

What Makes Pain Unique?

A critique of representationalism about pain in service of perceptualism

by

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B.A., University of Victoria, 2010

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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The goal of this thesis is to defend non-representationalist perceptualism about pain against the challenges brought to it by Murat Aydede. These challenges are intended to apply to both a strong version of representationalism and general perceptualism about pain, however I maintain that they are less effective when aimed at the latter. In the interest of pulling apart these two views, I suggest that a more comprehensive theory of introspection than what is currently being used in the debate should be given. This thesis is an attempt to put forward such a view in service of the perceptual theorist. Once an alternative theory of introspection is given, several of the challenges that target perceptualism are avoided. Additionally I argue that the version of representationalism developed by Michael Tye is undermined by his explanation of pain's negative affect. Consequently, I claim that one need not endorse representationalist commitments in order to maintain the attractive tenets of perceptualism.

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Introduction

Philosophers generally regard pain as the perception of something, or as David Armstrong puts it, the perception of “some objective state of affairs”.¹ This indicates that when a subject undergoes pain, there is information given by that experience. We might draw an analogy between pain and visual perception. When I see my immediate surroundings, I am presented with objective features of the world (states of affairs) that are in my field of vision.² Similarly when I am in pain, I am presented with an objective state of my bodily condition at the location of that pain, or so it initially appears.³ Indeed this is the position for which Michael Tye, Brian Cutter, David Bain, and several others argue. But visual perception and pain perception present us with different kinds of objective data. Visual perception gives us information about the external world, and does not provide any information about our internal states other than – at most -- the fact that we are having visual experiences. With pain, it’s not so clear what the information is about. One might think that pain is an indicator of a bodily disturbance, since pain and tissue damage often go together. As we know, however, this is not always the case: it is common to experience a pain even though there is no damage present (at least not at the location of the felt pain). Instead, pain more accurately provides information about internal phenomena, or in other words, information about private events. It is something that we do not want to experience and something we wish to stop. It also has a distinct phenomenal character. In other words, there is

¹ David Armstrong, *Bodily Sensations* (1968), 4.

² At least, certain features. One might argue that although we see the colour of an object it is not “objective” the way its size and position is. But nevertheless, that it appears to us as a certain way indicates an objective state of affairs either within us, or of the external world.

³ It should be noted that, while the possibility of developing a perceptual view of emotional and/or additional kinds of pain is open, this thesis is limited to perceptualism about *physical* pain.

something it is like to be in pain. We describe this in terms of a pain's being burning, stabbing, throbbing, sharp, and so on. These qualities vary depending on the type of pain that is present. Further, nobody can experience your pain the way you do, and similarly, nobody has access to your pain the way you do. So here we have an interesting tension. If perception is meant to be the perception of some objective state of affairs and give us information about the world, how can that information also be a private and seemingly subjective phenomenon, as it is with pain?

Murat Aydede raises this difficulty about pain perception when he discusses what he calls the 'asymmetry problem' (or the Asymmetry Thesis, as it shall be called from here on). This is the problem that pain perception (if it is perception) is clearly different from standard cases of perception. Standard cases of perception involve the ability to make judgments about the objects of our experiences. Aydede is quick to point out many differences between this kind of process and pain. The most important of these differences is that the locus of concept application for pain does not match that of standard perception – or at least, so he claims.⁴ In standard cases, our concepts apply to external particulars. In pain cases, it seems that our concepts apply only to the experience (according to Aydede). This apparent asymmetry between pain and standard perceptions prompts several concerns discussed throughout the philosophical literature on pain.

In this chapter I motivate what I take to be the main concern that arises under the heading of 'the Asymmetry Thesis', which is (roughly) that pains don't initially look like typical cases of perception. I also try to focus the debate on two key areas of the philosophy of pain that I discuss in Chapters Two and Three. First, I motivate the problem of introspection. That is, I argue that not enough care has been given thus far to what introspection is. I use this opportunity to sketch

⁴ Murat Aydede refers to the asymmetry problem in multiple places during the introductory chapter to *Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study* (2005).

out what an improved version of the introspective process might look like. Second, I introduce the problem of pain's *painfulness*, or in other words, its negative affect. I discuss why this is a particularly difficult issue for some of the current perceptual views about pain. Nevertheless, this thesis does defend perceptualism about pain -- the view that feeling pain *is* in fact perception in most instances. It is my view that perceptualism fits better with our common-sense judgments about internal phenomena, and that any theory of pain should be anchored to these intuitions. I will begin by showing why treating pain as a perception is compelling in the first place. This will help to clarify what's at stake in this debate.

1. The perceptual view – Why it's better, and the problem of fallibility.

i. What counts as perception?

The common perceptual view of pain is that there is some objective information given by the pain experience.⁵ This is the same with standard cases of perception. There is objective information about the world given by my visual experience of a cat, for example. I take “objective information” to have a special meaning here. It's not merely that perception is an information-bearing process in an objective way (as in, it *feels* objective). It's rather that there is some real property or feature of the world that gets identified.⁶ Perhaps the most likely consequence of this is a commitment to versions of the following philosophical positions:

⁵ This view is established both by David Armstrong and George Pitcher from a direct realist position. However, they both acknowledge that it should be easy to adopt the perceptual view of pain from an indirect realist stance as well.

⁶ See Aydede's “Introduction: A Critical and Quasi-Historical Essay on Theories of Pain” (2005), as well as “Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities” (Forthcoming). He distinguishes between the philosophically relevant position and ‘platitudes’. The following positions are what I take is meant by his distinction.

1. Phenomenal externalism: What it is like to see the cat is not solely determined by facts about my experience. It is also determined by facts about the cat. More extreme versions of this view claim that facts about my experience are determined entirely by facts about the cat.
2. Functionalism and/or physicalism: My visual experience of the cat necessarily has a certain phenomenal character. Physiological/neural states make it the case that I experience the cat in a certain way. These states have the function of determining what it is like to see the cat.

Which of these (functionalism, physicalism, or both) gets adopted will become important for the certain theories of perception, which I will discuss later on. For now, the combination of these positions (1) and (2) is attractive because it fits with our commonplace intuitions about perception. My perception of the cat typically tracks something in the world, namely, the cat. Further, I am constituted in such a way that my perceptual experience of the cat is limited to and determined by what's available to my sense-modalities. While these initial commitments aren't particularly controversial, pain perception introduces a unique obstacle for them. We might be persuaded to think of pain's phenomenal qualities (throbbing, piercing, burning, or what the experience is otherwise like) as tracking some bodily disturbance. We might further be persuaded to say that the perceptual object of pain is the tissue damage associated with the phenomenal qualities we experience. But of course the most obvious problem with this view is that we are often in pain with no tissue damage present, and likewise have tissue damage with no pain. Do we just get it wrong when there's a poor fit between the phenomenal qualities of our experience of pain and the tissue damage *normally* associated with it?

This will later become more of a problem, and one of my goals is to show that the popularized view of pains “tracking” tissue damage is not the best position for the perceptual theorist to argue. But regardless, the initial structure of the perceptual view remains uncontroversial. For something to count as genuine perception, it needs to provide information about the world. So pain must provide information about *something*. More specifically, this rules out any process that merely provides information about *how* a subject is experiencing things. For example, the perceptual proposition “the apple is red and round” is a judgment about *something*. The proposition “I *see* the apple *as* red and round” is primarily a judgment about the way I *experience* the apple (not typically perception). This distinction should be kept in mind in what follows. For now, however, it will be useful to ask what the alternative to a perceptual view about pain might be. Further, why should we favor the perceptual view of pain over the alternatives?

The most plausible alternative to a perceptual view of pain is that pain is merely a special, perhaps extreme, kind of sensation. This sensation provides no new objective information about the world. Instead it provides information about a necessarily subjective experience. A sensation might be useful for making judgments about particular things in the world. But sensations *on their own* are not judgments about anything at all. This means that the earlier difficulty about unclear perceptual objects does not apply.⁷ If pain is just a sensation, then it doesn’t need to have a perceptual object at all. A consequence of this view is that pain no longer refers to something that is perceived, but rather it functions as a *way* the subject experiences something else. I might say something like “the experience of burning my tongue

⁷ The Asymmetry Thesis also doesn’t apply.

was very painful". This refers to how *I* experience burning my tongue. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two as well.

ii. Fallibility

The alternative view to versions of perceptualism is further motivated by several dissimilarities between pain and standard perception. Most important of these is that it seems we could never be wrong about pain. Indeed fallibility appears to be one of the key ingredients in standard perceptions. Our perception of the cat includes the *possibility* that the conceptual object (the concept CAT) we arrive at when we perceive the public object (the cat) is flawed in some way. The error occurs when *we* make a mistake about the objective feature in question, yet the objective feature itself stays fixed. This is because the cat's existence and its various features do not depend on our perceptions of it. By contrast, pains do *not* seem to have the possibility for a poor fit between the concept and the external object. They are private phenomena in the first place, and *do* seem to require for their existence our feeling them. It should be noted that I do not see fallibility as a necessary condition for genuine perception, and I do not know of any philosophical positions that suggest this. I merely see this as one of the features that accompanies standard perception that is, or appears to be, mysteriously absent with pain. This is one of the stronger motivations for the Asymmetry Thesis.

David Armstrong makes a useful distinction about bodily sensations that might clarify why this is a problem. Physical sensations of external objects (warmth, pressure, motion) are what he calls *transitive* sensations, whereas internal sensations of bodily states of affairs (pains, aches, tickles, itches) are *intransitive* sensations.⁸ The former are sensations *of* things that exist

⁸ Armstrong, *Bodily Sensations* (1962), 1-4.

independent from being sensed. Apples and cats do not require me to perceive them in order for them to exist. Our sensations of these things (redness, or catness), are features *of* the apple or the cat. *Intransitive* sensations do not have a further public object such as an apple or a cat. These sensations do not have a clear object since they are simply felt or not felt. Moreover, *intransitive* sensations do not require the existence of public objects to be felt/had. There don't initially seem to be any hidden pains that show up when we attend to the right place to feel them. This distinction is useful for identifying the non-perceptual view of pain in that intransitive sensations, like pains, do not enjoy the same kind of objective persistence that transitive sensations do. What I mean by this is that we can be sure about what transitive sensations are sensations of, since their *objects* do not depend on our experience of them for their existence. When I put my hand on the table I feel the resistance *of the object* (the table). Pains, on the other hand appear to require a 'to-be-is-to-be-felt' quality.⁹ They don't have a further object to be anchored to. Instead they are just *there*. The non-perceptual view treats pains (and presumably other intransitive sensations) as being just *there*, without having further public objects. When these are experienced, they are not perceptions because there are no objects for those perceptions to be about. Note that if pain is a sensation, there is no problem with classifying them as intransitive. This means that pain avoids any potential difficulties that arise due to its apparent intransitivity.

What intransitive sensations are supposed to bear information about (if they bear information about anything) is not as clear as what transitive sensations bear information about. This means that we can easily point out what information is given by sensations of warmth, pressure and motion.¹⁰ For example, the warming sensation I feel when I put my hand in warm

⁹ Aydede, "Introduction: A Critical and Quasi-Historical Essay on Theories of Pain", in *Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study* (2005).

¹⁰ Armstrong, *Bodily Sensations* (1962)

water bears information about the temperature *of the water in relation to my hand*. We then might make the perceptual judgment that the *water* is warm. But it is not clear what kind of information is given by intransitive phenomena like pains. It seems that they do not refer to (track) any objective feature of the world – or, if they do, it isn't clear what that feature is. Keep in mind, the typical perceptual commitments (1) and (2) that were discussed earlier demand that there be some fact about the world that at least partly determines what it is like to make that perception. What that fact is appears to be up for grabs when it comes to pain. Further, the relation between that fact and its mental content has yet to be determined.

We might try to run the argument that pain (on its own) is the sensation caused by tissue damage, and that this is its objective and perceptible object. Indeed this is an argument introduced by the representationalists, which I will discuss in detail later on. But even if this argument gains ground with respect to pain, it is not plausible with respect to other intransitive sensations (like itches). Murat Aydede points out that other intransitive sensations don't have a clear object about which information can be gained, even if there is motivation to treat pains as if they do have such an object.¹¹ Sensations whose object depends solely on being sensed (felt), at first glance, do not seem to enjoy the same information-bearing status as sensations of objects where those objects exist independent from any subject. And, as many philosophers have already pointed out, in order for something to count as genuine perception, it needs to provide some information about the world.¹²

iii. Pitcher's three benefits

¹¹ Aydede, "Introduction: A Critical and Quasi-Historical Essay on Theories of Pain", in *Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study* (2005).

¹² The most notable proponents of this view are the general perceptual theorists (David Armstrong, George Pitcher, David Bain), as well as Michael Tye, and Murat Aydede.

So the non-perceptual view of pain is compelling on the grounds that whatever kind of phenomenon pain is, it does not clearly provide objective information about the world. Whereas, such information *is* present in standard forms of perception. But there are nonetheless good reasons to prefer a perceptual view of pain. George Pitcher suggests a direct realist version of the perceptual view. He motivates this view with the following three arguments:

“1. It simplifies one's conception of the human mind by assimilating our sensitivity to pain to our standard perceptual abilities, thus lowering the number of irreducibly different types of mental capacities.

2. The view has definite metaphysical advantages over theories that regard pains as being a sort of mental object; it does not have to cope with the embarrassing problems that attend the introduction of such objects.

3. It is superior to all its competitors in that it avoids the well-known and difficult problems, so poignantly elaborated in the later works of Wittgenstein, that attach peculiarly to pains (and other sensations) when these are sharply distinguished from "perceptual experiences." On the perceptual view, there are no special philosophical difficulties about pains, but only the old familiar worries about sense perception. And surely this reduction in the number of different kinds of problems represents a clear gain.”¹³

The first argument is merely a methodological one, however, we might expand this and say that the perceptual view not only reduces the number of different types of mental functions, but also more accurately reflects our reports of pain. It makes very little sense to limit perceptual experiences to merely external objects when the sentences used to express these experiences look so similar. Consider, “I see an apple on the table” and compare it with “I feel a sharp pain in my leg”. Nothing about the structure of these reports suggests that we should classify one as perception and the other not. Although there might be a distinction to be drawn when it comes to the intended content of the term ‘feel’ (i.e. “I feel the hardness of the table” versus “I feel a pinch in my neck”), this distinction does not require a difference in what’s at stake: That being the

¹³ Pitcher, “Pain Perception” (1970), 368-369.

interpretative acquaintance with some objective feature of the world. Furthermore, there is no obvious difference in the kind of judgment that takes place. Consider the judgment “the table has a certain hardness of the type x ”. I do not see how the structure of such a proposition alone suggests a difference in kind from the judgment “my neck has a certain pinch of the type y ”. The only real difference is that one is externally verifiable and the other not. This is not to say that the same process necessarily applies. This just goes to show that the way we often talk about pains and pinches is similar to the way we talk about perceptual judgments.

