The Transition to Democracy: Proceedings of a Workshop

Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council

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Proceedings of a Workshop

COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
AND EDUCATION
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COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AND EDUCATION

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Preface

The recent movements toward democracy in many areas of the world have brought the United States a growing number of requests for assistance from governments that are undergoing transitions to new, more open forms of society. Finding the appropriate U.S. role requires addressing complex and sometimes controversial questions: Can we identify the major elements that characterize effective democratic societies? Can we identify the critical steps necessary to support the transition to such societies? What are the major threats to achieving and maintaining democratic societies? What can the U.S. government, and particularly A.I.D., do to help countries move toward a more enduring type of democracy?

The intellectual and policy challenges posed by these questions formed the core of a workshop, "The Transition to Democracy," held by the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education (CBASSE) of the National Research Council with the sponsorship of the Agency for International Development. A.I.D. is in the midst of rethinking its basic strategies, exploring how its programs can most effectively foster and support the development of democratic political and economic processes and institutions. This workshop was an important part of the process of developing new "democratic initiatives."

Antonio Gayoso, Agency Director of the Human Resources Directorate of A.I.D.'s Bureau of Science and Technology, conceived the workshop and brought the idea to CBASSE. CBASSE invited some 20 experts who represent a variety of fields—including political science, sociology, economics, and legal studies—as well as people actively involved in programs to foster democracy in various parts of the world, for a 2-1/2 day meeting in October 1990. The workshop was organized around a series of plenary sessions and small group discussions. The plenary sessions provided the opportunity to discuss general issues in the transition to democracy. The small groups permitted participants to explore these

concepts through discussions of specific institutions, processes, and problems central to transitions, and also to examine how well these ideas applied to particular regions and countries.

These proceedings include the introductory remarks from A.I.D. officials, edited transcripts of each of the plenary talks, summaries of the plenary discussions, and summaries of the reports of each of the working sessions. Neither CBASSE nor A.I.D. expected consensus among the speakers and participants, nor did they set out to discover a model of a "democracy" that would work in the same way in every society. These issues are the subject of intense, continuing debate and redefinition. Nonetheless, we believe that the workshop identified important areas of agreement and illuminated the major issues and arguments that should be part of any attempt to understand democracy and to develop policies to promote it.

The commission wishes to express its gratitude to staff members Jo Husbands and Joseph Masteika for developing the workshop and for producing these proceedings and to Mary Thomas who worked with them in planning and organizing the meeting. Maryellen Fisher helped prepare the proceedings, Elaine McGarraugh edited and produced the final manuscript, and Eugenia Grohman provided editorial supervision and good advice. On the A.I.D. side, Robert McClusky devoted time and tremendous intellectual energy to the design and development of the workshop, while John O'Donnell, Eric Chetwynd, and Gerry Britan contributed throughout to its successful evolution. Without their efforts, the meeting would neither have occurred nor succeeded.

Special thanks are due to cochairs Charles Tilly and Sidney Verba, whose wise counsel throughout the planning process and stellar leadership at the workshop helped foster the candid and cordial tone of the discussions and draw out the key issues. Finally, the workshop participants deserve special thanks for coming to Washington on relatively short notice to give talks and lead working sessions that we believe provided genuine insights and built important bridges between scholars and practitioners who share a common concern for finding ways to nurture and support the new movements toward democracy around the world.

ROBERT McC. ADAMS, Chair

Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education

Introduction from A.I.D. Officials

ANTONIO GAYOSO AGENCY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE FOR HUMAN RESOURCES, BUREAU FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Gayoso welcomed the group and commented that, for him, the reasons for this workshop were as simple as they were complex. Simple, because we are not questioning whether democracy, as a form of government, is desirable; it is accepted that it is. Complex, because the concept of democracy is not monolithic; rather, it responds in many ways to the needs and desires of the people, if freely expressible. Political and economic freedom go hand in hand; political and economic development are inseparable. Both are essential for broad-based social and economic progress, for just as prosperity without democracy will almost certainly be inequitable, democracy without prosperity will almost never be sustained.

The last 5 years has brought an extraordinary series of events. In many countries, ranging from Latin America to Eastern Europe, from Africa to Asia, the will of the people, expressed in different ways, has resulted in many countries moving toward more open and participatory political and economic systems. These events reemphasize the fact that the birth of democracy can only be the result of decisions and actions taken by the people themselves.

There have been similar, although less dramatic swings in the past. We have learned the hard way, he argued, that democracy, particularly when young and new, can be very fragile and perishable as it emerges from dictatorship, tyranny, or chaos. Democracies are not only difficult to build, but also difficult to maintain. The long-term sustainability of the new experiments remains uncertain. Gayoso suggested that there is still much to learn about how transitions to democracy can best be facilitated: about how underlying social, political, and economic institutions should be nurtured; about how economic growth and political development are intertwined; about which outside interventions will be most effective; and about what approaches to democratization are most appropriate for which settings and in which order.

The workshop is concerned with the role A.I.D. can play in facilitating

democratization. Many believe that, as a foreign assistance agency, A.I.D. needs to operate within an agreed-upon basic conceptual framework of democracy that clearly identifies long term and systemic objectives for our efforts in democratization. Individual interventions in an appropriate sequence, consistent with that framework, can then be formulated.

In every country and every region of the world A.I.D. faces unique and difficult challenges. In Latin America and the Caribbean, despite much progress, some countries remain intractably authoritarian. And, even in settings of almost unimagined success, the transition to democracy remains poorly linked to economic progress, as recent news stories on Nicaragua and Panama attest. In Asia—the scene of most rapid economic growth—promising beginnings are evident, even in such countries as Cambodia and Vietnam. But political progress also remains uneven, reverses remain common, and traditions of political freedom remain thin. In Africa, on the other hand, political freedoms remain largely nonexistent, but opportunities and the willingness to take political risks are growing. However, Africa also encompasses some of the world's most intractable problems of poverty, tribalism, warfare, and state-dominated economic collapse.

The workshop will not—and cannot—try to solve all of the specific problems A.I.D. will encounter around the world. It will not define standard solutions. It will be helpful if the workshop is able to highlight the values, inherent in our society, that we are projecting; if it can identify those precepts that are simply not negotiable as A.I.D. deals with other countries, such as respect for human rights; if the workshop can define the broad objectives A.I.D.'s program seeks; and if it can build recognition that success and stability in this area are mostly a long-term proposition.

RICHARD BISSELL ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The Assistant Administrator began by commenting on the importance of remembering the immense diversity of the American experience with democracy, from New England town meetings to statewide referenda in California. This matters because it means we have more than a single American model to offer the world, and because we inevitably bring our own varied experiences and biases to this enterprise.

Bissell noted the immense changes that have taken place in the world over the past ten years. When President Reagan spoke about the importance of encouraging democracy at Westminster in 1982, many wondered why the president was taking the time to mention such a hopeless cause. By the end of the decade, the spread of democracy had captured the world's imagination. He commented that "democracy" includes many

things—processes, people, institutions—and requires insights from many disciplines—economics, psychology, political science, and sociology. In trying to support democratic development, one must remember that many of our goals, such as effective governance, will only be created over the long term; getting elected is the easy part.

Promoting democracy will be a central part of U.S. foreign policy for many years. Bissell commented that he could not imagine a foreign assistance act without programs to support democracy. The challenge now is to give meaning to "democracy," to find a definition that is inclusive—certainly more inclusive than it has been in the past—yet discrete enough to build programs around. Bissell then introduced a video with greetings and introductory remarks from the A.I.D. Administrator.

RONALD W. ROSKENS ADMINISTRATOR

I can't think of anything more timely than the gathering of this distinguished group of scholars and practitioners to reflect on some of the most significant changes in and challenges for development since the avalanche of African independence in the 1960s. I regret not being with you. It is perhaps ironic that the reason I cannot join you is a trip to review our programs in Eastern Europe.

The democratic torrent of the past 2 years—from the dramatic demolition of the Berlin Wall to the grass roots construction of constitutional government in Nicaragua—has produced changes that are startling and profound. What President Bush has called the "new wind" of democracy both feeds our hopes for the future and presents us with Herculean challenges. I know many of you have worked in depth on the issues that confront us. Your work, together with that of the U.S. government, has been an important part of the changes occurring around the globe.

Now our search for understanding impels us to ask what America can do to further the process of democratization in the emerging democracies. Certain investments, we know, produce results. Tens of thousands of people from developing countries have been trained in this country—hundreds of thousands, if we count privately supported students. We have invested heavily and continue to invest in literacy programs and in education at all levels in developing countries—primary education and education for women and girls being a particular challenge today. We have worked assiduously with the volunteer sector to increase participation at the grass roots level in both rural and urban settings. We have strengthened legislative systems and local judiciary bodies. And, at last count, the Agency has sponsored 137 projects that have, in one way or

another, addressed the cause of justice, the rule of law, and the institutions of democracy.

Beyond these programmatic accomplishments, we must explore the underlying precepts of democracy, to understand its fundamentals, to examine how it evolves. It is critical to grapple with the question of where to start in initiating or strengthening the democratic process. It is important to know the significance of working in countries at different stages of economic and political development. And we know that democracy is not without its threats. I am pleased to see that you are resolved to identify these threats and how to avoid or confront them.

In closing, I congratulate the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education and the National Research Council for assembling such a distinguished group of experts. I also want to offer an observation and a commitment. First, the observation: During the 1990s, the United States Agency for International Development will be involved in a broad array of democracy-building programs. I believe we have a responsibility to the democracy-seekers around the globe to base our efforts and programs on sound, rigorous research into the critical issues and questions with which you will grapple in this workshop. And, the commitment: I promise you that the findings of this workshop will be widely disseminated within A.I.D. and will be an important part of our effort to support democratic process—a process I intend to pursue with vigor. I wish you success in your important deliberations and thank you for your willingness to participate.

What is a Democracy? Plenary Session I

POLITICS

Jane Mansbridge

Why do we want democracy? I can give you one of many reasons: this finding is absolutely extraordinary, but democracies do not fight one another. Democracies are not more peaceful than other political entities—it is just that they do not seem to fight one another. One could, in fact, argue that since 1816, no democracy has fought another democracy. In order to make that statement, it is necessary to presume that Germany under the Kaiser in World War I was a monarchy, that Germany under Hitler was a dictatorship, and that Lebanon in 1967 was a military government. However, if one accepts these presumptions, then one could say conclusively that since 1816 not a single democracy has fought a war against another democracy.

This finding is quite a recent discovery about wars among nations, and it is backed up by anthropological data on societies that have no political organization beyond the local community. If you look at the data from the Yale Human Relations Area Files on 186 societies, you find that the more people in individual communities within a society participate in community decisions, the less fighting there is among communities in that society. Also, the easier it is to remove community leaders, the less fighting there is among those communities. These Yale scholars get correlations of .7 between democracy and an absence of fighting, which is a very strong relationship in anthropological data. But nobody has much idea why this relationship exists.

This relatively recent discovery is a serendipitous stumbling onto a very strong relationship. When it was first discovered about 10 years ago, it sent everybody into a tizzy; nobody could believe it. Researchers have tried to figure it out and, as yet, they have not gotten very far. The Yale anthropological data are as yet unpublished; the scholars working on it are only halfway through their analysis.

Because we do not know why this relationship holds, we cannot ask what the crucial institutions are in a democracy that produce this result. What is it about democracy that leads to what I presume is for most of us

this desired end? We should be asking what specific kinds of things exist in a democracy that get us what we want. This may be a more helpful way of thinking about democracy than the metaphysical question of "What is democracy?" It may be better to ask, "What in democracy brings about the ends we want?" rather than "What is it in some platonic, ideal world?"

What is this second, equally or more important practical reason for wanting democracy? Because democracy embodies widely held ideals—freedom of expression, global equality—and because it meets deeply felt needs—such as the need to be part of larger decisions contributing to one's life, and the need to be listened to—democracy is able to produce peaceful, legitimate decisions about a larger number of matters that might otherwise end in disruptive conflict.

You could say that democracy helps us to lose peacefully. Whenever there is a conflict, it is likely that somebody is going to lose. Sometimes both parties lose, both parties give something up. But to the extent that democracy is about conflict, which it often is, it is about losing. A good democracy will help people lose well, and losing well, to my mind, includes losing peacefully.

Because we have known for a long time that democracy produces the peaceful resolution of conflict within nations, we are further along in identifying the features in democracy that help produce this end. Two of those features are fairness and participation. Even convicted criminals support the system that convicts them when they believe the process to be fair. If you try to measure support among criminals for the criminal justice system in the United States, you find that support is much higher among people who thought the system was fair than among people who simply got off. Sometimes criminals will even say, "The system's no good because it let me off." Part of democracy's usefulness is that we can accept loss if we think losing is fair.

As for participation, let us look at the criminal justice system again. Americans prefer informal, out-of-court procedures to formal legal ones. Why? Because in the informal procedures they get to have their say instead of a lawyer speaking for them. Even when the case goes against them, they are more satisfied because they have been heard. They have had a voice. Management studies also show that when employees participate in making a tough or unpopular decision, they are more likely to accept the results. When management makes the decision alone, employees are more likely to quit or to call in sick.

Participation works this way for a while, even in cases of pseudo-participation where management has rigged all the numbers so that even after employee participation, management gets the answer that they wanted all along. But people learn. Citizens in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia do not have much enthusiasm for the idea of participation anymore,

because they are used to it being rigged. But genuine participation and fair procedures can legitimate hard decisions. It can help people live with losing.

It is largely the ideals of democracy that help us lose gracefully. We say to ourselves that although we have lost, the fairness of the process fits our ideal of what democracy should be.

But we have, I believe, two ideals of democracy: one based on conflict, the other on commonality. And these two ideals are somewhat in tension; to some degree they are even contradictory. We need both, but we need to realize they are conflicting ideals. In fact, democracy as it is practiced in the United States and Western Europe today is a hybrid of these two ideals. In one vision of democracy, the system creates fair procedures for resolving conflicts of interest. In another vision, somewhat in tension with the first, the system encourages deliberation about how best to promote the common good. The intellectuals in the newly democratizing nations of Central Europe recognize this tension better than we do. As East Germany was democratizing, the *New York Times* reported a growing gap between "dissidents who had formed groups like New Forum with a notion of democracy as a process of well-meaning discussion in which the universal good was the shared goal, and political parties in West and East Germany whose primarily goal was to win the elections."

Practicing politicians in America and Western Europe tend to understand democracy in only one of these two ways, the conflict-based way. For them, democracy is an adversary system that assumes conflicting interests. The system sets up fair procedural rules under which each side attempts to win. Political scientists in the Western democracies also describe politics in this way, as who gets what in a fair fight.

But American and European philosophers who discuss democracy usually emphasize its deliberative character. In deliberative democracy, citizens talk with one another about public problems. Their talk can certainly be raucous and full of conflict; it can turn on opinion as well as fact; it can draw on emotion as well as reason. But the talk in deliberative democracy often aims at a common good. "How can we work out our disagreements?" "How can we get this thing that we all want done, done efficiently?" Every manager is familiar with this kind of deliberation. It works through persuasion, not power. And in fact, politicians in the United States practice not only the politics of power, but also the politics of persuasion for the common good in their legislative roles. Recent research in political science is uncovering the extent of this "common interest" behavior, even among politicians who, when asked directly, would probably deny it because they want to be "realists" and to see themselves as strong actors in a conflictual setting.

Believe it or not, politicians are often deliberating with the common

good as an end. It is true that rhetoric invoking the common good often masks self-interest, or the interest of a particular group or locality. But realism that stresses self-interest cannot explain how the concern with the common good—which acts as a glue for democracy—came to exist and prevail in some contexts.

When we promote democracy in other countries, we must be careful not to duplicate only the West's highly visible adversary institutions premised on conflict and designed to aggregate or sum individual preferences. We must not ignore our less visible but no less real deliberative institutions. We must encourage others to find within their own cultures traditions that may encourage a quality of citizen deliberation that surpasses that in the West.

The newly democratizing nations thus have two tasks: they must act quickly to foster the aggregative institutions that settle issues of fundamental conflict fairly on the basis of "one person one vote," but they also must provide what is not so common in the West, extensive forums for deliberation in which citizens have a voice in determining the common good.

To legitimate the very hard decisions that it will have to make, any newly democratizing government must first protect its new aggregative institutions from the usual forms of corruption: bribes, stuffed ballot boxes, intimidation, intentional miscounts. We know how to protect the electoral process fairly well, even though sometimes we cannot do it. We know about multiparty monitoring of elections, neutral investigative commissions, and punishments for infractions that are fast and strong. These protections help maintain confidence that the adversary procedure is fair. Such confidence is absolutely critical in a country's first elections. Faith in the electoral process is built on such confidence.

Another aspect of legitimacy in adversary democracy is more problematic. In this conflictual, counting, summing, aggregative democracy, legitimacy rests on the proposition that each citizen should count for one, and none for more than one. But, of course, every democracy admits to gross inequalities in power derived from unequal, often vastly unequal, economic and social resources. As a result, citizens on the bottom of the socioeconomic scale often feel that, as one survey in the United States put it, "people like me do not have any say about what the government does."

In every country on the globe, citizens' political resources differ dramatically. Democratic institutions in newly democratizing nations do not have the same force of tradition behind them that is present in most Western democracies. If the newly democratizing nations cannot create institutions that consciously guard against excessive power among their new elites, if they cannot find ways to spread power, they may find the legitimacy of their decisions severely undermined.

In terms of adversary procedural fairness, we must also realize that majority rule works only in polities with many cross-cutting cleavages. Cross-cutting cleavages exist if, for example, in my relationship to you I am on your side on some issues, but against you on other issues. When majority rule results in certain groups being outvoted again and again on almost all their major points of interest, majority rule democracy will not work. It needs corrective measures, such as proportional representation, or federalism, or something called "corporate federalism," which is devolving power to nonterritorial subgroups to legislate on matters that involve only them, or something that some political scientists have called "consociationalism," which is dividing power and state-provided goods like school and television time in proportion to each group's percentage of the population. Those are absolutely necessary correctives if you have a polity that is segmented and lacks cross-cutting cleavages. If you plan to use straight majority rule, you need a situation in which some may be in the minority this time, but in the majority next time, and then in the minority again, so they can feel "Well, win one, lose one." "Lose one, lose one, lose one, lose one, lose one, and lose one" does not work. Consociational, federal, and other supplements to majority rule still do not provide equal satisfaction to ethnic and other minority groups, but they work better than winner-take-all majority rule.

Adversary democracy creates winners and losers, and therefore combines quite badly with state socialism where there is only one arena in which to lose, since the state runs everything. As state socialist systems begin to adopt adversary democratic procedures, they will need diversified political and economic systems. They will need diversified political systems so that if you lose in one arena you can turn to another arena. They will need a diversified economic system so that "apparatchiks" who lose in politics can become "entrepreneurchiks"—as they are called these days—who may win in economics.

Moving toward adversary democracy means injecting large amounts of risk into previously risk-averse systems. The new democratizing governments will have to learn to live with uncertainty. Accepting uncertainty, losing control over outcomes, and being unable to guarantee the protection of one's personal interests will require an ideological, political, and psychological breakthrough for many citizens and bureaucrats. We all try, above all else, to guarantee the little bit of security we have. Adversary democracy, where you can win one day and lose the next day, means losing that security. People who have had this security through government are not going to be very enthusiastic about losing it.

Institutionalizing continual conflict also requires tolerance of opposition parties. In cultures that are unfamiliar with the peaceful resolution of conflict, it is hard not to see one's opponents as traitors to

the state. If most people with talent and administrative experience have collaborated in some way with an old pre-democratic system, the impulse to blame may breed a rhetoric of character assassination that is bound very quickly to erode the citizens' trust in any existing system of representation. Citizens cannot be weaned from cynicism easily after decades of "facade politics" in which elites determined public policy behind a front of supposedly democratic institutions. And I refer here not only to the countries with which we are familiar, but to our own United States as well. Hungarian voters have already grown jaded. "All they do is make promises," says one. "Those advertisements on television, it is like a cabaret, I do not believe any of them." This is a cynicism born of facade politics.

To counter that legacy of pervasive cynicism, Western forms of aggregation through representation may have to be supplemented. The mostly symbolic device of recall is important because citizens can remove their representatives from the legislature. There are other participatory institutions such as national and local referenda. Most important, decentralizing decisions to the lowest possible level, instituting elections and referenda in schools, workplaces, villages, cities, and counties would provide experience in accepting conflict. As those who run in local elections and those who vote for them learn to lose on some issues but win on others, they should become more able to understand and bear losing nationally.

These procedural methods of adversary democracy are necessary to produce legitimate decisions and conditions of conflict. But they are insufficient to generate the individual transcendence of self-interest that hard decisions often require. Adversary democracy encourages the participants to aim at winning rather than finding a course of action that is best for the whole. It discourages listening and lends itself to short time horizons. Like an economic market, adversary democracy legitimates the pursuit of self-interest. Voters pursue their individual interests by making demands on the political system in proportion to the intensity of their feelings. And politicians pursue their own interest by adopting policies that buy them as many votes as possible.

This system of politics as a marketplace ensures accountability if it works properly, but it also mirrors, and perhaps encourages, a larger materialism. Candidates and their policies become commodities, selling themselves or being sold. The dynamic of adversary democracy has traditionally made democracies incapable of the kinds of sacrifices that many newly democratizing nations must now ask of their citizens. National unity and national sacrifice for long-run ends have instead often required a strong, even dictatorial, leader. And it would be foolish for us to think that it is just an accident that in many of these cases countries have come

together, sometimes enthusiastically, under strong dictatorial leaders. They know that this is one way to produce the kind of unity and sacrifice needed for long-run ends.

