

ABSTRACT

PERSONS AND HOW WE TRACE THEM: WHAT JOHNSTON GOT WRONG

By

Kevin F. Watson

December 2014

In *Surviving Death*, Mark Johnston claims we can trace the persistence of others and ourselves in simple and offhand ways that are criterionless—that do not depend on the use of sufficient conditions for cross-time identity. According to Johnston, we offload the question of persistence onto substances. Furthermore, Johnston claims, if we are able to trace others and ourselves by way of offloading, then neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity fail. According to Johnston, personal identity depends on how concern is directed rather than psychological continuity.

In this thesis, I respond to Johnston's arguments against neo-Lockeanism presented in *Surviving Death*. I argue that Johnston's account of offloading misinterprets research in cognitive science and developmental psychology. While we may trace some objects non-conceptually, it is implausible that we could trace persons in the manner Johnston claims. In addition, I argue that Johnston's concern based account of personal identity is problematic.

PERSONS AND HOW WE TRACE THEM: WHAT JOHNSTON GOT WRONG

A THESIS

Presented to the Department of Philosophy
California State University, Long Beach

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Philosophy

Committee Members:

Marcy Lascano, Ph.D. (Chair)
Cory Wright, Ph.D.
Wayne Wright, Ph.D.

College Designee:

Mark Wiley, Ph.D.

By Kevin F. Watson

B.A., 2011, California State University, San Bernardino

December 2014

UMI Number: 1569385

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 1569385

Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

Copyright 2014

Kevin F. Watson

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
1. INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE.....	1
Introducing Neo-Lockeanism	2
The Aim of This Thesis.....	7
Outline	7
2. JOHNSTON’S PROJECT	11
3. JOHNSTON’S MAIN CLAIM AGAINST NEO-LOCKEANISM.....	25
The Implications of Offloading	25
The Failure of Neo-Lockeanism	29
Objections	30
What if We Accept Johnston’s Main Claim(s)?	33
4. JOHNSTON’S ARGUMENT AGAINST NEO-LOCKEANISM.....	34
The Same Mind Argument.....	34
5. REJECTING JOHNSTON’S ARGUMENT.....	41
The Empirical Evidence from Developmental Psychology.....	41
Development of Self-Understanding	41
Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children.....	43
Understanding Early Adolescent Self and Identity.....	45
Five Levels of Self-Awareness	46
Justifying My Objection	47
6. JOHNSTON’S REPLY	50
Kiddie Dualist Reply.....	50
The Further Problem	55

CHAPTER	Page
7. THE NEW TASK FOR NEO-LOCKEANS	64
Do We Offload onto Persons?.....	64
An Alternative to Johnston’s Offloading	66
The Increasing Implausibility of Johnston’s Offloading	69
Offloading and the Falsity of Neo-Lockeanism Again	73
8. ALTRUISM, JUSTICE, AND GETTING WHAT ONE DESERVES	78
Biologically Self-Interested	79
The Wicked Lucky	81
The Protean Problem.....	83
9. CONCLUSION.....	87
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	90

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE

In his influential article "Human Beings," Mark Johnston argues against the intuition-based methodology common within discussions of personal identity.¹ A few particular claims made by Johnston, however, left readers wanting. In passing, Johnston claims that there is a reliable, humble, and ubiquitous way that we re-identify others and ourselves over time.² According to Johnston, we are mutually available to one another; I just know that the people around me persist, and the people around me also know that I persist.³ The people around me and I can cognize and recognize each other easily and unproblematically. When cognizing and recognizing the people around me, I do not appear to be using a criterion—I trace identity in a way that is criterionless. What is

¹ Mark Johnston, "Human Beings," *Journal of Philosophy* 84 (1987): 59-83; reprinted in M. Tooley, ed. *Metaphysics* (1993), J. Kim and E. Sosa, eds., *Metaphysics: An Anthology* (1999), and *Postgraduate Foundation in Philosophy* (2002). Discussed further in Mark Johnston, "'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal," in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 33-74.

² Johnston, "Human Beings," 63.

³ From the outset, I would like to point out that beginning a philosophical investigation with the folk psychological fact that we "know" when a person persists is, to some extent, unphilosophical. If we began our physics with our folk expectations about the physical world, then our theories would begin with our just "expecting liquids to flow, unsupported things to drop, hot substances to burn us, water to quench our thirst, and rolling stones to gather no moss" (Dennett 2013, 74). However, these expectations do not tell us the physical laws and rules. It would be unscientific to base our physical laws and rules on folk expectations alone.

more, Johnston claims, our mutual availability entails that neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity fail.⁴ But how, some have asked, does our mutual availability lead to the failure of neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity?⁵

Introducing Neo-Lockeanism

Neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity take inspiration from John Locke, who, in his writings, appears to defend a theory of personal identity based on the memories of past experiences (or experience-memories).⁶ Locke, for example, appeared to believe that the same man, both drunk and sober, could be different people—if the sober man did not remember the actions of the drunkard.⁷ I will stipulate, then, that the Lockean view claims personal identity consists in the “Experience-Memory Criterion.” The Experience-Memory Criterion can be stated as follows: X at one time (t1) is identical to Y at a later time (t2) if Y at t2 remembers any of the experiences of X at t1. Thus, your identity will extend into different times so long as a person in the future remembers the experiences that you have.

⁴ Mark Johnston, *Surviving Death* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 43.

⁵ Authors who have asked just this question include David S. Oderberg, "Johnston on Human Beings," *Journal of Philosophy*, 86 (1989): 137-41, and Denis Robinson, "Human Animals, Human Beings, and Mentalistic Survival," in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), *Oxford Study of Metaphysics*, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3-32.

⁶ It is not clear whether Locke actually held this view, but this is not a thesis on Locke's actual account of personal identity.

⁷ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (ed.) Peter H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 118. Note, though, that this interpretation is debated.

For example, when I was a child I used to ride my bicycle nearly every day; I have many memories of these experiences (or experience-memories). Thus, for each memory that I now have of myself riding my bicycle as a child, I can claim that I am the same person as the child who rode the bicycle. Therefore, according to the Lockean view, I can trace the identity of my person in terms of the Experience-Memory Criterion.

On the other hand, there are several issues with the Experience-Memory Criterion. For example, my mnemonic faculties are very poor. As I stated, I remember many days of riding my bicycle; however, for every day that I remember riding my bicycle, there are numerous other days that I do not remember. If experience-memory is what tells me whether I am the same person as some person in the past, my poor ability to remember will be detrimental to my identity. What is more, there are few nights for which I can remember my dreams. For any given night that I do remember my dreams, there are hundreds of nights (if not thousands) that I do not remember them. In fact, the processes and neurotransmitters that allow me to remember are largely dormant while I am sleeping. For the most part, then, I am not identical with any sleeping person according to the Experience-Memory Criterion—but this is clearly false.

Working through these issues, modern philosophers have revised and refined the Lockean position to avoid its pitfalls. Individuals who take inspiration from the Lockean position are referred to as “neo-Lockeans.” This thesis will focus on, and defend, the neo-Lockean position.

One individual who is commonly associated with the neo-Lockean position is Derek Parfit. In *Reasons and Persons*, Parfit appeals to overlapping chains of experience-memories to solve some of the issues commonly faced by the Experience-Memory

Criterion.⁸ Parfit begins by differentiating between *direct memory connections* and the *continuity of memory*. According to Parfit, Locke believed that there must be direct memory connections between two persons for them to be identical. Parfit says, “between X today and Y twenty years ago, there are *direct memory connections* if X can now remember having some of the experiences Y had twenty years ago.”⁹ However, requiring direct memory connections between a person at one time and a person at some later time leads to issues for the Lockean position—because the mnemonic faculties of most individuals are poor.

To solve some of the issues of direct memory connections, Parfit claims, “even if there are no direct memory connections, there may be *continuity of memories*.”¹⁰ According to Parfit, if there is an overlapping chain of direct memories, then there will be continuity of memories. For the most part, individuals have experience-memories of the previous day. These day-to-day direct experience-memory connections build up a chain that links a person in the past to a person in the present. So, if personal identity requires the continuity of memories rather than direct memory connections, we can solve some of the issues faced by the Lockean position. Thus, we have arrived at the “Continuity of Memory Criterion.” According to the Continuity of Memory Criterion, X at one time (t1) is identical to Y at a later time (t2) if there is an overlapping chain of experience-memories connecting Y at t2 to X at t1.

⁸ Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 205.

⁹ Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 205.

¹⁰ Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 205.

However, Parfit points out, there are also other facts that neo-Lockeans can appeal to.¹¹ For example, there are psychological connections between intentions and later acts, as well as beliefs, desires, and other psychological events that continue to be had in the future. All of these psychological connections, according to Parfit, should be appealed to, and are relevant, when we are discussing the identity of persons. Parfit defines two general relations: first, “*psychological connectedness* is the holding of particular direct psychological connections;” second, “*psychological continuity* is the holding of overlapping chains of *strong* [psychological] connectedness.”¹²

Psychological connectedness can admit of degrees; between each day, there can be thousands of direct connections, very few connections, or anything in-between. As such, we have to be careful about when psychological connections tell us two persons are identical. According to Parfit, if there is *strong* (or *enough*) psychological connectedness, then two people are identical.¹³ Parfit claims that there is strong connectedness “if the number of direct connections, over any day, is *at least half* the number that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.”¹⁴ Now, we might ask, do we always need strong psychological connectedness for identity?

Yes, we need strong connections, but we do not need strong connections as such. According to Parfit, neo-Lockeans need overlapping chains of strong connectedness rather than strong connectedness as such. Identity is transitive; strong connectedness

¹¹ Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 205.

¹² Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 206.

¹³ Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 206.

¹⁴ Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 206.

itself, however, is not transitive.¹⁵ For example, I am strongly connected to myself yesterday, but I am probably not strongly connected to any person many years ago. I may have one or two experience-memories from many years ago, but many of my beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on are different. So, I am only weakly connected to a person in the past. However, I am psychologically continuous with a person in the past; there are overlapping chains of strong connectedness between a person many years ago and me now. For every day, there are (probably) strong connections between my person on that day and a person the previous day. Furthermore, psychological continuity is transitive. If X is strongly connected to Y and Y is strongly connected to Z, then X is psychologically continuous with Z. Even though X may not be strongly connected to Z, there is still an overlapping chain between X and Z. If neo-Lockeanism is true, the theory must define identity in terms of a transitive relation. Strong connectedness does not give us a transitive relation, but psychological continuity does. This leads us to Parfit's

Psychological Continuity Criterion:

(1) There is psychological continuity if and only if there is overlapping chains of strong connectedness. X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause, and (4) it has not taken a 'branching' form. (5) Personal identity over time just consists in the holding of facts like (2) and (4).¹⁶

¹⁵ Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 206.

¹⁶ Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 207. For the purposes of this paper, I am not going to explain (3) and (4) of Parfit's Psychological Continuity Criterion. I will simply stipulate, as Parfit does, that I will use 'psychological continuity' in the widest sense possible; so, in the case of (3), any cause will be good enough for continuity. For a detailed discussion of (3), read Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 204-209. For a detailed discussion of (4), read Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 253ff, and Derek Parfit, "Personal Identity," *The Philosophical Review*, 80 (1971): 3-27.

The Aim of This Thesis

In *Surviving Death*, Johnston outlines the reasons why our mutual availability entails the failure of neo-Lockeanism. As we have seen, if neo-Lockeanism is true, the identity of persons is defined and determined by a criterion—namely, the Psychological Continuity Criterion. Thus, Johnston claims, when we are actually tracing persons over time, we should be using such a criterion. Johnston's claims about our mutual availability, however, entail that we are tracing persons without using a criterion. Thus, Johnston's account of mutual availability and neo-Lockeanism are at odds. If neo-Lockeanism is true, we trace persons using a criterion; if persons are mutually available, we trace persons without using a criterion.

In the proceeding chapters of this thesis, I propose to respond to Mark Johnston's arguments against neo-Lockeanism. I will defend neo-Lockeanism against Johnston's claim that we do not use a criterion when tracing persons over time. Furthermore, I will argue that Johnston's account of mutual availability is false; while our physical bodies, which are coincident with persons, may be mutually available in some sense, persons are not mutually available. In addition, I will point out the flaws of Johnston's own account of personal identity and the general conclusions of *Surviving Death*.

Outline

In the following chapter, I will summarize the general project of *Surviving Death*. An outline will provide us with the clarification needed to understand the objections and concepts discussed later in this thesis. Furthermore, in outlining some of the claims made by Johnston, we will be led to the central arguments that are of concern.

In the third chapter, I will examine two central claims Johnston advances against neo-Lockeanism. Johnston claims that if we are not using or cannot use a criterion for tracing persons over time, but we can trace persons nevertheless, then neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity fail. Second, Johnston claims there are implications that conflict if we accept both neo-Lockeanism and that we are mutually available to one another. I will argue that these claims are, at best, problematic. On the other hand, even if we accept Johnston's main claims against neo-Lockeanism, his arguments are still unsound.

In the fourth chapter, I will outline an argument presented in *Surviving Death*. I have entitled this argument the "Same Mind Argument." After outlining the argument, I will explain Johnston's reasoning behind it. Then, I will give a rudimentary objection that will be justified in the chapter that follows.

In the fifth chapter, I will reply to Johnston's argument on behalf of the neo-Lockean. I will employ empirical evidence from child developmental psychology to defend my response. It is my hope that this empirical evidence will give us reason to be skeptical of Johnston's claims.

In the sixth chapter, I will respond to my objections on behalf of Johnston. The replies given on Johnston's behalf will be entitled the "Kiddie Dualist Reply" and the "Further Problem."¹⁷ After outlining each reply, I will respond to these replies on behalf of the neo-Lockean. The responses offered on behalf of the neo-Lockean show why both the Kiddie Dualist reply and Further Problem do not save Johnston from the objection

¹⁷ A rudimentary articulation of the "Kiddie Dualist" reply can be found on *Surviving Death*, 47. For Johnston's articulation of the further problem, see Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 83, and Johnston, "Human Beings."

given in chapter four and justified in chapter five. My response to the Kiddie Dualist reply is straightforward enough; however, in response to the Further Problem, I will touch upon the topic of methodology—which is at the heart of Johnston’s arguments in “Human Beings.”

In the seventh chapter, I will side with Johnston's claim that facts about how we actually trace persons must be brought to bear in discussions of personal identity. According to Johnston, when we look at the facts, neo-Lockeanism becomes an implausible account of tracing persons over time. However, I will argue that neo-Lockeanism is better supported by empirical data than Johnston supposes. I will argue that Johnston's account of our mutual-availability is inconsistent with current research in cognitive science. While current research has shown that we may “offload” in the case of sensory objects, tracing persons over time amounts to more than tracing sensory objects.

In the eighth chapter, I will argue that accepting Johnston's general conclusions about surviving death leads to unsatisfactory results. *Surviving Death*, as you might have guessed, tries to give an account of how individuals can survive after their biological death. I will claim, however, that even if we accept Johnston’s arguments and conclusions, individuals deserving of survival may not receive it. Johnston’s account of survival only allows the survival of those who act in such a way that treats everyone as part of their person (in other words, one acts and treats everyone as equally important),

yet very few, if any, can do such.¹⁸ Second, Johnston's account may allow the survival of individuals undeserving of the “ultimate reward.” Finally, Johnston’s account of persons fails to recognize the importance of distinct persons and justice in this life.

¹⁸ I want to qualify this claim by saying that Johnston also believes goodness provides its own reward—that goodness is good in itself. By being good, Johnston claims, one will overcome one’s fear of death. However, most individuals do not survive in the way Johnston describes. According to Johnston, most individuals are good enough to overcome their fear of death, but not good enough to survive death.