The second advantage of perceptualism about pain Pitcher states reflects his preference for a direct realist account of pain rather than an indirect realist or sense datum view.¹⁴ Indirect realism about pain enjoys a certain amount of explanatory power regarding hallucinated/referred pains and other non-standard cases of pain (phantom limbs).¹⁵ This is because the indirect realist introduces an extra metaphysical apparatus to do the explaining.¹⁶ The downside, however, is that it suffers an unnecessarily complicated metaphysics for the sake of rare cases. The direct realist can just appeal to an error theory to account for these cases.¹⁷ Perceptualism about pain fits well with a commitment to direct realism. This is because our common reports seem to reflect a connection between pains and physical disturbances. Indeed pains seem to be physically

¹⁴ *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* uses the following definition for direct realism: “the view that physical objects are after all themselves directly or immediately perceived in a way that allegedly avoids the need for any sort of justificatory inference from sensory experience to physical reality.” Indirect realism is defined like this: “the view that the immediate objects of experience represent or depict physical objects in a way that allows one to infer justifiably from such experience to the existence of the corresponding “external” objects”. “Epistemological Problems of Perception”, SEP.

¹⁵ Referred pains occur when they are caused by bodily disturbances that are not physically located where the pains are felt.

¹⁶ The suggestion is that when I hallucinate something, there is still *something* that is causing the relevant sensations. This is a kind of ‘sense-data’, or mental particular that has a certain metaphysical status.

¹⁷ Aydede, “Introduction: A Critical and Quasi-Historical Essay on Theories of Pain”, in *Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study* (2005).

located at bodily locations external to the mind. The doctor doesn't ask you about the pain in your mind, but rather about the pain in your foot where it is spatially located.

These arguments make a compelling case in favor of the perceptual view of pain. But there is also an additional reason to prefer the perceptual treatment of pain. This is the intuition that pains provide unique information *that is not given by other experiences*. This is pain's negative affect. When you touch a hot plate, you are immediately acquainted with what Armstrong calls the "peremptory desire for the sensation to cease".¹⁸ Similarly when you stub your toe, or cut your finger, this negative affect not only accompanies but is, as I shall argue, constitutive of your experience. And as I will discuss in Chapter Three, the negative affect that is *necessary* for pain plays a special role in its information bearing status. Tye & Cutter (2011) argue, for example, that pain's negative affect tracks potential bodily harm. Aydede & Fulkerson (2013) deny this claim. But whichever explanation is given for the negative affect of pain, most philosophers pick up on the intuition that there is something information-bearing going on. My goal in this thesis is to preserve and defend the attractive tenets of the perceptual view against the criticisms that come out of the Asymmetry Thesis.

2. The Asymmetry Thesis – Why it's a problem for the perceptual view

The general consensus in the current literature on pain follows the work of Pitcher and Armstrong in the claim that pain is the perception of something. As we have seen, there are still a number of problems with holding this view. This arises due to what Aydede calls the

¹⁸ Armstrong, *Bodily Sensations* (1968), 314-316.

‘Asymmetry Thesis’. As has already been discussed, pain is a uniquely private phenomenon that needs to somehow fit with the objectivity found in standard cases of perception. By ‘standard cases’ I mean the perception of external objects via sight, sound, etc. Aydede introduces the following problem:

“So if “pain perception” is a matter of introspection in the first place, despite being sustained by the same kind of information flow mechanism underlying other genuine perceptual processes, it is legitimate to express worry and ask why pain processing doesn’t conform to the norms of standard perceptual processing. In other words, why is pain a matter of introspection of an experience in the first place, and only then a perception of tissue damage—if at all? I am yet to see why this worry is misplaced.”²¹

My discussions of introspection will come in Chapter Two of this thesis, since it is not clear exactly what this process is. Currently I will consider it a kind of looking inward, or internal examination, as opposed to looking outward for standard perception. The worry expressed by Aydede here is directed primarily at the view that any perceptual information provided by pain is constituted and determined by tissue damage (representationalism).²² Additionally, this criticism is directed at the view that pain is a perception in general (perceptualism). Since the so-called ‘genuine perceptual processes’ appear to take only external particulars as their objects, we can imagine a strict criterion for genuine perception that looks something like the following:

x counts as genuine perception only if it bears information about some purely *external* state of affairs.

²¹ Aydede, *Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study* (2005), 129.

²² The version of representationalism that will be discussed throughout this thesis is what often gets referred to as “strong representationalism”. This is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is identical to or entirely determined by its representational content. So the representational content for pain here would be its external counterpart, namely, tissue damage. Aydede considers pain (and other intransitive phenomena) to be a counter example to this version of representationalism. Cutter, Dretske, and Tye are the main proponents of strong representationalism that will be discussed in this thesis.

So if perception is the process by which we gain information about features of the external world, then where does information about internal states of affairs fit? Further, what can be said about the processes that provide that information? The motivation behind these questions likely comes from the general idea that we do have infallible access to our internal states of affairs. I do seem to have access to the pain in my toe, in a way that I don't have access to features of the worldly objects around me. I am not able to access properties of a tree the way I have internal, somatosensory access to my leg, for example. In other words it seems that we have a special kind of knowledge of our internal states of affairs, perhaps due to our seemingly infallible access to those states.

The difficulty brought on by the Asymmetry Thesis lies in the apparent differences between objective external perceptual processes and private internal *seemingly* perceptual processes. But there is also a *semantic* tension between perceptual reports about the external world, and reports about internal events. This is likely because of the natural tendency to refer to external phenomena by using the terms 'see' and 'feel' in a traditionally perceptual sense – at least insofar as they are perceptual reports. These terms are also used when referring to pains. Sentences like "I see the apple" and "I feel the table", or reports of an object's redness or hardness, are all reports of external objects. The emphasis of these reports is on that which is being perceived, namely the object in question. This is because such reports provide information about some objective thing or state of affairs to which the subject stands in a perceptual relation. Now, we use this kind of perception language to identify the location and nature of bodily disturbances as well. A sentence like "I feel a pain in my hand", e.g., indicates where the bodily disturbance is *felt*. But this use of 'feel' in particular tends to emphasize facts about the subject rather than object (if there is an object). This tracks the experience of pain fairly accurately.

Sentences like “I feel discomfort in my hand”, “I feel cold”, or “I feel uneasy” might include something that is felt, as in the perceptual reports just mentioned, but this use of ‘I feel’ has a different meaning than in the former report. This use refers to *how* the subject is feeling rather than *what* she is feeling. And if this use of the term ‘feel’ accurately reflects the process involved, then the strict criterion for perception is not met: the information provided by the report is about internal phenomena. So there is either something wrong with the way we report pains, or the criteria for genuine perception should be revised.

A further problem for perceptualism is that pain seems to have both neutral phenomenal qualities and an affective component. This is another instance of pain being asymmetrical with standard perceptions. The immediate perceptual features of a pain, according to Armstrong, are masked by the negative affect of the experience. These features are phenomenal qualities that might be described as burning, throbbing, piercing and so on. Any time we try to isolate these as features of pain via somatosensory identification, they are necessarily given in such a way that we want them to stop.²⁴ When you touch the hotplate, you can’t help but want whatever it is you are feeling to stop, and thus direct all your attention to the afflicted location. So it becomes difficult to form a complete concept of a perceptual object (pain) without first confirming that there is tissue damage via standard or ‘genuine’ perceptual processes (vision).²⁵ Note that ‘standard perceptual processes’ refers to strictly external relations. It is not pain that’s doing the perceptual work here, but rather, standard perception. This is only applicable if pain *does* track a physical disturbance. This asymmetry is particularly difficult for the representationalists to disarm.

²⁴ Somatosensory identification of pain refers to the internal phenomenal ‘feeling’ of bodily locations, rather than external confirmation of tissue damage or physical status.

²⁵ Aydede, *Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study* (2005), 130.

Additionally, even if we are able to isolate the immediately perceptible features of pain from their negative affect, we are no longer left with pain. A burning feeling in the context of alleviating an itch can be pleasurable. An intense throbbing can also be completely neutral. Thus the strong negative affect of pain seems to obscure access to what it is like to experience negatively valenced tissue damage.²⁶ Once the affect is gone, so too is the pain. This further suggests that negative affect is essential to pain, since without the affect, there is no pain. But then if we somehow include the negative affect in the phenomenology of pain, the process by which this information is given is directed at internal phenomena as well. Remember that there is nothing about tissue damage that requires negative affect to accompany it. It is only that *sometimes* tissue damage is accompanied by negative affect. Pain on the other hand is always accompanied by negative affect. This suggests that whatever it is that makes pain awful is something internal. In other words, any genuine attribution of pain to a bodily location such as “that hurts” is directed at something private. Again, this does not fit the aforementioned strict criterion.

3. The current theories – Representationalism, and what is missing

To get around some of the difficulties noted above, philosophers (beginning with Pitcher and Armstrong, but more recently Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, Brian Cutter, David Bain) have attempted to connect private phenomenal qualities with an ‘objective state of affairs’. They do not all do this in the same way, though. I have briefly mentioned the representationalist position,

²⁶ Aydede, (2005), 130. Aydede cites Armstrong’s definition of negative affect here as the ‘peremptory desire for the sensation to cease’. This is what prevents a transparent kind of access to the tissue damage, since it obscures whatever phenomenal qualities that attach to tissue damage.

however in the following section I will discuss it in more detail. This position starts with the notion that pain is the perception of an objective state of affairs of bodily disturbances, or in other words, tissue damage. The representationalist position, however, continues to state that the phenomenal character of the experience (what it is like to experience pain) is identical to or determined by its representational content (the damage). This is not to say that the perceptual theorist need endorse representationalism to get ‘objective state of affairs’, however, the current popular representationalist position is a development of perceptualism in naturalistic terms. This has the advantage of being able to identify public objects (tissue damage) as the perceptual object of pain. I have already discussed some of the difficulties in holding the perceptualist position, so I will now turn to how the representationalists deal with them since they also try to develop a perceptual view. I also introduce some areas that need to be explained for any perceptual theory to be successful.

Michael Tye, perhaps the most vocal proponent of representationalism claims that through ‘introspection’, we can understand the perceptual information given by pains as tissue damage.²⁷ This is where the initial philosophical commitments (phenomenal externalism, functionalism/physicalism) prompted by a perceptual view of pain get more detailed. The way we access tissue damage for Tye is by attending to the phenomenal qualities that are supposedly identical to or constituted by the representational content of pain. In other words, what it is like to be in pain is limited to the representational content of that experience – which, according to Tye, is tissue damage. Tye’s version of representationalism also claims that there is nothing over

²⁷ Tye & Cutter, “Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pains” (2011).

and above this content that determines the pain's phenomenal qualities.²⁸ Thus, for example, a pain's throbbing phenomenal quality that is experienced at a specific location is determined by throb-inducing tissue damage at that location, with the volume and intensity specified by the damage. Nothing over and above these external qualities determines *what it is like* to experience them. For Tye (and several others), to have a perceptual experience of anything is to mentally represent the objects of that experience. This claim explains the connection between the phenomenal character of our experiences and their external objects. Further it explains the phenomenal character of experiences in general. The apple exists on the desk in front of me. What it is like to see the apple is determined by features of the apple, not features of me. So for pain, the phenomenal qualities are burning, throbbing and so on. The event of tissue damage is represented as burning or throbbing the way that the apple is represented as red and round (and apple-like). This is not to say that there is some metaphysical entity like an image that makes up the phenomenal experience. On the contrary, this view is intended as a direct realist perceptual view of pain. Note again that the representational *content* of the pain constitutes the phenomenal qualities of the experience, not a representation *of* pain on this view. This representationalist view establishes a direct connection to the objective state of affairs indicated by the bodily disturbance. But the Asymmetry Thesis is still problematic, as is noted by Aydede's criticism of this kind of representationalism.²⁹ The two main concerns will be discussed in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis, however I will briefly motivate the issues here.

²⁸ There are other versions of representationalism, but Tye's use of what Aydede calls the Strong Transparency thesis is largely what is at issue here. I will be referring to this type of representationalism in this thesis. See Aydede's introduction to *Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study* (2005), "Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities" (Forthcoming), Tye (2005), Tye & Cutter (2011).

²⁹ Aydede, *Pain: New Essays...*(2005), 129-131.

i. Introspection

For each of the problems with perceptualism I have discussed so far, several important things are missing or remain to be explained. First, philosophers cannot seem to agree on the notion of introspection. I have already referred to introspection as a kind of ‘turning inward’, however it is unclear what this means. Some, such as Aydede, call it a kind of inner sense. This refers to ‘higher order thought’.³⁰ The nature of introspection for Aydede is subjective and experiential. He thinks that the process of introspection is a process by which we identify the experience of something, rather than the perceptual object of that experience. To give an example, the introspective judgment “I experience the tomato as red and round” is different from the perceptual judgment “the tomato is red and round”. By contrast, Michael Tye seems to regard introspection as the process by which we can examine phenomenal qualities caused by bodily states or physical conditions.³¹ Introspection here is the vehicle that makes tissue damage the objective and informational feature of perception for representationalism. And others think of introspection as internal reflection. Barry Maund, for example, is critical of Tye’s use of ‘introspection’ and instead thinks of it as an acquaintance with an objective relation, namely, that a subject is having a certain kind of experience.³² One might additionally think introspection refers to awareness of any internal process, perceptual or otherwise. It could refer to the awareness of emotional or imaginative states as well. If this is the case, then the asymmetry

³⁰ Aydede & Donald D. Price. *Pain: New Essays...* (2005).

³¹ Tye, *Pain: New essays...* (2005).

³² Maund, *Pain: New Essays...* (2005).

problem prevents us from calling anything given by introspection a perceptual object. The overall vagueness of the term creates much of the dispute about pain.

This uncertainty about introspection makes it difficult to establish the perceptual view of pain because the term is often used to describe the process by which we have somatosensory access to pain. It is not enough to say that when I look inward, I perceive something – especially when we consider the lengths to which philosophers have gone to discuss the process by which we perceive external objects. Thus, an explanation of what is meant by ‘introspection’ is needed. The second chapter of my thesis will be an attempt to do so.

ii. Negative affect of pains

In addition to introspection, it seems that the recent development of Tye’s representationalism is missing an explanation of pain’s negative affect. Aydede argues that this is especially problematic given the work done by Armstrong and Pitcher on the subject. Their efforts specifically include such an explanation.³³ In fact, as Aydede points out, it is precisely the negative affect of pain that poses a significant problem for introspective access to tissue damage.³⁴ This is because one of the immediate features of pain is that we want it to stop. This does *not* include that it tracks tissue damage in any way, or that we want the tissue damage to be fixed. According to the representationalist, the phenomenal qualities of tissue damage are constituted by its representational content, or in other words the content given in experiencing

³³ Pitcher, “The Awfulness of Pain” (1970). Armstrong, *Bodily Sensations* (1962).

³⁴ Aydede, *Pain: New essays...* (2005).

tissue damage. However, it seems clear that what it is like to feel a pain at the very least includes and perhaps is constituted primarily by the desire for it to stop.

Tye claims that the negative affect associated with pain is a feature of experiencing tissue damage. So the experience of tissue damage represents it as bad.³⁵ He writes:

“People whose pains lack the affective dimension undergo purely sensory, nonevaluative representations of tissue damage of one sort or another in a localized bodily region. Those whose pains are normal experience the same qualities, but now those qualities are experienced by them as unpleasant or bad. It is precisely *because* this is the case that normal subjects have the cognitive reactions to pain they do, reactions such as desiring to stop the pain. To experience tissue damage as bad is to undergo an experience that represents that damage as bad”.³⁶

Aydede is critical of representationalism on this point, since there is nothing about tissue damage alone that includes any affective quality. The only way to hold this view, it seems, is to be committed to a view that entails the badness of tissue damage for our well-being getting somehow transmitted to the phenomenal qualities of our experience. But Aydede shows, there is nothing about tissue damage that can explain how our experience represents it as bad.³⁷ Chapter Three discusses why this kind of view is further problematic.

