

**State, Market and Media:
The Changing Chinese Nationalistic
Discourse since the 1980s**

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Abstract

The main aim of this thesis is to examine power relations among the Party-state, intellectuals, mass media and the ordinary citizens, the four agents that are involved in the hegemonic struggle for the leading position of nationalistic discourse in the thirty years' "reform and opening" era, and explain the features and transitions of China's nationalistic discourse and the power relations behind it from the political-economic-cultural (media) structure perspectives.

Considering nationalism as an important political issue, China's Party-state has always paid considerable attention towards acquiring the leading status for its official patriotic discourse. Yet, the mass media, intellectuals and the ordinary citizens all strived to influence the nationalistic discourse, and as a result, the fierce power struggles unfolded amongst the four agents. Such power struggles were dynamic with the rise of the Chinese nationalistic sentiment during the past thirty years. Accordingly, Chinese nationalism becomes an ideal approach to study contemporary China's power relations and its transitions.

Three nationalistic cases - TV-documentary *Heshang (River Elegy)* in 1988, the anti-NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the anti-Tibet Independence movement in 2008 - will be analyzed in detail in this thesis. They were selected because these are unique cases that could clearly illustrate the relationships of the four agents and the political context during that historical period. Then, the critical realism-based hegemony approach will be suggested as a new theoretical framework in this study. From this approach, on the one hand, Chinese nationalism will be considered as a hegemonic field in which all four agents struggled in for the hegemonic status of nationalistic discourse. Accordingly, we can examine the nationalistic discourses/projects promoted by the four agents, their discursive struggles and the dynamic process of how one's nationalistic discourse acquires hegemonic status in each case. In this process, the power relations among the four agents can also be explored clearly. On the other hand, since the critical realism perspective pays attention to the dialectical relations between structure and agency, this approach can help us explore how China's transitional structures in the past thirty years – from totalitarian state to authoritarian state, from planned

commodity economy to socialist market economy, and from a media market to the Internet society – shaped the power relations amongst the four agents and the hegemonic nationalistic discourse, as well as how their hegemonic power struggles contribute to the transformation of China’s social structure. Moreover, the critical discourse analysis can help us clarify such issues from three levels: text/discourse, power relationships/ discursive struggles, and social structure.

By examining Chinese nationalistic discourse from discursive relations and the structural perspective, this study tries to combine “structure-agency”, stressing both the deeper structural reasons in shaping nationalistic discourse and power relations amongst the four agents, as well as the active role of agents in promoting the transformation of social structures through such hegemonic struggles. Besides, considering China’s social structure as a dynamic transitional process, and examining in which respect the four agents’ hegemonic struggles contribute to the transformation of social structure, this study also goes beyond the dominant paradigm that regards the “state-society” as a static structure, especially in the field of communication study. Moreover, putting mass media into a broader social context, this thesis hopes to make a contribution to the study of the “publicness” of China’s mass media and the role of the mass media and the Internet society in promoting democratic discourse and the formation of a civil society.

This study finds that in the past thirty years, Chinese nationalistic discourse experienced significant change from intellectual-led to the CCP-led, and then, to netizen-led. Such change reflected the fierce hegemonic struggles among the four agents and the transitional power relations amongst them. Yet, fundamentally, it is the changing economic-political-cultural (media) structure in China’s thirty years that shaped the power relations amongst the four agents and the features of hegemonic nationalistic discourse. Especially, it finds that market economy, combined with the authoritarian political structure, tends to promote radical nationalistic discourse, rather than a democratic and rational discourse as the consensus among the society. Then, China’s media commercialization, operating under the dual logic of the state and market, further radicalized such radical anti-western discourse. The Internet society that emerged in the 2000s sharply decentralized China’s authoritarian political structure. Yet, under the *marketized*

authoritarian structure, the rational-critical discourse still cannot acquire the hegemonic status.

Besides, it finds that China's social structure indeed transformed as the unintended consequence of the agents' hegemonic struggles. Though both China's mass media and the burgeoning Internet society have not yet developed as a civil society, and the rational-critical discourse has not acquired consensus among the society, this study adopts an optimistic attitude towards them, yet, of course, the final answers indeed lie in the agents' own hands.

摘要

本論文旨在觀察當代中國民族主義話語，並透過其探討改革開放以來中國政府、知識分子、大眾媒體、民眾之間權力關係變化及其指后國家、市場體製與傳媒結構的型塑。

民族主義作為一種重要的政治議題，一直處於國家的高度重視之下，並希望以官方愛國主義話語獲得主導地位。但它同時也是民眾、傳媒與知識分子積極參與的熱點話題，因此其話語一直處於四個參與者間的激烈博弈中。而在中國改革開放時期高潮疊起的民族主義情緒中，這種權力博弈也始終呈現動態互動。這使得民族主義議題成為研究當代中國權力關係與社會結構變遷的一個理想進路。

本文將以批判現實主義霸權理論為框架，對當代中國最具代表性的三個民族主義事件——《河殤》熱（1988）、反北約轟炸中國駐南聯盟大使館（1999）、反藏獨及支持火炬傳遞（2008）——進行個案分析。從這一視角出發，一方面，文化霸權理論幫助我們將民族主義話語看作參與者權力鬥爭/接合的場域，從而詳細梳理三十年來民族主義話語參與者各自的話語特徵、話語鬥爭及話語變遷。同時，在上述分析中參與主體間的權力關係得以展現。另一方面，批判現實主義視角重視考察結構性因素對話語鬥爭及權力關係的型塑，由此我們可以探討三十年來從國家極權到威權管制、從商品經濟到市場經濟，從媒介市場到網絡社會，這樣一種社會結構性變遷，如何型塑民族主義話語參與者的權力關係與主導話語；並且參與者間的鬥爭又在多大程度上推動了社會結構的變遷。在此過程中，批判話語分析方法進一步幫助我們在文本/話語、權力關係/話語鬥爭、以及社會結構這三個層面上厘清此一問題。

可以看到，本論文將民族主義話語看作是一個在社會結構與權力關係變遷中建構的過程，同時考慮社會結構對權力關係及民族主義話語特徵的決定性因素與參與者個體的能動性作用，由此試圖連結“個體—結構”辯證關係。同時，本文強調社會結構三十年來的動態變遷，也超越了傳播學中將“國家—社會關係”當作靜態因素的主導研究範式。此外，本文將大眾傳媒放在更廣闊的社會

關繫中審視，對中國大眾傳媒在推動民主話語與市民社會形成中的作用有新的認識。

本文發現，三十年來中國民族主義話語歷經知識分子主導到政府主導再到網民主導，其背後是國家、知識分子、大眾傳媒與民眾之間權力博弈的變化。而從根本上，社會結構的轉型型塑了民族主義話語與權力關係。在國家長期的威權控制與信息壟斷下，中國經濟三十年飛速發展並未推動大眾對民主、理性、反思、批判的民族主義話語的追求。相反，二者共同孕育了激烈的民族主義話語表達。國家—市場雙重邏輯下的大眾傳媒更加推動並激化了此一激進的民族主義話語。即便二零零零年代網絡社會出現，在新的信息環境下網民主導的民族主義話語更加豐富、多元，但在國家威權政治體制下民主、理性的民族主義話語依然無法獲得霸權地位。

此外，本文同時也強調，在民族主義話語的鬥爭中，不能否認參與者的個體能動在客觀上促進了社會結構的變革。雖然大眾傳媒作為市民社會仍未形成，我們也不能忽視個體的努力的確促進了傳媒市場與網絡社會的出現。至於未來中國市民社會何時出現？批判—理性的民族主義話語何時能成為社會共識？本論文給予樂觀展望，但其答案都離不開民族主義話語參與者的推動與努力。

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

- APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
- ASEAN: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
- BBS: Bulletin Board System
- BSERI: Beijing Social Economy Research Institute
- CAS: Chinese Academy of Sciences
- CASS: Chinese Academy of Social Science
- CCP: China Communist Party
- CCTV: China Central Television
- CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
- CMC: Computer-mediated Communication
- COD: Central Organizational Department, P.R.C.
- CPD: Central Propaganda Department, P.R.C.
- CSSM: China Society for Strategy and Management Research
- DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- GAPP: General Administration of Press and Publication, P.R.C.
- GDP: Gross Domestic Product
- GFW: Great Firewall
- GPS: Global Positioning System
- G20s: the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
- ISA: Ideological State Apparatus
- ISP: Internet Service Provider
- KFC: Kentucky Fried Chicken
- MC: Ministry of Commerce, P.R.C.
- MOC: Ministry of Culture, P.R.C.
- ME: Ministry of Education, P.R.C.
- MER: Ministry of Water Resources, P.R.C.
- MFTEC: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, P.R.C.
- MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, P.R.C.
- MFN: Most-Favored Nation
- MIIT: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, P.R.C.
- MPS: Ministry of Public Security, P.R.C.

MWRPI: Ministry of Water Resources and Power Industry, P.R.C.
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRC: National Development and Reform Commission, P.R.C.
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NPC: National People's Congress
PLA: People's Liberation Army, P.R.C.
PRC: the People's Republic of China
RSA: Repressive State Apparatus
SAIC: State Administration for Industry & Commerce, P.R.C.
SARFT: the State Administration of Radio Film and Television, P.R.C.
SARS: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCIO: State Council Information Office, P.R.C.
SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEZ: Special Economic Zone
SMS: Short Message Service
SMTH: Shuimu Tsinghua
SSB: the State Statistics Bureaus, P.R.C.
TMD: Theater Missile Defense
TMSA: Transformational Model of Social Activity
UN: United Nations
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VOA: Voice of America
WTO: World Trade Organization
YRWCC: Yellow River Water Conservancy Committee

Chapter One Introduction

Scenes of Chinese Nationalism in 2008

On the evening of 8 August, 2008, the Opening Ceremony for the Beijing Summer Olympics began at the Chinese stadium known as the Bird's Nest. As an official in China's cultural system, my father got a ticket to see the ceremony at the stadium. When he came back home, he was sweaty and tired, but excited. To reduce the cost, the Bird's Nest was built as an open-air stadium. Accordingly, there is no air conditioning in the stands. On that day, it was hot with high humidity. Since my father did not take a fan, he had to spend 100 *yuan* buying the cheapest one at the stadium. To help the spectators cool down, ice cream was also sold in the stands and immediately sold-out no matter how expensive. Even so, my father perspired from beginning to end. Indeed, nearly 100,000 spectators endured six sweaty hours of pre-ceremony and ceremony. When I asked him about his feelings on the performance, my father told me that since his seat was so far from the center, actually he couldn't see anything clearly except a sea of faces. But, he was so excited:

“It was amazing! The striking sound, the flashing lights, and the splendid spectacle – all of them were incredible! But more importantly, everyone was exhilarated in the whole process. You know, more than 100 heads of state attended the opening ceremony, including US President Bush. President Hu Jintao sat at the center of the Presidential Box, while Bush and Sarkozy sat around him. It seems that Hu is the center of the world. When Hu declared open the 29th Beijing Olympic Games, thundering cheers rocked the full-packed stadium. 204 nation-states participated in this Olympics. When Chinese athletes walked into the stadium finally, tens of thousands of people stood up simultaneously, and break into thunderous applause. It was really fantastic!” (Interview #1)

The same excited feelings also permeated in the Tsinghua's Bulletin Board System (BBS) SMTH.¹ On that afternoon, when President Hu Jintao met important political guests at the Great Hall of the People, a post titled "*Wanguo laichao*" (*Enjoy the honor!*) appeared on SMTH with pictures depicting a scene of more than fifty foreign heads of state standing in line waiting to meet Hu. The post aroused young people's strong patriotic reactions. To millions of Chinese Internet users, it seems that the dream of great nation as the ancient Tang dynasty has achieved. And they were really proud of and confident for hosting the Olympics successfully, which for them was a significant symbol of China's rise in the world. At that time all complaints, such as the exorbitant cost of the Beijing Olympics, and the series of inconvenient city control measures before Olympics, melted into the air. It seems that all prices are reasonable to display a strong nation with growing international influence. According to 2008 Global Attitudes Survey released by the Pew Research Center, of the 24 countries surveyed, Chinese people expressed the highest level of support for the direction in which their country was heading – 86%. Nearly two out of three said the government was doing a good job on issues that mattered to them.²

Interestingly, while Chinese people generally showing political support to their government, China's international image worsened, and China has experienced an international political crisis before the Olympics. Especially, when the overseas torch relay began, it encountered the largest protests in London and Paris. One of China's representatives at United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) describes his feelings to me (Interview #2):

"You know what they say when a rat runs across the street, everybody cries 'kill it'? I never knew what it's like when you are hated by everyone. But I experienced it this time. The scene of the torch relay in Paris is really terrible, even the armed police cannot prevent the crazy Tibetan protesters and their supporters from grabbing the torch. The only thing our torch bearers can do is

¹ SMTH, www.newsmth.org, is one of the earliest BBSs in China, and the most famous University BBS in China.

² See,

http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Public_opinion_and_polls/GAP%20report061208.pdf. Released on June 12, 2008. Retrieved July 10, 2008

run from one place to the other place in a panic. You know, the torch relay in US even had to change routes secretly.”

I then asked him why the Chinese government and our Embassy in France did not predict such situation? He said:

“They only made some precautionary measures after seeing the chaotic situation in London. But it was too late. In fact, before planning the torch relay route, the central government questions each embassy as to whether the local political environment is favorable to a torch relay. Yet, the leaders of our embassy were too optimistic about our national image. Indeed, they hoped to impress good national image to the whole world via the overseas torch relay.”

Clearly, a huge gap exists between China’s excellent image domestically and its poor image internationally. Before the torch relay turbulence, on March 14, the largest protest in China since the spring 1989 erupted at Tibet, when hundreds of Tibetans expressed their desires for independence through violence. Many influential western media taken for granted that it is Chinese government who suppresses Tibetan human right and, thus, they tended to support protesters with sympathetic attitude in their reports. Yet, western media’s fake reports with clear errors inflamed Chinese people’s strong nationalistic mood. Chinese young people even launched Anti-CNN website to point out each piece of distorted fact in a systematical way, and angrily condemned western media’s deliberately misleading articles.³ The tensions between China and western countries were even more intensified when the overseas torch relay began. Regretfully, almost in each overseas city the Olympic torch relay passed, there were severe conflicts between Tibetan protesters and global Chinese patriots.

For most of Chinese people, they really cannot understand what has happened, and why western countries suddenly and collectively have such negative attitude toward China? Out of purely nationalistic sentiment, the overseas Chinese people organized various “Protecting the Olympic Flame” teams to ensure smooth running of the relay in San Francisco and cities beyond. At the same time, a large-scale “Boycott French Goods and Carrefour” activity organized through the cyberspace

³ See, <http://www.anti-cnn.com/>

quickly spread to the bigger cities in all of China. In the public square of each Carrefour branch, thousands of young people waved the national flag, sang the national anthem and chanted patriotic slogans, with the hope to show their anti-western attitude and their resolution to protect the torch relay. In addition, millions of Chinese MSN and QQ users added a pattern of “red heart” and the English word “China” in front of their online signatures to show their unity and patriotic feelings.

Yet, while the hot-blooded Chinese patriots condemned the Tibetan protesters and western media’s bias reports, another voice that urged to make self-reflection on our own problems also emerged. And there were also vehement controversies between the clashed popular nationalistic discourses. Faced with the radical anti-western sentiment after Tibet riot, Chang Ping, the deputy editor-in-chief of *Southern Metropolis Weekly (SMW)*, published an essay titled “*Tibet: the truth and nationalistic mood*” in FT Chinese.com.⁴ In this essay, he criticized hot-blooded patriots’ “taking stand” activity (*zhandui*), as well as Chinese government’s media control policy, and argued that if the hot-blooded young really care about news objectivity, not only should they expose the fake reports by western media, but also should challenge news censorship system of Chinese authority, because truth can only be obtained in an open atmosphere with adequate discussions. Nevertheless, instead of calming down the radical nationalistic mood, his essay ignited serious confrontations between the two camps which made the complex situation into chaos. Not only Chang Ping was labeled as “Chinese traitor” by angry young patriots, but also *Southern Metropolis Weekly (SMW)*, the paper he worked for has been called the “running dog” of western countries. In the following days, hot-blooded patriots’ “taking stand” behavior was more radical when the Sino-West relationship further worsened. When Jin Jing, a handicapped torch-bearer who was assaulted by the ethnic Tibetan protesters in France, used her body to protect the Olympic flame, she was treated as a heroine by China’s millions of Internet users. Ironically, only a few days later, she was labeled as the “traitor” since she claimed that she did not support boycott Carrefour activity. In addition, in the cyberspace, almost all my Chinese MSN friends, no matter those Ph.D. students or people only got high school

⁴ See, “*Xizang: zhenxiang yu minzuzhuyi qingxu*” [*Tibet: the truth and nationalistic mood*], in <http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001018387>, Retrieved April 8, 2008.

education, added “red heart China” (*hongxin Zhongguo*) before their online nickname, to show their patriotic feelings to their friends. Indeed, if one did not do like this, he/she was likely to be criticized sharply by his MSN/QQ friends and ostracized.

During that time, I was a Ph.D. student preparing for qualifying examinations. Each afternoon my friends and I would have a tea break, during which time we discussed the Tibet riot and torch relay issues for one or two hours. We talked about what we heard or watched from various mass media or our friends’ personal experience in overseas, our worries when seeing the populist xenophobia sentiment. In her blog, one of my tea-break friends criticized patriots’ series of “taking stand” activities directly. She wrote,

“It is meaningless for Chinese people just to express their loyalty to the country. Indeed, all the foreigners know that China has a large population and Chinese people love their country extremely. However, such activity is useless to strengthen foreigners understanding to us. Although they may keep silent, it does not mean they trust what we have said. By contrast, what they think in their heart may be, ‘what a huge number of Chinese stupid people who had been brainwashed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)!’

Therefore, instead of expressing the extreme patriotic feelings, what we’d better do is to communicate with foreigners patiently. It is true that most of foreigners do not know China (of course, it is also true that we may donot know them neither). Yet, just because of this, the first thing we should do is to listen to their opinions. After all, it is totally impossible to communicate if we donot know their assumptions but only stressing our own conclusions.”

However, when we had breakfast next morning, she wept bitterly because many messages left behind her post, including her friends’ posts, condemned her “unpatriotic thinking” since she “did not take a clear-cut and firm stand”, and thus considered her ideas unbelievable and unacceptable. My friend’s experience shocked me enough that it lingered in my mind for days. It seems that to hot-blooded patriots, they may criticize their government, even sharply; however, if a foreigner criticizes Chinese government, it is out of the foreigner’s bias towards

China. Then, if a foreigner criticizes Chinese government, and you as a Chinese person take side with him/her, you are the “running dog” of the westerners. The worst situation is, if you question Chinese patriots’ nationalistic sentiment or their “taking stand” activities in a reflexive way, you will be sharply condemned as a “Chinese traitor”. Based on these phenomena, I wonder why Chinese hot-blooded patriots considered criticizing the Chinese government as criticizing China? Why did they believe that they can achieve the final victory if only their voices are louder than those who disagree? Why people with different nationalistic attitudes cannot have rational debates in China? And also, when a democratic, critical-rational kind of nationalistic discourse can become the consensus among Chinese people? Indeed, these questions had never intrigued me so much as in those days. And I began to realize that there was the germ of an idea that I wanted to pursue.

Research Questions

The aim of this study is not to discuss the Tibet issue, providing evidence for China’s patriots or Tibetan protesters from historical perspective, or investigate the relationship between China and western countries, or examine the origin and development of Chinese nationalism. Indeed, the initial aim is to explain the features and formation process of Chinese nationalism in the 2000s. Yet, when I focused on the fierce struggles among different nationalistic discourses, I found that the power relations among the agents involved influenced their nationalistic projects and discourse struggles. As Unger (1996) argued, Chinese nationalism is contested, hybrid and polysemic. Instead of a one-power game, it is made up of a set of symbols and practices interpreted and manipulated by number of interested factions rather than a universally-shared set of symbols and practices with uniform meanings determined solely by state elites (Yuen, 2003). Accordingly, I am interested in examining nationalistic discourses promoted by the related agents, and their hegemonic projects and struggles for the leading role of nationalistic discourse, from which their power relations can be explored.

Besides, when we put the issue of Chinese nationalism in a historical context, we may find that there is a radical change of Chinese nationalistic discourse in China’s “reform and opening” era. In the beginning years of “reform and opening”, China

adopted a cosmopolitan orientation, linking domestic reform with “complete westernization” (*quanpan xihua*) project. However, with the rapid market reforms, Chinese people turned to support their authoritarian regime. Indeed, it is really a phenomenon contradicting established propositions in the west that free market will unavoidably produce new ideas and values that challenge the authoritarian political system. Thus, to explain transitions of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the past thirty years, as well as why China’s rapid economic growth did not promote democratic thinking as the consensus in the whole society, it is necessary to consider the deeper structural reasons, studying the impact of political, economic, and cultural (media) structures to agents’ power relations and their struggles for the leading of nationalistic discourse.

However, to understand Chinese nationalistic discourse in relation to China’s social structure does not mean that this thesis adopts the economic determinism perspective. By contrast, considering China’s social structures as a transitional process, I am also interested in whether and to what extent agents’ struggles and nationalistic projects contribute to the transformation of social structures, especially, whether the agents’ power struggles for the leading role of nationalistic discourse pushed the mass media or the Internet society evolving as a civil society. Besides, putting the mass media in a broader China’s social context, this study hopes to examine its role in promoting the democratic discourse and, thus, make contribute to China’s media study.

Chinese Nationalism as a Hegemonic Discourse

Generally speaking, there are two popular arguments to explain Chinese nationalism from power relations perspective: top-down structuralist argument and bottom-up culturalist argument. For the first one, Chinese nationalism was considered as a kind of propaganda manipulated by the ruling group. Most of China watchers from the West tend to adopt this perspective. Paying significant attention to the Party-state’s patriotic education, they argue that Chinese people with strong nationalistic sentiment has been brainwashed by the government. By contrast, the second one regards Chinese nationalism as a cultural community which mirror people’s real needs and aspirations, and as a result of bottom-up mass movement. Scholars who focus on popular nationalism, especially China’s online nationalism in

recent years, always take this argument, stressing the positive role of popular nationalistic movements in promoting China's political reform. However, both of the two arguments are the simplistic explanations of contemporary Chinese nationalism. By the first instrumental view, the Party-state is depicted as a rational actor constructing and deploying nationalist sentiment for its own instrumental purposes, while the masses are portrayed as blinded by an irrational anti-foreign hatred. Clearly, it neglects, or at least underestimates the critical role that people's emotions and passions play in it. On the other extreme, the culturalist understanding of Chinese nationalism is often uncritically romantic in its celebration of popular nationalism as expressing the authentic voices of the ordinary people, and its potential role to China's political reform, while neglecting the role of the Party-state plays in it.

Then, in this study, Chinese nationalism will neither be considered as an "ideological machine" dominated by the ruling group, nor it will be simply regarded as a mass movement which reflect people's real aspirations and always pose challenge to the Party-state's rule. Alternatively, the hegemonic understanding of contemporary Chinese nationalism will be proposed. As Bennett (1986) argued, the substitution of the concept of hegemony for that of domination is not merely terminological. It is an entirely different conception of the means by which cultural and ideological struggles are conducted. Specifically, to see nationalism as a hegemonic process means to view it as a field of relations shaped by multiple parties — the ruling group, mass media, intellectuals, and the citizens. Thus, here, "nationalism" is not a static concept which has definite meaning. Instead, it is dynamic according to the discourse struggles among the four related agents. Clearly, this hegemonic understanding can help us examine social agents' concrete nationalistic discourses, as well as exploring their hegemonic process for the leading role of nationalistic discourse from power relations perspective.

However, the traditional understanding of Gramscian concept of hegemony is restricted to the agential aspect. From this understanding, the construction of hegemonic nationalistic discourse is simply an intersubjective affair by or between different sets of agents with their opposing strategies. Without considering the structural factors, we cannot explore why one agent adopts certain nationalistic


projects in this period, while adopting others in that period, and why one kind of nationalistic discourse acquired hegemonic status in this period, while losing such status in that period. Then, to understand the conditions under which agents' projects and hegemonic struggles operate, the critical realist theory of hegemony will be adopted as the theoretical framework in this study. From this perspective, social agents' actual hegemonic projects are *emergent* out of a deeper hegemony which concerns the deep, underlying conditions within society. This means agents' nationalistic projects and their power relations are shaped by the basic structure of society, and thus, ultimately cannot escape these conditions. However, on the other hand, the relations of "structure-agency" cannot be reducible to this. Social agents' hegemonic projects and hegemonic struggles can at least develop in their own dynamics and may come into conflict with these conditions in a dialectical overdetermination. Therefore, they are needed to be analyzed in their specificity. Obviously, this realist understanding to hegemony can help us examine the features and transitions of Chinese contemporary nationalistic discourse, explain them from agents' dynamic power struggles, as well as exploring the deeper structural reasons. More importantly, by this theoretical framework, we can also examine whether or to what extent social agents' nationalistic struggles pushed the transformation of social structures. And thus, the active role of social agents will not be neglected while stressing the structural reasons.

Then, generally, the method of critical discourse analysis will be adopted in this thesis. According to Fairclough (1992), discourse, as a semiotic system, has three dimensions to analysis: a text, a discursive practice, and a social practice. In other words, texts can never be understood in isolation. Instead, they can only be understood in relation to webs of other texts and in relation to certain social context. Yet, the relationship between texts and social practice is mediated by discursive practice. Thus, any analysis to discourse should focus on 1) the linguistic features of the text; 2) processes relating to the production and consumption of the text; and 3) the wider social practice to which it belongs.

Clearly, the three dimensional model in Fairclough's critical discourse analysis corresponds to the critical realist understanding of hegemony. Accordingly, considering Chinese nationalism as a hegemonic discourse, China's contemporary

nationalistic discourse will be also analyzed under three layers (See Figure 1.1). Firstly, textual analysis will be made to nationalistic discourse promoted by the Party-state, mass media, intellectual, and citizens. Then, the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse since the 1980s can be depicted. Secondly, in the discursive level, we will examine the hegemonic struggles among the four agents, by which their power relations can be explored. Then, in the third layer, we will study the structural reasons behind the agents' power relations and the features of nationalistic discourse. Also, it will shed light on whether and to what extent agents' dynamic power struggles contribute to China's transformation of political, economical and cultural structures.

Figure 1.1 Three-dimensional model for nationalistic discourse analysis



Organization of This Study

This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the background of this study, the general questions and approach to it. Especially, this opening chapter addresses that considering Chinese nationalism as a hegemonic field in which the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens struggle for the leading role of nationalistic discourse, we can explore the power relations among the four agents. Besides, it is necessary to take into account the structural

reasons when explaining the power relations and the features of nationalistic discourse. Then, this chapter also introduces the hegemonic theoretical framework informed by the critical realist theory, as well as the method of critical discourse analysis. By such framework and method, this thesis may combine “structure-agency” dialectic, explaining the power struggles and features of nationalistic discourse from deeper structural perspectives, as well as studying agents’ active role in pushing the transformation of social structures.

A literature review is conducted in Chapter Two. It first reviews literature on China’s contemporary power relations approached from Chinese nationalistic discourse. Four kinds of nationalistic discourse and power relations then may be found. Yet, dominated by “top-down” or “bottom-up” perspective, those studies only considered one or two agents and their relations involved in the formation of Chinese nationalistic discourse. By contrast, this study stresses that to explore power relations approached from nationalistic discourse, all nationalistic projects promoted by agents involved, and their power struggles should be examined in detail. Then, literature on structural analysis to Chinese nationalistic discourse follows. It finds that one-dimensional structural analysis cannot explain the features of China’s nationalistic discourse, as well as the power relations behind it. For example, though the market economy had penetrated into each corner of Chinese society, the political support from Chinese people increased continuously. This is indeed a contradiction with the established proposition that the free market will unavoidably produce new ideas and values that challenge the authoritarian political system. Then, from the political structure analysis, such as the “state-society” analysis, we will never know why social agents take such strategies without considering the deeper economic reasons. Nor can media structure analysis alone, since media commercialization trend and the Internet society was argued to be a positive force for democratic discourse. Thus, a comprehensive structural analysis – considering “economic-political-cultural (media)”structure together – will be adopted in this thesis to explain the features of nationalistic discourse and the power relations behind it.

In Chapter Three, it argues that from Gramscian concept of hegemony, we can consider Chinese nationalism as a hegemonic field, and thus combine “bottom-up”

and “top-down” perspectives to study Chinese nationalistic discourse and power struggles behind it. Yet, the concept of hegemony is also open to a wider interpretation, especially from the culturalism, structuralism, and post-structuralism perspectives. While culturalism approach restricts Chinese nationalistic discourse to agential understanding, the post-structuralist approach is even more radical in that considering nationalistic discourse as a textual articulation. On the other extreme, de-historizing social relations among agents involved in the formation of nationalistic discourse, the structuralism approach may rule out any possibility of transformation of Chinese nationalistic discourse and social structure. Since all the three approaches only stress one side of hegemony, in this chapter the critical realism-based hegemony will be introduced as the theoretical framework of this study, which can combine both structure and agency by the transformational model of social activity (TMSA). Accordingly, the dialectical duality of hegemony model – concerned with both structural hegemony and a surface hegemony of actual hegemonic projects – will be illustrated in detail.

Based on such understanding, concretely, Chinese nationalism in this study will be defined as a hegemonic field around the nation-state, in which all agents involved – the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals and the citizens – struggled, negotiated and articulated under certain social structure, trying to acquire leadership for their nationalistic discourse. Specifying social structure as economic, political or cultural (media) aspects, three manifest transitions of China’s social structure during the past thirty years can be traced. Then, by studying three unique cases – TV-documentary *Heshang (River Elegy)*, the anti-NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and, anti-Tibetan Independence and protecting the overseas torch relay movements in 2008 – this study will explore the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse and the power relations behind it, and explain how the social structures — “Totalitarian state - Planned commodity economy” in the 1980s, “Authoritarian state - Socialist market economy - Media commercialization” in the 1990s, and “Authoritarian state - Socialist market economy - the Internet society” in the 2000s – shape the agents’ discursive practices and hegemonic nationalistic discourse in each case. Moreover, it will shed light on in which respect social agents’ practices and struggles promote reproduction or transformation of social structures. The research questions will be examined carefully with

qualitative methods including textual analysis, semi-structured interview, and online ethnography. Then the concrete research design and data collection process will also be illustrated in this chapter.

By the case of popular TV documentary *Heshang*, Chapter Four explicates the features and formation of China's nationalistic discourse in the 1980s and the power relations behind it. Through textual analysis to *Heshang*, it finds that the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 1980s was liberal and utopian, led by *qimeng* intellectuals criticizing Chinese traditional culture and promoting western-style modernization. With the "strong nation complex", it is fundamentally a radical utopian vision. Then, in the discursive practice, it examines the strategies adopted by the four agents separately, and argues that the unique phenomenon of the relationships between the four agents in the 1980s was the formation of "historic bloc" between *qimeng* intellectuals and media intellectuals. They pressured the Party-state for political reform on the one hand, and cultivated the public for a democratic thinking and promoted their "complete Westernization" project to the whole society on the other hand. And as a consequence, their radical pro-west, anti-traditional Chinese culture discourse acquired the leading status in the whole society.

Then, this chapter may further argue that it is the "Totalitarian state – Planned commodity economy" structure in the 1980s that shape such liberal nationalistic discourse and the power relations amongst the four agents. With the transition of economic structure from "planned economy" to "planned commodity economy", the methods of state intervention into the economy, and its general political practice had to be reorganized. Specifically, the Party-state's "thought emancipation" campaign and the movement of demystifying Mao encouraged Chinese intellectuals to make proposals for China's modernization. In the process of economic development, Chinese people also expected a better standard of living and a more enlightened and wealthier future. Yet, finally, the failed price reform and the slow pace of political reform greatly challenged the totalitarian political structure, and intellectuals' "complete westernization" project and liberal nationalistic discourse acquire the hegemonic status by chance.

Yet, this chapter then further argues that liberal intellectuals' *de facto* reliance upon the reformist CCP leaders and the hidden agenda of "strong nation complex" in their liberal discourse not only made their project lose much of critical edge, but also caused their liberal project to lose the leading status to the coercive state; and finally, resulted in its failure in the struggle for media emancipation as a civil society.

Next, by the case of the anti-NATO bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Chapter Five examines Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 1990s, the power relations behind it, as well as the deeper structural reasons. Through textual analysis to the anti-NATO bombing demonstrations in China, related media reports, as well as interviewees' self-reports, this chapter may first observe a paradigm shift in hegemonic nationalistic discourse from intellectual-led liberal utopian narrative in the 1980s to the CCP-led anti-Western rhetoric and pro-CCP discourse with pragmatic elements in the 1990s. By examining the hegemonic projects and discursive relations, we may find that the eventual victory of the official patriotic discourse resulted from changing relations amongst the four agents. Rather than forming the "historic bloc" that promotes liberal discourse and mobilizes the public, both intellectuals and mass media in the 1990s cooperated with the Party-state, legitimizing the Party-state's authority and promoting official patriotism.

Then, in the structural level, this chapter may argue that *qimeng* intellectuals' liberal project and China's pro-democratic movement in the 1980s indeed led to the social structure changing from "Totalitarian state - Planned commodity economy" to a "Authoritarian state - Socialist market economy - Media market", though such far-reaching consequences were clearly not *qimeng* intellectuals' (democratic) intentions. Accordingly, this chapter will investigate how such new social structures shape the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse as well as the power relations behind it in the 1990s. It then finds that unlike the conventional liberal narrative would suggest, China's rapid economic development could not promote a democratic nationalistic discourse, under the combination of authoritarian political structure and market-oriented economic structure. Especially, while the official patriotism cultivated the "radical audience", China's media market, operating under the dual logic of "state-market", radicalized the already aggressive anti-western rhetoric and pro-CCP discourse. Moreover, from such kind of power relations and

the radical feature of nationalistic discourse in the 1990s, we can see that China's burgeoning media market and the media commercialization trend in the 1990s has not promoted mass media evolving as a civil society yet.

In Chapter Six, accordingly, through case study to the anti-Tibet independence movement and the pro-overseas torch relay movement in 2008, the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s and the power relations behind it will be investigated. It may find that unlike the almost homogeneous discourse before, Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s diversified and clashed, while netizen-led anti-western rhetoric and pro-CCP discourse acquired hegemonic status. Such hegemonic discourse was the continuities of official patriotism in the 1990s, yet, it was directly led by millions of Chinese Internet users, instead of the Party-state. By contrast, the official patriotism failed to acquire the leading role in the intensive discourse struggles.

Then, in the discursive level, the power relations amongst the four agents will be explored, approaching from the nationalistic projects and the discourses the four agents promoted and the fierce discursive struggles amongst them. It may find that incorporating Confucian concepts, the official patriotism adopted a more moderate attitude to Western countries, and a more favorable attitude to Chinese traditional culture. The establishment intellectuals, re-aligning with official mass media, promoted the elements in official patriotism. Yet, intellectuals who had been marginalized in the 1990s reemerged again. And the ordinary citizens, represented as millions of the Internet users, also made their own voice in public for the first time. No matter how fierce quarrels broke out between them, both of their alternative projects indeed posed a great challenge to the official discourse. Yet, it should be noticed that the victory of *zuofens'* radical discourse did not mean that Chinese ordinary netizens have enough ability to challenge the Party-state's authority, if we consider that their radical anti-west and pro-CCP discourse was the continuities of the official patriotism in the 1990s.

Likewise, this chapter will argue that the new "Authoritarian state - Socialist market economy - the Internet society" social structure in the 2000s, as the unintended consequence of the four agents' struggles through the 1990s, shaped the features of nationalistic discourse as well as the power relations among the four agents.

Accordingly, a detailed examination will be made on how China's market economy in the globalization era and the burgeoning Internet society shaped the diversified nationalistic discourse, and decentralized the Party-state's authoritarian media control, which further led to the official patriotism failed to acquire hegemonic status. More importantly, it will argue that the rapid economic development, combined with authoritarian political structure, can only radicalize the aggressive anti-western sentiment among Chinese people. Indeed, critical, self-reflexive kind of nationalistic discourse emerged. Even though, such liberal discourse was also radical and cannot obtain leading status, within the authoritarian political structure. And, considering *zuofens'* radical discourse and power relations amongst the four agents, we can see that China's mass media and the Internet society as civil society still has not developed yet.

Finally, Chapter Seven will summarize four major findings of the study, including: 1) the features and transitions of Chinese nationalistic discourses during the past thirty years, and 2) the transitions of power relations behind it; 3) how China's economic-political-cultural structures together shaped agents' power relations and their nationalistic discourses, and 4) agents' active role in promoting the transformation of social structures. Clearly, the critical realism-based hegemony not only can help us study Chinese nationalistic discourse from agents' discursive struggle perspective, but, it can also help us combine "structure-agency" perspectives, exploring the structural reasons for the features of nationalistic discourse and the power relations amongst the four agents.

In particular, this study finds that no matter how Chinese nationalistic discourse changing during the past thirty years, they were fundamentally radical. In the structural level, it also finds that economic development may cause political dissatisfaction – like situations in the 1980s China, but it also may elicit political support – like situations since the 1990s. This indeed challenged the conventional belief that economic development will naturally lead to the decline of political support for the authority (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1989). Besides, China's rapid media market expansion also did not promote an appeal for democracy from Chinese people. Instead, operating under the dual logic of state and market, China's media market since the 1990s only radicalized the already aggressive nationalistic discourse,

and damaged public debating spirit and rational thinking. Putting it differently, this study suggests that China's rapid economic development, combined with authoritarian political structure, tends to lead to radical political support.

Yet, it is undeniable that agents' hegemonic struggles for the leading position of nationalistic discourse indeed pushed the social structure change, from totalitarian politics to authoritarian politics, from socialist commodity economy to market economy, and from emerging of a media market to the Internet society, though such far-reaching consequences were unforeseen and were not previously designed by the agents. However, the mass media still has not developed as a civil society. Besides structural reasons, this study finds that all Chinese nationalistic discourse that acquired hegemonic status in the past thirty years incorporated the "strong nation complex" in the heart of Chinese people. Then, such psychological state to China's radical nationalistic discourse will be explored here.

Finally, this chapter will predict the future of Chinese nationalistic discourse, as well as whether China's burgeoning Internet society will develop as an online civil society. It may find that in the post-Olympic era, China's Party-state adopted more flexible authoritarian control methods to the mass media and the Internet society. Meanwhile, it also tried to strengthen the "strong nation complex" among Chinese people, especially by exporting official values and Chinese traditional values. From this perspective, one tends to have a pessimistic perspective on the future of Chinese nationalistic discourse, as well as China's Internet society as a civil society. Yet, based on Gramscian "philosophy of praxis" spirit, as well as discovering the active role of agents in promoting the transformation of social structures in the past thirty years, this thesis has an optimistic attitude on the agents' efforts to push the Party-state for a "passive revolution", and the Internet society developed as an online civil society, in which a healthy nationalistic discourse may become the consensus among China's society.

Chapter Two Literature Review

In this chapter, we will first review literature on China's contemporary power relations approached from Chinese nationalistic discourse. Four kinds of nationalistic discourse and power relations then may be found. Yet, dominated by "top-down" or "bottom-up" perspectives, these studies only considered one or two agents involved in the formation of Chinese nationalistic discourse and the related relations. Moreover, lacking of structural analysis, the reviewed studies tend to consider Chinese nationalism as a static phenomenon, and thus only label or describe it. By contrast, in this chapter I argue that to explore power relations approached from nationalistic discourse, all nationalistic projects promoted by agents involved and their power struggles should be examined in detail. Besides, considering Chinese nationalistic discourse as an ongoing process, a comprehensive social structural analysis is also needed to explain the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse, and the changing power relations behind it. Accordingly, literature on the influence of "political-economic-cultural" structural factors to Chinese nationalistic discourse will be reviewed.

Power Relations Approached From Chinese Nationalism

Study Power Relations from Nationalism Approach

As Zhao Suisheng (2004:20) argued, one reason why there is not a single definition of nationalism that has won a wide acceptance over the others is because different people have used the same term to emphasize very different aspects. In this thesis, I hope to explore the power relations among the Party-state, the mass media, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens approached from Chinese contemporary nationalism.

After the founding of the PRC, the CCP regarded nationalism as a bourgeois phenomenon. Accordingly, the Party-state did not allow nationalism to become an internal part of its ideology. Although the Party-state promoted official patriotism

among the whole society, it was, fundamentally, identical to Marxism (Zheng, 1999: 75), and was utilized to legitimate the totalitarian political system by portraying the communist state as the embodiment of the nation's will, and thus demanding that citizens subordinate their interests to those of the state (Zhao, 2004:26). Under the totalitarian political system, forging a communist-led Chinese nation-state meant giving all the power to the rulers who then have the ability refuse to acknowledge any opposite voice due to "patriotism", and then deprive the reactionaries of the right to speak. Accordingly, Chinese nationalism before the 1980s could not be considered as a field in which different social agents could promote their own nationalistic projects and compete for the leading role of nationalistic discourse.

Nevertheless, the situation changed since the 1980s when the "reform and opening" began. The market-oriented economic reform deeply violated the basis of official patriotism and Marxism ideology established in the pre-reform years, and fierce competitions appeared among different nationalistic projects. Generally, as many scholars observed, the remarkable resurgence of Chinese nationalism can be observed in at least four levels: in the state apparatus, in intellectual discourse, in media discourse and within popular society (such as Huang & Lee, 2003; Zhao, 2004). Indeed, when nationalistic related incidents broke out, all of the four agents were usually involved, promoting their own projects and struggling for hegemonic status. Accordingly, Chinese nationalism became an ideal approach towards studying China's power relations in the "reform and opening" era. Amongst numerous studies of contemporary Chinese nationalism, most of them more or less may refer to the power relations among the four agents. Generally speaking, previous studying found four kinds of power relations.

First, in most cases, overseas scholars on China study have a tendency to consider strong nationalistic feelings of Chinese people since the 1990s as the simplistic party propaganda, which has always been used to divert the attention of Chinese people from its various domestic problems (Zhao, 1997; Yuen, 2003; Gires, 2004; *et al.*). Besides, they believe that with rapid rise of Chinese economic and military power, China's Party-state has become increasingly nationalistic, and thus, promote nationalistic sentiment among the whole society. Accordingly, they always take a negative attitude on the rising of Chinese nationalism. By contrast, Chinese

political scholars tend to take a positive attitude on official patriotic discourse, since the most significant aim of official patriotism was to unite the spiritual faith among Chinese people in the transition period from a planned economy to a market one (Chen, 1996: 74).

Clearly, western and Chinese political scholars have binary attitude on China's nationalism. While western China watchers take a negative view on such "brainwashed" kind of nationalism, Chinese scholars, regarding it as an effective spiritual instrument which can replace old ideologues associated with either Maoism or Marxism, always have a positive attitude on it and, thus, promote it actively. Yet, they indeed have a broad consensus on the nature of Chinese nationalism and power relations behind it: it is the "top-down" movement and the Party-state can manipulate nationalistic sentiment of the public for its own purposes. From this point of view, studies on Chinese nationalism focused on exploring what kind of official nationalism the Party-state promoted to the society? How the Party-state utilized nationalism for its own purposes, and so on. Among them, special attention was put on the "century of national humiliation" (*bainian guochi*)⁵ discourse in the official patriotism, from which scholars found that a particular emphasis was placed upon the damages China suffered at the hands of aggressive Western imperialism, as well as a series of unequal treaties signed by first the Qing, and later, the Republican and Nationalist governments. Meanwhile, such "wounded" nationalistic discourse juxtaposed with stories of the determination and bravery of the CCP in its struggles against both domestic and international opponents (Chang, 2001; Callahan, 2006). For example, a case study had been made to the official discourse of Hong Kong's "Return to the Motherland" in 1997. During the victimization narrative, scholars found that the official discourse created a strong imagination to "wipe away" the "national humiliation" under the Party-state's leadership (Pan, et al., 2001; Huang & Lee, 2003; Garies 2004; Allen 2009).

⁵ This period begins with China's defeat in the First Opium War and the British acquisition of Hong Kong in 1842, to the founding of People's Republic of China in 1949. The period was marked by major wars between China and Western powers: the two Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860, the Sino-Japanese "*Jiawu*" War of 1894-1895, the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, and the "War of Resistance against Japan" of 1931/1937-1945.

Second, facing with the enormous changes that occurred to China's internal and external environments, nationalism also became a dominant discourse amongst Chinese intellectuals after the Tiananmen Incident (Zheng, 1999: 51). Internally, they argued that the westernization trend in the 1980s led to the crises of national and cultural identity. If this process continues, China as a nation-state would be in a crisis (for example, Kang, 1994: 10-12). Externally, what happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in late 1990s led Chinese intellectuals to believe that political and social chaos will only lead to the social disintegration and the decline of the traditional ideology (Sun, 1996:17). As a result, as noticed by Zheng Yongnian (1999:70), Chinese nationalism constructed by Chinese intellectuals "was not in the context of the relations between the Han majority and minorities, but in the context of the relations between Chinese civilization and other civilizations." Indeed, ethnic nationalism in China is called "narrow nationalism" (*xia'ai minzu zhuyi*), and what Chinese intellectuals promoted is another "new nationalism" – a combination of socialism, patriotism, Confucianism, traditional anti-foreign revolutionary ideology, and China's international environment (Zheng, 1999: 71) – basically advocating that people ought to serve national interests (Xiao, 1993; 1994c).

Obviously, nationalistic discourse promoted by Chinese intellectuals aimed to respond to various severe problems that China met during the rapid economic growth, such as the decline of central power and the trend of China's westernization (Zheng, 1999:111), the crisis of ruling group's legitimacy (Zhao, 1997; Huang & Lee, 2003), or western countries' "China Threat Theory" (*Zhongguo weixie lun*) (Wu, 1997), etc. Generally speaking, the major issue focused by Chinese intellectuals is how the political legitimacy of government can be established, and how to make the government strong. In this sense, Chinese intellectuals not only considered Chinese nationalism as an elite one, with the hope to rebuild national identity from top to down; but also, cooperating with the Party-state, they indeed legitimized the official arguments of strong government and political centralization.

Though various studies showed Chinese intellectuals catered for the Party-state by exploring how the intellectual nationalistic discourse feed on the official discourse, Guo's study (2004) examined the inconsistent meanings between cultural intellectuals' discourse and official discourse, especially in the battle for China's

“sole”. Notably, he finds that the first and foremost issue for Chinese cultural intellectuals is not territory or even citizenship, but the meaning of “Chineseness”. For them, culture, rather than loyalty to the Party-state, has become the most essential criterion for defining the national community. From this point of view, the cultural intellectuals’ discourse challenged official patriotic discourse which entails love of the Party, and the tensions between Chinese intellectuals and the Party-state were also found.

Third, different with the “top-down” perspective that pays attention to how the Party-state, in cooperation with elite intellectuals, manipulated popular nationalistic sentiment, the “bottom-up” perspective stresses the critical roles that people and emotions play in the formation of Chinese nationalism. From this perspective, scholars tend to consider nationalism as an aspect of individuals’ self-image that is tied to their nation, together with the value and emotional significance they attach to membership in the national community (Garies, 2004). Concretely, while top-down perspective stresses that it is the Party-state who shapes Chinese nationalism, the bottom-up understanding holds the view that it is China’s past 5,000 years of uninterrupted history that determine the present nationalism – that is, pride of China’s traditional culture and the strong nation in ancient history. Thus, different from western scholars’ definition of nationalism as an extreme/surplus phenomenon, and so tend to recognize nationalism in “others” rather than in themselves (Billig, 1995), Chinese people are always proud of their own nationalist sentiment.

Moreover, when considering the newborn Chinese cybernationalism in recent years, scholars always paid more attention to the active role of Chinese people in breaking through of the Party-state’s media control, disseminating alternative information, expressing dissent, and even organizing political demonstrations through the Internet. For example, by the case of Chinese cybernationalistic reactions to Indonesia’s anti-Chinese riot, Hughes (2000) indicated that the CCP finally had to align itself with the online nationalistic outbursts. Then, by examining Chinese cybernationalism from 1994 to 2006, Wu (2007) also used circumstantial evidence to build a convincing argument that Chinese top leaders really do invest substantial time and capital in monitoring nationalistic activity in cyberspace, and that China’s

foreign policy had actually changed as a result of nationalist cyberactivity. Clearly, the “bottom-up” understanding stresses genuine nationalistic sentiment of Chinese people and the strong power of it in influencing the Party-state’s policies. Moreover, observing that online nationalistic discourses pushed the Party-state towards changing its foreign policies effectively, scholars from this perspective tend to place high hopes on the potential role of popular nationalism in promoting the Party-state towards further political reform.

Fourth, as an important mediation between the Party-state and the public, media nationalistic discourse was also examined by media scholars. In this respect, Huang and Lee (2003) made a special contribution in finding four kinds of relations between China’s mass media and the Party-state. In detail, they categorized four patterns of media-produced nationalism: affirmative, assertive, aggressive, and rational/democratic. The affirmative nationalism staged an official “patriotic education campaign”, and stressed that the CCP represents China’s national interests and pride. In this model, mass media, represented by official media, strictly obey the Party-line and help the Party-state promote official patriotism to the ordinary citizens. For assertive nationalism, the mass media exercise their discretion in choosing preferred techniques, topics and scopes to shape news frames. By the case of Hong Kong’s return to China for example, such reports are always emotional, full with “century of national humiliation” discourse by the conflict angle of positive “us” and the negative “them”. In this model, mass media, represented by most of China’s commercial mass media, tried to make emotional reports to cater for the audience, and obey the Party-line at the same time. Accordingly, the strategy of “edge ball” was widely adopted by them to deal with the relations with the Party-state.

Then, the aggressive nationalism, capitalizing on public resentment to the western countries, had aggressively produced topics to stir heated debates over popular nationalism against US hegemony. In this model, clearly, mass media, represented by some sensational newspapers, already transcended the Party-line catering for the strong nationalistic sentiment of the public. Yet, obeying the bottom line such as admitting the CCP’s leading and foreign policies in their reports, such media always face economic punishment from the propaganda departments but avoid being closed

down. Finally, rational nationalism is argumentative and analytical, and always calls for political reform to build a democratic China. Clearly, in this pattern, mass media, represented by *Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD)* and *China Youth Daily (CYD)*, already pushed the boundaries of the CCP's permissible behaviors, and thus, was always repressed by the Party-state in various media rectifications. Accordingly, for Huang and Lee, this pattern is unlikely to become a major current of thought.

Limitations of Studies

The studies summarized above are insightful for us to explore China's power relations from nationalistic discourse. Yet, three problems exist in these studies, all of which will be dealt with in this study. First of all, as shown before, most of studies on Chinese nationalism tend to adopt a "top-down" or "bottom-up" understanding.⁶ Apparently, both of the two understandings have flaws in that they only stress the role of one agent but neglect others in the formation of Chinese nationalism. In detail, the top-down perspective can help us disclose the features and formation of official nationalistic discourse in contemporary China, and the ways state and elite intellectuals construct it. Yet, by reducing Chinese nationalism to a "party propaganda" model, it trivialized the critical roles that Chinese people and the passions play in it, and thus cannot explain the often intense commitment and passion of Chinese people for the nation. It also cannot explain the loyalty, even self-sacrifice of Chinese people for the nation. By contrast, the significant

⁶ Basically, such two perspectives on Chinese nationalism reflect the broader two paradigms in nationalism study – modernist/post-modernist paradigm and perennialist paradigm suggested by Anthony Smith (1998). The main tenet of the modernist paradigm is a functionalist and rationalist analysis of the place of nations in history and the role of nationalism in the modern world. Following Marxist instrumental view or Weberian approach, this paradigm stresses the economic or political reasons for the rise of nations and nationalism, and the active role of elites in the construction process of official nationalism. Among them, the most radical version is Hobsbawm's "invented traditions" concept (1983) and Andersons' "imagined community" theory (1991). While the former regarded all traditions are invented by the state elites to control rapid social change, the latter further considered nations and nationalism as a kind of modern-related discourse originating from print capitalism, a new conception of time and other forces.

While modernism considers nation as a political community which constructed by the elite, the perennialism regards it as a cultural community which mirror people's needs and aspirations. By comparing situations in West and Asia, they argue that if the West is generally characterized by a "state-to-nation" trajectory, then Eastern Europe and parts of Asia can be convincingly analyzed in terms of a "nation-to-state" model, because their unique contours and contents were largely determined by pre-existing ethnic, linguistic and religious heritages. And thus, the underlying principles of the nation to them are those of ancestral ties and authentic culture.

problem of the bottom-up perspective lies in that it was often uncritically romantic in its celebration of popular nationalism as expressing the authentic voices of the ordinary people, and tends to depict Chinese people's strong nationalistic feelings as a universal psychological state. By this argument, the role of the state in promoting official nationalism, the dynamic struggles amongst the public, state, mass media, and intellectuals, are all overlooked. Indeed, it is necessary to take into account the role of all the four agents together, and their intensive struggles in the formation of nationalistic discourse. Then, this study hopes to develop a more robust research design to combine the top-down and bottom-up perspectives, studying the concrete features of Chinese nationalistic discourse promoted by the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens separately, and their struggles for the leading role of nationalistic discourse, from which we can see the discursive relations among the four agents.

Second, literature in this part tend to describe and categorize Chinese nationalism by focusing on only one or two of four kinds of nationalistic discourses in a specific period. The list of such naming is long, including, defensive, confident, face, pragmatic, anti-foreign, assertive, patriotic, Confucian, democratic, and so on. By such labeling, Chinese nationalism was portrayed as a relatively static, even timeless phenomenon. In this study, the features and transitions of all four kinds of nationalistic discourse in the past thirty years, and their struggles for the leading role will be examined in detail. And thus, it will provide a comprehensive and dynamic picture of contemporary Chinese nationalistic discourse. More importantly, from such analysis, the dynamic power relations and their transitions among the four agents during thirty years will also be explored.

Third, none of the studies mentioned previously shed light on the structural reasons when examining the features of Chinese nationalism and the power relations behind it. Consequently, it is difficult to explain why agents adopt different nationalistic projects in different time periods, and why one kind of discourse may acquire hegemonic status in certain period but losing such status in other times. Thus, considering Chinese nationalism as a contestable discourse, and seeing China's social structures from a transitional perspective, this study hopes to explore the deeper "political-economic-cultural (media)" structural reasons in the shaping of

social agents' hegemonic projects, their discursive relations and the features of nationalistic discourse. Meanwhile, taking Chinese nationalism as a prism, it also aims at examining whether agents' nationalistic projects and hegemonic struggles promoted the transformation of social structures, especially, whether agents' nationalistic discourses and hegemonic struggles pushed China's mass media and the Internet society to become a civil society.

Structural Analysis to Chinese Nationalistic Discourse

Market Economy and Political Support

When considering the structural reasons to the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse, most scholars first focus their attention on the economic factor. Indeed, the political impact of the market economy has long been an issue under scholarly debate. One of the most established propositions in western liberal democracies advocates a close relationship between democracy and market capitalism (Dahl, 1989), arguing that the free market will unavoidably produce new ideas and values that challenge the established authoritarian political system (Lipset, 1959). Especially, facing the demise of communism and dictatorship in Eastern Europe accompanied with its radical market reform in the late 1980s, western scholars argue that with the development of a market economy, market values would gain support amongst citizens due to their increasing wealth and better education, as well as exposure to the outside world. Accordingly, individuals would demand rights in the political dimension, and finally, oppose authoritarian rule. Therefore, one should expect to see that a market economy would naturally lead to the waning of political support for an authoritarian regime, and the waxing of democratic society (Beck, 1991).

Yet, available data in Chinese contexts have demonstrated that this is not always the case. Numerous studies, no matter by qualitative or quantitative methods, have confirmed that political support in China in the 1990s increased continuously, and in a remarkably high degree, even among the highest in the world (Tang, 2001; Chen, 2004; Wang, 2005, etc.), though market economy had penetrated into each corner of the society in this period. By contrast, it is in the 1980s, when market economy

was not yet established, that liberal democratic ideas and anti-totalitarian discourse become popular in China.

To explain this unique phenomenon, Shou (2007) argues that the CCP's patriotic education plays the crucial role in countering democratic outcomes of market reform. As the public is exposed to official patriotism, they are more likely to cultivate a positive attitude towards the regime. Yet, the problems of this explanation lie in that it is a "top-down" perspective which considered that public attitudes were shaped or even dominated by elite discourse and communications. Regarding the public as "passive audience", it did not see the contradictions between popular and official nationalistic discourse, and thus, cannot explain how the CCP rides the radical popular discourse into its own patriotism framework. In addition, from this ideological explanation, we cannot explain why China's mainstream nationalistic discourse still gives great support to the authority, when Chinese people can acquire both sides of information on the Internet in the 2000s.

From the "bottom-up" perspective, Wu (2008) argues that the economic situation of a country is relevant to political support in terms of people's feelings about their status in the world. On the one hand, China was proud and confident about its rising status as a power in world politics; on the other hand, China's rise in the world was still dominated by the West. Both of these two elements formed the historical background to China's nationalistic sentiment in the 1990s. This psychological explanation is insightful. Yet it is still incomplete since it totally neglects the role of Party-state in promoting such feelings, and structural reasons such as the "marketized" authoritarian state and media commercialization process, in the formation of a radical anti-Western sentiment.

Authoritarian State and the Anti-Western Nationalistic Discourse

Clearly, a one-dimensional economic analysis cannot create sufficient explanation for the features and transitions of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the past thirty years. But neither can the one-dimensional political analysis. Zhao Dingxin has pioneered some thoughtful ideas in analyzing social movement from political structural analysis combined with concrete agent analysis. For example, when

studying student movement in the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Zhao (2007) explains the radical anti-government nature of the movement from a “state-society” relations perspective, suggesting that it is the authoritarian political structure, in which the middle-level social organizations independent from the state cannot be developed, that led the movement into a radical anti-political system. Still from a “state-society” relations perspective, Lin (2008) finds that, different from western mainstream media, Chinese media not only tend to positively report social movements, but also are frequently involved in these movements. The reason, as he implies, lies in that the Chinese government was unable to construct a hegemonic value system in which most Chinese people identify after the decline of the influence of communist ideology in China.

Indeed, when studying agents’ social practices and relations, it is a popular perspective, especially in the media field, to examine the practices and relations under a certain “state-society” model. This perspective can help us explain social movements and relations from agents’ strategies. Yet, without considering the deeper economic reasons, we will never know why social agents use such strategies. Concretely, under this “state-society” model, it is difficult for us to explain the contradicting phenomenon in the 1990s when the Chinese authoritarian government received high political support while the country experienced rapid economic growth. Also, it is difficult to explain why a hegemonic value system cannot be constructed in the authoritarian China. Besides, considering “state-society” as a static relation, few studies has been done in examining how the agents’ discursive practices influence China’s “state-society” relations, such as the formation of a civil society.

Then, this study will adopt a comprehensive structural analysis – considering “political-economic-cultural (media)” structures together – to explain how the discursive relations amongst the four agents formed, and why one kind of nationalistic discourse acquire the leading role in the hegemonic struggles. Accordingly, literature on the impact of media commercialization to the public nature of mass media since the 1990s, and the relationships between the emergence of the Internet society in the 2000s and the democratic features of nationalistic discourse should be examined.

Media Commercialization and the “Publicness” of Media

Most Chinese media scholars consider the intensified commercialization trend in the 1990s as a positive force for democratic media content, since it dramatically destroyed the Leninist media system, led media away from exclusive dedication to CCP’s political and ideological matters, reduced the grand narrative style, and accelerated the process of social secularization by providing diverse contents (He 1998; Chan & Qiu, 2002). Indeed, for the liberal-optimistic scholars, the “public” nature of mass media is embedded in the media market. On the one hand, they argue that the market itself has the emancipatory power. In the process of media commercialization, various independent or semi-independent social organizations may emerge out. No matter how the market has been distorted by the state’s manipulation, under the intensive market competition, the media will provide various news products, which may further promote the establishment of a public sphere in society (Lee, 2004:48). On the other hand, the enlightenment of news professionalism and the traditional culture of Chinese intellectuals also cultivate the “publicness” of China’s mass media (Lu & Pan, 2002). Thus, liberal-optimistic scholars generally believe that China’s profound media commercialization process would positively contribute to a political transition to democracy (Chu, 1994; Lee, 1994).

Some empirical studies also justify this argument. For example, by examining the transition of “media supervision” discourse in the past thirty years, Lei and Lu (2008) found that the subject of “media supervision” discourse has transferred from media to audience. The independent consciousness of mass media is increasingly clear. Mass media began to speak for masses, and negotiated with the state on the legitimacy of supervision discourse (Sun, 2008). In addition, many scholars examined conceptual changes in the notion of citizenship in post-Mao China’s media. They argue that in the practice of media discourse, media ideology has experienced a transition from “masses” to “audience”, “consumers” to “citizenship”. In this process, China’s mass media cultivates a “rights” consciousness among the populace, fosters their political participation, and even promotes public conduct through direct political engagement (Zhou, 2000; Liu, 2003; Yu, 2006; Sun, 2008).