CHAPTER 2

JOHNSTON'S PROJECT

In *Surviving Death*, Johnston attempts to give a naturalistic account of how the good and the bad can receive what they deserve after death. According to Johnston, death threatens the importance of goodness. Johnston views death as "the great leveler;" he claims, "if the good and the bad go down alike into oblivion, if there is nothing about reality itself that shores up [the] basic moral differences between [the lives of the good and the bad], say by providing what the good deserve, then the distinction between the good and the bad is less important."¹⁹ According to Johnston, morality requires the support of an afterlife.²⁰ In other words, the importance of goodness can only be redeemed if there is something in death that is better for the good than the bad—if there is an afterlife in which the good and the bad get what they deserve.²¹ Now, one might ask, how can death be better for the good than the bad? The answer, for Johnston, is that the good, but not the bad, live on after their biological death.

¹⁹ Mark Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 5.

²⁰ Mark Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 12.

²¹ While one may reject the claim that death threatens the importance of goodness, I do not wish to do so in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to examine Johnston's arguments against neo-Lockeanism and account of personal identity. For a critique of Johnston's moral claims, see Jeremy Wisnewski, "Book Review: *Surviving Death*," *Philosophy in Review*, 31, no. 2 (2011): 104-106. Wisnewski does a good job of pointing out how it is possible to believe goodness is good in itself, and, therefore, survival is not necessary for justice.

However, Johnston wants to give a naturalistic account of post-death survival, so he cannot depend on souls, God, or anything supernatural. In the first chapter of *Surviving Death*, Johnston says he "shall have no recourse to any supernatural means. [He] shall take us to be wholly constituted by our bodies. [He] shall find that there is no separate self or soul that could survive without the body or be reincarnated in another body."²² On the other hand, Johnston's account of survival does share some commonalities with Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism. According to Johnston, before her death, a good person has already undergone a kind of death—the death of her self.

According to Johnston, the identity of good individuals is different from the identity of others; the identity of the good persists after death because they become one with the onward rush of mankind. Johnston says, "To the extent that they are good, the good can see through death, and as a result death is less of a threat to them."²³ Now, one might ask, how is death less of a threat to the good? Furthermore, how do the good survive on after death?

Johnston argues that we are protean persons defined by our present and future directed concern. In other words, "what it is for someone to be P in the future, is for that someone to be the reasonable object of P's future-directed concern [and P's concern actually be directed at that future someone]."²⁴ Directing one's concern depends on how

²² Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 14.

²³ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 14.

²⁴ Trenton Merricks, "Realism about Personal Identity Over Time," *Philosophical Perspectives*, 15, *Metaphysics* (2001): 175.

one acts in anticipation of interests had in the future and whether one takes those interests as one's own.

For example, if a person who comes out of a teletransporter is a reasonable object of my future-directed concern, and I direct my concern toward the person who comes out of the teletransporter (i.e., I believe the person who comes out of the teletransporter's interests are my interests), then I am one with the person who comes out of the teletransporter. Similarly, if all of humanity is a reasonable object of my future-directed concern, and I direct my concern toward all of humanity, then I am one with all of humanity. As you may have noticed, this means that my personal identity is variable. According to Johnston, persons are protean in the sense that their identity is variable and changes based on how concern is directed.

According to Johnston, the good, but not the bad, have future-directed concern for all of humankind; the good live a life of radical altruism or agape. The good live as if everyone's interests are equally important; good individuals do not take their own interest as being privileged. Johnston says, the good "shed a certain kind of self-delusion... and so find that the death of [the] particular human being [that they are] is much less important than the onward rush of human kind."²⁵ Thus, as long as humankind is present, the good survive on with them and through them. The good person's concern toward all of humanity is identity constituting; so, whenever and wherever humanity is present, the good survive on. Johnston claims, "the good, but not the bad, can overcome death, in part by seeing through it;"²⁶ the good cease privileging their individual interests and see

²⁵ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 14.

²⁶ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 14.

their particular interests as the interests of one amongst many who are equally important. Furthermore, because good individuals take the interests of others as their interests (and concern is identity constituting), they see the death of the particular individual they are as the death of one amongst many who are equally important.

At first glance, however, it may appear that there is something odd going on within Johnston's theory. First, if no one has a self worth caring about, then it is not clear what we are supposed to direct our concern toward. Furthermore, one might ask, what exactly is "all of humanity" if not the collection of individual selves? What exactly are the good directing their concern toward if not selves? Furthermore, how is all of humanity important if there are no selves to make up humanity?

According to Johnston, there are no selves; however, there are individual personalities. Individual personalities, according to Johnston, are composed of the practical unity that we experience with temporally extended agency.²⁷ What we want in survival is the survival of these individual personalities. However, the implied center, the individuality of our experiences, is the result of something similar to hallucination. Each of us experiences the world from an implied center—the center of an arena of presence and action—but, Johnston claims, these implied centers are illusory. Johnston's claims here are quite complex, and, since the focus of this thesis is on Johnston's argument against neo-Lockeanism, I do not want to let them bog us down. However, I would like to give a rough sketch of Johnston's conception of persons.

According to Johnston, there are individual personalities, and we should have concern for them because individual personalities suffer, have interest, and so on—

²⁷ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 259.

individual personalities are important. Furthermore, there are persons; however, persons are not what we commonly believe them to be. According to Johnston, individual personalities have concerns, interests, preferences, and so on; you have an individual personality, and you are commonly concerned about that individual personality fulfilling its desires, interests, preferences, and so on. However, you are not justified in having special concern for your own individual personality; all individual personalities are equally important and (can be) equally constitutive of your person. Johnston argues that your identity is constituted by how you direct concern toward individual personalities—whether you take the interests of an individual personality as your interests. Good individuals are less attached to their individual personalities, so they have concern for every individual personality to an equal degree. Since, as Johnston claims, persons are protean, the person that these good people "are" is constituted by the other individual personalities that they have concern for as well as their own (in some cases, good persons are constituted by all of humanity).

Even so, before Johnston can arrive at the conclusion that we are protean persons defined by our concern, he must prove that there is no individual self or person that justifies special (read: self-directed) concern. If there is a self or person worth caring about, we may be justified in having special concern for the particular individuals that we are. On pages 237-238 of *Surviving Death*, Johnston claims that the command of agape or radical altruism (the life of the good) is "simply the command to respond to the structure of the reasons that there actually are."²⁸ However, if a theory of personal identity other than Johnston's is still up for grabs, then the structure of the reasons *may*

²⁸ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 238.

not command us to live a radically altruistic life. Thus, Johnston must reject theories of personal identity that *could* allow for the existence of an individual self or person worth caring about; if there is such a self or person worth caring about, agape might be an unreasonable command.

Now, because Johnston does not want it to turn out that there is an individual self or person that justifies special—self-directed—concern, he meticulously rejects the various theories of personal identity that have been defended over the years. For example, Johnston argues against animalism, dualism, and other theories of personhood. The focus of this thesis, however, will be on Johnston's arguments against neo-Lockeanism.

Before talking more about the neo-Lockean position, let me briefly discuss tracing, which will figure into the discussion at numerous points throughout this thesis. Johnston uses both “tracing” and “tracking” interchangeably within *Surviving Death*. Furthermore, Johnston never explicitly defines what either of these terms mean. However, in numerous places, Johnston notes that we re-identify objects and people over time through tracing.²⁹ As I hinted in the introductory chapter, tracing is a form of cognizing and recognizing. When tracing an object or person over time, we use cognitive, sensory, and external factors to determine whether an object or person has persisted through time or is identical with another we have come into contact with.

Suppose, for example, that I meet an individual named Joe. Then, at some later time, suppose I encounter what I think is Joe. While tracing Joe, there is a process by which I am able to infer whether the individual actually is Joe. My ability to trace Joe

²⁹ See, for example, *Surviving Death*, 46.

allows me to determine if the individual from each encounter is the same person. The process by which we trace, however, is disputed. According to Johnston, I trace Joe in simple and offhand ways that allow me to save cognitive labor—relying more heavily on external factors that can be sensed.³⁰ According to Johnston, I trace (or attempt to trace) a substance when tracing Joe over time, and my tracing of Joe depends on Joe presenting himself as persisting (i.e., on his being mutually available to me). According to neo-Lockeans, on the other hand, I trace Joe by determining whether the two individuals are psychologically continuous—relying more heavily on cognitive systems. To know if Joe is the same person, according to neo-Lockeans, I must first determine if there is an overlapping chain of psychological connections between Joe now and Joe in the past. Now, one might ask, how does our mutual availability lead to the failure of neo-Lockeanism?

As stated in the introduction to this thesis, Johnston rejects neo-Lockeanism based on the mutual availability of persons. However, instead of simply stating that persons are mutually available, Johnston expounds a theory of substances and substance tracing that he claims applies to enduring substances. Johnston refers to his theory of substance tracing as "offloading." While one may be wondering what offloading is, first, it will be important to understand Johnston's conception of substances, because it is crucial to why offloading is possible and plausible.

According to Johnston, a substance is an item that has, "at each moment of its existence, a power of self-maintenance, development, and persistence, which would have

³⁰ Earlier, this form of tracing was described as mutual availability; Johnston uses the term "offloading" (more on this later).

to be cited in any adequate account of what it is to be the substance in question."³¹

Furthermore, Johnston claims, the essence of a complex substance will "involve a form or principle of unity, a relation among its possibly varying parts which is such that if it holds at a given time the substance exists at that time..."³² Thus, "substances are in essence items that have in them a self-maintaining power of persistence, embodied in some matter sufficiently complex to contain that power."³³ Furthermore, when a substance is present, that substance "objectively determines what it would be to have the same thing at a later time."³⁴ In other words, substances have a power of self-maintenance and persistence in them, and these powers tell us that the substances persist.³⁵ Finally, Johnston claims, substances endure—thanks to their power of self-maintenance, development, and persistence being present at each moment the substances are present.

According to David Lewis, endurers "persists by being wholly present at more than one time."³⁶ Johnston, however, believes that Lewis's definition of endurance is wrong; according to Johnston, an endurer "has all of its essence present at each time at

³¹ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 51.

³² Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 51.

³³ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 53.

³⁴ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 53.

³⁵ I want to point out that Johnston is playing with loaded dice here. Johnston's account of substances will basically preclude the need for neo-Lockean criterion when we are tracing a substance even if the substance is a neo-Lockean person—though Johnston believes neo-Lockean persons cannot be substances.

³⁶ David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), 202. Lewis noted he was following Johnston in his use of this terminology.

which it is present."³⁷ I am not going to object to Johnston's theory of substances, but I would like to note that his theory is contentious. A theory of essences, for example, is no easy task; it is not clear what exactly is essential to a substance. According to Johnston, (part of) the essence of a substance is its "self-maintaining power of persistence,"³⁸ but it is not clear what this "power" is. Furthermore, Johnston seems to think that one can experience a substance's power of self-maintenance and persistence, but he never explains how this takes place—Johnston takes it for granted. Finally, Johnston claims to be giving a naturalistic account of post death survival, and his theory relies on (the early heaving lifting of) his theory of substances, but talk of powers, essences, and substances does not (at least *prima facie*) jibe with naturalism. It is not clear to me how powers, essences, and the like figure into the physical laws of the universe. Now, the question on everyone's mind: what is offloading?

According to Johnston, offloading can be expressed by the phrase "I don't know what the sufficient conditions for identity over time are, but I know a persisting object when I see one."³⁹ We are said to be offloading when our perceptual system saves inferential labor by perceiving objects *as* persisting over time. In other words, we are offloading when our perceptual system discloses persistence to us rather than perceiving momentary objects and using sufficient conditions to connect them into a continuous object.⁴⁰ Offloading, according to Johnston, is a way in which our perceptual system

³⁷ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 52 and 52, footnote 36.

³⁸ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 53.

³⁹ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 45.

⁴⁰ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 45.

exploits "an independently existing structure...in our environment."⁴¹ The independently existing structure (i.e., the nature of substances) allows us to offload the question of persistence onto the object itself; the cognitive labor associated with tracing the object is pawned off or "offloaded" onto the object. Now, how does offloading figure into the discussion of neo-Lockeanism?

While I already outlined the neo-Lockean position in Chapter 1, I will now give Johnston's interpretation of neo-Lockeanism. According to Johnston, "neo-Lockeanism [is the] position that a person at one time is identical with a later person just in case there is a chain of direct mental links uniquely connecting the first mentioned person and the second."⁴² So, "you will exist at a later time just in case you have a unique, and sufficiently close, mental continuer at that time."⁴³ Furthermore, neo-Lockeans claim that "the truths about personal identity have as their necessary and sufficient conditions the holding of relations of mental continuity and connectedness."⁴⁴ In other words, if X and Y are the same person, then there will be some overlapping chain of direct psychological connections uniquely connecting X and Y. Johnston's explication of neo-Lockeanism here is quite similar to the Psychological Continuity Condition given in Chapter 1. In Chapter 1, I claimed that neo-Lockeans believe personal identity consists in psychological continuity. Neo-Lockeans claim that there is psychological continuity if

⁴¹ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 45.

⁴² Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 28.

⁴³ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 28.

⁴⁴ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 209.

and only if there is an overlapping chain of strong connectedness or, as Johnston claims, a chain of direct mental links uniquely connecting two persons.

Additionally, however, Johnston claims neo-Lockeans believe tracing personal identity over time consists in tracing cross-time bundles. Cross-time bundles are "items that persist from one time to another by having distinct phases or distinct partial manifestations of their total reality present at the two times."⁴⁵ Thus, when a person is present at different times, only a partial manifestation (or stage) of the person is present at each time.⁴⁶ For example, right now, my total reality is not present; my personal identity includes experience-memories that I no longer have, beliefs I will form in the future, and so on.

Furthermore, neo-Lockeanism implies that persons can survive periods of non-existence, as well as survive bodily destruction and replacement.⁴⁷ In other words, persons are the sorts of things that can intermittently exist. For example, according to Locke, God could "restore us to a like state of Sensibility in another world, and make us there capable to receive the Retribution he has designed to men, according to the doings in this life."⁴⁸ Similarly, neo-Lockeans evoke thought experiments in which periods of non-existence do not obliterate the person. For instance, Derek Parfit uses the

⁴⁵ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 53.

⁴⁶ It may be helpful to think of worm theory here. The sum of the person is a cross-time worm, but we only see or experience a temporal part of that worm.

⁴⁷ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 56; see, for example, Derek Parfit on teletransportation.

⁴⁸ Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 542.

teletransporter thought experiment in his discussions of personal identity.⁴⁹ According to the teletransporter thought experiment, a technologically advanced device can send a person over a vast distance by creating an exact copy. However, "a passing of a signal from the teletransportation booth to a new destination takes a finite amount of time. During that time, the person who is supposed to survive the process has no bodily or psychological reality."⁵⁰ Because persons can intermittently exist, Johnston claims, they cannot be enduring substances; they must be cross-time bundles that perdure. An enduring substance, which has a power of self-maintenance and persistence, would no longer be persisting or self-maintaining during a period of non-existence.

Cross-time bundles, Johnston claims, perdure rather than endure. Perdurantism is a theory of identity over time that claims "Material objects persist by having temporal parts or stages, which exist at different times and are to be distinguished by the times at which they exist."⁵¹ According to David Lewis, things that perdure "...persist by having different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no part of it is wholly present at more than one time..."⁵² Thus, perduring cross-time bundles are collections (or bundles) of temporal parts which have a particular relation that unifies them. In the case of persons, the identity relation that unifies the temporal-person-parts is psychological

⁴⁹ Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 199.

⁵⁰ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 56.

⁵¹ Harold Noonan, "Identity", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/identity/>>.