There is another reason to be critical of Tye’s representationalism though. I can think of several cases where the experience of tissue damage is *not* represented as bad. There are many instances of cancers or other internal conditions that do not cause us to experience any pain at all. These cases of tissue damage can still be experienced somatosensorially though. The experience

³⁵ Tye, *Pain: New essays...* (2005), 107.

³⁶ Aydede quoting Tye, (2005), 107, 130.

³⁷ Aydede, *Pain: New Essays...* (2005).

of tissue damage in these cases is of some purely affect neutral pressure or tension. These conditions are dangerous precisely because they are not so easily detected by pain. Presumably there is some kind of tissue damage or physical condition taking place in these cases. However, we do not experience pain, and our experience of the tissue damage doesn't represent anything as bad.

Additionally, quite often the immediate reaction to physical trauma is not pain. Adrenaline and shock are known to mask pain, and we do not report that we are in pain until we 'realize it'. In these cases, we know that there is tissue damage. But that knowledge is confirmed through primarily external (though potentially internal) perceptual processes. In these cases, we do not report that we are in pain. We do not have the peremptory desire for the sensation to cease. These are not obscure occurrences either. Indeed the onset of pain is often gradual, even though there is no worsening of tissue damage. This might even fit with whatever naturalistic story we wish to tell about sensory receptors (nociceptors) transferring pain information after a brief amount of time. So how does Tye's representationalism explain cases where there is *felt* tissue damage that is not experienced as bad? Chapter Three discusses precisely this question.

Negative affect is perhaps the most difficult obstacle for the representationalist. In light of Tye's claim that people who lack the affective component of pain "undergo purely sensory, nonevaluative representations of tissue damage of one sort or another in a localized bodily region", I suggest that they are not in pain at all.³⁸ These rare cases are actually helpful in drawing a distinction between tissue damage as a sensory experience and tissue damage as an affective experience. Pitcher makes this distinction as well in his masochist and lobotomy patient

³⁸ Tye, *Pain: New Essays...* (2005), 107.

examples.³⁹ These obscure cases show that if there is any perceptual information given by our experience of tissue damage alone, it reduces to a kind of tactile perception. If we remove the negative affect of pain from the experience, what are we left with? It seems to me that what we are left with is something very similar, if not the same kind of thing exactly that is given by other tactile sensations. Surely those sensations are not pain.

In the following chapters I elaborate on such claims and argue against Tye's version of representationalism, while still preserving a perceptual view of pain. In order to do this the difficulties introduced by the Asymmetry Thesis must be dealt with. In the next chapter I claim that the initial problem of where to locate pain concepts is misplaced. I also argue that the problem of infallibility disappears when an alternative (and I think more complete) theory of introspection is provided. In Chapter Three I discuss pain's negative affect, and show how Tye & Cutter's explanation of negative affect contradicts the goals of representationalism. Ultimately I defend a less committed perceptualism that allows for additional factors to play a role in what it is to experience pain. This will show that our commonplace pain reports are not merely a manner of speaking, but rather correctly portray pain as a perceptual phenomenon.

³⁹ Pitcher sets up an argument between someone who thinks that pain is necessarily awful and someone who thinks that it isn't. Pitcher uses the example of a masochist to demonstrate that there are cases where people seem to enjoy pain. But he shows that these people are in fact not experiencing pain at all. See "Gate-Control Theory". Pitcher, "The Awfulness of Pain" (1970).

Introduction

The term ‘introspection’ is used to indicate different things throughout the literature on pain. Some have a rigid definition of introspection as a specific process, while others use the term to refer to the way we have access to any internal information. This information ranges from somatosensory and proprioceptive events like pains and itches, to reflective moments about experiences in general.⁴¹ Introspection can also be used to explain how we have knowledge of our bodily states. But while our bodily states can be thought of as external properties, pain (and other ways of experiencing bodily states like itches) is certainly an internal phenomenon. Those who adopt a perceptual model of pain have to meet several challenges that are grounded in the fact that pain is an internal phenomenon.⁴² These challenges are largely the result of disputes about what introspection is in the first place. For this reason, in order to effectively deal with these challenges an adequate understanding of introspection is required. After all, pain is indeed an internal phenomenon. That is, it is an experience of something seemingly private, subjective, and incorrigible.

In this chapter I outline one of the stronger challenges to any perceptual theory of pain -- namely, the problem of introspection. In particular I discuss Murat Aydede’s challenge to the representationalists, which is one that he intends to apply to any perceptual theory of pain as well. While I *do* think Aydede’s challenge is an important objection to the representationalist view, I do not see it applying as easily to other perceptual models the way Aydede intends it to. I

⁴¹ Proprioception is the ability to identify bodily locations in physical space without using standard sense modalities (for example, I can feel that my feet below my waist without needing to look at them).

⁴² Perceptual theorists include David Armstrong, David Bain, Brian Cutter, George Pitcher, Michael Tye. There are many others, however these are the most important for the discussion at hand.

will go through some of the options available to the perceptual theorist and argue that indeed most of them do result in some unresolved difficulties. Ultimately, however, I will defend the thesis that pain can still be treated as a perception on the grounds that the challenge of introspection misclassifies the role introspection plays in our access to pain. I argue that there is a successful option available to the non-representationalist perceptual theorist. This will hopefully have the added benefit of introducing a more complete picture of introspection than what Aydede's challenge suggests.

Additionally, the Asymmetry Thesis discussed in Chapter One introduces the problem of infallibility. To restate, one feature that seems to accompany typical perceptions is fallibility. We can misperceive things. Pain appears to be unlike typical perceptual phenomena because our (perceptual) judgments about external objects can be wrong, whereas our judgments about pains cannot. Pains are private and seemingly infallible, where typical perceptions are about public objects and fallible. So, the thinking goes, pain does not appear to be perception. In the second half of this chapter I will show how this problem is avoided on the basis of Christopher Hill's more complete analysis of introspection. Once this problem is dealt with, the perceptual theorist has disarmed one of the main concerns raised by the Asymmetry Thesis.

The Problem of Introspection

Murat Aydede discusses the difficulty in developing a perceptual model for pain.⁴³ He suggests that pain involves an introspective judgment rather than a perceptual judgment and thus that they

⁴³ Aydede discusses the various problems with the perceptual view in his comprehensive introduction to *Pain: New Essays...* (2005). More recently in "Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities" (Forthcoming) he claims that his objection to representationalism also refutes perceptualism.

are different in kind.⁴⁴ Aydede uses a strict definition for introspection. He demonstrates a contrast between perceptual judgments, such as that a tomato is red and round, and what he calls an introspective judgment, such as that he is *experiencing* a tomato as red and round. The concepts used to make the perceptual judgment that something is red and round (namely the concepts RED and ROUND) are used in the introspective judgment that one is *experiencing* something that is red and round. But the difference lies in the introspective judgment's being about one's experience, and not about the objects of that experience.⁴⁵ Perceptual judgments are about objects in the world, and the concepts applied in these judgments have *de re* (about the object) labeling uses.⁴⁶ This means that the concepts used in perceptual judgments are applied *to the objects* of experiences, and not the experiences. These are judgments like “the tomato is red and round”, where ‘*de re*’ indicates that the judgment is *about the object*. The tomato is *the object* that the concepts RED, ROUND and TOMATO get applied to. Being able to introspect our experiences *of the world*, for Aydede (and Michael Tye), requires that the subject have the concepts that enable one to make perceptual judgments about those things. In other words, one cannot make introspective judgments about experiences of things without the appropriate concepts used to make perceptual judgments about those particular things. In this case, one needs to have the concepts RED, ROUND, and TOMATO to make perceptual judgments about the object that it is a red and round tomato. In turn, because these concepts are used in making the perceptual judgment, they are required for the subject to make judgments about his or her *experience* of the tomato as red and round. This becomes a problem for the version of

⁴⁴ Aydede, “Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities” (Forthcoming).

⁴⁵ Aydede, (Forthcoming).

⁴⁶ Aydede, (Forthcoming).

representationalism currently being considered. Aydede argues that the concept PAIN doesn't have an obvious *de re* labeling use, so it must be about an experience in the first place.

The representationalist would have to claim that the *de re* labeling use for the concept PAIN is the tissue damage associated with it. On this account, when we introspect our experience we have access to the tissue damage. But as Aydede and many others have pointed out, there is often no particular (tissue damage) for *de re* judgments to apply to in the case of pain: as observed in the Chapter One, a pain experience can occur in the absence of any actual bodily harm. Furthermore, Aydede shows that there are instances of introspective judgments that employ concepts that don't have *de re* applications. These are judgments about experiences on their own where those experiences do not involve perceptual objects. The judgment that my experience of the color red is enjoyable depends not merely on the color red (the reflectance property), but on my enjoyment of something's looking red to me. My enjoyment of the experience does not have any perceptible particular to track, it merely qualifies the experience.⁴⁷ Any experiential phenomenon that doesn't have an appearance/reality distinction functions as a further example of this. Pain seems to fall into this category, along with itches and tingles (and presumably other intransitive bodily events).⁴⁸

So introspection for Aydede is the process by which we make judgments about experiences, rather than judgments about perceptible particulars. This includes judgments that merely qualify experiences, where those experiences don't have perceptible particulars. Pain seems to be a matter of introspection, then, and not perception. I argue that Aydede's definition

⁴⁷ Aydede suggests this response: "for any introspectable feature of an experience, if it is such that its concept doesn't have *de re* labeling uses, then this feature is a feature of experience that is over and above those implicated in the representational content of that experience" (Forthcoming), 11.

⁴⁸ This assumes that we are incorrigible about our pains.

of introspection is too simple and too strict. First, it is too simple, in that it leaves certain types of awareness unaccounted for. Second, it is too strict, in that it misses something important about the appearance/reality distinction for the awareness of internal phenomena (such as pains, itches, tingles etc.). I will bring this up again in the second half of this chapter, but first I will discuss what Aydede's definition of introspection means for pain.

Aydede argues that pain requires introspective judgments in the first place, since pain *does* seem to have similar characteristics to other 'experience' phenomena (incorrigibility, subjectivity etc.). He claims that PAIN does not have *de re* labeling uses that are required for it to be a perception. As Aydede sees it, this is due to the nature of the phenomenon itself: pain is not an object or particular; rather, there is just the *experience* of pain; or so Aydede claims. Thus whatever concepts are applied to instances of pain, (when one judges that one is pained in a certain way) they are applied to something that is *not* a particular, but rather an experience. This is also a natural way of talking about pain. We often speak about being *in* pain, or experiencing pain in body parts: "I am experiencing pain in my hand", for example. The semantics of pain sentences will become more important in the next chapter, but for now we can see why Aydede's treatment of pains as experiences is initially compelling.

Additionally, Aydede's strict definition of introspection entails that pain falls into the class of sensations, despite certain dissimilarities between pain and other sensations.⁴⁹ This is because the introspective process appears to explain the infallibility that subjective access to ordinary sense modalities and access to pains have in common. Note, this refers to the

⁴⁹ In particular, pain is necessarily awful, affective, and demands judgments about its instantiations that are different from typical sensations (the ones that can be described in terms of standard sense modalities like touch, sound, and so on). These typical sensations are for the most part affect neutral and non-motivational. Even the ones that do have some affect such as unpleasantness (imagine disgust at putting your hand into a bowl of slimy spaghetti) are in no way *painful*.

infallibility of sensations, not the use of sensations in perceptual judgments. If the truth of a state of affairs (my hand is itching) depends solely on my experience of that event, then it is merely contingent on whether I experience it or not. It is not contingent on any fact of the matter apart from my experience. This is part of Aydede's objection to representationalism. According to this definition of introspection, the only real option left is to classify pain as a feature of an experience (the experience of bodily locations for example). Naturally this poses a significant problem for any perceptual theorist about pain, since if it is the case that the concept PAIN applies only to an experience, then the perceptual relation no longer holds. It should be mentioned that I do not consider the introspective process to be necessarily distinct from perception as what Aydede suggests, such that if a process is introspective it is necessarily non-perceptual. My criticism of Aydede's challenge to perceptualism is precisely that his definition of introspection is too narrow. But Aydede's target is representationalism, which appears to use introspection in a similar way.⁵⁰ Even though the main target of this challenge is the representationalist, the perceptual theorist still needs to find a way to account for the fact that pain appears to be a phenomenon accessed via what I have thus far called strict introspection *alone*. Further, the perceptual theorist needs to either find a way to apply a standard perceptual model (that includes *de re* judgments), or explain the dissimilarity between pain and other perceptions. There are several ways to do this.

Solution 1

⁵⁰ There are some differences between Tye's and Aydede's use of introspection. Most important of these is that Tye thinks it is possible to introspect tissue damage where Aydede does not.

The first strategy involves simply denying that pain involves introspective judgments rather than perceptual judgments. This method implies that either (1) there are *de re* labeling uses involved in pain attributing judgments, or (2) *de re* labeling uses aren't crucial for the perceptual process.

(1) The first option doesn't outright reject Aydede's definition of introspection. It simply indicates that pain is a perceptual judgment about external particulars rather than about one's experience. This is likely the option available to anyone who thinks that pain refers to (or 'tracks') particular instantiations of disturbances in bodily locations, and indeed this might be the preferred route for the representationalist. The sentence "I have a pain in my knee" indicates that this 'tracking' idea has some natural plausibility: *my knee* is the external location (the particular), and whatever variety of discomfort that occupies it is the instantiation of pain. For the phenomenal externalist (representationalist) this is just like the perception of anything else. The knee has a certain pain-like quality that is no different from a door's being red, or a tomato's being round. There is nothing over and above the phenomenal character that constitutes the representational content of the experience. Thus, *that* in the *de re* labeling use refers to the knee, and the way in which it is pained constitutes the qualitative features to which our concepts apply. Just like the sentence "*that* is red and round" where *that* refers to the tomato, "*that* is hurting sharply" seems like a plausible way to understand *de re* labeling uses for pain. In this case *that* refers to the afflicted location. We often say something like "it hurts *there*", which suggests that we are indicating a perceptible particular.

Of course Aydede's objection arises here, since the correctness conditions of our introspective judgments about pain do not match the correctness conditions of perceptual judgments about tissue damage. Just because it is true that there is a physical disturbance or tissue damage does not mean it is true that there is pain (and *vice versa*). However, the

representationalist may be able to account for this with a variety of error theory. It might appear as if there is a bodily disturbance present (if experienced somatosensorily), when in fact the subject's report is simply incorrect. When we are not in pain with tissue damage present, then we have made a perceptual error. Similarly, when we are in pain and say "my hand is pained in a certain way" with no tissue damage present in the pained location, we have made some kind of mistake.

It would be difficult for the representationalist to take this line, however, since Aydede makes it quite clear that it's not that we are simply wrong about our experiences sometimes, but rather that being wrong about our pains is literally impossible. It's not that there is sometimes a poor fit between pains and physical disturbances, but rather, that if the subject genuinely believes he is in pain, then any judgment to that effect is always true. I will later argue that this is not the case, but for now it appears to be a compelling reason to reject this solution. The presence of tissue damage (what *de re* perceptual pain attributions *should* be about, on the representationalist account) is assessed independently of 'pain' or 'no pain'. It just happens to be the case that pain is a fairly reliable indicator for where to look for tissue damage. The kind of tissue damage present is also assessed independently of the kind of pain involved. What we call 'burning' pains are not indicators of being on fire. Dull throbbing pains can be had in the presence of deep tissue damage, and stabbing pains can occur in the presence of a bruise. The only close relation between the kind of tissue damage present and the kind of pain felt is the degree to which it is awful: more severe tissue damage is more likely to cause greater distress. But even this is not always the case. Pain also varies, and sometimes it is unclear whether we are in pain or something else is going on. Sometimes we don't notice the disturbance, and can't be said to be in

pain, or only notice it after it becomes more severe. So the representationalist will have some work to do here.

