs. protectionism, but the combination of agrarian crisis, the loss of the last overseas colonies in 1898 and the dearth of competitive manufactured goods pushed the balance toward Spain becoming one of the most protectionist regimes in Europe by the early twentieth century.

Until 1898, the colonies still played a significant role in the metropolitan economy, although less than before the loss of the continental empire in the 1820s.<sup>15</sup> While in 1792, the continental American empire absorbed 39 percent of Spanish exports, in the nineteenth century the remaining colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines received 14–19 percent, while the rest went to expanded European markets. Still, Cuba remained the third-largest market for Spanish goods behind England and France, especially for textiles, shoes and packaged food items protected by tariffs.<sup>16</sup> After 1898, exports to Cuba, especially Catalan textiles, did fall, but exports were absorbed by other markets, including Latin American countries and the domestic Spanish market.<sup>17</sup>

The upshot of all of these trends was a paradox: a consolidated national market that expanded the domestic circulation of Spanish goods while at the same time constraining the international expansion of the economy outside the protected colonial market, except during the extraordinary conditions of the First World War. Whether this outcome represented the best path given the existing resources and conditions or the result of missed opportunities by the state, industrialists or farmers is still debated by economic historians. What is hard to dispute is that the consolidation of the national market helped sustain the gradual growth pattern of the economy.

Growth was also sustained by the equally gradual upward trajectory of the population. Between 1830 and 1930, the population of the country almost doubled, from about 12 to 23.5 million, but a closer look reveals sub-periods that tracked closely with economic growth rates. Thus, during the nineteenth century, the population grew fastest between 1820 and 1860 (from 12 to 15.6 million), slowed down during the last four decades of the century (from 15.6 to 18.6 million), and increased again during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Spain continued to be sparsely populated compared to other western European countries, but given that the population had remained more or less stable at 6–8 million inhabitants for 900 years (the ninth to the seventeenth centuries), the growth pattern that began in the eighteenth century (3 million added) and accelerated in the nineteenth (7 million added) was an important shift. While periodic epidemics and subsistence crises persisted throughout the nineteenth century, the Spanish economy was growing fast enough to support this population increase without a major demographic catastrophe.

The other pieces of the modern demographic pattern, including declining mortality and birth rates and increased life expectancy, only solidified in the twentieth century. Life expectancy at the beginning of the nineteenth century was 27 years,

where it remained until 1860, rising to 35 by 1900 and jumping to 50 by 1930. Mortality began to decline slowly from about the same point, dropping from 37/1000 to 30/1000 between 1860 and 1900 and then cut nearly in half to 17/1000 by 1930. Infant mortality, which remained high even in wealthy countries until the last decades of the nineteenth century, dropped slightly between 1800 and 1900 (from 230/1000 to 204/1000), but almost halved by 1930 (117/1000). The drop in birth rate usually lags behind falling death rates, and indeed the birth rate fell more slowly (42/1000 in 1870, 36/1000 in 1900 and 28/1000 in 1930), as the average number of children per family decreased from 4.4 in 1870 to 3.05 in 1910.<sup>18</sup>

One last indirect indicator of the demographic transition is increasing literacy. Spain experienced a gradual increase in literacy after the passage of the 1857 Moyano Law, which made primary schooling obligatory although not free. The percentage of illiterate Spaniards dropped from 75 percent in 1850 (compared to 42 percent for France and 38 percent for England) to 55 percent in 1900, accelerating between 1900 and 1930, when it was cut nearly in half, to 29 percent, as the most advanced countries had virtually eliminated it.

In sum, while the demographic trends were improving from the second half of the nineteenth century, they remained far below the wealthiest European countries. Thus, the Spanish population grew more slowly than any other western country except France, and it had the highest mortality rate and the lowest life expectancy, along with Portugal, into the 1930s. At the same time, in the early twentieth century, Spain started on a convergence trajectory that, by the end of the 1950s, would almost erase the remaining demographic gap.<sup>19</sup>

The gradual increase in population was accompanied by a parallel movement from rural to urban settings. As with the other indicators, urbanization proceeded slowly in the nineteenth century but speeded up significantly in the early twentieth century. Between 1787 and 1860, the overall urban population remained stable (15 percent in cities over 10,000), although this number disguises a beginning trend of internal migration from declining or smaller urban centers to growing ones in the vicinity. About 75 percent of the population lived in strictly rural settlements, closely tracking the percentage of the population working in agriculture (another 10 percent lived in smaller urban nuclei of 5,000–10,000 people). The overall urban population began to increase in the second half of the nineteenth century, doubling between 1860 and 1900, with much higher rates of growth in dynamic urban centers, including ports, industrial towns and cities and, in some cases, provincial capitals.<sup>20</sup>

It was in the early twentieth century that urbanization began to take off, propelled by agrarian crisis and rural exodus, as well as industrial growth in the cities. On the grand scale, the largest cities of Madrid and Barcelona grew substantially, doubling to top one million inhabitants between 1900 and 1930. With the addition of Bilbao, these three cities absorbed about two-thirds of all the internal migration between 1887 and 1930. By 1930, only one-third of the residents of Madrid and 43 percent of those in Barcelona had been born there. On the smaller scale, the population of cities larger than 100,000 nearly trebled (from 6 to 15 percent of the population), while at the smaller end of the urban population, those who lived in nuclei of at least 5,000 residents increased from 29 percent of the population in 1900 to 37 percent in 1930.<sup>21</sup>

One population trend that picked up steam in the final decades of the nineteenth century was emigration to the Americas, particularly Spanish-speaking America.<sup>22</sup> After emigration was liberalized in 1853, Spaniards began to follow their European counterparts to make their fortunes across the ocean. But the agrarian crisis and the inability of Spanish industry to absorb the entire rural exodus turned a small stream into a wave by the early twentieth century, with between 1.5 and 2 million Spaniards emigrating, particularly to Argentina, Cuba, Brazil and Uruguay. This exodus mirrored, but lagged slightly behind, the “second wave” of European immigration from Italy, Portugal, Poland and Russia, although more of these other Europeans ended up in North America. Most of the emigrants were young and male, from agrarian households with small plots in the north, from Galicia to Asturias and Cantabria. This marginal farming population was hardest hit by the agricultural depression but also had the minimal resources as well as the contacts derived from a long tradition of migration necessary to send their children abroad. In contrast, many of the poorest landless laborers from the south had neither the financial nor the human capital to emigrate.

The patterns of emigration are consistent with the trends in economic and population growth as well as the structural changes in occupation and residence. The big picture is a gradual trajectory of slow and sustained growth from the 1830s to the 1930s, with a significant acceleration from 1910 to 1930. The changes generally began later than in the most advanced western European countries and proceeded at a much slower pace, falling further behind the vanguard economies and located at the bottom of comparative health and growth statistics. However, when placed within the broader spectrum of European countries, including southern and eastern Europe, Spain was located somewhere in the middle, with significant variation within national borders.

## The Agricultural Sector

The portrait of slow but sustained growth applies first and foremost to the bedrock agricultural sector of the economy. The key achievements of this sector were to expand food production at a rate that kept up with a growing population and to begin a process of diversification and specialization that created a dynamic, if still small, export market in fruits, nuts, olives and wine. For most of the century between 1830 and 1930, it was these diverse agricultural exports that drove the steadily increasing foreign trade, balancing the import of industrial supplies and capital goods without creating a trade deficit. These successes were achieved in the face of considerable disadvantages, which included the worst combination of poor soil, low rainfall and uncultivable land, even among the Mediterranean countries. Thus, only 10 percent of Spanish territory approached the favorable conditions of Italy’s fertile Po Valley. As a result, it was not surprising that the low yields of the core cereal sector in Spain remained 30–40 percent below the western European average, so that an acre of Spanish farmland in 1914 produced about half of what a French acre and one-third of what a British acre produced.

This low productivity in turn created the negative dynamic highlighted by critics, including lack of capital accumulation, an underemployed labor force with limited consumption capacity and the survival of traditional farming methods.<sup>23</sup> However, overall cereal production, if not yields, continued to increase, due largely to the dramatic expansion of cultivated land. The process of commercialization and market integration also advanced significantly, consolidating a national agricultural market that, with the help of the railroads, could effectively distribute food throughout the peninsula by the end of the century, diminishing the occurrence of localized subsistence crises. Between the expansion of cultivation and the growth in specialized crops, it is hard to sustain the traditional picture of a completely moribund agrarian sector. Given the poor growing conditions of much of the peninsula, the agricultural sector probably performed as well as could be expected.<sup>24</sup>

The expansion of cultivated land was largely a result of a dramatic transformation in land ownership. Between 1766 and 1924, about one-third of all land changed hands. The pursuit of a greater return on investment likely led new owners to farm more land, which resulted in the addition of 8 million hectares to the cultivated acreage, most of it between 1840 and 1880. In turn, this expansion drove the sustained growth in cereal output, despite the continued low yields. Some of this land was sold privately after entail was abolished, allowing or forcing noble families to sell off pieces of their previously indivisible holdings to pay off debts. But just under half of the total 18 million hectares was sold as the result of the controversial government program of *desamortization*. The program was instituted in two phases, the first following an 1836 law that targeted monastic properties, and the second more extensive phase initiated in 1855, focusing on the secular clergy and municipal common lands. The sales included both urban and rural property, but about three-quarters of total land sales were concentrated in twenty provinces. Most of the agricultural land was located in the south and center, overlapping considerably with the map of *latifundia* territory. In Extremadura, for example, the provinces of Badajoz and Cáceres had the third- and fifth-highest land sales, virtually reconstituting property ownership in the region.<sup>25</sup>

While land sales increased cultivation, the benefits were not evenly distributed among the rural population. By selling land to the highest bidder and not dividing up large estates into smaller affordable farms, critics have argued that the state lost the opportunity to create a more equitable division of wealth. In particular, the land reform may even have worsened the condition of landless laborers under a capitalist wage labor and profit system. In the eighteenth century Enlightenment vision of *desamortization*, the liberal goal of unblocking the land market was part of a broader plan to create a nation of prosperous farmers. By the time the concept was permanently implemented between the 1830s and 1860s, however, the latter goal was subordinated to the need to recoup a bankrupt state's coffers.

At the same time, the limited social impact of the *desamortization* process was not unique to Spain. Thus, despite widespread liberal concern about rural inequality, symbolized by large landed estates from South America to Asia and Europe, ambitious land-reform projects generally came up short.<sup>26</sup> Most nineteenth-century governments, including in Spain, were more likely to form alliances with powerful landowners than to dispossess them. At the same time, Spanish land reform did not simply ossify the existing landowner class, but created a new composite rural elite, including nobles, merchants, shippers, military men and government

bureaucrats, like the two finance ministers who designed the 1836 and 1855 laws, Juan Alvarez Mendizabal and Pascual Madoz.

Even though desamortization largely benefitted elites, there were also a few northern provinces, like Burgos, León and Palencia, where smaller holdings dominated the sales, reflecting the existing property structure of the area as well as the configuration of local power structures. Thus, by 1860, the number of wealthy peasant farmers in Spain had increased from 2.3 million in 1797 to 3.1 million, while the number of tenant farmers had decreased from 1.77 million to 1 million, presumably some of whom became owners.<sup>27</sup> While the number of landless laborers also increased, from 3.7 to 5.3 million, Spain's total rural population remained diverse, as did the landholding patterns across the peninsula. Particularly during the second wave of municipal land sales, struggles between the state administration, local governments and large and small landowners could produce various results, from preserving common lands to selling them to the most powerful owners to distributing them more widely among the residents.<sup>28</sup>

If the central decades of the nineteenth century were distinguished by the impact of desamortization and the expansion of cultivated land, the end of the century was marked by the global agricultural crisis that sparked the subsequent reorientation of the sector. The fall in wheat prices from the mid-1880s, caused by a glut of cheaply produced cereals from the US and elsewhere, opened up the crisis but also generated a set of responses that reinvigorated the sector. The cereal sector was partly protected by the imposition of high tariffs on imported wheat in 1887 and the consolidation of the national market, but it also began a structural adjustment that included the first major exodus of rural residents and the abandonment of the least fertile land that was no longer profitable to plant. Some of those rural inhabitants moved to the cities while others emigrated.

As the cereal market contracted and turned inward, the specialized sector of wine, fruits, nuts and other food items like beet sugar and meat, expanded to fill the gap. Spanish wine briefly captured the international market during the 1880s, when the phylloxera epidemic devastated French production. But olives and olive oil, meat, almonds and, especially, Valencian oranges, were major growth sectors between 1900 and 1930, leading to a 55 percent increase in total agricultural production over the period. By the 1930s, the agricultural export market was beginning to shift, increasing the percentage of the Mediterranean crops like oranges and olives for which Spain had a comparative advantage in the European market.<sup>29</sup> In other words, the gradual structural transformation away from agriculture and towards the service and industrial sectors was paralleled by a market realignment within the remaining agricultural sector. The trimmed down cereal sector supplied the national market, while a growing export sector filled a niche for specialized products which could not easily be grown in northern Europe.

## The Industrial Sector

As with the agrarian sector of the economy, significant disadvantages, most notably the scarcity of high-quality coal or water power, made it unlikely that Spain would industrialize early and rapidly. Neither an "early" industrializer like Britain

or Belgium, nor a “late” industrializer like Germany, Spain followed a long-term gradual path beginning in the 1830s and accelerating during the 1920s.<sup>30</sup> Industrial growth centered on two major industries: textiles and metallurgy, although smaller industries like food processing, leather making and fish canning were also important, as well as the mining sector. The textile industry of the late eighteenth century quickly rebuilt in the 1820s after the Napoleonic wars. At the same time, a nascent iron-working industry was developing in Andalucía, processing local iron. Metallurgy moved to Asturias in the 1860s and then shifted its center of gravity to the Basque Country from the 1880s, while mining of coal, copper, and mercury took off in the 1860s. By that point, the basic shape of Spanish industrialization had crystallized. It was characterized by its uneven and regional locus, as well as by its struggle to compete in an international marketplace in which its products had few comparative advantages. At the same time, the rhythm was on par with that of other countries on the southern periphery of the European industrial heartland.

The stable core of Spanish industrialization began in Catalonia, where the first steam-powered looms installed in 1833 inaugurated the new phase of mechanized and urban-based textile production in Barcelona and its suburbs.<sup>31</sup> Capital for the industry came from agriculture, shipping and trade from Barcelona’s port, and sugar profits from the Cuban trade. By the end of the period, Catalonia produced 90 percent of all the textiles made in Spain, as older hand-made textiles, such as Gallegan linen, Valencian silk and Segovian wool, could no longer compete. After American independence, the Catalan textile industry recovered quickly from the 1820s, shifting its exports to the protected Antilles colonial markets until 1898 and then the protected domestic market in the early twentieth century. Water-powered mills only partially compensated for the lack of cheap and accessible coal that made it difficult to compete with northern European production. Still, textiles constituted about a quarter of all Spanish industrial production during this period.

Furthermore, from the 1870s the profits from textiles and other exports were increasingly invested in diversifying the regional Catalan economy, which became the center of Spanish industrialization. The 1888 Universal Exposition in Barcelona highlighted the city’s role as “Spain’s factory,” while another seven of Spain’s 20 major industrial cities were located in the region, along with about 300,000 industrial workers. Indeed, Catalan industrial growth remained at twice the Spanish average between 1844 and 1935. By the end of the period, Catalonia had developed a full diversified portfolio of textiles, food packaging, leather, wood, chemicals and construction, in addition to a social and physical landscape on a par with the industrial regions of Europe.<sup>32</sup>

Less stable was the mining sector and the related metallurgy industry, which, more unusually in the European context, migrated from one region to another, depending on access to resources and energy sources.<sup>33</sup> The early, often-forgotten origins of metallurgy were in Andalucía, where an iron-working industry fueled by charcoal peaked in the 1840s and 1850s, dominating Spanish iron production until the 1860s. Centered in Málaga, the industry’s growth was probably tied to Catalonia’s early industrial development. The combination of deforestation and the lack of cheap, accessible coal undercut the competitiveness of this early industrial center, although the “heavy” de-industrialization of the region was

partially compensated for by “light” industries such as flour, shoes, olive oil, ceramics and glass.<sup>34</sup>

By the 1860s, the northern region of Asturias built its first metalworking factories, fueled by local coal mines and facilitated by the first railroad connecting the mines to the port of Gijón in 1854. In addition to supporting metallurgical production in the province, Asturian coal was exported, increasing from a few hundred tons in 1840 to 143,000 tons by 1872. To a lesser degree than Catalonia but following a similar dynamic, Asturias underwent a regional industrial diversification, from mining and metallurgy to food processing and fish canning, machine building, petroleum refining and ship building. As in Catalonia, its occupational structure transformed more quickly than the national average, with 41 percent of its population, or some 130,000 workers, employed in industry by 1930. Most of these workers lived either in the mining towns or in the industrial city of Gijón. At the same time, Asturian industry struggled to stay competitive, relying on a coal that was both lower quality and more expensive to extract than the ubiquitous British coal. Asturias continued to extract coal and refine metal, but producers became increasingly dependent on the national market after the turn of the century.

At the same time as Asturian mining and metallurgy took off, the Basque province of Vizcaya began to reorganize a traditional iron industry that had been derailed by the Carlist wars. By the 1880s, the Basque Country had replaced Asturias as the major metalworking region of Spain, turning it into one of the most dynamic industrial sectors. With high-quality iron ideal for making steel with the new Bessemer converter, the Basque Country began to export iron to Britain in return for coal to fuel its own ironworking industry. Until the 1930s, the Basque Country remained the principal source of iron for the British market, and, in turn, imported a large chunk of the British coal sent to Spain. Because importing British coal was still cheaper than using Asturian coal, Basque metalworking soon surpassed the Asturian industry. However, because steel produced with imported coal was still more expensive than that produced by countries with access to high-quality local coal, Basque steel had trouble competing on the international market, except during the First World War. During the 1920s, the Spanish steel, iron and coal industries were able to grow in part because of state investment in public works and building projects, at the same time consolidating their dependence on the national market. Along with continued growth in steel and iron, the Basque Country followed Catalonia and Asturias with its own regional economic diversification. However, these regional foci of industrialization remained largely unconnected, with early links between Málaga iron and Catalan textiles or Asturian coal and Basque iron weakened by unfavorable conditions.

In addition to the iron- and coal mining in Asturias and the Basque Country, Spain had rich mineral deposits of copper, zinc, mercury and lead, whose commercial exploitation took off in the 1870s due to a combination of favorable factors. During the *Sexenio* (1868–1874), free trade advocates decided to effectively “desamortize” the mining subsoil, encouraging foreign investment and making it simpler to attain a private mining concession. At the same time, rising international demand made extraction more profitable. Developed by foreign, largely British, capital and technology, the mineral deposits in southern Spain, including Rio Tinto, the largest copper mine in the world, turned Spain into one of the largest

mineral-exporting countries in the world. In the decades before the First World War, mining (including Asturian coal and Basque iron) was the most dynamic sector in the national economy.

While there is no doubt that Asturian coal and especially Basque iron had important multiplying effects within their broader regional economies, economic historians still debate the impact of the other mining operations on the national economy. The most critical perspective, aligned with classic “dependency theory,” views them as isolated enclaves of foreign capital and technology, whose profits were largely exported as Spain’s natural resources were exhausted.<sup>35</sup> The contrasting view is that Spain could not have exploited—or used—these rich resources without foreign capital and technology, and that the economy did benefit, from employment in the mines to the auxiliary services and infrastructure, as well as from the contribution to the balance of foreign trade.<sup>36</sup> Most scholars would agree that, in practical terms, there were few other options for Spain in this period. At the same time, the foreign extraction of raw materials was only one piece of Spain’s complex national economy, which was more unevenly than under developed.

### **Uneven Regional Development: Center/Periphery Divide**

The reality of uneven economic development, already taking shape in the early nineteenth century, provides a necessary corrective for all of the national-level statistics on economic and population growth during the period. And, while the contrast between a dynamic periphery and a stagnant interior is too simplistic, the most dynamic regions, with the major exception of Madrid, tended to be located on the periphery. During the first third of the twentieth century, the once purely administrative and court city of Madrid developed its own industrial base, including food and publishing, but also electricity, chemicals and construction. Aside from Madrid, the industrializing regions of Asturias, Catalonia and the Basque Country were located on the coast, as was the fruit-exporting region of Valencia. These regions were favored in part by access to natural resources, and in part by proximity to ocean transport. And, while the older picture of a “stagnant” interior has been modified, the largely traditional cereal economy of the central arid regions followed a trajectory of gradual growth with minimal structural and social transformation.

These distinct regional growth paths are clearly illuminated when national trends regarding everything from urbanization and occupations to literacy and life expectancy are broken down. In basic terms, the population continued its shift from the center to the periphery that was already evident in the first half of the nineteenth century, again with the exception of Madrid. In addition to the capital city, the other major poles of attraction were Barcelona, the Basque Country, and Andalucía, especially Seville and the mining centers of Córdoba and Huelva. In occupational structure, Barcelona and Asturias had 62 percent and 41 percent of their populations employed in industry by 1930, with only 11 percent of Barcelona province’s population engaged in agriculture. At the other end of the spectrum was the province of Badajoz in Extremadura, which still employed 65 percent in

agriculture in 1930, down from 80 percent in 1900.<sup>37</sup> More generally, the proportion of the Andalusian population employed in agriculture dropped from 72 percent in 1900 to 59 percent in 1930, while the national average dropped from 66 percent to 45 percent. Rates of industrial growth reflected this disparity, with an annual national rate of 2.06 percent between 1875 and 1935, flattening the break-out 7.2 percent of the Basque economy and the still higher than average 2.95 percent of the Catalan economy.

Finally, there are clear disparities in health and wealth indicators between the faster- and slower-growing regions.<sup>38</sup> Thus, while illiteracy had fallen to 29 percent in Spain in 1930, it was at 55 percent in Extremadura and 16 percent in Catalonia. The gap in infant mortality was equally large, with Catalonia (66/1000) at one end and Extremadura (150/1000) at the other, closer to the national average of 117/1000. Likewise, life expectancy in Catalonia in 1930 was 54 years, compared to 46 in Extremadura. Finally, underpinning all of these disparities was the regional gap in per capita income, with Catalonia and the Basque Country at the top, with an index of 78 in 1930, and Extremadura at the bottom (5.67).

At the same time, more fine-grained studies reveal that even regional statistics can hide significant variation. For example, one study of Andalucía shows that literacy rates varied, with the western part of the region situated in an intermediate zone along with Galicia, Aragón and western Catalonia, while the eastern part was in the lower-literacy zone, along with the southern Levante of Alicante and Almería. The zone of highest literacy included the Cantabrian coast, the Basque Country, Madrid and Barcelona, but also León and Old Castile. If one digs deeper in the Andalusian statistics, there was a large gap between the illiteracy rates in cities like Seville (49 percent in 1900) and Cádiz (39 percent) and their surrounding rural areas (72 percent and 67 percent). Likewise, the stereotype of a purely rural Andalucía populated with landless farm laborers sits uncomfortably with the rate of industrial growth in the region, which, at 2.3 percent, was above the 2.06 national average.<sup>39</sup>

Such examples provide a necessary dose of caution to any sweeping generalizations about Spain's economic development. There is certainly solid evidence for the unevenness of economic development and health and welfare indicators not captured in national statistics. There is also evidence for a regional component to that unevenness, with some regions growing and transforming more rapidly. There is also some truth to the classic binaries drawn between urban and rural, center and periphery, industrial and agrarian, but dynamism was not always limited to one side of the binary. Thus, while urban, peripheral and industrial Catalonia epitomizes the viability of these binary formulas, the rural exodus and agrarian restructuring from the late nineteenth century demonstrates that the interior was not stagnant. Uneven development was not unique to Spain, and to some degree it remained a characteristic of industrialization into the twentieth century. Perhaps more pronounced in Spain was the slower convergence and integration, with weaker multiplying effects of development across regions. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spain's national market had consolidated, bringing Castilian wheat, Asturian coal, Andalusian wine and Catalan textiles into direct mutual exchange, but as all the regions turned inwards towards the national market they were constrained as well as enabled by these parameters.

## **Conclusion: Missed Opportunities or Inherent Constraints?**

There is a broad consensus about the facts of economic and demographic development in Spain from the early nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. That development followed a paradoxical trajectory of gradual growth and structural change, while at the same time falling further behind the most dynamic European economies. It fit neither in the category of “undeveloped” traditional economies nor in the most “developed” economies, if measured by levels of industrialization, urbanization and the transition to a modern demographic pattern of sustained growth, longer life expectancy and lower death and birth rates. Characterized by uneven growth, with significant gaps between fast- and slow-growing regions, Spain followed an intermediate trajectory that some have identified as the “southern European” model. Catalan and Basque nationalists would go further, arguing that their dynamic regions should not be folded into the picture of the Spanish economy, but at the least they must be recognized as distinct paths within the undeniable reality of nation-state based economies at the turn of the century.

What scholars still debate was why the Spanish economy followed this path and whether it was the best trajectory possible, given the available resources and constraints. In particular, scholars question whether the Spanish state could have contributed more to development. While there is no question that wealthier states had more tools at their disposal to support economic growth with investment in infrastructure and education, recent studies have challenged the characterization of the Spanish state as completely incompetent and pathetically weak. Thus, the Spanish state put in place many of the basic elements that underpin a stable national economy, albeit with imperfect implementation, including a central banking system with monopoly on the emission of notes, a uniform tax and tariff system, and a property structure that encouraged private investment, whether in land, mining or railroads. Given that the state was too poor to build its own railroads and extract its own minerals, it adopted probably the best available option, of allowing private investors to undertake the projects. The railroad system has been the subject of particular debate, with critics arguing that the design and construction of the railway system was symptomatic of the consequences of letting foreign capital control what should have been national resources. However, the positive impact of the railroad system was impressive, overcoming the huge natural obstacles to building a national market by dramatically lowering the cost of transport.

The economy certainly would have benefitted from more public spending, especially on education and other social reform measures, like those being instituted in the wealthiest countries. Not only was literacy and education strongly linked to economic growth, but social legislation might have helped integrate the working classes, instead of pushing them into the arms of anti-state revolutionaries. At the same time, there is little evidence that the Spanish state invested significantly less than in countries with similar levels of development, or that the distribution of public spending was dramatically skewed in comparison. Nineteenth-century liberals, in Spain or elsewhere, were not centrally concerned with inequality, public welfare or redistribution of resources, so it is a bit anachronistic to hold them

responsible for not doing enough to address what today we would call the Human Development Index (HDI). If the Democrats and Federal Republicans had been able to pursue their democratization agenda instead of going down to defeat in 1874, it is possible that the Spanish state would have made some changes to the regressive tax structure or instituted more social reforms, but they too would have been limited by the massive new debt acquired with the Carlist and Cuban wars of the 1860s and by the resistance from employers to even timid social reforms that would characterize labor relations in the following decades. In any case, the conservative Restoration liberals after 1874 certainly did little to decrease inequality or raise living standards for the poorest Spaniards, leaving these as festering problems for the twentieth century.

These qualifications help us understand why the Spanish trajectory of economic growth before 1930 solved some problems but not others, but they should not be measured against some “ideal type” growth model that Spain should have been tracking. As in every historical situation, some choices or priorities would have solved more problems, and thus constitute a range of missed opportunities. Nevertheless, the Spanish state, in addition to the millions of economic actors, behaved within reasonable parameters, as defined by the existing resources, the constraints and the expectations of their specific historical time and place. Neither a “failure,” a “success,” or “lagging,” the Spanish economy followed its own comprehensible rhythm, part of a heterogeneous European system that included the periphery as well as the center.

# CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 1830–1930

## Introduction: Social and Cultural Evolution in Comparative Perspective

Paralleling the economic and demographic evolution analyzed in the previous chapter, cultural and social transformation proceeded gradually and unevenly, accelerating in most areas in the last couple of decades, but with a pace that lagged behind the vanguard European countries. The once-dominant paradigm based on those vanguard cases defined a clear trajectory to “modernity” in the nineteenth century, which included the transition from rural to urban culture, aristocratic to bourgeois values, a peasant to an industrial class society, the traditional to the modern woman, religiosity to secularization and local and regional cultures to a uniform national culture and public sphere.

Recent scholarship has confirmed these general trends, but also acknowledged that they were less homogenizing and more uneven into the twentieth century than once imagined.<sup>1</sup> Thus, while the expanding urban lifestyle had become the aspirational reference point for intellectuals and political leaders by the end of the nineteenth century, in practice many Europeans, let alone the rest of the world’s population, still lived according to rural, local, agrarian and /or religious rhythms. At the same time, these latter were also evolving, not archaic elements of a static “traditional” society in decline. As a result, characteristics that were once thought of as mutually exclusive, like local and national culture, rural and urban, or religion and secularization, co-existed in an ongoing dynamic that was more complex than “modern” vs. “traditional.” The Spanish case followed the general parameters of this modified narrative of social and cultural evolution, which included both change over time and diversity of experience and lifestyle.

This more complex narrative of transition to a “modern” society has not resolved long-standing debates about how to characterize the impact of these changes. From a liberal modernization perspective, the transformation to modernity left behind a world crippled by superstition, social immobility, ignorance and isolation and inaugurated a new age characterized by rationalism, social mobility through merit, democratization of opportunity through education and of culture in the urban milieu. The critical Marxist narrative countered that the bourgeois revolution (or its purported “failure” in the Spanish case) that produced this transformation had replaced one framework of social domination for another, and that

all the accoutrements of modern culture functioned to consolidate the class power relationships of the new social hierarchy. Today, few scholars would defend either paradigm in its pure form. The cheery modernization version occludes the role of power in modern social relationships and cultural practices, while demonizing or dismissing remnants of “traditional” society as irrelevant to the narrative of historical progress. In contrast, the Marxist version, even in its softer forms, reduces complex social and cultural phenomena to an over-simplified class struggle that is equally dismissive of “tradition.”

Instead of the linear trajectory of both these models, recent scholarship has made room for diversity, heterogeneity and co-mingling of practices once placed on either side of the modern/traditional divide. Thus, the “rediscovery” of religion by historians of the nineteenth century has revealed expansion and adaptation for all major religions, rather than erosion or across the board secularization, even in the vanguard countries of northern Europe.<sup>2</sup> Religious institutions did witness a decline in political power and financial autonomy, and some states adopted secularization measures to separate political and religious power, a process that also occurred in Spain, if less aggressively. But as churches withdrew from the formal political sphere, they expanded their influence in social and cultural life. And while they claimed to be defending a “traditional” society against the perceived ills wrought by modernity, in fact churches embraced new technologies and practices, from the press to associationism and the public sphere, and played a major role in one of the important social innovations of the century, mass education.

For the Catholic Church, the Vatican’s imperative to “rechristianize” a population tainted by secular and anti-clerical liberalism utilized traditional devotions but also new forms of lay associations and rituals to carry out its mission. In other words, the Catholic Church, in Spain as elsewhere during this period, was a cultural institution operating in the modern world, not an anachronistic holdover from an old regime society. As such, the European “culture wars” between Catholics and anti-clericals should be viewed less as a struggle between “tradition” and “modernity” than as one over the values of modern life itself.<sup>3</sup>

Likewise, the local and regional “turn” in the study of nationalism has focused on these identities as more than simply archaic obstacles to the onward march of “nationalization.”<sup>4</sup> All of these cultural frames could and did continue to co-exist, both in more decentralized states like Germany and in centralized ones like France, in a dynamic interaction that was at times mutually reinforcing and interdependent and at others competitive and antagonistic.<sup>5</sup> In the former case, regional culture and identity provided the most accessible path to nationalization for many citizens, while in the latter it could nurture an alternative national identity; but in either case, people could inhabit more than one territorial identity at a time and the outcome was not predetermined.

From a different perspective, the linear formation of two opposing classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, has given way to a more diverse and variegated picture of social relationships. On the one hand, the industrial working class remained a relative minority of the population, even in northern Europe, until the last decades of the century, while other middling clerical jobs, small businesses and artisan production kept the workforce from being reduced to two classes.

Meanwhile, the equally heterogeneous agrarian population remained dynamic, adapting in response to technological innovations, a growing urban market and transportation and communication networks linking villages to a larger world. At the top of the social hierarchy, while aristocratic privilege and wealth declined, the new elite stratum was a hybrid of noble, commercial, industrial, agrarian, urban and bureaucratic wealth, rather than a homogeneous “bourgeois” class.

These revisions don’t mean that class, secularism, nationalism or modernity itself are irrelevant to the narrative of social and cultural evolution in this period. Thus, there remains an overarching story of long-term transformation from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries that included the ongoing renegotiation of social hierarchies and power relations. Furthermore, many people increasingly imagined themselves as living in a “modern” social order, which was as important as any “objective” changes in their lives.<sup>6</sup> For example, by the early twentieth century, an increasing number of Europeans, especially in the urban settings that became staging grounds for the class drama, thought they lived in a bipolar society in which the working class and the bourgeois were the main characters to either fear, admire or emulate, depending on one’s position. From this vantage point, they identified everything, from their neighborhood to their associations and their leisure activities, with the embrace or contestation of this overarching reality. At the same time, this perspective was only one of several lenses through which individuals viewed their place in the social order, including familial, gendered, religious, local, regional or national, often in nested layers of meaning. The upshot was a complex and intertwined social and cultural landscape that resists a single developmental narrative.

## **The Social Order: Evolution and Diversity**

Until recently, the developmental narrative of nineteenth-century social evolution in Spain was framed by the overarching debate regarding the purported failure of the “bourgeois revolution.” The classic interpretation argued that, as a result of the failed industrial revolution, the weak bourgeois class remained subordinate to the feudal nobility, which in turn explained not only the failure of a liberal and then democratic political revolution but also the lack of transformation to a bourgeois culture and society, with its purported characteristics of consumerism, secularism, urbanism and, of course, capitalism.

A recent generation of scholars have convincingly disassembled this simplistic model, demonstrating the long-term erosion of the old regime society and its aristocratic cultural framework and the construction of a new social order. Some argue for a gradual erosion from the late eighteenth century while some pinpoint the liberal revolution of the 1830s as the key turning-point, but in either case, by the early twentieth century the old aristocracy as a group had been largely displaced from the top of the social hierarchy, replaced by a hybrid elite or “generalized power-holding group,” whose wealth had been consolidated by the opportunities of a capitalist economy.<sup>7</sup> At the same time as the economic profile of the elites evolved, so did their cultural practices, in terms of how they lived, behaved, dressed and

entertained themselves. Descending from the new hybrid elite were the slowly expanding, heterogeneous and mostly urban middle classes, who aspired to join or at least share the trappings of the emerging elite society. At the bottom of the urban hierarchy were the diverse popular classes, gradually evolving to fit the needs of growing commercial, service and industrial sectors. Finally, there was the majority rural population, just as hierarchical as the urban, but more dynamic than often assumed.

The upshot of a century of gradual change was a significant transformation in the social order which included some upward mobility and shifting status in both the rural and urban middle and upper ranks, as well as a large sector at the bottom with few prospects for advancement. Neither a rigid two-class system nor a utopia of equal opportunity, the emerging social order represented a reconfiguration of hierarchy, power, opportunity and inequality that both accompanied and reinforced the ongoing political and economic changes.

### A Hybrid Elite

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the gradual shift in economic and cultural power away from the old aristocracy that had begun in the late eighteenth century continued, though most of the old families were able to survive the political changes of the liberal revolution. In the 1850s, the nobility as a group still owned the most wealth, with the majority invested in land and agriculture. Many noble families benefitted from the transition to a private property regime, especially given the continued weight of agriculture in the Spanish economy. Of the 100 wealthiest families in Madrid at that point, 42 percent belonged to the nobility.<sup>8</sup> What allowed old families to thrive was no longer aristocratic privilege, but the ability to capitalize on existing resources in an increasingly market-driven economy. These same opportunities provided channels for a growing number of non-noble families to earn fortunes through commerce, industry, mining, and farming, and by the end of the century nobles no longer stood out among this hybrid elite, which only constituted a “class” in contrast to the lower social ranks.

No doubt there was significant regional variation as well. In Valencia and Catalonia, for example, there was a more dramatic turnover of economic elites in the early to mid-nineteenth century.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, there were parts of Andalucía and Extremadura where much of the aristocracy transitioned from feudal lords to private, often absentee, owners and powerful *caciques*. It was finally the agricultural crisis of the later nineteenth century that forced many old families to sell off property, either to wealthy urbanites looking for investment in land or to well-off peasant renters or owners. Even in the slower-changing agrarian sector, the composition of the elite was neither static nor representative of an archaic social order.

The hybrid elite also mixed and matched “aristocratic” and “bourgeois” markers of status. Thus, as elsewhere in Europe, the continued practice of ennobling wealthy and accomplished commoners from state administration, the military, the colonies, industry and commerce, expanded noble ranks (1200 new titles over the century) and demonstrated the continued prestige of aristocratic status. Also, while elements of a distinctive “bourgeois” lifestyle gradually emerged, wealthy

families still made social and business decisions through patronage and kinship networks designed to protect family status more than maximize profit in the free market.<sup>10</sup> In elite society, the family, not the “rational individual” of liberal ideology, defined social power and its reproduction.

At the same time, those elite families embraced “bourgeois” complementary gender roles. In contrast to men’s role in the work force and the political sphere, women were supposed to manage the domestic sphere. According to the widely diffused “angel in the house” separate spheres model, women’s emotional, nurturing and weaker constitution was unsuited to the harsh realities of individual competition out in the world.<sup>11</sup> These same qualities would help her create a nurturing home environment that would replenish her husband’s spirit and prepare her children for adulthood, while embodying the chaste and religious values expected of a respectable woman.

### The Urban Middle Classes

Of course the boundaries of elite status were never fixed or permanent, especially for the intermediate “middle classes,” for whom the aspiration to join elite society shaped their own identities. Comprised of a range of mostly urban professions, including civil servants, journalists, lawyers, small business owners and merchants, writers, teachers, middle-ranking officers and clergy, they were a diverse group often united by their status as property-holders. Given the slow development of Spain’s urban, industrial and consumer sectors, these intermediate classes remained a minority of the population, probably no more than 5 percent in 1870, but expanded more quickly from 1900 to 1930, when the urban population grew by 27 percent. The earliest middle-class sector to expand was the civil service, which doubled between 1860 and 1900, as the state consolidated its administration. More stable in number but still significant in a top-heavy military were the officers, many of them sons of middle-class families. Another growing sector was made up of merchants, whose numbers increased sixfold over the course of the nineteenth century, and most of whom probably belonged to the middle classes, given the small size of most commercial establishments. The numbers of doctors and lawyers also rose as increasing numbers of university students (12,000 total in 1868, 30,000 in the 1920s) chose these professions over traditional concentrations like theology.

Although most middle-class women did not hold paying jobs, unless they were single or widowed, they played an important role in securing the family’s status precisely by not working outside the home. In other words, a non-working wife was one of the key aspirational goals of families hovering on the lower border of the middle class, and could secure their presence in it as much as the ownership of property. For single or widowed women of this class, opportunities to enter the middling professions did not open up until the early twentieth century, and their employment remained low compared to northern Europe. The female occupation of teacher had been expanding since the law mandating girls’ education in 1857, followed by the establishment of female teacher training schools. But higher professions began to open in 1910 when girls could enroll in the university and in 1919, when they were allowed to enter the civil service.

### The Popular Classes or “el pueblo”

At the bottom of the social hierarchy were the equally diverse popular classes, or *el pueblo*, the majority of whom lived in rural areas, although a growing minority populated the expanding cities. For most of the nineteenth century, the vast majority of the urban popular classes were occupied in the artisanal trades, from shoemaking to cabinetmaking, either as masters (some of whom passed into the “middle classes”), or journeymen. While these middling jobs survived longer than once believed, by the latter decades of the century the process of “proletarianization,” in which formerly independent artisans lost their businesses and became employees of factories or commercial establishments, did begin to gather momentum. Another category of urban worker was the clerk. Most retail establishments that hired clerks were in cities and towns, and most remained small, with the smallest shop owners barely holding on to middle-class status. In Madrid in 1930, the 8,851 merchants had an average of three employees each, with the first department store, the Almacenes Madrid–Paris (1920) and its 416 employees the exception to the rule.<sup>12</sup> Aside from trades and shops, the largest category of urban worker was the domestic servant, almost all young single females, many of them daughters of farming families who moved to the city to find positions in elite homes.

Only later in the century did the industrial worker become a significant presence, and then highly concentrated in the major industrial or mining regions and Madrid. In the 1860 census, the category of industrial worker appeared for the first time, and by 1900 there were about a million, including miners and railway workers, and 1.6 million by 1930. The biggest category were construction workers, followed by tailors and dressmakers, then workers in food packaging and textiles.<sup>13</sup> Female industrial workers, the majority of them single, were concentrated in textiles, dressmaking and tobacco factories, with 40 percent of them located in Catalonia, and many of the rest employed in sweatshops and the ten tobacco assembly plants around the country. Despite the “angel in the house” ideal, the reality for virtually all women of the popular classes was employment for most or part of their lives.

While the economic situation of the popular classes was not homogeneous, for the most part their lives shared a series of characteristics that included long workdays, job insecurity, illiteracy and poor health conditions that led to higher rates of infant mortality and shorter life spans. After long, persistent debate about whether industrialization and other aspects of “modernization” improved the lives of the lower classes, the more pessimistic view seems to have prevailed. Thus, the early stages of industrialization and urbanization, unregulated by protective legislation and vulnerable to the diseases of overcrowding, may have worsened or at least not significantly improved living standards until the late nineteenth century, even in the vanguard countries.<sup>14</sup>

In Spain, there was modest improvement by the end of the century in the decline of what we would now call food insecurity as well as in the variety of the diet, both facilitated by the consolidation of the domestic market. In addition, there was an average decline of 1–2 hours in the workday of at least some jobs, culminating in the “8 hour day” legislation of 1919 that expanded leisure time for the regularly employed. And there were modest improvements in health indicators as a result

of pasteurization and vaccinations, although the gap between lower- and upper-class statistics remained wide. This gap was reinforced by the segregation of urban neighborhoods from the late nineteenth century, with lower classes concentrated either in the decaying old city centers or in the newer industrial suburbs on the outskirts, where they often lived in self-built shacks or poorly constructed buildings without plumbing, ventilation, clean water or sewers. Some categories of workers were worse off than others, including women, who were paid between 50 and 65 percent of male wages, and unskilled laborers, whose wages and irregular work did not support a subsistence-level existence.

What undoubtedly helped these and the rest of the popular classes survive was the family economy, in which multiple earners pooled their resources.<sup>15</sup> Women were often the cornerstone of lower-class households, both in terms of their unpaid labor caring for husbands and children, their strategies for stretching tight budgets, and their ability to augment family income through regular employment, casual labor, taking in laundry or sewing, and even occasional prostitution. Until well into the twentieth century, children contributed to the family economy, helping their mother with “piece work” sewing, doing casual jobs like running errands or cleaning stores, or entering factories where that work was available. In Barcelona there were over 22,000 children (two-thirds male) between 10 and 14 years old working in industry in 1905, which constituted a significant proportion of the city’s child population. Due to children’s financial contribution to the family, the rates of truancy were high, as in Madrid at the end of the nineteenth century, where half of the enrolled primary school population attended only irregularly, despite mandatory attendance.

### Rural Society

The story of an evolving and diverse society also applies to the rural and agrarian sector, which was more than a timeless relic of a past social order. While many of the rhythms of rural life, shaped by the daily farm chores and planting and harvesting cycles, may have remained constant, there were also changes resulting from the process of desamortization, the abolition of the seigneurial system, the agricultural crisis of the late nineteenth century, the construction of the secondary railway lines and the consolidation of the domestic market by the end of the century.

As noted in Chapter 6, the desamortization process reinforced the varied land tenure and property structure of rural Spain, reconstituting a hybrid elite but also expanding the middle class of independent farmers, whose numbers increased by almost 50 percent. Not only did this expanding rural middle class lead a more comfortable life, but they were increasingly likely to send their children to school, leading to the highest rates of literacy in the northern regions where they predominated.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, desamortization increased the number of landless laborers (*braceros*), from 33 percent to 36 percent of the entire working population of the country, but regionally distributed according to property size. Thus, their proportion rose as one moved south, away from the smaller farms of the north and towards the *latifundia* of the center and south. They were fewer than 25 percent of

the farming population in the *minifundia* area along the northern coast, between 25 and 50 percent in León, Old Castile and Aragón, 50 to 75 percent in New Castile, Murcia and parts of eastern Andalucía, and over 75 percent in western, and parts of eastern, Andalucía. The livelihood of these laborers remained as precarious, if not more so, at the end of the century as at the beginning, with below-subsistence daily wages, grueling ten hour workdays and an average of three months' seasonal unemployment. Their situation was often made worse after the privatization of the municipal common lands, which had supplemented their meager resources.<sup>17</sup> Even during the first major exodus of the late nineteenth century, the *braceros* were often left behind, lacking even the minimum resources or networks to facilitate their emigration, although some probably joined the seasonal migration to find extra work in nearby cities.

In addition to farming, there were a variety of occupations in the small towns that dotted the countryside, so that as much as one-third of the rural population was engaged in artisanal, commercial, service or even industrial jobs, sometimes as a supplement to farm work. In particular, the mining centers in Asturias and the Basque country or the Rio Tinto mines in the south, whose collective work force tripled from 23,000 in 1860 to 76,000 in 1900, were often located outside urban centers. Mining families either lived in self-contained small communities or in farming villages where miners still performed agricultural tasks. Until the 1920s, two-thirds of the labor force in the Asturian mining industry was comprised of these "mixed workers," and about the same percentage lived in towns of fewer than 500 people.<sup>18</sup> Not only did these mixed workers and small town artisans diversify the rural population, but they often provided links between rural and urban society. These links were enhanced by the railroad lines and the integrated market, belying the stereotype of isolation and insularity that emerged as a theme among turn of the century "regenerationist" critics, who viewed the countryside as holding Spain back from achieving full "modernity."

## Sociability and Identity: A Diverse and Evolving Cultural Landscape

In dynamic interaction with the long-term changes in economic status and work experience was an evolving cultural landscape that framed how Spaniards understood their relationship to others with whom they associated and where and how they socialized. One of the most highlighted innovations of the period was a new set of largely urban leisure, spatial and symbolic practices, increasingly identified as "bourgeois culture." Similarly to what was occurring in European cities elsewhere, the diffusion and impact of these new norms spread later and more gradually than in the vanguard cities of northern Europe.<sup>19</sup> Immortalized in the literary language of the great realist novelists of the late nineteenth century, Benito Pérez Galdós, Armando Palacio Valdés and Leopoldo Alas, by the early twentieth century these norms not only defined the standards for the new hybrid elite, but also the aspirational goal for the broader middle classes. For those who could not afford to participate in this elite urban culture, there was a world of popular sociability

that was both evolving and expanding along with the potential for “leisure” among the lower classes. However, this new stratified urban culture was only one of the lenses through which Spaniards viewed their collective identity. Other cultural identities that both overlapped with and cut across social hierarchy were religion, regionalism and nationalism.

### A New Urban Culture: Encoding Social Hierarchy in the Public Sphere

Between the 1830s and the 1930s, a new urban culture in Spain took shape, at first quite limited but continuing to grow with the urban population. In contrast to the aristocratic salons, much of the action took place in the “public sphere,” defined as the virtual space where citizens came together without control or tutelage of the state, but also stratified according to social hierarchies.<sup>20</sup> The connecting tissue of the public sphere was an expanding print culture, which included an increasingly diverse range of periodical publications for different constituencies, from fashion magazines like *Moda Elegante* (1842), to the extensive political press, lush illustrated magazines like *La Ilustración Española y Americana* (1869) and *Blanco y Negro* (1891), satirical magazines like the anti-clerical *El Motín* (1881), and learned journals and bulletins of associations. From 1837, when there were 120 newspapers in all of Spain, many of them published in Madrid, by 1900 the total number of periodicals had risen to 1,347. But the expanding print culture included even more accessible forms, such as pamphlets, posters, maps, drawings, stamps, announcements and musical scores, which could be imbibed through written, oral or visual means. The result was a growing “ambience” of print culture that did not require true literacy in order to participate.<sup>21</sup>

At the top of the cultural hierarchy was the new realm of elite sociability, shifting away from aristocratic codes of behavior and towards a new set of self-consciously modern norms.<sup>22</sup> Beginning in the 1830s, a growing number of etiquette manuals standardized a new code of conduct based on the cultivated “urbane” ideal rather than the inherited social distinction of the aristocratic “cour-tier.” While this transition implied equal access, in fact the new code established different types of barriers for those lower down the social hierarchy, including elaborate forms of social protocol for visits, weddings, dress, dining etiquette and entertaining.

Social distinctions were also reinforced by the physical transformation of urban space, particularly the growing segregation between elite and popular neighborhoods. Beginning in the 1840s in Madrid and Barcelona, wealthy families began to move out of the city center and into new neighborhoods called *ensanches* (extensions), where luxury apartment buildings along broad boulevards punctuated by parks and monuments, replaced the mixed housing of the old city center. The most famous urban transformation occurred in Barcelona, beginning with the 1859 *Plan de Eixample* of the visionary Ildefons Cerdà I Sunyer, which laid out a grid of wide avenues and unlimited room to grow. Over the following decades, modernist and Catalanist architects like Lluís Domenèch I Montaner and Josep Puig i Cadafach designed spectacular upscale apartment buildings and public structures, from railway stations to city government offices and cultural venues, that created a unique

and self-consciously modern architectural landscape for a “bourgeois” (and Catalan) city. With the establishment of a new school of architecture in Barcelona in 1875, these architects aimed to break with the conservative style of the Madrid school and embrace a “critical eclecticism” that freed designers to pick and choose elements from past styles. As Domenèch put it in his 1877 manifesto entitled “In Search of a New Architecture,” this experimentation would help launch a new artistic era expressing the requirements of a modern civilization.<sup>23</sup>

Madrid, in ongoing competition with Barcelona for its modern credentials, adopted its own *Plan de Ensanche* in 1860, drawn up by the city engineer, Carlos María de Castro. It proposed the systematic division of city space between wealthy residential districts to the north and industrial zones in the south, along with suggestions for monumental public buildings like a national library or museums. After the passage of the Law of *Ensanches* in 1864, many other smaller cities followed the model of urban beautification and residential differentiation, especially towards the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Often planned and funded by investments from elite family businesses, they were literally remaking the city as a space to showcase their power and prestige.

In the upscale housing of the *ensanches*, the interior design and furnishing constituted the nucleus of the new elite urban identity as well as the stage for enacting modern gender roles. The new apartments were divided into public rooms, like the salon, which was increasingly filled with ornamental and decorative elements for display, and private rooms for domestic life. With the central role of “private” domestic life in representing the new social order, women were key protagonists in the new elite code of conduct. Thus, the ideal rested on a set of complementary roles for men and women, each of which was essential to the complete package of family status.

While the subordinate and dependent “angel in the house” would seem like a powerless figure, in practice elite women had significant responsibility for maintaining and showcasing the family’s status. From her decisions on decorating the parlor, to the hierarchy of her social visits, her fashion choices and her attendance at prestigious cultural events, the elite woman made visible her family’s place in the social order and erected barriers to differentiate her family’s status from those below. Beyond the home, elite women defined their place in the social hierarchy through participation in the growing arena of private philanthropy, which also paradoxically allowed them access into the supposedly masculine public arena. Organizations to promote girls’ education, penal reform, orphanages or hospitals confirmed “respectable” women’s social mission to help the less fortunate, especially in the exposed gap between expropriated Catholic charities and a liberal state that rejected state intervention in solving social problems.<sup>24</sup>

Philanthropic organizations were just one piece of a larger world of elite sociability whose hallmark was the voluntary association. Nurtured by the liberal belief in the connection between civic virtue and sociability, associations allowed citizens to develop the bonds that would create a society out of autonomous individuals.<sup>25</sup> The associational milieu of the nineteenth century was theoretically open and inclusive, but in practice it both reflected and reinforced social hierarchies, with membership segregated by status but also constitutive of that status. The more exclusive segment of the emerging associational milieu in Spain included

scientific and literary associations like *ateneos* and *liceos*, philanthropic organizations, recreational *casinos*, and, in some cases, professional organizations of doctors, lawyers or businessmen.

These new types of elite associations date from the 1830s. An 1838 article introducing the first *Ateneo* in Madrid (1835) identified the new “spirit of association” as one of the key characteristics of “civilized peoples.”<sup>26</sup> In contrast to the eighteenth-century royal academies, which continued to operate, these new associations did not require the imprimatur of the monarch or the state. From this point on, the *ateneos*, which combined the promotion of academic scholarship with the general knowledge required to participate in polite society, constituted the heart of intellectual life and educated society. By mid-century, there were 54 *ateneos* in the major cities and provincial capitals of the country, and by 1880 there were 143. *Ateneos* hosted public lectures, conferences and discussion groups, mounted art exhibits and concerts, and contained libraries and reading rooms. In particular, the Madrid and Barcelona *Ateneos* organized high-impact events, such as the fourth centennial of Columbus’ voyage, the anniversary of the publication of *Don Quixote* or, in Barcelona, important events in Catalan history and culture. The goals of *liceos* (Madrid 1837) overlapped with those of *ateneos*, but focused on promoting artistic consumption by sponsoring plays, exhibits, poetry readings, concerts and dances.

*Casinos* were private, masculine recreational associations, whose members often also belonged to an *ateneo* or *liceo*. Designed for playing billiards, card games and sociable drinking, as well as reading newspapers, membership fees kept *casinos* selective. By the 1860s, there were nearly 600, spread through virtually every province, and by 1900 there were over 2,000. The *casinos* of major cities like Madrid and Barcelona tended to be more exclusive than those of provincial towns, but in general they were segregated spaces where wealthier men could enjoy each other’s company. Some of the earliest *casinos* emerged out of more informal *tertulias*, or discussion groups, as was the case in Madrid, where the 1837 institution was formed by a group that had been meeting in a café for many years.

Beyond membership in selective associations, the emerging “bourgeois” public sphere was constituted by other mostly commercialized leisure spaces and practices, including theatrical and music venues, museums, elite sports like tennis and cycling, cafés, spa vacations, the extended summer holiday in coastal resorts or mountain retreats, “pleasure gardens” with entrance fees and boulevards where well-dressed families could be seen for the daily *paseo*, loosely translated as a public ritualized promenade along regular routes. Most of the major nineteenth-century museums were in Madrid, beginning with the inauguration of the Prado museum in 1819 and ending with the completion of the National Library and Archeology museum in 1895. The most prestigious theatrical and musical venues were established in Madrid and Barcelona, and by 1900, each city had a dozen major theaters, two opera houses and smaller venues for producing plays and Spain’s light opera, the *zarzuela*. In addition to constituting the main audience for theater productions, the bourgeoisie was the source of the themes and lifestyle featured in most of the more than 1,000 plays written over the course of the nineteenth century.<sup>27</sup> While there were cheap seats in the “chicken roost” top rows of the theaters, the box seats of the first floor were spaces for high society to see and be seen, “dripping with jewels and diamonds,” according to one poor student

looking down on the “ocean of bourgeoisie.”<sup>28</sup> As this observation highlights, the articulation of class hierarchies was both a motive for, and a consequence of, a range of cultural and leisure activities. While the comment makes clear that participation in the public sphere was not limited to “bourgeois” citizens, class hierarchy was one of the primary factors that structured where and how people joined.

At the same time, those boundaries were flexible and shifting, especially between elites and the diverse middle classes. Many of these intermediate groups participated in the associational culture of the age, founding a range of philanthropic, professional and lobbying associations that carved out more or less selective sites of sociability for groups ranging from doctors, lawyers, industrialists and academics to those united around a specific cause such as social reform, free trade or abolitionism.<sup>29</sup> In terms of professional associations, the most numerous belonged to lawyers and notaries, more than 100 by the end of century, all but a handful in urban settings.<sup>30</sup> By the end of the century, there were also a smaller number of “colleges” or associations for doctors and pharmacists, Chambers of Commerce for businessmen in the major commercial centers, and a handful of associations for writers, artists, composers, engineers and teachers, most of these latter in Madrid or Barcelona. With diverse political views and social status, these types of associations sometimes mirrored the qualities of the most selective associations and in other cases existed in a parallel but less exalted social sphere.

### **On the Margins of Middle Class Culture: The Avant-Garde and the Modern Woman**

One aspect of modern urban culture that did not fit neatly into the social hierarchy was the relatively small world of avant-garde artists, most notably in first Barcelona and later Madrid. Building on the modernist school of architecture, in the early 1890s Catalan artists Ramon Casas and Santiago Rusiñol worked to create an artistic community that could develop a “new school” of painting, modeled on what they had seen in Paris. In 1897, they opened a café, *Els Quatre Gats* (The Four Cats), housed in one of the new buildings designed by Puig i Cadafalch, which functioned as a gathering place for *tertulias* and an exhibition space, including the first show of 17-year-old Pablo Picasso in 1900. In addition to Picasso, Barcelona nurtured the early careers of Salvador Dalí and Joan Miró, the three most important European-level artists from Spain, before they moved on to Paris. The Madrid avant-garde took shape in the 1920s, when young artists like Federico García Lorca and Luis Buñuel congregated at Madrid’s *Residencia de Estudiantes*, discussed the role of the artist in modern life in *tertulias* at the Café Pombo, and published small-circulation literary and artistic magazines. Often highly critical of what they viewed as staid “bourgeois” culture, they pushed the envelope in characters, language and painting techniques, and looked to Paris for inspiration from movements like Futurism, Dadaism and Surrealism, which arrived in Spain at that time.<sup>31</sup> Consciously situated outside the hierarchical social structure, the avant-garde culture struggled between a critique of bourgeois culture and the desire to create an audience for their work.

Similarly situated on the margins of respectable middle-class culture was the emerging phenomenon of the “new woman,” both as a physical presence in previously

masculine spaces, and in discussions about feminism and changing gender roles. From the turn of the century, a small group of mostly middle-class women that included teachers, writers and journalists, separated and single women, leftist political activists and free thinkers, pushed the limits of accepted female behavior and created their own world of associations, such as the Autonomous Women's Society in Barcelona (1889–1892) or the Women's Freethinker Union of Huelva (1898–1906), of publications, and informal networks.<sup>32</sup> By the 1920s, spurred by the pervasive iconography of "modern women," supporters of an evolving role for women increased, as did detractors who predicted that gender confusion would lead to the demise of civilization.<sup>33</sup> In practice, more middle-class women were visible in the workforce, especially in the service sector and the universities (from one female student in 1900 to 1,681 (4.5 percent of the total) in 1930), while the once largely masculine territory of the cafés and *ateneos* began to develop more mixed clientele. Female associationism continued to expand beyond the respectable terrain of Catholic and philanthropic organizations, including the Female Lyceum Club, founded in 1926 by a group of intellectual elite women that included Victoria Kent, a future member of parliament.

The explicitly feminist movement remained both small and divided into various branches, including Catholic feminism, moderate secular feminism and equal rights feminism linked to free-thinking and left-wing political groups. Catholic feminism, embodied in the lay Women's Catholic Action organization, accepted women's primary roles as mothers and wives but asserted the right to protect and improve women's lives within this framework.<sup>34</sup> The moderate version, represented by the newspaper *La Voz de la Mujer* (1917–1931) and the National Association of Spanish Women (1918), supported women's access to the professions and education, as well as the reform of the Civil Code that made women virtual dependents. Radical groups like the Spanish League for the Progress of Women supported full equal rights, including suffrage. This latter association was established in 1918 and submitted a petition to the Cortes the following year demanding political rights for women.<sup>35</sup> While the "new woman," whether explicitly feminist or not, challenged the division between public and private and the strictly domestic role for women, the impact on the broader urban culture, like that of the avant-garde artists, was probably limited. Even in Madrid and Barcelona, these were subversive sub-cultures, while in smaller cities they may have been accessible mainly through the virtual space of the press.

### Urban Popular Sociability and Mass Culture

Clearly differentiated from elite, middle-class or avant-garde culture was the world of popular sociability. In general terms, the associational milieu was a middle-class and elite phenomenon until the end of the nineteenth century, when republicans, anarchists, socialists and social reformers designed cultural associations just for workers, although the idea originated with the first "working class" mutual aid associations in the 1830s and 1840s.<sup>36</sup> Many participants in this first wave were artisans, who constituted the core of the working men's associations in nineteenth-century Spain and Europe.<sup>37</sup> At first, most were located in Barcelona and its industrial belt, including the first *Ateneo Obrero* (1881) and the first workers'

choral societies, the brainchild of composer Josep Anselm Clavé in the late 1840s. In response to the establishment of the first trade unions in the 1840s, social reformers founded educational “uplift” organizations that taught literacy and professional skills as well, they hoped, as self-discipline and sobriety. The later republican centers shared these goals, while also offering secular recreational alternatives to traditional religious activities, as part of their anti-clerical mission. The anarchist and socialist versions of worker cultural centers, the *ateneos libertarios* and *casas del pueblo*, shared the educational and anti-clerical goals of the republicans but aimed to liberate themselves from “bourgeois” supervision while weaning workers from the tavern. From the early twentieth century, another strand of popular associations were the first football (soccer) clubs, with neighborhood and city teams that were at the start popular and participatory, rather than commercial, ventures. Without the need for specialized equipment or courts, football quickly became the sport of the (male) masses.

All of these uplifting initiatives to organize workers’ leisure time, like their counterparts in other European countries, sought to compete not only with the Church but with the seductive attractions of commercial mass culture, which emptied their wallets and diverted them from self-improvement and/or political engagement. This workers’ associational milieu was explicitly politicized and increasingly differentiated according to ideology, while at the same time united by a dedication to bringing literacy, cultural appreciation and healthy forms of leisure to those who could not access “bourgeois” cultural channels.<sup>38</sup> Made viable by the increase in salaries, the reduction of the workday and the mandated Sunday holiday (1904), all of which regularized “leisure” as a working-class achievement, a growing network of worker cultural and educational centers with libraries and reading rooms, sports teams and singing societies, consolidated a dense realm of self-defined worker sociability that achieved its apotheosis during the Republic of the 1930s.

Beyond the workers’ associations, the world of urban popular sociability was characterized by a range of informal sites of participation that gradually incorporated new forms of commercial mass culture in the early twentieth century. The classic site of popular masculine sociability was the local tavern, where men congregated after work to play cards and drink, and these continued to proliferate. In turn-of-the-century Madrid there were 1,437 taverns, and 928 in Barcelona.<sup>39</sup> In contrast to the tavern, many of the new commercial pastimes crossed class and gender lines, but remained segregated by ticket prices and “box seats,” as in the more traditional theaters. The most important of these activities was the bullfight, a traditional activity that had been transformed over the course of the nineteenth century into Spain’s first modern spectator sport.<sup>40</sup> From the first bullring in Madrid in 1749, by 1880 there were 105 permanent bullrings, seating between 2,500 and 12,500, in addition to hundreds of smaller structures for watching other bull events.

From the early twentieth century, the so-called “national” pastime competed increasingly with other commercialized activities, especially football and films. The commercialization of football occurred relatively rapidly from the first club in Huelva in 1889, formed by English workers at the Rio Tinto mines, to the creation of many of the now-storied clubs, such as Real Madrid (1902) and FC Barcelona (1900).

The first game charging an entrance fee took place in 1902, and by the 1910s, stadia were being built in cities across the country. By the 1920s it was a full-fledged professional sport, with the first league championship between ten teams in 1928. In the twentieth century, the cinema joined the list of popular attractions, with 900 theaters in 1914 and 3,000 by 1931, but there were also many forms of live entertainment aimed at a more popular or mixed clientele than the opera houses, from the *zarzuela* shows, to nightclubs (*cafes-cantantes*), where aristocrats rubbed shoulders with the working classes, cabarets and variety shows.<sup>41</sup>

All of these evolving cultural sites and practices, from the casino to the football stadium, reinforced and mirrored the social hierarchy, simultaneously working to constitute that hierarchy and contest its boundaries. As cultural historians have argued, these sites were not simply pale reflections of the “real” economic hierarchies, but helped articulate as well as visualize power differentials. Thus, in general, the urban milieu grouped people according to their status, from where they lived to how they spent their leisure time. At the same time, the hierarchies they acted out were not fixed in stone but actively contested, as when middle-class groups adopted cultural practices to blend into elite society, or workers’ groups appropriated forms like the *ateneo* that were meant to signify distinction. As much as hierarchy defined and shaped the urban society, these practices were not completely “saturated” with class identity either, in the sense that drinking at the tavern, attending an *ateneo* lecture or joining the abolitionist society were not necessarily experienced as exclusively class-based activities. In reality, there were other cultural prisms through which people understood their relationship with the larger community, such as local, regional or national identity, religious practice or gender identity.

### The Catholic Church, Religion and Rural Society

Foremost among these alternative prisms and sites of sociability was religion and its main purveyor in Spain, the Catholic Church. In Spain as elsewhere, the Church and religious practice underwent a significant transformation during the period. With the liberal revolution, the old regime Church and its network of monastic houses was virtually destroyed, forcing a reconstruction process that began with the 1851 Concordat and a *modus vivendi* with the liberal state, and culminated with the relatively cozy understanding between the Restoration parties and the Church that lasted until the turn of the century. After two Carlist wars in which many priests had supported the rebels, the Church definitively abandoned any theocratic claims to political authority in exchange for “protected” free rein in the social and cultural realm.<sup>42</sup> Building on official support, the Church made an impressive financial and institutional recovery, securing patronage from wealthy elites to launch new charity initiatives and reconstructing many of the religious orders that had been decimated.<sup>43</sup> Many new congregations were also founded, especially after the expulsion of religious orders from France in 1901 sent some 64 congregations, divided into 328 houses, into Spain.

What made this recovery more than a reconstruction of the past was the greater percentage of active congregations operating in secular society, which could justify their existence according to the more utilitarian values of liberalism. In particular,

many of the new orders stepped into the gap that had opened between the 1857 law mandating universal primary education and the insufficient number of public schools. The dramatic expansion of Catholic schools (20 percent of primary and 80 percent of secondary by the early twentieth century) thus came as a response to the demands of a modernizing society. From this perspective, such schools should not be viewed as an obstacle to social modernization, but as a version of it. As one local study found, Catholic schools not only provided literacy skills to many more children than the state could handle, but they often offered modern professional education, spacious and hygienic classrooms and growing prestige for middle-class and elite children.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to the Church's expansion into education, other initiatives included the promotion of collective religious rituals, such as processions, devotions and pilgrimages, the organization of missions, and the formation of a range of voluntary associations under the rubric of *Acción Católica* (Catholic Action), for lay Catholics to contribute to the larger rechristianization goal. Most of these activities took place at the community level, aiming to shore up or reconstruct a way of life in which religion saturated collective as well as individual identity.<sup>45</sup> These included traditional festivals, based on the annual calendar of saints' days and seasonal religious holidays, like Christmas and Carnival, as well as new devotions like the cults of Marianism and the Eucharist. They also included periodic missions, which involved over a week of intense preaching, mass communions and other events that would heighten the emotional level of religiosity and hopefully revitalize parish devotion in the future. On a larger scale, there were the pilgrimages to sacred sites where religious apparitions had been witnessed and authenticated by the Church, such as the famous Lourdes, in France, which attracted a million visitors a year in 1900. One effort to establish a Spanish Lourdes in the town of Limpías (Cantabria) briefly flowered into a pilgrimage site in which a million commemorative medals had been given out by 1920 before it fizzled out.<sup>46</sup> While many of these forms were part of the Church's existing cultural tool kit, they were being reappropriated for a new context. That modern context was defined, on the one hand, by increasing competition and challenges to sacred authority, and on the other by the technology and communication that facilitated outreach.

Finally, there were the voluntary associations of *Acción Católica* (AC), first established in Italy but proposed for Spain by the Papal Nuncio in 1908. While coordination and institutionalization developed slowly, with national statutes only approved in 1926, at the local level bishops and parish priests launched a range of associations dedicated to piety, charity, education and workers' spiritual and economic welfare, some established as early as the 1880s, but most after the turn of the century.<sup>47</sup> Some of the most influential were the agrarian syndicates which offered practical programs like loans, credit, insurance, and purchasing cooperatives for small farmers, and were consolidated in the *Confederación Nacional Católica Agraria* (CNCA/ *National Catholic Agrarian Federation*), National Catholic Agrarian Confederation of 1918.<sup>48</sup> Smaller in size but with a greater national reach was the *Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas* (ACNP/ *National Association of Catholic Propagandists*), National Association of Catholic Propagandists (ACNP), a group of intellectuals and journalists who came together in 1908 with the goal of inserting the Catholic movement into journalism and the university.

In 1912 it gained control of the conservative newspaper, *El Debate*, which remained a Catholic mouthpiece through the 1930s. The ACNP also formed a Catholic student youth association in 1923. Lastly, there was *Acción Católica de la Mujer* (ACM/*Catholic Action for Women*) Catholic Action for Women (ACM), created in 1919 to bring women into the public defense of religion but also to serve as an alternative to the growing current of secular feminist thought. ACM flourished during the 1920s and 1930s, adopting a variety of initiatives focused on girls' education, the protection of women workers and charity. By the end of the 1920s, there were over 800 parish-level groups and 118,000 members.<sup>49</sup>

In the older narrative of the "two Spains," these organizations were dismissed as part of the Church's desperate effort to staunch the tide of modernity. But recent studies have argued convincingly that they offered an alternative version of modern society based on Catholic values, which generated vibrant if uneven activity at the grassroots level. Thus, the agrarian syndicates were virtually the only institutions offering help for small farmers, while opening new channels between local communities and the market, the state and national political elites. Likewise, the ACM offered a channel into the public sphere for the "angel in the house," with a Catholic feminism that did not directly challenge gender roles. At a time when left-wing parties and trade unions hardly thought about women, and the secular feminist movement was embryonic, the ACM provided one of the most important associational spaces for women to organize as women.

In contrast to these relative success stories, Catholic associationism could not compete for urban workers' loyalty with left-wing, often anti-clerical trade unions and parties. Thus, the formation of Catholic Workers' Circles and then trade unions mobilized a fraction of those drawn to anarcho-syndicalist or socialist unions (60,000 vs. 1 million in 1919). In this realm, Catholic organizers remained deeply divided over whether worker organizations should be strictly confessional or empowered to pursue their economic interests vis à vis employers. While there were a few defenders of this latter option, like the Asturian Canon Maximiliano Arboleya, who tried to implement autonomous unions among that region's coal miners, the majority of the hierarchy defended the more conservative position, which was expressed in the 1926 AC statutes. The Spanish church's timidity on the "social question" left it lagging behind other national churches and poorly positioned to attract workers back into the fold.

This weak position reinforced the broader structural problem of neglected and expanding poor urban parishes. Since the decimation of urban male religious communities in the mid-nineteenth century, urban pastoral care was mostly left in the hands of priests in parishes that continued to grow. Thus, in the early twentieth century, the average parish size in Barcelona was 19,000 and in Madrid 21,000, with ratios of priest to parishioner at 1: 1,125 in the former case and 1: 626 in the latter. While "internal" dechristianization is hard to measure, a study of one of these poor urban parishes in Madrid found that only 7 percent regularly attended mass and about 25 percent did not even follow the formal rituals of baptizing their children or marrying in the church.<sup>50</sup>

What this last example illustrates is that the Church's recovery of social and cultural influence was very uneven, resulting in parallel and interactive processes of dechristianization and rechristianization that followed—imperfectly—various divisions, including regional, rural/urban, gender and class. The result was a

confusing map of religious culture, with urban elites in modernist Barcelona, women of all classes and rural small farmers in Navarre likely to be strongly identified with Catholicism and its cultural universe, and rural landless laborers in the south and the urban working and middle classes more likely to be dechristianized and even actively anti-clerical. Some of these divisions can be explained by the competition from other cultural frames, as in the case of urban workers and middle-class professionals, and others from the weakness of that competition, in the case of women and more isolated rural communities. Also part of the mix was the growing equation between the Church and the elites, a function partly of the financial dependence on those elites and of the weakening of the Church's charity institutions in the post-desamortization world. The Church's declining "coverage" in poor urban parishes and rural *latifundia* areas in the south also contributed to the geography of religious practice, as did the reverse situation of small villages where the priest : parishioner ratio was small, weekly mass was a universal practice and community identity was synonymous with religion. Finally, there was the general "feminization" of religious practice in nineteenth century Spain, as elsewhere in Europe, which strengthened gender distinctions in levels of participation.<sup>51</sup>

What is clear about this uneven geography of religious practice is that it was much more complex than a binary opposition between "traditional" rural communities mired in timeless practices vs "modern" urban residents, or the religious north vs the secular south. Even the most apparently devout religious localities were increasingly drawn into a "culture wars" dynamic with secularizing forces, especially in the early twentieth century. Thus, in Santander, one of the most conservative northern cities, where the ratio of clergy to parishioner was 1: 299 in 1900, three secular private schools were established and dozens of anti-clerical protests were organized over the following decade. In this context, it was no accident that Church officials were interested in promoting a pilgrimage to Limpías, located not in some isolated enclave but close to ironworks and mines. Likewise, many of the new religious houses established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were located either in cities or close to industrializing areas. Despite the rhetoric of returning to the past, then, the Catholic cultural universe was, for many Spaniards as well as other Europeans, a compelling communitarian alternative to the individualist and class frameworks offered by other groups.<sup>52</sup>

### Local, Regional and National Cultures and Identities

Other important forms of communitarian identity and culture in this period were rooted in the territorial units of locality, region or nation, which co-existed in both harmony and tension, depending on the context. From the perspective of the nineteenth century Spanish state, especially the dominant liberal parties, the centralizing project was as much cultural and linguistic as political. In contrast to other "multicultural" nation-building models such as Belgium, the Spanish state followed a generally homogenizing plan of "castilianization," in which the history, language and institutional features of Castilian history were equated with Spain and the Spanish monarchy. The territorial division into provinces that would theoretically replace the identity of the historical regions with a purely administrative unit exemplified this ambition. The political elites' suspicion of regional culture was confirmed with the Carlist wars, which were blamed on the inadequate

integration of a territory run by its own laws (*fueros*) and customs. The result was a Spanish nationalist discourse in the Restoration that replaced an older notion of Basques as the pure original Spaniards with a new hostile version of their divisiveness and anti-Spanishness.<sup>53</sup> From this perspective, local and regional efforts to define distinct historical and cultural features were viewed as antiquarian at best and subversive at worst, a view accepted until recently by historians of nationalism.<sup>54</sup>

However, these efforts to construct distinctive local and regional identities were an important feature of mid and late nineteenth-century literature, music and art, as well as the widespread process of codifying and inventing folklore, festivals and traditions, and not simply in “unhappy” regions destined to reject their national belonging.<sup>55</sup> In a famous speech in 1897, the novelist Benito Pérez Galdós affirmed that “we are all regionalists,” approaching the nation through “some corner” of Spanish territory.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, most of the producers of this nineteenth century regionalist culture viewed it as contributing to a larger Spanish national culture, within a framework that has been defined as “dual patriotism.”<sup>57</sup> In the Valencian case, popular theater and literature written in Catalan, still the exclusive language of 75 percent of the population, promoted a portrait of Valencians as cheerful and enterprising, with a glorious past and a promising future. During this same period, the primary “markers” of Andalusian culture, including bullfighting, flamenco, popular festivals and natural rebelliousness, took shape among local folklorists and chroniclers. In the Basque Country, the defense of the *fueros* opened the door to a regionalist cultural excavation that emphasized the specific features of a *fuerista* people.

The most famous Catalan case of “dual patriotism” took shape in the 1860s with the *Renaixença*, or renaissance, a literary movement which aimed to distill the essence of a distinct Catalan identity, rooted in history, customs, language and rituals, adopting the local vernacular language as a literary medium of communication. By the end of the century there were Catalan cultural and sporting associations, museums, and excursions that disseminated this regional pride into the broader population. Even the avant-garde culture of architects and artists framed their work in terms of the creation of a specifically Catalan modern culture, as in *Els Quatre Gats'* art journal, which was dedicated to promoting the splendor of the “Catalan homeland.” Not surprisingly, the region that was experiencing the most dramatic economic and social conflict generated one of the most powerful nostalgic regionalist literatures harking back to an idyllic past, but also full of pride regarding the unique Catalan contribution to the modern Spanish nation.

While these regional cultural projects were not *prima facie* evidence of the failure of the Spanish national project, there is still debate about their role in Spanish nation-building. Thus, some have suggested that they may have been a primary channel of nationalization for ordinary Spaniards in a context where the state-led nationalization process was tepid.<sup>58</sup> In the debate about the extent of nationalization, much of the evidence supporting the “weak” thesis has been drawn from the paucity of state-led initiatives such as national festivals, symbols, monuments, a unified school curriculum and so on. For example, most of the monuments built in Madrid celebrated local heroes, not national ones, while the national anthem famously lacked patriotic lyrics. In general, the Restoration political leaders paid little attention to “nationalizing the masses,” and tended to conflate nation-building

with state-building.<sup>59</sup> But recent studies have shifted the focus from the state to the public sphere, arguing that the process of “making Spaniards” was occurring in everyday life, in a context in which nearly everyone assumed the reality of the Spanish nation as a given in the nineteenth century.<sup>60</sup> In this process, local and regionalist cultures helped ordinary Spaniards imagine themselves as part of the larger national community, although more research needs to be done to confirm the extent of this integration across the peninsula.

In a few cases, these regionalist cultural projects evolved into alternative nationalisms, most prominently in Catalonia and the Basque country at the end of the nineteenth century. At that point, these cultural regionalisms celebrating a glorious history and distinct customs shifted towards political regionalism. This shift did not always entail the demand for a separate nation-state, but it did reappropriate the cultural identity in a claim for sovereignty. Except for peripheral nationalists who view this transition as “natural” and preordained, scholars are still debating when and why it occurred. In the “weak” nationalism thesis, these alternative regional nationalisms were a product of the weakness of Spanish national identity. However, once it became clear that Spain was not the only country with “unhappy regions,” their link to a special Spanish “failure” was undermined.<sup>61</sup>

In the Catalan case, scholars have suggested that a combination of factors, rooted in Catalonia’s specific social, economic and political context, came together to favor this shift.<sup>62</sup> Thus, the state’s increasingly aggressive castilianization in language and culture from the 1880s made “double patriotism” more difficult to sustain. Conversely, the Catalan elites’ growing unease with rising class-based conflict and the loss of the colonial market that hurt Catalan business and undermined Spanish national legitimacy helped them embrace Catalanism as an alternative framework for cross-class unity, prosperity and pride. In contrast, Galician regional identity never made that transition to political regionalism in this period, perhaps due to the early castilianization of the Church, the low social status of Galician identity from the early modern period and the lack of an important group invested in taking up the banner.<sup>63</sup>

The development of alternative regional nationalisms did not preclude the ongoing process of Spanish nationalization. Even though explicit state-led initiatives were less robust than in other countries, some degree of nationalization was occurring through schools, military service and colonial wars, nationalist cultural production in the arts and historical writing, and popular culture, most of it produced at the hands of “non-state” actors. Thus, several generations of artists and intellectuals dedicated themselves to the construction of a national culture and literary canon.<sup>64</sup> More popular forms of mass commercial culture, such as the “national pastime” of bullfighting and the musical theater genre of *zarzuela*, which was replete with nationalist themes, may have been even more important in diffusing such themes.<sup>65</sup> In terms of education, recent studies have questioned the old assumption that only a public school system could nationalize the population.<sup>66</sup> Emerging from the more general reconsideration of the Church as a “modern” actor, this perspective views Catholic schools as alternative sites of nation-building, albeit within a religious instead of secular framework. In terms of military service and wars, there was at least some popular and patriotic support for Spain’s colonial wars, in Africa in 1859–1860 and in the Antilles in 1895–1898, although the country’s neutrality in the First World War deprived Spain of the massive

nationalizing potential of that conflict.<sup>67</sup> More broadly, the empire, both past and present, was a defining element of Spanish national identity, as evidenced by its prominent place in nineteenth-century national histories.<sup>68</sup> While all of this work on the diverse sources of nationalization and national culture have challenged any simple model of “weak” nationalism, there is still no consensus as to the precise relationship between local, regional and national identities across the Spanish state, as well as the way that these relationships evolved over time, from the 1830s to the Second Republic.

## Conclusion

The upshot of all of these interlocking cultural frameworks is at once a less coherent, and at the same time a richer and more nuanced, portrait of the evolution of Spanish society between the early nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Rather than following—or worse, failing to follow—a uniform developmental trajectory from a “traditional” to a “modern” social and cultural order, Spain underwent a gradual and long-term transformation that retained a diversity of experience as viewed through alternative cultural lenses, including class, gender, religion, locality, region and nation. In some cases, these cultural identities were mutually reinforcing, while in others they existed in uneasy or open tension. Thus, in the former case, most would now recognize that there was a Catholic version of Spanish nationalism that relied on religion as the core element of national identity, while many regionalist movements were aimed at integrating their smaller story into the larger Spanish narrative. In contrast, these interlocking forms of identity could clash, as when the Spanish state tried to impose a “Castilian” version of Spanish culture on other regions, or in the degree to which “religion” increasingly divided rather than united the “nation” by the early twentieth century, particularly along class and gender lines.

Within this diversity of experience, common elements of transformation lend some coherence to the story. Thus, all of these cultural frameworks developed new spaces and practices in a consciously “modern” world. Even religious and regional cultures, which often harked back to some lost paradise or glorious past, were responding to the perceived challenges of modernity. At the same time, the overarching cultural universe for Spaniards was growing more connected, increasingly linked by those classic features of a modernizing society, such as transportation, a national press, the public sphere and education. While the result was not a homogenized national or bourgeois culture, these frameworks were accessible to ever more Spaniards, either as aspirations or as targets of attack. Spaniards remained divided by culture as by politics, but they were increasingly aware of the different ways of situating themselves in the modern world. The connections were slower to develop in Spain than in the vanguard countries of northwestern Europe, but even there the transformation was later and less homogenizing than once assumed. In the end, Spain followed its own path to modernity, a gradual and diverse evolution that still belongs inside, rather than on the margins of, a broader European story.

— PART IV —

—  
DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY,  
1923–PRESENT

# THE FIRST DICTATORSHIP: THE PRIMO DE RIVERA REGIME, 1923–1930

## **Introduction: The Primo Regime in Comparative Perspective**

Of all the political turning points during the last years of the Restoration, the military coup of September 1923 was the most decisive in opening a new phase in Spain's twentieth-century political history. Whether the Restoration was a "corpse" or a gasping newborn, the coup definitively ended the era of parliamentary government with an authoritarian solution to the political crisis. Once viewed narrowly as an outcome of Spain's specific "failures," most historians would now situate the dictatorship in the broader interwar crisis that left no European state untouched. In that crisis, which emerged as the elite liberal regimes of the nineteenth century transitioned to the reality of mass politics, there were a number of possible outcomes, including a workers' revolution, democratization and a variety of new right-wing authoritarian options, from fascism to military dictatorship. Of all the options on the table, it was right-wing dictatorship that gained momentum, so that by the Second World War, it dominated the European political landscape.<sup>1</sup> In this context, the dictatorship in Spain constituted one of several authoritarian resolutions to the first post-First World War wave of crisis, including in Italy (1922), Hungary (1920) and Poland (1926). In the case of Spain, this first authoritarian experiment was only temporary, and its demise at the end of the decade opened a new political phase of democratization (the Second Republic, 1931–1936), followed by a civil war (1936–1939) and a second authoritarian regime that lasted until another democratic transition in the late 1970s. Thus, the Primo regime inaugurated a long alternating cycle of dictatorship and democracy that defined Spain's political evolution over the next half-century.

As with the Restoration that preceded it and the Republic that followed, the Primo regime has been the subject of longstanding debates about its role in Spain's political evolution, although to a lesser degree than these other periods. In part, this lack of attention may derive from its short life and sense of failure, but there has been unflagging interest in the Second Republic, which exhibited the same qualities. More likely, lack of interest was rooted in the dominant interpretation of

the regime as a mere “parenthesis,” which emphasized its lack of innovation and thus its negligible contribution to Spain’s political “modernization.”<sup>2</sup> Compared to the Republic, which represented the tragic aborted launch of Spain’s democratic future, the Primo dictatorship was linked more to the past than the future.

