

Conflict and Reconstruction in Multiethnic Societies: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop

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CONFLICT and **RECONSTRUCTION** in Multiethnic Societies

Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop

Committee on Conflict and Reconstruction in Multiethnic Societies

Office for Central Europe and Eurasia
Development, Security, and Cooperation
Policy and Global Affairs

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Preface

In February 2000 the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) proposed to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) that the academies initiate a joint project on conflicts in multiethnic societies. The RAS suggested that such a project take into account lessons learned in Chechnya when addressing ethnic conflicts in other areas of the former Soviet Union. Western specialists with broad international experience in addressing ethnic relations who were consulted believed they could contribute important perspectives that would complement the extensive expertise of Russian colleagues in addressing problems in the former Soviet Union. The NAS Council thereupon agreed that an interacademy project would be of mutual interest.

When the project was initiated 18 months before the events of September 11, 2001, western scholars did not view violence in Chechnya or other ethnic enclaves of Russia as manifestations of or responses to terrorism despite the use of the term by the Russian authorities to characterize the situation in Chechnya. It was evident that there existed a wide diversity of situations prone to possible conflict within the territory of the former Soviet Union. Beyond descriptive case studies of individual instances, however, little analysis had been devoted to identifying causal relationships or prescriptions for remediation that could be drawn from the divergent events and outcomes as a guide to Russian policy. A systematization of much international as well as Russian experience with state-level responses to the threat of conflict, together with analyses of successes or failures of reconstruction programs, would clearly be a step

forward. A deepened theoretical understanding should also result. This was an opportunity for an international collaborative effort in the social sciences of a new and unusually intensive kind, building on expanded possibilities for Russian-American cooperation after the end of the Cold War. It was only dimly foreseen that there would soon be significant new international dimensions to manifestations of violence such as those seen within the former Soviet Union.

Consistent with this understanding, by mid-2000 the academies had begun planning for an international symposium on ethnic conflict to be hosted by the RAS in Moscow in the fall. The purpose of the symposium was to survey experiences in different geographical settings concerning ethnic conflicts of particular relevance to problems in Russia and in other former Soviet republics.

In preparation for the symposium, a small team of American specialists visited Rostov-on-Don where they discussed ethnic relations with officials and specialists who came to Rostov from a number of republics and oblasts in the North Caucasus, including Chechnya. These consultations provided an opportunity for local specialists to have direct input into the project in general and the symposium in particular. In addition, the American specialists met on several occasions with officials and scholars in Moscow in designing the symposium. The symposium was held in December 2000 with 12 American and more than 50 Russian participants in attendance, and several contributions from that symposium are included as appendixes to this volume.

Plans for a next phase of project activities took shape during the spring of 2001, and in June 2001 an interacademy workshop was scheduled for December. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon three months later clearly signaled a radical departure in world patterns of multiethnic violence that might be expected in the future. But the project's basic objective of systematizing existing knowledge of prior cases and developing a more adequate theoretical base remained a valid starting point for coming to grips with the new, still virtually unknown patterns that might emerge.

Three working groups were established, on the topics of collective violence; culture, identity, and conflict; and comparative study of identity conflict. The task was to develop lists of research priorities in the three areas. The members of these U.S.-Russian working groups initially communicated among themselves by e-mail.

Also in preparation for the workshop, a small team of American specialists traveled to Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod in November 2001. In Moscow they consulted with members of the Duma as well as with scientific colleagues. In Nizhny Novgorod they held discussions with specialists from republics and oblasts throughout the Volga region on the state of

ethnic relations and research needs. They also met with Sergey V. Kirienko, the representative of President Putin for the region. His deputy, Vladimir Yu. Zorin, who became minister of nationalities in December 2001, was the host of the visit and played an active role in the project both in Nizhny Novgorod and later in Washington, D.C. In December 2001 members of the three working groups met in Washington, D.C., to complete their deliberations and to present their findings at the workshop. There were interrelationships among the topics assigned to the working groups, and therefore there is some redundancy in the working group reports. While the working groups were in session, three Russian policy officials who were part of the Russian delegation discussed broader policy concerns with U.S. government officials and local scholars interested in ethnic conflict.

These proceedings present an overview of the discussions during the workshop, followed by the reports of the working groups, background, and papers developed by working group members. In addition, several general papers on ethnic relations in Russia are included.

The three working groups were not appointed by the National Research Council or the National Academies. Therefore, their findings reflect the views of the individuals comprising the working groups, not necessarily those of this institution or the appointed study committee. All of their individually authored papers were presented or distributed at the workshop and likewise reflect the views of the individual authors based on the state of affairs in December 2001.

The appendixes present significant papers considered in Rostov and Nizhny Novgorod, presentations at the Moscow symposium of special interest, and background documents developed by Russian specialists during the course of the project. The appendixes help provide the context within which the workshop in Washington was held.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many scholars and officials in Russia and the United States participated in this activity. They are identified in the appendixes to the proceedings, and their contributions are greatly appreciated. Valery A. Tishkov, Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in Moscow, deserves particular recognition for his continuous efforts in ensuring that the activities would be both professionally rewarding for the participants and useful for government officials.

Special appreciation is extended to the Council of the National Academy of Sciences and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which provided the funding for this initial phase of an important inter-academy project.

The papers in these proceedings have been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their expertise, in accordance with the procedures approved by the NRC's Report Review Committee. The purpose of the independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the authors and the institution in making the papers as sound as possible and to ensure that the proceedings meet institutional standards for quality. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential. In addition to the members of the NRC Committee, we wish to thank the following individuals for their review of selected papers in these proceedings: Rogers Brubaker, University of California, Los Angeles; Christian A. Davenport, University of Maryland; George Demko, Dartmouth College; Zvi Y. Gitelman, University of Michigan; Alexander J. Motyl, Rutgers University; and Uri Ra'Anan, Boston University. Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the content of the individual papers, nor did they see the final draft of the proceedings before its release.

We wish to thank Kelly Robbins, Rita Kit, and Rita S. Guenther for their translations of the Russian language papers into English. Special thanks also to Jan Dee Summers, Kelly Robbins, and A. Chelsea Sharber for their editing of the proceedings.

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Conflict and Reconstruction in
Multiethnic Societies

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Priorities for Research on Conflict in Multiethnic Countries

Charles Tilly

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Political conflict in which at least one participant claimed to speak in the name of a distinctive national, ethnic, racial, or religious group—ethnic conflict for short—became common in many parts of the world during the nineteenth century. It takes a wide variety of forms, from peaceful demonstrations to genocide. Ethnic conflict accelerated worldwide after World War II, as rival claimants for state power recurrently argued that they spoke for distinct, authentic nations. Africa and Asia experienced a great deal of violent ethnic conflict from the 1940s onward. It reached new heights, however, toward the end of the twentieth century. In the Soviet Union and its successor states, such encounters swelled from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, then diminished except in a few regions, such as the Caucasus and Tajikistan. As it fragmented, Yugoslavia bled with ethnic conflict.

Both within the post-Soviet world and elsewhere, ethnic conflict, broadly defined, currently takes far more lives than any other form of political conflict. Yet participants, politicians, public authorities, international agencies, and academic specialists lack consensus about explanations of ethnic struggles. In hopes of reducing uncertainty and increasing useful knowledge, this report summarizes the major recommendations for further inquiry that emerged from discussions among Russia- and U.S.-based specialists in political conflict during 2000 and 2001. It presents the common points of the discussions by working groups on systematic comparative study of conflict events; culture, identity, and conflict; and collective violence.

Although working group participants drew on their familiarity with particular conflicts, competing explanations, and available methods for collecting and analyzing relevant evidence, in this workshop they did not aim at empirical generalizations, theoretical syntheses, or methodological recommendations. Instead, they sought to identify open questions concerning ethnic conflict that appear to be tractable, significant, and suitable for collaboration between Russian and American scholars.

Disagreements concerning what exists, what is possible, and what cause-effect chains are in operation lie behind many policy disputes. The world at large has much to gain from better knowledge of causes, constraints, means of termination, means of prevention, and processes of conflict settlement in the area of ethnic conflict. Superior knowledge would have a supremely practical advantage. It would improve the capacities of responsible specialists, officials, participants, and third parties to anticipate the consequences of alternative policies, and even to design creative, nonviolent ways of settling conflicts.

Academic specialists themselves play four quite different roles in the search for answers, as

- investigators seeking better explanations and more effective forms of intervention
- communicators with students, intellectuals, and the general public
- advisors and critics of governments and other agencies that seek to resolve serious conflicts, suppress them, prevent them, or terminate those that are already under way
- advisors to participants in serious conflicts and advocates for their causes

Specialists engage in the last three activities from day to day. The first challenge takes time, collaboration, extensive exchanges among specialists, access to evidence, and support for research. In the present state of knowledge, specialists in ethnic conflict have identified a number of long-term, contextual, and immediately precipitating influences on open conflict without arriving at a widely accepted synthesis of all these elements. With that state of knowledge in mind, we concentrate here on agendas for the longer-term investigation of ethnic conflict without laying out a specific set of policy recommendations for day-to-day action.

Specialists in such regions as Africa, Latin America, and South Asia have no choice but to recognize the importance of ethnic conflict in the polities they study. Most embed their analyses in knowledge of their regions' distinctive histories and cultures without paying much attention to similar conflicts elsewhere. A few scholars examine ethnic conflict, genocide, or collective violence in general, but they generally lack the

local knowledge to arrive at either detailed explanations or policy recommendations regarding particular struggles. Clearly some form of collaboration between area experts and comparative-historical students of political conflict will benefit both sides.

Any such collaboration will gain from locating particular varieties of contemporary conflict in comparative and historical perspective. That means relating and comparing ethnic conflict to other forms of struggle based on religion, race, class, region, or other social divisions. It also means examining historical precedents for contemporary conflicts on the premise that earlier conflicts not only supply cases for comparison but can become models, pretexts, or even causes for later ones.

Despite starting from rather different questions and perspectives, the three working groups converged on a number of shared recommendations. The plenary discussion did not reject any of those recommendations, but underlined some, added specifications to others, and placed additional items on the agenda. Recommendations identified open questions, problems to be solved, and types of evidence to collect. The recommendations set forth below and in the working group reports reflect the views of the individuals in each group and are not necessarily those of the National Academies or one of its appointed committees.

After reconciling differences in terminology, the most widely shared recommendations for inquiries include the following:

1. investigations of social processes that promote mobilization, demobilization, and division of populations along lines of ethnicity rather than according to other divisions, such as industry, locality, and age; the subject definitely includes
 - a) examining how groups and conflicts come to be defined
 - b) comparing ostensibly ethnic conflicts with those in which participants align themselves along religious, political, racial, regional, or other divisions
2. investigations of social processes that move ethnic conflict (which often proceeds in relatively nonviolent ways) into or out of violent forms of struggle, including conditions, processes, and interventions that promote nonviolent conflict resolution
3. research on how political entrepreneurs (such as ethnic leaders), violence specialists (such as heads of militias), and dealers in contraband (such as drug merchants) promote and inhibit transitions between violent and nonviolent forms of struggle
4. studies of which combinations of governmental form and population composition promote or inhibit acute conflicts in the names of ethnic groups; how and why this occurs
5. compilations of extensive, comparable catalogs of conflict events

across the space of the former Soviet Union before, during, and after the Soviet collapse, that include

a) brief accounts and descriptions of events for selected periods across the entire territory

b) closer studies of long-term changes in conflict for selected regions

c) analyses of selected episodes with evidence on both violent and nonviolent forms of interaction before, during, and after collective violence

6. studies of interventions in ethnic conflicts, covering the whole range from explanation of conditions and processes that promote (or inhibit) interventions by third parties—authorities, allies, émigrés, international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and mass media—to conditions and processes of intervention that actually contribute to the incitement (prevention, alteration, enlargement, or termination) of violent conflicts

7. conduct of complementary comparative studies of social changes in localities and regions with dual purposes of

a) identifying early stages and precipitants of serious conflicts

b) using area expertise to look closely at the processes generating, inhibiting, mitigating, or terminating serious conflicts

8. analyses of impacts of varying and changing state policies for protection, recognition, representation, or repression of ethnic categories' rights and obligations on the extent and character of ethnic conflict, including violent conflict

9. studies of the impacts of legal systems (for example, the establishment [or refusal] of separate legal codes and enforcement mechanisms for specific ethnic or religious categories) on the extent and character of ethnic conflict

10. assessments of the effects of changing forms of communication and mobility (for example, access to television and the Internet) on ethnic mobilization, conflict, violence, and conflict resolution

The reports of the three working groups contain much more detail on approaches to addressing the 10 topics. Although these themes may seem to cover the entire range of possible topics, they actually outline a distinctive approach to the analysis of ethnic conflict. Instead of concentrating on the individual orientation of one actor or group at a time and taking up the explanation of one action at a time, they constitute a program of focusing on interaction among multiple parties to ethnic conflicts, stressing transitions among forms of conflict, and engaging in rigorous comparisons among local episodes.

Altogether, these 10 topics outline a considerable range of difficult but manageable problems concerning ethnic conflict upon which collaboration among Russian and American scholars could considerably advance our store of knowledge. Inquiries into any one of these topics would augment the knowledge available for the design of effective policies to help resolve conflicts without widespread losses of life and property.

Reports of Working Groups

Priorities for Research on Collective Violence

*Charles Tilly, Valery A. Tishkov, Stathis N. Kalyvas,
Mark R. Beissinger, Viktor V. Bocharov, Lev D. Gudkov,
Larissa L. Khoperskaya*

This group reviewed a series of pressing questions concerning description, explanation, and comparison of violent interactions in general, regardless of whether participants make ethnic claims or identify themselves as ethnic groups. This working group's recommendations for high-priority research relevant to the explanation of conflict in multiethnic policies are included. This statement summarizes the group's conclusions, adapting some of its language and most of its ideas from the more detailed statements that follow. This working group was not appointed by the National Research Council or the National Academies. Therefore, its findings reflect the views of the individuals composing the group, not necessarily those of the National Academies or the appointed committee.

These illustrations and concrete recommendations concentrate on the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the phenomena discussed here occur across the world. They therefore lend themselves to comparative research including sites, past and present, both within and outside the Soviet space as it existed in 1989.

This group's assignment is collective violence. It is working in parallel with other working groups dealing with 1) culture, identity, and conflict and 2) systematic comparative studies of conflict events. Obviously the three topics overlap. On the topic of collective violence, however, it is especially important to determine

- Which among the many competing efforts to explain collective violence or its major varieties look most promising?

- What sorts of empirical investigations would advance those efforts, or at least subject them to critical scrutiny?
- Among those types of empirical investigation, which would best lend themselves to collaboration among Russia- and U.S.-based scholars?

Empirical investigations might make comparisons within Russia, within the former Soviet Union, or across a wider range of cases selected for comparability with respect to crucial questions or arguments. This document identifies possible areas of agreement in these three regards suggested by the following papers, included in these proceedings:

- “The Anthropology of Collective Violence,” by Viktor V. Bocharov
- “Violence in Ethnonational Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space,” by Lev D. Gudkov
- “The State of the Art in Understanding Violence,” by Valery A. Tishkov
- “The Dynamics of the Ethnopolitical Situation and Conflicts in the North Caucasus,” by Larissa L. Khoperskaya
- “Priority Themes for Research on Collective Violence,” by Mark R. Beissinger and Stathis N. Kalyvas

Students of collective violence employ four rather different general approaches to explaining violence: *cognitive-behavioral* accounts concentrating on the individual cognitions, emotions, beliefs, and constraints that affect participation in collective violence; *ethnographic* approaches that locate violent practices and relations within their social and cultural settings; *organizational process* accounts conceiving of violence as a component or outcome of organized social interaction; and *epidemiological* accounts relating the incidence of violent acts or events to characteristics of their settings. Instead of arguing for one of these approaches or attempting to adjudicate among them, fruitful combinations of their insights are sought.

For the purpose of this report, a brute force definition of collective violence is held: interactions between at least two parties that produce direct and immediate damage to persons or property. (Damage includes forcible seizure.) While it is true that all acts of collective violence share several features (they all involve the intentional exercise of physical force by two or more persons with the aim of inflicting injury on other persons or causing damage to property), the range of acts that fall under the rubric of collective violence is capacious. Collective violence assumes such disparate forms as terrorist activity, brawls, pogroms, riots, communal attacks, vigilante violence, forced expulsions, insurrections, civil wars, revolutions, and genocides. At times, people have defined it to include

state-sponsored terror and interstate warfare as well. Significant and largely separate literatures exist on all these subjects. Several generations of research on collective violence have produced agreement that no universal explanation for all of its many forms is possible.

The collectives involved in the perpetration of collective violence, furthermore, vary significantly: small networks or organizations of individuals, less formally organized crowds and gatherings, loosely connected paramilitaries, armies with varying degrees of discipline, and government bureaucracies. Sometimes members of dominant groups or state agents inflict damage on members of subordinate groups. Sometimes members of subordinate groups initiate violence against dominant groups or the state. Still other times two groups of actors seek to inflict damage on each other.

In addition to the variety of forms and actors involved, problems of explanation emerge from the varied scope and severity of collective violence. Collective violence can constitute a relatively brief event embedded within a larger chain of social interaction (such as typically occurs in a pogrom or terrorist activity) or a sustained series of violent acts that concatenate over a protracted period of time (as in civil war or genocide). And the severity of the violence involved in these acts differs significantly from one case to the next, extending from minor property damage to thousands and even millions of lives. All of these issues beg serious attention and qualification from the researcher.

In studies aimed specifically at interethnic collective violence, collective violence has tended to remain under-specified as an object of explanation; it has often been folded into the larger and more vague category *interethnic conflict* and thereby left undefined—in its specific forms as well as in distinguishing it from other potential outcomes, that is, nonviolent modes of conflict, diffuse social violence, and others. Situations have often been coded dichotomously (conflict/no conflict), and many scholars have viewed collective violence “as a *degree* of conflict, rather than as a *form* of conflict,”¹ This has unfortunately served to cut the study of interethnic violence off from the study of other social processes that remain closely connected to it.

Before the 1990s, studies of collective violence and analyses of ethnic conflict remained largely unconnected; generic theories of collective violence tended to ignore ethnicity or to subsume it within larger analytical categories of collective violence, assuming that there is nothing about the relationship between ethnicity and collective violence that would distinguish it from collective violence over other types of issues. At the same

¹Brubaker, R., and D. D. Laitin. 1998. Ethnic and Nationalist Violence. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:425.

time, scholars focusing on ethnic conflict have tended to assume that interethnic violence flowed logically out of the intensity of cultural allegiance, and that these emotional attachments constituted the single, cohesive set of motivations for those perpetrating acts of violence. Evidence of other motivations (personal rivalries, revenge, power, and in some cases, respectability) has been too easily glossed over and overlooked.

What, then, can be identified as promising in terms of future research directions for collaboration, given the theoretical Babel, empirical complexity, and analytical muddle faced in the study of collective violence in multiethnic societies? There is a series of questions and themes that merit abiding or greater attention in the future and would therefore make promising topics for potential collaboration.

Following is a list of six pressing research questions with brief comments drawn from the group's discussions.

1. Causal connections between Soviet and post-Soviet forms of governance on one side and post-Soviet interethnic violence or its absence on the other side

One must distinguish with care among three interrelated problems: (a) what caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, (b) interplay between different forms of violence and the process by which the Soviet Union collapsed, and (c) significant relations between local or regional forms of governance, on one side, and variable intensities, forms, and causes of collective violence, on the other. It would be extremely valuable to promote systematic research on variations in ethnic violence before the Soviet collapse, for comparison with what happened during and after that process. Conceivably that research could identify a few national cross-sections of the Soviet Union for periods of especially rich evidence, and complement them with long-term studies of regions for which privileged records and long traditions of professional study exist.

In all cases, it would be crucial to record and analyze interventions in such conflicts from elsewhere in the Soviet Union as well as from outside. Among other things, systematic studies along these lines would help clarify much-discussed problems, such as whether ethnofederalism promotes or inhibits conflict, whether migration (forced or otherwise) plays a significant part in generating conflict, how (on the contrary) restrictions on population mobility generate grievances and conflict, how the location of a region in the Soviet Union's political economy affected its post-Soviet conflicts, how the pattern of Soviet withdrawal affected subsequent struggles for power, and to what extent and how Soviet-era elites and officials struggled for and acquired post-Soviet power in different regions.

2. Facilitating and inhibiting effects of transnational connections on interethnic violence

On the grounds that they operate in somewhat different ways, it is important to distinguish among four different forms of transnational connection: (a) direct aid or intervention in violent conflicts by outside parties; (b) involvement of third parties, including international organizations and agencies, as mediators, monitors, or pacifiers; (c) appeals by participants to outside parties, including adjacent governments and leaders of related political movements; (d) transecting networks of trade, population movement, and communication, including flows of contraband, military supplies, and military personnel.

- Under heading (a), closer study of both the conditions under which outsiders join existing conflicts and the processes by which outsiders that do not join directly nevertheless promote or sustain local conflicts is needed.

- Under heading (b), a clearer look at how international aid, monitoring, and labeling (for example, of actors as indigenous peoples or of conflicts as genocide) affect the course of violent conflict is needed. The inquiry should include effects of selective attention from mass media, transnational organizations, and international bureaucracies.

- Under heading (c), better information about how religious or ethnic diasporas become available as supporters and inhibitors of local conflicts is needed.

- Under heading (d), much more systematic investigation of relations between the course of violent conflicts and their connection to criminal networks, arms flows, mercenaries, mass media, and refugees is needed.

All of these point to the value of generating evidence on three topics: violent conflicts and their contexts as such; international events that are likely to affect violent conflict; and flows of crucial goods, personnel, and information.

3. Onset, duration, and termination of sustained violent conflict, using multiple cases for comparison and quantitative analysis, including specification of micromechanisms and process tracing by close analysis of particular cases

Specialists in Soviet and post-Soviet studies should consider provisional results that are coming in from large quantitative international studies, which provide relatively robust findings concerning conditions for onset of sustained, large-scale collective violence, plus some indications concerning duration, termination, and recurrence. The former Soviet Union offers a series of research challenges and opportunities for looking more closely not just at generally favorable or unfavorable condi-

tions but at the actual processes producing or containing long, large, lethal conflicts. Obvious elements to consider include

- how changes in relations among ethnic segments, for example, cross-ethnic coalitions and associations, affect the likelihood, intensity, and character of conflicts
- involvement of refugees and externally based members of local populations
- external intervention as incitement and constraint, with special attention to third-party involvement as a reinforcement for termination of violent conflicts
- the character of effective and ineffective peacekeeping interventions, including close analysis of the processes by which they produce their effects
- replacement of warriors by new generations and outside reinforcements
- other sources of material support for sustained military activity: arms, money, food, shelter, clothing, supplies

Although these questions certainly arise in the study of violent conflicts across the former Soviet Union, they also concern intense collective violence currently occurring in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Relevant comparisons could therefore occur both within the Soviet space and between former Soviet regions and conflicts elsewhere in the world. In all such studies, it is important to carefully compare what actually happened with coherent counterfactuals, drawn either from closely comparable cases with different outcomes or from disaggregation of causal processes into comparable components.

4. Participation in intermittent forms of mobilized interethnic violence, with special attention to (a) transitions and relations between nonviolent and violent forms of interaction, (b) direct evidence concerning actions of perpetrators, (c) networks through which participants mobilize, (d) in-group constraints on violent actions, (e) diffusion and containment of related events

For all these issues, it would be extremely valuable to assemble systematic, comparable narratives of violent episodes, including nonviolent interactions among the parties preceding, during, and after the direct infliction of damage. A well-documented collection of this kind would facilitate both analysis of transitions to or from violent interactions and comparisons with otherwise similar interactions in which little or no violence occurred. Likely switching mechanisms affecting rapid transitions between violent and nonviolent interactions between two parties include

- coordinated deployment of such violent specialists as militias
- activation or deactivation of binding ties between participants and third parties
- opening or closing of alternative nonviolent arenas of contention
- initiation or cessation of external payoffs to one or both parties

In the case of diffusion and nondiffusion of violent episodes from one connected site to another, analyses should proceed at two levels: first, identifying forms of connectedness among sites that promote or inhibit diffusion and, second, distinguishing among three objects of diffusion: (1) information (whether true or false, verifiable or unverifiable) about threats and opportunities affecting political actors; (2) means of performing violent acts, including weapons, technical expertise, and leadership; and (3) knowledge of likely outcomes of various possible actions.

Within the former Soviet Union, important regions for comparison in these various regards include: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan (Fergana, Osh), Azerbaijan and Armenia (Sumgait, Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku), Moldova (Transdnester), Tajikistan, Russia (Chechnya, North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tuva, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria), Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tbilisi), Ukraine (Crimea), and Lithuania (Vilnius). External comparisons are available in such countries as Colombia, Liberia, Macedonia, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan.

5. Variable cultures, discourses, traditions, and rituals as causes, effects, and channels of interethnic violence: To what extent, how, and why do the circumstances, character, meaning, and consequences of interethnic violence differ as a function of the ambient culture?

Instead of assuming direct translation of culture into violent action, investigators should treat established understandings, practices, and representations as occasions on which and means by which people engaged in struggle. For example, rituals such as religious processions occur without violence much of the time. Yet established processions also provide opportunities for participants, spectators, or opponents to initiate violent interactions, and political actors sometimes organize or manipulate public rituals as parts of larger political conflicts. For instance, for more than two centuries, Northern Ireland has experienced episodic violence centering on processions. Again, the construction and activation of we-they boundaries (which is crucial in a wide variety of violent conflicts) involves political processes that certainly draw on previously existing cultural materials, but by no means simply reproduce commonly accepted distinctions. India's Hindu activists, for example, draw on age-old sym-

bols and practices to create new definitions of boundaries between Hindus and other Indians.

Investigators should also distinguish between explanations of two related phenomena: *formation and transformation* of significant we-they boundaries (ethnic and otherwise), on the one hand, and *activation or deactivation* of such boundaries when they are already available, on the other. Studies of rituals and boundaries require collection of evidence not only about violent episodes themselves but also about the contexts of violent struggles—emphatically including nonviolent forms of contention in those contexts.

6. The place of intellectual elites, political leaders, entrepreneurs, and specialists in violence—how they acquire the means of performing or controlling violence and what parts they play in initiating, organizing, delivering, and containing collective interethnic violence. This topic includes the emergence, deployment, and containment of criminals as agents of collective violence.

Our first recommendation is simply to recognize that these special categories of actors play important but different roles in collective violence, variously providing public justifications, connections with outsiders, practical guidance, coordination, and the means of destruction that often make the difference between small- and large-scale conflict. In the post-Soviet space, the previously high production of educated people, the contraction of bureaucratic and professional opportunities for educated people, and the contraction of governmental security forces have probably all augmented the pool of potential participants in organized violence. Although in principle one might expect education to make people more moderate and more integrated into existing political systems, under some conditions it also forms dissident elites. There is a need for more extensive examination of involvement (and noninvolvement) of intellectual elites, political leaders, political entrepreneurs, and violent specialists in the initiation, maintenance, termination, and prevention of violent conflicts.

Writing as specialists in the study of violence, it is necessary to reflect, in closing, on the proper place of our own tribe in the initiation, maintenance, termination, and prevention of violent conflicts. As this report indicates, specialists are accumulating knowledge that weighs heavily against a variety of common explanations for collective violence. People working in the field, however, have by no means arrived at airtight explanations that lead directly to prescriptions for controlling collective violence. The proper combination of prudence, modesty, commitment, and responsibility requires incessant self-criticism, dialogue, and reexamination of received opinion. Continued exchanges between Russian and American scholars can forward their shared agenda.

Priorities for Research on Culture, Identity, and Conflict

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This working group's assignment is culture, identity, and conflict. The group was not appointed by the National Research Council or the National Academies. Therefore, its findings reflect the views of the individuals composing the group, not necessarily those of the National Academies or the appointed committee.

The relationship between identity and ethnic conflict should be studied with regard to the following four themes—(1) the relationship between identity and action; (2) the dynamics of ethnic identity; (3) the role of social, economic, and cultural conditions; and (4) the role of the state and elites.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IDENTITY AND ACTION

It should be recognized that identities by themselves do not generate conflict and violence. Moreover, if the goal is to explain specific outcomes, such as ethnic strife, the relationship between identity and action must be addressed more fully. Therefore, it is worthwhile to shift attention from theorizing ethnicity and identity formation to understanding ethnically motivated behavior, in other words, how ethnic identity influences behavior and actions that lead to conflict. Among other things, this should facilitate the forecasting of imminent ethnic conflicts.

One may suggest further research along the following lines:

- Interests are indeed the motor that drives the establishment and orientation of identity into action. One must better understand the relationship between identity, interests, and action. Also, one needs to take into account the idea of perceived interests, which might not always be the same as objective assessments of interests.

- Indicators of the self-consciousness or status of ethnic groups should be developed. A group's perception of social and political inequality, trampled dignity, and a sense of humiliation are causes of negativism in identity. A condition for tolerant interethnic relations may be the positive perception of one's own group (including a critical regard for negative facts in its history and current life) and the readiness for contacts with other groups.

- Quantitative and qualitative measures and indicators of the level of tension between different groups as well as the conditions under which tension is transformed into actual conflict are needed.

- Certain values, behavioral norms, and worldviews separate the groups that are in conflict or in a state of interethnic tension. Moreover, certain ideologies can lead to violent conflicts in specific situations. Rigorous study must be undertaken to clarify the connections between ideas, programs, and specific actions.

- The relationship between content and intensity of the components of ethnic identity and action must be further explored. In particular, specific behavioral outcomes must be studied with respect to the components of ethnic identity.

THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

In the study of identity and its relationship to conflict, it is necessary to understand identity as a dynamic process, meaning that the components of identity are subject to change. These changes may have important implications for ethnic relations; some changes may be related to greater levels of conflict and others, to lower levels.

It is necessary to consider more fully the following types of changes:

- **Content or bases of ethnic identity:** The content of identity may include, for example, race, gender, language, culture, symbolic boundaries, political positions, territorial claims, or economic positions. This content is not constant but also subject to change; moreover, certain aspects of content are more or less subject to change.

- **Intensity:** The intensity of groups' attachment to particular aspects of identity may change. For example, at one time, language may be seen as a very important component of identity, and at another time, territorial claims might be seen as primary.

- **Contestation:** The components of identity are subject to contestation *within groups*. In other words, there may be competition within the groups for the primacy of particular ideas, values, or claims.

- **Historical change, or changes over time:** This point may seem obvious, but it is often not taken into account, especially in the construction of data sets, which are compiled at a certain point in time and not subsequently updated as identities change.

- **Orientation of ethnic identity to various types of nationalism, such as civic, ethnic, political, cultural, and others:** There are different types of relationships between particular identities and various nationalist programs, and these relations are subject to change.

- **Relations between ethnic groups:** The level of tension as well as actual relations between groups change, and these changes must be monitored.

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS

Worldwide political and economic changes, often associated with the term *globalization*, can contribute to altering social, economic, and cultural conditions in a way that contributes to the emergence of ethnic conflict. Moreover, in the former Soviet area, transitions from one-party rule and centralized state control of the economy also constitute an important source of complementary change in these conditions.

The study of this topic presupposes that

- Ethnic identities become salient and relevant to conflict under certain conditions.

- One mechanism by which such external and internal changes can activate ethnic conflict is by creating differential impacts on particular groups and provoking concerns about inequality of both opportunity and status.

- Not only the differential impact of such changes on groups or regions but particularly the perceptions of those changes must be considered; some groups perceive that they are doing better or worse than other groups under the new conditions, or have greater or lesser opportunities to take advantage of the new conditions. These changes and perceptions may be related to the potential for conflict.

- It is important to better understand how changes in status or opportunities stemming from economic and political transitions and globalization are interpreted through institutions such as the media and education. The media and educational institutions can heighten the salience of ethnic identity by invoking historical myths and grievances.

- One must understand why the differential impact of the changes is

perceived in terms of ethnic identity rather than other possible identities, such as class, gender, or age (generations).

THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND ELITES

Almost all CIS states consist of multiethnic and multinational societies with pluralistic identities and narratives, which increase the necessity for—and simultaneously the danger of—an activist state. In this respect, the role of the state in regulating ethnic relations may include legislative acts, executive or governmental decisions, selective enforcement of laws and administrative practices, as well as the use of police or military force.

Along these themes, further research is needed on the following issues:

- More work should be done in determining the optimal role of the state in regulating ethnic relations and its intervention on ethnoterritorial boundaries, especially in conditions where a state is identified with an ethnonational majority, or where linguistic and/or cultural assimilation or accommodation has progressed. At present, nationalizing and assimilating projects are often less successful than in the past because ethnic collectivities are differentiated today more and more by symbolic boundaries and markers, rather than by real and significant cultural differences.
- It is necessary to understand whether minority groups perceive their relations with the state in strictly formal terms of citizenship or whether they embrace the more ambitious program of civic nationalism, which implies the acceptance and interiorization of common historical memories, values, norms, rituals, and symbols that exceed the formal pledge of allegiance.
- Finally, it remains underinvestigated to what extent and why ethnic elites are enjoying the support of their coethnics. One may wonder whether, in the post-Soviet context, ethnic solidarity is mainly based on historical memory (real or constructed and manipulated) and common experiences (or experiences that can be presented as common), which flowed into overall legitimation myths, or if it is a more rational response to the interplay of sociopolitical, cultural, and economic factors. It is also worth exploring the extent to which ethnopolitics provide real or perceived benefits to the members of corresponding groups, for example, social advancement, new economic opportunities, or cultural reproduction.

Priorities for Research on the Comparative Study of Identity Conflicts

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The authors of this report recommend a major focus of research on comparative studies of the factors involved in supporting, maintaining, and ending violence in the expression of identity conflicts. This working group was not appointed by the National Research Council or the National Academies. Therefore, its findings reflect the views of the individuals composing the group, not necessarily those of the National Academies or the appointed committee.

Identity conflicts involve at least one party that defines itself by who its members see themselves as being. In this respect, they are different from most conflicts between states. Identity conflicts often occur within a country, and the country's government can be a party to the conflict.

The research should be organized so as to provide insights relevant to conflicts with a potential for violence within the former Soviet space and similar conflicts occurring elsewhere. Our selection of topics for emphasis is motivated by the search for effective policy instruments that might be used, either by parties to the conflicts or by outside parties, to reduce violence or the potential for violence. It is presumed that there is no single best policy instrument for all such conflicts. Rather, the goal of analysis is to identify the conditions under which particular approaches to identity conflicts are likely to work best.

Useful knowledge for understanding and addressing conflicts in any specific region may come from conflicts occurring in other places and times. Comparative research should not, therefore, be arbitrarily restricted in space or time; instead, it should encompass all conflicts, violent or nonviolent, that are relevant for understanding particular conflict pro-

cesses of interest. Similarly, comparative research should not be restricted to any single method. In particular, both qualitative case-study methods and quantitative/statistical methods may be useful. Because these methods have complementary strengths and limitations, understanding will be best advanced by research that builds on the findings produced by different methods.

To develop the research agenda, a broad typology of sources and manifestations of conflicts, factors affecting whether they are expressed with violence or not, and policy tools (see background paper by Bennett et al., p. 86) were considered. A broad range of violent and nonviolent identity conflicts in the post-Soviet space were considered, as well as existing databases that might be used or expanded to support the needed comparative analyses.

It is recommended that comparative research efforts focus on the eight substantive topics described below. Some of these topics are defined primarily in analytical terms, and others are focused on types of intervention that may be used to reduce levels of violence in identity conflicts. All the topics are highly worthy of examination for the goal of providing the understanding needed for well-informed efforts to keep identity conflicts from becoming violent and for reducing levels of violence when it does occur. Some of these topics overlap with those recommended by other working groups. These overlaps indicate broad endorsement by conflict scholars, who recognize the importance of the same issues even though they approach the understanding of identity conflict from different perspectives. The eight topics are as follows:

1. mechanisms of mobilization for identity conflict
2. processes of transformation in identity conflicts (processes that change the identity markers or the actual social cleavages around which conflict is organized)
3. uses and limitations of force for conflict management
4. effects of possibilities for nonviolent expression and adjudication of grievances on the likelihood that a conflict will become violent (This topic includes the effects of democratization and its pace and process on the potential for violent expression of identity conflicts.)
5. political economy of violent identity conflict, for example, roles of illicit sources of funds
6. studies of conditions favoring the rise of entrepreneurs of identity violence, the maintenance of their influence, and their marginalization
7. the problem of similar contexts generating violent expressions in some identity groups but not others
8. detailed comparisons of potentially instructive cases, for example, Chechnya versus Ingushetia and Dagestan

Finally, it is recommended that comparative research on identity conflict and violence employ a multimethod approach including both case study and multivariate statistical approaches. This point is elaborated at the end of this report.

RESEARCH AREAS

Mechanisms for Mobilization in an Identity Conflict

The leaders and entrepreneurs of ethnic, religious, and political movements and organizations use a variety of methods to mobilize popular support for their positions and for popular expressions of these positions, including violent actions. These mechanisms are of interest at all stages of identity conflicts, but especially during phases of escalation and de-escalation.

Comparative research is recommended to uncover the regional and historical specifics of these mechanisms by examining their use in different places and times, with specific focus on cases in which mobilizations for violent collective actions were and were not successful. Are there universal methods of mobilization or do they vary depending on the time, place, and context of their use? Why do particular methods of mobilization appear successful in building mass support and action in one case, while the same mechanisms remain unnoticed by broad masses of people in other cases?

Processes of Transformation in Identity Conflicts

In many cases the ideology of an identity conflict may change in the course of the conflict into something different from what was originally envisioned by the ideologists or organizers of the conflict. A conflict that started as political in nature may evolve into an ethnic or religious conflict. An example is the conflict in Chechnya, which initially was essentially a political conflict but later acquired features of an ethnic and eventually a religious conflict, substantially complicating the search for options for its resolution. Such transformations sometimes deviate from the intent of those who instigated the conflicts and seem to evolve based on a logic of their own. Processes that transform the ideology of a conflict may also transform the nature of the actual cleavages in a society—that is, change the picture of who is in conflict with whom. Thus, people who are on the same side when a conflict is framed in ethnic terms may begin to fight one another if it becomes defined as a religious conflict.

Research is recommended, focusing on the following questions:

- What are the mechanisms of conflict transformation?
- How can the course of development of the definition of a conflict be projected?
 - How can decision makers act to keep conflicts from transforming into types that are especially dangerous?
 - What can be done to transform conflicts into forms that are more amenable to nonviolent resolution?

Uses and Limitations of Force for Resolving Identity Conflicts

Third parties to identity conflicts are often tempted to intervene forcefully in one way or another to reduce or prevent violence in conflicts that have a real or potential identity dimension. Some have argued that the use of armed forces, for example, peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, in zones of ethnic and religious conflicts, uprisings, and so forth, often gives rise to unmanageable processes. These may include drawing an outside country or group of countries into the conflict, a loss of control over the situation by the government, and increased alienation of peacekeeping forces from the local people, who may come to perceive them as taking sides in the conflict—usually the side of the adversary. In such circumstances, peacekeeping missions may be counterproductive. Also, some have argued that interventions can at times create an identity dimension to a conflict that did not previously have that dimension, possibly making resolution more difficult.

Comparative research to identify the conditions under which particular kinds of forceful third-party interventions affect identity conflicts (for better or worse) is recommended. The research would seek to identify principles that can guide the use, extent, timing, function, and form of forceful interventions. Research would examine both negative and positive experience in the use of force in different regions by the Soviet Union and Russia, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies, on the other. It would seek to test hypotheses such as the above and to arrive at useful principles by using a comparative approach to experience worldwide.

Effects of Opportunities for Nonviolent Expression of Grievances

Evidence suggests that identity conflicts are less likely to turn violent if identity groups have institutionalized opportunities to articulate their grievances and believe that their preferences are taken into consideration by local and national leaders. These opportunities may be embodied in institutions of Western democracies, such as free and fair elections, freedom of speech, a free press, freedom of assembly, and full access to the

judicial system to seek redress for discriminatory treatment, violence, slander, or activities that incite intercommunal violence. Opportunities for expression may also be embodied in traditional institutions that may, in some places, be considered more legitimate and more effective than the formal institutions of liberal democracy for providing voice and representation and for adjudicating intercommunal conflicts. Consider, as examples of these institutions, the *loya jirga* in Afghanistan; customary law (*adat*) administered by village or clan (*jammaty* or *teipy*) in Dagestan and Chechnya; or the informal system of nationality quotas for public office, ethnic electoral gerrymandering, and preferential treatment in Dagestan.

