LESSER VICTORIES: A STUDY OF

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY AND HAITIAN GENDARMERIE

A Thesis

by

ROBERT YOSHIO MIHARA

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

August 2007

Major Subject: History

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Approved by:

Chair of Committee,	Brian McAllister Linn
Committee Members,	James S. Burk
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ABSTRACT

Lesser Victories:

A Study of the Philippine Constabulary and Haitian Gendarmerie. (August 2007)

Robert Yoshio Mihara, B.S., United States Military Academy

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Brian McAllister Linn

Determining what constitutes the proper role and characteristics of a constabulary has received renewed interest in recent years as the international community increasingly involves itself in peace and stability operations. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has further stimulated discussion over how foreign powers should go about establishing security institutions within a host nation, particularly in one as turbulent as Iraq. Recent events in both Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear the importance of indigenous police forces, or constabularies, to pacification and state-building operations. Effective constabularies can perform the key role of separating insurgents from the population and giving substance and legitimacy to federal and local government.

This thesis examines two U.S.-organized paramilitaries: the Philippine Constabulary (1901-1917) and the Haitian Gendarmerie (1916-1934). It argues that in both the Philippines and Haiti, the constabularies became armies, and the instruments of autocratic rule, because American military officers allowed the militarization of the police forces to become institutionalized without also establishing normative constraints

on the use of military power. The thesis contends that American military authorities undermined the constabularies' suitability for enforcing civil law by aggressively developing their military capabilities to meet the challenges of fighting violent insurgencies. Both organizations generalized their pragmatic responses to immediate circumstances without considering the long term implications for them as institutions. The historical experience of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie testify to the real temptation for leaders to stretch an organization beyond its mandate or capabilities by focusing on success and victory over purpose and the ends for which the organization exists.

Dedicated to

The Soldiers and Families of Troop A, 8th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment

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This work has benefited from the contributions of many scholars who willingly gave of their time and wisdom. Dr. Brian Linn provided patient mentorship throughout the past 18 months and nurtured my vague professional interest in counterinsurgency into a graduate research project. His humor and willingness to share his experiences as a research scholar put my struggles into perspective. I am also very grateful to Professors, James Burk, David Vaught, and Terry Anderson for their mentorship and thoughtful input into this work. These scholars prepared me intellectually as a military professional more than any group of mentors that I have yet worked with. To all, I owe a great debt.

Several archivists provided invaluable assistance to me as a novice researcher. Bruce Tabb stepped away from battling budgets and mold to help me navigate the University of Oregon's collection of the Philippine Constabulary manuscripts. Joseph Schwarz at the National Archives II and J. J. Rhodes at Alfred Gray Research Center at Quantico, Virginia provided valuable assistance to me in getting started with their collections as well.

Throughout this project I relied upon the foundation provided by my family and faith. The work of research and writing would not have been possible without the sacrifice and support of my wife, Mary, who read many of my early drafts in addition to looking after our two young children, Maria and Vincent. Most importantly, I thank God for wisdom, for providing me this incredible opportunity, and for guarding me through many dangerous days.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The subject of organizing indigenous security forces has remained relevant in recent years as the international community increasingly involves itself in peace and stability operations. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has further stimulated discussion over how foreign powers should go about establishing security institutions within a host nation, particularly in one as turbulent as Iraq. Recent events in both Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear the importance of indigenous police forces, or constabularies, to pacification and state-building operations. Effective constabularies can perform the key role of separating insurgents from the population and giving substance and legitimacy to federal and local government. John A. Nagl argues that constabularies are essential to establish the proper security environment for civic action and to isolate insurgencies being fought directly by foreign and indigenous military forces. The Army's 2006 draft counterinsurgency field manual, *FM 3-24*, devotes an entire chapter to constabularies and notes their advantages in performing local security tasks.[1]

This thesis follows the style of the *Journal of Military History*.

1. Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003), 3-5; John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xiv-xv; Hq., Department of the

The breadth of responsibility for security forces during pacification and stabilization campaigns exceeds the spectrum normally encountered during conventional wars. These unconventional campaigns have political and social dimensions that complicate military operations and place unfamiliar demands on soldiers trained for conventional warfare. Historically, indigenous constabularies appear as appealing solutions to military leaders seeking to impose order on complexity. Constabularies fill a critical security role where the military and municipal police lack the means and mandate to control. They insulate professional armies from performing police duties, cost much less than soldiers, and can possess clear advantages in interacting with the local population. They also address the long-term issue of developing indigenous institutional capability in the occupied territory.[2] However, the very ability of paramilitary police forces to bridge this security void makes them vulnerable to dissipation. Leaders can feel compelled to employ them in solving every problem when very few effective organizations exist. The history of past unconventional operations can provide insight into how such forces should be organized and employed and also reveal the potential consequences of getting it wrong.

This thesis examines two U.S.-organized paramilitaries: the Philippine Constabulary (1901-1917) and the Haitian Gendarmerie (1916-1934). The thesis contends that American military authorities undermined the constabularies' suitability

Army, *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, draft, (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, February 2006), 6-1 to 6-20.

2. Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 38-39; Andrew Rathmell, et al., *Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2005), 86.

for enforcing civil law by aggressively developing their military capabilities to meet the challenges of fighting violent insurgencies. Both organizations generalized their pragmatic responses to immediate circumstances without considering the long term implications for them as institutions. The historical experience of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie testify to the real temptation for leaders to stretch an organization beyond its proper mandate by focusing on success and victory in the short-term at the expense of larger strategic concerns. In the case of the Philippines and Haiti, American leaders involved with the constabularies did not provide for reforming the militarized constabularies as civil police forces or divorcing them of their domestic police responsibilities when such reform was no longer feasible.

Although the United States accumulated a wealth of experience in establishing constabularies during the early twentieth century, historians and military professionals have given scant attention to these hybrid police forces. Much of this inattentiveness is due to the broader stagnation of military thought within the Army on pacification and stabilization operations that have characterized Army doctrine since the end of the Second World War.[3] Leaders in Iraq turning for guidance from dusty volumes printed half a century ago reveals how little has changed, or evolved, in the U.S. military's general approach to unconventional operations. One of the more prominent reference texts for current military planners is the Marine Corps' much-heralded *Small Wars Manual*. Published in 1940, this manual confidently prescribed that indigenous

3. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, 260-61, 282; Richard W. Smith, "Philippine Constabulary," *Military Review* 48 (May 1968): 73; Robert M. Cassidy, "Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerilla Warfare," *Military Review* 84 (September-October 2004): 41.

constables can be expected to take census, gather agricultural data, and perform virtually every other function of civil government. It defines indigenous constabularies as the overarching security institution of an occupation, acting simultaneously as a military and as a police force.[4] Despite its limitations, the 1940 *Small Wars Manual* provides better guidance than post-Vietnam U.S. military doctrine, which treats constabularies as peripheral military organizations between local police and the military. Yet, the marine manual establishes no core functions or roles for constabularies, leaving the specifics to be determined by unique local conditions, and subordinates the constabularies as adaptable auxiliaries to conventional military forces. The *Small Wars Manual* alternates between defining constabularies as an aid in accomplishing conventional tasks, as an optional component of host nation security forces, or as a buffer between military and civilian spheres. It does not settle on a comprehensive definition for the role and purpose of constabulary forces, implying that they were not essential to any nation-building effort. The marine manual reflects the prejudice of military regulars held against civilian or irregular forces and the presumption that effective militaries could perform any mission if they could succeed in major combat.[5]

Today's doctrine, which reflects the perceived lessons of the Persian Gulf War, is little better. *FM 3-0*, the current operations doctrine, includes paramilitary forces, but it only stresses their general importance in stability operations and the necessity of

4. U.S. Marine Corps, S*mall Wars Manual* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), 12-1, 12-10.

5. Hq., Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Hq. Department of the Army, 1976), 7-11; Hq., Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 1982), 6-9.

integrating them into the overall effort. The manual omits the constabularies' specific capabilities, and it ignores the necessity of grounding indigenous forces with a logical, complementary, distinct and tangible purpose.[6] The Army's doctrinal manual for tactics, *FM 3-90*, refers to paramilitary forces as one of several important host nation organizations but only in their ability to aid military forces in performing conventional tasks, such as base or route security.[7] The counterinsurgency manual, *FM 3-07.22*, mentions indigenous police and paramilitary forces frequently and goes further than the general operations or tactics doctrine in identifying the particular capabilities of constabularies. However, the manual blurs the boundaries between police and paramilitary forces by consolidating them into a general category with other host-nation security forces. It recognizes local police and paramilitaries as separate organizations, but neglects to clearly define the distinction.[8] *FM 3-07.22* and similar manuals imply that paramilitary forces exist to provide a buffer between local police duties and military forces, U.S. and indigenous, shoring up local police forces when needed and preventing military forces from having their operational capability sapped by civil duties.[9]

6. Hq., Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 2001), 9-9, 9-15.

7. Hq., Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-90, Tactics* (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 2001), E-12, E-23.

8. Hq., Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 2004), 1-6, 1-8, 1-10, 2-2, 3-3, 3-8, 3-14.

9. Hq., Department of the Army, *Field Manual 31-23, Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 1972), 4-5 to 4-6, 5-4, 8-8, 8-11, 8-13 to 8-14, C-3; Hq., Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 1990), 2-13 to 2-16, 2-18, 2-23, 5-7, E-2, E-4 to E-10, E-19, E-21; Marine Corps Warfighting

Produced jointly by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, the published draft of *FM 3-24* explicitly describes indigenous paramilitaries as necessarily distinct from host nation military forces. It asserts that paramilitaries "should counter crime while the military should address external threats" and that "police and military roles should be clearly delineated."[10] However, the manual bases its dichotomy on a division of legitimate function without providing historical context or justification for requiring a clear distinction between host nation police and military forces. Persistent inattention to paramilitaries in current doctrine, despite the U.S. military's substantial experience with them, provides an opportunity for gaining important insight through historical studies of previous experiments with constabularies.

Neither the Constabulary nor the Gendarmerie achieved the full aspirations of their early advocates. Many of these advocates were military officers who attached their personal career ambitions in the Army and Marine Corps to the success of the paramilitaries. These officers hoped that the indigenous constabularies, under their leadership, would become the leading institutions of U.S. authority. Their accomplishments in pacifying the Philippines and Haiti required substantial assistance from U.S. military forces, and both constabularies had to reinstate military control over some, or all in the case of Haiti, of the territory over which they were responsible.

The dependency of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie on military assistance highlighted their shortcomings as armies, and their claimed successes in establishing

Laboratory, *Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006), 9-11.

10. Hq., Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24*, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, December 2006), 6-9.

order and extending government authority obscured the long term repercussions of militarization. Both constabularies sacrificed their ability to function as national police forces by trying to make effective soldiers out of their constables. This decision would constitute an important factor in the troubled development of the Philippines and Haiti as republics in the post-occupation.

There is comparatively little research on the American military's efforts to create constabularies in the Philippines and Haiti. The literature largely consists of studies on the constabularies' performance as military forces without an examination of its relevance for the post-occupation era. George Y. Coats' dissertation on the Philippine Constabulary argues that its most significant contribution to the American Army's effort in the Philippines was its role in pacifying the islands. He consistently refers to its members as soldiers rather than as constables, chronicling their combat exploits across the archipelago from 1901 to 1917. Coats does not address the institutional ramifications of subordinating the Constabulary's police role to its militarization. Nor does he consider the consequences of the deliberate choice made by civilian and Constabulary leaders to resource large military-style expeditions at the expense of policing the rural areas or improving the municipal police. Fixated on military campaigns and Army-Constabulary rivalry, Coats fails to address the broader context of the Constabulary's role in governing the Philippines as an American possession or an independent nation.

Other historians have also focused on the Philippine Constabulary's role as a military organization. Andrew J. Birtle measures the security and civic actions of the

Constabulary as part of the broader Army-Philippine Scouts-Constabulary pacification effort following the Philippine War. His focus on the methods that led to the campaign's overall success obscures the inter-service bickering, the Constabulary's rivalry with the Army, and its often serious effects on pacification.[11] Like Coats, Birtle does not evaluate the Constabulary as a police force and an agent of the civil government. Focused on the Army and on military campaigns, he treats the Constabulary's nominal mission – civil government and imposing law and order – as adjuncts to its military functions.

The history of the Haitian Gendarmerie rarely escapes being subsumed within the broader literature on the U.S. occupation of Haiti. Few works exist on the Gendarmerie specifically, and the bulk of the scholarship on the organization dwells on alleged abuses by gendarmes and on the Gendarmerie's role in furthering American imperialism. Few historians have been able to set aside their subjective views of the gendarmes in their work. The only lengthy evaluation in print is James McCrocklin's *Garde d'Haiti*, which is an overly sympathetic chronicle that relies almost entirely on the papers of a single Marine officer, Major Franklin A. Hart. In his retrospective, Arthur C. Millspaugh credits the Gendarmerie for leaving Haitians better off after the occupation. An American official in Haiti from 1927 to 1929, Millspaugh dismisses the alleged abuses of gendarmes as being the product of U.S. policy blunders and an allegedly indigenous proclivity towards committing such abuse. He emphasizes improvements in state stability and infrastructure arguing them to be more representative of what the

11. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, 154-58.

Gendarmerie provided to the Haitians than the alleged abuses.[12] Both Hans Schmidt's study of the Haitian occupation and his biography of the first chief of the Gendarmerie, Smedley D. Butler, castigate the Gendarmerie as an instrument of American imperialism.[13] Schmidt's ideological approach leads him to overlook or ignore the practical lessons of the Gendarmerie for future policy, and he does not examine its functions as an instrument of nation-building, only of American avarice. Mary A. Renda adopts a similar perspective in her study of the occupation of Haiti as part of the rise of American imperial culture. She argues that American interactions were informed by paternalism at every level of leadership, from the gendarme officer to the President of the United States.[14] While some of these historians have lauded the gendarmes for their contributions and others bemoaned their abuses, none have attempted to evaluate the Gendarmerie as a civil police force or the consequences of its militarization as the Garde d'Haiti during the latter part of the occupation.

The historiography does not measure either of the constabularies against the long-term U.S. objective of establishing stable governments apart from their contributions to the immediate aim of pacification. Historians, such as Birtle, recognize the unique dynamic of unconventional operations and measure constabularies by their ability to meet its particular demands. They recognize the special attributes of

12. Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Haiti Under American Control, 1915-1930* (Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1970), 88-89, 95-98, 194.

13. Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 86, 89; Schmidt, *Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 83.

14. Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 36.

indigenous paramilitary police, and focus on their effectiveness in performing military tasks. However, one should ask whether those tasks should be performed by constables at all, and, if so, what the long term implications are of nascent police institutions conducting themselves as armies. Without answering those questions, the historiography cannot fully inform the debate on who should be assigned the responsibility for organizing national police forces in collapsed or occupied states and how that agency, or those agencies, should go about the task.[15]

This thesis seeks to redress this historical omission by evaluating these organizations individually and then providing a collective analysis. The next two chapters examine the Philippine Constabulary's genesis and maturation as a military force through its campaigns in Leyte and Samar. The case provides a historical example of emphasizing the military capability of a police organization at the expense of its law enforcement and civic functions. Chapter II follows the Constabulary's evolution from conception to rival army during the Luzon campaign from 1901 to 1903. Chapter III focuses primarily on the period from 1903 to 1906 during the Leyte and Samar campaigns because of their marked impact upon the organization and the occupation as a whole.

The fourth chapter examines the Haitian Gendarmerie's rapid rise as a shadow bureaucracy with all of the powers of a military government through its initial militarization experience. It focuses on the Caco Uprising in 1919 as another instance

15. Roxane D. V. Sismanidis, *Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report from a workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), v, viii, 1-2, 4.

where military considerations reshaped a constabulary into an army. The concluding chapter analyzes the course of the constabularies after the U.S. surrendered control of them to indigenous officers and explores some of the possible implications of the constabulary experience in the Philippines and Haiti for efforts today in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This thesis relies upon official reports submitted by the Philippine Commission to the War Department, Congressional hearings on Haiti, daily diary reports from the Marine brigade in Port-au-Prince, and several important secondary sources to provide the essential framework of key events and personalities. The official records and secondary sources provide structure and spawn important questions, but it is the personal correspondence and journals that allow us to interpret the purposes for these police forces and how leaders intended to accomplish their goals. The letters, journal entries, and scribbled notes reveal the obstacles that the U.S. encountered in struggling to achieve the greater victory and to make the outcome of war relevant to their highest aspirations. The manuscripts utilized in this paper were concentrated in five places: the National Archives I and Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland; the Alfred M. Gray Research Center at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia; and the University of Oregon Special Collections in Eugene.

Addressing this gap in the historiography will permit historians to understand more critically the Constabulary and Gendarmerie. It will also provide insight to doctrine writers seeking to institutionalize lessons from previous pacification efforts undertaken by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. If indigenous forces truly are

irreplaceable, as Nagl believes, it behooves the U.S. military leaders to understand their institution's proper role in organizing such forces and how they should proceed if it is their mission, as it has been historically. The invention and reinvention of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and the security architecture of Iraq indicate that defining the process for establishing indigenous forces remains a contested matter.[16] This thesis seeks to clarify that debate by analyzing the development of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie under American leadership a century ago and asking what the consequences were of militarizing the national police forces of the Philippines and Haiti to the legacy of U.S. nation-building.

16. Rathmell, et al., *Developing Iraq's Security Sector*, 36-41.

CHAPTER II

PRELUDE: THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY'S LUZON CAMPAIGNS, 1901-1903

From 1899 to 1902, a combined force of Regular Army and volunteer regiments fought against Filipino nationalists, religious sects, warlords, clans, and bandits. By the spring of 1900, the resistance to U.S. occupation assumed the form of regionalized guerrilla warfare it would retain until the final pacification campaign ended with the battle at Bud Bagsak on Jolo Island in 1913. Nationalist insurgents, brigands and guerrillas dominated the towns by intimidation, propaganda, and securing the cooperation of the landed elite or *principales* in spite of the U.S. conventional victory. Initially, the Army high command did not recognize that the composition of their enemy had changed from marching battalions into a mixture of guerrilla bands, banditry, and sects. It only coincidentally adjusted to the nationalists' new approach by dispersing its forces into small semi-autonomous garrisons.

Major General Elwell S. Otis, the senior Army commander in the Philippines, divided his command to promote the benefits of good government under American authority to the Filipinos. Otis had come to recognize the existence of the insurgency and taken measures to combat it, but he continued to underestimate the intensity and pervasiveness of the guerrilla campaign as he relinquished command to Major General Arthur MacArthur in May 1900. Otis believed that a deliberate program of civil affairs,

government, and localized patrols would be sufficient to defeat the unconventional threat by winning over the majority of the population. MacArthur recognized the need to bolster security efforts but did little except offer amnesty to the guerrillas and sanction approaches already being taken by regional commanders.[17]

The change in the Army's approach began from the bottom. American officers operating at the provincial and town level developed the beginnings of a counterinsurgency strategy by responding to the specific threat they faced and to the specific needs of their locality. Army units immersed themselves in the environment, and their officers became involved in virtually every aspect of civil governance. The most successful officers developed counterinsurgency measures that reflected the unique conditions in each town or district. Filipino auxiliaries became an increasingly important instrument for these leaders as U.S. volunteer regiments departed the Philippines. MacArthur had initially resisted recruiting for indigenous forces, such as the Macabebe Scouts, but under his tenure, the size and diversity of Filipino paramilitaries increased. Regional commanders organized local militia and police forces, as well as increasing the ranks of Filipino scouts. In contrast to his modest goal of 1,400 scouts in May 1900, MacArthur had supervised the dramatic expansion of the indigenous scout contingent to 5,500 men by June 1901.[18]

In most provinces, American success at the local level severely constrained the mobility of the guerrillas and allowed mobile U.S. forces to concentrate and meet flare-

17. Brian M. Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 200, 213-16.

18. Ibid., 210, 215-16.

ups wherever they occurred. The capture of Aguinaldo and the surrender of Mariano Trías in March and April 1901 shattered the tenuous insurgent unity, and the subsequent pause in violence across most of the Philippines encouraged American leaders to assume that Filipino resistance would quickly decline. Anxious to shed the Army's troubled reputation, the McKinley Administration seized upon the opportunity for changing the look of American imperialism and established civilian rule over the Philippines under William H. Taft and the Philippine Commission on 4 July 1901.[19]

Taft had arrived in the Philippines on 3 June 1900 with an assessment of the occupation that differed greatly from MacArthur's. He held a more nuanced view of Filipinos in general and of the insurgency specifically. Taft had taken a two month tour of the archipelago with members of the Commission and concluded that the insurgents represented a narrow cut of Filipino society. In contrast, MacArthur believed that the resistance sprang from a widespread antipathy to American authority and ethnic sympathy among Filipinos. Although Taft seemed to understand the nature of the nationalist insurgency better than MacArthur, he underestimated the challenges in implementing a balanced civic and military campaign to end the insurrection and lawlessness.[20]

Substantial antagonism towards the U.S. occupation persisted amongst the Tagalog elite in Luzon, and banditry, mixed with religious fanaticism, sustained

19. George Y. Coats, "The Philippine Constabulary: 1901-1917" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1968), 391-92; Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 16-19, 20-22, 23-26, 151.