Situating the regime in the interwar crisis has opened up less linear perspectives, especially given the panoply of right-wing solutions to the political crisis across Europe.<sup>3</sup> There is still no consensus on where exactly the regime lay on the spectrum of right-wing dictatorships in the 1920s, but there is a broader acceptance that it was more than simply a placeholder. At a minimum, most would now accept that it was a real political turning point, both finishing off the constitutional monarchy and generating renewed support for a democratic republic among the opposition. But many would also argue that the regime represented a more substantial break, an attempt to implement a novel style of authoritarian regime consistent with the “new right” of the age.<sup>4</sup> In contrast to the “old right” of the nineteenth century, which was theocratic, elitist, conservative and monarchist, the “new right” accepted the framework of mass politics that the old right had merely resisted. The rhetoric and practice of these new authoritarian regimes varied tremendously, with some still claiming legitimacy in the traditional religious, elitist and conservative language of the past, and others, particularly the fascists, spouting a revolutionary agenda that rejected the old bases of legitimacy and proposed the construction of a new state and social order as well as a new man. While the differences between these right-wing movements were indeed substantial, one could argue that they all constituted versions of a “modern” right that brought authoritarian solutions to the perceived chaos of mass politics and society.<sup>5</sup>

There have been many efforts to establish clear typologies for these right-wing regimes, but in practice their heterogeneity has resisted clear categorization. In the case of the Primo regime, it incorporated many elements that explicitly looked back to an older conservative tradition as well as some that sought to apply new solutions. Those who emphasize the latter place the regime closer to the fascist side of the spectrum,<sup>6</sup> but there is virtual consensus that it did not qualify as fascist, despite similarities with Mussolini’s regime and Primo de Rivera’s admiration for the Italian dictator. Thus, the Primo regime came to power through military intervention, without a grassroots popular movement. Once in power, Primo did not impose a “totalizing” ideological and institutional structure and articulated no revolutionary claims to overturn the social order. His alliance with the traditional elites, from the military and the Church to landowners and industrialists, never had to compete with a rabble-rousing populist party, as occurred in both Italy and Germany. Indeed, the dictator himself was a product of that elite world, a general from a distinguished military and large landholding family, rather than an upstart from the margins of society like Mussolini or Hitler. Some have argued that successful fascist revolutions only occurred in more highly mobilized settings, where strong left-wing revolutionary movements generated enough fear to provoke the middle and upper classes to support fascist movements. While there was some mobilization in the final years of the Spanish Restoration, it had been largely crushed by traditional military forces well before 1923. Thus, a revival of the

*pronunciamento* tradition of military intervention in politics, dormant since 1876, was still enough to effect regime change.

At the same time, from the very start, the regime broke the old *pronunciamento* protocol. Instead of turning power over to civilian authorities, the king agreed to appoint Primo as prime minister in a military Directorate, Spain's first truly praetorian government. More substantively, Primo explicitly worked to devise new solutions to the "modern" problems of mass politics, including working-class revolution and the lack of social and political integration. Thus, the regime launched various experiments to mobilize the population around an aggressive nationalism, sought to create institutional channels for labor relations, and launched a program of state-directed economic modernization that one classic study called a "revolution from above."<sup>7</sup> The nationalization campaign in schools and the army was a significant contrast to the Restoration state, which launched few such initiatives and preferred a demobilized population. In addition to utilizing existing institutions, the regime created an official political party, the *Unión Patriótica* (UP), that at least nominally claimed 2 million members, and expanded the employer-led paramilitary force in Barcelona, the *Somatén*, into a national civilian militia with 175,000 members. Primo also pursued an informal partnership with the Socialist trade union federation (UGT), offering a formal structure for resolving workplace conflicts in exchange for acceptance of the political status quo, although the relationship never progressed beyond mutual tolerance.<sup>8</sup> Finally, in economic policy, the regime pursued a form of "authoritarian modernization" that has become a common feature of interventionist twentieth-century dictatorships seeking legitimacy in prosperity instead of elections.

The result was a hybrid authoritarian regime that was neither a parenthesis nor the opening act of the next dictatorship, which had its own heterogeneous mix of attributes. Clearly the experiment failed, since Primo was forced to resign for lack of support only a few years after his triumphal coup. In the end, the balance the regime tried to strike between supporting the traditional elites and incorporating the masses did not stabilize and both constituencies turned against it. But failure does not negate the impact or legacy of the regime. On the one hand, the regime energized a democratic opposition that, for the first time since 1874, united behind the goal of a republic. While the king sought to distance himself from the regime at the end, his acceptance of the coup and his support of the dictator (whom he once called "his Mussolini") ruined his already tarnished liberal credibility. On the other hand, the dictatorship and its supporters had begun to define the elements of a modern anti-democratic project that would be further developed in the 1930s. From "national Catholic" ideology to state-led national development, the legitimization of political violence and the symbolic and institutional efforts to incorporate the masses through non-democratic channels, the Primo dictatorship marked a turning point in conservative politics as it had been practiced under the Restoration. As such, the Primo regime was a step forward, not in the positive sense of the modernization theorists who assumed that "forward" led to democracy, but in the less linear understanding of "modern" politics as the effort to deal with the new challenges of mass politics.

## From Coup to “Temporary” Dictatorship, 1923–1925

At the outset of the dictatorship, it seemed as if Miguel Primo de Rivera, the Captain General of Catalonia, only intended to open what he himself termed a “brief parenthesis” in the constitutional regime. During the coup that began on September 13, 1923, he professed loyalty to the king, claimed to be “above” politics, vowed not to change the Constitution and declared that he would be out within three months. Even when three months had passed, much of the activity during the first two years consisted of the minimalist aim of restoring public order and solving the immediate crises, like the Moroccan quagmire, all justified by the supposed impotence of the divided parliament. The king’s acceptance of the coup signaled other military and political leaders to follow his lead. There is still no consensus as to whether energetic resistance on his part could have defeated the coup,<sup>9</sup> but given his increasing frustration with parliamentary government over the previous years, it is hard to imagine him vigorously defending it.<sup>10</sup>

Most of the major political and interest groups outside the Liberal and Conservative party elites, including the Church, business groups, the *Lliga* and the *Mauristas*, either accepted the coup or displayed a marked indifference, reflective of what was a growing culture of contempt for parliamentary practice. Business groups, including Catalanists, hoped the regime would crush labor unrest and restore public order. *Mauristas* and Catholics liked Primo’s moralizing rhetoric about the purification of Spain against the threats of revolution, separatism, and secularism. The Church was particularly enthusiastic, as bishops’ pastoral letters referred to the new regime as the “work of Divine Providence” and the Catholic press urged ordinary Catholics to support it as a “patriotic duty.”<sup>11</sup>

Reinforcing the sense of continuity, the initial goals of the dictatorship were framed in a regenerationist rhetoric that harked back to Joaquín Costa’s call for a temporary “iron surgeon” who could cleanse Spanish politics of the corruption of *caciquismo* and release the voice of the “authentic” citizen. Primo ordered the dissolution of all local government bodies, in an attempt to root out the power of *caciques* and replace them with a new class of political elites, drawn from the largest taxpayers and supervised by military officials. The results of this campaign were mixed, with Conservative party fiefdoms more likely than Liberal ones to survive and establish a modus operandi with the dictatorship, sometimes by joining the UP.

As part of the purification campaign, the UP aimed to transcend old political divisions and unite all Spaniards, but it never aspired to become the only official state party or movement like the Fascists in Italy. Also in contrast to the grassroots Italian fascist party, the UP began and remained a top-down organization, with regime-appointed mayors controlling local party committees. The profile of the new party was diverse, but in general it attracted activist Catholics linked to the agrarian syndicates or the ACNP (the intellectual group that controlled the Catholic paper *El Debate*), as well as the *Mauristas*. As part of the effort to uproot the networks of *caciquismo*, Primo also tried to tighten up bureaucratic efficiency, cutting off patronage hires and having civil servants clock in a full day at work. Sharing many of the goals of Maura’s “reform from above,” Primo tried to accomplish by fiat what Maura had been unable to achieve through parliamentary procedure.

More practically, the Primo regime focused much of its initial energies on the pressing problems of public order, especially in Barcelona, and on the Moroccan rebellion in the aftermath of military defeat at Annual. Through collaborating with the French colonial army in Morocco, Primo was able to achieve the “pacification” of the Moroccan rebels, culminating in their surrender in May 1926 and the drastic reduction of Spanish troops deployed there. To restore public order at home, the government imposed a state of war that included greater powers for provincial governors, the suspension of many constitutional rights, stricter press censorship, and military prosecution of many labor activists, particularly members of the anarcho-sindicalist CNT. Given the pre-existing militarization of public order, this crackdown was less a dramatic change of course than a shift of emphasis toward a harder line. The tiny Communist party was banned in 1923, while CNT leaders were arrested and their main newspaper, *Solidaridad Obrera*, was shut down, disarticulating the unions and sending the movement underground. The regime could then point to its success in reducing political violence, as the number of assassinations and other acts of street violence dropped from 819 in 1923 to 18 in 1924.<sup>12</sup>

Another pending issue that Primo aimed to resolve was the regional question raised by Catalan and Basque proposals for greater autonomy within the Spanish state. Despite the fact that the conservative Catalan *Lliga* welcomed the coup as a path to restoring public order, the dictatorship took a firmly centralist stance, both culturally and administratively. Reflecting Primo’s conservative Spanish nationalism, he viewed regional autonomy as equivalent to separatism. Almost immediately, he prohibited flying the Catalan flag or singing its national anthem, and banned the use of the Catalan language in public business and, later, schools. The regime even sparred with the Church in Catalonia, pressuring the bishops and priests to deliver mass in Spanish/Castilian. Administratively, he reinforced the powers of the state-appointed provincial governing bodies, which came at the expense of the *Mancomunidad*, the special structure established in 1913 as a base for decentralization of powers. In the Basque region, the regime closed most of the Basque cultural centers and shut down the “separatist” newspaper of the main party, the PNV. The “resolution” to the regional question, as with the public order problem, relied largely on traditional methods of repression and demobilization. Beyond the innovation of the military dictatorship itself, the Primo regime at first seemed more interested in stanching the emergence of mass politics than in channeling it.

### **Elements of a New Kind of Dictatorship: The Civil Directory, 1925–1929**

The shift from a “parenthesis” to what was intended to be a permanent authoritarian structure was symbolized by the transition from the Military to the Civil Directory in December 1925. At this point, Primo explicitly abandoned any pretense of a return to parliamentary government and set out to create a new constitutional structure. The regime convoked a national assembly, whose membership would represent, not individual voters, as in a liberal system, but the “corporate”

interests of different groups. Corporatism, a theory of social and political organization based on the affiliation of natural and harmonious communities, was widely adopted in various versions by Catholics, nationalists and fascists. In basic terms, it emerged as a right-wing alternative to the perceived atomization of liberal democratic individualism, on the one hand, and the class-based community of the left. Groups represented in the national assembly came from the local and provincial governments, the UP, the army, the Church, and economic and educational organizations, most of the delegates appointed by the government. The assembly debated the parameters of an anti-liberal and authoritarian constitution with a powerful executive, but internal disagreements, even among initial supporters of Primo, as well as the growing power struggle between the king and Primo, prevented successful institutionalization. The debates, as well as the persecution of many prominent intellectuals like Miguel de Unamuno, also helped reinvigorate opposition to the regime. The combination of declining support among conservative groups and the growing opposition forced the resignation of the dictator in January 1930.

Before that point, however, the Primo regime undertook several projects that pushed the limits of traditional conservatism and put the dictatorship in a hybrid category of “modern” right-wing authoritarian states. The common denominator of these projects was the effort to mobilize the population behind the regime rather than simply demobilize and repress dissidence, and the techniques pursued were social reforms, nationalization campaigns and state-led economic development. While most scholars agree that the implementation of these projects or their efficacy in achieving social integration or the nationalization of the masses was limited, it is important to acknowledge the innovation and ambition behind them, not least because many of their architects went on to develop their ideas more fully in the 1930s and 1940s, first against the Republic and then under a new dictatorship.<sup>13</sup>

### **Labor Relations**

Perhaps the most striking innovative strategy was the effort to win over elements of the working classes, through social reforms and an institutionalized labor relations. Social reforms included workplace regulations, the first systematic construction of affordable housing, the beginning of public health services and the expansion of retirement pensions. The new labor relations system was inspired by both the Italian fascist model and by social Catholic ideas. The common denominator in all these structures was the effort to replace the adversarial framework of class struggle with a cooperative environment in which workers and employers could work together for the greater good. At the core of the National Corporatist Organization established in November 1926 were organizations for each sector of the economy. Governing committees made up of equal numbers of workers and employers would then establish guidelines for regulations, impose sanctions and arbitrate conflicts between workers and employers. By the end of the regime, there were 460 committees, with 250 more in process, with at least formal jurisdiction over one million workers, most of them in urban industrial and service jobs.

One of the major differences with fascist labor relations was that the Primo regime allowed existing workers' organizations to participate in the committees, as long as they agreed to abide by the overall framework. In particular, Primo worked hard to convince the UGT that collaboration would benefit both workers and their unions, which would finally enjoy the state-supported arbitration that the UGT had been promoting for decades. A further attraction for the UGT was the privileged and public role that might finally allow them to win the competition for followers that it had been waging with the, now underground, CNT. With legal status, the UGT rebuilt to its 1921 levels of over 200,000 members, and it contributed 60 percent of the worker delegates on the new labor committees (most of the rest came from Catholic unions). Divisions among Socialists, between pragmatists who wanted to take advantage of this practical opportunity and purists who rejected cooperating with an undemocratic regime, prevented full collaboration, and eventually the Socialists moved en masse into the opposition. Nevertheless, the idea of a right-wing authoritarian government working with left-wing trade unions to develop an institutional structure that could induce both workers and employers to negotiate solutions was a bold strategy for not just repressing violent class conflict but resolving it. While the idea of social reform and arbitration boards were not new, the Primo regime's packaging of authoritarian repression and social inclusion sought to transcend the previous fluctuation between conservatives and repression, on the one hand, and liberals and reform on the other.

### Nationalization Campaigns

The balance between repression and inclusion was also evident in other mobilizing schemes that aimed both to rally the population behind the government and discourage competing messages. The basic mobilizing ideology was a conservative nationalism that rejected regionalist autonomy, embraced the Catholic essence of the Spanish nation and viewed the state as the bearer and enforcer of that "national Catholic" identity. The mingling of Catholicism and nationalism on the Spanish right had been percolating over the previous decades, as Catholics increasingly linked their destiny to that of the nation, but it was during the Primo regime that these ideas coalesced in the writings of young ideologues like the writers José María Pemán and José Pemartín, both of whom would go on to play an important role in framing the anti-democratic crusade of the next dictatorship. During the Primo regime, national Catholicism never rose to the level of a coherent state ideology that pervaded every institution, but it constituted a broadly shared mentality that informed a variety of campaigns aiming to unify the population through a process of "nationalization," or getting all Spaniards to see themselves as members of a common national community. While nationalization had been occurring gradually over the course of decades, the dictatorship embarked on an unprecedented state-led project to bring the nation to every corner of the Spanish state.

One of the most important campaigns centered on both intensifying and purifying the nationalization that occurred in the schools.<sup>14</sup> This campaign required a two-pronged approach that began by attacking the still high rates of illiteracy and the shortage of public schools, and continued by trying to implement a more uniform curriculum delivered by loyal teachers. The literacy and school expansion

campaigns were reasonably successful, although they also probably benefitted from a greater demand for education on the part of a growing urban population of both boys and girls. In any case, by 1930, 8,000 new public schools had been built, enough to matriculate an additional 387,000 students, almost 25 percent more than had been enrolled in 1923. Altogether, by 1930 50 percent of children were enrolled in public schools, with another 25 percent in mostly religious private schools, and an average literacy rate of 73 percent. The regime invested even more resources into secondary and university education, to meet the demand of the expanding middle classes, both male and female. Thus, the number of state secondary schools increased by 50 percent over the decade, including two institutes for women in Madrid and Barcelona, while the number of private Catholic secondary schools increased by almost as much.

In an effort to control and standardize what was taught in those schools, the regime tried to implement a common curriculum and prevent teachers from spreading “anti-patriotic ideas.” To this end, the Callejo Plan of 1926 called for the adoption of single textbooks for each secondary school subject so that, in Primo’s words, “the state should channel the mind of the youth in order to strengthen it and give him an education that in its moral, religious, patriotic and civic characteristics ... possesses homogeneity.”<sup>15</sup> Even before the Plan, the government assigned its military provincial delegates the task of inspecting schools and sanctioning teachers who displayed “irregular behavior,” as well as rewarding those who taught proper doctrine. Dozens of teachers were removed from their posts for political reasons, and inspectors were given the power to shut down schools that were promoting anti-religious or anti-patriotic doctrines, or which were teaching in a language other than Spanish/Castilian. Scholars seem to agree that the efficacy of these campaigns was limited, both because the uniform textbooks never materialized and because the close supervision and punishment of teachers provoked resistance, but they illustrate the nationalizing ambitions of the regime.<sup>16</sup>

These ambitions were also manifested in the efforts to infuse other institutions, such as the UP and the *Somatén* militia, with national Catholic values, and to involve their members in public displays of patriotic fervor. Thus, the dictatorship significantly expanded what had been a limited state repertoire of parades, festivals, rituals and symbols, incorporating party and militia members to fill out rallies and parades. For example, on the fifth anniversary of the coup in September 1928, some 100,000 members of the UP and the *Somatén* participated in the official celebration. It was this new element of visual culture, combining the public mass presence in the streets and the dissemination of nationalist symbols and rituals that made the regime look most like its fascist neighbor, Italy. The impact and dissemination of this visual culture was undoubtedly more limited in the Spanish case. In addition, the “look” was quite distinct, since neither the UP nor the *Somatén* wore the striking uniforms of the Italian black shirts. However, in some towns or villages, the annual flag festival and other patriotic campaigns celebrating the military victories in Morocco in 1925–1926, the *Día de la Raza* and the *Fiesta del Árbol*, might have constituted the first state-sponsored nationalist events the population had experienced.<sup>17</sup>

Primo also sought to improve the process of nationalization in the army with a reform of military recruitment and education for both officers and conscripts. In

terms of conscripts, who were envisioned as uneducated and pre-political peasants, the regime tried to make it harder for them to be excused from service and expanded the reserve units so as to bring more young men into military training (although the partial monetary exemptions for wealthy sons remained in place). Once in the barracks, Primo aimed to achieve a “unity of doctrine” focused on producing the “citizen-soldier” for whom the dictatorship, the army and the nation were indivisible. For officers, the regime established a new General Military Academy (AGM) in 1927, also with the goal of providing a “common military spirit in all corps,” and Primo appointed General Francisco Franco, a member of the so-called “*africanista*” faction of the army, named for its participation in the colonial wars in Morocco, as its first Director. Not only would Franco become the next dictator, but the corps of rebel officers who would join him in rising against the Republic was consolidated during his tenure at the Academy.<sup>18</sup>

### Authoritarian Development

Beyond specific efforts to incorporate the population through nationalization campaigns, the Dictatorship also pursued legitimization and stabilization through economic development. While state-encouraged modernization was not an innovation of the twentieth-century dictatorships, they embraced a package of economic nationalism, state intervention, social harmony and protectionism that distinguished them from the interwar liberal democracies. As such, economic policy was part and parcel of the larger project of an authoritarian state to resolve the conflicts of modern society through nationalist integration. The government tried to establish the same corporatist structure for economic development as it did for labor relations, setting up national monopolies and advisory bodies that would reduce “destructive” competition and benefit the national economy as a whole. The regime formed the National Economic Council in 1924, as the overarching coordinator of the industry-based committees, which became the Ministry of the National Economy in 1928. Relying on deficit spending, the state also embarked on the most ambitious public works projects in Spanish history, focused in particular on building roads, improving the railway network and irrigation infrastructure.

While these projects most likely nurtured Spanish businesses and supported the rapid industrial growth of the 1920s (almost twice the growth rates of the first two decades of the century), they also reinforced the existing economic and social inequalities. Similar to authoritarian modernization projects in general, state-led development was carried out in close collaboration with economic elites, whose interests dominated the advisory boards and industry committees. As a result, plans to reform the bottom-heavy tax structure had to be dropped due to opposition from wealthy industry and agrarian groups, the growth in monopolies led to higher prices, and the lack of independent labor protest kept wages down, all of which undercut the potential of raising purchasing power and living standards for the lower classes. In the agrarian sector, reform projects intended to help renters become landowners and make it harder for them to be evicted were resisted vigorously by the large landowners, as was a tax reform threatening those who tried to hide the extent of their landed wealth with expropriation.<sup>19</sup> Even in terms of the

dramatic economic growth, scholars disagree as to how much credit the Primo regime and its public-sector spending deserves for Spain's participation in the decade's transnational economic boom, buoyed by internal population growth and urban expansion that spurred private industries like construction, electricity and cement-making.<sup>20</sup>

### End of the Dictatorship, 1929–1930

Whatever the ambitions of the regime's mix of repression, economic development, corporatism, social integration and mobilization, it did not succeed in building a stable support base. In some cases, the ambitions never materialized, as in the incomplete corporatist reorganization of the state or the inoperative labor arbitration process. In other cases, like the efforts to mobilize the population in organizations like the UP and the *Somatén*, the combination of top-down control and lack of social and political diversity tended to reproduce rather than transcend existing fractures. In yet others, like the nationalization campaigns, the lack of time and resources limited their reach, while repressive measures generated as much opposition as conformity. In particular, Catalans were alienated by the attacks on their language and culture, increasing sympathies for Catalanism instead of snuffing it out. However much the regime at times gave the appearance of having a mobilized popular base, as when it staged rallies or marches, none of its initiatives came close to consolidating the complex grassroots constituency of the fascist regimes.

Even more important to the dictatorship's survival was the declining support from Primo's conservative allies, including the king, the army, the Church and the economic elites. Thus, the economic elites were unhappy with labor arbitration, tolerance of the UGT and social policies, while the Church felt snubbed by the regime's courting of UGT unions over the Catholic syndicates and anxious about state incursions into education.<sup>21</sup> And Primo's efforts to reform the military, including the new unified training system, encroached on entrenched interests and favored some factions over others. Declining support among these groups led to a weakening of the king's confidence in the year before Primo resigned in January 1930, a month and a half before he died in Paris. The precipitating event for his resignation was the tepid response from army leaders to Primo's request for their vote of confidence. As scholars have long recognized, the endorsement of these conservative elite groups was essential to the success of all the right-wing interwar dictatorships, including in Italy and Germany, where fascist leaders could not have come to power without it.

As his erstwhile allies were losing faith in the dictator, opposition groups began to reorganize and construct alliances.<sup>22</sup> The future prime minister of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, formed a new party called *Acción Republicana* and, in 1926, joined with all the major republican groups to constitute *Alianza Republicana*, which was endorsed by many of the leading intellectuals of the time, including the philosopher Miguel de Unamuno and the novelist Vicente Blasco Ibáñez (both exiled by Primo). The *Alianza* signed on to an attempted military coup in June of 1926, which revealed not only the divisions within the army but the way in which Primo's coup had reopened the door to this kind of militarized political conspiracy. In

1929, university students and professors joined the opposition against the dictatorship, beginning with a strike against the proposed reform of university education which led the regime to shut down many universities around the country. In August of that year, the Socialists also definitively abandoned their tolerance and issued a manifesto condemning the dictatorship and calling for a democratic Republic.

Other movements that played little role in the opposition until after Primo's resignation were the CNT and the regional nationalists in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Until 1930 and the return of some constitutional liberties, the CNT remained both divided and demobilized. The legalist and trade union faction that was disposed to collaborate in favor of a republic had been weakened by the years of repression. In contrast, the pure anarchist groups that favored underground revolutionary conspiracy and the rejection of any "bourgeois" regime, republican or monarchist, were strengthened by this context, and they formed their own parallel organization in July 1927, the FAI (*Federación Anarquista Ibérica*). The FAI was meant to work alongside and within the CNT, keeping the focus on "maximalist" revolutionary goals. In terms of Catalanism, the Dictatorship also inadvertently promoted a leftward shift, exacerbated by the discrediting of the collaborationist *Lliga*. Left-wing Catalanist groups formed just before 1923 benefited from this shift, pursuing conspiracies both inside and outside of Catalonia and Spain. The most important group was *Estat Català* (EC) (1923), led by Francesc Macià, but until 1930, it remained largely aloof from any "Spanish" project, even a republican one. The Basque nationalists, also divided since their split in 1921, barely surfaced as political players until the end of the dictatorship.

### Political Transition to a Republic, 1930–1931

With the resignation of Primo in January 1930, the king appointed a new cabinet led by General Damaso Berenguer, whose job was to prepare the ground for a return to the constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary election. But the opposition only intensified, coalescing around a republican alternative to a monarchy that many believed was too tainted to recover its legitimacy. Prestigious figures from the old *turno* parties publically defected, including ex-minister Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, who founded a conservative republican party with Miguel Maura, son of Antonio Maura. Philosopher José Ortega y Gasset formed his own conservative republican organization, the "Group at the Service of the Republic." In August 1930, all the anti-monarchist forces met and signed the "Pact of San Sebastian" to form a revolutionary committee tasked with mounting a combined military-civilian uprising. The Catalanist EC (but not the Basque PNV) finally joined the opposition, signing onto the pact in exchange for a promised autonomy statute for Catalonia. The uprising took place on December 12, but due to a combination of factors, including a precipitous launch by Captains García Hernández and Galán, it failed.

Even though it was easily suppressed, the Berenguer government's plan for constitutional normalization could not proceed without some support from political parties. The declaration of not only republicans and socialists but also of old

monarchist politicians like the veteran Liberal party leader Romanones, that they would only support an election that produced a constituent Cortes, that is, one empowered to write a new constitution, proved more effective than a coup in preventing a controlled top-down transition. The transitional government finally proposed the holding of local elections on April 12, 1931, to be followed by a general election. Despite the strategy of holding local elections to prevent a plebiscite on the monarchy, all the opposition parties treated them as such and campaigned heavily to get out the vote for the broad republican coalition. This included a new Catalanist party, the ERC (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*), representing a coalition between EC and other republican elements, that was formed in March 1931 to compete in the elections.

Although monarchist candidates won more city council seats overall, the republican coalition won overwhelming majorities in most of the urban districts, including 45 of 52 provincial capitals. After more than a decade of accelerated urbanization, the weight of the urban vote in Spanish politics had suddenly emerged as decisive.<sup>23</sup> With jubilant Republican crowds filling the streets of these urban districts, the Commander of the Civil Guard, General Sanjurjo, warned the government that the Guard could not be counted on to support a policy of resistance. The king also read the election results as a plebiscite on the monarchy and decided that public opinion had turned against him. Most of the government and military leaders seemed to accept that the level of popular mobilization against the monarchy had made the old-style liberal politics, with its reliance on a combination of *cacique* manipulation and repression, unsustainable. On April 14, King Alfonso abdicated and left Spain, opening the way for the declaration of the Second Republic the next day.

## Conclusion

How did a dictatorship that came into power with virtually no opposition collapse only a few years later with virtually no support, dragging down the entire Restoration monarchy with it? Most important for imperiling regime survival was the abandonment of the Dictator and then the monarch by the “forces of order,” especially the military, but also powerful social and economic interest groups from the Church to urban and rural elites. Significantly, they abandoned Primo not because his restoration of “order” had failed, since his “pacification” of colonial rebels, labor protest and “separatist” movements was largely successful. Instead, one might argue that the dissatisfaction of the elite conservative groups reflects the degree to which Primo sought to create, however fitfully, something more than a traditional regime of order, and in so doing at least appeared to be threatening their power and privileges. At the same time, Primo’s efforts to go beyond traditional conservatism did not win him broad popular support either. Thus, the dictator’s experiments with new forms of non-democratic mass mobilization that would integrate the population into a united and harmonious Spanish nation produced limited results. Without adequate time or resources, his nationalization projects were more aspirational than realized, especially when contrasted with those of the fascist regimes in Italy and later Germany. In the end, the hodgepodge

of traditionalist, social Catholic, modern authoritarian and even fascist-inspired rhetoric and practice pleased no one, from the king to the Socialists.

This hybrid quality of the Primo dictatorship has made it difficult to categorize, and indeed there is probably no single label that can sum it up. More fruitful than such a quest might be to place the regime on a broad spectrum of interwar right-wing authoritarian regimes, with mass-mobilizing fascism on one end and demobilizing military dictatorships on the other. Too often the debate has been mired in a false binary between “traditional” vs. “fascist,” ignoring the variety in between. One might even suggest that regimes could move along this spectrum at different moments of their existence, as would occur with the long Francoist dictatorship. In any case, the Primo regime was closer to the “traditionalist” side of the spectrum than was the Franco dictatorship, even while both regimes shared a hybrid mix of characteristics.

The construct of a largely hybrid spectrum also undercuts any simplistic opposition between “modern” and “backward” authoritarian regimes. “Modern” politics in the early twentieth century, defined broadly as the effort to govern within the new reality of mass politics, could be anti-democratic as well as democratic. According to this definition, the Primo regime, like virtually all of the right-wing authoritarian regimes of the era, was modern, not backward. In contrast to the “old” right, which resisted the onset of mass politics, these new authoritarian regimes accepted and responded to this challenge with new techniques and experiments, even when couched in traditionalist rhetoric.

However the regime is defined, what role did it play in Spain’s political development? On the one hand, the hybrid project did not coalesce into a coherent alternative, while on the other hand, it was more than a simple “parenthesis” that left no trace. In the short term, it made it impossible to go back to the old parliamentary monarchy, both by discrediting the monarch and by disrupting the political techniques of the old parties. As a result, any fledgling efforts to link democracy and monarchy during the Restoration had been broken, recovered only decades later with the establishment of a democratic monarchy in 1978. Long tainted with the *Sexenio’s* disintegration, the fusion of democracy and republicanism came to the fore once again. In response to the perceived failure of the dictatorship, a previously fractured and fractious democratic and republican opposition came together with a credible political alternative at the moment when the monarchy was sinking.

While the immediate effect of the dictatorship was to stimulate the democratic opposition and decapitate conservative politics, its more important longer-term impact was to begin a transition from an old-style conservatism to a new style of right-wing politics, which blended traditionalist rhetoric with mass mobilization. In terms of the mobilizing techniques, the ideological framework of National Catholicism, the state-led economic nationalism and the corporatism, in addition to the formation of a generation of future leaders, the Primo regime served as an incubator for the “new right” that would come into its own during the next dictatorship. For both right and left, then, the Primo regime marked a political break, inaugurating a long cycle of dictatorship and democracy that defined Spanish politics until the consolidation of the current democracy in the 1980s seemed to finally break that cycle.

## THE SECOND REPUBLIC: 1931–1936

Nearly a century after the inauguration of the Second Republic in April 1931, it is still, along with the civil war that followed, the most passionately contested period of Spanish history. Venturing into clashing interpretative frameworks is akin to stepping into a minefield. Instead of softening over time, the debates have reignited, unleashing a virtual “memory war” in the broader society. The history of the Republic has always been shaped by the current political situation, with clashing views linked to national narratives of Spain’s trajectory. Thus, under the Franco regime (1939–1975), the dominant conservative narrative viewed the Republic as a period of left-wing chaos mercifully cut short by the military heroes who rescued the “true” Spain. With the democratic transition of the late 1970s, pro-Francoist voices were muted, while pro-Republican narratives blossomed, celebrating the recovery of a repressed past. The public resonance of this recovery was in part limited by the consensus politics of the early transition, in which the major political parties refrained from mobilizing the past against each other. This agreement began to break down in the 1990s, when the ruling Socialist party began to link the opposition Popular party to the Francoist past and to push for public recognition of the crimes of that dictatorship, while conservatives revived a critical account of the Republic.<sup>1</sup>

Each side has incorporated their reading of the Republic into opposing grand “moral narratives” on the history of democracy in Spain.<sup>2</sup> For the left, the Republic is the main source of Spain’s democratic tradition, a noble experiment crushed by reactionaries and fascists, while for conservatives, the Republic’s political culture was marked by intolerance, sectarianism and violence. In practice, there are more nuanced positions along this spectrum, which range from neo-Francoist to liberal, social democratic and Marxist, but the competing moral narratives threaten to flatten these out.<sup>3</sup>

Navigating this minefield is no easy feat, as there is no objective map to reveal the “true” path. Thus, for example, in the debates over whether the Republic was the true origin of Spain’s democratic tradition, each side implicitly invokes a competing understanding of “democracy.” The conservative moral narrative is rooted in a liberal and procedural definition of democracy. A liberal definition equates democratic practice with fair elections, the players following the procedural “rules of the game” and formal representation through suffrage, while it privileges the protection and guarantee of individual rights as the ultimate goal. In contrast, the “left” moral narrative is rooted in a social definition of democracy, which views

democratic practice more in terms of “just” outcomes than procedures, measured against a broader notion of egalitarianism and popular empowerment.<sup>4</sup> From this latter perspective, then, the Republic was a noble effort to create a social democracy that could empower the masses not only politically, but culturally, economically and socially. In the former, the Republic was an anti-liberal democracy that rode roughshod over individual rights, especially those of its Catholic citizens, while its leaders refused to follow the basic pluralist “rules of the game,” such as acknowledging the adversary.

## The Second Republic in Comparative Perspective

Without pretending to resolve the conflict with Solomonic equanimity, it can be persuasively argued that the Republic was both things (and more) at once, i.e., more “this and that” than “this or that.” Thus, it was a contradictory democratic experiment that was both noble and flawed, as well as richly heterogeneous in its practices. Heterogeneity reigned within political movements and at the local level, where the balance of forces created radically distinct contexts for contesting democracy. Moreover, the experimental nature of democracy was not a feature of Spanish “backwardness.” With a few notable exceptions, European democracy was in its infancy in the interwar period, with the Spanish Republic constituting the fourteenth new democracy since 1910. Rather than a well-established system with fixed parameters, it was a work in progress, with competing visions dividing democrats across the continent. Few of the democracies had stable bi-party systems or parties able to command absolute majorities, and this instability was reflected in frequent changes of government, with an average length of less than a year across Europe throughout the interwar period. By the 1930s, democracy was also increasingly on the defensive, so that by the onset of the Second World War, virtually all of the new democracies, including the Spanish one, had been replaced by some sort of authoritarian regime.<sup>5</sup>

With politics in the 1930s increasingly polarizing between an authoritarian right and a revolutionary left, the porous democratic middle leaked support to both sides. In fact, democrats committed to the “rules of the game” were in decline, and many were linked with old-style elitist parties. Most of the “mass” political parties that exploded during the interwar period were only “conditionally” committed to the procedural rules of the game, being more invested in the “substance” of a particular vision of the social order. In this broader European context, it is not surprising that the major political groups in Spain shared this conditional commitment to democratic process. Without effacing the human agency of this situation, we can see the Spanish version as consistent with the fragile democratic culture of the time.

On one side of the conditional democratic political spectrum were the Catholic parties, which were generally anti-liberal, leaned toward authoritarian leadership and prioritized people’s duty to the (Christian) community over their rights as individuals. While the Catholic parties participated in democratic parliaments, their passivity or ambivalence facilitated authoritarian transitions, to fascism in Italy (1922–1924) and Germany (1933–1934), and to Catholic corporatism in Austria

in 1933. There were more nuanced debates between Christian democratic and authoritarian wings of Catholic political thought, but it was not until after the Second World War that Christian democracy, reinforced by Vatican II's (1960s) unequivocal embrace of democracy and religious freedom, consolidated as a fully loyal participant in the democratic "rules of the game."

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Socialist parties constituted the other major "conditional" supporter of democracy.<sup>6</sup> Like political Catholics, Socialists were a heterogeneous group, divided as to their level of commitment to "bourgeois" democracies and on the timetable for transformation to the future socialist society. But even the least conditional of the Socialist parties, like the German SPD, were only invested in a "social" democracy whose reforms would improve workers' lives in the short run while they waited for the socialist revolution. The transition from this conditional "socialist democracy" to a "social democracy" that fully accepted democracy as the "endgame" rather than a transitory phase only consolidated after the Second World War, with notable exceptions in Scandinavia and Britain. One of the conditions for this transition was the grand "welfare state" bargain that was struck in the postwar democracies between labor, the state and employers, guaranteeing certain social rights and benefits in exchange for Socialists' loyalty to the democratic endgame. While elements of this grand bargain were on the table in the interwar period, the economic crisis of the Depression prevented its consolidation. As unemployment skyrocketed and liberal governments cut welfare benefits to balance budgets, Socialists' ambivalence toward democracy grew, as did defections to revolutionary parties like the Communists to their left.

Even the international support for democracy was considerably weaker in the 1930s than after the First World War. American isolationism replaced Woodrow Wilson's aspirational vision of universal democracy, and France and Britain's priorities shifted from pro-democracy to anti-communism, evident in those countries' refusal to help Spain's Republic defend itself against military rebellion in July 1936. Within the few more-established democracies, there was a growing sense that democracy might not be so easily universalized. Such a perspective justified not only "non-intervention" in Spain and "appeasement" toward Nazi Germany, but also resistance to the self-government claims from colonial peoples.

There was a partial shift in this international context in 1936, with the formation of "Popular Front" coalitions whose goal was to unite all the parties on the democratic and revolutionary left, from liberals to communists, against the threat of fascism. Promoted by Stalin and the USSR, it gained traction among non-communists in part because of the purported role of a divided opposition in facilitating the Nazi rise to power. Despite its communist roots, the Popular Front was supposed to defend democracy over workers' revolution, and thus resolve the "conditional" nature of the left's loyalty, at least in the short term. In practice, however, the Popular Front was not able to save democracy in the two contexts in which it came to power, in France and Spain. Probably more decisive for the victory of fascist and authoritarian assaults on democracy was the coalition of conservative and military forces on the right.

In addition to an unsupportive international context for democratic consolidation and the weakness of democratic culture, the Spanish Republic also faced major structural cleavages that made majoritarian politics more difficult. Thus, Spaniards

were deeply divided by class, but also by religious practice, rural and urban cultures, and regional and national identity. These cleavages were not unique to Spain, but they were profound, with little progress made on building bridges between landless laborers and landlords, Catholics and anti-clericals, peasant farmers and urban professionals, and Catalan and Spanish nationalists. Democratization theorists still argue about the level of shared values necessary to sustain a commitment to the “rules of the game.” But at the least, for a political party to accept electoral defeat and loyal opposition, they have to believe that their whole way of life is not at stake. In 1930s Spain, after the initial optimism faded, many members of the major interest groups increasingly felt that too much was at stake to prioritize the procedural rules over the “substance” of their way of life.

Another structural challenge that was partly linked to these cleavages was Spain’s level of economic development. Modernization theorists once posited that a country had to reach a certain level of development, in which a large middle-class, broad education and literacy, and communication technology were prerequisites for a functioning democracy. While few would now accept this level of structural determinism, virtually none of the poorest countries in the world today have functioning democracies, while most developed nations do. At an intermediate level of development, occupied by Spain in the 1930s, it could go either way. Particularly challenging was the uneven development, with regions like the *latifundia*-dominated south, whose low levels of literacy and extremes of wealth and poverty were particularly infertile ground for building democratic consensus around agrarian reform. Indeed, agrarian reform was a key element of democratic stabilization or destabilization in the *latifundia* regions of eastern Europe, in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, the rapid pace of urbanization in Spain in the 1920s clearly favored the democratic transition, since it was the urban vote that most supported regime change in 1931.<sup>8</sup>

There is still no consensus as to which of these factors are the most important in democratic consolidation, from solid institutions and elite political decisions, to the global context, a shared democratic culture, a society without major cleavages or a certain level of economic development. Current scholars focus most on the quality of institutions and political decisions and thus on the agency of both individual and collective actors and the contingency of the outcome. However, most would accept that none of these factors was favorable and that all of them played some role in a dynamic that undermined the viability of the Second Republic. From this perspective, there is no magic explanatory bullet, no single turning point or fatal decision, but instead a complex story of both missed opportunities and impossible conundrums.

### **Periodization: The Shifting Majority Coalitions of the Second Republic**

Across conflicting and shifting interpretations of the Republic, the basic periodization of three phases has remained constant, defined by the major elections and governing coalitions of the First *Bienio*/Biennium (April 1931–November 1933),

the Second *Bienio*/Biennium (November 1933 to February 1936) and the Popular Front (February to July 1936). Lacking any party with an absolute majority, the challenge was to construct a majority coalition that could stabilize the regime, aided, leaders hoped, by an electoral system that heavily favored coalitions.

During the First Biennium, the Republic was led by a left-leaning coalition government with a “social” democratic platform that aimed for a majority coalition of the secular urban middle classes, the urban working classes and the rural poor, especially in the south. At the beginning, this coalition was both broad and heterogeneous, including all republicans: the liberal Catholic *Derecha Liberal Republicana* (DLR) of Alcalá Zamora and Miguel Maura, the secular liberals like Lerroux’s Radical party, and the left, notably Azaña’s *Alianza Republicana* (AR) and the Radical Socialist party (PRRS, a left-wing offshoot of the Radical party), and the Socialists (PSOE). The PSOE was the largest party in the coalition, after ballooning to almost 1 million members (including the UGT) in 1931. After the June 1931 parliamentary elections, this broad coalition had an overwhelming majority of deputies: 115 seats for the PSOE (which had never held more than 7 in the past), 90 for the Radical party, 25 for the DLR, 26 for the AR, 61 for the PRRS and another 60 seats for other left republican parties, including the Catalanist *Esquerra*, which won 35 of the 49 seats in Catalonia. In contrast, a disorganized monarchist right gained only 55 seats. The breadth of Republican support contrasted dramatically with the 20 percent of republican deputies in the First Republic of 1873.

Nevertheless, the broad republican–socialist governing coalition did not consolidate, with the DLR withdrawing in October 1931 and the Radicals in December 1931, and finally the Socialists in September 1933. More informally, the initially agnostic CNT, a sector of which was willing to tolerate the Republic as long as they could legally operate, became increasingly disenchanted and openly hostile. Still, the first biennium constituted a coherent legislative period, with an ambitious reform agenda anchored by secularization, social welfare, and regional autonomy initiatives.

The Second Biennium took shape in reaction and response to the politics of the first phase, experimenting with a different majority coalition that leaned to the right, appealing to Catholics, businessmen and landlords, and the rural peasant communities of the northern part of the Peninsula. In the November 1933 elections, probably the most cleanly but also vigorously contested elections to date, the left republican and Socialist parties were roundly defeated, in part because they had abandoned their electoral coalition, and in part because conservative sectors of the population had a new option, the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA), which was formed in March 1933 under the leadership of José María Gil Robles with 700,000 members. In contrast to 1931, when the right mounted candidates in only 14 percent of districts, this time the CEDA ran a comprehensive campaign in defense of religion, social order, private property and the revision of the Constitution. The CEDA’s official position toward the Republic was “accidentalist,” meaning they would give conditional support as long as their interests could be defended through parliamentary channels.

The election produced a dramatically different balance of forces than in 1931. The CEDA received the most votes and 115 seats, the Radicals held steady (from 94 to 102), while the PSOE dropped from 117 to 59 and AR lost 21 of its 26 seats.<sup>9</sup>

Overall, the “right,” both non-republican like the CEDA and anti-republican monarchist groups, increased the number of seats from 55 to 200, the “left” dropped from 250 to 100, and the center rose slightly to 177 seats. Even though the CEDA was the largest party, the President of the Republic refused to ask a non-republican party to form a government. Instead, he asked the veteran Radical leader Alejandro Lerroux, who formed a minority government supported by an informal alliance with the CEDA. Lerroux claimed to offer a “Republic for all Spaniards,” in contrast to the social and secularist version that had alienated many Catholics and frightened the propertied classes. In practice, the programs of both parties in the alliance were much less developed than that of the first biennium, beyond a general sense of “rectifying” the existing legislation.

The third brief phase of the peacetime Republic was the Popular Front, which reunited the left republican and socialist alliance of the first biennium (with the addition of the Communist party (PCE)), but in the more charged context of growing polarization, workers’ impatience at the slowness of reforms, the Nazi takeover in Germany and the rise of fascist and authoritarian movements everywhere. Campaigning on catastrophic threats of fascist or communist revolution, the two major “left” and “right” coalitions each received almost the same number of votes, although the electoral system gave the winning left coalition 257 seats compared to 139 for the right. Significantly, support for the centrist parties dropped dramatically, from 177 seats in the 1933 legislature to 57 in 1936, illustrating growing polarization as well as a political scandal that decimated the Radical party (5 seats). Belying the “fascist” vs. “communist” rhetoric of the electoral propaganda, the support for the parties bearing these names remained insignificant. In any case, despite another huge majority, the left-leaning coalition was no more successful in stabilizing the Republic than in 1931. The refusal of the Socialists to join a coalition government (in contrast to 1931), and of the “right” parties to accept electoral defeat, and, most definitively, a military conspiracy, brought an end to this last phase of the peacetime Republic, when a military-led coup on July 17 unleashed a civil war.

The question of why neither of the majority coalitions could stabilize the democratic Republic is hotly contested, with debates about which period and which political actors deserve most blame for undermining the democracy. In the left moral narrative, the first biennium agenda constituted the only viable and authentic democratic project of the Republic. In terms of why it failed, all on the left agree that right-wing resistance to a “social” democracy dealt the final death blow, but they disagree as to why the left-leaning majority coalition imploded. Thus, a moderate left position blames radicalizing workers’ movements for irresponsible rhetoric and behavior that destabilized democratic legality, while a further left position defends radicalization in the face of excessive repression and insufficient social reforms. But all on this side would agree that the second “black” biennium had no democratic project, with a government nominally headed by a corrupt and vacuous “center” but in reality controlled by the CEDA, which was at best conditionally democratic and at worst authoritarian or even tending toward fascism.<sup>10</sup>

In the conservative moral narrative, the first biennium coalition was essentially non-democratic, having written an exclusionary Constitution that would inevitably alienate half the population, and then rejecting any legitimate electoral challenge

to this agenda.<sup>11</sup> This narrative argues that the second biennium did represent an alternate “liberal” democratic project, although there is debate as to whether this was a centrist “third way” led by the Radical party or whether the CEDA also could have consolidated as a Christian democratic party.

Equally contested is the Popular Front era, viewed as either the last chance to rescue democracy from a descent into fascism or as an uncontrolled spiral into disorder, social revolution and violence. The neo-Francoist version goes further to justify the military rebellion to prevent impending communist revolution. Whether the Second Republic could have consolidated if certain individual and collective actors had behaved differently will continue to generate heated speculation. Rather than trying to resolve the debates over responsibility, the goal of this chapter is to analyze the competing goals that, for a variety of reasons, could not successfully be contained within a democratic framework.

### **The First Biennium (1931–1933): Pursuing a Center/Left Majority Coalition**

The governing coalition of the first biennium aimed to consolidate a left-leaning democratic majority that could incorporate the progressive middle classes and the working classes to complete what they viewed as the long-delayed “modernization” of Spain. This vision was confirmed in December 1931, when Prime Minister Azaña accepted the Radical party’s withdrawal from the coalition, rather than meet Lerrooux’s condition of dropping the alliance with the PSOE. It was also explicit in the first article of the Constitution, which proclaimed a “democratic Republic of workers of all types, structured around freedom and justice.” With a substantive and social vision of democracy, the left republican leaders believed that the only path forward was to convince the working classes that democracy could bring them the better life they deserved. In so doing, they sought to wean workers away from the revolutionary CNT and to fully democratize the Socialists by enlisting their help in designing and implementing the reform agenda. With a Socialist labor minister, the government passed an ambitious package of reforms that aimed to reduce poverty and economic inequality, protect workers and undertake a redistribution of income through peaceful democratic means. These included a minimum wage, health and retirement benefits for workers, guidelines for collective labor agreements and arbitration boards to handle labor disputes.

The linchpin of this social democratic program was agrarian reform, intended to transform impoverished landless laborers into prosperous farmers. In the short term, the government passed some measures to give these workers more leverage in the labor market, including a law forcing employers to hire local workers first, compulsive cultivation to prevent owners from “locking out” farm workers, and rural arbitration boards. But the crowning legislation was the September 1932 Agrarian Reform Bill, which called for the compensated expropriation of large and uncultivated land holdings and their redistribution to landless laborers. The goal was to settle 60,000–70,000 families a year for 12–15 years, including grants for equipment and training.<sup>12</sup>

Alongside this agenda of economic inclusion of the lower classes was the goal of cultural inclusion, constitutionalized in the universal right to education and culture. Consistent with democratic and republican tradition since the mid-nineteenth century, the left republicans believed that education was the first step in building a responsible citizenry. While literacy had risen gradually since the nineteenth century, it was lowest among the poor, especially in the rural south. One of the Republic's major tasks, the leaders believed, was to expand the public school system until it could serve all children, both the estimated 1 million not enrolled, and the 352,000 who were attending 6,000 Catholic primary schools. The Director of primary education estimated that the Republic would have to build 27,000 schools to reach this goal, of which 10,000 were built between 1931 and 1933.

Beyond mere literacy, the republican cultural project sought the democratization and diffusion of Spain's cultural heritage, introducing the masses to the great works of "high" culture, in theater, music, literature and poetry, as well as the new medium of film. What had been the goal of numerous local republican cultural centers now became the official project of the state. In the republican tradition, not only was the right to culture as important as the right to land, but it had as much if not more power to consolidate a class-divided population into a harmonious democratic nation. A common set of cultural references would, it was hoped, build solid bridges across the cleavages that divided workers and middle classes. Emblematic of this project were the so-called "pedagogical missions," which sent teachers, artists and performers to visit nearly 500 villages, putting on plays, singing and doing poetry readings, in addition to establishing more than 3,000 libraries in village schools.<sup>13</sup> Many of the prominent artists and writers of the so-called "Generation of 1927" were sympathetic with this agenda, and their prolific artistic output consolidated the identification between cultural modernity and the Republic.

Another feature of the first biennium's project of social and cultural integration was the, albeit more ambivalent, incorporation of women. On a basic level, women became full voting citizens, codified in Article 36 of the Constitution. Following the Weimar Constitution, the government also passed a range of reforms that replaced the position of subordination and legal dependence in the 1889 Civil Code with full political, civil and marital equality. In the domestic sphere, women gained shared paternity rights over their children as well as the autonomy to sign contracts or take a job without their husbands' permission. Divorce was also considered to be mainly a "woman's issue," giving them the option to leave an abusive marriage. In the workforce, more professions were opened to women, maternity insurance was obligatory and employers could no longer fire a woman once she married. On a theoretical level, the concept of women's equality had great symbolic significance for republicans as an essential piece of a "modernizing" agenda.

In practice, many of the republican deputies feared granting women immediate suffrage rights and doubted their capacity for responsible citizenship. Including female deputy Victoria Kent, they opposed enfranchisement, based on a common republican fear in Catholic countries (as in France, where women could not vote until after the Second World War) that women would pad the right-wing vote because of their presumed religiosity and subservience to their priests. There was

also little organized popular pressure for women's suffrage, given the small size of Spain's feminist movement. In the end, it only passed with the broad support of the Socialists, some of the right-wing deputies (who agreed with the republican analysis), and a few of the republican leaders like Azaña, who insisted that excluding women would be the height of hypocrisy.<sup>14</sup> Despite the ambivalent path, female equality became part of the "social" democratic package.

The last sector of the potential left-leaning democratic majority were the Catalanist regional nationalists. The 1930 Pact of San Sebastián had guaranteed the Catalanists an autonomy statute in return for their support for a (Spanish) Republic, and the Constitution's first article asserted that an "integrated state" was "compatible with the autonomy of its municipalities and Regions." In the June 1931 elections, the new *Esquerra* party consolidated its position as the voice of left republican Catalanism, winning 68 percent of seats in the region. The regional governing body, the *Generalitat*, was restored immediately, followed by an autonomy statute (September 1932), which established two official languages and gave the Catalan parliament the power to pass laws regarding welfare, public health and civil law, as well as to administer national legislation on public education, labor relations and the judiciary. The statute did not satisfy many Catalanists, who favored a fully federalist structure (vs. an "integrated state") and one official language, but the statute cemented the Catalanist presence in the coalition. In the first regional government elections in November 1932, the *Esquerra* retained its broad cross-class support, and the next month a commission began the task of negotiating the transfer of powers. In contrast, no autonomy negotiations were opened with the conservative and Catholic Basque Nationalists (PNV), who remained outside the first biennium coalition.

More broadly, the first biennium government made little effort to incorporate practicing Catholics into their imagined democratic nation, despite the first Prime Minister Alcalá Zamora's Catholic Republicanism. Most of the left republicans were not explicitly anti-religious, but they were secularist as well as anti-clerical, to varying degrees. In philosophical terms, most republicans viewed the Catholic Church as the emblem of the backwardness, superstition and tradition that prevented Spain's full modernization. The religious policy of the first biennium is incomprehensible without understanding the centrality of this conviction in republican culture since the French Revolution. While private belief and communal worship were never challenged, the goal was to reduce the public power of the Church, especially in education, where it could mold hearts and minds.

Although not without debate and many abstentions, the secularist position easily carried the day in the constitutional discussion of the "religious question," given the small number of conservative deputies. The final text of Article 26 mirrored (but did not go as far as) the earlier French Third Republic legislation, banning religious orders from teaching, removing the Church from its privileged position in the 1876 Constitution, abolishing state financing of the Church, cutting off most of its private income, and dissolving the controversial Jesuit order. Although it included a conciliatory gesture to the Church, leaving the other religious orders intact, pending future legislation, most practicing Catholics, including Alcalá Zamora, who resigned as Prime Minister in response, understandably found it unacceptable. Other secularizing measures included a ban on state officials

attending religious ceremonies, the secularization of Catholic cemeteries, full religious liberty, divorce and civil marriage, the end of mandatory religious education in public schools and, finally, the May 1933 Law of Congregations, which ordered the (unrealistic) closure of all primary religious schools by December 1933.<sup>15</sup>

A final element of the first biennium reform project that was linked more to the broad modernization agenda than to the effort to consolidate a democratic majority was military reorganization. Like the Church, the army was considered to be a bastion of reactionary values. In addition to streamlining and pruning a top-heavy officer corps and changing the promotion system, the government tried to reduce the control of military courts over civilians, abolishing the 1906 law that gave the army the right to prosecute crimes against the honor of the military or the nation.

## What Went Wrong with the First Biennium?

On paper, this ambitious social and secular agenda seems to have had the potential to consolidate a left-leaning democratic coalition, while reducing the power of potential enemies like the Church and the army to derail it. In practice, the agenda energized and mobilized powerful opponents, while failing to keep its coalition together. This challenging combination of polarization and fragmentation will emerge as a common theme across all the efforts to build a stable majority coalition during the Republic.

### Mobilizing against the Coalition

The religious policy generated the most immediate reaction, with some Church leaders accusing the Republic of launching an all-out war against Catholics. The accuracy of this accusation remains a subject of intense debate, but clearly the interaction between all the different players produced a toxic dynamic which drowned out the few mediating voices.<sup>16</sup> Thus, as conservatives rightly point out, some of the secularization measures went further than simply separating Church and state and transgressed basic freedoms of assembly and association. Furthermore, many of the first biennium leaders spoke in demeaning terms of an institution that could only be an obstacle to progress, as when Azaña famously pronounced that “Spain had ceased to be Catholic.” While some Catholics mistook this statement to mean that religion itself was to be outlawed, most would have disagreed even with his narrower meaning, that the Spanish nation-state—or their local community—was no longer identified with Catholicism.

What made Catholics even more mistrustful was the resurgence of the anti-clerical hostility that had simmered on the “left” since the early nineteenth century. In left republican and socialist-controlled municipalities across the country, governments often seemed intent on expelling the Church from community life, restricting public religious processions and the ringing of church bells, changing street names from those of saints to secular heroes, and removing religious statues from public spaces and crucifixes from public schools, in addition to excising the customary religious presence in official celebrations. And when city governments tore down the walls separating civil and religious burial plots, a legal document was required

to approve a Catholic burial.<sup>17</sup> These intrusions into everyday religious practice inflamed many ordinary Catholics, whose path into politics might have started with a protest to restore their crucifixes and public processions. And finally, there was the threat of anti-clerical violence, brought to the surface early on, in May 1931, when dozens of religious buildings were burned down in a number of cities, including Madrid, Málaga, Valencia and Seville.

If anti-clericalism undermined Catholic trust in the Republic, anti-republican attacks from sectors of the Catholic press reinforced a vicious cycle, even though the Church did not take an official stance against the new Republic. In August 1931, the Archbishop of Toledo issued a pastoral letter ranting against laicism, modern liberties and democracies that many republicans interpreted as a declaration of war against the Republic. The language of an epic battle between Christian civilization and modern liberalism constituted a minority voice at first, but grew stronger over the first biennium. Between the grassroots culture of mistrust between Catholics and anti-clericals, and the real ideological gulf between a secularist agenda and Catholic national identity, the space for Catholic republicanism was small to begin with and shrinking fast. By the end of 1931, the “friendly, gradual, correct [and] decent separation of Church and state” that Catholic Republican Alcalá Zamora had hoped for was already unviable.<sup>18</sup> Tellingly, in the 1933 election, support for his political party fell precipitously, with most Catholics flocking to the (non-republican) CEDA.

An important player in this growing rift was *Acción Católica de la Mujer* (ACM), whose female members organized letter campaigns and petitions against the secularizing legislation.<sup>19</sup> Catholic women were specifically impacted by the divorce law, which they viewed as an attack on the family, civil marriage and burial requirements and the threat to close religious schools. Despite the Church’s insistence that Catholic Action groups remain “apolitical,” the ACM mobilized in favor of CEDA candidates in the 1933 elections. While there is no evidence that more Spanish women than men voted for the CEDA, it is true that conservative women were better mobilized than those on the left. This was in part because of the small feminist organizations, but also because conservatives actively courted women, believing them to be a natural constituency.<sup>20</sup> In contrast, the parties of the first biennium coalition remained ambivalent in outreach to women, and many of its members were quick to (erroneously) blame women for their electoral defeat in 1933.<sup>21</sup>

Another sector alienated by the first biennium legislation was the peasant and landowning rural population. It was hardly surprising that large landowners would emerge as early enemies, but more significant numerically were the smaller, mostly Catholic, landowners and renters, who would form the mass base of the CEDA. Even though there was nothing in the Agrarian Reform bill to indicate they were targeted for expropriation, many smaller landowners feared that private property was no longer secure, especially since Article 44 of the Constitution qualified its protection with an open-ended right of expropriation in cases of “social utility.” There was also nothing in the bill aimed at winning over these smaller farmers, such as subsidized loans for equipment, protectionist tariffs or more stable leases for tenants. Even without the fear of expropriation, the reforms that shifted control of the labor market from employers to the unions increased

labor costs for smaller rural employers, already squeezed by the global decline in agricultural prices.<sup>22</sup> While it was no doubt difficult to frame a bill that would address all the different agrarian realities of the country, the smaller farmers were left out of the imagined urban middle class/worker democratic majority of the first biennium.

As with the religious conflict, disputes over economic and labor policy played out in increasing confrontation at the local level, depending on which groups were in charge. In Socialist strongholds, the UGT and city councils could arbitrarily set conditions on work contracts, reducing working days and increasing wages, forcing landowners to continue to pay day laborers even after the harvest was complete, while fully admitting that the goal was to support poor families, not sustain employers' livelihoods.<sup>23</sup> CNT unions used their own direct action methods of coercing landlords, including work stoppages and destruction of crops. Landowners had fewer mechanisms to evade such controls as a result of the decrees preventing them from hiring non-local labor or taking fields out of cultivation, but at times they simply ignored the legislation. Their associations inveighed against the "aggressive Marxism" of absolutist labor control. One local study describes how this growing hostility spilled into everyday violence and a culture of political intolerance that was reflected in city council meetings stacked with boisterous Socialist supporters who intimidated the few conservative members into boycotting the sessions.<sup>24</sup>

While dissatisfaction with the government policies were felt by broad sectors of the population, the only direct attack came from the army in August 1932, when a group of monarchist generals, including the former head of the Civil Guard, José Sanjurjo, launched a weakly organized coup that was easily suppressed because the vast majority of armed forces remained loyal to the Republic.

### A Disintegrating Majority Coalition

More immediately problematic for the first biennium government than the enemies it made was the defection of the working class organizations, officially in terms of the withdrawal of the PSOE from the coalition (September 1933), and unofficially in the combativeness of the CNT and its purist anarchist offshoot, the FAI. While both the PSOE/UGT and the CNT/FAI were heterogeneous collectives, the collaborationist voices in both organizations got weaker over time, first in the CNT/FAI and then in the PSOE/UGT. In schematic terms, one could argue that movement along this spectrum measured organized workers' confidence in the reformist potential of the democratic republic. On the optimistic end was support for the PSOE's participation in the government, while on the pessimistic end was the FAI, which planned its first insurrection in December 1931 aiming to destabilize the Republic, with many positions in between. So why did the politicized working class move away from the hopeful social democratic side of the spectrum?

One of the major sources of disillusionment was the slow implementation of agrarian reform, especially in a context of high rural unemployment. The main bill was plagued with problems from the start. After various drafts and heated discussions, it was finally signed into law a year and a half after the inauguration of the Republic.

Furthermore, its complex legal procedure forced each transaction to settle with the owners in court, reflecting the hope that the reform would be a peaceful rather than coercive process. Instead, landowners' associations mounted public campaigns and funded judicial resistance that slowed the process even further. In one local study of Badajoz, a province in which a third of all farmland was in the hands of 400 owners who relied on the labor of 80,000 landless laborers, landowners' lawsuits virtually paralyzed implementation.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the budget allocated for implementation was inadequate, which exacerbated both the slow pace and the sense that it was not an urgent priority for the government. By the end of the first biennium, only 6,000–7,000 properties had changed hands.

In the meantime, the government had little to offer unemployed workers, partly as a result of economic crisis and partly due to priorities. The world Depression had a less severe impact on Spain, with industrial production falling only 15 percent compared to twice that in Europe as a whole, and unemployment peaking at 13 percent, almost half what it was in Britain and Germany.<sup>26</sup> But unemployment was as high as 25 percent in the *latifundia* south, exacerbated by the closing of the emigration valve due to the world crisis.<sup>27</sup> Further, few unemployed received any unemployment benefits. Like most of the democratic governments in interwar Europe, Spain faced the economic crisis with the orthodox liberal strategy of cutting spending and balancing the budget. This policy split socialist and liberal democrats across Europe in the early 1930s and Spain was no exception. At the local level, Socialist mayors and city councils wanted more public funds for welfare needs, unemployment assistance and public works, pressured by the rank and file who expected immediate relief from socialist-led governments. In local governments controlled by liberal republicans, unions complained that budget allocations for public works, welfare and education were no higher than under the monarchy.<sup>28</sup> And without unemployment benefits or public works to create jobs, landowners and employers retained considerable leverage. From many workers' perspective, the combination of landowners' resistance to what they regarded as moderate reforms and the general paucity of welfare and public works initiatives undermined the initial optimism about the potential of "bourgeois" democracy.

An even bigger wedge between the center and left wings of the coalition was how many workers experienced the regime's policies of law and order.<sup>29</sup> Despite Azaña's efforts to gain civilian control over the army, the Republic continued the previous practices of militarized policing and a repressive version of "public order." Military leaders remained in charge, not only of the Civil Guard, but of other police units as well, including the newly formed Assault Guards, which were supposed to be better equipped for the new context of democratic mass mobilization, but did not receive adequate training in flexible and proportional measures of crowd control. The Republican government also passed a series of decrees giving it powers to suspend liberties in the name of defending public order, most notably the Defense of the Republic Act of October 21, 1931. While Spain was not alone among interwar democracies struggling to define new models of policing, workers must have expected more from a Republican/Socialist government.<sup>30</sup>

Republican leaders were aware of the negative dynamic between the forces of order and the lower classes, especially in the trade unions, but they were not able to alter it. Instead, the obsession with public order intensified in the context of a growing number of strikes and protests on the part of workers impatient to see immediate benefits in wages and jobs. And, as had been the case with policing over the past century, the forces of order had a hard time modulating their response between ordinary protests and threats to the regime. For example, during a CNT telephone workers' strike in Seville in July 1931, four detainees were shot in police custody "while escaping," a practice reminiscent of the assassination culture of postwar Barcelona. In more everyday policing, one local study argues that most workers, especially the unemployed, still viewed the state mainly as a purveyor of repression, including "preventive" detainment without trial, beatings and deportation and oppressive surveillance in their neighborhoods.<sup>31</sup>

The tension over policing and protest exploded in several high-profile incidents, in which apparently limited protests unraveled into what many on the left viewed as excessive police violence. The first incident in Castilblanco in December 1931 began with a peaceful general strike and spiraled into violence and the killing of several Civil Guards. But the event that provoked the most outrage on the left was the so-called "massacre" of 22 men, women and children in January 1933 at Casas Viejas, provoked by an anarchist insurrection in a town of about 2,000 inhabitants. The most controversial police act came after the revolt was crushed, when the Guard summarily shot 14 prisoners, few of whom had actually participated. While the Socialists were no friends of anarchist revolutionaries, the taint of the repressive "Republic of Casas Viejas" undermined their commitment to the "bourgeois" republic and played a part in the PSOE's decision to abandon the coalition later that year.

The final and perhaps most complex thread of the unraveling first biennium coalition was the escalating conflict between the PSOE/UGT and the CNT. The Socialists had greatly increased their numbers and influence since their minority status in the post-First World War working-class movement. In 1931, the Socialists had almost twice the members as the CNT's half a million. However, the CNT bounced back after the Dictatorship, reconquering many of its regional and local strongholds, and retaining its complex mix of agricultural and industrial workers. Half of the CNT's members were in Catalonia, with another quarter from Andalucía, much of which remained CNT territory, despite the growth of rural Socialist unions.<sup>32</sup> In this context of intensified competition, the struggle between the organizations was as much a turf war as a battle of principles.

In terms of principles, the CNT's labor tactics of direct action and occupation of the streets clashed with the UGT's advocacy of a state-regulated arbitration and regulation system. Consistent with the CNT's anti-political stance, it rejected the arbitration boards, which the UGT viewed as a senseless rejection of workers' best interests. And the CNT's refusal to participate did make the labor arbitration structure more likely to fail. But the fact that the UGT was both a union and part of the government meant that the legislation was indeed partisan. At a fundamental level, the entire scaffolding of labor legislation was in part calculated to finally achieve the victory of the UGT over the CNT. The CNT fought back by calling strikes and

labor stoppages simply in order to break the arbitration boards. The UGT blamed the rival federation for destabilizing the Republic, but, for the CNT, it was a Republic that seemed heavily stacked against them, especially given the government's propensity to interpret their "direct action" labor tactics as inherently criminal.

Beneath the principled disagreement, then, was a battle for survival on the part of each union federation. Thus, in places where Socialists controlled the local government and union structure, they used their control over labor exchanges to make sure employers hired from their own union, while the CNT tried to do the same in its strongholds. With the CNT more likely to strike than their Socialist counterparts, the latter sometimes even helped break those strikes by crossing the picket lines, as occurred in Gijón in December 1932.<sup>33</sup>

The inter-union dynamic only strengthened the more intransigent voices in both movements. Perhaps if employers had quickly jumped on board and accepted agrarian reform, higher wages and arbitration boards, the outcome would have been different. Instead, the meager achievements of the reform agenda further weakened the collaborationist wing of the Socialist party. In the CNT, the anarchists of the FAI who argued that the Republic offered them nothing worth defending were gaining ground. Indeed, they engineered a series of revolutionary insurrections against the Republic between 1931 and 1933. Though none achieved widespread support and all were easily crushed, they still generated a dynamic of repression that then fueled the next rebellion. Without a real endgame, these "revolutionary gymnastics," in the words of FAI leader Joan García Oliver, were meant to destabilize the Republic and undoubtedly did so. At the same time, they also alienated some CNT members and membership declined.<sup>34</sup>

In sum, a number of mutually reinforcing factors undermined the ability of the first biennium coalition to consolidate the new democracy. On the structural level, the coalition had to navigate serious cleavages in Spanish society, making debatable decisions about which groups to include and which to exclude or at least ignore. Because some of those decisions angered and marginalized practicing Catholics and the rural middle classes, the coalition created a large dissatisfied sector of the population. At the same time, the coalition couldn't keep its own urban middle-class/working-class majority together, hampered by an economic crisis that limited funds for the deep social reforms desired by the "left" part of the coalition.

Whether there were other viable paths through this complex landscape will continue to be debated. Deep social, economic or cultural cleavages do not automatically prevent democratic consolidation, but political groups have to be willing to defend their often hugely disparate competing interests within the "rules of the game." Not surprisingly, a procedural democratic culture was weak in Spain, especially among the new parties taking on governing responsibilities for the first time. During the first biennium, many Socialists in particular, especially at the local level, demonstrated that they were more committed to a set of "social" outcomes than to respecting the rights of their opponents. While Socialists were the most "conditional" democrats during the first biennium, this position was consistent with a broader context of working-class movements whose commitment to "bourgeois" democracy was weakening in the face of economic crisis, reduced state spending and receding hopes of a grand social democratic bargain.

## The Second Biennium, 1933–1935: Pursuing a Center/Right Majority Coalition

With the collapse of the left-leaning coalition, the challenge of the new Radical-led government was to construct an alternative democratic majority, but the second biennium was even less successful in consolidating such a coalition. Compared to the Azaña government (October 1931–September 1933), the second biennium was marked by instability and had no grand alternative vision of the Republic. It had 12 governments led by 5 prime ministers and a much less productive legislative record than the first biennium. Nevertheless, the often neglected second biennium was an essential turning point in the Republican story that has to be taken seriously on its own terms.<sup>35</sup>

A potential alternative majority would have been a “centrist” all-republican coalition, which was discussed in the months before the November 1933 election.<sup>36</sup> The failure of this coalition to materialize, more as a result of rival personalities and lack of trust than of deep doctrinal differences, sent all the republican parties alone into the election and disadvantaged by the electoral law. After the electoral results, the second option was for the Radicals to form a majority alliance with the largest party in the new Cortes, the heterogeneous but “accidental-ist” CEDA. Although the Radical leadership resisted a formal coalition, they accepted collaboration with the CEDA, both because it gave them the parliamentary majority and because Lerroux hoped to “republicanize” the CEDA as well as the Catholic masses.<sup>37</sup>

The Radicals shared some goals with the CEDA but the distinctions were profound. Both agreed on the need to rein in reforms, on an amnesty for the 1932 coup planners and on restoring “law and order” for landowners and employers, especially against what many considered to be abusive Socialist power in the countryside. At the same time, the Radicals were “unconditional” republicans and liberal democrats, who had voted for the Constitution of 1931 as well as for most of the reforms of the first biennium. The CEDA, on the other hand, was non-democratic and anti-liberal, although it contained a range of opinion from Christian democratic to authoritarian corporatist. In policy terms, it promised to abolish labor and agrarian reforms and to revise the Constitution, especially regarding religion, all within a discourse of “conditional” support for the regime. The result was an unstable alliance, not a formal coalition government. To further destabilize the second biennium government, the most left-wing elements within the Radical party, under the leadership of Diego Martínez Barrio, broke off to form a new party after a showdown in the spring of 1934 over the amnesty bill (and merged with the Radical Socialist party to form the *Unión Republicana* (UR) in September 1934). After another showdown in October 1934, the CEDA demanded and received three ministerial posts, and by the spring of 1935, it had become the majority voice in an increasingly right-wing government. The second biennium ended when a political scandal forced the resignation of the Radical party prime minister and President Alcalá Zamora called new elections for February 1936.

As a result of these shifting dynamics, the second biennium can be further divided into a “center/right” period from November 1933 to October 1934, and another more “right”-wing period until the Popular Front elections.<sup>38</sup> During

the first period, despite some “rectifications” in social policy, most of the reform legislation was generally respected by the Radical government. In fact, the pace of settlement on expropriated land during the first 9 months of 1934 was faster than during the first biennium (700 vs. 275 families a month). One of the few pieces of labor legislation that was abolished was the law preventing employers from hiring non-locals over locals, although wage levels were also allowed to fall back to a market level.

There were also some Radical initiatives, including a health law that started the process of creating a national health system. And in terms of religious policy, the Radicals tried to steer a pragmatic course, indefinitely delaying the closure of Catholic schools, while constructing more public ones and hiring new teachers. This latter process was even supported with proportionally more state expenditure on education than during the first biennium. The government also stopped enforcing the ban on public religious ceremonies and let Catholics restore the crucifixes in public schools. Another pragmatic stance was the (unsuccessful) effort to find a middle ground between the Catalan *Generalitat* and the Court of Constitutional Guarantees over the devolution of powers to the autonomous government.

While the Radicals made some compromises with their right-wing allies, on other occasions they resisted demands to reverse previous legislation. The compromises most criticized by the “left” were the law extending transitional state salaries for poor parish priests and the amnesty for the conspirators of the coup. What has received less attention is the significant continuity with the first biennium. It was perhaps this quiet continuity that has made the Radicals seem almost invisible in contrast to the ambitions of the CEDA or the first biennium coalition. But while the Radical governments lacked a grand vision and coherent strategy for their liberal democratic Republic, the often-stated commitment to uphold the Constitution was a coherent principle in and of itself. In a sea of parties and movements more invested in specific outcomes than in the “rules of the game,” the Radical party consistently defended formal democratic process. Whether this commitment was enough to stabilize the Republic, given the disagreements over “substance,” is still up for debate.

The shift to the right began with the appointment of three CEDA ministers in October 1934, which was the spark for a Socialist general strike and uprising. Aside from scattered strikes, the uprising only succeeded in the mining province of Asturias, where the UGT and CNT rebels conquered towns and cities, holding off troops in some places for more than two weeks, and briefly in Catalonia, where the *Generalitat* President Luís Companys declared a “Catalan state” in a “Spanish federal republic.”<sup>39</sup> The rebellion, which resulted in the deaths of more than 300 members of the armed forces and 40 religious personnel, strengthened the hand of the CEDA, which advocated for a harsh repression of the “left” that would crush the danger of revolutionary and anti-clerical disorder. After October 1934, Gil Robles pursued a strategy that would undermine the CEDA’s Radical allies and pave the way for a CEDA-led government—none of which, it should be pointed out, was procedurally anti-democratic for the largest party in the Cortes. Their short-term policy aims encompassed the disarticulation of the “left,” including the Catalan nationalists, and a frontal attack on the legislative reforms of the first biennium. In the longer term, they had grand but vague plans for a “complete revision” of the Constitution.

The repression of the left was harshest in Asturias, followed by Catalonia, but included the arrest of thousands of Socialists and Cenetistas around the country, as well as the closure of union centers and newspapers. In addition, some 2,000 elected Socialist or left-republican-dominated city councils, whose members were accused of supporting the insurrection, were replaced with Radical- or CEDA-appointed councils. In Asturias, hundreds were either killed in summary military executions or tortured and beaten in prison. In Catalonia, 3,000 were arrested, including Companys, who was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment for rebellion. In addition, the Catalan autonomy statute was indefinitely suspended, with the central government reclaiming all delegated powers, and a military governor was appointed to oversee the province. Disagreement between the CEDA and the Radicals limited the extent of repression, with all but two of the formal death sentences commuted in the end, as the Radicals advocated.

After May 1935, the CEDA agenda came to the fore, although Radical party resistance in some areas still maintained a check on the rightward tilt.<sup>40</sup> The main target was agrarian reform, symbolized by the passage of a July 1935 bill that annulled the earlier one. The new bill, written by large landowners in the Cortes, abolished the general principle of confiscation and drastically reduced the budget for implementation, although the Radicals did manage to retain a clause allowing expropriation in cases of "social utility" (a loophole used by the future Popular Front government). However, the new bill signaled the intention to restore the pre-existing rural balance of power. When the Christian democratic Agricultural Minister of the CEDA, Manuel Giménez Fernández, had tried to pass a moderate agrarian reform bill in April 1935 that gave long-term tenants the right to take possession of their land, he was ousted under pressure from the conservative land-owning sector of the party.

The full extent of the counter-reform and constitutional revision that would have resulted from a CEDA-led government was never allowed to develop, as a result of Alcalá Zamora's decision in December 1935 to dissolve the Cortes and hold new elections. The President decided he could not appoint Gil Robles as Prime Minister because the latter had not declared unconditional loyalty to the Republic. The Radical government fell apart in the fall of 1935, in the wake of corruption scandals about influence-peddling and clientelistic practices that discredited the party leadership. Whether or not the so-called "Straperlo Affair" was more serious than similar practices found in other parties, it allowed the Radicals' enemies to destroy them. The election in February 1936 ended the troubled second biennium and opened the last, even more troubled, period of the peacetime Republic.

## What Went Wrong with the Second Biennium?

As with the first biennium, the second biennium governments alienated and mobilized powerful opponents while not consolidating a center/right majority coalition. Whether this coalition was ever a viable alternative for stabilizing the Republic is still hotly debated. For critics, the so-called "black biennium" undermined the Republic rather than offering any real democratic alternative.<sup>41</sup> All would agree that

the Radical/CEDA alliance did not coalesce into a stabilizing democratic coalition, although they would disagree as to why—and as to who holds more of the blame. Clearly the “conditional” support of large movements on the left and right of the political spectrum, particularly the PSOE and the CEDA, did not help, while whatever “centrist” option represented by the Radicals collapsed along with the party. As the second biennium shifted to the right, the first biennium coalition reunited. By the 1936 elections, the catastrophic rhetoric generated by a “left” and “right” electoral coalition framed a showdown between two incompatible versions of Spain’s future. In this climate, the likelihood of either side accepting electoral defeat and loyal opposition status was tenuous at best.

### **Mobilizing against the Coalition**

During the second biennium, the Socialists most clearly demonstrated their “conditional” loyalty when they rejected the appointment of CEDA ministers on October 4, 1934, and launched an insurrection. The plan was to induce sympathetic elements of the armed forces to join in ousting the “rightist” government. From a procedural perspective, the October Revolution was clearly undemocratic, a rejection of the largest elected party’s right to govern. Critics rely on this undisputed fact to accuse the Socialists of launching the Republic on a death spiral. And yet, in the context of the corporatist Catholic coup in Austria and the semi-legal fascist takeover of power in Germany in 1933, not to mention Gil Robles’ ambiguous statements, it was not unreasonable to fear the CEDA’s authoritarian intentions. That the October insurrection was not the best strategy to defend the Republic, as the PSOE claimed to be doing, is another issue. By any measure, it was a disaster, both for the Socialists, for the labor movement in general, and for the Republic, which shifted even farther to the right under a harsh repression.

The October revolution only makes more sense as a contradictory expression of the deep and growing divisions within the Socialist movement. Not unlike the Italian Socialist party in the years before the fascist takeover, the Spanish Socialists were caught between a radicalizing rhetoric meant to keep its impatient base from defecting, and a more pragmatic practice that recognized they were in no position to stage a revolution. When the Socialists lost half their seats and their place in the government in November 1933, the pragmatic sector was weakened, but the movement remained internally divided. The confused result was a violent insurrection against the government with contradictory aims. Leaders ordered the revolt in defense of their version of a “social” Republic, while some of the participants viewed it as the opening act of the socialist revolution, a confusion party leaders never clarified.<sup>42</sup>

Beyond these formal divisions was the quandary of facing a government that threatened to eviscerate everything that made the Republic a democracy worth defending for the Socialists. While the Socialists have been reasonably criticized for placing a higher value on the social content than on the Republic itself, this commitment to “substance” over “procedure” was a common feature of interwar socialism. For the Spanish Socialists, the social legislation was most important, but the other mobilizing factor was opposition to the “clerical” agenda of the CEDA. In the parts of Asturias where the rebels took control, the most lethal anti-clerical

violence since the 1830s left 34 priests and other religious personnel dead and 58 churches destroyed. While most national leaders did not endorse the violence, the anti-clerical sentiments that viewed the Church as an impediment to “progress” were widely shared.

While Socialist radicalization was a key factor in the destabilization of the second biennium, the CNT played a smaller role than it had in the first. Its radicalization had begun in 1931, including the expulsion of the more moderate syndicalists, but peaked with its third major insurrection in December 1933, after an abstention campaign in the November elections, during which they promised to revolt if the “right” won the election. The insurrection was centered in Aragón, but broke out in scattered towns and villages in CNT territory around the country, with a death toll of 75 rebels and 15 Civil and Assault Guards, in addition to another 160 wounded. While it was the most serious of the CNT insurrections, it too was easily repressed, leaving a disarticulated and broken organization that no longer posed an immediate threat to the Republic. When the Socialists organized their insurrection ten months later, most of the CNT, with the exception of the Asturian branch, remained aloof. After October 1934, then, the insurrectionary threat from both wings of the labor movement had been decisively defeated, while both organizations had generally accepted the futility of continuing down the revolutionary path.<sup>43</sup>

As a result, after October 1934, the collaborationist voices among the CNT and the PSOE/UGT regained strength, and both organizations charted a new path: of cooperation between them in the new guise of the “Popular Front.” Instead of a point of no return on the road to civil war, there is evidence that at least the leadership of the worker organizations changed course after October 1934. Thus, the CNT welcomed back the expelled moderates and voted to pursue collaboration with the UGT, while the PSOE agreed to rebuild an electoral coalition with the “bourgeois” republican parties. In a European context of the move toward a “Popular Front” defense against fascism, Spain was at the forefront of this trend. At the same time, it seems likely that, if the Popular Front had lost the February 1936 elections, its members would not have peacefully accepted the outcome.

The labor movement was not alone in displaying a weak commitment to democratic process during the second biennium. As critics have pointed out, the left republican parties and leaders moved toward more “conditional” stances, also refusing to accept a CEDA-led government.<sup>44</sup> From a proceduralist perspective, the actions of President Alcalá Zamora in doing everything he could to prevent the CEDA from governing, including the dissolution of the legislature in December 1935 and the calling of new elections, were indefensible. While republicans claimed to defend the Republic, it can be argued that they, like the Socialists, were defending the “substance” of the first biennium Republic, not the scaffolding of the regime itself. The left moral narrative defends all of these actions as legitimate defenses against a political organization whose stated goal was to gut the Republic of everything that made it worth defending. Both claims make sense within their own set of assumptions about procedural vs. substantive democracy, but either way, they demonstrate the lack of “trust” essential to a democratic political culture.

The “substantive” understanding of democracy also applied to the Catalanist *Esquerra* party, whose loyalty to the Republic had been secured by the promise of autonomy and decentralization.<sup>45</sup> The second biennium government threatened the terms of that *quid pro quo* by slowing the transfer of powers to the *Generalitat* and projecting a more aggressively Spanish nationalist rhetoric of a “unitary” state. The specific conflict unfolded around the *Generalitat*’s agrarian reform law (March 1934), which allowed tenants in Catalonia to buy land they had worked for at least 15 years. When challenged by landowners, the Spanish Court ruled that the law exceeded the authority of the autonomous government, which refused to back down. Whether there was a missed opportunity for a compromise deal, the radical nationalist base of the *Esquerra* pushed for an uncompromising stance. This conflict formed the backdrop to the *Esquerra* leader Companys’ participation in the October 1934 rebellion, which he claimed was in defense against the “monarchist” and “fascist” forces in Madrid. The rebellion was snuffed out within a day, since the army garrison in Barcelona disobeyed Companys, but it remained a powerful symbolic act of “conditional” commitment. For the Catalan nationalists, as for the other forces from the first biennium coalition, a Republic shorn of its autonomist structure was not a democracy worth defending.

On the right side of the political spectrum, but outside the range of a potential center/right democratic majority were the explicitly anti-republican parties, divided among “Alphonsine” monarchists (*Renovación Española*), the small fascist party (*Falange Española y de las Jons*), formed in late 1933, and the Carlists, whose support had been growing again since 1931. All of these groups defended an authoritarian alternative, and their electoral participation was explicitly aimed at taking power in order to dismantle the regime. The RE leader, José Calvo Sotelo, tried unsuccessfully to unite the anti-republican right under an umbrella group, the “National Front” (*Bloque Nacional*), which competed in the February 1936 elections, but support for all these formations was minimal during the second biennium. Scholars continue to debate the degree of “fascistization” of the Spanish right during the Republic, with regard to the adoption of fascist rhetoric and mobilizing techniques which seeped across the boundaries between the “accidentalists” and anti-republican right. But as long as the CEDA was in the government, the broad appeal of the so-called “catastrophic” right was clearly limited. It was only after the CEDA’s defeat in February 1936 that the anti-republican forces gained momentum, as many “accidentalists” lost faith in the possibility of defending their “substantive” interests through electoral channels.

### **An Unconsolidated Majority Coalition**

Beyond the behavior of the opposition, the potential for consolidating a center/right majority in the second biennium lay with the CEDA and its practicing Catholic constituency. The CEDA has been alternately portrayed as fascistized, Christian democratic, or an unstable hybrid mix. As with many of the political formations of the Republic, it is precisely the heterogeneity and diversity that keeps such debates alive, since example or quotes can be cherry-picked to illustrate various positions. Thus, the CEDA’s “big tent” included the Christian Democratic minister, Giménez Fernández, and the youth organization (JAP) which

staged mass rallies calling for “all power to the leader.” Adding to the difficulty in pinpointing the CEDA’s position was a lack of specific goals beyond the rejection of the first biennium’s agenda.