By contrast, there are also many scholars who doubt about any logical relationship between media commercialization and the “public” nature of mass media exist, especially when they consider the dual logic of China’s media structure and characterize it as “authoritarian-new liberalism” (Ma, 2000), “state corporatism” (Zhan & Li, 2008), “Chinese Party Publicity Inc” (He, 2006), “state-controlled capitalist corporation” (Huang, 2007b), and others. No matter how it is labeled, scholars stress the fact that media commercialization in China has been controlled by political powers and economic interests. Under this dual logic, on the one hand, political power and capital force may only work cooperatively to serve each other’s interest and their joint interests, but ignoring the democratic impetus in the society that is being liberalized by the expanding market. On the other hand, when the Party-state legitimated itself as the only representative of public interest, considering the interest of itself as the public interest, its strict control to the content of mass media may also be legitimated (Pan, 2009). Meanwhile, situated in the state corporatist arrangement, journalistic professionalism is being distorted to serve the interest negotiated between media and state actors.

Generally speaking, as a historical project, the basic aim of China’s “reform and opening” is to preserve the political legitimacy of the Party-state. Accordingly, media reform, as one part of this grand reform, is one of the Party’s important strategies towards achieving this aim. Thus, most of the changes that were instigated and constituted the reforms may be characterized as the authoritarian state co-opting market forces into its orbit for the purpose or with the effect of preserving the core of the party-press system (Pan, 2008). Under this situation, it is difficult to say that China’s media commercialization alone carries a compass pointing towards a democratic future (Chan, 1993; Yu, 1994).

Undeniably, there are many positive changes in China’s media practice with the commercialization process, as observed by scholars with optimistic attitude. However, in the process of this state-controlled media commercialization project, the party-state authorities and media practitioners embarked on a joint adventure into some uncharted terrain (Chan, & Qiu, 2002; Pan, 2008 & 2009, etc.). Some improvising reform activities with limited innovations indeed appeared (Pan, 2000). Yet, if the publicness is not the intrinsic nature of mass media, then we can only see

whether mass media operates for public interest by analyzing the concrete media practice and discourse in historical context (Pan, 2008).

In this study, we will investigate the impact of China's unique media structure in the commercialization process on the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse and the transitional relations between mass media and the Party-state. In addition, Chinese media nationalistic discourse is a good approach for us to explore the "publicness" of mass media in China. Indeed, among numerous studies examining the influence of China's media commercialization on news contents, many have noticed the Party-state's discriminated control over different types of news. Lin & Zhao (2008) summarized the Party-state's categorizing of news contents as white zone, black zone and grey zone. The white zone is politically "healthy" news, such as a political "main melody" (*zhu xuanlv*) and various kinds of apolitical news, especially in the entertainment field. By contrast, the black zone is the sensitive political news and commentary, which are under strict control by the Party-state. Between the black zone and the white zone, the grey zone includes reporting on various social problems, criticizing the non-critical policies and so on. Since the Party-state's media policy in this zone is highly vague and uncertain, – sometimes banning these news and punishing the relevant news organizations sometimes, or allowing and even encouraging such reports to resolve social problems or abolish unjust policies in other times, – news reports in the grey zone became the most vibrant part of China's media ecology. Then, the nationalism related topic, with both political and entertainment elements, is always located in such grey zone (Liu, 2003). In other words, though the Party-state hopes to utilize nationalism to maintain its legitimacy (Zhao, 1997; Zheng, 1999; Huang & Lee, 2003), mass media, intellectuals and the public all have opportunities to influence nationalistic discourse. Accordingly, a fierce contestation began amongst the four agents struggling for the leading role of nationalistic discourse. Thus, taking Chinese nationalistic discourse as a prism, we can see clearly to what extent the "publicness" of mass media in China formed by examining the quality of nationalistic discourse, and the hegemonic struggles between the mass media and the Party-state in the formation of the hegemonic nationalistic discourse.

The Internet and Democratic Nationalistic Discourse

After demystifying the democratic role of the Internet in the initial years of the Internet study, literature on the relationship between the Internet and China's politics mainly focus on the Party-state's efforts to control it by blocking the free flow of information and suppressing political dissent online. However, when considering the newborn Chinese cybernationalism since the end of 1990s, much literature focused on the democratizing potentials of the Internet again. Providing various vivid cases, scholars argued that the Internet not only provides the Internet users with alternative information and ideas, and promotes flow of information in a more transparent manner; but more importantly, millions of Chinese Internet users become "active audience" in constructing their own stories, participating in online discussions, decoding official discourse, and even organizing petitions and protests (Hughes, 2000; Liu, 2003; Yu, 2006; etc.). In other words, the Internet is full with what James Scott (1990) had called "the arts of resistance". And in this new environment, the Party-state's monopoly of communication is no longer possible, especially by traditional means. By these online activities, the Internet in China has even transformed the role of conventional media and has made them more responsive to market forces (Tan, 2004). From these points of view, many scholars tend to hold an optimistic attitude for the further transformation of China's online public sphere towards political democratization, and accordingly, consider Chinese online nationalism as a progressive, liberal and democratic force to promote a cyber-civil society and China's modernity project (in particular, see Wu, 2007).

These works have laid a solid foundation for us to study the struggles between the Party-state and Chinese Internet users in the formation of nationalistic discourse since the 2000s. Yet, to study whether or to what extent the Internet technology promotes the democratic nationalistic discourse, we need to more carefully reflect on the quality of online public debate, the hegemonic project the Party-state adopted, and the concrete struggles among the Party-state, Internet users, intellectuals and mass media. Indeed, Internet technology does change the information environment of China. But just as the "publicness" is not the intrinsic nature of mass media, the democratic impact of the Internet is also not intrinsic in the Internet technology. Rather, this impact is filtered through institutional contexts and user interests, as well as the contests and negotiations between the four agents' online practices. Also, at issue here is not only opportunities to express, but also opportunities to be heard; not

only the opportunities to have the alternative views, but also the quality of online debate.

Remarks

By examining the features and transitions of Chinese nationalistic discourse during “reform and opening” era, analyzing the concrete struggles among four agents for the leading role of nationalistic discourse, and theorizing its transformations during the past thirty years, this study hopes to show China’s power relations and explain their transitions among four agents in the past thirty years. To achieve this goal, it is not only necessary to combine the “top-down” and “bottom-up” perspectives together, and examine the concrete features of Chinese nationalistic discourse promoted by the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the citizens separately, and their relations in struggling for the leading role of nationalistic discourse; but also, we should explore the deeper “political-economic-cultural (media)” structural reasons in shaping of the nationalistic discourse. Besides, in this analytical process, this study also hope to shed light on the issue on whether the agents’ hegemonic struggles contribute to the transformation of social structures, especially promoting the “publicness” of mass media and the formation of an online civil society.

To explore these critical issues, we need to develop a new robust theoretical framework. In the following chapter, the critical realism-based hegemony approach will be suggested. Based on this approach, we will analyze the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse by textual analysis, study its formation process from the perspective of discourse struggles and discursive relations, and explore such discourses and relations from a structural perspective. Moreover, considering social structure as an ongoing process, this framework can also help us study whether the social agents’ concrete hegemonic struggles and negotiations contribute to the formation of a more healthy social structure in China – such as the “public” nature of China’s mass media and the Internet society as a kind of civil society – which may further promote the healthy and rational nationalistic discourse in future.

Chapter Three Theoretical Framework, Research Questions, and Methodology

Theoretical Framework: Critical Realism-based Hegemony

As has been argued in Chapter Two, we should combine the “top-down” and “bottom-up” perspectives, and examine the discursive relations among four agents and their hegemonic struggles together when studying China’s power relations approached from nationalistic discourse. In addition, we also found that one-dimensional structural analysis cannot explain the features of China’s nationalistic discourse, and the power relations behind it. Instead, we suggested that a comprehensive structural analysis to understand Chinese nationalistic discourse should be developed. To achieve such theoretical goals, in this chapter, the critical realism-based hegemony approach will be introduced as a new theoretical framework. Then, the research questions of this study, case study and critical discourse analysis as methods, research design, as well as the data collection process will be illustrated in detail.

Hegemony: Nationalism as a Struggle Field

The concept of hegemony was the central idea in Antonio Gramsci’s social theory. In his *Prison Notebooks* (1929-33), he examined the reasons why proletarian revolution did not come in Italy when the objective conditions for revolution had been present for several years, and found that the ruling group’s dominance is not simply caused by the imposition of the will of the dominant class via ideology, which is said by structuralist Marxism; but by its presentation of itself as the group best able to satisfy the interests and aspirations of other classes. From this perspective, “culture” was understood as an area of negotiation field between the dominant and dominated, rather than being imposed by the dominant groups, or simply coming from spontaneously oppositional groups. As a consequence,

“[B]ourgeois culture” ceases to be purely or entirely bourgeois. It becomes, instead, a mobile combination of cultural and ideological elements derived from different class locations which are, but only provisionally and for the duration of a specific historical conjuncture, affiliated to bourgeois values, interests and objectives. By the same token, of course, the members of subordinate classes never encounter or are oppressed by a dominant ideology in some pure or class essentialist form; bourgeois ideology is encountered only in the compromised forms it must take in order to provide some accommodation for opposing class values.

(Bennett, 1986: 351)

Clearly, in this hegemonic process, dominant, subordinate and oppositional cultural and ideological values and elements are all “mixed” and articulated in different permutations. Suggesting this “movable” nature, Gramscian model of hegemony opens up the field of culture as one of enormous political possibilities. Thus, to explore why one kind of ideological values was in dominant position, we should pay attention to the historical context in which different interest groups may articulate, negotiate, or struggle with each other.

This hegemonic understanding to culture is very useful when we examine Chinese nationalistic discourse. Instead of considering Chinese nationalism as an official ideology promoted by the Party-state or a “bottom-up” popular movement, we can now regard it as a negotiation field in which different nationalistic discourses promoted by the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the citizens struggled for the hegemonic status. Thus, it provides us an integrating framework to study the concrete articulations and struggles among different agents in the formation of hegemonic nationalistic discourse, while at the same time avoiding to take a position — either opposed to it because it is constructed by the ruling group, or uncritically praise for it since it represents the genuine narrative of the populous.

Three Approaches to “Hegemony” and Problems

Yet, when this new concept emerged at the center in Marxist theory, it is also open to a wider interpretation from the culturalism, structuralism, and post-structuralism

perspectives. Joseph (2002b) summarized these three popular approaches to hegemony, through which we can find that all such three approaches only stress one dimension of hegemony between the “structure-agency”, instead of combining them together.

For culturalist Marxism approach, Gramscian model of hegemony, with its general lack of structural emphasis, is welcomed and used to justify their move away from analysis of social structures towards cultural superstructures.⁷ As a consequence, it tends to reduce the concept of hegemony to its concrete expression in human practice, only concerning with the plans and actions of social agents, groups and individuals. From this understanding, the formation of Chinese nationalistic discourse becomes an intersubjective affair by or between different agents with their opposing ideas and world-views.

Compared with the humanist Marxism, the post-Marxism is more radical by arguing that the true subversion lies in undermining the text and the radical use of word-play, and accordingly, politics and identity become textual matters. To maintain their concept of the discursive reality⁸, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) tied the theory of hegemony to discursive articulation. From this perspective, the formation of Chinese nationalistic discourse becomes a pure game of competing discourses, rather than in relation to any object of enquiry. Worse, since they argued that the essentially neutral character of the social elements prior to their hegemonic articulation, they not only ruled out the possibility of any progressive nationalistic hegemonic project transforming the existing unbalance social relations; but also, they denied any possibility to understand our society, including nationalism phenomenon scientifically.

Rejecting the humanist analysis which considers social structure as human experience, as well as the poststructuralist understanding which reduces hegemony

⁷ Though Williams proposed the concept of “the structure of feeling”, which linked to the objective conditions give rise to human experiences, his position sees too much in terms of experience and too little in terms of structure.

⁸ Laclau and Mouffe made distinction between the *being* of the object (in or through discourse) and the *existence* of the object (outside it). In such, they reduced *being* to discursive description/re-description, and rendered *existence* meaningless. They argued that all social objects are constituted according to their discursive articulation, and materialism no longer concerns what exists, but is about how objects are articulated through discourse.

to discourse, structuralists emphasize the structural element of hegemony, and exclude any conscious application. For them, if hegemony is a kind of expression, it is an “expression” of a purely mechanical process derived from social structures, without any internal dynamics.⁹ Thus, from this point of view, Chinese nationalistic discourse is a non-historical closed process that is only determined by the social structure and unaffected by the consciousness of social agents.

Clearly, all three approaches are problematic since they only stress one side of hegemony. For the culturalism approach, it may restrict Chinese nationalistic discourse to agential understanding. Yet, even if it can hint at which hegemonic nationalistic projects are successful in certain period, it cannot explain why one agent’s project becomes more dominant and processes the hegemonic position, without considering the deep social structure under this hegemony. Then, the post-structuralist approach is even more radical in that they not only deny the necessary social structures for hegemony’s operation, but also deny the existence of material conditions. Yet, nationalistic discourse means a lot more than discursive or textual articulation. And why one nationalistic discourse is more powerful than another is also an extra-discursive question. Finally, the structuralism approach contributes to stress the structural role in the formation of hegemonic nationalistic discourse. Yet, since it de-historicises social relations among agents involved in the formation of nationalistic discourse, and considers social structures as the static categories, it rules out any possibility of transformation of Chinese nationalistic discourse, which is obviously contradicted with the phenomenon of Chinese nationalism during the thirty years.

Critical Realism-based Hegemony

Critical Realism Philosophy

Drawing out the strengths and weaknesses of three approaches to hegemony, in this study, the critical realism understanding of hegemony which sees agential aspects of hegemony as strategically located on the terrain of objective social structures will be

⁹ Nicos Poulantzas contributes to structural explanation of hegemony in *Marxist political theory in Great Britain* (1967). Joseph J. summarized his main arguments in *Hegemony: a realist analysis* (2002b).

adopted as theoretical framework to study Chinese contemporary nationalistic discourse and the hegemonic power struggles. Generally speaking, for critical realism, both sides of the objective-subjective debate within Marxism are the crude simplification of social complexities. A study of human society cannot be reduced to a study of social structure or human activities. From outside Marxism, critical realism approach tries to combine structure-agency, and provide a new framework for the conceptualisation of social relations.

Concretely, “realism” stresses the separation of thought and being, and the primacy of being over thought, or structure over practice. For the realism, society exists independently as an intransitive realm that our transitive knowledge and action try to comprehend or change. Moreover, society itself has some kind of structure that is relatively enduring and consistent so that it is open to our investigation. From this understanding, it is clear that critical realism philosophy is against the culturalism Marxism or post-Marxism which tends to concentrate on human relations and actions at the expense of objective social structure. Since social world is more than just a bundle of meanings, actions and understandings but is comprised of real, intransitive social structures, to understand society and social relations, it is also necessary to examine deeper social structure, which makes human activity possible.

However, in contrast to mechanical materialism with the famous base-superstructure metaphor which considers economic structure of society as the prime driving force of history, critical realism proposes a non-contemporaneous and pluralistic social model, arguing that the society is comprised of a series of structures and generative mechanisms, and these structures form a stratified and differentiated totality. Among them, though economic structures – or the various structures that make up the mode of production – are the most powerful social mechanisms, its influence on social relations has varying degrees (Joseph, 2002a: 30-31). Besides, many other powerful generative mechanisms exist alongside economic ones. Such different mechanisms, structures and layers overlap, mutually co-determine and complement or contradict one another.

Besides, the term “critical” implies also that it is necessary to make important qualifications to the realist approach. Though it locates social relations within the

nexus of social structure, it does not turn agents into simple bearers of this structure. Indeed, critical realism recognizes that social structures are bound up with the activities of the agents that they govern, and, it is because of their structural location that agents have the potential to engage in transformative practice. (ibid., 29) Yet it is stressed that agents' potential ability to transform or reproduce social structure is always the unintentional consequences of their activities. Agents do act on concrete intentions, but these have wider, unintentional consequences to social structure.

Here, critical realism combines structure and agency in its transformational model of social activity (TMSA). According to this model, social structures are both the necessary conditions for and the reproduced outcomes of human action. On the one hand, structures pre-exist and hence shape and determine human action. On the other hand, the continued existence of these structures depends upon the activities of the agents they govern. While structures tend to predominate over agents, agents do have the potential to alter or transform these structures and the wider social ensembles that they make up (ibid., 32).

A Dual Conception of Hegemony

It is within this structural context that critical realism approach to hegemony be developed. From critical realism perspective, there are two distinct but inter-connected types of hegemony, concerned with (1) structural hegemony and (2) a surface hegemony of actual hegemonic projects (Joseph, 2002b). From this duality of hegemony model, hegemony retains its strategic role as the conscious projects or cunning plans of different social groups, and its functional role of securing the unity and cohesion of the social system and in ensuring the reproduction of basic structural processes and relations. As Table 3.1 shows, structural hegemony concerns the deep, underlying conditions within society and the unity of the social formation. It performs the functional role of ensuring the reproduction of social structures and structural ensembles. By contrast, surface hegemony concerns the conscious hegemonic projects and practices. It *emerges* from underlying structures, and manifests the underlying conditions, but with its own dynamics.

Owing to different social structure, the conscious activities will have differing degrees of unintended consequences.

Table 3. 1 The duality of hegemony model

<i>Structural hegemony</i>	<i>Surface hegemony</i>
Deep	Actual
Functional	Manifest/realized
Structural	Agential
Secures unity of social formation	Hegemonic activity, projects and practices
Reproduction of social structures and structural ensembles	Emergent from underlying structures (but with their own powers and dynamics)
Underlying conditions	Conscious political expression
Reproduction	Struggle
Social cement	Coercion and consent
Largely unconscious structural reproduction	Conscious transformation, conservation or political advancement

From Joseph, J. (2002b). *Hegemony, A realist analysis*, pp.131.

Clearly, the relationship between structural and surface hegemony is dialectical. Each side of the hegemony distinction depends upon the other for its being. For hegemonic projects to take place, objective social divisions and distinctions must already exist at a deeper level. This means that these projects and struggles are determined by the structures of society, and thus, ultimately cannot escape these conditions. At the same time, while structural hegemony has a certain causal primacy, the workings of surface hegemony have an *emergent* character – that is, they are not predetermined but have their own specific dynamics. They can at least develop in their own dynamics and may come into conflict with these conditions in a dialectical overdetermination. Therefore, they still need to be analyzed in their own context.

Chinese Nationalism under the Framework of Critical Realism-based Hegemony

Definition of “Chinese Nationalism”

Following the critical realism-based hegemony model, this study attempts to define “Chinese nationalism” as a hegemonic field around the nation-state, in which all agents involved – the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals and the ordinary citizens

- struggled, negotiated and articulated under certain social structure, trying to acquire leadership for their nationalistic discourse from all major groups of China. With this understanding, textual analysis will first conduct to the nationalistic discourse that acquiring the hegemonic status, as well as to the discourses promoted by other agents. Then, we will investigate the formation process of hegemonic discourse by examining the articulations, struggles and negotiations among the four agents, from which the power relations among the four agents may be also developed. For example, what kind of nationalistic discourse was produced by the four agents separately? Which elements or ideas had been articulated in their discourse? What kind of strategies did they adopt to promote it? How has the official discourse been consumed by the intellectuals, the mass media and the ordinary citizens? Where and how does antagonism emerge? To what extent do nationalistic projects promoted by the mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens actually or potentially have impact on official discourse? And which ideas and elements have been incorporated into the official discourse and which are excluded out? Furthermore, we will examine the specific social structures under which agents' concrete hegemonic discourses and power relations emerged. And through three unique cases, we will examine the influence of social structure on the features and transformations of Chinese nationalistic discourse and power relations of the four agents, as well as shedding light on the unintended consequences of agents' nationalistic discourse and power struggles to the transitions of social structures in the past thirty years.

Thus, practically, critical realist understanding of hegemony can make a critical contribution to overcome the opposition between "top-down" and "bottom-up" perspectives to Chinese nationalistic discourse. It informs a new approach that leads to a more adequate understanding of the relationship between social structure and agents and formulates a reflexive approach to the discursive practices. Moreover, considering social structures as an ongoing-historical process, the dialectical relations between structural hegemony and surface hegemony can help us systematically examine how the four agents' hegemonic struggles influence the transitioning social structures in the "reform and opening" era.

Clarify Possible Problems

Two potential problems need to be further stressed for this definition. Firstly, developing an understanding of Chinese nationalism as a hegemonic field in which different social agents negotiated or struggled for the leading position of hegemonic nationalistic discourse, it is necessary to distinguish the concept between Chinese nationalism as a kind of ideology and as a hegemonic process. To consider nationalism as a kind of ideology implicates that nationalism lives in the superstructural realm and acquires dominant status by the operation of Ideological State Apparatus (ISAs) or Repressive State Apparatus (RSAs). From this understanding, nationalism becomes an official ideology promoted by the state from top to down. By contrast, from hegemonic perspective, such dominant status is movable, since the hegemonic status is not given by has to be secured. Even though the official nationalistic discourse acquires the hegemonic leadership and becomes a kind of ideology at this moment, the possibility exists that it may be replaced by other agents' discourse and practice under the continuous contestations and negotiations. In addition, if Chinese nationalistic discourse is approached from a critical realist understanding of hegemony, then it concerns the articulation not just of ideas, but of many practices including ideological, cultural, political and economic. In other words, it encompasses not just ideological processes, but the material forces that generate these discourses. No matter what kind of nationalistic discourse appears, it is the expression of deeper social structures — the economic, political and cultural structures.

Secondly, critical realism-based hegemonic understanding of nationalistic discourse can help us stress the structural reasons, and assist examining the concrete struggles and negotiations among different social agents in the formation of hegemonic nationalistic discourse, especially in a transitional society like China. However, this wide application of a technical academic theory may cause some misunderstandings. For example, in this study, the concept of hegemony, as a kind of analytical framework, is used to analyze the struggles and negotiations between social agents involved in the formation of Chinese nationalistic discourse. In addition, as a social strategy, it encompasses different projects adopted by social agents in the hegemonic struggle. Moreover, in the case of the Party-state's hegemonic project, it implies how the Party-state incorporated different projects and

practices into its own framework to reproduce a stable social structure. Thus, we should be cautious when using the concept of “hegemony” in this study.

The Location of Hegemony

The final theoretical problem dealt with in this section is the location of hegemony. For Gramsci, the location of hegemony is elusive, though three major terms were used to identify areas in which hegemony operates: the economic, the state, and civil society. In this chapter, we argue that hegemony can operate through all the three realms. Thus, the theoretical framework adopted herein is appropriate in Chinese context, especially when examining Chinese nationalistic discourse. Indeed, this understanding echoed with Perry Anderson’s idea in his article (1976) reviewing Gramsci *Prison Notebooks*.

In the article, Anderson outlined three conflicting models concerning Gramsci’s positions on hegemony. The first hegemony model is that the state contrasts with civil society, and thus, hegemony, in the sense of cultural and moral leadership, is located within civil society while coercion is confined to the state. The problem of this model, Anderson argued, is that hegemony does indeed operate through the institutions of the state, particularly through the process of legitimisation in the form of parliamentary democracy. The second model lost the distinction between the state and civil society, for Gramsci sometimes defines the state as political society plus civil society. However, it is this model that has been used by structuralists who argue that the state and civil society combine together through the ISAs and RSAs, and thus reduce agents’ interactions to social structures.

The third model argues that state and civil society are distinct, but that hegemony operates across both. In other words, it suggests not only that hegemony operates through the consensual institutions, but also hegemony itself is affected through both force and consent. Clearly, this understanding opposed to the normally accepted view that hegemony is consent and that it contrasts with coercion. But in Anderson’s view, this model Gramsci developed was reasonable. For critical realism approach, this is also the best formulation, because it leads to the view that the organization and maintenance of hegemony is related to important social

institutions and structures. Thus, rather than confining hegemony to one of these, it shows that hegemony involves the process whereby structures and superstructures codetermine and relate to one another (Joseph, 2002b: 31).

Theoretical Framework in China's Context

This study attempts to employ critical realism-based hegemony as a working framework to study Chinese nationalistic discourse and power struggles in the “reform and opening” era (1978-2008). Yet, the distinction of two aspects of hegemony made by Joseph (2002b) is necessarily rough and abstracted. In pursuing my enquiry into the hegemonic struggles of Chinese nationalistic discourse in thirty years, I want to first clarify the social agents involved in Chinese nationalistic discourse and the transition of social structures under which agents' hegemonic nationalistic projects operate (See Figures 3.1; 3.2; & 3.3).

Four social agents — the Party-state, intellectuals, the mass media, and the ordinary citizens — were involved in the hegemonic struggles of Chinese nationalistic discourse during this thirty year period. Considering Chinese nationalistic discourse as an important and sensitive political public opinion, the Party-state, as the ruling group, never gives up its effort to shape nationalistic discourse, especially through national-wide patriotic education. Then, Chinese intellectuals are another important agent who have great influence on Chinese nationalistic discourse. During thirty years, they actively promoted various nationalistic projects and articulated, cooperated and struggled with different social agents. The third important agent is mass media. Undeniably, mass media in China is the most significant channel for the Party-state promoting its nationalistic discourse, and struggling for hegemonic position; but more importantly, in this process, as well as in the trend of media commercialization, mass media also developed its own interest and thus, participated in this struggle for the leadership of nationalistic discourse. Finally, numerous case studies have shown the strong strength of China's popular nationalistic sentiment (See, Gries, 2001&2004; Zhao, 2002; Wu, 2007; etc.). And most of the large-scale popular nationalistic movements broke out in cities, with the young students, workers and intellectuals as the main force involved. Thus, the voices from the ordinary citizens also cannot be neglected. Especially during the

Internet era, Chinese netizens, as independent agents, have a strong influence on nationalistic discourse autonomously and spontaneously. Then, whether and how the ordinary citizens' nationalistic projects and discourse challenged the official patriotic discourse during the past thirty years should be examined in detail.

As reviewed in Chapter Two, previous studies on hegemonic struggles of Chinese nationalistic discourse only considered one or two agents and their power relations. In this study, nationalistic discourse promoted by all the four agents and their hegemonic struggles for the leading position will be examined in detail. Besides, at the structural level, this study will also investigate the influence of social structure to agents' discursive practices, as well as the (unintended) impact of agents' practices to the transformation of social structure.

Then, social structures in this study will be specified as economic, political or cultural (media) aspects. Accordingly, three manifest transitions of China's social structure during the past thirty years may be traced. The first period is from the end of 1978 to 1991. In the initial years of "reform and opening", China's economic structure transitioned from the planned economy system to a planned commodity economy. Yet, the political structure was still totalitarian. And thus, though the social atmosphere had been relaxed from various political movements, the society as a whole, including mass media, was strictly controlled by the state.¹⁰ The second period is from 1992 to 2002. During this period the "socialist market economy" was ratified by the Fourteenth Party Congress (in 1992). From that time on, practical concerns have become far more important than Marxism ideology in justifying the Party-state's continued rule. With this new economic situation, the political structure changed from totalitarian to authoritarian – the Party-state adopted indirect ways to manage economic operations and direct ways to exercise political and ideological control. Meanwhile, due to intensive media commercialization, China's media structure also changed from purely being shaped by the Party-state, to

¹⁰ In this thesis, China's political structure was mainly distinguished by Weberian concept of legitimacy. Political system in the post-revolutionary China was closely associated with charismatic legitimacy. Putting it simply, China's politics was dominated by the charismatic leader of Mao Zedong rather than institutions or the laws, which symbolized the totalitarian rule. Though the CCP leadership in the 1980s tried to break through Mao's cult of personality, China's politics, in a broader sense, was still dominated by the strong central rule which attempts to control and direct all aspects of individual life, mainly through the unique *danwei* system.

being shaped both by the Party-state and the media market, with its own dynamic interest.¹¹ Finally, the third period was from 2003 to 2008. During this period, China's market economy became more globalized with China entering the World Trade Organization (WTO). More radical social change occurred when the Internet society emerged in earnest circa 2003, from which time the Internet played a critical role in promoting government transparency, specifically in the cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the Sun Zhigang Incident.¹² Though the political structure was still authoritarian during this period, the political power had been decentralized in almost all aspects via economic globalization and the Internet society.

Each of these aspects or combinations of social structure may shape the four abovementioned agents' nationalistic discourses and their discursive relations. By examining the three cases mentioned later, this study will explore how the social structures in each case – manifested as political, economic, and cultural (media) structures – shape the agents' (i.e., the state, intellectuals, the mass media, and the citizens) discursive practices and hegemonic nationalistic discourse. Moreover, it will shed light on in which respect social agents' practices and struggles promote reproduction or transformation of social structures.

¹¹ When the market economy established in China since the 1992, China's political system mainly relied on traditional legitimacy (both represented the traditional Chinese Confucian culture, and the CCP's traditions) and economic/performance legitimacy. Then, on the one hand, to develop market economy, the Party-state had to leave a larger sphere for private life, resort to legal and rational procedures in the economic realm, and thus, exercise their power within relatively predictable limits. Yet, it is the *socialist* market economy which means that the CCP leadership was also responsible for the direction of China's market economy. On the other hand, similar with the totalitarian system, the Party-state also tried to monopolize the ideological control, especially by controlling various mass media and Chinese intellectuals. Such marketized political system was called as authoritarian structure in this thesis. It continued to the era of 2000s China.

¹² Sun Zhigang was a young graphic designer working for a clothes factory in Guangzhou. On the night of March 17, 2003, he was stopped by the police for randomly checking residency permits on his way to a nearby Internet cafe. Unfortunately, Sun had not obtained his permit yet because he had just moved to Guangzhou to his new job. Then Sun was taken to a local detention center for beggars and vagrants on suspicion. However, on March 20, he was pronounced dead. Yet, under the pressures from online communities and mass media, all 13 suspects involved in beating Sun were caught by the police, and 12 were pronounced guilty at the end of the trial. Meanwhile, twenty three government officials and police officers faced Party or administrative disciplinary punishment for their roles in this case. Most surprisingly, as a result of a heated national debate and subsequent uproar about the Chinese deportation system directly stirred by Sun's death, the State Council decided at a conference chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao on June 18, 2003, to terminate the 1982 Measures on the custody and repatriation of urban vagrants and enforce a new set of management methods for such people.

Figure 3. 1 The duality of hegemony model in China: 1978-1991




Figure 3. 2 The duality of hegemony model in China: 1992-2002





Figure 3. 3 The duality of hegemony model in China: 2003-2008



Research Questions

As argued before, based on critical realist understanding of hegemony, this study will examine discursive relations of the four agents involved in the hegemonic struggle for the leading position of nationalistic discourse in a recent three decade time-span. Specifically, the following questions will be addressed: *what* are the features of hegemonic nationalistic discourses; *how* such hegemonic discourse is formed – by examining the discursive relations and hegemonic struggles among the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens; *why* such discourse can win the hegemonic status in the power struggles, from a structural perspective; and *in which respects* social agents' practices and struggles promote the reproduction or transformation of social structures. In greater detail, the research questions are as follows:

Research Question 1:

In each case, what are the features of China's hegemonic nationalistic discourse?

Here, the "features" of nationalistic discourse includes its contents (key arguments for example), formats (rational or radical sentiment), and attitude (to western countries and China).

Then, at a discursive level, Question 2 will examine the formation of Chinese nationalistic discourse by analyzing the hegemonic projects/practices different social agents promote, their hegemonic struggles for the leadership of nationalistic discourse. From this analysis, the power relations among the four agents may explore. The research questions for this section are:

2.1 In each case, what are the nationalistic discourses produced by the Party-state, intellectuals, mass media and the ordinary citizens separately?

2.2 In each case, what kind of strategies/ projects do the four agents – the Party-state, intellectuals, mass media and the ordinary citizens, adopt separately to promote their own nationalistic discourses?

2.3 In each case, how do the mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens consume/interpret official nationalistic discourse?

2.4 In each case, to what extent do nationalistic discourses promoted by mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens actually or potentially challenge the official nationalistic discourse?

2.5 In each case, as for alternative nationalistic projects, how does the Party-state deal with them?

2.6 In each case, what are the power relations among the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens?

Next, Question 3 will examine why certain kinds of nationalistic discourse can acquire hegemonic status through structural perspective.

Research Question 3:

3.1 In each case, how do the economic, political, and media structure shape the hegemonic practices and power relations among the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens?

3.2 In each case, how do the economic, political, and media structure shape the features (content/format/attitude) of hegemonic nationalistic discourse?

Finally, this study will also examine the (unintended) consequence of the hegemonic struggles to the transformation of China's social structure.

Research Question 4:

In each case, in which respects do the hegemonic struggles among the four agents – the Party state, mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens – contribute to the transformation of China's economic, political and media structure?

Methodology

Case Study

Empirically, the case study method investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. But also, it is a “comprehensive research strategy” in its data collection and data analysis strategies, which are driven by “prior development of theoretical propositions” (Yin, 1994: 13). The case study method is proper for study contemporary Chinese nationalistic discourse because it can cope with “the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points”, and because it “relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” (ibid.,13). Indeed, no other method can help us analyze Chinese nationalistic discourse in the past thirty years, while dealing with so many relations among four agents in their struggle for hegemonic discourse. As Hamel (1993) argued, the merit of the case study method can be summarized as three key words: describing, understanding, and explaining. In detail, by the case study method, this study can *describe* the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse, and then *understand* its formation process by examining the agents’ concrete discursive relations and hegemonic struggles in the representative cases. Finally, we can *explain* the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse and the power relations behind it through investigating dialectical relations between agents’ practices and the social structures employed by each.

One important critique of the case study method is a lack of external validity. Over the years, critics of the case study method have argued that the study of a small number of cases can offer no justifications for establishing reliable or generalizable findings. Indeed, many advocates of the case study method have recognized the importance of this issue. Most of them agree that the classical view of external validity as principal in quantitative research needs to be adapted to the specific nature of case study research. They argue that the validity of results from cases studies are made to the specific theoretical framework adopted in the study, not the population at large as typical survey research designs (Yin, 1994). It is a kind of logic inference that depends upon the cogency of the theoretical reasoning (Mitchel, 1983).

Critical Discourse Analysis

Then, the method of critical discourse analysis, proposed by Fairclough introduced in Chapter One, will be used as analytical framework for each case study. From the

three dimensional mode – text, discursive practice, and social practice – the central of Fairclough’s approach is that discourse is an important form of social practice, which both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices. In other words, as social practice, discourse is in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions (Philips, 2002: 61). Thus, to explore the links between language use and social practice, the focus is the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of the social order and facilitation of social change.

Clearly, the three dimensional model and their dialectical relationship in Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis correspond to the critical realism-based hegemony theoretical framework. For Fairclough, discursive practice can be seen as an aspect of a hegemonic struggle that contributes to the reproduction and transformation of the order of discourse of which it is part. Then, from a critical realist understanding of hegemony, we can analyze how discursive practice is part of a larger social practice involving power relations. Thus, the critical hegemonic framework, combined with critical discourse analysis, can not only help us to examine the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse and the power relations behind it, but also, it can help us to see how the discourse and power relations are socially and historically situated, as well as how they potentially or actually changes social structure.

Research Design

Sampling Cases

The main object of this thesis is to study the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse during the past thirty years, from which we hope to explore the transitions of China’s power relations, as well as explain such transitions from a structural perspective. Thus, we should seek out cases that fulfill the following conditions: 1) all the cases should be nationalistic related cases that happened in mainland China during the past thirty years; 2) the cases should be unique in that all the four agents highly involved and actively engaged in the nationalistic movements; 3) the cases should be influential in each period, and thus, we can examine how the social structures shape such discourse and power relations, as well as the potential ability of social agents’ struggles to the transformation of social structures; 4) the cases should

be availability of information and data. According to such principles, three cases will be examined in this study. They are: TV-documentary *Heshang (River Elegy)*, the anti-NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and, anti-Tibetan Independence and protecting the overseas torch relay movements in 2008.

CASE 1: *Heshang (River Elegy)* is a six-part television documentary series produced from October 1987 and broadcast on China Central Television (CCTV) in June 1988. Basically, it is a political-style documentary full of discussions of some key issues and hard problems in the process of China's modernization. Divided into six episodes – “In Search of a Dream” (*Xumeng*), “Destiny” (*Mingyun*), “A Glimmering Light” (*Lingguang*), “A New Epoch” (*Xinjiyuan*), “Sorrows and Crises” (*Youhuan*), and “Azure” (*Weilanse*) – *Heshang* illustrates Chinese *qimeng* (enlightened) intellectuals' nationalistic project in the 1980s comprehensively and concretely. Actually, *Heshang* is the first instance of Chinese intellectuals promoting their ideas and nationalistic projects through television to the public. Since it received such enthusiastic responses, CCTV had to rebroadcast it in August 1988. Indeed, in the context of China's initial economic reform, this documentary sparked “the fever of *Heshang*”. Accordingly, it quickly transitioned from a media event to a cultural event; and finally, to a political event, which ignited the Tiananmen Incident in spring 1989, and then was banned and sharply criticized by the central Party.

CASE 2: At approximately midnight on Friday, May 7, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air forces dropped five laser-guided bombs on the Chinese embassy located in Belgrade. The journalist of *People's Daily* Shao Yunhuan, and two *Guangming Daily* reporters, Xu Xinghu and Zhu Ying were killed in this bombing. Twenty people working in the embassy were injured. This incident quickly sparked China's largest-scale anti-West protest, especially anti-US nationalistic protest in the 1990s. From mid-night of May 8, hundreds of busloads of university students demonstrated outside the embassies and consulates of the NATO countries, particularly U.S. facilities in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Shenyang. In Beijing, students held up the posters of journalists killed, chanted anti-America and anti-NATO slogans, and asked the U.S. embassy to lower the flag expressing their condolences for the deaths. Thousands of Tsinghua

students held the self-made targets and shouted angrily: "Please bomb! We are all here!" The students sang the national anthem and *the Internationale* together. Besides street demonstrations, university students in the whole country also demonstrated on their own campuses, raising arms and protesting NATO's gross violation of Chinese sovereignty. At the famous *Triangle Corner (sanjiaodi)* in Peking University, students bannered "Not To Take TOEFL, Not To Take GRE! Attack the imperialism US with whole-heartedly!" (*bu kao Tuo, bu kao G, yixinyiyi da meidi!*). In the evening, students in many universities lit candles as memorials for the victims. Additionally, thousands condolence letters, essays, and poems were mailed to *the People's Daily* and *Guangming Daily* in the hours and days following the May 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing, with the hope that Chinese government may take a tougher stand on the bombing (Garies, 2004: 131). Besides these protest activities, in the new online protest forum, *bbs.people.com.cn*, there were more than 90 thousand protest posts till June 19, which presented an online protest storm in China.¹³

CASE 3: On March 14, 2008, Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, saw the most serious disturbance since Tibetan uprising of 1959, which prompted the Dalai Lama to go into exile. During the riot, hundred of mobs and Tibet protesters threw stones at ethnic Han Chinese, and smashed and grabbed the shops owned by them. In this process, many governmental and Party offices, and news organizations were also attacked and damaged. After that, Tibet protesters carried Chinese national flags out into the street and trampled on it, with cheered and yelled: "Long live Tibet!", "Free Tibet!", and "Long live the Dalai Lama!"

This disturbance sparked a series of pro-government and anti-West nationalistic activities among Chinese people, especially young Chinese. When the riot broke out, a seven-minute short video – "*Tibet was, is, and always will be a part of China!*" – made by an overseas Chinese student spread like wild fire across China. Thousands pages of messages were left by Chinese netizens to show their support to the views presented in the video and their resolutions of anti-Tibet independence. Then, wide anger was further expressed when some fake reports with clear errors by

¹³ Million net izens were like million soldiers, [*batwan wangmin baiwan bing, renminribao wangluoban wangshang kaitong 'BBS kaongyi luntan' zongshu*], <http://www2.ggl.com.cn/fuwu/dt/hm99/hm9905.html>, Retrieved 2010-01-02.

overseas media were discovered. One of the famous slideshows “*Riot in Tibet: True face of Western Media*”¹⁴ posted on YouTube accused CNN, Germany-language TV station RTL, the German news channel N-TV, the Radio France Internationale website (RFI) and other international media of cropping pictures of Indian and Nepalese police wresting Tibetan protesters with captions about China’s crackdown. To respond to the distortions of facts by Western media in a systematical way, Rao Jin even launched the Anti-CNN website on March 18.¹⁵ Identifying CNN as “the World’s Leader of Liars”, the top page of the website linked articles, videos and photos documenting some of the alleged distortions in the coverage of the Tibet events, as well as a PowerPoint presentation and a PDF file covering much of the same materials. Notably, the website attracted 500,000 visits per day.¹⁶ Almost all of the posts criticized the western media’s strong bias of pro-Tibetan protesters. In those days, CNN’s bureau in Beijing was deluged by a barrage of phone calls and faxes that accused the organization of bias coverage, sometimes with threatening messages. Additionally, from April 16, more than 2 million Chinese MSN and QQ users added a pattern of “red heart” and the English word “China” in front of their online signatures, to oppose foreign press’ bias coverage and show their unity and patriotism.

Then, Chinese patriots’ nationalistic sentiments increased when the Olympic overseas torch relay progressed from London to Paris. Especially in Paris, the scene was so chaotic that the Olympic officials unlit the torch four times for the sake of safety. Worse, Jin Jing, a handicapped Chinese overseas torch-bearer, was assaulted by protesters during her torch relay. Such events, as well as French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s comments that he was considering France boycotting the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics, enraged Chinese patriots and incited their boycott of French goods. Quickly, Carrefour became the main target for its much more accessibility. Starting April 13, large-scale boycotts occurred in Wuhan (Hubei province), Hefei (Anhui province), Shanghai, Suzhou (Jiangsu province), Beijing, Kunming (Yunnan province), Hangzhou (Zhejiang province) and other big cities. In each city, thousands of Chinese youths gathered at Carrefour stores,

¹⁴ <http://hk.youtube.com/watch?v=uSQnK5FcK>

¹⁵ <http://www.anti-cnn.com/>

¹⁶ Jill Drew, “Protests may only harden Chinese line.”, *Washington Post*, March 24, 2008.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/23/AR2008032301595.html>

raised Jin Jing's big pictures as the symbol of brave and strong of Chinese people, waved national flags, sang the national anthem and chanted patriotic slogans, to protest the French government's pro-Tibetan separatist stance and the suggestion of boycotting the Beijing Olympics' opening ceremony.

Generally speaking, all the three cases selected in this study are unique to study Chinese contemporary nationalistic discourse and the hegemonic power struggles in it. Firstly, all of them are nationalistic movements with a national scope and with world wide influence. Besides, in each case all the four agents – the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the citizens – are involved with fierce contestation for the leading role of hegemonic nationalistic discourse. Moreover, the three cases were fit to the three time-spans separately, and represented the highest peak of Chinese nationalistic sentiment in each period. Accordingly, by such three cases, we may not only study the features of nationalistic discourses, examine the power relations behind the four agents' hegemonic struggles; but also, we can examine how China's economic, political and media structure shape such discourse and power relations, as well as in which respects agents' power struggles pushed the transformation of social structure. Thus, we can say that all the cases are highly unique and fit the critical realism-based hegemony framework.

One problem may be the reason that we select the anti-Tibet Independence movement and the pro-overseas torch relay case, both of which happened before the Olympic Games, rather than analyzing the case of the Beijing Olympics directly. Without a doubt, the Beijing Olympics was also unique, with world-wide influence. However, it is not an ideal representative to examine the power relations among the four agents. First, for most Chinese people, they have a consensus on the Olympics that it represents the friendship, peace, and fair competition among the whole world; and holding the Olympics symbolized the rise of China among the world. Therefore, when facing such a grand event, almost all of the Chinese ordinary people, intellectuals, mass media, and the Party-state tend to have a positive attitude towards the Beijing Olympic Games. Putting it differently, the four agents' real nationalistic attitude and discourse towards western countries and the Party-state may not be clearly embodied in the Olympic case. Second, as a world-wide influential sporting event, the operations of the Beijing Olympics were mainly

dominated by the Party-state. Accordingly, the related reports in China's mass media were also strictly censored by the Party-state, even though the overseas media organizations and journalists have a great deal of freedom on their Beijing Olympic reports. On the contrary, it is during pre-Olympics period in which time we can see how the four agents promoted their nationalistic projects clearly, and their hegemonic struggles for the leading role of nationalistic discourse, as well as examining the potential ability of the agents' struggles towards the transformation of China's social structures.

Field Work Schedule

My work began when I started paying attention to the rise Chinese nationalistic discourse before 2008 Beijing Olympics. After the 3·14 Tibet riot, I quickly began to collect online data by archiving forum discussions, posts and follow-posts in BBSs, and blogs concerning the Tibet riot, no matter if they are descriptive, telling of what happened in Tibet during the days of riot, the newest progress of the incident; or analytical essays on why the riot happened, why western media have bias to us, how Chinese people and government should react to the turbulence; or even the posts only expressing netizens' angry sentiments to Tibet-separatists and western media's bias reports. All related information in sample online sites had been archived. At the same time, I also discussed the Tibet riot with my friends and acquaintance everyday, and observed their online discussions and interactions.

Quickly, I realized that the online nationalistic discourse I had observed was closely relevant to the political position of the Internet users. Instead of rational discussion and debate, online nationalistic discourses were full of misunderstanding, mutual-criticizing and even mutual-abusing with linguistic violence and dirt-digging (*renrou sousuo*) activities. Before I began the study then, I had some tacit knowledge of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 1990s. Thus, the initial three questions emerged directly from the context: 1) if the anti-western nationalistic sentiment in the 1990s was the result of Party-state's propaganda, like many scholars argued, why was the dominant nationalistic sentiment in 2008 still anti-west and pro-CCP, when both sided information can be acquired by Chinese people through the Internet? What is the role of the Party-state in the formation of popular

nationalistic discourse? 2) Compared with homogeneous anti-Western voice in the 1990s, popular nationalistic discourse in 2008 divided into two mutual-abusing camps. Thus, what is the impact of China's online context to such change? And faced with divided online nationalistic discourses, how do the Party-state, intellectuals and mass media react to it? And, 3) why are rational debate and consensus on nationalistic issue difficult to develop in China?

To answer these questions, I developed a more systematic observation focusing on the discursive relations among the Party-states, netizens, mass media and online intellectuals, and concerning their ongoing discourse struggles. This process of collecting online data continued to May 12, 2008, during which time the turbulence of Olympic overseas torch relay man further enrich my data. Then after May 12, all of attentions in mainland China had quickly turned to the Wenchuan earthquake. After creating an archive of online data, I developed provisional categories to help explain the discursive relations among the four main agents in the formation of hegemonic anti-west and pro-CCP nationalistic discourse. Four provisional genres of discursive interaction – nationalistic discourse production, discourse consumption, discourse struggling, and discourse strategies – were then developed to account for the power relations among the four agents.

I used these four categories as an analytical basis for the second round of data collection – series of interviews over the course of one year (from July 2008 to July 2009) using semi-structured interview technique (see Appendix A). Then, I coded the interview data with the four initial categories as a guide. In this process, I deleted some codes, because from the interview data I discovered that the power relations of the four agents are imbalanced, in that all the intellectuals, mass media, and netizens pay significant attention to consumption and struggling with the official discourse. Then, I used these categories to finalize the more elaborated coding scheme throughout the rest of the study (See Table 3.2).

Table 3. 2 Categories, agents, and projects/strategies used to code web data and interviews (2008)

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Agents</i>	<i>Projects/Strategies (in 2008)</i>
Nationalistic discourse	the Party-state	Rational patriotism; Confucian harmony world; peaceful rising
	Online intellectuals	<u>The Left</u> : memorizing Mao's era; anti-globalization; anti-market economy <u>Liberals</u> : enlightenment; asking for democratic political reforms; calling for universal values
	Mass media	<u>Tabloid</u> : stressing national interest; eye-catching and sensationalist <u>Professionalism</u> : enlightenment; promoting universal values; critical and reflective
	Netizens	<u>zuofens</u> : asking for national interests; aiming for a strong-nation state; economic development determinism; negative attitude to Western countries <u>youfens</u> : asking for universal values; aiming for a democratic nation; negative attitude to China's Party-state
Discourse consumption/ interpretation to official discourse	Online intellectuals' interpretation	<u>The Left</u> : directly criticizing the Party-state's globalization orientation <u>Liberals</u> arguing that the real rational patriotism can only be achieved by freedom of speech.
	Mass media's interpretation	<u>Tabloid</u> : Obeying the bottom line, but promoting assertive discourse in reports. <u>Professionalism</u> : Obeying the bottom line, but criticizing official discourse by promoting alternative viewpoints.
	Netizens' interpretation	<u>zuofens</u> : supporting official discourse; becoming official online commentators; <u>youfens</u> : Getting around the firewall to see information from other side; calling official online commentators as <i>Wu Maodang</i>
	<i>zuofens</i> vs. <i>youfens</i>	<i>zuofens</i> called <i>youfens</i> as "traitor", while <i>youfens</i> called <i>zuofens</i> as " <i>Wu Maodang</i> "
Discursive struggles	<i>The Left</i> vs. <i>Liberals</i>	The Left criticized the Liberals that they had been engaged by western anti-China force; Liberals criticized the Left's "extreme nationalistic feeling".
	Official alternative views vs.	<u>To netizen</u> : tacit endorsing <i>zuofens</i> ; <u>To online intellectuals</u> : Never referring to

		their arguments, with temporally shutting down their websites and forums.
		<u>To mass media</u> : tacit endorsing tabloid's assertive nationalistic discourse; paying closed surveillance on the professionalism newspapers.
Discourse strategies	Online intellectuals	Through the Internet, trying to enlarge their influence to millions of Internet users.
	Mass media	Followed online nationalistic discourse. While tabloid newspapers tried to radicalize it, professional ones tried to rationalize it.
	The Party-state	<u>New propaganda model</u> : Saying the fact quickly; telling the reasons cautiously; covering bad information by good information, negative information by positive information <u>New media control method</u> : government media spokespeople system; new online regulations; online commentators; combined with traditional methods

Data Collection

Textual Analysis

The first step of critical discourse analysis is conducting textual analysis. Textual analysis to the three unique cases can help us see the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse in each period, and the discursive relations and struggles among the four agents. Specifically, *People's Daily*, China's most important party newspaper and mouthpiece, was chosen as representative of official nationalistic discourse during the thirty years. All its nationalistic-related reports in the period of the three cases happened – from June 1988 to August 1988 and from June 1989 to October 1989; from May 8 1999 to July 8 1999; and from March 2008 to May 2008 – will be analyzed. Moreover, considering that official discourse may be more radical in three cases since the Sino-West relationship was intensive, it will be added by analyzing the speeches of General Party Secretary in each CCP's Congress Party from 1979 to 2008. Indeed, patriotism-related elaboration in such speeches represented the most authoritarian voice of official nationalistic discourse.

Then, the text of TV-documentary *Heshang* will be examined as intellectual and mass media discourse in the 1980s, since it was planned and written by numerous

intellectuals and then broadcasted in the prime time of CCTV. And the text for popular nationalistic discourse in the 1980s is mainly from archival materials – such as the audience response letters to *Heshang* published immediately after its broadcasting.

Thirdly, the texts about intellectual discourse in the case of 1999 anti-bombing were mainly from *People's Daily* and the *Journal of Strategy and Management*. On the one hand, during the month after the 1999 incident, there were two to four intellectuals' related articles published in *People's Daily* each day. By analyzing these articles, we can see the nationalistic discourse promoted by China's influential intellectuals in the 1990s, as well as their relations with the Party-state. On the other hand, nationalistic related articles published in the famous journal, *Journal of Strategy and Management* will also be examined. First published in 1993 by the China Society for Strategy and Management Research (CSSM), the journal acted as a forum, bringing together many of China's most influential social scientists to discuss China's future after the cold war. Among various topics, nationalism was one of the most important themes that had been discussed in the journal, and various nationalistic projects were promoted there in the 1990s.

Fourthly, instead of newspapers, the sampling text of media discourse in the 1990s will be from series of nationalistic books, since the most notable nationalism phenomenon in the 1990s was the flourishing of nationalistic books in the media market. Especially, the book *China Can Say No*, and *China's Road under the Shadow of Globalization* will be examined as the represented media nationalistic discourse. The former was the most successful and noticeable nationalistic book in the 1990s, and the latter was published quickly after the NATO's bombing of China's Embassy. Then, the sample texts of media discourse in the 2000s are mainly from two newspapers: *Southern Metropolis Daily* and *Global Times*. The first one is the influential liberal newspaper that strives for professionalism; and the second is the influential nationalistic tabloid newspaper that resorts to sensationalism. Specifically, their reports on Chinese nationalistic sentiments from March to May 2008 will be analyzed in detail.

Indeed, during the past thirty years, various kinds of nationalistic discourses from different groups and agents had emerged and contested for the hegemonic leadership.

In the process of analysis, special attention will be paid to the interdiscursivity phenomenon, by which different discourses are articulated together in this period, but new articulations may be formed in the next. Thus, the change and maintenance of discursive relations, and power relations between different discourses can be traced. Among them, the most manifest relations can be found in the phenomenon of intertextual chain – a series of texts in which each text incorporates elements from another text or other texts.

Online Ethnography

In the 2000s various Internet communities, BBSs, and personal blogs in China sprang up. They become the new but most important field for social agents, especially intellectuals and members of the public with alternative views, to promote their nationalistic projects. And accordingly, the Internet society becomes an important space for agents struggling for hegemonic nationalistic discourse. Thus, in this study, online ethnography will be adopted to examine online nationalistic discourse and power relations.

Ethnography, more commonly called “participant observation”, describes and interprets observed relationships between social practices and the systems of meaning in a particular cultural milieu. It usually involves a “thick description” of activities and relations of cultural membership, and a holistic description of all relevant aspects of a culture’s material existence and meaning systems. Yet, ethnography on the Internet is particularly a multifaceted trend. Terms such as “virtual ethnography” (Hine, 2000), “network ethnography” (Howard, 2002), “netnography” (Kozinets, 2002), indicate researchers’ attempts at transferring principles and techniques of ethnography to settings of computer-mediated communication (CMC). Generally speaking, though online ethnography has different versions, they can be mainly divided into two types depending on how they strike the balance between research online and offline (Greschke, 2007, summarized by Androutsopoulos, 2008). The first type focuses on the relations of offline everyday life and online life, asking how CMC technologies are integrated into and have influence on everyday life and culture. Accordingly, it proceeds as blended online and offline ethnography. The second approach is concerned with life on the Internet, trying to theorize the Internet as a site where culture and community are

formed. Accordingly, it pays attention to the various online communities and the corresponding online interactions. Actually, the second type of online ethnography provides the methodological background for this study, which means, focusing on the online nationalistic discourses, as well as the interactions, struggles, and negotiations among the four agents in the Internet society.

As most of ethnographers have argued, to fully understand a complex social situation, one must enter into an unbiased observation or interaction with the society being studied. Accordingly, in this study, the sites to study Chinese intellectuals' online nationalistic discourse will be the *bullog* (*Niubo*, www.bullog.cn) and the *Utopia* (*Wuyou zhixiang*, <http://www.wyzxsx.com>). Dissatisfied towards the censorship of China's major blog portals, Luo Yonghao, a famous and popular English professor at Beijing New Oriental School, founded *Niubo* in 2006. Gathered by many cultural and social scholars and critics with liberal tendency, such as Han Han, Lian Yue, Wang Xiaoshan, Huang Jiwei, etc, *Niubo* quickly became one of the most liberal and edgy blog portals in Chinese cyberspace.¹⁷ Though I am interested in, and have already paid attention to more than twenty blogs in *Niubo* since 2007, I paid special attention to Lianyue's blog, *Lianyue de diba dazhou* (<http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/lianyue>)¹⁸ as a sample site to study liberal intellectuals' nationalistic discourse in the 2000s, for its "externally-focused, news-aware" genre, ten thousands clicks and hundreds of responses for each main post (*zhutie*), as well as his enduring effort to construct a cyber civil society in his blogshpere. In detail, the main posts and follow-up posts (*gentie*) from March 14 to May 12, 2008 were downloaded as qualitative data. From the main posts we can see the nationalistic discourse promoted by liberal intellectuals, and their dynamic discursive relations with the Party-state, mass media and the netizens. In addition, from hundreds of follow-up posts for each main post, we can also see netizens' responses to liberal discourse.

¹⁷ *Bullog.c n* had been banned by the authority since January 2009. Then it transformed as two versions: *Niubo International* <http://www.bullogger.com/> and *Yan Niubo*, <http://www.bullock.cn/>. The former can only be read by servers outside China since it has been blocked by the CCP authority; the latter can be read within China since it has no political content.

¹⁸ After *bullog.cn* had been shut down in January 2009, his blog moved to: <http://www.bullock.cn/blogs/lianyue/> in mainland China, and <http://www.bullogger.com/blogs/lianyue/> in *Niubo International*.

The website *Utopia* has evolved into a major base for online leftist intellectuals in recent years. Compared with liberal intellectuals' online activities, the left-wing intellectuals' activities in *the Utopia* are more systematic and well organized. Rather than a kind of blog portal like *Niubo*, *the Utopia* is organized into 11 different sections of interest. For thousands articles it accumulated since its founding, the website also provides search engine for netizens. Like the function of BBSs or blogs, online readers can leave messages to express their opinions behind each article. More significantly, it operates a book bar (*shu ba*) offline selling pan-Leftist books published both in China and overseas. The book bar also holds weekly salons, unofficial seminars and conferences, inviting elite leftists to discuss the problems in China's reform process and various hot social issues. Accordingly, the nationalistic related articles and discussions on the *Utopia* during the period of March 14 to May 12, 2008 will be examined, as the representative nationalistic discourse of China's left-wing intellectuals.

Clearly, systematic observation to the two websites can help us to examine intellectuals' nationalistic discourse in the 2000s, their debating and dynamic relations with netizens and the authorities. In addition, as supplementary materials, nationalistic topics posted in two famous BBSs, *Strong Nation Forum* (bbs.people.com.cn) and *Kaidi Community* (<http://club.kdnet.net>) – the first is the harbor for Left-wing angry youth (*zuofens*) and second is the harbor for Right-wing angry youth (*youfens*) – during the case period will also be examined as online popular nationalistic discourse. However, faced with tens of thousands of posts and follow-up posts in the two BBSs, only random observation was conducted due to obvious time constraints.

Conducting online ethnography is a challenge to researchers. The first difficulty arises from the enormous amount of information that the Internet carries. Since no researcher can conduct participant observation in cyberspace around the clock, then how to collect, preserve, and analyze data becomes a problem to carry out the online anthropological research. For the tons of data in two BBSs, though I did not observe them at regular intervals, I followed the posts and follow-up posts intensively for many continuous hours, as long as my body and schedule permitted. It at least guarantees that most of key arguments and debates between *zuofens* and

yousheng were under my scrutiny. After downloading them as qualitative data, I viewed them as historical texts, and then analyzed them by textual-oriented critical discourse analysis. Compared with tons of data in BBS, the posts in Lian Yue's blog and the website *Utopia* are more manageable. Yet, another problem emerged – some of sensitive posts or responses may be deleted by managers of blogosphere. Yet, these being deleted posts were important to study the bottom line of the Party-state and the discursive relations among the intellectuals, the Party-state, and the netizens. Thus, my way was to observe Lianyue's blog and the *Utopia* more than five times per day, downloading the new main posts and follow-up posts into computer files in each time, especially marking which ones have been deleted, and the related responses from the writers and netizens.

The second difficulty is about the fluidity of the Internet and netizens. As Zhou Yongming (2006: 11-12) explained,

[The Internet] is in a constant state of flux, making cyberspace extremely fluid and, sometimes even puzzling. The Internet is thus a field site very different from those an anthropologist typically faces. In earlier times, when the anthropologist entered a community to study culture, he or she usually selected a group of people in a certain locale and stayed and interacted with them for a prolonged period or time. That is now participant observation, the trademark of the profession, has been done. But since a community in cyberspace has no definite boundary, and its members can easily join and leave, what is the essential characteristic that defines it?

Indeed, Chinese online nationalist communities are a very fluid and constantly changing group. It is difficult to define who is nationalist or who is not in the cyberspace. And not all netizens visit a nationalistic community are nationalists. To deal with this problem, instead of defining online social agents concretely and paying attention to certain definite netizens, this study focuses on several representative online sites (mentioned previously), since we observed that liberal intellectuals tend to propose their projects at *Niubo*, while left-wing intellectuals mainly wrote in the *Utopia*; most of *zuosheng* published posts at *Strong Nation Forum*, while most of *yousheng* publishing posts at *Kaidi Community*. Indeed, instead of defining who belongs to *zuosheng* and who belongs to *yousheng*, this study only

concerns their nationalistic discourse, and struggles and negotiations in such online sites.