But citizens will sacrifice even their lives when they believe their sacrifices are for the common good. That belief can arise not just from devotion to a charismatic leader, but also from faith in policies arrived at through deliberation that command the loyalty of those who participate in creating them. For example, throughout their past struggles, many dissident groups in Eastern Europe held together through institutions that fostered a common commitment to the national good. One of my American friends came back very surprised from talking to members of Solidarity, and told me, "The decision rule there is what is good for Poland." Much of Solidarity, in fact, operated by de facto consensus, making decisions only after the members had worked their way through a deliberative process that tried to encompass widely different points of view. The experience produced unity in the struggle, widespread practical understanding of how to take many interests into account, and consequent willingness to live with the results of decisions.

This bottom-up practice in deliberative democracy may give Poland an edge over the other newly democratizing nations in the use of democracy to make hard decisions. Now Poland has entered into a more classic adversary process and we will see how they play out the tensions between their earlier deliberative process and their new electoral adversary process.

I would argue that whenever possible, participatory institutions should bring together citizens of opposing views in circumstances that reward mutual understanding and the accurate gathering of information. Deliberation among intellectuals, or even elected representatives, is not enough. In the United States theorists have proposed things such as referenda that require two distinct votes separated by a period of deliberation. The first vote would indicate that you favor or oppose a policy on a scale from one to ten, with space to record the various different reasons, followed 6 months later by a second, plain "yes" or "no" vote. The two-stage process would promote deliberation. Other ideas are workplace assemblies, or "policy juries," where a representative sample of citizens meets with experts in the same manner as elected representatives would do, and comes out with policy recommendations that then inform the elected representatives. There are many other institutional means of nourishing deliberation at the citizen roots.

Obviously, each nation must work out the deliberative innovations and the mix of adversary and deliberative institutions that fit its own patterns of cleavage, history, and culture. What we need to do in each country is find a successful indigenous democratic institution and document how it works in that culture. How do the people handle their conflicts? What

are their strategies? Grass roots democracy is essential for learning how to lose, but it must be a grass roots democracy that works, that solves conflict in a way that leaves losers somewhat satisfied.

In a grass roots democracy you learn not only how to lose and how to listen to one another, you can also learn how to move from the deliberative institutions appropriate to moments of commonality to the adversary institutions appropriate to moments of conflict and back again. In the long run, deliberative processes may offer the best hope of finding ways to handle not only the class conflicts, but also the ethnic disputes that threaten to split several of the newly democratizing nations in Central Europe. While consociational and federal solutions can produce reasonably just allocations among groups, shifting citizen perspectives from class or ethnic interest to a long-run common good requires transformations of self that deliberative processes make possible.

ECONOMICS

Sidney Weintraub

My presentation today is about the interplay between economic and political openings and how they operate in a nation's transition to democracy. When I speak about political opening, I mean political democracy. What I mean by economic opening is not necessarily economic growth, which may result from economic opening, but a process of democracy in economic decision making. The basic theme of this presentation is that the kind of opening to come first will depend largely on national circumstances. I think that any attempt at a general rule about sequencing would lead you down a false path.

The main point here is that economic opening—for example removing bias against exports, allowing the market to make more decisions, and giving the central authorities less power to make decisions—need not lead necessarily to rapid political opening. But if, in fact, the economic opening is successful, I am convinced that the pressure will eventually grow for greater political opening. On the other hand, I am also convinced that political opening will lead quite rapidly to economic opening. To put it differently, a closed economy, dominated by state power, is incompatible in most cases with political freedom of choice. This has some policy implications, which I address later.

It is hardly startling to note that political and economic opening interact, and interact quite strongly in ways that I think are not necessarily predictable in the short term. The likely directions, if not the exact outcomes, are predictable, however. I approach these issues as an economist rather than a political scientist; what Jane Mansbridge talked about

is quite important. By "political opening" I mean such things as the ability of different groups to compete, raise funds, place items on the agenda, have an enlightened understanding of issues, access to media, voting equality at decisive stages, and peaceful transitions of power. I was helped a good deal in my understanding by Robert Dahl's book, *Democracy and its Critics*. Dahl talks about "polyarchy" rather than democracy, and I have drawn heavily, but not exclusively, on the political discussion in that book for this talk.

Economic opening means the ability to take private initiatives, relative freedom of imports depending on price considerations of various kinds, and a modest role for the state. No one seriously talks about eliminating the state. State enterprises are quite compatible with economic opening, I think, but not if they result in widespread state trading. Perhaps my point would be best conveyed by some examples rather than by definitions. The Soviet Union today is neither politically nor economically open. The United Kingdom is open in both areas. South Korea is mostly open economically, since despite some state intervention there is no great bias in its import or export emphasis, but the country is only slowly approaching political opening. Czechoslovakia is mostly open politically, but very far from being open economically. Again, my hypothesis is that once you are open politically, economic opening will follow. The political opening cannot survive by itself. It is a telling point that while not all market economies are democracies, I can not think of a single country that is a democracy that does not have a market economy.

Let me go through the sequence in different places and propose some general contextual rules. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, political opening came before economic opening. We are seeing the struggle right now in the Soviet Union over what might happen on the economic side. We are seeing it in Czechoslovakia and Hungary as well. Part of the picture is that protest against political suppression demanded some opening in that area first. In Poland, Solidarity represents a political opening, but not yet an economic opening. Eastern Europe is experiencing that sequencing of politics first and experiencing it quite strongly. If you look at East Asia and Latin America, the sequencing is quite different. There the sequencing was economic first, while the political lagged. It lagged in Chile, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico. In this last case, the collapse of the economic structure has brought about a profound transformation in the economy, but political opening is lagging.

However, neither opening can lag forever behind the other. In Chile it took 16 years for political democracy to be restored, but the pressure was there. Modest political opening is now taking place in East Asia as well. The Mexican government is deliberately seeking to phase in the political opening slowly until the economic opening breeds results. It is

quite clear from the government's plan that part of the motivation is to hold on to political power in what is seen as an inevitable political opening. The official party does not want to lose power; hence, it is holding back political opening. If any of you have observed Mexico, however, you know that the official party has lost full control of the process. The type of activities once used to win elections are less possible in the new context. Therefore, I am convinced that Mexico will need to move faster—now that it has opened its economy—than South Korea or Taiwan had to move.

Let me now try to give some reasons behind particular examples of sequencing. One important factor is whether the initial impact came from above or from below. In Eastern Europe it came from below, and the political opening occurred first. In East Asia and Latin America, political opening came mostly from above. In Korea and Taiwan, and in Mexico, economics came first. Some of the discussion in A.I.D.'s papers on the Agency's regional democratic initiatives make the point that economic development sometimes takes place under an enlightened dictator. There are some cases where this is true, though they are rare. South Korea would not have developed the way it did without Park as leader. Chile would not have developed the way it did after the Allende regime without the Pinochet government. But there are not too many cases of enlightened and successful dictators. It seems reasonable that the particular sequencing of these cases had real impact on the shape of the outcome.

I think, also, that the degree of political suppression makes a difference. In Eastern Europe, where the political suppression was so total, once the shackles came off, a widespread political opening occurred. In Mexico, where the suppression was not as great, as long as you had economic success, the ruling party could hold back the pace of the political opening for a while. In all these cases, a good deal of the pressure came not just because people wanted democracy, although that is part of it, but because the economic system collapsed around them. That is not the case in South Korea. There you are getting, after a long transition, demands for political opening when the economy is doing quite well. Economic collapse cannot be cited as the start of the political sequence in all cases.

I believe that there is likely to be a transference of some important consequences from one kind of opening to the other. When an economy opens and nongovernmental actors make major decisions, a form of democracy is already instituted. Jane Mansbridge talked about politicians treating themselves as commodities selling ideas. It is possible to look at it another way: once the state gets out of the way, private actors have to make decisions. In the case of Latin American economies, where prices and markets increasingly determine the decisions rather than officials and governmental regulations, decision-making power has been expanded from

the center down to thousands, hundreds of thousands, in some cases millions, of decision makers making those decisions for themselves. And that, too, will have a definite effect on the political structure. A political structure may not necessarily open all the way—it may open only for certain groups within that society, such as the middle class or dominant elites. But I do not think that arrangement is likely to prove highly durable in the long run either.

Let me make a few general conclusions, and then draw some policy implications from what I have said. We are obviously now in a time of both political and economic transitions. What happens in one place is infectious. When the rest of Latin America began to move toward some sort of political opening, there was no stopping this movement in Chile, just as there is no stopping it now in Mexico. By the same token, once Chile demonstrated the success of its model of economic opening, followed by Mexico, the infection spread all over Latin America. The only point at issue is the speed of the transfer from one place to another.

I believe that the speed from political to economic opening is almost always more rapid. However, moving from economic to political opening depends on the context, the tradition, the history, the degree of political suppression that previously existed, the general level of education, and a variety of such factors.

What kind of policy implications can we draw from this? What should the U.S. government be supporting? What should A.I.D. be supporting? The first piece of advice is to conclude that any approach has to be country-specific and must depend on the context of what is going on in that country. Second, you can encourage democracy not only by directly encouraging political democracy, but you can also promote democracy by encouraging private decision making in the economic sphere. Indeed, in many countries that may be the best opening that A.I.D. has. I get a little nervous when I read in the newspapers that A.I.D. is preparing the type of democratic conditionality that must be imposed through U.S. foreign aid. I see that discussion coming up over and over again. I do not object to the conditionality; if it will work, go ahead and impose conditions, but if it is going to be counterproductive, it may actually slow down the process. On the other hand, if democratic economic conditions are imposed, it will, in a slow, progressive way, also be imposing the political conditions. The economic conditions may be within A.I.D.'s power to impose, while the political conditions may not.

I think you will find that the conditions for what I am talking about are now extremely good in Latin America because of shifts in both economic and political openings that are taking place in almost every country in the Western hemisphere. The politics have grown far more fragile than the economic opening, and therefore, I would advise A.I.D. to focus much

of its program on economic opening, as this is where the leverage will be greatest. Leverage is less great, I suspect, in Africa because of the different level of economic conditions that exist along with the greater problems of ethnic differences (compared to Latin America as a whole).

My final point is that it will be difficult in most cases, if not impossible, to encourage simultaneous opening. Push for them, but push hardest for that opening where it is clear from the country analysis that leverage is likely to be greatest.

SOCIETY

Philippe Schmitter

I have been asked to address the question of what is a democracy from a societal and perhaps a sociological perspective. I propose to do so by juxtaposing two essentially contested concepts, that of democracy and that of civil society. I do not have a lot to say about democracy, thanks to Jane Mansbridge, who laid out the fundamental parameters of what we mean in her presentation. By "civil society" I mean the presence of intermediary organizations and arrangements that lie between the primary units of society—individuals, families, extended families, clans, ethnic groups of various kinds, village units—and the ruling collective institutions and agencies of the society. All the key properties of civil society hinge on the presence of these intermediaries between the primary units and what could be called the tertiary units of the systems, that is: the governing institutions, the all-embracing and coercive institutions of the society as a whole.

It is doubtful whether either democracy or civil society can be attained, and especially sustained, without the presence of the other, although the sequencing of one with regard to the other seems to provide certain important clues for explaining the long-term outcome. Civil society seems to be a necessary, but alas, not a sufficient condition for the presence of stable democracy. That, I think, is about as general a hypothesis as one is likely to find in the sociological literature.

Inversely, without at least some even unstable democratic practices, civil society is unlikely to persist. Eastern Europe and Chile are the cases that have taught us that it is possible for elements of civil society to survive, in some cases even to flourish, under protracted autocratic and even totalitarian rule, and hence, to precede the advent of democracy. So civil society is likely to have some precedence that may play a causal role in the process of democratization. For example, we observed in a comparative study of Southern Europe and Latin America that it is frequently only after the previous authoritarian or autocratic regime has begun to

"liberalize," that is to say to loosen up its most arbitrary and illiberal procedures, that a resurgence or revival of civil society takes place. It precedes democracy. It is the process or the phenomenon that links liberalization, the mere loosening of arbitrary aspects of autocratic rule, and pushes it into a democratic outcome. But the existence of civil society is not the cause of liberalization in and of itself.

In Eastern Europe the concept of civil society serves a double function. It indicates a somewhat elusive set of "theoretical" or "abstract" conditions that seem to be necessary but not sufficient for democracy to flourish. That seems to be an accepted central postulate of the Eastern European experience. But the concept also serves a second, much more obviously political function. The concept of civil society that is used in Eastern Europe also identifies a set of more concrete historical properties that serve to differentiate European from non- or less-European developmental patterns. In other words, for Eastern Europeans, it resolves in the mind of its users the rather difficult issue of delimiting the eastern border of European civilization. Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, and Balts in particular, are sure they are on the "right," that is, the "civil society" side of that divide. They know that Russians are not and suspect that they will never be. And they are suspicious about their neighbors Romania and Bulgaria. Unfortunately for Yugoslavia, it is possible that the boundary of civil society runs through the middle of the country.

When we talk about civil society and democracy, we must try to grasp both what is being generically referred to and the diversity of possible types within those generic labels. My major hypothesis is that different types of civil society will be, in the long run, associated with different types of democracy. This presentation, in combination with Terry Karl's presentation about types of transition, lays out a fundamental conceptual map of the problem. In other words, there are different types of civil society, and these civil societies undergo differing types of transition, often due to fortuitous events, including contagion from an adjacent country and even from one region of the world to another. Finally, as a dependent variable, one has types of democracy. My central theme is that the countries of Latin America, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and perhaps even the Middle East are not just undergoing a transition to "democracy," but that they are undergoing a transition toward various and different types of democracy. The nature of their civil societies, I believe, is one of the key determinants of the likely outcome.

The intermediary organizations and arrangements that comprise civil society have three general characteristics. The first is autonomy from both the state and from primary groups. In Eastern Europe, the emphasis is obviously on autonomy from the state. Elsewhere, in Latin America, Asia, and especially Africa, the main problem is often the autonomy of civil

society from primary groups, from family groups, or from what we would call in the jargon of various social sciences "clientelistic" relationships that link them to primary groups.

The second characteristic is that the units of civil society have some degree of organizational continuity. They have a "corporateness" that rests on rights and entitlements protected by the state; hence there is no such thing as civil society without the state. It requires state recognition and protection of that corporate status and also the emergence of explicit tolerance between the units of civil society.

There are two basic hypotheses regarding the limits of organizational continuity, especially affecting the central problems of mutual recognition among competing units within civil society and recognition by the state. The first is the problem of social inequality. Is it possible to sustain a civil society when there are gross inequalities, either based simply on material distribution of rewards, or on traditional distinctions of caste or race within the society? With how much inequality between the primary units of the society is it possible for there to be a civil society? The reason some Eastern Asian or Asian societies may have very substantial advantages, not merely economically, but also politically, is the previous existence of land reform in these countries that has reduced some of the grotesque inequalities one tends to find, for example, in Latin America.

The second major hypothesis that comes out of the work of Barrington Moore and others, is that it is very difficult, and one is tempted to say impossible, to imagine a civil society in which coercive force is a major element in the constitution of the productive units of the society. This is particularly true with regard to agriculture. If you have an agricultural system based on semi-serfdom, not to mention slavery, the possibility of developing norms of reciprocal tolerance between competing interest groups or competing intermediaries seems to be severely limited. We do not know exactly what the thresholds for either of these hypotheses are, but we think we know that two factors that contribute to the development of civil society are: (1) the elimination of grotesque inequalities, and (2) the elimination of coercion in production.

Another characteristic of civil society is the capacity for self-governance. These intermediary organizations are political units that more than just aggregate the preferences of their members. They not only represent their interests and make collective demands on others, especially on the state, but they should also be capable of controlling and governing the behavior of their own members. In other words, if you have a civil society, you have units of private governance and of private implementation of policy. This has very important implications for a range of possible developmental policies within those societies.

What are the major types of civil society? In the theoretical literature,

some of which is very old, people have identified the emergence of the notion of civil society with developments within the Church around the years 1000 to 1200. It is a very Eurocentric conception, but there are two major themes in this literature. One emerges out of the Scottish Enlightenment and is best expressed by Adam Smith. The author or originator is in fact a man named Adam Ferguson who wrote the first book on the history of civil society. I call this the "Anglo-American" theme, and I think it is cultural as well as geographic. This is a liberal conception of civil society in which the intermediary units are essentially voluntary associations of individuals. They are quite similar to market forces; people choose the intermediaries that by personal will or interest they prefer.

Opposed to that idea is a concept, much more associated with Hegel, and eventually Marx and Durkheim, and a number of continental European thinkers, that I will call the "corporatist" conception of civil society. It stresses collective units that are frequently involuntary. The *locus classicus* for this is the guild in European cities, particularly continental cities. These are units created and very often sustained by the political authority of the state, that individuals do not choose to join, and that have an involuntary or semi-voluntary, in many cases an outright compulsory, nature. People are either born into them as sons of guild members or must become members in order to practice various occupations.

In the first conception, the idea is that, with the development of differentiated social and occupational structures, multiple, overlapping, and dispersed units will emerge spontaneously from the civil society to compete with each other in highly specialized categories of self-interest. The second conception emphasizes the emergence of singular, monopolistic, hierarchically-ordered organizations that usually emerge in collusion with the state to structure this intermediary space. The code word in political science jargon for the former is "pluralism," and the code word for the latter is "corporatism." The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and in a rather different way, Italy and France, are frequently cited as those with more pluralistic, overlapping, multiple structures. The Scandinavian countries, Austria, Germany, certainly Switzerland, and, interestingly enough, contemporary Spain are countries that have adopted, or rather conformed to, the second model. Both, obviously are ideal types and of course there are mixtures in all of these societies.

The main underlying message in terms of individual countries is not to attempt to force upon a given country a mode or conception of civil society that is antithetic to how its basic institutions have emerged. A very interesting example of this comes out of the American occupation of Germany. The Americans arrived to occupy Germany and discovered a corporatist civil society. They mistakenly thought it was Nazi and therefore tried to dismantle it. It took a while before they discovered that

the roots of these institutions were several hundred years older than the Nazi regime, although the Nazis did a magnificent job of taking them over and using them for their own purposes. Here was a classic confrontation between a well-intentioned, zealous occupying power determined to bring pluralism and democracy to a country that was at its mercy. The end result was that the Americans were unsuccessful and these German roots of corporate civil society took precedence. The Federal Republic is very different from the United States if you compare their interest group structure.

The central problem is whether, and how far, we can take this Eurocentric conception of what we suspect to be a requisite for democracy and apply it outside the European area. We have seen that it serves a convenient function in Eastern Europe in distinguishing the visible, or barely visible, Eastern European frontier. What will this concept have to take on to provide the same "functional equivalent" for stable democracy in sites that are far removed from those in which it originated?

Democracy is obviously a capacious concept that seems at times almost formless and certainly contentless. It has been over-conceptualized, misunderstood, and "under-understood." In the past there has been an incredible proliferation of suspicious adjectives stuck in front of it: guided democracy, tutelary democracy, popular democracy, people's democracy, unitary democracy, consensual democracy, even African democracy, Latin American democracy, and Asian democracy. Usually these have been very thinly-disguised attempts to justify something that was not at all or only remotely democratic. The interesting thing about discussions now is that those adjectives have disappeared. That seems to be absolutely central. I think there is a rather extraordinary consensus about what are called the threshold conditions or the minimal conditions of democracy.

Another thing that has disappeared is something that Europeans had the luxury of pursuing throughout the nineteenth century, what could be called "partial" democracy. One must not forget that Europeans practiced democracy in this somewhat cautious manner and at times had notions that are much more restrictive, particularly of the definition of the eligible citizenry. The French had a term, *deémocratie cencitaire* , that meant democracies that were limited to taxpayers. You had wonderful democracies like Great Britain with 2 to 5 percent of the population eligible to vote. At the time nobody argued that this was undemocratic, and eventually the percentage of voters increased over time. There was also a French term, *démocratie capacitaire*, that referred to a democracy in which you became eligible as a citizen once you became literate or met various other criteria.

These are not options available to contemporary democracies. They cannot just say that only people over 40 years old will be allowed to vote,

or only men, or any of those other criteria that Europeans manipulated, especially in the nineteenth century. Today, crossing that threshold involves the elimination of a wide range of restrictions that Europeans once practiced. There is a Mexican social thinker, who put it very well in a book advocating "Democracia sin adjectivos," democracy without adjectives. He was referring to some rather unpleasant practices of the Mexican regime that put not just adjectives, but unsavory practices in front to limit the possible uncertainties of outcome.

I do not have time here to go into the factors and conditions that are discussed in the paper that Terry Karl and I have written. I think that there is broad consensus on seven criteria defining democracy set out by Robert Dahl in his book *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* :

(1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
(2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
(3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
(4) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government.
(5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined.
(6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
(7) Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

We have added two other conditions to correct one of the problems we find with discussions about the criteria of democracy, namely the concentration on the institutions of democracy itself without regard to the international and broader national context in which it is set. First, you cannot have a democracy in a country that does not control to some significant degree the content and deliberation of its collective decisions. One could have only quasi-democracies in colonies in which the outside colonial power controls the basic parameters and leaves the "natives" to deliberate and to decide minor points after the colonial power has fixed the essential ones.

Second, most definitions of democracy do not pay much attention to what the Spaniards like to call *los poderes fácticos*: the military, the civil service, the church, the various kinds of institutions that may condition the

possible range of deliberation and the possible range of outcomes. Clearly an adequate definition of democracy implies that the minimal procedural rules of fairness that Jane Mansbridge referred to are respected, but also that they are not conditioned by, or limited to, those spheres that the military or some other socioeconomic institutions will tolerate.

