

**Regional Security, Early Warning and
Intelligence Cooperation in Africa**



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Regional Security, Early Warning and Intelligence Cooperation in Africa

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Keywords

Regional security

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Abstract

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This dissertation explores the potential contributions of the mechanisms for early warning and intelligence sharing to regional security in Africa. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) are centrally concerned with the dissemination of information to enable decision-making on continental security. The main focus of the dissertation is on the manner in which the information generated by the CEWS and CISSA can contribute to regional security.

In order to analyse the potential contribution of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security, a sound theoretical framework is proposed so as to explore how and why states choose to cooperate, as well as addressing multifaceted cooperation and integration at inter-state, government department and non-state levels. Constructivist interpretations of international cooperation are utilised to explore the role of ideas, meanings and understandings in shaping behaviour. The focus is placed on the manner in which interaction as provided for by the CEWS and CISSA can shape understandings of reality and potentially impact on the definition of actors' interests. This is based on the assumption drawn from security community and epistemic community theory that, enabling the creation of shared meanings and shared knowledge there is the potential for both the CEWS and CISSA to have a positive influence on the choices that stakeholders take in favour of peaceful change.

The theoretical analysis is complimented with an analysis of the conceptualisation and design of the CEWS and CISSA. The depth of analysis also benefits from international experiences with early warning and intelligence cooperation and some of the successes and challenges that lie

therein. Some of the key debates in the fields of early warning and intelligence were utilised to draw inferences of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA as mechanisms to enhance regional security.

The primary conclusion was that there is potential to consider both the CEWS and CISSA as able to make positive contributions to regional security in Africa. The importance and power of information lies at the heart of why these mechanisms can influence the practice of peace. There is the underlying notion that diffusing the power of information and knowledge can lead to new patterns of behaviour. Sharing information can shape perceptions, expectations and behaviours. It can also break down uncertainty and enable actors at community, national and regional levels to better fulfil the regional security aspirations of the continent.



Declaration

I declare that *Regional Security, Early Warning and Intelligence Cooperation in Africa* is my own work, that it has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted, have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Lauren Angie Hutton

Date.....

Signed.....



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Chapter 1 - Introduction

1. Introduction

Since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the norms, practices and institutions regulating multilateral relations on the African continent have been evolving. The process of regional integration has transformed the way in which peace and security issues are dealt with. The change from the OAU into the African Union (AU) in 2000 represented a fundamental shift in the objectives and priorities of the organisation and presented the opportunity for significant advances in the creation of structures to manage the conflict prevention, management and resolution portfolio.

Central to the change in the orientation of the continental body was the awareness that peace and security were necessary to achieve sustainable development and economic prosperity. Member States gave the African Union the mandate, powers and structures to be better equipped to address issues of peace and security. This commitment found voice in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council in 2003. This Protocol enabled the creation of, what is generally referred to as, the AU peace and security architecture consisting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

The CEWS was envisaged as a central component of the peace and security architecture tasked with the anticipation and prevention of conflict through the provision of information and analysis and recommendations for response. The early warning system is to be the core of the conflict prevention mandate providing the ability for the AU to implement timely responses to prevent the outbreak and/ or escalation of conflict. The ability of the CEWS to fulfil this ambitious function is predicated on the capacity to collect, analyse and disseminate information that is reliable and relevant in a timely fashion.

In 2004, just one year after the Protocol establishing the early warning system entered into force, the heads of intelligence and security services of African states met in Abuja to establish the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA). CISSA is a mechanism to enable intelligence cooperation on the continent. The primary aim of this structure is to assist the AU and all its institutions to effectively address the security challenges confronting the continent through providing information and analysis on threats as well as providing advice on possible courses of action.

CEWS and CISSA bear both marked similarities and marked differences. Both mechanisms are designed to serve the vision of a stable and secure African continent as enunciated in the founding documents of the AU. Both CEWS and CISSA have the potential to make positive contributions to regional integration and regional security.

2. Purpose

This dissertation aims to build upon existing research into regional security and conflict prevention in Africa, with a specific focus on the means for information sharing, namely the CEWS and CISSA. The possibility exists that, in both fulfilling essential roles concerned with the provision of information for decision-making to the AU, the CEWS and CISSA will experience certain synergies and animosities. The purpose of this research project is to analyse the development, norms and functions of the CEWS and CISSA as mechanisms that enable intelligence and information sharing on the continent. The aim is to explore the roles of both mechanisms in order to understand how these structures can contribute to regional security in Africa.

The main assumption is that information is an essential requirement for regional security. This is based on the recognition that timely information is a precondition for response. Furthermore, the ability to take decisions relating to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict is predicated on the ability to understand the complex security environment and to initiate informed, reasonable and appropriate response strategies.

Both the CEWS and CISSA contribute towards the provision of information for security decision-making at continental level. The research is not concerned with the policy options for regional security and conflict prevention in Africa, but with the information sharing tools that are available on which to base these policy decisions. The main concern is with the potential contributions of these mechanisms towards regional security on the continent.

Thus, the research question is: how can CEWS and CISSA contribute to regional security in Africa?

3. Research methodology

This research project is largely descriptive and exploratory by nature. It entails describing the mechanisms for information sharing and the manner in which these have evolved. It then seeks to explore the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanisms - this entails drawing assumptions and conclusions from the preceding descriptive outline. The final task is to consider the manner in which these mechanisms for information sharing could operate in context, i.e. the way in which they can potentially contribute towards the aims of regional security.

Given that the CEWS is in its infancy and that access to information on the operations of CISSA is limited, the focus of the research task is on the conceptualisation of the CEWS and CISSA and how these mechanisms are designed and imagined to work. The CEWS and CISSA's design and conceptualisation as contributors to regional security will be analysed in the context of available literature on early warning and intelligence in order to (a) identify the potential for their successes and (b) highlight aspects that may inhibit success and (c) make recommendations.

The method to answering the research question is to adopt a three-step approach based on description, conceptual analysis and contextual analysis.

Description - The first section of the dissertation describes in detail the three primary elements being studied – the AU, CEWS and CISSA. This entails

drawing on historical perspectives as well as relying on foundation documents, such as international agreements and protocols, to lay the foundation for analysis. This is presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively.

Conceptual analysis – The second section of the dissertation utilises conceptual analysis to draw from the descriptive section an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA. This entails developing a deeper knowledge of the implications of the mechanisms for decision-making at regional level. The key issue for this phase is to draw an analysis from the descriptive section of how CEWS and CISSA would function operationally. This is captured in Chapter 6 and draws from a wide range of literature on the potential strengths and weaknesses of intelligence and early warning more broadly, as well as on the challenges facing CEWS and CISSA.

Contextual analysis - The final section establishes the manner in which each mechanism could support regional security, and contributes to achieving the security priorities of the AU. This is done by analysing the CEWS and CISSA through the theoretical lenses of security community and epistemic community theories respectively.

The logical flow of the argument seeks to establish that, in order to achieve the goal of regional security, information is required, and the mechanisms that have been established to enable collaboration in terms of information sharing have the potential to positively impact on regional security. Due to the elements being analysed, this is largely a theoretical study. Both the CEWS and CISSA are relatively new mechanisms, and empirical evidence on the actual successes and weaknesses is not widely available. The approach taken thus draws on theoretical frameworks to extrapolate potential contributions to regional security while also relying on literature about the strengths and weaknesses of early warning and intelligence more broadly. The empirical evidence presented is drawn from a growing body on literature evaluating successes and failures in early warning and intelligence.

In order to fulfil the demands of the research design and to answer the research question, data will be sourced from primary and secondary sources.

Official documentation such as international agreements and protocols will be used to delineate the functions, principles and objectives in which the AU, CEWS and CISSA operate. Further information will be gathered from academic sources and from practitioners who contribute to papers at conferences and for publication in journals. The aim is to balance information from academic sources with that from practitioners in order to gather theoretical and normative perspectives and empirical evidence based on experience.

4. Rationale

The rationale for the pursuit of this research project is that, although there is a body of literature and study on early warning in Africa with particular reference to the CEWS, there is very little synthesis of ideas on the roles of early warning and intelligence cooperation at continental level. This is presenting a gap between developments at continental level with regard to the creation of mechanisms for information sharing and normative and academic interrogation of the challenges and opportunities that these developments present. There is also a general lack of consideration of the type of information that will be required by decision makers and the mechanisms that can best deliver different types of information to different actors for different purposes.

Furthermore, there is a general lack of research and examination of the role of intelligence in Africa at both national and regional levels. As a tool in the state security arsenal, intelligence is often perceived in a largely negative light, and the potential positive role of intelligence for conflict prevention, management and resolution is often overlooked. This is primarily due to the historical legacy of intelligence being used to ensure the continuity of particularly autocratic regimes and as a tool to discourage internal dissent. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that within apartheid South Africa, the intelligence and security forces:

used both overt and clandestine methods to suppress resistance and counter armed actions by opponents of apartheid. Overt methods

included banning and banishment, detention without trial, judicial executions and public order policing. More clandestine and covert forms of control included torture, extra-judicial killings and support for surrogate forces (TRC Report 1998:165).

The conditions under which abuses as exemplified above occurred, have changed. Not only has the end of apartheid changed the orientation of the national intelligence structures in South Africa, but the pursuit of democracy elsewhere on the continent has also advanced similar reform. In post-conflict situations and democratic transitions, state intelligence agencies have been restructured and reoriented from Uganda to Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique (see for example Africa & Kwadjo 2009). Democratic governance requirements have impacted on the nature, functions and tasking of intelligence agencies.

From a more global perspective, the end of the Cold War and the security demands of a globalised world have placed new demands on intelligence structures. The global, regional and national contexts in which intelligence services in Africa now find themselves call for a fundamentally different approach to intelligence operations and the functions thereof. As Hutchful (2009) observes:


Intelligence more than any of the security services has undergone profound challenges and transformations over the preceding two decades. After a steep recession in the post-Cold War period, Intelligence has once again been thrust to the forefront of the global public agenda by radically redefined threat environments ... that place primacy on ... Intelligence capabilities.

However, in Africa interrogation of the role and functioning of intelligence has been limited. Hutchful (2009) notes that the silence over intelligence in Africa seems to contrast with renewed controversies over the role, strategic mission and governance of intelligence in the global arena. Part of the rationale for this study, therefore, is to promote research and debate about intelligence on the continent and it is an attempt to make a positive contribution to the emerging field of intelligence studies in Africa.

5. Theoretical framework and background of the study

This is largely an analytical study involving the consideration of two key elements (CEWS and CISSA) and their relationship with regional security. As such the literature review as outlined here serves only to frame the issues that will be explored in the dissertation and to introduce the themes that inform the research. Instead of having a formal literature review and a chapter of the dissertation devoted entirely to the literature review, the approach adopted here is to present the key issues informing the research in Chapter 1 and then to draw on primary and secondary resources throughout the development of the discussion. The literature review forms part of the dissertation and is drawn on as the argument above develops. Furthermore, the theoretical lenses used to explore intelligence; early warning and regional security in Africa are presented in Chapter 2 and are not presented in any detail here.

This section will explore the key issues framing the discussion and will then present a brief introduction to the concepts of regional security, intelligence and early warning.



5.1. Parameters framing the study

The study is framed within certain important parameters that provide the overall contextual reference points and place the concepts of early warning, intelligence cooperation and regional security in a broader context. These parameters are highlighted throughout the various chapters and form the central part of the golden thread that ties early warning, intelligence cooperation and regional security together. This set of parameters is:

- i) The paradigm shift from state security to human security
- ii) The transnational and cross-boundary nature of security threats
- iii) The impact of globalisation, and particularly advances in information and communication technology (ICT).

These three trends have to a large degree enabled the consideration of early warning, intelligence cooperation and regional integration as intricate parts of security discourse. Furthermore, this dissertation acknowledges the impact of these global trends on the development of the regional security architecture

and recognises that these broader global trends have shaped the discourse and orientation of security and multilateral relations in Africa.

5.1.1. A human security orientation

The concept of human security became part of global discourse following the 1994 *Human Development Report* of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which called for a profound transition in thinking – “from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of human security” (UNDP 1994:24). The UNDP Report highlighted the importance of investing in development in order to ensure long-term security and has become a cornerstone document recognising the security-development nexus and the much-lauded phrase that, without security there can be no development. Another important aspect emphasised within the UNDP Report is that “human security is *easier to ensure through early prevention*¹ rather than through later intervention” (UNDP 1994:22).

The idea of human security has rekindled the debate over what security means and how to achieve it (Acharya 2001:442). At the heart of human security discourse is the shift from a perception of security as defined in terms of the security of the state to a definition of security based on the security of the individual. As explained in Hendricks (2006:3):

In essence, the human security approach seeks to fundamentally question, and alter, whom we protect and how that protection is afforded. The approach takes individuals, rather than states, as its referent, and emphasises the need for a holistic, long-term view of security that includes the redress of structural inequities... It identifies different levels of security, viz, personal, community, national and international, and argues that their interdependence implies that insecurity in one sphere has ramifications for other spheres – it is therefore not a case of ‘one at the expense of the other’.

A human security approach, therefore, transcends the centrality of the state and recognises that, although “the primary role of the state is to protect citizens, given past experiences, this cannot be left as the sole preserve of the state” (Hendricks 2006:3). Thus, as Hendricks (2006:3) argues, international

¹ Italics as used in original text

and regional organisations have the responsibility to intervene when human lives are under threat, and any sustainable transformation has to include civil society in the formulation and execution of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction agendas.

The human security agenda, therefore, is an expanded approach to security in terms of both the threats that are considered part of the security agenda and the actors that are involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution. As explained by Acharya (2001:442):

Although it is presented as a global template on which to recast the security philosophies and policies of countries fundamentally to reflect the changing conditions and principles of world order, human security has also been an instrument of national strategic priorities that often have strong domestic roots. As such, human security has been presented variously as a means of reducing the human costs of violent conflict, as a strategy to enable governments to address basic human needs and offset the inequalities of globalization, and as a framework for providing social safety nets to people impoverished and marginalized by sudden and severe economic crisis.

Human security provided the normative framework for reconsidering the role of the state and the manner in which sovereignty is practiced. The notion of absolute sovereignty is no longer perceived as a means of isolating the state against external involvement, but rather sovereignty is increasingly refined as a normative concept of responsibility (Cilliers 2004:39). This view was echoed in a 2009 report of the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN):

The responsibility to protect, first and foremost, is a matter of State responsibility, because prevention begins at home and the protection of populations is a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the twenty-first century (UN 2009:10).

The concept of absolute sovereignty has evolved into a more nuanced understanding of the responsibilities and tasks of statehood. “Thus, national sovereignty now requires a system of governance that is based on democratic and popular citizen participation, constructive management of social diversities, respect for fundamental human rights, an equitable distribution of national wealth, and opportunities for development” (Cilliers 2004:39). As enunciated by the UN Secretary General (UN 2009:10):

Responsible sovereignty is based on the politics of inclusion, not exclusion. This entails the building of institutions, capacities and practices for the constructive management of the tensions so often associated with the uneven growth or rapidly changing circumstances that appear to benefit some groups more than others.

The re-thinking of security and sovereignty has, as was predicted in the 1994 UNDP Report (1994:22), impacted on the norms, structures and behaviours of international society in the 21st Century. These changes have occurred at conceptual and operational levels in terms of the manner in which security is conceptualised and responses to insecurity are formulated. It has also manifested in greater responsibility for security being assumed by diverse actors, ranging from international organisations to civil society groups, non-governmental organisations, the private sector and humanitarian assistance groups. As Hammerstad (2005:12) observes, an important accompaniment of the shifting security paradigm has been the development of more prominent regional organisations with stronger institutions and broader and more intrusive security mandates.

Although the rhetoric of human security has gained international recognition and is widely accepted in international agreements and statements, the practice thereof has been mixed. Too often solutions to insecurity are first sought through resort to force and only later are the conditions to foster long-term security considered. Furthermore, the realisation of human security requires commitment to inclusive and equitable governance and enabling societies to participate, not as victims but as empowered actors, in conflict prevention, management and resolution. This calls for fundamental change in the power relations between people and state actors, especially in conflict and post conflict states.

In summary, a human security orientation provides this dissertation with a framework in which to explore the changed global security context and the changed nature of security threats. It also provides an understanding of the increase in relevance of intergovernmental organisations - the AU, in particular - regarding conflict prevention, management and resolution. Lastly, the human security approach brings conflict prevention to the fore and is part

of the global tide urging preventative methodologies such as early warning. Thinking about human security, as opposed to state security, opened the space for exploring different response mechanisms beyond the national level.

5.1.2. The transnational nature of security


The end of the Cold War ushered in a period in which previous assumptions and dominant discourses on security were reassessed. The human security paradigm was one part of this reassessment based on the acknowledgement that traditional state-centric security threats and the responses were no longer the predominant security context. Intra-state violence is just as prevalent, if not more so, than inter-state conflict. State borders do not bind sources of insecurity and the source of threats now facing countries are much wider and more complex (Harris 2004:6). Global advances in communication, transportation and commerce have enlarged spaces for transnational insecurities such as international organised crime syndicates, drug and human trafficking, terrorism, infectious disease, economic crime and environmental degradation.

As 'new' sources of risk and insecurity have come to the fore in the globalised world, so too have 'new' methods to overcome these challenges become more discernible. Mills (2001:19) notes that the transnational nature of many of the security issues faced by states in the 21st Century "are beyond the capacity of both the military and of individual states to tackle unaided. Combined and/ or multi-laterally led operations could become the future norm." Although he was referring more directly to national and regional military cooperation, the point remains valid - in the modern globalised world facing insecurity requires coordinated, cooperative responses. Gibson (2005:28) makes a similar point, reflecting that globalisation creates and reflects issues that are increasingly outside the scope and remit of nation-state governments.

This theme echoes throughout this dissertation, as the importance of collaboration and formalising regional security arrangements is the foundation on which the potential impact of CEWS and CISSA on regional security is

explored. The global trend towards cooperation in the security arena finds resonance in developments towards more integrated security responses in Africa. The driver for greater cooperation in Africa has been based on the need to mitigate the impact of and to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict that had become so common a feature of the African landscape in the 1990s.

Because of the trans-boundary nature of many security threats, the relationship between national and regional security has changed. This is not to say that either internal or external security is more relevant, but rather that the inter-linkages between internal and external security are more pronounced. It has become more difficult to distinguish where causes of insecurity originate. To mitigate the effects of and vulnerabilities to insecurity requires national and transnational responses. The AU peace and security architecture is born of this legacy. As recognised in the preamble of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, in Africa, security is indivisible – “the security of one African country is directly linked to that of other African countries”.



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5.1.3. Globalisation and information communication technology

Advances in communication and technology have created new avenues for economic activity and opened security vulnerabilities. Such advances have also enabled advances in operational responses to insecurity. Even the earliest conceptions of early warning systems relied on the centrality of a computer-based system for information management. One of the first examples of this were efforts made during the 1970s funded by the United States Department of Defence on integrated crisis warning systems. It is against the backdrop of multidisciplinary advances in research on decision-making processes, the use of quantitative variables and indicators, the recognition of the credibility of forecasting as a science and the development of computer technology that conflict early warning systems became a possibility (Andriole & Young 1977:107-108).

Technological advancement has played a key role not only in the possibilities for early warning but also in the modalities for information more broadly.

These changes in the manner in which societies can interact with information impact upon the manner in which government agencies tasked with information functions can operate. The massive increases in the amount of publicly available information have challenged fundamental assumptions about intelligence and the functions and capacities of intelligence organisations. On the one hand, the massive information flows that are available in the modern globalised environment, as epitomised by the World Wide Web (www), necessitate the requirements of computer based systems to manage, store and process information. On the other hand, increases in the flow of information and the manner in which information can be stored and transferred mean that it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep secrets. It calls for a re-examination of when secrecy is required, the stringent application of security measures to ensure secrecy when required and a more nuanced understanding of why secrets should be kept.

As Gibson (2005:28) notes, globalisation and the increased ability of information to be communicated to interested parties around the globe, has also witnessed a significant shift in changing societal expectations. He uses transnational civil society organisations (TCSO) to exemplify this impact of globalisation as follows (Gibson 2005:28):

While TCSOs may not have the power to effect change, they have certainly understood that moral authority, based on transparent knowledge, provides convincing reputational risk management challenges for the other entities (offending in their eyes) within global commons.

This globalised advocacy, monitoring and evaluation role of civil society opens new space for African civil society groups as active participants in conflict management, resolution and prevention. This could be especially relevant in terms of the monitoring and evaluating the impact of interventions by regional and international actors in conflict situations.

Information technology brought new capabilities in the field of decentralisation, tailored systems and networking (Liaropoulos 2006:7). The most essential revolution has been in the way that people can interact with information. In the past, information was scarce, expensive and considered

authoritative; information nowadays is accessible, cheap and more tangible (Liaropoulos 2006:8). This is not to imply that there are no longer barriers and controls on information flows. As explained by Keohane and Nye (1998:85):

The information revolution alters patterns of complex interdependence by exponentially increasing the number of channels of communication in world politics – between individuals in networks, not just individuals within bureaucracies. But it exists in the context of an existing political structure, and its effects on the flows of different types of information vary vastly ... Politics will shape the information revolution as much as *visa versa*.

Whereas ICT advances have opened the space for information to be used in a different way and has enabled new flows of information, the manner in which this will manifest is ultimately a matter of politics. As with other fields of international activity, the manner in which ICT has enabled information flows and the manner in which people are able to interact with technology is uneven. The so-called digital divide does, however, not detract from the global trend towards increased globalisation of information and the tendency to rely on technology for information collection, processing, dissemination and storage. Although in 2009, only 6.8% of the population on the continent utilised Internet access, Africa is the world's most rapidly growing market for mobile telephony and is also home to some of the fastest growing fixed-line markets in the world (Internet World Statistics 2009).

The relevance of advances in ICT for the purpose of this dissertation is twofold. Firstly, ICT enables the operation of early warning systems – advances in ICT have meant that a continental early warning system linking information sources from across the globe is a possibility. Masses of information can be organised, stored and transferred. Interacting with information and moving information across great distances can literally be done with the click of a button. Furthermore, because of the masses of publicly available information, computerised systems are almost a prerequisite for the sorting, storage and retrieval of data. Automated data collection systems can also assist with mitigating the impact of information overload.

Secondly, the speed at which information travels and the ease with which people are able to communicate across geographical divides means that governments struggle to hold a monopoly on information of a sensitive nature. Governments also struggle to maintain definitive technical expertise, as expertise is becoming diffused across disciplines and spaces. For example, information that 20 years ago was only available from secret government satellites is downloadable to any desktop through Google Earth. Although this may be perceived as vulnerabilities to state security, this can actually help to remove restrictions preventing the sharing of information between states, such as certain classification criteria, thus enabling collaboration. The wealth of open source information challenges the significance attached to covert information. As Best and Cumming (2007:5) explain, secret information may be less important “than the combination of open source information, information sharing, computer networking, and an ability to sift and analyze a dizzying volume of open source information.”

These factors are important for this dissertation, as both early warning and intelligence are most centrally concerned with information. For early warning, advances in communications technology is an enabler and the very relevance of early warning systems are based on recognition of the value of open source information. For intelligence, the challenge of a more open information regime is that state intelligence is being challenged to become a sharpened and more focused tool. The task of controlling information is increasingly difficult and the roles and functions of state intelligence need to be conceptualised within this broader framework.

5.2. Regional security in Africa

A central component of this study is regional security in Africa and the mechanisms that serve the regional security agenda. Institutions are the product of the particular historical context in which they were developed. The African peace and security architecture is no different. The structures that have evolved at continental level bear the markings of the tensions between Pan African expectations, national interest and politically palatable and resource-able solutions.

In 1975, Colin Legum published an article in *International Affairs* in which he considered the successes and failures of the OAU. Legum (1975:208) highlighted that Africa is the first continent on which pan-continental aspirations have become anything close to reality. The evolution towards continental collective security structures has been marked by the continuing conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment that plague Africa. When considering the successes and failures of regional integration in Africa, especially in terms of regional security, the tendency is towards critical pessimism and cynicism. Legum (1975) presents a more balanced argument, positioning the development of the OAU against the global backdrop in which African states achieved independence and positing the OAU as a support for newly independent states in a highly competitive global system. Furthermore, newly independent African states had to come to grips with not only international relations but also inter-African relations. Legum (1975:211) notes, therefore, that “(T)he OAU provides the arena within which common African policies are forged, or disputed, and where tensions of inter-African relations can be released.”


The tightrope that both the OAU and the AU has had to traverse is the inherent tension between regional aspirations and national sovereignty. This is a global phenomenon, which preoccupies even the most advanced integrated regions. For Africa, this tension has been complicated by the reality that the ability of regional organisations to fulfil conflict prevention, management and resolution mandates is predicated on the ability to contravene the central global norm of respect for national sovereignty. This is because of the dominance of intra-state conflict. This dichotomy led Legum (1975:213) to conclude “no organisation like the OAU can hope to survive once it attempts to intervene – however good the reasons – in the internal conflicts of one of its members. This essential constraint is inherent in any international organisation; this may be a pity, but no such organisation should be condemned for failing in an area which it cannot, realistically, touch”.

The question then becomes, what can we realistically hope for international organisations, the AU in particular, to achieve in the arena of regional

security, and what are the mechanisms that can best serve that purpose? This is an important point of departure because it is unrealistic to base this discussion on the idealistic, yet false, assumption that the AU can realise its conflict prevention, management and resolution functions outside of the constraints of national sovereignty and the continued relevance of power in international relations.

The approach adopted here is position the AU within the system of sovereign, independent states and to understand the manner in which the regional organisation can promote peace and security within this specific context. The challenge for Africa continues to be the conversion of a continent so long dominated by foreign powers into a stable society of states within a system of continental order (Legum 1975:219).

In comparison with the OAU, the AU represented a definitive step by heads of state to commit to the creation of regional security. According to Mohammed *et al* (2002:3),



the establishment of the African Union reflects a global trend away from treating security issues as the sole preserve of governments, in favour of ideas of common security based upon an international or cosmopolitan community of citizens, bound together by multiple ties of common interest and a commitment to basic values.

The notion of regional security is closely tied to the achievement of peace. Emmanuel Adler (1998:168) defines peace as “the practice of security community sustained by the attachment of collective meanings and purposes to physical reality.” This is similar, as quoted by Adler (1998:169), to the advancement of “a wider form of international community” as enunciated in E.H. Carr’s *Conditions of Peace* (1964). Drawing on the work of Carr and Deutsch (1968), Adler (1998) places the emphasis of building security communities on the development of a collective identity – the building of a ‘we-feeling’.

Regional security in Africa has taken place against the backdrop of Pan-African identity and the vision of a common African identity based on common historical experiences and common future aspirations. The development of

institutions in which regional integration is pursued also enhances the development of a sense of community and oneness as through increased communication, common meanings and understandings are generated.

The issues of common identity and collective meaning are central to the understanding of the development of regional security mechanisms in Africa and are also central to understanding the potential for regional security response mechanisms. The notion of security community will be applied to the regional security aspirations in Africa with the purpose of establishing that the regional institutions – the OAU and AU – are part of an evolution towards building a security community on the continent. Casting the AU in this light navigates the dichotomy between national and regional aspirations and by applying notions of security community theory and a human security approach the centrality of national sovereignty is diluted. An evolutionary view is applied, as national sovereignty remains a core part of the African political landscape, but there are indications that the notion of sovereignty is becoming more nuanced as indicated in the discussion on human security above. The boundaries of sovereignty are being tested in the modern globalised world.

The evolution of regional security, the challenges of regional security in Africa and the evolution of a continental security community will be further explored in Chapters 2 and 3.

5.3. Intelligence and Early Warning

The final section of this overview addresses the CEWS and CISSA and differentiates between early warning and intelligence. This section serves merely as an introduction to the CEWS and CISSA, as these mechanisms for collaboration are further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The objective of this section, therefore, is to provide an introduction to early warning and intelligence collaboration in Africa.

5.3.1. The Continental Early Warning System

The CEWS is an information sharing mechanism that has been designed to assist the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to operationalise its conflict

prevention, management and resolution mandate. The purpose of the early warning system is to provide the PSC with information to guide the formulation of strategic options directed at taking action to prevent conflict. The CEWS is an information system that can provide data and indicators that will be used to forecast the emergence of conflict (Nhara 1996).

