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Improving the Compatibility of Vehicles and Roadside Safety **Hardware**

DETAILS

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Summary of Findings

The objectives of this study, "Improving the Compatibility of Vehicles and Roadside Safety Hardware", are to 1) Identify current and future vehicle characteristics that are potentially incompatible with existing roadside safety hardware, 2) assess opportunities for and barriers to improved compatibility, and 3) increase the vehicle and hardware manufacturer's awareness of compatibility problems.

Since the early 1990's, the United States vehicle fleet has shown drastic changes in its characteristics. Overall, vehicle size and mass have increased while a large population of drivers have shifted from passenger cars to Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs) and pickup trucks. The magnitude and implication of these changes as they affect roadside hardware crash outcomes was one area of concentration during this research.

Based on early studies, the 820 kg small car and the 2000 kg pickup truck were considered to be representative of the worst cases or extremes of the passenger vehicle population during impacts with roadside devices. Based on vehicle population profiles, this assumption was valid during the early 1980's. However, a steady increase in vehicle size for the compact and small car categories as well as the emergence of SUVs has lead to a significantly different vehicle fleet today.

Pickup trucks were found to inadequately represent the crash behavior of SUVs. Also, analysis of fatal crashes involving longitudinal barriers (guardrails and concrete median barriers) indicated that midsize SUVs have nearly 8.6 fatal crashes per million vehicles per year registered during barrier impacts; compared to 4.6 for full size pickup trucks. In addition, it was found that rollover involvement is 10-14% higher for compact and midsize SUVs verses compact and full size pickup trucks. An evaluation of the dynamic characteristics of pickup trucks and SUVs indicated significant differences in the center of gravity location (CG) and vehicle weight distribution. Further, SUVs were found to have a 10% higher rollover risk than pickups of similar wheelbase and track width.

A methodology to review real world crash cases from the National Automobile Sampling System/Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/CDS) database was developed to identify patterns and occurrences of incompatibility. In all, 247 crash cases were reviewed thoroughly. These cases involved passenger vehicle impacts with guardrails, concrete median barriers and end terminals. Based on this review, the following observations were made.

1. Under typical impact conditions (i.e. impact angles \leq 25 deg), small and midsize cars involved in guardrail crashes are usually safely redirected with minimal injury to the occupants. This

indicates that there are no major compatibility issues between guardrails and these types of vehicles.

- 2. Impacts with concrete median barriers were found to be more serious. Even at moderate impact angles, significant numbers of car occupants sustained serious injuries.
- 3. Under normal impact conditions into guardrails and concrete median barriers, significantly higher counts of rollovers were found among SUVs than compact and full-size pickup trucks.
- 4. A significant number of end terminals intruding into the occupant compartment during side impact collisions with passenger cars were found.
- 5. Side impact crashes of SUVs involving guardrail end terminals often resulted in severe barrier deformation and a lack of vehicle containment. Often this lack of containment lead to additional harmful impacts with natural features behind the barrier.

Passenger vehicle crashes with roadside devices often involve other harmful events or impact characteristics which contribute to the likelihood of serious injury. Data contained in the NASS/CDS system provides good documentation of vehicle behavior and occupant protection; however, several factors that are important for roadside hardware safety analysis are missing. To provide this additional information, supplemental data collection sheets have been created (Section 4.2 Figures 4.2-4.5). These proposed sheets are intended to help accident investigators collect pertinent device and crash characteristics. In addition, supplemental instructions are given to document impacted devices using more detailed scene photographs.

In order to identify the vehicle structural characteristics that affected the outcome of roadside hardware crashes, several databases were examined to determine the vehicle dimensions. Upon examination of the structural characteristics of the vehicles contained in the databases, some correlation was found between vehicle global attributes and crash outcomes. Specifically an evaluation of track width and height, overall height, and mass indicated good correlation with crash outcomes and severe injuries. However, more detailed characteristics, such as frame rail spread, frontal overhang and center of force did not show a significant correlation.

Further, to identify the most appropriate vehicles for testing roadside hardware devices, vehicle registration data as well as vehicle characteristics were examined. A new vehicle classification method was established using this data. An average vehicle from within each of these classes would be a logical choice as a test vehicle.

To solicit ideas from a group of safety experts and to raise awareness to communities who are not exposed to roadside safety issues, a one day workshop was organized. Representatives from the automotive industry, roadside hardware manufacturers and a series of government agencies attended a one day workshop for this purpose. Specific workshop findings include:

- 1. The automotive industry was not aware of the magnitude and frequency of incompatibilities between roadside hardware and vehicles. Because of this, their current vehicle design strategies do not specifically address these issues.
- 2. Future roadside hardware testing criteria must take emerging vehicle platforms and design trends into account. The vehicles chosen for testing must be representative of the current vehicle population.
- 3. Automotive manufacturers are willing to explore the use of finite element methods to evaluate their emerging vehicle designs. Vehicle finite element models can be used to simulate a series of impact conditions with prominent roadside devices.
- 4. Improved data collection and analysis techniques are necessary to evaluate on-the-road systems and aid in identifying vehicle to roadside hardware incompatibilities.

Chapter 1 Introduction and Background

Between 1995 and 2000, over 2,000,000 people were injured during single vehicle crashes involving roadside structures. More than 280,000 sustained serious injuries. Single vehicle crashes involving roadside objects accounted for over 1/4 of all serious and fatal injuries that occurred on the roadways. The societal costs associated with these impacts consistently exceeded \$70 billion annually during this time period.

The function of roadside safety features, as stated by NCHRP Report 350, is:

to provide a forgiving roadway and roadside for an errant motorist. The safety goal is met when the feature either contains and redirects the vehicle away from a hazardous area, decelerates the vehicle to a stop over a relatively short distance, readily breaks away or fractures or yields, allows a controlled penetration, or is traversable, without causing serious injuries to the vehicle's occupants or to other motorists, pedestrians, or work zone personnel. [38]

As these devices contain, redirect or decelerate vehicles in a safe manner, the risk of impact with noncrashworthy objects at the roadside is reduced.

In many cases, the roadside hardware safety systems were designed and installed over 20 years ago. These systems are based on attributes of a now outdated vehicle fleet. The current crash testing criteria utilizes more modern impacting vehicles but only two vehicle classes are required for testing. These two classes, specified in Report 350, are the small passenger car class (820 kg) and the large pickup truck class (2000 kg). These platforms adequately represent the extremes of the passenger vehicle fleet, but it remains unclear if intermediate vehicle platforms exhibit the same impact behavior as these tested vehicles.

Changes in vehicle attributes over the past two decades; including size, mass and geometry; have been drastic while design criteria for roadside hardware systems have evolved at a lower rate. Those safety systems designed to perform adequately with older vehicles cannot be expected to perform similarly with more modern vehicle structures. In addition, the populations of today's vehicle classes are drastically different than those of only 5 years ago due to the increased popularity of light trucks and sport utility vehicles. These vehicles have gained popularity recently, and their market share will continue to grow based on recent projections. Due to higher CG, larger mass and varied structural geometry, this vehicle class will not interact with roadside structures like passenger cars. Conversely, small cars have decreased in popularity and their vehicle structures have become larger in recent years. As a consequence,

current test procedures using the 820 kg body structure may not adequately represent the current and future vehicle fleet.

This study investigates these changes in vehicle attributes and the vehicle's compatibility with roadside hardware devices. A summary of this investigation is included in the next three sections of this report. First, in Chapter 2, real world crash data and case studies from the NASS/CDS and FARS databases are examined. Next, Chapter 3, the vehicle characteristics and registrations are presented to identify changes in the vehicle fleet over the past ten years. Following this, strategies to improve vehicle to roadside hardware compatibility are included in Chapter 4. In chapter 5, conclusions and suggestions for future research are given for the benefit of subsequent work in this area.

Chapter 2 Analysis of Real World Crash Information

An investigation of cases in the National Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness Data Systems (NASS/CDS) [13] and the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) [28] databases unearthed many accidents involving vehicles and roadside hardware systems. It was found that the different classes of vehicles had different compatibility issues with roadside hardware systems. These issues were investigated using two different approaches. The first approach used statistical analysis to find correlations between vehicle characteristics and roadside hardware compatibility. The second approach examined individual accident cases to gain further insight into compatibility issues.

2.1 Statistical Analysis

A detailed investigation of NASS/CDS and FARS databases was conducted to understand the impact performance of vehicle body types during crashes with roadside objects. The vehicle body types surveyed included different sizes of cars, SUVs, pickup trucks and vans. Roadside hardware objects were categorized as guardrails, concrete median barriers and small to midsized poles and posts.

New vehicle classifications were derived based on vehicle mass, wheelbase and body style. This classification was adopted in this study due to limitations found in the classification schemes currently used in NASS and FARS databases. The absence of a midsize SUV category and outdated mass cutoffs for the small car category prompted this reclassification. These new vehicle classes are listed in Table 2.1.

Midsized	3500 lb. \leq Weight \leq 4850 lb. AND Length $<$ 190 in. AND Height $<$ 75 in.
Large	Length \geq 190 in. OR Weight > 4850 lb. OR Height > 75 in.
Pickup Trucks	
Compact	Weight $<$ 3500 lb. AND Height $<$ 70 in.
Large	Weight \geq 3500 lb. OR Height \geq 70 in.
Vans	
Midsized	Height \leq 70 in. OR (Height < 75 in. AND Weight < 4000 lb.)
Large	Height \geq 70 in. OR Weight > 4000 lb.

Table 2.01 Reclassification criteria for new vehicle categories

 Over 90% of all passenger vehicles listed in the 2000 registration database were classified using this new scheme. Low volume models, pre-1980 models, and vehicles with missing dimensional information could not be classified. All statistical analysis includes only those vehicles where the key dimensional attributes are known.

Figure 2.1 shows crash mode distribution by body type for these vehicle classes listed above. The figure includes frontal, near side, far side, rear and rollover crashes. Frontal crashes are defined as impacts where the Principal Direction of Force (PDOF) is 10 o'clock through 2 o'clock and the General Area of Damage (GAD) is "front." Nearside crashes occur when the GAD is side and the occupant in question is seated on this side of the vehicle. Far side crashes are side impacts where the occupant is seated on the non-struck side of the vehicle. Rear crashes involve a PDOF of 5 through 7 o'clock and a "rear" GAD. A crash is classified as a rollover if a vehicle undergoes at least one quarter-turn. In addition to the percent of total, included in the figure is the percent involvement of frontal and rollover crashes for each class. It can be observed from the figure that compact and midsize SUV's are nearly six times more likely to be involved in rollover events than midsize cars.

Crash Mode Distribution By Bodytype Per Occupant (1998-2000 NASS CDS)

Figure 2.01 Crash involvement of passenger vehicles by impact mode (1998-2000 NASS/CDS)

Fatality rates for each vehicle class were also investigated. These rates, shown in Table 2.3, are presented in deaths per million vehicles registered. The four columns in the table display: fatality rates for all occurring crashes, crashes where guardrail impact was the most harmful event, crashes where concrete barriers were the most harmful event and crashes where posts and poles were the most harmful event. Each set of data has been ranked by fatality rate. The highest rates were placed at the top and the lowest at the bottom. A similar analysis was performed with rollover crashes excluded from the data, these results are listed in Table 2.4. In the table of all crashes (including rollover), fatality rates for compact cars are higher than fatality rates for other vehicle classes. However midsize and large SUVs have the highest fatality rates during Guardrail and Concrete Median Barrier impacts. Table 2.4, where rollover events are not considered, shows that fatality rates for SUV impacts with longitudinal barriers drop below the fatality rates of small and midsize cars.

During this analysis, adjustment for vehicle occupancy was considered. Table 2.2 shows the average number of vehicle occupants per vehicle class. Figure 2.2 shows these values in terms of occupant count for each vehicle body type. These occupancy values are normalized as a percent of the total number of crashes for each vehicle category. Further normalization by crash involvement reveals that SUV's are involved in slightly more crashes per vehicle registered than pickup trucks so that the fatality rates may be influenced by driver behavior in addition to the crash performance of each vehicle class. This trend is recognized however no adjustment for this trend has been made during this analysis.

Body Type	Ave. Occupants Per Vehicle	Percent Difference vs. Passenger Cars
Cars	1.46	Baseline
Small SUV's	1.49	1.9%
Large SUV's	1.64	11.7%
Small Pickups	1.28	$-12.6%$
Large Pickups	1.41	-3.6%
Minivans	1.83	25.0%

Table 2.02 Occupancy rates for each vehicle class relative to passenger car occupancy

Distribution of Crash Involvement by Occupant Count

Figure 2.02: Occupancy counts normalized by total crash count per vehicle class

Another observation is that compact cars have the highest fatality rates during impacts with poles and posts.

Rollover Cases Included							
All Crashes		Guardrails		Concrete Barriers		Posts/Poles	
Comp Car	192.2	Mid SUV	8.6	Lrg SUV	2.3	Comp Car	14.3
Comp Trk	189.4	Lrg SUV	7.5	Comp SUV	1.9	Mid Car	13.4
Lrg SUV	189.1	Comp Car	5.8	Mid SUV	1.8	Comp Trk	12.9
Mid SUV	176.6	Mid Car	5.7	Comp Car	1.4	Lrg SUV	11.9
Mid Car	168.5	Comp SUV	5.6	Mid Car	1.2	Lrg Car	10.1
Comp SUV	156.9	Comp Trk	4.9	Lrg Van	0.9	Mid SUV	9.9
Lrg Car	133.6	Lrg Trk	4.6	Mid Van	0.9	Comp SUV	9.6
Mid Van	117.1	Lrg Car	4.3	Lrg Car	0.9	Lrg Trk	7.2
Lrg Trk	111.3	Mid Van	4.2	Comp Trk	0.9	Lrg Van	5.7
Lrg Van	87.5	Lrg Van	3.9	Lrg Trk	0.6	Mid Van	4.8

Table 2.03 Fatality rates for each vehicle class ranked from highest to lowest

Rollover Cases Excluded								
All Crashes		Guardrails		Concrete Barriers		Posts/Poles		
Comp Car	147.6	Mid Car	3.4	Comp Car	0.9	Comp Car	10.5	
Mid Car	130.4	Comp Car	3.3	Mid Car	0.8	Mid Car	9.7	
Comp Trk	112.7	Lrg Car	2.8	Lrg SUV	0.7	Lrg Car	7.8	
Lrg Car	110.9	Mid SUV	2.5	Lrg Car	0.7	Comp Trk	7.8	
Lrg SUV	78.9	Comp SUV	2.2	Mid Van	0.5	Lrg SUV	5.5	
Mid Van	74.1	Comp Trk	2.0	Comp SUV	0.4	Lrg Trk	3.9	
Lrg Trk	62.3	Lrg Trk	1.9	Lrg Van	0.4	Mid SUV	3.7	
Mid SUV	59.5	Mid Van	1.9	Comp Trk	0.3	Lrg Van	3.6	
Comp SUV	58.8	Lrg SUV	1.4	Mid SUV	0.3	Comp SUV	3.5	
Lrg Van	48.9	Lrg Van	1.4	Lrg Trk	0.3	Mid Van	2.9	

Table 2.04 Fatality rates excluding rollover-involved fatalities for each vehicle class ranked from highest to lowest

The NASS/CDS database was also used to assess fatality counts for impacts where the most harmful event was contact with a roadside hardware object. Fatality trends in impacts involving these objects were found per vehicle class based on the population of those vehicles on the road from 1990-2000. The analysis did not show significant differences in crash performance as vehicle design changed over this ten year period. It should be noted the frequency of roadside device installations was not included in the analysis therefore exposure was not well accounted for.

2.2 Single Vehicle Crash Case Reviews

In order to examine the vehicle to guardrail interaction more closely and identify compatibility issues, a thorough investigation of individual crash cases from the NASS/CDS database was performed. A webbased query tool was developed to facilitate access to complete NASS/CDS case information. The tool was used to query the NASS/CDS database with a user defined set of crash attributes. Once the cases were chosen, the tool allowed the individual cases to be reviewed in a simple and easy to read format. In these summaries, all data points recorded by NASS/CDS investigators were available, including the scene diagrams and post-crash photographs. Key variables from the NASS/CDS database have been selected for this study and displayed for each individual case. These variables gave a concise overview of the following accident attributes:

- 1. Crash Severity
- 2. Pre-Crash Environment
- 3. Vehicle Factors
- 4. Pre-Crash Driver Data
- 5. Driver Factors
- 6. Severe Injuries Sustained Per Occupant

This format was chosen to understand crash causation, vehicle behavior and injuries for individual roadside hardware crashes. Due to the limited amount of information concerning the roadside hardware systems in the NASS/CDS database, the crash photos were carefully examined to determine the type of guardrail involved in the collision. Upon completion of review for each case, the four photographs that best represent the case were chosen. The summary sheets were created, which include these photographs, the relevant case information, the scene diagram and the case summary to highlight the nature of the crash event.

Note: In some cases, certain data points could not obtained by NASS crash investigators and are therefore unavailable for this analysis. These data points, including some deltaV values and impact speeds, are alternatively coded as \leq km/h or 998 to indicate unknowns. This occurs in some cases because current methods used to retrospectively calculate deltaV based on vehicle crush are not valid for underride or override situations seen during some roadside hardware impacts. Similarly, impact speed is

difficult to discern if final rest position and impact trajectory is unavailable. The data presented here is based on the best available crash information available within the NASS/CDS database.

The case review revealed different levels of vehicle to roadside hardware compatibility. Guardrails performed well when impacted by cars. Very few injuries were found in car to guardrail collisions involving a belted occupant. Un-belted occupants suffered more injuries than belted occupants, however many of these injuries were caused by partial or full ejection upon impact. Therefore it was hypothesized that the installation of a side curtain airbag would help reduce these injuries. More injuries were found in impacts involving cars and concrete barriers. Side curtain airbags would also help to reduce these injuries. Airbags can also be used to minimize the acceleration during automobile impacts with end terminals, however the timing of the airbag deployment could be critical.

Pick-up trucks and SUVs suffered from different types of incompatibilities with roadside hardware systems. The higher CG of these vehicles led to the vaulting of roadside barriers more frequently than cars. In addition, many of the injuries found in impacts between these vehicles and roadside hardware systems were the result of a rollover. In several cases, the hardware itself tripped the vehicle inducing a roll. A second mechanism of roll occurred due to an instability introduced by the collision with a barrier. Even though the barrier redirected the vehicle, this added instability caused the vehicle to roll later in the crash event.

The following 13 cases have been selected as examples of typical behavior during passenger vehicle impacts with roadside devices. In all of these cases the roadside device was the first or second most harmful event, and a serious injury (Maximum Abbreviated Injury Severity [MAIS] level 3+) occurred. Additionally, Appendix A contains a further selection of NASS/CDS cases meeting these criteria.

Case 1: 1998-75-154

In this case, a driver of a Toyota 4-Runner lost control while attempting a right-hand turn. Once out of control, the vehicle impacted a guardrail, climbed over the rail and subsequently rolled over. The rollover was a climb over initiated event with a tripping force applied to the undercarriage of the vehicle as indicated by the NASS investigator. The vehicle completed 5-quarter turns, and the occupant was ejected and killed.

This case is an example of poor interaction between the vehicle and barrier system where the guardrail failed to contain an SUV. Investigation into the scene and vehicle post crash pictures showed that the SUV hit the guardrail at a modest angle; however the SUV vaulted the barrier. It is hypothesized that impact severity (impact speed) may have exceeded the design capacity of this barrier; however, the post impact trajectory, as indicated by the scaled scene diagram, does not suggest excessive impact energy where multiple vehicle rolls occurred over a large distance. Current NCHRP 350 guidelines test these barrier systems at 100 km/h, 80 km/h and 60 km/h. This impact appears to have been at a lower severity than those required by NCHRP 350.

Pictures of the scene showed the guardrail to be a W-beam rail with wood posts and wood blockouts. It appears the guardrail was installed down a backslope. The high ground clearance, short overhang and exposed front tires of the 4-Runner led to interaction of the tires and barrier climbing by the vehicle. Additionally, the high CG and low static stability factor of this vehicle raised the risk of subsequent rollover once the vehicle climbed over the barrier system.

Important Factors

- Height of Treatment Relative to Roadway
- Installation Height of Treatment
- Distance of Treatment Relative to Roadway
- Downward Slope of Roadside before Impact Point
- CG Height of Toyota 4-Runner
- Average CG Height of Mid-Size SUVs
- Average CG Height of Full Size Pickup Trucks
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

1 Case 1998-75-154

Summary:

V1 WAS TRAVELING WESTBOUND ON A TWO LANE TWO-WAY ROADWAY. V1 HAD JUST NEGOTIATED A SLIGHT RIGHT CURVE IN THE ROADWAY WHEN CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE WAS LOST. THE VEHICLE TRAVELED TO THE LEFT ACROSS THE CENTER LANE LINE, YAWED COUNTER CLOCKWISE ACROSS THE EASTBOUND TRAVEL LANE AND IMPACTED A GUARDRAIL WITH ITS FRONT. THE VEHICLE CONTINUED WESTBOUND, CLIMBING OVER THE GUARDRAIL AND BECAME AIRBORNE. THE VEHICLE HIT THE GROUND, ROTATED SLIGHTLY CLOCKWISE HIT A SMALL TREE AND ROLLED 5 QUARTER TURNS LEADING WITH ITS LEFT SIDE. DURING THE ROLLOVER, THE RIGHT FRONT DOOR OPENED. THE DRIVER WAS EJECTED THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD. THE DRIVER CAME TO REST APPROXIMATELY 13 METERS FROM V1'S FINAL REST. V1 CAME TO REST ON ITS LEFT SIDE FACING NORTHWEST. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED FROM THE SCENE. THE DRIVER WAS TRANSPORTED AND DIED APPROXIMATELY 5 HOURS AFTER THE ACIDENT.

Figure 2.03: Case 1: Summary

Occupant: 1998-75-154-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 3 Rollover Initiation Type CLIMB-OVER Location of Rollover Initiation ROADSIDE/MEDIAN Rollover Initiation Object OTHER BARRIER Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied UNDERCARRIAGE Direction of Initial Roll ROLL LEFT

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 26 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.04: Case 1: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 60.957641664

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 7
Pre-event Movement NEGOTIATE NEGOTIATE CURVE Critical Pre-crash Event OFF EDGE-LEFT Attempted Avoidance BRAKE W/O LOCKUP Maneuver Pre-impact Stability LATERAL SKID-CLK Pre-impact Location DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

Occupant
MAIS

MAIS $S = \text{CRITICAL INJURY}$

Seat Position
FRONT LEFT SIDE FRONT LEFT SIDE

Case 2: 2000-12-4

In this case a Pontiac Grand Prix was traveling on a snowy road when it lost control. A clockwise rotation was induced and the vehicle went off of the road to the right. The vehicle engaged a guardrail end terminal, but due to the direction of the velocity vector only a short portion of the beam was deformed as designed. Buckling downstream of the impact point due to bending loads lead to redirection of the vehicle down the backslope. As the vehicle initiated a rollover down the hill, the driver was severely injured due to multiple contacts inside the vehicle compartment.

Initially, the guardrail terminal performed as designed. An examination of the car showed some damage, but there was little barrier penetration into the occupant compartment as seen in other end terminal cases. Due to the compatible heights of the door sill and the lowest point on the end terminal, the stiff vehicle side structure adequately transferred energy to the barrier.

An examination of the accident scene showed that the guardrail absorbed some energy and deflected adequately, however the distance between this installation and the backslope may have been too small. Had the terminal been installed slightly upstream, the system may decelerate the vehicle sufficiently before the backslope to avoid the rollover. Similar cases were seen where a guardrail terminal decelerated the vehicle, but the vehicle still subsequently impacted trees, poles and bridge posts with sufficient speed to cause injury.

Therefore the installation of a guardrail should ensure that the hazard is protected using a sufficiently long section of guardrail. In doing this, the guardrail terminal will be installed well forward of the protected hazard.

Other Similar Cases: 1998-12-18, 1999-73-12, 2000-12-4, 2000-8-190

Important Factors

- Location of End-Terminal Relative to Hazard
- Length of Deformation of End Terminal
- Vehicle Door Sill Height
- Average Mid-Size Vehicle door Sill Height
- Height of Treatment (bottom edge)
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

2 Case 2000-12-4

Summary: V1 WAS HEADED NORTH ON A 3 LANE, SNOWY, ASPHALT ROADWAY AFTER DARK AND WITH LITTLE OR NO ARTIFICIAL LIGHTING. TRAVELING IN LANE 1, V1 LOST CONTROL OF HIS VEHICLE DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS AND LEFT THE ROADWAY TO THE RIGHT STRIKING A GUARDRAIL PRIOR TO FINAL REST ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE VEHICLE OFF ROAD. THE VEHICLE WAS TOWED DUE TO DAMAGE AND THE DRIVER WAS TRANSPORTED TO MEDICAL ATTENTION DUE TO THE SEVERITY OF HIS INJURIES. ⊙

Figure 2.05: Case 2: Summary

Occupant: 2000-12-4-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 2 Rollover Initiation Type TRIP-OVER Location of Rollover Initiation ROADSIDE/MEDIAN Rollover Initiation Object OTHER FIXED OBJECT Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied WHEELS/TIRES Direction of Initial Roll ROLL LEFT

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 16 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.06: Case 2: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 46.019742061

Pre-Crash Driver Data

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

Case 3: 1999-11-70

This case showed a Ford Escort that impacted a concrete barrier while trying to avoid another car. The occupant in this case suffered severe injuries, although he was belted and did not hit a concrete barrier at a severe angle.