There now is relative agreement on the defining conditions of democracy. The adjectives have disappeared and, at least in terms of the definitions of democracy that emphasize procedure rather than deliberation, I think there is a fairly substantial agreement on what they are. Then the question becomes twofold: first, will democracy get over that threshold? Will those conditions be consolidated? Even more interesting in terms of my present research, what type of democracy can one expect to emerge?

Let me say something about consolidation simply to lay out the alternatives, because I think one of them is unfortunately not recognized enough in the literature. The most probable outcome, if you simply project previous experiences into the future, would be reversion to autocracy. If you simply look at the data and mindlessly say that there is no change in these countries, and the probability of Latin America remaining democratic is the same today as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, you feel pretty hopeless. From such a narrow, positivistic perspective, you have to predict probable reversion to autocracy. There are a few countries that have done this practically like clockwork; Turkey, for example, was on a ten-year cycle that you can almost get down to the month. Bolivia was another case, as was Ecuador. Obviously, if you take the past as your example, that is the probable outcome.

Second, I tend to discard, although it is probably important for some in terms of their immediate situations, the persistence of some sort of political hybrid that does not cross the minimal threshold, like the various restricted democracies that the Europeans practiced in the past. In a book I co-authored with Guillermo O'Donnell, we stole one term and invented another, to refer to these hybrids. We called one "dictablanda": "soft" dictatorship or liberalized authoritarian rule. And we invented the term "democradura" or "hard" democracies. These are democracies in which the military, the civil service, or whatever the previous ruling power was, severely control such things as access to the ballot box or the agenda of public choice. For us, these are interim forms. It is very unlikely in the present context that this will be a stable, self-reproducing form of government.

The one that unfortunately looks persistent is the possibility of protracted unconsolidated democracy. Some countries are likely to be condemned to democracy without being able to enjoy it. They are condemned to democracy because the alternative forms of domination are so utterly discredited that they are simply not available given the current

distribution of values and power. But these societies cannot, or have not yet been able to, come up with those famous rules of fairness that Jane Mansbridge referred to, that is, with mutually acceptable conditions for practicing what we call "contingent consent" as the central feature of any viable democracy.

The country that jumps into my mind every time people start this discussion is poor Argentina. And in fact, in European jargon, people in Poland and Hungary talk about the dangers of the "Argentinization" of their transition or consolidation. It is possible that some of these countries now in transition will get over the threshold, but the country will still be a mess. It does not have consensual rule. People do not settle into the routine of an adversarial democracy and they certainly never get around to very much of a deliberative one.

Finally, there is consolidated democracy. The important point here is what type. What I offer you as a first approximation is the "property space" for understanding types of democracy. The literature in political science on types of democracy is generally quite unsatisfactory because it focuses on single types and does not really try to lay out the full range of possibilities. It seems to me that there are two abstract properties to consider in charting the types of democracy. The first is something that Jane Mansbridge stressed: the dominant principle of aggregation or decision making rule. At one end, you have majoritarianism. The idea here is that democracy is a system that relies on equal and fair counting of votes, whether this is the electorate, or the parliament, or the committee room. The inverse, which is much more practiced in Europe, is a form of democracy that Americans might not even recognize, in which you weight the intensities of citizens' preferences rather than simply count their equal votes. Switzerland would be a model of this. Voting makes virtually no difference; as a matter of fact, the Swiss are just as bad about not voting as the Americans. Switzerland is also the only country that I know of in which the turnout is greater for local elections than for national elections. The Swiss are not stupid; the only place where their vote counts is in communal elections, it counts less at the canton, and virtually not at all at the national, so they do not bother to vote. In Switzerland, it is the intensities that are weighted and aggregated, and that makes Swiss democracy the ultra-stable system that it is.

The other dimension is civil society. What is the balance in the system between the state as a source of initiatives and structuring as opposed to a bottom-up conception of democracy based on the complete predominance of civil society over the state? Each country has a different historical mix. Some countries are simply more statist; France jumps to mind if you are thinking about Europe. Switzerland, the United States, and Great Britain to a certain extent, come to mind as countries that are

fundamentally oriented around the institution of "privatism" and civil society.

Let me conclude with two "bottom lines." Countries transit to democracy. Countries consolidate into different types of democracy. Moreover, the type of democracy for any given country is, in most cases, likely to be the outcome of a compromise or an extremely complex set of compromises, and it is likely to be the type of democracy nobody wanted in the first place, that is to say, not the original preferences of any of the actors. Early in the transition some may want an ultra-majoritarian form, others may be preoccupied with the protection of minority rights. And if things work out well, and democracy is consolidated, you will get a compromise. Frequently, the outcome is often a second-best solution, a compromise nobody wanted in the first place, but that people are willing to live with and that they subsequently come to define as fair, even though at the beginning they would have all said, "no, that particular set of institutions and rules is unfair."

The second bottom line concerns the fit between the type of civil society and democracy. You are wasting your time if you try to promote a type of democracy that is fundamentally at odds with the nature of civil society in a given country. I recommended starting with civil society, trying to understand whether there is the possibility for one, and if so what its units are, what the distribution of various kinds of resources across these intermediary organizations is going to be, no matter whether they are unions, business associations, professional groups, or religious brotherhoods.

There is an important distinction between the literature on democracy and the literature on democratization. The literature on democracy fills a library, the literature on democratization fills a shelf. We have libraries full of books about how more or less stable democracies function, reproduce themselves in fairly regular ways, and occasionally change through realigning elections. Sensible ideas about how countries got where they are, even well-established and settled ones, are extremely scarce.

As we work on the problem of democratization, trying to understand the dynamics of becoming a democracy, there is a growing suspicion among many who work not merely in many different countries but even in different areas of the world, that the particular characteristics of institutions within the United States do not provide a viable model for most transitional cases. It is interesting that if you work in countries that are in the midst of a transition, and you talk to people who are making choices, there are two countries to which they are paying much more attention. The one institutional setting that interests people in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and even in Latin America the most is the German constitution. There are certain features—I will not call it a model

democracy—about the mix of institutions of the Federal Republic that is very appealing. Moreover, the Germans are out there promoting that model, too, so it is not entirely just a demand phenomenon.

The other country they pay a lot of attention to, and which in some ways provides the dominant model for regime transition in contemporary terms, is Spain. Spain is emerging, in terms of its reputation—and I think it is a deserved one—as *the* model transition. Latin Americans, Venezuela for example, were pioneers in the use of social pacts. But if you are looking for shortcuts to figure out what people are thinking about, then look into the German constitution and the Spanish transition. If you are looking for a "crash course" in finding out how this relationship between civil society and democracy has worked out and what kind of institutions it is likely to produce, Germany and Spain are the two examples that I recommend.

DISCUSSION

In the time remaining after formal presentations, the three speakers responded to questions from the chair and from the audience.

Charles Tilly suggested that democracy could be conceptualized either the way one thinks of a skyscraper or as one thinks of the weather. The "skyscraper" model of democracy assumes that the phenomenon of democracy has very clear, recognizable characteristics that vary within certain limited parameters. A skyscraper (or democracy) is easily recognizable, whether in Manhattan, Nairobi, or Cairo; one knows a skyscraper (or a democracy) when one sees it. There are only a limited number of ways to build a skyscraper, and a general set of rules for correct construction can be specified. In addition, there are certain conditions that make a given place unsuited for a skyscraper. Democracy, in this view, can be readily identified and promoted.

At the other end of a spectrum, Tilly proposed an analogy with the weather as a model for grasping the phenomenon of democracy. This model looks more skeptically at the prospects for outside intervention to promote democracy. We can more or less understand the weather and its wide variation in different times and places, perhaps even affect it in small ways. However, the most one can reasonably hope to accomplish is to show some ways of coping with variations; no one seriously talks about promoting good weather. It is possible to regard the development of democracy as similarly unresponsive to outside intervention, as something that develops based on tremendously complex and largely internal factors. From this model, the logical conclusion is that outside intervention makes little sense.

Tilly then attempted to rank the three speakers based on his sense of how each would answer the following questions: "Can democracy reasonably be produced short of transforming everything else in the society? Or, in other words, how realistic is it to expect results from outside intervention?" He interpreted the Weintraub presentation as the most optimistic, since a policy promoting economic opening could lead to demands for political participation, protection of minorities, and other political opportunities. Tilly saw Mansbridge's comments as the most cautious. Her distinction between adversarial and deliberative democracy raised a number of potential pitfalls for outside agents trying to promote democracy and highlighted the difference between adopting democratic forms and actually producing democratic participation. Tilly placed Schmitter between the other two, as more ambivalent, keenly aware of how the specific history of a given country's civil society affects prospects for and the shape of democracy. At the same time, however, Tilly found an implication that carefully constructed outside intervention could promote traditions of civil society that would in turn promote democracy.

Tilly then ranked the three panelists based on his perception of their varying answers to another question: "To what extent do we believe that there are many different forms of democracy?" If democracy has essentially only one form, it is considerably easier to decide which countries are moving toward democracy and which are not. A variety of interventions could be devised to promote movement toward the goal. If, on the other hand, there are numerous models of democracy, it becomes more difficult even to identify countries approaching democracy, let alone promote democracy as a goal. Tilly commented that Schmitter seemed to propose "one country, one form of democracy;" that Mansbridge apparently believes in some well-defined conditions recognizable as democratic; and that Weintraub was essentially skeptical, not only of the idea that one universal model could explain democracy everywhere, but also of the idea that democracy truly exists in myriad forms.

Mansbridge responded first to Tilly's comments and clarified a number of points. She largely agreed with Tilly's characterization of her position, but stressed that it was inadvisable to come to a place with a ready-made pattern for democracy and to treat it as "the" plan. For example, she commented that the adversarial institution of elections seemed to tap into a very basic, even "pan-cultural" understanding of fairness. She noted how people throughout the world would often risk death to vote. However, she cautioned that once new elites assume power after elections, it becomes necessary to find ways of continuing to promote a perception of fairness. Her advocacy of various "deliberative" or "consociational" solutions was meant to address this problem. In response to another question from Tilly, she was less optimistic about using area specialists to come up with

specific programs to promote democracy. She worried that such endeavors could simply produce "thousand-page brochures" for how best to promote democracy in each country. In response to a later question from the audience, Mansbridge stressed that grass roots solutions ought to be favored over state-imposed ones and thought she detected an implicit bias toward state-run solutions in the question.

Weintraub, too, essentially agreed with Tilly's characterizations of his presentation. Noting that his task was to focus on the economic aspects of democracy and A.I.D.'s role in the economic arena, he emphasized that in his view, meaningful political participation of any kind—leaving aside entirely the finer distinction of adversarial versus deliberative democracy—would be very unlikely with a state-dominated economy. As for the likelihood of successful outside efforts, he stated that the United States could definitely exert influence at critical moments, but he expressed doubt about the ability of the United States to determine outcomes.

Schmitter's comments first stressed the tremendous dynamism of civil society and the complexity of mechanisms of collective action. He underscored that he did not mean to convey a static model for civil society; the reality was vibrant and always changing. Civil society responds to a variety of internal and outside forces and is in constant motion. Second, civil society influences the state, but the nature of the state, to a very considerable extent, affects the nature of civil society as well. He expressed skepticism about the ability of outsiders to determine outcomes, stating that the majority of choices are mainly endogenous during transitions. Furthermore, exogenous variables are frequently "endogenized," that is, focused through the lens of local conditions.

Schmitter commented that to him it was clear that more than one type of democracy exists, but that it is generally accepted that some limited number of basic characteristics can be identified. However, he noted these minimal conditions tend to be procedural and adversarial; there is far less agreement on the common deliberative elements of democracies. He expressed optimism about the ability of countries to learn from one another and noted the existence of numerous "clusters" of new democracies as evidence of this ability to translate and share experience from country to country. Finally, Schmitter noted that a remarkably common language about democracy is now being shared around the world in areas undergoing quite different transitions to democracy.

One participant commented that the general advice to select intermediary groups with care in order not to force an inappropriate model of civil society onto the host country was good in principle, but extremely unrealistic in practice. She observed that conditions in many countries where A.I.D. works are now in a state of extreme flux. It is often next to impossible to identify fundamental, unchanging societal elements in such

upheaval. Next, she noted a special type of unthinking cultural bias in all support decisions. For instance, as Americans raised on the "pluralist" conception of civil society, we have an inherent tendency to support these types of organizations, regardless of whether a more "corporatist" model might offer a better fit in the host country. Schmitter agreed with this observation.

Another participant noted that much of the theoretical literature on the importance of "cross-cutting cleavages" in divided societies had not been written for areas as deeply divided as those where A.I.D. is now working. He cited African tribalism, Middle Eastern confessional differences, and Asian ethnic divisions as extremely deep, vertical divisions, and questioned the validity of applying theoretical literature largely written about northern Europe to such cases. Mansbridge largely agreed that it was correct to question the validity of such approaches, but noted the necessity of first attempting to apply the theory to see how well it fits a given case. Schmitter then noted that the literature originally written for the Netherlands no longer even applies there today. He stated that no model could realistically expect to remain valid for many decades, precisely because interests in democracies change over time.

A participant made a final comment in the session, urging everyone present to be sensitive to the language being used to discuss democracy. Much of the language used in this session would largely mean the same thing to elites in host countries as it means to the people at the workshop. She cautioned that the same words might have very different meanings for people at the bottom of those societies, however.

Getting to Democracy: Plenary Session II

A RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE

Terry Karl

The questions that are on the table all over the world right now that interest us can be put quite simply: will the recent demise of authoritarian rule around the world, combined with certain efforts at liberalization that are also occurring, lead to democracies that are durable? In other words, will these new experiments last? Second, in those cases where we cannot say, according to some basic definition, that a full-blown democracy exists, such as Mexico and certain parts of Eastern Europe, will those liberalizations continue into some real form of democratization? The third question is will previously consolidated democracies be able to extend the principles of political citizenship and political equality into the economic and social realms in their societies and be able to perpetuate themselves? I am putting forward several propositions that sum up what we do and do not know about democratic transitions.

(1) What social scientists once thought were preconditions for democracy are no longer regarded by many as preconditions and may instead be outcomes of democracy.

(2) The "rules of the game" in democratic transitions may be very different from the rules that operate during periods of "normal politics."

(3) There are many different ways of getting to democracy. Historically, some ways have been more successful than others, but this does not mean that ways that have been least successful in the past are ruled out for the future. In fact, they may become some of the more likely modes of transition in the future.

(4) The way you get to democracy, the "mode of transition," has a great deal to say about what type of democracy will or will not evolve in the future. It has a great deal to say about whether democracies will endure or collapse. The old vision—that everything good comes along with democracy, including economic development, peace, all kinds of civil society—is probably not the case. Modes of transition are characterized by some very real and often painful trade-offs.

(5) The role of external actors in the overwhelming number of democratizations is in fact quite limited. The centrality of local actors and circumstances emerges very clearly from comparing democratizations.

Having put forth these propositions, let me elaborate on each of them. The first issue concerns preconditions. As economists, political scientists, and social scientists, we have put forward a number of preconditions, one of which is that a certain amount of wealth is necessary for democracy. One study of Central America concluded that democracy will not occur until everyone has a per capita income of approximately $250 in 1970 dollars. A country must reach that threshold before it can have political democracy. A whole school evolved that said "These are the economic conditions/preconditions that you need . . . ." These conditions included literacy, urbanization, education at different levels, and they came as a package.

A second precondition was a certain type of political culture characterized by high degrees of trust, tolerance, civil behavior, and so forth. If countries had those kinds of cultures, they would be more likely to develop democracies than if they did not.

A third set of preconditions was based on the historical sequencing of events, on particular historical conditions. In Barrington Moore's version, for example, the argument was that without a landed aristocracy in decline, democracy would not develop. Of course, there are all sorts of other social and historical conditions and sequences that have been put forward as preconditions of democracy.

A fourth, and final set—although there are many more examples—was that external influences matter enormously in the process of democratization. There are two different schools of thought on this. One group, "dependency" theorists, would say that external influences were in fact *not* conducive to democratization. The more that developing countries became linked to the international economy, the more dependent they became on the system of international trade and other transnational and international systems, then the more likely that nation would be pushed toward military rule. These beliefs were very strong, particularly in the late 1960s and 1970s. Another school said, on the contrary, that it was not increased integration into the international system that led to authoritarianism. They put forth a different interpretation that is strongly associated with Samuel Huntington. They argued that external influences were important and most important was the role of the United States. If the United States was strong, political democracies would emerge around the world, but if the United States was weak, you would be less likely to find this taking place.

One of the things that we know now, after watching this enormous

wave of recent democratizations, is that virtually every one of these propositions has been disputed by the evidence from some country. In other words, they just do not hold up. The hypothetical links between wealth and democracy, for example, cannot account for the fact that transitions to political democracy occurred in countries undergoing very severe economic crises, whose per capita incomes were dropping rather than rising. Economic crisis itself, as we heard this morning, may in fact be one of the pushes toward political democracy; therefore the link between wealth and democracy is not as clear as it was believed to be. The arguments about political culture make it difficult to understand why nations with cultures that were hierarchical and Catholic—the same cultures we used to explain the rise of authoritarian rule, such as Brazil and Argentina, for example—now tend to be producing political democracies. The cultures and cultural values are the same, but the countries have switched from one form of rule to another. How can cultures that looked authoritarian and hierarchical suddenly become "civic?"

The preconditions for democratic outcomes based on international influences have not held up very well either. Highly dependent countries are sometimes democratic and sometimes authoritarian. The pattern of the emergence of democracy in Latin America, in particular, raises very real questions about the relationship between a strong United States and political democracies. In the Latin American context, those countries in the Southern Cone, where United States influence has been weakest, have moved much further ahead in the democratization process than the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, where the United States is much stronger. That particular relationship is trickier than many people initially thought.

One precondition has held up relatively well, and I want to highlight it because it has a great deal to say for transitions in agrarian societies. That is Barrington Moore's notion that it is very difficult to get political democracies in countries where the landed class, which is generally the most recalcitrant of interests in a society, has the dominant economic role. This is not just a landed class—oligarchs, landlords, plantation owners, and so on—but also one that uses what we call "labor repressive forms of government." In such countries, it is very difficult to build sustained democracies. The problem is obvious in places like Guatemala and El Salvador today, where those types of agrarian relationships are still very much in play.

All these problems with preconditions suggest that we need to rethink the entire issue of what is necessary to start a process of democratization. They suggest two arguments that many of us are now putting forward. First, there may be no single necessary condition, and there is certainly no single sufficient condition for producing democracy. Second, what we once

considered preconditions for democracy—a certain level of wealth, certain kinds of economic growth, civic cultures, and so forth—may be the products of a long-running democracy. Long-running democracies, through their political institutions, can build over time habits of trust, habits of tolerance, notions of compromise, and political behaviors that are different from the behaviors that led to the construction of the democracy in the first place.

In fact, in my study with Philippe Schmitter, it seems that democracies arise not from these forms of trust and tolerance, but specifically from very uncivic behavior, such as warfare and out of internal social conflicts. Even though many transitions happened relatively peacefully, there was an enormous amount of conflict involved in many of them. Some of these democracies, such as Costa Rica, are the products of warfare. Costa Rica had a civil war in 1948 in which one side defeated the other militarily, and that war was the basis of the kind of democracy that exists there today.

If, indeed, there are no preconditions, and what we once thought of as preconditions are outcomes, the result is that many of us are turning away from large, structural arguments about how to get to democracy and beginning to look at specific calculations, processes, and patterns that are involved in moving from authoritarian rule to democratic rule. Specifically, we are beginning to realize that there are a number of ways to get there, and many of these ways have to do with the kinds of strategic interaction that happen between political actors, military actors, and economic actors, on the left, on the right, and in the center. We are now spending a lot of time on those strategic interactions. By use of the term "strategic interactions" I want to underline something that Philippe Schmitter stated in his presentation: transitions are usually second-best options, they are not what people plan. A group with another agenda, that wants something else—to restore authoritarian rule, for example, or to protect their property, or to have a revolution—realizes in the process that it lacks the strength to impose that vision on the whole society. So, it falls back and accepts a game, if I may put it that way, in which it can win some of the time, but in which losing does not guarantee that it will lose all of the time. If you do not win in the first round, you have a chance to come back and try again and push your vision in another round. Democracy is a second-best option; it happens on the installment plan, which means that there is no grand design. Instead you make your way as you go. The key to that process of building democracy is the notion of stalemate. In other words, no one group is strong enough to impose its vision and will on the society as a whole. There is stalemate, which means you must compromise about the ultimate outcome, and that compromise is the basis of democratization.

I am now going to talk about why transitions are a time of struggle

and uncertainty. What is important here is that democratic transitions are characterized by enormous amounts of uncertainty. All the rules of the game are in flux. Property rights, the role of the military, the role of the political opposition, who will be the political leaders, the existence of labor unions with the right to organize, the existence of peasant organizations are all suddenly up for grabs. We do not know what is going to happen. The absence of predicable rules of the game is key in a transition. Indeed, the dynamics of a transition, what marks it as such, is bargaining between competing actors to begin slowly to establish a new pattern of rules of the game: who gets in; who gets out; which resources will be allowed to be brought into the political process, and which will not be allowed; what happens to winners and losers in round one, and whether the losers will be guaranteed some way to come back later. These decisions, made incrementally in bargaining processes along the way, often in the heat of the moment, will have enormous consequences later for what type of democracy is built.