There are, additionally, other instances of subjects being able to identify pain-like qualities of an experience, yet they do not mind them (or in some cases they even enjoy them). I am not speaking here about the atypical pain asymbolia cases⁵¹ or masochist examples that are used as challenges to the perceptual model, even though it might be possible to include them.⁵² These cases are non-standard and might be better explained by other means. Instead I mean to specify what happens in common itches or tinglings. When one scratches an itch, the scratching can have the same kind of phenomenal features that pains do. I call this the pain/relief paradox. This can happen if the phenomenal qualities of pain are to be described in terms of their affect-neutral features (imagine a sharp or burning sensation). In the context of alleviating an itch, these features are welcomed and enjoyed. It would certainly be odd to suggest that the subject is in pain. Thus the concept PAIN shouldn't be applied despite having common features with actual pains. This is a problem for the representationalist because the *phenomenal features* of the experience, such as a burning feeling, *should* give us access to tissue damage under the concept PAIN, yet those same features are present in pleasurable itch-alleviating contexts. One might argue that pain *is* present when scratching an itch, and is merely obscured due to the itch-alleviating pleasure (or relief) of scratching. But even if that is true, the phenomenal qualities that are often present with pains are available under a positive valence, and surely they don't *hurt* the way pain does. Those qualities alone cannot be unique to pain, even though we might describe pains in terms of those qualities. The representationalist needs to provide an account of

⁵¹ Pain asymbolia is when a subject can identify something as pain but doesn't seem to mind it (no negative affect).

⁵² Aydede "Introduction", *Pain: New Essays...* (2005). Also, Pitcher, "The Awfulness of Pain" (1970).

why sometimes those phenomenal qualities are represented negatively, and sometimes positively/neutral. It can't be the phenomenal qualities alone that grant PAIN the application to tissue damage. So what do the phenomenal qualities actually give us access to? How do we account for the distinction between times when the phenomenal features of tissue damage are enjoyed, and when they are awful? Especially when the affect-neutral features of the experience are the same. Treating the physical location as the perceptual object to which our concepts apply seems to work only if the perceptual theorist can explain pain's variable and often indeterminate nature. Note that I don't think this is impossible to do, since after all, other perceptual experiences can be variable as well. One might explain the pain/relief paradox by appealing to independent desire or motivation modules in the brain that seek to terminate or continue the experiences.⁵³ David Bain argues instead that pain has evaluative content.⁵⁴ But there are also simpler options available that don't run into these worries.

(2) The second option denies that in general perception requires *de re* labeling uses of the relevant concepts. This option suggests that there are many 'unattended to' perceptions of external particulars where our concepts would have *de re* labeling uses only if we applied them with the correct amount of attention (or whatever threshold is required for those concepts to be applied). Insofar as they are perceptions, they do not require labeling uses of any kind. For example, the thought might be that only when we make perceptual judgments do *de re* labeling uses occur. In other words, we only apply concepts to the objects of perception the way Aydede suggests when attending to them in a manner sufficient to make judgments like "the tomato is red and round". I might have an awareness of the redness and roundness of the tomato in such a

⁵³ David Bain, "What Makes Pains Unpleasant?" (2012), 8.

⁵⁴ Evaluativism is the claim that the experience of pain additionally represents damage as *bad*. Bain, "Pains that Don't Hurt" (2014), 2. Evaluative content is not constitutive of all experiences though.

way that I am conscious that there is a red and round blob in my phenomenal field, but I only apply these concepts when I attend to the particular in question appropriately. This results in increasing the significance of this object in my phenomenal field to a degree that then requires me to apply the concepts RED and ROUND (and eventually TOMATO) to it. It suggests that I can perceive something with varying degrees of concept application, or perhaps a threshold for concept application. The object in my phenomenal field *appears* vague or undetermined until attention is drawn to it in a manner sufficient for concept application to occur. This general notion will get taken up again in the second half of this chapter. It is important to note, however, that the strategy currently being discussed is meant to target perception in general. Later on I will discuss how this might be applied to introspection.

Now consider how option (2) affects pain. I might be mildly aware of some disturbance, but unclear as to whether it is pain I'm feeling or something else. This is likely because I am distracted or otherwise occupied in such a way that I am not properly attending to the phenomenon. But once the phenomenon is attended to, the concept PAIN gets correctly applied to the disturbance. This has an easier time of dealing with the difficulty of experiences that we seem to have but don't realize that we have until they become more severe. Not every pain is attended to right away, and in many cases they can be forgotten due to distractions. We often tell people to find a way to busy themselves with other things to "take your mind off it". But would it truly be correct to say that the phenomenon still exists when one can find ways of not attending to it? This is an open question, since we might be able to attend to the pain, but purposely divert our attention to something else. In this case, the pain still exists, but it is lessened due to the distraction. If I have the visual experience of a red and round tomato, the object persists when I close my eyes, or look away. But remember, pain is a subject-dependent. If I were to find a way

to shut off the phenomenal experience of a pain completely, with an anaesthetic for example, the particular instance of pain does not persist. There is also a difference between shutting off the experience completely, and finding a way of not noticing it. This is where the perceptual theorist has to be able to explain what occurs when our perceptible internal properties do not have concepts applied to them. A sense-datum theory might be able to make sense of this, since the unattended-to phenomenal qualities might be explained in terms of mental particulars that get picked up on once the threshold for concept application is passed.

The difficulty with this strategy is that it still doesn't seem correct to attribute pain to a subject who is under anesthetic (or lessen the pain so that it no longer has the appropriate negative affect). Even if pain is only momentarily gone, during that moment the subject is not in pain. This is again due to the seemingly infallible nature of pains. Furthermore, it seems that the best way to explain this is by using a more complicated metaphysics than one might be committed to (sense-datum or indirect realism, as opposed to direct realism). So this option is just as difficult to develop as (1) is. Note that this is not an impossible strategy for the perceptual theorist. One might introduce the sense-datum theory of perception here to allow for perceptible particulars that *do* persist when we shut off or lessen the phenomenal experience. However, this has the downside of a more complicated metaphysics that is contrary to the spirit of common-sense perceptualism that was introduced in Chapter One. Moreover, the problems of infallibility and negative affect will continue to be difficult for the perceptual theorist if this option is pursued. So I will now turn to what I view as a superior strategy in dealing with these concerns.

Solution 2

The second strategy is a more complicated one. This is the strategy I wish to explore and use to defend the perceptual view of pain. It suggests that introspection is a more complex process, one that leaves open the possibility of perceptual judgments about internal phenomena, as well as potential error when it comes to making those judgments. Why is this significant? First, potential error (fallibility) is one of the traditional features of perception about anything. That is, perception is usually thought to involve judgments about particulars whose truth conditions do *not* depend solely on the subject making the judgment, but rather on the particular that the judgment is about. Second, both Aydede and the representationalists use ‘introspection’ in a way that makes it an internal process of experience identification. Aydede contrasts introspective judgments with perceptual judgments, and claims that introspective judgments take the form “I am *experiencing* that as red and round”.⁵⁵ This makes introspective judgments claims about experiences rather than claims about the particulars (such as ‘*that* is red and round’). This is not to say that introspective judgments cannot involve perceptual judgments. Indeed, to make judgments about the *experience* of a tomato as red and round requires the ability to make perceptual judgments ‘red’, ‘round’ and ‘tomato’, as was noted earlier. The problem for introspective judgments for Aydede is that they do not satisfy the perceptual requirement of being about the particular object in question. They are instead about a subject’s experience. Aydede argues that pain does not have a perceptual object the way the experience of a red and round tomato does. Instead, pain is an introspective judgment on its own.⁵⁶ This is again because it seems impossible to be wrong about our pains, and this (as Aydede sees it) fits with other ‘experience’ claims. While I don’t deny the availability of a process that identifies experiences

⁵⁵ Aydede, “Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities” (Forthcoming).

⁵⁶ Aydede, (Forthcoming).

rather than their objects (or representations), I do argue that introspective judgments need not be limited to claims about our experiences.

To make this point I will need to first discuss Aydede's position on pain as an introspective judgment, and then show how his supposed counterexamples to representationalism are treated incorrectly as judgments about experiences. He makes the following claims against representationalism:

“The way [pain attributing] judgments work is exactly the way introspective judgments work: they track experiences, not what these experiences represent if they represent a physical condition of body parts. In other words, the empirical facts about the interplay between pain experiences and the judgments they directly prompt is opposite of what representationalism predicts. Our pain-attributing judgments *are* already *introspective* judgments if there aren't any corresponding *de re perceptual* judgments attributing pain (=bodily disturbance, according to ST) to body parts whose correctness conditions track whether such disturbances are occurring or not”.⁵⁷

And again later,

“I am in front of my computer trying to finish writing this paper, suddenly a particular spot on my right thigh starts to itch for no apparent reason at all. So I am feeling an itch on my thigh. Feeling an itch is an experience. I know that I am now feeling an itch. I have introspective knowledge of this experience. How? According to representationalism, I must have the concepts that would express what my experience represents so that I can judge that I am experiencing *that* as ... what? Here 'that' refers to the location on my thigh (where I feel the itch)”.⁵⁸

This second passage is supposed to show that these kinds of internal phenomena don't have any perceptual object that our concepts can apply to, at least not over and above the experience of feeling the itch. While these arguments against representationalism are quite strong, this position

⁵⁷ ST refers to “Strong Transparency”, which Aydede suggests is one of the major tenets of Tye's representationalism. Aydede, “Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities” (Forthcoming), 12, 13. This is the claim that “experiences have no introspectable features over and above those implicated in their representational contents”. – Tye (1996a), 296.

⁵⁸ Aydede, (Forthcoming), 13.

should prompt a response similar to what follows. If introspective judgments are claims about experiences, then they specify something that is not a public object. Instead, they specify something about the subject, something private. This is a fairly non-controversial position. But these claims (claims about experiences) also suggest a high degree of variance in terms of their content. What I mean by this is that claims about experiences imply that the fact of the matter could be otherwise. For example, the claim “I am experiencing fatigue” carries with it the possibility that I might not actually be fatigued, but rather drugged or pacified in some way. As soon as I judge that I am *experiencing* fatigue, the fact that I actually *am* fatigued is no longer at issue. Judging that one is *experiencing* *x* does not mean that *x* is actually occurring. I argue that with pain, whatever judgment takes place actually does refer to a fact of the matter, not to an experience that could potentially be otherwise.

The claim that “I am experiencing a pain in my hand” can indicate that I am only *experiencing* a pain, and I’m not actually pained. Of course, this might seem absurd, since only in very special cases would this statement be true. But if the stringent definition of introspection is correct, then there is some degree of uncertainty as to whether I am actually in pain, or merely *experiencing* it. Consider again the passage about the tomato. The perceptual claim looks like “*that* is red and round”, and the introspective claim should look like “I am *experiencing* that as red and round”, according to the stringent definition. But what does the latter claim actually suggest? By making this an introspective judgment we introduce the possibility of being wrong about what’s actually going on, or that the fact of the matter could be otherwise. Instead of the judgment being about the tomato’s redness and roundness, the experiential claim “I *experience* the tomato as red and round” makes the assertion completely neutral as to the status of the tomato. It only bears upon my experience. One might say that tomatoes aren’t *really* red and

round of course! We merely *experience* them as red and round. Even if we think this absurd suggestion goes too far, any suggestion like this is problematic for Aydede. The nature of genuine experiential claims like this is that the assertions on their own don't purport objectivity.⁵⁹ And yet with pain, "*that hurts*", or any typical utterance used to describe the phenomenon, indicates an objective feature. *That* does not refer to an experience in this case, rather, it refers to some objective property instantiating a bodily location. The stringent definition of introspection suggests that the sentence should read "I am *experiencing* that as pained", where 'that' refers to the location. Just as it is with the case of the tomato, the claim that I am experiencing it (the leg or whatever) as pained suggests that my pain attribution doesn't necessarily correspond to what is going on (feeling pain). But it *does* necessarily correspond to what is going on, given Aydede's incorrigibility requirement for pain. Remember that a judgment about experiences says nothing about the objective state of affairs that constitutes the content of those experiences. But any genuine pain attributing judgment is meant to indicate something objective, namely, pain in a bodily location. The doctor asks you where it hurts, and you reply: *there*. He doesn't ask you if it is actual pain or only the experience of pain. He might ask you if there is pain or no pain (or stiffness etc.) given a certain heuristic approach. But this is a method used for external examination of a physiological disorder. You already have the objective belief that you are in pain, *there!* Any judgment made about pain in this way is an objective one, that is, it is about *something*, even if it is a private phenomenon. The suggestion

⁵⁹ I grant that experiential claims are sometimes used to indicate objective features of the world. For example, "I see that the apple is red and round" appears to be a judgment about *seeing* the apple. But in these cases the subject's intent is actually the perceptual judgment "the apple is red and round". This alternate use of experiential claims is perhaps due to the desire to indicate the specific use of certain sense modalities within the context of the utterance (in this case, vision).

that pain is only a claim about an experience would likely be met with an irate response when given to someone who is in considerable pain: “don’t worry, it’s only an experience!”

Pain is indeed a private phenomenon, yet the judgment *that I am in pain in a certain location* in most cases is not about an experience. The pain attribution is to an objective location. It is *in* the toe, or wherever it hurts, the same way that the cup is on the desk in front of me with the relevant properties that it has. Even though pain is a private phenomenon and the cup is not (at least not merely private), the relevant attributions are judgments about those particulars and not about the experience of them. I do acknowledge that there are some cases where judgments are made about the experience of pain rather than the pain itself. These are cases where one is in pain and the focus shifts from a proposition about an affected location to a proposition about an experience of pain. When I touch a hot plate, I have the immediate reaction “*that hurts*”, referring to where it hurts. Then afterwards I might try to think about it as an experience in order to deal with the pain (in such a way that I’m reminded of the fact that eventually it will cease). Additionally we often talk about pains as experiences when it is suggested that we gain some knowledge from instances of pain. But this refers to an experience qua human experience. A common report of this nature might be something like “don’t worry about the pain, it builds character”. Here “the pain” does not refer to a judgment about particulars, but rather a judgment about the experience. It is possible to construct other scenarios where the judgment is about the experience of pain. For example, a hypochondriac might judge that he is in pain, but know full well that he is a hypochondriac. He then has the subsequent judgment that it is only an experience. But the common attribution of pain is not a judgment about an experience, but rather a judgment about a particular *thing* I strongly dislike. In other words, it is a judgment about a particular unpleasantness that occupies a somatosensorially perceived bodily location. I do not

make a judgment about my experience of pain when I touch the hotplate, I make a judgment about a particular thing that is pain in my finger.

An Alternative Introspection

So if pain attributions involve judgments about particulars, how can they be private in the way that they are? Pains certainly are not public objects the way cups and tables are. The answer lies in an alternative definition of introspection, one that leaves open the possibility of making pain attributions about private phenomena.