The evidence for the most optimistic version of the CEDA includes a low propensity toward political violence, a focus on passing legislation, not overthrowing the Republic, and its openness to defending its interests through electoral politics. As Gil Robles said on one occasion, the CEDA had to “act within legality,” adding that “there is no other road than that of elections.”<sup>46</sup> Evidence for the less optimistic categorization can be found in the tone of Gil Robles’ free-wheeling rhetoric, the visual culture of mass rallies that aped elements of fascist aesthetics, and the openly anti-democratic ideology that brought into question the sincerity of their engagement with the democratic system.<sup>47</sup> As Gil Robles famously pronounced during a campaign rally, “democracy for us is not a goal, but a means to move toward the conquest of a new state.”<sup>48</sup> The combination of internal heterogeneity, ambiguous rhetoric and an undefined program make it hard to predict what the CEDA’s course of action would have been if given the reins of government. Would it have pursued a constitutional reform that, over time, made Catholics feel at home in a democracy, or one that moved quickly toward an authoritarian corporatist regime? What we do know is that this combination of qualities, in the context of the rise of authoritarianism across Europe, made the CEDA an, at best, unpredictable and, at worst, unpromising, instrument of democratic consolidation.

The other player in a potential center/right democratic majority was the Radical party. In the competing left and right moral narratives, the Radicals have been either ignored or dismissed.<sup>49</sup> There is no question that the Radical party had significant flaws, including Lerroux’s personalistic leadership style, a clientelistic practice that was focused as much on procuring local jobs as on governing, and the lack of a coherent program, reflecting its heterogeneous constituency. At the same time, however, the general concept of a “middle-class” liberal democratic Republic earned the Radicals significant and steady support through the first two elections. And even without a clear program, they pursued the critical goal of consolidating Republican institutions. However, whether the ambition to republicanize the CEDA was mere wishful thinking or a reasonable strategy before the October 1934 revolution, after this point it steadily unraveled, as the government was pulled ever more to the right and the left was excluded as fully as the right had been in the first biennium. Even before the scandal that exploded in the fall of 1935, the Radical party had lost the ability to chart the course of the government. In this context, it is debatable as to whether, even without the scandal, the Radicals could have rescued a centrist “third” option between the exclusionary “left” and “right” coalitions in 1936.

In sum, the consolidation of a center/right democratic majority during the second biennium faced obstacles that were as serious, if not more so, than those of the first biennium coalition. Both potential coalitions marginalized important sectors of the population while not holding together their own heterogeneous elements, demonstrating the combined force of fragmentation and polarization. During the second biennium, the outline of a program that could have consolidated a democratic center/right coalition was even more inchoate, since the Radicals and the CEDA did not share a “minimalist” democratic program like that which united the

first biennium coalition. At the same time, it was clear that none of the other political forces, from the left republicans and Socialists to the “catastrophic” right, were willing to give a center/right coalition the space to take shape. Whether they were justified or not in their fears about the CEDA’s intentions, it was the lack of commitment by Socialists (in October 1934) and republicans (Alcalá Zamora’s dissolution of the Cortes) to the democratic “rules of the game” that finally foreclosed this option. With this unstable alignment of forces, unfolding against the backdrop of political radicalization across the continent, the space for democratic consolidation was rapidly shrinking.

### The Popular Front, February–July 1936

On the surface, February 1936 appeared to turn the clock back to 1931 with an explicit aim to reconstruct and consolidate the first biennium majority coalition. Thus, the new government planned to reactivate the Catalan autonomy process and pass a similar statute for the Basque Country and Galicia, accelerate the construction of public schools, reinvigorate labor legislation and both restart and speed up the process of land redistribution. However, beneath the surface almost everything had changed, from the international context to the level of political mobilization across the spectrum. The electoral coalition was narrower than in 1931, without the Radical party, but included all the left republicans (consolidated into the *Unión Republicana* (UR) and the *Izquierda Republicana* (IR)) and the PSOE, with the addition of the small *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE). The new framework of a “Popular Front” electoral coalition also gave it a distinct tone, less optimistic and more about defending against “fascism,” in addition to securing amnesty for the October 1934 political prisoners. Furthermore, the new governing coalition was even narrower, a minority left republican government (25 percent of the deputies) without the Socialist party. Although the Socialists joined the electoral coalition as a defensive measure, the radical majority led by Largo Caballero rejected Azaña’s plan to form a coalition government with him as President and the moderate Socialist Indalecio Prieto as Prime Minister.

Despite the minority government and the charged political context, there were some hopeful signs that the left-leaning progressive middle class/worker majority coalition could be reconstructed. One of the first acts of the government was an amnesty that affected up to 15,000 prisoners, including Companys and his cabinet members. In addition, the city governments that had been purged of leftists after October 1934 were now purged of rightists, and many workers fired for political reasons were rehired. And finally, the government authorized a streamlined process of expropriation to convert landless laborers into farmers. Outside the government, the majority voices within the CNT and UGT seemed more disposed to cooperate with a reformist government, if not join it. However, these hopeful signs were balanced with a number of destabilizing factors, including the massive defection from the “accidental” to the “catastrophic” right, the left-wing grassroots strikes, political violence and land occupations that some interpreted as out of control, and a general rise in aggressive rhetoric on both sides of the spectrum.

### What Went Wrong with the Popular Front?

As with the previous periods, there is no consensus as to why the reconstituted left-leaning majority could not consolidate. The “left” moral narrative places primary responsibility on the catastrophic right, especially the military, while the “right” moral narrative blames the left-wing “chaos” that was spinning out of control, with various positions between the two extremes.<sup>50</sup> Looking at the evidence, grassroots confrontation, strikes and violence in left-wing strongholds around the country was probably at a peak during the spring of 1936. And, while most of this activity was not aimed at overthrowing the regime, there was significant coercion and intimidation of opponents. Political violence left a death toll of 260–500 during the first 6 months of 1936, in addition to hundreds of attacks on religious buildings.<sup>51</sup> In terms of labor actions, even when not revolutionary in a strict sense, the “rights” of employers or landowners could be dismissed in forced requisitions, expropriation or mandatory work contracts. While this sort of calculus was not new in 1936, it had been reinforced by disillusionment over the slow pace of “procedural” reforms and the intensity of conservative resistance.

Local studies provide various examples of such actions in left-wing strongholds, including occupation of land, destruction of opposition votes, the seizing of town halls, forcible closures of Catholic schools and the political purging of non-Popular Front civil servants.<sup>52</sup> The largest illegal action was the occupation of over 2,000 estates in the province of Badajoz, organized by the Socialist rural workers’ union, the *Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra (FNTT)*, with the support of some 60,000 landless laborers, although there were other smaller examples of illegal occupation. In many cases, the central government either did not intervene forcefully or retroactively legalized it, so that by July 1936, some 110,000 families had been resettled in less than five months. The government hoped that legalization would both gain control over the process and earn the loyalty of the workers, a not unreasonable strategy, according to one local study of the Badajoz case.<sup>53</sup> But critics, then and now, argued that the government was either complicit or helpless in the face of brazen left-wing disdain toward both procedural democracy and individual property rights.

At the same time, the enemies of the Popular Front had a low tolerance for any sign of mobilized workers as a threat to their law-and-order version of an acceptable Republic. And for some, the specter of finally implementing serious agrarian reform was probably as unthinkable as revolution. In terms of the “catastrophic” right’s effort to justify a rebellion against the Republic on the basis of this disorder, in fact the conspiracy began as soon as the election results were in. Just as the Socialists had rebelled in October 1934 because the second biennium government did not represent a Republic worth defending, for many conservatives, the Popular Front Republic was unacceptable under any conditions. The ranks of the Falange and the Carlists swelled with those who now viewed a frontal assault on the Republic as the best course of action. In any case, if the military in particular had really been committed to democratic “legality,” it would have focused on restoring order, not overthrowing the regime.

Instead, of course, military officers began planning their revolt, with the first formal meeting on March 8, and active recruitment of garrisons and divisions across the country thereafter, with the message that the Republic was going down

in the flames of left-wing chaos, separatism and anti-religious hatred. The assassination of monarchist politician Calvo Sotelo by Republican police officers on July 13, in revenge for the partisan killing of one of their own, consolidated support among wavering officers and provided the spark for the rebellion. In addition to military garrisons, the coup was supported by the Carlist paramilitary force, the *Requetés*, who had been training for battle over the previous months and occupied the front lines in their stronghold of Navarre. Elsewhere, though, the coup was largely a military affair, with the other forces of the right, including the *Falange*, playing a minor role.

Without the military disloyalty against the legitimate government, any revolt would have failed. Democratic regimes have been overthrown only when a significant portion of the military withdraws its support from the regime, whether alone, or in conjunction with popular forces, as in the Bolshevik or Nazi seizures of power. In all of the interwar agitation, left-wing revolution never succeeded against a united and loyal military apparatus. However much popular mobilization destabilized the Republic's efforts to consolidate its majority coalition, it was the military rebellion that unequivocally caused its demise.

## Conclusion

If military conspiracy was the ultimate cause of the Civil War, it was only one of various factors that undermined the consolidation of Spain's first twentieth-century democracy. While this failed consolidation was a tragedy, and even more so since the outcome was a devastating civil war, it was not the unique product of Spain's failure trajectory. The Spanish Republic was one of many failed democracies established during the interwar period. Even the few established democracies were still experimenting with various coalitions, programs and grand bargains that could stabilize the heterogeneous interests of mobilized societies within some shared "rules of the game." While great structural cleavages are not inherently incompatible with a functioning democracy, it takes a good deal of negotiation and trust to convince adversaries looking across a chasm of economic, religious, ideological or social distinctions to accept the position of loyal opposition. As a result, the transition from the elite liberal politics of the nineteenth century to the twentieth-century mass democracies required more than universalizing suffrage. In most cases, the grand "substantive" bargain that allowed Catholics and secularists, employers and workers, to join together in unconditional loyalty to a common set of procedures and institutions was only consolidated after the Second World War in the western democratic nations. In the interwar period, democracy was still very much a contested term, while the trust needed to sustain a democratic culture was weak. From this perspective, the failure of democratic consolidation in Spain was tragic but not shocking.

Within this generally unfavorable context, however, were there missed opportunities or turning points that could have pushed the Republic toward stabilization? There were certainly plenty of undemocratic, irrational or unwise decisions made by virtually all of the main actors at one point or another. At the same time, it is hard to know how many different interlocking decisions would have been required

to alter the outcome. Complicating the story is that many of the groups that are often treated as single culprits, especially in polemical narratives, were heterogeneous and decentralized, not monolithic. Thus, instead of a single definable turning point, more likely it was a complex dynamic among decisions and actions—all situated within an international and structural context—that would have mapped a different route.

Does this mean that the Republic was doomed to fail? If the warring interpretations agree on anything, it is that human agency was to blame. Indeed, few would want to revert to the faceless determinism of rigid structural explanations. At the same time, it seems hard to deny that human decisions are constrained and shaped by their circumstances, i.e., that the Socialist and Catholic parties of the 1930s made decisions from within a different worldview than their counterparts in western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. All the actors could certainly have made better decisions, but not all of them were equally plausible in that specific context. Thus, there were missed opportunities but also impossible conundrums. Instead of rendering moral judgments on what actors should have done according to the norms of ideal democratic practice, perhaps historians should be content with understanding why and in what context decisions that made sense to the actors at the time undermined democratic consolidation.

But does this moral detachment leave historians stuck in a dissatisfying relativism that accepts all outcomes as normal and even necessary? Regarding the Second Republic, all of us historians will continue to have our heroes and villains, as well as our version of the democracy we wish had prospered. In the broader academic world today, there is consensus around the general idea that “democracy,” with all its flaws, is the best form of government available, but there remain broad disagreements about the parameters of an ideal democracy. For those who defend a social democracy, defined by economic justice and popular empowerment, the first biennium center/left program, with all its flaws, will continue to represent a noble and ambitious project. Those who defend a liberal democracy will continue to argue that this project was overshadowed by anti-liberal intolerance, exclusivity, and indifference to the fundamental rules of the game. Another option would be to acknowledge that the Second Republic was a messy and contradictory democratic experiment that contained elements that were both promising and disappointing for any version of democratic consolidation. As such, it was less of a model, negative or positive, than a laboratory. As a laboratory of democratic practice, the Second Republic remains a key period in the unfolding and always evolving history of Spanish democracy.

## THE CIVIL WAR: 1936–1939

On July 17, 1936, military conspirators launched what they expected to be a surgical coup against the Republican government, but which instead devolved into a brutal civil war that ended almost three years later on April 1, 1939, with the victory of the right-wing Nationalist forces and the defeat of the loyalist Republican coalition. Everyone would agree that the Civil War was a tragic and momentous turning point in Spain's modern history. On the most basic level, it was a demographic catastrophe that cost a half a million lives in battlefield deaths, repression and disease and another 250,000 to exile. In political terms, it ended Spain's democratic experiment and inaugurated a 40-year repressive right-wing regime that broke with the trajectory of post-Second World War western democratic Europe and joined Portugal in a southern European zone of dictatorship. And, of course, it left the legacy of a fratricidal conflict that continues to shape current politics and society. Not surprisingly, explaining the significance and outcome of such a tragedy continues to generate enormous scholarly as well as popular interest. In the competing moral narratives about Spain's twentieth-century history, conservatives argue that the Nationalists saved Spain from communism or the "reds," while for the left the war sealed the victory of fascism over the democratic Popular Front. Beneath the homogenizing strokes of these moral narratives are more nuanced positions, but there is still fundamental disagreement about what each side stood for, and especially whether Republican defeat represented a lost opportunity for a viable postwar democracy.<sup>1</sup>

Beyond this meta-debate about the significance of the Republic's defeat, historians have focused most of their energies on explaining this outcome. There is general agreement that some combination of unfavorable external and domestic factors put the Republicans at a significant disadvantage and ultimately led to their defeat. In terms of external factors, the foreign aid and military support provided by the fascist regimes for the Nationalists were countered by a policy of non-intervention on the part of the western democratic powers of Britain, France and the United States, a deficit only partly filled by inferior Soviet aid. In terms of domestic factors, the Nationalists were more successful in pursuing a unified, efficient and effective war effort, while Republican divisions about both goals and methods undermined efficiency and effectiveness. Not surprisingly, conservatives tend to accentuate the importance of domestic factors, especially Republican "disorder," while the left emphasizes the debilitating impact of non-intervention on Republican survival. Whether the latter was the definitive reason for defeat, external

factors played a more direct role than at any other point in Spain's modern history, propelling a process of internationalization that pushed the country from the margins into the European limelight. While the Civil War remained a primarily domestic conflict, it also came to embody the dark side of interwar Europe, increasingly marked by political violence, ideological struggle and war.

## The Civil War in Comparative Perspective

Situating the Civil War in this broader context of war and violence has helped to undermine an older "failure" narrative based on Spain's unique inability for peaceful cohabitation. In this tradition, the 1930s war was just the last in a long series of civil wars between the "two Spains." While there were unique elements to Spain's civil war, recent scholarship has framed it within broader trends in twentieth-century warfare and politics.<sup>2</sup> Thus, Spain's civil war fit into a trajectory of increasingly lethal military operations that began in the colonial world in the late nineteenth century and inside Europe in the First World War, culminating in the Second World War.

The descent into "total" warfare was characterized by weapons of mass destruction, from the machine gun to aerial bombing, and the vilification of the enemy in radical exclusionary terms that justified the growing "civilianization of warfare." Some scholars emphasize the brutalizing impact of colonial pacification campaigns from the end of the nineteenth century, which included herding enemy populations into concentration camps, as in the British Boer War in South Africa and Spain's war against Cuba. Others highlight the battlefield experience of the First World War, which "brutalized" both the veterans and the home front, creating a permanent "war culture" that normalized violent solutions to political problems in the postwar period. Still others put the focus on exclusionary radical political projects that accepted the elimination of the "other" as a legitimate goal. Through some combination of these factors, the unfolding "dynamic of destruction" transformed the face of warfare in the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>3</sup> Thus, even though Spain did not participate in the two world wars, its civil war both drew from and exemplified this broader dynamic.

Whatever the precise origins of the violence that erupted into civil war in Spain in 1936, the coup unleashed an unparalleled dynamic of destruction, especially for the "civilianization of warfare." The contrast between the few hundred civilian deaths from political violence in the spring of 1936 and the tens of thousands of civilians killed in the first few months of the war leaves no doubt about the rupture of July 17.<sup>4</sup> Of these, 50 members of the clergy were killed before the Civil War, while almost 3,000 were assassinated during its first two months.<sup>5</sup> The radicalizing dynamic of warfare was evident even in the fascist states of Nazi Germany and Italy, where civilian killings skyrocketed under the loosened constraints of wartime. Some of this radicalization emerged from the decisions made "on the ground," whether in the Spanish Republican rearguard or on the Russian front in the Second World War. And, while warring states certainly played a role in mass killings, civilian deaths could be higher in situations where state power had either collapsed or weakened, as during the first few months of the Spanish Civil War or

in the “bloodlands” of eastern Europe during the Second World War.<sup>6</sup> The civilianization of warfare was also propelled by the lethal capacity of the weapons, inaugurated by the aerial bombing of the Spanish city of Guernica and culminating in the atom bomb and the gas chambers. Rather than a “preview” of the Second World War, the Spanish war unleashed its own logic of mass violence which matched, in intensity if not in absolute numbers, the viciousness of the war that followed.

The full extent of the brutality of the Spanish war has only emerged in recent years, as historians have been piecing together body counts for which there are no complete official records, especially for extra-judicial killings.<sup>7</sup> The incomplete records have generated a virtual war of numbers about the level of repression on one side or the other, but also a war of terminology. In terms of numbers, most recent estimates put the number of executions by the Nationalists at between 130,000 and 150,000, about 100,000 of these during the war, with 50,000–60,000 on the Republican side.<sup>8</sup> Regarding terminology, some historians who emphasize the qualitative and quantitative magnitude of Nationalist violence have employed terms like “war of extermination,” “genocide” or “holocaust” to describe the repression against the Republicans.<sup>9</sup> Pointing to the “exterminationist” rhetoric of Nationalist leaders, as well as to broader uses of the term genocide beyond racial or ethnic targets, these historians have made the case for an explicit plan of mass murder. Others have rejected these terms as either imprecise or exaggerated, since the Nationalists did not literally exterminate the entire Republican camp, and shifted from killing enemies to either “re-educating” them or “excluding” them from the mid-1940s on. They have argued that terms like “terror,” “crimes against humanity,” “war of occupation” or “politicide” can communicate the level of repression with greater precision, without minimizing it.<sup>10</sup> For republican violence, defenders of the conservative moral narrative equate it with Stalinist mass murder.<sup>11</sup>

But distinct from both Stalinist and Nazi mass murder, political violence in Spain in the late 1930s took place in the context of a civil war, which generated its own violent logic. On one level, civil wars had been constitutive of Spanish politics since the early nineteenth century, although other southern European countries, including Portugal, France and Italy, shared in this nineteenth-century dynamic.<sup>12</sup> However, twentieth-century civil wars, including the Spanish one, vastly surpassed these past conflicts in the degree of popular mobilization, as well as in their international dimensions. The twentieth-century European civil wars all took place in peripheral countries, beginning with Russia and Finland after the First World War, Spain in the 1930s, and then Greece and Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War, but all sparked great power intervention that was linked to the broader geopolitical and ideological struggles of the era. There were similar features of twentieth-century European civil wars, but also important differences that highlight the specificities of the Spanish case.<sup>13</sup>

All of these civil wars exemplified the ideological power struggle of the first half of the twentieth century, between left-wing revolution, liberal democracy and authoritarianism or fascism. Civil wars imply a clear left/right dynamic, but in all of these cases there were complex alliances, especially in the later conflicts, in Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia, where Popular Front coalitions between liberal

democrats and revolutionaries complicated the left/right dynamic. These alliances also generated a field of experimentation that blurred the boundaries between “democracy” and “socialism.” Scholars still debate whether the Popular Front offered an unprecedented path to an inclusive “new-style” social democracy,<sup>14</sup> or whether it was simply a “camouflage” for Stalinist revolution, or perhaps an unstable tension between both forces. At the time, this debate influenced the great powers’ decision to intervene or not. In both Spain and Greece, the western democratic powers saw revolution, not “popular democracy,” in their Popular Fronts. Only during the Yugoslavian civil war (1941–1943), which took place during the brief period of the Soviet/Western powers’ anti-fascist alliance, did the international context favor intervention on behalf of the Popular Front forces. In all of these wars, external intervention was a decisive element in determining the victor.

Within this general framework, the Spanish Civil War had its unique elements. Of all these civil wars, it was the only one with a purely domestic origin, without the precipitating pressure caused by external war or invasion. In addition, a key source of this domestic strife was rooted in a “religious war” between Catholics and anti-clericals, which produced the most religious violence of any of the civil wars.<sup>15</sup> The war itself also unfolded as a conventional military operation, with battles, active fronts and rearguard politics and violence vs. the largely guerilla struggle in Greece and Yugoslavia. Equally significant was the distinct context in which the Spanish Civil War ended, which impacted the continuing international influence on the postwar regime.<sup>16</sup> When the Spanish war was over in 1939, the right-wing regime that had won with the aid of the fascist powers was under no pressure to pursue an inclusive postwar settlement, either from its allies or from the democratic powers, whose attention was turned to the outbreak of war in Poland. The unique combination of brutal civil war followed by a 40-year right-wing dictatorship produced a legacy of violence and repression that was closer to the Russian experience of civil war and left-wing dictatorship than it was to the other southern European dictatorships of Portugal and Italy, which did not emerge from civil wars.

## **From Military Coup to Civil War: The Summer of 1936**

The military coup began on July 17, after the Spanish army in Morocco declared themselves in rebellion against the Republic, launching a planned series of parallel uprisings in military garrisons across the country, which assumed the massive defection of the troops and expected the immediate collapse of the existing regime. While the conspirators miscalculated about the resistance they would face, both from loyal military units and a mobilized population, the Republican government had also miscalculated, taking few precautions against what was widely rumored to be an impending coup. The result was an initial period of confusion, with localized fighting across the country, in which about a third of the military garrisons successfully joined the rebels, while the rest either remained loyal or were defeated by a combination of Republican troops, police forces and trade union-based militias. Outside of Carlist Navarre, few places fell to the rebels without a struggle. The Nationalists also had the advantage of the battle-hardened Army of Africa,



**Map III-1** Stages of the Civil War 1936–39: July 1936

which was transported from Morocco to the mainland by German and Italian planes and Spanish ships, in response to General Franco's request for help from Hitler and Mussolini. Without this initial logistical support, the coup might have been stopped in its tracks.<sup>17</sup>

During the first few weeks, a geographical division of the country began to take shape that, with a few exceptions, looked remarkably like the Popular Front election voting map. (See Map III-1.) That is, most of the traditionally left-leaning areas fell into Republican territory. These included urban centers, such as Madrid, in addition to the coastal Mediterranean regions and the northern industrial coast. In contrast, the rural Castilian heartland north of Madrid that had voted for the conservative coalition fell quickly into rebel hands. As a result of this urban/rural split, about 70 percent of the agriculture was located in the rebel zone, while 80 percent of industry was in the Republican zone. The main exception to this overlap between political and military geography was in western Andalucía and Extremadura, where local loyalist forces were soon overwhelmed by the moving columns of the Army of Africa, which set off from Seville on August 2.

### The Rebel Forces in the Summer of 1936

Who were the rebels of July 1936? The insurrection was planned and implemented by military conspirators, led by Generals Francisco Franco, Emilio Mola and Gonzalo Quiepo de Llano, after the early death of General Sanjurjo and the arrest of others whose local insurrections failed. The early military communiqués focused on saving Spain from the anarchy of a republic sliding into Bolshevism, but without

articulating a political program. Unlike fascist seizures of power in Germany and Italy, in which the traditional military was a junior partner, in Spain it took the lead, as in so many previous *pronunciamientos*. The conspirators mistakenly thought they could re-create this “surgical” intervention in the very different conditions of a much more politicized population. They also mistakenly believed they spoke in the name of the entire military, or at least the officer corps, when in fact only a minority of generals and just over half of the field officers, who controlled about half of the total 250,000 armed forces in the Peninsula, supported the uprising, in addition to only 20 percent of the navy and the air force.

Of these troops, 40,000 belonged to the Army of Africa, which included Moroccan (the *Regulares*) and Spanish (the Legion) mercenary troops as well as conscripted soldiers. It has been persuasively argued that these colonial troops brought with them an “*Africanista*” culture that had been developed over the previous decades in brutal pacification campaigns in Morocco that erased the distinction between combatant and civilian and prepared the ground for the total war mentality against their own countrymen.<sup>18</sup>

Beyond the official military units, only in Carlist Navarre was there a significant paramilitary force, the *Requetés*, which played an important role from the outset, first within the province and then in helping to take Zaragoza, the only major city in the north to fall to the rebels. However, these paramilitary volunteers were very different from the marginalized and alienated fascist squads of Italy or Germany. Thus, the Carlist *Requetés* emerged out of the context of tight-knit traditional rural communities which responded to the perceived threat to their way of life.<sup>19</sup> Building on familial connections and local associations, the *Requetés* were able to mobilize over 10,000 volunteers within a few days, who marched to the capital of Pamplona with their red berets under Carlist and monarchist flags and the Crusade-like image of the Virgin of Jerusalem. In an atmosphere steeped in religious ritual and celebration, the Carlist volunteers were blessed by local priests and the bishop of Pamplona, who evoked the rhetoric of a “crusade” or holy war, a concept which would quickly be incorporated into the official Nationalist propaganda.

The other major civilian source of support for the rebellion was the Spanish fascist party, the *Falange*, although in July 1936 its impact was limited, since it had been operating underground after being banned in March 1936. Furthermore, most of its old leaders, including founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera, were either in Republican custody (he was executed in November 1936) or died on the battlefield in the first few weeks, so the *Falange* lacked central coordination. Still, many of its members volunteered to fight against the Republic, and their militia units contributed 36,000 volunteers to the Nationalist army by the fall of 1936 as membership in the *Falange* expanded dramatically, from 5,000 in February 1936 to 1 million by August. After failing as an electoral force, the Fascist party blossomed in the new lawless context where uncontrolled violence ruled. The women’s branch, the *Sección Femenina* (SF), grew rapidly from a membership of 2,500 to a major rearguard organization mobilized in auxiliary support of the war effort. While the insurrection was not instigated by a mass fascist party, as in Germany or Italy, the dramatic growth of the *Falange* after July 1936 contributed to the evolving identity of the incipient Nationalist regime.

### Ideology and Violence in Rebel Territory

In July 1936, however, it was unclear what the rebels stood for, with Carlists, Falangists, Alphonse monarchists and military leaders holding distinct and at times conflicting political goals. It would take several months for the Nationalists to unify this diverse group of supporters, in military, political and ideological terms, a process facilitated by the ambitious Franco's successful efforts to take charge, first among the rebel generals and then of the "New State." Formal unification began with the declaration of Franco as head of state on October 1, and ideological unity was achieved in the blend of two key principles, the nation and religion, that would come to be labeled "National Catholicism." During the summer of 1936, the theme of a second "Reconquest" of Spain from the infidels took shape. At a religious festival on August 15, 1936, which began with Franco kissing the monarchist flag, poet José María Pemán delivered a speech in which he called the rebellion a "new war of independence, a new Reconquest, a new expulsion of the Moors ... twenty centuries of Christian civilization are at our backs."<sup>20</sup> The Catholic Church as an institution did not participate in the uprising, but by the fall of 1936, its leaders endorsed the framework of a religious war, beginning with a pastoral letter (September 23) by Bishop Pla y Deniel that utilized Augustine's metaphor of the "two cities," one "celestial" and one "earthly," to define the conflict as a crusade rather than a civil war. Significantly, of course, this rhetoric framed the enemy as invaders or "anti-Spaniards."

From the outset of the rebellion, the violence perpetrated against the Republican enemy was more than simply a functional consequence of gaining control over the territory. Even where there was little active resistance, the conquering forces pursued a practice of indiscriminate, public and brutal killings that was linked to a rhetoric of terror, cleansing and "annihilation." In addition to loyal army personnel, major targets included individuals who belonged to Popular Front parties or trade unions, from civil governors to mayors and city councilors, as well as schoolteachers and professors, who were considered dangerous transmitters of secular culture, or even those who never attended mass. Victims were hunted down in their homes, summarily shot and left to rot in the streets. Some were held for a few days before being taken from the jail in the middle of the night and taken for a "walk" (*paseo*) that ended in assassination, without being tried or registered. Killings were carried out by military and Civil Guard units, but also by paramilitary death squads, led by Falangist and Carlist militants or simply those seeking personal revenge. The most notorious swathe of mass killings were carried out by General Queipo de Llano's "column of death," the Army of Africa units which marched from Seville through Extremadura toward Madrid in July and August 1936, leaving 8,000 dead in Seville, 10,000 in Córdoba and 6,000 in Badajoz.<sup>21</sup> The combination of officially endorsed terror and multiple, uncontrolled killing units made this period the most deadly of the entire war, with between 50 and 70 percent of all the wartime and postwar civilian executions occurring during that summer. What changed after this point was not the attitude toward the anti-Spanish enemy but rather a centralization and institutionalization of the repression process that reined in—at least in part—the radicalizing dynamic of the no-holds-barred opening act.<sup>22</sup>

### The Loyalist Forces during the Summer of 1936

So who were the Spaniards who remained loyal to the Republic in July 1936? On one level, the answer is simply the Popular Front coalition. But after July 18 the center of gravity among the various groups shifted dramatically, away from the republican parties and toward the worker parties and unions. The shift began when the Republican government agreed to provide arms to the best organized mass bodies, i.e., the trade unions, so they could assist remaining loyal army and police personnel in putting down rebellious garrisons. In many places, impromptu trade union militias made significant contributions to the defeat, although they only emerged victorious in coalition with at least some police or military units.

Nevertheless, by arming the populace and acknowledging the unreliability of the security forces, the Republican government unleashed an unraveling of central authority in which state power effectively collapsed. The vacuum of power was filled by local “defense committees” made up of representatives of the indigenous political forces, often in collaboration with the newly formed trade union militias. The dense formal and informal networks constructed by the UGT and CNT, especially in urban working-class neighborhoods, formed the basic structure on which local authority could be reconstituted from the ground up. In contrast, most of the left Republican parties had little grassroots presence, except in Catalonia, where the *Esquerra* had developed a strong popular base. Even so, while the *Esquerra* remained in charge of the *Generalitat*, it had to share power with local CNT committees, which ruled the streets of Barcelona. Elsewhere, as in the Asturian city of Gijón, the republican-dominated city council was simply replaced by a CNT-majority “defense council” which embarked on a combined platform of defense and transformation.<sup>23</sup>

The other Popular Front player that followed its own trajectory was the Communist party (PCE). Insignificant before the Popular Front election, it grew into a new mass party that rivaled the PSOE and CNT. Its membership had quadrupled to almost 90,000 since the election of 17 deputies in February had increased the party’s visibility, and its ranks continued to grow, even before the arrival of Soviet aid in September 1936 further boosted the party’s standing. By the end of 1937, the PCE had reached a membership of nearly 1 million, culling from Socialist and Cenetista ranks, but also including large numbers of the previously unaffiliated.

### Revolution in Republican Territory

In general terms the military coup and the collapse of central state authority opened the door to a heterogeneous and grassroots revolutionary experimentation.<sup>24</sup> The irony is that the coup that was waged in the name of preventing the slide into revolution actually unleashed it. The working-class organizations now seized the chance to act on their revolutionary dreams of a proletarian utopia. As one euphoric militant wrote about Barcelona in the summer of 1936, “It was incredible, the proof in practice of what one knows in theory: the power and strength of the masses when they take to the streets.”<sup>25</sup> More famously, the English writer George Orwell, after visiting the city during the same time period, enthused in his memoir, *Homage to Catalonia*, that he finally understood what it meant to have the working class “in the saddle.”

In most places, the CNT took the lead in a grassroots politics of direct action that played to their strengths and goals. In Barcelona, and less dramatically in other CNT urban strongholds, militants embraced a “revolutionary urbanist project” that would transform the capitalist bourgeois city into an island where workers were the masters.<sup>26</sup> Businesses were expropriated and transformed into worker collectives, religious and monarchist symbols were torn down and replaced with CNT and UGT flags, slogans and posters, workers’ organizations occupied former luxury buildings in city centers that had once belonged to the wealthy, and the streets were visually transformed by a new egalitarian dress code exemplified by the working-class blue coveralls. Applying a concept coined by urban sociologist Henri Lefebvre in the 1960s, the urban revolution of the summer of 1936 asserted workers’ collective “right to the city.”<sup>27</sup> The defense committees took over many of the administrative tasks of the state, from urban services to policing, justice and provisioning, putting a revolutionary twist on all these functions. Thus, justice was transferred from the regular courts to popular tribunals, while provisioning committees requisitioned food and clothing from stores and warehouses to redistribute in working-class neighborhoods, and public medical centers were set up in mansions, churches or private hotels.

In Catalonia, the grassroots social revolution intermingled with the nationalist revolutionary actions of the *Generalitat*, which extended its claims beyond what had been granted by the 1932 statute, toward a federalist conception of the Republican state. With a minority of Catalanists calling for separatism, the majority *Esquerra*-led government expanded its de facto powers by issuing economic, social, labor and education legislation, including the passage of an abortion law. While the *Generalitat* also had to compete with local CNT-led defense committees, the *Esquerra* and CNT shared a general affinity for federalist structures and local centers of power that formed the basis of a generally cooperative if uncoordinated relationship.

One final manifestation of the revolutionary rupture of the summer of 1936 was the active mobilization of women in the Republican public sphere.<sup>28</sup> While women’s rights had been a symbol of Republican modernity since 1931, it was not until the war that all the Popular Front organizations explicitly called on women to leave their domestic sphere to join the struggle. The icon of the “new woman” during the summer of 1936 was the militiawoman, clad in blue coveralls and holding a rifle, an image celebrated in posters and propaganda. In practice, more women were drawn in not as fighters but in other auxiliary “home front” functions, from building barricades to caring for the wounded. Furthermore, they were drawn in not only as individuals but as members of expanding women’s political organizations, particularly the *Asociación de Mujeres Antifascistas (AMA/Anti-fascist Women’s Association)* and the “Free Women” *Mujeres Libres (ML/Free Women)*. The former association, established in 1933 and led by the PCE, grew rapidly to 50,000 members in 255 local associations during the summer of 1936, while the latter CNT-affiliated movement claimed about 20,000 members in 168 local groups. The AMA was focused exclusively on channeling women into the anti-fascist struggle, while the ML recognized a “double struggle” that included women’s autonomy. But the ML’s claims were not accepted by the CNT, and as the war continued the group focused more on the defense of anarchist principles than on challenging gender roles. While this new public space for women did not transform gender roles and attitudes,

it provided an opening for thousands of women to “transgress” the traditional boundaries of what was considered proper female behavior.

At the same time as the war opened a rupture in ordinary life, there was no uniform blueprint of transformation or revolution, and diversity remained the rule. For example, the economy remained a hybrid of private and collective enterprises. In Barcelona, it has been estimated that as many as 3,000 businesses, including 70 percent of large factories, were collectivized, while many of their owners and managers fled, including conservative Catalanists of the *Lliga*, who ended up joining the Nationalists. In other cities, however, lower levels of collectivization were combined with cooperative arrangements, in which small businesses were run in partnership between owners and workers. In Madrid, no more than 30 percent of businesses were collectivized, while in Asturias urban unions collaborated with small farmers in provisioning. Even within a single region, there could be dramatic variation, depending on the local forces. Thus, in Valencia, the CNT-stronghold of Alcoy underwent an immediate and complete economic revolution, while in Castellón and Alicante, only a few industries were collectivized.<sup>29</sup>

In areas of the countryside under CNT control, individual farms were collectivized as well, although the percentage ranged from 4 percent in Valencia to as high as 75 percent in Aragón, with a total estimate of 800 collectives operated by 400,000 people.<sup>30</sup> Some of the land belonged to owners who had fled or been killed, and some was directly requisitioned, along with the farm equipment and tools. Up to 40 percent of the agricultural land in republican territory was expropriated and collectivized, although the exact number is difficult to ascertain, since most of the process occurred at the grassroots level, with little coordination or oversight. The main region of agrarian collectivization was eastern Aragón, which, according to probably inflated CNT estimates, collectivized 75 percent of its privately owned land, including smaller farms, which operated in a barter economy.<sup>31</sup>

The grassroots revolution in Republican territory has been variously demonized and celebrated, both during the war and since. For detractors, including other Republican groups at the time, it was a coercive and divisive distraction from the war effort, while for defenders it opened a window into the new egalitarian paradise that made the war worth fighting. In practice, of course, revolutionary change was experienced as both inspirational and coercive, depending on one’s position and perspective. There is no question that many on the Republican side were alienated and frightened, or felt coerced into a process that was framed as liberation by militant believers. Thus, for example, most of the collectivizations in Eastern Aragón were implemented not by local peasants or laborers but by columns of invading CNT militia from Catalonia, which imposed their model not only on large farms but on the many smaller ones, after executing up to 4,000 people, many of them lower- and middle-class owners of businesses or land. Ironically, most of the *latifundia* territory where strong rural unions had widespread support for expropriation fell quickly into Nationalist hands. The more complex landholding patterns in places like Eastern Aragón made collectivization a more controversial project, especially among the peasant farmers. But even ordinary workers could be resistant to the personal sacrifices expected of them in the pursuit of the collectivist utopia, as one study of the tension between union leaders’ focus on increased production and workers’ desire for more leisure time argues.<sup>32</sup>

Whether the grassroots revolutionary situation alienated or inspired those on the Republican side, it was never consolidated. Without a plan to seize power and institutionalize the revolution, the CNT lost the initiative and the clout it had during the heady summer of 1936.<sup>33</sup> The practical consequences for both the CNT and its revolutionary project were devastating. In the internecine struggle between republicans, socialists, anarchists and a growing Communist party to take control of the Republican military and political apparatus, the CNT organization crumbled. Likewise, the social revolution unleashed in the first few months would dissolve under pressure from a reconsolidating central government that wanted to focus all energies on the war effort. Whether the social revolution was undermining the war effort, as Communists and others argued, the relative ease of its dismantling demonstrated the fragile foundations of a localized revolutionary process that gave participants the false impression that workers were really “in the saddle.”

### Violence in Republican Territory

While coercion was more or less integral to the reorganization of the economic and social order, depending on where one stood, the violence that accompanied the revolution surpassed these utilitarian aims. Thus, there were some similarities to initial violence on the rebel side, with the proliferation of multiple killing units and a rhetoric of cleansing and demonization of the enemy that unleashed a dynamic of radicalization. Significantly, the vast majority of civilian executions on the Republican side took place during this initial summer and early fall, before a process of institutionalization once again reined in the dynamic of destruction. What was missing on the Republican side, however, was the massive, official campaign of military-led terror by the rebels. With the end of the state’s monopoly on violence and the arming of private militias, professional policing and justice were replaced by vigilante patrols and summary executions, motivated by class, political and religious hatred and fears of “fifth column” counter-revolutionaries. In Madrid, for example, there were more than 60 centers that detained, tried and killed suspects, most of them linked to one of the Popular Front parties or organizations.<sup>34</sup> An estimated 6,000–8,000 were killed in this process of extra-judicial terror in the capital city, 60 percent of them in the first two months of the war, although the most famous “Paracuellos massacre,” in which 2,700 prisoners were summarily executed during a series of prison transfers took place in November–December 1936. Executions of purported enemies were probably among the highest in Madrid, which developed a siege mentality as the city awaited the arrival of the Army of Africa slashing and burning its way toward the capital. However, extra-judicial killings of “fascists,” clergy and employers occurred across Republican-held territory, stoked by anger against the rebellion and a sometimes violent left-wing propaganda, which tended to lump everyone outside the Popular Front coalition into “fascist” enemies of the people.

One of the most notorious targets of Republican violence during the summer of 1936 was the clergy. Of the estimated 6,800 who lost their lives during the war, almost half were killed during this period, about a third of them in Catalonia. There has been a “chicken and egg” debate about which side started the

“religious war,” but all the essential elements of hatred and mistrust were in place when the coup opened the space for the indiscriminate violence either in defense of, or, in this case, in opposition to, “Christian civilization.”<sup>35</sup> Many scholars have sought to interpret the dramatic symbolism of anti-clerical violence as an attack on a morally corrupt institution, or on its links to the upper classes, or as an attack on the Catholic religion itself, long consubstantial with the conservative version of Spanish national identity. What seems convincing, however, was that the violence directed at the clergy, sacred icons and religious structures was specific to their religious nature and steeped in an eliminationist symbolism that sought to eradicate the sacred place of Catholicism and the Catholic Church in Spanish society.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, in addition to executions and torching of churches, shrines and monasteries, anti-clerical militants from all political groups engaged in violent iconoclastic warfare, pulling sacred images out of churches and shrines and “executing” them in the public square, or gouging out their eyes before dragging them through the streets in a parody of the religious procession. Corpses of long-dead clergy were exhumed, mutilated and publicly displayed, while those who were still living could be subjected to torture and mutilation before they were murdered. Symbolic violence was also directed at the private sphere of Catholic belief, including the removal of private religious artefacts from homes and, in some cases, forcing Catholics to collectively witness the desecration of sacred images. While the anti-clerical violence did not turn a “neutral” Church into an enemy, it certainly reinforced the conviction that the Nationalists were the only defense against the “atheistic horde.” Of all the violence perpetrated on the Republican side, none was as damaging to their cause, within Spain but also abroad, where Catholic organizations in the western democratic countries lobbied their governments not to help the atheistic Republic.

The competing moral narratives have conflicting explanations for this Republican violence, with the left minimizing it as “spontaneous” or “uncontrollable” and the conservative one framing it as the logical product of “totalitarian” communism. While there were some elements of both spontaneity and ideologically motivated killings, the key factor seems to be the state of lawlessness opened by the collapse of central authority, as evidenced by the dramatic decline in killings after the reconstitution of the Republican state and military in the fall of 1936. Thus, as many as 80–85 percent of the Republican killings, including against clergy, had been perpetrated by the end of 1936. Many people belonging to defense committees, trade unions, political parties or other Popular Front bodies—i.e., not just “uncontrollable” anarchists—were implicated in the bloodletting of the summer of 1936, but it was arguably the vacuum of central state power that made it possible.<sup>37</sup>

## Organizing for the Long War: The Republicans

This first phase of the war lasted into the fall of 1936, after which the Popular Front government began to reconstruct a unified state authority and to centralize the war effort. The turning point came on September 4, 1936, when President Azaña

appointed the UGT leader Francisco Largo Caballero to be the Prime Minister, with the hopes that he would have the moral authority to draw the revolutionary union base into a more coordinated and disciplined military effort. In November, the CNT leadership put aside its longstanding apoliticism to approve the appointment of four ministers. The *Generalitat* had already been reconstituted on September 26 with representatives of the CNT, the *Esquerra*, a new Catalan Communist party (PSUC) and a dissident Communist party (POUM). In addition, the government further broadened its base with the approval of a Basque autonomous statute on October 1 that won the commitment of the Basque PNV. The PNV's Catholic and conservative constituency did not fit easily into the Popular Front, but it helped muddy the Nationalists' claim to be speaking in the name of all Catholics. The Republican government's reconstruction was aided by the unexpected military victory in Madrid in November, which disrupted the Nationalist momentum and gave the Republicans a chance to regroup for a longer war. As a result of all these factors, over the next several months the new government was able to re-exert central authority, reconstitute municipal governments, stem the tide of extra-judicial violence and integrate the militia units into a regular army.

Once the wartime Republican state coalesced, it had two main interrelated tasks: to fight the war and to govern its territory. In the conservative moral narrative, Republican defeat was primarily a result of ineptitude and internal divisions that also destroyed any semblance of democratic practice. Conversely, in the left moral narrative, the heroic Republican democracy was defeated by the collusion of fascist powers in pumping resources to the Nationalists. Once again, there are more nuanced positions along the spectrum, but no broad consensus about the causes and stakes of victory or defeat. Most scholars, however, would admit that some combination of internal weaknesses and an unfavorable international context formed an evolving lethal combination for the Republic. The internal divisions were probably the most serious in the initial phases of the war, while the weight of uneven foreign aid became more important as the war dragged on.

### Foreign Aid

The internationalization of the civil war through foreign aid, diplomacy and troops is indisputable, as is the fact that decisions made by foreign powers regarding these factors played an important role in the war's evolution.<sup>38</sup> The two most important decisions affecting aid to the Republic were the Non-Intervention in Spain Agreement, signed by 27 European nations at the end of August 1936, and the Soviet decision in mid-September to assist the Republic. From the beginning of the war, Britain declared neutrality and convinced the Popular Front French government to reverse its initial decision to aid its Spanish compatriots. France then suggested the non-intervention pact to prevent fascist support of the Nationalists. However, Germany and Italy, and to a lesser extent Portugal, continued to arm the Nationalists, while all the major democracies, including the United States, followed the pretense of non-intervention.<sup>39</sup>

The democracies' decision to abandon the Republic was a result of both domestic concerns and geo-strategic interests. Although their populations were

deeply divided, none of the liberal democratic governments were comfortable with the Spanish left-leaning democracy of July 1936. They were even less so once news of the initial revolutionary experimentation and anti-clerical violence was reported, often by conservative Spanish diplomats in their countries who overwhelmingly defected to the rebel cause. Even so, the Nationalists' claim that they fought to save Spain from Bolshevism and for Christian civilization was much more compelling than anti-fascism in the mid-1930s. Thus, even after the Republican state could demonstrate that social revolution and anti-clerical violence had been contained, the democratic powers were more invested in appeasing Nazi Germany than in fighting fascism, a strategy that culminated with the Munich conference of September 1938. While the Soviets at first agreed to non-intervention, Stalin changed his mind in September 1936, once it was clear that the fascist powers were not observing the pact. For conservatives, this was the first step in a plan to set up a satellite Communist state.<sup>40</sup> But there is also convincing evidence from the Soviet archives that supports a more complex strategic goal of testing out a possible anti-fascist alliance with the democratic states while keeping Germany occupied away from Soviet borders.<sup>41</sup> Whether it was merely tactical or not, Soviet aid to Spain was framed within a Popular Front defense strategy that the USSR continued to follow until its obvious failure led to the volte-face of the Nazi Soviet pact in August 1939, just after the end of the Civil War.

The military impact of foreign aid on the war's outcome continues to be debated, but the Republican cause was significantly undermined by both the low quality of materiel and the irregular timing of its arrival.<sup>42</sup> The Republic was not poor, since it controlled the gold reserves, about a quarter of which were sent to Paris early on and the rest to Moscow to pay for Soviet supplies. But most of the Soviet weapons and materiel were no match for the Nazi armaments that Hitler wanted to test before unleashing his own military ambitions. Because of the non-intervention pact, most of the rest of the materiel for the Republican side had to be purchased at high prices from private buyers. Finally, in terms of timing, the Republic was virtually starved of weapons at crucial points: during the summer of 1936 before the start of Soviet aid and from the end of 1938. Of the 66 shipments from the USSR, 52 arrived between October 1936 and the end of 1937. And, in contrast to more than 100,000 troops sent by Germany and Italy, the USSR sent only 2,000 advisers, in addition to the 31,000–32,000 volunteers of the International Brigades that were organized by the Communist International.<sup>43</sup> The International Brigades have been attacked as Stalinist stooges and celebrated as heroic anti-fascists, with additional debates about their impact on the outcome of the war itself.<sup>44</sup> Undoubtedly reflecting a variety of motives, the volunteers from over 50 countries probably played a positive role in several Republican battles, including the defense of Madrid, but overall, foreign troops contributed more to the Nationalist victory, especially if the Moroccan troops are included. In any case, the Brigades were sent home in September 1938, in hopes that the Nationalists would do the same with their larger contingent of foreign fighters. Instead, the departure of the Brigades marked the beginning of a precipitous slide toward final defeat.

### Reconstructing a Republican State

While in principle the coalition government of October 1936 incorporated all the major forces and voices on the Republican side, from left Republicans, Communists, Basque (PNV) and Catalan (Esquerra) Nationalists, to moderate and left-wing socialists (PSOE/UGT) and (after November) moderate (CNT) and radical (FAI) anarchists, in practice the fractures within and between the different groups were not resolved. Not merely polarized, the Republican camp was fragmented along various axes, relating to the conduct of the war and political and territorial organization. Even with a reconstituted central government, there were still alternative centers of power, in the *Generalitat*, the regional councils in Aragón, Asturias, Madrid and the Basque Country, and in local collectives and trade unions, each with competing visions of the future. Likewise, even with the constitution of a Republican army under the supervision of the war ministry, the combination of resistance from some anarchist units and the challenge of building an army from scratch undermined the consolidation of military strategy.

As a result of the continued infighting, after only seven months Largo Caballero was forced to resign in May 1937. A new government was formed under the leadership of Juan Negrín, which pursued a policy less focused on inclusion and more on discipline, further centralization and diplomatic appeals for aid. The outcome was a diminished role for the revolutionary elements of both the CNT and UGT unions, which were expelled from the government coalition, and a stronger position for the Republican and Communist parties.

Following the theory shared by republicans, Communists and moderate socialists that winning the war required greater centralization and military discipline, the Negrín government directly challenged all competing centers of power. By the summer of 1937, the agrarian collectives in Aragón had been shut down, CNT autonomy in Barcelona had been crushed in open street battles in the so-called "May events,"<sup>45</sup> and the CNT-dominated regional councils in Aragón and Catalonia had been dissolved, all of this against the backdrop of the military defeats in Málaga (February 1937) and the June 1937 surrender of the Basque country. Negrín remains a controversial figure, demonized by some as "Stalinist" and celebrated by others as a statesman who tried to hold the Republic together.<sup>46</sup> In any case, by the end of 1937, the internecine fighting on the Republican side had been largely brought under control, although the challenge of maintaining morale and military discipline on the front intensified as defeatism and pessimism grew.

At the center of debates over the Republic's trajectory are competing interpretations of the evolving role of the Communist party.<sup>47</sup> Hanging over this debate is the question of how much the PCE was responsible for its own actions or a pawn in Soviet schemes.<sup>48</sup> In any case, in one version of the story, the Communists pursued a Stalinist strategy of subordinating all other forces, culminating with the May 1937 defeat and expulsion of the CNT and the crushing of the dissident Communist POUM. In this telling, the PCE controlled the Negrín government, which then used Stalinist tactics, including military commissars and secret police, to terrorize the Republican camp into submission. The PCE defense of the Popular Front is presented as a duplicitous tactic to gain the support of the democratic countries. A Republican victory, following this logic, would have ended in a totalitarian dictatorship, not a democracy.

In the contrasting narrative, the PCE was committed to the Popular Front cross-class strategy of “popular democracy” that would include not only workers but the middle and lower classes who had been frightened by the initial social revolution. Indeed, Negrín’s 13-point program of May 1, 1938 focused on democratic rights, including the respect for property and religion. And, while the PCE did use its growing military leverage to impose greater discipline on the Republican side, most of the measures taken, both at the front and in the rear guard, were a defensible product of an increasingly desperate war effort. Finally, this democratic narrative of the Negrín government points out that the Socialist and Republican parties remained powerful partners, not just “camouflage” for PCE rule. In this view, then, the Republic remained a pluralist democratic state, with the inevitable compromises forced on a wartime government.

In practice, the complex reality of Republican politics defies either/or categorizations. The fragmentation on the Republican side was so pervasive that it fractured each political group, none of which can be treated as a unified actor. Thus, Cenetistas argued amongst themselves about whether or not collaboration with the government was a good idea, Socialists argued about whether the government should be constituted by union syndicates or political parties, and even Communist leaders shared no master plan beyond centralization and winning the war. At the same time, all of these competing visions shared the revolutionary sense that they were constructing a new society.<sup>49</sup> Instead of “revolution” vs. “democracy” on the Republican side, there were competing revolutionary visions of the future, some of which included a “new type” of popular/egalitarian and/or federalist democracy. Thus, for most players, the “democracy” on the table was not the liberal democracy that Britain and the United States recognized, nor even the orderly social democracy that would emerge in western Europe after the war. Instead, the revolutionary democracy of the wartime Republic was part of a broader experiment, opened by the Popular Front alliances in the mid-1930s, and culminating during the Resistance movements of the Second World War, in places like Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy.

The revolutionary democracy was exemplified by the reconstituted justice system that accompanied the rebuilding of the Republican state after the chaotic summer of 1936. On the one hand, the state’s mostly successful efforts to publicly discredit and replace extra-judicial executions with legal channels of punishment drastically reduced the killing. On the other hand, the new popular tribunals, staffed by a combination of professional magistrates and political groups, did not operate according to classic liberal democratic principles of justice but within an “anti-fascist” collective framework. Individuals were convicted not only for specific crimes but for their “fascist” beliefs or their lack of support (disaffection) for the Republican cause.

Instead of killing them, the Republican justice system expanded prisons and created the beginnings of a “redemptive” labor camp system.<sup>50</sup> Under the leadership of CNT Justice Minister Joan García Oliver (November 1936–May 1937), the camp project took shape after December 1936 both as a pragmatic solution and as a political program of rehabilitation through work. At least half a dozen camps were constructed, the first one in April 1937, although they never contained more than a few thousand prisoners employed in public works projects. A different type

of military labor camp expanded after the spring of 1938, including a network of six in Catalonia, which were focused more narrowly on helping the war effort. The camps imprisoned between 7,000 and 8,000, most of whom were identified as draft dodgers, deserters and enemies close to the front, in conditions that ranged from harsh discipline to terror.

Given the increasingly desperate military situation and the eventual defeat, it is difficult to know what a postwar Republican judicial—or indeed political—system would have looked like, which is why debate continues. For the left, the Republican experimentation represented a fleeting opportunity to establish a new synthesis of democracy and socialism based on grassroots power structures. For the right, following Cold War logic, these experiments could only end in totalitarian Communist dictatorship. In Spain as elsewhere, the question is whether black-and-white Cold War categories explain or obfuscate the complex political dynamic in Spain. What is clear is that none of the various political visions on the table emerged as dominant.

Beyond the issue of fragmentation, the growing military and humanitarian crisis of the war began to overshadow all other concerns. In fact, there were probably plenty of Spaniards on the Republican side who were more concerned with the efficiency of provisioning and the protection of their homes and families than with grand political visions. It has been persuasively argued that the Republic consistently fell short in its support of the civilian population, as well as of the soldiers under its command, and that this lack of efficacy was particularly devastating in the war of attrition which set in after the Republican victory in Madrid in November 1936.<sup>51</sup> Thus, the Republicans didn't always pay for their requisitions or set unattractive price caps, they served inadequate rations to their soldiers and provided them with inferior health care on the front lines. For example, in Republican and Nationalist divisions on the Madrid front in 1937, the former received 20g of meat per day compared to 200g for the latter. From a more bird's-eye view, the Republicans were not able to translate their significant wealth into sufficient resources on the ground, especially when compared to the Nationalists. Decentralization, multiple sites of authority and local revolutionary projects may have made some militants feel empowered, but in the big picture they undermined a coherent provisioning strategy. Even after the reconstruction of the state, logistics and transportation networks remained unreliable, and unregulated printing of currency notes led to inflation and reluctance to accept Republican currency.

The growing morale gap between Republican and Nationalist sides, resulting in higher rates of military desertion in the former, was undoubtedly partly a result of the inferior everyday conditions. These conditions were especially important to conscripts, whose percentage in the Republican army increased as the war dragged on.<sup>52</sup> Contributing to the difficulties of the Republican army was the lack of trained officers, few of which had leadership experience before the war. While the deteriorating conditions on the Republican side are clear, debate remains as to whether they were more or less important in explaining defeat than the quality and quantity of foreign aid, especially once the USSR cut back its shipments in 1938–1939. In either case, during the last year of the war, it seems fair to assume that, for many on the Republican side, the importance of ideological battles had faded before the reality of military defeats and daily privations.

## Organizing for the Long War: The Nationalists

In contrast to the deteriorating Republican situation, the initially weak Nationalist position was gradually strengthened as a result of the combined impact of significant foreign aid from Italy and Germany and the military and political unification that allowed the rebels to utilize those resources most effectively. Key to the successful process of unification was both the ambition and shrewd calculations of Francisco Franco, who had himself appointed “*Generalissimo*” on September 29, 1936 and used that position to definitively subordinate all other competing sources of authority.<sup>53</sup> Leveraging his leadership of the Army of Africa, as well as his successful request for German and Italian aid in transferring the army to the mainland, Franco positioned himself as the architect of the early victories and gathered astute political advisers, like his brother-in-law Ramón Serrano Suñer, who could help him institutionalize this leadership.

### Constructing a “New State”

After the centralization of military command with the integration of all militia units into the regular army on December 20, the key challenge was to both incorporate and neutralize the main civilian groups, the Carlists and the *Falange*, along with the smaller contingent of Alphonsine monarchists. The shared “national Catholic” message, as well as the explicit support of the Church hierarchy, certainly helped to bridge the substantial ideological distance between these groups. But equally important was Franco’s peremptory decision in April 1937, against significant opposition in the ranks, to unify all groups into a single political organization under his leadership, called the *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS*, or simply, the *Movimiento*. Franco probably would have preferred a strictly military dictatorship, but advisers like Suñer convinced him that the creation of the *Movimiento* would provide the regime with a mass base and the foundation of an institutional structure. In January 1938, Franco formed the first government of the “New State,” regulated by the Law of Central Administration, which granted him full executive and legislative power in a single-party state.

Beyond its obvious authoritarianism, the nature of this “new state” continues to provoke debate. Was it traditional and counter-revolutionary or modern and fascist? Did Franco absorb the Fascist party into a traditionalist framework or did the unification lead to greater fascistization of the Nationalists? The most convincing response may be that all of these things were partly true. The formation of a unified party diluted the impact of the fascists and their ideas but did not erase them. In convincing the *Falange* to join the *Movimiento*, Franco adopted much of the fascist rhetoric, including their basic program, in addition to establishing institutions like the *Fuero del Trabajo* of March 1938 that were based on the Italian model of the corporatist state. This process of “fascistization,” or the adoption of certain elements of fascism in recognition of its growing international stature, continued into the early 1940s.<sup>54</sup>

At the same time of course, Franco drew on the traditionalist rhetoric of divine authority and religious crusade, and public events were steeped in Catholic ritual and symbolism, supported by the (non-Basque) clergy. From August of 1936, a few bishops had already blessed the concept of religious crusade, and in September

Bishop Pla y Deniel issued his famous pastoral letter on the “two cities,” but the key document was the July 1, 1937 “Collective Letter from the Spanish Bishops to the Bishops of the World,” which defined the struggle as one between Christian civilization and anti-Christian communism.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, the conquest of new Nationalist territory was marked by the restoration of religious symbols.

Whatever the exact balance of this unstable and evolving combination of elements of military authoritarianism, mass mobilization, fascist revolutionary rhetoric and medieval religious crusade, it was neither fully traditional nor fascist. It was, however, arguably a modern right-wing movement, situated along the broad spectrum of anti-democratic and anti-socialist political frameworks that could compete in the world of mass politics. Even the apparently traditionalist appeal to timeless religious values was a product of a Catholic culture that had transformed itself over the previous decades to compete in this new arena. Exemplary of the fusion of “movement politics” and Catholic values were the Carlist *Requetés* which, despite their avowed traditionalism, shared many functional attributes with the *Falange*.<sup>56</sup> Likewise, the *Sección Femenina* of the *Falange* (SF) proclaimed a pious domestic role for women while mobilizing them into an auxiliary force that did everything from sew uniforms and work in the fields, to propaganda and nursing.<sup>57</sup> Thus, the “national Catholicism” that coalesced during the war was not a paradoxical juxtaposition of the “traditional” and “modern” right but a new hybrid synthesis whose future evolution was hard to predict in 1939.

What is indisputable is that this synthesis provided the framework for a harsh repression of an enemy defined as outside the boundaries of Spanish civilization. While there was a decline in extra-judicial killings after the first few months, as the Nationalists set up formal military tribunals, the broad legal definition of the enemy as anyone who supported the Republic cast a wide net, leading to hundreds of thousands of investigations over the next few years. After the establishment of the new state in early 1938, the regime declared that it had been the legitimate political authority in Spain since July 1936, thus defining any resistance to the rebellion as treason. Still, the bureaucratization of justice during the winter of 1936–1937 did reduce the killings, about 80 percent of which took place by the end of 1936.<sup>58</sup> There were exceptions to this trend, as in the capture of Málaga (February 1937), where a combined force of militias and army units engaged in the kinds of massive direct terror that was rife in the summer of 1936. But, in general, tribunals were increasingly likely to result in prison or labor-camp sentences rather than execution for those not convicted of “blood crimes,” although application of “justice” remained unpredictable. The fall of the Basque Country (June 1937) transferred a huge number of prisoners of war into Nationalist hands, which provoked the dramatic expansion of a fledgling camp system. While there are structural similarities with the evolution of Republican justice, the scale of the Nationalist repressive operation was vastly greater. By the end of 1937, there were 106,822 prisoners in 60 camps, and of these 34,000 worked as laborers, while 59,000 were conscripted into the army. By the end of 1940, when most of the camps were closed, a total of 507,000 prisoners had been incarcerated.<sup>59</sup>

Between the massive incarceration and the estimated 100,000 judicial and extra-judicial executions during the war, it seems clear that the Nationalists were engaged in a broader “cleansing” process that transcended military strategy.

Because the Nationalists won the war, there is no guesswork involved in analyzing the outcome, a regime constructed on the foundation of the cultural, social and political exclusion and marginalization of the defeated. As Franco put it in a November 1938 interview, "There will be no negotiated peace because the criminals and their victims cannot live side by side."<sup>60</sup> Neither normal wartime violence nor total extermination, the level of Nationalist repression can only be understood in the context of a binary framework of victors and vanquished, in which the latter might at some future point be reluctantly reintegrated through extensive punishment, education and transformation.

### Foreign Aid

In addition to the Nationalists' effective internal unification, the foreign aid they received was certainly also a factor in their victory. Without foreign aid a rebel force with no access to government institutions or gold reserves would have had no chance of success. Although the Nationalist war effort was largely financed by loans, both sides spent about the same. However, the apparent parity of resources obscures the superiority of Germany and Italy's consistent and high-quality support of the Nationalist side, especially in the summer of 1936 and from mid-1937 until the end of the war, as the gap in aid continued to grow. From the use of German planes to airlift the Army of Africa to the mainland in July 1936, to the arrival of the Condor Legion air force in October of that year, followed by Italian troops in December, the fascist powers maintained their military and logistical aid until the end. The Condor Legion carried out perhaps the most notorious action of the war, the aerial bombing of the civilian population of Guernica on April 26, 1937, which killed at least 1,500 and came to symbolize the horrors of "total" war in Picasso's famous painting. The number of foreign fighters was definitely higher on the Nationalist side, including 19,000 Germans and over 78,000 Italians, in addition to the 70,000 native Moroccan *Regulares*.

While foreign aid was superior, there is also evidence that the Nationalists utilized that aid more effectively than their enemies, thus securing their rearguard and keeping their army loyal.<sup>61</sup> While it is true that Nationalist armies employed massive initial terror to crush resistance and subdue the occupied territories, in the long war of attrition successful provisioning and supplies were essential to maintaining morale. Thus, the Nationalists established a better relationship with peasant farmers, returning farms if they had been confiscated, paying them for requisitioned food, setting price guarantees and distributing seeds, leading to a dramatic increase in the production of wheat in the Nationalist zone in 1937. Nationalist currency, guaranteed by lines of credit from foreign banks and states, was more stable and regulated than Republican currency, and effective tax collection of private property funded about 30 percent of the war, with the rest financed on credit and loans. And when the industrial regions of the north fell to the Nationalists in the summer and fall of 1937, productivity in these areas increased. In addition to stabilizing resources for the general population, the Nationalists took better care of their soldiers, leading to lower rates of desertion, especially as confidence in a Nationalist victory increased. It seems likely that the professional military leadership of the Nationalist army better understood these logistical realities

and their importance to a victorious military campaign. Whether this logistical acumen provided the decisive edge for the Nationalists, it was certainly one of several favorable factors, including political unity and high-quality foreign aid.

### The Military Stages of the War

On purely military grounds, specialists disagree as to the ranked importance of the quality and consistency of arms shipments, the uneven faceoff between a professional army and a newly constituted one, and the tactical and strategic superiority of the Nationalist command, but, once again, all of these factors worked against the Republicans. Pinpointing the exact moment when Republicans' defeat became inevitable is difficult, but the war steadily and relentlessly turned against them after the initial respite of the saving of Madrid in November 1936.<sup>62</sup> Whether the Nationalists deliberately dragged out the war in order to achieve a crushing and punishing victory or were simply following a methodical and deliberate plan, the aim of unconditional victory was never in doubt.

Before November, the first phase of the war had been characterized by rapid progress of the Nationalist army columns, against which the volunteer militias could do little. During this period, the Nationalists finished their conquest of the rural areas of the southwest, old Castile and León, Galicia, Navarre and western Aragón, which incorporated a majority of agricultural territory. (See Map III-2.) The Republic was left with about two-thirds of the country, from Madrid to the




**Map III-2** Stages of the Civil War 1936–39: March 1937

Mediterranean coast, which included a northern strip of industrial territory with the mining and metallurgy regions of Asturias and the Basque Country, but was cut off from the rest of the Republic. The victory of the Republicans in Madrid, which resulted from the combined effort of militias, loyal police units, a mobilized population and the arrival of the first Soviet shipments of arms and tanks as well as the first International Brigade troops, replaced the rapid “war of movement” with the agonizing “war of attrition.”

Between November 1936 and March 1937, the front remained more or less stable, with the Republicans successfully turning back two major offensives at Jarama and Guadalajara, after which the Nationalists abandoned the goal of capturing Madrid. The only major Nationalist victory during the period was in Málaga, which, with the aid of Italian troops, consolidated the rebels’ control over western Andalucía. Still, at this point the outcome was certainly not determined. The Nationalists had to devise a new master plan, and the Republicans significantly increased their military effectiveness through the integration of militia units into a regular army that was about the same size as the Nationalists’ domestic forces, and the regular flow of supplies from the USSR.

It was during the next stage, from April to October 1937, when the tide began to turn toward the Nationalists. While the makeshift Republican army, with its inexperienced officer corps, had performed reasonably well in defensive battles, the Nationalists proved their superiority in designing and carrying out major offensives with well-trained troops. Even new officers received better training in the military academies set up in Nationalist territory in September 1936. In the spring of 1937, the general Nationalist strategy shifted from the early goal of a quick victory to the piecemeal and gradual conquest of Republican territory. In March, the Nationalists began their attack on the northern industrial corridor of the Basque Country, Santander and Asturias, completing the conquest of the former in June, after civilian bombings to demoralize the population (including Guernica), and the latter in October. In contrast, the Republican army only mounted diversionary defensive fronts, with the hopes of diverting resources from the northern attack. The Nationalist victory in the north not only put the industrial capacity of these regions at the service of the Nationalist cause, but also shifted the majority of the population to its territory.


From November 1937 to the summer of 1938, the Nationalists had taken definitive strategic control, moving east through Aragón toward the Mediterranean coast, with the goal of cutting the remaining Republican territory in two. (See Map III-3.) In April 1938, the Nationalist army reached the sea, effectively cutting off most of Catalonia from the rest of the Republic, bordered on the northwest by Madrid, on the northeast by Valencia, and on the southwest by Granada. Once again, during this period the Republican army remained on the defensive, mounting costly but ultimately ineffective diversionary campaigns. With the battle of Teruel in December and January 1937–1938, the Republicans attempted to seize the initiative with a major offensive, but after 60,000 Republican and 40,000 Nationalist casualties, they could not hold on to it. With the defeat of the eastern army in April 1938 and the declining number of shipments from the USSR, the Republican strategy was reduced to prolonging the war in the hope that the



**Map III-3** Stages of the Civil War 1936–39: March–April 1938

European democracies would abandon non-intervention or at least pressure the Nationalists to offer a negotiated peace without reprisals. With Nazi Germany's escalating aggression in the east, the Republican leaders hoped that the outbreak of general war might finally convince the democracies to scuttle appeasement and embrace anti-fascism.

The next phase of the war, from the summer of 1938 to the fall of Catalonia in February 1939, sealed the Republic's defeat, although Nationalist victory was declared on April 1. (See Map III-4.) The last major Republican stand against the Nationalist army came during the battle of the Ebro, which began in July 1938 to stop the latter's advance on the capital of Valencia and ended four months later with up to 90,000 casualties and a Nationalist victory. Parallel to the Ebro defeat, the Munich Conference of September, in which Britain and France agreed to let Germany annex part of Czechoslovakia, confirmed the policy of appeasement and crushed any hope of support from this corner. By the fall of 1938, the policy of resistance at all costs while lobbying the democracies to change their mind was in tatters, leaving the Republic without a viable strategy and with massive demoralization behind the lines and at the front. The rapid fall of Catalonia, that symbol of Republican pride and commitment, epitomized the deteriorating state of morale and military resistance. Conversely, the violence and retribution delivered by the conquering army in this region illustrated the symbolic power of crushing "red" Barcelona. After the fall of Catalonia, Britain and France recognized Franco's regime and President Azaña resigned, but the Negrín government continued to resist surrender. The final act was not a battle but a failed internal coup launched by army officers in Madrid under Segismundo Casado, who argued they could negotiate an honorable peace.



**Map III-4** Stages of the Civil War 1936–39: February 1939

## Conclusion

But of course there was no honorable peace, only an unconditional victory followed by between 30,000 and 50,000 more executions and hundreds of thousands of arrests, in addition to the exile of some 450,000 people and the continuation of guerrilla warfare, all of which blurred any clear distinction between the war and the postwar period. Just as historians of the Second World War have argued that May 8, 1945 was not a “zero hour,” the same is true for April 1, 1939. A more meaningful periodization would probably combine the civil war and the immediate aftermath, up to at least 1941 and perhaps 1945, as a period of intense strife, warfare, privation and the overarching struggle to impose a new hegemonic order. Not until then can we speak of the beginning of a process of reconstruction, although never reconciliation, under the control of what would become one of the longest right-wing authoritarian regimes in postwar Europe.

So how do we evaluate the “meaning” of this bloody conflict that cost over a half a million lives and traumatized millions more? It seems clear that the answer lies somewhere between the competing moral narratives of “fascism vs. democracy” or “Christian civilization vs. communism,” but it is difficult to pinpoint the exact balance of forces and it is no surprise that Spaniards remain deeply divided. Did Spain lose the opportunity to consolidate a democratic regime that would have joined postwar western Europe? To imagine this outcome would have required not only functional pluralism among the fractured Republican groups but a letting go of the exclusivist rhetoric that permeated their language, both of which the Negrín government at least claimed to support. Even so, a Republican

victory in 1939 would not have given Spain much international support in this process, unless they held on as an anti-fascist democracy until 1945, when Spain may have been able to benefit from the Marshall Plan. As tentative as this alternative imagined path is, it seems to offer more possibilities for a better outcome than the Francoist victory, although of course some would disagree. It is, however, difficult to view the unconditional, unforgiving and extremely repressive Nationalist victory as the best option available to Spain in the 1930s. This conclusion would suggest that Spaniards were simply incapable of attaining the minimal degree of consensus necessary for a functioning democratic state, but one could point to the counter-examples of countries like Italy and Germany, whose political systems were transformed in the more favorable context of a post-allied victory.

The precise circumstances under which the Republic could have won the war are also difficult to define, although everyone would agree that a combination of mutually reinforcing unfavorable factors led to its defeat. It seems hard to sustain the conviction that everything would have been fine if only the democracies had decided to support the Republic, given the level of internal challenges, from political fragmentation to military ineptitude and logistical inexperience, not to mention the alienation of most of the practicing Catholics. But there is no question that non-intervention exacerbated all of these problems, in addition to increasing the Republic's dependence on the Soviet Union and thus the power of the controversial Communist party. For the Nationalists, it seems equally hard to sustain the position that their victory depended solely on the foreign aid from fascist powers. Equipped with about the same amount of resources as the Republican side, the centralized and efficient Nationalist organization was able to channel these into a coordinated military and logistical strategy that gained at least passive acceptance by many non-Republicans and bested the Republican armies on the battlefield. At the same time, it is impossible to imagine the Nationalist victory without this foreign aid, since a rebellion against an elected democratic government would have had no international standing among non-fascist powers. However one ranks the importance of the various domestic and international factors, none of them worked in the Republic's favor, not even its status as the democratically elected government. What is also clear is that the outcome marked a huge fork in the road in Spanish history, whose consequences are still being played out today.

## THE SECOND DICTATORSHIP: THE FRANCO REGIME, 1939–1976

The Republican defeat in the Civil War was followed by nearly forty years of dictatorship that ended only with the death of the man whose name came to define the regime. While the Franco regime began and ended as a dictatorship, its adaptive survival over four decades has generated ongoing debates about its identity. Was it a fascist regime, a military dictatorship, a traditional authoritarian regime, or some hybrid type? The regime began as a de facto ally of the fascist powers during the Second World War and ended as an ally of the democratic “West” in the Cold War. Evolving along with its international alliances was the regime’s economic and cultural policies, which began with an isolationist autarky designed both to promote national self-sufficiency and to keep out impure foreign ideas, and ended with a booming tourist industry and economic integration into the global capitalist economy, a process that sparked dramatic rates of growth and cultural pluralism. And, while the political institutions of the regime never underwent a parallel evolution, there was a shift in leadership away from fascist ideologues and toward more “technocratic” modernizers, whose primary goal was to increase at least passive support for the regime through higher standards of living rather than indoctrination and mass terror.

The regime’s evolution has made it difficult to pinpoint its essential nature, a problem exacerbated by the competing moral narratives of Spain’s twentieth-century history. Thus, for the left, any apparent changes were merely cosmetic, while the fundamental identity of the regime remained rooted in its fascist and violent origins. In contrast, the other camp argues that the Franco regime underwent a substantive evolution from a “hard” to a “soft” authoritarian regime, whose gradual liberalization created not only prosperity but even the conditions (if only inadvertently) for transition to democracy in the late 1970s. Between these two extremes are various nuanced positions, but no consensus about whether the regime fits into a single typology, or stands as a hybrid, or moves from one category to another over its long life. More than an academic dispute over terminology, the debate reveals the ongoing struggles to define the trajectory of Spain’s modern history. Was the Franco regime a dramatic deviation from “normal” European development that crippled Spain’s progress for four decades, or a mere parenthesis in which the country recovered from the devastation of the war and started down a

path of prosperity and stability that set the country on a convergence course with its western European neighbors?<sup>1</sup>

## The Franco Regime in Comparative Perspective

Situating the regime in relationship to the rest of Europe has been a challenge, given the unique combination of longevity and change over time.<sup>2</sup> At first, it was one of various fascist and non-fascist dictatorships, but after 1945 it stood with Portugal's Salazar regime (1930–1974) as one of two surviving right-wing dictatorships until Greece joined them (1967–1974). At the same time, the dramatic contrast between a violent, repressive and impoverished Franco regime and a prosperous and seamlessly reconstructed postwar democratic "Europe" should not be overstated. Recent histories of "postwar" Europe have emphasized the continuing impact of the war and its violent legacies well beyond 1945, not to mention the privation and population displacement and deportation that disrupted recovery into the early 1950s.<sup>3</sup> And Europeans' involvement in violent conflicts did not end in May 1945, with civil wars in Greece and the Balkans, and the efforts to reconquer colonial empires in Asia, where former anti-fascist fighters could end up participating in dirty colonial wars.<sup>4</sup>

In terms of political reconstruction, democratic Europe encompassed a minority of the continent, and was still consolidating in many countries. Older histories of "postwar" Europe too often erased both eastern and southern Europe from a story of the seamless democratic reconstruction of "Europe." The Cold War context helped solidify the connection between democracy and the "west."<sup>5</sup> But between the left-wing dictatorships in the east and the right-wing dictatorships in the south, non-democratic rule remained an important element of "European" political culture. Even within what would become the democratic core, democracy was very much a work in progress in countries like Germany and Austria. It can be argued that not until the late 1960s could democracy be described as consolidated and entrenched in north western Europe. After this point, the identification between "Europe" and democracy created the space for imagining a southern Europe in need of democracy, or of a transition into what had only recently become normalized in "Europe."<sup>6</sup> This longer trajectory of European recovery and democratization does not minimize the impact of continuing dictatorship in Spain, but it suggests that 1945 was not the "zero hour" after which Spain's path veered dramatically away from the European norm for the next thirty years.

Before 1945, the Franco regime fitted comfortably in a Europe in which democracy had become an endangered species. Indeed, most of the ideological struggles of the later 1930s were taking place on the right, with the basic division between traditional authoritarian regimes, which wanted to return to an elitist pre-democratic era, and "new-right" fascist regimes which embraced the instruments and rhetoric of mass totalitarian-style mobilization.<sup>7</sup> During the 1930s and 1940s, opponents of the Franco regime as well as outside observers believed it was fascist, the only fascist regime to survive the Second World War. By the 1960s, however, the regime's economic evolution and its sloughing off of most of the visual and rhetorical trappings of fascism prodded political scientists to re-evaluate,

resulting in a new categorization, that of authoritarianism, which became the dominant interpretation until a recent generation of historians revived the fascist label as well as the debate.<sup>8</sup>

The authoritarian school relies both on process and institutional characteristics to distinguish it from fascist regimes.<sup>9</sup> The regime's origins in a top-down military coup, the negligible role of the *Falange* (the Fascist party) in the road to power and its absorption into the regime's catch-all party, the *Movimiento*, which contained fascists, Alphonsine monarchists, and Carlists, all point to the protagonism of traditional elites and mechanisms of seizing power. They also rightly argue that no parallel party structure competed with the state institutions, as existed in Italy and Germany, and that the fascists were always "junior partners" in a conservative-dominated coalition.<sup>10</sup> Reinforcing traditionalist rhetoric was the Catholic Church, which provided ideological support for a dictator who claimed to be defending Christian civilization. Although Franco's personal power had no institutional limits, the "authoritarian" school argues that the regime maintained a certain "limited pluralism," both in terms of political groupings or "families," and in terms of cultural space, in which the Church and the *Movimiento* often competed. While this camp acknowledges early fascist trappings, such as the salute, the mass spectacles, the military uniforms and the corporatist bodies, they are viewed as both superficial and fleeting.

In contrast, the fascist school rejects what they view as rigid taxonomies in favor of a broader spectrum of fascisms that all shared a similar "social function" at a particular moment of social and political crisis. From this Marxist-influenced perspective, fascism is defined by its destructive goals, not by its formal characteristics. In response to the claim of ideological and organizational pluralism, those in this camp argue that fascism and Catholicism worked in tandem as a unified ideology for the "victory coalition," which created a monolithic state. And, while the fascists were junior partners, they rightly point out that fascists never came to power alone and were always part of a broader coalition. From the spectrum perspective of fascist regimes, there are many similarities between Spain and Italy that seem to undermine any firewall between them, including the autonomous presence of the Catholic Church, the survival of the monarchy, and the dominance of conservative over fascist elements in the regime coalitions. The fascist school also points to the high level of violence and eliminationist rhetoric, which some compare to the Nazi genocide.<sup>11</sup> They argue that the "authoritarian" label, assigned to regimes with varying levels of internal repression, seems to minimize the centrality of violence. The fact that the "authoritarian" category emerged in a Cold War context to distinguish Communist "totalitarian" dictatorships from implicitly more benign right-wing dictatorships exacerbated this perception.

Part of the difficulty in resolving this debate is that neither typology fully captures the regime, especially its evolution over time. Thus, the "fascist" position brushes over the marginalization of fascist elements in the later decades. At the same time, the "authoritarian" position downplays the regime's origins and the continued impact of violence and repression. Those in the first camp argue explicitly that the foundational violence "fixed" the identity of the regime at its origins, with any subsequent changes more superficial than substantive.<sup>12</sup> In contrast, the classic 1964 article on authoritarianism based its analysis on a current snapshot of

the regime, with scant reference to its origins in the fascist era. At the same time, the equation between fascism and high levels of internal repression is dubious, as the contrast with prewar fascist Italy and Germany reveals.<sup>13</sup> Thus, about 500,000 people were incarcerated in concentration camps in Spain between 1937 and 1942, compared with 25,000–50,000 in prewar Nazi Germany, while 30,000–50,000 were executed after the civil war in Spain in contrast to 29 death sentences in fascist Italy before 1939.

Instead of the straitjacket of single typologies, more dynamic models that can accommodate hybridity as well as change over time seem more promising. One way out of the conundrum is to highlight the coalition of nationalist forces that provided both continuity and change in the nature of the regime.<sup>14</sup> That is, the same coalition of conservatives and fascists provided continuity, while the shifting balance of those forces within the coalition evolved toward “entropy” rather than the “radicalization” that occurred in Nazi Germany. This type of coalition placed the regime in the “fascist era” at its inception, as a “modern” response to the pressures of mass society and popular mobilization.<sup>15</sup> And it was this same coalition that made the regime more than a traditional authoritarian dictatorship, even in the 1960s–1970s, when the fascist element had been sidelined. One approach to encapsulating this dynamism is to adopt an evolutionary model, in which the regime evolved from a “semi-fascist” to an authoritarian regime.<sup>16</sup> Another approach is to define the entire dictatorship as a “fascitized” hybrid, that is, containing enough elements of fascism to differentiate it from the traditional right, but not enough to constitute a proper fascist regime. From start to finish, fascist ideology and practice remained as one frame of reference, competing with the dominant conservative national Catholicism.<sup>17</sup> Yet another hybrid approach, “graduated authoritarianism,” locates the regime between two categories, that is, “semi-reactionary” and “corporatist authoritarian.”<sup>18</sup> Given the complexity of a regime with so many moving parts, as well as the competing narratives of the dictatorship in Spain’s twentieth-century trajectory, consensus may always be elusive.

## Periodization: The Stages of the Franco Dictatorship

There is broad agreement that the regime passed through distinct phases, in terms of the shifting prominence of one group or other in the nationalist coalition, the economic policy of the regime, and its position in the international scene.<sup>19</sup> Because this chapter is focused on the political evolution of the regime, its periodization will follow the major shifts in the ruling coalition. From this perspective, there was a first fascist-influenced period from 1937 to 1945, a second “national Catholic” phase, 1945–1957, and a third “technocrat” stage, 1957–1969, in which capitalist development became the dominant goal. A final phase, from 1969 to 1975, witnessed the dissolution of the nationalist coalition and the crisis of the regime.

While power shifted among what were called the “families” of the regime, the cast of characters remained constant beneath the unquestioned authority of the *Caudillo*, or supreme leader. The families included the military, the Church, the *Falange*, the Carlists, the Alphonsine monarchists and the CEDA Catholics, all of whom remained semi-autonomous interest groups within the “single-party” *Movimiento*

structure, but none of them strong enough to challenge Franco's authority. It was only in the late 1960s that Franco agreed to a further process of institutionalization that could, he hoped, survive his death. In this sense, there was an overarching continuity in the political organization of the aptly named "Franco regime" that trumps more subtle shifts in the supporting coalition over time. Whatever the limited de facto pluralism of squabbling families, the arbitrary power of the *Caudillo* never wavered.

The secret to Franco's extraordinary personal authority over a long dictatorship has been the subject of much debate, but most would agree that the story began with his initial formation as a soldier, a fervent Catholic and an ardent Spanish nationalist.<sup>20</sup> Born in 1892, Franco spent his formative military years in the conquest and "pacification" of Spanish Morocco, one of the *Africanista* soldiers who would later bring their colonial mentality to the war against their Spanish compatriots. After ten years fighting in Morocco, Franco emerged at age 33 in 1926 as the youngest general in Europe and the Director of the new military academy in Zaragoza. During the Republic, he voted for the CEDA and collaborated with the government to lead the crackdown on the Asturian rebellion of October 1934, after which he was named Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1935. Franco did not initiate the military conspiracy, and only definitively signed on after the assassination of monarchist politician Calvo Sotelo on July 13. From this cautious position on the margins, with the help of astute advisors and, crucially, his command of the best military units of the Army of Africa, Franco moved to claim supreme authority over the Nationalist side, which he maintained until his dying moments.