20. Linn, *Philippine War*, 216-17.

dangerous civil discord and violence throughout the Visayas and southern islands. The sanguine view of U.S. administrators in the Philippines encouraged them to directly challenge the authority and mandate of the Army in the archipelago, both on the battlefield and in the halls of Congress. The armed struggle with bandits and violent sectarians became a forum for the larger political contest between American military and civilian leaders. The seminal event of the first years of civilian rule in the Philippines was not the pacification of any province or district but the passage of a 1903 congressional bill that effectively subordinated the Army in the archipelago to the civil government in matters of internal security. This political victory culminated Taft's effort to reduce U.S. dependence upon the Army in establishing and maintaining order that began with him displacing the military governorship of the Philippines in 1901.

As the first American civil governor of the Philippines and head of the lawmaking Philippine Commission, Taft administered the more populous of the provinces in the northern portion of the archipelago with 29 of the Philippine's 45 provinces under his authority. The Army would only retain a few turbulent regions under martial law by the end of 1902.[21] Taft and the Commission believed that they needed a security force of their own to guarantee the transition from military to civilian government, as well as to enforce their authority in the Philippines. Continued violence by recalcitrant insurgents and bandits threatened the transition to civilian rule and strengthened the Army's argument that the establishment of civilian rule was premature. Taft believed that the Army was too inclined to use brutal methods and that even the

21. Henry T. Allen and Casper Whitney, 27 August 1901, Box 7, Henry T. Allen Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

most benign form of military rule would provide fodder for anti-imperialist attacks in the U.S. Even nominally peaceful provinces required security forces to handle small groups of well-armed marauders in the volatile rural and remote areas. Taft believed that local incidents of violence needed to be contained before they could threaten the legitimacy of civilian rule.

The Commission established the Philippine Constabulary on 18 July 1901 through the passage of Act No. 175, and Army Captain Henry T. Allen was appointed to the position of Chief of Constabulary.[22] Taft and the commissioners believed that a native "semi-military police" organization, officered and trained by Americans, provided their best option for maintaining the peace and imposing civil governance.[23] Luke E. Wright, the vice-governor, lobbied vigorously to create a force that would reduce the presence of the Army in the Philippines.[24] He viewed the Army's role as confined to defeating large scale insurgent forces and not in the chasing down of *ladrones*, the bandits and brigands that plagued a large part of the archipelago. He and Taft believed

22. The Army was responsible for governance and pacification of the Philippines until the establishment of the Philippine Commission in 1901. The Army's Philippines Division retained authority in areas declared under martial law. The Constabulary held authority over all areas not under martial law. The only Army units who operated in the Constabulary's areas of responsibility were the Philippine Scouts, consisting of Filipino enlisted and officered by Army regulars.

23. "Chief of Philippines Police," *New York Times* (31 January 1903): 8 [hereafter *NYT*]; Charles Burke Elliott, *The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government: A Study in Tropical Democracy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1917), 7; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 5.

24. Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 6; Clayton D. Laurie, "Philippine Constabulary," in *The War of 1898, and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Benjamin Beedle (New York: Garland, 1994), 412; Heath Twichell, Jr., *Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer, 1859-1930* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 118.

that American soldiers were poor instruments for pacification and shared the civilian consensus that organized resistance to American rule was over.[25]

Allen and the Commission organized the Philippine Constabulary according to the existing department system established by the Army, making boundary changes as necessity dictated. The Philippine Islands were initially divided into four districts in 1901. First District consisted of most of northern and central Luzon. Second District included Manila, the rest of Luzon and the island of Mindoro. Third District covered the Visayas, and the Fourth District initially included the islands south of Leyte and the Sulu Archipelago. Fighting in southern Luzon, the Visayas, and northern Luzon resulted in the redrawing of some districts and the creation of a fifth provisional district in 1902. Each district was assigned an assistant chief who held the Constabulary rank of colonel. The districts were further sub-divided into provinces, under an American senior inspector who held the Constabulary rank of lieutenant colonel or major. Below that, the provinces consisted of Constabulary stations that were responsible for the various *pueblos*, or towns, and commanded by inspectors and sub-inspectors.

Each province was authorized to organize one company of 150 constables, to be recruited from amongst the population. These companies were broken down into smaller elements to man the various stations within the province, usually supervised by a Filipino non-commissioned officer, a sergeant or corporal. The organization did not

25. *Reports of the Philippine Commission* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 3 [hereafter *RPC*]; William H. Taft, "Governor Taft's Responsive Address," Entry 95, RG 350, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 4; James R. Woolard, "The Philippine Scouts: The Development of America's Colonial Army" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1975), 88.

lend itself to conducting conventional large-unit military operations. A full-strength Constabulary company could only patrol with a fraction of its 150 men due to the need to detach constables for administrative duties, garrison security, training, and normal rest and refitting. The dispersion of companies also inhibited rapidly transferring them to other provinces. The design of the Constabulary lent itself more toward local police duties than campaigning, assuming that constables could subordinate personal allegiances to their police duties.[26]

The practice of recruiting each province's company from amongst its population was a conscious divergence from the Spanish constabulary or *Guardia Civil*.[27] The Spanish had assigned constables outside of their home areas to prevent them from making common cause with the inhabitants and to reduce opportunities for corruption and political favoritism. Allen and the Commission expected that forces recruited from their own communities would be less inclined toward abusing their authority and would more readily gain the voluntary cooperation and respect of the local population. Wright asserted that constables "would be absent that disposition to abuse" when not "operating among strangers and often hereditary enemies." Wallace C. Taylor, district chief for the Third District, observed that "native troops from distant provinces are looked upon more

26. "The Filipino Police a Decided Success," *NYT* (22 December 1901): 4; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 18.

27. David R. Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976), 118-19.

as invaders than supporters of law and order."[28] However, surging banditry and violent religious sectarianism threatened civil governance and immediately superseded the effort to recruit constables from the same locales they served in. Constables from provinces with historical enmities were soon employed in troubled areas throughout the archipelago. Moro constables served in both Luzon and Samar despite the assertion by Colonel James Harbord, commanding the Constabulary's Fifth District, that they "will not mess with the Filipino and dislik[e] being associated with him, and the feeling is reciprocated."[29] Having ruled out the Army's direct assistance, Allen could not afford to adhere strictly to ethnic and cultural niceties.[30]

Organized hastily, the Philippine Constabulary lacked an established leadership and a standardized training program. It also suffered from inadequate logistical support and obsolete weapons. The officers' academy would not be established until 1904, and the Constabulary's standardized basis for training, the *Manual for the Philippine Constabulary*, would not be published and widely distributed until 1906. In the meantime, Allen had to rely on four captains seconded from the Regular Army and from volunteers taken from the regiments that were being sent back to the United States. He rounded out his officer corps with modestly trained volunteers from college campuses in the United States and a small number of foreign expatriates. By the summer of 1902, the

28. Henry T. Allen to J. Franklin Bell, 22 April 1902, Box 7; Henry T. Allen to Albert J. Beveridge, 3 May 1902, Box 7; Henry T. Allen to William Crozier, 5 February 1905, Box 7; Henry T. Allen to W. Cameron Forbes, 1905, Box 8, all in Allen Papers; *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 4; *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 92; Laurie, "Philippine Constabulary," 412.

29. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 143.

30. "The Filipino Police a Decided Success," *NYT* (22 December 1901): 4.

Constabulary had 193 officers selected personally by Allen from this motley pool of prospects. The organization at its height peaked at approximately 300 officers.[31]

The diversity of origins in the officer corps gave the Constabulary a distinct sub-culture that set it apart from the Army and divided its officer corps into two distinct communities. All Constabulary officers agreed that Filipino constables possessed clear advantages over U.S. soldiers as instruments for the post-war occupation, but Allen and other officers from the Regular Army understood those advantages differently than their colleagues without Army commissions. They emphasized the negative political impact of foreign soldiers as occupiers and the high expense of maintaining a large U.S. garrison relative to the low cost of uniformed Filipinos. These career military officers viewed indigenous troops as preferable for the work ahead. Yet, they discarded few of the Army's methods and tactics even as they sought to distance themselves from its reputation for brutality.[32]

Constabulary officers who were not drawn from the Regular Army were less wedded to military methods, but they rarely ascended to the senior positions in the organization where they could influence the direction of the force. Ironically, these officers appeared more willing to cooperate with the Army than their Regular Army colleagues. Fortunately for Allen, the division amongst officers did not impede the

31. Twichell, *Allen*, 121.

32. "Memorandum Regarding Changes Needed in the Organization of the Constabulary," Box 6; Journal Entry, 5 June 1910; Journal Entry, 28 July 1910; Diary Entry, 21 October 1910, all in John R. White Papers, Special Collections, Knight Library, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.

effectiveness of the Constabulary and the initial cohort of officers included many very capable leaders.[33]

From 1901 to 1906, the presence of several competent and steady Army officers served the Constabulary well in addressing the immediate problems of getting organized and trained for rural pacification campaigns within a short period of time. District and provincial officers trained the constables they recruited using Army drill manuals to implement general guidelines from Manila. Taylor protested this haphazard approach, "If a central school could be established our rapid advancement toward a perfect organization will be assured."[34] The lack of basic resources added further to the challenge of establishing the Constabulary. Supplies of essentials such as first aid packets and ammunition were not available in sufficient quantities. The initial allocation of ammunition for each constable armed with a single-barrel shotgun was limited to twenty-five rounds per year. In a report to Allen, Taylor begged that the allocation be increased to fifty to permit leeway for marksmanship training. His request remained shelved for two years before seeing it granted.[35] Initially, the constables were armed with pistols or single-shot black powder shotguns, facing bandits with "high powered, smokeless, repeating rifles captured from the Spanish or stolen from army warehouses" and fanatics armed with *bolos*.[36]

33. *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 91.
34. *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 93-95.
35. Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 31 January 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers; Elliott, *The Philippines*, 178; Philippine Commission, Constabulary Bureau, "General Order 20," in *General Orders* (Manila, PI: Bureau of Constabulary, 1908); *RPC* (1901), pt. 2, 389; *RPC* (1902), v. 10, pt. 3, 183-84; *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 96.
36. Twichell, *Allen*, 124.

Major General Adna Chaffee, commander for the Army's Philippines Division from 1901 to 1903, adamantly refused Allen's pleas for better arms.[37] After several years of guerrilla warfare, Army officers worried about the threat of mutiny from the Constabulary as well as their own Filipino Scouts. They were cognizant of the British experience during the Sepoy Rebellion in India where Britain's superiority in arms helped them to defeat a force of mutineers armed with inferior firearms.[38] The Constabulary's critics warned that equipping constables with superior arms would accomplish no more than to supply the enemy with better weapons, through treachery or cowardice. Chaffee persuaded Taft of his case and the matter would remain closed for several years. In 1902, Allen succeeded in refitting much of the Constabulary with single-shot Springfields but without bayonets to defend against bolo charges. Fear of rearming the bandits and insurgents still informed Army policy. It would not be until 1906 that the Constabulary received significant quantities of repeating rifles from the Ordnance Bureau in the form of Krag-Jörgensen six-shot rifles, too late to significantly impact the Luzon and Visayan campaigns. The Army had decided that year to phase these magazine rifles out of their inventory and the issuing of qualitatively better arms to American soldiers made the change in policy politically acceptable.[39]

The early campaigns from 1901 to 1903 to consolidate control over Luzon and to complete pacification of the Visayas severely tested the constables, and their sometimes

37. Linn, *Philippine War*, 218-19.

38. Charles D. Rhodes, "The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions," *Journal of the Military Service Institution* 30 (January 1902): 8.

39. Rhodes, "Native Troops," 8-9; Vic Hurley, *Jungle Patrol* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1938), 79; Twichell, *Allen*, 124-25; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 23.

narrow victories fed doubts in the minds of critical observers. Allen had realized by mid-1902 that short-term methods such as shuffling constables around and relying upon local Filipino volunteers would eventually fail. He needed a ready source of trained and equipped military forces to command, and the Philippine Scouts were an obvious choice. Congress passed *An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Philippine Constabulary*, known alternatively as the Scout Law or Constabulary Act, on 30 January 1903.

The new law empowered the Philippine Commission to appropriate the Army's Philippine Scout companies at the order of the civilian governor-general, but it left responsibility for supplying the Scouts with the Philippines Division. It also sealed the subordinate status of Constabulary officers without Regular Army commissions by stipulating that only officers with the Regular Army rank of major or higher could command Scout companies.[40] The law also provided for the provisional promotions in the Army for the Chief and Assistant Chiefs of Constabulary to brigadier general and colonel respectively. The rank requirements and provisional promotions eliminated the formal obstacles to subordinating Scouts, commanded by Regular Army officers, to the tactical control of the paramilitary police. Allen wasted no time in availing himself of the newly available resource. The number of Scouts appropriated for work with Constabulary increased rapidly from a token eight companies in February 1903 to thirty in July. At least half of the Scout companies would be committed to supporting the

40. *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 91; House Committee on Insular Affairs, *Efficiency of the Philippine Constabulary, Etc*., 57th Cong., 2d sess., 1902, H. Report 2781; Senate Committee on Military Affairs, *Philippine Constabulary*, 57th Cong., 2d sess., 1903, S. Report 2410; "Constabulary Bill in the House," *NYT* (9 January 1903): 8.

constables through 1907.[41] The addition of Scouts profoundly changed the outlook of the Constabulary by providing it with much needed manpower at a critical moment, reinforcing its military orientation as an institution. The appropriation of Scouts sustained the fiction of Constabulary self-sufficiency and the assertion that the Philippine Commission had pacification and state-building under control. Both illusions would later be shattered in the campaign for Samar by 1906.

Allen and Taft viewed governance in the Philippines as a zero-sum political contest between the civilian Commission and the Philippines Division. They guarded the reputation of the Commission and the Constabulary against any claim that civilian agencies could not handle administering the Philippine Islands. Their faith in civilian rule, their suspicion of the Army's methods and motives, and their pronounced sensitivity to criticism encouraged them to accept the absence of adequate equipment and the rawness of the Constabulary's recruits as the only viable alternative to military control. Instead, they insisted that the Constabulary was as capable of controlling the provinces as the Army. They clung to this perspective even as escalating violence in portions of Luzon and the Visayas suggested that the declaration of victory over insurgency was premature. Allen sympathized with Taft's fear of military primacy and defended the prerogative of the Constabulary against what he viewed as Army encroachment. Allen praised the virtues of civilian rule over martial law in the Philippines and assured Taft that a Constabulary victory would "leave no doubt about our ability to deal with almost any *ladrone* or *insurrecto* measures that may appear." He

41. Woolard, "Philippine Scouts," 98, 100.

acknowledged that reintroducing military forces could bring the conflict to a swifter conclusion but warned Taft that the "military wants these provinces returned to their control."[42]

Chaffee repeatedly voiced his doubts to Taft of the Constabulary's ability to manage all of the recently pacified provinces of the archipelago. In the troubled province of Cavite, he urged Taft to delay the scheduled transfer of eight companies of U.S. infantry out of the region in 1901, but Taft refused to consent to any action that might support arguments that civilian rule should be abandoned. Allen believed that the Philippine Scouts would ensure similar success for the Commission in future campaigns. Taft sided with Allen's assessment and declined military offers for aid from Chaffee. Allen argued that ending unrest in the Visayas represented a crucial test for the new Constabulary and would legitimate civilian rule beyond question if the Commission could succeed without significant Army assistance. He acknowledged that a cooperative effort with the Army would be more efficient in achieving pacification, but Allen believed that establishing the primacy of civilian rule and indigenous troops trumped any argument for a combined Army-Constabulary effort based on military efficacy.[43]

In retrospect, Allen, Taft, and Wright were over optimistic about the Constabulary. Allen engendered this by consistently understating the difficulties that his forces faced and seemed remarkably insulated from some of his field commanders' astute observations. Taft counted on the Constabulary to provide him with the means to

42. Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 28 March 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers.

43. Henry T. Allen to Albert J. Beveridge, 5 December 1901, Box 7, Allen Papers; Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 28 March 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers.

justify relieving the Army of its control, and he proved a willing believer in Allen's sanguine estimations. The optimistic assessments propped up a fragile success story that obscured the significant deficiencies that remained. As field conditions worsened, Allen blithely predicted that the entire archipelago would be under civilian rule by August 1902 and the Constabulary would be able to hold the provinces "without any active assistance on the part of the military."[44] Of the islands, Allen dismissed only Mindanao as too difficult for the constables to handle. He had written off the Muslim population in the region as too unruly for civilian rule early on in his tenure.

Allen's optimism stemmed partially from his ambition. A cavalryman and Philippine War veteran, he shared the aim of many Regular Army officers of career advancement through service in the Constabulary during a time of declining Army strength and scarce combat service. J. Franklin Bell's rapid promotion from major in 1899 to brigadier general in 1901 only stoked Allen's thirst for similar advancement and his willingness to use the Constabulary as a means to that end. Allen developed a hypersensitivity to outside criticism of the Constabulary that became pronounced when Army peers and superiors openly questioned its capability.[45] Allen's perception of himself as persecuted would poison his relationship with many senior officers.

44. Henry T. Allen to Luke E. Wright, 17 May 1902, Box 8, Allen Papers; Henry T. Allen to Clarence R. Edwards, 19 June 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers.

45. Henry T. Allen to Albert J. Beveridge, 5 December 1901, Box 7; Henry T. Allen to Luke E. Wright, 10 January 1903, Box 8; Henry T. Allen to Herbert D. Peirce, 8 April 1903, Box 8; Henry T. Allen to Henry C. Rouse, 13 April 1903, Box 8; Henry T. Allen to Andrew D. White, 27 August 1903, Box 8; Henry T. Allen to F. B. Wiborg, 27 August 1903, Box 8, all in Allen Papers; Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, 154; Twichell, *Allen*, 144.