Christopher Hill discusses two kinds of introspection: active and passive.⁶⁰ He argues that “our ordinary discourse testifies to the existence of a form of introspective awareness that is essentially active in nature. Thus, we are disposed to describe ourselves and others as “attending to an itch,” “concentrating on a toothache,” “focusing on a burning sensation,” and “scrutinizing a visual image”.”⁶¹ Hill states that there are three varieties of active introspection. The first is focusing more closely on already available phenomena, the second is maintaining focus on those phenomena when competing phenomena are present, and the third is identifying new phenomena that aren’t already given.⁶² The third variety of active introspection is perhaps the most interesting one for my present purposes. It should be noted that Hill is concerned with introspective access to *sensations*, but his analysis covers any phenomenon that is seemingly private. This includes what Armstrong called ‘intransitive bodily sensations’ like itches and tingles. Ultimately this can have consequences for the perceptual theorist about pain.

⁶⁰ Hill, “Introspective Awareness of sensations” (1988).

⁶¹ Hill, (1988), 12-14.

⁶² Hill, (1988), 12-14.

Hill argues that when attending to a certain sensation in one's phenomenal field, it is possible to become aware of something that has always been available, yet not explicitly attended to. He gives the example of attending to a certain bodily location and finding it to be itching or tingling, when it would have otherwise not been tingling or itching. I grant that what's at issue for Hill here is primarily the availability of access to sensations in our phenomenal field, and not a fully developed theory of introspection. But this definition of introspection is much broader than the one used by the representationalists and Aydede. It suggests that this process can provide new information about our internal states and bodily locations. This can be information such as "*that* is itching", where *that* refers to the bodily location. But access to intransitive sensations is also an internal process. It's not as though attending to the bodily location where the itch is present involves confirming that there is an itch using non-somatosensory modalities (like vision). Neither does it require external examination from alternative sources, much like we would need to discover that colors are actually certain reflectance properties and so on. Notice that with active introspection, there is no judgment about the experience of something. Active introspection for Hill involves attending to one's internal bodily states and sensations, not attending to the experience of sensing. I might feel an itch in my toe, but feeling it does not demand that I be focused on my experience of feeling. It simply demands that I feel the itch.

But one might object that this does capture '*de re* labeling uses', and thus it is possible to apply concepts ITCHING and TINGLING to these bodily locations. This is precisely why active introspection makes perception about private phenomena possible. Judgments made by this process are not about one's experience of something, but rather they are about an itching or tingling at a particular bodily location. A tingling sensation is distinct from the process by which

we judge it to be a tingling sensation. Likewise, a pain is distinct from the process by which we judge it to be a pain. But these are not judgments about our experiences, or in what way we experience the pain as described by sentences like “I experience X as Y”. Rather, they are about the particular instances of tingling and itching.

In the following section I discuss Hill’s interpretation of active introspection. While Hill does not think that his position implies a perceptual model regarding internal phenomena, I suggest that it can. If Hill’s version of introspection allows for the perceptual model to be applied to pain, then Aydede’s worry about the exclusivity of introspective and perceptual judgments doesn’t hold. Further, the infallibility thesis is denied, and pain is given a better fit with ‘perceptible object’ rather than ‘sensation experience’. With this in mind I defend what Hill calls ‘The Volume Control Hypothesis’, and claim that it provides evidence for a perceptual model of pain. Keep in mind, this model is not incompatible with the view that pain can *also* be introspected in the way suggested by Tye, and Aydede.⁶³ It simply allows for the additional (and likely more commonplace) attribution of pain that involves perceptual judgments.

Volume Control Method versus Inner Eye Method

Hill describes two views about the nature of Active Introspection.⁶⁴ They are described as the ‘Inner Eye Hypothesis’, and the ‘Volume Control Hypothesis’. He notes that presently these are just metaphors, but they are useful for laying out the relevant philosophical positions with regard to active introspection. The Inner Eye Hypothesis draws an analogy with a physical eye. We rearrange the position of our eyes to gain information about external objects. Similarly with

⁶³ Namely, “I *experience* this, or that, as painful”.

⁶⁴ Hill, “Introspective Awareness of Sensations” (1988), 12.

the inner eye, we rearrange its position to pick up new information about our sensations.⁶⁵ Hill writes:

“...extramental entities can exist without standing in any informational relations to the physical eye, and their internal qualities are never affected by their coming to stand in such relations. The Inner Eye Hypothesis claims that the same things are true, *mutatis mutandis*, of sensations and one’s internal scanning device. [The Inner Eye Hypothesis] asserts that sensations can exist without being scanned, and also that internal qualities of sensations do not change when one scans them”.⁶⁶

This passage asks us to abandon our intuitions about the ‘to-be-is-to-be-felt’ quality of the bodily states and sensations in question. It suggests that they can exist in a non-informational relation to the subject. So I might have an itch in my hand, but not notice that it is itching. When I properly focus on my hand I pick up on the fact that it is itching. The more interesting feature of this model, however, is that qualitative changes in sensations on this view are produced by a change in the position and orientation of one’s ‘inner eye’, rather than changes in the sensations themselves. Whatever qualities are given when we attend to the sensation in question (so that they stand in an informational relation to us), appear to be fixed.

The ‘Volume Control Hypothesis’ claims that instead of rearranging one’s attention (inner scanning device), the intensity or volume of a particular sensation in one’s phenomenal field is increased.⁶⁷ This is the result of qualitative changes in the sensation itself, rather than changes in the orientation of the scanning device. This hypothesis also explains how new sensations come into existence via introspection. Hill gives the following description of the Volume Control Hypothesis:

“It attempts to explain what it is to summon a sensation into existence by asserting that each sensation derives ultimately from a packet of information in an unconscious portion of one’s mind – a packet which has the potential to become a

⁶⁵ Hill, (1988), 13.

⁶⁶ Hill, “Introspective Awareness of Sensations” (1988), 13.

⁶⁷ Hill, (1988), 13.

sensation with a particular set of phenomenal characteristics, but which must be subjected to further processing before it can achieve its potential. The hypothesis claims that summoning a sensation of a certain kind into existence is simply a matter of actualizing the potential of a packet of the right sort. Thus, according to the Hypothesis, attending to a new sensation is like converting radio waves into sound by turning on a radio”⁶⁸

Here, potential information is like radio waves, and the actualized sensation is like sound. At first, it seems that perceptualism about pain fits better with the Inner Eye Hypothesis.⁶⁹ This is because the potential difficulty of experience-dependent existence of pain is avoided. It is avoided because according to this model there can be existing internal phenomena that are available, but missed because the scanning device is oriented to pick up something different. Additionally, we can easily be wrong about those phenomena. For example, we often talk about not noticing pains and undertaking activities to keep our minds off pain. This suggests that they are still there, yet somehow not picked up by the inner scanning device. Thus there is no problem of infallibility here either since there can be cases of error. Perceptual error under this model would occur in any case where we are able to find distractions to deal with pain.

The problem with the Inner Eye Hypothesis, however, is that it requires a level of representation between the introspectable bodily states or sensations and our ability to make judgments about them (and beliefs as well).⁷⁰ The problem might look something like this: I arrange my inner eye so that it can focus on my hand and discover there to be an itch where there wasn't one before. The itch must have existed independently from my attending to it, and I only picked up on it after doing so. My belief and/or any judgment about the itch in my hand (this

⁶⁸ Hill, (1988), 13.

⁶⁹ Hill remains neutral on whether perceptualism about pain is correct, however, he does suggest that the IEM fits better with perceptual views about other internal phenomena. Hill, “Introspective Awareness of Sensations” (1988), 13.

⁷⁰ Hill, (1988).

could also include knowledge *that* there is an itch in my hand) is determined by the orientation of the inner scanning device. So any judgment made about the itch, is not about the sensation, but rather a representation of the itch (as it is determined by the scanning device). This is problematic since, as Hill notes, the qualitative changes appear to be in the sensation, not its representation.⁷¹ A tomato appears red and round as a consequence of my attending to its redness and roundness. But it also appears *to be* red and round because the tomato *itself* is red and round.

The Volume Control Hypothesis doesn't have this problem, and I argue that it *also* fits with the idea that perceptual judgments can be made about internal phenomena. In particular, Hill explains that it is possible and perfectly common for sensations to exist without any kind of belief about them. He claims the following:

“The Volume Control Hypothesis does not imply that a sensation must inevitably be accompanied by a belief that is directed on the sensation. It is entirely compatible with the idea that sensations can exist without being the topics of states of belief, and by the same token, it is entirely compatible with the idea that they can exist without being the topics of states of knowledge of any kind.”⁷²

We can be totally oblivious to the unconscious ‘packets’ of information that are given by sensations, and only when we attend to them (by “turning the volume up”) do we become aware of their existence⁷³. This accounts for the examples of not noticing an itch until one focuses on a specific location long enough. Other examples can include degrees, such as increases in volume when attending to auditory sensations. More important for my purposes is that what Armstrong called ‘intransitive’ bodily sensations like itches, tingles, and pains can be included in this analysis. They are not always attended to, and they can exist independently of any judgments

⁷¹ Hill, “Introspective Awareness of Sensations” (1988), 16.

⁷² Hill, (1988), 16.

⁷³ Hill classifies these kinds of packets as ‘unconscious’ to show that they are unattended to, however I grant that depending on one’s view of consciousness, they might be considered ‘conscious’ packets.

about them. They have the potential to become fully actualized packets of information in the event that our attention is drawn to them in a manner sufficient for forming beliefs about them.

This gives the perceptual theorist some ammunition. On this account, there are internal phenomena that can exist independently from a subject's beliefs about them. Consequently they can exist free from any sort of epistemic judgment about them. They have the potential to have beliefs and judgments formed about them. And any qualitative changes that occur depend on the phenomena themselves, not the subject's beliefs about them. This begins to look more and more like standard cases of perception, however, I have thus far left the infallibility problem unanswered. It still seems counter-intuitive to suggest that a subject could be wrong about his or her pains. Hill's analysis of active introspection gives us the answer.

Hill suggests that the infallibility thesis about sensations is characterized in the following way:

“It is logically necessary that if p is a proposition to the effect that S currently has a sensation with a certain phenomenal quality, and S believes that p , then it is true that p .”⁷⁴

The analysis demands that genuine introspective beliefs are always true. This is still a major obstacle that any perceptual theorist needs to overcome. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, this is central to Aydede's rejection of perceptualism: the truth conditions for judgments about these phenomena are different from the truth conditions for judgments about standard public objects. Hill claims that this earlier formulation of the infallibility thesis misses a distinction between errors of ignorance and errors of judgment.⁷⁵ Errors of ignorance show up when we lack the

⁷⁴ Hill, “Introspective Awareness of Sensations” (1988), 17.

⁷⁵ Hill, (1988), 17.

relevant information about something. With errors of judgment, we have all of the relevant information but do not properly form beliefs based on that information. This happens in many common instances where we are simply not paying attention to the information given, for whatever reason.⁷⁶ In the case of pain, we might not notice a pain if we are distracted. In the case of an itch, we might not be focusing on the specific location because we are preoccupied with other locations. In the case of vision, I might not form the belief that the cup on the desk in front of me is white rather than tinted yellow because I am too busy writing this paper. Further, I might mistake it for something else, and so on.

Hill offers what he thinks is a more accurate characterization of the infallibility thesis which he calls the “Direct Awareness Thesis”:

It is logically necessary that if x believes that y has a certain phenomenal quality, where y is one of x 's current sensations, and x 's belief is based on y , then x has not been misled by appearances.⁷⁷

He then makes room for errors in judgment with the “Manifest Nature Thesis”:

It is logically necessary that if (i) p is a proposition to the effect that y has a certain phenomenal quality, where y is one of x 's current sensations, (ii) it is true that p , (iii) x believes either p or the denial of p , (iv) this belief is based on y , and (v) x has not committed an error of judgment, then x believes that p .⁷⁸

The conjunction of these principles leaves open the possibility of error about sensations and, in turn, about private phenomena. The “Direct Awareness Thesis” indicates that if we are forming beliefs based on the phenomenal qualities of our sensations, then we have not made an error of ignorance. But we may have made an error in judgment. It is still possible for inattention,

⁷⁶ Hill, “Introspective Awareness of Sensations” (1988), 17.

⁷⁷ I take Hill to mean that x 's belief is based on y rather than z , where z is whatever circumstance contributes making an error of ignorance (where we are misled by appearances).

⁷⁸ Hill, (1988), 19.

confusion, or distractions to prevent correct judgments about the relevant sensations. The “Manifest Nature Thesis” shows that if we do *not* make this kind of error (and we properly pay attention to the phenomenon), then the resulting belief will be true. Notice that (ii) demands truth of the proposition, that a subject’s sensation has a certain phenomenal quality, and (v) requires that the subject not make errors in judgment, in order for the introspective belief to be true. This leaves room for the sensation with the relevant phenomenal quality to exist independently from the subject’s belief if the subject *has* made an error in judgment (for example, the subject didn’t notice the itch in his hand because he was distracted).

Hill takes one example from Rogers Albritton that helps clarify the point. The example involves someone who has been shown a razor blade, then is blindfolded and told that his throat will be cut with it. When the subject feels something across his throat he reacts and indeed believes that he is in pain for a moment. Yet it turns out to be just a piece of ice instead of a razor blade.⁷⁹ This is an example of an error in judgment, and indeed an error about being in pain. All the information is available in this case. The subject should have noticed a cold and smooth object going across his neck. Yet the subject is tricked into thinking it will be painful. If the subject weren’t tricked, he wouldn’t believe it to be pain he is feeling. In this case, the subject doesn’t satisfy (v), and thus doesn’t believe that the phenomenal quality of the sensation he feels is ‘cold and smooth’ the way he should.

One of the major disputes between Aydede and Tye arises due to limitations on introspection. The way this gets solved is by providing an alternative account of what this process is. I suggest that Hill gives us precisely this. I find that Hill’s analysis of active

⁷⁹ Hill, “Introspective Awareness of Sensations” (1988), 18.

introspection makes better sense of what actually occurs when we attend to internal phenomena than the simple and strict treatment suggested by Aydede and the representationalists. It also leaves room for misperception and fallibility to better fit with features of standard perception. This is by no means a complete account. This is merely one quite plausible alternative that makes the problem of infallibility go away. I grant that the correctness conditions of any physical disturbance that typically accompanies pain still do not match the correctness conditions for pain. But that is a task for the representationalist to undertake, since they tend to want to connect pain with its physical disturbance counterparts. I have instead shown how Hill's account of active introspection opens up a way around the problem of infallibility for perceptual theorists – one that doesn't result in representationalist difficulties. I consider this to be a more complete version of introspection than that which prompts Aydede's concern about the exclusivity of perceptual and introspective judgments.