The notion of early warning has its roots in more technical fields with uses such as to forecast natural disasters, food shortages and to guide humanitarian relief agencies. The application of early warning to security issues and conflict prevention in particular is guided by a human security paradigm and is based on the recognition of the responsibility of states to protect people from the impact of violence and conflict.

The CEWS is a system designed for the sharing of open-source information from the Regional Economic Communities to the AU and processed to the PSC. It is based on principles of collaboration, which extend to the collection of information from all open sources, including the utilisation of networks from civil society and academia. The CEWS will, theoretically, enable the AU to anticipate security problems and facilitate the PSC to initiate response strategies based on timely, accurate and reliable information.

5.3.2. Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa

The Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa established CISSA in August 2004 in Nigeria through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

CISSA is a mechanism for information and intelligence sharing between states in Africa through the intelligence and security services of those states. It serves as a platform for formalising interaction between these services and for formalising cooperation on common security matters. Unlike the CEWS, CISSA is not a part of the AU, but operates as an independent subsidiary of the regional authority with links to the Office of the Chairperson through the Intelligence and Security Committee (AU 2005:12). The relationship of CISSA to the AU will be explored further in Chapter 5.

The evolution of CISSA is indicative of the challenges of balancing regional imperatives with national interests. Intelligence by its nature is closely associated with state power and is central to conceptualisations of state power in international relations. CISSA provides for a blend between national and regional intelligence and allows for the formalisation of intelligence cooperation for national intelligence capacities to better fulfil the role of supporting regional security priorities.

5.3.3. Differentiating between intelligence and early warning

A part of the research problem relates to the differences between intelligence and early warning and the manner in which these mechanisms can contribute towards regional security. The basis of differentiating systems for early warning and intelligence in Africa stems from a preoccupation in many circles with the distinction of intelligence as firstly, secret and secondly, concerned only with issues of state security. The utility of early warning is conceived as being based on open sources and collaboration and concerned with the broader human security agenda. Evidence of these lines of thought have been repeated by Schmeidl (2002:73) and Adelman and Suhrke (1996:75), who argued that early warning differs from intelligence in that it serves the common good. Nyheim (2008:7) explains:

From the start conflict early warning was envisaged as distinct from intelligence based analysis that focused on protection of state interests. It sought multi-stakeholder solutions and gender sensitivity, used open source information and aimed at protecting human lives and creating sustainable peace based on locally owned solutions.

Nyheim (2008:7) points to one of the key issues that has differentiated early warning from intelligence – the end-users. Intelligence is traditionally concerned with the supply of information to national decision-makers on issues of national security. Early warning is designed to cater for multiple users in an inter-governmental context on issues of global or regional importance.

Boshoff (2008:106) explains the difference between intelligence and early warning in terms of the centrality of sovereignty and the closed nature of traditional intelligence systems, presented as follows:

Table 1: Differences between early warning and intelligence (Boshoff 2008:106)

Early Warning	Traditional Intelligence Systems
Depends on the collection and analysis of information, scenario-building and the presentation of recommendations to decision makers	Depends also on the collection and analysis of information, scenario-building and the presentation of recommendations to decision makers
Focuses on human security	Focuses on state security
Seeks to serve larger objectives than those of the state	Seeks to serve state interest
Depends on transparent methods and sharing of information	Rely on secrecy, situation rooms and encrypted communications of classified information
Transparency in information and analysis	Closed system
Decentralised and dependent upon other sources of information and analysis	Centralised and dependent on in-house information and analysis

Cilliers (2005) explains the difference as follows:

Intelligence systems rely primarily on secrecy, situation rooms and the encrypted communication of classified information. Early warning, on the other hand, depends primarily upon transparent methods and the sharing of information.

The commonality of intelligence and early warning lies in that both seek as the most primary objectives to provide end-users (decision-makers at the AU in this context) with timely, accurate, relevant and reliable information on which to formulate policy options. This role is the same for intelligence and early warning – although the sources of information are difference.

Conflict early warning was traditionally concerned with anticipating state failure or collapse into conflict, particularly in the mid-1990s. After 9/11 the issue of weak, fragile and failed states took on a whole new relevance in international affairs. This was no longer the terrain of humanitarian organisations and UN agencies – weak states were now seen as an enabler of global insecurity. The divide between conflict early warning systems and intelligence has become narrower, as it becomes increasingly difficult to isolate what is of interest to intelligence and what should be the focus of early warning.

This function of providing information to prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflict is at the heart of both modern intelligence and early warning. In order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of CEWS and CISSA and to analyse the contribution these structures make in terms of enhancing regional security, this dissertation also addresses some of the more fundamental challenges faced by both intelligence and early warning.

The role of CEWS and CISSA in contributing to regional security will be analysed in this broader environment influenced by both theoretical assumptions (drawn from the theoretical framework that guides this study as outlined in Chapter 2) and practical challenges and opportunities garnered from local and international experiences. The benefit of such an approach is that it grounds the research in both normative and operational realms and as such serves to address the issues raised in the research question – i.e. how can CEWS and CISSA contribute to regional security in Africa? It is necessary to develop an understanding of the broader operational and conceptual debates on intelligence and early warning that will inform the potential contributions that CEWS and CISSA will make to regional security in Africa. These ideas will be explored in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

6. Conclusion

This introductory chapter sought to establish the basis from which the study is pursued. This was done through (1) presenting an overview of the purpose, rationale and methodology of the study; (2) by providing an overview of the

key issues that inform the study; and (3) by introducing the elements being studied. As such this dissertation aims to address the potential contributions of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security. This chapter has provided the broader framework in which the discussion will be further developed. To complete the framing of the study, the theoretical assumptions on which the study is based will be addressed in the next chapter.



Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework: Of Cooperation and Social Constructs

1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to outline the major theoretical trends that influence the understanding of information sharing, intelligence cooperation and regional security in Africa as used in this dissertation. This study is situated in the international relations discipline, but recognises the shortcomings of mainstream international relations theories, most notably the bias towards Western experience. Therefore, the study looks through alternative theoretical lenses to answer the research question. It is not that relations between states in Africa do not conform to the expected patterns of behaviour in international relations (such as competition and cooperation), but rather that the path to get to the platform of interaction has been fundamentally different from that experienced in other parts of the world. This, thus, affects the way in which inter-state politics in Africa occurs.

This chapter examines theoretical perspectives and assumptions informing inter-state cooperation. The first section outlines some assumptions about international cooperation, on why states cooperate, and the influence of international organisations on international relations. The first section is primarily concerned with state-centric relations. The discussion then moves to consider sub-state levels of international relations that occur both within and outside of governments. This is done through utilising trans-governmental relations and epistemic community theory.

The final section of this chapter examines the notion of security communities and the relevance of a sense of community that underpins regional integration in Africa. The intention is to craft a theoretical framework that can address multi-faceted cooperation and integration at state, government department and non-state levels. This is because the subject matter addressed in this dissertation covers the spectrum of interstate relations (as represented by the African Union); inter-departmental collaboration (as exemplified by CISSA) and state and non-state cooperation (as evidenced in the CEWS). The range

of actors studied in this dissertation is a manifestation of the multi-faceted nature of modern international relations and is also indicative of the complex network of actors and interests that influence policy-making and implementation. The theoretical frameworks presented in this chapter attempt to capture that diversity and to present a framework within which to explore why states choose to cooperate and how information, ideas and interests can shape the national and collective security agenda.

2. Considering assumptions about international cooperation

Cooperation between states has been of interest to political scientists for many years but came into its own as a field of study during the 1970s. It was during this period that attempts by states to organise and institutionalise cooperation in economic and security affairs became an accepted feature of international affairs. The assumptions on which much of international cooperation theory is based, is distinctly ground in the Realist political tradition that was predominant in the Cold War era. Trying to understand and explain international cooperation in this light is based on three major assumptions about the nature of the international system and the international interactions that can be expected as a result, namely (Eriksson & Giampiero 2006:228):

- 1) The state is the primary unit of analysis
- 2) The state acts in rational ways to satisfy its national interest
- 3) Power and security are the core values of the state.

A further important assumption that provides the backdrop for a Realist analysis of international relations is the anarchic nature of the international system. As Waltz (1993:59) explained even with the end of the Cold War and despite changes that constantly take place in relations between states, the basic structure of international politics continues to be anarchic. Thus, “each state fends for itself with or without the cooperation of others” (Waltz 1993:59). This implies that when states choose to cooperate, it is out of recognition that cooperation is in the interest of the state with positive effects on the position of the state in an anarchic system. These positive effects would be manifest as benefits to the national interest in terms of access to power, increased military security or economic benefit.

This style of thinking also led to conclusions about the nature of inter-governmental organisations as extensions of the state realm positing international organisations as “instruments of government, and therefore unimportant in their own right” (Keohane & Nye 1974:39). Samuel Huntington argued that international organisations are relatively insignificant actors in international politics as they are based on accord between states and embody the principle of nationality (Huntington 1973:338-339). Similarly, Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001:762) argue that states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly. Realists believe that international organisations are shaped and limited by the states that found and sustain them and have little independent effect (Waltz 2000:18).

Koremenos et al (2001:762) further define international institutions as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/ or authorize behavior (*sic*)”. International organisations are the product of negotiations between states to create structures to enhance cooperation and sometimes even to work towards integration. This is the foundation of understanding international organisations as put forward in this dissertation. More specifically, the OAU and the AU are interpreted firstly as institutions designed specifically and purposefully by states to further identified interests. Both organisations are products of the particular regional and global context of the time and bear the markings of negotiated settlements, for example, in the clauses relating to sovereignty, non-interference and non-indifference, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Furthermore, as exemplified by the transition from the OAU to the AU, the nature and purpose of institutions change as structures vary (Waltz 2000:18).

However, a vital difference between an essentially Realist interpretation of international relations and the approach to regional integration espoused in this dissertation, is the notion that regional organisations are significant beyond the impact on the state. The approach to international organisations and the AU in particular draws also from the Constructivist assumption that

“agents and structures construct each other” (Frederking 2003:364). Thus, African states have made decisions that shape the behaviour of the AU, but the AU also makes decisions that shape the behaviour of states. This will be discussed further in later sections of this chapter.

The relevance of the field of study of international cooperation emerged as interdependence increased and the need to take action on trans-boundary issues became more pronounced. Global interconnectedness, which became more apparent in the 1960s and 1970s, had security, economic and political dimensions. As the distinction between national and global issues began to narrow, the levels of communication between states increased. International organisations provide a platform for such interactions and facilitate direct contact among officials of national governments. This was evidenced by the rise of the United Nations and the multifaceted specialised agencies; the rise of military blocks such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the increase in international organisations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Greenpeace. As commented by Keohane (1998:82), to analyse world politics in the 1990s is to discuss international institutions: the rules that govern world politics and the organisations that help implement those rules.

A distinct characteristic of much of the literature on international cooperation is a focus on the system level of analysis – looking at sources of and constraints on cooperative behaviour as part of the international system. Much of this literature applies the tenets of rational choice theory as tools of analysis. The underlying principle of rational choice theory is that actors make decisions based on a rational assessment of options and choose the most beneficial path. As explained by Fiorina (2000), the central premise of the approaches known as rational choice is that behaviour is purposive. “Political behavior (*sic*) is not solely the product of psychological drives, socialization or organizational norms. Rather, individuals have goals they try to achieve, acting as rationally as their knowledge, resources and the situation permit” (Fiorina 2000).

In a critique of rational choice, Kristen Renwick Monroe (2001:151) argues that rational choice is “a paradigm under stress” and proposes the notion of a theory of perspective as an alternative paradigm. Monroe (2001:157) further proposes “our perceptions of ourselves in relation to others sets and delineates the range of options we find available, not just morally but empirically.” This theory of perspective is based on identity as a source of options – making choice a function of identity (Monroe 2001:157) – and is an interesting alternative perspective for explaining cooperative choices by African states. The centrality of identity and the perception of self in relation to others are explored later in this discussion in relation to Pan-Africanism and the importance of African unity as a safeguard against international pressures.

Another critique of rational choice draws from the notion of actors as unified units – “individual actors consciously choosing to pursue their perceived self-interest” (Monroe 2001:154). The manner in which state interests are developed is explored in further detail through considering firstly, a pluralist approach looking at sub-state interactions as articulated by Keohane and Nye’s (1974) formulation of the importance of trans-governmental relations, and secondly, through exploring how ideas, identities, norms and beliefs affect the definition of state interest. Although a state-centric approach is adopted (as the purpose is to explore how states define their interests), a purely rational choice approach is not adopted as state choices are seen to be the product of perceptions, ideas, identities and beliefs interacting at sub-state, national and international levels. The next section will explore interactions between states occurring at inter-departmental levels.

2.1 Trans-governmental relations

In 1974, as a critique on the state-centric approach to international cooperation that was predominant at the time, Keohane and Nye (1974:44) put forward an argument to highlight the importance of “bureaucratic contacts that take place below the apex of the organizational hierarchy.” The interest was in cooperation (and conflict) that takes place between government sub-units – that is, between national departments. By acknowledging the importance of this level of interaction, the centrality of the state as a unitary

actor was challenged and a more multifaceted picture of international cooperation was put forward.

The authors define “trans-governmental relations as sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments” (Keohane & Nye 1974:43). The most basic and diffuse form of trans-governmental relations takes place in meetings between officials from different bureaucracies. As explained by Keohane and Nye (1974:44-45):

Face-to-face communications often convey more information (intended or unintended) than indirect communications, and this additional information can affect policy expectations and preferences. It is well known that international organizations frequently provide suitable contexts for such trans-governmental communication. As one official said of INTERPOL, ‘What’s really important here are the meetings on a social level – the official agenda is only for show’.

The importance of this trans-governmental perspective, which is picked up again in the discussion on epistemic communities, is that one begins to think of governments as open decision-making units where various preferences and influences - from internal and external, government and non-government relations - come to bear. The state-centric realist worldview created the idea of states as units and distinct actors. State interests were defined as seeking to maximise power – this simplistic formula gave foreign policy a distinctly closed and focused agenda. As explained by Farrell (2002:50), Realism portrays a world occupied by undifferentiated rational actors (i.e. self-interested states), whose relations are structured by the balance of material power. This perspective can be challenged through recognising that international cooperation takes place at various levels and that the state is not a single unitary actor with all departments working towards one common agenda. In doing so, both a pluralist and a constructivist approach (see Section 2.2 below) are incorporated into the analysis, recognising that interests and power operating at domestic level influence state preferences (Farrell 2002:53) and also that state choices are shaped by attitudes, norms, identity and beliefs.

Keohane and Nye (1974:45-46) recognise that, as communication and coordination between national departments becomes regularised, changes in attitudes may result and thus policies or the implementation of policies might be affected. “Even where attitudes are not fundamentally affected and no major deviations from central policy positions occur, the existence of a sense of collegiality may permit the development of flexible bargaining behaviour in which concessions need not be required issue by issue or during each period” (Keohane & Nye 1974:46).

The degree of influence of trans-governmental relations can vary from a sense of collegiality to policy coordination to coalition building. The relevance here is not the *degree* to which such relations can influence state behaviour rather the recognition that such relations build cooperation and provide for the development of common positions – even for the development of common attitudes, values and behaviours. As Farrell (2002:50) explains, ideas and norms operate “all the way down” to actually shape actors and actions in world politics.

International organisations, therefore, can play an important role not only for state-to-state interaction at heads of state level, but also in facilitating the building of collective responses at lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Furthermore, these trans-governmental relations have the potential to impact upon domestic and international policies and practices. An important function, even outside of affecting policy, is that increased communication and interaction can create a common normative platform from which future policy or practice will be fashioned. This is similar to the idea of Skolnikoff (1971:772) of international organisations having the function of norm creation. The centrality of common norms, behaviours and understandings as a precursor for stability is a theme explored throughout this dissertation.

2.2 Constructivist approaches to cooperation

Another dimension of international cooperation that deserves further attention is the role of international organisations as actors in the global system, as indicated in the above section. The basic assumption is that African states

have made decisions that shape the behaviour of the AU, but the AU also makes decisions that shape the behaviour of states. This is largely based on Constructivist approaches to political science which emphasis “the existence of social structures – including norms, beliefs and identities – constituting world politics” (Frederking 2003:364). Constructivist interpretations of international cooperation are important because they situate state behaviour in a larger society of rules and institutions (see for example Berger and Luckmann 1966). The relevance for this dissertation is that a Constructivist approach is concerned with the impact of norms on international security (Farrell 2002:49).

Constructivism is an alternative view to a rationalist approach to international relations. As opposed to the rational choice approach as referred to previously which relies on making choices in the favour of maximising interest, Constructivism is concerned with “the unavoidability of the interpretation of reality” (Eriksoon & Giacomello 2006:233). Drawing from the work of Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), Kubalkova (2001) and Wendt (1999), Frederking (2003:364) presents the following primary positions in Constructivist thinking:

1. Social factors primarily influence human interaction
2. Social structures help constitute the interests and identities of purposive actors; human agency is enmeshed in a web of social rules that constitute and regulate agency
3. Agents and structures construct each other; rules make agents and agents make rules.

Constructivist approaches challenge thinking about international relations to transcend both the state and sub-state levels and to consider the influence of social structures on political behaviour. Whereas Realists define the actions of states in international relations in terms of what they have the power to do, from a Constructivist view, states do what they think is more appropriate (Farrell 2002:52). In selecting appropriate courses of action, states are guided by the social structures that shape world politics. Social structures as the broader context for state action is made up of the beliefs, norms and identities that influence world politics (Frederking 2003:364). Beliefs, norms and identities influence the choices that states make in international relations, as

well as the manner in which states construct national interest. Furthermore, as much as state behaviour is influenced by beliefs, norms and values, so too does state behaviour influence the development of regional or international beliefs, norms and values.

Frederking (2003:365) defines beliefs, norms and values as follows:

- Beliefs are shared understandings of the world
- Norms are shared understandings of appropriate actions
- Identities tell agents who they are and who others are


The relevance of this approach for the discussion of cooperation that underlies this dissertation is the implication that regional security in Africa will be served through cooperation and cooperation will be served through the choices of sub-state, state and regional actors. The manner in which cooperation will manifest is based on the beliefs, norms and identities of the actors at various levels. Regional security arrangements in Africa will depend on beliefs about the nature of security or insecurity; norms about social relationships (i.e. appropriate actions for example on the legitimate use of force) and identities about the self and other (adapted from Frederking 2003:365). In relation to identity and regional security, the notion of Pan-Africanism is explored further below. However, the relevance of identity as a parameter influencing behaviour extends also to interpretations of friend and enemy, as well as to inferences about who provides security or at what level security responses are triggered. This last point is discussed in relation to early warning in Chapter 6 and the assumption that leaders at regional level are best situated to provide responses is questioned. Evidence of norms that have the potential to influence state choices can be found in the Constitutive Act of the AU (as discussed in Chapter 3) and the other declarations and protocols of the regional body.

This first section of the theoretical framework has explored some assumptions underlying international cooperation. For the purposes of this dissertation, the state is recognised as a central actor in international relations, but it is not the only unit of analysis. Furthermore, within the state, there are various forces, which influence the determination of national priorities, and these aspects

should also be incorporated into an analysis of international cooperation. Lastly, the utility of a purely rational choice-based approach to cooperation has been questioned and the choice to cooperate has rather been situated within the framework of beliefs, norms and identities. It is in the manner in which beliefs, norms and identities are constructed that information plays a central role and that the role of the CEWS and CISSA is considered in latter parts of this dissertation. The concept of epistemic communities and security community is presented below to further develop an understanding of the implications of beliefs, norms and identities on national and international behaviour.

3 Epistemic communities

In addressing the importance of trans-governmental relations, Keohane and Nye (1974) begin to bridge the gap between international relations and domestic policy-making. Adler and Haas (1992:367) take this one step further and proclaim that:



(T)o study the ideas of epistemic communities and their impact on policymaking is to immerse oneself in the inner world of international relations theory and to erase the artificial boundaries between international and domestic politics so that the dynamic between structure and choice can be illuminated.

The purpose of discussing epistemic communities as part of this dissertation is an attempt to illuminate the dynamics of structure and choice that have resulted in the creation of the particular mechanisms for information sharing and intelligence collaboration as part of the African peace and security architecture. The structures that have been established are the result of complex decision-making, negotiation and strategic alliance formations. These structures are also the result of choices made by African actors based on an interpretation and perceptions of reality and the options available to them. This builds on a Constructivist approach to political behaviour as introduced in the previous section. By looking at epistemic communities, the central concern is on how meanings and understandings are derived.

An epistemic community can be defined as “a network of knowledge-based experts who have an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise” (Sebenius 1992:351). A central focus of epistemic community theory is the importance of collective meaning as the basis for creating order and stability. If a certain normative position is dominant, then that becomes reflected in the policies and practices of the day. Epistemic communities are a vehicle for the development of theoretical premises about the creation of collective interpretation and choice (Adler & Haas 1992:368). The epistemic community approach then brings to the fore the impact and importance of shared interpretations and expectations as the basis for policy coordination. Selection of policy alternatives is based on understandings of the world, and if a common picture of the world is accepted, then certain policy alternatives become more likely for policy selection. The major contribution of the epistemic community concept is that it insists on the importance of perceptions and learning in international relations and deepens our knowledge of how actors define their interests (Sebenius 1992:365).

At the core of epistemic community theory is an interest in political styles of thought and how they combine to create various types of world order (Adler & Haas 1992:370). This then turns the focus to cognition and therefore to information, which occupies a fundamental position in this dissertation. Epistemic communities is a useful framework to study political processes in terms of questioning *who learns what, when, to whose benefit and why* (Adler & Haas 1992:370). This reflects notions of social constructs, as mentioned in the previous section, that inform political behaviour in terms of beliefs, norms and identities. As explained in Eriksson and Giacomello (2006:233):

At the most basic level, actors have a set of norms – beliefs about right and wrong. Norms shape identities – the separation of “we” and “them”. In turn, identities shape interests...all these elements are seen as inherently dynamic. If interests change, it is because of an underlying shift in identities and norms.

Similarly, Haas (1992:2) argues that how states identify their interests and recognise the range of actions deemed appropriate in issue-areas of policy-making are functions of the manner in which the problems are understood by

the policy-makers or are represented by those to whom they turn to for advice under conditions of uncertainty. Central to Haas's hypothesis is that human agency lies at the nexus between systemic conditions, knowledge and national action (Haas 1992:2). His approach, therefore, is to examine "the role that networks of knowledge-based experts – epistemic communities – play in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems" (Haas 1992:2). The role of such knowledge-based experts is to help states identify their interests, frame issues for collective debate, propose specific policies and identify salient points for negotiation (Haas 1992:2). Similar to the way in which power is diversified in the international political economy, epistemic community theory acknowledges that "control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination" (Haas 1992:2-3).

As noted by Adler (1998:173) common meanings enable people to live in the same normative world. Adler (1998:173) further quotes Taylor's (1979) words:

Common meanings are the basis of community. Intersubjective meaning gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common meanings does this common reference world contain significant common actions, celebrations and feelings ... This is what makes a community.

Members of an epistemic community "share basic values on the subject in question, share causal models of the workings of the involved phenomena, share inference patterns or the criteria by which knowledge will be validated, and have a common policy enterprise or project" (Sebenius 1992:351). In other words, epistemic communities can create "shared interpretations that frame and structure human practices" (Frederking 2003:365). Thus, by examining the role of epistemic communities, one is concerned with the generation and role of ideas in world politics.

As explained by Adler and Haas (1992:374), "epistemic communities play an evolutionary role as a source of policy innovations and a channel by which these innovations diffuse internationally." Epistemic communities provide a

channel through which ideas can circulate from societies to governments and from country to country (Haas 1992:27). Adler and Haas (1992:375) refer to this role of epistemic communities as exerting influence on policy innovation through (1) framing the range of political controversy surrounding an issue, (2) defining state interests and (3) setting standards. Adler and Haas (1992:375) further explain:

(H)ow governments think of interests, policy objectives, and ways of conducting policy coordination depends on how they conceive of the context in which particular efforts must be made. By identifying the nature of the issue-area and framing the context in which new data and ideas are interpreted, epistemic communities bound the range of collective discourse on policy, as well as guide decision makers in the choice of appropriate norms and appropriate institutions within which to resolve or manage problems.

Prevailing ideas are an important aspect influencing policy choice (Haas 1992:26). As members of the epistemic community interact with actors at national and international levels, ideas and common understandings “can diffuse from a small number of key national actors to a much wider group, eventually reaching and appealing to the critical mass of governments needed to undertake effective international coordination of policies” (Adler & Haas 1992:379). Adler and Haas (1992:373) explain the policy coordination function of epistemic communities as follows:

(W)e can view foreign policy as a process by which intellectual innovations (which epistemic communities help produce) are carried by domestic and international organizations (in which epistemic communities may reside) and are selected by political processes to become the basis of new or transformed national interest ... we can view international politics as the process by which the innovations of epistemic communities are diffused nationally, transnationally, and internationally to become the basis of new or changed international practices and institutions and the emerging attributes of a new world order... Once the expectations and values injected by epistemic communities into the policy process are internationally shared, they help coordinate or structure international relations.

The causal logic of epistemic policy coordination is based on three major dynamics, namely: uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalisation (Haas 1992:3). Haas (1992:3-4) explains that in international policy coordination, the forms of uncertainty that tend to stimulate demands for information are those

which arise from the strong dependence of states on each other's policy choices for success in obtaining goals and those which involve multiple and only partly estimable consequences of action. The information required is the product of human interpretations of social and physical phenomena (Haas 1992:4). It is precisely because of the type and purpose of information that can be provided by epistemic communities to enable international policy coordination, that the notion of considering the broader inter-state intelligence community as an epistemic community is advanced in this dissertation. The underlying assumption is that, given conditions of uncertainty, as is characteristic of the complex security environment, decision-makers can utilise information from respective intelligence communities to ameliorate uncertainty. Intelligence practitioners are well placed to provide interpretations of reality and through the institutionalisation provided by CISSA, there is the potential for the development of common meanings which could lead to improved policy coordination. The application of epistemic community as a theoretical lens to study intelligence collaboration in Africa will be further elaborated in Chapter 6.

The purpose of exploring epistemic communities as a means to understand international cooperation and policy coordination is to provide a lens through which to view the development of common meanings and ideas. Choices towards regional integration and regional security are guided by shared beliefs, norms and identities. The epistemic community concept provides a means to consider how that social reality is constructed and how ideas can diffuse through the national and international system to shape policy choice and interests.

4 The concept of security communities – exploring African identity and the sense of community

The notion of a security community combines the concept of integration with the purpose of peace. The work of Karl Deutsch is central in the conceptualisation of security communities and forms the basis of the understanding of security communities as advanced by other scholars such

as Ernst Haas, Emmanuel Adler and Charles Taylor. Deutsch (1957:5) defined a security community as

(A) group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of the group.

The primary notion is that community can exist at inter-state level and that security politics can be profoundly shaped by it (Adler & Barnett 1998:3). Further, those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition (Adler & Barnett 1998:3). A security community can be defined as a condition in which countries have integrated to the point where people have dependable expectations of peace (Franke 2008). Adler (1998:168) explains that the state or condition of peace is the practice of security community sustained by the attachment of collective meanings and purposes to physical reality. Mohammed *et al* (2002:3) highlight that a security community is more than an inter-state order that outlaws aggression and other forms of conflict - it is a set of complex inter-relationships between all branches of government, civil society, the private sector and citizens themselves.

International community results mainly from communication, mutual responsiveness and shared identity (Adler 1998:173). "The core of Deutsch's security community approach was the assumption that communication binds social groups in general and political communities in particular (Adler 1998:174). This is in agreement with the previous section presenting Constructivism and supports the claim "that fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material and that these structures shape actors' identities and interests" (Wendt 1995:72). Thus, a security community can be understood as a type of social structure composed of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war (Wendt 1995:73). Social structures are defined by shared understandings, expectations and knowledge (Wendt 1995:173). The development of shared understandings, expectations and knowledge is based on communication. "Communication alone enables a group to think together,

to see together and to act together” (Deutsch quoted in Adler 1998:174). Communication is the social glue that enables peoples to share common meanings across national borders and a common normative environment (Adler 1998:174).