Most Army officers, including those strongly supportive of the Philippine Scouts, were adamantly opposed to the organization of a native constabulary under civilian control. The Army had organized the Scouts during the Philippine War as military auxiliaries, and, as the war progressed, Army leaders looked to them as the only realistic means of reducing the need for American garrisons post-pacification. The Scouts would form the core of an independent Filipino army but only after the Army had completed its work imposing civil order.[46] Army leaders extended the same logic to the Constabulary, conceptualizing it as subordinate to the military: "The prevention and suppression of insurrection and disorder should continue to remain in a great measure with the army, aided as largely as possible by the native police . . . and passing entirely under its control wherever and whenever an outbreak is anticipated."[47]

The Army high command accepted employing Filipinos in military or constabulary organizations as auxiliaries but not as the leading forces for pacification. William H. Carter, the Army's commanding officer in the Visayas, shared the parochial view of many Army officers, but he also questioned the logic of employing inexperienced constables in military campaigns while his soldiers sat idly in garrisons. The Scout Act of 1903 further soured professional relations between the Army and Constabulary. Not surprisingly, professional military opinion turned sharply against the Constabulary in 1904 when a mutiny of constables coincided with increased violence in Samar and Leyte. The editor of the *Army and Navy Journal* echoed the sentiments of

46. Ronald G. Machoian, *William Harding Carter and the American Army: A Soldier's Story* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 202-4.

47. E. J. McClernand, "Our Philippine Problem," *Journal of the Military Service Institution* 29 (November 1901): 331; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 5-6.

many officers, "We have frequently expressed a doubt as to the wisdom of trusting too implicitly in the loyalty and devotion of native troops, particularly the constabulary."[48] Allen's insistence on pacifying Samar without the assistance of military forces in the field and his politicking with members of the Commission and Washington politicians only deepened Army officers' disdain for the indigenous police force.[49]

Nevertheless, early events appeared to be a prelude to productive cooperation between the Army's Philippines Division and Allen's constables. After Aguinaldo's surrender, the Army concentrated its efforts around insurgents and banditry in the south on Samar, Cebu, and Bohol; and in the north on Luzon in the Batangas and Laguna provinces. In 1902, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell conducted operations against guerillas under the capable Miguel Malvar. The constables demonstrated their usefulness by establishing a tight cordon around Bell's punitive expeditions in Batangas, Lagunas, and Tayabas provinces. Reinforced by several hundred local volunteers, the Constabulary prevented Malvar from finding relief in nearby Rizal province and escaping the constant pressure imposed by the Army's ubiquitous patrols. After several months on the run, Malvar and the last of his lieutenants surrendered to U.S. forces in April 1902. The Constabulary netted an impressive number of prisoners and equipment for its modest operation: 574 insurgents and bandits, 348 rifles, nine cannons, and several hundred miscellaneous small arms and bladed weapons.

48. *Army and Navy Journal* 41 (13 February 1904): 619.

49. *Army and Navy Journal* 41 (20 February 1904): 592; *Army and Navy Journal* 41 (2 April 1904): 803; *Army and Navy Journal* 41 (14 May 1904): 977; Machoian, *William Harding Carter*, 202-5.

The Constabulary's performance in Southwestern Luzon swelled Allen's confidence but said little for the efficacy of the Constabulary. The effort of the constables would have amounted to little without Bell's well-coordinated and relentless expeditions. The constables themselves only constituted a small fraction of supporting forces and relied heavily upon large numbers of Filipino volunteers and municipal police to bolster their forces. Many of the additional volunteers and local police joined the effort in order to escape the retribution of Bell's commanders, who endeavored to make non-cooperation painful. Despite the Constabulary's minor role, Army leaders appeared to welcome the additional assistance that they provided and took action to support their operations. Chaffee volunteered the services of the Philippines Division's medical corps to aid and care for wounded constables. The Philippine Commission, in return, agreed to reimburse the Army for its expenses. Allen spoke glowingly of the cooperation and goodwill between the Army, Bell specifically, and his organization: "We are operating in complete harmony with the military authorities who publicly recognize the value of the aid."[50]

Bell's pacification campaign in Luzon had provided sufficient stability for the Constabulary to begin establishing itself throughout the island. The defeat of Malvar instantly opened up several provinces south and west of Manila for civil administration. The campaigns that followed, from late-1901 until late-1903, developed into two overlapping periods. The establishment of constables as rural guards characterized the

50. Henry T. Allen to Albert J. Beveridge, 5 December 1901, Box 7; Henry T. Allen to John A. Johnston, 21 January 1902, Box 7; Henry T. Allen to Henry C. Corbin, 9 May 1902, Box 7, all in Allen Papers; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 32-9; Linn, *U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 152, 158-59.

first period. Material limitations and inexperience led to improvisation and surprising successes in some provinces but not all. Even in the success stories, the provincially focused Constabulary required substantial reinforcement to gain any initiative over the rising banditry following the fragmentation and collapse of the Filipino nationalists. The critical moment occurred in 1902 when gathering bandit strength under former nationalist leaders threatened to overwhelm Allen's ability to maintain civil control through raising volunteer militias and shuffling around Constabulary detachments. The second period revealed an increasing militarization of the paramilitary police force and a clear rejection of Army-Constabulary cooperation. The Commission turned to Army garrisons and Scout companies to guard urban centers while constables conducted military campaigns in the interior of Luzon, Leyte, and Samar in bid to secure civilian governance and supremacy.

Sorsogan, situated on the northern side of the strait separating Luzon from Samar, was organized by act of the Commission on 30 April 1901 and was one of the first provinces taken over by the Constabulary. It covered a modest 786 square miles and a population just under 100,000. Harvey P. Nevill assumed his duties as Constabulary senior inspector and chief of the Sorsogan provincial detachment in December 1901. The relative peace following the collapse of guerillas under Francisco de la Cruz lasted less than a year before bandits under Antonio Colache struck along Sorsogan's coastal towns. Colache had served as an insurgent under de la Cruz and previously as a soldier in the Spanish Army before his surrender to American forces. He attempted to establish himself as a businessman but emerged from his failed venture in

the hemp trade disillusioned, turning to banditry. His first reported raid occurred on 30 March 1902 against the town of Bulisan, leaving several local policemen dead. Nevill dispatched a Constabulary patrol to the town to investigate reports of the attack. After surveying the damage, the patrol was ambushed by Colache's bandits as it departed from Bulisan. The ambush was a slaughter, and two members of the patrol escaped only by leaping from a cliff into the sea. The attackers mutilated the fallen constables' bodies, hacking them to pieces.[51]

Nevill responded vigorously. A week after the ambush, he pressed his men into the field, but his forays into the dense hemp fields with small patrols produced little. His officers estimated that Colache's forces numbered around 400 men. In Sorsogan, the Constabulary only had 156 constables out of a total authorization of 162.[52] Needing more manpower trap the bandits, Nevill withdrew all of his patrols and met with the provincial governor, Bernardino Monreal, to coordinate a final campaign. The leaders agreed on a cordon around Colache's sanctuary, where the population supported him, and to forcibly relocate townspeople outside the cordon into designated areas. Monreal levied hundreds of local volunteers from the friendly towns to augment Nevill's modest force of constables. Nevill commissioned the town *presidentes* as field commanders to manage his newly organized battalion of volunteers.

By mid-April, Monreal had his militia assembled and organized. Nevill gave his orders to the *presidentes*, and from 17 to 19 April, they deployed their volunteers into three main lines to establish the cordon. After two weeks of minimal Constabulary

51. *RPC* (1902), v. 10, pt. 1, 205, 207; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 54-58.
52. *RPC* (1902), v. 10, pt. 1, 205-6.

presence, Colache interpreted the inactivity to be a sign of weakness and had already brought his men into the open, occupying three abandoned towns within the cordoned area. Nevill capitalized on Colache's exposure and attacked the northern town of Santa Cruz and the town of San Isidro to the south with his constables, driving the bandits toward the center into Santa Barbara. A fourth column of 300 volunteers, under *presidente* Rufino Gerona, trailed behind Nevill's constables, linking up with them at San Isidro. Reinforced, Nevill sent a third of his force to investigate Santa Barbara. The column of 115 constables and volunteers arrived on the 21 April and engaged approximately 150 of Colache's bandits. Inexperienced, the volunteers panicked and broke into a retreat, but the Constabulary inspector rallied them behind the fifteen constables and turned the battle against Colache. Defeated, the bandits abandoned Santa Barbara and hunkered down in the hemp fields between towns to avoid patrols within the cordon. Colache and his men could find no sanctuary or dependable access to supplies, and within a week, the bandit army began to rapidly disintegrate under the harsh privations.

Nevill already had sufficient numbers of volunteers and temporary officers at the time of his attack on Santa Barbara to maintain constant pressure on the bandits and more reinforcements arrived over the following two weeks. On 27 April, he received twenty fresh Constables from Masbate Province to relieve some of his exhausted detachment. Nevill also deputized Gerona and another local leader as Constabulary inspectors to lead constables in the field, giving him the necessary depth to rotate leaders on patrol. On 3 May, an additional officer and thirty more constables arrived in

Sorsogan. With the added numbers, Nevill tightened his encirclement. As the government forces closed in, a patrol came upon Colache's encampment on 4 May. The bandit leader managed to escape, but the constables succeeded in seizing a stash of documents. The papers laid out Colache's entire bandit support network in the towns and villages. Nevill directed a series of follow-up raids that broke the back of Colache's gang. Using information gleaned from the documents, he captured 143 bandits and sympathizers. The converging forces finally met on 20 May 1902. The cordon operation left the bandits thoroughly shattered, but Colache remained elusive. Now focused on one man, Nevill disbanded the volunteers and pursued Colache with hired secret agents. He finally caught up with the bandit leader when Gerona responded to a tip from an infiltrator. On his own, Gerona organized a patrol and captured Colache and his deputy while they were encamped on 24 May 1902.[53]

Nevill's pacification campaign demonstrated the Constabulary's ability to manage bandit or insurgent forces in their early stages with active and able cooperation of the provincial government and municipal forces. By winning the ruling elite to the government's cause, they successfully completed the pacification work begun by the Army during its occupation of Sorsogan. Nevill made the way for locals to take ownership of the campaign. He led the fight, but the enabling manpower came from volunteers led by the ruling elite of the towns. Even with the additional constables in May, the Constabulary could not have hoped to defeat the bandit forces. Victory came when Nevill robbed the bandits of their sanctuary. For that task, the hundreds of Filipino

53. *RPC* (1902), v. 10, pt. 1, 207-8; *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 91, 98; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 58-63.

volunteers were indispensable. Colache's bandits could not hope to survive after being effectively cut off from their support in the towns. Without reprieve, they crumbled beneath the unrelenting pressure from combined civil forces upon their sanctuaries.

To the northwest, in Tayabas Province, constables waged a simultaneous campaign against a loose band of recalcitrant rebels. Tayabas was substantially larger than Sorsogan, covering 1,910 square miles, and populated by some 120,000 Filipinos. Ruperto Rios was the most notable among the bandit leaders of the province. He had fought with Malvar's forces before escaping Bell's encirclement and fleeing to Tayabas in 1901 and declaring himself "Son of God."[54] Rios first engaged constables and American soldiers in an intense firefight in November 1901 and then largely remained out of sight over the following year. He and his men escaped pursuit by exploiting local sympathy and melting into the population, hiding their weapons. While in hiding, Rios steadily added to his ranks and bolstered his leadership by building up an array of "generals" and his own municipal government that paralleled the civil authority. He also developed a network of willing supporters in the towns. Aware of Rios' growing network, constables searched the towns and imprisoned several hundred suspected sympathizers. Esteban Herrera, a town *presidente*, represented the most notable arrest of these anti-sedition raids. Rios ruthlessly terrorized the towns that aided the government, and constables descended on the home of anyone believed to be abetting the bandit army in the struggle for control of the population.

54. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 100; Tayabas Province was renamed Quezon Province in 1946 after the second president of the Philippines, Manuel L. Quezon.

As in Sorsogan, the Constabulary gained the initiative in Tayabas by maintaining constant pressure on the bandits and separating the bandits from the population. Unlike Sorsogan, the Constabulary lacked a capable leader of Monreal's caliber to rally the *presidentes* and the population as a militia to fight alongside the constables. Locals did not initially trust the government, and Rios possessed greater influence in Tayabas than Colache did to the south against Monreal. Seeing the initial moral disadvantage he faced, the province's senior inspector, Ben L. Smith, met with the Tayabas *presidentes* and labored to convince them of the government's commitment to their welfare. He eventually persuaded them to consent to a program of concentration, consolidating the populations of the minor barrios into the larger towns. Sustained patrol operations by the Constabulary and cooperation by the *presidentes* deprived Rios and the other bandit leaders of supplies and easy refuge. Rios' forces began to seriously unravel as the Constabulary isolated them from the townspeople and continued to harass them into the spring months of 1903. Several minor skirmishes through the summer of 1902 culminated in a two of significant bandit defeats in September.

The combination of battlefield losses and isolation produced a series of surrenders through the end of 1902, and the remnant of the bandit leadership never regained initiative over the government forces. By April, Rios had fled into neighboring Laguna Province to find refuge and recruits. While on the move, local townspeople offered him and his men shelter and assistance. Rios gratefully accepted and entered one of the towns only to discover that the offer was a ruse. The residents seized him, forcibly disarmed his contingent, and turned them turned over to the nearby

Constabulary detachment on 25 March 1903. Rios and his men were sentenced to death the following May. His ignominious end illustrated the degree to which the local leadership had turned on him to the benefit of civil forces.[55]

The Constabulary defeated Rios' bandits because they were able to deny the population to the bandits with a combination of aggressive action, demonstrating their resolve and capability against the outlaws, and a direct appeal to the town leadership. Two successive Constabulary senior inspectors applied the same combination of a patrolling offensive and population isolation that had been accomplished in Sorsogan, albeit with different methods. The dramatic transformation of a barely tolerant populace to one that openly cooperated with the government testified to the power of locally-based constables when properly led and employed according to their role as an indigenous rural guard. However, the Tayabas campaign required outside reinforcements from other provinces at a time when cholera outbreaks in the archipelago and troubles in Cavite, Leyte, and Western Negros already strained the limited capacity of the Constabulary. Constables ultimately prevailed in Tayabas without military assistance, but the victory was a narrow one.[56]

The Constabulary proved less able or adept in Albay Province. Although they ultimately triumphed, the government campaign against former insurgents Simeon Ola, Lazaro Toledo, Augustin Saria, and Tito Saculo, went through a series of abortive efforts before time and bandit errors brought the violence to an end. All of the bandit leaders

55. *RPC* (1902), v. 10, pt. 1, 33 and pt. 3, 211; *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 65, 100; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 65-75.

56. Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 28 March 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers.

were veterans of the 1901 insurrection in Luzon under the insurgent general, Vito Belarmino. From the summer of 1902 to the fall of 1903, Albay reeled under tit-for-tat exchanges between government forces and banditry. For a province about twice the size and population of Sorsogan, the Constabulary only had 43 more constables than the smaller province to contend with an estimated bandit army strength of well over 1,000 men during that period. The bandits harassed several towns but focused their raiding primarily on the main road that cut through the province. They struck throughout Albay and quickly expanded their operations into the adjoining provinces.

The district chief, Major Jesse S. Garwood, attempted to quell the violence through direct negotiation with Ola. However, the bandits felt under no compulsion to surrender. The violence continued, and Garwood appeared impotent. It was at this low point in the Albay campaign that the Scout Law took effect, and Allen quickly exercised his newfound authority. He appropriated two companies of Philippine Scouts from the Army, sending them under Colonel D. J. Baker, Jr., a Regular Army officer, to replace Garwood as the senior Constabulary leader. Baker employed the combined Constabulary and Scout forces much as had been done in the other Luzon provinces. Unlike Sorsogan, the volunteers participated very little in active operations. Baker used the Scouts instead of Filipino volunteers to garrison the towns to free the constables for expeditionary work. By 1903, Allen and the civil government had decided more needed

to be done in Albay and dispatched Colonel Harry H. Bandholtz to replace Baker on 13 February 1903, with three additional companies of Scouts and 330 constables.[57]

Bandholtz, like Baker, was a Regular Army officer and familiar with the military method of concentration. He accelerated the relocation process that had already begun under Baker, coercing Filipino locals to move into designated areas. In all, Bandholtz moved approximately 125,000 civilians into camps that soon were centers of disease and malnutrition. He defended the tactic as both humane and necessary. Bandholtz observed that he could not adequately cordon off towns and simultaneously conduct patrols, and he denied that civilians suffered much from concentration: "There was no starvation, as all the people were given sufficient food for their needs, provided they performed some work."[58] Bandholtz also disbanded the local volunteer units first organized by Garwood to solve the manpower shortage. He judged the untrained volunteers to be a waste of resources and a threat to the pacification campaign. Bandholtz found that their ammunition expenditure the previous year exceeded that of the constables and Scouts combined and that their ranks were riddled with bandit sympathizers. A volunteer mutiny in Oas in February 1903 confirmed Bandholtz's suspicions, and the availability of Philippine Scouts as adjuncts conveniently eliminated the serious need for volunteers.[59]

57. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 43, 91-95, 138-39; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 79-86, 90-93.

58. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 158; Norman G. Owen, "Winding Down the War in Albay, 1900-1903," *Pacific Historical Review* 48 (November 1979): 580.

59. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 93-94; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 93-95.

Like Rios, Ola and the other bandit leaders aided Bandholtz by making bold but costly attacks against Constabulary and Scout patrols and garrisons. While they gained arms and enhanced their reputation, the losses suffered gradually reduced their numbers. Baker and Bandholtz's concentration of the rural population made the losses more painful and prevented them from replenishing their ranks and supplies. By August 1903, Bandholtz had substantially increased the number of patrols, blanketing the province with outposts. The combination of losses, constant harassment, and low supplies triggered a wave of surrenders. Captured bandits showed signs of malnutrition and severe tropical ulcers. In September, Ola surrendered to government forces at Guinobatan. Toledo and two other leaders followed his example one month later. The surrenders in September through November 1903 marked the end of the Constabulary's Albay campaign.[60]

The Albay campaign illustrated some of the challenges that the Constabulary faced in following the Army into many of these provinces, some of their own making. Sorsogan was exceptional in that the bandits made enemies of the town populations and that the provincial leadership responded aggressively to the threat. Nevill was thus able to transform the locals into a willing and motivated arm of his uniformed forces. In Tayabas and Albay, the dichotomy did not fall so cleanly. Rios, Ola, and Toledo could claim support from substantial numbers of Filipinos, at least initially. Constabulary officers in those provinces found it difficult to differentiate loyal local volunteers from bandit sympathizers and worried over their reliability. However, not all of the officers

60. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 138-40; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 95-101.

courted the locals as aggressively and astutely as Nevill in Sorsogan. Bandholtz preferred calling upon Philippine Scout formations than relying upon Filipino militia. Even given the inclination, Bandholtz lacked the familiarity with local leaders in Albay as the third commander in as many years to contemplate a delicate integration in the manner of Nevill's example.

The Constabulary continued to be confounded by its trained manpower difficulties during pacification efforts in Rizal and Cavite Province. In meeting this challenge, Taft and Allen made excluding the Army a primary condition. Sensitive to threats on their prerogative, both leaders believed that the Constabulary needed to hold its own in every territory handed over to civilian rule. The authority to appropriate companies of the Philippine Scouts from the Army represented a major political victory for them. It provided an alternative to calling upon Filipino volunteers or submitting to military authority whenever necessity demanded additional reinforcement, a routine occurrence over the following decade.

In Rizal, a confederation of *ladrone* bands gathered strength under Julian Santos through 1902. By January 1903, the Constabulary estimated bandit strength at around 300 men, armed with approximately 200 stolen rifles. The banditry rallied under the banner of a new independence movement led by Luciano San Miguel, a rebel holdout from the Philippine War. San Miguel arrived in the province from his refuge in Cavite on 15 January and immediately went to work consolidating his control by appointing various lieutenants and developing his political credentials. They rampaged across the province under his leadership. Armed with a claim to legitimacy, the bandits recruited

hundreds more into their ranks and eluded government patrols. At their peak, the bandits under San Miguel numbered several thousand armed men and were aided by many more sympathizers in the towns. His small army consisted of a motley mixture of recalcitrant insurgents and criminal opportunists, but many locals supported them as true nationalists against the constables and Scouts.