Another very important point is that these bargains and rules are not made in a vacuum. Even though everything is in a sense up for grabs, certain groups have more power and resources than other groups because of their historical position. Some may be wealthier or have more political support. Groups may have all kinds of resources to bring to bear; you cannot begin with a clean slate. These bargains take place in institutional spaces and settings that are inherited from the past. They are particularly influenced by the nature of the authoritarian regime that was in place before the transition. This means that not all potential bargains can be struck. There are certain things that will not be up for grabs, no matter what.

Let me give you some examples of how this political space is defined, and how it is different in the areas of the world that I am most familiar with: Latin America and Eastern and Southern Europe. The overriding problem that constrains all Latin American transitions to democracy is the nature of civil/military relations in South America. The big problem, the sword of Damocles, that hangs over the Latin American transitions is whether or not the armed forces will tolerate a return to democracy, particularly one that seeks to limit the privileges and prerogatives of the military. That is *the* question in Latin America.

In Eastern Europe, the overriding problem is quite different. It comes instead from the nature of state/civil society relations. Will the state and party apparatus permit elected governments to undermine their monopoly on administrative roles and structures? Will they undermine the possibility of transferring substantial productive resources to private citizens? It is a very different political space, a very different problem. In Eastern Europe it is often referred to as the *nomenklatura* problem; in Latin

America we often call it the "gorilla" problem: what to do with the armed forces.

In Southern Europe, the cases lie in between; transitions face different problems. In Greece and Turkey, for example, the problem was a Latin-America-like fear of what the military would do. In Spain, Franco had already asserted civilian control over the military. This did not mean that the military posed no threat to the democratic transition; the threat did indeed come from certain groups inside the military. But the military as an institution had already been subordinated to civilian rule.

Economic contexts are also extremely different among these regions. In Latin America, the overriding issue again is the enormous social and economic inequalities under which democratization takes place and within which democracy has to operate. In Eastern Europe, social and economic inequalities are much less harsh. There the issue is how to privatize, how to get to some of the growth issues that Latin America has been dealing with for a longer period of time.

Now let me turn to a discussion of different modes of transition, which can be thought of as lying along two different axes. On the horizontal axis is a continuum from force to compromise. By force, I mean transitions that come from above, in which some authoritarian actor or actors already in power tries to design the rules of the game, and say, "This is the way it will be, and if you don't like it, we have force behind us to make sure it will be that way." Other transitions are much more negotiated, not set up unilaterally. On the vertical axis is a continuum between transitions largely designed by elites at the top and transitions more deeply and heavily influenced by the masses. My intent was to design four different modes of transition to democracy (see Figure 1) and to say that each of these modes has a particular set of problems accompanying it that will tell us a great deal about what we should expect down the road.

I am now going to talk about each one of those modes and state some problems associated with each. Practitioners can think about whether the cases they are particularly interested in actually fit this model and whether it is a helpful way of conceiving different kinds of transitions. My first point is that some transitions cannot be neatly located in this space. Poland, for instance, started at the box labeled "reform." With the rise of Solidarity, they moved toward the "pact" box in 1981, then into "imposition" when the military regime said, "We don't like these rules," and back to "pact" in 1989 when the military regime bargained with Solidarity for restricted elections, and finally once again back to "reform" at the bottom when those elections produced a more reformist regime.

The most frequent modes of transition in the past have been some sort of transition from above, either elite transitions or bargains among contending elites. In these transition from above, the "pacted" transitions



FIGURE 1
Modes of transition
SOURCE: Karl, T. (1990) Dilemmas of Democratization *Comparative Politics* 23:1–2.

have beneath them not just small deals struck by politicians, but big, foundational pacts. In most cases, these pacts revolve around four types of agreements. The first is a military/civilian pact, which is the bargain struck between the military and civilians regarding the prerogatives of the military and how the military will be treated after democracy. Amnesty is

a very important issue in that bargain. What happens to military officers who have committed crimes? A second extremely important bargain is one among politicians on what the rules of the game will be. Will the game be presidential? Parliamentary? Majority rule or some sort of proportional representation? What will the rules of party interaction be? If one party is clearly dominant, will it give up a little piece of the game to a lesser party, as happened in Venezuela? A third set of bargains is socioeconomic. This concerns the rules of property. Will you confiscate or not? If you are confiscating, will you give back? What are the relationships between capitalists and labor unions, between private sector associations and labor unions, and so on. Understanding the socioeconomic component of the transition to democracy is absolutely essential. Finally, there are often religious or ethnic pacts that concern how to deal with religious and ethnic cleavages in society.

The combination of these four types of bargains, all interacting, all set simultaneously or at some point along the way, and all feeding back on each other in different ways, are the kinds of bargains that have historically led to durable democracies. Let me stress that elections, as important as they are for transitions to democracy, are not the way the bargains are struck. The elections themselves cannot strike a bargain; out of the bargains comes the decision to have an election. When elections are finally held, certain rules of the game have already been decided outside the electoral arena. The notion that you can simply have elections and resolve the conflict is false; it will not work. What happens along the way is that mechanisms are needed to reduce the uncertainty that characterizes the transitions in the first place. Because elections are so inherently uncertain, you need something in these transitions that guarantees some certainty outside the electoral process.

This in turn means that there is something inherently undemocratic about these pacts, in that they remove certain issues from the electoral arena. In Columbia, for example, a political deal was struck at the end of the 1950s to decide who would be president, who would have political office over an 18-year period. Even if they had elections, it was already decided outside the electoral arena who would be the head of the country. In Venezuela, the political parties signed an accord in which all the political parties fighting for office agreed to implement the same kind of economic programs. Contestation was thus mediated prior to the election since they had all agreed to essentially the same economic program. This reduced the uncertainty of the transition itself, by providing certain guarantees so that the military and economic elite, who may not have wanted democracy in the first place, had enough protection for their vital interests to remove the threat of attempts to undo the democratic process itself.

The "imposition" model has an inherent problem. While it is often the smoothest transition, strangely enough successful authoritarian rule may be the hardest to transform. When there has not been a need to bargain, the rules of the game are set up in such a way that the continuing ability of political institutions to transform themselves is very circumscribed. This means that transitions from above, including, to a lesser extent, "pacted" transitions, share a fundamental dilemma. The very decisions that are made to guarantee having the transition in the first place may make it extremely difficult to deal with the equity issue, with questions of socioeconomic justice, and so on. Trying to bring everyone along so that no one will undo the process and giving sufficient guarantees that vital interests are respected may prevent you from continuing to transform the economic and political rules of the game in a way that creates a more open and just society for everyone. If that is so, and you get what I call the "freezing" of the democratic process, those democracies will be the weakest, the least durable, and the ones that increasingly are less capable of transforming themselves in the direction of greater equity. These are likely to be cases that we will be looking at as democratic breakdowns in the future.

I now present an hypothesis: democracies that are the least likely to survive tend to be those in which no clear strategy of transition is apparent at any given time. By that, I mean cases characterized by some mix of imposition, pact, or mass action with no clear mode dominating at any one time. I do not mean movement from one mode to another, as I talked about earlier in the case of Poland.

Finally, something about the bottom of the graph. In the past, at least in Latin America, the "reform" component of these modes of transition has been least likely to succeed. In the history of Latin America, reformist governments have been the most fragile and have frequently been overthrown, usually by their militaries. This is in the past, in the following sense: an important component of the failed "reform" cases Philippe Schmitter and I investigated in Latin America was the identification of mass movements with communism, with Soviet-inspired actions. The winding down of the Cold War means that it will be more difficult to make an automatic assumption that mass movements per se are linked to external actors that have important security implications for the United States. Cases like Guatemala in 1954, or Chile in 1970 and 1973, may or may not be seen as desirable types of transitions, but the fact remains that there is a very important link between those cases and the Cold War. This link may be increasingly drawn into question, and that may create more space for that reformist model in the future.

Let me conclude with some implications. First, what does all this mean for what external actors can or cannot do? I want to read the

conclusion of a book that is soon to be published entitled, *The United States and Latin American Democracy: Lessons from History*, that looks at transitions to democracy and U.S. efforts to export democracy from the 1920s to the present. The final chapter, written by Abraham Lowenthal, concludes:

> Recurrent efforts by the government of the United States to promote democracy in Latin America have rarely been successful, and then only in a narrow range of circumstances. From the turn of the century until the 1980s, the overall impact of U.S. policy on Latin America's ability to achieve democratic politics was usually negligible, often counterproductive, and only occasionally positive. Although it is too soon to tell, this general conclusion may turn out to be true for the eighties and nineties as well. Despite Washington's current bipartisan enthusiasm for exporting democracy, Latin America's experience to date suggests that expectations should be modest.

Let me explain why I think this is probably true. First, my conclusion comes from our understanding of transitions. In order to establish a durable transition to democracy, the major local forces must be given sufficient room to maneuver. In other words, what we see more and more is that the self-organization of groups into intermediary units that Philippe Schmitter talked about earlier is very important in building a durable transition to democracy. They need to have their own room to maneuver; they need to act on their own behalf, often even counter to the desires and wishes of bigger powers. They need, in a sense, to be able to establish their credentials as authentic groups and not as clients somehow manipulated or directed by external actors. One important implication is what I call a "self-denying ordinance." By this I mean that it is often very important to sit back and refrain from doing the kinds of things that you actually could do at the moment, in the sole interest of allowing the local groups to build certain kinds of authentic credentials on their own.

That does not mean that external actors should do nothing, which is a pessimistic conclusion of this last implication. If you look at the figure, there are some guidelines about what can and cannot be done. What we think we know about democracies is that the ones that have the greatest capacity to endure, and the greatest capacity to transform themselves, will permit as much local expression as possible. That means that to the extent that modes of transition happen first, by compromise, and second, with as much mass participation as possible within legitimately organized intermediary organizations, durable transitions are more likely. Two very important questions for any attempt to help foster democratization are: (1) what can external actors do to encourage compromise over force and (2) what can external actors do to encourage the participation of groups that have not been previously incorporated into the political system under authoritarian rule?

DISCUSSION

Karl emphasized that she opposed both overly simplistic "necessary preconditions" approaches to understanding transitions and the equally fallacious strategy of assuming "all is choice" in periods of transition. For example, she uses the term "structured contingency" to describe a bargaining situation in which different actors bring very different resources and strengths to the table. In Karl's view, a successful pact is predicated on the idea that not all issues are up for grabs in the bargaining process. The first bargain of most democracies is a "pact to make pacts," which is in essence an agreement to remove certain issues from the arena of debate.

Karl disagreed strongly, however, with a suggestion that democracy is primarily a "procedural" issue. While the initial pact may be largely procedural (a recognition that different actors will bargain over certain rules), later pacts are frequently substantive, with enormous consequences for the shape later taken by the new democracy. Examples of such substantive pacts are agreements on property rights or labor relations. The key idea is that the mode of transition to democracy provides very important information on the type of democracy likely to result. She presented a number of hypotheses about the relationship between the initial bargains and the forms of democracy that emerge later:

(1) "Imposed" transitions would likely result in what she termed "conservative democracies" in which the prerogatives of the dominant power are so pervasive that the emerging democracy's ability to continue transforming society and provide increasingly equal citizenship rights is severely circumscribed.
(2) "Pacted" transitions, resulting from bargains struck among a number of actors and organizations, would be more likely to result in a "corporatist" form of democracy.
(3) Bargains involving a significant "mass actor" component would be more likely to result in a "competitive democracy" operating under majoritarian rules.

Each type of bargain has implications for the durability of the democracy and its ability to cope with internal social problems.

A number of participants questioned whether Karl's model had implicit preconditions for democracy. For instance, questioners suggested the necessity of (1) intermediary groups with sufficient strength to discipline their followers, and (2) at least one strong competing group with whom it was possible to strike a compromise or reach a "stalemate." Using Venezuela as an example, Karl responded that at the time of transition the country had neither a well-organized collection of intermediary groups nor

a strong competing opposition. She argued that the process of deal-making enabled organizations to bargain without a strong constituency, building their own followings simultaneously. One participant suggested that Spain also supported Karl's point; at the time of the Moncloa Agreement there were no real trade unions or viable business associations, allowing political parties to sign the agreement. The eventual outcome of the pact was the emergence of a very vibrant civil society in Spain, including some of the most influential trade unions in Europe.

Karl also disagreed that successful transition pacts necessarily required at least one strong competing group. Again citing the Venezuelan example, she commented that a powerful group there had shown wisdom and political insight by not fully utilizing its powers, actually giving up control over portions of the labor unions and ministries to competing political parties. Such far-sighted behavior helped a successful transition by giving outside groups a stake in the system, preventing disillusionment.

Issues in the Transition to Democracy: Reports of the Working Groups

THE RULE OF LAW

John Norton Moore, Chair

Three major points emerged from the working session discussions. The first is the important new trend in the international arena toward acceptance of many obligations that go beyond basic human rights requirements to things that are very much part of democratic governance. These have been discussed internationally as "The Rule of Law," which is very broadly conceived, and hence relevant to the workshop's discussion of democracy and assistance in democratic processes. For example, little noticed by the media, this summer the Copenhagen round of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reached agreement on an extraordinary extension of human rights guarantees. These new guarantees, under the rubric of the rule of law, are really a series of fundamental principles of democratic governance. A logical next step in human rights engagement is now to look seriously at what governmental institutions are necessary to achieve those guarantees in the real world. At present there is a rather extraordinary consensus, with Western and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union all agreeing in essence to supplement the human rights guarantees with a basket of rule of law guarantees that may prove of great importance for transitions to democracy.

The second point is: "What is the core of this rule of law?" Moore acknowledged that every scholar will have a different list, but argued that most lists would include:

(1) *The notion of constitutionalism*—constitutions embody the fundamental compact with the people. They are the highest form of law, to which all other laws and governmental actions must conform, and they should be taken seriously.

(2) *The general principle of accountability*—governments should be democratically accountable to the people. Legislatures and chief executives should be popularly elected under a system that will ensure competing

electoral tickets and frequent accountability on the part of government officials.

(3) *Separation of powers and checks and balances*—Americans take this for granted, yet there is great interest internationally in the concept of separation of powers and checks and balances, not solely among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which is the core, but also through such notions as ombudsmen or bicameral legislatures.

(4) *A series of human rights guarantees*—minimum guarantees that cannot be altered even by a legislative majority. These would certainly include preserving a climate of free discussion and opinion, fairness in criminal process, protection of religious freedom, protection of civil rights, accountability of governmental officials, protection of the integrity of governmental processes, protection of the rights of workers, civilian control of the military, protection of the environment, and protection of economic freedom and entitlements.

(5) Finally, *limited government and federalism*—and as a separate point that takes different forms in different democratic societies, *a strong judiciary*. In the American experience, an independent judiciary is capable of acting as a check on the other branches with respect to fundamental constitutional concepts, the separation of powers, the rights of individuals, and the integrity of the overall electoral process.

The third and final point is the core of the policy debate: To what extent should a government have an active program to share its experience in rule of law or democracy-building with other countries? Participants agreed that one should not simply crusade "to make the world safe for democracy," and that there are a variety of naive programs that could be proposed in this area. One needs to be careful to avoid simple cultural imperialism and imposing dysfunctional structures in settings where they may not make sense. However, some also argued that there is a strong case for well thought out programs as a significant part of U.S. foreign policy to share on a voluntary basis the American experience in rule of law and constitutionalism. Criticisms that efforts at rule of law and democracy-building reflect peculiarly American values may in fact themselves be a form of disguised chauvinism. That is, in some cases they may not reflect accurately the extraordinary range of international support that exists for many of these principles. For example, the principle "of the people, by the people, and for the people" from the Gettysburg Address seems peculiarly American, but comparative constitutionalists know it is a fundamental principle, in exactly that language, of the French Constitution. The concept of property rights that Americans stress is a fundamental principle of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. In short, there are fundamental principles of good governance that are internationally shared,

just as the international community has found a variety of broad common principles with respect to human rights.

A second point in support of the same general conclusion is the extraordinary interest around the world in the American experience in rule of law and constitutionalism. Moore described his experiences in participating in the constitutional drafting process in Namibia, noting the strong interest in the American experience from virtually every faction involved. He concluded that if one regards this as technology transfer, it is striking that the United States should be willing to transfer agricultural or steel-making technology, yet at the same time be reluctant to share on a voluntary basis what it regards as the fundamentals that actually make its system function.

INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES FOR DEBATE, CONSENSUS, AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Michael Mezey, Chair

The working group discussed national political institutions that in most countries symbolize commitment to democracy: legislatures and political parties. In discussing the functions of legislatures, the group addressed a traditional question in political science: how much power does a legislature need in order to be viewed as a true legislature? The particular question concerned budgetary power and whether it was necessary for legislatures to have the power to restrain the extractive power of the state and to restrain the capacity of the executive branch to tax and to spend money. Mezey argued that not all legislatures had such powers, and that such powers were not required to deem a legislature "real." Other participants thought that legislatures needed to have exactly those sorts of powers. They agreed that U.S. strategies need to involve both strengthening legislatures, perhaps through activities such as support for training legislators and developing greater degrees of public policy expertise.

The group discussed political parties and their particular role as a democratic institution in encouraging democracy. In particular, it discussed the functions of political parties, their role in representing the diverse interests in particular countries, in recruiting new elites to government power, in public education, and in legitimizing political decisions. Ideally, political parties embody the idea of collective responsibility for public policy, encourage processes of coalition-building, and reduce the incidence of political opportunism. The group observed that in many countries, strong political parties were the major institutional alternative to military domination. Such parties have the capacity to restrain military elites. This

raised a number of questions, such as whether it is appropriate for organizations such as A.I.D. to support political parties, and if so, what form such support should take. For example, programs might help parties develop basic skills—organizational development, candidate education, or issue research, or work more broadly to support the mechanisms that permit parties to develop. Some argued that supporting particular political parties raised a range of difficult, sensitive questions, whereas supporting a recognized governmental institution, such as a legislature, is an easier task.

Participants also considered what types of political parties should be supported. Some political parties, narrowly based or highly ideological, reinforce internal divisions within the country and may make nation-building and democratization more, rather than less difficult. While it is reasonable to believe that supporting political parties can serve an integrative function by bringing people together and that broad-based parties may have a very positive influence, some argued that in many countries it is not clear that such party organizations exist, that they can exist, or how they can be supported.

The group ended with the interesting question of supporting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as interest groups. Some participants questioned whether this would be a wise strategy, suggesting that interest groups, to the extent that they encourage the articulation of narrow, parochial, specific interests, or make the aggregation of interest into public policy more difficult, may not be the best organizations to support. The group did not recommend that they be discouraged, but that resources might be better spent on creating institutions of what political scientists call "interest aggregation" that can bring people together behind public policies. Mezey commented that he felt the current American political woes—rapacious interest groups, opportunist legislators, a Congress that seemed unable to make fundamental decisions about governing—influenced their discussion. He felt that this had a healthy impact on the group's discussions as it considered whether to recommend transplanting the American model or holding it up as a paradigm. The current state of American political problems encouraged greater openness to thinking about other nations' models.

INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OF STATE POWER: POLICE AND CIVIL/MILITARY RELATIONS

Louis Goodman, Chair

Understanding how the military, police, and judicial systems function as institutions is critical for advancing democratic processes. This group consensus can be seen as a recommendation for A.I.D. or others to support research as well as direct program activities. The group endorsed Terry Karl's point about the need to have a civil/military pact to enable the process of democratization to continue. Goodman argued that there are numerous examples of explicit pacts forming the foundation for progress in democratic transitions, all of which had to do with relations between political society and the coercive element of the state, namely, the military. The group disagreed about mechanisms of how to continue this civil/military pact and keep the military in check. Some, including Goodman, thought that it would be useful to have training for civilians in oversight of the military, such as occurs in the American congressional system. Others argued strongly that this was inappropriate for many historical and cultural reasons, and that the United States should support development of a self-governing professional military, as now exists in Europe.

Participants agreed, however, that the most appropriate role for the military in any country is to provide for external security. It is a serious mistake to look for nonexternal security roles into which the military can expand, such as the provision of education, building of roads, providing for public health, and public works. The group also concurred that it was important to reinforce the separate roles of other elements of state power, such as the police, which play a very different role than the military.

The group discussed how to prevent the military from taking on inappropriate roles and from reassuming explicit or de facto control of government. Participants thought it was important to extend the basic pact to include discussion about how to reduce the size of military forces, and felt it was essential to consider how to move existing officers away from positions in which "they could think about inappropriate role expansion." Participants agreed that it was important to encourage the military in its most appropriate role—preparing for future wars that one hopes will never be fought—and that it was useful to look for regional international security roles or other collective security arrangements that might duplicate Europe's success with NATO.

Some participants suggested that an appropriate role for military officers would be to manage quasi-state organizations, since many officers have very impressive managerial skills. How to move officers into the

private sector, perhaps via a "golden parachute," deserves more exploration. Goodman commented that there are many cases of military officers moving honestly and successfully and playing very important roles in the flowering of private sectors in developing nations. He argued that people tend to forget that some significant entrepreneurs once were military officers, and that their skills are often readily transferred. One way to convince the military to do this is to defeat them. Another is to buy them out, a time-honored process that has been used with many kinds of civil servants.

The group also discussed the importance of the judicial system in its relationship to state power. Participants agreed that the judiciary cannot possibly operate effectively without a strong civil/military pact that permits the judiciary to exercise its functions.