How was he able to achieve this political longevity? For some, his personal ambition was his only driving force, making him a scheming opportunist whose main skill was the ability to balance all the forces in his coalition against one another, and to follow the winds of international security wherever they led. Others argue that he held strong beliefs, rooted in the religion and nationalism of Spanish conservatism, and that he was inspired by what he thought was a divine mission to save Spain from chaos and dissolution. In this scenario, his shifting allegiances, from an admiration of Mussolini and Hitler to his alliance with the United States in the 1950s, reflected pragmatic efforts to protect Spain in a shifting international context. Although apparently paradoxical, it does seem as if Franco stuck to his core beliefs throughout his life while pragmatically accepting changes, if sometimes reluctantly, in order to secure his personal political survival. One of those core beliefs was the absolute virtue of the "victorious coalition" in the Civil War, which nurtured a politics of exclusion against the defeated that never gave way to a discourse of reconciliation, even after the mass killings stopped. Significantly, the ongoing celebration of the "victory," reinforced by the carefully nurtured myths of the *Caudillo's* greatness, served to keep the coalition intact, while Franco's selective appeasement of different groups kept each one loyal, if not always satisfied.<sup>21</sup>

The proof of Franco's indispensable role in the dictatorship is that it could not survive his death, however much he thought it was "securely tied down" (*atado y bien atado*), in his famous phrase from a 1969 speech. At the same time, the regime was never simply a personal dictatorship run like a family business; instead, it depended on Franco's ability to maintain and balance the loyalty of distinct interest groups. This combination of a broad coalition and the unifying authority of Franco

created a paradoxical balance between strength and fragility that eventually broke down in the last phase, as the coalition disintegrated.<sup>22</sup>

### **Phase One, 1936–1945: Militarization, Fascist Influence and Extreme Repression**

The first phase of the Nationalist regime began in the midst of the Civil War, and ended with the Axis defeat in 1945. In contrast to disagreements about the later phases, there is broad consensus about the extreme violence, militarized control and fascist influence that characterized this opening act. Its first feature was the militarization of political power, which began with the creation of the National Defense Junta on July 24, 1936 and its assumption of all state powers, and continued with formal martial law until 1948. At the same time that ultimate military authority remained constant, the shift to a single leader was consolidated on October 1, 1936, when Franco was declared head of state and personally endowed with all the powers of that state. While Franco may have preferred a personal military dictatorship, the need to build a coalition for the long war led to the creation of the *Movimiento* in April 1937, a single organization that forcibly integrated all the political groups under his authority, and was meant to serve as a link between the new state and society, following the model established in fascist Italy and Germany.

The second feature of fascist influence peaked between 1937 and 1942, reinforced by the rising star of European fascism. Leadership in this period was provided by the Falangist chief minister and brother-in-law of Franco, Ramón Serrano Suñer, who also became foreign minister in 1940. The influence of fascism was also an internal product of the grassroots expansion of the *Falange* after July 1936, which remained the dominant element within the *Movimiento*, and was later reinforced by the rising star of European fascism, especially after the Nazis invaded Poland in the fall of 1939. Fascist influence began to fade from 1943, when the international tide began to turn, with German defeats in the USSR and Mussolini's ouster in July.

The last feature of this period was one of the most brutal campaigns of internal violent repression ever waged by a European state against its own population. Even though the regime probably never aimed to literally eradicate all of the defeated "anti-Spain," the hundreds of thousands of individuals who were either incarcerated or executed between 1937 and 1945 demonstrate the ambition of the violent "cleansing" project. How do we explain this ferocity? Given the chronological overlap between fascist influence and massive repression, the impulse to link these processes as causally related is understandable. However, given the huge disparity in domestic violence perpetrated by fascist regimes, it seems more plausible to link the extreme violence in the Spanish case to its origins in a civil war, which generated its own radicalizing dynamic of destruction. The continued intensity of repression even after total victory in 1939 can be further explained by an international context in which there was no effective pressure on the Franco regime to reconcile with the defeated.

While these features are hard to fit into a simple "fascist" typology, there were plenty of "semi-fascist" or "fascitized" elements. In particular, the *Movimiento*

mimicked many of the performative roles played by the fascist movements in Germany and Italy. It incorporated most of the *Falange's* fascist platform, its blue uniform, its emblem of the yoke and arrows and the fascist salute, while fascists dominated the leadership structure. Franco himself made almost half of his public appearances in the Falangist uniform and continued to use the salute.<sup>23</sup> The *Movimiento* also carved out an important space in propaganda and the dissemination of information, through the most extensive network of newspapers and radio stations established within the limits of the strict 1938 press censorship law.<sup>24</sup> And, while the mobilization of the population in regime-controlled organizations never reached the level of Nazi Germany after its “coordination,” or *Gleichshaltung* campaign, about 2 million people belonged (at least nominally) either to the *Movimiento* (932,000 in 1942) or one of its affiliated institutions, like the *Sección Femenina* (SF) (almost 300,000), the *Frente de Juventudes* (FJ/ Youth Front) (565,000 boys and 279,000 girls in 1941) and the *Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitarios* (SEU/ University Student Union) (53,000). These organizations, which had branches in nearly every city and most towns in Spain, also staged mass spectacles that evoked the public narrative of choreographed mass support that characterized fascist rallies in Italy and Germany. Beyond the *Movimiento's* orchestration of media and spectacle, its members filled the ranks of the public administration at all levels, from mayors to civil governors to central administrators.

Perhaps the centerpiece of fascistization was the *Fuero del Trabajo* (Labor Charter) (March 6, 1938), a framework for corporatist and “vertically integrated” labor relations that was modeled after the Italian version. Under its auspices, the *Organización Sindical de España* (OSE/ *Syndical Organization of Spain*) was established, with mandatory affiliation for all “producers,” that is, owners, managers and workers, in 28 National Syndicates in various sectors of the economy. Significantly, against the opposition of the Church, the Catholic unions were integrated into the unified structure of the OSE, just as their university association was incorporated into the SEU. The organizational structure was framed in the totalitarian language that Mussolini had invented and embraced, promoting the mobilization of the masses through monopolistic channels in the service of the state. The OSE also included a mandate to dispense “social justice” to the population, with various branches dedicated to material assistance, protecting mothers and children, and affordable housing, all consistent with the fascist rhetoric of building the national community.<sup>25</sup> Also consistent with fascist community-building was the complementary language of exclusion, which demonized not only “reds,” but also Freemasons, Jews and Protestants.<sup>26</sup>

What further enhanced the fascistic appearance of the regime was its open affinity with the Italian and German states when Europe appeared to be on the brink of a new fascist order.<sup>27</sup> Although Spain never joined the Axis cause, it maintained a “non-belligerent” status in favor of the Axis for most of the war, which included opening Spanish ports to German submarines and collaboration on military intelligence. After the war, the Franco propaganda machine claimed that the *Caudillo* had saved Spain from further destruction by wisely keeping the country out of the war. While historians still argue about Franco's intentions, in June 1940 he offered Spain's services to the Axis powers, in exchange for ownership of part of the French empire in North Africa and the promise of massive military and economic aid.

Supporters claimed he deliberately made impossible demands knowing Hitler would refuse them, which the latter did in a famous meeting between the two leaders in October at the French border.

However, there was no question that Franco's sympathies lay with the Axis, especially once Germany invaded the communist USSR. In support of this anti-communist crusade, the Franco regime sent the "Blue Division" of some 47,000 volunteers to fight on the Russian front alongside the German army. Less well known is that Franco shared the Nazis' anti-Semitism and viewed the Allied coalition as a Jewish-controlled evil power, although it was not a driving force in his policies as it was for Hitler.<sup>28</sup> In any case, even without a deal with Hitler, Franco still hoped that an Axis victory would advance his imperial ambitions in Gibraltar and North Africa. Only with the declining international fortunes of the Axis did Franco begin to move toward a stricter neutrality (from October 1943), although not enough to escape pariah status among the democratic victors after the war.

But the direct fascist influence in the government had already begun to decline, even before the turn in Axis fortunes. Serrano Suñer's totalitarian ambitions for the *Movimiento* had never been popular with the other families, and the ministerial crises in May 1941 and September 1942 that culminated in his ouster signaled a shift. His replacement by Franco's new trusted adviser, an anti-Falangist military man, Admiral Luís Carrero Blanco, inaugurated the Dictator's *modus operandi* of juggling to maintain a balance of forces. The *Movimiento* organizations continued to operate, but a 1941 law confirmed the right of the Church to establish its own religious organizations, like *Acción Católica* (442,000 members in 1946), which would compete with the *Movimiento* in both mobilization and public spectacle, from open-air masses to popular missions. Perhaps more important in the long run, the Church had free rein to operate and expand its private-school network, while the Catholic religion was established as a mandatory feature of the state-school curriculum. Further diluting the Falangist influence, in July of 1942 Franco reconstituted the Cortes as an "organic" body of representation whose delegates would be appointed members of the military, the Church, the *Movimiento*, the Syndicates and the local and provincial administrations.

At the local and provincial levels, the totalitarian claims of the *Movimiento* leaders were undercut not only by the Church but also by the traditional elites and their *cacique* networks, only partially disrupted by Republican reform efforts.<sup>29</sup> Thus, it was one thing to hold ministerial positions in the government and another to penetrate and transform local political cultures of patronage. From the outset, power struggles over administrative positions and resources at the local level belied both the illusion of a "single party" and of totalitarian integration under new fascist leaders. Instead of extreme centralization, the result was often arbitrary power and corruption, with favors distributed to friends and withheld from enemies. Ironically, all sides often accused each other of trying to revive corrupt *caciquista* practices in what was supposed to be a "new state," but the upshot was often significant continuity in both personnel and the informal culture of patronage, only now contained within the heterogeneous ranks of the *Movimiento* rather than between rival parties as in the past.

Whatever the limits of fascist influence before 1945, it was in the wake of Allied victory and efforts by exiled Republican officials and the monarchist heir, Juan de

Borbón, to win support for ousting Franco that the regime made a significant shift away from fascist trappings and toward what would become the dominant national Catholic ideology. After 1945, ministerial cabinets were dominated by monarchists, military men and the Catholics of *Acción Católica*. Instead of a fascist “new state,” national Catholics advocated the restoration of the pre-liberal kingdom. Illustrating the rise of Catholic influence, as well as the desire to project a more favorable international image of a regime steeped in religious tradition, Franco approved the restoration of the kingdom in June 1947. But at the same time, he retained his ultimate authority and the power to decide when to choose a successor.

The distancing of the regime from the Axis powers coincided with a decline in mass executions and incarcerations, although there is evidence that it began even earlier. Some studies on postwar military justice have suggested that most of the death sentences were handed down by the end of 1940, with a growing shift toward incarceration.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, as a pragmatic response to an overwhelmed judicial system, in January 1940 a new sentencing order encouraged reconsideration and reduction of previous sentences, as well as expedited processing of the tens of thousands of pending cases. By 1945, all civil war offenses other than “blood crimes” were pardoned. As a result, while as many as 280,000 republicans occupied 190 concentration camps at their peak capacity in 1940, after 1942 all but one camp had shut down.<sup>31</sup> By 1952, only 829 prisoners were still serving sentences for civil-war crimes (although thousands continued to be imprisoned for new political offenses). At the same time, the number of death sentences declined precipitously: whereas an average of 10 people a day were shot between 1939 and 1945, from 1960 to 1975 the average rate of executions was one per year.<sup>32</sup> Scholars still debate whether the decline of mass execution and then incarceration was primarily a cynical effort to curry favor with the Allies or a pragmatic attempt to reduce an exploding prison population, but all agree that the regime’s attitude toward the defeated had not changed and there was no move toward reconciliation.

In any case, the decline in mass death and incarceration in the post-Civil War era does not minimize the extreme repression of the Franco regime against its own population. From the outset, when the Nationalist army declared itself the rightful government of Spain, loyalty in any form to the Republican state after July 18, 1936, even in Republican territory, was defined as military rebellion. Under this definition of “reverse justice” (a term later coined by Serrano Suñer), many people were killed or incarcerated simply for doing their jobs, and many more were theoretically excluded from ever rejoining normal society, like the numerous public employees who lost their livelihoods through political purges. Another 200,000 went into permanent forced exile, a number comparable to the Russian exodus after 1917.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, even as civil-war prosecutions declined, the regime continued its draconian surveillance and persecution of suspected enemies of the regime, which decimated the remaining organized opposition, including sporadic guerrilla warfare, which petered out by 1948.<sup>34</sup> Finally, the system of forced prison labor that was established in 1937 continued well into the postwar period, with up to tens of thousands laboring either for the military or private companies, building roads, railroad tracks, port facilities and, most famously, the Francoist war monument,

the “Valley of the Fallen” (*Valle de los Caídos*).<sup>35</sup> Supporting the military apparatus of repression, the Church lent its imprimatur to a victory without mercy by framing it as a necessary process of purification and redemption through suffering rather than as ignoble revenge.

Beyond physical punishment, the concept of “repression” encompasses many other ways of excluding, punishing and marginalizing the defeated population.<sup>36</sup> It is common knowledge that the postwar years brought extreme poverty, hunger and often brutal working conditions to ordinary Spaniards, with an estimated 200,000 deaths from starvation and related diseases. But scholars have also made a compelling case that the worst effects of this subsistence crisis were deliberately aimed at the working classes, collectively identified as “reds.”<sup>37</sup> Thus, the economic policy of autarky, which economists agree had a disastrous impact on reconstruction, allowed the government to manipulate the distribution of resources in a closed environment that weighed most heavily on the poorest. At the same time, the new “vertical union” structure imposed complete social discipline on workers, who had no recourse against the power of their employers to set wages and conditions. With a 1943 law that equated strikes with military rebellion, and a 1944 law that codified the principle of worker obedience, only individuals could file complaints. Similarly, in rural areas, not only were the agrarian reforms of the Republic revoked, but the power of vengeful landowners over their landless laborers was virtually unchecked.

Repression also had a cultural face, exemplified by the “silencing” of the defeated and the monopolization of public memory and history by the victors.<sup>38</sup> With a tightly censored public sphere populated mainly by mass displays of religious and nationalist fervor that celebrated Spain’s victory over anti-Spain, the Republic and republicans were rhetorically excised from the national story. Beyond the silencing of purported political enemies, the regime made every effort to excise cultural manifestations of alternative national identities, like Catalan and Basque, whose existence the victory coalition denied. Thus, the use of Catalan in public life was forbidden, and extensive restrictions on publishing in that language were also imposed, along with a campaign urging the population to speak “the imperial language.” Within this broader conception of repression, the end of the fascist era in 1945 did not constitute a significant turning point for the defeated, who continued to be meaningfully excluded—economically, politically, linguistically, socially and culturally.

## **Phase II, 1945–1957: National Catholicism, Monarchist Restoration and International Integration**

While the broader fascist era in Europe ended in 1945, it took until at least the end of the decade for the Franco regime to consolidate its internal structure and its external position. The context of international ostracism, extreme privation, renewed guerrilla activity and diplomatic pressure by exiled Republicans and the Bourbon heir made the last half of the 1940s the most vulnerable period of the entire regime. And yet, by the end of the decade, the regime had begun a process

of international rehabilitation, crushed any remaining hope of opposition and stabilized politically around the hegemonic national Catholic vision, all under the auspices of the still unlimited authority of Franco. The dictatorship's capacity to survive through a process of adaptation that never threatened Franco's authority was plainly on display at this critical juncture. At the same time, adaptation did not totally transform the regime, which retained its unstable balance of all the regime families and ideologies. Thus, 1945 was certainly not a "zero hour" after which the dictatorship left behind all fascist influence.

Even from the international perspective, 1945 was no "zero hour." Thus, immediately after the war, the potential for reintegrating Spain into western Europe looked bleak. Spain was denied membership in the United Nations (UN) in June 1945, a decision supported by Britain, the United States and the USSR at the Potsdam Conference in August. In March 1946, France and the United States issued a condemnation of the regime that included the hope that Spaniards would achieve a peaceful end to the dictatorship and a return to democracy, and in December the UN issued a resolution to explore ways to achieve regime change in Spain. More concretely, most countries refused to establish diplomatic relations, apart from a few exceptions, including the Vatican and Argentina, whose wheat exports were key to economic survival.

Despite such rotund declarations, in practice none of the democratic states were willing to intervene directly to force Franco's removal. Partly they feared a renewal of civil war, but they were also uncertain about the alternative. That is, in the emerging Cold War polarization, where anti-communism was quickly replacing anti-fascism as the unifying ideology of the "west," the heterogeneous Republican opposition was not viewed as a reliable partner to establish an acceptable liberal democracy. Conversely, Franco's enthusiastic anti-communism, played up precisely to make the case, began to seem like the lesser of two evils. Finally, there were economic imperatives for restoring at least some ties, particularly the European demand for Spain's pyrites and zinc. As a result, even before the political shift, bilateral trade agreements with Britain and France opened a quiet process of economic reintegration into western Europe.<sup>39</sup>

The political shift began in the United States in 1947, when military officials broached the desirability of incorporating Spain into the security apparatus of western Europe, given its strategic location. The formal turning point was the November 1950 resolution of the UN revoking the 1946 condemnation, although membership was delayed until 1955. After the 1950 resolution, however, most countries renewed diplomatic relations. The most important symbol of Spain's integration into the anti-communist alliance was the September 1953 agreement with the United States, which offered aid in exchange for US military bases on Spanish territory.<sup>40</sup> Reintegration was still partial, as evidenced by Spain's subordinate position in the US agreement, its exclusion from the Marshall Plan (1947) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949), and later from the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957). Nevertheless, it was enough to dash any lingering opposition hopes that the Allies would support regime change, and to give the regime space to consolidate its new political orientation.

The regime's new political orientation was officially defined by the Cortes (May 1946) as an "organic and Catholic democracy." Its "democratic" credentials were

codified in the *Fuero de los Españoles* (Charter of the Spaniards) in July 1945, which was, on paper, an impressive declaration of rights. Instead of “inorganic” liberal democracy, with its divisive political parties and atomized citizens, “organic” democracy would be based on the “three pillars” of community life: the family, the municipality and the syndicate. Elections to both city councils and the Cortes were based on corporatist suffrage representing these “natural” social units. The first municipal elections were held in 1948 after the lifting of martial law, although they were not intended to expand political freedoms. Candidates were closely screened by the civil governors, and, until 1954, all voting was channeled through regime-controlled bodies like the syndicates or the Chambers of Commerce. In 1954, heads of household were allowed to vote for the one-third of city council seats representing “families” (not until 1968 for the Cortes), but candidates still had to pass a background loyalty check, and there was no principle of “opposition,” loyal or otherwise. Despite the trappings of electoral procedure, these policies cannot be considered part of a blueprint for gradual democratization, given the unwavering dictatorial authority.

Nevertheless, the declaration of an “organic and Catholic democracy” allowed church leaders to justify official collaboration with a regime that had embraced “Christian liberty” over “totalitarian statism.”<sup>41</sup> Thus, the new Foreign Minister in the 1945 cabinet overhaul was the former President of *Acción Católica* (AC), who began the successful campaign to negotiate a new Concordat with the Vatican, concluded in 1953. AC continued to expand its autonomous reach into Spanish society with the establishment in 1947 of several new organizations, the *Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica* (HOAC/Catholic Action Workers’ Guild), the *Juventud de Obreros Católicos* (JOC/Catholic Workers’ Youth) and the Catholic Student Youth (JEC), all of which further undermined the *Movimiento*’s totalitarian ambitions.

At the same time, Franco moved to mollify his Monarchist supporters and keep them from defecting to Don Juan’s plan for immediate restoration of the legitimate dynasty. Thus, the March 1947 “law of Succession” defined Spain as a kingdom and restored the medieval advisory Council of the Realm, but without accepting the principle of legitimacy or a timeline for restoration. Most importantly, Franco remained “Head of State,” not Regent, with the sole right to choose the successor. The new law was put to a public vote in a referendum (July 1947), which not surprisingly produced an overwhelming victory. The strategy successfully deflated Don Juan’s position, and he moved from directly challenging the regime to angling for his son’s future prospects. To this end, in 1948 he agreed to Franco’s demand that his 10-year-old son, Juan Carlos, return to Spain to be educated under the *Caudillo*’s supervision, an education that culminated at the military academy at Zaragoza, which Franco had once directed.

While monarchists and Catholics shifted into the dominant position in the victory coalition, the fascist-dominated *Movimiento* remained part of Franco’s balancing act, and he resisted calls from the other families to dissolve it. Even though its budget was cut by 75 percent in 1946, Falangists still controlled the ministries of labor, justice and agriculture in 1951, and the *Movimiento* was given permission to stage a massive congress in October 1953. Attended by up to 250,000 members, the *Caudillo* himself addressed the gathering, clad in the Falangist uniform that he had not worn regularly since 1945. In yet another cabinet shuffling in 1956, two more

Falangist ministers were brought in to help quell the first sign of dissent among university students in Madrid. The new Secretary General of the *Movimiento*, José Luis Arrese, even launched an ambitious plan in 1956, which proposed autonomous authority for his organization to veto ministerial decrees and rule on constitutional issues. But after several months of internecine turmoil, Franco rejected what the other families labeled a “totalitarian” project.

In yet another ministerial crisis in February 1957, the *Movimiento* was relegated to the most subordinate position in the government coalition, where it remained for the rest of the dictatorship. This crisis would represent the last substantive initiative of the fascist sector to recover leadership in the coalition, although the *Movimiento* retained its presence through its projects of popular mobilization, social justice and propaganda. The architect of the *Movimiento's* political defeat was Carrero Blanco, whose vision would define the next phase of the regime.

Of course, in 1957 it was not apparent that the regime was on the cusp of a new era. The *Movimiento* was still a visible presence in Spanish politics and society, and, despite some internal jockeying, the “victory coalition” of 1939 was still fully intact, as was Franco’s unlimited authority. And, although the Church and its organizations shared the state-controlled public sphere with the *Movimiento*, their goal was not greater pluralism but indoctrination of Spaniards into active support of the dictatorship, whether through fascism or national Catholicism. Change was perhaps most dramatic in international relations. Whether from pragmatism or opportunism, Franco had deftly negotiated the international shift from anti-fascism to anti-communism, showcasing religious and monarchist tradition, in addition to “organic democracy,” as evidence of accommodation with the “west.” Never fully fascist in structure, but with important fascist elements in the government up to 1957, the regime remained an unstable hybrid, held together by the blood pact of the Civil War and the implacable marginalization of anti-Spain.

### **Phase III, 1957–1969: Authoritarian Development and Institutionalization**

As with the transition between the first and second phases of the dictatorship, the beginning of a third phase after 1957 is only clear in retrospect, as Franco clearly had no grand reform plan. Indeed, many of the dramatic changes of this period can be viewed as unforeseen consequences of pragmatic decisions taken to address immediate problems. Those who make a case for a transition to a “softer” authoritarianism tend to subscribe more intentionality and broad vision to the economic liberalization measures adopted at the end of the 1950s. Those who argue for more continuity point out that the victory coalition remained intact, as did the claim to uphold national Catholic ideology while quashing all opposition. In terms of the coalition, the weakened *Movimiento* did not disappear from the scene, and continued to resist the course set by the new group of technocratic leaders who took control of the cabinet.<sup>42</sup> In other words, the regime still contained a hybrid mix of conflicting visions that resists a clear narrative of transition from one regime type to another. In any case, what began as economic policy changes to address the

failure of autarky unleashed a chain of consequences, the majority of them unanticipated and undesired. The desired outcome was economic growth and rising standards of living, while the unwelcome consequences were the negative side effects of growth, the revival of opposition and the growing pluralism of culture and society, aided by the influx of millions of foreign tourists. Despite these changes, the political structure of the regime remained essentially static, only apparently more institutionalized or “tied down” with the formal succession plan of 1969. There is no evidence that Franco—or Carrero Blanco—envisioned a parallel political opening to match the economic liberalization that, in any case, they only reluctantly accepted.

Without deviating from the overall goal of preserving the dictatorship and maintaining Franco’s authority, the strategic shift after 1957 took shape as a version of what political scientists call “authoritarian development.” That is, the dictatorship would promote economic growth and stability, with the hopes that a higher standard of living would generate at least passive support and undermine the mobilizing potential of any emergent opposition. Shifting the focus from indoctrination, penance and active exclusion, the new dominant strategy would harness the power of capitalism to create consumer goods, jobs and prosperity and, it was hoped, consent. In the authoritarian development model, the state gambles that prosperity will compensate for the lack of political freedoms among a population whose energies are too invested in making and spending money to become dissidents. For those few who still chose to rebel, the authoritarian state still had a formidable repressive apparatus.

By most accounts, the Franco regime was one of the most successful versions of authoritarian development in this period, its economic results outstripping similar projects in the Middle East and Latin America, and surpassed only by Japan.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the new strategy succeeded, at least in the short run, in reinforcing what some scholars have called “sociological Francoism,” the apolitical support of the regime among sectors of the population who felt they had benefited, first from the myth of “Franco’s peace” in the 1940s and now by the perceived economic opportunities. At the same time, the unforeseen consequences of the new technocratic strategy probably also weakened the regime in the long run. Indeed, scholars still debate whether the authoritarian development model is infinitely sustainable or is destined to erode as a result of tensions between economic and cultural pluralism and the lack of channels for political expression.

The orientation of the new government was reinforced by further cabinet reshuffling in 1962 and 1965 that confirmed the dominance of the so-called technocrats. The technocrats belonged to an elite Catholic organization called *Opus Dei*, whose purpose was to train Catholic secular leaders, not represent Catholic organizations or the church hierarchy like the national Catholic faction. They were monarchist, but not involved in the disputes about the legitimate heir. Instead, they were professionals whose main ideology was economic liberalization; that is, they advocated the reduction (not disappearance) of government control over the economy and the unleashing of free trade, foreign investment and market-based production. Under Carrero Blanco’s direction, the technocrats also aimed to complete the institutionalization of the monarchy and to increase the efficiency and efficacy of the administrative bureaucracy.

In foreign policy, the regime placed increasing emphasis on economic pragmatism, beginning with a petition to join the EEC in 1962, but including trade agreements with communist countries in eastern Europe in the late 1960s, followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations, which would have been unthinkable in the 1940s. Also unthinkable in the 1940s was the gradual process of decolonization in Morocco, which symbolized the end of Franco's dreams of imperial expansion. Spain had been reluctantly forced to recognize Moroccan independence in its Protectorate zone in 1956 once France had done so, and withdrew most of its troops by 1961. Nevertheless, Spain retained its claims over the Sahara and other enclaves, even changing their status to Spanish provinces in 1958. However, Spain eventually followed the western European trend of letting go (rather than the Portuguese intransigence), instituting rudimentary self-rule in 1967 and promising a referendum on self-determination in 1973. In 1975, when Franco was on his death bed, Spain finally let go, after which Morocco moved in to occupy the territory.

In domestic policy, the new orientation was demonstrated in the pragmatic technocratic measures intended to boost efficiency, efficacy and growth. Between 1957 and 1967, a series of laws aimed to create a uniform state bureaucracy with a professionalized corps of administrators who were promoted through merit and expertise, not ideological affiliation or personal influence. While undoubtedly there were limits to this transformation, there is no question that the professional civil servant contributed to the de-ideologization of the state apparatus during the second half of the regime. Many have argued that this class of civil servants, loyal to the dictatorship while it lasted, easily shifted their professional affiliation to the new democratic government, thus facilitating the political transition.

In terms of the institutionalization of the regime itself, the 1958 law revising the principles of the *Movimiento* completed the eradication of fascist principles from the regime's official platform and confirmed the commitment to a "traditional, Catholic, social and representative Monarchy," with "organic representation" of the family, municipality and syndicate. Carrero Blanco was ready to follow this up with an overarching "Organic Law of the State," but Franco's resistance to limiting his range of action delayed its promulgation until 1967. The law represented more of a consolidation than an innovation, although it did slightly redefine the Cortes as the "organ of participation of the Spanish people in the labors of the state," and expanded the election of family representatives from city councils to the Cortes. Like the 1947 law restoring the kingdom, this law was put to a vote in a popular referendum, which was overwhelmingly approved.

The last piece of the structure was the formal declaration of a successor, increasingly urgent after a hunting accident in 1961 almost killed Franco and even more so as he began to demonstrate signs of Parkinson's disease from the mid-1960s. The ultimate authority of the dictator was evident in how long he delayed the decision, but, at age 77 he finally acceded to the pressure and nominated the 31-year-old Juan Carlos in July 1969. At the same time that Franco's ultimate authority remained intact, his active participation as head of state had been declining over the decade of the 1960s as Carrero Blanco increasingly took charge of policy. What maintained this delicate balance was the shared commitment to both maintaining Franco's position in the present and to ensuring that the regime

would continue after his death. With the 1969 succession law in place, it appeared that everything was on track to achieve this goal.

Beyond institutional consolidation, the most important innovation was the inauguration of a new economic policy. The new direction is often tied to the 1959 Stabilization Plan, but involved a more gradual process of reforms that stretched back to the early 1950s and extended into the mid-1960s. What changed after 1959 was the explicit abandonment of economic autarky and the pursuit of full integration into the EEC and the global capitalist market. The autarkic economy had limited exports and foreign investment and overvalued the peseta, while the state had invested heavily in a domestic industrial sector. While this strategy achieved some economic recovery in the 1950s, the massive state infusion into industry drove up inflation, and the restrictions on international trade limited the potential for expanded markets and the import of capital and technology. It was only the sense of urgent crisis that finally convinced Franco to accept a fundamental change of economic direction, although it was clear that he was as suspicious of economic liberalism as he was of political liberalism.

Once the so-called “economic miracle” unfolded, Franco did not hesitate to take credit for it, increasingly adopting the authoritarian development strategy of foregrounding prosperity over victory in the Civil War as the centerpiece of legitimation going forward. Indeed, from a purely statistical perspective, the results were spectacular, generating the highest rates of economic growth (7 percent per year) that Spain had ever experienced, surpassed only by Japan in the 1960s and early 1970s. While Franco himself can hardly be credited for a policy shift that was forced on him, the liberalization undoubtedly allowed Spain to participate in the broader European “miracle” happening outside its borders. But the primary engine of economic growth was western Europe, and the regime did little more than remove the obstacles placed there by the regime itself, which had prevented Spain’s taking advantage of this broader process.<sup>44</sup> In fact, one could argue that the liberalization only compensated for the disastrous and punishing autarkic policies, leaving the regime’s overall economic legacy ambiguous.

Furthermore, the limits of the authoritarian economic miracle were as evident as its successes. With a minimal welfare state and without free unions, as well as few regulations or taxes on banks, employers and developers, the distribution of this new wealth remained very unequal. Despite the new strategy, then, economic growth most benefited the elite groups that had always supported the regime and was felt least by those who had always been marginalized. As a result, one could argue that the negative consequences of economic growth for those at the bottom were as powerful as the positive consequences in fueling social and cultural change. Thus, ordinary consumers faced the spiraling prices of an unregulated market, as the regime retreated from price controls. And the new working-class residents pouring into the major cities to take jobs in the booming industrial sector were confronted with chaotic and unregulated development that produced substandard housing and a lack of basic services.

In an authoritarian state, the channels for citizen complaints were weak, and petitions could drag on for years. The formal centralization of the Francoist state located decision-making in bureaucratic structures far removed from peoples’ lives, while largely appointed local governments had neither the power, the

resources nor the political will to act as defenders of their communities. The combination of the embedded culture of patronage and corruption and the authoritarian lack of accountability maintained the image of a state that was at best inept and at worst negligent. It was one thing for Carrero Blanco and his team to adopt the principles of administrative efficiency and efficacy, and another thing to create a new culture of service that “delivered the goods” to the ordinary citizen, not just the well-connected elites.

Whatever the limits of authoritarian economic liberalization, the regime tried to prevent it from spilling into political liberalization. That is, as the technocratic governments hoped to seduce the population with an increased standard of living, they also continued their efforts to keep dissidence in check. In 1957, in response to the re-emergence of strike activity, a new law gave the police broad leverage to make arrests without demonstrating individual participation, and in 1958, a new military court was established to deal specifically with “extremist activities.” A 1960 law on military rebellion, banditry and terrorism authorized these courts to deal with all sorts of vague subversive activities that opposed public order and national unity. The absolute number of people convicted under these rubrics was not large, but between the surveillance of local police brigades and the exemplary executions, such as that of the communist Julián Grimau in 1963, the barriers to actively working against the regime remained high. Moreover, these “flashes of brutality” created a sense of arbitrary unpredictability that was itself a weapon of intimidation.<sup>45</sup>

Nevertheless, the regime could not prevent the gradual revival of social conflict and opposition, yet another unintended consequence of authoritarian development.<sup>46</sup> Without arguing for a direct causal relationship, it is clear that the changes unleashed in the economic sphere spun out of the regime’s control, opening new spaces for mobilization as well as new grievances. Significantly, the state was most successful in attacking traditional and familiar forms of political opposition, like Communist party cells. But it proved more difficult to both recognize and suppress new forms of mobilization. Beginning sporadically in the mid-1950s with the first strikes and student protests, by the late 1960s popular mobilization was a regular if minority feature of Spanish society.<sup>47</sup> The government tried to keep tabs on this activity with measures like the 1964 Law of Associations, which provided a legal rubric for registering organizations with varied goals and interests, as long as they promised loyalty to the regime. But it proved increasingly difficult to contain what has been called the “return of civil society.”<sup>48</sup> From Catholic worker organizations to semi-independent unions, student groups and neighborhood associations, diverse collective voices increasingly challenged the regime’s strategy of channeling a demobilized population’s energies into economic activity. And paradoxically, it was partly the chaotic and unregulated results of economic growth that created the problems these new forms of mobilization sought to solve.

Another oft-cited example of unintended consequences was the impact of the tourist boom on Spain’s cultural and social autarky.<sup>49</sup> Promoted to generate wealth and capital accumulation through the comparative advantage of Spain’s warm Mediterranean beaches, the annual influx of millions of tourists forced a degree of cultural and social opening to the outside world that Franco never wanted. At first accepted grudgingly, by the 1960s the state embraced the phenomenon with the

hopes of channeling its benefits. The campaign to make Spain inviting for foreign tourists is identified with Manuel Fraga, the Minister of Information and Tourism (1962–1969), who accepted a pragmatic degree of social modernization in order to preserve the regime. As part of this campaign, Fraga convinced a reluctant Franco to approve a new press law in 1966 that recognized freedom of expression and rescinded pre-publication censorship. More of a pragmatic response to the growing quantity and diversity of media and publications than an embrace of pluralism, the law still made it more difficult for the regime to maintain control over the expanding cultural sphere.<sup>50</sup> The iconic illustration of this loss of control was the gradual de facto acceptance of bikini-clad tourists on Spain's vacation beaches, despite morality laws forbidding indecent exposure. While the impact of tourists on the local population is sometimes exaggerated, the regime was increasingly sensitive to bad publicity about the "inquisitorial customs" which might prevent tourists from bringing their much-needed foreign currency to Spain.<sup>51</sup>

All of these unintended consequences of economic liberalization loosened the regime's ability to maintain the strict control over culture and society that had been possible under autarky. Even the *Movimiento* leadership under the new director José Solís Ruiz realized that the dream of totalitarian integration was no longer viable. But while the technocrats hoped to replace state intrusiveness and control with demobilization and economic "freedom," the *Movimiento* sought new ways to voluntarily mobilize the population around its broader goals. Already in the wake of the 1956 university protests, a 1957 *Movimiento* report on "recovering" the university warned of the need to "modernize" the SEU (the official student organization) and find better ways to reach the students.<sup>52</sup> Likewise, a 1958 law that introduced collective bargaining into the *Movimiento*-controlled syndicates (OSE) implicitly acknowledged that the old hierarchical structure based on obedience was not functioning. In order to increase industrial productivity, collective bargaining between workers and employers was supposed to inject more flexibility into the system, but also make the syndicates more representative of, and attractive to, the needs of workers.

In addition to reinvigorating existing organizations, the *Movimiento* created new channels to encourage ordinary Spaniards to get involved in public life and their communities. While the concept of grassroots participation was not new, the novelty was linking it to greater diversity and pluralism and giving voice to different perspectives, if still within the limits of regime loyalty. Within this framework, Solís proposed two new types of associations. The first, never approved, were "political" associations, which, instead of a party system, would institutionalize the de facto limited pluralism of the "families." The second proposal, for family associations, envisioned them as a direct channel between the "natural" unit of the family and the state. In 1963, the *Asociaciones de Cabezas de Familia* (ACF/ *Associations for Heads of Household*) were created, followed by associations for housewives, parents of disabled children, consumers and student parents. The *Movimiento* hoped that the family associations would both invigorate public life and channel this new energy into support for its own goals, specifically mobilizing votes for *Movimiento* "family" candidates for city councils and, later, the Cortes. There was thus an inherent tension between the rhetoric of "pluralism" and the expectation that diversity would ultimately be channeled under *Movimiento* "tutelage," as the ACF proposal affirmed.<sup>53</sup>

Not surprisingly, this tension ended up creating yet more unintended consequences. In the case of the SEU, the *Movimiento* lost the battle completely when it was dissolved in 1965. The OSE, on the other hand, was reinvigorated, but not as the *Movimiento* anticipated. Thus, the institution of relatively free shop-floor elections for worker delegates opened a space for a new generation of dissidents who ended up co-opting the syndical organizations. In the case of the family associations, while most probably did not become seedbeds of opposition, they did not all remain in the *Movimiento* orbit either. More broadly, the rhetoric and space for “participation” took on a life of its own that escaped the channeling goals of the *Movimiento*. While the *Movimiento*’s and technocrats’ responses to a more diverse society were distinct, both paths inadvertently opened the door to a more diverse and plural civil society. While direct political expression and dissent were still tightly monitored, this growing pluralism undermined the regime’s control over many aspects of Spaniards’ lives.

#### **Phase IV, 1969–1975: Collapse of the Coalition and Death of the Dictator**

While the decade of the 1960s was characterized by a growing tension between a more diverse and pluralist culture and society and a closed political system, it was only at the end of the decade that the stability of the regime itself began to waver. Scholars argue about which was the most important factor in signing the death warrant of the regime. Social movement theorists tend to emphasize the rising dissidence and opposition, while modernization theorists emphasize what they call the unsustainable disjuncture between a “modern” society and an authoritarian regime. But dictatorships do not automatically fade away as a result of rising living standards and better education, nor can they be toppled by opposition unless they have been weakened from within. That internal crisis of the regime began in 1969, when the coalition that supported it started to dissolve, and culminated with the death of the leader in 1975, when the final link was broken.

Following 30 years during which the “victory coalition” remained intact, united by the Civil War and Franco’s ability to balance the “families,” the last five years witnessed its dissolution. In part this was a direct result of Franco’s withdrawal and physical decline. But more importantly, it reflected a division within the coalition about how to proceed after his death. One faction, the “bunker” led by Carrero Blanco and supported by Franco, wanted to stay the course after his death. For the other faction, known as the “reformers,” the regime had to “open up” to the new political and social forces of Spanish society, although there was no consensus about what this would look like. Significantly, this division was largely generational, with younger members of all the groups, from the Church to the *Movimiento*, falling into the reformer category. Thirty years after the end of the Civil War, a new generation which had no personal experience of war and victory or defeat rejected the “blood pact” as a relevant political compass.

Nevertheless, it was the bunker that remained in charge, confirmed by the passage of the Organic Law of 1968, which only consolidated existing practices. Indeed, the

governments formed between 1969 and 1973 were dominated by this position. In response, a growing, if uncoordinated, sector of “reformers” deserted the victory coalition and began to experiment with new political ideas and formations as well as conversations and dialogue with moderate opposition groups. The open disagreements among the regime elites were apparent in the endless debate over recognizing some form of political associations, while the ultimate decision to table any such reforms while Franco was alive indicated where the power lay. What disrupted this internal power balance was the dramatic assassination of Carrero Blanco in June 1973 by the Basque independence organization, ETA. In retrospect, most analysts see the event as the point of no return for the regime, but there was still no substantive move toward political reforms before Franco’s death in November 1975.

Outside the government, any illusion of “Franco’s peace,” which had been trumpeted at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the Civil War in 1964, was quickly evaporating. While popular mobilization affected only a minority of the population, it forced the dictatorship to choose between *de facto* tolerance and ramping up repression, which was becoming less palatable. Indeed, the reformers argued that unless the government opened up more legitimate political channels, it would lose any chance at winning the loyalty of people who wanted sewers in their neighborhoods, better working conditions or reformed education curricula. Much more important to the regime was the declining loyalty of Catholics, a key element of the founding coalition. In one of the most visible representations of the collapse of the victory coalition, the Catholic Church pulled away from its unquestioned support, as a younger generation of clerics inspired by Vatican II embraced democracy and social justice and sometimes communism. In 1971 the bishops issued a statement affirming the independence of the Church, thus abandoning “national Catholicism,” and in 1973 another resolution defended democratic pluralism and human rights, as well as the separation between religious and state spheres.

The most direct threat to “Franco’s peace” was ETA, which pursued a terrorist policy of assassination after 1968, with the hopes of promoting a repressive spiral that would mobilize the population against the regime.<sup>54</sup> The regime’s hard line against ETA, including large-scale arrests, torture and prosecution, failed to contain the group and even created sympathy and popular support, especially since all their early targets were police and Francoist officials. The 1970 military trial in Burgos of ETA activists provoked international outrage and scrutiny, about the lack of democratic process as well as the repression of the Basque language and culture. And of course the visual spectacle of the public explosion that killed Carrero Blanco represented a serious blow to the fiction that everything was “tied down.”

Of course no single causal factor or event can explain the relatively rapid decay and death of the dictatorship. The growing pluralism of society and culture and the direct challenge from oppositional forces certainly put the regime on the defensive and exposed the illusory nature of many of its myths. At the same time, that pluralism acted as a wedge prying apart the regime coalition, which was increasingly divided on how to deal with the new world growing up under its feet. Finally, Franco’s looming mortality threatened what had been the most unifying

feature of the regime. The man who had held together the coalition for more than 30 years could not force agreement on what to do after his death. With a ruling coalition that was both divided and about to be decapitated, the regime was unlikely to survive in its current form. Explaining the demise of the regime, however, is not the same as explaining the transition to democracy. In other words, there was no automatic or preordained process that led from economic growth to the implosion of the dictatorship to a democratic state. Franco's death clearly ended an era, but it is only in retrospect that it opened the transition to what would become Spain's current democratic regime.

## Conclusion

So how do we define this complex dictatorship that spanned nearly four decades with contradictory currents of continuity and change? While there are features of all the non-democratic regime categories that ring true at one point or another, no single typology adequately sums up the dictatorship. It was never purely fascist, at least in terms of standard characteristics, but it never completely left its fascist roots behind. Over time, the regime looked increasingly like a conventional authoritarian dictatorship, but it was never only or completely this, as the huge *Movimiento* bureaucracy illustrated. Franco's personal authority was an overarching reality, but it was never just a personal dictatorship either. Most convincing is to view the regime either as a dynamic entity that resists categorization or as a hybrid formation defined by the shifting balance between competing ideologies and visions. One thing that is clear is that it remained a dictatorship from start to finish, with no evidence of movement to dismantle the authoritarian structures.

Beyond the question of definition is the evaluation of its impact. The competing moral narratives of good and evil try to condense this complexity into one story, either a Francoism permanently defined by its earliest, most violent stage, or one that evolved into a benevolent soft dictatorship that smoothed the path to democracy. But any understanding of the regime should encompass the full picture, in all its messy complexity. Thus, the regime pushing economic growth in the 1960s still had threads of continuity with the fascist-influenced, ultra-repressive period. Conversely, focusing only on the mass executions and incarcerations of the first phase leaves us without a road map going forward. Simply put, any effort to define the regime's impact cannot bracket one period or another as the "essential" Francoism. The impact of the nearly 40-year period between a brutal civil war and a consolidated democratic regime is inevitably more contradictory than that. And it is even more difficult to isolate the impact of the dictatorship itself from that of all the other changing factors beyond its control, from the Cold War to the European community, the postwar economic boom in Europe and the transformation of Spain's own culture and society. Spain was undoubtedly a very different society and existed in a very different Europe in 1975 than in 1937, but it is hard to know what the trajectory would have looked like without Franco and the dictatorship. Neither a "mere parenthesis" nor a "lost four decades" seem to adequately sum up the legacy of this controversial regime.

# ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION, 1930s–1970s

After a century of gradual economic growth and social evolution, the half-century inaugurated by the Depression and Civil War interrupted this long-term trend. Instead of a continuation of this gradual trajectory, the next fifty years witnessed a dramatic lurch from one extreme to the other, from declining growth and demographic catastrophe, often called the “years of hunger,” to rapid growth and social transformation in the last two decades, sometimes labeled the “economic miracle.” Explaining this dramatic change of course continues to fuel debates about what finally put the Spanish economy and society on a convergent course with the wealthier western European countries that would culminate in the latter decades of the twentieth century. At the center of these debates is the impact of politics and policy on shaping these broader trends, particularly the role of the evolving Franco dictatorship. Thus, from the start of the Civil War to the 1950s, few disagree that the regime’s economic and social policies had a deleterious impact, while the issue is muddier in the 1960s and 1970s, when economic and social transformation, as well as quality of life indicators, took off. Regime elites at the time took credit for the increased prosperity, but most scholars today would paint a more complex picture, not only about the source of the “miracle” but about its selective and unequal impact on the population.

## **Economy, Society and Culture in Comparative Perspective**

Equally complex is the question of how to situate the moving target of the Spanish economy and society from the 1930s to the 1970s in the broader European and global context. Taking the long view would suggest overall consistency with European patterns, while the short view highlights Spanish “difference.” From the 1830s to the 1930s, Spanish trends paralleled those in western Europe but at a pace that widened the gap between the haves and the have nots. Over the next couple of decades, Spain also shared with Europe the setback of devastating war, albeit on a different timetable. By the 1970s, the pace of change in Spain began to narrow the

gap with the wealthiest countries and, in parallel fashion, to widen that gap with the rest of the world, so that by the end of the century Spain had left its intermediate status behind to become a full-fledged member of the “first world.”<sup>1</sup>

From the short-term vantage point of the early 1950s, however, the trajectories of Spanish and western European societies stood in stark contrast, perhaps more than at any other point in the modern period. At the moment when western European countries embarked on their “golden age,” a period of rapid and inclusive economic growth whose benefits were broadly distributed, thanks to increased social spending and progressive taxation, Spain suffered from a stagnating economy, a highly unequal society and a polarizing and vengeful state. While in Europe, leaders optimistically embraced the welfare state in order to end class divisions, in Spain the regime’s policies hardened the class-based social order. With the tendency to conflate working class and political enemy status, economic and social polarization increased, despite the regime’s effort to adopt a “post-class” rhetoric. In cultural terms, the entire network of voluntary associations and organizations linked to the working and urban middle classes, from unions to cultural centers and secular schools, were wiped out, leaving a void that was filled either by the Catholic Church or simply by a retreat into family life. While some have used the concept of “totalitarian” to describe this impoverished landscape, most agree that the regime never approached the level of control over society and culture that occurred in Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia, which even in those cases was never “total.” Nevertheless, there is no question that the space for an independent and vibrant civil society had disappeared. More broadly, the regime’s cultural autarchy kept Spaniards isolated from “modern” foreign trends while imposing a set of traditional values, from gender roles to sexuality and religious practice.

Given the dramatic divergence between Spain and western Europe in the 1950s, the convergence of the 1960s and 70s seems all the more surprising. From a glacially slow economic recovery through the 1950s, the “opening” of the Spanish economy at the end of the decade led not only to the most rapid growth in the modern period but to the completion of the structural transformation from an agrarian to an industrial and service economy, and to a largely urban society. Parallel to these structural changes were dramatic increases in standards of living that expanded the middle classes and “consumer society,” and improved aggregate health and life-expectancy indicators. Perhaps equally dramatic were changes in the cultural realm, including the revival of associations, non-state media and artistic and cultural production, as well as the influx of foreign products and ideas, delivered in print or through the millions of tourists who arrived from the 1960s. Finally, there was the erosion of “traditional” values, especially among a younger cohort that shared much with the “60s” generation elsewhere in Europe, despite less freedom of expression. The great irony was that the regime that had made a concerted effort to shield Spain from “modernity” witnessed an unprecedented degree of transformation in its final decades.

Explanations for this apparent conundrum vary, but most would agree that the existence of a dictatorship in Spain inserted an element of “difference” in the process. The most benign view is that the Franco regime’s eventual embrace of “authoritarian development” as a survival strategy provided a stable environment

for growth, which unleashed a modernizing dynamic that the regime may not have planned or even intended. Others argue that the most important factor in Spain's economic and social transformation was not the regime's policies but the European boom.<sup>2</sup> But even once the Spanish economy joined Europe, part of Spain's competitive advantage was rooted in its authoritarian system—that is, in a disciplined labor force with no bargaining power, coerced into accepting low wages.<sup>3</sup> When added to the low level of social spending and the regressive tax structure under the dictatorship, this meant that benefits were unevenly distributed, by class but also geographical region.<sup>4</sup> And while the benign view minimizes the residual effect of the extreme repression and privation of the earlier period, critics argue that these structured the inequalities of the boom period and beyond.<sup>5</sup> The upshot is a complex interplay between difference and convergence that does not divide neatly into an earlier period of difference and a later period of convergence.

## Economic and Demographic Trends

At the macro level, however, the economic and demographic statistics illustrate a clear division between the earlier “years of hunger” and the later “economic miracle,” divided by a transitional phase in the 1950s when the economy was no longer in decline but not yet on a growth trajectory.<sup>6</sup> The late 1930s and 1940s witnessed a decrease in growth and productivity, as well as population, as a result of repression, disease and exile. Foreign trade was 50 percent less than before the war, agricultural and industrial productivity were down, 20–30 percent and 10 percent respectively, and the annual growth rate hovered well under 1 percent. Per capita income was still at one-third of prewar levels in 1945, with earning levels at 40 percent below postwar Italy. It was not until the mid-1950s that the Spanish economy and income had recovered to its 1929 levels, and not until the end of the decade that calorie consumption had returned to its pre-Civil War levels. Demographic transition began in the 1950s, with a decline in infant mortality and rising life expectancy, although this trend was due more to the impact of antibiotics than to rising standards of living.<sup>7</sup> After the Stabilization Plan of 1959 began a process of liberalization, the new growth pattern set in. Thus, the period from 1960 to 1975 was marked by 7 percent annual growth of GDP, higher than in any other industrial country except Japan, and the per capita GDP doubled from the previous 25 years. By the early 1970s, Spain had moved up to the eighth-largest economy in the world, with a per capita income of \$2,000, which placed it among the wealthiest nations.

### The “Years of Hunger”: Deprivation, Disease and Death in the 1940s

When the Civil War ended in 1939, the Franco regime blamed the war, droughts and international boycotts for the privations of the postwar decade. But in fact, the physical and economic destruction caused by the war was not as great as that of the Second World War in the rest of Europe. Thus, most experts agree that the slow path to recovery was due as much to Francoist policies, which not only hindered

recovery but enhanced the misery of the poorest and most vulnerable.<sup>8</sup> The main features of economic policy in this period were an inadequate rationing system, a black market that increased inequality and corruption and an autarchic framework that limited foreign trade and aimed for self-sufficiency, despite shortages and a lack of key resources, from cotton to oil.

As a result of these strictures, day-to-day life for many Spaniards was defined by privation if not desperation. The rationing system that lasted for twelve years was both punitively implemented to exclude the losers and inadequate to cover caloric necessities without some access to the black market. One scholar estimates that rations in the mid-1940s covered 73 percent of bread needs, but only one-quarter to one-third of daily consumption of pasta, potatoes, rice, coffee, oil and sugar. A poor family which had to spend half its income on food in 1936 to cover caloric needs would have needed 242 percent of their income in 1941 to maintain that diet. Instead, many Spaniards simply ate less, consuming an average of 500 fewer calories a day in 1948 than 1936 (2,380 vs 2,760), which represented around 80 percent of western European consumption at the time.<sup>9</sup> Even by the mid-1950s, consumption remained 10 percent below prewar levels. Basic living conditions were also primitive, with an acute shortage of housing units, estimated at 680,000, and only one-third of existing homes equipped with running water, 9 percent with a bath or shower and 2.6 percent with heat.<sup>10</sup>

Not surprisingly, these conditions led to increased mortality rates from starvation and diseases caused by malnutrition. An estimated “excess” 200,000 Spaniards died from such causes between 1939 and 1945, while infant mortality rose from an already high 120/1000 in the early 1930s to 150/1000 a decade later. Epidemics spread like wildfire through weakened populations, such as the 4,000 struck down by typhus in Málaga in 1941 or the 60,000 who died of dehydration from diarrhea across Spain that year. And of course these deaths came on top of the 30,000–50,000 political executions carried out after the Civil War, between 1939 and 1941.

This privation had a geographical and class component. Wealthier Spaniards could take advantage of the thriving black market to purchase extra goods, and those who owned land could grow their own food and sell it for double on the black market, while the landless, the unemployed and the families of Republican prisoners fared the worst. One local study of an agrarian community in north-eastern Spain shows how the black market created huge fortunes for large estate owners, millers, bakers and olive oil transporters, but also healthy profits for smaller farmers.<sup>11</sup> As a result, farming communities with more equitable land distribution in the north of the country could not only survive but begin to recover their prosperity.

In contrast, in the *latifundia* areas of the south the landless laborers were returned to their former subservient position, their livelihood dependent on often vengeful landowners. Even without considering the 15 percent who were permanently unemployed, the purchasing power of agricultural laborers’ wages was half what it had been in 1936, and the growing disparity between rising prices and stagnant wages did not start to narrow until the 1950s. One 1941 government study reported that tens of thousands in Extremadura had eaten nothing but grass boiled in salt water for months.<sup>12</sup> Whether rationing and autarchy were intended to punish the

poor for their support of the Republic or were simply misguided, in either case the results were the same.<sup>13</sup> That is, the “years of hunger” disproportionately affected those at the bottom of the economic hierarchy, who were also more likely to have supported the Republic.

In addition to the “extra” deaths from war, execution, disease and malnutrition, the Spanish population lost another 500,000 to exile, although all but 160,000–200,000 returned. During and in the immediate aftermath of the war, about 470,000 fled across the border to France, and by 1949, there were 125,000 Spaniards remaining in France, with another almost 40,000 having left for Latin America, mostly Mexico, as well as for Russia and other parts of Europe.<sup>14</sup> During the Second World War, as many as 10,000 of the European exiles fought in the anti-fascist resistance in France, while another 13,000 were handed over to the Germans and interned in concentration camps, where most of them died. For the rest, the end of the Second World War, the crushing of the final guerilla resistance inside Spain by 1948 and the grudging international acceptance of the Franco regime marked the transition from temporary to permanent exile.

By any measure, the extended postwar period in Spain was an economic and demographic disaster from which the country, and especially the most vulnerable sectors of the population, was only beginning to recover by the mid-1950s. The dictatorship showed more enthusiasm for bolstering national pride and shoring up moral standards than with improving the material welfare of the population, especially the sectors associated with the Republican side.

### **From Economic Stagnation to Rapid Growth: 1950s–1970s**

The economic trajectory began to shift slowly in the 1950s, when production and income finally recovered to prewar levels, but it was not until the 1960s that the macroeconomic indicators began to rise dramatically, paralleled by structural transformation in the workforce and in where and how people lived. Once the government reduced the barriers blocking Spain from the European economy, the process of growth and transformation was funded by a dramatic increase in foreign capital.<sup>15</sup> One source was direct foreign investment, which rose from 40 to 700 million dollars between 1960 and 1975. A second source was tourism, whose numbers catapulted from 6 million visitors in 1960 to 30 million a year in 1975 and 42 million in 1982, as tourist spending in Spain rose from 300 million dollars per year to 7 billion. The third source of foreign capital was remittances from migrants working abroad, mostly in northern Europe, who sent back 360 million dollars per year in 1965 and 1 billion in 1973.<sup>16</sup> As foreign capital entered Spain, foreign trade multiplied by a factor of ten. Equally significant were the evolving contours of that trade, with the value of industrial exports growing as the importance of foodstuffs, especially citrus fruits, declined.

At the same time as the gross statistics provide evidence for an “economic miracle,” it is also important to note the inequalities still embedded in this new prosperity. If Spain was no longer “underdeveloped” by the death of Franco, it was still unevenly developed in geographical terms, with benefits unequally distributed among the population. In addition to these qualifiers, the 1973 oil crisis hit Spain particularly hard, slowing growth significantly for the rest of that decade.

*Structural shift from Agriculture to Industry and Service Sectors*

At the macro level, the most dramatic change was the structural shift away from agriculture and towards the industrial and service sectors, accompanied by accelerated urbanization. During the years of hunger, the proportion of the population working in agriculture actually increased from 45 percent to 50 percent, with only a slight decline by 1950. By the end of the 1950s, however, it had dropped to 36.6 percent, as unemployed or underpaid landless laborers began to flee the countryside with hopes of a better life in the city or abroad. By 1970, only 22.8 percent worked in agriculture, falling to 13.9 percent by 1981. Conversely, the percent working in industry rose from 18.9 percent in 1950 to 23.5 percent in 1960, 27.9 percent in 1970, reaching its peak in 1981 at 28.4 percent. Another 6.6 percent worked in construction in 1950, rising to 10.5 percent in 1970. Even more dramatic was the increase in the service sector, from 26.9 percent of the work force in 1950 to 33.2 percent in 1960, 38.8 percent in 1970 and 48.9 percent in 1981. These jobs reflected a growing consumer society, the expansion of the tourist industry and, by 1981, the expansion of government spending and services after the end of the dictatorship.

In the agricultural sector, the shrinking workforce was accompanied by widespread mechanization, which both increased productivity and transformed the rural landscape. As laborers left the countryside, shrinking supply and forcing up wages, mechanization finally became economically viable. By the end of the regime, cereal farming with tractors used 90 percent fewer labor hours.<sup>17</sup> The government stepped in with incentive programs for the purchase of tractors and better credit options, but the combination of liberalization, which made high-yield fertilizers and farm equipment widely available, and the profits larger farmers had earned off the black market, were the other two important factors. During the 1960s, the smallest farmers and sharecroppers who could not afford mechanization found themselves increasingly uncompetitive, and an estimated 500,000 farms disappeared. One local study provides a window into the dramatic consequences of this rural transformation. Between 1950 and 1965, all the landless families left the village, whose total population was cut in half, leaving only mid-sized and large mechanized commercial farms. For these remaining families, agriculture had been converted from a way of life into a livelihood, while they had been transformed from peasants into capitalist farmers.<sup>18</sup>

In one of the ironic consequences of this structural transformation, a regime that had celebrated and tried to protect traditional rural life witnessed the most massive depopulation of the countryside since the seventeenth century. Between 1950 and 1975, about 6 million Spaniards, or 20 percent of the population, relocated, most of them leaving rural and small town communities for cities, while one-third of them left the country.<sup>19</sup> During the 1960s, the rural population declined from 42 percent to 25 percent, while the urban population rose from 56 percent in 1960 to 73 percent in 1981. The internal migration routes sent those from central Spain to Madrid, from the south, Aragón and the Mediterranean coast to Catalonia and from northern Castile and Galicia to the Basque Country, all three destinations being centers of industrial growth. Cities like Barcelona, Madrid and Bilbao ballooned in population, with an additional 1.4 million settling in each of the first two, while a quarter-million moved to the Basque Country. The number of mid-sized

and large cities doubled between 1960 and 1981.<sup>20</sup> Those who left Spain mostly headed north (more than one-third each to France and Germany), along with other southern Europeans, attracted by wages for unskilled labor that were 2.5–3 times higher than in Spain. About 84,000 a year left through legal channels, with the rest emigrating illegally.

Many of the internal migrants joined the expanding industrial work force, in which salaries were increasing by 8 percent per year, almost tripling between 1964 and 1972. In 1973, before the oil crisis hit the first-world economies, the unemployment rate in Spain was at just 1 percent. Supply and demand partly explains the higher wages, but the ratio of skilled to unskilled jobs was also greater than it had been in the earlier industrial workforce. In 1973, about 40 percent of industrial employees were skilled workers, another 18 percent occupied administrative and technical positions, and 41 percent were unskilled.<sup>21</sup> As industrial production increased, so did productivity, multiplied by more than three between 1960 and 1973.

As significant as the increase in productivity and brute production was the diversification and the shift towards more heavy industry, which rose from 21 percent of industrial output in 1900 to 53 percent in 1980, with a spectacular boost in the 1960s.<sup>22</sup> Industrial growth was concentrated in chemicals, paper and metal industries like automobiles, ships (the fourth-largest producer in the world) and machine tools, although the older textile industry remained a force, especially in hiring female workers. Seventy percent of the 91,000 textile workers in 1968 were women, and new factories were built in Madrid and Valencia, as well as smaller cities, extending beyond the traditional stronghold in Catalonia.<sup>23</sup> However, in line with the shift towards heavy industry, the signature product of Spain's industrial boom was the automobile, whose production grew at a rate of 22 percent between 1958 and 1973, from 36,000 cars a year in 1950 to 700,000 in 1973. Led by the Spanish SEAT 600 coupe, the automobile industry was also an engine for growth in ancillary industries like cement (road construction), oil refining and metallurgy.

#### *Consumption and Population Trends*

The SEAT 600 was also emblematic of the other side of economic growth, that is, the rising consumer power of a domestic market that bought most of those automobiles. The engine of the expanding consumer economy was a fast-growing middle class, comprising professionals, administrative personnel, business owners and managers, foremen and technicians, and other white collar workers, along with a larger skilled and better paid working class. Consumption of "non-essential" goods began to grow in the early 1960s but really took off later in the decade, when the "virtuous cycle" between production and consumption peaked. From 35 percent of GDP spent on food in 1954, by 1975 it had dropped to 24 percent. This shift left more disposable income for washing machines, televisions, refrigerators and cars, most of which were produced in Spanish factories. Thus, whereas only 1 percent of Spanish homes had TVs in 1960, an astonishing 32 percent had one only six years later, increasing to 40 percent by 1970. Ownership of fridges and washing machines almost doubled from 1960 to 1966 (19 percent to 36 percent of homes), while car ownership catapulted from 4 percent in 1960 to 35 percent in 1971. By 1975, about two-thirds of households had most of these goods and

80 percent at least some of them, although the national averages were still below northern European levels.

Parallel to the economic growth and structural transformation was the last phase of the long process of demographic “modernization” that had begun in the second half of the nineteenth century. By 1980, the population of 37.7 million was double that of 1900. More significantly, growth was now a result of mortality rates declining faster than fertility rates. Life expectancy increased from 70 years in 1960 to 76 years in 1980, while infant mortality dropped to 19/1000. Birth rates also began to drop, but more slowly, from 21/1000 to 18/1000 during the last decade. By 1980, the average number of children per family was 2.2, with the proportion of families with five or more children plummeting from 32 percent in 1950 to 8 percent in 1985. Contrasting all of these numbers with those earlier in the century reveals the spectacular scope of transformation: life expectancy was 50 in 1930 (up from 35 in 1900), infant mortality was 117/1000 and birth rates were 28/1000. After a century of slow evolution, Spain’s demographic structure had leaped from transitional to “modern” within a few decades.

### *Uneven Benefits*

While all of these macro trends are indeed impressive, a more fine-grained analysis reveals significant unevenness in the benefits of the “miracle.” From a regional perspective, Spain was one of the most unequal societies in Europe in 1960, a distinction that remained true at the end of the century. Not surprisingly, the division between the haves and the have-nots exacerbated the existing pattern of a dynamic periphery and a slow-growing center, with the exception of Madrid, which diversified from an administrative capital into an industrial city. The fastest-growing economies and populations were in Catalonia, Madrid and the Basque Country and, to a lesser degree, Asturias, while the poorest were Andalucía, Extremadura and La Mancha. In one estimate, the development gap between Vizcaya and Almería at the end of the 1950s was greater than that between Belgium and Algeria. Half of all industrial development occurred in Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque Country, while 50 percent of the GDP was generated in 11 percent of the territory.

Standard of living and poverty rates were correspondingly unequal. With an overall poverty rate estimated at 25 percent in 1970, the rate was as low as 10 percent in Catalonia and as high as 30 percent in Galicia and parts of the south. To flesh out what this poverty looked like, one 1969 report calculated that 75 percent of the homes in Extremadura had no running water, two-thirds had no access to printed news and only 3 percent owned a TV.<sup>24</sup> And while the populations of the wealthiest regions had achieved parity with northern European per capita GDP by the end of the dictatorship, Andalucía, Extremadura and Galicia were still 60 percent below the European average.

Even in the wealthier urban and industrial areas, there was still a significant gap between the expanding middle classes and the working classes. By the 1960s, working-class standards of living were on the rise, with wages finally outstripping inflation, but life in the shanty towns of the urban peripheries was grim. Urban workers often lived in self-built shacks or shoddily constructed housing projects with little in the way of basic neighborhood infrastructure, from paved streets to transportation, sewers or indoor plumbing. Even with rising wages, one 1968

study reported that 71 percent of unskilled laborers and 64 percent of service sector workers complained that wages were insufficient to cover basic needs, let alone the “non-essential goods” being snapped up by the middle classes. Many of their children either had no schools to attend or dropped out by age 13 to work in the textile and food-packing industries. If workers’ households did manage to participate in the consumer revolution, it was often at the cost of multiple workers holding multiple jobs. For these workers, not the poorest of the poor, the economic “miracle” filtered down to them through greater opportunities to work extremely hard in order to claw their way up from privation to basic comfort.

Integrating this granular data into the overall trend of economic growth, transformation and rising prosperity produces a complex portrait that cannot be summed up as a “miracle.” While most boats probably did rise, to use the classic metaphor, some rose much faster than others and there was still a group of boats at the bottom that stubbornly refused to budge. At the same time, it was this contradictory impact of the “miracle” that created unintended social and political consequences which in turn undermined support for the regime in its last decade. Not surprisingly, then, the economic transformation of the 1960s and 1970s probably had a contradictory impact, shoring up support among those who benefitted from the prosperity, creating the phenomenon of “sociological Francoism,” and undermining it among those who, while no longer on the edge of starvation, felt the sting of rising expectations.

## Social and Cultural Trends

Paralleling the economic and demographic transformation, Spanish society and culture also evolved, from the insular and privatized social world of the autarky years to a gradual repopulation and diversification of civil society and social life, in which “traditional” values and norms were gradually diluted, if not weakened. The regime began with the totalitarian ambition to forcibly reinstate a “traditional” world, defined by rural life, social hierarchy, religion, gender role differentiation and patriotism. While even in the 1940s, this goal was never fully realized, by the 1960s the regime was clearly losing control of social and cultural practices in an increasingly complex world, as the goals of rapid growth destabilized the world it claimed to protect. At the same time, a simple narrative of a transition from a “traditional” to a “modern” society doesn’t quite capture the complexity of a postwar reconstruction that was not simply a return to the past, but contained elements of rupture as well as restitution.

As with the process of economic transformation, scholars continue to debate the regime’s role in these changes. Did the regime simply “let go” of its initial totalitarian ambitions and accept social and cultural pluralism as the price of economic growth and political stability? Or did the regime miscalculate the unintended social consequences of what leaders hoped could be a targeted set of economic reforms? In contrast to these relatively benign versions, critics emphasize the ongoing repression, marginalization and censorship of certain sectors of the population, especially the working classes, intelligentsia and artists, and Catalans and

Basques. In addition, they argue that the regime's negative footprint in the social and cultural realm extended to its manipulation and instrumentalization of new forms of mass culture and sociability, from television to football and cinema. Whereas from one angle, these activities are taken as evidence of the greater leisure of an increasingly affluent society, from another they are viewed as tools that the dictatorship exploited to keep the population quiescent.

### Society and Culture in the Years of Hunger

After the noisy and polarized mobilization of the 1930s, for most Spaniards the contrast with the stifling 1940s could not have been greater. The new regime tried to erase every element of that Republican society, from class-based and secular associations and schools, to gender equality and regional cultures. While it largely succeeded in destroying that world, we have contrasting portraits as to what kind of society emerged from the ashes of the Civil War. One narrative emphasizes a return to the past, anchored by the reinstatement of the old *cacique* elite over a powerless working class, and the Catholic Church's domination of sociability, public morality and education.<sup>25</sup> Conversely, another narrative claims a traumatic rupture of old patterns, broken by a combination of the transformative impact of the brutal war and fascist revolutionary ambitions. In this version, the social networks of this new era emerged from the ashes, led not by the old elites but by "new men" of the *Movimiento* whose authority was rooted in the military victory.<sup>26</sup> Lurking in the shadows of this debate is the nature of the regime as either a conservative counter-revolution or a fascist-influenced revolution.

#### *Rupture and Restitution for Winners and Losers*

For the losers, it is likely that some experienced the postwar society as rupture and others as a return to an old social order they had briefly escaped. In the *latifundia* regions, for example, an agrarian counter-revolution restored the large landowners to their social as well as economic domination over the landless laborers, who were more powerless than ever. But there were plenty on the Republican side with middle-class lives and professions before the war who were imprisoned and/or blackballed, had their homes and properties confiscated, and were pushed to the margins of a new social order that was defined as much by winners and losers as by traditional hierarchies. Conversely, the winning coalition included a heterogeneous mix of classes, some of whom undoubtedly moved into new positions of social power based on this realignment. For example, up to 80 percent of new public administration positions were reserved for Nationalist army veterans and others who had contributed to the military effort.<sup>27</sup>

The complex mix of restitution vs. rupture is visible at the local level, which constituted the social world for most Spaniards in the 1940s. While more studies need to be done, it seems that in some local governments the old elites stepped back in while the "new men" of the *Movimiento* and its institutions made few inroads. But other local communities experienced a renovation of personnel after the war, most from a younger generation who fought but had no prior political experience. Thus, in one case, only 15 percent of local officials had held positions before the war, the majority of whom were under 40 years old.<sup>28</sup>

In rural society, the winning coalition included not only large landowners but small farmers, renters and sharecroppers, attracted by a fascist-influenced agrarian discourse that promised more financial support for the smaller farmers and long-term contracts for renters. This vision of a bolstered rural middle class was not simply a return to the past but a “post-class” utopia that aimed to transcend class polarization. Even though it didn’t pan out, it helps explain the broad support for the new regime beyond the old elite class.

The new social order of winners and losers was confirmed by the vindictive treatment of the latter, who were subject not only to death and imprisonment but sustained social and economic marginalization. Beyond the responsibility of the state in this widespread repression, ordinary Spaniards collaborated in judicial cases by filing denunciations against their neighbors. In the massive investigation called the *Causa General*, launched in April of 1940, public prosecutors drew up a file for each village, preceded by a public call for denunciations.<sup>29</sup> Going forward, the division between denouncers and denounced likely had a residual impact on the social order, especially in small towns. In the short term, returning prisoners often couldn’t find work at home, while they were forbidden to leave municipal boundaries. The professionals who couldn’t re-establish practices and the 30 percent of school teachers who were purged were all subject to what a British Embassy worker poignantly labeled a form of “civil death.” One local study reveals how ex-prisoners and their families were later prosecuted for petty crimes related to basic survival, while others had their children taken away by the state due to their destitute status or their mothers having turned to prostitution.<sup>30</sup> These children joined others forcibly taken from female prisoners and placed in state orphanages where they were put up for adoption with families in the victory coalition.<sup>31</sup> Republican families whose head of household had either died in the war or been executed were also denied the widows’ pensions granted to those on the other side. At the most fundamental level, communities and families could be torn apart by the continuing effort to maintain the barrier between winners and losers. The distinct treatment of Republican and Nationalist families undermines any simple narrative of a restoration of the old order or its “traditional” values.

### *Family and Gender*

While Republican families were under siege, for the victory coalition the (traditional) family was supported as the foundation of the new order. At the core of family restitution was a focus on procreation and a clear delineation between gender roles. Thus, a pronatalist rhetoric linked reproduction to national regeneration, while policies sought to prevent contraception and to provide incentives for large families.<sup>32</sup> The state awarded supplemental income to large families as well as prizes each year to the largest.

Other laws confirmed the centrality of women’s “separate sphere” role as mothers and wives and their traditional status as guardian of the family’s reputation.<sup>33</sup> In contrast to the gender equality legislation of the Republican period, which included divorce, voting and civil rights, birth control and even abortion, the 1938 Labor Charter restricted women’s work, while making birth control and abortion illegal. Indeed, in 1950, only 16 percent of women participated in the workforce, one of the lowest rates in Europe. The regime also instituted gender-segregated

education, both to protect public morality and to implement distinct curricula that indoctrinated boys and girls into their future prescribed roles. Finally, the legal structure of Spanish family law reinforced the propaganda of distinct sex roles. Thus, the regime reinstated the nineteenth-century Civil Code, which defined the husband as head of the household and the wife as obliged to obey him. Wives had no control of their finances, no custody of their children, and, of course, no political representation.

One window into everyday gender roles in rural society is provided by a classic anthropological village study from the 1940s.<sup>34</sup> In what the author defined as a traditional honor-based society, the core values of honor were gender-specific. The quintessence of manliness was fearlessness, translated as *cojones* (testicles). For a man, the most important indicator of his status and identity in the community was his ability to uphold his masculine honor through the active qualities of bravery, potency and the willingness to fight to defend his reputation and his family. Women, on the other hand, were judged by *vergüenza* (shame), which depended on defense of their chastity, which included not only sexual relations but refraining from any behavior that might look suspect to watching neighbors, such as walking alone with another man, wearing a sexy dress in public, or going to public places where women did not go. A shameless woman (*sin vergüenza*) tainted the honor of the entire family, a stain that could be passed down even to children. When a woman's infidelity was discovered, the young men of the town would expose it with a *vito*, in which they gathered at the couple's house, banging pots and pans, singing the story of the infidelity and wearing horns—the symbol of the cuckold. Thus, male honor was secured by the close surveillance of women, displays of jealous rage and the willingness to fight and even to kill to defend the family's reputation, a behavior protected by law.

### *The Church, Religion and Education*

The main institution charged with protecting and/or restoring the moral probity of the community was the Catholic Church. The Church was granted sweeping powers to both shape educational curriculum in public schools and to deliver it in the robust private school network. In addition to religion and nationalism, the curriculum emphasized obedience, rigid moral codes and fear of eternal damnation. Its influence on the men and women of the middle and upper classes was greatest, given that the Church operated half of all secondary schools, whose student population was drawn almost exclusively from these classes. Adult Catholics were encouraged to participate in public displays of religious fervor. Thus, it was not unusual to have thousands of believers filling streets and public squares for processions, ceremonies, masses and pilgrimages.

The flip side of the Church's mission was to "reconquer" the purportedly anti-clerical masses. The crisis was exemplified by the statistics in one working-class neighborhood (Madrid 1941), where the priest reported that only 5,000 of its 90,000 residents attended mass and 10,000 children remained unbaptized. Using a combination of persuasion and coercion, the Church sought to restore the Catholic unity of premodern Spain, before it had been tainted by liberal, socialist and secular ideas. With the full approval of the regime, the Church organized campaigns to enforce regular attendance at mass, baptism and church marriages, and sent missions to urban and industrial areas.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful that re-Christianization efforts turned the clock back to the era of Catholic unity, despite the significant advantages of a supportive state and the defeat of the Church's enemies. Especially given the Church's clear affiliation with the victory coalition, it faced a steep challenge to overcome a long modern history of alienation in urban, industrial and *latifundia* regions of the country. There is evidence that at least external observance of rituals may have increased, although not uniformly. In another study of a working-class neighborhood (Madrid 1958), for example, the percentage of children born out of wedlock dropped from 11 percent in 1940 to 4 percent a decade later.<sup>35</sup> However, a different case illustrates the divergence between observant and unobservant communities: whereas in 1958 half the population of a different Madrid working-class barrio died without receiving the last sacrament, only 15 percent of the generally religious city of Salamanca did so. Even in Salamanca, attendance at mass ranged from 74 percent in wealthy neighborhoods to 30 percent in poorer ones. Without reliable national statistics on religious practice or belief before 1931 that would sustain firm comparisons, existing data tend to support the implications of both of these studies: that is, increased formal observance overall, but continued uneven practice, according to neighborhood, region and gender, with women more likely than men to be among the practitioners.<sup>36</sup>

The picture of increased but uneven influence of the Church on the population was exemplified by the school system. Thus, on the one hand, the Franco regime was the first to achieve a relatively uniform curriculum that promoted the regime's religious version of the Spanish nation.<sup>37</sup> For young people growing up during the early decades of the dictatorship, there were few alternative channels of information other than the Church, whose message was coordinated with the regime's during this period. And yet, any potential for "totalitarian" indoctrination was foreclosed by the massive underfunding of the public education system, which left tens of thousands of children un-enrolled.<sup>38</sup> The Francoist state had one of the smallest educational budgets in Europe, a meager 0.9 percent of the state budget in 1954 (vs. 2.5 percent in Germany or 2.68 percent in Italy). In one 1950 estimate, only two-thirds of primary school aged children were enrolled, while only one-third regularly attended classes. Beyond the compulsory primary level, only 18 percent of teens were enrolled in secondary schools in 1965, most of these in Catholic institutions, with 9 percent of young adults in universities.

This unequal education system solidified a growing gap between an expanding middle class who could afford to educate their children for the new managerial and administrative jobs, and the working classes, whose children either never attended school or dropped out early. Illiteracy in the poorest regions was as high as 25 percent (30 percent for females), while the overall average stood at 15 percent in 1950. While the education gap limited the regime's ability to win hearts and minds, it also added to the already marginalized status of those at the bottom of the ladder. One might argue that this disinvestment in public education for the masses constituted the regime's most lasting negative impact on Spanish society.

#### *The Public Sphere: Associations and Sociability*

In addition to churches and classrooms, the state and Church could wield influence over the population through the limited channels for sociability. The main

legal channel of association was the Church, whose *Acción Católica* (AC) had a membership of 442,000 in 1946 and 533,000 in 1956, about two-thirds of whom were women (ACM). In addition, the *Confederación Católica de Padres de Familia* (Catholic Federation of Parents) claimed 74 provincial federations, 247 associations in individual Catholic schools and a total of 143,500 parent members.<sup>39</sup> The other main legal channel, the *Movimiento*, had 932,000 political members and another million in associated organizations like the *Guardia de Franco*, the *Sección Femenina* (SF: 295,000), the youth groups and the university student association (SEU).<sup>40</sup> Outside the Church or *Movimiento*, there were only small numbers of non-affiliated business, recreational, cultural and sports associations, which probably account for most of the 2,500 nationally registered associations (1965). One estimate (1961) puts the total number of voluntary associations, including those of the *Movimiento* and the Church, at 8,329.<sup>41</sup>

Beyond the numbers, it is not clear how much impact these organizations, especially those belonging to the *Movimiento*, had on everyday social life. The potential for totalitarian mobilization was further undercut by the competition between Church and *Movimiento* which, despite overlapping goals, should not be conflated. Moreover, the *Movimiento's* organizations were underfunded and reached only a minority, no more than 30 percent of men and 15 percent of women.<sup>42</sup> Still, many women and girls who were not members of the SF were exposed to its values through the Social Service program, a six-month curriculum of religion, domestic skills, physical education and volunteer work. Although theoretically required for all women, it incorporated mostly middle- and upper-class women, who needed to complete the program to obtain a certificate that would enable them to get a driver's license, passport, government job or enter university.<sup>43</sup> The *Movimiento* also had an institutional presence in each municipality, but the local chapter was more a subset of the state apparatus than a mobilizing channel. It seems clear that the Franco regime never matched Nazi Germany's or even fascist Italy's lesser level of mass mobilization in state-controlled associations.

In contrast, formal membership in Catholic organizations probably underestimates the broader role of the Church as the primary channel of sociability for most communities in the 1940s and 1950s. Thus, the local parish brought together residents through attendance at mass and other religious ceremonies, as well as at church-sponsored festivals like the annual patron saint's day celebrations. In some cases, it may have recovered its traditional monopoly over local networks of sociability, as one case study of a Basque town concludes.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, in those communities where the Church was still struggling to expand its historically weak footprint, social networks may truly have been reduced to individual or family support systems. In either case, while the public sphere may not have been completely "silenced," it must have seemed deadly quiet to those who had lived through the Republican period.

The severe limits of the public sphere during the early decades also apply to the world of art and culture. While some have dismissed this period as a "cultural desert," in which the only artistic value was produced by the exile community, most would accept that cultural expression was not extinguished, and even that not all cultural production allowed by the regime was necessarily bad. The regime certainly did all it could to eliminate independent thought and creativity, through

rigid censorship, state control of the press, purging of libraries and control of the national academies.<sup>45</sup> Censorship was particularly harsh against Catalan and Basque cultures, which were viewed as threats to Castilian Spanish national identity.<sup>46</sup>

Beyond restricting most elite cultural production, the regime encouraged but sought to control popular forms of culture, such as football and festivals.<sup>47</sup> Thus, sports policy was centralized under the leadership of the *Movimiento*, and both players and directors of football clubs had to undergo background checks.<sup>48</sup> At the same time, in the case of football, fans attended games in large numbers not because the regime forced them to, but because it had been a hugely popular spectator sport since the 1920s. In general terms, what applies to football could be argued about culture in general—the regime could prevent any public practice or product that openly contravened its values, but was not a puppet master that dictated every cultural manifestation and what it meant to participants.

The overall portrait of society and culture during the early decades of the Franco regime cannot be reduced to a single narrative. On the one hand, it was neither purely a restitution of a traditional order nor a rupture with the past, but took shape in the unstable tension between change and continuity. In many ways, the boundaries of the old class society were hardened, but in some cases the war realigned social hierarchies around winners and losers. Likewise, it was neither a society fully controlled and mobilized by a totalitarian state nor a completely privatized demobilized society. *Movimiento* and Catholic institutions sought to mold the population in their competing images, but their reach was always partial. National unity was the common theme, but both visions divided as much as they united. Some Spaniards embraced these goals while others kept their heads down, just trying to survive. What was a “desert” for some was a purified utopia for others. What can be affirmed is that the options were severely limited, joining in or opting out, a world in which the full palette of colors had been reduced to black and white, winners and losers.

### Social and Cultural Evolution in the Growth Years: 1960s–1970s

During the latter decades of the regime the palette considerably diversified, and the once-strangled public sphere was repopulating with distinct voices, ideas, cultural products and social networks. Critics point out that change was limited by continued censorship and repression, high social inequality and the stubborn consistency of the regime’s traditionalist message. And yet, many Spaniards experienced dramatic changes in their world. Economic prosperity, urbanization and shrinking rural communities, tourism and Spain’s integration into the Cold War “West,” all had rebounding consequences for society and culture that the regime’s leaders likely never predicted and, in many cases, only dimly understood.

#### *Migration and Social Mobility*

First and foremost was the impact of structural transformation on the social order. The exodus of landless laborers as well as small farmers and sharecroppers from the countryside destroyed the hierarchies of a rural society whose contours had been formed by desamortization in the nineteenth century. Migration to the cities opened a broader world of sociability, leisure and entertainment. Most significantly,

the gateway to social mobility was finally pried open, as a majority of the population finally achieved middle-class status in the 1970s (26 percent upper middle/28 percent lower middle).<sup>49</sup> As a result, the aspirational middle-class culture whose parameters had been sketched out over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries finally became accessible to a majority. The very rich (5 percent) and the lower classes (41 percent) did not disappear from this new social order, but these categories seemed less permanent and defining than they once were. Even skilled workers could participate in some aspects of an increasingly cross-class urban mass culture, from watching TV to going to the cinema or football matches.

Contributing, in an albeit limited way, to greater social mobility was the regime's belated effort to beef up its investment in public education, embodied in the 1970 Education Law and the almost tripling of the education budget between 1969 and 1975. Ambitious in scope, if only partially implemented, the law aimed to finally universalize free primary education, and to meet the demand for higher education among the growing middle classes and the needs of an increasingly complex economy. By the mid-1970s, Spain finally achieved a rate of 97 percent enrollment for primary education. At the same time, the number of public secondary schools rose from 120 in 1960 to 294 in 1970 to 700 by 1975, while the student body increased more than fivefold. The pressure from more students graduating secondary school led the regime to build seven more universities, as enrollment more than quadrupled, from 76,000 in 1960 to 333,300 in 1970. Those university students formed the core of a new critical youth culture and student movement that was open to influences from their European counterparts. There were limits to this education reform, the funding of which didn't match its ambitious goals, but it did begin to address the catastrophic failure to educate and broadened the path of social mobility.<sup>50</sup>

#### *Diversification of the Public Sphere*

At the same time that social mobility improved, the growing industrial and urban working class began to rebuild its collective voice and identity. Thus, in the 1960s, working-class social and cultural networks decimated by war and repression began to recover. While opposition movements like the Communist party (PCE) remained underground, new labor laws legalizing collective bargaining led to the formation of a new generation of trade unions, the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO). Even though the regime never legalized strikes, per se, a 1961 law provided room for labor conflicts as long as they addressed purely economic issues. Starting with a two-month-long miners' strike in Asturias in 1962, the number and intensity of labor conflicts increased, especially in the last years of the regime, when more than 600,000 workers a year participated. Adding to the density of urban working-class networks were the *Asociaciones de Vecinos* (AAVV/ Neighborhood Associations), which multiplied after a 1964 law legalized non-political associations. Formed in many of the neglected peripheral neighborhoods to either provide their own services or petition the municipality to take responsibility for building roads, schools, sewers and recreation centers, this movement coalesced in the late 1970s into the so-called "citizen movement," demanding both urban services and political rights.<sup>51</sup> While during the dictatorship, unions and neighborhood associations could not directly challenge the regime without risking being shut down, which

did happen, even the limited demands for wage increases or sewers represented a significant diversification of a public sphere once characterized by the absence of virtually all independent voices.