Constabulary woes began almost immediately. In January and February 1903, San Miguel's bandits forced two detachments of forty constables into a retreat in southern Bulacan Province, across Rizal's northern border, and encouraged a mass defection of provincial volunteers who immediately joined the bandit army. To meet this challenge, Allen dispatched Colonel W. S. Scott with six Philippine Scout companies, totaling about 500 men, to Rizal. Scott planned a conventional approach of a static cordon combined with a concentration of the population and expeditions within the encircled area.[61]

Foreshadowing the frustrations of Samar, Constabulary expeditions chased after San Miguel and his men without success. A detachment discovered him with several hundred bandits in his fortress headquarters in late-February, but Scott could not concentrate his forces quickly enough to pin San Miguel down before he fled. The extended campaign in Rizal translated into real problems for provinces loaning constables to Scott's force as they struggled to maintain the peace with their reduced garrisons. To prevent a resurgence of *ladrone* activity, Allen appropriated an additional six Scout companies to sustain them. The supplemental support within Rizal and in

61. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 5; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 107-23; "The Filipino Nationalists," *NYT* (17 March 1903): 6.

other provinces allowed Scott to sustain his campaign, and the relentless patrolling began to produce results on the heels of the debacles in southern Bulacan. Over a two-month period, chance encounters and fatigue gradually wore down San Miguel's forces. Between February and March 1903, the Constabulary estimated that the bandit leader lost as much as a third of his personal force.

It was a chance encounter that finally trapped San Miguel on 27 March. Two Scout companies stumbled upon a well-camouflaged fortress between the towns of Caloocan and Mariquina. The Scouts charged over the eight-foot walls at the defenders and cornered San Miguel with his personal bodyguards, killing the bandit leader with a rifle volley. His followers scattered in the wake of his death and the capture of Julian Santos two weeks earlier. By May 1903, the uprising he inspired had faded away with the key leaders captured or in hiding.[62]

As Rizal quieted, Cavite continued to roil with violence. Several independent bands, numbering several hundred strong, challenged government control. Twice in 1902, Constabulary detachments narrowly escaped complete massacres when ambushed by marauding bandits. Allen disputed assessments by Chaffee and others that constables could not manage the province and remained committed to advancing the Commission's cause, denying any need for Army direct assistance. Taft and Allen agreed to utilize Army soldiers to garrison important towns only as a means to free up constables and attached Philippine Scouts for active operations.[63]

62. Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 125-33.
63. Henry T. Allen to Albert J. Beveridge, 5 December 1901, Box 7, Allen Papers; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 140-41, 149-50.

The pacification effort in Cavite unfolded in the familiar pattern that characterized the Constabulary's other campaigns. Allen spoke glowingly of incorporating Filipinos as an innovative means for pacification, but the most substantial effort to reach out was the inclusion of a modest number of local Filipino volunteers with Constabulary detachments. In a pattern seen elsewhere, Constabulary fortunes in Cavite often flowed opposite of concurrent campaigns in neighboring provinces as bandits fled pressure from one province, seeking refuge in another. As Rizal sapped Constabulary manpower, Allen also surged detachments from other provinces to shore up the effort in Cavite. Overall strength in the province rose to 1,200 constables by July 1902 out of a total Constabulary strength of about 5,000.[64] The significant investment in men and materiel failed to decisively stem the banditry.

Before relieving Garwood in Albay, Baker commanded nearly a quarter of the Constabulary's men and thousands of Filipino volunteers in his bid to quell the violence in Cavite. He failed to employ them to good effect, and bandits routinely leaked through his cordons. As in Bell's campaign, Baker relied upon the volunteers to fill gaps in his line and reinforce garrisons. Frustrated, Baker accused the volunteers of being ineffective, and he abruptly disbanded his corps of Filipino militia. Sharing Bandholtz's antipathy for the volunteers, Baker considered them a waste of money and more of a help to the bandits than to the government. The Scout Act still awaited approval in Congress. So, Baker could not rely on substantial replacements from the Philippine Scouts to compensate for the disbanded volunteers. Inconclusive fighting convinced

64. Henry T. Allen to Henry C. Corbin, 9 May 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers.

him by mid-1902 that the civil effort required more draconian measures. In a startling admission, Baker recommended that the writ of habeas corpus be suspended in Cavite.[65]

Scott, Baker's successor, assumed command of the combined forces and initiated a deliberate campaign under the leadership of Cavite's senior inspector, T. R. Hayson. Hayson reinstituted the use of volunteers and directed hundreds of patrols from August 1902 to July 1903. His early operations brought in scores of prisoners, but conditions in the province remained chaotic. Hayson laconically commented that the "conditions in this province are bad and have always been."[66] Brief periods of relative inactivity would be interrupted by raids on towns and at least one incident where a Constabulary detachment was nearly massacred in November 1902. After two years, bandits shattered any illusion of progress when they initiated a new wave of reprisals in 1905, assassinating and torturing government sympathizers. The reign of terror led many Filipinos to flee as refugees to neighboring provinces. The government would not bring a decisive end to the violence until 1906, and then, only after having suspended *habeas corpus* and having committed thousands of constables, Filipino scouts, volunteers, and soldiers to several years of fighting.[67]

Cavite represented only one of several trouble spots that encouraged doubts as to the timing of civil rule and of the Constabulary's readiness by the end of 1902. A column in the *Army and Navy Journal* pointed to the turmoil in the provinces

65. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 154; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 141-44, 146-47.

66. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 56.

67. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 56-57; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 150-52, 166-67.

surrounding Manila and declared that the "change from military to civil rule in the islands was premature and of doubtful wisdom."[68] The Commission, with Allen's encouragement, resisted calls from Army leaders to turn Cavite and other provinces over to Army stewardship.

However, in 1903, Allen and the Commission had some reason for optimism. They had wrested a major concession from the Army by convincing Congress to give them nearly unconditional access to the Philippine Scouts. The additional manpower allowed the Constabulary to quell banditry in several provinces, and it appeared to Allen and the commissioners that civilian government was turning a corner. Luzon seemed calmer than at any time previous under American rule, with the notable exception of Cavite. In the Visayas, Leyte appeared to be manageable based on reports, and Allen voiced confidence that constables would repeat the purported success achieved in Rizal again in Samar. Mindanao and the Sulu islands remained distant concerns for the Philippine Commission, and early evaluations of Moro constables sounded promising. The battles, while bloody, seemed relatively brief in hindsight and the Constabulary survived them all with civilian authority intact. They comforted themselves in the victories and felt vindicated by the low desertion rates and stories of Constabulary valor. Wright, addressing a crowd in Ohio, declared confidently that the "the passion excited by years of unrest and insurrection are fast dying away," asserting that the Filipino

68. Henry T. Allen to Luke E. Wright, 10 January 1903, Box 8, Allen Papers; *Army and Navy Journal* 40 (15 November 1902): 248.

people "now recognize and appreciate the spirit of humanity and justice which has characterized the American administration of affairs."[69]

The new optimism in 1903 reflected a significant change from the Constabulary's perspective and approach to pacification through much of 1902. The campaigns in Sorsogan and Tayabas demonstrated the Constabulary's dependence on Filipino militia and local leaders to muster the necessary strength and to isolate the bandits from the population. The availability of Filipino Scout companies contributed to a pronounced shift towards militarizing the Constabulary by eliminating the need for the volunteers and reducing the importance of reliable municipal leaders. Allen and the Commission no longer believed that they needed the Army or local volunteers to succeed against renewed violence. Instead, they relied upon Scouts to aid the Constabulary whenever the banditry exceeded its ability to manage alone.[70] Scott's Rizal campaign succeeded in quelling the violence and validated their confidence in being able to handle banditry and lawlessness with Scout support.

Looking ahead, Allen and the Commission did not appreciate the narrowness of their victory in holding onto Luzon. In 1903, their correspondence revealed little concern over the inconclusiveness of Cavite or an inkling that the bloodiness of Albay, Tayabas, or Rizal should be seen as the harbinger of worse things to come. Taft and Allen had committed themselves from the beginning to keeping the Army out of their

69. Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 9 March 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers; Luke E. Wright's Speech at Canton, Ohio, 29 January 1903, RG 350, Entry 5, Bureau of Insular Affairs, National Archives.

70. Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 9 March 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers; Henry T. Allen to John A. Johnston, 9 April 1903, Box 7, Allen Papers.

pacification effort. The self-imposed imperative to keep civilian provinces civil trapped the Constabulary into an impossible situation. Poorly trained and equipped, the Constabulary inherited provinces rack with deep social divisions and bitter enemies. Several thousand fresh Filipino constables, ambitious Army officers, and adventurous expatriates attempted to finish the difficult work that the Army had only begun, without the Army. Allen initially relied on provisional Constabulary battalions he cobbled together, but the violence and lawlessness was too great to manage with only his constables. It was the Congressional authorization to claim Philippine Scout companies from the Army that staved off disaster. Allen relied heavily on the Scouts to reinforce his active campaigns and to prevent provinces with depleted Constabulary detachments from slipping into disorder. At its peak of 7,000 constables, the Constabulary could only hold ground it controlled by borrowing Scout companies. Relatively manageable flare-ups such as Sorsogan and Tayabas represented the positive exception rather than the general rule from 1901 to 1903. In the other contested provinces, the Constabulary transitioned from crisis to crisis. Allen's strategy of relying on Scouts instead of civic mobilization or allowing for direct Army intervention would face more daunting trials as the Commission expanded its rule southward and the Constabulary attempted to continue its formula for pacification in the wildernesses of Samar from 1903 to 1906.

CHAPTER III

TRIAL: THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY'S VISAYAN CAMPAIGNS, 1902-1906

The Philippine Commission created the Constabulary "to prevent and suppress brigandage, insurrection, unlawful assemblies and breaches of the peace" without having to rely on the U.S. Army. However, from late-1902 to 1907, the militarization of the Constabulary rendered it a poorly resourced rival to the Army. By the end of 1902, Allen was forced to deploy a substantial number of his constables to deal with armed resistance to government authority in Bulacan, Rizal, and Cavite provinces, and across the Visayan islands - especially Leyte and Samar.[71] The intensity of the violence in the affected provinces required more forces than the Constabulary Act authorized and the Philippine Commission could afford, and Allen could only contain the crisis by diverting significant portions of Constabulary garrisons from calmer districts and with the help of thousands of Filipino Scouts. By 1905, unrest on Luzon had subsided sufficiently for the Secretary of Commerce and Police to optimistically declare that the island was "in a condition of unprecedented tranquillity [sic]."[72] Yet, even as the Constabulary gained control over Luzon, the escalating violence in Leyte and Samar threatened to discredit the civilian government's ability to administer the Philippines.

71. *RPC* (1902), v. 10, pt. 1, 189-92; *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 27-33.
72. *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 1-2, 29.

In 1904, Leyte and Samar, narrowly separated by the San Juanico Strait, constituted the greatest challenges for the Constabulary in the Visayas. The topography of both islands was characterized by sharp relief between the mountainous interiors and fertile coastal plains. Leyte had relatively substantial coastal areas capable of supporting sufficient food crops for the island's population. In contrast, Samar's low-lying areas were much smaller than Leyte's and isolated by forbidding mountain and jungle terrain. "Interior Samar was a place of great snakes and malaria mosquitos [sic] and sludgy, oozing swamps," recounts one observer, "It was a place calculated to try the stamina of the fighting men who forced the bush of the interior."[73] Its 5,000 square miles lacked sufficient arable land to support the population with food and adequate roads to make communication possible by any other means than by boat.[74]

Leyte and Samar also contained a complex mix of religious sectarians and disaffected mountain villagers who conducted periodic raids on the coastal towns. The surrender of Filipino nationalist guerrillas under Vicente Lukban in 1902 did nothing to resolve the long standing grievances between the coastal population and mountain villagers. Consequently, the end of the war failed to produce the closure to localized resistance the Commission had hoped for and expected. Instead, many mountain peasants continued to aid anti-government brigands and sects, both to strike back at exploiting Filipino elites and to avoid harsh retribution. Natural disasters such as

73. Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 188.
74. Ibid., 188.

epidemics occasionally exacerbated anti-government sentiment prompting rumors of an American plot to poison the wells.[75]

By 1903, a broad syncretic movement had spread across the Visayas that fused Catholic doctrine with native animism. Generally known as *pulajanes,* the religious insurrectionists were led by a group of former *Dios-Dios* leaders, recalcitrant revolutionaries, and former criminals. The evident religious fervor and wild melee tactics of the *pulajanes* movement led many contemporary observers to mistakenly dismiss it as a resurrection of the defeated *Dios-Dios* movement. The *Dios-Dios* sect had clashed with American soldiers and marines in Samar during the Philippine War. The *pulajanes* shared many religious practices with the *Dios-Dios,* including the use of charms to deflect bullets, but the newer group incorporated a more diverse body of leaders than had its predecessor. The spiritual head of the *pulajane* movement, Pablo Bulan or "Pope Pablo," anointed several defeated *insurrecto* and *ladrone* leaders as *pulajane* chiefs and granted them his blessing to establish themselves throughout Samar and Leyte for their own ends. A diverse group of anti-government leaders in the Visayas would use the religious vision of the *pulajane* movement to legitimize their campaigns against government and military forces. Tapping into the embedded cultural animosity

75. Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 231; Twichell, *Allen,* 189; *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 114; The *pulajane* and *ladrone* bands had no direct association with the Filipino nationalists that faced the Army and Marines during the Philippine War from 1899-1902. Some former members of the nationalist forces melted into the *pulajane* and *ladrone* forces, but they did not transmit the cause to these insurrectionary groups.

within the population, Bulan and others rapidly established their sectarian movement throughout the island provinces of Leyte and Samar.[76]

Allen confidently assured the Commission that the Constabulary was up to the task of quelling this latest sectarian uprising: "Leyte is giving us considerable work at present, but I do not doubt that we will be able to run down all those who are still out in arms and that in a short time the complete pacification of the province will follow."[77] Even before having secured access to the Philippine Scouts in 1903, he believed that the Constabulary could overcome the *pulajanes* with whatever recruits it could muster and with the active support of local elites. Allen conceded that the campaign would take time, but he never seriously questioned the validity of his basic strategy throughout the Constabulary's campaign across Leyte and Samar from 1902 to 1907.

Allen had developed his approach to counterinsurgency while he commanded units of the 43rd U.S. Volunteer Infantry during the regiment's campaigns in the Visayas from 1900 to 1901. The regiment divided its 1,200 soldiers between two of the islands. Two battalions under Allen occupied Samar while the third battalion under Colonel Arthur Murray, the regimental commander, established itself on Leyte. Commanding fewer than 900 infantrymen of the 43rd, Allen attempted to overcome resistance and extend American control by combining harsh punitive measures against locals

76. *Army and Navy Journal* 44 (12 January 1907): 528; Linn, "The Pulahan Campaign: A Study in U.S. Pacification," *War in History* 6 (January 1999): 45-49; Linn, *Philippine War*, 175-76; Sturtevant, *Uprising*, 128-29; *Pulajanes* is one of multiple spellings found in the sources. This spelling was selected because of its common use by W. C. Taylor of the Third District in his reports. The alternative spellings include *pulajan, pulahan, polajan, polagan,* and *pulahane*; Bolos were the indigenous weapons frequently used by guerrillas in mass charges. They resembled long knives or machetes

77. Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 19 April 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers.

cooperating with the insurgents and the liberal use of indigenous troops organized from the local communities.

His efforts on Samar initially produced promising results. Allen expanded the U.S. zone of influence far beyond the coastal enclaves envisioned by his superiors, Murray and Brigadier General William A. Kobbé. However, by April, Allen's achievements rapidly unraveled as insurgents overwhelmed Allen's far flung garrisons and terrorized towns that had cooperated with him. Seeking to reestablish control, Allen responded with a series of punitive actions that failed to decisively weaken the insurgency but inflicted deprivation upon many local villagers caught in the middle of the conflict. Fortunately for Allen, the department commander, Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, shielded him from the severe criticism targeted at him for the reversals he suffered in April, and Major General Arthur MacArthur's decision to temporarily surrender the interior of Samar to insurgents saved Allen from reaping the shortcomings of his strategy. Allen's apparent successes on Samar and Leyte convinced him that a small force of well-led indigenous troops could defeat any insurrectionists. His approach to pacification would receive its severest test in the Visayas, beginning with Leyte.[78]

As most of the Constabulary concentrated on pacifying Luzon in 1902, constables under the leadership of Captain Peter Borseth struggled to stamp out unrest in Leyte Province, which included the small neighboring island of Biliran. Borseth had been assigned to Leyte as the province's senior inspector after its transfer to civilian rule.

78. Linn, *Philippine War*, 231-34; Linn, "Pulahan Campaign," 54, 58-59.

The significant power of the *pulajanes* over many poor Filipinos represented one of the important long term challenges Borseth and his district commander, Lieutenant Colonel Wallace C. Taylor, needed to overcome. Isolated villagers seemed particularly susceptible to the teaching of the numerous "popes" and vulnerable to coercion.[79] The historical enmity between the highland villagers and the peoples of the coastal lowlands made them ready recruits, especially during difficult times. A significant feature of Taylor's strategy was to eliminate this source of *pulajane* manpower by gaining the sympathy of the indigenous population. Initially, Filipino villagers rewarded his efforts by passing on valuable intelligence and providing friendly bases of operation for his constables.[80]

Taylor would establish himself as one of the Constabulary's fiercest jungle fighters, once fighting on after being hit in the jaw with a *pulajane* .45 caliber bullet. Yet, he held a relatively humane view of the Leyte population and rejected relying upon force alone to enforce order. Instead, he insisted the "establishment of society on so firm a basis that the depradations [sic] committed by small bands can not disrupt it and cause the members to break away . . . and join the murderous raids upon neighboring settlements."[81] Taylor initially shared Allen's belief that a relatively small number of locally organized Constabulary detachments could succeed in chasing down *ladrones*

79. Numerous syncretic groups emerged during the later half of the Philippine War. They were led by numerous self-appointed "popes" who merged aspects of Roman Catholicism with native animism. Often, they would promise their followers immunity from bullets and other such magical blessings.

80. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 114; *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 15-16.

81. Philippine Constabulary, "General Orders No. 38," June 1906, Entry 95, RG 350, National Archives; *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 92-93.

and *pulajanes* with the support of local Filipino leaders in the towns. However, by 1905, months of indecisive fighting would lead Taylor to openly question the efficacy of this strategy.

Despite the Constabulary's other troubles, Borseth's initial response to the *pulajane* raids and his efforts to reestablish government control appeared promising. In harmony with Allen's favored strategy, he developed a rapport with local officials while briefly acting as Leyte's provincial governor when the civilian administrator resigned in March 1903.[82] Taylor testified that Borseth had made himself "popular throughout his province," giving the district chief hope that the lawlessness would end without much difficulty.[83] However, Borseth's politicking had little impact on the insurgency as evidenced when a pair of *pulajane* raids on Biliran towns in September 1902 overwhelmed local forces and resulted in the death of several Filipinos, three constables, and the loss of two firearms. Borseth, with the cooperation of a Biliran *presidente*, responded to the September raids by organizing a force of nearly 400 bolomen to augment the constables and municipal police of eastern Leyte. The combined force succeeded in limiting *pulajane* traffic from Samar's western coast to Biliran Island, but Borseth lacked sufficient forces of any kind to control the entire Leyte coastline. Drought and disease also mitigated the inroads made with the local population. Low rainfall and cholera outbreaks generated unrest as quarantine measures and potential food shortages undermined local goodwill towards constables and the government.

82. "Governor Grant Resigns as Executive of Leyte," *Manila Times* 5 (14 March 1903): 1; *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 116.

83. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 117.