This case demonstrates the typical behavior of small and midsize vehicle impacting concrete median barriers. Although the occupant was belted, he sustained head injuries due to steering wheel contact. The contact marks on the barrier indicates that the impact angle was shallow enough to lift and deflect the vehicle downstream so that the PDOF is estimated to be about 11 o'clock. Further, scrapes on the rear of the vehicle indicate that the vehicle yawed/rotated back out toward traffic without a high longitudinal acceleration of the vehicle.

For this impact scenario, a more vertical barrier profile may have reduced the longitudinal acceleration of the vehicle, which leads to the head strike. However, a reduction in longitudinal deceleration would result in a higher lateral acceleration force of the vehicle and occupant. Further analysis is necessary to understand if this tradeoff would lead to increased or decreased occupant risk. The contribution of frontal airbag systems (not available here) would also change occupant injury potential for this impact condition. Any new design of concrete median barriers must not only consider interaction with cars, but also trucks and SUVs, which may benefit from increased barrier slopes as well.

Important Factors

- Barrier Impact Speed
- Barrier Profile
- Occupant Restraint system and Kinematics
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

Other Similar Cases: 1999-12-120,1999-72-71,1999-73-92, 1999-9-7, 2000-73-167, 1999-8-226, 1997-45-198, 1998-12-161

Summary: V1 A 1988 FORD ESCORT WAS TRAVELING WESTBOUND IN LANE TWO ON AN EXPRESSWAY. THE EXPRESSWAY IS PHYSICALLY DIVIDED BY A MEDIAN WALL. A NON-CONTACT VEHICLE CAME INTO LANE TWO AND V1 STEERED LEFT TO AVOID THE VEHICLE. V1 LOST CONTROL AND WENT OFF ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE ROADWAY (ON THE SHOULDER) AND THE FRONT LEFT BUMPER OF HIS VEHICLE CONTACTED THE MEDIAN WALL. V1 WAS TOWED DUE TO VEHICLE DAMAGE. THE DRIVER OF V1 WAS TRANSPORTED AND HOSPITALIZED DUE TO HIS INJURIES HE SUSTAINED FROM THE ACCIDENT. $\sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}$ E STED 70 E Vehicle Body Type Make Model Year Occ.# Age Occupant's Maximum known occupant sex a is
 $3 =$ SERIOUS INJURY 1 3DR/2DR HATCHBAK Ford Escort/EXP 1988 1 17 MALE

Figure 2.07: Case 3: Summary

Occupant: 1999-11-70-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 1 Rollover Initiation Type NO ROLLOVER Location of Rollover Initiation NO ROLLOVER Rollover Initiation Object NO ROLLOVER Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied NO ROLLOVER Direction of Initial Roll NO ROLLOVER

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test $(< 95$ indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 213.58406145

Pre-Crash Driver Data

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

Figure 2.08: Case 3: Crash Information

22

Case 4: 2000-13-113

In this case, an Oldsmobile Cutlass drifted off of the road and impacted a guardrail without an end terminal head on. The vehicle was severely damaged and the occupant was fatally injured. The magnitude of the vehicle deformation suggested a very large deltaV or a stiff barrier system. Critical information was missing within this case to draw either conclusion.

The occupant suffered fatal injuries. It should be noted that the driver was not belted in a nonairbag equipped vehicle. Due to the delayed investigation of this case, it is unclear what the resulting barrier characteristics were. No estimate of deltaV has been provided due to limitation in NHTSA accident reconstruction software (WinSmash). This software does not include models of typical roadside barriers from which deltaV calculations can be made. This case provides a good example of flaws in currently available crash data.

Other Similar Cases: 1997-41-14, 1997-73-37, 1997

Figure 2.09: Case 4: Summary

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Occupant: 2000-13-113-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 1 Rollover Initiation Type NO ROLLOVER

Location of Rollover Initiation NO ROLLOVER Location of Rollover Initiation NO ROLLOVER
Rollover Initiation Object NO ROLLOVER Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied NO ROLLOVER Direction of Initial Roll NO ROLLOVER

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 1 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.10: Case 4: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 86.712829417

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 1 Pre-event Movement GOING STRAIGHT Critical Pre-crash Event OFF EDGE-RIGHT Attempted Avoidance NO AVOIDANCE Maneuver Pre-impact Stability TRACKING Pre-impact Location DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

Case 5: 1997-12-114

This case indicates correct performance of a guardrail where a severe injury still occurred. In this case a Mercury Sable left the road and impacted a double W-beam guardrail installation (mounted one above the other). The angle of impact was not severe, the driver was belted but she sustained severe injuries to her arm. Evidence of significant steering wheel loading is seen which may have lead to the serious (AIS-3) lower arm injury.

The deformation of the vehicle and barrier system is not well documented however; a significant amount of barrier penetration has taken place. In addition, sections of the upper beam have failed which contributed to the extreme frontal damage to the vehicle. The presence of the stiff bumper point may have caused the rupture of the W beam (in a manner similar to the results of section 3.4). This behavior during deformable longitudinal barrier interaction was detrimental. However, the presence of the lower section here may have prevented subsequent barrier penetration.

Important Factors

- Frame Rail Spread
- Barrier Installation
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

Other Similar Cases: 1998-2-148, 1998-9-123, 1998-9-72, 1999-41-65, 1999-75-70, 2000-43-115

Figure 2.11: Case 5: Summary

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Occupant: 1997-12-114-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 3 Rollover Initiation Type NO ROLLOVER Location of Rollover Initiation

Rollover Initiation Object

NO ROLLOVER Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied NO ROLLOVER Direction of Initial Roll NO ROLLOVER

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test $\left($ < 95 indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 98.655342224 Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 2 Pre-event Movement SUCES AVOID PREV Critical Pre-crash Event OTH CRIT EVENT Attempted Avoidance BRAKE+STEER RT Maneuver
Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Stability LATERAL SKID-CLK

Pre-impact Location DEPARTED ROADWAY DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

Figure 2.12: Case 5: Crash Information

Case 6: 1998-6-31

End Terminal - Door Penetration

This case is an example of a guardrail terminal penetration into the side structure of a car. In this case, a Lexus GS 300 lost control and spun into the median. Once off of the road, the car impacted the guardrail end at the driver's side door. Due to the lack of rigid structure within the door, the guardrail penetrated the occupant compartment and caused serious injuries to the driver's thigh.

The case presented the need for the guardrail end to engage the door sill/rocker panels of automobiles. In side impact, the rocker panel is a major structural element. If this feature is engaged, the vehicle stiffness should exceed that of the barrier system leading to controlled deformation at the end terminal system.

Important Factors

- Door Sill Height
- Average Door Sill Height for Full Size Vehicles
- End Terminal Height

Other Similar Cases: 1999-49-209

Figure 2.13: Case 6: Summary

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Occupant: 1998-6-31-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 2 Rollover Initiation Type NO ROLLOVER

Location of Rollover Initiation NO ROLLOVER Location of Rollover Initiation NO ROLLOVER
Rollover Initiation Object NO ROLLOVER Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied NO ROLLOVER Direction of Initial Roll NO ROLLOVER

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 8.6703603942 Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 7 Pre-event Movement NEGOTIATE CURVE Critical Pre-crash Event OVER LINE LEFT Attempted Avoidance NO AVOIDANCE Maneuver
Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Stability LATERAL SKID-CTR CLK DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

AIS Level Region Injured Contacts 3 = SERIOUS INJURY THIGH LEFT HARDWARE

Figure 2.14: Case 6: Crash Information

Case 7: 1997-41-51

During this case, a Ford Explorer collided with another passenger vehicle. This force the Explorer to veer into concrete median barrier at a fairly steep impact angle (estimated 45 deg.). Upon impact the interaction with the barrier lead to a counterclockwise rotation of the Explorer followed by a roll onto its right side.

Important Factors

- Frontal Overhang of Ford Explorer
- Average Frontal Overhang of Mid-Size SUVs
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

7 Case 1997-41-51

Summary:

V1 WAS TRAVELING SOUTHBOUND ON SIX LANE INTERSTATE ROADWAY, ROAD SURFACE BLACKTOP, LEVEL, WET DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. V1 WAS IN SIXTH LANE. V2 WAS TRAVELING SOUTHBOUND IN FORTH LANE WHEN V1 COLLIDED WITH RIGHT SIDE AT WHICH TIME V2 VEERED LEFT STRICKING CONCRETE MEDIAN WITH FRONT THEN ROTATED IN COUNTERCLOCKWISE ROTATION AND FLIPPING OVER ONTO RIGHT SIDE COMINT TO FINAL REST FACING S/E. V3 WAS TRAVELING SOUTHBOUND IN FORTH LANE WHEN V1 CAME TO FINAL; REST IN FORTH LANE,V3 COLLIDED WITH THE REAR OF V1. V1 and V2 WERE TOWED FROM SCENE, V3 LEFT SCENE UNDER OWN POWER, DRIVERS OF V1 and V2 PLUS PASSENGERS IN V1 WERE TRANSPORTED TO A MEDICAL FACILITY.

Vehicle	Body Type	Make	Model	Year	$Occ.$ #	Age	Occupant's	Maximum known occupant
							sex	ais
	4-DR SEDAN/HDTOP	Chrysler	Lebaron	1987		35	FEMALE-	$1 = MINOR INJURY$
							NOT PREG	
	4-DR SEDAN/HDTOP	Chrysler	Lebaron	1987	2	6	MALE	$0 = NOT INJURED$
	4-DR SEDAN/HDTOP	Chrysler	Lebaron	1987	3		FEMALE-	$1 = MINOR INJURY$
							NOT PREG	
	COMPACT UTILITY	Ford	Bronco II	1995		31	MALE	$3 =$ SERIOUS INJURY

Figure 2.15: Case 7: Summary

Occupant: 1997-41-51-2-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 4 Rollover Initiation Type BOUNCE-OVER Location of Rollover Initiation ROADSIDE/MEDIAN Rollover Initiation Object CONCRETE BARRIER Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied END PLANE Direction of Initial Roll ROLL RIGHT

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test $\left(< 95 \right)$ indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.16: Case 7: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 58.819306296 Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 45
Pre-event Movement GOING STRAIGHT Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event SAME DIR-OV RGHT Attempted Avoidance NO AVOIDANCE Maneuver Pre-impact Stability

Pre-impact Location

STAYED IN LANE Pre-impact Location

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

34

Case 8: 1997-6-92

In this case, a grossly overloaded (11 occupants) Isuzu Rodeo collided with a concrete barrier. This collision although minor, resulted in the rollover of the vehicle and serious injuries to the occupants. The driver (belted) did not sustain serious injuries; however, a two year old occupant who was unrestrained sustained serious injuries during the crash.

This case exemplifies the difficulty in designing roadside hardware for SUVs. In the summary to this case, it appeared the vehicle impacted the barrier at a relatively shallow angle. It also appeared that the barrier performed as designed (i.e. redirect the vehicle). The vehicle photos appeared to confirm this. The damage to the vehicle was mostly due to the vehicle sliding along the ground.

It is unclear how the vehicle interaction with the barrier on the right side lead to a positive roll direction about the longitudinal axis of the vehicle (roll right). It is speculated by the research team that the barrier introduced a slight instability to the Rodeo and the driver was unable to recover.

Important Factors

- Height of Contact With Barrier
- CG Height of Isuzu Rodeo
- Average CG Height of Mid-Size SUVs
- Average CG Height of Full Size Pickup Trucks
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

Figure 2.17: Case 8: Summary

Occupant: 1997-6-92-1-4

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 2 Rollover Initiation Type BOUNCE-OVER
Location of Rollover Initiation ROADSIDE/MEDIAN Location of Rollover Initiation

Rollover Initiation Object

CONCRETE BARRIER Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied SIDE PLANE Direction of Initial Roll ROLL RIGHT

Age 2 Height 61 Weight 23

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.18: Case 8: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 10.465799133

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 2
Pre-event Movement CHANGING LANES Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event OFF EDGE-RIGHT Attempted Avoidance STEERING LEFT Maneuver Pre-impact Stability TRACKING
Pre-impact Location LEFT TRAVEL LANE LEFT TRAVEL LANE

PASSENGER Factors

Injuries

AIS Level Region Injured Contacts 3 = SERIOUS INJURY FOREARM UNKNOWN SOURCE

Case 9: 1998-72-44

The events of this case include a Chevrolet Blazer drifting off of the left side of the road and impacting a concrete median barrier. This impact caused the Blazer to roll and resulted in a severe head injury for the driver. Although the vehicle experienced a deceleration severe enough to result in significant steering wheel deformation, the airbags in this vehicle did not deploy. It should be noted that the left front (driverside) wheel was torn from the upper and lower a-arms due to the high interactive forces with the barrier as well.

This case indicates that excessive conditions are not required to roll less stable SUVs. A sudden vertical loading of one wheel will initiate a rollover event. Although the Blazer drifted off of the road at a slight angle, there was enough roll moment to cause the vehicle to overturn. This case also suggests that airbag sensors in recent model vehicles may not be well suited to sense these off axis impacts with longitudinal barriers. This hypothesis requires additional investigation using crash testing of airbag equipped vehicles or simulation study.

Unfortunately, in this case, the vehicle was already in the shop before the NASS investigator could photograph the damage. Since it was impossible to tell the exact location of vehicle impact with the barrier, the importance of a timely investigation was also illustrated.

Important Factors

- Height of Contact With Barrier
- Slope of Roadway at Impact Point
- CG Height of Chevrolet Blazer
- Average CG Height of Mid-Size SUVs
- Average CG Height of Full Size Pickup Trucks
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

9 Case 1998-72-44

Summary:

V1 WAS TRAVELING SOUTHBOUND ON A TWO-LANE DIVIDED EXPRESSWAY RAMP IN THE SECOND TRAVEL LANE. V1 DRIFTED OFF TO THE LEFT SHOULDER AND IMPACTED THE CONCRETE BARRIER WITH ITS' FRONT PLANE. THIS IMPACT CAUSED V1 TO ROLL ONTO ITS' RIGHT SIDE AND SLIDE TO FINAL REST IN THE SECOND TRAVEL LANE. V1 WAS TOWED FROM THE SCENE AND THE DRIVER WAS TRANSPORTED TO THE HOSPITAL WITH "A" INJURIES.

Figure 2.19: Case 9: Summary

Occupant: 1998-72-44-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 2 Rollover Initiation Type BOUNCE-OVER
Location of Rollover Initiation ROADSIDE/MEDIAN Location of Rollover Initiation Rollover Initiation Object CONCRETE BARRIER Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied END PLANE Direction of Initial Roll ROLL RIGHT

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 20 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.20: Case 9: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 6.5847139881

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 6
Pre-event Movement NEGOTIATE NEGOTIATE CURVE Critical Pre-crash Event OFF-EDGE-LEFT
Attempted Avoidance NO AVOIDANCE Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability TRACKING Pre-impact Location LEFT TRAVEL LANE

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

AIS Level Region Injured Contacts 4 = SEVERE INJURY HEAD - SKULL FRONT HEADER

Case 10: 1998-49-184

This case involved a Ford Explorer that lost control on a 3 lane divided highway. In the first collision, the Explorer hit a concrete median barrier dividing the opposing lanes of traffic. During this collision, the driver was partially ejected and the driver's head impacted a light post adjacent to the roadway. The vehicle, after this collision, traveled across the roadway and collided into the concrete barrier on the opposite side of the roadway. The collision with this wall caused the vehicle to rollover, and the occupant was fully ejected.

As a result of the first barrier impact, the Explorer climbed quite high on the barrier introducing enough vehicle motion to partially eject the unbelted occupant. During the second collision and following a severe head strike, the combined high impact angle and lack of driver control lead to the subsequent rollover event and complete occupant ejection.

This case shows the necessity of controlling the lateral Delta-V during impact with roadside structures. In this case, a midsized SUV impacted a barrier with sufficient force to partially eject the driver. In addition, this case shows the need for proper vehicle to guardrail interaction so that rollover is not initiated after vehicles to guardrail interaction.

Other similar cases:

1997-6-92, 1998-49-184, 1998-72-44, 1999-43-152, 1997-45-109,2000-49-107, 2000-79-15, 1997-12- 151, 1999-9-61, 1999-11-150, 1998-75-40, 1998-8-157, 1999-49-75, 1997-72-125

Important Factors

- Height of Contact With Barrier
- Profile of Impacted Barrier
- Lateral DeltaV for First Impact
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle for Second Impact

10 Case 1998-49-184

Summary:

V1 WAS TRAVELING NB IN THE 1ST LANE OF A WET 3-LANE DIVIDED CONCRETE URBAN TOLLWAY. V2 WAS TRAVELING IN THE SAME LANE OF THE SAME ROADWAY. V1 BEGAN A CCW ROTATION CROSSED ALL LANES, AND IMPACTING THE CONCRETE RETAINING WALL, PARTIALLY EJECTING DRIVER ALSO CAUSING THE PARTIALLY EJECTED DRIVER TO IMPACT A LIGHT POLE WITH HIS HEAD. V1 CONTINUED BACK IN A CLOCKWISE ROTATION, AGAIN CROSSING THE THREE LANES AND A SHOULDER, IMPACTING THE RETAINING WALL ON THE EAST SIDE OF TRAFFIC. THEN ROLLED TO THE LEFT, EJECTING DRIVER. V1 THEN CAME TO REST FACING EAST ON THE CONCRETE SHOULDER. V2 WAS BEHIND V1 IN THE 1ST LANE AND, IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID V1 COMING BACK ACROSS THE TRAFFIC, TURNED RIGHT AND IMPACTED FRONT TO THE EAST RETAINING WALL AND CAME TO REST STILL NORTHBOUND ON THE SHOULDER JUST TO THE SOUTH OF V1. V1 WAS TOWED DUE TO DAMAGE AND THE DRIVER WAS PRONOUNCED DEAD AT THE SCENE. V2 WAS RELEASED AT THE SCENE.

Figure 2.21: Case 10: Summary

Occupant: 1998-49-184-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 4 Rollover Initiation Type TRIP-OVER
Location of Rollover Initiation ROADSIDE/MEDIAN Location of Rollover Initiation

Rollover Initiation Object

GROUND Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied WHEELS/TIRES Direction of Initial Roll ROLL LEFT

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 24 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.22: Case 10: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 6.8343921903

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 98 Pre-event Movement GOING STRAIGHT Critical Pre-crash Event TRAVEL TOO FAST Attempted Avoidance NO DRIVER Maneuver Pre-impact Stability NO DRIVER
Pre-impact Location DEPARTED ROADWAY

DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

6 = MAXIMUM INJURY HEAD - SKULL OTHER VEH OR OBJ

43

Case 11: 1998-49-71

This case involved a Jeep Grand Cherokee that failed to negotiate a right hand turn. The vehicle engaged a guardrail surrounding the turn, however the vehicle climbed over the guardrail and a roll was induced. Due to the roll, the driver was ejected came to rest between the vehicle and the ground. He died shortly after the collision due to his injuries.

An investigation into the vehicle damage pictures shows that there was little damage to the front of the vehicle during the barrier impact. For this reason, it is believed that the vehicle mounted the barrier at the turned down end which began just after the start of the circular exit ramp. In addition, due to the lack of photographic evidence, it was impossible to know whether the barrier was ruptured during the collision. Therefore, in order to improve the effectiveness of this type of investigation, it would be helpful for investigators to visit crash scenes before roadside repairs are completed if possible.

This case indicates the need for review of barrier installations particularly at critical locations like this one. It should be noted that the Grand Cherokee has a CG height which is lower than other mid-size SUVs in its class.

Summary:

V1 ON EXIT RAMP FROM A N. BOUND DIRECTION TO W.BOUND. THE RAMP IS POSITIVELY SLOPED, CURVING RIGHT, SINGLE LANE OF DRY ASPHALT. V1 CONTACTED ITS FRONT LEFT CORNER WITH A GUARDRAIL - CLIMBED OVER THE RAILING, DID A COMPLETE ROLL, EJECTED DRIVER, CAME TO REST ON ITS LEFT PLANE ATOP DRIVER. VEH TOWED. DRIVER TRANSPORTED AND WAS LATER REPORTED DEAD, LESS THAN 1 HOUR AFTER CRASH.

Figure 2.23: Case 11: Summary

Occupant: 1998-49-71-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 2 Rollover Initiation Type CLIMB-OVER Location of Rollover Initiation

ROADSIDE/MEDIAN

Rollover Initiation Object

OTHER BARRIER Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied UNDERCARRIAGE Direction of Initial Roll ROLL LEFT

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 17 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.24: Case 11: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 8.7992799451

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 6 Pre-event Movement NEGOTIATE CURVE Critical Pre-crash Event TRAVEL TOO FAST Attempted Avoidance NO DRIVER Maneuver Pre-impact Stability NO DRIVER

Pre-impact Location DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Age 30 Height 168 Weight 84 MALE Restrain NONE USED/AVAIL Airbag Deployment NONDEPLOYED Airbag Deployment
Ejection Ejection
 COMPLETE EJECT
 Figs. COMPLETE EJECT FRONT Ejection Area LEFT FRONT
Entrapment NOT ENTRAPPED NOT ENTRAPPED Airbag Deployment - 1 st Seat NONDEPLOYED
Airbag Deployment – Other MOT EQUIP W/OTH Airbag Deployment – Other Seat
AOPS YES-RES DET

Injuries

Occupant
MAIS

MAIS $5 = \text{CRITICAL INJURY}$
Seat Position FRONT LEFT SIDE FRONT LEFT SIDE

46

Case 12: 2000-9-15

In Case 2000-9-15, a Toyota 4-Runner impacted an Acura Integra. After this initial collision, the damaged 4-runner collided with the guardrail at a moderate angle. Unfortunately the guardrail did not contain the 4-runner, and the vehicle climbed the guardrail and started to roll. This roll however was averted by a collision with a light pole. Eventually the vehicle comes to rest in a ditch and with the driver sustaining incapacitating injuries.

This case exemplified a failure of the guardrail to contain the vehicle. The 4-Runner, although damaged, should have hit the guardrail and come to rest. As it stood however, the vehicle was able to vault over the guardrail and only avoid a rollover by a secondary collision with a light pole.

Investigation of the pictures of the guardrail and the vehicle showed that the guardrail in place was of a standard design and seemed to be installed properly. It was hypothesized that the vehicle was able to vault this guardrail because the point of impact was below the center of gravity. Therefore possible future designs should be able to engage the vehicle in a manner such that the projected point of impact is at or above the vehicle CG while avoiding vehicle under ride of the barrier.

Other Similar Cases: 1999-73-12, 2000-48-169, 2000-9-15

Important Factors

- Frontal Overhang of Toyota 4-Runner
- Average Frontal Overhang for Midsize SUVs
- CG Height of Toyota 4-Runner
- Average CG Height of Mid-Size SUVs
- Average CG Height of Full Size Pickup Trucks
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

12 Case 2000-9-15

Summary:

V1, A 1997 ACURA INTEGRA WAS TRAVELING EAST, IN LANE THREE, OF A FOUR LANE DIVIDED HIGHWAY(JERSEY WALL LEFT GUARDRAIL RIGHT). V2, A 1997 TOYOTA 4-RUNNER SUV WAS TRAVELING THE SAME HIGHWAY, IN LANE NUMBER TWO. V1 SWERVES/CHANGES LANES TO THE RIGHT TO AVOID A DEAD ANIMAL IN THE ROADWAY. V2'S FRONT PLANE STRIKES V1'S RIGHT SIDE PLANE. V1 TRAVELS BACK ACROSS LANE THREE AND COMES TO REST IN LANE FOUR. V2 CROSSES LANE ONE AND DEPARTS THE ROADWAY TO THE RIGHT. V2 STRIKES A GUARDRAIL WITH IT'S FRONT PLANE. V2 CLIMBS THE GUARDRAIL, STARTS TO ROLL (NO ROLLOVER OCCURRED / LIGHT POLE IMPACT PREVENTED ROLL) AND BECOMES AIRBORNE. V2 THEN STRIKES A LIGHT POLE WITH ITS TOP PLANE (NON-HORIZONTAL). V2 THEN DESCENDS A STEEP EMBANKMENT (UNKNOWN IF STILL AIRBORNE) AND STRIKES MULTIPLE TREES AND THEIR RELATED BRANCHES WITH ITS UNDERCARRIAGE. V2 THEN STRIKES THE NEAR SIDE EMBANKMENT WITH ITS UNDERCARRIAGE AND COMES TO REST AT THE BOTTOM, IN A DITCH/GULLY (V2 AT REST ON ALL FOUR WHEELS). BOTH VEHICLES ARE TOWED. THE DRIVER AND SOLE OCCUPANT OF V1 IS NOT INJURED OR TRANSPORTED. THE DRIVER AND SOLE OCCUPANT OF V2 IS TRANSPORTED AND HOSPITALIZED WITH INCAPACITATING INJURIES.