Some analysts have suggested that efforts to modernize national governments in order to standardize and rationalize political and legal systems may undermine the effectiveness of traditional institutions and upset an existing equilibrium, thereby increasing the likelihood of intercommunal violence.

Additional comparative research is needed on the varieties of traditional mechanisms of intercommunal dispute mediation, on the compatibility of these traditional mechanisms with the formal institutions of liberal democracy and a liberal economy, and on the ways in which greater legal rationality promoted by modernizing national governments affects traditional conflict management institutions. A practical goal of the research is to identify ways in which national governments can consolidate their institutions without upsetting existing intercommunal equilibria.

In some settings, efforts to liberalize and democratize a rigidly authoritarian regime have resulted in intercommunal violence by giving bigots and extremists access to the media and new opportunities to articulate their views and organize politically. Just as economic liberalization entails short-term sacrifice for long-term rewards, political liberalization and democratization may entail short-term instability in the interest of more effective institutions of voice and representation in the distant future. For example, Gorbachev's efforts to introduce a measure of liberalization and democratization to the Soviet Union provoked intercommunal violence in many parts of the USSR. Arguably, a decision to liberalize or democratize Uzbekistan today could provoke interfaith or interethnic violence not only in Uzbekistan but also in other parts of Central Asia. At the same time, there are successful examples of democratization without violent identity conflicts (for example, democratic transitions in Hungary and Poland and the peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia).

Comparative research is recommended to focus on the question of why, under some circumstances, democratization has been peaceful despite the presence of different identity groups, while under other circumstances democratization has exacerbated identity conflicts. Possible comparisons might involve Hungary, Poland, or Czechoslovakia as relatively

peaceful cases and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, or Georgia as relatively violent cases. Independent variables to consider should include the structure of previous conflict resolution mechanisms, the nature and sequencing of the democratization process, the structure and ownership of the media, and the preexisting level of identity conflict. As above, a practical goal is to identify strategies of liberalization and democratization that might make intercommunal violence less, rather than more, likely during periods of transition.

Political Economy of Violent Identity Conflict

Some economic networks provide resources for violent conflict, produce additional incentives for conflict, or perpetuate conflict. Domestic and international actors want to find ways to dissolve or contain such networks.

In providing resources such as arms, food, and hard currency, economic networks enable groups to continue fighting. Sometimes economic networks can also generate new incentives for conflict, as they do in countries with natural resources that are valuable on the international market, such as drugs, diamonds, and oil. Groups profit from the sale of these resources, sales that are only possible given the conditions of conflict. These groups benefit from continuation of the conflict, so they do not actively seek to end it, and in some cases, may hinder settlements. In some paradoxical cases, though, dividing the spoils of illegal activity may make a settlement possible, and international efforts to stop the illegal activity may make settlement more difficult.

Comparative research on these processes should also draw on past research on the international arms trade, humanitarian aid, and to some extent the role of diaspora elements in identity conflicts. Research projects may help identify how and from where violent identity groups gain access to economic resources. This research should focus on how violent identity groups develop the economic networks that support them; whether these networks provide resources for the conflict or produce a new incentive for conflict; and the comparison of how different types of economic networks, for example, networks supporting the sale of drugs or diamonds, develop in different regions.

Other research questions are raised by the problem of how to disable economic networks that support violent identity conflict in order to increase the possibilities of peace. Research on this problem might include studies of the effects of economic sanctions, monetary measures (such as freezing accounts), international diplomacy, and the creation of alternative economic opportunities on the viability of illicit markets and the support for peace and normal venues for economic production and profit.

All these research questions have been addressed to some degree in the literature on conflict, and especially by studies conducted by the World Bank and the International Peace Academy. However, these studies have focused primarily on Africa. Thus, a comparative study that includes cases from the former Soviet space would provide a broader base of knowledge for comparing cases and building theories about effective conflict management strategies.

Conditions Favoring the Rise and Fall of the Entrepreneurs of Identity Violence

Because of the expressed interest in this topic by the working group on collective violence, this working group did not prepare a separate description of the research agenda. The working group on comparative study of identity and conflicts endorses this research emphasis and refers readers to the report of the working group on collective violence.

The Problem of Similar Contexts Generating Violence in Some Identity Groups but Not Others

Ethnic conflicts are the result of a complex interplay of factors. Comparative research is recommended to attend to, in particular, the effects of three types of variables on the likelihood that identity conflicts become or remain violent: (1) major societal characteristics and transformations, (2) cultural/value-based factors, and (3) the behavior of elites and leaders.

The societal factors may include the conflicting parties' differing social interests and their being part of a particular type of society, such as traditional or industrial. The important transformations may involve modernization, revolution, national revival effects associated with disintegration of a traditional society, national liberation movements, and the transition from the view of society as a melting pot to the image of a salad. Research would examine the roles of such social factors and transformations in countries where there has been violence and where there has been long-term peaceful coexistence and interaction of different identity groups despite differences in development or despite major social crises.

Violence may also depend on major differences in cultural values between identity groups. A desire among members of one group to protect its values from imaginary or real threats posed by a different culture or system of values can intensify antagonisms between identity groups to the point of violent conflict, especially in a social crisis. Research should track the relationship over time between claims of threats to an identity group's values and the extent to which it engages in violent collective action.

Both the genesis and the resolution of violence between identity groups may also depend on the actions of cultural and political leaders, who interpret their groups' values and define their courses of social and political action. Leaders' actions may also depend on personal factors such as a leader's personal charisma, political and organizational skills, and so forth. It is worthwhile for comparative studies to consider the activities and personal characteristics of the leaders of identity groups in studies of whether the groups use violence to pursue collective goals.

Detailed Analysis of Instructive Cases

There is a place for detailed case comparison of places and identity groups that may be particularly instructive both in itself and for the development of theory and understanding. Of particular interest are comparisons of similar ethnic groups in the same region who differ strongly in their use of violence to pursue collective goals. A good example is the comparison of the Chechens with the Ingush, who also form part of the Vainakh group, but who have never risen against the Russian authorities. These groups are also different in levels of involvement in criminal activities, among other things. Such divergences deserve special attention to investigate whether they can be accounted for by cultural differences as is sometimes hypothesized, or by other factors. Other instructive comparisons in the North Caucasus region would include Dagestan, which stands out from other parts of the North Caucasus because the balance among the ethnic groups has long been maintained without much violence through a variety of traditional mechanisms.

IMPORTANCE OF A MULTIMETHOD APPROACH

The authors accept the position increasingly being taken by researchers on identity conflicts that statistical analysis and case study research traditions have complementary strengths and limitations and that understanding of these conflicts will best be advanced through multimethod work or work that builds on the findings produced by different methods.

The primary advantages of statistical methods include the ability to carry out partial correlation analysis and its equivalents, which allow for quantitative estimation of causal weights and other causal relationships; the ability to analyze the representativeness or frequency of subsets of the data collected; and the high degree of replicability of studies using the same database. Limitations of statistical methods include a lack of accepted procedures for identifying new variables, difficulties dealing with path dependencies and complex causality, problems in devising conceptually valid operationalizations of qualitative variables, and difficulties in

providing or testing historical explanations of individual cases. Some of these limitations may be inherent in statistical methods, while others may involve trade-offs that could ease somewhat with the development or more effective use of more sophisticated statistical techniques. Notably, this listing of advantages and limitations is almost the converse of those of case study methods, which are poor at partial correlations and measures of frequency but good at identifying new variables, dealing with complex causal relations, and providing and testing historical explanations.

The increasingly evident complementarity of case studies, statistical methods, and formal models is likely to lead toward more collaborative work by scholars using these different approaches. The recent interest among rational choice theorists in using case studies to test their theories, for example, is an important step in this direction. More generally, there are a variety of ways in which the methods can be used together, either in a single study or sequentially.

- Statistical analysis might identify outliers or deviant cases, and case studies can investigate why these cases are deviant.
- Statistical studies might identify strong patterns that can then be used to structure the study of individual cases.
- Case studies can explore the possible causal mechanisms behind the correlations or patterns observed in statistical studies and provide a check on spurious inferences.
- Statistical studies can assess the general applicability of causal mechanisms uncovered by case studies.
- A proposed formal model can be tested in a case study to see if its hypothesized causal mechanisms were in fact in operation.
- A case study can inductively identify a theory that can then be formalized in a model.

Because case studies, statistical methods, and formal modeling have all become increasingly sophisticated, it is becoming less likely that a single researcher can be adept at more than one set of methods while also attaining a cutting-edge theoretical and empirical knowledge of a substantive field. Successful collaboration is therefore likely to take the form of several researchers working together using different methods, or of researchers more self-consciously building on the findings generated by those using different methods. In either form, effective collaboration requires that even as they become expert in one methodological approach, scholars also become conversant with alternative approaches, aware of their strengths and limitations, and capable of an informed reading of their substantive results.

The working group therefore encourages multimethod collaboration among Russian and American researchers on comparative studies of identity conflicts. Russian and American scholars with knowledge of statistical techniques and databases might collaborate with their colleagues who have knowledge of particular cases and formal models to do the following:

- identify statistical correlations that have unclear causal mechanisms and that might be usefully explored through case studies
- identify case study findings and new variables that might be tested statistically
- work to agree on valid, operationalizable measures of key variables that can be collected into data sets
- build upon the lessons learned from the American “Correlates of War” project and similar large-scale quantitative analyses of violence to produce valid and cumulative findings.

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The State of the Art in Understanding Violence

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This paper attempts to analyze existing theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of violence and illustrate their applicability or limitations in explaining post-Soviet era conflicts. More importantly, I will attempt to introduce a more complex view of this research topic, where no holistic theory will be able to explain the phenomenon in its entirety, possibly because too many different societal events have been erroneously labeled under the general category of violence.

We are primarily interested in political violence, especially in its group and militant manifestations. This type of violence is currently of the greatest concern to present day society and specialists. One reason for this heightened interest lies in the fact that the twentieth century was marked by an unprecedented increase in killings motivated by racial, class, ethnic, and religious differences. Perhaps no sociopolitical movement, even those pursuing the most admirable goals, has ever escaped what French philosopher Michel Foucault called the "paradox of hegemonistic consequences of liberation movements." In fact, among modern political movements, those aimed at various sorts of self-determination are the most likely to use violent struggle to achieve their goals. The struggle not only takes on a prolonged character, but also develops its own set of subjects and creates its own mitigating arguments. "In search of moral justification, violence turns death into ritualistic sacrifice, transforming suffering into proof. With death becoming a measure of one's commitment to a noble cause, victims themselves become accomplices, as long as they view it as some historic necessity. This is one way political violence tries to gain

legitimacy,"¹ writes David Apter in his introduction to a collaborative research study of modern political violence.

We would like to draw your attention to the possibility of using socio-cultural anthropology to explain violence and its legitimization as a phenomenon of human culture. However, we are interested in collective violence as more than merely the sum of individual deviant acts, as discussed in our earlier works.² The anthropology of modern violence includes a number of issues as complex and difficult to understand as the most complex murder rituals of the past. To date, few studies have been done on the modern ethnography and the choreography of violence. It is sufficient to point out the television-style display of violence and death employed by Chechen militants in executing their victims. The events of September 11 in New York and Washington were planned with an eye to their spectacular visual impact value.

Compared to an individual act of violence, political (collective) violence cannot exist outside of some form of discourse. In order to plan and commit a violent act, people must first verbalize it. Covert meetings only add significance to this statement. Promulgated in political platforms or religious preaching, the violent message becomes inflammatory in nature. It manifests itself in proclamations, works of literature, and even academic lectures. In short, violence involves people, who in turn put their intellectual abilities to work for the cause. "Therefore, political violence doesn't have a purely interpretive nature. It employs intellects reaching beyond the scope of ordinary. Violence makes people forget who they are."³ Involving large numbers of people, both perpetrators and victims, violence gains its own momentum where various arguments made by its participants and coparticipants (including scientists) gain a completely different perspective from the victims or those on whose behalf the actions were committed. It is this cultural dynamic that appears to be the most interesting.

Anthropologists have traditionally viewed violence as one of the characteristics of the primitive or uncivilized societies or as a manifestation of asocial, deviant human behavior. Scientists have attempted to define rules and laws governing the existence and manifestation of violence as an element of human culture. Classical anthropology treats violence as a certain social function. Despite their seemingly divisive nature, this func-

¹Apter D. E., ed. 1997. *The Legitimization of Violence*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 1-2.

²See Tishkov, V. A. 1995. "Don't Kill Me, I'm a Kyrgyz!": An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 32(2):133-149.

³Apter, D. E. Op. cit., p. 2.

tional approach treats skirmishes and intertribal wars as a unifying function that creates common norms and expectations.⁴ Violence is often interpreted as a given in human life in society, and as such, society must be capable of controlling and suppressing it. This approach lies at the foundation of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis, Emile Durkheim's sociology, and Morselle Moss's anthropology (giving gifts as a means of avoiding war). In fact, the social realities of violence represent one of the foundations of the concept of the state as a monopolist of legitimate violence.

A more essentialist approach to violence is shared by sociobiologists, who link violence to the genetic nature of humankind. For example, based on ethological studies of violence among animals, some authors have concluded that humans have also inherited some sort of internal aggressive drive. Although humans lack the biologically uncontrollable mechanisms of aggression present in other living beings, it is this innate aggressive drive that is responsible for weapons development and wars.

Modern science has almost unconditionally refuted this theory, although the sociobiological school of thought still exists in a more refined form. American anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon's classic ethnographic documentary film and accompanying description of the Yanomamo tribe was based on this approach. His work sparked fierce debates among specialists, especially Chagnon's conclusion that reproductive factors are the key to understanding tribal violence, since males who killed tended to have more wives and children than the non-killing men.⁵ Marshall Sahlins conclusively proved that this theory failed to describe the link between reproduction and violence and failed to offer any insights for understanding specific forms of violence.⁶

Modern science has rejected any attempts to explain human violence in terms of biological parameters. This is especially true when treating collective violence as a common characteristic of human nature.⁷ As one scholar has pointed out, "history and comparative anthropology illustrate that people go to war not to satisfy some instinct, but because at some point their interests come into collision with the interests of others.

⁴For a classical example of this interpretation, see Gluckman, M. 1956. *Custom and Conflict in Africa*. Oxford: Blackwell.

⁵Chagnon, N. A. 1968. *Yanomamo: The Fierce People*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. For discussion, see Chagnon N. A. 1988. Life histories, blood revenge, and warfare in a tribal population. *Science* 239:985-992. Lizot, J. 1994. On warfare: an answer to N.A. Chagnon. *American Ethnologist* 21:841-858.

⁶Sahlins, M. 1976. *The Use and Abuse of Biology*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

⁷Hinde, R. A. 1988. *Aggression: Integrating Ethnology and the Social Sciences*. *Medicine and War*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

The definition, nature, and relative value of such interests are usually determined by cultural factors."⁸

Another prominent trend among anthropological schools was the ecological approach, which attempts to link conditions of human societies with natural resources and their availability. For example, based on his research in New Guinea, the prominent American anthropologist Roy Rappaport suggested that demographic pressures result in conflicts, which serve as a tool for redistributing the population in habitable areas.⁹ Later, Russian researcher Anatoly N. Yamskov attempted to apply the works of Rappaport to an analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, this highly ideological and artificially manipulated conflict can hardly be attributed to rivalry over resources or other natural factors alone, especially given the violent actions of the rank-and-file combatants and the deviousness of the elite.

Supporters of the sociobiological and ecological approaches have been engaged in a long-standing debate, particularly with regard to the causes of tribal wars in the Amazon. However, no consensus has been reached. One fruitful outcome of these debates has been a number of ethnographic studies of peaceful communities as another form of natural existence.¹⁰

Collective violence and especially wars were studied extensively within the context of the early stages of formation of state and central political systems. In general, it is accepted that violence served almost as a midwife for early states, even in relatively recent history. However, several researchers have justifiably argued that it is far more difficult to accept the notion of violence ensuring the stability of nation-states in the modern world.¹¹

Among other general conclusions, I would like to mention the idea that the nature of violence is primarily collectivist rather than individualist, that violence is a social rather than an asocial or antisocial phenomenon, and that it is constructed and interpreted within a given culture. These statements have been illustrated by a number of scholars who have conducted field research among extremists in Northern Ireland; victims

⁸Koch, K. F. 1974. *The Anthropology of Warfare*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, p. 55.

⁹Rappaport, R. 1967. *Pigs for the Ancestors*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

¹⁰Howell, S., and R. Willis, eds. 1989. *Societies at Peace: Anthropological Perspective*. London: Routledge.

¹¹Turner, P. R., and A. D. Pitt, eds. 1989. *The Anthropology of War and Peace: Perspectives on the Nuclear Age*. Granby, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey. Foster, M. L., and R. A. Rubinstein, eds. 1986. *Peace and War: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books.

of religious conflicts in India; and war victims in Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, and other countries.¹²

Modern approaches have made it possible to look at violence much more comprehensively and to break down this wide-ranging phenomenon into several important components. The first is the cultural conditioning of the norms and definition of violence. Different societies under different sets of circumstances define this phenomenon differently. What unmistakably constitutes violence in one culture could be a completely tolerable and even welcomed norm of behavior in another. Second, violence manifests itself in two different spheres: one pertains to bodily harm and even death, while the second is defined as symbolic violence. Finally, some anthropologists have pointed out the existence of two types of social behavior related to two different concepts of personality. One of these types involves the world of human politics and wars created and supported through ritualistic acts requiring individuals and societies to display violence.¹³

Overall, theoretical models of violence are very underdeveloped, which in turn results in much fruitless debate over the theory of war and conflicts. As Simon Harrison points out in the *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, “an adequate theory of war has to await the emergence of a theoretical understanding of the more global problem of violence, which is so far not well developed in anthropological science.”¹⁴

I believe that in order to understand and explain violence we don't need a metatheory—instead this goal will be better achieved by conducting ethnographic studies of different cultural (social) environments producing behavior that we currently classify as violent. This approach enables us to answer the question regarding the reasons for some regions of the former Soviet Union suffering from large scale conflicts, even full blown wars as in Chechnya, while others in similar situations (having great numbers of refugees and displaced persons, suffering from economic crisis, and populated by a number of ethnic groups) enjoy relative peace.

Otherwise, we will have to employ simplistic approaches to explaining violence in Chechnya and violence against Chechnya, approaches

¹²Feldman, A. 1991. *Formation of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Das, V., ed. 1990. *Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots, and Survivors in South Asia*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

¹³See Harrison, S. 1993. *The Mask of War: Violence, Ritual, and the Self in Melanesia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

¹⁴Harrison, S. 1996. War, warfare. P. 562 in *The Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, A. Barnard and J. Spencer, eds. London: Routledge.

that are plentiful both in academic work and in the media. In other words, the key to understanding violence and conflict is *the concept of a context*, which results from the recognition of the primary role of the specific social situation in the interpretation of the human behavior and institutions. The key point is an examination of human responses to common existential problems under different social conditions. Only by accepting the diverse spectrum of human abilities and restrictions under a given social situation will we be able to concentrate our efforts on studying specific manifestations of violence in different societies.

What prolongs violence? What makes it renewable (or cyclical)? There are several answers to these questions, proving once again the discretionary nature of this phenomenon, and therefore the need for discretionary analysis. Certainly, there are several factors attributable to the hard reality rather than discourse. Conflict itself can generate not only front lines but also other physical divisions capable of ending violence. Among those are the borders of newly established political entities separating hostile parties (as happened in Yugoslavia). Externally imposed green lines can also serve this purpose, as in Cyprus. A concrete wall with barbed wire was erected in Belfast to separate militant factions. A mud wall with barbed wire was installed at the border between Chechnya and neighboring Stavropol Krai. My observations of these physical dividers resulted in the conclusion that violence cannot be stopped this way. Violence can be suppressed, but it is never completely removed from discourse, and therefore remains ready to resurface. I conclude that peace and violence, as well as transition from one stage to another, are parts of a certain discourse, without which none of these three factors can exist, let alone interact. Without discussing conflict or trying to explain it, just as without the first violent utterings of the conflict, conflict and physical violence are simply impossible. However, sporadic violence and separate violent acts can still take place.¹⁵

The next stage of collective violence analysis is to determine whether stopping verbal violence can eliminate or reduce political violence and prevent direct (physical) acts. Also, does the cessation of direct violence mean de-escalation of political violence? Or are there no laws governing the transformation of violence from one form into another? The latter appears to be important in light of the 1999 reopening of hostilities in Chechnya.

Words can be very important components of violence. Armed conflict in Chechnya started with its legitimization through verbal expressions

¹⁵On sporadic, riot-type violence see: Horowitz, D. L. 2001. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

and introduction of such slogans as *national revolution* and *national self-determination*, as well as statements about *nation-killing* and Russian *imperial domination*. Some works by Chechen authors, numerous publications by local and Moscow historians, nationalist brochures from other parts of the former USSR portraying a heroic Chechen history and calling for correcting past injustices, contributed to the outbreak of violence. Scientific conferences devoted to the prominent leaders of the *liberation movement* aired not only mythical versions of the past (replacing the heavily censored version of the Soviet era), but direct appeals to *complete the mission of liberation*.¹⁶

It is important to determine at what point all these words were transformed into bullets, that is, direct violence, although the link between verbal and direct violence is rather peculiar. As a rule, those who put forward these appeals or develop moral or ideological justification rarely fight themselves. Fighters are recruited from different groups. Most often they are recruited among young males in rural areas or on urban margins. That is the situation with numerous jihads, liberation movements, revolutions, and other collectively violent movements. Different players, often changing the very nature of these appeals, will relay academic and other appeals. With the escalation of violence, initial slogans are not only transformed beyond recognition, they quite often are simply forgotten.

¹⁶Academic prescriptions and political fantasies on the part of internal and external actors during the Chechen crisis have been analyzed in the author's book: Tishkov, V. A. 2001. *The War-Torn Society: Ethnography of the Chechen War*. Moscow: Nauka.

Priority Themes for Research on Collective Violence

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While it is true that all acts of collective violence share several things in common (they all involve the intentional exercise of physical force by two or more persons with the aim of inflicting injury on other persons or causing damage to property), the range of acts that fall under the rubric of collective violence is quite capacious. Collective violence assumes such disparate forms as terrorist activity, brawls, pogroms, riots, communal violence, vigilante violence, forced expulsions, insurrections, civil wars, revolutions, and genocides; at times, it has been defined to include state-sponsored terror and interstate warfare as well. Significant and largely separate literatures exist on all these subjects, and several generations of research on these topics has produced agreement within the scholarly community that no single explanation for collective violence is possible.

Moreover, the “collectives” involved in the perpetration of collective violence vary significantly—small networks or organizations of individuals, less formally organized crowds and gatherings, loosely connected paramilitaries, armies with varying degrees of discipline, and government bureaucracies. Some acts are perpetrated by members of dominant groups or the state against members of subordinate groups; others by members of subordinate groups against members of dominant groups or the state; still others involve two groups of perpetrators seeking to inflict damage on each other. In addition to the variety of forms and actors involved, there are problems of explanation that emerge out of the varied scope and severity of collective violence. Collective violence can constitute a relatively brief event embedded within a larger chain of social

interaction (such as typically occurs in a pogrom or terrorist activity) or a sustained series of violent acts that concatenate over a protracted period of time (as in civil war or genocide). Moreover, the severity of the violence involved in these acts differs significantly from one case to the next, extending from minor property damage to thousands and even millions of lives. All of these issues beg serious attention and qualification from the researcher.

To complicate matters further, in the study of interethnic collective violence more specifically, collective violence has tended to remain underspecified as an object of explanation; it has often been folded into the larger and more vague category “interethnic conflict” and thereby left undefined—in its specific forms and in distinguishing it from other potential outcomes (that is, nonviolent modes of conflict, diffuse social violence, and the like). Situations have often been coded dichotomously (conflict/no conflict), and many scholars have viewed collective violence “as a *degree* of conflict, rather than as a *form* of conflict” (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 425). This has unfortunately served to cut the study of interethnic violence off from the study of other social processes that remain closely connected to it.

Until the last decade the study of collective violence and the study of ethnic conflict remained largely unconnected; generic theories of collective violence tended to ignore ethnicity or to subsume it within larger analytical categories of collective violence, assuming that there is nothing about the relationship between ethnicity and collective violence that would distinguish it from collective violence over other types of issues. At the same time, scholars focusing on ethnic conflict have tended to assume that interethnic violence flowed logically out of the intensity of cultural allegiance, and that these emotional attachments constituted the single, cohesive set of motivations for those perpetrating acts of violence. Evidence of other motivations (personal rivalries, revenge, power, and in some cases, respectability) has been too easily overlooked.

What, then, can we identify as promising in terms of future research directions for collaboration, given the theoretical Babel, empirical complexity, and analytical muddle that we face in studying collective violence in multiethnic societies? We see a series of questions and themes that merit abiding or greater attention in the future and would therefore make promising topics for potential collaboration.

THE ONSET, DURATION, AND TERMINATION OF SUSTAINED VIOLENT CONFLICT

The theoretical and empirical research on civil war onset, duration, and termination is presently booming. Several groups of scholars have

produced datasets covering the universe of cases of civil wars; these studies typically attempt to identify the correlates of civil war in a way that parallels the large sample study of interstate wars.

Macro-level cross-national studies have so far produced a number of sometimes divergent results. There is one interesting and important result upon which they converge—*popular grievances* (coded in a variety of ways) appear to be a bad predictor of the onset of civil wars. Because most descriptive work on civil war onset focuses on cases where civil wars did erupt, they tend to endow grievances (repression, among others) with a causal force that disappears when the selection bias is corrected for. Insofar as nationalism is part of the popular grievances, this finding undermines much conventional wisdom about the causes of civil war; the same is true for *ethnic antipathy* and other culturally derived hypotheses. Instead, opportunity costs of violence seem to play a more important role; the presence of difficult or rough terrain increases the likelihood of a rebellion, as does the presence of lootable resources, that is, high value, easily transportable goods. Diffusion and contagion effects have also been identified as potential culprits, but the available evidence so far fails to support this hypothesis. Last, regime type and ethnic fragmentation have been included in a number of studies, for which the results are curvilinear: Democracies and autocracies are more likely to avoid civil wars, as are highly fragmented and nonfragmented polities.

A different line of macro-inquiry associates ethnic networks with civil wars—because they can solve collective action problems and facilitate mobilization, such networks make civil wars more likely. However, important methodological problems undermine the empirical testing of this hypothesis. Furthermore, with one notable exception, we lack work that systematically traces and identifies differences and similarities between ethnic and nonethnic civil wars.

The central problem of macro-level studies is the general lack of microfoundations. Some studies do identify a number of micro-level mechanisms. Three promising lines of inquiry in this respect may be (1) economic theories of criminal behavior (pointing to informational asymmetries and other communication failures that lead to civil wars); (2) the ethnic security dilemma that may facilitate the mobilization of individuals by politicians; and (3) constraints to policing and the use of indiscriminate reprisals by incumbents that amplify small rebellions into full-fledged insurgencies.

Recent large sample studies also address the duration of civil wars, and their termination and recurrence, starting from the empirical observation that negotiated settlements tend to be less common in civil as opposed to interstate wars. This appears to be the case not necessarily because of indivisible stakes, irreconcilable differences, or high cost toler-

ances but because of the impossibility of the warring parties making credible commitments. Last, some studies have begun to look at third-party intervention and postwar settlements, particularly peacekeeping, peacemaking, and partition (and find that they do not guarantee peace).

The most promising line of inquiry in this area lies in the specification of better micro-mechanisms, as well as *process-tracing* case studies that take into account the large sample findings. In this respect, collaborative small sample studies that are carefully designed to take into account and test large sample findings hold particular promise. Collaborative research can also contribute to the design and implementation of systematic studies that rely on subnational units of analysis, such as villages, municipalities, counties, and so forth; such studies combine a large number of observations with stronger controls and allow for careful tracing of causal mechanisms.

PARTICIPATION IN INTERMITTENT FORMS OF MOBILIZED INTERETHNIC VIOLENCE

Much interethnic collective violence is intermittent and irregular in character, bursting out in intense but short episodes that may or may not lead to more sustained violent conflict. Indeed, in most societies at most times, strong taboos and institutional constraints of varying degrees of effectiveness exist against participation by individuals in acts of violence and even more so, in acts of collective violence. Yet, in most pogroms, ethnic riots, or other instances of intermittent acts of mobilized collective interethnic violence, violence enjoys substantial public support within specific micro-contexts and involves significant participation by societal members in these acts (though usually direct participation is confined to a minority of community members). Thus, an important part of the explanation of intermittent, mobilized forms of interethnic collective violence (such as pogroms, riots, and communal violence) is an understanding of how norms of interethnic peace and institutional constraints are set aside, and what cultural, social, or political circumstances might cause ordinary individuals to commit what in normal times would be, for most people, unthinkable acts.

Here, research during the last decade has taken a number of different directions. Rational choice scholars have modeled how expectations of reasonable behavior by others can suddenly collapse, tipping toward spirals of mistrust and transforming violence into a seemingly rational outcome. Others have focused on the role of the media in shaping the perceptions of individuals in ways conducive to mobilizing them into violent action against others, contending that the propagandistic manipulation of populations by media oriented toward ethnically segmented markets is

critical in setting off violence. Recent research has also linked ethnic riots with the absence of associational interaction across ethnic lines (*social capital*) and with the structure of electoral incentives of elites in the context of democratic regimes. Still others have focused on how norms of interethnic peace are policed and maintained, concentrating on the within-group enforcement mechanisms that sustain norms and keep spoilers of interethnic peace marginalized or on the ways in which government agents themselves have signaled acquiescence to or support of the use of violence, thereby encouraging an atmosphere of license and abuse. Finally, others have focused attention on narratives of violence—both the ways in which these are constructed and their contributory role to a larger discourse of metaconflict that itself becomes contributory to further violence.

Collaborative research could contribute to our further understanding of these phenomena in a number of respects. First, even within existing strands of research there has been a serious information problem that collaborative research could help address. Most of what we know about acts of mobilized interethnic violence comes from the testimonies of victims or witnesses, not from the perpetrators whose behavior we seek to explain (for an important exception, see Tishkov, 1995). This is problematic for trying to understand how individuals come to be drawn into acts of violence, for it can only address the issue of motivation indirectly, through the eyes of others. There is a particular need to bring to bear new types of individual-level evidence drawn from the testimony of perpetrators, such as police depositions or court testimony, triangulating these with other information drawn from victims or eyewitnesses. This would allow us to have a better understanding of the disparate motivations underlying participation in mobilized interethnic violence, and how these disparate motives become focused and mobilized within the context of violent action itself.

Second, like acts of nonviolent collective action, most acts of violent collective action depend upon networks of friends, coworkers, and acquaintances for mobilizing individuals. In contrast to other forms of collective action, however, we know relatively little about the networks that underlie pogroms and riots and the process by which participants are identified and mobilized. Collaborative research could make a major contribution to our understanding of interethnic collective violence by focusing its attention on these networks and how they compare with other types of collective action networks.

Third, a fruitful focus for potential collaborative research are those formal and informal mechanisms of ethnic in-group policing that can restrain violent entrepreneurs within a situation of rising tension and that uphold norms of interethnic peace. Most work has tended to concentrate

on those cases in which violence has occurred rather than engaging the counterfactuals of violence, that is, where violence might have occurred but did not. But an examination of the mechanisms that have prevented potential violence from materializing in instances in which the threat of violence was real would have significance not only from a theoretical viewpoint but also from a practical one.

Finally, by breaking down intermittent waves of collective violence into specific events, large sample event studies can help us understand the dynamics by which violence spreads (or fails to spread) temporally and across geographic locations. Here, the challenge has been less the measuring of events themselves than of relevant and meaningful independent variables that might be useful as explanatory variables. Access to better quality information concerning the local contexts in which violence occurs or fails to occur could produce more fine-grained and accurate quantitative models of the spread or containment of waves of intermittent mobilized violence. Media and demographic sources are simply insufficient here, and access to police records would seem to be of critical value, both by furthering our systematic knowledge of the factors shaping the patterning of violent collective action and by providing qualitative insights into what occurs specifically within the event to turn the unimaginables of violence into the thinkable.

TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES

An increasingly important dimension of collective violence in the United States and the Russian Federation is the transnationalization of violence. In a number of cases, violence-producing networks cross state boundaries, connecting with violent entrepreneurs in third-party states, or at times even receiving support and inspiration from third-party states. Ethnic diasporas that cross state boundaries increasingly play a role in the production and prevention of interethnic violence. Some indeed argue that the issues raised by the treatment of ethnic diasporas abroad have grown central to the dynamics of interethnic violence in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In certain regions of the world (the Great Lakes region of Africa, for instance) violence has spread across state boundaries with relative rapidity. In the post-Soviet region this has been less true (despite the expectations of some to the contrary), though reasons have yet to be fully explored.

Moreover, international organizations have made the prevention and settlement of interethnic violence, the sanctity of boundaries, and human rights major directions of activity and criteria by which to judge the provision of aid or membership. Many transnational nongovernmental orga-

nizations (NGOs) also work in the area of violence prevention and monitoring.

Thus, in many respects, collective violence is no longer a phenomenon of a single political order; it has grown increasingly transnationalized in character. Research on collective violence, however, has been slow to recognize this fact. While some work has focused on the role of international organizations in regulating (or in some cases, condoning) interethnic violence, relatively few works have focused specifically on the transnational spread of violence or on transnational networks of violent entrepreneurs. Any of these themes would make excellent topics for collaborative research.

RITUALIZED INTERETHNIC VIOLENCE

Anthropologists and historians have stressed the discursive, symbolic, and ritualistic aspects of violence. There are two ways to approach ritualized interethnic violence: The first way is to “thickly” describe it; the second way is to attempt to define and measure it, compare it to non-ritualized violence, and explain how it is linked to the larger phenomenon of collective violence. Following the latter course, it is possible to introduce a distinction between instrumental and expressive violence. Expressive violence is not intended to be a means of accomplishing any other goal beyond the satisfaction of emotions associated with its use. Although expressive violence is often used to mean identity or sectarian violence—that is, violence directed against persons on the basis of who they are and not what they did or are expected to do—this association is incorrect: Sectarian violence can be, and often is, instrumental.

A source of confusion in distinguishing between expressive and instrumental motivations is the following: Arguments referring to the expressive and symbolic aspects of violence claim, implicitly more often than explicitly, that they are explaining the motivations of *collective* actors when in fact they only describe the way in which particular *individuals* participate in violence. However, the fact that violence may follow a particular ritual does not necessarily imply that it is expressive. There is little doubt that individual motivations behind acts of violence can be and often are expressive. Sociological research on criminal violence has also pointed to expressive motivations. However, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to uncover with an acceptable level of accuracy individual motives behind violent acts. Deducing motive from behavior is fraught with methodological problems. Motives are typically subject to (either strategic or unself-conscious) reinterpretation and ex post rationalization by the subjects themselves, and they can be highly fluid and mixed. Moreover, the little available empirical evidence suggests that expressive moti-

vations may be less widespread than we think. Insofar as expressive motivations of violence reflect extreme personality features, such as sadism, the available empirical evidence suggests that people involved in the production of political violence, such as terrorists or leaders of political gangs, lack those features. Last, acts of violence can be performed in highly symbolic ways, yet still be instrumental. In short, it is problematic to explain social phenomena by reference to their manifestation among the states of individual consciousness rather than the social facts preceding them. A solution to this problem is to clearly define the level of analysis (individual or collective).

Fruitful collaborative research on the ritualized dimensions of collective violence could potentially focus on a number of themes: collective violence as a type of performance, with attention specifically to the relationship between performers and audience in various contexts; the role of collective violence in the creation and maintenance of ethnic identity boundaries; and how rituals of collective violence are created and reproduced.

POLITICAL LEADERS, ENTREPRENEURS, AND SPECIALISTS IN VIOLENCE

The first step is to specify the level of analysis. *Elite* and *political leaders* are overaggregate concepts that may include everything from the president of a country down to local actors.

National elites are central in theories of civil war that point to the security dilemma. The key idea is that political elites that are losing power have an incentive to shift political competition from the dimension where they are losing (class, regional, or other) to the ethnic dimension. This argument is incomplete, insofar as it assumes that individuals (a) find this shift credible and (b) engage in violence. Thus, the necessity of disaggregation.

We generally know little about political actors such as militias, paramilitary groups, insurgent organizations, and the like. In many cases these people have had connections to criminal groups, raising issues concerning the motivations of those directing violence. We need systematic answers to such questions as who are violent entrepreneurs, what are their goals, what kind of resources do they have, what are their relations vis-à-vis the underlying population. This is an extremely promising opening for theoretically informed and well-designed ground-level studies that could greatly benefit from collaboration.

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Violence in Ethnonational Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space*

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All violent conflicts, especially ethnically motivated ones, involve the interaction of two or more sides that are incapable (because of unwillingness or lack of readiness) of finding nonviolent means of resolving their problem. Violence in ethnic conflicts can be extremely diverse in nature and have a wide variety of social meanings for the participants themselves: It can be an instrumental, targeted action; take on demonstrative-terrorizing forms; or represent purely affective behavior. In some cases, however, it can even have self-sufficient significance. But for the researcher oriented toward seeking sociopolitical means for resolving conflicts, violence appears in only one form: the absence of consciousness of an involved party regarding resources and means for peacefully resolving conflicted relations or contradictory interests, or else a rejection of these resources and means for various reasons unconnected with the very nature of the conflict. In any case, violence entails a retreat to the past experience of a national or ethnic group (including the experience of imperial expansion or archaic layers of ethnic culture).

In this regard, both sides are responsible for the outbreak and development of a conflict. There is no single unified explanation for the phenomena by which violence erupts in ethnic conflicts. The task of the researcher lies in the need for typologically differentiating their structures and consequences. The common feature of these conflicts in all instances

*Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins.

is found in the collisions of activated ethnotraditional structures that are semiarchaic (or have been or are becoming archaic) with formalistic, modernizing, state-oriented ways of regulating relations that pretend to be formally universal, that is, ignoring the particular characteristics and problems of ethnic minorities. If we look at where (within the boundaries of the former USSR) ethnonational conflicts have arisen involving massive violence, human casualties, bloodshed, and disorders, we see that they occur in zones of incomplete modernization. These zones are characterized either by the violent maintenance of imperial structures and relations or by the establishment of new ethnocratic relations within territories having ethnically heterogeneous populations: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan (Fergana, Osh), Azerbaijan and Armenia (Sumgait, Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku), Moldova (Transdnier), Tajikistan, Russia (Chechnya, North Ossetia-Alania, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Tuva, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria), Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Tbilisi), Ukraine (Crimea), and Lithuania (Vilnius).

Any *violent* conflict on the territory of the former USSR represents a degradational development of socioinstitutional relations, a shift from more complex and differentiated levels of regulation to less complex and more primitive types of social organization. This means that for certain local and situational reasons, failures are occurring in the operation of previously established institutional (administrative, legal, customary) forms of maintaining social order that arose in the Soviet period or have changed little in recent years.

The fundamental principles of ethnonational collisions are based on the unreformed lingering heritage of the Soviet empire, which creates a mass of problems that remain unresolved at the state or political levels. This issue primarily concerns the very structure of unequal and hierarchical ethnonational relations, which formed in the totalitarian society and were maintained not only by repression but also by the then-existing system of economic relations characterized by planned distributions, personnel assignments and transfers, social mobility, and so forth. The Soviet system facilitated processes of modernization in ethnonational regions, which as a rule were located on the periphery of territories with predominantly Russian-speaking populations. The system also stimulated, often by rather crude and violent means, the transformation of many ethnic communities that previously lacked statehood or maintained semitraditional lifestyles and organizational forms into some semblance of a modern industrial society. Modernization in these regions preserved all features of violent russification and ethnocracy (if the issue concerned enclaves of ethnic minorities within other ethnic groups). Therefore, it must be recognized that conflicts within communities that are forming and affirming themselves since the fall of the Soviet system largely main-

tain the repressive character and nature of the Soviet system, which had no legal or conventional mechanisms for regulating tensions and contradictions that arose. The practices of totalitarian society did not include actions by institutions capable of resolving conflicts involving ethnonational interests, such as special judicial bodies (there was no appropriate legislation or legal precedent); special political representative bodies; or elements of civil society such as associations, political clubs, conferences, and so forth. There was also a lack of the appropriate conflict resolution experience. Therefore, the universal arming of the population became common in zones of ethnic tension, while violence, especially involving ethnic paramilitary units, often provided participants with the most effective means of resolving problematic situations.