Diversification of the public sphere was also propelled by the influx of 20 million tourists a year by the late 1960s. Promoted by some sectors in the regime as a source of capital and a (non-political) channel for European integration, cheap Spanish beaches were a magnet for northern Europeans newly endowed with paid vacations. The impact was both direct, in terms of the difficulty of maintaining prudish moral standards in the face of bikini-clad foreigners, and indirect, in terms of what else entered Spain through the door opened for tourists, including foreign books, pop music and newspapers. While the social reach of tourism can be overstated, given that the great majority of tourists were concentrated along the southern beaches, in new hotel complexes built to accommodate them, any pretense of cocooning against “modern” influences was unsustainable. Indeed, those within the regime leadership who supported tourism accepted that Spain had to enter the modern world (on its own terms, of course) in order to survive.<sup>52</sup>

Another element of the diversification of the public sphere was the re-emergence of peripheral cultures and languages. After being confined to the home, publications in Catalan reappeared: from four books in 1942, 96 were published in 1954 and 465 in 1967. In addition to Catalan editions of poetry and literature, there was a revival of the Catalan Boy Scouts, led by Catholic leaders who taught members Catalan history and culture, in addition to religion. Choral and dance groups performed Catalan songs and the Catalan dance, the *sardana*. In 1965, the first television broadcast of Catalan language theater hit the airwaves in Barcelona. Significantly, one of the strongest forces of Catalanization at the outset was the Catalan Church, which at first provided some cover for a movement that quickly took on oppositional implications. The most important Catalanist leader after the dictatorship, Jordi Pujol, was arrested during a cultural event at the Music Palace in Barcelona in 1960, where a rendition of the Catalan national anthem was illegally performed. The regime continued to ban the Catalan flag and, most importantly, forbid the teaching of Catalan in schools. Despite continued restrictions, however, by the end of the 1960s many referred to the decade as a “second *renaixença*,” harking back to the cultural renaissance of the mid-nineteenth century. *Omnium Cultural*, an umbrella organization dedicated to the promotion of Catalan language and culture, represented more than 90 Catalan organizations in 1968. By the end of the dictatorship, the freedom to speak and acknowledge Catalan identity had become inextricably entwined with opposition to the regime.<sup>53</sup>

It was not only in the periphery that cultural production and activity beyond the Church and the *Movimiento* channels expanded. There was an increasing gap between the official culture of the regime and an independent vanguard culture, which included underground publications, critical films and literature, rock and roll and cosmopolitan abstract art, linked to the international scene. Not all of it was aimed against the regime, but virtually none of it supported the regime’s cultural stance. Some of this production made it into the public sphere after the 1966 press law abandoned pre-publication censorship. Some argue this was part of the regime’s process of “letting go” of its efforts to control all cultural output. For example, the regime tolerated and even tried to take advantage of new cultural

trends, particularly abstract art, by supporting international exhibitions and showcasing Spanish artists like Antoni Tàpies.<sup>54</sup> Others interpret the toleration of some cultural diversity as a great miscalculation by regime elites, who believed that prosperity, a rising standard of living and mass consumption had created a broad consensus that could not be threatened.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, many books and films still could not be read or seen in Spain, and the abolition of pre-publication censorship put the onus on producers to decide what might be acceptable, risking financial ruin if they made the wrong choice.<sup>56</sup> Whatever combination of forces was at work—greater tolerance in some areas, overconfidence, or the sheer power of artistic expression—the result was a significant enrichment in the field of cultural production.

*The Decline of “Tradition”: Youth, Gender and Religion*

As important as the emergence of new voices, cultural currents, social networks and associations was the corresponding weakening of “traditional” culture and values, especially among the younger generation of the 1960s and 1970s. One manifestation of this trend were the slowly changing gender roles and the attitudes towards them. From the uncompromising “separate spheres” gold standard of the 1940s, young Spanish women in the 1960s and 70s were both behaving differently and given more freedom. If 80 percent of the population in 1975 still thought women’s place was in the home, the remaining 20 percent was probably disproportionately under 30 years old. From the 16 percent of women in the work force in 1950, by 1975 it had nearly doubled, to 30 percent, but among 20–24 year olds it was 57 percent. During the last decade of the regime, women were obviously taking more steps to control their reproduction, evidenced by the rapidly falling birth rate, despite the fact that birth control was still illegal. More women were graduating from high school and university, reaching 22–24 percent of the college student population by the early 1960s and doubling in absolute numbers between 1950 and 1960.<sup>57</sup> From the 1960s, both the SF and the Catholic ACM were advocating a modernization of women’s roles, promoting more education and accepting employment as a legitimate stage in a woman’s life.<sup>58</sup> The SF lobbied for some legal reform, most notably the 1958 changes to the Civil Code that gave women control over their own property, the 1961 law that extended their labor rights and the abolition of a husband’s right to murder his wife if caught in an act of adultery.

There were still plenty of restrictions on women’s choices, including lack of child care facilities, a gender wage gap, continued social pressure to conform, and limited access to effective birth control, which led to more than 100,000 illegal abortions a year in the early 1970s. Only in the decades after the dictatorship did this evolution culminate in a dramatic transformation in women’s status. Nevertheless, even the concept that women’s roles could “modernize” contrasted with the starkly “traditionalist” discourse of the earlier period.

An even more stunning indicator that “tradition” was no longer the steady rudder it had been was the sea change in religious practice and belief. During the earlier decades, the Church was the recognized bulwark of traditional values, the institution charged with stemming the tide of modernity. But by the 1960s, a new generation of young priests were rejecting the ultra-conservative views of the Civil War leadership (only 3 bishops were under 45 in 1966) and embracing the modern

ideas of the Vatican II, liberation theology and even Marxism. For these young priests, the Church had been tainted by its association with the dictatorship, as well as by the efforts to coerce Spaniards into Catholicism. Several hundred Basque and Catalan priests wrote letters of protest to the regime in 1960 and 1964, and at least 150 priests were sanctioned or arrested by 1975. In a 1970 survey, only 20 percent of priests approved of the existing Church/State relations. While the Church hierarchy never fully broke with the regime, a significant number of bishops and priests voted in 1971 to ask forgiveness of the Spanish people for the Church's participation in the Civil War. By the end of the dictatorship, the Church as an institution was divided and in crisis, no longer the stable reference point for a "traditional" society.<sup>59</sup>

At the same time as the Church itself lost its unified stance, at least part of the same young generation of ordinary Spaniards was beginning to reject the intensely religious culture of the early decades. The number of young men studying to be priests dropped from 8,000 in the 1950s to 1,800 in 1972, and regular attendance at mass began to decline again after the initial recovery in the 1940s. By 1975, only about 60 percent of Spaniards were practicing Catholics, although only 2 percent considered themselves non-Catholics or atheists. Paradoxically, the coercive efforts to enforce religious practice may have ended up alienating more than re-Christianizing.

By the mid-1970s, it is hard to dispute that the world in which young Spaniards were growing up was quite distinct from that of their parents' generation. The majority had left the countryside to join an increasingly diverse urban culture which many of them had the education and income to take advantage of. As social networks were reconstructed and more voices diversified the public sphere, the traditionalist message of the Franco regime was both diluted and increasingly irrelevant. Some have described this growing gap between a stagnant political sphere and an evolving culture and society as inevitably unstable, preparing the ground for regime transition. But it has been amply demonstrated in a variety of national cases that social and cultural "modernization" does not automatically lead to democracy.

In the Spanish case, there is evidence that for some, social and cultural transformation gave them the tools and knowledge to oppose the dictatorship. University students, industrial workers, Catalan and Basque nationalists, artists and intellectuals: all of these groups were proportionately more likely to view the changing world as a political opportunity. But for others, and perhaps still the majority in the early 1970s, political freedom was less important than the "peace" and prosperity they believed had been achieved in recent decades. The range of attitudes undoubtedly ran the gamut from consent, acceptance and indifference, to non-conformity and dissent. It was only with the growing political crisis of the regime and the death of Franco that the social and cultural transformation of the previous decades was effectively harnessed to the process of regime change and democratization.

## Conclusion

The shifting landscape of the Spanish economy, society and culture during the long Franco dictatorship resists any single narrative or framework. The period encompasses perhaps the bleakest era in the country's modern history, when

war and a vengeful regime halted a century of gradual growth and social evolution. At the same time, it also includes the most rapid growth and transformation of any other period, a pattern that put Spain closer to a convergence path with the rest of western Europe than at any time since the Napoleonic era. The question of how to make sense of these contrasting stories is complicated by the competing moral narratives about the Franco regime, each of which tends to focus on one of these snapshots as definitive. Thus, the critical narrative highlights the bleak and repressive early decades as evidence of the supreme destructiveness of Francoism, and argues that the patterns set then continued to haunt and restrict social, economic and cultural development in the latter decades, despite cosmetic changes. The more benign view glosses over the early decades as tragic but ephemeral, crediting the regime's change of course as opening the door to the economic, cultural, and social liberalization that in turn made the peaceful democratic transition possible, if not necessary.

Between both extremes, each of these narratives contains elements that ring true. Thus, the devastation caused by the regime during the early decades was never compensated for by the later growth, and most of the transformation was still in spite of, not because of, the regime's policies. In addition, the impact of transformation was both uneven and not always experienced as positive. On the other hand, changes in regime policies, from the 1959 economic reforms, to the 1958 collective bargaining law, the 1964 Law of Associations, the 1966 Press Law and the 1970 Education Law, to name some of the most important, did have real consequences, cracking open doors, even if inadvertently, that had been firmly shut. The upshot was a complex relationship between the political sphere of the dictatorship and the economic, social and cultural spheres, which were neither completely stifled nor liberated. Spain's forty-year dictatorship had an undoubted negative impact on the society, but the dramatic transformations that improved and enriched many peoples' lives also occurred during the dictatorship, in part in spite of, but also in part as a by-product of the regime's actions. In the end, there is no simple explanation for the paradox of a traditionalist, ruralist, Catholic regime presiding over the industrialization, urbanization and secularization of the country.

## THE LAST DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: 1976–1982

After nearly forty years of dictatorship, Spain underwent a political transition to what would become the longest and most stable period of democratic government in its history, promising to end once and for all the persistent narrative of Spanish “failure.” The exact periodization is still debated, but the December 1978 approval of the Constitution ended the formal institutional transition, and most agree that consolidation was secured by 1982. In the afterglow of what was universally considered to be both a successful transition to, and consolidation of, democracy, the main debates revolved around which factors contributed most to Spain’s achievement. The initial celebratory view of the “model” transition was framed in both domestic and global terms. Domestically, the relatively peaceful and consensual transition from dictatorship to democracy was compared favorably to the turbulent and polarizing democratic experiment of the 1930s, which had ended in civil war. Globally, Spain negotiated an essentially uncharted path that would be looked to as a model for other authoritarian regimes transitioning to democracy. With no prefabricated blueprint or predetermined outcome, the transition was a unique accomplishment that Spaniards could be proud of.

In recent decades, what was once an object of pride has become swept up into the competing moral narratives of Spain’s modern history. While some continue to defend the triumphal narrative, there has been a shift from celebrating it as a perfect moment to acknowledging its problems and analyzing their impact on the quality of the current democracy.<sup>1</sup> Some have challenged the so-called “pact of forgetting,” questioning the decision to construct the new democracy on the repressed memory of mass killing and brutal repression. Others have critiqued what they view as the negative consequences of the obsession with consensus, which, they argue, left a passive public and a “low-intensity” democracy in its wake. The upshot has been a reappraisal of the transition and its place in the history of Spanish democracy. Nevertheless, most accept that, while the transition was not a spotless “model,” it was a positive process that led them successfully from dictatorship to consolidated democracy.<sup>2</sup>

## The Transition to Democracy in Comparative Perspective

No other moment in modern Spanish history has been more thoroughly integrated into comparative scholarly analysis than the democratic transition of the 1970s. Furthermore, it is perhaps the first time that the comparison positions Spain as the positive model to emulate rather than the failure to pity or avoid. Thus, of all of the dozens of transitions of the so-called “third wave,”<sup>3</sup> Spain has been universally judged as the most successful, turning it into a global model, really *the* model, for both democratization and consolidation.<sup>4</sup> As such, the “Spanish model” has been a ubiquitous positive presence in comparative democratization studies.<sup>5</sup>

While Spain’s new status as positive role model has been a refreshing change, there are problems and ambiguities with the way the Spanish transition has been framed in comparative perspective. Thus, the wave theory establishes arbitrary boundaries between groups of transitions that have important consequences. By situating Spain and Portugal within a “third wave,” the model implicitly marks them off from western European transitions of the “second wave” only a couple of decades earlier. Spain then becomes a model, not for Europe, but for the developing world. In this scheme, Spain stands as a bridge between the Europe it has recently joined and the developing world it has recently emerged from. In other words, it is precisely Spain’s ambiguous role in Europe that was confirmed by the “third wave” periodization.

The arbitrary decision to separate the Spanish and Portuguese transitions from the process of postwar European democratization has had important consequences for the “Spanish model.” The reason there is a “Spanish model,” as opposed to an Austrian, German or Italian model, is that the Spanish version was assumed to be more accessible to developing nations. If Spain could transition successfully from a (backward) authoritarian regime to a modern democracy, then so could any number of similar countries. The early 1970s was a period of pessimism about the future of democratization in the developing world. Most of the postwar democracies established in ex-colonial nations had collapsed and been replaced by authoritarian regimes of various sorts, and the southern European transitions came as a delightful surprise when expectations were at their lowest.<sup>6</sup> What turned this surprise into new optimism was the implicit barrier between southern and western Europe that allowed observers to interpret these transitions as a “new phase,” as democracy spreading beyond its “natural boundaries.” If democracy could put down roots in the unlikely soil of southern Europe, then why not anywhere in the world?<sup>7</sup>

With consensus regarding the success of Spain’s “model” transition, debates focused on why. Since the early 1980s, Spain’s transition has been marshaled as evidence of the importance of a range of factors, from economic and social modernization, to global support, elite decisions and civil society mobilization.<sup>8</sup> After decades of debate, the most convincing synthesis is that the Spanish transition emerged out of a favorable confluence of all these ingredients, although the exact ordering of each factor is still debatable. In any case, as the “model” becomes more complex, it is rendered less replicable. Indeed, the initial optimism that all countries could democratize if they followed a universal blueprint has faded in the wake of permanent transitions, shaky consolidation or the relapse into authoritarianism on

the part of various third wave democracies, especially outside of the European core.<sup>9</sup> While the Spanish transition continues to fascinate comparative social scientists seeking to unlock the universal secrets of success, it is also increasingly a subject for historians, who are situating the process in the long-term trajectory of Spanish political evolution.

## Origins of the Transition: Favorable Factors vs. the 1930s

### *Economic Development*

From this historical perspective, Spain had a more favorable context than the majority of the “developing” nations of the “third wave” with which it was often grouped. In social and economic terms, by the 1970s Spain had completed its long transition from an agrarian and rural to a largely industrial and urban society. Although now most scholars would reject the classic “modernization” paradigm, which posited that democracy was the (inevitable) result of this transformation, many would agree that some threshold level of economic development and distribution of wealth seems to be necessary to create the infrastructure of communication, education and welfare that sustains the fundamental bonds of a community of democratic citizens. In the Spanish case, the process of economic transformation occurred slowly and unevenly, making it hard to pinpoint the moment when that threshold was crossed. By the 1970s, however, Spain had moved into the camp of “developed” nations.

There were also specific social consequences of rapid growth, industrialization and urbanization that added to the favorable conditions for a democratic transition. In particular, as poor landless laborers deserted the countryside and moved to the cities, they unwittingly destroyed not only the *latifundia* system but the structure of *caciquismo* that had conflated economic and political power in the hands of large landowners able to impose their will on a dependent labor force. While the so-called economic miracle did not level class differences, the vast inequalities of rural society that had provoked such conflict—and revolutionary politics—in the 1930s had been greatly tempered by the 1970s. Rising standards of living don’t automatically create the basis for democratic consensus, but huge income inequality is difficult to negotiate within a democratic system.

### *Geographic Location: Western Europe*

Equally important in creating a more favorable environment for democratic transition in the 1970s was Spain’s location in western Europe, which clearly structured the choices that could be made. In contrast to the 1930s, democracy was perceived as the “only game in town” and had become naturalized as the western European way of life. Furthermore, the increasing commercial, economic and cultural ties established between authoritarian southern Europe and its democratic northern neighbors since the 1960s brought this way of life more directly into public view than it had been during the more insular early decades. And finally, the personal contact between individuals and groups, particularly the EEC’s social democrats, influenced the decisions of political elites in the south. While one democratization school argues for the infectious impact of a global imperative to democratize, for Spain in the mid-1970s it was the region. Within Spain, the aspirational myth of

joining an advanced “Europe” dated back to at least the late nineteenth century, surviving as a persistent counter-narrative to the Franco regime’s motto that “Spain is different.” During the transition, “Europeanization” and “democratization” became fused as almost interchangeable values.

### *Civil Society Mobilization*

In addition to more favorable economic, social and international conditions, it can be argued that Spain had significant usable political capital, despite the forty years of authoritarian rule. The country had a long, if unstable, history of constitutional government dating from the early 1800s, and a parallel trajectory of popular political engagement, even though the latter was never fully incorporated into a functional democratic system. As such, Spanish political culture had long—if uneven—experience with the habits of grassroots mobilization, the appeal to “rights,” a pluralist political culture, and channels for maintaining conversations among citizens and between social groups and the state.

This active civil society had continued to develop until the forcible demobilization after 1939, but it had already begun to recover in the 1960s through both clandestine and public channels. In terms of organized anti-Francoist opposition, the Communist party (PCE) was the most important force, spreading its influence through a policy of “*entrismo*,” where militants “entered” non-political organizations from the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) labor unions to neighborhood and housewife associations.<sup>10</sup> In these initial stages of grassroots mobilization, the labor movement played a key role, serving in many cases as the “early risers” who “lower the transition costs” for weaker actors.<sup>11</sup> On a national level, the regions where sustained mobilization began in the 1960s were those with strong labor-organizing traditions, like Asturias, the Basque Country, Barcelona or Madrid. On a local level, the worker movement was often the first social movement in poor neighborhoods, providing not only leaders for other movements but also the visible example of collective action in public spaces.<sup>12</sup> By the mid-1970s, labor movement protest and organization had spread, both geographically, but also to new sectors, particularly professionals in education and healthcare. Seven million working days were lost in strikes in 1971, rising to 14 million in 1974.

A more surprising source of anti-Francoist activism was the Catholic Church. From the radicalized *curas obreros* (worker priests) preaching a version of liberation theology to the labor activists of the Catholic Action Workers’ Guild (HOAC) and the Catholic Workers’ Youth (JOC), to the Christian Community movement, there was a powerful generational challenge to the Church’s explicit affiliation with the dictatorship.<sup>13</sup> Another generational hotbed of opposition was the universities, where as early as the mid-1950s students launched protests that led to police occupation and closure at the major universities.<sup>14</sup> In addition to explicitly anti-Francoist activist organizations, there were a range of other groups mobilizing in the expanding public sphere, including Catalan and Basque cultural organizations and neighborhood (AAVV), family (ACF) and housewife (AAC) associations, sometimes implicitly opposing the regime but often simply advocating for community welfare.

Both anti-Francoist and issue-specific forms of grassroots organization had an erosive impact on the dictatorship’s legitimacy. Oppositional movements disrupted the narrative of “Franco’s peace,” especially as they became more vocal

and coordinated. An important turning-point was the formation of two major coalitions, the PCE-dominated *Junta Democrática de España* in 1974 and the Socialist party-dominated *Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática* in 1975. A different kind of explicit challenge was presented by the Basque independence movement, ETA, with its terrorist strategy of assassinations and bank robberies. While only a minority of the population participated in any of these movements, their existence forced the dictatorship to choose between de-facto tolerance and a ramping-up of repression.

More diffusely, interest group associations enhance pluralism and often force the authoritarian state into opening a dialogue.<sup>15</sup> Through engaging in this dialogue, civil society organizations serve as “schools of democracy,” in which members learn how to articulate collective interests and make demands, as well as developing the skills and habits of self-government. Thus, they write statutes, elect leaders, discuss goals and priorities, participate in collective projects and mediate conflicts between contrasting points of view. This expanding civil society mobilization was not powerful or coherent enough to overthrow the dictatorship or even to dictate the terms of the transition. But the “push from below” helped convince some regime elites of the need for reforms and strengthened the hand of democratic political forces once the formal transition period opened.

#### *Francoist Elites: Reformers and the Bunker*

A final favorable factor was the “top down” willingness of the reformers in the Francoist coalition to open a dialogue with the democratic opposition in the months after Franco’s death. But without the “push from below,” elites had no plan for regime transition, as was evident in the cosmetic changes proposed by the first government installed after Franco’s death. Franco’s designated successor, King Juan Carlos, appointed prime minister Arias Navarro, who spoke of a “Spanish-style democracy,” but proposed a minimal reform of existing institutions without elections or inclusion of the democratic opposition. The combination of resistance by the most intransigent Francoist officials, known as the “bunker,” and demands for a real political rupture from the opposition torpedoed the plan and the Arias Navarro government. It was finally in July of 1976, when the king appointed Adolfo Suárez as prime minister, that a more open-ended process was set in motion. For most analysts, this moment marks the beginning of the institutional transition.

### **The Institutional Transition: July 1976–December 1978**

The institutional transition occurred between July of 1976 and December of 1978, when a new democratic Constitution was handily approved by the voters.<sup>16</sup> Whatever favorable conditions existed, Spain’s transition was made by human actions and decisions, both collective and individual. In the immediate aftermath, admiring observers emphasized the speed, the relative peacefulness and the spirit of compromise and consensus that produced a settlement acceptable to most major players as well as the majority of the population. In the midst of the process, however, there was both uncertainty and conflict, not only about how to transition to democracy, but about what kind of democracy it would be. More critical reassessments of the

transition in recent years have sought to resurrect and recognize the alternative paths that were contested but eventually foreclosed in the final democratic settlement.<sup>17</sup> Even more positive assessments acknowledge that the transition had its flaws, including a messier combination of violence and peaceful negotiation, consensus and conflict, which left some thorny issues unresolved.<sup>18</sup>

What is clear is that the final transition settlement emerged out of a dynamic and sometimes contentious process rather than a pre-existing consensus. One axis of this process was the interaction between elite negotiations and an increasingly massive popular mobilization of citizen and labor groups, including the Socialist UGT and the Communist Comisiones Obreras (CCOO). Competing schools of thought have emphasized the primacy of one or the other, but both were essential.<sup>19</sup> Not surprisingly, the agendas and goals of all these players differed dramatically, as did their competing visions of the contours of a future democratic government. Some envisioned a liberal representative monarchy while others imagined a more participatory socialist democratic republic, and still others, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia, hoped for a radically decentralized federal system or even, in the case of ETA, independence.

At the end of the twentieth century, when liberal democracy linked to a capitalist economy has become normalized as the “only game in town” in Europe, it is worth remembering that, in the mid-1970s, Eurocommunism, social democracy and collectivist alternatives were still being actively contested. In Portugal between April 1974 and November 1975, revolutionary groups had carried out massive land expropriation and collectivization in the south, worker-management experiments in industries and systematic home occupations in the major cities. Social movements in Spain promoted similarly radical alternatives, but were constrained by the fact that the administrative, military and police apparatus in Spain remained intact.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the transition began without a clear blueprint on two levels: first, regarding the process of moving from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, and second, about the meaning of democracy itself.

#### *Elite Actors and the “Push from Below,” 1976–77*

The dynamic relationship between the “push from below” and elite actions was evident from the moment of Suárez’s appointment, which was made in the context of a burgeoning wave of popular mobilization, which included 17,455 strikes (six times as many as in all of 1975), 1,672 demonstrations and 283 sit-ins during the first four months of 1976, as well as the unification of the democratic opposition in the *Coordinación Democrática* or *Platajunta*, in March, and the first mass demonstration, of 75,000 people, in Barcelona in February. In addition to mobilizing in defense of a range of specific issues, the popular opposition was coalescing around demands for political rights, amnesty and a complete “rupture” to a democratic republic. Because all of these demands and actions were still illegal, and the repressive apparatus of the Francoist regime remained in place, protesters were arrested, beaten and even shot, as in a police raid in Vitoria in March, in which five striking workers were killed. Faced with the “bunker” on the one hand, and the democratic opposition which denied his legitimacy on the other, King Juan Carlos gambled on a young man who had held posts in the Franco regime but had no investment in holding on to the past.

Over the next crucial six months, Suárez proved to be an astute politician who launched a transition process and convinced most of the key players to participate. He began by promising to lead Spain to a “modern democracy,” institute political pluralism and hold a free election within a year’s time. He first approached the Francoist leaders, presenting his plan for political reform to the military, the *Movimiento* and finally, in November, to the Cortes, which voted overwhelmingly to endorse his plan, even though it would lead to the dissolution of that body.

Probably no single reason explains the acquiescence of many of the Francoist elites to the dismantling of the dictatorship. The perhaps grudging agreement of the military not to interfere was due in part to their institutional duty to serve Franco’s successor, in part to the pressure exerted by reformist defense minister Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado, and in part a result of Franco’s longer-term efforts to separate military and political authority in order to secure his personal power. In terms of the Cortes, some members may have believed they could still be elected in a democratic system while others might have feared that failure to accept a negotiated transition would lead to a more radical rupture (the Portuguese scenario). Indeed, all of these internal negotiations were taking place in a context of still-intensifying popular mobilization. Thus, in September, 100,000 people marched in Madrid in the name of “bread, work and liberty” and another million publicly celebrated Catalonia’s national holiday, the *Diada*, with calls for amnesty, freedom and autonomy, while in November, there was a general strike with at least one million workers demanding freedom, amnesty and wage increases. The hot-spot for political violence was the Basque Country, where police and demonstrators clashed in the streets and ETA assassinated 26 people over the course of the year.

In any case, once Suárez had secured authorization from the existing regime institutions, he held a referendum on December 15, in which 94 percent of voters, representing a solid 77 percent of the census, responded in the affirmative to his plan of negotiated transition. The meaning of that “yes” vote is difficult to interpret, but the result was clear. In strategic terms, the resounding “yes” vote further weakened the remaining bunker, but it also undermined the opposition’s demand for rupture, since the *Platajunta*’s call to abstain from voting was ignored by most Spaniards. The opposition and later critics of the negotiated transition argued that the “yes” vote was cast out of fear, with the government insinuating through its slogan, “To Silence Violence,” that a “no” vote might unleash a revolution, a military coup or a return to civil war. Public opinion polls at the end of the dictatorship indicate that a majority valued peace and economic prosperity over “democracy” or “freedom,” which is hardly surprising after decades of Francoist insistence that they would lead only to disorder and chaos. Some have disparaged this mentality as “sociological Francoism,” while others see a healthy rejection of extremist politics and an attraction to moderate views on the part of a population weary of ideological struggles and ready for reconciliation.<sup>21</sup> Whatever the motives, the preference for centrist positions defined significant turning-points in the transition process, most notably the June 1977 parliamentary elections, in which Spaniards voted overwhelmingly for center-left and center-right parties.

Whether fear or moderation weighed more heavily in the referendum vote, the result helped convince the main parties of the democratic opposition to accept

Suárez's offer to participate in a "negotiated rupture" and his ground rules, most notably the monarchist form of the state. Thus, the major state-wide opposition parties, the Socialist PSOE and the Communist PCE, as well as the center-right Catalanist party, *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* (CDC), led by Jordi Pujol, all agreed to join the government in constructing a constitutional monarchy. In return, Suárez legalized most political parties (February 1977), the trade unions (March), and, most dramatically, the PCE (April). The PCE under Santiago Carrillo had already considerably moderated its rhetoric since the 1930s, having adopted a discourse of democracy and national reconciliation since the 1960s, but its legalization was a huge symbolic gesture. While the PSOE was still formally a Marxist workers' party, a new young leadership under Felipe González was already moving towards the cross-class "catch-all" social democratic party that it would become. The CDC, merging with another Catalanist party in 1978 to form the *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), sought to revive the populist interclass constituency of the Republican *Esquerra* of the 1930s, but positioned itself as moderate and pragmatic.

*The June 1977 Elections and Building Consensus Through "Pacts"*

The next step in the negotiated rupture was the June 1977 parliamentary election, for which almost 79 percent of the eligible voters turned out. Seventy eight political parties were registered, including Adolfo Suárez's new party, the *Unión del Centro Democrático* (UCD). With a panoply of choices from extreme left to extreme right, the results narrowed the field to what some political scientists have called an "imperfect bi-party system." That is, two-thirds of the votes (and over 80 percent of the seats in the weighted electoral system) went to two parties, the center-right UCD (34 percent) and the center-left PSOE (29 percent), with another 18 percent divided evenly between the conservative *Alianza Popular* (AP) (8.8 percent) and the left wing PCE (9.3 percent), while most other parties failed to reach the minimum threshold to gain a seat. The exception, which also further complicated the bi-party model, was the regional vote. Thus, at the state-wide level, the Catalanist parties received 2.8 percent and the Basque PNV 1.7 percent. Within Catalonia, however, 16 percent voted for the centrist Catalan coalition led by Pujol and another 19 percent for the Catalan Communist party (PSUC/Partido Socialista Unificado de Catalunya), followed by the PSOE, with the UCD in fourth place.

The largest party, the UCD, was actually a coalition of more than a dozen small groups, whose ideologies ranged from Christian democratic to social democratic and liberal. Its victory reflected both Suárez's popularity and his visibility, as well as his access to state-controlled media, but it also represented a familiar demographic bloc of rural and middle-class voters. Most of the PSOE's votes came from another familiar bloc of urban and industrial middle and working classes. The most activist working class and student left voted for the PCE/PSUC (as well as for other small revolutionary parties), but party leaders and supporters were disappointed at the poor electoral showing of the Communists (outside of Catalonia), who had stood at the forefront of opposition to the Franco regime. On the other side of the spectrum, the AP of Francoist Minister Manuel Fraga represented direct continuity with the dictatorship, with more than a dozen ex-ministers on its slate. Significantly, the older leadership of both the AP and the PCE based their legitimacy in the past, while both the UCD and the PSOE showcased young leaders with modernizing, vague platforms of progressive but orderly change.

The June 1977 elections marked an important turning point in the transition dynamic, when the major victorious parties began to hash out the contours of a new regime in the constituent Cortes. For the next year, during which the text of a new constitution was written, revised and debated, the reins of the transition process were taken over by the small group of major party leaders, who eventually reached the much-vaunted consensus that permitted some ex-Francoists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Socialists, Communists and Catalan Nationalists (but not Basques) to sign on to a single document. In contrast to 1931, when a majority center-left coalition could ignore the minority conservatives in drafting its constitution, this Cortes was evenly divided between left and right, so consensus required overcoming significant divisions. This feat was accomplished by narrowing considerably the options on the table as well as the room for popular participation. In fact, some of the thorniest issues were resolved at a famous dinner when representatives of the major political groups agreed to a series of compromises that allowed negotiations to move forward.

This process of elite transaction and consensus continues to be both praised and criticized, as cornerstones of the successful transition, betrayals of popular democracy, or perhaps both at the same time.<sup>22</sup> From the positive side, the small number of elites at the table were able to make the hard decisions that their popular constituencies would not have accepted, allowing them to pick their way through a minefield of apparently irreconcilable differences. Their negative point of reference was precisely the divisive Constitution of 1931, which had not been accepted by all major political groups. Defenders of the process of elite negotiation argue that it was the only way to produce a constitution acceptable across the political spectrum, one which would create the broad unconditional loyalty to the democratic system that was never achieved in the 1930s.<sup>23</sup>

For critics, the process of backroom negotiations between a handful of individuals reduced the transparency and participatory nature of creating a new democracy. Even the PSOE and PCE leaders accepted these terms, distancing themselves from the demands of their grassroots followers and discouraging further mass mobilization as potentially disruptive to the evolving consensus. Grassroots citizen groups like the *Asociaciones de Vecinos (AAVV)*, small left wing parties like *Bandera Roja (BR)*, the *Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (ORT)*, and the Marxist-Leninist Communist party (PCE-ml), feminist organizations and local trade unions continued to push for a more communitarian form of direct democracy, in which citizens would participate directly in decision-making, especially at the local level. While there were a variety of radical democratic options among these groups, all wanted a more dramatic rupture with the Francoist past than the consensus permitted, and more fundamental changes in economic and political power relations than would be offered by the liberal democratic Constitution. From this perspective, the elite-pacted transition set in motion an overly statist and neo-liberal democratic regime that has been resistant to civic participation and has lacked transparency.

At the time, there was no question that the main political leaders viewed consensus as the essential path to a functioning democracy. On a symbolic level, consensus epitomized the opposite of civil war and the hope for national reconciliation.<sup>24</sup> The majority of the young political class aspired to transcend the polarization of

the past, and many seem to have accepted what had become a widely shared view of the Civil War as a collective tragedy with guilt on both sides. More practically, the UCD had formed a minority government that required collaboration with other parties in order to move forward. The combination of the practical necessity and the shared commitment to avoiding another civil war at all cost created a climate in which the “process” of reaching an agreement became more important than the “substance” of each party’s platform.

In this spirit, even before work was begun on the constitution, the new government embarked on a series of pacts that prepared the ground for broad-spectrum negotiations, including the Amnesty Law, the Moncloa Pacts and the provisional reinstatement of the Catalan and Basque autonomous governments. In each case, the agreement required compromise across previously unbridgeable political terrain. The Amnesty Law (October 15, 1977) was a blanket pardon that applied to political acts committed by all sides since the 1930s. It freed all political prisoners convicted by the Franco regime, including ETA members, while also pardoning Francoist officials for acts committed during the Civil War or the dictatorship. It has been described as a pact of political amnesia, in the sense that all main parties decided that the best foundation for the new democracy would be to leave the enmities of the past behind.

The Moncloa Pacts (October 25) proposed bringing employers and the main worker organizations, the UGT and the CCOO, together in a social and economic agreement to collectively tackle the destabilizing effects of the international oil crisis on Spain’s economy, culminating in 30 percent inflation and 1.4 percent annual growth (down from 8 percent in 1973). In general terms, the pact asked workers to acknowledge the framework of capitalism and the market economy, while asking employers to accept collective bargaining and redistribution through a social welfare state. Specifically, the pacts called for freezing wages and other austerity measures in order to bring down inflation and the foreign deficit, with a promise of future structural changes to bolster worker security and benefits.

And finally, the provisional reinstatement of the *Generalitat* (September 29) legitimized Catalan nationalists’ claims to autonomy by inviting the exiled *Esquerra* leader of the 1930s, Josep Tarradellas, to return as President. In turn, Tarradellas agreed to recognize the unity of the Spanish state and to wait for the reinstatement of the Catalan statute as part of a new constitutional order. Although the Basque General Council was also reinstated (December), various factors prevented this gesture from successfully incorporating the Basque Nationalists into the negotiated transition, a pattern that would continue throughout the process, culminating in widespread abstention and majority rejection by Basques of the new Constitution in the referendum of December 1978.

### *The Constitution of 1978*

The centerpiece of the pacted Transition was the lengthy 160-article Constitution, which emerged after 18 months of laborious negotiations. Ceding to pressure from the opposition parties, the government agreed to turn over the drafting of a constitution to the new Cortes. The first draft was drawn up by the seven so-called “fathers” who were nominated by the Constitutional Commission of the Cortes, with representation of the UCD (3), PSOE(1), PCE-PSUC(1), AP(1) and the Catalan and

Basque nationalists(1). The draft text was debated in the Commission in May of 1978, and in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate during the summer, culminating in a vote on October 31 in both chambers with only a half a dozen “no” votes in each chamber and another 14 abstentions. All groups supported the final draft except some AP members and all the Basque Nationalists, who withdrew early from the negotiations and abstained in the final vote because their demand for a preconstitutional recognition of Basque sovereignty was denied. Consensus threatened to be derailed at various points, but was finally secured by the famous backroom deals, which produced a combination of compromises and vague wording that bridged the various positions.

Both compromises and ambiguity are evident in the 1978 Constitution’s treatment of such historically contentious issues as religion, the territorial organization of the state, individual and social rights, economic organization and monarchy or republic. Since a monarchy had been one of the “ground rules” of the negotiated transition, it removed one of the key historical divisions in Spanish politics from the field of contention. Agreeing on the place of religion and the Church in the Constitution required a combination of compromise and ambiguity. Thus, the Constitution clearly rejected any state religion and guaranteed freedom of religious practice, while recognizing the special place of the Catholic Church in Spanish society and opening the door to public financing of religious education. More ambiguously, it neither constitutionalized rights like divorce or abortion, which were key demands of feminist groups and the left-wing parties, nor closed the door to implementing them in future legislation. On economic and social organization, the Constitution recognized private property and the free market, but also a “mixed” economy with a public sector, economic planning and the right to seize private property for the public welfare. Mostly yielding to the demands of the left parties, the document spelled out an extensive list of political, civil and social rights. These rights were framed within a state that was defined as both democratic and social and guided by the principles of liberty, equality, pluralism, and even the right to participation. Article 9 goes further to oblige the state to remove obstacles to full participation and substantive access to the full spectrum of rights for all citizens.

One important group targeted for explicit inclusion was women. In all but one clause, the Constitution followed a gender equality framework that promised women equality before the law and forbade discrimination on the basis of gender or other categories (Article 14), while Articles 32 and 35 spelled out a series of rights that apply to both sexes, including the right to property and privacy, the right to work and to judicial appeal, and other rights previously denied women. At the same time, there was little concrete discussion of how such equality would be effectively implemented.<sup>25</sup> The one major exception to formal equality was Article 57, which directly contravened Article 14 with its assertion of male privilege in the royal line.

The territorial organization of the state was perhaps the most contentious issue, pitting peripheral nationalists against unitary Spanish nationalists. In this case, Article 2 recognized, for the first time in a single paragraph, the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation and the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions that constitute it. Adopting the term nation to describe both Spain and its

constituent parts was an unprecedented symbol of conciliation, but also an example of an “apocryphal compromise,” in which contradictory demands were acknowledged without explaining how they would be simultaneously respected.<sup>26</sup> In any case, the crucial details of how autonomous governments would be established, whether “historical” nationalities in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia should have special privileges, and what the distribution of powers would be, were all left for future discussion. The ambiguity and imprecision of some of these formulations left many uncertainties, but in the moment the symbolic achievement of nearly universal consensus seemed proof that Spain had left its fratricidal past behind.

### *The Basque Exception*

The one major exception to this culture of consensus was the Basque Country, which followed a distinct transition, characterized by high levels of violence and conflict, and ending in weak support for the Constitution as well as strong semi- or non-loyal political movements.<sup>27</sup> Violence took the form of massive unruly protests, legal and covert police repression and escalating ETA terrorist attacks, which increased rather than decreased over time. From four attacks in 1973, ETA carried out 71 in 1978, leading to 85 deaths, and 91 in 1980, leading to 124 deaths, all with the avowed goal of derailing a political transition that its leaders insisted was no more than a continuation of Francoism. Popular support or at least sympathy for an organization that was still associated with the struggle against Francoism was shared by up to one-third of Basque residents. The political arm of the movement, called *Herri Batasuna* (HB/Union of the Basque People) was formed in the spring of 1978, and received about 20 percent of the vote in the 1979 elections. The government’s efforts to quell the terrorist threat with a combination of legal and covert paramilitary repression only provided more fuel for ETA’s argument that Spain was an occupying power, while doing little to promote support for the new democracy among the population. The Basque Country stands as a case apart, a virtual failed transition that tarnished, while not derailing, the larger consolidation of Spanish democracy.

## **From Transition to Consolidation, 1978–1982**

The approval of a Constitution marked the beginning of a new phase of consolidation, defined by social scientists as the unquestioned legitimacy of the democratic system among all major political actors and a majority of the population. Consolidation was no more preordained than was the Transition, but it occurred relatively quickly in Spain. Most observers point to the 1982 general election as the key turning-point, because it fulfilled the formal requirement of a peaceful shift of power from one governing party (UCD) to another (PSOE). In this period of initial consolidation that lasted barely more than three years, there were significant challenges and threats that extended the uncertainty about Spain’s democratic future. The government had to turn the “apocryphal compromise” of regional autonomy into reality, devise a strategy to combat terrorism, hold municipal elections that

would form democratic local governments, survive an attempted military coup in February 1981 and finally, reconfigure the party system after the collapse of the governing UCD in the 1982 elections.

### *Autonomous Governments*

The regional question was addressed in stages, beginning with the “fast track” approval of autonomy statutes in the “historical” nations of Catalonia and the Basque Country in the fall of 1979. The first autonomous government elections were then held in March of 1980, establishing what would become regional fiefdoms for the two centrist nationalist parties: the PNV, with 38 percent of the vote in the Basque Country, and CiU, with 28 percent of the vote in Catalonia. The third “historical nationality,” Galicia, held the referendum to approve its statute in December 1980, followed by an election in October 1981, but nationalists never gained the support they did in the other two autonomous governments.

While these first steps launched the process of devolution, they raised as many questions as they answered, especially about how to finesse the gulf between a “symmetrical” federalist state desired by the state-wide parties and the special nation status demanded by the “historical” regions. The grassroots initiative of Andalusian municipalities to hold a referendum in February 1980 demanding “fast track” status for Andalucía disrupted the government’s original plan to clearly separate the two categories of autonomous communities. Meanwhile, although the percentage of Basques who approved of their statute in the October 1979 referendum was some 15 percent higher than in the Constitutional referendum, almost 20 percent voted for HB in local elections at a time when ETA violence reached its peak (174 deaths in 1979–80). Enough progress had been made on creating the framework for a nation of autonomous communities to move forward towards consolidation, but constructing a plurinational Spanish state remained an ongoing challenge for the democracy.

### *Local Governments*

Another important but often overlooked aspect of democratic consolidation was the reorganization of local governments, many of which still had their Francoist-appointed mayors and city councils. Municipal elections were held in 1979, but it was not until 1985 that the central government produced a statute regulating the institutions and powers of local governments. The long history of tension between a centralizing state and many important political movements that had based their claims to empowerment on local governance and participation had not been resolved. During the Transition, one of the key claims of the so-called “citizen movement,” comprised mostly of neighborhood (AAVV) and other locally based organizations, was that these citizen groups participate directly in decision-making at a local level and not simply through voting for representatives. These hopes were dashed after the 1979 local elections, as the major parties took charge of the new city councils.

And yet, local government became an alternative site of democratization that could transform citizens’ everyday relationship with their community in important ways. Especially in urban centers, many social movement activists joined the new local administrations, either as elected officials or bureaucrats, working to

implement some of the demands of the neighborhood associations to build schools, create recreation facilities and parks, sponsor elaborate community festivals and otherwise democratize access to the city. Significantly, most of cities elected left wing majorities of PSOE and PCE/PSUC councilors, who often created coalition governments with ambitious egalitarian social agendas that contrasted with the moderate tone and rhetoric of national politics.<sup>28</sup> By the mid-1980s, however, the centralizing impetus of the state-wide parties had generally diminished the possibility for radical local alternatives. However, the notion of municipal government as a source of opposition and democratic empowerment vis a vis the central government has remained a recurrent feature of Spanish democracy up to the present.

#### *Leadership Crisis and Attempted Coup, 1981*

As regional and local governments were defining their relationship with the central government, leadership at the national level began to dissolve after the 1979 parliamentary election, which had closely reproduced the results of 1977. Despite Suárez's many achievements and his popularity at the end of the Transition, the UCD proved too heterogeneous to chart a coherent path through a fragile period. Thus, for example, debate over the laws authorizing public financing of religious schools (March 1980) and divorce (1981) each divided the Christian and secular democratic wings of the party, as did disagreements among liberals and social democrats as to how to deal with the ongoing economic problems, especially the lack of progress in reducing unemployment. Suárez himself finally resigned as prime minister at the end of January 1981, the beginning of the end of a party held together largely by his presence. An indication of how unconsolidated the democracy seemed at that point was the suggestion of PSOE leaders that they might need to set up a government of "national concentration" led by an army officer.

The combination of the government crisis and the unwavering terrorism provided the spark for an attempted military coup in February 1981, although dissatisfaction and even plotting in the armed forces had begun as early as 1977, and rumors of an impending coup had been swirling during the previous year.<sup>29</sup> One of the consequences of the negotiated transition was the continuity of Francoist personnel, particularly in the armed forces, in which more than two-thirds of the brigadier generals had fought in the Civil War. The coup was launched by Lt. Colonel Antonio Tejero, who charged into the Cortes on February 23, 1981 with a group of officers, but it was also supported by the deputy chief of the General Staff, General Alfonso Armada, and the head of the military garrison in Valencia, Jaime Milans del Bosch. The plotters claimed to speak in defense of the Crown and called for a military-led government to save the country from its purported slide into disorder.

By all accounts, it was the king's actions that defused the crisis and prevented the military uprising from spreading to other garrisons around the country. As Franco's designated successor, his was the only authority that many of the military leaders acknowledged. As a result, when he called the other high-ranking officers and ordered them not to join the coup, most felt obliged to obey. After hours of public uncertainty, the king appeared on television at 1:20 a.m. to disavow the subversive action and announce that he had taken all measures to maintain constitutional order. The king's path from Francoist successor to defender of democracy

has rightly made him one of the heroes of the Transition, but his evolution also occurred within a larger context in which democratization of the monarchy had become the best route to self-preservation.<sup>30</sup> Confirming this context, on February 25, hundreds of thousands of Spaniards brought their support for democracy and the 1978 Constitution into the streets, in the largest citizen demonstrations of the new democracy, while in the Cortes, deputies came together to resolve the short-term leadership crisis. Ironically, as many observers have pointed out, the attempted coup had the ultimate effect of helping to consolidate democracy, including the legitimacy of its royal head of state. While many Spaniards had accepted the monarchist form of government as a necessary price of the consensus, the king's behavior during the coup convinced most that the monarch was an asset to democratic consolidation, rather than a burden or obstacle, as in the past.

### *The 1982 Election*

In the wake of the failed coup, the parliamentary election of October 1982 was viewed by many, even at the time, as an important moment of democratic affirmation and consolidation, as reflected by the 80 percent voter turnout, the highest of any election thus far. Perhaps most remarkable was that the election marked a seismic shift in voting behavior at the same time that it boosted confidence in the stability of the democratic system. The election gave the PSOE an absolute majority with 48 percent of the votes, 4.5 million more than in 1979, under the slogan "Vote for Change." The UCD vote collapsed, reaching less than 7 percent, while the AP, fortified by a coalition with Christian Democrats who defected from the UCD, jumped into second place with 26 percent. The PCE continued its decline, with 4 percent, while the CiU and the PNV confirmed their hegemonic status in Catalonia and the Basque Country.

The PSOE victory was more than a default outcome of UCD disintegration. Since 1979, the PSOE leadership under Felipe González had pushed through changes in its platform and its image, most notably the abandonment of Marxism.<sup>31</sup> New PSOE voters included a big chunk of former PCE voters but also about one-third of former UCD voters, plus about two million first-time voters, many of them young people. In a sign of how much had changed, up to one-third of practicing Catholics voted for the Socialist Party. With the ideological and demographic shift of both leadership and constituency, the PSOE had completed its transformation to a "catch-all" cross-class party of the center-left which ran on a platform of democratic consolidation and modernization.

After the 1982 peaceful transfer of power, the next important turning-point reconfirming that consolidation was the 1996 election. The intervening phase of the democratic regime was defined by the stability of one-party hegemony, with PSOE absolute majorities into the early 1990s. While long-term governmental power and the lack of a viable opposition allowed the PSOE to carry out an ambitious program of institutionalization and reforms, it also discouraged popular participation and fostered corruption and complacency, which steadily undermined its support. It was not, however, until the early 1990s that the conservative opposition leadership (renamed the *Partido Popular* after 1989) was able to convince enough voters that it could be trusted to take the reins of government. After 1996, when the PP formed its first government, the democratic party system finally

stabilized around the “imperfect bi-party” alternation between two main statewide parties that covered a broad range of positions and captured about two-thirds of the votes, with the remaining votes split between a new left coalition (Izquierda Unida/IU) and the regional parties. While democratic institutions were fully legitimated before this, the 1996 election confirmed the principle and practice of peaceful rotation as a normal, and, for many observers, a necessary, element of democratic consolidation.

At the same time as institutional consolidation was reconfirmed with the 1996 elections, debates about the quality of Spanish democracy intensified, around such issues as political corruption, the weakness of civil society, elitist party bureaucracies and, increasingly, the politics of memory. These debates in turn sparked a reevaluation of the Transition, with some critics blaming defects of the transition process as the origin of what they see as democratic deficits today. In this sense, the more critical reevaluation of the Transition belongs to the later history of the democracy itself, part of the normal process of each generation viewing the past through its own lens.

## Conclusion

Spain’s transition to and consolidation of a democratic regime has been viewed through multiple and competing lenses since the late 1970s, some aimed at celebrating Spain’s achievement and others at pointing out deficits. For the first couple of decades, the dominant narrative focused on what had worked, contrasted with what had not worked in Spain’s previous democratic experiment of the 1930s. From this perspective, after 40 years of dictatorship, Spain carried out a relatively peaceful and consensual transition to a democratic government, which was consolidated within a few years and remained unchallenged in its basic parameters. This is the Spanish model that continues to be celebrated in comparative democratization and consolidation scholarship, as the star pupil of the “third wave” of transitions. The more critical view that has taken shape in recent years questions the trade-offs that were made to achieve this relatively smooth process, including the suppression of popular participation and the decision not to confront the demons of the Francoist past, all of which has resulted in what detractors call a “low-intensity” democracy. Rather than allowing the Transition to be absorbed into the competing moral narratives, held up as an unblemished icon or vilified as the source of all evil in Spain’s current democracy, it should be historicized as the complicated, inspiring and flawed process that moved Spain from dictatorship to democracy.

# DEMOCRATIC STATE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, 1982–2016

After the institutional consolidation of the early 1980s, democracy was increasingly normalized internally as Spain became just another European democracy. In a parallel process, the social, cultural and economic convergence that had begun in the 1960s turned the country into just another western European society by the end of the century, albeit with its own particularities. At the same time, normalization of democratic government paradoxically opened the space for more philosophical debates about the past, present and future direction of the country. In fact, the consensus and satisfaction that marked the early years of democratic rule have been supplanted by a more combative political culture, which has raised questions about both the “model” transition and the quality of the democratic polity it produced. These questions have been exacerbated since 2009 and the “great recession,” which has brought confidence in the functioning of Spain’s democracy to an all-time low. At the same time, there remains a fundamental consensus about the framework of democratic government that did not exist in the 1930s. It may in fact be the sense of security about Spain’s democratic stability in a democratic Europe that has provided an invisible perimeter for the politics of *crispación* (tension or conflict) among the current generation of “grandchildren” of the Transition.

## The Democratic Era in Comparative Perspective

When Spain, along with Portugal and Greece, joined the European democratic club in the late 1970s, they constituted part of a long trajectory of European democratization that culminated in the early 1990s in eastern Europe. Southern Europe’s democratic consolidation and integration into the European Community (EC) after 1986 set the precedent for an expanding concept of Europe defined by its democratic boundaries. But it was only at the end of a century in which democracy competed with fascism, authoritarianism and communism that a “Europe” without western, southern or eastern qualifiers consolidated its democratic identity.

But there was also a western/northern European core that, in the decades after the Second World War, established the parameters for what became known as European-style democracy, which consolidated around a trade-off between market

capitalism and government planning, individual freedom and social benefits. The democratic welfare state transformed political categories, with conservatives accepting Keynesian spending and high taxes and socialists accepting capitalism and electoral democracy, with a much diminished revolutionary left. The apparently win/win formula functioned smoothly during an extraordinary period of economic growth, from the early 1950s to the onset of the oil crisis in 1973. Since that point, the model has been under increasing strain, with global competition, the collapse of the manufacturing sector, massive immigration and slower growth making it more difficult to fund expensive social programs. The trend for both center-right Christian Democrat and center-left Social Democrat parties has been to gradually curtail programs, limit immigration, cut government spending and pursue other neo-liberal measures, while at the same time maintaining the ever more tenuous scaffolding of social, as well as political and civil rights.<sup>1</sup>

At the grassroots level, democratic politics in Europe has been enriched and complicated by a variety of social movements since the late 1960s, including the student and feminist movements, the embattled labor movement, the peace and anti-nuclear and environmental movements, as well as pro-democracy mobilization in southern and eastern Europe during their transitions.<sup>2</sup> In particular, grassroots movements have provided democratic renewal at the local level, with less success in transforming national politics. At first, the "old left" of the Communist party played a role in some of these movements, especially in France, Italy and Spain, when 1970s Eurocommunism offered an alternative to both Stalinism and social democracy. By the 1980s, however, the crisis of Marxism and the shrinking industrial working class continued to reduce support until the 1989 revolutions sealed the death of European communism, both as unfulfilled aspiration and tainted reality. Since then, there has been no coherent left wing democratic alternative capable of challenging the center-left and center-right status quo. At the same time, ultra-right wing populist organizations have been growing, mobilized around xenophobic fear of immigrants "swamping" European culture and society, but with rare exceptions these have not (yet) mounted a serious governing alternative.

As a full-fledged member of the European democratic club since the late 1970s, Spain has participated in most of these trends. At the same time, there were important consequences for Spain, as well as Portugal and Greece, in democratizing at that moment, just as the democratic welfare state model entered into crisis. Thus, the new democratic government in Spain faced the challenge of recession, unemployment and uncompetitive old industries as it attempted to build a welfare state nearly from scratch, raise taxes and prepare the economy to enter the EC. As conservative governments in the 1980s in the UK, West Germany and even Scandinavia adopted austerity measures and cut welfare programs, in southern Europe the socialist parties took power, in Greece, France, Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Italy. In each case, the socialist parties began with ambitious Keynesian promises and egalitarian rhetoric and ended up accepting most of the neo-liberal austerity strategy. With a shrinking union base undermined by the closure of old industries, and the decline of the Communist alternative, the socialist parties could survive outrage and cries of abandonment from their traditional base.

What made the sense of betrayal particularly poignant in the Spanish case was the fact that workers had been waiting forty years for a government that

represented them. While socialist parties in older democracies were faced with trimming generous benefits, in Spain there was no fat to trim, leaving the PSOE with the unenviable task of trying to adapt the Spanish economy to the new global pressures while still building a social infrastructure that approached European levels. The upshot was a welfare state that largely achieved the European principle of universality, but at lower benefit levels, with some experts emphasizing convergence and others the distance between Spain (and Greece and Portugal) and northern Europe.<sup>3</sup> While the left felt betrayed by the PSOE's hybrid strategies, they seemed to be accepted by most voters, as evidenced by the long Socialist hegemony (1982–1996). Even with the return of alternating majorities in 1996, both the PSOE and the conservative governing party, the Partido Popular (PP, formerly AP until 1989), generally followed the European pattern of negotiating a tenuous balance between austerity and the basic model of social democracy.

This underlying shared framework contrasted with an increasingly combative political rhetoric, or *crispación*, that does have some uniquely Spanish characteristics. For one thing, it was not until the early 1990s that the conservatives in Spain were able to “rebrand” themselves as a fully democratic party that voters were willing to trust as a governing alternative.<sup>4</sup> The election of the first PP government in 1996 was an important moment of reconsolidation of Spanish democracy, when voters felt comfortable enough penalizing the PSOE for a series of corruption scandals, but it also opened the door to a new era of competitive elections and polarizing rhetoric in which the two parties took the gloves off in trying to mobilize their constituencies. Since the old left/right divisions based on economic policy had largely been replaced by the centrist hybrid model, the terrain of disagreement shifted to cultural and social issues. Specific to Spain's left/right divide is the centrality of dueling historical narratives, with a distinct version of the past incorporated into each party's identity. While consensus national narratives have come under fire in other European countries, the memory wars in Spain have been particularly fueled by the political parties.

Whether this politics of *crispación* reflects deep cleavages that bode ill for Spain's future democracy as opposed to “normal” divisions consistent with other European democracies is up for debate.<sup>5</sup> The classic structural cleavages that defined pre-Civil War Spain, between urban/rural, Catholic/anti-clerical, male/female and bourgeois/working class, have certainly weakened. Fueling this process has been the combination of rapid growth and increased public spending, which made Spain, by the mid-1990s, not only the eighth-largest economy in the world, but the ninth when measured by the HDI (Human Development Index) indicators of well-being.

The structural transformation that had begun in the 1960s continued to disrupt the old divisions. The agrarian sector declined from employing 21 percent of the population in 1976 to western European levels of 4.5 percent in 2011, while the industrial sector also shrank, from 27 percent to 14 percent. In contrast, the service sector has expanded from 41 percent to 74 percent, largely as a result of the expansion of welfare services and their administration at the local, regional and state levels. Many of these new service sector employees are women, whose massive entry into the work force, from 27 percent of women in 1980 to 53 percent in 2011, has brought Spain close to the European average. At the same time, the birth rate has halved since the mid-1970s (from 19 to 10/1000), with the average family

including only 1.1 child, one of the lowest in the world, while the life expectancy of 80 years (2005) is on par with western Europe. Non-traditional family forms are also on the rise, with almost one-third of births occurring to unmarried parents (2010), up from 2 percent in 1976, and half as many divorces as marriages.<sup>6</sup> These trends mark the end of the long demographic transition and “first world” convergence.

As a whole, these structural changes have dramatically improved standards of living. Thus, after stagnating since the 1930s, per capita income increased by a factor of 12 between 1960 and 1990, reaching 85 percent of the European average in 2007. There has even been significant regional redistribution of income since the 1960s, away from the rich regions of Madrid, Catalonia and the Basque Country, and towards poorer regions like Andalucía, Castile, Galicia and Extremadura.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the most significant indicator of economic opportunity has been Spain’s transformation from a country of emigration to a country of immigration since the mid-1990s, with the number of foreigners, from Africa (18 percent), Latin America (28 percent) the EU (40 percent) and Asia (5 percent), increasing from half a million to 5.6 million in 2010, one of the highest in Europe. In regions like Madrid, Valencia or Catalonia, where immigrants top 15 percent of the population, birth rates are higher than elsewhere, reflecting their younger and more dynamic demographic profile.

Among the native population, the other sharp cleavages of the 1930s have also softened. Access to education has reduced class as well as gender inequality, with the average length of schooling up from only four years in 1964 to 11 years in 2005, and a corresponding rise in the number of university students from 1 to 5 million, over half of them women, since the mid-1980s. Even more dramatic has been the decline in the religious divide since the 1930s, when politics, rural vs. urban residence and religious affiliation were closely correlated. Thus, one-third of practicing Catholics voted for the PSOE in 1982, unthinkable in the 1930s. The number of practicing Catholics has also been in steep decline, from 60 percent in 1975 to 25 percent by 2012, with the percentage of non-Catholics rising from 2 percent to 20 percent (27 percent among young adults), including 3 percent who practice Islam and 1 percent Protestants.

At the same time, Spain remains one of the most unequal societies in Europe, and income inequality has been rising again since the 1990s. By 2006, about the same percentage was living below the poverty level (20 percent) as in the 1970s. Gender inequality in the work force is also a reality, with women more likely to be hired with temporary contracts and earning about 75 percent of men’s salaries (2000).<sup>8</sup> The Spanish economy relies heavily on low-skilled temporary contract jobs in its large construction and tourism sectors, which are vulnerable to periodic layoffs that send unemployment to astronomical levels (above 20 percent). Many of the workers who fill these jobs are among the least educated in Europe, part of the 24 percent of the population that doesn’t finish secondary school. Whereas in most western European countries, the biggest sector of the population are secondary school graduates, followed by those with university degrees and in third place those with only a primary education, in Spain the order is reversed, reflecting a greater polarization in education levels that translates into income disparity.<sup>9</sup> Since 2009, the economic crisis has exacerbated these weaknesses, demoting Spain to the thirteenth-largest economy and sending unemployment up to 26 percent

(before dropping back to 20 percent in 2016). However, without knowing whether the current state of affairs is part of a longer trend, a glitch, or the end of an era, it is hard to make accurate predictions about the future.

## **Democratic government under PSOE leadership: 1982–1996**

After formal consolidation in 1982, the democratic era can be divided into two main periods, the first marked by the stability of PSOE hegemony (1982–1996) and the second framed by alternating center-left and center-right governments (1996–2011).<sup>10</sup> During the first period, the stability and longevity of a strong majority government that permitted long-term projects was mostly beneficial for the fledgling democratic state.<sup>11</sup> The result was the most productive era of democratic institutionalization and normalization in Spain's modern history. The PSOE oversaw the implementation of the system of autonomous governments, created the blueprint for local government, subordinated the military to civilian rule, brought the welfare state closer to European levels, expanded the impoverished cultural infrastructure and negotiated Spain's entry into European institutions and onto the global stage, a process that culminated in 1992 with the Olympics in Barcelona and the World Exposition in Seville.

There was also another less rosy side to the PSOE era. Thus, it disappointed many of its original supporters, was unable to end high unemployment, and was increasingly tainted by corruption scandals that revealed a deeply clientelistic culture and a patrimonial attitude towards public resources. Finally, while its centralized, hierarchical structure produced coherent government programs, it was also generally impervious to popular pressure and was more interested in state institutions than citizen empowerment. However, when voters finally ejected the PSOE in 1996, it paradoxically affirmed the normalization of democratic practice.

### **Institutionalization and European Integration**

One of the first projects of the PSOE, in the wake of the recent failed military coup (February 1981), was a largely successful military reform. It began with the National Defense Act (1984), which reduced the number of senior officers but, more importantly, restructured the chain of command under civilian leadership. Later, the government instituted reforms of military education, limited the jurisdiction of military courts, reduced the length of service for conscripted soldiers and acknowledged conscientious objection, in addition to removing the most conservative hard-liners from key posts. Integrated into the western European defense system and deployed on humanitarian missions, the Spanish army lost its historical capacity for autonomous political intervention.

An even more dramatic transformation was the "state of autonomous communities," which turned Spain from one of the most centralized states into one of the most decentralized (see Map IV). By 1983, the government had negotiated statutes for the remaining "slow-track" autonomous communities, and affirmed that both fast- and slow-track governments would end up with the same powers and



**Map IV** The State of the Autonomous Communities

resources (symmetrical federalism). It was harder to reach agreement on exactly what those powers and resources would be, with some foot-dragging on the part of the central government. However, the eventual level of devolution was dramatic, including authority over urban planning, education, health care, police, environment and finances. Devolution also increased heterogeneity, from Catalanization of the education system in Catalonia to varying levels of social benefits, as the percentage of state expenditure controlled by the autonomous governments rose from 8 percent in 1983 to 18 percent in 1989 and 25 percent in 1992. Important breakthroughs in negotiations occurred between 1993 and 1999, when the PSOE and then the PP participated in coalition governments with the Catalan nationalist coalition (*Convergència I Unió, CiU*) CiU, which resulted in a higher percentage of income tax reserved for the autonomous communities. While points of disagreement existed over powers and finances, during this period all major parties outside the Basque Country seem to have accepted the devolution process as a legitimate framework of territorial organization.<sup>12</sup> Even in the Basque Country, the 1988 *Ajuria-Enea* Pact between all the political parties in that region except the ETA-affiliated Herri Batasuna HB marked a hopeful turning point, when the PNV affirmed its democratic nationalism against the unapologetic terrorism of ETA.

In contrast to internal devolution, the Socialists pursued further integration into Europe and the Cold War "West." The PSOE completed the arduous negotiations granting Spain, along with Portugal, entry into the EC in 1986. More controversial was the PSOE's flip flop on membership in the NATO military alliance, from the promise to withdraw in 1982 to the insistence in 1986 that it would be irresponsible

to do so. The government squeaked out a narrow victory in a March 1986 referendum, which further confirmed the PSOE's hegemony but also its shift towards the center. Thus, the NATO referendum was an important turning point in the PSOE's relationship with left-wing civic and political forces, which fought hard for the principle of non-aligned status in the Cold War. The left tried to reconstitute itself in the wake of the NATO betrayal and the decline of the PCE, with the formation of a new coalition called *Izquierda Unida* (IU), but the "United Left" made little dent in Socialist power or popularity, as evidenced by the second absolute majority in the 1986 elections (the PSOE won 44 percent, down from 48 percent, with 4.6 percent for IU), held a few months after the NATO referendum.

### Neo-Liberalism and Social Welfare

The PSOE's abandonment of its traditional base was manifest in other ways. With the goal of making the Spanish economy more competitive, the government cut spending in the face of inflation, privatized public companies, loosened job security and eased the way for the closure of uncompetitive heavy industry, like mining, steel and textiles (euphemistically called industrial reconversion), with the estimated loss of 1.5 million jobs. With unemployment reaching 22 percent in 1985, there were not enough new jobs in the service sector, and many of them took advantage of the new temporary contract law (1984). The labor unions, both the Socialist UGT and the Communist CCOO, took an increasingly combative stance towards the government in trying to resist these policies. But the left opposition, in Spain as elsewhere, was not strong enough to pose a governing alternative. Adding to the weakness of the left was the dependence of many organizations, including the trade unions, on government support and state subsidies.<sup>13</sup>

While the PSOE was becoming less working class, the party tried to open its ranks to more women as well as incorporate women's issues into its agenda. With women constituting only 10 percent of party members and only one woman among the top tier leadership, the PSOE was an overwhelmingly masculine institution in 1982. The party addressed this issue with gender quotas for candidate lists, 25 percent in 1988 and parity in 1994. Although implementation has been plagued by typical problems, including overrepresentation of women at lower levels and in certain "feminized" posts, it was enough to differentiate them from the AP/PP. Thus, in parliamentary elections, the percentage of PSOE female candidates rose from 12 percent in 1977 to 27 percent in 1989 and 49 percent in 2000, while the PP, with no quotas, fielded 17 percent in 1989 and 25 percent in 1996. The percentage of women elected was lower, but rose from 8 percent to 28 percent in 1996 and 37 percent in 2000 for the PSOE, vs. 6 percent, 14 percent and 25 percent for the AP/PP.<sup>14</sup> In terms of policies, the PSOE government also passed a limited abortion law (1985) and established parental and maternity leave, but also created the *Instituto de la Mujer* (*Women's Institute*) in 1983, which took the lead in funding gender research, establishing women's centers across the country and other woman-friendly projects.

The Instituto de la Mujer and related legislation was part of a broader PSOE goal to create a social democratic state defined by a strong commitment to public welfare. Thus, at the same time as it pursued neo-liberal economic "adjustment"

policies, the PSOE followed the European model of a mixed economy that balanced market capitalism with increased state investment, higher progressive taxes and social spending. Thus, the government invested heavily in infrastructure, constructing a national highway system and building high-speed trains, and expanded basic welfare state services, as well as the cultural infrastructure of museums, libraries and theaters. Much of the funding for social programs came from the new progressive income tax, which replaced a system of mostly indirect (and thus regressive) taxation. The late Franco regime had begun to increase social spending, but it was under the Socialist governments that public spending began to converge with western European levels, from 65 percent in 1980 to 87 percent in 1994. Thus, whereas in 1960 the Spanish state spent 15 percent of the GNP on public administration, compared with 52 percent for France and 35 percent for Germany, by 1990 it was up to 43 percent, with a parallel shift towards social spending.<sup>15</sup>

Important targets of social spending included a national health care system (the 1986 General Health Act), and, after 1992, a universal pension system. In the cultural realm, the PSOE asserted the state's role in protecting, financing and stimulating cultural production and consumption, including the founding of the *Reina Sofía* modern art museum in 1986 and the restoration of more than 40 theaters, among them the iconic *Liceo* in Barcelona and the *Teatro Real* in Madrid.<sup>16</sup> In 1985 the Right to Education Act increased spending on schools and the years of compulsory schooling. Instead of trying to create a single public school system and close religious schools, which had been the controversial program of the Second Republic, the PSOE chose a conciliatory path, which not only recognized a double network of public and private schools but granted a significant subvention for private Catholic schools. While there was a certain tension between neo-liberalism and state spending in the PSOE's economic policies, the economic recovery that began after 1985, aided in part by EC markets and subsidies, lowered unemployment somewhat (to 16 percent) and helped maintain an uneasy balance until recession hit again after 1992 and unemployment climbed back to 22 percent.

### The End of the PSOE Era

By the early 1990s, the recession was one of several issues that came together to undermine the PSOE's long hegemony. The spike in unemployment revealed that the Socialists had not resolved the structural problems of the Spanish economy. The ongoing unsuccessful anti-terrorist struggle was another issue, as 300 more victims fell to ETA attacks during the Socialist era. More important, however, was the public scandal exposed in a series of media and judicial investigations that accused and eventually tried government officials for supporting a "dirty war" against ETA during the 1980s, which included torture, abduction and the assassination of about two dozen people. The so-called *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* (GAL/Liberation Anti-terrorist Groups) were paramilitary right wing groups financed by authorities in the Basque Country, but also protected by top PSOE officials.

Concurrent with the GAL investigations, a series of corruption cases involving government officials began to paint a picture of a party indifferent to the rule of law and in violation of the public trust. The cases involved Socialist officials using

their positions for personal gain, giving government contracts to cronies, taking bribes and misappropriating public moneys into private slush funds. While none of the scandals were linked personally to the prime minister, Felipe González, even the sins of omission were glaring in a party that was as tightly centralized and hierarchical as the PSOE.

In that context, the 1996 election can be viewed as at least a partial victory for Spanish democracy. The defeat of the PSOE in a solid turn-out (77.4 percent of electors) demonstrated that the electorate was willing to hold the party accountable, and that the media and the judiciary were capable of acting as “watchdogs” to monitor government activities. Further, the percentage of Spaniards who believed that democracy was the preferred system of government never faltered, increasing from 70 percent in 1980 to 76 percent in 1995. Equally important, enough of the electorate felt confident that they could vote for the opposition PP or another party without endangering the democracy. Although the PP barely edged out the PSOE (38 percent to 37 percent), it had finally broken through the ceiling of about 25 percent that its predecessor, the AP, had maintained in the 1980s. For many, the AP was still tainted by its links with Francoism, symbolized by founder and Francoist minister, Manuel Fraga. The make-over began in 1989 when the leadership baton was passed to a young conservative, José María Aznar, and the name was changed to the Partido Popular (PP).

Even though the new era of competitive elections led to a resurgence of more confrontational politics, the flip side of *crispación* was a functioning pluralist system that was more accountable in the long run than single-party hegemony. At the same time, the long PSOE hegemony also contributed to democratic consolidation, providing the stability for sustained institutionalization at the local, regional, state and European levels. In most cases, that stability bolstered the Spanish democratic state, if perhaps less so a flourishing democratic society.

### **From Consolidation to *Crispación*: PP and PSOE alternation from 1996 to 2011**

From 1996 to 2011, the stability of single-party rule was replaced by the high drama of competitive elections and shifting majorities between the two major state-wide parties, as well as growing tensions between state wide and region-based parties, with polarizing rhetoric and controversial legislation aimed at solidifying each party’s base. The PP governed for eight years, from 1996 to 2004 (in coalition with CiU from 1996 to 2000), before it was voted out of power as a result of its handling of the March 11, 2004 terrorist bombing by Islamic militants. The PSOE, having renovated its leadership after the 1990s, also won two consecutive terms, from 2004 to 2011, after which it was voted out for its handling of the recession that unfolded in 2007–9. While the Transition mode of consensus politics had been abandoned long ago, the lack of a viable opposition party during the 1980s kept political debates muted. The culture began to shift in 1993, during the last (minority) PSOE government. Thus, during the 1993 electoral campaign the PSOE tried to shore up its support by linking the PP to Francoism, breaking the

implicit agreement not to instrumentalize the past.<sup>17</sup> By the end of the decade, this style of high-stakes polarized politics had become the norm.

### Political Polarization

So, what does this culture of *crispación* mean for Spanish democracy? Was the willingness to take the gloves off a sign that the ring itself was viewed as secure, with the added luxury of a long period of economic growth from 1994 to 2007? Or did it reflect the resurgence of an unresolved polarized past that had festered untreated since the Transition? Not surprisingly, there is evidence for both viewpoints.

Thus, one could argue that the political fireworks disguised a fundamental underlying consensus between the main parties on various basic issues, albeit with differences of style and degree. Both parties shared the desire to raise Spain's profile on the world stage. They also shared a hybrid approach to economic and social policy, balancing neo-liberalism and welfare state protection, in an unstable equilibrium that relied on the long growth cycle for sustainability. Thus, social spending continued to rise until 2010, although less sharply than during the first PSOE era. Likewise, they agreed on the general parameters of anti-terrorism policy, including police action, collaboration with the French government to extradite terrorists and the illegalization of HB, ETA's political arm. Conversely, both accepted the constitutional framework of autonomous governments and continued devolution, while neither state-wide party fully embraced the pro-independence nationalist parties' concept of multiple sovereign nations. Furthermore, the fact that on the left the IU continued to lose votes (from 10 percent in 1996 to 5 percent in 2000 and 4 percent in 2004), and on the right no populist xenophobic party coalesced, suggests that most Spaniards outside Catalonia and the Basque Country did not see a viable alternative outside this centrist framework.

At the same time, each party stoked the flames of contention around a series of symbolic identity issues, which did seem to resonate among the population. For example, after 1996 the PP embraced an unapologetic Spanish nationalism that seemed to be welcomed by a sector of the population, after decades of its discredited association with Francoism. This nationalism was reflected in gestures like the installation of the largest (Spanish) flag in the world in Madrid's *Plaza de Colón* (October 12, 2001), or in education reform, in which the party proposed (1997) that the unitary character of Spain's identity be a guiding principle of the history curriculum. Externally, the PP asserted its national independence from Europe, supporting the US in the 2003 Iraq war against the wishes of the major European countries (as well as the majority of the Spanish population).

When the PSOE returned to office in 2004, the government withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq and adopted a more pro-European orientation, while rescinding the PP's educational guidelines. Religious identity has also become repoliticized, even though only about 20 percent of the population define themselves as practicing Catholics who think the government should be guided by the views of the Church. One of the most contentious religious/political issues in this period was same-sex marriage, whose legalization by the PSOE in 2005 was challenged by the PP in the Supreme Court (which ruled in favor of the law in 2012). The PSOE's left-wing

cultural program included a landmark 2007 law mandating “effective equality” between women and men, including parity in government, private business and electoral lists.

Perhaps the most potent symbolic battle ground has been the past, which was increasingly mobilized in the “memory wars” over competing historical narratives. After linking the PP with Francoism in the 1993 election campaign, the PSOE submitted the first proposal to condemn the dictatorship in 1999. The PP agreed only to a generic condemnation of “totalitarian regimes” in 2002, claiming it wanted to avoid “opening old wounds” and unleashing dormant hatreds. While a slight majority of the population supported this view at the time, a vocal minority (weighted towards the younger generation) began criticizing what they called the suppression of (Republican) historical memory, imposed, they claimed, with the Amnesty Law of 1977.<sup>18</sup> Civil society groups like the Association for the *Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica* (ARMH/Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory, 2000) began to advocate for excavating Civil War mass graves but also for more public recognition of the victims of the dictatorship.<sup>19</sup> Around the same time, the Church initiated proceedings to recognize its own victims through requests that resulted in the beatification (in 2001 and 2007) of 631 religious personnel who had been killed during the Civil War.

During the Socialist government of 2004–8, the PSOE responded to left-wing grassroots pressure with the so-called “Law of Historical Memory,” passed after much amendment and discussion in 2007. For the first time, the democratic government officially condemned the Franco regime as illegitimate and committed the state to rehabilitate its victims. Not surprisingly, the law did not satisfy everyone, with those on the left upset that Francoist judicial sentences would not be revisited, and the PP voting against it on the grounds that it “buried the consensus” of the Transition.

The current debate in Spain has revealed precisely the lack of consensus, not only about memory politics during the Transition, but about the longer trajectory of twentieth-century Spanish history.<sup>20</sup> Taking shape in both popular and academic histories are conflicting moral narratives that assign distinct political meanings to the Transition and what it produced. For conservatives, the “pacted” reformist Transition was the result of a gradual process of democratization that began during the liberal Restoration regime (1875–1923), was derailed by the radical and intolerant Second Republic (1931–1936) and facilitated once again by the stability and economic growth of the later Franco regime. Thus, on the anniversary of the death of the architect of the 1875 Bourbon Restoration, Antonio Cánovas del Castillo (1997), PP leader Aznar situated the origins of the current democracy in nineteenth-century liberalism. This narrative culminates in the peaceful transition planned by reformist Francoist elites and implemented after Franco’s death. Feeding into this version is a neo-Francoist strain of Civil War history (led by best-selling journalist Pio Moa) that justifies the military coup of 1936 as a patriotic response to a disintegrating Republic.

The opposing left-wing narrative asserts that the main source of Spain’s democratic tradition lies, not in the elitist and corrupt Restoration regime but in the popular democratic Second Republic, which was brutally crushed by a fascist dictatorship that derailed the country’s political modernization for forty years and

contributed nothing to the democratic transition, whether directly or indirectly. In this narrative, Spain's democratic tradition was preserved and carried forward by the anti-Francoist opposition, culminating in the popular mobilization that forced reluctant regime elites towards rupture. The left narrative diverges at this point as to whether the anti-Francoist democratic culture ended up completely crushed, derailing the achievement of true democracy, or whether the important story is that an imperfect but genuine democracy was "conquered from below," not gifted from above.<sup>21</sup>

### State/Regional Polarization

The revisiting of the Transition also informed the growing *crispación* in the relations between Madrid and the historical nationalities, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country. With some qualifications, the polarization situated both state-wide parties, which sought to preserve the constitutional settlement, against the nationalist parties, which asserted the sovereign right to self-determination of all nations within the Spanish state. The turning-point came in 1998, with the Declaration of Barcelona, in which parties representing the three historical nationalities (including Galicia) declared that the "state of autonomous communities" had not gone far enough in recognizing the plurinational reality of Spain. In the same year, the PNV concluded the Pact of Estella with HB, which won the 1998 regional elections on the platform of the right of the Basque people to decide their future vis-à-vis the Spanish (and French) state. That platform was consolidated in the *Plan Ibarretxe*, approved by the Basque Parliament in 2004 but rejected even for debate in the Cortes by the PP and PSOE (2005).

In Catalonia, the CiU lost control of the *Generalitat* after 23 years in 2003 to a new Catalan nationalist coalition, led by the pro-independence *Esquerra* (ERC) and the the Catalan branch of the PSOE, the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC-PSOE), which drew up a plan to revise the autonomy statute. The PSOE supported the general concept, although the version it pushed through the Congress in 2006 fell short of what the Catalan parties had initially proposed. The PP went further, stoking anti-Catalan sentiment and challenging the constitutionality of the new statute. The 2010 ruling by the Constitutional Court rejecting some of the articles of the statute was the final blow to a negotiated solution. The failure of statute reform undermined the credibility of the PSC/ERC coalition, which lost again to the CiU in 2010, but it also dramatically increased independence sentiment in Catalonia.

### Democratic Society

What has been the effect of the political evolution on the quality of Spain's democratic society? A consistent critique since the 1980s has complained of a "low-intensity" democracy, marked by low levels of membership in political parties and NGOs, and anemic participation in civil society mobilizations.<sup>22</sup> Critics have blamed the legacy of the dictatorship, the "top down" Transition, the hierarchical political parties or a statist political culture in which Spaniards look to the state to solve their problems.

On the other hand, there is evidence that the population is less passive and disengaged than statistics suggest. First, turn-out in elections has remained consistently solid since the late 1970s (70–80 percent of eligible voters), with more coming out in highly competitive elections. Thus, neither stability nor *crispación* undermined the investment in the electoral system. Further, from the outset there has been massive mobilization at critical moments, such as during the Transition and after the February 1981 coup. In 1997 there were huge demonstrations against ETA violence after the assassination of a city councilman, in 1998 there was a state-wide general strike, in 2002 an oil spill off the coast of Galicia sparked an environmental social movement, and in 2004, 35 percent of Spaniards joined demonstrations, including massive gatherings after the March 11, 2004 Atocha terrorist bombing to demand more information from the government. Three days before the general election, the PP pointed to ETA instead of Islamic terrorists because it feared the attack would be blamed on its unpopular participation in the Iraq war. Although mobilization fell again following the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq after the election, interest in politics has been rising in inverse relationship to the declining sense of satisfaction with the government. When politics at the top becomes more uncertain, in other words, the level of civic engagement seems to rise.

The upshot is a mixed portrait of Spanish democracy in the period between 1996 and 2011. On the one hand, the democracy showed every sign of continued institutional consolidation. Where polarization in the 1930s led to large sectors of the population abandoning legal channels after electoral defeat, recent *crispación* did not convert any of the major state-wide parties to “semi-loyalty.” At the same time, the nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country have become increasingly semi-loyal to the constitutional framework. However, even if both of these nations eventually seceded, the Spanish democratic state would still survive, albeit with different territorial boundaries.

## 2008–2016: Crisis and Uncertainty

In the last few years, the picture has become even muddier, with Spain’s democracy beset by economic crisis from 2008 and political crisis from 2011. The “great recession” hit Spain particularly hard in two vulnerable areas: high levels of unemployment (peaking at 26 percent in 2013) and inequality. Partly a result of these economic woes, the political crisis also included the territorial challenge and declining faith in the major parties. The crisis exacerbated existing schisms, destabilized what had been common points of reference, but at the same time showcased Spaniards’ capacity for grassroots mobilization in a crisis.

Confidence in both major political parties is at its lowest point, with barely over half the population voting for one of them in the 2015 and 2016 general elections, down from two-thirds in 2011. Outside the electoral arena, there has been a surge in popular mobilization. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of public demonstrations or meetings more than doubled, taking shape in the so-called 15-M *Indignado* movement, a predecessor of Occupy Wall Street, that was launched in May 2011 in

the name of the 99 percent against the 1 percent.<sup>23</sup> Using social media platforms, citizens have mobilized both virtually and physically against the privatization of health care and the eviction of residents, among various issues.<sup>24</sup> Thus, in June 2011, the PAH (Platform for those Affected by Mortgages) prevented its first eviction in Madrid, and in December 2012, thousands of patients and doctors formed a human chain around Madrid's hospitals defending health care as a public good. Anger at both parties is also linked to the perception that corruption is an endemic problem that crosses political lines, now framed as evidence that all political elites represent the interests of the "haves" against the "have nots."

Grassroots mobilization also fueled the formation of two upstart reform parties, the left-wing *Podemos* (We can) and center-right *Ciudadanos* (Citizens), which together won over one-third of the votes in the December 2015 (24 percent and 14 percent) and June 2016 general elections (21 percent and 13 percent). The June election was called because the fractured December vote had produced neither a majority nor a governing coalition. While some had predicted that the PSOE might be finished, its support held steady at 22 percent, while the PP recovered slightly from 29 percent to 33 percent. Even though Podemos formed a coalition with IU for the June election, predictions that it would absorb the PSOE's voters did not pan out. Following the inconclusive elections and months of fruitless efforts to form a majority coalition, on October 29, 2016, the PP formed a new minority government. Whether the party system will re-stabilize around the PP and the PSOE or be re-configured into a multi-party system is still unclear.

The combination of economic crisis and the failed statute reform sparked a rapid deterioration in the relations between the central government and Catalonia, as financial meltdown heightened the conflict over whether the Catalan economy was contributing too much or only its fair share to the rest of Spain. The Catalan government campaigned to turn the regional elections of September 2015 into a referendum for independence, and a pro-independence coalition won just under 50 percent but a majority of seats, further increasing uncertainty about the future. Although the Basque situation improved dramatically with ETA's definitive cessation of armed activity in October 2011, the Spanish government has still not responded to ETA's request for negotiation over its prisoners, and support for non-violent independence parties has surged in recent regional elections. The territorial issue of the relationship between the Basque Country, Catalonia and Spain is, to say the least, unresolved.