The group next discussed internal and external influences on civil/military relations and agreed that internal, domestic influences were generally more important. Goodman suggested that both internal and external influences might be necessary but may not be sufficient in particular circumstances. A very important point to remember for effective external influence is consistency. Some suggested this has been a problem with U.S. policy in the past. This means not just inconsistency over time, but instances in which the same host-country nationals received different, contradictory messages in the same year. While the group agreed that one should be very leery of the role of external influences, and be very humble about the potential impact that the United States might have, Goodman noted that external influences may, from time to time, play a critical role in tipping the balance. The policy dilemma for the United States is when it should and should not try to exercise that influence.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Carol Lancaster, Chair; Taryn Rounds, Rapporteur

The first issue addressed by the group was the definition of democracy. How should it be measured and operationalized? Among the measures suggested were an open and just society with a focus on rules and procedures, a culture of openness, and the elements of governance.

The next question discussed was why A.I.D. should be concerned with democracy as opposed to continuing with its economic development programs. The group agreed that there were links between democracy and sustained economic development, and that although they are not necessary conditions for each other, they are reinforcing processes. Democracies tend to keep markets more honest, they are more fair and just, and there

are human rights reasons to support them. Moreover, as Jane Mansbridge has pointed out, democracies seem to be involved in less war, fighting, and aggression with each other.

One important point was that although democracy and economic development might complement each other in the long run, during a transition there could be severe short-term conflicts between them. For example, economic stabilization and structural adjustment tend to be very painful. In a democracy, there is more likely to be resistance, and it may be more difficult for the government to cope with the opposition and carry out its policies.

The group addressed how to support democracy, and whether there are trade-offs between economic development programs and ways to promote democracy. Participants generally agreed that there are not necessarily trade-offs between trying to do both. Participants also recognized that A.I.D. is an external influence, with real limits on what it can do to promote democracy. Moreover, democracy is not the only American objective, but one of many, and economic development will remain first and foremost in what A.I.D. is trying to do.

The group discussed promoting democracy by supporting intermediary groups, particularly indigenous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but was sensitive to the need to distinguish among such organizations as candidates for American assistance. Support for the growth of procedural rules, constitution-building, and specific democratic initiatives was another option. This can be difficult, because it requires host-country support, which those currently in power might be reluctant to give. The group also agreed that A.I.D. could promote democracy through its ongoing programs by focusing on specific democratic objectives. One participant cited education programs that empower people and have a positive impact on both promoting democracy and the economy. The group agreed that the United States could try to distribute funding based on formal criteria of a country's movement toward democracy. Again, however, participants questioned how A.I.D. would measure democracy, and how this objective squares with others. Another suggestion was to support policies and programs to improve equity—even though it may entail economic trade-offs—because it could promote a more stable democracy.

Finally, the group agreed that any actions by A.I.D. must be situation-specific. For example, in Eastern Europe political reform is already underway and the urgent need is for help with economic development. Other countries, such as Chile or Korea, are going through economic reform, but political reform has been slow to follow. On a final note, the group agreed that it is not a question of whether there is a relationship between economic development and democracy, or if the United States should promote democracy, but how and how not to accomplish that goal.

MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMIC REFORMS AND DEMOCRACY

Joan Nelson, Chair

The group began with the premise that although in the long-run there may be strong complementary relationships between political pluralism and market-oriented economies, the process of moving from statist to market-oriented economies, and from more authoritarian to more open political systems, creates the potential for significant conflict between these two processes if they are occurring simultaneously.

Overall, the discussion covered two broad sets of ideas. The first concerned the potential and the limits of market-oriented reform for promoting democratic development. In many countries, the development community in general, including the United States and A.I.D., are pushing market-oriented reforms. The group discussed some of the mechanisms linking market-oriented reforms to the process of opening up political systems. Moving from a situation where governments monopolize or heavily dominate jobs, contracts, and production in a great many areas to a more diffuse pattern breaks the link between livelihood or economic security and support for the current political regime. This also opens up the possibility of financing both for autonomous interest groups and for opposition political parties. It may also shift the emphasis of interest group activities from trying to look for special favors from bureaucrats to engaging in a more open public dialogue directed at altering policy.

This shift also changes the nature and the extent of corruption in societies. A great deal of corruption in many developing countries is linked to the pervasiveness of government controls over, and political/bureaucratic manipulation of, resource allocation. Nelson commented that it had occurred to her later that reducing the level and pervasiveness of corruption also has a great deal to do with increasing the legitimacy of government.

This particular set of mechanisms that link market-oriented reforms to promoting democracy has some clear limits. Participants noted that the groups that are most likely to benefit from market-oriented reforms are those that are better-off—in general, the elites, semi-elites, and at best the middle class. Economic benefits are not equally shared and that clearly has political implications for democracy.

The group explored whether the particular design and pattern of fiscal reforms have implications for democratic openings. That is, under the broad umbrella of market-oriented reforms and of measures needed to stabilize economies that have been suffering from inflation and from persistent and very severe budget and balance of payments gaps, the precise design may make a big difference in terms of repercussions for democratic development. One can start with the goal of economic reform

and economic stabilization, but still refine the means to try to take into account implications for democratic development. Charles Tilly, in an earlier discussion, put forward the proposition that means of raising revenue that are "transparent"—where citizens see very clearly what they are paying and to whom, such as income tax—are likely to create situations where governments must bargain with the people represented through parties, through interest groups, or in legislatures. This led the group to the proposition that the measures that are perhaps economically most effective or administratively easiest for solving particular economic problems may not be those that are most conducive to democratic development. That thought seemed particularly important in light of the fact that many transitional governments tend to be weak. Hence, in weighing these various objectives, one must often take into account the weakness of government, rather than its strength.

The group's second set of issues dealt with the ways in which the simultaneous efforts to consolidate democratic transitions and move toward more market-oriented economies may conflict. Nelson made the personal observation that she sensed a real questioning of the notion that political opening almost always leads to economic opening. Rather, she felt the group discussed a number of ways in which democratization might pose obstacles to promoting market-oriented reforms. For example, the point was made in the summary of Carol Lancaster's session that market-oriented reforms, as well as macroeconomic austerity measures, create hardship for many groups that can be threatening to fragile governments.

Another type of conflict arises from the fact that market-oriented reforms often have or appear to have the effect of undermining equity or equality. This is clear in Eastern Europe, where one of the major political obstacles to going ahead with some market-oriented reforms is the inequalities and insecurities that would be created. But the same kinds of concerns are also true in many other parts of the world where, for example, removing subsidies on basic commodities, or price controls more generally, are viewed by some parts of the population as threatening equality.

A third kind of conflict concerns the process of consolidating democratic openings, particularly decentralizing power. Nelson offered one of the conclusions from research that she and a group of colleagues have been doing on the politics of adjustment: virtually all effective economic reorientation and adjustment programs in the 1980s entailed a high degree of executive centralization and a rather autocratic style of decision-making. That was true even in the several democracies that have carried out considerable market-oriented reforms. There may thus be a tension between the short-run political requirements for certain kinds of economic reform and pressures for decentralization as part of the democratization process.

The group's discussion underscored the need for not comfortably assuming that all good things go together, for looking closely at interactions, including potential conflicts between democratization and market-oriented reform. Such an examination could have implications for A.I.D. programs and also for broader U.S. policy with respect to issues such as debt, trade, and other aspects of foreign economic policy.

INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTIONS THAT OPERATE BETWEEN THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: UNIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, INTEREST GROUPS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES

Michael Bratton, Chair

The group discussed the range of institutions that operate between the state and its citizens, in the realm that has come to be known in this workshop as "civil society." The first point to make is that civil society is a contested territory, with a number of competing visions of what civil society can be like. One is the corporatist vision, in which the state gives structure to the representation of interests. Another is a pluralist vision, in which a diverse body of citizens express their interests. And although never explicitly stated, the discussion revealed that there was also a communalist vision of civil society, in which basic social solidarities structure organization and affiliations. For example, the group discussed the influence of clans and patron-client networks in organizing the way that people come together and associate.

Bratton suggested that a debate was emerging in the workshop between the ideas best represented by Philippe Schmitter and John Norton Moore. Schmitter offered a sort of culturally relative view of civil society and democratic processes, while John Norton Moore advocated a universalist perspective that cuts across different cultural conceptions. Participants were ambivalent about the two arguments. On the one hand, the group discussion reflected a belief that a plural civil society, one based on individual self-interest and cross-cutting ties, is most likely to contribute to a democratic transition. This included associations that display certain key characteristics: open, voluntary membership; a membership base that cuts across existing social cleavages; the election of leaders within associations; deliberation about group action; universalist, rather than self-serving goals, such as human rights as opposed to a particular economic interest; and a sustainable institutional structure, especially at the local level, but also possibly federated up to the national level. The group's general discussion was within the framework of the pluralist model.

On the other hand, the group also discussed the paradox of pluralism:

that in fact pluralism, under certain social and economic conditions, can be a threat to democracy. Embedded in the promise of pluralism is also the threat of particularism. Pluralism promotes contestation; democratic processes thrive on contestation, but where states are weak, and where societies are divided, pluralism can be a force for political instability, rather than for political development. Particularly in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, the big question is "Can the center hold?"

The working group members did not agree about whether intermediary associations should undertake political advocacy. One view was that there is a natural progression from the articulation of particular economic interests by a group through policy advocacy in that particular economic sector, to broader concerns with governance for the political unit as a whole. Another view stressed that horizontal linkages among organizations within civil society were more important than vertical linkages between local associations and national policy. These could be people-to-people linkages at the grass roots level, or linkages between citizens and intellectuals, for example through promoting independent policy analysis centers.

Some participants expressed concern that if associations became active in policy advocacy, the middle classes would benefit first since the wealthiest are the most likely to organize. The mass of people would be excluded yet again. Some participants also argued that intermediary organizations should be considered primarily as alternative mechanisms for service delivery, rather than as agencies for political advocacy. There was agreement, however, that intermediary organizations are the building blocks of political parties. Some suggested that it may be better to encourage political parties to undertake the advocacy role, echoing Michael Mezey's earlier argument that it may be more conducive to democratic stability to have aggregate policy platforms, rather than a cacophony of special demands.

Finally, the group discussed the appropriate role for A.I.D. in relating to intermediary associations. Participants considered both the policy level and the project level. At the policy level, the point was made that A.I.D.'s strength is really in government-to-government relations, rather that government-to-NGO relations and that there was room for A.I.D. to broaden the policy dialogue with recipient governments to include more explicitly the question of strengthening the environment for civil society. Issues that might be raised in government-to-government negotiations include: the enforcement of existing constitutional guarantees, particularly the freedom of association; the simplification of registration and reporting procedures for various types of association, whether they are cooperatives, welfare societies, or nonprofit companies; and the creation of tax incentives, for example to encourage corporate and individual giving to associations.

At the project level, participants put forward a number of suggestions. One participant suggested that public opinion polling was a relevant activity since polling gives an independent voice to an otherwise silent public and has the added advantage of strengthening local research institutions. Others argued that pre-election polling in the third world has turned out to be notoriously inaccurate, citing Chile and Nicaragua as recent examples. Moreover, intermittent polling cannot substitute for permanent associations that can speak for themselves over the long run and between elections. Participants also expressed interest in subnational political units, both governmental and nongovernmental. Some of the discussion revolved around whether support to improve the administrative capabilities of municipal councils might be appropriate. Participants agreed that A.I.D.'s best approach to intermediary organizations was to continue working with U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Some suggested more exchanges and grants made in the cultural area, for example in promoting sports and artistic endeavors. Associations need not be explicitly political to accomplish a contribution to the transition to democracy. The mere existence of associations populates and pluralizes the institutional environment. They provide citizens with a choice in selecting where to affiliate themselves, and choice, the participants felt, was at the essence of democracy.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF DIVIDED SOCIETIES

Eric Nordlinger, Chair; Jo Husbands, Rapporteur

The group limited its discussion to a particular type of divided society: those countries in which political participation and political contests tend to take place along ethnic, religious, cultural, or racial lines. The group considered only those societies in which the different competing groups were actually participating, in contrast to societies in which some groups are completely outside the political process, such as the Indians in Guatemala. The distinction was important because it meant the group started out with bad news. If one looks at the approximately two dozen transitions to democracy that have been attempted or completed since the mid-1970s, at most only one quarter of those have been deeply divided societies. By and large, deeply divided societies have been left out of the recent wave of democratization.

Trying to understand what it might take to foster democratization in divided societies led the group to discuss a number of issues and problems. One problem was a genuine dispute about the importance of cross-cutting cleavages. A participant offered the widely accepted idea that it is better if people have a variety of identities, so that no single identification

dominates. Someone countered, based on research by Donald Horowitz and others, that there is strong evidence that it is extraordinarily difficult to break ethnic identification as the primary and most powerful identification. Promoting cross-cutting cleavages as the basis for eventual democratization may be thus much easier in theory than in practice. What would it take to create other kinds of identities that could mediate or mitigate the primary identification of tribe, race, religion, or language group?

The group spent considerable time talking about divided societies that have been relatively successful in moving toward democracy. All of these transitions have involved ways of sharing power among the major social groups. This emphasizes the importance of creating structures to provide "rules of the game" for divisions of power. These arrangements have taken a variety of forms; in Nigeria after the civil war, for example, the new federal structure deliberately tried to create balances of power among the groups. Whatever the formal arrangements, some cautioned that what may matter most is various groups' perceptions of their power relative to one another.

The group's final set of arguments concerned whether it is possible to create these power-sharing arrangements in anything but a "top-down" manner. That is, was one necessarily talking about elite bargains? Some participants argued that one could see negative roles for individuals—communal strife, violence—but that without effective organization, it was difficult to envision individuals playing a positive role in moving toward political arrangements or bargains at the social or political level that would allow representation and ease ethnic strife. The idea that the only hope might be to strike bargains at the elite level was not a comfortable notion for some people in the group. Participants agreed about the need to explore what, if any, kinds of bottom-up mechanisms and inclusive policies would best serve the interests of fostering democratic processes in these kinds of societies.

WHERE TO START IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "TOP-DOWN" AND "BOTTOM-UP" DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL CULTURES

Pearl Robinson, Chair

The group began by offering a new analogy to add to the "skyscraper" and "weather" models proposed by Charles Tilly—creating a green belt in the desert. This process would begin by stabilizing the sand dunes, planting scrub brush as a first step in creating an environment that can

sustain larger species of plants. Next would come bushes and small trees, then larger trees, and eventually forests could be created. In the process, climate changes increase the humidity and truly begin to create a forest environment where there once was a desert. Robinson suggested that one ought to look at the process of democratization as one that requires the creation of an environment that can sustain different kinds of institutional behavior.

A major question for the group was whether A.I.D. has a comparative advantage in trying to involve itself in bottom-up approaches to democratization. Some people suggested that A.I.D. was not very good at "retailing" its services, and that the agency has been in the process of shifting from project aid to program assistance. If that is the case, bottom-up approaches would be better left to other agencies. That led to another question: Since democratization is a new initiative, is A.I.D. compelled to do business as usual? If not, serious consideration should be given to the management implications of bottom-up approaches.

The group decided that successful democratization would require a mix of bottom-up and top-down approaches. Participants agreed that it was more useful to think about multiple points of entry for the initiative. Work might be needed to support grass roots organizations, but at the same time, one should address basic policy issues such as the administration of justice, access to the market, and what could be done to create an appropriate legal framework that enables grass roots groups like water-users associations to survive and function more effectively.

Participants agreed on the need to broaden the understanding of the roles and functions of NGOs in societies with which A.I.D. is concerned. Historically, A.I.D. has tended to see PVOs as a service delivery system to meet economic needs, but in the context of civil society NGOs have a crucial role in democratization. Here the group drew a distinction between U.S. NGOs, which are usually called PVOs and indigenous nongovernmental organizations that are involved in development work, as well as other areas such as human rights and "know-your-rights" legal work that are relevant to democratization initiatives. Participants agreed on the importance of not assuming all NGOs are equally worthy of support and on the need to examine internal decision-making structures and what these organizations are doing that may be relevant to democratization.

The group talked specifically about the crucial role that religious organizations, such as the Catholic Church in Latin America, can play in the process of democratization. Islam, on the other hand, tends to have a bad or antidemocratic name in the American press, since people tend to focus on Islamic fundamentalism. Robinson argued that in many societies Islam is playing or can potentially play an important role in fostering democracy. She cited the example of Elma Gali from northern Nigeria,

a Muslim scholar and teacher who settled in Kano in 1492. He wrote a treatise on how a good Muslim ruler should govern, titled "The Crown of Religion and the Obligations of Princes," that includes discussions of the leader's obligation not to separate himself from the people. In northern Nigeria, this treatise became very important in the creation of political parties, in efforts to get the right to vote for women, and even in convincing the government that it should encourage education for young women. In Niger, when the military government decided to start promoting Islam, it had scholars translate this document from Arabic and encouraged discussions in universities and in Islamic associations. It became a basis for evaluating the performance of the military government in a language that the military government itself had sanctioned. Islamic organizations thus can also be a vehicle for promoting values that support democratization.

The group briefly discussed education in terms of bottom-up strategies. Certain types of educational programs are more likely than others to support democracy, for example, creating elites who will be able to function in the new institutions. Literacy programs, frequently in indigenous languages, give people at the bottom level skills and tools that allow them to communicate politically and in such ways that may contribute to supporting democracy.

This discussion led to the issue of ownership: "Whose democratization is it?" If A.I.D. adopts a democratization agenda, what are the incentives it can offer to persuade the leaders of a country to support it? As with economic reform, democratization may mean that the leaders lose their jobs. Again, the group agreed that one needs to think in terms of points of entry, of where to build some sense of ownership of the initiative within the country. Without that, its life span will be that of A.I.D.'s initiative. Some participants commented that opting for a bottom-up approach to develop a sense of ownership might restrict A.I.D.'s points of intervention. In the NGO community, a series of north/south dialogues is currently under-way between American and European NGOs on the one hand and southern countries' PVOs on the other. In these dialogues, pacts are being negotiated about the nature of the relationship between northern nd southern NGOs. Some pacts include stipulations that aid to southern being PVOs should not come with political strings attached. For example, in Latin America many NGOs want nothing to do with political parties. The results of these negotiations may put significant constraints on a bottom-up approach to democratization.

Participants favored linking aid to certain political conditions, so that if the country violates those conditions, aid is cut off. There was concern that political conditionality might undermine any potential for the success of a democratization initiative. If the United States is defining the

conditions, then it becomes very difficult for the country to feel ownership of the democratization. The United States also becomes open up to accusations of cultural imperialism. Moreover, if a country fails to meet the stipulated conditions, and aid is cut off, it is not clear that democratic outcomes can be anticipated. Participants finally agreed that the goal of criteria that must be met is important, but U.S. policy makers must address the question, "How do you create the desired effect with different mechanisms?" Several other suggestions emerged, such as relying on U.S. citizen lobbies to push for aid cut-offs to countries that have been involved in especially egregious abuses. Another suggestion was the importance of supporting a proliferation of human rights monitoring groups within countries so that one has internal groups working in tandem with external groups such as Amnesty International. Overall, some suggested the best goal would be an external/internal "pincer" movement for dealing with political conditionality, rather than an Agency check list.

The group debated the advisability of capitalizing on traditional institutions as a way of promoting democratization. There were very strong objections or at least reservations raised that these institutions may be operating with values that are antithetical to the ones that the United States would like to promote. Others cautioned that, as Americans and Westerners, outsiders sometimes look at traditional institutions and miss the implications of what is occurring for social transformations. Robinson endorsed Jane Mansbridge's call for comparative field research on deliberative democracy to attempt to document, in a number of societies, how people resolve conflict. What institutions do they have, what are they doing? A better understanding of these sorts of institutions and mechanisms could provide a sense of how bottom-up, indigenous institutions can link up with this initiative and begin to lay the scrub brush for democratization.

Comment and Synthesis: Plenary Session III

OVERVIEW

Charles Tilly

In case anybody thought otherwise, we are not going to leave this meeting with a clear, illuminated, unambiguous set of rules for identifying democratic processes, much less for promoting them. We who have not been involved in A.I.D. activity have probably come to a realization that was not as clear until these discussions began: there is a very sharp dilemma that faces any public agency involved in the work of promoting democratization. Clearly, the consequences of any intervention, given the present state of our knowledge, are limited and partly unpredictable. This is an uncomfortable position to be in, although a common one in public policy. If there is anything that the discussions of the last day or so have promoted, or ought to have promoted, it is some sense of humility about the extent to which we as American experts and activists and agents of the state can actually make a difference and about the extent to which we can predict the outcome. That is one side of the dilemma. It is a genuine dilemma because it is also true that the American state, arguably the most powerful state in the world militarily, diplomatically, and economically, continues to act in the world arena in ways that will significantly affect the prospects for democracy in different parts of the world. While it is convenient for us academics to say, "Well, we don't know enough, let's forget about it," or "Let's do more research," it is more of a problem for A.I.D. that the United States continues to act. Trade policy, the writing of constitutions, military assistance, diplomatic initiatives, especially those involving others than the current representatives of the state, as well as assistance programs of various kinds, all have a significant, often indirect effect on the prospects for democracy in the future. At a minimum, by undertaking an initiative for democratization, you have taken it on yourselves to think through and perhaps even act on the effects on democracy of a wide range of American actions. The kind of understanding of democratization that we are coming to in this meeting implies looking closely at the consequences of actions of other divisions of the government over which A.I.D. itself has little or no control.