In October 1902, *pulajanes* struck throughout the island concurrent with a general rise in lawlessness across the Visayas in late 1902. The most intense fighting between *pulajanes* and constables centered in and around the town of Ormoc on Leyte's western coast. Even with reinforcements from Cebu and Negros, the Constabulary could not eliminate the *pulajanes* and succeeded only in driving them between Ormoc and Biliran, while they continued to raid the towns in their path. The *pulajanes* inflicted the most grievous loss of the year to the Constabulary on 14 November when a night raid surprised the garrison at Dolores, one of Ormoc's barrios. Of the eighteen constables present, the *pulajanes* killed two and wounded eight others before they were repulsed. Although the violence in Leyte concerned Allen, he could do little to reinforce Borseth that winter as even greater violence plagued towns in Cavite and Samar.[84]

Passage of the Scout Act and success on Luzon in 1903 allowed Allen to divert more forces from the northern island to assist Taylor's constables. Reinforced, the Constabulary succeeded in reducing the endemic violence on Leyte, but failed to decisively end the insurgency or capture Faustino Ablen, the principal *pulajane* leader. The next major engagement between *pulajanes* and government forces did not occur until late-August 1904 when Captain Henry Barrett, Borseth's replacement as Leyte's senior inspector, attacked a *pulajane* fort. The defenders threw back the assault and killed Barrett. The loss of their commander sent the constables into a panicked retreat, leaving Barrett's body on the field. It would be another six months before the Constabulary resumed the offensive against Ablen's *pulajanes* by assaulting their

84. *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 114-16; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 290-92.

stronghold south of Ormoc where Barrett had been killed. Aided by a contingent of local volunteers, the Constabulary force took the fortress and captured thirty *pulajanes* and killed three. Two major engagements followed between February and July 1905 in which an additional twelve *pulajanes* were killed, including one of Ablen's chief lieutenants – Juan Tamayo.[85]

Tamayo's death preceded another year of apparent *pulajane* inactivity and general tranquility in Leyte. However, the peace was illusory. *Pulajanes* under Felipe Ydos, another Ablen subordinate, shattered the calm by defeating government forces in a series of engagements. On 19 July 1906, 300 hundred *pulajanes* raided the municipal police station in Burauen, in central Leyte, killing five policemen and seizing fifteen rifles. Two days later, a force of 34 constables led by two officers blundered into 500 *pulajanes* in the vicinity of the same town. The Constabulary lost one of its officers, twelve constables, twelve rifles, and two pistols in the uneven battle.[86]

The shocking defeats of July shook the Commission's confidence in the Constabulary. Henry C. Ide, Wright's successor as Governor-General, directed that Major General Leonard Wood, commander of the Philippines Division, reinforce Allen's constables in Leyte. Wood agreed to send one battalion each from the 8th and 24th Infantry. Freed of major burdens in Samar and Cavite, Allen could also afford to send additional constables and able officers to the province. Unlike Samar, the Constabulary

85. *RPC* (1906), v. 7, pt. 3, 202; Coats, 293-94.
86. *RPC* (1906), v. 7, pt. 1, 36; *RPC* (1906), v.7, pt. 3, 227-28; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 296-98.

would not be required to cede part of Leyte to military control in order to gain their active participation in the pacification campaign.[87]

The addition of Army infantry proved decisive to the Leyte campaign. They inflicted heavy casualties on Ablen's forces, forcing him to impress more villagers to maintain his strength. Pulajane losses and local resentment over their increasingly oppressive presence convinced much of the rural population to cooperate with government forces. Sensing victory, Wood arrived in person on Leyte in early-August with two more battalions of infantry. Despite occasional reversals, the columns of Army regulars, scouts, volunteers, and constables kept the *pulajanes* on the run. As on Luzon, the constant pressure gradually destroyed the insurrection. By the time a Scout patrol captured Ablen on 11 June 1907, the *pulajanes* no longer posed a serious threat on Leyte.[88]

Pulajane recruiting and raiding on Samar was largely ignored both in Manila and by local Army and Constabulary officers who reported only minor activity by small bands of fewer than a dozen men and arms. In 1902, Chaffee made the strikingly incongruous observation that "Samar is now as quiet and peaceful as the city of San Francisco."[89] The Commission applied no additional pressure to accelerate the slow pace of Constabulary recruitment in the province despite the observed increase in *pulajane* activity over the previous year. One month after assuming responsibility for Samar on 15 June 1902, the Constabulary boasted three officers and two constables for

87. *RPC* (1906), v. 7, pt. 1, 37; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 298.
88. *RPC* (1907), v. 2, 294; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 299-303.
89. *Army and Navy Journal* 40 (15 November 1902): 248.

the entire province. By the following June, Samar's detachments had increased its ranks but still remained short of full-strength, claiming 250 of the 300 constables it was authorized. The Constabulary also augmented their forces with roughly 300 Filipino scouts. The Commission accepted the Constabulary's assurances that these numbers were sufficient and that the incidents of violence in the province did not represent any kind of general movement.

However, Bulan had been rebuilding the *pulajane* ranks since Lukban's surrender in 1902. By spring 1904, he had gained the cooperation of the principal pulajane leaders on Samar: Pedro de la Cruz, Antonio Anugar, and Enrique Dagohob. De la Cruz dominated operations above the in the center of the island, near the headwaters of the Gandara River, and was the most important insurgent leader to the Constabulary prior to the arrival of Enrique Dagohob in 1904. His raids and ambushes exploited the small size of Constabulary patrols and garrisons in the islands interior by overwhelming them with superior numbers. Anugar operated to the east in the Gandara River Valley and became Bulan's deputy. Dagohob proved to be the more charismatic and capable of Bulan's subordinate leaders and quickly established himself in the vicinity of the towns of Oras and Dolores. Bulan and his leaders benefited from the same social schisms and forbidding island terrain as previous insurgents in recruiting peasants and evading government patrols. After more than a year of preparation, he felt confident enough to initiate further raids from his mountain strongholds and secure his hold on the northern portion of the island, terrorizing towns and villages sympathetic to the Commission. The first of these attacks occurred in February 1904 when 500

pulajanes ambushed a detachment of twenty constables responding to disturbances near the town of Borongan, resulting in the loss of two constables and eight rifles. Subsequent patrols succeeded in chasing the *pulajanes* out of the region around the town but failed to ascertain the strength of the threat to government control.[90]

Bulan, de la Cruz, Anugar, and Dagohob escalated the conflict in the summer of 1904 with a series of raids against the lowland villages and coastal towns of Samar. They aimed to undermine government control directly by destroying the Commission's sanctuaries and thus eliminating its core supporters, as well as possibly hastening the realization of their millennial vision. *Pulajanes* began their raids in northern Samar in July and rapidly overwhelmed much of the Constabulary's garrison from the fertile Gandara Valley to the island's northern coastline. Still ignorant of the insurgent strength, Allen responded by sending a small detachment from his Manila Battalion under the command of Captain Cary I. Crockett to reinforce the Samar garrisons. Crockett and his constables made their first contact with a group of *pulajanes* while rushing to the rescue of another detachment on 21 August 1904. In the engagement, Crockett's men killed forty-one *pulajanes* and captured four rifles in the process. Crockett's men performed with distinction while facing a larger force, but the incident typified the kind of desperate stands that Constabulary forces would fight in the coming months.[91]

90. Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 312-13; *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 89-90.

91. Philippine Constabulary, "General Orders No. 108," 14 September 1904, Entry 95, RG 350, National Archives; Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 192-94; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 313-14, 316-18.

The renewed fighting over control of Samar invigorated criticism in the United States of the Republican Party's administration of the islands. Wright, the new Philippine civil governor, publicly refuted assertions by Alton B. Parker, a Democratic presidential candidate, that insurgents dominated entire districts, claiming that there was "not a single band of ladrones operating in the . . . Visayan islands."[92] Members of the Commission and Allen defended the viability of American control in the archipelago throughout the election year, but reports that hundreds of bolomen roamed Samar instead of scattered holdouts raised concerns among them that the Constabulary could not control the island.

Several bloody clashes between small patrols and insurgents in late-1904 revealed how poorly Allen and Taylor had estimated the state of insurgency in Samar. In November, thirteen Philippine Scouts serving with the Constabulary were massacred at Oras. The following month, a scout company of thirty-seven men, under the command of Lieutenant Stephen K. Hayt, was annihilated near Dolores. The decisive defeat of two scout units by pulajanes brought Samar back to the full attention of the Commission and provoked commissioners to confront Allen on his sanguine assurances of Constabulary control of Samar. Free to act in November with the election behind him, Wright pressured Allen to quell the nascent insurrection in Samar and suggested that the Army be used to garrison towns along the coast in order to free up constables and scouts for use on expeditions. Taking personal command of Constabulary forces on Samar, Allen acceded to Wright's suggestion to accept military assistance, and the Army

92. "Parker Answered," *Washington Post* (24 October 1904): 1.

garrisoned the five towns of Llorente, Oras, Taft, Trangunan, and Bulao with U.S. infantry on 31 December 1904.[93]

The resurgence of sectarian violence on Samar in 1904 had taken Allen and the Commission by surprise. Both had accepted the slow pace of Constabulary recruitment and training on Samar given the relative calm that followed the Army's campaign in 1902. Samar had about 239 constables, reinforced by a little over 100 Philippine Scouts, occupying the entire island in July 1904. An Army infantry regiment also sat in garrison on the western coast, near the Gandara River, but agreements between the Commission and the Philippine Division limited the soldiers to serving as a reserve in case of emergency. Constabulary strength was scattered across the island in small detachments that lacked the strength to chase Bulan down or even to repel deliberate attacks by his forces. The *pulajanes* frequently attacked isolated patrols and garrisons with several hundred men and always with superior numbers. Crockett's small detachment was only the first of several waves of reinforcements of constables, scouts, and soldiers sent to shore up the Constabulary's effort to repeat the conquering of Samar from Pablo's forces. Collectively, they would prove equally inadequate in the following year.[94]

The material challenges that continued to plague Allen's strategy on Samar were exemplified by Crockett's expedition into Samar in January 1905. Allen ordered

93. "Corbin Reports Massacre," *NYT* (25 December 1904): 4; *RPC* (1902), v. 10, 215, 218; *RPC* (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 131; William H. Taft to Luke E. Wright, 24 December 1904, Entry 95, RG 350, National Archives; Luke E. Wright to William H. Taft, 26 December 1904, Entry 95, RG 350, National Archives; Diary, 28 December 1904, Allen Papers; Diary, 31 December 1904, Allen Papers; *RPC* (1904), v. 5, pt. 3, 66; Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 189-90, 197, 232-33; Twichell, *Allen*, 138.

94. *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 89-90; Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 188-89; Twichell, *Allen*, 137-8; Coats, 314-15.

Crockett to occupy the remote town of San Ramon in order to create a supply center, shield the coastal population from further depredations by the *pulajanes*, and serve as a staging point for punitive expeditions. When Crockett arrived with three officers and a company of 145 constables, he found that the *pulajanes* had already burned the town and scattered or killed its population.[95] Interpreting the destruction of San Ramon as evidence of a major *pulajane* stronghold in the vicinity, Crockett immediately set about constructing what he termed "Fort Defiance" and sent word to Manila of the town's destruction and for logistical support. Crockett's constables suffered greatly and were forced to subsist "on coconuts, edible roots, bats . . . and other such things, including two large boa constrictors."[96] They probed and waited for further indications of *pulajane* presence or activity. After nearly a month, Crockett discovered a well-worn trail in the jungle while leading a patrol. His small band followed the trail and encountered a small party of *pulajanes*, killing all three, before turning back to the fort at nightfall.[97]

One day after returning to Fort Defiance, Crockett's company found their enemy. On 23 February 1905, two groups of *pulajanes* struck at the fort in succession. With covering fire from the tree line, sixty *pulajanes* charged the small rectangular fort with flame-lit poles. The *pulajanes* leaned the poles on the dry grass and the roof of the fort erupted in flames. Clambering over the walls, the first wave of attackers crashed through the burning roof. Crockett ordered the roof supports cut and the flame-engulfed

95. Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Subcommittee No. 5, *Philippine Constabulary Hearings on H.R. 9496*, [hereafter *P.C. Hearings*] 70th Congress, 1st session, 27 February 1928, 21-23; Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 213.

96. *P.C. Hearings*, 22.

97. Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 219-20.

structure collapsed on the *pulajanes*. The final *pulajane* charge came upon the heels of the first. Fighting with discipline and determination, the constables held the walls of the fort in a brawl of rifle volleys and hand-to-hand fighting. When the black powder smoke finally cleared, the constables emerged with light casualties, one killed and four wounded, and the *pulajanes* had melted away with about one hundred dead strewn around the fort walls.[98]

Despite the victory, Crockett's force remained isolated, with nearly a quarter of the men sick and the rest exhausted.[99] He organized a party of able-bodied men and set out to find a village to obtain food. His attempt to find a village to obtain supplies was a disaster. Fighting terrain and wildlife, he nearly died and was forced to temporarily abandon the wounded at the fort without support or communication. Crockett's experience highlighted the fact that troops in the interior of Samar could only survive if they held a logistical base on the coast and maintained a chain of supply depots.

The following February, with the Army securing his coastal bases, Allen pressed into the island interior with a combined expedition of several hundred constables and Filipino scouts from across the Philippines. He had received reports of a concentration of 2,000 *pulajanes* under Pablo in the Gandara River Valley near the town of San Jose. Working informally, Allen coordinated with a battalion from the 12th U.S. Infantry to converge on an area suspected of hiding several thousand *pulajanes*. Allen divided the combined force of 405 constables, scouts, and soldiers into three columns. 160 men under Allen would isolate the *pulajanes* by blocking the main trails leading out of San

98. Ibid., 221-22; *P.C. Hearings*, 22.
99. *P.C. Hearings*, 22.

Jose. The remaining 245 men would attack the town from the south and east to destroy the *pulajane* force. The expedition cordoned off the town and struck according to plan, but the *pulajanes* had already evacuated the town, slipping between the deploying columns. Determined, Allen pressed on eastward with a select group of 166 constables and scouts to locate the reputed *pulajane* stronghold in the Maslog Mountains south of Oras. The remainder of the force retired westward.[100] Since the Constabulary had become cognizant of the *pulajane* threat in Samar, constables scoured the unsettled interior of the island for the infamous place of Pope Pablo and it had risen to the status of legend. Many officers believed it to hide thousands of *pulajanes* along with the infamous Ablen. Within the Constabulary ranks, it was "the place everybody looks for and hopes to God he won't find."[101]

Allen's men marched for nearly three days only to discover a fortress that had been abandoned for some time near the Dolores River. Several rotting corpses of soldiers and *pulajanes* provided the sole evidence of previous activity. The journey from San Jose and the Gandara Valley to the Dolores River had taken its toll on the expedition. Reflecting the weakness of the Constabulary in Samar, none of Allen's constables were familiar with the terrain, nor did they have cooperative guides. Consequently, instead of a decisive blow, the February expedition had produced little more than exhausted, hungry, and diseased troops. On 22 February, Allen embarked his men aboard several rafts on the Dolores River and followed the current for two days to

100. Henry T. Allen to W. Cameron Forbes, 5 March 1905, Box 8, Allen Papers; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 333-35.

101. Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 214-15.

the coast where he boarded a steamer bound for the town of Oras finding Crockett's battered relief party. In explaining his departure from San Ramon, Crockett asserted that the destruction of San Ramon and the ferocity of the attack on Fort Defiance suggested that the *pulajane* attack had originated from Maslog. The testimony of a young Filipino boy, Feliciano, that had escaped captivity under the *pulajanes* convinced Crockett that his forces had been attacked from the *pulajanes* main encampment. When he brought Feliciano forward to Allen, the boy claimed that he had been in the company of Bulan's war chief, Anugar, at a great fortress and could lead them to its location. Seeing an opportunity to wrestle control from the *pulajanes* and salvage the Constabulary's prerogative in Samar, Allen once again set about organizing a force to locate and destroy Bulan's stronghold.[102]

Allen's second expedition departed Oras for San Ramon on 28 February. Augmented with Crockett's constables, it sailed to the nearby coastal town of Cagamotan and, guided by Feliciano, it set off for the Anugar's fort. The column followed a trail that followed a gentle slope, interspersed with patches of vegetation and jungle canopy. Cresting the mountain foothills, the expedition struggled through thick walls of tall grass. The waiting *pulajanes* erupted in a flurry of gunfire and bolo rushes, seriously wounding Crockett and several others in the opening exchange. The column responded effectively — firing volleys into the charging bolomen and killing many of their leaders early in the battle. The disciplined ranks and deliberate fire of the column broke the momentum of the attack, and the bolomen were driven off with heavy

102. Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 335.

casualties. After arranging for the wounded, Allen attempted to complete the destruction of the attacking *pulajane* force but to no avail. He tracked them back to the purported location of Maslog only to find yet another fortress, abandoned and demolished. The second expedition in late-February was Allen's last personal foray into Samar, a tactical victory without strategic significance.[103]

In the spring of 1905, the Constabulary continued to pursue a strategy of scattered garrisons and constant patrolling. Allen wisely reinforced his garrisons and enlarged his patrols to 100 or more to avoid repeating the massacres of 1904, but Bulan and the bulk of his forces eluded the Constabulary sweeps and threatened the existence of its outposts. To Allen's frustration, *pulajanes* continued to maul small patrols on ground previously cleared by his expeditions. He could neither clear nor hold any terrain on Samar with the men and arms the Constabulary possessed. However, Allen still believed in the validity of his strategy and directed the return of constables to their home provinces in March 1905.[104] He remained convinced that mixing provincial detachments was counterproductive and that the Constabulary's "policy must be to keep the minimum forces in the various provinces."[105]

After six months of effort, Allen conceded defeat in May 1905 and recommended to Governor-General Wright that the Army's Philippines Division assume the pacification effort on Samar. On 2 June, Wright made the formal request for the Army

103. Henry T. Allen to Luke E. Wright, 5 Mar 1905, Allen Papers; Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 228-31; Twichell, *Allen*, 139; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 335-37.