In this sense, the very nature of state power (even in its negative form—its weakness or absence) and the forms in which it is organized represent the most important factors determining the outbreak and further development of conflict. In places where there are no guarantees of social order and no possibilities of protection for the weak, the state is already seen not as a universal, political-legal, supra-ethnic structure but only as an ethnic power, an ethnocratic organization of one ethnic community against another. This conclusion also remains significant with regard to the federal authorities, when state-institutional violence (the participation of Russian military and police structures) against ethnic separatists or new national or ethnoreligious movements is perceived by the weaker side as a manifestation of Russian imperialism. In such cases, the very problem of statehood, social order, and the law (not in the ordinary sense of ethnic and traditional order as understood in such cases, but rather in the formalistic sense) becomes something alien, granted from outside by the stronger side (as a rule, either ethnocratic structures of the republic government or organs of federal power—“Russians”).

Severe violent conflicts do not arise in places where the following are true:

- The stronger side imposes the rules of the game and has sufficient power to force its opponents to comply.
- Other types of behavior are possible, for example, migration.
- There is no critical mass of participants or special interests in favor of continuing the conflict.
- The presence and capabilities of the federal government are sufficient to suppress the most radical organizations and movements.

Of fundamental importance in determining how the conflict develops is the presence of an educated and therefore more moderate ethnic or national elite. As a rule, this group was the former Soviet (in its genesis

and characteristics) bureaucracy, the ethnic nomenklatura, and the intelligentsia, which with the weakening or withdrawal of the former authorities replaced the previous centrally appointed cadres who were pushed out of positions of executive or regulatory authority. This group is or was opposed by nationalistic organizations or movements that were extrainstitutional or at the margins of power and were generally much more radically minded. With the withdrawal or removal of the moderate group, which is more responsible and prepared to compromise, the conflict situation could shift to a form marked by acute intensification. In such cases, the initiative would be seized by less modernized groups and leaders of traditional or quasitraditional communities, people with an acute identity deficit, who experience difficulties in adapting to the ongoing changes. For that reason, they present themselves as protectors and defenders of the basic traditions and values of the ethnic community (especially in situations where there is a real or imagined threat to the existence and future of this community).

Therefore, to understand the structure and developmental prospects of an ethnonational conflict, attention should be paid to how well informed the participants are about one another, as well as the overall horizon of understanding of the situation. For the researcher, this means adhering to several methodological requirements that give rise to the need to consider the following points:

- definition of the situation, interests, and motives of the groups acting on behalf of the state or the ethnic whole
- definition of the situation, interests, and motives of the ethnic minority and its representatives (the local or national intelligentsia, the ethnonational bureaucracy, the elites, and leaders of religious groups)
- attitude toward these representatives by the bulk of the ethnic minority population and leaders of the major traditional formations (clans; *teips*; kinship-based, tribal, and locality-based associations; and so forth)
- definition of the situation, interests, and motives of the forces and institutions in the federal structures of the central government that are affected by the ethnonational conflict that is arising

In their scope and nature, violent conflicts on the territory of the former USSR can be divided into two types: (1) local, momentary or sporadic, short-term clashes and excesses (pogroms, murders, aggressive actions, and demonstrations) and (2) wide-scale, regular, and prolonged military actions involving the use of military weaponry. In contrast to those in the first group, those in the second may be described as socially recurrent, that is, retaining their conflict structure regardless of the specific personal participants in the clash. This means they can continue only

thanks to the use of significant social, economic, cultural, and symbolic resources (ethnic wars).

Examples of the first type of ethnic conflicts in Russia today include the pogroms and clashes in major cities and acts of aggression against Azerbaijanis, gypsies (Roma), and other communities; tensions with Meskhetian Turks and Armenians (in Krasnodar Territory); the constant conflicts involving Kazakh and Caucasus peoples in Stavropol Territory or Rostov Oblast; the clashes with the Chinese in the Far East and elsewhere; and the periodically violated balance between the ethnic clans in Dagestan.

Conflicts of the second type (organized violence) include primarily both Chechen wars and the unresolved Ingush-Ossetian conflict. In other republics, such examples include the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetin conflicts, among others.

The development of violent conflict depends on the nature and amount of resources available to the opposing sides. These resources could include the following:

- internal sources—aid provided by the population to violent organized groups; support and provisioning by the population, local government budgets, state (federal or republic level) sources of support
- outside sources—the diaspora; other states (including former imperial powers in the region); international organizations of a religious, terrorist, or other nature

If the sides involved in the conflict exhaust their resources, it could produce a lessening of the conflict and a shift to a dormant phase, but it does not resolve the conflict (Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniester, the Chechen War).

The degree of intensity with which a conflict progresses is conditioned by a number of factors, with special importance attached to the following:

- the nature of religious beliefs justifying or condemning violence as such
- archaic cultural traditions and rituals; for example, admiration of or even a cult of aggression against outsiders, as well as the renegade culture as a remnant of initiation rituals in the Caucasus
 - special characteristics of ethnic or religious identity (images of self and of threats from outsiders)
 - the conditioned closed nature of an ethnic community (tribal ethic)
 - approving or neutral attitudes toward brutality to outsiders

Also extremely important are such circumstances and issues as the degree to which the development of the conflict has impacted the most important fundamental values of the ethnic community (minority) or surrounding majority (be it the views of the bulk of the population of Russia or the titular republic). Another key point is the degree to which a threat exists to the preservation of the ethnic community as a whole.

Conflicts caused by one set of reasons and by one type of participant could take on a more radical and aggressive nature by virtue of their very duration, inasmuch as the composition and motives of conflict participants are changing.

Regardless of the direct basic reason for the taking of sides, wide-scale conflicts are initially motivated by the interests of elite ethnic groups in society that are striving either to restrain acting institutions, power relations, and associated economic prospects or to change these in their favor and create new structures. (However, in principle these are repetitions of old models of authority and the exercise of power, for truly new relations and organs of power in this regard should not involve grounds for disagreement or potential for conflict.)

Turning an ethnic conflict into a special military enterprise pursued by people living exclusively by war and participating in violent actions is possible only by destroying or very significantly eroding the usual social order that defines the life of an ethnic community. In such cases, the traditional structure of the ethnic community is destroyed, the authority of the bearers of tradition is eroded, and young wolves come to the forefront, new extraordinary leaders who have arisen during the course of the conflict and are recognized primarily by the young generation, disregarding the elders. It is in this phase of development of the conflict that criminal and deviant groups within society acquire legitimacy, and robberies, raids, hostage seizures, ransom demands, and so on are sanctioned and in various ways supported by the population or outside organizations. In other words, in this stage of the conduct of armed or aggressive actions, the conflict itself becomes a source of material support for the most radical groups (self-supporting conflict).

The problem of the participation of federal government structures in ethnonational conflicts merits separate consideration, as these motives are far from transparent, as shown by the declarations of the Russian leadership itself. The leadership is determined by the composition of interests and the circumstances of internal political struggle within Russian society. The unleashing of the Chechen wars was largely conditioned by pressure from those institutions and political forces that were striving to preserve Soviet forms of the sociopolitical organization of society.

The Anthropology of Collective Violence*

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There is no doubt that every act of collective political violence is always largely irrational. The perpetrator of the violence either carries out his actions despite all common sense (with his actions gaining him no advantages), or else the goals he is pursuing ultimately lead to directly opposite results. For example, almost all the revolutions of the twentieth century, both social and national-liberational in nature, have not only not led to overcoming the economic backwardness of their states as the revolutionaries had planned, but also, as a rule, have further exacerbated the economic situation. The very humanistic ideals toward which they seemingly sincerely strove in the course of their struggle for power at times were transformed into unprecedented violence perpetrated by the new power structure against its own population.

It would seem appropriate to focus this project on the study of the irrational in acts of collective violence. I believe that in order to uncover the unconscious determinants of such actions, which largely define current class or ethnic conflicts, it would be most productive to use anthropological research methodology, singling out two aspects—the social-anthropological and the cultural-anthropological.

The social-anthropological aspect involves studying the function in modern conflict of traditional institutions (or their fragments) that are associated with the use of violence. These institutions arose at the dawn

*Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins.

of human history during the establishment of the first socium, and they continue to operate at later stages in the evolution of social life.

This assertion is based on the following methodological premise: The appearance of new types of relations (social information) in the course of social-historical progress does not signify the loss of previous types of relations. The proportional weight of the latter undoubtedly is greatly reduced in the sharply increased overall volume of social information, with previous types of relations seemingly dissolving into the overall volume and becoming less noticeable. Primary behavioral norms were formed unconsciously as the system selected randomly occurring behavioral acts that promoted its survival to a greater degree than did other acts. This unconscious process is also characteristic of modern society. The sense of these acts is coded in human culture, but they can be reflected at the conscious level in ideological worldview concepts prevailing at any given moment in time.

The action of such institutions is most clearly seen in peripheral societies, which preserve a powerful layer of traditional (primary) relations. As for industrial (postindustrial) sociums, these institutions are present in latent form but can be activated under certain conditions, coming to the forefront and determining people's real behavior.

In particular, one such institution of violence that ensured the survival of the first socium was the institution of vengeance (blood feud). Fear of retribution restrained the members of one kinship-based collective from resorting to violence against another collective of the same sort. Current ethnographic materials on the Caucasus clearly attest to the fact that the institution of blood feud still exists in its initial form both as a regulator of the use of violence and as a motive for initiating violent actions.

An example of the preservation of vengeance as an institution in postindustrial society and, furthermore, its ability to determine the behavior of its members is the tragic events of September 11 in the United States and the actions that followed in response. At first, as everyone knows, the proposed U.S. response action bore the name "Operation Justice."¹ In other words, we see that in the given instance, representatives of one of the most civilized countries turned to the sources of human legal thought, when vengeance was the keystone in restoring justice according to the principle "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."

The taking of vengeance was not only sanctioned but also firmly

¹Translator's note: In the Russian, the author uses the word *vozmezhdie*, the most common translations for which are "retribution" or "vengeance." The word has been translated as "justice" here to comply more closely with the actual initial name of the antiterrorist campaign, "Operation Infinite Justice."

supported by society. The modern civilized society is not only prepared for massive violent actions, organizing them in accordance with the traditional cultural algorithm, but also rigidly follows its logic. In particular, many political commentators were not without grounds in viewing in the intentionally unacceptable demands made of the Taliban by the United States a desire in fact to avoid the hand-over of Osama bin Laden to U.S. justice. This would lead to a conflict of various legal systems, with Western law on the one side and legal views based on archaic values on the other. American laws naturally rule out blood feuds as a legal action, and if bin Laden were to find himself in the hands of justice, he would have to be tried according to American laws. Under these laws, in the opinion of jurists, it would be extremely difficult if not completely impossible to prove his guilt. Most importantly, it would mean an end to "Operation Justice," which would fundamentally run counter to justice as understood in its primary sense. Moreover, as indicated by public opinion polls conducted immediately after the attacks, more than 90 percent of the country's population considered vengeance not only justified, but mandatory. We note that vengeance has generally become widespread in international political-legal practice.

On the whole, it seems obvious that civilization holds within itself a memory of the past, a memory that under certain circumstances comes to life and becomes dominant in determining the behavior of its representatives. Emanating from the depths of the human psyche, such behavior is today formed in public discourse with the help of modern political-cultural symbols.

In this regard, the dynamics of the symbolification of the current antiterrorist action are illustrative. Whereas the earlier name was conditioned by the predominantly emotional response of Americans to the events that occurred and therefore reflected these reactions in the most archaic form ("Operation Justice"), the name was later changed to bring it into maximum accord with Western political-cultural values ("Enduring Freedom").

It would be of interest to study and calculate the conditions under which archaic models oriented toward collective violence are activated in modern society. For example, we might mention the following points.

First, these models are activated when society, just like the first *socium*, finds itself in a situation requiring it to mobilize its forces for its own survival. In particular, one might suppose that the spark of archaic consciousness in the United States following the well-known events was conditioned by the fact that Americans really sensed a threat to the integrity of their societal system.

Second, the activation of archaic models of violent behavior is also characteristic of systems undergoing modernization, in which the life of

society is predominantly regulated not by market mechanisms but rather by political-administrative methods. Here, intergenerational contradictions, which according to a great deal of ethnographic data represented the main source of conflicts in traditional societies, determine the sociopolitical mobility of individuals. In other words, the process of modernization entails conflicts characteristic of traditional society but arising in another cultural form.

Indeed, to neutralize such conflicts, which always involve a biological component, a traditional society has in particular sanctioned youth violence, channeling it against outsiders (in the form of raids on neighbors, intervillage fights, and so forth). If this is not done, youth aggression could be directed within the *socium*—that is, against their elders. Such a course of events occurred in colonial Africa. By forbidding intertribal warfare, the European colonizers largely defined the violence vector, but caused it to take the form of a national liberation movement that was aimed not only against them but also against the older generation. The age aspect was reflected in the names of the political parties that arose: Young Kikuyus, Young Kavirondo, and Young Algerians, among others.

The violent practices of youth were regarded positively by society and ensured high social status. (Among Russians, for example, the institution of intervillage fights involving young unmarried men has been documented by ethnographers up to the present time.) By sanctioning youth violence and directing it outside the bounds of the *socium*, the elders strove painstakingly to regulate such violence, justifiably fearing that it could lead to strengthening the social position of young people in society. Such indeed was the case. Data have been collected on the youth revolutions in Africa in the colonial period. In this instance, a youth subculture seized all of society, and war became the main enterprise of its members.

Presumably, an analogous situation has developed in many regions of the world where prolonged interethnic or social conflicts have been observed, with armed adolescents representing their main driving force. In such societies, the traditional authority of age has devolved, and the most successful military ringleaders become the actual leaders of society. This type of activity allows young people to achieve high social status in society rather early. The conditions of instability that are characteristic of these *sociums* give rise to a high demand for charismatic leaders, who in turn always rely on youth, as the phenomenon of this type of leadership is congruent with adolescent psychology (rejection of traditional values, ideologies, authorities, and so forth).

The youth subculture also dominates in totalitarian states, where the authorities use violence against external and internal enemies. Moreover, by striving to find support among the young, the authorities exacerbate

the conflict between the generations. In the USSR, Pavlik Morozov, who denounced his own father, became a national hero.

The stability of the political regimes in these states depends on the ability of the ruling powers to ensure the social growth of young people and define the vector of their violent strivings. In the USSR, where a youth subculture reigned, all socioeconomic life abounded in violent symbols of "taming the virgin lands," "battling for the harvest," and "conquering outer space." International sports took the form of a virtual "war against the capitalist system." Not only urgent "shock" construction projects but also local wars (Afghanistan) served as channels for diverting youth aggression. By taking part in these violent actions, young people gained opportunities for proving themselves and raising their social status.

The main objective of authoritarian-totalitarian regimes is the regulation of age-based social conflict within their own cores, especially within their party-state hierarchies. By periodically giving rising layers of the bureaucracy (youth) the opportunity to increase their social status, the ruling powers reduce tensions within this organization. The repressions of the Stalinist period are viewed as a periodic removal of an older generation of leaders from power, as a result of which young people (the next generation of leaders) gained prospects for social growth. In China, Mao Tse-tung removed the older generation from power at the hands of the younger generation itself (the *hun wei bin*) during the Cultural Revolution. Mass violence on an analogous scale is characteristic of many developing states.

The revolutionary nature of political cultures in systems undergoing modernization is also explained by age-based social conflict. In these states, there is a constant overproduction of the intelligentsia, which, given the overall undeveloped nature of the socioeconomic infrastructure and in accord with the priorities of the traditional mentality, sees prospects for its own social mobility exclusively within the framework of the state-bureaucratic hierarchy. The state is not in a position to fulfill the social claims of numerous young people with diplomas. The next revolution comes with the maturation in society of a new generation of intelligentsia alienated from power as a consequence of the state-bureaucratic machine being filled with representatives of the older generation.

Indeed, both the revolution at the beginning of the century in Russia and perestroika represented the resolution of this sort of conflict. A concentration of aggressive potential arises in society from a social excess of young "unneeded minds," who use social and ethnic symbols in the struggle for power.

With regard to the cultural-anthropological aspect, the attention of the researcher should be focused not so much on the social causes of various conflicts (ethnic or social) as on the specific form of its develop-

ment—that is, its symbolic realization. The concept of violence is culturally determined and cannot be reduced to the social content it has acquired in Western European culture. In this culture, violence is treated primarily as the infliction of physical damage by one party on another, that is, by the violator against the victim, which society views negatively from a moral and legal standpoint. Such an approach to understanding violence is conditioned by the relationship between the individual and society that has formed in this culture, a relationship that is rather unique in human civilization, namely, that the interests of the individual are primary in relation to the interests of society. Indeed, whereas in the first days after the events, 90 percent of Americans unequivocally supported Operation Justice, only 50 percent of them supported it a week or two later. There is every reason to suppose that over time this percentage will become even smaller. In other words, a return to archaic cultural strata occurs under conditions of emotional upheaval, which leads to the activation of more ancient cultural strata.

At the same time, in peripheral societies in which the value of human life is determined not on the basis of developed social individualism but rather in connection with various sorts of collective and religious conceptions, similar actions by a subject with regard to an object could be both justified and encouraged by the *socium*. In Russia, it is not the legitimacy of power that determines its right to violence; on the contrary, its capacity for violence serves as the basis for its legitimacy. Therefore, the events in Chechnya did not prevent President Yeltsin from being elected to a second term, and largely determined Putin's victory in the presidential elections. In other words, the concept of violence should be viewed within the framework of cultural pluralism. Otherwise, the researcher is doomed to misunderstand the logic of the actions of representatives of other cultures.

Despite the uniqueness of any culture and its understanding of violence, one may discern identical mechanisms by means of which each culture legitimates mass violence. These primarily include attaching demonic supernatural qualities to the object of violence (the "enemy of the people" or "enemy of mankind"), who is understood as the main agent of destabilization (chaos). The elimination of this enemy thus represents the main condition for the creation of harmony in society.

Today, following the events in the United States, the strivings of politicians and respectable scholars to divide the world into civilization (the "realm of harmony") and barbarism (the "realm of chaos") are attracting attention. We observe a process of mythologizing the image of the enemy, a process that in traditional (barbaric) societies always precedes the use of violence against one group or another. The danger here lies in the fact

that, in contrast to civilization, barbarism is currently characterized by its very diffuse nature, both territorially and culturally.

Thus, even Europeans may use mass violence, legitimating it using methods taken from their own cultural archives. As for representatives of the periphery, such methods represent to them a living matter, linking violence with such concepts as sacred duty, honor, and so forth. The mastery of European models by these cultures does not have a substantial impact on the behavior of the bearers of these cultures.

Therefore, it would be interesting to study the process of adaptation of Western political-cultural values, especially by the peripheral intelligentsia. Though they assimilate these values on the verbal and declarative level, the real behavior of these intelligentsia members continues to be determined by their own cultural imperatives. For example, if classical Marxism understands the liquidation of the capitalist class as the deprivation of their rights to private property, then in Russia this process took the form of the physical elimination of property owners.

Sociopolitical practice attests to the fact that it was the peripheral intelligentsia that was the yeast that spurred the rise of mass violence in developing states; they headed all social and national revolutions in the twentieth century. Studies of colonial Africa clearly show that only with the appearance on the continent of an intelligentsia did we see the rise of the phenomena of ethnic identity and, largely as a result, interethnic conflicts.

Clearly it is by no means mandatory that European humanist ideals must triumph everywhere as peoples join civilization. It is the violent imposition of Western cultural standards, which is being done everywhere with the best intentions, beginning with the era of colonization, that evokes a violent (and at times fierce) rejection from other cultures. Furthermore, the initiators of the struggle against the Western way of life are educated people, often graduates of prestigious universities in the "civilized" world.

These individuals, it seems, should attract the attention of researchers studying mass violence. The appearance of these people is directly linked with the process of modernization—that is, with the interaction of cultures, which has given rise in their form to a rather unique phenomenon. Their activities associated with mass violence are often ascribed to mercenary interests tied to the seizure and exercise of power. In particular, it is felt that they manipulate traditional or religious symbols in the aim of achieving the political mobilization of the masses to attain their own goals. However, an acquaintance with the biographies of these political leaders unambiguously attests to the fact that they value neither the lives of others nor their own.

It appears that the modernization process engenders a special cultural-psychological phenomenon. (Russian philosophers of the early twentieth century as well as Frantz Fanon wrote on the consequences of the influence of Western rationalism on traditional thought.) Being religious in its content, the traditional mentality not only easily absorbs ideas of world religions but also adapts Western political-cultural values in accordance with its own inherent algorithm of mental activity. As a result, these values necessarily acquire all the signs of religiosity, including its inherent conceptions on life and death.

Therefore, in this regard, political leaders always stand as sacred persons, embodying either "God's anointed" or even God in human form. Their actions are not regulated by ethical or moral considerations, as they themselves are the measure of morality. Such people are sincerely inclined to self-deification, which frees their psyches of agonizing feelings on the use of violence against the masses and gives them internal legitimacy. Like those they govern within the framework of this culture of thought, they themselves experience no fear of physical death, as life to them is the service of a sacred (immortal) idea (teaching), embodied as a rule in the image of a specific person.

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State, Ethnocultural Identities, and Intergroup Relations

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Economic, technological, and cultural reorganization of the contemporary world demands reconsideration of such widespread concepts as the nation-state or civic and ethnic nationalism that are directly connected with identity formation and maintenance, and not infrequently with ethnic tension and conflict. Apparently, it is worthwhile to divorce conceptually ethnocultural identities: citizenship, which regulates the relations between the individual and the state without any connotation of collective uniqueness; and civic nationhood, which implies more than common interests and simple membership in a political community, but is connected with the acceptance and interiorization of common historical memories, values, norms, public rituals, and symbols that exceed the formal pledge of allegiance (Miller, 1995; Brown, 2000). State, society, and culture are not only a synchronic slice of time; they are also historical processes. It may be worth exploring the extent to which attempts at civic nation building in Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries (this is a project that, among others, is strongly advocated by Tishkov, 1997) are feasible under current circumstances. As numerous examples from the past and present have proven, a civic nation by itself does not eliminate ethnic and other inequalities, including discrimination. Therefore, its appeal to minorities may be limited. One may wonder whether, in Russia's context, it is more expedient at the moment to concentrate efforts on achieving not only legal but real equality, which may open the way to a kind of constitutional patriotism advocated by Jürgen Habermas (1995).

This brings one to the concept of the nation-state, which because of its prevalence in contemporary discourse is largely responsible for the confusion of citizenship with civic nationalism (see, for example, Brubaker, 1992). Actually, the dichotomy of ethnic versus civic nationalism is based on the illusion of the nation-state's universality. Historically, nationalisms have envisioned a world consisting of states that are uniform within but sharply distinct from what lay beyond their borders. Today, however, the world as a whole in some respects is becoming less diverse, while individual states are becoming more ethnically heterogeneous than has been perceived or designed.

There is a certain terminological and even conceptual confusion in the social sciences. Many alleged nation-states are simultaneously characterized as multiethnic states, states with plural or multicultural societies, and so on. In fact, many contemporary states, including Russia, are multinational rather than multiethnic.

At present, nationalizing and assimilating projects often are less successful than in the past, even in cases where linguistic assimilation or accommodation has made progress. It is not enough to construct identities. To be successful, these identities must be accepted. However, where ethnic groups, especially somewhat territorialized ones, develop into nationalities or nations with literary languages, cultural institutions, mass media, occupationally differentiated social structures, specific economic interests, and political elites and counter-elites, there is less room for unifying integration and more grounds for ethnic/national competition.

Multiethnic and especially multinational societies with pluralistic identities and narratives increase the necessity for and simultaneously the danger of an activist state. The striving of a state for homogenization is rife with the potential for conflict (Connor, 1972), especially when a state is identified with an ethnonational majority (Khazanov, 1995). In this respect, it is worth considering such areas as language policy, education, religion policy, regional development policy, demographic and migration policies, political representation, and some others.

In the study of ethnic tension it is important to pay attention to differences between self-estimation of ethnic groups and their perception by others. Thus, many Russians in the Soviet Union considered their attitude towards other peoples in the country as internationalist, friendly, and assisting; while members of the non-Russian groups not infrequently perceived it as patronizing, insensitive, and humiliating. A timely diagnosis of the differences in perception may help to ameliorate ethnic relations if corresponding measures are undertaken.

Likewise, it is worth exploring further the extent to which not only the policies of republican authorities but those of the center as well actu-

ally are or are perceived as ethnically neutral policy. One can even go a step further. Many contemporary liberal theorists seek to countervail structural and other disadvantages of ethnic and national minorities by institutionalized affirmative action and differentiated political rights (see, for example, Kymlicka, 1989, 1995; Young, 1990; Kis, 1996). One may wonder to what extent their recommendations are applicable to Russia and other CIS countries' conditions as a method for the alleviation of ethnic inequality and reducing ethnic tension.

At present, the hypotheses that explain particularistic identities of peripheral communities with distinct cultural characteristics as caused mainly by their underdevelopment (Hechter, 1975; Nairn, 1977; Blaut, 1987) have lost a great deal of their credibility. The claims that successful modernization should diminish the salience of ethnic identities and reduce ethnonational strife (Deutch, 1966; Haas, 1966; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) remain unsubstantiated and even self-contradictory, since modernization is always uneven and differential. The same can be said about globalization as its new stage. So far, supranational and suprastate identities do not diminish the role of ethnocultural and national ones.

One may doubt that a certain cultural homogenization should result in corresponding ethnic homogenization since there is no direct correlation between the strength of ethnic identities and the degree of cultural distinctiveness. Not real and significant cultural differences per se, but symbolic boundaries and markers make ethnic collectivities different (Barth, 1969). Any cultural trait, however insignificant it may seem, can serve as an ethnic marker.

Apparently, in the politics of identity, ethnicity remains the most controversial aspect. Ethnic identities are alternatively characterized as irrational, epiphenomenal, and based on "false consciousness" (Hobsbawm, 1990; Ignatieff, 1994; Banks, 1996), as contextual and constructed (Eriksen, 1993), or as paramount and a primary source of all other identities (van den Berghe, 1981; Schöpflin, 2000). Notwithstanding all of these differences in understanding, in the former Soviet Union, ethnicity is often simply taken for granted as a constant and invariable factor in intergroup relations. However, ethnic identities, just like any other, are not static but dynamic phenomena; moreover, at any given moment they consist of different varieties, including gender and generational ones. One may dare to predict that in the foreseeable future, ethnocultural identities in the post-Soviet political space will remain strong, but these by themselves do not generate conflict and violence. Therefore, it is worthwhile to shift attention from theorizing ethnicity and identity formation to ethnically motivated behavior and actions, which, among other things, should facilitate the explanation of ethnic strife and forecasting imminent ethnic conflicts.

In this case, ethnic situations may be considered the dynamic outcome of at least four interconnected developments.

1. ethnic politics of the state
2. interactive relations between different ethnic groups within the state
3. ethnic assertiveness and politicization
4. the impact of external forces, such as global economic transformations and the telecommunications revolution, which increases the capacity for mass mobilization

So far, most attention has been paid to the first two of these developments. The continuing salience of ethnicity and nationalism in the former Soviet Union is explained mainly by competition between the central and ethnorepublican elites or as a manipulative ideology employed by political elites to secure their power base or both. However, members of ethnic groups and nations do not simply live in the here and now. They encounter the present in terms of the past and the future, and compare it with the situations of other regions and countries.

While the term *ethnocracies* has become popular in Russian scholarship, it remains underinvestigated to what extent and why the ethnic elites are enjoying the support of their coethnics. The elite-manipulation explanation of ethnic conflicts has many deficiencies. First, it is essentially undemocratic, since it assumes that the masses are incapable of making rational decisions about their own lives. Second, it fails to explain why ethnonational forms of identity have become so successful, while others fail to attract sufficient support (Moore, 2001: 12). One may wonder whether, in the post-Soviet context, ethnic solidarity is mainly based on historical memory (real or constructed and manipulated) and common experiences (or experiences that can be presented as common), which flowed into overall legitimation myths, or if it is a more rational response to the interplay of sociopolitical, cultural, and economic factors. It is also worth exploring the extent to which ethnopolitics provide real or perceived benefits, for example, social advancement, new economic opportunities, or cultural reproduction, to the members of corresponding groups.

As for globally produced ideas, they contribute to contemporary concerns with identity issues. An immediate transmittal of local and national events throughout the world by mass media has become an important factor in identity assertion and is calling for the attention of scholars. It is important to study the effects of global flows of information upon national affairs at the local policy level. In the new conditions of the telecommunications revolution, the state is capable to a much lesser degree of

controlling the dissemination of undesirable historical narratives and ethnocentric concepts. The creation of the "single information field" that some CIS politicians are striving for is not only undesirable but also hardly feasible, if even a modicum of the freedom of information and speech is maintained.

Therefore, future research on ethnonational identities and nationalism should be based on the study of the interplay between three major forces:

1. actors and events
2. ideologies, concepts, and ideas
3. structures, agencies, institutions, and social conditions.

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The Effects of Globalization on Russia: An Analysis of New Russian Nationalism

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Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the term *Russian* was defined in opposition to the term *Soviet*. Russia was also defined as a nation in transition to democracy, a prodigal son coming back to the family of Western nations. Soon enough, however, this anti-Soviet, pro-Western, and democratic idea was superceded by its opposite. Democracy and the West are now seen in very negative terms by increasing segments of Russian society. The current anti-Western tide in Russian public opinion coincides with the formative period in the Russian national identity. It may solidify the image of the West, and the United States in particular, as Russia's national enemy and may determine our relations for many years to come. Drawing on theories of Ernest Gellner and Liah Greenfeld, a theoretical explanation of the attitude change is advanced and related to globalization. The shift started among certain segments of the elite, who passed it on to the masses. When around 1998 the new attitude was fixed on the mass level, it became a factor in the political competition. Then a logic of elite outbidding reinforced the change. This model found confirmation in a preliminary analysis of thick journals, mass media, and VTsIOM [All-Russian Center on Research of Public Opinion] polls.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES

Nationalism as a Reaction to a Powerful Alien Culture

Many students of Russian nationalism agree that Russians, traditionally the dominant imperial group, have had only a vague ethnic aware-

ness and identified primarily with the state, rather than with their ethnic group. This follows from theories of nationalism that relate its rise to the emergence in a modernizing multiethnic state of a single standardized culture that allows even perfect strangers to easily get along in formal contexts. If, for whatever reason, people cannot easily switch to this new standard culture or are simply excluded from it by the dominant group, they get into the humiliating position of being second-rate citizens struggling with a hostile bureaucracy. Such people become acutely aware of the difference between the standard culture and their own, that is, they become nationalists (Gellner, 1983).

Russians have easily identified with dominant standard Russian cultures, be it Russian Orthodox, Russian Imperial, or Russian Soviet. It was other peoples of the empire, in particular Moslem and Western Christian (whether Roman Catholic or Protestant), who found it difficult to merge with those cultures. This is in part why Russians did not have a strong ethnic identity, whereas their many non-Russian neighbors did. However, this has been changing.

Globalization and New Russian Nationalism

Modernization is leading to globalization. It has nurtured the emergence of a global culture rooted in the North European Protestant ethic and epitomized by the U.S. culture. Many Russians who encounter this new standard culture find it alien and exclusionary. The alienation it produces among Russians is felt right at the entrance to the U.S. consulates throughout Russia, which is ironic, since one would expect the Russians who seek U.S. visas to be most sympathetic to the West.

The alienation is due, first, to the American and Russian cultures being very different. The distance between cultures may partially explain the degree of the nationalist reaction to globalization. For instance, whereas Great Britain has few problems with it, France does experience a conflict of cultures, as well as some anti-American attitudes. The cultural distance for Russia is far greater than for France: Consider, for instance, how different are Russian villages and American suburbia or Russian and Western gender relations.

Second, whereas the European countries associate globalization with good economic prospects, military security, and other advantages that may make even the French swallow the burger, as it were, the pro-Western reforms in Russia are associated with economic hardship and loss of prestige in the world. Such negative associations do not help Russians to embrace the global culture. And third, NATO expansion followed by the action in Yugoslavia that sidelined the United Nations Security Council and in particular Russia means to Russians not only a loss of prestige but

also fears of potential problems with the security of their country. How can Russians identify with a culture that does not want them and seems to threaten them?

This process of alienation in its most basic aspects seems very similar to the eighteenth century *ressentiment* felt by the native elite in France, Germany, and Russia with respect to cultures of their ostensibly more successful neighbors (Greenfeld, 1992). The German elite fed its resentment against the French to common people. The nationalist fervor whipped up by German political entrepreneurs determined Franco-German relations for about a century. On the other hand, Russian aristocrats failed to ground their nationalism in the Russian masses, in part because of low literacy levels of prerevolutionary Russian peasants. Today, however, technologies of mass communication present a more favorable environment for a spread of nationalist ideas among an impoverished, but generally well-educated, Russian population. Whereas in Gellner's theory, nationalism is a reaction to modernization, new Russian nationalism may be thought of as a reaction to globalization.

New Russian nationalism emerged within two segments of the Russian elite. What they both had in common was (1) contact with the West and (2) loss of status in the course of reform; these are necessary components for the emergence of an anti-Western sentiment. The segments are Russian intelligentsia and the foreign policy community. Both have more contacts with the West or Western people than average. In the wake of liberal pro-Western reforms, Russian intelligentsia lost its traditional status of spiritual leadership, as well as material benefits given by the Soviet state to its recognized artists, writers, poets, scholars, and so forth. The Russian foreign policy community lost the status of superpower agents; their material well-being deteriorated, too.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS SHAPING NEW RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

The Beached Diaspora

In late 1991, 25 million Russians, about 17 percent of the total number of Soviet Russians then (which was 150 million), woke up to find themselves in various foreign countries of the near abroad. David Laitin calls those Russians the *beached diaspora*. Unlike most other diasporas, whose members consciously migrated from their home countries to foreign territories, those Russians became a diaspora because what they thought was their home country suddenly shrank as an ocean during the ebb-tide, and they found themselves beached like stray ships whose crews were too careless to keep the ships safe in deeper waters. In most of those newly

independent countries the Russians experienced status reversal, which produced various degrees of resentment among them, often in various forms of Sovietism, or nostalgia for the old times and ways. In the most extreme case of Moldova, the diaspora members took up arms to re-establish a Soviet-like rule on a narrow strip of land along the Dniester River. In many other cases, they have migrated to the Russian Federation where they feed the emerging Russian nationalism.

Whereas most permanent Russian residents continue the long historical tradition of being the dominant group in Russia and, according to the previously proposed model, do not think much about ethnic issues, the new Russian migrants are often quite nationalistic, as they have already bitterly felt the difference between their own culture and those of various newly independent countries. For example, the Russian Cossacks, who traditionally lived in what is now northern and eastern Kazakhstan, that recently migrated to the Russian Federation areas bordering Kazakhstan are often intensely anti-Kazakh; for example, they strongly resent Kazakh migration to the same areas.¹ That may reflect their experiences in independent Kazakhstan where their organizations were prohibited and some of their leaders arrested. While this is a special case, many other migrant Russians share less intense but still unpleasant experiences associated with their status reversal in the newly independent states. Similar experiences of a German beached diaspora in such places as Poland and Czechoslovakia in the wake of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles fed German nationalism in Germany. A similar process is taking place in modern Russia.

Federalism

Another problem that contributes to and shapes the emerging Russian nationalism is the legacy left to post-Soviet Russia by Soviet federalism. Although the Russian Constitution postulates that all subjects of the federation have equal rights, in reality some of the ethnic republics were able to negotiate special rights and privileges for themselves. For example, Ingushetia and Kalmykia secured a special status for themselves as tax-free zones. In effect, this means that Russian regions subsidized ambitious construction projects in those republics, including the newly built city of Magas (the new capital of Ingushetia) and Chess City in Kalmykia. That is when many Russian regions experienced a shortage of regular housing.

¹For more on Russian migration as driven by economics vs. ethnicity, see Smith, G. 1998. *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Redistribution of economic resources was one of the issues that had fed various nationalisms during the Soviet period. Today, it may feed Russian nationalism.

On the other hand, the vestiges of imperial consciousness among Russians, including Russia's leadership, work to ban any of the ethnic republics from seceding from the Federation. For instance, even though Russians do not perceive Chechnya as a real Russian territory, they fight to keep it within Russia's boundaries. A sore sense of status loss in the post-Cold War era prevents what could seem a humiliating disintegration of the country.

The problem of territorial institutionalization of ethnicity often interacts with passport institutionalization of ethnicity. The Russian Constitution stipulates that all its citizens are equal. However, there is an informal practice of institutionalized group rights left over from the Soviet period that often contradicts the constitutional equality. For example, Bashkirs are the third largest group in their republic after Russians and Tatars, or about 22 percent of the republic's population. Yet ethnic Bashkirs have an exclusive position of power in their republic, including various levels of government, law enforcement agencies, and so forth. Attempts to challenge the status quo are ruthlessly squelched by the Bashkir-controlled government; there is virtually no free press, no free speech, and no independent political activities. Discrimination of nontitulars is certainly another source that feeds Russian nationalism.

Another aspect of passport institutionalization of ethnicity is that people have been taught to think of themselves in terms of ethnicity, and this will not change suddenly. Even Russified Tatars, for example, may find it hard to fully merge into the Russian nation as both they and Russians continue to think of such Tatars in old terms. This is an obstacle that makes it more difficult to build an inclusive Russian nation and feeds a narrower ethnic version of national identity.

LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE: A PRELIMINARY APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT TO RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Russian Intelligentsia's Ressentiment

A few people predicted that the fall of the Soviet Union was inevitable. In their opinion, the system under which an authoritarian government industrialized the country contained a fatal internal flaw: It nurtured a class of intellectuals whose liberal aspirations were incompatible with the Soviet Union's authoritarian government (Lipset and Dobson, 1972; Parkin, 1972). Indeed, a survey of Soviet émigrés showed that edu-

cation was negatively associated with the regime's norms (Silver, 1987). Soviet liberal journals, such as *Novyi Mir*, helped to pass the values held by the liberal intelligentsia on to other segments of the population (Hahn, 1991). In effect, the intelligentsia buried the Soviet Union.

Soon enough, however, the liberal tide was rolled back. Liberal intelligentsia who had supported perestroika en masse in the late 1980s and early 1990s were hit hard by new Russian realities. In 1993 a former flagship of perestroika, *Novyi Mir*, published an article by Yulia Latynina that questioned the value of democracy. On the popular level, an album of remake songs from Stalin's era became the top hit of 1995. At about the same time, old Soviet movies became successful competitors in the market hitherto filled with Hollywood action movies. Yet VTsIOM polls in 1993 and 1995 still showed that the United States remained on the list of most admired countries. Evidently, new Russian nationalism had not become anti-Western or was still confined to rather narrow segments of the elite.

The situation changed dramatically in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. The resentment of intelligentsia, combined with frustration of politicians, spilt over to mass media. Anti-Western sentiment became a semiofficially sanctioned mainstream phenomenon. Since the Kosovo crisis, it has spread to more than half of the Russian population.

Kozyrev to Primakov: Evidence of Growing Nationalism

The public opinion change has been going on in spite of the Western humanitarian aid, financial loans, and on the whole prodemocratic Russian media. What is causing such radical changes? The answer may be in the emerging national sentiment of the Russian people. Since the end of the Cold War, Russians have encountered a powerful, alien culture that makes them feel powerless, disadvantaged, and inferior. Yet because of the nature of globalization they cannot avoid it and are confronted by it every day: on television, in print media, in advertising, and (with the appearance of Western companies in some Russian cities) even in the workplace.

Coupled with the general failure of economic reform, the nationalist alternative, which manifested itself by 1993, presented a formidable challenge to the political regime. While older segments of the Russian population were getting increasingly nostalgic about the Soviet past, the younger generation of Russians was more prone to look for a nationalist answer. Even the supposedly internationalist Communist Party was gradually becoming a nationalist party in the new Russian context. The regime's response in 1993 was to prevent nationalist parties from running in the elections. The only exception was made for LDPR [the Liberal Democratic

Party of Russia] run by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy who, as many observers agree, was in fact a government stooge. Perhaps his task was to make the protest vote manageable for the government.