Although communication and shared meanings provide the normative basis for security community behaviour, the extent to which state interests become synonymous with collective interest (i.e. the practice of peace) is dependent on the extent to and the manner in which social identities involve an identification with the fate of the other (Wendt 1994:387). Collective identities require the positive identification with the destiny of others as well as the identification of the group in relation to other groups (Adler 1998:177). Collective identity in turn is the basis for feelings of solidarity, community and loyalty and for collective definitions of interest (Wendt 1994:386).

In an article on collective identity formation, Alexander Wendt (1994:389-391) explores the mechanisms that effect the formation of collective identity among states. Collective identities are socially constructed and have a particular historical context. Wendt (1994:389-391) defines aspects of that particular context, which advance collective identity formation. The first aspect relates to the structural context denoting that the structures of regional or global international systems constitute interaction contexts that either inhibit or facilitate the emergence of dynamics of collective identity formation (Wendt 1994:389). For example, as discussed further in the next chapter, collective identity formation in Africa (as embodied by Pan-Africanism) can be interpreted as being facilitated by the global international system, because the collective identity was forged through common suffering at the hands of colonial rule. A further example could be drawn from the impact of the end of the Cold War on Africa and the revitalisation of an African agenda popularised by the African Renaissance and a more African-owned approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution as embodied by the Peace and Security Council.

Aside from the broader structural context which impacts on collective identity formation, Wendt (1994:389) also highlights the importance of systemic

processes such as rising interdependence and the emergence of a “common Other”. Rising interdependence creates more common interests and areas of identification of mutual interests, increasing the potential for collective identity formation. A common threat or external aggressor creates common vulnerabilities and sensitivities. Systemic processes, such as those mentioned above, reduces the ability to act unilaterally and increases the extent to which actors share a common fate, thus encouraging collective identification. A further systemic process that may encourage collective identity formation is the transnational convergence of domestic values (Wendt 1994:390). This can be evidenced in transnational agreement on, for example, human rights, norms and democratic institutions and practices.

The final aspect of Wendt’s analysis of factors that influence the formation of collective identities is the specific actions or strategic practice of states (Wendt 1994:390). When actors undertake strategic interactions it involves the production or reproduction of identities and interests (Wendt 1994:390). Wendt (1994:390) explains:



If we treat identities and interests as always in process during interaction, then we can see how an evolution of cooperation might lead to an evolution of community. This can occur as an unintended consequence of actions carried out to realize self-interests or as a result of a conscious strategy of collective self-transformation.

This is similar to the explanation offered by Weldes (1998:218) that interests are produced, reproduced and transformed through the discursive practices of actors. “More specifically, interests emerge out of the representations that define for actors the situations and events they face” (Weldes 1998:218). In other words, interests shape actions, but actions also shape interests. This again exemplifies the inter-relationships between structures and processes and highlights that no facet of political behaviour exists in and of itself. Identity can only be understood through looking at the definition of interests and actions.

The relevance of this presentation of collective identity formation lies in the application of security community to the AU, as will be presented in the following chapter. Collective identity is central to the vision of security

community, and the existence of a collective African identity is central to considering the potentials for security community behaviour in Africa. The aspects of collective identity formation as presented above can be exemplified in the African context through an analysis of Pan-Africanism, as will be further elaborated in Chapter 3. The primary argument is that the structural, systemic and strategic contexts have been conducive for collective identity formation in Africa. Although the process of collective identity formation might not be complete, in terms of the evolution to community, the foundation of Pan-Africanism as a collective identity has created a platform for integration towards community.

As part of collective identity formation, Wendt (1994:390) considered the impact of interactions, noting “actors form identities by learning, through interaction, to see themselves as others do”. Similarly, Adler (1998:175) observes that a sense of community also requires particular habits of political behaviour, which are acquired through processes of social learning and socialization” (Adler 1998:175). Adler (1998:175) explains that people learn new habits slowly as background conditions change and these “lessons” and expectations are diffused to one another through various processes of communication. Such learning involves the questioning of original shared meanings and replacing them with others (Adler 1998:176). An example of this type of learning and socialisation can be drawn from experiences with conflict resolution in the OAU and the AU and the manner in which the notion of non-interference transitioned into non-indifference. This is in agreement with Adler’s notion that social learning encourages political leaders to see each other as trustworthy (Adler 1998:178). Furthermore, Wendt (1994:390) highlights the effect of behaviour on community formation by emphasising that identities are shaped through interactions. In other words, by teaching others and themselves to cooperate, actors are simultaneously learning to identify with each other – to see themselves as “we” bound by certain norms (Wendt 1994:390).

Security community formation can be understood as a social-cognitive process involving the social construction of shared understandings (Adler

1998:176). The possibility for the practice of peace to become a reality is in part dependent on how much change within the social structure can be attributed to shared knowledge. “To say that structures are socially constructed is no guarantee that they can be changed” (Wendt 1995:80). However, if it is possible for policy-makers to make choices in favour of peaceful change, then there is an ethical responsibility on leaders to ensure the well being of their populations. The key point could be that, if there are enough structures in support of choices favouring peaceful change, then in the long-term those practices negating such behaviour could become obsolete. As such a security community could be seen to be evolving out of increased communication, the development of common normative frameworks and security-community-building institutions that encourage common behaviour patterns. These behaviour patterns could in the long-term become entrenched habits for conflict resolution. Indeed, security communities may have humble and self-interested beginnings but according to Adler (1998:175)

With (a) increased communication; (b) a large number of transactions; (c) learning and socialization processes, which lead to the generation of a common normative framework and common behaviour patterns; (d) a ‘core of power’ that attracts weaker states; and under the guidance of (e) security-building-institutions and (f) elites that use material and symbolic resources to empower a particular set of identity traits, to the detriment of others, the cultural affinities (‘a way of life’) needed for a collective identity to exist would develop and become institutionalized.

As explained by Wendt (1995:81), to analyse the social construction of international politics is to analyse how processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures – cooperative or conflictual – that shape actors’ identities and interests. The scope of this dissertation is concerned with collective security in Africa and the manner in which information sharing through the CEWS and CISSA can contribute to this. The central assumption is that security threats and responses to threats are socially constructed based on understandings of reality influenced by norms, identities and interests. The focus is on the manner in which interaction as provided for by the CEWS and CISSA can shape understandings of reality and actors’

identities and interests. The assumption is that through enabling the creation of shared meanings and shared knowledge, there is the potential for both the CEWS and CISSA to have a positive influence on the choices that policy-makers make in favour of peaceful change. This understanding of regional security by the CEWS and CISSA will be further developed in the remaining chapters of this dissertation with the aim of being able to draw conclusions on how the CEWS and CISSA contribute to regional security in the final chapter. Firstly, the application of the concept of security community is applied to the AU and then in later sections the notion of the CEWS and CISSA contributing to security community behaviour is explored.

The application of security community in this dissertation relies on a pluralist view of security community. A pluralist security community can be defined as, “transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peace” (Adler 1998:176). A pluralist security community does not require the elimination of the sovereign state but rather requires sovereign states “to adopt a novel form of regional governance that, relying on collective identity and mutual trust for coordination and compliance with norms, sustains dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler 1998:177). Collective knowledge makes possible the development of a regional governance system based on collective identity (Adler 1998:178). In as much as structures and processes influence each other, regional governance systems also contribute towards the building of the security community. As explained by Adler (1998:178), international institutions help states discover new areas of common interest and by helping establish, articulate and transmit norms of acceptable and legitimate behaviour, they also encourage elites and people to consider themselves to be part of a region, thereby building a sense of community and shaping state practices. Thus international institutions such as the AU can provide a platform for contributing to security community formation. The application of security community to the AU will be further explored in the next chapter.

5 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to outline the theoretical lenses that inform this study. This firmly grounds the dissertation in current theoretical discourse and enables the further investigation of the elements of the study (CEWS, CISSA and regional security) by raising questions and testing assumptions about relationships. This chapter has also provided an introduction to the theoretical assumptions that inform further analysis, as will be explored in later chapters. The theoretical framework presented here has explored assumptions about international cooperation and why states pursue cooperation. Moving away from a purely Realist position, the importance of ideas, identities and interests has been explored as a way to understand state behaviour. A Constructivist approach to international relations was advanced to analyse the impact of social constructs on state behaviour. This approach is particularly useful for this dissertation because of the central concern with the impact of ideas, information and knowledge on decision-making processes. By focusing on social constructs, the contribution of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security can be interpreted in terms of the manner in which these mechanisms can contribute towards the development of common meanings, collective understandings and thus regional security as community behaviour.

Chapter 3 – In pursuit of security community: From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union

1. Introduction

Since the formation of the OAU in 1963, the norms and institutions governing multilateral relations on the continent have been evolving. This process of regional integration has transformed the way in which peace and security issues are dealt with. The change of the OAU into the AU in 2000 represented a fundamental shift in the objectives and priorities of the organisation as well as significant advances towards the creation of institutions to manage the conflict prevention, management and resolution portfolio.

This chapter seeks to contextualise the role of CEWS and CISSA within the broader regional security cooperation agenda through providing a succinct description and analysis of the regional security architecture. In order to do this, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first looks at the evolution of the regional security architecture in Africa with specific reference to the OAU and the AU. The second section examines the catalysts of change that have driven the pursuit of security through cooperation and the manner in which the institutional architecture has developed. The third section applies the notion of security communities as a means to understand the evolution and structure of institutions that make up the African regional security architecture.

2. Establishing a tradition of collective security: The Organisation of African Unity

The institutionalisation of collective responses to political, economic and security issues in Africa began with the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). On the 25th of May 1963, 30 of the 32 independent African states signed the OAU Charter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The purposes of the OAU, as outlined in Article II of the OAU Charter, were:

- (a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African states;
- (b) To coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;

- (c) To defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;
- (d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism on the continent;
- (e) To promote international cooperation.

In order to achieve these objectives, member states committed to coordinating and harmonising policies in the following fields (OAU Charter 1963, Article II):

- Politics and diplomacy
- Economic development, transport and communications
- Education and culture
- Health, sanitation and nutrition
- Science and technology
- Defence and security.

As can be seen in the enunciation of purposes and the approach to achieving this policy harmonisation, the focus of the OAU was on political and economic issues. Security was mentioned, but more in terms of establishing the independence of African states through the eradication of colonialism. At the core of the OAU was a need for emerging independent states to have a degree of insulation from international political and economic pressures. As explained in Ibok (2000:3):

(T)he ultimate objective of the founding fathers of the OAU ... was to provide the then fragile African States, emerging from colonial rule into a better organized international political and economic environment, some degree of a sense of collective security through the minimization of individual vulnerability in their relations with their erstwhile colonial powers.

As with all types of organisations, the OAU was a product of its time, and its objectives, functions and structures reflected a specific historical trajectory. This is relevant in two instances. Firstly, the early 1960s was a period of intense upheaval with independent states being born through violence and social turmoil. Breaking the shackles of colonial rule was a social and political imperative, and the OAU was founded on the belief that integration and cooperation would liberate the continent from colonial rule.

A second important point to note is that the OAU was strongly based on the recognition of the centrality of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is

reflected in Article II of the OAU Charter, which affirms the following principles of the organisation:

- 1) The sovereign equality of all Member States;
- 2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
- 3) Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the inalienable right to independent existence;
- 4) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
- 5) Unreserved condemnation of political assassination as well as subversive activities;
- 6) Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories that are still dependent;
- 7) Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

The centrality of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference was a product of the specific historical context in which the OAU was born. These values, beliefs and behaviours had relevance because of the inherent need of the newly independent states to assert themselves as states in the global state based system. As noted by Møller (2005:44), the founding of the OAU can be seen as the codification of an embryonic 'Westphalian system' in Africa. Statehood is traditionally defined in terms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Also given the years of colonial dominance, a certain degree of over-protection of national political space was to be expected. Møller (2005:44) observes that the OAU might be seen as a 'safety net', protecting the newly independent states through their process of state building.

As commonly observed 'form follows function' and the structures of the OAU at inception did not cater for a broad security function. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established with the prime function of addressing disputes between member states. During the first decade of its existence, the OAU was preoccupied with diffusing tensions between member states, particularly tensions arising from boundary disputes and territorial claims (Ibok 2000:3).

It was only in 1993 that the OAU reformed its objectives for peace and security. Meeting in Cairo, the Heads of State and Government adopted a declaration on the creation within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The establishment of the

Mechanism was the third attempt by the OAU to coherently address peace and security issues. The other two attempts – the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration and the Ad Hoc Committee on Inter-African Disputes – had shared the common fate of falling into disuse (Institute for Security Studies 2009)

The creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution represented a defining shift in the continental approach to conflict prevention, resolution and management – moving from a preoccupation with inter-state conflict to a broader mandate to include intra-state conflict. Until this time, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference were intractably connected and the OAU was precluded from taking collective action to address internal conflicts.

Olonisakin (2000) observes that the establishment of the Mechanism was an attempt by the OAU to shift from an ad hoc to a 'systematic' approach to conflict resolution. The creation of the Mechanism was an attempt by the OAU to make itself more relevant to the security and political context of the post-Cold War environment. Olonisakin (2000) explains the context for the reorganisation of the OAU security apparatus in the 1990s:

Africa was not prepared in the early 1990s for the responsibility that was thrust upon it. The principles upon which many organisations in the region were founded, were no longer relevant, nor were they sufficient to meet the post-Cold War security needs of the continent ... The OAU's preference for sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states rendered it powerless to address situations of poor governance and the abuse of human rights within many member states that threatened to erupt into violent conflict in some cases.

The establishment of the Mechanism also heralded a significant change in institutional arrangements for and prioritisation of conflict prevention. The main aim of the Mechanism was to focus on anticipating and preventing situations of potential conflict from escalating, with emphasis on anticipatory and preventative measures. At the core of the conceptualisation of the role of the Mechanism is the understanding that, while early warning and conflict prevention lie at the heart of the OAU's conflict management objectives, there

may be a need for peace-keeping and peace-building in situations where conflicts are already present (Olonisakin 2000).

The Mechanism consisted of a Central Organ, Peace Fund and Centre for Conflict Management. Within the Conflict Management Centre, the OAU sought to establish an Early Warning Network. In January 1996, a workshop was held in Addis Ababa that brought together academics, policy-makers, practitioners and other experts to brainstorm on the modalities for establishing such a network (Ibok 2000:8). Ibok (2000:8-9) outlines the envisaged Early Warning Network as follows:

(T)he Early Warning Network would have OAU Member States as key focal points, including, of course sub-regional organizations ... the United Nations and its specialized agencies, academic institutions, research centres, the media and NGOs. It is the expectation of the OAU that the information which will be sourced from such a Network would be appropriately analyzed, so that accurate information, data, policy options and recommendations, could be provided to the Secretary General and the Central Organ, for early political action.

Plans for the establishment of the Early Warning Network morphed into plans for the Continental Early Warning System as the momentum towards greater African responsibility for peace and security on the continent accelerated. During the 1990s, global and regional impetus for increased regional integration and more formalised approaches to regional security drove the evolution of the OAU into the AU.

By 1999 there were calls for the establishment of an AU to replace the OAU. The principle decision to establish the AU was taken at the OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya in 1999. At the Summit of the OAU on 11 July 2000 in Lome, Togo, the Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted. The Constitutive Act entered into force with two-thirds of African states having ratified it in 2001. At the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya in March 2001, the decision was taken that the OAU and the AU co-exist for a period of one year to enable a smooth transition. The AU was officially inaugurated at a Summit in Durban, South Africa in July 2002.

3. Moving towards unity: From the OAU to the AU

Throughout the 1990s regional cooperation within inter-state organisations in Africa remained fraught because regional institutions were weak, bureaucratic, under-resourced and toothless. However, during this period the seeds were sown for a much more ambitious formal regional security structure on the continent (Hammerstad 2005:13).

The transformation of the OAU into the AU has been described by Bjørn Møller (2009:7) as a process of convergence of three projects, namely a Libyan quest for Pan African unity, a Nigerian project for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), and a South African project for an African Renaissance. Although the focus of Møller's 2009 paper is on the role of hegemony in building an effective regional security architecture, the three projects or components that he draws together have been significant events that shaped the evolution of collective security and the design and orientation of the institutional arrangements of the AU. The Libyan quest for African unity has inspired a renewed Pan African vision of unity, which contributed towards gaining support for the devolution of more powers to the AU. The South African vision of an African Renaissance provided impetus for more responsibility for peace and security being taken by African leaders. Although these are two defining initiatives in terms of the evolution of the continental peace and security architecture, it was through the CSSDCA that the normative framework for addressing conflict was developed. The CSSDCA informed the manner in which the conflict prevention, management and resolution mandate of the AU was developed and sets an important basis for considering the continental peace and security architecture. For the purposes of brevity in this discussion, therefore, only the CSSDCA will be elaborated upon.

3.1 The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa

The CSSDCA was a process among African states to create a framework for conflict prevention, management and resolution on the continent. This is similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its

successor, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Møller 2005:56). In May 1991, a conference was convened by the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa, in Kampala, Uganda, under the auspices of President Museveni. This conference adopted the Kampala Document, which recommended the launch of the CSSDCA. This conference is an important landmark in the evolution of collective security in Africa, as much of the normative framework informing the development of the African peace and security architecture was enunciated in the Kampala Document.

The CSSDCA conceptualised regional security in terms of four calabashes, namely: security, stability, development and cooperation. Within each calabash specific principles and policy measures are outlined. The four calabashes represent a holistic approach to security that predates the international popularity of the term human security but actually captures many of the same ideas as the notion of human security. According to the Kampala Document (1991:2):

The concept of security goes beyond military considerations; it embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, and community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/ her society in freedom and enjoying fundamental rights.

Further than providing a succinct and clear, yet often overlooked, definition of what security should entail, the CSSDCA actually provides the outline of the principles, mechanisms and tasks of a collective security architecture. The CSSDCA was ahead of its time in many respects – the Conference was held in 1991, the Mechanism was only constituted as part of the OAU in 1993. The Mechanism can be seen as an imperfect attempt at operationalising the recommendations of the CSSDCA, and in the transformation into the AU, the policy measures articulated in the Kampala Document were further taken on board.

An example of this can be seen in the notion of non-interference and domestic insecurity. The CSSDCA noted that, with respect to the principle of non-interference:

growing international concern for humanitarian causes and the experience in Africa of civil strifes (sic) and acts of wanton repression, have led to an increasing concern over domestic conditions pertaining to threat to personal and collective security and gross violations of basic human rights. The CSSDCA must aim at promoting and strengthening this welcome development to enable African countries to cooperate in ensuring the security of Africans at all levels (Kampala Document 1991:3).

Regarding actual policy recommendations to advance the cause of collective security in Africa, the CSSDCA emphasises the need for timely mediation and reconciliation; an African peace-keeping capability; confidence building measures to cover exchange of information, joint military training and joint studies on continental security issues; and the need for a council of elders (Kampala Document 1991:3).

Although probably anticipated to be more of a permanent part of the peace and security architecture, the CSSDCA established the foundations for the peace and security architecture that found voice in the AU. The Kampala conference represented the start of a movement towards greater collaboration in security issues and provided a normative foundation for that movement towards greater responsibility for security for all people in Africa.

The CSSDCA remained dormant until 1999, when it was formally endorsed by the OAU. The Kampala Document became the CSSDCA Memorandum of Understanding, and the implementation of many of the recommendations of the CSSDCA have been mainstreamed into the peace and security architecture and assumed by mechanisms and institutions of the AU.

4. The African Union

In July 2000 in Lome, Togo, more than 30 independent African states signed the Constitutive Act of the AU. The Constitutive Act entered into force in 2001, leading to the inauguration of the AU in Durban, South Africa in 2002. This

was the culmination of a process towards greater integration that had been ongoing since the launch of the OAU. It was, however, during the 1990s that the drive towards greater integration really took shape. The factors that contributed towards the transformation of the OAU into the AU will be discussed later in this chapter. The discussion firstly needs to present a clearer view of the nature, functions and structures of the AU.

Article 3 of the Constitutive Act defines the objectives of the Union as to:

- (a) Achieve greater unity and solidarity;
- (b) Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;
- (c) Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- (d) Promote and defend African common positions;
- (e) Encourage international cooperation;
- (f) Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
- (g) Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- (h) Promote and protect human and peoples' rights;
- (i) Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;
- (j) Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels, as well as the integration of African economies;
- (k) Promote co-operation to raise the living standards of African peoples;
- (l) Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities;
- (m) Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology;
- (n) Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

When considered in comparison to the objectives of the OAU, the AU is a markedly different construct. Evolving from the OAU to the AU, the regional body seems to have a sense of identity and purpose. The Constitutive Act and Protocols that followed to establish the required institutional architecture were carved in response to a changed regional political and security environment and to a renewed vigour for achieving security and development through integration.


This renewed vigour was captured by former President Mbeki in his opening address at the first Heads of State summit in Durban in 2002 as follows (Mbeki 2002):

As Africans, we have come to understand that there can be no sustainable development without peace, without security and without stability. The Constitutive Act provides for mechanisms to address this change, which stands between the people of Africa and their ability and capacity to defeat of poverty, disease and ignorance.

Together we must work for peace, security and stability for the people of this continent. We must end the senseless conflicts and wars on our continent which have caused so much pain and suffering to our people and turned many of them into refugees and displacees and forced others into exile.

We must accept that dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts are the only way to guarantee enduring peace and stability for our people. The Constitutive Act provides for such mechanisms.

The shift in focus and more pronounced peace and security agenda is also reflected in the principles of the AU as specified in Chapter 4 of the Constitutive Act, as:



- (a) Sovereign equality and interdependence;
- (b) Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence;
- (c) Participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union;
- (d) Establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent;
- (e) Peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States;
- (f) Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States;
- (g) Non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
- (h) The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
- (i) Peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security;
- (j) The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security;
- (k) Promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union;
- (l) Promotion of gender equality;
- (m) Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;
- (n) Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development;

- (o) Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;
- (p) Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.

The orientation of regional cooperation with regard to peace and security in Africa was fundamentally altered with the establishment of the AU. As reflected in the principles above, the notion of non-interference was qualified as one of non-indifference, and the centrality of sovereignty and territorial integrity was replaced with sovereign equality, interdependence and respect for borders. In both the objectives and principles of the AU, the prioritisation of common defence and security, common economic positions and common political aspirations are reflected.

The Constitutive Act does not address the institutional arrangements for conflict prevention, management and resolution. In 2002, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Peace and Security Council (also known as the Durban Protocol or PSC Protocol) was approved. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) replaced the Mechanism as “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict” (PSC Protocol 2002, Article 2).

Article 2 of the Protocol defines the role of the PSC as “a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.” Similar to the role of the Security Council at the United Nations, the PSC is the highest decision-making authority on peace and security issues within the AU.

According to Article 6 of the Protocol, the PSC is to perform functions in the following areas:

- (a) Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa;
- (b) Early warning and preventative diplomacy;
- (c) Peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry;
- (d) Peace support operations and intervention;
- (e) Peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction;
- (f) Humanitarian action and disaster management.

Experience with the Mechanism of the OAU had highlighted that, in order for the continental peace and security architecture to fulfil a conflict prevention, management and resolution mandate, the PSC had to be able to (1) pre-empt conflict; (2) deploy force for conflict management; and (3) undertake high level mediation. The Protocol, therefore, established the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System and African Standby Force to support the PSC.

The PSC Protocol and the African peace and security architecture that it established reflect a commitment to regional security and to a more central role for the regional organisation. This evolution from the preoccupation with independence and sovereignty of the OAU to non-indifference and greater African responsibility for security on the continent as embodied by the AU was possible because of an altered regional and global political and security environment. The factors that contributed towards the evolution towards greater collective security in Africa will be discussed in the next section.

5. Catalysts of change in pursuit of the collective security agenda

The end of the Cold War is globally recognised as a watershed for the conduct of international relations. The end of the global ideological conflict, which played out as much on African soil as elsewhere, resulted in fundamentally questioning the pillars that had defined international affairs for fifty years. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War did not result in an overwhelming peace dividend for Africa. At the end of the Cold War there were far-reaching changes in the nature of state power and the conduct of warfare in Africa (De Waal 2000:22).

As explained by Franke (2008:318):

First, the sudden breakdown of the bipolar system of order that had kept African conflicts in check led to a proliferation of violent crises throughout the continent. Awash with weapons delivered by their respective sponsors (US\$ 65 billion worth of weapons had been transferred to Africa during the last 20 years of the Cold War alone), client states like Somalia descended into chaos once superpower support ceased to prop up their regimes. Second, the end of superpower competition meant that Africa's geopolitical and strategic

importance declined dramatically ... As a result, the amount of international aid given to African states fell by more than 21% between 1990 and 1996 despite the fact that conflict and humanitarian crises increased manifold over the same period. This and the negative effects of globalization further consolidated Africa's economic marginalization and added to the continent's long list of pressing problems.

However, as Africa descended into a turbulent and violent era, there re-emerged the necessity of continental unity in the face of increasing global indifference. This necessity was founded in the need for Africa to become less dependent on international crisis intervention. During the 1990s, and highlighted by the Rwandan genocide, the international community was shown to be unable, sometimes unwilling and unsuitably equipped to respond to African conflicts. This period also marked a time in which Africa sought to develop its own doctrines and practices to face the security challenges and conflict prevention, management and resolution requirements. Exemplified by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), intervention in Liberia (1990) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention in Lesotho (1998), Africa began to assume responsibility for urgent action to resolve crises on the continent, in the context of multi-lateral institutions and international law (De Waal 2000:xvi).

There were, therefore, two major outcomes of the turbulent 1990s that require further note. On the one hand, there was a call for greater cooperation, action and responsibility on the part of African states for security in Africa. On the other hand, though, there was the consolidation of states as the primary building blocks of the security architecture. Many of the intra-state conflicts that broke out in the 1990s were related to contested legitimacy and the fragility of political authorities, which had existed because of international backing during the Cold War. These conflicts, which often took on ethnic dimensions, were centrally concerned with legitimacy and the exercise of political authority within the state. As such they solidified in some respects the role of the state in African politics.

As argued by Cilliers (2004:48-49), there is no alternative to geographical states as the basic building block for domestic safety and a stable international system. What he notes, however, is that, emerging from the

1990s, there was the shaping of a global consensus on the norms that apply to acceptable state behaviour (Cilliers 2004:49). The notion of what constitutes acceptable state behaviour will be further developed in relation to the expanded security agenda and the erosion of absolute sovereignty. Suffice to say, it was only after this period that the necessity for democratic practices became a central component of the African political identity and the expectation of access to political space became a shared norm. As commented by Carbone (2002:31), with the launch of the AU, a new era began for Africa where peace, democracy and good governance are considered as necessary prerequisites for development.

There is an additional dimension to the security context of the 1990s that has driven the urgency of the continental security agenda. When thinking about the emergence of conflicts during the 1990s, it was not only external factors that contributed to widespread violence. African states provided fertile ground for conflict to flourish. One of the factors that contribute to this is the transnational nature of insecurity on the continent. As De Waal (2000:32) noted, the most fertile ground for conflict escalation is in countries that have emerged from war or where there is war in neighbouring countries. The recognition that the security of one state was intrinsically tied to the security of others contributed to the necessity of developing a collective security regime.

Although the necessity for cooperation and collective security in Africa had become a recognised requirement for improved security and thus development, the operationalisation thereof demanded overcoming the conceptual hurdles that had prevented meaningful and effective cooperation in the past (Franke 2008:319). These conceptual hurdles, as Franke calls them, revolve around overcoming the divergence between the necessity for cooperation and interdependence and the notion of exclusive sovereignty, which implies limitations on full cooperation and independence.

The conceptual shift, which has taken place over the past decade or so, has two defining elements. There was the conceptual shift from regime security to human security and complimentary to that was the move from non-interference to non-indifference. Hammerstad (2005:2) highlights that the

erosion of the norm of absolute sovereignty and the espousal of a comprehensive, people-centred conception of security are complimentary processes – “these two processes follow each other and nourish each other, both logically and in practical terms.”