Figure 2.25: Case 12: Summary

Occupant: 2000-9-15-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 5 Rollover Initiation Type NO ROLLOVER
Location of Rollover Initiation NO ROLLOVER Location of Rollover Initiation

Rollover Initiation Object

NO ROLLOVER Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied NO ROLLOVER Direction of Initial Roll NO ROLLOVER

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Traffic Flow DIVIDED/W/BARRIER Number of Travel Lanes FOUR Roadway Alignment CURVE LEFT Roadway Profile UPHILL GRADE Roadway Surface Type ASPHALT Roadway Surface Condition DRY

Light Conditions DAY LIGHT Light Conditions Atmospheric Conditions NO ADVERSE COND Relation to Intersection NONINTER/NONJUNC Traffic Control Device Police Reported Alcohol NO ALCOHOL Presence

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.26: Case 12: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 35.411450506

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type 46
Pre-event Movement CHANGING L Critical Pre-crash Event OVER LINE - RIGHT Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability NO DRIVER
Pre-impact Location LEFT TRAVEL LANE LEFT TRAVEL LANE

CHANGING LANES

DRIVER Factors

Age 26 Height 178 Weight 64 Gender MALE
Restrain LAP Al LAP AND SHOULDER
NONDEPLOYED Airbag Deployment
Ejection Ejection NO EJECTION NO EJECTION Entrapment NOT ENTRAPPED Airbag Deployment – 1st Seat NONDEPLOYED
Airbag Deployment – Other NOT EQUIP W/OTH Airbag Deployment - Other Seat
AOPS YES-RES DET

Injuries

Occupant

MAIS $0 = NOT INJURED$
Seat Position FRONT LEFT SIDE FRONT LEFT SIDE

49

Case 13: 1998-12-54

A Jeep Grand Cherokee lost control while traveling and struck its left rear on a concrete retaining wall. The driver, while trying to regain control, then hit another guardrail with the left front of the vehicle. The collision with the retaining wall redirected the vehicle back into traffic where it collided with a Chevrolet Pick-up. This T-bone collision resulted in severe injuries for the driver of the Grand Cherokee.

The concrete wall in this case showed an incompatibility due to of the high re-direction angle of the bullet vehicle. When the driver of the Cherokee hit the guardrail the second time, he was not traveling at a high angle in relation to the retaining wall. Therefore, the vehicle should have come to rest against the guardrail or a short distance away. As it happened, the vehicle was redirected sharply into traffic, which resulted in a second, T-bone, collision with a full size pick-up truck.

- Redirection Angle following Initial Barrier Impact
- Frontal Overhang of Grand Cherokee
- Average Frontal Overhang for Midsize SUVs
- CG Height of Jeep Grand Cherokee
- Average CG Height of Mid-Size SUVs
- Average CG Height of Full Size Pickup Trucks
- Researcher Determined Impact Angle

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13 Case 1998-12-54

Summary:

VEHICLE ONE WAS HEADING EAST ON A TWO LANE, TWO WAY, ICY, ASPHALT ROADWAY. V2 WAS HEADING WEST ON THE SAME ROADWAY. V1 LOST CONTROL ON AN ICY OVERPASS AND STRUCK THE LEFT, BACK OF THE VEHICLE ON A CONCRETE BARRIER. THE VEHICLE BOUNCED OFF THE BARRIER AND CONTINUED IN A SOUTH EASTERLY DIRECTION. V1, STILL SLIDING ON THE ICE, THEN HIT A GUARDRAIL WITH THE LEFT, FRONT, GLANCING OFF AND HEADING INTO ONCOMING TRAFFIC. WITH VEHICLE ONE IN ITS TRAVEL OF PATH, THE FRONT OF V2 CONTACTED THE LEFT SIDE OF V1. BOTH VEHICLES WERE TOWED DUE TO DAMAGE. OCCUPANTS ONE AND THREE OF V1 WERE KILLED IN THIS ACCIDENT. OCCUPANT TWO OF V1 WAS TRANSPORTED FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. OCCUPANTS 1 AND 2 OF V2 WERE TRANSPORTED FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. ALL OCCUPANTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACCIDENT WERE WEARING LAP AND SHOULDER BELTS. $\frac{1}{2}$ ദ P12054B SCALE: 1/3.5
SPEED: 89 KPH MPACT₂ 高兴 高 IMPACT 1-11 総通 旨面 Vehicle Body Type Make Model Year Occ.# Age Occupant's Maximum known sex occupant ais 1 COMPACT UTILITY Jeep Cherokee84 1993 1 34 FEMALE-2 = MODERATE NOT PREG INJURY 1 COMPACT UTILITY Jeep Cherokee84 1993 2 8 MALE 5 = CRITICAL INJURY 1 COMPACT UTILITY Jeep Cherokee84 1993 3 7 FEMALE-7 = INJURY, UNK NOT PREG
MALE SEV 2 COMPACT PICKUP Chevrolet S-10 1982 1 31 MALE 1 = MINOR INJURY
2 COMPACT PICKUP Chevrolet S-10 1982 2 31 MALE 1 = MINOR INJURY $COMPACT~PICKUP$ Chevrolet $S-10$ 1982 2 31

Figure 2.27: Case 13: Summary

Occupant: 1998-12-54-1-2

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events 3 Rollover Initiation Type NO ROLLOVER Location of Rollover Initiation

NO ROLLOVER

Rollover Initiation Object

NO ROLLOVER Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied NO ROLLOVER Direction of Initial Roll NO ROLLOVER

Crash Severity

Pre-Crash Environment

Traffic Flow NOT DIVIDED Number of Travel Lanes TWO Roadway Alignment STRAIGHT
Roadway Profile LEVEL Roadway Profile Roadway Surface Type ASPHALT Roadway Surface Condition ICE Light Conditions DARK Atmospheric Conditions NO ADVERSE COND Relation to Intersection NONINTER/NONJUNC Traffic Control Device Police Reported Alcohol NO ALCOHOL Presence

Alcohol Test (< 95 indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Figure 2.28: Case 13: Crash Information

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 32.466587775

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type
Pre-event Movement GOING STRAIGHT Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event POOR ROAD CONDIT Attempted Avoidance NO DRIVER Maneuver Pre-impact Stability TRACKING
Pre-impact Location LEFT TRAVEL LANE LEFT TRAVEL LANE

DRIVER Factors

Age 8 Height 122 Weight 34 Gender
Restrain Restrain LAP AND SHOULDER
Airbag Deployment NOT EQUIP/AVAIL Airbag Deployment NOT EQUIP/AVAIL Ejection

Ejection Area

NO EJECTION NO EJECTION Entrapment NOT ENTRAPPED Airbag Deployment – 1st Seat NONDEPLOYED
Airbag Deployment – Other MOT EQUIP W/ OTH Airbag Deployment – Other Seat
AOPS YES-RES DET

Injuries

Occupant
MAIS

Occupant 2

MAIS 5 = CRITICAL INJURY

Seat Position SECOND LEFT SECOND LEFT

52

2.2.1 Case Review Summary

The NASS/CDS cases reviewed above indicate that a series of vehicle and roadside device characteristics are critical for the proper performance of the vehicle/roadway system in the event of a crash. These characteristics are as follows:

- Vehicle CG height
- Vehicle Frontal Overhang (propensity for Snagging)
- Vehicle Mass
- Roadway Profile and Design
- Barrier Height
- Impact Severity (i.e. deltaV)

The current vehicle fleet is shifting towards a higher percentage of larger SUV, crossover and pickup style vehicles. These vehicles have higher ground clearances, shorter frontal overhangs and higher CGs. This combination of characteristics leads to greater risk of negative interaction with barrier systems. This interaction includes barrier snagging, tearing and overriding. The cases reviewed indicate that subsequent instability of higher CG vehicles is often involved in subsequent rollovers and increases injury risk. This behavior must be improved from the vehicle design perspective as well as design of the barrier systems so that this rollover propensity is reduced.

For the passenger car fleet, favorable interaction with the longitudinal sections of the barriers is observed. Few vehicle penetrations, high redirective accelerations or vehicle rollovers were found in the crash cases. The deployment timing of airbags during vehicle/roadside hardware crashes is in question however.

As airbag systems are designed to deploy based on deceleration of the vehicle structure in the event of a crash, low acceleration forces brought about by longitudinal barrier interaction may lead to delays in deployment from first contact. To determine if any negative effects are brought about by airbags and soft barrier systems further crash investigation is required. In the future, enhanced crash testing procedures should be used which include airbag equipped vehicles, human surrogates to measure crash forces and visual documentation of belted occupants to understand their kinematics in the event of an oblique barrier crash. Automotive manufacturers should consider the nature of vehicle crash signatures to ensure that

vehicle sensor systems and deployment algorithms effectively select deployment regimes to best protect occupants. This testing should be conducted for all vehicle body types.

Chapter 3 Assessment of Vehicle Characteristics

In order to identify vehicle body styles and structural characteristics which were influential during crashes with roadside systems, a review of full scale crash tests was conducted. This review provided a clear indication of the roadside systems that performed best under a series of test conditions with the chosen NCHRP test vehicles (i.e. 820kg and 2000kg vehicles). The review provided the research team with an understanding of the characteristic behavior of vehicles during these crash events. Since only these two vehicle classes have been observed during tests, little was learned about the vehicle attributes that influence crash performance during roadside impacts. Influential characteristics would be recognized if two tests of identical roadside systems were conducted using different impacting vehicles. Under these conditions, a direct comparison of geometric and dynamic vehicle properties indicates possible sources of incompatibility. Alternative methods to study the effect of vehicle attributes on compatibility with roadside hardware using analytical modeling of vehicles and barrier systems is included in Section of this report.

Information regarding characteristics of passenger vehicles that are influential during vehicle crashes with roadside structures was gathered through individual crash case reviews shown in Chapter 2 of this report and through information compiled during the literature review for this project. These sources provided the basis for the following list of vehicle attributes that potentially are influential during roadside hardware crash events.

- 1. Vehicle mass
- 2. Height of vehicle front structure and profile
- 3. Stiffness and geometry of vehicle front and side structure
- 4. Frontal overhang ahead of front wheels
- 5. Front and rear suspension characteristics
- 6. Vehicle door rocker geometry
- 7. Vehicle door latch/structural geometry
- 8. Vehicle wheelbase

9. Vehicle Static Stability Factor

In addition, the literature review provided insight into the most appropriate characteristics which should be considered to assess vehicle performance during roadside crashes. A comprehensive FHWA project conducted by the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) was reviewed. The objective of this project was to develop protocols that could be used to identify compatibility issues caused by changes in the future motor vehicle fleet. The final report of this project included many relevant findings and recommendations regarding vehicle compatibility with roadside hardware. Some highlights from this project are shown below [2].

- 1. Vehicle platforms will be face lifted every 3 4 years with new platforms every 5 7 1/2 years. A protocol needs to be in place to categorize the vehicle fleet to assess the level of performance.
- 2. Light truck population will continue to increase from its current exceedance of 50% of total vehicle markets. The greater vehicle height which is unregulated will make vehicle stability a continuing concern.
- 3. Curb weight and size of the 820 kg class vehicle will continue to increase requiring a selection of heavier vehicles for the lower weight class.
- 4. Driver and passenger side airbags will approach 100 percent in the next decade. It may be appropriate to consider this and the increased safety restraint usage (i.e. over 70% seat belt usage) when evaluating roadside hardware.
- 5. Recently introduced crumple zones in light truck subclasses have shown a significant reduction in occupant compartment deformation.
- 6. Vehicle manufacturers are producing less full-size passenger cars.
- 7. Market share of the two midsize car platforms continue to increase above the two small car platforms.
- 8. Large pickups (1/2 ton and 3/4 ton) continue to dominate the sub-class in terms of market share among light trucks.
- 9. Some of the more significant characteristics identified are: Total mass, front overhang, height of vehicle center of gravity, suspension height, bumper height, geometric profile, and frontal crush stiffness.

10. Because wheelbase, weight, overall length, overall width, and front track width were highly correlated, by retaining one of them, all of the statistical information contained in original data was preserved.

Many of the vehicle characteristics highlighted by the TTI study were further reviewed to understand their correlation with real world crash outcomes and results of full scale tests. Further, it was determined that a thorough survey of the current vehicle fleet to understand the variability and range of characteristics that exist today was necessary. The following section outline the methodology used to gather those relevant characteristics.

3.1 Geometric Characteristics

During the literature survey portion of this project, trade magazines and engineering resources were compiled to document a series of vehicle characteristics for US model automobiles. Some of those resources include: The Mitchell Automotive Repair Series by Mitchell Automotive and the "Consumer Review 2001 Car Prices" By Harris Publications. The Mitchell Series documents dimensions of all vehicle sub structures for body shop repair professionals. The "Consumer Review" Magazine documents consumer information such as vehicle weight, height, wheelbase and engine type. Following review of these resources, a large amount of data was compiled however, a series of critical vehicle attributes were still unknown. Since this necessary data was not available directly from the manufacturer, the research team performed measurements by hand on a large number of new and used vehicle structures. Those attributes and procedures for these measurements were conducted as follows.

1. **Frame rail spread-** The frame rail spread is the distance between the left and right frame rails. When viewing the car from the front, this measurement is taken from the inside of the left frame rail to the inside of the right frame rail at the point closest to the front of the car possible.

This vehicle attribute is important during oblique and frontal impact events. During oblique impacts, including interaction with longitudinal barriers, the proximity of this stiff body structure to the impacting device often dictates the acceleration and crush profile exhibited by the body structure. A soft outer body structure surrounding frame rails positioned well inboard (close to the vehicle longitudinal centerline) often leads to high body deformation and a high likelihood of snagging with barrier systems. Conversely, if the stiff vehicle structure is positioned more outboard, the stiff vehicle structure will engage with the rigid or flexible barrier without absorbing large amounts of impact energy. Higher levels of lateral acceleration result in this case.

During frontal impacts with narrow objects, the position of these frame rails is important when considering optimal engagement of the pole/post with rigid structure (engine) or deformable structures (rails).

2. **Bumper structure (lower and upper)-** The bumper structure is defined as the hard portion of the bumper that will not deform in a minor accident. Usually the bumper structure is made of steel or a hardened plastic. Foam and light plastic have less significant effect on the impact and are not included in the bumper structure measurements. In some cases, when the vehicle could not be disassembled or direct measurements of the front bumper structure could not be performed, the actual bumper structure height was estimated by the measurement of the outer fascia.

The bumper structure location as well its overall height could have significant effect on the outcome of a crash. The bottom and top aspects of the bumper structure are important to determine the approximate region of first engagement with guardrail devices. These beams or Ushaped channels are responsible for transferring a large percentage of loading during frontal impacts to the vehicle structure before crushing occurs. The size (height) of the structure is important during pole impacts to understand the likelihood of pole bending, fracture or collapse as well as the likelihood of release of breakaway devices during those impact conditions.

3. **Bumper fascia (lower and upper)-** The bumper fascia is defined as the continuous metal or plastic cover surrounding the bumper structure. The measurements of the fascia are always taken at the center of a vehicle from the ground to the upper most and the lowest point on the front fascia. These measurements do not include structures such as chin spoilers unless these spoilers are directly cast into the fascia (i.e. it does not include bolt on spoilers). If the grill is continuously integrated into the bumper fascia, the measurements are taken to the top of the grill. However if there is a gap between the bumper and the grill, the measurements do not include the grill area.

The geometry of this fascia is important to determine the likelihood of post snagging with the vehicle structure. Also, this "flexible" structure that is often plastic gives the impression that impact forces will be distributed over a larger area than the bumper structure explained above.

4. **Rail height (lower and upper)-** The rail height is the height of the frame rail measured at the most forward point possible. The frame rails are two longitudinal members that carry most of the

frontal impact force during impact. These rails are often tubular, box or c-channels welded to the vehicle structure in the case of unibody constructed vehicles.

The dimensions of these members are important to understand the probable center of force that results during frontal impacts with a wide variety of devices. The lowest and upper-most points on the frame rail will indicate the likelihood of favorable interaction with guardrails, end terminals and semi-rigid longitudinal barriers during high-energy impacts. Often during these types of impacts, the outer body and bumper structure collapse and all remaining engagement with the barriers occurs with the engine or frame structures.

5. **Free Space-** Free space is measured from the aft most point of the radiator to most forward hard point of the engine. Hard points are defined as engine components and frame components (Plastic fans, belts and pulleys are not considered hard points in this measurement). If the engine protrudes underneath the radiator, the free space is defined to be 0.

This dimension is important during frontal impact with narrow objects and partner vehicles. Often vehicle crash sensors deploy airbags based on sudden deceleration of the vehicle structure. Usual deceleration levels experienced by the vehicle during deformation of the bumper structure and the radiator often fail to trigger airbag sensors. The larger the free space is, the later the airbag deployment will occur. If the sensors do not trigger airbags before the pole structure begins interacting with the engine block, a sudden peak in deceleration forces will take place leading to airbag deployment. In some cases, the occupant has moved forward or out of position relative to the deploying airbag causing an unfavorable late deployment crash scenario. During interaction with partner vehicles, a large amount of free space creates a more favorable situation for impacted vehicles as this region is more compliant than the engine block itself.

6. **Frontal Overhang-** The frontal overhang is the distance from the lowermost potion of the front fender to the most forward position of the vehicle. This gives an indication of the exposure of the wheel, suspension and power train to objects struck during frontal impact conditions.

The ride height combined with the front overhang dictate the level of interaction seen between impacted and rotating tires/suspension structures. In the case of Pickup Trucks and SUVs, a short frontal overhang and higher ride height often lead to higher potential for snagging with guardrail posts and rail members themselves. This condition is prevalent during guardrail impacts with

pickups and may occur during impacts between barriers and similarly configured sport utility vehicles.

7. **(Window) Sill Length-** The Sill length is measured from the front most position of the lower portion of the driver's side window to the rear most position of the driver's window. If the rear view mirror is incorporated in the main frame of the window, the measurement begins at the beginning of the rear view mirror housing.

During crash events with narrow objects (posts or poles) or end terminals in a side impact configuration, the length of the door or window sill will indicate some potential for occupant compartment intrusion. A door structure securely fixed at door hinge points and the door latch point which are closer together are likely to resist intrusion well. Conversely, a structure where these points are further apart often has a more compliant door allowing for greater levels of intrusion. Also, as the ratio of windowsill length to total vehicle body length increases, the likelihood of contact between the deforming door and nearside occupants also increases.

8. **(Window) Sill Longitudinal Location-** The longitudinal location is the distance from the gap between the hood and the front fascia/fender and ending at the lower portion of the driver's side window.

This measurement indicates two characteristics. First, this distance provides a metric for location of the front door versus the front of the car. Second, the distance from the front most impact point to the base of the windshield can be estimated as well. During frontal impacts with small sign support structures, the likelihood of contact between the sign blank and the windshield are a direct function of this distance. Other factors that indicate this are vehicle bumper height, ride height and vehicle mass. In some cases the sign blank strikes may strike the hood, the roof or the windshield. Windshield contact is least desirable.

9. **(Window) Sill Height-** The sill height is the height from the ground to the lower part of the driver's side window. This measurement is taken at the rear most portion of the driver's window. Plastic sheathings are not included in the measurement of sill height.

This metric provides an estimate of occupant head position in the event of a side impact. A life threatening situation exists if the occupants head strikes and breaks the driver side window during a near side collision. In this situation, there is potential for contact of the head with the stiff

impacted device. This information is critical to properly determine barrier heights including longitudinal and end terminals in use.

10. **Rocker height (lower and upper)-** The measurement for the lower rocker height is taken from the ground to the beginning of the rocker panel. This height does not include the jack mount points or the rail channel below the vehicle. The upper rocker height is measured from the ground to the upper most portion of the rocker panel. The measurement of the upper rocker panel only measures the metal portion of the rocker panel. Vinyl and plastic coatings are not included.

During side impact events, a critical factor determining crash severity is the degree of structural interaction of the vehicle rocker and pillars with the impact partner. If the center of force generated by the impacted device is above or below the rocker panel, poor engagement and high levels of compartment intrusion are likely. Trends in new vehicle design indicate increased overall height of rocker panels in order to maximize potential interacting space. The Volvo Side Impact Protection System (SIPS) is an example of this design enhancement without compromising the ease of vehicle entry and exit.

11. **Striker Height-** The distance from the ground to the lowest portion of the striker perpendicular to the doorframe (i.e. from the ground to the lowest portion of the striker that engages the door).

The striker or latch point is a structurally rigid point where a positive connection is made between the door structure and the B-Pillar. Often manufacturers will attach side impact door beams at this rigid point and the hinge attachment points at the vehicle A-Pillar. Knowledge of the striker height, provides an indication of the potential for interaction between the door's side impact beam and the impacted structure.

12. **Static Stability Factor-** The Rollover Resistance Ratings assigned by NHTSA are based on the Static Stability Factor (SSF). The SSF is essentially a measure of how top heavy a vehicle is. This factor is the ratio of one half the track width to the center of gravity (c.g.) height. The Rollover Resistance Ratings of vehicles were compared to 220,000 actual single vehicle crashes, and the ratings were found to relate very closely to the real-world rollover experience of vehicles. Based on these studies, NHTSA found that taller, narrower vehicles, such as sport utility vehicles (SUVs), are more likely than lower, wider vehicles, such as passenger cars, to trip and roll over once they leave the roadway. Accordingly, NHTSA awards more stars to wider and/or lower

vehicles. The Rollover Resistance Rating, however, does not address the causes of the driver losing control and the vehicle leaving the roadway in the first place.

One criticism for the static stability factor is the fact that it is an oversimplification of the true structure of the vehicle. It does not include the effects of suspension deflections, tire traction and electronic stability control (ESC).

The above vehicle characteristics are shown graphically in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Vehicle Characteristics As Measured

Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 below contain average vehicle specifications for each class reviewed. All available resources were used to obtain this data. It is believed that if a vehicle with attributes closest to the class average is chosen for future crash testing, the entire class should be well represented. However,

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current practices utilize the "worst case vehicle" approach where the attributes of the test vehicle lie at the boundary of the population. To aid the selection of an average vehicle, Appendix B lists over 342 vehicle makes and models and their corresponding design attributes.

		Average of Moments of Inertia					
Vehicle TypeClass		Pitch	Roll	Yaw	Avg. SSF		
Car	Compact	1584	374	1685	1.342		
	Midsize	2438	495	2544	1.354		
	Large	2946	560	3081	1.346		
Car Total		2208	460	2320	1.347		
SUV	Compact	2059	515	2143	1.064		
	Midsize	3353	692	3399	1.083		
	Large	5165	1019	5206	1.076		
SUV Total		3172	674	3233	1.074		
Truck	Compact	2627	474	2669	1.205		
	Large	4644	846	4693	1.172		
Truck Total		3782	676	3824	1.171		
Van	Large Van	5953	1198	5912	1.110		
	Minivan	3481	822	3536	1.154		
Van Total		3991	884	3996	1.145		
Grand Total		3152	640	3212	1.187		

Table 3.1: Average Inertial Properties per Vehicle Type and Class

		Length Width	Ht	Whlbase	Curb Wgt.	Front	Rear Ovrhng Ovrhng	Ft. Rock Height
CAR	compact	168.19 65.21 52.88		96.42	2380.01	34.75	36.93	7.56
	mid	186.68 70.11 53.43		104.41	3159.74	38.86	43.44	7.87
	large	206.27174.46155.401		114.21	3831.85	41.43	50.56	8.45
CAR Tot		184.19 69.23 53.72		103.68	3012.77	37.91	42.75	7.88
SUV	compact	157.92 66.33 66.61		94.89	2849.49	28.17	34.56	10.99
	mid	177.68169.59168.831		104.54	4022.32	31.12	41.67	15.07
	large	195.89 78.19 72.56		116.08	4907.71	33.62	46.02	15.59
SUV Tot		178.06 71.56 69.48		105.63	3977.77	31.08	41.00	13.44
TRU	compact	186.55 66.94 63.58		112.79	3038.79	30.97	43.09	11.89
	large	212.66 77.32 71.36		132.18	4269.49	34.47	46.03	13.18
TRU Tot		196.46 70.88 66.49		120.15	3505.77	32.33	44.24	12.15
VAN	mid	186.51 72.34 66.92		112.25	3547.82	35.77	38.63	9.89
	large	200.33177.56177.751		121.18	4426.65	33.35	45.53	
VAN Tot		191.71 74.30 70.91		115.61	3878.47	34.90	41.11	9.89
Grand Tot		184.78 69.84 56.81		105.46	3183.29	36.78	42.56	8.35

Table 3.2: Structural Properties per Vehicle Type and Class (Averages)

		Rr.	Ft. Rocker Bumper Bumper Height Height	Rr. Height Ground	Door to	Front	Ft. Wght	Rr. Wght Track Percent Percent
CAR	compact	7.35	11.23	11.68	10.95	56.98	60.7%	39.3%
	mid	7.62	11.18	11.83	11.30	59.17	59.8%	40.3%
	large	8.37	11.55	12.51	11.19		61.46 59.2%	40.8%
CAR Tot		7.69	11.29	11.94	11.10	59.12	60.0%	40.0%
SUV	compact	11.21	12.83	13.42	15.75		57.18 54.7%	45.3%
	mid	15.23	16.64	17.04	18.41	58.45	53.1%	46.9%
	large	16.57	15.89	18.50	19.49	64.73	52.9%	47.1%
SUV Tot		13.72	15.15	15.85	17.94	59.92	53.6%	46.4%
TRU	compact	13.34	15.03	13.92	14.70	57.21	61.0%	39.0%
	large	14.74	18.08	16.91		64.50	0.0%	0.0%
TRU Tot		13.65	15.59	14.95	14.70	60.50	61.0%	39.0%
VAN	mid	10.41	10.10	12.13	12.80	61.61	57.7%	42.3%
	large						65.55 55.8%	44.2%
VAN Tot		10.41	10.10	12.13	12.80		62.80 57.4%	42.6%
Grand Tot		8.26	11.55	12.19	11.44	59.67	59.5%	40.5%

Table 3.3: Average Structural Properties per Vehicle Type and Class- (Population Weighted Averages)

3.2 Barrier Force Data

Vehicle to vehicle crash incompatibility has been attributed to three factors: (1) mass incompatibility, (2) stiffness incompatibility, and (3) geometric incompatibility [14]. These factors may be effectively applied when considering compatibility between vehicles and roadside hardware objects as well. The measurement of vehicle mass is relatively straightforward. However, measurement of stiffness and geometric compatibility needs further definition. Without exhaustive investigation of individual vehicle attributes as shown in the following section, a method has been developed to understand vehicle metrics critical to the interface between striking vehicles and objects struck. This method is repeatable and objective making it ideal for side by side comparison of a variety of structures.