Introduction

I have previously addressed the distinction between perceptual judgments and the strict version of ‘introspection’, namely, judgments about experiences. I have argued that in the case of pain, while it is possible for both types of judgments to occur, the more commonplace judgment is perceptual. That is, when S has a pain, this typically involves a judgment about *something* S strongly dislikes at a specific location. I have argued that perceptual and introspective judgments are *not* mutually exclusive. Once this exclusivity is dissolved, typical pain cases look more like standard perceptions. Nonetheless, I still treat perceptual judgments about pains as distinct *processes* from judgments about experiences. The obvious concern with this account is that technically pains are themselves experiences. Most philosophers, including the ones presently involved in this discussion, also refer to pains as experiences.⁸⁰ The preceding account of pain only explains the process involved in the common occurrences of pain. It explains what our commonplace judgments are about, yet leaves out the fact that those judgments themselves are sufficient conditions for a ‘pain experience’ to occur. On the one hand, my judgment is perceptual in that it is about the pain in my finger. On the other hand, my judgment is introspective (according to Aydede’s meaning of ‘introspection’) because having a pain in my finger entails that *I* am in pain (experiencing pain). This means that pain is both a felt particular at a physical location, and an experience. Additionally, both of these can be true simultaneously. So what do we make of the tension between the token perceptual judgment about the pain in your finger, and the experience of being in pain -- or, in other words, between the judgment about the pain in my finger, and the experience of making that judgment? Further, having a pain

⁸⁰ David Bain, “The Location of Pains” (2007), 181, David Armstrong (1962), 107.

at a specific location and being *in pain* do not on the face of it mean the same thing, yet this needs to be addressed in order to account for the relation between the subject's experience and the perceptual object. After all, when I have a pain in my finger, it is perfectly plausible to report that *I am in pain*. To make sense of this distinction I will attempt to explain what it is to have 'a pain'.

Additionally, I have not yet given an account of pain's motivational or affective character. When we make perceptual judgments about external objects, we do not typically have the same negative (or positive) reaction to *those* objects that we do when we experience pain. When I put my hand on the stove I am immediately compelled to react and pull away. There appears to be a difference between strongly disliking something in my visual field, for example, and the awfulness of pains. Further, strongly disliking something in my visual field is not necessary for my perception of that object. Yet with pain the negative valence is required. This seems to support the Asymmetry thesis. A significant portion of this chapter will be devoted to discussing pain's affective component. Michael Tye and Brian Cutter defend their representationalist brand of perceptualism by arguing that pain's negative affect can be explained by its functional role in identifying potential threats to our bodies.⁸¹ Murat Aydede and Matthew Fulkerson reply that this analysis results in strange utterances that express unintended contradictions. I agree with their objection, but I also suggest there are further reasons to reject the claim about harm tracking presented by Tye & Cutter (2011). In this chapter I argue that Tye & Cutter's use of harm tracking contradicts the primary tenet of their representationalism. But I also claim that despite these arguments against representationalism, it is still possible to preserve

⁸¹ Tye & Cutter, "Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain" (2011).

perceptualism without the representationalist commitments. I provide some strategies for doing so. But first I will discuss what is meant by ‘a pain’.

So what is ‘a pain’ then?

One view that answers this question treats pain as an objective entity that occupies a physical location. Thus, to have a pain in a limb means that the pain is actually instantiated *in* the limb, rather than just felt there. Another view argues instead that to have a pain is to *be in pain*, where ‘being in pain’ refers to an experience. David Bain provides an analysis of these views, while also suggesting that perceptualism is the superior alternative to them. These views are also discussed as potential ways for the representationalist to explain pain’s negative affect (in Aydede & Fulkerson’s critique). The following is an exposition of the views suggested as options both by Bain (2007) and Aydede & Fulkerson (2013). This will hopefully resolve the issue of pain being simultaneously a felt particular in a physical location, while also an experience.

Bain’s analysis of the Objective State View states the following:

The Objective State View: “S’s having a pain in L consists in L’s being S’s, and L’s hurting, where L’s hurting consists in L’s instantiating an objective property (i.e., a property such that a complete account of what it is for a limb to instantiate it does not mention experiences)”.⁸²

Aydede & Fulkerson formulate this view somewhat differently.

(OV): Affective qualities primarily/fundamentally qualify the objects of perceptual experiences rather than the experiences themselves, and [for] any x and affective quality A, if x is A and x is an (aspect of an) experience, then x is A only derivatively (i.e., x is A only because its object is A).⁸³

⁸² Bain, “The Location of Pains” (2007), 183.

⁸³ Aydede & Fulkerson, “Affect: Representationalists’ Headache” (2013), 4.

Both of these accounts locate the affective property (pain) in limbs (or other body parts), and treat them as potential objects of perception. A consequence of this view is that the pain is literally in the toe. So how does this resolve the tension between pain being located in the toe, and also a feature of my experience? It just so happens to be *my* toe, and I am only *in* pain by virtue of the toe being mine (mine in such a way that I have somatosensory access to it). So when I say “I am in pain”, what this actually means is that there is some perceivable bodily location that instantiates the pain. It could be argued then that to speak about being *in* pain is simply to make a report that lacks sufficient detail of the perceptual experience. For instance, “I am in so much pain” might just be a report that doesn’t include the location of the felt pain, even though the information is available. If the report were to be more detailed it would contain this information. Such a report would look more like the perceptual claim “I have a pain in *x*”. This view is perhaps the most obvious choice for the representationalist to adopt.⁸⁴ This is because representationalists defend the view that pain “tracks” damage at bodily locations. So the analysis naturally fits well with typical pain sentences like “I have a pain in *x*” (L-sentences), where *x* is the bodily location that instantiates damage.⁸⁵ The difficulty comes when there is *no* damage at *x*, yet it is still felt as though there is.

By contrast, the experience view makes pain a feature of the subject’s experience. Bain’s characterization of the experience view is the following:

The Experience View: “S’s having a pain in L consists in L’s being S’s, and L’s hurting, where L’s hurting consists in L’s undergoing an experience”⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Aydede & Fulkerson suggest that while this (OV) seems like the most obvious route for the representationalist to take in explaining pain’s negative affect, most of them in fact adopt the ‘experience model’.

⁸⁵ The phrase ‘L sentences’ is borrowed from David Bain’s discussion of pain semantics. It refers to types of sentences that attribute properties to bodily locations.

⁸⁶ Bain, “The Location of Pains” (2007), 184.

Aydede & Fulkerson formulate a similar view:

(EV): Affective qualities primarily/fundamentally qualify perceptual experiences rather than their objects, and [for] any x and affective quality A, if x is A and x is not an (aspect of an) experience, then x is A only derivatively (i.e., x is A only because its experience is A).⁸⁷

I share Bain's intuition that it makes no sense to talk of fingers experiencing things.⁸⁸ My finger can't experience the world; *I* experience the world. Perhaps this could be used as an argument against the suggested analysis (EV) given by Aydede & Fulkerson as well. But they only provide it as the preferred view for the representationalist to explain pain's negative affect.⁸⁹ Aydede & Fulkerson's formulation does not appear to have the same implication of body parts experiencing things. Their analysis merely states that the affective qualities of bodily locations only qualify the experiences themselves, not what those experiences are of. The "affective qualities" used here refer to pain's negative affect, or *painfulness*. So for example, pain's negative affect only bears upon the *experience* of pain, not the particular that pain might track (think of tissue damage at a certain location for the representationalist). It's likely that the motivation for this view is that it also explains/resolves the tension between L-sentences and experience claims like "I am in pain". Under this analysis, having a pain in a body part entails the body part's hurting, and to hurt in a body part is to undergo an experience. So if this is the view adopted by the representationalist, he can then explain what that experience tracks, which will be discussed in the next section. If pain is the perception of tissue damage, EV (according to Aydede & Fulkerson) implies that pain's negative affect qualifies *the experience* of tissue damage. This plausibly gives the representationalist a strategy to explain pain's negative affect.

⁸⁷ Aydede & Fulkerson, "Affect: Representationalists' Headache" (2013), 4.

⁸⁸ Bain, "The Location of Pains" (2007), 185.

⁸⁹ Aydede & Fulkerson, (2013).

David Bain, on the other hand, remains a perceptual theorist while not fully endorsing the kind of representationalism developed by Tye & Cutter. His own analysis of pain's perceptual object still refers to some kind of external damage. He refers to a bodily 'disorder', but allows for any naturalistic theory of physical disturbances to suffice as the object of somatosensory perception.⁹⁰ The main difference between David Bain's view and that of the representationalists thus far discussed is that Bain thinks the phenomenal character of experience is only *partly* determined by their representational content.⁹¹ This is opposed to being *entirely* determined by or *identical to* the representational content. This has the added benefit of allowing additional factors to contribute to our experiences of the world.

Bain also distinguishes our typical pain locutions (like L-sentences) from whatever process the subject undergoes when he experiences pain. He argues that perceptualism as a thesis is indifferent to semantic worries that come up as a result of L-sentences.⁹² Consider the sentence "I have a pain in my finger", and contrast it with "my finger hurts". Plausibly, the commonplace utterance of these sentences amount to the same thing. If the account of pain involving perceptual judgments about particulars (disordered locations, or objective states) is true, then 'a pain' takes on a special role. But "my finger hurts" does not require the same entity to exist.⁹³ There is instead some property in my finger that I *perceive* in a certain way.

Bain argues the following to make this point:

"As a merely metaphysical or constitutive thesis, perceptualism is silent about the semantics of L-sentences. When it comes to the semantics, therefore, perceptualists are surely free to endorse Hyman's pains/hurts paraphrase, i.e., his rather plausible claim that 'Amy has a pain in her hand' can be paraphrased

⁹⁰ Bain, "What Makes Pain Unpleasant?" (2012), 71, 72.

⁹¹ Bain, "The Location of Pains" (2007), 177.

⁹² Bain, (2007), 195.

⁹³ Bain, (2007).

‘Amy’s hand hurts’. For, interpreted as a metaphysical thesis, perceptualism is simply an account of what makes it the case that Amy has a pain in her hand – again, assuming the paraphrase *is* correct, what makes it the case that her hand hurts.’⁹⁴

So what does it mean for Amy’s hand to hurt under the perceptual model? Further, what does it mean for Amy to be *in pain*? Bain’s version of perceptualism makes sense of this by introducing a somatosensory relation between the subject, Amy, and a bodily location that is disordered. Bain’s account of perceptualism is the following:

“There is some property or process, F, such that S’s having (or feeling) a pain in a body part L consists in S’s somatosensorily perceiving L as instantiating or undergoing F”.⁹⁵

It’s not that pain is an entity that occupies a physical location. Neither is it body parts’ experiencing things. On this view, pain is merely perceived by the subject as being present at the relevant location. With the perceptual view, we can make sense of pain being in the toe. If I perceive it to be in the toe, then the pain is in the toe. But it is also *my* perceptual experience of pain in the toe. With this view, there is no problem with phrases like “I have a pain in *x*” because the nature of that “having” is perceptual. This view is also the same starting point for representationalism, and note, it is not on the face of it incompatible with EV and OV. But both of those accounts do not specify the somatosensory relation on their own. They leave open the mode of access to pains.⁹⁶ I would also like to point out that Bain’s account does not require a commitment to any of the typical representationalist views. It does not demand that the value for

⁹⁴ Bain, “The Location of Pains” (2007), 196.

⁹⁵ Bain, (2007), 175.

⁹⁶ For example, a sense-datum theorist might suggest that the entity existing in a location under OV is a mental particular.

F be some kind of tissue damage. It merely states that there is a somatosensory perceptual relation that holds between the subject and the bodily location that is pained.

The representationalists, on the other hand, prefer to develop their naturalistic account of pain perception by introducing the idea of phenomenal character/representational content identity -- that is, the idea that the phenomenal character of the experience is identical to or entirely determined by its representational content. This allows them to identify the external physical particular (tissue damage) as pain's perceptual object. This in turn determines phenomenal qualities such as burning, throbbing, stabbing, as has been previously discussed. But without an explanation of pain's negative affect -- of why, as we might put it, pain is *painful* -- their account is incomplete. They provide this explanation by suggesting that pain's negative affect tracks a functionally defined state of bodily harm. In the following section I discuss pain's negative affect for the representationalist: why pain is *painful*. I argue the representationalist account provided by Tye & Cutter (2011) does not adequately do this. I suggest that once they introduce a functional role for negative affect, they contradict the phenomenal character - representational content identity that is the hallmark of their representationalist view. I then provide strategies for David Bain's version of perceptualism to be defended in the face of these objections to the popularized perceptual view (representationalism).

Why does it hurt?

- i. Negative Affect -- What makes pains *painful*?

When I touch the element on a stove top I immediately react and pull away. The common view to account for this is that pain has motivational content, or perhaps better stated: the nature of

pain's phenomenal character is such that it is motivational. The phenomenal qualities thus far identified with pains under the representationalist model haven't included this negative affective component.

Pains have previously been described as throbbing, burning, sharp, and so on. This is especially important for the typical representationalist view. This is because the phenomenal character/representational content identity claim explains the way pain typically has a certain kind of phenomenal character. The kind of tissue damage determines the kind of phenomenal qualities we have in the somatosensory perception of that tissue damage. But none of these qualities necessitates that they are bad. As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, it is possible to identify these qualities with positive valence as well (alleviating an itch, for example). It seems difficult or impossible to identify a unique phenomenal quality of pain that captures its negative affect, other than the fact that it is *painful*.⁹⁷ When trying to identify that quality, I am only left with features that are *not* part of the phenomenal experience. These are things such as my desire for the feeling to cease, or my immediate reaction to pull my hand away.⁹⁸ But there is something about pain that makes it uniquely *painful*. That is, it doesn't feel bad the same way that feeling something unpleasant feels bad (imagine the unpleasantness of putting your hand in a bowl of slimy spaghetti). Pain feels bad in a way that is much worse than (in most cases), or at least distinct from, 'unpleasantness'. So what makes pain necessarily *painful*? Bain provides

⁹⁷ I claim that pains are necessarily *painful*. This is to say that if a given subject does not experience the negative valence or aversive property under optimal conditions, then the subject is not properly in pain. George Pitcher discusses several cases that appear to be counter-examples (in particular masochism, and lobotomy patients), and shows that they are in fact exceptions to typical pain cases (gate-control theory). He argues that pains are necessarily awful if gate-control theory is correct, and that these cases fall outside of the parameters for 'pain' in the first place. Pitcher, "The Awfulness of Pain" (1970), 491.

⁹⁸ Some call these T-desires, or the desire to terminate whatever the experience is. See Bain, "What Makes Pain Unpleasant?" (2012).

useful examples of “Hedonistic Claims” that any perceptual theory needs to be able to explain regarding pain’s motivational and affective character.

“Normativity

A1. Unpleasant pain is bad for its subject, intrinsically and defeasibly.

A2. Unpleasant pain is a justifying reason (i.e. a good reason) for avoidance behaviour, intrinsically and defeasibly.

A3. Intentionally causing unpleasant pain in another is wrong, *prima facie*.

Motivation

B1. Unpleasant pains are motivational states. Independently of further desires, they defeasibly motivate avoidance behaviour.

B2. Unpleasant pains are motivating reasons. Independently of further desires, they defeasibly rationalise avoidance behavior”.⁹⁹

Some representationalist philosophers argue that pain has unique imperative content.¹⁰⁰

Other philosophers argue that pain has an evaluative character (Bain). But the view that Tye & Cutter (2011) develop initially appears to fit closely with the relatively uncontroversial claims above. They argue that the combination of representationalism with a “Tracking Theory of Intentionality” (TTI) allow pain to play a functional role in tracking bodily harm.¹⁰¹ Remember Aydede’s claim that EV is the preferred option for the representationalist to explain negative affect. The representationalist can argue that pain’s negative affect qualifies the experience of bodily damage, and thus tell a story about how that damage is functionally defined. TTI-Representationalism is attractive because we often tend to associate pain with some kind of damage (cuts, bruises, etc.), which are instances of bodily *harm*. This seems like the most

⁹⁹ Bain, “What Makes Pain Unpleasant?” (2012), 70.