⁵² David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, 202.

continuity and connectedness. When there are temporal parts that are psychologically continuous over time, you get a person-bundle.

Now, if something can exist intermittently or perdures, there must be a genidentity relation (read: criterion) that connects the temporal parts broken by intermittence or time. According to the neo-Lockean, what connects the various stages or phases of a person is their psychological continuity. The criterion that we use to determine whether the person is psychologically continuous proceeds as follows: There is psychological continuity if and only if there is overlapping chains of strong connectedness. After determining whether there is overlapping chains of strong connectedness, we can determine whether two temporal parts are part of the same persons. As we stated earlier, X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if and only if X is psychologically continuous with Y. However, Johnston argues that we do not employ neo-Lockean criterion when tracing persons over time—we offload. We do need to determine whether there is overlapping chains of strong connectedness; thanks to offloading, we just know when a person is the same. Now, one might ask, what sorts of things can we offload onto?

According to Johnston, if we are offloading, we must be offloading onto an enduring substance; only enduring substances have their total essence present at different times and, thus, could determine what it means to have the same thing at those times. Furthermore, if we are offloading, we are tracing something that does not require the use of a criterion (like a cross-time bundle). Thus, if we are offloading, then we are tracing an enduring thing (a substance) and not a perduring thing (a cross-time bundle).

Now, let me summarize the argument thus far. If neo-Lockeanism is true, we are tracing a perduring thing (e.g., a cross-time bundle) when tracing others and our self (*qua*

person). Furthermore, if neo-Lockeanism is true, then it is not the case that we are tracing an enduring substance. However, if we are offloading, then we are tracing an enduring thing—only enduring things have their total reality present at two different times. Thus, if we are offloading when tracing others and our self (*qua* person), neo-Lockeanism cannot be true. According to Johnston, we offload when tracing others and our self. Thus, neo-Lockeanism cannot be true. What has been said thus far may seem a little fast and loose. Before we go on, let me explain a little more about how offloading leads to the failure of neo-Lockeanism.

CHAPTER 3

JOHNSTON'S MAIN CLAIM AGAINST NEO-LOCKEANISM

In the first two chapters of this thesis, I sketched Johnston's main reasons for rejecting neo-Lockeanism. First, Johnston claims that offloading implies that we are tracing enduring substances, rather than perduring cross-time bundles. Second, Johnston claims that the mutual availability of persons—or offloading—implies that we are not using a criterion when tracing others or our self. According to Johnston, however, neo-Lockeanism requires persons to be perduring cross-time bundles that we trace with a criterion.

Now, I would like to discuss the first of Johnston's main reasons for rejecting neo-Lockeanism. Subsequently, I will discuss Johnston's second reason for rejecting neo-Lockeanism. I will then argue that we should not accept these two interrelated claims. Finally, I will respond to my argument on behalf of Johnston. As it will turn out, however, even if we accept both of Johnston's main claims, Johnston must still prove that we trace *persons* by offloading.

The Implications of Offloading

First, Johnston claims, "If we are offloading, then contrary to Locke's suggestion, we are in fact tracing substances, or more generally what I once called enduring things, and not bundles of remembered acts and experiences that make up Lockean or neo-

Lockean persons."⁵³ If neo-Lockeanism were true, we would be tracing perduring things; if we are offloading, however, we are tracing enduring things. When offloading, a substance presents itself to our visual system, and we save cognitive labor by offloading the question of persistence onto the substance itself. In the case of perduring things, however, one cannot offload the question of persistence. Why, one might ask, can we not offload onto something that perdures?

According to Johnston, perduring cross-time bundles do not settle what it means to have the same thing again. When a particular phase of a cross-time bundle catches our attention, "there is nothing in that phase which itself selects one cross-time bundle from a host of others as the bundle to which it belongs."⁵⁴ According to Johnston, phases of a cross-time bundle can be bundled in a variety of ways—each of which are equally reasonable.⁵⁵

In order to see a phase of a cross-time bundle as a phase of a cross-time bundle, one must already have some conception or genidentity condition in mind when the phase is present. There is nothing in the phase itself, according to Johnston, which tells us it is part of one particular cross-time bundle rather than another. According to Johnston, "there is no such thing as *the* bundle we are attending to; there are many such bundles as

⁵³ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 51.

⁵⁴ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 55. I am not convinced that Johnston's claim is true. *Prima facie*, there could be a variety of special cross-time bundle unifiers. For example, the laws of nature, causation, or some other relation could bundle phases together. For example, my thoughts, memories, emotions, and intentions have unique causal connections that cannot hold between my memories and another person's emotions.

⁵⁵ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 55.

there are genidentity conditions to apply to the phases."⁵⁶ So, even if there is a cross-time bundle unifier, we must already have it in mind when we are attending to the bundle; if we did not, we could bundle the temporal parts in a number of different ways.

On page 55, Johnston gives an example of Governor Corzine's car crash. According to Johnston, the only way we can know what bundle of which the crash is a phase is if we have a particular genidentity condition in mind relating the crash to a bundle. Take, for example, the fact that Corzine's crash was part of the bundle that is the history of New Jersey.⁵⁷ According to Johnston, we "can only have seen or witnessed [the crash] as an event in the history of New Jersey if [we] had some conception of what it would take for an event to be bundled into the history of New Jersey."⁵⁸ After all, Johnston states, "the very same event was also an even in the history Corzine's administration, and in the history of the United States...and so on and so forth."⁵⁹ Thus, according to Johnston, there is no such thing as *the* bundle we are attending to; there are many bundles of which an event or phase can be part. A phase itself, Johnston claims, does not settle what bundle the phase is a part of. Therefore, we need a genidentity

⁵⁶ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 56.

⁵⁷ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 55.

⁵⁸ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 55

⁵⁹ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 55.

relation in mind to connect phases to a bundle; without a genidentity relation, there are innumerable bundles of which a phase can be part.⁶⁰

I take it that Johnston is making something similar to the following claims. Assume we trace cross-time bundles in the case of personal identity. Now, a Buddhist might claim that the Dali Lama is the same person as many human animals who suffered their biological death in the past. An animalist, on the other hand, would claim that the current Dali Lama is a different person than the previous Dali Lamas because each Dali Lama is a different human animal. According to the neo-Lockean, we determine whether a Dali Lama at one time is the same person as a Dali Lama at a later time through psychological continuity and connectedness. Each individual mentioned (the Buddhist, animalist, and neo-Lockean) has a different genidentity condition (phase to bundle unifier) in mind when connecting a stage of the Dali Lama to the Dali Lama bundle. Furthermore, if an individual did not have a genidentity condition in mind, Johnston claims, they would not be able to determine what bundle the stage is part of; this leads us to the second, but closely related, claim.

⁶⁰ Here, I think Johnston is being uncharitable; the bundle theory of persons claims that persons just are their properties, relations, tropes, or some other fundamental entities. These entities, the bundle theorists's claim, have a particular relation that unifies them—that makes them cohesive. For example, Neo-Lockeans claim that if person x and person y are the same person, there is psychological continuity and connectedness between their memories, emotions, intentions, and so on. Continuity and connectedness, the neo-Lockean might claim, is a *special kind of relation* that does not and cannot hold between temporal parts that do not belong to the same bundle. Thus, the neo-Lockean might claim, there may be other bundle unifiers, but there is only one reasonable unifier that can come to mind—and it does so intuitively.

The Failure of Neo-Lockeanism

As I mentioned in the previous Chapter (and Chapter 1), neo-Lockeans hold that psychological continuity and connectedness give us the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity.⁶¹ Furthermore, I noted that neo-Lockeans claim persons are cross-time bundles or successions (perduring things); in other words, at each time a neo-Lockean person is present, only a partial manifestation of that person's total reality will be present.

Now, in order to know if a stage or partial manifestation of a person at t_n is part of some neo-Lockean person, Johnston claims, one would have to employ a criterion to connect the partial manifestation at t_n to partial manifestations at t_1 , t_2 , and so on (where t_n , t_1 , t_2 , etc. are times). According to neo-Lockeans, the criterion for personal identity comes in the form of psychological continuity and connectedness.⁶²

According to Johnston, if we are not using (or cannot use) the neo-Lockean criterion for tracing persons over time, but we can trace persons nevertheless, neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity fail. Johnston is claiming that neo-Lockeanism requires the employment of a criterion to trace persons. Without a criterion, the phases of a bundle are not cohesive; without a criterion, there is an infinite number of bundles of which a phase can be part.⁶³ Since, according to Johnston, we are offloading, we are not using a criterion to trace persons. Thus, neo-Lockeanism cannot be true.

⁶¹ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 209.

⁶² Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 48; Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 205-207

⁶³ See footnote 58.

According to Johnston, we can be agnostic about what a person's persistence consists in and still trace persons.⁶⁴ Neo-Lockean persons, on the other hand, require that we are not agnostic about what a person's persistence consists in. Neo-Lockean persons are cross-time bundles; if we remain agnostic about what a cross-time bundle's persistence consists in, then we can only be aware of the present, partial manifestation of that cross-time bundle.⁶⁵ In other words, if we are not using a neo-Lockean criterion for tracing persons, "Neo-Lockeanism leaves us without a way to get to see the persons around us as persisting persons, rather than as their short-lived stages or stand-ins. And yet, without relying on a criterion, we are indeed seeing and thinking of the persons around us as persisting persons."⁶⁶

Objections

To respond, even if we are not using or cannot use necessary and sufficient conditions (a criterion) for tracing persons over time, there may still be necessary and sufficient conditions for tracing persons (and for personal identity in general). Secondly, it could be that we are using conditions unknowingly, and, in addition, it could merely appear that we are offloading.

First, consider a case in which there may still be a criterion for x even if we are not or cannot use a criterion when considering x. Take morality as an example. We sometimes act morally without considering the necessary and sufficient conditions for what makes an action morally right. However, most individuals would not say that moral

⁶⁴ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 45.

⁶⁵ Refer back to Corzine's car crash.

⁶⁶ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 78.

theory M is false just because we can act morally without considering the criterion for M. Consider, for example, utilitarianism. Assume there is a world in which an action is morally right if and only if it produces the greatest utility for the greatest number. Furthermore, assume that individuals act morally on a regular basis. Finally, assume the majority of individuals who act morally do not consider or think about what makes an action morally right and do not have the mental capacities for employing utilitarian reasoning when acting. In other words, individuals act morally, but they do not and cannot consider any moral theory (a set of necessary and sufficient conditions or criterion) when they are acting; the individuals just “know”⁶⁷ whether an action is moral. Now, one might ask, are there any inconsistencies in the above assumptions?

Prima facie, there are no inconsistencies; not bringing a set of utilitarian necessary and sufficient conditions to bear does not seem to necessitate the falsity of utilitarianism. In other words, not employing the necessary and sufficient conditions does not entail that those necessary and sufficient conditions do not tell us what is true in the case of morality. Utilitarianism could be true without us knowing—or being able to know—whether, why, or how it is true.

On the other hand, the assumptions made above may not be analogous to offloading in the case of persons. Furthermore, even if the story is analogous, there may be a problem with the assumptions that I cannot see. Third, Johnston may simply say “so much the worse for most moral theories.” So, for the sake of charity, assume Johnston would claim either that our story about morality is disanalogous to personal identity, there

⁶⁷ I am using “know” very loosely here; the beliefs of these individuals will be true, but it is not clear whether they are justified in those beliefs.

is an inconsistency in the assumptions of our analogy, or we should reject ethical theories that do not correlate with how people actually reason when acting morally.

Second, consider the possibility that we are using a neo-Lockean criterion unknowingly.⁶⁸ The human brain is obviously complex, and very few of its processes are well understood. Furthermore, it is common for the human brain to, unwittingly, draw conclusions from complex problems.⁶⁹ So, for the sake of argument, assume we are biologically selected to intuit when a person persists over time without needing to explicitly consider or employ any necessary and sufficient conditions for cross-time identity. According to Johnston, if we are not employing a neo-Lockean criterion when tracing persons, neo-Lockeanism fails. On the other hand, if we are employing a neo-Lockean criterion unwittingly, neo-Lockeanism would not fail and it could simply appear as if we are offloading.

According to Johnston, on the other hand, if we are employing a criterion for personal identity unwittingly, "then it ought to be possible to clearly articulate [the] implicit principle [being used unwittingly], say by the method of [coming up with, and responding to, real and imagined] cases."⁷⁰ When using the method of cases, we, first, attempt to make the implicit principles of personal identity explicit. After, we are left with a set of competing accounts of personal identity. Finally, we evaluate the competing

⁶⁸ See Ron Mallon's question; Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 83.

⁶⁹ Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); K. E. Stanovich, "Balance in Psychological Research: The Dual Process Perspective," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 27 (2004): 357-358.

⁷⁰ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 83. Hereafter I will refer to the method of coming up with, and responding to, real and imagined cases as the "method of cases."

accounts based on intuitions resulting from real and imagined cases. If we are using a criterion unwittingly, we ought to be able to determine what this criterion is through our intuitive reactions to thought experiments.

However, "the method of cases seems in some contexts to favor the bodily criteria, in others the neo-Lockean criteria, and in still others contexts we can be induced to react as if we were tracing 'bare loci' of consciousness that can survive any amount of bodily and psychological discontinuity."⁷¹ In other words, the method of cases does not favor any particular account of personal identity. According to Johnston, the best way of explaining why intuitions do not converge with one set of conditions is that "we are operating with an evidential criteria or *de facto* reliable signs of personal identity and...not metaphysically sufficient conditions for identity."⁷² Since we cannot make the criterion for personal identity explicit, we are probably not using a criterion; we are probably relying on the signs and evidence provided by offloading.

What if We Accept Johnston's Main Claim(s)?

As I will now argue, even if we accept Johnston's claim that tracing persons by offloading leads to the falsity of neo-Lockeanism, Johnston still fails to give a sound argument against neo-Lockeanism. Even if we accept that offloading and neo-Lockeanism are incompatible, Johnston must prove that we are offloading when we are tracing *persons*.

⁷¹ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 83.

⁷² Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 83.

CHAPTER 4

JOHNSTON'S ARGUMENT AGAINST NEO-LOCKEANISM

Now, I will outline what I call the "Same Mind Argument." I will then reject one of the premises of this argument. In the following section, I will present empirical evidence in support of my objection and give justification for the objection I advance.

The Same Mind Argument

On pages 47-49 of *Surviving Death*, Johnston gives a summary of the Same Mind Argument. Most Lockeans and neo-Lockeans correlate sameness of person with sameness or continuity of mind, consciousness, or psychology. Johnston believes that "same mind" can point to two different situations; it can amount to the same stream of consciousness or the same mental bed in which a stream of consciousness flows.⁷³ Johnston's argument against both of these possibilities proceeds as follows.

1. Assume we trace others and our self (*qua* person) with the criterion "numerically the same mind, therefore, numerically the same self."
2. Sameness of mind amounts to either the continuity of a stream of consciousness or tracing consciousness back to the mental bed in which a stream of consciousness flows.
3. Assume sameness of mind amounts the continuity of a stream of consciousness.

⁷³ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 47-8.

4. If 3, anyone able to trace persons must employ some continuity criterion (e.g., Lockean or neo-Lockean) to determine whether a streams of consciousness at one time is identical to a stream of consciousness at another time.

5. Very young children are able to trace persons.⁷⁴

6. However, very young children cannot employ a continuity criterion when tracing others or their self (*qua* person).⁷⁵

7. Therefore, some cannot use a continuity criterion (e.g., Lockean or neo-Lockean) to connect instances of a stream of consciousness.