Nonetheless, this is actually a rather good time to be talking about democratization. It is a good time because changes in the international system are aggressively and inevitably placing the political futures of a large number of states on the agenda in the way that they were not 20 years ago, or even 10 years ago. Decisions made in the next few years in Eastern Europe, in Latin America, in the Middle East, and elsewhere will significantly affect the prospects for democracy in those areas. Again, those are not A.I.D. decisions, but they are ones about which all of us have to care a great deal. This is a moment of volatility; those of us that have been thinking about and dealing with Eastern European changes discover our Eastern European counterparts eager to talk about the very same subjects that we have been discussing here, far removed from Prague, and Warsaw, and Budapest, and Moscow. Not only are they eager to talk about them, but eager to devise policies, try experiments, reorganize their governments in the light of ideas drawn from other experiences. Indeed, one of the problems that we have faced repeatedly is the sometimes over-eager readiness of our Eastern European counterparts to import a model of organization that they think represents the immediate substitution of an American, or at least a Western parliamentary alternative, not to mention a Western market system, for the organization that occurred under state socialism. In some sense, our most prudent role in these cases is first to warn and then to advise; that in itself could be a major service.

Nevertheless, for all the worry about making the wrong recommendations, intervening wrongly, supporting naive initiatives that will then have catastrophic consequences, we are at a wonderful moment in some sense because the world is volatile and there actually is an opportunity for change. That means that as the state system goes through a remarkable transformation, one of the main things we ought to be thinking about is how to accommodate American policy to what is already happening to these opportunities for dramatic intervention. So we have a kind of convergence in opportunities for public policy, public concern, and academic interest. We are at a privileged moment for collaboration compared with almost any time in the last 25 years.

My particular expertise has to do with European experience over a very long period of time. I am not going to treat you to a lecture on democratization in European history; much of it would be irrelevant. But I do want to emphasize some conclusions that are clear from European experience over the last 500 years or so, and that are germane to our discussions.

The first conclusion is that democratic institutions emerge from struggle. They emerged from conflict, struggle, and contest within European states. They took shape as what you might call "bargains" between different segments of the population and those that are trying to keep the

state going. Bargains may be a misleading word if it suggests sitting around a table and deciding where the interests of each party can best be met. These bargains took place at the conclusion of revolutions, of rebellions and their settlement, or of major regional struggles. But it is particularly through massive struggle and the settlement of struggle, through accommodations in which the parties that survived the struggle each got some recognition of their claims on the State and on the political process, that democratic institutions' protection of minorities, minimum guarantees of human rights, representative institutions, judiciaries that had a certain amount of autonomy, and so on through our standard list, came into being.

And that background of struggle has two further implications. First of all, the movement was not on the whole a continuous incremental movement, but one that occurred in fits and starts: long moments of accommodation, continued but now constrained struggle, moments of crisis and very rapid change. A second implication is that the moments of settlement stood out for their great importance in the creation, maintenance, and implantation of democratic institutions.

A further lesson of the European experience, into which Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter gave us more insight from recent experience in Southern Europe, is that far from converging on a single path to democratic development, the European states, and I would say this more generally for Western states, arrived at broadly democratic situations by many different paths. The implications are that anyone trying to anticipate or promote democratization cannot do it by treating it as a kind of railroad track and watching whether a country is on that particular track. There are multiple, quite different paths depending on different countries' prior class structure, ethnic structure, economic organization, and position within the geopolitical complex of the world.

A further implication is also one that Terry Karl and Philippe Schmitter brought out: a series of alternative provisional settlements, the ones they described as pact, imposition, reform, and revolution, all have historically produced partly, or even strongly, democratic outcomes. Pessimistically, this means that no single formula is likely to help us very much, but optimistically that we have the chance to use the enormous area expertise that A.I.D. has accumulated as a basis for thinking through alternative paths to democratic institutions.

What we have done is to sharpen our sense of the kinds of choices facing any government seeking to promote democratization in the world. This includes the U.S. government and A.l.D. as an agency with an initiative for democracy.

It seems to me that there are implications with respect to six different choices that come from the discussion so far. Each time I name "A" and

"Z" as alternatives, remember that we are not talking whether we want to choose A or Z, but what the distribution of efforts along this continuum ought to be. The first we might call the choice between infrastructure and mechanisms. This is the choice between promoting those conditions that in discussions here we have called elements of civil society or intermediary institutions, and in other contexts the economic circumstances that promote democracy, as opposed to the specific promotion of mechanisms that are manifestly democratic in themselves. All of these choices turn out to be tough choices, both of relative emphasis and of making our choices politically viable. But these choices are difficult because every bet on infrastructure is chancy. It is often easier to say that we will promote the appearance of juries, or particular democratic institutions that we know to operate in different Western contexts, than it is to bet on the existence of organizations that have their own agendas and whose short-term interests and perhaps even dominant values are ones that make us at least uncomfortable and perhaps even angry. Yet the weight of the expertise that has been aired so far says that the investment in manifestly democratic mechanisms is likely to be less effective than the investment in infrastructure.

A second choice is between democratization and democracy, that is, the difference between choosing to forward a process and the alternative of moving directly into the realm of democracy as such. Emphasizing process includes taking the chance to stabilize the rights of minorities to speak in opposition, even if the immediate step of supporting those minorities is to cement in place ideologies of which we do not approve. The discussion so far has sharpened the recognition of an uncertain and varied process of democratization that does not simply consist of a little more each year of each of fifteen elements of democracy, but that is likely to lead through very peculiar paths, some of which look like steps away from democracy. This is one where a serious collaboration between the area expertise already accumulated within A.I.D. and expertise outside may be particularly helpful.

The third choice is between external intervention and internal promotion. Our choice obviously is limited in this regard; if we are talking about projects in countries other than the United States, we will always be external. Nonetheless, the choice lies between essentially offering incentives that we apply ourselves—offering ourselves as the judges of the success of programs—and the solidification, support, promotion of groups within any particular country that we think will take initiatives for democracy. This is a terrible choice for any operating agency because of the many horror stories of betting on wrong horses, letting money go to waste or to corruption, and the sheer possibility that we have analyzed incorrectly who will do what. Yet the cost of a strictly external program,

by the very reasoning that we have laid out during this workshop is that the impact on democratization in the medium-and long-run is likely to be slight.

That brings us to a fourth choice between "bottom-up" and "top-down" programs. One difficulty is that, to some extent, one can better control the top-down approach. One can make a bargain with those who hold power and one has some means of enforcing that bargain internationally. But, from the analyses presented here, the chances are that, over the long run, other interventions below the governing elite will have a substantial impact on democratization.

An obvious fifth choice that follows from the previous ones lies between a regional approach and a general approach. Here we see the great advantage of having an agency-wide program, not least because it is something one can communicate to the legislature, to the administration, and to others who provide support for the programs of the agency. Budgets, to some extent, depend on the ability to launch programs that are coherent and connected, or at least appear to be. In the studies and arguments and theories we have been discussing, however, the weight of the evidence lies on the other side. It argues that intervention is likely to have more power by taking into account the particular circumstances of one area of the world or even of one particular country.

Finally, one choice that we have not talked about much, and that follows from what I was saying earlier about the current world situation, is between crisis intervention and routine intervention. At least some of the evidence and reasoning we have followed, and my reading of the European experience in general, suggests that the point at which an initiative for democracy could make a difference is when a crisis has occurred and when parties are open for some kind of settlement, when they are negotiating what will happen next. However, if you are going to design coherent programs, there is much to be said for making them incremental—something you can do this year, something you can do next year, something you can do the year after that. You can then watch the progress of programs of education, of transforming police forces, or of providing support to political party systems. But we ought to consider quite seriously the possibility of providing aid to states that have arrived at the moment when they are going to develop a constitution, settle a civil war, end a rebellion, make a new arrangement among ethnic groups, somehow set into place the treaty that ends one era of political struggle and produces the next accommodation. But the obvious difficulty is that as a program such an approach does not fall into a neat set of incremental initiatives or constitute a program. Rather, it consists of preparing a "rapid strike force" for intervention that would be available as advisers in a time of crisis, the way that John Norton Moore has been involved in

writing the constitution of Namibia.

You can read what I have to say as another declaration of how complicated the world is, but it does seem to me to provide opportunities for all of us. Certainly it provides opportunities for the obvious recommendation that a significant effort go into monitoring what is happening in different countries with respect to the infrastructure of democracy: sheer watching, comparing, indexing, reporting back. And the obvious recommendation from an inveterate academic: an opportunity for collaborative research on such questions as Jane Mansbridge raised about deliberative democracy and for following Pearl Robinson's recommendation to look at the resources that any particular people, any particular state, any particular area already has in existence for deliberation and conflict resolution and protection of minorities. Other opportunities include feeding the hunger of many states for clarification on what the rule of law implies and spending more time and more ingenuity on reorganizing coercive institutions, the military and the police. Another opportunity is to risk analyses of the different paths by which countries in different parts of the world have already gingerly stepped toward democracy. We need to explore whether there are ways of intervening, or counseling intervention, or assisting processes that are already going on that will not immediately install the precise replicas of American or even Western democratic institutions, but in a more general way will institute the infrastructure, the social organization that will lead one country or another toward human rights, the protection of minorities, consultation of the public, integrity of the judiciary, limits on the self-enrichment and aggrandizement of those who hold political power, and guarantees of articulate opposition that we put together as a general sense of "democracy" and of values for which all of us are willing to sacrifice something.

Regional Perspectives: Reports of the Working Groups

ASIA

Selig Harrison, Chair

One of the most interesting recent developments for Asia is the end of the Cold War. Now the United States, instead of finding itself promoting the growth of military-dominated polities in many countries, which put it in the position of working against democratic reforms, may find that fading superpower tensions greatly reduces the conflict in objectives in some Asian countries. Some participants suggested that the United States should begin to exercise the leverage provided by its economic aid to achieve political liberalization. There was a general feeling, with some differences in emphasis, that in most of the countries where the United States could be exercising this influence by making aid conditional on political liberalization, it is not taking full advantage of this potential. This is especially true for American work with other donors and aid consortia in the countries concerned.

The group found the six choices posed by Charles Tilly a good basis for its discussion. First, on the choice between emphasizing democratic infrastructure and emphasizing mechanisms, participants felt that both were necessary. On the one hand, the United States has to work through and strengthen intermediary institutions. Private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and organizations of all kinds in countries where PVOs are not the norm, could serve to activate social and political consciousness, broadly defined, among many population groups. At the same time, however, participants felt that A.I.D. should not neglect clear-cut cases where there are opportunities to promote specific mechanisms in the countries concerned. Any choice between infrastructure and mechanisms should be grounded in a hardheaded assessment of the viability of particular options.

The second choice was between democratization and democracy, in other words between modifying and refining systems, incrementally moving to make the systems more responsive, or attempting, through more direct approaches, to influence the redesign of systems. Participants generally agreed that in a crisis the United States could attempt to go beyond democratization and move toward trying to influence the creation and the

redesign of institutions in a democratic way. In order to do that, however, the United States has to have resources and capabilities that can be mobilized quickly. In most cases the United States should be moving incrementally, but where it has leverage, for example through a big economic aid investment, it would now have a greater opportunity to position that aid money to obtain the maximum liberalization.

In the choice between external versus internal intervention, there was definite agreement among the group that, as much as possible, the United States should be looking to the groups and places in a society where local initiatives have already been demonstrated. This includes supporting intermediary organizations that might not fit A.I.D.'s defined objectives, but still represents initiatives and motivation already present in the country concerned. Participants felt that this was more promising than attempting to adopt a grand design and then search for people or groups willing to try the American idea. At the same time, some members of the group felt very strongly that the United States should keep in mind the basic opportunity to intervene externally that is a result of A.I.D.'s government-to-government contacts. Again, the end of the Cold War provides an opportunity to use this leverage in ways that have not been attempted before.

In the choice between bottom-up and top-down development strategies, the group tilted slightly toward the "bottom-up" concept, but with the caveat that this does not necessarily mean that A.I.D. should work at the bottom. That led to a further discussion about how to aid PVOs in a foreign country, given existing mechanisms. Some suggested the agency might have to channel funding or work through organizations in the private sector in particular countries. Several participants cautioned against attempting to intervene at the bottom through any U.S. government organizations that go directly to the local level and become visibly involved with local intermediary groups. Others argued that most countries are so large that this type of intervention would not have a meaningful impact, and therefore A.I.D. should use its "top-down" leverage.

The group did not find the choice between regional or general approaches difficult. The participants agreed that one needed country-specific approaches tailored to varying situations. Similarly, the group agreed that the choice between crisis and routine intervention must be decided on a case-by-case basis, but again recommended enhancing A.I.D.'s crisis response capabilities.

Apart from these six choices, the point was made that donor coordination is needed internationally, not just at the level of government-to-government aid. Some felt it would be more beneficial to target certain countries where the opportunities and challenge seem to be greatest, rather than infusing money into a lot of countries where, in some cases, it may be money less well-spent. Finally, the group discussed Michael Bratton's

question: Can pluralism threaten democracy? He had expressed concern that pluralism may strengthen particularism, so that "Can the center hold?" is often the most important issue. Participants found this very relevant to the multi-ethnic societies of Asia. The group's feeling, however, was that in Asia, institutions are more often too strong than too weak. The problem is thus not whether the center can hold, but how to make strong, militarily-supported centers responsive to democratic pressure.

Harrison expressed his own concern that more emphasis needs to be placed on the sociology of individual countries. In the multi-ethnic countries of Asia, the social landscape and social divisions are fundamental. He expressed fears that linking open societies and open markets would exacerbate some of these cleavages. In every Asian country certain ethnic groups have a head start, because in most cases they have traditionally been the mercantile and entrepreneurial groups long before the beginning of modern economic development. Moreover, they often achieved that position in unpopular ways. In attempting to apply the concept of open markets and the promotion of an environment to provide entrepreneurship, one has to be sensitive to who has the money and who will be able to profit from a more open market environment. Otherwise, one could easily end up making the rich richer and aggravating inequities. Programs that promote new entrepreneurship, that target diverse groups, and that are careful not to create an environment more favorable to existing concentrations of economic power—which are the essence of the political contest in many of these countries—would be the most appropriate way to implement this objective.

NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Robert Bianchi, Chair; John Mason, Rapporteur

This discussion group was not as optimistic about the Middle East as a potential place for transition to democracy as Harrison's group was about Asia. To start the discussion, Bianchi depicted a continuum of possibilities for democratization in the Middle East. On one end is cynicism: political parties are not really possible; they are just facades. At the other end are the apologists: people saying that there are genuine openings, such as the improving opportunities for women in some countries and the existence of intermediary institutions that could be the base for civil society.

Bianchi's own view was essentially optimistic for several reasons. He argued that the religious movements that journalists and the State Department focus on are marginal, and that they might be brought into a more pluralistic social and political structure. Bianchi also argued that political sophistication is much greater in the Middle East than most people

assume. He drew encouragement from the willingness of some Middle East leaders to spread the benefit or the blame, as the case may be, in terms of economic development. These leaders believe that in this way, if there is failure, it will be shared among other groups of people in the society. Ultimately, this could be a stepping stone to greater democracy if those who are being given that role are also given some role in political decision-making. Finally, Bianchi commented that there is always a lingering threat of revolution in the Middle East, and he did not preclude the notion of conflict as a basis for creating a context for democracy.

The group's discussion also centered on A.I.D.'s role in promoting democracy. Participants agreed that A.I.D. has been undertaking such initiatives for a long time, and that the Agency reinvents its programs every 10 years or so. The current interest is the third apparent re-invention.

One major issue was the question of intent versus consequence, with decentralization in Egypt as an example. The original idea behind decentralization, in which A.I.D. invested heavily, was to improve the distribution of benefits and services to rural people. One of its consequences, however, was to strengthen the hand of the central government in controlling these populations. Some in the group suggested that A.I.D. personnel may not be fully aware of the consequences of certain actions and raised this as a warning flag for the work in democratization that is occurring across the Agency.

Another point was the question of the competence of A.I.D. to implement democratization. Participants raised the question, "What do Americans really know about democracy?" Americans assume they know what it is and assume that their values are shared, but A.I.D. should be careful not to present American-style democracy as being better or as an improvement over other models. One participant commented that in discussions with Middle Easterners, he found them fearful that the United States would not accept their different version of what constitutes democratization.

One of the discouraging conclusions reached by most participants was that unless the political equation of the whole region—that is, the Arab-Israeli conflict—can be resolved, the United States is probably not going to have much opportunity to promote democracy. Overall, the group ended its discussions on a rather pessimistic note. Bianchi noted that some Arabs feel that perhaps people like Assad in Syria constitute forces for democracy because he has gotten General Aoun out of the picture in Lebanon, opening up new possibilities there. Similarly, if the current crisis ends without war, Saddam Hussein will have affected the situation in Kuwait, ensuring that Sheik Sabah, if he returns to power, would very likely choose a more open form of government.

EASTERN EUROPE

Daniel Nelson, Chair

The group discussed what A.I.D. could do with limited resources to confront the enormous problems of a region that is just beginning to emerge from decades of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Nelson began by suggesting that it is a region of high threats and low capacities for most states. Among the domestic threats are fragile or nonexistent institutions, rising nationalism and ethnonationalism, the continued presence of the old *nomenklatura* and the secret police, the unresolved issue of civil-military relations, privatization and market reforms versus the social welfare expectations of the population, and finally what he called "antipolitics politics," or a purposeful apathy in some of these populations.

The discussion addressed the very hard choices that would have to be made among the different emphases that A.I.D. has selected, including ameliorating the nationalistic divisions within these societies, promoting the rule of law, improving the media, and aiding social process. Participants tentatively agreed that some of the threats facing Eastern European nations could be ameliorated or at least attacked by some of the things that A.I.D. is capable of doing. For example, on nationalism and ethnonationalism, some suggested a mediation or arbitration center that could be started with A.I.D. seed money or efforts to provide third-party intervention between and among ethnonationalist groups.

There was considerable discussion about training administrators and legislators to reinforce the weak existing institutions and also to weed out the old *nomenklatura*. One participant talked about the need for a social welfare emphasis, particularly providing work relief, housing, and retraining for people dislocated by moving to a market economy. Such programs reinforce the performance of these systems and show the population that a democratic, nontotalitarian system indeed does work.

There was quite a bit of discussion as well about civic education and the potential for A.I.D. activity. English language education, for example, is a basic step in helping people avail themselves of Western expertise and experience. Civic education could obviously be much more broader; for example, A.I.D. could help to introduce the experience of Latin American countries such as Chile that have made the transition to democracy.

Overall, some in the group saw a fundamental choice between emphasizing either the institutional operation of the new systems and their performance—encouraging and training the legislators and administrators to do their jobs better and enhancing the performance of the systems by housing, work relief, and so on—or emphasizing social process and citizen education. The group disagreed about the degree to which this really is

a choice. Some asked whether A.I.D. and other Western efforts should be creating that dichotomy between institutions, between the "superstructure" and the "base," and argued for a more general effort.

Participants recognized that, given the problems of Eastern Europe and the enormous threats to these systems, the chances that A.I.D. efforts are going to make a significant impact on the worst problems, such as holding Yugoslavia together, are slight at best. Across the entire region, however, there are states, such as Czechoslovakia, that have far greater chances of democratization. At the end of the discussion, there was no easy consensus on whether A.I.D. efforts should go toward the neediest—but perhaps more doubtful—cases or toward those with the greatest potential payoffs. The group nonetheless considered some specific programs, such as mediation centers, training legislators and administrators, work relief, housing, and English language training that seem to be tangible and realistic program options.

AFRICA

Michael Clough, Chair

Clough offered the observation that one of the problems of dealing with Africa is its immense diversity. One's view of what democratization in Africa involves will vary radically depending on whether his or her latest venture has been in South Africa, where there is a process that looks somewhat like what can be seen in Latin America and Europe, or in the Horn of Africa, where it is difficult even to conceive of anything in the short run that resembles democratization.

The group generally agreed that the future of the state system in Africa is uncertain. Questions of borders and forms of government are probably much more open in Africa than in many other places, which obviously clouds any debate. It makes a big difference whether one thinks that 25 years from now Africa is going to look roughly like it does today in terms of its borders.

Second, there was agreement that for Africa the end of the Cold War has had a major impact in opening up possibilities for changing the overall structure in which the African states operate and for U.S. policy options. One participant made the point that Africa is and has always been extremely marginal to U.S. interests. This meant that the Cold War had greater impact on the superpowers' Africa policies than it had in other regions. A second important point is that, although events in Eastern Europe obviously have had an impact on Africa, it is mistake to assume that the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe is what has given rise to democratization in Africa. One participant made the point very strongly

that Africa has strong indigenous opposition groups, popular discontent, and dissent that are largely independent of what is going on in Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War has certainly allowed more opportunities for the opposition movements, but this is quite different from saying that because of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Africans are suddenly looking for other models.

There was a general agreement that in Africa, where states are relatively weak, the emphasis ultimately has to be on the nongovernment organizations and the intermediary associations, rather than relying on states. Participants disagreed about the question of "Can the center hold?" Some argued that, in Africa, the question instead should be: "In designing U.S. strategies and policies for democratization, how concerned should we be about the ways in which what we do will affect the strength of the center?" Others argued that the United States needs to focus on programs that in one way or another ultimately will lead to the building of a strong, capable center at the national level, whether through aggregating interest groups or reinforcing state capacity. In the process of supporting NGOs, one could still be concerned about the center. Another view argues that in Africa the center *is* the problem, so that the policy focus should be on supporting intermediary groups, almost regardless of the consequences for the center's ability to hold.

On concrete policy issues, the group agreed that a variety of policies, responding to the realities of various countries, is essential. In more practical terms, this translated into a recognition that there is considerable difference between those African countries in which there is very little room for associational activity and those in which there is already a range of associational groups that A.I.D. can support. In the former, where civil society is quite weak, there is a correspondingly much greater need to put pressure on governments to create openings, particularly in the areas of civil and political liberties. Here the United States will need to rely more on gaining the support of external agencies and NGOs. In the latter countries, almost everyone agreed that the effort should be focused on building up internal intermediary organizations wherever possible.