The third difficulty should be addressed here is the role of the researcher in the ethnographic research. As a Chinese people who studies Chinese nationalistic discourse and power relations, the advantage is that I am familiar with China's context and the nationalistic feelings of the Chinese people in the "reform and opening" era. And thus, when studying this phenomenon, I can guarantee both the cases and the concrete sites selected are unique. Yet, the major problem is that whether or not the researcher can really study the internal society without bias. In this study, I not only analyze different nationalistic discourses, but also interview both liberal and left-wing intellectuals, talk with *zuofens* and *youfens*, and listen to the officials' opinions. The aim is not to promote a new balanced view on Chinese nationalism, but to describe and analyze in detail different discourses promoted by the four agents, and their power relations over thirty years. More importantly, I believe that in qualitative research, the researcher's own experience of everyday life should not be regarded as a hindrance or something which might bias our research, but something which should be acknowledged and employed in our intellectual work. During this study work, I not only examine others' experience, but also always made self-reflexive on my own nationalistic feelings. Critically, this can help me to recognize Chinese people's nationalistic feeling rationally, see the debates and quarrels between different camps clearly, and understand their logic correctly.

Semi-structured Interview

In studying the interactions and struggles among the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the ordinary citizens, some kinds of data can only be obtained through in-depth interviews, especially when studying the discursive relations with the Party-state. Thus, semi-structured interviews were conducted in this study. Concretely, I interviewed 31 participants within a year's field work. 5 of them are China's cultural officials, working (or had worked) at China's Propaganda Department (CPD), Ministry of Culture (MOC), State Council Information (SCI), and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Except the official at SCI, all other people are at high level in departments with more than twenty years working experience at China's cultural management field. Thus,

their sayings are highly representative of the official attitude towards nationalistic discourse. 11 of the remaining interviewees are media workers ranged from vice chief-editor of *People's Daily*, editors at *Qiushi Magazine*, journalists and editors at *Global Times* and *Southern Metropolis Daily*, editors at Cultural Relics Press, as well as book dealers. Then, 5 of them are intellectuals from a liberal tendency to Old Left Marxists who have strong influence to China's society from the 1980s to the 2000s. And also, 10 of them are Chinese senior netizens who had 8-10 years online experience and are active participants in various online nationalistic related discussions.

The interviews covered a broad range of topics, including the interviewee's personal nationalistic tendency, their attitude to official discourse, perceived relations between the Party-state and mass media, their Internet use, the Party-state's media censorship, netizens' interpretation to official patriotism, etc (See Appendix B). What proved to be quite fruitful for these interviews was acquiring the cultural officials' attitude to nationalistic discourse promoted by intellectuals, their new methods to censor online discourse, as well as the dynamic hegemonic struggles of the mass media and netizens with the Party-state's censorship.

Among 31 interviewees, 26 were male and 5 female. For the semi-structured interviews, most of them were face-to-face, although emails were also used to some netizens' interviews. In addition, thirty-two of the informants were between the ages of 45 and 60, and the average age of the 10 netizens was 29. Additionally, open-ended interviews with flexible contents were also made to more than 20 acquaintances and personal friends. Their self-reported nationalistic feelings and various online and offline nationalistic activities depict the lively scene of popular nationalistic discourse and power relations. Their personal nationalistic stories, uncertain or resolute attitude on official discourse, rational or radical nationalistic expressions, combined with their life history, made me feel the strong impact of official discourse on them, and the strong tendency of them to escape from this influence. This further ignites my idea to explain the complex phenomenon of Chinese nationalism from discursive relations and even the structural perspectives.

Chapter Four Intellectual-led Nationalistic Discourse in the 1980s: the Case of *Heshang*

This chapter will discuss Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 1980s, and the power relations amongst the Party-state, intellectuals, mass media and the ordinary citizens in the hegemonic struggles for the leading role of nationalistic discourse, by the case of TV documentary *Heshang (River Elegy)* produced in 1988. Textual analysis to *Heshang* will be done in the first section, and its liberal, utopian discourse with “strong nation complex” will be explored. Then, the second section will examine *how* such intellectual-led liberal nationalistic discourse achieved hegemonic status in the 1980s by investigating discursive relations and struggles amongst the four agents, from which the power relations amongst them may be explored. Particular attention will be paid to the “historic bloc” between *qimeng* intellectuals and media intellectuals, and their negotiations and struggles with the Party-state for the leading role of nationalistic discourse. Finally, in a broader sense, the third section will examine how the “Totalitarian state - Planned commodity economy” social structure in the 1980s shaped the discursive relations of the four agents and such liberal nationalistic discourse. Four questions will be answered: *why* the liberal utopian discourse achieved hegemonic status in the 1980s; why was the historic bloc able to push the Party-state for political reform (though they were controlled by the Party-state); how did the crisis of hegemony happen in spring 1989; and did the mass media evolve into a civil society in the process of this hegemonic struggle?

***Heshang*: Intellectual-led Liberal Nationalistic Discourse**

***Heshang* and the Nationalistic Discourse in the 1980s China**

Anti-totalitarianism and Pro-Western Modernization

Literally, *Heshang (River Elegy)* means the Yellow River, from which Chinese traditional culture and civilization originated, already receded because of its early peak in influence. From this title we can see that one of the main tenets of *Heshang*

is anti-traditional Chinese culture. Obviously, this self-reflexive criticism of China's traditional culture is presented across the whole six episodes.

Firstly, from a historical perspective, *Heshang* reduces China's modern poverty to its Asiatic mode of production, under which the low level of productive power leads to a high central regime with the need to organize millions of people to combat the Yellow River each year (in Episode One). Then, it criticizes China's unenterprising spirit, which contributes to China's historical hesitance to engage in oceanic exploration, expansion and overseas trading. Furthermore, it reduces this inward looking attitude and stability-loving culture to China's unique geographical environment (in Episode Two). Following this, it further asks the question why the four great inventions of ancient China – the compass, gunpowder, papermaking and printing – can help Western countries to create a new industrial epoch, but not China itself; and, why the science and culture that came from foreign lands cannot push ancient China towards scientific revolution. To answer these two questions, the documentary also criticizes the idea of *guanbenwei* – to always consider official rank as the sole criterion of a person's worth – among Chinese people; and finally, in a broader sense, it considers Confucian culture as the impediment of China's modernization (in Episode Three and Six).

To make this criticism more understandable and vivid, *Heshang* particularly focuses on some cultural symbols, which have always been considered as China's glorious past and representative of Chinese civilization. For example, in the documentary, the totem symbol of the dragon and China's thousand-year-old "yellow culture" represented by Yellow River, have been personified as the capricious or ruthless tyrant; and the Great Wall is considered as "gigantic tragic monument" for that it embodies enclosure, conservatism, impotent defense, and faint-hearted non-offense.

Yet, it is incomplete if we only consider the documentary as a culturally reflexive work. In essence, all these anti-traditional arguments served a core idea: faced with the downfall of traditional Chinese civilization and the rise of Western industrial civilization, China's future lies in western-style modernization. Portraying Western civilization as a boundless ocean, the documentary argues that, "Just as the Yellow River finally flowing into the ocean and meeting surging billows of azure blue, our

bright future is also at embracing the economic and political civilization of westerners.... We cannot refuse the invitation from the ocean again.” (in Episode One, Two and Six)¹⁹

Obviously, the liberal tendency of *Heshang* manifests itself as a promotion of western-style modernization. In this sense, it articulates its arguments with China’s reform process at that time, by arguing that the western-style modernization not only means establishing market economy, but also involves conducting political reform. On the one hand, it cited Georgi Plekhanov, the first Russian Marxist’s famous argument – “Russia would have to pass through a capitalist stage of development before becoming socialist” – to illustrate that China, as a socialist country, also has to pass through the stage of commodity economy. Indeed, in the eyes of *Heshang*’s producers, almost all of China’s economic problems, such as the imbalance of regional development, low income for educated people, out of control commodity prices, are the result of an incomplete market mechanism. On the other hand, it argues that basically, only a democratic political system can break China’s ultra-stability-oriented system and prevent the tragedy of “Cultural Revolution” from happening again. From this perspective, *Heshang* not only boldly supports student pro-democracy movement in late 1986 and early 1987 China; but also with the hope to pressure the CCP leadership into conducting political reform at a rapid pace.

Dream of the Past

In the First Episode “*In Search of Dream*”, the documentary displays the complex psychological feelings of most Chinese people: they are prideful of China’s glorious and strong past, but meanwhile, worried about becoming a weak nation in the present world; they have a strong motivation to win, yet, are afraid of failure. Such contradictory and uncomfortable nationalistic feelings, argued in *Heshang*, originate from the nostalgia for the greatness of China’s “golden past”. By contrast, reiterating the message that “history is a burden” for future development, the documentary suggests Chinese people need to eliminate their nostalgia for the

¹⁹ Su, X. K., Wang, L. X., Zhang, G., Xie, X. J., & Yuan, Z. M. (2005). *Heshang*. Third edition. Taipei: Fengyun Shidai.

“golden past”, and instead develop a western-style commercial and competitive culture.

However, a hidden agenda of *Heshang* is also embedded in the same dream of recreation of China’s golden past. In an article response to scholars’ criticism for *Heshang*’s denying Chinese culture, Su Xiaokang, one of the scriptwriters, argued that “they are two different concepts between discussing the decline of our tradition and deny it completely” (Su, 1989a: 176). And “instead of criticizing the unification of our country, what we really condemn is the “grand unification” (*da yitong*) idea system based on the Confucian moral political frame” (Zhang, 1989: 156). Illusively and unconsciously, the hidden agenda of *Heshang* is neither to condemn China’s imperial past, nor to advocate Western ideas such as progress, rationalization and democracy. Instead, equating modernization and “wealthy and powerful China”, the dream of *Heshang* is the rejuvenation of China with hegemonic status in the world of nation-states. And, thus, western-style modernization is only the means to achieve this goal.

Radical Sentiment under “Anxious Consciousness”

Behind the anti-traditional discourse was the pervasive “anxious consciousness” (*weiji yishi*) tone of the documentary. As portrayed in a metaphor associating the periodical floods of the Yellow River with the unbroken chain of China’s periodical alternation between order and disorder, the producers eagerly hope to find ways to break out this ultra-stability-oriented system (*chao wending jiegou*) in China’s history. If China cannot break out of this loop, the documentary prophesied that the developmental gap between China and western countries will grow larger and larger, and finally, China will be “expelled from the globe” (*kaichu qiujì*) several years later. Hope, the documentary strongly suggests, lies in developing a western style of industrial civilization.

Heshang ostensibly ridicules patriotic delusions and feelings, asking Chinese people to make the rational choice for Western-style modernization. Yet, with its deep-rooted sense of crisis, such cosmopolitan orientation is *de facto* rooted in the radical nationalistic response to China’s modern problems. Firstly, its criticism of

China's traditional culture was full of poetic immersion in history and literary imagination, which renders any genuine cultural introspection elusive. Secondly, besides complete "self-contempt" attitude to traditional culture, it mystifies Western democratic political system and liberalism, by taking an utopian attitude towards Western-style modernization, without considering its adaptation in China's social context. As Xiao Gongqin argued, for most of liberal intellectuals in the 1980s, they tend to believe that western economy and political system are universal to all the society, and thus consider liberalism as the only criterion for a good government. Accordingly, they have a strong tendency to promote radical "complete Westernization" (*quanpan xihua*) (Interview #3). Finally and fundamentally, instead of promoting western democratic ideals and rational self-reflection, the final aim of *Heshang* is to search for a once-glorious empire and restore the political and economic hegemony of Chinese nation in the present world. Putting it differently, it takes an instrumental view to western-style modernization and China's traditional culture. Thus, though the means are rational, the final aim and its attitude to West and itself are fundamentally radical.

Actually, the liberal nationalistic discourse and "complete westernization" project promoted in *Heshang* are not new ideas in the 1980s China. As one scholar's criticism to *Heshang*:

What *Heshang* wants to say, in a word, is replacing agricultural society with industrial society. The main theme of it is claiming for competing culture, opening atmosphere and political reform. It is rare and valuable if such kind of claims voiced ten years ago; however, in fact, the theme of *Heshang* had already become our national plan and guided to the whole nation's activities. Its basic topic and enlightenment idea had already embeded in people's heart. Therefore, such claiming is just like a kind of senior grudge.

--Ding Tao, 1988: 175

Needless to say, such criticism to *Heshang* is poignant and realistic. Produced in 1988, all the key arguments in *Heshang* had been promoted by liberal intellectuals before the mid-1980s, most of which had been even discussed in the whole society.

For example, its discussion of the problem of China's admission to global citizenship was first suggested by the Shanghai-based newspaper *World Economic Herald* (*Shijie jingji daobao*) in February 1988, and already triggered widespread concern and discussion throughout China. The issues of establishing a market economy and promoting political reform were also hot topics in the whole society. Yet, this criticism also implies that *Heshang* was highly representative of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 1980s. In addition, whether *Heshang* is only a kind of "senior grudge" needs to be reconsidered in the social context of 1980s China, which will be explored in this chapter later.

In the Form of the Intellectual-led

The liberal nationalistic discourse in the 1980s was promoted and led by *qimeng* (*enlightenment*) intellectuals. Cooperating with newspapers, *qimeng* intellectuals' ideas and arguments were disseminated to the whole society, and especially had great attractiveness to university students. But *Heshang* was the first time that *qimeng* intellectuals promoted their ideas and nationalistic projects through television to the public.

Indeed, *Heshang* was largely borne out of the reused materials from *Yellow River*, the thirty-part documentary series co-produced with Japan. Initially, Xia Jun, the director of *Heshang*, was not satisfied with *Yellow River* for its historical-geographic-folk narrative; and thus, hoped to reproduce it with the same video materials (Xia, 1988: 84). As an intellectual who just graduated from Beijing Broadcasting Institute majored in China's modern literature, Xia expected to introduce *qimeng* intellectuals' discussions and thinking through television programs. Thus, unlike other documentaries in China at that time, thinking and ideas, rather than visuals or footage, were given priority in *Heshang*. Moreover, he broke the traditional spatial-temporal frame, and constructed the frame by different cultural themes instead (Su, 1988:88). Thus, after completing the proposal, Xia invited Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang (the former was a famous writer and the latter was a professor at Beijing Normal University at that time) to write the script. Finally, the video was edited around this script (Cui, 1988: 126).

Led by intellectuals, one of the distinct characteristics of *Heshang* is the “*Studio Section*” in each episode. 17 Chinese influential intellectuals were invited there to discuss Chinese culture and problems from different aspects, and many famous cultural and social theories at that time were thus introduced to the public through this section (See, Table 4.1). The contents they discussed were various from dragon worship to the Yellow River control, from economic reform to political problems, from the psychological structure of Chinese people to the role of intellectuals in the process of reform. In this process, most famous social theories in the 1980’s China, such as historian Jin Guantao’s “ultra-stability theory”, Feng Tianyu’s “geographical environment determinism” theory, economist Li Yining’s ownership reform theory, scientist Huang Wanli’s Yellow River control theory, Bao Zunxin’s political reform proposal, etc, all were introduced to the audience.

Table 4. 1 Scholars invited to the “Studio Section” in *Heshang* and the key arguments

<i>Scholar</i>	<i>Content</i>	<i>Key arguments</i>	<i>Episode</i>
Cai Dacheng, mythologist	Dragon worship	Dragon symbolizes the hope of reincarnation in ancient people.	1
Xie, Xuanjun, deputy managing editor of <i>Cultural Philosophy</i>	Dragon worship	Dragon is the despot of nature. China’s emperors portray themselves as dragons, illustrating that they are the tyrants of the human world.	1
Zheng Yi, Shanxi Writer	Story related to Yellow River	The peasants of Yellow River do not want to leave their native land, even though the living conditions there are extremely hard.	1
Zhang Wei, Shandong Writer	Story about adoration for earth	Two elders search for root at the side of Yellow River, choking with sobs because of extremely exciting.	2
Feng Tianyu, history scholar at Hubei Uni.	China’s geographic environment	The unique characteristics of the geographical environment shapes China’s inward looking attitude and stability-loving culture.	2
Ye Lang, scholar at Beijing Uni.	culture of the glorious Tang Dynasty	The all-round openness of Tang Dynasty led to the strong national confidence of the Tang Chinese.	3

Liu, Qingfeng, Scholar at CAS	Why scientific revolution did not happen in China?	Advanced technology in ancient China directly served the "grand unification" of the country and centralization of the ruling regime.	3
Li Yi'ning, Scholar at Beijing Uni.	Economic reform	Ownership reform is the precondition for successful economic reform; meanwhile, we should aggressively develop a commodity economy.	4
Wang, Juntao, deputy director of BSERI	Development at Yan'an, the old revolutionary base area	Economic mechanisms can accelerate development of poor regions, and resolve the unbalanced development between regions.	4
Cui Aizhong, Mayor of Kaifeng, Henan Province	Yellow River control	Concerns about the flooding of Yellow River	5
Wang Huayun, former vice minister of MWRPI	Yellow River control	A solution involving damming the upper portions of the Yellow river while draining in the lower protions.	5
Huang, Wanli, scholar at Tsinghua Uni.	Yellow River control	A split stream solution.	5
Zhang, Hanying, former vice minister of MWRPI	Yellow River control	The lower course of the Yellow River should be changed.	5
Chen, Xiande, deputy director of YRWCC	Yellow River control	The Yellow River control should rely on changing the course.	5
Jin Guantao, researcher at CAS	Ultra-stability system	China should prevent disorder resulting from social transitions by incorporating democratic political mechanisms.	5
Bao Zunxin, vice-researcher at CASS	Democratic consciousness and industrial civilization of East Asia	Modernization can only be achieved by breaking with traditional culture and promoting democracy and scientific inquiry.	6
Yuan, Zhiming, PhD student at Renmin Uni.	Intellectuals issue	The hope of China lies in entering the world political forum. Intellectuals should take on the burden of discarding traditional culture and constructing a democratic country.	6

Indeed, the main goal of *Heshang* is to promote *qimeng* intellectuals' liberal ideas to the growing television audience in China. As Jin Guantao considered:

China had 150 million TV sets. We should not neglect this figure. If four people watch one TV set, then we have 600 million audience members. That accounts for half of China's population.

-- in Zhang, 1989: 150

With the hope of enlightening 600 million potential viewers, the scriptwriters tried to make complex cultural theories understandable and attractive. Thus, on the one hand, instead of introducing abstract theories, they selected several representative culture symbols, such as dragon, the Great Wall, Nine-dragon screen, etc, as examples to illustrate their anti-tradition and pro-West arguments. On the other hand, in the process of arguing, scholars used many metaphors and provided many vivid examples and stories to develop their ideas. By these efforts, *Heshang* hoped to enlighten the public struggling for a transformation of political structure into a more democratic one.

Historic Bloc and Relations with the Party-state

To explain how such intellectual-led liberal nationalistic discourse could obtain hegemonic status in the 1980s, a detailed examination of the discursive relations among the Party-state, intellectuals, mass media and the ordinary citizens should be made. Indeed, a distinctive feature of their relations in the 1980s is the formation of a historic bloc between *qimeng* intellectuals and media intellectuals. Their projects, strategies to get support from the public and struggles with the CCP leadership for a democratic political system will be explored in this part.

Historic Bloc: *Qimeng* Intellectuals and Media Intellectuals

With the aim of enlightening the public and pushing China's economic and political reform a step further, *qimeng* intellectuals in the 1980s became "organic intellectuals" in the Gramscian terminology. Articulated via the mass media, *qimeng* intellectuals tried to promote their nationalistic project through the whole

society in the 1980s. The appearance of the documentary *Heshang* meant the historic bloc between liberal intellectuals and media intellectuals had already formed in China. Their calls for radical political and economic reforms opened a brief relaxed environment of speech unseen in the history of the People's Republic of China, which enabled a far-reaching discussion of critical cultural, economical, and even political issues to take place. Indeed, in the heart of many intellectuals and journalists nowadays, the era of the 1980s' China is a golden age for freedom of speech.²⁰

Yet, this does not mean that the content censorship from the Party-state propaganda departments vanished in the 1980s. The relationship between mass media and the Party-state will be explored in the following section. But at least, it is clear that China's mass media in the 1980s dare to challenge Party-state's propaganda disciplines, and even have different opinions with, or criticize directly the Party-state's economic and political policies. Take *Heshang* for example, the director of CCTV Wang Feng and vice director Chen Hanyuan were responsible for the political correctness of *Heshang* directly. When Xia Jun, the director of *Heshang* – only 25 years old, having just graduated from Beijing Broadcasting Institute at that time – reported the proposal of *Heshang* to Chen Hanyuan, Chen just encouraged the young producer to pay special attention to the attractiveness of the documentary, rather than giving him hypercritical comments and political suggestions (Wang, 1988: 96-7 & Su, 1988b: 31). Considering *Heshang* as an art documentary, neither Chen nor Wang intervened in its production process. They just told Xia their own experience of making TV programs in China for his reference – that is, the programs should serve two masters: one is “old revolutionary cadres” (*Lao tongzhi*), the other is “ordinary people” (*Lao baixing*). If one of them is not satisfied, then there will be trouble in political orientations or in programs' attractiveness (Cui, 1988: 133). Finally, when the producers of *Heshang* worried about whether this documentary, contained so many sensitive topics, can be broadcast in CCTV, all the CCTV leaders passed it immediately after randomly reviewing the First and Five Episodes. Though the leaders of CCTV in the whole process were conscious about the potential political risk of the documentary and had

²⁰ Many intellectuals, both liberal and leftists, express this feelings to me in the interview.

the authority to ban it, they still gave good remarks to *Heshang* and approved for its broadcast in the primetime of CCTV (Wang, 1988: 91& Cui, 1988: 135).

Indeed, articulated with intellectuals in mass media, *qimeng* intellectuals led Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 1980s. When *Heshang* was first broadcast at CCTV in June 1988, it got such enthusiastic responses from the public that CCTV had to rebroadcast it in August 1988. During that time, the producers of *Heshang* received thousands of letters, from intellectuals to office workers, from PLA soldiers to laborers and young peasants, from students to veteran cadres (Su, 1989b: 32). Mostly, what they expressed in the letters were only three wishes: heartfelt thanks to the crew of *Heshang*, ask for the script of *Heshang*, and request for its rebroadcast. Especially warm feedback was received from teenagers. For instance, in the summer of 1988, high school students in Wuhan participated in speech contest and summer camp centered on *Heshang*. In autumn that year, millions of Guangzhou teenagers participated in a debate competition on *Heshang*, with the title “Blue Activity” (Su, 1989b: 35-36). After *Heshang*’s second broadcast, mainstream newspapers such as *Pe ople’s Daily*, *Guangming Daily*, *the Literary Newspaper*, *China Youth Daily*, *Wen Wei Po* not only published *Heshang*’s script, but also, they sponsored endless discussion sessions on *Heshang* and published numerous articles and editorials on it. The reports and discussions that appeared on various mainstream media further promoted *Heshang*’s popularity and finally made it a rare spectacle in the thirty years history of Chinese television.

The Projects of Historic Bloc

In the “golden times” of greater speech freedom in the 1980s China, Chinese intellectuals promoted various projects around the topic: how to modernize China. Among the so-called “hundred schools” of intellectuals’ modernization projects, all of them had utopian features. Cooperated with the mass media, the enlightenment project was able to acquire hegemonic status.

Intellectuals’ Hegemonic Projects: Modernization with Utopian Feature

Considering “China’s modernization” as the final aim, each school had its own prescription or blueprint for China’s future. Among them, the most famous projects

promoted by intellectuals were enlightenment, modernized Confucianism, and liberal Marxism.

Firstly, the enlightenment project was promoted by *qimeng* intellectuals. Their ideals of cosmopolitanism and cultural renovation were best exemplified by *Heshang*. Promoting the spirit of scientific rationality (*kexue lixing*), *qimeng* elites had a totally negative attitude to the Confucian cultural traditions, arguing that it is the complicity of the traditional culture with the centralization of politics that prevents China from struggling free of the backward ideology characteristic of the rural mode of production. By contrast, they called for the introduction of Western-style institutions such as market systems and political democracy, believing that only through wholesale westernization can China be modernized.

Indeed, besides TV documentary *Heshang*, *qimeng* ideas were reflected by a great deal of activities in all cultural areas. For example, in the artistic domain, the *qimeng* artists, such as the North Art Group (*Beifang Qunti*)²¹ and the Southwest Art Group (*Xi'nan Yishu Qunti*)²², claimed that art does not reside in technique and style; rather, it is a vehicle of direct expression of humanistic thought such as rationalization, and it is the way to search for Chinese modernity and individual freedom. Moreover, as the first influential avant-garde group in China, the Stars (*xingxing huazhan*) reflected people's need for freedom and democracy as well as their great courage to challenge dictatorship.²³ The 1989 China/Avant-Garde

²¹ The North Art Group was founded in March of 1985 in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province. It promoted a "Civilization of the North", which reflected a desire for strengthen nationalism and creating a new modern society when China opened to the world. As they proclaimed in their manifesto, "Our paintings are not art! Instead, they are only a means to express our way of thinking, constituting a part of our total thinking. ... we believe that to judge whether a collection of art has value or not depends primarily on whether it demonstrates genuine reason or the force of wisdom of mankind, and if it exhibits the noble qualities and sublime aspirations of human beings." From Shu Qun, "*Beifang yishu qunti de jingshen*" [the Spirit of the North Art Group], *Zhongguo meishu bao*, 23 November, 1985, p.1.

²² The Southwest Art Group addressed the value of humanism in the breaking down of collective rationalization that had suppressed individual consciousness and desire. Interested in foreign philosophy, psychology, and literature, the painters took term "current of life" from Henri Bergson to describe the natural disposition of life that embraces violence, irrationality, and intuitive action. For them, action is the highest objective of their art. And art is not an act of materialization, it is, instead a channel of the soul of mankind. Therefore, there is no such thing as art criteria and standard art forms.

²³ Most of the artists in the Stars are self-taught. Usually, they use of formerly banned Western styles, from post-impressionism to abstract expressionism, to emphasize self-expressionism. The group's first exhibition, in September 1979, was a provocative display of about 140 works by twenty-three artists. But it had been disrupted by the police since it hung without official permission. The Stars' first formal exhibition which had been approved by the official was held in Beihai Park,

Exhibition was the most influential and the last liberal exhibition,²⁴ two months before the Tiananmen Incident.

Secondly, when the enlightenment project asked to “look forward” and asked for westernization, the Confucianists insisted on looking “backward” and “inward”. It is, however, not the simplistic revival of Confucianism. Faced with the fierce attack on Chinese culture by the *qimeng* intellectuals, advocates of the Confucianism were more concerned with the capacity of Confucianism to aid the commodity economy and modernization processes. Especially, inspired from Max Weber’s theoretical framework laid out in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, but against his conclusions about Confucianism, the Confucianists were eager to demonstrate that Confucianism can also be creatively transformed into a new ethos and ethics that could serve as the ideological foundation for Chinese modernization. At this juncture, the success of the “Four Little Dragons” – south Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong – was an excellent example for the Confucian intellectuals to illustrate that Confucian tradition did not jeopardize modernization; by contrast, it can facilitate the modernization process.

The third project was proposed by Li Zehou, who made effort to reconstruct liberalism by Marxism with his famous proposition of *Xiti zhongyong* (Western substance, Chinese application). From Marxism “base-superstructure” framework, Li argued that the superstructural stability in ancient China was built on the relative infrastructural stability of the economic system based on the agricultural mode of production. As long as such an economic system remains intact, the corresponding superstructure will recycle itself; Confucian cultural logic that emphasizes ethics at the expense of ontology and epistemology and privileges functional harmony over resistance and agency will be continual reproduced (Wang, 1996: 99). In other words, it is the economic base, the agricultural mode of production in particular, that constitutes the bottleneck of Chinese modernity. Under this logic, what Li prescribed for modernization is first and foremost the transformation of the

Beijing, in November 1979, with thirty-one artists participated and 163 works were displayed. And another formal exhibition was at the Chinese National Art Gallery, Beijing, in August 1980.

²⁴ The China/ Avant-Garde Exhibition took place in the Chinese National Art Gallery in Beijing on February 5-19, during the Spring Festival. It involved 186 artists and included 300 pieces. Although it had gained support from many official units, like All China Aesthetic Association, *Zhongguo Meishu Bao* and, *Dushu*, and from some influential artists of the older generation, the exhibition had been interrupted twice during its already short exhibition period.

“substance”, including the feudal mode of production, and replacing it with western-style commodity economy production. And it is in this point that Li comes to the same conclusion with the “complete westernization” project proposed by *qimeng* intellectuals, though his starting point is from the production of large modern industries, not the ideas of individual democracy and freedom.

Obviously, though the *qimeng* school, Confucianism, and Marxism proposed different plans for China’s modernization, all of their proposals made efforts to answer the core question of how to modernize China, and suggested that the only way is to develop market economy. And the Western Marxism School which would become popular in China’s intellectual circle in the 1990s by its critique of modernization project, had little influence they could exercise on Chinese intellectuals and China’s society in the 1980s.

Besides modernization, the other consensus among intellectuals was considering superstructural transformation as the motivating force for China’s modernization, and thus, their modernization projects in the 1980s had an embedded utopian feature. They believed that to achieve modernization in China, the most important step was to destroy Chinese traditional culture, replacing it with more advanced competitive and democratic thinking. Even Confucianists stressed modernizing Confucian ideas with democratic and scientific elements. In this sense, they *de facto* practiced Mao Zedong’s faith of voluntarism (*wei yizhi lun*), believing that the power of ideas determines and shapes socioeconomic reality. Accordingly, intellectuals stressed their privileged position to “enlighten the public” in the process of China’s modernization.

Mass Media: Echoed with *Qimeng* Intellectuals

Among three influential schools promoted by intellectuals, *qimeng* intellectuals’ “complete westernization” rhetoric won the hegemonic status in the society, especially for youths, since its strong sense of a national crisis and radical sentiments catered to young people’s proactive thinking and indomitable energy. But more significantly, it is the rapid development of mass media in China that contributes to the popularity of *qimeng* ideas.

It seems that all China experienced an almost free atmosphere in the 1980s. This decade has even been called “the golden age for China’s mass media” by Chinese media workers. By 1987 the number of newspapers stood at a total of 2,509 with a combined annual circulation of 25.98 billion copies, compared with fewer than 200 newspapers survived the onslaught of the Cultural Revolution.²⁵ Besides sharply increasing the number and copies of newspaper, one significant development was the emergence of quasi-independent newspapers. In the 1980s, there were about 48 quasi-independent newspapers – such as *Beijing Spring*, *Economic Weekly*, etc., – run by themselves, rather than the Party or government (Goldman, 1994). The most outstanding newspaper among them was the *World Economic Herald* (*Shijie jingji daobao*). Founded in Shanghai on June, 1980, it was sponsored by the Chinese Society of World Economics, and the Shanghai Research Institute of World Economy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Financially, it was supported by advertising and sales revenue; and at an editorial level, it can search for editors and reporters themselves. As a weekly tabloid, its circulation increased year by year, rising from a few thousand to a high of 500,000 in 1984 and then stayed around 300,000 before its demise (Hsiao and Yang, 1990: 115). In the television field, television was the most swiftly developing mass medium in the 1980s. With the rapid growth of television-set ownership, television played a significant and active role in the spread of *qimeng* intellectuals’ modernization projects.

Rightly, many scholars noticed the restriction factors behind the “blossom of mass media” in the 1980s, and described the situation in mass media domain as “freedom in the cage” (e.g. Liu, 2003). In theory, mass media were still the loyal servants of the Party and the state. It was the “mouthpiece” (*houshe*) of the Party, and the tool for political propaganda. However, and interestingly, cooperated with *qimeng* intellectuals, China’s mass media generally had great courage to break through the media control of the Party-state. They challenged the official understanding of “mouthpiece”, considering themselves as the mouthpiece for the people and reform. Instead of propagating the official voices, their reports always emphasized new problems, new thinking and intellectuals’ new points of view. Even CCTV, as the most influential Party mouthpiece, broadcasted *Heshang* two times to promote

²⁵ Data were from 1989 China News Yearbook.

qimeng ideas. With the help of mass media, *qimeng* thought became the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 1980's society.

Discursive Relations between the Historic Bloc and the Party-state

When explaining why China's mass media in the 1980s was so bold in challenging the party's authority in support of the *qimeng* intellectuals' "complete westernization" project, many scholars argued that it is the factional warfare within the CCP leadership that provided a liberal space within mass media. Particularly, the reformers, represented as the Party head Zhao Ziyang and his allies, manipulated the press against the conservatives and build political support for their reform program (Hood, 1994; Goldman, 1994). Undeniably, a factional struggle within the CCP leadership existed, and the media have always been used as a weapon by them in factional warfare. However, as suggested by Gramsci, hegemonic discourse can only be created by articulating major groups' projects in a nation-state, instead of by manipulation through a ruling group. Thus, the fact that Zhao supported *qimeng* intellectuals' project still cannot explain why the *qimeng* ideas became the hegemonic discourse, rather than other projects promoted by other conservative leaders, such as campaigns against "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois liberalization" which will be mentioned later.

In addition, the relationship between the CCP leadership and the *qimeng* intellectuals in the 1980s was very delicate, and even ambiguous, which cannot be reduced simply to support or not. Though some elements in the *qimeng* projects can be accepted by the reformists within the CCP leadership, there were many differences between them.

Similar Elements: Modernization and "Strong Nation Complex"

In the initial years of "reform and opening", Deng Xiaoping set out "three major tasks" for the Party-state's future work in his speech to the Central Committee, namely opposing hegemonism and striving to preserve world peace, returning Taiwan to the motherland for China's reunification, and stepping up economic construction. The three tasks can be summarized as anti-hegemonism, national

unification, and modernization. Among them, modernization had been put on the highest priority and considered as the essential condition for solving both domestic and external problems.²⁶ Obviously, *qimeng* intellectuals also considered modernization as the only means for China to become a strong nation in the present world; and thus, they recognized and supported the Party-state's "reform and opening" program. To the CCP leadership and *qimeng* intellectuals, though the "modernization" means a different thing in the political dimension, it does mean the same thing in the economic dimension: developing a market economy and helping China progress out of poverty and backwardness. Thus, it is understandable that to a great extent, the Party-state also welcomed *qimeng* intellectuals' modernization project. As my interviewee worked at the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) in that period introduced (Interview #4),

At that time, we followed liberal intellectuals' activities. Indeed, most of their activities were radical and even disobeyed our "Four Basic Principles" (*Sixiang jiben yuanze*)²⁷. But we can do nothing except reporting their movements to our superiors. Taking *Heshang* as example, after its broadcasting, we've received a series of critical articles and letters, especially from the old cadres. They really felt worried about the liberal tendency displayed in the documentary. But we were asked not to deal with those articles because any criticism to *Heshang* may have negative influence to the Party's reform agenda. Actually, to some extent, we can say that liberal intellectuals' modernization projects corresponded with our "reform and opening" policy. In addition, some of our cadres even agreed with their "complete westernization" argument and radical political reform agenda.

Indeed, all *qimeng* intellectuals' theoretical orientation discussions have one clear point: asking for cosmopolitan outlook and modernization project. In this sense, it has a strong connection with official "reform and opening" discourse in the 1980s. For example, in *Heshang*, this connection is manifested by pictures of General

²⁶ "Muqian de xingshi he renwu" [The present situation and the tasks before us], in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (1975-82nian)* (*Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-82*), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, pp.203-4.

²⁷ The Four Basic Principles referred that "keep to the socialist road, uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat, uphold the leadership of the Communist Party, and uphold the Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought".

Secretary Zhao Ziyang's speech at the 13th Party Congress in 1987, who called for establishing a "socialist planned commodity economy", and asking for further political reform. Clearly, for this documentary, China's "new epoch" described in Episode Four implies the spirit of 13th Party Congress.

In addition, the hidden agenda of the "strong nation complex" in *qimeng* intellectuals' project is another similar element with the official discourse. As showed previously, though the narrators of *Heshang* preached most eloquently the elimination of nostalgia for China's golden past, their vision for the future is unconsciously embedded in the same rhetoric of imperialistic nationalism. Their "complete westernization" project did not just mean building the nation based on the idea of progress, rationalization and democracy as in the West; but most importantly, it meant achieving a rejuvenation of China in the present world. Similarly, the logic between economic modernization and building a strong nation-state was also clear in the CCP's official documents presented at each Party's Congress in the 1980s. Its argument – that further economic reform needed to be implemented regardless of whatever the costs, otherwise there is no chance for China to be a strong nation-state – clearly shared the same logic with *qimeng* intellectuals' modernization project.

Modernization under the Party Line vs. Democratic China

Though similar elements are present in the projects of *qimeng* intellectuals and the CCP leadership, their political aims were seriously divergent. While the *qimeng* intellectuals argued that democratic political system is the precondition for a successful economic reform and China's revival, the CCP leadership stressed that modernization should be under the Party line.

When examining China's political system in the 1980s, one may find many policy controversies between liberal and conservatives. Scholars tend to consider this phenomenon as the result of tug-of-war between the reformers and the "leftists" in the CCP leadership (Goldman, 1994; Hood, 1994; etc.). Yet, though the factional struggle exists, the CCP central leaders had the same hope of social cohesion and stability under the CCP's leading. Even the advocates of political reform within the CCP leadership argued that modifications in the Party leadership system would be

sufficient for economic development and the re-legitimization of the regime, and would be preferable to alternatives that undermine Party legitimacy or to open up the system to broad participation (Lee, 1994: 68).

For example, in the beginning of the “reform and opening”, Deng Xiaoping asked China’s reform should uphold “Four Basic Principles” (*Sixiang jiben yuanze*).²⁸ Among the four principles, “keeping to the socialist road” was put in the first place. Although the dogmatism and rigid applications of Marxism had been rejected, upholding the Marxist ideology and Mao Zedong Thought was written in the “Four Basic Principles” as the Party’s ideological line. To further balance the relationship between economic reform and socialist ideology, several theoretical innovations had been made by the CCP leadership. In Hu Yaobang’s major report to the 1982 Twelfth Party Congress, he called for integrating the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, and building “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (*You zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi*). What this concept stressed was that reform and openness should never violate the fundamental principles of the socialist movement, including the preeminence of public ownership and the leading role of the planned economy. Then, in the Thirteenth Party Congress held in 1987, Zhao Ziyang, as General Secretary of the Party, stressed the Party line with the formula of taking “economic construction” as the “centre”, the “Four Basic Principles”, and “reform and opening” policy as the “two basic points”, which came to be summed up as the slogan “one centre and two basic points” (*Yi ge zhongxin liangge jiben dian*). In other words, although commodity economy was promoted, the planned economy would remain paramount; although the status of “reform and opening” was unshakable, the orientation of reform should be guided by the “Four Basic Principles”.

To provide positive connotations with this Party line, the “socialist spiritual civilization” (*Shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming*), initially introduced into the Chinese political vocabulary by Marshall Ye Jianying on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the PRC, became the dominant political discourse of Party-state in the 1980s.

²⁸ “*Jianchi sixiang jiben yuanze*”, [Keeping the Four Basic Principles], 30 March, 1979. From *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (1975-82nian)* (*Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-82*), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p.150.

Deng Xiaoping first gave this idea authoritative form in a speech to the Central Party Work Conference in December 1980:

What I call spiritual civilization refers not only to education, science, and culture (although these are essential) but to **communist thought ideals, belief, morality, discipline**, a revolutionary standpoint and principles, comradely relations between people, and so on.²⁹ (Emphasis not in the original)

In the speech at 1982 Twelfth Party Congress, Hu Yaobang reiterated that:

Socialist spiritual civilization not only gives a tremendous impetus to the building of material civilization, but also **guarantees that it will develop according to a correct orientation**. (Emphasis not in the original)

Besides, the official patriotic education in schools and universities had also launched during these years. The “patriotism” was defined as: contributing to the wealth and power of the motherland and the welfare of the people; correctly knowing the glorious tradition of the thought and culture of the Chinese nation; opposing the influence of corrupt bourgeois thought; putting the interests of the country above all else; respecting the policy on nationalities; and, upholding the unity of the nationalities and the unification of the motherland (Hughes, 2006: 51). In general, by patriotic education, the CCP hoped to instill a consciousness of the state, of the nation, and of civics, which may lead the young to establish communist ideals and faith.

Pressuring the Party-state for Political Reform

As a matter of fact, the political implication of economic reform did not escape the minds of CCP top leaders in the beginning stage of the economic reform, especially when they made reflections on the disastrous results of the Cultural Revolution. As Deng argued, “basically, all the errors we had made in the past resulted from the imperfect organizational and work systems. Without sound political systems, a good person may become corrupt. By contrast, with sound political systems, even a

²⁹ “*Guanche tiaozheng fangzhen, baozheng an'ding tuanjie*”, [Carry out the adjustment of the orientation, guarantee stability and unity], From *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (1975-82nian)* (*Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-82*), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p.326.

bad person would have to behave in a required way.”³⁰ At the end of the 1970s, the top leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, Wan Li, and other high-ranking officials, churned out in quick succession speeches about the urgency of political reform, arguing that the goal of the political reform was “to reform and improve, in a practical way, the Party and state systems, and to ensure, on the basis of these systems, the democratization of the political life of the Party and the state, the democratization of economic management, and the democratization of the life of society as a whole.”³¹ Encouraged by the top leaders, China’s mass media began to question the Leninist political system and mobilize public opinion for a democratic politics. However, faced with the Beijing Democracy Wall Movement and Wei Jingsheng’s appealing for democracy as the “Fifth Modernization”, Deng Xiaoping finally worked for the suppression of this movement, and proposed “Four Basic Principles” as the criteria for political discussions.³²

From that time to the mid-1980s, the topic of political reform was almost totally ignored in the official document of the Party-state. Yet, *qimeng* intellectuals had never given up efforts for a democratic political system. On the one hand, based on various kinds of newspapers, particularly the quasi-independent newspapers such as *World Economic Herald*, and various intellectual journals such as *Reader (Dushu)*, *qimeng* intellectuals repeated their “complete Westernization” arguments, and emphasized the importance of political reform to China’s future. Their active activities kindled a “Culture Fever” (*Wenhua re*) among the whole society. Led by the *qimeng* intellectuals, Chinese people, particularly the youths, were in favor of discussing various cultural, philosophical, and political issues. As a result, many

³⁰ “*Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu de gaige*”, [The leadership system reform of the Party and the state], From *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (1975-82nian)* (*Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-82*), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p.293.

³¹ This is Deng Xiaoping’s speech on “The leadership system reform of the Party and the state”, to an enlarged session of the Politburo in 18 August 1980. From *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (1975-82nian)* (*Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-82*), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p.280-302.

³² Beginning in December 1978, in line with the CCP’s policy of “Seeking truth from facts”, China’s democratic activists gathered around Xidan in Beijing, recorded news and ideas, often in the form of big-character posters (*dazibao*). These activists were initially encouraged to criticize the *Gang of Four* (*siren bang*) and previous Hua Guofeng’s failed policies. But the wall was closed in December 1979 when the leadership and the party system were being criticized. Its shutdown coincided with suppression of political dissents.

The “Fifth Modernization” was a signed wall poster placed by Wei Jingsheng on December 5, 1978, on the Democracy Wall in Beijing. In response to the government’s “Four Modernizations” campaign, Wei argued that freedom was the only “modernization” that really mattered, rather than improved living standards.

new and less rigid interpretations to Marxism emerged and were more attractive to young people. On the other hand, many influential *qimeng* intellectuals, such as Jin Guantao, were involved into Zhao Ziyang's reform think tank. Five "brain trusts" acquired unprecedented prestige and influence as the think tanks for the State Council.³³ Since intellectuals were given more access to decision-making, they played the role of "bridge" between CCP leaders and the public. With this capacity, they continuously conveyed popular desires for political reform to the CCP leadership.

Yet, the "Culture Fever" suffered a dramatic setback in 1983 since the bold discussions on political reform and the popularity of alternative views on Marxism worried the CCP leadership, especially the leftist cadres. From 1983 to 1985, the CCP leadership launched a campaign against "spiritual pollution" (*Jingshen wuran*)³⁴ and "bourgeois liberalization" (*Zichan jieji ziyouhua*)³⁵. Indeed, both of these campaigns targeted media intellectuals. The deputy editor-in-Chief of *People's Daily* Wang Ruoshui was targeted in the former campaign, and folk-hero journalist Liu Binyan in the latter.

Under this political situation, *qimeng* intellectuals, aligned with the reformers, counterattacked in the name of science. A series of special policy research meetings were convened from late 1983. By the end of 1984, over 2,000 Party and government officials, including members of the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the

³³ They are: the Rural Policy Research Center; the Science Commission's Research Center for Science and Technology development; the Economic System Reform Institute; the Development Research Center; and the Center for International Studies.

³⁴ In September 1983, Wang Zhen, the member of the Politburo and President of the Central Party School, asked for theoretical workers guarding against and removing spiritual pollution on the ideological front, and warned that "We absolutely cannot become over-cautious to the "leftist" errors we made in the past; and we should not relax or even abandon criticism of, and struggle against, spiritual pollution". See, Wang Zhen, "*Jianchi sixiang jiben yuanze, jianshe jingshen wenming. Sixiang linghui ge bumen yao nuli qingchu jingshen wuran*", [Uphold the "Four Basic Principles, build spiritual civilization. In all areas of the ideological domain we must strive to eliminate spiritual pollution]. *People's Daily*, September 25 and 26, 1983, p1.

Indeed, this tone and vocabularies were almost universal in articles published in *People Daily* during November, December 1983 and January 1984.

³⁵ The "Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign" was launched from 1985 by the CCP leadership. The aim of this campaign is to oppose the "capitalism worship" and "complete Westernization" thought which was prevalent in society. Still, Wang Zhen poured scorn on those who 'advocate national nihilism [sic], debase and negate China, and call for complete westernization'. All these ideas he condemned were summarized as "bourgeois liberalization".

military, attended a series of workshops on the technological revolution in the world.³⁶

The results of this initiative cleared the way for the further economic reform, such as the expansion of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), the opening of 14 coastal cities to foreign investment, etc. Meanwhile, a new round “*Culture Fever*” and political reform requirement from the society reemerged again. In the time, the press was flooded with articles and speeches on the necessity and importance of undertaking political reform (Rosen, 1987: 38). When the popular demand for political reform became so keenly felt, the Party decided to set up a “Central Political Structural Reform Deliberation Group” (*Zhongyang zhengzhi tizhi gaige lingdao xiaozu*) in September 1986. However, among the 50 proposals on political reform they proposed, only 30 reached the Party leaders. And worse, during the meeting of the Politburo, the proposals were cut to 10. When it came to practice, none were put in effect (*ibid.*, 35). In this context, student movement asking for rapid political reform broke out, initially from China Science and Technology University in Anhui, and then quickly spread to the whole nation, from winter 1986 to early 1987.

Unfortunately, instead of pushing the CCP leadership for further political reform, this demonstration finally led to the removal of Hu Yaobang as Party general secretary on January 1987, for his resisting repress the student movement. And the subsequent campaign against bourgeois liberalism succeeded almost in all fields. However, at that time, popular demand for political reform became too strong to ignore. And thus, the conservative atmosphere was soon followed by louder voices for deeper political reform. In the Report to the 13th Party Congress held in October 1987, Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang finally provided a blueprint for China’s political reform. According to Zhao, the major objectives of the political reform included: power delegation to lower levels, reform of government organs, separation of the Party from the government, reform of the personnel system, establishment of a system of consultations and dialogue, development of socialist

³⁶ The workshops are described in Chen Tuguang, “A big event in science in China 1984”, in *Kexuexue yu kexuejishu guanli*, [*The study of sciences and the management of science and technology*], Tianjin: no.12, pp.13-15.

democracy, and strengthening of the socialist legal system.³⁷ Specifically, the report asked for further relaxed control on mass media by highlighting three principles for news work: the press should exercise oversight over the work and conduct of public officials, expressed in the term “supervision by public opinion” (*yulun jiandu*); the press should inform the public of important events (*zhongda shijian rang renmin zhidao*); and it should reflect public debate on important issues (*zhongda wenti rang renmin taolun*). Particularly, to guarantee an independent sphere for the press and guard against arbitrary political interference, the draft of the press law had been completed and was due to come before the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for discussion in June 1989. And the documentary *Heshang* appeared in this atmosphere, when the discourse of political reform dominated China public opinion in 1988.

Obviously, China’s political reform experienced a tug-of-war process, louder in voice with slow pace in action. However, without *qimeng* intellectuals’ push, China’s political reform could not have entered the CCP leadership’s discussion agenda. In this process, we can see that aligned with mass media, *qimeng* intellectuals successfully enlightened the democratic consciousness of the public. Meanwhile, the modernization appealing and patriotic “strong nation complex” behind the *qimeng* project can be accepted by the sympathetic reformers in the Party. As the “bridge” between the CCP leadership and public, *qimeng* project finally became the hegemonic discourse in the 1980s.

Yet, as has been argued in Chapter Two, there was no alternative nationalistic project can be promoted before the 1980s China, except to follow the official Marxism and patriotism. Then, why did *qimeng* intellectuals, aligned with media intellectuals, not only promote liberal nationalistic discourse, but also dare to push the CCP leadership for political reform in the 1980s? And why did the liberal pro-Western nationalistic discourse acquire hegemonic status among the society in the 1980s? To answer these questions, we have to turn to structural analysis, studying how the “planned commodity economy- totalitarian state” social structures shaped the features of nationalistic discourse and the discursive relations among the four agents.

³⁷ Zhao, Z. Y. (1987). “*Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi daolu qianjin*”, [Advancing along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics], in *People's Daily*, October 26, p1.

Social Structure and Nationalistic Discourse in the 1980s

The Changing Social Structure in the 1980s

From Planned Economy to Planned Commodity Economy

In the 1950s after the founding of the PRC, the Party-state implemented socialist transformations of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce by adopting the Soviet style economic development under central control. However, years of operating a centrally planned economy with “*da guofan*” (big rice bowl) distribution system led to many economic problems, such as irrational prices, isolation from foreign competition, a pervasive emphasis on quantity rather than quality of output, etc. A lack of material incentives for worker motivation under the system of job security and free medical care further complicated the inefficiency problem. This kind of planned economy is by nature an administrative economy requiring an all-powerful bureaucracy to execute central planning (You, 1998:4). Accordingly, no matter *renmin gongshe* (the people’s communes system) in China’s rural or *danwei* system (work units) in the city, both of them have a strong political and ideological orientation, and thus, blurred the boundaries between the state and society. In this system, the politicized ties to clientele inherently served as a hotbed of corruption, causing widespread discontent among the whole society by the end of 1970s. Worse, after suffering the Great Leap Forward movement (*Da yuejin*) in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, by the end of 1970s sixty percent of Chinese people had to survive on less than the internationally accepted poverty line of one US dollar per day. Productivity in agriculture and industry was either standing still or in decline.

When Hua Guofeng succeeded Mao Zedong as chairman of the CCP in 1976, China’s economy was at the brink of total collapse. The need for change became desperately urgent. Thus, even though Hua stressed his identification with Mao by “*Two Whatever’s*” (*Liangge ‘fanshi’*)³⁸, he had to pragmatically adjust some of Mao’s

³⁸ Hua was able to assume power because the dying Mao had supposedly handwritten a note that said: “With you in charge, I am at ease” (*Ni banshi wo fangxin*). In January 1977, Hua proclaimed his allegiance to two principles soon to be known as the “*Two Whatever’s*” (*Liangge ‘fanshi’*): whatever

economic and political policies. Under Hua's leadership, the "Four Modernizations" (*sige xiandaihua*) of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology, which had been promoted by Premier Zhou Enlai in the 1950s, had been re-announced as the new policy orientation in the first Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in February 1978. Moreover, he actively promoted foreign investment, with the hope to achieve industrial modernization through the large-scale importation of foreign plants and capital. Since his step forward into foreign investment was too rapid, many old cadres in the Central Party even criticized his policies as the "Foreign Leap Forward" (*Yang maojin*).

Apparently, faced with a series of deep social problems, modernization, as a state-led process of social, political, and economic renewal, became the main hegemonic project of the Party-state to guarantee the reproduction of existing social structures at the end of 1970s. When Deng Xiaoping reemerged in the leadership and replaced Hua, the modernization project had been advanced with extraordinary speed. In the famous Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CCP convened in December 1978, Deng asserted that nowadays the goal of the socialist revolution had already taken away from class struggle toward economic modernization. According to the *Communique*³⁹, agricultural development had been put as the first target of the economic reform. Quickly, successive methods were conducted to promote agricultural development, such as replacing the *renmin gongshe system* of agricultural production with the household responsibility system (*jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi*) consisting of economic incentives to procure agricultural goods; the system of unified procurement was abolished in favor of contract purchases of grain and cotton, diversifying rural economy, etc.

The Twelfth Party Congress held in September 1982 reinforced the overall thrust of the CCP's direction after 1978. In Hu Yaobang's speech entitled "*Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization*", he emphasized the importance of legitimating non-orthodox economic measures. After China's economic reform completed its first initiative of promoting household-based agriculture, a

policies Chairman Mao devised we will resolutely support, and whatever directives Chairman Mao laid down we will forever observe.

³⁹ *Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, People's Daily, Dec 22, 1978.*

much-anticipated large-scale urban industrial reform began in 1984. In the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Congress held in October 1984, the Party-state clearly claimed for the first time that the system of socialist economy is a planned commodity economy based on public ownership.⁴⁰ In this Plenum, the CCP argued that the development of a commodity economy is an inescapable phase for a socialist society, and a necessary precondition to achieve economic modernization. In accordance with this, the factory manager responsibility system was introduced; reward mechanisms were linked to performance; and more autonomy was given to enterprises to decide on investment, research and development, production, marketing, prices, and personnel matters. Moreover, the price reform also began to allow prices of nonstaple foods, agricultural and sideline products, as well as industrial raw materials to float according to market demand.

In the Thirteenth Party Congress in October 1987, the concept of “the primary stage of socialism” (*Shehui zhuyi chujī jieduan*) was introduced as a theoretical innovation. Defining Chinese socialism in the “primary” stage, the CCP leadership argued that some capitalistic measures should be allowed in this intermediate phase. In addition, it argued that the primary contradiction of the present stage is between the growing material and cultural needs of the people on the one hand, and backward production on the other. Thus, to resolve this contradiction we must vigorously expand the commodity economy to achieve the Four Modernizations.⁴¹ Clearly, the aim of this concept was to further legitimate the status of China’s nascent commodity economy. During the era of 1980s, the “reform and opening” policy, especially the economic reform, was initiated and conducted by the CCP leadership.

Ideological Change: “Thought Emancipation” and Demystifying Mao

Both the transformation of the economic system from planned economy to commodity economy and the transformation of the central doctrine from class struggle to modernization were based on an ideological change in the Chinese people from Mao Zedong’s cult of personality to a rational market-based logic. Thus, to

⁴⁰ “*Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jingji tizhi gaige de jueding*”, [the Decision of Central Party on Economic Institutional Reform], *People’s Daily*, p1, October 21, 1984.

⁴¹ “*Yanzhe you zhongguo tese de shehui zhuyi daolu qianjin*” [Marching toward the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics], *People’s Daily*, November 4, 1987, p1.

prepare public opinion for the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, the first order of business was to attack Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers" doctrine. Accordingly, in May 1978, Deng Xiaoping launched the "thought emancipation" campaign (*Sixiang jiefang yundong*) among the whole society. Professor Hu Fuming's famous article "Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth" (*Shijian shi jianyan zhenli de weiyi biao zhun*), published on 11 May 1978 in *Guangming Daily*, is commonly taken as the starting-point for this "thought emancipation" campaign.⁴² Then, the "Great Debate Concerning the Criterion of Truth" (*Zhenli biao zhun da taolun*) took place across the whole country. Finally, the Communiqué of the Third Plenum endorsed Deng's dictum on "practice as the sole criterion of truth".⁴³ Indeed, the "thought emancipation" and the discussion on "the criterion of the truth" were important political milestones in China's history because they cleared way for China's future economic reform. Considering practice as the sole criterion of truth, The CCP leadership tried to break through Mao's cult of personality and helped the Party-state establish its legitimacy on future economic reforms.

Then, the CCP leadership further demystified Mao Zedong in the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1981 by issuing the influential document titled *Resolution on Certain Key Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China*. In this document, it mainly settled questions about Mao's legacy by redefining Mao's role in the nation. Firstly, it transformed Mao's image from a demigod, infallible and omnipotent, to a very human leader, capable of disastrous mistakes. Then, it reevaluated Mao's historical role by "70:30" formula, that Mao's policies were 70 percent good and 30 percent bad. Thirdly, in the *Resolution*, it pointed out clearly that "Mao Zedong Thought" (*Mao Zedong sixiang*) was the intellectual product of the CCP collectively. Mao was only the "chief representative" of the Party. By this effort, it not only demystified Mao, but also made the "Mao Zedong Thought" more manageable and flexible.

⁴² Hu Fuming was in 1977-78 vice-chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Nanjing University. This article submitted to *Guangming Daily* in the autumn of 1977, but could finally be published only eight months later, after it had been considered and approved by a number of authoritative figures at the Central Party School. See the interview with Hu Fuming in *People's Daily*, March 21, 1979, p3, under the title "Shijian zhishu changqing" [The tree of practice is forever green], for a detailed history of the article's gestation.

⁴³ "Jiefang sixiang, shishi qiushi, tuanjie yizhi xiangqiankan", [Emancipating the thought, seeking truth from the fact, and uniting as one in looking toward the future], the Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh People's Congress, *People's Daily*, December 14, 1978, p1.

Later, the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982 clearly identified economic modernization as the very heart of Mao Zedong Thought; and the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987 introduced the concept of “primary stage of socialism”, which further legitimized the capitalistic elements in the process of China’s reform. Clearly, “Mao Zedong Thought” had been used to legitimize China’s “reform and opening” policy step by step.

However, as argued before, the fundamental aim of the “thought emancipation” campaign, the discussion of the “the criterion of truth”, and the *Resolution* of demystifying Mao, is to legitimize the regime and enable the political system to act in service of economic development, rather than questioning the Party’s centralization and legitimacy. When asked about the experience of being a journalist in Beijing in the 1980s, Dai Qing, a female journalist in *Guangming Daily* at that time, said:

The 1980s of China is a golden age for intellectuals and journalists. But such freedom is restricted by the CCP. We can see this clearly from two examples. Firstly, the function of “the criterion of truth” discussion and the “thought emancipation” movement are only de-sacralization Mao, but not de-Maoization. In other words, though Chairman Mao’s saying is not always true, Mao Zedong Thought is the correct ideology. Only one year later, Deng Xiaoping reiterated the “Four Basic Principles”, telling that it is unpatriotic, and even criminal to destroy Mao Zedong Thought. Another example is the process of redressing of the 55,000 “rightist” people labeled in the “anti-Rightist” Movement in 1956-57. In the whole process, there is no clear standard for reparation. The power is in the hand of the Central Organizational Department (COD). Moreover, to illustrate the “anti-Rightist” Movement is a historical necessity, not all the grievances had been redressed. In addition, other wronged cases made before the Movement by the CCP had never been mentioned. (Interview #5)

Indeed, what the CCP leadership done in the dawn of “reform and opening” was not really “seeking truth from the fact”. Instead, it only hoped to make consent among the society for its “reform and opening” policy. Its propaganda on the “Four Basic Principles”, the campaign against “spiritual pollution” in 1983, and the campaign

against “bourgeois liberalism” in early 1987 are consistent with this strategy. These examples show that the Party-state made effort to maintain political stability and its legitimacy during the reform. And the replacement of Hu Yaobang with Zhao Ziyang as General Secretary of the Party later signaled the continuity with said economic reforms, instead of a resurgence of “leftism”.

Social Change and the Liberal Utopian Nationalistic Discourse

The modernization process in the 1980s was the CCP leadership’s conscious hegemonic project crafted with the goal of getting support for reconstruction a set of social structures and practices, as well as to legitimize its continued rule after the “Culture Revolution”. However, the new “Totalitarian state - Planned commodity economy” social structure in the 1980s not only reshaped the relationships among the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the citizens, but also enabled the liberal utopian discourse to become the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 1980s, and finally caused a crisis of hegemony of the Party-state.

Why Did Liberal Utopian Nationalistic Discourse Win Hegemonic Status?

Firstly, the reason that liberal utopian discourse can become hegemonic nationalistic discourse lies in that it reflected and represented the expectations from the public, by asking for a better life conditions and more enlightened and wealthier future. Though the transition of economic system was in an initial stage, with the expansion of market transactions, concepts such as property rights, individual choice and fair competition become familiar, and people began to gradually make new kinds of political demands. Then, the deepened and continuous opening toward the outside world during this decade enabled Chinese people to recognize the huge gap between China and the West in almost each field. Chinese people not only admired Western life style, but also crazed for going abroad, experiencing western-style modernization. Thus, it is not surprised that *qimeng* intellectuals’ “complete Westernization” project can strike a chord among Chinese people.