Yet the overwhelming success of Zhirinovskiy's party in December 1993 highlighted the power of nationalist sentiment. The ever-decreasing popularity of his party since then can be attributed not only to widespread disappointment in the personality of Zhirinovskiy but also to the fact that ever since December 1993, virtually all Russian parties, including the mainstream of Russian politics, have been steadily becoming more nationalist, thus taking votes away from Zhirinovskiy. During the last presidential elections, all major presidential candidates except Grigory Yavlinsky were using nationalist rhetoric. It makes one wonder if that is why Mr. Yavlinsky could not score much higher than 5 percent of the vote in spite of running a very costly campaign.

Furthermore, the regime itself has grown nationalist. Pro-Western Andrei Kozyrev had to quit his job as Foreign Minister to be replaced by Yevgeny Primakov, who was later promoted to the position of Prime Minister. Mr. Primakov was by far more assertive about Russian national interests than Andrei Kozyrev, as is evidenced by his famous U-turn over the Atlantic during the Kosovo crisis. His tough stance on international issues, cessation of hostilities with the Russian legislative body, and successful handling of the financial crisis unleashed by his predecessor Sergei Kirienko made him a prime minister of unprecedented popularity.

Primakov and Putin: Evidence of Nationalist Outbidding

Mr. Primakov became so popular that he could act independently of President Yeltsin. The move by the powerful prime minister against corruption, and in particular against Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky, made him dangerous for the continuity of the political regime. President Yeltsin fired Mr. Primakov and replaced him by dull but personally faithful Sergei Stepashin.

Yet it only increased Mr. Primakov's popularity. His alliance with Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, who had at his disposal substantial financial and organizational resources, made him a potent political competitor. Mr. Yeltsin's pathetic efforts to outbid his former prime minister in the nationalist field were hopeless. (The last instance of this effort was Mr. Yeltsin's incoherent threats to President Clinton during the former's visit to Beijing.) It seemed as if Mr. Primakov was set to become the next Russian president.

It was against this background that Vladimir Putin emerged out of obscurity to become first a new prime minister and soon afterwards the acting president. On many dimensions the opposite of feeble Boris Yeltsin,

young and energetic Vladimir Putin could successfully compete with the Luzhkov-Primakov alliance. Equally important, he successfully competed with other heavyweight politicians in the nationalist field.

Playing in that particular field, he ventured into the second Chechen War, a move that all other major politicians met with apprehension. Yet Putin turned it into an electoral success. Chechens, who are different from Russians culturally, religiously, and physically, were disliked by many people and were easy to demonize. The early stages of the war made the impression of a revitalized Russian army and government. In the wake of Kosovo, Western criticisms of the Chechen war fell on deaf ears of a nation thirsty for a national success. Nationalism got fixed on the mass level and became a factor of domestic politics.

In lieu of a conclusion, I would like to emphasize that, whatever the sources of new Russian nationalism are, the national sentiment has much to do with a sense of dignity, status, and prestige. If Russia is able to become an insider of the international community, if it is able to economically benefit from globalization, and if ethnic Russians in the near abroad and in the ethnic republics of the Russian Federation feel themselves well-respected citizens, then the nastier aspects of Russian nationalism will likely become less common or benign and vice versa.

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Culture, Identity, and Conflict: Suggested Areas for Further Research

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Under the heading of identity and conflict, there are three main areas where more research is needed: (1) theorization of the relationship between identity and action; (2) empirical work on the definition, measurement, and development of identities; and (3) integrated approaches to the role of economic and cultural factors in identity politics.

IDENTITY AND ACTION

Much of the research on identity is unclear concerning how identity affects the behavior of actors; that is, how does having an identity lead to action? The relationship between identity and action has to be more fully addressed, especially if the goal is to explain specific outcomes, such as ethnic conflict. Currently there are at least three main theories of how identity affects behavior.¹

The first is essentially a theory of interpretation; that is, having an identity allows actors to interpret the external world in particular ways. In this case, the material or social incentives for a particular action take on different values according to one's identity. Thus, action still flows from material or social incentives, but identity affects the valuation of incentives.

¹For a review, see Abdelal, R., Y. M. Herrera, A. I. Johnston, and T. Martin. Treating Identity as a Variable: Measuring the Content, Intensity, and Contestation of Identity. Paper, presented at APSA, August 30-September 2, 2001.

A second theory corresponds roughly to what is sometimes referred to as role theory. Here the central causal process in behavior is the performance of roles. The behavior of actors is more or less consistent with actors' role expectations flowing from their identities—thus, if we are peace loving, we should act in a peace-loving fashion. Identity provides socially appropriate roles that actors perform and that are taken for granted. In this conceptualization, the reasons to act in a particular way are found in a decision to perform a role, not in a decision to choose between optimizing paths to some preferred outcome.

Alternatively, social identity theory suggests that the central causal process in behavior derives from in-group and out-group differentiation, not the roles or identity traits per se that are attributed to in-groups and out-groups. In this case, action is in some sense a reaction to, and conditioned by the existence of, those who are different. Some relationships (with the group that is socially recognized as similar) are more cooperative than others (with the group that is socially recognized as different) even if the same issue is at stake (territory, power, or status). These three theories are obviously not the only ways to understand the relationship between identity and action, but they may be a useful beginning.

MEASURING IDENTITY

The enormous amount of work on theorizing identity has resulted in some definitional and methodological clarity but also in a good deal of chaos. While we have developed many theories of identity, too few have been put to work in terms of measuring and documenting the development of actual identities in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Too many works begin by assuming the existence of particular identities, and focus instead on analyzing the effects of such identities (without, however, necessarily making explicit the relationship between identity and action—see above). In addition, many works use proxies for identity, such as language or racial categories, rather than attempting to measure identity explicitly. If the contributions of constructivist approaches to ethnicity are to be appreciated, we should think about how constructivism informs scholarly categorization of identity, including, for example, the construction of datasets on ethnicity.²

²On appreciating theoretical advances in data sets, see Symposium: Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics. Pp. 7-25 in APSA-Comparative Politics Newsletter Winter 2001; on measuring identity, see Abdelal et al., 2001.

ECONOMIC BASES OF IDENTITY POLITICS

In recent years, as scholars have recognized that economic issues are integral to identity politics and nationalist movements, analyses have increasingly focused on the examination of the economic factors. However, because the methodology used in analyses of political or cultural factors traditionally has been quite different from that used in the analysis of economic factors, most studies of identity politics focus either on political/cultural factors, or alternatively, on economic factors. In studies that attempt to account for both, often ideology or beliefs, on the one hand, account for political and cultural variables, while instrumental rationality, on the other hand, accounts for economic variables.

More recently, there have been several significant attempts to account for cultural and economic variables using integrated models. There are two basic types of integrated models. In the first, culture is used instrumentally for material gain.³ In the second, cultural benefits substitute for material benefits.⁴ Although the integrated models seem theoretically able to account for a range of outcomes, unfortunately there are two areas where these models remain inadequate. First, one must be able to explain why identity-based movements occur in both wealthy and poor regions. In other words, within or across countries, why do different economic conditions lead to similar outcomes or vice versa? A second problem with current integrated models of identity politics is that they cannot account for the fact that local notions of economic advantage are often inconsistent with outside assessments, and therefore current models cannot explain seemingly irrational economic behavior—that is, groups or elites pursue identity-based claims even when it appears they will be materially worse off for doing so.

Thus, to develop a better understanding of the relationship between economic factors and identity or cultural politics, the researcher is faced with a triple task of

- further advancing integrated models that can account for both cultural and economic factors
- explaining the general pattern of identity politics, that is, why identity-based movements occur in both rich and poor regions

³For examples, see R. Bates. 1983. Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa. Pp. 152-171 in *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola, eds. Boulder: Westview Press, and Shepsle, K. and A. Rabushka. 1972. *Politics in Plural Societies*. Columbus: Merrill.

⁴For examples, see Laitin, D. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- better accounting for the apparent economic irrationality of some identity movements

A useful line of research might consider that just as culture and politics can be analyzed in terms of instrumental rationality, so too can economics be analyzed in terms of historically, socially constructed ideas.⁵ In other words, economic data—like other types of information including demographic statistics, biological facts, and so forth—are subject to multiple, legitimate understandings and uses by elites and groups. To put it in the language of other contemporary debates, economic advantage and disadvantage may be as imagined as nations. In previous integrated models, the relative economic situation comes in as a *deus ex machina* to explain the variation. The models assume that ethnicity is fluid but that the economic interests are definite and real. However, empirical evidence suggests that economic interests may well be as fluid as ethnicity. This alternative theory of economic rationality builds on the nationalism literature but addresses the one area of social information that has been ignored by constructivist scholars, namely economic information. In addition, the theory may advance the development of integrated models of identity politics by providing a more satisfying explanation of how politicized economic factors affect the development of identities.

⁵See Herrera, Y. M. 2001. *Imagined Economies: Regionalism in the Russian Federation*. Unpublished manuscript. Harvard University.

Culture, Identity, and Conflict: The Influence of Gender

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Motherland. Mother tongue. The birth of the nation. These common metaphors suggest an apparent link between gender and ethnic or nationalist movements. Women in general and mothers in particular are responsible for inculcating the key characteristics that define a cultural or ethnic identity, including such basics as language, religion, dress, and cuisine. Women “serve as boundary markers between different national, ethnic, and religious collectivities” (Kandiyoti, 1991) and thus might be expected to play an important role when such communities come into violent conflict. Yet the relationship between gender, identity, and ethnic or nationalist conflict has received little systematic investigation. In some recent overviews of ethnic conflict, by anthropologists and political scientists alike, one cannot even find *gender* or *women* in the index (Eller, 1999; Gurr, 2000). Nevertheless, a number of scholars have offered promising hypotheses that link gender to nationalism and ethnic conflict. The mandate of the group on “culture, identity, and conflict” is to consider “ethnic conflict as an outcome of identity assertion and/or cultural change,” with such developments in turn a possible “consequence of worldwide political and economic reorganization.” Some of the work on gender and nationalism suggests, for example, that gender identities might mediate some of the relationships between economic globalization or religion and ethnic conflict.

Several hypotheses link gender identities to nationalism and conflict. One set of hypotheses concerns beliefs men and women hold about the attributes of masculinity and femininity as they relate to ethnic/national-

ist conflict and violence. One common hypothesis about men's beliefs is that in order for nationalist movements to become militarized, men must embrace an identity that defines their masculinity as directly linked to the armed protection of their society's women (Enloe, 1993; Nagel, 1998).

For women, there are several possibly contradictory hypotheses. The first is that women must accept their role as the passive, protected segment of society in order for men to identify successfully with a militarized masculinity. Thus, in seeking to anticipate, for example, which ethnic groups might adopt methods of violent secession, one would look to the groups where women are culturally predisposed to accept submissive roles.

However, we know from the case of former Yugoslavia that modern societies with high levels of nominal gender equality (in education, employment, and the like) can also fall prey to ethnic violence. The Yugoslav case gives rise to a set of hypotheses that identifies *changes* in gender relations as a possible early-warning sign of impending ethnicized violence. Pressures on women to produce more babies, and consequent limitations on women's reproductive rights, were a significant component of the nationalist mobilization in Serbia and Croatia, for example. The goals were generally to increase the population of one's ethnic group vis-à-vis the others, and in the most militarized versions, to provide future soldiers for ethnic conflict (Albanese, 1996; Licht and Drakulic, 1996). That gender played a role in the nationalisms of former Yugoslavia seemed apparent also in the conduct of the wars themselves and the extent to which they entailed organized campaigns of mass rape and other sexual atrocities (Allen, 1996; Borneman, 1998).

Contrary to hypotheses associating militarized nationalism with increasing gender inequality are those that see nationalist movements as a vehicle for improving women's status. With rare exceptions, nationalism did not play such a positive role in its original nineteenth century European guise (Kaplan, 1997). Beliefs about the emancipatory potential of nationalism were, however, more widespread in the anticolonial movements of the second half of the twentieth century (Kandiyoti, 1991; McClintock, 1996). And they were especially prominent in the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and the Chiapas rebellion in Mexico (Randall, 1981; Castro, 1995; Poniadowska, 1995; Mora, 1998), even if, in the Sandinista case at least, expectations were disappointed (Randall, 1992, 1994). Thus, a further set of hypotheses suggests that women have sometimes supported nationalist movements, including violent ones, because they perceived them as likely to advance their collective interests. In some cases the militarized nationalist struggles themselves provided opportunities for women that would not have been available under peaceful conditions. Thus, in some nationalist or national-liberation movements, as in

Algeria or Nicaragua, women have sought equality with men in an explicitly militarized context—namely as guerrilla fighters (Amrane-Minne, 1994; Randall, 1981). A militarized nationalist movement can apparently be founded on principles of gender equality as well as on polarized identities of protective male and protected female. One task of future research might be to try to identify the conditions under which one dynamic is more likely than the other.

Looking for early warning signs of the militarization of an ethnic or secessionist movement is complicated by the range of competing hypotheses regarding gender. We would certainly want to pay attention “when a community’s politicized sense of its own identity becomes threaded through with pressures for its men to take up arms, for its women to loyally support brothers, husbands, sons, and lovers to become soldiers” (Enloe, 1993). A highly traditional society with distinct gender identities might be most susceptible to such pressures. But women in a more modern society could also support a violent secessionist movement if the struggle itself provided them opportunities for individual empowerment and if the outcome of national autonomy or independence promised more egalitarian gender relations than existed under the old order. Studies of gender roles in advanced industrial societies with separatist movements, such as Québec in Canada or the Northern League in Italy, might shed light on this question (Cento Bull, 1996; LeClerc and West, 1997; Malette and Chalouk, 1991).

Hypotheses about the impact on gender relations of the promotion of religious identity (especially for religions that posit women’s inferiority and subordination to men) and global economic transformations suggest links between those factors and the propensity for violence (Bookman, 1994; Gagnon, 1994/95; Woodward, 1995). For example, the 50 percent unemployment rate for militia-aged young men in Belgrade in 1991, itself in part a consequence of changes in the international economy, could also be related to demands for women to stay out of the workforce and have babies instead. The relationship between desperate economic conditions, repression of women’s rights, religious fundamentalism, and violence—highlighted most recently in Afghanistan—could easily yield more general hypotheses (Moghadam, 1997; Pollitt, 2001)

A recent study (Goldstein, 2001) has provided a comprehensive survey of hypotheses linking gender and war. It constitutes a good starting point for exploring further hypotheses relating gender to nationalism and ethnic violence, along the lines suggested in this paper.

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A Typology of Identity Conflicts for Comparative Research

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As background for discussions about a research agenda for comparative studies of identity conflicts, it is useful to consider a broad typology of conflicts, a range of conflicts in the former Soviet space that might be included in comparative studies, and the expanse of relevant literature. It is not expected that the eventual research will cover all this range of topics and conflicts. However, having a broad view at the outset may help guide choices of more specific research directions.

TYPOLOGY OF CONFLICTS

This typology includes not only a classification of identity conflicts and their sources, but also classifications of factors that may affect the course of conflicts (particularly the likelihood that they will become violent); ways in which conflicts are manifested; conflict outcomes; and policy tools for preventing, mitigating, transforming, or resolving identity conflicts. We conclude by presenting a model that can address issues of process in identity conflicts, such as the potential for change in the ways the conflict is defined.

Types of Cleavage and Sources of Conflict

Every society has the potential for conflict along various lines of cleavage—social, economic, and political. In an identity conflict, at least some of the parties define their grievances and objectives and organize them-

selves in terms of identity markers in the society. It is useful to distinguish the markers that are associated in a statistical sense with objective differences between groups from those that are used as the basis for organizing grievances. For example, the greatest economic differentiation in a country may be by region, but an internal conflict may be organized around ethnicity instead.

Social cleavages may be defined by a variety of identity markers, including nationality or ethnicity, religion, region, and clan or tribe. Any of these cleavages may be used to organize the grievances of social groups. It is useful to consider both the amount of diversity on these dimensions (for example, the number of ethnic groups and their relative proportions in the population) and the geographic distribution of the diversity (for example, are the ethnic groups stratified by region or dispersed?).

Economic and political cleavages and sources of grievances may also arise along several dimensions. These include levels of income and wealth; differences in political power, influence, and access; freedom or restrictions on cultural, linguistic, or religious expression; demands for political independence or autonomy; and access to land or other natural resources.

Possibilities for Nonviolent Expression and Adjudication of Grievances

The course of a conflict may be influenced by the availability of methods and institutions in the larger society that allow grievances to be expressed and addressed by nonviolent means. It is sometimes hypothesized that conflicts are less likely to become violent if those pressing grievances can take advantage of the following: free elections; free press (though propagandistic media may incite violence); free assembly and expression; traditional conflict resolution methods, for example, intertribal councils; political representation; and effective legal recourse against violence, discrimination, and slander.

Other Contextual Factors Affecting Conflicts

The course of a conflict may also be affected by a variety of other attributes of the society, the conflict, or the groups involved in the conflict. One of these is the *balance of forces* between the parties (typically the government and an opposition group). The balance may be equal or unequal, and if unequal, may be government- or opposition-dominated. The balance includes military capabilities, and also strength of commitment to the conflict (King, 1997). Other factors include the *number of parties to the conflict* (two, three, or multiple); the *existence of external assistance* to any or all parties and the extent and type of such assistance (military, economic,

diplomatic, ideational); *internal sources of resources* for the parties (for example, revenue, arms) and the type and extent of such resources; the *degree of group cohesion* maintained by each party; and the level of *external interest in conflict resolution*.

Manifestations and Outcomes of Conflict

Identity conflicts may have a variety of violent and nonviolent manifestations, all of which may be treated analytically as outcomes of the conflict at the time they are observed. The violent manifestations, ordered roughly from most to least extensive, include organized large-scale warfare; guerilla warfare; ethnic cleansing and forced migration; riots and other mass civil disturbances, either spontaneous or planned, for example, pogroms; and isolated incidents of small-scale violence, such as attacks on individuals or businesses. The variety of nonviolent manifestations of identity conflict includes protests; electoral polarization on identity-group lines; creation of civil society organizations that express political agendas on identity lines, for example, newspapers, identity-defined civic organizations; and complaints in the legal system. Other aspects of identity conflicts may also be analyzed as outcomes. These include changes in the political objectives of the parties, redefinition of the conflict by the parties, and changes in levels of hostility between identity groups.

Policy Tools

Policy tools may be used by parties to the conflict and by third parties within and outside the country where the conflict is located. Some tools are more readily used by internal parties and some by third parties; some tools benefit from the involvement of both. Several general policy strategies and some tools that (primarily) employ each strategy have been identified. The major categories derive from the typology in Stern and Druckman (2000).

Power politics strategies are usually imposed from outside. They include arms embargoes, economic sanctions, judicial measures such as criminal tribunals, military intervention (limited or full-scale; unilateral or multilateral), threats of force, inducements to negotiate, bargaining to trade off interests, and so-called power mediation.

Conflict mitigation strategies may be initiated from outside or by the parties. These include humanitarian assistance, fact-finding missions, mediation, confidence-building measures, traditional peacekeeping operations, multifunctional peacekeeping operations, military and economic technical assistance, and unilateral conflict reduction initiatives—for example, inducements, graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT), compromise on grievances.

Conflict transformation strategies are often initiated from outside, but always involve the parties. These include problem-solving workshops, alternative dispute resolution techniques, and attempts at reconciliation by truth commissions.

Structural prevention strategies always involve the parties and often involve support from outside. These include strategies of electoral system design, autonomy arrangements, power-sharing arrangements—for example, consociationism, ethnic set-asides, legal guarantees of free speech and association, and the development of civil institutions for expression and adjudication of grievances.

Normative change strategies involve the application of international norms, such as human rights, to conflicts that might otherwise be addressed only by local- and national-level institutions.

Modeling Process in Identity Conflicts

It is important for research to pay attention to the variety and fluidity of ways identity conflicts are defined. For example, it is important to take into account the fact that political objectives do not remain the same over time. Moreover, there can be conflicts about objectives within a group, lack of clarity about what a group's objectives are, and different objectives for different groups in a conflict. Sometimes a policy goal is to change the parties' political objectives, for example, from independence to autonomy. A typology that divides conflicts into categories such as ethnic, religious, etc. avoids that problem but doesn't adequately distinguish the objective dimensions of cleavage in the society from the identity markers around which groups organize. Sometimes there may be great economic differences by region, but an insurgency organizes around ethnicity. It may be useful to think about these issues with a metamodel (see Figure 1).




FIGURE 1 A metamodel of issues contributing to identity conflicts.

Contextual factors are things a policy cannot change in a given time frame, but outcomes are contingent on them. Intervening variables are things the policy can target, and outcomes are contingent on them, too, but context may affect them. From this perspective, the category of possibilities for nonviolent expression/adjudication of grievances represents an important class of intervening variables affecting whether a conflict becomes violent. A typology of outcomes should include both violent and nonviolent types.

Research needs to recognize that conflicts are dynamic—that is, that there are important feedbacks not shown in the above simple model. All outcomes are interim, and over the long term, policies may even change contextual factors, for example, the structure of the state, by altering the interim outcomes of the conflict. A fruitful conceptual framework is one that allows the examination of conflicts in time series and that allows for the consideration of feedbacks.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The problem of conflict perpetuation and termination has been approached in several ways, with each approach focusing on specific aspects of conflict, and therefore prescribing different paths to resolution. Early studies argued that the issues at stake in civil wars are indivisible, and therefore negotiated settlements are nearly impossible (Ikle, 1971; Modelski, 1964; Pillar, 1983). This approach was later taken by many of those studying ethnic conflict, leading some to argue that the only solution is partition (Kaufmann, 1996).

Approached from the point of view of causes of conflict or grievances, conflict is seen as the violent expression of unresolved political issues and inequalities. The answer to this situation is often a political solution of democratic governance (Lake, 2001; Rothchild, 1997; Sisk, 1996). Others focus on the termination of conflict and a concern with stable peace agreements, arguing that conflict termination is hindered by security dilemmas and spoilers (Walter and Snyder, 1999; Posen, 1993; Stedman, 1991, 1997). The solution suggested is a power-sharing agreement ensured by a credible security guarantee from international actors. These approaches tend to focus on static moments in the conflict, rather than acknowledging the organic and changing nature of conflict. In other words, these approaches often assume that what initiated the conflict is what keeps it going, and that the groups prefer peace to war.

In contrast to these political and security approaches, a different approach looks at the economics of conflict and the motivation of greed (Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Keen, 1998; Reno, 1998). This approach suggests that parties may not only fi-

nance their war efforts through economic and political networks, but also get rich while doing so. This suggests one reason conflicts persist in resource-rich areas, and also raises a challenge to the assumption that belligerent groups prefer peace to war. The solution suggested is the elimination of access to these economic benefits, often through the imposition of sanctions, as in Sierra Leone. However, these remedies have been relatively ineffective to date.

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Comments on the Design and Direction of the Comparative Study of Identity Conflicts Project

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It is important to have a clear idea of the topic to be conceptualized, classified, catalogued, or explained. The topic *conflicts in multiethnic societies* is enormously broad. Every society (even Armenia) is multiethnic in some sense, while conflict is universal. Limiting the scope to violent ethnic conflict still presents problems, because it is by no means easy to distinguish ethnic from other kinds of conflict. Even with agreement on what ethnicity means, it is often difficult to decide whether a particular conflict is predominately ethnic or something else. For example, is the Chechen conflict ethnic, national, or religious? In what sense is the internal violence in Afghanistan ethnic?

It makes sense to finesse this problem, at least in part, by identifying the topic as identity conflict. Not only does this make the problem of defining *ethnicity* or *ethnic* less important, but it also opens up some very important questions that would be missed if the topic were ethnic conflict, however defined. For example, why has conflict between ethnic groups been the most important line of political cleavage in Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz vs. Uzbeks, Kyrgyz vs. Tajiks), while regional/clan cleavages (Kulyabis vs. Garmis vs. Leninabadis) have been most important in Tajikistan? In Uzbekistan, in contrast, political opposition is mobilizing on the basis of religion (an Islamic Wahhabi opposition versus a more or less secular regime). Are there particular policies or contingent factors that account for these differences, or are structural factors more important?

Another important question, and one of great importance to policy makers in the Soviet successor states today, is why in some cases—for

example, Chechnya—does what begins as a nationalist conflict or a war of national liberation, in which the primary mobilizing mythology of resistance is opposition to what is seen as imperial occupation, change into a conflict where religious mythologies of resistance become far more important? Or why in Afghanistan did a war of national liberation that initially cut across ethnoreligious cleavages (Tajik-Pashtun, Shia-Sunni) become Islamized (Islamist parties had basically defeated the traditionalist parties by the time the Soviets had withdrawn) and then, after 1992, become increasingly ethnicized (Pashtun versus Tajik)?

One plausible hypothesis is that the era of romantic ethnonationalism has run its course in the former Soviet space and that ethnonationalism as an ideology is now almost as discredited as communism (and for that matter, liberalism). Militant Islam in the North Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere is seen by national authorities as the greatest threat to internal order because it provides the only remaining effective ideology of resistance for the opposition movements. And it may bring with it considerable material support from the outside, including training, weapons, and funding, but also an elaborate and well-funded propaganda apparatus.

Another important question we can ask: Why in some cases of conflict is there spontaneous, decentralized, communal, nonorganized interethnic violence (as in the attempts at ethnic cleansing by both sides in Abkhazia, or the pogroms in Azerbaijan against Armenians), while in other cases there is much less? In the Chechen conflict, for example, the Chechens never slaughtered Russian civilians in a concerted effort to drive them out of the republic. Is there something about the ethnic quality of the Chechen-Russian conflict that distinguishes it from the Abkhaz-Georgian or Armeno-Azeri conflicts? We should not assume that the motivations, interests, concerns, or fears that initiate a conflict are the same as those that sustain it or make it difficult or impossible to settle or both—which is to say, particular conflicts may move from one box of a typology to another over time.

It might make sense to begin discussing typology by distinguishing among types of cleavage—ethnonational, religious, regional, clan, and others. Only then should there be differentiation among political objectives (secession, autonomy, regime change, and so forth). One should also include objectives that are less clearly political, particularly those associated with more spontaneous forms of intercommunal violence, such as ethnic purification or cleansing (that is, simply driving those perceived as others out, at whatever cost) or changes in status, power, or wealth (you had the jobs, wealth, political power, housing, now we should—which is apparently what was behind the Kyrgyz-Uzbek bloodletting in Osh in June 1990, as well as the pogroms against the Meskhetian Turks in the

Ferghana Valley in June 1989). It is also worth noting that it may be extremely difficult to identify the political objectives of various parties to a conflict—what, for example, are the political objectives of bin-Laden’s al Qaeda network?

When considering contextual variables, group cohesion is not necessarily a function of agreement or disagreement on goals or tactics, and neither is it very easy to assess. The Chechens are arguably extremely cohesive, in the sense they fight the Russians ferociously and effectively, but they also fight among themselves, and their resistance is highly decentralized. Are they a cohesive group? Much the same can be said of the Pashtuns.

Any list of case studies should include some “dogs that didn’t bark”—for example, Tatarstan; Dagestan (more or less not barking); Karachaevo-Cherkessia; Adjaria; Akhalkalaki; the Lezgins, Talysh, and Gaguaz; or the Russians (or Russian speakers) in Kazakhstan or the Baltics. Adding “dogs that didn’t bark” would mean starting the typology with a violent/non-violent outcome slicing. Also, it implies that it is possible to accurately distinguish “near violence” from “never close to violence.”

Finally, a list of policy tools should not be restricted to what external actors can do. There is a huge menu of options (all manipulable variables, but the people doing the manipulating are different) available to the leaderships of the respective parties to a conflict. These options include symbolic acts, such as flattering the other side instead of insulting it, allowing the leaders of other parties to sit at the table as equals; particular policies, for example, preferential versus discriminatory treatment, particularly in the field of language/education; and particular institutions (itself a vast topic—for example, territorial or nonterritorial autonomy, the electoral system, presidential versus parliamentary systems and subtypes, ethnic set-asides, full-blown consociationism, gerrymandering to increase/decrease representation). It also makes sense to distinguish between policy tools available to internal actors and those available to external actors.

**General Analyses
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Multiethnic States and Conflicts After the USSR*

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The primary purpose of this analysis is to provide an overview of major issues and to determine the most promising areas for a National Academies-Russian Academy of Sciences research project on conflicts in multiethnic societies.

TERRITORY, BORDERS, AND RESOURCES

Territorial issues over and claims to natural resources are directly related to the status of ethnic relations and potential conflicts. Moreover, most armed conflicts are caused by these issues. In this context, territory serves not only as a utilitarian life-supporting resource, but also as a symbol of history or culture or both of a given nation, or a "historic land." In the post-Soviet environment, in spite of a long-time and extensive mingling of people with different cultures, ethnicity used to be and still is highly territorialized, predominantly through doctrines and emotions. This link was reinforced by the newly emerging polities and now it carries substantial political weight: Ukraine is a land of Ukrainians and Estonia is a land of Estonians; the others non-titulars live on ethnic territories not their own. Therefore, to what extent is peaceful cultural mix possible within the post-Soviet states or are these states doomed to move toward ethnic homogenization through out-migration, assimilation, and even cleansing? Answering this question will have significant scientific value

*Translated from the Russian by Rita Kit.

and will influence policy making to ensure the democratic and peaceful management of complex societies. It is likely that no single solution will be found for all countries, but some of the problems are similar, and there is sufficient international experience that can be applicable.

The breakup of the Soviet Union, where administrative borders between republics were not defined, resulted in serious tensions in many regions, especially in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. First, there are disputed territories both in the mountainous areas and in the river valleys and oases. Attempts to impose strict control, up to the mining of border zones, as Uzbekistan did on the border with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in a unilateral order, results in deprivation, extortion, and sacrifice among the common population. Second, the population of the post-Soviet states, especially culturally-related populations of the border regions, do not wish to recognize rigid lines. These strict borders interfere with human relations and everyday business.

Immediately after the breakup of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), serious mistakes were made not only in the area of citizenship rules and regulations, but also in formulating the new border regime. In our view, the situation required at least a decade of free movement and free choice of citizenship. Although we cannot go back in time to correct these errors, one very important conclusion can be made based on this experience: People will respect national borders only when they are transparent and democratically established.

One can argue that transparency of the post-Soviet borders may be contrary to the new states' desire to build up their national security and defend themselves from outside extremists and paramilitary groups. But, it is much better to build effective cooperation among authorities, armed forces, and special services of the post-Soviet states, rather than installing roadblocks and mine fields. Post-Soviet states possess various territories and natural resources, and no considerable changes took place after the breakup, except for some newly created states losing control over part of their territories because of armed separatist struggles. These events represent serious challenges for several countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and to some extent, the larger world community. All of the secessionist conflicts took place in the first half of the 1990s, and most of them ended with some form of military victory, but none of the self-proclaimed separatist regions has achieved its political objective of creating a viable and recognized state. At the same time, none of these territories has been returned to the control of the central government. Some of these regions have transformed into isolated military-political formations with various degrees of political governance and some form of a blockade economy. This situation has existed for more than a decade and can last for an even

longer time. However, this does not mean the conflict has been resolved. Rather, it has halted, with the danger of a new cycle of violence as with Chechnya three years after the first war. The experience of restoring constitutional order in this part of Russia in 1999-2001 clearly illustrates the difficulty of restaging lost battles, where sovereignty over the territory and governance systems has been lost. An alternative scenario—namely, accepting the separation of the region—does not solve the problem either. Post-Soviet states will not accept a second round of disintegration.

In this context, the past decade brought growing understanding that separation of states per se does not encourage economic and cultural prosperity, much less bolster the nations' self-determination. The price of separation (including human casualties and economic losses) is much higher than the strategy of improving governance systems, including improving ethnic relations based on the principles of internal self-determination and democratic governance. The Yugoslavian crisis and the situation in the former Soviet republics marks rethinking of the minority problem, which dominated the second half of the twentieth century and remains vital for the European community and the post-Soviet countries. The new approach is that the only solution to the territorial disputes in the multiethnic societies is not creating new borders, but searching for mutually acceptable ways of social governance on a common territory.

However, this declaration does very little for specific ongoing open conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union. From a strategic standpoint, these conflicts can be ended one of two ways: either by forcing the will of central governments on separatist regions or through negotiated compromise. In recent years, both ways were tried, but it is too early to claim any success. It is possible that joint efforts (and not only a joint declaration of the CIS members about their commitment to the principles of territorial integrity) will change the situation. Nevertheless, preservation of the status quo, namely, keeping these conflicts simmering is the worse possible scenario.

Territorial issues remain potential sources of conflicts within the Russian Federation; however, during recent years their significance has diminished. At this point, there are no explicit territorial disputes among the subjects of the Russian Federation, except for some unresolved consequences of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict. Separate radical appeals to draw new, fair borders lack support from the public and government authorities. Even so, these problems exist and they could escalate. I can mention several cases, the Chechnya-Dagestan and Chechnya-Ingushetia borders, the claim of Kalmykia to regain a part of the Astrakhan Oblast in Volga Delta, the unification of three different Buryat autonomies, and a unique situation with Russia's territorial enclave—the Kaliningrad Oblast severely isolated by the Shengen visa regime. Constant monitoring and

preparation of adequate responses remains a necessity in Russia and other nations.

As far as natural resources are concerned, the last decade illustrated that among CIS and Baltic states, the best results in economic well-being and fairness of natural resources utilization were achieved by nations without the largest reserves. In large nations, many natural resources of the former Soviet Union are still being used jointly—some nations receive direct benefits from these resources; some nations gain from transportation routes; others do not have any of the above, and therefore, they cannot take any advantage from these resources. With the exception of the Caspian Sea resources and fresh water in Central Asia, there are no disputed natural resources within FSU territory. However, it is possible for tension to appear in the tie between agrarian overpopulation of the countries of Central Asia and the growing need of water resources. These problems affect not only the region itself but also Russia as a potential donor of the vital resource.

Within the Russian Federation itself, the issue of natural resource distribution and utilization has been primarily resolved through constitutional means, policies of budget federalism, and targeted development and economic assistance programs. However, there appears to be a very important issue that remains underestimated. It is probable that natural resources have been distributed unequally—northern regions and Siberia possess larger deposits than southern and some central parts of Russia. Some subjects of the Federation, for example, the North Caucasus, possess few natural resources. Nevertheless, standards of living in these regions often do not correspond to the resource base of that particular territory. People residing in the donor regions, like Bashkortostan, Yakutia, Komi, the Udmurtia and Tatarstan Republics, northern autonomous okrugs should live better than the population of the regions receiving federal budget aid. Otherwise, tensions are inevitable, and some of these tensions might be based on ethnic issues.

Overall, the Russian Federation possesses sufficient natural resources to provide a reasonable level of social well-being. In order to prevent internal tensions and conflicts, the state should avoid significant inequalities in the living standards of different regions. At the same time, attempts to impose a rigid egalitarian system or transfer additional funds to certain regions in return for political loyalty will not yield positive results.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND MIGRATION

During the past decade, two major factors shaped the demographic situation in the FSU. First, the population declined because of a drop in the birth rate and an increase in mortality. The second factor was the

unprecedented growth of migration. The overall population of the FSU was reduced by approximately 5-6 million people (some of that from emigration to other parts of the world). The most noticeable population declines were in Armenia, Georgia, the Baltic states, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Population growth rates in Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics remain relatively high (yet lower than in Turkey); however, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are donating a serious proportion of the male working population as labor migrants to Russia. Russia, like the Baltic states, has suffered serious negative natural growth, but the loss of population has been compensated by immigration. Since 1990, the country has experienced a very high migration flow. Through an exchange of population with other former Soviet republics, Russia has increased its population by 5 million; it has lost one million in migration exchange with the rest of the world. The country's total population is about 145 million people (147.8 in 1989), but this estimate does not include the large number of non-registered (illegal) migrants, most of whom will stay in Russia (for example, Meskhetian Turks).

Population decline is not related to shock therapy, or rapid impoverishment of the population, since in Russia, for example, the highest birth rates are registered in the North Caucasus, especially in the rural areas of Dagestan, the Republic of Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. Natural population growth (or decline) has no direct link to ethnic relations and ethnic conflicts, although overall political instability and conflicts may have an adverse impact on birth rates and, obviously, on the number of deaths. In Chechnya alone, direct (combat casualties) and indirect losses (from diseases and collapse of the healthcare system) could reach one hundred thousand people.

At the same time, differences in birth rates can be identified along ethnic borders, sometimes even within the same region, community, city, and city quarters. Large families in one ethnic group may cause a negative attitude from representatives of other nationalities, which in turn can lead to ethnic tensions. Some specialists and politicians have issued alarming forecasts, and authorities have responded inadequately. Some regions and cities deliberately imposed limitations on registration and housing, introduced declared and undeclared restrictions on labor markets, and so forth. In some instances, attempts were made to exile members of non-indigenous ethnic groups with higher birth rates.

Excessive attention and politicizing the issue of different birth rates among various ethnic groups in the Russian Federation cannot yield any positive outcome. Demographic processes will always have their own dynamics, which should be accepted as a natural phenomenon. We should learn to adjust to new realities and attempt to benefit from them rather than turning them into the source of potential conflict.

Demographic situations are shaped not only by natural growth (or decline) of the population, but also by migration processes. The ethnic makeup of the population and its proportions are determined through marriages (resulting in a change in identities and the passage of representatives from one group to another) and assimilation. In this regard, Russians have almost always emerged as the culturally and quantitatively dominant ethnonation in the Russian Federation. Despite the growth of ethnic identity among non-Russian residents of the Federation, this trend holds. Russianness remains the preferred group identification in the country, and most offspring of mixed marriages usually choose it as their ethnic identity.

Sharp changes in the migration processes in the FSU became the second major component shaping the status of ethnic relations and conflicts. Migration from rural to urban areas is not included in the scope of this analysis, although it would have been required for proper ethnographic monitoring. Often, ethnic conflicts start as conflicts between rural and urban populations, as in Chechnya, where the urban population was predominately Russian, while the majority of the rural population was Chechen. Here, we are primarily interested in the migration between different states and the ethnic characteristics of this process.

Recent decades produced a number of new trends and features. First, there was a sharp increase in international migration and a slowdown in the internal movement of people (other than forced migrants from the areas of armed conflicts in, for example, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Russia). As a result of the Chechen war, half of its former population (approximately five hundred thousand people) moved to other parts of Russia. A similar number of people were forcefully moved because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan. In Georgia at least two hundred thousand people were forced to leave Abkhazia and forty thousand left South Ossetia.

Sizable movements of people primarily took place between Russia and other former Soviet republics; earlier, it happened between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Russian Federation experienced a sharp increase of inflow with simultaneous reduction of outflow of its population. According to official data, more than five million people moved to Russia during the past 10 years. However, this number does not include undocumented immigrants and the so-called shuttle migrants (people who spend most of their time in Russia, have jobs and residences there, but keep the citizenship of another country). Russian society (including politicians and academicians) understood poorly that the arrival of culturally related and economically valuable migrants from the former Soviet republics was in fact a benefit, most likely the only factor working against depopulation

and acting as a source of development. However, these migrants were not embraced (net migration declined from eight hundred thousand in 1994 to two hundred thousand in 2000). The economic uncertainties and the Chechen war were not the only reasons for curbing immigration to the Russian Federation. Potential immigrants were concerned about how they would be received by the authorities and the rest of the population, and what would happen with registration, housing, and schools for their children. Xenophobia and incompetence of Russian experts and policy makers channeled energy and fears into the false direction of "consolidating the Russian nation" and "repatriation of the compatriots." Instead of supporting valuable workers from Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine, a federal law was passed, granting preferential treatment to ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics (most likely, no longer interested in moving to Russia) and the descendants of former Russian emigrants residing primarily in such countries as Israel and the United States. In reality, strict anti-immigration policy is still pursued. Starting in 2000, simplified procedures for obtaining Federation citizenship are no longer in place; passport and visa agencies are prohibited from accepting new citizenship applications. Restrictions on migration and receipt of Russian citizenship for all residents of the Soviet Union regardless of nationality are clear examples of nearsighted and self-destructive Russian policies.

A few million new residents slowed the natural decline of the country's population and seemingly should have removed grounds for claims about the so-called demographic disaster. Russia is not losing seven hundred thousand or even one million people a year, and any statements and forecasts to that effect are unscientific and politically self-destructive. Besides, these statements become a breeding ground for Russian chauvinism, since it is the Russian people who are supposedly dying out. Nevertheless, sharp changes in the usual makeup of the population in various Russian regions have caused some social and cultural-psychological problems. Even ethnic Russians settling into their new communities were faced with problems of adaptation and integration in the new surroundings.