104. Henry T. Allen to Luke E. Wright, 5 Mar 1905, Allen Papers; Twichell, *Allen*, 138-39.

105. Henry T. Allen to Luke E. Wright, 5 Mar 1905, Allen Papers.

to pacify those portions of Samar in active unrest. The failure in Samar was prominently reported in June 1905 by the *Army and Navy Journal* who ran the headline "Philippine Constabulary a Failure." The *Manila Sunday Sun* editorial was hardly less caustic: "T'ell with the Constabulary. We will now go to work and establish order in the islands with the only real weapon there is – the American Soldier."[106]

While succeeding in Leyte, by July 1903, the Constabulary had been overwhelmed by *pulajanes* raiding the lowland towns of Samar. Their campaigns through Samar had succeeded in drawing blood but failed to end religious fanaticism or resolve dangerous sectionalism on the island. With insufficient men and resources, the Constabulary could not bring to bear the same force as the Army's Philippines Division. The Constabulary lacked the men to simultaneously conduct substantial expeditions and establish outposts to restrict *pulajane* and *ladrone* movement. Several of the mountain folk confessed to Taylor that "with bandits on one side and abusive municipal officials on the other there was no one they could look to for protection. They assured him that if the constabulary would establish a post in their midst . . . there would be no more trouble in that section."[107]

To reinforce Samar's small garrisons, the Constabulary depended heavily on reinforcements of constables and Filipino scouts recruited from distant provinces. Allen could not replicate Taylor's success in Leyte when so little of the Constabulary's strength was drawn locally. Constables found themselves fighting an enemy with superior numbers and aiding a populace which commonly viewed them as invaders and

106. Twichell, *Allen*, 140; *Army and Navy Journal* 43 (1 July 1905): 1187.
107. *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt.. 3, 92-93.

outsiders. The advantages of popular support and local knowledge that had mitigated their weaknesses in arms and numbers in other provinces were absent in Samar. The only local support the Constabulary could depend upon came from the lowland elites whose predatory practices produced much of the antagonism sustaining the *pulajane* movement. With none of its natural advantages, the Constabulary failed to pacify Samar or establish effective civil governance despite Constabulary reinforcements from other provinces and the Philippine Scouts.[108]

Ironically, it would fall upon the foreign U.S. Army, under Brigadier General William H. Carter, to bring a decisive end to the insurgency on Samar. Carter had assumed command of the Army's Department of the Visayas in February 1904 and promptly engaged in a running feud with Allen over the proper role of the Constabulary and the use of the Philippine Scouts. Wright's call for aid provided Carter with his opportunity to act. On 4 June 1905, a mixed force of soldiers and Filipino scouts struck a main encampment at Maslog, killing Enrique Dagohob and ninety-four other *pulajanes*. The death of Dagohob precipitated a surge in surrenders that accelerated with a series of victorious Army expeditions. Carter supplemented his military campaign with a direct assault on the social tensions that had sustained rural discontent on Samar. Less dependent upon the cooperation of local *presidentes* than Allen, Carter took measures to halt the exploitation of peasants by the lowland elite, initiating limited land reform and supplying food to those in need. The Army's combined civil-military strategy on Samar had drained the pulajane insurgency of most of its strength by the

108. Machoian, *Carter*, 205; Sturtevant, *Uprising*, 36-37; Twitchell, *Allen*, 118-20.

summer of 1906. In November, combined Army-Constabulary forces killed de la Cruz, and in December, Bulan was mortally wounded when another expedition surprised his party while they were encamped. No other major *pulajane* leaders remained after Bulan's death, and the Army returned responsibility for Samar to the Constabulary in the spring of 1907.[109]

The Philippine Constabulary ultimately proved a poor substitute for the U.S. Army in pacifying the Philippines. The usage of the Constabulary in the pacification campaign in Leyte and Samar squandered its fundamental strength in preventing insurgency, defeating banditry at its source, and furthering the objective of creating republican political and social institutions. Instead of complementing the military campaign, the Constabulary competed with the Army as the predominant pacification force in the post-war Philippines. Rivalry overruled the imperatives of nation-building in dictating the direction of the Constabulary. Allen asserted, and Taft concurred, that the Constabulary needed to fight independently in Samar to fend off criticism from the Army and to protect the prerogative of the Commission. With Taft's approval, Allen focused the Constabulary on pacifying Leyte and Samar and dismissed offers from the Army to assume the mission. As he funneled constables into Samar, constabulary stations in other districts gradually lost the initiative, and indications of reemerging banditry and insurrection appeared in several provinces. The official assertion that it was "now safe to travel practically throughout the archipelago" became increasingly

109. "Fight with Pulajanes," *NYT* (29 November 1906): 1; "Eleven Pulajanes Killed," *NYT* (2 December 1906): 3; Machoian, *Carter*, 205-7; Twichell, *Allen*, 138-39; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 342-43, 346-47.

farcical.[110] The inadequacy of the indigenous municipal police in managing local affairs became a routine comment in official reports and correspondence between Constabulary officers: "Municipal Police are almost without exception, inefficient, undisciplined, slouchy and dishonest: little hope can be advanced for their betterment until they are placed on an entirely different footing."[111]

When the Constabulary finally refocused on their civil action role, the municipalities were weak and rife with corruption. The previous commitment of the Constabulary to a military focus had three immediate consequences. It squandered the limited resources available to the Philippine Commission by creating a poor duplicate of the U.S. Army instead of an effective paramilitary police force, it left significantly fewer resources for the Commission to create republican institutions at the local level, and it curbed progress being made by constables in civic action.

Even as constables waged war in Samar and Leyte, the Constabulary assumed aspects of civil government as the Philippine Commission extended its influence. In 1902, the Commission called upon constables "to assist in various works somewhat extraneous to the duties laid down for it in the organic act."[112] In June 1904, the Constabulary established a separate medical division. Within a year, they established seven hospitals and two wards that served constables and the native population. The medical division reportedly received over one thousand cases in its first year.[113] The

110. *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 1.
111. "Monthly Reports on Conditions and Occurrences," 5 May 1903, Box 6, Ax 192, White Papers.
112. *RPC* (1903), v. 5, pt. 3, 27.
113. *RPC* (1905), v. 12, pt. 3, 4.

Constabulary also assumed responsibility for much of the wire services in the Philippines. The Army eagerly passed on the onerous task of maintaining those services. Remarkably, despite distractions, the constables made significant headway in improving and maintaining communications across the islands. From June 1903 to June 1904, the miles of telegraph lines quadrupled, the number of telegraph stations nearly tripled, and the number of working telephones outside of the Manila area more than doubled.[114] Constables also ran the mail in much of the country, the remote areas in particular, with several officers serving as postmasters. Across the islands, they contained epidemic outbreaks and enforced sanitary laws. They guarded jails and escorted prisoners. Their commissary system gained a reputation for efficiency, servicing both the civil administration and themselves.[115]

The contribution of the Constabulary went far beyond simple public works projects. Officers learned that their success required guiding the governance of their localities and the reshaping of Filipino society. They understood better than most the challenge of establishing a democratic civil society. However, attempting to fight the military campaigns with fewer resources than the Army stalled their civic efforts and diverted men and pesos. As constables bled fighting the *pulajanes*, the municipal government and police maintained the same culture of graft unfettered.

114. Ibid., 31.

115. *Army and Navy Journal* 40 (10 January 1903): 440; *Army and Navy Journal* 40 (7 November 1903): 244; *Army and Navy Journal* 42 (15 July 1905): 1259; R. A. Duckworth, "The Philippine Constabulary and Its Work" attached to J. R. White's "Memorandum for the Regarding Changes Needed in the Organization of the Constabulary," Box 6, Ax 192, White Papers; Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 207.

The Constabulary could not effectively conduct pacification and civil action simultaneously. A senior officer asserted that the relative successes of the Constabulary were only the result of heroic efforts by "a few very high grade men who have, during the past few years performed feats of supererogation, *de facto* and also *de jure* by means of persuasion, tact and personal magnetism." By such effort, many officers made some headway in stemming corruption and implementing forms of social change.[116]

Constabulary Lieutenant Colonel John R. White observed in 1911 that the military organization and focus of the Constabulary produced real costs to the organization and to the American civil administration. The time and resources spent honing military drill and conducting expeditions reduced their proficiency in their core functions of police and civil work. White noted that when a compromise must be made "generally speaking it is the police work which has been sacrificed to the military features, in an effort to emulate the Philippine Scouts."[117] The petty rivalry with the Scouts and the Army infected the Philippine Commission and the senior leaders of the Constabulary, many of whom were ambitious Regular Army officers. The drift in focus cost the Constabulary where it could have contributed most. The particular demands of both drill and expeditions required a size force that did not fit the specific demands of policing and civil action. Large companies and ad hoc battalions drained the budget and forced wages and subsistence provisions down. White observed that his constables never ate better than his prisoners at Iwahig Penal Colony and that low wages attracted few men of dedication and competence. White complained that on "a muchacho's, or

116. "Memorandum Regarding Changes . . .," Box 6, Ax 192, White Papers.
117. Ibid.

less than a muchacho's pay, a muchacho quality is obtained which cannot be taught the duties of a peace officer or depended on for anything but routine and parrot-like work."[118] The delicate work of constables in towns had to be closely monitored by quality officers and non-commissioned officers, a body of men always in short supply.

Nevertheless, the militarization of the Constabulary did allow it to survive its formative years and provided the Commission with the means to establish its authority over the Philippine archipelago. Conditions in the provinces dictated that constables be trained and equipped as paramilitary troops. In this task, Allen and his officers accomplished great feats of organization and planning to establish the Constabulary within a year against the constraints of limited funds and equipment. With few exceptions, the founding cohort of officers selected by Allen created disciplined units that fought well against fierce enemies while armed with obsolescent weapons and often away from their home provinces.

Yet, the development of constables as soldiers ultimately fell short of providing the Commission with the force necessary to complete the pacification of the Philippines and it came at a cost to the future of the islands as a republic. The Constabulary could not have completed the pacification of any of the districts without the substantial reinforcements provided by the Army. Soldiers and scouts provided the well-equipped numbers that made the decisive difference in several campaigns and provided the flexibility necessary to keep pacified provinces under control. In the case of Samar, the Army had to assume the lead before that province could be brought under control.

118. Ibid.

When the Constabulary relieved the Army of its responsibilities in Samar and in the Moro provinces, its constables had taken on the identity of soldiers who fought dissenters as foreign enemies of the state, not of national policemen who enforced the law.

CHAPTER IV

THE MILITARIZATION OF THE GENDARMERIE

In 1915, the United States embarked on a nineteen-year occupation of the Haitian Republic. After a brief pacification campaign, the U.S. Marines would quickly establish an indigenous constabulary to maintain order and enforce centralized authority from Port-au-Prince. Under the leadership of a solid group of marine officers, the Haitian constabulary extended unprecedented central government authority and efficiency in Haiti's history as an independent nation. By 1916, brigandage and insurrection had subsided into occasional small raids that constituted little threat to government control. Although Haitian constables were trained according to the Marines' own drill manuals, tactical and technical competence remained weak until a nationalist uprising encouraged the rapid militarization of Haiti's constabulary. The entrenchment of the constables under the Marines as a domestic military force would significantly shape their future role in the development of Haiti as a nation.

The Caribbean region took on greater strategic significance for the United States in the early-1900s. The outbreak of the First World War raised concerns that the Great Powers coveted defendable ports in the Caribbean Sea and sought control over the Panama Canal. President Woodrow Wilson feared that a European power, Germany in particular, would use protection of foreign interests and collection of debt payments from the chronically unstable regimes of the region as a pretext for occupation.

American leaders worried about the island of Hispaniola in particular. The island was divided between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Each nation had suitable locations for naval bases that could facilitate control of the Windward and Mona Passages between the Caribbean and South Atlantic Seas. To deny these locations to European powers, the U.S. would intervene repeatedly in the internal affairs of Haiti and the Dominican Republic during the first decade and a half of the twentieth century, but Haiti would be the first to be completely occupied by American forces.[119]

Haiti covers nearly 28,000 square miles on the western third of Hispaniola, but only a small percentage of the land is naturally arable. Most of Haiti consists of mountainous terrain that rises eastward from the coastal plains and valleys. The elevated ground in the east limits the flow of westward trade winds, causing occasional droughts, and tropical air from the west frequently inundates Haiti with heavy rain fall, producing floods and severe soil erosion. The paucity of cultivated land and weather extremes produced a constant battle between lowland villagers and mountain rebels, known as *cacos*, over subsistence crops as well as over control of customs revenues passing through the port cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien.[120]

119. Allen R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1991), 178-84; Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 54-57.

120. Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook* (Washington, D.C.: 17 October 2006), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html; The *cacos* were a diverse mixture of genuine nationalists, brigands, and military adventurers. During much of Haiti's history prior to the U.S. occupation, *caco* armies played central roles in the transfer of power between regimes. Marine officers generally regarded all violent opponents to the U.S.-imposed order to be *cacos*.

The events leading directly to occupation began when Vilbrun Guillaume Sam forcibly seized power in Haiti with the aid of a *caco* army on 4 March 1915. Historically, *caco* armies had determined the lifespan of Haitian presidents in office. When a president fell out of favor, the *cacos* would sponsor a political rival and lead a coup to install a new president.[121] Wilson worried that Sam's seizure of power would provide a justification for military action by European creditor nations. He believed that American direction of the Haitian government provided the only realistic solution for ending both persistent regional instability and the threat of European involvement. Wilson's Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, sent a diplomatic commission to Haiti in April 1915 that called on the Haitian government to settle the multitude of foreign claims against it, to guarantee the protection of foreign interests, to American management of the Haitian national bank, to U.S. control of Haitian customs, and to barring foreign possession of the undeveloped harbor at Mole St. Nicolas.[122]

Although Sam refused the American terms, political rivals circulated rumors that he had accepted them. Public outrage over the alleged concession spawned a rebellion in June under the leadership of the unstable but charismatic Ronsalvo Bobo. A *caco* army loyal to Bobo seized the port town of Cap Haïtien and threatened to take Port-au-Prince. On 27 July, *cacos* stormed a prison in the capital holding political prisoners. Panicked, the prison commander, Oscar Etienne, executed 167 of the inmates, many of

121. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, *Hearings Before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,* vol. 1., 67th Congress, 1st session, 5 Aug., . . . 14-16 November 1921, [hereafter *Hearings*], 518-19.

122. Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Haiti Under American Control, 1915-1930* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931), 34.

whom were members of the Haitian elite. The ensuing outrage forced Sam and Etienne to take refuge in two of the foreign legations. Rioting Haitians stormed the consulates and brutally killed both men, parading their dismembered remains through the streets.[123]

A small detachment of U.S. Marines had arrived in Port-au-Prince more than two weeks before the coup to protect an American field radio station, but on 28 July, an additional 330 marines and sailors under Rear Admiral William B. Caperton arrived to establish control of the city. Between 1913 and 1915, marines had landed in Haiti thirteen times in response to the recurring instability, and many Haitians assumed that the landing force would limit its presence to Port-au-Prince and immediately depart after imposing order. Instead, Wilson used Sam's gruesome death as an opportunity to implement his bolder vision for imposing responsible government on Haiti. At the direction of the new Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, the Navy reinforced the initial landing party with the 1st Marine Brigade consisting of two regiments, an artillery battalion, and a signal company under the command of Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller on 15 August.[124]

By September 1915, the marine brigade had easily secured the principal port cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien as well as the coastal region with the help of the Navy. However, the Wilson Administration still did not have a thoroughly developed plan for administering Haiti. The opportunistic landing of the first expeditionary force

123. Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 184-85; Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 35; Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 48-49, 61.

124. *Annual Report of the Navy Department*, 1916 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), 763; Millett, *Semper Fidel*is, 184-85; Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 35-36; Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 67.

preceded a month of muddling through key issues, such as identifying strategic aims and whether to retain the Haitian government in office or replace it with military governor. It was not until the end of that month that the administration settled upon establishing a virtual protectorate on the basis of a joint treaty with the existing Haitian government.[125]

The principal military officers on the island, Caperton and Waller, attempted to overcome the lack of specific guidance by independently developing strategy, but, without deliberate oversight, they occasionally contradicted the approach envisioned by the Wilson Administration. Caperton attempted to win Haitian acceptance of the U.S. occupation by applying a conciliatory tone. The Haitian government was struggling to maintain any semblance of legitimacy while under foreign occupation, unable to pay its civil servants or dole out patronage. Caperton promised Haitian senators U.S. loans to alleviate their government's fiscal problems and quell their opposition to the proposed treaty, requesting $1.5 million through the State Department. However, American diplomats in Washington disputed Caperton's financial figures and his assessment of the Haitian government's situation. Arthur B. Blanchard, the U.S. chargé d'affairs in Haiti, voiced his support of the admiral's request, but Caperton and Blanchard only succeeded in obtaining a fraction of the funds requested. The amount allowed Haiti to pay some salaries but the government was also forced to discharge many other civil servants into unemployment.[126]

125. L. W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 17 August 1915, Reel 3, John A. Lejeune Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 184; Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 70.

126. Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 38, 46-47, 82-83.

Caperton and Waller shared a frustration with the contradiction of maintaining the form and appearance of Haitian sovereignty while violating Haiti's sovereign prerogatives. Waller, in particular, had little patience with diplomatic wrangling. He advocated bypassing the Haitian elite and establishing an American-run military government. To their credit, both officers succeeded in providing the United States with the necessary leverage in negotiation by pressuring Haitian politicians while not provoking an uprising, balancing coercion with persuasion. Both officers understood that Wilson wanted an intervention by nominal consent even if it was obtained by military intimidation. Waller recognized that a violent clash with revolutionaries or bandits would complicate the treaty negotiations between Washington and the presiding Haitian government. Consequently, he kept his marines under tight rein despite the occasional provocation by *caco* insurgents. He limited military activity to the coastal areas that the *cacos* had already ceded to the marines and undertook no punitive expeditions. Waller also bided his time by developing plans and lobbying friends in Washington, such as the ascendant Colonel John A. Lejeune, to shape the treaty provisions favorably toward a strong military authority in Haiti. On 16 September 1915, Philippe Sudre Dartiguanave, President of Haiti, signed the final treaty agreement.

Among the treaty's provisions was an American-led constabulary, the Gendarmerie, to constitute the sole armed force in Haiti.[127] The Haitian Gendarmerie was to be "under the direction of the Haitian Government, have supervision and control

127. Littleton W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 21 August 1915, Reel 3, JAL Papers; Littleton W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 26 September 1915, Reel 3, Lejeune Papers; Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 75-77.

of arms and ammunition, military supplies, and traffic therein, throughout the country."[128] A supplementary agreement the following August specified the gendarmes would have "full power to preserve domestic peace, the security of individual rights, and the full observance of the provisions of the Treaty."[129] Nowhere in the treaty was a hint of the sweeping duties and functions the gendarmes would perform during the nearly two decades of American occupation.

With the treaty signed, Waller felt free to pursue the recalcitrant Haitians that had retreated to several mountain strongholds when marines occupied the coastal towns. The *cacos* lacked sufficient quantities of working firearms to equip most of their men and relied upon mass charges with machetes. In addition, many of the *caco* leaders seemed more interested in fighting for favorable terms of settlement than in fighting a protracted war for domination against better equipped U.S. force. Waller exploited both vulnerabilities of the *caco* resistance. He eliminated the most prominent members of the *caco* leadership using a combination of bribery, martial law, and punitive expeditions. By December 1915, Waller's marines had pacified most of the Haitian countryside and the principal towns. The climactic battle was led by Major Smedley D. Butler, future chief of the Haitian constabulary, at a *caco* stronghold near Cap Haïtien called Fort

128. James H. McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine Corps* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1956), 241.

129. McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 243.

Rivière. It came several months after Waller had negotiated the surrender of several *caco* generals and was the last major battle of the Marine pacification campaign.[130]

Waller did not bother waiting for the Haitian National Assembly to ratify the treaty or the protocol specifying the status and duties of the constabulary before installing the first chief of the constabulary and recruiting the first cohort of gendarme officers.[131] Butler shared Waller's sentiments: "This wretched Government absolutely refuses to sign any agreement which may deprive them of their graft."[132] Publicly, he defended expanding the Gendarmerie as the only viable path to national improvement for the Haitian people: "the Gendarmerie will not be a success without the control of the public utilities." Privately, Butler continued to view public improvements primarily through the lens of military utility and necessity. Obligated by treaty to cooperate with Haiti's president and ministers, Waller and Butler viewed the Gendarmerie as their only assurance that their efforts would bear any fruit for the common Haitian and any promise of an end to the occupation.[133]

Forced to accept nominal Haitian sovereignty, Waller prescribed most of the functions he had recommended for a military regime to the Gendarmerie. It was an

130. *Hearings*, 80; Littleton W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 21 September 1915, Reel 3, Lejeune Papers; Thomas E. Thrasher, Jr., "The Taking of Fort Rivière," *Marine Corps Gazette* 15 (February 1931): 31-33, 64; Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, 78, 83.

131. Smedley D. Butler to J. Butler Wright, 15 May 1916, Box 1, Smedley D. Butler Papers, [hereafter Butler Papers] Alfred Gray Research Center, MCU, Quantico, VA; Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 188.