The notion of absolute sovereignty is no longer perceived as a means of isolating the state against external involvement, but rather sovereignty is increasingly refined as a normative concept of responsibility (Cilliers 2004:39). The concept of absolute sovereignty has evolved into a more nuanced understanding of the responsibilities and tasks of statehood. National sovereignty requires a system of governance based on democracy and popular participation, constructive management of social diversities, respect for fundamental human rights, an equitable distribution of national wealth, and opportunities for development (Cilliers 2004:39).

According to Hammerstad (2005:12), the erosion of the norm of absolute sovereignty and the embrace of a comprehensive understanding of security in Africa have been accompanied by the development of more prominent regional organisations with stronger institutions and broader and more intrusive security mandates. Furthermore, in the 21st century, institutions at regional and sub-regional levels have become increasingly important for dealing with security threats in Africa (Hammerstad 2005:15). This trend was visible during the 1990s as the OAU became more involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution and sought effective institutional arrangements to deal with the complexity of peace and security issues on the continent.

The shift from non-interference to non-indifference was enabled by the learning that had taken place during the OAU era, particularly within the context of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. This learning included experiences with mediation and support for political dialogue in the Comoros (1997); intervention in Burundi (1995) and peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999); election observation in Niger (1993) amongst others; and conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone (1995).

These experiences of the OAU of conflict prevention, management and resolution helped to build the legitimacy of the OAU as a continental actor in the peace and security field. The early attempts at the operationalisation of the continental security architecture also marked an important movement toward multilateral relations and regional security. The role of the OAU in the 1990s showed that states would allow the regional body to play a leading role in conflict prevention, management and resolution, and were the first indicators of the evolution towards a more formalised security community. The OAU, taking some responsibility for peace and security, ushered in the era of 'African solutions for African problems'.

6. The African Union as a Security Community

Franke (2008:316-317) remarks, "At first glance, neither the concept of security communities nor any of the other concepts of security cooperation currently in academic discourse ... seem applicable to Africa's emerging security architecture." The persistence of conflict on the continent has distracted from the application of security cooperation theory to the development of the continental security architecture. The very utility of inter-state security cooperation is questioned due to the continuation of intra-state violence and instability. Central to the notion of a security community is the unacceptability and inconceivability of the use of force - this challenges the consideration of a security community on the African continent.

However, regardless of the existence of domestic instability, regional security cooperation and the AU in particular can be construed as the evolution towards a security community because of the evidenced collective African identity (previously captured in Pan-Africanist terminology), shared norms, values and meanings and common expectations of change. The sociological foundations of security community theory have sound reference in the notion of African unity.

In his 2008 article on Africa's evolving security architecture and the notion of an African continental security community, Benedikt Franke identifies three

defining traits of Africa's continental security community. These traits can be captured as follows:

- *Common values, meanings and understandings* – “In the case of Africa, the pressures of the post-Cold War environment combined with a return of Pan-Africanist ideology to promote the emergence of a shared developmentalist project and a common security culture (that is, an intersubjective system of meanings about security problems and their required solutions)” (Franke 2008:323)
- *Shared commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict* – “In order to qualify as members of a security community ... they (states) need to display a shared commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict and optimally have institutionalized a practical knowledge of such in some kind of rule or regulation structure that generates trust” (Franke 2008:324). Such institutionalised practices can be evidenced in the Constitutive Act of the AU, for example, as well as in the PSC Protocol, and when fully operational, the envisaged African security architecture.
- *Increasing institutionalisation of cooperation* – since the late 1990s and the transformation from the OAU into the AU, regional cooperation has been defined by increasing institutionalisation. In fact, with the notion of a Union Government finding increasing traction, there are signs that the institutionalisation of cooperation within the framework of the AU will intensify even further (Franke 2008:325).

Former President Mbeki captured the evolution towards becoming a security community when at the first heads of state summit in 2002, he made the following call to action:

By forming the Union, the peoples of our continent have made the unequivocal statement that Africa must unite! We as Africans have a common and a shared destiny! Together, we must redefine this destiny for a better life for all the people of this continent.

The first task is to achieve unity, solidarity, cohesion, cooperation among peoples of Africa and African states. We must build all the institutions necessary to deepen political, economic and social integration of the African continent. We must deepen the culture of collective action in Africa and in our relations with the rest of the world.

The establishment of the AU reflects the global trend in favour of ideas of common security based on an international community of citizens, bound together by multiple ties of common interest and a commitment to basic values (Mohammed et al 2002:3). Central to understanding the potential of the AU to be considered a security community is the importance of beliefs, norms and identity as enunciated in the previous chapter and reflected in

Franke (2008) as quoted above. The concept of identity has a position of primacy in security community defined in terms of a sense of “we-ness” (Adler, 1998:170). Adler (1998:170) notes that peaceful change involves a change of identity. Eriksson and Giacomello (2006:233) comment that identities shape interests and, if interests change, it is because of an underlying shift in identities and norms. Frederking (2003:365) explains:

*Identities*² tell agents who they are and who others are; they enable agents to make the actions of themselves and other intelligible ... interests stem from a particular, constructed representation of the relationship between self and other.

The notion of an African identity and the manner in which this identity influences inter-state relations on the continent requires further consideration. Frederking (2003:365) asserts that identities are a type of social rule that constitute and regulate world politics. The notion of a “we-ness” as Africans was highlighted during former President Mbeki’s speech as quoted above. The notion of an African identity is closely tied to the notion of Pan-Africanism. Bjørn Møller (2005:42) describes Pan Africanism as consisting of several elements, namely:

- A shared mythology of a glorious past of African unity
- A collective historical memory of victimisation, stemming from the slave trade and the colonisation of Africa
- A sense of community, that is, of all of Africa ‘belonging together’, perhaps even in the sense of forming one nation
- A shared hope for an ‘African Renaissance’.

The Pan-African movement was formally launched at the London Pan-African Conference of 1900 and represented the reaction of African and Afro-American intelligentsia to European imperialism and white racism³ (Geiss 1969:190). Independence for the colonised African states was a priority on the Pan-Africanist agenda in the post-World War II period (Geiss 1969:193), and this remained so even as states were beginning to be granted political autonomy. Rupert Emerson (1962:275) notes that with the African scramble for independence came a renewed devotion to Pan-Africanism as enunciated

² Italics as in original text

³ For more detailed accounts of the development of the Pan-African movement see Geiss 1969 and Emerson 1962

by Kwame Nkrumah's insistence that the independence of African states only takes on its full meaning if all of Africa is free and if African unity is achieved. The case for African unity rests not only on utilitarian grounds as the need to collaborate and to establish a common front against Africa's enemies (such as colonialism) but also on the conviction that Africans are born to share a common destiny (Emerson 1962:275).

Although throughout the years Pan-Africanism has taken on many guises from the prioritisation of independence to the notion of an African leviathan and to various experimental and compromise positions such as the OAU and more recently efforts such as the Pan-African Parliament. "The simplest and, all in all, perhaps the most satisfactory version of it (i.e. Pan-Africanism) is that sense that all Africans have a spiritual affinity with each other and that, having suffered together in the past, they must march together into a new and brighter future" (Emerson 1962:280). Thus the notion of a collective African identity is based on the belief of a common heritage and the belief in a common future. The sense of "we-ness" that sits at the heart of efforts towards regional integration in Africa rests upon a common identity that "has been forged in the flames of (their) common suffering." This common suffering has its roots in the slave trade and colonial rule, and in order to prevent a return to such exploitation, African states are driven towards collaboration and unity as the basis for a common future.

The impact of Pan-Africanism and common identity on national and regional politics has been mixed. On the one hand, as argued by Ake (1965:535), Pan-Africanism has influenced domestic politics by encouraging policies that maximise political independence. This prioritisation of independence was exemplified by the position of the OAU on non-interference and the centrality of territorial sovereignty. Perhaps this could be interpreted as a response to the shared understanding of priorities at that time reflective of the experiences with colonial rule and the negative impact of foreign involvement on domestic affairs.

An alternative view is that the net effect of Pan-Africanism has been to promote "institutional uniformity in Africa by focusing the attention of African

governments on common problems and pressuring them into adopting certain standard solutions to these problems” (Ake 1965:539). “Increased inter-African intercourse, consciousness of the continent’s uniqueness, a vague belief in a common destiny, and the failure of certain imported Western institutions have predisposed Africans to look increasingly within the continent for answers to their problems” (Ake 1965:539). Thus, the manner in which Pan-Africanism as a common identity impacts upon regional security can be situated in terms of the manner in which security interests, threats and responses are defined. Indeed a common identity can be said to have influenced the prioritisation of independence from foreign rule as a security imperative in the immediate post-colonial period, which in turn had national and foreign policy implications.

Perhaps the continued utility of the concept of Pan-Africanism lies not in its value as a political ideology, but rather in its effect on social constructs. As noted by Anderson (1991:204), narratives of identity have historical frames and sociological settings. Pan-Africanism can be interpreted as an imagined community; as a way to link fraternity, power and time (Anderson 1991:26). It provides a sense of identity and commonality as well as a sense of we-ness and continuity. The notion of continuity, so central to Anderson’s (1991) conceptualisation of imagined communities, resonates in Pan-Africanism as a means for African societies to evolve towards a unified state of peace. Adopting an evolutionary approach, one can interpret the continued relevance of Pan-Africanism in terms of a continued search of Africans to imagine themselves as part of a particular community characterised by independence and peace. Pan-Africanism has offered an alternative source of identity in the face of a lack of global unity (Africans are distinct by race, history and power inequality) and weak and fragmented national identities. It provides an avenue for Africans to imagine themselves as part of “a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991:7).

The notion of a common identity can also be exemplified in more current events such as the position taken by the AU on the warrant of the International Criminal Court issued against Sudanese President Omar Al-

Bashir or the lack of sanction from SADC against Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (see for example Human Rights Watch, 2009). In both instances a sense of African leaders being unfairly persecuted by Western power interests led towards other continental leaders adopting positions of unity with them. Thus, a sense of “we-ness” can be said to influence the definition of interests and the creation of common meanings.

The importance of the expectation of peaceful change as characteristic of the security community concept finds resonance in the conflict prevention, management and resolution prioritisation of the AU. Furthermore, it is within this broader conflict prevention, management and resolution context that the CEWS and CISSA are relevant. The emergence of these mechanisms is evidence of the shared commitment to security, and the orientation towards conflict prevention can be linked to the shared commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict.

Furthermore, as highlighted by Deutsch (quoted in Adler 1998:174), communication is the social glue that enables people to share common meanings across national borders and therefore a common normative environment. Both the CEWS and CISSA are centrally concerned with communication and providing platforms for the exchange of information. Adler (1998:174) explains that communication processes and transaction flows are factories of shared identification and through communication and transactions “a social fabric is woven among both elites and the masses, instilling in them a sense of community” (Adler 1998:174). Indeed, the existence of a platform for intelligence cooperation, in particular, can be interpreted as a reflection of community, as states have agreed to cooperate in one of the most sensitive areas of state security. The willingness to engage in collaborative intelligence efforts is indicative of a sense of “we-ness” as opposed to excessive secrecy and exclusive sovereignty.

Franke (2008) highlights that the peaceful resolution of conflict and the expression of power by means short of physical violence characterise a security community. At national level, this aspect remains a challenge. The resort to violent means to resolve internal conflicts or contestations for political

and economic power is a feature of governance in Africa. Mohammed et al (2002:5) refer to this phenomenon as the “militarisation of governance”, explaining that “decision-makers resort to force because it is quick and, they hope, decisive, and because they do not have the patience or skill for other means of resolving their problems.”

As Mohammed et al (2002:4) ask: Is prevailing internal peace an essential precondition for an inter-state security order? For the purposes of this dissertation, the argument is made that, because of the intractable nature of conflict in Africa, the distinction between internal and external security is misplaced. Even within the broader global context, the nature of security and insecurity in the globalised world order has decreased the relevance of borders and the ability to separate national, regional and international security concerns and responses. Furthermore, as argued in Mohammed et al (2002:4), because of spillover effects of conflicts in Africa and the susceptibility of African societies to conflict, all conflicts need to be addressed in a systematic inclusive fashion.

The question then remains that, given the weakness of the building blocks that make up the AU, can the AU be considered as a step towards the creation of a security community in Africa? The obstacles facing the AU are daunting. However, the position advanced in this dissertation is that the AU is aspiring towards being a security community, and the ideals expressed in the Constitutive Act, protocol and declarations represent the hope of the people and leaders of the continent that unity will lead to stability. The building blocks of security community are common beliefs, norms and identities. The argument presented here is that through the Pan-African agenda there is evidence of a common identity, which shapes the definition of interests. The Constitutive Act, protocols and declarations can be interpreted as reflecting agreed upon common norms and standards of acceptable behaviour – for example, defining parameters in which the use of force is legitimate in inter-state behaviour in the Common African Defence and Security Policy.

The drive towards integration has coincided with democratic consolidation and advancement processes at national level. Regional integration and the AU

have to be seen in the broader framework of simultaneous institution building at national and regional levels. National identities and values have been placed under increasing pressure due to tensions between traditional and modern values and the divisive and fragmented practices of post-colonial states. Regionalism in Africa needs to be viewed as an alternative to nationalism and as a means to overcome some of the weaknesses that have been endemic to national governance on the continent. The development of identities, norms and values at regional level create a supporting framework for the development of expectations of peaceful change.

The evolution of regional integration in Africa challenges some of the theoretical constructs of international relations that are more suited to Western contexts in which stable liberal democratic states are opted for integration and cooperation as means to extend power and achieve gain. In Africa, there has been a two-track process of achieving independence, democracy and stability at national level and developing regional mechanisms to cope with uncertainty in the inter-state environment. As the process of integration continues, the practices of democracy and good governance, as well as the development of collective understandings and expectations of peaceful change will be advanced. The AU provides a platform for increased interactions and for the evolution towards a security community. This should, however, not be treated as a given end state. The challenges are immense and a cautiously optimistic approach can be advocated. As concluded by Franke (2008:334):

I also called for a less cynical view of inter-African security cooperation. Although the tensions and rivalries that have characterized (sic) Africa's institutional landscape have thus far cast a penumbra of doubt over the ability of the continent to establish a viable peace and security architecture, the past decade has seen several important developments. Yet, it is true that many challenges remain... Consequently, even though the Deutschian terminology of security communities suits the conditions in parts of Africa well, since there has indeed been gradual development towards improved security relations, this should not be interpreted to mean that there is something inevitable about this process.

Indeed, the realisation of sustained non-violent change will take new ways of thinking and interacting and calls for resilience and commitment to something greater than individual well-being.

7. Conclusion

Although the entrenched concept of sovereignty has plagued security cooperation in Africa since the birth of independent states, regional institutions to address conflict prevention, management and resolution have evolved out of necessity. Due to the central role that states continue to play, the regional security architecture is at best a compromise on the path to greater cooperation.

However, the path towards security and stability in Africa only started with independence. Global equality did not come with independence, and the need to unify and bound together against global forces has always been a part of the African integration agenda. The powerful forces of African identity are the foundation for African integration and as such bear relevance for the consideration of the AU as evolving towards being a security community in which peace becomes the defining characteristic.

It is in working towards the goals of peace and security that CEWS and CISSA are framed, and the potential roles of these mechanisms can only be understood against the backdrop of regional integration and regional approaches to security as outlined in this chapter. Furthermore, the potential role of the CEWS and CISSA has to be viewed within the framework of building a security community characterised by shared meanings and understandings, common values and identity. This chapter has laid the foundation for considering the potential role of CEWS and CISSA in contributing to regional security, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. Before that, however, the CEWS and CISSA will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.

Chapter 4 - The Development of the Continental Early Warning System

1. Introduction

The concept of early warning is closely related to the notion of conflict prevention. At the level of international organisations such as the AU, the necessity of early warning is framed within the need to prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflict. Thus, if warning of potential conflict is provided, mechanisms to prevent the escalation or outbreak of the conflict can be mobilised and deployed. The purpose of this chapter is to further explore conflict early warning and to consider the development of the early warning system at the AU as a mechanism to provide conflict early warning. This will include an analysis of the current status of operationalisation of the CEWS.

The objectives of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, it aims to consider early warning as a means of operationalising the PSC conflict prevention mandate. This is done through analysing conflict early warning and conflict early warning systems. The second aim is to create a platform from which to further analyse the role of the CEWS in contributing to regional security in a way that builds on the theoretical framework provided in Chapters 2 and 3. The further analysis is enabled through the descriptive analysis of CEWS provided in this chapter.

2. Background to conflict early warning


Early warning systems for the prevention of *conflict* are 'latecomers' compared with their application in other fields (Wulf & Debiel 2009:3). Various types of early warning systems have emerged to assist national and international actors in the early anticipation of and timely preparation for natural disasters, the outbreak of famine, political destabilisation and forced migration (Schnabel & Krummenacher 2009:2).

Andriole and Young (1977:107-108) capture the trajectory of the development of early warning thinking in the 1970s as having four important lines: first, basic research regarding the sources and decision-making processes of crisis

proliferated since the early 1960s; second, interdisciplinary research regarding the development and use of quantitative variables and indicators progressed; third, the art of forecasting convincingly evolved into a credible science; and finally, computerised techniques were developed for the storage, retrieval, manipulation, and display of data.

Early warning efforts do not intend to suppress conflict, but rather to respond to the way a conflict develops (von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller 2006:3). “The objective of conflict early warning and crisis prevention initiatives in this sense is to prevent the use of violence or to transform the violent conflict into constructive dialogue” (von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller 2006:3). Conflict early warning is conceived as a means of preserving and protecting lives (Nyheim 2008:7).

Early warning is concerned with managing uncertainty and developing a coherent picture of events before or as they unfold. As Gurr and Moore (1997:80) note:



Those who make foreign and international policy seek more than explanation: they want better ‘early warnings’ of impending conflicts so that preventative diplomacy and other conflict management tools can be brought into play.

The goal of early warning can be conceived as minimising the impact of violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that threaten the sustainability of human development (Davies 2000:1). Theoretically, early warning allows for decision-makers to prepare short-term containment strategies and longer-term proactive strategies to reduce the likelihood of future crises (Davies 2000:1). Alexander Austin (2004:2) defines an early warning system as:

(A)ny initiative that focuses on systemic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both.

Modern early warning systems therefore have two focus areas: understanding (1) symptoms of conflict and (2) the underlying causes of conflict. As enunciated by Nhara (1996):

Early warning is ultimately aimed to assist with addressing the 'root causes' of conflict and must allow for the development of proper understanding of situations, their development, conditions for resolution and guidance for better settlement. It entails ways of forestalling or alleviating the worst effects of conflict, including early intervention to transform or resolve conflicts.

Woocher (2008:3) identifies three components of early warning as:

- 1) Estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging threats;
- 2) Analysing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios;
- 3) Communicating early warning analyses to decision makers.

As highlighted in the aspects of early warning as identified by Woocher above and noted by Cilliers (2005), early warning needs to consist of more than just the timely provision and sharing of relevant information and requires the analysis of that information as well as the formulation and communication of analyses and policy options to relevant end-users. Early warning is thus concerned with information collection, analysis and dissemination. As explained by Von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller (2006:4), conflict early warning systems are designed to provide information on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in a timely manner. "The information is then processed to develop scenarios, anticipate most likely developments and to propose appropriate response options designed to prevent and/ or limit violent conflicts" (von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller 2006:4).

Most of the accepted definitions of early warning use terminology like "relevant end-user" in reference to Cilliers (2005) above. As noted by Wulf and Debiel (2009:3), the underlying assumptions of most early warning systems is that international actors will take responsibility as protectors as soon as adequate information is being processed along with rules and procedures for initiating appropriate action at the level of an international or regional organisation. As Von Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller (2006:4) explain, effective conflict early warning systems should "help mitigate conflict by providing strategic advice to decision-makers." Less attention is paid to disseminating early warning information to local levels for response.

According to Davies (2000:1-2) early warning systems should:

- Supply reports from those on the ground regarding highly visible or rapidly escalating crises;
- Provide reliable analyses that identify latent, low-level conflicts or instabilities while there is still time to invest in structural development and conflict management capacity;
- Generate analyses that identify key factors driving instability;
- Provide a basis from which to assess likely future scenarios;
- Recommend appropriate options for local and international policy-makers oriented towards early action;
- Keep track of what preventative strategies have been used in what contexts in the past, to what effect and at what cost.

As indicated in this discussion, the expectations of what an early warning system can achieve are ambitious to say the least. Having a concern with both structural causes of conflict and with the outbreak of conflict or escalating crisis, means that early warning is tasked to provide both strategic and operational or tactical reports. Furthermore, as per the conceptualisation of Davies above, early warning systems also need to provide some form of monitoring and evaluation capacity to track the implementation of preventative strategies.

Conflict early warning raises highly political questions about causes, triggers and the impact of various role-players on the development of conflict situations. Control of information flows is deeply political and security is not a neutral, value-free concept (Cilliers 2006:9). Conflict early warning can be a highly contentious undertaking. The contention, however, lies not only in understanding what early warning is designed to do, but also in creating systems that can provide the type of information required to enable the provision of reliable and timely early warning information. The analytical tools designed to serve early warning purposes make selections from vast quantities of information, organise that information according to pre-determined parameters and allow for the generation of scenarios. This undertaking seeks to simplify fluid and complex conflict situations. The manner in which this is done – i.e. the methodological approach – is at the heart of much contention surrounding conflict early warning.

The debate on conflict early warning methodologies tends to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative analytical tools for conflict analysis. The difference lies in the manner in which information is collected and processed. Qualitative early warning systems rely on field-based analysts or special envoys, often posted within the region in question, to monitor and conduct specific research (Austin 2004:5; Matveeva 2006:14). It is often within the realm of non-governmental organisations and international advocacy that qualitative methodologies are used. The reports of Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and International Crisis Group exemplify qualitative early warning systems. Qualitative data is able to provide in-depth, context and actor sensitive and typically narrative information (Matveeva 2006:16).

According to Austin (2004:6) quantitative early warning systems celebrated their heydays during the 1960s when, driven by large government budgets, academics and researchers sought to construct theoretical models for understanding political behaviour. By the mid 1980s they had lost their flavour due to the consuming human and financial resources required (Austin 2004:6). However, with improved technology and new information sources such as the Internet, quantitative early warning methodologies regained their significance in the 1990s (Austin 2004:6).

Quantitative systems aim “to ascertain the preceding contextual structures, events and processes that caused the outbreak of violence from empirical evidence” (Matveeva 2006:13). In trying to find causes of conflict, quantitative early warning systems examine data for causal relationships: when A is present, how often does B follow it? (Austin 2004:16). An argument for quantitative early warning would be that a state’s macro-structural factors – its internal and external economic complex, resource endowment, demographic pressures, ethnic and religious diversity and government performance – form the conditions that affect its susceptibility to different forms of conflict (O’Brien 2002:795). Therefore, as explained by O’Brien (2002:795):

If one could identify and validate the macrostructural factors that make states more susceptible to conflict in one configuration and less

susceptible in another, then forecasts on these generally predictable factors could, in turn, be used to forecast the likelihood that states will experience a certain level of intensity of instability at some generally specific point in the future.

The main objective of quantitative early warning is to isolate the factors that contribute to the outbreak of conflict or make violent conflict more likely (Austin 2004:16). The underlying assumption is that the origins of conflict lie in empirically observable casual relationships. However, referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2 on social constructions and political behaviour, perceptions and understandings of reality drive the definitions of interests, behaviours and actions. As Austin (2004:17) observes, the origins of conflict do not lie in causal relationships outside of the individual but rather within the perception of the individual or group. These reasons for resorting to violent conflict cannot be ascertained through empirical evidence alone. Matveeva (2006:14) supports this argument, noting that grievance is not a static quota given equally to all, but rather an ever-changing force where there are as many grievance tolerance levels as there are people.

Quantitative methods, as indicated by O'Brien (2002) in the above quotation, rely on the assumption that socio-economic, macro-structural factors are the prime determinants of conflict. As such, issues of power, identity and ideology are ignored in favour of the search for objective reasons for the resort to violent behaviour. By focusing on social and economic indicators, quantitative models often fail to explain why conflict occurred in one country but not in another with similar developmental problems (Matveeva 2006:15).

This should not infer that qualitative methodologies are preferable, as reliance on qualitative data has its own shortcomings, most notably "the potential for subjectivity and interference of political ideology" (Matveeva 2006:14-15). The appeal of quantitative methods lies in the perceived neutrality of observable reality and the removing of political and ideological biases that underlie qualitative methodologies. Matveeva (2006:17) explains

Quantitative or statistical methods have as an important asset their power in terms of presentation: they convey a sense of objectivity, even if on closer examination it is apparent that data is collected from a

certain political perspective. Striving for objectivity is an important aspiration in the early warning field, but in practice one has to acknowledge that all data are prone to subjective interpretation.

By emphasising its scientific character and devoting attention to objective or structural causes of conflict, early warning moves away from scrutinising the behaviour of leadership groups and the role of personalities in politics (Matveeva 2006:15). Matveeva (2006:15) thus observes that statistical and events-based methods are more suited to conflict situations in weak states than in authoritarian states. “When issues of conflict are already in the open and violence has broken out, it is easier to see who has a stake in violence or peace” (Matveeva 2006:15).

Matveeva (2006:16) notes reluctance on the part of early warning practitioners to collect and report on “risky” issues and rather to only explore dimensions of conflict they have the capacity and opportunity to act upon. In designing early warning systems, methodological decisions are highly political decisions based on whom the system serves, who the stakeholders are and what conflict prevention tools available. It is not purely a choice of quantitative or qualitative methodology, as dual systems can also be employed. Methodological choices will, however, impact on the potential of the system to provide early warning and will determine the type of information that can be provided. Methodological decisions will influence the contexts to be studied and the types of conflict to be analysed, and will also determine and be determined by the scope of responses available.

3. Background to the establishment of the CEWS

Efforts to institutionalise a mechanism for conflict early warning began with the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (hereafter referred to as the Mechanism) in the OAU. At the 29th Heads of State summit of the OAU held in Cairo, Egypt in June 1993, the declaration to create the Mechanism was adopted. According to the declaration, the primary objective of the Mechanism was the anticipation and prevention of conflict (OAU 1993 Declaration 3 Item 15). As explained by Nhara (1998):

The decision to establish this Mechanism within the OAU was reached against a realisation that there was no way Africa could improve its socio-economic performance...in an ocean of wars, conflicts and domestic tension. The Heads of State and Government saw in the establishment of such a Mechanism the opportunity to bring to the process of dealing with conflicts on the African continent a new institutional dynamism, enabling speedy action to prevent or manage and, ultimately, resolve conflicts when and where they occur.

As per the Cairo Declaration, the Mechanism consisted of a Central Organ with the Secretary General and Secretariat as its operational arm (OAU 1993 Declaration 3 Item 17) and a special fund (OAU 1993 Declaration 3 Item 23). In 1994, the Mechanism created a Division for Conflict Management tasked with the development of policy options and the coordination of activities in support of the Mechanism (Cilliers 2005). According to Cilliers (2005), the Division for Conflict Management was expected to:

- (a) Collect, collate and disseminate information relating to current and potential conflicts;
- (b) Prepare and present policy options to the Secretary General of the OAU;
- (c) Undertake or commission analysis and long-term research;
- (d) Support and manage political, civilian and military observer missions and coordinate regional training policies to support peacekeeping operations.

Although the institutions and practices of the Mechanism laid the foundation for the peace and security architecture of the AU, the notion of a formal early warning system was absent. By 1996, the need for an early warning system within the Mechanism had become recognised as is highlighted by this extract from the 1996 Heads of State summit in Yaounde, Cameroon (AU 1996):

We hail in advance the imminent institution within the said Mechanism of our early warning system (EWS) on conflictual situations in Africa, convinced that its establishment should be able to further improve the action of the Organization in the area of preventive diplomacy by making it possible, notably through pre-emptive action in gathering and analyzing pertinent data, not only to establish the existence of a threat to the peace, but also to look for a quick way to remove the threat. We exhort all potential data collectors to communicate the same information in time and provide the OAU Mechanism regularly with any at their disposal on warning signs of imminent conflict.