Recent monitoring indicated that anti-immigrant tendencies are rising in Russia and several other countries. None of the countries has a policy of stimulating immigration, although all of them, with the exception of Azerbaijan and the Central Asian countries need such policies to ensure their further development. Our conclusion is that exchanges of population in the form of temporary or permanent migration will continue in the former Soviet Union and these countries should compete for human resources. It should not become reason to create additional barriers between countries. Xenophobia toward immigrants of other ethnicities should be overcome through public awareness and education, and even

administrative actions against politicians, government officials, and employers, if necessary.

POWER, THE STATE, AND ETHNICITY

What is the recent history and current context of legislative and regulatory actions regarding managing ethnic diversity and ethnic relations in complex multiethnic societies, such as the Russian Federation and other former Soviet states? There are numerous, and unfortunately, fruitless debates among Russian academicians and policy makers. At the same time, law making and its practical implementation has yielded some positive results, although numerous mistakes were made, and several opportunities lost.

Positive results include several federal laws and regulations, that is, the Concept of State Nationality Policy in the Russian Federation (1996), the Federal Law on National and Cultural Autonomy (1996), and Federal Law on Support and Development of Small Nations of the Russian Federation (1999). The Russian Federation also joined a number of international conventions, including a framework convention of the European Council, on the Rights of National Minorities.

At present, the Russian Federation is revisiting the fundamental principles of the federal state. Currently, the Federation comprises ethnoterritorial autonomies (republics, autonomous oblasts, and districts) and regular administrative units of the Federation, namely oblasts and krais. The weakness of the state during a period of tremendous social transformation, a lack of competence, and a sense of responsibility and political will on behalf of politicians can explain the wide diversity of actions and declarations, some of which are simply unacceptable in mature societies. Obviously, the scope of these conflicts, especially results of the first war in Chechnya—the semirecognition of an armed separate region totally outside of the central government's control—shocked Russian society and became a serious burden for the present generation of Russian politicians, most of whom are truly concerned about the well-being of their country and their constituencies.

Some may argue that there are simple solutions to these problems: let Chechnya (or the entire North Caucasus) go; turn present-day republics into states; let the Russian people exercise their right of self-determination; let everybody have their state and government structures, and so forth. Some take the opposite stance, urging the use of force to restore law and order in the country and to eliminate ethnoterritorial autonomies. The number of forecasts and proposals at the level of official discussions and in sociopolitical literature is so high that there seems to be no chance of introducing any sort of order into the mental chaos and resulting policy.

We do not support this fatalistic position and believe that the overall development and even evolution of the state is the result of targeted, daily efforts. The better thought-through and targeted these efforts are, the better the final outcome. Nothing is programmed in history. History is best used as a political and ideological resource. Obviously, there are several limitations in place, including the predominant state of mind. It is difficult to change views and perceptions, which were imposed and reinforced throughout long periods of time. The proper level of expertise and competency cannot be achieved overnight, either. Experience illustrates that it is easier to learn how to set up a bank or a successful enterprise than to draft a law or a presidential decree, not resembling the structure of communist party resolutions, and capable of working in a modern environment.

All of the above implies that there is a great need to educate (or re-educate) average citizens as well as the political elite about what state they live in, the fundamental principles of that state, and the territory it occupies. In order to educate Russia (or learn what Russia means), there is no need to make fast and ill-conceived conclusions, especially involving restructuring and disintegration of the state. States are the most stable and long lasting form of social coalitions of people. Although they are not created by God and not expected to last forever, every generation has limited rights to change and transform this legacy.

EXPERIENCE OF THE POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING

All modern states were first formed on a political level. Creation of the new social and cultural communities came later. The same thing happened in 1991, where the words "Russia," "Ukraine," "Kazakhstan," etc. were used to describe new formations. What it really meant (other than new borders between former republics and various degrees of local nationalism/patriotism) remained unclear for politicians and the rest of the FSU population. Actual creation of the new states by institution building began after the collapse of the former Soviet Union.

Russia's route was the most difficult not because it has fewer resources or less reason to become an independent state, but because Russia was the country most closely associated with the FSU, and there was a lack of clarity in the overall direction and objectives of the nation-building process. This lack of clarity in the process of Russian state building was caused by the fact that most of the ideologists of socialist federalism and proponents of the resolution of the nationality issue have lived and stayed in Moscow. The breakup of the FSU limited the activities of these so-called specialists to the boundaries of Russia, which made life easier for

other countries. However Russia was not so lucky: Some Soviet passport holders with the right nationality, that is, similar in pronunciation to the name of the republic, found themselves to be the owners of the nation-state, while others had their home base in other parts of the country, or even outside of it. This unfortunate friend-foe formula was long lasting and caused discrimination, ethnic tensions, and conflicts.

Even though the post-Soviet states were created on behalf of all their respective residents participating in the voting (regardless of the actual vote of a specific individual), during the further legislative process, exclusive or preferred status was grabbed by the representatives of the one ethnic group (indigenous or titular ethnicity). This process was executed through various legal loopholes. The most widely used one was wording in the constitution, stating that the state is created on behalf of all its residents, then adding that the state is the tool of self-determination of a specific ethnicity and therefore is a nation-state of ethnic Moldovans, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and so forth. Overall, except for some declarations, nobody seriously considered cocitizenship or civic approaches to nation building.

As a result, newly created states abandoned the old Soviet concept of multinationalism and embraced the traditional concepts of ethnonationalism, which could be described as follows: Ukraine is defined as a national state of ethnic Ukrainians; all other people are defined as national minorities. They can become members of that nation only through the process of *Ukrainization*, that is, cultural assimilation, sometimes more softly referred to as integration. This approach was used throughout the rest of the newly created states, except for the Baltic states. However, in Latvia and Estonia, where in principle citizenship is linked to the idea of the nation, this is made up for by excluding the overwhelming majority of nonindigenous ethnic groups from citizenship, which is viewed as a cultural-linguistic consideration—*Latvia-ization* or *Estonia-ization*.

THE INEVITABILITY OF FUTURE CORRECTIONS

The choice of ethnonationalism as a fundamental principle of state building was not a random one. This choice was made in order for the new states to distance themselves from Russia and its culture, which is dominated by the Russian language, and to protect the new state cultures and official languages. This approach also enabled some states to limit the number of people that claim access to power and resources, especially during privatization and other market reforms. Most importantly, this approach maintains the old ideology that nationality is not citizenship, but a membership in a specific ethnic and cultural group. This mentality

prevented the noncitizens and minorities from playing a more active part in the larger political process. No one explained to these groups that the newly created states are their common property and that the government must speak the language of its taxpayers, which implies having at least two official languages in the countries where over half the population (including members of the political elite) speak Russian, and not Ukrainian, Kazakh, or Moldovan languages.

Even with the shortcomings of this process in the newly created multiethnic states of the FSU (except Russia), many of them have a chance to correct the situation and to move away from the principles of ethnonationalism toward truly democratic and all-inclusive principles of state building. With the presence of a huge Russian-language culture in neighboring Russia and the status of the Russian language as one of the leading world languages, newly created states will have serious difficulties trying to eliminate the Russian language from their countries, for example, switching the Gagause population in Moldova from the Russian to the Moldovan language, as part of the *derussification* of the non-Russian ethnic groups. Cultural and language issues have nothing to do with the colonial past, which has to be dismantled. Therefore, ethnonationalism becomes counterproductive, and it will be replaced by civic nationalism in order to keep new polities from disintegration.

Eventually all the groups initially excluded from the process of nation building will claim a more prominent role for themselves, with other countries setting the example for nonimmigrant national minorities being included in the definition of the nation. There exist all the reasons to treat Russians in Ukraine or in Kazakhstan as partner communities, rather than national minorities. Another important issue relating to the constitutional arrangements in the post-Soviet states is that they all (except Russia) chose a unitary form of organization and did not risk federalism. In general, a unitary state can exist in the multiethnic societies, but a federation seems to be preferable, since it allows for internal self-determination. Such autonomous units exist in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Moldova, and even Ukraine (the Crimean Republic). Federations are possible and necessary in such countries as Georgia and Ukraine, not only because of the ethnic factors but also because of a wide cultural and regional diversity, which exists in many post-Soviet states.

FROM MULTINATIONALISM TO A DIVERSE NATION

What is the situation in Russia today—the only country that kept the references to multinationalism in its constitution, while imparting more innovative concepts, such as the multiethnic nation?

The recent term *national minorities* seems hardly acceptable for Russia. This statement does not mean that there are no national minorities in the Russian Federation or that the state refuses to recognize the specific rights of a part of its population. In fact, Russia went further in protecting the rights of the national minorities, beyond guaranteeing them cultural autonomy. Since the Soviet era these small non-Russian nations had a certain degree of self-determination in their territories, and the current Russian constitution preserves these republic-states. These ethnic communities have long been nationalized on political and emotional levels, and will obviously not be willing to accept the minority status. The same reasons prevent them from accepting the possible and even desirable idea of the Russian civic nation.

Ethnic rights are collective rights, and they are supposed to enhance individual rights, rather than substitute or dominate them. Collective ethnic rights are a double-edged sword, and should be used carefully and expertly. Recent years proved that in an underdeveloped civil rights culture, ethnic rights can be used to support ungrounded claims and demands, impose minority rule, and even bring down the central state through an armed separatist movement. These practices exacerbate ethnic tensions and distrust in the rest of the population. The situation may become extremely tense if the state is undergoing an identity crisis or if there is competition for limited resources.

This is what is happening in the Russian Federation. The worst variant would be to attempt to realize the radical dismantling of collective rights, including an important democratic acquisition by a federative organization with elements of ethnic federalism. Existing laws provide many more options, some of which have not been tried. Federalism in the multiethnic states does not necessarily provide stability, since not all the relevant issues have to be resolved by the present generation of policy makers. It is the overall approach and fundamental principles, such as recognition of cultural diversity and desire for integration that are important. There are many forms of federalism, and federalism can have a very strong integration component, provided that we can ensure support of local political elites, always keeping local interests in mind. These local interests present a major obstacle to integration. Federalism by itself is not enough. The entire population must accept and develop dual loyalties and identity, form broad coalitions crossing ethnic and regional boundaries, and create motivation for integration.

The application of federalism should not be restricted to the way that the government authorities are set up. The federal legal system allows coexistence of mutually enhancing or even parallel legal systems, combining central (national) law and legal norms of different cultures. To accomplish that, one does not need to revitalize nonexistent historic tradi-

tions such as mountainous democracy and tribal communities. It is the recognition of legal pluralism arising from ethnic diversity that is important—as long as these different legal traditions do not undermine the fundamental principles of state and do not provoke a mass exodus from the legal framework.

Problems of Maintaining Ethnopolitical Stability and the Prevention of Conflicts in the Volga Federal District*

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The Volga Federal District comprises 15 subjects of the Russian Federation. Of the 32 national-administrative entities in Russia, 7 are located in the district, and 6 of these are considered republics (Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Mary-El, Mordovia, Tatarstan, and Chuvashia). The total population of the district is 31.5 million. More than 100 nationalities live in the district, including 22.5 million Russians (71.2 percent), 3.6 million Tatars (12 percent), 1.4 million Chuvash (4.7 percent), 1 million Bashkorts (3.2 percent), 787,500 Mordovians (2.5 percent), 598,500 Udmurts (1.9 percent), and others.¹

Adherents of 58 religious denominations may be found here. The Volga Federal District represents a minimodel of Russia. Historically, through the course of many centuries of coexistence and cooperation among various ethnic groups within the territory of the district, traditions of mutual understanding and respect, interethnic dialogue, and religious tolerance developed among the Slavic, Turkic, and Finno-Ugric peoples.

Unlike the North Caucasus region, the ethnopolitical situation in the Volga region is relatively stable. Outbreaks of separatism and so-called status conflicts in the republics have receded into the past, extinguished as a result of agreements reached on the division of powers and spheres

*Translated from the Russian by Rita S. Guenther.

¹Zorin, V. Y. 2001. Ethnic-religious map of the Volga Federal District and survey of inter-ethnic communication, *Ethnopanorama* 3:15.

of authority between the federal and lower-level governments. Work is currently under way in the regions to bring republic constitutions and laws into accordance with federal laws and the constitution of the Russian Federation. This process is close to completion. Of 1,100 legislative acts passed at various levels that did not comply with federal laws and the constitution of the Russian Federation, only 11 have yet to be brought into compliance, of which 6 are in the Republic of Tatarstan. Changes will be made in the constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. According to a statement by the president of the republic, Mintimer Shaimiev, a constitutional commission will review the constitution in the near future.²

At the same time, a number of problems existing in the sphere of political life and interethnic relations in Russia are especially characteristic of the regions of the Volga Federal District.

The unequal access to power of various ethnic groups could become a potential conflict-generating factor, with the republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan being possible examples. An analysis of the makeup of the higher leadership of the republics indicates an obvious predominance of representatives of the titular nationalities above other ethnic groups. In the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 59.6 percent are Bashkorts, and among the heads of local government administrations, 54.8 percent are Bashkorts, although that ethnic group comprises 21.8 percent of the republic's population. Meanwhile, 28.5 percent of the region's population is Tatar, although they make up only 11.1 percent and 16.4 percent respectively of the membership in the above-mentioned governmental bodies. In Bashkortostan, Russians make up 39.3 percent of the population. Representatives of the Russian ethnic group make up 25.9 percent of the membership of the Cabinet of Ministers and 23.3 percent of the heads of local government administrations. An analysis of the ethnic composition of the two most recent convocations of the State Assembly of the Republic of Bashkortostan likewise provides evidence of the predominance of deputies of the Bashkort nationality, which does not correspond to the proportion of this ethnic group in the overall population of the republic. The proportion of deputies who are ethnic Russians is nearly half the proportion of the Russian population of Bashkortostan, and conversely, the proportion of Bashkort deputies is twice as high as the proportion of that ethnicity in the overall population. This is partially a result of the policy developed by Stalin in which distribution of the key posts in the regions was conducted along ethnic lines and according to which indigenous nations have been assigned a leading role in the regional governments. In the opinion of researcher Ildar Gabdrifikov, the ethnic fac-

²Kalashnikova, M. 2001. Regional leaders return. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, November 28.

tor is the most effective mechanism for sharply constricting the social base of potential contenders for higher state posts. Furthermore, the researcher believes that subethnic, local, and clan factors still play a shadowy role.³

Border-related problems represent the next serious conflict-generating factor. They are particularly intense in Orenburg Oblast. The great length of the Russian-Kazakh border that forms one of the oblast's borders—1,876 kilometers (one-third of the length of the entire Russian border with Kazakhstan)—remains a critically important factor determining the ethnopolitical situation in the region. The region has become a sort of *cordon sanitaire*, restraining the penetration into Russia of narcotics and contraband goods from the countries of Central Asia and beyond.

In 2000 the volume of contraband shipments totaled tens of millions of rubles. In the last two years, up to 3 metric tons of narcotics (marijuana, opium, and heroin) have been seized. The volumes of heroin confiscated range from one gram to tens of kilograms. The increasing prevalence of heroin is evidenced by the fact that it has become comparatively cheap on the black market in the cities of the oblast, including in the border city of Orsk, where it sells for one-third the price that it does in the city of Orenburg. The widespread public opinion is that heroin is transported and sold mainly by nationals of the Central Asian states. However this is no more than part of the negative stereotypes developed in the public perception of these nationals. The facts suggest that a significant portion of drug-related crime is perpetrated by the citizens of Russia itself. From January through March 2001, 1,033 crimes related to the illegal narcotics trade were registered in Orenburg Oblast.

One reason for the influx of narcotics may be found in the multitude of border problems that remain unresolved. These problems require operational solutions. One example is the situation along the Orenburg section of the Western Kazakhstan Railroad, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy. This 110-kilometer section of the railway and the junction station Ilek-1 belong to the Republic of Kazakhstan. This makes it difficult to institute full and effective customs and border controls.

Surveys of the residents of the border regions of Orenburg Oblast have shown that the respondents have their own ideas regarding how border security should be handled. Opinions were divided into two positions supported by approximately equal numbers of people: 41.4 percent believe that the border should be strictly secured, while 43.4 percent believe that it should be relatively free for contacts between citizens of Rus-

³Gabdrafikov, I. M. 2001. Ethnic and general-citizen aspects of nationalities policy in the republics of contemporary Russia (based on materials from the Republic of Bashkortostan). *Ethnopanorama* 3:24-25.

sia and Kazakhstan, with a developed network of transit points. It should be noted that tensions regarding the border are increasing in the public consciousness. Whereas in 1998, 20.4 percent of Russians polled felt that the border should be strictly secured, by 2000, 46.4 percent of Russians felt that way. There was a similar change in the position of *Russian Kazakhs*.⁴ In 1998, 11.7 percent and in 2000, 28.2 percent supported strict enforcement of the border. At present, a Russian-Kazakh group is continuing its work on delineating the state border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan.⁵

Another conflict-generating problem is connected with the border, namely, immigration processes. Because the oblast is located on the border and its territory is crossed by heavily used transportation routes, it is among the areas in the Russian Federation receiving the highest number of migrants.

From 1992 through 2000, *refugee* and *forced migrant*⁶ status was granted to 67,800 of the 73,200 people who applied to the migration service. Overall, during this period, some 200,000 migrants arrived. For a region with a population of 2 million, 200,000 is a fairly large number.

The main influx of migrants came from the Central Asian states, involving 86.5 percent of the total number of immigrants from 1992 through 1999 and 95 percent in 2000. Moreover, the percentage of those coming from Kazakhstan is increasing.⁷ Whereas it was 34 percent in 1994, it was 36 percent in 1995, 39.4 percent in 1996, and 64.1 percent from 1999-2000. Among Kazakhs, there is a wave of migration under way, meaning that much of it is undocumented.

Of the total number of registered migrants from 1992 through 2000, Russians composed 69.3 percent; Tatars, 9.1 percent; Ukrainians, 9.6 percent; Bashkorts, 1.9 percent; Chechens, 1.4 percent; Germans, 1.2 percent; Kazakhs, 1.1 percent; and Mordovians, 1.0 percent. The Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas are also growing intensively.

Migrants represent a rather good resource for the oblast. For example, of the 47,000 migrants aged 16 and over, 7,100 are university graduates,

⁴Russian political scientists and sociologists often use the term *Russian Kazakhs*, *Russian Uzbeks*, etc. when referring to the migrants of Russian nationality that formerly lived in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other former USSR republics or CIS countries.

⁵Tishkov, V. A., and E. I. Filippova, eds. 2001. *Interethnic Relations and Conflicts in Post-Soviet States*. Annual Report 2000. Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, pp. 124-125.

⁶The term *forced migrant* is introduced in the corresponding Federal Law of the Russian Federation. There are two major laws regulating migration in Russia, namely the Law on Refugees and the Law on Forced Migrants. Forced migrants are virtually economic migrants.

⁷This percent includes migrants of different nationalities (Russian, Tatars, Kazakhs, etc.).

and 16,500 either have completed two years of university study or have graduated from specialized vocational schools.⁸

However, the problems of the migrants place an additional burden on the infrastructure of the oblast (housing, jobs, day care). The situation is further aggravated by the fact that Russia has still not affirmed an overall concept governing state migration policy. These factors decrease the tolerance of local residents. This is another conflict-generating factor. Among the negative consequences of migration, the local population notes

- reduced availability of jobs
- reduced availability of housing
- increased crime rates
- aggravated interethnic relations
- possibilities of the spread of infectious disease

Incidentally, as sociological surveys demonstrate, the migrants themselves have an overly positive estimation of the way in which the local population views them. The migrants perceive the attitude of locals as mainly loyal, however reality often overturns this perception.

On the whole, of the group of respondents who were asked the question "Are there any nationalities toward which you feel hostility?" 28 percent answered yes in 1998, while in October 2001 this figure had risen to 49 percent. Intolerance is primarily expressed towards people from the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, Chechens, Armenians, Azeris, and Roma.

Migration processes are also characteristic of other regions in the Volga Federal district. In Perm Oblast, approximately 9,000 forced migrants have been registered,⁹ and in Saratov Oblast, statistics on migration inflows have previously shown up to 58 percent of arrivals coming from Kazakhstan, 15 percent from Uzbekistan, and 4.2 percent from Tajikistan and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).¹⁰

Another potentially conflict-generating factor is becoming particularly acute in the regions of the Volga Federal District, namely internal contradictions within the Muslim *umma* (community of believers). For example, in Ulyanovsk Oblast there are three functioning *muftiyats* (Mus-

⁸Amelin, V. V. 2001. Problems of social adaptation of migrants in Orenburg. *Ethnoproblemy* 3: 60.

⁹Sergeeva, S. 2001. The migratory process. *The Bulletin of the Network of Ethnological Monitoring* 15(June 16-30):21.

¹⁰Tarasova, T. 2001. Migratory movements of the population. *The Bulletin of the Network of Ethnological Monitoring* 6(February 1-15):18.

lim councils), which are involved in an intensifying battle for believers. The two muftiyats of the cities of Buguruslan and Orenburg have been in conflict for several years. Moreover, on June 7, 2001, the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims (CSBM) in Orenburg Oblast, based in the city of Buguruslan, was officially registered with the justice administration of the Russian Federation for Orenburg Oblast. Mufti Ismail Shangareev of the Buguruslan Muftiyat became its chairman.

The Orenburg muftiyat includes 80 religious organizations and is subject to the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and the European Countries of the CIS headed by the chief mufti of Russia, Talgat Tadzhuiddin. The Buguruslan muftiyat includes 35 organizations. It is affiliated with the Council of Muftis of Russia, led by Ravil Gainutdin.

The registration of the new religious organization once again agitated the community in Orenburg Oblast. The following press publications in June 2001 may serve as corroboration: "Dead SBMs" (*Southern Urals*), "Schism" (*Moskovsky Komsomolets in Orenburg*), "Today Allah Akbar, Tomorrow Hands Up" (*Orenburg Week*), "Muslims of Orenburg, Unite!" and others. These articles trace the development of the conflict, including the seizure of mosques by supporters of the Buguruslan muftiyat two years ago in the city of Buguruslan and the village of Asekeevo. Further, the articles discuss the generous charity of Saudi Muslims, who have given tens of thousands of dollars to build a mosque in the city of Buguruslan, and they cite statistical data on students (*shakirds*) from CIS countries who attend the *madrassa* that was opened at the mosque. Accusations of Wahhabism are made.

Worried by the conflict within the Muslim community, the Council for Orenburg Regional Tatar Ethnocultural Autonomy issued a statement expressing concern that the situation would create unnecessary intra-denominational tensions, which could easily lead to tensions within the Tatar community as a whole.

The Orenburg muftiyat called a special emergency conference of Muslims of Orenburg Oblast. More than 100 Muslims attended, including 59 delegates from the various parishes of the Orenburg muftiyat. Also in attendance was Talgat Tadzhuiddin, the chief mufti and chairman of the CSBM of Russia and the European Countries of the CIS. Participants in the conference disagreed with the renaming of the Buguruslan muftiyat as the CSBM of Orenburg Oblast Based in the City of Buguruslan until a joint conference of the two muftiyats was held to discuss unification into a single spiritual administration and the Orenburg muftiyat approved the registration.

Conference participants sent a telegram to the leadership of the country concerning the illegal registration of the muftiyat. In it, they requested that the matter be investigated and that the introduction of Wahhabism

into Russia be halted. In turn, the chairman of the newly registered CSBM of Orenburg Oblast, Mufti Ismail Shangareev, convened a meeting of his organization on July 13, 2001.

Taking advantage of the poor training and shortage of Islamic clerics in Russia, adherents of radical strains of Islam are making active propaganda efforts among believers, striving to gain their sympathies. This will certainly lead to destabilization in society, the growth of separatist attitudes, and the split of the umma into traditional and true Muslims.

In this regard, the practice of training Islamic clerics abroad arouses the anxieties of government officials and the public. Today, hundreds of young Muslims, including those from Orenburg Oblast, are being educated at Muslim theological institutions in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Turkey, and other countries.

Open displays of religious intolerance in the region have not been observed, but hidden mutual hostility exists between peoples of various faiths, as illustrated by data from sociological surveys conducted in the region. For instance, a survey taken in November and December 2000 showed that 20 percent of those polled believed that mutual hostility exists between peoples of various faiths in the region, while 25 percent of the residents of border areas are convinced that Islam and the activities of Islamic organizations contribute to the exacerbation of interethnic relations.

The authorities are striving to prevent the situation from getting out of control and to prevent possible (even local) conflicts, and they are successfully bringing scientific expertise to bear in their efforts. Directed by Valery Tishkov and coordinated by Venaly Amelin, the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts is now in its second year of operation in the Volga Federal District. Approximately 20 independent experts analyze and monitor the situation in the regions and issue assessments, which are published in a special biweekly bulletin. The bulletin is then disseminated to the Federal Assembly, the Government of the Russian Federation, regional leaders, and research centers.

To maintain ethnopolitical stability in the regions of the Volga Federal District, a series of programs on regional ethnic policy is being developed. One such program is successfully functioning in Orenburg Oblast. The program is particularly relevant, since Orenburg is a border region with a multiethnic population, including representatives of 80 nationalities and 20 denominations. The program provides for the maintenance and development of ethnic cultures and native languages, addresses the religion factor, and includes systems of measures to develop native-language mass media and counter ethnic extremism. Similar programs are being undertaken in the Udmurt and Bashkortostan republics and Samara, Saratov, and Perm oblasts.

CONCLUSIONS

In the regions of the Volga Federal District, overall ethnopolitical stability will be maintained. Meanwhile, a number of conflict-generating factors will continue to influence the situation in the Volga region. They include

- intradenominational conflicts within Islamic communities, conflicts between muftiyats, and intensified competition for believers in regions where there are two or three muftiyats with different orientations
- increased flows of narcotics from adjacent states, as well as illegal immigrants from more distant countries
- decreased tolerance toward immigrants from the Caucasus, which may lead to local conflicts
- increased migration flows in the border regions of the Volga Federal District as a result of an aggravation of the situation on the border with Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

The Dynamics of the Ethnopolitical Situation and Conflicts in the North Caucasus*

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A retrospective analysis of political processes in the late 1990s attests to the fact that, as the year 2000 approached, tendencies toward a deepening crisis of the Russian state were intensifying. In the North Caucasus, this was expressed in

- the existence of political (an understanding of the nature of the federation as a federation of ethnoses), legal (discrepancies between regional and federal legislation on fundamental questions), and organizational (the creation of unconstitutional organs of power) conflicts between the federal center and federation subjects, primarily republics, which were claiming full sovereignty and priority of local legislation above Russian legislation
- the involvement of new participants in the Chechen conflict (Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechen diasporas in other federation subjects)
- the intensification of the struggle for regional influence among political groups formed along ethnic and religious lines; that is, the political crisis in the Karachai-Cherkess Republic and the intensification of Ossetian-Ingushetian relations

*Translated from the Russian by Rita S. Guenther.

- the widening of the spectrum of local and intrasubject conflicts; that is, interethnic, *interteip* [clan], religious, political, and socioeconomic conflicts, including

- ◆ struggles for influence between political groups created along ethnic and subethnic lines based on membership in various *teips* or *virids* [autonomous religious sects] or residence in particular villages or settlements (in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Kabardino-Balkaria)

- ◆ local conflicts between resident populations and non-Slavic migrants, for example, Chechens, Dargins, Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and others (in Rostov, Volgograd, and Astrakhan oblasts, Krasnodar and Stavropol krais, and Adygeya)

- ◆ conflicts with adherents of nontraditional denominations and faiths, especially Wahhabists

- the intensification of conflicts between Russian Federation subjects in the regions on various grounds, including

- ◆ territorial: conflicts resulting from territorial disagreements, such as those between Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania (Prigorodny Region) and Kalmykia and Astrakhan Oblast (the Chernye Zemli area)

- ◆ ecological: conflicts connected with questions of ecological safety, which affect not only the interests of the two federation subjects involved but also those of their neighbors. One such example is the dispute between Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Stavropol Krai over the coordination of joint environmental protection activities in the Caucasus Mineral Waters district. This conflict was caused by violations of natural resource utilization rules and the initiation of agricultural activities (livestock grazing, timber cutting, and so forth) in ecologically protected areas. In addition, the interests of the two federation subjects were also at odds on questions regarding the joint use of existing water management systems, including the Great Stavropol Canal and other water engineering facilities.

- ◆ religious-political: conflicts connected with the consequences of aggression (Dagestan-Chechnya) and the export of Wahhabism from areas beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. The Wahhabi factor is closely linked to terrorism and is considered an instrument of interethnic conflict, which destabilizes the internal political situation in multiethnic republics.

A fundamental change in the tendencies and dynamics of the ethnopolitical situation in the North Caucasus occurred in 2000, when the

newly elected president of Russia, in one of his first decrees, began a process of administrative-state reforms primarily aimed at strengthening vertical chains of command and enhancing federalism. The ultimate goal was to introduce a system of federal districts and create the new posts of plenipotentiary representatives of the president of the Russian Federation.

Almost a year and a half after the decision was made to implement the reforms, it is possible to draw some initial conclusions and evaluate the activities of the plenipotentiary representatives using as an example the most difficult and conflict-prone district in Russia, the Southern Federal District.

The Southern Federal District was created in accordance with presidential decrees No. 849 of May 13, 2000, and No. 1149 of May 21, 2000. Its administrative center is located in the city of Rostov-on-Don. Viktor Kazantsev has been appointed as the plenipotentiary representative of the president of the Russian Federation for this district.

The Southern Federal District occupies 3.5 percent of the territory of Russia and consists of some 589,200 square kilometers. It has a population of more than 21.5 million (14.3 percent of the population of the Russian Federation). It is one of the most multiethnic and multireligious regions in the world. Representatives of more than 100 ethnic groups, belonging to various language groups and professing belief in all of the world religions, reside in the district. The district is composed of 13 Russian Federation subjects—8 republics, 2 krais, and 3 oblasts.

The plenipotentiary representative is pursuing the strategy of strengthening vertical chains of command in several respects, as outlined under the following headings.

CREATION OF POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATIONAL STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS

South Russian Parliamentary Association (SRPA)

An agreement on the formation of the SRPA was signed by representatives of the parliaments of 11 federation subjects on April 25, 2001. The agreement highlights the principles on which the association is founded: voluntary commitment, independence, and self-governance. The primary tasks of the association are

- promoting the development of democracy, parliamentarianism, and government based on the rule of law
- coordinating activities aimed at strengthening parliamentarianism and constitutional forms of government

- developing a coordinated approach to political, economic, and social reforms
- strengthening contacts and dialogues among parliaments

Aleksandr Popov, chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Rostov Oblast, has been elected as chairman of the SRPA.

The Consortium of South Russian District Legal and Law Enforcement Agencies

One of the first members of the consortium, the Office of the General Prosecutor for the Southern Federal District, was created in February 2001. The three tasks facing this office are

- ensuring the observance of Russian constitutional provisions and other federal laws in the sphere of state-building and federalism in the district
- monitoring the observance of laws by federal agencies in the district that perform pretrial investigations, inquests, and operational investigative activities
- investigating criminal cases involving the most dangerous and socially significant crimes

Under difficult sociopolitical circumstances conducive to a high incidence of crime, the office is facing an expanded range of problems. It has been assigned responsibility for conducting antiterrorist operations in the Chechen Republic, participating in the resolution of Ossetian-Ingushetian conflicts, suppressing the anticonstitutional activities of certain regional leaders, and combating particularly dangerous crimes, such as terrorist acts, kidnappings, and assassinations.

Other subsidiary legal and law enforcement agencies have also been created, including a district office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a council of heads of local offices of Russian Federation security agencies in the Southern Federal District, a district branch of the tax police, and a district justice administration. Each of these organizations has been assigned specific responsibilities.

Federal Targeted Program for the Socioeconomic Development of Southern Russia Through 2006

This program was considered and adopted on July 5, 2001, at a meeting of the government of the Russian Federation. Conceptually, the program includes a wide range of political, organizational, legal, economic, social, scientific-technical, and cultural activities. It involves international

and federation-wide projects as well as those between and within federation subjects. Cooperation at all of these levels has been outlined in the six components of the program, with priority to be given to development of the energy, manufacturing, transportation, agricultural, tourism, and social sectors of the economy.

The program addresses the socioeconomic problems of 12 federation subjects located in the Southern Federal District. The inclusion of only 12 subjects (rather than all 13, with Chechnya being the 13th subject) is due to there being a specific 2001 federal program for the economic and social recovery of the Chechen Republic, which will be continued through 2002-2003. Subsequently, the problems of socioeconomic development in the Chechen Republic will become part of the federal targeted program for southern Russia.

The program calls for the implementation of more than 700 projects at a cost of more than 150 billion rubles, with about 18 percent of the funding to be provided by the federal budget. Implementation of the program will

- build or renovate hundreds of facilities and enterprises and improve their financial condition
- create more than one million jobs
- promote the resolution of housing problems for forced migrants
- increase freight shipment and oil transport volumes by 400 percent
- ensure at least a tripling of revenues accruing to government budgets at all levels

The structure of the program focuses considerable attention on matters related to rebuilding a unified state transportation system as a major stabilizing factor for the economy. Proposals have been made to the Government of the Russian Federation regarding the creation of a centralized civilian air traffic control system in the Southern Federal District. A favorable decision has been made on the idea of creating a single enterprise to handle airspace utilization and air traffic management. Headquartered in Rostov-on-Don, the Southern Air Transport Administration of the Russian Ministry of Transportation has been given lead status for the entire Southern Federal District. It has been assigned special functions in the area of civilian aviation throughout the territory of the district.

The program also provides for the reorganization of communications companies in southern Russia, as these enterprises are vitally important for the functioning of the state and its institutions. The reorganization will make it possible to increase tax receipts and share liquidity, accelerate telecommunications development, and introduce unified standards for

the provision of communications services in the Southern Federal District.

Specific questions regarding the implementation of the southern Russia program will be handled by a specially created executive director's office reporting to the plenipotentiary representative and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development.

CONTROLLING FUNCTIONS

Above all, the post of the plenipotentiary representative was created to help control the process of bringing regional legislation into compliance with federal law. At present, many legal acts contradict federal legislation, particularly in the sphere of economic activity. This is most typical of Stavropol and Krasnodar krais, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, the Kabardin-Balkar Republic, and Volgograd Oblast. In a number of federation subjects, for example, in Astrakhan Oblast, violations of federal legislation have become widespread in the signing of international contracts and agreements. Considerable violations have also been discovered in regulations governing the organization of elections in federation subjects in the federal district.

By October 2001 the justice authorities and the office of the public prosecutor had uncovered more than 1,200 legal acts in contradiction with federal legislation. More than 700 have since been brought into compliance with federal law, and work is nearly complete on revising approximately 150 more local laws and other regulatory acts.

Work to create a unified legal space in the district and bring regional legislation into compliance with federal laws and the Constitution of the Russian Federation has already produced results. Most regional regulations concerning questions of government structure and the observance of human and civil rights and freedoms have been brought into compliance with federal law. The most typical violations found in regional legislation are connected with the violation of the constitutional principle regarding the definition of jurisdictions and authorities between the federal government and local authorities within the various federation subjects. This is true of almost all of the federation subjects of the district.

The enforcement of a number of laws has been halted, but they have not been repealed. At the same time, in reviewing inconsistencies between federal and regional legislation, it must be recognized that reality objectively compels the local authorities to violate a host of outdated or ineffective federal laws.

In accordance with presidential decree No. 741 of June 21, 2001 ("On the Russian Federation Presidential Commission on the Preparation of a

Plan on Defining the Jurisdictions and Powers of the Federal Authorities, Authorities of Federation Subjects, and Local Self-Government Bodies”), a special commission was established in the Southern Federal District to prepare the appropriate plan. Working groups were formed on the following topics:

- general matters regarding the organization of state authorities and local self-government
- legality, law and order, and protection of civil rights and freedoms
- management and disposition of natural and other material resources
- interbudgetary relations
- sociocultural development
- economic development
- environmental safety in populated areas
- agreements regarding the division of jurisdictions and authorities

Analogous structures have also been created in the various federation subjects, and they submit materials prepared by bodies of state power and local self-government for the district commission to analyze and synthesize.

The plenipotentiary representative also monitors the implementation of judicial reforms and the improvement of the operation of the entire system for legal rights protection in the various federation subjects. Special attention is being focused on creating a system of justices of the peace, who will be called upon to relieve the regular courts of less significant cases, and on monitoring the effectiveness of the operations of the regular courts and arbitration courts in the Southern Federal District as well as the activities of regional units of such governmental departments as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Customs Committee, and the tax police.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE AND REGIONAL ELITES

The political life of the Southern Federal District is increasingly shaped by events connected with election campaigns. In 2000, elections for posts at various levels were held in 7 federation subjects, and in 2001 such elections either have taken place or are expected in 9 of the 13 subjects. The task of the plenipotentiary representative as defined by the Russian president is to ensure the exercise of citizens’ constitutional rights and prevent violations of federal law, while working jointly with law enforcement agencies to keep criminal forces from coming into power. In

this regard, the plenipotentiary oversaw the election process at all stages: the formation of electoral commissions, the nomination procedures for all candidates, the financing of and preparations for the elections, the resolution of problems of informational support in the campaigns, and the organization of voting and vote counting. He was also responsible for any violations of voting laws.

The plenipotentiary's involvement was limited to gathering and analyzing information on the candidates for the various electoral posts, inasmuch as he was not in a position to become an independent political actor capable of advancing his own candidates for regional and federal posts. This conclusion was confirmed in the September 2001 elections for the head of the Rostov Oblast Administration, as a result of which the existing regional elite maintained all the positions it had previously held.

In the coming months, presidential elections are scheduled in North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia, and the campaigns promise to be intense. Three assassinations have already been committed in the course of the ongoing preelection campaign for heads of municipalities in Karachaevo-Cherkessia. In this context, it is especially clear that the plenipotentiary representative still has no effective mechanisms for influencing the regional elites and preventing fierce rivalry between political groups. Consequently, there is also no guarantee that political stability will be preserved in these federation subjects.

An important indicator of the nature of relations between the plenipotentiary and the administrative-political elites is his reaction to the draft federal laws proposed by local parliaments. Here, events could develop in two different ways. The plenipotentiary could support the project and lobby for it at the federal level, which would result in the positive development of relations with local elites, or he could refuse to support it, consequently resulting in conflict with regional political actors. In the context of bringing regional laws and regulations into compliance with federal legislation and clarifying principles governing the division of authority between the federal government and federation subjects, this question is taking on fundamental importance.

In the opinion of existing regional elites, the reforms of 2000-2001 have already achieved undoubtedly positive results, while at the same time creating new problems. In particular, after the reform of the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly, leaders of the legislative bodies of the various federation subjects faced the question of organizational forms and mechanisms of participation in the development of federal legislation. The formation of a legal space for the country, founded on unified legal principles, should take into consideration the regional and ethnocultural diversity of the Russian Federation. It is necessary to remember that the North Caucasus is a territory with particular local cus-

toms and traditions that differ greatly from those in other parts of Russia. This is one reason institutions and legal norms that do not fit the framework of general Russian legislation may arise there. Primarily, this relates to the legal basis for resolving problems of forced and uncontrolled migration and countering extremism and terrorism rooted in ethnic and religious differences and resulting from the actions of radical sects and religious-political organizations that are untraditional for southern Russia.

In the opinion of local elites, a serious set of problems is connected with the need to improve federal and regional laws regarding elections to offices at the republic, oblast, krai, or local levels. In particular, this problem has been raised by the People's Assembly of Dagestan, which presented an initiative on amending the federal law "On Fundamental Guarantees of Voting Rights and the Right to Participate in Referenda for Citizens of the Russian Federation." The proposals included in the initiative focus on the need to take the ethnic composition of the population into account during elections to republic and municipal bodies. In this case, the initiative recommends that attempts to replicate Dagestan's experience in creating ethnic electoral districts should be made in all multiethnic subjects of the Russian Federation.

Another example is connected with the draft federal law "On Migration in the Russian Federation," which was jointly developed by the legislative bodies of the Republic of Adygeya and Krasnodar Krai and submitted for consideration by the State Duma of the Russian Federation in early 2001. The bill calls for making migration policy substantially stricter.

