Military Cultures
in Peace and Stability Operations

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in Peace and Stability
Operations

Afghanistan and Lebanon

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Introduction

Fatma is from Bar-al Canoon, a small village in Southern Lebanon, where more than 18,000 soldiers are deployed under the United Nations flag. At the end of my first interview with her in 2007, she asked a striking question: "Why, Chiara, do we need all these soldiers to bring peace?"

While this book may not be able to answer Fatma's seemingly simple but ultimately complex question, it does recognize the crucial role that military organizations play in international peace and stability operations, and tries to better understand the dynamics that influence military behavior on the ground.[1] At the time of writing, more than 100,000 soldiers are deployed in UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Another 300,000 are deployed under the auspices of regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Soldiers in these missions are important actors, with significant responsibility for implementing peace and stability operations—and a corresponding influence on the goals and impact of peacekeeping missions. Yet we know surprisingly little about the factors that influence soldiers' behavior. In an attempt to address this gap, this book examines the behavior of military organizations in peace and stability operations.

Soldiers deployed in multinational peace and stability operations are typically assigned to a specific area—called an Area of Operations (AO) or Area of Responsibility in military parlance—along with other soldiers from their country of origin. In their AO, soldiers are expected to implement a specific mandate to keep or enforce peace, in accordance with their rules of engagement (ROE). Usually, they are equipped with weapons. They may also have some responsibility for delivering humanitarian aid and maintaining control of their assigned territory. Their day-to-day tasks can vary widely, and could include, for example, conducting patrols, neutralizing improvised explosive devices, delivering humanitarian aid, organizing meetings with the village chief, launching programs to benefit vulnerable groups, and conducting

combat operations against specific targets. Mandates and standard operating procedures (SOPs) must be interpreted and executed. In contrast to conventional military operations, which have precise tactical objectives such as fighting or holding terrain, soldiers in contemporary peace and stability operations have a wider range of responsibilities with significantly greater room to maneuver.[2]

Given the relative autonomy of action of national contingents in peace operations, it is perhaps unsurprising to find that different national contingents interpret and implement identical mandates in a given mission in very different ways. Despite strong anecdotal evidence of such differences in interpretation, the factors that influence and impact soldiers' behavior have never been systematically studied in the literatures on peace operations or in the field of military studies.[3] The existing literature on peace operations has indeed analyzed the different conditions under which peace operations can be successful, and has elaborated sophisticated ways of measuring what influences durable peace, but it has neglected the variable of soldiers' or contingents' behavior. This lack of attention is particularly pertinent in light of the recent finding that deploying troops, rather than military observers or police, in a peacekeeping operation affects the protection of civilians.[4] Similarly, soldiers' behavioral variations may have important consequences on the level of violence against civilians, the local population's perceptions of the mission, soldiers' propensity to coordinate with other actors, and eventually the prospects for conflict resolution.

That different armies behave differently in war is a recurring classical theme in military studies.[5] More recently, sociologist Joseph Soeters has launched a new research program that systematically examines cross-national variations.[6] Anecdotal evidence also suggests that different armies behave differently in the same peace operation. For instance, in the UN mission in Lebanon, operating under the same regional command and implementing the same mandate, Indian troops conducted foot patrols and organized popular yoga classes, while the Korean units used high force protection measures and conducted patrols strictly in armored vehicles. Why do some military contingents prioritize humanitarian activities, while others prioritize operational activities when deployed under very similar conditions? No previous study has systematically examined the differences in peacekeeping practices in multinational missions and what might explain them.[7]

The first aim of this book is to systematically document variations in soldiers' tactical behavior in peace operations. I borrow Stephen Biddle's concept of "force employment" to denote such variations.[8] The force employment variable includes all activities carried out by soldiers in peace operations—force protection, patrols (including levels of armament, timing and types of patrols), interactions with local military forces and civilians, as well as command and control. This book also uses a concept derived from the literature on military effectiveness, which I call Unit Peace Operation Effectiveness (UPOE), to categorize and compare how different armies behave. UPOE does not analyze the impact or consequences of military behavior. Rather, by assessing how good military units are at doing certain things, it evaluates how likely it is that their behavior will have particular intended consequences on the ground. The impact and consequences of such actions, however, are very hard to discern because of several other potential confounding factors. Therefore, I limit myself here to evaluating units' behavior using the concept of UPOE. The book's second (and central) objective is to explain the determinants of behavioral variations. I argue that an important factor influencing soldiers' tactical behavior is the military culture of their home army, on which I elaborate in my next section.

Military Cultures, Domestic Political Configurations, and Force Employment

Militaries are a special kind of organization, often referred to by scholars and practitioners as "total institutions."[9] Compared to other organizations or state bureaucracies, members of the military are bound together by higher levels of cohesion, hierarchy, and discipline, which are linked to their organization's core function of exercising the state's monopoly over the use of violence. Becoming a member of a military organization requires individuals to become socialized into a very specific set of practices, beliefs, routines, and rituals. In this book, military culture is defined as a core set of beliefs, attitudes, and values that, through processes of socialization, become deeply embedded within an army and guide the way in which it manages its internal and external lives, interprets its tactical and operational objectives, and learns and adapts.[10] It operates as a filter between domestic political configurations and the way the military behaves in the field.

While conventional military operations are guided by tactical manuals that provide detailed behavioral prescriptions, there is more room for interpretation in peace and stability operations. Soldiers on such missions must decide, for example, how to behave when patrolling, how to interact with the local population, and how to protect themselves from enemy attacks. In this book, I argue that it is military culture that influences the way soldiers exercise their freedom of action and behave at the tactical level on peace and stability operations.

When a military unit deploys, its military culture goes with it. I argue that the values, attitudes, norms, and beliefs that constitute this military culture influence the unit's perceptions as it enters the AO by shaping soldiers' interpretations of a number of factors of importance for their behavior on the ground: the perceptions of the local context, the perceptions of abstract concepts related to the operations (such as peace), and perceptions relating to organizational variables. For instance, units from different countries in the same AO may or may not perceive the "enemies" as easily identifiable and may understand the nature of their mission as a counterinsurgency or a peacekeeping mission. These perceptions, in turn, guide the choices made by active units in the field, within the boundaries of the freedom of maneuver left to the unit after the mission mandate, actual material conditions, and threat levels have been considered. In sum, I document that these perceptions are strongly consistent with the way soldiers behave and their respective military cultures.

When soldiers are abroad, they are usually deployed as units. Notwithstanding the level of heterogeneity across army unit cultures, this book focuses on military culture in countries' armies. This is because, a priori, the set of beliefs, attitudes, and values of an army's military culture seems to have the greatest influence on soldiers' behavior, through their socialization into the specificities of the service, frequent rotations, and basic and advanced training. I studied several units from different armies and detected common patterns across units of the same army. Empirically, specific unit cultures only account for some residual variation.

Ultimately, I am interested in understanding what influences force employment and UPOE—that is, why military units behave the way they do and how this might influence their ability to keep peace. But doing so requires finding out *where military culture comes from*, a topic long neglected by the literature on military culture.[11] And I show empirically that military cultures do not emerge from nowhere. For the first time in the literatures on security

studies and comparative politics, I use historical-institutionalist theories to trace the emergence of a specific military culture.[12] I show how military cultures are nested in the domestic political configurations of the armies' respective countries.[13]

This means that a military culture, with well-defined traits, is shaped by a specific domestic configuration, usually following a critical juncture (such as a war or the specific reaction to it)—"a moment at which decisions are highly contingent but, once taken, will shape politics."[14] This configuration is shaped by two sets of domestic conditions of importance for setting the constraints to specific military cultures: policies about the armed forces and the military's relations with civilian decision-making processes and society. I hypothesize that military culture may acquire new salient traits or renegotiate old ones, providing them with new meanings to respond to the new domestic configuration—which emerged from a new set of domestic conditions. For instance, some specific beliefs—such as the importance of assertiveness or an aversion to combat operations—may change their meaning as a consequence of a critical juncture, while others may become less salient.

Two domestic conditions have particular influence on military culture. The first is societal beliefs about the use of force, that is, whether the public tends to be supportive of the armed forces. The second is domestic models of civil-military relations, specifically civilian decision makers' preferences regarding the degree of military input into decisions related to security and defense, including public expressions of opinions and views by the military. These two conditions create an environment within which military organizations must navigate; military culture tends to follow (and be shaped by) them.

While military culture is inherently conservative and inertial, it slowly adapts to the changed domestic context by reinterpreting and renegotiating its motives and approaches. In some extreme cases, such as a regime change, a military culture may have to change almost completely, as was the case of the Wehrmacht after the reconstitution of West Germany's armed forces in 1957 as a completely new organization, the Bundeswehr. When new structural changes occur, for instance professionalization or new kinds of operations, military culture will attempt to develop within the constraints imposed by the two primary domestic conditions discussed above. Yet domestic conditions alone do not fully explain soldiers' behavior in peace and stability operations. Organizations respect constraints but also develop and work around them. Military culture crystallizes a well-specified group of

attitudes, beliefs, and values that restricts the set of conceivable courses of action once soldiers are deployed in peace and stability operations.

I also engage in competitive theory testing. The book's research design takes into account as many potential intervening factors and competing theories as possible. The case selection controls for many factors by choosing examples with similar characteristics in terms of material resources, mandate, ROE, type of threat level, doctrine, and training. In addition, I discuss and empirically test three complementary factors (doctrines, SOPs, and training) and five relevant alternatives to my cultural argument, which fall into two categories: mission-specific explanations (headquarters' directives and leadership) and domestic-political explanations (governmental mandates, previous operations, and organizational interests). Empirical expectations and causal claims are discussed at the end of Chapter 1.

Case Selection and Strategy of Data Collection

My focus on variations in operational styles in peace and stability operations has a theory-building purpose. I have selected my cases in order to control for as many material and mission-related factors as possible so I can isolate the potential causal role of military culture and theorize about the relationships between domestic political configurations, military culture, and the observable behavior of soldiers in the field. Therefore, this book is the result of a long and complex "series of iterations."[15] To increase the external validity of the findings,[16] it analyzes two very different kinds of operations—the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) and the NATO mission in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). UNIFIL II is a traditional peacekeeping operation: soldiers are tasked to supervise a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, and are mandated to use force only for self-defense. ISAF, by contrast, is a stability and security operation: its mandate requires soldiers to enforce minimal security conditions (using force if necessary) and provide security for reconstruction projects.[17]

I assess my explanatory variable—military culture—through field observations, questionnaires, and qualitative in-depth interviews, which I supplement through historical analysis and secondary literature.[18] I analyze the dependent variable, force employment, via interviews, observations, and military reports. For each case, the book relies on in-depth ethnographic material about two specific military units, and on interviews and analysis of

primary sources for all other units across rotations in two armies, to detect potential variations across different units of the same army. I focus on the French 1st Fusilier Regiment from Epinal and the Italian 132nd Ariete Regiment deployed in UNIFIL II in 2007 and all the other French and Italian rotating units until 2013; and the French 8th Marine Parachute Infantry Battalion and the Italian 9th Alpini Battalion in ISAF deployed in 2008 and all successive units until 2013. The analysis thus combines cross-case and within-case comparative approaches.[19]

The French and Italian armies deployed roughly the same number of troops in the AOs studied, and were deployed in areas with comparable threat levels and with identical ROE (as I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4).[20] To illustrate, in Lebanon, the French deployed 2,000 troops and the Italians 1,800; in Afghanistan they deployed 2,500 and 2,510 troops, respectively. Troop deployment numbers remained roughly consistent across rotations within my time frame. Nonetheless, despite all these similarities, the French and Italian units in each operation behaved differently and excelled at different tasks across the two missions.

I spent nine months collecting data in the two countries, embedded within each army and as an observer in the area. I was in Lebanon from September to December 2007 and in Afghanistan from July to November 2008. I also conducted seven follow-up fieldwork missions in Paris and Rome. I have maintained contact with each of the four units and visited their military bases, where I conducted follow-up interviews, and also circulated post-deployment questionnaires with the units that were subsequently deployed.

I interviewed thirty soldiers per unit and ensured that the sample was balanced between officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers, and also regarding activities undertaken, which included logistics, force protection, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), and operational activities. The thirty-five- to ninety-minute interviews explored soldiers' everyday lives and activities, perceptions, and understanding of the context via open-ended questions. To ensure robust data, I recorded only those behavioral patterns that could be observed from interviews with at least three soldiers of different ranks and triangulated with my own observations, as well as those obtained through secondary interviews with humanitarian and UN staff and the local population about the French and Italian units deployed in their AO.

Interviews focused on soldiers' understanding of the situation, interpretation of the ROE, and their daily lives in order to highlight variations in force employment. I conducted more than 80 interviews in each case, with

a well-balanced sample of soldiers deployed in each unit, as well as with civilian officials and military officers at the headquarters both in the field and at home. This data was complemented by approximately fifty context interviews with nongovernmental organization (NGO) practitioners and UN officials in each case. Where possible, interviews were conducted with parties involved in the conflict: Hezbollah and Amal members in Lebanon, and Afghan intellectuals who are critical of the NATO presence in Afghanistan.[21]

Questionnaires were distributed following the logic of randomized stratification: I stratified by rank and then randomized within each rank (adhering to quotas of officers and soldiers, thus overrepresenting the officers). The questionnaires—30 of which were distributed to the units under study, while the others were received by other contingents in Lebanon, and thirty of which were distributed to the units under study in Afghanistan—gave respondents multiple pre-specified choices and room to elaborate on their answers. Though the rather small sample size has limits for generalizability, the careful sample selection, qualitative approach, and robust triangulation to ensure that the results were consistent across several sources enhances the validity of the findings.

Questionnaires were used to gain insights into different components of military culture, namely the organization's self-perception, perception of change within the army, and interpretations of basic notions such as victory and peace. Semi-structured questionnaires, which presented a limited set of options but left space for free answers where necessary, were used to cross-check this information and collect personal accounts of the soldiers' world views. The questionnaires were anonymous to encourage genuine responses about the beliefs and perceptions of the organization, and were distributed predominantly to soldiers who had not been interviewed.

I employed direct observation as a complementary methodological tool. As demonstrated in many studies, direct observation is one of the best ways to collect information on behavior, that is, force employment and military culture.[22] Accordingly, it is widely used by scholars studying culture: "Investigators typically participate in the daily life of the organization over a period of several months to a year."[23] The goal of observation is to check and validate the findings emerging from interviews and questionnaires. In some cases where it was not otherwise possible to collect data about actors' perceptions, I have used data obtained by observation as principal data. Observations were conducted between 2007 and 2009, by living for several weeks

with each unit on base in Lebanon and Afghanistan, and accompanying patrols and CIMIC activities.

Data obtained through interviews, questionnaires, and observation was supplemented by analysis of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include army doctrines for the military organizations deployed, military training handbooks, white papers, military doctrines of the relevant regional organizations, mission mandates, and diaries and memoirs of soldiers in operations. The literature dealing with the history of each military organization was also studied as a secondary source, in particular historiographical research on the symbols, hymns, and history of each unit, of the French and Italian armies more broadly, and of civil-military relations in France and Italy.

Main Findings

Although the French and Italian troops in the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the UN mission in Lebanon were deployed under similar circumstances, they displayed consistent and systematic variations in behavior. The French troops emphasized operational activities and displayed high force protection levels, while the Italian troops focused on humanitarian and "hearts and minds" activities, such as implementing development projects and distributing toys to children. These traits were consistent across rotations and remained broadly similar across missions. Preliminary data suggests that these behavioral variations could have influenced the level of violence in each unit's AO. I find that these variations in behavior can be traced back to the respective traits of French and Italian military cultures, and that competing explanations are less convincing.

The perceptions of soldiers in each military unit were in line with the observed behavioral variations. French soldiers in Lebanon and Afghanistan understood their missions as more combative than the Italian soldiers did and clearly identified an enemy, while Italian soldiers did not. I find that these variations in perception can be traced back to the respective traits of French and Italian military cultures, and that competing explanations are less convincing. Before World War II, the French military culture was strongly based on assertiveness, while its Italian counterpart evolved based on the belief that Italian soldiers are "good people." Despite some remarkable differences, both countries displayed a similarly uneven military record in both

world wars, with the disbandment of both armies in the aftermath of World War II.[24] However, the different domestic conditions in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the partial transformation of the core tenets of military cultures in Italy and France. In France, the disbandment of the officer corps in 1960–1961 and De Gaulle's forceful reaction to it (re)introduced a strong element of "obedience" and an overemphasis on executing orders to the letter into the inherited assertiveness culture. In Italy, by contrast, the army tried to overcome the consequences of its disbandment after the fascist dictatorship and World War II through humanitarian activities. The contemporary French military culture is thus one of "controlled assertiveness," while the Italian one is based on the belief of being "good humanitarian soldiers." Military culture thus adapted to new conditions, and their new versions within each of those military organizations eventually became inertial and deeply ingrained via processes of socialization.

Contributions

Security studies scholars have written extensively about military culture in recent decades. My work builds on this tradition, namely on the third generation of studies on strategic and military culture, which defines culture as distinct from behavior.[25] However, by considering military culture in a new field—peace and stability operations—my work tries to make three contributions.[26]

First, and in line with recent scholarship, I reintroduce military culture as an important factor in explaining variation in military behavior, building on the third generation of strategic culture studies.[27] I advance the "culturalist" debate in security studies by adding to existing empirical contributions about military cultures: I suggest a plausible causal mechanism of how military culture influences military behavior—via individual-level perceptions about the context in which soldiers are embedded. The existing literature has focused on how military culture influences doctrines, inadvertent escalation, or norms of restraint—factors that are crucial to understanding military behavior at the tactical level—but few studies have focused on understanding how military culture influences military behavior or explored the underlying causal mechanisms.[28] This book makes a first step in this direction by showing how military culture is consistent with individual-level perceptions in the contexts of operations and soldiers' interpretations

of the mission, and how these are in line with military behavior in ways that are partly independent of doctrines, training, and SOPs.

Second, the book engages with the debate about the sources of military culture and suggests that military culture is not a monolithic and overdetermined variable, as it is often depicted. Military culture consists of long-lasting and deeply ingrained beliefs, attitudes, values, and norms that do adapt to new domestic conditions. Members of the organization internalize modified military cultures that emerge after changes in domestic conditions (post-World War II in this context). Although several scholars have demonstrated that military culture matters,[29] how much (and why) it matters has rarely been the subject of systematic analysis. Without examining the specific domestic political conditions under which a given military culture emerges, one cannot understand the dominant traits of the culture, how this culture guides soldiers' actions, or how it is distinct from domestic conditions. This book answers the question "Where does military culture come from?" that was raised in the epilogue of Elizabeth Kier's famous book *Imagining War*; it finds that military culture emerges from specific domestic political conditions, namely traditions of civil-military relations and societal beliefs about the use of force.

Third, the book is the first study to systematically document strong behavioral differences across military contingents deployed under identical mandates, with similar troop numbers and material resources, and to propose a way to assess these differences. By studying the determinants of military behavior, which is considered to strongly influence military effectiveness, this book fills an important gap in the security studies and peacekeeping literatures.[30]

The book thus seeks to connect two strands of related (but, until now, disconnected) literatures: peace research and security studies. While the study of peacekeeping operations is sophisticated and advanced in the peace research literature, few studies have considered how military organizations actually operate within their missions. It is, however, crucial to study the determinants of soldiers' behavior, as they are critical agents in these operations. Exploring cross-national variations is an important first step in this regard.

The literature in security studies has traditionally focused on conventional military operations or, more recently, counterinsurgency operations, which still have traditional military objectives at their core. There is a surprising lack of cross-referencing between military and peace research

scholars.[31] Undoubtedly, security studies and peace research originate from two profoundly different (and often conflicting) intellectual and normative traditions. However, their practical fusion in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which comprise a relevant component of modern military operations, makes it imperative to reconnect the two traditions. Such a holistic approach can promote greater awareness among soldiers about the nonconventional context in which they are operating and, similarly, encourage a better understanding by peace scholars of the factors that guide the behavior of soldiers—the primary implementing agency in a peacekeeping operation.

Finally, this book can shed light on other kinds of military contributions in today's political and social climate. Despite the winding down of support to ground operations and the greater acceptability of more secretive operations, such as drone or special forces operations, it is still important to try to understand the conditions under which military organizations operate in foreign missions, and how domestic political configurations shape their military cultures and subsequent actions on the ground.

Structure of the Book

The remainder of the book is divided into four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 outlines the book's main theoretical contribution, proposing the theory to be tested and developed in the subsequent empirical chapters. It reviews the literature on peacekeeping operations and demonstrates that variations in behavior across units and AOs have never been systematically explored. Next, the central argument of the book is put forward: that military culture shapes soldiers' behavior. In explaining the argument, a workable definition of military culture is provided, and a theory on how culture emerges and becomes inertial over time is elaborated. Chapter 1 concludes by discussing competing explanations.

Chapters 2–4 constitute the empirical part of the book. Chapter 2 presents and discusses the Italian and French military cultures, showing how they emerged from their respective domestic political configurations. Chapter 3 delves into the Lebanon case. The first part discusses how their respective military cultures influenced the perceptions of the deployed French and Italian soldiers, while the second explores how military culture via perception affects the core variation in operational activities, CIMIC,

force protection, and command and control and how these variations are consistent with the level of violence in the AOs. The same structure is then applied to the Afghanistan case in Chapter 4, where I also discuss the alternative explanations for both cases.

The final and concluding chapter probes the plausibility of the argument by discussing how it could be applied to other cases. Theoretical arguments and empirical findings are considered together, the contributions and limitations of the present research are analyzed, and possible implications for future studies and policy prescriptions are discussed.

CHAPTER 1

Force Employment, Unit Peace Operation Effectiveness, and Military Cultures

Col. Brian Christmas served as US Marine Corps Force Commander under NATO command during the battle of Marja in Southern Afghanistan, one of the most famous battles fought by Western troops against the Taliban. When I asked him to tell me more about his experience there during an interview in the fall of 2013, he started by discussing the vast differences in approaches between his own soldiers and the British soldiers they fought alongside: "Our cultures are so different, and it matters so much."[1] Similarly, when I visited the Italian Force Commander of the Regional Command Capital in the fall of 2009, he told me that one could clearly distinguish between Latin and Anglo-Saxon cultures based on the way soldiers behaved.[2] Field commanders are often well aware of the differences between (and the importance of) the operational styles and military cultures of different armies. These characteristics inform the way commanders plan coordination across contingents; the tactical and operational planning for launching a battle, which might involve two bordering AOs (as was the case for Col. Christmas); or simply the expectations about the security situation in a specific AO. More importantly for this book is that military contingents are deployed along national lines with, in general, limited contacts with military contingents in different AOs and an even more limited sharing of information. This makes comparing operational styles an important area of research in order to understand and explain various military units' behavior. While there is recurring anecdotal evidence that national contingents behave differently in peace and stability operations than in other types of deployments, the issue of variation

in behavior across contingents has received little attention from scholars writing about peace operations, and has been dealt with only implicitly in the security studies literature.[3] This chapter presents the main theoretical building blocks of the book in two steps. The first step is to extrapolate concepts from the existing literature, develop a theory of force employment in peace and stability operations, and use differences in force employment to categorize different kinds of UPOE. The second step is to present the core theory of the book, which focuses on explaining variations in force employment, with reference to military culture as a main factor influencing how soldiers implement their mandate. The theory outlined in this chapter is then tested empirically in Chapters 2–4.

Conceptualizing Military Behavior in Peace and Stability Operations

The Issue with Success in Peace and Stability Operations

The peace and conflict literature has developed sophisticated ways of studying the impact of conflict dynamics on conflict outcomes. With an overall greater emphasis on quantitative approaches, peace and conflict scholars have mapped, analyzed, and tested the dominant components that affect different kinds of conflict-related dependent variables, ranging from conflict termination to conflict outcomes.[4] Explanations of the success and failure of peace operations have been labeled as "structural."[5] In line with the broader peace and conflict tradition, such structural explanations have focused on variables that affect the durability of peace or the level of violence against civilians, such as the nature of hostilities, local and international capacities, and the characteristics of the troops deployed.[6] Recent works have used the number of battle-related deaths to measure the effectiveness of UN peace operations.[7] Through quantitative approaches sometime combined with case studies, scholars have isolated the positive effect of specific factors on a well-specified outcome.[8] While all these structural explanations seem to confirm that "external interventions tend to increase the chances of establishing a durable peace,"[9] these works have failed to explore the conditions, or causal mechanisms, that lead specific characteristics of a phenomenon (or a particular behavior of specific set actors) to result in peace operation

success. In addition, they have only assessed success and failure at the aggregate level.

A smaller set of explanations, called "agent driven," has partly addressed this problem by looking at specific actors involved in those operations, such as belligerents, UN agencies, and NGOs—usually describing their main traits. Unfortunately, however, such studies do not prioritize the measurement of the actual impact.[10] Only Séverine Autesserre, in her recent book *Peaceland*, has analyzed the impact of the everyday politics of intervention on peacebuilding effectiveness. In what she identifies as an "empirical shift," she advocates for a much deeper analysis of the on-the-ground dynamics of external interventions.[11] Such analysis is crucial for understanding how certain agencies' practices affect the effectiveness of various operations, and the mechanisms that ultimately lead to what (at the aggregate level) peacekeeping scholars call success.

The Big Absence: Military Organizations

Neither structural nor agent-driven explanations have studied foreign military organizations in depth.[12] The peace operations literature has surprisingly never debated the conditions under which military organizations operate, whether behavior varies across national militaries, or whether specific patterns of military behavior affect peacekeeping success. Yet military organizations' role in peace operations is eminent, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, military contingents constitute the bulk of most deployed peacekeeping missions. Qualitatively, in most peace operations, military units are assigned to specific AOs and are in charge of implementing the mandate in those areas—centralizing core responsibilities such as maintaining control of the territory, as well as quintessentially political decisions such as deciding where to distribute humanitarian aid, or how to interact with local institutions.

Despite their crucial role in peacekeeping, the peace operations literature has overwhelmingly neglected to consider military organizations' role, behavior, or effectiveness. Some peacekeeping scholars have identified relevant material factors that influence success, which are to some extent tied to the military, such as equipment, vehicles, weapons, munitions, and financial support for humanitarian projects. Yet even these studies fail to study

foreign military organizations as actors with some measure of agency.[13] Fortna's influential work, which partially recognizes the important role of military organizations in peace operations, analyzes the size of the host government's army, but does not consider the size of foreign peacekeeping forces.[14] And in general, most authors largely omit military organizations—national or international—as an object of study. For instance, Doyle and Sambanis offer a sophisticated explanation of peacebuilding success that is based primarily on the nature of the conflict (ethnic/ secular/ religious), the level of economic development and resources available to the host country, and whether the country has a UN peacekeeping operation or financial assistance package.[15]

Even an important recent work by Hultman et al.—which finds that deploying troops, rather than military observers or police, has a positive effect on the protection of civilians—does not take military organizations and their complexity into account.[16] Their research relies on the assumption that the mission type and mandate determine force employment, and does not consider soldiers' interpretation of the mandate or their behavior as variable factors potentially affecting the implementation of the mandate. Thus a review of the peace operations literature leads to the conclusion that the characteristics of military organizations (as an important actor with agency), as well as their behavior and effectiveness, have been neglected.

Following Autesserre's call for an empirical shift, I argue that we can make peace operations more successful—in their ability to save lives, protect civilians, and avoid mass atrocities—by better understanding the on-the-ground dynamics.[17] In particular, I will study the role of military organizations in peace and stability operations and their effectiveness. When I first went to the field working for the UN's reconstruction mission in the Central African Republic in 2006, I was struck by all those soldiers in uniforms from different countries patrolling together with their blue helmets. Sarah, my supervisor within the Human Rights Section, immediately recommended that I address only what she referred to as the "right military guys" for pushing our agenda in denouncing human rights violations, as they had "a pretty incredibly different idea about what they are here for and why."[18] Assuming that military organizations will execute the mandate's orders without interpreting them just because they are hierarchical and fundamentally differ from civilian organizations is simplistic, to say the least. Military organizations' role and contribution in peace operations must be explored

empirically, and understanding how the operating conditions affect military organizations' behavior needs to be theorized.

Force Employment and UPOE

The important question when studying militaries' contributions to peace and stability operations is whether their behavior when applying the mandate affects their effectiveness. In this section, as a first step, I review the existing literature on military behavior and introduce "force employment" as the study's dependent variable. In a second step, I introduce a new concept called UPOE to assess the effectiveness of different units deployed in multinational operations.

Force Employment

The most obvious starting point for understanding whether the same mandate is interpreted and implemented differently is to look at cross-national variation. While we have anecdotal evidence that different military contingents behave differently, the fact that soldiers from different national militaries behave differently in war has received relatively little attention even in the fields that have military organizations as the most obvious object of study—security studies and military sociology.[19] Studies on military behavior, cohesion, and effectiveness in both fields still focus predominantly on "one case, one country," with the exception of a strand of research initiated by sociologist Joseph Soeters.[20] Soeters's work has studied variations in operational styles during peace and stability operations. Saideman and Auerswald's work also provides a partial exception: it focuses on variations in the national caveats (exceptions of mandates) of the various troop contributors to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Saideman and Auerswald have not, however, explored behavioral variations at the tactical level.[21] The question of how systematically behavioral variations occur among different national militaries (and how to theorize them) has never been the subject of a thorough analysis. In order to study such variations, it is important to find a way to conceptualize, categorize, and measure soldiers' behavior on the ground.

I turned to the security studies literature to find out how soldiers' behavior in conventional operations has been conceptualized and to explore

whether any of those concepts could be borrowed to study military behavior in peace and stability operations. The classical literature studying military power has traditionally emphasized material factors, assuming that the amount of resources available will directly impact tactical behavior. Similarly to the peace operations literature, these works also overwhelmingly focus on explaining battle outcomes, rather than examining how military organizations work. They identify numerical military preponderance—which is linked to countries with larger populations, more industrialized economies, and greater military expenditure—as the main factor influencing behavior and thus indirectly leading to victory in battle.[22] Technology is also often emphasized as influencing military capability.[23] However, these two classical determinants of military power—numerical preponderance and technology—do not satisfactorily explain how soldiers behave or why they succeed or fail in battle. They cannot, for example, explain why small, poorly equipped armies have defeated larger and more technologically advanced armies.[24] Other variables, such as motivation, cohesion, and leadership, seem to be influencing the outcome. For instance, despite constant increases in resources and troops during the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan, authors have pointed to alternative factors as responsible for improvements in the security situation, such as the Al-Anbar awakening in Iraq, a factor completely independent of US military strategy.[25]

Only a handful of classical military and security studies works have implicitly argued that the way force is used at the tactical level is an important determinant of effectiveness.[26] McMurry, for example, explains the differences in military effectiveness during the American Civil War between the two largest Confederate armies as a factor of how different military actors—leaders, officers, general officers, and enlisted men—behaved during their operations.[27] Nonetheless, there has been no systematic study of how soldiers do their work when deployed in military operations until quite recently.

The first author to attempt to theorize this type of tactical-level behavior was Stephen Biddle, in his book *Military Power*, which has become one of the most influential pieces of scholarship in political science.[28] Biddle introduced the concept of force employment, which he defines as "the doctrine and tactics by which armies use their material in the field," and uses a variety of methods to study a set of conventional military operations to demonstrate empirically that how material resources are used influences battle outcomes.[29]

Biddle's work on force employment, while originally intended for the study of conventional warfare, should logically have an even clearer application to

low-intensity operations, such as peace and stability and counterinsurgency operations, in which soldiers have a much greater margin of maneuver.

I borrow Biddle's concept of force employment—that is, the specific ways armies employ their material resources on the tactical level[30]—and expand it to capture the broader range of military activities undertaken in peace operations, which may include patrolling, humanitarian work, and responding to enemy fire. Studying peace and stability operations also requires considering a range of nontraditional military activities performed by soldiers in addition to (or instead of) their normal military activities. Thus, in the context of peace and stability operations, force employment refers to the ways in which peacekeepers use their weapons, vehicles, and organizational and social structures to accomplish the various goals of the mission, which may be as diverse as providing humanitarian relief, disarming combatants, controlling territory, and conducting targeted combat operations. I operationalize force employment along five dimensions that cover all activities carried out by soldiers in multinational peace operations—patrols (frequency, timing, and level of armaments), interaction with local military forces, interaction with civilians (including through engagement in humanitarian and development work and civil military coordination [CIMIC] activities), extent of force protection, and command and control. While the military and security studies literature has considered behavioral differences between national militaries in war, there has never been a thorough study of how systematically and persistently these variations occur.[31] Furthermore, neither the peace operations nor the security studies literature has studied behavioral variations within multinational missions.[32]

Ultimately, this research considers force employment as the dependent variable, and seeks to understand what influences how force is employed. However, it is also relevant to consider how force employment influences the effectiveness of each deployed military contingent, and ultimately impacts on the success of the mission as a whole. This book enriches agent-driven explanations of peace operations by specifically focusing on military organizations. I mainly study the force employment of military contingents deployed, but I also make a step forward by evaluating their effectiveness. Studying force employment immediately raises the question, "How does it affect the outcome of the mission?"

Although studies of peace operations and military organizations have both addressed these issues, they fundamentally differ in the way they understand the notion of the success of operations and military effectiveness. In

particular, there seems to be a misunderstanding about what effectiveness means in each of these two fields. In security studies, military effectiveness traditionally refers to assessing behavior without looking at the actual impact on, namely, victory and defeat; in the peace and conflict literature, effectiveness refers to the impact on the ground. As a consequence, works in security studies have emphasized the concept of military effectiveness that is assumed to have an effect on victory and defeat. Interestingly, however, studies on how such effectiveness actually affects outcomes have been lacking. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for observable measures of operational progress. Prior to this, military effectiveness was (and to a great extent still is), in fact, conflated on the behavioral side, "simply" providing ways of measuring behavior.[33] By contrast, the literature on peace and conflict and international relations (IR) in general tends to understand effectiveness as actual impact on the ground.[34]

Weighing the impact of military organizations against other explanations of the success and failure of peace and stability operations is beyond the scope of this book. My book instead draws on the literature on military effectiveness to provide a partial, nonsatisfactory answer to the question of why force employment matters in peace and stability operations.