The Yaounde Declaration followed on previous steps taken to explore the modalities of an early warning system at continental level. In January 1996, an experts meeting was held in Addis Ababa “to brainstorm on the modalities for establishing such a network so that it could take care of the need for timely information on potential conflict situations” (Ibok 2000:8). The original conceptualisation of the CEWS was to create an information-sharing network with capacity for analysis and the development of policy recommendations at the regional level. As explained by Ibok (2000:8-9):

As envisaged, the Early Warning Network would have OAU Member States as key focal points, including, of course subregional organisations like ECOWAS, SADC, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and IGAD among others, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, academic institutions, research centres, the media and NGOs. It is the expectation of the OAU that the information which will be sourced from such a Network would be appropriately analyzed, so that accurate information, data, policy options and recommendations, could be provided to the Secretary General and the Central Organ, for early political action.

The modalities and methodologies for analysis were not deeply explored during this initial experimentation with early warning. The focus was on establishing new networks and formalising existing ones “so as to meet the need for quality information gathering, analysis and presentation of policy options” (Cilliers 2005). The main result of efforts during the 1990s aimed at establishing a continental early warning system was the establishment of the Situation Room at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa.

The Division for Conflict Management was mostly occupied with conducting fact-finding and observer missions, as was the case with the joint UN and OAU missions to the Comoros and Burundi. Special Envoys, such as former Heads of State, were also used to encourage dialogue and mediation during political crises. In this form, the initial experiments with continental early warning lacked true institutionalisation and operated more as an initial reaction system. As quoted in Cilliers (2005), a 1999 OAU report entitled ‘A Comprehensive Framework for Strengthening the Mechanism’ summarised that:

More than five years after the adoption of the Declaration establishing the Mechanism, the Central Organ still lacks adequate information to effectively predict, plan for, prevent and manage the complex and numerous conflicts that have plagued the region. It also lacks the capacity for in-depth analysis of strategic options on which to base decisions.

Part of the challenge for developing an early warning capacity within the Division for Conflict Management was that there was a failure to secure agreement and support for an empirically based indicators module around which to operationalise the early warning network. At an experts meeting in 1998, two sets of indicators were discussed but were not adopted by the statutory authorities (Cilliers 2005). The proposed sets of indicators were (1) for the prediction of impending conflict and (2) to indicate ongoing conflict.

The development towards a continental early warning capacity began within the Division for Conflict Management of the OAU. The OAU was challenged by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and the fulfilment of the conflict prevention mandate was restricted. However, in the 1990s, member states began to allow the OAU and the Mechanism in particular to play an increasingly active role in conflict prevention, management and resolution. Ibok (2000:9) adds:

Indeed, this improved environment for action has meant that our Member States no longer instinctively cling to the concepts of non-interference and sovereignty. On the contrary, there has been growing acceptance of the fact that the OAU can constructively, get involved in promoting political dialogue and helping resolve conflicts. The readiness of Member States to call upon the OAU to facilitate negotiations, observe and sometimes even monitor elections, is a manifestation of this growing positive disposition towards the Continental Organization.

The optimistic assessment of Ibok (2000) refers to but one part of the picture. Experiences with conflict prevention, management and resolution at the OAU laid the foundations for an enhanced conflict prevention, management and resolution mandate for the AU. The changed political climate on the continent enabled the progression towards greater collaborative security mechanisms. However, the sensitivities surrounding security in Africa continue to affect the manner in which regional and national security tensions are negotiated. In the

context of the CEWS, this is most evident in the approach to indicators and conflict early warning. The notion of predicting conflict was always viewed with suspicion and caution and developing indicators, which could label states as potential conflict zones, was a precarious undertaking. This aspect continues to affect the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the continental early warning capacity, as will be further discussed below.

4. Continental early warning: what, why and how

Since the creation of the PSC of the AU, the concern for the prioritisation and institutionalisation of early warning found an answer in Article 12 of the Durban Protocol, which made provision for the CEWS. The primary function of the CEWS is to “facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (PSC Protocol Article 12(1)). According to the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS, the purpose of the CEWS “is the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security and to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflict” (AU 2008:66).

Article 12(2) of the Protocol further outlines that the CEWS shall consist of:

- An observation and monitoring centre, to be known as ‘The Situation Room’, located at the Conflict Management Directorate and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module, and
- Observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.

Similar to the original conceptualisation of the CEWS under the OAU, the Protocol further establishes that the effective functioning of the CEWS will be facilitated through collaboration with the UN and its agencies, other relevant international organisations, research centres, academic institutions and non-governmental organisations (PSC Protocol Article 12(3)).

Furthermore, the CEWS was tasked to develop “an early warning module to be based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military

and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyse developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action” (PSC Protocol Article 12(4)). This early warning module is commonly associated with the development of some type of automated electronic process enabled by technology to assist with bulk information processing. Besides being a practical consideration because of the masses of open source information that would need to be processed, Cilliers (2005) notes that the use of an automated system might provide a degree of “technical protection”. He explains (Cilliers 2005):

The use of some type of automated electronic process (as opposed to having an approach based only on human deductive reasoning) would provide a degree of objective automation to the work of early warning. Having decided on particular indicators of emerging conflict, an indicator’s module would, in theory, trigger some type of red light report and compel the provision of an alert to the Commission and possibly the PSC. In this manner, the inherent suspicion of the political manipulation of data as part of early warning could be averted and the staff of the CEWS would be provided with some level of ‘technical protection’.

This point should be noted for further discussion as the highly political nature of the content of early warning reports could present a significant challenge to the ability of the CEWS to provide warning and for the PSC to initiate preventative action.


The primary client of the information generated by the CEWS is the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU. The Chairperson is tasked in the Protocol to use the information from the CEWS to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and to recommend the best course of action (PSC Protocol Article 12(5)). As explained by former Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Said Djinnit (2008:9):

This structure (CEWS) is core to the fulfilment of the Union’s conflict prevention, management and resolution mandate. Without the capacity to monitor, analyse and develop tailored and timely responses and policy options to threats to peace and security on the Continent, the AU would be severely limited in its ability to address these appropriately...In fulfilment of his/ her responsibility to advise the PSC on potential threats to peace and security in Africa, as well as recommend best courses of action, the Chairperson therefore relies on

a well functioning, comprehensive and AU specific early warning system...Consequently, the CEWS assumes a critical role as regards the ability of key institutions of the Union and other pillars of the peace and security architecture to perform their responsibilities.

The structure of the CEWS can be diagrammatically represented as below:

Figure 1: Structure of the CEWS (adapted from Cilliers 2005)



In a report of the status of the establishment of the continental peace and security architecture presented at the 57th meeting of the PSC on 21 June 2006 in Addis Ababa, the process towards the establishment of the CEWS was outlined. Several important meetings and consultations have formed the basis of developing the CEWS. Even before the entry into force of the PSC Protocol, the AU Commission hosted an experts meeting on the establishment of the CEWS in Addis Ababa from 30-31 October 2003. This meeting brought together representatives from civil society, academia, think tanks and representatives from governments and inter-governmental organisations. The platform for the development of the CEWS was laid at this meeting and some of the recommendations are still visible in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the CEWS as detailed in later documents.

This first experts meeting in October 2003 made the following recommendations (PSC 2008:39):

- (a) Begin with significant threats of violence and loss of life as the entry point in the AU's early warning system;
- (b) Build a measureable, verifiable and standard database that is simple, user friendly, based on multi-levelled and field-based sources;
- (c) Develop an analytical capacity and expertise within the AU on early warning, conflict prevention and conflict management;
- (d) Establish diagnostic linkages between analysis and desired outcomes so as to provide the AU with regular reports on conflict situations.

The next step in the process was the development of a draft "Roadmap". This was done during an experts meeting organised by the AU Commission from 27-29 July 2005 (PSC 2008:39). The draft Roadmap was further deliberated upon at the governmental experts meeting held in Kempton Park, South Africa in 2006. The purpose of the Kempton Park meeting was to finalise and adopt the draft Roadmap (PSC 2008:41).

4.1 Roadmap for the operationalisation of the CEWS

At the Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, a Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS (hereafter referred to as the Roadmap) was adopted. This section will highlight aspects of the Roadmap in order to develop a clearer understanding of the CEWS, more specifically in terms of what functions the CEWS has been designed to fulfil and the methodology behind it.

4.1.1. Key elements of the Continental Early Warning System

The Roadmap highlights that, in order for CEWS to fulfil its conflict prevention mandates, there needs to be a strong link between information, analysis and action (AU 2008:66). In order to fulfil this purpose, the following four key elements to the operationalisation of the CEWS are identified (AU 2008:66):

- Data collection
- Strategic analysis
- Reports and engagement with decision-makers

- Coordination and collaboration.

These four elements have become the four pillars of the CEWS. In practice, separating the elements into four areas of activity is difficult, as overlaps, especially between collection and analysis, are unavoidable. The indicators module is the central component that ties collection, analysis and dissemination together for a common purpose. As explained in the Roadmap, data collection and analysis shall be undertaken on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module (AU 2008:67). As the indicators module is central to understanding the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the CEWS, it will be discussed in more detail below.

4.1.2. Indicators Module of the Continental Early Warning System

Article 12 of the PSC Protocol establishing the CEWS tasks the CEWS to develop “an early warning module to be based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action” (PSC Protocol Article 12(4)). According to the 2006 Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS (AU 2008:68):

(T)he implementation of the indicators module will allow the CEWS to undertake the systematic monitoring of risk indicators, including the analysis of trends and dynamics and their significance in their specific structural contexts. While the immediate focus must be on significant threats of violence and loss of life, the indicators module must also focus on underlying structural causes of conflict.

This means that the CEWS is envisaged as being able to provide both strategic and operational early warning and would require an indicators module capable of generating reports on the emergence of conflict and the long-term potential for conflict.

Because of the various purposes of early warning systems, there are various early warning modules or methodologies based on specific criteria and assumptions and designed for specific purposes. Verstegen (1999) introduced four ideal type models:

- a) Correlation models – focus on structural indicators and future outbreaks of violence;
- b) Sequential models – try to understand when particular events lead to escalating a crisis;
- c) Conjunctural models – seek to establish what factor combinations lead to violence;
- d) Response models – try to identify windows of opportunity for intervention in crisis situations.

The proposal for an indicators module presented at the Kempton Park conference and the approach advocated for the CEWS was a mixture of Versteegen's sequential and conjunctural models. The rejection of the correlation model approach was based on the apprehension of "making bold claims towards a universal explanation of violent conflict and, thus, a single list with a limited number of indicators valid for all African countries" (AU 2008:84). This area of prediction was probably too politically sensitive, as it would involve labelling countries in terms of conflict propensity. This serves as an example of how the CEWS has developed through negotiating difficult political terrain.

The indicators module developed for the CEWS entails a four-step process: (1) matching conflict information against a framework of conflict early warning indicators; (2) information gathering; (3) information analysis; and (4) production of outcomes and reporting (AU 2008:85). These four steps are further outlined in the proposal for the indicators module as presented at the Kempton Park conference as follows (AU 2008:85-92):

Step 1: Matching conflict information against a framework of conflict early warning indicators

The approach of CEWS is to utilise the decisions and commitments of the AU and its predecessor the OAU as the foundation for the development of conflict indicators. These documents represent a consolidated framework of commonly accepted norms and principles which when interpreted *ex negativo* can be translated into a list of attitudes and behaviours that African leaders disapprove of (AU 2008:85). An example of how this works is provided below:

Table 2: Example of CEWS Indicator Module (adapted from AU 2008:86)

Objective	Documents adopted by the OAU and the AU ⁴	Generic early warning indicators
Prevention and reduction of intra- and inter-state conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, 2005 • Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, 2004 • Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism, 2003 • Durban Declaration on the Control of Illicit Drug Trafficking and Abuse, 2002 • AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002 • Memorandum of Understanding on the CSSDCA, 2002 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horizontal or vertical escalation of violent conflict • Increase in human rights violations • Armed insurrections • Border conflict • Border skirmishes • Preparation of an insurgency from a neighbouring country • Expulsion of identity groups

The rationale is to focus on active conflict zones and limit the scope of conflict early warning. Evidence of this approach is highlighted in the Roadmap (AU 2008:68):

Attention will be focused on a limited number of cases at first which either (i) are extremely likely to face violent conflict in the immediate future, or (ii) are already in conflict, or (iii) have been in conflict in their more recent past.

Furthermore, as explained in the Roadmap (AU 2008:69), by basing the indicators module on existing standards (i.e. the protocols and documents from which the early warning indicators were determined) the framework ensures “a degree of objectivity in the selection of cases to be brought on the political agenda and in front of the PSC.”


This means that the presence of conflict serves as the basis for attention by the CEWS. This then activates step 2 of the early warning process.

⁴ A selection of those mentioned in the proposal are provided here merely as an indication. The complete list and table is not required for the purposes of this discussion.

Step 2: Information gathering – conducting modified Strategic Conflict Assessments

When there is sufficient match between the indicators and current developments in a given Member State, the CMD⁵ has probable cause to start analysing the situation (AU 2008:90). Step 2 entails conducting a Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) to generate an overview of the background and dynamics of a violent conflict unfolding and to address more comprehensively problems of causation, action and dynamics (AU 2008:90). The SCA seems like a generic conflict analysis methodology entailing analysis of actors and intentions and factors driving or inhibiting conflict. A three-step conflict analysis methodology is adopted to develop an SCA. This can be represented as below (AU 2008:90):

Figure 2: Strategic Conflict Assessment Process (AU, 2008:90)



As per the design of the CEWS, the information for generating the SCA is to be sourced only from open sources. These sources of data as identified in the Roadmap (AU 2008:67) include:

- AU field mission reports and field monitor reports
- Inputs from Member States and the regional economic communities
- International organisations including the United Nations
- The media, academia, non-governmental organisations and think-tanks

⁵ Conflict Management Division of the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission

An analysis like SCA would be useful for considering the range of options and potential intervention strategies during a conflict or escalation towards conflict.

Step 3: Information analysis – Monitoring

According to the indicator module as adopted in the Roadmap, on the basis of an SCA, the information analysis role of the Conflict Management Division is activated (AU 2008:92). “If an SCA produces information of the existence of a potential for violent conflict, the situation has to be monitored” (AU 2008:92). Such monitoring would be produced in the regular reports, such as Daily and Mission Reports, which are discussed further below.

Step 4: Producing outcomes – Reporting

The final phase of the process is the production of early warning reports “to its end-users to alarm them to up-coming potential of/ or violent conflict and enable them to take appropriate political action” (AU 2008:92). These reports are to complement the other products of the CEWS.

The primary responsibility for the collection of information and dissemination of reports lies with the Situation Room within the Conflict Management Division located at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. On a daily basis, the Situation Room “solicits, collates, screens and disseminates relevant information to a variety of stakeholders” (AU 2008:67). According to an information pamphlet dispensed by the Situation Room⁶, the Situation Room is an integral part of the CEWS and the AU Conflict Management Division “where information is monitored continuously on situations of simmering, potential and actual conflict, as well as post-conflict initiatives and activities in Africa.”

The Situation Room is responsible for producing several reports including News Highlights, Daily Reports, Flash Reports, Country Profiles and Mission Reports. It is at the level of the Situation Room that issues around information management are vital.

⁶ See Appendix 1 for copy

In order to fully enable the Situation Room to deliver on the ambitious reporting requirements, the Roadmap recommended (AU 2008:68):

the introduction of an automated data gathering and processing system; the introduction of an internal news trends tracking service; the development of a system of grading sources and reports to reduce information overflow and to increase efficiency; greater use of African information sources; and the strengthening of the existing system of internal country profiles.

By 2009, there was an operational automated news clipping service within the Situation Room. According to the information pamphlet distributed at the Situation Room⁷:

The Situation Room has access to online information sources, including Dialogue, NewsEdge, Reuters, Agence France Presse (AFP), Oxford Analytica and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The Situation Room, with the support of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, has developed a new software “the Africa News Brief”, an automated information gathering tool, which collects information from a variety of open sources in real-time and in all African languages. It has also designed and developed a CEWS Portal, which serves as a one-stop-shop to access data collection and analysis tools. It is used for information sharing with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and archiving relevant documents.

The *modus operandi* of the CEWS had to be accepted by member states, and what is reflected in the above description seems to be the product of negotiation and the finding of a politically acceptable system for continental early warning. The methodology of this system is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods utilising both country reports and an empirically based indicators module. By basing the CEWS indicator module on regional agreements and protocols, an attempt was made to imbue the system with a degree of objectivity. Furthermore, by basing the system on cases that (i) are extremely likely to face violent conflict in the immediate future, or (ii) are already in conflict, or (iii) have been in conflict in their more recent past (AU, 2008:68), a cautionary approach is applied.

⁷ See Appendix 1 for copy

This caution could be related to not only the political sensitivities of early warning, but also to the possible deployment of conflict prevention tools by the AU. Moving from the OAU to the AU marked a fundamental shift regarding the issue of intervention. Reports generated by the CEWS would be the basis for decisions by the PSC to intervene in conflict situations. When agreeing on the indicators on which to base the CEWS, member states were implicitly agreeing to criteria on which the PSC would consider deploying fact-finding missions, observer missions, high-level mediation teams and even military forces. Early warning reports could embarrass governments, question the ability of the government to exercise territorial control, bring to light abuses on the part of government forces and may even provide a platform for advocacy or action at regional level.

5. Status of Operationalisation of the CEWS

The notion of a continental early warning system for the AU was first considered in 1996. More than 13 years later the system is still not fully operational. It is possible to visit the Situation Room at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. It is also possible to visit the early warning centres at sub-regional level in Gaborone (SADC), Abuja (ECOWAS) and Addis Ababa (IGAD). Progress in some of the other regions has been slow and there is a lack of information on the exact status of operationalisation in North Africa, Central Africa and East Africa. Most of the progress with operationalisation at sub-regional level has been at SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. The problem of overlapping regional structures and overlapping membership, which challenges many of the AU peace and security ambitions, also affects the full operationalisation of the CEWS. IGAD has one of the longest running early warning systems, yet the East African Community also wants to create an early warning centre, and COMESA has indicated a similar intention (AU 2008:154-163).

Progress towards the full operationalisation of the CEWS at AU Headquarters seems to be continuing regardless of the uneven progress at sub-regional level. Unlike the African Standby Force, the CEWS does not have to rely on

commitments and contributions from the regional economic communities to exist. With so many information sources and the commitment to open source information, early warning reports from the sub-regions would be one source for CEWS but not necessarily a defining element.

The full operationalisation of the CEWS depends, however, on the commitment and political will of member states. The main challenge seems to be that the inherently political nature of early warning could lead to commitment in rhetoric only. Whether or not it will ever be able to occupy a central position in conflict prevention on the continent remains to be seen. The challenges relating to the operationalisation of the CEWS may point to larger challenges facing the early warning field. Matveeva (2006:46) concludes that there is more to be done to improve early warning practice and to raise awareness of what it can deliver. David Nyheim (2008:7) explains that, in spite of increased resources going into early warning, key shortcomings of governmental and multilateral interventions in violent conflict remain, including faulty analysis, late, uncoordinated and contradictory engagement and poor decision-making. "Conflict early warning as a field of conflict prevention is today undergoing significant scrutiny" (Nyheim 2008:7). As the efficacy of conflict early warning is being globally questioned, so too will the potential of the CEWS as the base for conflict prevention decision-making be questioned. These questions will be further explored in Chapter 6.

6. Conclusion

By 2009, the CEWS was producing regular reports from the sources as named in the previous section. The quality and impact thereof are difficult to ascertain and the added value of early warning is unproven on a continent that continues to be faced with conflict. Early warning systems as central to multilateral conflict prevention have an ambitious agenda. For the AU and its CEWS, the ambitions of creating a multi-user open source information system have been complicated by questions of methodology, capacity, resourcing and ultimately politics.

The purpose of this chapter was, however, not to provide an evaluation of the CEWS, but rather to outline the development of the CEWS and to explore the conceptual and operational framework that informs its functionality. It is only with this basis that an analysis of the potential contribution of the CEWS to regional security can be further explored.



Chapter 5 - Formalising Intelligence Cooperation – The Role of the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services of Africa

1. Introduction

Intelligence cooperation in Africa was inspired by continental aspirations towards collective security and the institutionalisation of common defence and security systems. The need for mechanisms to enable working together within the secret domain of state power has further evolved out of necessity to utilise the tool of intelligence to combat transnational security threats. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the evolution of the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA) as a mechanism for information sharing and confidence building at continental level. This will provide a basis from which to explore the contribution of CISSA to regional security in later chapters. However, in order to be able to contextualise CISSA as a mechanism for intelligence cooperation, some background information will be provided to explore the nature of intelligence and the role of intelligence cooperation as a feature of the modern globalised security environment.

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2. Defining intelligence

For the purposes of clarity, it should be noted that in this dissertation the term intelligence is used in a twofold manner.⁸ Firstly, it is used to refer to information products produced by state intelligence agencies. Intelligence as such is the product of the intelligence process – sometimes referred to as the intelligence cycle – which most simplistically contains three basic elements namely, (1) collection, (2) analysis and (3) dissemination. Intelligence as a product is the analysed information supplied to decision and policy-makers; information generated from open and closed sources for decision-making purposes. Chesterman (2006:3) defines this analytical product of intelligence agencies as “risk assessment intended to guide action.”

⁸ This is similar to the distinction made by Mark Lowenthal (1999) in his book *Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy* in which he utilises three dimensions to define intelligence as a process, intelligence as a product and intelligence as an organisation.

The second manner in which the term is employed is in reference to the state actors that are charged with the collection, analysis and dissemination of information for decision-making purposes. The main concern is with public sector intelligence actors, although cognisant of the fact that actors outside of the public arena do in the modern world engage in intelligence related activities.

Intelligence is distinguished from other forms of information and actors by the authority to utilise secrecy. This means that state intelligence actors utilise covert and open methods to collect information. Covert collection is a fundamental characteristic of intelligence. Covert collection refers to information obtained without the consent of the government or body that controls it (Chesterman 2006:3). The ability to act under the cloak of secrecy is possibly the most controversial element of intelligence. Secrecy is, however, a useful trait to use to differentiate intelligence from information and intelligence agencies from other information providers.

A second distinctive facet of intelligence is that it is most often concerned with national security. Intelligence, as Abram N. Shulsky (1993:1) defines it, is "information relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further national security interests." It is commonly defined in government documents as information about threats or potential threats to the state and its people. For example, according to the South African National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994, the functions of both the domestic and foreign intelligence services are to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse intelligence in order to identify any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic or its people.

These aspects of intelligence are succinctly presented in Michael Herman's articulation of the two main functions of intelligence as "collecting information by special, covert means, and acting as government's experts on targets or subjects mainly of a national security kind" (Herman 2002:229).

Intelligence is concerned with providing decision-tailored information. Intelligence products are geared to serve the distinct purpose of providing

information on which to base decisions. In military terms, intelligence is a force optimiser. Information about the adversary's capabilities, geographical locations and intentions forms the basis of battle planning and allows for the optimal application of military power. Intelligence also enables the ability to utilise the all-important element of strategic surprise. It is this origin of the notion of national intelligence capabilities that was captured by military strategist Carl Von Clausewitz (1976:117), "By 'intelligence', we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, of our plans and operations."

In most countries the role of warning of imminent attacks or the escalation of conflict falls to the intelligence sector. Indeed, the very function of conflict early warning has its roots as much in humanitarian disaster relief as it does in military intelligence. Following the failure to detect North Korea's surprise attack on South Korea in 1950, the United States established a warning system that drew on increased communication between its regional commands around the world (Cavelty & Mauer 2009:126). The United States intelligence community switched to an indicator-based warning system in the 1960s based on the premise that the USSR could not mount an attack without some preparatory efforts (Cavelty & Mauer 2009:126). The US intelligence community developed a worldwide network of "Indications and Warning Centres" to keep track of certain indicators that could predict the intention of the Soviet Union to launch an attack against the US or its interests (Hulnick 2005:595).

The organisations and practices of the intelligence community are shaped by the particular geopolitical and technical requirements of the time and are designed in response to a given set of historical circumstances (Rolington 2006:739; Cavelty and Mauer 2009:126). Changes in the broader political and security context result in shifts in conceptualisation and functions of intelligence. The requirements for intelligence in independent African states today are remarkably different from those of the colonial states for example. The nature of the global intelligence environment will be briefly explored in the next section.

3. Shifting global intelligence paradigms

Some scholars observe that the end of the Cold War “brought about nothing less than the collapse of an international system” (Gaddis 1993:53). Perhaps that view is extreme, but the end of the Cold War presents a watershed in international relations in which the forces which dominated inter-state relations changed and resulted in a testing and re-evaluation of previous assumptions and mind-sets (Cavelty and Mauer 2009:128). The end of the Cold War raised fundamental questions about the nature, role and functions of national intelligence apparatus. As noted by Andrew Liaropoulos (2006:6), whereas the Cold War provided a reasonably predictable and linear framework for the intelligence community, the same cannot be said for the security environment at the beginning of the 21st century. There is greater complexity and variety of enemies and threats.

It was, however, the shock of 9/11 and the massive intelligence involvement in the war on terror that drove the re-evaluation of paradigms for understanding the nature, roles and requirements of intelligence in the modern globalised world. Many of the analyses that followed the 9/11 attacks “pointed directly to the need for an entirely new way of developing insight and anticipating surprises, one which places less emphasis on secrets or restricted channels for sharing information and more emphasis on open source information and creating networks of expertise that connect diverse thinking across disciplines as well as continents” (George 2007). As Scharf (2004:6) notes, the challenges for the intelligence community are even bigger now in the era of globalisation, organised crime and terrorism.

The global call for a new paradigm for intelligence is based on the recognition that the traditional manner of thinking and conducting intelligence is no longer useful to counter risks associated with insecurity. The traditional intelligence paradigm, which only became a formalised global norm in the post-World War II era, was based on the development of critical information through a national, classified system of collection and analysis (George 2007). The focus of critical information prescribed by the dominant traditional paradigm

related mostly to the capacities and intentions of foreign states – be it in the form of military, political or economic data.

Traditionally intelligence functioned to gather information (from all sources) on a specified threat in order to be able to better apply the tools of power to counter such threats. The evolution of an intelligence function has in general been associated with contestation for power and influence – be it against domestic or foreign enemies, generally confined within a state-centric security paradigm. Changes in the security paradigm have resulted in changes in the manner in which threats to security are interpreted. These threats are geographically unbounded and many of them cannot be countered through military or security means (for example HIV/AIDS; climate change; migration; urbanisation). Furthermore, the threats to traditional state security have also changed and have become largely transnational in nature. When referring to transnational threats the primary assumption is that the concern is with security vulnerabilities that transcend national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent (see for example Evangelista 1995).

The transnational nature of security and the diversity of the security paradigm issues have driven intelligence cooperation to a higher priority. As observed by Roger George (2007)

What distinguishes today's tests and makes the traditional intelligence paradigm less effective is the transnational and global character of many trends ... the compression of time and space and the easy movement of people, weapons, toxins, drugs, knowledge and ideas have transformed the way threats emerge and challenge the way intelligence must operate.

Cavelty and Mauer (2009:126) explain that the new spectrum of threats is dominated by three interrelated characteristics, namely: complexity, uncertainty and a diminishing impact of geographical space. Increased complexity increases uncertainty. Increased uncertainty increases the demand for information. As the importance of national borders become challenged and the compression of space and time opens opportunities and vulnerabilities for the global security order, security actors are challenged to evolve to remain relevant to this new global security paradigm. Recognising

that modern threats are frequently not geographically bounded, Gijs de Vries, the former EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, noted that, in order to combat this threat, “national agencies must work across borders to be effective” (quoted in Melady & Hilscher 2008:13). Scharf (2004:6) makes a similar observation as follows:

Whether one is talking within countries or between countries, about police intelligence, military intelligence, internal intelligence or external intelligence, the relevant institutions have to work closely together, not only with their cognate institutions at home, but also with those of partner countries too.

There is, however, a certain paradox in the globalised security context, as globalisation enables border-crossing and borderlessness, yet controlling borders and national boundaries has become increasingly important. Regulating migration flows and containing border disputes remain central to state security functions. The reality, however, is that controlling access to territories and citizens is difficult in the globalised security context, as technology has enabled the increased flow of goods, people and ideas across national boundaries, and global inter-connectedness has increased interactions between people around the world – whether for work, sport or entertainment. The paradox lies, therefore, in the increased relevance of the state as a geographical unit in a system in which the centrality of and ability to control geographical units is being challenged by transnational security actors and vulnerabilities. Thus, in order to counter threats that transcend state borders, new patterns of interaction are required.