8. Therefore, we are not tracing sameness of mind by tracing the continuity of a stream of consciousness.

9. Assume we trace minds by tracing consciousness back to a mental bed.

10. If 9, "sameness of mind appears as a manifest fact" when tracing ourselves; "in the case of others, it is a fact correlated with numerical sameness of body, where sameness of body is made available by offloading."

11. On the other hand, there is the conceptual possibility of this self being resurrected with a numerically distinct body.

12. Therefore, we cannot trace minds by tracing them back to a mental bed (because we must correlate it with sameness of body, which fails if bodies and consciousness are conceptually distinct).

⁷⁴ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 48, 51, 59, and 211.

⁷⁵ Johnston also mentions young "I"-users in his argument, but it is not important for our current purposes; the objections that follow will apply to both "I"-users and person-traces.

13. Reject 1.⁷⁶

I am going to accept the first two premises of the argument as non-controversial; here, the mind is considered akin to one's stream of consciousness (or mental events). To trace this stream, one must make connections between the different events of the stream or trace the stream's events to the same origin.⁷⁷ For our current purposes, we will ignore the latter half of the disjunction. Why, one might ask, would we ignore the latter half of the disjunction?

A brief history of the neo-Lockean tradition will show us why neo-Lockeanism is not compatible with tracing consciousness back to a mental bed.⁷⁸ First, in the famous cobbler and prince thought experiment, John Locke showed how personal identity does not always follow bodily identity. According to Locke's famous example, the consciousness of a prince and cobbler are swapped.⁷⁹ In other words, the prince's consciousness is transferred into the cobbler-body, and the cobbler's consciousness is transferred into the prince-body. According to Locke, when the consciousness of the prince is transferred into the cobbler-body, the cobbler-body person becomes the same person as the prince.

⁷⁶ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 47-48.

⁷⁷ This paper is only concerned with the former, so I will ignore the possibility of tracing a stream back to a mental bed.

⁷⁸ While I claim that neo-Lockeanism is not (historically) compatible with the later half of the disjunction, Parfit has recently taken a view that could be made compatible with tracing a stream of consciousness back to its mental bed. See Derek Parfit, "We Are Not Human Beings," *Philosophy*, 87, no. 1 (2012): 5-28. Furthermore, the narrowest version of the Psychological Continuity Criterion—where there must be a normal cause rather than any cause—may also be compatible with the latter half of the disjunct.

⁷⁹ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 340.

Second, neo-Lockeanism has a long tradition of thought experiments similar to those advanced by Locke.⁸⁰ For example, Derek Parfit uses the teletransporter thought experiment in his discussion of personal identity.⁸¹ In the thought experiment, a technologically advanced device makes an exact copy of an individual and transports that individual across a vast distance. After teletransportation, the copy has all the emotions, intentions, memories, character, and physical properties of the original, but it is made up of different matter. The mental beds are different, but the teletransported person and the person who comes out of the teletransporter are, according to the neo-Lockean view, the same person.⁸²

As we can see from the thought experiments of Locke and Parfit, having the same mental bed is not a necessary condition of neo-Lockean personal identity—though it may be sufficient. While a neo-Lockean can be a materialist about the mind, and, thus, claim that a person will always have the same brain and body (or mental bed), neo-Lockeanism holds that personal identity is defined in terms of psychological continuity. In other words, neo-Lockeans do not claim that the mental bed is the seat of personal identity; they claim that psychological continuity tells us when a person persists. In both Locke and Parfit's thought experiments, the mental bed changes. The mental bed of the prince is within the cobbler-body, and the mental bed of the teletransported individual is within the copy. In both cases, the mental bed changes, but the person stays the same.

⁸⁰ Johnston believes that Lockean thought experiments are problematic; see, for example, Mark Johnston, "Human Beings," *Journal of Philosophy* 84, (1987); more on this in Chapter 6, Section II.

⁸¹ Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, 199-217.

⁸² At least according to the widest interpretation of the Psychological Continuity Criterion where there can be any cause.

Furthermore, consider an individual who has undergone complete amnesia.⁸³

According to neo-Lockeans, an individual who undergoes complete amnesia is a different person from the individual prior to complete amnesia. The stream(s) will have the same mental bed, but the stream(s) would not have any connectedness to the past. Complete amnesia results in a lack of psychological continuity and connectedness. Thus, if we are going to defend neo-Lockeanism, we must defend the claim that we trace persons by tracing the continuity of a stream of consciousness.

Next, according to premise 4 of the Same Mind Argument, if one is tracing others and their self by tracing a stream of consciousness, one must employ a criterion when making connections between a stream at t1 and a stream at t2. Now, one might ask, what exactly is one connecting when tracing a stream of consciousness?

A stream of consciousness is constituted by thoughts, memories, beliefs, and other psychological events. If a person's persistence and identity are determined by the continuity and connectedness of a stream of consciousness, then the thoughts, memories, beliefs, and other psychological events will determine the persistence and identity of a person. In other words, to trace a person over time, one must make connections between the thoughts, memories, beliefs, and other psychological events at one time (t1) to those at another time (t2). If there is a unique chain of psychological connections (or strong connectedness) between the states at t1 and t2, then the stream(s) of consciousness at t1 and t2 belong to the same person. However, determining whether there is a unique connection (or strong connectedness) requires the relevant data and criterion. One cannot

⁸³ By "complete amnesia," I mean the loss of all psychological connectedness with any past persons; the brain is *completely* wiped. I am not sure that there actually are any cases of complete amnesia, but it is not hard to imagine.

just “know” whether there is strong connectedness between a person at one time and a person at another time.

On the other hand, Johnston claims, such a criterion is not used and, in some cases, cannot be used. According to Johnston, Lockean and neo-Lockean criteria are too complex for some individuals who trace persons. For instance, Johnston claims, young children trace persons, but it is impossible that they are using a neo-Lockean criterion. On page 81 of *Surviving Death*, for example, Johnston cites the work of Onishi, Baillargeon, and Leslie as evidence for the claim that we are attending to persons at very early ages.⁸⁴

However, Johnston is wrong to assume (in premise 5) that very young children are tracing others and their self in a sense that is relevant. Very young children do not appear to understand the mental aspects of their self or others—which are an important aspect of the person—at these early ages, so it is impossible that they are tracing the person. According to this line of reasoning, young children are not tracing persons; young children are tracing the human object.

The little evidence that Johnston uses to support this claim is not conclusive. Onishi, Baillargeon, and Leslie claim that infants “have some expectations about how others should engage in pretense.”⁸⁵ Whether such findings should lead to the conclusion that infants trace others and their self in the relevant sense (qua person), on the other hand, is not clear. Kristine H. Onisi, Renee Baillargeon, and Alan M. Leslie note that

⁸⁴ Kristine H. Onisi, Renee Baillargeon, and Alan M. Leslie, “15-Month-Old Infants Detect Violations in Pretend Scenarios,” *Acta Psychologica*, 124 (2007): 106-128.

⁸⁵ Kristine H. Onisi, et al., “15-Month-Old Infants Detect Violations in Pretend Scenarios,” 123.

young children “will interpret appropriate motion patterns even in inanimate objects as goal-directed...”⁸⁶ If infants have similar expectations of both inanimate objects and people, it is equally plausible that infants just assume humans are a special type of object—an animate object.

The empirical evidence that I will present in the next chapter suggests that very young children are tracing the human object. While tracing the human object may usually be good enough (read: as good as tracing the person), a neo-Lockean does not have to accept that tracing the human object equates to tracing the person. Thus, a neo-Lockean could argue that the youngest "person" tracers are tracing something other than the person. So, while this argument is valid, it is unsound. Premise 5 of the argument wrongly assumes that very young children are tracing others and their self *qua* person. Empirical evidence, on the other hand, suggests that very young children are tracing the human object, which would not discount the truth of neo-Lockeanism. Later in life, however, children do seem to be using the neo-Lockean criterion when tracing persons.

⁸⁶ Kristine H. Onisi, et al., “15-Month-Old Infants Detect Violations in Pretend Scenarios,” 107.

CHAPTER 5

REJECTING JOHNSTON'S ARGUMENT

As you can see, the Same Mind Argument assumes that very young children are tracing others and their self *qua* person; I will argue that this assumption is false. Before I lay out the objection, however, I will present some empirical evidence in support of the objection. According to the studies I will present, children at very young ages are not tracing their self (or others) *qua* person; they are tracing themselves (and others) *qua* human object. As children get older, they begin to trace their self (and others) *qua* person.

After presenting the relevant studies, I will show how this empirical evidence supports the objection I briefly touched upon in Chapter 4. I want to be clear, however, that this empirical evidence is not beyond question. I am merely presenting evidence that suggests Johnston's argument is inconclusive and that some of his assumptions are, at the very least, contentious. In Chapter 6, I will reply on behalf of Johnston, and respond to the reply.

The Empirical Evidence from Developmental Psychology

The Development of Self-Understanding

To begin, "The Development of Self-Understanding from Infancy Through Adolescence," written by William Damon and Daniel Hart, surveys and provides a chronology of empirical research on self-understanding. According to a number of the

surveyed works, there is a defining of the self through physical and categorical features at very early ages.⁸⁷ Citing J. Broughton, Damon and Hart say that "in early childhood, the self is conceived strictly in physical terms. In other words, the self is believed to be part of the body."⁸⁸ At these stages, the child associates what it is, what persists over time, with its body, physical characteristics, and the like. Damon and Hart claim that from infancy through early childhood, young children trace sameness through physical features and distinctness through actions, physical features, and their name.⁸⁹

At later stages of development, on the other hand, children "begin to understand the mental and volitional aspects of self on their own terms," removed from the body; "children [at around 8] begin to distinguish between mind and body."⁹⁰ During late childhood, according to the studies surveyed by Damon and Hart, continuity is asserted based on body and psychological attributes, and psychological attributes emerge as a criterion for distinctness.⁹¹ During late childhood, children begin to use psychological conditions for distinguishing themselves from others. For example, a 10-year-old boy discussed in the survey said, "I am one of a kind... there could be a person who looks like

⁸⁷ William Damon and Daniel Hart, "The Development of Self-Understanding from Infancy Through Adolescence," *Child Development*, 53, no. 4 (Aug., 1982): 845-59; Citing Amsterdam (1972); Broughton (1978); Dixon (1957); Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979); Selman (1980).

⁸⁸ Damon and Hart, "The Development of Self-Understanding," 849.

⁸⁹ See table 1 in Damon and Hart, "The Development of Self-Understanding," 851 citing Amsterdam (1972); Broughton (1978); Dixon (1957); Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979); Selman (1980) and others.

⁹⁰ Damon and Hart, "The Development of Self-Understanding," 852.

⁹¹ See table 1 in Damon and Hart, "The Development of Self-Understanding," 851 citing Guardo and Bohan (1971); Broughton (1978).

me or talks like me, but no one has every single detail I have. Never a person who thinks exactly like me."⁹² The 10-year-old boy appears to be claiming that his thoughts differentiate him from others. So, it seems like very young children are merely tracing the human objects that they are during their early stages of development and begin tracing consciousness or psychology after they develop an ability to do so.

"Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children"

Second, in a paper titled "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children," Carol J. Guardo and Janis Beebe Bohan asked 116 children from ages 6 to 9 questions regarding their humanity, sexuality, individuality, and—most importantly—their continuity (or being the same person across time). Guardo and Bohan set out to study these characteristics because they believed that (at least) one of them would be necessary, but possibly not sufficient, characteristics of a sense of self-identity.⁹³ Each child was interviewed by asking a series of question based on a methodology developed through extensive construction and piloting.⁹⁴ Specifically, children were asked 3 questions about their continuity into the future—one regarding continuity into the past, one about continuity into the near future, and one about continuity into the distant future.⁹⁵

⁹² Damon and Hart, "The Development of Self-Understanding," 852 quoting Broughton (1978).

⁹³ Carol J. Guardo and Janis Beebe Bohan, "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children," *Child Development*, 42, no. 6 (Dec., 1971): 1910.

⁹⁴ Guardo and Bohan, "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children," 1912.

⁹⁵ The answers to these questions should not be taken as conclusive evidence; however, their answers to these questions match the conclusions of others.

According to Guardo and Bohan, when asked about their identity into the near-future, younger children claimed their names or other physical characteristics were the reasons for their persistence.⁹⁶ When asked about their continuity into the past, younger children were more likely to answer that they were not the same because they were different from babies.⁹⁷ Finally, when asked about the continuity into the remote future, younger children were more likely to answer that they would not be the same person because of physical growth, name change (from marriage), and the like. *Prima facie*, these children are correlating themselves with the human object that they are; these children are identifying the thing persisting over time as an object with certain physical characteristics, and their name picks that object as a referent.

Older children in the study, however, cited that they would remain the same despite knowing more, being smarter, and other cognitive growth. Older children cited physical appearance, feelings, attitudes, roles, and behaviors as reasons for their persistence into the past, near future, and distant future.⁹⁸ At later stages, children were making connections between their feelings now and their feelings in the future, their attitudes now and their attitudes in the future, and so on.

Understanding Early Adolescent Self and Identity

In the introduction to *Understanding Early Adolescent Self and Identity*, Thomas M Brirthaupt and Richard P. Lapka provide a review of research done on pre-adolescent

⁹⁶ Guardo and Bohan, "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children," 1918.

⁹⁷ Guardo and Bohan note that this response was more prevalent in young boys.

⁹⁸ Guardo and Bohan, "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children," 1919-20

self and identity development as well as other research being done on the self. Most importantly, Brirthaupt and Lapka review some of the research related to cognitive changes during pre-adolescence. For example, citing M. Lewis, they note that it is not until around 15-to-18-months of age that the initial aspects of self-awareness and self-consciousness are recognizable.⁹⁹

Citing M. Rosenberg, Brirthaupt and Lapka claim that there is a "shift from an emphasis on the social exterior to an emphasis on the psychological interior" from early to late childhood.¹⁰⁰ According to Rosenberg, young children think of the self in terms of overt external dimensions such as features of the body, activities, and possessions. Older children, on the other hand, think of the self in terms of psychological or internal dimensions, such as attitudes. Rosenberg argues that "the self-description and self-perceptions of the child change from the primary visual and observable to a more abstract and conceptual trait system."¹⁰¹ As children reach a certain age, they shift from a focus on external identification to internal (psychological) identification.

Five Levels of Self-Awareness

⁹⁹ Guardo and Bohan, "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children," 2; citing Lewis (1990)

¹⁰⁰ Thomas M. Brirthaupt and Richard P. Lapka, *Understanding Early Adolescent Self and Identity*, (New York: SUNY press, 2002), 3, referencing Rosenberg (1986).

¹⁰¹ Brirthaupt and Lapka, *Understanding Early Adolescent Self and Identity*, 3; M. Rosengerg, "Self-Concept From Middle Childhood Through Adolescence." in J. Suls and A.G. Greenwald (ed.), *Psychological Perspectives on the Self*, 3 (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), 106-135.

However, it seems that children do begin identifying their self and others at earlier stages. So, one might ask, can young children use sufficient conditions to identify their self and others? I think there is reason to believe that the answer is yes.