It has been suggested that the height of the forward-most load-bearing member of the vehicle structure as a metric for geometric incompatibility. Since this element has no precise definition, the rocker panel height was used as the geometric metric. For the stiffness metric, the vehicle crush at the maximum barrier force during a 35-mph rigid barrier crash was utilized. [14]

NHTSA's crash test program produces additional measurements, which can contribute to assessing stiffness and geometric characteristics of vehicle frontal structures. For most of the 35-mph crash tests conducted under the NCAP program, the time history of the distribution of force applied by the vehicle to the barrier was measured. These measurements indicate the geometric location of "hard spots" and the amount of force the vehicle imparts to a rigid barrier. This data permits the calculation of local stiffness and of load paths at various heights.

Different aggressiveness metrics may be applicable to different crash modes. The efficacy of any proposed metric would need to be verified using on-the-road crash and injury data. However, a number of metrics can be proposed and developed from the available NCAP test data.

For a front to side impact, the front of the striking vehicle may crush less than 125 millimeters. The force developed in this intermediate crush range and the height of the force measured on the barrier face may be the critical parameters. For a frontal-offset crash, the force and geometry of only the left or right portion of the vehicle front may be applicable. For interaction with reasonably compliant roadside devices such as roadside hardware crush levels rarely exceed 125 millimeters unless localized intrusion by barrier sections occurs.

The use of barrier force data permits a finer discrimination of vehicle stiffness and geometry that can be further investigated as appropriate aggressivity metrics. From this approach, metrics may be derived from barrier test data that may be used to assess vehicle geometric and stiffness aggressiveness in frontal type crashes.

Barrier Information

The barrier used in the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) is a rigid, fixed barrier with 36 force measuring load cells on its surface. The load cells array consists of 4 rows of 9 cells, as shown in Figure 3.2. The rows are designated by letters A through D, with A at the bottom. The columns are numbered 1 through 9, starting at the left, facing the barrier. The array is subdivided in 6 groupings, 1 through 6, numbered left to right, and beginning with lower left grouping (see Figure).

Figure 3.2: Configuration of Load Cells on Barrier

The array of load cells provides the opportunity to assess the distribution of forces that the vehicle imposes on the barrier during the crash. In this study, the relationship between barrier forces and their geometric location are of particular interest. In offset crashes, the left or right side of the structure principally deforms and absorbs energy. In centerline impacts with narrow objects, the center response is primary. In head-on crashes with large overlap, the entire width of the force array may be required. The vertical force distribution of the vehicle structures in contact during the crash is important in assessing the geometric compatibility.

To address these various requirements, the barrier measurements have been used to graphically present the forces measured by all 36-load cells. The force distributions are examined at three points during the crash. The stiffness is calculated by dividing the force measured by the load cells at a particular time by the calculated vehicle crush at that time. The vehicle crush is determined by double integration of the longitudinal acceleration measured on a structural member close to the vehicle's center of gravity.

To quantify the height of the structural loading, a center of impact force was calculated for three columns of cells. The left column contained the 1 and 4 groupings, the center column the 2 and 5 groupings, and the right the 3 and 6 groupings. In addition, the height of the center of force for the total loading was calculated. For each grouping, the force on each row of cells was assumed to be uniformly
distributed. The height of the center of the force was calculated, applying static equilibrium relationships as shown in Figure 3.3. The center of force was calculated for vehicle crush of five inches, 10 inches and 15 inches. In the tables and figures given here all data are reported in metric units. The three crush levels are reported as the approximate metric equivalent - 125mm, 250 mm and 375 mm.

In Figure 3.3, static equilibrium is first applied. The force (F) that is required to resist the sum of the load cell forces from rows A, B, C, and D is determined. The height of force F is then found by applying moment equilibrium to the barrier forces and moment arms. The height H is defined as the Center of Force. The center of force calculation is made for the entire rows of load cells as well as for the left third, the center third, and the right third of the rows.

Figure 3.3: Definition of Center of Force, H

The linear stiffness is sensitive to the accuracy of the zero time step selected for the barrier force data. The force level is less sensitive than the stiffness to the zero time step selection. Consequently, force rather than stiffness is a preferred metric at the selected crush values.

Figure 3.4: Total Barrier Force vs. Vehicle Crush

At a crush of 200 mm, the Jeep Grand Cherokee exerts almost twice as much force as the Dodge Neon. This difference in stiffness will result in a higher extent of crush for the Dodge Neon in a frontal crash involving the two vehicles. This difference illustrates the stiffness differences between the two vehicles. These differences are shown in Figure 3.4 above.

Figure 3.5: Force Deformation Relationships in Vehicle to Vehicle Frontal / Side Crashes

An idealized relationship between the crash forces of cars with different frontal stiffnesses is shown in Figure 3.4. In a frontal-to-frontal collision, the soft car crushes more than the stiff car at the same interface force. In the example, the interface force level is 400 kN. The crush of the soft car is 500mm and the crush of the stiff car is 250 mm. The area under the force-deformation curve is proportional to the energy absorbed. Consequently, the soft car has absorbed about twice as much crash energy as the stiff car. This difference illustrates the stiffness incompatibility of the two vehicles. As shown in Figure 3.5, the force vs. crush relationship may not be linear, as assumed in the figure.

It should be noted that the difference in the geometric location of the forces generated by the vehicle structures could influence the idealized interaction presented in Figure 3.5. This difference will be addressed under the discussion of geometric compatibility.

The maximum force produced during the crash and the linear stiffness based on the crush at maximum force have been suggested as metrics for stiffness incompatibility. In view of the force vs. crush non-linearities, and geometric influences during the crash, some more robust metrics may be needed. In this study, we propose to investigate the force levels at 125, 250, and 375 mm. The forces developed by the vehicle left, center, or right segments of the vehicle front may be applicable in offset collisions.

Tabular Summaries of Load Cell Barrier Data

This report presents summary data from 50 vehicles. The 50 vehicles are listed in Appendix B of this report. Another 14 vehicles have been analyzed, but the data was found to be of unsuitable quality. In 17 of the cases, data was not reported for three of the four rows of load cells.

The data on the 50 vehicles included in this report should be considered preliminary. Several adjustments in the data will be necessary. For example, some vehicles may not have impacted the center of the barrier. Shifting of the load cell columns to the right or left will be needed in these cases. In other cases, a single load cell in the array may produce unrealistically high readings. Finally, adjustments to gain a precise zero time step may be necessary in a few cases.

The vehicle characteristic table shown in Appendix B provides selected results of the barrier data analysis. The nine columns of load cells are divided into three groups as described earlier. The groups are: left, center and right. The sums of the forces left, center, right, and total are designated by FCRT, FCCT, FCLT, and FCT, respectively. The percent of the barrier force on the A, B, C, and D rows are designated in the last four columns of the tables. The values listed in the table are for a vehicle crush of 375 mm.

Data Processing Procedures

The acceleration data points were the average of two accelerometer readings. The two accelerometers selected were the left and right rear floor pan or the left and right rear seat accelerometers. In the event inaccurate velocity changes of the vehicle were predicted, the best available accelerometers were selected.

The raw data from all 36 load cells was processed. The raw acceleration and barrier load cell data points were filtered according to SAE J211 Standard, with a corner frequency of 18, using a filter supplied by NHTSA. It was assumed that the zero time steps provided in the data were accurate, and were identical for the force and acceleration data. Beginning with the zero time step, acceleration data and barrier force data were sampled every 2 ms for 120 ms. The resulting acceleration data and load cell data were the input for subsequent analysis.

In examining the resulting data, several inconsistencies were observed. The most frequent was an initial force on load cells at time zero. In the event the total force at time zero was greater than 10% of the maximum barrier force, the data was rejected. A second problem was the presence load on cells outside the contact region, or unrealistically high loads on cells inside the contact region. These cases were not rejected in the event the consequence was negligible. Finally, in some cases, the acceleration readings produced a higher or lower delta-V than expected. In the event that the delta-V prediction from the accelerometers up to the time of maximum crush was reasonable, the data was not rejected.

Discussion

The results of the barrier data provide useful insights into the geometry and height of the stiffest portions of the vehicle structure in a barrier crash. By developing metrics for these properties, it may be possible to quantify more precisely vehicle compatibility with a variety of impacted structures. Other structures may include any aspects of opposing vehicles or roadside safety systems. The proposed metrics need to be further evaluated. The evaluation should include the assessment of a large number of vehicles and an assignment of proposed compatibility metrics based on barrier crash test data and physical measurements. The resulting metrics should be evaluated by determining the extent to which they explain the aggressiveness characteristics observed in the on-the-road crash data.

The application of load cell barrier data provides valuable measurements for assessing the loading of vehicles in a crash. The metrics developed from barrier data needs to be evaluated against NASS/CDS and FARS data to assess the viability of the metrics, and their applicability to understand compatibility issues between the current vehicle fleet and existing roadside safety structures.

3.3 Application of Vehicle Characteristics

For this task, the relationship between vehicle characteristics, roadside hardware design characteristics and impact scenario are studied. Metrics such as vehicle mass, geometry (bumper height, sill height, and hood profile) and structural factors such as body type and stiffness can be used in combination to assess effectiveness of roadside hardware devices during impact. Ideally, design and performance corridors for vehicles and roadside hardware devices should be aligned to ensure optimal performance of highway systems during crashes.

The following full-scale crash tests (#472580-1 and #472580-2) were performed at the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI). During this testing, two different vehicles of similar size, class and mass impacted a W-beam guardrail under the same conditions yet resulted in drastically different post impact vehicle behavior. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present general information regarding test vehicles and test configuration.

Table 3.4: Vehicle Specifications for TTI Test #472580-1 & 2

Table 3.5: Barrier Specifications for TTI Test #472580-1 & 2

The guardrail system used consists of a series of 2-Space W-Beam Guardrail sections each 4130 mm long. Steel wide-flange posts are placed 1905 mm apart (2 per section) and embedded in packed soil. Timber block-outs separate the post and the guardrail by 150 mm and are mounted using a single steel bolt through the block center. The guardrail system in pre-tensioned using a BCT Cable anchor assembly in conjunction with a strut and yolk assembly.

During the first test (#472580-1) where the impacting vehicle was a 1996 Ford Taurus, the guardrail provided adequate protection during the 25 degree impact. The vehicle was redirected without serious deformation to large parts of the vehicle structure or excessive deceleration of the vehicle in the longitudinal or lateral direction.

Conversely, the interaction of the Chevrolet Lumina and the W-beam system during test #472580-2 raises several questions regarding performance of this system. The Lumina impacted the barrier at approximately the same location as that described above (3 ft. before the thirteenth post of the complete barrier system). As the vehicle traveled longitudinally along the length of the W-beam, the first block-out released from the W-beam at its single attachment point similar to the Taurus test. Shortly following the release of the block-out, the front left corner of the vehicle reached the splice connection point between the thirteenth and fourteenth barrier sections (first and second contacted). At this time, an out pocketing of the steel W-beam is created and travels longitudinally along the rail until it reaches the splice section. This localized region of high deformation (and stress) is due to underlying structure that initiates a fracture that travels vertically from the bolt attachment point. With the failure of the W-beam, the vehicle intruded further behind the barrier and past the midline of the vehicle. Later, an off center frontal impact with the next post initiated rollover of the vehicle.

It has been hypothesized that similar vehicle mass, CG height and outer body dimensions would yield similar results during crash testing. For these tests, great care was taken during guardrail installation to produce repeatable barrier behavior. One remaining factor not eliminated by identical test conditions is vehicle structural properties. These include varying stiffness of underlying structural members (frame rails, engine configuration, drive train geometry, suspension characteristics, etc.) Using vehicle characteristics sited in Task 3 described in this report, differences that may have led to divergent test behaviors has been discovered.

Upon inspection of the underlying frame structure of both the Taurus and Lumina, it can be seen that geometric differences do exist. Figure 3.6 shows an overlay of schematics for the underbody structure of the two vehicles. Individual structural diagrams were obtained from the 2000 Mitchell Automotive Repair Database and images were subsequently overlaid. It can be seen that an upward distance of 12 cm exists between the lowest structural point of the forward frame structure (engine cradle) of the Chevrolet Lumina and the lowest structural point of the Taurus. In addition, the lateral location of the bumper mounts between the two vehicles indicates that the Lumina structure is 5 cm wider than the Taurus (i.e. mount points of the Lumina lie slightly outboard of the Taurus). Geometric characteristics of the Lumina show a reduced distance between the vehicle outer body and the hard point at the engine cradle mount point on the vehicle frame in the lateral direction. In other words, crush distance has been reduced in the lateral direction before direct interaction between structural members and adjacent hardware. In the

vertical direction, the lowest structural point of the Lumina falls at nearly the same height as the bottom edge of the W-beam section as installed. This vertical and lateral location of this hard point creates a more favorable condition for loading at splice of the W-beam section. Upon examination of crash test footage, the tear in the W-beam appears to initiate along the lower portion of the rail at the first upstream bottom bolt of the splice and subsequently travels upwards. A larger area of vehicle/beam interaction may prevent this localized rail deformation. Also, reduced levels of outer body deformation of the vehicle may have a similar positive effect. This design for the front portions of rail structures is observed in other vehicle platforms; however, it is certainly not a common feature across all passenger vehicle structures.

Figure 3.6: Overlay of Chevrolet Lumina (light) and Ford Taurus (dark) lower frame structures

(Permission for Reprint Given by Mitchell Automotive Repair, 2002)

Geometric factors are hypothesized to have an effect on the potential for W-beam failure during these impact conditions; however other influential structural differences exist between the two vehicles as well. Upon comparison of the frontal stiffness profiles outlined earlier in this report, considerable differences may be observed. Figures 3.7 and 3.9 below show stiffness levels across the frontal structure of each vehicle at increasing levels of vehicle crush. During interaction with guardrail systems or other similar longitudinal barrier devices, crush levels rarely exceed 10 inches. Accordingly, only stiffness profiles at 2 inches, 5 inches and 10 inches will be discussed.

Figure 3.7: Ford Taurus Stiffness Profile

Figure 3.8: Ford Taurus Underbody- Post Crash

Figure 3.9: Chevrolet Lumina Stiffness Profile

Figure 3.10: Chevrolet Lumina Underbody- Post Crash

At 2 inches of crush, the stiffness profile of the Ford Taurus peaks at approximately 75 N/mm and the shape of the stiffness curve spans from the 3L location to the 7R column. For the Lumina, this curve peaks at 45 N/mm and spans a narrower region across the vehicle. Upon comparison, the differences in stiffness between the two vehicles indicate that the outer-body structure of the Lumina will deform more significantly than the Taurus. This difference should be more considerable at the most outboard regions of the vehicle face.

At 5 inches of crush, important differences become obvious. The stiffness profile for the Taurus, which peaks at 100 N/mm, is very broad spanning from the 2R level to the 8R level. It should be noticed that this high stiffness level evenly spans the entire front face of the vehicle. In comparison, the Lumina stiffness at this level of crush also peaks at nearly 100 N/mm but spans a much smaller percentage of the vehicle frontal structure, It spans from the 3L location to the 7R location. The implication of this during an oblique guardrail impact would be high levels of deformation of the outer body structure of the Lumina at the outboard regions of the vehicle. Deformation of this structure would expose a vehicle hardpoint to the opposing guardrail structure. This, in turn, creates pocketing to the metal guardrail structure, a region of increased stress concentration and higher likelihood for failure of the W-beam. In order to expose the hard-point which exists beneath the outer body of the Taurus, a larger force in an oblique direction would be required.

It may be observed from the post impact photos shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.10 above, that the integrity of the front driver side structure of the Taurus remains intact throughout the test while significant deformation is observed in the frontal structure of the Lumina. This deformation exposes the underlying structural hard-point discussed previously. It should be noted that severe deformations along the centerline of the Lumina shown in the photos are the result of interaction with guardrail posts during and after beam failure. This interaction does not contribute to the failure of the system; however they indicate the severity of the resulting vehicle behavior leading to rollover.

In order to investigate the nature of the rail/vehicle interaction more closely, a finite element model of the Modified G4 (1S) systems was assembled. This model accurately represents all aspects of the barrier system including accurate ground properties and post interactions, accurate geometry and material properties of posts, block-outs and rails plus accurate bolts and other attachment hardware. Further, a model of the 1995 Chevrolet Lumina, created by EASi Engineering International in 1997 exists and has been combined with the Modified G4(1S) system for the simulation cases.

To understand the likelihood of rail failure during impact, stresses of each element within the Wbeam have been monitored. High levels of localized stresses seen in the lower half of the W-beam section confirm excessive contact forces with the underlying engine cradle/frame hard-point.

A second simulation case was created where the Lumina structure impacted the guardrail section under identical impact conditions. For this case, the vehicle structure was rigidized so that the outerbody would not deform. This stiffening of the outerbody prevented the narrow underlying hardpoint from directly interacting with the W-beam structure. During this case, it was shown that the high levels of localized stress seen in the previous case were reduced to levels where material failure is unlikely. This type of analysis provides an opportunity to vary both vehicle and roadside hardware design characteristics to confirm hypothesized mechanisms and occurrences of incompatibility.

Figure 3.11: Interaction of Ford Taurus and Chevrolet Lumina impacting Modified G4(1S)

Chapter 4 Strategies to Improve Vehicle/Roadside Hardware Compatibility

Throughout the research period, a number of techniques and available data sources were used to evaluate compatibility between vehicles and roadside hardware systems. Findings presented in previous chapters offer some insight into existing compatibility issues. In this chapter, a number of future strategies to further improve compatibility were synthesized based on research discoveries and findings.

Overall, these strategies are as follows. Each of the following four sections overview suggested approaches and ideas to improve research in these areas. These include:

- Increasing awareness of roadside safety related organizations including vehicle manufacturers, DOT regulatory groups and roadside safety engineers regarding compatibility issues. This effort requires significant commitment from both automotive and roadside safety engineers to regularly communicate and work together to optimize both components of the roadside/vehicle system simultaneously.
- Improve current methods used to collect real world accident data so that future studies may benefit from improved information. Suggested data collection forms targeting roadside features are included here so that NHTSA's NASS Crash Investigators can consider their implementation.
- Proposed methods to improve test methodologies so that vehicle to roadside hardware compatibility can be better assessed using test results. This testing should include a wider yet non-excessive sample of vehicle platforms to better characterize vehicle interaction for the entire fleet. Methods to select these vehicles have been proposed using average vehicle characteristics compiled within Chapter 3.
- Initiating the use of advanced modeling techniques to isolate occurrences of incompatibility across an expanded group of vehicle platforms. As a supplement to testing or as a more cost effective method for verifying vehicle to roadside hardware, a protocol for the use of advanced simulation techniques should be implemented.

4.1 Industry Interaction and Workshop Findings

A workshop involving representatives from the automotive industry, Federal and State DOTs, roadside hardware manufacturers and other related groups was held to discuss roadside hardware compatibility issues. This open forum allowed relevant groups to learn about ongoing research and offer valuable suggestions to improve safety in this area. Attendees for the workshop and their affiliations are as follows:

- 1. Maurice Bronstad, Research Team Contractor- Dynatec Engineering
- 2. Monique Evans, Ohio DOT
- 3. Gene Buth, Texas Transportation Institute
- 4. Chuck Niessner, NCHRP
- 5. Daniel Godrick, Research Team- GWU
- 6. Steve Kan, Research Team- GWU
- 7. Leonard Meczkowski, FHWA
- 8. Michele McMurtry, NTSB
- 9. Paul Bedewi, Ford
- 10. Michael Griffith, FHWA
- 11. Stephen Maher,
- 12. Michael Cammisa, Alliance International Automotive Manufacturers
- 13. Ralph Hitchcock, Honda
- 14. John Laturner, E Tech
- 15. Richard Powers, FHWA
- 16. Harry Taylor, FHWA
- 17. Kennerly Digges, Research Team- GWU
- 18. George Bahouth, Research Team- GWU
- 19. Dhafer Marzougi, Research Team- GWU
- 20. Azim Eskandarian, Research Team- GWU

At the workshop, the nature of future vehicle characteristics in relation to roadside hardware and the expected safety implications were discussed. The workshop agenda also included the discussion of potential changes in technology affecting roadside hardware and design, e.g., new materials, new trends in manufacturability and assembly, and new federal and/or state initiatives affecting transportation policy.

This workshop initiated dialog and interaction between groups who do not typically communicate on such topics.

A primary feature of this workshop was the exchange of information between the roadside community and vehicle safety researchers/manufacturers. No forum currently exists in which vehicle manufacturers learn about observed performance of roadside systems in relation to their vehicle design features. Additionally, current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) do not mandate that new vehicles meet any minimum standards in terms of roadside hardware crash performance.

One overwhelming response and intended outcome of the workshop was the initiation of communication and further interactions of this type between the roadside safety and vehicle safety communities. Future collaboration between roadside researchers and vehicle manufacturers to address key workshop finding was proposed and efforts to begin this process is underway.

The workshop began with an overview of research presented by the GW Team. Following these presentations, a questionnaire was used to guide discussion on a variety of relevant topics. The exchange of ideas related to the proposed questions was found to be very valuable for the research team and other in attendance. Below, a summary of the discussion surrounding the questionnaire is given.

Note: The text below has been reproduced based on workshop discussions. This information contains opinions of the workshop attendees; however the accuracy and validity of the ideas have not been verified by the research team.