The shifting security paradigm is predicated on the waning distinctions that can be made between local, regional and global security issues. Paul Monk (2005) explains that the technologies generated in the Cold War – especially weapons of mass destruction, information technology and global communications – have undermined the basis of the liberal nation-state through the creation of threats and pressures against which the nation-state finds it increasingly difficult to defend itself under the terms of the 20th Century strategic paradigm of threat, deterrence and retaliation. The security paradigm shift is based on vulnerability, pre-emption and resilience (Monk 2005). It is

within these parameters that CISSA has emerged – as a mechanism to combat transnational vulnerabilities, to enable pre-emptive action (as exemplified in the prevention of the *coup* in Equatorial Guinea) and to increase the resilience of the regional security architecture to unexpected change.

4. From national to international intelligence cooperation

As noted in the previous section, the transnational nature of security threats in the modern climate requires changes in the way that national intelligence structures operate. Definitions of threats and vulnerabilities determine the agenda of an intelligence service. The nature of transnational security threats, such as terrorism, mercenaries, small arms proliferation, drug smuggling and organised crime, means that the security risk operates in and manifests from various locations despite of national boundaries involving actors of various nationalities. National intelligence structures are, therefore, “monitoring threats to their national security interests and homelands that are far more diverse, interconnected and dynamic than ever before” (George 2007). This means that the individual actions of any single government or intelligence service may prove ineffective in detecting, deterring or preventing insecurity (George 2007).

Africa and Kwadjo (2009:9) capture the post-Cold War shift in intelligence in terms of the emergence of new security threats as legitimate focus areas for intelligence services. They explain that these new threats “included post-conflict civil wars, genocidal activities, transnational crimes such as money laundering; international terrorism; people, drug and arms smuggling; and political extremism” (Africa & Kwadjo 2009:9). As explained by Herman (2002:232):

The shift is towards a different class of target: non-state entities, semi-states and the so-called rogue states. The range is familiar. International terrorism is one well-established category, and others have included individuals and firms involved in activities such as dealing in nuclear material, the development of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, arms trading, sanctions-busting, drugs and other criminality; ‘pre-state’ groups seeking statehood

through insurrection and civil war; collapsing and fragmenting 'post-states'; and some transnational corporations.

States in Africa face the same range of threats as the above global trend refers to. As explained by the Executive Secretary of CISSA during a conference in Pretoria, South Africa in October 2009, the African security environment in the twenty-first century continues to be marked by inter-state and intra-state conflicts, organised crime manifesting in the form of cross border threats such as terrorism, piracy, vehicle theft, smuggling and counterfeiting. "These threats have made the geographic distinction between domestic and foreign security theatres irrelevant and demands of intelligence and security services to adopt seamless operational approaches in combating actual and potential threats" (Dlomo 2009:1).

As Africa and Kwadjo (2009:10) note, intelligence services in Africa have found both conflict and post-conflict scenarios the focus of their attention, as it has increasingly been demonstrated that the troubles of a neighbouring country are bound to impact on another's domestic stability. Gibson (2005:31) captures the same notion by highlighting that the intelligence community should treat risk on a global rather than state level. "That security threats can seldom be contained by national borders underscores the need for the intelligence services to operate in a regional context and cooperate with other services to achieve commonly-identified solutions" (Africa & Kwadjo 2009:10).

Furthermore, as noted by Nederveen Pieterse (2002:3), transnationalisation both requires and prompts flexible approaches and making optimal use of information. The need for flexibility has been captured above in terms of the need for national and cooperative security strategies. The requirement and promotion of information can be interpreted in terms of the increased value being attached to knowledge derived from intelligence. Because many of the targets are intrinsically secretive, intelligence has become indispensable (Herman 2002:232). Examples of legitimate targets for intelligence services that rely on secrecy include organised crime, terrorism, the smuggling of arms and drugs and counterfeiting. This means that the global trend of intelligence

being a growing field of activity will continue and will be as true for Africa as for other parts of the world.

The legitimate role of intelligence as a source of policy information, especially for conflict prevention, management and resolution, has not been traditionally associated with intelligence on the continent. The global trend could have a positive impact on the functioning of intelligence in Africa. Dlomo (2009:1) notes that the security environment has increased the need for agile, adaptive and collaborative domestic and foreign security services between and among themselves and their neighbours. This is a call for intelligence to become a key part of the fight against insecurity in Africa.

Michael Herman (2008:200) explains that international cooperation between intelligence agencies is a feature of modern intelligence, “overlaying the received picture of it as a secretive, exclusively national entity.” This is based on the necessity of cooperation as outlined above. By the start of the 21st century, several states had recognised the necessity of cooperation amongst their intelligence agencies, as seen by the 2004 instalment of the first European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the creation of a South American Intelligence Center in Brazil in 2006 (Melady & Hilscher 2008:18).

Although international cooperation between intelligence services is not a new phenomenon, it has grown exponentially since 9/11 (Born 2007:2). Melady and Hilsher (2008) focus on intelligence cooperation in the context of counter-terrorism and provide interesting accounts of successes of intelligence cooperation (Melady & Hilscher 2008:21-22):

Over the last few years there have been countless examples of national intelligence agencies working side by side to prevent attacks. Most notably in July 2006, through the sharing of information, United States, British and Pakistani intelligence officials were able to thwart an attempt by suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists to blow up ten jets leaving the United Kingdom for the United States. Meanwhile, close cooperative ties between Russian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani security services enabled them to uncover and foil a plot, hatched by Chechen rebels, to assassinate Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting of former Soviet states in Yalta in 2000.

Besides intelligence collaboration to serve national and international security threats, there is another aspect to the increasing importance of international intelligence collaboration. The multiplicity of actors on the global arena and the role of international organisations in global peace and security, create a challenge of national intelligence machinery to support international decision-making. The actors within the modern security environment are more diverse and diffuse than were their counterparts in the Cold War era (Cavelty & Mauer 2009:127). It is not only the diversity of threats that has increased, but also the diversity of actors actively involved in the security paradigm. More states are involved in international affairs; regional organisations and non-state actors all have complex interests in international peace and security.

The utility of a state-based closed system of information is questionable in the multifaceted global order. Herman (2002:234) enunciates this as a vision “of national intelligence services collectively developing groups of states as their corporate clients, alongside their well-established, individual, national governments.” Gibson (2005:31) takes this a step further and urges that, in order to remain relevant as a national resource, “the intelligence community will have to graduate from the secret, tactical, puzzle-solving ethos of a static Cold War, on behalf of governments, to an open, strategic, mystery-understanding ethos of a contemporary complex global society, on behalf of the public.”

Chesterman (2006:2) asks whether collective security is possible when the evaluation of current threats and the calibration of responses turn on the use of national intelligence that, by its nature, cannot be openly shared. He argues that, because multilateral responses to emerging threats are inherently more legitimate and preferable to unilateral action, intelligence can and should play a role in collective security structures at regional and international levels (Chesterman 2006:3). The demands of global security have emphasised the need to develop multinational and international intelligence mechanisms. In recognition of this need, Herman (2002:235-236) proposes that “supranational intelligence machinery” may be in order. He highlights that such supranational intelligence machinery could lead to more emphasis on potential of

intelligence for reducing interstate misperception and facilitating cooperation, for making states more 'intelligent' (Herman 2002:236). Notably, Herman (2002:236) argues that the process of forming collaborative intelligence mechanisms would reduce some of the difficulties over the legitimacy of intelligence – this will be further discussed when considering the potential contribution of CISSA to regional security.

Collaboration between states is a complex undertaking in most fields, and intelligence would be no different. Building international relationships takes time and effort, but the sharing of intelligence requires relationships of trust and mutual interest as foundations. As Herman (2008:208) explains:

Cooperation at its closest depends upon individuals who have grown up in their national organizations, done business against common enemies, socialized together for years and helped each other out of difficulties on the way. There is also a genuine sense of professional community...there is also a sense of common problems and the search for solutions...Agencies in close collaboration over long periods develop a kind of bonding.

The point raised about forming a professional community is especially important when considering that CISSA has the potential to play a positive role in regional security as an epistemic community. This will be further deliberated in the next chapter. Suffice to say that increased communication and collaboration between intelligence agencies have the tendency to create professional networks that identify themselves as a community searching for solutions to common problems. These networks do not only have the potential to positively contribute to the professionalism of the intelligence trade, but also to function as conduits for the development of common understandings and common positions so central to the practice of peace in security communities.

5. Intelligence collaboration: the formation of CISSA

The Committee of Intelligence and Services of Africa (CISSA) was established in August 2004 in the wake of the failed *coup* plot in Equatorial Guinea in March of the same year. Foiling the attempted *coup* in Equatorial Guinea involved cooperation between intelligence and security services across borders – particularly between South Africa, Zimbabwe and Equatorial

Guinea, setting a precedent for relatively large scale, publicly known, collaboration in achieving common conflict prevention goals. Steps towards institutionalising intelligence collaboration proceeded rather rapidly after this.

The intelligence and security services of African states met in Luanda, Angola in April 2004 specifically to discuss collaboration to combat mercenaries in view of the Equatorial Guinea attempted coup. The meeting emerged with a commitment to formalising cooperation through the establishment of a committee of experts composed of representatives from Algeria, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda to advance a draft Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a Committee of Intelligence and Security Services. The draft Memorandum was discussed in Johannesburg in June 2004, with particular emphasis on the procedures for membership of the committee and the development of institutional structures. During a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria on 26 August 2004, CISSA was launched.

CISSA is a collective arrangement for intelligence agencies on the continent. One should not be misled by the terminology of *intelligence and security services*. The inclusion of the term *security services* is reflective of the sensitivities of intelligence in Africa – the term security service is often more politically acceptable than intelligence. As explained by Africa and Kwadjo (2009:3), in some countries on the continent, the more acceptable label for domestic agencies conducting strategic intelligence work is “internal security service”, a label meant to distinguish such structures from those engaged in policing activity.

Secondly, just because the word ‘services’ is used in the title does not mean that all of the signatory agencies are bound by democratic governance principles or that they are legally constituted state agencies. Furthermore, as Africa and Kwadjo (2009:3) point out, the definitional dilemma surrounding intelligence in Africa is compounded by the fact that some internal security agencies, aside from playing strategic intelligence roles, also have executive powers of arrest and detention.

There are fundamental democratic governance deficits for many countries on the continent in relation to intelligence agencies (See for example Human Rights Watch (2006) and Hendricks and Hutton (2009)). Some states have not replaced out-dated colonial era regulations that created intelligence agencies; other agencies are created by presidential or executive regulation (for example Zimbabwe and Nigeria), and others are not even covered by legislation of any kind (for example Angola, Morocco and Sudan). A harsh criticism of CISSA is that, although enshrining the principle of “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” (Article 6b of the Memorandum), there seems to be no basic democratic governance criteria for membership. A more positive interpretation could be that through the forum of CISSA, democratic governance interests could be advanced, as will be discussed in later sections.

5.1. Objectives, functions and structure

Michael Herman (2008:208-209) observes that “multilateral intelligence clubs” are usually single-discipline in nature having a “pragmatic and cautious flavour about them, limited to particular categories of information.” The development of CISSA has followed a similar approach. It started from a particular focus on acting against mercenary activity, in particular involvement in unconstitutional changes of government. From that common interest and need for collective action, the platform for increased confidence building and expansion of issue areas has emerged.

Article 5 of the CISSA Memorandum (2004) outlines the objectives of CISSA as to:

- a) Provide leadership with regard to intelligence and security matters in furtherance of peace, security and stability in Africa;
- b) Coordinate strategies to facilitate interaction amongst intelligence services and exchange intelligence on all common security threats;
- c) Develop and consolidate confidence building measures among intelligence and security services;
- d) Provide the PSC of the AU with necessary data and intelligence for the adoption of, amongst others, an African policy and strategy for peacekeeping and conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- e) Serve as a platform for cooperation with similar organisations to CISSA outside of Africa;

- f) Serve as a back channel of communication between Members during crisis;

The objectives of CISSA reveal several pertinent points about the nature and orientation of the structure. Firstly, it is noticeable that there is an intention for CISSA to be centrally situated in the African peace and security architecture and for the Committee to play a leading role in peace and security matters. This is particularly evident in points (a) and (d). This is a rather controversial role for the body to assume, as CISSA is not a statutory organ of the AU and there are other structures assuming some of those responsibilities, namely the Peace and Security Council and the early warning system. There is a general lack of specification on the manner in which CISSA fits into the peace and security architecture of the AU, but this will be discussed later in this chapter.

Secondly, the role of CISSA as a platform for communication and information sharing between intelligence and security services is highlighted. This aspect is the core of CISSA and is prioritised in the objectives. In fact, four of the six objectives are concerned with communication and cooperation among intelligence agencies. This is echoed in the mission statement of CISSA as found on their website⁹, which is:

To coordinate intelligence, as well as to promote cooperation, confidence building measures and capacity building among intelligence and security services in Africa.

There is a certain logic to this, as, in order to achieve the vision of being the “primary provider of intelligence to the policy-making organs of the African Union¹⁰”, there would have to be information sharing and collaboration at inter-state level. Information sharing and collaboration at national level is, in turn, dependent on building confidence among member services to enable communication of sensitive information.

⁹ <http://cissa-au.org/>

¹⁰ The vision statement is also taken from CISSA’s website as above.

As with the structure of most inter-governmental conventions and protocols, the Memorandum also outlines principles guiding the work of CISSA and functions of the cooperative body. Article 6 outlines the guiding principles as:

- a) Respect for the sanctity of human life and the need to prevent genocide, impunity and other crimes against humanity;
- b) Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;
- c) Defence of the sovereignty and the independence of AU Member States
- d) Cooperation amongst intelligence and security services in pursuit of common security as defined in the Common African Defence and Security Policy of the AU.

The principle of democratic governance and rule of law has already been raised and is an issue to which this discussion will return when considering the potential contribution of CISSA as a norm-setting institution. Given that this provision (b) is in the Memorandum, there is scope for CISSA to encourage the formalisation of intelligence services in Africa and to encourage the development of democratic governance structures. This would include legislation, oversight structures, mechanisms of control and controls on the use of intrusive methods of investigation.

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The second notable point about the principles of CISSA is the association with the AU, especially in defining itself within the context of common security and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). In the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, security is defined in Section I (6) as follows:

... ensuring the common security of Africa involves working on the basis of a definition which encompasses both the traditional state-centric, notion of survival of the state and its protection by military means from external aggression, as well as the non-military notion which is informed by the new international environment and the high incidence of intra-state conflict. The causes of intra-state conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values but on social and political imperatives as well.

The definition of security in the Solemn Declaration (Section I (6)) goes on to list the issues that the “newer, multi-dimensional notion of security” entails, including:

- Human rights
- The right to participate fully in the process of governance
- The right to equal development
- The right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life
- The right to protection against poverty
- The right to conducive education and health conditions
- The right to protection against marginalisation on the basis of gender
- Protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation.


Without going too much into an analysis of the CADSP, it is important to take note of the framework for common security that CISSA references. Firstly, the CADSP places human security at the core of the approach to common security, as reflected in the above extracts. However, the CADSP fails to translate this philosophy and the principle of inclusive security into meaningful policies and strategies. The key gap is informed by the failure to address the following question: if we accept that security is based on political and social imperatives, what is the role of traditional state security service providers in pursuing this human security agenda?

The CADSP never really narrows the common security agenda down to the issues that require common defence and security structures, but rather presents a shopping list of issues that have to be addressed to achieve stability on the continent. These are as diverse as external aggression; genocide; impunity; unconstitutional changes of government; absence of popular participation and good governance; absence of the protection of human rights; discrimination on the basis of gender; failure to consolidate peace; refugees and internally displaced persons; pandemic diseases; environmental degradation; human trafficking; the adverse effect of globalisation and the dumping of chemical waste (to name but a few of the two page list of common security threats).

In relation to this discussion, by framing its approach to security within the CADSP, CISSA is, theoretically, advancing a human security approach. This can be seen in a positive or negative light. On the one hand, it can be interpreted as acknowledging the broad nature of security and the need for national intelligence structures to serve the security needs of the people of the continent. On a more critical note, however, the manner in which the human

security approach is used to develop a shopping list of security threats allows the intelligence services of the continent to adopt a rather broad mandate and potentially utilise the intelligence tool for questionable means.

In order to operationalise the human security approach, an assessment of the broad security risks needs to be presented, followed by an assessment of which actors have a role to play in mitigating the impact of these risks. Given, for example, that African states are vulnerable to the adverse effects of globalisation (as indicated in the CADSP), the role of intelligence in mitigating this vulnerability would need to be analysed. Such considerations would have to take place in order to align the tasking and activities of intelligence to national and regional security priorities. The broad and ill-defined approach is useful as it allows for room to manoeuvre and enables CISSA to navigate a variety of issues. This approach should be questioned, however. Having more detailed and focused intelligence efforts allows for specialisation and avoids duplication and unnecessary utilisation of resources; it crafts a precision tool for a precise purpose.



Article 7 of the Memorandum details that CISSA shall perform functions in the following areas:

- a) Acquisition, processing, analysis and transmission of intelligence on any nature of threats
- b) Facilitate capacity building and harmonise approaches to common security threats
- c) Coordinate strategies to provide advice on appropriate courses of action
- d) Enhance the development of an African security doctrine in order to establish a common basis of study and analysis of harmful phenomenon and factors to the stability of Members.

Michael Herman (2002:236) writes the following about possibilities for multinational intelligence machinery:

Coalitions and international and regional institutions should concentrate on establishing supranational frameworks further downstream in the intelligence process; in producing 'finished intelligence', particularly at the final stage of (policy-free) assessment. Source protection here is less difficult, and the impact on policy-making and decision-taking greatest.

This would still be based on nations' own collection and processing. Their intelligence services would not be sidelined, but doctrine and procedures would be developed for feeding their product into some form of supranational assessment.

Herman's vision and the conceptualisation of the functions of CISSA as per the Memorandum bear striking similarities. Dlomo (2009:3) highlights that CISSA is an intergovernmental organisation and not an intelligence *service*. This is not just a matter of semantics. CISSA is not tasked as an intelligence collection agency. As an intergovernmental body, the Secretariat of CISSA acquires information from national intelligence bodies and then processes and transmits such information. Theoretically, as posited by Herman and quoted above, this distinction is essential, as it allows for greater collaboration without infringing on the secretive and controversial arena of intelligence collection and the related issue of source protection. Chesterman (2006:8) observes that the prospects of any international organisation developing an independent intelligence collection capacity are remote. He attributes this to the understandable wariness on the part of states to authorise a body to spy on them and also to the larger anomaly in the status of intelligence as an activity commonly denounced but almost universally practised (Chesterman 2006:8).

Dlomo (2009:4) adds another dimension as to why CISSA should not be involved in covert collection. He explains as follows (Dlomo 2009:4):

CISSA Members provide intelligence to the Secretariat based on the Continental Intelligence Production Schedule of CISSA. The Secretariat is therefore neither involved in clandestine intelligence collection nor in managing human, signals and technical sources of information. Whilst open source collection is part of its (the Secretariat) brief, the clandestine and secret collection functions are conducted by the individual services that are Members of CISSA. This is to enable the Secretariat to serve as a conflict resolution organ with clean hands, clear conscience and cool heads. The Secretariat can therefore easily help with the confidence-building initiatives when there is conflict or tension between Members. In this way, the CISSA Secretariat serves as an effective back channel of communication as provided for in its statutes.


Thus, by situating CISSA as a platform for information sharing further down the line of the intelligence cycle, not only is the issue of covert collection and

source protection mitigated, but it also opens the space for consideration of other functions for CISSA to play.

The Memorandum of Understanding, Article 8, establishes that CISSA has three permanent bodies namely:

- The Conference
- Panel of Experts
- The Secretariat.

Article 9 of the Memorandum outlines that the Conference consists of heads of intelligence and security services of the Members of CISSA meeting on an annual basis prior to the AU Assembly in order to advise the AU Commission Chairperson on matters relating to common security threats. The Conference is the primary tool for intelligence collaboration at a high level and it sets the framework in which cooperation and information sharing takes place. Article 10 of the Memorandum establishes that the functions of the Conference are to:

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- (a) Set the general policy guidelines for the CISSA and its institutions;
 - (b) Task, receive, consider and take decisions on reports and recommendations from the Secretariat;
 - (c) Deliberate on any matter referred to it by the AU Commission Chairperson;
 - (d) Establish a databank for the purpose of exchange of intelligence;
 - (e) Consider and adopt the budget of the CISSA;
 - (f) Establish any other institution of the CISSA as may be required;
 - (g) Select the Secretariat based on the AU principle of equitable regional representation.

The Panel of Experts is composed of a representative of each member country (Article 11) as is tasked to *inter alia* (Article 12):

- Advise the Conference on its activities
- Prepare programmes and projects of the Conference;
- Provide the machinery for coordinating and harmonising the programmes, projects and joint operations of the Conference;
- Ensure the implementation of the decisions of the Conference.

The third component of CISSA is the Secretariat. The Secretariat of CISSA is based in Addis Ababa near the Headquarters of the African Union. According to the Memorandum (Article 13), this geographical co-location is to enable

easy coordination with the Intelligence and Security Committee in the Office of the AU Commission Chairperson. The role of the Intelligence and Security Committee will be addressed in relation to the relationship between CISSA and the AU in the next section of this chapter.

Returning to the Secretariat, Article 14 of the Memorandum outlines that the roles of the Secretariat are to:

- (a) Submit to the AU Commission Chairperson, through the Intelligence and Security Committee, the decisions and deliberations resulting from the Conferences;
- (b) Implement the deliberations, follow-up plans, monitor programs, actions and strategies of the Peace and Security Council of the AU regarding intelligence and security matters;
- (c) Promote the standardisation of data and concepts within the Peace and Security Council of the AU, pursuant to deliberations of the CISSA;
- (d) Collect data and intelligence from organs of intelligence and security services and other institutions of Members necessary for the production of studies, forecasts, assessments and perspectives of the overall situation in the framework of peace and stability monitoring in order to suggest actions necessary to eradicate factors of threat or tension;
- (e) Submit to the organs of intelligence and security of Members half-yearly reports on the stance of the AU and extraordinary reports on any situation of any given region or sub-region under tension or conflict as well as the forecasts and likelihood of settlement
- (f) Fulfil any other task submitted by the AU Commission Chairperson and/ or by the Conference and report back;
- (g) House the database of the CISSA;
- (h) Initiate and manage the budget of the CISSA.

The Secretariat manages the affairs of the CISSA and runs the headquarters of the organisation (Dlomo 2009:3). In terms of information sharing, the Secretariat plays a central role as CISSA Members provide intelligence to the Secretariat based on the Continental Intelligence Production Schedule of CISSA (Dlomo 2009:4). The CISSA Secretariat also fulfils an essential role as a conduit for communication and as a mediator. This role was highlighted by Dlomo (2009:4) in relation to the Secretariat not being involved in covert collection so as to enable it to function as a conflict resolution mechanism and for the Secretariat to support confidence-building initiatives.

In order to achieve the objectives set by the Memorandum, the Secretariat also undertakes field visits to interact with member states and to enable intelligence sharing. Dlomo (2009:4) explains that, because of existing bilateral cooperation agreements, it is a challenge for some member agencies to table written intelligence reports on each other, resulting in poor submission of intelligence to the Secretariat. “This obstacle is circumvented through field visits undertaken by the CISSA Secretariat that have become the most insightful method of intelligence sharing by CISSA Members with the Secretariat” (Dlomo 2009:4).

The CISSA Secretariat has also adopted a broader collaboration role and has actively engaged with civil society and experts from outside of government. In 2008, the representatives from the African Security Sector Network were invited to participate in some of the sessions of the annual CISSA Conference in Cape Town, South Africa. This was a first on the continent, as civil society engagement and participation in matters related to intelligence, especially from a governance and reform stance, is not a common phenomenon.

The approach of engagement with civil society has extended to using external resource persons during CISSA workshops and seminars - as was the case during discussions on the implications of the International Criminal Court decision to issue a warrant of arrest against President Hassan Omar Al-Bashir (Dlomo 2009:5). The CISSA Secretariat also hosts seminars at the Headquarters in Addis Ababa, bringing experts and international partners to share their understandings of emerging security issues of mutual concern (Dlomo 2009:5).

Interestingly, the open source mandate of the Secretariat that was referred to previously, has been operationalised in the form of an Early Warning Desk being established at CISSA Headquarters in Addis Ababa (Dlomo 2009:8). This is quite literally across the road from the AU Headquarters where the CEWS is hosted. This brings to the fore questions about the relationship between CISSA and the AU structures.

6. CISSA and the African Union

The relationship between CISSA and the AU is based on commitments contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of CISSA. In the preamble, it is stated that the parties to CISSA:

- Resolved to operate within the framework of the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the Common African Defence and Security Policy;
- Acknowledged the need for more efficacious and efficient intelligence for the Peace and Security Council of the AU in its deliberations, action and adoption of conflict prevention, management and resolution strategies;
- Reaffirmed commitment to the Constitutive Act of the AU and UN Charter principles and the standards of international law.

Furthermore, the Memorandum provides that the mandate of CISSA is based on the Constitutive Act of the AU as well as the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. The Memorandum also places the AU Commission Chairperson as the primary end-user.

There are no clear lines of reporting between CISSA and the AU, nor is the formal relationship between CISSA and AU structures clearly defined. The second bullet point above seems to indicate that CISSA was designed to fulfil an information gap at the level of the PSC – an information gap that the CEWS was also designed to fill.

At the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005, CISSA was recognised and collaboration between CISSA and the AU was agreed upon (AU 2005:12). The Abuja decision also creates an Intelligence and Security Committee, located in the Office of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, to receive reports from CISSA (AU 2005:12). Article 16 of the Memorandum of CISSA also provides for formal relationships between CISSA and Regional Intelligence and Security Committees. The general aim of these Committees seems to be to provide a conduit for communication between CISSA and the regional bodies.

The relationship between the AU and CISSA is predicated on supplier-client relations in which CISSA operates as a conduit to enable the transmission of

intelligence from national agencies to the multilateral body for continental security decision-making. The lack of processes and systems to enable the sharing of intelligence from national to multilateral level has been identified as a source of concern at the level of the UN (see for example Chesterman 2006). In this regard, the establishment of a mechanism to enable and facilitate the transmission of information from national intelligence agencies to a regional organisation is a global first. Having access to such information should enable more informed decision-making at the AU. There are, however, serious concerns about manipulation and the potential of stronger states to subvert decision-making at the AU through the provision of intelligence biased towards national interest. Chesterman (2006:72) provides a good summation of the potentials for increased intelligence cooperation at multilateral levels:

Better intelligence and analysis will not, of course, guarantee better decisions – either at the international level or domestically...The test should not be, however, whether reforms will prevent great powers from pursuing foreign policy objectives decided at the highest levels of government. Rather, more effective use of intelligence would lay a foundation for more effective use of the multilateral forum, making it harder for states participating in that forum to ignore emerging crisis or embrace unworkable policies. Over time, it may also encourage greater cooperation between states to address those threats that no one state – even the most powerful – can address alone.

7. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to outline the concept of international intelligence cooperation and then to outline CISSA as a mechanism to enable cooperation between national intelligence structures in Africa. The aim was not to analyse in detail the manner in which CISSA can contribute to regional security, but rather to provide the platform from which that analysis can be drawn in the next chapter. The context in which international intelligence cooperation has become important was discussed before the objectives and role of CISSA was further elaborated. The formal relationship between CISSA and the AU was also briefly presented.

Although the preceding two chapters have adopted, out of a necessity drawn from the research design, a descriptive and somewhat technical approach,

both CEWS and CISSA have the potential to provide normative, strategic and operational support for the continental peace and security ambitions. This will be explored further in the following chapter.