132. L. W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 18 May 1915, Reel 3, Lejeune Papers

133. Smedley D. Butler to L. W. T. Waller, 25 June 1916, Reel 3; Butler to Lejeune, 13 July 1916, Reel 3; Butler to Lejeune, 13 August 1916, Reel 3, all in Lejeune Papers.

expanded role that burdened it with functions far exceeding that of an urban or rural guard. In February 1916, Waller outlined his twenty functions for the gendarmes to perform. Collectively, they reflected Waller's broader vision for the Gendarmerie as a temporary civil service bureaucracy and went far beyond what the treaty agreement specified. He proposed a range of duties that ranged from sanitation enforcement to census-taking. The Haitian constabulary would function as a military government and interact with the Haitian government as a formality.[134]

Waller called upon Butler to organize and lead this instrument of U.S. state-building. Twice awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, Butler was an adept organizer and charismatic leader.[135] After less than a year, he established a constabulary force of 120 officers and approximately 2,600 gendarmes from a token force of about 500 Haitians that the Marines had organized locally in 1915. Unlike Allen in his time with the Philippine Constabulary, Butler did not face either active or passive resistance from the senior military commander in country during his tenure. From the beginning, the Marine brigade and Gendarmerie operated cooperatively, serving complementary functions. Waller invested heavily in establishing the constabulary. Butler noted that in selecting the initial cohort of Gendarmerie officers Waller had "contributed the pick of the Marines. I have never found their equal anywhere in the United States service.

134. Millspaugh, *Haiti Under American Control*, 68-69.

135. Schmidt, *Maverick Marine*, 80, 83; Thomas E. Thrasher, Jr., "The Taking of Fort Rivière," *Marine Corps Gazette* 15 (February 1931): 31-33, 64.

Many of them learned to speak Creole fluently." He proudly observed that they worked "like Trojans to lick the Gendarmerie into shape."[136]

Although thousands of Haitians were already members of the Haitian military and police forces, Waller and Butler dismissed the idea of using them for the Gendarmerie. They believed that eliminating the old military and security forces of Haiti would help to erase the memory of abuses committed by the Gendarmerie's predecessors. They also perceived these forces as hopelessly demoralized and defeatist. Select members of the Haitian military and police were recruited by the Gendarmerie, but they entered as basic recruits and trained alongside green volunteers according to the Marine drill regulation.[137] With regular pay, good clothing, and meals everyday, the Gendarmerie quickly grew in popularity with the local population and recruiting soared. By October 1916, the Gendarmerie had reached its full authorized strength of 2,533.[138]

The Gendarmerie organized on a territorial basis with gendarmes recruited from their home districts to serve in units based in those localities, reflecting the favored approach of previous American constabularies in the Philippines and Cuba. The U.S. divided the country into three geographical departments. The Department of the Cape included the northern peninsula eastward to the border with the Dominican Republic. The Department of Cayes covered the southern peninsula. The Department of Port-au-Prince included the capital city and a narrow stretch of territory between the two

136. L. W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 11 June 1916, Reel 3, Lejeune Papers; McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 67.

137. Dion Williams, ed., "The Haitien Gendarmerie," *Marine Corps Gazette* 11 (June 1926): 73, 75.

138. Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 217.

peninsulas, bounded by the towns of Thomonde to the north and Leogane to the south. The Gendarmerie further subdivided the departments into districts and sub-districts, each centered on a town. Districts were each allotted one gendarme company. Although administered as a regiment, the companies operated as independent units in their respective districts in performing their assigned duties, their recruitment and their training.[139]

The effort to teach poor and illiterate Haitians the essential skills and knowledge for gendarmes was initially decentralized and of uneven quality. While the gendarme officers were among the best in the 1st Marine Brigade, they were severely challenged by the task of training the Gendarmerie from the foundations across a language barrier. The Marines translated their drill manual into French for training. However, officers discovered that "while French is the official language of Haiti, Creole is the common language and was universally spoken by the new recruits." The officers adjusted their training methods by focusing on simple commands and teaching trainees tasks by imitation. They also focused on a limited range of simple duties, such as urban patrols and manning outposts. The improvised training program also fell short of achieving the ambitious cultural transformation Butler had hoped to achieve by building the Gendarmerie from the foundations. The habit of petty abuses, carried over from previous government forces, persisted throughout the Gendarmerie's history.[140]

139. Frank L. Bride, "The Gendarmerie d'Haiti," *Marine Corps Gazette* 3 (December 1918): 297-98; Williams, "Haitian Gendarmerie," 74.

140. *Hearings*, 541; Williams, "Haitian Gendarmerie," 73-74; McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 62; Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 189; Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 88.

In addition to language barriers, the gendarmes had not yet gained the full trust of their officers. Issued Krag-Jörgensen rifles, few of them were trained on proper firing technique. In one instance, a rifle squad of ten effectives, with the eleventh firing a blank cartridge, managed to hit the condemned prisoner with only one round from thirty feet. The immediate response was to reduce the distance to fifteen feet. Gendarmerie officers understood the limited capabilities of their gendarmes, but they demonstrated little concern. Instead, they congratulated themselves on their progress: "The Garde in two short years had emerged from a mob of barefoot, ragged peasants, armed with obsolete Russian rifles, into a fairly well equipped and disciplined force of approximately 2,500 officers and men."[141] Engagements with *cacos* from the fall of 1918 into 1919 revealed this assessment to be overoptimistic.[142]

Although the documentary evidence seems far from conclusive, the Gendarmerie officers' sanguine estimation of their men likely stemmed from the apparent lack of military opposition to the occupation. Gendarmerie leaders believed that the *cacos* had been removed as a force in Haitian affairs by the Marines' 1915 pacification campaign. Through 1917, the low level of hostile activity reinforced their perception. *Caco* raids during those two years were small in scale and sporadic. Butler and other gendarme officers also assumed that Haitian peasants would support them against the *caco* chieftains who allegedly exploited them. Gendarmerie officers mentally divided rural

141. John A. Gray, "Boucan Carré," *Marine Corps Gazette* 16 (November 1932): 28; *Hearings*, 80; The Gendarmerie would later be renamed the Garde d'Haiti in 1928. After the American departure, the Garde was renamed in 1949 to the Arme d'Haiti. This chapter uses the organization's original name for consistency.

142. Gray, "Boucan Carré," 29; McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 99-100.

Haitians into discrete categories of cooperative peasants and parasitic banditry. By casting all *cacos* as bandits, the Gendarmerie and Marines revealed their ignorance of the indigenous opposition and the potential support available to any charismatic *caco* leader that might arise.[143]

The Gendarmerie's weaknesses became obvious during resurgence in *caco* activity between 1918 and 1922. Instead of militarizing, as the Philippine Constabulary had done, the Gendarmerie assumed a remarkable proportion of the functions of government. One U.S. official observed that gendarme officers "were veritable potentates in their respective districts."[144] Gendarmerie officers supervised elections and district commanders were encouraged to hold town meetings to build popular support for the measures and to explain the new constitution and voting procedures. One dispatch even recommended considering an American-style barbecue to increase participation. Gendarme hospitals and wards provided medical care to the population, as well as the gendarmes. Officers disbursed pay to the civil servants, such as teachers. They enforced sanitary regulations and contained epidemic outbreaks. Many officers were assigned double duty as Communal Advisors in an effort to reduce graft at the local level.

The Gendarmerie's approach to elevating Haiti's condition through economic improvement lacked the necessary funding to support many of the necessary infrastructure projects. Preoccupied with European problems, the Wilson Administration gave little attention to Haiti. As a result, Butler was forced to scrounge

143. Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 158-59; Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 82-83.
144. Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 68.

for resources. Bypassing his superiors, Butler succeeded in appropriating the services of several specialists from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to increase the productivity of Haitian fields, many of which had lay fallow because of *caco* raids. But the specialists proved of little worth They were unfamiliar with the local crop varieties and soil type and the Gendarmerie lacked the wherewithal to implement their recommendations.[145]

The Gendarmerie's reestablishment of the *corvée*, or drafted road labor, was another attempt to spur economic prosperity through infrastructure projects. Short on funds, the Haitian government could not afford paid labor to improve and maintain a national road network. Butler and Colonel Eli K. Cole, Waller's replacement, believed a road network capable of supporting vehicle traffic was necessary to create a unified nation and to facilitate Haiti's economic development. It would also allow gendarmes and marines to more effectively reach the interior of the nation and eliminate the last *caco* holdouts. Begun in 1917, the road project was accepted grudgingly by the Haitian population. Employing 6,000 Haitians, the *corvée* initially made significant progress without triggering a general revolt. Labor parties only improved and maintained roads within their home regions and only for short durations.

The labor program's resemblance to slavery rankled the Haitian peasantry and their toleration of the *corvée* masked their seething resentment. The heavy-handed conduct of the Gendarmerie towards the workers only aggravated the problem. The gendarmes, themselves former peasants, persistently abused their authority over laborers

145. Bride, "Gendarmerie d'Haiti," 298-99; *Hearings*, 535; Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 59, 91-93; Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 15-16.

while enforcing the *corvée*. A U.S. naval investigation later found that Haitians had been tied together as chain gangs, and many had been allegedly shot wantonly by their gendarme guards. One Haitian testified before the U.S. Senate that his son had been physically pulled from his home by a gendarme detail to work on the *corvée*, beaten over the head, and never returned home.

Resentment developed into open insurrection after gendarmes began forcing drafted laborers to work in remote areas for extended periods. By 1918, the road network had expanded beyond the coastal towns and required construction in the highlands to unify the system. However, the mountain regions were too sparsely populated to support the arduous task of carving roads. Gendarmerie Colonel Alexander S. Williams resorted to drafting workers from the lowland population to support the project.[146]

As civic work progressed, most American officers saw little reason for urgency in accelerating or improving gendarme training from 1915 to 1918. By the end of 1915, virtually all armed resistance from the *caco* insurgency had been quelled, and the Marines had retired to consolidated garrisons in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien on the coast as a reserve.[147] In the intervening years, from 1916 to 1918, the gendarmes participated in numerous minor engagements against small groups of bandits, led by opportunists who tried to claim the mantle of *caco* leadership.

146. *Hearings*, 560-61, 911; Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 189-190, Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 88-89; Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 148-49; Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 92.

147. Schmidt, *U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 140.

In late 1918, while serving a five-year sentence for leading a raid against a gendarme garrison, Peralte escaped from his guards into the mountainous jungle of northern Haiti. He rapidly organized a force and immediately began raids in the northern District of the Cape. The Gendarmerie had already been drafting *corvée* laborers to work beyond their home areas, and Haitian resentment over the forced labor practice fueled Peralte's bandit recruitment. Riding on pent up animosity, he quickly amassed a force of bandits and a network of supporters and part-time volunteers. As one Marine later recalled, "Soon by the throbbing signal drums the news was being relayed from mountain to mountain in the Department of the North that a mighty general, a second Dessalines, was raising an army that would shortly drive the '*Blancs*' into the sea, and great would be the pillage and loot to the followers of General Charlemagne."[148]

The Marine brigade commander in 1919 was Brigadier General Albertus W. Catlin, who had just returned from the Western Front in Europe and "was inclined to believe that the problem was properly one for the Garde to solve, without the help of God and a few marines."[149] Likewise the Gendarmerie leaders did not take Peralte's activities seriously. The three years of relative peace led Catlin and others to believe that the worst was long behind them. The Gendarmerie's leaders were also not of the same caliber as those Waller had handpicked for Butler in 1915. Most of the better officers departed for the American Expeditionary Force and did not return before the *caco* uprising.

148. McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 103-4; Gray, "Boucan Carré," 28.
149. Gray, "Boucan Carré," 28.

Unmolested, Peralte was able to build up his contingent into a small army of several thousand insurgents and sympathizers. The force lacked adequate arms and ammunition, but it possessed mobility, physically strong individuals, and the ability to sustain operations on limited resources. Peralte divided his forces into independent bands, or "detachments," of thirty to fifty men each. The detachments were further sub-divided into ten to fifteen man "divisions" led by chiefs and sub-chiefs. Under Peralte's charismatic leadership, the pace of *caco* expansion was rapid. By the fall of 1918, *caco* detachments roamed Haiti from the northern mountains southward into the agriculturally-rich Artibonite Valley. Peralte assigned the fertile southern region to one of his more capable chiefs, Benoit Betraville.[150]

Colonel Walter N. Hill, commanding the Department of Port-au-Prince, believed the rumors of *caco* activity were more credible than did Colonel Alexander S. Williams, Butler's interim replacement as chief, or the other department chiefs. Catlin remained unconvinced that the bandits represented a significant threat. However, Hill followed his instincts and dispatched Gendarmerie Major John A. Gray to Mirebalais, the principal town of the Artibonite Valley, to investigate rumors of *caco* activity in that important region. To his chagrin, Gray discovered that Mirebalais's young garrison commander had noted increased *caco* activity, but he had refrained from reporting it because "he was afraid that he might be regarded as a scaremonger."[151]

Native informants had reported to the lieutenant that about two hundred *cacos* were encamped at an old fortification called Boucan Carré, about ten miles northwest of

150. Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 89.
151. Gray, "Boucan Carré," 28-29.

Mirebalais under the leadership of Betraville. Gray submitted a request to the department headquarters in Port-au-Prince for a machine gun to reinforce his position in Mirebalais. Hill responded by personally leading a detachment of thirty gendarmes, a captain, a lieutenant and the requested machine gun in tow. Hill was briefed on the native reports upon his arrival and decided to attack the *caco* camp that night.

The Boucan Carré fort was once part of the line of French outposts in the valley. It rested on a stone platform overlooking the Boucan Carré River thirty feet below on a near-vertical drop. Several trails merged within a few yards of the southern wall of the fort, including a main trail leading to Mirebalais. Moving by night, Hill's detachment came upon a voodoo ceremonial at around 2 a.m. The *cacos* were dancing about an enormous bonfire and had not posted any guards. Gray and the garrison commander led two wings of fifteen men each and moved into position on the north and west sides of the fort. The remaining ten gendarmes and the machine gun moved to the south as the ambush element under Hill.

A chance contact with bandits in the tree line by one of the lieutenant's gendarmes tripped off the attack prematurely. Having lost the element of surprise, the gendarmes opened fire less than two hundred yards from the camp of stunned *cacos*. In the confusion, several gendarmes crossed in front of the machine gun position. Hill, frustrated, held his fire and the attack devolved into a melee with gendarmes firing wildly and *cacos* scattering. Despite the large number of *cacos* in concentration, the number of enemy killed totaled only nineteen. The gendarmes suffered no fatalities. The result of the raid was the scattering of *caco* forces and the lowering of Betraville's

prestige. Still, the ineffectiveness of gendarme marksmanship was galling. "The gendarmes, through no fault of their own, could not employ aimed fire. They fired their Krag carbines from the hip, or held them with hands grasping the comb of the stock and both arms extended, then closed their eyes and pulled the trigger."[152] Hill's disappointment was palpable. The number of enemy killed closely matched the number of rounds expended by the officers. Most of the *cacos* had escaped along with their leader.

Although the battle at Boucan Carré failed to eliminate Betraville's forces in central Haiti, it awakened the Gendarmerie leadership and Catlin to the size of the *caco* threat. In March, Williams requested the active support of the 1st Marine Brigade in quelling the budding insurgency. Catlin, still underestimating the size of his enemy, responded with only six companies of marines to augment gendarme patrols in the interior of the country, north and east of Port-au-Prince. The combined marine-gendarme force inflicted heavy losses on *caco* forces, but Peralte remained undeterred and continued to command a sizeable army. In October 1919, he felt confident enough to challenge control of Port-au-Prince. His assault on the city with 300 *cacos* was repulsed, but the audacity of the attack and the level of popular support that came out in support of the *caco* leader shocked U.S. leaders into taking a more deliberate approach to ending the uprising.

As the Marines and Gendarmerie began intensifying their efforts, they scored their first major victory through the creative deceptions of gendarme Captain Herman H.

152. Gray, "Boucan Carré," 30.

Hanneken. Less than a month after the October attack, Peralte had established a stronghold named Fort Capois in Hanneken's district of Grand Rivière du Nord after his defeat outside of Port-au-Prince with intentions of raiding towns in the district. Discovering Peralte's scheme through informants, the gendarme officer convinced a prominent local Haitian, Jean B. Conze, to work his way into Peralte's confidence. Conze proved himself to be an able and courageous informant, meeting with Hanneken routinely to pass on information and receive instructions. Together, the gendarme officer and his agent convinced Peralte and his deputies that the district garrison was unprepared to repel any determined assault. Seeking redemption from the Port-au-Prince debacle, Peralte developed plans to take the Gendarmerie garrison. In preparation, several hundred *cacos* from throughout the region began gathering at the stronghold on 26 October 1919.[153]

As the *caco* force assembled, gendarme Colonel James J. Meade secretly reinforced Hanneken's garrison under the cover of night on 30 October. With the arrival of Meade's reinforcements, Hanneken and gendarme First Lieutenant William R. Button led a detachment of eighteen gendarmes, all in local dress, toward Peralte's stronghold. He planned to ambush the *caco* column near the town of Mazare as it advanced towards the Gendarmerie garrison in hopes of capturing Peralte. However, Peralte abruptly abandoned his stated plans and ordered Conze to lead the column into Grand Rivière in his stead. Private Jean E. Francois, a gendarme that had infiltrated with Conze, rushed from Fort Capois to inform Hanneken. Determined to capture Peralte, the Gendarmerie

153. McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 113-15.

captain continued his penchant for covert operations and improvised a plan to infiltrate the stronghold with his detachment and seize the *caco* leader. Improbably, the two American officers and their men, with Francois as their guide, managed to pass by five sets of *caco* sentries without being discovered. Once in the main camp, the well-armed detachment overwhelmed Peralte's personal guard and Hanneken killed Peralte with two pistol rounds to the chest. At Grand Rivière, the reinforced garrison easily repulsed the *caco* attack and the survivors fled back to the temporary refuge of Fort Capois.[154]

Hanneken mobilized his garrison for a combined attack to eliminate the last *caco* holdouts. On the morning of 2 November, his reinforced gendarme company maneuvered to attack along the northern and southern approaches to the *caco* fort, expecting the marine detachment to trap the *cacos* from the east and west. Once again, Hanneken's plans came undone near the moment of execution. *Caco* lookouts spotted the gendarmes as dawn broke, and the promised marine reinforcements were nowhere to be seen. Not willing to wait, the Gendarmerie captain ordered the attack to proceed with the western and eastern avenues left open. The gendarmes demonstrated their mettle when well led, advancing under constant rifle and cannon fire over 100 yards of open ground. As the gendarmes neared the fortress walls, the *caco* defense disintegrated, and much of the garrison began to flee through the unguarded east and west walls. After razing Fort Capois, Hanneken pursued the fleeing *cacos* and established a cordon with his marine detachment, which had finally arrived, to prevent them from joining Betraville in the Department of Port-au-Prince. On 8 November 1919, the combined

154. McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 115-17; Millett, *Semper Fidelis*, 198.

gendarme-marine force succeeded in cornering the *caco* survivors, taking nearly 300 of them prisoner.[155]

Betraville remained a threat to towns in the Department of Port-au-Prince until January 1920 when he recklessly charged the defenses of Port-au-Prince with approximately 400 men. Marine and Gendarmerie defenders repulsed the attack with heavy losses to Betraville's forces. Thereafter, the *caco* chief was preoccupied with dodging Hill's gendarmes until a chance contact with a gendarme patrol, under the command of gendarme Captain Jesse L. Perkins, caught up with the *caco* chief on 18 May 1920 in the mountains northeast of Port-au-Prince near the town of Las Cahobas. Perkins's men encountered a lookout position consisting of five *cacos* and pursued them after exchanging rifle fire when they came upon a *caco* encampment where Betraville was hiding. In the ensuing fight, the *caco* chief was killed, eliminating the last *caco* leader with the ability to hold the loyalties of the subordinate chiefs. In the wake of Betraville's death, the uprising quickly disintegrated under the sustained pressure of gendarme-marine patrols.