For instance, in a paper researching the various levels of self-awareness, Philippe Rochat observed that children begin to grasp the *temporal* aspect of the self at around 3. Focusing on mirror-style self-recognition tests (in which tests are conducted to determine whether a child can recognize itself in a mirror, photos from the past, etc.), Rochat claims there are 5 levels of self-awareness. As early as 2-months-old, children begin to situate themselves amongst other objects that surround them. Then, at around 2-years-old, children begin to understand themselves as distinct entities. However, it was not prior to 3 that children begin to grasp their temporal dimensions. For example, Rochat says, "The careful empirical work of Povinelli and colleagues on delayed self-recognition shows that it is not prior to approximately 3 years that children *begin* to grasp the temporal dimension of the self."¹⁰²

Now, while there is not much empirical work telling us when children develop the ability to use sufficient conditions, tracing the self over time seems to develop at a time when it would be reasonable to assume children can use complex criteria to draw conclusions. For example, Rochat claims,

By the time young children begin to express and recognize themselves as enduring entities, they also begin to show major advances in their understanding of others. By 4–5 years, children begin to be capable of holding multiple representations and perspectives on objects and people. They can for example

¹⁰² Philippe Rochat, "Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life," *Consciousness and Cognition*, 12 (2003): 727 (my emphasis); referencing Povinelli (1996).

infer the particular age, relative sentience, temperament, and emotionality of a person by merely looking at the quality of a simple drawing.¹⁰³

Presumably, these children are using criteria when looking at the simple drawing to make inferences about the person who drew it. The drawing does not itself have the qualities of the artist; the child must infer the qualities using the data presented and some set of criteria relating the data to the conclusions they reach.

Justifying My Objection

Thus, a neo-Lockean could accept Johnston's claims about offloading but reject the claim that we are tracing persons when doing such. When "offloading," a neo-Lockean could claim, we are tracing the human object rather than the person. To trace persons, however, we must use a continuity criterion. In the case of young children (Johnston's primary example), the empirical evidence suggests that they are tracing their self (and others) *qua* human object. As children get older, however, they appear to be tracing their self (and others) *qua* psychological continuity and connectedness. Furthermore, children appear to be able to use criteria to reach conclusions (about people) at around the same time they begin tracing themselves temporally.

As I noted earlier, premise 5 of the Same Mind Argument assumes that young children are tracing others and their self *qua* person; however, the empirical evidence presented above suggests that young children are not actually doing so. For example, according to Damon and Hart, "in early childhood, the self is conceived strictly in physical terms. In other words, the self is believed to be part of the body."¹⁰⁴ Young

¹⁰³ Rochat, "Five levels of self-awareness," 727.

¹⁰⁴ Damon and Hart, "The Development of Self-Understanding," 849.

children appear to be tracing others and their self *qua* human object. Furthermore, according to Guardo and Bohan, most young children claim that their names or other physical characteristics were the reasons for their staying the same over time.¹⁰⁵ *Prima facie*, these children are identifying the thing persisting over time as an object with certain physical characteristics, and their name refers to that object. If children are tracing the human object, then, the neo-Lockean could claim, they are not necessarily tracing the person. If young children are not tracing the person, then Johnston's prime example does not reduce the likelihood of neo-Lockeanism's truth.

As children get older, they begin to cite feelings, attitudes, roles, and behaviors as reasons for persistence.¹⁰⁶ At later stages, children begin making connections between feelings now and feelings in the future, thoughts now and thoughts in the future, and so on. For example, a 10-year-old boy in Damon and Hart's study is quoted saying there is "Never a person who thinks exactly like me."¹⁰⁷ Thus, a neo-Lockean could simply argue that young children are not tracing persons (yet). Young children are tracing the body or human object. Accordingly, premise 5 of the Same Mind argument is false.

¹⁰⁵ Guardo and Bohan, "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children," 1918.

¹⁰⁶ Guardo and Bohan, "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children," 1919-20.

¹⁰⁷ Damon and Hart, "The Development of Self-Understanding," 852 quoting Broughton (1978).

CHAPTER 6

JOHNSTON'S REPLY

Kiddie Dualist Reply¹⁰⁸

One reply that Johnston could offer against the empirical evidence presented above is what I call the “Kiddie Dualist Reply.” In his book *Descartes' Baby*, Paul Bloom argues that we are naturally inclined to believe that bodies and souls/minds are separate;¹⁰⁹ in other words, Bloom believes that we are “kiddie dualists.” According to this line of reasoning, beginning at very young ages, “We are susceptible to a broadly Cartesian view of the self as a ‘bare locus’ of consciousness: an enduring entity, distinct from anything physical, distinct too from any particular mental events, but underlying, sustaining, and unifying such events, simply by being a constant that-to-which-psychological-presentations-are-presented.”¹¹⁰ Even at very young ages, we appear to be interested in the mind of others and are inclined to believe that minds are distinct from bodies.

¹⁰⁸ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 211-212.

¹⁰⁹ Paul Bloom, *Descartes' Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Humans*, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 190.

¹¹⁰ Denis Robinson, “Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival,” in *Oxford Study in Metaphysics*, 3, (ed.), Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 12. See, also, Johnston “Fission and the Facts”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 3 (1989a): 372, and Johnston “Reasons and Reductionism”, *The Philosophical Review*, 101 (1992): 593.

If young children are kiddie dualists, then it is not the case that they are merely tracing the human object. If young children were tracing the human object alone, then they would not be interested in the minds of others. According to Bloom, young children are interested in the mind of others—young children are dualists. What evidence is there for the claim that young children are kiddie dualists?

To begin, babies prefer to look at people's faces above other objects, recognize anger, fear, and happiness, and have expectations about how people will act.¹¹¹

Furthermore, in research that Bloom has done with colleagues, he found that when very young children see one actor help and a second actor hinder, the children expect a third party to approach the one that helped and avoid the one that hindered.¹¹² In other words, young children appear to attribute mental states to actors based on their apparent goals.

So, Johnston could ask, if young children are merely offloading onto the physical bodies of themselves and others to determine persistence, why do they have a peculiar interest in the minds of others? Children's interest in the minds of others seems to indicate that they are kiddie dualists. Children would not be kiddie dualists if they were merely offloading onto the human object; if children are kiddie dualists, it is more likely that they are attempting to offload onto a mental substance or soul that does not exist.

While these examples are quite interesting, I do not think that they conflict with the neo-Lockean account of personal identity. First, Bloom assumes that these examples imply young children have an interest in the minds of others, but looking at faces,

¹¹¹ Bloom, *Descartes' Baby*.

¹¹² Valerie Kuhlmeier, Karen Wynn, and Paul Bloom, "Attribution of Dispositional States by 12-Month-Olds," *Psychological Science*, 14, no. 5 (2003): 402-408.

recognizing emotion, and expecting things to act in certain ways does not prove that children are kiddie dualists. All of these examples could just as easily support the claim that evolution has predisposed us to act in certain ways and to recognize certain things very early on. For example, if very young children knew to avoid anything that causes harm or hinders very early on, they would be more likely to survive into adulthood. Furthermore, looking at faces and recognizing certain facial expressions would have an adaptive advantage; for example, if I tend to look at the faces of others and recognize certain facial expressions, I will recognize familiar individuals more quickly and have the ability to avoid people who may cause me harm. Thus, recognizing facial expressions, looking at faces, and having certain expectations does not mean that children are kiddie dualist or that children are interested in the minds of others.

On pages 200 and 207 of his book, Bloom uses the example of some 4-to-6-year-old children to make a stronger point. For instance, Blooms claims his 6-year-old son Max has a dualistic conception of the world because Max lists seeing, hearing, smelling, and thinking as functions of the brain while listing dreaming, feeling sad, or loving his brother as “things that he does.”¹¹³ Bloom is quick to assume that "he" is referencing Max's soul, but it could just as easily be referring to a holistic account of the person where person is both body and stream of consciousness.¹¹⁴ Max may simply be recognizing that his physical body does not constitute his entire person; for example, the proper functioning of the brain and body is also required. Furthermore, dreaming, feeling

¹¹³ Bloom, *Descartes' Baby*, 200.

¹¹⁴ Gary Fuhrman, "Review: *Descartes' Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human*," *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11, no. 9 (2004): pp. 89–96.

sad, and loving are complicated functions that are difficult for 6-year-old children to comprehend.

In a second example, provided on page 207, Bloom claims that young children "believe that the soul survives the destruction of the body."¹¹⁵ Bloom cites a study conducted by Bering and Bjorklund as evidence for his claim.¹¹⁶ According to the study, 4-to-6-year-olds know that the brain and ears of an anthropomorphized mouse no longer work after death, but over half of the children believed that the mouse's psychological properties (i.e., hunger, thoughts, and desires) would continue. Bloom takes this as evidence of kiddie dualism; in other words, Bloom claims that the kids studied believe that the soul will live on but the body will not. Again, this example is quite interesting, but it does not prove kiddie dualism. By 4-to-6-years-old, children begin to differentiate between self-as-subject and self-as-object; however, their understanding is underdeveloped and incomplete. Yes, over half of the children claimed that the mouse would continue to have psychological properties after it died, but the data could be interpreted in a number of ways. For example, the children could just be making a childish mistake due to their lack of understanding—children do not understand that psychological states cease when the brain stops functioning. The children see the brain and ears as part of the mouse's body, but do not understand that psychological properties depend on the functioning of the brain and body.

¹¹⁵ Bloom, *Descartes' Baby*, 207. Also, see Gery Fuhman's review in the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*.

¹¹⁶ Jesse M. Bering and David F. Bjorklund, "The Natural Emergence of Reasoning about the Afterlife as a Developmental Regularity," *Developmental Psychology*, 40, no. 2 (Mar 2004): 217-233.

Bloom's research, however, seems to indicate that young children attribute mentalistic mediators for the actions of others. For example, in "Attribution of Dispositional States by 12-Month-Olds," Bloom et al. claim "infants are able to interpret actions of an actor on the basis of the actor's previous actions and interactions."¹¹⁷ Furthermore, Bloom et al. claim that "This finding raises the possibility that infants of this age make such interpretations on the basis of the attribution of mental states to actors."¹¹⁸ In the study, Bloom et al. conducted three experiments;

In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- and 12-month-old infants were habituated to computer-animated movies depicting two objects (a square and a triangle), one engaging in helping behavior and one engaging in hindering behavior toward a third object (a ball) that attempted to climb a hill. The infants were then shown two new test movies in which all three objects were present in a new context in which the original goal state did not apply (no hill was present). In one test movie, the ball approached and settled next to its helper, and in the other movie, the ball approached and settled next to its hinderer.¹¹⁹

According to Bloom et al., if the infants looking times differed depending on whether the third object (the ball) approached the helper or hinderer in the second context, then it is possible that the infants interpreted the third object (the ball) as having a disposition of preferring the helper object. The results of the study concluded that the infants looked longer at (and, therefore, preferred) the movies depicting the third object (the ball)

¹¹⁷ Kuhlmeier, et. al., "Attribution of Dispositional States by 12-Month-Olds," 407.

¹¹⁸ Kuhlmeier, et. al., "Attribution of Dispositional States by 12-Month-Olds," 407.

¹¹⁹ Kuhlmeier, et. al., "Attribution of Dispositional States by 12-Month-Olds," 402.

approaching the helper object.¹²⁰ Thus, Bloom et al. concluded, it is possible that the infants interpreted the third object (the ball) as having a mentalistic disposition of preferring the helper (because it helped the ball to accomplish its goal).

However, it is not clear why looking times should be indicative of attributing mentalistic dispositions. It could just as easily be argued that the baby looked longer at (and, therefore, preferred) when the third object approached the helper because the infant itself preferred when the third object completed its “goal.” Additionally, in the study, after the helper in the first computer-animated movie approached the third object (the ball), the ball would complete a climb up a hill and, then, expand and contract when it reached the top. When the ball was approached by the hindered, the ball would fall down the hill. Then, in a second movie, the ball would approach either helping object or hindering object outside of the hill-climbing context; according to the study, the infants looked longer at the movies depicting the ball approaching the helping object in the second movie. It might be argued, then, that the infant was looking in anticipation of the ball expanding and contracting (partially associating the expanding and contracting with the helper object). Instead, however, Bloom et al. claim that the infants attribute mentalistic dispositions to the ball; this claim, on the other hand, is not well supported.

The Further Problem

Nevertheless, Johnston might claim, there is an additional issue with neo-Lockeanism. According to the objection, neo-Lockeanism is “typically justified largely by appeal to intuitions about the loss or preservation of personal identity in various kinds

¹²⁰ Kuhlmeier, et. al., "Attribution of Dispositional States by 12-Month-Olds," 405.

of real and imaginary cases.”¹²¹ Again, call the type of theorizing that appeals to real and imagined cases “the method of cases.” Johnston claims, “the method of cases seems in some contexts to favor the bodily criteria, in others the neo-Lockean criteria, and in still other contexts we can be induced to react as if we were tracing 'bare loci' of consciousness that can survive any amount of bodily and psychological discontinuity.”¹²² When we come up with real and imagined cases, our intuitions do not converge with one account of personal identity. Our intuitions favor different accounts of personal identity depending on the context of the real or imagined case. Thus, Johnston claims, there is still a problem. Johnston might ask, if neo-Lockeanism is true, why does the method of cases not favor the neo-Lockean view of personal identity? The method of cases seems to suggest that each account of personal identity has its advantages and disadvantages.

Furthermore, according to Johnston, the method of cases leads to a conundrum. The use of the method of cases would only be justified if two conditions were met. First, Johnston claims, “our grasp of the concept of being the same person should be able to be correctly represented as a grasp of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the predicate ‘is the same person.’”¹²³ In other words, if one claims that personal identity can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, then the methodology used should lead to a definition composed of necessary and sufficient conditions. If the methodology does not lead to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, then the methodology is an unreliable source of the definition. Second, the

¹²¹ Robinson, "Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival," 5.

¹²² Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 83.

¹²³ Johnston, "Human Beings," 60.

intuitions that result from method of cases “should be able to be taken as manifestations of our grasp of those necessary and sufficient conditions, and not as overgeneralizations from the everyday run of cases or manifestations of a particular conception of people.”¹²⁴

The method of cases is a methodology that claims real and imagined cases will lead to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity. If the method of cases is supposed to tell us what is true in the case of personal identity, then it must give those necessary and sufficient conditions rather than a general definition that is uninformative.

According to Johnston, because there are many coherent conceptions of people (i.e., bodily continuity, psychological continuity, and the bare loci view), our concept of people is, at best, unspecific.¹²⁵ In other words, the intuitions that result from the method of cases are not a grasp of necessary and sufficient conditions. The intuitions that result from the method of cases are, Johnston claims, “the dry articulation of a vague generality compatible with all the more interesting and specific conceptions that have guided practical life.”¹²⁶ Thus, the method of cases fails the second condition required for its justification. The method of cases cannot tell us what is true in the case of personal identity because it only provides an uninformative, overgeneralized account of personal identity. Why, exactly, does Johnston think that the method of cases leads to overgeneralized and uninformative definition of personal identity?

In both "Human Beings" and *Surviving Death*, Johnston employs thought experiments similar to those presented in Bernard Williams's "The Self and the Future" to

¹²⁴ Johnston, "Human Beings," 60.

¹²⁵ Johnston, "Human Beings," 60.

¹²⁶ Johnston, "Human Beings," 60.

articulate a conundrum.¹²⁷ In "The Self and the Future," Williams gives a hypothetical example in which two people, A and B, take part in an experiment. In the experiment, A and B enter a machine that swaps the information from the two persons's brains. So, at the end of the swap, there is an A-body-person and a B-body-person. According to Williams, "the A-body-person is that person (whoever it is) with whom I am confronted when, after the experiment, I am confronted with that body which previously was A's body," and the B-body-person is the person with whom I am confronted when I am confronted with the body which previously was B's body.¹²⁸ Then, we ask, what do our intuitions tell us in this case? Is the A-body-person now B? Is the B-body-person now A?

Before the procedure, however, we "announce that one of the two resultant persons, the A-body-person and the B-body-person, is going after the experiment to be given \$100,000 while the other is going to be tortured."¹²⁹ Then, we are to suppose that the experimenter tortures the A-bodied-person and gives the \$100,000 to the B-bodied-person. So, what do our intuitions tell us? Williams claims that our intuitions tell us that bodily continuity does not matter—psychological continuity matters; we imagine the B-bodied-person waking up and being lucky to have had their memories transferred from A-body to B-body.