Chapter 6 – Potential Operational Strengths and Weaknesses of the Continental Early Warning System and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa

1. Introduction

In the two preceding chapters, descriptive analyses of the CEWS and CISSA were provided and the main issues informing the development of an early warning and intelligence sharing capacity were introduced. The aim of this chapter is to explore the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA by drawing on international and continental experiences with early warning and intelligence sharing to elucidate potential opportunities and challenges. It presents an exploration of potential operational challenges based on the choices that have been made in terms of design and processes.

The CEWS and CISSA are relatively young institutions with limited operational experience and limited available information about operational successes and challenges. The approach adopted is to explore the manner in which the CEWS and CISSA may contribute to regional security based on an understanding of some of the operational challenges that are faced by early warning and intelligence in general. This chapter explores the implications of the design of the CEWS and CISSA on the potential contributions to regional security. A conceptual and contextual analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of early warning and intelligence more generically is presented, after which the role of early warning and intelligence in the context of regional security in Africa is explored within the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 2 – particularly in relation to epistemic community and security community theories.

2. The Continental Early Warning System

The notion of a continental early warning system for Africa started to gain currency in the 1990s, and nearly two decades later the system is only partially operational with actual links to conflict prevention difficult to ascertain. Evaluating the success or impact of early warning is a matter of much

international contention. As Alexander Austin (2004:13) observed, early warning is faced by substantial, possibly unobtainable, evaluation criteria. “In few other fields, is there such a success criteria as high and ideal as peace or the prevention of conflict” (Austin 2004:13).

This problem of measuring the success of early warning systems is tied to the larger problems of methodology and theory that surround the concept of early warning. Even in terms of definition and purpose, the notion of early warning sways between the production of analytically sound and timely reports to broader purpose of preventing violent conflict. These two perspectives were introduced in Chapter 4 through definitions of early warning by Davies and Austin. Davies (2000:1) underscored that the goal of early warning can be conceived as minimising the impact of violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that threaten the sustainability of human development. Whereas Austin (2004:2) focused on early warning as “any initiative that focuses on systemic data collection, analysis and/ or formulation of recommendations including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic.”

Nyheim (2008:15) notes that there are two schools of thought on the purpose of early warning. The first is that early warning should serve as a tool to predict the outbreak or escalation of conflict (Nyheim 2008:15). The alternative position is that early warning should be linked to strong response mechanisms and advocacy efforts at national, regional and international levels (Nyheim 2008:16). The difference between these two approaches frames the manner in which success and challenges are cast. On the one hand, early warning is about producing reports; on the other it is about taking action.

On his popular conflict early warning and early response blog, Patrick Meier (2009a) relates the following exchange at an academic conference after a presentation on the CEWS:

When I asked what their measurement of success for CEWS was, the answer confirmed my concerns: “The success of CEWS is measured by the number of regular, high-quality early warning reports issued per year.”

“So not operational response, then?” I asked. “No,” the panellist confirmed.

In the context of CEWS, the primary function of the early warning system is to “facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (PSC Protocol Article 12(1)). According to the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS, the purpose of the CEWS “is the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security and to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflict” (AU 2008:66). The aim of CEWS can therefore be formulated as the production of reports to enable response strategies. The focus is on the products and not on the impact thereof. In their analysis of the CEWS, Wulf and Debiel (2009:15) offer a similar opinion: “The main instruments of the CEWS are reports, compiled on the basis of open source information that identifies potentially dangerous activity. These reports are the basis for the Peace and Security Council decisions.”

The focus of CEWS on reporting as opposed to response is probably the result of a combination of practical and political considerations. In a review of early warning systems and tools for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Commission, Nyheim (2008:31) highlights the following challenges faced by inter-governmental early warning systems:


- Member states’ sensitivity around the monitoring of violent conflict and state fragility, as well as sensitivities of labelling states “conflict prone” or “fragile”;
- Political interference and manipulation of analyses prepared because of political sensitivities of member states;
- Lack of conviction among high-level decision-makers about the value of early warning.

The inherently and intricately political nature of early warning, in particular, and peace and security issues in general lies at the heart of the practical challenges facing the full operationalisation of CEWS and the realisation of the full potential contribution to regional security. The challenge for the CEWS and the AU in terms of realising the conflict prevention, management and

resolution mandate lies in the scale of task before them. Instability, conflict and poor governance dominate large swathes of the continent. The same leaders who have to face instability and allegations of illegitimacy at home are tasked with confronting continental peace and security issues, leading some to question whether any true commitment to peace and security can be expected from the leaders of Africa. Wulf and Debiel (2009:29) point to this fundamental problem:

Usually, governments are quite aware of acute or emerging major conflicts. Often they themselves are the cause of this conflict. Sophisticated early warning indicators are not needed to warn about such conflicts. However, governments are not usually interested in the fact that their abuses of civil rights and the violation of human rights are documented or acted upon. Thus, despite mandating secretariats of regional organisations, this might only be lip service. In practice, certain governments make sure that the relevant regional bodies remain weak in early warning, thereby preventing early response.

In an interview conducted in 2009 with a staff member¹¹ at the Situation Room of the CEWS in Addis Ababa, the following operational challenges were discussed:

- 
- (a) Limited analytical capacity
 - (b) Financial constraints
 - (c) Limitations on information communication technology (ICT) capacity which influences the capacity to disseminate reports.

The ICT, resource and skills constraints impede the ability of the CEWS to develop quality early warning products and then to ensure that the reports reach a broad target audience. This is a matter of investment. In 2008, the European Parliament commissioned a study on the CEWS and concluded that the CEWS is understaffed and underfunded and thus seriously constrained in its activity (quoted in Wulf & Debiel 2009:15). Since the inception of CEWS under the OAU, the early warning system has been inordinately dependent on funding from non-African states in the international community. In a 2005 paper, Jakkie Cilliers estimated that roughly 70 per cent of contributions towards CEWS came from non-African sources. Cilliers (2005) also pointed out that by mid-2002 the Division for Conflict Management

¹¹ Alemayehu Behabtu, 24 June 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

had 41 positions – 13 financed by the OAU, 11 by the UNDP and 16 directly by donors.

However, it is not necessarily in the products of early warning that the potential contribution of early warning to regional security should be viewed, but rather the manner in which the *process* of early warning affects social dynamics. Early warning is not prophecy (Matveeva 2006:7). “Rather, it is a political tool for engagement, and ultimately its value lies in the extent to which it helps to prevent or mitigate conflict” (Matveeva 2006:7).


In the African context, early warning systems can provide an opportunity for long-term conflict prevention through providing a platform for participatory governance. Early warning systems are one of the few mechanisms on the continent that have been designed from the start with the involvement of civil society and academia, and the role of non-governmental actors is built into the operational concepts as reflected in Chapter 4. Von Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller (2006:17) observe that an early warning system provides a structured framework for the free-flow of information from various sources to create a cooperative network of people and institutions. As such there is scope to consider the CEWS as a network of state and non-state actors committed to conflict prevention and the encouragement of peaceful change.

The notion of CEWS as providing a platform for participation should be further explored as a potential operational success. According to Von Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller (2006:10), conflict early warning systems can work as capacity building engines to empower people at grassroots level and for facilitating transparent interaction between government and civil society. Due to the highly sensitive nature of peace and security issues on the continent and the governance deficits associated with internal conflict in many states, there is no tradition of strong civil society participation.

Furthermore, the notion of participation as represented here can be seen as a positive contribution towards creating a civic culture as a pillar of building a security community. The notion of a ‘civic culture’ as described by Adler (1998:182) embodies the creation of strong civil societies “which promote

community bonds and a common identity through the relatively free interpenetration of societies, particularly the movement and exchange of people, goods and ideas.”

It is within the open source nature of early warning that the potential benefits thereof lie. Open source information is sharable - information collected by one organisation can easily be shared with another (Pallaris 2008:2). Reports can travel from Accra to Gaborone to Addis quickly and easily. Information is also not restricted to government employees and reports can be shared with non-state actors that might be in a position to act on it - for example, humanitarian organisations offering refugee support and grassroots civil society organisations. This is where the real value of open source information lies: it can be used to inform the public of serious threats and could mitigate the effects of violent conflict. Early warning reports can also provide a platform for advocacy and can function as a means to monitor the commitments of national and regional actors to peace and security and the responsibility to protect.



The argument being forwarded is that the CEWS has the potential to make positive contributions to regional security at both the community and regional levels. As explained by Monama (2008:88), for early warning to be effective, it requires an interactive, multi-sectoral approach and multilateral systems that facilitate cooperation. Early warning “should not be an exclusive preserve of bureaucratic institutions, but a communal and collective responsibility” (Monama 2008:88). This notion of collaboration with international, sub-regional and non-state entities is enshrined in the PSC Protocol establishing the CEWS. The Protocol states that the effective functioning of the CEWS will be facilitated through collaboration with the UN and its agencies, other relevant international organisations, research centres, academic institutions and non-governmental organisations (PSC Protocol Article 12(3)).

The collaboration between the CEWS and other actors, particularly at sub-national level, needs to be more than just for input into the system. Monama (2008:95) presents a commonly observed perspective that, in order to reinforce the strategic response of international organisations to violent

conflict, “it requires a multiple perspective approach from a range of sources in a networked interaction to derive knowledge about ‘where, when and how to engage’ in preventative action.” One of the views being advanced here is that for conflict prevention and regional security to move from the realm of ideals and continental aspirations, will require the building of a vibrant engaged and empowered civic culture and societies that are able to access and/ or initiate conflict prevention, management and resolution at community levels. For this to happen, people require access to information – a role that the CEWS could theoretically fulfil. Matveeva (2006:36) provides, amongst others, the following strengths of civil-society based early warning systems:

- Civil society can address and act upon certain problems in which policy-makers cannot get involved because of political sensitivity;
- Civil society organisations (CSOs) can capitalise on the strengths of individuals and groups that already exist by using local knowledge and coping techniques to help prevent conflict or escalation;
- CSOs can cross-fertilise experiences from different regions and bring peace-building knowledge from one conflict zone to another;
- They can facilitate dialogue between affected people and those with an immediate responsibility to protect;
- CSOs can serve as an accountability mechanism;
- CSOs can act faster than formal actors as soon as potential for conflict has been identified.

There is, however, a problem with bridging the information divide between communities in Africa and the governments that hold on quite closely to security related information. Gibson (2005:29) observes that the availability and interpretation of information exposes the simple truth that governments have been operating on behalf of their cosseted elites rather than their populations and that politicians have generally run out of ideas beyond self-preservation.

There is an inherent danger that free flows of information will alter patterns of complex interdependence (See for example Keohane & Nye 1998:85). From the perspective of some governments faced with increased gaps between political and economic elites and the majority of the population, the survival of the ruling regime could be threatened by an active, organised and empowered society able to take responsibility for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Indeed it could work counter to the objectives of

powerful interests if civilians are forewarned about potential attacks or abuses and better prepared to take evasive action. It is, as Keohane and Nye (1998:85) predicted, a matter in which existing political structures will shape the flows of information and thus the potential impact of the CEWS on regional security. Furthermore, the capacity of civil society and local populations to prevent conflict should not be over-emphasised – there is a role for CSOs, but one should be realistic about expectations in this regard.

Outside of the potential to consider that the CEWS could be wired towards communities at risk and could serve as a platform for improved local response to conflict situations, the value of the CEWS to regional security also needs to be considered in terms of the relationship between the CEWS and the AU. As raised in the previous section, there is the potential for considering that the CEWS should be the central information platform of the AU and should serve broader decision-making purposes than just the Peace and Security Council. This seems to be the vision for the Situation Room, as, according to information provided by a staff member in the Situation Room¹², the objectives are:

- To collect and provide timely information relating to potential, actual conflicts and post-conflict activities;
- To provide reports on specific issues on request from the decision makers in the AU Commission;
- To provide the AU Headquarters with a 24/7-mission-wide information gathering and dissemination capacity;
- To serve as a Point-of-Contact and Communication Room for the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission.

The vision of the role of the Situation Room as captured above seems to indicate movement towards being the information hub of the AU Headquarters. This is difficult terrain to navigate, as on the one hand there should be no obstacle to sharing information on conflict and potential conflict situations throughout the AU in order to develop common platforms of understanding and interpretation of events. On the other hand, this broader role could create problems when developing targeted policy recommendations. The danger is that the Situation Room will become nothing more than a news-clipping service for the AU Headquarters and a

¹² Alemayehu Behabtu, 24 June 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

communications centre for the Conflict Management Division. An indication of the dilution of the Situation Room, and in effect the CEWS, towards these kinds of functions can be drawn from the information pamphlet distributed by the Situation Room which defines its information dissemination functions as:

- To serve as a communication unit, at which the official e-mail and fax messages of the Conflict Management Division are dispatched and received;
- To disseminate communiqués and press releases, prepared by the Commission or emanating from the AU Peace and Security Council to Member States, media agencies and other relevant recipients.

In summary, the CEWS has the potential to make a positive contribution to regional security in two spheres – at community and at regional level. At the core both contributions should be interpreted within the overarching framework of the evolution towards a security community. Thus the aim of conflict prevention is served through creating common meanings and understandings as the basis for the practice of peace. This broader framework of the security community was presented in Chapter 2 and is further reflected upon below.

Adler and Barnett (1998:37) present a three-tiered approach to the development of security communities as a means to “isolate the conditions under which the development of a community produces dependable expectations of peaceful change.” In the context of Africa, evidence can be drawn to support the development of a security community at the levels of Tiers One and Two. At Tier One, Adler and Barnett (1998:37-38) explain that, because of exogenous or endogenous factors, states begin to orient themselves in each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations. As discussed in Chapter 2, the foundations of Pan-Africanism and the desire for African unity in the immediate post-colonial era provided the context for the development of new social bonds.

The three-tiered approach to the development of security communities can be diagrammatically represented as follows:

Table 3: The development of a security community (adapted from Adler and Barnett, 1998:38)

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TIER ONE	TIER TWO	TIER THREE	
<i>Precipitating conditions</i>	<i>Factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity</i>	<i>Necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change</i>	<u>Dependable expectations of peaceful change</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Change in technology, demography, economics, the environment • Development of new interpretations of social reality • External threats 	<u>Structure:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power • Knowledge <u>Process:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transactions • Organisations • Social learning 	Mutual trust Collective identity	

At Tier Two, “states and their peoples have become involved in a series of social interactions that have begun to transform the environment in which they are embedded” (Adler & Barnett 1998:39). The contention in this dissertation is the regional security as embodied by the AU, finds resonance with the characteristics of this second tier on the path to the realisation of a security community. The manner, in which the CEWS is understood as having the potential to contribute to regional security, is analysed in terms of potential contributions to enhance the development of a security community at this level.

The CEWS can be interpreted as operating at both structural and process levels – to use Adler and Barnett’s distinction. Information has both structural and process characteristics, as it not only shapes interactions as part of a structural context, but also transforms interactions through transactional and learning processes. In the context of the CEWS, early warning information has the potential to shape interactions in the form of knowledge as well as to

shape collective experience through exchanges of information and social learning.


It is through exploiting the advantages of open source information that the CEWS can reach its potential. Sharing reports from the CEWS within the AU, Member States and Regional Economic Communities could enable collective understandings and create the necessary commitment to enable collective responses. As Adler and Barnett (1998:40) explain, part of what constitutes and constrains state action is the knowledge that represents categories of practical action and legitimate activity. Knowledge as a cognitive structure in terms of shared meanings and understandings creates a framework, which promotes policy coordination or a shared response.

At regional and national level, the CEWS has the potential to play a role in creating a particular set of ideas that can generate impetus for action. The CEWS also represents part of the operationalisation of the regional commitment to conflict prevention, management and resolution, which finds voice in the instruments of the regional security architecture including the African Standby Force and the Panel of the Wise. The full operationalisation of the CEWS as part of the commitment to conflict prevention needs to be empirically demonstrated before the causal link between the idea of early warning and the action of conflict prevention can be asserted. The influence of the CEWS as a source of knowledge within the structural context of security community evolution needs to be empirically evidenced before the achievement of this potential contribution to regional security can be realised. At this time, such evidence is limited due to the current status of operationalisation of the CEWS.

In terms of contributing to the development of a security community through the process variable at Tier Two level, the CEWS functions on the transactional level and also as an instrument to enable social learning. As a means to enable exchange of information, the CEWS facilitates communication between various actors. Such communication can influence the definition of identities and interests - “qualitative and quantitative growth of transactions reshapes collective experience and alters social facts” (Adler &

Barnett 1998:41). The flows of information between stakeholders of the CEWS at national, sub-regional and continental levels can in and of themselves affect change. The crux, however, lies in the transformation of communication links and changes in the social environment into political reality and changes in institutional and political power. This highlights the centrality of social learning as “an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation of reality – what people consider real, possible and desirable – on the basis of new casual and normative knowledge” (Adler & Barnett 1998:43).

According to Adler and Barnett (1998:44), social learning plays a critical role in the emergence of security communities and is facilitated by transactions that typically occur in organisational settings. Adler and Barnett (1998:44) explain:



First, during their transactions and social exchanges, people communicate to each other their self-understandings, perceptions of reality, and their normative expectations. As a result, there can occur changes in individual and collective understandings and values...Second, learning often occurs in institutionalized settings. Institutions promote the diffusion of meanings from country to country, may play an active role in the cultural and political selection of similar normative and epistemic understandings in different countries, and may help to transmit shared understanding from generation to generation.

A hypothesis presented here and theoretically validated, is that the CEWS can contribute to social learning and to the realisation of regional security as embodied by a security community. However, in addition to viewing the CEWS as a mechanism for social learning within the AU, there is the potential for early warning information to be utilised by a wider audience inclusive of non-state actors. There are two areas in which the CEWS can be seen to have a potentially positive effect on regional security – both centrally concerned with the diffusion of information and ideas. The first is at the level of the AU and Member States, where the role of the CEWS has been detailed above with reference to Adler and Barnett’s three-tier approach to the development of a security community. As an institutionalised entity, the practice of information generation, analysis and dissemination will impact on

the peace and security architecture through enabling knowledge and social learning.

The other important aspect is that, because of the open source and information sharing nature of early warning, the CEWS creates a platform for greater participation of civil society. Such participation could extend beyond inputs into the CEWS, as reports from the CEWS could potentially also be utilised as tools for advocacy and monitoring. Meier (2007:33) notes that a genuine change in discourse towards people-centred early warning and response would be far more effective and significantly less expensive. He further highlights that preventing violent conflict requires not merely identifying causes and testing policy instruments, but also building social and political movements – the task of advocating for response cannot be separated from the analytical tasks of warning (Meier 2007:34). Thus, Meier situates communication as central to conflict prevention.

Communication – the collection and dissemination of information – cannot be limited to state and inter-state level. The potential for the CEWS to have a positive impact on regional security will be predicated on the ability to serve multiple stakeholders - a task particularly suitable to an open source information system. Stimulating social learning at local, national and regional levels could transform social systems and build more resilient and responsive systems for conflict prevention. Response activities are a collaborative effort and should involve a variety of actors at different levels and sectors (von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller 2006:17).

3. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa

At the heart of the potential role of CISSA in contributing to regional security are fundamental questions about the nature and functions of intelligence in Africa. For CISSA to be a mechanism in service of continental peace and security, the association of intelligence with covert action and repressive regimes needs to be overcome. Intelligence is too often “seen as an instrument of power and ideology, inherently threatening; an instrument of internal state power, or part of the power of rich states over poor ones”

(Herman 2002:237). What is needed is an intellectual shift where it concerns intelligence, emphasising support for international purposes – and in this case for African peace and security - and increased legitimacy (Herman 2002:239).

This means that intelligence would have to be developed as a professional field of study and activity - not at all dissimilar from other experts and analysts. To give meaning to this, intelligence agencies on the continent would have to align themselves with standards of behaviour, appropriate levels of authority and restrictions on and sanctions for unbecoming behaviour. This would form the basis of changing the morally questionable image of intelligence and would also have positive broader democratic governance benefits.

CISSA has the potential to play an increasingly important role in this regard, as Dlomo explains (2009:9-10):

Topical issues, such as Security Sector Reform or Development, are discussed at a multilateral level to ensure a common understanding and approach to them. It is during these discussions that democratic governance of intelligence becomes a hotly debated topic. Many valuable lessons are learnt during these robust debates which are quite informative on the thinking of CISSA Members and the fears that they may harbour. In most instances the debates tend to lead to requests for presentation of papers by the Secretariat and capacity building initiatives through Workshops aimed at unifying the understanding and approaches of CISSA to contested issues.

Through such exchanges as well as consultations and dialogues with civil society representatives (as mentioned in Chapter 5), CISSA provides a 'safe' environment in which the highly contentious issue of democratic governance of intelligence can be discussed. It is widely accepted that democratic governance of the intelligence sector, as part of the broader security sector, is part of a broader peace and security agenda. This is encapsulated by Bryden *et al* (2008:3-4):

At the heart of the African insecurity story is a breakdown in governance systems due in large part to rule by patronage and the associated misuse of governmental instruments of coercion to entrench political and social exclusion. At best, while maintaining a façade of viability and stability, this situation has created state repression of local populations under authoritarian regimes...At worst, it has led to the outbreak of armed conflict and humanitarian tragedy. An underlying

argument is that only a fundamental shift in the way security is conceived and the pursuit of a governance agenda that puts citizens at the centre of security planning and provision can mould these states into stable and secure environments where development can thrive.

Through CISSA issues such as democratic governance, legislation and controls on the use of intrusive methods could be discussed. There is the possibility that CISSA can contribute towards the development of a professional community of practice amongst intelligence practitioners that is based on commonly accepted codes of conduct. This could include aspects such as legislation and legislative oversight. Dlomo (2009:12) captures this notion:

Although some of the African intelligence and security services are still perceived as a source of threat rather than of security by their people and that they tend to emphasise the narrow conception of national security with a predominant focus and pre-occupation with regime security rather than human security, this situation is changing. The legacy of the Cold War and more recently the War on Terror, is being replaced by the democratization movement in Africa. The principles of CISSA and the commitment of 47 Members of this organisation are significant but modest steps in that direction.

The real question about the success and challenges of the operationalisation of CISSA is whether or not intelligence in Africa will serve a national or continental security goal. Possibly, as argued elsewhere and encapsulated in the Common African Defence and Security Pact, national and continental security bears more similarities than distinctions. Therefore, intelligence serving the purposes of national security has to take regional security into account. The focus on national security, so closely tied to the very nature of intelligence, has a negative connotation more associated with the security of the ruling regime than the security of the territory and its people (see for example Herman 2002:237). It could be preferable to operate not from a notion of security but from the notion of policy; intelligence does not serve national security interests, but rather foreign policy interests. Thus, if foreign policy dictates prioritisation of regional security, the objectives and priorities of the intelligence services will be subordinated to the interests of national foreign policy and therefore to the pursuit of regional security (Shebarshin 2000:77).

Following this logic, the distinction between national and regional security may even become redundant, as CISSA can be situated rather as a platform for confidence building and information sharing. As such, questions then need to be asked about the impact of intelligence on national behaviour and the manner in which that impact will be influenced through collaboration. The key issue here would be to consider the operational strength of CISSA in terms of creating a platform for the sharing of ideas and information and forging common understanding. Dlomo (2009:9) explains:

The strength of CISSA is its ability to bring together African and international intelligence officers to reflect on the developments in the intelligence field and share ideas on what is to be done by the collective and by individual Members. It is a stage where best practice is canvassed and ideas garnered.

Not only does this have the potential to have positive effects on professionalism and governance, but such sharing of ideas and information can also create common platforms of understanding about intentions and actions. The platform provided by CISSA and the function of international intelligence collaboration here is to reduce uncertainty and to reduce the effect of misperception. Michael Herman (2008:369) notes that the predominant effect of misperception is to reduce international security. "Intelligence as considered here provides some antidote to misperception-induced insecurity between states" (Herman 2008:369).

There is an additional element to the potential operational strength of CISSA: as a platform for engagement, created through long-term investment in confidence-building, the relationships between intelligence practitioners become based on mutual respect and a degree of trust. Thus, CISSA is able to function as an additional channel of communication in times of insecurity and can function as a conduit for back door diplomacy. This is similar to the notion of reducing misperception and can enable negotiation and even dispute resolution. In the conflicts in Northern Ireland and South Africa, intelligence agencies were utilised as points of contact between opposing forces to initiate communication, which laid the foundation for further

negotiation between rival leaders (see for example Sanders 2006:301). As Shebarshin (2000:79) notes:

Intelligence services have been actively, though silently, participating in all major and minor international conflicts. They did not always succeed, which meant bloodshed and material expense. Their potential was not fully utilized.

A final observation on operational strengths of CISSA is that, by being removed from the AU, collaboration on sensitive security issues could be enabled. Not part of the AU, CISSA may not be prone to the bureaucratic inadequacies that plague the regional body. Decision-making and agenda setting may be easier and less politicised, as practitioners rather than politicians will be making decisions about the collaborative agenda. This does however point to the one major operational challenge when considering the contribution of CISSA to regional security: CISSA is not formally part of the continental peace and security architecture.

The relationship between CISSA and the AU and the very manner in which CISSA came into being outside of the continental peace and security architecture could be interpreted as indicative of the elitist, secretive and closed nature of the intelligence community. It is almost characteristic of intelligence to operate outside of the usual security sector parameters. A cynical view would hold that the establishment of CISSA was in part the intelligence services ensuring that they continue to occupy a central position in security affairs as the emphasis moved from national to regional structures. However, the real question is: How does the relationship between CISSA and the AU affect the operational behaviour of the mechanism? CISSA operates outside of any system of controls other than at national level. The tasking and setting of continental intelligence priorities is determined by the Conference, and accountability is provided through a system of internal controls (see Dlomo 2009:7-10). This means that the priorities of CISSA reflect a process of negotiated national priorities, which takes place among the Directors-General of the various agencies. As such, the views of dominant states could easily affect the continental intelligence agenda. Furthermore, the tasking does not reflect the priorities or coordination with the agenda of the AU. It is rather a

sideshow – setting its own agenda and tasking and then communicating with the regional body (see for example Dlomo 2009:7-10). This arrangement could provide CISSA with some insulation from the political haranguing that tends to haunt regional organisations or it could call into question the motives, aspirations and intentions of the collective intelligence mechanism.

The issue of international intelligence cooperation received much attention in the post-Cold War and the post-9/11 globalised security context. Cooperation between states to combat transnational threats, as was argued in Chapter 5, has formed the basis of international intelligence efforts. Similar to Herman, Shebarshin (2000:78) cautions that intelligence cooperation has certain built-in parameters:

The cooperation of intelligence services is possible only in those fields where the interests of their respective states coincide, which happens rarely enough and practically never in full measure... Thus, one may speak only about cooperation between some services in some matters. Even with the best and closest relations between the services, their cooperation extends, as a rule, to the exchange of information, joint analysis and estimate of certain situations, sometimes to operational support, i.e. it is limited to areas removed from the heart of every service - its sources. The inherent secrecy of the intelligence work puts natural limits to the closest cooperation.

The importance of the secrecy of sources limits the extent to which intelligence agencies will cooperate. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is something that CISSA has taken on board. As much as secrecy could be an operational weakness when considering intelligence collaboration, by not infringing on national collection processes, CISSA is attempting to navigate these treacherous waters. Collaboration on open source collection (such as the envisaged Early Warning Desk at the Secretariat), exchange of information, joint analysis and possible operational support, are the realms of traditional intelligence in which CISSA can function.

Another possible challenge facing CISSA is that sharing information does not come naturally to intelligence agencies. There is an inherent contradiction between the need to share information (i.e. openness) and the need to keep information (i.e. secrecy). Intelligence agencies are not created for sharing

information. The idea of sharing intelligence between national governments and regional organisations requires a seismic shift in attitudes and practices on all sides (Boatner 2000:84). Helene Boatner (2000) documents some of her experience with the Central Intelligence Agency as support to the US Mission to the UN. She deals extensively with intelligence sharing in the context of international organisations and the challenges associated with relationships between international organisations and national intelligence structures. The following lessons can be drawn from her experiences (Boatner 2000:88-91):

- It is the unity of purpose engendered by outlaw behavior that makes nations willing to share even some quite sensitive intelligence information;
- Member states should strive to provide as much intelligence as possible to an international organisation before an irreversible commitment is made, and a structure should be in place for accomplishing this;
- It is generally wise to assume that information given to an international organisation is potentially available to all its members before long;
- If the products are of sufficient importance to justify sharing, they should be released to the international organisation with as much supporting data as possible;
- Any international organisation that has a need for intelligence also has a need for an analytic element to serve its senior officials and provide both the organisational leadership and the member states with an overview that supplements the national views put forth by members;
- Working in an international environment is harder than working in a national one.