Another very important practical point was the need to focus on human resources. Africa differs somewhat from the rest of the world due to its tremendous crisis in human resources, one which is accentuated by the spread of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). One participant noted after the year 2000 actual depopulation might occur in Africa, therefore this is a very practical need and priority.

Clough added his personal concern about whether ii is possible to develop a policy for promoting democracy in Africa when democracy is only one of several American objectives. In the clash of rival interests, he feared democracy would ultimately be at a disadvantage given the

bureaucratic structure of American foreign policy making. He argued that in the African case in particular, if the United States is serious about promoting democracy, then democracy has to be almost the only objective, or it must be so clearly accorded priority that it will quite easily overwhelm other interests. The internal forces in Africa pushing toward democracy are so weak and fragile and the time period for the development of democracy is so long, that unless the United States has a clear and consistent emphasis on democracy as the predominant goal, it will lose out. If that happens, the United States will end up looking quite hypocritical, with a policy that talks about democracy, but in the final analysis ends up supporting other objectives.

LATIN AMERICA

Gary Wynia, Chair

The group concentrated very heavily on specific policies for A.I.D. Participants felt that the main point to be made at the outset, particularly because of the way legislation is written and discussed, was the necessity that democracy be defined in Latin America on a country-by-country basis, as well as generally. That is, one starts with a basic definition and then, in trying to apply that definition, looks at the specifics in each country's political practice. Promoting "elections," for example, offers a wide range of different possible policy recommendations. The Argentines are sending people to the United States to look at the American electoral system as an alternative to proportional representation in their congress. They argue that the parties that create the lists for their congressional elections are so elitist in their choices of candidates that people in the provinces have virtually no influence over the selection of candidates, since primary elections are virtually nonexistent. The Argentines are interested in single-member districts, so that they will know the person that they elect, even though Americans worry about the risks of entrenched incumbents.

Nor can one assume that the institutions generally associated with democracy will be welcome or easy to support. Wynia commented that in the recent presidential elections in Peru, Brazil, and to some extent in Argentina, people voted against political parties and for individuals. Even if the United States believes parties are important, it may not be realistic to think of counseling Brazil that it needs better-organized political parties.

The group spent considerable time on long-term and short-term goals. Many people stressed A.I.D.'s difficultly in fostering and sustaining long-term thinking, largely because of budgeting and evaluation cycles. Democracy is a long-term process, yet most of what A.I.D. does focuses on immediate projects that may have little or even perverse long-term impact.

The group discussed local versus national focus in policy. This is important in Latin America because these are very centralized regimes, much as in some African countries. Participants suggested that A.I.D. might encourage these states to become more decentralized, allowing more dispersion of power throughout the countries, which could build foundations that will be conducive to more consensual, open, and democratic process. Some argued that this may be nearly impossible, but agreed that it should be explored, rather than just ignoring or accepting what the central authorities wish.

When the group turned to institutions and processes, it addressed a frequent dilemma. What should A.I.D. do in a situation where members of a Latin American legislature ask for aid to build a library and purchase materials such as computers, even though this congress may never hold hearings before its committees and legislation passes virtually automatically. Should they be judged undemocratic and these new computers used as leverage? Participants disagreed, with some arguing that A.I.D. must make those evaluations and set conditions if it is trying to help create democracy. Others said that is going too far, pushing too deeply into a society's practice.

In talking about the armed forces and police, two very important issues in Latin America, the group addressed the issues in several ways. It agreed that currently the police are in some ways the most difficult issue. Democracies need law enforcement, but the danger remains that law enforcement is being used against particular groups in the political process, rather than people who commit crimes. Should A.I.D. be instrumental in trying to improve law enforcement, especially since the drug problem will likely compel us toward some involvement? Or will that get the United States into difficulties that it has tried to avoid for some time?

As for the armed forces, most participants agreed that "civic education"—trying to turn the armed forces into a professional, apolitical institution—is unwise. But others raised the question of whether the U.S. military should attempt whatever it can to teach Latin militaries about the democratic process. The group concluded, however, that reducing the need and opportunities for a military force would be more effective if these efforts were initiated and carried out by internal forces within that particular nation.

The group discussed the judicial process, wherein A.I.D. and other American projects have already begun and continue to operate. One important issue was the need to consider not only how to staff courts and better prepare judges, but to raise the larger question of whether they are working in a legal system that allows them to adjudicate in a reasonable way. In some Latin American countries, participants argued, the process is fairly restricted and judges may either have too much power in which to

operate or have little genuine opportunity to function. One cannot assume that if there are well-educated judges and staff assistants that the country will have good courts.

Finally, Wynia commented on the stress on private enterprise and free markets and the problem that is beginning to develop in the minds, if not in the actual policies, of some Latin American governments. As they privatize, removing enterprises from government control and turning them over to the private sector, the question arises of whether the governments can continue to regulate those new enterprises as necessary. Or will the governments be trapped into a new dependence? It is unclear whether there are even any training programs on how to regulate private enterprise. Of course, private enterprise does not resolve all problems. Governments will always need to provide some public goods, and that is not something that Latin American governments have done very well. They have experience in distributing private goods by government authorities; they will now need to discover ways of achieving public goods.

DISCUSSION

Workshop cochair Charles Tilly began the discussion with an observation and an admittedly contentious question. He noted a consensus that different regions varied tremendously in how likely they were to undergo successful transitions to democracy. For example, at present, U.S. efforts in the Middle East seem to have a relatively small chance of promoting democracy successfully. In contrast, certain parts of Africa appear to offer significant opportunities for the United States to promote democratization. Tilly asked where it makes most sense to invest efforts and funds, given the reality of limited resources: in areas like Eastern Europe that appear very likely to succeed in moving toward democracy, or in areas like the Middle East that appear least likely to move toward democracy. Related to the key issues of limited resources and difficult choices, three basic themes emerged from the discussions.

First, several participants asserted that the choices facing A.I.D. were not a "zero-sum game." One commented that framing the debate as competition between Eastern Europe and Africa was unfortunate. He argued that the real issues in Africa concerned not whether to give more or less money to a given country, but how that money was used. He particularly urged support for conflict resolution in Africa, and noted that investing (or withholding) even small amounts of money could have a tremendous impact.

A second important theme was new opportunities for promoting democracy brought about by the end of the Cold War. Someone observed that

the United States now has less reason to support authoritarian regimes based solely on their anticommunist stance. Improved superpower relations provide the United States with an opportunity to condition aid to authoritarian governments on political liberalization. The group stressed the need to coordinate all U.S. efforts, including military aid, to ensure that this new leverage is used effectively.

The third and broadest idea to emerge from the discussion centered around attempts to understand more precisely the nature of A.I.D.'s commitment to democracy. The discussion resulted in productive disagreement as workshop participants identified potential dilemmas in promoting democracy and offered suggestions for A.I.D.'s proper role. One participant cited a dilemma for Americans in the Middle East: the groups most interested in the sorts of political openings that Americans call "democratization" are usually the groups *least* interested in any formal relationship with a U.S. government organization. Associational life is flourishing in the Middle East, but these indigenous groups have a life and a mind of their own. Though in many ways "democratic," they do not necessarily support the United States. Someone else expressed concern that participants too easily assumed that democracy was one of "our" values, almost equating support for democracy with support for the United States. He suggested it was better to seek points where U.S. interests converge with interests of independent groups, rather than identical goals. In a similar manner, another participant observed that the focus in Africa has frequently been on achieving a certain political form, "multi-party democracy." He suggested that this emphasis on form is misplaced and urged devoting more resources to promoting certain kinds of processes instead.

Finally, regarding A.I.D.'s role, a participant suggested that A.I.D. should regard democracy not primarily as a goal in itself, but as instrumental in achieving the Agency's larger mission: development. He cited several potential benefits of democracy, such as increased access to health care, increased equality of opportunity, and increased autonomy at the individual, family, group, and national levels. He also noted the potential problem of short-term commitment to individual projects, since democratization is a long-term, ongoing process. However, his suggestion to regard democracy as instrumental produced disagreement from other workshop participants.

Threats to Democracy: Plenary Session IV

A RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE

Sidney Verba

I am going to talk about the threats to democracy that can still exist even after democracy has been installed. As with people, the threats to life really come in the early years. One's life expectancy, particularly if one is born under circumstances where there is poverty or ill health, is better after a number of years than it is at birth, and I think that is true of democracies. Democracies begin with a great burst of light, but as one Eastern European said recently, "At the end of the light is the tunnel." And I think that indeed is what new democracies are faced with—most democracies, if they can survive 20 years, seem to survive forever. At least, historically speaking, this has been true.

The question this raises, of course, is what one can learn for newly developing democracies, newly democratizing countries, from the experience of those democracies that have been around for a long time. This is the old question of what it is one can learn from history; are the circumstances today so different that one cannot really generalize from the past? Most of us who think about the lessons of history accept Santayana's famous aphorism that those who do not learn from history are forced to repeat it. There is, unfortunately, the opposite aphorism as well—that those who do learn from history are forced to make the opposite mistakes the next time. It is not easy to learn from history, but we have to learn from something.

Democracies have been defined half a dozen times in this meeting, and I assume here that we mean the most rudimentary definition: a society in which there is some kind of control over the rulers by the ruled. This means rule by the people, and that involves some kind of regular procedures whereby citizens can hold their leaders accountable. This probably means regular free elections that are meaningful, in which almost all people can participate as voters and as potential candidates. It means, also, the auxiliary features that are necessary for meaningful elections, such as freedom of speech and the freedom to organize.

There are several implications of that definition. One is that democ

racy is not everything: democracy is not free markets, democracy is not an effective set of social welfare policies in a society. It may be that these things are useful for democracy, it may be that they are necessary for democracy—these are debatable propositions—but they are certainly not the same thing as democracy. The corollary of that is that democracy is not necessarily positively related to all other good things. One of the main things that everyone needs to face is the great tension between democracy—rule from below—and other things that we might value. Let me mention two of them.

One is that the very term "democratic government" is internally contradictory. There is a tension between fostering democracy and fostering governance. Democracy comes from below; governance is making effective decisions from above. And as we know, the two may not easily go together. An old theme in democratic thinking is "are the people really capable of ruling?" The answer, of course, is "no" if one is thinking of the people directly running the government. With the exception of very, very small social units, that seems to be impossible. Are the people capable of selecting rulers and influencing them in ways that lead to effective, coherent policies? On that, the answer is by no means clear. Democracy by its nature frees and expands the number of conflicts in a society, it releases selfish and short-sighted interests, it creates and allows factions.

A question people ask is "Can one have a democracy in a multi-party system with many conflicting factions?" Some studies have suggested that overall economic performance in countries is inhibited if there are too many special interests because these interests, out for their own benefit, impede the development of coherent national policies leading to effective performance. One might make the argument that this is the case with American economic performance. If you simply look at the budget process as it goes on in Washington these days, one can certainly see that democracy and effective governments do not easily go together.

A second tension is that between democracy and citizen welfare. This is clearly related to the first tension. To put it in Lincoln's terms, we can raise the question of whether government by the people is the best way of getting government for the people. Most of us can imagine circumstances under which we think the world would be better run, certainly our own country would be better run, with an intelligent, rational, benevolent leader. If we had someone to make those kinds of decisions, we would do better in dealing with the homeless, drugs, our weak economy, our bad schools, and the like.

That idea has two limitations. First, it is hard to know what it is to be rational, to make intelligent policies. Policies always are contested and therefore the problem is not with doing something; it comes even earlier, with knowing what it is that one should do. The second problem, of

course, is with the term "benevolence" when speaking of a benevolent leader. Are leaders likely to be benevolent; more importantly, once they are in office are they likely to stay benevolent if they are not under control of the citizenry? The experience with governments around the world certainly supports one generalization in political science—Lord Acton's famous aphorism that power tends to corrupt. And looking at the experience of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, we see them as evidence for the strong version of Acton's aphorism: absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely. So it is hard to think of citizen welfare, though it may not be dealt with efficiently, being dealt with for a long period of time by leaders who are not in some manner under the control of the citizenry.

What that means is not that the citizens are particularly effective in developing the right kinds of policies, but that they are effective in being negative, in blocking bad policies. And I think that perhaps that negative check was a major philosophical impetus behind American government, and that it is one of the major reasons for having democratic government.

Let me turn to the theories of democracy, and what we know from democratic history to see what it is we might possibly learn. One issue that is not often dealt with, that we do not know very much about, and do not have very good theories about, is the basic, often unanswered issue of the political units within which democracy should take place. There is a lot of writing about the way in which decisions can be made in a democracy. Should they be made by majority rule? Should they be made by some rules of proportionality? Should we aim for consensus? How many people should participate? What are the consequences of more or fewer people being given the franchise? But there is little on what is the proper unit in which those decisions can be made. Majority rule is a wonderful democratic rule, it is one of the best—but there is nothing in the theory of majority rule, its strengths and its weaknesses, that says majority of *what*. And obviously that is crucial. It makes a difference for language policy in Canada, for example, if it is the majority of Quebec, or the majority of Canada. There is nothing that can tell you what that is supposed to be, and as we know, in most societies the nature of the unit is contested.

We think of the United States as a democracy for the last 200 years, and yet one-third of the way into those 200 years, we had to fight one of the bloodiest wars in history to decide the size of the unit. And in almost all cases the answer —should it be many separate states or one big state—is something that is quite morally ambiguous. In retrospect, the Civil War was a great moral crusade because slavery was an unambiguous evil. But in terms of Lincoln's initial goal, to preserve the Union, if not for the issue of slavery we might look at that conflict in an ambiguous way. Was it worth fighting a war that large in order to preserve the Union? Maybe yes, but maybe no.

Democracies all over the world are facing challenges to their boundaries. Usually these are subnational challenges, the desires of separate groups to break apart, but there will also be supernational challenges to their boundaries, whether decision units should be larger than the nation-state. Usually it is the nation-state that we focus on, but the nation-state is to some extent an arbitrary institution.

One easy answer to what the proper unit should be is wrong. The easy answer is that we should look around the world to find natural units in which people are homogeneous, that are small enough so people can work together easily, share the same language, share the same culture, share those things that we think of as qualities of nations in some general sense or of societies. Such natural units do not exist. To find them one has to go to units so small that they cannot possibly survive in the real world. And second, even the smallest political units are really extremely heterogeneous. Boundaries are mixed, populations are spread out, the possibility of the small, easy-to-govern, homogeneous political unit is a romantic ideal of the past. I visited Estonia in May, one of those small republics where a homogeneous population is trying to set itself off as separate from the Soviet Union. But 40 percent of the population is Russian, half of the capital's population is Russian. There is no possibility of its becoming that kind of old-fashioned, Rousseauian ideal of a homogeneous political unit.

What that means is that we are unavoidably dealing with large, complex political units. It also means that when we talk about democracy, we probably have to talk about representative democracy. The notions of direct, participatory democracy, of consensus decision-making, do not make sense in the modern world. And when we talk about representative democracy, we talk about elections. When we talk about elections, we probably talk about political parties. It is very hard to imagine democracies with elections without organized political parties. But this illustrates, again, one of the great tensions of democracy. Political parties are divisive. It is their job to battle with each other, to exacerbate differences in society. They create conflict. Nevertheless, they may indeed be necessary institutions.

This shows one of the dilemmas of democracy, that it is by nature a conflict ridden system. The main problem in democracies, I would argue, is not achieving the common good, not finding a just policy and efficient government. The main problem in democracy is managing conflict, avoiding conflict that becomes so great it tears a society apart. James Madison's great achievement as a democratic theorist was turning the earlier view of democracy upside down. The earlier view from Rousseau was that democracy would only work in small homogeneous societies where there were no great conflicts of interest. Madison said that was

impossible; people have differences of interest and will always have conflict. He tried to make the differences of interest into the basis of democracy, arguing for a large, diverse society in which people could battle it out for success. It means that democratic politics is not rational decision making, not balancing costs and benefits, not planning for development. Democratic politics is conflict, it is coalition building, it is log rolling, it is messy. And above all, democratic politics involves, almost always, lots of unsavory characters, people whose views one finds unattractive, even antidemocratic, certainly unpalatable. One of the glories of American democracy is the First Amendment and the protection of freedoms when the First Amendment works. If you read the history of the First Amendment, the sleazy characters that are defended by it overwhelm you, but that is the nature of democracy.

What can we learn from the history of those fortunate nations that have learned how to manage conflict peacefully and democratically over an extended period of time? Is there general knowledge about democracy, or do we understand democracies only in specific places in their individual contexts? This is an old problem in the social sciences and in comparative politics: we search for general knowledge, we search for reusable knowledge from one place that can then be applied to someplace else. Yet when we look at each specific place, we always find things are different. This is an issue that is too complex to work out here; I suppose the answer is a little bit of each. We cannot go around the world in pure "ad hocery," dealing with each country totally on its own terms. We have to have some general sense of where we are going, but we cannot apply it blindly and mechanically in different places.

How did the democracies we recognize today develop? It is relatively a new form of government. There were some democracies in the nineteenth century, but most of today's democracies began in the twentieth century. There is no single answer, there is no single feature that makes a successful democracy. For a long time those who looked at the failure of some democracies before World War II argued that it had something to do with the nature of the electoral system. Proportional representation was highlighted as the reason for the decline of the Weimar Republic, for example. It turns out, however, that there are many democracies that do very well with proportional representation. Sometimes it does good, and sometimes it does harm.

If there is no single feature, there are a few general things. One is clearly that political leaders, if they could get away with it, would probably suppress opposition. I have a feeling that runs through George Bush's mind daily as he looks down Pennsylvania Avenue. Why not suppress the opposition—the leaders are trying to accomplish something and the other guys are standing in their way. Therefore, one of the things one needs for

democracy is some limits on the autonomy of coercive power, some control by civilians over the military, some ways in which the threat to democracy from those people who control coercive power can be controlled.

There are many other features that clearly underpin or seem to go along with democratic government. The list is fairly well known: high income, economic growth, an educated population, a diverse economy, a relatively free and autonomous economy, many autonomous interest groups, high levels of well being, long life expectancy, and on and on. It is a syndrome we label as "modernization," "development," or what have you. And it is clear that it does foster democracy and that it is very important for it. For a variety of reasons, it creates wealth and people's satisfaction. It creates the kind of diverse society that makes it more difficult for any governmental group to dominate, that allows the formation of groups that can then be part of a complex political process, and that fosters the civil society on which democracy rests.

Education is probably still the single most important thing that underlies and ensures democracy. Most of the literature shows that in any place, at any time, educated people are more likely to be politically active, more likely to be committed to democracy. One ought not to overstate this. A long, long time ago, I wrote a book called *Civic Culture* in which we found that educated people were more committed to democratic values. And we wrote a conclusion saying, "Isn't it wonderful that the world is getting more and more educated, therefore we're going to get a citizenry that is going to participate more, be more satisfied because they'll understand what's going on, and they'll play a greater role in society." But that was a long time ago, and since then the citizenry, certainly in this country, and most democracies, has become much more educated. Has it led to democratic satisfaction? Of course not. What education does is teach you how complex the world is, that a lot of what you think should be accomplished cannot be accomplished. Education does not necessarily lead to a more satisfied citizenry, but it does lead to a more democratic citizenry. It leads to a citizenry that is more active in politics and that is less likely to accept violations of democracy. As a colleague and I, paraphrasing an old cigarette ad, wrote in the conclusion of a book looking at how people in the United States were participating in politics that was published many years after *Civic Culture*: Americans were participating more and enjoying it less.

There are other features that are important for democracy. One is the absence of deeply antagonistic subgroups or subcultures that do not trust each other and are not willing to turn over power to the opposition. We who are Democrats probably do not fully trust Republicans, we who are Republicans probably do not trust fully Democrats. Nevertheless, we are basically willing to turn over government to the opposition because we do

not think our interests will be that substantially harmed. A great problem and puzzle for newly-formed democracies is that they are filled with groups so antagonistic that they are unwilling to alternate or share power.

There are many techniques to try to have a democracy that is not majoritarian, where the fundamental interests of minority groups are protected with the possibilities of mutual vetoes, with the possibilities of having certain areas of social policy—about language, about religion—kept out of the governmental decision process to allow for the autonomy of groups that do not want to see someone else exercising power over them. Federal arrangements that maintain some local autonomy are also a way of dealing with it.

One very important way of dealing with the problem is the existence of plural institutions within the government. Not pluralism in the society, but plural institutions in the government, so that various groups have alternative mechanisms by which they can get some governmental response. Imagine a society in which there is a permanent minority, which because of the social tensions and issues in the society cannot form a coalition with other groups and therefore in some way, at some times, share political power. Those circumstances are very, very bad if there are no alternative ways in which those minorities can get their way.

A simple comparison may be between Northern Ireland and the United States. Northern Ireland, with a government that is roughly parliamentary (and therefore where almost all decisions are made by one institution), becomes a society in which the Catholics really have no chance of having any force. Religion is the major conflict within their society, they are a permanent minority, and they are permanently kept out of power. In the United States, the nearest analogy, of course, is race. For a long time American blacks were in that position. They were a permanent minority vis-a-vis the U.S. Congress since there was no way in which they could join a coalition with any other group to be part of a majority. But the United States, by having a variety of other institutions, offered other possibilities for the exercise of influence and power. There were courts, which is where the NAACP turned, there were local governments, which is where black representatives have been elected, and there was a multiplicity of ways in which the government operated. This is one way in which having a complex government is not very efficient, but does gives minorities some opportunity.