The campaign against Peralte and Betraville from 1919 to 1921 represented an interruption to an institutional history characterized more by civil administration duty than military action. The *cacos* of the time were poorly armed and divided. The gendarmes were comparatively better disciplined and often courageous when called upon in action: there are many accounts of gendarmes recovering the body of a fallen

155. McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 118-19.

officer or shielding their officers from *caco* fire.[156] Even so, the Gendarmerie could not control the unrest they had generated. Without greater support and guidance from the U.S., the Gendarmerie overextended itself in performing the role of a military government and attempting to fulfill every promise of the occupation. In resurrecting the *corvée*, Butler had also planted the seeds of uprising just as the quality of the Gendarmerie's leadership declined dramatically. Few Haitians had been commissioned as gendarme officers, and many of the Gendarmerie's most competent American officers had departed to join the American Expeditionary Forces by 1919, including Butler.[157] The initial cohort of officers was replaced by less experienced, less competent, and less culturally acclimated marine and naval officers. As a result, the Gendarmerie encountered the *caco* uprising confused and physically unable to quell the turmoil it had created.

The 1st Marine Brigade and Gendarmerie did successfully complete a second U.S. pacification campaign, defeating the *cacos* handily, but their victory could not rescue the moribund occupation. The violence of the uprising raised skepticism towards the American mission in Haiti and wounded American political will to continue the effort. The altruistic claims of the occupation's proponents could no longer mask Haiti's persistent problems after the *cacos* uprising, and investors largely abandoned any hopes

156. *Hearings*, 514-15; Littleton W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 3 April 1916, Reel 3, Lejeune Papers; McCrocklin, *Garde d'Haiti*, 107.

157. Butler to Philippe S. Dartiguenave, 5 March 1918, P.C. 54, Box 2, Butler Papers.

of turning a profit in the Haitian Republic. In the end, the pacification had left over two thousand Haitian casualties and provoked an extended Congressional inquiry.[158]

By 1921, the historical moment for reforming Haiti had passed. The remaining years consisted of gradually turning over all affairs of government to the Haitians. Political pressure in the U.S. and abroad for the handover of all governmental affairs to Haitians mounted, and several changes were made in the directing of the occupation. The State Department assumed the lead from the Navy Department in 1924, and a high commissioner was appointed to work with Haiti's president and oversee U.S forces in the republic. Advocates of the intervention succeeded in limiting the Haitianization of the occupation to a stately pace despite scandals of prisoner abuses and atrocities at the hands of some marines and gendarmes.

However, the slow pace of transition abruptly accelerated in 1929 when rioters lashed out over the suspension of elections by the Haitian president, Louis Borno, and the increasing power of the State Department-run civilian bureaucracy in Haiti. The protest movement overwhelmed the Gendarmerie, and the U.S. high commissioner responded by reinforcing them with several marine detachments and declaring martial law. Neither the reinforcements nor the imposition of strict government controls quelled the violence. On 6 December 1929, a gathering of 1,500 Haitians flooded the streets of Cayes, a Haitian town located on the south coast. Armed, the crowd challenged the marine detachment dispatched to stop them. In the confusion, several marines fired into

158. Emily Balch, ed. *Occupied Haiti: Being the report of a Committee of Six disinterested Americans representing organizations exclusively American, who, having personally studied conditions in Haiti in 1926, favor the restoration of the Independence of the Negro Republic* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 125.

the mob and killed at least fifty of the protestors. Public outrage in the U.S. triggered another inquiry into the conduct of the occupation which called for the rapid transition of all aspects of the occupation to Haitian leadership, including the Gendarmerie.[159]

In the aftermath of the Cayes Incident, Gendarmerie officers were rushed to transfer control to a young Haitian officer corps, only recently commissioned. Not surprisingly, their belated efforts to implement Waller's recommendations in 1915 to focus on establishing a professional cadre of Haitian officers failed. The Gendarmerie began the process too late for the Marines to mature a cohort of leaders who could resist the corruption of the political system and the temptation to abuse their power. Instead of protecting Haitian society, the discipline and dominance of the gendarmes would come to serve the tyrannical whims of Francois Duvalier.[160]

159. Millspaugh, *Haiti*, 178-79; Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 34.

160. Littleton W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 30 September 1915, Reel 3; Littleton W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 7 October 1915, Reel 3; Littleton W. T. Waller to John A. Lejeune, 10 October 1915, Reel 3, all in Lejeune Papers.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

By the time the United States relinquished control, the Philippine Constabulary and Haitian Gendarmerie had been shaped by several years of military campaigning against insurgents. Both constabularies retained their policing responsibilities throughout the pacification efforts, but they both came to identify themselves foremost as armies. The counterinsurgency campaigns produced a cadre of Filipino and Haitian veterans who accepted the institutional model that American officers had created and successfully used to pacify their countries. The militarization of the constabularies was further motivated by immediate security needs at home and from abroad. The Philippines continued to be troubled by peasant uprisings against the landed elite and faced an aggressive Japan. Haiti faced a menacing Dominican Republic on its border as well as tension over the existing social order. The governments in Manila and Port-au-Prince relied upon their constabularies to secure their new autonomy. Under these conditions, the constabularies' experience in civil affairs projects influenced them far less than their counterinsurgency battles.

The Constabulary and Gendarmerie were originally created to maintain a peace established by U.S. military forces to support compliant governments under U.S. auspices. However, when violence escalated, constabulary officers emphasized military skills and organization to make the constabularies more effective in combating

insurgents. In the Philippines, Allen exercised his prerogative to organize battalion-size formations of constables for military expeditions and, for a time, all but won operational control over the Army's Philippine Scouts. Both measures made the Constabulary a more effective counterinsurgency force, but they also undermined its identity as a federal police institution. Allen bragged about the diversity of civil functions that his constables performed, but the focus of the institution was directed towards militarizing the Constabulary. By the end of the pacification campaigns in 1913, many Filipino constables had more experience in infantry tactics than in the enforcement of civil codes. The Constabulary had become a small army accustomed to enforcing the broad mandates of martial law.

Likewise, in Haiti, the militarization of the Gendarmerie accelerated under the pressure of violent insurgency. Responsibility for leading the pacification campaign during the *cacos* uprising in 1918 primarily fell upon the Marines when gendarmes revealed how poorly trained they were during several clashes with *caco* insurgents. Language barriers, questions of loyalty in the minds of many marine officers, and the poor physical condition of many recruits hindered the advancement of gendarmes beyond basic drill and garrison administration. Few of the Haitians that joined the Gendarmerie could read and many were in such poor health that simple guard duty was difficult, making complex training programs problematic. While most gendarmes proved themselves to be disciplined in ranks and loyal to their officers, it was not until Peralte's uprising occurred that the Marines overcame their fear of mutiny and seriously sought to improve the Gendarmerie's ability to fight. The hard lessons of

counterinsurgency and an awareness that the Gendarmerie would need to defend Haiti from invasion prompted marine officers to reconsider the principle role of the Haitian constabulary. They began focusing more on improving the gendarmes' marksmanship and training the growing ranks of Haitian officers in leading infantry missions, performing administrative law, managing organizational logistics, and conducting ceremonial functions. The American and Haitian governments formally acknowledged the changing role of the Gendarmerie from a civil police force to an army when it renamed the constabulary as the Garde d'Haiti in 1928.[161]

However, the militarization of the constabularies went beyond tactics and organization. It extended to the human characteristics of the institutions as well. Both constabularies had fought opponents of the government in moral terms, characterizing insurgent leaders as manipulators preying on innocent villagers. Loyal followers of these manipulators were described loosely as *fanaticos*, bandits, and so forth. Biased recruiting practices also ensured that the Constabulary and Gendarmerie would not be representative of the nation. Although driven by necessity, the dominance of Filipino recruits vetted by landed interests and lower-class Haitians recruited by marines would also destabilize the constabularies as the Constabulary chose sides in a class conflict and the Gendarmerie became the battleground between mulatto elites and *noir* Haitians. Under American leadership, both constabularies also modeled an easy blurring of boundaries between military and police functions. The Gendarmerie went further by

161. Robert F. Baumann, "The Historical Context of American Intervention," in . . . http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/kretchik/chapter1.asp.

directly interfering with civil government and vetoing Haitian decisions the United States found unsatisfactory.[162]

Many American officers reduced the pacification conflict into two related moral themes. They described the campaigns as a battle between the occupation and its lawless opposition and characterized the constabularies as defenders of the innocent peasantry against predatory demagogues, motivated by greed or fanatical religion, seeking to exploit the ignorant rural villagers. The loose labeling of opponents as *ladrones, pulajanes,* and *cacos* reflected the American tendency to reduce diverse rural movements into identifiable enemies with moral overtones. In the Philippines, Constabulary officers frequently referred to their opponents as brigands and fanatics and ignored the legitimate grievances that motivated peasants to join with men like Ablen or Bulan. The same officers praised landowning *presidentes* who stepped out and support the pacification, such as Monreal in Sorsogan, oblivious to the fact that they were perpetuating the class oppression that predated U.S. occupation of the archipelago. In Haiti, many marine officers used *caco* and bandit interchangeably in their correspondence and distinguished the insurgent ranks from their leadership. Butler dismissed the *caco* leadership as nothing more than political opportunists and portrayed their armies as a mass of discontents "that had nothing else to do and wanted a little loot."[163]

162. Michel S. Laguerre, *The Military and Society in Haiti* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1993), 76, 79.

163. *Hearings*, 518; Sturtevant, *Uprising*, 120.

Butler's successor, Alexander S. Williams, took a more charitable view of the *caco* ranks. He believed that a majority of them had been coerced into fighting the Gendarmerie by *caco* chiefs leading a corps of bandits and terrorizing villages, maiming or executing those who refused. Williams asserted that once joined the Haitians "felt they could not desert" for fear of retribution. When asked if this meant that victimized Haitians had been killed, Williams explained that "in the jungle and in the morning twilight it is impossible at 200 yards to tell exactly what a man's inclinations are."[164] Both assessments expressed elements of truth. However, they also overlooked the influence of cultural and historical factors that sustained peasant support of the *cacos* in addition to the effects of terrorism.

The rhetoric of constables defending naïve peasants from the deceptions of fanatics and criminals embedded itself in the self-perception of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie as well as their proponents among the governing elite. One provincial governor in the Visayas asserted that the mountain attackers have always been "outlaws and bandits. They live in mountain fastnesses and have no visible means of support" except for "robbery, arson, and murder. These bandits sweep down at night armed and uniformed upon some unprotected barrio, commit their depredations and return to the mountains."[165] In the Philippines, the moral identity as defender of the people produced a sense of righteous indignation in the Constabulary. Allen declared that "any one attempting to treat with *ladrone* bands looking to a surrender will be considered as an

164. Ibid., 556.
165. Henry T. Allen to Henry C. Corbin, 24 March 1903, Box 8, Allen Papers.

accomplice" and "that my policy henceforth is to kill or capture them in the field."[166] In Haiti, Williams' similar views served to justify trial of captured *cacos* by provost courts rather than civil courts. The Gendarmerie did not trust the Haitian justice system to punish the guilty "in such a fashion that the punishment would act as a deterrent."[167] Thus, American officers set a precedent for the constabularies of vilifying indigenous opposition movements and dealing with them harshly that would be repeated periodically during the post-occupation era. This institutional trait set the Constabulary and Gendarmerie in opposition to a majority of their countrymen, an alienation that did not disappear with the transition to indigenous rule.

The other human dimension influenced by militarization was the first generation of Filipino and Haitian officers. The Constabulary and Gendarmerie had been slow to deliberately pursue the creation of an indigenous officer corps until very late in the occupation. Both constabularies had difficulty finding suitable candidates for establishing a reliable corps of officers from within the ranks during the pacification campaigns. W. Cameron Forbes, Philippine Secretary for Commerce and Police, observed that "it frequently happens that where a Filipino is advanced to a position of authority that . . . he abuses his privileges."[168] Butler encountered similar difficulties with Haitian recruits. "We had very little success with the Haitian officer," he testified, "they were brutal with the people, unnecessarily harsh."[169] During Butler's tenure as Gendarmerie chief, only two Haitians retained their commissions as officers in Haiti's

166. Ibid.
167. *Hearings*, 556.
168. *RPC* (1904), v. 13, pt. 3, 3.
169. *Hearings*, 517.

constabulary, and both were serving in the presidential guard performing ceremonial functions. The others were dismissed for abuses of authority.[170]

With very few Filipino and Haitian officers serving, the majority of constables experienced the years of occupation as non-commissioned officers or enlisted men. Few of the indigenous officers that replaced their American counterparts had experience in managing infrastructure projects or conducting standard police work, but many of them had observed the effectiveness of a centralized and disciplined military force during the pacification campaigns. They had also witnessed the regular interventions in civil police matters by military and paramilitary forces. Filipino and Haitian officers would remember the demonstrations of military power more than any abstract lessons about the separation of military and police functions.

After the pacification campaigns, both constabularies were pressed to increase the level of indigenous participation and leadership in their ranks. Having adapted to the threat of endemic violence, the Constabulary and Gendarmerie required steady leadership either to transition them back to civil police duties or to divorce them from their policing responsibilities and fully develop them as professional militaries. However, both constabularies suffered from leadership changes that likely hindered the ambitious transition from taking place before the end of U.S. control. In the Philippines, the Constabulary had benefited from competent and energetic Army officers during its battles against insurgents, but these leaders gradually departed the Constabulary as resistance subsided and many anticipated American entry into the First World War.

170. Ibid.

Allen left the Philippines in April 1907 before the final pocket of anti-occupation resistance had been quelled, and many of the Constabulary's most experienced Army officers had left to seek better promotion opportunities in the U.S. and in Europe by 1917. In Haiti, the quality of leadership also peaked early and declined rapidly in response to the world war. Butler left his position as chief of the Gendarmerie in May 1918, just prior to the eruption of the *caco* uprising.

A few proven officers, such as Captain Harold H. Elarth in the Philippines, remained with the constabularies and did important work in establishing the post-occupation officer training programs, but they no longer determined the direction of the paramilitaries. Filipino and Haitian leaders chose not to reform the constabularies as police institutions or to weaken central authority by stripping the constabularies of their policing responsibilities. Ruling elites in power, having lost the protection of the U.S. military, understood the precariousness of their new governments against foreign threats and internal unrest, and their response to these dangers would not only reinforce the militarization of the constabularies but also to their politicization.

In the Philippines, domestic troubles tested the Constabulary first. Secular peasant protest movements replaced the regional independence movements of the Philippine War. As the Philippine Assembly failed to resolve their grievances, poor rural Filipinos organized and turned to armed resistance against the landed elite. Public protests broke out across the archipelago but were especially frequent in the provinces of Central Luzon around Manila. Throughout the 1930s, Constabulary units routinely clashed with peasant rebels in towns throughout the archipelago with most of the

confrontations occurring in the Central Luzon provinces around Manila. Manuel Quezon, president of the Philippine Commonwealth, increased the size of Constabulary garrisons in the region several times, quadrupling Pampanga's contingent to 400 constables, and directed the Constabulary to take over the municipal police forces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Bataan, and Cavite provinces.[171]

Protecting the landowners had been an expediency of Allen's strategy for the U.S. pacification campaign, but, in the 1930s, the defense of landed elite interests came to be seen as the Constabulary's primary purpose in the eyes of many Filipinos. Constables sometimes leveled the homes of tenant farmers who challenged landlord orders. Constabulary officers in Nueva Ecija and Pampanga ordered their men to shoot anyone they deemed suspicious during periods of public disturbance.[172] The brutality of constables who remained in service under the Japanese after their capture of the islands in 1941 proved particularly damaging to the reputation of the Constabulary. Following a large number of the landed elite, many of the officers chose to cooperate with the new occupying power and led their constables on numerous raids and patrols against the Filipino resistance. *Nenita* units under the command of Captain Napoleon Valeriano were arguably the most brutal of the collaborating forces. The *Nenitas* bore a skull and cross-bone insignia and conducted numerous terror raids of suspected villages. Valeriano's constables tortured, murdered, and destroyed homes as part of their

171. Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 148-49; Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California, 1977), 56.

172. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, 57.

counterinsurgency campaign for the Japanese. To the chagrin of veterans of the resistance, Valeriano would survive the war to manage the Philippine government's rural pacification operations in 1949.[173]

In Haiti, the Garde was confronted by an immediate military threat in the Dominican Republic. In early October 1937, Dominican soldiers and members of the *Policia Nacional* attacked camps of migrant Haitian field workers in the frontier region that divides the two nations, killing fifteen to twenty thousand over a period of three days. The savage and systematic killing of Haitians rattled the Garde, cognizant of how lightly armed they were compared to the Dominican forces. However, what disturbed them more was the noncommittal response of the government in Port-au-Prince. Sténio Vincent, Haiti's president from 1930 to 1941, defended the Dominican Republic and his government attempted to cast doubt that the massacre had been committed by Dominican government forces. Vincent's responses to subsequent Dominican-sponsored raids on Haitian communities along the border were equally tepid. The matter came to a head in December when several Garde officers attempted to assassinate, Major Durcé Armand, a trusted relative of Vincent and the president's chosen commander of the presidential guard. The assassins had hoped that killing Armand would motivate Vincent to take a more aggressive stance against the Dominicans. Instead, the president

173. Ibid., 63, 196-97; Alfred W. McCoy, *Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 101.

responded with a purge of suspected Garde officers and consolidated his control of the military.[174]

The confrontation over Haiti's response to Dominican depredations brought to the surface the tension between civilian and military authority inherited from the U.S. occupation period. Cognizant of the cycle of revolution under the *cacos* and the domination of the marines, Vincent and his successor, Elie Lescot, vetted the leaders of the Garde based upon political reliability and personal loyalty. They also implemented structural changes to the Garde that created controllable factions within the institution. Their measures created personalized militaries that would determine the transfer of political power through the rest of the twentieth century.[175]

The precedents set by Army and Marine Corps leadership and unresolved social problems weakened the prospects that either of the militarized constabularies could be counted on as apolitical enforcers of the law or benign standing armies. Instead, they became active participants in the battles between social and political factions in civil society and within their own ranks. While appropriate for the pacification phase, the militarization of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie established institutional cultures incompatible with a domestic police force. As armies, the constabularies became active participants in the political life of their nations. In the Philippines, the Constabulary became a trusted agent of the ruling elite as an independent service and as an integrated part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Garde developed into an important

174. Robert D. Heinl and Nancy G. Heinl, *Written in Blood: the Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995,* 3d ed. (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2005), 480-81, 483-84; Laguerre, *Military and Society*, 85-87.

175. Laguerre, *Military and Society*, 80, 87-89.

arbiter to political succession until Francois Duvalier elevated his party militia, the *Tonton Macoutes*, to the level of a government security force and ended the Garde's monopoly of armed force in Haiti in the 1960s.[176]

Under competent and stable leadership, the Constabulary might have successfully made the difficult transition from being an army to a police force, and the Garde could have succeeded in surrendering its police functions to a successor constabulary. However, the institutional identity of both constabularies was grounded in the idea that the division between military and civil police functions was one of skill sets rather than of important principle. The Constabulary adopted the broad functions as sources of elite pride. In an official history, it observed that "whoever thought of giving the Constabulary this dual role must not have considered the blessing that such duality would bring about."[177] The resistance to relinquishing their police functions suggests that the Garde took the same degree of pride in its broad mandate.

Ultimately, however, the internal issues of the constabularies did not decisively determine their identity and function in the post-occupation. With the best leadership and entrenched professional norms, the Constabulary and Garde would have been hard pressed to sustain them under the political and social conditions present in the Philippines and Haiti. The constabularies were not likely to demilitarize when peasant uprisings threatened or when ambitious elites recognized the utility of a having a reliable

176. *Tonton Macoutes* translates as "Uncle Knapsack." It refers to the folk image of the antithesis to Saint Nicholas. Misbehaving children were told that *Tonton Macoute* would snatch them away in the night and never return.

177. Philippine Constabulary, Public Information Office, *The Constabulary Story* (Quezon City, PI: Bustamante Press, 1978), 23.

paramilitary force in their bid for power. The U.S. occupation provided neither the political and military stability to sustain a civil national police nor the environment conducive to demilitarizing the constabularies into such a force. In the end, the evolution of the Philippine and Haitian paramilitaries could not be divorced from the significant shortcomings that marred the U.S. nation-building efforts.

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