However, if the imagined case is changed slightly, we appear to believe that no amount of psychological discontinuity will matter. Williams asks us to consider a

¹²⁷ For Johnston's own articulation of this conundrum, see the section entitled "The Conundrum" in Johnston, "Human Beings," 65.

¹²⁸ Bernard Williams, "The Self and the Future," *The Philosophical Review*, 79, no. 2 (Apr., 1970): 163.

¹²⁹ Williams, "The Self and the Future," 163.

hypothetical situation where one is told they are going to be tortured tomorrow. If you are told you are going to be tortured tomorrow, you would be (justifiably) frightened and apprehensive.¹³⁰ Then, Williams adds, the person who is going to torture you tells you that you will not remember being told you are going to be tortured; before the torture takes place, something will make you forget the announcement.¹³¹ Still, though, you would be justified in being scared and apprehensive *now*. Then, the torturer adds, “when the moment of torture comes, [you] shall not remember any of the things [you are] now in a position to remember, but will have a different set of impressions of [your] past, quite different from the memories [you] have now;” instead, your memories will exactly fit the past of another person.¹³² Even with this additional information, you would probably be fearful of the impending torture, and (*prima facie*) you would be justified in fearing the torture to come tomorrow. While the psychology of the individual who is tortured tomorrow is different from your psychology now, you still know what is going to happen to the body you presently are—torture.¹³³ This second hypothetical situation leads to the intuition that psychological continuity does not matter. According to Williams, even though all of your memories will be swapped out with another individual, you are still fearful of the impending torture. Even though the person being tortured is psychologically discontinuous with you, you are still fearful of the torture to come.

¹³⁰ Williams, "The Self and the Future," 167.

¹³¹ Williams, "The Self and the Future," 167.

¹³² Williams, "The Self and the Future," 167-8.

¹³³ Williams, "The Self and the Future," 167-8.

According to Johnston, the thought experiments of Williams lead to two conflicting intuitions, as well as an intuition that, taken alone, threatens the neo-Lockean view.¹³⁴ Johnston claims, "The first presentation of Williams's case seems to show that bodily continuity is not necessary for survival, and the second presentation seems to show that psychological continuity is not necessary for survival."¹³⁵ In the first case, you are lead to believe that the A-body person is B because the psychology is swapped. However, in the case of your impending torture, no amount of psychological discontinuity puts you at ease.

Since the intuitions that result from these two cases conflict, we should be skeptical of the reliability of intuition—and, thus, the method of cases.¹³⁶ Johnston asks, "For how can intuition be reliable if we can be got to react so differently to the very same case?"¹³⁷ What is more, the intuition associated with the second presentation threatens neo-Lockeanism because it leads to the intuition that psychological continuity is not necessary for personal identity.¹³⁸ Thus, the thought experiments of Williams threatens both the method by which neo-Lockeanism is commonly defended (the method of cases) and neo-Lockeanism itself. The neo-Lockean, according to this objection, depends on the method of cases, yet the method of cases does not favor neo-Lockeanism; the method of cases does not seem to favor any theory of personal identity.

¹³⁴ Johnston, "Human Beings," 66-7.

¹³⁵ Johnston, "Human Beings," 70.

¹³⁶ Johnston, "Human Beings," 67.

¹³⁷ Johnston, "Human Beings," 67.

¹³⁸ Johnston, "Human Beings," 67.

According to Johnston, his argument should lead to the rejection of the method of cases and, because neo-Lockeanism depends on the method of cases, neo-Lockeanism. Johnston claims that we could rid ourselves of the conundrum produced by the method of cases by beginning our theorizing with the "humble and ubiquitous practice of re-identifying each other over time," rather than theorizing with the method of cases.¹³⁹ In other words, if we start our theorizing with offloading, then we only need to ask what kinds of things can be offloaded onto; from there, we can determine what is true in the case of our identity. If we begin our theorizing with the fact of offloading, our theorizing does not depend on the method of cases as heavily as neo-Lockeanism—though the method of cases can still take a secondary role.

However, it is not clear why this is the only acceptable solution to the conundrum.¹⁴⁰ First, the neo-Lockean could reject the claim that neo-Lockeanism depends on the method of cases as its primary methodology. According to this response, we need to conduct empirical research before more abstract theorizing. On the other hand, it is unclear if whether an empirical investigation will tell us what is true in the case of personal identity. Johnston thinks that we can investigate personal identity by looking at how we trace "persons," but our tracing of others and ourselves may not always be the tracing of persons—this is part of the reason philosophical investigation is necessary.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Johnston, "Human Beings," 63-80.

¹⁴⁰ For an alternative solution, see, Ted Sider, "Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis," *Philosophical Perspectives*, 15 (2001): 189-209.

¹⁴¹ This is one of the reasons reason Parfit uses "criterion of identity over time" to mean what identity necessary involves or consists in rather than our way of telling whether an object is identical; Parfit, *Reasons and Person*, 202.

On the other hand, empirical data is a useful tool, and it should be used when possible. Thus, the neo-Lockean should begin theorizing with empirical research.

Second, the neo-Lockean could claim, the method of cases, as used by Williams and Johnston, does not tell us about personal identity over time—it tells us what we care about in our survival. In normal cases, bodily and psychological continuity do not come apart; in cases where they do come apart, we are obviously going to have confused and inexact reactions. While the method of cases can assist us with philosophical investigation, we must recognize that our intuitive reactions to cases about personal identity may align with what we care about in survival rather than what is true of our identity.

In everyday life, and according to the empirical data, we seem to be tracing the person *qua* psychological continuity along with the human body *qua* object. Because we also trace the human body *qua* object, we can become confused about what it means to be the same person. We have evolved to care about and protect our bodies. Furthermore, our psychological lives depend on our bodies. Thus, it is easy to understand why we would react in the way that we do to cases similar to Williams's. Hypothetical cases can help us to understand our intuitions, beliefs, what we care about, and so on, but bastardized examples will often lead to intuitions that are not relevant to what we are researching. Williams's case, it seems, leads us into a discussion about what we care about rather than what persons are. Williams's second example is used to make us fearful—it elicits an emotional response about what we care about, not a logical response about identity.

Intuition can be reliable, but it is unhelpful in cases where intuitions may align with something other than what is being pursued. In the case of personal identity, our intuitions will commonly align with what we care about rather than what identity consists in. Because intuitions in these cases are not always reliable, I claim that a neo-Lockean should begin with a more scientific approach to personal identity. The neo-Lockean must begin by looking at the empirical data. From there, the neo-Lockean must use a methodology that does not elicit responses regarding what we care about rather than personal identity—we must be scientific about our research, otherwise we will lose sight of the truth.

Thus, like Johnston, the neo-Lockean must look to the empirical data. If the empirical data favors animalism, Johnston's proteanism, the bare loci view, or the no-fact-of-the-matter view, then those will be the more plausible theories. At the moment, however, neo-Lockeanism is plausible, and rejecting it on the grounds that it is commonly justified with the method of cases is, as far as I can see, not an objection to the theory; it is only an objection to either the methodology or the current use of the methodology. It is still an open question whether the method of cases is being misused. It is also an open question whether neo-Lockeanism depends on the method of cases.

CHAPTER 7

THE NEW TASK FOR NEO-LOCKEANS

Johnston's account of offloading sheds light on the road ahead for the neo-Lockean. If neo-Lockeanism is to remain a defensible theory of personal identity, then empirical evidence regarding how we trace persons should be consistent with neo-Lockeanism. If psychological continuity is criterial for personal identity, it would be difficult, though not impossible, to explain how an individual could trace persons without the Psychological Continuity Criterion.

In this chapter, I claim that Johnston's account of offloading misrepresents cognitive scientific data on object tracing. I will look at empirical studies related to offloading and show how this empirical evidence is consistent with neo-Lockeanism. Finally, I will recite another of Johnston's arguments against neo-Lockeanism, and respond on behalf of the neo-Lockean.

Do We Offload onto Persons?

While discussing the metaphysics of personal identity does not necessarily entail a need to relate one's view to the empirical literature, defending a view of personal identity with empirical evidence is always beneficial to a philosopher. Johnston defends his view by citing the empirical evidence of offloading. I have already shown that Johnston's appeal to offloading fails to undermine neo-Lockeanism, but it is important to put things into a broader perspective.

A neo-Lockean can grant Johnston the claim that we could trace the persistence of enduring substances by offloading. Neo-Lockeans, according to Johnston, are only committed to the perdurance of persons, not to the general metaphysical thesis that all persisting things perdure. It is unlikely that a neo-Lockean would do so, but a neo-Lockean could claim that human animals are enduring substances, but persons are not enduring substances. If a neo-Lockean accepted the claim that human animals are enduring substance, it would explain how we could trace individuals by offloading (however, we would not be offloading onto persons). Nevertheless, endurance theories are extremely complex, and attempting to combine the theories of endurance and perdurance would complicate theorizing further. More likely, a neo-Lockean would claim that offloading is consistent with perdurantism.¹⁴² For the present purposes, however, I will simply assume that neo-Lockeans are only committed to the perdurance of persons; after all, persons are the focus of this thesis.

In the case of offloading, a neo-Lockean could claim that we only trace sensory objects when offloading, and persons are not *merely* sensory objects. Conceptual, as well as visual, identification is necessary in the case of persons. Johnston's offloading gives an account how we pre-conceptually identify objects, but this form of identification is not informative when we ask what it means to be the same person.

¹⁴² For example, a neo-Lockean might cite examples of cartoon characters that are made up of a series of stills. These characters, *prima facie*, perdure—they are made up of a bundle of multiple individual pictures or stages. When watching an animation, one does not have an enduring substance to offload onto; yet, we seem to trace animated characters and individuals in our everyday lives in a similar manner.

An Alternative to Johnston's Offloading

In his book *Things and Places* and elsewhere, Zenon W. Pylyshyn proposes a mechanism called the Fingers of Instantiation (or FINST), which, to some degree, mirrors Johnston's account of offloading. FINST theory claims that we have a mechanism of visual indexing, and it is from this mechanism that object-based individuation, tracking, and access is realized.¹⁴³ According to FINST theory, early stages of our visual processing includes a primitive means of individuating a small number of visual objects prior to grasping their properties or locations.¹⁴⁴

The visual system, according to FINST theory, includes a limited number of pointers that mark or index items in the visual field (using one of a limited number of FINSTs); then, after being marked, the items can be traced and accessed quickly and easily for later cognitive operations. In other words, according to FINST theory, the visual system picks out or points to certain patterns or items in a scene, marks those patterns as distinct from the rest of the visual scene, and maintains the identity of those patterns or items.

The visual system, according to Pylyshyn, must include a resource-limited mechanism that allows quick, easy identification of visual objects; without the mechanism postulated by FINST theory, we would not be able to trace items in the

¹⁴³ Brian J. Scholl and Zenon W. Pylyshyn, "Tracking Multiple Items Through Occlusion: Clues to Visual Objecthood" *Cognitive Psychology* 38, 259–290 (1999) p. 261.

¹⁴⁴ Visual objects or proto-objects are items or tokens that catch the attention of the visual system, and the visual system "decides" they should be individuated from the rest of the visual scene or field. Importantly, though, proto-objects are not yet full blown objects. The visual system, in a sense, carves out certain things in the visual field by responding to certain patterns that the FINST mechanism is hardwired to notice.

manner that we do. Pylyshyn claims, we need "...a way to refer to individual things in a scene independent of their properties or their locations. This is precisely what FINSTs provide."¹⁴⁵ For example, one of the reasons FINSTs are necessary is because we can trace multiple (up to 4 or 5) items at once without being aware of their properties. FINSTs provides a way to trace the items in a non-conceptual manner; FINSTs allow us to save cognitive labor while tracing visual objects—and, therefore, trace multiple objects at once. According to Pylyshyn, the tracing done using FINSTs is automatic and non-attentional.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, FINSTs explain why, when tracing visual objects, we do not notice changes in the properties of those items.¹⁴⁷

Speaking of Pylyshyn's theory, Lawrence Shapiro claims, "Just as we can point to the blue jay on the telephone wire and say 'look at that', without having to attribute blueness or jayness to the blue jay (without, arguably, having even to conceive of the blue jay as an object), the objects that the visual system tracks with FINSTs (Pylyshyn calls these objects FINGs) are identified non-conceptually."¹⁴⁸ In other words, the visual objects traced using FINSTs are not represented as objects (*per se*) or as something fitting

¹⁴⁵ Zenon Pylyshyn, *Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 23.

¹⁴⁶ Zenon Pylyshyn, "Multiple Object Tracking," *Scholarpedia*, 2, 10 (2007): 3326.

¹⁴⁷ Zenon Pylyshyn, "Visual Indexes, Preconceptual Objects, and Situated Vision," *Cognition*, 80, (2001): 138.

¹⁴⁸ Lawrence Shapiro, "Review: *Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World*," *Mind*, 472, Vol. 118 (2009): 1169.

in a particular category.¹⁴⁹ Visual objects or FINGs “are just picked out transparently by a causal or informational process without being conceptualized as something or other.”¹⁵⁰

FINSTs, then, point out certain visual stimuli, lump it together into a FING, and files the FING such that it can be accessible to the rest of our cognitive faculties. However, this process takes place at a level unnoticeable to us. Thus, thanks to FINSTs, the visual system can trace visual objects while saving onerous cognitive labor (by tracing them non-conceptually); the visual system does most of the heavy lifting.

Like offloading, then, FINSTs allow us to save cognitive labor while tracing (or identifying and re-identifying) objects. The FINST mechanism, like offloading, allows non-conceptual tracing. However, the things traced using FINSTs are nothing like Johnston’s substances. FINGs, unlike Johnston’s substances, are individuated and traced by our visual system rather than because of their essences. According to FINST theory, the visual system “creates” FINGs and files them for later conceptualization and understanding. According to Johnston, substances present themselves as self-maintaining and persisting. According to FINST theory, however, early vision’s FINGs are quite unstable, being created and overwritten depending on whether attention is allocated to them. Stable, full-blown object representations are dependent on attention as well as other cognitively-relevant factors. According to FINST theory, early vision only has a rudimentary conception of what an object is, one that does not exactly line up with how we experience objects in full-blown perception.

¹⁴⁹ Zenon W. Pylyshyn, *Things and Places*, 56.

¹⁵⁰ Zenon W. Pylyshyn, *Things and Places*, 56.

In addition, unlike in Johnston's account of offloading, the visual system does appear to be using some criteria to make inferences about FINGs and full blown objects. According to FINST theory, the visual system receives input from a visual scene, and, from that input, responds to certain patterns based on its own "criteria"; then, depending on whether anything fits the "criteria," the FINST mechanism marks the patterns responded to and traces the marked FINGs. After such, cognitive faculties are used to categorize and assign properties to the FINGs—eventually leading to full-blown object representations.

Finally, there is no research that I am aware of supporting Johnston's *expanded* theory of vision, which states that the visual system offloads onto things that are (*prima facie*) extra-sensory. It is possible that the essences or powers of substances tell us that objects persist. However, it is not clear how one could empirically verify or falsify Johnston's claims. What would an empirical investigation into substances, essences, powers, and offloading consist in? If we are restricting ourselves to empirically tested and testable theories, then Johnston's account becomes less plausible. So, FINST theory is probably the means by which we "offload" (or trace objects in simple and offhand ways).

The Increasing Implausibility of Johnston's Offloading

There are now three questions that must be addressed. First, if FINST theory were true, would we be justified rejecting Johnston's theory of offloading? Second, are we tracing sensory individuals or visual objects when tracing persons? Third, is there something in addition to a visual object or sensory individual that we must trace in the case of persons?