Up to now, Viktor Kazantsev has not rejected such initiatives, but he has reacted extremely cautiously to them, which suggests that he does not see supporting them as a means of establishing a positive dialogue with regional elites. He uses different means to create a positive public image, primarily including the following:

- direct influence on the development of the military situation (the shift from the military to the police stage in the counterterrorist operation) and the political situation (the development of the draft constitution) in the Chechen Republic
- personal participation in the resolution of severe conflict situations (the Ossetian-Ingushetian conflict, the political crisis in the Karachai-Cherkess Republic in 2000) and the investigation of terrorist acts committed in the district (Caucasus Mineral Waters Region in 2001)
- organization of interest group meetings with Muslim and Orthodox clerics, leaders of Russian (Slavic) communities, heads of municipalities, journalists, the business elite, members of the armed forces, and so

forth, at which operational orders are given for the handling of specific situations

- initiation of and support for various activities at the federal district level, for example, the South Russian Festival of the Press, and the creation of districtwide public associations, for example, the Southern Architectural Society of the Union of Architects of Russia or the district branch of the All-Russian Public Organization "Business Russia"
- implementation of projects aimed at forming a unified information space in the Southern Federal District, by means of supporting and creating publications under the patronage of the plenipotentiary
- creation of a multitude of consultative bodies reporting on such topics as Cossacks, veterans, sports, and so forth, to the office of the plenipotentiary

Thus, a year of active engagement by the plenipotentiary of the President of Russia in the Southern Federal District has shown that he has, with varying degrees of success, used all possible legitimate means of weakening regional authorities, including

- strict demands to bring local legislation into compliance with federal laws
- assistance in strengthening the roles of local branches of federal agencies in the region, especially those connected with law enforcement
- initiation of integration processes
- isolation of the second (commercial) and third (noncommercial) sectors, which were not involved in active cooperation with the existing administrative elites in the various federation subjects
- formation of a unified informational space in southern Russia

These tendencies generally suggest the appearance of a tactic of restructuring the elites around the plenipotentiary. On the one hand, such a tactic is in accordance with the basic task assigned to the plenipotentiaries by the president of the Russian Federation, namely strengthening the vertical chains of command through which presidential power may be exercised. On the other hand, a clear picture has already emerged of the purposeful formation of a social base for Kazantsev's future political activities and his transformation into an independent political figure.

The dynamic of the ethnopolitical situation attests to the search for new ways of resolving and preventing conflicts and demonstrates the existence of a specific strategy guiding the activities of the plenipotentiary of the president of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District, namely that of transforming the district into a new socioterritorial and sociopolitical community.

Organizational Aspects

Working Group Members and Charges to the Three Working Groups

INTERACADEMY WORKSHOP ON CONFLICTS IN
MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES

DECEMBER 2001

Working Group on Collective Violence

Scholars have significant disagreements on the extent to which collective violence is a coherent, autonomous phenomenon or is an expression of underlying processes and conflicts that are not intrinsically violent. At one extreme are specialists who think of violence as a specialized business reflected in guerilla warfare, arms flows, and violent entrepreneurs. At the other extreme are specialists who consider ethnicity a cultural phenomenon and who view violence as an occasional by-product of nonviolent striving. Where in that range can we find the most promising leads for further research?

Russian Participants:

- Coordinator: Valery A. Tishkov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
- Larissa L. Khoperskaya, Advisor to the Presidential Representative in the Southern Federal District
- Viktor V. Bocharov, St. Petersburg State University
- Lev D. Gudkov, Russian Institute for the Study of Public Opinion

American Participants:

- Coordinator: Charles Tilly, Columbia University
- Stathis N. Kalyvas, University of Chicago
- Mark R. Beissinger, University of Wisconsin

Working Group on Culture, Identity, and Conflict

Many specialists interpret ethnic conflict as an outcome of identity assertion or cultural change or both, often seeing new developments in this regard as a consequence of worldwide political and economic reorganization. What are the major competing ideas in this area, what types of research do these ideas imply, and which ideas are the most promising for further work?

Russian Participants:

- Coordinator: Aleksey Miller, Institute for Information in Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences
- Aleksandr Kamensky, Russian State University for Humanities
- Valikhan Merzikhanov, Saratov State University
- Leokadia Drobizheva, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences
- Eduard D. Ponarin, European University at St. Petersburg

American Participants:

- Coordinator: Anatoly M. Khazanov, University of Wisconsin
- Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University
- Yoshiko M. Herrera, Harvard University

Working Group on Systematic Comparative Studies of Conflict Events

In the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, scholars are examining political conflict, including ethnic conflict, by preparing uniform descriptions or catalogs of multiple events in different geographic and political settings. What are the strengths and weaknesses in these approaches, what are the alternatives, and what are promising new findings in such studies?

Russian Participants:

- Coordinator: Vitaly Naumkin, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, and International Center for Strategic and Political Studies
- Aleksandr Shubin, Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences
- Ludmila Gotagova, Institute of Russian History
- Emil Pain, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences

American Participants:

- Coordinator: Paul C. Stern, National Research Council
- Andrew Bennett, Georgetown University
- Edward W. Walker, University of California at Berkeley

Each working group met at the National Academies on December 5 and 6, 2001, to prepare papers in response to the charges listed above. These papers were presented at a plenary session on December 7, 2001.

Agenda for Russian Policy Officials

DECEMBER 5-6, 2001

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vladimir Yu. Zorin, Deputy to the President's Representative to the Volga District on Questions of Nationality and Religion; Minister of Nationalities

Svetlana Smirnova, Deputy Chair, Committee on Nationalities, State Duma of the Russian Federation

Venaly V. Amelin, Chair, Committee on Internationality Relations, Orenburg Oblast Administration

Wednesday, December 5, 2001

Roundtable Seminar with members of the Department of State

Michael R. Bosshart, Senior Political Officer, Office of Russian Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

Dennis Curry, Acting Division Chief, Russia Division, Office of Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Timothy Richardson, Russian Affairs Officer, Office of Russian Affairs

Seth Winnick, Director of Office of Russian Affairs, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

John Parker, Division Chief, Division of Regional Analysis and Eastern Republics

Meeting at Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission)

Ronald S. McNamara, Chief of Staff
Dorothy Douglas Taft, Deputy Chief of Staff
John J. Finerty, Jr., Staff Advisor
H. Knox Thames, Staff Advisor for Freedom of Religion

Roundtable Seminar at the Brookings Institution

Update on Nationality Issues in the Volga Region, Center-Periphery Relations and the Future of Asymmetrical Federalism
Zorin, Smirnova, Amelin

Thursday, December 6, 2001

Meeting at Library of Congress with John Van Oudenaren

Local publications donated to the Library of Congress, European Reading Room, to expand the collection of materials pertaining to issues in the Volga Region

Briefing by James Angus, Office of the Assistant to the Attorney General on Civil Rights

History of the American Justice System: Slavery and Civil Rights

Meeting with Congressman Curt Weldon

A New Time, A New Beginning—Congressman Weldon's Vision of Future U.S.-Russian Cooperation

Roundtable Seminar at the Brookings Institution

Center-Periphery Relations and the Future of Asymmetrical Federalism: Special Focus on the Volga Federal District and the North Caucasus
Zorin, Smirnova, Amelin, Khoperskaya

Plenary Session Agenda and Participants

INTERACADEMY WORKSHOP ON CONFLICTS IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES

DECEMBER 7-8, 2001

AGENDA

December 7, 2001

Opening Remarks

Welcome

Robert McC. Adams, Adjunct Professor of Anthropology,
University of California at San Diego

Dynamics of Ethnicity and Conflicts in Post-Soviet States

Valery A. Tishkov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology,
Russian Academy of Sciences

Session 1

Recent Conflicts in the Caucasus

Larissa L. Khoperskaya, Advisor to the Presidential Representative
in the Southern Federal District

Recent Conflicts in the Volga Region

Venaly V. Amelin, Chair, Committee on Internationality Relations,
Orenburg Oblast Administration

Comments on National Research Council Consultations in Rostov-
on-Don

Allen Kassof, President, Project on Ethnic Relations

Comments on National Research Council Consultations in Nizhny
Novgorod

John L. Comaroff, Professor of Anthropology, University of Chicago

Discussion

Session 2

Presentation of findings of three working groups during sessions
held December 5-6, 2001

Three Russian policy officials share reactions to reports of working
groups

Vladimir Yu. Zorin, Deputy to the President's Representative to
the Volga District on Questions of Nationality and Religion
Svetlana Smirnova, Deputy Chair, Committee on Nationalities,
State Duma of the Russian Federation

Venaly V. Amelin, Chair, Committee on Internationality
Relations, Orenburg Oblast Administration

Discussion

Session 3

Responses of academies to global terrorism—related projects

Valery A. Tishkov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology,
Russian Academy of Sciences

John Boright, Executive Director, Office of International Affairs,
National Research Council

Discussion of responses and projects

December 8, 2001

Plenary session to discuss creation of proceedings using three
working group reports

Russian and U.S. committees consider compilation of all reports for
first two phases of the project and activities during a proposed
next phase

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

- Robert McC. Adams, University of California at San Diego
 Valery A. Tishkov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
 Charles Tilly, Columbia University
 John L. Comaroff, University of Chicago
 Fiona Hill, The Brookings Institution
 Allen Kassof, Project on Ethnic Relations
 Vitaly Naumkin, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, and International Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Moscow
 Aleksandr Shubin, Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences
 Ludmila Gotagova, Institute of Russian History
 Emil Pain, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences
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 Vladimir Yu. Zorin, Deputy to the President's Representative to the Volga District on Questions of Nationality and Religion; Minister of Nationalities
 Svetlana Smirnova, Committee on Nationalities, State Duma of the Russian Federation
 Venaly V. Amelin, Committee on Intenationality Relations, Orenburg Oblast Administration
 George Kolt, U.S. Department of State
 Dennis Curry, U.S. Department of State

Michael Bosshart, U.S. Department of State
Jennifer Hazen, Georgetown University
Yury K. Shiyan, Russian Academy of Sciences
John Boright, National Research Council
Glenn E. Schweitzer, National Research Council
Paul C. Stern, National Research Council
A. Chelsea Sharber, National Research Council
Rita S. Guenther, National Research Council

Appendix A

Selected Documents from the Interacademy Symposium in Moscow, December 18-20, 2000

Appendix A-1

Postconflict Chechnya: Analysis of the Situation and Reconstruction Problems (Political Aspects)*

Dzhabrail Gakaev

Institute of Economic Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences

On April 15, 2000, Russian military and political leaders officially announced the completion of the military portion of the antiterrorist campaign in Chechnya. According to the Russian Federation General Staff, Ministry of Defense units had crushed all major heavily armed groups and destroyed the rebels' military command structure and unified infrastructure. According to official sources, up to 13,000 rebel fighters were killed, including 20 known field commanders, and the same number were detained and are being held in isolation units for interrogation. The Russian army lost about 3,000 service members (although these figures are questioned by many nongovernmental organizations and the media). According to human rights organizations, about 10,000 civilian residents were killed during the second Chechen campaign (Ichkerian representatives cite other figures, namely that the federal troops lost 14,000 men, while the Chechen rebels lost 1,500). During the campaign, federal troops occupied all strategically important population centers and for the first time gained control of the Chechen segment of the Russian-Georgian border.

With the completion of active military operations, the major burden of combating small groups of rebels was supposed to fall to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Services (FSB). However, in defeating the main rebel forces and occupying the entire perimeter of

*Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins.

Chechnya, the federal troops did not win the war. It is still going on, gradually taking on the characteristics of a guerilla war. It has already been six months since the conflict entered into a partisan warfare phase without an end in sight. According to the estimates of Russian military leaders, there are about 2,000 to 2,500 fighters left in Chechnya (Maskhadov states that he has 15,000). They are attacking Russian troops on a daily basis and carrying out acts of sabotage, resulting in losses of 50 to 70 Russian servicemen a month. The number of rebels is not declining, and their leaders—Maskhadov, Basaev, Khattab, Gelaev, and Baraev—are still at large, moving unhindered throughout Chechnya and successfully controlling military operations. As a result, the major goal of the antiterrorist campaign remains unmet.

Army units have proven ineffective against small mobile separatist groups. They have gone on the defensive, reducing active military operations to a minimum. This marked the start of a difficult and exhausting struggle against diversionary warfare operations. The troops are furthermore sustaining heavy losses, especially from kamikaze-type actions. "During the daytime, we are the bosses, and at night, the rebels are," say soldiers. The completely ruined city of Grozny, with its crushed and destroyed factories, demolished apartment buildings, and deep ravines, is a perfect platform for guerilla warfare. According to military sources, there are several hundred rebel fighters permanently positioned in the city. During the daytime they hide, and at night they attack checkpoints and shell and mine targets they have identified. All the attributes of guerilla warfare are present in Chechnya. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that a guerilla war lasts as long as the causes that produced it.

Official statements from the Russian military to the effect that the situation is under control do not truly represent the facts. In fact, the federal troops cannot ensure their own security or protect the civilian population. On December 9, General Anatoly Kvashnin, the chief of the general staff, announced the start of a new phase of the antiterrorist campaign. The essence of this phase is that federal military units and the Chechen militia are planning to take under their protection several hundred major population centers of Chechnya, thus guaranteeing the security of the residents. This decision illustrates the no-win nature of the situation. There are 450 villages in Chechnya, and there will not be enough military garrisons to cover them all.

Bogged down in a prolonged guerilla war, the Ministry of Defense for the first time officially expressed its dissatisfaction with the actions taken by the MVD and FSB. General Valery Manilov, deputy chief of the general staff, publicly stated that "the effectiveness of the campaign has been noticeably reduced. Things continue to drag on. Look how the checkpoints operate and how clearing operations are performed. It's no won-

der that with operations like these the bandits can move almost unhindered across the territory of the republic and set up bases and storage facilities" (*Moskovsky Komsomolets*, September 17, 2000). The military leaders correctly believe that it should be the task of the special intelligence services to destroy small groups of rebels, carry out operational missions, and suppress terrorist activities. But the facts indicate that the internal security troops—Special-Purpose Militia Detachments (OMONs) and Emergency Response Composite Detachments (SOBRs)—that were temporarily commissioned to the Chechen Republic are not coping with this task. Furthermore, these special operations, clearing operations, and retribution actions are producing numerous civilian casualties, contributing to an increase in the number of refugees, and expanding the support base of the Chechen fighters.

The inappropriate use of force against the civilian population of Chechnya, based on the so-called principle of collective responsibility, produces animosity among the people, who initially had been inclined against the separatists. At times the rebels themselves carry out actions that provoke retribution operations by the army, but the federal troops bear all the blame for the consequences. Naturally, military operations that lead to civilian casualties negate the effects of all social and economic programs, and this is the major obstacle to the stabilization process in the Chechen Republic. Outrages and violence on the part of Russian military structures against Chechen civilians only intensify the emerging tendency by which the military actions of the federal troops are perceived as "anti-people," while the resistance of the Chechen rebels takes on the features of a national liberation movement. A new wave of recruits could become the dominant force in the Chechen resistance. Together with their new leaders, they will become ideological crusaders, meaning that they will be more brutal. It must be kept in mind that the Russian military contingent in Chechnya is basically uniform in its ethnic composition, and it is fighting in a territory with an ethnically homogeneous population. This is also an objective precondition for the tension in relations.

World experience shows that an army brought from its barracks into the field is liable to become degraded quickly. Acts of vandalism and robberies of civilians become everyday occurrences. Today the command is facing the following challenge: how to protect troops who have fulfilled their military duties from being subject to degradation. The soldiers, mostly paid contractors, who have been put through severe tests and ordeals, now find themselves with a good deal of spare time. As a result, this group of some 120,000 servicemen is becoming uncontrollable. An increase in the crime rate is being registered among service personnel as a result of drug and alcohol abuse and fraternization. The combination of guns, drugs, and alcohol is of greater danger now for the troops than the

Chechen fighters are. Many soldiers who have survived war and risked their lives are failing the test of peaceful life and reaching for their weapons on the slightest pretext, using the only argument they know—killing—in any conflict situation. In most instances, local residents become the victims.

The war in Chechnya has become a very profitable business for both sides in the conflict, and this is the main obstacle to the stabilization process in the Chechen Republic. Some high-ranking army officers have an interest in maintaining the stagnating war. The current situation guarantees the military a fat line item in the budget and growing authority with the nation's leadership. Chechnya is needed as a test site, a live target for building up the army's muscles. In trying to preserve all of this, the generals impress upon themselves and the public that the "Chechen problem" will be resolved once the militant leaders are captured or eliminated. In fact, the military leaders are in no hurry to resolve this problem. According to the newspaper *Segodnya* (dated August 28, 2000), the Russian military structures in Chechnya have "two options for actions in the current situation. The first is to follow the behest of General Vladimir Shamanov, who thinks that the rebels' family members are not much different from the rebels themselves. The second is to try to gain as much personal benefit from the war as possible, even at the expense of treason. Both options are equally dangerous. While the harm of treason is quite straightforward and does not require long deliberations, the implementation of the principle 'a good Chechen is a dead Chechen' is not only amoral but also creates new participants in the guerilla war."

The war in Chechnya is of a fundamentally criminal nature. Everything, including human life, is bought and sold. The continuation of the conflict in its present phase is to the advantage of certain forces in Russian political, financial, and military circles. Their representatives have so-called business contacts in Chechnya. Mafia structures make their business dealing in people, weapons, drugs, and petroleum products. The clans of certain regional "barons" are involved in this business as well. A portion of the funds gained from the sale of humanitarian aid sent from abroad goes to line their pockets (and embezzlement of federal funds goes without saying). Because of such criminal outrages, Chechnya has seen the development of an environment in which it is impossible for people to do good and fulfill their essential human nature.

Human rights violations are occurring on a massive scale in Chechnya. Russian laws have no effect, and lawlessness and tyranny reign. There is still no legislation that would regulate how antiterrorist operations are conducted. Certain military service personnel (contractors and OMON and SOBR troops) perform acts of violence, commit premeditated murders of civilians, and rob local residents during clearing operations.

Such robberies are often committed completely openly and furthermore involve not only small valuables, such as money or jewelry, but also the organized removal of large cargo. Such robberies may take place only with the authorization of the commanders of individual units. Systematic extortion is quite common at the checkpoints.

Today it is not only bandits who are kidnapping and selling people; legal armed formations are involved in this business as well. During the conflict, more than 10,000 people have passed through the detention and interrogation system, with many of them being ransomed by their relatives. According to official data, 467 criminal cases have been filed against military personnel, but only 14 involve crimes committed against civilians. The problem is complicated by the lack of a judiciary system in Chechnya. The lack of legal protection during the entire period of military operations in the Chechen Republic means that the residents of Chechnya are deprived of the main mechanism for protecting their legal rights. According to data gathered by the independent commission of Pavel Krashenninikov, cases of pillaging and extortion have become more frequent among military personnel. "In just one region of Chechnya, according to commission member Ella Panfilova, the commandant had to fire 62 contract soldiers for using forged documents" (*Moskovsky Komsomolets*, September 14, 2000). There are instances in which clearing operations have been carried out without federal government authorization.

Recently, disappearances have become more frequent in Chechnya. People detained at checkpoints disappear without a trace. According to official data, the number of missing people has reached 500. According to the Pavel Krashenninikov commission, "the names of many detained local residents cannot be found in the lists of the MVD, the General Prosecutor's Office, or the FSB." A serious problem faced by Chechen residents is that many people do not hold Russian passports, and the latter are issued very slowly. Without a passport, citizens are deprived of the right to move about freely, and they face a real danger of being detained during clearing operations in various population centers.

In general, the commission believes that "since military operations ended, the humanitarian situation in the Chechen Republic has deteriorated dramatically" (*Moskovsky Komsomolets*, September 14, 2000). The problem of human rights violations during wanton clearing operations, drug and ammunition search operations, and similar actions was raised for the first time on such a high level at parliamentary hearings held on September 21, 2000. Almost all speakers at the hearings, including Vladimir Kalamonov, special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the preservation of human rights and freedoms in Chechnya, admitted that "human rights violations are still occurring on a massive scale" (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, September 22, 2000). According to

Aslanbek Aslakhonov, State Duma deputy from the Chechen Republic, the army and law enforcement agencies are conducting "all sorts of experiments in brutality, unscrupulousness, and immorality" on the residents of Chechnya. As for the residents who left Chechnya and now reside in other regions of Russia, "some werewolves with shoulder straps have turned them into private sources of off-budget financing" (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, September 22, 2000). It is generally agreed by Duma leaders, analysts, and experts that the problem of providing for the security of residents and protecting them from both the Chechen fighters and the federal troops remains the biggest problem in Chechnya. Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer and Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly representative Lord Judd confirmed this point during their appearances at the hearings.

Recently the refugee problem has again intensified. The economy and social sector of the Chechen Republic, which had been partially restored after the first war and had been functioning to a certain extent, have now been completely destroyed. Those who left Chechnya before 1999 will not be able to come back to their homes, as they have been destroyed once again. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of new forced migrants have now joined their ranks. And with the onset of winter, 150,000 refugees in Ingushetia again found themselves in a desperate situation. From the beginning, the rebels have been using the refugees as a means of putting pressure on the federal authorities, trying to push them into negotiations with Maskhadov. Some of the forced migrants are willing to return home, but they need security guarantees and minimal social support.

The Chechen rebels have recently stepped up their terror campaign against local residents. For the purposes of intimidation, they shoot local government officials and carry out conspicuous executions of those who dared to condemn their actions publicly. A string of murders has occurred in many communities of Chechnya. From March through July 2000, 9 heads of local government administrations, 12 Chechen police officers, 4 staff members of the public prosecutor's office, and 4 imams of rural mosques were killed. In late August 2000, the rebels executed two men in the villages of Dargo and Belgatoy and placed their heads on stakes for intimidation purposes. On September 16, five people (local residents ranging in age from 15 to 70) were killed in the village of Starye Atagi. Previously, six people were killed in the same village (local residents suspect federal troops in this incident). The rebels publicly executed Lieutenant Colonel Shamil Azaev, deputy commander of the Regional Department of the Interior in Chechnya's Vedeno Region, and Lieutenant Colonel Said Bisultanov, chief of the general staff. On October 11, the separatists carried out a terrorist act against Chechen police officers by blowing up the building of the Regional Department of the Interior in the

Oktyabrsky District of the city of Grozny. A total of 12 people were killed and 17 wounded; the victims were all Chechen, including women and children. On October 23, 70-year-old Magomed Saidaliev fell victim to the terrorists. He was chairman of the Council of Elders in the village of Goity, Urus-Martan Region and an irreconcilable adversary of the Wahhabists. On October 31, Isa Yemurzaev, a police inspector from the Grozny Regional Department of the Interior, was killed at his home in Alkhan-Kala. On November 9, Isa Tsuev, head of the Alkhan-Kala Village Administration, was killed along with two female employees. On November 12, nine civilians were killed in the city of Urus-Martan. On November 16, Dadalov, head of the Mesker-Yurt Village Administration, was killed along with his deputy. On December 8, two Chechen police officers were killed and three wounded as a result of a terrorist act in Gudermes. In November-December, in Urus-Martan Region alone about 100 Chechen civilians fell victims to terrorists—of them, 40 died and almost as many were wounded. And this bloody score keeps increasing.

By using terror against war-weary Chechen civilians, the rebels are attempting to intimidate their compatriots who are cooperating with the Kadyrov administration. In addition, the operations of the federal troops often turn against civilians as well. As a result, the civilian population of Chechnya finds itself facing two equally severe dangers, a hostage to the conflict. Ivan Babichev, the commandant of Chechnya, has admitted that in some cases civilians are also affected during clearing operations. Akhmed Kadyrov, the head of the government administration in Chechnya, has also stated that continuing the practice of mass-scale clearing operations could have serious negative consequences and cause intense public indignation. Should this ever occur, Kadyrov has indicated that he “will be compelled to admit that the people are right” and that he “will be on the side of the people” (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, September 19, 2000).

The appointment of Akhmed Kadyrov as head of the Chechen Republic Administration has yet to have a significant impact on the alignment of forces in Chechnya. Moreover, the reaction of people in Chechnya and Russia to this appointment has been quite ambiguous. Not only separatists but also the pro-Russian segment of Chechen society have reacted negatively to the Kremlin’s choice, believing that a more authoritative person capable of consolidating Chechen society could have been selected from within the Chechen establishment, if the will to do so had been there. However, the Kremlin had its own logic in backing Kadyrov, a choice that was based on a number of circumstances. First, it was conditioned by the influence of military circles on the president of the Russian Federation (Kadyrov is the protégé of the military and intelligence services and is controlled by them). Second, the foreign policy factor also played a significant role. It was important for the leaders of the Russian

Federation to demonstrate to the international community that a spiritual leader of the Chechens, a former colleague of Maskhadov who had grown disenchanted with the policy of separatism, had been appointed as the head of Chechnya. Third, the appointment of Kadyrov was supposed to serve as an example of reconciliation with the former followers of Dudaev and Maskhadov, who for various reasons were not taking up arms at the time. It was the Kremlin's intention to use the ambiguous and contradictory figure of the mufti to unite all Chechens against the Wahhabists. Finally, should Kadyrov fail, the federal government could lay the blame on the Chechen political elite, reasoning that the latter by definition is incapable of producing and supporting a leader from within its own ranks. The idea of appointing a Russian governor-general in Chechnya is already being actively discussed by the Russian media.

Recent events in Chechnya demonstrate that the new administration is not succeeding in changing the situation. And it is not only that Kadyrov's popularity rating among the public is not very high; the main problem of the local authorities lies in the legal outrages perpetrated by the federal troops and the lack of funds for restoring the economy and the social sector in the Chechen Republic. Against this backdrop, conflicts among the major figures of the Chechen administration have reintensified. This primarily involves Akhmed-khadzhi Kadyrov and his first deputy, Bislán Gantamirov. That there is still no clear legislative solution regarding the division of authorities among the various government structures in Chechnya has also contributed to this conflict. According to Kadyrov, he "does not know himself what authorities he has, what authorities the president's plenipotentiary representative in the southern district has, and what authorities the commandant of the republic has."

Some analysts are inclined to view the attempt to team Kadyrov and Gantamirov as not so much a mistake as a deliberate action of the Kremlin. According to these analysts, this is being done with the aim of proving to everyone that the Chechens are incapable of governing the republic themselves. General Vladimir Shamanov has confirmed these suspicions to the fullest extent. He was quick to state that there is "a fight going on among the ringleaders of local crime families in Chechnya"; therefore, leadership may be entrusted only to a Russian. It appears no coincidence that the same idea has been put forth by Mikhail Gutsiriev, head of the oil company Slavneft. According to local experts, it is the commanders of federal troops in the Chechen Republic who are promoting this idea to convince the country's political leadership that the military should govern Chechnya for the time being. They then proceed to conclude that the military leadership does not have the goal of bringing the war to an end. In fact, the instability that gives rise to conflicts within the Chechen administration helps to prolong the war.

It is difficult to predict what actions the Kremlin might take in response to a split in the republic's leadership. For the time being, Gantamirov and Kadyrov have been reconciled once again. However, recent observations made by Viktor Kazantsev and Gennady Troshev as well as reports in the media indicate that the federal government will very soon be forced not only to choose between these two leaders but also possibly to change the very structure of government in the Chechen Republic. The appointment of Vladimir Yelagin as federal minister for the recovery of the Chechen economy and social sector is only the beginning of this process. It is quite obvious that the Russian president is interested in solving the Chechen problem; however, the desired results are not yet being achieved because of the weakness and disunity of the government and the prevalence of bureaucratic interests.

External factors are also having an extremely negative impact on the situation in Chechnya. The Chechen conflict is taking on an increasingly international character, drawing into its orbit new players on the world geopolitical stage. Chechnya has become a platform for anti-Russian forces, a staging area for the clash of interests between world and regional powers seeking to take advantage of the collapse of the USSR and the weakness of Russia for the purpose of reallocating spheres of influence and the energy resources of the Caucasus. A broad-scale information war is being conducted against Russia. In the West and in the countries of the Islamic Conference, Chechen separatists aided by certain elements of the Western media are persistently spreading the myth that the Chechen people support the struggle against the federal troops. The rebels strive at all costs to inflict maximum losses on the federal troops and to demonstrate their combat potential to the local population and the West in particular. They do this with only one intent, namely to compel the federal government to begin negotiations.

Certain political forces in the United States, for example Zbigniew Brzezinski; representatives of the left wing forces in France; and radical Islamic centers in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and other Muslim countries oppose the positive steps that Russia has taken towards stabilizing the situation not only in Chechnya but also in the Caucasus region as a whole. Chechnya has fallen victim to the sprawling expansion of international mercenaries and terrorists. This is illustrated by the regular flows of funds and personnel being sent to aid extremist groups in the North Caucasus. Each influx of dollars brings a new wave of subversive activities. Units of international mercenaries and their leaders, such as Khattab and others, have begun to play a dominant role in the Chechen resistance movement. It is they who are receiving large funds from abroad, so they make the decisions and are thus gradually displacing Maskhadov and the Chechen field commanders into a

secondary role. Foreign partners of the Chechen rebels have invested too much in the creation and development of this conflict to let the invested efforts and funds be dissipated so easily. The stakes in this game are too great. The hard line of the West regarding Russia's actions in Chechnya and the increasing aid to the Chechen rebels by radical extreme Islamic organizations are promoting a protracted war in Chechnya and drawing new regions of the North Caucasus into the conflict.

PROGRAM PROPOSITIONS FOR POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

1. An analysis of the situation in Chechnya confirms that this problem will not be resolved by force alone. The government must initiate the process of political resolution of the conflict by declaring its intent to make every possible effort to overcome the effects of the devastating conflict and bring life in Chechnya back to normal. It is important to publicize the conflict resolution program, including the conditions for ending the war in Chechnya, the boundaries of the republic, and its legal position within the Russian Federation. Chechnya must be provided with the fullest rights of self-determination and high sovereign status within the Russian Federation. The Chechen people must feel confident that their sovereignty will be preserved and that they will not be governed by regents or military commandants, but rather they will be able to choose their own leaders on the basis of free elections and establish a basis for civil governance. Taking into account the tragedy of the war and the extreme severity of the problem, additional (foreign) guarantees of Chechen sovereignty may be possible. While waging a decisive war against terrorism, the federal government must clearly and unambiguously define the limits of a possible compromise in resolving the crisis and indicate where concessions are impossible by definition. The federal government must proceed on the assumption that Chechnya may remain an integral part of Russia, should the country and its people recognize not only the territory but also the Chechen people as full-fledged members. Hence, the program should provide for maintaining within Russia not only the territory of Chechnya but more importantly its people. Consequently, it is necessary to change the climate of interethnic relations in the country, curb the rage of xenophobia and chechenophilia, and guarantee in practice equality before the law for all citizens of the Russian Federation, regardless of their ethnic origins. The Russian state is a state made up of all its component nationalities, and they must be assured of this in practice.

The federal government must place the actions of the military under strict control and ban the shelling of Chechen population centers. It must

demonstrate to the world that Chechens are rightful citizens of the Russian Federation and that the goal of the military campaign is to protect their lives, rights, and property from terrorists and thugs. It is not expedient for the Russian authorities to formulate a harsh ultimatum on recognizing the priority status of certain federal laws. Chechnya has the right to its sovereignty. The constitution of 1992 could serve as a starting point for drafting a Chechen constitution. This will help to avoid a defeated nation syndrome and will maintain the dignity of the Chechen people. The initiatives of the Russian leadership on launching the peaceful resolution process should be given broad coverage and interpretation in the media.

2. The Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia must define the priorities of Caucasus policy for the current phase and defend these priorities consistently in the changed geopolitical conditions. Ethnopolitical conflicts in the Caucasus may be resolved by working out mutually accepted rules of the game on the basis of international law. It is important to convince the world community that development of a global network of noncivil society—organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and international terrorism (all of which are present in Chechnya)—poses a threat to humanity. Russia must provide the world and especially the Islamic countries with objective information on the causes and nature of the Chechen conflict and must disavow Udugov's propaganda about the "jihad against the unbelievers" that is supposedly under way in Chechnya. The world community must know that the Chechen separatists have discredited the idea of independence. They terrorize the civilian population and lack mass popular support. Russia must identify and neutralize the political and financial centers that support the terrorists.

3. At present, Chechen society is in a state of deep division and conflict. Striving to maintain oligarchic control in the country, Russian political elites continue to use Chechnya for their own expedient interests. The people of Chechnya have become spare parts in the geostrategy of a unipolar world. Civil and ethnic reconciliation in Chechnya is the key condition for resolution of the conflict. The federal government must facilitate the return of refugees, contribute to the consolidation of the Chechen people, and encourage the taking of power by genuinely national forces oriented towards union with Russia. These objectives are in line with the country's strategic interests. In addition to the military component, a dialogue should be initiated with organized forces within the Chechen community. A conflict resolution program must be developed and implemented by the federal authorities in cooperation with all actors in the Chechen political process, except for those associated with criminal activities, armed separatism, and terrorism. For the purpose of defining

terms for the cessation of military actions, negotiations with Maskhadov and the field commanders may be initiated. The problem of the status of the Chechen Republic cannot be discussed with the separatists, since it is the prerogative of the Chechen people to decide on this matter.

4. The Chechen conflict is primarily a consequence of internal contradictions within Chechen society. Hence, an internal political resolution represents the foundation for the overall stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic. This political resolution implies the resolution of an entire range of problems, including overcoming civil opposition and conflicts within *teips* (clans), localities, and *virds* (Sufi brotherhoods), which became urgent during the period of government by radical nationalists. As a result, tens of thousands of people in Chechnya are involved in deadly feuds. Stabilizing the situation in Chechnya is impossible by definition without reaching national consensus and achieving peace within Chechen society, that is, the reconciliation of hostile groups of people. Solving this problem requires not only firm government and the rule of law but also traditional institutions and people's diplomacy, specifically in the form of reconciliation commissions composed of authoritative individuals. This is a major and extremely important effort that also requires government support. The main task of the Chechen political elite is to overcome the split within the nation. The resolution of Chechnya's socio-economic and political problems is possible only through national consensus and reconciliation.

5. The following principle must prevail in the work of all federal agencies and departments: Chechnya's problems must be solved by Chechens themselves, with support from the federal government. In this context, it is essential that an operable system of law enforcement be reestablished in the Chechen Republic as soon as possible. Chechen law enforcement structures, diverse in the ethnic backgrounds of their officers, must combat thugs and terrorists by means of special operations, protect citizens' rights, and maintain law and order across Chechnya. The number of officers and their backgrounds must correspond to the level and size of problems to be solved. Officers should be employed on a contractual basis. The MVD and FSB should hire young people who wish to display their talents in the fight against separatists and who have good references from authoritative elders and local community leaders. The army must be relieved of performing police functions as soon as possible, as such functions are not the army's duty. MVD agencies should be given responsibility for maintaining law and order. It is their job to arrest or eliminate identified gang leaders and guarantee security for the civilian population. The size of the army contingent in Chechnya must be reduced, with units on permanent dislocation status to remain in place. It is essential that the border control regime with Azerbaijan and Georgia be

strengthened accordingly and that heightened controls be put in place over ammunition and weapons maintained by federal troops. It is of the utmost importance to overcome tendencies of opposition between federal troops and local residents, eliminate the sociopolitical conditions for a revival of the rebels' influence, and mobilize local residents and the Chechen diaspora to cooperate with the federal government and support its policies. Military units with experience and skills in combating terrorism should be permanently deployed in Chechnya, with the units to be partially staffed with draftees and contract soldiers from Chechnya. All federal forces in the Chechen Republic should be placed under a unified command, with their efforts to be focused on protecting strategic sites and supporting the actions of the Chechen police force. Only through the joint efforts of Chechen and federal military and law enforcement structures can success be assured in operations to eliminate saboteurs and terrorist groups.

6. To consolidate positive forces within Chechnya, a Constitutional Assembly of the Chechen Republic should be convened. An organizational committee should be elected to develop the constitution and other legislation for the Chechen Republic, which are crucial for the restoration of constitutional rule. It is important to ensure public support for the government of the Chechen Republic, provide it with the appropriate legislative base, and clearly divide authorities among the various power structures. It may be feasible to establish a state council, a temporary collegial executive body, during the transitional preelection period. Such a council could include all authoritative leaders of Chechen society and representatives of the regions and ethnic groups of Chechnya. The main priorities are completing the process of building an operable governance system for the transitional period and restoring the vertical chain of command. Potential candidates to serve in the governing bodies of the Chechen Republic should be qualified professionals with authority and influence in Chechen society.

7. Nationwide democratic elections must be the final phase in the political resolution of the conflict in the Chechen Republic. Ending the protracted civil conflict in Chechnya and consolidating Chechen society are possible only through the election of a legitimate government that carries authority with the people. The historic traditions and mentality of the Chechen people are in favor of a parliamentary republic. Institutions of collective power based on the consensus of the main ethnic groups are typical for the weakly structured Chechen society. The free democratic societies of Chechnya did not tolerate authoritarian power or tyranny. That is why the institution of the presidency did not take root in Chechnya. Traditionally, Chechnya has had a collective or parliamentary form of government. Organs of state power in Chechnya have always

been based on such traditional institutions of self-governance as the *Mekhk-Kkhel* (Council of Elders), Community Council, and Village Council. This is how the Chechen people have lived over the ages. Consequently, they need to return to a controlled society with an autonomous parliamentary system of governance.

The parliament of the Chechen Republic should consist of two chambers. The upper chamber (9 to 11 members) would be formed on the basis of proportional representation of regions and major ethnic and religious groups. The lower chamber (38 to 40 members) would be formed on the basis of nationwide elections. The parliament elects a State Council and council chair from among its own members and approves members of the Cabinet of Ministers. Elections to the Chechen Republic parliament should be held in 2001, without further delay. However, the problem of Chechnya, and of Russia as well, lies not only in choosing a form of government appropriate to their historical traditions but also in selecting a governing class of individuals who must be united in the common goal of serving the people. Chechnya's prosperity depends on the selection of honest men and women who would lead their people through chaos and hesitation to the correct path of their progressive development. This is the foundation for the nation's recovery.

8. The recovery of the economy and the social sector of the Chechen Republic is a crucial condition for stabilizing the situation not only in Chechnya but also in the North Caucasus region as a whole. Ending the war in Chechnya is possible only by making the war unprofitable, that is, by starting a process of creation. The more efficiently the federal government works to resolve the socioeconomic problems that caused the crisis, the more isolated the separatists will be and the sooner the war will end. The priority objective remains restoring the housing stock, the agricultural sector, and the petrochemical industry, as well as developing knowledge-intensive and waste-free technologies. At this juncture, the federal authorities must first assist forced emigrants from Chechnya, provide financial support in the form of pensions, benefits, and humanitarian aid for the poor and war victims in the Chechen Republic, and most importantly promote the consolidation of social and political forces loyal to Russia. The program of recovery activities in Chechnya should be directly linked to the process of returning forced migrants to their homes, including not only Chechens but also Russian-speaking people (some 800,000 citizens of the former Chechen-Ingush Republic currently reside outside Chechnya). This point is even more important, given that it is by definition impossible to restore the economy and the social sphere, revive the popular culture, and generally stabilize the situation in Chechnya and surrounding areas without the help and support of these people, who have better professional and educational backgrounds than other seg-

ments of the population. The attitude of the federal government regarding the problem of forced migrants is the key to resolving the Chechen conflict. Finally, in terms of protecting the rights of Russian Federation citizens of Chechen nationality, the way in which the federal authorities respond to their needs may win the trust of those who are currently being deceived by nationalistic propaganda within Chechnya. The federal and local authorities must move decisively to eliminate oppression, unlawful acts, and ethnic discrimination directed against people from Chechnya. In the aim of returning forced migrants to Chechnya, it is essential to guarantee their security and provide them with targeted governmental and humanitarian aid within the republic.

9. It is extremely important to have ethnic Chechens working in government departments and agencies at both the regional and federal levels. These people should be worthy and highly qualified. It is a matter of fundamental importance that Chechens, as representatives of the third largest ethnic group in Russia, are represented proportionally within the ranks of government officials and employees. Their appointments to responsible positions along with other nationalities, especially on the federal level, would have great resonance in the Chechen community. This along with other factors would reduce ethnic tensions in the country and strengthen the confidence of Chechens in the Russian government.