As a logical step forward, one can wonder what might be the impact of force employment on the general success of peace missions. This book does not offer a definite answer to that question, but explores and proposes a way to comprehend the role of military organizations in relation to the general success of peace and stability operations. Because of the fundamentally different ways in which the security studies and peace and conflict literatures have understood and conceptualized success, we need a bridging concept that can evaluate peacekeeping practices, while at the same time serve as a stepping stone toward understanding what kind of impact force employment might have on the level of violence. To do so, I introduce the UPOE concept, and tease out criteria to be able to assess and categorize the characteristics of different armies' force employment.

UPOE

As Biddle recalls, "Military effectiveness matters chiefly because it shapes military outcomes."[35] Given this book's focus on military organizations, I start by surveying the plethora of scholars who have dealt with military

effectiveness in order to determine which dimensions might be relevant for UPOE. Four strands of literature have attempted to disentangle the concept of military effectiveness: political science, military sociology, military operations research, and military history. Political scientists tend to engage in macro-level analysis and consider the possible factors affecting military effectiveness at the state level. Stephen Rosen, for example, has looked at the impact of society on military effectiveness.[36] Similarly, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam focused on the effects of regime type on military effectiveness, while Biddle and Zirkle looked at differences in civil-military relations in society.[37] As such, this strand of literature conceptualizes military effectiveness as "the capacity to create military power from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size and human capital."[38] But only focusing on strategic, political, and societal factors misses what happens in practice at the tactical level.

Military sociologists, historians, and military operations researchers have, by contrast, emphasized the importance of getting the tactics right for military effectiveness. For these military scholars, it is not only about the projection of military power but also the tactical execution. While my argument draws on the political science literature, it nonetheless borrows this tactical focus from the military sociological literature.

Sociologists have systematically explored the ideational characteristics of effective armies. For example, for Janowitz and Shils, high levels of unit cohesion, such as "interpersonal bonds among soldiers," are typical of effective armies.[39] In contrast, Bartov considers that high levels of indoctrination to the Nazi ideology explain the "barbarisation" of warfare conducted against the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa between 1941 and 1945. The Eastern Front ended with a Russian victory, but the indoctrination of German soldiers largely explains German military effectiveness at the beginning of the war.[40] Similarly, Castillo posits that individual initiative, discipline, courage, and nationalism explain a nation's determination—and, hence, effectiveness—in war.[41] More recently, King has identified professionalization as a crucial factor to understand cohesion.[42] The "individual and small-unit behavior" focus of sociological explanations is useful for my study of tactical behavior.[43] Such explanations tend, however, to adopt an overly narrow focus on one or two factors and to conflate cohesion, military performance, and effectiveness, three concepts usually considered distinct by positivist security studies scholars.[44]

Military operations research, in contrast, provides a more comprehensive and systematic understanding of military effectiveness, focusing on the tactical level of war, although its emphasis on hard assets neglects important organizational and ideational dimensions.[45] Military historians provide a partial solution to this issue. While often criticized for being overly contextual, Millet and Williamson support their conceptualization with a comprehensive theoretical model that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of different armies. They combine a formal model to evaluate strategic, operational, and tactical military effectiveness with relevance attributed to the context.[46]

Political scientists Brooks and Stanley built on Millet and Williamson's work in their *Creating Military Power* and identified four important sets of indicators of military effectiveness at the tactical level: "level of integration of military activity within and across different levels; level of responsiveness to internal constraints and to the external environment; level of skills (such 'as motivation and basic competencies of personnel'); and quality of assets deployed (meaning 'calibre of state's weapons and equipment')."[47]

These indicators offer a valuable starting point for analyzing soldiers' force employment at the tactical level. However, the context of peace and stability operations differs significantly from traditional military operations, and thus may require some adaptation in three main areas. First, there are limited opportunities to use force in peace operations: since peacekeepers are not a party to the conflict, they are not supposed to fight belligerent parties, but instead to operate within the limits imposed by the mandate. Mandates often entail activities, such as reconstruction work or humanitarian aid, that go beyond strictly military, combat-oriented skills. Second, the objective of peace and stability operations is not military victory through the defeat of an enemy, but rather "establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided," to put it in General Sir Rupert Smith's words.[48] Third, in contrast to traditional military operations, it is not possible to establish a single "type" of effectiveness for peace and stability operations: there is no single set of characteristics one can use as a metric to determine that one army will be more effective than another in such a mission. Rather, the effectiveness of units in peace and stability operations can be analyzed along varying dimensions, which results in different typologies of effectiveness because the objectives vary between peace operations more than they do for conventional military operations. Peace operations vary not only in their context and the type of conflict, but also in the type of mandate, the core

objectives, and the conditions under which armies are deployed. In conventional operations, the core objective is to achieve victory. By contrast, in a traditional peacekeeping operation such as UNIFIL II, humanitarian and development projects are more important than controlling territory, because making sure that the population is not supporting Hezbollah is more urgent than securing a territory that is already stabilized. Yet security conditions are so precarious for ISAF that traditional military skills are in greater demand to ensure control of the territory. Nonetheless, control of territory in Afghanistan can also be pursued through humanitarian instruments, such as humanitarian aid delivery. Thus, indicators of effectiveness in peace operations vary in importance in different contexts, and the standards of peace operation effectiveness must be adapted to and negotiated for each mission.

I propose a new concept, UPOE, which measures and categorizes the effectiveness of each single unit deployed in its AO. UPOE does not measure the outcome of a mission as a success or failure. Instead, it categorizes and evaluates a single component (force employment—i.e., soldiers' behavior), which together with other factors will lead to an outcome of success or failure. UPOE is situational and multidimensional, and it lies on a continuum that includes various degrees of attainment and typologies of effectiveness.[49] Consequently, there can be various degrees of attainment of different subgoals within the same mission. UPOE has the advantage of producing an evaluation of force employment that allows for comparison. UPOE assesses how well each unit under study scores for each indicator identified. It is located at the unit level because, generally speaking, contingents of different sizes are deployed as units in their respective AO. In the remainder of this section, I derive different indicators from the classical literature on military effectiveness and adapt them to develop the concept of UPOE.

The four indicators used by Brooks and Stanley and Millet and Williamson (integration, responsiveness, skills, and quality) must be adapted to the new context described above.[50] In addition to traditional combat abilities, the indicators should include reconstruction, logistical, and humanitarian skills. Soldiers in peace operations may be required, for example, to assist in reconstructing civilian infrastructure, undertaking humanitarian rescue operations, or providing humanitarian support such as the delivery of food, medication, water, and clothing, or launching social or agricultural projects. These activities require a much wider set of military and nonmili-

tary skills, ranging from empathy to the ability to identify core military and nonmilitary objectives.

Responsiveness, defined as the ability to react to the enemy's tactics in a conventional context, should be expanded to include the ability to interact with the local population and adapt to their needs and requests. Similarly, integration includes not only integration between the strategic, tactical, and operational aspects of combat activities, but also activities related to humanitarian aid and reconstruction. In addition to adapting the four indicators of military effectiveness to the peace operations context, an additional indicator is necessary—interoperability. Interoperability—having the necessary tools and skills to operate and communicate with other military organizations—is necessary for armies working in multinational contexts, where a single, multinational operational headquarters coordinates the activities of each AO, as is frequently the case for modern peace operations. Thus, the indicators for UPOE are responsiveness, integration, military and nonmilitary skills, quality, and interoperability; and each ranges from low to high.

In practice, each deployed contingent will score differently on the UPOE indicators, either because they perform different activities than other organizations or do some things better than others. A perfectly effective unit serving in a peace operation should be highly responsive; well integrated; have high military, humanitarian, and logistic skills; have high-quality weapons and munitions; and be interoperable with units from other countries to conduct both joint combat operations and joint humanitarian projects. This construct should, however, be understood as an ideal type in the Weberian sense, meaning that it does not necessarily correspond to an empirical reality. According to Weber, "an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct."[51] In practice, I expect few military units to score highly on all of these indicators, since, for example, strong combat skills are not normally associated with strong humanitarian skills (or at least, armies have to prioritize between the two in practice). The same trade-off exists within kinds of quality and interoperability: the allocation of resources for materiel, such as bulletproof vests, will be different in quality according to how humanitarian and combat roles are prioritized. Similarly, interoperability in humanitarian actions is different from interoperability

in combat. Responsiveness and integration can vary from low to high, and they are required at a high level for both combat operations and peace operations. Yet the ability to adapt and implement orders is different in a peace operation versus a kinetic mission. For example, responsiveness might mean understanding what the population needs in terms of humanitarian assistance in a peace operation, while in combat it might be related to the need to adapt to the rapidly changing enemy's tactics.

Such an ideal type makes it possible to compare the effectiveness of various armies with the ideal type and develop different typologies of effectiveness. The empirical observations of the French and Italian units in my two case studies (UNIFIL II and ISAF) give rise to two different typologies. While in Lebanon it might have been more important for the military unit to be humanitarian effective, in Afghanistan combat effectiveness might have been more important. A unit is humanitarian effective when it is responsive but not well integrated (i.e., considerable leverage is attributed to individual initiatives of patrolling and CIMIC teams at the tactical level), has high humanitarian and logistic skills, dedicates its resources to humanitarian projects, and coordinates well with other armies for joint humanitarian projects. In contrast, a unit that is combat effective will score low in responsiveness—because it would be less adaptable—but high in integration. It has strong (mainly military) skills, good-quality military equipment and munitions, and coordinates well with other armies for joint combat operations. It would still need to present traits that are specific to low-intensity operations, such as contacts and interaction with the locals, but its strengths are more applicable to conventional military effectiveness.

In the two case studies, the French units tended to be more combat effective, and were thus more effective along dimensions such as integration and military skills, whereas the Italian units were more effective in responsiveness and humanitarian skills. Within each typology, each unit had strengths and weaknesses. Thus, the Italian and French units were differently effective, meaning they had different capabilities and strengths in different areas, and in fact different profiles.

UPOE is also inherently mission specific and situation specific. First, it is contingent on the mission's characteristics: the standards of effectiveness change according to the type of conflict. For example, peace operations aim to use specific instruments to solve particular types of problems—primarily protecting civilians or making sure humanitarian aid is provided, or that the security situation is stabilized. But UPOE is also AO-specific. In Afghani-

Table 1. Two Empirically Derived Typologies of Peace Operation Effectiveness

| | Types of Effectiveness | | |
Indicators of Effectiveness	Humanitarian Effectiveness	Combat/Security Effectiveness	Peace Operation Effectiveness (Ideal type)
Responsiveness	High	Low	High
Integration	Low	High	High
Skills	Emphasis on humanitarian, logistics	Military	The appropriate combination
Quality	Humanitarian and development projects	Munitions and equipment	High
Interoperability	Coordination for humanitarian and civil-military coordination project	Coordination for security operations	Great coordination skills in both

stan, the standards of UPOE required in Regional Command South were different from those required in Regional Command North. Thus, different evaluative standards of UPOE are required. Table 1 summarizes UPOE indicators as well as two potential empirical types of UPOE and the UPOE ideal type.

UPOE is a way to evaluate and categorize force employment in order to compare units' force employment with each other. It seeks to bridge the gap between (1) how well the military does things on the ground and (2) their impact in the field. Biddle stresses that in conventional operations, "other things being equal, 'effective' militaries ought to win more often than ineffective ones."[52] Writing about counterinsurgency, Nagl similarly points out that "the army contributes to a large degree to determine whether victory in the campaign is attained and the army contributes materially to the determination of which tasks it can and it cannot do and how and why."[53] This allows us to link what the soldiers do (and how well they are doing it), on the one hand, with the actual impact in the field, on the other hand. UPOE should be consistent with outcome indicators. In the empirical chapters, I try to connect the assessment of UPOE for each unit studied

with the available data on the impact of the army studied in their respective AOs.

Explaining Variations in Force Employment:
A Culturalist Explanation

In the second half of this chapter, I develop a theory of how military culture influences the observed variations in force employment. I begin by reflecting on how my understanding of military culture relates to previous works on culture. I then discuss the novelty of my contribution and the theory that explains how military culture emerges from domestic political configurations—and how it influences soldiers' behavior.

The Glorious Past of the Literature on Culture

Though this book focuses specifically on military culture, it builds on a long-lasting tradition of broader studies about culture. Contested and influential at the same time, culture is a notoriously difficult concept to define and study. As early as 1944, Kluckhohn provided eleven different definitions of culture in the *Mirror for Man*.[54] Political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists have all written about culture. My conceptualization is drawn predominantly from the field of political science, and security studies in particular, but borrows some components from military sociology and anthropology to fit its specific focus on military organizations at the tactical level of operations.

In political science, culture has traditionally been considered an important but fundamentally residual explanation. The debate about political culture flourished in the 1950s, drawing inspiration from the field of anthropology, and then declined in prominence in the 1970s and resurged in the 1990s.[55] Almond and Verba defined political culture as "a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place."[56] Similarly, for Pye, political culture was "the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals currently making up the system."[57] Thus political culture was thought to affect the context in which political action takes place, and thus indirectly influence political action. As such, political culture was a combination of long-lasting beliefs transmitted through history

and lessons learned, and common past experiences of being part of the group under study. Socialization and learning were two crucial components of the concept.[58] These classical works found it difficult to develop compelling causal explanations because the boundaries of groups bearing a certain culture were not clear, and these scholars' understanding of culture was static and broad.[59] These classical studies brought culture to the forefront, and were accused either of being overly deterministic or not entirely convincing scientifically; afterward, studies on culture became rare.

The specific concepts of "strategic" and "military" cultures became hot topics in the IR subfield of security studies in the early 1980s, in conjunction with a broader interest in ideational concepts. Most authors treated strategic and military culture as distinct, but similar, concepts. Strategic culture is "a unique combination of geographic setting, historical experiences, and political culture which shapes the formation of beliefs about the use of force," whereas military culture is "assessed according to ideas and beliefs about how to wage war."[60] Strategic culture is thus located at a higher level of analysis, while military culture can be studied at the unit, service, or armed forces level.

Johnston identifies three generations of scholars dealing with cultural issues in the security studies field. The first generation includes those writing in the early 1980s such as Snyder depicting the Soviet strategic culture, and Gray and Jacobsen writing books on nuclear strategy and Soviet defense, respectively.[61] For this generation of scholarship, strategic culture was a monolithic concept including almost all possible explanatory variables. Culture included patterns of behavior and therefore inevitably fell into a tautological trap. In line with the broader literature on culture, the relationship between strategic culture and behavior was conceived as deterministic and hard to change. These theoretical issues made it difficult to operationalize the concept of culture and develop observable indicators. The second generation explored the issue of the instrumentalization of strategic culture to pursue strategic choices.[62] In contrast to the first generation, they viewed strategic culture as closely linked to history. Yet they did not attribute causal autonomy to culture.

A third generation emerged in the 1990s, which focused on a more rigorous understanding of strategic and military culture.[63] Importantly, these scholars explicitly excluded behavior from their definition of military culture. They focused on recent practices and experiences rather than long-term history. According to Johnston, this third generation's work had two major advantages. First, it avoided determinism: on the one hand, authors used a definition of culture that was completely separate from the behavior they

wanted to explain, while on the other hand, they allowed for cultural variation. Second, they engaged in competitive theory testing. Consequently, third-generation studies on strategic and military cultures are theoretically and methodologically stronger than those from the first and second generations. Still, third-generation scholars use cultural explanations in a residual way, combining them with other theories, such as the domestic balance of power, as in the case of Kier.

Aside from a few exceptions, the literature on strategic and military cultures reached a stalemate around the early 2000s.[64] A group of scholars lead by Gray advocated a more complex and broader understanding of culture with no room for causality, while another group continued in line with the third generation without providing any persuasive solution to the assumption that culture was a monolithic bloc emerging from nowhere.[65] Since the debate over military and strategic culture seems to have reached a stalemate in terms of its ability to address its over-determinism and failure to isolate cultural effects, other disciplines might provide fresh insights and perspectives.[66]

Anthropologists, historians, and military sociologists have approached military and strategic cultures in ways that security studies scholars have overlooked. Historian Isabel Hull explains this lack of dialogue with reference to the fact that military sociology mostly studies military organizations during peacetime, whereas scholarships using a military cultural approach focus on wartime.[67] Yet some classical works on military sociology focus on armies during wartime, such as Stouffer's *American Soldier*, whereas many works in security studies focus on peacetime, such as Kier's *Imagining War*.[68] Whatever the reason for such lack of dialogue, an important distinction is that sociologists and anthropologists have paid little attention to the state or formal politics, focusing instead on small communities.[69] Indeed, military anthropologists and sociologists do not engage much with the institution-centered approach in security studies.[70] The same can be said for authors working in the security studies field.[71] Yet the subjects largely overlap, and each discipline could greatly benefit from the others. From a positivist security studies perspective, the sociological approach is useful but also insufficient: it does not problematize the interplay between culture and behavior; its extremely micro-level focus neglects the higher-level dynamics that are at the core of security studies scholars' explanations. Still, the debate on culture in security studies could be greatly enriched by a greater focus on cultural practices at the small unit level, and on how military cultures influence the perceptions and construction of the surrounding context on the ground.[72]

Similarly to anthropology, military sociology has conceptualized culture in a nuanced and sophisticated fashion, which has proven a useful inspiration for the conceptualization of culture in this book.[73] Military sociology has traditionally used three different perspectives for the study of military culture, which emphasize different aspects: integration, differentiation, and fragmentation. The integration perspective emphasizes how "culture is seen as a pattern of thoughts and priorities gluing all members of the group together in a consistent and clear manner."[74] By contrast, the differentiation perspective highlights the existence of subcultures within the group or organization, such as service and gender, and ranks subcultures. The fragmentation perspective seeks to integrate the previous two views, combining "the general frames of reference within the group or organization" and its "multiplicity of views."[75] Military culture is probably more heterogeneous than security studies scholars have argued; it exists in a turbulent environment and must change and adapt to new circumstances. In fact, the "differentiation perspective seems more attractive: a certain kind of heterogeneity precludes 'organizational myopia.' "[76] Armed forces today are involved in different types of operations, ranging from traditional cease-fire observation to counterinsurgency; therefore, a higher degree of heterogeneity enhances adaptation and internal dialogue. Sociologists and anthropologists are also able to show the several faces of the military, pointing at the same time at the common features that shape military culture (cohesion, communal character of life in uniform, hierarchy, discipline) as well as the characteristics that frame differences within the group. As such, they are able to show how army cultural traits resonate at the unit level, and vice versa. From this perspective, military culture provides ideational means to an organization, as well as attitudes and orientations; it provides a tool kit of symbols, stories, rituals, and worldviews that people may use in varying configurations to solve different problems. Culture is ideational, and includes a set of notions about how the world works that become naturalized, obvious, and unquestionable. At the same time, these assumptions provide ways of organizing action.

Military Culture 2.0

Writing within the security studies field, but drawing inspiration from studies in sociology and anthropology, I argue that military culture is an important factor that drives variations in force employment. I define military

culture as a core set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, and values that become deeply embedded in a military unit and the national army to which it belongs.

Military culture is typically studied at a single level, for instance, as elaborated by high-level officials, or at the branch, division, or unit level.[77] Johnston is the only scholar who implicitly recognized the existence of a multilevel interaction.[78] As national military contingents tend to deploy a particular military unit to each AO, those units are the only available focal points to study practices of force employment in operations. Though it is uncontested that different subcultures exist within military organizations (for instance, at the unit level), this book demonstrates that a relatively consistent military culture, identifiable by important cultural traits, exists across different units of the same army serving in different international missions. When deployed units make tactical decisions about how to execute the mandate for their mission, they are acting in line with a unit-specific interpretation of broader general beliefs, values, and attitudes shared at the level of the national army.

Military culture is closely related to the national origins of a military unit, and operates as a filter between domestic political configurations and the way the military behaves in the field. This filter is independent of the local conditions in which the soldiers are deployed; it excludes certain actions from the realm of possibility and shapes the courses of action that are adopted. Military culture helps translate fixed threat assessments into tactical choices. Military cultures may lead units to bring certain tactics to the field and maintain them over time, even when practice proves them to be less efficient or ineffective in the context. My conception of military culture is in line with the third generation of military culture scholars who see culture and behaviors as distinct and causally related factors. Such understanding of military culture contributes to the debate about the ideational turn in IR, and in particular the culturalist one, in two ways.[79]

This book's first contribution to the literature on military culture is to trace the causal mechanism through which military culture influences behavior. Even though the constructivist approach has become more empirical in recent years, few scholars have explored the mechanisms through which culture affects military behavior. I conceive the mechanism as follows: when a military unit deploys, the values, beliefs, norms, and attitudes that constitute its military culture shape the way it perceives the context it operates in, which in turn guides the choices made by units in the field, within the freedom of maneuver that exists after mandates, material conditions,

and objective threat levels are accounted for. For instance, different national units deployed in the same context interpret their enemy, the nature of their mission, standards of appropriate behavior, and threat levels very differently. These perceptions are strongly consistent with how soldiers behave and with their respective army military cultures. Training, SOPs, and doctrines are unable to account for all these variations. The causal mechanism proposed here helps move beyond the Gray-Johnston debate and take a step toward theorizing cultural influence on military behavior.[80]

The book's second contribution to the culturalist turn in IR is that it counters the tendency to treat military culture as a monolithic variable.[81] By doing so, it goes beyond the existing literature by trying to pinpoint where military culture comes from, and by describing how it emerged within its respective domestic context.[82] Military culture is constituted by inertial and deeply ingrained beliefs that can, however, evolve over time as the meaning and understanding of these fundamental cultural tenets adapt to new specific domestic contexts. This raises questions such as "What constitutes military culture in the first place" and "How do different components of military culture interact and become synthesized into a specific configuration of military culture?" Understanding how culture adapts to modified domestic conditions is a first step toward avoiding the over-determinism found in some studies about military and strategic cultures.[83] It also helps understand how military organizations learn how to navigate within domestic conditions and how they might become entrapped in their military cultures.

The Sources of Military Culture

Military cultures do not emerge from nowhere. For a long time, the military culture literature has failed to progress the question of where military culture comes from.[84]

I combine historical-institutionalist theories, which are not typically referenced in security studies and comparative politics literatures, to provide an initial answer to this question.[85] While historical-institutionalist arguments run the risk of becoming difficult to falsify and over-deterministic, my scope is to use institutionalist insights to understand how military culture emerged in its current version and what sustained its persistence. I contend that military cultures are derived from the domestic political configurations of their respective countries. In this book, I show how military

culture, with well-defined traits, emerges in line with two specific sets of domestic conditions, usually following a critical juncture—primarily policies about the armed forces and their relationship with civilian decision-making and society.[86] I hypothesize that military cultures acquire new salient traits or provide new meanings to old ones in response to new domestic conditions. Some specific beliefs, such as the importance of professionalism, may become more important, while others may fall out of fashion. I selected two sets of domestic political conditions that are the most relevant in the domestic context that gives rise to military culture: societal beliefs about the use of force, and traditions of civil-military relations. These two conditions include both material (such as institutions and procedures) and ideational factors (such as norms and beliefs).

Widely shared beliefs about the conditions under which the use of force is acceptable (and for what purposes) influence how civilian decision makers structure, shape, and react to foreign and defense policies. The literature on casualty aversion has overwhelmingly focused on particular narratives about specific missions and the conditions that affect the levels of support for those missions.[87] Many scholars have argued that the prospects of success affect tolerance to casualties: "casualties are the central force behind opposition to war, and defeat phobia makes people less tolerant of casualties."[88] For others, casualty aversion—that is, a government unwillingness to take risks—is closely correlated with levels of public sensitivity to military and civilian casualties. Public levels of casualty sensitivity cannot simply be categorized as high or low; contextual factors about how (and from where) the sensitivity has developed are also important.[89] In this book, I focus on a rather broad range of societal beliefs about the use of force. Societal beliefs about the use of force are constituted by three indicators: (1) the propensity to intervene in an out-of-area operation, (2) the kind of intervention considered to be appropriate (i.e., combat or peacekeeping, unilateral or multilateral), and (3) to what extent the public is adverse to casualties in war and other types of international interventions. These beliefs need to be understood in the broader context of their relations with civilian decision makers and the armed forces. Beliefs about interventions are nested into broader narratives and conditions concerning the legitimacy of the armed forces in contemporary society; the historical acceptability of military organizations in society, and in relation to the founding myths of the country; and the level of proximity between civilians and soldiers (for instance, through the existence of conscription).

The second condition is the domestic model of civil-military relations that applies. In democratic regimes, the military is subordinate to civilian control and two broad typologies determine the level of military input: (1) the civilian supremacy model, in which civilians do not want the military to intervene in any way in military decisions and grant very little voice to high-ranking officers, or (2) the professional supremacy model, in which civilian decision makers acknowledge and value military officers' inputs to decisions related to security and defense and tolerate opinions publicly expressed by the military.[90] I expect that military culture, which is inherently inertial because it is grounded in deeply ingrained beliefs, will adapt to the new historical context emerging from the critical juncture and reproduce itself by reinterpreting and renegotiating some of its traits to better fit into the new environment. In some extreme cases, such as a regime change, military culture may have to change almost completely, such as the Wehrmacht in 1957.

Societal beliefs about the use of force and the specific character of civil-military relations are the constraints within which military culture emerges and become inertial and deeply ingrained. When structural changes occur, for instance professionalization or new kinds of operations, the culture will attempt to develop while retaining its allegiance to the primary domestic conditions in which the culture emerged. In this book, however, I demonstrate that these two domestic conditions are not sufficient to explain how soldiers behave. Organizations respect constraints, but also develop and work around them.

Military culture crystallizes a well-specified set of attitudes, beliefs, and values that restricts the set of conceivable courses of action once soldiers are deployed in peace and stability operations. Figure 1 illustrates how the military culture influences (and is influenced by) domestic conditions to affect mission success.

Because of its inertia and over-determinism, military culture is often treated as a catch-all variable. This section discusses how, as a concept, military culture is a construct into which the members of the organization are socialized.


Figure 1. Influence of military culture on mission success.

Socialization into Military Culture

Military culture is a type of organizational culture, meaning it is shared by a group of individuals belonging to an organization. It is a collective concept that is distinct from national culture and strategic culture. While it may share some traits with national culture, it is much narrower and specific to a military organization. Likewise, it is different from strategic culture, which refers to ideas and beliefs collectively held by civilian policy makers instead of members of a military organization.

It is important to understand how members of a military organization are socialized into military culture, as such a culture can provide a tool kit for action only if the members are socialized into it. Yet are all soldiers equally socialized into the culture? First, the characteristics of military organizations make socialization very likely to occur. Like other "total" institutions, military organizations function on the basis of shared beliefs, a strong sense of hierarchy, and a closed-career principle at their core. New members are recruited and indoctrinated into the core mission of the unit: this assures cultural continuity. Promotions within the military have no real external competition and are based on limited external veto, meaning that members of the organization usually decide progression of junior members. In this sense, military culture is more homogeneously distributed among members than, for instance, political culture among members of the political elite.

Two aspects could weaken socialization into military culture. On the one hand, as Moskos reminds us, armies are becoming more open to society.[91] This could lead to a different degree of socialization or "embeddedness" into military culture. On the other hand, the professionalization of the armed forces is leading to increasing specialization within each service, such as logistics, or "special forcification," which promotes the development of subcultures. Military culture is most pronounced at the operational and tactical levels because symbols, traditions, beliefs, attitudes, and values related to the organization are a powerful tool to keep the troops cohesive and help them manage difficult operational situations on the ground. At the operational and tactical levels, the focus of this book, soldiers are much more likely to be socialized as the theory expects, especially given the heightened situation of being deployed together on a mission.

Competing Explanations

Since other factors besides culture and domestic conditions could explain the observed variations in soldiers' behavior in peace and stability operations, this book takes into account as many potential intervening factors and competing theories as possible.[92] As theories explaining behavior are scarce in the literature on peace and stability operations, I draw on broader IR theories for competing explanations, primarily from the rationalist paradigm—theories of realism, bureaucratic politics, SOPs, and military leadership theory. I test versions of these theories at the organizational level, which is the most relevant to the question under study. I also test a theory of military leadership, focusing on differences at the individual (rather than unit) level. Factors derived from realist theory are already controlled for through the case selection. I have selected cases with similar characteristics in terms of material resources, mandate, ROE, type of threat level, doctrines, and training.

The difference between military culture and doctrine deserves some further clarifications. Military doctrine is "an authoritative expression of a military's fundamental approach to fighting wars and influencing events in operations other than war."[93] However, "analyses of military action and decision making derived solely from doctrines will miss much of the actual motivation and most of the tension, dysfunction and irrationality that frequently occur in military organizations."[94] At the same time, doctrines should not be neglected: they are one of the determinants of the variations in force employment and—indirectly—military effectiveness. Therefore, this research not only focuses on patterns in practices, but also on a "group's language, myths, explanations of events, Standard Operating Procedures, doctrines."[95] Today, most Western armies (and many non-Western armies) dedicate a specific section in their doctrines to peacekeeping. The French and Italian armies do, and in Chapters 3 and 4 I show further how their military doctrines are extremely similar. Military doctrines are shaped by culture, the domestic balance of power, and the internationalization of military procedures, particularly in Western countries.[96] A change in military doctrine can reflect military cultural change, while continuity in doctrine may indicate cultural continuity. Alternatively, an innovative doctrine may not mirror a cultural change in the military, but instead reflect an adaptation to international norms. According to Kier, military doctrines are only rarely designed in response to the international security environment and its development; this influence depends on how the military organization

perceives the constraints set by civilians and how they cope with them.[97] In this way, changes in doctrine can occur notwithstanding the continuity in military culture.[98] In this book, I study how military cultures differ from one another, and observe that they are largely independent from military doctrines.

Army training is another important dimension that differs from military culture. The secondary literature shows that training is partly shaped by culture, yet is distinct from it. Sion, for instance, shows that even well-trained members of the military are not trained for the role they have to perform, as training templates still very much depend on military culture.[99] The way training is conducted is shaped partly by culture and partly by other factors, such as the availability of resources and the internationalization of Western armies. The French and Italian units received some specific training together before deploying, and they often trained together with other NATO countries. By tracing the basic characteristics of the training that each unit received, I show how similar this training was, which I control for by observing how the training differs from the practice.

For bureaucratic politics theory, I select a version of organizational interests theory related to military organizations, which argues that military organizations develop preferred ways of behaving in order to control and coordinate the contributions of large numbers of sub-units. I test two particular variants of this theory: that military organizations pursue their agenda either by increasing (a) their prestige and legitimacy or (b) their relative power, for instance by seeking an upgrade in military equipment or an increase in resources. According to this competing explanation, different armies behave differently because they pursue different interests in order to increase their prestige, legitimacy, or power. With respect to SOP theory, I test to see whether the units have different procedures and standardized ways of operating that could explain the behavioral variations. According to this alternative explanation, different armies behave differently because they have different procedures and standardized ways of doing things. Finally, military leadership theory holds that military leaders can "stretch constraints and this process requires determination and skill as well as opportunity."[100] According to this explanation, different armies behave differently because they have leaders with different approaches who order different kinds of behavior.

The next chapter focuses on the French and Italian military cultures and how they emerged.

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French and Italian Military Cultures

This chapter describes the domestic political conditions under which distinct military cultures emerged in France and Italy in the decades following World War II. It presents the main traits of these army cultures and explores the characteristics of the units studied in Lebanon and Afghanistan. This provides the historical-institutionalist background for the following chapters on the recent operational histories of French and Italian troops in Lebanon and Afghanistan, that describe how their military cultures shaped the perceptions of the deployed units and how they influenced what soldiers did on the ground.

Exploring the Roots of the Current Italian Military Culture

The current Italian army military culture emerged from a slow process of transformation that was completed in the early 1990s. This process originated in the controversial and widely debated postwar period of 1947–1949. This phase was a critical juncture—a period of radical break with the past that led to a completely new domestic political configuration, particularly concerning the relationship between the armed forces, civilian decision makers, and society. This new political configuration was based on strong societal beliefs rejecting war and militarism, and on the marginalization of the armed forces from civilian decision-making processes. These two components led to the emergence, in the early 1990s, of a specific army military culture based on the idea—true or instrumental—that Italian soldiers were "good humanitarians." This core value was the result of a reinterpretation of the idea of Italian soldiers as good people (*brava gente*) and the quest for

legitimacy in the post–World War II period. This section describes the historical process that led to the critical juncture in 1947–1949, the resulting political configuration, and how it eventually shaped a unique army culture that functionally served the organization. I then reflect on how this army culture is manifested in the specific unit traits of the battalions deployed in Lebanon and Afghanistan.

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The Critical Juncture in Italy: A Disbanded Army
in a Disbanded Nation?

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This section elucidates the complex set of conditions that led to the post–World War II critical juncture in Italy. For reasons that still remain partly unknown, Italian troops came to consider themselves (and to be considered as) ineffective soldiers but good people during World War I and the colonial campaigns. The "good soldier" belief spread quickly and became an important identification marker. The Italian armed forces also enjoyed broad popularity and legitimacy, and were perceived as the apolitical defenders of the nation.[1]

In the interwar period, Italy shared many of the challenges of other European countries, namely growing economic hardship, unemployment, and the rise of nationalism, which in Italy became strongly coupled with the bitter issue of *irredentismo*—a movement to reclaim territories that were lost (allegedly unjustly) during World War I. During that war, Italy changed sides in 1915 and fought against the Central Powers, to which it had been allied at the beginning, and thus ranked among the winning powers at the end of the war. But the general understanding was that it had not gained enough and that the victory was "mutilated, debased and demonized."[2] Taking advantage of a general climate of frustration, in 1924 Mussolini staged a coup d'etat and enforced an autocratic dictatorship, which maintained—but marginalized—the monarchy.