First, as we saw from the discussion of FINST theory, there are some commonalities between FINSTs and offloading. Both FINSTs and offloading entail that we trace things in “simple” and offhand ways. However, FINSTs and offloading provide alternative accounts of how this offhand tracing is possible. Johnston’s theory of offloading claims that the nature of substances allows us to trace objects in offhand ways; FINST theory claims that the visual system allows us to trace objects in offhand ways.¹⁵¹

Furthermore, Johnston’s theory of offloading claims that the tracing of substances does not involve criteria and is non-inferential. According to FINST theory, however, this is deeply implausible. According to FINST theory, even at early stages, there are criteria and inferential processes used by the visual system to identify, individuate, and trace visual objects.

Moreover, Johnston claims that the tracing of objects depends on the enduring nature of substances—substances present themselves as persisting. According to FINST theory, the visual system is what tells us that an object persists—the visual system individuates and identifies objects. Objects are not presented to the visual system as the full-blown, individuated items. Full-blown objects require attention to be maintained and traced.

Finally, Johnston claims that, because we can offload, substances must endure. FINST theory, however, does not require the additional baggage of endurance; according

¹⁵¹ Note, however, that the process involved in FINST is much more complex than it appears to us. At the cognitive level, it may appear as if we are tracing sense objects in simple and offhand ways, but (in reality) the visual system is going through a very complex process. The process appears simple and offhand because it is taking place automatically, intuitively, and fast; there is no effort, on our part, when the FINST mechanism is at work.

to FINST theory, early vision uses its own criteria to individuate objects pre-conceptually. Even if objects perdure, the visual system could differentiate and trace objects using its own criteria and associative systems. Thus, if FINST theory is true, we are justified in rejecting Johnston's theory of offloading. Furthermore, because FINST theory does not require extra postulates, it is (*prima facie*) more plausible.

Second, are we tracing visual objects when tracing persons? In other words, are persons the type of things that we would expect the visual system to be able to trace in simple and offhand ways? If we assume that materialism is true, then (in a sense) we are only tracing a brain and body when tracing a person. Thus, we might be inclined to claim that we are tracing a visual object. However, when it comes to tracing a person, we also trace a subject. The subject, one might claim, will be fleshed out in terms of functional properties of the brain, mental events, the phenomenal character of experience, or something of the like. However, tracing functional properties of the brain, for example, requires the use of a criterion to determine whether the functional properties of the brain are the same over time.¹⁵² So, *prima facie*, there is something in addition to the sensory object that we must trace in the case of a person. Thus far, however, Johnston can agree with us.

According to Johnston, we trace both the subject and object by offloading. When tracing the object, we trace the human being (or human substance). Then, Johnston says, "although the self [or subject] is not a substance, it can be specified in terms of a unity condition that involves an item—an arena of presence or a consciousness—that *seems* to

¹⁵² For example, my brain and body will not coincide with me after I am dead because my brain will cease to function; on the other hand, my brain and body will be the same objects.

settle its own conditions of identity over time in just the way that a substance does."¹⁵³ However, Johnston is merely speculating, and the burden of proof is on him to show that we attempt to offload when tracing (or attempting to trace) subjects, selves, or arenas of presence. As I have attempted to show, offloading is an implausible means of tracing, and it becomes less plausible because Johnston claims that we also attempt to offload onto something illusory.

Johnston's theory of offloading falls apart when it comes to selves or arenas of presence; in fact, Johnston believes that our attempts to offload onto arenas of presence necessarily fail. According to Johnston, we believe that the subject is a substance we can offload onto; however, the subject is merely intentional. The subject is not actually something we can offload onto. According to Johnston, the implied center of our experience—the arena of presence—is illusory, and we cannot offload onto something that does not actually exist. The necessary failure of offloading in the case of the subject or self should lead us to question whether we are actually attempting to offload in the case of subjects, selves, or arenas of presence. Furthermore, the claim that “offloading” includes or depends upon anything other than the visual system and objects visualized (e.g., essences, powers, arenas of presence) is implausible or, at least, not supported by empirical research.

Finally, the visual object that coincides with the person (i.e., human object) is not itself the person. As I noted, the person also includes a subject, mental functions, and the like—which are (to some extent) non-visual. If the person is not equivalent to the human object, offloading cannot be the means by which we trace persons. However, if we trace

¹⁵³ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 211.

the subject, functional properties of the brain, and the like with a criterion, we can adequately and successfully trace persons; this seems to imply that a criterion-based account of tracing persons is more plausible.

Offloading and the Falsity of Neo-Lockeanism Again

In Chapter 2, I noted that (according to Johnston's interpretation) neo-Lockeans believe persons are cross-time bundles. Furthermore, I stated that offloading onto a cross-time bundle does not settle what it means for a neo-Lockean person to persist. Now that we have outlined an empirically justified view of how we trace (some) objects, it is important that we understand how it causes problems for Johnston's offloading argument against Neo-Lockeanism.

On pages 57-58 of *Surviving Death*, Johnston gives the following argument.

1. "When it comes to a cross-time bundle at a given time, what we can simply see at that time is only a present phase of that cross-time bundle. And when it comes to a (potential) succession of substances at a given time, what we can simply see at that time is a present "stand-in" substance.

2. We can only have a particular cross-time bundle as an object of visual attention and subsequent thought if we see a present phase as a phase of that cross-time bundle. And we can only have a particular (potential) succession of substances as an object of visual attention and thought if we see a present substance as a stand-in for that succession.

3. We can only see a present phase as a phase of a cross-time bundle and we can only see a present substance as the present stand-in of a (potential) succession of

substances if we are employing a cross-time unity condition for the bundle or the succession, that is, if we are not offloading.

4. The Neo-Lockean treatment of persons counts them as either bundles or successions. (This is the best explanation of the fact that the treatment allows for the intermittent existence of something that is not a mere simple.)

5. But particular persons, and not just their present phases or present stand-ins, are objects of visual attention and thought. (Otherwise we could not see persons as persisting, and we could not have them in mind as the persisting objects that they are. Our thoughts and judgments about personal identity would lack determinate content that they do have.)

6. So if the Neo-Lockean treatment of personal identity is correct, then we are deploying cross-time unity conditions for the bundles or the successions that are persons; that is, we are not offloading.

7. We are offloading ([Johnston's] Hypothesis).

8. So, the Neo-Lockean treatment of personal identity is not correct."¹⁵⁴

However, if FINST is the process by which we are able to “offload,” then Johnston’s argument fails.

Now that we have a new account of tracing, we see why Johnston's argument, again, does not falsify neo-Lockeanism. In premises 5, Johnston says, persons "are objects of visual attention and thought."¹⁵⁵ However, a neo-Lockean could claim that the human object (or

¹⁵⁴ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 59-60.

¹⁵⁵ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 60. Johnston says persons here, when he seems to be referring to human objects.

body), rather than the person, is the object of visual attention and thought. The person requires more complex cognitive processes to be attended to and thought of. Furthermore, tracing the human object is not equivalent to tracing the person; tracing the human object may be as good as tracing the person in most cases (in other words, tracing the human object may be good enough), but it is not tracing the person. Furthermore, the neo-Lockean could claim, Johnston's offloading hypothesis (premise 7) is false or, at the very least, contentious.

Consider, for example, the common case of confusing twins. Suppose you have a friend named Tim; Tim has a twin brother named Jim, but you do not know that Tim has a twin brother. One day, when you are walking down a university hallway, you suddenly see someone you think is Tim. You, it seems, have visually offloaded onto the human object presented before you. You “see” Tim in a simple and offhand way. Then, you walk up to who you think is Tim and start chatting about your day. Suddenly, the individual who looks like Tim speaks. He sounds similar to Tim and shares some of his mannerisms, but there is something different. You quickly realize that the *person* you are talking to is not Tim. So, you ask the individual who they are; they tell you “I am Jim.” You then ask Jim whether he has a brother, and Jim tells you he has a twin brother named Tim. How did you come to realize that Jim was not Tim? *Prima facie*, you realized that Jim was not Tim by means of a criterion (or set of criteria). You began by visually tracing Jim *qua* human object in a simple and offhand way—assuming he was Tim—but you quickly realize that Jim was not Tim (perhaps because he does not have the memories of being friends with you, the interests you share with Tim, and so on). Visual tracing failed, so you reverted to a criterion. In most cases, however, visual tracing is good enough. If the human object was, in fact, Tim, you would not revert to a criterion.

Furthermore, the case of twins is rare, and, in these rare cases, there is often an easy remedy such that visual tracing succeeds.

Furthermore, if, as I suggested in section one of this chapter, we take Pylyshyn's FINSTs as the basis for visual tracing and indexing (or “offloading”), then premise 3 of Johnston's argument is false. If, as Pylyshyn claims, we have a visual mechanism that allows us to—non-conceptually—keep track of objects through their various changes and movements, then we could very well be “offloading” in the case of perduring objects. Part of Pylyshyn's research on FINSTs included visual objects that disappeared and reappeared from ones visual field, as well as blinking in and out of existence (something we would only expect from perduring objects).¹⁵⁶ According to Pylyshyn, his experiments “showed that if the objects being tracked...disappear and reappear in certain ways, they are tracked as though they had a continuous existence.”¹⁵⁷ As far as I can tell, enduring objects cannot disappear and reappear—but a perduring object can.¹⁵⁸

On the other hand, Johnston could claim that the objects in Pylyshyn's study still present their total essence at each moment (Johnston’s definition of enduring substances),

¹⁵⁶ For a video demo that includes the disappearance of the visual objects behind occluding bars, see <http://rucss.rutgers.edu/val/images/demos/motococclusionextended.mov> and <http://perception.research.yale.edu/highbeams/Highbeams-E1-RegObjs-Trial.mov>

¹⁵⁷ Zenon W. Pylyshyn, “Perception, Representation and the World: The FINST that Binds,” 28.

¹⁵⁸ Johnston argues that neo-Lockean persons must endure because they can survive periods of intermittence; Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 53-56.

and, thus, are still (like) enduring entities.¹⁵⁹ However, Pylyshyn's study consisted of tracing half of a group of identical objects on a monitor; the half that was supposed to be traced was only differentiated from the rest by causing them to flash (or blink in and out of existence) on the screen at the beginning of the experiment. It is hard to see what the essence that differentiates these items would be.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ However, this would be inconsistent with his claims on Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 53-56.

¹⁶⁰ For video demos of the experiments, see <http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/val/index.php/demos> and <http://www.yale.edu/perception/Brian/demos/MOT-Highbeams.html>.

CHAPTER 8

ALTRUISM, JUSTICE, AND GETTING WHAT ONE DESERVES

Finally, I would like to discuss the general conclusion of *Surviving Death*.

According to Johnston, "if the good and the bad go down alike into oblivion, if there is nothing about reality itself that shores up [the] basic moral differences between [the lives of the good and the bad], say by providing what the good deserve, then the distinction between the good and the bad is less important."¹⁶¹ Johnston claims that if we live a radically altruistic life, a life of agape, we can survive death and receive just retributions for our altruistic lifestyle by surviving death; good individuals will get their just deserts. In this chapter, however, I will argue that Johnston's theory of post-death survival (and justice) is flawed. Given Johnston's account of post death survival, very few, if any, will survive death and receive justice. Johnston believes that reason commands us to live a radically altruistic life. However, biology and common sense lead us to be concerned with our interests, our family's interests, and the interests of those closely linked to us.¹⁶² I am not claiming that selfish concerns are morally right; however, Johnston's account demands an unreasonable—and probably impossible—lifestyle. It is extremely implausible that any *Homo sapiens* can feel and act as if all of humanity is part of their person.

¹⁶¹ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 5.

¹⁶² Steven Luper, "Book Review: *Surviving Death*," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 61, no. 245 (2011): 884-887.

Second, Johnston's theory includes oddities that either detract from Johnston's view or need to be better explained by Johnston. Two such oddities are as follows. First, according to Johnston individuals can "get lucky" on their deathbed and survive on after their biological death—call those who survive in this way the "wicked lucky."¹⁶³ Second, according to Johnston, persons are protean. However, it is unclear how we should assign praise and blame if persons are protean—call this the "protean problem."

Biologically Self-Interested

First, there is considerable evidence suggesting that humans and other animals tend to be self-interested.¹⁶⁴ While we can overcome our self-interest at times, natural inclinations and habit will lead us back to what is biologically advantageous for our individual survival as *Homo sapiens*. A theory of justice that only provides justice to individuals who live radically altruistic lives does not really provide the kind of justice that is important. *Maybe* Mother Teresa, Jesus, Ghandi, and Siddhartha Gautama Buddha can survive death, but even they were (naturally) predisposed to care and have concern for the particular human being that they were. Caring for the particular human being that one is is a starting point for action. However, Johnston claims, "special concern is also, to some extent, under our emotional and rational control. Once we see that the focus and extent of that concern is not justified by any demand outside of the concern itself, we can

¹⁶³ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 370.

¹⁶⁴ For example, see Megan Fredrickson, Doug W. Yu, and Naomi Pierce "Economic Contract Theory Tests Models of Mutualism," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science*, 107, no. 36 (2010): 15715-15716. See, also, Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1976).

use our intellectual and emotional resources to elaborate that concern in different ways."¹⁶⁵

In the comments and replies section of Chapter 5 of *Surviving Death*, Johnston addresses a question regarding concerns similar to my objection. Johnston says, "I do not want it to turn out that goodness is important, but only for the good."¹⁶⁶ According to Johnston, goodness is important because it allows one to see through death. If one is "good enough," according to Johnston, one will find that death "leaves much that is fundamentally important behind."¹⁶⁷ Thus, Johnston claims, the "good-enough" still have something to rejoice in.¹⁶⁸ By simply beginning to see that we are one amongst many who have interests that are equally important, we can recognize that the death of the particular person that we are still leaves behind much of what is important—to be exact, when we die humanity and other individual personalities (who are equally important) live on. Our death, Johnston seems to be suggesting, is insignificant in the grand scheme of things. In other words, if one is good enough, one will begin to recognize the insignificance of the particular individual that one is; then, one can rejoice in the continued flourishing of human kind.

I agree with Johnston that we can overcome our selfish nature at times, and that many of us are good enough (many individuals recognize that we are insignificant in the grand scheme of the cosmos), but most individuals will be led back to the habits of a self-

¹⁶⁵ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 260.

¹⁶⁶ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 375.

¹⁶⁷ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 375.

¹⁶⁸ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 375.

interested life. The individuals driven back to self-interested concern are not driven there because they are bad or undeserving of post-death survival. Many individuals will simply not be able to survive death because they are not in a position to direct their concern in the right sort of ways. Consider, for example, individuals with severe dementia, retardation, or brain trauma. It would not be just if the concern-directing-handicapped (people who cannot understand that everyone is equally important) did not survive death simply because they were unable to direct their concern in the right sorts of ways. According to Johnston's account, individuals unable to direct their concern in the right ways are just out of luck when it comes to surviving death and seeing through death. However, an account that excludes individuals from receiving justice outright—merely because they are not fortunate enough to understand that they are one amongst many who are equally important—is not just.