Perhaps even more disquieting has been the uncertainty around what had been stable compass coordinates: Europe and the king. Juan Carlos, once the stabilizing figure above warring politicians, squandered all his political capital in various misadventures, from a corruption case within the royal family to an ill-advised elephant-hunting safari in Africa, leading to his abrupt abdication in favor of his son Felipe in June 2014 and a revival of interest in republicanism. Finally, the European integration strategy which promised to bring Spain from the periphery to the core has reversed itself, with Spain once again grouped among the Southern European poor relations who are indebted to northern European "haves." Beyond Spain, the resurgent divide within an expanded EU has weakened faith in "Europe" across the continent, as exemplified in the stunning "Brexit" referendum (June 2016), in which a majority of the UK electorate voted to leave the EU.

With the addition of the migrant/refugee crisis exposing a western/eastern divide, the tension between European integration and national priorities is on full view.

While it is difficult to predict where all of these trends will lead, it appears that most Spaniards still envision the path forward within the framework of democratic government, although not necessarily within a single nation-state under the 1978 Constitution, or even as a monarchy. Whether the two main parties restabilize or are replaced by multiparty coalitions, the upstart parties have been operating within the electoral system. And throughout the crisis, Spaniards continue to demonstrate engagement on both levels, filling the streets in protest demonstrations and going to the polls in healthy turnouts. In contrast to the mass mobilization of the 1930s, thus far the current wave of mobilization and the new parties seem to be aimed at reviving the democracy, not torpedoing it. In any case, whatever direction the current political and economic crisis takes, it is too uncertain a moment from which to evaluate the entire course of the Spanish transition and democracy.

## Conclusion

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Spain is a consolidated first world democracy. Although consolidation is an ongoing process in all democracies, the more than thirty years of democratic government since the transition has normalized the institutions and the “rules of the game.” Normalization has been aided by a European context in which democracy’s dominance has only strengthened since the 1970s. Beyond the basics of electoral institutions, Spain has also become integrated into the (increasingly embattled) social democratic European model, which equates social rights with civil and political ones and carves out a strong role for the state in ensuring the well-being of its population within a capitalist market economy. Experts continue to debate whether Spain has achieved parity, or whether there is a lingering Spanish “difference” (read inferiority), or perhaps a Southern European difference. One could argue that the question itself is misleadingly phrased, because it assumes a core “European” identity against which newcomers are measured. From a different perspective, southern and eastern Europe’s democratization during this period transformed the parameters of democratic normalization in Europe. As has been argued throughout this book, the effort to place Spain in a comparative European perspective not only rescues Spain from the “failure narrative” but also complicates the larger European narrative.

The other points of comparison for Spain’s current democracy are previous efforts to democratize, none of which were ultimately successful. Conservatives may look back to the Restoration of 1875, while the left’s point of reference is the Second Republic. Whatever the competing arguments about the potential democratic projects of these periods, neither achieved democratic consolidation; the Restoration was consolidated but mostly undemocratic, while the Second Republic was mostly democratic but unconsolidated. For different reasons, neither could establish a functioning pluralist system that made most groups feel represented. Even with the growing polarization since the 1990s, the main parties have remained

committed to the electoral “rules of the game.” Is this change a result of the rapid structural transformation that culminated in the final decades of the twentieth century, softening the major cleavages that defined Spanish society before the Civil War? Or is it simply a feature of a new political reality, in which alternatives to western style democracy in Europe have been virtually non-existent? Whatever most explains the difference, the contrast is important. Without minimizing debates about the quality of Spain’s current democracy, one could argue that those debates are made possible by the fundamental consolidation of the democratic state.

From this perspective, the debates about quality or deficits can be viewed as a normal part of the ongoing project of deepening democracy, always an unfinished project. Spanish democracy is neither a perfect crafted creation nor uniquely flawed and out of sync with some ideal “European” model. Like other modern democracies, it is a complex mix of “lights and shadows,” with deficits as well as resources for democratic renovation. The complexity of Spanish democracy is reflected in the ongoing dynamic between grassroots mobilization and elite politics which has shaped its evolution from the outset, especially at particular moments of crisis. It is also reflected in the dynamic relationship between local, regional and state politics, all of which constitute channels of democratic decision-making and negotiation. Spanish democracy at the start of the twenty-first century is the untidy sum of all these moving parts, making it, like every democracy in the world today, a work in progress.

# NOTES

## Preface

- 1 Richard Kagan, "Prescott's paradigm: American historical scholarship and the decline of Spain," *AHR* C1(1996), pp. 423–46. The "black legend" of a ruthless and intolerant Spanish empire was popularized in Julián Juderías, *La leyenda negra y la verdad histórica: contribución al estudio del concepto de España en Europa, de las causas de este concepto y de la tolerancia política y religiosa en los países civilizados* (Madrid, Tip. de la Revista de Archivos, 1914).
- 2 Jose Alvarez Junco, "The formation of Spanish identity and its adaptation to the age of nations," *History and Memory* 14(1–2) 2002, pp. 13–36.
- 3 Adrian Shubert, "Spanish historians and English-speaking scholarship," *Social History* 29, 2004.
- 4 Michael Latham, "Modernization," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008, 2nd edition).
- 5 Jordi Nadal, *El fracaso de la revolución industrial en España, 1814–1913* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1984. Spanish edition 1975).
- 6 *Spain, Europe and the Spanish Miracle, 1700–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- 7 "Myths of failure, myths of success: new perspectives on nineteenth century Spanish liberalism," *JMH* LXX (1998), 892–912.
- 8 *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Politics and Society in 19th Century German History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
- 9 *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).
- 10 Bjorn Wittrock, "One, none or many? European origins and modernity as a global condition," in *Daedalus* 129(1), 2004, special issue on multiple modernities.
- 11 Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- 12 Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: the Idea of Communism in the 20th Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (NY: Pantheon Books, 1977).
- 13 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

## Chapter 1

- 1 José María Portillo Valdés, *Revolución de nación: orígenes de la cultura constitucional en España, 1780–1812* (Madrid: CEPC, 2000).
- 2 For an argument about the coherence of this “saddle period,” see Jurgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the 19th Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 58–62.
- 3 The key text is David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the “Spanish Miracle”: 1700–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- 4 The following account is based on C. A. Bayly’s narrative in *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
- 5 Jeremy Adelman, “An age of imperial revolutions,” *AHR* 113(2), April 2008, p. 325.
- 6 Of the 860,000 horsepower expended in Europe in 1820, 620,000 were in Britain, with France in second place with 90,000, Belgium and Germany 40,000, and Spain and the Netherlands with 10,000 each. From Carlo M. Cipolla, ed. *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: Vol. 4(1)* (London 1973), cited in John Merriman, *A History of Modern Europe: From the French Revolution to the Present* (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 566.
- 7 The percentage of the population living in urban areas was about the same in France as in Spain, about 23–25 percent. John Merriman cites the figure for France, *A History of Modern Europe*, p. 577. Germán Rueda provides the statistics for Spain: “Demografía y sociedad, 1797–1877,” in *Historia contemporánea de España: Siglo XIX* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2004 edition), edited by Javier Paredes.
- 8 Jan De Vries, “The industrial and industrious revolutions,” *Journal of Economic History*, 54, 1994.
- 9 Marta V. Vicente, *Clothing the Spanish Empire: Families and the Calico Trade in the Early Modern Atlantic World* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
- 10 Kenneth Pommeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
- 11 Josep Fradera, “Reading imperial transitions: Spanish contraction, British expansion and American irruption,” in *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, edited by Alfred McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), pp. 34–62.
- 12 The “Bourbon reforms” instituted by the monarchy included military reorganization of the army and navy, liberalization of trade, including in slaves, centralization of the colonial bureaucracy in order to extract more taxes, and imposition of uniform legal and administrative structures. Gabriel Paquette, *Enlightenment, Governance and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759–1808* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
- 13 Jeremy Adelman, “Age of imperial revolutions.” See also his *Struggle for Sovereignty: Empire and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
- 14 Ringrose, *Spain*, ch.6. The 75 percent decline in trade was cited in Nadal’s book on the failure of the industrial revolution. Revised estimates claim that exports held steady until 1804, then declined by 30 percent between 1804 and 1814 and recovered to 1792 levels by 1820.
- 15 Enrique Llopis Agelán and José Antonio Sebastián Amarilla, “Impulso económico e inestabilidad: España 1808–1850,” in *Latinoamérica y España, 1800–1860. Un crecimiento nada excepcional*, edited by Enrique Llopis Agelán and Carlos Marichal (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009).
- 16 See Richard Herr, *Rural Change and Royal Finances in Spain at the End of the Old Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), Chapter 1.
- 17 James Casey, *Early Modern Spain: A Social History* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 48–9. The number of sheep had been increasing from the low point of 2 million during the demographic crisis of the early seventeenth century.

- 18 Juan E. Gelabert, “Un Gran palacio abandonado: la España urbana del Siglo de las Luces,” in *La vida cotidiana en la España del siglo XVIII*, edited by Manuel-Reyes García Hurtado (Madrid: Silex, 2009).

	1797	1857
% population in center	48	43
% population in periphery	52	56

- 19 Rueda, “Demografía y Sociedad,” p. 312.
- 20 This discussion relies on David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe*, Chapter 8.
- 21 J. K. J. Thomson, *A Distinctive Industrialization: Cotton in Barcelona, 1728–1832* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- 22 Ringrose organizes the Spanish economy into four regional networks which operated more or less autonomously until the railroad system allows the integration into a national market in the later decades of the nineteenth century.
- 23 Jesus Millán García-Varela, *El poder de la tierra: la sociedad agraria del Bajo Segura en la época del liberalismo, 1830–1890* (Alicante: Institut de Cultura “Juan Gil-Albert,” 1999), p. 79.
- 24 In 1800, Bilbao had 11,000 inhabitants, Santander 5,000, La Coruna 10,000.
- 25 The number of Basque ironworks fell from 160 in 1800 to 50 in 1815. Renato Barahona, *Vizcaya on the Eve of Carlism: Politics and Society, 1800–1823* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1989), p. 11.
- 26 The proportion was between 50 and 75 percent from Murcia to Extremadura and New Castile to eastern Andalucía, as well as Palencia, Zamora and Catalonia, and upwards of 75 percent in western Andalucía, Córdoba and Jaén. Rueda, “Demografía y sociedad,” p. 340.
- 27 On the historical origins of Spain’s landholding patterns, see the classic analysis by Edward Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), Chapter 1.
- 28 Ringrose, *Spain*, Chapters 10 and 11.
- 29 The statistics in this paragraph come from Rueda, “Demografía y sociedad.”
- 30 John Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), Chapter 1.
- 31 Gonzalo Anés, *El antiguo régimen: los borbones* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1975), p. 65.
- 32 Jesus Cruz, *The Rise of Middle-Class Culture in 19th-Century Spain* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), Chapter 2.
- 33 Stephen Jacobson, *Catalonia’s Advocates: Lawyers, Society and Politics in Barcelona, 1759–1900* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), Chapter 2.
- 34 Celso Almuiña, “Medios de comunicación y cultura oral en la crisis del Antiguo Régimen,” in *Orígenes culturales de la sociedad liberal: España XIX*, edited by Jesús A. Martínez Martín (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003).
- 35 María de los Angeles Pérez Samper, “La alimentación cotidiana en la España del siglo XVIII,” in *La vida cotidiana en la España del siglo XVIII*, edited by Manuel-Reyes García Hurtado (Madrid: Silex, 2009), pp. 25–29.
- 36 William Callahan, *Church, Politics and Society in Spain, 1750–1874* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
- 37 David Bell, *The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007).
- 38 Bell, *The First Total War*, p. 280. At their peak in July 1811, there were 350,000 French troops in Spain, of whom some 180,000 may have died.
- 39 See Charles Esdaile’s *Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808–1814* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).

- 40 The following discussion is drawn from José Alvarez Junco, *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), Chapter 3, whose main point is to deconstruct the nationalist narrative of a “war of independence” as a later, nation-building, invention.
- 41 For a balanced military account of the war, see Charles Esdaile, *The Peninsular War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003).
- 42 Tone, *The Fatal Knot*.
- 43 Ronald Fraser highlights the importance of this dynamic as a key motive. *Napoleon’s Cursed War* (New York: Verso, 2008).
- 44 For a similar argument about popular participation in the revolution in Mexico, see Eric Van Young, *The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810–21* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
- 45 José Alvarez Junco and Javier Moreno Luzón review the debates over the “meaning” of 1812 from the 1950s to the present in their introduction to *La Constitución de Cádiz: historiografía y conmemoración* (Madrid: CEPC, 2006).
- 46 Portillo Valdés coins “constitutional culture” and emphasizes the first two in his *Revolución de nación*, pp 13–14, and Carmen García Moneris discusses the third in “El debate preconstitucional: historia y política en el primer liberalismo español,” *El primer liberalismo: España y Europa, una perspectiva comparada*, edited by Emilio La Parra López and Germán Ramírez Aledón, (Valencia: Biblioteca Valenciana, 2009), p. 45.
- 47 José María Portillo Valdés, “Una Constitución universal,” in *La constitución de Cadiz*, p. 97.
- 48 Scott Eastman, *Preaching Spanish Nationalism Across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759–1823* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2012). Eastman cites Blanco White’s claim that “The influence of religion in Spain has no limit, and divides its inhabitants into two classes: fanatics and hypocrites,” p. 11.
- 49 Cited in Raymond Carr, *Spain 1808–1939* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 96.
- 50 Carmen García Moneris, “El debate ‘preconstitucional’: Historia y política en el primer liberalismo español (Algunas consideraciones).”
- 51 García Moneris, “El debate preconstitucional,” pp. 56–58.
- 52 See Jaime E. Rodríguez, *We are Now the True Spaniards: Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–1824* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
- 53 Chris Schmidt-Nowara, *Slavery, Freedom and Abolition in Latin America and the Atlantic World*, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2011), Chapter 3.

## Chapter 2

- 1 Manuel Santirso Rodríguez’s comparative study of liberal regimes in Europe during this period convincingly argues not only against the “failure” model for Spain, but for southern Europe in general. As he argues, the fundamental differences among the states was greater than any division between north and southwestern Europe. *Progreso y Libertad: España en la Europa Liberal (1830–1870)* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2008), p. 12.
- 2 Jesús Millán and María Cruz Romeo, “Was the liberal revolution important to modern Spain? Political cultures and citizenship in Spanish history,” *Social History* 29(3), September 2004.
- 3 This discussion relies on Alan Kahan, *Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Political Culture of Limited Suffrage* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp 3–6.

- 4 Isabel Burdiel, "Myths of failure, myths of success: New perspectives on nineteenth-century Spanish liberalism," *Journal of Modern History* 70, December 1998, p. 911.
- 5 See Joaquín del Moral Ruíz, Juan Pro Ruíz and Fernando Suárez Bilbao, *Estado y territorio en España, 1820–1930* (Bilbao: Libros de la Catarata, 2007). For the "weak state" argument, see Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurúa, "Centralismo y localismo: la formación del Estado Español," in *Nación y estado en la España liberal*, edited by Guillermo Gortázar (Madrid: Editorial Noesis, 1994).
- 6 C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830* (Harlow: Longman, 1989) and David Todd, "A French imperial meridian, 1814–1870," *Past and Present* 210 (2011).
- 7 This discussion is based on Stephen Jacobson and Albert García Balañà, "A Spanish imperial meridian, 1824–68?," unpublished MS.
- 8 Chris Schmidt-Nowara, *Slavery, Freedom and Abolition in Latin America and the Atlantic World* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2011).
- 9 Josep María Fradera, "Raza y ciudadanía. El factor racial en la delimitación de los derechos políticos de los Americanos," in *Gobernar colonias* (Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsular, 1999).
- 10 See Josep María Delgado Ribas, "Eclipse and collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1650–1898" and Josep María Fradera, "Empires in retreat: Spain and Portugal after the Napoleonic Wars," in *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, edited by Alfred McCoy, Josep Fradera and Stephen Jacobson (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012).
- 11 See the work of Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, "La España Ultramarina: Colonialism and nation-building in 19th-century Spain," *European History Quarterly* 34(2), 2004 and *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the 19th Century* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).
- 12 Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millán and María Cruz Romeo, "El Estado en la configuración de la España contemporánea. Una revisión de los problemas historiográficos," in *Estado y periferias en la España del Siglo XIX: Nuevos enfoques*, edited by Calatayud (Valencia: University of Valencia, 2009).
- 13 At the level of government ministers, Manuel Santirso Rodríguez demonstrates that the proportion of nobility among the ruling elite was only 8 percent in the 1830s–40s and 7 percent in the 1850s–60s, which put Spain towards the bottom of the liberal states. *Progreso y Libertad*, pp. 78, 201.
- 14 Carolyn Boyd, "The military and politics," in *Spanish History since 1808*, edited by J. Alvarez Junco and Javier Moreno Luzón (London: Edward Arnold, 2000). The disintegration of the regular army during the War of Independence opened the door to non-noble officers, who were upset when Ferdinand attempted to restore the old-regime army in 1814. Santirso Rodríguez argues that there was almost an inverse relationship between the percentage of military and noble ministers, with Britain as the extreme example. *Progreso y Libertad*, p. 82.
- 15 This discussion relies on Isabel Burdiel's work. See "The uses of the monarchy: A 'Spanish Incident' in the mid-19th Century," in *Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600–1900*, edited by John Morrow and Jonathan Scott (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008) and *Isabel II: una biografía (1830–1904)* (Madrid: Taurus, 2010).
- 16 The term "revolutionary practice" from Isabel Burdiel, "Las claves del período," in *España: la construcción nacional, 1830–1870* (Madrid: Fundación MAPFRE, 2012), pp. 17–18. On popular mobilization in the *pronunciamientos* see Roberto L. Blanco Valdés, "Paisanos y soldados en los orígenes de la España liberal: sobre revoluciones sociales, golpes de Estado y pronunciamientos militares," in *Las Nuevas Naciones: España y Mexico, 1800–1850*, edited by Jaime E. Rodríguez (Madrid: Fundación MAPFRE, 2008).
- 17 See Guy Thomson, *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain: Democracy, Association and Revolution, 1854–1875* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) for a local study that makes this argument.

- 18 Isabel Burdiel and María Cruz Romeo make this argument in “Old and new liberalism: the making of the liberal revolution, 1808–1844,” *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 75(5), 1998.
- 19 As Jordi Canal notes, in the middle decades of the nineteenth century there was a virtual “white” counter-revolutionary international, including economic aid and volunteer fighters moving between conflicts in France, Spain, Italy and Portugal. *El carlismo: dos siglos de contrarrevolución en España* (Madrid: Alianza, 2000), p. 13.
- 20 Angel Bahamonde and Jesús Martínez define *fueros* as a judicial identity that encompassed a series of privileges in terms of justice, fiscal questions and military service. *Historia de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1998), p. 189.
- 21 Jesús Millán García-Varela, “Una reconsideración del carlismo,” in *La política en el reinado del Isabel II*, edited by Isabel Burdiel (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1998), pp.101–2.
- 22 See Scott Eastman, *Preaching Spanish Nationalism Across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759–1823* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012).
- 23 Still, as Felipe-José de Vicente Alguero argues, there remained a space for liberal–Catholic cooperation in practice, especially when it was linked with national struggle, as in Belgium, Ireland and Poland. *El Catolicismo liberal en España* (Madrid: Encuentro, 2012), p. 20.
- 24 Charles Esdaile, *Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808–1939* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 43.
- 25 Burdiel and Cruz Romeo, “Old and New Liberalism.”
- 26 One of these societies, the *Comuneros*, named after the sixteenth-century uprising against the Hapsburg rulers, claimed tens of thousands of members in 1821. Scott Eastman, “‘America has escaped from our hands’: Rethinking empire, identity and independence during the *Trienio Liberal* in Spain, 1820–1823,” *European History Quarterly* 41(3), 2011, p. 423.
- 27 Leandro Álvarez Rey, “El trienio constitucional (1820–1823),” in *Historia contemporánea de España, Siglo XIX*, edited by Javier Paredes (Barcelona: Ariel, 4th edition 2004), pp. 97–8.
- 28 Bahamonde and Martínez, *Historia de España*, p. 121. The authors cite the classic study of A. Gil Novales, *Las Sociedades Patrióticas: 1820–23* (Madrid, 1975), which discovered evidence of their existence in 164 towns and cities across the country.
- 29 Josep María Fradera, “Porqué no se promulgaron las leyes especiales de ultramar?,” in *Gobernar Colonias*.
- 30 See Gabriel Paquette’s summary of the state of debate on the subject: “The dissolution of the Spanish monarchy,” *Historical Journal* 52(1), 2009.
- 31 Jean-Philippe Luis, *L’utopie réactionnaire: épuration et modernisation de l’état dans l’Espagne de la fin de l’ancien régime (1823–1834)* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2002).
- 32 Traditional Spanish law allowed the succession of a female heir, but the Bourbons had imposed the French model after 1712, which denied female access. In 1830, Ferdinand issued a decree reinstating the traditional succession order, a few months before Isabel was born, but Carlist supporters rejected its legitimacy.
- 33 Carlist support was strongest in Navarre and the Basque Country, and rural areas of Catalonia, Valencia and Aragón.
- 34 See Adrian Shubert, “Baldomero Espartero: del idolo al olvido,” in *Liberales, agitadores y conspiradores: biografías heterodoxas del siglo XIX*, edited by Isabel Burdiel and Manuel Pérez Ledesma (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2000).
- 35 María Sierra makes this suggestion in “La vida política,” in *España: la construcción nacional, 1830-1880*, p. 77.
- 36 Manuel Santirso Rodríguez’s comparative analysis of the percentage of military cabinet members reveals the increase in the later period, but not out of line with other cases: thus, before 1848, Spain, Portugal and France all had about a third military ministers, with Spain and France both having military prime ministers about 60 percent of the time. After 1848, Spain is third after Italy and Portugal in military ministers and second after Portugal (78 percent) in military prime ministers (75 percent). *Progreso y libertad*, pp. 82, 203.

- 37 Santirso Rodríguez, *Progreso y Libertad*, pp. 62, 168. He emphasizes the major turnover within the same party as largely a result of Crown interference.
- 38 Del Moral Ruíz, Pro Ruíz and Suárez Bilbao, "Epilogue: Estado y paisaje nacional," in *Estado y territorio*.
- 39 De Vicente Algueró, *El catolicismo liberal*, pp. 98–99.
- 40 The Basque *fueros* remained in place, however, as part of the negotiated end of the Carlist War. They would be revoked in 1874 after the Second Carlist War.
- 41 Fradera makes the distinction between the imperial constitutions, which were theoretically inclusive, like the 1812 Constitution in Spain, the US Constitution of 1787, the Portuguese Constitution of 1822 and the French Constitutions of 1793 and 1795, and the dual-regime constitutions, which became the nineteenth-century norm. "Empires in retreat," pp. 60–61.
- 42 Josep Fradera, "Quiebra imperial y reorganización del poder colonial en las Antillas y filipinas," in *Gobernar Colonias*, pp.117–119.
- 43 See Stephen Jacobson, "Imperial ambitions in an era of decline: Micromilitarism and the eclipse of the Spanish Empire, 1858–1923," in *Endless Empire*; and Jacobson and García Balaña, "Imperial meridian." Micro-militarist adventures are small projects designed to showcase imperial strength with easy victories.
- 44 Albert García Balaña, "The Empire is no longer a social unit: Declining imperial expectations and transatlantic crises in metropolitan Spain, 1859–1909," in *Endless Empire*.
- 45 Santirso Rodríguez, *Progreso y libertad*, Chapter 5.
- 46 See Thomson, *The Birth of Modern Politics*, Chapter 1, for a vivid local view of democratic politics in three counties near Málaga and Granada during the 1854–56 revolution. He argues that the radical political culture that had taken root in the bigger cities and towns reached small towns at this point (pp. 39–40). J. A. Iñarejos Muñoz concurs: *Ciudadanos, propietarios y electores en la construcción del liberalismo español: el caso de las provincias castellano-manchegas (1854–1868)*, (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2008).

### Chapter 3

- 1 See Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, "Democracy and associations in the long 19th century: Towards a transnational perspective," *Journal of Modern History* 75(2), 2003.
- 2 See Sabine Freitag, ed. *Exiles from European Revolutions* (Oxford: Bergahn Books, 2003).
- 3 Florencia Peyrou, "The role of Spain and the Spanish in the creation of Europe's transnational democratic political culture, 1840–70," *Social History* 40(4), 2015.
- 4 See Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Anti-Slavery: Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999).
- 5 Guy Thomson, *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain; Democracy, Association and Revolution, 1854–75* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
- 6 Jordi Canal, "Guerra civil y contrarrevolución en la Europa del Sur," *Ayer* 55/2004(3).
- 7 See Jesús Millán, "Popular y de orden: la pervivencia de la contrarrevolución carlista," *Ayer* dossier on Carlism 38/2000.
- 8 See Coro Rubio Pobes, "Que fue del 'oasis foral'? Sobre el estallido de la Segunda Guerra Carlista en el País Vasco," *Ayer* 38/2000.
- 9 See José Piqueras Arenas, "La cuestión cubana de la Revolución Gloriosa a la Restauración," in *España 1868–1874: nuevos enfoques sobre el sexenio democrático*, edited by Rafael Serrano García (Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2002).
- 10 Florencia Peyrou, *Tribunos del pueblo; demócratas y republicanos durante el reino de Isabel II* (Madrid: CEPS, 2008), p. 511.
- 11 Demetrio Castro, "Orígenes y primeras etapas del republicanismo en España," in *El republicanismo en España (1830–1977)*, edited by Nigel Townson (Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1994).

- 12 Peyrou, *Tribunos del pueblo*, p. 13.
- 13 See Angel Duarte, “El municipio republicano: sostén de la democracia y refugio en la tempestad,” in *Provincia y nación: los territorios del liberalismo*, edited by Carlos Forçadell and María Cruz Romeo Mateo (Zaragoza: Instituto Fernando el Católico, 2006).
- 14 Albert García Balaña, “‘El Verdadero productor’: lenguaje y experiencia en la formación de las culturas políticas obreras,” in *Historia de las culturas políticas en España y América Latina: la España liberal, 1833–1874*, edited by María Cruz Romeo and María Sierra (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2014).
- 15 Manuel Morales Muñoz, “Cultura política y sociabilidad en la democracia republicana,” in *España 1868–1874*.
- 16 Florencia Peyrou, “Demócratas y Republicanos: la movilización por la ciudadanía universal,” in *De súbditos a ciudadanos: una historia de la ciudadanía en España*, edited by Manuel Pérez Ledesma (Madrid: CEPC, 2007).
- 17 Schmidt-Nowara, p. 121.
- 18 Ángel Duarte and Pere Gabriel, “Una sola cultura política republicana ochocentista en España?” *Ayer* dossier on republicanism 39/2000.
- 19 See Genís Barnosell Jordà, *Orígens del sindicalisme català* (Vic: Eumo, 1999).
- 20 On the origins of the International in Spain, see George Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working Class Movement in Spain, 1868–1898* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989).
- 21 Anselmo Lorenzo, *El proletariado militante: Memorias de un Internacional* (Madrid: Alianza, 1974).
- 22 Eric Hobsbawm’s *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: Norton, 1965) was the classic text.
- 23 See Antonio López Estudillo, “El anarquismo español decimonónico,” in the *Ayer* dossier on Spanish anarchism, 45/2002(1).
- 24 For a case study that elaborates this argument, see Antonio López Estudillo, *Republicanism and anarquismo en Andalucía: conflictividad social agraria y crisis finisecular (1868–1900)* (Córdoba: Ayuntamiento de Córdoba, 2001).
- 25 See Gregorio de la Fuente, “Actores y causas de la Revolución de 1868,” in *España, 1868–1874*, who argues that popular mobilization was more a consequence of the revolution.
- 26 Eloy Arias Castañón explores this dynamic in *La revolución de 1868 en Sevilla* (Seville, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2010).
- 27 See L. Santiago Díez Cano, “Existió alguna vez la I República? Notas para recuperar un período historiográfico,” in *España 1868–1874*.
- 28 Angel Bahamonde and Jesús Martínez break these down into chronological stages of the Republic: *Historia de España: Siglo XIX* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1998), pp. 586–588.
- 29 See Gloria Espigado Tocino, “La historiografía del cantonalismo; pautas metodológicas para un estudio comparado,” in *España, 1868–1874*, for an overview. While some have argued for putting each cantonal movement in a single category, she argues there was too much overlap for such a schematic framework.

## Chapter 4

- 1 A narrative first articulated at the time: see Joaquín Costa, *Oligarquía y caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España: Urgencia y modo de cambiarla* (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Fortanet, 1901).
- 2 C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). Chapter 7.
- 3 See Joaquín del Moral Ruíz, Juan Pro Ruíz and Fernando Suárez Bilbao, *Estado y territorio en España, 1820–1930* (Bilbao: Libros de la Catarata, 2007), for an extensive and

convincing argument about the generally effective construction of the institutions of the nineteenth-century liberal state, including public administration, uniform systems of justice and taxation, a national army, and the ability to count and map the population and territory—all within the limits of its resources and historical context.

- 4 See Frederick Cooper, "States, empires and political imagination," in *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), for the caution on reading back from the post-Second World War order.
- 5 The classic work on nineteenth-century Spanish nationalism adopts this framework: José Álvarez Junco, *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations* (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011).
- 6 For an overview of these debates, see Javier Moreno Luzón, "El fin de la melancolía," in *Construir España: nacionalismo español y procesos de nacionalización*, edited by Moreno (Madrid: CEPC, 2007).
- 7 For example, Ferrán Archilés Cardona, "'Hacer región es hacer patria.' La región en el imaginario de la nación española de la Restauración," *Ayer* 64 (2006).
- 8 Borja de Riquer, "La débil nacionalización española del siglo XIX," *Historia Social* 20 (1994).
- 9 See Xosé Manuel Núñez Seixas, "Provincia, Región y Nación en la España contemporánea: una re-interpretación global en perspectiva comparativa," in *Provincia y nación: los territorios del liberalismo*, edited by Carlos Forçadell and María Cruz Romeo Mateo (Zaragoza: Instituto Fernando el Católico, 2006).
- 10 The term was coined by Josep María Fradera. See his "La dificultad de describir la nación," in *Del territorio a la nación: identidades territoriales y construcción nacional*, edited by Luis Castells (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2006).
- 11 Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, Chapter 6, pp. 219–27.
- 12 See Chris Schmidt-Nowara, "La España Ultramarina: Colonialism and nation-building in 19th-century Spain," *European History Quarterly* 34(2), 2004.
- 13 See Ferrán Archilés Cardona, "Ni imperio ni imperialismo? El imaginario nacional español y el imperialismo africanista en la España de la Restauración," in *Nación y nacionalización: una perspectiva europea comparativa*, edited by Archilés, M. García Carrión and Ismael Saz (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2013).
- 14 See Stephen Jacobson, "Imperial ambitions in an era of decline: Micromilitarism and the eclipse of the Spanish Empire, 1858–1923," in *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, edited by Alfred McCoy, Josep Fradera and Stephen Jacobson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012). Micro-military projects expended limited resources on forays that were more about visibility than victory.
- 15 A variation on the "failure" motif is the grouping of southern European countries into a semi-peripheral regional subset defined by economic backwardness, Catholicism, illiteracy, the weakness of the state and the strength of family ties. See James Kurth, "A tale of four countries: Parallel politics in southern Europe, 1815–1900," in *Mediterranean Paradoxes: The Politics and Social Structure of Southern Europe*, edited by James Kurth and James Petras (Oxford: Berg, 1993).
- 16 For an overview of recent historiography, see Javier Moreno Luzón, "Political clientelism, elites and *caciquismo* in Restoration Spain, 1875–1923," *European History Quarterly* 37 (2007).
- 17 A very useful collection is: *El poder de la influencia: geografía del caciquismo en España (1875–1923)*, edited by José Varela Ortega (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001).
- 18 Carlos Dardé, *La aceptación del adversario: política y políticos de la Restauración, 1875–1900* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003), p. 21. He also reviews the competing interpretations of Cánovas as authoritarian (the minority position) or liberal.

## 19 Breakdown of governments: 1875–96

1875–1885 (Conservatives 65%/Liberals 35%)	
1885–1897 (Conservatives 29%/Liberals 71%)	
1875–81: CP	1885–90: LP
1881–83: LP	1890–92: CP
1884–85: CP	1892–95: LP
	1895–96: CP

- 20 With fewer Spanish immigrants, fewer communication networks and a weaker state presence, the Restoration government never considered this option for the Philippine colony.
- 21 In 1898, the Autonomy Party won 73 percent of the seats, almost the exact reverse of all the previous elections, in which the Conservatives had always won a minimum of 70 percent.
- 22 See Inés Roldán de Montaud, “Cuba,” in *El poder de la influencia*.
- 23 Some local and regional studies have suggested that the dynastic parties began to transition during the Restoration from parties of notables to more substantial and permanent institutional structures. See, for example, Rafael Zurita Aldeguer, *Notables, políticos y clientes. La política conservadora en Alicante, 1875–1898* (Alicante: Generalitat Valenciana, Conselleria de Cultura, Educació i Ciència, 1996).
- 24 See Juan Pro, “Caciquismo y manipulación electoral en la España de la Restauración, 1890–1907,” in *En torno al 98: España en el tránsito del siglo XX*, Volume I, edited by Rafael Sánchez Montero (Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2000).
- 25 See the classic study by Manuel Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional, 1912–1983* (Madrid: Alianza, 1985) and, more focused on this period, Eduardo González Calleja, *La razón de la fuerza: orden público, subversión y violencia política en la España de la Restauración, 1875–1917* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1998).
- 26 González Calleja, *La razón*, p. 32.
- 27 The number of posts increased from 1,591 in 1875 to 2,493 in 1914, with the total number of *guardias* rising from 12,636 to 21,208: González Calleja, *La razón*, p. 46. See his chart on the uneven distribution, pp. 48–9.
- 28 González Calleja, *La razón*, pp. 61–4.
- 29 See Pedro Carasa and Antonio Fernández Sancha, “Un análisis microhistoria del poder local en Castilla,” in *En torno al 98* for the methodology of “ascending” power.
- 30 For a good introduction, see Xosé R. Veiga Alonso, “Entre centro y periferia. La dinámica política lucense en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX,” in *En torno al 98*. He cites cases in which the civil governor complained that it would be difficult to get a government candidate elected, because he had no local support.
- 31 Pro, “Caciquismo,” identifies 24 percent of all districts (1890–1907) in this category, with the vast majority belonging to one of the two dynastic parties. Overall, the percentage grew from 14 percent in 1898 to 31 percent in 1905.
- 32 “See, for example, María Sierra and María Antonia Peña, “Clientelismo y poder político en Andalucía: una reflexión sobre los límites del liberalismo durante la Restauración,” in *Elecciones y cultura política en España y Italia, 1890–1923*, edited by Rosa Ana Gutiérrez, Rafael Zurita and Renato Camurri (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2003).
- 33 See Mercedes Cabrera and Fernando del Rey, “De la Oligarquía y el caciquismo a la política de intereses. Por una re-lectura de la Restauración,” in *Las máscaras de la libertad: el liberalismo español, 1808–1950*, edited by Manuel Suárez Cortina (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003).

- 34 For a provincial study exploring this dynamic, see Margarita Caballero Domínguez and Carmelo García Enabo, “Una realidad compleja: poder central y poderes locales en los procesos electorales decimonónicos: El caso de Soria,” in *En torno al 98*.
- 35 See Salvador Cruz Artacho, “Caciquismo y mundo rural durante la Restauración,” in *Elecciones y cultura política*, for an extended version of this argument.
- 36 See Carmelo Romero, “Campesinado parcelario y parlamento oligárquico en España,” in *Elecciones y cultura política*, and Cabellero Domínguez and García Encabo, “Una realidad.”
- 37 Rosa Ana Gutiérrez and Rafael Zurita, “España en la campaña electoral de 1907,” in *Elecciones y cultura política*. They define competitive as at least two candidates for one spot receiving a minimum of 10 percent of the vote.
- 38 Dardé, *La aceptación*, Chapter 12.
- 39 See Ángel Duarte, “El municipio republicano: sostén de la democracia y refugio en la tempestad,” in *Provincia y nación*, on the importance of city government as the “last refuge” for republicans, but also on the limits placed on their power by government-appointed mayors.
- 40 See Ramón Villares, “Política y mundo rural en la España contemporánea,” in *La politization des campagnes au XIX siècle: France, Italie, Espagne, Portugal*, edited by Maurice Agulhon (Rome: École Française, 2000), for a review of this literature. The French case was immortalized by Agulhon, who wrote several classic works on the politicization of the countryside in France as a result of the 1789 and 1848 revolutions.
- 41 See Cruz Artacho, “Caciquismo” and Romero, “Campesinado.”
- 42 See Pamela Radcliff, “The emerging challenge of mass politics,” in *Spanish History since 1808*, edited by José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- 43 The number of periodicals increased from 544 to 1,347 between 1879 and 1900, including a jump in political periodicals from 146 to 497. See David Ortiz, *Paper Liberals: Press and Politics in Restoration Spain* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000).
- 44 Among many examples, see José Álvarez Junco, *The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain: Populist Demagoguery and Republican Culture, 1890–1910*. (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1990).
- 45 See Pamela Radcliff, “Women’s politics: Consumer riots in twentieth-century Spain,” in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood*, edited by Victoria Enders and Pamela Radcliff (Binghamton, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999).
- 46 Villares, “Política y mundo rural,” p. 41.
- 47 See Juan Pan-Montojo, “Introducción. 98 o fin de siglo?” in *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo*, edited by Pan-Montojo (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1998), for an elaboration of this analogy.
- 48 For this quote and a general discussion of the rebellion and war, see Sebastian Balfour, *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Chapter 1.
- 49 For an excellent military account, see John Tone, *War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–98* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

## Chapter 5

- 1 A term first coined by Paul Preston in *Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–39*, edited by Preston and Ann L. Mackenzie (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).
- 2 See Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s 20th Century* (New York: Knopf, 1999).
- 3 See C. A. Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), Chapter 13.
- 4 See Angeles Barrio’s “Introduction” to the special issue of *Ayer* 63/2006(3) on the “Crisis of the liberal regime,” which takes missed opportunities as its theme.

- 5 For a more pessimistic view, see Francisco Romero Salvadó, *The Foundations of Civil War: Revolution, Social Conflict and Reaction in Liberal Spain, 1916–23* (London: Routledge, 2008); for a “moderately optimistic vision” see Mercedes Cabrera and Fernando del Rey, “De la oligarquía y el caciquismo a la política de intereses. Por una relectura de la Restauración,” in *Las máscaras de la libertad: el liberalismo español, 1808–1950*, edited by Manuel Suárez Cortina (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003).
- 6 For an excellent overview of the entire period, see Javier Moreno Luzón, *Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902–1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).
- 7 Teresa Carnero, “La difícil transición de la política liberal a la política democrática,” in *La transición a la política de masas*, edited by Edward Acton et al. (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2001), emphasizes the negative and even regressive impact of Maura’s electoral reform.
- 8 Javier Tusell, “La crisis del liberalismo oligárquico en España. Una rivoluzione mancata a la española,” in *La transición a la política de masas*, argues for the potential impact of this measure.
- 9 Julio de la Cueva Merino defines anti-clericalism as “opposition to the attempt by clergy and lay Catholics to ideologically control society from a position of privilege.” “El anti-clericalismo en España: un balance historiográfico,” in *L’Histoire religieuse en France et en Espagne*, edited by Benoît Pellistrandi (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004), p. 354.
- 10 The number of religious personnel in convents and monasteries had increased from 1,683 men and 18,819 women in 1863 to 12,142 men and 42,296 women in 1900. William Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000).
- 11 Pablo la Porte, “Marruecos y la crisis de la Restauración, 1917–1923,” *Ayer* 63/2006 (3).
- 12 Miguel Martorell Linares, “No fue aquello solamente una guerra, fue una revolución’: España y la primera Guerra Mundial,” *Historia y Política* 26 (julio–dic. 2011).
- 13 Gerald Meaker, “A civil war of words: The ideological impact of the First World War on Spain, 1914–1918,” in *Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917–1923*, edited by Hans A. Schmitt (Richmond, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1988).
- 14 For example, in the 1914 Cortes there were 214 Conservative deputies, while in 1919 there were 91 self-defined Conservatives, 4 Independent Conservatives, 64 *Mauristas* and 31 *Ciervistas* (named for another leader, de la Cierva). From a table of election results 1914–1923 in *Con luz y taquígrafos: el Parlamento en la Restauración (1913–1923)*, edited by Mercedes Cabrera (Madrid: Taurus, 1998), p. 355.
- 15 Juan Linz, “The party system of Spain,” in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, edited by Seymour Lipset and Stern Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967).
- 16 For a volume that emphasizes the complex and evolving role of the king, see *Alfonso XIII: un político en el trono*, edited by Javier Moreno Luzón (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003).
- 17 For an argument that emphasizes this decision as a real turning point that prevented the regime from possible gradual evolution, see Fernando del Rey Reguillo, “Que habría sucedido si Alfonso XIII hubiera rechazado el golpe de Primo de Rivera en 1923?,” in *Historia virtual de España (1870–2004)*, edited by Nigel Townson (Madrid: Taurus, 2004).
- 18 See description and analysis of *Mauristas* on p. 94.
- 19 Julio de la Cueva, “Clericalismo y movilización católica durante la Restauración,” in *Clericalismo y asociacionismo católico en España: de la restauración a la transición: un siglo entre el palío y el consiliario*, edited by de la Cueva and Ángel Luís López Villaverde (Cuenca: Universidad Castilla-La Mancha, 2005).
- 20 *La Lectura Dominical* January 19, 1907, cited by de la Cueva, “Clericalismo,” p. 42.
- 21 Ramón Villares, “Política y mundo rural en la España contemporánea,” in *La politisation des campagnes au XIX siècle: France, Italie, Espagne, Portugal*, edited by Maurice Agulhon (Rome: École Française, 2000).

- 22 For an overview, see Xosé Manuel Núñez Seixas, *Los nacionalismos en la España contemporánea (siglos XIX y XX)*, Barcelona: Ediciones Hipótesis, 1999), Chapters 3.3, 4.2.
- 23 Alejandro Quiroga, "Nation and reaction: Spanish conservative nationalism and the Restoration crisis," in *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913–1923*, edited by Francisco Romero Salvadó and Angel Smith (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
- 24 Enric Ucelay da Cal, "Entre el ejemplo italiano y el irlandés: la escisión generalizada de los nacionalismos hispanos 1919–1922," *Ayer* 63/2006 (3).
- 25 See Pamela Radcliff, "The political left in the interwar period," in *The Oxford Handbook on Europe 1900–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
- 26 See Pamela Radcliff, "The emerging challenge of mass politics," in *Spanish History Since 1808*, edited by José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (London: Edward Arnold, 2000).
- 27 In 1919, the UGT had 68,590 members in Andalucía, while the CNT had 113,214. Francisco Cobo Romero, "The Red Dawn of the Andalusian countryside," in *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism*. The UGT held its first peasant congress in Andalucía in October 1920, which was a watershed in its rural organizing (p. 135).
- 28 On the divisions within the left, see Chris Ealham, "An impossible unity: Revolution, reform and counter-revolution and the Spanish left, 1917–1923," in *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism*.
- 29 Angel Smith, *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction: Catalan Labour and the Crisis of the Spanish State, 1898–1922* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).
- 30 The classic case study is José Álvarez Junco, *The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain: Populist Demagoguery and Republican Culture, 1890–1910* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1990) (a shorter English version of the original). For an overview, see Ramiro Reig, "El republicanismo popular," *Ayer* 39/2000.
- 31 Out of more than 400 seats, only 19 Republicans were elected in 1914 and 13 in 1923. Cabrera, *Con luz*, p. 355.
- 32 For an overview, see Núñez Seixas, *Los nacionalismos*, Chapters 3.1, 4.1.
- 33 Núñez Seixas, p. 61.

	1918	1919	1920	1923
Dynastic parties	9	13	16	12
Lliga	21	16	17	21

- 34 Angel Smith, "The Lliga, the Catalan right and the making of the Primo dictatorship, 1916–1923," in *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism*.
- 35 See Francisco Romero Salvadó, "Spain's revolutionary crisis of 1917: A reckless gamble," in *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism*, for a more detailed account.
- 36 For a more detailed analysis, see Angeles Barrio Alonso, "La oportunidad perdida: 1919 mito y realidad del poder sindical," *Ayer* 63/2006(3).
- 37 In fighting rebellious tribesmen in the Rif, the Spanish army lost 10,000 men at Annual, about 40 miles from Melilla, during a humiliating retreat from unsustainable positions. On the opportunities provided by the Annual defeat, see Pablo La Porte, "The Moroccan quagmire and the crisis of Spain's liberal system," in *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism*.

## Chapter 6

- 1 David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the Spanish Miracle: 1700–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). He estimates income per capita rose 80 percent from 1830 to 1910.
- 2 In 1820 Spain's per capita GNP (Spanish—PIB) was 86 compared to 100 (the benchmark of the major European economies), while in 1913 it had fallen to 64.7. Ramon Villares,

- “Fabricantes y Trabajadores,” in *Restauración y Dictadura*, edited by Javier Moreno Luzón and Villares (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), pp. 135–136.
- 3 See Rafael Domínguez Martín, *La riqueza de las regiones: las desigualdades económica regionales en España, 1700–1900* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2002).
  - 4 Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millán and María Cruz Romeo, “El Estado en la configuración de la España contemporánea. Una revisión de los problemas historiográficos,” in *Estado y periferias en la España del Siglo XIX: nuevos enfoques*, edited by Santiago Calatayud, Jesús Millán and María Cruz Romeo (Valencia: PUV, 2009).
  - 5 C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1789–1914* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
  - 6 Gabriel Tortella and Clara Eugenia Núñez make this point in *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea: Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2011) p. 37.
  - 7 Tortella and Núñez emphasize this framework in *El desarrollo*.
  - 8 John Merriman, *A History of Modern Europe: From the French Revolution to the Present* (New York: Norton, 2004), Chapters 14 & 19.
  - 9 Manuel Santirso, *Progreso y Libertad: España en la Europa Liberal (1830–1870)* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2008), Chapter 9.
  - 10 See *The Costs and Benefits of European Imperialism from the Conquest of Ceuta, 1415, to the Treaty of Lusaka, 1974*, special issue of *Revista de Historia Económica* (VXVI (1), 1998, edited by P. K. O’Brien and L. Prados de la Escosura.
  - 11 Leandro Prados de la Escosura’s methods have been fundamental in calculating growth rates. See *El progreso económico de España, 1850–2000* (Madrid: Fundación BBVA, 2003).
  - 12 The growth of the GNP/PIB between 1850 and 1914 was about 1.5 percent per annum, vs. 2.9 percent per annum between 1914 and 1929. *Historia Económica de la España contemporánea (1789–2009)*, by Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell (Barcelona: Crítica, 2009), p. 40.
  - 13 Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “Economic growth and backwardness, 1780–1930,” in *Spanish History since 1808*, edited by José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (London: Edward Arnold, 2000).
  - 14 See Juan Pro, “El proceso económico,” in *España 1830–1880: La construcción nacional*, edited by Isabel Burdiel, (Madrid: Fundación MAPFRE, 2012).
  - 15 On the economic importance of the empire in the nineteenth century, see Josep María Fradera, *Colonias para después de un imperio* (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2005).
  - 16 Leandro Prados de la Escosura, *De imperio a nación: crecimiento y atraso económico en España (1780–1930)* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988), pp. 76 and 202.
  - 17 See Jordi Maluquer de Motes, *España en la crisis de 1898: de la Gran Depresión a la modernización económica del siglo XX* (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1999), Chapter 8.
  - 18 Javier Moreno Luzón, *Historia de España*, V7, pp. 400–412.
  - 19 See Carreras and Tafunell, *Historia económica*, pp. 34–5, for a comparative chart.
  - 20 Germán Rueda Hernanz, “Demografía y sociedad, 1797–1877,” in *Historia contemporánea de España: Siglo XIX*, edited by Javier Paredes, pp. 314–17. He defines the urban population as cities > 10,000 inhabitants.
  - 21 Fernando Sánchez Marroyo, “Demografía y sociedad, 1875–1939,” in *Historia contemporánea*, pp. 577–80.
  - 22 César Yáñez Gallardo, *La emigración española a América (siglos XIX y XX)* (Colombres: Archivo de Indianos, 1992).
  - 23 See James Simpson, *Spanish Agriculture: the Long Siesta, 1765–1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) for the pessimistic view.
  - 24 See Josep Pujol et al., *El pozo de todos los males: sobre el atraso en la agricultura española contemporánea* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2001). for the revisionist view.
  - 25 The value of the land sold between 1855 and 1895 was double that sold between 1836 and 1845. See Francisco Simón Segura, *La desamortización española en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1973) for the classic overview.

- 26 C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, pp 295–9.
- 27 Germán Rueda, “Demografía y sociedad,” p. 333.
- 28 Juan Pan-Montojo, “Los liberalismos y la agricultura española en el siglo XIX,” in *Estado y periferias*.
- 29 Oranges increased from 6 to 14 percent of total exports between 1900 and 1930. By 1930, fruits and olive oils had doubled from 14 percent of total exports to 33 percent, while only constituting 3 percent of the cultivated land. Tortella and Núñez, *El desarrollo*, p. 453.
- 30 Spain’s industrial product per capita increased threefold between 1850 and 1913 and sevenfold by 1935. Jordi Nadal, “Introducción,” *Atlas de la industrialización de España, 1750–2000*, edited by Nadal (Bilbao: Fundación BBVA, 2003). See Part II for a detailed comparative analysis of industrialization during this period.
- 31 For a comprehensive account, see *Història econòmica de la Catalunya contemporània: s. XIX, s. XX/3 Indústria, transports i finances*, by Jordi Nadal, Jaime Benavente, Josep M Benaül i Berenguer and Carles Sudrià i Triay (Barcelona: Enciclopèdia Catalana, 1991).
- 32 Jordi Nadal and J. M. Benaül, “Dos excepciones: los éxitos de Cataluña y el País Vasco,” in *Atlas*.
- 33 For a comprehensive analysis of the mining sector, see Gérard Chastagnaret, *l’Espagne, puissance minière dans l’Europe du XIXe siècle* (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2000).
- 34 See Antonio Parejo Barranco, *La Producción industrial de Andalucía (1830–1935)*, (Seville: Instituto de Desarrollo Regional, 1997).
- 35 Chastagnaret, *l’Espagne*, emphasizes the minimal benefits for the Spanish economy.
- 36 Tortella and Núñez, *El desarrollo*, pp. 138–52. The lack of an internal market for the minerals is illustrated by the fact that Spain exported over 90 percent of its iron in 1900, while the UK exported none, despite producing one-third more than Spain (8.6 vs 14.2 thousand tons) (p. 144).
- 37 Fernando Sánchez Marroyo, “Demografía y sociedad,” p. 580.
- 38 See the regional statistics in Domínguez Martín, *La riqueza*, pp. 216, 242, 259.
- 39 María Sierra and María Antonia Peña, “Clientelismo y poder político en Andalucía: una reflexión sobre los límites del liberalismo durante la Restauración,” in *Elecciones y cultura política en España e Italia*, edited by R. A. Gutiérrez, R. Zurita and R. Camurri (Valencia: PUV, 2003), p. 209.

## Chapter 7

- 1 C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), Chapter 5.
- 2 See Carolyn Ford, “Religion and popular culture in modern Europe,” *Journal of Modern History*, 65(1), March 1993.
- 3 Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser, “Introduction: The European Culture Wars,” in *Culture Wars: Secular–Catholic Conflict in 19th-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- 4 Celia Applegate, “A Europe of regions: Reflections on the historiography of sub-national places in modern times,” *AHR Forum, American Historical Review*, 104(4), 1999.
- 5 For a summary, see Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, “Provincia, región y nación en la España contemporánea: una (re) interpretación global en perspectiva comparativa,” in *Provincia y nación: los territorios del liberalismo*, edited by Carlos Forcadell and María Cruz Romeo Mateo (Zaragoza: Instituto Fernando el Católico, 2006).
- 6 For the “cultural turn” in Spanish social history, see Miguel Angel Cabrera, “Developments in contemporary Spanish historiography: From social history to the New Cultural History,” *Journal of Modern History*, 77, December 2005.

- 7 Gary Wray McDonough, *Good Families of Barcelona: A Social History of Power in the Industrial Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 5.
- 8 Ángel Bahamonde and Jesús A. Martínez, *Historia de España: Siglo XIX* (Madrid: Catedra, 1998), p. 449.
- 9 Jesús Millán García-Varela, *El poder de la tierra: la sociedad agraria del Bajo Seguro en la época del liberalismo, 1830–1890* (Alicante: Diputación Provincial de Alicante, 1999). Nobles owned 31 percent of the irrigated land in 1830 and 9 percent in the 1880s. (p. 107). Ángels Sola, “Una burguesía plural,” in *La gran transformació 1790–1860*, edited by Josep Maria Fradera (Barcelona: Fundació Enciclopedia Catalana, 1997). In 1872, three of the 20 largest taxpayers in Barcelona were nobles (p 200).
- 10 See Jesús Cruz, *Gentlemen Bourgeois and Revolutionaries: Political Change and Cultural Persistence among the Spanish Dominant Groups, 1750–1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and McDonough, *Good Families*.
- 11 Bridget Aldaraca, *El angel del hogar: Galdós y la ideología de la domesticidad en España* (Madrid: Visor, 1992).
- 12 Adrian Shubert, *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 129.
- 13 Germán Rueda Hernanz, *España 1790–1900: sociedad y condiciones económicas* (Madrid: Ediciones Istmo, 2006), pp. 194–204.
- 14 C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, p. 189.
- 15 David S. Reher, *Perspectives on the Family in Spain: Past and Present* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Chapter 8, “Family Economies.”
- 16 Rueda Hernanz, *España 1790–1900*, pp. 333 and 527.
- 17 Rueda Hernanz, *España 1790–1900*, pp. 368–75.
- 18 Adrian Shubert, *The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934* (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
- 19 See Jesús Cruz, *The Rise of Middle Class Culture in 19th-Century Spain* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2011).
- 20 Famously defined by Jürgen Habermas, later critics questioned his idealistic vision of an inclusive and rational space. Some scholars talk about multiple public spheres or multiple publics within a single sphere, but in either case, the “structuring” of the public sphere according to status was one of the realities of participation in this collective realm. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- 21 Jean-François Botrel, “La construcción de una nueva cultura del libro y del impreso en el siglo XIX,” in *Orígenes culturales de la sociedad liberal: España XIX*, edited by Jesús A. Martínez Martín (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003).
- 22 This section relies on Cruz, *The Rise of Middle Class Culture*.
- 23 David Mackay, *Modern Architecture in Barcelona, 1854–1939* (New York: Rizzoli Press, 1989).
- 24 Mónica Burguera, *Las damas del liberalismo respetable* (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2012).
- 25 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Democracy and associations in the long 19th century: Toward a transnational perspective,” *Journal of Modern History*, 75(2), 2003.
- 26 *Semanario Pintoresco Español* V94/5, 1838, cited in Virginia Maza Castán, “La cara pública del liberalismo. Ambitos de sociabilidad liberal-burguesa en Aragón (1834–45),” in *En construcción: historia local contemporánea*, edited by Ignacio Peiró Martín and Pedro Rújula (Zaragoza: Centro de Estudios Darocenses, 2003), p. 236.
- 27 David Gies, *The Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Spain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 182–3.
- 28 Josep Pla, cited in McDonough, *Good Families*, p. 194.
- 29 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery: Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–74* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999) provides a case study of the abolitionist movement that demonstrates how it took shape within an existing network of associations dedicated to social and economic reform.

- 30 For one of the few case studies of professional group identity, see Stephen Jacobson, *Catalonia's Advocates: Lawyers, Society and Politics in Barcelona, 1759–1900* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
- 31 Sue Frank, Chris Perriam and Mike Thompson, "The literary avant-garde: A contradictory modernity," in *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- 32 Susan Kirkpatrick, *Mujer, modernismo y vanguardia en España, 1898–1931* (Madrid: Cátedra, 2003).
- 33 Nerea Aresti, *Médicos, Donjuanes y mujeres modernas: los ideales de feminidad y masculinidad en el primer tercio del siglo XX* (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 2001).
- 34 Inmaculada Blasco Herranz, "Feminismo católico," in *Historia de las mujeres en España y América Latina: V 4: del siglo XX a los umbrales del XXI*, edited by Isabel Morant (Madrid: Cátedra, 2008).
- 35 Pilar Folguera, *El feminismo en España: dos siglos de historia* (Madrid: Fundación de Pablo Iglesias, 1988).
- 36 Jesus de Felipe Redondo, *Trabajadores: lenguaje y experiencia en la formación del movimiento obrero español* (Oviedo: Genuève Ediciones, 2012).
- 37 See *En el nombre del oficio: el trabajador especializado: corporativismo, adaptación y protesta*, edited by Vicent Sanz Rozalén (Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2005).
- 38 For a case study in a provincial city, see Pamela Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War: the Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapters 7–8.
- 39 Lorenzo Díaz, *La España alegre: ocio y diversión en el siglo XX* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1999), p. 127.
- 40 See Adrian Shubert, *Death and Money in the Afternoon: A Social History of the Spanish Bullfight* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- 41 Jorge Uría, *La España Liberal (1868–1917): cultura y vida cotidiana* (Barcelona: Editorial Síntesis, 2008), pp. 361–74.
- 42 William Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000).
- 43 Between 1833 and 1859, the number of male religious houses fell from 37 to nine, with a 98 percent reduction in personnel, while the number of female houses fell 60 percent and lost half their personnel. Père Fullana and Maitane Ostolaza, "Escuela católica y modernización: las nuevas congregaciones religiosas en España (1900–1930)," in *La secularización conflictiva: España (1898–1931)*, edited by Julio de la Cueva and Feliciano Montero (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2007), p. 192.
- 44 Fullana and Ostolaza, "Escuela católica."
- 45 Julio de la Cueva, "The assault on the City of Levites: Spain," in *European Culture Wars*.
- 46 William Christian, *Moving Crucifixes in Modern Spain* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
- 47 Feliciano Montero García, "Del movimiento católico a la Acción Católica. Continuidad y cambio, 1900–1930," in *La secularización conflictiva*.
- 48 For a regional case, see Mary Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1900–1936*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, Chapter 5.
- 49 Inmaculada Blasco Herranz, *Paradojas de la ortodoxia: política de masas y militancia católica femenina en España, 1919–1939* (Zaragoza: Prensa Universitaria de Zaragoza, 2003).
- 50 William Callahan, "An organizational and pastoral failure: Urbanization, industrialization and religion in Spain, 1850–1930," in *European Religion in the Age of the Great Cities: 1830–1930*, edited by Hugh McLeod (London: Routledge, 1995).
- 51 Inmaculada Blasco Herranz, "Género y religión: de la feminización de la religión a la movilización católica femenina. Una revisión crítica," *Historia Social*, 53, 2005.

- 52 Juan Pan-Montojo, “Reconstructing communities and uniting ‘classes’: Agrarian movements and *agrarismo* in Spain, 1882–1917,” in *Communities in European History: Representations, Jurisdictions, Conflicts*, edited by Pan-Montojo and Frederik Pederson (Pisa: Edizioni Plus, 2007).
- 53 Fernando Molina Aparicio, *La tierra del martirio español: el País Vasco y España en el siglo del nacionalismo* (Madrid: CEPC, 2005).
- 54 Josep-Ramon Segara Estarelles, “El reverso de la nación. Provincialismo e independencia durante la revolución liberal,” in *Construir España: nacionalismo español y procesos de nacionalización*, edited by Javier Moreno Luzón (Madrid: CEPC, 2007)
- 55 Joost Augustejn and Eric Storm, “Introduction,” in *Region and State in 19th-Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012).
- 56 Cited in Ramon Villares, *Restauración y dictadura* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009), pp 227.
- 57 Josep Fradera, “El proyecto liberal Catalan y los imperativos del doble patriotismo,” *Ayer* 35 (1999).
- 58 Ferrán Archilés, “La novela y la nación en la literatura española de la Restauración: región y provincia en el imaginario nacional,” in *Provincia y nación*.
- 59 José Alvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa: la idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001).
- 60 Ferrán Archilés Cardona and Marta García Carrión, “En la sombra del Estado: esfera pública nacional y homogeneización cultural en la España de la Restauración,” *Historia contemporánea*, 45, 2012.
- 61 Eric Storm, “The birth of regionalism and the crisis of reason: France, Germany and Spain,” in *Region and State*.
- 62 Josep María Fradera, “The Empire, the nation and the homelands: 19th-century Spain’s national idea,” in *Region and State*.
- 63 Justo Beramendi, “Algunos aspectos del nation-building en la Galicia del siglo XIX,” in *Construir España*.
- 64 Inman Fox, *La invención de España: nacionalismo liberal e identidad nacional* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1998).
- 65 Clinton Young, *Music Theater and Popular Nationalism in Spain, 1890–1930* (New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 2015).
- 66 Maitane Ostolaza Esnal, “La nación española en el País Vasco, 1857–1931: el papel de la escuela,” in *El país vasco y España: identidades, nacionalismos y estado: siglos XIX–XX*, edited by Luis Castells, Arturo Cajal and Fernando Molina (Bilbao: Universidad de País Vasco, 2007).
- 67 On 1859–60, see Albert García Balañá, “Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina: la guerra de Africa en Cataluña, 1859–60,” in *Marruecos y el colonialismo español, 1859–1912*, edited by Eloy Martín Corrales (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2002); and for 1898, Manuel Pérez Ledesma, “La sociedad española, la guerra y la derrota,” in *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo*, edited by Juan Pan-Montojo (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1998).
- 68 Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the 19th Century* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006).

## Chapter 8

- 1 Richard Bessel, “European dictatorships in comparative perspective,” in *La transición a la política de masas*, edited by Edward Acton and Ismael Saz (Valencia, Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2001).
- 2 Javier Tusell and Genoveva Queipo de Llano, “The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, 1923–1931,” in *Spanish History Since 1808*, edited by José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (London: Edward Arnold, 2000).

- 3 José Luís Gómez-Navarro, *El régimen de Primo de Rivera: reyes, dictaduras y dictadores* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1991).
- 4 See Eduardo González Calleja, *La España de Primo de Rivera: la modernización autoritaria, 1923–30* (Madrid: Alianza, 2005), the best synthesis of this perspective.
- 5 Martin Blinkhorn, *Fascism and the Right in Europe, 1919–1945* (Harlow: Pearson, 2000).
- 6 Alejandro Quiroga, *Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera and the Nationalization of the Masses, 1923–1930* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- 7 Schlomo Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above: the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923–1930* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). Despite the title, Ben-Ami does not characterize the regime as fascist.
- 8 Julio Aróstegui, *Largo Caballero. El tesón y la quimera* (Barcelona: Debate, 2013), p. 193.
- 9 For a defense of this position, see Fernando del Rey Reguillo, “Que habría sucedido si Alfonso XIII hubiera rechazado el golpe de Primo de Rivera en 1923?” in *Historia Virtual de España (1870–2004)*, edited by Nigel Townson (Madrid: Taurus, 2004).
- 10 Gómez-Navarro, *El régimen*, Chapter 3, discusses the king’s evolving views.
- 11 William Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 2000), pp. 151–2.
- 12 Javier Moreno, *Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902–1931* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), p. 151.
- 13 Quiroga, *Making Spaniards*, pp. 70–6.
- 14 See Carolyn Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), Chapter 6.
- 15 Boyd, *Historia Patria*, p. 175.
- 16 Quiroga, *Making Spaniards*, pp. 113–14.
- 17 Quiroga, *Making Spaniards*, p. 153.
- 18 Quiroga, *Making Spaniards*, Chapter 4.
- 19 Juan Pan-Montojo, “Asociacionismo agrario, administración y corporativismo en la dictadura de Primo de Rivera, 1923–1930,” *Historia Social* 43 (2002).
- 20 See González Calleja, *La España*, Chapter 4.
- 21 See Callahan, *The Catholic Church*, pp. 158–68.
- 22 See González Calleja, *La España*, Chapter 6.
- 23 Schlomo Ben-Ami, “The crisis of the dynastic elite in the transition from monarchy to republic, 1929–1931,” in *Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain*, edited by Frances Lannon and Paul Preston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 73.

## Chapter 9

- 1 See Carolyn Boyd, “The politics of history and memory in democratic Spain,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* V 617 (2008).
- 2 See Charles Maier’s discussion of “moral narratives” in “Consigning the 20th century to history: alternative narratives for the modern era,” *American Historical Review*, June 2000.
- 3 Without claiming to be objective, an excellent synthesis in English that analyzes and acknowledges competing positions is Julian Casanova, *The Spanish Republic and Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 4 See Jean Grugel and Matthew Louis Bishop, *Democratization: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
- 5 On the novelty and crisis of interwar democracy, see Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage, 2000), Chapter 1.
- 6 See Pamela Radcliff, “The political Left in inter-war Europe,” *The Oxford Handbook of Early Twentieth Century Europe*, edited by Nicholas Doumanis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

- 7 Robert Paxton and Julie Hessler, *Europe in the 20th Century* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002), pp. 246–49.
- 8 See Germán Rueda, “Tres cambios sociales, causas profundas (entre otras muchas) de la evolución española entre 1931 y 1939,” in *La República y la Guerra Civil: setenta años después*, edited by Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luis E. Togores (Madrid: Editorial ACTAS, 2006).
- 9 Roberto Villa García, *La República en las urnas* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2011), p. 489.
- 10 Good representations of this general position are many of the articles in the recent collection, *En el combate por la historia: la República, la Guerra Civil, el Franquismo*, edited by Angel Viñas (Barcelona: Pasado y Presente, 2012).
- 11 Good representations of this general position are many of the articles in the recent collection, *La República y la Guerra Civil: setenta años después*, edited by Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luis Eugenio Togores Sánchez (Madrid: Actas Editorial, 2008).
- 12 The best work is still Edward Malefakis, *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).
- 13 On the Republican cultural project, see Sandie Holguin, *Creating Spaniards: Culture and National Identity in Republican Spain* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002).
- 14 See Judith Keene, “‘Into the clear air of the plaza’: Spanish women achieve the vote in 1931,” in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*, edited by Victoria Enders and Pamela Radcliff (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999).
- 15 See William Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 2000), Chapter XII, for the first biennium’s religious policies and the Church’s reaction.
- 16 See *Laicismo y catolicismo; el conflicto político-religioso en la Segunda República*, edited by Julio de la Cueva and Feliciano Montero (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2009).
- 17 For a local study of this conflict, see Mary Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1930–1936* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Chapter 8.
- 18 Quoted in Callahan, p. 281.
- 19 See Inmaculada Blasco Herranz, *Paradojas de la ortodoxia: política de masas y militancia católica femenina en España (1919–1939)* (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2003).
- 20 See Mary Vincent, “The politicization of Catholic women in Salamanca, 1931–1936,” in *Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain*, edited by Frances Lannon and Paul Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
- 21 See Gerard Alexander, “Women and men at the ballot box: Voting in Spain’s two democracies,” in *Constructing Spanish Womanhood* for a refutation of this argument.
- 22 See Francisco Cobo Romero, “Campesinado, política y urnas en los orígenes de la Guerra Civil, 1931–1936,” in *La España rural, siglos XIX y XX: aspectos políticos, sociales y culturales*, edited by Teresa María Ortega López and Francisco Cobo Romero (Granada: Editorial Comares, 2011).
- 23 José Manuel Macarro Vera, “The Socialists and revolution,” in *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War, 1931–36*, edited by Manuel Álvarez Tardío and Fernando del Rey Reguillo (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).
- 24 Fernando del Rey Reguillo, *Paisanos en lucha: exclusión política y violencia en la II República* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2008).
- 25 Timothy Rees, “The political mobilization of landowners in the province of Badajoz, 1931–1933,” in *Elites and Power*.
- 26 Joseph Harrison, *The Spanish Economy in the 20th Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984), Chapter 4.
- 27 Rueda argues this was one of the three major structural conditions shaping politics in the 1930s. “Tres cambios sociales.”

- 28 Pamela Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War: the Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapter 5.
- 29 See Eduardo González Calleja, *En nombre de la autoridad: la defensa del orden público durante la Segunda República Española, 1931–1936* (Granada: Editorial Camares, 2014).
- 30 See Gerald Blaney, “Keeping Order in Republican Spain, 1931–36,” in *Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change and Crisis, 1918–1940*, edited by Blaney (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- 31 Chris Ealham, *Policing the City: Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937* (London: Routledge, 2005).
- 32 José Luis Gutiérrez Molina, “Andalucía y el anarquismo, 1868–1936,” *Ayer* 45(1), 2002.
- 33 Radcliff, *From Mobilization to Civil War*, pp. 286–7.
- 34 On the CNT/FAI, see Julian Casanova, *Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain, 1931–1939* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- 35 See Manuel Ballarín, Diego Cucalón and José Luis Ledesma, “Introducción,” in *La II República en la encrucijada: el segundo bienio*, edited by Ballarín, Cucalón and Ledesma (Zaragoza: Cortes de Aragón, 2009).
- 36 See Nigel Townson, “Qué hubiera pasado si los partidos republicanos se hubieran presentado unidos en las elecciones de 1933?,” in *Historia virtual de España*, edited by Townson (Madrid: Taurus, 2004) for a discussion of the counterfactual possibilities.
- 37 On the Radical party and the second biennium, see Nigel Townson, *The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic, 1931–36* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000).
- 38 For a concise presentation of this case, see Nigel Townson, “A Third Way? Centrist politics under the Republic,” in *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited*.
- 39 On the revolution in Asturias, see Adrian Shubert, *The Road to Revolution in Spain: the Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
- 40 See Nigel Townson, “Rectificación o reacción? La alianza de centro-derecha, 1933–1935,” in Ballarín et al. eds., *La II República en la encrucijada* (2009).
- 41 See Paul Preston, “Bajo el signo de las derechas: las reformas paralizadas,” in Viñas, ed. *En el combate e por la historia*.
- 42 Julio Arostegui, “Los socialistas en la Segunda República: una victoria con alto costo,” in *En el combate*.
- 43 Julian Casanova, *Anarchism*, pp 74–8.
- 44 Gabrielle Ranzato, “The Republican Left and the defence of democracy, 1934–1936,” in *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited*.
- 45 See Eduardo González Calleja, “Entre el seny y la rauxa. Los límites democráticos de la Esquerra,” in *Palabras como puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República Española*, edited by Fernando del Rey (Madrid: Tecnos, 2011).
- 46 For the optimistic version, see Manuel Álvarez Tardío, “The CEDA: Threat or opportunity?” in *The Second Republic Revisited*. The quote is cited on pp. 70–71.
- 47 For the negative view, see Sid Lowe, *Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism: The Juventud de Acción Popular in Spain, 1931–1939* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2010).
- 48 Cited in Paul Preston, “Esperanzas e ilusiones en un nuevo régimen: la República reformista,” in *En el combate*, p. 68.
- 49 For example, there is no article on the “center” or the Radicals in the collection *En el combate*.
- 50 Stanley Payne, “Political violence during the Second Spanish Republic,” in *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (2–3) 1990 emphasizes the spring of 1936 as a peak of disorder, while Julian Casanova, *The Spanish Republic*, disagrees (p. 131).
- 51 The lack of reliable statistics continues to fuel the debate. See Fernando del Rey Reguillo, “Reflexiones sobre la violencia política en la II República española,” in *Conflicto político*,

*democracia y dictadura: Portugal y España en la década de 1930*, edited by Mercedes Gutiérrez Sánchez and Diego Palacios Cerezales (Madrid: CEPC, 2007), pp 76–79, for a discussion of the different estimates.

- 52 See Fernando del Rey Reguillo, *Paisanos en lucha*, Chapter 7, and José Manuel Macarro Vera, *Socialismo, República y Revolución en Andalucía* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2000).
- 53 Francisco Espinosa Maestre, *La Primavera del Frente Popular: los campesinos de Badajoz y el origen de la guerra civil* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2007).

## Chapter 10

- 1 For the left narrative, see Josep Fontana, “La naturaleza de la Guerra Civil,” in *España en la crisis Europea de entreguerras*, edited by Francisco Morente (Madrid: Catarata, 2011), and for the right, Pio Moa, “Guerra civil, franquismo, democracia,” in *La República y la Guerra Civil: setenta años después*, edited by Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luís E. Togados (Madrid: Actas, 2008).
- 2 See the collection: *If You Tolerate This: The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War*, edited by Martin Baumeister and Stefanie Schuler-Springorum (Frankfurt a M: Campus Verlag, 2008).
- 3 See Alan Kramer, “Asesinatos en masa y genocidio entre 1914 y 1945: un intento de análisis comparativo,” *Ayer* 76/2009 (4).
- 4 Those who want to emphasize the violence before July 1936 estimate at least 2,200 political deaths from April 1931, or as many as 5,700, but even the highest number does not minimize the rupture in the level of violence with the Civil War. For the highest estimates of Republican violence, both before and after July 1936, see Ángel David Martín Rubio, “Las pérdidas humanas en la Guerra Civil: el necesario final de un largo debate historiográfico,” in *La República y la Guerra Civil*.
- 5 Mary Vincent, “Religious violence in the Spanish Civil War,” in *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*, edited by Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 72.
- 6 For this argument, see Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: the Holocaust as History and Warning* (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015).
- 7 The first major collection, based on a compilation of local studies from about half the provinces, was *Víctimas de la guerra civil*, edited by Santos Juliá (Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1999).
- 8 Julius Ruíz, “Old wine in new bottles: The historiography of repression in Spain during and after the Spanish Civil War,” in *The Spanish Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War*, edited by Manuel Álvarez Tardío and Fernando del Rey (Eastbourne: Sussex Press, 2012).
- 9 Spanish authors began using these terms from 2002, but in English the major publication is Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain* (New York: Norton, 2012).
- 10 See Javier Rodrigo, “1936: Guerra de exterminio, genocidio, exclusión,” *Historia y Política* 10 (2003).
- 11 See José Javier Esparza, *El terror rojo en España* (Barcelona: Altera, 2007).
- 12 See Jordi Canal, “Guerras civiles en Europa en el siglo XIX o guerra civil europea,” in *Guerras civiles: una clave para entender la Europa de los siglos XIX y XX*, edited by Eduardo González Calleja and Jordi Canal (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2012).
- 13 See Philip B. Minehan, *Civil War and World War in Europe: Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece, 1936–1949* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) and Julian Casanova, “Civil wars,

- revolutions and counter-revolutions in Finland, Spain and Greece (1918–1949),” *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 13(3), 2000.
- 14 See Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 18.
- 15 Mary Vincent, “The Spanish Civil War as a war of religion.”
- 16 Sandie Holguín, “How did the Spanish Civil War end? ... not so well,” *American Historical Review* 120(5), 2015.
- 17 For this argument, see Angel Viñas, *Franco, Hitler y el estallido de la guerra civil* (Madrid: Alianza, 2001).
- 18 See Sebastian Balfour, “Colonial war and civil war: The Spanish Army of Africa,” in *If You Tolerate This*.
- 19 Javier Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga insurgente: orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación en 1936 en Navarra y el País Vasco* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1998).
- 20 Published in the document collection, *The Spanish Civil War: A Cultural and Historical Reader*, edited by Alun Kenwood (Providence, RI: Berg, 1993).
- 21 See Francisco Espinosa, *La columna de la muerte. El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003).
- 22 See Rafael Cruz, “Las campañas rebeldes de aniquilación del enemigo,” *Ayer* 76/2009 (4).
- 23 See Pamela Radcliff, “The culture of empowerment in Gijón, 1936–37,” in *The Splintering of Spain*.
- 24 For a concise portrait of this local heterogeneity, see Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War, 1936–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 4.
- 25 Cited in Ronald Fraser, “The popular experience of war and revolution, 1931–1939,” in *Revolution and War in Spain, 1931–1939*, edited by Paul Preston (London: Routledge, 1984), p. 227.
- 26 Chris Ealham, “The myth of the maddened crowd: class, culture and space in the revolutionary urbanist project in Barcelona, 1936–37,” in *The Splintering of Spain*.
- 27 *Le droit à la ville* (Paris, 1968).
- 28 See Mary Nash, *Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War* (Denver, CO: Arden Press, 1995).
- 29 Aurora Bosch Sánchez, *Ugetistas y libertarios: Guerra Civil y revolución en el país valenciano* (Valencia: Institución Alfonso el Magnánimo, 1983).
- 30 Fraser, “The Popular experience of war.”
- 31 Julian Casanova, *The Spanish Republic and Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 242. See his *Anarquismo y revolución en la sociedad rural aragonesa, 1936–1938* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1985) for a closer view of that region.
- 32 Michael Seidman, *Workers Against Work: Labor in Paris and Barcelona during the Popular Fronts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
- 33 Chris Ealham calls it the “institutional vacuum” at the heart of the anarchist project; “The myth of the maddened crowd.”
- 34 Julius Ruíz, *The Red Terror and the Spanish Civil War: Revolutionary Violence in Madrid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
- 35 See Julio de la Cueva, “Religious persecution, anticlerical tradition and revolution: on atrocities against the clergy during the Spanish Civil War,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 33(3), 1998.
- 36 See Manuel Delgado, *La ira sagrada: Anticlericalismo, iconoclastia y antiritualismo en la España contemporánea* (Barcelona: Humanidades, 1992).
- 37 See José Luís Ledesma, “Total war behind the front lines? An inquiry into the violence on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War,” in *If You Tolerate This*.
- 38 See Enrique Moradiellos, *El refugio de Europa: las dimensiones internacionales de la guerra civil española* (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 2001).

- 
- 39 Some US companies, like Texaco and Firestone, even supported the Nationalists. See Adam Hochschild, *Spain in our Hearts: Americans in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2016), Chapter 14.
- 40 For a selection of Soviet documents that emphasizes Soviet control, see *Spain Betrayed: the Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War*, edited by Ronald Radosh, Mary R. Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).
- 41 See Daniel Kowalsky, *The Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
- 42 For a strong version of this argument, see Gerald Howson, *Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).
- 43 See Enrique Moradiellos, "La intervención extranjera en la guerra civil: un ejercicio de crítica historiográfica," in *La Guerra de España (1936–1939)* (Barcelona: RBA Libros, 2012).
- 44 For a recent scholarly analysis, see Michel Lefebvre and Remi Skoutelsky, *Brigadas Internacionales. Imágenes recuperadas* (Barcelona: Lunwerg, 2003).
- 45 Beginning on May 3, open warfare broke out between CNT supporters, including dissident communist party, the POUM, and the government over the latter's effort to reclaim the telephone company building occupied by the CNT since July 1936. When troops had crushed resistance, there were 400 dead and 1,000 wounded.
- 46 See Gabriel Jackson, *Juan Negrín: Physiologist, Socialist, and Spanish Republican War Leader* (Eastbourne: Sussex University Press, 2010) for a positive portrait.
- 47 The classic anti-Communist text is Bernard Bolloten, *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counter-Revolution* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1991), while the other position is laid out in Helen Graham, *The Spanish Republic at War*.
- 48 For the most nuanced position on this question, see Tim Rees, "The highpoint of Comintern influence? The Communist Party and the Civil War in Spain," in *International Communism and the Communist International, 1919–1943*, edited by Rees and Andrew Thorpe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
- 49 See Tim Rees, "Battleground of the revolutionaries: the Republic and Civil War in Spain, 1931–1939," in *Reinterpreting Revolution in 20th Century Europe*, edited by Moira Donald and Tim Rees, (NY: St. Martin's Press, 2001).
- 50 Julius Ruíz, "Republican forced labour camps during the Spanish Civil War," in *Contemporary European History* 18(4), 2009.
- 51 See Michael Seidman, *Republic of Egos: A Social History of the Spanish Civil War* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002).
- 52 See James Matthews, *Reluctant Warriors: Republican Popular Army and Nationalist Army Conscripts in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
- 53 See Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
- 54 On this concept and its application to Spain, see Ismael Saz, "Régimen autoritaria o dictadura fascista," in *Fascismo y franquismo* (Valencia: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2004).
- 55 On the Church's role, see Hilari Ragner, *Gunpowder and Incense: The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War* (London: Routledge, 2012).
- 56 See Javier Ugarte Tellería, *La nueva Covadonga*.
- 57 Kathleen Richmond, *Women and Spanish Fascism: The Women's Section of the Falange, 1934–1959* (London: Routledge, 2003).
- 58 For this argument, see Julius Ruíz, "A Spanish genocide? Reflections on the Francoist repression after the Spanish Civil War," *Contemporary European History* 14(2), 2005.
- 59 See Javier Rodrigo, *Los campos de concentración franquistas, entre la historia y la memoria* (Madrid: Siete Mares, 2003).
- 60 Cited in Julian Casanova, *The Spanish Republic*, p. 316.

- 61 See Michael Seidman, *The Victorious Counter-Revolution: the Nationalist Effort in the Spanish Civil War* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011).
- 62 On the military aspects of the war, see Gabriel Cardona, *Historia militar de una guerra civil* (Barcelona: Flor de Viento, 2006) and Anthony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006).

## Chapter 11

- 1 For the former, see Julian Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés, *Twentieth Century Spain: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Chapters 10–12, and for the latter, Stanley Payne, “La política,” in *Franquismo: el juicio de la historia*, edited by José Luís García Delgado (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2000).
- 2 See Nigel Townson, “Spain is different? The Franco dictatorship,” in *Is Spain Different? A Comparative Look at the 19th and 20th Centuries*, edited by Townson (Eastbourne: Sussex Press, 2015), for a balanced summary.
- 3 See Frank Biess, “Introduction,” in *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*, edited by Frank Biess and Robert Moeller (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).
- 4 See Pieter Lagrou, “The age of total war, 1945–55,” in *Histories of the Aftermath*.
- 5 Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s 20th Century* (New York: Knopf, 1999).
- 6 See Tom Buchanan, “How ‘different’ was Spain? The later Franco regime in international context,” in *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, edited by Nigel Townson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- 7 Stanley Payne further subdivides these into seven types of right-wing dictatorships: *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995).
- 8 For a detailed discussion of the debates, see Enrique Moradiellos, *La España de Franco, 1939–75* (Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 2000), pp. 209–225.
- 9 The classic article is Juan Linz, “An authoritarian regime: Spain,” in *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology*, edited by Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964).
- 10 See Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York: Vintage Books, 2005).
- 11 See Paul Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth Century Spain* (New York: HarperCollins, 2012).
- 12 The classic article is Josep Fontana, “Reflexiones sobre la naturaleza y las consecuencias del franquismo,” in *España bajo el franquismo*, edited by Fontana (Barcelona: Crítica, 1986).
- 13 Mazower makes this point: *Dark Continent*, p. 38.
- 14 Ismael Saz’s work on the conflicting ideologies that continued to define the internal struggles of the Franco regime has been instrumental in pushing the debate beyond “either/or” categorizations. *España contra España: los nacionalismos franquistas* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003).
- 15 Robert Paxton’s *Anatomy of Fascism* defines this coalition as a key element of the “new politics” of the interwar period, with the Franco regime as an example of “entropy” in his “stage theory” of fascism; pp. 148–9.
- 16 See Javier Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
- 17 See Ismael Saz, “Régimen autoritario o dictadura fascista?,” in *Fascismo y franquismo*, (Valencia: PUV, 2004), pp. 79–90.
- 18 Michael Mann creates a broad spectrum of “authoritarian” regimes with fascism as its most extreme form. *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 31. Chapter 9 explores the Spanish case.