Let me talk about one more theme, the relationship of democracy to free markets, of democracy to capitalism. It is clear these are different sets of institutions. It is clear, furthermore, that free markets and capitalism are perhaps necessary for democracy because they create an open, autonomous sector of society that remains out of the government's control. I do not necessarily mean free markets à La Milton Friedman;

certainly the markets in Sweden are free enough to have supported democracy for a long, long time. We can argue whether their policies are good or not, but I do not think anyone can argue that Sweden is not a democracy.

Free markets and capitalism have a complex relationship to democracy. The tension grows out of the fact that they are based on somewhat different principles. Democracy is based on a very clear principle: equality, on the notion that each individual is of equal worth. It is also based on the somewhat weaker notion, which I think democrats accept, that not only is each individual of equal worth in terms of interests, each is equally competent to know what his or her own interests are and express them in the political process. This is reflected in such principles as "one person, one vote."

Capitalism, of course, rests in a way on inequality. It rests on the opportunity of individuals to make money and get ahead. And one of the greatest and most interesting problems in understanding modern democracies is the tension between these two systems side by side. The tension can be seen by the way in which people at both ends of the political spectrum look at democracy. For the right, democracy is the ultimate threat. It is a threat to their property, to what they think are their rights to be autonomous in the market, because the mass of people will vote in governments that will take away their rights. Looked at from the left, capitalism is a threat to democracy in the opposite direction. Inequalities in wealth, inequalities in control over resources have a major effect in distorting the extent to which democracy is a system whereby each person has equal influence.

Where does this all lead me? What kind of advice can one give on the basis of some of these tensions in democracy to those who have to face what to do about it? In thinking about that, I am reminded of the story of the owl and the rabbit who are on a little strip of land during a flood. As the water comes up and up, the rabbit gets very nervous and says to the owl, "What am I supposed to do?" The owl says, "It's very simple. Turn yourself into a pigeon and fly away." The rabbit says, "What a terrific idea, I'll turn myself into a pigeon and I'll fly away. But how do I turn myself into a pigeon?" The owl, as he takes to the air, says, "I just do policy, I don't bother with implementation."

One conclusion I have come to is that if we know so little for certain about what is necessary for democracy, if we know that we cannot specify any particular thing that is sufficient for democracy, and if we know that various combinations of factors work differently in different contexts, we should be very modest about our expectations of how well we can understand the formation of democracy in other nations and how well we can direct it. Democracy is not easy to design from inside and probably

impossible to design from outside. So we must not overstate our ability to effect change. We know that it is hard to steer any society, including our own. As one person put it, we want results and we get consequences. Above all, it is very difficult to design and implement structural changes in the way a government operates. One of the best examples is the attempt to change the structure of our elections and the campaign finance laws. The campaign finance reform was supposed to limit the power of money over elections. It had two consequences: it increased the power of money over elections and it deeply damaged our political parties. And that was not intended by anyone at the time. If that is true here, where we speak the language as native speakers, where we have a feel for what is going on, imagine what the risk is in other parts of the world.

Does that mean that one can do nothing? Of course not; one has to do something and there is probably much that one can do. The first advice I suppose I would give is "do no harm." It is easier to harm democracies, I think, than to create them or foster them. There probably are more clear examples of effective harm than there are of effective help. Certainly there are examples of American policy doing harm to democracy. I think now that the Cold War has simmered down, there are fewer pressures for policies that serve other goals, but that is still something to keep in mind.

The second is: "Do not expect too much." Some of the underlying features of things that we know foster democracy, such as higher levels of education or more autonomous social groups within a society, reduce conflict between intensely antagonistic groups. These clearly foster democracy, but they are very difficult to design and to implement. One supports them because in the long run they are likely on average to do good, but one does not expect results to emerge rapidly, nor in any very precise and measurable way. This underscores my notion that we are to be modest in our goals. This, of course, goes against the American grain. When we have a problem, we declare war on it. We have a war on drugs. The problem is that when you declare war on something, you can be sure you are going to lose. A good example is the Great Society. We wanted to create a Great Society, so we declared a war on poverty. Obviously we lost the war, obviously we do not have a great society. The irony is that much of the research that now looks back at what happened—programs like food stamps, the Voting Rights Act—finds that we did accomplish a great deal during that period. Many things were done that reduced the level of poverty and people's level of misery. But we did not win the war, and therefore we set ourselves up for failure by setting our goals too high.

The last point is that one gives support, one does not manage. We do not know how to manage change, we do not know how in any precise way to create democracy out of nondemocracy. Therefore we can provide

support, but whatever grows probably has to grow uncontrolled and grow outside our control in ways that are sometimes negative. So, I suppose what we do is to help and to hope for the best.

I was trying to think of whether I should end on an optimistic or a pessimistic note. Again, I am reminded of what I think is the best definition of the distinction between an optimist and a pessimist, which I will use as my conclusion. It is simply that an optimist is someone who looks around and says, "This is the best of all possible worlds," and a pessimist is someone who reflects for a moment and says, "You know, you're right."

Setting an Action Agenda: Plenary Session V

The workshop's final plenary session allowed participants to discuss specific policy choices in light of the working groups and earlier plenaries. The session resulted in consensus on a number of issues and identified several key issues for further study.

A fundamental distinction emerged among three types of A.I.D. intervention: economic, political, and technical. Several participants gave examples of how specific programs often fit into more than one category, for example, a rural banking program that fostered democratic, participatory values as it increased economic prosperity.

Participants disagreed over the need for an entirely new democratization initiative within A.I.D. One concern was that a new initiative would simply lead to the repackaging of existing programs under a new label, "democracy." Others expressed concern that a new initiative might stress visible short-term results over the potentially more important long-term consequences of sustained programs. Basic education and building community banking were mentioned as examples of specific programs with significant implications for promoting democratic values whose effects on democracy were gradual and thus unlikely to yield immediate measurable results. In general, participants agreed that promoting democracy requires a sustained effort over a considerable period of time, with no more than modest hope for early indications of success or failure.

Others cited a number of potential positive features for a new democratic initiative. Participants suggested that such an initiative makes sense for purely pragmatic reasons given the current realities of funding in Washington. Others cited the potential benefits of synthesizing experience from a variety of regions and programs, trying to generalize from many concrete cases, and sharing this information widely among A.I.D. bureaus. Finally, a participant noted that even though A.I.D. should have modest expectations about its ability to promote democracy throughout the world, much more could be gained than lost from setting initially ambitious goals.

One participant identified five operational challenges for A.I.D. that emerged from the workshop:

(1) Civil/military relations—how can A.I.D. deal effectively with historical tendencies in some regions for democratic governments to be overthrown by the military?
(2) The absence of civic culture/democratic values—what role might various kinds of education programs play in addressing this problem?
(3) Deep ethnic, religious, or tribal cleavages in a society—how can cross-cutting identifications and coalitions be built?
(4) Weak democratic institutions in countries new to democracy—how can accountability be improved?
(5) Lack of competition, whether a lack of competing political parties, an independent media, or independent think tanks—how can such productive competition be encouraged?

The discussion frequently touched on the issue of how explicitly A.I.D. should promote specific values and institutions. The distinction among political, economic, and technical intervention was essential here. Some argued that the best strategy was to foster policy making on empirical or technical grounds rather than promoting specific values or outcomes. Such technical advice is less likely to be offensive or controversial, and thus may be helpful in building coalitions. Many potential members of coalitions will accept technical advice but reject advice that obviously tries to promote specific values. Some questioned whether "purely technical" advice truly existed, however. Another participant cited the generally poor record of explicit political reform efforts. As an example, he cited failed attempts to use Latin American universities as tools of democratic institutional reform in the early 1960s. Another participant expressed skepticism that A.I.D. could accurately assess the consequences of most attempts to achieve specific political outcomes. Moreover, since uncertainty is a key element of democracy and transitions, how could outsiders reasonably be held accountable for outcomes?

The difficulty of trying to engineer democracy cross-culturally surfaced frequently as a counterargument to promoting basic democratic principles. Some of the session's most heated exchanges revolved around this basic tension. One participant argued that, even with the best intentions, intervention to promote democracy could violate freedom of choice. Participants strongly agreed with Verba's caution that, at minimum, A.I.D. initiatives should seek to "do no harm."

A basic framework of "stages" in development of democracy underscored the discussion in much of the workshop. Someone observed that policy choices would largely depend on identifying at least roughly where

a particular country was located on various measures of democratization. This in turn led to the suggestion that A.I.D. might be best advised to concentrate on countries somewhere in the middle, neglecting both countries far from democracy and well-established democracies that might nonetheless benefit from assistance in maintaining their success. One participant suggested choosing 10 or 12 such countries on which to concentrate A.I.D.'s efforts. Some participants proposed adopting a "triage" strategy. Other participants challenged the idea of ranking countries by their stage of democratic development. One basic objection was that A.I.D. probably lacks the analytical sophistication to identify stages correctly. Another objection was that a "triage" strategy violates the Agency's original mandate to help the neediest. One participant urged A.I.D. to commit itself to strategies that would enable it to work with countries no matter where they were in the democratization process.

Some participants noted that outside attempts to define specific political models provoke extraordinary sensitivity and emotional responses in many areas of the world. With the partial exception of Eastern Europe, one participant commented, few places have asked for U.S. help in building democracy. Someone commented that, looking over past A.I.D. efforts, initiatives for democracy that did not come out of, or at least respond to, genuine interests fared poorly. Another participant argued that, in his experience in the Middle East and North Africa, any association with the United States has ultimately compromised and even harmed the groups involved. He cautioned strongly against attempts at "social engineering" and the cultural imperialism it implies. Another participant urged A.I.D. to pay special attention to the alternative democratic models available around the world, and not simply to export familiar forms. He admitted that supporting democratic models unlike the American experience would not be easy, but he urged A.I.D. to support local think tanks as one way to facilitate the development of alternative democratic models. He spoke of fostering a new round of "de Tocquevilles," who would share models of democracy from different regions. Discussion of this broad issue resulted in limited consensus that A.I.D. should focus more on process and less on outcome, and trust that the end result would be positive.

There was much discussion and considerable agreement on identifying a set of fundamental democratic principles. A participant argued that promoting democracy is fundamentally different from supporting economic development because democracy is a moral issue. Hence, he said, it is important to make explicit exactly what we will not tolerate, to define the moral basis behind what we mean by "support for democracy." Unless such fundamental values are explicitly identified, he feared that old programs would simply be relabeled as "promoting democracy." One participant then proposed six fundamental democratic values he thought had emerged from

the workshop:

(1) respect for human rights;
(2) protection of minority rights;
(3) consultation of the public (responsible governance);
(4) an independent and protected judiciary;
(5) guaranteed rights for the opposition; and
(6) limits on the power of the central government.

Another participant suggested that A.I.D. should be seeking the emergence of societies that are fair, just, efficient in their use of resources, and compassionate without regard for questions of efficiency.

A number of opinions emerged on how such fundamental principles ought to be applied to A.I.D.'s work. There was general agreement that positive reinforcement was generally preferable to negative reinforcement, such as reducing or cutting off aid, but a number of options exist. A.I.D. could use fundamental principles as a test, conditioning aid on evidence of movement toward democracy. A.I.D. projects could incorporate these principles in projects that explicitly attempt to promote democratic values. Another approach would be to establish a fund to which countries could have access if they showed evidence of meeting a list of democratic requirements. In this way, there would be no penalty except opportunities foregone if a country chose not to avail itself of the fund.

A participant suggested that certain kinds of goals could be more easily promoted by reductions in aid than others. She argued that it was reasonable to believe that respect for human rights could be influenced by lowering aid in response to violations. Establishing competitive political institutions seemed more difficult to promote by "negative conditionality." Indicators of success were also harder to establish. She argued that the goal of broader popular participation, not necessarily in politics, was completely inappropriate for negative conditionality. She also urged that A.l.D. examine two broad distinctions when selecting goals and appropriate instruments. First, the Agency should determine how open or resistant a given country is to advice and "well-intentioned" intervention from a U.S. government agency. Second, A.I.D. should take into consideration the degree to which a given country is undergoing simultaneous economic upheavals and political change. The importance of taking into account economic upheaval occurring alongside political democratization was emphasized throughout the workshop.

The area of clearest agreement to emerge was that A.I.D. support for intermediary organizations and civil society should continue and should play a major role in A.I.D. efforts to promote democratization. A participant suggested that A.I.D. closely examine its past successes with

NGOs, including those in the private sector, and survey possibilities for NGO coalitions. Such coalitions might occur along programmatic lines (e.g., NGOs in a given country concerned with health issues) or in a country-to-country alliance of NGOs concerned with a specific issue.

The weight of the evidence presented at the workshop suggested that supporting intermediary organizations as fundamental components of a healthy civil society would be as, if not more, important for successful democratization than support for the formal institutions and mechanisms of government. NGOs, even seemingly apolitical ones, help to build the "infrastructure" for democracy by increasing citizen participation and promoting an active associational life.

Appendix:

Biographical Sketches of Workshop Speakers

ROBERT BIANCHI is associate professor of political science at the University of Chicago. His areas of specialization include international relations, comparative politics (especially the Middle East) and Islam and political change. Recent publications include *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth Century Egypt* (Oxford University Press, 1989), *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton University Press, 1984) and numerous journal articles on interest groups and associations in developing countries.

MICHAEL BRATTON is associate professor in the Department of Political Science and African Studies Center, Michigan State University. He has written extensively on a variety of issues relevant to Africa, particularly the importance of nongovernmental and voluntary organizations for development. He has also done research for A.I.D. and for the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. He is the author of recent articles in *Issue*, *Development and Change*, *World Politics*, and *World Development* , among other journals, and co-editor of *Governance and Politics in Africa* (Lynne Rienner Press, forthcoming 1991).

MICHAEL CLOUGH is senior fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is also a member of the board of directors of Africa Watch. In 1986–87 he was the study director of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa and the principal drafter of the Committee's report, *A U.S. Policy Towards South Africa*. He has taught at the Naval Postgraduate School and the University of Wisconsin. In addition, he has worked as a consultant to CBS News. Dr. Clough's most recent published work includes *Africa and the U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* (forthcoming), "Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices" (Summer, 1988 *Foreign Affairs*), "Beyond Constructive Engagement" (Winter, 1985–86 *Foreign Policy*). He has visited southern Africa regularly for over a decade.

LOUIS GOODMAN is dean of the School of International Service of the American University. From 1982 to 1986 he served on the senior staff of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Before joining

the Wilson Center, he was on the faculty of Yale University and was director of the Social Science Research Council's Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. Dr. Goodman has also taught at Georgetown, Princeton, and Northwestern universities, as well as at the Facultad Latinoamericana de las Ciencias Sociales in Santiago, Chile. His publications include nine books and numerous scholarly articles. His major continuing research interest, reflected in his publications, is international influences on national development in the Third World.

SELIG HARRISON is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington and has written on Asian affairs and American policy problems in Asia for almost 40 years. Mr. Harrison has written and edited a large number of books on Asia, as well as numerous articles on a range of Asian issues. Recent works include *In Afghanistan's Shadow* (Carnegie, 1981), "Ethnicity and the Political Stalemate in Pakistan" in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan* (Syracuse University Press, 1986) and numerous articles published in the domestic and foreign press. He is co-editor of *Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean* (Oxford University Press, 1989).

TERRY L. KARL is associate professor of political science at Stanford University, where she is director of the Center for Latin American Studies. Her research interests include comparative politics, the political economy of development, and theories of democratization in developing countries. Her work has largely focused on Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. She is the author of *Oil Booms and Petro-States* (University of California Press, forthcoming, 1991). Recent articles and chapters include "Dilemmas of Democratization" (in *Comparative Politics*, forthcoming, 1991), "El Salvador at the Crossroads" (*World Policy Journal*, 1989), and "The Christian Democratic Party and the Prospects for Democratization in El Salvador" in *The Sociology of Developing Countries: Central America* (Monthly Review Press, 1989).

CAROL LANCASTER *is assistant professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington. She is co-editor of African Debt and Financing* (Institute for International Economics, 1986) and the author of numerous articles. Some of the most recent are: "Reform or Else" (June/July 1990 *Africa Report*), "Economic Reform in Africa" (Winter, 1990 *Washington Quarterly*), and "Economic Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa" (May, 1989 *Current History*). She was co-author of "Funding Foreign Aid" (Summer, 1988 *Foreign Policy*).

JANE MANSBRIDGE is professor of political science at Northwestern University and a member of its Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research. Professor Mansbridge was program chair of the 1990 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. She has published

three books, *Beyond Self-Interest* (University of Chicago Press, 1990), *Why We Lost the ERA* (University of Chicago Press, 1986) and *Beyond Adversary Democracy* (University of Chicago Press, 1980), as well as numerous scholarly articles dealing with theoretical aspects of inequality and conflict in democracies.

MICHAEL MEZEY is professor of political science and associate dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at De Paul University. He is the author of *Comparative Legislatures* (Duke University Press, 1979), *Congress, the President, and Public Policy* (Westview Press, 1989), and co-editor of *Parliaments and Public Policy* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). He is also the author of book chapters, scholarly articles, and papers in the areas of comparative legislative behavior and American political institutions, including "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World" in *The Handbook of Legislative Research* (Harvard University Press, 1985).

JOHN NORTON MOORE is Walter L. Brown Professor of Law, Director of the Center of Law and National Security, and director of the Center for Oceans Law and Policy at the University of Virginia. Professor Moore's major research interests include international law, national security law, and the Constitution and foreign policy. He has served on numerous government boards and agencies as a consultant and counselor. Dr. Moore is chairman of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace, and recently observed the constitutional drafting process in Namibia on behalf of that organization. His most recent books include *The Vietnam Debate: A Fresh Look at the Arguments* (University Press of America, Inc., 1990), *National Security Law* (co-editor, Carolina Academic Press, 1990), and *The Secret War in Central America* (University Publications of America, Inc., 1986).

DANIEL NELSON is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he writes on Eastern Europe and European security. Dr. Nelson's recent books include *Romanian Politics in the Ceauscscu Era* (1989), *Elite-Mass Relations in Communist Systems* (St. Martin, 1987), and *Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact* (Westview, 1986). He edited *Soviet Alliance: Empirical Studies of the Warsaw Pact* (Westview, 1988). Dr. Nelson is the author of several recent pieces on political attitudes in Eastern Europe for the *New York Times*, *The National Interest*, *El Pais*, and other national publications. Dr. Nelson has been a Dorothy Danforth Compton Fellow, a Kellogg Foundation National Fellow, and the recipient of a research fellowship from the Hoover Institution.

JOAN NELSON is a senior associate at the Overseas Development Council in Washington. Her research interests include development assistance and policy dialogue, migration, foreign aid, and the politics of economic stabilization and reform. Her major publications include *Access*

to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1979), *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (with Samuel P. Huntington), (Harvard University Press, 1984), and *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (ed.) (Princeton University Press, 1990).

ERIC NORDLINGER is professor of political science at Brown University and an associate of Brown University's Center for Foreign Policy Development and of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. Professor Nordlinger has been the recipient of grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Ford Foundation, and the National Science Foundation. Two recent books are *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Harvard University Press, 1981), and *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government* (1977).

PEARL ROBINSON is associate professor of political science at Tufts University. She has written extensively about African politics. Her most recent work includes articles on transnational NGOs, the neotraditional corporatist state in Niger, and the challenges posed by co-development for African and Afro-American women. She contributed a chapter, "Grass-roots Participation and the Legitimation Process: The Quest for Effective Military Governance in Burkina and Niger" to *Governance and Politics in Africa* (Lynne Rienner, forthcoming). Professor Robinson co-edited *Transformation and Resiliency in Africa* (Howard University Press, 1986). She is currently working on a book, *Neotraditional Corporatism in Niger*.

PHILIPPE SCHMITTER is professor of political science at Stanford University. He has written extensively on transitions from authoritarianism to more democratic forms of rule, particularly in Southern Europe and Latin America. His recent work has dealt with topics such as corporatism and the organization of business interests, as well as a variety of other issues related to transitions to democracy. He co-edited and contributed to the four volume series, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

CHARLES TILLY (*Workshop Cochair*) is University Distinguished Professor and director of the Center for Studies of Social Change at the New School for Social Research. Professor Tilly is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the author of many scholarly books, articles, and papers. His recent books include *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Random House, 1978), *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (Russell Sage, 1985), and *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990* (Blackwell, 1990).

SIDNEY VERBA (*Workshop Cochair*) is Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professor and Professor of Government at Harvard. Professor Verba is the author of numerous books, chapters, and articles on American and com

parative politics. His recent books include *Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States* (Harvard University Press, 1987) and *Equality in America: The View from the Top* (Harvard University Press, 1985). Professor Verba has been chair of the Policy Committee of the Social Science Research Council and is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, a Guggenheim Fellow, and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dr. Verba is also director of the Harvard University Library.

SIDNEY WEINTRAUB is jointly Dean Rusk Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas and distinguished visiting scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. Prior to joining the faculty of the LBJ School, he was a foreign service officer in the U.S. Department of State. Among his positions in the State Department were deputy assistant secretary for International Finance and Development and assistant administrator of the Agency for International Development. Professor Weintraub is the author of many books and articles on international political economy. His most recent book is *A Marriage of Convenience: Relations between Mexico and the United States* (Oxford University Press, 1990).

GARY WYNIA is William J. Kenan Professor of Latin American Politics at Carleton College. He is the author of numerous books, articles, and other publications dealing with Latin America, particularly Argentina. His most recent books are *The Politics of Latin American Development* (third edition, Cambridge University Press, 1990), and *Argentina: Illusions and Realities* (Holmes and Meier, 1986). Dr. Wynia's recent articles and book chapters have dealt with issues such as Latin American debt, Central American integration, and the causes of rebellion in Central America.