Historian Marco Mondini recently illustrated the military's non-negligible role in mobilizing against the so-called "anti-nationalist" leftist parties after World War I and supporting the coup, which contrasts with the perceived traditional apolitical orientation—at the time—of the Italian military.[3] At the time, the military was a popular, highly influential institution that was very close to the king. The fascist dictatorship gave greater public visibility to the armed forces, as it celebrated the values of militarism

and military skills and capabilities.[4] Yet the collusion between the military and the dictatorship, although very natural, should not be exaggerated; it was far from an "idyllic marriage."[5] Mussolini tried to divide and control the military, thus "inflicting some huge attacks against the jealous independence of the military world," in line with what Hitler did with the Wehrmacht.[6] Even before the decision to intervene in World War II, several high-level generals expressed their concerns to Mussolini about fighting in a war for which they had not prepared enough.

During World War II, when Italy was allied with Nazi Germany, the army was deployed in Northern and Eastern Africa, the Balkans, and Russia. The army managed to win some battles but was defeated in most of them.[7] These defeats, combined with growing public discontent and dissent within the Fascist Party, resulted in the fall of the Mussolini regime in July 1943—which marked the beginning of the fragmentation between the armed forces, civilian decision makers, and society. The period until the end of the war profoundly changed the army's sense of its own mission, as well as society's trust in it.

After Mussolini was ousted, the Italian armed forces continued to fight alongside Germany until the new Italian prime minister, General Badoglio, signed an armistice with the Allies on September 5, made public on September 8; Italy was declared a "cobelligerent nation." In the aftermath of the armistice, confusion reigned within the armed forces.[8] Some units continued fighting alongside the Germans, while others disbanded, went home, or joined the resistance. Many soldiers perceived the armistice as a traumatizing and confusing event, including those who were not fighting at the front.

It was a terrible defeat for the military—particularly for the army: the perception was that the organization had failed to fulfill its mission. As the official Italian Army history explains, "obliged to the armistice, the Army was terribly defeated on September 8."[9] Rossi argues that Italy was a "disbanded nation" (*allo sbando*), and a civil war ensued between partisans fighting the liberation war against the German troops that had occupied Northern Italy, and former fascist leaders.[10] These events created an irreparable disconnect between the military, civilian decision makers, and the rest of society.[11] In this context, the military, in line with its tradition, became strongly associated with the monarchy, and the resistance movement was linked to the republic. According to some, "the military had let down its own people."[12] Other, more nuanced, interpretations argue that "the Italian armed forces started to lose their credibility . . . when they stopped being perceived as the

incarnation of the nation and took up one side, only one component among the many fighting in the Italian civil war."[13] For four main reasons, this was one of the most dramatic points in Italian history, not only because of the suffering imposed on the civilian population, but also due to the general sense of disorientation it created and the pluralistic, democratic, and "creative" new equilibrium that emerged.

First, the founding myth of the new republic was based on a solid convergence between the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party, and their shared value of pacifism. Article 11 of the 1948 Constitution of the newly established Republic clearly states that "Italy rejects war as a means of settling international disputes."[14] In such context, the military had to be contained: "The political elite involved in the reconstruction agreed that in the future, Italy could not and should not give military power a central role in its foreign policy."[15] At the same time, the armed forces were given the important role of the guarantor of stability.

Second, the Italian armed forces entered a profound moral crisis, which is considered to be unique in Europe.[16] Overall, partly because of the military's inability to adapt to the changing role asked of the armed forces, partly because of the difficulties of purifying the armed forces of its fascist infiltration and of integrating resistant organizations into military ranks, there was the widespread public perception of a link between the armed forces, the monarchy, and the regime, which set the foundation for the events following 1943.[17] Marco Mondini argues that even the Wehrmacht was perceived to be cleaner and less colluded than the Italian armed forces. In this climate of general distrust, the Italian army was unable to renounce to its traditional role as "priest of the nation" and prestige attached to it: "It was like a priest that had lost its sacred aura: tired and without conviction, it was repeating old rituals, unable to engage, to trigger emotion and mainly to unite as it used to do."[18]

Third, the dramatic transition in the immediate post–World War II era provoked "the most profound reshaping of the relations between state, society and the armed forces in the history of unified Italy."[19] The events following the fall of the fascist dictatorship created a peculiar political spectrum in Italy that became deeply polarized, triggering unusual relationships between the right and the left; the military came to be strongly associated with the extreme right.[20] For instance, referring to the 1943–1945 period as the liberation war carries a profound antimilitaristic legacy to this day. Similarly, the

role of the resistors and former fascists during the 1943–1945 period still provokes heated debates. The 1946 referendum, in which Italians opted for a republican system of government, reiterated the military's inability to be perceived as an apolitical body.[21]

Fourth, Italy dealt with the issue of memory of the war and its aftermath in a completely different way to a country like Germany. Although the majority of Italians had accepted fascist rule, Allied officers testified to the difficulty of finding a single fascist immediately after September 1943.[22] The Italian people were never considered to be collectively responsible for the fascist totalitarian regime. Rather, the period "was marginalized in the memory of those who lived under the regime and virtually obliterated from the official history of the Italian post-war republic."[23] According to Italian liberal philosopher Benedetto Croce, fascism was an external virus that penetrated Italian history.[24] The myth of the fascist regime as a fundamentally benign dictatorship became quite dominant despite its disconnect from reality. Unlike Germany, Italy never faced its controversial past, only partly because the collusion between the people, the regime, the military, and the preexisting political institutions had not been equally systematic. Instead, the new republic was founded on "public amnesia"[25] and the myth of "the resistance," a strong antiwar framework and the obliviousness of the many people who had supported the fascist regime. As a consequence, the armed forces did not have an important space in this narrative.

In sum, this critical juncture led to a new domestic political configuration that emphasized civilian supremacy over the military and strong antiwar beliefs, and conditioned the emergence of a peculiar military culture decades later.

Civilian Control in Italy: Autonomy Through Marginalization?

The first important component of the new domestic political configuration originated from the necessity to prevent the resurgence of militarism, which resulted in a series of constitutional and legislative provisions clearly establishing the norm of civilian supremacy. The military was given a particularly limited voice in Italy, even in relation to decisions about national defense. Rather than strengthening the mechanisms of military accountability to civilian institutions, as occured in many other democracies, civilian

supremacy over the military emerged in postwar Italy through the marginalization of the military. Somewhat unintendedly, however, this marginalization eventually allowed the Italian armed forces, and the army in particular, to increase their margins of maneuver.

The 1948 constitution includes strong provisions that clearly implement the principle of civilian control over the military and severely limit the margins of maneuver of civilian decision makers when it comes to wars and foreign military operations to the formal advantage of the Parliament. Similar to Article 5 of the German constitution and Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, Article 11 of the Italian constitution "rejects war, authorizes limitations of sovereignty necessary to guarantee peace and stability among nations" and "strongly expresses a commitment to favor all international organizations with such objectives, namely peace and justice among nations."[26] The only additional constitutional norm related to these issues reminds the legislator that in the case of a war of legitimate defense (Article 78), parliamentary approval is necessary for declaring a state of war and to imbue the government with the appropriate powers.[27]

During the Cold War, these provisions led to a strong commitment by Italy to what was referred to as "chair diplomacy," referring to focusing on being as present as possible in multilateral initiatives, while the role of the military was limited to a few instances of multinational cooperation. The Italian armed forces thus "remained in the barracks for almost half a century" during the Cold War—as did their counterparts in Germany—and mainly managed a large conscript base.[28] Moreover, there were no attempts to increase transparency and accountability measures, such as the concept of *Innere Führung* in the German armed forces that formally introduced a measure of internal self-control within the military. Again unlike in Germany, formal provisions to remove those who had explicitly supported the regime from the Italian armed forces were never fully implemented. After the war, "the armed forces retained their special status as a separate body."[29] While the constitution called for their democratization, they were only partially integrated into the democratic process. Until the early 2000s, the armed forces remained under the jurisdiction of a separate military judiciary; the Ministry of Defense enjoyed relative autonomy from both the government and Parliament, and even the military budget was traditionally drafted in partial secrecy. The Italian military was thus marginalized, but paradoxically allowed to enjoy greater margins of maneuver.

At the same time, the armed forces did not gain any legitimacy in the eyes of the political elite or the public. Rather, several events during the 1960s and 1970s contributed to erode the already limited societal trust in the armed forces. High-ranking military personnel were exposed as being involved in a series of subversive plots of right-wing groups and intelligence units, such as the Masonic Lodge P2 in 1981 and the Gladio affair in 1990. Also, during the Ustica affair—in which an Italian commercial airplane was hit and destroyed by a mysterious object—the Italian Air Force refused to release information to clarify the event. By the early 1980s the military had thus lost much of its legitimacy, further contributing to its marginalization in Italian society.

In reaction to this, during the mid-1980s, some high-level army officers began to promote a greater involvement of conscripts in natural disaster management, in order to potentially give the military greater visibility. Particularly, high-level officers, such as Loi and Angioni, became promoters of an Italian way to peacekeeping, a frame that quickly "started to resonate and spread among Joint Chiefs of Staff members."[30]

This change in character of civil-military relations gained pace with the beginning of the peacekeeping era. The Italian military became a viable foreign policy instrument that could be used to achieve specific objectives. The practices of operations abroad seem to have conformed to the general tendency to preserve and guard civilian supremacy, yet allowed the military to carve out increased margins of maneuver. Thus, since the early 2000s, the legal vacuum concerning operations abroad and parliament's focus on the financial rather than political aspects of the use of force has led the Chief of Defense Staff to enjoy considerable flexibility. Since the constitution foresees only extreme scenarios—either a war of legitimate defense or peaceful relations among nations—there are no specific provisions and institutions aimed at managing operations abroad. This gives the top levels of the armed forces almost paradoxically strong leverage in decision-making. In theory, the Italian constitution tasks parliament and the government (which is bound by the parliamentarians' confidence vote) with making the relevant political decisions. The top levels of the armed forces—namely the chief of the Joint Defense Staff—can, however, exercise influence as they are part of the Supreme Defense Council, which plays an important role even though it has no executive power: "Opinions expressed by the Council can heavily influence the government's decision even before coordination with Parliament

begins."[31] Due to a lack of civilian experts, the military can exercise a reasonably strong influence over council decisions.

The army has overcome its long-lasting tradition not to intervene in the political sphere. On a factual level, the Italian armed forces have a long tradition of nonintervention in the political sphere, reinforced for almost a century by their direct dependence on the king. This nonpolitical stance also led to their separation from the country and put them in a condition similar to that of the nineteenth-century French military, which was defined as *la grande muette* (the big silent one). Only in the last twenty years has the military started to express itself publicly and promote its humanitarian image, perhaps with the only noticeable exception of specific elite combat units. The military indeed became more vocal, as when advocating for better and more appropriate vehicles for the mission in Afghanistan.

Italy is thus a very good example of apparent civilian supremacy, high casualty sensitivity, and a continuous tension between what soldiers are actually doing in the field, what the politicians say they are doing, and what the public would like them to do. The military has a limited voice and a limited (but growing) influence on civilian decision-making about the use of force, which is also linked to societal beliefs about the use of force.

Societal Beliefs About the Use of Force

The second important component brought about by the critical juncture was the Italian public's profound mistrust of the armed forces. The societal beliefs about the use of force, due to the distrust created in the 1943–1945 period, were based on generally low levels of support for the armed forces. This triggered the creation of an army culture constantly seeking legitimacy and inclined toward peacekeeping activities and images.

The level of support for the Italian armed forces remained exceptionally low during the Cold War. Surveys conducted in the 1980s revealed that "only 27.7% of the Italian public opinion thinks that the armed forces are an indispensable instrument of foreign policy."[32] Although the army tried to increase its legitimacy by intervening domestically after natural disasters, such as the flash flood in Polesine (1966) or the earthquake in Friuli (1976), and by guaranteeing a military presence in Southern Italian cities with extensive Mafia infiltration, the level of support remained exceptionally low. The other source

of legitimacy of the Italian army during the Cold War came mainly from international institutions, namely NATO. After Italy's accession to NATO in 1949, the army was allowed to rearm and to station contingents for the defense of European soil. After the end of the Cold War, the increasing involvement of Italian troops in multinational operations (but mainly within a peacekeeping framework) increased the army's legitimacy, which led to higher levels of support for the armed forces.[33]

The military's role as peacekeepers has helped to rehabilitate its reputation among the Italian public since the early 1990s.[34] During the early 2000s, about 50 percent of the Italian public has ranked the Italian armed forces as the most popular state institution.[35] The level of *active* support for the armed forces in Italy, however, is relatively thin, coming mainly from people who are connected to the military, former mountaineering troops, and former *carabinieri*, a service of the armed forces with distinct public order functions. It remains extremely problematic to display militaristic symbols domestically: military operations launched domestically (such as *Operazione Strade Sicure* [Operation Safe Roads], against criminal activities) have to be framed and communicated clearly showing the civilian objectives, and patrolling units rarely wear tactical uniforms.

In Italy, as in several other countries, the presence of casualties in missions abroad always leads to reconsiderations of the mission. Such sensitivity is mainly related to the legitimacy of the mission and its true nature rather than to the prospect of success. For instance, during the 2003 Iraq war, the Italian public opinion was massively opposed to a mission they perceived as illegitimate. The deadly attack in Nassirya against sixteen Italian *carabinieri* and soldiers (and two civilians) sparked a debate about withdrawal. During the mission in Afghanistan, public support decreased when it became obvious that Italian soldiers were not involved in traditional peacekeeping but in combat-like operations. "Just don't call it war" seems to be the frame within which the Italian armed forces are constrained in order to maintain and capitalize on their public support.[36]

The Italian Army Military Culture

The strong societal beliefs about the use of force, together with the strong norm of civilian control and the army's quest to increase its legitimacy, led to the creation of a unique Italian military culture, based on a reevaluation

of the preexisting idea of Italian soldiers as "good people." They started to see themselves and be seen instead as "good humanitarians."

Italian Soldiers as "Good People"?

Until World War II, the Italian military culture was largely in line with other continental European armies. As in several other military organizations at the time, the Italian military culture had to mirror and balance the nation-building effort with issues of public order. Unlike other military organizations toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, high-level Italian generals were confronted with an extreme lack of motivation and discipline. The core structural decisions related to building up the new army were accompanied by attempts to create a culture of national unity and patriotism. General Lamarmora founded the Piedmontese army in 1854, a few years before unification, combining the Prussian and French army models—based on large-scale conscription and highly professional volunteer mobile guards, respectively.

After the foundation of the unitary state in 1861, the Italian army was explicitly modeled on the Piedmontese army. The most novel element of the newly created Italian armed forces was that conscription was done on a national basis: Southern citizens were sent to the North and Northern citizens to the South, and every military unit contained a mix of people from all over the country. This decision addressed a national security priority, given the strong social tensions in the aftermath of unification. The victory of the Prussian troops over Napoleon III in 1870–1871 convinced the Italian ruling class to adopt the Prussian model in 1876. As in Prussia, conscription was based on a three-year period of service. Yet while the Prussian model recruited regionally to capitalize on soldiers with in-depth knowledge of the area, the Italians maintained their national system due to the risks of social tensions and unit disbandment.[37] The only exception was the Alpini unit, discussed in more detail below.

Before World War I, the Italian army was mainly involved in colonial campaigns, namely in Oriental Africa (up to Adua in 1896), Libya (1911), and the Dodecanese (1912). Italian historian Angelo del Boca argues that a myth evolved during this time that Italian soldiers were fundamentally less violent and more generous (as well as "nicer") than other contingents, which bolstered the country's sense of national unity.[38] The notion that the Italian

soldiers were "good people" was particularly strong during the colonial era and World War I. Del Boca shows how this myth is pervasive but not supported by the facts. Italian soldiers, among others, perpetrated terrible violations—particularly (but not only) during colonial warfare—yet they maintained this positive self-image until World War II.

Nevertheless, the Italian army used this myth to revive its image and regain legitimacy after World War II. The scope for this was limited, however. The military tried to participate in international venues, such as NATO and the UN, as much as possible. But the Italian army was used outside of Europe only on a few occasions, such as the Multinational Force in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984. The rebranding of the Italian military as a humanitarian force therefore gained pace only with the start of the peacekeeping era during the 1990s. With the increased participation in peace and stability operations, the myth of the "good people" acquired a new meaning: Italian soldiers were good people because they were delivering humanitarian aid and doing reconstruction work allegedly better than those from other countries.[39]

Although some Italian politicians have tried to change this frame of reference for the Italian military and dispel the myth, Italian soldiers deployed abroad are still guided by the perception of being exceptionally good at humanitarian work and being in need of recognition and legitimacy. For instance, when Italian decision makers have tried to change this frame of reference—such as when Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa declared that the mission in Afghanistan also entailed some combat operations—they have been fiercely opposed by the military.[40]

Italian Unit Cultures

Since soldiers are usually deployed in out-of-area operations as units, I outline the main traits of the units examined in the case studies to illustrate how broad army cultural traits are reflected at the unit level but also how specific unit level variations modify the core tenets of military culture.

THE ITALIAN ARIETE UNIT

The Italian Ariete brigade that I studied and observed in Lebanon is an interesting case because it mirrors broader army cultural traits but modifies them in light of its historical memory. The unit originates from the II Armored Brigade, formed in Milan in 1937 and named after a "ram" (*ariete*

in Italian), which is the unit symbol. The unit was dissolved after the armistice and reconstituted in 1948 as the Armored Regroupment Ariete; the heroism and spirit of sacrifice exhibited at El Alamein became part of the unit's collective memory. It then went through successive reorganizations in 1963 and 1975. The Ariete Brigade as a whole resisted several budget cuts in 1989, 1991, and 1992, gradually abolishing some units and acquiring others from other regiments but still managing to maintain its traditions.[41]

The image of the inept soldier but good person can be detected in the Ariete brigade's elaboration on its humiliating defeat by the British at El Alamein in 1939. The unit has reframed this defeat in a way that tries to portray them as heros willing to fight till the end.[42] Since its beginning, the Ariete unit has been proud and focused on the relationship between the man and its machine—the tank—as many other armored units in the Western world. The tank drivers' emotional motto, "Iron dimensions, iron heart," again links to the human dimension. When describing the opening of a new military barracks, the Ariete unit's magazine refers to the "magic atmosphere of a Regiment and of a barracks in the important memory of a romantic industrious past and in the certitude of a dignified present."[43] This mirrors the Ariete tank drivers' quest for legitimacy: a nostalgia for the past accompanied by the hope for a dignified role in today's Italy. Similarly, talking about his recently published book on El Alamein, Rebora notes that his research allowed him "to reconstruct a valid daily life snapshot of the combatants and of the tank drivers of the Ariete in particular[. T]he deeds of these tank drivers during World War II have not been told in detail," thus reflecting how their role needs to be rehabilitated.[44] In sum, several attempts were made to create a unit that combined the rather controversial past with the broader army cultural trait of humanitarianism.

THE ITALIAN ALPINI UNIT

The Italian 9th "Alpini" Regiment has a long-standing tradition of prestige and is a specialized fighting unit.[45] It has been involved in all peace operations that Italy has taken part in since the beginning of the 1990s. The Alpini (Alpine) battalion traditionally specialized in mountain fighting. As discussed above, the Italian army was originally based on conscription from throughout the national territory; the only exception was the Alpini, where recruitment was conducted region by region on a territorial basis.[46] Its mountain focus and regional recruitment make the Alpini very different from other elite units, such as the Folgore paratroopers. This section discusses the

cultural traits of the Alpini battalion emerging from its history, symbols, and traditions as well as the beliefs and assumptions that emerged in the fieldwork.

The Alpini were created in response to an emerging new concept of defense of the national territory.[47] Contrary to the conventional wisdom that any aggressors would be stopped in the Po valley, in 1871, Captain Perrucchetti proposed to protect Italian territorial integrity in the Alps by creating a new military section based on territorial recruitment. The underlying idea was to organize the defense of the Alpine borders with the support of the people from these regions. Previously, only a small portion of the alpine population had been active in the units fighting in the Alpine areas. Perrucchetti's proposal was instead to divide the Alpine territory into many defensive units, each managed by a military district and to recruit people from each district: "Whoever has wandered around for long through the mountains shall have realized how among these, that remarkable book called terrain is extremely difficult to read; for reading it correctly it is necessary to get used to it: the practical knowledge of the terrain that has to be defended can be acquired only by maneuvering over it considering all the foreseeable hypotheses."[48]

Thus, the Alpini units had to have a profound knowledge of the territory and mountain life in addition to military skills. The political elites were very skeptical about territorial recruitment because of the risk of a breakdown in public order in case of an intervention. Perrucchetti and the minister of war overcame this skepticism by showing that the risk in this case was minimal: "The Alpine valleys were all profoundly conservative, Catholic and monarchic, absolutely incapable of rebelling," and the numbers of people who failed to report for military service were extremely low.[49] The then-Italian army chief of staff explained the military advantage of this new model as exploiting "a strong cohesion where the links among men were authentic" and a population that was untainted by exposure to the outside world.[50]

Echoing this history, the culture of the Alpini is based on the principles of territorial recruitment, cohesive units, closeness to the local population, and a mainly defensive role. The 9th Alpini Regiment was created in 1921. Its motto was invented by the Italian poet Gabriele d'Annunzio, who interpreted the nationalistic spirit of the time: "Feather of an eagle, claws of a lioness."[51] The Alpini specialty was involved in the Greek campaign and in Russia during World War II. When it was left without orders in 1943, many soldiers joined the resistance, while others kept fighting with the

German troops. In 1975, when the army was reorganized, the 9th Alpini battalion maintained its traditions, symbols, and war flag.[52]

The unit's cohesiveness translated into a profound attachment to symbols. Thus, the Alpini regiments' uniforms were green—ideally like the "landscape of the mountain valleys."[53] The symbol of the Alpini was a feather on a wide-brimmed hat—black (from a rook) for noncommissioned soldiers and noncommissioned officers and white (from a goose) for officers. This has been the case from the very beginning, with several newspaper articles and figurative images (due to the widespread illiteracy) magnifying their symbols and the character of the units: "You could see them coming forward, behind them hundred of long straight feathers, which grew taller than the public: they were the Alpine troops the defenders of Italy's doors; all tall, rosy and strong with wide-brimmed hat and bright green uniform, the same color of the grass of their mountain."[54]

The Alpini is traditionally highly regarded as a defensive unit aimed at protecting the Italian nation from neighboring countries. It remained the most popular unit after World War II, and is today strongly attached to the cult of the flag and its symbols. One of the reasons for its popularity has been that it represented a defensive myth and hence is always represented in a defensive posture. The recurring images were Alpini on a rock, one hand on the side and the other holding a rifle, their face looking at the horizon. The motto "From here you do not pass" and references to Alpini soldiers as "vigilantes" and "lookout of the summit" refer to a defensive function.[55] Italian historians working on the Alpini, such as Oliva and Mondini, highlight another recurring element: their love of heights.[56] "The Alpine soldier was always standing on the highest summit of the mountain."[57] In the images, another recurring element is the natural environment, which was still largely unexplored by a significant portion of the population.

Saint Maurice is the protecting saint of the Alpini. The cult of this saint is particularly widespread in Northern Italy. He was killed because he refused to obey an order to persecute Christians and to sacrifice and pray to idols. He is usually represented in a defensive (rather than aggressive) posture, wearing armor, and his symbols are the sword and the palm frond.[58] The prayer of the Alpine troops is very different from those of paratroopers or mechanized specialties. It underlines the unit's defensive role and attachment to the motherland: "On the bare rock, on the perennial glaciers, on every crag of the Alps where providence has put us as bulwark of our districts, we, purified by the duty dangerously implemented we elevate to you, Oh Lord,

who protects our mothers, our spouses, our children, our distant brothers. . . . God all powerful, make our foot stand safe on the vertiginous peaks, on the steep face, beyond the insidious crevasse, make strong our weapons against whoever menaces our Homeland, our Flag, our thousand-year Christian civilization."[59] Such core defensive traits and the distinct component of territorial recruitment magnify and reinforce the general traits of the Italian army culture to result in an exceptionally strong level of socialization into the culture of "good humanitarians."

In sum, the Alpini unit displays a unit culture that is fundamentally different from the Ariete one and that presents unit cultural traits that are in line with—and reinforce—the Italian army culture, much more strongly than other units within the Italian army.

The French Military Culture

In contrast to the case of Italy, the critical juncture in the French case is more specific to the armed forces and triggered a cultural shift within a much shorter period of time following the decolonization period. Before World War II, the French military had a rather high status, as, for example, shown by Elizabeth Kier's groundbreaking work on the interwar period.[60] During the war, part of the French army remained loyal to World War I hero General Petain, while another part joined the Resistance or joined the Free French Forces under General de Gaulle and the Army of Africa under General Giraud. While superficially similar to the Italian experience, the effects of this collapse as a coherent fighting force were different. Thus, although divisions like the Charlemagne fought with the Nazis to defend Berlin from Soviet forces in 1945, General de Gaulle's personal prestige and the glory of being ranked among the victorious powers of World War II (and participating in the Liberation of 1944–1945) contributed strongly to the French military's prestige and popularity. However, during the fifteen years following World War II, the French army increasingly "lost its sense of mission and duty, its military professionalism and discipline, and its subordination to civilian control."[61] A critical juncture built up in reaction to this postwar insubordination of the military to civilian power and de Gaulle's subsequent extremely firm response to it. After the war, the officer corps was disillusioned as "the general patterns of French military performance seemed inglorious, ignominious, and shamefully unsuccessful," the French military

undertakings were punctuated by "broken dream and shattered illusions."[62] The decolonization wars and the Suez Crisis further strengthened this discontent.

General Leclerc's glorious victories during World War II were expected to be replicated in Indochina, as exemplified by the motto on a recruitment poster "Yesterday Strasbourg . . . tomorrow Saigon."[63] His unexpected death inflicted a blow to the counterinsurgency operations against Ho Chi Minh and his general Vo Nguyen Giap. General De Lattre, the other hero of World War II, restored the division's self-confidence, faith in its leadership, and will to win.[64] He was, however, seriously ill, and his death further weakened the French army morale.

The death of de Lattre, among other factors, convinced many mid-rank and senior French officers that the war in Indochina was one they could have won. "A myth emerged as defeat was a product of misfortune or downright bad luck, of desertion of the civilian leaders 8,000 miles away in Paris," which exacerbated the disconnect between the soldiers and civilian decision makers.[65] Moreover, the army that had fought against Ho and Giap was a professional army but not supported by the French public. Although there still was conscription in France, the war in Indochina had not really touched the country and French soldiers felt themselves to be a "forgotten army."[66] The antagonistic sentiments of those fighting in Indochina hardened toward the politicians in Paris when Generals Salan and Navarre, who were conservative and disconnected from the Gaullist armies, took command.

The fallout from the frustrated Anglo-French intervention in Suez in November 1956 amplified the frustration of the French troops. The torpedoing of the operation by US troops meant that "the frustration and fury of French officers was unbounded."[67] In particular, "the French army thought the politicians in Paris were responsible for robbing it of victory at Suez, just as the same politicians had previously been accused of having abandoned it in Indochina."[68]

Several French veterans from Indochina were redeployed to Algeria. The attitudinal and psychological legacy of the war in Indochina played an important role in shaping perceptions of the new operation. The scope of the war in Algeria expanded in 1956–1957 and entailed significant counterinsurgency operations in the mountains. Many senior French officers were directly connected to the cause of *Algérie française*—a political and militant movement in favor of a French Algeria. Other leading commanders, such as

Challe and Salan, had played a critical role in engineering de Gaulle's return to power in May 1958. Operation Resurrection was conceived and developed as a result of the armed forces' "disintegration of discipline and the growing tendency to question civilian political authority."[69] Yet, it became clear early on that de Gaulle had no intention of succumbing to the will of his generals, and that he would not have prevented the decolonization of Algeria.

This situation triggered the plotting of the generals and mobilized the younger generation of officers to engage in various kinds of conspiracies. Some field officers in Algeria went underground and took the lead of sections of the OAS (Organisation de l'armée secrète) who tried to assassinate de Gaulle between 1961 and 1963; others became involved in other conspiratory plots, such as the Delta Commando. The anti–de Gaulle conspiracy came to a head with the attempted putsch in Algiers in April 1961 and de Gaulle's forceful reaction.

On April 23, de Gaulle appeared on television in general's uniform and ridiculed the four generals behind the putsch as "a quartet of retired generals" and "forbade every Frenchman, and above all every French soldier, from executing a single one of their orders." De Gaulle's reaction to the attempted coup was forceful and extremely firm: he punished the parachutists who had sided with the four generals in 1961 by disbanding the prestigious First REP (Régiment Etranger de Parachutistes) and 14th and 18th colonial regiments.

The four general members of the Revolutionary National Council, who played a key role in the putsch, were tried and sentenced to either death or life in prison. In the 1960s de Gaulle's Fifth Republic was determined to "erect a civilian regime whose authority would be incontrovertible in the eyes of not only the people but also the military."[70] New men were promoted to guide the French army back to discipline, a sense of duty, and a new Eurocentric mission.[71] France's acquisition of nuclear weapons was an excellent opportunity to provide a new mission and new core tasks to the officer corps and to make them less self-absorbed.

De Gaulle "set the seal on this reconstructed consensus or solidarity between nation, regime and armed forces." Alexander and Bankwitz argue that "what de Gaulle carried out was nothing less than the reprofessionalization of the French officer corps."[72] Yet these steps were arguably more broadly related to the reconstitution of a new model of civil-military relations, in which the French armed forces, and the officer corps in particular, were more explicitly and firmly subordinated to the civilian political leadership.

Civil-Military Relations and Societal Beliefs: No More Voice

This new model of civil-military relations triggered two main reactions. First, thanks to de Gaulle, the French public acknowledged that the army remained an extremely important institution. De Gaulle managed to rehabilitate the French armed forces while at the same time constraining their role. Even today, French public opinion is the most supportive of military options within Europe, revealing a strong support for the armed forces at the base of foreign policy attitudes.[73] A recent article discussed the armed forces' profound frustration about the lack of understanding on the part of the French public of their effort in Afghanistan, to the point that the military has felt abandoned by its public.[74] This feeling of abandonment, Jankowski argues, is mainly linked to the lack of mass spontaneous national mourning. But she finds that such decline in mobilization is mainly explained by the lower number of casualties suffered by the French army and that the level of support to the military remains exceptionally high. French societal beliefs about the use of force must be understood in the context of the broader tradition of civil-military relations. Even though casualty sensitivity may increase, the inertia of these traditions tends to indicate that they should remain within the boundaries of soldiers' main expected roles. French soldiers have traditionally been expected to sacrifice themselves and die for the nation, which has become part of the society's collective beliefs. Accordingly, the French public is not particularly casualty averse compared to public opinion in other European countries.[75]

Irondelle and Schmitt have argued that France's broad foreign policy orientation "is heir of two distinct traditions."[76] The first entails France's self-perception as being a country of human rights, with the responsibility to defend and promote these rights worldwide. The second is "the Gaullist legacy of independence and the sacrosanct principle of autonomous decision-making and independent defense capabilities."[77] While these two norms may conflict, the core French objective is to maximize the country's presence and relative rank within international military coalitions.[78] To do that, the armed forces have the most appropriate role in maximizing these objectives. Because of its military assets, France was authorized as a NATO High Readiness Force. This emphasis on capabilities ensures that France is ready and willing to be both a major contributor to multinational operations and to act independently in conducting unilateral operations if needed.[79] Similarly, concerning the use of military force, France highlights the need for a UN

resolution and mandate, but acknowledges that the armed forces may need to intervene unilaterally in order to protect French citizens abroad or to enforce bilateral security agreements.

Although the armed forces hold such an important role in society, they have very limited influence over decision-making. Decisions about deploying armed forces abroad are highly centralized in the hands of the (civilian) executive—namely the National Defense and Security Council, headed by the president of the republic. The prime minister, defense minister, and foreign affairs minister are members of the council and are strongly involved. The joint chiefs of staff, comprising the most senior military officers, has very little say.

The limited voice of the French armed forces has historical roots, which correspond to the reasons that led to the creation of a French military culture based on controlled assertiveness. These traits acquired the central function they play today and a specific meaning within French military culture after the critical juncture of the failed coup d'état in Algeria and the subsequent speech by General de Gaulle that called upon the French armed forces to be less outspoken.[80] In the new domestic context of civil-military relations, the French military was expected to be as strong as its glorious tradition dictated, while also subordinating itself to civilian decisions. This peculiar context made the French armed forces simultaneously well respected but also confined to their specific space and expected role. These constraints triggered some high-ranking generals to speak up and denounce, in particular, the recent budgetary cuts, which led to a quick decline in their career trajectory.[81] Furthermore, the French public is used to a military presence in the public space, as exemplified by the use of the military to patrol railway stations and other potential sensitive targets; this was reinforced after the 2015–2016 terrorist attacks by the deployment of Operation Sentinel.

In sum, the relatively low casualty sensitivity in French society must be understood in the broader context of societal beliefs and civil-military relations: the limited voice of the armed forces reinforces the understanding that the armed forces are an important and legitimate institution that ultimately must follow orders from the civilian decision makers.

The French Army Culture: Controlled Assertiveness

After World War II, the French military culture maintained its most important historical value—assertiveness—but tempered it with the emerging

belief that the army had to be "silently" obedient to civilian control. The French military culture was (and still is) strongly associated with the concept of resolve—summarized by the motto "We are going to go for it"—and the perpetuation of the heroic historical myth of the "French fury."[82] The underlying idea—which is unanimous in the literature—has been that French soldiers have been able to be combat-oriented when needed and "whatever happens they are going to manage," thanks to the French resourcefulness and ability to fight fearlessly and with a spirit of sacrifice.[83]

Despite the uneven military record, in the aftermath of World War II, the French army and French politicians celebrated the assertiveness and the few meaningful victories of the French army during the war.[84] De Gaulle, however, imposed strong limitations on this assertiveness, which the military internalized. The renewed military culture with a stronger emphasis on obedience became apparent in subsequent operations, in which soldiers' behavior had to be characterized by what I call "controlled assertiveness." That soldiers should be subordinate in a democratic regime to civilian control should not come as a surprise, nor that they use force in a controlled way. However, after the forceful reaction of de Gaulle to the attempted coup in Algeria, the French soldiers moderated their assertiveness with a particular commitment to subordination and an overemphasis on managing violence, not exceeding in the use of force, and adhering strictly to the mandate. As a consequence, French soldiers became more careful and tried to use their assertiveness in a controlled way, mainly for domestic reasons. This had important consequences for French soldiers in most of the operations they were involved in afterward. Military reports and soldiers' diaries suggest that when French soldiers deployed, for instance, to Lebanon during the Multinational Force in 1982–1984 or to the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, they were more assertive than other military organizations but also more careful about following the mandate.[85]

This approach dates back to the post-Napoleonic model of a small, well-trained, and well-equipped professional army that could be assertive when needed. After 1814, the French government wanted an army separated from society and formed by professional units complemented by a small number of conscripts as opposed to the mass conscription of the Napoleonic army. The competing Prussian army model, adopted to some extent in Italy, for instance, in contrast took inspiration from the Napoleonic victories and was based on large-scale territorial conscription. The new French army model

was very effective in public order duties but was much less effective when facing other large armies that used the Prussian model.