¹⁰⁰ Martinez (2011), Klein (2007), Hall (2008) as noted by Tye & Cutter (2011).

¹⁰¹ Tye & Cutter, “Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain” (2011).

obvious route for the representationalist to take, since they already treat tissue damage as the perceptible object of pains.

ii. Tye & Cutter – Harms

The Tracking Theory of Intentionality put forward by Tye & Cutter consists in the following claim:

“(TTI): Tokens of a state S in an individual x represent that p in virtue of the fact that: under optimal conditions, x tokens S iff p , and because p .”¹⁰²

Here, “optimal conditions” means a great deal. Tye & Cutter claim that “in the case of visual experience, we are in optimal conditions just in case we are in conditions of the sort that our visual system was designed to operate in by natural selection or by analogous processes in the course of ontogenic development”.¹⁰³ This basically means that there are facts about my physiological constitution that determine the tokening of a particular state. So for pain, if my physiological constitution is working correctly, whenever there is tissue damage, my experience will represent that damage with the qualities it has. This explains my ability to identify (track) pain-like qualities of the experience phenomenally (being in a certain location, with a certain intensity, throbbing and so on). Tye & Cutter defend Tracking Representationalism by arguing that TTI doesn’t specify whether tokens of state S are physically or functionally defined.¹⁰⁴ They

¹⁰² Tye & Cutter “Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain” (2011), 91.

¹⁰³ Tye & Cutter (2011), 91.

¹⁰⁴ Tye & Cutter (2011), 100.

defend a view where S is defined by a “forward-looking causal role of bringing about... avoidance behavior” (Tye & Cutter).¹⁰⁵ This has the following consequence for the theory:

A) My experience of pain represents the tissue damage as having certain phenomenal qualities (burning, throbbing, stabbing)

Now includes,

B) My experience of pain represents the tissue damage as bad *for me*

Armed with TTI, the representationalist can argue that if pain tracks harms, he has successfully explained pain’s motivational and affective character. The upshot of introducing this functional role for pain is that it explains the “hedomotive” examples. It explains why we typically prefer to avoid pains. If something is bad *for me*, and I perceive it as bad *for me*, then I have a motivational reason to find ways of making it stop. Keep in mind that for the representationalist, the phenomenal character of an experience is identical to or wholly determined by its representational content. If that content of the experience includes ‘bad *for me*’, and the representationalist argues that the phenomenal character is *identical* to its representational content, then ‘bad *for me*’ must somehow be given in its phenomenal character. If the representationalist thinks that the phenomenal character is merely *determined* by its representational content (a weaker claim), then he needs to explain why ‘bad *for me*’ is represented as *painfulness*, and not something else. Better yet, he needs to explain why ‘bad *for me*’ is the property tracked by pain’s *painfulness*.

The representationalist claims that bodily states physically defined as tissue damage are functionally defined as something harmful or ‘bad for me’. Supposedly this is why pain is

¹⁰⁵ Tye & Cutter (2011).

painful. Additionally, the functional role provides a teleological account of why pains hurt. Simply put, if pains weren't *painful* they would not be as useful in bringing about the kind of avoidance behavior necessary for survival. It should be noted here that 'bad *for me*' for Tye & Cutter refers to something constituting bodily harm, and counter-productive for human flourishing.¹⁰⁶ They argue that "the property of being bad for you is just the property of being apt to harm you".¹⁰⁷ They do not intend the '*for me*' addendum to be a subject-indexed experience claim.

I argue two things in service of the perceptual theorist. First, he need not endorse the teleological/functional state view given by Tye & Cutter to salvage perceptualism. Second, even if the perceptual theorist finds the teleological/functional view compelling, it does not commit him to the version of representationalism suggested by Tye & Cutter. In addition to this second claim, I argue that the functional role of pain can be introduced in a different and more plausible way, though perhaps without consequences for any perceptual theory. While I agree that the functional/teleological story introduced here is attractive, I do not think Tye & Cutter have adequately explained pain's negative affect by telling it. Further, their use of functionally defined states undermines their commitment to phenomenal character/representational content identity.

To begin with, including 'bad *for me*' in the way my experience represents tissue damage is problematic. Keep in mind, the kind of representationalists in question here typically think that tissue damage is to pain the way a certain reflectance property is to red.¹⁰⁸ Tissue damage being functionally defined as harmful to its subject is supposed to be what makes pain is *painful*. In

¹⁰⁶ Tye & Cutter mention that it is possible to imagine an uncontroversial teleology grounded in a Darwinian or evolutionary system. (2011), 99.

¹⁰⁷ Tye & Cutter, "Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain" (2011), 99.

¹⁰⁸ Tye, "Another Look at Representationalism about Pain" in *Pain: New Essays...* (2005), 165.

light of the description of the aforementioned functionally defined state, ‘*bad for me*’ becomes the way this tissue damage is represented by my experience. Given that (for the representationalists) the phenomenal character is identical to or determined by the representational content of the experience, ‘*bad for me*’ should be evident in the phenomenal character somehow, at least if the first disjunct is true.

The first reason to doubt Tye & Cutter’s claim is that ‘*bad for me*’ is simply *not* evident in the phenomenal character. The phenomenal qualities of pain are often described as burning, throbbing, sharp, and so forth. We might even say that they are experienced negatively (as opposed to having the kind of positive valence of alleviating an itch). But there is no *phenomenal* property of the experience that can be identified with ‘*bad for me*’. *Bad for me* is supposed to be the way my experience of pain represents tissue damage, with the functionally defined state explaining the negative affect. However, *painfulness* is nothing like ‘*bad for me*’. So already the phenomenal character of the experience is not *identical* to its representational content, that is, if ‘*bad for me*’ is intended to be part of that content. It requires perhaps a rational inference to go from the negatively valenced phenomenal qualities of pain to ‘*bad for me*’. But the latter is not part of the phenomenal character. There is a difference between reacting negatively due to not liking the way something feels and reacting negatively because it is ‘*bad for me*’. It might be true that the tissue damage present during pain is harmful (*bad for me*), and perhaps there is some evolutionary connection between bodily harms and feeling pain. But I suggest that this kind of functional relation is either not part of the phenomenology of pain at all or, if it is, only in a secondary capacity (if the phenomenology of pain is extended to include what it is like to desire a feeling to stop/continue). For example, I have a throbbing pain in my toe. It causes me to direct my attention to my toe and I confirm that there is tissue damage. Through some acquired notion

of tissue damage being harmful to me it *feels bad for me*. But even still, it is difficult or impossible to describe what this is like (its phenomenal character). I will attempt to clarify why this is a problem for the TTI-representationalist if he claims that the phenomenal character is *identical* to its representational content:

1. Representationalism states that the phenomenal character of an experience is *identical* to its representational content (leaving aside the supervenience claim momentarily).¹⁰⁹
2. Pain necessarily has a negative affect.
3. Representationalism explains negative affect of pain in terms of tissue damage being *bad for me*.
4. That explanation involves the phenomenal character of negative affect being identical to tissue damage being *bad for me*.
5. Therefore there should be some indication of ‘*bad for me*’ in the phenomenal character of pain.
6. There is no distinguishable quality of ‘*bad for me*’ in the phenomenal character of pain.
7. So either negative affect is something other than a functionally defined state, or functionally defined states play a role over and above the phenomenal character of my experience.
8. (7) contradicts TTI-representationalism.

¹⁰⁹ It is unclear whether Tye & Cutter’s representationalism demands that pain’s negative affect be identical to a state defined as ‘*bad for me*’ or merely determined by a state defined as ‘*bad for me*’, since the catchphrase generally contains both disjuncts. The current argument put forward is an attempt to deny the stronger identity claim. The determinacy claim will be rejected in one of the following anticipated responses.

Next, I will attempt to anticipate two potential representationalist responses. The first and most likely response is to argue that the phenomenal character of pain *does* have a ‘bad for me’ quality. The fact that it hurts, indeed is *painful*, indicates the functional role for avoidance behavior. We don’t want to be in pain. The second and perhaps more effective response is this: tissue damage *is* ‘bad for me’. It is merely perceived as pain’s negative affect, the way that a particular reflectance property is perceived as red.¹¹⁰

My reply to the first response is that although the experience of having a pain in my toe might be bad or unpleasant (*painful*), there is nothing about the phenomenal qualities of an experience that can be harmful. It is what those qualities are supposed to track that’s harmful. Tye & Cutter do not refer to the harms tracked by pains as being *bad to experience*, but rather as being apt to harm the to the subject (harmful to the person). Tye & Cutter give a rough explanation that “something harms a teleological system to the extent that it hinders that system (or one of its subsystems) from performing its function(s)”.¹¹¹ We can speculate as to what those functions are, but it is easy to fill in the gaps here. The general outcome of continued harm to the teleological system in question would be for the subject to cease living (or thriving/flourishing etc.). Following this, if I am able to describe the *experience* of tissue damage as *bad for me* and have *that* (the experience) constitute harm to a teleological system, the judgment that the *experience* is bad or *bad for me* is no longer perceptual. This contradicts the intention of representationalism. Moreover, I argue that the phenomenal character of pain itself is not harmful, at least not the way tissue damage is harmful. Again, there is a difference between not

¹¹⁰ In an earlier paper (2005), Tye does talk about the experience of tissue damage representing that damage as bad (107), rather than tissue damage itself actually being functionally bad. Tye & Cutter (2011) are more careful to note that it is the functionally defined state (damage) being tracked by pain that *is* ‘bad for me’ in their 2011, not merely perceived or experienced as ‘bad for me’. Instead we should assume that ‘bad for me’ is experienced as pain’s negative affect, and this tracks a functionally defined bodily state.

¹¹¹ Tye & Cutter “Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain” (2011), 100.

liking the way something feels, which is most likely the case with pain, and judging that something is bad *for me*. There might also be a sense in which the experience of pain could be considered harmful. For example, when overcome by intense pain one is unable to perform basic functions necessary for survival. While this initial argument is not intended to include these cases, I imagine that it isn't the pain itself that *constitutes* the harm, but rather the absence of performing the necessary functions for survival. This result might be *caused* by pain, but it is not the pain itself.

My reply to the second response is twofold. The first part of the reply goes back to what is meant by phenomenal externalism. Our ordinary perceptions of the world are anchored to the external particulars that determine what it is like to experience them.¹¹² If it is the case that 'bad *for me*' is part of the representational content *alone*, then the phenomenal character of pain tracks something that is not typically a perceptible particular. There is no external property of 'bad *for me*' that can be tracked the way that tissue damage is supposed to be tracked. The judgment that something is harmful to me is not part of the tissue damage taking place. Tye & Cutter argue that the bodily states tracked by pain *can* be functionally defined (as opposed to physically defined).¹¹³ But I question whether functionally defined states are properties that can be tracked by perceptual judgments. I suggest that judgments about whether something is good/bad for me falls outside the scope of what perceptual judgments can be about. I concede that it might be possible to argue that judgments about these kinds of things can be perceptual, however, none of the representationalists have done so.

¹¹² I leave open whether or not our perceptual experiences are partially or wholly determined by their external counterparts.

¹¹³ Tye & Cutter, "Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain" (2011).

The second part of this reply is directed at the representationalist who claims that *painfulness* is merely *determined* by its representational content, and not *identical* to it. The reply is, roughly, that an explanation has yet to be given for why *painfulness* tracks ‘bad for me’ when the functionally defined states are often unfaithfully represented. On the face of it, there is no reason for ‘bad for me’ to be perceived (experienced) as pain. Pain itself isn’t intrinsically harmful to the subject (at least not in the sense described by “functionally defined states” here), it is what pain is supposed to *track* under TTI-representationalism that is potentially harmful. There are many things that are harmful that are not perceived with any negative valence at all. Eating too many hamburgers is harmful to the teleological system, yet they are delicious. There is no adequate story told by Tye & Cutter that specifies *which* kind of harms get tracked by pains, or *why* some minor harms are often much more painful than major harms.

Tye & Cutter discuss this objection briefly, however I do not see how their response disarms the concern. They provide a scenario where, due to a car accident, you have a cut in your leg.

Case 1: As a result of an accident, your leg is sliced open at the location of your great saphenous vein.

Case 2: As a result of an accident, your leg is sliced open just next to the great saphenous vein.¹¹⁴

The cut in Case 1 is much more harmful than the cut in Case 2. They use d1 and d2 to specify the respective damage types in cases 1 and 2. If their analysis of harm tracking is correct, then Case 1 should represent the damage to a much higher degree of pain than Case 2 but both pains are felt to the same degree. Here is their answer to this concern:

¹¹⁴ Tye & Cutter, “Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain” (2011), 102.

“...a disturbance of the type *slice of the great saphenous vein*; this type of damage is bad for you (under optimal conditions) to a very high degree (a degree much higher than [the degree of felt badness in both cases]). But it is also a disturbance of the types *slice of the leg*, and *slice of the skin*. These types of damage are bad for you to a much lesser degree. If your experience in case 1 represents your disturbance under the type *slice of the great saphenous vein*, then this would be a problem for our view. But just because your (token) disturbance does belong to this type, it does not follow that your experience represents it under this type. It is quite plausible that the type under which your experience represents the disturbance in case 1 (namely d1) is very similar to, or even identical to, the type under which your experience represents the disturbance in case 2 (d2). (Perhaps they are both represented under a type like *slice of the skin*.) If so, then it’s plausible to suppose that d1 and d2 in fact are equally bad for you under optimal conditions.”¹¹⁵

This defense shows that disturbances with varying degrees of harmfulness can be represented under the same damage types. It explains why they appear to have the same degree of felt badness. But at no point is there mention of some mechanism that distinguishes these types from one another. Why would they both be represented under the same (lesser) damage type if in fact Case 1 is much more apt to harm you – and if the *telos* of pain is to track harm? This seems contrary to the spirit of any teleological view. Cases like these often occur, where the felt badness does not match the badness *for you*. Why suppose that pain tracks harms at all, then, if the degree of harm is not faithfully represented, even in extreme cases?

The representationalist might appeal to this as a case of misperception. But this is not just a matter of “getting it wrong”. Misperception occurs when there is either some impairment to my perceptual faculties, or the context of the experience (features of the subject or features of the world) has prevented facts about my experience from fitting with facts about the world. Neither of these is the case in the example above. It’s not that our experience should have represented damage under the type with a higher degree of felt pain. We should *never* experience the degree

¹¹⁵ Tye & Cutter, (2011), 103.

to which a slice of the great saphenous vein is harmful even in optimal conditions if our experience *normally* represents that damage under the (lesser harm) type *slice of the skin*. It seems that in many standard cases, the lesser damage type (minimal pain) overrides the greater damage type (high degree of pain), even though the harms taking place are much worse than what is represented. That something is bad *for me* is a rational judgment, not a perceptual judgment. So while I agree with the representationalist that pain is (in most cases) a perceptual judgment, I do not see how the latter can include the former in either its phenomenal character or its representational content. If the somatosensory perception of tissue damage has the “function of indicating” that the damage is harmful, any judgment to that effect falls outside the scope of the experience’s phenomenal character. Hence TTI-representationalism is false.¹¹⁶

iii. Aydede & Fulkerson – Additional Challenges for Tye & Cutter

Murat Aydede and Matthew Fulkerson offer a further reason to reject the representationalist account of negative affect. They claim that certain problems arise if representationalism endorses the objective state view (OV) for pain -- the view that pain is the experience of an objective property in the affected location.¹¹⁷ If the affective quality of pain tracks harms, and harms are identified as the objective states perceived (whether functional or physical), then utterances like “this is good for me, but so painful” should express a contradiction. They don’t.¹¹⁸ Any situation where one has to endure pain for the *benefit* of the teleological system is a problematic example for OV + representationalism. Imagine going to the dentist, for example. The experience of

¹¹⁶ Physiological activity having the ‘function of indicating’ is Dretske’s wording for representational content. Dretske, (1995), 35-37, found in Aydede & Fulkerson (2013).