Secondly, the CCP’s “thought emancipation” campaign and the movement to demystify Mao relaxed ideological constraints. Inspired from the Party-state’s emancipation movement, Chinese intellectuals, with great impetus, made various

proposals for China's modernization. With a painful awareness of the gap between developed western nations and China, Chinese intellectuals eagerly searched for ways to make China strong and rich quickly. With this pressing determination, they tended to simply reduce China's poverty to its traditional culture, and the prosperity of Western countries to their perfect political systems. *Heshang* was the last milestone in the intellectual history of the 1980s representing utopian discourse, asking for western-style modernization with self-criticizing attitude. Moreover, as was argued before, though the political aims of the Party-state and *qimeng* intellectuals were divergent, the economic reform project and the hidden "strong nation complex" behind *qimeng* intellectuals' "complete Westernization" project created an affinity between the reformers within the CCP leadership and the *qimeng* intellectuals, which made the former even to support the dissemination of the latter's arguments.

Thirdly, hegemonic leadership involves developing intellectual, moral and philosophical consent from all major groups in a nation (Bocock, 1986: 37). Thus, to acquire hegemonic status for a discourse or project, organic intellectuals not only should articulate the other social groups' desires and projects, but more importantly, they should cultivate the public's will and enlighten them in achieving consent. Specifically, aligned with mass media, *qimeng* intellectuals in the 1980s spared no effort to promote their "complete Westernization" project in the society. During the 1980s, both official newspapers and quasi-independent newspapers discussed the relationship between political reform and economic reform, and considered democracy as a prerequisite to economic reform. Many intellectuals proposed their proposals for China's political reform in influential newspapers. Innumerable meetings, lectures, and conferences on China's social, political and cultural problems sponsored or organized by newspapers were held and reported. Many young and middle-aged cultural elites translated various western masterworks of the humanities and social sciences, the publishing of which exercised considerable influence on university students and reform-minded elites. In the art field, various avant-garde performances, and self-organized exhibitions were held and flourished. Most of these works searched for individualism, humanism, and nationalism (Gao, 1999). Such "Cultural Fever" got its peak when the popular TV documentary *Heshang* had

been broadcast in 1988, which blanketed praise on western economic and political systems, simultaneously condemning traditional Chinese culture.

All these efforts played a crucial role in instilling democratic ideals into the Chinese people, and expanding the social base for political reform. When the economic reform failed to produce expected results, especially when price reform gave rise to high inflation and shortages in material supplies, popular voices for political reform became louder and louder, since they naturally considered all economical and social problems, such as uncontrolled inflation, political corruption and inequitable distribution, rooted in incomplete political reform.

Why Was the Historic Bloc Able to Push the Party-state into Political Reform?

Without a doubt, in the 1980s, *qimeng* intellectuals and mass media formed as a “historic bloc”, producing a hegemonic liberal nationalistic discourse to transform China’s political and economic structure. With their efforts, political reform was always on in the CCP leadership’s political agenda, though the real process of political reform was very slow and always a tug-of-war. Yet, it is the CCP leadership who provided *qimeng* intellectuals with greater leniency for economic initiatives. And it was within this limited space that intellectuals in turn pushed for further political reform.

Intellectual elites were labeled as the “stinking old nine” (*Chou laojiu*) and sank to the bottom of the social ladder during the Cultural Revolution. However, this situation changed dramatically in the “reform and opening” era, since the modernization and marketization agenda need intellectuals’ contribution. Indeed, the reorganization of production methods corresponded to a reorganization of state intervention and political practice. In the national conference on science held in March 1978, Deng Xiaoping claimed that “science and technology is the first productive force”, and asked for audience members to “Respect knowledge, respect talent” (*Zunzhong zhishi, zhunzhong rencai*).⁴⁴ From that time, intellectuals resumed their positive role in Chinese society. Freed from political concerns, they

⁴⁴ “*Zai quanguo kexue dahui bimushi shang de jianghua*”, [Speech at the Closing Ceremony of the National Conference on Science], March 1978, From *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (1975-82nian)* (*Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975-82*), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p.86.

could put most of their time to academic research.⁴⁵ Gradually, technical expertise began to play key decision-making roles in factories, hospitals, and schools. Moreover, the Party-state sought to create a regularized system of broad consultation and advice, and thus, many influential scientists and social scientists entered various think tanks of the Party-state.

As intellectuals were given more access to decision-making, they became the “bridge” between political leaders and the citizenry. On the one hand, in this capacity they have the opportunity to repeatedly convey their *qimeng* project and popular desires for political reform to the leadership, pushing them to think about political reform. On the other hand, they engaged and organized various social and political activities trying to nurture democratic desire of the public. More importantly, in this process it also involved an emotional dimension. Intellectuals and students’ courage and resolution in pursuing democratic political reform manifested in various national-wide or local demonstrations, always got sympathy and support from the public. Chinese people who did not participate in the demonstration directly served water and food for the students and intellectuals in demonstrations. Accordingly, the appeals for political reform always escalated dramatically after each demonstration. Public opinion further exerted huge pressure to the CCP leadership, who were forced to discuss the political reform issue seriously, rather than ignoring it.

The Crisis of Hegemony

As argued before, the disastrous result of the “Culture Revolution” forced the CCP leadership to adopt a modernization project via the “reform and opening” policy. In this developmental process, the CCP leadership had to mobilize intellectuals and the public by relaxing the political atmosphere and providing limited free speech. Unfortunately, the so-called “authority crisis in modernization” (Pye, 1992:6) appeared in the late 1980s. The cultural and psychological basis for the legitimacy of political power was radically undermined by demands for a rapid economic reform and a democratic political system.

⁴⁵ I *bid.*, p91.

Clearly, the Party-state's reform project could not satisfy the democratic desires of the public. The tension between the Party-state and the liberal intellectuals intensified from the "Democracy Wall Movement" of 1978-1979, to the student demonstrations during 1986-87. Chinese people's grievances for the slow pace of political reform and hope for a western-style modernization were reflected in the documentary *Heshang*. Accordingly, its broadcast in CCTV stirred up the higher level of political dissatisfaction and discursive struggles between the *qimeng* historical bloc and the CCP leadership.

On the Third Plenum of the Thirteenth Party Congress held in September 1988, Wang Zhen, a member of the Politburo and the vice president of China, criticized *Heshang* for its bourgeois liberalism tendency, and asked the Central Party to be very cautious of this social trend. Quickly, in October, the Central Party issued a report of "Several comments on dealing with *Heshang*'s problems", which asked the mass media to publish enough articles to rectify the wrong views in *Heshang* (Jin, 1990: 13). Thus, when Su Xiaokang and other scriptwriters in October 1988 prepared for organizing a series of seminars about "*Heshang* and the future of China's reform: contemporary ideology and political work", in which they planned to replace the Party's traditional ideology education with the new *qimeng* viewpoints presented in *Heshang*, the seminar was quickly stopped by the high level Party leaders (Tian, 1990: 35-36). Additionally, after the success of *Heshang*, Su was invited to write another documentary named "*May Fourth*" to promote their western-style modernization project continually. Yet, again, it was banned by the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) (Hua, 1990: 241).

After several rounds of struggle, as well as triggered by other incidents such as Hu Yaobang's death, and the banning of *World Economic Herald*, the accumulated grievances of the public were powerfully translated into street marches in the spring months of 1989. Despite the government condemning the marches as "turmoil", the demonstration continued to draw support from urbanites as workers, intellectuals, journalists, and the self-employed, even after martial law was imposed in Beijing on May 21. Faced with the intensified situation and no compromise on either side, the regime finally became intolerant, and the demonstrations were suppressed by troops on June 4.

After the Tiananmen Incident, Zhao Ziyang was ousted for his “wrongdoings” in dealing with the student movement. Instead, Jiang Zemin was suddenly appointed as Party General Secretary in June 1989. From that time on, a sweeping “rectification” began, and media organizations became the prime target. The editorial leadership of the *People's Daily* was replaced by conservatives, and virtually a whole tier of middle-level editors were removed. Then, *People's Daily* published a series of articles condemning *Heshang* as the most pernicious “poisonous weed” that was fed to the “innocent minds” of young students who swarmed the Tiananmen Square in the long summer of 1989. Following it, *Guangming Daily*, *Wen Wei Po*, *Beijing Daily*, *China's Culture newspaper*, *China's Education newspaper* and other mainstream newspapers and journals, organized articles to criticize *Heshang* from different perspectives successively. From November 1989, a series of books which collected those critical essays published, such as *Chongping Heshang (Reassessing River Elegy)*, *Heshang Baimiu (the Hundred Errors of River Elegy)*, *Heshang Pipan (Criticizing to River Elegy)*, etc. In June 1990, *Heshang de wuqu: cong Heshang dao Wusi (The Mistake Ideas of River Elegy: From River Elegy to May Fourth)* published by Central Propaganda Department (CPD), represented the official evaluation to *Heshang*. In it, *Heshang's* scriptwriters were criticized since they advanced historical fatalism, geographical determinism, the “fallacious backward ideology” of grand unification, Euro-centrism, total westernization, elite culturalism, the postulate of a non-socialist new epoch, and the theory of the ultra-stability of Chinese feudal society, etc.

Undoubtedly, the Party-state's hegemonic projects in Tiananmen Incident were expressed through a dominance of coercion over consent. It indeed reflected a deeper disjuncture between economic and political structure. Yet, instead of conducting political reform to satisfy the demand of the public, the Party-state's solution was to control the ideological realm strictly after 1989. Finishing the personnel adjustment in mass media, a widespread press campaign to strengthen Party principles was undertaken. Meanwhile, the CCP leadership began to propose “peaceful evolution” (*heping yanbian*) theory, claiming that “the imperialist Western world made a plot to force all socialist countries give up the socialist road, and

transform them into the capitalist road”.⁴⁶ And the collapse of the Soviet Union and the whole Eastern bloc were the vivid examples for their plot. In the 1990 annual May Fourth commemoration, Jiang Zemin made an important speech titled “*Patriotism and the Mission of Our Intellectuals*”, in which he asserted that the students’ movement in the spring of 1989 was unpatriotic, because the ideas inspired the movement were Western, and because what the students demanded would throw the country into chaos. Thus, the students’ demonstrations only contributed to the Western countries’ “peaceful evolution” plot to China.⁴⁷

Mass Media: a Civil Society?

In the process of China’s modernization under the “reform and opening” policy, the trend of de-politicization and decentralization emerged. The transformation of the role of *danwei* and the phasing-out of political campaigns substantially relaxed the political environment in society. This decentralization trend further divided state and society apart, clarifying the boundaries between the state and society. Even with such changes, most of the discussions on “state-society” relations in the 1980s argued that the civil society in China did not develop. By contrast, they attributed the failure of the student movement in June Fourth to the absence of civil society – no independent labor unions, no democratic parties, no autonomous church, etc, (Cheek, 1992). And thus, autonomous organizations composed of city dwellers and workers were not able to build up significant membership or to coordinate actions in support of the student protests in 1989 (Walder, 1989).

The discursive relations between the historic bloc and the Party-state provided us another perspective from which to discuss whether *qimeng* intellectuals’ collaboration with intellectuals in mass media spurred the establishment of China’s civil society in the 1980s. We have showed the appearance of some quasi-independent newspapers, the “golden age” of speech freedom, and the brave activities of mass media to criticize the CCP leadership, and push it for further political reform. Yet, we still cannot get a positive conclusion that mass media has

⁴⁶ “*Disandai lingdao jiti de dangwu zhiji*”, [Urgent tasks for the third generation of leaders], in *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping], Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe, Vol.3, 1993, p.310.

⁴⁷ “*Aiguo zhuyi he woguo zhishi fenzi de shiming*”, [Patriotism and the mission of our intellectuals], *People’s Daily*, May 4, 1990.

evolved as a kind of civil society in the 1980s. This is because as the mouthpiece of the Party-state, the mass media system was ultimately controlled by the Party-state. Indeed, most of *qimeng* discourses were produced and developed within existing media institutions, and almost all influential intellectuals were employed by the think tanks of the Party-state – and many of them were Party members. This means that *qimeng* intellectuals' bold speech and self-proclaimed independence was in fact reliant upon the support of reformist leaders, or at least their toleration. Thus, when *qimeng* intellectuals' speech and activities went tested the Party-state's permissiveness, they were easily suppressed in the Tiananmen Incident. But more importantly, in the so-called "golden age" of speech freedom in the 1980s' China, instead of rational debates among different opinions which may appear in any kind of civil society, no oppositional opinions can be heard in the society. It seems that almost all intellectuals at that time became liberal intellectuals; and any criticism to the liberal projects cannot be tolerated. Indeed, this radical discourse with unquestionable attitude almost cannot become the consensus in a healthy civil society.

However, we cannot deny the active role of *qimeng* intellectuals and mass media in the transformation of social structures. On the one hand, with their efforts, an open atmosphere for critical ideas had been created for the first time in the history of the PRC. *Qimeng* intellectuals indeed enlightened and cultivated the democratic consciousness of the public, as well as pressuring the CCP leadership to accelerate the pace of political reform. On the other hand, though their existence was reliant upon the support of reformist leaders, in their struggle with the CCP conservative leaders, a sense of "self-interest" of media intellectuals also developed to some extent. This was especially manifested in their pursuit for press freedom.

In the initial years of the 1980s, China's press reform stressed technical and operational matters such as writing style, layout, speed in news gathering and reporting, accuracy, diversity in content, etc, because of popular discontent of the old practice of using the press as a mere tool of political propaganda. Yet, in the process of articulating with *qimeng* intellectuals to ask for a western-style democratic political system, mass media workers also made self-reflections on their role in a more democratic system, which further led to a growing sense of

professionalism and independence. When an enlightened “right to know” (*zhiqing quan*) consciousness of the public appeared, they also appealed for the “right to speak” (*huayu quan*) for themselves. Accordingly, from 1985, the discussions on press reform quickly shifted to criticize Leninist press theory, and asked for a democratized structure of the press system and press freedom.

At the end of 1986, provincial newspaper editors in a national forum expressed their desire for greater editorial independence. They argued that Party-state’s management to journalism should refrain from exercising “excessive and rigid management”, and should allow news organizations “a free hand” in covering news (Polumbaum 1990: 41). Furthermore, in March 1989 at the National People’s Congress (NPC), Hu Jiwei, the chief-in-editor of *People’s Daily*, lobbied for legislation providing more freedom for journalists, and giving people proper channels to air their grievances. The appealing reached its height from April to June 1989, when the 439th issue of *The World Economic Herald* was banned by the Shanghai Municipal Communist Party Committee for its supporting students Tiananmen movement mourning the ex-Party chief Hu Yaobang. Quickly, waves of support to the *Herald* came from other media institutions. On May 3, nearly 100 concerned journalists from some 30 state-run influential media institutions in Beijing called the authorities to redress the wrong against the *Herald*. In the next day, for the first time in the CCP’s 40-year rule, hundreds of Beijing journalists took to the streets, chanting their support for the *Herald* as well as demanding press freedom. The waves of journalists’ demonstrations indicated that their consciousness of independent role and self-interest had already grown. And this is the precondition for the development of a civil society which is independent from the state and economic realms.

Concluding Remarks

By the case of popular TV documentary *Heshang*, we can see that the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 1980s was liberal, utopian, led by *qimeng* intellectuals that criticized Chinese traditional culture and promoted western-style modernization. With the “strong nation complex”, it is fundamentally a radical utopian vision.

At the discursive level, this chapter argued that the unique phenomenon of the relationships between the four agents in the 1980s was the formation of “historic bloc” between *qimeng* intellectuals and media intellectuals. It further analyzed how such historic bloc developed hegemonic nationalistic discourse that obtaining consent from the public and toleration from the CCP leadership. On the one hand, we can see that *qimeng* intellectuals’ project not only represented the desires of the ordinary citizens, but, more importantly, aligned with the mass media, *qimeng* intellectuals cultivated and enlightened the democratic consciousness of the public. Their efforts indeed expanded the social base for political reform. When the economic reform failed to produce expected results since 1987, the public naturally considered all economic and social problems were resultant from incomplete political reform. And thus, their voices for political reform became louder and louder. On the other hand, as the members of think tank for the CCP leadership, *qimeng* intellectuals also pressured the CCP leadership for a rapid and complete political reform. In this process, it is the appeal for modernization and the “strong nation complex” behind the *qimeng* project that makes it acceptable or tolerable to the reformist leaders. Generally speaking, though China’s political reform in the 1980s experienced a tug-of-war process, without *qimeng* intellectuals’ effort, China’s political reform could not have entered the CCP leadership’s discussion agenda.

Then, in the social structure level, this chapter argued that this liberal, utopian hegemonic discourse is shaped by the “Totalitarian state - Planned commodity economy” structure of the 1980s. On the one hand, the “complete westernization” discourse reflected and represented the expectations from the public in the process of economic development – asking for a better standard of living and a more enlightened and wealthier future. On the other hand, the Party-state’s “thought emancipation” campaign and the movement of demystifying Mao encouraged Chinese intellectuals to make proposals for China’s modernization. Faced with the huge gap between developed western nations and China’s own underdevelopment, their sense of urgency, fused with a “strong nation complex” rhetoric, promoted *qimeng* intellectuals’ “complete westernization” discourse.

With a message rooted in a “strong nation complex”, the *qimeng* project was accepted by the reformists within the CCP leadership as well as the ordinary citizens. However, it is also this agenda that eclipsed its liberal tendency which stresses the individual’s freedom and liberation from the totalitarian state. Thus, though a sense of “self-interest” for independence and press freedom had already been developed in their pursuit of political reform, liberal intellectuals’ *de facto* reliance upon the reformists within the CCP leadership and the collective nationalistic dream in their liberal discourse not only led to their project lose much of its critical edge, but also caused their liberal project to lose hegemonic leadership to the coercive state, and finally, resulted in its failure in the struggle for media emancipation as a civil society.

Chapter Five The CCP-led Anti-Western Nationalistic Discourse in the 1990s: the Case of Anti-bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade

In Chapter Four, we argued that the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 1980s China was the *qimeng* intellectuals' liberal project, with the appeal for western-style modernization and against the totalitarian state. In the discursive level, we also found that the distinct feature of power relations among the four agents was the formation of a historic bloc between *qimeng* intellectuals and media intellectuals. They not only actively promoted the democratic consciousness among the society through mass media, but also pushed the Party-state for further political reform. Finally, we explained such features of nationalistic discourse and power relations from the structural perspective, arguing that to legitimize the "reform and opening" policy and the socialist commodity economy, the Party-state had to relax its ideological control. Besides, to achieve the official modernization project, the Party-state also had to stimulate enthusiasm from the intellectuals. Both of them further provided space for *qimeng* intellectuals to promote liberal discourse. With their active promotion, when the economic reform failed to produce expected results, popular voices for political reform became dominant.

Then, by dissecting the case of anti-bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the following chapter will explore a paradigm shift of hegemonic nationalistic discourse from intellectual-led liberal, utopian narrative in the 1980s to the CCP-led anti-western rhetoric in the 1990s. Then, by examining the hegemonic projects and discursive relations among the four agents, we may find that the eventual victory of the official patriotic discourse was resulted from changing relations amongst the four agents. Rather than forming the "historic bloc" that promoted liberal discourse and mobilizes the public, both intellectuals and mass media in the 1990s cooperated with the Party-state, legitimizing the Party-state's authority and its "reform and opening" policy. Finally, this chapter will explain how did the changing social structure – "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – Media market" in the 1990s –

shape the discursive relations and in particular, the radical anti-Western nationalistic discourse. Especially, it is argued that the distortion of the media market not only radicalized the already radical anti-Western nationalistic discourse, but also impeded the mass media's evolution as a civil society.

The CCP-led Anti-Western Nationalistic Discourse in the 1990s

On May 7, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air forces dropped five laser-guided bombs on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Three Chinese journalists were killed in this bombing, and twenty people working in the embassy were injured. This incident quickly sparked China's largest anti-West, especially anti-US nationalistic protest of the 1990s. The polarized interpretations of what had taken place during the tragedy showed the event's ongoing ambiguity and complexity. Yet, it is very clear that, by contrast to the intellectual-led utopian pro-Western discourse in the 1980s, hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the case of 1999 anti-bombing turned out to be the CCP-led radical anti-Western sentiments, with pragmatic ideas and the "strong nation complex".

Radical Anti-Western Rhetoric, Pragmatism, and the "Strong Nation Complex"

Radical Anti-Western Sentiment

When the incident broke out, large-scale protests erupted at US and other NATO countries' embassies and consulates throughout China. Almost all of the protests were full of violent, slogans and demonstrations. In Beijing, enraged students burned the US flags, smashed US cars outside the US embassy, hurled rocks, paint bombs, and even Molotov cocktails at the US embassy compound, while yelling "Kill Americans!" By the morning of May 9, demonstrators appeared so threatening that the embassy staffs began to shred official documents. US Ambassador James Sasser was even trapped in the embassy for five days. In Chengdu, protesters set ablaze the residence of US consulate, and beat American journalists because they reported that the bombing was an accident, and, accordingly, argued that the US government should not apologize to China. Afraid of being attacked, many European and American journalists in China even resorted to hanging a sign in Chinese characters: I am Russian.

In universities across China, students rushed the streets once the news of the bombing broke out. One of my interviewees (Interview #6) recalled what had happened in his university at Guizhou on that day:

At that time I was an undergraduate student at Guizhou University. We knew this news in the evening at the dormitory. We were so furious that we began to smash beer bottles and water bottles. Then, the whole dormitory building filled with raging, roaring and the voice of smashing bottles. Quickly, the situation seemed uncontrollable. Later, the school leaders showed up and tried to appease us. But nobody listened to them. Suddenly, some people began to sing the national anthem. Then all of us in the building sang it together, loudly and emotionally. I remembered at that night, we did not sleep at all. Instead, we prepared for the banners and protest posters. Students who had learnt painting or calligraphy became the main force. On the next day, thousands of us waved the national flags, shouted slogans such as “Blood for blood!”, “China cannot be bullied!”, “Boycott American goods!” etc, walking and shouting in the main streets of the city aggressively.

At the same time, the earliest Chinese Internet users utilized the new Internet technology to vent their anti-Western sentiment. They uploaded the newest information about the incident to their homepages and BBSs, yelling for military action, e.g., bombing the Empire State Building. In several days, Chinese hackers attacked more than 300 US and NATO government websites, changing the webpages or crashing their systems completely.⁴⁸

One senior Chinese Internet user recalled his excited feelings during the incident:

As matter as a fact, I felt excited during that [anti-bombing] demonstration. I was moved by others’ angry sentiments, and became more excited. After demonstrating, I quickly uploaded pictures, and described my own experiences and feelings during the demonstration on the *Protest Forum* and my webpage. I almost did not sleep in those days, waiting for new responses to my posts, and

⁴⁸ Jiu Dawang, “wangluo renmin zhanzheng—wangshang kangmei fengchao qinli ji”, [People’s war online], <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=536>. Retrieved Dec 2, 2008.

for new information about the bombing. Of course, during the online protest, I vented my 'complex feelings: not only against America, but also towards our government's timidity in responding to the attack. (Interview #7)

Obviously, the anti-US sentiments among Chinese people in reaction to the Belgrade bombing were genuine and radical. Undeniably, to a great extent, the radical reactions of Chinese people came from their perception that an embassy is a country's territory and a symbol of sovereignty. Yet, it was indeed not the unique case for Chinese people's anti-Western sentiment in the 1990s. A national survey conducted by *China Youth Daily* in 1995 already showed that 87.1 percent of respondents believed the United States was the country "least friendly" to China, while 57.2 percent regarded the United States as the most disliked country.⁴⁹ During the 1990s, a series of events, such as the US' yearly criticizing China's human rights record, annual debating over China's Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status, blocking China's bid for 2000 Olympics, the Cox Report on China's covert operations within the US, as well as the US' support of a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) to protect Taiwan from attack, all helped accelerate anti-Western sentiment among Chinese people.

Conspiracy Theory

This anti-Western sentiment among Chinese people in the 1990s was not only manifested in a series of anti-bombing activities, but also showed in people's radical attitude: instead of concerning with the real and complex reasons for the bombing, they just intuited that the bombing was intentional; and in the process, they dismissed what western media said; instead, they just accepted the Chinese government's version of the incident as truth. For example, in the fallout of the incident, most Chinese people considered western countries' explanations and investigation findings unconvincing. By contrast, the "conspiracy theory" (*yinmou lun*) promoted by the Party-state in the 1990s – believing that the bombing was absolutely an intentional military action by the US as part of its "containing China" strategy because US is afraid of China's stability and strength – was very popular

⁴⁹ "Zhongguo qingnian kan shijie", [The world in the eyes of China youth], *China Youth Daily*, May 30, 1995.

among Chinese people. An undergraduate student at Sichuan University even made a flow chat analysis of US' intention:⁵⁰

The first step of America is bombing China's embassy in Belgrade to stir up outrage of the Chinese people. After that, the US will make up a lame explanation intentionally. Then, the Chinese may become more indignant, and finally, will tend to give huge pressures to Chinese government for a tougher position. Given that situation, Chinese government may get into trouble: if it ignores people's strong nationalistic mood and concentrates on economic construction continually, people will direct their rage onto the government. On the contrary, if the government promises to take military action out of a feeling of national humiliation, then the "China Threat Theory" (*Zhongguo weixie lun*) and "Contain China" strategy will gain support in western countries.

From this logic, most Chinese tended to reduce the reasons of embassy bombing, as well as series Sino-US confrontations during mid-1990s, including the 2001 EP-3E Surveillance Plane Collision near Hainan Island,⁵¹ to Western countries' accelerating the "containing China" (*Ezhi Zhongguo*) strategy. Notably, based on Zhao Dingxin's study (2002), even students who had some exposure to Western media, such as Voice of America (VOA) and BBC at that time, still strongly believed the embassy bombing was premeditated by either the US government or the US military, and considered the bombing as part of US' "containing China" strategy.

A Pragmatic "Strong Nation Complex"

Though Chinese nationalistic discourse had radically transformed from pro-West in the 1980s to anti-West in the 1990s, the "strong nation complex" remains a consistent theme in nationalistic discourse. Analyzing articles in an online Forum

⁵⁰ "Chuanda xuezi dui benci shijian de jingpi fenxi", [Excellent analysis to the bombing by a Sichuan University student], <http://www.fuping.net/home/star/nato/nato03.html#精辟分析>, Retrieved May 12, 2009.

⁵¹ On the morning of April 1, 2001, an American EP-3E Aries II airplane experienced a collision with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet, leading the Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, to eject from his plane before it crashed. After the collision happened, the American and Chinese pilots and crew reported different sequences of events in terms of which airplane caused the accident. While Americans stressed the collision as a military "accident", Chinese official viewed it as deliberately caused by the American EP-3E plane. Furthermore, both sides disputed whether the U.S. was in international waters at the time of the incident and whether it had received permission to land at Hainan Island. Again, from the beginning of the incident, Chinese people believed that it was US's plot to further attack on China's sovereignty to achieve its aim of "containing China".

called *Fuping*, which saved 30 famous analytical posts around the NATO bombing from 9 May to 13 May 1999⁵², we can find that they followed the “conspiracy theory” explanation; and all of the articles called for Chinese people “turning grief into strength” (*hua beitung wei liliang*), and conveyed the desires for reinforcing comprehensive national power and revitalizing the nation, because only in this way can China assure being bullied by western countries will never happen again.

Yet, if compare such “strong nation” discourse in the 1990s and in the 1980s, we may find that instead of simple utopian visions, the “strong nation” discourse in the 1990s is more pragmatic. For example, to achieve the dream of “a prosperous country and a strong army” (*fuguo qiangbing*), university students vowed to study hard to empower China;⁵³ and the soldiers pledged to master advanced modernized military equipment and technologies to protect China.⁵⁴ Besides, Chinese youths also called for reviving national industry by purchasing domestic products as well as boycotting foreign goods. Indeed, various boycott activities took place during the protest, targeted at American conglomerates such as Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), McDonalds, Coco Cola, Nike and so on. In the city of Nanjing, protesters staged a sit-down protest outside a KFC restaurant and plastered posters on its windows saying “Striking the US Economy”. Trade unions in Guangzhou marched around the US consulate promoting a message of developing domestic industries and boycotting US goods. During those days, there were few customers in the KFC and McDonalds in larger Chinese cities. Many of their branches had been vandalized, and some of them were even forced to close.

The CCP-led Anti-Western Discourse

Another distinctive feature of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 1990s is that it was led by the CCP. This CCP-led nationalistic discourse was clearly manifested in the anti-bombing protest, from which we can see how the Party-state manipulated

⁵² <http://www.fuping.net/home/star/nato/>, Retrieved May 12, 2009.

⁵³ “Zai Beijing daxue guangfan sanfa de yifen ‘changyishu’”, [*Initial written proposal distributed widely at Peking University*], <http://www.fuping.net/home/star/nato/nato06.html#倡议书>, Retrieved May 12, 2009.

⁵⁴ “Shi ke ren, shu buke ren”, [*If this can be endured, what else cannot be?*], <http://www.fuping.net/home/star/nato/oldcm.html#3>, Retrieved May 12, 2009.

hegemonic nationalistic discourse successfully, by taking advantage of pervasive anti-Western nationalistic sentiments among Chinese people.

When the incident broke out, CCTV's famous program *News Broadcast (Xinwen Lianbo)* broke this news. Without any preparatory words, it showed the shocking pictures, followed by the Chinese government's solemn statement that asked the US-led NATO take full responsibility for this event, and that the Chinese government reserves right to take further measures against NATO. In addition, the three dead journalists' work and life stories were also emotionally introduced to the audience. In the wake of bombing news, the wide-spread anti-bombing protests erupted. On 9 May, encouraged by the CCP leadership and organized by universities authorities, over one hundred thousand students in Beijing demonstrated at the embassies of NATO countries, which became the largest demonstration in China since the Tiananmen Incident. Enraged students threw bricks, smashing the doors and windows of NATO embassies and consulates. The scene was chaotic, but hundreds of armed police just watched without intervening. After demonstrations, thousands of students were bused back to their campus, where the dinner and hot water were specially provided for them.

Later, in a series of CCP leaders' speeches around the bombing incident, these university students' demonstrations were praised as "fully reflective of the Chinese people's intense fury toward the atrocity committed by NATO, fully reflective of the Chinese people's great patriotism",⁵⁵ and "fully showing the great patriotism and collective force of the Chinese nation".⁵⁶ In addition to public protest activities, a new online protest forum, *bbs.people.com.cn* was also established on the website of the *People's Daily* on May 9. By June 19, there were more than 90,000 posts in a flood of online protests.⁵⁷

However, fearing that the rising anti-US sentiment might spiral out of control, which might then damage economic cooperation with western countries, the CCP

⁵⁵ Hu Jintao's television speech at CCTV 7:00 pm *News Broadcast*, May 10, 1999.

⁵⁶ Jiang Zemin, "Zai huanying woguo zhu nansilafulianmeng gongheguo gongzuorenyuan dahui shang de jianghua", [The speech on the conference of welcoming the return of embassy staffs], *People's Daily*, 14 May 1999.

⁵⁷ "Baiwan wangmin baiwan bing, renminribao wangluoban wangshang kaitong 'BBS kaongyi luntan' zongshu", [Million netizens were like million soldiers] <http://www2.qgl.com.cn/fuwu/dt/hm99/hm9905.html>, Retrieved Jan 2, 2008.

tried to appease the radical anti-US sentiment, and guide it back to the “right track” under the principle of “struggle without faction” (*dou er bu po*)⁵⁸ — struggling with the US but keep social stability and economic development. On the afternoon of May 10, vice President Hu Jintao gave a nation-wide televised speech. In the speech, Hu condemned the bombing as a barbaric attack and a gross violation of Chinese sovereignty, but also reiterated the “reform and opening” policy and promised foreigners’ safety in China. He confirmed the students’ patriotic demonstrations; but meanwhile, indicated that “over-reaction activity” (*guoji xingwei*) must be prevented and social order should be maintained. From that moment, Chinese authorities reinstated the necessity to obtain official permission before demonstration. Meanwhile, reports in Party mouthpieces of students’ demonstrations halted although various kinds of protests continued for more than four days. Later, President Jiang Zemin echoed Hu’s televised speech in a May 11 statement, stating that “economy necessity” demanded that the demonstrations must come to an end. Then, several repeated apologies made by the US government and other NATO leaders were finally published in China’s mass media on May 11.⁵⁹ Particularly, US President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright’s apology had been published again on 12 May, stressing that US government had made a formal

⁵⁸ *Dou er bu po*, is the central government’s principle to deal with Sino-US relationship after the bombing. *Dou*, means struggle with the imperialism US; *Bu po*, means the China-US relationship should not break up.

⁵⁹ Indeed, the US President William Clinton gave China his “regrets and condolences” during a visit to inspect storm damage in Oklahoma by the afternoon of May 8. Moreover, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright tried to contact Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to express her condolences after the day of bombing. When told that Tang was not available, she and three other high American officials made a midnight visit to the Chinese ambassador Li Zhaoxing, told him that the bombing had been a terrible accident and that she was extremely sorry. She also hoped Li would convey her condolences to the families of those who had died or been injured. In addition, President Clinton also sent an official letter to President Jiang Zemin that conveyed his “apologies and sincere condolences for the pain and casualties brought about by the bombing of the Chinese embassy” by the morning of Sunday, May 9, and then conveyed his apologies again via a telephone call to President Jiang. He also made the conciliatory gestures of meeting with Chinese ambassador Li Zhaoxing and signing a condolence book for the victims of the bombing. Besides Clinton’s repeated apologies, the US ambassador James Sasser, the NATO’s Secretary General, Javier Solana, as well as the leaders of the NATO countries such as Germany, Italy, and Canada also gave China their regrets for the loss of life after the bombing. However, such apologies were not initially allowed to be broadcast by Chinese media outlets until May 11. See Madeleine Albright with Bill Woodward, *Madame Secretary: A Memoir*, pp. 417-418; Erik Eckholm, China pauses as remains of victims returns home, *New York Times*, 13 May, 1999; Unintended consequences, *Asia Times*, May 19, 1999; “*Jiu beiyue xiji wo zhunanshiguan, mei deng beiyue guojia lingdaoren biaota*” [American and other NATO countries’ leaders express their attitude to the NATO bombing our embassy in Belgrade], *People’s Daily*, May 11, 1999.

apology to Chinese people.⁶⁰ Subsequently, national-wide anti-bombing demonstrations gradually came to end.

Clearly, in this process, the focal point of the official discourse changed from condemning the bombing sternly to stressing maintaining social stability and economic development. Again, in the official Welcome Meeting for the staff working in the embassy in Belgrade held on 13 May, President Jiang Zemin condemned the “US-led NATO” strike, calling their action as “a gross violation of Chinese sovereignty and a random violation of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations and the norms of international relations”. But more importantly, he asked Chinese people turn grief and patriotic feelings into strength by upholding economic development as the central collective task, unswervingly promoting the reform and opening policy, and maintaining social order, because “only in this way can we become a strong nation in the world that will not be bullied again.”⁶¹

At the same time, the official media outlets tried to lead the nationalistic discourse into the approved track. One of former deputy chief-editors of the *People's Daily* recalled their editorial policy about the NATO's bombing:

For the anti-bombing reports, our goal was leading **rational nationalism**, and stifling the extreme anti-Western nationalistic mood pervasive among the society. When we made the reporting policy, we asked our journalists analyze the hegemonic nature of the US' foreign policy in detail, disclose NATO's new hegemonic strategies, as well as its negative influence on world peace in the 21st century. We thought the more reports like these, the better our people can understand our government's position. And so we can create an environment that favored social stability and economic development. (Interview #8, emphasis added)

⁶⁰ *Jiu zhongguo zhu nanlianmeng dashiguan bei xiji shijian, meiguo lingdaoren xiang zhongguo renmin gongkai daoqian*, [US leaders had apologized to Chinese people publicly to Chinese embassy in Belgrade had been attacked], *People's Daily*, May 12, 1999.

⁶¹ Jiang Zemin, “*Zai huanying woguo zhu nansilafulianmeng gongheguo gongzuorenyuan dahui shang de jianghua*”, [The speech on the conference of welcoming the return of embassy staffs], *People's Daily*, May 14, 1999.

Clearly, the so-called “rational nationalism” in the official discourse mainly means maintaining social stability.⁶² And interestingly, to promote the so-called “rational nationalism”, the *People's Daily* adopted radical-style discourse. For example, during one month after the bombing, *People's Daily* at least published one editorial or commentary per day, condemning US' hegemonism, its “human rights above sovereignty” (*renquan gaoyu zhuquan*) argument, and the dishonesty of western freedom of press. Yet, all of these reports adopted a Manichean, black-or-white view of the image of US–China relations. China's struggle with the NATO was described as justice combating evil. Besides, the “conspiracy theory” – that instead of an isolated event, the bombing was part of long series of Western aggressions against China – was also promoted widely in official discourse. Since western countries were scheming and inciting civil unrest by bombing, as an editorial argued, maintaining social stability and supporting the Central Party's statements is of utmost importance for China. Moreover, articulated with China's hundred-year humiliation discourse, official propaganda promoted the logic of “economic development determinism” – that backwardness leads to attacks, and only the CCP-led economic development can guarantee China status and strength.⁶³ At here, it argued that to prevent such a tragedy from happening again, students should go back to the classroom and study hard to empower China; and Chinese people should “turn grief into strength” and do their work well to reinforce comprehensive national power. Then, beginning on May 13, serious pictures and articles in the *People's Daily* reported that Chinese students, peasants, businessmen, doctors, as well as intellectuals claimed to study hard and do their own jobs with renewed vigor for the prosperity and strength of the motherland.

Furthermore, besides official newspaper and television outlets, the CCP also led the nationalistic discourse via the Internet. On May 9, the day after bombing, an online protest forum, *bbs.people.com.cn*, had been established under the website of the *People's Daily*. By June 19, more than 90 thousand protest posts appeared on the forum, constituting a flood of online protests. During that time, the host of the online protest forum invited more than 50 experts and guests, including senior

⁶² For example, see the editorial “*Zui youli de huiji*”, [The most powerful blow], *People's Daily*, May 14, 1999.

⁶³ For example, the Editorial, “*Jianding buyi de jianchi yi jingjijianshe wei zhongxin, xuexi Jiang Zemin tongzhi zai huanying wo zhunan gongzuo renyuan dahui shang de jianghua zhi er*”, [Taking economic construction as the central task unshakably], *People's Daily*, May 25, 1999.

officials and scholars in the field of foreign relations and international politics, to lead the online discussions. Then, the manager of the forum selected some of online letters and posts, compiled them together as a special edition of *people's voice*, showing that Chinese people support the government's position.⁶⁴

Indeed, almost all Chinese people accepted such official discourse. Guided by the official nationalistic discourse, the main theme of popular nationalistic discourse quickly shifted from condemning NATO's bombing to discussing how to revitalize China. As showed in the *Fuping Forum*, though the popular discourse was more radical, the "conspiracy theory" explanation, "economic development determinism" logic and the importance of stability, all of them had been accepted and stressed among popular nationalistic discourse. Accordingly, on June 19, the "Online Protest Forum" in the website of *People's Daily* changed its name as *Strong Country Forum (Qiangguo luntan)*. Discussing how to make China stronger, it gradually became the main online community of China's Left-wing angry youth (*zuofens*) in the following years.

Unlike the *qimeng* intellectuals' discourse that promoted western-style economic and political system in the 1980s, intellectuals in the 1990s espoused the official "anti-West and pro-CCP" views. Taking the anti-bombing protest for example, from 10 to 16 May, 31 influential intellectuals published articles at, or accepted interviews by the *People's Daily*, to state their attitude on the NATO's bombing. All of articles incorporated some elements from official discourse. For instance, scientists and ballistic engineers confirmed that the bombing was intentional rather than an "accident". Political scientists analyzed US' plot to split China apart and create chaos. The experts on international relations criticized NATO's "human rights above sovereignty" argument and US' hegemonic activities on the international stage. The legal experts and lawyers indicated that NATO's bombing not only violated the international law, but also was a kind of war crime. And famous writers condemned NATO's bombing activity morally. In the course of their analysis, all of articles endorsed the Party-state as an embodiment of justice, and showed their firm support to Jiang Zemin's statement and Hu Jintao's televised

⁶⁴ "Baiwan wangmin baiwan bing, renminribao wangluoban wangshang kaitong 'BBS kaongyi luntan' zongshu", [Million netizens were like million soldiers], <http://www2.qglt.com.cn/fuwu/dt/hm99/hm9905.html>, Retrieved May 12, 2009.

speech. Additionally, as to how to respond to the bombing, all of articles called for the Chinese people to unite together tightly around the CCP leadership, maintain social stability, and concentrate on economic development. Because only in this way can the dream of strong nation be achieved; and, thus, only in this way will China not be humiliated again in future.

At the same time, China's mass media also followed the official discourse and helped the Party-state guide public opinion. It is noticeable that within ten days after bombing, more than ten books on the embassy bombing had already come out.⁶⁵ Besides books, many collections of news pictures were also on the shelf of bookstores nation-wide⁶⁶. Indeed, all of them became best-sellers and sold out quickly. For example, when the "*Unfinished War Dairy*" was published on 18 May, more than 40,000 copies were sold. Similarly, the first 15,000 copies of "*Chinese People Cannot Be Pushed Around*" and the first 27,000 copies of "*China Cannot Be Bullied*" also sold out quickly.⁶⁷ In general, all such books followed the official discourse and the CCP's political orientation. Based on this precondition, all of them echoed popular radical anti-Western rhetoric.

Clearly, from discourse analysis, we can find that both intellectuals and mass media in the 1990s cooperated with the Party-state, helping to promote anti-Western and pro-CCP nationalistic discourse. It is a sharp change from the situation in the 1980s, when media intellectuals and *qimeng* intellectuals formed a bloc to pressure the CCP leadership for further political reform on the one hand, and led the popular discourse directly on the other.

The Party-state's Mixed Stance towards Nationalistic Fervor

⁶⁵ For example, *Zhongguo renmin buke qi—Beiyue xiji wo zhunan shiguan teji baogao*, [*Chinese People Cannot Be Pushed Around*], Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 1999; *Weiwancheng de zhandi riji* [*Unfinished War Dairy*], Guangmingribao chubanshe, 1999; *Zhongguo fennu le—zhongguo zhunan shiguan beizha zhihou*, [*China Was Anger*], Xinhua Chubanshe, 1999; *Zhongguo renmin buke ru*, [*China Cannot Be Bullied*], Renmin ribao chubanshe, 1999; *Qinli shiguan beizha*, [*Experiencing Embassy's Bombing*], 1999, etc.

⁶⁶ For example, "*Shijie renmin bukeqi, Zhongguo renmin bukeru*", [*World People Cannot Be Pushed Around and Chinese People Cannot Be Bullied*], Xinhua Chubanshe; "*Zhongguo bukeru*", [*Chinese People Cannot Be Bullied*], Dangdai Shijie Chubanshe, etc.

⁶⁷ "*Shiyu benshu shengtao beiyue zuixing*", [*More than ten books protest the NATO's crime*], <http://www.gmw.cn/01ds/1999-05/19/GB/250^DS131.htm>, Retrieved May 12, 2009.

Though the hegemonic nationalistic discourse was led by the Party-state in the 1990s, from the previous analysis we can find clearly that the Party-state's own attitude to the intensive anti-Western nationalistic discourse was wavering. When the bombing happened, the Party-state organized students' demonstrations quickly. Meanwhile, the *People's Daily* published a series of very harsh articles with angry and abusive words which suggested deep anti-US sentiments; the CCTV reported students' demonstrations and the stories of three killed journalists in detail, claiming that the NATO had purposely "spilled Chinese blood".

However, four days later, though the Party-state still displayed a stern anti-West attitude in the field of foreign diplomacy,⁶⁸ the official discourse, such as Hu Jintao's television speech, and editorials in *People's Daily*, transitioned from condemning the NATO's barbaric bombing to stressing the continuity of China's "reform and opening" policy, and trying to avoid reinforcing public anti-Western nationalistic sentiment. As argued in one of the important editorials in the *People's Daily*, Chinese history since 1840 has taught us only the strong nation can avoid being humiliated by foreigners. Thus, we must transform our anger into strength. And what was important in the immediate present, therefore, was to follow the Party center with Jiang Zemin at its core, resolutely uphold social stability and the great

⁶⁸ For example, on May 11, Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao announced the stern decisions Chinese government made: to postpone high-level military contacts between the armed forces of China and the US; postpone PRC consultations with the US in the fields of proliferation prevention, arms control and international security; and suspend dialogue with the US on human rights. Then, when the NATO indicated that the bombing was an accident because an out-of-date map was used during the target selection process, Chinese government never accepted such conclusion, arguing that it was irresponsible to make a hasty conclusion before doing a complete investigation. Moreover, the Chinese government urged the UN pass a President Statement on May 15, which asked NATO make a complete investigation and publish their report for the bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade. However, when US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering lead the delegation to China to present the investigation report in June, reinforcing the message that the bombing was a mistake, again, Chinese government did not accept the report, and asked the US give the convincing explanation to China.

See, "Zhongguo zhu mei dashi jieshou mei dianshitai caifang, duncu beiyue jiu xiji wo shiguan zuochu jiaodai", [Chinese ambassador to the US accept CNN's interview], *People's Daily*, May 12, 1999; "Meiguo bixu jinkuai zuochu jiaodai", [America has to investigate completely and rapidly], *People's Daily*, May 19, 1999; "Wo changzhu Lianheguo daibiao xiang An'nan zhuanjiao zhengfu shengming", [Chinese ambassador in UN passed the government statement to the President], *People's Daily*, May 12, 1999; "Jiu beiyue xiji zhongguo zhu nan shiguan anlihui tongguo zhuxi shengming", [the UN passed the President Statement for the NATO bombing Chinese embassy in Belgrade], *People's Daily*, May 16, 1999; "Mei zongtong teshi laihua baogao meizhengfu dui xiji zhongguo zhu nan shiguan diaocha jie, Zhongguo zhengfu zhichu meifang qijin suozuo de jieshi nanyi lingren xinfu, bingqie qiandiao meifang bixu zuochu ling zhongguorenmin manyi de jiaodai", [The US President's special representative came to China to report the investigation], *People's Daily*, June 18, 1999.

unity of the nationalities, resolutely take economic construction as the center, and comprehensively strengthen national defense and the armed forces.⁶⁹

Another noticeable issue was that the CCP leadership held the highest level official memorial meeting for the three dead journalists. Indeed, it was the first time in the PRC's history that the national flag at Tiananmen Square was lowered for the common people. At that memorial meeting, President Jiang titled the three killed journalists as "revolutionary martyrs", and believed that they "died for peace, justice and the motherland", and thus they will "stay in our memory forever".⁷⁰ However, on the other hand, on the Welcome Meeting for the staff worked on the embassy in Belgrade held by the Central Party and Chinese government on the next day, President Jiang reiterated that Chinese people should turn grief and patriotic feelings into strength, uphold the economic development as central task, unswervingly promote opening and reform policy, and maintain social order. Only in this way can we complete the reform and development tasks, and then become a strong nation in the world which cannot be bullied again.⁷¹

Hegemonic Projects and Discursive Relations with the Party-state

Briefly, the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 1990s, exemplified by the case of the NATO bombing, was anti-West and pro-CCP, with conspiracy theories, the logic of "economic developmental determinism", and an emphasis on the importance of stability. When exploring the reasons why this discursive milieu become dominant, many reduced it to the Chinese people's "reactive" responses to intensive Sino-US relations. Yet, though it can explain the anti-Western sentiment among Chinese people, it cannot explain why the radical black-or-white, justice-and-evil style of discourse acquired hegemonic status, or why the pro-CCP discourse was also pervasive among intellectuals, mass media and the ordinary citizens in the 1990s.

⁶⁹ "Ningju zai Aiguo zhuyi qizhixia", [Coming together under the great banner of patriotism], *People's Daily*, May 27, 1999.

⁷⁰ "Jianbi chi qianguan huhuan zhengyi, yingyun ying zuguofengfan yongsal. Shao Yunhuan, Xu Xinghu, Zhu Ying daonian yishi longzhong juxing, Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing, Li Lanqing deng jingxian huaquan, Ding Guangen deng canjia daonian yishi", [A solemn memorial meeting for Shao Yunhuan, Xu Xinghu and Zhu Ying had been held by the central CCP and government], *People's Daily*, May 13, 1999.

⁷¹ Jiang Zemin, "Zai huanying woguo zhu nansilafullanmeng gongheguo gongzuorenyuan dahui shang de jianghua", [The speech on the conference of welcoming the return of embassy staffs], *People's Daily*, May 14, 1999.

To explore these questions, we should examine the concrete projects adopted by the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals and ordinary citizens, and their discursive relations and hegemonic struggles for the leading role of nationalistic discourse.

Official Patriotism

As argued in previous chapter, the Tiananmen Incident had a far-reaching influence on China. For the CCP leadership, the crisis of hegemony in the Tiananmen Incident also meant contention of its legitimacy, since afterwards social stability was maintained by coercive force instead of consent. Thus, in the post-Tiananmen era, the first thing the CCP leadership did was to uproot the “complete westernization” trend and rebuild consensus among the society. Patriotism became the most important project promoted by the CCP leadership in the 1990s.

The Meanings and Logic of Official Patriotism

In the era of the 1980s China, spiritual civilization and the communist faith was the key concept in Party-state’s political propaganda. Patriotism was also promoted by the Party-state in the 1980s, but was within the circles of young intellectuals. And its meaning in practice stressed more on calling for working class intellectuals making contributions to the wealth and power of the motherland and the welfare of the people. Nevertheless, after the Tiananmen Incident, patriotism became the main tool for the Party-state to rebuild a fragile consensus and maintain its legitimacy. As one editor who worked at the mouthpiece journal *Qiushi* (*Seeking the Truth*) argued:

This is because the CCP leadership found that patriotic feelings remained one of the few bedrock of political beliefs shared by most Chinese in the post-Tiananmen era. For example, the CCP leadership defined the students’ movement in the spring 1989 as unpatriotic. But this was because students’ demonstrations and political demands engendered the CCP’s legitimacy and social stability, not because they were really unpatriotic. Indeed, we cannot deny that it is the patriotic feelings that drove students to march in the streets. Thus, patriotism had a good base as a new, cohesive ideology. (Interview #9)

Thus, soon after the Tiananmen Incident, Jiang Zemin launched the new patriotic campaign in a speech entitled “*Carry on and Develop the Tradition of Patriotism in New Historical Circumstances*” (1990). According to Jiang, patriotism mainly means a devotion to building and safeguarding the course of *socialist* modernization and the motherland’s unification.⁷² When he was appointed to the General Secretary in 1992 the Fourteenth Congress, he further accelerated promoting patriotic education with the nation-wide scope. In this process, the patriotic education movement reached the climax in September 1994, when the CCP Central Committee published the document, “*The Outline of the Implementation of the Education of Patriotism*”, in which the basic principles, the main content, the main focus, as well as the ways to promote patriotic education, all were explained systematically.⁷³

According to the *Outline*, the term “patriotism” was the combination of various existing elements. First and the most important, patriotism was put into a specific historical context. Accordingly, in the “reform and opening” era, it means loving “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, and supporting the “reform and opening policy”. Thus, patriotic Chinese people should concentrate their patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Clearly, here, it articulated *Aiguo*, which in Chinese literally means “loving the nation/country”, with “loving the state” led by the CCP directly.

Secondly, the glorious history of China and Chinese cultural achievements held a prominent place in *Outline*, such as to know Chinese traditional culture, the great contributions Chinese people made to the world, the great events and famous patriots, etc. Among them, particular emphasis was placed upon the “Century of national humiliation”, and CCP’s efforts to lead Chinese people struggling against foreign aggressions, moving China from darkness to light. From the “century of national humiliation” discourse, the CCP was portrayed as the embodiment of the Chinese national will, and made valiant efforts to save China from its degrading period of semi-colonization. The conclusion to be drawn was thus that, only the CCP can

⁷² Jiang Zemin, “*Zai xinde lishi shiqi jianchi yu fazhan aiguo zhuyi chuantong*”, [*Carry on and Develop the Tradition of Patriotism in New Historical Circumstances*], *People’s Daily*, Oct 1, 1990.

⁷³ “*Aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao*”, [*The Outline of the Implementation of the Education of Patriotism*], See, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/16/content_2705546.htm, Retrieved Jan 2, 2008.

lead the Chinese people to national independence. Moreover, it is a calculated attempt to create the myth that there cannot be a strong state without a strong CCP. If the Party is weakened or overthrown, China will plunge into internal chaos (*neiluan*) and fall prey again to foreign incursions (*waihuan*).

Thirdly, it asks Chinese people to be conscious of the national condition. By this it means knowing current economic conditions, economic resources and population, the gap between China and western countries, etc. But special emphasis was given to China's great achievements since the "reform and opening" era, such as the "Three Steps" (*sanbuzou*) strategy⁷⁴, China's rising position in the world, etc. Here, the "strong nation" element was incorporated into the official patriotism, by promising increasing China's "comprehensive national power" (*zonghe guoli*)⁷⁵. According to the official patriotic discourse, China's history in last 100 years have shown that economic backwardness puts China in a vulnerable position, susceptible to constraint and manipulation by other powers. Thus, China has no alternative but to focus on increasing its "comprehensive national power", which refers to the totality of a country's economic, military and political power in a given period, even though economic growth is the top priority in the discourse of official patriotism. And accordingly, to achieve this goal, Chinese people should support "reform and opening" policy.

Fourthly, besides economic development, a strong state was another precondition to make China as a strong nation in modern times. According to the logic of patriotism, the break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Czechoslovakia, and the civil war in Yugoslavia are all vivid examples demonstrating that the weakening of state power could only lead to the collapse of the nation-state. In addition, major anti-China and anti-communist forces in the US and other Western countries will not give up their efforts to westernize and fragment China and eventually contain China, since they do not like to see a strong China with a rapidly growing economy (Jiang, 1995). A series of confrontations between

⁷⁴ The "Three Steps" strategy was proposed at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987. It subdivided the primary stage of socialism into three steps: the first step would be the doubling of the 1980 GNP; the second is redoubling of the economy by 2000, and the third, to be accomplished by the middle of the 21st century, would see the per capita GNP equivalent to that of moderately developed countries.

⁷⁵ In the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992, the strategy of "comprehensive national power" was proposed for the first time.

China and US from mid-1990s became the evidence of US' conspiracy to "make trouble" for China and "split China" apart. Here, the anti-Western discourse and conspiracy theories were promoted in the patriotism. Thus, if Chinese people do not hope China will fall into chaos like those countries, they should support the CCP's domination, taking reform step by step, especially in the political dimension. Accordingly, what the Chinese people should do is to use "political means" to resist political pressure from foreign anti-China forces – realizing that only the CCP could lead a strong state to resist political pressure from the outside world.

The "Strong Nation Discourse" in the Official Patriotism

It is clear that the "communism" idea vanished completely in the official patriotism. Instead, the CCP-led "strong nation" discourse replaced it. Since the official patriotism echoed the "strong nation complex" in the heart of Chinese intellectuals and the ordinary citizens, it is much more easily accepted by the whole society.

In detail, the official patriotic discourse argued that there are two preconditions to China as a strong nation – centralization in politics and liberalization in economics. On the one hand, it articulated the Chinese people's "strong nation complex" with its "strong state" and "conspiracy theory" discourse, by arguing that the imperialist Western world made a plot to split China, and only a strong state can guarantee our nation will not be humiliated by western countries in the future. Clearly, the official patriotic discourse of the 1990s is sharply contrasted with the official discourse in the 1980s, in which the Party-state accepted *qimeng* intellectuals' vision of western-style modernization. Stressing the importance of political centralization, democratic political reform in the 1990s was totally neglected in the Party-state's agenda.

Though anti-West in political realm, on the other hand, it has a liberal attitude in economic realm. Particularly, the official patriotic discourse distinguished rational patriotism with extreme nationalism, and argued that only absorbing the knowledge of all of the civilizations in the world, including developed capitalist countries, can China become a strong nation and make further great contributions to world peace. Putting it differently, it argued that to make China as strong as possible, Chinese people should absorb the advanced fruits of the western capitalist civilization.

In short, via “strong nation” discourse, the official patriotism resolved the apparent contradiction between political centralization and economical liberalization, anti-Westernism in politics and pro-western civilizations in economic realm, and conflated loving China with loving the Party-state. Finally, it displayed a beautiful dream of China’s future: under the “great banner” of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, a wealthy, strong, democratic and civilized socialist modernized China must come to pass.⁷⁶ It is clear that utilized the “strong nation dream” of Chinese people, the final aim of official patriotic education was to legitimate the Party-state’s ruling status and policies, and rebuild social consensus after the Tiananmen Incident.

Establishment Intellectuals and Their Relations with the Party-state

Two major changes occurred among Chinese intellectuals after the Tiananmen Incident. Firstly, as showed before, *qimeng* intellectuals’ project, which regarded complete westernization as the only means for China to modernize itself, and ascribed China’s backwardness to its tradition, came increasingly challenged by CCP propaganda. In fact, facing the legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen Incident, the CCP leadership paid significant attention to controlling intellectuals’ discourses and activities. The Party-state was particularly wary of potential links between intellectuals and protesting workers (Goldman, M, 1999; from Zhao, 2004: 65). As a result, instead of becoming “organic intellectuals”, almost all Chinese intellectuals became “establishment intellectuals” (*tizhinei zhishifenzi*) in the 1990s, whose primary task was to shape, explain and promote the Party-state’s policies. Accordingly, the “historic bloc” – intellectuals cooperating with mass media to promote their projects towards the ordinary citizens while pushing social change – also disappeared. Instead, Chinese intellectuals in the 1990s gradually became realistically collaborative with the Party-state, or returned to the ivory tower and concentrated on the specialized apolitical scholastic research.

Secondly, in the initial years after Tiananmen Incident, Chinese intellectuals entered a period of hibernation (Xu, 2004: 194). Yet, from mid-1990s, a wide variety of perspectives arose within the intellectual community, from New Conservatism to the

⁷⁶ Jiang Zemin (1999) “*Jiang Zemin zai qingzhu Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli wushi zhounian dahui shang de jianghua*”, [National Day Address], *People’s Daily*, Oct 1, 1999.

New Confucianism, from the New Left to the Liberals. Their pluralistic projects around nationalism mainly can be seen from famous academic journal of *Strategy and Management* (*Zhanlue yu guanli*).

The New Conservatism

The forerunner of this school of thought was the neo-authoritarianism that had gained popularity in late 1980s. Unlike *qimeng* intellectuals who argued for immediate democratization, advocates of neo-authoritarianism such as Wu Jiexiang, Xiao Gongqin, Wang Huning, Zhang Bingjiu, etc, argued that the pluralist democracy could only be a result of China's reform, rather than its precondition; China had to go through a period of economic modernization under an authoritarian state before democracy would be possible. Though neo-authoritarianism had been proscribed after Tiananmen Incident, its central themes had been revived and reemerged in the 1990s, especially after the collapse of the USSR, and the increased decentralization resulting from Deng's economic reform.

For example, Wang Shaoguang, a Cornell University-trained political scientist published a series of articles discussing the dangers of decentralization during economic reform. For him, though over-centralization may lead to inefficiency, over-decentralization may also lead to break-up of the state (Wang, 1995: 37). Indeed, China's state capacity, symbolized by the ability to amass revenue, had been seriously weakened as a result of Deng Xiaoping's economic decentralization (Wang, 1997: 3). As the central government's "extractive capacity" fell, other aspects of state power would inevitably fall. If this situation continues, the break-up of China as a nation-state is not impossible. Another theme emerged was the need for "ideological regeneration". For example, Kang Xiaoguang, a member of the "National Condition Study Group" at CASS, warned that in a country of over a billion people, allowing everyone to follow their own feelings would lead to the collapse of the state. Thus, it was important to promote the regeneration of a common ideology that would allow China to "stand up in the world of nations" and cure a certain decadence of the spirit. (Kang, 1994: 10-12) Examining neo-authoritarianism in East Asia, Xiao Gongqin, the professor in Shanghai Normal University, further explored ways of combining political control and economic marketization (Xiao, 1994b:34). According to him, *nationalism* could play the

function of political integration and cohesion in the post-Cold War era. In addition, considering the Four Little Dragons as the model for development, he claimed that Confucianism may be regarded as the core of Chinese nationalism, since Confucian values, such as collectivism, the family, hard work, frugality and a hierarchical, patriarchal power structure, etc, not only can underpin prosperity, but also can be a pillar for galvanizing the social spirit in a market economy society (ibid, 16).

A more assertive version of this social theory was expressed by He Xin, a grassroots intellectual who then became a researcher at CASS in the 1990s. He identified himself with the regime and shared many of the basic views of new conservatism. His central focus point was on China's position in the world, and promoted anti-Americanism nationalism. For him, American demands for human rights and democracy were merely a part of its strategy to weaken and divide China. Thus, he expressed his dismay at the decline of ideology, national spirit, values, and social order in the 1980s, especially the "complete westernization" argument presented in *Heshang*. By contrast, he argued that since the Western thought could not solve China's problems, we should return to Chinese values and emphasize nationalism and the restoration of political authority.