Masculinity is a value strongly associated with assertiveness within most military organizations.[86] In the French army, it is closely tied to the value of citizenship. Forrest argues that manliness and soldierliness represented part of a wider cultural heritage that the French revolution adapted to its own ends: "The virile and heroic values associated with the military became increasingly merged with the ideal of the citizen."[87] According to this historical study, manliness was even stronger in the army, which was translated into assertiveness in the country's modern professional army. While the society became increasingly egalitarian, the French army remained rooted in its assertiveness, which explains why French units remain more assertive than those of other armies.

French Unit Cultures

1ST FUSILIER BATTALION FROM EPINAL

From the nineteenth century, the French army created many lightly equipped units in the colonies. The 1st Fusilier Battalion was recreated in 1994, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation as a tribute to Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian fusiliers. The battalion is part of the Mechanized Brigade based in Chalons-en-Champagne, and the regiment it belongs to is based in the Vosges region not far from Nancy.

Its symbol is a silver crescent on an Arabic word that means "first always first" (the unit's motto)—a reference to the fact that fusiliers are light infantry troops that deploy in front of the first rank of troops to harass the enemy. Above it there is the hand of Fatima that holds the number one. The crescent refers to the moon calendar adopted in the Muslim world, and Fatima's hand serves as the traditional protecting saint. Their mascot is a ram.[88] Because of their diverse religious origins they do not have a common Christian prayer, unlike most units.

In 1944, the unit participated in the landing and reconquering of the French territory. During the liberation war it freed the cities of Toulon and Marseille, and was among the first liberating units to the Rhone, Rhein, and Danube. It was dissolved in 1946 and recreated in 1948.

More recently, the 1st Fusilier Battalion has taken part in out-of-area operations (Kosovo, Macedonia, Ivory Coast, Afghanistan), short-term operations

(such as in Africa or in the DOM-TOM), organized training sessions with other armed forces (Gulf 2000, Czech Republic), and domestic operations, such as Polmar or Vigipirate. The unit also took part in a number of multi-national operations, namely the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and UNPROFOR and IFOR in the Balkans between 1992 and 1997. The brigade has a very cosmopolitan composition and tends to include troops from Northern African countries, which is true equally and specifically for the 1st Fusilier Regiment from Epinal. The Mechanized Brigade protecting saint is Saint Louis. He is said to have died on the hill of Carthage, exactly where the brigade won victoriously in Tunisia against the Germans in 1942.[89]

Overall, the brigade is a large inter-army unit. Its current tasks are conducting contact operations (combat and intelligence) and coordinating support action in the AOs. Beyond professionalism and assertiveness, the unit's core values are pride in its unique cosmopolitan origins and its primary role supporting France in both world wars. These elements also link to a strong spirit of egalitarianism, and an attacking posture coupled with a mild cohesiveness. The unit demonstrated these characteristics in its involvement in UNIFIL II.

THE 8TH MARINE PARACHUTE INFANTRY BATTALION

This is a relatively young but prestigious unit that fought in Indochina in 1951 and then in Algeria. It is now extremely active in peace operations and counterinsurgencies.[90] It is part of the 11th Parachute Brigade, which is very rich in memory and traditions. The combination of rituals, symbols, hymns, signs, berets, prayers, and flags suggests a core set of values. These elements also reinforce the values and beliefs that emerge through the interviews and questionnaires.

The unit's military culture displays some clear patterns that are different from its Italian counterparts. It is a typical infantry division, which was traditionally used for offensive operations, particularly those that exploited its parachuting skills. It is more attuned to recent experiences in Indochina and Algeria than those from the nineteenth century. The 11th Parachute Brigade is specialized in air-transported combat and air assaults. It is a very reactive and light unit, and has traditionally been used in emergency situations to provide a first response before the arrival of a heavier force.[91]

The parachute spirit for all specialties is based on managing fear. Fear makes all paratroopers equal, and obliterates distinctions related to rank, origins, or length of service. These elements represent "an exceptional cohe-

sive power" within the unit.[92] Traditionally, paratroopers have been used to surprise the enemy behind their lines, or to conduct "punch" missions or intelligence or destruction operations. They have also been used to operate in very hostile environments, where they face numerical inferiority and limited logistic autonomy.[93]

Since World War II the protecting saint of the regiment has been Saint Michael, who has been called "the first fighter who came from heaven to fight his enemy."[94] The unit's prayer includes the phrases: "Give me, my God, what you have left / Give me what others refuse / I want insecurity and restlessness, I want the storm and the fight / And please give them to me, my God, indefinitely, so that I am sure to have them forever because I won't have always the courage to ask you for them / . . . but also give me the courage, and the force and the faith as only You can give what a man cannot obtain but by himself."[95]

This excerpt from the paratroopers' prayer highlights three elements. First, it reiterates that the paratrooper should live with a high degree of uncertainty and insecurity due to the type of operations in which s/he is involved. Second, the paratrooper has a "total" engagement with the institution of which s/he is part, from the time s/he joins the organization until her/his death. Third, the paratrooper is courageous and self-confident in her/his skills and competences, but s/he believes that some things can be achieved only with God's help.

Like any other air-transported brigade, the 8th RPIMA uses the typical red beret, which is described as "the symbol of the legend and the striking proof of the first jump."[96] The sign on the beret depicts Saint Michael's wing. As in the Alpini, wearing a beret is a true honor. In order to commemorate the bravery of French paratroopers during World War II and their support to the Allies during the French campaign, the then-king of the United Kingdom, George VI, authorized French paratroopers trained in the UK to wear the red helmet instead of the traditional blue of the French. In the 1950s, all parachute units adopted the red beret, apart from the Legion Etrangère, which kept the green one.

The regiment's symbol displays an eagle in an attacking posture, which portrays how the attack comes from the sky. The parachute is the symbol representing the whole brigade. The waves underline the projection of the brigade "beyond the sea."[97] The green and reddish purple refers to the beret colors of the Legion Etrangère and of the rest of the brigade.

The French unit's history and experience matter; they are characterized by professionalism, assertiveness, and involvement in counterinsurgencies.

Professionalism and assertiveness are two values that are widely shared among different units of the French army. They apply to the 8th RPIMA even more strongly, for two reasons. First, parachuting is a specialty that requires specific training and thus strengthens the unit's professionalism and subsequent separation from society. Second, the 8th RPIMA is an intensive combat unit that is used in complex operations, which enhances its professionalism and assertiveness.

Within the unit, learning from recent counterinsurgency experiences is important, and in the interviews soldiers from the unit compared their involvement in Afghanistan to counterinsurgencies from the past.[98] One soldier noted the similarities in the types of units used in Algeria and Afghanistan: "units able to control a territory, units that can guarantee the safety of the local population, units extremely mobile with helicopters, and units capable of doing intelligence, to trace insurgency organizations."[99]

The soldiers described the lessons learned from Indochina as more negative. They discussed the disconnect between the French troops deployed there, decision makers, and the public. A soldier deployed in Afghanistan reflected: "France lost 12,000 men coming from elite units and yet we did not lose the war, but it was a real shock for the French democracy. . . . There is a fragilization in all democracies today, people in their daily comfort do not understand what is at stake here while they are in their little cocoon."[100] So overall, 8th RPIMA is fully socialized into the culture of contained assertiveness, but the assertiveness component is somewhat reinforced by the elite and parachuting component of the unit.

This chapter has shown how the Italian and French military cultures have developed particular and distinct traits on the basis of different national and army histories in general, and in reaction to two critical junctures in particular. The following chapters explore whether these deeply ingrained cultures shape the way soldiers behave in peace and stability operations.

CHAPTER 3

French and Italian Units in Lebanon

Chapter 1 outlined the theory of how military culture influences force employment and Unit Peace Operation Effectiveness, and Chapter 2 explored the development and emergence of the contemporary military cultures in the French and Italian armies. The next step is to test the theory on two empirical cases: French and Italian units deployed in multinational operations in Lebanon (Chapter 3) and Afghanistan (Chapter 4). The units were selected for study because they presented highly similar characteristics in both missions, including the number of troops deployed, the kind of equipment and vehicles, identical mandates, and AOs with comparable levels of threat and difficulty. I focused on the French and Italian units deployed in their respective AOs in Lebanon between July and December 2007 and then controlled for potential variations from other units across turnover until 2013. For each unit, this represents a six-month period between two turnovers followed by several follow-up interviews in Paris and Rome to explore variations from other rotating units and the respective regiments' locations up until 2013. The French deployed the 1st Fusilier Regiment from Epinal, part of the Mechanized Brigade, while the Italians deployed the 132nd Regiment belonging to the "Ariete" Brigade. While this analysis is mainly concerned with national army characteristics, it also highlights some unit-level peculiarities based on observations and soldiers' narratives. At the end of Chapter 4, I discuss potential additional alternative factors influencing my argument in both sets of cases.

This chapter links the differences in French and Italian military cultures to differences in contextual perceptions and force employment. It also argues that this implies two different kinds of UPOE for the two armies. The first part of this chapter establishes that the units were deployed in very similar

contexts, yet exhibited strong differences in soldiers' perceptions of these contexts, as demonstrated in their responses to interviews and questionnaires. The collective perceptions of the units under study in the field broadly adhered to the core values of their respective army cultures, namely "controlled assertiveness" for the French unit and a humanitarian focus for the Italian one. These perceptions influenced the behavior of the French and Italian units, as the second part of the chapter documents. It shows that the units demonstrated significant differences along a number of dimensions of force employment, and that these corresponded both to differences in perceptions of the mission context and to the different military cultures more generally. Specifically, in line with the perception of UNIFIL as an ordinary military operation with a high threat level that calls for military skills, the French prioritized patrolling and force protection, suggesting a deterrence-focused type of effectiveness. The Italians, in contrast, prioritized CIMIC and humanitarian activities, which corresponded to their perception of a low-threat peacekeeping operation, thus displaying a humanitarian-focused effectiveness.

The UNIFIL II Mission in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) is a peacekeeping operation in Southern Lebanon along the Litani River border between Israel and Lebanon. The mission originated as UNIFIL I in 1978 to "confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area."[1] After the Israeli withdrawal was completed in 2000, UNIFIL I remained in an observatory role. However, following the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war in Lebanon and Northern Israel, the UN Security Council enhanced the mission, deciding that UNIFIL II would, in addition to the original mandate, among other things, "monitor the cessation of hostilities," "accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they deploy throughout the south, and as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon," "assist the LAF in creating an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL," and "extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons."[2]

Substantively, UNIFIL II has remained a traditional peacekeeping mission, authorized under chapter VI of the UN Charter ("Pacific Settlement of

Disputes"): it was launched with the consent of the host state, Lebanon, and the agreement of Israel and with broad international legitimacy. Though the media tended to indicate otherwise, the robustness of the mandate was only slightly increased.[3] Under UNIFIL II's expanded mandate, the use of force was (and still is) allowed in a very limited number of cases—for self-defense, or to protect humanitarian workers or civilians under imminent threat— whereas the original UNIFIL I mandate only authorized the use of force for self-defense. But unlike UNIFIL I, the mandate to assist the LAF in keeping the area free of weapons—that is, preventing Hezbollah weapon smuggling in the area—is more typical of a peacekeeping operation with "muscles and teeth."

During the study period (2007–13), the units deployed ranged from 13,000 to 18,000 troops from 20 to 27 different countries.[4] The European presence increased notably with the strengthened UNIFIL II, and the French and Italian contingents were among the first to be deployed. As is the case for most peace operations, peacekeepers in UNIFIL II are deployed along national lines. Each contributing country rotates military units, usually on a six-month basis, and all contributing countries are tasked to implement the same UN mandate.

Setting the Stage: Conditions of Deployment in UNIFIL II

The French and Italian armies not only share similar recent historical experiences, as outlined in Chapter 2, but also have essentially identical ranking and command structures, as well as similar doctrines and training programs. These factors can thus not account for the differences in force employment observed between the two armies.

The units that both armies deployed to UNIFIL II between 2007 and 2013 (the end date for this study) had the same number of troops and similar technology, equipment, and weapons. Each national unit was composed of approximately 2,100 troops, which remained constant over time. The core of the French battalion under study, which deployed in the fall of 2007, totaled 2,000 troops and was made up of two infantry components: (1) the 1st Fusilier Regiment of Epinal and (2) 100 support troops from the mechanized infantry regiment, part of a mechanized brigade in Chalons-en-Champagne. The regiment consisted of 59 officers, 297 noncommissioned officers, 814 noncommissioned soldiers, and 34 civilian employees.[5] Additionally, 100

support troops were drawn from the Combat Tanks Regiment from Mour-melon (the 501st and 503rd regiments), the 28th Transmission Regiment from Issoire, and the 3rd Logistic Regiment from Charleville-Mézières.

The Italian unit deployed was from the Ariete Brigade: the 132nd Artil-lery Regiment from Maniago and a logistic battalion. The Italian Parliament authorized 2,470 troops, including the Maritime Task Force and land forces. The Maritime Task Force included around 400 men who were not involved in operations on the ground. Therefore, the total number of troops on the ground for the Italian unit was 2,070.

The French and Italian units utilized similar vehicles and equipment. The French units deployed 13 "Leclerc" tanks and 35 AMX 10P, a light infantry fighting vehicle with NBC (Nuclear Biological and Chemical) protection and amphibious capabilities, and hydro jets to operate in the water.[6] Similarly, the Italian unit used a series of vehicles—15 transport and combat vehicles, 12 VTC M113 tanks, and around 20 multi-mode armored vehicles (FIAT VM 90). Thus, both the French and the Italians had mostly wheeled armored ve-hicles and a limited number of tanks. The only difference was that the Leclerc tanks used by the French were heavier than the tanks used by the Italian Ariete Brigade.

In terms of weapons, the French unit had at its disposal a 155-mm auto-matic cannon AUF-1 intended to equip forces with armored artillery in or-der to carry out their missions to support direct and indirect fire. The French unit also employed three radar Cobras (counter battery radar placed on a trunk to detect targets) and six Mistrals (portable infrared homing surface-to-air missiles). Similarly, the Italian unit used half-moving howitzer ("Obice Semovente"), which are equipped to launch surface-to-air missiles. They also used radars, although the type could not be specified during interviews because classified. The French and Italians also used very similar models of personal vehicles and the same type of bulletproof vests and helmets.

The two national units were deployed under the same UN mission with a common mandate. The rules of engagement (ROE), which allowed for the use of force only for self-defense or when under imminent threat, were iden-tical.[7] Neither unit applied national caveats to their ROE. The units were as-signed to different areas of operations (AOs) within the same command area (Sector West Command). Each unit had full control of the AO in which it implemented the mandate. It is well established that these two AOs and their "borders" (the Litani River for the Italian battalions and the Blue Line for the French) had comparable levels of difficulty and threats.[8] UN officials agreed:

Figure 2. French and Italian areas of operation in UNIFIL II.

"French and Italian units have a very similar threat level in their area of operation: some Hezbollah activity, a division line to supervise, yes, similar very similar."[9] A Lebanese local confirmed this observation: "It is weird, with my family we live close by both areas and you wonder why they behave so differently, Hezbollah is all over and Israel could attack at any time anywhere too, so why are they doing things so differently?"[10] Figure 2 shows the two AOs (Italy and France are on the left side of the map under sector West command), and Table 2 summarizes the similarities of these components.[11]

Thus, the French and Italian units were comparable with respect to troop personnel, weapons, vehicles, equipment, and mandate as well as subjective and objective levels of difficulty and threat, ruling out all these elements as potential explanations for their differences in force employment.

French and Italian Soldiers' Perceptions in Lebanon

All the soldiers I interviewed from several different countries in different peace operations were adamant that when they are deployed abroad, a whole new experience opens up: "It is like being catapulted into a new world."[12]

Table 2. Similarities of the French and Italian Contributions to UNIFIL II

	UNIFIL II (Lebanon)	
	French	*Italian*
Material resources		
Troop numbers	2,100	2,100
Equipment / vehicles	15–17 heavy tanks (somewhat heavier tanks than those of Italian troops)	15–17 heavy tanks
	35 AMX (light armored vehicles)	35 AMX (light armored vehicles)
	Comparable levels of other equipment	Comparable levels of other equipment
Threat level		
Area of operation	Sector West	Sector West
Difficulty of the area of operation	Potential Hezbollah rearming	Potential Hezbollah rearming
	Violations along the Israeli border	Violations along the Litani River
Mandate		
	UN Security Council Resolution 1701/2006	UN Security Council Resolution 1701/2006
	- Monitoring the cessation of hostilities	- Monitoring the cessation of hostilities
	- Providing humanitarian relief	- Providing humanitarian relief
	- Force to be used only in self-defense or under imminent threat	- Force to be used only in self-defense or under imminent threat
ROE		
	Identical	Identical

Some even referred to it as a rite of passage: "I love this adrenaline when we are about to land in the AO, all new, like being born again."[13] The intensity of the experience does not seem to decrease, even among those who have been deployed many times: a French noncommissioned soldier (NCS) once told me, "You can have been in the operation ten times and you may get what they call operation fatigue, but you never stick together to your comrades as in operation."[14] For most national contingents in UNIFIL II, deploying is an all-encompassing experience that lasts for approximately six months; social interactions take place mainly with other members of the unit, far away from family and friends: as several military personnel from different countries told me: "The contingent is my new family."[15]

While some national contingents were allowed to go on leave to Beirut or Cyprus or even their home countries, French and Italian soldiers were not allowed to do so, which added to the intensity of the experience. I conducted my interviews and questionnaires with French and Italian soldiers of the selected units in different phases of their deployment so as to collect perceptions that were not immediately affected by the novelty of the arrival. The deployed French and Italian soldiers had undergone quite a substantive amount of training; cultural awareness courses provided them with specific knowledge about Southern Lebanese society. Yet their perceptions about the context seemed to reflect previously acquired cultural values and beliefs. During the fieldwork conducted with the Ariete Brigade battalion and the 1st Fusilier Regiment from Epinal deployed within UNIFIL II, radically different perceptions emerged of the similar context in which they were embedded. If anything, I would have expected a relative convergence in perceptions, as the "Ariete" unit culture should have made the Italian humanitarian army culture weaker, given the rather more martial experience of the Italian unit compared to the French one.

In this section, I document the differences in contextual perceptions that emerged in surveys and interviews conducted in Lebanon and show that they are consistent with the French "controlled assertiveness" and Italian "good humanitarian soldier" military cultures. In order to cover the broadest possible spectrum of perceptions, I inductively identified three main strands of variation in perceptions, on the basis of responses given to my questionnaires and interview questions: soldiers' interpretations of the different dimensions of the local context; their understanding of abstract security-related concepts, which I call "big concepts"; and their perceptions

of several organizational dimensions. These perceptions, while of course not exhaustive of the possible range of contextual indicators, represent a diverse range of factors that are likely to be important for soldiers' behavior during deployment.

Perceptions of the Local Context

In this section, I present data about French and Italian soldiers' perceptions of the Lebanese context, namely their understanding of the enemy, victory, the appropriate use of force, and the perception of threats.

The French and Italian units in Lebanon had different perceptions of the enemy. French soldiers acknowledged that they did not have an enemy in the traditional sense; they defined "the terrorists" who wanted to jeopardize the success of their mission as the enemy.[16] They did not specify who was considered a terrorist; they implied that the term could refer to Hezbollah, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), or Islamist terrorism.[17] In contrast, all the Italian soldiers interviewed shared the view that "there is no enemy." The units also differed in their understanding of the UNIFIL mission. The Italians understood it as a traditional peacekeeping mission, while the French considered it a peace enforcement operation.[18] A traditional peacekeeping operation is more lenient and foresees a very limited use of force, while a peace enforcement operation entails more opportunities to use force and takes place in a more violent and hostile environment.

This difference was consistent with threat perceptions communicated in the surveys. On a scale from 1 (low) to 10 (high), the Italian unit perceived a low-level threat (80% of responses clustered between 2 and 4), whereas the French threat perception was high (67% responded between 8 and 10).[19] The interviews suggest that the French collective memory (rather than the national culture) could have played a role. French units were attacked in Lebanon, both when serving with the multinational force in 1982–1984 (when they were deployed with the United States and Italy) and recently when serving as part of UNIFIL I in 2005, when a French officer was killed during a confrontation between Hezbollah and the IDF. The Italian unit's rather low threat perception is probably linked to its positive experiences in Lebanon during the multinational force operation in 1982–1984 (only the French and US units were attacked) and to the army's self-perception as a humanitarian rather than combat army.[20]

When asked what they would consider "victory" for their mission, six Italian soldiers answered that victory would consist of a long-term ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel; five responded that there would be no victory. Unfortunately, I was allowed to only ask seven French soldiers this question. The recurring perception among the French was that there was a victory to be had—over the terrorists and people who wanted to jeopardize the mission.[21]

Furthermore, the French and Italian units had different understandings of when and how to use force. How norms such as the ROE were interpreted influenced the likelihood that ROE would be applied in operations. One French general described the standard as follows: "You are going through various stages of application of force as a peacekeeping force you do not use the maximum force at your disposal straight away, I mean you should be following rules of engagement and apply force gradually unless there is an imminent threat of some hostile activities." French and Italian units displayed remarkably differently ideas in that respect. Most French soldiers interviewed deemed it appropriate to use force if IDF soldiers shot at French units, or if a civilian Hezbollah sympathizer or a general hostile party was shooting. For the Italian unit, beliefs were more divided across options. Most of the Italian sample believed that force should be used if Hezbollah was shooting at Italian soldiers, but fewer thought the same of IDF soldiers or "hostile parties."

Perceptions of "Big Concepts"

The units expressed clear differences in broad perceptions, such as the concept of peace and the difference between peace operations and conventional military operations. When asked to explain the concept of peace, the French invoked a negative concept (the absence of war), while the Italians referred to peace in its fuller and positive conception. Specifically, 53% of the French respondents defined peace as the absence of war, compared to 13% of Italian respondents. In contrast, only 27% of French respondents defined peace as building trust among the local population, while this was the most common response among the Italian respondents (60%). Similarly, 40% of Italian respondents perceived peace as the building up of a democratic regime—a response not found at all among the French.[22]

When asked about the general values of importance for the mission, the French unit identified military training and high technology as the most

important (53%), followed by neutrality and impartiality (40%), being a warrior (27%), and being culturally aware and free of prejudice (13% each), in line with the focus on "controlled assertiveness." The Italian unit's value rankings are almost the inverse, and mirror broader beliefs about the Italian army culture's focus on being good humanitarian soldiers: being culturally aware and without prejudice score equally high (53%), followed by being neutral (40%). Military training, technology, and being a warrior were not chosen.[23]

Making Sense of Their Own Military Organization: Roles, Doctrines, and Transformation

This section presents findings on perceptions of the army, including interpretations of roles and relevant documents (and their impact on the perceived transformation of the army), and how French and Italian soldiers who were deployed to UNIFIL II viewed such perceptions. When asked to compare important material and ideational elements required for the mission in Lebanon with those required in domestic operations, 47% of the Italian sample believed that the required skills were the same, while 33% held that the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission required less combat capacity. Only 7% of the Italian soldiers interviewed contended that peacekeeping required more combat capacity. The Italian military had also recently deployed in low-intensity "show the smile" operations in the domestic context, such as Operazione Strade Sicure (Operation Safe Roads) against criminal groups, which entailed a very limited use of force, may explain why the skills needed for domestic and international peacekeeping missions were perceived as similar: the Italian self-image of the "good soldier" applied equally in domestic and international contexts. By contrast, the French unit's perceptions were much more scattered: 60% of the troops interviewed reported that the skills required in Lebanon were the same as for domestic operations, while 40% contended that peacekeeping requires more combat skills. While rather inconclusive, this evidence suggests that for French soldiers, it does not really matter whether the skills required are the same; a French NCS explained: "It does not matter for us: we are French soldiers. We do what we have to do and we stick to that."[24]

Exploring the perceived shifts within each army was important for understanding whether the unit perceived itself to be in line with the core mission

imposed by the decisionmakers. An army's propensity to incorporate change and adapt to a specific situation is a function of its military culture—which is traditionally understood as reluctant to change. Asking the question while soldiers were deployed was thus a way to understand their reflections on military culture itself. In selecting the interview sample, I chose soldiers with varying years of experience (2 to 30 years of service) to make sure that neither a lack of experience nor a long service career had an undue influence on the responses. While both samples perceived a change in military roles and structures, the French and Italian units understood the characteristics of this change, as well as its determinants and timing, differently.

Most Italian soldiers believed that the change had occurred over the last 10 years due to the peace operation era and greater transnational cooperation. This result is telling, as it indicates that the two main drivers of change coincided with the two elements most associated with the increased legitimization of the Italian army—peace operations and the search for greater international legitimacy. By contrast, the core of the French unit mainly identified changes in French military culture with the professionalization of the army. Similarly to the Italian unit, the majority of French soldiers explained that the change had occurred over the past 10 years (7 soldiers believed so), while fewer (4 and 3, respectively) held that the most remarkable modifications had occurred in the past 5 or 15 years, respectively. This meant that the majority of the sample identified change strongly with the end of conscription in 1996. Fewer soldiers opted for the end of the Cold War (which would roughly coincide with the past 15 years) or the launching of the first large counterterrorist operations (which would mean the past 5 years, thus coinciding with the French involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and other counterterrorist operations). According to most French soldiers, new activities had been introduced: "We are deployed more and more in countries where they need us, helping them with fighting to go back to their everyday life."[25] Those activities mainly refer to the transition from a conventional to nonconventional focus within the French military, which does diminish the emphasis on assertiveness. Interestingly, while the army is changing its role by introducing new missions, the mindset stays the same. "If you do peacekeeping only, then you miss points as a soldier; peacekeeping is more of a little bit of diplomacy, negotiation, and minimum use of force. It is easier to adapt a regular army to peacekeeping than the other way round because we sometimes need these soldiers for real soldiering."[26] This is linked to the fact that since the 1990s, Western armies in particular

have had to develop competence in using force in mid-to-low intensity conflicts. "For example, in Mitrovicka, my soldiers had to switch from a passive position to an aggressive one in one second," one commander noted.[27] This suggests that assertiveness associated with cautiousness is considered important.

When asked which documents were primarily referred to, the Italian sample reported that the UN ROE were the primary reference point, with the UN resolution as secondary. By contrast, the French soldiers prioritized the French doctrine: 38% of the unit relied on the French doctrine, while another 33% relied on the *White Defense Book*; 24% relied on the UN ROE, and only 5% on the UN resolution. This suggests that French doctrines mattered more than other documents, which is in line with professional peacekeeping practices.

Each of these contextual interpretations is consistent with the main traits of the French and Italian military cultures. While we should be cautious due to the small-n of this questionnaire, it is interesting to note that some clear patterns emerge. French soldiers perceived the UNIFIL mission as an ordinary military operation with a high threat level that called for military skills, which is in line with the core trait of the French army culture—controlled assertiveness. Italian soldiers, in contrast, understood the mission as a peacekeeping operation, and had an accordingly low threat perception. They saw their role as that of peacekeepers, and constructed their required skills around cultural awareness and neutrality, in line with the ideal of good humanitarian soldiers and the quest for legitimacy, the main traits of the Italian military culture. The next section shows how these differing interpretations of the mission context are consistent with differences in force employment.

Variations in Force Employment in UNIFIL II

While deploying within UNIFIL II, not only did French and Italian soldiers have different contextual perceptions; they also behaved differently in their respective AOs. In this section, I identify and describe variations in the force employment of French and Italian units. In particular, force employment varied along five dimensions: (1) the number, timing, and level of armament of patrols, (2) cooperation with the LAF, (3) interactions with civilians, (4) force protection, (5) and command and control.

Variations in force employment also made it possible to assess different models of UPOE as they emerged among French and Italian units in UNIFIL II.[28] My data documented recurring actions undertaken at the tactical level. Each highlighted difference in behavior has been cross-checked through triangulation of different sources or cross-checked with at least three soldiers of different ranks. Furthermore, soldiers' narratives were combined with direct observation. It was difficult to distinguish between actual patterns of behavior and soldiers' interpretations of that behavior, because my empirical material was to some extent based on soldiers' reflections of what they do. For that reason, I have first tried to make extensive use of observation material and military reports. Second, I also extensively report soldiers' narratives and have tried to be as transparent as possible in the presentation of the findings. Third, I discuss how potential confounders—such as the mandate or national or headquarters' (HQ) decisions—could account for some of the variations. After highlighting the variations in force employment along the five dimensions, I assess the French and Italian units against the various indicators of UPOE.

Patrols: Frequency, Timing, and Level of Armament

The mandate defined the main objective for both units as controlling the territory and maintaining stability and security in their AOs. Patrolling was therefore a key element of fulfilling the mandate. The French and Italian units differed in the number and types of observations and patrols they conducted daily. The French unit was mainly concerned with patrolling; it allocated few units to observation. Patrolling units conducted two types of activities: zone control patrolling and contact patrolling. Zone control patrolling was designed to prevent and monitor hostile activities in the area, while contact patrolling aimed to get in touch with the population and collect information about the security situation and people's needs. Zone control patrolling was the clear priority for the French troops. They patrolled their whole AO, particularly the villages—for the stated purpose of finding weapons caches—as well as along the 10 km of the Blue Line in the French area of operation. They conducted an average of 27 patrols every day—mainly at night, due to a higher risk of hostile activity.[29]

The Italian unit also patrolled but did not consider it to be a priority action. They conducted fewer patrols—an average of 15 daily[30]—and mostly

during the day. The Italian unit did not distinguish between the two types of patrols but tended to undertake contact patrolling, which involved inter-action with the local population. When they were first deployed, Italian soldiers were taking photographs while they patrolled. The multinational HQ ordered them to stop in December 2007, considering the behavior inap-propriate. While according to most of them these pictures did not have any information-collection purpose attached to them, the Lebanese popu-lation had complained that foreign forces were not culturally sensitive and were taking pictures of them, and of the women in particular. After the HQ directive, the Italian unit ceased taking pictures, thus adapting to the context.

Finally, the choice of vehicles used to patrol is also relevant. The French patrolled with both tanks and armored vehicles, whereas all other soldiers in the UNIFIL mission used only armored vehicles: "We do patrolling with armored vehicles, they can be light or heavy. . . . We are under chapter VI and not under chapter VII, the parties agree that everything will go on qui-etly, but we are authorized to react in case of self-defense and in order to re-act we have to be armed from the start."[31] Furthermore, the Leclerc tanks used by the French, which were purchased at the end of the Cold War, were so heavy that the French received complaints from the local population: "Yes, they complained at the beginning. . . . We realized very quickly that patrol-ling with our tanks at two in the morning was neither ideal nor discrete for the people."[32] Interestingly, the French units decided to change routes but not vehicles: "Therefore, we rapidly changed the route of the vehicles if we had to patrol because we are obliged to do that with tanks: we used routes that were not as disturbing to the population."[33]

These tanks also destroyed roads. However, the French soldiers explained that they wanted to keep using tanks because they send a much more mean-ingful message than a civilian vehicle.[34] The UN HQ tolerated this decision, despite the troubles it posed for the local community, because it allowed for tactical results and was seen as improving UNIFIL's image. In the words of one colonel: "It is convenient for us to have them repair roads. In this way our means will circulate more easily; and he [referring to the local man/woman] thinks that this is good for his/her community."[35]

In contrast, the Italian troops patrolled using only armored vehicles: they had originally used tanks but immediately abandoned them in June 2007 as they realized they were badly received by the locals and started to use vehi-cles on wheels. However, this was not without its problems. Some NGO

workers reported complaints from the local population that the Italian vehicles were high enough for the soldiers to see into the Lebanese houses, which was problematic because the Shia women do not wear their heads-carves inside the house. Accordingly, the Italian unit stopped using those specific vehicles for patrols in the villages where this problem was encountered.

The clear differences in the frequency, timing, and methods of patrolling between the French and Italian troops did not stem from different directives given by UN HQ. HQ did not generally undertake any operational activities, and it tended not to deal with units' operations in the field, except where there were serious problems. Individual units in the field therefore had considerable independence, and differences in their force employment cannot be explained on the basis of HQ directives.

Cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

Under the UN mandate, the military units had a role in helping the LAF deploy in the south of Lebanon and ensuring that there were no other armed groups apart from the LAF and UN soldiers in the AO. The French unit prioritized this task, considering it to be a pivotal element of the mandate, while the Italian unit treated it as a subsidiary activity. The French unit therefore invested significantly more effort, energy, and programs into cooperating and conducting joint activities with the LAF than its Italian counterpart. The French also conducted joint patrols with the LAF, which few other UNI-FIL II units did. In the words of one French soldier: "We have a friendly relationship with them and we work with them more and more. We get along really well. We are now starting the so-called joint patrolling where you will have Lebanese and French elements doing joint patrolling together."[36] Joint patrolling entails a more institutionalized relationship between the LAF and French army, including the appointment of a liaison officer to manage the joint patrols: "We planned joint patrolling along the Blue Line with them, thus they are trying to deploy. It's going pretty well. The LAF are here in the French unit military base with a liaison officer who is here every day."[37] The French evaluated their cooperation very positively: "We work together in a perfect way and all this to help them a little bit to establish themselves in Southern Lebanon because they have not been here for a long time."[38] The LAF spoke favorably about the cooperation; no complaints about the French soldiers emerged during the interviews.[39]

The Italian soldiers had much more limited cooperation with the LAF. First, they did not undertake any joint training, in contrast to the French. As one Italian soldier explained: "We do not train the LAF that already exist. We usually cooperate. They are supposed to have control of the territory. We do joint activities with them."[40] These joint activities did not include joint patrolling, but only joint checkpoints on the Litani River. Managing joint checkpoints was less complex and required less institutionalized coordination than joint patrolling. As only the LAF could inspect vehicles at checkpoints under the UNIFIL II mandate, the UNIFIL units simply provided support and assistance to LAF units performing this role: "We mainly do checkpoints to cooperate with them and then they in particular have to control trades of illegal material between Northern and Southern Lebanon."[41] Thus, cooperation was part of the Italian units' activities but was given a lower priority; they perceived a clear separation between the activities that were the responsibility of the LAF and the Italian forces.