4.1.1 Accident Data Related Results

- 1. Midsize and large SUVs far exceed the car market regarding fatal rollovers during impact with guardrails. What is the reason for this?
	- o SUVs differ from cars in center of gravity height, front overhang, width, wheelbase and height and therefore react differently with guardrails. In particular, the static stability factor (track width/ $(2 \cdot \text{c} \cdot \text{c})$ is usually lower with these vehicles. i. It is more difficult to keep an SUV from rolling after it hits a guardrail. ii. Car based or Unibody constructed SUVs seem to have lower CGs and structures. Pickup based SUVs seem to have relatively higher CGs and structures.
- o Driver behavior is a confounding issue. SUV drivers may behave differently than automobile drivers. Also, it may make sense to examine only driver fatalities to control for the fact that SUVs may transport more occupants. This characteristic has not been proven.
- o It is impossible to say definitively that a barrier caused a rollover. It would be nice to know whether the SUVs rolled over before guardrail engagement or if the guardrail was a contributing factor to the rollover. Currently there is not enough granularity in the data (in some cases there is often not enough cases or data presented). i. In order to address this further, NASS data needs to be examined to see evidence where the outcome would have been different had a different guardrail been installed. These cases would have the most harmful collision with a guardrail.
- o Impacts with guardrails are often difficult to test and computer simulations can help model the circumstances surrounding rollover. When doing a computer simulation of an SUV into a guardrail, a real world scenario must be modeled.
- o In terms of frontal compatibility, the structure of the pickup trucks and SUVs needs to be lower to engage the current guardrails properly. Currently there is no bumper standard with SUVs (unlike cars). It is not necessary to lower the CG, just the vehicle structure so the vehicle can engage the guardrail. Ideally the guardrail and vehicle will distribute the forces since a more uniform distribution prevents penetration.
- o In hardware tests that have been performed, the thrie-beam performed far worse for the pickup than the standard W-beam - although a modified (14 inch block in vertical plane added) thrie-beam performed well. Severe failures were found with G41S - even with wood block-outs. These tests may not have been indicative of real world conditions though. During these tests, it was found that higher barriers were not necessarily safer. Also, if changes are made for the pickup truck, this may lead to serious delta-v problems for small cars. Currently, no tests have been performed with an SUV in a 25-degree 100km impact.
- o During rollovers, risk of ejection is high. This risk can be reduced with the introduction of side curtain airbags.
- o Time is an important issue- in order to replace all of the guardrails in operation, it will take many years.
- 2. Large and compact SUVs were shown to have high fatality rates during impacts with concrete barriers.
	- o Is there any evidence that higher safety shape (NJ or F) barrier might reduce this? i. Passenger cars would not benefit from the use of Jersey or F shape barriers. Taller barriers were not necessarily better since vehicles ride up and roll over these barriers ii. The concrete barrier held no advantage over guardrails when testing with SUVs iii. Higher barriers did have less intrusion into oncoming traffic.
	- o Is there any evidence that the higher constant slope barriers reduce these fatality rates compared to the lower safety shapes? i. Vertical walls were best at preventing rollovers ii. Not much real world accident data exists about the type of barrier impact- either in police data or NASS. Some state DOT's have information, but police and accident investigators rarely examine the guardrails for failure. iii. To get more information it would be best to work with state highway inspectors and receive data and pictures. Another option would be to include more information in the NASS database.
- 3. Buckled guardrails have penetrated into passenger compartments of SUVs and pickup trucks. What causes this?
	- o Guardrails have seams that break, and these exposed ends may lead to increased risk of intrusion.
	- o When the end terminals of flexible longitudinal barriers penetrate vehicles, this may not be a compatibility issue. If it is a compatibility issue, it is difficult to determine whether the guardrail penetrated due to a vehicle issue or a guardrail issue.
- 4. Should guardrails be tested with mid-sized SUVs due to the high fatality rate of occupants in these vehicles involved in rollovers?
- o Many of the fatalities were caused when people were ejected from the vehicle during a rollover. Also, since SUVs roll more without engaging a guardrail, the fatalities of occupants in mid-sized SUVs might not be a guardrail issue.
- o The costs of testing roadside hardware with SUVs are potentially high. SUVs are expensive to buy as used vehicles. The SUV category falls within the range of the small car to large pickup.
- o Installation problems are larger issues. The installation is often performed improperly due to terrain constraints and the training of the construction crew.
- o Tests of popular guardrails should be run with SUVs such as a 25-degree impact to see how they perform in these impacts.
- 5. Due to the significance of the compact SUV fatality rate, should testing with a compact SUVs replace the 820 kg car for redirection tests?
	- o Previous tests show these vehicles pass the redirection tests and during testing have demonstrated that they are not necessarily less stable than a passenger car (vehicle characteristics do not support this claim however). Compact SUVs do have potential snagging issues though.
- 6. Do the current 2000 kg pickup truck and 820 kg car adequately represent the range of high sales vehicles?
	- o These vehicles are satisfactory given the budget considerations. The categories of small car and large truck encompass most vehicles. However, testing end terminals with different classes may be worthwhile. In addition, computer analysis can be used to reduce the cost and possibly test more vehicles.

4.1.2 Assessment of Vehicle Compatibility

1. What are your thoughts on the available data sources to search for compatibility issues?

- o More granularity is needed in the accident data in order to know what to test. Anecdotal evidence can be used to determine where the issues lie. The NASS cases can be investigated to show where vehicles are having engagement issues.
- o Full-scale tests are good for finding compatibility issues, however these are costly therefore more than one platform is rarely tested.
- o Computer simulation is also good at unearthing issues, and it is cheaper than full-scale tests.
- 2. How can the accident data be improved to assess the performance of roadside hardware?
	- \circ Better granularity is needed in the accident data (i.e. type of barrier hit/ end treatment was used?) Pictures are also valuable tools in investigating accidents and should be included whenever possible. This is something that should be brought up to NASS.
	- o It would be interesting to take an inventory of currently used roadside hardware and evaluating the real world performance.
- 3. What improvements can be made to full scale crash tests?
	- o Dummies could be used, although this increases the number of factors that are being tested and increases that cost of the test. Since cost considerations limit the amount of tests than can be run and analyzed, the inclusion dummies might limit the amount of tests that could be run.
	- o It is theorized that event data recorders would also give more information into what is happening in real world scenarios. With this information more realistic tests can be created. It was indicated that roadside crash events often have a very long duration. For that reason most EDRs do not capture enough information to make their data useful.
	- o Computer simulations can test different configurations. Since these are possibly cheaper than full-scale crash tests, more scenarios can be run.
- 4. Can the design of barrier systems be modified to allow for improvements in airbag systems?
	- o If airbags and dummies are used, is it a vehicle or a guardrail test?
	- o If airbags are considered in guardrail development, the guardrails may be made stiffer rather than softer. This might have unintended negative consequences. However, if the hardware is made too soft, it might complicate airbag firing logic leading to less suboptimal firing during a collision.
- 5. What are vehicle characteristics that may have an impact on guardrail performance?
	- o The vehicle height (especially the height of the front structure) influences how the vehicle engages the guardrail. Also the frontal overhang of the vehicle affects the potential for snagging of the front wheel and guardrail engagement. The center of gravity and yaw moment of inertia also have an impact since these characteristics determine how the vehicle yaws and rolls. Side curtain airbags may help the occupants inside of the vehicle. In addition, ABS and other vehicle handling countermeasures like Dynamic Stability Control (DSC) may help vehicles from engaging the guardrails altogether.

4.1.3 Policy Issues Regarding Compatibility

- 1. What is the best course to take with regards to compatibility?
	- o More communication within the industry of the vehicle manufacturers and hardware creators. If the hardware test is a failure, it is hard to tell if this failure is fault of the vehicle or the hardware. Often the test failures can be attributed to several different causes. Therefore it is important to change the mindset from vehicle versus hardware to vehicle and hardware working together to reduce the severity of these accidents.
	- o The ideal scenario would use a broad range of vehicle models to test compatibility with hardware.
	- o Passenger cars usually have no problems with guardrails since these vehicles have standard frontal structure requirements. Since SUVs do not have standard frontal structure requirements, the guardrail design for these vehicles is made more difficult.

- 2. What is the best way to resolve hardware concerns?
	- o It would be good for FHWA to rate hardware like NHTSA rates new cars. In order to do this, a grading system needs to be developed where devices are judged on a scale opposed to current criteria where each device passes or fails at a given test level. These grades could be arrived at using data including occupant (dummy) injury values in addition to current vehicle acceleration, dynamics and deformation criteria.
	- o There are 2 types of barriers those that absorb energy and those that break away. Because of this, the designs need to evaluate based on performance. In particular, "In service performance" needs to be monitored to examine how well the designs are performing in real world accidents. Also, since no state wants to pay too much for roadside hardware, cost is of utmost concern.
	- o Formal and informal communication in the industry and government is necessary to ensure that both parties are moving in the same direction regarding vehicle to guardrail impacts.

4.1.4 Computer Simulation

- 1. How much faith do you have in computer simulation and its ability to identify roadside safety problems?
	- o Models are validated and perform with 80-90% similar responses, but the timing of guardrail rupture is still a shortcoming.
	- o Currently, the validation of wood and soil models is underway.
	- o FHWA has confidence in modeling as a prediction tool. It is a good way to see what should be tested and as a supplemental source of data from the tests.
- 2. What role should simulation have in the NCHRP report 350 update?
	- o It is a tool that definitely should be used to help choose vehicles for future tests.

- o It is a less expensive approach to examine the existing vehicle platforms used.
- o At the very least, it should be used as a first step in the research before full scale tests are performed.
- 3. Are 6-year-old vehicle models OK for tests?
	- o Yes. The designs of vehicle structures has not changed dramatically within this period of time, however, vehicle fleet populations (relative numbers of small passenger cars vs. large cars vs. SUV's vs. Pickups) can drastically change within this period.
- 4. What should be the basis of vehicle selection?
	- o Models should be made based on sales of the platform. The more common vehicles should be modeled and tested.
	- o The mid-sized vehicle classes need to be updated and simulated based on characteristics of real world accidents (impact angles, yaw angles, speeds, etc.)
- 5. What are the challenges for side impact simulation?
	- o Side impacts leave less room for energy absorption. Therefore it is necessary to look in the accident data to determine typical impact speeds that cause injuries.

Conclusions and Future Steps

This workshop showed that dialog between the automakers and the roadside hardware creators was valuable to share ideas regarding vehicle to guardrail impacts. More workshops like this were seen as an effective way to disseminate information to all parties interested in reducing the severity of vehicle to roadside hardware collisions. A formal committee should be put into place, possibly within SAE, that directly addresses these issues on an on-going basis.

In order to determine if there is a true compatibility problem, steps should be taken to not only get more data surrounding accidents with roadside hardware, but also to get more out of the data that is currently available.

With increased support, more modeling can be done to address the problems of vehicle compatibility with guardrail systems. Test methods, vehicles and criteria can be evaluated to understand if the tests truly assess the compatibility of guardrails with the most appropriate segments of the US vehicle fleet.

4.2 Crash Data Collection

Accident databases that provide some insight into vehicle compatibility were evaluated in this study. The Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), National Automotive Sampling System / Crashworthiness Data System (NASS/CDS) and the Highway (HSIS) databases were reviewed. It is believed that no database that exists today provides a large and complete enough data set to confidently identify compatibility issues. Clearly, as identified in other sections of this report; another try in this important area is warranted.

Of each database reviewed, the NASS/CDS system contains the most complete and relevant information to assess vehicle to roadside hardware compatibility occurrences however a series of shortcomings remain.

Current NASS/CDS data collection procedures focus on crash causation, vehicle handling, vehicle crashworthiness, restraint system performance, occupant characteristics and injury outcomes. Currently, over 500 crash variables are collect for the sampled crashes described above, however little attention if given to roadside attributes and safety systems.

In order to adequately characterize roadside crash dynamics, suitability of installation configurations and compatibility of vehicles with roadside systems it appears that a large collection of additional variables must be considered to improve the NASS System for use by the roadside safety community for compatibility investigation.

In 1983, a research project, known as the Longitudinal Barrier Special Study(LBSS), was initiated to collect additional data for NASS collected barrier crashes[29]. Additional variables were added to the NASS systems and NASS investigators were trained to collect these variables related to roadside systems. The study was successful in determining relevant information for a limited population of roadside events, however the large number of data points collected and corresponding high cost of such collections lead to the eventual termination of the study.

During statistical evaluation of NASS data during data collection years following the LBSS, it was found that critical crash attributes necessary to conduct accurate analyzes were missing from the CDS

coded variables. These variables include pre-impact dynamics of vehicles that interact with roadside hardware systems, barrier characteristics and resulting barrier interaction/performance. Further, the concept of improper installation of barrier systems must be addressed during accident investigations.

It is believed that this additional information should be gathered by NASS investigators if possible. The use of electronic photos with sufficient detail to post process case information collected is one method to significantly increase information collected while limiting time spent in the field by accident investigators. Items including barrier designs, dimensions and deformations may be extracted from photos by a roadside expert at the completion of NASS investigation. This approach would require improved photos with geometric indicators (measurement guides/rulers) and adequate labeling.

A number of practical considerations remain regarding roadside investigations as well. These relate to current practices used by NASS investigators and safety concerns related to on-road investigations.

Many roadside crash events occur on state roads and busy highways. In order to perform the necessary evaluations of the crash scene, investigators would be exposed to dangerous environments in some cases. This was evident during the investigation of individual cases shown in Chapter 2. Many photos were "drive by" shots of accident scenes because it was not possible to walk to the impact location.

Another issue concerning barrier interactions involves the timeliness that the crash scene is reviewed by investigators. Often state DOTs repair barrier sections and impacted devices before the arrival of accident investigators. The process for selection and inclusion is outline in the NASS/CDS coding manual. It involves preliminary review of the police accident report to determine if it is eligible for study inclusion by the PSU. This process may occur in as little as one day but up to two weeks from the time of the crash. On average investigation occurs 1-2 weeks from the crash event and in some cases, limited deformed barrier data can be collected.

The following forms have been created based on information found lacking in current NASS/CDS Cases for roadside safety investigations and using the Longitudinal Barrier Special Study (LBSS) data collection forms which were previously developed. A number of variables and sections have been eliminated which were found to be of limited importance for compatibility evaluation. These forms are proposed as a starting point for improved collection strategies for NASS/CDS investigations.

NCHRP 22-15 Proposed Roadside Form

NASS/CDS Data Collection Format

I. Header Variables

III. $\overline{}$

Figure 4.1: Proposed General Form, Roadside Crashes

I. General Roadside Form

1. Impacted Device $_{1}(0)$ None ____ (1) Deformable Guardrail ____ (2) Other Deformable Barrier ____ (3) Concrete Barrier ____ (4) Bridge Rail ____ (5) Longitudinal Barrier End Terminal ____ (6) Barrier Transition ____ (7) Crash Cushion ____ (8) Other (specify___________________) ____ (9) Unknown 2. Location of Feature (in direction of vehicle travel) ____ (0) Impact conditions not applicable (see manual) ____ (1) Off left side of roadway ____ (2) Off right side of roadway (3) Other (specify ____ (9) Unknown 3. Impact Angle (è 1- angle formed by longitudinal axis of vehicle and primary axis of feature) ____ (00)-(90) Code Actual Angle in Degrees ____ (99) Unknown 4. Separation Angle (è 2- angle formed by longitudinal axis of vehicle and primary axis of feature at last contact) ____ (00)-(90) Code Actual Angle in Degrees ____ (99) Unknown 5. Vehicle Yawing Angle at Impact(è 3- angle formed by direction of vehicle travel and longitudinal axis of vehicle) ____ (000)-(180) Code Yawing Angle in Degrees ____ (999) Unknown 6. Vehicle Rotation at Impact (ù 1-about vehicle vertical axis) (1) No ____ (2) Yes ____ (9) Unknown 7. Run length of impacted treatment section ____ (00) Not Applicable ____ (01-29)Estimated Distance in Meters ____ (30) Greater than 30 meters ____ (99) Unknown 8. End Treatment Type (0) None (1) BCT ____ (2) Free End 9. Impact Speed (derive based on vehicle/barrier deformation) $(01-98)$ Code speed in km/h ____ (99) Unknown 10. Treatment Performance ____ (1) Vehicle Redirected by Treatment ____ (2) Vehicle snagged/pocketed by treatment ____ (3) Vehicle overrode treatment ____ (4) Vehicle vaulted treatment ____ (5) Vehicle Penetrated Treatment ____ (6) Vehicle contained by treatment ____ (7) Other (specify___________________) ____ (9) Unknown 11. Post Impact Vehicle Trajectory ____ (1) Vehicle remained on roadside ____ (2) Vehicle returned to roadway ____ (3) Vehicle crossed roadway/ran off opposite side ____ (4) Vehicle crossed median other travel way ____ (5) Vehicle remained on top of, went over or through treatment ____ (6) Other (specify___________________) ____ (9) Unknown 12. Curb Type/Presence ____ (0) No curb present ____ (1) Barrier curb ____ (2) Mountable Curb ____ (3) Other (specify___________________) ____ (9) Unknown 13. Curb Height ____ (0) No curb present ____ (00)-(49) Code actual curb height to nearest cm. ____ (0) 50 cm. or higher 14. Perpendicular Distance from Curb to Struck Feature ____ (0) No curb present ____ (000)-(996) Actual distance to nearest cm ____ (997) 25 meters or greater or greater ____ (999) Unknown 15. Height of Treatment Relative to Roadway Edge (-97) -97 cm or higher ____ (-96)-(96) Code actual height of treatment relative to roadway edge to the nearest cm. $(97) + 97$ cm or higher ____ (+99) Unknown

Figure 4.2: Proposed General Form, Continued

____ (3) Turned Down End ____ (4) Cable with Concrete Anchor

____ (9) Unknown

16. Treatment Height

 $\frac{1}{2}$ (-97) -97 cm or higher

____ (-96)-(96) Code actual height of treatment to

the nearest cm.

 $(97) +97$ cm or higher

 \equiv (+99) Unknown

17. Normal Treatment Height if different from height at impact point ____ (00) Constant height

____ (00)-(99) Actual height in cm.

 (99) Unknown

18. Treatment Damage Refer to the diagram below for recording of field measurements on barrier damage.

Length of Contact Damage in meters (Ld)

Length of Induced Damage in meters (Li)

19. Maximum Depth of Treatment Deformation ____ (0) No deformation

 (ie. Minor scrapes, paint transfer) ____ (000)-(999) Code actual deformation in cm.

Figure 4.3: Proposed Longitudinal Barrier Data Form

Longitudinal Barrier Form

Complete this section for each impact involving a longitudinal barrier. (if multiple impacts with a barrier type take place, relative location by vehicle number should be indicated by sequence number for item 1 below.)

Code this form for the following Longitudinal Barrier Types

- a. Guardrails
- b. Median Barriers
- c. Bridge Rails

2. Sequence number of Impact with Longitudinal Barrier (01) - (98) Code impact sequence number

____ (99) Unknown

3. Beam Type

- (0) N/A- No Beam
- (0) Cable
- (0) "W" Beam
- ____ (0) Box Beam
- ____ (0) Aluminum Extrusion
- ____ (0) Thrie Beam

____ (0) Other (specify________________.)

- ____ (0) Unknown
- 4. Beam Material
- 5. Beam Dimensions
- 6. Post Shape
- 7. Post Material
- ____ (0) Wood
- ____ (0) Steel
- ____ (0) Aluminum ____ (0) Concrete
- ____ (0) Fiberglass/Composite
- ____ (0) Plastic
- $_$ (0) Other (Specify)

8. Blockout Type

- 9. Blockout Material
- (0) Wood
- (0) Steel
- ____ (0) Aluminum ____ (0) Concrete
-
- ____ (0) Fiberglass/Composite
- ____ (0) Plastic
- ____ (0) Other (Specify)

10. Post Spacing (center to center)

 (0) N/A- No Posts

____ (0) Record actual distance from center to center in meters.

____ (0) 30 meters or greater

- ____ (0) Unknown
- 11. Post Dimensions

12. If the post spacing at the point of initial impact is different from that of the normal section of the barrier, record the normal spacing below to the nearest cm. Code the post spacing at the point of initial impact for variable B45

13. Concrete Barrier Type

- ____ (0) N/A- Not a Concrete Barrier ____ (1) Concrete Safety shape (indicate profile dim. cm.)
- ____ (2) Vertical Wall
- ____ (3) Constant Slope Barrier
- ____ (8) Other (provide sketch with dimensions)
- ____ (8) Unknown

14. Concrete Barrier Dimensions

____ (000) No Concrete Barrier

- ____ Vertical Rise
- Lower Slope
- (999) Indicates unknown quantity

15. Permanent Barrier

- ____ (0) N/A- Not a Concrete Barrier
- ____ (1) Moveable Barrier (in workzone)
- ____ (1) Permanent Barrier

16. Portable/Moveable Barrier Connections

- ____ (0) N/A- Not a Moveable Barrier
- ____ (0) No Connections
- ____ (0) Pin and loop with fastening nut
- ____ (0) Pin and loop with no nut
- ____ (0) Pin and loop with fastening nut /w spacer
- ____ (0) Tongue and groove
- ____ (0) Fastening Plate
- ____ (0) Top C-Channel

Figure 4.4: Proposed Crash Cushion Data Form

End Treatment/Crash Cushion

Complete this section for each impact involving an end treatment or crash cushion. (if multiple impacts with a barrier type take place, relative location by vehicle number should be indicated by sequence number for item 1 below.)

1. Sequence number of Impact with End Treatment/Crash Cushion ____ (01)-(98) Code impact sequence number

____ (99) Unknown

Barrier end-treatment/crash cushion Dimensions

____ (0) Other (specify_____________) ____ (0) Unknown

2. Location of End Treatment (in direction of vehicle travel)

- ____ (0) N/A- Impact not with Barrier End
- ____ (0) Upstream
- ____ (0) Downstream
- (0) Other (specify__________)
- ____ (0) Unknown
- 3. Distance From End Treatment to Initial Point of Impact
- ____ (0) N/A- Impact not with Barrier End
- ____ (0) Impact with barrier or within .5 meters of barrier
- ____ (01)-(96) Code Actual Distance to nearest meter
- ____ (99) Unknown

4. Length of Flare

5. Flare Offset

6. Performance

- ____ (0) N/A- Impact not with Barrier End
- ____ (0) Vehicle came to rest in contact w/ treatment)
- ____ (0) Vehicle redirected by barrier
- ____ (0) Energy absorbing stage in mid-stroke
	- indicate stroke amount __________cm

Figure 4.5: Proposed End Treatment Data Form

In order for NASS/CDS investigators to accurately distinguish specific crash cushions, barriers and end treatments, additional training in this area is necessary. Alternatively, a requirement for clear labeling on each device may facilitate data coding required by proposed Figure 4.5.

4.3 Crash Test Methodology

Crash test results allow detailed evaluations of vehicle interaction with impacted roadside devices. The crashworthiness performance of roadside structures is currently is determined through crash testing according to the procedures of NCHRP Report 350 [38]. The number of required tests varies with the device ranging from 2 for longitudinal barriers, supports structures, and TMAs to 7 for terminals/crash cushions. A number of different Test Levels (TLs) are specified in Report 350. The number ranges from 6 for longitudinal barriers to 2 (TL 2 and 3) for terminals and crash cushions, support structures, and truck mounted attenuators.

Currently, the basic test level (TL-3) and TL-2 require testing with a 820 kg car and a 2000 kg pickup. Higher test levels also use larger vehicles including an 8000 kg 2 axle truck, a 36,000 kg tractor/van trailer and a 36,000 kg tractor/tanker trailer. Report 350 recommends various geometric property ranges for the test vehicles for each test that provide some uniformity in vehicles used.

The crash tests are conducted using a very limited number of vehicles that are not more than 6 years old. For economy of testing, it is not surprising that vehicles near the age cut off are normally used. This practice may be a significant contributor to the lag in roadside device improvement when compared with the rate that new vehicle platforms emerge.

Current test methods do not include representations of occupants. Largely the longitudinal and lateral acceleration limits are designed to limit the severity of loading experienced by occupants. As new occupant restraint systems emerge including advanced frontal and side impact airbags, plus pretensioned and force limited belt systems, the crash environment will change significantly.

In the case of longitudinal barrier design, increasing stiffness to avoid vehicle pocketing and penetration would have a divergent effect. First, barrier penetrations and deformations such that vehicle override becomes possible will be avoided. However, lateral accelerations during vehicle redirection following impact with a stiff barrier could increase injury risk for occupants. Newly emerging side impact airbags and improved energy absorbing vehicle side structures may mitigate the effects of this increased risk. Without the use of human surrogates during testing and analysis, the true nature of occupant loading and injury risk cannot be quantified.

Similarly, airbag systems may not be well designed to trigger during oblique impacts at low angles with longitudinal barriers. If late deployments occur after an occupant has move out of position, the resulting interaction with a deploying airbag could have harmful effects. Human surrogates and/or close attention to airbag deployment timing is necessary to understand this phenomenon.

At this time, an effort to update NCHRP Report 350 has begun. Many of these issues discussed above should be addressed by future updates in some way. Based on current indications, specific areas to be addressed include the following:

- Test vehicles used
- Number of tests
- Transition/Temporary Barrier Test Conditions
- Higher Test Speed Reflecting 70-75 mph Speed Limits
- TMA Crash Test
- Occupant Risk
- Occupant Compartment Intrusion
- Soil Specification
- Side Impact Requirement

4.3.1 Test Vehicle Selection

During this project, definite behavioral trends were observed when comparing vehicle response during impacts with roadside devices. It was determined that pickup trucks do not represent the behavior of SUVs adequately during all impact conditions. Further, the compact car category does not represent a significant population of vehicles on the roads today and therefore its use should be reconsidered. Rather, one vehicle per identifiable class should be selected for crash testing. Although this approach would greatly increase the number of tests required, the benefit in terms of lives saved and injuries reduced would greatly outweigh the financial implication of more tests.

Table below provides information regarding vehicle characteristics for a series of vehicle classes. Those classes include compact, mid-size and large cars and SUVs. Compact/full-size pickups as well as mid-size and large vans. The vehicle which most closely resembles the weighted average vehicle for its class should be considered during selection of future test vehicles. This vehicle may not be the most popular, yet behavior during crashes with roadside structures would represent the mean characteristics exhibited by its class.

Type	Class	Length Width Height (in.)	(in.)	(in.)	Wheel Base (in.)	Curb (lb)	Front Weight Bump Ht. Overhng. (in.)	Front (in.)
Car	Compact	168	65	53	96	2380	11	35
	Midsize	187	70	53	104	3160	11	39
	Large	206	74	55	114	3832	12	41
Pickup	Compact	187	67	64	113	3039	15	31
	Large	213	77	71	132	4269	18	34
SUV	Compact	158	66	67	95	2849	13	28
	Midsize	178	70	69	105	4022	17	31
	Large	196	78	73	116	4908	16	34
Van	Midsize	187	72	67	112	3548	10	36
	Large	200	78	78	121	4427		33

Table 4.1: Average population weighted vehicle characteristics per class

A second approach to selecting a set vehicle platforms for future testing would be through a review of vehicle whose characteristics lay at the extremes of each vehicle class. Those extremes may fall at the high or low end depending on the probable worst case per test. Appendix B of this report contains all specifications for all vehicles surveyed. A quick search of these parameters would provide an indication of the vehicle platform whose specifications place it at the extreme of each group. This philosophy resembles the current approach taken during the selection of future test vehicles.

4.3.2 Occupant Representation During Crash Testing

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) require that both active and passive restraint systems provide a minimum level of protection for belted and unbelted occupants. These standards have lead to the introduction of frontal driver and passenger airbags in all new vehicles and a rapid growth in the population of side impact airbag equipped vehicles.