The New Confucianism

While the New Conservatism movement focused on the danger of decentralization in the reform era, the New Confucianism suggested a revival of Confucianism to cope with the perceived problems of ideological fragmentation and moral decay. The 1993 publication of the three-volume historical novel *Zeng Guofan* was an important event in the dissemination of Confucianism nationalistic discourse.⁷⁷ Contrary to portraying Zeng as a "traitor" and "cold-blooded killer", Zeng had been rewritten in the novel as an almost perfect Confucian intellectual with great personality and charm. This Confucian spirit, according to the writer Tang Haoming, was the most important value in Chinese traditional culture. By contrast, the *Taiiping* leader Hong Xiuquan, who was always a positive figure in the CCP's official history, was depicted as a negative character in the novel. This transformation not only showed

⁷⁷ The novel *Zeng Guofan* got skyrocketing attentions since its publication. Between 1993 and 1996, it was reprinted nineteen times and sold more than a million copies. See, Guo, Y. J. and He, B. G. (1999). Reimagining the Chinese nation: the Zeng Guofan Phenomenon. *Modern China*, 25 (2): 142-70.

a bold historical paradigm shift from radical revolution to evolution, but also recast Confucianism as a progressive force (Tang, 1994: 56 & Shi, 1994: 58).

After publication of *Zeng Guofan*, Neo-Confucianism became a popular social thought in the 1990s. Like the Confucians in the 1980s, the New Confucians asked for a “Confucian renaissance” by modernizing the traditional Confucianism. For example, they called for a pragmatic nationalism based on Confucianism instead of Confucian fundamentalism (Xiao, 1996a:59), arguing for giving up some traditional values which are not suited to a market economy (Pi, 1996: 56). As a result, the New Confucianism absorbed modern western ideas into their own system (Qiao, 1994: 114). But more importantly, the New Confucians stressed ideological aspects of their politics – considering Confucian value as a new source of spiritual guidance in an era of economic modernization and ideological transformation. They mobilized traditional cultural resources for national integration and social stability when facing the legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen Incident (Xiao, 1994), and recommended Confucianism as a new source of cultural unity for China in light of Marxism’s diminished appeal (Xiao, 1996). Moreover, echoing the official anti-bourgeois liberalism movement, the New Confucians reiterated that only through a resurgence of Confucianism can Chinese modernity be rescued from the Western model of modernity and the influence of bourgeois liberalism.

The New Left

The term “New Left” encompasses a range of views and advocates. Basically, the New Leftists argued that westernization-oriented reforms would lead to both economic and political chaos, as shown by dramatic events in Eastern Europe. Accordingly, they criticized various reform theories that they believed were influenced by the Western assumptions about economic reform. Instead, they emphasized the importance of a centralized state in guiding China’s development, because the Party’s loss of control, in the ultimate analysis, will spell the end of socialism (Zheng, 1999; Misra, 2001: 144). Along this line, some of them were even nostalgic for Mao era themes of social justice, equality, romantic revolutionary ideals and a popular deep faith in Communism. Yet, different from the Old Leftists who suggested an abandonment of reform, the New Leftists’ concern was to ensure

that there is a balance between equity and growth, distribution and development, and collective interests and private benefit during the economic reform.

One famous argument of the New Left was a critique of the liberalists' comparative advantage theory.⁷⁸ For the New Leftists, the adoption of the comparative advantage strategy means integration of China's economy into the international economy. This, it was argued, is dangerous because it will allow other countries to determine China's fate (Shi/Wang, 1995:11); and also, it means following international rules and norms established by the developed West, which will not necessarily be in China's national interests (He, 1993). Instead, the proponents of the New Left hoped to provide a Chinese theory of economic reform (Zheng, 1999).

Besides, the New Leftists' pride over Chinese traditional values, especially Confucianism, was sparked by Samuel Huntington's 1993 article in *Foreign Affairs*, "The Clash of Civilization?", as well as Francis Fukayama's book "*The End of History*." While Huntington argued that Confucianism is becoming one of the major threats to Western Christian civilization, Fukayama further claimed that the post-Cold War world would be unified ideologically under Western neoclassical liberalism. For the New Leftists, Huntington's article reflected a strong tendency toward Western cultural centrism. Wang Xiaodong was one of those who expressed resentment. Any clash between nations, he argued, would be based not on civilization but on economic interest; and Huntington's article was an American defense of the status quo and a declaration that the West would not let China into the developed world (Shi/Wang, 1993). Thus, he called the Western culture worship in the 1980s as "self-abandonedness" or "self-abasement" (Shi/Wang, 1996). Instead, the New Leftists argued that the Confucian civilization is superior to the Western one, and accordingly, defending Confucian civilization is their mission.

The more radical expression of the New Left was from the 1994 bestseller *Looking at China through a Third Eye*, by Wang Shan, a deputy director of the Beijing Opera

⁷⁸ The comparative advantage theory was proposed by Lin Yifu, a Chicago University-trained economist. According to Lin and his collaborators (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1994a, 1994b), the success of the economic reform in Deng's era was due to the implementation of the strategy of comparative advantages. Domestically, economic decentralization led to a far greater autonomy for local government officials and individuals to promote local development. Internationally, the open-door policy made it possible for China to make use of its advantage to compete with other countries in the international market system. Thus, if China wants to deepen its economic reform, the strategy of comparative advantage needs to be implemented further.

Academy. In the book, Wang was openly critical of the Dengist and Jiangist reform, arguing that the reform period eroded faith in Marxism-Leninism, undermined the power and authority of the Party and state, and unleashed a host of social problems – including corruption, crime, social polarization, and moral decay – that the government, given its weakened authority, was increasingly unable to deal with. His diagnosis of China’s social ills and his hope that the CCP could provide stability in a period of transition was coined the “Third Eye” – combining Social Darwinism and Marxism with nationalism as the new ideology. By this, not only social stability can be maintained, but also a new ideological guide would be provided for China to compete with western countries.

Reemergence of Liberalism

An important event in China’s intellectual circles in the late 1990s was the reemergence of liberalism. The 1995 publication of the *Diaries of Gu Zhun* and the surrounding frenzy of interest in him, marked the reemergence of liberalism in China. This fascination was further fuelled in 1997 by the extraordinary, and unexpected, impact of the publication by Chinese translators of F. A. von Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom* and *The Constitution of Liberty*. In early 1998, Li Shenzhi, a senior Communist expert on international affairs and former vice-president of the CASS, openly claimed that “after 300 years of comparison and selection in the whole world since the age of industrialization, and particularly after more than 100 years of Chinese experimentation, ... there is sufficient evidence to prove that liberalism is the best policy and a universal value.” (Li, 2000:242-6; from Feng, 2004: 224) By 1998 the camp of Chinese liberals had gathered a large number of well-known outspoken scholars, such as Li Shenzhi, Qin Hui, Xu Jilin, Xu Youyu, Yuan Weishi, etc, and secured a relatively stable forum for expression in publications such as *Gongong Luncong (Res Publica)*, *Kaifang Shidai (Open Times)*, etc.

In the meantime, most of arguments of China’s liberals were developed in the response to the attacks from the New Left, New Conservatism and New Confucianism. Concretely, Chinese liberals insisted that the authoritarian political system and an inadequate development of the market economy are the main sources of social inequality and other social ailments in contemporary China. Furthermore, the current trend of globalization, rather than representing a new form of invasion,

offers the best opportunity for China to achieve its long overdue project of modernization using international capital (Feng, 2004: 229). Here, they warned against the potential dangers of nationalism in causing social disorder, arousing xenophobia and chauvinism, and suppressing individual freedom and personal rights (Liu 2000: 12-17) – especially since Chinese nationalism had been informed by Sino-centrism and held back China from learning from other societies and making progress in civil life (Lei 2000: 305-10). To the contrary, they asserted that democracy and liberal values were the prerequisite for rational nationalism (Qin 2000: 381-8).

Indeed, Chinese liberals promoted the enlightenment ideal such as peace, freedom, democracy, rationality, human rights, etc, and the western-style modernization, as they had done in the 1980s. However, their discourse was more moderate. For example, gradual economic liberalism, instead of radical political reform in the 1980s, was become an essential part of the liberal project in the 1990s. In most of times, liberal intellectuals in the 1990s advocated democracy with coded language and in a subtle way. Besides, they admitted the importance of a strong central power, but doubted whether the foundation of a strong state needs to be based on nationalism, since Chinese nationalism in history often prevents China from learning from other nations and thus slows China's modernization. In addition, they concurred with official discourse that China needs to oppose US hegemonism and a general Westernizing trend. Yet, they argued that hegemonism cannot represent Western civilization as a whole. To the contrary, whether China can cope with challenges such as hegemonism from the outside was depended on whether it can integrate itself into the world civilization. Universal values cannot be reduced to the influencing force of westernization, but belong to the whole human civilization.

The Features of the Four Social Schools

Four features can be traced of the four mainstream social theories in the 1990s. Firstly, the discourses of four theories tend to be conservative. Except liberals, all other three attempted to make efforts promoting Chinese traditional culture and civilization while attacking the West sharply. They preferred socio-political stability, asking for state power and wealth rather than radical reforms and democratization; they stressed the recentralization of state power as the precondition

of China's development, and promoted Confucianism-based nationalism as a new national identity to unify Chinese people and resist the intrusion of Western influences. Even the liberals refrained from taking radical positions such as calling for radical political reform. Instead, they promoted gradual reform, and paralleled official propaganda, such as anti-hegemonism, anti-Westernism, the need for a strong central power, etc.

Secondly, compared with the homogeneous pro-Western discourse in the 1980s, intellectuals' nationalistic discourse in the late 1990s divided into conservatism and liberalism. A sharp debate between the two camps broke out around key issues such as whether China should pursue globalization, or should take nationalism as a new national identity. Briefly, though the three conservative groups took dominant status in the struggle with the liberalism, liberalism has developed quickly since the late 1990s.

Thirdly, though proposing different projects, all the four social schools adopted the similar strategies to deal with the relations with the Party-state. On the one hand, all the intellectuals' discourses echoed the official concept of "patriotism". In fact, all three conservative groups defended the Chinese model of development, endorsed political authoritarianism, and sought sources of legitimacy and identity in traditional Chinese culture. Even the liberals articulated official discourse such as anti-US hegemonism and anti-Westernization. Though liberals opposed nationalism, they only argued that national interests are an aggregate of individual interests of a society; and thus, one can only discover what is in China's national interest through democratic procedures.

On the other hand, though all four schools in the 1990s had emerged independently of official patriotic discourse, all of them were produced by intellectuals' collaborating with the Party-state consciously. Indeed, suppressed by the Party-state in the Tiananmen Incident, almost all intellectuals in the 1990s became "establishment intellectuals", for each of them have a "client-clientele" relationship with sponsors within Party-state institutions. In this situation, moreover, all intellectuals have managed to serve as advisers to the CCP leadership, playing a key role in the Party-state's reform. Clearly, this is in stark contrast to intellectuals in the 1980s, in which intellectuals always criticized and pushed the CCP leadership for

radical political reform. And ironically, as argued by Ogden, those who most openly challenge CCP rule in the 1990s are not intellectuals or students, but unemployed workers, rural migrants, disgruntled peasants and followers of Falun Gong (Ogden, 2004: 129).

Fourthly, intellectuals' relations with the public diminished. There was a lack of intensive interactions with the ordinary citizens in the 1990s, which is also in stark contrast to the situation in the 1980s. Indeed, though pluralistic ideas and debates between contending views emerged, most of the discussions and debates took place within intellectual circles and had rarely caught the attention of the public. Thus, their influence remained at the margins of society.

The Rise of Radical Nationalistic Discourse in Mass Media

Radical Media Discourse

As showed before, the cooperation between liberal intellectuals and mass media had been cut off in the 1990s. Thus, the role of mass media in the formation of nationalistic discourse should be reassessed. According to Huang and Lee's category (2003), both affirmative and rational discourse existed in media realm. Yet, the dominant discourse was assertive or even aggressive anti-Western discourse, especially in the flourished book market. Almost all nationalistic-related books were full of aggressive discourse.

Among numerous nationalism-related books published in the mid-1990s, the most influential one was *China Can Say No*. Wrote by Song Qiang, Zhang Xiaobo and other cultural workers, the book attacked Western cultural, political, and economic imperialism, and especially denounced the US' opposition to China on series issues, such as US' opposition to China's 2000 Olympics bid and GATT/WTO bid, its support of Tibetan-independence protesters, and the intensifying the Taiwan Strait Crisis (especially Lee Teng-hui's visit to the U.S.). Reasoning from these cases, it made conclusion that the United States was an arrogant, narcissistic, hegemonic power that acted as a world policeman. And now it was doing everything in its power to keep China from emerging as a powerful and wealthy country. Finally, it

suggested that China, being capable of confronting the United States in all spheres of international activities, should be prepared to go to war with America.⁷⁹

Concretely, *China Can Say No* contained numerous radical vocabularies with sensational descriptions and graphic pictures, to express the authors' hatred of the western countries and their pride in their own culture. Providing diverse examples, they accused Chinese of self-hating habits, praised a brave Chinese woman who successfully negotiated the issue of intellectual property rights with US delegates, and introduced Wuhan citizens' refusal of an American cigarette company's advertisement on the highest tower of the city. And, in the book, the rejection of the Chinese application to host the Olympic Games was seen as the rejection of a Chinese nation with five thousand years of civilization, and the deprivation of China's right to welcome the festival of nations; intensive Sino-US relations were explained as the US' attempts to create an "anti-China club" in international society.

Quite unexpectedly, the book attracted great attention in China. The 50,000 copies of the first edition sold out immediately, and the book drew hundreds of letters of support from all over China. Immediately, "Say No" became a fashion in the whole society. The success of this book encouraged similar ones to be published. China's book market quickly witnessed a flood of nationalistic works. A series of "Say No" publications, such as *China Still Can Say No*, *Why Should China Say No?* *China Not Only Can Say No*, etc., emerged in the book market, and all of them sold very well. In general, all such books showed a chauvinistic attitude full of self-pride, self-esteem and a radical anti-Western sentiment by using more extreme rhetoric, triggering more hatred against Japan and the US.

Then, after the embassy bombing incident, another best-seller *China's Road under the Shadow of Globalization*, co-authored by Wang Xiaodong and Fang Ning was released. In this book, Wang warned that the intention of NATO in bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was to weaken the Chinese government by making it lose face in the eyes of an angry population once they see it does not have the power to react. In addition, it vehemently criticized the producers of *River Elegy* as

⁷⁹ Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, and Qiao Bian (1996), *China Can Say No* [*Zhongguo keyi shuobu: lengzhan hou shidai de zhengzhi yu qinggan jueze*]. Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe.

preachers of a kind of “reverse racism” that puts them on the same level as anxious Italians before the rise of fascism. Finally, Wang called for using nationalism as a political strategy in Chinese politics, and portrays himself as a nationalist icon.

Obviously, nationalistic books in the 1990s were always published quickly – from planning, writing, editing, cover designing, printing and distributing. For example, *China Can Say No* was written in only 20 days, to quickly respond to the intensifying Taiwan Strait Crisis in April 1996. It took only ten days to make the layout and cover design and a week to have the book printed (Seo, 2005). In addition, most of the writers of these nationalistic books are usually part-time employees in various cultural and educational institutions, or graduate students who sought extra income through their works. As a result, the contents of such books are highly inconsistent and generally of low quality. Yet, such aggressive discourse had penetrated deeply into society. One gets the impression people are competing to say “No” in the 1990s. If you do not say no, you might risk being labeled a traitor (Ling and Ma, 1999: 264). Clearly, China’s book market in the 1990s promoted a more radical anti-Western mood echoing the enraged sentiment among Chinese people at the time.

The Relations with the Party-state: Bolder Book Dealers Go beyond the Party-line

The relationship between Chinese journalists and the Party-state in the 1990s was under the scrutiny of scholars. One noticeable study was done by Zhao Yuezhi (2004), who examined the multifaceted role of Chinese journalists in the 1990s, and concluded that they are effectively under the system’s control in the final analysis. As she argued, firstly, economic capital has become an increasingly important regulative force in Chinese journalism. On the one hand, although journalists are given more operational autonomy in the process of marketization (Pan and Lu, 2003), they are subjected to rigorous financial reward and punishment schemes based on management-determined “quality” classifications for each item (Zhao, 2004: 50). Making profit mainly through advertising, Chinese journalists tried to serve the middle-class people who are the advertisers’ most favored targets. On the other hand, as the beneficiaries of the economic reforms in the 1990s, Chinese journalists themselves are also part of China’s new urban middle-class. Moreover, they are

highly corrupt with massive “grey income” from unaccountable resources. Thus, rather than fighting against the state for more political autonomy, they have been co-opted by the post-1989 political and economic elite and now act as their lapdogs.

Secondly, besides “paid journalism”, the increasingly competitive media environment and commercial imperative also produced “investigative journalism” in China. With the expectation to earn credibility among their audiences, as well as a strong sense of social responsibility, a small group of enterprising young journalists, considering themselves as the watchdogs of the Party, are genuinely concerned for the weak and the voiceless, exposing official corruption, illegal and unethical business practices and social problems. However, such watchdog role in the media was basically initiated and promoted by the Central Party leadership as a way to rebuild its legitimacy and quell popular indignation against barbarous bureaucrats, unethical capitalists and petty criminals threatening the emerging economic and social order, as showed by the case of establishing the CCTV News Commentary Department in mid-1990s. With this aim, even investigative reporting should obey two principles. First, it should promote the market ideology and economic liberalization in general. Any critical examination of the process of marketization was almost politically impossible. Second, instead of calling for political reform as a solution to systemic problems like the media critiques in the 1980s, watchdog reporting, by individualizing, localizing and moralizing social problems, often prescribes the legal system and the implementation of the Party’s “correct” policies as a solution to many of social problems.

To simplify, Chinese journalists in the 1990s do serve the Party-state well. Even the investigatory journalists served as the central leadership’s eyes and ears on local situations, and helped the Party-state to defuse social tensions, rather than playing any meaningful watchdog role in checking official profiteering and massive illegal privatization. Finally, in the field of nationalistic reporting, the situation is similar. In the coverage of the Belgrade bombing and popular reaction to it, most of newspapers followed the guidance of the Central Party’s propaganda, mirroring the shift from anti-Western discourse to a pro-government “reform and opening” stance. Indeed, instead of affirmative discourse, most market-oriented newspapers promoted assertive nationalistic discourse with a strategy of “playing the cutting-edge ball”

(*Ca bianqiu*).⁸⁰ However, this kind of strategy is highly risky. Most news organizations who dared to pass the Party's bottom line faced severe punishment, such as removing the journalists and editors related to the illicit story, or even being closed down during the periodic rectification campaigns. Thus, when getting a warning from the propaganda departments, usually the newspaper organs will obey the guidance (Interview #10). In fact, even assertive nationalistic discourse, as Huang and Lee (2003) defined it, though emotional and sensational, was within the larger party-defined parameter, rather than going beyond the Party line.

Yet, significantly, when compared with the cooperative attitude of Chinese journalists within the Party-state, Chinese publishers seemed much bolder to challenge management and censorship from the propaganda departments, and to try to redefine the boundaries of what was politically permissible in the publishing field. As shown before, aggressive nationalistic discourse beyond the Party line – emotional, sensational, and designed to capitalize on public resentment to the West – dominated the nationalistic discourse in the book field. Especially, while criticizing Western countries' conspiracy against China, nationalistic books always straightforwardly criticized China's on-going output-oriented economic reforms, or Chinese government's weak responses to Western countries.

Why is the nationalistic discourse in book market more radical than newspapers in the 1990s? Is it because Chinese book publishers are much bolder than journalists? Actually, both Chinese newspaper and publishing are under strict control by different levels of Party-state's Propaganda Departments. Investigating the Chinese book market in the 1990s, Seo (2005) made a significant finding that the hidden driving force behind publishing nationalistic books in the 1990s was not the publishers, but the "book license" system and this emerging market was spurred on by book dealers (*shushang*) – cultural businessmen who were outside the publisher-propaganda department relationship, but had a better sense of what cultural markets needed and were familiar with book production and the distribution process.

⁸⁰ As Liu (2003) defined, this strategy is to justify politically alternative perspectives by reconstructing the standard of "political correctness" and use various discursive resources to evade, appropriate, and resist the controls imposed by the state. And it is widely recognized in media circles that *Southern Weekend* has set a model of using the strategy of the cutting-edge shot in dealing with politically sensitive issues.

Briefly, in China, each book must obtain a book number (*shuhao*) prior to publication. The book numbers are distributed by an official authority – General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP). Initially, the GAPP assigns a certain book numbers to each publisher, but later, it assigns book numbers directly to the editors in each publisher – usually, around five numbers for each editor. Then, from “book number trading” (*maimai shuhao*) activity, the book dealers can get book numbers from the publisher.⁸¹ After buying a book number, the book dealers will be responsible for the whole process of publication, including finding the author, buying the manuscript, editing, designing the cover, printing, and distributing the book. Indeed, most of nationalistic books in the 1990s, especially best-sellers such as *Looking at China through a Third Eye* and the series of *China Can Say No*, were all planned by book dealers and were only able to be published because of “book number trading”. As Seo (2005) observed, because they included politically sensitive issues, radical nationalistic sentiment, and discussion of the fate of China, such kind of books became an attractive commodity for readers who had never read before. It was this novelty that allowed book publishers and book dealers to make large profits quickly. But more importantly, by “book number trading”, the risk of disseminating unapproved political literature was also transferred from state-owned publishers to private book dealers who were willing to take those risks. Thus, publishers were eager to cooperate with book dealers, publishing nationalistic books with radical nationalistic discourse and sensitive political issues, ignoring the potential political risk of going beyond the Party-line. The penetration of book dealers into the publishing industry resulted in the proliferation and radicalization of the nationalistic discourses of the Chinese populace.

The Victory of Official Patriotic Discourse

Compared with the situation in the 1980s, there is a more cooperative relationship between China’s intellectuals and the CCP leaders than between intellectuals and the common people in the 1990s. Moreover, mass media, no matter official or market-oriented newspapers, were also generally obeyed the Party-line. Yet, by

⁸¹ I interviewed a senior editor at a noticeable specialized publisher at Beijing. As his introduction to me, in a typical book number trading, the book dealers will pay the “management fee” to his publisher. Actually, the fee varies depending on the personal relationship between the book dealer and the director of his publisher, and the potential political risk of the book. But usually, it is roughly in the range of 30,000 to 80,000 *yuan*. (Interview #11)

previous analysis, it is also clear that as independent projects promoted by intellectuals and mass media, not all their elements and ideas accorded with the official patriotic discourse, not to mention the radical anti-western discourse promoted in the book market. Yet, the Party-state dealt with such confrontations successfully, both by incorporating intellectuals' discourse into its official patriotism, and by adopting authoritarian control methods to mass media.

Hegemonic Strategies to the Intellectuals

The Hegemonized Official Discourse

Actually, the Party-state's official patriotic discourse incorporated the intellectuals' discourse in the 1990s. The most noticeable example is that of New Conservatism, with the idea of centralization in politics and "strong state" project, had been supported, even adopted by the CCP leadership in the 1990s. And Wang Huning, a well-known new conservatist at Shanghai Fudan University, was summoned to Beijing as an advisor to Jiang Zemin since early 1990s. Similarly, though some of ideas of the New Left departed from the CCP's very positive appraisal of "reform and opening", their belief that China should maintain stability so that the state will have sufficient power to preserve the national interest, was compatible with the official discourse.

The ideas of New Confucianism were also incorporated into patriotic discourse, especially in Chinese history education, such as knowing China's glory past, the great achievements in China's history, etc. Moreover, the elements in the New Confucianism, such as the notion of Great Unity, loyalty to the ruler, national glory above individual rights, and its cultural-moral order, were certainly a benefit to the Party-state's narrative of reconstruction of social stability as a justification of its legitimacy. In addition, the Party-state's endorsement of the revival of New Confucianism was also evidenced by its officially sponsored celebration of the 2545th anniversary of Confucius' birth in October 1994, at which time the CCP leadership claimed Chinese culture as quintessentially Confucian and presented

Confucianism as enlightened and progressive, instead of condemning it as “feudalistic” as the CCP had done previously.⁸²

Then, liberals in the 1990s were also no longer necessarily perceived as enemies of the Party-state, as it was before (Feng, 2004:244; Ogden, 2004:129). By contrast, its liberalization project, especially in the economic realm, such as asking for emerging into the globalization trend, accelerating privatization, the full legalization of private property, the termination of government involvement in enterprises, etc, were all incorporated into the Party-state’s economic policies and manifested in its official patriotic discourse. Taking the case of the embassy bombing for example, faced with strong anti-Western sentiment from Chinese people, the CCP leadership had a complex and delicate attitude – condemning NATO’s barbaric bombing on the one hand, reiterating the “reform and opening” policy on the other hand.⁸³ Indeed, the most important reason for Chinese Party-state’s complex attitude to the Western countries was because too strong a reaction may engender the US-China “strategic partnership”, and thus harm China’s export-oriented economic development (Interview #12). As a result, both the Party-state and liberals implicitly made compromises with each other.

Controlling Methods to the Alternative Views

Indeed, though the dominant social thoughts in the 1990s corroborated the official discourse, alternative views were still unavoidable. Usually, the Party-state regulated intellectual life via institutional methods, such as regulation, guidelines, meetings, academic activities, salary, housing, funding, etc (Faulkner, 2007). By such intensified institutional approach, the Party-state aimed to discourage radical political views, and transform intellectuals into its think-tank.

Besides, learning lessons from the 1980s, the Party-state was particularly wary of potential linkages between intellectuals and the public. On the one hand, the mediated channel for intellectuals mobilizing the public – mass media – was

⁸² At that time, not only Gu Mu, the former vice-premier chaired the conference as Chairman of the China Confucius Foundation, but also Jiang Zemin himself made an exception by gracing the event and spent two hours talking about his own Confucian upbringing. See, Gu, M. (2009). *Gu Mu Memoirs*.

⁸³ For example, Editorial, “*Jiandingbuyi zhixing dulizizhu hepingwaijiaozhengce*” [Firmly implement the independent foreign policy of peace]. June 3, 1999, *People’s Daily*.

controlled by the Party-state strictly. This point will be developed later in detail. On the other hand, for the intellectuals with radical ideas, the Party-state always adopted “imprisoned policy” (*quanyang zhengce*) to them, which means, providing such intellectuals fixed salary and other material guarantees in certain academic institutions, but prohibiting them to participate in academic activities, publish articles or books, give speeches or courses, and guide research students (Interview #13). Clearly, being isolated from the society, marginalized intellectuals almost have no opportunity to organize and mobilize the public.

Finally, for intellectuals who disobey the Party-state’s regulation, they may be forced to resign from their positions. Accordingly, they will lose financial support from the Party-state and institutional resources from their academic institutions. For those who become overseas dissidents and dare to challenge the legitimacy of the Party-state openly, the Party-state will concentrate their limited resources on such persons while providing considerable freedom to those who do not (Ogden, 2004: 129).

Hegemonic Strategies to Control Mass Media

From ad-hoc Ordinances to Routinized Regulated System

From the founding of the PRC to the early 1990s, the main methods of the Party-state to control mass media were ad-hoc ordinances and mass campaigns such as “anti-bourgeois liberalism”, “anti-Spiritual pollution”. After the Tiananmen Incident, the Party-state paid significant attention to propaganda and public opinion monitoring. Moreover, with the expansion of media market, the Party-state adopted more systematic and routinized method to control mass media. For example, the tri-level inspection system, initially promulgated in 1952, was enforced more strictly after 1994.⁸⁴ In addition, new “Checkup groups” (*shendu xiaozu*), semi-formal groups of semi-retired old cadres that monitors the media for political problems, were created at the province level in 1992 to conduct post-examinations. If certain

⁸⁴ The tri-level inspection was initially promulgated in “Regulations Regarding the Editing Organizations and the Working System for the State-Owned Publishers” published in 1952. The core of this system was the locating of responsibility. It meant that the three levels of editors – the editor on duty, the chief editor and the editor-in-general – must examine the articles, books, radio or TV programs to be published or broadcasted. This tri-level censorship was revitalized in 1994 by the CCP Propaganda Department.

publications or TV programs were flagged by such groups, those publications or programs may be subjected to a prolonged period of increased scrutiny, during which time their activities will be proscribed (Interview #14).

Another method of mass media control was the “Public Opinion Notice” (*Yuqing tongbao*) system. Each week, propaganda departments made a memo circulated within various media organizations in China. This notice contains 1) lists all the hot issues that happened in the last week and guidelines on how to report such issues. For example, after the Hujintao’s televised speech on the Chinese embassy bombing, the CPD’s “Public Opinion Notice” suggested China’s mass media should not report on any student demonstration movements; 2) lists of all sensitive incidents that happened in the past week which must not to be discussed; 3) criticisms of media organizations which violated regulations in last week. A chief-editor may be removed if his media organization receives such warnings three times. More seriously, the media organizations even may be closed down immediately or in the periodical “comprehensive rectification” (*quanmian zhengdun*) campaigns. (Interview #15)

The periodical “comprehensive rectification” campaigns of mass media, cleaning up the “unhealthy” newspapers and discourses, especially before important political events or sensitive dates, was also adopted to regain the Party’s loosened control over media in the 1990s. For example, in September 2000, China closed four hundred newspapers operated by bureaus and offices below the departmental level of provincial governments. The goal of this campaign was to streamline and consolidate the print media, making the media easier to manage and helping to ensure those publications toed the Party line.

Thus, the mass media system was under strict and systematic control in 1990s China. Accordingly, a keen sense of which themes the authorities will encourage and which topics are politically dangerous was an important part of the professional survival of media workers. For instance, reporters refrained from discussing new sensitive issues for which the Party-state had not yet proscribed an official discourse. Indeed, it was a very different scene compared to the 1980s, when discussing the sensitive topics in mass media, such as democracy, student movements, cultural fever, the role of intellectuals, etc, was normal.

Besides media censorship, “positive political guidance” (*zhengmian zhengzhi yindao*), called the “main melody” (*zhu xuanlv*), such as the famous “Top Five Projects Awards” (*wuge yi gongcheng*),⁸⁵ was another important tool for the Party-state to promote official discourse. In fact, President Jiang Zemin was a strong believer in the need for political education and “guiding” public opinion. He had explained to news workers several times that they had a responsibility to stimulate a spirit of nationalist pride, self-confidence and activism, to educate society in patriotism, socialism, collectivism, self-reliance, hard struggle, and nation-building (Jiang, 1998: 354-5). For example, in “*The Outline of the Implementation of the Education of Patriotism*”, the media workers are clearly asked to create a good social atmosphere for patriotic education, such as using special columns for patriotic education articles, promoting the prominent figures, the great achievement of socialism construction, as well as the China’s great history and glorious culture with patriotic fervor. After the embassy bombing incident occurred, to guide and control aggressive nationalistic sentiments, more than ten anti-NATO books were released by various state-owned publishers within a week. In most cases, the GPPA approved such titles quickly, and shortened the censor period. For instance, *China Cannot Be Bullied*, published by the People’s Daily Publisher, collected the news on the Belgrade bombing reported by the *People’s Daily*, described the events and focused on the reactions of Chinese leaders. In *China Was Anger: After Being Bombed of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade*, published by Xinhua Publisher, it collected various voices condemning NATO from people all of world. *Chinese People Cannot Be Pushed Around*, published by China Book Publisher, took full advantage of the international department of Xinhua Agency’s resources, including many color pictures covering the whole event. Via such nationalistic books, the Party-state hoped to promote official anti-Western and patriotic discourse, legitimating its policy in the process.

⁸⁵ The Top Five Project Awards” (*wuge yi gongcheng*) was launched by the CPD in 1992. This project requires the provincial level propaganda departments to nominate its best article, book, play, film and television program of the year. Winning the Five One Project award is the highest achievement in terms of political standard. The winners would be rewarded a considerable amount of money from propaganda authorities at multiple levels, and this would also mark up the value of the winners in terms of their future career advancement.

Besides newspapers, China's publishers were also all state-owned and under the Party-state's strict control since the founding of the PRC. Yet, with the expansion of book market, the regulation method of the Party-state to the book market also transitioned from focusing on content censorship in the 1980s to regulation of the production process in the 1990s. Especially, the GAPP and the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) became more and more sensitive to the newly emerging practices of book number trading. Beginning in early 1993, a series of notices and ordinances were issued to limit and ban the book number trading, such as "*A Notice on Selling and Buying Book Numbers*" by the CPD in 1993, and the revision of "*Regulations on the Management of Publishing Works*" by the GAPP in 1997, etc.

Indeed, the phenomenon of "book number trading" was never completely eradicated in the 1990s, and continues to a limited extent today. And as was shown before, it is the "book number trading" that popularized and then radicalized aggressively anti-Western nationalistic discourse. We will explore the reasons why the "book number trading" emerged, and why it was difficult to control in later section. Generally speaking, though, the nationalistic discourse in the 1990s book market was subject to pressure from the Party-state. This was because, with the threat of serious repercussions from the Party-state, the actors in the publishing market, both the book dealers and the publishers had to carefully measure political safety before publishing any politically sensitive book. Thus, though it seems that many of nationalistic books contained radical and extreme nationalistic discourse in appearance, most of their ideas essentially followed the Party's guidelines. For example, most such nationalistic books defended the authoritarian regime's domestic behavior, maintaining that, although being an oppressive and coercive force, the Party-state was the major protector of the weak, and a "reliable" community. Internationally, they criticized Western political, cultural, moral and economic ideals. These books generally believed the "conspiracy theory" that international media outlets and Chinese political dissidents were merely trying to demonize China. Accordingly, their conclusion was often that all the things the west criticized China for were things which the Chinese should love and be proud of. To be sure, it is not really different from the rhetoric of the official patriotic discourse. Even in the

book *Looking at China through a Third Eye*, that criticized the failing political and economic policies of China, it passionately supported Maoist discourses. These themes assured the political correctness of the book, since Maoism had long been the official ideology in China; the Party-state could not ban a book like this.

Social Structure and the Nationalistic Discourse in the 1990s

We have explained how the CCP-led anti-Western and pro-CCP nationalistic discourse attained hegemonic status in the 1990s by examining the discursive relations between the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals and the ordinary citizens. We argued that the historic bloc between intellectuals and mass media, which pushed the Party-state for political reform on the one hand and cultivated democratic ideals among the ordinary citizens on the other hand, was undermined by the Party-state after 1989. Instead, almost all intellectuals became “establishment intellectuals”, cooperating with the Party-state and legitimizing the CCP’s ruling status and its political centralization and anti-Western discourse. Then, the mass media further radicalized the official discourse. As a result, sharply contrasting with the pro-Western and anti-traditional culture zeitgeist of the previous decade, the anti-west, pro-CCP discourse constructed by the Party-state became the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 1990s.

However, from the perspective of discursive relations, there are some problems we still cannot explain: why did the historic bloc between intellectuals and mass media playing active role in the 1980s but disappearing in the 1990s when both of them were under strict control during the 1980s and the 1990s? Compared with Party-state’s sharp condemnation of liberal ideas following the Tiananmen Incident, why did the Party-state made a compromise with the liberals in the mid-1990s? And, why did the China’s burgeoning media market promote the radical nationalistic discourse, instead of democratic one, as the conventional liberal narrative would suggest? To answer all these questions, we need to explore the deeper structural reasons behind the discursive relationships among the four agents.

The Changing Social Structure in the 1990s

Indeed, *qimeng* intellectuals' project and China's pro-democratic movement in the 1980s led to the transformation of social structures in the 1990s, from "Totalitarian state - planned commodity economy" to the "Authoritarian state - Socialist market economy – Media market", though such far-reaching consequences were clearly not *qimeng* intellectuals' (democratic) intentions.

Briefly, as we have argued in previous chapters, the Party-state's hegemonic projects in the 1980s were finally expressed through coercion rather than consent. To maintain power and social stability, the CCP leadership in the post-1989 era had to carry out the project of radical social modernization, promoting pro-capitalist elements of the bureaucracy, petite bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists, while keeping revolutionary democratic sentiments within a moderate, national framework. Meanwhile, during the economic development, the CCP leadership, drawing lessons from the 1980s, in turn paid significant attention to aligning with the public, monitoring public opinion closely, and strengthening the ideological control among intellectuals and mass media. Finally, the Party-state's crisis of hegemony in the late 1980s was followed by an entire decade of authoritarian capitalist developments. The nascent media market, caught in the middle of capitalist market and authoritarian state, was distorted and had significant influence on radical nationalistic discourse in the 1990s.

From Planned Commodity Economy to Socialist Market Economy

After the Tiananmen Incident, *qimeng* intellectuals and students who questioned the continuing ability of the Party-state to lead the nation in far-reaching reforms were suppressed. However, in the meantime, the pace of China's economic reform also slowed down based on the Party-state's diagnosis of the Tiananmen Incident: that it was caused by the "major international climate" and China's own "minor climate". The "major international climate" is one in which "Western countries headed by the US have always pursued a strategy of sabotage that aims to subvert communist governments throughout the world", and that China has become the main target now that the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc have collapsed. And the "minor climate" is the "bourgeois liberalization" that had been taking place within the Party

under Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang since the early 1980s.⁸⁶ The two “climates”, according to the Party-state’s diagnosis, compounded to reduce national confidence and patriotism to its lowest point since 1949, and created an unprecedented “crisis of faith” and social discontent, thereby resulting in a weaker Party, weaker state and a demoralized nation.

Under this conservative atmosphere, *qimeng* intellectuals were criticized as “agents of Western countries”, who were bought by Western countries to foster blind worship of the Western values and propagate the political and economic patterns, sense of values, decadent ideals and life-style of the Western capitalist world in China. Accordingly, their “complete Westernization” project was condemned as a policy of “peaceful evolution”.⁸⁷ In this social context, the Old leftist cadres further questioned the legitimacy of the reform, arguing that economic reform, especially commodity and market economies, will lead to “bourgeois liberalization” which may endanger the CCP’s rule and faith in communism among the Chinese people.

Nevertheless, the renewed anti-bourgeois liberalism rhetoric and the “peaceful evolution” political discourse were short-lived in the initial years of the 1990s. Undoubtedly, the Party-state faced the severe legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen Incident. With the decline of popularity in communist ideals in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping realized that the Party-state had to rely on performance legitimacy – raising the living standard of Chinese people continuously – to justify its continued rule. Thus, despite its suppression of the democratic student movement and condemning Western countries’ “peaceful evolution” strategy, China should remain open to Western investment and continued expansion economically.

To acquire consensus among the society for economic reform, Deng set out the second “thought emancipation” movement. At Shanghai, he collaborated with the editorial team of the city’s *Liberation Daily* to produce a series of articles under the pen-name Huang Puping. To set the debate on the nature of socialism he argued

⁸⁶ Deng Xiaoping (1989), “*Zai jiejian shoudu jieyanbudui jun yishang ganbu de jianghua*”, [Address to officers at the rank of general and above in command of the troops enforcing martial law in Beijing] 9 June, 1989, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/23/content_2608913.htm, Retrieved April 15, 2009.

⁸⁷ Jiang Zemin, (1989), “*Zai qingzhu Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli sishi zhounian dahui shang de jianghua*”, [Speech at the 40th anniversary of the PRC], Sep. 29, 1989. from <http://gaige.rednet.cn/c/2008/05/11/1504444.htm>, Retrieved April 15, 2009.

that socialism does not mean poverty, but development. Furthermore, in the spring of 1992, he made a widely publicized trip to the booming cities of southern China. In his Southern Tour Text, he overtly reduced socialism to the liberation of productive forces, and argued that if socialism is to achieve a competitive advantage over capitalism, it should “boldly absorb and borrow all the fruits of civilization created by human society, absorb and borrow all the advanced methods of enterprise and management that reflect the rules of production modern society has created in all the countries of the world, including the advanced capitalist ones.” Accordingly, he declared that leftist errors are more dangerous than rightist errors, and urged boldness in experimenting with measures such as the introduction of stock markets and expansion of foreign investment.

Deng’s southern China tour and his political discourse sent shockwaves throughout China, and undermined the previous hard line of the party on economic matters. The Deng’s speeches on the Southern Tour were further taken as the basic line of the Fourteenth Party Congress in October 1992. In Jiang Zemin’s keynote address “*Accelerating reform and opening-up*”, he not only reiterated Deng’s principle that the criterion for judging a policy of socialism was whether it was “good for socialist production, good for increasing the comprehensive national power of the socialist state, and good for raising the standard of living of the people”; but more importantly, he took another step towards transformation Chinese economy into the market model by creation of socialism market economy.

One of the most important steps in this process involved a change in emphasis from price adjustment in the 1980s to the reform of the whole ownership system – replacing state-run enterprises (*guoying qiye*) by state-owned enterprises (*guoyou qiye*). This strategic change was legalized when the Eighth National People’s Congress amended the Constitution in 1993. From that time, to construct a “modern enterprise system”, and transform state-run enterprises to state-owned but privately run (*guoyou minying*), has become the guideline for China’s enterprise reform. By the end of 1990s, the forms of ownership in China included: state, collective, Sino-foreign joint venture, private, individual, joint investment, shares and stock, foreign proprietorship, and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan concerns (You, 1998:170). Most of China’s state-owned enterprises operated within a new

hybridized ownership structure. Furthermore, the private sector was increasingly aggressive in penetrating state ownership. For one thing, thirst for investment pushed local governments to go beyond the general guideline of the State Council that foreign capital should be restricted in key areas of the national economy (You, 1998: 189). For another, the growing financial incentive for individuals to get rich quick by buying into state owned enterprises through stocks heralds a long-term dilution of state ownership. As the reform deepens, this trend of “State retreat but private promotion” (*guotui minjin*) accelerated.

Marketized Authoritarian State

As shown before, one of the important lessons the Party-state drew from the Tiananmen Incident was that it should pay significant attention to controlling public discourse during the economic reform. Accordingly, the economic liberalization beginning in 1992 was not accompanied by a similar liberalization in the political sphere. Instead, the authoritarian political structure replaced totalitarian structure.

To accommodate the market economy as well as the restructuring of the ownership system, a new round administrative reform was launched. In the Eighth National People’s Congress in 1993, a fifteen-year, two-phased, long-term program was drafted as the guideline for the overhaul of the state structure: by the year 2000 the first phase was projected to create a government administrative system that was centered on servicing the evolving market economy. From then, the reform will move on to constructing a “modern administrative system” by the year 2010, which refers to the features of government commonly found in advanced market economies, such as indirect government, checks and balances, and “small government and large society” (You, 1998: 200). Clearly, instead of promoting democratic political structure, administrative reform in the 1990s aimed to serve market-led micro-economic activities by redefining the government’s economic functions and removing certain government functions that seriously impeded the activities of enterprises in the market. By the end of 1990s, a large number of specialized industrial bureaus had been removed and nationally over two million state cadres, or 25 per cent of a total of 9.2 million working in government, were streamlined (*ibid.*,: 194).

However, this does not mean the Party-state lost its control over the society. On the contrary, it got authoritarian status during the economic reform. On the one hand, in the economic sector, the two-track reform strategy for state-enterprise reform – revitalizing large state firms through corporatization and selling small ones through privatization (*Zhuada fangxiao*) – had been adopted. Besides, the larger state-owned enterprises were converted more quickly into national conglomerates. The genesis of this strategy was not only economic considerations, e.g. improving larger state-enterprises' efficiency and reducing the government burden of bailing out those small ones, but more importantly, it also had far-reaching political ramifications. Given that these larger state-enterprises and conglomerates were the backbone of China's key industrial sectors, controlling these “bigger and stronger” national conglomerates meant controlling the vitals of national economy.

On the other hand, in the ideological field, the Party-state considered the propaganda and thought work as an “extremely important department” and allocated it greater powers. From 1992 on, for the first time in Party-state's history, the head of the CCP Central Propaganda Department (CPD) was ranked ahead of the CCP Central Organization Department (COD) in the Chinese bureaucracy system. The director of the CPD was also the state leader of the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In addition, unlike the situations in the 1980s, Jiang Zemin attended all annual national propaganda meetings and made the leading speech in the meetings (Interview #16).

The propaganda departments also provided greater freedom in economic-related propaganda work, but strictly restrained on matters that related to aspects of CCP legitimacy. This strategy was called “relaxing controls on economic matters, tightening controls for political issues” (*jingji song, zhengzhijin*). While controlling public opinion, the CCP leadership also promoted new official discourses, such as *Deng Xiaoping Theory* (*Deng Xiaoping lilun*), *Three Representatives Theory* (*sange daibiao*), Patriotism, etc, trying to construct new hegemonic value system that could be accepted by the whole society.

The Formation of Media Market and Its Dual Logic

Since the early 1990s, market-oriented economic reforms have been gradually extended to the mass media domain. Under the socialist market system, the leadership recognized the multiple natures of the media, including political, cultural, informational and commodity-oriented for the first time (Liang, 1992). Transforming media outlets from “administrative units” (*shiye danwei*) to “administrative units with enterprise management” (*shiye danwei, qiyehua guanli*)⁸⁸, media units that previously depended on state subsidies were now required to be responsible for their own profits and losses. By 1998, with few exceptions, media units achieved financial solvency and many were even able to return profits to the state. And thus, for the first time, China’s media became an “industry” – one that is enjoying dramatic expansion in terms of scale of dissemination, diversity of content and profits.

However, it should be stressed that media reform since 1992 was oriented solely towards economic viability. The intent of the Party-state was to pass the economic burdens of running a media institution – such as subsidies for the papers and costs of subscription fees – to the media institutions themselves while retaining political control over public opinion. In other words, media reform in the 1990s was consistent with China’s overall direction of reform: economic liberalization and political repression. The development of the media market, therefore, was under the dual “market-political” logic: various media organizations must make profit by catering to the popular tastes on the media market, and they have to obey the state’s management and ideological regulations.

Social Change and the CCP-led anti-Western Nationalistic Discourse

⁸⁸ After the establishment of the PRC, media institutions were part of governmental organizations called “administrative units” (*shiye danwei*). Like other administrative units, media units were nonprofit institutions. Under this system, newspapers were run by state money, subscribed at the cost of state money, and circulation was apportioned through Party-state imperatives.

In 1978, the State Ministry of Finance endorsed the *People’s Daily* and other six newspapers in Beijing as “experimental units” of “administrative units with enterprise management” (*shiye danwei, qiyehua guanli*). Being “administrative units with enterprise management” meant that media units were still under the direct administration of the Party’s propaganda departments. These units could still receive subsidies from the government and were obliged carry out their political and cultural duties. Nevertheless, they also had to learn how to manage business as enterprises and would be responsible, at least partially, for their own economic circumstances. This model of media system was amended several times by increasing the proportion of the finances for which the media organization would be responsible until, at last, the system evolved into the so-called “wholly self-responsible for profits and losses” (*zifu yingku*) system, which was adopted by almost all media units by the end of the 1990s.

We have argued that one of the unforeseen consequences of *qimeng* intellectuals' "complete Westernization" project and the series of pro-democratic movements in the 1980s was the transformation of social structure from "Totalitarian state – Planned commodity economy" to "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – Media market". Then, in this section, we will argue that it is this new social structure that reshaped the power relationships among the four agents (the CCP, mass media, intellectuals and the ordinary citizens) and leads the CCP-led anti-Western rhetoric and pro-CCP nationalistic discourse to hegemonic status in the 1990s.

Social Change and Intellectuals' Discourse

Three striking changes occurred in the Chinese intellectual sphere in the 1990s. Firstly, the "historic bloc" which actively promoted political democracy to the public on the one hand, and pushed the Party-state for political reform on the other, was cut off in the 1990s. Instead, almost all Chinese intellectuals in the 1990s became "establishment intellectuals" who cooperated with the Party-state, helping to legitimize its authority. Secondly, Chinese liberals, after entering a period of hibernation in the early 1990s, reemerged since mid-1990s. Unlike situations in the 1980s, this time they were not rivals of the Party-state. Thirdly, compared with the homogeneous pro-Western discourse in the 1980s, highly fractious debates among them routinely broke out. Indeed, the new "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – Media market" social structure did re-shape the power relations between the Party-state and the intellectuals, and, the production and circulation of intellectual discourse.

First and foremost, undeniably, the coercive suppression to the *qimeng* intellectuals in the Tiananmen Incident shocked Chinese intellectuals deeply. Then the series of systematic authoritarian controls on the intellectuals left little space for democratic ideas. Especially, the Party-state was particularly wary of potential linkages between intellectuals and the ordinary citizens. Under this situation, the "historic bloc" between intellectuals and mass media disappeared. Lacking intensive interactions with ordinary people, Chinese intellectuals in the 1990s became establishment intellectuals who either echoed the official discourse, or stayed in the ivory tower producing specialized knowledge, both of which contributed to the

situation in the intellectual circle wherein “thinkers fade out and academicians come to prominence” (*sixiangjia danchu, xuewenjia tuxian*).

However, the Party-state’s authoritarian control was not the exclusive reason for the intellectual’s cooperation with it. Comparatively speaking, the Party-state’s totalitarian control to the intellectuals in the 1980s failed to imprison their liberal ideals; surely the softer authoritarian control methods of the 1990s were not more effective in this regard. Here, the rapid development of market economy also had significant influence on the intellectuals’ project and discourse. On the one hand, the market economy undermined the autonomy of Chinese intellectuals. The professionalization of bureaucracy turned some intellectuals into technocrats; other more “serious scholars” turned to academic specializations, by giving up the traditional role in public affairs and relocating themselves to the ivory tower. Moreover, the commercialization of culture and spread of hedonistic views of life further challenged traditional understandings of the role of intellectuals. More and more intellectuals were busy for personal fame and money, instead of truth and knowledge. On the other hand, since most intellectuals were part of the Party-state apparatus, they were “intellectual power elite” and members of the middle-class (Xiao, 1999; Zhao 2004; Odgen, 2004). Accordingly, they have tended to be more interested in maintaining their own rising status than in promoting democratic ideas for the masses. And their political and social isolation from the masses left precious few with the intention to organize and mobilize the ordinary citizens.

Without a doubt, the market economy also had a positive influence on Chinese intellectuals’ discourse. For example, economic development produced the pluralistic interests which further promoted the pluralistic thoughts and ideas. Accordingly, around key issues such as social justice, economic efficiency, globalization, national interest, etc, the severe debates among liberalism and conservatism often broke out, though most of such debates were within intellectual circles and had rarely caught the attention of the public. Furthermore, the reform by economic development, as well as the Party-state’s awareness the necessity of entering the global economy, provided a good environment for the reemergence of liberals. Indeed, despite intensive anti-Western sentiment in official discourse and the citizens around mid-1990s, President Jiang Zemin hoped to repair the

relationship between the US by visiting the United States in October 1997, during which the “strategic partnership” relationship between the two countries was built, and billions of dollars of new business was cleared for US companies. Then, when President Clinton returned Jiang’s visit with his own trip to China in June 1998, deals for some US\$1.4 billion worth of US goods and services were signed. Obviously, the reemergence of Chinese liberals helped the Party-state mollify the radical anti-Western sentiment among the citizens and legitimize its globalization strategy, epitomized by the entering of the WTO in the end of 2001.

Even though, compared to *qimeng* intellectuals’ radical “complete Westernization” project in the 1980s, Chinese liberals in the 1990s refrained from calling for political reform and taking radical positions, but paid more attention to appealing for economic liberalization, mindful of the imminent possibility of being suppressed under the CCP’s strict authoritarian control.

Social Change and Media Discourse

We have shown that the emergence of book dealers enabled by “book number trade” with official publishers allowed the rise in nationalistic books in the 1990s. In essence, it is also the unique media structure that produces this phenomenon.

Under financial pressures due to harsh competition, China’s publishers struggled to create revenues. Yet, unlike newspapers and televisions programs, which rely on advertisement revenue, the profit in the book market is determined directly by sales. However, because of publishers’ status as administrative units, official publishers lost their ability to compete in the market, as the bureaucratic inertia relying on the Party-state. By selling the book numbers they acquired from the Party-state to book dealers, who had a better sense of readers’ tastes, publishers were able to get generous profits and transfer political and operational risk to book dealers. Due to the competitive advantage the practice conferred, the phenomenon of “book number trade” became widespread among China’s publishers.

Book dealers, too, were able to make huge profits from best-sellers. However, book dealers also had to obey the dual “state-market” logic of the Chinese media market. Especially, they must make profit by catering to the populace while simultaneously obeying the Party-state’s management and ideological regulations.

Under these market and politico-cultural structural constraints, book dealers found both political safety and marketability in promoting anti-western nationalistic discourse. For one thing, obviously, the anti-Western discourse catered for both official discourse and popular sentiment in the 1990s. For another, such books always included political messages critical of the Party-state on topics such as the fate of China, China's economic and political policy, or even the "inside stories" within the CCP leadership. In a largely state-controlled media market, these discontented political views were in short supply and, thus, were potentially profitable.

Clearly, it is the unique dual system of media market that promoted the "book number trading" phenomenon, which further stimulated the aggressively nationalistic discourse. Indeed, the Party-state made efforts to eliminate the practice of book number trading. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of "book number trading" was never extinguished in China. By contrast, the political risk of being sanctioned by Party-state was encouraged rather than suppressed the popularity of such books and accelerated its circulation in the market. Crucially, though many nationalistic books were banned by the authorities, their first print run was often big enough to generate a great amount of profit. As a result the primary concern of the book dealers became short-term financial gain, and "book number trading" became an informal but normal operation for most of China's publishers.

Social Change and Popular Nationalistic Discourse

Both the new social structure and the "strong nation complex" of the Chinese people had a deep impact on the paradigm shift in popular nationalistic discourse from radical pro-west in the 1980s to radical anti-west in the 1990s. On the one hand, export-oriented economic development provided Chinese people more opportunities to see both-sides of Western countries. Thus, far from the utopian conception of Western countries of the 1980s, Chinese people in the 1990s understood Western countries in depth, especially their various social problems, and their attitude towards Western countries had accordingly progressed beyond simple worship. On the other hand, Chinese people could accept the official patriotism since the CCP-led rapid economic development in the 1990s catered to their "strong nation complex". With the sustained growth of China's economy, aspirations for a Chinese

superpower became clearer and stronger among Chinese people. Besides, when such patriotic feelings met Western countries' stereotyped negative attitude toward China – compounded by a series of anti-China activities after the Tiananmen Incident – Chinese became irritated. With stronger economic consciousness, it is also understandable that Chinese youth resorted to boycotting American products to vent their radical anti-Western feelings.

More importantly, under the authoritarian political structure, the information flow was controlled by the Party-state, especially through its daily regulations to the intellectuals and regulative censorship to mass media. In such a closed information environment, only pro-CCP information and the Party's explanation to the information was available to the public. For the official patriotism in particular, providing one-sided pro-CCP information and describing the Sino-West with white-or-black and justice-or-evil logic, the official patriotic education finally may cultivate radical audience with radical anti-western nationalistic feeling. Moreover, ^{how} as shown before, the mass media, operating under the dual logic of "state-market", further helped to radicalize such radical nationalistic sentiment. Under such complex situation, the popular nationalistic discourse in the 1990s would be radical with anti-western and pro-CCP sentiment. As a result, the unique phenomenon emerged that China's rapid economic growth promoted the political support to authoritarian regime instead of a democratic political system.

Hegemonic Status of Official Nationalistic Discourse

One of noticeable characteristics of official nationalistic discourse in the 1990s is that it incorporated different discourses and projects into its own patriotic discourse. The reason for this is also rooted in the new social structure. First of all, the development of a market economy inescapably brings about privatization, and decentralization. Both of these trends not only undermine the state control of the society, but also bring new but intensive social problems, such as an ostensible gap between the "new rich" and ordinary people, millions of laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises, the fallout of the welfare system, the prevalence of materialistic thinking, etc. As a result, most Chinese people were neither psychologically nor monetarily dependent on the Party-state during this period of painful transition. Clearly, the authoritarian state hoped to utilize patriotism as a

unifying ideology to manage growing dissatisfaction and foster social cohesion. However, the pluralistic interests, beliefs, and opinions are beyond exaggeration during China's rapid economic development. Moreover, under the new economic, political, and mass media structure, the new patriotism should legitimate the economic liberalization and political conservation, as well as restore the Party-state's legitimacy in the post-1989 era. Accordingly, instead of monopolizing social discourse, the Party-state's new patriotic discourse had to incorporate various kinds of interests and thoughts.

Indeed, it is this hybridized ideology that makes the official patriotic discourse appealing to all Chinese people regardless of social strata. On the one hand, the patriotic discourse echoed the "strong nation complex" among Chinese people. Both of its key arguments – centralization in politics and liberalization in economics – were constructed around the vision of transforming China into a "strong nation". For example, to stress the importance of social stability led by the Party-state, it was argued that only with a stable society can China develop economically at a rapid pace that enables it to be strong. Thus, faced with Western countries' plot against us, what Chinese people should do is "biding time while nurturing grievances" (*woxin changdan*), and "turning grief into strength" to reinforce comprehensive national power guided by the Party-state's "reform and opening" policy. On the other hand, the Party-state also compromised with intellectuals' discourse in its patriotic discourse, incorporating the authoritarian thinking from New Conservatism, the pro-traditional culture element from New Confucianism, and criticism of Western countries from the New Left. In addition, even liberals reemerged under the CCP's connivance, supporting the Party-state's globalization strategy, and acting as a counterbalance to the radical anti-Western sentiment among the citizens, which would impair China's economic construction by potentially dissuading would-be investors.

Mass Media: a Civil Society?

As we argued previously, the development of market economy promotes privatization and decentralization among the society, both of which reshape the state-society relations in the 1990s. Particularly, with the formation of the media market, various kinds of newspapers and TV programs emerged. The multiple

discourses in mass media represented pluralistic interests and ideas from different social strata. Fierce debates between different opinions also appeared in mass media. Investigative journalism flourished, exploring numerous social problems, the abuse of power, etc. All such positive changes were shaped by the burgeoning media market and the trend of media commercialization. However, all such changes did not promote mass media as a civil society. This distinction is clearly manifested in both power relations and media nationalistic discourse. First, as argued before, almost all the intellectuals become “establishment intellectuals”, cooperating with the Party-state to promote official patriotic discourse and legitimize its economic liberalization and political authoritarian argument. And mass media, as well, was under the Party-state’s strict control. In such situation, it is clear that media commercialization trend in the 1990s has not pushed the mass media as a civil society. Second, considering the features of media nationalistic discourse under such power relations, we found that instead of encouraging rational discourse, mass media, especially in the book market, always radicalized the already aggressive anti-Western discourse. Though the alternative opinion against aggressive anti-Western nationalistic discourse from liberals appeared since the mid-1990s, it was incapable of balancing the radical anti-Western mood among the society, especially under the Party-state’s information control.

Then, why the development of China’s media market did not promote mass media as a civil society? And why the emergence of media professionalism did not promote the “publicness” of mass media? Fundamentally, the reason is rooted in China’s unique media market structure. First of all, operating under the dual “state-market” logic, the content that can satisfy both the requirements of media market and state was non-political or “main-melody” stories. Accordingly, the mass appeal papers, such as evening papers, youth papers, metro papers, lifestyle papers, and entertainment papers etc., became popular and widespread in each city of China. In addition, various “main-melody” drama series, movies, and popular songs, also achieved mainstream success. As advertising-driven media offering entertainment, the “main-melody” contents promoted official patriotic discourse effectively by infusing popular and entertainment elements. More to the point, as showed before, under financial pressures and harsh competition in the burgeoning book market, nationalistic topics became the first choice for book dealers despite the political risk

involved. Yet, this nationalistic discourse, catering to aggressive nationalistic sentiments among ordinary citizens, radicalized the anti-Western nationalistic discourse among the society.

It is clear that both the pressures of political control from the Party and the drive for profit in the marketplace forced media agents preferring to produce non-political or political correctness contents. For the nationalistic books that containing sensitive political issues, they would only radicalized the already strong anti-Western sentiment, rather than promoting rational and critical discussions on political affairs and social problems. More importantly, when the volume of entertainment, Party-inspired propaganda, and radical anti-Western nationalistic discourse predominate the mass media as it did in the 1990s, rational and reflective thinking cannot be cultivated. With all these in mind, it is not surprising that media commercialization did not lead to the media market evolving as a civil society in the 1990s.

Conclusion

The social agents' projects and hegemonic struggles in the 1980s finally led to the transformation of social structure from "Totalitarian state - Planned commodity economy" to the "Authoritarian state - Socialist market economy – Media market" in the 1990s, though such a far-reaching influence was unforeseen and unintended by *qimeng* intellectuals. Under such new social structure, the discursive relations among the four agents changed. The "historic bloc" between intellectuals and mass media was cut off. Instead, both intellectuals and mass media cooperated with the Party-state to legitimize official discourse, and maintain society stability. Accordingly, with the discursive relations articulated in new ways, the hegemonic nationalistic discourse also changed, from liberal intellectual-led a liberal orientation to the CCP-led conservative, anti-West, and pro-CCP in the 1990s.

From a structural analysis, we found that under the authoritarian political structure, China's Party-state exerted strict control to intellectuals and the mass media. In such closed information environment, Chinese people can only obtain pro-CCP information and the Party-state's explanation to the information. Accordingly, the radical white-or-black and justice-or-evil logic and anti-western propaganda in the

official patriotic discourse became popular in the 1990s. Meanwhile, China's rapid economic growth in the 1990s satisfied the "strong nation complex" among Chinese people, which further legitimized the Party-state's authority and fostered the anti-western sentiment when facing series confrontations between China and western countries. All such factors helped the official patriotism acquired hegemonic status among the society in the 1990s.