Interactions with Civilians

CIMIC refers to a wide range of activities undertaken by a military unit that aim to establish a good relationship with the local population and other actors from the international community operating in the same area—or at a minimum, facilitate the acceptance of the military presence in the area. CIMIC was critical in Southern Lebanon in the period under study. Several diverse activities were undertaken. While some of the CIMIC activities of the French and Italian units were similar, remarkable differences persisted between the two, as well as in comparison to non-Western contingents.[42]

The most uniformly implemented CIMIC activities, which were largely consistent among national contingents, were medical care and veterinary care for animals injured by mines and cluster bombs. Coordination with local municipalities to address urgent service problems, namely the provision of electricity and waste management, was also widespread practice.

The first notable difference in CIMIC activities between the French and Italian units was the priority given to CIMIC. For the Italians, CIMIC was the top priority in the mandate. They did more projects than the French, and were more frequently outside the base for CIMIC purposes. As one Italian soldier recalled: "We went out every day, in the morning from 9 am to 1 pm; it depends on how many visits there were."[43] They were involved in school

reconstruction and the rehabilitation of playgrounds and hospitals. They also started Italian language classes for the local population, an activity that was not undertaken by any other national contingent, and was not deemed particularly useful by the local population. The Italians were also involved in mine risk education. In contrast, the French did not consider CIMIC to be their priority. They engaged in some CIMIC activity, mainly involving support to schools and de-mining, and distributed special engines for olive presses in a joint project with the French Embassy.

Second, and consistent with the priority they gave to this line of work, the Italian unit understood CIMIC as a way of "advertising" their national characteristics. "Something good remains. The good that Italy is doing for them remains for sure; we are here for other reasons, but through aid the idea of the 'Italian' is better communicated."[44] The same perception did not exist within French troops: the only reason they undertook CIMIC activities was because they were listed in UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1701: "These civil military actions, they are not among our priorities. . . . It is the 1701 resolution that requires that."[45]

Third, the Italian unit interacted with the local population more closely than the French. This was true both for the Italian CIMIC team and its escort. Although the UN HQ asked both French and Italian CIMIC agents to wear their weapons discreetly, all units were escorted by heavily armed patrol teams wearing at least a combat jacket. However, I observed on many occasions that the Italian unit took any opportunity to interact with the local population. For example, one Italian noncommissioned soldier who was escorting a CIMIC doctor explains that while he was waiting outside the medical clinic, he socialized with the people: "Mainly children came, they asked for presents or something, but also old people, any type of person came."[46] However, the soldier's inability to speak Arabic prevented him from deeply interacting with the locals. None of the Italian soldiers spoke Arabic, and the interpreter was reserved for the CIMIC agents. As a consequence, interactions between the local population and the contingents were limited, but the Italian troops nonetheless demonstrated interaction skills and a willingness to communicate.

The fourth difference in French and Italian approaches concerns the appropriate means of transportation to use during CIMIC activities. The Koreans, Italians, and Ghanians did not use tanks, preferring to use "a small vehicle, a jeep, or a small van."[47] The French unit, in contrast, deployed Leclerc tanks for CIMIC activities. One Italian soldier explained: "Many

children are afraid when they see the armored vehicles, and the soldiers would stop and try to explain to the children that the reason they are here is to help the population."[48] The French were simply not focused on the local population: "We build upon the resolution; therefore we come here also with heavy means, such as the Leclerc."[49] In fact, the French troops even considered that gaining acceptance for the presence of tanks in the territory was one of the goals of CIMIC activities.

Fifth, the French and Italian units provided different types of training for CIMIC agents. Italian and Ghanian CIMIC agents at the battalion level openly admitted that they did not receive any specific CIMIC education in most cases. In contrast, French CIMIC agents were specifically trained for the task, which entailed a higher degree of professionalism.

Sixth, French and Italian units also differed in the way they interacted with NGOs. Launching joint programs with NGOs in their AO was one possible way to interact with the local population. NGOs in Southern Lebanon pursued diverse approaches: some were clearly development oriented, while others responded to more urgent needs. None of the military units in Lebanon had launched joint activities with NGOs at the time of study, yet the way the different military units perceived the NGO community was telling. The French soldiers considered NGOs to be part of the landscape but did not interact with them: military units "should act without substituting for the Lebanese government or NGOs."[50] The Italians, in contrast, had undertaken preliminary discussions with the Italian Aid and Development Cooperation. They saw the overlap between similar types of projects and the need for coordination to avoid duplication.

Finally, Italian and French units learned and adapted in different ways. CIMIC activities seemed to foster bottom-up innovation processes, which one might expect would lead to increasing similarities among armies. Yet the Italian unit could be seen to be adapting more quickly than its French counterpart. For example, veterinary care was the first CIMIC activity that most military units in the UNIFIL mission undertook: "Before the war there was only one veterinary doctor in the South, which was the Indian veterinary doctor. He was the most popular guy in UNIFIL: he would get a call in the middle of the night from local people saying 'Come! My goats and my sheep,' and now you have seen that each contingent has brought its own vet."[51] The Italian unit took inspiration from the Indians and immediately commenced its own veterinary program. The French, however, had still not implemented

a veterinary program by the end of the observation period, despite its prevalence in other military units.

Again, these variations could be explained by different directives given to the two units by HQs. The main aim of CIMIC activities undertaken by HQs was to harmonize and balance the policies of the force commander. For instance, HQs had to pay attention to the extent to which UNIFIL's broad mission was respected. But HQs had limited funds available from the UN to undertake Quick Impact Projects (QIP) up to a total of about $100,000 per year. In addition, HQs did not quite manage to speak with one voice, in part due to the duplication of humanitarian activities undertaken by the Civil Affairs Office (which dealt with QIPs) and a military cell (which dealt with CIMIC). The Civil Affairs Office worked toward a long-term goal, and thus "considers any type of intervention project that fosters the UN's political mission."[52] The action of this military unit could be either indirect, such as giving input to the sectors' commands or to national contingents, or direct on the tactical level with a small unit launching particular projects. "CIMIC has a military objective, instead of pursuing that goal through patrolling, and checkpoints, it relates to the population."[53] A colonel pointed out that the militaries at the unit level and the military at the UN HQs level "had different approaches toward CIMIC."[54] Furthermore, contingents took initiatives on their own: while some reconstructed religious buildings, others invited the locals to take part in their weekly celebrations, organized very popular yoga classes, or taught children tae kwon do. Importantly, there is no information indicating that the French or Italian units had received any guidelines from the HQs concerning the number and kind of CIMIC activities to undertake. Thus, national units had relatively ample margins of maneuver: such decisions were taken at the tactical level on the initiative of the unit's commander or at the individual soldier level, without any pressure from the national level or the United Nations. CIMIC was therefore undertaken in very different ways by the different contingents.

Force Protection

Force protection concerns the security of the base (and the protection of all the soldiers attached to it) in the AO. In UNIFIL II, this included the organization of checkpoints inside and outside the base; the maintenance

of weapons, vehicles, materiel, and the technology soldiers used every day in operational activities; and daily bureaucratic duties. In general, the soldiers charged with force protection rarely left the base. During the study period, the UN HQ in Naqoura had established a security code level yellow, meaning a medium level of alert and force protection. Yet although the types of force protection activities undertaken did not vary greatly, the intensity and the degree of force protection did. I observed three major differences between the French and Italian units.

First, the degree of force protection in the military bases varied based on the soldiers' level of threat perception. The Italian Army allocated few resources to force protection: it was easy to pass the checkpoint at the entrance, the bases of the Italian unit did not have permanent walls, and the bases were not built in a strategic position.[55] There was also an unsecured hill close to the base. In contrast, the French soldiers in their base at Tiri used very strong force protection measures: they had recently embarked on new restructuring works to enlarge and secure the base, and the fortifications were made of reinforced concrete. The base was located on a well-protected hilltop. "We have not had particular problems for a year. . . . Nevertheless we stay vigilant. . . . We know that even if it stays calm, we have always to be vigilant in order to avoid the worst."[56]

The second difference is that the Italian unit displayed lower force protection measures than the French when conducting patrols outside the base. Italian soldiers wore a helmet and a bulletproof vest only when standing outside the vehicle, while French soldiers wore a helmet even when inside the vehicle. As mentioned earlier, French units patrolled with tanks, while Italian units patrolled with armored vehicles. Third, the higher prioritization given to force protection was reflected in the units' perceived percentage of time allocated to force protection compared to other operational activities: approximately 60% of the French unit's activities could be characterized as force protection, compared to 40% for the Italian unit.[57]

HQ's directives cannot explain these observed variations, because it released no specific directives concerning force protection. Furthermore, the national units rotated responsibilities for the force protection of the HQ; at the time of my research, the Italian unit had just taken over this duty from the French.[58] However, special units were tasked with HQ force protection, which were not the same as those deployed in the AO. For the French, they were part of the Quick Reaction Force (paratroopers). For the Italians, they were Folgore paratroopers, an elite unit of the Italian army, traditionally

in charge of the more complex and combat-oriented operations. Yet according to many observers, the level of force protection decreased during the period of Italian responsibility compared to the French security precautions. Thus, the consistency of the approach to force protection when charged with this responsibility at HQ confirms that the differences originated from the different national contingents. The differences observed in the field must thus derive from decisions taken at the unit—rather than the HQ—level.

Command and Control

Command and control played a more substantive role at the tactical level in UNIFIL II compared to other missions, primarily because all contingents shared the same mandate and the same ROE, which was not at all the case for other, more enforcing-type missions, such as the NATO mission in Afghanistan. In UNIFIL II, the force commander circulated directives in order to modify certain behavior. One of his concerns was to guarantee a degree of homogeneity among the different areas. For example, he issued a directive on contact patrolling, asking the contingents to carry their weapons very discreetly when patrolling in the villages. While we should expect similarities among units due to the coordinating role of the HQ, variations emerged between the French and Italian units in how they interpreted HQ directives.

Usually the head of a UN peacekeeping mission is a civilian, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). UNIFIL II does not have an SRSG, but the head of the military mission (the force commander) also served as the political chief of the mission.[59] Paradoxically, although the operation was civilian-led, hence requiring transparent and full exchange of information, the chain of command was not entirely clear: the units lacked clear military focal points at the HQ level, and the military commander was busy with political decisions—all of which made it difficult for HQ to control the units.

This lack of control also facilitated differences among units. First, French and Italian units interacted differently with the companies from Qatar and Slovenia, respectively, assigned by HQ to be under their operational control. The French were satisfied with the relationship overall, but they found it difficult to work with the Qataris because the two armies' structures are different. This was a widely shared impression. The Italian unit, in contrast,

coped well with the Slovenian presence: the Italians understood their own presence as merely political and hence did not mind if other contingents were deployed under their operational control as long as this did not negatively affect their image back home. An Italian officer explained, "Our presence is for sure a political presence; for us, the military, it is not easy: we can never intervene at first, we have to wait until the political authorities decide; but it makes us look good."[60] Coordination with other contingents was perceived as an "atypical function of the military. . . . According to me the Italian soldier is good at that."[61] While the command relationship might have worked well due to the similarities between the Italian and Slovenian armies, it would not explain why the Italians interpreted the chain of command and control in such a flexible way.

Second, the French had a vertical and rigid chain of command and control. For example, I was not allowed to ask some of my questions about command and control in the individual interviews or on the anonymous questionnaires. They perceived it as something junior officers or enlisted soldiers could not possibly know: "This is not a very fair question, I am just a soldier, I do not think about the opportunity."[62] In contrast, the Italian unit did not have any problems with me asking these specific questions. While the Italian attitude could be explained by my Italian citizenship, the French were very open in answering all my other questions.

French and Italian UPOE: "Deterrence" vs. "Show the Smile"?

While I was interviewing French soldiers at the At Tiri base in Southern Lebanon, French Colonel (now General) Bernard Commins told me, "Effectiveness is thousands of small things." Indeed, trying to identify the patterns of behavior that may lead to potential kinds of effectiveness is a complex endeavor, particularly for missions where the desired end state is not conventional victory. Below I discuss what the identified variations in force employment tell us about each unit's UPOE. Table 3 presents the UPOE scores on all six dimensions.

Concerning operational activities, the French unit scored higher on military skills because they patrolled more frequently, and in a way that was directly intended to monitor the security situation and prevent weapons smuggling. Furthermore, the choice to use Leclerc tanks indicated that they

interpreted their mission as having a greater military ambition than a typical humanitarian operation. The French unit also exhibited low humanitarian skills. By contrast, the Italian unit exhibited low military skills. The fact that the Italian unit was less assertive in operational activities did not seem to be explicable on the basis of cultural awareness. As highlighted by the issues with taking photographs and the height of patrolling vehicles, the Italian unit had difficulty understanding what was and was not appropriate. In contrast to the French unit, however, the Italians adapted more easily to their context, and thus can be considered more responsive. This is seen in the ease of the Italian unit's bottom-up innovation processes—for example, the speed of learning and adaptation regarding the fact that tanks disturbed the local population. The French unit's more sophisticated cooperation with the LAF gives it a higher interoperability score. There is no empirical evidence with which to evaluate integration in this case. As the type of vehicles and equipment used by the two units are roughly similar, they scored equally on the quality criterion.

Given the strong variations on dimensions of CIMIC activity between the French and Italian troops, how did they compare when measured using the UPOE tool? The French unit allocated little importance to CIMIC activities, and accordingly scored low in humanitarian skills. Meanwhile, it scored high in military skills because it only deployed CIMIC soldiers who had been trained. Furthermore, it carried out CIMIC activities using heavy vehicles that created barriers to contact with the local population. Its responsiveness was low, as evidenced by the inability to adapt regarding veterinary care. There was no evidence with which to evaluate interoperability in this case, and the quality of hardware was similar to that of the Italian unit. In contrast, the Italian unit scored higher in humanitarian skills, quality, and responsiveness due to the number and types of CIMIC projects undertaken, and its strong adaptability to new CIMIC scenarios. The Italians scored lower on integration than the French unit because of the lack of training of the unit's CIMIC agents as well as their perceived ample margins of maneuver on CIMIC projects. Military skills and interoperability could not be evaluated for CIMIC activities.

As far as force protection is concerned, the French unit scored high on military skills and integration because it displayed high force protection measures, and this was consistent throughout the levels of command. In contrast, the Italian unit scored high on humanitarian skills, responsiveness, and interoperability, and low on integration. The Italians demonstrated

lower force protection measures, which enhances contact with the population, but it was also more attentive to other armies' dynamics and in adapting to bottom-up innovation processes. Quality was constant because of the similar hardware used by the two units.

Variations in the command and control structure emerged, which suggested that the French scored high on integration but low on responsiveness and interoperability. They have a well-structured army, with well-functioning command and control procedures. However, they did not manage to be as responsive and interoperable as the Italians. The Italian unit scored low on integration but high on responsiveness and interoperability. The unit was flexible and ready to adapt to a multinational context, but its chain of command was not very well integrated. The French and Italian units thus were effective in different ways, as they score differently in UPOE for each indicator.

In summary, the French and Italian units in UNIFIL II behaved very differently during their deployments. This cannot be linked to a disparity in resources or other material factors because both units were comparable in all relevant respects, as detailed at the beginning of this chapter. The French unit prioritized the monitoring of the AO, while the Italian unit was more concerned with humanitarian activities. To aggregate the results on UPOE, the French scored high on military skills and integration. In the specific case of operational activities, they also scored high on interoperability because of their cooperation with the LAF. Territorial control and force protection were understood to be the most important tasks, which was why the French unit deployed Leclerc tanks. From a French unit perspective, in an area where Hezbollah was very strong, it was pivotal to show their presence and deter hostile activities with frequent night patrols with heavy vehicles. The drawback of this approach was that the local population perceived it as aggressive, and the heavy tanks destroyed roads. This is why the French unit scored low on humanitarian skills and responsiveness. However, by dedicating less attention to humanitarian activities, the French unit was better able to accomplish the mandate's aim of creating an area free from weapons smuggling and preventing hostile activities at the border.

The Italian unit, by contrast, scored higher in humanitarian skills, responsiveness, and interoperability. Indeed, it had a stronger commitment to CIMIC activities than to operational ones, which explains why the Italian unit launched many different humanitarian projects, from Italian classes to environmental projects. The Italian soldiers explicitly recognized that humanitarian projects pursued tactical objectives: protecting Italian soldiers

Table 3. Summary of Variations in UPOE Between French (F) and Italian (I) Units

	Patrolling and Interaction with LAF		Interaction with Civilians		Force Protection		Command and Control	
	F	I	F	I	F	I	F	I
Combat skills	High	Low	Not applicable	Not applicable	High	Low	Not applicable	Not applicable
Humanitarian skills	Low	Low	Low	High	Low	High	Not applicable	Not applicable
Quality	Same	Same	Same	Same	Same	Same	Same	Same
Integration	Not applicable	Not applicable	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Responsiveness	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low	High
Interoperability	High	Low	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Low	High	Low	High

in the area. The Italian unit thus prioritized one particular aspect of the mandate: providing humanitarian aid. By contrast, it did not seem to contribute to maintaining security. Indeed, according to some sources Hezbollah was rearming, particularly in the Italian AO.[63] In any case, two models of effectiveness seem to emerge: the French were more "security effective," while the Italians were more "humanitarian effective." Their appropriateness and importance depends on the situation.

Other factors could potentially explain these two kinds of peace operation effectiveness. For example, HQ decisions, national directives, and material resources can influence effectiveness. While these elements may sometimes be important, in this case they were roughly constant or comparable. The evidence thus shows that the variations in force employment derived from tactical decisions. In other words, the way soldiers use their room to maneuver affects their UPOE.

Making Sense of UPOE: Preliminary Thoughts
on Its Impact on the Ground

These two emerging models of effectiveness correspond well to the different perceptions documented in the first section of this chapter: the French perceive the UNIFIL mission as an ordinary military operation with a high threat level, while the Italians interpret it as a peacekeeping operation. Importantly, the different models of effectiveness also seem to be related to the evolution of the security situation on the ground. Many factors influenced the overall success and failure of the mission, which is still ongoing—thus it is hard to evaluate the outcome. Nonetheless, I tried to understand whether the UPOE results were consistent with the evolution of the security situation on the ground.

While the situation was generally calm during the period of observation, without open conflict in progress, small incidents occurred. These were either directed against UNIFIL or against Israeli or Lebanese political leaders. Thus, they did not target the Lebanese population in general. In the study period, only one major incident occurred against the Spanish contingent in August 2007, but various other events threatened the security of the area without targeting UNIFIL or the local population. In August 2007, an unarmed NBC device (which was not conceived to explode) was placed on the beach in Tyre. Every two to three days there were Israeli over-flights in vio-

lation of the UNSC resolution 1701 followed by skirmishes at the border. In December 2007, Lebanese General Al-Hajj was assassinated the day before the planned presidential elections.

The local population I interviewed was convinced of the general effectiveness of UNIFIL II, but they also recognized that it mainly helps maintain the international community's attention.[64] The attack against the Spanish happened in the Eastern sector, the unexploded device was found in the Korean area, and the bomb blast that killed Al-Hajj happened in Beirut, thus out of area. However, given the type of "invisible" threat, the attack against the Spanish has been interpreted as a warning. According to an HQ official, the Spanish unit found something it should not have found, and the explosion was a signal from Hezbollah.[65] While all the elements above influenced the outcome of the mission, none signaled anything explicitly to the French or Italian units.

In comparison to UNIFIL I, which gained the trust of the Southern Lebanese, UNIFIL II was sometimes seen as a tool for a US-led initiative to support Israel.[66] Yet the Israeli press often accuses UNIFIL II of being pro-Hezbollah.[67] According to a Hezbollah member, UNIFIL II is "useless and gives us time to rearm and train against Israel."[68] At the same time, from Hezbollah's perspective, UNIFIL II could remain in the area "if it does not try to do too much."[69] While no clear-cut differences in outcomes emerge between the French and Italian AOs, interviews and media reports suggested their actions had different impacts. While the local population often criticized the French unit for its aggressive posture, the Italian unit gathered greater consensus. Yet the Lebanese and Israeli perception was that the French were more effective in detecting Hezbollah's hostile activities. While we should be cautious in drawing inferences from these data, this suggests that the two units' UPOE were consistent with their impact in the field.

This chapter has shown how the different military cultures of the French and Italian armies, and the corresponding differences in perceptions of the UNIFIL context, are consistent with the substantial differences in force employment observed. The French prioritized patrolling and force protection in line with their culture of controlled assertiveness, which corresponded to their perception of UNIFIL as an ordinary military operation with a high threat level. The Italians prioritized humanitarian activities and displayed lower force protection levels, in line with their humanitarian culture centered on winning legitimacy through good humanitarian deeds abroad, as well as their perception of UNIFIL as a peacekeeping operation.

French and Italian Units in Afghanistan

The second case study examines the French and Italian deployments to the multinational NATO operation in Afghanistan. I chose a NATO case because SOPs and general regulations are much stricter in NATO missions than in UN missions. Accordingly, one would expect to find fewer behavioral variations in the NATO mission in Afghanistan than in the UN mission in Lebanon. Yet the results show that differing contextual perceptions linked to military cultures—and corresponding differences in force employment—persist, and are consistent with the variations observed between the two units in Lebanon, thus supporting the validity of the cultural explanation proposed in this book. This chapter concludes by discussing the explanatory power of alternative explanations, discussing both cases (Lebanon and Afghanistan) at the same time.

This chapter documents the same correspondence between force employment, perceptions of the mission, and military cultures as in UNIFIL II. As in Lebanon, the Italian and French AOs in Afghanistan shared similar threat levels, and their units had similar material and nonmaterial constraints and opportunities. Despite these contextual similarities, they behaved differently in the field.

This chapter discusses how these differences in force employment correspond to differences in the French and Italian military cultures, and in perceptions of the ISAF mission, and imply the same two models of UPOE as seen in the Lebanese case. The French, who perceived ISAF as a combat operation in a hostile environment, again prioritized patrolling and force protection; the Italians again engaged mainly in humanitarian activities. Given the precarious security situation, observation was more limited in the Afghanistan case than in Lebanon, and was therefore complemented

with other sources. Interviews were conducted not only with the soldiers who were part of the mission but also with other actors in the country (for instance, staff members of UNHCR, OCHA, ICRC, Red Cross, journalists, refugees, internally displaced people, and other Afghans), enabling the verification of facts and perceptions reported in the interviews without as much need for direct observation. I conducted direct observation, interviews, and questionnaires in 2008 (May-October) as well as several follow-up interviews in Paris and Rome and in the areas where the units were located in France and Italy, respectively, until 2015.

ISAF

NATO assumed strategic command, control, and coordination of ISAF on August 11, 2003. It was a security and stability operation, meaning that the security forces carried out "operations for the restoration and maintenance of order and stability" and engaged in reconstruction activities.[1] It was thus different from UNIFIL's traditional peacekeeping mission in Lebanon in many ways, particularly because there were many different missions ongoing at the same time.

ISAF was established as one of the provisions of the Bonn Agreement in 2001 made between major Afghan leaders, in the presence of numerous international powers, to ensure a stable political transition following the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001.[2] Afghanistan was ruled by a formal three-way partnership between the Afghan Transitional Authority, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and the NATO ISAF mission. Shortly after the Bonn Agreement, the UN Security Council authorized ISAF "to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas" for six months.[3] The mandate was then progressively extended and strengthened over time. The mission was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter, which authorizes the use of military measures, including the limited use of force, in response to a threat to international peace and security. In the practice of peace operations, a Chapter VII intervention is considered to be equipped with more "muscle and teeth" than traditional peacekeeping operations.[4]

The UN resolution authorizing ISAF also mentioned two important provisions of the Bonn Agreement. First, the UN resolution pledged "the withdrawal of all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other

areas."[5] This is why the only ISAF military base in Afghanistan was the NATO HQ in Kabul. ISAF also operated through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were controversially vaguely designed to be joint civil-military units, and thus did not always have fully fledged "military bases."[6] There were five regional commands: North (German led) with five PRTs, West (Italian led) with four PRTs, Regional Command Capital (RCC; French led) with no PRTs, South (Dutch led) with four PRTs, and East (US led) with 13 PRTs. The RCC, located in the area surrounding Kabul, did not have a PRT because its area of control was geographically limited and had a more stable security situation;[7] its CIMIC activities were undertaken by specialized units.

Second, the UN resolution cited the Bonn Agreement's statement that it would be "desirable if such a force were to assist in the rehabilitation of Afghan infrastructure,"[8] thereby juxtaposing security-related and reconstruction activities. This recommendation became overstretched in practice, and ended up including all humanitarian activities undertaken by ISAF HQ and the national armies.

In the study period, ISAF was present throughout the country, leading approximately 55,100 troops from more than 40 countries and 26 PRTs.[9] ROE and national caveats varied greatly by country, and some national armies were involved in heavy combat while others provided strictly logistical support or displayed exceptionally high force protection levels, hence keeping patrolling to a minimum.[10] This triggered profound disagreements and tensions within NATO.

Setting the Scene: Conditions of Deployment in Afghanistan

French and Italian troops deployed a similar number of troops (approximately 2,500) to the RCC in Kabul.[11] The French contingent included units involved in different types of activities: 75 members of the chief of staff in the RCC, 800 soldiers who were part of the French Battalion (FrenchBatt), 500 serving in active units of the Command and Support Battalion, 600 in units based in Kapisa, and roughly 600 soldiers involved in specific training activities for the Afghan Army (either with Epidote or the Commando School and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team). The bulk of the French-Batt was composed of the 8th Marine Parachute Infantry Regiment, which

is the unit on which I concentrated my fieldwork and with whom I spent time as an observer.

The Italians deployed 2,510 troops to the RCC: a core battalion (the 9th Regiment "Alpini" during the time of observation) and support units (made up of the Administrative Centre, Support and Adherence Group, Transmission Company, Engineer Company, Surveillance Company, and Acquisition of Objective Company).

The French and Italian battalions were both elite and prestigious operational units with a history of foreign deployments in peace and stability operations. The two units used similar types of tanks and armored vehicles. The French used so-called small protected vehicles (*petit véhicule protégé*), which are armored to protect material and personnel.[12] They also used infantry combat armored vehicles (*véhicules blindé de combat de l'infanterie*, VBCI).[13] The main vehicle was the AMX 10P, which is armored, amphibious, protected by medium-sized weapons, and designed for use in contaminated areas.[14] Similarly, the Italian unit deployed two types of armored vehicles and one tank: a Multirole Vehicle FIAT VM 90, the VBL "Puma" infantry combat armored vehicle, and the BV 206 armored tank.[15]

As part of NATO force protection measures, every French and Italian NCO and soldier had to carry a long weapon at all times inside the base, while officers were allowed to carry guns only. The types of weapons used were comparable. The French unit used a mid-range anti-tank weapon (Milan), a light long reinforced mortar (81 mm), an anti-tank AT4 CS, and a mid-range portable anti-tank missile (AntiChar Courte Portée, ACCP). Similarly, the Italian unit used a mid-range anti-tank weapon (Milan), a long-range anti-tank missile (the US TOW system), and mortars (60 mm and 120 mm).

The personal equipment used by the two units was also very similar. Every French and Italian soldier had to wear a bulletproof vest (weighing 14 kg) and a Kevlar helmet when outside the base.[16] Unlike for UNIFIL, I was not able to collect information concerning the precise numbers of weapons and troops as they were classified. However, both French and Italian interviewees (and those from NATO HQ) agreed that France and Italy had access to roughly the same amount and types of weapons, vehicles, and munitions.[17] The French and Italian units served as part of the same multinational NATO mission, under identical mandates. The ROE did not differ substantially and the caveats imposed were the same.[18]

ISAF's threat level was significantly higher than UNIFIL's, and ISAF's mandate allowed military units to use more force. One would expect that

the high threat levels and stringent NATO procedures in Afghanistan should have led to greater behavioral convergence between units, by reducing the margins of maneuver for units at the tactical level. A priori, these considerations should make Afghanistan a hard case, and again increase the external validity of the culturalist argument if it is found to apply.

As in Lebanon, the French and Italian AOs in Afghanistan displayed similar threat levels. Indeed, all officers interviewed at the multinational HQ in Kabul agreed that the French and Italian AOs were similar in terms of threat level.[19] The French and Italian contingents also shared the same command (RCC), the surface area was similar. The Italian contingents had to deal with two problematic valleys, Chahar Asyab and Musay, while the French were in charge of Khaki Jabar and Surobi (handed over by the Italian contingent on August 3, 2008).[20] While during the period of observation (May-December 2008) the two units suffered different numbers of casualties, over the longer term the French and Italian AOs were subject to similar numbers of attacks and suffered similar numbers of casualties.[21] The French experienced three attacks during the study period (36 casualties), while the Italians suffered only one attack (one casualty). Yet 34 out of the 36 French casualties were suffered in the Taliban ambush in the Surobi Valley in July 2008, an area that the Italian contingent had just handed over to the French; the attack appears to have been a warning to the newly deployed French unit.[22] The other two attacks against the French and the one against the Italians were all caused by improvised explosive devices.[23] An attack had also occurred against the Italian contingent in February 2008, just after they had taken control of the area, killing an Italian officer.[24]

Table 4 summarizes the similarities between the French and Italian units in Afghanistan and shows that, as in Lebanon, they were comparable across a range of criteria concerning the nature and conditions of their deployment.[25]

French and Italian Soldiers in Afghanistan

As in the Lebanese case, I study perceptions along three dimensions and consider their link to military culture: understanding the context of the mission, perceptions of "big concepts," and organizational dynamics.

Table 4. Similarities of the French and Italian Contributions to ISAF

	ISAF (Afghanistan)	
	French	*Italian*
Material resources		
Troop numbers	2,500	2,500
Equipment / vehicles	Heavy tanks	Heavy tanks
	Pick-up trucks	
	Light vehicles	Light vehicles (Lince)
	Comparable levels of other equipment	Comparable levels of other equipment
Threat level		
Area of operation	RCC in Kabul	RCC in Kabul
Difficulty of the area of operation	Stabilizing the Surobi Valley	Stabilizing the Mosay Valley
Mandate		
	NATO mandate	NATO mandate
	- Establishing minimal security conditions in the AO	- Establishing minimal security conditions in the AO
	- Identical ROE	- Identical ROE
ROE		
	Identical*	Identical†

* Note how they were identical in the RCC between 2008 and 2012
† Note how they were identical in the RCC between 2008 and 2012

Perceptions of the Local Context

The differences in perception of the nature of the mission were more polarized in Afghanistan than in Lebanon. For the French, ISAF was clearly not a peace operation: "We know we are not in a time of peace. Thinking sometimes that we are not at war is being unfair toward people who are taking enormous risks."[26] Rather, the French describe the mission as a counterinsurgency operation: "Without doubt, we are in an area in which there is a

counterinsurgency" and "at every moment we can be drawn into war actions. . . . It is definitely not peacekeeping, it is a war."[27] Soldiers reported that during the pre-deployment phase, "our chiefs told us we were going straight into a war."[28] Some gave even more direct responses: "It is a war, a war against the Taliban."[29]

In stark contrast, the Italians perceived the ISAF mission as a peace operation: "Yes, this is clearly peacekeeping," with objectives of economic development, or, as one of them wrote in the questionnaire, "to obtain a declaration of defeat from the Taliban, followed by a political process."[30] As observed in Lebanon, the French and Italian units differed in their perceptions of the local context—particularly in defining the "enemy." The French unit unanimously reported that there was an enemy. They saw the enemy primarily as the Taliban: "the Taliban are taking over at the moment" or "our enemies are not all here for the same reasons, but they are all our enemies."[31] However, they were convinced that the Taliban were mixed with the local population: "This is not a war against someone, we are at war against organizations and against people who know the country; they speak the language and they are here in their country."[32] "It is a network of enemies: a first circle of people coming from abroad, then there is a second circle of Taliban, and the third circle, it is other Afghans themselves, for different reasons."[33]

While some members of the Italian unit also perceived the Taliban as enemies, the Italian soldiers were clear that the enemy could be clearly distinguished from the civilian population: "An American, English, or French soldier would never do that; they see their enemy everywhere."[34] According to the questionnaire responses, 35% of the Italian sample believed that there was no enemy, another 35% held that it was a very small group of Taliban, and a further 20% held that it was another group of insurgents. Only 7% identified the enemy with the local population. As they specified in their questionnaire responses: "Not all people are enemies. It is a country that is born again, not one that is dying. The locals keep the bad people away."[35] For the Italian unit, the enemy could thus be distinguished from the local population, in line with their general posture of closeness to the population.

With respect to the meaning of victory in the context of Afghanistan, more than 50% of the Italian soldiers interviewed identified the economic development of the entire area as the main objective. Thus, most Italian soldiers saw their role in ISAF as to reconstruct the area.[36] Furthermore, the second and third preferences were not particularly militaristic: the Taliban's

surrender declaration (29%) implied a political process rather than a military victory in the traditional sense, and a ceasefire among hostile parties (identified by 13% of respondents) again required a diplomatic initiative rather than a military intervention. Only 3% of the Italian sample believed that capturing Bin Laden was one of the objectives of the mission. Thus, the Italian sample did not have an assertive or militaristic conception of their role in the NATO mission. By contrast, the French unit perceived its main objective as a military objective: the great majority of the sample (80%) identified defeating the Taliban as the core objective of the mission, underscoring the assertiveness idea entrenched in its military culture.