- 
- 19 But scholars argue for between two and five phases: See Moradiellos, *La España*, pp. 24–7.
- 20 For a full biography, see Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London: HarperCollins, 1993).
- 21 See Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, *Franco: The Biography of the Myth* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2013).
- 22 Jean Grugel and Tim Rees make this point, in *Franco's Spain* (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 71.
- 23 Stanley Payne, *The Franco Regime, 1936–1975* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 432. The other half of his appearances were in a military uniform.
- 24 Three-quarters of the 48 daily newspapers founded between 1936 and 1964 belonged to the *Movimiento*. C. Barrera del Barrio, *Periodismo y franquismo* (Barcelona: Ediciones Internacionales Universitarias, 1995), p. 61.
- 25 See Carme Molinero, *La Captación de las masas: política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista* (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2008).
- 26 See Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, *El antisemitismo en España: la imagen del judío (1812–2002)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2002).
- 27 See Stanley Payne, *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
- 28 Stanley Payne and Jesús Palacios, *Franco: A Personal and Political Biography* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), p. 261.
- 29 See Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, “Dictatorship from below: Local politics in the making of the Francoist state, 1937–1948,” *Journal of Modern History* 71, December 1999.
- 30 Julius Ruíz, *Franco's Justice: Repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
- 31 On the camp system, see Javier Rodrigo, *Los campos de concentración franquistas: entre la historia y la memoria* (Madrid: Siete Mares, 2003).
- 32 Edward Malefakis, “The Franco dictatorship: A bifurcated regime?” in *Spain Transformed*, p. 250.
- 33 See Abdón Mateos, *¡Ay de los vencidos! El exilio y los países de acogida* (Madrid: Edición Eneida, 2009).
- 34 See the collection edited by Julio Aróstegui and Jorge Marco: *El último frente: La resistencia armada antifranquista en España, 1939–1952* (Madrid: Catarata de los Libros, 2008).
- 35 See the collection edited by Fernando Mendiola: *Los trabajos forzados en la dictadura franquista* (Pamplona: Instituto Jerónimo de Uztáriz, 2007).
- 36 See Gutmaro Gómez Bravo and Jorge Marco, *La obra del miedo: violencia y sociedad en la España franquista (1936–1950)* (Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsular, 2011).
- 37 See Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- 38 Michael Richards, *After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-Making Spain since 1936* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
- 39 On the argument for Spain's early economic reincorporation into western Europe, see Fernando Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57: Challenge and Response* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
- 40 Bases were set up in Rota, Morón, Zaragoza and Torrejón, housing a total of about 15,000 troops and civilians.
- 41 Quoted in Moradiellos, p. 105.
- 42 The continued faceoff between fascist and national Catholic projects is emphasized in Ismael Saz, “Mucho más que crisis políticas: el agotamiento de dos proyectos entretendos,” *Ayer* 68/2007 (4).
- 43 Stanley Payne, *The Franco Regime*, p. 463.
- 44 Pablo Martín Aceña and Elena Martínez Ruíz, “The Golden Age of Spanish capitalism: Economic growth without political freedom,” in *Spain Transformed*.

- 45 The term is Malefakis's: "The Franco dictatorship," p. 252.
- 46 José María Maravall, *Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers and Students in Franco's Spain* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1978).
- 47 See Père Ysás, "Una sociedad pasiva? Actitudes, activismo y conflictividad social en el franquismo tardío," *Ayer* 68/2007 (4).
- 48 Victor Pérez Díaz, *The Return of Civil Society: the Emergence of Democratic Spain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
- 49 Up from 1 to 4 million per year between 1954 and 1960. See Sasha Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe's Peaceful Invasion of Franco's Spain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
- 50 Elisa Chulía, *El poder y la palabra : prensa y poder político en las dictaduras : el régimen de Franco ante la prensa y el periodismo* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2001).
- 51 Sasha Pack, "Tourism and political change in Franco's Spain," in *Spain Transformed*, p. 54.
- 52 Père Ysás, *Disidencia y subversión. la lucha del régimen franquista por su supervivencia, 1960–1975* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), p. 3.
- 53 See Pamela Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960–1978* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), Chapter 1.
- 54 See Robert Clark, *The Basque insurgents: ETA, 1952–1980* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

## Chapter 12

- 1 For convergence HDI statistics vis a vis European countries, see Dudley Baines, Neil Cummins and Max-Stephan Schulze, "Population and Living Standards, 1945–2005," in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: 1870–Present, Volume 2*, edited by Stephen Broadberry and Kevin O'Rourke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 2 Pablo Martín Acena and Elena Martínez Ruiz, "The Golden Age of Spanish capitalism: Economic growth without political freedom," in *Spain Transformed: the Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, edited by Nigel Townson, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- 3 Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, *Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco's Spain, 1939–1975* (Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
- 4 Rafael Domínguez Martín, *La riqueza de las regiones: las desigualdades económica regionales en España, 1700–2000* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2002), Chapter 6.
- 5 Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–45* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- 6 Juan Pan-Montojo, "El proceso económico," in *La búsqueda de la democracia: España 1960–2010, Volume 5 of América Latina en la historiografía contemporánea*, directed by Jordi Canal (Madrid: Penguin-Random House/MAPFRE, 2015).
- 7 Anna Cabré, "La gent: natalitat i mortalitat i migracions," in *La vida quotidiana durant el franquisme, 1939–1975*, edited by Francesc Bonamusa and Francisco Morente (Gener, Spain: Ajuntament di Barbara del Valles, 2004).
- 8 For a minority view that emphasizes the US's exclusion of Spain from the Marshall Plan as a factor in the slow recovery, see Fernando Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57: Challenge and Response* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
- 9 Jordi Catalan, "Fam I penuria de les condicions de vida durant el franquisme, 1939–75," in *La vida quotidiana*.
- 10 In 1950. Joan Ràfols Esteve, "L'Habitatge en el període franquista," in *La vida quotidiana*.
- 11 Susan Harding, *Remaking Ibiaca: Rural Life in Aragon under Franco* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).

- 12 Antonio Cazorla, *Fear and Progress*, Chapter 2.
- 13 See Richards, *A Time of Silence*, for the first argument.
- 14 Dolores Pla Brugat, Introducción, *Pan, Trabajo y Hogar: el exilio republicano español en América Latina*, edited by Pla Brugat (Mexico, D.F.: DGE Ediciones, 2007). She estimates that 20 percent of the exiles settled in Latin America (pp. 30–31).
- 15 Javier Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 189–197.
- 16 Adrian Shubert, *A Social History of Modern Spain* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 209.
- 17 The number of tractors in use rose from 59 in 1945 to 259,819 in 1970 and 523,907 in 1980, while the use of fertilizer per hectare increased from 18kg to 72kg in 1970 and 102.7kg in 1980. Juan Manuel Mates Barco, “La Economía durante el régimen de Franco,” in *Historia contemporánea de España: Siglo XX*, edited by Javier Paredes (Madrid: Ariel, 1998), p. 830.
- 18 Susan Harding, *Remaking Ibieca*.
- 19 See Cazorla, *Fear and Progress*, Chapter 3, “Migration.”
- 20 Ricardo M. Martín de la Guardia and Guillermo A. Pérez Sánchez, “La sociedad española durante el régimen de Franco,” in *Historia contemporánea de España*, p. 782.
- 21 Carne Molinero and Pèrre Ysàs, *Productores disciplinados y minorías subversivas. Clase obrera y conflictividad laboral en la España franquista* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1998).
- 22 Gabriel Tortella and Clara Eugenia Núñez, *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea: Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2011), p. 373. For a breakdown of fast- and slow-growing industries, see chart p. 403.
- 23 Pilar Díaz Sánchez, “Trabajo y género en la España franquista: estudio comparado de dos sectores: la confección-textil y los ferrocarriles,” in *Mujeres y hombres en la España franquista: sociedad, economía, política y cultura*, edited by Gloria Nielfa Cristóbal (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2003).
- 24 Cazorla, *Fear and Progress*, p.130. From a development agency report of 1969.
- 25 See Antonio Cazorla, *Las políticas de la victoria: la consolidación del nuevo estado franquista, 1938–1953* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000)
- 26 See Miguel Angel de Arco Blanco and Miguel Gómez Oliver, “Los franquistas del campo: los apoyos sociales rurales del régimen de Franco, 1939–1951,” in *La España rural: aspectos políticos, sociales y culturales*, edited by Teresa María Ortega López and Francisco Cobo Romero (Granada: Editorial Comares, 2011).
- 27 Cazorla, *Fear and Progress*, p. 36.
- 28 Francisco Cobo Romero and Teresa Ortega Lopez, “No solo Franco: La heterogeneidad de los apoyos sociales al régimen franquista en el mundo rural del sureste español (1936–1951),” *Historia Social* 51 (2005).
- 29 Angela Cenarro, “Violence, surveillance and denunciation: Social cleavage in the Spanish Civil War and Francoism, 1936–1950,” in *Social Control in Europe, 1800–2000*, Volume 2, edited by Clive Emsley, Eric Johnson and Pieter Spierenburg (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2004). See also the articles by Estefania Langarita in *Pagar las culpas: la represión económica en Aragón (1939–1945)*, edited by Julián Casanova and Angel Cenarro (Barcelona: Crítica, 2014).
- 30 Peter Anderson, *The Francoist Military Trials: Terror and Complicity, 1939–1945* (London: Routledge, 2010) is a local study of a judicial district in Córdoba. The British embassy comment is on p. 136.
- 31 *Los niños perdidos del franquismo*, by Ricard Vinyes, Montse Armengow and Ricard Balís (Barcelona: Plaza Janés, 2002).
- 32 Mary Nash, “Pronatalism and Motherhood in Franco’s Spain,” in *Maternity and Gender Policies: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States, 1880s–1950s*, edited by Gisela Bock and Pat Thorne (New York: Routledge, 1991).

- 33 Aurora Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood: Gender Ideology in Franco's Spain* (Dekalb IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000).
- 34 Julian Alfred Pitt-Rivers, *The People of the Sierra* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).
- 35 Jesus María Vázquez, *Así viven y mueren: problemas religiosos de un sector de Madrid* (Madrid: Ope, 1958), cited in Cazorla, p. 144.
- 36 See William Callahan, *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998* (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 2000), Chapter 18, "Religious reconquest."
- 37 See Carolyn Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), Chapter 8.
- 38 See Cazorla, *Fear and Progress*, pp. 88–94. He calls it a catastrophic educational legacy.
- 39 Juan Linz, "La realidad asociativa de los Españoles," in *Sociología española de los años setenta* (Madrid: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1971), p. 315.
- 40 The *Guardia* was a paramilitary organization formed in 1944 incorporating the most committed Falangists from the *Movimiento*.
- 41 Juan Linz, "La realidad," p. 313, cites the lack of published statistical data as the obstacle to greater precision.
- 42 Cazorla, *Fear and Progress*, Chapter 1.
- 43 María Teresa Gallego Méndez, *Mujer, Falange y Franquismo* (Madrid: Taurus, 1983).
- 44 Mikel Aizpuru, "Asociacionismo popular: reverso del modelo de organización social del franquismo? El caso de Barakaldo," in *Estado, protesta y movimientos sociales*, edited by Santiago Castillo and José María Ortíz de Orruño (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1997), p. 482.
- 45 Eduardo Ruíz Bautista, *Tiempo de la censura: la represión editorial durante el franquismo* (Gijón, Spain: Ediciones Trea, 2008).
- 46 Josep Benet, *L'intent franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya* (Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadía de Montserrat, 1995).
- 47 Javier Escalera Reyes, "El franquismo y la fiesta: régimen político, transformaciones sociales y sociabilidad festiva en la España de Franco," in *La cultura popular en la España contemporánea*, edited by Jorge Uría (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003).
- 48 Julián Sanz Hoya, "La patria en los estadios: fútbol, nación y franquismo," in *Nación y nacionalización: una perspectiva Europea comparada*, edited by Ferrán Archilés, Marta García Carrión and Ismael Saz (Valencia: PUV, 2013).
- 49 Ricardo M. Martín de la Guardia and Guillermo A. Pérez Sánchez, "La sociedad española durante el régimen de Franco," p. 785.
- 50 Francisco Morente Valero, "La enseñanza durante el franquismo," in *La vida cotidiana*.
- 51 See Pamela Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960–78* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
- 52 See Sasha Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe's Peaceful Invasion of Franco's Spain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
- 53 See Andrew Dowling, *Catalonia since the Spanish Civil War: Reconstructing the Nation* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2013), Chapter 3 "Revival, 1955–1970."
- 54 See Jeremy Treglown, *Franco's Crypt: Spanish Culture and Memory since 1936*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2013), Chapter 5, "Art's Abstractions."
- 55 Alvaro Ferraz, "La cultura y el pensamiento español durante el franquismo," in *Historia Contemporánea de España*.
- 56 See Robert Long, "Salir del desierto: Dissident Artistic Expression under Franco, 1936–1975" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California San Diego, 2014).
- 57 Morcillo, *True Catholic Womanhood*, p. 97.
- 58 Inbal Ofer, *Señoritas in Blue: the Making of a Female Political Elite in Franco's Spain* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009).

- 59 Feliciano Montero García, “La Iglesia dividida. Tensiones intraeclesiales en el segundo franquismo,” in *De la cruzada al desencanche: la Iglesia española entre el franquismo y la transición*, edited by Manuel Ortiz Heras and Damián A. González (Madrid: Sílex, 2011).

## Chapter 13

- 1 See Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz, “La Transición a la democracia: una perspectiva histórica,” and Julio Aróstegui, “La Transición a la democracia, matriz de nuestro tiempo reciente,” both in *Historia de la Transición en España: los inicios del proceso democratizador*, edited by Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz (Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2007); and Manuel Ortiz Heras, “Nuevos y viejos discursos de la Transición: la Nostalgia del Consenso,” *Historia Contemporánea* 44 (2011).
- 2 In a 2001 poll, 86 percent of Spaniards were proud of the Transition. Cited in Felix Moral, *Veinticinco años después: la memoria del franquismo y de la Transición a la democracia en los españoles* (Madrid: CIS, 2001), pp. 19–21.
- 3 Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late 20th Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).
- 4 Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz, eds., *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
- 5 The first author to refer to the “Spanish model” was Josep Colomer, “Transitions by Agreement: Modeling the Spanish Way,” *American Political Science Review*, 85(4), 1991.
- 6 Jean Grugel and Matthew Louis Bishop, *Democratization: A Critical Introduction*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
- 7 If Spain, why not Eastern Europe, argued Giuseppe de Palma, “Why democracy can work in Eastern Europe,” *Journal of Democracy*, 2(1) Winter, 1991.
- 8 See Pamela Radcliff, “The Transition: A global model?” in *Is Spain Different? A Comparative Look at the 19th and 20th Centuries*, edited by Nigel Townson (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2015).
- 9 See Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
- 10 See Joseph Foweraker, *Making Democracy in Spain: Grass-roots Struggle in the South* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- 11 For this framework, see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For the Spanish case, see Manuel Pérez Ledesma, “Viejos y nuevos movimientos en la Transición,” *La Transición, treinta años después*, edited by Carme Molinero (Barcelona, Península, 2006).
- 12 Xavier Domènech Sampere, “La reconstrucció de la raó democràtica: del suburbi a la ciutat,” in *Construint la ciutat democràtica: el moviment veïnal durant el tardofranquisme i la transició*, edited by Carme Molinero y Pere Ysàs (Barcelona: Icaria, 2010).
- 13 See Rebecca Clifford and Nigel Townson, “The Church in crisis: Catholic activism and ‘1968’,” *Cultural and Social History* 8(4), (2011) pp. 529–548; and Javier Domínguez, *Organizaciones obreras cristianas en la oposición al franquismo (1951–1975)* (Bilbao: Ediciones Mensajeros, 1985).
- 14 Gregorio Valdevira, *La oposición estudiantil al franquismo* (Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 2006).
- 15 Pamela Radcliff, *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960–1978* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
- 16 For a more detailed account, see Javier Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy, 1939 to the Present* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).

- 17 Pelai Pagés I Blanch, ed. *La transició democrática als Països Catalans: Història i memòria* (València: PUV, 2005)
- 18 See articles by Ignacio Sánchez Cuenca and Paloma Aguilar and by Sophie Baby, in *Violència y transiciones políticas a finales del siglo XX*, edited by Sophie Baby, Olivier Compagnon and Eduardo González Calleja (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2009).
- 19 See Nicolas Sartorius and Alberto Sabio, *El final de la dictadura: la conquista de la democracia en España* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2007), for the primary role of pressure from below, vs. Richard Gunther, “Spain: the very model of the modern elite settlement,” in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, edited by Gunther and John Higley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
- 20 Rafael Durán Muñoz, “Fortaleza del estado y acción colectiva en el cambio del régimen: España y Portugal en perspectiva comparativa,” in *Violencia y transiciones*.
- 21 See Ferrán Gallego, *El mito de la transición: la crisis del franquismo y los orígenes de la democracia, 1973–1977* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008) for the former, and Victor Pérez Díaz, *The Return of Civil Society: the Emergence of Democratic Spain* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) for the latter.
- 22 For an account of this debate that comes down in favor of the pacts, see Santos Juliá, “Memoria y amnistía en la transición,” in *Hoy no es ayer: Ensayos sobre la España del siglo XX* (Barcelona: RBA Libros, 2010).
- 23 Richard Gunther, “The Spanish Model revisited,” in *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: The Spanish Model*, edited by Gregorio Alonso and Diego Muro (London: Routledge, 2011).
- 24 Paloma Aguilar Fernández, *Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española* (Madrid: Alianza, 1996).
- 25 Pamela Radcliff, “El debate sobre el género en la Constitución de 1978: orígenes y consecuencias del nuevo consenso sobre la igualdad,” *Ayer*, 88(4), 2012.
- 26 Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship*, p. 297.
- 27 Diego Muro, “The Basque experience of the transition to democracy,” in *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition*.
- 28 For Madrid, see Hamilton Stapell, *Remaking Madrid: Culture, Politics and Identity after Franco* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
- 29 See Stanley Payne, “The army in the Transition,” in *Spain in the 1980s: The Democratic Transition and a New International Role*, edited by Robert Clark and Michael Haltzel (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).
- 30 On the king’s role, see Charles Powell, *Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-Made Monarch* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
- 31 On this process, see Santos Juliá, *Los socialistas en la política española, 1879–1982* (Madrid: Taurus, 1997).

## Chapter 14

- 1 See Robert Paxton and Julie Hessler, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 4th edition. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001), Chapter 23.
- 2 See Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: the History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- 3 For an emphasis on convergence, see Luis Moreno, “The Spanish development of Southern European welfare,” in *Survival of the European Welfare State*, edited by Stein Kuhnle (London: Routledge, 2000); on inferiority, see Martin Rhodes, “Southern European welfare states: Identity, problems and prospects for reform,” in *Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform*, edited by Martin Rhodes (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

- 4 Sebastian Balfour, "The reinvention of Spanish conservatism: The Popular Party since 1989," in *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*, edited by Sebastian Balfour (London: Routledge, 2005).
- 5 Walther Bernecker and Gunther Maihold, "Presentación: Consenso y polarización en España," in *España: del consenso a la polarización: cambios en la democracia española*, edited by Walther L. Bernecker and Günther Maihold (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2007).
- 6 Santos Juliá and Miguel Martorell, *Manual de historia política y social de España (1808–2011)*, (Barcelona: RBA Libros, 2012), Chapter 8.
- 7 Juan Pan-Montojo, "El proceso económico," in *La búsqueda de la democracia: España 1960–2010, Volume 5 of América Latina en la historiografía contemporánea*, edited by Jordi Canal (Madrid: Penguin-Random House/MAPFRE, 2015).
- 8 Christine Cousins, "Securing a foothold in the labor market," in *Gendering Spanish Democracy*, edited by Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente (London: Routledge, 2005).
- 9 Juan Pan-Montojo, "El proceso económico."
- 10 For a comprehensive general history of the period in English, see Javier Tusell, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
- 11 See Santos Juliá, "The Socialist era, 1982–1996," in *Spanish History since 1808*, edited by Jose Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (London: Edward Arnold, 2000).
- 12 Julian Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés, *Twentieth Century Spain: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 337–338.
- 13 See Sebastian Royo, *From Social Democracy to Neoliberalism: the Consequences of Party Hegemony in Spain, 1982–1996* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
- 14 Monica Threlfall, "Towards parity representation in party politics," in *Gendering Spanish Democracy*.
- 15 Juan Pan-Montojo, "El proceso económico."
- 16 Álvaro Ferrary, "Cambio político cambio social y cambio cultural: la cultura española después de Franco," in *Historia de España contemporánea*, edited by Javier Paredes (Barcelona: Sello Editorial, 2007).
- 17 Carsten Humlebaek, "The Pacto de Olvido," in *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: The Spanish Model*, edited by Gregorio Alonso and Diego Muro (London: Routledge, 2011).
- 18 Helen Graham, "The afterlife of violence: Spain's Memory Wars in national and international context," in *The War and its Shadow: Spain's Civil War in Europe's Long 20th Century* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012).
- 19 *Unearthing Franco's Legacy: Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical Memory in Spain*, edited by Carlos Jerez-Farrán and Samuel Amago (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2010).
- 20 Carolyn Boyd, "The politics of history and memory in democratic Spain," *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 617 (2008).
- 21 For the latter, see Père Ysás, "la Transición española: luces y sombras," *Ayer* 79 (2010), and for the former, see Luis Martín Cabrera, *Radical Justice: Spain and the Southern Cone beyond Market and State* (Harrisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2011).
- 22 *Existe sociedad civil en España? Responsabilidades colectivas y valores públicos*, edited by Joan Subirats (Madrid: Fundación Encuentro, 1999).
- 23 *Informe sobre la democracia en España: 2014 democracia sin política*, edited by Julio Embid (Madrid: Libros de la Catarata, 2014), pp. 88–90.
- 24 Juan Luís Sánchez, *Las 10 mareas del cambio* (Barcelona: Roca Editorial, 2013).

# WORKS CITED

- Adelman, Jeremy. "An age of imperial revolutions." *American Historical Review* 113 (2008): 319–340.
- *Struggle for Sovereignty: Empire and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Aguilar Fernandez, Paloma. *Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española*. Madrid: Alianza, 1996.
- Aizpuru, Mikel. "Asociacionismo popular: reverso del modelo de organización social del franquismo? El caso de Barakaldo." In *Estado, protesta y movimientos sociales*, edited by Santiago Castillo y José María Ortíz de Orruño. Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 1997.
- Aldaraca, Bridget. *El angel del hogar: Galdós y la ideología de la domesticidad en España*. Madrid: Visor, 1992.
- Alexander, Gerard. "Women and men at the ballot box: Voting in Spain's two democracies." In *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*, edited by Victoria Enders and Pamela Radcliff. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Almúñia, Celso. "Medios de comunicación y cultura oral en la crisis del Antiguo Régimen." In *Orígenes culturales de la sociedad liberal: España XIX*, edited by Jesús A. Martínez Martín. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003.
- Alonso, Gregorio and Diego Muro, eds. *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: The Spanish Model*. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Álvarez Chillida, Gonzalo. *El antisemitismo en España: la imagen del judío (1812–2002)*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2002.
- Álvarez Junco, José. *El emperador del paralelo: Lerroux y la demagogía populista*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1990.
- *Mater Dolorosa : la idea de España en el siglo XIX*. Madrid: Taurus, 2001.
- "The formation of Spanish identity and its adaptation to the age of nations." *History and Memory* 14(1–2) 2002, pp. 13–36.
- *Spanish Identity in the Age of Nations*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011.
- *The Emergence of Mass Politics in Spain: Populist Demagoguery and Republican Culture, 1890–1910*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1990.
- and Javier Moreno Luzón, eds. *La Constitución de Cádiz: historiografía y conmemoración: Homenaje a Francisco Tomás y Valiente*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2006.
- and Adrian Shubert, eds. *Spanish History Since 1808*. London: Edward Arnold, 2000.
- Álvarez Rey, Leandro. "El trienio constitucional (1820–1823)." In *Historia contemporánea de España, Siglo XIX*. 4th edition, edited by Javier Paredes. Barcelona: Ariel, 2004.

- Álvarez Tardío, Manuel. "The CEDA: Threat or opportunity?" In *The Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War, 1931–36*, edited by Manuel Álvarez Tardío and Fernando del Rey Reguillo. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- Anderson, Peter. *The Francoist Military Trials: Terror and Complicity, 1939–1945*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Anés Álvarez, Gonzalo. *El Antiguo Régimen: Los Borbones*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1975.
- Applegate, Celia. "A Europe of regions: Reflections on the historiography of sub-national places in modern times." *American Historical Review* 104 (1999): 1157–1182.
- Archilés Cardona, Ferrán. "'Hacer región es hacer patria.' La región en el imaginario de la nación española de la Restauración." *Ayer* 64 (2006): 121–147.
- "Ni imperio ni imperialismo? El imaginario nacional español y el imperialismo africanista en la España de la Restauración." In *Nación y nacionalización: una perspectiva europea comparada*, edited by Archilés Cardona, Ferrán, M. García Carrión and Ismael Saz. Valencia: PUV, 2013.
- *Parlar en nom del poble: cultura política, discurs i mobilització social al republicanisme castel·lonenc (1891–1909)*. Castelló: Ajuntament de Castelló, 2002.
- and Marta García Carrión, "En la sombra del Estado: esfera pública nacional y homogeneización cultural en la España de la Restauración." *Historia contemporánea*, 45, 2012.
- Aresti, Nerea. *Médicos, Donjuanes y mujeres modernas: los ideales de feminidad y masculinidad en el primer tercio del siglo XX*. Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 2001.
- Arias Castañón, Eloy. *La revolución de 1868 en Sevilla*. Sevilla: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2010.
- Aróstegui, Julio. *Largo Caballero. El tesón y la químera*. Barcelona: Debate, 2013.
- "La transición a la democracia, matriz de nuestro tiempo reciente." In *Historia de la Transición en España: los inicios del proceso democratizador*, edited by Rafael Quiros-Cheyrouze Muñoz. Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2007.
- "Los socialistas en la Segunda República: una victoria con alto costo." In *En el combate por la historia: la República, la Guerra Civil, el Franquismo*, edited by Angel Viñas. Barcelona: Pasado y Presente, 2012.
- and Jorge Marco, eds. *El último frente. La resistencia armada antifranquista en España, 1939–1952*. Madrid: Catarata de los Libros, 2008.
- Augusteijn, Joost and Eric Storm. "Introduction." In *Region and State in 19th Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism*, edited by Joost Augusteijn and Eric Storm. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012.
- Baby, Sophie, Olivier Compagnon and Eduardo González Calleja, eds. *Violencia y transiciones políticas a finales del siglo XX*. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2009.
- Bahamonde, Angel and Jesús Martínez. *Historia de España en el siglo XIX*. Madrid: Catedra, 1998.
- Baines, Dudley, Neil Cummins and Max-Stephan Schulze. "Population and living standards, 1945–2005." In *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: 1870–Present, Vol. 2*, edited by Stephen Broadberry and Kevin O'Rourke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Balfour, Sebastian. *The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898–1923*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- "Colonial war and civil war: The Spanish Army of Africa." In *If You Tolerate This: The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War*, edited by Martin Baumeister and Stefanie Schuler-Springorum. Frankfurt a M: Campus Verlag, 2008.
- "The reinvention of Spanish conservatism: The Popular Party since 1989." In *The Politics of Contemporary Spain*, edited by Sebastian Balfour. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Ballarín, Manuel, Diego Cusalón and José Luís Ledesma, eds. *La II República en la encrucijada: el segundo bienio*. Zaragoza: Cortes de Aragón, 2009.
- Ballbé, Manuel. *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional, 1912–1983*. Madrid: Alianza, 1985.

- Barahona, Renato. *Vizcaya on the Eve of Carlism: Politics and Society, 1800–1823*. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1989.
- Barnosell Jordà, Genís. *Orígens del sindicalisme català*. Vic: Eumo, 1999.
- Barranco, Parejo. *La Producción industrial de Andalucía (1830–1935)*. Sevilla: Instituto de Desarrollo Regional, 1997.
- Barrera del Barrio, Carlos. *Periodismo y franquismo de la Censura a la Apertura*. Barcelona: Ediciones Internacionales Universitarias, 1995.
- Barrio Alonso, Angeles. "Introducción: la crisis del régimen liberal en España (1917–1923)." *Ayer* 63 (2006): 11–21.
- "La oportunidad perdida: 1919 mito y realidad del poder syndical." *Ayer* 63 (2006): 153–184.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Baumeister, Martin and Stefanie Schuler-Springorum, eds. *If You Tolerate This: The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War*. Frankfurt a M: Campus Verlag, 2008.
- Bayly, C. A. *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780–1830*. Harlow: Longman, 1989.
- *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.
- Beevor, Anthony. *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 2006.
- Bell, David. *The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as we Know It*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007.
- Ben-Ami, Schlomo. *Fascism from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923–1930*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
- "The crisis of the dynastic elite in the transition from monarchy to republic, 1929–1931." In *Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain*, edited by Frances Lannon and Paul Preston. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- Benet, Josep. *L'intent franquista de genocidi cultural contra Catalunya*. Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadía de Montserrat, 1995.
- Beramendi, Justo. "Algunos aspectos del nation-building en la Galicia del siglo XIX." In *Construir España: nacionalismo español y procesos de nacionalización*, edited by Javier Moreno. Madrid: CEPC, 2007.
- Bernecker, Walther and Gunther Maihold. "Presentación: Consenso y polarización en España." In *España: del consenso a la polarización: cambios en la democracia española*, edited by Walter Bernecker and Gunther Maihold. Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2007.
- Bessel, Richard. "European dictatorships in comparative perspective." In *La transición a la política de masas*, edited by Edward Acton and Ismael Saz. Valencia, PUV, 2001.
- Biess, Frank. "Introduction." In *Histories of the Aftermath*.
- and Robert Moeller, eds. *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010.
- Blackbourn, David and Geoff Eley. *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Politics and Society in Nineteenth-Century German History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Blanco Valdés, Roberto L. "Paisanos y soldados en los orígenes de la España liberal: sobre revoluciones sociales, golpes de Estado y pronunciamientos militares." In *Las Nuevas Naciones: España y México, 1800–1850*, edited by Jaime E. Rodríguez. Madrid: Fundación MAPRFE, 2008.
- Blaney, Gerald. "Keeping Order in Republican Spain, 1931–1936." In *Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change and Crisis, 1918–1940*, edited by Blaney.
- Blasco Herranz, Inmaculada. "Feminismo católico." In *Historia de las mujeres en España y América Latina: V 4: del siglo XX a los umbrales del XXI*, edited by Isabel Morant. Madrid: Cátedra, 2008.

- “Género y religión: de la feminización de la religión a la movilización católica femenina. Una revisión crítica.” *Historia Social* 53 (2005): 119–136.
- *Paradojas de la ortodoxia: política de masas y militancia católica femenina en España, 1919–1939*. Zaragoza: Prensa Universitaria de Zaragoza, 2003.
- Blinkhorn, Martin. *Fascism and the Right in Europe, 1919–1945*. Harlow: Pearson, 2000.
- Bolloten, Bernard. *The Spanish Civil War. Revolution and Counter-Revolution*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
- Bonamusa, Francesc and Francisco Morente, eds. *La vida cotidiana durant el franquisme, 1939–1975*. Barbera del Valles: Ajuntament de Barbara del Valles, 2004.
- Bosch Sanchez, Aurora. *Ugetistas y libertarios: Guerra Civil y revolución en el país valenciano*. Valencia: Institución Alfonso el Magnánimo, 1983.
- Botrel, Jen-Francois. “La construcción de una nueva cultura del libro y del impreso en el siglo XIX.” In *Orígenes culturales de la sociedad liberal: España XIX*, edited by Jesús A. Martínez Martín. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003.
- Boyd, Carolyn. *Historia Patria: Politics, History and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- “The military and politics.” In *Spanish History since 1808*, edited by J. Alvarez Junco and Javier Moreno Luzón. London: Edward Arnold, 2000.
- “The politics of history and memory in democratic Spain.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 617 (2008): 133–148.
- Buchanan, Tom. “How ‘different’ was Spain? The later Franco Regime in international context.” In *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, edited by Nigel Townson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Bullón de Mendoza, Alfonso and Luís E. Togores, eds. *La República y la Guerra Civil: setenta años después*. Madrid: Editorial ACTAS, 2008.
- Burdiel, Isabel. *Isabel II: una biografía (1830–1904)*. Madrid: Taurus, 2010.
- “Las claves del periodo.” In *España: la construcción nacional, 1830–1870*, edited by Burdiel. Madrid: Fundación MAPFRE, 2012.
- “Myths of failure, myths of success: New perspectives on nineteenth-century Spanish liberalism.” *Journal of Modern History* 70 (1998): 892–912.
- “The uses of the monarchy: A ‘Spanish Incident’ in the mid-19th century.” In *Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600–1900*, edited by John Morrow and Jonathan Scott. Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008.
- and María Cruz Romeo. “Old and new liberalism: The making of the liberal revolution, 1808–1844.” *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 75 (1998): 65–80.
- Burguera, Monica. *Las damas del liberalismo respectable*. Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2012.
- Caballero Domínguez, Margarita and Carmelo García Enabo. “Una realidad compleja: poder central y poderes locales en los procesos electorales decimonónicos: El caso de Soria.” In *En torno al 98: España en el transito del siglo XX*, Volume I, edited by Rafael Sánchez Montero. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2000.
- Cabré, Anna. “La gent: natalitat, mortalitat i migracions.” In *La vida cotidiana durant el franquisme, 1939–1975*, edited by Francesc Bonamusa and Francisco Morente. Gener, Spain: Ajuntament di Barbara del Valles, 2004.
- Cabrera, Mercedes, ed. *Con luz y taquígrafos: el Parlamento en la Restauración (1913–1923)*. Madrid: Taurus, 1998.
- and Fernando del Rey. “De la oligarquía y el caciquismo a la política de intereses. Por una re-lectura de la Restauración.” In *Las máscaras de la libertad: el liberalismo español, 1808–1950*, edited by Manuel Suárez Cortina. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003.
- Cabrera, Miguel Angel. “Developments in contemporary Spanish historiography: From social history to the new cultural history.” *Journal of Modern History* 77 (2005): 988–1023.

- Calatayud, Salvador, Jesús Millán and María Cruz Romeo. "El Estado en la configuración de la España contemporánea. Una revisión de los problemas historiográficos." In *Estado y periferias en la España del Siglo XIX: Nuevos enfoques*, edited by Salvador Calatayud. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 2009.
- Callahan, William. "An organizational and pastoral failure: Urbanization, industrialization and religion in Spain, 1850–1930." In *European Religion in the Age of the Great Cities: 1830–1930*, edited by Hugh McLeod. London: Routledge, 1995.
- *Church, Politics and Society in Spain, 1750–1874*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.
- *The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1998*. Washington, DC: Catholic University Press of America, 2000.
- Canal, Jordi. *El carlismo: dos siglos de contrarrevolución en España*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2000.
- . "Guerras civiles en Europa en el siglo XIX o guerra civil europea." In *Guerras civiles: una clave para entender la Europa de los siglos XIX y XX*, edited by Eduardo González Calleja and Jordi Canal. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2012.
- . "Guerra civil y contrarrevolución en la Europa del Sur." *Ayer* 55 (2004): 37–60.
- Carasa, Pedro and Antonio Fernández Sancha. "Un análisis microhistorica del poder local en Castilla." In *En torno al 98: España en el transito del siglo XX*, Volume I, edited by Rafael Sánchez Montero. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2000.
- Cardona, Gabriel. *Historia militar de una guerra civil*. Barcelona: Flor de Viento, 2006.
- Carnero, Teresa. "La difícil transición de la política liberal a la política democrática." In *La transición a la política de masas*, edited by Edward Acton, et al. Valencia: PUV, 2001.
- Carr, Raymond. *Spain, 1808–1939*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- Carreras, Albert and Xavier Tafunell. *Historia Económica de la España contemporánea (1789–2009)*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2009.
- Casanova, Julian. *Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain, 1931–39*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- . *Anarquismo y revolución en la sociedad rural aragonesa, 1936–1938*. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1985.
- . "Civil wars, revolutions and counter-revolutions in Finland, Spain and Greece (1918–1949)." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 13 (2000): 515–537.
- . *The Spanish Republic and Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- and Angela Cenarro, eds. *Pagar las culpas: la represión económica en Aragón (1939–1945)*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2014.
- and Carlos Gil Andrés. *Twentieth Century Spain: A History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Casey, James. *Early Modern Spain: A Social History*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Castro, Demetrio. "Orígenes y primeras etapas del republicanismo en España." In *El republicanismo en España (1830–1977)*, edited by Nigel Townson. Madrid: Alianza Universidad, 1994.
- Catalan, Jordi. "Fam I penuria de les condicions de vida durant el franquisme, 1939–75." In *La vida quotidiana durant el franquisme, 1939–1975*, edited by Francesc Bonamusa and Francisco Morente. Gener, Spain: Ajuntament di Barbara del Valles, 2004.
- Cazorla-Sánchez, Antonio. "Dictatorship from below: Local politics in the making of the Francoist state, 1937–1948." *Journal of Modern History* 71 (1999): 882–901.
- . *Fear and Progress: Ordinary Lives in Franco's Spain, 1939–1975*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- . *Franco: The Biography of the Myth*. London: Taylor and Francis, 2013.
- . *Las políticas de la victoria: la consolidación del nuevo estado franquista, 1938–1953*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000.
- Cenarro, Angela. "Violence, surveillance and denunciation: Social cleavage in the Spanish Civil War and Francoism, 1936–1950." In *Social Control in Europe, 1800–2000*, Vol. 2, edited by Clive Emsley, Eric Johnson and Pieter Spierenburg. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2004.

- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Chastagnaret, Gérard. *L'Espagne, puissance minière dans l'Europe du XIXe siècle*. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2000.
- Christian, William. *Moving Crucifixes in Modern Spain*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Chulía, Elisa. *El poder y la palabra: prensa y poder político en las dictaduras: el régimen de Franco ante la prensa y el periodismo*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2001.
- Cipolla, Carlo, ed. *The Fontana Economic History of Europe*. Vol. 4. London: Collins, 1973.
- Clark, Christopher and Wolfram Kaiser. "Introduction: The European Culture Wars." In *Culture Wars: Secular–Catholic Conflict in 19th Century Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Clark, Robert. *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952–1980*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.
- Clifford, Rebecca and Nigel Townson. "The Church in crisis: Catholic activism and 1968." *Cultural and Social History* 8 (2011): 529–548.
- Cobo Romero, Francisco. "Campesinado, política y urnas en los orígenes de la Guerra Civil, 1931–1936." In *La España rural, siglos XIX y XX: aspectos políticos, sociales y culturales*, edited by Teresa María Ortega López and Francisco Cobo Romero. Granada: Editorial Comares, 2011.
- "Nation and reaction: Spanish conservative nationalism and the Restoration crisis." In *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913–1923*, edited by Francisco Romero Salvadó and Angel Smith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- and Teresa María Ortega Lopez. "No solo Franco: La heterogeneidad de los apoyos sociales al régimen franquista en el mundo rural del sureste español (1936–1951)." *Historia Social* 51 (2005): 49–71.
- Colomer, Josep. "Transitions by agreement: Modeling the Spanish way." *American Political Science Review* 85 (1991): 1283–1302.
- Cooper, Frederick. "States, empires and political imagination." In *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
- Costa, Joaquín. *Oligarquía y caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España: Urgencia y modo de cambiarla*. Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Fortanet, 1901.
- Cousins, Christine. "Securing a foothold in the labor market." In *Gendering Spanish Democracy*, edited by Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Cruz, Jesús. *Gentlemen, Bourgeois, and Revolutionaries: Political Change and Cultural Persistence Among the Spanish Dominant Groups, 1750–1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- *The Rise of Middle Class Culture in Nineteenth-Century Spain*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011.
- Cruz, Rafael. "Las campañas rebeldes de aniquilación del enemigo." *Ayer* 76 (2009): 65–82.
- Cruz Artacho, Salvador. "Caciquismo y mundo rural durante la Restauración." In *Elecciones y cultura política en España y Italia, 1890–1923*, edited by Rosa Ana Gutierrez, Rafael Zurita and Renato Camurri. Valencia: PUV, 2003.
- Dardé, Carlos. *La aceptación del adversario: política y políticos de la Restauración, 1875–1900*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003.
- De Arco Blanco, Miguel Angel and Miguel Gómez Oliver. "Los franquistas del campo: los apoyos sociales rurales del régimen de Franco, 1939–1951." In *La España rural: aspectos políticos, sociales y culturales*, edited by Teresa María Ortega López and Francisco Cobo Romero. Granada: Editorial Comares, 2011.
- De Felipe Redondo, Jesús. *Trabajadores: lenguaje y experiencia en la formación del movimiento obrero español*. Oviedo: Genuve Ediciones, 2012.

- De la Cueva Merino, Julio. "Clericalismo y movilización católica durante la Restauración." In *Clericalismo y asociacionismo católico en España: de la Restauración a la Transición: un siglo entre el palio y el consiliario*, edited by Julio de la Cueva and Angel Luís López Villaverde. Cuenca: Universidad Castilla-La Mancha, 2005.
- "El anticlericalismo en España: un balance historiográfico." In *L'Histoire religieuse en France et en Espagne*, edited by Benoît Pellistrandi. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2004.
- "Religious persecution, anticlerical tradition and revolution: On atrocities against the clergy during the Spanish Civil War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 33 (1998): 355–369.
- and Feliciano Montero, eds. *Laicismo y catolicismo; el conflicto político-religioso en la Segunda República*. Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2009.
- and Feliciano Montero, eds. *La secularización conflictiva: España (1898–1931)*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2007.
- De la Fuente, Gregorio. "Actores y causas de la Revolución de 1868." In *España, 1868–1874: nuevos enfoques sobre el sexenio*, edited by Rafael Serrano García. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 2002.
- De Montaud, Inés Roldán. "Cuba." In *El poder de la influencia: geografía del caciquismo en España (1875–1923)*, edited by José Varela Ortega. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001.
- De Palma, Giuseppe. "Why democracy can work in Eastern Europe." *Journal of Democracy* 2 (1991): 21–31.
- De Riquer i Permanyer, Borja. "La débil nacionalización española del siglo XIX." *Historia Social* 20 (1994): 97–114.
- De Vicente Algueró, Felipe-José. *El Catolicismo liberal en España*. Madrid: Encuentro, 2012.
- De Vries, Jan. "The industrial and industrious revolutions." *Journal of Economic History* 54 (1994): 249–270.
- Del Moral Ruíz, Joaquín, Juan Pro Ruíz and Fernando Suárez Bilbao. *Estado y territorio en España, 1820–1930*. Bilbao: Libros de la Catarata, 2007.
- Del Rey Reguillo, Fernando. *Paisanos en lucha: exclusión política y violencia en la II República*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2008.
- "Que habría sucedido si Alfonso XIII hubiera rechazado el golpe de Primo de Rivera en 1923?" In *Historia virtual de España (1870–2004)*, edited by Nigel Townson. Madrid: Taurus, 2004.
- "Reflexiones sobre la violencia política en la II República española." In *Conflicto político, democracia y dictadura: Portugal y España en la década de 1930*, edited by Mercedes Gutiérrez Sánchez and Diego Palacios Cerezales. Madrid: CEPC, 2007.
- and Manuel Álvarez Tardío, eds. *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War, 1931–36*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- Delgado, Manuel. *La ira sagrada: Anticlericalismo, iconoclastia y antiritualismo en la España contemporánea*. Barcelona: Humanidades, 1992.
- Delgado Ribas, Josep María. "Eclipse and collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1650–1898." In *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, edited by Alfred McCoy, Josep Fradera and Stephen Jacobson. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
- Díaz, Lorenzo. *La España alegre: ocio y diversión en el siglo XX*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1999.
- Díaz Sánchez, Pilar. "Trabajo y género en la España franquista: estudio comparado de dos sectores: la confección-textil y los ferrocarriles." In *Mujeres y hombres en la España franquista: sociedad, economía, política y cultura*, edited by Gloria Nielfa Cristóbal. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 2003.
- Díez Cano, L. Santiago. "Existió alguna vez la I República? Notas para recuperar un período historiográfico." In *España, 1868–1874: nuevos enfoques sobre el Sexenio*, edited by Rafael Serrano García. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 2002.

- Diamond, Larry et. al, eds. *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.
- Domènech Sampere, Xavier. "La reconstrucció de la raó democràtica: del suburbi a la ciutat." In *Construint la ciutat democràtica: el moviment veïnal durant el tardofranquisme i la transició*, edited by Carme Molinero y Pèrre Ysàs. Barcelona, Icaria, 2010.
- Dominguez, Javier. *Organizaciones obreras cristianas en la oposición al franquismo (1951–1975)*. Bilbao: Ediciones Mensajeros, 1985.
- Domínguez Martín, Rafael. *La riqueza de las regiones: las desigualdades económica regionales en España, 1700–1900*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2002.
- Dowling, Andrew. *Catalonia since the Spanish Civil War: Reconstructing the Nation*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2013.
- Duarte, Ángel. "El municipio republicano: sostén de la democracia y refugio en la tempestad." In *Provincia y nación: los territorios del liberalismo*, edited by Carlos Forçadell and María Cruz Romeo Mateo. Zaragoza: Instituto Fernando el Católico, 2006.
- and Pèrre Gabriel. "Una sola cultura política republicana ochocentista en España?" *Ayer* dossier on republicanism, *Ayer* 39(2000): 11–34.
- Durán Muñoz, Rafael. "Fortaleza del estado y acción colectiva en el cambio del régimen: España y Portugal en perspectiva comparativa." In *Violencia y transiciones políticas al finales del siglo XX*, edited by Sophie Baby, Olivier Compagnon and Eduardo González Calleja. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2009.
- Ealham, Chris. *Policing the City: Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- "The myth of the maddened crowd: Class, culture and space in the revolutionary urbanist project in Barcelona, 1936–37." In *The Splintering of Spain*.
- and Michael Richards, eds. *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- "An impossible unity: Revolution, reform and counter-revolution and the Spanish left, 1917–1923." In *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913–1923*, edited by Francisco Romero Salvadó and Angel Smith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Eastman, Scott. "'America has escaped from our hands': Rethinking empire, identity and independence during the Trienio Liberal in Spain, 1820–1823." *European History Quarterly* 41 (2011): 428–443.
- *Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759–1823*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2012.
- Eley, Geoff. *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Embid, Julio. *Informe sobre la democracia en España: 2014 democracia sin política*. Madrid: Libros de la Catarata, 2014.
- Enders, Victoria and Pamela Radcliff, eds. *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Escalera Reyes, Javier. "El franquismo y la fiesta: régimen político, transformaciones sociales y sociabilidad festiva en la España de Franco." In *La cultura popular en la España contemporánea*, edited by Jorge Uría. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2003.
- Esdaille, Charles. *Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808–1814*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004.
- *Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808–1939*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
- *The Peninsular War: A New History*. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
- Esenwein, George. *Anarchist Ideology and the Working Class Movement in Spain, 1868–1898*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
- Esparza, José Javier. *El terror rojo en España*. Barcelona: Altera, 2007.

- Espigado Tocino, Gloria. "La historiografía del cantonalismo; pautas metodológicas para un estudio comparado." In *España, 1868–1874: nuevos enfoques sobre el sexenio*, edited by Rafael Serrano García. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 2002.
- Espinosa Maestre, Francisco. *La columna de la muerte. El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2003.
- *La Primavera del Frente Popular: los campesinos de Badajoz y el origen de la guerra civil*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2007.
- Ferrary, Álvaro. "Cambio político cambio social y cambio cultural: la cultura española después de Franco." In *Historia de España contemporánea*, edited by Javier Paredes. Barcelona: Sello Editorial, 2007.
- Ferraz, Alvaro. "La cultura y el pensamiento español durante el franquismo." In *Historia Contemporánea de España: Siglo XX*, edited by Javier Paredes. Madrid: Ariel, 1998.
- Folguera, Pilar. *El feminismo en España: dos siglos de historia*. Madrid: Fundación de Pablo Iglesias, 1988.
- Fontana, Josep. *España bajo el franquismo*. Barcelona: Crítica, 1986.
- "La naturaleza de la Guerra Civil." In *España en la crisis Europea de entreguerras*, edited by Francisco Morente. Madrid: Catarata, 2011.
- "Reflexiones sobre la naturaleza y las consecuencias del franquismo." In *España bajo el franquismo*.
- and Ramón Villares, eds. *Historia de España: Restauración y Dictadura*. Barcelona: Marcial Pons, 2009.
- Forçadell, Carlos and María Cruz Romeo Mateo, eds. *Provincia y nación: los territorios del liberalismo*. Zaragoza: Instituto Fernando el Católico, 2006.
- Ford, Carolyn. "Religion and popular culture in modern Europe." *Journal of Modern History* 65 (1993): 152–175.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.
- Foweraker, Joseph. *Making Democracy in Spain: Grass-roots Struggle in the South*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Fox, Inman. *La invención de España: nacionalismo liberal e identidad nacional*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1998.
- Fradera, Josep María. *Colonias para después de un imperio*. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2005.
- "El proyecto liberal Catalan y los imperativos del doble patriotism." *Ayer* 35 (1999): 87–100.
- "Empires in retreat: Spain and Portugal after the Napoleonic Wars." In *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*, edited by Alfred McCoy, Josep Fradera and Stephen Jacobson. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
- "La dificultad de describir la nación." In *Del territorio a la nación: identidades territoriales y construcción nacional*, edited by Luis Castells. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2006.
- "Porqué no se promulgaron las leyes especiales de ultramar?" In *Gobernar colonias*. Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsular, 1999.
- "Raza y ciudadanía. El factor racial en la delimitación de los derechos políticos de los Americanos." In *Gobernar colonias*. Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsular, 1999.
- "Reading imperial transitions: Spanish contraction, British expansion and American irruption." In *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, edited by Alfred McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.
- "The Empire, the nation and the homelands: 19th-century Spain's national idea." In *Region and State in 19th Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism*, edited by Joost Augsteyjn and Eric Storm. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012.

- Frank, Sue, Chris Perriam and Mike Thompson. "The literary avant-garde: A contradictory modernity." In *Spanish Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Fraser, Ronald. *Napoleon's Cursed War: Spanish popular resistance in the Peninsular War, 1808–1814*. London: Verso, 2008.
- "The popular experience of war and revolution, 1931–1939." In *Revolution and War in Spain, 1931–1939*, edited by Paul Preston. London: Routledge, 1984.
- Freitag, Sabine, ed. *Exiles from European Revolutions: Refugees in Mid-Victorian Britain*. New York: Berghan Books, 2003.
- Furet, Francois. *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999.
- Fusi Aizpurriá, Juan Pablo. "Centralismo y localismo: la formación del Estado Español." In *Nación y Estado en la España liberal*, edited by Guillermo Gortázar. Madrid: Editorial Noesis, 1994.
- Gallego, Ferrán. *El mito de la transición: la crisis del franquismo y los orígenes de la democracia, 1973–1977*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2008.
- Gallego Méndez, María Teresa. *Mujer, Falange y Franquismo*. Madrid: Taurus, 1983.
- García Balañá, Albert. "El Verdadero productor: lenguaje y experiencia en la formación de las culturas políticas obreras." In *Historia de las culturas políticas en España y América Latina: la España liberal, 1833–1874*, edited by María Cruz Romeo and María Sierra. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2014.
- "The Empire is no longer a social unit: Declining imperial expectations and transatlantic crises in metropolitan Spain, 1859–1909." In *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
- "Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina: la guerra de Africa en Cataluña, 1859–60." In *Marruecos y el colonialismo español, 1859–1912*, edited by Eloy Martín Corrales. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2002.
- Carmen García Monerris. "El debate 'preconstitucional': Historia y política en el primer liberalismo español (Algunas consideraciones)." In *El primer liberalismo: España y Europa, una perspectiva comparada*, edited by Emilio La Parra López and Germán Ramírez Aledón. Valencia: Biblioteca Valenciana, 2009.
- Gelabert, Juan E. "Un Gran palacio abandonado: la España urbana del Siglo de las Luces." In *La vida cotidiana en la España del siglo XVIII*, edited by Manuel-Reyes García Hurtado. Madrid: Silex, 2009.
- Gies, David. *The Theatre in Nineteenth Century Spain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Gómez Bravo, Gutmaro and Jorge Marco. *La obra del miedo: violencia y sociedad en la España franquista (1936–1950)*. Barcelona: Ediciones Peninsular, 2011.
- Gómez-Navarro, José Luís. *El régimen de Primo de Rivera: reyes, dictaduras y dictadores*. Madrid: Cátedra, 1991.
- González Calleja, Eduardo. *En nombre de la autoridad: la defensa del orden público durante la Segunda República Española, 1931–1936*. Granada: Editorial Camares, 2014.
- "Entre el seny y la rauxa. Los límites democráticos de la Esquerra." In *Palabras como puños: la intransigencia política en la Segunda República Española*, edited by Fernando del Rey. Madrid: Tecnos, 2011.
- *La razón de la fuerza: orden público, subversión y violencia política en la España de la Restauración, 1875–1917*. Madrid: CSIC, 1998.
- *La España de Primo de Rivera: la modernización autoritaria, 1923–30*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005.
- Guirao, Fernando. *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57: Challenge and Response*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

- Gunther, Richard. "Spain: The very model of the modern elite settlement." In *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, edited by Gunther and John Higley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- "The Spanish Model revisited." In *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: The Spanish Model*, edited by Gregorio Alonso and Diego Muro. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Graham, Helen. "The afterlife of violence: Spain's memory wars in national and international context." In *The War and its Shadow: Spain's Civil War in Europe's Long 20th Century*. Eastbourne: Sussex University Press, 2012.
- *The Spanish Republic at War, 1936–1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Grugel, Jean and Matthew Louis Bishop. *Democratization: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- and Tim Rees. *Franco's Spain*. London: Edward Arnold, 1997.
- Gutiérrez Molina, José Luís. "Andalucía y el anarquismo, 1868–1936." *Ayer* 45 (2002): 171–195.
- Gutiérrez, Rosa Ana, Rafael Zurita and Renato Camurri, eds. *Elecciones y cultura política en España y Italia, 1890–1923*. Valencia: PUV, 2003.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Harding, Susan. *Remaking Ibiaca: Rural Life in Aragon under Franco*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.
- Harrison, Joseph. *The Spanish Economy in the 20th Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1984.
- Herr, Richard. *Rural Change and Royal Finances in Spain at the End of the Old Regime*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. New York: Norton, 1965.
- Hochschild, Adam. *Spain in our Hearts: Americans in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2016.
- Hoffman, Stefan-Ludwig. "Democracy and associations in the long 19th century: Towards a transnational perspective." *Journal of Modern History* 75 (2003): 269–299.
- Holguin, Sandie. *Creating Spaniards: Culture and National Identity in Republican Spain*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002.
- "How did the Spanish Civil War end?...Not so well." *American Historical Review* 120 (2015): 1767–1783.
- Howson, Gerald. *Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
- Humblebaek, Carsten. "The Pacto de Olvido." In *The Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: The Spanish Model*, edited by Gregorio Alonso and Diego Muro. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late 20th Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.
- Inarejos Muñoz, J. A. *Ciudadanos, propietarios y electores en la construcción del liberalismo español: el caso de las provincias castellano-manchegas (1854–1868)*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2008.
- Jackson, Gabriel. *Juan Negrín: Physiologist, Socialist, and Spanish Republican War Leader*. Eastbourne: Sussex University Press, 2010.
- Jacobson, Stephen. *Catalonia's Advocates: Lawyers, Society, and Politics in Barcelona, 1759–1900*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
- "Imperial ambitions in an era of decline: Micromilitarism and the eclipse of the Spanish Empire, 1858–1923." In *Endless Empire: Spain's Retreat, Europe's Eclipse, America's Decline*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.

- and Albert García Balaña. "A Spanish imperial meridian, 1824–68?" (unpublished ms.).
- Jerez-Farrán, Carlos and Samuel Amago. *Unearthing Franco's Legacy: Mass Graves and the Recovery of Historical Memory in Spain*. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2010.
- Juderías, Julián. *La leyenda negra y la verdad histórica: contribución al estudio del concepto de España en Europa, de las causas de este concepto y de la tolerancia política y religiosa en los países civilizados*, Madrid, Tip. de la Revista de Archivos, 1914.
- Juliá, Santos. *Hoy no es ayer: Ensayos sobre la España del siglo XX*. Barcelona: RBA Libros, 2010.
- *Los socialistas en la política española, 1879–1982*. Madrid: Taurus, 1997.
- *Víctimas de la guerra civil*. Madrid: Ediciones Temas de Hoy, 1999.
- and Miguel Martorell, *Manual de historia política y social de España (1808–2011)*. Barcelona: RBA Libros, 2012.
- Kagan, Richard. "Prescott's paradigm: American historical scholarship and the decline of Spain." *American Historical Review* 101 (1996): 423–446.
- Kahan, Alan. *Liberalism in 19th Century Europe: The Political Culture of Limited Suffrage*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Keene, Judith. "'Into the clear air of the plaza': Spanish women achieve the vote in 1931." In *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*, edited by Victoria Enders and Pamela Radcliff. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Kenwood, Alun. *The Spanish Civil War: A Cultural and Historical Reader*. Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1993.
- Kirkpatrick, Susan. *Mujer, modernismo y vanguardia en España, 1898–1931*. Madrid: Cátedra, 2003.
- Kowalsky, Daniel. *The Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
- Kramer, Alan. "Asesinatos en masa y genocidio entre 1914 y 1945: un intento de análisis comparativo." *Ayer* (2009): 177–205.
- Kurth, James. "A tale of four countries: Parallel politics in Southern Europe, 1815–1900." In *Mediterranean Paradoxes: The Politics and Social Structure of Southern Europe*, edited by Kurth and James Petras. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993.
- Lagrou, Pieter. "The age of total war, 1945–55." In *Histories of the Aftermath: The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*, edited by Frank Biess and Robert Moeller. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010.
- La Porte, Pablo. "Marruecos y la crisis de la Restauración, 1917–1923." *Ayer* 63 (2006): 53–74.
- "The Moroccan quagmire and the crisis of Spain's liberal system." In *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913–1923*, edited by Francisco Romero Salvadó and Angel Smith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Latham, Michael. "Modernization." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. 2nd edition, edited by William A. Darity. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008.
- Ledesma, José Luís. "Total war behind the front lines? An inquiry into the violence on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War." In *If You Tolerate This: The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War*, edited by Martin Baumeister and Stefanie Schuler-Springorum. Frankfurt a M: Campus Verlag, 2008.
- Lefebvre, Henri. *Le droit a la ville*. Paris: Economica, 1968.
- Lefebvre, Michel and Remi Skoutelsky. *Brigadas Internacionales. Imágenes recuperadas*. Barcelona: Lunwerg Editores, 2003.
- Linz, Juan. "An authoritarian regime: Spain." In *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology*, edited by Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen. Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964.
- "La realidad asociativa de los Españoles." In *Sociología española de los años setenta*. Madrid: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1971.

- “The party system of Spain.” In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, edited by Seymour Lipset and Stern Rokkan. New York: Free Press, 1967.
- Llopis Agelán, Enrique and José Antonio Sebastián Amarilla. “Impulso económico e inestabilidad: España 1808–1850.” In *Latinoamerica y España, 1800–1860: Un crecimiento nada excepcional*, edited by Enrique Llopis Agelán and Carlos Marichal. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009.
- Long, Robert. “Salir del desierto: Dissident Artistic Expression under Franco, 1936–1975.” Ph.D. Dissertation, UC San Diego, 2014.
- López Estudillo, Antonio. “El anarquismo español decimonónico.” *Ayer* dossier on Spanish anarchism, *Ayer* 45 (2002): 73–104.
- *Republicanism y anarquismo en Andalucía: conflictividad social agraria y crisis finisecular (1868–1900)*. Córdoba: Ayuntamiento de Córdoba, 2001.
- Lorenzo, Anselmo. *El proletariado militante: Memorias de un Internacional*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1974.
- Lowe, Sid. *Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism: The Juventud de Accion Popular in Spain, 1931–1939*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2010.
- Luis, Jean-Philippe. *L’utopie réactionnaire: épuration et modernisation de l’état dans l’Espagne de la fin de l’ancien régime (1823–1834)*. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2002.
- Macarro Vera, José Manuel. *Socialismo, República y Revolución en Andalucía*. Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2000.
- “The Socialists and revolution.” In *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War, 1931–36*, edited by Manuel Álvarez Tardío and Fernando del Rey Reguillo. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- Mackay, David. *Modern Architecture in Barcelona, 1854–1939*. New York: Rizzoli Press, 1989.
- Maier, Charles. “Consigning the twentieth century to history.” *American Historical Review* 105 (2000): 807–831.
- Malefakis, Edward. *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970.
- “The Franco dictatorship: A bifurcated regime?” In *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, edited by Nigel Townson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Maluquer de Motes, Jordi. *España en la crisis de 1898: de la Gran Depresión a la modernización económica del siglo XX*. Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1999.
- Mann, Michael. *Fascists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Maravall, José María. *Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers and Students in Franco’s Spain*. London: Tavistock Publications, 1978.
- Martín Aceña, Pablo and Elena Martínez Ruíz, “The Golden Age of Spanish capitalism: Economic growth without political freedom.” In *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, edited by Nigel Townson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Martín Cabrera, Luis. *Radical Justice: Spain and the Southern Cone beyond Market and State*. Harrisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2011.
- Martín de la Guardia, Ricardo M. and Guillermo A. Pérez Sánchez, “La sociedad española durante el régimen de Franco.” In *Historia contemporánea de España: Siglo XX*, edited by Javier Paredes. Madrid: Ariel, 1998.
- Martín Rubio, Ángel David. “Las pérdidas humanas en la Guerra Civil: el necesario final de un largo debate historiográfico.” In *La República y la Guerra Civil: setenta años después*, edited by Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luis E. Togores. Madrid: Editorial ACTAS, 2008.
- Martorell Linares, Miguel. “No fue aquello solamente una guerra, fue una revolución: España y la primera Guerra Mundial.” *Historia y Política: Ideas, procesos y movimientos sociales* 26 (2011): 17–45.
- Mateos, Abdón. *Ay de los vencidos: El exilio y los países de acogida*. Madrid: Edición Eneida, 2009.

- Mates Barco, Juan Manuel. "La Economía durante el régimen de Franco." In *Historia contemporánea de España: Siglo XX*, edited by Javier Paredes. Madrid: Ariel, 1998.
- Matthews, James. *Reluctant Warriors: Republican Popular Army and Nationalist Army Conscripts in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*. Oxford: Oxford Historical Monographs, 2012.
- Maza Castán, Virginia. "La cara pública del liberalismo. Ambitos de sociabilidad liberal-burguesa en Aragón (1834–45)." In *En construcción: historia local contemporánea*, edited by Ignacio Peiró Martín and Pedro Rújula. Zaragoza: Centro de Estudios Darocenses, 2003.
- Mazower, Mark. *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*. New York: Vintage Books, 1999.
- McDonough, Gary Wray. *Good Families of Barcelona: A Social History of Power in the Industrial Era*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Meaker, Gerald. "A civil war of words: The ideological impact of the First World War on Spain, 1914–1918." In *Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917–1923*, edited by Hans A. Schmitt. Richmond: University of Virginia Press, 1988.
- Mendiola, Fernando, ed. *Los trabajos forzados en la dictadura franquista*. Pamplona: Instituto Jerónimo de Uztáriz, 2007.
- Merriman, John. *A History of Modern Europe: From the French Revolution to the Present*. New York: Norton, 2004.
- Millán García-Varela, Jesús. "Popular y de orden: la pervivencia de la contrarrevolución carlista." *Ayer* dossier on Carlism, *Ayer* 38 (2000): 15–34.
- "Una reconsideración del carlismo." In *La política en el reinado del Isabel II*, edited by Isabel Burdiel. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1998.
- *El poder de la tierra: la sociedad agraria del Bajo Segura en la época del liberalismo, 1830–1890*. Alicante: Institut de Cultura "Juan Gil-Albert", 1999.
- and María Cruz Romeo. "Was the liberal revolution important to modern Spain? Political Cultures and Citizenship in Spanish History." *Social History* 29 (2004): 284–300.
- and Salvador Calatayud and María Cruz Romeo. "El Estado en la configuración de la España contemporánea. Una revisión de los problemas historiográficos." In *Estado y periferias en la España del Siglo XIX: Nuevos enfoques*, edited by Calatayud, Millan and Cruz Romeo. Valencia: University of Valencia, 2009.
- Minehan, Philip B. *Civil War and World War in Europe: Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece, 1936–1949*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Moa, Pio. "Guerra civil, franquismo, democracia." In *La República y la Guerra Civil: setenta años después*, edited by Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luis E. Togados. Madrid: Editorial ACTAS, 2008.
- Molina Aparicio, Fernando. *La tierra del martirio español: el País Vasco y España en el siglo del nacionalismo*. Madrid: CEPC, 2005.
- Molinero, Carme. *La Captación de las masas: política social y propaganda en el régimen franquista*. Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2008.
- and Père Ysás. *Productores disciplinados y minorías subversivas. Clase obrera y conflictividad laboral en la España franquista*. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1998.
- and Père Ysás, eds. *Construint la ciutat democràtica: el moviment veïnal durant el tardofranquisme i la transició*. Barcelona, Icaria, 2010.
- Montero García, Feliciano. "La Iglesia dividida. Tensiones intraeclesiales en el segundo franquismo." In *De la cruzada al desenganche: la Iglesia española entre el franquismo y la transición*, edited by Manuel Ortiz Heras and Damián A. González. Madrid: Sílex, 2011.
- "Del movimiento católico a la Acción Católica. Continuidad y cambio, 1900–1930." In *La secularización conflictiva. España (1898–1931)*, edited by Julio de la Cueva and Feliciano Montero García. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2007.
- Moradiellos, Enrique. *El refugio de Europa: las dimensiones internacionales de la guerra civil española*. Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 2001.
- *La España de Franco, 1939–75*. Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 2000.

- “La intervención extranjera en la guerra civil: un ejercicio de crítica historiográfica.” In *La Guerra de España (1936–1939)*, edited by Enrique Moradilleros. Barcelona: RBA Libros, 2012.
- Moral, Felix. *Veinticinco años después: la memoria del franquismo y de la Transición a la democracia en los españoles*. Madrid: CIS, 2001.
- Morales Muñoz, Manuel. “Cultura política y sociabilidad en la democracia republicana.” In *España 1868–1874: nuevos enfoques sobre el Sexenio democrático*, edited by Rafael Serrano García. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, Consejería de Educación y Cultura, 2002.
- Morcillo, Aurora. *True Catholic Womanhood: Gender Ideology in Franco’s Spain*. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000.
- Moreno Luzón, Javier. *Alfonso XIII: un político en el trono*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003.
- “El fin de la melancholia.” In *Construir España: nacionalismo español y procesos de nacionalización*, edited by Javier Moreno. Madrid: CEPC, 2007.
- *Modernizing the Nation: Spain during the Reign of Alfonso XIII, 1902–1931*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- “Political clientelism, elites and *caciquismo* in restoration Spain (1875–1923).” *European History Quarterly* 37 (2007): 417–441.
- Moreno, Luis. “The Spanish development of southern European welfare.” In *Survival of the European Welfare State*, edited by Stein Kuhnle. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Morente Valero, Francisco. “La enseñanza durante el franquismo.” In *La vida cotidiana durant el franquisme, 1939–1975*, edited by Francesc Bonamusa and Francisco Morente. Gener, Spain: Ajuntament di Barbara del Valles, 2004.
- Muro, Diego. “The Basque experience of the transition to democracy.” In *Politics and Memory of Democratic Transition: The Spanish Model*, edited by Gregorio Alonso and Diego Muro. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Nadal, Jordi. *El fracaso de la revolución industrial en España, 1814–1913*. Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1984.
- “Introducción.” In *Atlas de la industrialización de España, 1750–2000*, edited by Jordi Nadal. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA, 2003.
- and J. M. Benaül. “Dos excepciones: los éxitos de Cataluña y el País Vasco.” In *Atlas de la industrialización de España*.
- and Jaime Benavente, Josep M Benaül i Berenguer and Carles Sudrià i Triay. *Història econòmica de la Catalunya contemporània: s. XIX, s. XX/3 Indústria, transports i finances*. Barcelona: Enciclopèdia Catalana, 1991.
- Nash, Mary. *Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War*. Denver, CO: Arden Press, 1995.
- “Pronatalism and motherhood in Franco’s Spain.” In *Maternity and Gender Policies: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States, 1880s–1950s*, edited by Gisela Bock and Pat Thorne. London: Routledge, 1991.
- Novales, A. Gil. *Las Sociedades Patrióticas (1820–1823): Las libertades de expresión y de reunión en el origen de los partidos políticos*. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos 1975.
- Núñez Seixas, Xosé Manuel. *Los nacionalismos en la España contemporánea (siglos XIX y XX)*. Barcelona: Ediciones Hipótesis, 1999.
- “Provincia, Región y Nación en la España contemporánea: una re-interpretación global en perspectiva comparativa.” In *Provincia y nación: los territorios del liberalismo*, edited by Carlos Forcadell and María Cruz Romeo Mateo. Zaragoza: Instituto Fernando el Católico, 2006.
- O’Brien, Patrick, Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Jorge Miguel Viana Pedreira. *The Costs and Benefits of European Imperialism from the Conquest of Ceuta, 1415, to the Treaty of Lusaka, 1974*. Special issue of *Revista de Historia Económica*. (VXVI(1) 1998.

- Ofer, Inbal. *Señoritas in Blue: The Making of a Female Political Elite in Franco's Spain*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009.
- Ortiz, David. *Paper Liberals. Press and Politics in Restoration Spain*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000.
- Ortiz Heras, Manuel. "Nuevos y viejos discursos de la Transición: la Nostalgia del Consenso." *Historia Contemporánea* 44 (2011): 337–367.
- Osterhammel, Jurgen. *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.
- Ostolaza Esnal, Maitane. "La nación española en el País Vasco, 1857–1931: el papel de la Escuelas." In *El país vasco y España: identidades, nacionalismos y estado: siglos XIX–XX*, edited by Luis Castells, Arturo Cajal and Fernando Molina. Bilbao: Universidad de País Vasco, 2007.
- Pack, Sasha. *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe's Peaceful Invasion of Franco's Spain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Pagés i Blanch, Pelai, ed. *La transició democrática als Països Catalans: Historia I memoria*. Valencia: PUV, 2005.
- Pan-Montojo, Juan. "Asociacionismo agrario, administración y corporativismo en la dictadura de Primo de Rivera, 1923–1930." *Historia Social* 43 (2002): 15–30.
- "El proceso económico." In *La búsqueda de la democracia: España 1960–2010, Vol 5 of América Latina en la historiografía contemporánea*, directed by Jordi Canal. Madrid: Penguin-Random House/MAPFRE, 2015.
- "Introducción. 98 o fin de siglo?" In *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo*, edited by Pan-Montojo. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1998.
- "Los liberalismos y la agricultura española en el siglo XIX." In *Estado y periferias en la España del Siglo XIX: nuevos enfoques*, edited by Santiago Calatayud, Jesús Millán and María Cruz Romeo. Valencia: PUV, 2009.
- "Reconstructing communities and uniting 'classes': Agrarian movements and *agrarismo* in Spain, 1882–1917." In *Communities in European History: Representations, Jurisdictions, Conflicts*, edited by Pan-Montojo and Frederik Pederson. Pisa: Edizioni Plus, 2007.
- Paquette, Gabriel. *Enlightenment, Governance and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759–1808*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- "The dissolution of the Spanish monarchy." *The Historical Journal* 52 (2009): 175–212.
- Paxton, Robert and Julie Hessler. *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 4th edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.
- *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York: Vintage Books, 2005.
- Payne, Stanley. *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995.
- *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
- "La política." In *Franquismo: el juicio de la historia*, edited by José Luís García Delgado. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2000.
- "Political violence during the Second Spanish Republic." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (1990): 269–288.
- "The army in the Transition." In *Spain in the 1980s: The Democratic Transition and a New International Role*, edited by Robert Clark and Michael Haltzel. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987.
- *The Franco Regime, 1936–1975*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.
- and Jesús Palacios. *Franco: A Personal and Political Biography*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014.
- Père Fullana and Maitane Ostolaza. "Escuela católica y modernización: las nuevas congregaciones religiosas en España (1900–1930)." In *La secularización conflictiva: España (1898–1931)*, edited by Julio de la Cueva and Feliciano Montero. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2007.

- Pérez Díaz, Victor. *The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Pérez Ledesma, Manuel. "La sociedad española, la guerra y la derrota." In *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo*, edited by Juan Pan-Montojo. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1998.
- ed. *De súbditos a ciudadanos: una historia de la ciudadanía en España*. Madrid: CEPC, 2007.
- "Viejos y nuevos movimientos en la Transición." *La Transición, treinta años después*, edited by Carme Molinero. Barcelona, Península, 2006.
- Pérez Samper, María de los Angeles. "La alimentación cotidiana en la España del siglo XVIII." In *La vida cotidiana en la España del siglo XVIII*, edited by Manuel-Reyes García Hurtado. Madrid: Silex, 2009.
- Peyrou, Florencia. "Demócratas y Republicanos: la movilización por la ciudadanía universal." In *De súbditos a ciudadanos: una historia de la ciudadanía en España*, edited by Manuel Pérez Ledesma. Madrid: CEPC, 2007.
- "The Role of Spain and the Spanish in the Creation of Europe's Transnational Democratic Political Culture, 1840–70." *Social History* 40(4), 2015.
- *Tribunos del pueblo; demócratas y republicanos durante el reino de Isabel II*. Madrid: CEPS, 2008.
- Piqueras Arenas, José. "La cuestión cubana de la Revolución Gloriosa a la Restauración." In *España 1868–1874: nuevos enfoques sobre el sexenio democrático*, edited by Rafael Serrano García. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 2002.
- Pitt-Rivers, Julian Alfred. *The People of the Sierra*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- Pla Brugat, Dolores, ed. *Pan, Trabajo y Hogar: el exilio republicano español en América Latina*. Mexico, D. F.: DGE Ediciones, 2007.
- Pommeranz, Kenneth. *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Portillo Valdés, José María. *Revolución de nación: orígenes de la cultura constitucional en España, 1780–1812*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000.
- Powell, Charles. *Juan Carlos of Spain: Self-Made Monarch*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. *De imperio a nación: crecimiento y atraso económico en España (1780–1930)*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988.
- *El progreso económico de España, 1850–2000*. Madrid: Fundación BBVA, 2003.
- Preston, Paul. "Bajo el signo de las derechas: las reformas paralizadas." In *En el combate por la historia: la República, la Guerra Civil, el franquismo*, edited by Ángel Viñas. Barcelona: Pasado & Presente, 2012.
- "Esperanzas e ilusiones en un nuevo régimen: la República reformista." In *En el combate*.
- *Franco: A Biography*. London: Harper Collins, 1993.
- , ed. *Revolution and War in Spain, 1931–1939*. London: Routledge, 1984
- *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth Century Spain*. New York: Norton, 2012.
- and Ann L. Mackenzie, eds. *Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–39*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996.
- Pro, Juan. "El proceso económico." In *España 1830–1880: La construcción nacional*, edited by Isabel Burdiel. Madrid: Fundación MAPFRE, 2012.
- "Caciquismo y manipulación electoral en la España de la Restauración, 1890–1907." In *En torno al 98: España en el transito del siglo XX*, Volume I, edited by Rafael Sánchez Montero. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2000.
- Pujol, Josep, Manuel González de Molina, Lourenzo Fernández Prieto, Domingo Gallego and Ramon Garrabou. *El pozo de todos los males: sobre el atraso en la agricultura española contemporánea*. Barcelona: Critica, 2001.
- Quiroga, Alejandro. *Making Spaniards: Primo de Rivera and the Nationalization of the Masses, 1923–1930*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007.

- “Nation and reaction: Spanish conservative nationalism and the Restoration crisis.” In *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913–1923*, edited by Francisco Romero Salvadó and Angel Smith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Quirosa-Cheyrouze Muñoz, Rafael, ed. *Historia de la Transición en España: los inicios del proceso democratizador*. Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2007.
- “La Transición a la democracia: una perspectiva histórica.” In *Historia de la Transición en España*.
- Radcliff, Pamela. “El debate sobre el género en la Constitución de 1978: orígenes y consecuencias del nuevo consenso sobre la igualdad.” *Ayer* 88 (2012): 195–225.
- *From Mobilization to Civil War: The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish City of Gijón, 1900–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- *Making Democratic Citizens in Spain: Civil Society and the Popular Origins of the Transition, 1960–1978*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- “The culture of empowerment in Gijón, 1936–37.” In *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*, edited by Chris Ealham and Michael Richards. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- “The emerging challenge of mass politics.” In *Spanish History since 1808*, edited by José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- “The political Left in the interwar period.” In *The Oxford Handbook on Europe 1900–1945*, edited by Nicholas Doumanis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- “The Transition: A global model?” In *Is Spain Different? A Comparative Look at the 19th and 20th Centuries*, edited by Nigel Townson. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2015.
- “Women’s politics: Consumer riots in twentieth-century Spain.” In *Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain*, edited by Victoria Enders and Pamela Radcliff. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Radosh, Ronald, Mary R. Habeck and Grigory Sevostianov, eds. *Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.
- Ràfols Esteve, Joan. “L’Habitatge en el període franquista.” In *La vida quotidiana durant el franquisme, 1939–1975*, edited by Francesc Bonamusa and Francisco Morente. Gener, Spain: Ajuntament di Barbara del Valles, 2004.
- Raguer, Hilari. *Gunpowder and Incense: The Catholic Church and the Spanish Civil War*. London: Routledge, 2012.
- Ranzato, Gabrielle. “The Republican Left and the defence of democracy, 1934–1936.” In *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931–36)*, edited by Manuel Álvarez and Fernando del Rey. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- Rees, Timothy. “Battleground of the revolutionaries: The Republic and Civil War in Spain, 1931–1939.” In *Reinterpreting Revolution in 20th Century Europe*, edited by Moira Donald and Timothy Rees. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001.
- “The highpoint of Comintern influence? The Communist Party and the Civil War in Spain.” In *International Communism and the Communist International, 1919–1943*, edited by Timothy Rees and Andrew Thorpe. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998.
- “The political mobilization of landowners in the province of Badajoz, 1931–1933.” In *Elites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain: Essays in Honor of Sir Raymond Carr*, edited by Frances Lannon and Paul Preston. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Reher, David S. *Perspectives on the Family in Spain: Past and Present*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- Reig, Ramiro. “El republicanismo popular.” *Ayer* 39 (2000): 83–102.
- Rhodes, Martin. “Southern European welfare states: Identity, problems and prospects for reform.” In *Southern European Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform*, edited by Martin Rhodes. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
- Richards, Michael. *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

- *After the Civil War: Making Memory and Re-Making Spain since 1936*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Richmond, Kathleen. *Women and Spanish Fascism: The Women's Section of the Falange, 1934–1959*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Ringrose, David. *Spain, Europe and the Spanish Miracle, 1700–1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Rodrigo, Javier. "1936: Guerra de exterminio, genocidio, exclusión." *Historia y Política* 10 (2003): 249–258.
- *Los campos de concentración franquistas, entre la historia y la memoria*. Madrid: Siete Mares, 2003.
- Rodriguez, Jaime E. *We Are Now the True Spaniards: Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808–1824*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.
- Romero Salvadó, Francisco and Angel Smith, eds. *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913–1923*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- "Spain's revolutionary crisis of 1917: A reckless gamble." In *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism*.
- *The Foundations of Civil War: Revolution, Social Conflict and Reaction in Liberal Spain, 1916–23*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Royo, Sebastian. *From Social Democracy to Neoliberalism: The Consequences of Party Hegemony in Spain, 1982–1996*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- Rubio Pobes, Coro. "Que fue del 'oasis foral'? Sobre el estallido de la Segunda Guerra Carlista en el País Vasco." *Ayer* 38 (2000): 65–89.
- Rueda Hernanz, Germán. "Demografía y sociedad, 1797–1877." In *Historia contemporánea de España*, edited by Javier Paredes. Barcelona: Ariel, 2004.
- *España 1790–1900: sociedad y condiciones económicas*. Madrid: Ediciones Istmo, 2006.
- "Tres cambios sociales, causas profundas (entre otras muchas) de la evolución española entre 1931 y 1939." In *La República y la Guerra Civil: setenta años después*, edited by Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luís E. Togores. Madrid: Editorial ACTAS, 2006.
- Ruíz Bautista, Eduardo. *Tiempo de la censura: la represión editorial durante el franquismo*. Gijón, Spain: Ediciones Trea, 2008.
- Ruíz, Julius. "A Spanish genocide? Reflections on the Francoist repression after the Spanish Civil War." *Contemporary European History* 14 (2005): 171–191.
- *Franco's Justice: Repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
- "Old wine in new bottles: The historiography of repression in Spain during and after the Spanish Civil War." In *The Spanish Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War*, edited by Manuel Álvarez Tardío and Fernando del Rey. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- *The Red Terror and the Spanish Civil War: Revolutionary Violence in Madrid*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- "'Work and don't lose hope': Republican forced labour camps during the Spanish Civil War." *Contemporary European History* 18 (2009): 419–441.
- Sánchez, Juan Luís. *Las 10 mareas del cambio*. Barcelona: Roca Editorial, 2013.
- Sánchez Cuenca, Ignacio and Paloma Aguilar. "Violencia política y movilización social en la transición española." In *Violencia y transiciones políticas a finales del siglo XX*, edited by Sophie Baby, Olivier Compagnon and Eduardo González Calleja. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2009.
- Sánchez Mantero, Rafael, ed. *En torno al "98": España en el tránsito del siglo XIX y XX: Actas del IV Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea*. Huelva: Asociación de Historia Contemporánea. Congreso, 1998.

- Sánchez Marroyo, Fernando, "Demografía y sociedad (1875–1939)." In *Historia contemporánea de España (1808–1939)*, edited by Javier Paredes. Barcelona: Editorial SA, 1996.
- Santirso Rodríguez, Manuel. *Progreso y Libertad: España en la Europa Liberal (1830–1870)*. Barcelona: Ariel, 2008.
- Sanz Hoya, Julián. "La patria en los estadios: fútbol, nación y franquismo." In *Nación y nacionalización: una perspectiva Europea comparada*, edited by Ferrán Archilés Cardona, Marta García Carrión and Ismael Saz. Valencia: PUV, 2013.
- Sanz Rozalén, Vicent, ed. *En el nombre del oficio: el trabajador especializado: corporativismo, adaptación y protesta*. Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2005.
- Sartorius, Nicolas and Alberto Sabio. *El final de la dictadura: la conquista de la democracia en Espana*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2007.
- Saz, Ismael. *España contra España: los nacionalismos franquistas*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003.
- "Mucho más que crisis políticas: el agotamiento de dos proyectos entretendados." *Ayer* 68 (2007): 137–163.
- "Régimen autoritaria o dictadura fascista?" In *Fascismo y franquismo*. Valencia: PUV, 2004.
- Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher. *Slavery, Freedom and Abolition in Latin America and the Atlantic World*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2011.
- "La España Ultramarina: Colonialism and nation-building in 19th-century Spain." *European History Quarterly* 34 (2004): 191–214.
- *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the 19th Century*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006.
- *Empire and Anti-Slavery: Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1833–1874*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999.
- Segarra Estarellés, Josep-Ramon. "El reverso de la nación. Provincialismo e independencia durante la revolución liberal." In *Construir España: nacionalismo español y procesos de nacionalización*, edited by Javier Moreno. Madrid: CEPC, 2007.
- *La desamortización española en el siglo XIX*. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1973.
- Seidman, Michael. *Republic of Egos: A Social History of the Spanish Civil War*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002.
- *The Victorious Counter-Revolution: The Nationalist Effort in the Spanish Civil War*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011.
- *Workers Against Work: Labor in Paris and Barcelona during the Popular Fronts*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
- Shubert, Adrian. *A Social History of Modern Spain*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.
- "Baldomero Espartero: del idolo al olvido." In *Liberales, agitadores y conspiradores: biografías heterodoxas del siglo XIX*, edited by Isabel Burdiel and Manuel Perez Ledesma. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2000.
- *Death and Money in the Afternoon: A Social History of the Spanish Bullfight*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- "Spanish historians and English-speaking scholarship." *Social History* 29 (2004): 358–363.
- *The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias, 1860–1934*. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
- Sierra, Maria and María Antonia Peña. "Clientelismo y poder político en Andalucía: una reflexión sobre los límites del liberalismo durante la Restauración." In *Elecciones y cultura política en España y Italia, 1890–1923*, edited by Rosa Ana Gutiérrez, Rafael Zurita and Renato Camurri. Valencia: PUV, 2003.
- "La vida política." In *España: La construcción nacional. Tomo 2 1830–1880*, edited by Isabel Burdiel. Madrid: MAPFRE, 2012.
- Simpson, James. *Spanish Agriculture: The Long Siesta, 1765–1965*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

- Smith, Angel. *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction: Catalan Labour and the Crisis of the Spanish State, 1898–1922*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007.
- “The Lliga, the Catalan right and the making of the Primo dictatorship, 1916–1923.” In *The Agony of Spanish Liberalism: From Revolution to Dictatorship, 1913–1923*, edited by Francisco Romero Salvadó and Angel Smith. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Snyder, Timothy. *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*. New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2015.
- Sola, Àngels. “Una burguesía plural.” In *La gran transformació 1790–1860*, edited by Josep Maria Fradera. Barcelona: Fundació Enciclopedia Catalana, 1997.
- Stapell, Hamilton. *Remaking Madrid: Culture, Politics and Identity after Franco*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Stepan, Alfred and Juan Linz, eds. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Storm, Eric. “The birth of regionalism and the crisis of reason: France, Germany and Spain.” In *Region and State in 19th Century Europe: Nation-Building, Regional Identities and Separatism*, edited by Joost Augsteijn and Eric Storm. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012.
- Subirats, Joan, ed. *Existe sociedad civil en España? Responsabilidades colectivas y valores públicos*. Madrid: Fundación Encuentro, 1999.
- Tarrow, Sidney. *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Thomson, Guy. *The Birth of Modern Politics in Spain: Democracy, Association and Revolution, 1854–1875*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
- Thomson, J. K. J. *A Distinctive Industrialization: Cotton in Barcelona, 1728–1832*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Threlfall, Monica. “Towards parity representation in party politics.” In *Gendering Spanish Democracy*.
- Threlfall, Monica, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente, eds. *Gendering Spanish Democracy*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Todd, David. “A French imperial meridian, 1814–1870.” *Past and Present* 210 (2011): 155–186.
- Tone, John. *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.
- *War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–98*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006.
- Tortella, Gabriel and Clara Eugenia Núñez. *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea: Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2011.
- Townson, Nigel. “A Third Way? Centrist politics under the Republic.” In *The Spanish Second Republic Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931–36)*, edited by Manuel Alvarez and Fernando del Rey. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- , ed. *Is Spain Different? A Comparative Look at the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2015.
- *The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic, 1931–36*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000.
- “Qué hubiera pasado si los partidos republicanos se hubieran presentado unidos en las elecciones de 1933?” In *Historia virtual de España*, edited by Nigel Townson. Madrid: Taurus, 2004.
- “Spain is different? The Franco dictatorship.” In *Is Spain Different?*
- , ed. *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–1975*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Treglown, Jeremy. *Franco’s Crypt: Spanish Culture and Memory since 1936*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2013.
- Tusell, Javier. “La crisis del liberalismo oligárquico en España. Una revolución mancada a la española.” In *La transición a la política de masas: V Seminario Histórico Hispano-Británico*, edited by Ismael Saz Campos and Edward Acton. Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2001.
- *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.