10. The Chechnya problem is largely a cultural problem. During the reign of radical nationalist leaders, the Chechen Republic became a sort of factory producing new members of the lumpenproletariat. Therefore, resolving the Chechen crisis first and foremost requires providing new jobs for people and ensuring their education and enlightenment. The tens of thousands of young people who have reached adulthood in the past 10 years could become a social base for the separatists if they are not provided with employment or training. Federal health and education programs must be high-priority activities. Every year, tens of thousands of Chechen young people should be enrolled in Russian universities, technical colleges, and vocational training schools. The main point is to support Russian cultural and educational centers in Chechnya, the foundations of civilized society.

11. The Russian media have created a negative image of Chechens, presenting a marginal segment of that population as a reflection of the entire Chechen nation. This conscious misrepresentation must be disavowed. The federal and local authorities must present persuasive arguments to prove the reasonableness of the antiterrorism campaign, reveal the danger and the antihuman nature of terrorism, and destroy the false hero status of its leaders. Representatives of the Chechen intelligentsia, who represent the true interests of the people, must have the opportunity to use the Russian media to tell the entire world the truth about what is

happening in Chechnya and how they feel about it. So far, the voice of the separatists has been presented as the voice of the people, while the true interests and opinions of most Chechen people, who want to live as part of Russia, have been suppressed. A Russian television channel (broadcasting in both Russian and Chechen) is essential. There must be more coverage of the lives and activities of Chechens in Chechnya and in Russia, and persecutions and the practice of labeling the entire nation and presenting Chechen people as "proud savages" must be ended. It is necessary to show more coverage of people who are engaged in constructive work. Only by restoring confidence between peoples can the Russian state be strengthened and the Chechen conflict be resolved.

12. For 10 years, Chechnya has been outside the legal space of the Russian Federation. It is necessary to restore the judicial system of the Chechen Republic, ensure the efficient operations of the courts and investigative agencies, facilitate effective prosecutorial oversight, and stop the practice of abductions. A significant portion of the population has been deprived of the right to travel because of their lack of identification documents. Therefore, the issuance of passports to all citizens must be a high-priority objective, as without these documents it is impossible to guarantee the rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation in Chechnya.

13. To ensure the rights of citizens of Chechnya, the inappropriate use of force in the republic must be halted. The unreasonably large number of checkpoints in the Chechen Republic must be reduced (today there are more than 400 of them), and the practices of extortion, blackmail, and oppression of local residents by federal troops must be ended. Arrangements should be made for checkpoints to be jointly manned by federal troops and Chechen militia. Special rules and standards should be introduced in the army and other federal military and civilian structures in Chechnya to govern the treatment of local residents, rebels, and fellow service members. A law prohibiting the use of alcohol is urgently needed for armed services personnel during their service in Chechnya. All segments of the noncombatant population must receive humane treatment, and international legal standards must be observed when dealing with rebels who have voluntarily laid down their arms. Another amnesty should be announced for individuals who have not committed grave crimes and are willing to stop their resistance. At the same time, public judicial inquiries should be conducted regarding those who have committed grave offences against the civilian population. The fight against terrorism must be waged consistently, without hesitations or extremes, and in a highly professional manner in strict compliance with legislative acts and democratic principles. Otherwise, state terrorism will replace com-

mon terrorism and banditry. The use of force against bandits must be lawful and justified in the people's eyes.

14. The Russian business sector and Chechen entrepreneurs in particular are called upon to play an enormous role in the recovery of Chechnya and the revival of its economy and culture. Private capital must be attracted to restore the economy and the social sector of the Chechen Republic, so the government must take the appropriate actions to encourage the flow of investments. The creation of a Council of Chechen Entrepreneurs, a Foundation for Chechen Revival, and other social organizations may facilitate the achievement of these objectives. A Russia-wide campaign is urgently needed to provide humanitarian aid for Chechnya and Chechen refugees. The effects of the Chechen conflict may be overcome if all of Russian society confronts the problem.

Appendix A-2

Ethnic and National Conflicts in the Age of Globalization

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The postmodern concept of the world as a huge supermarket in which customers voluntarily choose from a wide range of identities just like they choose consumer goods is far from reality. The twenty-first century is often characterized as the Age of Globalization; however, the claim that ethnic and national identities are becoming vague and utterly meretricious remains unsubstantiated.

So far, globalization is primarily an economic and technological development. Economic factors should certainly not be ignored or overlooked, but as important as they are, by themselves they are only blind forces. They are revealed in changing social constellations, interpreted in the language of politics, and expressed and perceived through culture. It is claimed that if cultures overlap and interpenetrate, they cease to be available as a political symbol of national difference and national unity. Hardly so, since any cultural trait, however it is or seems to be, can serve as an ethnic or national marker.

Many assimilationist projects failed because they were based on direct identification of ethnicity and nationalism with culture, which is problematic. Actors live not only in the here and now; they encounter the present in terms of the past and the future. Therefore, the social and historical context should always be taken into account to make sense of the choices that actors are able to make regarding self-identification.

Ethnic and national identities are based on selected, or even constructed and imagined, but emotionally significant and integrating symbols and landmarks of historical memory, as much as on cultural similari-

ties and differences. Even myths cease to be myths and become social reality when people internalize them and are ready to kill and be killed for them. The advent of the postmodernist era has not changed much in this respect.

Inasmuch as ethnicity and nationalism are directly or indirectly linked to identity formation and maintenance, there is so far nothing in the global process that for better or worse can break this link. On the contrary, globalization, which makes individual cultures less bound by their traditional ethnonational and territorial entities, at the same time enables them to use new technologies in order to reinvent, redefine, reproduce, and propagate themselves and their real or imaginary differences. Likewise, globally produced ideas contribute to contemporary concern with identity, uniqueness, tradition, and indiginization.

Another argument in favor of globalization as a force capable of reducing nationalism is connected with the allegedly diminishing role of nation-states. It is true that a strong link between unitary and more or less homogeneous states, on the one hand, and economic and social advancement, on the other, is not imperative, but it is far from clear that nation-states are weakening, declining, eroding, and withering away because of transnational economic forces. So far, globalization has not shaken the world system of nation-states, or the so-called nation-states. Their somewhat changing economic functions do not diminish their role as the main actors on the global political scene.

There are many reasons to doubt that globalization per se is a remedy for centrifugal forces. On the contrary, sometimes it brings them to the fore and provides a favorable environment for them. Nationalism and ethnic strife not only have many varieties, they also have many causes. Still, in most of the cases nationalism is directly connected with the modernization process and its consequences. However, globalization is but a new stage of modernization, and like modernization in general, it is uneven and differential. Being primarily an economic and technological development, it creates a new disequilibrium and new gaps between ethnic groups. As with previous stages of modernization, globalization has its winners, its losers, and those whose rewards are delayed. First, various components of globalization occur sequentially rather than simultaneously. Second, individual countries, as well as certain strata and groups within these countries, benefit from globalization to a greater extent and more quickly than others. Where the differences are of an ethnic nature, competition for the scarce goods of modernization may be increased and, thus, ethnic relations aggravated. Third, globalization presupposes a further increase in mobility, both occupational and spatial. This disrupts the old division of labor but sometimes creates a new one. Such situations in time of rapid social, economic, and cultural change in plural societies and

even worldwide may transpose economic, social, and political competition to the ethnic plane.

Conventional wisdom says that modernity brings about stability. Correspondingly, incomplete and insufficient modernity may easily cause and be accompanied by instability. The same may be said about globalization, especially at its present, initial stage. In this case, one should expect growth of nationalism as a reaction to the difficulties and shortcomings connected with the globalization process. It seems that we are already witnessing some signs of such backlash.

Another factor that should be taken into account is the illusion of the universality of nation-statehood. Historically, nationalisms have envisioned a world consisting of nations that were uniform within but sharply distinct from what lay beyond their borders. It turns out, however, that the world as a whole may be becoming less diverse, while individual nations are becoming more heterogeneous than it was perceived or designed. There is a certain terminological and even conceptual confusion in the social sciences. Many alleged nation-states are simultaneously characterized as multiethnic states, states with plural or multicultural societies, and so on. In fact, some of these states are already not multiethnic but multinational, since the process of nation building is ongoing. However, when ethnic groups develop into nationalities or nations, with literary languages, cultural institutions, mass media, occupationally differentiated social structures, specific economic interests, and political elites or counter-elites, there is less room for unifying integration than in the premodern and early modern societies. Multiethnic, and especially multinational societies with particularistic identities, increase the necessity for and simultaneously the danger of an activist state. The striving of a state for homogenization is rife with the potential for conflict. Under this situation, the policy of ethnic and national homogenization and in a broader sense, all kinds of nationalizing projects, are at present less successful than in the past, even when linguistic assimilation or accommodation has made progress.

Since the obituary of ethnonationalism is premature, it is better to turn our attention to more programmatic questions, to the ways of preventing and reducing tension, conflicts, and violence. The first observation that should be made in this regard, while at the moment trivial but still worth repeating, is as much empirical as it is theoretical. As a rule contemporary liberal democracies are more successful in regulating ethnonational problems than any other sociopolitical and economic order. Repressive regimes can temporarily contain nationalism, but in the long run they only aggravate it. On the contrary, liberal democracy, or rather the civil society without which it is impossible, often weakens the threat of ethnic corporatism and is sometimes capable of diffusing the

conflict. Civil society not only guarantees but also implies awareness of and participation in the political process; it is based on agreement and the search for compromise. This is a necessary condition for its very existence. Based on the separation of the public and private spheres and on the plethora of voluntary associations from the control of state power, civil society ideally provides its citizens with the opportunity to have a number of identifications and loyalties at once, and ethnic identity is only one of these. Besides, a multiplicity of groups that criss-cross each other reduces the centrality of any one particular group. Surely, liberal democracy per se is not a solution for ethnic and national problems. However, it is the best precondition for their solution.

This is especially true with liberal democracy in developed countries. Human behavior is inspired by more than stomachs and purses, but credit cards and checkbooks do matter. Though much despised and criticized, consumerism also has many advantages, and not only of the economic variety. It reduces the desire to fight for any *ism*. Citizens of affluent democratic states have a different appreciation of the value of human life than the subjects of repressive authoritarian regimes and calculate differently the cost and effects of military expenditures and violent conflicts caused by nationalism, because they have more to lose. This is one of the reasons only the extreme fringes of the ethnic minorities in these countries tend to resort to terrorism. The rest prefer to pursue their goals by legal political means.

Like it or not, the continuing salience of ethnic and national identities, both territorialized and transnational, and ethnonational strife and conflicts seem to be inevitable at the current stage of globalization. The best we can hope for is that their underlying reasons will not be eliminated, but that their most extreme forms will be prevented. At present, even this is sometimes impossible. Thus, these conflicts should somehow be regulated and diffused, and the first thing that must be done in such cases is to reduce violence and bloodshed.

There is a growing understanding that local conflicts can no longer be addressed as purely internal issues. We are witnessing a gradual erosion of the nonintervention principle in the affairs of other states when universal human rights are at stake. Just as the right for self-determination cannot always be equated with the right to independent statehood, in the twenty-first century, the monopoly on violence of individual states in dealing with ethnonational conflicts on their territory can no longer be regarded as their absolute prerogative. Through moral condemnation, sanctions, and other measures, the international community can and should raise the cost of violence, when the latter exceeds internationally accepted norms and violates international treaties on human rights.

This allows the international community to exercise a certain deter-

rent influence. Under this situation, freedom of information and its collection, as well as the activities of international truth-seeking bodies, should be guaranteed and become *sine qua non* of conflict resolutions.

Since it is the civilian population that suffers the most in ethnonational conflicts, it should be protected first and foremost. I refer to crimes committed against the civilian population by all sides in such conflicts, be they mass destruction, execution, rape, looting, ethnic cleansing, or terrorist activities. The perpetrators should be uncovered and punished, and it is depressing that so far too many of these remain unpunished and protected by their states or ethnonational communities. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, both created by the United Nations, as well as the permanent International Criminal Court that may soon be established are only the first steps in the right direction.

Actually, some local ethnonational conflicts have already become somewhat internationalized. Hopefully, in the future, international law in this regard will also be adjusted to new realities, but this is still a far cry from the current situation. Meanwhile, the growing *de facto* involvement of international peacekeeping forces in these conflicts in different parts of the world has become a *fait accompli*. It seems that this is sometimes the only way to interrupt violence and bloodshed. Maybe in the future, international forces will be used to prevent violence. Large-scale ethnic cleansing should especially be prevented by any means, including international intervention. The main danger of international forces is that after a while they become almost irreversible and thus perpetuate conflict. Another danger is their destabilizing effect, which extends far beyond the conflict area.

International intervention, even when it is accepted by all sides of a conflict, has many deficiencies. It is very difficult to reach a consensus in the United Nations or in the U.N. Security Council on this extreme measure. For many reasons, including domestic ones, individual countries are reluctant to commit their troops to this purpose. Additionally, international intervention interrupts conflicts, but by itself does not solve the problems that lead to violence, as well as those that emerge as the result of violence. Even when peaceful agreement between warring sides is achieved, or imposed by the intervention of external force, not infrequently with far more gusto than it deserves, it must often be maintained by this force indefinitely.

It is much better to prevent conflicts than to deal with their disastrous consequences. In this regard, I envision at least two positive roles for the international community. First, it can play a much more active role in diagnosing ethnonational strife and encouraging national governments to find peaceful resolutions before conflict breaks out. An imperfect and

painful compromise is better than bloodshed. If this principle is assumed or installed, then politics as the art of the possible may be directed toward ethnonational accommodation and accord as a part of negotiated political culture.

These accommodations need creativity, imagination, patience, flexibility, and the ability to redefine one's own position. Moreover, since we are living in a rapidly changing world, the laws and rules regulating ethnonational relations should hardly be considered unchangeable. Certain mechanisms acceptable for all sides can be elaborated, which may imply the possibility of their eventual reconsideration by well-defined legal means. When trust is low, international monitoring and certain guarantees with the clear understanding that unilateral departure from the agreements would not remain unpunished by the guarantors, are also desirable. This is another important role for international organizations that I foresee in the future.

In all, there are many reasons to expect that nationalism will remain one of the main sources of conflict and violence in many parts of the world. The only hope that remains is not to eradicate it, but to contain it, to curb its excesses, in other words, to try to domesticate it by making it civil. This happens only when the mutual benefits of cohabitation are obvious to the vast polyethnic majority in a common state. It would be too optimistic to expect that even the most thoughtful, considerate, and generous politics in plural societies, with good will, skill, and luck also, can satisfy all nationalist demands. However, if ethnic and national identities are respected and minorities are provided with a real voice in decision making, then it may be possible to avoid the desire to fight because the consequences of strife may appear worse than other options.

Appendix A-3

Transition and Conflict in Multiethnic Postsocialist Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina¹

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In her fascinating presentation yesterday, Professor Drobizheva referred to the quest for scapegoats in times of deep socioeconomic crisis in a given society, and that in multiethnic societies the scapegoat and enemy tend to become the ethnic other.²

This is clearly what happened in the former Yugoslavia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, why does the ethnic other become the enemy, and what are the processes whereby this happens? This is a crucial question to examine, for without an understanding of this issue, we will not be able to identify constructive and long-term approaches to reintegration and reconciliation postconflict.

The issue of the ethnic other may be approached from different angles and will receive different answers depending on the particular case at hand. This presentation focuses on the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, discussing three main themes organized according to the three phases of the war.

¹This presentation uses arguments and material in an article by Tone Bringa called "Averted Gaze: Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995," and published in Hinton, A., ed. 2002. *Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

²Leokadia Drobizheva gave a presentation on December 18, 2000, entitled "Socioeconomic Parameters of Interethnic Stability and Tension," at the Symposium on States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Russian and International Perspective, Moscow.

1. *preconflict*, focuses on the institutional legacies of the communist Tito regime, and in particular the institutionalization of ethnicity

2. *conflict*, focuses on fear as a necessary driving force in the escalation of conflict; how a climate of fear is created and eventually turned into a climate of hatred

3. *postconflict*, focuses on the need to change the ways in which ethnicity is institutionalized; how to eliminate fear of the ethnic other, and create secure conditions for displaced people and refugees to return to their homes

Before proceeding further, however, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between identity and identifications. A person's identity consists of a set of identifications, and ethnicity (or nationality) is only one of these. If one fails to make this distinction, it is not possible to properly account for the process whereby ethnicity becomes a person's only relevant public identification.³ This is the National Academies process we could observe taking place in the former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina this process was not merely borne out of the need for security amidst the chaos of a severe economic and political crisis but had to reach its completion by organized, violent force.

The breakup of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars cannot be explained by one factor only (Bringa, 2002). It was the result of a combination of factors; a series of circumstances whereby dramatic structural changes, both domestically and internationally, and certain political players came together at the end of the century in Yugoslavia. Some of these circumstances were contemporary, for example, those in the international arena, while others were legacies of previous structures (this was particularly the case in the domestic arena). Internationally, there were, among others, the following circumstances:

- the end of the cold war and the crisis of the communist and totalitarian state structures
- the misguided efforts of the European Union to draw up a common foreign policy line in its attempt to establish itself as a prominent player in international affairs, using Yugoslavia as its launching case
- the absence of the great powers of the United States and Russia (the latter was struggling with its own problems) in any positive mediation role at an early preventive stage

³For use of this distinction to highlight the issue of identity formation in Sarajevo during the siege of 1992-95 see Macek, 1999.

- the international mediators who mistook the nationalist leaders for democratically elected and democratic-minded representatives of their constituencies, when in effect they were mostly totalitarian-minded ethnically defined leaders who each controlled an army and media outlets and therefore the minds and actions of their ethnic communities
- the international mediators and diplomats who, with a few exceptions, let their understanding of the conflict be informed by the rhetoric and force of the separatist nationalist leaders, and dismissed other non-nationalist politicians as not representative
- the fourth faction in Bosnia, nonnationalist Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) and others, being ignored and silenced by domestic and international forces alike
- the roller-coaster approach of international players such as the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union in dealing with the conflict

There is plenty to discuss. However, I would argue that the war was primarily caused by factors within the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; domestic causes will therefore be the focus of this presentation.

REDEFINING SPACE AND BELONGING BY FORCE

The extreme personalized violence that soldiers, paramilitaries and thugs directed toward individuals because they belonged to or were identified with a specific nationality or ethnic group was the expression of a politically organized attempt at radically redefining categories of belonging and redrawing spatial boundaries. But why the need to redraw boundaries? The old structures of Tito's Yugoslavia that defined the boundaries disintegrated, but legacies of the old system remained. The forced re-drawing of boundaries of exclusion and inclusion could be seen as the eventual resolution of authority—a delayed transition of authority—a transition that had never found resolution after the death of Yugoslavia's founder and post-World War II leader, Tito, in 1980.

The premise for this argument is that the Yugoslavs did not properly address issues of succession and political legitimacy following the death of Tito in 1980, and no other mode of authority than the one embodied by Tito was allowed to develop. This was the *Tito we swear to you* model of paternal authority that Tito passed on not to one successor but to six, each of whom, with the important exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, represented the special interests of their republic/nation in a rotating presidency (see Bringa, 2002 and 2003). When Yugoslavia held multiparty elections in 1990 there had been more than 10 years of an unresolved process

of authority transition, to which was added the problems entailed in the transition from an authoritarian one party system to a democratic multi-party system. It should be clear that Yugoslavia was in a fragile state of transition.

In Tito's single party state the only opportunity to express diversity was through ethnicity. Indeed, in many instances political representation was based on ethnicity, for example, in the rotating presidency that Tito had designed, all seats were allocated on the basis of ethnic or national identity (Bringa, 2002). Thus the foundation for a political system based on ethnic or national identity was already in place. Since very little time was allowed to lapse and other forms of thinking to take place before calling for multiparty elections, the fact that people overwhelmingly voted for ethnically defined parties in the first multiparty elections in 1990 was only a logical extension of this system.

The leaders who came to power in 1990 through popular vote (except Milosevic who maneuvered his way to the top of the Serbian Communist party hierarchy) came to power with different agendas, but they had one thing in common: their new power base was the ethnically defined nation. Their hold on the masses (the people) was, as with the Titoist leaders who preceded them, a rhetoric and public discourse based on fear, but no longer fear of an outside threat (the Soviet Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) but of the ethnic other within.

COMMUNISM REINVENTED AS NATIONALISM

In a process that started with the 1974 Yugoslav constitution (resulting in the devolution of power to the republics), the *people as one* principle that is characteristic of totalitarian rule was moved from the Yugoslav (federal) level to the ethnonational level (see Bringa, 2002 and 2003). The one-party Communist state that controlled its army and media dissolved into one-party ethnonationalist-governed republics that each controlled an army and media. When this logic was taken to Bosnia-Herzegovina it resulted in the formation of three ethnically defined parties, three governments and three armies: Croat, Bosnian (majority Muslim or Bosniac), and Serb. But there was a twist—only the Croat-defined and the Serb-defined nationalist parties propagated an ideology of ethnic purity, and were separatist. The Bosniac party preferred a unitary and multiethnic Bosnian state when that still seemed an option. The totalitarian thinking of the one-party state was thus transferred to the ethnonational level. This, together with the tradition of viewing political conflict or competition in ethnic terms, accounts for the fact that all people that the ethnonationalist elites identified as belonging to another ethnic group were branded as political enemies. In Serbian President Milosevic's political

project for a greater Serbia (and later Croatia's President Tudjman's for a greater Croatia), all non-Serbs (or non-Croats, in Tudjman's case) were considered enemies who had to be removed in the fashion characteristic of totalitarian systems (Bringa, 2002).

Tito's regime was ambivalent in its policy toward ethnic relations. On the one hand, it encouraged national identities through the political and administrative system,⁴ and on the other, it ethnicized political opposition. Demands for more democracy were branded as outbursts of nationalism and an anathema, a threat to the very existence of Yugoslavia (based on the principle of brotherhood and unity) and therefore considered antistate and prosecuted (Bringa, 2002).

When the totalitarian thinking of the one-party state was transferred to the ethnonational level it also implied a particular perception of the majority-minority relationship. During the 1990 elections in Bosnia and elsewhere people worried about the outcome of free elections and the new divisions of power they would create. Since there was no political tradition of democracy or pluralism, people feared that to be a minority in a political-administrative area could mean having no rights (under one-party rule, only those who supported the party had political rights; consequently no one wanted to be a minority [Bringa, 2002]). This was a concern that was not addressed by the new political leaders (except in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia).

THE ENEMY RHETORIC OF THE NEW NATIONALIST LEADERS

The transfer of the totalitarian thinking of a one-party state to the Yugoslav republics and therefore to the ethnonational level is also evident from the way in which people not siding with one of the nationalist parties were marginalized or silenced. Indeed, the war was not primarily ethnic but political; it was a war about silencing political plurality and quelling the democratic movement by casting it in totalitarian-nationalist rhetoric, by casting all politics (party politics and opposition politics) in the idiom of ethnicity. Those who challenged or broke with that idiom were marginalized, silenced, and relegated to the realm of nonreality (see Gagnon, 1996). This is clear from the fact that Serbs who opposed the project of establishing an ethnically pure greater Serbia by publicly expressing solidarity with non-Serb neighbors were targeted, too: Anyone

⁴For Bosnia this still goes on with the help of the international community and the governmental structures laid down in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Political representation and the allocation of resources are still based on ethnic (or national) community membership.

who was against the nationalist aim of creating ethnically homogeneous territories and states was targeted (Bringa, 2002). They were branded as enemies of the people; indeed they were exposed to the same kind of rhetoric and harassment that political dissenters were during the Tito regime.⁵ Under Tito the crime was to be a nationalist, under his successors the crime was not to be a nationalist.

In Bosnia in 1993, one could no longer choose to be a Bosnian rather than a Croat or Serb, or to be a Yugoslav rather than a “Muslim” or just a Sarajevoan or a citizen. Any category other than Croat, Serb, or Bosniac fell outside the dominant discourse, that is, the discourse of power (Bringa, 2002).

Opposition and resistance became impossible. If a Serb opposed the harassment or expulsion of his neighbor with a Muslim name, he was a traitor, risked being killed (or was killed), or the ethnic cleansers threatened to kill (or killed) his son or another close relative. The brave persons who resisted and opposed, in other words, were given impossible choices. The methods the Serbian paramilitaries in particular applied were very efficient. Serbs who either protected their Muslim friends or neighbors or voiced opposition to the mistreatment of non-Serbs in any other way were dealt with effectively—tortured, killed, and left in view for others who might contemplate similar acts. Individuals who refused to be separated from their friends or neighbors along ethnic lines were dealt with, too.

⁵In Communist times, dissidents and political opposition were branded as *cominformists* or nationalists that is, traitors, or fifth columnists. In a speech given in early 2000, Yugoslav President Milosevic stressed that “[w]e have no opposition, but rather contemporary *janissaries*. These latter-day *poturice* (turncoats) are at the service of foreign masters.” In other words, Milosevic brands his political opponents *janissaries* and *poturice*. Both terms are associated with Muslims and refer to the Ottoman period. *Poturice* literally means *those who have become Turks*. The term refers to South Slavs who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule in the Balkans. But in some contexts it is used as a term for traitors or turncoats. The term is often used in this meaning in Serbian folklore. *Janissaries* is used as another term for fifth-columnists. [Editor’s note: The *janissaries* were an elite corps of Turkish troops originally organized in the fourteenth century as the sultan’s guard, drawn chiefly from subject Christian boys siezed in tribute and forcibly converted to Islam. This corps continued as the largest and strongest unit of the army until abolished after revolting in 1826. Information taken from Gove, P. B., ed. 1963. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Springfield: G. & C. Merriam Company and <http://www.tlfg.ulaval.ca/axl/europe/Youginfpref.htm>.] The Communist-turned-nationalist has changed his labels and targets for repression, but the rhetorical strategy remains the same and has changed little since the late 1980s except for the current absence of the words *Muslim* and *Muslim fundamentalism*. A twenty-first century nationalist is using sixteenth-century terms to express his twentieth-century Communist world view (Bringa, 2002).

Potential witnesses to massacres were silenced by implicating them in the acts (c.f., Rhode, 1997).⁶ In this fashion, even if a person wanted to disassociate himself from acts of violence committed in the name of the ethnic or national group with which he identified, it would be difficult since every attempt was made to implicate everybody in inflicting pain on the perceived enemy. Whatever opposition there was against dividing Bosnians along ethnic lines the separatist elites effectively dissipated through the use of the rhetoric of fear and hate propaganda and organized violence. Bosnians quickly learned not to argue with a gun. Ethnic cleansing then was not only and not even primarily about ethnic purification. It was primarily, to borrow a term from Gordy (1999), about the “destruction of alternatives,” and the elimination of people who represented these alternatives by virtue of identifying or being identified with another ethnic community or political community or both (Bringa, 2002). This meant that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslims, Croat, and Serb nonseparatists, and individuals of ethnically mixed backgrounds, who all favored the continued existence of a multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina within its existing borders became particularly vulnerable.

So why were Muslims and nonnationalists the main targets in first, the propaganda war preceding and then accompanying the war, and second, in the physical harassment and violence during the war?

First and most simply, they were nonseparatist, favored a multiethnic and undivided Bosnia-Herzegovina and were therefore (according to the logic described above) considered political enemies who had to be pacified or eliminated. Second, the principle of multiethnicity by itself was considered an ideological enemy to ethnonationalism. This was because the idea was detrimental to the essence of separatist political movements based on ethnonationalism and because multiethnicity and particularly its most poignant expression, “interethnic marriage” was portrayed as the ultimate communist invention (it did look very much like brotherhood and unity, one of Titoist Yugoslavia’s three ideological pillars). This was particularly destructive for Bosnia, which had a long tradition of cooperation between the different ethnoreligious communities hundreds of years before Tito’s Yugoslavia (Bringa, 2002). Indeed, interethnic or so-called mixed marriages were considered (and probably rightly so) a threat to the mobilizing effect of nationalism. Bosnia was the region of the former Yugoslavia where intermarriage was the most common. It is interesting to note that cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia where the ethnic com-

⁶In addition to Rhode, 1997, court documents from the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague and Human Rights Watch reports from Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war provide examples.

munities were most intimately connected through a relative high number of inter-marriages, were also those (Sarajevo, Mostar, Vukovar) that were subject to the most severe bombing and destruction. Third, there was a rich repertoire of prejudice and negative folk images about “Muslims” particularly in Serbian folklore that the Serb nationalists could use to encourage forces of intolerance (see Sells, 1996; Loud, 1996). The traditions and vocabulary of hatred in folklore, such as old epics, do not motivate people’s actions per se. It is the activation of the images that matters; the reconnection of those historic images and attitudes with the present and their translation into contemporary action. People have to be made to act upon them; fear and violence are the triggers. Both Serb and Croat nationalist rhetoric portrayed the native Slavic Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina as fundamentalist and as representatives of a long-gone repressive Ottoman regime, and thus turned them into a threat of a future force of oppression that had to be defeated. Forces of intolerance were not only allowed to flourish they also were encouraged by the postsocialist and nationalist leaders. Propaganda via the media outlets controlled by the nationalists was backed up by organized violence and harassment.

Little by little, the harassment, violence, and war experience of individuals served to confirm the nationalist propaganda of the need for ethnic unity and the threat from the ethnic other. War experiences changed the way people and communities think and feel about their and others’ identities. Indeed, the experiences of violence and war seem crucial for the strong ethnic and national identification people in most of the former Yugoslavia have developed (cf. Povrzanovic, 1997). Yet, the fact that ethnic separatist armies and militias needed to perpetrate intimate and personalized terror and violence toward individual members of an “other” ethnic community on a large and organized scale—the hallmark of ethnic cleansing and the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina—in order to engineer new ethnically defined nation-states, proves that most people did not want the new social order that was being imposed on them. How then did so many citizens seemingly end up participating in or supporting the violence aimed at driving out people of a different ethnicity from their community?

THE MANIPULATION OF FEAR AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY

Fear was the mobilizing factor. The nationalists (the new elites) created and manipulated fear by publicly raising old grievances. One can call this the politics of memory. This was possible because there had been no public process under Tito for acknowledging injustices and crimes committed during the Second World War.

Tito had been reluctant to deal with past injustices, such as atrocities towards civilians of a specific ethnic identification, and had instead glossed over the animosities created by the communal fighting during the Second World War by his key ideological pillar, Brotherhood and Unity. The civil wars that ran parallel and intertwined with the larger World War II in Yugoslavia were never properly dealt with in the official history after 1945. It operated with two mutually exclusive categories: the Fascists (the evil perpetrators) and the Partisans (the heroic victors and victims of the fascists). The suffering and injustices of anyone who fell outside of these categories were not publicly acknowledged. Civilians who had been caught in between or those who had suffered at the hands of the Partisans did not have a place in the official account. No memorial was ever erected over the graves of these victims. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, "the nameless dead" were in many cases exhumed and given a religious burial, a burial that imbued these victims with an ethnic identity (Verdery, 1999). They became Serb victims of the Croat Ustasha or Croat victims of Communists (Serbs). Finally, there was public acknowledgment of the suffering and loss that had been silenced under Tito, but the public acknowledgment was only to the living members of the victims' ethnic/national groups. It was therefore not a ritual that could be part of a process of reconciliation; on the contrary, there was another, hidden message—a collapsing of time identifying the victims with all other members of the same ethnicity and the perpetrators with all other living members of the group they were seen to represent. As argued by Verdery (*ibid.*), the underlying message was, "[t]hey may do it to you again."

Indeed, the public process of remembering these events from 1989 onwards was not owned by the local communities where the events had taken place; instead, it was hijacked by national leaders as a tool to manipulate fear and create a social climate where supporters would rally behind them for protection.

Manipulation of fear became the most important tool for the nationalists. Media (controlled by the various nationalist governments) would dwell on past atrocities committed by members of other nationalities and reinterpret them in the light of the present political development. Or they would simply fabricate incidents, such as massacres, perpetrated by the other group. Such incidents were broadcast repeatedly in the nationalist party-controlled media. Incidents were provoked in local communities by police or paramilitaries before the war broke out. Incidents involving one or a few persons from the enemy group, it was hoped, would lead to retribution and give an excuse for a more massive attack on the local enemy population as a whole. Intimidation and provocations could consist of beating up people and bombing shops owned by members of the perceived enemy group. This happened in municipalities throughout

Bosnia. Barricades were put up, people were stripped of their freedom of movement, war raged elsewhere in the country, and citizens asked themselves, are we next? A siege mentality developed with fear of an imminent attack by members of the other group.

The media propaganda and individual incidents of intimidation did not bring immediate results, and ultimately war proved to be the only means by which Bosnians could be separated and convinced of the truth of the doctrine (Bringa, 2002). On the eve of the war, this was illustrated by Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb nationalist leader's favorite propaganda line, that they could not live together.

KINSHIP, ETHNICITY, AND MOBILIZATION

Why did nationalist rhetoric and the appeal to ethnic solidarity have such resonance in Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia)? The issue of political representation and the allocation of resources have already been discussed; a few words about the emotional appeal are now necessary.

First, let it be clear that before the war, Bosnia was neither a society of ethnic hatreds and incessant intercommunal killings, nor was it the ideal model of a harmonious multiethnic society free of ethnic prejudices. Before the war, there were various ways in which people with different ethno-religious backgrounds coexisted and accommodated each other's differences. Social patterns of interaction among people with either Serb, Croat, Bosniac, or a combination of two or all three ethnic backgrounds varied across time, place, and social groups. There were urban neighborhoods or workplaces where ethnic identification rarely defined a person in his/her interaction with his/her neighbors or colleagues; a common identity relating to place, network, education, or profession was more important. There were Bosnians who grew up in families whose networks of friends and family consisted of a mixture of Bosnians and Yugoslavs of different ethnic backgrounds. Like Bosnians who grew up in "mixed" neighborhoods they took pride in the diversity and in knowing about the different traditions and religious rituals of their friends, neighbors, and relatives with whom they socialized during informal coffee-drinking get-togethers.

There were also Bosnians who grew up in families whose networks of friends and family consisted entirely of people from the same ethnic background, but this in fact seems to have been a rarer situation. In some villages people from different ethno-religious backgrounds would live side by side, socialize over coffee, visit each other to pay their respects at various ritual events, exchange favors, and sometimes have close friendships, but they would rarely intermarry. In others they would live parallel lives in separate hamlets and know little about each other. While in some

ethnically mixed villages relationships between members of different ethnoreligious groups were friendly and relaxed, in others there were tensions, mutual distrust, and separation. In some cases, tensions were caused by injustices during or immediately after the Second World War that had not been addressed during the Tito era of Brotherhood and Unity, in others they were due to neighborhood quarrels over land and property that had mobilized people along kinship lines. And this leads me to the point of the emotional appeal of nationalist rhetoric.

In rural Bosnia-Herzegovina (which is where the nationalist appeal is perhaps the strongest), kinship networks are important; kinship is the primary bond of loyalty. In rural areas, ethnic intermarriage is rare and therefore kinship overlaps with ethnicity. In other words, kin are also members of the same ethnic community. This fact may help explain a mobilizing potential in a conflict that was based on the rhetoric of nationalism, because nationalist discourse uses the idiom of kinship. It is, in other words, kinship and not ethnicity that holds the primary emotional appeal and is the mobilizing factor. Having said that, however, it should be remembered that for most civilians on all sides, the mobilization (the motivation to fight in a war) was primarily based on fear, and varying degrees of coercion, and the need to protect one's family and kin and therefore perceived in defensive terms. Indeed, it could be argued that the level of fear and violence needed to engage people (or rather to disengage people, that is, to silence their opposition) is an indicator of the weak power of ethnic sentiment as a mobilizing factor (see Gagnon, 1996). Furthermore, for the perpetrators of crimes the motivations were often economic gain (through extensive looting), power, and prestige. Prestige was forthcoming since acts, which in a functioning state governed by the rule of law would be considered criminal and punished by society as a whole, were considered heroic by many of those in whose name and on whose behalf the crimes were allegedly committed; they were portrayed as acts in defense of the nation. As the nationalist rhetoric of ethnic solidarity takes hold, it becomes almost impossible to resist because national identity becomes the only relevant identity, nationalism is the only relevant discourse, and people who resist are exiled, treated as traitors, or forced to become accomplices to crimes committed in the name of the group (see Gagnon, 1996; Bringa, 2002).

A FINAL WORD

In all societies at all times there exist both the potential for conflict and the potential for peaceful coexistence. What will become dominant or prevail is very much dependent on what a given society's political and economic elites—political leaders, academics, media, and others—choose

to stress. Societies in states of radical transition and severe political crisis are more vulnerable to individuals and organizations that seek to exploit the potential for conflict. The nationalist political leaders that (aided by the media and armed forces they controlled) instigated and drove the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, consciously exploited the potential for conflict. Manipulating fear of the threat of the other within became the most important tool in holding onto power and quelling the forces of democratization. Tellingly, all the nationalist leaders who had been voted into office because they had promised their people better living conditions in a time of severe economic social crisis brought a complete economic and social state of disaster onto their respective people.

SUGGESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

A few points for emphasis in a discussion of lessons learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina that could be applied to conflict management in other multiethnic societies that have experienced ethnic conflict and war are suggested.

Societies in economic and political regime transition are in a danger zone and in great need of attention. It is important to consider how to avoid marginalization of certain strata or groups (particularly the old elites) in such societies. An effort is needed to bring the old elites into the restructuring process as a constructive force.

The issue of old grievances also deserves focus, including

- the responsibility of media and political leaders in publicly acknowledging past injustices, suffering, and loss of “the other”
- the need for the states involved in the war to cooperate with international legal institutions (such as the Criminal Tribunal in The Hague)
- a general process of acknowledging and assigning individual responsibility for crimes committed so that responsibility is decollectivized; both processes above would contribute
- a need to commemorate all war dead independent of ethnic/political affiliation

In addition to actions taken by postwar authorities to ensure that citizens guilty of crimes are identified and brought to justice, media and respected public figures should also focus on those people who resisted the pressure to turn against their neighbor or fellow citizen of another nationality and helped without regard to ethnic identification. Once the fears and pressures associated with conflict and war recede such a focus may be a spontaneous response by ordinary people who want to try and overcome the past and live in peace with their neighbors.

In thinking about the future structure of a multiethnic society like Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is a mistake to institutionalize the kind of division that ethnic cleansing and ethnonationalist wars create. Instead we need a Bosnia that embraces all the different ways in which people in Bosnia accommodated differences and coexist described above. Soft boundaries are needed that will allow people to establish relationships with fellow citizens free of the pressures and dictates of bigots. To put it simply: Those who do not want to live together should not be allowed to force their preference onto everyone else. Policy makers and mediators in conflicts in multiethnic societies (that are based on the rhetoric of ethnicity) need to gain insights into and encourage the practical ways in which people deal with the issue of identity on the ground. Ethnicity is just one identification among the many that constitute a person's identity. It may be emphasized or de-emphasized depending on context. Multiethnic societies should be structured in ways that allow for a multiplicity of forms for coexisting in accordance with the contextually shifting and flexible approach of ordinary people who interact in an atmosphere free of cohesion and fear.

Lastly, governments' approach toward local politics should be based not on the assumption of a commonality of ethnic ties but on the communality of experience. In postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina there are many examples of people who share a common understanding with Bosnians of a different ethnicity than their own. This is an understanding based on shared war-time experiences. For instance, Sarajevo Serbs who lived there during the almost four-year-long siege and shelling campaign by Bosnian Serb forces may feel emotionally and socially as well as politically closer to their Bosniac or Croat neighbors who were in the same situation as them than to their Serbian relatives elsewhere (who do not share the siege experience and may have a very different perception of what happened based on what their government-controlled media told them).

Instead of measures that help to reify boundaries and separation between the three ethnic communities, arenas and fora should be created and encouraged to develop so that citizens of different ethnic backgrounds who share similar experiences and nonethnic identifications can meet. In other words, arenas where people can relate to each other with reference to identifications other than those of ethnicity are needed.