¹¹⁷ Aydede & Fulkerson, “Affect: Representationalists’ Headache” (2013), 13.

¹¹⁸ Aydede & Fulkerson, “Affect: Representationalists’ Headache” (2013), 12.

having corrupted enamel cut away is extremely painful, yet you have the belief that drilling away the corrupted part of the tooth is actually beneficial to you. Further, the damage that takes place in this case actually *is* beneficial to the tooth, even if you lack the belief. Another example might be pouring alcohol on a wound to disinfect it. This is very painful, yet the process is beneficial to the bodily location. The representationalist might be able to account for this by suggesting these kinds of problems are caused by the experience of other functionally defined states. For example, the cleansing of the wound is only painful due to the use of certain chemicals on the skin. This then gets represented under certain damage types to the effect that there is pain of a certain sort. But this does not escape the earlier objection that whichever damage type gets represented appears to be arbitrary.

Aydede & Fulkerson then pose a further challenge to the preferred representationalist view that combines its outlook with the experience view (EV), rather than with objective state view (OV). They write the following claim about representationalism + EV:

“...[perceptual judgments] that attribute affective qualities to the objects of affective experiences don’t track a completely objective property of these objects such as their being harmful or beneficial. In this regard, the attribution of affective qualities in the act of experiencing them is radically different from the parallel attribution of sensible qualities to the objects of our experiences.”¹¹⁹

This objection points out that if the representationalist adopts EV for negative affect, he contradicts one of the main tenets of representationalism. If we have access to the way something is experienced without having access to what that experience represents, then the phenomenal character-representational content identity that representationalism insists upon is compromised.

¹¹⁹ Aydede & Fulkerson, (2013), 14.

Aydede & Fulkerson argue that this is because the use of EV + representationalism requires an ‘introspection first view’. This means that “when we make introspective judgments... our attribution of affective qualities to our experiences does not depend on our capacity to have perceptual judgments about the relevant range of objective properties of their objects”.¹²⁰ This issue was raised by Aydede’s criticism in Chapter Two. Remember that for him, any pain attributing judgment is going to be about the experience first (introspection first).

Unlike Aydede & Fulkerson, I do not think that the use of EV requires the representationalist to adopt the introspection first view, that is, if the stringent definition of introspection is used. In light of the alternative definition of introspection discussed in Chapter Two, I tend to see EV as a plausible option for the representationalist. The Volume Control Hypothesis provides a basis for making objective (and perceptual) judgments about internal events. So there might be a story to tell about the content of pain being tissue damage, and the *experience* of it being *bad for me*. Introspecting that damage, however, involves “turning the volume up” on ‘*bad for me*’. But in order for this option to be seriously considered, a more fully-fledged theory of introspection needs to be provided.¹²¹ Moreover, given the earlier difficulties with the absence of phenomenally identifiable harms, it seems more plausible to deny the phenomenal character-representational content identity on the preceding criticism. If judgments about functionally defined states like “that is harmful to me” are included in the experience of pain, this instead shows there is more to our experiences than what Tye & Cutter argue for. This also contradicts their brand of representationalism because it demands that perceptual pain experiences can include features over and above their phenomenal qualities. They can include rational judgments

¹²⁰ Aydede & Fulkerson, “Affect: Representationalists’ Headache” (2013), 14.

¹²¹ Other accounts of introspection might also provide an option for the representationist here.

about the potential harmfulness to the subject. Further, the spirit of representationalism is to develop a *perceptual* view of pain (in naturalistic terms). Adopting EV about affect and developing OV for the phenomenal qualities results in an inaccurate picture of pain's phenomenology. There is no reason for the representationalist (or any perceptual theorist) to separate pains' phenomenal qualities like burning, or throbbing, from their negative valence. Negative affect makes it *pain* that's at issue, not the neutral properties that happen to be phenomenally available in the experience.

iv. Strategies to preserve non-representationalist perceptualism about negative affect.

The difficulties with the representationalist view of negative affect have been discussed at length. It has been, however, my objective in this thesis to defend perceptualism. So in light of the problems mentioned for the popular current perceptual view of pain (representationalism), the question becomes how to salvage the remaining tenets of perceptualism. I suggest that the perceptual theorist has several options:

- a. Reject the claim that phenomenal character = representational content.
- b. Argue that rational judgments about whether or not something is harmful *are* part of our experiences, just not contained in typical perceptual judgments.
- c. Reject OV and EV, and instead favor a neutral 'perceptual' relation (Bain)

The perceptual theorist can (a) reject the defining claim of representationalism – namely, that the phenomenal character of an experience is identical to or supervenes upon its representational content. This way the perceptual theorist can endorse the perceptual relation talked about by Bain without being committed to the view that the perceptual object of these experiences is

limited to tissue damage. He can thus fill in whatever story he wants for what the perceptual object is (depending on, i.a., his metaphysical commitments).

The upshot of (b) is that one can endorse the attractive teleological/functional role for “bringing about avoidance behavior”. This has been difficult for the representationalist to develop purely because of the prior commitment to what is denied in (a). Without this restriction, the teleological/functional role of harm tracking can still be part of our experiences, just not accessed via perceptual judgments. This allows the perceptual theorist to explain the hedonistic claims about pain discussed earlier. Experiences that involve perceptual judgments can include or prompt secondary (rational) judgments that what pain tracks is harmful. Here is an example: “there is a dull throbbing pain in my toe, but it probably isn’t very harmful”. Here “it” refers to what might potentially be harmful to the person. The judgment about pain in the toe prompts the judgment that whatever the pain signifies probably isn’t bad for the subject, where the latter judgment is based on the type/degree of pain that is felt. There still needs to be an account of why pain is *painful*, however, and because I view pains as necessarily *painful*, their negative affect is constitutive of the phenomenal character of the experience. Once an alternative account of introspection is fully developed, the perceptual theorist should have an easier task of providing the details.

I will now revisit the Asymmetry Thesis. What I have argued here helps the perceptual theorist disarm some of the concerns brought on by the Asymmetry Thesis. My goal has been to show that it is not necessary to endorse the full representationalist view the way Michael Tye does. But despite this, the perceptual theorist still needs to find a way to solve the problems noted by Aydede. I will begin by restating what's at stake in this debate.

Asymmetry Thesis – What is it again?

The Asymmetry Thesis is the claim that pain is not a perception because of its asymmetry with standard perceptions. There are several grounds for this claim.

First, we don't apply our concept of pain to public objects the way we do with standard perceptions. When I see the cup in front of me my concept of the cup has a *de re* labeling use. It applies to the *object*. It appears that pain does not have a *de re* labeling use like this because the concept applies to a feature of the subject in the first place.

Second, a typical feature of standard perceptions is that they are fallible. It is possible to misperceive or be wrong about the objects we see/hear/feel. I might think what I see is a hawk but it is in fact an eagle, or I might think the cup in front of me is white when it is really tinted yellow. This kind of fallibility appears to be absent with pain. It seems that we can never be wrong about our pains. Note again that fallibility is not seen as a necessary condition for perception, but rather an accidental property or feature of perception. Pain itself doesn't seem to depend on external facts about the world; rather (it seems), it depends only on facts about the subject's experience. This is problematic for the phenomenal externalist (and indeed the

representationalist) who claims the contrary. It is problematic because this type of theorist typically claims that pain is the perception of something. If pain is the perception of something, that experience needs to be determined by facts about the world. This is one of the motivations for Tye's argument that pain is to tissue damage as the color red is to a certain reflectance property. We see red when looking at a specific kind of reflectance property, and likewise we experience pain when somatosensorially perceiving tissue damage.

Third, pain has negative affect and motivational character. In other words, pain is *painful*. Typical perceptions do not have this kind of character. They can be pleasant or unpleasant, but they are not *necessarily* painful the way pain seems to be. Negative affect is another difficulty for the representationalists to explain. They are able to identify certain phenomenal qualities that correspond to certain types of tissue damage, but those qualities are not necessarily *painful*. In order to get around this, they (Tye & Cutter specifically) claim that the objective states of affairs perceived via pain can be functionally defined.¹²² The functional role here is that tissue damage is harmful to the subject, and this is supposed to be picked up on by pain's *painfulness*.

These three considerations are intended to dissuade us from the intuition that when we feel a pain, there is an objective and perceptual relation taking place. I have argued that there is no reason to do this. That is, there is no reason to abandon this intuition. When I stub my toe there is some real property of pain that instantiates the location of my toe – a property that *feels* bad at the location of my toe. Not only *can* I pick up on (perceive) this property at its location, but I am generally forced to do so.

¹²² Tye & Cutter, "Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain" (2011).

What I've said

I have argued that the first two considerations introduced by the Asymmetry Thesis can be dealt with by providing an alternative account of introspection. I claim that the both of these considerations are motivated in the first place by an overly stringent definition of introspection – namely, the view that introspective judgments are solely about experiences, while judgments about the objects of those experiences are perceptual. The alternative account I suggest is the one offered by Christopher Hill. He introduces the idea that we can make errors in judgment about private events like pain. Further, I argue that his use of the “volume control hypothesis” makes introspection a kind of inner perception rather than a contrast to it. I suggest that this is a much broader and more plausible picture of the introspective process.

With Hill's notion of introspection in place, the first consideration of the Asymmetry Thesis no longer applies because with the alternative account of introspection comes the ability to make perceptual judgments about internal events. The second consideration no longer applies either: if we can make errors in judgment about our inner states, then judgments about inner states are fallible, just as with standard perceptions.

I have taken the opportunity in Chapter Three to reject Tye's representationist account of negative affect. At the same time I have provided some ammunition in service of the non-representational perceptualist. This rejection is based on the slogan representationalist premise that the phenomenal character of an experience is identical to or entirely determined by its representational content. Tye & Cutter (2011) argue that pain's affective and motivational character “tracks” harms, or in other words a bodily disturbance that is functionally defined as

bad *for me*.¹²³ At best, this analysis is incomplete. At worst, it contradicts the slogan premise of representationalism just mentioned above.

Tye & Cutter's analysis is incomplete because it doesn't provide an explanation of why tissue damage seems to be represented under damage types that don't faithfully match the type/degree of bodily harm. If the functionally defined state (identified by pain's negative affect) is intended to bring about avoidance behavior, why is it possible that both severe and mild harms can be represented under the same damage type? I also argue that there is no phenomenal quality that can be identified as tracking 'bad *for me*'. Tye & Cutter want to say that this is captured by pain's negative affect. But then the phenomenal character of that affect *should* be identical to (or at least have something to identify as) 'bad *for me*'. It isn't. This is likely because pain itself is not intrinsically harmful to me (except perhaps in extreme cases). It's the tissue damage that is often associated with pain that's harmful. In some sense, pain is actually good *for me*, in that it alerts us to something that potentially needs care. But regardless, if there is no phenomenal quality that can be identified with 'bad *for me*', and the judgment 'bad *for me*' is part of the experience, then there is some part of the experience that is over and above the phenomenal character-representational content identity. This contradicts at least one important part of the slogan: that the phenomenal character of an experience is *identical to* or determined by its representational content. If the perceptual theorist rejects this identity claim, a theory of functionally defined states might still explain pain's negative affect. Further, my objection to the identity claim leaves the less committed perceptual view untouched. This allows us to maintain

¹²³ Tye & Cutter, "Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain" (2011).

the attractive tenets of perceptualism discussed in Chapter One. So while the third consideration of the Asymmetry Thesis is successful in some respects, there is still a way around it.

How does this help the perceptual theorist?

My rejection of the Asymmetry Thesis does a number of things for the perceptual theorist. First, it makes it clear that with an alternative definition for introspection, pain looks more like perception than the Asymmetry Thesis predicts. I do not argue that Christopher Hill's view on introspection is the only option for the perceptual theorist, but rather that with this kind of theory in mind, the perceptualist need not be concerned by issues surrounding fallibility. There might be other theories of introspection, but this one has the added benefit for the perceptual theorist about pain. There are other implications of benefit to the perceptual theorist here as well. An alternative theory of introspection can do a better job of explaining what appears to be perceptual access to intransitive bodily states and events. If perceptual judgments can be made about internal events as well, we no longer need to worry about the distinction between judgments about external objects and judgments about experiences. This is indeed what the perceptual theorist wants to say about the somatosensory relation between the mind and the pained location. Hill's theory of introspection implies that there is more to accessing our own bodily states and events than just identifying their external counter-parts (e.g., tissue damage). Introspection also picks up on internal facts about us (intransitive sensations, and how they feel to the subject). The perceptual theorist can then fill in whatever he wants for what/if those perceptions track.

Another benefit to the perceptual theorist is by way of rejecting the kind of representationalism defended by Tye & Cutter about pain's negative affect. Given the principle

that the phenomenal character of pain experience is identical to or determined by its representational content (tissue damage), Tye & Cutter can give a general explanation of what the phenomenal qualities track. But what they can't seem to explain, at least in terms of phenomenal character, is pain's negative affect. Without the burden of this character-content identity claim, the perceptual theorist is free to use any teleo-functional story he likes to explain pain's negative affect. This makes better sense of pain attributing judgments that attach to rational judgments about the damage being harmful. The doctor asks you, where does it hurt? You reply, *there*, and indicate the location of the pain. Feeling that pain may or may not include the judgment that it is harmful, but the judgment *that it is harmful* is certainly not part of the purely *perceptual* experience.

This thesis has been an attempt to provide support for the perceptual theorist. I have argued that more care needs to be given to what is meant by introspection. But I have also been critical of the kind of representationalism that many perceptual theorists adopt *without* relying on the alternative theory of introspection. I have instead given reasons to doubt this kind of representationalism that are grounded in the phenomenal character/representational content identity claim. The next step for the perceptualist is to investigate the consequences of adopting a more comprehensive theory of introspection as suggested. He will need to integrate this theory of introspection into whatever framework that best fits the perceptual model. If Hill's version of introspection is adopted, what metaphysical consequences does this theory demand? One might still be persuaded by a naturalistic account of perception. So a proper explanation of introspection in naturalistic terms must then also be given. For example, one would have to explain the "Volume Control Hypothesis" in terms of physiological activity in the brain. Once this kind of approach is taken, however, we might better understand how we have knowledge of

our bodily states and events. With this kind of theory in mind, we can see that pains (and likely similar internal events) are not as different from typical perceptions as the Asymmetry Thesis predicts. It's just that the current developments of the perceptual view, namely, versions of representationalism, warrant a critical response. Lastly, the perceptual theorist will still need to provide an explanation of pain's negative affect. I have argued in Chapter Three that he is free to endorse the teleo-functional "harms" view, however, this will likely still prove to be a difficult task. While there might be a plausible teleo-functional explanation for pain, it is not obvious that it would explain pain's negative affect in particular. Thus, I suggest that negative affect is the next important area of research for the common-sense perceptualist.

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