These perceptions of the mission and enemy are confirmed by assessments of the threat levels (where 10 represents the highest threat level and 1 the lowest): 93% of the French unit reported a threat perception ranging between 8 and 10, and 7% perceived a threat ranging between 5 and 7. By contrast, 70% of the Italian unit reported a threat perception between 5 and 7, and 27% perceived a threat between 2 and 4.[37] Not only was the threat perception lower for the Italian unit than for the French in Afghanistan; the two units also perceived the threat as qualitatively different. The French perceived the local Afghans to be distant, in contrast to previous deployments where they felt welcomed by the local population.[38] Correspondingly, all French soldiers who had served in other locations perceived the threat level in Afghanistan as higher than in any other context. The Italian unit's perception of the local population was the opposite: "In Afghanistan, compared to Kosovo, we relate to people more actively. We are more involved in activities that involve them."[39] "We are all brothers."[40] And more precisely, "Afghanistan is different threat-level wise. We take more care of the relationship with the population here with CIMIC, medcap, and other activities."[41]

Adjusting for the higher threat level in Afghanistan, these findings were in line with those in the Lebanese case. The perceptions of French soldiers deployed to Afghanistan resonated with the core trait of the French army culture—"controlled" assertiveness. Accordingly, soldiers' appropriate skills are combat related, and the mission is understood as a counterinsurgency where the enemy can be hiding in the civilian population, explaining the higher threat perception and very careful adherence to the mandate. Conversely, the Italian unit, in line with their army's dominant cultural beliefs of being good humanitarian soldiers for seeking legitimacy, perceived the mission as a standard peace operation with a more moderate threat level, and

understood their role within the mission as humanitarian soldiers, with a clear connection to the civilian population.

Perceptions of Big Concepts

The negative and positive conceptualizations of peace observed in Lebanon held equally true for the units in Afghanistan. The French unit mostly characterized peace as the absence of war (60% of the sample), while a smaller but conspicuous number (40%) of soldiers believed that peace was the absence of major security attacks in the past 3–6 months; 7% characterized peace as the absence of security threats. Only 13% of French troops considered peace to mean building trust among the local population, and no respondents referred to the presence of a democratic regime.

In contrast, the Italians in Afghanistan (as in Lebanon) saw peace in a fuller and more idealistic sense: 53% and 47% believed that peace meant building trust among the local population and the presence of a democratic regime, respectively. The option "absence of war" received a meager 7%, while the other options were not mentioned. When elaborating on their responses, one soldier contended that "peace is the greatest resource for human beings, but unfortunately it is not exploited by everybody." Many other Italian soldiers—of which I report only a small number—embarked on a long series of diverse and highly idealistic ruminations that were completely absent from the responses of their French counterparts. For example, "Peace is an upside down pyramid: everybody can enjoy its volume but its equilibrium is quite precarious,"[42] "Peace is helping those who need it and those who unfortunately have been involved in a war,"[43] "Peace is freedom of speech and a people's ability to live,"[44] "It is the reciprocal respect of different peoples, it is the respect of human right,"[45] and "When you manage to find a perfect equilibrium."[46] The Italian soldiers' definitions of peace ranged from situations of equilibrium to elements related to respect for human rights. One soldier even spoke of global inequalities: "It [solving global inequalities] is our end goal, but unrealizable while you still have some people richer than others."[47]

These responses, though varied, showed an overall cohesiveness among the Italian soldiers about seeing peace as a positive concept. There was again, as in Lebanon, a strong difference in perceptions of the combat capacities required for peacekeeping missions: 87% of the Italian sample responded that peacekeeping required less combat capacity than actual warfighting, while

60% of the French sample held that peacekeeping required more combat capacities.[48] In response to the question "What are appropriate values about behavior in peace operations?" similar variations were observed between the French and Italian units as were found in Lebanon. Being a warrior was significantly more important for the French: 60% of French soldiers called it the most appropriate characteristic, followed by military training (27%) and cultural awareness (20%). No preference was given to neutrality and a lack of prejudice. In elaborating on their responses, the French soldiers often emphasized the importance of professionalism, for example: "I often compare the military to firefighters . . . in order to have firefighters you need to have educated people, professionals who are well motivated for the mission or well-suited to the operation."[49] French soldiers also frequently expressed their desire to engage in combat more often, believing that this is how soldiers should behave: "Everybody would like to go for it [lit.: *y aller une fois pour toutes*]."[50]

The Italian soldiers, in contrast, prioritized the absence of prejudice (53%) and neutrality (47%) as the most important characteristics, clearly in line with the mandate of a humanitarian mission. They also gave low priority to military training (13%), cultural awareness (8%), and "being a warrior" (8%). In further elaboration, they emphasized the importance of empathy between commanders and soldiers. The broad and populist narrative of Italians as "good people" and empathetic also emerged frequently in their discourse: "The approach derives from our military culture . . . meaning we are all friends, brothers, so Italian."[51] They also considered these national ideals of being a "good soldier" to be relevant to the way others saw them: "We are Italian: they love us abroad; they really see the Italians with a different eye."[52]

Again, as in the Lebanon case, French soldiers tended to prioritize values that linked to their ability to do a military job as soldiers well, clearly stemming from their cultural focus on controlled assertiveness, whereas the Italians were oriented toward qualities that are important for being (or being perceived as) "good humanitarian soldiers."

Making Sense of Their Own Military Organization: Roles, Doctrines, and Transformations

All soldiers who responded to the questionnaires believed that both the French and Italian armies were changing. The majority of the Italian sample

(8 out of 10) attributed major changes in the military over the past 15 years to the beginning of the peacekeeping era. "This has led over time to an ever-increasing use of the armed forces in operations abroad and in the homeland," and a "different operational theater and thus different characteristics [has] led to an evolution of the means, materials, and also the way of working."[53] Italian soldiers reported that the army has taken advantage of this opportunity and adapted. "We adapted our military instrument to international geopolitical changes." This was mainly due to changes in the international system. "International politics became aware of the necessity to use the armed forces directly in some territories for humanitarian aid aimed at the oppressed population." The changed international context, such as the end of the Cold War, has also created for the Italian unit the necessity to further integrate European military policy: "This has eventually obliged a change: [Europe] needed a flexible instrument that could be used out of national borders." As a consequence, decision makers have also adapted: "The political part became aware of the fact that the armed forces can be a valid instrument of foreign policy." This has increased the army's legitimacy: "This change has implied that the Italians have elaborated a different awareness of the armed forces; this has been made possible thanks to the enrolling of volunteers who have changed the nature of the army and have engendered more trust in the military instrument *per se*." As a consequence, joining the army was also motivated by this new pride.

By contrast, for the French sample, the big transformation was identified in what they referred to as "De Gaulle's era." When asked about more recent years, the French respondents identified professionalization and new technology as two important drivers of change. One can still sense a certain emotional attachment to the era of big technological innovations.

For instance, the Leclerc tanks were outdated for most of the sample: "We said we were going to do like the Americans or the Brits: we were going to adopt a policy of heavy tanks and be hyper-equipped hyper-protected, and hence the tank started being produced. It is silly that the Warsaw Pact collapsed and we kept the tanks but we did not have the enemy to fight."[54] The component of controlled assertiveness keeps coming back. "We have a professional army deployed into five major and 17 secondary operations; we executed orders, which requires more and more sophisticated equipment operating more and more in multinational coalitions."[55] Interestingly, no French soldiers mentioned humanitarian action or activities previously undertaken by other actors, which seemed to be a recurring theme for the Italian sample. According to the French sample, the French army has not become

involved in more humanitarian activities. Most of the soldiers interviewed added comments to the open-ended portion of the questionnaire; and five added that another sign of this post–Cold War change was participation in war operations: "Before we had a mission against the communist regimes (Cold War); today we have peace operations and anti-terrorist operations,"[56] one noted. In general, there is a perception that the French army is expected to conduct new operations, but with insufficient political support. For example, "There have been many out-of-area missions, but few troops and little equipment,"[57] and "The reduction of public expenses has a huge impact on our defense budget, but we have to shut up, we cannot speak."[58] While many choices were not understood and were not shared, soldiers accepted them as they were. These sentiments are in line with the assessment.

The French and Italian samples also differed in identifying the main reference documents related to the ISAF mission. In the questionnaires, the great majority of soldiers from both countries referred to NATO directives as the main reference points. But this opinion varied across ranks. Most officers from both countries valued UN documents—probably referring to the UN Security Council resolution—as highly as the NATO directive. Fewer Italian officers considered the UN resolution important, while for NCOs the UN did not seem to be relevant at all. However, the most interesting finding on this survey question is that no Italian soldier mentioned Italian military doctrine, which, in contrast, was the dominant answer for the French respondents. This suggests that for the Italians, international norms were more important than national ones, perhaps due to a particular desire for the Italian army—and the Alpini in particular—to be accepted by Italian civil society by showing that the battalion values the country's international commitments. In comparison, 47% of the French soldiers interviewed made reference to the French army doctrine during their ISAF deployment, while 33% relied on the mission's ROE, and 13% and 7% referred to the NATO directives and UN mandate, respectively. Therefore the French understanding of professionalism guided the perception that national and cohesive doctrines were more important than international norms, even in a multinational operation, mainly because the idea of "getting the job done" in a professional way was linked to a traditional understanding of the military organization and command structure.

In summary, the perceptions of the two units were very different, and correlated with their military cultures, as was the case for the troops in Lebanon. The Italian unit was concerned about its image back home, as well

as within Afghan society, and accordingly was rather defensive. In contrast, the French unit was assertive but concerned with explicitly respecting the civilian authorities, which meant prioritizing the security of the AO. The Italian unit deemed it fundamental to be accepted as "peacekeepers" by the local population, while for the French sample the reference point and standard of appropriate behavior were to be professional soldiers.

The next section analyzes the effect of these contextual perceptions on how soldiers behaved in Afghanistan. It characterizes the main force employment differences between the French and Italian armies deployed in the RCC. As in Chapter 3, I focus on the number, timing of patrols, and level of armament; cooperation with the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police; interactions with civilians; force protection; and command and control. For each set of activities, I analyze the different patterns of behavior observed. I also discuss whether they scored differently in indicators of effectiveness, and show how differences in UPOE parameters are largely consistent with the data assessing the security situation in the area during the study period.

Variations in Force Employment in ISAF

Patrolling: Number, Timing, and Level of Armaments

According to NATO's strategic vision, in relation to its mission in Afghanistan, "numerous military activities are undertaken outside the base in order to accomplish the mandate of the mission, that is, to build an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism together with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan."[59] Due to the precarious security conditions, both the French and Italian units had limited movements outside the base during the period of observation. The limitation of outside movements hindered the full implementation of the mandate and the UPOE of the two armies. As a French soldier highlighted, "It is sure that if we stay locked in our compound, as we are doing nowadays, it does not work."[60] Similarly, an Italian officer recalled, "In order to guarantee the security of an area, you should be continuously present; you cannot expect that an area is safe if you patrol four-five-six hours, how about the other eighteen hours?"[61] The fact that both armies chose to limit their movements to a specific extent was not linked to any NATO procedure. ISAF HQ labeled the threat level as severe and provided

all the national contingents with recommendations on what security precautions to take outside the base—namely, using armored vehicles, one long weapon per soldier, a helmet, and a bulletproof vest. This also applied to the relatively lenient situation in terms of threat level in the RCC. The decision on the frequency of leaving the base was left to the national contingent assigned to the base. Both the Italian and French units decided to leave the base as rarely as possible in the period under study.

Yet the French and Italian units displayed different behavior during patrols in three main ways. First, they exhibited different tactical skills. The French unit displayed military skills, whereas the Italian unit worked to develop empathy with the local population, a key humanitarian skill. The French unit was more involved in patrolling and combat, while the Italian group was less active in reacting to hostile activities. For the French soldiers, "all people are on the ground to train the Afghan army, they scan villages, they pass by villages to check that the zone is secure, and then you have the security forces."[62] This passage suggests how the French unit's orientation was combat-oriented. If any hostile activity was apparent, or if the soldiers were under threat or in imminent danger, the French units would respond. Many French soldiers reported having been involved in combat. During their first three months of the mission, French soldiers ended up three times in a combat situation for 75 minutes, 25 minutes, and 3 minutes, respectively. A soldier describes the first combat encounter:

> All of a sudden, I saw some peasants running. . . . We were at the end of the line, in the last group. The peasants started running toward us and during the following 30 seconds they opened fire. We returned fire. During the first five minutes we were stuck; it was impossible to move. Everybody managed to remain calm; we got organized. A few supports arrived from the front of the columns and we returned fire, the enemy was hiding behind house walls and among trees. Our response included a grenade, a missile, and some rockets.[63]

In contrast, the Italian unit was less involved in combat. The units undertook "milder" activities to control the territory: humanitarian aid delivery—discussed further in the next subsection—as well as training the Afghan army, patrolling, and demonstrating presence. Italian soldiers never wanted to talk about the possibility of being involved in acts of war. They admitted that only Special Forces were involved in hostile activities, and that their

operational activities were unrelated to anti-terrorist operations, but instead focused on humanitarian activities. In this regard, they claimed that they were "even more involved than other armies."[64] This finding might be biased by my presence as an Italian researcher and the fact that they did not want to show that regular contingents within the regular army were also fighting. This opinion, however, was widely shared across ranks and was double-checked in informal settings, such as the canteen or other gatherings, so does not appear to be biased by my nationality. The French and Italian ROE were identical and did not explain these variations in behavior.

In this case, the French unit was more worried about the potential security threat than its Italian counterpart. Key leader engagement is an important aspect of patrolling, but each unit referred to a different authority. While French units preferred to involve institutional leaders, the Italians opted to also involve local elders. For the French, "when patrolling, non-institutional leaders are also engaged; the only important thing is that they are not Taliban."[65] Since monitoring the situation was a priority for the Italian group, the type of interlocutor did not matter as long as they provided information. The Italian approach relied on the relationship with the population, whereas the French tended to see the enemy everywhere. An Italian officer recalls, "I once saw my soldiers give something to eat to children in a moment of chaos outside. An American, English, or French soldier would never do that; they see their enemy everywhere."[66] According to the Italian, this results in a better perception of the Italian army on the part of the population. "It is not true that when a French vehicle passes by they say hello France hello America, but they say hello Italy."[67] On the French side there is greater suspicion; a French soldier recalled that after a battle he was surprised to hear that the insurgents had beaten a woman because, according to him, the insurgent can only survive with the support of the local population.[68] This explains why the French tend not to stop and talk to the population at all, but to focus instead on their military targets. Along similar lines, a unit member explained to me that "the reason for this is that to arrive at external departments one needs to make sure that the inner ones are secure and that the population does not complain about the situation."[69] In sum, the French and Italian units use different skills and behaviors at the tactical level.

The second type of different behavior observed during patrols relates to foot patrols. Foot patrolling was recommended by NATO guidelines, but it was not undertaken by all national contingents. Both units deployed foot-patrolling teams, but the French did so willingly, while the Italians were

skeptical. For the French, foot patrols were extensive and "even necessary in this country where roads are rare and bad."[70] For the French, foot patrolling was done without vehicle support: "We went on the ground with armored vehicles and then we continued on foot."[71] The Italian unit opted for so-called dismounted patrolling, but only where they could also have armored vehicle support. Thus the Italian units tried to avoid direct confrontation. While this difference could be considered a minor variation, it reflects the significantly different postures of these soldiers while in the field.

The third difference related to the personnel deployed. In the French units, everybody was combat ready. As a French soldier recalls, "In any case all of them are on the road. . . . Those who take the most risks are the infantry. At this time we have the 8th paratroopers battalion, also those people who do de-mining take risks too, and then you have people doing material transportations, they take risks too."[72] And also: "We can never really prepare for a war; if it comes we will know how to react. We train in France to be operational."[73] Thus all French personnel were ready for combat, and the unit did not only deploy strictly operational soldiers: "There are people from the transmission unit who also do patrolling."[74] Along the same lines, the French were ready at any moment to deploy soldiers not specialized in patrolling. For example, logistics specialists could be deployed at any moment. "At Warehouse (the French military base) they asked for reinforcements and there are people from the transmission unit who do also patrolling."[75] In contrast, fewer Italian units deployed outside the base, and thus they did not need to involve other reserve units. On the Italian base, there were many Alpine troops who never left the base. This difference suggests that the French army was better integrated than the Italian one because it was prepared to deploy all operational units for patrolling.

These different approaches to patrolling cannot be explained by HQ issuing different directives to each unit. The two units are involved in security and stability operations at the tactical level, whereas the HQ focuses on coordination. This division of responsibility gives both units relatively ample margins to maneuver at the tactical and operational levels.

Interactions with Civilians

CIMIC projects were undertaken only six months per year: the Afghan winter prevented all reconstruction activities but also slowed down hostile

activity. As my empirical work was conducted during the summer months, my research was not affected by the winter blockage to CIMIC activities, but for security reasons I could not follow their activities extensively.

Four main variations emerged between the two units with respect to CIMIC activity. First, French and Italian units launched different types and sizes of projects. The French unit worked mainly in the agricultural domain and on a limited number of projects. "Our principle is to develop these (agricultural) activities, to help feed them and help nourish them, it includes wheat seeds, fruit trees . . . and hens in order to have eggs and chicks."[76] They preferred to focus on "small projects; we do not have big projects."[77] In contrast, the Italians were mainly involved in bigger projects and the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and humanitarian projects that were nominally similar to those implemented by NGOs.[78] As one Italian CIMIC agent recalled, "We did 130 projects this year and any kind of stuff: from an electrical line in a school, to the construction of an Afghan WC."[79]

The construction of an Afghan toilet was a good example of how the Italians adapted to the local culture: "We asked the Minister of Public Welfare for guidelines about how things are made here."[80] A former colleague of my interviewee had accepted the need to build a traditional Afghan toilet outside a clinic to prevent obstructions to the Western toilet inside the clinic. The Afghan toilet was placed at the top of an embankment and small stones from the river were used instead of toilet paper. "We take clear inspiration from the local culture if we want to do something. . . . Yes, I think it helps with the contact."[81] The French soldiers I interviewed were less involved in CIMIC activities, and one soldier even expressed the opinion that CIMIC activities were useless. The French soldiers interviewed saw in-depth control of the territory as much more important.

Second, similarly to Lebanon, there was variation in the degree of professionalization of CIMIC personnel. In the French case, CIMIC experts were sent from France and were not part of the battalion. By contrast, CIMIC agents in the Italian unit had not received specialized training and were thus part of the battalion. Italian soldiers explained that particular personal qualities are important when appointing a CIMIC agent; it was essential to select a flexible person, who is open to dialogue: "80% is the choice of the person . . . but for sure one month of training at Monte Livenza [where the NATO CIMIC Group South is based] would be useful."[82]

Third, the French units had a much more limited perception of security, which was related to patrolling and combat. For the Italian units, the concept of security took on a more holistic, human dimension:

> Security is also giving a biscuit out at the hospital, leaving behind a memory for sure, much better than light machine guns aimed against people. Also when you go on the top of a vehicle there are machine guns, having the barrel aimed at the person or keeping it high; it is a matter of half a second for the reaction, but one thing is a behavior going around and making a bad face from the top of the vehicle, they look like small things but . . . greeting the population when one passes by or when an Afghan vehicle stops to let us pass, saying thanks and making a friendly gesture is surely different than behaving in a bold way.[83]

The French units allocated a subordinate role to CIMIC activities. They only used tactical vehicles when launching security operations. The Italian units used the same vehicles to increase their visibility as a primarily humanitarian actor and to make their military presence more acceptable. While different HQ directives to the French and Italian units could explain these variations, there was no effective coordination policy from HQ and thus the national contingents were left to their own devices. The Italians and French agreed that the most important tactical objective of CIMIC was to win hearts and minds (and thus promote security in the AO), but they planned and conducted CIMIC activities differently, which affected their type of effectiveness.

Force Protection

The French and Italian units also had strikingly different procedures for entering their bases, maneuvering within the base, and precautions to protect soldiers outside the base: the French used traditional military standards, whereas the Italians employed an approach that was designed to establish an effective relationship with the local population. The variations concerning protecting the base and force protection measures used while patrolling were more significant than those regarding units operating inside the base.

Both countries' bases were located just outside Kabul, close to the airport and surrounded by mountains controlled by the Afghan National Army. Given their similar geographical locations, there were no differences between the two bases in term of strategic position. However, the French units took greater force protection precautions than the Italians.

Notwithstanding the identical NATO force protection standards, the French military base, Warehouse, was better protected than the Italian base, Camp Invicta. Entering the French military base, which was also the RCC site, there was a serpentine route just before the entrance to discourage suicide attacks. After this entrance, access to the base was separated for pedestrians and vehicles. Another access allowed entrance for civilian vehicles. Entering as civilian was a long process. First, there was passport control, and then each person had to leave his or her cell phone. Next, the visitors were taken to a place behind huge sandbags (to limit the effects of potential suicide bombings) and were carefully inspected. Only then could the visitor enter the French base.

Access to the Italian base was quicker: there were unique entrances for pedestrians and vehicles, and a single entry point for civilian and military vehicles. This meant that it was possible, though unlikely, that a pedestrian could enter the base without being detected. The first round of inspections once inside the base was conducted in front of everybody. Entering as a civilian, the procedures from this point on were passport control and cell phone delivery at the same time.

Furthermore, the two bases used security dogs differently. The French unit used dogs on leashes to inspect vehicles entering the base. "It is because different soldiers use the same dog to conduct inspections," that is, the task was not adapted to the context, but to the military structure and the necessary rotation among military personnel.[84] The Italian units used unleashed dogs: "In our method the dog is not looking for the explosive, it is looking for the ball, and it is actually trained to think of it as a game and entertainment."[85]

NATO procedures defined the force protection level for all contingents. At every ISAF military base, security conditions are indicated at the entrance, prescribing the type of weapons (long or short) the soldiers should carry and the level of risk on a scale from 1 (low threat) to 5 (high threat). Because of the standard NATO procedures and similar material constraints, there were no major differences in force protection measures inside the two bases. Nonetheless, minor differences persisted.

Within the two bases, many activities were undertaken. Italian soldiers dealing specifically with logistics and rescue seldom left the base. "In five months, I went out four times, three times for representational purposes and the fourth I went to the airport."[86] Similarly, a French NCO who dealt with communication explained, "We do not go out very often, we do not have many contacts with the outside world. . . . We are used to it, if you put us alone in the desert with nothing we would start organizing scorpion competitions, there are plenty of things to do."[87] There were also personnel who dealt with the canteen services, laundry, transport, and communication. All services were supposed to make each base completely self-sustained. Yet the logistic soldiers' force employment varied between the French and the Italians. Different armies required different proportions of logistics and operational units, and they made different decisions about outsourcing certain services. Logistic support indirectly affects security. As one soldier explained:

> Every day something new happens: now everything seems to be all right, but in two seconds there could be a problem with the electronic group and they call you and you have to activate the team; a vehicle that gets stuck outside and you have to call and rescue it; it could be a very boring day or a day in which you cannot even breathe. If we had people who got stuck and were not able to arrive from 50 km away, my work is to organize a truck and we would put inside stuff for them to live and fight for one week.[88]

Moreover, many Afghan civilians worked on the French and Italian military bases on logistics and construction projects, as well as for private companies working on the bases. Entertainment activities (such as going to pubs, restaurants, a massage center, and small cafes called *picks*) were usually managed by non-Afghan civilians. Afghans were involved only in one type of operational activity—translation from Dari and Pashto. The Italian unit was very supportive of having local personnel employed on the base, while the French contingent perceived them as a potentially extremely dangerous threat. In the words of a French soldier: "Here in the base, I find there are a bit too many Afghan civilian personnel. They are not sufficiently monitored; they can go wherever they want, and I find this is not normal at all."[89]

Force protection precautions were also taken when deploying troops outside the military base. In order to go out, NATO procedures established that

helmets and bulletproof vests were compulsory. The type of materiel used was very similar for the French and the Italians. However, Italian soldiers displayed lower force protection measures despite having the same kind of vehicles. The Italians tended to stop more often to repair vehicles that got stuck in the middle of the road, whereas the French would keep moving for security reasons.

Tactical Command and Control

While part of the same chain of command (the RCC and ISAF HQ), the French and Italian units had different ways of transmitting orders to the smallest units on the ground because they also strongly depended on their national chain of command with their respective chief of staff. NATO had a homogenizing effect: the command structure followed NATO standards at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For instance, NATO established a common standard so that at every level in every single army, all ranks were clearly recognizable by every member of the other contributing armies. In practice, this meant that each soldier had to wear an identification card containing his/her rank, such as "OF-5" for Colonel or "OR-8" for Warrant Officer. This enhanced interoperability and improved communication between armies and in NATO HQ in particular. The NATO HQ coordinated all regional commands for ISAF and served as the main interlocutor for the Afghan Government and international organizations, UNAMA in particular. ISAF Command's main objective was coordination and planning. The regional command divided the territory into AOs.[90] A single country was in charge of each AO; however, small armies often sent companies to work in an AO under the operational control of another unit, which coordinated the mandate in that area. The Italian army, for example, had been assigned an AO in the RCC; two companies, one Bulgarian and one Greek, worked under its operational control. The French had a Croatian and a Romanian company under their operational control. The RCC was under Italian command until August 5, 2008, when it was handed over to French command. A trilateral agreement established a rotation every eight months. The leading nation—the French from January 2008 to April 2009—had a Portuguese Quick Reaction Force at its disposal.

   Despite the multinational composition of the RCC, the work of each army remained strictly national. "They do not work in a multinational envi-

ronment apart from a few coordination meetings," as pointed out by a French general based at NATO HQ. France, Italy, and Turkey divided the Kabul region into three different areas in which they implemented their mandates. When one country took over the command, key positions within the regional chain of command were taken up by officers of that nationality. According to an Italian lieutenant, the "RCC [then under French command] numbers 200–300 people; 80% are French, and 20% are Turkish, Bulgarian, Italian, and Croatian." Partly for that reason, contacts remained very limited at both the regional command level and in the national bases. For instance, at Camp Invicta, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Italians lived together but were completely separate, apart from a few encounters in the canteen. Despite the homogenizing role played by NATO and the formally multinational environment, two main differences in command and control emerged between the French and Italian units.

First, the French units had a vertical chain of command with the presence of key officers in the field. The French battalion hosted chief-of-staff liaison officers in Afghanistan, who were in direct contact with their colleagues in Paris at the inter-army chief of staff. By contrast, the Italians had no liaison. Their chain of command was more centralized: the Italian force commander was in direct contact with Rome.

This pattern was echoed in the two units' approaches to communications policy. French public information officers (PIOs) were sent directly from Paris and from other battalions than those deployed at the time, and were experts in public information. The Italians used non-specialist officers from the battalion who responded to two lines of command: operational (to the unit commander) and technical (to public information experts based in Rome). While Italian commanders requested authorization for each operation from Rome, making the process slow and inefficient, French officers had a more agile chain of command but more control was exercised.

In addition, the Italian army promoted bottom-up innovation processes while the French did not. French soldiers rarely conveyed dissent on a particular issue. One NCO explained: "Nobody dared to make it clear in front of the high-ranking generals that [our armored] vehicles do not protect again the specific explosive devices used here."[91] By contrast, the Italian soldiers found ways of having a voice on a case-by-case basis; there was no structured procedure. For example, one officer kept contact with the private companies producing military vehicles, and transmitted comments and critiques to them.

There were serious coordination problems between the two military operations deployed in Afghanistan—ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)—because both units operated in the same areas, had overlapping mandates, and partly used the same chain of command. While ISAF focused on the control and stabilization of the Afghan territory, OEF launched more ad hoc, combat-oriented activities with an anti-terrorist focus.[92] OEF could also launch operations in the RCC, using either the Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101) in the East or "Task Force Aegis" in the South.[93] The French and Italian units should have been formally informed when OEF operations were carried out in the RCC; sometimes they were asked to provide at least logistical support. The French and Italian armies reacted differently at the tactical level to such a confusing situation, in part because they understood the OEF presence very differently.

Italian units were reluctant or cautious at best about discussing their involvement in OEF. One officer described it as follows: "Italy has provided a small contribution through a support against pirates in the Indian Ocean with the Italian Navy."[94] Italy had taken part in OEF with two operations, Operations Nibbio 1 and Nibbio 2 (with Alpini units), from March to September 2003. The same officer reluctantly admitted that there was also a Task Force 45 operating under OEF that conducted special operations, which had freed a kidnapped Italian journalist.

By contrast, the French unit immediately acknowledged being part of OEF, and readily discussed the depth of its involvement. Most French soldiers were also aware of the possibility that OEF could operate in the RCC. They also underlined that it is very sensitive: "It creates problems: it is true that OEF is clearly focusing on the fight against terrorism, whereas ISAF is rather a mission of Afghanization. . . . We are in support of the country." It was very important for French soldiers that there was good information sharing from OEF to ISAF HQ to the RCC, to "avoid stepping on each other's feet."[95]

Integration within ISAF and interoperability between OEF and ISAF are very important indicators of effectiveness in command and control. It is an integration question because it requires consistency between strategic, tactical, and operational levels. It is also an interoperability issue because it requires optimal information sharing from OEF to the smallest unit on the ground. Based on my observations and interviews with soldiers, French command and control seemed to be more effective than that of the Italians at the high, middle, and low ranks. The French units were aware of the exis-

tence of OEF and of the need for good coordination between the two operations. The Italian units avoided confronting the OEF issue in general.

The second main difference in command and control is related to ISAF HQ. The HQ was an international command with soldiers from all contributing nations; this transnational organizational culture made cooperation easier. Yet the Anglo-Saxon army model—including US military rankings and the English language—dominated HQ ISAF, and represented a unifying force. According to a military political advisor, in a context such as counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, it is very important to work in a multinational environment with "joint services working together," and under strong leadership.[96] There were no major differences between the French and Italian elements at HQ. At the same time, given that the elements of the respective units are completely disconnected from HQ's elements, this does not necessarily enhance information sharing between HQ and tactical units on the ground.

In conclusion, the French and Italian units understood their chains of command differently. The French unit was set on vertical and centralized interaction with higher authorities. This enhanced good integration and effective information sharing, but it did not facilitate a bottom-up innovation process. The Italian unit's approach seemed to enhance horizontal relationships within the units and relative autonomy from the inter-army chief of staff. This pattern is completely consistent with the French units being more operationally effective and the Italian units needing to be more responsive given their priority—humanitarian effectiveness. The French also had a more unified understanding of the OEF mandate than the Italians.

UPOE and the Security Situation on the Ground

As in UNIFIL, variations in force employment can be used to assess both contingents on each UPOE indicator. In terms of patrolling, the French scored higher than the Italians in combat skills as they did more patrolling, and patrolled in ways that enhanced the implementation of the mandate. Each country had a different approach to responsiveness: the Italians seemed to be more flexible in observing the evolution of the enemy's strategy, while the French seemed to be much more aware of the threat. According to the Italian units, the enemy in Afghanistan had learned how to fight against them. A few months earlier, the enemy had been using remote control bombs,

but during the period of observation they had returned to exploding bombs as vehicles passed by.[97] This required short-sighted vision patrolling instead of patrolling troops looking for hostile actors with remote control detonators. The French did not talk about any of these evolutions. Instead, they were aware that the enemy could hide anywhere. Therefore, the Italian unit scored higher than the French unit in responsiveness. But the French unit was better integrated than its Italian counterpart because of the widely shared responsibility for its mission. Finally, in this particular attribute of peace operation effectiveness, no particular difference in interoperability was observed.

The main differences in interactions with civilians and the Afghan National Army were related to the type of operations launched: they were mainly humanitarian and contact patrolling activities for the Italians, and combat and joint operations with the Afghan Army for the French. Only professional operational soldiers together with specific groups (medical, CIMIC, demining teams) left the base in the Italian case, whereas the French units seemed to have greater flexibility. Yet there was a similar general caution about leaving the base. Thus, given the similarities in material resources and threat levels of the respective AOs, the main differences were attributable to force employment—that is, the way in which soldiers at the operational level actually behave. The Italians were more effective than the French in humanitarian skills and responsiveness, while the French were more effective in integration and skills. No noticeable differences were detected in interoperability.

The differences in force protection were less sharp than in the case of UNIFIL II because of the high degree of standardization, but they were clearly observable. The Italian contingent used its humanitarian skills when inspecting vehicles entering the base, but the French displayed more elaborate military skills. This showed that the French units were better integrated and that their soldiers had strong military skills, whereas the Italian units were more responsive to the external environment and their soldiers exhibited stronger humanitarian skills.

In terms of command and control, despite the similarities in the armies' structures, the two units interpreted and understood the chain of command very differently: the French units were more vertical and in closer contact with their national chief of staff, whereas the Italian units were more horizontal and autonomous, because of the dual chain of command. This affected two aspects of effectiveness: integration and responsiveness. The Italians were more flexible and showed higher levels of responsiveness, whereas the

French showed higher degrees of integration between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In sum, two different configurations of UPOE emerged: while the French contingent was more combat effective, the Italian one was more humanitarian focused.

The different types of attainment of UPOE should be connected to the evolution of the security situation in order to preliminarily show whether UPOE is consistent with the results on the ground. Unlike in the UNIFIL case, which was based on threat perception assessment, in the case of ISAF, I could rely on specific indicators regarding the attainment of basic security conditions. The RCC was one of the few areas without heavy fighting between the insurgency and the international forces. However, there were signals of hostile activities and the situation remained extremely tense. In Afghanistan, the UPOE attributes should be assessed preliminarily according to whether (1) minimal security conditions were generally achieved, (2) security trends improved or worsened, or (3) there was an absence of immediate threat (i.e., close to the definition of human security). The reports I used encompassed three aspects: the targets of an attack, the general security trend, and the occurrence of an attempted accident (such as an unexploded device or a failed suicide bombing). Levels of violence could be of different types: attacks against the international military forces (ISAF or OEF), attacks against civilian foreigners, attacks against the civilian population, and attacks against the Afghan security force (either the Afghan National Army or the Afghan National Police). I assessed all these indicators for three reasons. First, attacks against the international forces or civilian foreigners aimed to create a media effect and weaken the international presence in Afghanistan. Second, attacks against ISAF forces could also be due to a lack of effectiveness in any of the five strands of activities. Third, attacks against the Afghan security force or the Afghan population immediately destabilized the security of the local population.