Besides, in the burgeoning media market that operating under the dual logic of "state-market", nationalistic books with radical anti-Western sentiment became the book dealers' first choice under the principle of political safety and market profitability. Accordingly, China's media market further radicalized the anti-Western sentiment in the public. More significantly, with the mass media full of consumerism, repackaged Party propaganda, and radical anti-Western sentiment, it can only cultivate a "radical audience" without democratic ideals and rational thinking. As a result, China's mass media did not display any signs of a kind of civil society in the 1990s.

Chapter Six Netizen-led Anti-Western Nationalistic Discourse in the 2000s: the Case of Anti-Tibet Independence Movements

In the previous chapter, we argued that the CCP-led anti-west and pro-CCP nationalistic discourse, replacing the liberal discourse in the 1980s, acquired hegemonic status in the 1990s China. Behind the transition of hegemonic discourse were the changing power relations among the four agents. Significantly, the historic bloc between *qimeng* intellectuals and media intellectuals were cut off, and consequently, almost all Chinese intellectuals became “establishment” in the 1990s. They, on the one hand, echoed the official patriotism and legitimated the Party-state’s authoritarian control from different angles. On the other hand, they were lacking intensive interactions with the ordinary citizens. Most of their arguments and proposals were within the intellectuals’ circle and rarely caught the attention of the ordinary citizens. In the media realm, while the newspapers generally obeyed the Party-line, the book publishers always went beyond it, by radicalizing the official anti-west discourse, or straightforwardly criticizing China’s ongoing economic reform.

We then explained the features of nationalistic discourse and power relations in the 1990s China from a structural perspective. Specifically, the crisis of hegemony in 1989 forced the Party-state to carry out a radical economic modernization project to keep the revolutionary democratic sentiment within a moderate framework. In addition, the Party-state adopted the authoritarian political system to regain its control on the society and condense social consensus through patriotic education with a strong anti-west sentiment. Under the Party-state’s systematic authoritarian control, the intellectuals and mass media had to obey the Party-line. Moreover, the rapid development of the economy in the 1990s further undermined the autonomy of Chinese intellectuals. More and more intellectuals tended to be more interested in maintaining their own rising status than in promoting democratic ideas for the masses. Then, the book agents, operating under the dual logic of the state and

market, further radicalized the official patriotic discourse. This is because the anti-west discourse may echo the official patriotism, while the radical sentiment can absorb the attention from the public. With the nationalistic books flourishing in the book market, the radical anti-west discourse acquired the hegemonic status in society.

In this chapter, we will examine the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s, as well as power relations in the discursive level, by the case of anti-Tibet independence movement and the pro-overseas Beijing Olympic torch relay in 2008. First, Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s was diversified compared with the homogeneous anti-western nationalistic discourse in the 1990s. Though official discourse was more rational, it lost hegemonic status in the struggle with popular discourse. Yet, amongst the clashed popular nationalistic discourse, it is still the radical anti-western discourse that finally acquired hegemonic status. Then, when we examine the discursive relations among the four agents, we may find that the Party-state's authoritarian ideological control was decentralized and diluted by reemerging marginalized intellectuals, market-oriented mass media, as well as the citizens, presented as millions of Internet users. Indeed, the cracks appear in the Party-state's hegemonic patriotism in the 2000s. Nationalistic discourse in the 2000s was diversified, contested, which even challenged official patriotism. However, as the continuities of the official patriotism in the 1990s, *zuofens'* hegemonic nationalistic status implies that Chinese netizens still have no enough ability to pose serious challenge to the Party-state. Finally, this chapter will argue that it is the new "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – the Internet society" that reshaped power relations among four agents, as well as the radical feature of hegemonic nationalistic discourse.

Diversified Nationalistic Discourse

On March 14, 2008, Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, saw the most serious disturbances since the Tibetan uprising of 1959. During the riot, hundreds of mobs and Tibet-separatists threw stones at the Han Chinese, and smashed and overthrew the shops owned by them. Moreover, many governmental and Party offices, news organizations were also attacked and damaged. During such destructive activities,

Tibet-separatists trampled the Chinese national flags in the main streets, cheering and yelling “Long live Tibet!”, “Free Tibet!”, and “Long live the Dalai Lama!” In the sensitive time before the Beijing Olympics, this disturbance quickly sparked series of anti-West nationalistic activities among Chinese people, especially Chinese youth. And this wave of anti-West nationalistic sentiment was continuously overheating and even went on to the overseas Olympic torch relay when Tibet-separatists attempted to sabotage the torch relay by protesting. Through the case, this chapter will illustrate the new features of China’s nationalistic discourse in the 2000s and the power relations behind it, as well as explaining them from a structural perspective.

Hegemonic Nationalistic Discourse: Netizen-led Radical Anti-Western Rhetoric

With more than ten million Chinese Internet users making their voice through the Internet, Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s not only became an increasingly mixed cauldron in which more and more social agents influence its formation and features; but also, it was more contested than we can imagine it to be. There are, at least, three distinctive features of Chinese hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 2000s. First, it was led by millions of Internet users rather than intellectual-led in the 1980s or the CCP-led in the 1990s. However, second, instead of promoting rational and critical nationalistic discourse, the logical and radical content of such netizen-led nationalistic discourse was the continuities of the official patriotism in the 1990s. Third, compared with the almost homogeneous anti-Western nationalistic discourse in the 1990s and the pro-Western discourse in the 1980s, China’s popular nationalistic discourse in the 2000s diversified. Fierce quarrels and controversies always broke out amongst the clashed nationalistic discourses.

Radical Anti-Western Sentiment

The reason that the “3·14” Tibet riot initiated the widespread anti-Western sentiment amongst Chinese people was some fake reports with clear errors made by the Western media on the Tibet riot. On a slide-show “*Riot in Tibet: True Face of*

Western Media"⁸⁹ posted on YouTube, it accused CNN, Germany-language TV station RTL, the Radio France Internationale website (RFI) and other international media of cropping pictures of Indian and Nepalese police wresting Tibetan protesters with captions about China's crackdown. Within a few days, this slide-show was quickly transferred to numerous BBSs, chat-rooms, and personal blogs in mainland China, which further ignited Chinese netizens' angry towards the Western media's deliberate misleading. In one of the most popular websites, www.mop.com, radical anti-western sentiment was widespread with words such as, "kill the foreign!" and "Kill with no leniency!". On March 18, a website named "Anti-CNN" launched to respond to the lies and distortions of facts made by Western media in a systematical way.⁹⁰ In the first five days, the website attracted 500,000 visits per day, and received more than 1,000 volunteers who offered to help check facts and translate the foreign media distortions of the Tibet issue.⁹¹ In those days, CNN's bureau in Beijing was deluged by a barrage of phone calls and faxes that accused, sometimes with threats, the organization of bias coverage.

Yet, the Tibet riot was just the beginning of the candled radical anti-Western nationalistic discourse of Chinese people. When the Beijing Olympic overseas torch relay went to Paris on April 7, the scene was so noisy that not only did the Olympic officials unlight the torch four times for the sake of safety; but, Jin Jing, a handicapped Chinese overseas torch bearer, was also assaulted by the ethnic Tibetan protesters during the torch exchange. When the video clip of the torch relay in Paris with Jin Jing's brave story was uploaded on China's major online forums by Chinese overseas students, tens of thousands of Chinese Internet users were moved by Jin, and went into frenzy to saboteurs. The protesters who grabbed the torch from Jin became the public enemy of Chinese netizens. The netizens, on the one hand, broadcasted the demonstrators' photo and wanted them over the world through the Internet; on the other hand, the netizens organized "Protecting the Olympic Flame Team" to ensure the smooth running of the relay in San Francisco and other cities overseas.

⁸⁹ <http://hk.youtube.com/watch?v=uSQnK5FcK>, Retrieved March 20, 2008.

⁹⁰ <http://www.anti-cnn.com/>

⁹¹ Jill Drew, "Protests may only harden Chinese line", *Washington Post*, March 24, 2008. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/23/AR2008032301595.html>, Retrieved March 25, 2008.

Besides venting strong anti-Western nationalist frustration through the Internet, the more radical boycott Carrefour movement broke out in the wake of the unfavorable overseas torch relay and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy's saying that he wants to boycott the Beijing Olympics. From April 13, the boycott Carrefour movement pervaded throughout China, from Wuhan to Hefei, Shanghai, Suzhou, Beijing, Kunming, Hangzhou and other big cities. At Hefei, thousands of university students gathered at the Carrefour store in San Li'an on the evening of April 18. They waved national flags, sang the national anthem, chanted patriotic slogans, and signed their names on the national flag, protesting French government's pro-Tibet independence attitude. When the San Li'an branch was forced to close, student demonstrations took place at the other two Carrefour branches in Hefei the following day. This time, Chinese youths were more radical and hoped to burn the French national flag to vent their strong anti-French sentiment, but instead, they burned the Holland national flag, which is similar to the French flag. Moreover, more than 50 students rushed into the Carrefour, destroying part of the store setup, staring at and condemning innocent shoppers and buyers. The students' radical sentiment and activities forced the check-out counters to shut down temporarily, with the cashiers looking perplexed. The anti-riot police even showed up at the scene, afraid that student demonstrators may create big trouble, to maintain order. However, on April 19, all three Carrefour stores in Hefei were closed. Meanwhile, the homepage of Carrefour China was also hacked by Chinese hackers, carrying a "Boycott Carrefour" slogan.

Netizen-led "Showing Attitude" Kind of Discourse

The radical feature of China's strong anti-Western sentiment in the 2000s also manifested at the "showing attitude" kind of nationalistic discourse in all of the anti-western activities. To most "hot-blooded" Chinese nationalists, a person who loves China should show his/her support to the Beijing Olympics and the Chinese government, and show anti-Western stance through boycott activities. When I interviewed two Internet users who took part in the boycott Carrefour movement in Beijing, both of them told me that the most important aim was to "show the strength of Chinese people to foreigners", to tell foreigners that "if the Chinese people unite together, there is nothing that we cannot win". (Interview #17) Besides boycott

activities, most Chinese people showed their attitude through the Internet, especially by the “red heart signature” activity. From April 16, more than 2 million Chinese MSN and QQ users added a pattern of “red heart” and the English word “China” in front of their online signatures to show their unity and patriotism to the world. As one of my friends described, it was a huge interpersonal pressure if she did not add the “red heart” before her online signature, which all of her MSN friends had done. Moreover, she would be considered “unpatriotic” by her friends and everyone would cease to talk to her (Interview #18). The real attitude change happened to Jin Jing. When she refused to boycott Carrefour, she was quickly labeled as a “traitor” by Chinese Internet users, though she was just portrayed as “the most beautiful torchbearer” by them only a few days ago.⁹²

Here, to tell foreigners the rise and strong strength of China, it is clear that the “strong nation complex” played a significant role behind such “showing attitude” discourse. Besides, their support to the Party-state also contained strong pragmatic thinking. For example, most Chinese people condemned the Tibet riot from an economic standpoint. For them, it is undeniable that Tibetans received great financial and policy support from the central government every year, and Tibetan people’s life is in the best condition in history. Therefore, they believed that the “3 • 14” Incident and the series of Tibetan-separatists protests were schemed by the Dalai group and supported by western countries, with the aim of creating chaos and splitting China apart. At this time, what Chinese people should do now is to support the Party-state for a wonderful Olympics.

Thus, clearly, the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 2000s, represented by the case of the anti-Tibet Independent movement, was full of radical anti-Western and pro-CCP sentiment, and the logic of “conspiracy theory”, and “economic development determinism”, which was similar with the CCP-led nationalistic discourse in the 1990s. Yet, interestingly, instead of being led by the CCP, the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 2000s was directly led by the emerging millions of Internet users. Indeed, from the beginning, the anti-Tibet Independence

⁹² Jin Jing’s post on Tianya: “*The feelings of being scolded by numerous people*”, <http://cache.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/sport/1/113163.shtml>, Retrieved April 22, 2008.

movement was initiated and organized by Internet users voluntarily, without the Party-state's guide.

For example, when the Tibet turbulence broke out, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) did not hope to stress this incident in the mass media; accordingly, the *People's Daily* only gave a brief introduction to this incident with a stern official attitude. However, the seven-minute online video "*Tibet was, is, and always will be a part of China!*", with stern words and forceful background music, ignited the strong nationalistic feelings among Chinese people.⁹³ When the video first showed on Youtube, it was crazily transferred by numerous mainland Internet users, and thus, spread like wild fire across China. Millions of Chinese Internet users burned with righteous indignation, leaving thousands of pages of messages to support the video.

Then, when the western media made bias reports on the "3·14" Incident, Chinese Internet users also collected the evidence spontaneously and made the slideshow "*Riot in Tibet: True Face of Western Media*". To respond the lies and distortions of facts in a systematical way, Rao Jin, a 23-year old student who graduated from Tsinghua University, launched the Anti-CNN Web site. Identifying CNN as "the World's Leader of Liars", it linked articles, videos and photos documenting some of the alleged distortions in the coverage of the Tibet events; It also invited submissions that documented bias or countered misrepresentations of China in the global media.

Later, faced with the disturbance of the overseas torch relay, Chinese nationalists organized the "Protecting the Olympic Flame Team" through the Internet, welcoming all Chinese people to protect the torch relay, whether it is protecting the torch in reality or showing their attitude on the Internet. The turbulence in Paris, especially Jin Jing's brave story that protected the flame and struggled with Tibetan

⁹³ The video was said to be made by a young Chinese overseas student. In it, six points to oppose Tibet-separatists' activity of tearing the country were listed: 1) China has 56 ethnic groups and is a multicultural nation-state just as Canada; 2) Tibet has been a part of China for thousands of years; 3) Prior to 1950 when Chinese regained Tibet, Tibet was still in a slavery society under Dalai Lama's puppet regime; 4) DaLai Lama was, and still is, funded by the CIA to separate Tibet from China; 5) The Chinese government spends 200 millions RMB a year developing Tibet, building schools, hospitals, infrastructures, etc; and, 6) China is not Yugoslavia. No one could ever, ever break it apart. Obviously, all such claims were accorded with the official discourse, from "national condition" perspective, to "conspiracy theory", "economic development determinism", white or black logic, etc.

protesters, further promoted nationalists organizing activities to boycott French goods. They not only listed the French goods through the Internet, calling Chinese people to boycott them, but also organized boycott Carrefour activities, when they found that the LVMH group, who alleged to have donated money to the cause of Tibet independence, was the largest shareholder of Carrefour. Around April 10, an Internet post titled “Boycott French good, let us start with Carrefour”, which was initially posted to the Mop forum by “Shui Ying”, generated a wave of passion amongst netizens quickly. Meanwhile, another larger scale campaign was organized over mobile SMS, calling for a seventeen day boycott to Carrefour, from May 8 to May 24, exactly three months before the Beijing Olympics. Within one day, ten new QQ groups were set up by Shenzhen Internet users to communicate boycott Carrefour related issues. Finally, the boycott Carrefour movements took place in many big cities of China starting in mid-April.

Obviously, all such nationalistic activities and discourse were directly led and promoted by numerous Chinese Internet users. Yet, instead of rational and critical thinking, we found that both logic and activities in netizen-led nationalistic discourse were similar with the CCP-led patriotic discourse in the 1990s. In this respect, it illustrates that the official patriotic discourse in the 1990s was so successful that it had already internalized into the heart of Chinese people.

Clashed Popular Discourses: “Don’t be too CNN!” vs. “Don’t be too CCTV!”

Though netizen-led strong anti-western and pro-CCP nationalistic discourse acquired hegemonic status in the 2000s, the popular nationalistic discourse clashed with fierce quarrels. Unlike the almost homogeneous popular nationalistic discourse before, the popular discourse in the 2000s sharply divided into two camps: *zuofens* (*left-wing angry youths*) and *youfens* (*right-wing angry youths*). As shown before, around the Tibet riot and the subsequent issues, *zuofens*, who called themselves “hot-blooded patriots”, condemned the Tibetan separatists and supported the Party-state with similar logic and activities of the official discourse in the 1990s. Yet, in the meantime, *youfens*, with liberal and self-reflexive thinking, always focused on the Party-state’s problems, even when facing the Tibet riot and the bias reports from western media. Unfortunately, instead of promoting rational-critical kind of debating and creating a consensus amongst the two camps, their sharp controversies

only led to a severe mutual misunderstanding and abusing. This sharp antagonistic attitude further radicalized Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s.

The noticeable example of the sharp conflict between the two camps was the “Chang Ping event”. Faced with the radical anti-Western nationalistic discourse after the Tibet riot, Chang Ping, the deputy editor-in-chief of *Southern Metropolis Weekly (SMW)*, wrote an essay titled, “*Tibet: the truth and nationalistic mood*”, and published it at FTChinese.com on April 3 and separately in his own blog renamed, “*Where does the truth about Lhasa come from?*”.⁹⁴ In this article, he criticized the Chinese government of blocking Tibet-related information, and of *zuofens* “showing attitude” kind of nationalistic discourse. For him, the former forced Chinese people to obtain additional information from overseas media which promoted the spreading of rumors; the latter, including the popular ANTICNN website, only focus on the side that you are on, rather than news objective. Instead, Chang argued that if the numerous Chinese Internet users really care about truthful news, not only should they expose western media’s fake reports, but they should also challenge the news control by the Chinese authority. Indeed, the harm from the latter is even worse than the former, because only in an open atmosphere with adequate discussions can we have the opportunity to obtain truth.

Nevertheless, this article did not calm the radical nationalistic mood. By contrast, it ignited a new round of sharp controversy between *zuofens* and *youfens*. Based at China.com BBS, *zuofens* attacked Chang Ping as a “Chinese traitor” and a “running dog of Western countries”. They labeled the *Southern Metropolis Daily (SMD)* as a “Chinese version of CNN”, of course, in a sense due to CNN’s bias report on Tibet rather than positive recognition of its professionalism. On April 4, there were more than 20,000 *zuofens* leaving messages on the BBS of China.com, asking to shut down the *SMD* and punish the Chinese media which colluded with foreign forces. In the following days, *zuofens* posted a series of articles criticizing Chang Ping’s promotion of universal values rather than national unification and exposing that the

⁹⁴ See, <http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001018387>, and, <http://blog.ifeng.com/article/1371855.html>, retrieved both of them on April 8, 2008. But this article had been deleted from Chang Ping’s blog now.

SMD was being controlled by foreign investment.⁹⁵ Moreover, on April 11, the *Beijing Evening News* joined the debate suddenly, by publishing the article “*Chang Ping: the rumormonger to freedom*” with the alias name Wen Feng.⁹⁶ Full of hysterical words, this article made a personal attack on Chang Ping and condemned the westernization trend of *SMD*. Under such pressures, Chang Ping, asked by the *SMD*, made a statement on his blog that the articles in his blog and FT Chinese.com website have nothing to do with his newspaper. He was, then, removed from the newspaper. In the meantime, *youfens* who gathered at Tianya BBS and kdnet BBS criticized *zuofens*’ overreaction to Chang Ping’s essay. When *zuofens* laughed at *youfens* by “Don’t be too CNN!” for fake reports on the Tibet riot, *youfens* ridiculed *zuofens* by “Don’t be too CCTV!” for fake news and news control from the Party propaganda.

Needless to say, the confrontations between *zuofens* and *youfens* were not only restricted to the “Chang Ping event”. On the day that the Olympic torch was carried through San Francisco, Grace Wang, a Chinese freshman at Duke University attempted to act as a mediator between Tibetan protesters and China patriots, letting the two groups to understand and negotiate with each other. However, this activity enraged Chinese *zuofens*. Within a day, a photo of Wang with the words “traitor to your country” emblazoned in Chinese across her forehead popularized on China’s numerous BBSs, followed with thousands of raging, derogatory posts. Moreover, her Chinese name, identification number and contact information were also posted, along with directions to her parents’ apartment in Qingdao, Shandong province. Of course, such radical “showing attitude” activity with a personal attack was sharply condemned by *youfens*. When *zuofens* called Wang a “traitor” (*maiguozei*), *youfens* called *zuofens* “patriotic thieves” (*aiguozei*).

Generally speaking, the features of hegemonic nationalistic discourse were still anti-west, and pro-CCP in a radical form, both the logic and activities of which were the continuities with the official patriotic discourse in the 1990s. However, there

⁹⁵ For the two online articles, see, “*The Southern Metropolis Daily: Universal values cannot above national unification*”, in http://club.china.com/data/thread/1011/888/22/41/5_1.html, retrieved on April 6; and, “*The truth of the Southern Metropolis Daily*”, in <http://www.wyxsx.com/Article/Class4/200803/33215.html>, retrieved on April 10, 2008.

⁹⁶ See, http://liy303.tianyablog.com/blogger/post_show.asp?BlogID=4872&PostID=13378144&idWriter=0&Key=0, retrieved April 12, 2008.

are also two differences. First, the strong anti-west and pro-CCP discourse in the 2000s was directly led by numerous Chinese Internet users rather than being promoted by the Party-state. In other words, it is the popular nationalistic discourse, rather than official patriotic discourse, that acquired hegemonic status in the 2000s. Second, compared with homogenous popular discourse before, it was diversified and clashed in the 2000s. However, the fierce quarrels amongst *zuofens* and *youfens* did not promote rational and critical nationalistic discourse as a consensus among the whole society. Instead, they only deepened the mutual misunderstanding between the two camps, and promoted nationalistic discourse in a more radical form.

Hegemonic Projects and Discursive Relations

As has shown before, Chinese hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 2000s was led by millions of the Internet users. Though the popular discourse was divided and clashed, *zuofens*' radical anti-west and pro-CCP discourse still won the hegemonic status. Compared with situations in the 1990s, it is clear that both continuities and changes existed. Again, to explain the radical change and continuities, as well as why the more liberal and rational nationalistic discourse could not acquire the leading position, we should turn our attention to the four agents' changing nationalistic projects and their discursive relations.

Official Patriotism: From Radical to Rational

Compared with the radical anti-western official discourse in the 1990s, the official nationalistic discourse adopted a more moderate attitude towards the West. Besides, with strong economic consideration, it also became more pragmatic and rational. Taking the anti-Tibet independence movement for example, when the center of Lhasa descended into chaos, China's policemen simply kept their distance, which led to Lhasa being under rioters' control for several days. Even on the night of March 14, the authorities only sent armoured personnel-carriers laden with riot police to put out the biggest blazes, and then sealed off the old Tibetan area for "special traffic-control measures". Without bloody crackdown, declaring martial law, or enforcing any emergency restrictions, it is clear that China's authority, taking into account the international influence, hoped to handle the unrest gradually and

peacefully.⁹⁷ Besides, instead of blocking messages and expelling foreign journalists and tourists after the Tibet turbulence, the authority just persuaded them to leave for safety considerations. Moreover, two weeks after the riot, western press corps were allowed to go to Tibet for interviews. Though the interview route for the western media was organized by the State Council Information Office (SCIO) previously, it at least displayed the authority's much more open attitude to the world.

Then, faced with the western media's bias reports on the Tibet riot, The Party-state condemned western media by listing hundreds of pictures cropped before and after concretely.⁹⁸ Yet, the "conspiracy theory", and the logic of Manichean, black-or-white, justice-to-evil disappeared in official nationalistic discourse. By contrast, it explained the western countries' bias from their interior superiority complex. Then, when the influential western media, such as the Washington Post, RTL, NTV, AFP, etc, acknowledged their mistakes in reporting the violence in Tibet, and apologized to the Chinese people from March 23, the *People's Daily* quickly reported their apologies.⁹⁹ Clearly, the Party-state this time hoped to calm down the radical anti-western sentiment, instead of igniting it. Moreover, it asked Chinese people to have the "great power consciousness" (*daguo xintai*) – to respect different voices, express our own idea rationally, and smooth out such bias by holding a successful Olympic Games – to treat the western countries' bias towards China.¹⁰⁰ Cai Mingzhao, the deputy director of SCIO, indicated that the Chinese government will not be angered by outside criticisms and it will not ban the athletes' blogs that contain negative opinions because the Olympics should be an opportunity for the global media to look at China from a different angle. He even promised that

⁹⁷ Commentator, "Jianchi fazhi, baohu renmin, wei hu wending", [Uphold law, protect people, maintain stability], *People's Daily*, March 22, 2008.

⁹⁸ For example, Yue, Lushi, "Shi wuzhi, haishi pianjian?", [Ignorance, or bias?], *People's Daily*, March 24, 2008; "Qianglie qianze xifang meiti dui lasa shijian de waiqu baodao", [Strongly condemning western media's bias report on Tibet issue], *People's Daily*, March 27, 2008; "Huangyan tuiduan", [Lies have short legs], *People's Daily*, March 27, 2008; "Heibai burong diandao, shishi qineng hunxiao", [Right and wrong cannot be confused], *People's Daily*, March 27, 2008, etc.

⁹⁹ For example, "Ruishi yi dianshitai wei cuowu baodao Xizang weiti daoqian", [A Switzerland television made apology for bias Tibet reports], *People's Daily*, May 4, 2008; "CNN xiang Zhongguo renmin daoqian", [CNN made apology to Chinese people], *People's Daily*, May 16, 2008;

¹⁰⁰ He Zhenhua, "Ba ziji de shiqing banhao", [Do our things well first], *People's Daily*, April 19, 2008. Also see, He Zhenhua, "Aiguo zhuyi ruhe geng youli?", [How to make patriotism with much more strength?], *People's Daily*, April 20, 2008, etc.

foreign correspondents can interview anybody or any organization in China if they can get consent from the related organizations or individuals.¹⁰¹

Moreover, the strong pragmatic consideration also forces the Party-state to adopt a more moderate attitude towards Western countries. For example, when the boycott Carrefour movement began to spread, the *People's Daily* quickly published the Carrefour's statement, saying that Carrefour has never given money to aid the Dalai Lama. Then, the official Xinhua Agency interviewed the appropriate officer in China's Ministry of Commerce, who not only reiterated that Carrefour was against Tibet's independence and supported the Beijing Olympics, but also stressed that since entering China's market in 1996, 95% of products sold at Carrefour were manufactured in China.¹⁰² Besides, from April 14, 2008, the major Internet forums and search engine websites in mainland China were asked to systematically delete the posts calling to boycott Carrefour. From April 17, Chinese netizens found that the Easyown (*shenzhouxing*) users cannot send out short messages when they included words such as "boycott Carrefour". Meanwhile, numerous mainstream websites, such as China.com, Anti-CNN, People.com.cn, Xinhuanet.com, etc, transferred patriotic related articles from the official media, calling for rational nationalism and maintaining social stability. Clearly, afraid of the deterioration of China's investment climate, and damaging China's rapid economy and the interest of foreign companies in China, China's Party-state did not cater for a radical anti-Western sentiment this time.

New Elements in the Old Patriotism

Obviously, there are continuities in the official patriotism. Discourses such as "loving China means loving the CCP",¹⁰³ equating "national rejuvenation" with

¹⁰¹ Cai Mingzhao, "Zhongguo zhengfu keneng fangkuan dui caifang aoyunhui waiguo jizhe de xianzhi", [Chinese government may relax the restriction to foreign correspondents] March 21, 2008, <http://www.scio.gov.cn/gzdt/ldhd/zyxw/200803/t154271.htm>, Retrieved on April 30, 2010.

¹⁰² "Shangwubu jiu guonei bufen qunzhong dizhi jialefu biaotai" [The commerce ministry made declaration as to the boycott Carrefour issue], April 23, 2008, *People's Daily*.

¹⁰³ *Zhongyang bangongting yaoqiu kaizhan aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu yundong*, [General Office of the CPC Central Committee calls for launching patriotic education], April 26, 2009. http://news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20090426/15451268.html, retrieved on April 30, 2009.

supporting the Party-state's "reform and opening" policy,¹⁰⁴ and considering "social stability" as the precondition of a "strong nation"¹⁰⁵, still existed in official patriotism in the 2000s. Yet, changes also happened. Especially, the Party-state adopted a more moderate attitude towards western countries. For example, the "conspiracy theory", a binary attitude towards China and western countries that the Party-state once actively promoted, were all erased. Besides, new elements were also added into the patriotism. Indeed, as to the official explanation, patriotism is not an abstract concept and it should be understood in the concrete historical context. Then, for the Party-state, the "concrete historical context" since the 2000s means the era of globalization, and the "opening to the outside".¹⁰⁶ Under the new globalization situation, the Party-state made an effort to reduce the contradiction between its patriotism and globalization. In the national condition education, the Party-state draws distinction between official patriotism and radical anti-western discourse:

The coming times we faced is that the economic globalization penetrated deeply, the times that competition on comprehensive national strength among nations are intensive, and also the times that the Chinese nation's great rejuvenation lies before us.

In this time, as a great power, we should have due spirit height, and thus enrich the contemporary meaning of patriotism. Moreover, in the process of rejuvenation, the future and fate of the Chinese nation has merged into the world structure.... Thus, in this historical process, we should have great breadth of mind, turning rationality, opening, and generosity to our active choice and conscious mind-set.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ *Hujintao zai tong zhongguo nongye daxue shisheng daibiao zuotan shi de jianghua*, [The speech to the teachers and students at China Agricultural University], May 2, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-05/02/content_11301313.htm, retrieved on May 4, 2009.

¹⁰⁵ "Gedi gaoxiao shisheng fenfen biaoshi reqing yu lixing jiehe caishi zhenzheng aiguo", [University professors and students in whole China believed that the true patriotism combines the patriotic feelings and the rationality], April 22, 2008, *People's Daily*.

¹⁰⁶ Qiu Shi, "Cong aiguo zhuyi dao zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi", [From patriotism to socialism with Chinese characteristics], *Qiushi*, September 1, 2009, http://big5.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-09/01/content_1406329.htm, retrieved on September 2, 2009.

¹⁰⁷ "Rang aiguo zhuyi huanfa shidai de guangmang", [Patriotism should give a sparkle in contemporary times], *People's Daily*, April 15, 2009.

Moreover, traditional Chinese culture, especially the traditional Confucian vision of a world order, was utilized by the Party-state to deal with the contradiction between patriotism and globalization. For example, in Premier Wen Jiabao's speech at Harvard University in 2003, he not only projected an image of China as a force of peace through narrating China's long history, but he also argued that under the more complex social political issues around the world, conflict caused by ignorance and prejudice is even worse than that caused by a clash of interests. Accordingly, he suggested applying the Confucian concept, *he er bu tong* (*harmonious but different*), to resolve problems and conflicts in the international community.¹⁰⁸ While *he* projects a pacifist cultural image of China, *bu tong* means seeking common ground and engaging in dialogues between civilizations under the spirit of equality and tolerance.

The *he er bu tong* strategy, then, was further integrated into the Party-state's "peaceful rise" (*heping jueqi*) project. As a new political discourse, it was first promoted by Zheng Bijian, the vice president of the Central Party School, in a speech on "*A New Path for China's Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia*", presented to the Bo'ao Forum in November 2003, an Asian equivalent of the World Economic Forum that was established under the auspices of Jiang Zemin. On November 24, 2003, the Central Politburo further organized the Ninth Study Session, titled "*the Development History of the World's Main Great Powers since the Fifteenth Century*", with the hope of drawing lessons from the experiences of western countries in the process of becoming a great power, and clearly recognizing the tendency of world development and China's future development.¹⁰⁹ Emanated from this Politburo study session, the CCTV made a twelve-series documentary, "*Rise of the Great Powers*" (*Daguo jueqi*) since 2003, and broadcasted it at CCTV-2 from November 2006. In this documentary, it described the reasons that nine nations, from Portugal and Spain in the 15th century, to Netherlands, British, France, German, Japan, Russia, and the United States in the 20th century, rose as great powers in the world, and encouraged Chinese people to discuss what it means to be a major world power.

¹⁰⁸ Wen Jiabao (2003). "*Ba muguang touxiang zhongguo*", [Turning your eyes to China], Speech at Harvard University, December 10, 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Hu Jintao, the speech on the Ninth Politburo Study Session, 2003. From <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1024/2210998.html>; Retrieved April 14, 2009.

Interestingly, twenty years later, China's Party-state embraced the "blue civilization" again. Indeed, the documentary *Rise of the Great Powers* has so many similarities with the *River Elegy*, especially for its positive attitude to the western countries. For example, it breaks the narrative that links the western countries' development in the early stage with their exploitation and incursion. By contrast, an alternative historical argument about the rise of great powers was developed by citing numerous achievements worthy of emulation: Spain had a risk-taking queen; Britain's nimble navy secured vital commodities overseas; Russia and Japan's opening policy and active study of western countries' advanced technology; the United States regulated markets and fought for national unity, etc. By endorsing the idea that China should study the experiences of nations and empires it once condemned as aggressors bent on exploitation, the Party-state further showed its friendly attitude towards the capitalist countries.

Yet, the documentary *Rise of the Great Powers* was fundamentally different with *Heshang*. This is clearly shown in that, while *Heshang* made sharp self-criticizing and self-reflection towards China's traditional culture and the incomplete "reform and open" policy, *Rise of the Great Powers* emphasized historical themes that coincide with official patriotism. For example, in examining the rise of the United States, Lincoln is accorded a prominent part for his efforts to "preserve national unity" during the Civil War. However, his determination in two-party system even Union lines in a great victory is not mentioned. Similarly, Roosevelt wins praise for creating a bigger role for the government in managing the market economy during the economic crisis, and for his suggestion of the freedom for want in his Fireside Chats. Yet, three other freedoms – freedom of expression, freedom of worship, and freedom from fear – were never mentioned in the documentary. Actually, in this documentary, social stability, industrial investment, peaceful foreign relations and national unity are presented as more vital than military strength, political liberalization or the rule of law for a country to become a great power. And in today's world, the only way to become a great power, as it is argued, is through "peaceful rise", that mastering the ability of science and technological innovation, merging into the globalization trend, making an effort to cooperate within regions and in the globe for the double win, and exploring its own road to become a great power. Indeed, the term "peaceful rise", on the one hand,

incorporated the “strong nation complex” among Chinese people. Promising Chinese people a rising China as a great power in the world in the twenty-first century, the Party-state’s legitimacy can be further strengthened. On the other hand, it stressed that China’s rise as a major power in the world will not disrupt the international order or cause a threat to other countries. By contrast, it can only bring others along, and thus promote world peace and development.

Combative Popular Discourses Challenge Official Patriotism

Although the official patriotic discourse incorporated a “strong nation complex” and traditional Confucian culture, trying to promote a more moderate patriotism, the popular discourse, represented by cybernationalistic discourse, challenged the official patriotism instead of following it this time. This is indeed a dramatic turn of the relations between the ordinary citizens and the Party-state. As implied in previous chapters, Chinese popular nationalistic discourse was either influenced by the Party-state or the elite/grass-root intellectuals, or both of them, in the “reform and opening” era. Thus, it is the first time that the ordinary citizens became an active agent in promoting their own nationalistic discourses.

Yet, based on Huang and Lee’s category (2003), the popular nationalistic discourse in the 2000s was aggressive. Not only did the radical discourses of the two camps – *zuofens*’ radical anti-West and pro-CCP nationalistic sentiment and *youfens*’ radical pro-West and anti-CCP discourse – depict two Chinas, but they also posed a great challenge to the official patriotic discourse. As argued, the online popular nationalistic discourse in the 2000s divided as *zuofens* and *youfens*. Table 6.1 summarized different nationalistic discourse promoted by *zuofens* and *youfens*.

Table 6. 1 Different nationalistic discourse promoted by *zuofens* and *youfens*

<i>Features</i>	<i>Zuofens</i>	<i>Youfens</i>
<i>Core task</i>	Maintain national interest	Maintain universal values
<i>Aspire towards</i>	A strong nation-state	A democratic nation-state
<i>Negative attitude</i>	Towards western countries	Towards the Party-state
<i>Criticizing</i>	Western countries’ bias to China	Problems of the Party-state
<i>Method of problem-solving</i>	Rapid economic development	Complete political reform

As shown in Table 6.1, the biggest difference between *zuofens* and *youfens* is that the former holds an outward-problem outlook, while the latter holds an inward-problem outlook. For *zuofens*, with the “strong nation” dream, the most important task is to maintain China’s national interest through rapid economic development. And thus, they are more sensitive to western countries’ bias towards China, considering such activities as the Western countries’ plot to “split China apart”. Clearly, *zuofens*’ online nationalistic discourse is the continuities of the official discourse in the 1990s. By sharp contrast, with the dream of a democratic nation-state, *youfens* always focus on inner problems. Especially, they were inclined to expose China’s serious social problems, condemn the Party-state’s media censorship, and deconstruct the patriotism, in particular, “loving the CCP means loving the country” logic in official patriotic discourse. For them, the hope for China lies in complete political reform and pursuing “universal values”, such as democracy, freedom, human rights, etc. All such claims, interestingly, symbolize the continuities of the utopian liberal thought popularized in the 1980s.

Since both *zuofens* and *youfens* only paid their attention to one side of the question, the harsh debates and struggles between them were inevitable. When the “3 • 14” Tibet riot broke out, based on the *Strong Nation Forum* and *Kaidi Forum* separately,¹¹⁰ the “combat” between *zuofens* and *youfens* began a national-scale debate. When *zuofens* condemned Tibetan protesters’ barbarous violent activity and the western media’s bias reports, *youfens* criticized the Party-state’s national policies and media censorship. When *zuofens* promoted the logic of economic development determinism as the way to solve the Tibet riot, *youfens* argued that the injection of wealth into Tibet was not equivalent to the injection of happiness. As the Olympic flame continues its tumultuous world journey from Paris, *zuofens* applauded for the organizers’ protection measures, such as keeping the routes secret, changing the routes without notice, shortening the routes or temporarily putting out the flames and arresting protestors. But *youfens* felt embarrassment towards hiding the torch from one place to another. When *zuofens* organized boycott activities around China, *youfens* expressed their loathing to such “showing attitude” nationalistic activity. Instead of helping western people understand China, they

¹¹⁰ According to Le, Y. & Yang, B. X.’s study (2009), among the subject posts in the *Strong Nation Forum*, *zuofens*’ arguments account for 75%; while among the subject posts in the *Kaidi*, *youfens*’ arguments account for 48.4%.

argued, the boycott activities can only deepen their fear of us. Then, finally, *zuofens* called *youfens* “traitors” (*maiguozei*) and *network spies* (*wangluo tewu*, simplified as *wangte*), since they always promote western values and criticize the Chinese government. Yet, *youfens* labeled *zuofens* as “patriotic thieves” (*aiguozei*) or “50Cents Party” (*Wumao Dang*), laughing at their “trouble causing” patriotism and working for the Party-state to skew online public opinion.

Though fierce debates always broke out between *zuofens* and *youfens*, both of their nationalistic discourses indeed posed a great challenge to the official patriotism. On the one hand, the “strong nation” for *zuofens* means that becoming the strongest comprehensive national power in the world, and thus having abilities to establish new orders and rules in the international world. Clearly, this kind of nationalistic discourse, not only full of bellicose attitude towards the West, but also set China’s rise against the existing international political and economic system. It, indeed, challenges the moderate and “peaceful rising” discourse in official patriotism.

On the other hand, though *youfens*’ voice is not as loud as *zuofens*’, their challenge to the Party-state is more influential, through their inward-problem look, and with the help of the interactive information technology. Indeed in recent years, through *youfens*’ online monitor, more and more official scandals had been exposed, and more and more citizen-led protests organized. Noticeable examples included Zola’s reports about Chong Qing’s “Nailhouse” (*Ding Zihu*),¹¹¹ netizens’ online “Beat Tiger” movement,¹¹² and Xiamen citizens’ protest of the PX industrial project through the Internet,¹¹³ etc. Though all such events were motivated by common

¹¹¹ In 2007, China’s first citizen blogger, Zhou Shuguang (net name as “Zola”), posted in his blog a battle between developers and one couple who simply refused to move in the southwestern city of Chongqing. Zola’s effort turned such local story into a national controversy, and raised concerns from the central government. Finally, China’s National People’s Congress passed the first law giving private property substantial protection against local authorities who wished to develop it.

¹¹² Still in 2007, Zhou Zhenglong, a villager from Zhengping County in Shanxi province, claimed to have risked his life spotting a South China tiger, a species that is known to be nearly extinct, and captured it on film. Quickly, Shanxi Provincial Forestry Bureau held a press conference, publicizing photographic evidence excitedly, backing up Zhou’s claim. However, Zhou’s photographs aroused suspicion from numerous netizen who expressed doubts about the authenticity of the digital pictures. Then, an online “Beat Tiger” movement spread through the whole country. Finally, evidences from netizens that the “tiger” was actually a paper model doctored with Photoshop were confirmed by cyber experts. Under such pressures, the local authorities had to claim that all pictures published were proven to be forged in 2008, and made a public apology for the South China tiger scandal.

¹¹³ In 2006, Xiamen local government introduced a US\$1.41-billion chemical plant project. As the largest industrial project ever in the city’s history, the government expected to produce 800,000 tons of paraxylene (PX) and generate revenues of 80 billion *yuan* (US\$10.45 billion) a year. However,

Internet users or non-establishment intellectuals, they finally not only attained national-scale influence, but also forced related authorities either to revise the law, or make a public apology, or suspend the project. Without a doubt, such online monitors challenged the Party-state's ideas and ability of state governing, and even its authority. A propaganda official in Suide County of Shanxi province even sighed that "If only we did not have the Internet! Then I can say anything if I like."¹¹⁴

Intellectuals' Re-aligning with Mass Media

One distinct feature of Chinese intellectuals in the 2000s was their re-aligning with the mass media and thus returning to the eyeshot of the ordinary citizens. On the one hand, though most establishment intellectuals, under the Party-state's systematic control, lived in the "ivory tower", concentrating on various projects sponsored by central or local governments with the aim of legitimating the Party-state's authority or helping the Party-state govern the state skillfully and effectively, some of them mounted the front stage actively, writing articles in newspapers, or giving public lectures through television. This is indeed in sharp contrast with situations in the 1990s: establishment intellectuals became various specialists focused on their own field of study and disappeared from the eyes of the ordinary people. On the other hand, non-establishment intellectuals who had vanished in the 1990s reemerged in cyberspace. Relying on the Internet, the Old Left, radical liberals and the so-called "public intellectuals", all showed up. Their different nationalistic projects and discourses not only diversified Chinese nationalistic discourses, but also posed a great challenge to the official patriotic discourse, especially when spread through the interactive Internet.

TV Cultural Forums and Establishment Scholars as Super Girl/Boy

since PX was a highly polluting, carcinogenic petrochemical, the Xiamen-based blogger Lian Yue and citizen blogger Zola spread tons of information about PX via blogs, calling for citizens in Xiamen to protest this project. Organized by text messages, on June 1, 2007, nearly 2,000 Xiamen residents took to the streets in a protest march to demonstrate against the plant. Then, Xiamen local government suspended the project, and held two public hearings on December, 2007, seeking opinions on the project. Finally, the government planned to relocate the halted chemical plant to Gulei Peninsula in Zhangzhou, Fujian.

¹¹⁴ Zheng, T. X. (2008). "Dang xiaozhang yudao xianzhang", [*When the head of school meets the head of County*], *Southern Personalities Weekly*, January 30, 2008.

From the 2000s, various “Cultural Forums” appeared from national to local TV programs. Many intellectuals walked out from university camps to such programs, giving public lectures to the public. Among them, the most influential program was the “Lecture Room” (*Baijia jiangtan*), produced by, and broadcasted on CCTV-10. With high audience rating, it even became the most famous program of the CCTV. Seemingly, without a famous anchorperson, and always broadcasted during late night hours, the popularity of such cultural programs means that intellectuals, influencing the public through the mass media, rekindled a new “cultural fever” in the 2000s. However, it is indeed different with *Heshang* in the 1980s. Instead of promoting a self-reflexive kind of spirit, intellectuals in such cultural programs always promoted Chinese traditional culture, and did not refer to contemporary political issues. Its success was instead, the victory of commercial force.

Take the famous “Lecture Room” for example. Broadcasted from July 2001, its initial aim was to popularize common sense among Chinese people. Accordingly, the program team invited famous scholars in various fields to give introductory lectures, such as Physics Nobel Prize winner Yang Zhenning and Li Zhengdao, scientist Zhou Guangzhao, writer Wang Meng, specialist in the novel *Dream of the Red Chamber* Zhou Ruchang, etc. However, the program was under great pressure with almost zero audience rating. Under CCTV’s new manageable system from 2003, programs with the lowest audience rates will be eliminated. Thus, “Lecture Room” decided to cater for audience’s interest by changing its orientation to traditional Chinese culture, since such kind of content, such as Yan Chongnian’s lecture on 11 emperors in the Qing dynasty, once received the highest audience rating in CCTV-10’s history. Then, with Yi Zhongtian’s series lectures of *Three Kingdoms*, Yu Dan’s the *Analects of Confucius* series and *Zhuangzi* series, both the program and those lecturers received the highest popularity. Yet, at the same time, the topics appeared in “Lecture Room” narrowed to Chinese history and Chinese literacy, along with few economic themes. Without any discussions on politics, current affairs, science and social science, it is clear that the program has no interest towards becoming a public sphere for rational and self-reflexive thinking.

Moreover, the program also tried to appeal to audiences with attractive stories. For traditional Chinese culture, the topics were always around anecdotes, love stories

and political struggles in the palace, without any theoretical orientation and critical thinking. Inspired from TV series, the content of each lecture was set to tempt audiences with many suspicions, so it can maintain a high audience rate and satisfy the viewers. In addition, instead of interpreting the ancient texts with dull and academic words, in most of lectures, especially Yu Dan's the *Analects of Confucius* series, lecturers tend to share their life experiences and perceptions, like *Chicken Soup for the Soul*. Indeed, packed by the directors, professors in the "Lecture Room" were always considered super girls or super boys, who only catered to the audience's interests, instead of public intellectuals who provide common sense and rational ideas to the public.

Indeed, intellectuals in the 2000s had already become important resources for the mass media to gain economic profit. And for intellectuals, they were also willing to cooperate with the mass media, turning academic research to TV series, catering for the need of the public and then gaining personal fame and economic feedback. As a result, though re-aligned with television again in the 2000s, intellectuals did not promote democratic and self-reflexive ideas, not to mention pushed the Party-state for political reform. Such a critical role was then taken by intellectuals in cyberspace. Promoting their own projects or concerns for public interest, online intellectuals' nationalistic discourses posed challenges to the official patriotic discourse.

The Rise of non-Establishment Intellectuals in Cyberspace

Old Left, Liberals, and Public Intellectuals

As it has been argued, under the Party-state's strict ideological control in the 1990s, intellectuals with alternative views disappeared. Almost all intellectuals became establishment intellectuals who promoted the Party-state's patriotic discourse from different aspects. Yet, the alternative ideas reappeared in the 2000s, with marginalized and non-establishment intellectuals reemerging in cyberspace. Indeed, as a new communication tool which is accessible to everyone with a strong interactive function, the Internet gradually became a new field for marginalized intellectuals. Furthermore, the rapid development of the Internet in China

witnessed the revival of the Old Left, Liberals and the so-called “public intellectuals”.

Tracing the chronological development of China’s leftist websites, Hu Yinan (2006) argued that the year 2003 saw the aggressive comeback of the Chinese leftist online, when 28 leftists’ scholars organized an online petition campaign, drafting and co-signing “*A Statement Opposing U.S. War Plans against Iraq*” (*Fandui Meiguo zhengfu dui Yilake zhanzheng jihua de shengming*) on February 2003. On the website <http://www.fanzhan.org>, which was coined solely to solicit online signatures for the statement, they finally collected 3,480 signatures under the theme of opposing the war. It was from this time onwards that Chinese leftists rushed online to find room to breathe again. After some years’ development, *the Utopia* (*Wuyou zhixiang*, <http://www.wyzxsx.com>) became the most famous leftist website.

Compared with leftists, Chinese liberals’ revival online was much earlier. In September 1999, *the Realm of Ideas* (*Sixiang de jiangjie*), China’s first website specifically designed for intellectual and academic readers, was created by Li Yonggang, a researcher in political science at Nanjing University at that time. The content in the website has a strong liberal orientation, including the works of liberal authors such as Dai Qing, Wang Lixiong, etc., whose articles could not otherwise be published in China. It also included commentary on sensitive topics such as the Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, Tibet and political reform. Though it was short-lived when it was shut down by the authorities in October 2000, an increasing number of liberal orientation websites then flourished. Dissatisfied towards the Party-state’s online censorship, Luo Yonghao, a Chinese Internet celebrity, created *Niubo* (www.bullog.cn) in 2006. Initiated by inviting bloggers whom Luo personally liked, *Niubo* quickly became an important online harbor for liberal intellectuals. Now, it is already been considered as one of the most liberal and edgy blog portals in Chinese cyberspace.

Also, with the rapid development of China’s Internet society, more and more so-called “public intellectuals” emerged online. Actually, most of them were liberals who faced the public, worked for the public and were concerned about public affairs. Among them, Lian Yue, a free columnist for many newspapers, was a representative “public intellectual”. Especially, he made an enduring effort to

construct a cybercivil society through his blog, *Lian Yue de diba dazhou*.¹¹⁵ With an “externally-focused, news-aware” genre, tens of thousands of clicks and hundreds of responses for each post, his blog had great influence among Chinese youths.

Radical Projects Challenge Official Patriotism

Accordingly, the leftist, liberals, as well as public intellectuals promoted different, even controversial nationalistic projects. Their projects not only made the picture of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s more complex, but also challenged the official discourse directly.

For example, the leftists challenged the Party-state’s neo-liberal economic reform policy. Chanting “Long Live Chairman Mao!” and guarding China’s socialism system, they criticized China’s reform as “signaling left, turning right” (*Dazuodeng, xiangyouzhuang*). Practically, they argued that the Party-state’s economic reform was only the continuity of the exploitation relating to old capitalism. Taking similar economic reforms in the states of Latin America and Russia as a negative example, they warned that liberal orientation economic reform finally may actually bring about serious problems and social disaster, rather than social justice and humanity.¹¹⁶ Besides, no matter from Mao’s ideology, or considering China’s national interest, they also had a strong anti-Western attitude, especially opposing China’s merge into the world.

By contrast, taking the universal values, such as democracy, human rights and freedom as ideal, China liberals also criticized the Party-state’s reform as “economic reform without political”. Especially, they sharply condemned the official logic of patriotism, which equates loving the CCP with loving the country. Instead, for them, having strong and happy individuals is more important than having a strong nation. And only democracy can guarantee free information and human right. For example, before the Beijing Olympics, when the official “happy media” promoted the “New Beijing” images actively, liberal intellectuals focused on China’s tainted food, dangerous work environment, bad air quality, and other social problems.

¹¹⁵ See <http://www.bullock.cn/blogs/lianyue/>

¹¹⁶ Among hundreds of articles in *the Utopia* criticizing the neo-liberalism, Liu Zhiming’s article is much more systematic. See, Liu Zhiming, “*Xin ziyou zhuyi quanqituhua de xingqi, weihai yu tidai gengxin shijian*”, [*The rise, dangerous and the renewal time of neo-liberalism globalization*], January 15, 2010, <http://www.wyzsx.com/Article/Class20/201001/125880.html>, retrieved January 16, 2010.

Without resolving such social problems, they not only “say no” to the Beijing Olympics publicly in their blogs,¹¹⁷ or transferring articles from international human rights organizations;¹¹⁸ more radically, they even drafted *08 Charter*, in which they asked for the transformation of China’s political system, and initiated online signatures.¹¹⁹ Such political activities, clearly, were of more serious challenge to the legitimacy of Party-state than leftists’ anti-economic liberalization discourse.

For public intellectuals online, striving towards constructing a cybercivil society, they always lead millions of Internet users to discuss serious social and political problems, and debate hot events or sensitive issues that were forbidden to be mentioned in mass media. In this process, online public intellectuals hoped to promote rational and reflexive thinking, instead of echoing official patriotism or catering for a “strong nation complex” among Chinese people. Take Lian Yue’s blog for example, from March 14 to May 12, 2008, Lian published 108 posts related to the Tibet issue. Among them, 12 were news from western media, 13 were his own commentaries published in various newspapers, 11 were other liberal intellectuals’ essays, and 11 were the latest information from China’s official mass media. In addition, amongst thousands of emails sent to him during the two months, he selected 61 representative emails to post in his blog, showing different views from different camps. By these efforts, Lian hoped that Chinese people can know others’ voices besides China’s official standpoint, and then discuss the Tibet issue in a full information environment. However, developing rational and reflexive thinking among Chinese people was not the hope of the Party-state, since with such consciousness and ability, Chinese people may also question policy, logic and ways for the Party-state’s governing. Besides, creating an open information environment

¹¹⁷ For example, on 8 August, 2007, during one-year countdown to the Beijing Olympic Games, Wang Xiaofeng, a famous editor at *Lifeweek* and notable bulloger, launched a new blog named “*Beijing Aoyun, wobu zhichi!*” [*Beijing Olympics, I Don’t Support!*], saying “no” to the Beijing Olympics publicly. Without a doubt, it has been shut down by related authorities within 6 days.

¹¹⁸ For example, the article “*China Human Rights Making No Progress*” by Human Right Watch, the slogan “*One world, one dream, and Universal human rights*”, and the handcuffs Olympics picture by Reporters Without Borders (RWB) were all transferred by bullogers.

¹¹⁹ There were 19 requirements in *08 Charter*. Among them, it mainly asked for political reform, such as separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial, democratic election, and establishing a federal republic of China; and human rights, such as speech and religious freedom, protecting private property by a privatization movement, a social security system that covers all Chinese people, and reducing the tax burden on Chinese people, etc. In the first batch of signatures, 303 were from mainland China, and 58 from outside Chinese. For the content of *08 Charter*, see, <http://www.ottawachinese.com/bbs/cgi-bin/view.cgi?forum=11&topic=1146>, Retrieved Dec 20, 2008.

was also not the aim of the Party-state, for the only concern of the Party-state was maintaining its legitimacy.

Hegemonic Struggles with the Party-state

With the help of the Internet, marginalized intellectuals with alternative views not only reappeared, but also tried to increase their influence on millions of Chinese Internet users and acquire hegemonic status for their nationalistic projects. Among them, liberal intellectuals always highly praised the role of the Internet as a new site to influence the ordinary citizens. As Dai Qing, the representative liberal intellectual said (Interview #19),

In China, we cannot estimate the importance of the Internet too much. For one thing, the CCP can hear and feel the genuine public opinion through the Internet. For another, it gives us – who had been blocked by the CCP to voice through mass media and academic journals – a new place to promote our ideas and thinking, and thus make us feel self-valuable to society. Indeed, I dare to say that the relative freedom of the Internet is not the government's initial intention. However, it is beyond the government's capacity to police cyberspace in the way that it controlled the traditional mass media. And it is really impossible for the government to assign one police to stand behind each person online.

Indeed, liberals faced much more risks than the Left in that their messages or even their blogs were blocked or shut down by the Party-state for their challenge to the legitimacy of the Party-state. Therefore, on the one hand, their influence was always limited to small groups, though they were frenzied with various ways of bypassing official online censorship. On the other hand, in such a struggling process, liberals found that to increase their influence, it is urgent to break through the Party-state's censorship system. Thus, they gradually turned their critical orientation from the Party-state's political autocracy to its media censorship. Especially, observing the phenomenon that Chinese citizens tended to praise China's great economic achievements but neglecting the Party-state's ideological control, Chinese liberals stressed repeatedly that "if the right to criticism is not free, then the praise is meaningless" (*Ruo piping bu ziyou, ze zanmei wu yi*).

By contrast, defending the Chinese national interest and socialism system, the Left sharply criticized various liberal projects and ideas. When liberal intellectuals such as Chang Ping criticized the official media censorship instead of condemning western media's bias reports, the Left created a *Special Topic* column on the website *Utopia*, in which they collected hundreds of articles criticizing Chang Ping from various websites and major BBSs, and labeled the *SMD* that Chang Ping worked for as anti-China media.¹²⁰ Among them, the most severe attack was from Sima Nan, a famous leftist and self-claimed "science warrior". Following liberals' "learning to the West" logic, he argued that the political legitimacy of both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party in the U.S. are based on the principle that "national interest is paramount and above all else".¹²¹ Yet, Chinese liberals did not introduce this to Chinese people. For one of *SMD*'s commentaries "*Another thinking to Tibet issue*", he criticized that the commentary only "objectively" reported Dalai's voice that he "never sabotaged Beijing Olympic", but did not say Dalai's manipulation of the Tibet riot and his proposal of establishing a "Greater Tibet"; it only criticized the central government's "economic development determinism" in Tibet's policy, but never talked about how the Tibet riot violated human rights; it only urged the central government to negotiate with Dalai, but never mentioned that our door for discussion was always open to Dalai.¹²² For Sima Nan, the aim of the liberals promoting "universal values" was to dispel the sense of nationalism and nationhood among Chinese people.¹²³ What he promoted, instead, was socialist values which are based on permanent ideals and human sympathy; and that only the development of the country can guarantee the welfare of Chinese people.

Clearly, though faced with the same strict ideological control, the Left and their online activities felt more free atmosphere than the liberals since their national interest argument supported the Party-state's authoritarian control, and their anti-liberal discourse in fact helped the Party-state maintain its authority. As a result, compared with liberal intellectuals' disperse online activities, the leftists'

¹²⁰ See, <http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class22/200804/36349.html>, Retrieved May 3, 2008.

¹²¹ Si Ma Nan, "*Learn to Mr. McKeown*".

<http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class22/200810/52775.html>, Retrieved October 10, 2008.

¹²² "*Kebi de youzhibing: jianping NanFang ZhouMo shiju guanchayuan dui Xizang de lingyizhong siwei*", [*Despicable infantilism: comments on "Another thinking to Tibet issue"*], <http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class4/200809/50646.html>, Retrieved September 20, 2008.

¹²³ From *Economist Observer's* interview to Sima Nan.

<http://www.xys.org/xys/ebooks/others/science/misc/wenchuan357.txt>, Retrieved June 13, 2008.

activities are more systematic and well organized. Take *Utopia* for example, unlike Bullog which is only a site collecting liberals' blogs, *Utopia* is a website organized into 11 different sections of interest, such as news analysis (i.e., "observation of the times", *shidai guancha*), theoretical critique (i.e., "thought collision", *sichao pengzhuang*), critical globalization (i.e., "global horizons", *guoji zongheng*), etc. For the thousands of articles accumulated since its establishment, *Utopia* provides a search engine for online readers. Online readers can also leave messages behind each article to express their opinions. Moreover, offline, it operates as a book bar to sell pan-Leftist books published both in China and overseas. The book bar also holds weekly salons, unofficial seminars and conferences, inviting elite leftists such as Cui Zhiyuan, Zuo Dapei, Han Deqiang etc, to discuss problems in China's reform process and various hot social issues. Needless to say, the relatively free atmosphere and well-organized online and offline activities further promoted the leftists' anti-Western nationalistic discourse winning hegemonic status.

Media Nationalistic Discourse

Combative Media Discourses

As has argued before, with the intensive media market competition, China's market-oriented newspapers actively learned from western media, and thus saw the rise of tabloid journalism and professional journalism since the 1990s China. The first western-style tabloid journalism was mainly represented by the popular "city newspapers" in the 1990s (Huang, 2001). And the second one, represented as *Southern Metropolis Daily* and *China Youth Daily*, insisted on the limited watchdog role, and kept the style of investigative journalism and the liberal-oriented editing policy. Then, at the end of the 1990s, the growing public interest in Sino-Western relations triggered a flourish of a new tabloid-style newspaper specializing in foreign affairs, such as *Global Times (Huanqiu shibao)*, *World News (Shijie bao)*, *Global Outlook (Huanqiu liaowang)*, etc. Such nationalistic newspapers always tried to provide what the readers want, and were always keen on making breaking news and writing nationalistic stories in a sensational style.¹²⁴ Meanwhile, nationalistic

¹²⁴ In an interview with an editor of the *Global Times*, I asked why the paper adopted a nationalistic angle when reporting foreign affairs. He firstly denied that his paper took a nationalistic perspective when reporting. But he admitted that *GT* aimed at satisfying what their readers wanted, and indeed

reports and commentaries in professional papers also increased noticeably. Accordingly, the fierce discourse struggles between two kinds of market-oriented newspapers broke out. Especially, both of them paid extraordinary attention on the Internet-triggered nationalistic events. They not only widely reported online nationalistic activities; but, many journalists also took part personally in the online debates, trying to lead the online popular nationalistic discourse.

Take the “3 •14” Tibet riot for example. For such a sensitive political topic, there is no room for both *Global Times* and *Southern Metropolis Daily* to develop stories around the Dalai Lama, but only following official tone. Nor can they introduce the voices and opinions from the Dalai group. However, around this issue, both of them chased online “hot” nationalistic events, such as anti-western countries’ bias reports, protecting the overseas torch relay, and the boycott Carrefour movement, developing a great number of reports, yet, without a doubt, from opposite perspectives and with sharp discourse struggles (see Table 6.2).