- and Genoveva Queipo de Llano. "The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, 1923–1931." In *Spanish History Since 1808*, edited by José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert. London: Edward Arnold, 2000.
- Ucelay da Cal, Enric. "Entre el ejemplo italiano y el irlandés: la escisión generalizada de los nacionalismos hispanos 1919–1922." *Ayer* 63 (2006): 75–118.
- Ugarte Tellería, Javier. *La nueva Covadonga insurgente: orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación en 1936 en Navarra y el País Vasco*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1998.
- Uría, Jorge. *La España Liberal (1868–1917): cultura y vida cotidiana*. Barcelona: Editorial Síntesis, 2008.
- Valdelvira, Gregorio. *La oposición estudiantil al franquismo*. Madrid: Editorial Síntesis, 2006.
- Van Young, Eric. *The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810–1821*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Varela Ortega, José. *El poder de la influencia: geografía del caciquismo en España (1875–1923)*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2001.
- Vázquez, Jesús María. *Así viven y mueren: problemas religiosos de un sector de Madrid*. Madrid: Ope, 1958.
- Veiga Alonso, Xosé R. "Entre centro y periferia. La dinámica política lucense en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX." In *En torno al 98: España en el tránsito del siglo XX*, Volume I, edited by Rafael Sánchez Montero. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva, 2000.
- Vicente, Marta V. *Clothing the Spanish Empire: Families and the Calico Trade in the Early Modern Atlantic World*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Villa García, Roberto. *La República en las urnas*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2011.
- Villares, Ramón. "Fabricantes y Trabajadores." In *Restauración y Dictadura*, by Javier Moreno and Ramón Villares. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009.
- "Política y mundo rural en la España contemporánea." In *La politisation des campagnes au XIX siècle: France, Italie, Espagne, Portugal*, edited by Maurice Agulhon. Rome: Ecole Française, 2000.
- and Javier Moreno. *Restauración y dictadura*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2009.
- Viñas, Angel, ed. *En el combate por la historia: la República, la Guerra Civil, el Franquismo*. Barcelona: Pasado y Presente, 2012.
- *Franco, Hitler y el estallido de la guerra civil*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2001.
- Vincent, Mary. *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1900–1936*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
- "The politicization of Catholic women in Salamanca, 1931–1936." In *Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain*, edited by Frances Lannon and Paul Preston. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- "Religious violence in the Spanish Civil War." In *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939*, edited by Chris Ealham and Michael Richards. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Vinyes, Ricard, Montse Armengow and Ricard Balís. *Los niños perdidos del franquismo*. Barcelona: Plaza Janés, 2002.
- Wittrock, Bjorn. "Modernity: One, none or many? European origins and modernity as a global condition." *Daedalus* 129 (2000): 31–60.
- Yáñez Gallardo, César. *La emigración española a América (siglos XIX y XX)*. Colombres: Archivo de Indios, 1992.
- Young, Clinton. *Music Theatre and Popular Nationalism in Spain, 1890–1930*. New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 2015.
- Ysás, Père. *Disidencia y Subversión: la lucha del régimen franquista por su supervivencia, 1960–1975*. Barcelona: Crítica, 2004.
- "La Transición española: luces y sombras." *Ayer* 79 (2010): 31–57.
- "Una sociedad pasiva? Actitudes, activismo y conflictividad social en el franquismo tardío." *Ayer* 68 (2007): 31–57.
- Zurita Aldeguer, Rafael. *Notables, políticos y clientes. La política conservadora en Alicante, 1875–1898*. Alicante: Instituto de Cultura Juan Gil-Alber 1996.

# INDEX

- abolitionism 53, 133  
absolutist rule, period of 18, 45  
    *See also* Ferdinand VII, Old Regime Spain  
Acción Católica de la Mujer: Catholic Action  
    for Women (ACM) 138, 168, 243, 247  
Acción Católica: Catholic Action (AC) 92,  
    137, 216, 217, 220, 243  
    *See also* ACM, JOC, HOAC, ACNP  
Acción Católica Nacional de  
    Propagandistas (ACNP) National  
    Association of Catholic  
    Propagandists 137, 148  
*Acción Republicana* (AR) 154  
afrancesados 22  
africanista 153, 189, 213  
    *See also* Army, Spanish, Army of Africa  
Age of Revolutions 3  
Agriculture/agrarian sector  
    *See also* desamortization and latifundia,  
    landless laborers, peasants and rural  
    society  
    19<sup>th</sup> century Europe 6  
    “agrarian individualism” 11  
    agrarian reforms 164, 168–9, 218  
    agrarian syndicates 80, 137  
    agricultural sector, Spain  
    1800 8–10  
    1830–1930 113–15  
    Franco regime 235–6  
    Democratic monarchy, 268  
    leaseholders, position of 11  
agricultural and rural workers 6, 54, 59, 96,  
    162, 181  
*Ajuria–Enea* Pact 1988 271  
Alas, Leopoldo 129  
Alcalá-Zamora, Niceto  
    Catholic Republicanism 166, 168  
    and conservative republicanism 155, 162  
    dissolution of the Cortes 175, 177, 180  
    resignation as Prime Minister 166  
    as President 173, 175  
Alcoy 59, 64, 193  
Alfonso XII, King 72, 73, 74  
    *see also* Crown  
Alfonso XIII, King 73, 81, 86, 89, 91, 103, 156  
    *see also* Crown  
aliadófilos 90  
Alianza Popular (AP later Partido  
    Popular) 257, 259, 260, 264, 271  
*Alianza Republicana* (AR) 154, 162  
Alicante 11, 119, 193, 207  
Almacenes Madrid–Paris 127  
“Alphonsine” monarchists (*Renovación*  
    *Española*), 178, 201, 210, 212  
Álvarez, Melquíades 97  
Amadeo I, King 54, 61, 62, 72  
    abdication 63  
Amnesty Law (October 15, 1977) 259  
anarchism 59, 60, 46, 51, 59–60, 65, 73, 79,  
    84, 87, 89, 97, 101  
    *See also* anarcho-syndicalists, CNT  
    Barcelona 101  
    and cultural workers associations 134, 135  
anarcho-syndicalists (CNT) 86, 88, 92, 95,  
    96–7, 98, 138, 149  
    *See also* CNT, working class movements  
Civil War 188, 192, 194, 195, 198  
Primo de Rivera regime 155  
Second Republic 169, 172  
Andalucía 9, 10  
    1869 62  
    1978 Constitution 262  
agriculture 119, 129  
Carlist wars 39  
Civil War 205  
culture 140

- economy and poverty 237, 269  
 elites 125  
 industrialization 118  
 insurrections and unrest 62, 101  
 interwar period 97  
 iron working and metallurgy 116  
 literacy 119  
 networks 54  
 politicization 97, 102, 171, 188, 262  
 regional economy 12  
 workers in 54, 59
- Annual, battle of 102  
*see also* Morocco
- anti-clericalism 138, 161, 187, 268  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 37, 64, 86, 135  
 20<sup>th</sup> century 88, 92  
 anarcho-syndicalist 88  
 legislation 64  
 policies 86, 88  
 politics 92, 93  
 and Republicanism 84, 86, 93, 97, 98,  
 135, 166  
 urban culture and 130  
 Second Republic 166, 167  
 Vatican and 123  
 workers 138, 139
- anti-clerical violence 88, 168, 174, 176–7  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 19, 34, 40  
 Civil War 187, 195, 197
- Aragón 119, 129, 177, 193, 235  
 Civil War 204, 205  
 regional councils in 198
- Arana, Sabino 93
- Arboleya, Canon Maximiliano 138
- Argentina 113, 219
- Armada, General Alfonso 263
- army, Spanish 76, 150, 154, 167  
*see also* pronunciamientos  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 43  
 Franco period 212  
 Transition 270  
 and outbreak of Spanish Civil War 187,  
 188–9  
 1981 coup, 263  
 military reform 1980s 270
- Army of Africa 189, 190, 194, 201, 213  
*see also* africanista  
 transfer to Spain 187–8, 203
- Arrese, José Luis 221
- Asociacion de Amas de Casa (AAC)  
 Housewife Association 253
- Assault Guards 170
- Asociacion de Cabezas de Familia (ACF)/  
 Association of Heads of Household  
 (ACF) 226, 253
- Asociacion de Mujeres Anti-Fascistas  
 (AMA/Anti-fascist Women's  
 Association) 192
- Asociaciones de Vecinos (Neighborhood  
 Associations (AAVV) 245, 253, 258
- Association for the Recuperation of Historical  
 Memory (ARMH, 2000) 276
- Association for Women's Education 57
- associations and organizations,  
 voluntary 96, 131, 137, 231, 243
- Asturias 12, 15, 20, 174, 175, 176–7, 198  
 October 1934 rebellion, 174–5, 176–7, 213  
 1962 miners strike 245  
 agriculture 113  
 Civil War 205  
 economy 107, 237  
 industry 11, 96, 118  
 metallurgy 116, 117, 205  
 mining 129, 205, 174  
 politics 94, 176  
 unions 193, 253
- ateneo 57, 132, 134, 136  
 ateneo libertario 135  
*Ateneo Obrero* 134
- Atocha terrorist bombing, March 11, 2004 278
- Austria, 1933 coup 159–60, 176
- autarky, economic policy of, 218, 222, 224, 225
- authoritarian movements 163, 222
- authoritarianism, Franco regime 211–12
- automobile industry 236
- autonomous governments, state of (1979),  
 262, 270–72, 275, 279  
 devolution, 270–2, 275  
 historical nationalities, 262  
 symmetrical federalism 271
- Autonomous Women's Society,  
 Barcelona 134
- Avant garde culture 133
- Axis powers 215–16
- Ayacucho, battle of 38
- Azaña, Manuel 154, 162, 164, 166, 167, 169,  
 173, 180, 195–6  
*See also* Biennium, First, Second Republic  
 resignation 206
- Badajoz 114, 118, 170, 181, 188, 190
- Bakunin, Mikhail 53, 59

- Barbados 30
- Barcelona 10, 76, 112, 149, 178, 253, 255, 270  
*see also* Catalonia  
 architecture, school of 131  
 Catalan Lliga assembly 100  
 child workers 128  
 citizen militia units 57  
 Civil War 188, 191, 192, 193, 204, 206  
 class divisions 130, 132, 138, 198  
 CNT and UGT 97, 101  
 collectivization of industry Civil War 193  
 cultural development 132, 133, 134  
 culture and entertainment in 132, 171, 273  
 Declaration of Barcelona 1998 277  
 defeat of turno parties 80  
 education 152  
 general strike 88  
 industrialists 16  
 as insurrectionary city 40, 101  
 literacy in 119  
 population growth 112, 118, 235  
 Radical partie 79  
 Republicans 62, 93, 97  
 "revolutionary urbanist project" 192  
*Somatén* 147  
 state of exception 76, 103  
 textile industry 116, 128  
 "Tragic week" 88, 89  
 workers 16, 53, 134, 135  
 Workers' First International 59
- Barrio, Diego Martínez 173
- Basque General Council 259  
*see also* Basque nationalists
- Basque nationalists 86, 120, 155, 248, 259, 260, 278, 279  
*see also* ETA and Herri Batasuna, Sabino Arana  
 as alternative nationalism 141, 218  
 Basque nationality 102, 261, 277  
 Basque sovereignty 260, 277  
 nationalism 69, 92–4, 120, 141, 149, 228, 258, 261  
 Primo de Rivera period 155
- Basque Nationalist Party (PNV/CNV, Partido Nacional Vasco) 93–4, 166  
 and Catholic vote 93, 196, 198  
 Civil War 196  
 and democratic nationalism 271  
 under Primo dictatorship 149, 155  
 in Transition and democratic monarchy 257, 262, 277
- Basque provinces and Basque Country 11, 256, 275  
*see also* Herri Batasuna, ETA, PNV, Basque nationalists  
 1978 Constitution and 259, 260–1  
 autonomous government democratic monarchy, 255, 259, 262  
*Ajuria–Enea* Pact 271  
 autonomy statute (Second Republic) 101, 149, 180, 196  
 during Transition 255, 261  
 Basques and Spanishness 94, 140  
 Carlists 54, 62, 72  
 and Catalan identity, 98  
 censorship under Franco regime 244  
 Civil War 198, 202, 205  
 Basque cultural organizations 253  
 economic growth 237  
 economy 107, 108  
 elections 72, 257  
 Franco regime and 218, 228  
*fueros* 55, 56, 110, 140  
 industry, 118, 119, 205, 237  
 iron industry 12, 118  
 labor-organizing traditions 253  
 literacy 119  
 metallurgy 116, 117  
 migration 235  
 mining 129  
 nobility status 17  
 October 1982 election 264  
 Pact of Estella 277  
*Plan Ibarretxe* 277  
 Primo de Rivera period 149  
 primogeniture 11  
 regional redistribution of income 269  
 repression of the Basque language and culture under Franco regime 228, 244  
 Basques 140, 239, 248
- Belgium 4, 6, 29, 31, 39, 70, 86, 109, 139  
 economic development 28, 108  
 empire, 31
- Berenguer, General Damaso 155
- Biennium (Bienio), First (Second Republic) 161, 162, 163, 164–72, 174, 179, 180  
*see also* Manuel Azana, Second Republic  
 anti-Catholicism 167–8  
 secularizing measures 166–7  
 what went wrong 169–70

- Biennium (Bienio), Second (Second Republic) 162, 164, 173–80, 181–2  
*see also* CEDA, Second Republic, black biennium  
 October revolution 1933 176  
 What went wrong 175–8
- Bilbao 12
- birth control, illegal 247
- birth rate 109, 111–12, 237, 247, 268–9
- “black biennium” 175  
*see also* Biennium Second
- black market Franco regime 233, 235
- Blanc, Louis 53
- Blasquistas 97
- “Blue Division” 216
- Bolshevik revolution 102
- Bourbon monarchie 3, 218  
 abdication 20, 24  
 reforms, 18<sup>th</sup> century 7, 38, 276  
 restoration 65, 72
- bourgeoisie/bourgeois 4, 123, 124, 268  
 anarchist and socialist view 135, 155, 160, 171  
 “bourgeois” democracy 95, 170, 172  
 and Barcelona 131, 192  
 bourgeois revolution 4, 37, 28, 122, 124  
 and hybrid elite 32, 125, 126  
 lifestyle and culture 124–6, 129, 132–3, 135, 142  
 Lliga and 100  
 PSOE and 96, 177
- Brazil 31, 113
- Britain (United Kingdom) 29, 36, 68  
 19<sup>th</sup> century industrial development 108, 115–16  
 19<sup>th</sup> century political development 28, 29, 39, 70, 73, 83, 94  
 1832 Reform Bill 39  
 1867 Reform Bill 44  
 20<sup>th</sup> century political development 160  
 abolition of slavery 30  
 agriculture 113  
 Boer War 185  
 as decentralized state 68  
 democratic transition 44, 46  
 empire and colonies 4, 6, 7, 30, 31, 89  
 EU referendum (2016) 279  
 and Franco regime 206, 219  
 global economy 8, 117, 170  
 industrialization 4  
 Munich Conference 206  
 Napoleonic Wars 20, 23, 26  
 population growth 6, 14  
 post-World War I 83  
 religion 25, 34  
 and Spanish Civil War 184, 196, 199
- bullfights 135, 141
- “bunker” (intransigent Francoist officials) 254
- Buñuel, Luis 133
- Burgos 115
- Caballero, Francisco Largo 180, 196
- Cáceres 114
- caciques* 75  
 attacks upon 100  
 and Catholic mobilization 93  
 power of 77–8
- caciquismo 71, 74–5, 87, 148  
*see also* Restoration
- Cádiz, economic decline 7  
 revocation of colonial trade monopoly 12
- calico industry 6, 10
- Callejo Plan 152
- Calvo Sotelo, José 178, 182
- Campomanes, Count of 17
- Canada 76
- Canalejas, José 87–90
- Cánovas de Castillo, Antonio 65, 71–2, 73, 74, 76, 81, 276  
*See also* Conservative party
- Cantabria 113, 119, 137
- cantonalist movement (Sexenio) 64
- Captain General 43
- Caribbean 30
- Carlists 33–4, 71, 178  
*see also* Carlos, Carlist Wars  
 Civil War 189, 201  
 Franco regime 212
- Carlist War, First 33–4, 35, 39–40
- Carlist War, Second 53, 54–5, 60, 62, 63
- Carlos (brother of Ferdinand VII) 33, 39
- Carrero Blanco, Admiral Luís 216, 221, 222, 223, 225  
 assassination of 228
- Carrillo, Santiago 257
- Cartagena 10
- Casado, Segismundo 206
- Casas, Ramon 133
- Casas Viejas, “massacre” at 171
- casinos 132, 135  
*casinos obreros* 57
- Castelar, Emilio 58, 65

- Castilblanco, December 1931 171
- Castile 22, 269
- Church ownership of land 13
  - Civil War 188, 204
  - economy 7, 10, 11, 111
  - landless laborers in 129
  - literacy 119
  - migration 235
- Castilian (language) 152
- version of Spanish national identity 244
- “Castilianization” process 139, 141, 142, 244
- Catalonia 10, 174, 175, 238, 256, 275, 277
- see also* Generalitat, Mancomunidad, Catalan language, Catalan nationalism
  - 1988 *Ajuria–Enea* Pact 271
  - agrarian reform law 178
  - agriculture 11, 26, 54
  - and censorship Franco dictatorship 244
  - autonomous government, reinstatement of (1977) 259
  - autonomy statute (Second Republic) 155, 166, 175, 180
  - Boy Scouts 246
  - calico industry in 6, 59
  - Carlists 54
  - Catalanization of education 271
  - Church 149
  - Civil War 192, 193, 194, 198, 200, 205, 206
  - CNT militia in 193
  - decentralization 255
  - “dual patriotism” 140
  - economy 98–9, 107, 108, 125, 237
  - exports 12
  - female employment 127
  - health and wealth indicators in 119
  - industrialization 10–11, 116, 118, 236
  - migration 235, 269
  - October 1934 rebellion, 174
  - politics 162, 171, 174, 191, 257, 262, 264, 277–8
  - standards of living 237
  - textile industry 8, 110, 116
  - textile unions 59
  - trade unions 58
- Catalan Communist party (PSUC) 257
- Catalan (language) 98, 140, 149, 152, 154, 218, 246
- Catalan language on TV 246
  - Renaixença 140
  - repression of Catalan language Franco regime 218, 246
- Catalan nationalism and nationalists 94, 155, 259–60, 261, 279
- See also* Lliga, Esquerra, Estat Catala, Convergència i Unió
  - 19<sup>th</sup> century 69, 85, 86, 98–9
  - 20<sup>th</sup> century 91, 102, 120, 141, 149, 161, 166, 174, 178, 192, 198, 248
  - elections and coalition 257, 258, 272, 277
- Catholic Action (*see also* Accion Catolica) 92
- Catholic League (1901) 93
- Catholic political parties, post-World War I 83–4
- Catholic Student Youth (JEC) 220
- Catholic Workers’ Youth (JOC) 220, 253
- see also* Juventud de Obreras Catolicas
- Catholic Workers’ Circles 138
- Catholicism 123, 275
- see also* anti-clericalism, JOC, HOAC, Catholic Workers’ Circles, Catholic Church, National Catholicism, religion
  - Austria 159, 176
  - Catalonia 246
  - Catholic associations 54, 62, 79–80, 87, 88, 89, 103
  - see also* Accion Catolica, JOC, HOAC, JEC
  - Catholic mobilization in the Restoration 79–80, 92–3, 92–3, 94, 95
  - Catholic press 162 (*See also* ACNP 137)
  - “Catholic public sphere” 23
  - Catholic Republicanism 166, 168
  - Catholic unity 241–2
  - Catholicism and the state 35, 84, 86, 87, 88, 90, 182, 223
  - Catholics and the PSOE 264, 269
  - charities 131
  - Civil War 19, 190, 195, 196, 201, 201, 202, 208
  - and Constitutions 23–4, 41, 73, 260
  - corporatism 150, 159
  - cults of Marianism and the Eucharist 137
  - cultural universe 19–20, 139
  - and education 88, 137, 141, 152, 165, 174, 181, 216, 242, 243, 273
  - European “culture wars” 123
  - and fascism 159
  - “feminization” of religious practice 139
  - and Franco 201, 211, 215, 217, 218–21, 228, 244, 248, 249
  - Integralists 72
  - liberals and 23, 29, 34, 37, 88
  - and labor relations 150
  - in Napoleonic war 22, 23–4

- “national Catholic” ideology and  
     identity 147, 151, 157, 190, 201, 202,  
     212, 217, 218–21, 228  
 and Spanish nationalism 94, 100, 142, 152  
 opposition to the liberal State 54, 61  
 Opus Dei 222  
 political parties and politics 84, 86, 92,  
     93, 95, 137–8, 159–60  
 Transition and democratic  
     monarchy 268, 276  
 post-World War II 218  
 and Primo de Rivera 148, 157  
 Second Republic 159, 161, 162, 163,  
     166–8172, 173, 178, 183  
 and women 134, 138, 139, 165, 168, 247  
 unions 151, 154, 215  
 worker organizations 225
- Catholic Church in Spain 11, 19–20, 123,  
     136–9, 141, 88, 136–9, 231, 239, 241, 243  
*See also* Catholicism, National  
     Catholicism, priests  
 and anti-Francoist activism 253  
 and Carlism 34  
 and education 216  
 and Franco 211  
 republicans and 166  
 early 19<sup>th</sup> century 19–20, 29, 34–5  
 1960s and 1970s 247–8  
 20<sup>th</sup> cultural development 88, 135  
 anti-Francoist activism 247–8, 253  
 Civil War 190, 202  
 Liberal governments and 42–3  
 and the liberal state 34–5, 93  
 in Franco regime 211, 212, 216, 218, 228,  
     239, 241–2  
 as land owner 13, 17  
 new congregations 136  
 religious culture 19–20, 138–9  
 Republican violence against 194–5  
 and community life 19–20  
 and re-Christianization, 138–9, 241–2  
 schools 137, 141, 151–2, 165, 181, 242, 245  
 and Trienio 37  
 and the Vatican 123, 228
- Caudillo *see* Franco  
 censorship 46, 149, 215, 226, 238, 244, 246, 247  
 Cerdà I Sunyer, Ildefons 130  
 Chambers of Commerce 220  
 Charles IV, King 20  
 cholera outbreaks 14  
 Christian democracy 160, 164  
 Christian Democrats 264, 267
- círculos* 57  
 citizen militia units 57  
 “citizen movement” Transition 245, 262  
*Ciudadanos* (Citizens) 279  
 Civil Code 134, 165, 241, 247  
 “civil death” 240  
 Civil Directory (Primo Regime) 149–50  
 Civil Guard 76, 170, 171, 190  
     creation of 41, 43  
 civil society, 231  
     *see also* public sphere  
     Democratic monarchy 265, 276, 278, 279–80  
     Transition 251, 253–4, 255–6, 258
- Civil War, 1930s, 31, 107, 184ff, 232  
     *see also* Army of Africa, Nationalists,  
     Republicans  
     causes of 182–3  
     comparative 185–87  
     Church and 19, 190, 195, 196, 201, 201,  
     202, 208  
     deaths in 184, 185–6  
     foreign aid 196–7  
     interpretations of 184–5  
     Loyalists 184, 188, 191  
     military stages of 204–7  
     moral narratives 184  
     Nationalists 201–4  
     political violence 186, 190, 194–5, 202–3  
     repression 217, 233, 239, 240, 244  
     Rebel territory 188, 188–90, 191–4  
     Republican territory 191–200  
     significance of 207–8  
     start of 187–9
- Clavé, Josep Anselm 135  
 CNT (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajo*) 92,  
     95, 96–7, 164, 177, 193–4  
     *see also* anarco-syndicalists, working class  
     movements  
     appeal of 96  
     Cenetistas 175, 191, 199  
     Civil War 191–2, 196, 198  
     and democratic assembly movement  
     (1917), 100  
     and FAI, 155, 169  
     growth 101  
     powerbase 97  
     Primo de Rivera regime 149, 151, 155  
     and revolution 102  
     Second Republic 162, 169, 171–2, 177, 180  
     and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)  
     101, 102, 171–2, 174, 177, 191, 192  
 coal industry, Spanish 12

- Cold War 209, 210, 219
- colonialism/colonial empire,  
*see also* under Cuba, Morocco, the  
 Philippines, and Puerto Rico  
 European 7, 30, 43, 67, 69  
 1812 Constitution 26  
 1837 Constitution 43  
 American empire 4, 7, 23, 24, 30, 36, 38,  
 46, 69, 111  
 and Civil War 189  
 colonial market 111, 116, 141  
 colonial policy 89, 103  
 colonial public sphere 53  
 colonial reform 55, 61, 62, 63, 64  
 colonial relationship 38, 74  
 colonial wars 71, 81, 91, 141, 153, 185  
 economies 30–1  
 Franco 213  
 imperial administration 30  
 “imperial meridian” 30  
 industry 125  
 loss of colonies 7, 69, 81–2  
 “scramble for Africa” 69  
 slavery 25, 30  
 “micro-militarist” projects 43–4  
 negative impact on Spain 89, 98  
 “special laws”, 43
- colonial subjects 29, 30, 25, 43  
*see also* Cuba, Morocco, the Philippines,  
 and Puerto Rico  
 abolitionist movement 53  
 colonial revolts 4, 36  
 anti-colonial mobilization and  
 nationalism 51, 84  
 self-government claims 160
- Communism 84, 200, 211, 266  
*see also* POUM, PSUC, Communist party PCE  
 Spain 97, 149, 160, 199, 202, 207, 228  
 Bolshevik revolution 102  
 Third International 102, 197
- Communist Party (Partido Comunista de  
 España: PCE) 149, 198, 245, 253, 259,  
 263, 272  
 1978 Constitution 259  
 Civil War 184, 191, 192, 194, 195, 197,  
 198, 199, 208  
 and CCOO 272  
 Franco era 225, 244, 253  
 Second Republic 163, 164, 180  
 in Transition and Democracy 253, 254,  
 257, 258, 263, 264, 267, 272
- Companys, President Luís 174, 175,  
 178, 180
- Concordat of 1753 17  
 of 1851 34, 42–3, 136
- Condor Legion 203
- Confederación Católica de Padres de  
 Familia y Padres 243
- Confederación Española de Derechas  
 Autónomas (CEDA) 164, 168  
*See also* Jose Maria Gil-Robles  
 1933 election and Second Biennium  
 government 162–3, 168, 173, 174,  
 176, 178, 179–80  
 political agenda 175,  
 Franco period 212  
 Franco and 213  
 youth organization (JAP) 178–9
- Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores  
*see* CNT
- Congress of Vienna 35
- Conservative Party, Spain 72, 81, 85, 86–7  
*see also* Antonio Canovas del Castillo and  
 Antonio Maura
- Conservative Union, Cuba 74
- Constitutions  
 and first Carlist War 40  
 liberal revolutions and 35  
 Charter/Estatuto Real 1834 40  
 Constitution of 1837 40, 41, 43, 56  
 Constitution of 1845 41  
 Constitution of 1854 44  
 Constitution of 1869 54, 61, 64, 73  
 Constitution of 1873 64  
 Constitution of 1876 73, 74  
 Constitution of 1931 173, 258
- Constitution of 1812 22–5  
*see also* Cortes of Cadiz  
 “Constitutional culture” 23–6  
 revocation of 1812 Constitution 35  
 Trienio and 1812 Constitution 36, 37
- Constitution of 1978 250, 258, 259–61, 280  
 monarchy 260  
 place of religion and the Church 260  
 referendum 259  
 support for 264  
 territorial organization of the state 260–1  
 women 260
- Constitutional Commission of the  
 Cortes 259, 260
- Convergencia I Unio (CiU) 257, 272, 275  
*see also* Catalan nationalists

- corporatism 150
- Cortes 3  
*see also* Constitutions  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 22, 26, 29, 33, 34, 54, 56, 61  
 1869 Constitution 61, 64  
 1869 Cortes elections 61, 62, 72  
 1873 Cortes 63, 65  
 1876 Constitution 74  
 1893 election 79  
 1907 election 99, 20<sup>th</sup> century 100  
 1978 Coalition 259, 264  
 21<sup>st</sup> century 277  
 and American colonies 38  
 and female suffrage 134  
 Franco period 216, 219, 220, 223  
 monarch and 41, 54  
 Restoration 91  
 Second Republic 156, 173, 174, 175, 180  
 Transition 256, 258  
 and Trienio Liberal 36–7
- Cortes of Cádiz 22–5  
*see also* Constitution of 1812  
 1813 parliament 26  
 and Constitution of 1812 25, 26  
 clerical presence 24  
 reforms of 23
- Costa, Joaquin 75, 80, 148
- crispación* 274, 277, 278
- Crown, Spanish 11, 32, 147, 148  
*see also* Alfonso XII, Alfonso XIII, Felipe VI,  
 Ferdinand VII, Isabel II, Juan Carlos I,  
 monarchy  
 and Church 17  
 and Constitutions 41, 42  
 and governments 19<sup>th</sup> century 43, 46  
 imperial nature of 24  
 and land distribution 12, 13  
 and liberals 29, 32–3  
 and nobility 17  
 and the Turno 74
- Cuba 30, 63, 71, 74, 76, 81, 185  
*see also* colonial rule and colonial subjects  
 abolitionist movement, 53, 69  
 Colonial War 1868–78 71  
 Constitution of 1876 and 74  
 creole elites 52, 55, 81  
 creole planter elites and slavery 25, 30  
 1895 insurrection 69, 81  
 elections 74, 77  
 elites 25, 52, 77, 81  
 emigration to 113  
 “Manifesto of the Revolutionary Junta of  
 the Island of Cuba” 55  
 military campaigns in 69, 121  
 separatists 51, 53, 62, 55, 57, 62, 63, 64, 74, 81  
 “special laws” 43  
 Spanish loss of 111, 185  
 Spanish rule 30, 31, 43, 111  
 Trade with Spain 7, 10, 11, 111, 116  
 United States and 81
- culture 121–4, 238–9  
 Avant garde 133  
 bourgeois/middle class 129–133  
 Catholic/religious 19–20, 136–9, 241–2,  
 247–8  
 popular 134–6, 244  
 regionalist 139–141  
 rural 18–19  
 urban, 129–135  
 working class 134–5  
 youth 245, 247
- Czechoslovakia 206
- Dalí, Salvador 133
- de Llano, General Gonzalo Quiépo 188
- Declaration of Barcelona 277
- del Bosch, Jaime Milans 263
- democracy  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 40, 44, 46, 51, 57, 63, 65, 72, 81  
 20<sup>th</sup> century 83, 84, 85, 86  
 anti-democracy attitudes 19<sup>th</sup> century 32  
 consolidation democratic  
 monarchy 261–65  
 declining international support in  
 interwar 160  
 defining in Transition 254–5  
 democratic monarchy 266–70  
 interwar period 95, 103, 159, 160, 182  
 and republicanism 157  
 Restoration 68, 70  
 revolutionary democracy Civil War 99
- Democratic assembly movement 100
- Democratic Convergence of Catalonia  
 (CiU) 257, 274, 277
- Democratic Convergence Platform 254
- Democratic Coordination 255
- Democratic Party (Spain 19<sup>th</sup> Century) 44,  
 45, 56, 121  
*see also* Garrido, Fernando  
 demo-republican movement 56–7, 58, 60  
*La Discusión* (newspaper) 56
- democratization theorists 161

- demography  
 trends 1800 14–15  
 trends 1830–1930 111–13  
 demographic transition 1950s 232, 237  
 trends late 20<sup>th</sup> century 268–9
- Denmark 29
- “dependency theory” 118
- Depression (1930s) 160, 170
- Derecha Liberal Republicana (DLR) 162
- desamortization 114, 115, 117, 129, 139  
 “dead hands” (*manos muertas*, mortmain) 42  
*see also* Madoz, Mendizabal
- devolution 271–2
- Día de la Raza* 152
- Diada* (Catalonia national holiday) 256
- Diputación* 43
- Directorate, Primo Regime 147
- divorce 269  
 legislation on 263
- Domenèch I Montaner, Lluís 130, 131
- Dutch Indonesia 30
- economy 107, 120–21  
 comparative 1800 4–7  
 comparative 1830–1930 108–10  
 consumer growth Franco regime 236–7  
 economic growth 1800 7–10  
 economic growth 1830–1930 110–11  
 “economic miracle” 1960s 234–7  
 regional networks 11–14  
 unevenness of growth 10–14, 118–19, 237–8  
 “years of hunger” 232–234
- education 137, 152, 245  
*see also* schools  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 37, 43, 47, 57, 58, 135  
 20<sup>th</sup> century 142, 150, 152, 154, 165, 166, 170, 174, 192, 203, 228, 245, 248, 252, 276  
 access to 269  
 Church 137, 141, 166, 167, 239, 241–2  
 and citizenship 57, 98, 165  
 devolution of 272  
 elite 132  
 failings of 245, 269  
 female 57, 126, 131, 134, 138, 152, 240–1, 247  
 Franco period 240–1  
 improvements in 269  
 middle class 161, 242  
 military 152–3, 270  
 of priests 17, 19  
 popular education 98  
 primary 43, 112, 128, 137, 165, 245, 270  
 public education 109, 120, 122, 123, 166, 242, 245  
 religious 260  
 secondary 137, 152, 241–2, 245, 269  
 strikes 253  
 underfunding of 242  
 uneducated masses 59, 70, 153  
 universities 126, 134, 137, 152, 155, 215, 221, 226, 242, 243, 245, 247, 248, 253, 269  
 working class 135, 242
- Education Law, 1970 249
- El Debate* 138, 148
- elections  
 and anarcho-syndicalists 96  
 1980 autonomous government 262  
 1835 40  
 in 19<sup>th</sup> century liberal regimes 44, 46  
 1868 election 46  
 1931 election 156, 162  
 1933 election 162–3  
 1936 election 163  
 1977 elections 256–8  
 1979 general election 263, 261  
 1979 municipal election 265  
 1982 election 262, 264–5  
 1986 election 272  
 1996 election 265, 274  
 2015–16 elections  
 electoral reform law of 1907 86–7  
 electoral manipulation Restoration 70  
 and female candidates 273  
 Franco regime 220  
 in rural society in the Restoration 70, 76, 79, 87
- Elío, General 26
- elites, 17, 18, 125–6  
*see also* bourgeoisie, landowners  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 20, 22, 25, 31, 32, 84, 90–1, 100, 145  
 20<sup>th</sup> century 138  
 boundaries 33, 126, 133, 134  
 business 55  
 “channels of elite domination” 80  
 code of conduct 131  
 colonial 31  
 and Church 139  
 and citizens 70  
 conservative 154, 156  
 Creole 7, 25, 52, 55, 81  
 Cuba 25, 52

- culture 244, 253  
 economic 153, 154  
 education 137  
 and elections 70-1  
 elite associations 132  
 elite sociability 130, 131  
 elite women 132  
 evolution of 125, 126, 127  
 Franco period 224, 228, 230, 240, 247  
 hybrid elite 124-5, 128, 129  
 intellectual 134  
 interwar 211, 239  
 intra-elite conflict 81  
 liberal 32, 36, 37, 44, 51, 66, 182  
 and the masses 83, 84  
 metropolitan 7, 38  
 opposition and 60-1  
 and Peninsular War 21  
 philanthropic organizations 131-2  
 policies 83, 89  
 political 77, 99, 139, 148, 252, 279, 281  
 Primo de Rivera and 146, 147  
 Progressive 41, 45  
 provincial and local 47, 71, 77, 78, 253  
 regional 141  
 religious 136  
 Restoration elites 77, 81, 82, 85, 87, 97, 98  
 rural 114, 115, 156  
 social power 126  
 traditional 216, 239  
 and Transition 251, 254, 255, 256, 258, 277  
 urban 19, 138, 156  
 and urban differentiation 130, 131
- Els Quatre Gats'* 133, 140  
 Emigration 113  
*emphyteusis*, Catalonia, 19<sup>th</sup> century 11  
*encasillado* 77  
*ensanches* (extensions), urban, development of 130  
 "entrismo" 253  
 "España Ultramarina" 31  
 Espartero, General Baldomero 39, 42, 44, 45  
 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ESC)  
   Civil War 191, 192, 196, 198  
   formation 156  
   Second Republic 162, 166, 177, 178,  
   transition and democratic monarchy  
   259, 277
- Estat Català* (EC) 155  
 Estates General 4  
 Estatuto Real 1834 Moderate Charter 40
- ETA "Basque Country and Freedom" 228,  
   254, 256, 258, 261, 273, 278, 279  
   *see also* Basque nationalists  
   cession of armed activity 278  
 Euro-communism 255, 267
- Europe  
   1848 revolutions 44, 51  
   19<sup>th</sup> century state formation 68  
   19<sup>th</sup> century struggle between absolutist  
     and liberal forces 28, 35, 39  
   19<sup>th</sup> century transformations 69, 70-1  
   20<sup>th</sup> century 84  
   anarchism in 59-60  
   attitudes towards monarchy 32  
   colonial empires 19<sup>th</sup> century 30  
   "crisis of meaning" 84  
   democracy 210, 266  
   emigration from 113  
   "European civil war" 84, 87, 103, 186  
   Fascism 214  
   "great divergence" Europe and rest of  
     world 6  
   industrialisation 108-10  
   interwar period 84, 85  
   interwar right wing 146  
   population increase 108-9  
   post-World War II transition 266-7  
   religious "culture wars" 123  
   rise of liberalism 29  
   rise of the central state 52  
   social evolution 124  
   transition 1930-1970 230-1  
   welfare state 231
- European Community (EC 1958-1993)  
   Spain joins 266  
 European Economic Community (EEC,  
   1957) 219, 223, 224, 252
- Euzkadi 93  
 exaltados 40  
   *see also* Trienio
- Extremadura 9, 12, 59, 97, 114, 118, 119, 125,  
   188, 221, 226, 237, 269  
   and "years of hunger" 233
- Falange Española y de las JONS (Movimiento)*  
   218, 223, 226, 229, 239, 244  
   *See also* fascism, Franco Regime
- Associations 243-4  
 bureaucracy 229  
 and Church 216  
 Civil War 189, 201

- Falange Española y de las JONS*  
(*Movimiento*) (*cont'd*)  
Congress of 1953 220  
constraints on 216, 220  
dissolution 227  
as fascist party 214, 215  
formation of 178, 214  
and Franco 201, 211, 212–13, 220, 221  
membership of 243  
minimizing of impact 221, 223, 226  
reach of 215, 239, 246  
Second Republic 178, 181, 182  
Suárez and 256  
Suñer and 214, 216  
family economy 128  
Fanelli, Giuseppe 53, 59  
fascism, 158, 163, 210–11, 214–5  
*see also Falange Española y de las Jons*,  
Franco Regime  
post World War I Europe 84, 150, 151, 163  
language of exclusion 215  
“fascistization,” 201  
FC Barcelona 135  
*Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (FAI) 155, 169, 198  
*see also* CNT  
*Federación Nacional da Trabajadores de la*  
*Tierra* (FNNTT) 181  
Federal Republican Party 45, 57, 61, 62, 121  
Felipe VI, King (2014-) 279  
Female Lyceum Club 134  
Female Section of the *Falange* (SF) *see*  
Sección Femenina  
feminist movement 134, 138, 166, 168, 267  
Ferdinand VII, King 3, 20, 22, 25, 26, 32  
*see also* absolutist rule  
and American colonies 35, 36  
restoration 35  
return to absolutism 38–9  
and Trienio 36–7  
death of 33, 39  
Fernández, Giménez 178  
fertility rates 237  
*Fiesta del Árbol* 152  
“fifth column” counter-revolutionaries 194  
First International 51, 53, 58–60  
First Republic 63–4, 73  
*Fomento de las Artes* 57, 59  
football (soccer) clubs 135–6  
Fraga, Manuel 226, 257  
France 23, 27, 28, 55, 68, 83, 90, 185, 196,  
219, 234, 267, 275  
1830 Revolution 29, 39  
agrarian economy 6  
anarchism 60  
ancien regime 9, 17, 20  
Basques 277  
Catholics in 29, 34  
culture 123  
economy 6, 109, 111, 273  
and Franco’s regime 206, 219  
French empire 4, 6, 7, 31, 89, 149, 215, 223  
French Revolution 3, 4, 9, 22, 28, 29, 32,  
35, 43, 84, 166  
imperialism 7  
liberalism 23, 29, 70  
literacy 112  
Munich Conference 206  
Napoleonic interventions abroad 3, 7, 20–1  
Napoleonic interventions in Spain 22,  
23–4, 26, 35, 36, 37–8, 39  
nationalization processes 68  
peasant rebellion in the Vendée 21  
phylloxera epidemic 115  
political challenge 26  
politicization of the masses 79  
politics 160, 196, 267  
recognition of 206  
reconstitution 35–6  
religion 136, 137  
secularization 88  
and slavery 30  
Spanish Civil War refugees in 234, 236  
suffrage 165  
syndicalist strategy 96  
Third Republic 44, 46, 51, 65, 70, 97, 166  
war with Britain 21  
Franco, General Francisco 84, 153, 157  
*See also* Nationalists, Franco Regime  
1937–1945 214–18  
and Axis 215–16, 217  
anti-Communism 219  
anti-Semitism 216  
appointment as “*Generalissimo*” 201  
Catholic Church 217, 228  
centrality to dictatorship 213–14  
and construction of new state 201  
decline and death 227–9  
and divine authority 201–2  
international connections 213  
on end of Civil War 203  
and Juan Carlos 224  
and the monarchy 217

- and monarchists 220  
and start of Spanish Civil War 188, 190  
"Franco's peace," narrative of 253  
Franco regime  
    "authoritarian development" 231–2  
    comparative 210–12  
    debates about nature of regime  
    decline of Franco regime 238–9  
    dismantling of Francoist regime 256  
    extra-judicial killings 202  
    and fascism, 210–11, 214–5  
    and "fascistization," 201  
    periodization 212–29  
    prison labor system 217–18  
    repression, 217, 233, 239, 240, 244  
    "victory coalition" 227  
Francoism 229, 249, 261, 274, 275, 276  
    *see also* national Catholicism  
    Francoist elites 254  
    "sociological Francoism" 222, 238, 256  
Fuero de los Españoles "Bill of Rights," 1945 220  
Fuero de Trabajo Labor Charter, 1938 201, 215  
*fueros* 33, 34, 55, 56, 93, 140  
Fusionist Liberal Party (Liberal Party) *see*  
    Liberal Party  
Futurism, Dadaism and Surrealism 133
- Galdós, Benito Pérez 129, 140  
Galicia 11, 12, 80, 141, 180, 269  
    autonomy 180, 277  
    civil war 204  
    "historical" nationality 261, 262  
    literacy 119  
    migration 113, 235  
    poverty 237  
    regional identity 141, 261, 262  
Garrido, Fernando 57, 58  
gender  
    *see also* men, women  
    1978 Constitution and 260  
    anarchists and gender roles 192  
    changing gender roles 134, 192–3, 247  
    Church and 138, 139, 242  
    and concept of "angel in the house" 131  
    elite families and 126, 131  
    family and gender 240–1  
    gender equality 239, 269  
    gender identity 134, 136  
    gender inequality 269  
    gender roles 57, 124, 131, 138, 142  
    gender wage gap 248  
    in Franco period 231, 238  
    legislation 240  
    and leisure time 135  
General Health Act 1986 273  
General Military Academy (AGM) 153  
*Generalitat* 166, 174, 178, 191, 192, 196, 198, 277  
    *see also* Catalonia, Catalan nationalism  
*germanófilo* groups 90, 91, 94  
Germany 28, 29, 68, 116, 267  
    fascism 159, 189  
    and Franco 201  
    *Gleichhaltung* campaign 215  
    and Nationalists 203  
    nationalization processes 68  
    Nazis 160, 163, 197, 212  
    post-World War I 83  
    and Spanish Civil War 196  
    Spartacists vs. the Social Democrats (SPD) 95, 96  
    workers' and soldiers' councils post  
        World War I 92  
        World War II 214, 219  
Gibraltar 216  
Gijón 12, 16, 117, 172, 204  
    politics and unions in 97, 172, 191  
Gil Robles, José María 162, 174, 175, 176, 179  
    *see also* CEDA  
Godoy, Manuel de 20  
González, Felipe 264, 274  
Goya, Francisco 20  
Greece 29, 186, 187, 199, 210, 267  
    joins European Community 266  
Grimau, Julián 225  
"Group at the Service of the Republic" 155  
*Guardia de Franco*, 243  
Guernica, bombing of 203, 205  
Gutiérrez Mellado, Manuel 256
- Hermanidad Obrera de Acción Católica (HOAC) 220, 253  
*Herri Batasuna*: (Union of the Basque People, HB) 261, 277  
    *See also* Basque Nationalists, ETA  
hidalgos 15, 17  
    ban on labor 17  
hierarchies, European 6–7  
    19<sup>th</sup> century 17–19, 55, 124, 130  
    20<sup>th</sup> century 226, 234, 238, 239, 244, 270, 274, 277  
    Church 34, 61, 93, 201, 222, 248

- hierarchies, European (*cont'd*)  
 racial 21, 53, 57, 77  
 rural 125, 244  
 Spanish 12, 123, 124, 133, 136  
 urban 125, 130–2, 133, 136  
 working class 127, 138
- Hitler, Adolf 84, 197  
 and Franco 213, 216  
 “Holy Alliance” 36
- honor-based society, Spain 241
- Ibañez, Vicente Blasco 97, 154
- Iglesias, Pablo 57
- illiteracy 18, 242, 151, 242  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 63, 165  
 combating 151–2  
 decline in 112, 119  
 distribution of 119, 128, 161  
 and working classes 127, 165
- immigration 269
- imperialism, European 7  
 see *also* colonial empires
- India 30
- Indignados/15–M 278
- industrial work force 236, 268
- industrialization/industrialism  
 see *also* mining  
 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe 4, 6, 14, 109  
 19<sup>th</sup> century Spain 8, 16–17, 107, 108,  
 115–18, 120  
 20<sup>th</sup> century Spain 118, 127, 249, 252  
 In Asturias, 12, 96, 118, 116, 117, 205, 129,  
 205, 174  
 In Catalonia, 6, 10, 59, 116, 118, 236  
 In Basque Country 93, 116–19, 205, 237, 12
- industrialists 18, 32, 111, 133, 146
- industrial workers 59, 102, 116, 117,  
 123, 267
- industrial geography, changing  
 in 19<sup>th</sup>–20<sup>th</sup> centuries 10
- Metallurgy 110, 116–17, 205, 236
- textile industry, 8, 11, 12, 58, 110, 236  
 and uneven development 118–19
- United Kingdom 4
- industrious revolutions 6
- infant mortality 112, 119, 127, 232, 233, 237
- Inquisition, Spain 35, 37, 38
- Integralists 72
- intelligentsia 238
- International Brigades 197
- Iraq, Spanish presence in 275, 278
- Isabel II, Queen 32–3, 38–9, 42, 73
- see *also* Crown, Spanish  
 deposition of 44–5, 51, 54, 61  
 son Alfonso 72
- Italy 22, 28, 29, 70, 199, 267  
 dictatorship in 187  
 fascism in 92, 159, 189, 212  
 and Franco 201  
 and Nationalists 203  
 post-World War I 83  
 and Spanish Civil War 196  
 Syndicalists vs. the Socialist Party 95
- Izquierda Republicana (IR) Left Republican  
 Party 180
- Izquierda Unida* (IU) 272
- Jamaica 30
- Japan 68
- Jesuit order, Spain 35, 54,  
 dissolution 166
- Joseph Bonaparte 20, 22
- Jovellanos, Gaspar Melchor de 17, 22
- Juan Carlos I, King 220, 223, 254, 255  
 abdication 279  
 and attempted coup of 1981 263–4
- Juan de Borbón (Don Juan) 216–17, 220
- juntas  
*Junta Central, Napoleonic War* 22–3, 24  
 juntas de defensa 100, 101, 103  
 juntas local 22  
 pattern of 61  
 juntismo 33
- “Jurisdiction Law” 1906 91
- Juventud Obrera Católica: Catholic Workers’  
 Youth Organization 220, 253
- Kent, Victoria 134, 165
- La Canadiense Strike, 1919 101–2
- La Voz de la Mujer* 134
- Labor Charter 1938 240
- laborers, landless, (*braceros*) 11, 13, 16, 64,  
 84, 96, 97, 128, 129, 252  
 see *also* latifundia, rural society  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 15–16, 114, 115, 119  
 20<sup>th</sup> century 161, 164, 169, 170, 180, 181
- agricultural 59, 109
- Civil War 202
- emigration 113
- female and child 88, 128
- Franco period 218, 231, 235
- impact of desamortization 128
- insurrections 56

- land redistribution, demands for 56  
*minifundia* area 129, 239  
 poverty 238  
 religion 139  
 rural exodus 235, 244, 253
- landowners  
*see also* latifundia, rural society  
 19<sup>th</sup> Century 15, 114, 115  
 Second Republic 168–9, 170, 173, 175, 178, 181  
 Franco regime 233, 239, 240
- latifundia 13, 114, 128, 139, 193, 239, 242  
*see also* landless laborers  
 end of 252  
 laborers and 233  
 and literacy 161  
 and unemployment 170  
 and “years of hunger” 233
- Law of Associations 1964 225  
 Law of Central Administration 201  
 Law of Congregations, May 1933 167  
 Law of *Ensanches* 1864 131  
 “Law of Historical Memory” 2007 276  
 “Law of succession” March 1947 220
- Left Republican Party (IR) 180
- Leo XIII, Pope 34
- León 115
- Lerroux, Alejandro 97, 162, 163, 173, 179  
*see also* Radical Party
- Liberal Autonomist Party. Cuba 74
- Liberal Party, Spain 72, 73, 81, 85–6, 87–90, 121  
*see also* Praxedes Sagasta, Jose Canalejas
- Liberal Union 42, 45, 60, 72
- Liberal–Conservative Party (Conservative Party) *see* Conservative Party
- Liberalism  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 29  
 elitist 29  
 persecution of Catholics 29  
 Spanish and French compared 23–4, 26–7  
 anti-liberals 34
- Liberation Anti-Terrorist Groups (GAL) 273
- liberation theology 253
- liceo 132  
*Liceo* Barcelona 273
- life expectancy 109, 111–12, 118–120, 269
- Limpias (Cantabria) 137, 139
- literacy 165  
 and economy 120  
 increasing 112  
 and regional growth 118, 128  
 spread of 135, 137, 151–2, 165  
 and urban settings 130
- Lliga Regionalista* 81, 92, 98–9, 100, 148, 149, 155, 193  
*see also* Catalan nationalists
- local government  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 32, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 45, 56, 62, 79  
 Democratic monarchy 262–3
- Loja, Granada 56
- Lorca, Federico García 133
- Lorenzo, Anselmo 57, 59
- Loyalists (Civil War) 184, 188, 191  
*see also* Republicans/Loyalists Civil War
- Macià, Francesc 155
- Madoz \* 42, 115
- Madrid 10, 53, 59, 64, 128, 138, 277  
 anti-clericalism 168  
 architecture 131  
 as administrative center 40, 43, 47, 55, 75, 78, 118, 236  
 Civil War 188, 190, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200, 204, 205, 206, 207  
 culture in 132, 133, 134, 140, 273, 277  
 economy 127, 236  
 elites 77, 125, 130, 132  
 Franco era 221, 235, 236, 256  
 industry 118, 127  
 journal publishing 130  
 labor 253  
 literacy and education 119, 128  
 Napoleon 21, 26  
 October 1934 rebellion, 178  
 politics 38, 40, 45, 57, 97, 96  
 popular culture 135  
 popular politics 278  
 population growth 76, 112, 118  
 regional income redistribution 269  
 religion in 241, 242  
 Republican victory in 196, 200  
 state factories 16  
 trade 10, 13, 14  
 unions 97  
 university students at 221  
 weaknesses of 200  
 women 134, 152
- Málaga 10, 11, 116, 117, 168, 198, 202, 204, 205, 233  
 Civil War 202  
*Mancomunidad* 149  
*See also* Catalan nationalism

- "Manifesto of the Persians" 26  
 Maria Cristina (wife of Alfonso XII) 73, 81  
 Maria Cristina (wife of Ferdinand VII) 39, 42  
     Regency of 32, 42  
 María de Castro, Carlos 131  
 Marina, Francisco Martínez 23  
 Marshall Plan 208, 219  
 Marx, Karl 53, 59  
     analysis of 28, 33  
 Marxism 4, 51–2, 58, 96, 122, 123, 158, 159, 248  
     PSOE abandonment of 264  
 Marxist-Leninist Communist party  
     (PCE-ml) 258  
 Maura, Antonio 86–7, 91, 94, 100, 148  
 Maura, Miguel 155, 162  
*Mauristas* 92, 93, 94–5, 148  
 "May events," Barcelona 198, 199  
 Mazzini, Giuseppe 53  
 Mediterranean Regional Network 10–11  
 Men  
     *see also* gender  
     associations 134, 135  
     Catholic 92  
     and Church 241, 248  
     citizenship 29  
     and etiquette 17  
     and honor-based society 241  
     masculine sociability 135  
     peasant 79  
     politics 168, 243  
     roles 15, 131  
     work 16, 126  
 Mendizábal 115  
*Mesta* (sheep grazing lobby, Spain) 9  
 Metallurgy 110, 116–17, 205, 236  
 middle classes 37, 39, 63, 95, 125, 127, 245  
     1970s 245  
     and collectivisation 193  
     and consumer society after 1960s 231,  
         236, 237, 238  
     education 152, 165, 242  
     and elites 129, 133, 136  
     nationalist 93, 94,  
     progressive 164, 180  
     Republican 97  
     Republican after Civil War 239  
     rural 128, 172, 239, 240, 257  
     Second Republic 179  
     urban 126, 139, 162, 169, 172, 231  
     women 134  
 military coup, February 1981 263, 270, 278  
     military, Spanish *see* Army, Army of  
         Africa and pronunciamientos  
 Mining 129, 174, 205  
     *See also* industrialism  
     miners' strike Asturias 1962 245  
     miners' strike Vizcaya 1910 89  
     Rio Tinto mine 117, 129, 135  
 minifundia 11, 129  
 Miró, Joan 133  
 Moderate Party (19<sup>th</sup> century) 31–2, 34, 40,  
     41–2, 44, 52, 53, 72  
     Charter/Estatuto Real 1834 40  
     Constitution of 1845 41  
 Mola, General Emilio 188  
 monarchy 3, 32, 39, 51, 61–3  
     *see also* Crown, Spanish  
     18<sup>th</sup> century 7  
     19<sup>th</sup> century 19, 23, 38, 58, 61, 73, 82  
     1978 Constitution and 260, 280  
     absolutist 24, 35, 38, 211  
     Bourbon 72  
     democratic (Sexenio) 57, 61–3,  
     democratizing under Restoration 88, 89,  
         98  
     democratic monarchy 264  
     and dictatorship 146, 155, 156, 157  
     and Franco period 222, 223  
     imperialist 21, 24  
     Isabelline 44, 51  
     liberal constitutional 44, 45, 65, 71, 85, 86,  
         155, 157, 255  
     Napoleonic 24  
     and national culture 139  
     reform 25  
     Savoy 55  
 Moncloa Pacts 259  
 Morocco 70, 102–3, 148  
     *see also* colonial empires  
     Battle of Annual 102  
     decolonization 223  
     Franco and 213, 223  
     military intervention 153  
     "pacification" of 149, 213  
     Spanish army revolt summer 1936 187  
     Spanish colonial policy 89, 91  
 mortality rates 112, 233, 237  
*Movimiento see* Falange Española y de las  
     JONS  
 Moyano Law 1857 112  
 Mujeres Libres ("Free Women") 192  
 Munich Conference 1938 197, 206

- Murcia 10
- Mussolini, Benito 84, 146, 188, 214  
and Franco 213
- Napoleonic period 7, 12, 14, 24, 29, 249  
*See also* Cortes of Cadiz  
blockade 12  
intervention in Spain 20–1, 24, 26  
end of 26, 28, 107, 109, 116  
Joseph Bonaparte, King 20, 24  
Napoleonic Wars 3  
Russian campaign 26  
“Spanish ulcer” 21  
as “total war” 20  
War and resistance 20–2
- Narvaez, General Ramon Maria 44, 45
- National Association of Spanish Women 134
- National Catholic Agrarian Confederation 137
- “National Catholicism” 151  
Civil War 190, 201, 202,  
Franco regime 212, 217, 218–21, 228  
Primo regime 147, 151, 157
- National Corporatist Organization 150
- National Defense Act (1984) 270
- National Defense Junta 214
- National Economic Council 153
- “National Front” (*Bloque Nacional*) 178
- National Syndicates 215
- nationalism 68, 93, 110, 123, 124  
*see also* Basque nationalists, Catalan  
Nationalism  
anti-colonial 84  
Catholic Spanish 84, 142, 151–3, 167  
Church and 241  
and corporatism 150  
Cuba 81  
dual patriotism” 140  
Germany 34  
“hyperactive” nationalism 84–5  
“peripheral” nationalism 69  
19<sup>th</sup> century Spanish 22, 43, 69, 84, 90, 92,  
94–5, 130, 140,  
20<sup>th</sup> century Spanish 147, 149, 151, 157, 178  
Franco period Spanish 212, 213, 218, 276  
within Spain 81, 84, 86, 87, 92, 100, 103, 142,  
153, 161, 174, 178, 248, 257, 259, 260
- nationalist movements  
colonial 7, 25  
post World War I 84
- Nationalists/Rebels (Civil War) 184ff  
*See also* Civil War  
and Army of Africa 187  
constitution of rebel forces 189–90  
constructing a “new state” 190, 201–3  
declaration as rightful Spanish  
government 217  
Falange and 189  
foreign aid 203–4  
Franco period 212  
Ideology 190  
international support for 184, 196, 197  
military strategy 204–5  
political violence, 189, 186, 202–3, 207  
post-war treatment of 240  
propaganda of 189  
revolutionary activity 192  
support for 193, 195, 196  
victory 184, 204, 205, 206, 208
- nationalization, process of 123  
in Primo regime 147, 150–1, 152–4, 156  
in Restoration 140–142
- Navarre 15, 21, 72, 139, 182  
Carlists 54, 62, 72, 182  
agriculture 138  
Civil War 187, 189, 204  
elections 72
- Navarro, Arias 254
- Nazi Soviet pact August 1939 197
- Negrín, Juan 198, 206, 207
- Neighborhood Associations (AAVV) 245,  
253, 258
- Netherlands 29, 31, 70
- nightclubs (*cafes cantantes*) 135
- Non-Intervention in Spain Agreement  
(August 1936) 196
- North Atlantic Regional Network 11–12
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO,  
1949) 219  
NATO referendum 272
- October 1934 rebellion, 174–5, 176–7, 213
- O'Donnell, General Leopold 45
- Olavide, Pablo de 17
- Old Regime, Spain 3, 4, 11, 16–20, 23, 27, 28ff
- Oliver, Joan García 172, 199
- Opus Dei 222
- “Organic Law of the State” 223, 227–8
- Organización Revolucionaria de  
Trabajadores (ORT)/ Revolutionary  
Organization of Workers) 258

- Organización Sindical Española (OSE)  
 Syndical Organization of Spain  
 215, 226
- Ortega y Gasset, Jose 155
- Orwell, George 191
- Pact of Estella 277
- Pact of San Sebastián 1930 166
- PAH (Platform for those Affected by  
 Mortgages) 279
- Palencia 115
- Pamplona 188, 189
- "Paracuellos massacre" 194
- Paris commune 51
- Partido Republicana Radical Socialista  
 (PRRS) 162, 173
- Partido Socialista de Obreros Españoles  
 (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party  
 PSOE) 73, 92  
*see also* Unión General de Trabajadores,  
 Socialism, Socialists
- Civil War 198  
 development 76, 95–6  
 formation 73
- PSOE governments 270–5, 275–7  
 1982 election 264
- Second Republic 162, 169, 171, 176, 177
- Transition and consolidation of democratic  
 monarchy 257, 258, 259, 261, 263–4
- turno period 92  
 and UGT 92, 95–6
- Pavia, General 65
- peasants 6, 15, 34, 84, 122, 161, 235  
*see also* Agriculture, rural society,  
 landowners
- and first Biennium 168
- Carlist 39, 54
- Catalonia 11
- central Spain 13
- Civil War 203
- CNT and 102
- and collectivizations 193
- and conscription 153
- France 9, 21, 22
- and markets 13
- mobilization 79–80
- northern provinces 11, 13, 15, 162
- peasant communities 79  
 and political fabric 80
- populist demands 37, 56
- riots 79
- Southern Spain 13
- structures of peasant society and  
 economy 15–16, 79
- transition to capitalism 235
- wealthy 115, 125
- Pemán, José María 151, 190
- Pemartin, Jose 151
- Peninsular War 21  
*see also* Napoleonic era
- Peru 38
- philanthropic organizations 131
- Philippines 30, 43, 69, 111
- Pi y Margall, Francisco 58, 65
- Picasso, Pablo 133, 203
- pistoleroismo 101
- Pius IX, Pope 54
- Pla y Deniel, Bishop 190, 202
- Plan de Ensanche* 131
- Plan Ibarretxe* 277
- Platajunta* 255, 256
- Podemos* (We can) 279
- Poland 187
- Popular Front 160, 162–4, 170, 173, 177,  
 186–7, 199  
*See also* Second Republic
- in Civil War 184, 187, 188, 190, 191–2,  
 194, 195–6, 197, 198–9
- February 1936 election 163
- European 160, 196
- Popular Front government  
 (Feb–July 1936) 180–182
- and women 192
- Popular Party (PP, previously AP) 264–5,  
 268, 271, 274, 275, 277, 279
- change of name 273, 274
- Portugal 20, 22, 28, 39, 55, 70, 184, 186, 267
- 1974–1975 transition 255
- demographic trends 112
- dictatorship in 187, 210
- empire 31, 223
- joins European Community 266
- migration 113  
 and Spanish Civil War 196
- Potsdam Conference 219
- POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación  
 Marxista) 196, 198
- press law 1966 246, 249
- priests 138  
*see also* Catholic Church  
 and Cortes of Cadiz 24
- decline in numbers 248
- uneven distribution 19
- worker priests/curas obreros 253

- Prieto, Indalecio 180
- Prim, General 60, 62
- Primo de Rivera, Miguel  
 1923 coup 91, 103, 145 ff  
 assessment of 156–7  
 and Church 154  
 and military 154  
 and Morocco 149  
 resignation 150, 154, 155
- Primo de Rivera regime 145–7  
 Civil Directory 149  
 as a hybrid authoritarian regime 145–47  
 labor relations 150–1  
 nationalization 151–3  
 authoritarian development 153–4
- Primo de Rivera, José Antonio 189
- print culture, spread of 130  
 nationalism 149
- prison labor system, Franco regime 217–18
- Progressive Party (19<sup>th</sup> Century) 31–2, 34,  
 40, 42, 44, 53, 56  
*see also* Baldomero Espartero  
 Constitution of 1837 40, 41, 43, 56  
 government of 1836 40–1  
 and Isabel II 44–5  
 radical wing 58  
 1854 Revolution 44–5
- pronunciamientos 32, 43  
*see also* Army, Spanish  
 1820 35  
 1868 60–1  
 and 1923 coup 147  
 1932 169, 173
- PSUC (Partit Socialista Unificat de  
 Catalunya: Communist party of  
 Catalonia) 196
- public sphere 122–2, 130, 142  
*see also* civil society  
 bourgeois 132–3  
 Catholic 24  
 early 19<sup>th</sup> century 18–19  
 Franco regime 242–3  
 diversification under Franco regime  
 244–6, 248, 253  
 nationalism 141  
 restoration, 79–80  
 and women 138
- Puerto Rico 30, 31, 43, 64, 69  
*see also* colonial empires, colonial subjects  
 abolitionist movement 53  
 Constitution of 1876 and 74  
 and Spain 111
- Puig I Cadalfach, Josep 130, 133
- Pujol, Jordi 246, 257  
*see also* CiU
- Quadruple Alliance 39
- Queipo de Llano, General 190
- racial hierarchy, concept of 31, 53, 57
- Radical Party  
*see also* Alejandro Lerroxx  
 formation 61, 81, 97  
 Popular Front 180  
 Second Republic 162, 163, 164, 173, 175,  
 176, 179
- Radical Socialist party (PRRS) 162, 173
- Real Madrid 135
- Reformist Party 97, 98
- Regenerationism 81, 91, 98, 148
- Regionalism 139–41  
 regional cultures 239
- Regulares 189, 203
- Reina Sofia* modern art museum 273
- religion 35, 123, 136  
*see also* Catholicism and Catholic Church  
 1812 Constitution 24  
 1978 Constitution 260  
 CEDA 162  
 Civil War 190, 195, 199  
 community identity 130, 139, 142  
 education 88, 241, 243, 247  
 Franco period 238, 247  
 freedom of religion 22, 52  
 and national identity 23, 25, 142  
 and “problem of Spain” 86  
 role of 23  
 Second Republic 167, 173  
 and secularization 122  
 and the state 52  
 late 20<sup>th</sup> century, religious identity 275
- Renaixença (Catalan) 140
- reparto 56, 102
- Republican Union (Unión Republicana,  
 UR) 173, 180
- Republicanism 57,  
*see also* AR, Federal Republican Party,  
 First Republic, PRRS, Radical Party,  
 Reformist party, UR, Second  
 Republic  
 demo-republican movement 56–7, 58, 60  
 in the Sexenio 61–5  
 in the First Republic 63–5  
 in the Restoration 97–8

- Republicans/Loyalists (Spanish Civil War) 184ff  
   *See also* Civil War  
   anti-clerical violence 194–5, 197  
   constitution of republican groups 191  
   defeat of 184, 196, 200, 201, 204, 205–6, 209  
   destruction of culture, Franco regime 239  
   divisions 184  
   and foreign aid 196, 197, 203  
   justice system 199–200  
   and Nationalist victory 217  
   Organizing the war 195–6, 200  
   post war treatment of 240  
   prospects of success 207–8  
   Republican government 196–8, 200  
   Revolution in republican territory 191–4  
   start of war 187, 188, 189  
   victory in Madrid 196, 197, 200, 204, 205  
   violence 194–5, 197, 202  
   violence against 186, 190
- Requetés Carlist militia, Civil War 182, 189, 202
- Restoration regime 1875–1898 67  
   *see also* Antonio Canovas del Castillo, turno system  
   “ascending power” 77–9  
   Caciques and caciquismo 74–5, 77–8  
   Comparative 68–71  
   Conservative party 72–3  
   and Cuba 74, 76, 77  
   1898 as turning point 80–1  
   multiple faces of 71  
   constraints on political liberties 75–7  
   defined 68–71  
   and democratization 70  
   “*distritos propios*” 77  
   *encasillado* 77  
   electoral fraud under 74–5  
   elites 89, 91, 97  
   evaluation of 75–80  
   in historical memory 277  
   Liberal Party and 72–3, 87  
   and nationalism 140  
   politics in 92, 93, 94  
   and public sphere 79–80  
   suspension of rights 76  
   the turno system 71–4  
   and war with US 81
- Restoration regime 1898–1923 85, 98, 99–103
- La Canadiense strike 101–2  
   and Canalejas’ Liberal party reforms 87–90  
   comparative 83–5  
   democratic assembly movement 100–1  
   evaluation of 103  
   and Maura’s Conservative party “reform from above” 86–7  
   and world war 1 90–1  
   mass mobilization 92  
   Basque nationalism 93  
   Catholic 92–3  
   CNT 96–7  
   Lliga 98–9  
   Mauristas 94–5  
   PSOE/UGT 95–6  
   Republicanism 97–8
- Revolutions  
   Trienio 36–8  
   1854–6 44–5  
   September 1868 Revolution 57, 60–1  
   October 1934 rebellion, 174–5, 176–7  
   in republican territory Civil War 191–4
- Revolutionary Organization of Workers (Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores, ORT) 258
- Riego, Major Rafael 35–7
- Right to Education Act 273
- Rio Tinto mine 117, 129, 135
- Rodriguez, Pedro 17
- Romanones, Count 90, 156
- rural society 119, 128–9, 161, 240, 252  
   *see also* agriculture, landowners, landless laborers, peasants  
   19<sup>th</sup> century economy 15–16, 18, 128–129  
   19<sup>th</sup> insurrectionary activity 45, 62  
   Franco regime, 218, 235, 238, 239–240, 249, 244–5  
   *caciques*, influence of 77  
   Church 19, 136, 138–9  
   Civil Guard 76  
   Civil War 188, 189, 193, 204, 268, 269  
   CNT and UGT rural activity 97, 101, 102  
   culture 18, 19  
   elections 70, 76, 79, 87  
   elites 156  
   gender roles Franco regime 241  
   interactions between rural and urban culture 122, 129, 139  
   legislation 164, 168–9  
   literacy and illiteracy 119, 128, 165

- political conflict 93  
 politics 54, 71, 257  
 popular classes 127  
 population 112, 115, 119, 125  
 post Franco period 252, 257  
 reform of 64  
 rural exodus 112, 113, 115, 119, 235–6,  
     244–5, 252  
 rural inequality 114  
 rural labor movement 102  
 rural middle classes 93, 125, 128,  
     172, 240  
 rural poor 162  
 rural upper class 125  
 ruralism 93  
   and the state 43  
 socialism 171, 172, 175, 181  
 transformation in land ownership 114, 128  
 unions 193  
 workforce 8  
 Rusiñol, Santiago 133  
 Russia, post-World War I 83  
   Bolshevik revolution 92  
  
 Sagasta, Praxedes 72, 73, 81  
 Salamanca 13, 188, 242  
 Salazar, António 210  
 Salmerón, Nicolás 65  
 Sanjurjo, General 156, 188  
 Santander 10, 12  
 Savoy monarchy 54, 55  
   *see also* Amadeo  
 schools 240, 242, 245, 263, 273–4  
   *see also* education  
   banning of Catalan 149, 245  
   Church and 241, 242  
   curriculum 140, 151–2, 216, 241, 242  
   girls 126, 242, 247  
   labor movement and 58, 59  
   nationalization 46, 141, 147, 151–2  
   primary 112, 128, 137, 165  
   public schools 137, 141, 151–2, 165, 167,  
     174, 180, 241, 273  
   religion in 88, 141, 167  
   religious 43, 137, 152, 165, 168, 174, 181,  
     216, 241, 263, 273–4  
   secondary schools 152, 241, 242, 245, 269  
   secular 88, 97, 139, 231, 239  
   working class and 238, 242, 269  
 “schools of citizenship” 86  
 “schools of democracy” 254  
  
 Sección Femenina: Female Section of the  
   Movimiento/Falange (SF) 189, 202, 243  
 Second Carlist War 34, 54, 55, 63, 71  
   *See also* Carlists  
 Second Republic 107, 142, 150, 156, 158ff,  
     276, 280  
   *see also* First Biennium, Second Biennium,  
     Popular Front  
   Comparative 159–61  
   Evaluation of 182–3  
   heterogeneity of 159  
   moral narratives 158  
   periodization 161–4  
   structural cleavages and changes 160–1  
     and the working class 170–1  
 seigneurial regime 9  
 señorío 10  
 Serrano Suñer, Ramón 201, 214, 216, 217  
 Serrano, General 60  
 SEU (Francoist student organization) 226, 227  
 Seville 16, 18, 56, 62, 118, 119, 168, 270  
   Civil War 188, 190  
   workers’ strike 171  
 Sexenio (1868–1874) 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 73, 86  
   and anarchism 60  
   cantonalist movement 64  
   Democratic monarchy 61–3  
   First Spanish Republic 63–65  
   free trade advocates 117  
   interpretation of 51–4  
   September 1868 Revolution 60–1  
 Silvela, Francisco 81, 85, 86  
*Sindicatos Libres* 101  
 slavery  
   Caribbean and North America 6  
   Cuba 30  
   and 1812 Constitution 25  
   slave economy 30  
 Socialism 51  
   *see also* Marxism, PSOE, Socialists, UGT  
   19<sup>th</sup> century 44, 46  
   20<sup>th</sup> century 84, 85, 86, 98, 134, 135, 170  
   Church and 241  
   countryside 173  
   demo-republican movement 57, 59  
   First International 51  
   Marxist 58, 59  
   and 1930s economic crisis 170  
   unions 138, 147, 151, 172  
   urban districts and 70, 76, 79, 96, 167,  
     169, 172

- Socialist Party (Europe)  
 European 96, 100, 268  
 Germany 160  
 Italy 95, 96, 176
- Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC), 277
- Socialist rural workers' union, FNTT 181
- Socialists (Spain) 95–6  
*see also* Partido Socialista de Obreros  
 Españoles (PSOE), UGT  
 Catholics and 269  
 Civil War 194, 198, 199, 200  
 end of era 273–4  
 end of the Second Republic 176  
 government under 270–5  
 Popular Front 180, 181, 187  
 Transition 254, 255, 257, 258, 264, 267,  
 Democratic Monarchy 268, 272, 273,  
 274, 276  
 Primo de Rivera period 151, 155–7  
 PSOE/UGT-CNT conflict 171–2  
 repression of 175  
 and Second Republic 158, 160, 162, 163–4,  
 166, 169, 171–2, 174, 175, 176, 177, 183  
 and women 272
- Solidaridad Obrera* 149
- Somatén* militia 152, 154
- Sotelo, Calvo 213  
*see also* Spanish American War 69, 80–2
- Spanish Democratic Council 254
- Spanish League for the Progress of  
 Women 134
- Spanish Legion 189
- Spanish Party, Cuba 52
- Spanish Regional Federation of the IWA  
 (FRE) 59
- Stabilization Plan 1959 224, 232
- Stalin, Joseph 84
- “Straperlo Affair” 175
- strikes 58, 62, 92, 245  
*see also* working class movements,  
 syndicates, UGT, CNT, CCOO  
 1910 law 89  
 1917 strike 90  
 1943 law on 218  
 La Canadiense Strike, 1919 101–2  
 Canalejas and 89  
 CNT 171, 172  
 Democratic monarchy 278  
 first major strike wave (1899–1903) 88  
 Franco regime and 218, 225, 245, 253  
 Primo regime students and professors 155  
 revolutionary general strike 96, 100  
 Second Republic and 58, 171, 174, 180, 181  
 Transition 255, 256,  
 Suarez, Adolfo 254, 256–7, 263  
*see also* Union of the Democratic Center  
 (UCD), Transition  
 December 15 1976 referendum 256  
 suffrage 52, 72, 73, 158  
 corporatist 220  
 expansion of 70, 71, 74, 182  
 female 134, 164–5  
 limited 40, 41, 54, 56, 76, 90  
 universal male 22, 40, 44, 46, 60, 61, 74,  
 78, 79, 80, 82
- Switzerland 29
- Syllabus of Errors (1864) 34, 55
- Syndical Organization of Spain (Organización  
 Sindical Española OSE) 215, 226
- syndicalism 95, 96, 97, 101, 177  
*see also* anarcho-syndicalists, CNT
- syndicates 220  
 agrarian, 80, 137
- Tapiés, Antoni 247
- Tarradellas, Josep 259
- Teatro Real* Madrid 273
- Tejero, Lt. Colonel Antonio 263
- tertulia 18, 132
- textile industry, Spain 8, 10, 11, 58, 110, 236  
 regional aspects 116  
 workers 16, 58, 236
- Tory Party 94, 95
- tourism 209, 222, 234, 235, 244, 246, 269  
 impact of tourism 1960s 225–6, 231, 234, 246  
 tourist boom 225–6
- trade unions *See* working class movements,  
 syndicates, UGT, CNT, CCOO
- Tragic Week, 88–9
- tradition/“traditional” society, concept  
 of 6, 22, 26, 122, 123, 139, 142  
 Franco regime 231, 235, 238, 247–8  
 and “Two Spains” x, 22  
 traditional/modern divide 123, 26, 27
- Transition (1975–8) 250, 254–9, 266, 275  
*see also* Constitution of 1978, elections  
 of 1977 and 1979  
 and Basque country 261  
 Civil society mobilization 251, 253–4,  
 255–6, 258  
 December 15 1976 referendum 256  
 and “memory wars”, 276, 277, 278, 280  
 Origins 252–4  
 “Spanish model” 251–2

- Treaty of Algeciras 1906 89
- Trienio (1820–1823) 36–8, 40  
 exaltados, 40  
 reforms 37
- Trotsky, Leon 102
- turno system 76–80, 91–3, 155  
*see also* caciquismo, Restoration, Antonio Canovas del Castillo  
 negative aspects 74–5  
 non-*turno* parties 78–9, 81, 98, 99, 100  
 turno pacífico 71, 73  
*turno* parties 155  
 defeat of 80, 90  
 “two Spains” concept 22, 23, 34, 138, 185
- Unamuno, Miguel de 150, 154
- unemployment 170
- Union of the Democratic Center (Unión del Centro Democrático, UCD) 154, 257, 259, 261–4  
*see also* Adolfo Suarez  
 formation 257
- Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) 95, 191, 192  
*see also* PSOE, Socialists, working class movements  
 Civil War 191, 192, 196, 198  
 and CNT 101, 102, 171–2, 174, 177, 191, 192  
 growth 96, 97, 101  
 general revolutionary strike 100  
 Democratic monarchy 272  
 and Primo de Rivera 147, 151, 154  
 Second Republic 162, 169, 171–2, 174, 177  
 Transition/Moncloa Pacts 259
- Unión Patriótica (UP) 147, 150, 152, 154  
*see also* Primo Regime
- United Nations 219
- United States 68, 199  
 1898 war with Spain 69, 80–2  
 and Cuba 52  
 and Franco regime 213, 219  
 as decentralized state 68  
 military bases on Spanish territory 219  
 post-WWI isolationism 160  
 slavery in 30  
 and Spanish Civil War 184, 196, 199
- urbanization 6, 16, 85  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 6, 17, 84, 112, 124, 127  
 20<sup>th</sup> century 112, 118, 120, 161, 235, 244, 249, 252  
 impact upon elections 156
- Uruguay 113
- USSR 83,  
 and Civil War 197, 200, 208
- Valdés, Armando Palacio 129
- Valencia 16, 168, 269  
 19<sup>th</sup> century 10, 11, 53  
 Civil War 188, 193, 204, 205, 206, 207  
 elites 125  
 exports 115, 116, 118  
 industry 16, 236  
 industrial workers 59  
 local patriotism 140  
 French victory 1812 26  
 politics 62, 79, 93  
 “Valley of the Fallen” (*Valle de los Caídos*) 217–18
- Vatican 34, 43, 55, 123, 219  
 Vatican II 160, 228, 248
- Victoria, Queen (United Kingdom) 46
- Vizcaya 117
- War  
*see also* First Carlist War, Second Carlist War, Civil War, WWI, WWII  
 War with US 1898 69, 80–2  
 Colonial wars 71, 81, 91, 141, 153, 185  
 War against Napoleon 20–22  
 “total war” 20, 185  
 weavers’ association, formation of 58
- Wellington, Duke of 21
- White, José María Blanco 23
- Wilson, Woodrow 160
- wine, Spanish 115
- women  
*see also* gender, feminist movement  
 1960s and 1970s 247  
 1970s 247, 268, 269  
 1978 Constitution and 260  
 “angel in the house” concept 125, 126, 127, 131, 134, 138, 240, 245  
 Catholic 92, 168  
 and Church 139, 241, 242  
 civil rights 57  
 education of 152, 242, 247  
 employment 15, 268  
 employment inequality 269  
 equality 260, 276  
 and etiquette 17, 131  
 and Falange 202  
 family law Franco regime 241  
 female candidates in elections 273

- women (*cont'd*)
- female associationism 134
  - female workers 236, 126, 127, 128, 134
  - Second Republic reforms 165–6
  - impact of childbirth 14
  - and honor-based society 241
  - inequality 29, 57, 134, 138, 269
  - legislation 165, 168, 192, 240, 260
  - militiawomen 192
  - Modern Woman 133–4
  - and *Movimiento* 243
  - “new woman” 192–3
  - peasant 15, 79
  - and politics 57, 134, 168, 189, 192, 243, 273
  - postwar treatment of 240–1
  - and poverty 16
  - PSOE and 272
  - and religion 138, 139, 165
  - roles 15, 29, 126, 131, 192–3
  - suffrage 134, 165, 166
  - as workers 16, 126, 127, 128, 138, 236, 245, 247
- Women’s Freethinker Union, Huelva 134
- Women’s Institute 272
- Worker Congress, 1870 59
- “worker priests” 253
- workers and working classes 58, 120, 129, 137, 150, 236, 239, 245
- see also* working class movements
- agricultural and rural 6, 54, 59, 96, 162, 181
  - Basques and Catalonia 94
  - Catholic 225, 253
  - Church and 138, 241, 242
  - citizen militia units 57, 58–9
  - Civil War 191, 192, 193, 194, 199
  - cultural centers 135,
  - Democratic monarchy 267–8, 269
  - and economic miracle 238
  - education 242
  - and employers 64, 101, 150, 182, 193, 215, 226, 259
  - factory 16, 18
  - female 16, 126, 127, 128, 138, 236, 245, 247
  - Franco period 218, 236, 237–8, 240, 245, 248
  - government and 164, 165
  - industrial 59, 102, 116, 117, 123, 267
  - the left and 95, 96, 218
  - leisure 135–6
  - literacy 120
  - male 16, 58
  - migration 236
  - political parties and 86, 88, 89, 160, 257, 273
  - Popular Front and 181
  - Transition 253, 255,
  - and Republicanism 97–8
  - Second Republic 163–5, 169–71, 177, 180
  - social and cultural networks Franco regime 245
  - textile 16, 58, 236
  - treatment as political enemy 231
  - unskilled 16
  - urban 16, 124, 127, 138, 139, 224, 237–8, 242, 245
  - “worker circles,” 92
  - worker delegates 227
  - workers’ emancipation 59
  - working-class culture 60, 134–5
  - and “years of hunger” 218, 233, 239
- working class movements/unions
- See also* strikes, UGT, CNT, CCOO
- associations 58, 59, 62, 134–5, 136
  - mutual aid associations 134
  - radical workers’ movements 163
  - republican workers’ groups 53
  - revolution, 84, 92, 102, 145, 160
  - worker mobilization 76, 79, 192
  - worker organizations 89, 90, 95, 97, 100, 151, 220
  - “workerist” ideology and parties 59, 84
  - unions 58–60, 93, 97, 101, 151, 169, 171–2, 177, 181, 192, 199, 218
- Workers’ Catholic Action Guild  
(Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica HOAC) 220, 253
- Workers’ First International (IWA) 59
- World War I 83, 90–1, 109–10, 141–2, 185
- “civil war of words” 90–1
- World War II 145, 159, 185, 186, 207, and Franco regime 209, 214, 232
- Spanish exiles 234
- “years of hunger” 230, 232–4, 235
- and Republicans 233
- youth culture and student movement 245, 247
- Yugoslavia 186, 199
- 1941–1943 civil war 187
- Zaragoza 10, 21, 189
- military academy at 220
- zarzuela Spanish musical theater 136