The presence of these newly emerging restraint systems in roadside crash involved vehicles may lead to vastly different occupant injury potential however their effects have not been studied. Early development of test criteria shown in NCHRP Report 350 considered only unbelted occupants who were not protected by airbag systems. The fail space model, currently used during roadside testing, limits loading through vehicle lateral and longitudinal accelerations. In addition, this model allows an occupant compartment intrusion. Although these criteria may still correspond with reasonable injury thresholds, the effect of countermeasures between the accelerating vehicle and the occupant must be further evaluated using human surrogates (dummies) during crash testing.

Due to the nature of off angled impacts with deformable longitudinal barriers, one concern regarding airbag system function is their ability to sense an impact event before any occupant excursion or motion takes place. In other words, if a weak longitudinal crash pulse results following a crash with a barrier system, an occupant may move towards the steering wheel, A-Pillar or side glass before an airbag is triggered. If later during the crash the vehicle is suddenly decelerated, the airbag may then deploy. This would result in an out of position airbag deployment where occupant injury risk may be higher than during typical deployments. The possibility of these conditions must be evaluated. However current test procedures do not provide sufficient information to determine occupant kinematics during crashes. Full scale testing using instrumented human surrogates is required.

4.4 Application of Computer Simulation

The maturities of Finite Element (FE) simulation using codes like LS-DYNA now make it possible to use highly complex computer models to investigate compatibility issues. In 1995, FHWA created a consortium of university research centers to develop accurate models of roadside structures. Since that time, developed FE models have been used to evaluate and improve roadside hardware design safety. Similarly, both FHWA and NHTSA have supported the development of highly detailed vehicle models for a variety of uses.

These models and those that may be provided by vehicle and roadside safety manufacturers provide a wide ranging opportunity for investigations of vehicle/roadside hardware compatibility. One strategy to

recognize potential occurrence of incompatibility would be to exercise all available roadside models with all available vehicle models to assess overall performance. To date, the only vehicles used for roadside hardware simulation studies have been limited to those specified by NCHRP report 350 requirements.

An aggressive effort by FHWA and NHTSA is recommended to maximize the number of computer models for vehicles and roadside safety features. A judicious selection process for future models developed will allow continuous monitoring of different classes of vehicles interaction with different roadside safety features.

Another approach to improving compatibility would be through joint studies by FHWA and vehicle manufacturers to evaluate the performance of newly emerging vehicle platforms with the most commonly installed roadside devices. NHTSA or FHWA could request that each manufacturer provides FE models for a selection of their passenger vehicles. At the same time, FHWA could require that FE models of each public or proprietary roadside device be delivered upon approval for use in the NHS system.

The process for creation and validation of these models has evolved sufficiently that any manufacturer producing roadside hardware features fit for use on US roadways should not find model creation prohibitive. Further, the safety importance of these devices should not be overshadowed by resource constraints of private and public companies developing these devices. The Centers of Excellence could be utilized when necessary to create and/or analyze features and their performance with emerging vehicles.

In the event that such an ideal partnership proves to be unattainable, more modest efforts using The Centers of Excellence and other sources could be used to reduce the reliance on expensive crash tests and accident data collection/analysis. These efforts would involve exercising currently available vehicle and roadside hardware models to simulate a variety of impact scenarios and identify potential compatibility issues. Furthermore, some of the previously identified vehicle characteristics, which could potentially lead to incompatibilities, can be changed in the computer models to understand their effects on the crash outcome. A list of currently available vehicle and roadside hardware models, which could be used for such a study are listed below:

List of currently or soon to be available computer Models:

Vehicle Models:

- Geo Metro (1997 year model)
- Toyota RAV4 (2000)
- Plymouth Neon (1996)
- Chevrolet S-10 Pickup Truck (1998)
- Ford Taurus (1991)
- Ford Taurus (2001)
- Honda Accord
- Crown Victoria
- Chevrolet Lumina
- Chevrolet C-1500/C-2500 Pickup Truck (1994)
- Dodge Caravan (1997)
- Ford Explorer
- Ford Econoline (1998)
- Ford F800 18,000 lb. Truck (1996)
- Freightliner Tractor/Trailer (1991)

Roadside Hardware Models:

- Slipbase Sign Supports
- U-Channel Sign Supports
- Dual Support Sign
- Portable Concrete Barrier (PCB) Several designs varying in length, shape, connection types, ... etc.
- G41S W-Beam Guardrail multiple versions with different posts type, post height, and blockouts
- Bullnose
- Thrie Beam Guardrail

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- Three strand Cable Rail Barrier
- G42W W-Beam Guardrail
- Concrete Median Barriers (CMB) Four Shapes: F-Shape, NJ Shape, Vertical Wall, Single Slope
- W-Beam to CMB Transition -Four models: Thrie-beam/W-beam, Wood-post /Steel-post
- PCB to CMB Plate Transition
- Secure Mailbox

Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Research

5.1 Conclusions

Throughout the research period, compatibility between vehicles and roadside hardware systems was investigated. Findings of the project indicated that the performance of roadside systems during typical crash configurations varied greatly according to the overall characteristics of the impacting vehicle class. However, the relationship between detailed vehicle characteristics and adverse crash outcomes could not be easily linked using currently available data.

5.1.1 Data Analysis

A review of NASS/CDS and FARS data was conducted to evaluate the compatibility of existing roadside systems and an evolving vehicle fleet. A historical review of fatalities during roadside hardware impacts was conducted using crash data from 1990-2000. Although NCHRP 350 criteria has lead to significant changes in roadside systems designs since it's publication, many roadside systems that remained in service during these years did not vary significantly in design. Using the assumptions and adjustments outlined in the following paragraphs, the variation in injury and fatality outcomes during impacts with roadside devices could be attributed to evolving vehicle characteristics.

Adjustments to crash exposure were based on vehicle population for each class. As more vehicles were registered, the occurrence of a fatal crash involving that vehicle class was expected to rise proportionally. R.L. Polk registration data was used to transform fatality counts into fatality rates per registered vehicle. Since the likelihood of an impact by an errant vehicle increases proportionally as the population of each device type increases, a second adjustment for the number of installed roadside devices would have been beneficial. However, most states do not maintain an accurate inventory of installed devices. Therefore the device installation counts could not be obtained. In addition the increased roadwork activity and resulting increase in the numbers of temporary barrier systems through the 1990's may have been responsible for an increase in barrier related deaths.

In assessing fatality trends for vehicles impacting each class of device, the inherent crashworthiness and level of occupant protection provided by the vehicle directly relates to crash injury outcomes. The improvement in the safe design of vehicles was not adjusted for during this analysis. The
effect of these improvements would lead to reduced fatality counts for a given impact condition when compared with crash outcomes for impacts involving earlier model vehicles.

Based on the analysis of guardrail, concrete median barrier and small to medium pole impacts involving each of the investigated vehicle classes (i.e. small, midsize and large cars, small, midsize and large SUV's, and small and large pickups), two clear trends were observed.

The first observation regarded fatality rates for longitudinal barrier (guardrails and concrete median barriers) impacts by small and midsize SUV's. These fatalities increased at a rate higher than the vehicle population increase. Further investigation of small and midsize SUV crash behavior indicated that the increase in fatalities correlated directly with the occurrence of vehicle rollovers. A comparison of fatality rates for these vehicles with and without rollover involvement (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) suggested that the inherent instability introduced to these vehicles during longitudinal barrier impacts had a more significant effect than the same condition involving pickup trucks. This finding suggests that pickups may not adequately represent the worst case impact for the vehicle fleet and selection of future crash test vehicles should account for this.

The second observation indicated improved outcomes involving small and midsize cars during impacts with longitudinal barrier systems. Small and midsize car impacts with longitudinal barrier systems occur frequently, however fatality rates have declined since 1990. This behavior may be attributed to improved vehicle handling characteristics reducing the frequency of such impacts, improved occupant protection by the vehicle, and improved roadside device performance.

5.1.2 Individual Case Review

Anecdotal evidence of poor interaction between roadside structures and impacting vehicles was gathered from review of existing NASS/CDS and CIREN case data. (See Section 2.2) This review lead to valuable insight into characteristics of common roadside crash configurations, however inadequate documentation of device characteristics and a lack of specific information regarding vehicle kinematics during impact hindered the analysis from drawing further conclusions.

Key findings from this review include the following.

1. Side impact crash outcomes involving barrier end-terminals depend largely on direct engagement of the vehicle structure (i.e. door sill or pillars). Taller SUV and pickup structures engage existing terminal devices adequately while lower small and midsize car structure often do not. Door structures often cannot prevent excessive door deformation and occupant compartment intrusion during these impact conditions.

- 2. Oblique longitudinal barrier impacts involving SUV's do not directly lead to rollover, however increased vehicle instability, driver overcorrection, and inherent vehicle kinematics lead to subsequent vehicle rollover.
- 3. The performance of airbag systems during roadside hardware crashes is not well understood, however it is possible that soft longitudinal pulses may delay airbag deployments. This condition may lead to reduced levels of occupant protection.
- 4. Frequently, existing NASS/CDS data collect techniques do not adequately document barrier crash conditions, barrier performance and structural interactions.

Currently, NASS/CDS investigators code a category of impacted device. While this information is helpful, an investigators ability to recognize cases of incompatibility is limited due to a lack of specific barrier/vehicle attributes. Case photos are available, however NASS/CDS investigations focus largely on the vehicle, the occupant compartment and restraint systems. Less consideration is given to the impacted device.

Through the case review process, additional data points have been defined that help to adequately characterize the performance of the vehicle/roadside device. Of particular interest are the specific installation attributes for crash involved devices. Currently, state highway engineers use guidelines for installation practices, however each installation is tailored to the terrain, road use and devices available. These conditions lead to complex installation practices and difficult crash investigations. To aid in data collection following a crash, three additional crash investigation forms, similar to existing CDS forms, have been created as a product of NCHRP 22-15.

These proposed forms improve data concerning the following items:

Device Design Characteristics

Post, block out, rail types, barrier profiles, installation heights

Location of impact relative to device features

Distance downstream, distance from splice, distance from roadway, curb presence

Verification of Proper device installation

Barrier heights, protection of dangerous features

Estimated Impact Mode

Impact angle, tracking vs. non-tracking, rotational conditions

Overall estimate of device performance

Improved crash photos, device deformation

5.1.3 Crash Testing

Currently, the test methods (NCHRP 350) evaluating the performance of roadside hardware devices use only a small sample of vehicle platforms. These tests are often performed without occupants or Anthropomorphic Test Dummys (ATDs). Due to the limited number of vehicles used, assessing compatibility of the entire fleet with a given device is not possible.

A broader cross section of test vehicles is required to verify the appropriate identification of the most extreme case. Currently only the 820kg car and full sized pickup truck are tested. To determine the vehicles included in this wider sample a database, which identified and measured the key attributes of over 300 different vehicles, was created. Additionally, less detailed data for over 5000 vehicles also was aggregated. This data, linked with vehicle registration data, was reviewed to establish trends in the vehicle markets and determine how the attributes of the United State's vehicle fleet are changing.

It was found that the small, midsize and large SUV populations were the most rapidly growing. These vehicles were somewhat similar to the full size pickup truck. However, these vehicles differ from the pickup truck in CG height, Static Stability Factor (SSF), weight distribution and other characteristics important in vehicle to roadside hardware impacts. These vehicles now account for a sizable portion of the US vehicle fleet, necessitating their compatibility with guardrails. It is important that testing be performed using these vehicles to determine that their level of compatibility with roadside hardware systems is adequate.

The crash test study shown in Chapter 3 is a compelling example of a vehicle to roadside system incompatibility. These test outcomes suggest that compatibility cannot be estimated using gross vehicle characteristics like vehicle mass, wheelbase and track width alone. Detailed structural attributes of vehicles must be considered with respect to the particular impacted device to understand crash behavior. The behavioral differences observed between these vehicles suggests that additional test requirements should be considered for all vehicle structures rather than a single representative vehicle or a vehicle chosen at the extreme of the entire vehicle fleet. The mechanism for implementing these additional tests must be determined however.

5.1.4 Industry and Government Awareness

The NCHRP 22-15 workshop displayed a gulf between Automobile manufactures and the roadside hardware creators in understanding the issue of roadside hardware compatibility. In order to improve the overall safety of vehicle entering the roadside, initiation of a cooperative approach between the roadside safety community and the automotive safety community is necessary. When such cooperation was discussed during the project workshop, both roadside and vehicle safety representatives expressed interest.

A proposed concept involves the creation of a working group within an existing professional society, The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). In addition, automotive industry involvement at the Transportation Research Board Annual meetings would stimulate future activity with the goal of safety improvement in mind.

5.2 Future Research

5.2.1 Roadside Collision Data Collection

Future evaluations of roadside hardware/vehicle compatibility will require improved data sources. Real world crash data is an important resource for the evaluation of roadside hardware compatibility. However, existing sources have a series of shortcomings. To rectify this, an evaluation of the proposed roadside crash investigation forms must be conducted. The ability for NASS/CDS investigators to collect additional barrier data must be evaluated through increased involvement of the National Center for Statistical Analysis (NCSA), the center that maintains the NASS systems. A pilot program to evaluate critical factors involved in the collection of this additional data must be performed. This program must address the following issues:

Data forms and collection techniques must be optimized so that investigators can collect the information within a reasonable time frame. The effect of the inclusion of additional barrier data on the time on scene and subsequent case analysis must be evaluated.

Roadside device crashes often occur on high-speed roadways. Performance of the detailed crash scene investigations, which were proposed in Section 4.3 of this report, requires some addition risk to investigators. An investigation into the willingness of investigators to assume this additional risk is necessary. Further, the authority of NASS/CDS investigators to block traffic when necessary for investigations must be understood.

Once new roadside crash investigation forms are adopted, guidelines must be established to ensure their suitability for investigation of existing and emerging roadside devices. A method to include new device designs into existing collection sheets must be implemented so that data collection remains useful.

The evaluation of proposed data forms and collection techniques should involve existing crash data collection studies. CIREN crash investigations offer great detail in evaluation of the causation, vehicle dynamics and occupant outcomes of vehicle crashes. These case investigations, although limited

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in number, currently include information that provides insight into vehicle/roadside hardware compatibility. A current shortcoming of this system however is the exclusion of vehicle rollovers. As demonstrated throughout the research period, rollover is a major component of vehicle to roadside hardware crash compatibility. A proposed special crash study would use these highly specialized CIREN investigators to inspect these types of crashes and their outcomes.

5.2.2 Evaluation of Alternative Test Methods

Since the US vehicle fleet is constantly changing, annual monitoring of vehicle populations should be conducted. As consumer tastes change, the vehicles that best represent the current vehicle fleet should be chosen for use in the hardware tests and the finite element models. Current development of vehicles that are compatible with one another are converging on higher degrees of geometric alignment for frontal structures. Synergy between the roadside community and vehicle manufacturers is necessary so that bumper and frame rail height requirements are common to serve vehicle to vehicle compatibility as well as vehicle to roadside hardware compatibility goals.

In order to verify improved performance of the vehicle/roadside system in the future, multiple vehicle platforms within a class should be tested (similar to Lumina and Taurus testing) for the most common roadside hardware devices being installed. Testing with similar vehicles within a class ensures that the barrier performs adequately across the class of vehicles, not only for a specific vehicle.

Current testing showed that that concrete barrier design uses barrier shape and vehicle lift to control vehicle damage and lateral accelerations. However, NASS/CDS and FARS data has shown that when vehicle lift is applied to some SUVs and pickups, these vehicles may roll or lose control due to their inherent instability. The HARM due to this increased instability and subsequent rollover is believed to exceed the potential HARM that results from the redirection of these vehicles by a more vertically oriented barrier. Further testing and research should be done to ensure the compatibility of these vehicles with these devices.

In addition, impacts with roadside systems may not provide a clear crash signature to airbag control modules. The emergence of improved side impact energy management systems (side airbags or energy absorbing side structures) has increased the levels of tolerance of occupants to the lateral acceleration of vehicle. In order to further address this issue, testing using occupants (ATDs) would help to identify if a more aggressive redirection of vehicles would lead to injury causing occupant loads.

Care also must be taken to ensure that the airbags continue to deploy properly when vehicles impact guardrails. Specifically, impacts at a 15-25 degree impact angle may lead to delayed or improper deployments of frontal and side airbags. Testing recent vehicle models with dummies is important to understand if the firing of the airbag is timed properly in these types of impacts.

5.2.3 Compatibility Evaluation Using Detailed Finite Element Models

A collection of finite element models, developed by the FHWA/NHTSA National Crash Analysis Center and the FHWA Centers of Excellence, has been created that can aid in the testing of roadside hardware devices. These models are publicly available to both the automotive manufacturers and the roadside hardware manufacturers. The models should be utilized to test a wide variety of vehicle types with several different roadside devices. In addition, the devices can be tested in almost any configuration at relatively low cost. Continuous renewal of these models is required to ensure that the effects of recent design trends can be simulated properly.

In addition, research should be done to combine the vehicle finite element models, provided by manufacturers, with roadside hardware models, created by the Centers of Excellence and other FHWA laboratories. These models may be exercised by an unbiased research organization, by safety engineers at the vehicle manufacturers, by FHWA staff or other proposed groups. This exploratory program will help to establish protocols and introduce the concept of vehicle design for improved interaction of emerging vehicles with roadside hardware systems.

Appendix A NASS/CDS Cases

A.1 Passenger Cars- Roadside Hardware Crash Cases

18 Case 1999-41-156

Summary:

Vehicle one was south bound in the second lane of a five lane, divided, dry, level, bituminous highway during dusk. A phantom vehicle traveling south in the first lane, next to vehicle one, encroached into vehicle one's lane. Vehicle one took evasive action by steering left. Vehicle one lost control and started a counter clockwise rotation. Vehicle one rotated across three driving lanes and then struck the concrete highway divider with its front left. Vehicle one continued the r one were hospitalized with 'A' injuries . Driver v-1 was injured by flying broken glass and the steering assembly. The passenger was injured by the windshield and the lower instrument panel. Both occupants claim to have been belted. The vehicle had air bags which did not deploy. Vehicle one was towed due to damage.

ONE WAY Traffic Flow Number of Travel Lanes **FOUR** $\textsc{curv}\xspace$ EIGHT Roadway Alignment Roadway Profile LEVEL Roadway Surface Type CONCRETE Roadway Surface Condition DRY Light Conditions **DAYLIGHT** NO ADVERSE COND Atmospheric Conditions INTERCHANGE REL Relation to Intersection **Traffic Control Device** Police Reported Alcohol Pres-NO ALCOHOL ence Alcohol Test ($<$ 95 indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

Make-Model Year Class **Body Type** Weight

Chevrolet Baretta/Corsica 1988 PASSENGER CAR 2DR SEDAN/HT/CPE 140

Injuries

AIS Level Region Injured Contacts

Case 1999-9-7 24

Summary:

Vehicle one(4dr 1992 volkwagen jetta) was traveling north on a four lane highway (positive barriers), in lane number four. The driver loses control and vehicle one departs the roadway to the left. Vehicle one strikes a concrete jersey wall (see footnote) with it's left side plane. Vehicle one rotates counter-clockwise and strikes the jersey wall again with it's right rear corner and comes to rest. The passenger in the 2nd row is fully ejected after the first impact and comes to rest in the roadway. The driver and right front passenger are transported. The driver is treated and released. The right front occupant is hospitalized for observations. FOOTNOTE: The damage to vehicle one was severe. The first impact pulled the c-post/left rear door and sill areas apart. This caused a massive opening that included the left rear door area, left rear window, c-post area and back light. It is believed that the rear occupant was ejected thru the opening that comprised the left rear door and c-post. Also, the police report, driver and family of deceased all give different accounts and locations as to what section of the jersey wall was contacted. Based upon the damage, the researcher believes the vehicle struck an end portion of the jersey wall typical of areas used by emergency vehicles to cross over into opposite lanes of travel. This end portion of the jersey wall appears to have engaged the left rear c-post area as well as the left rear wheel/axle. However, no opening in the jersey wall was found in the location the police report stated. The scene depicted is of the area listed on the police report and scene evidence was found. The scene trafficway is representative of this vehicles environment. The scene diagram is based upon the area given in the police report, however, no crossover was found or noted. However, the scene(at this date) is representative of the roadway that vehicle one was traveling.

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Location of Rollover Initiation

Rollover Initiation Object

Location on Vehicle where

Tripping Force was Applied
Direction of Initial Roll

Nr. Quarter Turns

 $\rm Contacted$

Principal

 CDC $\rm Run~off$

 $_{\rm ence}$

BAC 0.xx)

 $\rm NO$ ROLLOVER

 $\rm NO$ ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

 NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

Crash Severity

998

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

NEGOTIATE CURVE OTH CRIT EVENT NO DRIVER

NO DRIVER DEPARTED ROADWAY

PASSENGER Factors

ABDOMEN

ABDOMEN

ABDOMEN

GROUND

GROUND

GROUND

 $4 =$ SEVERE INJURY

 $4 =$ SEVERE INJURY

 $3 =$ SERIOUS INJURY

Vehicle Factors

VW Jetta 1992

106

PASSENGER CAR

4-DR SEDAN/HDTOP

 $\label{thm:angle-Model} \textbf{Make-Model}$ Year Class Body Type
Weight

Alcohol Test $(< 95$ indicates 0

${\bf 28}$ Case 2000-73-167

Summary:

V1 was traveling south on a two way highway through a construction zone. V1 drove into the median concrete barrier and damaged the front end of the vehicle. The vehicle was occupied by the driver only. He was hospitalized with an upper leg fracture. The vehicle was towed from the crash scene due to impact damage.