Table 6. 2 Discourse struggles between *GT* and *SMD* in three nationalistic related reports

	<i>Western media’s bias report</i>	<i>Protecting overseas torch relay</i>	<i>Boycott Carrefour</i>
	<i>Attitude:</i> Against	<i>Attitude:</i> Support	<i>Attitude:</i> Against in appearance, support in essence
	<i>Reports focus on :</i>	<i>Reports focus on:</i>	<i>Reports focus on:</i>
	1. Where the bias comes from?	1. Revealing the patriotic passion of global Chinese.	The effect of boycott activities
	2. Condemnations from Internet users	2. Denouncing pro-Tibet protesters’ savage act	<i>Key arguments:</i>
<i>GT</i>	<i>Key arguments:</i>	<i>Key arguments:</i>	Series of boycott activities make French government feel nervous.
	1. Western media never expose Dalai’s rumors; instead, together they invent the big lie.	1. Evil pro-Tibet protester sabotage torch relay;	<i>Style:</i> descriptive/rejoice
	2. Western countries hope to contain China by the Tibet issue.	2. Chinese people will win the victory finally.	
	<i>Style:</i> conflict framework	<i>Style:</i> descriptive/sentimental	

the headline stories of the paper were based upon feedback from various distributors around the whole country. (Interview #20)

	<i>Attitude:</i> Against	<i>Attitude:</i> Support	<i>Attitude:</i> Against
	<i>Reports focus on:</i>	<i>Reports focus on:</i>	<i>Reports focus on:</i>
	How to correct bias?	Revealing the patriotic passion of global Chinese.	What is the real patriotism?
	<i>Key arguments:</i>	<i>Key arguments:</i>	<i>Key arguments:</i>
SMD	1. The bias reports were not manipulated by western governments. Instead, it is the business nature of mass media that shape bias.	1. Olympic torch represents the universal values.	1. Patriotic sentiment needs balance from criticism;
	2. The effective way to correct bias is to become consumers of western media.	2. We should be tolerant with different opinions.	2. Chinese people should treat overseas criticism with tolerant, open, and free attitude.
	<i>Style:</i> commentary	<i>Style:</i> descriptive/ rational	<i>Style:</i> rational

For western media's bias reports, both of the two newspapers have a negative attitude, pointing and correcting the error pictures piece by piece. However, with a conflict framework, *Global Times* catered for the online radical anti-Western sentiment, especially in its report on the ANTICNN website, and criticizing western media's self-justification for bias reports.¹²⁵ In addition, in the reports, it articulated Western media's bias reports with the "conspiracy theory", arguing that western countries in the twenty-first century hope to contain China by the Tibet issue and split China apart by "Lama's revolution". Thus, the western media, together with the Dalai Lama invented the big lie that "Tibet is an independent country occupied by the PRC."¹²⁶ By contrast, *Southern Metropolis Daily* directly criticized the "conspiracy theory" logic, arguing that western mainstream media, rooted in the business society, cannot be controlled by the government.¹²⁷ Furthermore, it is such business nature, it argued, that shapes western media's bias, because media has to cater for its audience's political view. Since Chinese people in general were not the consumers of western media, they would not pay enough attention to public opinion from China. Thus, the effective way to correct CNN's

¹²⁵ For example, "CNN wei Xizang bushi baodao bianjie", [CNN defended for its mistake reports on Tibet issue], *Global Times*, March 31, 2008.

¹²⁶ "Xifang weihe mengda 'Zangdu pai'?", [Why western countries play "Tibet Independence" cards fiercely?], *Global Times*, May 5, 2008.

¹²⁷ "Xifang meiti chiyou shenme pianjian?", [What kind of bias western media have?], *Southern Metropolis Daily*, April 10, 2008.

bias was to package our own views in popular ways instead of official propaganda; and also, become consumers of the western media in an open media environment.¹²⁸

Then, for the overseas torch relay chaos, *Global Times* not only supported the radical online nationalistic discourse, but also presented them in a dramatic, eye-catching and assertive manner. Through a series of descriptive reports and many emotional stories, it displayed the sense that thousands of overseas Chinese people struggled with pro-Tibet protesters' savage acts, and defended the torch relay successfully. Meanwhile, it also criticized the French government's inability to safeguard the torch relay, and the western media for ignoring the strong patriotic voice of Chinese global patriots. Besides, the paper believed that various demonstrations from Chinese youths can finally help to correct the western media's bias to China.¹²⁹ Similarly, *Southern Metropolis Daily* also supported to safeguard torch relay activities from Chinese youth. Yet, the reason lies in that the torch represented universal values, peace for example, and human's common future.¹³⁰ Also, it gave the London police a positive image to safeguard the torch.¹³¹ Moreover, instead of criticizing western media's bias towards China, the paper called for respecting different voices and showing our tolerance as a great power.¹³²

Finally, considering Carrefour as a French enterprise, the virulent attitude of *Global Times* to Carrefour was obvious through its comment that, "it is ironic when seeing the countdown Ad. Post for Beijing Olympic in Carrefour".¹³³ Though it did not support online users' boycott activity directly, it rejoiced when seeing the French

¹²⁸ "Jiuzheng CNN pianjian de youxiao banfa", [The effective way to correct CNN's bias], *Southern Metropolis Daily*, April 19, 2008.

¹²⁹ "Wangyou shengyuan haiwai huaren fan zaongdu, fan pianjian", [Netizens support overseas Chinese people's anti-Tibet independence, anti-bias demonstrations], *Global Times*, April 11, 2008.

¹³⁰ "Aoyun shenghuo xiang shijie chuandi yongheng de pushi jiazhi", [The Olympic flame represents the external universal values], *Southern Metropolis Daily*, March 25, 2008, etc.

¹³¹ Such as, "Zangdu fenzi yuzai lundon jiechi aoyun huoju; lundon 2,000 ming jingcha baohu huoju chuandi", [Tibet splitists plan to hijack torch in London; 2,000 London police safeguard], *Southern Metropolis Daily*, April 7, 2008; and "Lundon jingfang jubu 'Zangdu' fenzi", [London police arrest Tibet splitists], *Southern Metropolis Daily*, April 8, 2008, etc.

¹³² For example, "Aoyun shenghuo buhui yin cubao chongji er andan", [The Olympic flame cannot dimmed by the cruel attack], *Southern Metropolis Daily*, April 10, 2008; and "Aoyunhui yudao kangyizhe bing bu kepa", [It is not a terrible thing when facing protests in Olympics], *Southern Metropolis Daily*, March 29, 2008, etc.

¹³³ "Zao dizhi keyuan weijian. Shifang zhongguancun jialefu xianzhuang", [Suffered the boycott, the customers reduced a little. Visit Carrefour Zhongguancun branch], *Global Times*, April 18, 2008.

government feel anxious towards Chinese youths' boycott activity.¹³⁴ By contrast, *Southern Metropolis Daily* took a negative attitude towards boycott activity. In its series of boycott-related reports, it not only reported the responses from Carrefour, who made a declaration that they never provided financial aid to Dalai, nor did they support Tibet independence; but also introduced viewpoints from Chinese famous journalists such as Bai Yansong and He Yanguang, both of whom did not support the boycott activities. In addition, anti-boycott Carrefour activities in Kunming (Yun'nan province) and other places were also reported by the paper. In its regular *Following-up Post* section (*gen tie*) which reports online public opinion on social issues, all the posts the paper selected opposed boycott activities.¹³⁵

Then, the fierce media nationalistic discourse struggle also extended to the Internet. Considering rapid development of the Internet as a new but important site for discourse struggles, journalists in traditional newspapers actively created personal blogs, trying to influence and lead online nationalistic discourse. Clearly, when the offline mass media struggles combined with online struggles, the picture of China's nationalistic discourse struggles were more complex. Yet, in this type of struggle, tabloid newspapers, catering for online radical anti-western sentiment, win the struggle. The "Chang Ping event" mentioned above is one of noticeable examples of this type of discourse struggle. In his blog, Chang Ping criticized China's Party-state of blocking Tibet-related information, and *zuofens'* "taking side" and "showing attitude" nationalistic discourse. However, instead of calming down the online radical anti-Western mood, Chang Ping was finally removed from his post at *SMD*, under the huge pressure of a condemning and abusing blanket.

Market-oriented Press Challenged Official Discourse

Similar with intellectuals and popular nationalistic discourse, though there were combative debates between tabloid and professional newspapers, both market-oriented media nationalistic discourses challenged official patriotism. Cao Qing (2007) once compared the role of the official press and market-oriented papers in covering foreign affairs, cased by *People's Daily* (*PD*) and *Global Times* (*GT*)

¹³⁴ "Jialefu shijian jingdong Fa zongtong. Sakeqi pai teshi lai hua", [*Carrefour event disturbed French President. Sarkozy sent special representatives come to China.*], *Global Times*, April 21, 2008.

¹³⁵ See the paper's *Following-up Post* section from April 15 to 18, 2008.

since the 2000s. Since newspapers' nationalistic discourses were often embodied in their foreign affairs coverage, Cao's comparative framework is a good foundation for us to further explore the strategies the three kinds of papers adopted and the contradictions among the three media discourses.

Table 6.3 Differences of Foreign Affairs Coverage among the *PD*, *GT*, and *SMD* in the 2000s

<i>Features</i>	<i>People's Daily</i>	<i>Global Times</i>	<i>Southern Metropolis Daily</i>
Perspectives	Moralist	National interest	Enlightenment
	Idealist	Realist	Idealist
	Accommodationist	Topic/country-based	Rationality/truth-based
	Promoting a Confucian world order	Coping with a "jungle world"	Promoting universal values
	Explicit culturalist values	Implicit power politics	Explicit democratic values
	General	Specific	Specific
Contents	Principle-based policy	Event-based information	Event-based analysis
	Prescription	Description	Prescription
	Decontextualization	Contextualization	Decontextualization
	Principles/rationales/expositions	"Hard facts"	Logic analysis
	Problems backgrounded	Problems highlighted	Problems solving
	Source: leaders and the government	Source: news agencies	Source: foreign news agencies
Style	Preaching	Informing	Self-reflexive
	Formal	Less formal/informal	Reasonable
	Sterile	Lively	Critical
	Content-based 'dry' headlines	Eye-catching/sensationalist headlines	Argument-based headlines

Based on Table 6.3, we can see clearly that both of the perspectives, content and reporting style of the three kinds of newspapers were sharply different. The Party press, such as *People's Daily*, actively promoted official patriotism. In their report on foreign affairs, they tried to present a pacifist Confucian image, *he er bu tong* ideal, China's "peaceful rise", and other principle-based foreign policies. As the key channel of the Party-state's policy dissemination, such reports were always full of preaching, taking the problems of foreign affairs as a background and using examples to verify the legitimacy and rationality of the official patriotism. Accordingly, in the four patterns of media-produced nationalism summarized by

Huang and Lee (2003: 53), the Party press adopted the “affirmative” approach to promote official patriotism.

By contrast, *Global Times*, a market-oriented tabloid newspaper focused on reporting foreign affairs, tended to concentrate on “hot” issues of foreign affairs that involved China, and foreground the conflict angle between the United States and its allies on the one side and China and other developing countries on the other. Rather than discussing foreign policies or ideologies, issues such as Taiwan’s military defense planning, Japanese manoeuvres in disputed islands, Japan’s bid to become a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, etc, were graphically described, with large-size eye-catching and sensationalist headlines, such as “*America surrounds China strategically*”, “*Japan’s Self Defense Force treats China as imagined enemy*”, etc. Clearly, in Huang and Lee’s four patterns, tabloid newspapers such as *Global Times* promoted “assertive” or even aggressive nationalistic discourse.

Then, *Southern Metropolis Daily*, as China’s favorite professional and critical newspaper, tried to enlighten readers’ pursuing of universal values, such as democracy, freedom, fairness, etc, through its nationalistic reports. Without preaching and sensational nationalistic stories, the paper developed event-based logical analysis. After self-reflexive kind of criticism, it hoped to solve Sino-Western conflicts or problems by rational communication and universal values. Accordingly, they always promoted “rational” nationalistic discourse based on Huang and Lee’s category.

Apparently, both nationalistic discourses promoted by *Global Times* and *Southern Metropolis Daily* were basically different with *People’s Daily*. Depicting international relations as a jungle world, tabloid newspapers’ assertive discourse challenged the official Confucian pacifism and “peaceful rising” principle. Then, it seems that the “rational” discourse with a pro-Western attitude promoted by professional newspapers were consistent with official pacifism. Yet, in essence, the implicit address in “rational” discourse of professional newspaper was its enlightenment aim, universal values pursuit, and political reform appeal, all of which undoubtedly may challenge the Party-state’s legitimacy.

The Victory of Popular Nationalistic Discourse

Authoritarian Ideological Control by the Party-state

Needless to say, faced with the diversified nationalistic discourses in the 2000s, the Party-state tried to acquire the hegemonic status in the fierce discourse struggle. First, the traditional authoritarian regulations to mass media were further tightened. For example, a new round of newspaper market rectification began in 2003, with the aim of streamlining operations, avoiding duplication, and thus making the media market easier to manage. In this rectification, six hundred and seventy-three newspapers, which did not toe the Party line, were closed down.¹³⁶ Then, new regulations on news-reporting were also conducted. Especially, the mass media cannot consider themselves as “Fourth Estate” or the “theory of the media as a tool of the public”, and they were forbidden from reporting on matters which could harm China’s state security, undermine social stability, or help spread the influence of cults or superstitions. All such matters can only be reported from Xinhua News Agency. Besides, to guarantee that all the media will follow the Party-line, a series of propaganda discipline trainings to journalists and editors were also carried out on a national-wide scale. In December 2002, the General Administration of Press and Publishing (GAPP) announced a five-year plan to vet and license four hundred thousand Chinese journalists. Journalists were required to pass tests on professional knowledge and ideology to gain their journalist licenses. Then, in early 2003 the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) organized study sessions for managing editors of provincial level and up newspapers, radio, and television stations on the topic of “Three Representative Theory”. Similar sessions were held at local Party schools for local leaders all over the country. Later, a much more intensive series of national-wide political study, “Three Theories Education” (*sanxiang xuexi*)¹³⁷, was arranged to all people who worked in the press and publication field, and all the university professors in the School of Journalism and students majoring in journalism and communication. Again, the main aim of such intensive retraining was to strengthen ideological control over journalists and editors.

¹³⁶ “Zhongxuanbu buzhang tan baokan zhili”, [The minister of the CPD discussing newspaper market rectification], from <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/14737/22039/2206609.html>, Nov 24, 2003, Retrieved April 23, 2010.

¹³⁷ For the “Three Theories Education”, it means to study the “Three Representative Theory”, the Marxism viewpoint on press, and the professional morality in the press and publication field.

Meanwhile, serious punishments were conducted to media organizations and intellectuals who disobeyed propaganda discipline. For example, in September 2004, Xiao Weibi, the editor of the liberal, Guangdong-based journal *Tongzhou Gongji*, was dismissed for publishing an interview with Ren Zhongyi, a former Guangdong Party secretary who had voiced strong criticisms in recent years. Shortly thereafter, Jiao Guobiao, a journalism professor at Beijing University who had created a sensation with his hard-hitting article harshly criticizing the CPD, was suspended from teaching. Furthermore, in November, the CPD issued “*Document No. 29*” with the Central Committee’s approval, and organized official media criticizing the term “public intellectuals” and rejecting this as a legitimate and positive role in Chinese society.¹³⁸ Besides, in this *Document*, it also named some famous liberal and left journals such as *Strategy and Management*, *Yanhuang Chunqiu*, *Tongzhou Gongji*, and *Tushu Zhoubao* for going beyond the Party-line. At roughly the same time, *Strategy and Management* was forced to be closed for publishing a critical article on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In January 2006, *Freezing Point (Bing dian)*, the weekly supplement of the *China Youth Daily*, was also forced to be closed for it publishing an article that disputed official interpretations of modern Chinese history, particularly the *Boxer Rebellion (Yihetuan yundong)*. Though the propaganda department allowed the supplement to resume publication later, it is on the condition that Li Datong, the famous liberal media intellectual, resigned from the *Freezing Point*.

Secondly, considering the Internet as a new media, the Party-state also paid significant attention to Internet censorship. After a horrific fire in an illegal, unregistered Internet café in June 2002, a national-wide rectification to Internet cafés

¹³⁸ On September 8, 2004, the *Southern Personalities Weekly* listed the 50 most influential Chinese public intellectuals, from the liberal economists Mao Yushi and Wu Jinglian, to liberal historians Zhu Xueqin and Qin Hui, to environmentalist Liang Congjie and poet Bei Dao. However, this suffered the CPD’s severe attack by issuing “*Document No. 29*”, in which economist Mao Yushi, writer Yu Jie, deceased economist Yang Xiaokai and other so-called “public intellectuals” were to be attacked. Soon, on November 15, Shanghai’s Party paper, *Liberation Daily*, published an article by the penname Ji Fangping titled, “Seeing through the Appearance to Perceive the Essence – An Analysis of ‘Public Intellectuals’ Theory”. Employing the harsh language of class struggle, the article declared that the concept of public intellectuals had been touted to “drive a wedge between the intellectuals and the Party and between the intellectuals and the general public.” Far from being “independent”, such public intellectuals, the article asserted, have “certain interest groups” supporting them. Ten days later, *People’s Daily* reprinted the article. Then, on December 14, *Guangming Daily* published an article called “Beware of the Intellectual Tide of ‘Public Intellectuals’”, in which it repeated the charge that public intellectuals seek to be “independent and critical”, but in fact, the article asserted that, intellectuals, like everyone else, reflect their social backgrounds and interests.

was initiated, in which one hundred and fifty thousand illegal unregistered cafés were shut down, and the remaining were put under strict control by various regulations and laws.¹³⁹ Meanwhile, a series of new departments and offices were set up to monitor online public opinion and strengthen Internet management.¹⁴⁰ In this process, Party authorities paid more attention to monitoring various campus BBSs. For example, in December 2004, *Yitahutu*, Beida-based BBS was closed down temporarily. Later, *SMTN*, the Tsinghua-based BBS was restricted to authorized campus users only starting March 2005. The CPD and Ministry of Education believed that such methods can reduce the risk of dissident groups influencing student discussions and track down students' radical viewpoints much easier. Moreover, from January 2006, the virtual online police, two cartoon characters named Jingjing and Chacha (together as "Jingcha", means "police" in Chinese), were introduced. Such icons will automatically appear on the screen of users accessing Shenzhen-based websites and various university-based BBSs, reminding Internet users that Little Brother and Little Sister are watching you. Besides, the authority also set up a reporting website (www.net.china.cn) in 2004, encouraging Chinese netizens to report any illegal Internet content on Chinese sites, with rich prizes.

Besides transferring traditional regulation methods into the Internet field, the Party-state also developed new technological methods to tighten its control on the Internet. The most noticeable was the key word filtering technology, by which the authorities can filter unwanted online messages based on its list including a variety of sensitive words, phrases and sentences. More importantly, the Party-state also turned the global Internet to a *de facto* China-based Intranet by the advanced blocking technology called the "Great Firewall" (GFW). Through such latest firewall and Internet surveillance software, the authorities can block access to

¹³⁹ The fire accident happened in an unregistered Internet café located at Beijing suburban apartment complex. It caused the death of twenty-five middle school students. After this incident, the Party-state strengthened its regulation on numerous emerging Internet cafés around all of China. For example, all Internet cafés are required to have users' register with their national identity cards. Foreigners are required to register with their passport details. Internet café computers must keep a record of all sites accessed. Internet cafés are also required to use software that can filter access to banned sites. Local police kept a regular check on cafés to ensure that they follow the rules. Internet cafés that break the rules can be shut down.

¹⁴⁰ One of these is the Bureau of Public Opinion in the CPD set up in 2004, in charge of coordinating public opinion polls on current sensitive topics, monitoring public opinion, and making reports for action. Similar bureaus were also set up at the local level.

“reactive” sites outside China, remove offensive content from both China-based and international sites, and filter all Chinese e-mail messages for sensitive content.

The Victory of Popular Nationalistic Discourse

Were the Party-state’s authoritarian control on the mass media and the Internet successful in the 2000s? If we consider the results, we can say that it was successful since China maintained social stability in general, and held a successful Olympic Games in 2008. Yet, if we consider that all the nationalistic discourses promoted by marginalized intellectuals, market-oriented mass media, as well as millions of netizens posed great challenge to official patriotic discourse, it will be hard to say that the Party-state’s authoritarian projects were successful in the 2000s.

Clearly, though the crisis of hegemony for the Party-state like situations in the late 1980s has not emerged, the cracks indeed appear of the Party-state’s hegemonic patriotism in the 2000s. The most important reason for this is that ideological control is nearly an impossible task in the Internet era, since the informational flow has become increasingly difficult to control than before. When an incident occurs, no matter how the CPD sent directives to the mass media organizations on what they could report or how to report, online “citizen journalists” (*gongmin jizhe*) like Zola have already reported it in cybersphere, not only with first-hand photos and eyewitness facts, but also describing, in detail, the struggles and conflicts among agents involved. Moreover, though the enduring efforts of the Party-state to control cyberspace by developing sophisticated techniques, there were various ways, such as proxy servers, VPNs, through which online users can evade the Party-state’s cyber firewall. Under this circumstance, liberal intellectuals and *youfens* were ecstatic over such technologies to spread their liberal discourses and Western information which were blocked and cannot appear in traditional mass media. Even if their websites or personal blogs were always shut down for containing sensitive content, they can re-open it by applying for another domain or using overseas Internet server.¹⁴¹ As a result, the Party-state’s ability to guide public opinion was under challenge.

¹⁴¹ Taking bullog.cn for example, when it was shut down by authorities in 2007, Luo Yonghao created an international version, bulloger.com during that period. In January 2009, the bullog.cn was shut down again by authority. This time, Luo launched another website, bullock.cn, named *Yan*

Besides, when *youfens*' inward-problem looking challenged the Party-state's legitimacy, *zuofens*' radical anti-western sentiment challenged the official "peaceful rising" discourse seriously. In this sense, we argue that the popular nationalistic discourse got victory in the hegemonic struggles with the official Confucian-patriotism discourse. However, it should be noticed that the victory of popular discourse in the 2000s does not mean that Chinese netizens, in the discursive level, have the ability to challenge the Party-state's authority. On the one hand, as has been analyzed, *zuofens*' nationalistic discourse was the continuities of the official patriotic discourse in the 1990s. With long-time patriotic education, the patriotic discourse, such as the "conspiracy theory" that western countries plot to split China apart; the "white or black" logic that China's Party-state was justice while western countries were evil, all sank deep into the heart of Chinese people. Then, when facing western media's biased reports and the Tibet protesters' sabotage to the overseas torch relay, Chinese people involuntarily considered western countries, together with the Dalai Lama, having a plot to split China apart and disrupt the Beijing Olympics by the Tibet issue and the Olympic torch relay. Besides, China's thirty years' aggressive economic modernization further fulfilled the "strong nation complex" of Chinese people, and legitimated the Party-state's patriotic logic. In other words, the hegemonic popular nationalistic discourse did not challenge the inside pro-CCP dimension, though it challenged the outside dimension by the anti-west discourse.

On the other hand, it is in this sense that *zuofens*' radical nationalistic discourse was endorsed by the Party-state tacitly. Compared with *youfens*' inward-problem looking, *zuofens*' outward-problem looking can indeed help the Party-state enhance legitimacy, especially when facing Western countries' attack. For instance, when the Tibet riot broke out, the Party-state quickly blocked the YouTube website, afraid that related videos made by foreigners may disturb official propaganda and endanger China's social stability. Yet, when the video "*Tibet was, is, and always will be a part of China!*" first appeared on YouTube, the Party-state unblocked it quickly, with the hope that more Chinese people can know and watch the video. When the website AntiCNN appeared, the Chinese government publicly praised netizens'

Niubo (means the doctored *Niubo*), without any political content, for mainland netizens who cannot get around the GFW to see bulloger.com.

spontaneous condemnations and criticisms to western media's bias report.¹⁴² Besides, though initially censoring the reports on the torch protests overseas, the Party-state quickly encouraged such kind of reports, when Jin Jing shielded the Olympic flame with her body to protect it against Western Tibetan attackers. Portraying Jin Jing as "a smiling angel in the wheelchair", the Party-state turned Jin Jing into an iconic image representing the innocence of the country, the defender of Chinese nationalistic pride, with contrast to the dastardliness of the Tibet separatist force. Then, in the initial stage of netizens' boycott Carrefour movement, Jiang Yu, the spokesperson of Foreign Affairs Ministry, considered boycott activities as Chinese people's rational and legal sentimental expression, and asked the French government to listen well to the voice from Chinese people, making self-reflections for its series of activities and speeches on the Tibet issue.¹⁴³ Accordingly, with the official endorsement, the anti-western sentiment popularized among the society.

Considering the content and logic of *zuofens'* nationalistic discourse, as well as the Party-state's endorsement to it, we cannot say that *zuofens'* hegemonic status of nationalistic discourse implies that Chinese netizens have enough ability to challenge the Party-state in the discursive level.

Social Structure and the Nationalistic Discourse in the 2000s

In previous sections, we have argued that though official nationalistic discourse in the 2000s is more rational than in the 1990s, it failed to win hegemonic status in the discursive struggle with multiple nationalistic discourses promoted by intellectuals, mass media and the netizens. Instead, the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 2000s is led by millions of Chinese Internet users, especially *zuofens*, featured as radical anti-West and pro-CCP. We have also explained this from the discursive relationship perspective, arguing that though the power relations among the four agents was still highly uneven and unequal, China's Internet users as an independent

¹⁴² In a regular Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference on March 27, 2008, a western journalist asked spokesperson Qin Gang whether Chinese government provided any support to the website Anti-CNN.com. Qin denied any connection with the website on the one hand, and on the other, praised netizens' spontaneous condemnations and criticisms to western media's bias report, by asking western journalists to look at western media's bias coverage and think about whether it is necessary for the Chinese government to fan the anti-Western flames. After this press conference, the clicks of Anti-CNN increased astonishingly.

¹⁴³ "Waijiaobu: minzhong dizhi shichu youyin", [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: There are reasons for Chinese people's boycott activities], the Southern Metropolis Daily, April 16, 2008.

social agent, became a strong force to challenge and influence official nationalistic discourse and projects.

Yet, in this discursive level, we still cannot explain why the Party-state's authoritarian control of the mass media in the 2000s did not help it promote new national Confucian-patriotism? Why did China's rapid economic development strengthen Chinese people's political support to the authoritarian state, rather than challenge it? With diversified nationalistic discourses, why was the hegemonic discourse still anti-Western, in the form of radical "showing attitude"? To answer these questions, we have to explore the deeper structural reasons – the transforming social structure from "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – Media market" in the 1990s to "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – the Internet society" in the 2000s.

The Changing Social Structure in the 2000s

Focusing on economic development, from 1992 to 2003, China's Gross Domestic product (GDP) increased from 2.69 to 13.58 trillion *yuan*, with the annual growth rate of above 8%.¹⁴⁴ The rapid economic development not only took up enough attention of the Western countries, but also gained wide acceptance from Chinese people. Though many severe social problems also emerged in this process, such as millions of laid-off workers during the painful ownership transition, the incident of Falun Gong Cult's self-immolation in 1999, Chinese people in general believed that the only way to make China strong is by persistently developing the economy; and only through maintaining such high economic development, all social problems may be solved with the greatest ease. Putting it differently, the hegemonic status of the official patriotic discourse in the 1990s implicated that the Party-state's legitimacy was already based on economic performance rather than Communist ideology. Accordingly, to maintain its authority, the Party-state had to sustain or even speed up economic development in the 2000s. However, its export-oriented economic development also pushed China's merge into the world system, both in the economic and political realm, as well as developing a high technology industry, especially the

¹⁴⁴ From China Statistics Bureau website, <http://tjxh.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/tongjiziliao/huiyuan/200808/20080805752250.html?467676307=1526927250>, Retrieved April 14, 2009.

Internet communication technology, and thus gaining much more profit by upgrading industrial structure.

Undoubtedly, the Party-state, in this process paid significant attention to guide online popular discourse. However, China's Party-state did not consider this as a big problem. On the one hand, it had already picked up confidence to guide public opinion, especially when acquiring hegemonic status successfully in the 1990s by authoritarian control of the mass media and intellectuals. On the other hand, considering the Internet as a new but similar type of mass media as newspapers and televisions, the Party-state also had great confidence in controlling online public opinion by old authoritarian methods. Under this circumstance, with the rapid development of China's Internet technology, the Internet society also emerged in the 2000s. Finally, the social structure changed from "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – Media market" in the 1990s to "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – the Internet society" in the 2000s. And it is this new social structure that shapes the discursive relations among the four agents, and netizen-led anti-western nationalistic discourses in the 2000s.

Socialist Market Economy in the Globalization Era

To further promote China's economic development, the Party-state made great a effort to push China into the international society from the mid-1990s. In 1999, as the burgeoning market economy country, China became a member of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20). Then, in 2001, China not only joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the premier forum for facilitating economic growth and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region; more importantly, it entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), the so-called "economic UN" successfully. From then on, China's full membership in the global economy had been recognized by the world, and the US' annual ritual of renewing China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status was also removed.

In this process, the Party-state also promoted political multi-polarity, trying to strengthening regional economic and political cooperation, and creating a favorable relationship with neighboring countries. In 2000, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded. It is the first international organization founded

in mainland China. Then, the Chinese government began to take part in “the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) +3 Foreign Ministers Meeting” every year. In 2010, it further established the world’s biggest Free Trade Area, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area, with the aim of making ASEAN a “pole” of global power.

Besides being involved in various international economic and political organizations, the urgent intention of China’s merge into the world was also represented in Beijing’s application and hosting of the Olympics, Shanghai’s hosting of the World Expo in 2010 and so on. Clearly and interestingly, unlike situations in the 1980s, by the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, it was the Party-state that was generally more cosmopolitan in its outlook, actively promoted China into the global economic system, and joined the mainstream world culture. In this sense, the dream in the *River Elegy* was partially achieved.

The Burgeoning Internet Society

Pushed by the Party-state, the expansion of the Internet in China was in a leapfrog speed. In March 1995, only 3,000 people in China were able to access the Internet. Among such small-scale Internet users, most of them were scientists, researchers, and university students in major metropolitan areas. This situation began to alter when the Golden Bridge Network, China’s first national public economic information network, started commercial operation in September 1996. As have been showed in a previous chapter, during that period, the Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs) and various online chat rooms became the newest and most popular sites for Chinese youths to vent their anti-Western nationalist sentiments. For example, when atrocities against ethnic Chinese Indonesians swept Jakarta in May 1998, Chinese youths not only obtained the newest information from foreign websites, but also organized political protest outside the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing.¹⁴⁵ Then, in the case of anti-NATO’s bombing, the *Strong Nation Forum (qiang guo luntan)* was an important site for university students expressing their anger towards Western countries. Later, the unprecedented Chinese hackers associations, represented by

¹⁴⁵ Hughes (2000) studied how Chinese students use the Internet to organize a march to the Indonesian embassy in Beijing against the Indonesian riot in detail.

“Chinese Red Hackers Association” (*zhongguo hongke lianmeng*) even emerged right after the US spy plane incident in April 2001.

Even though, there are only 4 million Internet users in China at the end of 1990s.¹⁴⁶ This means that the public use of the Internet was far from popular. Besides, both online interactive activities and their social influence were restricted within small groups. In other words, the Internet society has yet not formed in the 1990s. However, this picture changed starting around 2003, when the Internet played an increasingly prominent role in spreading information during the SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome) period,¹⁴⁷ and forming strong pressures to the government in the case of Sun Zhigang.¹⁴⁸ Various studies were made to such two

¹⁴⁶ The data is from the 4th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC).

<http://www.cnnic.cn/en/index/00/02/index.htm?4115543236=33921146>, retrieved Dec 12, 2008.

¹⁴⁷ The new disease Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) appeared in Guangdong province in November 2002. However, in the significant political period from the Sixteenth Party Congress that established Hu Jintao as the new leader of the CCP, to mid-February when the Chinese New Year approached, and later to the National People's Congress meeting in March and election of Hu as State President, Chinese media were strictly instructed to report only positive news to maintain political stability and national unity. Even when SARS spread quickly from Guangdong to almost the whole country, Zhang Wenkang, the Chinese Minister of Public Health, still repeated that mainland China had only dozens of cases and that they were “well under control”. For decades, the Party-state's authoritarian media control was successful. But the situation changed this time when the wide spread rumors about such a fatal flu disseminated through the new means of communication Short Message Service (SMS), which put a huge pressure on the government to tell the truth. Later, when the epidemic reached Hong Kong in mid-March, Chinese people began to turn to the Internet to search for more concrete information. Meanwhile, many surfers who got a hold of fragments of information already posted the information on the BBS of major portal sites in China.

At this critical point, on April 4, Jiang Yanyong, a senior Chinese doctor who treated SARS patients in Beijing Number 301 Hospital, sent emails to various mainland and overseas media, reporting that more than 100 cases of patients with the virus were in his hospital alone, and six of whom had died. Though mainland media did not follow up on the email, *Time* put the information on its website. Quickly, *Time*'s report and a large number of other articles from Western press were translated and sent to email inboxes all over China, and then posted on the BBS of innumerable Chinese websites. This led to strong demands from the public for the right to be informed. At the same time, the international community had begun to embarrass China by stating bluntly that Beijing was covering up the extent of the epidemic, and demanded China to tell the truth.

Under the immense pressure from abroad and inside, Hu Jintao presided over an extraordinary Politburo meeting on April 17, in which he warned officials not to delay reports and not to cover up the situation, and vowed to wage an all-out war against the disease. On April 20, the top leaders made the unprecedented move of firing the Minister of Public Health Zhang Wenkang, and the mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, for covering up the SARS epidemic. Following the firings, the Chinese media began to give daily reports on the number of new SARS patients. Medical experts were able to go to the media and alert the public on the seriousness of the situation. Finally the disease came under effective control towards the end of June.

¹⁴⁸ The Sun Zhigang incident, which also happened in Guangzhou in 2003 but then became a national focus event, provides additional evidence for the emerging forces of the Internet society. On the night of March 17, 2003, on his way to a nearby Internet café, Sun Zhigang, a young graphic designer working for a clothes factory in Guangzhou, was stopped by the police for a random check for residency permits. Unfortunately, Sun had not obtained his permit yet because he had just moved to

cases (Tan, 2004; etc). Generally speaking, both of the two noticeable cases illustrated that the Internet had created a totally new information environment, in which a monopoly of communication by the Party-state is no longer possible when facing hundreds of millions of Internet users, and online popular discourse can challenge the Party-state's policy greatly through intensive online protests and other interactive activities. Putting it differently, the Internet had become a new society in which not only the discursive struggles among four agents for hegemonic status of nationalistic discourse appeared; but more importantly, online popular discourse posed a greater challenge to official discourse since each Internet user can express and exchange their ideas publicly.

Authoritarian State

As argued previously, through accelerating economic development with the societal-wide patriotic education, the Party-state has steadily re-built its support from the public during the 1990s. At the same time, various kinds of mass media and intellectuals were also under strict ideological control. With great confidence, the similar authoritarian methods in the propaganda and thought work were adopted by the Party-state in the 2000s. Even with China's entering the WTO, this point did not change. For the Party-state, merging into the world was only one necessary step to sustain high economic development, rather than promoting a western-style political system. Instead, the Party-state was very concerned about various "color

Guangzhou to his new job. Sun was then taken to a local detention center for beggars and vagrants on suspicion. However, three days later, he was suddenly pronounced dead.

To be sure, Sun was not the first victim under the "custody and repatriation system" in China. There had been many unofficial reports about the brutal abuse of migrant workers in different custody-repatriation centers. Yet, again, the Internet changed the whole incident. A group of Sun's friends created a website on the Internet that revealed the story of his death. While Guangzhou police refused to provide information regarding the case for the media, the *Southern Metropolitan Daily* reported Sun's death and touched on the criticism of police brutality. This report was quickly disseminated via email and the Internet. The discussions of the incident became widespread on various online forums, much of them critical of the government's related policies sharply. Moreover, some netizens even wrote letters to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, appealing for an investigation into Sun's case and a reviewing of the constitutionality of the measures. Such appealing gained support from five prominent legal scholars, who called for the launching of a special investigation into the case. All these writings were first posted on the Internet but eventually published in major newspapers such as *China Youth Daily*. This was followed by tremendous media coverage around China. At the end, all 13 suspects involved in beating Sun were caught by the police, and 12 were pronounced guilty at the end of the trial. Meanwhile, twenty-three government officials and police officers faced Party or administrative disciplinary punishment for their roles in this case. More importantly, the "custody-repatriation system", one of the most discriminatory institutions in China, was also terminated during the conference of the State Council chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao on June 18, 2003.

revolution” (*yanshe geming*) – the nonviolent movements of overturning autocratic governments, especially those promoted by foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – in its globalization process.

For China’s internal politics, the period from 2002 to 2004 also marked a power transition, not only from the post-1989 leadership under Jiang Zemin to a new leadership team under Hu Jintao, but also from a “revolutionary Party” (*Geming dang*) to a “Party in power” (*Zhizheng dang*), acknowledged in the Sixteenth Party Congress in November 2002. Such transition meant that the Party-state’s main task was to hold on to that power by persuasion, not by force. Under this situation, the new leadership paid much more attention to the ideological state apparatus, making a great effort to “manufacture consent” by patriotic education on the one hand, and exerting strict control on media and intellectual discourse on the other hand.

Especially, in the background of China’s WTO entry, the Party-state initiated a systematic “cultural system reform” (*wenhua tizhi gaige*) in the 16th Party Congress in 2002. And the news media, which were always considered as the Party’s mouthpiece, were first categorized in the broader realm of “culture”. Then, one of the most important steps for the cultural system reform was establishing media groups. By the end of 2003, 39 newspaper groups, 18 broadcasting groups, 14 publishing groups, 8 distribution groups, and 6 film groups were established and approved by the GAPP and the SARFT.¹⁴⁹ Among such groups, media operational departments such as advertisement, printing and distribution were divided apart from the core media content departments, and thus they can operate independently, extending their business scope to gain much more profit. Indeed, there were multiple aims for establishing media groups. First, under the huge pressure that transnational capital and foreign media conglomerates were entering the Chinese media market in the WTO era, both Chinese mass media and the Party authorities hoped to make China’s culture industry bigger and stronger (*zuoda zuoqiang*) as soon as possible. Second, the Party-state also considered cultural industry as a new economic increasing point to pull the GDP and “comprehensive national strength”. Third, with the development of China’s cultural industry, it also hoped to strengthen China’s “soft power” in the competitive global context. But more importantly, all

¹⁴⁹ *Zhongguo xinwen nianjian*, 2003, pp. 110-111.

kinds of cultural reform in the 2000s, without a doubt, reflected the Party-state's strategy to strengthen the ideological control, and manage the media market easily by establishing media groups.

Then, to the burgeoning Internet society, the Party-state also exerted serious authoritarian control, both at the infrastructural, service, and content levels. First, all Chinese computer networks have to connect with the Internet through Chinanet, the national public information network. Ruling out any possibility of individuals and businesses connecting to the Internet independently, the Party-state can filter unwanted websites from the west into China. Second, the license system restricted behaviors of Internet service providers (ISPs). And a series of regulations gave detailed guidelines to BBSs, news websites, online games and videos on those services that are permitted and those that are not. Third, various Internet censorship technologies, such as keyword filtering, were developed and adopted by the Party-state to monitor online information. Websites or blogs that contain unfavorable content and transgress the bottom line will be blocked or shut down directly.

Generally speaking, though China's market economy merged into the world, and the media industry developed in a rapid speed and in a deeper level, the Party-state still exerted authoritarian control in the ideological realm, both to the mass media and the Internet. However, as we will argue later, such authoritarian control methods were finally decentralized by the Internet society and the continuous development of the media industry, under which circumstance both the hegemonic relationship among the four agents, as well as the features and forms of China's nationalistic discourse changed.

Social Change and the Netizen-led Anti-Western Nationalistic Discourse

As argued before, to sustain China's rapid economic development in the 2000s, the Party-state had to merge into the world actively, as well as developing information technology, both of which further promoted the emergence of the Internet society in China. With the social structure changing from "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – Media market" to "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – the Internet society", China's nationalistic discourse became diversified,

and the hegemonic discourse took in the form of the netizen-led, with radical anti-Western sentiment.

Why Did Chinese Nationalistic Discourse Diversify?

Compared with liberal pro-Western discourse in the 1980s and anti-Western discourse in the 1990s, Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s became diversified. All the state, intellectuals, mass media and the netizens promoted their own nationalistic discourse, and sharp conflicts and hegemonic struggles among them appeared. Indeed, the structural reasons, especially China's market economy in the globalization era and the emerging Internet society shaped such diverse nationalistic discourses.

On the one hand, China's merger into the global system with its export-oriented economic development not only helps China's Party-state maintain social solidarity and consolidate its legitimacy, but it also means that China had to change its attitude towards the West from confrontation to cooperation, obey the international rules on a range of issues, and even make compromises to some extent. Then, to cooperate with Western countries, China's Party-state not only cannot ignite anti-Western sentiment in the whole society, but also had to consider the international impact especially when dealing with sensitive political issues. Besides, in the globalization process, the Party-state also hoped to improve its negative autocratic image in the international world, and instead, show a more friendly, responsible great power through holding various international exhibitions and sport games. As a consequence, the Party-state redefined the meaning of patriotism, taking a more moderate attitude towards Western countries and asked Chinese people to respect different voices and express their own idea rationally. Meanwhile, asking Chinese people to have "great power consciousness" when facing criticisms from Western countries, the Party-state itself also had to respect different nationalistic discourses promoted by various media, intellectuals, and netizens, which *de facto* encouraged diversified nationalistic discourses.

On the other hand, the emerging Internet society also contributed to the diversified nationalistic discourses. The rapid development of the Internet provided a new space for Chinese people to express their ideas around various social issues directly.

Thus, not only the Party-state and establishment intellectuals can promote official patriotism in the cyberspace, but also marginalized intellectuals, such as the Old Left, liberals and public intellectuals, tried to promote their liberal or conservative nationalistic projects and enlarge their influence through the Internet actively. More importantly, China's citizens, represented as millions of Internet users, in the first time can make their own voice in public, which even posed great pressures to the Party-state. Under this new information environment, the hegemonic status of official patriotism would appear serious cracks, in which the fierce hegemonic struggles among the netizens, intellectuals, mass media and the Party-state broke out in the Internet society. Apparently, Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s showed diversified and clashed.

Why Did the Official Patriotism Fail to Acquire Hegemonic Status?

As previously argued, the official patriotism in the 1990s acquired the hegemonic status successfully in the nationalistic discourse struggles, and also became an effective way for the Party-state to rebuild the fragile consensus among the society while maintaining its legitimacy. This indeed promoted the Hu-Wen leadership to strengthen official patriotic education in the 2000s. However, generally speaking, the emerging of the Internet society decentralized the Party-state's authoritarian ideological control. As a result, not only the hegemonic cracks appeared for the Party-state, it finally made the official patriotism failed to acquire hegemonic status in the 2000s.

First, the emerging of the Internet society changed the whole information environment in China, in which China's public became the "informed public" (Zhou, 2006). Though the Party-state indeed invested substantial time and capital in controlling information flow and guiding online nationalistic opinion, in general it indeed cannot prevent Chinese millions of Internet users from getting information from the outside. Especially for tech-savvy netizens, if they want, they have various ways of getting around the firewall (*fangqiang*), acquiring information from outside, and then spreading "the other side" information among China's Internet society. Needless to say, compared with only pro-CCP information in the 1990s,

the opportunities to getting two-sided information in the 2000s indeed challenged the Party-state's patriotic propaganda.

Secondly, besides getting channels to see and spread the "enemy's" voice, the emerging of the Internet society also enabled Chinese Internet users to communicate and discuss with each other. Actually, Chinese netizens were zealous for online interactivity communities. Through various BBSs, blogs, and sharing websites, one piece of critical information, with various positive or negative comments, may spread quickly to the whole Internet society. As a result, with the Internet society, not only did the Party-state's effective control of information flow end; but the era of Chinese people blindly believing whatever was told by the Party-state was also over. By contrast, more and more Internet-triggered incidents emerged, such as Zola's online report about Chong Qing's "Nailhouse" (*Ding Zihu*), the online "Beat Tiger" movement, and Xiamen citizens' protest of the PX industrial project through the Internet as mentioned before. All of such incidents not only forced the Party-state to respect online public opinion, but also pushed it to change related unreasonable policies. Moreover, "*The Decree of Government Information Openness*", which empowers citizens to access government information and explicitly requires government departments to be more open in information disclosures, also took effect since 1 May 2008.

We have argued that one important reason that the official radical anti-west and pro-CCP patriotism could acquire hegemonic status in the 1990s was because it was promoted under the totally authoritarian environment, in which no alternative voices can be heard. Then, clearly, when the Party-state cannot hold the monopoly in terms of information in the 2000s, the cracks in the hegemonic official patriotism will inevitably appear. With various challenging nationalistic discourses emerging in the Internet society, the effect of official patriotic propaganda would be weakened sharply.

However, as argued previously, the victory of netizens' discourse did not mean that the ordinary netizens have enough ability to challenge the Party-state's authority. After all, it is *zuofens'* anti-west and pro-CCP arguments, rather than *youfens'* anti-CCP and pro-west discourse, which win the hegemonic status. Putting it

differently, *zuofens*' nationalistic discourse helped to legitimize the Party-state's authority fundamentally, though its radical anti-west discourse challenged the Party-state's foreign policy. Thus, from such complex analysis, we can see that, first, netizens' nationalistic discourse indeed had a huge potential to challenge the Party-state's authority; but also, second, the long-standing patriotic education under authoritarian political environment still have great influence among Chinese ordinary citizens, which weakened their ability to challenge the Party-state's authority.

Why Was the Hegemonic Discourse Not Democratic?

In the process of hegemonic struggles among diversified nationalistic discourses, why was the hegemonic discourse still radically anti-West and supported authoritarian state, like situation in the 1990s? Putting it differently, why did the rapid economic development not promote democratic nationalistic discourse? Especially, when two-sided information can be acquired, why was the popular discourse still anti-Western in the form of "showing attitude", and the two camps between *zuofens* and *yofens* cannot debate rationally and reach a consensus? General speaking, this is because China's market economy was operating under the Party-state's authoritarian control, and thus, its democratic and liberal factors were restricted by the authoritarian state.

First, the traditional market-oriented mass media, operating under the dual logic of state and market, cannot promote a democratic idea. Under the Party-state's strict ideological control, China's mass media had to follow the Party-line and, at least, cannot go below the bottom line, and thus keep away from taboos set by the CPD in their reports. Meanwhile, the market logic forced mass media to provide information based on the needs of the audience. In other words, only news content that both satisfied the Party-line and the audience that may be favored by mass media. Operating under the dual logic of state and market, as shown in previous chapter, nationalistic related books became some of the most popular books in China's book market in the period of 1990s. This trend went down to the 2000s, when various nationalistic orientation newspapers emerged and popularized. Though many TV cultural forums also popularized in the 2000s, instead of providing critical and rational thinking, they only paid significant attention to Chinese traditional culture and history, and narrating them in story forms, since such stories can both satisfied

the Party-state's patriotism and cater for the audience. In other words, under the authoritarian control and market logic, China's mass media cannot cultivate Chinese citizens for rational debate and critical thinking. Instead, they tended to amplify and radicalize the already radical online anti-western sentiment by following-up reports on various online nationalistic incidents.

Secondly, while the market-oriented media considered the audience only as consumers, the official media considered them as the target for patriotic propaganda, which also cannot cultivate critical citizens. Besides, though official patriotism in the 2000s seems more rational and moderate, it is still radical in essence. For example, in the case of the Tibet riot, the Party-state blocked the information first, condemned Dalai Lama second, and then showed its great contribution towards Tibet's economic development. Yet, such kind of official reports can only provoked extreme nationalistic sentiment with "economic development determinism" and binary black-white logic. Without introducing information and arguments from the other side, promoting rational nationalistic discourse will only be an ideal illusion.

Thirdly, it is true that Chinese people can get alternative views and information with the emerging of the Internet society. However, the flow of information is subject to different interpretations. Articulating the "strong nation dream" of Chinese people with its patriotic discourse, the official patriotism won the hegemonic status in the 1990s successfully. Then, with China's rapid economic development through the 1990s, Chinese people believed that the "strong nation dream" may come true, and accordingly, creating consensus on the discourse of official patriotism. As a consequence, when Chinese people in the 2000s have access to express their own voice directly through the Internet, they presented a radical anti-western sentiment.

Fourthly, it cannot be denied that under the open information environment created by the Internet society, more and more Chinese people have a liberal-critical and self-reflexive thinking, with less of a "strong nation complex". However, in the authoritarian environment, their liberal nationalistic discourse was also radical. On the one hand, to get overseas information on China's sensitive issues, costly efforts were made by *youfens* towards struggling with systematic and strong online censorship. Gradually, they tend to immerse in the game of struggling with the

Party-state's information control, instead of considering the overseas information seriously and rationally.¹⁵⁰ On the other hand, when getting overseas negative reports about China and China's Party-state, they tended to blindly believe western media since such reports were blocked by the Chinese government and made in an open and free atmosphere. In other words, mainly aimed at opposing the Party-state's media censorship, *yofens'* liberal nationalistic discourse was less considerable thinking and systematic idea, but more of a radical passion. Besides, even the professional newspapers are far from the ideal vehicle to fill the gap, when they operated in a closed, state-controlled media system in which Chinese people finds it difficult to engage in an open and rational discussion and debate on nationalistic issues.

Does China's Media Act as a Civil Society?

We cannot deny that China's mass media in the 2000s indeed headed towards the formation of a civil society. The many changes, including diversified nationalistic discourses, a less "strong nation complex" in *yuofens'* mind, intellectuals' re-aligning with mass media, Chinese people engaging in political issues through the Internet actively, and even pushing the Party-state for policy changing, all of them meant that the public nature of media was more and more obvious. Particularly, Liang Yue, as the representative of the Chinese public intellectual, even practiced the rational-critical discussions in his blog.

During the Tibet riot and the overseas torch relay chaos, Lian made a great effort to promote critical thinking and rational debates in his blog. For example, he posted an email from a Tibetan girl who narrated how she felt discriminated by Hans in her school life and work experience. On the same day, he posted a response email from a Han girl. In the email, the Han girl believed that the Hans did not discriminate the Tibetan girl and harm the girl's feelings intentionally. Instead, they only do not know how to respect the other's culture and customs and thus, may do some folly things. Then, behind this email was followed by Lian's remarks, arguing that the follies are seldom done with a black heart. Yet, it was already in a serious bad

¹⁵⁰ More than seven Chinese senior Internet users among ten I interviewed expressed their excited sentiment in the process of developing various anti-information control technologies. Indeed, when they go beyond online censorship successfully, they always feel a great sense of achievement.

situation when you do not know how to respect others.¹⁵¹ Unexpectedly, this dialogue triggered a series of self-reflective discussions. Another Han Internet user responded that most of the Han's superiority is already a kind of harm to the Tibetan. Indeed, indebtedness feeling is uncomfortable. And Tibetans have the right to enjoy the social welfare offered by the government. In addition, when we criticize that westerners do not really know us, do we, as Hans, really know Tibetans?¹⁵² Then, an email from a Mongolian, posted by Lian, hoped that the central government can reconsider its nationality policies. Instead of exporting Inner Mongolian natural resources to maintain rapid economic development, the central government should pay more attention to protecting Inner Mongolia's ecological environment and satisfying Mongolian people's spiritual needs.¹⁵³ Besides, another high school student argued that we just know the riot on March 14, but do not know what happened before the riot, and how the government dealt with it. If we do not know the whole process of the turbulence, we cannot judge the incident correctly.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, even a government officer sent an email to Lian engaging into the discussion, admitting that the terrible thing is not discrimination itself, but that we do not know that what we did is discrimination.¹⁵⁵

In the following days, similar discussions developed in his blog for the torch relay issue and the boycott Carrefour issue. Some of the discussions were so long that the follow-up posts continued several days. Though many online comments in his blog were not as rational and friendly as he hoped, netizens in different camps finally reached a consensus and became friends after keen but rational discussions.¹⁵⁶ And more than one posts expressed that Lian's blog had great influence for their political maturity.

¹⁵¹ "Email from a Tibetan girl", April 1 2008, in Lian Yue's blog:

<http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/lianyue/archives/125279.aspx>; and "Stupid, and that's all", April 1, 2008, in Lian Yue's blog: <http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/lianyue/archives/125288.aspx>, Retrieved April 1, 2008.

¹⁵² "Should ask the Tibetans directly", April 1, 2008, in Lian Yue's blog:

<http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/lianyue/archives/125482.aspx>, Retrieved April 1, 2008

¹⁵³ "Email from a Mongolia Friend", April 1, 2008, in Lian Yue's blog:

<http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/lianyue/archives/125306.aspx>, Retrieved April 1, 2008.

¹⁵⁴ "The power of thinking", April 4, 2008, in Lian Yue's blog:

<http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/lianyue/archives/125483.aspx>, Retrieved April 4, 2008.

¹⁵⁵ "An email from an officer", April 1, 2008, in Lian Yue's blog:

<http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/lianyue/archives/125317.aspx>, Retrieved April 1, 2008.

¹⁵⁶ "Brother Qing loves little T", April 9, in Lian Yue's blog:

<http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/lianyue/archives/125712.aspx>, Retrieved April 9, 2008.

Clearly, with Lian's effort, he transformed his blog into a small virtual civil society successfully. It was really a huge progress for China's Internet society, from which we can see the possibilities of China's media evolving as a civil society. However, as one of a few non-establishment public intellectuals, Lian's success was only a unique case. His success did not mean that all Chinese intellectuals would like to do the same thing, especially when facing the risk of being criticized, forced-out, or even dismissed. Moreover, it also did not mean that his efforts may change China's whole media environment. Operating under the dual logic of state and market, China's tabloid newspapers promoted sensational types of media reports on nationalistic related topics, while professional newspapers cannot evolve as a public sphere for Chinese people to engage in critical-rational discussions on the nationalistic issue. Then, the emerging Internet society, within the authoritarian political structure, also encouraged radical "showing attitude" styles of debates in general. Although the alternative democratic kind of discourses can be heard from the Internet society, they were still radical, mainly aiming at increasing influence through struggles with the Party-state's various online censorships, instead of developing a systematic political-moral philosophy. As a result, in the 2000s, both the traditional mass media and the Internet society had not developed as a civil society, in which people came together to engage themselves in critical ration debate regarding general sociopolitical issues through public reasoning (Habermas, 1992: 27).

Conclusion

Chinese nationalistic discourse in the 2000s became diversified and clashed. All the state, mass media, intellectuals and million of Chinese netizens promoted their own nationalistic projects and discourses, and tried to acquire hegemonic status in the fierce nationalistic discourse struggles. Moreover, different from the situations in the 1990s, nationalistic discourses promoted by market-oriented media, marginalized intellectuals and the netizens posed a great challenge to the official patriotic discourse. Yet, it is netizen-led radical anti-western and pro-CCP nationalistic discourse, as the continuities of official patriotism in the 1990s, finally won the struggle.

In the discursive level, we find that instead of following official discourse in the 1990s or intellectual discourse in the 1980s, China's ordinary people, for the first time, voiced their own nationalistic sentiment directly and independently. While *zuofens'* radical anti-western sentiment challenged the official "peaceful rising" discourse, *youfens'* inward-problem looking even challenged the Party-state's legitimacy. Then, intellectuals, re-aligning with mass media, also promoted their liberal or conservative discourses actively, both of which challenged the official patriotic discourse. And for market-oriented mass media, both tabloid nationalistic papers and professional papers always went beyond the Party-line. While the former always catered to the radical anti-western sentiment of Chinese people, the latter promoted a liberal and self-reflexive kind of discourse.

Again, this chapter argues that all the changes of power relations and the features of nationalistic discourse in the 2000s were shaped by the new "Authoritarian state – Socialist market economy – the Internet society" structure. Especially, China's export-oriented economic development and the burgeoning Internet society decentralized the Party-state's authoritarian ideological control. On the one hand, the commercialization trend in mass media and rapid expansion of the culture industries, particularly the non-state capital involvement in media production and distribution, promoted diversified nationalistic voices in the media market. On the other hand, in the burgeoning of the Internet society, not only marginalized intellectuals and million of Internet users can promote their alternative nationalistic projects actively, but the Party-state's control of informational flow became more difficult.

Yet, as the "informed public", the democratic and rational-critical nationalistic discourse did not win the hegemonic status. First, under the dual logic of state and market, the mass media cannot cultivate rational debate and critical thinking among Chinese people, but can only cater to the audience's interests. Secondly, official patriotic discourse in the 2000s also may provoke radical anti-western sentiment by only providing one-sided information with "economic development determinism" and binary black-white logic. Thirdly, with rapid economic development during past ten years, the logic of official patriotic discourse in the 1990s, articulating with the "strong nation complex", already embedded in the heart of Chinese people.

Besides, *zuofens'* radical nationalistic discourse also endorsed by the Party-state tacitly, especially when facing western countries' attack. Thus, when Chinese people have access to express their own voice directly through the Internet, they presented the radical anti-Western and pro-CCP discourse. Fourthly, under the authoritarian environment, *yofens'* liberal discourse was also radical since they tended to immerse in the game of struggling with the Party-state's information control and blindly believing the western media, instead of considering the overseas information critically and rationally.

Clearly, considering the quality of nationalistic debates, as well as the power relations among the four agents, we may find that China's mass media and the Internet society as a civil society still had not developed. Yet, we cannot deny that China's mass media in the 2000s indeed headed towards the formation of a civil society. As to the future of Chinese nationalistic discourse and whether China's mass media and the Internet society can evolve as civil society, we will discuss such issues in the conclusion chapter.

Chapter Seven Conclusion and Discussion

Summary of Findings

Guided by the critical realism-based hegemony model, this study examined the power relationships amongst China’s Party-state, intellectuals, mass media and the citizens in the past thirty years, approaching from their hegemonic struggles for the leading status of nationalistic discourse. It also explored how China’s complex “political-cum-economical-cum-cultural” structure shaped such dynamic relations as well as Chinese nationalistic discourses and, to what extent such tensions and struggles transformed China’s social structure. In this concluding chapter, I summarized the four insights.

First, by means of discourse analysis of the three cases, I found that in the thirty years’ fierce hegemonic competition among the four agents’ nationalistic discourses, intellectuals’ liberal discourse, the Party-state’s conservative patriotism, and netizens’ radical anti-Western discourse acquired hegemonic status in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s separately (See Table 7.1). Interestingly, all the hegemonic nationalistic discourses during the thirty years, no matter liberal or conservative, pro-West or anti-West, were radical and incorporated the “strong nation complex” among Chinese people.


Table 7. 1 Four agents’ nationalistic discourses: from the 1980s to the 2000s

	1980s	1990s	2000s
Party-state	Modernization/ patriotism	Patriotism: pro-CCP, anti-West	Patriotism: pro-CCP, pro-West
Intellectuals	<i>Qimeng</i> : complete westernization	New Conservatism New Left	-Establishment: rational patriotism - The Left: anti-west, pro-CCP

	-Confucianism	New	-Liberal: anti-CCP, pro-West
	-Liberal	Confucianism	-Public intellectuals: rational
	Marxism	Liberal	democracy
Mass media	Complete westernization	Radicalized official patriotism	-Tabloid: radicalized anti-West, obeying the bottom line -Professional: liberal pro-West, obeying the bottom line
Citizens	Followed intellectuals	Followed the Party-state	- <i>zuofens</i> : anti-West, pro-CCP - <i>youfens</i> : pro-West, anti-CCP

Second, from the changing hegemonic nationalistic discourse, we can find the power relations among the four agents changed during the thirty years. By analyzing the process of the four agents' hegemonic struggles for the leading role of nationalistic discourse, their changing power relations were then found (See Figure 7.1; 7.2; and 7.3).


Figure 7. 1 Power relations amongst the four agents: Case One



Through the case of *Heshang*, I found that both China's intellectuals and mass media were under the Party-state's totalitarian control in the 1980s. However, *qimeng* intellectuals, aligned with the mass media, formed the "historic bloc". They actively promoted their "complete westernization" project to the ordinary citizens, with the aim of "enlightening the public" on the one hand; and pressuring the Party-state for further political reform and news reform on the other hand. The *Qimeng* project, which incorporated the modernization discourse of the Party-state and "strong nation" discourse among Chinese people, finally acquired hegemonic


status among the society, not only within the ideological realm, such as the national-wide highly praised *Heshang*, but also in the practical realm, for such an idea was finally translated into street marches in spring 1989.