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Appendix A-4

States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Russian and International Perspectives

AGENDA

DECEMBER 18-20, 2000
MOSCOW

Monday, December 18, 2000

Opening of the Symposium: Welcoming Comments

Opening Remarks

States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict
Robert McC. Adams, University of California at San Diego

Session 1: Characteristics of Peaceful Management and Reduction of Tensions Within Multiethnic Societies

The Global Context for Addressing Multiethnic Issues in the Age of
Millennial Capitalism
John L. Comaroff, University of Chicago

Socioeconomic Parameters of Interethnic Stability and Tension
Leokadia Drobizheva, Institute of Sociology

Peace Enforcement in Ethnic Conflicts

Anatoly Dmitriev, Department of Philosophy, Sociology,
Psychology, and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences

Lessons Learned from Managing Conflict in Countries in Political
and Economic Transition

Allen Kassof, Project on Ethnic Relations

Session 2: Violent Conflict and Methods for Resolution

Ethnic Ideologies/Narratives: Causes and Consequences of
Conflicts

Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Colegio de Mexico

Ethnopolitical Conflict and Paths to Its Resolution

Arkady Popov and Vladimir Mukomel, Center for Ethnopolitical
Research

Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations

Ronald Suny, University of Michigan

The Chechen Conflict and Paths to Its Resolution

Dzhabrail Gakaev, Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology,
Russian Academy of Sciences

Tuesday, December 19, 2000

*Session 3: Postconflict Reconstruction: Political, Social, Psychological, and
International Aspects*

Lessons from Post-Soviet Conflicts

Fiona Hill, The Brookings Institution

Interregional Cooperation of Federal and Local Executive
Authorities

Khasan Dumanov, Institute for Humanities Research of the
Kabardin-Balkar Republic

Sociopsychological Aspects of Postconflict Situations

Galina Soldatova, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian
Academy of Sciences

Session 4: Postconflict Reconstruction: Problems of Economics, Education, Health, and Refugees

Power, Fear, and Ethnicity: Forging Nations Through Terror in
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Tone Bringa, University of Bergen

Ethnic Tension in Russia and Forced Migrants in the Territory of the
Independent States
Galina Vitkovskaya, Moscow Carnegie Center

Political and Economic Aspects of the Disintegration of Russia's
Internal Market
Daniel Berkowitz, University of Pittsburgh

Experience in Social Readaptation of Forced Resettlers Returning to
Their Places of Former Permanent Residence
Aleksy Kulakovskiy, Representation of the Russian President,
Vladikavkaz

Wednesday, December 20, 2000

*Session 5: Paths to Peaceful Multiethnic Relations in the Twenty-first
Century: Risks, Opportunities, Trends, and Needs for Long-term Strategies*

Ethnopolitical and Ethnoregional Factors in the Post-Soviet
Territory
Vitaly Naumkin and Irina Zvyagelskaya, Institute of Oriental
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Violent and Nonviolent Trajectories
Charles Tilly, Columbia University

Ethnic and National Conflicts in the Twenty-first Century
Anatoly M. Khazanov, University of Wisconsin

Perspectives on Multiethnic Accord Within a Federal Government—
the Example of Russia
Rafael Khakimov, Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of
Tatarstan

Summary of Discussion and Closing Remarks

Valery A. Tishkov, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology,
Russian Academy of Sciences

International Symposium Participants

Leading scientists of academic institutes and other scientific centers, members of the Russian government, officials of the Administration of the President and the Security Council, Deputies of the State Duma, members of the Council of Federations, and leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), migration services, and conflict reduction centers

Appendix B

Documents Concerning the Southern Federal District (North Caucasus)

Appendix B-1

Chechnya from Conflict to Stability: Problems of Postconflict Reconstruction*

Held November 27-28, 2000, the conference was organized by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in cooperation with the Fund for Humanitarian Assistance to the Chechen Republic and with support from the Milan Concern. Participating in the conference were about 100 scholars, policy specialists, and representatives of various government departments and agencies and of the mass media. More than half of the participants and speakers were representatives of Chechen society, which makes the conference particularly significant. The following main statements and recommendations were made at the conference.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The problems involved in restoring the Chechen Republic as an economic, sociocultural, and political self-governing society-territory in the federal Russian state are enormous in scope. Persistent efforts are needed, including on the part of scholars, in order to resolve the conflict and facilitate reconstruction. The following are essential elements in building a knowledge base: (a) monitoring of the situation in the Chechen Republic and other associated problems; (b) an increase in resources for research related to conflict and postwar reconstruction; and (c) coordina-

*Tishkov, V. A., ed. 2000. Recommendations made at the Scientific-Practical Conference, Moscow, November 27-28, 2000. Translated by Kelly Robbins.

tion of expert efforts and recommendations made, as well as the timely presentation of these recommendations to government agencies and the public. Support should be given to the proposal to create a scholarly expert council on problems of conflict resolution and reconstruction in the Chechen Republic, which could operate under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). It is also recommended that a North Caucasus Division of the Ethnic Monitoring and Conflict Early Warning Network be created to analyze the situation with regard to interethnic relations and conflicts.

2. Coordination is needed with regard to the efforts of organs of state power and administration: presidential structures, the government and legislative organs of the Russian Federation and of the Provisional Administration of the Chechen Republic, other regional authorities, and the representative of the president of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District. The efforts of the Russian government minister responsible for the problems of the Chechen Republic should be used to facilitate this coordination and to provide for more active cooperation with public organizations interested in peace and stability in the Chechen Republic.

3. More public monitoring is needed concerning measures to restore the economic and societal life and to provide other assistance to the Chechen Republic. A monthly informational bulletin should be created by the government of the Russian Federation to publicize the course of financing and execution of reconstruction work, the situation in the republic, and other issues. As for state television and radio broadcasting, special informational programs are needed, including programs aimed at the population of the Chechen Republic. These programs should be produced with the involvement of the Provisional Administration of the Chechen Republic and public organizations, including those representing Chechen society outside Chechnya. It is essential that an effective and professional television broadcasting system be created in the Chechen Republic.

4. Given the great role of the mass media in society and the broad international resonance of the events in Chechnya, special attention must be paid to (a) the ideological aspects of the struggle against armed separatism; (b) support for peace-oriented and loyal elements of the Chechen population; (c) the lessening of anti-Chechen sentiments in Russian society; (d) neutralization of foreign propaganda hostile to Russia; and (e) provision of objective information to international public opinion on the situation in the Chechen Republic.

5. From politics, economics, and ecology to medicine and psychology, the restoration of the Chechen Republic can only be a matter for the common efforts of all of Russian society to solve the problems of reconstruction. The key question is the readiness and mobilization of the

Chechens themselves to rebuild a peaceful life. The president of the Russian Federation should address the people of the country, including the population of Chechnya, regarding issues of settling the conflict and eliminating its consequences. A declaration must be made on the intention of the state and of Russian society to do everything to overcome the consequences of the conflict and restore normal life in Chechnya. The federal authorities must guarantee the residents of Chechnya that there will be no return to the rule of bandits in the republic and that the process of restoring legitimate order is irreversible.

6. It must be stated that self-determination of the Chechen people will be ensured, including statehood status for the Chechen Republic and a high level of independence with regard to internal governance. Demonstratively trampling Chechen self-determination is unnecessary. The residents of Chechnya must have the confidence that their sovereignty will be preserved and that the foundations of civil governance and just order will be restored in accordance with the expression of popular will within the framework of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and taking into account the cultural and religious traditions of the population.

7. It is necessary to carry through to its conclusion the process of forming governmental structures in the Chechen Republic, with particular emphasis on establishing trust and cooperation between military and civilian structures during the special regime period and under the Provisional Administration. In the aim of involving the maximum number of residents in the reconstruction process, it is essential to recreate, strengthen, and protect organs of local self-government. To this end, elections to local organs of self-government should be conducted on the basis of federal legislation. The elected local authorities will be able to counter the armed fighters and will be an important partner for military and civilian organs of power at the federal and republic levels.

8. Organs of power at the local (village) level should be given the right to regulate basic life subsistence matters and to disburse budgetary and social payments in direct subordination to republic-level organs of power, bypassing region (*raion*)-level administrations. Local authorities that are elected, protected, and provided with resources are the foundation for the process of rebuilding civil governance in the republic.

9. At the current stage, leaders at the region (*raion*) level must be appointed with consensus from the leaders of local organs of self-government, and they must have the functional responsibilities and authority to ensure the proper work of regional units of law enforcement structures, healthcare, and infrastructure.

10. The task of reconstruction must be formulated as a task of rebuilding the social and economic infrastructure. For this purpose, efforts and resources must be focused not only on the state economy, but also on

support for and development of private economic initiative. Nonstate economic entities on the territory of the Chechen Republic should be exempt from the payment of budgetary taxes and fees during the reconstruction period.

11. A special issue is that of measures to change the public climate after the harsh and difficult war. Positive peace is possible, not just the end of war. The country needs to see to the health and life prospects of not only the federal soldiers who served in military actions and their families, but also those in Chechen cities and villages who are today fooled by primitive sermonizing, who have lost their loved ones and homes, who are wounded or sick. The pacified participants in the civil war can find common tasks and interests, from education and work to sports and cultural activities and a joint association that could deal with the needs of survivors of wartime trauma.

12. The population must provide an example of reconciliation by showing sympathy and providing concrete assistance. Many Russian families have good, usable items, extra books and textbooks, as well as money, all of which are needed by those who have suffered from the war in Chechnya. A Russia-wide campaign to assist Chechnya is urgently needed. It is impossible to remain on the sidelines and continue making mutual accusations or seeking those to blame for the war. The Chechens are waiting for reconciliation, as is the rest of Russia.

13. Active work with children is essential. Chechen children and teenagers need kind care and equal treatment with regard to schools in Moscow or other Russian cities. Material and psychological aid is needed by Chechen children and teenagers both in Chechnya and outside its borders. This is a question of equipping schools; providing medical-psychological help, clothing, and food; facilitating enrollment in military training schools; and so forth.

14. Joint civil initiatives are needed on the part of Chechen, North Caucasian, and Russia-wide social forces and institutions, which would include people of various professions and ages (doctors, social and cultural workers, agronomists, engineers, scientists, and scholars). Without such efforts, it will be impossible to solve the problems of rebuilding the republic solely through the efforts of soldiers and policemen along with the traumatized and socially disoriented local residents.

15. Social therapy is needed to return various categories of the population to peaceful labor and peaceful life. Besides the lost lives and destruction, the most difficult result of the war and of the period of government by Dudaev and Maskhadov is the demodernization of Chechen society along with the destruction of institutions of social control. Such a situation did not exist in Chechnya before 1991, when the adult population worked honestly and lived by the same laws and rules as the entire

country. Chechnya maintained certain customs, its own culture and language, as did other peoples of Russia, but in their behavior, Chechens were no different from other citizens. The image of "other" (hostile or romanticized) was created in the years of conflict. This image is a creation of the war and must be destroyed.

16. It is necessary to restore not only the systems that support people's life needs, but also the very foundations of societal life. The main emphasis must be placed on men and women of middle age. One should not idealize the role of *teip* [clan] structures (largely mythical) and religious figures (largely self-styled) in restoring the social order.

17. In addition to rebuilding authority and order, the main difficulty lies in overcoming the postwar apathy among the population towards rebuilding the seemingly irreparable ruins. Postconflict apathy is a widespread syndrome. It is overcome by means of initial rewarded successes. It is for this reason that Grozny must be rebuilt, since, just as everywhere else, the urban life of Chechnya is the basis for the life of modern society.

18. The citizens of Chechnya must be given renewed confidence that it is they, and not outside forces, who must and can resolve their own problems. To this end, the weakened society must be protected against outside manipulators. Foreign ideologues, including Chechen emigrants, will continue the war against the "empire" and for the "freedom of Chechnya." Authoritative Chechen leaders (political figures, scientists and scholars, businessmen, cultural figures, and others) are obligated to unite in working to establish peaceful life in the Chechen Republic. Such a unified association must stand as a representative of Chechen society on the international arena as well.

19. In restoring the educational system, the basic emphasis must be placed on pre-school and elementary education. In institutions of higher education, departments not requiring a high level of technical equipment should be restored, and courses should be established and widely offered for those who in recent years have been deprived of the opportunity to receive a normal education. After preparatory courses, most young people should be sent to other regions of the country to obtain their secondary and higher education. This will make it possible to remove employment pressures and reduce the base of potential fighters. Education has the same significance for formation of a nonviolent population as the presence of a middle class of property owners.

20. Strict rules regarding treatment of the population must be affirmed in the army and other federal military and civilian structures operating in Chechnya. A "dry law" is necessary for armed forces personnel during the period of their service in Chechnya (in Bosnia, Russian peacekeepers are able to observe the ban on alcohol use). Humane relations and

international legal norms must be observed with regard to all categories of the noncombatant population.

21. Convincing and energetic judicial investigations must be pursued with regard to persons guilty of serious crimes. Information needs to be provided regarding the course of investigations of terrorist acts and crimes against the civilian population, the filing of charges against terrorists, or the start of criminal trials.

22. Measures of moral action are needed for Russian politicians, journalists, and public activists who are openly calling for the restoration of Chechen independence. These appeals represent appeals for the continuation of bloodshed. They are of an amoral character with respect to the majority of the population of Chechnya and they have a destructive impact on the army. Debates in the mass media must be refocused toward discussion of problems of postwar reconstruction and postwar trauma.

23. Wide-scale measures are needed in the international arena to defend the actions of the Russian government and to explain the situation in Chechnya. As yet, Russian diplomats and scholars have not played a great role; they are either absent from many international structures or take a passive position. Information for the outside world must be prepared in foreign languages, and the activities of the foreign media on this issue must be followed.

24. More coverage should be given to the life and activities of Chechens in Chechnya and outside its borders as part of the Russian community. Representation of them as noble savage people should be halted, showing instead how Chechens are building their lives and fighting against bandits. Special attention is merited for coverage of the entrepreneurial activities of Chechens, which are both successful and useful for the country. Support for this sort of business should also be provided by the authorities at various levels.

Chechnya is a fundamental problem of nationwide significance. It is a test of the new Russia's ability to correct its own tragic mistakes and respond to external threats. If we pass this test, peace will come to the Chechen Republic, and this means to all of Russia as well.

Appendix B-2

Officials and Specialists from the North Caucasus Consulted in Rostov-on-Don October 10-11, 2000

PARTICIPANTS FROM THE SOUTHERN FEDERAL DISTRICT

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Aleksandr Borisovich Dzadziev, Senior Researcher, Center of Social and Humanitarian Investigations, Vladikavkaz Institute of Management; Head of the North Ossetia Department of the Assembly of the People of Russia, Vladikavkaz Institute of Management

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Marina Fedorovna Kurakeeva, Minister on the Affairs of Nationalities of Karachaevo-Cherkessia

- Hussein Sagidovich Kushkhov**, Representative of Ministry of Nationalities, Kabardin-Balkar Republic
- Ismail Bulachevich Munaev**, Representative, Ministry on the Affairs of Federation and Nationalities of the Russian Federation, Chechen Republic
- Tatiana Mikhailovna Polyakova**, Dean of the Law Faculty, Adygeisky State University; Ethnological Monitoring Network Expert
- Ruslan Zakreivich Sagov**, Representative of the Ministry on the Affairs of Federation and Nationalities of the Russian Federation, Republic of Ingushetia
- Mikhail Valentinovich Savva**, City Administration of the Krasnodarsky Krai
- Asiyat Mukhmedovna Shkhacheva**, Representative of the Ministry on Federations and Nationalities of the Russian Federation
- Vitaly Victorovich Smirnov**, Head of the Department of the Apparatus of the President's Special Representative of the Russian Federation in the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia, Vladikavkaz
- Alim Inzrelovich Tetuev**, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Nationalities, Kabardin-Balkar Republic

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Advancement of Qualification of Humanities and Social Science
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Appendix C

Documents Concerning the Volga Federal District

Appendix C-1

Program for Strengthening Ethnoreligious Accord in the Volga Federal District*

(For the Staff of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation)

The Volga Federal District is home to an ethnically and religiously diverse population, people who as a result of long historical interaction within a unified state have many cultural characteristics in common and demonstrate a fairly high degree of tolerance and civil accord. In recent years the region has seen manifestations of interethnic tensions as well as a difficult religious situation. Intolerance on those grounds has led to increasing xenophobia among the population toward ethnic and religious minorities, forced migrants, and foreign citizens. Ethnoreligious conflicts represent one obstacle on the road to strengthening democratic traditions in Russia, facilitating socioeconomic transformations, and achieving civil accord and peace. All of this gives rise to the need for special efforts by society and all levels of government aimed at implementing the fundamental provisions of the proposed Concept for Creating a Harmonious Ethnoreligious Situation in the Volga Federal District.

Which basic spheres should be the focus of activities aimed at promoting ethnoreligious dialogue?

- organs of state power and administration
- education and training

*Draft prepared by V. A. Tishkov for the expert seminar on November 1-2, 2001, in Nizhny Novgorod. Translated from the Russian by Rita S. Guenther.

- the media
- public organizations and other institutions of civil society
- scientific research and applied monitoring

General Principles and Guidelines That Should Be Followed in This Effort

- Citizens of various nationalities and various religious convictions live in the Volga District, all enjoying the same civil rights and freedoms, including the right to preserve and develop their own cultures and profess various religious faiths.

- Interethnic and interfaith harmony and cooperation are the norm and the deep tradition of the population of the region, and this tradition deserves all possible support and promotion.

- In the district there are no large or small cultures, as there is no predetermined inequality among representatives of various nationalities and religions. Inequality and discrimination are engendered by social and political conditions, while intolerance and conflicts arise under the influence of improper education, ideological pressure, and political mobilization.

- The people of the district have far more historical-cultural values and sociopolitical features in common than they have differences based on religion or ethnic background.

- Tensions and conflicts arise when unfavorable socioeconomic conditions are combined with poor governance and when politicians and irresponsible social activists use ethnic and religious factors to pursue their ideological projects and to acquire power or personal gain.

- Xenophobia and negative stereotypes may arise among various categories of people and may be of a persistent and mass character, but there are ways and means of blocking or eliminating these phenomena.

- Education in the spirit of cultural and religious tolerance represents a fundamental means of affirming a culture of peace and harmony in society.

- The state and its social structure and politics may create institutions and a climate of inequality and discrimination, but the state likewise possesses all of the means to ensure societal accord, and only it has the right to use force to counter outbreaks of discord or violence.

- Overall, the sociopolitical structure of the Russian Federation, including its constitution and other laws as well as the constitutions and legislation of federation subjects, facilitates opportunities for real equality and self-determination of peoples in various forms and for religious freedom and church activity.

- The media, including the regional press and television and professional cultural and literary figures, play an important role in affirming a

favorable climate of ethnoreligious relations; however, they can also serve as a means of sowing and spreading prejudice and hate as well as rumors and appeals that may lead to conflicts.

- Intolerance, discord, and conflicts are not irreversible, and they may be eliminated and resolved relatively quickly by specifically targeted efforts.

Guided by these principles, what can various institutions, organizations, and individuals accomplish?

Organs of State Power and Administration

- Provide strict and consistent support for constitutional rights and laws guaranteeing the equality of citizens of any race or nationality and freedom of religion.

- Develop and pass new federal and regional laws and other legal acts on the given matters and ratify and observe international legal norms and special declarations.

- On the basis of political agreements and societal control, ensure fair representation of various nationalities at all levels of government and take the interests and rights of peoples and local ethnocultural communities into account in implementing socioeconomic, public information, and education policies.

- Provide special training for state employees, including those in law enforcement, for appropriate handling of interethnic relations and methods of combating manifestations of ethnoreligious tension and conflicts.

- Affirm all-Russian civic and historical-cultural values in state ideology and symbols (including at the regional and local levels) and demonstrate the multicultural nature of the Russian state.

- Implement programs to support minority cultures and languages and protect minorities at the district and federation subject levels, along with programs to develop the Russian language and Russian culture throughout the country.

- Ensure judicial prosecution for individuals, groups, and organizations that espouse intolerance and violence or commit acts of violence for ethnic or religious reasons.

- Create special state-societal organizational systems for monitoring the climate of ethnoreligious relations and establish a Commission of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President on Combating Sociopolitical Extremism.

- Along with clearer resolution of migration issues, provide support for migrants and refugees. Eliminate bureaucratic arbitrariness from pro-

cedures for the legal registration of residence and provide jobs and social welfare support for that segment of the population.

- Affirm Russian, regional, and local patriotism through state symbols, enhance the prestige of the authorities and the law, and take measures to limit access to weapons by the civilian population, especially young men.

Education and Training

- Remove ethnocentric versions of history and culture from textbooks as well as outdated ethnonational and racist interpretations and perspectives.

- Affirm doctrines of multiculturalism in the primary, secondary, and higher education systems instead of outdated and divisive concepts such as so-called national schools.

- Introduce courses on nationality studies and the history of religion and teach the history of intercultural interactions and cooperation along with the history of mass repression and discrimination against “aliens” and “heathens.”

- Institute special accreditation of schoolteachers and instructors in higher-education institutions for their knowledge and convictions on matters of intercultural dialogue and principles of tolerance.

- Conduct training and education work with parents and other adult members of the population on principles of behavior on questions of religious tolerance and interethnic accord, including relations with children and adolescents.

- Respond actively to displays of negative stereotypes, interethnic discord, and personal humiliation of representatives of other nationalities and races by children and youths.

- Refuse to tolerate actions and symbols of ultranationalist and neofascist groups and organizations in schools and higher-education institutions.

- Work individually with persons who have become involved in the activities of such groups or who share such views, first and foremost with young activists of ultranationalist groups.

- Develop excursions and field trips for schoolchildren and university students to expand their knowledge about the region and the cultural makeup of its population.

- Develop individual forms of artistic expression based on various cultural traditions and heritages.

- Organize local experts and educational agencies to create methodological recommendations, including specific courses for teachers and parents on how to instill in schoolchildren a negative attitude toward

weapons and violence without violating the principles of patriotic education, which include respect for the army and police.

The Media

- Expand television and radio networks and increase the range of programming offered to provide a more complete and adequate reflection of the cultural mosaic of the district and its component regions and of the problems of interethnic relations and interfaith dialogue.

- Create a district television channel and a radio station for broadcasting in the languages of those ethnic groups with the greatest population (Tatars, Bashkorts, Chuvash, Mordovians, Mari, Udmurts) and presenting programs organized by ethnic cultural associations and regional journalists.

- Conduct regular expert reviews of printed publications in the aim of uncovering newspapers and other publications that propagate racial, ethnic, and religious animosity and hate and call for violence.

- Augment journalism training programs with courses on the culture and traditions of the peoples of Russia and the world and principles for covering ethnic and religious themes.

- In cooperation with nationwide Russian journalistic organizations and scholars specializing in the field, develop a code of ethics for district journalists who cover relevant topics.

- Prevent appearances on television or in mass print publications by political leaders and social activists who espouse nationalist and neofascist views and block the broadcasting of their direct utterances and appeals.

- Reduce media references to the fundamental significance of ethnocultural differences among Russian citizens, the incompatibility of various civilizations, and the historical injustices supposedly perpetrated by one people against another.

- Ensure societal and other censure for journalists and other authors who, on behalf of self-styled ethnic entrepreneurs (“leaders of the people” or “leaders of Islam”), profess ethnographic romanticism and enthusiasm for the destruction of Russia as a “mini-empire” under the slogan of ethnic or religious self-determination.

- Respond more professionally and critically to the foreign media, especially to special programs and publications aimed at the Volga Federal District, which question the legitimacy of the Russian Federation and reject the overall Russian community in favor of ethnic particularism and separatism.

- Expand religious broadcasts of a peaceful nature, including those involving simultaneous and regular participation by representatives of different religions.

Public Organizations and Other Institutions of Civil Society

- Political parties and movements at the district and regional levels should have in their programs formulated principles and positions on matters of interethnic relations and on the question of relations to religion. The character of these positions should be among the fundamental criteria for determining the constitutionality and social significance of these groups.

- Participants in the program should support and take part in the activities of the parties and movements that do not hold nationalistic positions and that are governed by principles of consensus, respect for the cultural diversity of the population, and religious tolerance.

- Within the framework of the program or independently, nongovernmental organizations and associations should be created to engage in specific peacemaking activities, perform voluntary civic work toward encouraging peace and harmony, create “zones of peace,” and establish dialogue.

- Religious societies and organizations, including the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslims, can and should expand their activities among all categories of the population (not just among believers) aimed at preventing violence and conflicts in society and working among those experiencing discrimination as well as those who are subject to being influenced by xenophobia and ultraradical ideologies.

- Unlike state institutions, public organizations can work more effectively on the level of small projects and programs that directly reach people, including those on opposing sides in conflict situations.

- Representatives of public organizations often have stronger feelings of devotion to the cause of peace and accord and may devote time and effort to an extent that is impossible for officials because of the restrictions inherent in their positions.

- By means of public explanations and direct contacts, organizations and individual activists are in a position to help people understand complex situations and find peaceful ways and means of resolving them.

- Public organizations and coalitions are capable of exerting democratic control over leaders and activists and influencing those who destroy peace and harmony and provoke conflicts.

- Local peace committees (or commissions) can and should be created to take on the work of reducing prejudice and stereotypes among segments of the population, especially with regard to representatives of ethnic and religious minorities.

- Commissions or committees should be created at the school, community, regional, and city levels to monitor the quality of the environ-

ment for interethnic relations and serve as a means to provide early warning of unfavorable situations and quick reaction to such cases.

- Ethnic community leaders and authoritative citizens should become engaged in processes aimed at ending conflict situations. This would include becoming involved in negotiations as representatives of second-level diplomacy as well as serving as guarantors of the observation and implementation of any agreements reached.

- In conducting peacemaking activities, nongovernmental organizations may create broad coalitions and establish linkages with analogous organizations in other regions of Russia with the aim of applying positive experience and attracting resources.

Scientific Research and Applied Monitoring

- As part of the program, it is necessary to organize training for specialists and conduct scientific research on problems of peace and tolerance and violence and conflicts, including within the scope of such disciplines as social psychology, cultural anthropology, sociology, political science, and history.

- There is a need for centers and interdisciplinary research groups as well as the publication of special journals, serials, and methodological literature on problems of peace and harmony, geared toward both specialists and a wider audience.

- Only scholars can convincingly demonstrate the bankruptcy, societal harm, and criminal nature of ideologies, programs, and activities that involve hate and hostility toward people of other races, nationalities, and faiths, and their taking of an active position on this question is a matter of professional ethics.

- Only expert scholars can ascertain the deeper causes and nature of intolerance and conflicts and determine the most effective means for their prevention and resolution.

- Within the scientific community itself, there must be an atmosphere of condemnation and rejection of those colleagues who through their writings and other actions help to provide justification for racist and nationalistic views among the population, as well as those who sympathize with radical activists and violators of the social order and the constitutional-legal foundations of the state.

- Scholars can create informal networks and organizational structures to monitor the state of public opinion, interethnic relations, and the activities of political, social, and religious organizations for the purpose of identifying crisis situations and developing applied recommendations.

- Scholars can and should make greater use of the press, radio, and television to present current scientific positions on the role and significance of cultural traditions and ethnoreligious cooperation.

A Few Simple Truths for the Establishment of Ethnoreligious Dialogue

Tolerance is not when the residents of a city or village react peacefully to the building of a mosque or synagogue near a Russian Orthodox cathedral, but rather it is when they work together to help representatives of another faith build a new house of worship.

Individuals may be tolerant toward friends or persons close to them who are of a different faith or nationality, but they may be xenophobes and racists in a broader social environment (at work, in politics, or in creative works).

Tolerance and respect for other cultures are expressed not in refraining from taking a negative attitude toward them, but rather in striving to understand them and adopting valuable and useful elements from them.

Relying on dialogue and consensus is more difficult than engaging in rejection and hostility, for the latter requires no special efforts on personal development and is connected with a limited outlook and ignorance.

Xenophobia and intolerance are characteristic not only of limited and poorly educated people; even the most enlightened people may also have these qualities, only they may accompany their views and actions with more refined arguments.

The most diverse forms of intolerance may exist and be manifested in democratic societies, and the task of the state and society is to prevent their extreme (including violent) forms, which threaten the foundations of social order and statehood.

It is necessary to combat opponents of peace and supporters of violence not only with public condemnation campaigns but also with other effective methods: public rejection, judicial prosecution, education, and their inclusion in the systems of institutions of power and civil society.

Intolerance toward intolerance may give rise to new intolerance and create new supporters. It is more important to see the person inside the misanthrope and try to influence his or her views and behaviors.

Efforts to establish ethnoreligious harmony and prevent conflicts demand sacrifice and the best human qualities, but they may produce results only if carried out jointly and with the support of the state.

Strong government and prosperous living conditions do not guarantee peace and harmony, and conflicts among representatives of the elite are more frequent and stronger than those among the common people. However, order and prosperity provide increased opportunities to avoid intolerance, violence, and conflicts.

Appendix C-2

Officials and Specialists Concerned with the Volga Federal District Consulted in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod October 28-November 3, 2001

PARTICIPANTS IN MOSCOW

Aleksandra Burataeva, Deputy Chair, International Affairs Committee,
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Marina Kalashnikova, Journalist, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*

Aleksey Malashenko, Senior Researcher, Carnegie Moscow Center

Valentin I. Nikitin, Chair, Committee for Nationalities, Russian State
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Nodari A. Simonia, Director, Institute for World Economics and
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Sergey V. Kirienko, Plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian
Federation in the Volga Federal District

Vladimir Petrovich Kirienko, Vice Governor of Nizhny Novgorod
Region, Volga Federal District

- Ivan Konovalov**, Deputy for International Connections, Volga Federal District
- Stanislav Kuritsin**, Deputy for Connections with Social and Religious Organizations, Volga Federal District
- Aleksandr Lubavsky**, Deputy Director, International Office, University of Nizhny Novgorod
- George A. Maximov**, Vice Rector, University of Nizhny Novgorod
- Galina I. Muravskaya**, Director, International Office, University of Nizhny Novgorod
- Guly Peplyakova**, Deputy for Social Connections, Volga Federal District
- Aleksandr Petrov**, Social Sciences Faculty, University of Nizhny Novgorod
- Roman Strongin**, Vice Rector and Head of Software Department, University of Nizhny Novgorod
- Vladimir Yurevich Zorin**, Deputy to the President's Representative to the Volga Federal District on Questions of Nationalities and Religion

**PARTICIPANTS OF THE ETHNOLOGICAL MONITORING AND
CONFLICT EARLY WARNING NETWORK ROUNDTABLE,
NOVEMBER 1-2, 2001**

- Rafik Faizievich Abdrakhmanov**, Senior Scientific Researcher, Department of the History of Scientific Thought and Islamic Studies, Institute of the Academy of Sciences, Republic of Tatarstan
- Venaly Vladimirovich Amelin**, Chair, Committee on Internationality Relations, Orenburg Oblast Administration
- Ivan Ivanovich Boiko**, Lead Scientific Researcher, Institute of Humanities Research, Chuvash State Institute of Humanities
- Lilia Anatolevna Chudaeva**, Supervisor, Department of National Policy and Cooperation with Religious Groups, Saratov Oblast Government Branch of Societal Relations
- Vasily Rudolfovich Filippov**, Conductor, Section of Regional Research of Russia, Center of Civilizations and Regional Research, Russian Academy of Sciences
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- Sergey Nikolaevich Gradirovsky**, Expert, Center of Strategic Research, Volga Federal District
- Aleksandr Surenovich Kaltakhchian**, Docent, Russian Academy of State Service
- Aleksandr Pavlovich Kapustin**, Leader, Territorial Authority of the Ministry for Federal, National and Migration Policies, Volga Federal District
- Valentina Georgievna Kochkina**, Dean, Department of State and Municipal Administration, Volga-Vyatsky Academy of State Service
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- Nikolay Vladimirovich Shilov**, Docent, Department of History, Political Science and Law, Mordova State Pedagogical University
- Aleksandr Pavlovich Shinkin**, Deputy Editor, Department of Regional Policy, *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*
- Svetlana Konstantinovna Smirnova**, Deputy Chair, Committee on Nationalities, State Duma of the Russian Federation
- Valery Vladimirovich Stepanov**, Head Scientific Worker, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences

- Tamara Tikhonovna Tarasova**, Docent, Saratov Social-Economic University
- Sergei Fedorovich Terentev**, Deputy Director of the Territorial Authority, Ministry on Issues of Federation, Nationality and Migratory Policy of the Russian Federation, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast
- Valery Aleksandrovich Tishkov**, Director, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
- Vitaly Vasilevich Trushin**, Director of Scientific Work, Volgo-Vyatsky Academy of State Service
- Aleksandr Vladislavovich Tuzov**, Director, Center of Applied Sciences, Penza

Appendix D

Other Documents

Appendix D-1

The Dynamic of Factors of Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Post-Soviet States*

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The following indicators were developed and are distributed in the format of an annual survey at scientific seminars to members of the Early Warning Network, who monitor ethnic relations across Russia and in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Participants are asked to evaluate the sociopolitical situation in their states or regions in three ways, assigning points based on the following criteria.

- Using a scale of -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, respondents assign a rating to each indicator as to the positive or negative development of concrete ethnopolitical factors in the given period. A “-2” rating would indicate a significant aggravation of factors and their consequences, while a “+2” would indicate a significant improvement in the situation.
- Using a scale of 0, 1, 2, respondents assign value to the role of each factor in the composition of the ethnopolitical situation. A “2” rating would indicate a relatively strong influence, while a “0” rating would indicate no influence.
- Using a scale of 0, 1, 2, the respondents indicate the level of their confidence in each sphere represented by the indicators.

The results of these surveys are then compiled and compared with data from previous years to determine the changing levels of ethnic tensions over time. The 46 items included in the survey are listed in Table 1.

*Excerpt from Tishkov, V. A., and Ye. I. Filippova, eds. 2001. *Interethnic Relations and Conflicts in Post-Soviet States*, Annual Report, 2000. Moscow: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, RAS. The introduction has been summarized. Translation and summary by Rita S. Guenther.

TABLE 1 Indicators of Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Post-Soviet States

Category	No.	Indicator
1. Environment and resources	1	Condition of water (drinking, irrigation, water ways, industry related)
	2	Soil resources (quality and cost, quantity per person, access, forests and other arable lands)
	3	Natural wealth (use, access, user, dividends)
	4	Technological influence (hazardous facilities, emissions, waste, seizure of property by right of eminent domain, compensation)
	5	Disasters and catastrophes (natural disasters, ecological disasters, industrial disasters, provoked disasters)
2. Demography and migration	6	Resettlement (dynamic of numbers, ethnic proportions, degree and dynamic of urbanization)
	7	Mixed marriages and divorce
	8	Natural movements of populations (birth rates, mortality, life expectancy)
	9	Mechanized movements of population (migration, refugees and dislocated persons, temporary residents)
3. Power, State, and Politics	10	State administrative status
	11	Doctrine and regime of power (federalism, unitarianism, local control, parties and movements, elections and change of power, state programs of various levels)
	12	Ethnic representation (in authoritative positions, in business, in the informational, science, and education spheres)
	13	Relations of the center to the periphery (legal foundations, negotiations, contacts, advantages and degree of burden)
	14	Human rights and collective rights (legal well-being, violations, control, legal rights protection)
	15	Social order and control over weapons, legal investigations, and the implementation of court decisions
	16	Competence and authority of power and leaders
	17	Official symbolism and calendars
4. Economics and the social sphere	18	Production and dynamic of prices
	19	Income level and disparity of income
	20	Employment and unemployment
	21	Distribution of labor (by ethnicity, region, industry, level of societies, exchange of services, trade mediation, prestige of occupation)
	22	Socioprofessional mobility (advancement of ethnic groups, change of status in labor activities, existence of marginalized peoples and their composition)
	23	Participation in privatization, purchase and sale of land

continues

TABLE 1 Continued

Category	No.	Indicator
	24	State of social protection
	25	Crime and communal violence
5. Culture, education, and information	26	Cultural domination
	27	Religious life (composition and changes of denominations; presence of/access to places of worship; ability to conduct rites and rituals; presence and state of sacred objects, leaders, and proselytizing activity; role in the state, region, and community)
	28	Language status (laws and instructions, language of power, business, education, information and intergroup contacts)
	29	Primary and secondary education (access, infrastructure, guarantees, makeup of teaching staff, teaching materials)
	30	Higher education (conditions of admission, makeup of student body, contents of programs, student life)
	31	Mass media (structure, composition, control, character of the program, ethnic composition of journalists and television correspondents)
	32	Traditional holidays and rituals (conditions, support of power structures, political coloring, participation of various groups of the population)
	33	Historical discourse
6. Contacts and stereotypes	34	Group demands and complaints
	35	Previous conflicts and collective trauma
	36	Ethnic stereotypes (positive, negative, prevalence and use, offensive nicknames, official counteractions)
	37	Change in self-consciousness (correlation of ethnic and civic, local and regional revival of old identities and the formation of new identities)
	38	Myths, fears, and rumors
	39	Presence of group idea and ideologies
	40	Level of tolerance (intergroup hate, skirmishes and violence)
7. External conditions	41	Presence and influence of diasporas
	42	Stability/instability of neighboring and bordering regions and countries
	43	Influence of global rivalry
	44	Territorial claims and problems of borders
	45	External connections and cooperation
	46	Changing external image (of a country, region, republic, people, community, regime in a region, republic, country, or world)

Appendix D-2

Other Russian Officials and Specialists Consulted During the Project Moscow, Russia April 2000

- Yavus Akhmadov**, Professor and Member of Coordinating Council
Sergey Arutyunov, Head of Caucasus Department, Institute for
Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Aleksandr Blokhin, Minister, Ministry of Nationalities
Valentin Bushkov, Head of Middle East Department, Institute for
Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Ramazan Daurov, Chief Expert for the Caucasus, Institute for Oriental
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Oksana Demiankov, Executive Assistant to Deputy Minister, Ministry
of Education
Yelena Filippova, Senior Researcher, Institute for Ethnology and
Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences
Dmitry Furman, Senior Specialist, Institute for Europe, Russian
Academy of Sciences
Dzhabrail Gakaev, Chair of Coordinating Council for Chechen
Societies in Moscow
Andrey Kokoshin, Director, Institute for Security Studies, Russian
Academy of Sciences
Aleksandr Kondakov, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Education
Vladimir Kudryavtsev, Vice President, Presidium, Russian Academy of
Sciences
Sergey Nikolaev, Chief for International Cooperation, Ministry of
Nationalities

Vladimir Pavlenko, Chief of North Caucasus Department, Ministry of Nationalities

Vladimir Podolin, Chief of Department for Crisis and Reconstruction, Ministry of Nationalities

Andrey Nikolaevich Sakharov, Director, Institute of History, Russian Academy of Sciences

Umar Temirov, Staff Director, Duma Committee on Nationalities

Aleksandr Tkachiev, Chair, Duma Committee on Nationalities

Yury Ushanov, Deputy Director, Institute for Security Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Vladimir Yegorov, Chief of Social Sciences Department, Presidium, Russian Academy of Sciences

Anatoly Yomskov, Head of Conflict Solutions Department, Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences

Appendix D-3

Chronology of Events Throughout the Project

- February 2000** The Russian Academy of Sciences proposes an interacademy project on Conflicts in Multiethnic Societies.
- April 2000** A National Academies team of scholars visits Moscow and consults with Russian academy officials, scholars, and government officials on ethnic-related developments in the former Soviet Union and on the feasibility and importance of an interacademy project.
- June 2000** The Academies agree on the goals and character of the project, and the project begins.
- October 2000** A National Academies team of scholars consults with Russian officials and scholars in Moscow, and then travels to Rostov-on-Don where officials and specialists from 12 republics and oblasts of the Southern Federal District assemble in response to an invitation from the Russian Academy of Sciences to participate in consultations.
- December 2000** The Russian Academy of Sciences hosts an interacademy Symposium on States in Transition and the Challenge of Ethnic Conflict attended by more than 75 Russian and American scholars and officials.
- June 2001** Professor Valery Tishkov, representing the Russian Academy of Sciences on this project, visits Washington, D.C., to meet with the National Research Council Committee on Conflict and Reconstruction in Multiethnic Societies and plan the next phase of the project.

- October 2001** Three working groups of Russian and American scholars are established to discuss, respectively, collective violence; culture, identity, and conflict; and comparative study of identity conflicts; they begin communicating via e-mail.
- December 2001** The three working groups meet in Washington, D.C., to prepare proposals on research priorities. The proposals are presented at an interacademy workshop in Washington attended by 30 scholars and policy officials from Russia and the United States. In preparation for the workshop, three Russian policy officials consult with American officials and scholars in Washington. The day before the workshop, President Putin's office informs Vladimir Yu. Zorin, a workshop participant, that he had been appointed Minister of Nationalities.
- January 2002** President Putin's Representative for the Volga Federal District, Sergey V. Kirienko, speaks on ethnic and religious relations in Russia to an audience of 35 government officials and scholars at the National Academies.
- January 2002** Representatives of the Academies begin discussions of the next phase of cooperation.