Occupant: 1997-73-37-1-1

 $\begin{array}{c} \textbf{Number of Harmful Events} \\ \textbf{Rollover Initiation Type} \\ \textbf{Location of Rollover Initiation} \end{array}$

Rollover Initiation Object

Location on Vehicle where

Tripping Force was Applied
Direction of Initial Roll

Nr. Quarter Turns

 $_{Contacted}$ </sub>

Principal

Rollover Classification $\overline{2}$

Crash Severity

 $\stackrel{\text{\tiny \bf{LO}}}{\text{NO}}$ ROLLOVER NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

 $\rm NO$ ROLLOVER

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

GOING STRAIGHT **OVER LINE-RIGHT** NO AVOIDANCE

26.645180035

TRACKING
DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Occupant: 1998-2-148-1-1

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events Rollover Initiation Type Location of Rollover Initiation Rollover Initiation Object $_{contacted}$ </sub> Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied Direction of Initial Roll NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER NO ROLLOVER NO ROLLOVER NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

DELTA V CODED 1

 $<0.5 \mathrm{KMPH}$

 12 F R E E 9

1174105

NOT DIVIDED

 0.5 KMPH $\,$

Crash Severity

Nr. Quarter Turns **Impact Speed** Total, Longitudal, and Lateral delta- V Estimated delta-V with sequence number $\overline{\text{CDC}}$ Run off Road Damage (C1-C6) Crush (L and D)

156 59

Pre-Crash Environment

Traffic Flow Number of Travel Lanes Roadway Alignment Roadway Profile Roadway Surface Type Roadway Surface Condition Light Conditions Atmospheric Conditions **Relation** to Intersection **Traffic Control Device** Police Reported Alcohol Pres- $_{\rm ence}$ Alcohol Test $(95 indicates $0$$ BAC 0.xx)

TWO **CURVE LEFT LEVEL ASPHALT** DRY $\text{DARK}/\text{LIGHTED}$ NO ADVERSE COND $\textsc{NONINTER} / \textsc{NONJUNC}$ NO ALCOHOL

 $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ $30\,$ Height Age Gender Restrain Airbag Deployment Ejection Ejection Area Entrapment Airbag Deployment - 1st Seat PAS BAG DEPLY Airbag Deployment - Oth NOT EQUIP W/OTH Seat AOPS

Occupant

 Seat Position

MAIS

Weighting factor

Accident Type

ver

Pre-event Movement

Pre-impact Stability

Pre-impact Location

Critical Pre-crash Event

Attempted Avoidance Maneu-

163 Weight 70 FEMALE-NOT PREG LAP AND SHOULDER **BAG DEPLOYED** NO EJECTION NO EJECTION NOT ENTRAPPED DR

YES-RES DET

NASS Weighting Factor

Pre-Crash Driver Data

DRIVER Factors

21.865358689

NEGOTIATE CURVE

DEPARTED ROADWAY

OFF EDGE-RIGHT

 $\rm NO$ AVOIDANCE

TRACKING

Injuries

 $\mathbf{1}$ $5 = CRITICAL INJURY$ ${\tt FRONT\;LEFT\;SIDE}$

Vehicle Factors

Make-Model Mitsubishi Galant Year 1995 PASSENGER CAR Class Body Type 4-DR SEDAN/HDTOP Weight 125

Case 1998-9-123 14

Summary:

Vehicle 1 was traveling south on a 4 lane divided major limited access highway. For an unknown reason the vehicle pulled to the left and left the roadway striking a gaurdrail on the left side of the vehicle in a sideswiping action the vehicle then returned to the paved shoulder of the road, left the roadway again striking the gaurdrail a second time in the front end. the vehicle then bounced off of the gaurdrail, rotated counterclockwise and struck the gaurdrail with the rear of the vehicle coming to a final rest in that position. The vehicle was equiped with redesigned air bags and the front seat passingers were wearing their lap and shoulder restraints, they were not injured in the incident. The left rear seat occupant was not restrained and suffered multiple fx of the neck additionally this occupant experienced a massive heart attack on the scene he was revived and transported to a local trauma center were he is still hospitalized as of this report. The right rear seat occupant suffered a fx nose, multiple lacerations, he was transported to a local trauma center due to mechanism of injury he was treated and released

Occupant: 1998-9-123-1-3

Rollover Classification

Crash Severity

135

Number of Harmful Events 3 Rollover Initiation Type Location of Rollover Initiation Rollover Initiation Object Contacted Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied Direction of Initial Roll NO ROLLOVER

Nr. Quarter Turns

Weight

NO ROLLOVER $\rm NO$ ROLLOVER NO ROLLOVER NO ROLLOVER

 $\rm NO$ ROLLOVER

NASS Weighting Factor Weighting factor $16.678622322\,$

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

GOING STRAIGHT OTH CRIT EVENT $\text{BRAKE}\text{+} \text{STEER RT}$

LONGITUDINAL SKID DEPARTED ROADWAY

PASSENGER Factors

 $<0.5 \mathrm{KMPH}$ **Impact Speed** Total, Longitudal, and Lat- $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ 165 Age 60 Height Weight 64 eral delta-V 0.5 KMPH MALE Gender NONE USED/AVAIL
NOT EQUIP/AVAIL Estimated delta-V with se-DELTA V CODED $\boldsymbol{2}$ Restrain quence number Airbag Deployment $_{\rm CDC}$ 91 F D E W 3 Ejection **NO EJECTION** Run off Road Ejection Area NO EJECTION Damage $(C1-C6)$ 2 21 21 22 21 13 **NOT ENTRAPPED** Entrapment Crush (L and D) $162 - 15$ Airbag Deployment - 1^{st} Seat $_{\rm DR}$ PAS BAG DEPLY **Pre-Crash Environment** $Airbag \quad Deployment \quad -\ \ Oth \quad NOT \ EQUIP \ W/ \ OTH$ Seat $\rm DVDED/W/BARRIER$ Traffic Flow AOPS YES-RES DET Number of Travel Lanes ${\tt FOUR}$ **STRAIGHT** Roadway Alignment **Injuries** Roadway Profile **LEVEL** Roadway Surface Type **ASPHALT** $Occupant$ 3 Roadway Surface Condition DRY $4 =$ SEVERE INJURY **MAIS DAYLIGHT** Light Conditions Seat Position SECOND LEFT NO ADVERSE COND Atmospheric Conditions NONINTER/NONJUNC Relation to Intersection Traffic Control Device Police Reported Alcohol Pres- $\rm NO~ALCOHOL$ ence Alcohol Test $(< 95$ indicates $\overline{0}$ BAC 0.xx) **Vehicle Factors** Make-Model Oldsmobile Cutlass RWD Year 1998 PASSENGER CAR Class Body Type 4-DR SEDAN/HDTOP

Case 1999-41-65 19

Summary:

Vehicle one was N/bound in the right lane, of an eight lane, divided, dry, bituminous, interstate highway. Vehicle one veered out of Factor of the right, sideswiped a guardrail with its right side. After the first event, vehicle one veered left across the northbound lanes of traffic, to the right, sideswiped a guardrail with its right side. After the fi barrier, which one caromed off the barrier, still traveling North, and struck the barrier again with the front left corner of vehicle
one, overlapping the damage on the vehicle in events two and three, coming to final rest

23 Case 1999-75-70

Summary:

Vehicle #1 was west bound on a two lane left curve State Highway. Vehicle #1 traveled off the right side of the road hitting a guardrail with its front, sideswipping all along the right side. Vehicle #1 re-entered the roadway and ran off the left side of the road hitting another guardrail head on. Vehicle $#1$ came to rest at the guardrail facing east. Vehicle $#1$ was towed from the scene. The Driver was transportated and hospitalized for 14 days with injuries. Approximately 1-1/2 weeks after being discharged from the hospital, the driver died of a stroke.

27 Case 2000-43-115

Summary:

V1 was traveling south in lane 3 of a 4 lane divided highway. V1 swerved to the left and lost control. V1 then swerved to the right and struck the metal guard rail with its front. V1 then spun clockwise off the guard rail and the left side struck the same guard rail. and struck the metal guard rail with its front. V1 then spun clockwise off the guard rail and the left side struck the same guard rail.
V1 continued to spin clockwise and came to rest in lane 2 of facing the guard rail. O

10 Case 1998-12-18

Summary:

Vehicle 1 was traveling over the speed limit on a one way, 2 lane asphalt roadway under dry dark conditions. The driver fell asleep, and lost control leaving the right shoulder and contacting the front plane of the vehicle to the end of a guardrail peeling it back and breaking off 4 of the wooden posts. The vehicle continued a downward slope contacting a small sapling before coming to final rest. The vehicle was towed from the scene due to damage. The driver was transported to a local trauma center for treatment of injuries after losing consciousness. There was alcohol involved in the incident, and the driver states that he has lost a 3 hour time-slot and has been unable to recollect the accident except by what he's been told by relatives. The driver was wearing the seatbelt provided in the vehicle. The bumper cover was located at the scene jammed underneath the damaged guardrail.

Rollover Classification $\overline{2}$

Crash Severity

 $124\,$

 $\mbox{Number of Harmful Events}$

Rollover Initiation Object

Location on Vehicle where

Tripping Force was Applied
Direction of Initial Roll

 $\rm{Nr.}$ Quarter Turns

Rollover Initiation Type Location of Rollover Initiation

 $\rm Contacted$

 $\operatorname{Principal}$

Weight

 $\rm NO$ ROLLOVER NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

 NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

 $\rm NO$ ROLLOVER

NASS Weighting Factor

31.155384929

Pre-Crash Driver Data

 $\Large {\bf \textbf{Accident Type}}$ Pre-event Movement **GOING STRAIGHT** Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

Weighting factor

OFF EDGE-RIGHT
NO AVOIDANCE ${\bf TRACKING}$

DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

25 Case 2000-12-4 Summary: Vehicle 1 was headed north on a 3 lane, snowy, asphalt roadway after dark and with little or no artificial lighting. Traveling in lane 1, vehicle 1 lost control of his vehicle due to weather conditions and left the roadway to the right striking a guardrail prior to final rest on the left side of the vehicle off road. The vehicle was towed due to damage and the driver was transported to medical attention due to the severity of his injuries. € P12 CASE 004J
SCALE 1CM = 4M
SPEED 105KPH
SNOW
DARK - UNLIGHTED
ASPHALT $\pi T_{\overline{\nu}}$ 露 $\mathfrak{F}(\mathbb{C})$ 如 亚 45. 圖 高 $\fbox{\parbox{1.5cm} \begin{tabular}{|l|l|} \hline Occupant's sex & Maximum known occur and\\ \hline MALE & 3 = SERIOUS INJURY \\ \hline \end{tabular}}$ Year | Occ.# Age 32

Weighting factor

Accident Type

ver

AOPS

Pre-event Movement

Pre-impact Stability

Critical Pre-crash Event

Attempted Avoidance Maneu-

Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events Rollover Initiation Type Location of Rollover Initiation Rollover Initiation Object $\emph{Contracted}$ Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied Direction of Initial Roll

 $\overline{2}$ TRIP-OVER ROADSIDE/MEDIAN OTH FIXED OBJECT

WHEELS/TIRES

ROLL LEFT

Crash Severity

Nr. Quarter Turns Impact Speed Total, Longitudal, and Lateral delta-V Estimated delta-V with sequence number $_{\rm CDC}$ \rm{Run} off \rm{Read} Damage (C1-C6) Crush (L and D)

 $<0.5 \mbox{KMPH}$ $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ $0.5\,$ KMPH DELTA V CODED 1 11 L D E W 3 $29\ 15\ 13\ 23\ 7\ 4$

 5 QUARTER TURNS

4430

Pre-Crash Environment

Traffic Flow Number of Travel Lanes Roadway Alignment Roadway Profile Roadway Surface Type Roadway Surface Condition Light Conditions Atmospheric Conditions Relation to Intersection Traffic Control Device Police Reported Alcohol Presence Alcohol Test ($<\,95$ indicates 16 BAC 0.xx)

ONE WAY THREE $\ensuremath{\mathrm{CURVE}}$ RIGHT **LEVEL ASPHALT** SNOW OR SLUSH **DARK** SNOW NONINTER/NONJUNC ALCOHOL PRESENT

DEPARTED ROADWAY Pre-impact Location **DRIVER Factors** 32 Height 180 Weight Age $Gender$ $\rm MALE$ ${\rm LAP}$ AND SHOULDER Restrain Airbag Deployment $\mbox{NONDEPLOYED}$ Ejection NO EJECTION NO EJECTION Ejection Area **NOT ENTRAPPED** Entrapment Airbag Deployment - 1st Seat NONDEPLOYED NOT EQUIP W/ OTH Airbag Deployment - Oth Seat

YES-RES DET

46.019742061

NEGOTIATE CURVE

 $\operatorname{LATERAL}$ SKID-CLK

86

 NO $AVOIDANCE$

POOR ROAD CONDIT

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Injuries

Vehicle Factors

Make-Model Pontiac Grand Prix Year $1997\,$ PASSENGER CAR Class Body Type $2\mathrm{DR}$ SEDAN/HT/CPE Weight 154

Case 2000-8-190 29

Summary:

Summary:

V1 was travelling northeast on a two lane concrete roadway approaching an off ramp. V1 while attempting to exit onto the ramp

V1 was travelling northeast on a two lane concrete roadway to it's left. The left sid was towed from the scene due to damage and V101 was transported to a medical facility.

Body Regions with MAIS 3+ Injuries

Occupant: 1997-79-175-1-2

Rollover Classification

Crash Severity

998

 $12\ \mathrm{F}$

311

 ${\bf FOUR}$

Number of Harmful Events Rollover Initiation Type $\label{eq:1} \textbf{Location of Rollover Initiation}$ $\begin{minipage}{.4\linewidth} \textbf{Rollover} & \textbf{Initiation} & \textbf{Object} \end{minipage}$ $\rm Contacted$ Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied Direction of Initial Roll

Total, Longitudal, and Lat-

Estimated delta- V with se-

Nr. Quarter Turns Impact Speed

 eral delta-V

quence number $_{\text{CDC}}$

 $\rm Run$ off $\rm Road$ Damage $(C1-C6)$

Traffic Flow

Crush (L and D)

Number of Travel Lanes

 $\,2$ FLIP-OVER $\textbf{\textcolor{blue}{ROADSIDE}}/\textbf{\textcolor{blue}{MEDIAN}}$ **CONCRETE BARRIER**

6 QUARTER TURNS

DVDED/W/BARRIER

.
Die bestehen

 $\label{thm:unre} \textsc{UNDERCARRIAGE}$ ROLL RIGHT

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 2.1276219825

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

GOING STRAIGHT OFF EDGE-LEFT **NO DRIVER**

NO DRIVER DEPARTED ROADWAY

 $\overline{0}$

PASSENGER Factors

Injuries

Hyundai Excel

Make-Model Year 1987 PASSENGER CAR Class **Body Type** $3\mathrm{DR}/2\mathrm{DR}$ HATCHBAK Weight 101

Case 1997-49-17 $\overline{5}$

$\operatorname{Summary:}$

Vehicle 1 was SB in the 2nd lane of a 2-lane one-way concrete onramp completing a curve to the right. V1 went left, crossing a painted divider, across another lane, impacting front left to a curb. The impact caused V1 to leave the road, jumping on top of a guardrail. V1 rotated to the left while on top of the guardrail, still traveling SB, impacted and came to rest against a bridge support. V1 was towed and the driver was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Body Regions with MAIS $3+$ Injuries

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A.2 Truck/SUV - Roadside Hardware Crash Cases

20 Case 1999-8-226

Summary:

V1 was traveling in a southerly direction on a four lane, two way undivided roadway in lane two, approaching an intersection. V2 was traveling in a northerly direction in lane one of the same roadway. At the intersection, V2 attempted to turn to its left and travel west on an intersecting roadway. The front of V1 contacted the right side of V2 in the intersection, and in V1's original travel lane. V1 then traveled in a southwesterly direction after impacting V2, and the right front of V1 contacted a concrete retaining wall. V1 dragged down the wall for two meters, sliding along the sidewalk for another five meters, and eventually coming to rest facing in a southeasterly direction with the right rear of V1 still on the sidewalk and the front of V1 in lane one of southbound traffic. After the initial impact, V2 began to spin and yaw counterclockwise one-quarter turn, traveling 74 feet, sliding over the small concrete lane divider, and coming to rest facing in a southeasterly direction in lane one of northbound traffic. V1 and V2 towed due to damage. V2 airbags deployed. V201, V203 transported due to injury. V202 airlifted due to injury.

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Rollover Classification

Number of Harmful Events Rollover Initiation Type Location of Rollover Initiation Rollover Initiation Object $_{contacted}$ </sub> Location on Vehicle where Principal Tripping Force was Applied Direction of Initial Roll

3 $\operatorname{TRIP-OVER}$ ON SHLDER-PAVED **GROUND**

WHEELS/TIRES

ROLL RIGHT

Crash Severity

Nr. Quarter Turns **Impact Speed** Total, Longitudal, and Lateral delta- V Estimated delta-V with sequence number $\overline{\text{CDC}}$ \rm{Run} off \rm{Read} Damage (C1-C6) Crush (L and D)

4 QUARTER TURNS $<0.5 \mathrm{KMPH}$ $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ $0.5\ \mathrm{KMPH}$ DELTA V CODED $\boldsymbol{2}$ 32 F D E W 3 $60\ 54\ 48\ 42\ 38\ 35$ $176\ 0$

Pre-Crash Environment

 $\operatorname{Traffic}\,$ Flow **ONE WAY** THREE
STRAIGHT Number of Travel Lanes Roadway Alignment Roadway Profile ${\rm LEVEL}$ Roadway Surface Type **ASPHALT** Roadway Surface Condition DRY Light Conditions **DARK** Atmospheric Conditions NO ADVERSE COND $\textsc{NONINTER} / \textsc{NONJUNC}$ Relation to Intersection Traffic Control Device Police Reported Alcohol Pres- NO $\Lambda \rm{LCOHOL}$ ence Alcohol Test $(< 95$ indicates 0 BAC 0.xx)

Vehicle Factors

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 60.441446763

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

GOING STRAIGHT OFF EDGE-RIGHT $\rm NO$ DRIVER

 $\operatorname{TRACKING}$ LEFT TRAVEL LANE

DRIVER Factors

Injuries

 $3 = SERIOUS INJURY \quad CHEST$ **CENTER PANEL**

Case 1999-73-12 19

Summary:

V1 was traveling east on a two way, two lane roadway in the eastbound lane. V1 exited the roadway left in a counter-clockwise yaw, of the striking a guardrail with the right side passenger area of the vehicle. V1 continued down a ditch and struck the opposite side of the ditch with the front end. V1 came to final rest in the ditch. The vehicle was occ unassisted and was transported to an area hospital for treatment and admitted. He was not restrained in the crash. The vehicle was towed from the crash scene due to damage.

21 Case 2000-48-169

$\label{eq:1} \textbf{Summary:}$

Vehicle one was traveling north on a four lane, divided with positive barrier, dry, bituminous roadway. The front of vehicle one contacted a guardrail, the vehicle then rotated clock wise and the front, left side, and right side of the vehicle contacted a fence. Vehicle one then a concrete slope and rolled over. It's final rest position was on it's wheels facing north west. The restrained driver of vehicle one with a (redesigned) deployed airbag was hospitalized for liver laceration and lung contusion. The vehicle was towed due to disabling damage.

$\overline{5}$ Case 1997-72-147

Summary:

Vehicle one was traveling northwestbound on a four lane divided expressway in the second travel lane. Vehicle two was traveling on the same expressway, in the same direction, in the same travel lane. For unknown reasons, vehicle one rotated counterclockwise and impacted the right rear of vehicle two with its' own right side. This caused vehicle two to veer to the left and impact the left side concrete barrier with its' left side. Vehicle two rolled over and came to rest in the middle of lanes two and three on its' roof (per PAR). Vehicle one was driven from the scene with no reported injuries. Vehicle two was towed from the scene and the driver was transported to the hospital with "C" injuries. The front right occupant was totally ejected and later died from the injuries sustained in this crash.

Year

 $Class$

Weight

Body Type

3

Crash Severity

 $\overline{\mathsf{BOUNCE}\text{-} \mathsf{OVER}}$

 \textsc{SIDE} PLANE

ROLL RIGHT

 $<0.5 \mathrm{KMPH}$

 $0.5~\mathrm{KMPH}$

SEVERE 3

 0 T D D O 4

 $0\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0\; 0$

 $0₀$

2 QUARTER TURNS

 $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$ 0.5 KMPH $<$

 $\text{ROADSIDE} / \text{MEDIAN}$

CONCRETE BARRIER

Number of Harmful Events

Location of Rollover Initiation

Rollover Initiation Object
Contacted

Location on Vehicle where

Tripping Force was Applied

Total, Longitudal, and Lat-

Estimated delta-V with se-

Direction of Initial Roll

Nr. Quarter Turns

 $\bold{Im} \bold{pact}$ Speed

quence number

Run off Road Damage (C1-C6)
Crush (L and D)

BAC 0.xx)

eral delta- ${\bf V}$

 $\overline{C}DC$

Rollover Initiation Type

Principal

Make-Model

Chevrolet S-10 Blazer 1998 PASSENGER CAR COMPACT UTILITY 188

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor 5.8944214137

Pre-Crash Driver Data

48

 $\Large {\bf Accident Type}$ Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

GOING STRAIGHT SAME DIR-OV RGHT NO $DRIVER$ **NO DRIVER** STAYED IN LANE

PASSENGER Factors

Seat Position

 $5 = \text{CRITICAL INJURY}$ FRONT RIGHT SIDE

Case 1999-43-152 10

Summary:

Vehicle one was traveling west on a 8 lane dry, bituminous, divided roadway in lane four entering a curve to the right. Vehicle one impacted the concrete divider with its front plane. Vehicle one traveled across four lanes and departed the road on the right rolling over an unknown number of times, coming to rest on its top plane. Vehicle one was towed due to damage. The driver of vehicle one was killed. All three occupants received "B" injuries.

A-68

12 Case 2000-49-107

Summary:

Vehicle 1 was traveling west in an unknown lane of a four lane divided expressway. The vehicle went off the roadway to the right and the front collided with a metal guard rail. From this point, the vehicle took out several wooden rail posts and continued moving away from the roadway. The vehicle rolled an undetermined number of times down an embankment, across a street going under the and you are to rest on an uphill slope. The driver was fatally injured with brain and heart injuries and the passenger was hospitalized with internal injuries and fractures. The vehicle was towed.

Case 2000-79-15 13

Summary:

V1 traveling S in the #2 lane of A 2 lane wet, level, grooved concrete, one way highway. As V1 attempted a lane change to the right driver swerved to avoid collision with another car in the #1 lane traveling faster than anticipated. As V1 turned the wheels traction was lost due to the wet road conditions. As the car skidded and started rotating CW the car then impacted a guardrail and rolled over an unknown number of times and entered the roadway again. The driver of V1 was transported for serious head injuries. Occupant 2 was transported and admitted for observation with complaint of pain injuries. Occupant 3 was transported and released with minor abrasions and contusions to scalp and right arm.V1 was towed from the scene.

A-71

Occupant: 2000-79-15-1-1

Number of Harmful Events

Rollover Initiation Type
Location of Rollover Initiation

Rollover Initiation Object

Location on Vehicle where

Tripping Force was Applied

Direction of Initial Roll

Nr. Quarter Turns

 $\rm Contacted$

Principal

Rollover Classification $\bar{2}$

Crash Severity

NO ROLLOVER NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

 NO ROLLOVER

 NO ROLLOVER

NO ROLLOVER

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor

Pre-Crash Driver Data

1.3288317962

Accident Type Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

 $\overline{2}$ CHANGING LANES POOR ROAD CONDIT STEERING RIGHT

LATERAL SKID-CLK DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Number of Harmful Events

Rollover Initiation Type
Location of Rollover Initiation

 $\begin{minipage}{.4\linewidth} \textbf{Rollover} & \textbf{Initiation} & \textbf{Object} \end{minipage}$

Location on Vehicle where

Tripping Force was Applied

Direction of Initial Roll

Nr. Quarter Turns

 $\rm Contact$

Principal

Weight

Rollover Classification $\,2$

Crash Severity

239

TRIP-OVER ROADSIDE/MEDIAN

WHEELS/TIRES

 10 QUARTER TURNS

ROLL LEFT

 $_{\rm GROUND}$

NASS Weighting Factor

34.052922194

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver $\operatorname{Pre-impact}$ Stability Pre-impact Location

Weighting factor

NEGOTIATE CURVE OTH CRIT EVENT STEERING LEFT

 $\operatorname{TRACKING}$ $\sf DEPARTED}$ ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Case 1999-9-61 11

Summary:

Vehicle one, 1994 Jeep Grand Cherokee(4x4) was traveling north on a four lane divided highway in lane number four. For unknown reasons, vehicle one departs the roadway to the left, enters the median and sideswipes a guardrail with it's left side plane. Vehicle one steers right. Vehicle one re-enters the roadway, crosses all four travel lanes and departs the roadway to the right. Vehicle one strikes another guardrail with it's right side plane. Vehicle one steers left. As vehicle occupant is ejected thru the right front passenger window. The driver comes to rest on the right shoulder area of the roadway. Vehicle one crosses all four lanes again while rotating counter-clockwise. Vehicle one overturns, right side leading, one quarter turn. Vehicle one comes to rest on it's right side on the left shoulder area of the roadway. The vehicle is towed. The driver dies on scene and is not treated nor transported.

A-75

Case 1999-11-150 22

Summary:

Vehicle one, 1993 Mercury Villager, was travelling east in lane one of a Three lane urban express way, at an interchange. Vehicle one left the road way to the right, after lane one made a rapid turn to the right (off ramp). The driver of vehicle one had thought that there was three lanes of travel in her area. Vehicle one, left the road way and struck a guard rail with the front of the vehicle. V1 continued and began to rotate CW as the vehicle descended a 60degree hill. V1 struck three small trees, breaking them off, on the left side. Vehicle one came to rest at the bottom of the hill, after spinning 180 degrees. The driver of vehicle one was transported and hospitalized for 2 days. The passenger was transported and released. The vehicle was towed due to damage.

Rollover Classification

Crash Severity

 $\overline{4}$

CLIMB-OVER ROADSIDE/MEDIAN

OTHER BARRIER

 $\label{thm:unre} \textsc{UNDERCARRIAGE}$

 8 QUARTER TURNS

ROLL LEFT

Number of Harmful Events

Example of Harming Events

Rollover Initiation

Location of Rollover Initiation

 $\begin{minipage}{.4\linewidth} \textbf{Rollover} & \textbf{Initiation} & \textbf{Object} \end{minipage}$

 $\begin{minipage}{.4\linewidth} \textbf{Location} & \textbf{on} \quad \textbf{Vehicle} \quad \textbf{where} \end{minipage}$

Tripping Force was Applied

Direction of Initial Roll

Nr. Quarter Turns

 $\rm Contact$

Principal

NASS Weighting Factor

Weighting factor

 $40.069796108\,$

Pre-Crash Driver Data

Accident Type Pre-event Movement Critical Pre-crash Event Attempted Avoidance Maneuver Pre-impact Stability Pre-impact Location

 $\overline{2}$ NEGOTIATE CURVE OFF EDGE-RIGHT NO $DRIVER$

NO DRIVER DEPARTED ROADWAY

DRIVER Factors

Case 1998-8-157 17

Summary:

V1 was travelling south on a two lane concrete roadway in the curb lane. V1 departed the road to the left, striking a guardrail with its front. V1 after the guardrail impact rolled one quarter turn onto its driver's side and slid down an embankment coming to final rest on its left side. During the roll left, the driver was ejected through the LF window glazing. V1 was towed from the scene due to damage and V101 was transported to a medical facility. V101 airbag deployed.

Case 1999-49-75 18

$\label{eq:5} \text{Summary:}$

Vehicle 1 was EB in the 1st lane of a dry 2-lane urban interstate elevated exit ramp to another dry interstate rounding a curve left. V1 impacted a concrete retaining wall/guardrail on the south side, sending a part ot the guardrail through the vehicle, and continued over the top and fell to the ground below, landing on it's top. The vehicle was towed due to damage and both occupants were transported. The driver was hospitalized and the passenger was pronounced dead.