Figure 7. 2 Power relations amongst the four agents: Case Two



Then, through the case of the anti-bombing Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, I found that such power relations changed dramatically in the 1990s. Noticeably, the “historic bloc” between intellectuals and the mass media was cut off. And, almost all Chinese intellectuals became the “establishment” realistically collaborated with the Party-state. Though various projects, such as New Left, New Conservatism, New Confucianism, Liberalism, etc, were promoted by intellectuals independently, all of them, fundamentally, legitimated the centralized state in guiding China’s development, and justifying official patriotism, rather than aiming at “enlightening the public”. Meanwhile, in the mass media realm, when the official media spared no effort to promote official patriotic logic, book dealers and publishers together radicalized official discourse by organizing and publishing a series of nationalistic related books. Then, the fervent feedback from the public for such books further motivated market-oriented media to develop aggressive anti-Western nationalistic discourse.

Figure 7. 3 Power relations amongst the four agents: Case Three



Through the case of anti-Tibet Independence movement, I found that with increasing complexity among the four agents' struggles, the Party-state's influence on the society weakened in the 2000s. Market-oriented newspapers either radicalized the strong anti-Western discourse continually, or promoted a liberal, self-reflexive kind of nationalistic discourse, both of which challenged the official rational patriotism more or less. Though establishment intellectuals echoed official patriotism by raising "Chinese traditional culture fever" through the mass media, marginalized intellectuals reemerged again through the Internet, making efforts to promote their alternative views to the millions of netizens. Moreover, Chinese citizens, as millions of netizens, expressed their nationalistic feelings independently for the first time since the 1980s. Though online popular discourse divided into *zuofens* and *youfens*, both of them posed great challenges to the official discourse. And *zuofens'* radical anti-Western discourse even gained hegemonic status in the struggle with official discourse. However, considering its pro-CCP arguments as well as its endorsement by the Party-state, we cannot say that *zuofens'* hegemonic status meant that Chinese netizens have the ability to challenge the Party-state in the discursive level.

Third, it is argued that China's economic-political-cultural structures together shaped agents' power relations and their nationalistic discourses. Especially, from such structural level, this study explained the contradictory phenomenon that under the Party-state's strict ideological control in the past thirty years, why did the mass

media and intellectuals in the 1980s promote a liberal nationalistic discourse and even push the Party-state for political reform while they were forced to cooperate with the Party-state, and promoted official patriotism in the 1990s. Then in the 2000s, why did mass media and intellectuals again have the ability to challenge official discourse by proposing various alternative projects? And why did radical anti-Western discourse, promoted by millions of the Internet users, instead of official patriotism and others, acquired hegemonic status finally?

Indeed, though the Party-state controlled each aspect of social life in the 1980s, the transition of the economic system from planned economy to commodity economy forced the Party-state to reorganize the methods of state intervention on the economy and on political practice. In particular, to promote its modernization project, the Party-state had to liberate the ideological realm which provided a wide space for *qimeng*'s "complete westernization" project. Then, the Party-state's failed price reform and the slow political reform greatly challenged the totalitarian political structure. And intellectuals' "complete westernization" project and liberal, democratic discourse acquire the hegemonic status by chance.

Faced with a serious crisis of hegemony, the Party-state hoped to regain support by strict ideological control, as well as promoting the official patriotism with anti-Western rhetoric and pro-CCP discourse. Indeed, China's rapid economic development under the socialist market economy system in the 1990s satisfied the "strong nation complex" among Chinese people, and legitimized the Party-state's systematic authoritarian ideological control and official patriotic discourse. Inside the Party-state system, intellectuals lost their motivations to promote democratic ideas; instead, they either helped to legitimize the Party-state's authoritarian politics and economic liberalization, or simply enjoyed their high social status. Under the dual logic of state and market, nationalistic books, with political sensitive issues and aggressive anti-Western mood catering to both readers and the Party-state's patriotism, became the first choice of book dealers and publishers in the media market. Numerous nationalistic books further radicalized and popularized official pro-CCP and anti-Western nationalistic discourse.

However, the burgeoning of the Internet society in the 2000s decentralized the Party-state's authoritarian politics greatly. Creating a new information environment in which both-sided information can be acquired and everybody can express their ideas, various alternative views promoted by marginalized intellectuals reemerged, and their influence rapidly increased through the Internet. Besides, Chinese citizens, represented as millions of netizens, also can express their ideas directly through the Internet society. Though various censorship technologies were developed by the Party-state to control the Internet society, it was, indeed, almost an impossible task. With quick information dissemination and high interactions among netizens in the Internet society, netizens' discourse posed a great challenge to the Party-state's patriotism. Yet, the rapid economic development, combined with authoritarian political structure, can only cultivate "radical audiences", instead of promoting rational-critical nationalistic discourse. As a result, the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the 2000s was still radical with a strong anti-Western attitude.

Fourth, when China's economic-political-cultural structures shaped agents' power relations and the hegemonic nationalistic discourse, China's social structure also changed in the process of four agents' dynamic hegemonic struggles. The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 indeed reflected a deeper disjuncture between politics and economy in the 1980s China, which forced the Party-state to carry out the project of radical economic modernization, promote pro-capitalist elements of the bureaucracy, petite bourgeoisie and foreign capitalists, and so, kept revolutionary democratic sentiments within a moderate, national framework. Meanwhile, drawing lessons from the 1980s, the Party-state, in the process of rapid economic development, also paid enough attention to keeping in touch with the masses, surveillance on public opinion tightly and strengthening ideological control to intellectuals and the mass media. As a result, the Party-state's crisis of hegemony in the 1980s was followed by an entire decade of authoritarian capitalist developments, though such far-reaching consequence was beyond liberal intellectuals' designing. Then, to perpetuate the successful social structure of the 1990s, the Party-state tried to maintain high economic growth in the 2000s by merging into the world system and developing high-technologies, especially the

Internet technology. And the burgeoning of the Internet society was also the unforeseen consequences of such official projects.

Yet, agents' struggles still did not promote the media as civil society even though the Internet society emerged, especially when we consider the power relations of the four agents and the radical nature of hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the past thirty years. Apparently, *qimeng* intellectuals promoted a liberal, self-reflexive kind of nationalistic discourse, and even pushed the Party-state for political reform, which seems that civil society, providing checks and balance for the political power of the state, already formed in the 1980s. However, such liberal discourse was radical, for its "self-contempt" attitude towards traditional culture, and mystifying Western political system, as well as its search for the once-glorious empire and hope to restore the political and economic hegemony of the nation in the present world. Such utopian "strong nation complex" indeed made their project lose much of a critical edge. Besides, as the mouthpiece of the Party-state, China's mass media system in the 1980s was totally controlled by the Party-state all-around. As argued, though some semi-independent newspapers emerged, they were *de facto* supported or tolerated by reformist leaders for promoting the modernization project. Thus, when *qimeng* intellectuals lost the support from the reformist leaders, they eventually failed in the struggle for the media as a civil society.

Then, in the process of China's media commercialization in the 1990s, the "public" nature of the mass media had been threatened by both the authoritarian state and the capitalist market. Indeed, media nationalistic discourse always went beyond the Party-line and even below bottom line in a series of nationalistic related books. Yet, this was only the book dealers' and publishers' bold activity for economic consideration operating under the dual logic of state and market, rather than aiming at encouraging the public to engage in discussions on political issues. Besides, instead of challenging the strong Party-state and its patriotic discourse, the media nationalistic discourse only radicalized and popularized the official discourse. Putting it differently, the Party-state cultivated "radical audiences" by official patriotism, and the media radicalized it to cater to such "radical audiences". Thus, mass media as a civil society did not emerge.

Undoubtedly, by decentralizing the Party-state's authoritarian control, China's Internet society in the 2000s promoted media "publicness", such as netizens as the "informed public", emerging of diversified nationalistic discourses, online public intellectuals' efforts to promote critical thinking, etc. Moreover, non-establishment intellectuals' nationalistic discourse really challenged the Party-state's authority, and netizens' radical anti-western nationalistic discourse even forced the Party-state to adjust its foreign policy. Concluded from such phenomenon, many scholars took a positive attitude towards Chinese cybernationalism, (Liu, 2003; Garies, 2004; Seo, 2005; Wu, 2007; etc.), or even considered China's Internet society as a civil society (Tan, 2004; Wu, 2007; etc.). However, if we analyze netizens' nationalistic discourse and consider the quality of online debate, we may find that such conclusions are very optimistic. Instead of rational and a self-reflexive kind of discourse, the hegemonic discourse was full of xenophobic sentiment, argument of a binary logic, and "showing attitude" style. The debates between *zuofens* and *youfens* were so radical that they always led to mutual abuse and personal attack, and finally accumulated bitter anger and hatred among different camps. Clearly, such a kind of discourse and debate was not a positive signal for the formation of an online civil society.

Limitations of This Study

Through three unique nationalistic related cases, this study made a critical analysis of the features and transitions of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the past thirty years, and the power relations behind it, and explained them from the structural perspective. In detail, by textual analysis to the TV-documentary *Heshang*, the 1999 anti-bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, and anti-Tibet Independence movement and pro-overseas torch relay, the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse and its transitions in the "reform and opening" era were described extensively. Then, by investigating nationalistic projects promoted by the Party-state, intellectuals, the mass media, as well as the citizens, and their intensive struggles from the three representative cases, we understood how the intellectual-led liberal discourse in the 1980s, the CCP-led patriotic discourse in the 1990s, and the *zuofens*' radical anti-Western discourse in the 2000s win the hegemonic status separately. Moreover, with in-depth structural analysis to the

three cases, we explained the features of nationalistic discourses and the transitions of power relations among the four agents from China's political-economical-cultural structure in the past thirty years. However, it is a giant project that challenges the researcher's ability to deal with so many agents' projects and struggles in thirty years, as well as examining the deeper social structural reasons behind them. Due to constraints of both time and ability, several issues need to be examined more delicately and carefully in the future.

First, all the three cases represent the highest tide of nationalistic sentiment in each period that the four agents' projects were fully involved and their hegemonic struggles were vividly manifested. Yet, in a typical nationalistic incident, the reactions of the four agents may be deviated to some extent. Especially, mass media and Chinese ordinary citizens tend to be more radical and aggressive than usual. Accordingly, their power relations in nationalistic hegemonic struggles may also be deviated from normal cases. Though the directions of power relationships manifested correctly, more detailed examination on the intensifying power relations among the four agents is needed in future studies.

Secondly, there is more room for institutional analysis to the production process of agents' nationalistic discourses. Especially, it is clear that the Party-state was the most powerful agent to influence China's hegemonic nationalistic discourse. Yet, it is highly difficult to trace the production process of the official patriotic discourse. Thus, in the discursive level analysis, though we can see the projects adopted by the Party-state, its hegemonic struggles for the leading role of nationalistic discourse, and the way economic, political and cultural structure shapes it and its power relations, it is difficult to explore which was the most significant element to the Party-state for changing its nationalistic discourse, and to what extent certain structural factors shape the agents' nationalistic discourse.

Thirdly, to investigate the hegemonic struggles among the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals and the citizens, the in-depth interview method was adopted. Yet, since nationalism is a relatively sensitive political topic in China, it is difficult to get some unbiased responses and reactions from officials in propaganda departments and media workers, such as the official attitude of *Heshang* in 1980s, the detailed

management methods of online public opinion, the media organizations' interpretation of official patriotism, etc. Most of such qualitative data can only be obtained from archives and other public sources of information, as well as informal interviews of higher officials from private conversations.

Finally, one premise of this study considers China's economic, political and cultural structures as an ongoing process, and thus examines the influence of agents' nationalistic projects and hegemonic struggles to the transition of social structure, such as the formation of a civil society. For instance, the anti-Tibet independence case offers us a chance of "studying the 'leading edge' of change", as suggested by Schofield (2000). Yet, as Gramsci (1971:408) pointed out, "a structural phase can be concretely studied and analyzed only after it has gone through its whole process of development, and not during the process itself, except hypothetically." Indeed, we are not sure whether the social agents' hegemonic projects since the 2000s are correctly reflected the new emerging social structures. Thus, more studies need to be done in the future to understand whether some of the projects are miscalculations on the part of the agents, or may even have no relevance with the social structure.

Critical Realism-based Hegemony to Study Power Relations

Through the prism of Chinese nationalistic discourse, this study aimed to examine the power relations among China's Party-state, mass media, intellectuals, and the citizens in the "reform and opening" era, the structural reasons behind the transition of power relationships, as well as their impetus to China's economic, political and media structure. Thus, both "top-down" and "bottom-up" perspectives to Chinese nationalism will remain incomplete until it considers all agents involved in tandem with structure. With the help of Gramscian concept of hegemony, on the one hand, we can regard Chinese nationalism as a negotiation field among which social agents involved propose their hegemonic projects and discourses and compete for the leading position. Accordingly, as an ongoing process, the features and transitions of Chinese nationalistic discourse in thirty years can be graphically illustrated and analyzed in detail. More importantly, by this theoretical framework, we can examine the interactions and hegemonic struggles among the Party-state, mass media, intellectuals and the citizens, from which power relations among the four agents in

thirty years can be explored. On the other hand, approached from the hegemony framework, we find that though power relations among the four agents were seriously unbalanced, the Party-state cannot monopolize China's nationalistic discourse. It is indeed possible that the mass media, intellectuals, as well as the citizens challenge the Party-state's patriotic discourse and authoritarian ideological control, or even attain hegemonic status in the discursive struggles. Thus, examining the features and hegemonic process of one nationalistic discourse by the concept of hegemony, we may discern the ways and possibilities that a more democratic and rational nationalistic discourse emerged in a future China.

Then, a critical realism understanding of hegemony helps us combine the "structure-agency" perspective, and thus develop an understanding of Chinese nationalistic discourse and the power relations among the four agents with China's economic, political, cultural structures. Accordingly, the structural reasons to the features of Chinese nationalistic discourse and the transitions of power relations in the past thirty years can be found. For example, we have found that China's market economy and rapid economic development, combined with the authoritarian political structure, could not promote democratic appealing. And China's media commercialization also could not promote rational debate and liberal ideas under the dual logic of state and market. Though the Internet society decentralized the Party-state's authoritarian ideological control and promoted diverse nationalistic discourses, the high quality rational debates and democratic nationalistic discourse as a consensus among the society still could not develop, under the authoritarian political structure.

Meanwhile, with such critical realism understanding, we also avoid the crude base/superstructure determinism model by arguing that the social structure can be altered by the very agency it produced, though the broader structural consequences are always unforeseen. A systematic analysis was made in this study to examine the influence of the agents' discursive practices and hegemonic struggles in the transformation of China's economic, political, and media structure. Liberal intellectuals' "complete westernization" project indeed pushed "passive revolution" of the Party-state to establish an "authoritarian market economy" and media market. And the Party-state's successful ideological control and economic liberalization

project in the 1990s further led to the emergence of the Internet society in the 2000s. Though the Internet society as a civil society still has not developed yet, it can be achieved with the agents' efforts. For instance, online intellectuals have the opportunity to influence millions of Chinese netizens, promoting rational debate among diverse discourses, which may push the Party-state towards making a "passive revolution" for an online civil society.

China's Social Structure and Nationalistic Discourse

By critical discourse analysis, this study finds that economic development may cause political dissatisfaction – like situations in the 1980s China, but it also may elicit political support – like situations since the 1990s. This indeed challenged the conventional belief that economic development will naturally lead to the decline of political support for the authority (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1989). Besides, China's rapid media market expansion also did not promote an appeal for democracy from Chinese people. Clearly and ironically, it is in the 1980s, when media marketization did not begin in China, there was room for liberal intellectuals to align with the mass media to ask for democracy, news freedom as well as political reform. This challenged the idea shared by liberals that media commercialization is overall a positive development for China's democracy. Furthermore, there is a clear tendency, discussed in this thesis, to say that China's hegemonic nationalistic discourses in the recent thirty years, no matter liberal or conservative, were radical in essence. This radical kind of nationalistic discourse, as the product of specific political, economic and cultural structural factors, illustrated that the mass media and the Internet society did not evolved as a civil society yet.

All such features of Chinese nationalistic discourse in the past thirty years were shaped by the unique economic, political, and media structures. Especially, rapid economic development combined with authoritarian ideological control tended to lead to radical political support. On the one hand, under the strict ideological control, the channels for marginalized intellectuals and groups to voice alternative views and exert influence on the ordinary citizens were cut off. Meanwhile, the Party-state also tried to create a consensus among the society by its official patriotism, cultivating radical "anti-West and pro-CCP" discourse with the argument

of a binary logic and economic development determinism in the national-wide scope. This, undoubtedly, has a negative impact on developing democratic thinking and rational nationalistic discourse. On the other hand, this self-righteous nationalistic discourse was further radicalized and popularized by China's burgeoning media market. Operating under the dual logic of state and market, China's mass media, in the whole process of media commercialization, radicalized the official patriotism, since its "political correctness" can satisfy the Party-state, and the radical anti-Western sentiment catered for the citizens. Putting it differently, both the political authoritarianism and the media commercialization trend encroached on the "publicness" of China's mass media. Thus, China's mass media as a civil society that contributes to alternative views and rational debates on nationalistic issues was not achieved.

Then, the sharply increasing number of Chinese netizens and the formation of the Internet society in the 2000s triggered a new round of debates on the progressive potential possibilities of an online civil society. Indeed, under the new informational context, Chinese netizens were not only well-informed but also have a new space to voice alternative views and even actively engage in political activities. This is obviously manifested in the popular nationalistic discourse in the 2000s. Chinese netizens vented their nationalistic sentiment, debated on the Western media's bias reports and the overseas torch relay turbulence, and even organized national-scale boycott Carrefour demonstrations through the Internet. However, in most cases the "showing attitude" kind of discourse and xenophobic anti-Western sentiment still permeated in China's Internet society. Instead of rational debates and promoting a mutual understanding, the online debates focused around nationalistic topics always led to mutual abusing and personal attacks with bellicose and demagogic attitude.

Many Internet scholars explain this phenomenon from the nature of the Internet. For example, some reduced the radical online nationalistic discourse to anonymous characteristics of the Internet, or young netizens' tendency to express radical sentiments. Besides, others argued that it is not that young netizens' nationalistic voice became particularly stronger; instead, it is the Internet that unified their effort and made their voice heard, loud and clear (Seo, 2005). Yet, this study tended to

conclude that the major reason lies in China's authoritarian political structure, and the Party-state's long-time ideological control and patriotic education under such political structure. Undeniably, Chinese people can receive both-sided information in the Internet society. However, the flow of information is subject to different interpretations. With thirty years' patriotic education in an authoritarian media environment, most Chinese people accept the logic of official patriotism unknowingly, and tended to be suspicious of the Western media's motivation especially when facing critical reports from overseas. As a result, the spontaneous online popular nationalistic discourse in the 2000s was very similar with the official patriotic discourse in the 1990s. Even though the burgeoning Internet society provided a new space for Chinese netizens to acquire both-sided information and debate among different views, and both the Party-state and liberal intellectuals promoted rational nationalism,¹⁵⁷ the Internet society only amplified radical nationalistic discourse.

Here, it is clear that under the unique economic-political-media structures, the democratic implication of China's Internet society was still obscure. And the negative influence of authoritarian ideological control to Chinese nationalistic discourse is more severe than the media commercialization trend. Some improvising media reform activities with limited innovations indeed appeared (Pan, 2000). Yet, the authoritarian political structure restricted its space to provide alternative views and rational debates around nationalistic related issues. When the Party-state cultivated "radical audiences" by official patriotism, China's mass media radicalized it, catering for a strong anti-Western sentiment. Then, the Internet society further amplified it by providing a new space for Chinese netizens to vent such sentiment.

Hegemonized Nationalistic Discourse and Passive Revolution

¹⁵⁷ Of course, the meanings of the term "rational" were different to the Party-state and the liberal intellectuals. For the Party-state, the term of "rational" refers to maintaining social stability and supporting the CCP's legitimacy. Yet, for the liberal intellectuals, "rational nationalism" implies that Chinese people should have the real critical thinking and break through the Party-state's propaganda.

Though this study tried to explain the features and transitions of Chinese nationalistic discourse and power relations from a structural perspective, it also paid significant attention to the influence of the agents' intensive hegemonic struggles on the transition of China's social structure. In the analytical process, this study indeed found that though the power relations among the Party-state, intellectuals, mass media and the ordinary people were seriously unbalanced, the hegemonic nationalistic discourse in the "reform and opening" era was not completely dominated by the Party-state. Even the hegemonic official patriotism in the 1990s left spaces for the popular "strong nation" discourse, New Conservatives' neo-authoritarian discourse, liberal intellectuals' economic liberalization project. Then, in the 2000s it further contained the peaceful and harmonious idea from the New Confucianism. Leaving spaces for subordinated groups' discourses, it is indeed possible for the mass media, intellectuals, and the citizens to challenge official discourse, or even force the Party-state to make a "passive revolution", organizing the superstructure in-line with structural developments.

Through analysis of how the Italian bourgeoisie developed Fordist production techniques, Gramsci (1971) showed the ruling class compensates for any weaknesses it may have and attempts to combat any pressure coming from below by carrying through a reorganization of the civil society so as to preempt any activity from the masses themselves. Similarly, in the process of China's modernization, the intensive struggles and pressures from other agents also forced the Party-state to make a "passive revolution". Specifically, though the liberals' project failed under the Party-state's coercive suppression, it indeed forced the Party-state to rebuild ideological faith by patriotic education and guarantee rapid economic development in the 1990s, which pushed the burgeoning of the market economy and media market. Then, with a hugely successful structural reproduction in the 1990s, the Party-state picked up confidence for the continuity of political authoritarian and economic liberalization by developing the Internet technology and merging into the world system in the 2000s. Yet, such efforts *de facto* pushed the emerging of the Internet society, which further decentralized the Party-state's authoritarian control.

Obviously, the agents' hegemonic struggles for nationalistic discourse indeed pushed China's social structure change, from totalitarian politics to authoritarian politics,

from socialist commodity economy to market economy, and from emerging of a media market to the Internet society, though such far-reaching consequences were unforeseen and were not previously designed by the agents. However, the mass media still has not developed as a civil society yet. Besides structural reasons, another unique factor was the “strong nation complex” in the heart of Chinese people.

Indeed, most of Chinese people are proud of China’s 5,000 years history, and dream of China becoming a strong nation again. Especially, the internal chaos and foreign incursions in China’s modern history still lingered their mind. Accordingly, for most Chinese people, the defeat of socialism by capitalism might not be a problem, but the defeat of China by the West is a real problem. This indeed became the only consensus among different social groups in China. Thus, as shown in this study, each hegemonic nationalistic discourse in China’s recent thirty years contained such “strong nation complex”. In the 1980s, while the CCP leaders gave the highest priority to economic development, *qimeng* intellectuals argued that only democracy could make a strong nation. However, as argued before, it is this hidden nostalgia discourse that eclipsed its liberal tendency that stressed on individual’s freedom and liberation from the totalitarian state. Then, this psychological condition was further utilized by the Party-state to deal with the crisis of hegemony after the Tiananmen Incident. Especially, in the official patriotism, the Party-state successfully created the impression that the Chinese nation can only revitalize under the CCP’s lead. Accompanied by rapid economic development in the 1990s, both the official patriotism and the Party-state’s authoritarian control had been accepted by Chinese people, with the strong will of becoming a strong nation.

Articulating the CCP’s authority with the “strong nation complex”, the official patriotic discourse was so successful that in the 2000s, millions of Chinese *zuofens* supported the Party-state’s authoritarian control, condemning the western media’s bias reports on the Tibet issue, and sharply denouncing various self-reflexive and self-criticism kinds of discourse. Seemingly, if China only maintains a high rate of economic development, the logic of official patriotism, as well as the Party-state’s authoritarian political control are difficult to break.

The Possibility of China’s Internet Society as a Civil Society

The findings of this study implied that only a civil society, as one independent dimension of social structure separated from the state and market, can bring about rational nationalistic discourse. In the civil society, radical nationalistic discourse can only become one small category among diverse forms of public discourses. With rational debates and discussions, most ordinary people can come to accept, in the sense of really giving their free consent to, the rational, constructive and healthy nationalistic discourse.

Then, can China's Internet society evolve as an online civil society in the future? Can the agents' hegemonic struggles push the Party-state to make a "passive revolution" for the establishing of an online civil society? No doubt, the development of China's Internet society maintained a high rate. In June 2008, China became the number one largest Internet population in the world (253 million). At the end of 2009, this figure increased to 384 million, with the penetration rate above 28.9%.¹⁵⁸ In such an open information environment, it is an almost impossible task to block information completely. Moreover, since more and more Chinese netizens engage in political and social affairs in the Internet society, the online popular discourses also have a great power to influence the Party-state's policies and social reality. According to a report titled "Society of China: Analysis and Forecast 2010" by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, one-third of the 77 most influential social events in 2009 were publicized through online forums and blogs while the traditional media were kept silent.¹⁵⁹

However, at the same time, the Party-state also strengthened its censorship on the Internet society through more flexible ways, which can be summarized as:

"Saying facts quickly, telling the reasons cautiously, and covering the bad information by good information, negative information by positive information."¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), *the 25th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China*. January, 2010. See, <http://www.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2010/11/15/101600.pdf>

¹⁵⁹ <http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2315/node4411/userobject21ai380714.html>.

¹⁶⁰ This comes from Lianyue's blog. But the initial article "Bagong zhinan" was deleted. Now we can see this article from http://www.360doc.com/content/08/11/05/11/24223_1881093.shtml. And

In detail, recognizing that it is almost impossible to control the flow of information, the Party-state embraced public relations strategies to guide public opinion. When social or political crisis happened, the Party-state released the information quickly, especially in the form of news press held by related government departments, rather than trying to block it. Meanwhile, the Party-state was very careful when telling the reasons of the crisis. In other words, it means that like before, only a one-sided pro-CCP explanation to the crisis will be provided. We still cannot hear the other side's information and attitude from official channels. Finally, for tons of undesirable information online, a new pattern of public opinion guidance – employing official Internet commentators (*Wangluo pinglunyuan*) who provide tons of positive information – was conducted. Going online as ordinary users, the role of official Internet commentators was to post comments favorable towards the government policies in order to steer discussions away from anti-Party articulations, political sensitivity or other undesirable contents. Since online commentators can be quickly mobilized during the crisis and help the Party-state skew online public opinion, there were increasing numbers of official Internet commentators hired by the Chinese government in each level.¹⁶¹

Besides modernized propaganda methods, traditional authoritarian ways were also used to monitor public opinion, especially to the dynamic online interactive activities. From January 5, 2009, China's most serious anti-smut Internet rectification campaign started.¹⁶² Yet, besides various pornography-related websites, the famous

this new propaganda guide was also confirmed by my friend who worked at the International Communication Office of Beijing (Interview #21).

¹⁶¹ As the official document revealed, the CPC Changsha and Hengyang Municipal Committee began to hire Internet commentators since 2004; the government of Suqian, Jiangsu Province hired 26 commentators in 2005; there are an estimated 20 full-time commentators in Guangdong Province; and the Gansu government even announced that it was recruiting a team of 650 Internet commentators since 2009. Zhang Lei, (2010). "Invisible footprints of online commentators", *Global Times* (English version), February 5, 2010.

¹⁶² It was organized by seven related authorities, including: State Council Information Office (SCIO), General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), Ministry of Culture (MC), the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and State Administration for Industry & Commerce (SAIC).

During one month, more than 1,900 websites and 269 blogs were shut down for containing serious "bad stuffs". Google, Baidu, Sina, Sohu, Tencent, NetEase and other famous websites and search engines released public apologies for "unhealthy content" in search, forum, photo, blog, etc, promising to strengthen self-supervision to ensure a healthy online environment.

liberal blog portal bullog.cn was shut down;¹⁶³ and many liberal tendency groups on the social networking site Douban.com were also deleted for containing sensitive and harmful political issues.¹⁶⁴ In addition, new *Notice* was also imposed on Internet video content, aimed at banning the spread of sensitive political videos, and delaying the timeliness of the Internet by a strict “permit system”.¹⁶⁵ Meanwhile, a new government agency, the Internet News Coordination Bureau (*Wangluo xinwen xietiaojuzhuanqian*) under the State Council Information Office, was set up in April 2010 to help monitor online social networking sites and various user-driven forums such as micro-blogging and video-sharing sites. Furthermore, from May 2010, the online “anonymous publishing post” function on some key news-related websites and popular commercial websites were canceled. Accordingly, “the real name system” (*shiming zhi*) was promoted in various interactive forums.¹⁶⁶

Needless to say, by such flexible and traditional ways, the Party-state hoped to screen interactive activities and guide public opinion moment by moment. Yet, such flexible authoritarian control indeed impeded China’s Internet society to develop as an online civil society. On the one hand, most of junior netizens tended to have an illusioned freedom, feeling as if they can speak freely and be heard. Aimed at attacking liberal discourse, the Party-state may align with *zuofens*, which may further radicalize nationalistic discourse. On the other hand, various updating flexible control methods also stirred up *youfens*’ radical resistance. *Youfens* developed a new “online ironic culture”, one of hatred towards the Party-state’s information control but also of worry in being banned, deleted or filtered.

¹⁶³ Bullog was once shut down on October 19, 2007, supposedly due to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Then it was re-opened in April 2008. Yet, it was banned by the authority again in the anti-smut campaign. After that, it created two versions: *Niubo International* <http://www.bullogger.com/> and *Yan Niubo*, <http://www.bullock.cn/>. The former can only be seen by servers outside China; the latter can be seen within China since it has no political content.

¹⁶⁴ Among hundreds of deleted e-groups in Douban, most of them are social and political rather than vulgar and indecent, such as liberal tendency groups (Human right reading group, Liberalism group, Bullog group, etc), left-wing groups (Worship Mao Zedong group, Left-wing youth group, Seeking truth from fact group, etc), as well as many self-life and interest-related groups (Muslim group, Black humor group, online activities group, etc).

¹⁶⁵ SARFT: *Notice on strengthening content management of online audio-visual programs*, March 31, 2009. From <http://www.Chinanews.com.cn/yl/kong/news/2009/03-31/1625269.shtml>

¹⁶⁶ Wang Chen, “*The development and management of the Internet in China*”, [*Guanyu woguo hulianwang fazhan he guanli*], at the fifteenth special lecture to the Eleventh Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, May 5, 2010. From: <http://news.163.com/10/0504/04/65QIRDT40001124J.html>

Especially, many Internet slangs, such as “*Wu Mao Dang*”,¹⁶⁷ “*River Crab*” (*He Xie*),¹⁶⁸ “*Grass Mud Horse*” (*Cao Ni Ma*),¹⁶⁹ “*Green Dam Girl*” (*Lvba Nianǎ*),¹⁷⁰ were created as metaphors to express protest towards Party-state’s online censorship. Yet, when *youfens* vent their radical sentiments towards the Party-state’s censorship by this manner, the officials and people who do not go online cannot understand those Internet slangs. Without enough communication, as a result, a huge gap will appear not only among Chinese netizens and officials, but also among *zuofens* and *youfens*. If such tendency continues, the Internet society would fail to develop a genuine civil society in which a comprehensive and rational debate can be developed.

Secondly, the Party-state also strengthened patriotic education among the society, especially in the time of China’s 60th anniversary, and the CCP’s 90th anniversary. A series of main melody TV series and popular songs, such as the patriotic song *Country* (*Guojia*), the film *Founding of the PRC* (*Jianguo Daye*), *Founding of the CCP* (*Jiandang Daye*), etc, were produced. Adding with popular and international elements, such main melody films and songs quickly became popular in the whole country, though the logic of the patriotic discourse remained the same.¹⁷¹ Besides, significant attention was also paid towards cultivating patriotic feelings among

¹⁶⁷ For numerous online commentators engaged by the authorities, they have been ridiculed by Chinese netizens as the “50 Cent Party” (*Wu Mao Dang*), for they are paid 50 Chinese cents for each positive posting.

¹⁶⁸ The CCP leadership proposed a “harmonious society” (*Hexie shehui*) ideal in 2004. Since then, it usually cites this as the reason for media censorship. Then, the word “*River Crab*” (*hexie*), sounds similar to the word “harmonious” (*hexie*) in Chinese Mandarin, was used by Chinese netizens as a euphemism for censorship.

¹⁶⁹ “*Grass Mud Horse*” (*Cao Ni Ma*) is supposedly a species of alpaca. The name is derived from the profanity “*Fuck your mother*”. Representing Chinese netizens, this animal is characterised as “lively, intelligent and tenacious”. However, their existence is said to be threatened by the “*river crabs*”, which symbolises the official censorship, which are invading their habitat. Netizens also created a new Chinese character by combining the three Chinese character radicals for grass, mud and horse.

¹⁷⁰ The *Green Dam Youth Escort* (*lvba Huaji huhang*) is a kind of content-control software developed by the CCP government. Spending 41.7 million *yuan* on this project, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) asked manufacturers to ship machines that were to be sold in China with the software preloaded—either pre-installed or enclosed on a compact disc since 1 July 2009. Then, Chinese netizens satirically created this manga-style Moe anthropomorphism named “*Green Dam Girl*” (*Luba Nianǎ*), similar to the OS-tans, as the response to the release of the *Green Dam Youth Escort*. Though many versions exist, the common features are that, she is usually dressed in green, wearing a river crab hat and an armband with the words “discipline” on it, and carrying a rabbit (*Green Dam mascot*) in hand, and armed with a paintbrush to wipe out online filth.

¹⁷¹ For example, the patriotic song *Country* was produced by the Beijing Olympic music team, sang by Jackie Chan and favored Party chanteuse Liu Yuanyuan, and accompanied by superstar pianist Lang Lang. And more than a hundred famous film stars in mainland and Hong Kong were featured in the two films *Founding of the PRC* and *Founding of the CCP*.

children. From 2009, CCTV and the Ministry of Education produced a patriotic education evening extravaganza "*The First Lecture in the School Opening*" (*Kaixue di yi ke*), and broadcasted during the prime time on CCTV on September 1, the day school opened. In this extravaganza, popular singers, superstars, famous professors and Olympic champions, all showed up to promote official patriotism in the form of playing games, singing songs, and telling stories. By asking 2.2 hundred million students and their parents to watch this program, the Party-state hoped to embed official patriotism into the heart of the Chinese young.

Moreover, catered to the "strong nation complex", the Party-state also exported China's official values and traditional values. From spring 2010, the Party-state propaganda departments launched the most ambitious expansion plan, announcing that it will invest an astonishing 45 billion *yuan* in Chinese media organizations which target global audiences.¹⁷² Among various plans,¹⁷³ the most ambitious one came from the Xinhua Agency which claimed to expand its overseas bureaus from 100 to 186, and thus, having bases in virtually every country in the world. More importantly, it planned to create an Asia-based 24-hour television station to broadcast global news to international audiences. With Al-Jazeera as the model, Xinhua Agency hoped to build an "influential and reliable" station that has the capability to compete with CNN and BBC. Meanwhile, the Confucius Institutes, China's non-profit education organizations devoted to enhancing the world's understanding of Chinese language and culture, also spread around the world. Since the first Confucius Institute abroad was established in Seoul in November 2004, a total of 282 Confucius Institutes and 272 Confucius Classrooms had been established in 83 countries and regions around the world by October 2009.¹⁷⁴ Behind the rapid dissemination of the Confucius Institutes around the world was the Chinese government's heavy investment to this program from 50 million *yuan* in 2005 to 2.8 billion *yuan* in 2009. Only its official website, <http://www.chinese.cn/>,

¹⁷² "China plans to launch Chinese CNN by investing 45 billion yuan", [*Zhongguo ni touru 450 yi chuangli CNN shi dianshitai*]. January 23, 2009. From: <http://www.news.163.com/09/0123/14/50BOKOKU0001124J.html>

¹⁷³ The first step was to build a US edition of the *China Daily*. Then, an English version of the *Global Times*, as China's second national English newspaper, was launched on April 2009. Further, CCTV also launched its overseas Russian-language channel and Arabic-language channel, aggressively expanding its team of overseas reporters.

¹⁷⁴ The data is from http://college.chinese.cn/article/2009-10/23/content_77852.htm, Retrieved Dec 10, 2009.

has cost 32.5 million *yuan*, which was labeled as “the most expensive website in history” by Chinese netizens.

In short, there is basically no change on Party-state’s patriotic education and authoritarian ideological control. Moreover, with a new popular and entertainment format, its patriotic education may become more attractive. With China’s rapid economic development, the “strong nation complex” becomes more and more intensified, and the Party-state’s authority may be further legitimized. Furthermore, the flexible authoritarian information control may radicalize both *zuofens*’ anti-Western discourse and *youfens*’ liberal discourse, and thus broadening the gaps between such two camps. From this point, one tends to have a pessimistic perspective on the future of Chinese nationalistic discourse, as well as China’s Internet society as a civil society.

However, we have examined the active role of agents in promoting the transformation of social structure in the past thirty years, from totalitarian to authoritarian political structure, from the emerging of media market to the burgeoning Internet society. This thesis, also inherited the Gramscian “philosophy of praxis” spirit, has an optimistic attitude on the agents’ efforts to push the Party-state for a further “passive revolution”. Here, special hope was placed on the role of China’s intellectuals in pushing the Internet society developed as an online civil society. After all, Lian Yue’s effort that turned his personal blog to an online civil society already showed that aligned with millions of netizens through the Internet society, Chinese intellectuals indeed enlarged the freedom of speech; and through rational debate among multiple discourses, netizens can accept the healthy, democratic nationalistic discourse. Thus, to push the formation of an online civil society, Chinese intellectuals have the responsibility to express rational and independent views on controversial issues, cultivate a rational spirit among Chinese people, and encourage them to supervise the “publicness” of the mass media. More importantly, instead of venting mutual antagonistic sentiment and “showing attitude” type of debating, it is imperative for Chinese intellectuals, as suggested by Gramsci, to provide a philosophy which can get moral and philosophical consent from all major groups in a nation, like Lian Yue’s promotion of liberal moral-political values. By aligning with millions of Chinese netizens, promoting rational debates in the

struggle with the Party-state's authoritarian control, the intellectuals' democratic philosophy and a more moderate nationalistic project may one day acquire hegemonic role.

Appendix

Appendix A. List of Interviewees

1. My father, August 2008, at Beijing
2. China's representative at UNESCO, February 2009, at Beijing
3. Xiao Gongqin, historian, July 2009, at Hong Kong
4. Former cultural official A, the Literary Bureau of the CPD, January 2009, at Beijing
5. Dai Qing, the famous liberal intellectual, February 2009, at Hong Kong
6. Senior netizen B, *Strong Nation Forum*, August 2008, at Beijing
7. Senior netizen C, *Strong Nation Forum*, August 2008, at Beijing
8. Deputy chief-editor D, *People's Daily*, February 2009, at Beijing
9. Editor E, *Qiushi*, March 2009, at Beijing
10. Journalist F, *Global Times*, April 2009, at Beijing
11. Senior editor G, a noticeable specialized publishing house, April 2009, at Beijing
12. Deputy chief-editor H, *People's Daily*, February 2009, at Beijing
13. Wang Liesheng, Professor at Chinese National Academy of Arts, February 2009, at Beijing
14. Former cultural official I, the News Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department, January 2009, at Beijing
15. Former cultural official I, the News Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department, January 2009, at Beijing
16. Former cultural official A, the Literary Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department, January 2009, at Beijing
17. Senior netizens B and J, *Strong Nation Forum*, August 2008, at Beijing
18. Post-doctorate K, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, June 2008, at Hong Kong
19. Dai Qing, the famous liberal intellectual, February 2009, at Hong Kong
20. Editor L, *Global Times*, April 2009, at Beijing
21. Cultural official M, the Bureau of online public opinion, the International Communication Office of Beijing, July 2008, at Beijing

Appendix B. Questions of Semi-Structural Interview

I. Interview Questions (Netizens)

1. General Background Information

Year/ place of birth

Race or ethnicity

Occupation

Level of formal education

Years of online experience

Personal blogs/websites

2. On Personal Nationalistic Tendency

During the Tibet riot in March 2008, many western media made bias reports to the Tibet riot. In your opinion, why did the Tibet riot happen? And why western media have a bias tendency towards the Tibet issue?

During the overseas torch relay in April 2008, Tibet protestors wrecked the Olympic torch passing. What is your opinion on the torch relay turbulence?

During the overseas torch relay in April 2008, Chinese patriots organized various “protecting torch relay” activities, such as “red heart China online”, boycott Carrefour, etc. What is your opinion on their activities?

Do you know the website ANTI-CNN? Can you make a brief comment on it?

Do you know Chang Ping? Have you ever read his article “*Tibet: the truth and nationalistic mood*”? What is your attitude on Chang Ping and this article?

Do you know the *Wu Maodang*? What is your opinion towards the *Wu Maodang*?

3. On Official Nationalistic Discourse

Do you know the meanings of official patriotism? Please list some keywords about it.

In your opinion, why did the Party-state promote patriotism?

What is your attitude to the official patriotism?

In your opinion, what had the Party-state done during the Tibet riot and overseas torch relay turbulence? Do you think their crisis management methods were effective and successful?

In your opinion, what is the influence of the Tibet riot and overseas torch relay turbulence to patriotic discourse of the Party-state?

4. On Intellectuals' Nationalistic Discourse

Have you ever visited *Niubo*, or the *Utopia*? Please list some famous bloggers or scholars you know or like in the two websites.

Do you know the key debates/ quarrels between liberal intellectuals and the leftists?

What is your opinion on their debates?

5. On Internet Use

How many hours will you spend to go online every day?

Have you ever/ Do you know how to bypass the GFW when going online?

Have you ever used the RSS technology to read news?

Have you ever/ Do you always participate online forum discussions?

Have your posts/ articles been deleted by online forum managers? If yes, what kinds of posts were deleted? And what are your feelings and reactions?

Do you always browse official websites, such as official news portals, official newspapers/ TV programs online, or even government websites?

Please list some blogs or personal websites you always visit.

During the overseas torch relay period, have you participated boycott activities organized from online forums? If yes, why did you want to participate? Can you describe the whole process?

What is your attitude on the Party-State's media management? For example, what is your opinion on the Party-state's anti-smut Internet rectification campaign in January 2009?

6. On Mass Media

On average, how many hours will you spend to read newspaper/ watch TV per day? What kind of contents/ programs do you like to read/ watch?

Do you read Party newspapers/ watch news from CCTV?

Which paper do you like to read: *Global Times* or *Southern Metropolis Daily*?

Why?

II. Interview Questions (Intellectuals)

1. General Background Information

Year/ place of birth

Race or ethnicity

Study Field

Political Background

2. On Nationalistic Tendency

During the Tibet riot in March 2008, many western media made bias reports to the Tibet riot. In your opinion, why did the Tibet riot happen? And why western media have a bias tendency towards the Tibet issue?

During the overseas torch relay in April 2008, Tibet protestors wrecked the Olympic torch passing. What is your opinion on the torch relay turbulence?

During the overseas torch relay in April 2008, Chinese patriots organized various “protecting torch relay” activities, such as “red heart China online”, boycott Carrefour, etc. What is your opinion on their activities?

Do you know the website ANTI-CNN? Can you make a brief comment on it?

Do you know Chang Ping? Have you ever read his article “*Tibet: the truth and nationalistic mood*”? What is your attitude on Chang Ping and this article?

3. On Official Nationalistic Discourse and Relations with the Party-state

Can you explain the meanings of official patriotism in the “reform and opening” era?

In your opinion, why did the Party-state promote patriotism?

What is your attitude to the official patriotism?

In your experience, how does the Party-state regulate intellectuals’ behaviors and manage the thought work on intellectuals?

Are there any changes of the Party-state's attitude towards Chinese intellectuals during the past thirty years?

In your opinion, are there any similar elements/ logic between the official patriotic discourse and intellectuals' nationalistic discourse during the past thirty years?

4. Relations with Mass Media

Are you the columnist for certain newspapers or regular guest of certain TV programs?

Can you make an evaluation to the newspapers or TV programs that had invited you as the columnist or regular guest, such as its influence, its nationalistic tendency, its self-censorship system, etc?

Have your articles or words been deleted by such newspapers or TV programs? In general, what kinds of articles or words are easily to be censored?

What is your opinion on China's media censorship system?

Can you describe the relations among intellectuals, mass media and the Party-state during the past thirty years, and explain its transitions?

5. On Popular Nationalistic Discourse and Relations with the ordinary netizens

In your opinion, why did the so-called "rising" popular nationalism appear since the 1990s? What is your opinion to this phenomenon?

There is a significant change of official nationalistic discourse from the 1980s to the 1990s – from pro-West, anti-CCP to pro-CCP, anti-West. Can you explain for this radical transformation?

Different with once homogeneous voice of pro-CCP and anti-West popular nationalistic discourse in the 1990s, during the period of the Tibet riot and the overseas torch relay turbulence, there were sharp controversies around the attitude to the Western countries and the Party-state in the popular nationalistic discourse. In your opinion, why did the popular nationalistic discourse divide and clash in the 2000s?

Do you care about whether your ideas or opinions may have influence to the ordinary citizens, such as Chinese millions of netizens? If yes, how you keep relations with the citizens/ netizens?

Do you have personal blog? What is the main aim for you to write a blog? Have your posts/ articles ever been deleted? If yes, what kinds of posts have been deleted?

III. Interview Questions (Media workers)

1. General Background Information

Year/ place of birth

Race or ethnicity

Political Background

Working years in mass media field

The covering field

2. On Nationalistic Tendency

During the Tibet riot in March 2008, many western media made bias reports to the Tibet riot. In your opinion, why the Tibet riot happen? And why western media have a bias tendency towards the Tibet issue?

During the overseas torch relay in April 2008, Tibet protestors wrecked the Olympic torch passing. What is your opinion on the torch relay turbulence?

During the overseas torch relay in April 2008, Chinese patriots organized various “protecting torch relay” activities, such as “red heart China online”, boycott Carrefour, etc. What is your opinion on their activities?

Do you know the website ANTI-CNN? Can you make a brief comment on it?

Do you know Chang Ping? Have you ever read his article “*Tibet: the truth and nationalistic mood*”? What is your attitude on Chang Ping and this article?

3. On Official Nationalistic Discourse and Relations with the Party-state

Can you explain the meanings of official patriotism, and its transitions in the “reform and opening” era?

In your opinion, what is the effect of the patriotic education since the 1990s? Does the Party-state’s patriotic discourse acquire the leading role among the society?

As far as the nationalistic topic was concerned, what is the Party line and bottom line in covering nationalistic issues? Have you encountered any problems or censorship during reporting?

What is your attitude on China's media censorship system?

4. On Media Nationalistic Discourse

As far as the nationalistic topic was concerned, what kind of nationalism your paper promoted: official, assertive, aggressive, or rational?

What are the factors that may influence your decision whether to cover a nationalistic story or not?

During the period of the Tibet riot, what's your newspaper's attitude towards western media's bias reports, and the oversea torch relay turbulence?

During the period of the Tibet riot and the oversea torch relay turbulence, how your department deals with the radical popular nationalistic sentiment?

In the 1980s, China's newspapers have a liberal tendency, and called for anti-CCP, pro-Western nationalistic sentiment. But the situation changed totally since the 1990s. In your opinion, what is the main reason for such radical transformation?

5. On Intellectuals' Nationalistic Discourse and Relations with Intellectuals

How many columnists/ regular guests do your newspaper/ TV program have? What kind of intellectuals may be invited by your organization?

For the articles or words produced by the columnists/ regular guests, how did you make judgement whether the articles accorded with the Party line or bottom line?

In the 1980s, China's mass media, cooperated with intellectuals, promoted liberal nationalistic discourse and pushed the Party-state for political reform. In your opinion, why such relationship between mass media and intellectuals de-linked since the 1990s?

Can you describe the relations among intellectuals, mass media and the Party-state nowadays?

6. On Popular Nationalistic Discourse and Relations with Netizens

In your opinion, why did the so-called “rising” popular nationalism appear in China since the 1990s? What is your opinion to this phenomenon?

Different with once homogeneous voice of pro-CCP and anti-West popular nationalistic discourse in the 1990s, during the period of the Tibet riot and the overseas torch relay turbulence, there were sharp controversies around the attitude towards the Western countries and the Party-state in the popular nationalistic discourse of the 2000s. In your opinion, how did such controversies happen? How did your organization guide online nationalistic discourse during the period of the Tibet riot and the overseas torch relay turbulence?

What is the ways for you to know the public opinion on nationalistic issues?

In your daily work, to what extent will you pay attention on popular nationalistic sentiment, especially online nationalistic sentiment?

Among numerous online nationalistic events, what are the criteria for you to select and cover it?

IV. Interview Questions (Cultural officials)

1. General Background Information

Year/ place of birth

Race or ethnicity

Working years in the cultural field

The field to manage

2. On Nationalistic Tendency

During the Tibet riot in March 2008, many western media made bias reports to the Tibet riot. In your opinion, why the Tibet riot happen? And why western media have a bias tendency towards the Tibet issue?

During the overseas torch relay in April 2008, Tibet protestors wrecked the Olympic torch passing. What is your opinion on the torch relay turbulence?

During the overseas torch relay in April 2008, Chinese patriots organized various “protecting torch relay” activities, such as “red heart China online”, boycott Carrefour, etc. What is your opinion on their activities?

Do you know the website ANTI-CNN? Can you make a brief comment on it?

Do you know Chang Ping? Have you ever read his article “*Tibet: the truth and nationalistic mood*”? What is your attitude on Chang Ping and this article?

3. On Official Nationalistic Discourse

Can you explain the meanings of official patriotism, and its transitions in the “reform and opening” era?

In your opinion, why did the Party-state promote patriotism?

In your opinion, what is the effect of the patriotic education since the 1990s? Does the Party-state’s patriotic discourse acquire the leading role among the society?

For the *rational* patriotism you promoted during the Tibet riot and the overseas torch relay turbulence, how to achieve such *rational* in your opinion?

When promoting official patriotism, will the Party-state consider or incorporate the popular nationalistic discourse or intellectuals’ discourse?

In the Internet era, how did the Party-state promote official patriotism online?

Some scholars called for Confucian nationalism as China’s new official ideology. What is your opinion on this proposal?

4. On Mass Media Regulation

As a cultural official who was responsible for media regulation, can you introduce your daily work?

Can you describe the whole process of mass media regulation in nowadays China?

Many scholars both in foreign countries and mainland China criticized China’s media censorship system. What is your opinion?

During the period of the Tibet riot, what are the official reactions to western media’s bias reports, and the oversea torch relay turbulence?

During the period of the Tibet riot and the oversea torch relay turbulence, how your department deals with the radical popular nationalistic sentiment?

Can you describe the relations among intellectuals, mass media and the Party-state during the past thirty years, and then explain its transitions?

In the Internet era, what are different methods that the authority adopted to regulate mass media and the burgeoning Internet society?

5. Regulation on the Internet and Online Nationalistic Discourse

Can you describe your daily work on managing online public opinion?

In general, what kinds of articles or words are easily to be censored?

In the Internet era, what are the new methods the Party-state adopts to manage the Internet society, such as various online communities, online video websites, online blogs, and online interactive activities?

Can you introduce the new “official online commentators” system? Many netizens criticized online commentators as “Wu Maodang”, what is your opinion about this online management system?

Indeed, many scholars have criticized China’s GFW system and keyword filter system. Actually, numerous Chinese netizens nowadays have learnt to bypass the GFW or use alternative words to avoid being censored. So can you evaluate the effect of the Party-state’s online censorship system?

In your opinion, why did the so-called “rising” popular nationalism appear in China since the 1990s? What is your opinion to this phenomenon?

What are the methods for your department to know the public opinion on nationalistic issues?

Different with once homogeneous voice of pro-CCP and anti-West popular nationalistic discourse in the 1990s, during the period of the Tibet riot and the overseas torch relay turbulence, there were sharp controversies around the attitude towards the Western countries and the Party-state in the popular nationalistic discourse of the 2000s. In your opinion, why did the popular nationalistic discourse divide and clasp? How did you guide online nationalistic discourses during the period of the Tibet riot and the overseas torch relay turbulence?

Many have said that popular nationalistic discourse has more and more influences on the Party-state’s policy making. Is it true?

Appendix C. Glossary

Ai guozei	Patriotic thieves,	愛國賊
Ba rong ba chi	Eight honors and Eight Shames,	八榮八恥
Baijia Jiangtan	<i>Lecture Room,</i>	百家講壇
Bainian guochi	Century of national humiliation,	百年國恥
Ban zhimindi	Semi-colonisation,	半殖民地
Beifang Qunti	North Art Group,	北方群體
Bing dian	<i>Freezing Point,</i>	冰點
Ca bianqiu	Playing the cutting-edge ball,	擦邊球
Chao wending jiegou	Ultrastability system,	超穩定結構
Chou laojiu	Stinking old nine,	臭老九
Da guofan	Big rice bowl,	大鍋飯
Daguo jueqi	Rise of the Great Powers,	大國崛起
Daguo xintai	Great power consciousness,	大國心態
Da yitong	Grand unification,	大一統
Da yuejin	Great Leap Forward,	大躍進
Da zibao,	Big character posters,	大字報
<i>Dazuodeng, xiangyouzhuan</i>	Signaling left, turning right,	打左燈，向右轉
Danwei	Work unit,	單位
Deng Xiaoping lilun	Deng Xiaoping Theory,	鄧小平理論
Ding zihu	Nailhouse,	釘子戶
Dou er bu po	Struggle without fraction,	鬥而不破
E zhi Zhongguo	Contain China,	遏制中國
Fanyou yundong	“anti-Rightist” Movement,	反右運動
Fazhan caishi yingdaoli	Development is of overriding- importance,	發展才是硬道理
Fuguo qiangbing	A prosperous country and a- strong army,	富國強兵
Geming dang	Revolutionary Party,	革命黨
Gentle	Follow-up post,	跟貼
Gongmin jizhe	Citizen journalists,	公民記者
Guan benwei,	Official-rank oriented worth,	官本位
Guoji xingwei,	Over-reaction activity,	過激行為
Guojia,	Country,	國家
Guoqing	National condition,	國情
Guotui minjin	State retreat but private promotion,	國退民進
Guoying qiye	State-run enterprises,	國營企業
Guoyou minying	State-owned but privately run,	國有民營
Guoyou qiye	State-owned enterprises,	國有企業
He er bu tong	Harmonious but different,	和而不同
He ping jueqi	Peaceful rise,	和平崛起
Heping yanbian	Peaceful evolution,	和平演變

Heshang	River Elegy,	《河殤》
He xie she hui	Harmonious society,	和諧社會
Hongxin Zhongguo	Red heart China,	紅心中國
Houshe	Mouthpiece,	喉舌
Hua beitung wei liliang	Turn grief into strength,	化悲痛為力量
Huayu quan	Right to speak,	話語權
Hulianwang guanli fa	The Internet Management Law,	互聯網管理法
Jiatinglianchan chengbao zerenzhi	Household responsibility system,	家庭聯產承 -包責任制
Jingji song, zhengzhi jin,	Relaxing controls on economic matter,- tightening controls for political issues,	經濟松, - 政治緊
Jingshen wuran	Spiritual pollution,	精神污染
Jujing huishen gao jianshe, yixin yiyi mou fazhan	Concentrating on construction,- focusing on self-developing,	聚精會神搞建設, - 一心一意謀發展
Kaichu qiujì	Be expelled from the globe,	開除球籍
Ke xue fa zhan guan	Scientific development view,	科學發展觀
Kexue lixing	Scientific rationality,	科學理性
Lao Baixing	The common people,	老百姓
Lao Tongzhi	the Old revolutionary cadres,	老同志
Liangge 'fanshi'	Two "Whatevers",	兩個“凡是”
Mai guozei	Traitors,	賣國賊
Mai mai shu hao	Book number trading,	買賣書號
Mao Zedong sixiang	Mao Zedong Thought,	毛澤東思想
Neiluan	Internal chaos,	內亂
Ni banshi, wo fangxin	With you in charge, I am at ease.	你辦事, 我放心
Qimeng	Enlightenment,	啟蒙
Quanman zhengdun	Comprehensive rectification,	全面整頓
Quanpan xihua	Complete Westernization,	全盤西化
Quanyang zhengce	Imprisoned policy,	圈養政策
Renmin gongshe	The people's communes system	人民公社
Renquan gaoyu zhuquan	Human rights above sovereignty,	人權高於主權
Renrou suosuo	Dirt-digging,	人肉蒐索
Ruo piping bu ziyou, ze zanmei wu yiyi	If the right to criticism is not free,- then the praise is meaningless.	若批評不自由, - 則讚美無意義
Sanbu zou	Three Steps,	三步走
San ge dai biao	Three Representatives Theory,	三個代表
Sanjiaodi	Triangle corner,	三角地
Sanxiang xuexi	Three Theories Education,	三項學習
Shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan	The primary stage of socialism	社會主義初級階段
Shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhi guan	Socialist core value system,	社會主義核心價值觀
Shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming	Socialist spiritual civilization,	社會主義精神文明
Shendu xiaozu	Checkup groups ,	審讀小組
Shenzhouxing	Easyown,	神州行
Shengcun weiji	Crisis of survival,	生存危機

Shijian shi jianyan zhenli de weiyi biao zhun	Practice is the sole criterion- for testing truth.	實踐是檢驗- 真理的唯一標準。
Shiming zhi	Real name system,	實名制
Shiye danwei	Administrative units,	事業單位
Shiye danwei, qiyehua guanli	Administrative units- with enterprise management,	事業單位, 企- 業化管理
Shuhao	Book number,	書號
Shushang	Book dealer,	書商
Sige xiandaihua	Four Modernizations,	四個現代化
Si Ren Bang	Gang of Four,	四人幫
Sixiang jiben yuanze	Four Basic Principles	四項基本原則
Sixiangjia danchu, xuewenjia tuxian	Thinkers fade out and- academicians come to prominence	思想家淡出, - 學問家凸顯
Sixiang jiefang yundong	Thought emancipation movement	思想解放運動
Tigao zonghe guoli	Reinforce comprehensive- national power,	提高綜合國力
Tizhinei zhishifenzi	Establishment intellectuals,	體制內知識分子
Tongchou	Comprehensive planning,	統籌
Waihuan	Foreign incursions,	外患
Wanguo laichao	Enjoy the honor!	萬國來朝
Wang luo pinglun yuan	Official Internet commentators,	網絡評論員
Wangluo tewu	Network spy,	網絡特務, 網特
Wangluo xinwen xietiao ju	Internet news coordination bureau,	網絡新聞協調局
Weiji yishi	Anxious consciousness,	危機意識
Wei yizhi lun	Voluntarism,	唯意志論
Wending yadao yiqie	Maintaining stability is of top priority,	穩定壓倒一切
Wenhua da geming	Cultural Revolution,	文化大革命
Wenhua re	Culture Fever,	文化熱
Wenhua tizhi gaige	Cultural system reform,	文化體制改革
Woxin changdan	Biding time while nurturing grievances	臥薪嘗膽
Wugeyi gongcheng	Top Five Project Awards,	五個一工程
Wumaodang	50 Cents Party,	五毛黨
Xi'nan Yishu Qunti	Southwest Art Group,	西南藝術群體
Xiaai minzu zhuyi	Narrow Nationalism,	狹隘民族主義
Xiang qian kan	Looking to money in everything,	向錢看
Xinwen lianbo	News Broadcast	新聞聯播
Xingxing Huazhan	The Stars,	星星畫展
Xinxi anquan fa	The Information Security,	信息安全法
Xiti zhongyong	Western substance, Chinese application	西體中用
Yanse geming	Color revolution,	顏色革命
Yang maojin	Foreign Leap Forward,	洋冒進
Yige zhongxin, liangge jibendian	One centre and- two basic points,	一個中心, 兩個基本點
Yihetuan yundong	Boxer Rebellion,	義和團運動
Yinmou lun,	Conspiracy theory,	陰謀論

Youfens,	Right-wing angry youths,	右翼憤怒青年(右憤)
You hong you zhuan	Red and expert,	又紅又專
You zhongguo tese	Socialism with-	有中國特色的
de shehui zhuyi	Chinese characteristics,	社會主義
Yuqing tongbao	Public Opinion Notice,	輿情通報
Zhandui xingwei	Taking-side activity,	站隊行為
Zhenli biao zhun da taolun	Great Debate Concerning-	
	the Criterion of Truth,	真理標準大討論
Zhiqing quan	Right to know,	知情權
Zhongguo hongke lianmeng	Chinese Red Hackers Association,	中國紅客聯盟
Zhongguo weixie lun	China Threat Theory,	中國威脅論
Zhongyang zhengzhi	Central Political Structural-	中央政治體制
tizhi gaige lingdao xiaozu	Reform Deliberation Group,	改革領導小組
Zonghe guoli	Comprehensive national power,	綜閥國力
Zhengmian zhengzhi yindao	Positive political guidance,	正面政治引導
Zhizheng dang,	Party in power,	執政黨
Zhutie	Main post,	主貼
Zhu xuanlv	Main melody,	主旋律
Zhuada fangxiao	Revitalizing large state firms-	
	and selling small ones,	抓大放小
Zichan jieji ziyouhua	Bourgeois liberalization,	資產階級自由化
Zifu yingkui	Wholly self-responsible for profits and losses,	自負盈虧
Zunzhong zhishi,	Respect knowledge,-	
zunzhong rencai	respect talent,	尊重知識, 尊重人才
Zuoda zuoqiang	Bigger and stronger,	做大做強

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