Developing a relationship between CISSA and the AU may be one of the hurdles facing the operationalisation of a collaborative intelligence capacity. Such a relationship needs to be built on mutual trust and respect. CISSA has provided a structure in order to facilitate the provision of intelligence to the AU in order to inform actions and commitments, but the manner in which the relationship develops could determine the effect of CISSA on decision-making at the AU.

In an interview¹³ with the Executive Secretary of CISSA conducted in 2009, the possibility of CISSA one day becoming an organ of the AU was

¹³ Dennis Nkosi Dlomo, 25 June 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

recognised. In the opinion of the Executive Secretary, it is too soon to consider such a move, as there is a general lack of respect for intelligence products as the basis of decision-making in Africa and there is no culture of respecting the value of intelligence. By keeping CISSA slightly separated from the AU, confidence building has been able to take place and relationships have been developed between practitioners without always having to revert to political positions. The underlying idea seemed to be a concern that, if CISSA was incorporated into the AU too soon, it could lead to the politicisation of intelligence products and perhaps the misuse of the continental intelligence mechanism for the purpose of a strong state or group of states.

CISSA interestingly reflects the pressures of needing to work regionally within the framework of a state-based system with national interests. In a paper on intelligence and collective security, Chesterman concludes (2006:71):

In the absence of an international intelligence gathering capacity, states will remain the primary actors in this sphere. International organisations are thus forced to draw on national capacities. The result is not multilateral intelligence per se, but applications of national intelligence to serve national interests that happen to correspond to international security.

Legitimate questions can be asked about the removed position of CISSA from the continental peace and security architecture. This is because of the sensitive nature of intelligence, and the structure reveals the caution with which intelligence collaboration is being pursued. The primary operational challenge is building a relationship with the AU Commission and creating a relationship that enables continental intelligence products to form part of the decision-making process. As David Kahn (2006:134) commented, no matter how accurate intelligence is, it will be useless if ignored.

In the short to medium term, CISSA provides a unique platform for confidence building and information sharing among peers. Such a platform can inform national policy-making, reduce uncertainty and inform the development of common policy positions. It exposes intelligence practitioners to different perspectives and has the potential for creating a continental intelligence capacity that is at the same time both networked and independent.

The approach adopted in this dissertation has been to examine the role of CISSA in contributing to regional security through looking at the role of CISSA at national and regional levels and the potential to impact upon decision-making. As explained by Michael Herman (2002:230):

Far more important, however, is its general effect on national behaviour. If it does not make leaders wise in their international dealings, it at least reduces their ignorance, and where they are receptive it inclines them to display rather less insensitivity and recklessness than if they went without it ... Use of intelligence knowledge figures among the attributes of good governance and responsible international citizenship.

It is the impact of collaboration, as a result of the platform provided by CISSA, on national behaviour that allows the consideration that CISSA can function as an epistemic community. This is also based on the recognition that the complexity of the environment in which states function requires information on which to base policy decisions. In the realm of regional security and foreign policy, the national intelligence structures can be the source of such information and can reduce uncertainty and promote common security goals. As such, national intelligence agencies and CISSA can function as a network of knowledge-based experts assisting states to articulate “the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states to identify their interests, framing issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies and identifying salient points for negotiation” (Haas 1992:2).

Central to the argument made by Haas (1992:2-3) is that “control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination.” The importance of information and knowledge is a recurring theme in this dissertation. In the context of intelligence cooperation, the argument is that, through the platform provided by CISSA, the intelligence agencies on the continent can evolve into a robust epistemic community. This community of experts can utilise the power of information to influence the development of national policy. This by no means infers that national policy-makers always rely on intelligence as the basis for policy-making. Rather it implies that, as policy-makers are continually challenged to cope with the demands of a

complex, integrated security environment, they will turn to experts for guidance and state intelligence agencies are well placed to fulfil that function. As explained by Haas (1992:3-4):

The causal logic of epistemic policy coordination is simple. The major dynamics are uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalization. In international policy coordination, the forms of uncertainty that tend to stimulate demands for information are those that arise from the strong dependence of states on each other's policy choices for success in obtaining goals and those which involve multiple and only partly estimable consequences of action.

Haas (1992:4) goes further and explores the type of information that epistemic communities would be looked to for, given the environment of uncertainty:

These forms of uncertainty give rise to demands for particular sorts of information ... it (information) consists of depictions of social or physical processes, their interrelationships with other processes, and the likely consequences of actions that require application of considerable scientific or technical expertise. The information is thus neither guesses nor "raw" data; it is the product of human interpretations of social and physical phenomena.


It is not only because of the demands of complexity and uncertainty that intelligence could play a more central role in policy formulation, but also because of the type of information that is required for security and foreign policy-making. Also given the particular transnational nature of security in Africa, through CISSA a broader view can be brought to the national level.

The role of CISSA as proposed in this dissertation, has distinct associations with the functioning of an epistemic community. Decision-makers act and react according to their view of the environment and their interpretation of reality based on inherited and evolving attitudes, values and beliefs. Sir Michael Howard (1984:22) argued that "wars begin with conscious and reasoned decisions based on the calculation, made by both parties, that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace." Whether or not decisions about security are based on reliable information is another question altogether. In 1968, Karl Deutsch claimed "during the half-century from 1914 to 1964, the decisions of major powers to go to war or to expand a war involved major errors of fact ... in perhaps more than 50 per cent of the

cases” (Deutsch 1968:51-52). Barry Buzan (1991:23) took the same notion one step further and advanced that: “The natural structure of the system (international relations) tends to enhance misunderstanding.”

In the theoretical frameworks presented in Chapter 2, the importance of common understandings as the basis for cooperation and collective security was highlighted. Intelligence as presented here in the case of CISSA has the potential to play a positive role in reducing uncertainty and misconceptions in security-related matters on the continent. As Michael Herman (2008:369) observed, intelligence can “provide some antidote to misperception-induced insecurity between states.” As such CISSA could make a positive contribution to regional security both in encouraging the development of common understandings and through the provision of a platform to share information and reduce misconceptions about the intentions of other states.

In June 2004, before the launch of CISSA, Wilfried Scharf (2004:6-7) presented the following opinion on the potential for intelligence collaboration in Africa:



... clearly the size of the African Union is such that information-sharing takes place in circumstances only when it is in the interests of the countries to share. The newness of these initiatives, and the hollowness of some of the promises of the AU, such as peer review, means that there will still be many hurdles to clear before the intelligence-sharing becomes more complete and more productive. But one has to remain realistic about what can be achieved among such a varied set of interests in different places. One cannot ignore the fact that there is a political and/or economic pecking order in the continent better known for its propensity for conflict and empty promises than for solid co-operation in pursuit of a common goal.

Although slightly pessimistic about the potential for cooperation, Scharf presents quite a balanced view about the possibilities of intelligence sharing on the continent. Indeed, it is because of the very challenges referred to in the above quote that the contribution of CISSA to regional security should be interpreted. The progress made towards institutionalising intelligence collaboration through CISSA has happened with remarkable speed, and there

seems to be commitment from the intelligence agencies on the continent to undertake cooperation in pursuit of common goals.

As a mechanism for regional security, the contribution of CISSA can be considered in two ways: (1) as an epistemic community influencing national decision-making and (2) as a generator of options for the AU. The argument has been made above that CISSA could be considered an epistemic community because CISSA can be considered as a network of knowledge-based experts assisting states to articulate “the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states to identify their interests, framing issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies and identifying salient points for negotiation” (Haas 1992:2). The continental community of intelligence experts can utilise the power of information to influence the development of national policy.

It is in the domain of the complex continental security environment that national decision-makers would turn to intelligence structures for information and policy advice. The manner in which the continental security environment is interpreted by the state intelligence bodies could impact on the range of options pursued by a particular state. Through the institutionalisation of cooperation, as provided for by CISSA, the capacity of national intelligence structures to interpret the continental security landscape is amplified. Similarly, through increased communication and the sharing of information, enabled by CISSA, national intelligence capacities could be better equipped to deal with complexity and uncertainty.

CISSA has the potential to have a positive effect on regional security as it provides a channel of communication between states that may be parties to a conflict. There is the chance that through confidence building, lines of communication can be established within a professional community that can be utilised for mediation and conflict resolution. There is also the possibility that communication and cooperation between intelligence agencies will open the space for more collaborative operations and addressing cross-border security threats, such as arms smuggling, through multinational operations. As Gibson (2005:29) explained through collaboration, intelligence “can deflect

governments away from 'more of the same' management on behalf of elites towards management of global challenges on behalf of the global commons.”

The alternative consideration of potential contributions of CISSA to regional security is to facilitate the effective application of the tools of conflict prevention, management and resolution of the AU. Drawing from an understanding of intelligence at national level of being a force optimiser, there is room for the consideration of CISSA playing that role at regional level.

Traditionally, intelligence from a primarily military viewpoint served to provide information about adversaries' capabilities, locations and intentions as the basis for battle planning to enable the optimal application of military power. A similar logic can be applied to CISSA and the tools of the AU peace and security architecture. The deployment of the African Standby Force, Panel of the Wise or any mediation or observer missions can be facilitated by information from national intelligence agencies to enable effective planning and deployment. Conflict prevention, management and resolution interventions undertaken by the AU are costly and risky. CISSA reports are potential sources of information to manage risk and reduce the potential of deploying costly resources for limited purpose.

The role of CISSA in relation to regional security has been cast in a rather positive and normative light. This is an optimistic and idealistic view that plays on the importance of information for decision-making and assumes that policy-makers will utilise intelligence for decision-making purposes. It also assumes that there is the capacity within the national intelligence structures to serve regional security aspirations. This includes not only a commitment beyond the desires of the ruling regime of the state to common goods and the common goal of regional stability; it also assumes a commitment at national level to information and learning. For national intelligence agencies to be able to fulfil the goals of an epistemic community requires investment in and development of professional expertise and analysis. National intelligence structures could be challenged in some states to move out from under the shadow of domestic politics and recruit and train a cadre of non-partisan

technical experts in diverse fields such as counter-terrorism, post-conflict reconstruction, organised crime and democracy and governance.

4. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA by drawing on the implications of design and structures of these instruments on operational performance. Furthermore, the potential contribution of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security was discussed through the application of theoretical frameworks as presented in Chapter 2. Thus, the role of the CEWS in contributing to regional security was analysed in terms of the potential contribution that the early warning system can make towards the development of a security community. In relation to CISSA, the potential for the network of intelligence and security services to function as an epistemic community was explored. In both instances, there is the potential for the CEWS and CISSA to have a positive impact on regional security as conduits for the dissemination information and as mechanisms to create common understandings and ideas. This is, however, not a *fait accompli* and more empirical evidence will be needed before this impact can be measured in real - as opposed to potential - terms. Such empirical evidence is at the moment very limited. The contribution of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security in the long-term is dependent on how the regional security architecture continues to evolve and on what roles social learning and information play in shaping interests and decision-making at both national and regional levels.

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

1. Introduction

This final chapter seeks to close this dissertation by presenting key conclusions on the manner in which the CEWS and CISSA potentially contribute to regional security and by proposing a set of recommendations for enhancing the contribution of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security. In order to do this, a brief synopsis of the main arguments offered in the preceding chapters is presented, providing an overview of the argument in its entirety. Following that, a set of recommendations are advanced in view of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA as possible options to enhance the potential contributions of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security.

2. Summary of key arguments

The key research question posed at the beginning was how can the CEWS and CISSA contribute to regional security. The research was concerned not with the policy options for regional security and conflict prevention in Africa but with the information sharing tools that are available. The main focus was on the manner in which the information generated by the CEWS and CISSA can potentially contribute towards regional security. Given that the CEWS is in its infancy and that access to information on the operations of CISSA is limited, the focus of the research task was on conceptualisation and design. Part of the dissertation relied on primary resources such as official documentation from the AU to provide a detailed descriptive analysis of the CEWS and CISSA.

The CEWS and CISSA's potential contribution to regional security was analysed through available literature on early warning and intelligence in order to (a) identify the potential for their successes and (b) highlight aspects that may inhibit success and (c) make recommendations. Furthermore, through the application of the theoretical frameworks of security community and

epistemic community, inferences were made as to the potential contributions of these mechanisms to peace and security.

Chapter 1 established the basis from which the study was pursued. This was done (a) through presenting an overview of the purpose, rationale and methodology of the study; (b) by providing an overview of the key issues that inform the study; and (c) by introducing the elements being studied. Key concepts informing the study such as human security and transnational security threats were discussed. These are important reference points as it is within this broader security paradigm that multi-lateralism and conflict prevention have gained increasing international currency. The modalities for early warning and intelligence collaboration have emerged from this specific social and historical context and have become tools in the AU peace and security architecture because of changes in the security conceptualisation, discourse and practice.

Chapter 2 explored theoretical frameworks that enable the analysis of regional security, early warning and intelligence cooperation in Africa. There were two key issues: (a) why do states cooperate and (b) under what conditions does such cooperation lead to increased security. The intention was to craft a theoretical framework that addressed multi-faceted cooperation and integration at state, government department and non-state levels. The theoretical framework forms the basis from which to explore why states choose to cooperate and how information, ideas and interests can shape the national and collective security agenda.

Dominant international relations discourse such as Realism and rational choice theory was presented before an argument was made for alternative theoretical lenses drawing from Constructivist approaches to international political behaviour. Constructivist interpretations of international cooperation are important because they situate state behaviour in a larger society of rules and institutions, and the role of ideas, identities and values in shaping state interest is highlighted. The focus moves from a Realist preoccupation with national interest to a more nuanced concern with how actors define interests. Constructivist approaches challenge thinking about international relations to

transcend the international level and state as the unit of analysis and to consider the influence of the sub-state level and non-state actors, including social structures and the manner in which values, beliefs and identities influence political behaviour.

Using both epistemic community and security community as Constructivist approaches to international cooperation provided this dissertation with a theoretical framework in which the role of common meanings, understandings and ideas could be explored. This was essential, as both the CEWS and CISSA are primarily information collection and dissemination tools, and a theoretical framework was required which could assist with analysing the effects of information and ideas on regional security cooperation. Security, perceptions of threats and responses to threats are socially constructed based on understandings of reality influenced by norms, identities and interests. The focus was on the manner in which interaction as provided for by the CEWS and CISSA can shape understandings of reality and actors' identities and interests. The assumption is that, through enabling the creation of shared meanings and shared knowledge, there is the potential for both the CEWS and CISSA to have a positive influence on the choices that stakeholders take in favour of peaceful change. It is, however, not only the products, but also the process of communication that shapes behaviour.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 were predominantly descriptive in nature drawing on primary and secondary sources to present a detailed understanding of the key components of the study – i.e. the AU, CEWS and CISSA. In Chapter 3, the evolution of regional security in Africa was discussed, with particular emphasis on the importance of a common sense of identity as enunciated in Pan-African ideology. The trajectory of regional integration was traced as having particular historical, political and sociological influences. As opposed to integration in other contexts, in Africa liberal democratic values have not preceded cooperation. Rather calls for integration were first based on identity and the ideology of Pan-Africanism as a unifying and security-providing factor in the face of unequal global competition. The centrality of identity and the manner in which this has influenced regional integration in Africa was

presented as evidence of the development of a security community on the continent. This was established because the role of the CEWS and CISSA was later analysed in terms of contributing towards the development of a security community characterised by the dependable expectations of peaceful change.

Chapter 4 provided an analysis of the CEWS through, firstly, outlining some contemporary literature on early warning and, secondly, drawing from official documentation a descriptive presentation of the conceptualisation and structure of the CEWS. Some of the key debates in the field of early warning were introduced, with particular attention drawn to the methodological questions surrounding quantitative and qualitative analyses and the implications of design on perceptions about products. For example, part of the appeal of quantitative methods is the perceived neutrality of observable reality and the removing of political and ideological biases that underlie qualitative methodologies. Furthermore, the utility of events-based systems for conflict in weak states was noted. This is of relevance for the CEWS, as the regional system was designed to focus primarily on active conflict zones so as to create the perception of objectivity and political neutrality. Reports generated by the CEWS would be the basis for decisions by the PSC to intervene in conflict situations. Thus when agreeing on the indicators on which to base the CEWS, Member States were implicitly agreeing to criteria on which the PSC would consider deploying fact-finding missions, observer missions, high-level mediation teams and even military forces.

Similar to the approach taken in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 presented some key debates in the global intelligence field before examining the evolution of intelligence cooperation within the framework of CISSA. The literature reviewed highlighted that changes in the broader political and security context result in shifts in conceptualisation and functions of intelligence. This was discussed in terms of shifting global intelligence paradigms influenced by the end of the Cold War and the impact of the war on terror. The shifting security paradigm is predicated on the waning distinctions that can be made between local, regional and global security issues. As sources of insecurity have

become transnational in nature, so too have responses to insecurity become multi-lateral in nature. It is against this backdrop of international trends towards increased security cooperation that the development of CISSA is understood.

The role of CISSA as a platform for information sharing was discussed and the implication of the design of a multinational intelligence body was considered. The distinction of CISSA as an intergovernmental organisation and not an intelligence *service* is important for the discussion. By leaving controversial issues such as collection and source protection at national level, space is created for CISSA to provide a platform for communication, sharing information and confidence building.

Chapter 6 presented the central analytical component of this dissertation by providing an analysis of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA. As the CEWS and CISSA are relatively young institutions with limited operational experience and limited available information about operational successes and challenges, the approach utilised operational challenges faced by early warning and intelligence in general, after which, the role of early warning and intelligence in the context of regional security in Africa was explored in relation to epistemic community and security community theories.

Dominant international debate on the strengths and weaknesses of early warning was discussed with specific reference to the CEWS. It was noted that there is contention about measuring the impact of early warning systems. For the CEWS, from the conceptualisation of the system, the primary output and function is to produce reports to enable response strategies. The strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS cannot be interpreted against early response or conflict prevention, but rather against whether or not the system provided information on which the PSC can base decisions.

Given this starting point, some further challenges were identified related to early warning and decision-making. Two inter-related challenges were identified, namely: (a) political sensitivity and (b) resource constraints. The

inherent and intricate political nature of early warning lies at the heart of the practical challenges facing the full operationalisation of CEWS. International experiences with inter-governmental early warning systems have indicated high levels of sensitivity, political manipulation of products and lack of confidence in early warning information. Furthermore, given governance deficits and the dominance of intra-state conflict on the continent, the will of African leaders to respond to conflicts – some of which have been caused and maintained by the ruling regimes – has been questioned. The CEWS suffers from resource constraints that impede its full operation. These include technical, financial and human resources.

However, in view of these real and efficacy threatening challenges, alternative views on the potential contribution of the CEWS to regional security were posed. This was done through considering not only the potential impact of the products of the CEWS, but by also analysing the potential impact of the *process* of early warning on regional security dynamics. Thus, early warning was situated as a political tool for engagement that could be used by state and non-state actors, inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations. The CEWS has been designed with the involvement of civil society and academia, and the role of non-governmental actors is built into the operational concepts. It provides a structured framework for the free-flow of information from various sources to create a cooperative network of people and institutions. The notion of a cooperative network was further elaborated at the level of civil society organisations and communities as well as at the level of the AU.

The final piece of the analysis of the CEWS was to relate the idea of the CEWS as a platform for the free-flow of information to the potential contribution to regional security. This was done through the application of the development of security communities as presented by Adler and Barnett (1998). The argument was made that, in the context of the CEWS, early warning information has the potential to shape interactions in the form of knowledge as well as to shape collective experience through exchanges of information and social learning. For example, sharing reports from the CEWS

within the AU, member states and regional economic communities could enable collective understandings and create the necessary commitment to enable collective responses. Furthermore, as an open source information platform, the CEWS enables communication between various actors. Through the processes of communication, people exchange views, ideas and values as a result of which people can experience changes in collective meanings, values and understandings. The CEWS through information generation, analysis and dissemination has the potential to impact on regional security through enabling knowledge and social learning. Knowledge and social learning, in turn, can contribute towards to the development of mutual trust and collective identities as the foundation for dependable expectations of peaceful change.

Regarding the strengths and weaknesses of CISSA, the primary challenges identified were perceptions about the role of intelligence, legitimacy deficits and associations of intelligence with secrecy, repression and regime security. This largely negative perception, which is often associated with intelligence on the continent, does not enable intelligence agencies to be considered as having potentially positive effects on regional security. In order to overcome this legitimacy deficit, intelligence would have to be developed as a professional field of study and activity. Professionalising intelligence may well create standards and norms of behaviour appropriate in democracies, such as appropriate levels of authority and restrictions on and sanctions for unbecoming behaviour. The position advanced in this dissertation is that CISSA could serve as a conduit for the development of a professional community of practice amongst intelligence practitioners.

It is in view of the idea that CISSA could provide a platform for intelligence as a professional community, that the notion of CISSA functioning as an epistemic community emerges. Not only does this have the potential of having effects on professionalism and governance, but such sharing of ideas and information can also create platforms of common understanding about intentions and actions. In order to fulfil roles associated with the creation of common understandings, fundamental questions were raised about the

association of intelligence with national security. As had been introduced in earlier chapters, the distinctions between national, regional and international security vulnerabilities are increasingly difficult to demarcate. The argument was made that intelligence serving the purposes of national security has to take regional security into account. Alternatively viewed, if regional peace and security is part of the foreign policy agenda of the state, the intelligence agencies in service of that foreign policy agenda, would need to focus on regional security.

Furthermore, as a platform for communication, CISSA provides an opportunity for confidence building and information sharing. This can reduce uncertainties and manage expectations, particularly during conflict situations, negotiations or disputes. Misperception was noted as a source of insecurity and intelligence can function as an anti-dote.

The relationship of CISSA with the AU was also discussed, as this is an area of contention, which can be viewed both as a strength and weakness. The primary argument was that, by being outside of the formal regional security architecture, CISSA could be spared from some of the bureaucratic inadequacies that plague the regional body. Decision-making and agenda setting may be easier and less politicised, as practitioners rather than politicians will be making decisions about the collaborative agenda. Alternatively, a critical view would hold that the establishment of CISSA was in part the intelligence services ensuring that they continue to occupy a central position in security affairs as the emphasis moved from national to regional structures. The structural arrangement outside the AU creates accountability and tasking gaps that are not necessarily filled at national level.

In order to reflect more on the strengths and weaknesses of CISSA and the notion of collaborative intelligence, international experiences in this regard were noted, most particularly drawn from experiences at the UN level. The primary challenge for intelligence agencies when cooperating is overcoming the tendency to keep secrets and to forge relationships built on the sharing of information – a task not commonly associated with the secret services. This returns the discussion once more to the importance of building trust, mutual

respect and common understandings. Trust needs to exist not only between intelligence practitioners but also between CISSA and the AU. The realisation of the potential influence of CISSA on regional security would be determined by the manner in which intelligence influences decision-making. This would be premised on intelligence being considered as a professional, reliable and non-partisan tool for decision-making at national and regional levels.

Thus, the potential contribution of CISSA to regional security was positioned in terms of the consideration of CISSA as an epistemic community – a network of knowledge-based experts assisting states to articulate problems, identify issues, propose policy options and adopt negotiating positions. Similar to the way information was positioned in terms of the CEWS and the development of a security community, epistemic communities can utilise the power of information to influence the development of national policy. Decision-makers act and react according to their view of the environment and their interpretation of reality based on inherited and evolving attitudes, values and beliefs. Intelligence agencies have the capacity to influence the manner in which decision-makers interpret their environment. Operating at the continental level, through CISSA ideas could be diffused to national level and common positions can be advanced. Intelligence has the potential to play a positive role in reducing uncertainty and misconceptions. As such CISSA could make a positive contribution to regional security both in encouraging the development of common understandings and through the provision of a platform to share information and reduce misconceptions about the intentions of other states.

The argument was made that, in both instances, the CEWS and CISSA could positively contribute to regional security as conduits for the dissemination information and as mechanisms to create common understandings and ideas. This is contingent upon the manner in which regional integration continues to evolve on the continent and what roles information will play in decision-making at national and regional levels. However, how regional integration evolves will also be influenced by the CEWS and CISSA as agents for regional security.

3. Recommendations

The recommendations presented here have the ambition of being relevant for consideration as policy options and items for operationalisation. It is a perspective taken in view of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA as explored in previous chapters, as well as with consideration to future contributions of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security. This list of recommendations is in no way absolute, and, as the regional peace and security aspirations continue to evolve, so too will the mechanisms for information management. A further note is that these recommendations are presented here cognisant of political factors, which could hinder the implementation thereof, but hopeful that the commitment to regional security in Africa will transcend mere rhetoric to improved security for ordinary people.

- (a) The ability of the CEWS to serve as an information-sharing platform and to contribute to a sense of security community in Africa will be served by an online presence. The domain <http://www.ausitroom-psd.org> has been registered and is under construction. A website for the dissemination of reports and even a virtual space for discussion by state and non-state actors could facilitate the development of shared understandings and a common (African) identity.
- (b) The idea of creating people-centred early warning systems needs to be further explored within the context of the CEWS. The implications of operability need to be considered given differences in access to ICT on the continent. Avenues for communication and participation should be investigated for the CEWS to fulfil the potential role as a conduit for information in order to realise a security community.
- (c) A platform for communication between the CEWS and CISSA needs to be explored so as to prevent duplication of efforts and inefficient use of resources. The value of open source intelligence is recognised and a system of complimentary roles of open and closed information should be sought. It is questionable, for example, what additional value to regional security an Early Warning Desk within the CISSA Secretariat

will play when such a capacity already exists within the AU Headquarters.


- (d) Intelligence needs to be brought into the continental peace and security arrangements. Due to the sensitivities around intelligence, it may need to be a long-term plan, but the intelligence domain should not be treated differently from other sectors of the security apparatus. For the military and police, there are mechanisms for collective security based on regional agreements and as part of regional and sub-regional organisations. The same standards should be applied to intelligence.
- (e) Similar to the above point, intelligence cooperation should be bound not only by an agreement between intelligence agencies, but also by a protocol or declaration that sets parameters for behaviour and expectations, and establishes clear lines of reporting and authority between CISSA and the AU.
- (f) For CISSA to serve the continental peace and security ambitions, the setting of continental intelligence priorities and the tasking of the CISSA Secretariat should ideally come from the AU or even be done with the input of the AU. The efforts of CISSA cannot be separated from other efforts at continental level.

4. Conclusion

The final chapter of this dissertation has sought to synthesise the main conclusions and recommendations that can be drawn from this study. Two options have been presented for considering the manners in which the CEWS and CISSA can contribute to regional security. In answering the research question, the CEWS can contribute to regional security as a platform for information sharing and the development of common understandings at the level of inter-governmental organisations or at community level. The preference placed here is on orienting early warning to communities in order for societies to be more able to mitigate the impact of violent conflict. These are, however, not mutually exclusive options, and a broader approach to the targeted recipients and capacities to prevent conflict would need to be considered.

For CISSA, the functioning as an epistemic community was explored. This paradigm provided options to consider that CISSA could make a contribution to regional security through influencing national decision-making. The manner in which CISSA could influence decision-making at the regional level was also considered. Given the orientation of intelligence as state-based and the lack of integration into the continental security architecture, preference was given to the notion of CISSA as a platform to enable more informed national decision-making and as a tool of conflict prevention through communication and negotiation.

There is reason to consider both the CEWS and CISSA as able to make positive contributions to regional security in Africa. The importance and power of information lie at the heart of why these mechanisms can influence the practice of peace in Africa. Greater access to information can shape perceptions, expectations and behaviours. Sharing of information can create the development of common positions and understandings. It can also break down uncertainty and enable actors at community, national and regional levels to better fulfil the human security aspirations of the continent.



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Appendix I

List of Interviews

Alemayehu Behabtu, Information Officer, CEWS Situation Room, 24 June 2009, CEWS Situation Room, AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Dennis Nkosi Dlomo, Executive Secretary, CISSA, 25 June 2009, CISSA Offices, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



Appendix II