The Wicked-Lucky

Second, according to Johnston, the difference between the good and the bad is radical altruism, or treating yourself as one amongst many who are equally important. The only requirement of post-death survival (and being good), according to Johnston, is directing one's concern in the right sort of way. However, one might ask Johnston, what are we to say about the mad man, the murderer, or the rapist, who, by a stroke of incredible luck, has concern for all of human kind moments before their death? According to Johnston, it is possible to convert to goodness on ones deathbed; in fact, Johnston says he hopes for it himself.¹⁶⁹ If Johnston can convert to goodness on his deathbed, it is reasonable to assume that others can as well. Call individuals that convert

¹⁶⁹ Mark Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 370.

in goodness on their deathbed the “wicked-lucky.” If those who are undeserving of goodness's ultimate reward can receive the reward (if they can be wicked-lucky), then "both the good and the bad go down alike into oblivion."¹⁷⁰

According to Johnston, however, the wicked-lucky individual and the good are different. According to Johnston, "We need to distinguish between episodic and standing attitudes, and the disposition that is constitutive of identity is a standing attitude, not something that consists in an episode of now wanting to be good."¹⁷¹ If the murderer actually had the standing attitude of goodness, then he is deserving of the ultimate reward. Instead of thinking of the wicked-lucky murderer, rapist, or some other morally repugnant individual as getting lucky, we should think of them as good people who happened to commit a heinous moral wrong. A murderer who *genuinely* includes all of humanity in his concern at the moment of his death, according to Johnston, probably had the standing attitude of radical altruism all along. If the murderer did not have this attitude, then he would not genuinely include all of humanity into his concern.

However, Johnston's response seems *ad hoc* and, in the cases described, absurd. Johnston cites Christianity as analogous to his view; according to Christianity, if an individual genuinely accepts God at the moment of death, then they can reach heaven. Individuals who genuinely accept God or direct their concern toward all of humanity are not doing so because they now, suddenly, want to be good, they do so because they genuinely accept God into their heart or genuinely consider all individuals as equally

¹⁷⁰ Mark Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 5.

¹⁷¹ Mark Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 370.

important. Thus, we have a form of forgiveness included within Johnston's account; even those who commit atrocious wrongs deserve saving/survival.

On the other hand, Johnston's view of forgiveness is not analogous to Christian forgiveness in the sense he wants. According to Johnston, the good survive on through those they have special concern for. Now, let's say that one particular person (call this person "Jesus") has concern for all of humanity. If I have concern for Jesus, then I survive through Jesus and Jesus survives on through all of humanity. So, Johnston's view leads to me also surviving on through all of humanity (thanks to transitivity). Let's say that all of humanity has concern for one particular person (Jesus), and Jesus has concern for all of humanity. Given Johnston's account, all of humanity will survive thanks to Jesus; all of humanity only needs to have one scapegoat. Johnston, however, claims reason commands that we live a life of agape or radical altruism; caring for one individual is not radically altruistic. So, the morally repugnant do not have to have a standing attitude of goodness; they only need to have concern for a scapegoat (heck, they could even murder the scapegoat).¹⁷²

The Protean Problem

Finally, I would like to discuss an important aspect of personal identity that Johnston fails to recognize with his theory.¹⁷³ Since Locke, personal identity has been used as a tool to justly assign moral praise and blame. According to Johnston, persons

¹⁷² I guess Johnston's view was closer to Christianity than I thought.

¹⁷³ While I am only going to discuss one important aspect of personal identity that Johnston fails to recognize, I would like to point out that there are other practical consequences. Consider, for example, cases of Alzheimer's, vegetative states, insanity, and so on. Neo-Lockeanism has something to say about these cases; Johnston's theory, however, will have trouble explaining why we find them troubling.

are protean. Johnston believes that personal identity is the result of one's future directed concern. However, if we accept Johnston's view, assigning moral praise and blame becomes puzzling. It is commonly believed that moral praise or blame are assigned to the *person* who acts praiseworthy or blameworthy. If either the bodily or psychological approaches to personal identity are true, we have a means of tracing acts back to a person to be praised or blamed. On the other hand, if we accept Johnston's theory of personal identity, it is not clear who should be praised or blamed for particular actions.

For example, suppose a criminal commits a murder. However, the criminal has no concern for the particular human being that she is. Instead, the criminal has future directed concern for her daughter. In fact, the criminal believes that the particular individual that she is is not important. The criminal believes that she and her daughter are one; her person is continuous with her daughter because she has concern for her daughter's interests. No matter what happens to her individual personality, she will continue on with her daughter. She has future directed concern for her daughter rather than the particular human being that she is.

Now, assume the criminal is caught committing a murder. When the criminal is brought to trial, she tells the judge presiding over her case that there is nothing that can be done to the particular individual she is that would matter. The criminal says, "you can lock me up, but my person will remain on the outside; you can kill me, but my person will be continuous in my daughter. You can order me to be whipped and beaten, but you will not be punishing my person."

Prima facie, the criminal has said something ridiculous, delusional, and absurd. It is not clear how the criminal could *be* her daughter. According to Johnston, however, the criminal has said something true. According to Johnston, while the Judge can order the particular human body that the criminal is to be punished, the judge is not punishing the person that the criminal is. If the criminal has future directed concern for her daughter, rather than the particular individual that she is, she is continuous in her daughter. This absurdity, I claim, should lead us to be weary of (if not reject) Johnston's account of persons.

So, what is Johnston to say about such a confounding implication of his theory of personal identity? Johnston could claim that praise, blame, and punishment are transitory, and that what really matters is post-death survival and its reward. However, assigning praise and blame in this life seems just as important, if not more important, than post-death justice. It is not clear whether we can actually survive after our biological death and receive our just deserts.

Assume, as Johnston does, that a group of individuals are justified in the belief that they do not survive periods of deep sleep—call these individuals the hibernators.¹⁷⁴ Now, suppose a criminal within the community of hibernators commits a murder. However, unlike the rest of the hibernators, the criminal believes he *will* survive a period of deep sleep (he believes himself to be a human being). On the other hand, the hibernators do not know the criminal is not a hibernator. Furthermore, even if the hibernators did know the criminal was not a hibernator, they would claim he was wrong about his belief. Suppose the criminal hibernates after committing the murder and before

¹⁷⁴ Johnston, *Surviving Death*, 244-245.

going on trial. The criminal then goes on trial and claims that he is not the same person because he hibernated. The judge releases the criminal because he is a different person from when he committed the crime, and it is unjust to assign praise or blame to a person other than the one deserving of praise or blame. Thus, we have reached a problem. The person who is *prima facie* deserving of blame is not punished. What is more, it is impossible for the judge to know if the criminal is a hibernator—only the criminal knows how he directs his concern.

Cases such as these lead Johnston to value divine, ultimate, or post-death justice, rather than human justice. However, holding individuals morally responsible for their actions should not be left to wishful thinking. If Johnston's theory is true, then our practical, legal, and moral assignments of praise and blame become either arbitrary (and not based on Johnston's account of persons) or impossible (because some cases will not allow the assignment of praise or blame to the person).

Thus, it is not clear how praise and blame in this life should be assigned if Johnston's theory of personal identity is true. Unless we know how an individual's concern is directed, we will not know how to assign praise and blame. Second, even if we know how an individual's concern is directed, it appears as though we may not end up praising or blaming the person deserving of praise or blame. Finally, in disputes about personal identity and the directing of concern, it is unclear who will be correct.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I defended the neo-Lockean account of personal identity against Johnston's offloading arguments presented in *Surviving Death*. According to Johnston, we offload the question of identity onto substances. If neo-Lockeanism were true, on the other hand, we could not offload the question of personal identity—because persons would perdure rather than endure. If persons perdure, then we have to trace them using a criterion that connects their temporal parts. However, Johnston claims, we do not use a criterion to trace persons. As a prime example, Johnston claims that young children trace persons, yet young children are unable to use a criterion like those advanced by neo-Lockeans. I have argued, however, that young children are not tracing persons. According to the empirical data I presented, young children are tracing others and their self *qua* human object.

Furthermore, I argued that Johnston's theory of offloading is unsupported by current research. There is a plausible theory of tracing that is supported by current research, but it is not inconsistent with neo-Lockeanism. While we may delegate cognitive labor associated with tracing objects, we cannot do so in the case of persons. There are instances in which tracing the object is good enough, but it is not equivalent to tracing the person.

Additionally, I argued that accepting Johnston's general conclusions about surviving death leads to unsatisfactory results. Even if we accept Johnston's arguments and conclusions, individuals deserving of survival may not receive it. In addition, Johnston's account seems to allow the survival of the wicked-lucky—who do not deserve to survive death. Moreover, I claimed that Johnston's account of personal identity fails at giving a reasonable account of justice in this life.

Finally, the claims presented in this thesis are not meant to prove that neo-Lockeanism is true. Furthermore, this thesis is not meant to argue that there is a self or person worth caring about. This thesis is merely meant to show that Johnston's objections to Neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity are flawed. Johnston assumes that we offload when tracing persons, but it is not clear that this is the case. Furthermore, Johnston claims that young children trace persons at very early stages of development; again, it is not clear that this is the case. The evidence that Johnston believes he has stacked up against the neo-Lockean does not turn out to be very detrimental to the theory. In fact, I believe that some of what Johnston claims in *Surviving Death* can and should be taken into account when developing a neo-Lockean view of personal identity.

What is more, much of what Johnston argues for can be included into a neo-Lockean theory of personal identity. According to neo-Lockeans, personal identity consists in psychological continuity. However, it can easily be argued that personal identity is not what matters, and not what we care about, in survival. What matters is not something being identical to us, but something being psychologically continuous with us. In the case of identity, we need strong connectedness; however, survival may not require strong connectedness. If my survival doesn't require strong psychological connections

with someone in the future, then my beliefs, desires, interest in the good, experience-memories, and so on can survive on through others. When we influence the lives of others through good works, argue about philosophical beliefs, share stories about our experiences in the past, or influence others to live a good life, indirect psychological connections are formed. Indirect psychological connections, a neo-Lockean might claim, is just as Johnston's form of survival.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Amsterdam, B. "Mirror Self-Image Reactions Before Age Two." *Developmental Psychobiology*, 5 (1972): 297-305.
- Bering, Jesse M. & David F. Bjorklund. "The Natural Emergence of Reasoning About the Afterlife as a Developmental Regularity." *Developmental Psychology*, 40, no. 2, (Mar 2004): 217-233.
- Bloom, Paul. *Descartes' Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Humans*. New York: Basic Books, 2005.
- Brithaupt, Thomas M. & Richard P. Lapka. *Understanding Early Adolescent Self and Identity*. SUNY Press, 2002.
- Broughton, J. "Development of a Concepts of Self, Mind, Reality, and Knowledge." *New Directions for Child Development*, 1 (1978): 75-100.
- Damon, William & Daniel Hart. "The Development of Self-Understanding from Infancy Through Adolescence." *Child Development*, 53, no. 4 (Aug. 1982): 841-864.
- Dawkins, Richard. *The Selfish Gene*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Dennett, Daniel. *Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013.
- Dixon, J. C. "Development of Self-Recognition." *Journal of General Psychology*, 91 (1957): 251-256.
- Fredrickson, Megan, Doug W. Yu, & Naomi Pierce. "Economic Contract Theory Tests Models of Mutualism." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science*, 107, no. 36 (2010):15712-15716.
- Fuhrman, Gary. "Review: *Descartes' Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human*." *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11 no. 9, (2004): 89-96.
- Guardo, C. J., & J. B. Bohan. "Development of a Sense of Self-Identity in Children." *Child Development*, 42 (1971): 1909-1921.

- Johnston, Mark. "Fission and the Facts." *Philosophical Perspectives*, 3 (1989a): 369-97.
- . "Human Beings." *The Journal of Philosophy*, 84, No. 2 (Feb. 1987): 59-83.
- . "'Human Beings' Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal." in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, vol. 3 (33-74). New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- . "Reasons and Reductionism." *The Philosophical Review*, 101 (1992): 589-618.
- . "Relativism and the Self." in M. Krausz (ed.), *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation*, Chicago: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.
- . *Surviving Death*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
- Kahenman, Daniel. *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.
- Kuhlmeier, Valerie, Karen Wynn, & Paul Bloom. "Attribution of Dispositional States by 12-Month-Olds." *Psychological Science*, 14, No. 5 (2003): 402-408.
- Lewis, David. *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986.
- Lewis, M. "Self-Knowledge and Social Development in Early Life." in L. A. Pervin (ed.), *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research* (277-300). New York: The Guilford Press, 1990.
- Lewis, M., & J. Brooks-Gunn. *Social Cognition and the Acquisition of Self*. New York: Plenum, 1979.
- Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, P. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
- Luper, Steven. "Book Review: *Surviving Death*." *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 61 no. 245 (2011): 884-887.
- Merricks, Trenton. "Realism about Personal Identity Over Time." *Philosophical Perspectives*, 15, *Metaphysics* (2001): 173-187.
- Noonan, Harold. "Animalism Versus Lockeanism: Reply to Mackie." *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 51, no. 202 (2001): 83-90.

- Noonan, Harold. "Identity." in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Winter 2011 Edition), URL =<<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/identity/>>.
- Onishi, Kristine H., Renee Baillargeon, & Alan M. Leslie, "15-Month-Old Infants Detect Violations in Pretend Scenarios." *Acta Psychologica*, 124 (2007): 106-128.
- Oderburg, David S. "Johnston on Human Beings." *Journal of Philosophy* 86, (1989): 137-141.
- Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." *The Philosophical Review*, 80 (1971): 3–27.
- . *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- . "We Are Not Human Beings." *Philosophy*, 87, no. 1, (2012): 5-28.
- Povinelli, D.J., K.R. Landau, & H.K. Perilloux. "Self-Recognition in Young Children Using Delayed Versus Live Feedback: Evidence of a Developmental Asynchrony." *Child Development* 67, no.4 (Aug. 1996): 1540-54.
- Pylyshyn, Zenon W. "Multiple Object Tracking." *Scholarpedia*, 2, no. 10 (2007): 3326.
- . "Perception, Representation and the World: The FINST that Binds," in D. Dedrick & L. M. Terick (eds.), *Computation, Cognition and Pylyshyn* (3-48). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009.
- . *Things and Places: How the Mind Connects With the World*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007.
- . "Visual Indexes, Preconceptual Objects, and Situated Vision." *Cognition*, 80 (2001): 127-158
- Robinson, Denis. "Human Beings, Human Animals, and Mentalistic Survival." in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), *Oxford Study in Metaphysics*, 3 (3-32). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Rochat, Philippe. "Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life." *Consciousness and Cognition* 12, (2003): 717-731.
- Rosenberg, M. "Self-Concept from Middle Childhood Through Adolescence," in J. Suls and A.G. Greenwald (ed.), *Psychological Perspectives on the Self*, 3 (106-135). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986.
- Selman, R. *The Growth of Interpersonal Understanding*. New York: Academic Press, 1980.

- Shapiro, Lawrence "Review: *Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World.*" *Mind*, 118, no. 472 (October 2009): 1168-1174.
- Scholl, Brian J. & Zenon W. Pylyshyn. "Tracking Multiple Items Through Occlusion: Clues to Visual Objecthood." *Cognitive Psychology* 38 (1999): 259-290.
- Shoemaker, Sydney. "Personal Identity: A Materialist's Account." in Shoemaker & Swinburne (ed.), *Personal Identity* (296-310). Oxford: Blackwell. 1984.
- . "Persons and Their Pasts." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 7 (1970): 269–285.
- . "Persons, Animals, and Identity." *Synthese*, 162, no. 3, (June 2008): 313-324.
- . "Self, Body, and Coincidence." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 73 (1999): 287–306.
- Sider, Ted. "Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis." *Philosophical Perspectives*, 15 (2001): 189-209.
- . *Four-Dimensionalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.
- Stanovich, K. E. "Balance in Psychological Research: The Dual Process Perspective." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 27 (2004): 357-358.
- Wisnewski, Jeremy. "Book Review: *Surviving Death*," *Philosophy in Review*, 31, no. 2. (2011): 104-106.