The main source of this preliminary assessment of the potential impact of those troops was the Afghanistan NGOs Safety Office (ANSO), used by international NGOs to share information about the evolution of the security situation. This organization was completely independent from NATO, and its reports were exclusively reserved for its affiliated NGOs for very practical everyday use. Since ANSO had no interest in not reporting certain events, such as an attack on an ISAF patrolling team, this ensured the neutrality of my data. ANSO also had an original way of collecting security reports: in addition to the presence of ANSO security officers in the main areas of concern

all over the country, it also relied on cooperation from NGO operating throughout the country. It was thus NGOs' "inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the collective benefit of all."[98] The reports are divided by province, which allowed me to analyze the specific incidents that occurred in the French and Italian AOs.

I examined the data that correspond to the six months of operation of the 8th Marine Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 9th Alpini Regiment. I also included the months before and after the turnovers (April 2008 and November 2008) to highlight the evolution of the security situation and potential continuities or ruptures between one army's unit and the next. While a mission's outcome can best be evaluated once it has concluded, real-time assessments of its progression are informative.

The overall situation did not seem to improve at all during the six-month time span. "So far this year," the report stated, "the number of total AOG [armed opposition group] incidents in Kabul province is more than double that of the first five months of last year with Kabul City overwhelmingly the locus."[99] Armed opposition group attacks tended to increase in June until they peaked in August.[100] There were more attacks against the French than the Italians in the same period. However, there were a comparable number of attacks against the local population and foreigners in both AOs. Figure 3 summarizes the longitudinal results.

The upper graph shows that the French AO had slightly fewer attacks overall; the bottom graph shows that there were also more attacks directed against the French. Given the similarities of the AOs, the data suggest that the French unit's combat effectiveness enabled it to control the security situation in its AO despite an increasing number of attacks against it. Given their strength in humanitarian effectiveness, the Italians instead limited the number of attacks against them but did not improve the overall security situation. These results should be interpreted with great caution due to the limited time period and the qualitative nature, and because other factors could have influenced the connection between variations in force employment and the military's impact in the field. Still, the data suggest the plausibility of the two different models. The two armies prioritized different types of effectiveness. While neither improved the general security situation, the French seemed to attract more attacks than the Italians. These results do not show that one army is more effective than the other, but they suggest that their employment on the ground is different, which is in line with my overall argument. In general it is very hard to tell which strategies are more appropriate in either case study.

Security Attacks in FrenchBatt vs ItalBatt Areas of Operations (May-October '08)

Months: May-October 2008

Legend: ■ FrenchBatt n. attacks ● ItalBatt n. attacks ● Kabul Area

Specific Attacks Directed Against FrenchBatt or ItalBatt (May-October '08)

Months: May-October 2008

Legend: ◆ FrenchBatt n. attacks ▲ ItalBatt n. attacks ● Kabul Area

Figure 3. Evolution of the security situation, May-October 2008. Top graph: incidents of armed opposition groups in the French versus Italian area of responsibility. Bottom graph: incidents against foreign forces in the French versus Italian area of responsibility. Afghan NGO Security Office, Kabul.

Figure 4. Number of accidents in the RCC, May-December 2008.

These results are confirmed by recent geocoded data from the Uppsala Conflict Database. The data cover 2008–2013 and include all events in the dyads, including the Government of Afghanistan–Taliban dyad (including ISAF-Taliban), the Government of Afghanistan–Hizb-I Islami dyad, and the Taliban-civilians dyad. All the events were geocoded down to the village level when that kind of information was available. When the geographical information was available at the district or province level only, a representative point was chosen as the location of those events, which explains why there is a spike in fatalities in the middle of nowhere. Notwithstanding the limitation of the data, they are consistent with my findings on force employment. Figure 4 shows the number of accidents in the RCC. To the left are the areas under Italian command, while the areas under French command are to the right (from Bagram to the East), which suggests that the number of accidents in the French and Italian areas were comparable. Figure 5 shows how the French were targeted much more often than the Italians, as Kabul was under the control of the Afghan security forces.

This chapter has shown that the French and the Italian armies deployed in the RCC in Kabul behaved differently in the field. The French unit displayed higher force protection precautions, did more patrolling, implemented few

Figure 5. Number of targeted attacks in the RCC, May-December 2008.

and small CIMIC projects, and had a more structured command and control system. The Italian unit was less concerned about force protection, did less patrolling, launched many big CIMIC projects, and was more flexible in understanding and implementing command and control orders. I have shown that these variations derived mainly from tactical-level decisions that were independent of national decisions or NATO tactics. These variations in force employment shaped two different kinds of strategies for the French and the Italian units: combat effectiveness (with a concern for standard military security issues) and humanitarian effectiveness (with a focus on humanitarian problems), respectively. This result was largely consistent with the evolution of the security situation: while the number of attacks against civilians was roughly constant in both AOs, the Italians minimized the number of attacks against their unit but the French were targeted in more attacks. The impact of these approaches is of course hard to show; these results simply highlight that, qualitatively, there is a correspondence between the distinctive approaches of the two units and the security situation in their AOs. In sum, Italian units were more likely to fulfill the mandate in Lebanon with their emphasis on humanitarian activities, while the French were more likely to do so in Afghanistan with their emphasis on patrolling and combat.

Alternative Explanations of Variations in Force Employment in Lebanon and Afghanistan

This section discusses the alternative explanations that seem the most relevant for explaining behavior at the tactical level, which is the focus of this study, and it reviews them for both the UN mission in Lebanon and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. I show that some of them are, indeed, complementary to my cultural explanation. I conclude, however, that none of them can comprehensively account for the observed differences in behavior at the tactical level within the same mission, as documented in the previous sections.

Complementary Explanations: Doctrines, SOPs, and Training

Since military culture is expected to potentially affect army activities at all levels, we would thus expect doctrines, SOPs, and training guidelines to partly express the military culture of the army that produces them.[101] This chapter's main aim is to demonstrate a link between military culture, individual soldiers' values and perceptions, and behavior at the tactical level. While the argument would be equally valid if some of the observed variations operated through intervening variables (e.g., doctrines, SOPs, and training), this section shows that these factors cannot account for the observed variation.

Doctrines

The Italian and French military doctrines differ: the Italian version discusses its peacekeeping approach at length and emphasizes the importance of humanitarian aid,[102] while the French joint doctrine focuses on assertiveness in both conventional (particularly nuclear warfare) and nonconventional operations.[103] Yet the two doctrines are more similar than one might expect, for three main reasons. First, both armies share the same historical origins: the Italian doctrine was originally built on the French model.[104] Second, ongoing standardization has generated strong similarities in doctrine. Third, the two countries' formal approaches to peacekeeping in the doctrines are similar.[105] A number of interviewees confirmed these points: "French and

Italian doctrines? Nowadays they are the same, particularly when it comes to out-of-area operations."[106] Most importantly, the doctrines contain general recommendations that are not detailed enough to explain behavioral differences at the tactical level.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

SOPs give soldiers detailed guidelines on how to behave, such as whether to point a rifle at the sky while sitting on top of a tank. They are mentioned in the literature as an important mechanism affecting military behavior, yet their impact on force employment postures is more difficult to assess, in part because they are confidential in most militaries.[107] It is implausible, however, that SOPs alone can account for the observed variation for four reasons. First, they largely overlap across contingents, particularly in NATO missions. For instance, in Afghanistan a security code yellow imposed a particular way of organizing the entrance to a base. Second, SOPs could explain differences in force protection, but not in the quantity or kind of CIMIC activities. Third, and importantly, SOPs are always in line with a military's culture: in my interviews, soldiers indicated that their SOPs were aligned with their military culture and their own decisions. For instance, one NCO told me: "Yes of course I am pointing the rifle at the population; I do it because it is in my SOPs but mainly because I deem it appropriate."[108] Finally, SOPs are mission-specific; therefore, the fact that French and Italian units displayed consistent behavior across cases confirms that SOPs are unable to account for the consistency in behavior.

Training

Training templates are similar for French and Italian units as a result of the strong adaptation to NATO standards that has occurred over the past 20 years. For UNIFIL, both units had undertaken six months of pre-deployment training, which covered similar themes. But their similar mission-specific training templates do not seem to have reduced the amount of variations. The French and Italian units in Afghanistan did approximately three weeks of pre-deployment training together[109] and behaved differently. An Italian officer told me that "during the training, you know the French,

they were shooting around a lot."[110] A French officer reiterated: "It is some-
times difficult to train with the Italians, as they are so peace-oriented."[111]
Therefore, training templates seem unable to explain the observed variations,
but anecdotal evidence about soldiers' behavior during training seems con-
sistent with my argument.[112]

Mission-specific Factors: HQ Directives and Leadership

NATO and UN HQ directives also seem unable to account for the observed
variations in behavior. In Lebanon in 2007, the UN force commander issued
a directive to ask the French contingent to stop using heavy Leclerc tanks.
The French switched to a lighter tank but refused to patrol only with armored
vehicles. In Afghanistan, variations in behavior cannot be explained by HQ
directives, as "there is absolutely no coordination" between the regional
command and national contingents.[113]

I asked the force commander in each unit whether they had received any
particular instructions from their national HQs, but both had simply been
told to "have as few accidents as possible" and to "minimize the number of
casualties." The different personality types of the force commanders could
also explain the different approaches of the French and Italian soldiers.[114]
While in the French case, no individual initiative could be detected, the
Italian force commander initiated some of the humanitarian activities. For
example, the commander of the Alpini unit in Afghanistan launched a
collection of toys in the local community in Italy where the unit is based. The
initiative of individual leaders, however, seems unlikely to explain either the
systematic focus on humanitarian activities or the other detected variations
in force protection and operational activities.

Government Mandates, Role of Previous Operations, and Organizational Interests

I now discuss three explanatory factors for differences in observed military
behavior within the domestic political environment: governmental man-
dates, operational past, and organizational interests. Elsewhere, I have argued
that domestic institutional configurations are key factors for the emergence
and the shaping of a military culture, which partly develops in response to

critical junctures in the domestic political arena.[115] Once a military culture has emerged from its domestic institutional conditions, however, it becomes rather inertial and persists even though the domestic political environment changes or evolves.

Government Mandates

Different types of government mandates—i.e., the instructions provided to the military regarding the authorized range of activities in specific operations—could explain why French soldiers behave in a more assertive way than the Italians. Yet soldiers' behavior seems independent from the government mandates: in both cases there were important shifts in government during the period of observation that did not affect behavior. In Italy, in May 2008, there was an important change in government from a left-wing coalition lead by Prodi to a right-wing Berlusconi government; the new defense minister explicitly discussed a change in mandate and posture for deployed Italian soldiers.[116] Yet the deployed soldiers reacted strongly to his statements: they asserted that they were peace soldiers and did not change their behavior.[117] The opposite happened when President Sarkozy asked French soldiers to withdraw from Afghanistan after the deadly Uzbin attack.[118] The reactions of my interviewees was immediate: "This is a bad idea," "We should stay here," and "We will do what they tell us from above, but we disagree."[119] These reactions seem to confirm the culturalist argument: French soldiers stressed their obedience to their orders but made it clear that they would rather stay and keep fighting. Incidentally, they ended up staying longer than Sarkozy had planned.[120]

Operational Past

The fact that the French army has a longer history of involvement in combat operations—mainly in Africa, but also in colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria—could explain its emphasis on operational activities. Past conflicts required not only standard combat skills but also highly developed population-centric skills. In many operations, particularly those related to decolonization, French soldiers were also asked to conduct policing and CIMIC activities. The French experience in counterinsurgency should have

lead the French army to a more population-centric approach and made sol-
diers keener to interact with the local population, as suggested by several
counterinsurgency thinkers such as Galula and Trinquier.[121] But the opera-
tional experiences alone do not seem to account for the observed French
focus on patrolling. Likewise, the Italian army had less operational experi-
ence but experiences and approaches to humanitarian aid are consistent
over time. Participation in operations that became kinetic, such as the UN
missions in the Congo in the 1960s, the Multinational Force in Lebanon in
1982–1984, and the contribution to the United Nations in Somalia, did not
shift the preexisting idea that Italian soldiers were good people or, from the
1980s, that they had to be humanitarians.[122]

Organizational Interests

Organizational interests could also potentially explain why French and Ital-
ian soldiers display such important variations in behavior. For example,
given a set of civilian constraints, rational military organizations should be
expected to seek an increase in power or prestige.[123] It could, for instance,
explain why Italians behave in a humanitarian effective way. Yet, as seen
above, their behavior remained constant across the change of government in
a way that did not protect their organizational interests. The Italian center-
right government ruling in 2009 with Ignazio Larussa as defense minister
started to talk about Italian armed forces in more military terms. That would
have been an occasion for the Italian army to change the narrative and seek
to increase the defense budget by showing its alignment with the new politi-
cal leadership through more assertive behavior, which did not happen. A
variant of the organizational interest explanation—in which organizations
seek more resources—could explain why the French army behaves the way
it does. Yet its approach has been said to have been counterproductive to its
own organizational interests.

   In conclusion, in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, variations in the
perceptions of French and Italian soldiers deployed were consistent with
how they behaved (force employment) and UPOE. All these dimensions
seem largely in line with the variations in military cultures highlighted in
Chapter 2. Also, alternative explanations did not really seem able to ac-
count equally well for these systematic variations. The conclusion shall reca-
pitulate the argument and its relevance.

Conclusion

Before my first interview at NATO Headquarters in Kabul in 2008, the female colonel who welcomed me reacted strongly to the fact that I was wearing a headscarf: she had no idea that women in Kabul at the time would wear one. To me, at first, this complete lack of situational awareness symbolized the totality of the "total institution" that is the military, which represents the whole world to its member. At the same time, this very special kind of bureaucracy contains a diversity of members, openness, and richness that this book has tried to highlight. In this concluding chapter, I summarize my argument and reflect on its theoretical significance; I then discuss the conceptual and policy implications for peace and stability operations and, finally, the implications of my findings beyond peace operations.

The Argument, in Short—and Its Significance

This book has presented the French and Italian military cultures and how they emerged from specific domestic configurations after World War II. Those specific configurations modified the previously existing core tenets of the French and Italian military cultures and made these modified versions functional, persistent, and inertial within the new domestic environment. I showed how these distinct French and Italian military cultures influenced the ways in which soldiers behaved in two different kinds of contemporary peace and stability operations. Within the UN mission in Lebanon and the NATO mission in Afghanistan, both countries' soldiers were deployed under very similar conditions. Yet, in both missions, they displayed consistent and systematic variations in behavior. While French troops emphasized operational activities and displayed high force protection levels, Italian troops focused on humanitarian activities. These variations in behavior were consistent with the ways in which French and Italian soldiers perceived the

context they were embedded in. In turn, both perceptions and behavior were consistent with the French military culture of "controlled assertiveness" and the Italian military culture of "humanitarianism." Moreover, the observed differences in force employment resulted in two different types of what I call Unit Peace Operation Effectiveness (UPOE), namely combat/security effectiveness and humanitarian effectiveness.

I have showed the validity of my argument in two different cases and two different units of the same armies. Under the assumption that units within the same army are more similar than units in different armies, I have checked the argument in diverse situations: ongoing peace operations of different kinds, the UN mission in Lebanon, and the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The argument turned out to be valid in both contexts. Despite the similarities in resources, identical mandates, threat levels, and rules, the French and the Italians in both missions behaved differently. In particular, the French units opted to patrol with heavier vehicles, to prioritize activities of control of the territory, and to display high force protection precautions. The Italian units chose lighter vehicles, gave priority to CIMIC activities, and displayed lower force protection measures. Even though we should be cautious to generalize, the case selection criteria imply that other "in-between" cases are likely to present similar characteristics.

With this book, I hope to advance the existing debate on military culture in two ways. First, beyond suggesting that culture matters, like many other researchers before, I have pointed at the causal mechanisms via perceptions that make military culture relevant when soldiers take decisions at the tactical level. Second, I have highlighted how a military culture's deeply ingrained beliefs may get slowly and inertially modified across time. In the French case, the notion of assertiveness was mitigated by de Gaulle's forceful reaction, which introduced a strong component of civilian control. In the Italian case, the functional need of reestablishing legitimacy led to a reinterpretation of the self-understanding as "good soldiers" as "humanitarian soldiers." A specific kind of military culture thus has to remain functional within its own domestic constraints but can otherwise take many different shapes, as highlighted by the differences in unit cultures discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

This book has also engaged with the perennial debate between rationalist and constructivist theories. For the specific problem under study, rationalism is not as well placed as military culture to explain substantial behavioral variations by soldiers deployed in peace operations. Given the ap-

parent strength of the culturalist argument, it would be relevant to study whether this also holds true for conventional military operations as well, where rationalism has traditionally been the dominant theory at play.

I argued that the observed differences in force employment correspond to different kinds of Unit Peace Operation Effectiveness. The concept provides an alternative to the dichotomy of victory and defeat or success and failure, to measure the degree of success of peace operations in its various dimensions. Adapted from "military effectiveness," the notion of peace operation effectiveness takes into account elements such as humanitarian skills and interoperability. I used both of these in Afghanistan and Lebanon to evaluate the behavior of soldiers in the field. Two models of effectiveness emerged. The French were more security-effective (in Lebanon) or combat-effective (in Afghanistan), while the Italian were more humanitarian-effective in both missions. These results were largely consistent with the overall security situation in the respective area of operations in Afghanistan. The evidence suggests that UPOE is a good analytical tool for evaluating the impact. Caution, however, is needed because of my qualitative focus on military behavior and the impossibility of inferring a causal impact of UPOE on the actual evolution of the security situation, and on the level of violence in particular.

Making Sense and Good Use of Military Contributions to Peacekeeping

Notwithstanding the important role of military organizations in many interventions, a focus on military contributions is missing in the diverse and rich literature on peace operations. Disciplinary and normative boundaries between peace research and security studies still seem to limit this kind of research. Since normative divides may not be as relevant anymore, this book suggests the importance of bridging these approaches, which might be fruitful on both sides. It is only by bridging the methodological divide between quantitative and qualitative that we can really understand the micro foundations of peacekeeping behavior and connect them systematically to indicators of peacekeeping effectiveness, such as the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians. Even though recent studies acknowledge the importance of military peacekeeping, no study has so far studied how the military behave in those interventions.[1] In this book, I have highlighted that behavioral

variations across the sets of Area of Operations under study were recurring, systematic, and persistent. Focusing on general numbers of military contributions or on where they are deployed is relevant but insufficient for unveiling the micro-level dynamics and mechanisms and the heterogeneity that make military contributions effective and ultimately really able to diminish the level of violence.[2] By exploring further what soldiers actually do on the ground, one could also understand how hostile parties may react to the presence of a specific national contingent and unveil important conflict dynamics. In Afghanistan, for instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that the Taliban knew that French soldiers had just taken over a new area of operation, which had previously been under Italian control.[3] Taken with caution, this suggests that which contingent is deployed makes a difference also for the potential hostile parties, let alone for the civilians living in the area. More importantly, it would be interesting to focus on how the local population reacts and interacts with contingents deployed of different nationalities.

Number of troops and technology are one but not the only relevant factors to consider when looking to improve military operations. Other factors matter, such as the military culture of the specific army deployed in the field. It would be advantageous to deploy units to areas of operation best suited to their characteristics, rather than naively assuming, for instance, that all units will respond equally well once they come under fire. This is not the common practice: at NATO or the United Nations, decisions about which national contingent to assign to a specific area are either set by a state's specific constraints or haphazardly. This is even truer at the national level, where units are not chosen according to specific humanitarian or military needs. Furthermore, national contingents are often treated as interchangeable across missions, meaning that any contingent can be sent anywhere, regardless of its own specific weaknesses and strengths.

While both political benefits and costs attend participation in multinational operations, the costs may be particularly high when national contingents' military cultures are not compatible with the operations or regions to which they are assigned.[4] The United States, and NATO thereafter, expended considerable political capital to have European countries in Afghanistan and accepted very restrictive national caveats. Those caveats were quite appropriate for the operations until 2006 but not thereafter, which meant that soldiers with peacekeeping-oriented military cultures ended up in the midst of fighting with severe restrictions on when to use force.

Furthermore, cultural variations are likely to impact on the effectiveness of cooperation among contingents in multinational operations. It may be difficult for contingents in similar areas of operations with differing or incompatible military cultures to coordinate. While British and American coordination in Southern Afghanistan resulted in many military successes, the same cannot be said for American and Polish units that have struggled to coordinate their profoundly different approaches to achieving similar tactical objectives in Afghanistan. This does not mean that unilateral operations are better. Multinational interventions present clear advantages in terms of legitimacy and accountability, but specificities and compatibilities across military cultures must be considered more seriously. I expect these variations to affect directly the implementation of all or some aspects of the mandate, such as the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians. In sum, while still politically sensitive, more could be done to capitalize on each contingent's strengths to improve the ability of a mission to achieve its objectives. In order to do so, policy makers should discuss this specific issue more openly and create appropriate platforms to take decisions on structures and contributions taking into account the characteristics of units and contingents.

In addition, as one of the main agencies tasked to implement peacekeeping operations, peacekeepers should be more systematically exposed to standardized training specifically on peacekeeping and its different core tasks. Most military personnel find it difficult to be deployed in peacekeeping and to switch from standard military core tasks, such as combat, to situations where they have to perform different kinds of activities, ranging from delivering humanitarian aid to key-leader engagement, often in the same mission. Similarly, military personnel are not trained to take easily autonomous decisions when deployed in the field. Yet, junior officers deployed at the tactical level often have to take genuine political decisions that have important consequences for the safety and well-being of the local population.[5] Investing in developing the social and human capital of military personnel and their ability to perform a wider range of tasks is therefore of crucial importance. More structured and systematic pre-deployment training programs across contingents are likewise crucial. Soldiers and officers socialized into the multidimensional core tasks of peacekeeping and more situationally aware should perform better at protecting civilians and should be less likely to commit violations. In sum, a better understanding of dynamics specific

to military organizations deployed in peace operations could increase the likelihood of successful operations and better meet the needs of the civilian population.

Beyond Peace and Stability Operations

My argument was tested and developed on peace and stability operations, but it provides interesting pointers also to other kinds of operations. After the winding down of "boots on the ground" operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, countries like the United Kingdom or the United States have refocused on other kinds of interventions, with an extensive use of different means, such as drones and special forces. Notwithstanding the regime of partial secrecy under which these operations are conducted, military cultures are likely to matter also among the remote-control communities launching drones as well as the highly specialized special forces units, and further research could unveil the core tenets of those military subcultures.[6] The lack of accountability and the gray zone created by these new kinds of operations could also potentially, and slowly, trigger the development of military cultures that are not functional to their corresponding domestic political configuration. Other recent trends, such as a shift in focus toward national defense, as in Sweden, or the extensive use of the military for domestic counter-terrorist interventions, as in France, or even the greater role of Western forces in advisory roles, as in the case of the United Kingdom in Africa, raise the questions on how military cultures are adapting to new roles or returning to old roles that had been temporarily put aside.

In this complex and constantly changing landscape, a military organization has to "navigate" the constraints under which it operates and in doing so how it more or less consciously relies on the assumptions built into its military culture. Both the military and the civilian government can influence how the military organization navigates. Professional military education within military academies is among the key mechanisms to socialize officers into their military cultures but also to empower open-minded adaptive members of the officer corps to engage with civilian decision makers within the boundaries of civilian control.[7] A disconnect can also emerge between the domestic conditions that gave rise to a particular kind of military culture and the ongoing conditions in contemporary operations. The combination between a particular kind of military culture and a specific kind of

domestic configuration may simply turn out to be outdated, trigger tensions, and negatively affect organizational dynamics.[8]

In sum, military culture has been shown to impact significantly on the behavior of peacekeepers in the field and, consequently, is a relevant factor for consideration for policy decisions about missions as well as for understanding the relations between domestic conditions and unit-level behavior in operations. A greater understanding of specific army military cultures deployed in peace and stability operations could increase the likelihood of successful interventions and better meet the needs of the civilian population in war-torn countries.

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A. List of Interviewees

In my research for this book I conducted more than 164 interviews; below is a list of interviewees according to anonymous interview codes. The interviews were conducted in French, Italian, or English, occasionally with the help of an interpreter for translations from Arabic or Korean. The duration of the interviews ranged from 35 to 90 minutes.

Table 5. UNIFIL Mission: Interviewees During Fieldwork

Interviewee Code	Organization/ Position Within the Organization	Place	Date
UNHQCIV-1	UNIFIL Political Affairs Office	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
UNHQCIV-2	UNIFIL Civil Affairs Office	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
UNHQCIV-3	UNIFIL Civil Affairs Office	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
UNHQCIV-4	Chief of Political and Civil Affairs	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	October 2007
UNHQCIV-5	UNIFIL Media Officer	Beirut, Lebanon	November 2007
UNHQCIV-6	UNDP	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	September 2007
UNHQCIV-7	UNIFIL Spokeperson	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	December 2007
UNHQCIV-8	UNIFIL Deputy Spokeperson	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	October 2007
UNHQ-1	Vice Force Commander	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
UNHQ-2	Liaison Officer Chief	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	October 2007
UNHQ-3	Liaison Officer Staff	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	December 2007
UNHQ-4	UNIFIL National Component	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
UNHQ-5	UNIFIL National Component	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
UNHQ-6	HQs Naqoura CIMIC	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	December 2007
UNHQ-7	Senior Public Information Officer HQ Naqoura	Naqoura, Southern Lebanon	October 2007
8 Officers (O-1; O-2; O-3; O-4; O-5; O-6; O-7; O-8)	Italian Battalion	Tibnin, Southern Lebanon	November 2007

Table 5 (continued)

Interviewee Code	Organization/ Position Within the Organization	Place	Date
7 Noncommissioned Officers (NCO-1; NCO-2; NCO-3; NCO-4; NCO-5; NCO-6; NCO-7)	Italian Battalion	Tibnin, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
8 Noncommissioned Soldiers (NCS-1; NCS-2; NCS-3; NCS-4; NCS-5; NCS-6; NCS-7; NCS-8)	Italian Battalion	Tibnin, Southern Lebanon	November 2009
8 Officers (O-1; O-2; O-3; O-4; O-5; O-6; O-7; O-8)	French Battalion	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
7 Noncommissioned Officers (NCO-1; NCO-2; NCO-3; NCO-4; NCO-5; NCO-6; NCO-7)	French Battalion	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	October 2007
8 Noncommissioned Soldiers (NCS-1; NCS-2; NCS-3; NCS-4; NCS-5; NCS-6; NCS-7; NCS-8)	French Battalion	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	December 2007
8 Officers (O-1; O-2; O-3; O-4; O-5; O-6; O-7; O-8)	Ghanaian Battalion	Al Rmeish, Southern Lebanon	November 2009
7 Noncommissioned Officers (NCO-1; NCO-2; NCO-3; NCO-4; NCO-5; NCO-6; NCO-7)	Ghanaian Battalion	Al Rmeish, Southern Lebanon	November 2008

(continued)

Table 5 (continued)

Interviewee Code	Organization/ Position Within the Organization	Place	Date
8 Noncommissioned Soldiers (NCS-1; NCS-2; NCS-3; NCS-4; NCS-5; NCS-6; NCS-7; NCS-8)	Ghanaian Battalion	Al Rmeish, Southern Lebanon	September 2007
8 Officers (O-1; O-2; O-3; O-4; O-5; O-6; O-7; O-8)	Korean Battalion	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	December 2008
7 Noncommissioned Officers (NCO-1; NCO-2; NCO-3; NCO-4; NCO-5; NCO-6; NCO-7)	Korean Battalion	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	October 2007
8 Noncommissioned Soldiers (NCS-1; NCS-2; NCS-3; NCS-4; NCS-5; NCS-6; NCS-7; NCS-8)	Korean Battalion	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
2 Noncommissioned Officers, 1 Non-commissioned Soldier	Belgian and Luxemburgian Battalion	Tibnin, Southern Lebanon	September 2007
HO-1	Ricerca e Cooperazione	Beirut, Lebanon	November 2007
HO-2	Ricerca e Cooperazione	Beirut, Lebanon	November 2007
HO-3	Intersos	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	December 2007
HO-4	Intersos	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	October 2007
HO-5	Terre des Hommes Italy	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	December 2008
HO-6	Handicap International	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	

Table 5 (continued)

Interviewee Code	Organization/ Position Within the Organization	Place	Date
E-1	Former UNIFIL I Spokesperson and Senior Political Advisor	Beirut, Lebanon	October 2007
E-2	Heinrich Böll Stiftung Middle East Office	Beirut, Lebanon	November 2007
HO-7	ICRC	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
E-3	Journalist, L'Orient Le Jour	Beirut, Lebanon	September 2007
E-4	Financial Times Lebanon Office	Beirut, Lebanon	October 2007
E-6	Lebanese American University	Beirut, Lebanon	November 2007
E-7	Lebanese American University	Beirut, Lebanon	December 2007
E-8	Lebanese American University	Beirut, Lebanon	October 2007
E-9	American University Beirut	Beirut, Lebanon	November 2007
HO-8	ICRC	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	December 2007
E-10	Military Attaché, Italian Embassy	Beirut, Lebanon	October 2007
L-1	Amal Movement	Tyre, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
LAF-1	Lebanese Armed Forces	Beirut, Lebanon	November 2007
L-2; L-3; L-4	Hezbollah officials	Bar al Canoon and Tyre, Southern Lebanon	November 2007
L-5; L-6; L-7	Southern Lebanese	Tyre	December 2007

Table 6. ISAF Mission: Interviewees During Fieldwork

Interviewee Code	Organization/ Position Within the Organization	Place	Date
5 NCS	Italian Battle Group	Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan	October 2008
5 NCO	Italian Battle Group	Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan	October 2008
5 O	Italian Battle Group	Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan	October 2008
5 NCS	French Battle Group	Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan	October 2008
5 NCO	French Battle Group	Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan	October 2008
5 O	French Battle Group	Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan	October 2008
5 O	NATO HQ	NATO HQ, Kabul, Afghanistan	October 2008
Special Advisor to the Force Commander (NATO HQ-1)	NATO HQ	NATO HQ, Kabul, Afghanistan	July 2008
5 National advisors (NATOHQ-1; NATOHQ-2; NATOHQ-3; NATOHQ-4; NATOHQ-5)	NATO HQ	NATO HQ, Kabul, Afghanistan	July 2008
5 Humanitarian Officers HO	Intersos	Kabul, Afghanistan	July 2008
5 Officials	ICRC	Herat, Afghanistan	July 2008
Civil-Military Coordinator	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	Kabul, Afghanistan	July 2008
Local staff, experts, intellectuals	Kabul University, Afghan Research Evaluation Unit (AREU), UNICEF, UNDP	Kabul, Afghanistan	July-October 2008

Table 7. France and Italy

Code	Affiliation	Location and Date of the Interview
E-1	Ministry of Defense	Rome, November 2013
Gen-1	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Rome, November 2014
Gen-2	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Rome, November 2012
E-2	Ministry of Defense	Rome, November 2014
E-3	Think tank	Rome, November 2014
E-4	Think tank	Rome, November 2013
E-5	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Rome, November 2014
E-6	Think tank	Rome, November 2014
NCS-1	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Rome, November 2014
E-7	Ministry of Defense	Via email, December 2014
Gen-3	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Via phone, October 2014
Gen-1	Sciences Po	Paris, June 2014
Col-1	Army Chief of Staff	Paris, May 2014
Gen-2	Army Chief of Staff	Paris, June 2015
E-1	Sciences Po	Paris, May 2013
E-2	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Paris, May 2014
Gen-2	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Paris, June 2014
Gen-3	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Paris, June 2014
NCO-4	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Paris, June 2014

B. Interview Questions

1. Could you please introduce yourself? (Your age, rank, education, volunteer or not)
2. Is it your first peacekeeping mission?
3. If not, to what other peacekeeping missions have you been deployed?
4. Could you please describe your typical day here?
5. Do you take part in any patrolling? If so, how long does it last? Do you patrol villages or do you deploy more often out of villages? Do you use heavy (tanks) or light (vans, etc.) means of transport for patrolling? Do you often stop while patrolling to talk to the population (with interpreter or not)?
6. What kind of humanitarian projects have you been launching in the area of deployment? Do you think it is important to have some humanitarian project in a peacekeeping mission? Why?
7. Do you often meet other ISAF military contingents? For what reasons?

8. Have you received any specific training on peacekeeping? What kind of training have you received before you have been deployed with ISAF? Did your training include specific aspects of Lebanese/Afghan culture?

9. What kind of activities have you launched together with the Lebanese/Afghan Armed Forces?

10. What are the main documents you refer to (mandate, national military doctrine, rules of engagement)?

11. How do you perceive the threat here today from 0 (no risk) to 10 (high risk)?

C. The Survey Instrument

The survey has been a complementary instrument for my strategy of data collection. All the questionnaires in paper-based form is in the process of being archived in paper-based form. Scanned questionnaires are available upon request to the author pending certain terms and conditions. Below I provide more details on the questionnaires: I. a sample of answers, together with a simple statistical test to assess how likely it is that the observed differences are simply random variations, rather than systematic; and II. samples of the actual questionnaires distributed (in the original language).

I. Questionnaires, *p*-values

The questionnaires were distributed among 15 soldier per each unit. Within each unit, I have opted for the so-called "stratified randomization," meaning that I have selected randomly 5 soldiers per rank. This leads to a slight overrepresentation of the officer rank.

The respondents to the questionnaires were not those who took part in the in-depth interviews, so the fact that the results seem to go in the same direction confirms the validity of the argument.