Appendix B Vehicle Attributes

Selected Vehicle Measurements Adapted from the NHTSA Vehicle Characteristics Database and Research Team Measured Data

Appendix C NASS Case Investigation Forms

Figure C.01: Collision Diagram Form Page 1

U.S. Department of Transportation
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration

COLLISION DIAGRAM MEASUREMENT TABLE

National Automotive Sampling System
Crash Causation Special Study

 $02/07/02$ 10th Revision

Figure C.02: Collision Diagram Measurement Form Page 1

Figure C.03: Collision Diagram Measurement Form Page 2

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Figure C.04: General Vehicle Form Page 1

Figure C.05: General Vehicle Form Page 2

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Figure C.06: General Vehicle Form Page 3

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Figure C.07: General Vehicle Form Page 4

Figure C.08: General Vehicle Form Page 5

Figure C.09: General Vehicle Form Page 6

Figure C.10: General Vehicle Form Page 7

Figure C.11: General Vehicle Form Page 8

Figure C.12: Exterior Vehicle Form Page 1

Figure C.13: Exterior Vehicle Form Page 2

Figure C.14: Exterior Vehicle Form Page 3

Figure C.15: Exterior Vehicle Form Page 4

Figure C.16: Exterior Vehicle Form Page 5

Figure C.17: Occupant Assessment Form Page 1

National Automotive Sampling System - Crash Causation Special Study: Occupant Assessment Form 2 **EJECTION/ENTRAPMENT** 12. Ejection 15. Medium Status (Immediately Prior To Impact) No ejection (0) (0) No ejection (1) Complete ejection (1) Open (2) Partial ejection (2) Closed (3) Ejection, unknown degree (3) Integral structure (9) (9) Unknown Unknown 13. Ejection Area Entrapment 16. (0) No ejection (0) Not entrapped/exit not inhibited Entrapped/pinned - mechanically restrained Windshield (1) (1) Left front Could not exit vehicle due to jammed doors, fire, etc. (2) (2) (3) Right front (specify): (4) Left rear Right rear (9) Unknown (5) (6) Rear (7) Roof (8) Other area (e.g., back of pickup, etc.) (specify): 17. Occupant Mobility Occupant fatal before removed from vehicle (9) Unknown (0) Removed from vehicle while unconscious or not (1) oriented to time or place (2) Removed from vehicle due to perceived serious injuries 14. Ejection Medium (3) Exited vehicle with some assistance Exited vehicle under own power No ejection (4) (0) Occupant fully ejected Door/hatch//tailgate (1) (5) (2) Nonfixed roof structure (8) Removed from vehicle for other reasons (3) Fixed glazing (specify): (4) Nonfixed glazing (9) Unknown (specify): Integral structure (5) Other medium (8) (specify): (9) Unknown $04/01/02$ 12th Revision

Figure C.18: Occupant Assessment Form Page 2

 $04/01/02$ 12th Revision

Figure C.19: Occupant Assessment Form Page 3

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Figure C.20: Occupant Assessment Form Page 4

Figure C.21: Occupant Assessment Form Page 5

Figure C.22: Occupant Assessment Form Page 6

HS Form 433B (1/96) This report is authorized by P.L. 80-563, Title 1, Section 106, 108, and 112. While you are not required to respond, your cooperation is needed to make the results of this data collection effort comprehensive, accurate, and timely

 $04/02/02$ 12th Revision

Figure C.23: Occupant Injury Forms Page 1

 $04/02/02$ 12th Revision

Figure C.24: Occupant Injury Forms Page 2

 $02/07/02$ 10th Revision

Stud

Figure C.25: General Crash Event Form Page 1

Figure C.26: General Crash Event Form Page 2

Figure C.27: General Crash Event Form Page 3

U.S. Department of Transportation National

(Prior to Recognition of Critical Event)

(06) Passing or overtaking another vehicle

(13) Backing up (other than for parking position)

THIS VEHICLE LOSS OF CONTROL DUE TO:

(06) Traveling too fast for conditions

(18) Other cause of control loss

(25) Turning left at intersection

(28) This vehicle decelerating

(29) Unknown travel direction

(26) Turning right at intersection

(19) Unknown cause of control loss

(03) Disabling vehicle failure (e.g., wheel fell off)

(04) Non-disabling vehicle problem (e.g., hood flew up)

(05) Poor road conditions (puddle, pot hole, ice, etc.)

(20) Over the lane line on left side of travel lane

(21) Over the lane line on right side of travel lane (22) Off the edge of the road on the left side

(27) Crossing over (passing through) intersection

(23) Off the edge of the road on the right side

(17) Successful avoidance maneuver to a previous critical event

(07) Disabled or parked in travel lane

(02) Decelerating in traffic lane

(03) Accelerating in traffic lane

(08) Leaving a parking position

(09) Entering a parking position

(04) Starting in traffic lane

(05) Stopped in traffic lane

(10) Turning right

(12) Making a U-turn

(15) Changing lanes (16) Merging

(98) Other (specify): (99) Unknown

(01) Blow out or flat tire

5. Critical Precrash Event

(02) Stalled engine

(specify):

(specify):

(specify):

(07) Jackknife event

(specify):

THIS VEHICLE TRAVELING

(24) End departure

(08) Cargo shift

(14) Negotiating a curve

(11) Turning left

PRECRASH EVENT RELATED DATA

1. Primary Sampling Unit Number

2. Case Number - Stratum

Pre-Event Movement

(00) No driver present (01) Going straight

3. Vehicle Number

CRASH EVENT ACCESSMENT FORM National Automotive Sampling System

Crash Causation Special Study **OTHER MOTOR VEHICLE IN LANE**

- (50) Other vehicle stopped (51) Traveling in same direction with lower steady speed
- (52) Traveling in same direction while decelerating
- (53) Traveling in same direction with higher speed
- (54) Traveling in opposite direction
- (55) In crossover
- (56) Backing
- (59) Unknown travel direction of other motor vehicle in lane

OTHER MOTOR VEHICLE ENCROACHING INTO LANE

- (60) From adjacent lane (same direction) over left lane line
- (61) From adjacent lane (same direction) over right lane line
- (62) From opposite direction over left lane line
- (63) From opposite direction over right lane line
- (64) From parking lane
- (65) From crossing street, turning into same direction
- (66) From crossing street, across path
- (67) From crossing street, turning into opposite direction
- (68) From crossing street, intended path not known
- (70) From driveway, turning into same direction
- (71) From driveway, across path
-
- (72) From driveway, turning into opposite direction
(73) From driveway, intended path not known
- (74) From entrance to limited access highway
- (78) Encroachment by other vehicle details unknown

PEDESTRIAN, PEDALCYCLIST, OR OTHER NONMOTORIST

- (80) Pedestrian in roadway
- (81) Pedestrian approaching roadway
- (82) Pedestrian unknown location
- (83) Pedalcyclist or other nonmotorist in roadway (specify):
- (84) Pedalcyclist or other nonmotorist approaching roadway (specify):
- (85) Pedalcyclist or other nonmotorist unknown location (specify):

OBJECT OR ANIMAL

- (87) Animal in roadway
- (88) Animal approaching roadway (89) Animal - unknown location
- (90) Object in roadway
- (91) Object approaching roadway
- (92) Object unknown location

OTHER

- (93) This vehicle not involved in first harmful event (98) Other critical precrash event
- (specify): (99) Unknown
- - Critical Reason For The Critical Event 6. (000) Critical event not coded to this vehicle
	- **DRIVER RELATED FACTOR**
		- Critical Non-Performance Errors
		- (100) Sleep, that is, actually asleep (101) Heart attack or other physical impairment
		- of the ability to act
		- (108) Other critical non-performance (specify):
		- (109) Unknown critical non-performance
		-

 $03/01/02$ 13th Revision

Figure C.28: Crash Event Form Page 1

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Figure C.29: Crash Event Form Page 2

Figure C.30: Crash Event Form Page 3

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Figure C.31: Crash Event Form Page 4

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Figure C.33: Crash Event Form Page 6

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Figure C.34: Crash Event Form Page 7

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Figure C.35: Crash Event Form Page 8

 $03/01/02$ 13th Revision

Figure C.36: Crash Event Form Page 9

 $03/01/02$ 13th Revision

Figure C.37: Crash Event Form Page 10

Figure C.38: Crash Event Form Page 11

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Figure C.39: Crash Event Form Page 12

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Figure C.40: Crash Event Form Page 13

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Figure C.41: Crash Event Form Page 14

Appendix D Literature Review

I. Vehicle Fleet

A. One very important factor with regard to vehicle and roadside hardware interaction are classifications or categories of vehicle classes. Current crash testing under NCHRP Report 350 guidelines features the 820 kg car and the 2000 P pickup, there is a need to have some sense of how the RSH is performing for passenger vehicles intermediate to this range. Several additional vehicle categories have been identified by various studies. A possible finding for this research project may include additional proposed vehicle classifications and an assessment of how representative current classes are. (A.18, C.1.a., C.5)

B. Light truck (i.e. pickups, large vans, mid size and large utility vehicle) sales have continued to climb for the last 20 years. The 3/4 ton and 1/2 ton pickup have the largest market share and are considered representative of this category. The 3/4 ton pickup is considered a practical worst case; however, lighter SUV's are less stable. (C.1.a, C.5) It has been established that Fords have comparatively higher CGs. The implications of varied fleet characteristics and vehicle characteristics will be critical to assess compatibility.

C. The 820 kg car category may not be available in the near future due to phasing out of this lower end category. (C.5) This should be considered in future updates to NCHRP Report 350 and during the definition of performance ranges for future roadside safety systems.

D. Sales trends indicate that the light trucks will continue to be a more significant percentage of the vehicle fleet. Changes in accident data may be reflected as the fleet characteristics are reflected. (C.1., C.5) During this project, accident data should be evaluated to confirm these trends and to establish their implications to RH safety performance.

E. Air bags will be in 100% of the fleet within the next decade. There is some controversy about the meaning of this due to multiple impact consideration with roadside hardware. No evidence has been established to date of establishing the significance of this. This phenomenon is postulated to effect passenger safety during oblique impacts (off angle). Also, the emergence of side bags (ITS, curtain bags, thorax bags, etc) may provide additional occupant protection during side impact scenarios. The additional protection which airbags will provide should be considered as future safety criteria are established. A vehicle based (non-occupant) criteria may not take this additional energy absorbing system into account to estimate occupant protection.

F. Long term projections indicate huge changes in vehicle mass may become reality within the next 25 years. A goal of up to 40% weight reduction, if achieved, could significantly compromise the performance of energy absorbing or force threshold hardware due to higher g's imparted to small cars although safety improvements in vehicle design could offset this. (C.5) During short term planning, this will not be a problem. Without concrete knowledge regarding future vehicle trends, design changes to existing roadside hardware safety systems to accommodate future vehicles may compromise the current performance of these systems.

G. It is estimated that vehicle platforms will undergo major changes every 3 to 4 years with new platforms every 3 - 7 1/2 years. (C.5) The challenge for assuring compatibility could be great if significant changes occur. The focus of this project is to identify critical vehicle characteristics which may be used for the assessment of future interaction of vehicles and roadside systems. A general approach to testing and verification of correct interaction should be proposed.

H. Some increase in vehicle stiffness is forecast over the next decade. (C.5) This is based on frontal crash. Stiffness trends and metrics should be identified for other modes of impact as well. In particular, oblique structural stiffness is important during impact with longitudinal barriers.

I. The cab forward design may see up to 50% penetration by 2003. Disadvantages include a congested engine compartment and large windshield. (C.5) There is some anecdotal evidence that congested engine compartment may be a good thing, particularly for frontal impacts with narrow objects. (Bronstad) Narrow objects, such as guardrail terminal beams, can proceed somewhat unimpeded through the engine compartment of full-size pickups where voids are present (i.e. for frontal impacts). The engine compartment of cars and smaller LTV's are much more congested and provide resistance to invading structures. These voids could be characterized in this project.

J. Little change is forecast for frame design and suspension systems. (C.5) Closer interaction with vehicle manufacturers and related industry may help to confirm this statement. Innovations are not often publicly available therefore the research team cannot easily assume this to be true.

K. It is unlikely that future trends will be obtained from vehicle manufacturers due to "trade secret" status. (C.5) As stated above, there are mechanisms to interact with the automotive design community however, "trade secret" status will probably not change.

II. Vehicle Parameters

A. Problems using the 2000 P pickup in Report 350 evaluations are attributed to higher bumper height, shorter front overhang, stiffer crush properties, and higher CG locations. (C.5) These differences generally contribute to stability problems for 2000 P vehicles. These characteristics support the use of this platform to represent the worst case impacts with large vehicles however, vehicles intermediate to the 820

D-2

kg car and the 2000 P vehicle may have structural properties which can drastically influence crash performance depending on impacted device.

B. Geometry ranges for light trucks compared to the 4500 lb car; (C.5) a. top of Bumper exceeded all car values b. front overhang was less than all car values, c. wheel base was more or less (both sides), d. tire diameter - both sides e. curb weight - both sides, f. c.g. height mostly exceeded car, g. c.g. location from front axle - both sides. The combined effect of each of these factors is difficult to analyze. Parametric studies may be performed using finite element models to isolate the effect of design variables on performance behavior during impact. Few full-scale impacts have been performed using other vehicle platforms. As a result performance data is not currently available.

d. The 2000 P (3/4 ton pickup): (C.1.b) e. bumper/suspension varies, f. Ford CG. is typically 2.5 inches higher than Chevrolet, g. CG closer to front axle has tendency to counter rotate instead of smoothly redirected, h. front end stiffer than 4500 lb car. Testing, as currently done with mostly Chevrolet Pickups, is not the practical worst case. A robust approach to testing and roadside safety design should be established where the effects of these slight design changes are not significant.

C. 820 kg (1800 lb) car hood latches and hinges are lower strength; allows detachment. (C.1.b) Generally, this characteristic has not been critical for Report 350 tests.

D. Lower profile cars have been shown to interact unsatisfactorily with certain roadside hardware due to under-ride. (C.3.b., D.5, and D.6) No current testing with these vehicle types is required. Investigation of this effect could be performed during this project on a limited basis using FE Analysis if necessary. Establishing acceptable and unacceptable profile corridors may result.

E. Inertia of smaller cars (e.g. 820 kg) is a potential problem for off-center impacts. (C.5) This will remain a potential problem without drastic changes in energy absorbing capabilities in impacted systems.

F. A controlled hood-collapse mechanism is essential to prevent hood segments from being forced into the passenger compartment for certain hardware.(C.3.a.) During full-frontal impacts conducted under NHTSA's FMVSS 208, this phenomenon would also occur. Since compliance FMVSS 208 is required for all vehicles, this sort of structural behavior is considered during design. It is believed that vehicles are currently being made with this design principle.

G. A study conducted in the 1980's demonstrated that the profile of bumpers and location of the structural part of the bumper can influence override/underride interaction particularly with curved boundary features such as W-beam and thrie beam. Since this older study, there has been no effort to characterize this property. Based on gathered design characteristics of the current vehicle fleet, an evaluation of these characteristics as they relate to guardrail interaction will be given during this study.

H. A current study, which has examined design parameters of 7 vehicles, is considered one of the most comprehensive computer simulation projects which is publicly available to date. (C.5) Some correlation's have shown that much can be learned using some of the older codes, however limitations in accuracy, output information and applicability to new system designs do exist. Often though, use of simplified analysis codes are sometimes more economical to run than finite element codes such LS-DYNA.

I. The most significant factor was determined to be the mass; heavier vehicles impart larger forces/energies whereas lighter vehicles are more critical in terms of occupant risk. (C.5) Since testing is conducted on the extreme ranges of vehicle size - intermediate vehicle size evaluations may be recommended for certain devices. Devices should be classified as size, mass, stiffness or geometrically sensitive in order to establish the nature of applicable tests required for its validation.

J. CGs of light trucks in the vertical direction were typically 20 to 35 inches high whereas passenger car heights are in the 20 to 23 in. range. (C.5) Rollover rates will continue to increase as LTV's continue to increase as a percentage of the vehicle fleet. This data will be verified through investigation of rollover rates on a year-by-year basis.

K. Bumper heights of light trucks average about 17 to 27 in. (bottom to top) while passenger cars average 17 to 21 in. (C.5) This will increase override possibilities. Investigation of accident data is needed to evaluate this phenomenon.

L. The overhang for full-size passenger cars typically averages about 43 in. whereas the average for full-size pickups is about 30 in. (C.5) The combination of shorter pickup front wheel overhang and higher CG leads to a vehicle stability problem. Methods to mitigate the effects of these design characteristics will be studied and reported.

M. Structural differences made the front end of passenger cars ßofter" and more energy absorbing than light trucks. Different vehicle frame/bumper support geometry can provide different performance. (C.5) Some analysis of these factors will be accomplished in this project. Specific emphasis will be placed on understanding frontal and oblique crush stiffnesses.

N. Light truck suspensions are stiffer than passenger cars. (C.5) This fact, while important, will not likely change. Implications of this will be identified as it relates to the compatibility with specific roadside safety systems discussed.

O. Low profile designs are more common to cars and can represent an underride problem for certain RSH. (C.3.b., D.5, D.6) Generally all of the differences between cars and light trucks contribute to stability problems for the light truck category. In addition, vehicles override/vaulting can result due to bumper height considerations. These vehicle characteristics and their relationship to safety performance of each system will be identified and reported during this study.

D-4

III. Computer Simulations

A. Large parametric evaluations using the latest finite element analysis codes such as LS-DYNA require a great deal of computational time. In some cases, this type of analysis is impractical. Also, in some cases, a lack of validation for RH objects and vehicles is an issue. The use of HVOSM for rigid barriers simulations and BARRIER VII provides insight for flexible barrier systems although not to the extent that a validated LS-DYNA simulation can provide. (C.5) LS-DYNA simulations are preferred due to the great amount of flexibility and resulting output information, however, they cannot currently be economically employed in large-scale matrices. In many cases, the use of older, more efficient codes can be employed to achieve acceptable results.

B. LS-DYNA. This code has been used to examine performance of RSH with some very good results. It is particularly useful in examining complex behavior/deformation until the point of fracture in the W-beam system during crash tests. (C.5) The older codes lack the detail to examine certain complex behavior. Limitations such as accurate fracture initiation and crack propagation exist in current explicit finite element codes. During instances where fracture results, a technique is used where critical stresses are monitored to understand when fracture would be initiated. At this point, failure is anticipated in some form.

C. Latest versions of HVOSM are useful to perform hundreds of parametric evaluations for comparable performance using different vehicle and impact condition parameters. This 3-D code predicts vehicle stability after striking rigid barriers. (C.5) See the above discussion regarding limitations and applicability of available analysis codes.

D. The BARRIER VII code has been validated and widely used in flexible barrier simulations for over 25 years. It has some capability of predicting wheel snagging, but cannot predict vehicle underride/override or rollover. (C.5) Severe wheel snagging for higher c.g. vehicles can result in rollover. Alternative means for studying this phenomenon may be necessary.

IV. Roadside Safety Hardware (RSH)

In general, light trucks create a greater demand on RSH than did the 4500 lb car. (B.11, C.5) This has been examined more in depth with longitudinal barriers and terminals / crash cushions.

A. Rigid Barriers. Based on crash tests and computer simulations:

1. Light trucks are much more unstable than cars for tracking impacts with NJ barriers. (C.5) Only future accident data can reveal full extent of this problem. Characteristics of the light truck class indicate that high CGs directly yield some degree of instability during a number of impact cases.

D-5
2. The SUV category has the greatest level of instability with NJ shape among light truck category. (C.5) This has not been fully evaluated; there is a potential problem here that requires additional investigation. As stated above, evaluation of recent accident statistics will clearly define the seriousness of this interaction.

3. Tracking crash tests with 2000 P pickup with NJ shape under Report 350 TL-3 conditions resulted in satisfactory performance. (C.5) No compatibility issues here. Verification will take place using accident statistics.

4. Accident data indicates that a higher incidence of rollover occurs with light trucks than with passenger cars. (C.5) This will continue to increase as fleet reflects sales trends. Obvious vehicle characteristics such as CG height, frontal over hang distance and high ride height support this conclusion.

5. Of three barriers simulated, the constant slope barrier (CSB) introduced the greatest instability, especially with light trucks. (C.5) As the CSB usage, and light truck sales increase, this could be a problem as reflected in accident history.

6. Within light truck category, the SUV and small pickup (SPU) have greatest propensity for overturning even at relatively low speed of 70 km/h and 15 degree angle. (C.5) Accident experience reflecting this fact should increase serious injury and fatal rates.

7. The vertical wall barrier (VWB) introduces less instability - no overturns were predicted. (C.5) In order to analyze the trade-off in reducing overturn accidents as compared to increasing occupant risk due high acceleration levels and compartment intrusion, a calculation of the level of HARM associated with each is appropriate. This calculation, based on resulting cost due to injury, can help to identify the most desirable countermeasure under consideration..

8. Non-tracking impacts with VWB can result in excessive occupant risk values. (C.5) See above.

B. Flexible Longitudinal Barriers

1. The standard W-beam and thrie beam guardrail and median barrier systems are marginal at best when subjected to the basic TL-3 2000 P test of NCHRP Report 350. (B.11) Modifications to steel post block-out have resulted in successful test results, but performance over the acceptable range of barrier heights has not been explored.

2. For given impact conditions, more pronounced wheel snagging is associated with light trucks due to short overhang. (B.11,C.5) Strong post systems with rigid block-outs have reduced problems associated with this. Relative numbers of this installation type will be identified based on a sampling state inventory findings.

3. For given impact conditions light trucks produce larger barrier deflections than large passenger cars. (C.5) This larger increase is not sufficient to change fixed object distance criteria.

4. Block-out depth is critical for minimizing wheel snagging in strong post barriers. (C.5) Blockout collapse of 6 in block-out cannot be tolerated. Test results for barrier systems using non-steel blockout materials must be evaluated for their suitability.

5. Major wheel snagging occurred in a TL-3 test with 2000 P vehicle and G4-1(S) guardrail resulting in vehicle rollover. Major snagging was predicted by BARRIER VII. Use of an older code can predict wheel snagging if properly interpreted.

6. A G4(1S) test with 2000 P vehicle at 110 km/h and 20 degree angle resulted in vehicle rollover. (C.5) This information is useful to evaluate the current testing criteria as well as guardrail design specifications.

7. A modified G4(1S) with a 6 in. wood block-out was tested under TL-3 conditions with a 1995 Taurus with satisfactory results. A vehicle from the same intermediate class, a 1995 Chevrolet Lumina, was used in a subsequent test that resulted in tearing of the W-beam and vehicle penetration. Cause of the failure has been attributed to differences in frame geometry and stiffness characteristics. (D.1, Interim Report)This is possibly a problem; the project team has located a source of data for frame characteristics. A detailed study will be made and summary findings will be reported.

8. A G9 thrie beam test at TL-3 conditions with 2000 P vehicle resulted in multiple vehicle rollover. Major wheel snagging in the test was predicted by BARRIER VII. (C.5) See above regarding Wbeam.

g. Terminals and Crash Cushions

There are a large number of these devices that have met the requirements of NCHRP Report 350 TL-3. (A.7) Many devices meeting Report 230 met Report 350 requirements without any modifications.

1. The MELT terminal under development for Report 350 experienced 2000 P vehicle overturns in TL-3 tests for L-O-N. Devices employing flares at the end are susceptible to problems associated with increased impact angle.

2. In a surprising test, the W-beam fractured in a test of the MELT-2 for the TL-3 critical impact condition with the smaller car. (D.13) This surprising result was evaluated using LS-DYNA. Similar evaluation will be conducted as performance of various roadside safety systems are explored.

D. Signs and Luminaire Supports.

There are a very large number of these devices that have met both NCHRP Report 230 and 350.

1. Since the small car test controls with these devices, and since Report 230 requirements are considered more stringent, devices tested to 230 have been accepted according to criteria of 350. (A.7, A.16, Project Interim Report) A limited study determined problems with sign mounting heights.

Failure Summary- Summaries of known RSH failures are shown in Table 8 Due to vehicle design considerations, it was determined that only 1982 and newer vehicle results would be summarized.

(References D) While much of the RSH meeting Report 230 also met Report 350 requirements, problems associated with the 2000 P pickup required modifications with some designs. Tests with intermediate sedans (Taurus and Lumina) on a W-beam system resulted in a surprising failure attributed to geometric/structural differences.

V. Other findings

The following Selected RSH developed for Report 230 met Report 350 requirements without modification: 1. ET-2000 (A.1) 2. REACT 350 (A.2) 3. 29 Ft luminaire support used with road closure gate. (B.6.c.)

The following Selected RSH developed for Report 230 have been modified to meet 350. 1. BEST (B.6.a) 2. G4-1S (D.1) 3. Buried in-back slope terminals (B.8., B.9.)

A. LS-DYNA applications h. 1990 Taurus and 1982 Honda Civic modeled (A.14) i. LLNL-DYNA 3D modeled G2 Guardrail (B.b.j) j. LS-DYNA 3D steel characteristics (B.6.k) k. LS-DYNA 3D simulations of dual support breakaway sign compared to full-scale crash tests (B.6.l) Used as a Method to compare simulations with Full-Scale test results. (B.6.m)

A. Articles and Reports, Section 1

- 1. Hayes E. Ross, Jr., et al, "NCHRP Report 350 Compliance Tests of ET-2000
- 2. J. F. Carney III, et al, "Development of Reusable High-Molecular-Weight-High Density Polyethylene Crash Cushions".
- 3. Brian G. Pfeifer and Dean L. Sicking, "Development of Metal-Cutting Guardrail Terminal"
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