The questionnaire contained 23 questions in order to assess the following:

1. Self-perception of the organization
2. Standard of appropriate behavior

3. Perception of context
4. Assessment of change within the armed forces

In the following, I present the aggregate results for all the questions I use in the book. The questionnaire instrument was mainly conceived for a qualitative treatment; however, most of the questions can also be compared from a quantitative viewpoint. Since each question contained answers that were categorical variables, I have done a chi-squared test. The chi-squared test compares the table that we observe empirically with the table that we would observe if the variables at play were drawn from an independent distribution. Even if the work is qualitative, it gives us a good indication of whether variations between armies or across units are occurring randomly.

Documents of Reference

Table 8. Documents of Reference

What are the most important documents you refer to?	Mandates of the UN resolution	NATO/ UN mandate	Rules of engagement	National military doctrines	White paper on defense
Alpini	5	13	9	0	0
Ariete	6	6	9	1	0
8th RPIMA	1	2	4	7	8
1st Fusilliers Battallion	2	1	3	9	11

Notes: Percentages in brackets that appear in the text are rounded to the nearest whole numbers.

The entire table is significant with p-value $= <0.001$. This means that the variations occurring in the table are not occurring randomly. The variations across Italian units instead are rather small and could be independent (p-value$=0.22$). Similarly, the variations across French units are small and could be independent (p-value$=0.88$). Variations across French and Italian units in Lebanon are instead significant (p-value < 0.001). Variations across French and Italian units in Afghanistan are again significant (p-value $=<0.001$).

Threat Perception

Table 9. Threat Perception

What is your threat perception between 0 and 10?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Alpini	0	1	1	2	8	3	0	0	0	0
Ariete	0	2	7	3	1	2	0	0	0	0
8th RPIMA	0	0	0	1	1	3	4	3	3	8
1st Fusilliers Battallion	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	10	0	0

Notes: Here I have created four categorical variable (I have left out the number 1, which received no answer for any of the units).

The entire table is significant with p-value <0.001. This means that the variations occurring in the table are not occurring randomly. The variations across Italian units instead are rather small and could be independent (p-value = 0.025). The variations across French units instead are rather small and could be independent (0.78). Variations across French and Italian units in Lebanon are also significant (p-value <0.001), as are the variations across French and Italian units in Afghanistan (p-value <0.001).

Meaning of Peace

Table 10. Meaning of Peace

What does peace mean for you?	Absence of war	Absence of major security accidents in the last 3 months	Absence of major security threats in the last 3 months	Confidence building among civilians	Presence of a democratic regime (and similar response)
Alpini	1	0	0	8	7
Ariete	2	0	0	9	6
8th RPIMA	9	6	1	2	0
1st Fusilliers Battallion	8	1	3	4	0

Note: The entire table is significant with p-value <0.001. This means that the variations occurring in the table are not occurring randomly. The variations across Italian units instead are rather small and could be independent (p-value = 0.80). The variations across French units instead are rather small and could be independent (p-value = 0.14). Variations across French and Italian units in Lebanon are again significant (p-value <0.001). Variations across French and Italian units in Afghanistan are again significant (p-value <0.001).

Table 11. Values in Peace Operations

What are the appropriate values about behavior in peace operations?	Neutral/ impartial	Combatant / warrior	Culturally aware	Well-equipped / high tech / military training	Lack of prejudices
Alpini	7	1	12	2	8
Ariete	6	0	8	0	8
8th RPIMA	0	9	3	4	0
1st Fusilliers Battallion	6	4	2	8	2

Note: The entire table is significant (p-value < 0.001). This means that the variations occurring in the table are not occurring randomly. The variations across Italian units instead are rather small and could be independent (0.60). The variations across French units instead are rather small and could be independent (0.029). Variations across French and Italian units in Lebanon are again significant (p-value < 0.001). Variations across French and Italian units in Afghanistan are again significant (p-value < 0.001).

Table 12. Skills in Peace Operations

According to you, does taking part in peace-keeping operations require the same kind of skills as in traditional combat operations?	Yes, skills required are the same	No, peace-keeping requires fewer combat skills	No, peace-keeping requires more combat skills	Other
Alpini	3	13	1	1
Ariete	3	10	1	1
8th RPIMA	5	0	9	1
1st Fusilliers Battalions	8	0	9	1

Note: The entire table is significant with p-value < 0.001. This means that the variations occurring in the table are not occurring randomly. The variations across Italian units instead are not significant but rather small and could be independent, p-value = 0.98. The variations across French units instead are rather small and could be independent as they are not significant (p-value = 0.80). Variations across French and Italian units in Lebanon is again significant (p-value < 0.001). Variations across French and Italian units in Afghanistan are significant (p-value < 0.001).

Questionnaire Template
QUESTIONNAIRE

This anonymous questionnaire can be very useful for my research. Please take your time answering and thank you so much for your patience and understanding!

RANK: _____
AGE: _____
BATTALION: _____

Please indicate your preference with an X or an O

1. Is this your first mission abroad?   YES   NO

2. If this is not your first mission, could you please indicate to what missions you have been previously deployed? _____
_____
_____

3. If this is not your first mission abroad, could you please indicate what are the main differences compared to the other missions you took part in? (PLEASE INDICATE NO MORE THAN 2 PREFERENCES)
    The other missions were deployed where a conflict was in progress
    The other missions established more robust enforcement powers
    In the other missions we had combat powers
    In the other missions there was a different relationship with the civilian population
    Other _____

4. For what kinds of domestic operations have you been deployed in your country? (MAX 2 PREFERENCES)
    Public Security
    Protection of victims of natural disasters
    National Defense
    Protection / Guard to High Authority of the State
    Other _____

5. According to you, does taking part in peacekeeping operations and in traditional missions require the same kind of capacities? (MAX 1 PREFERENCE)
    Yes, capacities required are the same

No, peacekeeping requires fewer combat capacities
No, peacekeeping requires more combat capacities
Other

6. According to your understanding, what are the most relevant character-
   istics of peacekeepers? (MAX 2 PREFERENCES)
   Neutral
   Combatant
   Impartial
   Culturally Aware
   Well-equipped
   High-tech

7. According to you, is your army in the process of changing?
   YES   NO

8. If any change is occurring, since when have the changes started to
   occur? (MAX 1 PREFERENCE)
   Last 5 years / Last 10 years / Last 15 years / Last 20 years / Other

9. What are the main signals for this change? (MAX 2 PREFERENCES)
   More peacekeeping interventions
   More special operations in specific fields such as counterterrorism
   More humanitarian intervention
   New technology
   Transnational cooperation among armies
   Activities that were typical from other actors
   Other _____

10. If you think there is no change, could you please elaborate a bit more on
    this? (Reasons for stability, characteristics, etc.) _____
    _____
    _____

11. Do you think that procedures of selection are also changing within your
    army?   YES   NO

12. What are the main characteristics of an army leader today? (MAX 2
    PREFERENCES)
    Who is able to lead
    Who is able to mediate

Who was particularly effective in peacekeeping operations
Who is a good warrior

13. What is the role of national armies today? (MAX 2 PREFERENCES)
   Defense of the national territory
   War
   Public Security
   Peace Support Activities
   Peacekeeping Operations
   Post-conflict Reconstruction

14. Who are the enemies of this mission? (MAX 1 PREFERENCE)
   Terrorists
   Talibans
   There is no enemy
   Hostile parties
   Other _____

15. What does peace mean for you? (MAX 1 PREFERENCE)
   Absence of war
   Absence of major security accidents in the last three months
   Absence of major security threats in the last three months
   Confidence building among civilians
   Presence of a democratic regime
   Other _____

16. In which of the following situations are you allowed to shoot? (MAX 1
   PREFERENCE)
   Talibans are about to shoot at you
   A civilian (Taliban sympathizer) is about to shoot at you
   A hostile party is shooting at you
   A hostile party is shooting against children and women
   Talibans are shooting against some of your comrades
   A hostile party is shooting against a compatriot (nonmilitary)
   Other _____

17. Are these situations allowing the use of force enough according to you?
   Why?
   _____
   _____

18. What are the most important documents you refer to? (MAX 1 PREF-
ERENCE)
  Mandate of the UN resolution
  NATO directives
  Rules of engagement
  National military doctrines
  White paper on defense
  Other_____

19. What is your threat perception today? (Please indicate a number
between 0 and 10) _____

20. What was your threat perception during the last security operation
(homeland or abroad) you took part in? (Please indicate a number
between 0 and 10) _____

21. In what kind of training did you take part before deploying to the
mission? Where? For how long?
_____
_____

22. A victory for ISAF would be: (MAX 1 PREFERENCE)
  Long-term ceasefire between the fighting groups in the country
  There is no victory
  Also a victory for my country
  I do not know

23. What would your contingent need in order to become more successful?
(MAX 1 PREFERENCE)
  Resources
    More troops
    Different use of force
    More humanitarian tasks
    Particular kind of weapons
    Particular kind of technology
  Other _____

Thank you for your attention!!!!

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NOTES

Introduction

1. Peace and stability operations comprise the broad category of military or civilian interventions by third states or a group of states meant to keep, build, and maintain peace; enforce temporary governance; conduct limited combat operations for the sake of security; and prevent the outbreak of conflict. These interventions operate with the consent of the host state and/or a UN Security Council resolution. They can be led by the UN, regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, or even by states acting unilaterally, provided the host state consents. Paul Diehl, *Peace and Stability Operations: Challenges and Opportunities for the Next U.S. Administration 2008* (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2008), 3, http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/unf_website/PDF/2008_durch_peacekeeping.pdf, accessed October 1, 2014.

2. Similar considerations apply to soldiers involved in counterinsurgency operations.

3. The relevant literature includes Richard R. Caniglia, "US and British Approaches to Force Protection," *Military Review* 79, no. 1 (2001); Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, "Multinational Landforce Interoperability: Meeting the Challenge of Difference Backgrounds in Chapter VI Peace Support Operations," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 23, no. 1 (2003); Funmi Olonisakin, "African Peacekeeping and the Impact on African Military Personnel," in *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Lessons from the Field*, ed. Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Joseph Soeters and Miepke Bos-Bakx, "Cross-cultural Issues in International Peacekeeping," in Britt and Adler; Joseph Soeters and Jan Van der Meulen, *Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison* (London: Routledge, 2007); Joseph Soeters, "Value Orientation in Military Academies: A Thirteen Country Study," *Armed Forces & Society* 24, no. 1 (1997); Geert H. Hofstede, *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001); Joseph Soeters, Christina Rodica Poponete, and Joseph T. Page, "Culture's Consequences in the Military," in *Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat*, ed. Thomas W. Britt, Amy B. Adler, and Carl A. Castro (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Joseph Soeters et al., "Turkish-Dutch Encounters in Peace Operations," *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 2 (2004).

4. Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 4 (2013); Vincenzo Bove and Andrea Ruggeri. "Kinds of Blue: Diversity in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Civilian Protection," *British Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 3 (July 2016): 681–700.

5. Military studies is a broad interdisciplinary field, ranging from security studies to sociology, focused on the study of the military. For instance, Allan R. Millett and Murray Williamson, eds., *Military Effectiveness*, vols. 1–3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

6. See Joseph Soeters, "Do Distinct (National) Operational Styles of Conflict Resolution Exist?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 6 (2013); Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, "The Pitfalls of Cross-National Comparison in Conflict Research," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 6 (2013).

7. Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon distinguish between military, police and military observation missions but not across national contingents. See Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald have documented important variations in the caveats of contributing countries to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, but they do not look at the actual behavior of soldiers at the tactical level, i.e., soldiers' ways of putting caveats into practice and interpreting the mandate. See Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (March 2012).

8. Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

9. Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3.

10. I focus specifically on the army military culture because each service presents specific characteristics and historical trajectories that lead specific beliefs to become deeply ingrained. Also, since I focus on peace operations deploying ground forces, it makes sense to focus on the army. Once deployed, national contingents assign the task to specific units of their army, and for this reason I studied different units belonging to the same set of selected armies.

11. Kier, *Imagining War*, Conclusions.

12. Peters B. Guy, "Political Institutions, Old and New," in *A New Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 205–20.

13. Chiara Ruffa and Pascal Vennesson, "Fighting and Helping? The Domestic Politics of NGO-Military Relations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," *Security Studies* 23, no. 3 (2014).

14. Scott Greer, "Choosing Paths in European Union Health Services Policy: A Political Analysis of a Critical Juncture," *Journal of European Social Policy* 18, no. 3 (2008): 219.

15. Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (London: Sage, 2009), 143–44.

16. For example, one might expect military culture to matter more in a traditional peacekeeping operation, where the threat level is relatively low and the SOPs give military units more freedom of maneuver.

17. While certain areas in which ISAF is committed require counterinsurgency-type intervention, it is well established that in the area under study—the Regional Command Capital—the operation was a security and stability operation until summer 2009.

18. Each interview and questionnaire was administered to a different soldier. For details, see Appendix.

19. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). Also cited in Pascal Vennesson, "Case Study and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices," in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences*, ed. Donatella della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 231. For a detailed account of these elements, see Chapters 3 and 5 of this book.

20. The empirical chapter will present these characteristics in further detail.

21. For a complete list of the type of people and organizations interviewed, see Appendix.

22. Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 3.

23. Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995).

24. France was on the winning side, while Italy allied with Nazi Germany. Also, the role of the resistance was stronger in France than in Italy.

25. The initiators and most prominent "third-generation" scholars working on strategic and military culture include Alastair I. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995); Alistair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine"; Kier, *Imagining War*; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994); Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behaviour: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization*, 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Thomas Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," *International*

Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993); Hull, *Absolute Destruction*; Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention. Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). For a more comprehensive discussion, see "The Argument" section in Theo Farrell, "World Culture and Military Power," *Security Studies* 14, no. 3 (July-September 2005).

26. Cassidy also developed an argument on peace operations, but he applies standard third-generation arguments. See Robert M. Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Doctrine and Practice After the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).

27. The initiators and most prominent "third-generation" scholars working on strategic and military culture include Kier, *Imagining War*; Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Military Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*; Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior"; Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*; Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*; Theo Farrell, "Culture and Military Power," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 3 (July 1998). For a comprehensive discussion and overview of the three generations of studies on strategic and military culture, see John S. Duffield et al., "Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (July 1999); Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture." For a critical view, see Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998). For an alternative view, see Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (January 1999); Stuart Poore, "What Is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (April 2003).

28. Andrew M. Bell, "Military Culture and the Sources of Battlefield Restraint: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars," *Security Studies* 25, no. 3 (2016): 517

29. Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine"; Kier, *Imagining War*; Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II"; Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire*; Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behaviour"; Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*; Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*; Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum."

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Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

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44. Andrea Rebora, *Carri Ariete Combattono. Le Vicende Della Divisione Corazzata Ariete Nelle Lettere Del Tenente Pietro Ostellino. Africa Settentrionale 1941–1943* (Siena: Prospettiva Editrice, 2009).

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56. Mondini, *Alpini. Parole E Immagini Di Un Mito Guerriero.*

57. Ibid., 50.

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61. Ibid., 79.

62. Ibid., 81–82.

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71. Bastien Irondelle and Sophie Besancenot, *France: The End of Exceptionalism?* (Basingtoke: Emil J. Kirchner, James Sperling, 2009).

72. Alexander and Bankwitz, "From Politiques En Képi to Military Technocrats."

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74. Barbara Jankowski, "Opinion Publique et Armees à L'epreuve de La Guerre en Afghanistan," *Etude de l'Irsem* 34 (2014).

75. Sophie Meunier, "France and the World, from Chirac to Sarkozy," in *Developments in French Politics*, ed. Alistair Cole, Patrick Le Gales, and Jonah Levy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Bastien Irondelle and Sophie Besancenot, "France: The End of Exceptionalism?," in *National Security Cultures and Global Security Governance*, ed. Emil J. Kirchner (Basingtoke: Palgrave, 2009).

76. Bastien Irondelle and Olivier Schmitt, "France," in *Strategic Cultures in Europe*, ed. Bastian Giegerich, Heiko Biehl, and Alexandra Jonas (Vienna: Peter Lang, 2013), 126.

77. Bastien Irondelle and Sophie Besancenot, "France: The End of Exceptionalism?," 22.

78. Meunier, "France and the World."

79. Irondelle and Schmitt, *France*.

80. Michel Goya, *La Chair et L'acier: L'armée Française et L'invention de La Guerre Moderne (1914–1918)* (Paris: Tallandier, 2004).

81. Interview with French army general, Paris, June 2014.

82. GEN-2, Paris, France, May 2014. See also Sylvain Tesson, Thomas Goisque, and Bertrand De Miollis, *Haute Tension. Des Chasseurs Alpins En Afghanistan* (Paris: Gallimard, 2009).

83. Irondelle and Schmitt, "France"; O-1, Frenchbatt, Camp Warehouse, November 2008. Other sources from historical, doctrinal, and sociological points of view confirm this. See Jean-Claude Mallet, *General Loup Francart et Évolutions de la Doctrine Militaire Française* (Paris: CDES, 2001); Commandement de la doctrine et de l'enseignement militaire supérieur de l'armée de terre (CDES), *L'action Des Forces Terrestres au Contact Des Réalités: Une Nouvelle Approche Doctrinale* (Paris: CDES, 2000). On French colonial warfare, see Jacques Frémeaux, *Intervention et Humanisme: Le Style des Armées Françaises en Afrique au XIXème Siècle* (Paris: Economica, 2006); GEN-1, Paris, France, June 2014.

84. Goya, *La Chair et L'acier 'aL'armée Française et L'invention de La Guerre Moderne*; Allan R. Millett and Murray Williamson, eds., *Military Effectiveness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

85. Les sentinelles de l'agora, "Incidences des opérations de paix sur l'emploi de l'Armée française," *Défense nationale et sécurité collective* 4 (April 2007); Frémeaux, *Intervention et Humanisme*.

86. Liora Sion, "Too Sweet and Innocent for War? Dutch Peacekeepers and the Use of Violence," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 3 (April 2006); Soeters and Van der Meulen, *Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

87. Alan Forrest, "Citizenship and Masculinity: The Revolutionary Citizen-Soldier and His Legacy," in *Representing Masculinity. Male Citizenship in Modern Western Culture*, ed. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and Anna Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 112.

88. *Terre* information magazine 183, April 2007, 51.

89. To be precise, that was the Light Mechanized Brigade. Most of the troops in this brigade then became part of the 1st Armored Division.

90. http://www.troupesdemarine.org/actuel/unites/8rpima.htmhttp://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/decouverte/presentation/composantes/troupes_de_marine/8e_regiment_de_parachutistes_d_infanterie_de_marine.

91. http://www.brig-para11.terre.defense.gouv.fr.

92. In French "un exceptionnel pouvoir de cohesion."

93. http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/decouverte/presentation/composantes/brigades/11e_brigade_parachutiste.

94. Giorgi, *I Santi*, 118.

95. In French: "Donnez-moi mon Dieu, ce qu'il vous reste, Donnez-moi ce que l'on refuse. Je veux l'insécurité et l'inquiétude, Je veux la tourmente et la bagarre, Et que vous me les donniez, mon Dieu, Définitivement, Que je sois sûr de les avoir toujours, Car je n'aurai pas toujours le courag.e. De vous les demander. Donnez-moi mon Dieu, ce qu'il vous reste, Donnez-moi ce que les autres ne veulent pas. Mais donnez-moi aussi le courage Et la force et la foi. Car vous seul donnez Ce qu'on ne peut obtenir que de soi."

96. "Le béret rouge porté par l'ensemble du personnel servant dans les troupes aéroportées, est le symbole de la légende et la preuve éclatante de la consécration par le saut." http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/decouverte/presentation/composantes/brigades/11e_brigade_parachutiste.

97. http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/decouverte/presentation/composantes/brigades/11e_brigade_parachutiste.

98. O-1, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

Chapter 3

1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978.

2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006).

3. For example, see http://www.dailystar.com/lebanon, as well as a collection of articles about the renewed mission at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/08/.

4. Troops contributors of military personnel were Belgium, China, Croatia, Cyprus, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania, and Turkey. Statistics for international and local civilians are current as of July 31, 2007; see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/facts.html. Not all the contingents present are assigned an area of deployment. Some, such as the Chinese or Polish, are present with demining or logistic units and are deployed at the HQ level. Other small contingents, such as the Qatari or the Slovenian companies, are deployed under the operational control of other contingents.

5. http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/decouverte/presentation/composantes/infanterie/1er_regiment_de_tirailleurs.

6. Federation of American Scientists, "AUF-1 Canon de 155 AUtomoteur model F1," http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/auf1.htm (accessed September 14, 2016).

7. Interview with UN Deputy Force Commander, 2007, confirmed by several French and Italian senior officers.

8. Both civilians working for UNIFIL (CIV1, UNIFIL Senior Political Advisor; CIV2, UNIFIL Civil Affairs Officer) and officers (Col. Commins, Chief Liaison Officer) agree on this point.

9. HO-6, Beirut, Lebanon, November 2009; UNHQCIV-6, Beirut, Lebanon, October 2007; L-3, Tyre, Lebanon, August 2009.

10. L-5, Tyre, Lebanon, August 2009.

11. In the UN mission in Lebanon, Italy deployed to battalions, Italy1 and Italy 2. I focused on Italy1 because of its comparability with the French battalion nearby.

12. O-2, Ghanabatt, Lebanon, November 2009.

13. NCS-3, Koreanbatt, Lebanon, September 2009.

14. NCS-1, Italbatt, Lebanon, September 2008.

15. O-4, Frenchbatt, Lebanon, August 2008.

16. O-5, FrenchBatt, December 2008, Tyre, Lebanon also found in O-1, O-3, NCO-1, NCS-2. This statement was confirmed by NCS-1, NCS-2, NCS-5; NCO-1, NCO-4, NCO-5; O-1, O-3, O-4.

17. O-3; O-10, Frenchbatt, December 2008, Tyre, Lebanon. This statement was confirmed by NCS-1, NCS-4, NCS-5, NCO-1, NCO-2, NCO-5, O-1, O-3, O-4.

18. Based on the questionnaires only, the p-value is significant (p-value < 0.001. This means that the variations in the table are not occurring randomly; instead, there is a clear pattern. Variations across French and Italian units in Lebanon are also significant (p-value < 0.001).

19. Questionnaires for each unit. Tenent, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, 17-12-2007. Sergeant, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, November 2007.

20. Chiara Ruffa, "What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," *Armed Forces and Society* 40, no. 2 (2014).

21. Ruffa, "What Peacekeepers Think and Do."

22. The entire table is significant (p-value < 0.001). This means that the variations are not occurring randomly. Variations across French and Italian units in Lebanon are significant (p-value < 0.001).

23. The comparison in the table is significant (p-value < 0.001). This means that the variations occurring are not occurring independently. Variations across French and Italian units in Lebanon are again significant (p-value < 0.001).

24. O-3, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

25. NCS-1, Frenchbatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

26. HQ-1, UNIFIL HQ, Naqoura, Lebanon, December 2007.

27. HQ-4, Laison Branch, UNIFIL HQ, Naqoura, Lebanon, December 2007.

28. Chiara Ruffa, "The Long and Winding Road . . . to Success? Unit Peace Operation Effectiveness and Its Effect on Mission Success," *Defense & Security Analysis* 29, no. 2 (June 1, 2013): 128–40, doi:10.1080/14751798.2013.787793.

29. O-1, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, December 2007.

30. O-2, ItalBatt, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

31. O-1, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

32. O-1, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

33. O-1, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

34. O-1, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

35. O-2, CIMIC Branch, UNIFIL HQ, Naqoura, Lebanon, December 2007.

36. NCS-5, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

37. NCO-2, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

38. O-1, FrenchBatt, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

39. LAF-3, Tyre, Lebanon, December 2007.

40. NCO-2, ItalBatt 1, Shamaa, Lebanon, November 2007.

41. NCS-4, ItalBatt, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

42. Ruffa, "What Peacekeepers Think and Do."

43. NCS-2, ItalBatt, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

44. Sergeant, ItalBatt, Lebanon, November 2007.

45. O-1, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, December 2007.

46. NCO-2, ItalBatt 1, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

47. O-3, RokBatt, Tyre, Lebanon, December 2007.

48. NCS-5, ItalBAtt 1, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

49. O-1, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, December 2007.

50. O-1, FrenchBatt, At Tiri, Lebanon, December 2007.

51. HQ-2, UNIFIL HQ, Naqoura, Lebanon, November 2007.

52. HQ-2, CIMIC Branch, UNIFIL HQ, Naqoura, Lebanon, December 2007.

53. HQ-4, CIMIC Branch, UNIFIL Hadquarter, Naqoura, December 2007.

54. HQ-3, CIMIC Branch, UNIFIL Hadquarter, Naqoura, December 2007.

55. This also applied to the other Italian unit, which is not under study in this book.

56. O-1, FrenchBatt 1, At Tiri, Lebanon, November 2007.

57. O-1 Frenchbatt, 0-3 Italbatt, O-1 Rokbatt, O-2 Ghanabatt, November-December 2007.

58. Liora Sion has analyzed the same aspects but focused on external checkpoints and the relationship between soldiers and the local population. See Liora Sion, "The Soldier at the Checkpoint: Relationship Between Peacekeepers and Local Populations," in *Stabilizing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Consideration for a Multinational Peace Support Operation*, ed. M. Kobi and D. Kellen (Jerusalem: Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, 2007).

59. Notably UNMOGIP and UNDOF.

60. O-2, ItalBatt, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

61. O-2, ItalBatt, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

62. NCO-6, ItalBatt, Marake, Lebanon, November 2007.

63. Barak Ravid, "UNIFIL Steps Up Supervision to Deter Hezbollah Rearmament," *Haaretz*, December 30, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/news/unifil-steps

-up-supervision-to-deter-hezbollah-re-armament-1.236188 (accessed September 14, 2016).

64. L-1, Amal Mouvement, Tyre, Lebanon, Lebanon, November 2007, L-0 Lebanese Man, Tyre, Lebanon, November 2007.

65. HQ-8, Liaison Officer Staff, Naqoura, Lebanon, November 2007.

66. Karim Makdisi, Timur Goksel, Hans Bastian Hauck, and Stuart Reigeluth, "UNIFIL II: Emerging and Evolving European Engagement in Lebanon and the Middle East," EUROMESCO Report, January 2009, 25.

67. http://www.haaretz.com, Spring 2008.

68. L-3, Hezbollah, Tyre, Lebanon, December 2007.

69. L-2, Hezbollah, Tyre, Lebanon, December 2007.

Chapter 4

1. For a basic definition, see James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters* (Winter 1995): 59. See also US Army, FM 31-23, *Stability Operations—US Army Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967). There is little doubt that ISAF is conducting security and stability operations, as also acknowledged on NATO's website, http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html. However, it should be underlined that the type of operations varies greatly by area (more counterinsurgency in the South, more peacekeeping type in the North).

2. Annex 1, Bonn Agreement.

3. UNSC S/RES/1386 (2001).

4. Sabino Cassese, *Diritto Internazionale* (Pavia: Giunti, 2005).

5. Annex 1, Bonn Agreement; UNSC S/RES/1386 (2001).

6. PRTs were introduced in UNSC S/RES/1563 (2004). They are joint civilian-military structures aimed at promoting reconstruction and humanitarian activities. Certain PRTs are civilian-led, such as those under New Zealand control (with military representative), while others are strictly military led, such as the American PRT in Farah (with civilian officers). Most are jointly led, such as the Italian PRT in Herat.

7. http://www.nato.int/ISAF/structure/hq/index.html.

8. Annex 1, Bonn Agreement; UNSC S/RES/1386 (2001).

9. http://www.nato.org/ISAF.

10. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands are more heavily involved in combat, whereas Korea and Bulgaria offer logistical support but do not have combat units.

11. Cf. NATO figures, http://www.nato.org.

12. http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/decouverte/materiels/vehicules/petit_vehicule_protege.

13.   http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/decouverte/materiels/vehicules/vehicule_blinde_de_combat_de_l_infanterie.

14. http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/decouverte/materiels/vehicules/amx_10_p.

15. http://www.esercito.difesa.it/root/unita_sez/unita_ftralp_9_mezzi.asp.

16. http://www.esercito.difesa.it/root/unita_sez/unita_ftralp_9_mezzi.asp.

17. O-1, Italian unit, Kabul, 13/10/2009; O-1, French unit, Kabul, 15/10/2008; NCO-3, Italian unit, Kabul, 13/10/2008; NCS, French unit, 16/10/2008. Triangulation was also used to check this information.

18. According to my interviewees. This contrasts partly with Saidemann and Auerswald's assessment of French and Italian caveats, considered "strict" for the Italian and "medium" for the French. Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (2012): 72.

19. NATOHQ-3; NATOHQ-4; NATOHQ-5, Kabul, Afghanistan, July 2008 and November 2008.

20. O-4 and NCS-1, French unit, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, December 2009, also confirmed by Florence Aubenas, "Afghanistan: Les Morts de La Vallée d'Uzbeen," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, August 28, 2008.

21. Afghan NGO Safety Office weekly reports 2008–2010.

22. According to some sources, the incident in the Surobi Valley was a consequence of the different ways in which the French and Italians did things, a warning from the Taliban to the French. According to others, it was usual in that area for the Taliban to assert its presence to newly deployed contingents by launching attacks. Aubenas, "Afghanistan: Les Morts de La Vallée d'Uzbeen."

23. Jerome Starkey, "War in Afghanistan: The Battle of Surobi. 10 French Soldiers Die Fighting Their Way Back to Base After Patrol Is Ambushed by Heavily Armed Taliban Militants," *The Independent*, August 20, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/war-in-afghanistan-the-battle-of-surobi-902902.html. See also GED Point Dataset v.1.1-2011, in Ralph Sundberg, Mathilda Lindgren, and Ausra Padskocimaite, *UCDP GED Codebook Version 1.0-2011* (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2010).

24. Romain Rosso, "Comment l'Italie Contrôlait La Vallée d'Uzbin En Afghanistan," *L'Express*, October 15, 2009, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/comment-l-italie-controlait-la-vallee-d-uzbin-en-afghanistan_794782.html.

25. Certain details about the amount of weapons and type of material released to the author have been kept confidential for security reasons.

26. NCO-1, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

27. NCS-5, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

28. NCS-1, Questionnaire, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

29. NCO-1, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

30. NCS-6, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

31. NCS-2, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

32. O-2, Questionnaire, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

33. O-1, Questionnaire, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

34. O-6, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

35. O-1, Questionnaire, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008.

36. For interesting accounts of the Italian PRT experience, see Gastone Breccia, "Hearts, Minds and Guts: Running the Italian PRT in Herat. A Civilian Perspective," in *From Venus to Mars? Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experience in Afghanistan, 2001–2014*, ed. Bernard Chiari (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 2014); Valentina Albini and Nicola Labanca, "Military Deaths as Newspaper Stories: Italian Losses in Afghanistan and the Mass Media," in *From Venus to Mars? Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experience in Afghanistan, 2001–2014* (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 2014), 361–76.

37. NCS-3, Questionnaire, Italbatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

38. O-1, Questionnaire, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

39. NCS-2, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

40. NCS-4, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

41. NCO-3, Questionnaire, Italbatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

42. NCO-3, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

43. NCS-2, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

44. NCS-3, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

45. NCO-2, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

46. NCO-4, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

47. NCO-1, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

48. Ibid.

49. NCO-1, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

50. NCO-2, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

51. NCO-1, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

52. NCS-4, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

53. NCS-2 and O-8, ItalBatt, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

54. O-2, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

55. O-1, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

56. NCO-2, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

57. NCS-2, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

58. NCO-2, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

59. NATO Strategic Vision, April 2008, after the meeting in Bucharest.

60. O-3, French BattleGroup, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

61. O-6, Italian BattleGroup, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

62. O-2, interview via email, November 2008.

63. O-1, French BattleGroup, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 2008.

64. NCS-1, Italian BattleGroup, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

65. O-4, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

66. O-3, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

67. Ibid.

68. O-2, French unit, interview via email, November 2008.

69. O-2, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

70. Ibid.

71. O-2, Interview via email, November 2008.

72. NCS-1, French unit, Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

73. NCO-2, French unit, Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

74. NCS-1 French unit, Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

75. Ibid.

76. O-8 French unit, via phone, February 2009.

77. Ibid.

78. CIMIC is different for two reasons. First, CIMIC cells only involve government institutions (rather than the whole community) in setting up projects. After receiving authorization from the government institution, this is how they proceed: "One of our team goes out to have a look; we try to understand where primary schools and kinder-gartens are." O-3, Italian Units, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2009.

79. O-3, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

80. O-4, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

81. O-3, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

82. O-1, French unit, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008; O-3, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

83. NCS-4, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

84. NCO-3, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

85. Ibid.

86. O-3, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

87. NCS-3, French unit, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

88. O-5, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

89. OF-1 French unit, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

90. In every region except the RCC, PRTs follow the line of command of the regional command but are under the technical line of command of CIMIC groups and cooperation agencies.

91. O-3, FrenchBatt, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008.

92. To illustrate the confusion, OEF used to be partly intertwined with ISAF because the ISAF force commander was also the head of OEF. OEF could conduct operations everywhere, if authorized by ISAF Central Command, which was de facto part of the Central Command chain of command, which directly gave orders to OEF.

93. While "Aegis Task Force" operated under Regional Command South and was part of OEF, it was not clear to whom the CJTF-101 responded. According to a UN official, the CJTF-101 responded directly to HQ ISAF and dealt with special operations, but it was actually an OEF task force. In addition, two infantry brigades and an aviation brigade, one military police, one multipurpose, one engineer, and one logistics command responded to CTJF-101.

94. O-2, Italian unit, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

95. NCS-8, French unit, Camp Warehouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2008.

96. HQ-3, HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, July 2008.

97. O-7, Commander, Italbatt, Kabul, Camp Invicta, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2009.

98. The ANSO report, page 1, issue 3, May 16–31. The ANSO Reports are available upon request. For further detail, see http://www.ngosafety.org/, accessed September 21, 2016.

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110. Italian NCS-1, Rome, Italy, November 2014.

111. French NCO-4, Paris, France, June 2014.

112. See, for instance, http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/201508019 _Libano_addestramento_congiunto.aspx.

113. O-6, Italian unit, October 2008, Camp Invicta, Afghanistan. This statement was confirmed by NCS-1, NCS-2; NCS-3; NCS-4, NCO-1, NCO-3, NCO-4, NCO-3, O-4.

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Conclusion

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