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**May the Best Manipulator Win:
2004 and 2010 Ukrainian Presidential Elections Revisited**

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**May the Best Manipulator Win:
2004 and 2010 Ukrainian Presidential Elections Revisited**

by

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Report

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my mother, Vickie Smith. She would have enjoyed this moment immensely. And, I would have enjoyed sharing it with her...

Acknowledgements

This work would not have been possible without the support and help of numerous people. Elena, Nikita, and Anastasiya, your patience and support throughout my academic journey have been tremendous. You all have helped me stay focused and helped me unwind, encouraged me to learn new things and reminded me who I am, accompanied me to class and allowed me to lock myself in the bedroom to finish a paper. As much as I hope my degree encourages you, I want even more for you to know that your love and support made this possible. Additionally, I have been truly blessed with Robert Moser as my advisor. My position in the Ph.D. program at the University of Texas is due to his input. My progress through the program is a tribute to the time, attention, and friendship that Dr. Moser shared with me. Perhaps even more impressive than the manner with which Dr. Moser accepted me into the program was the manner with which he accepted my resignation. Dr. Moser, your understanding and encouragement are greatly appreciated and, once again, you have provided me with such a great example of the kind of professional, friend, and person that I should strive to be. I will miss our conversations in your office about the state of former Soviet politics.

Abstract

May the Best Manipulator Win: 2004 and 2010 Ukrainian Presidential Elections Revisited

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Ukraine is currently in the throes of revolution. Will this popular uprising move Ukraine closer to the West and a democratic government or strengthen the country's ties to Putin and Russia? Viktor Yanukovich's second round victory in the 2004 presidential election was nullified by Ukraine's high court due to rampant electoral manipulation. Viktor Yushchenko, supported by hundreds of thousands of protesters in the 2004 Orange Revolution, became president and ushered in, what many hoped would be, a more democratic government. Infighting and competition among the Orange coalition soon rendered the Yushchenko government ineffective. Ukraine's progression towards democracy slowed and ties to Russia began to flourish once again when Yanukovich became Yushchenko's prime minister. In 2010, Yanukovich was elected president in another second round election against Yulia Tymoshenko that observers and academics deemed free and fair. Unfortunately, a new evaluation of both the 2004 and 2010 elections presents a much less encouraging view of Ukrainian politics. As shown in this paper, electoral manipulation was present in both the 2004 and 2010 elections.

Additionally, *both* parties participated in manipulatory behavior in *both* elections. This finding challenges much of the academic literature to date on Ukrainian politics. In support of this finding of corruption by multiple candidates, a unique list experiment was administered to raion (county) level administrators in Ukraine. These administrators were asked about their views regarding electoral manipulation. The results of this experiment suggest that these administrators are still very influenced by and, arguably, willing to engage in electoral manipulation. The experiment shows that, at least at the raion level, Ukrainian governance has not become more democratic. Overall, the prognosis for democratization efforts in Ukraine is not good.

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Introduction

Much has been made in recent political science research of the blatant electoral manipulation and fraud in Russian presidential and parliamentary elections since Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999. Ethnicity, abundance of resources, and various socio-economic factors have all been used by researchers as explanations for the one-sided results in Putin's Russia. Unfortunately, similarly detailed analyses of Ukrainian elections have not, to date, taken place. The obvious explanation for this Russia-centered research agenda focuses on the fact that Russia is the geo-political powerhouse in Eastern Europe, dwarfing all other countries in economic activity, political stature, and military capabilities. Recent events in Ukraine, however, begin to show the importance of obtaining deeper understandings of political systems in other countries in Eastern Europe. The revolution that resulted in the ouster of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich and subsequent invasion of Crimea by Russia started a political crisis between Russian and Western governments over the fate of Ukrainian democracy.

Gaining a better perspective on Ukrainian politics can be advantageous for several reasons. First, Western interest in the democratization of formerly authoritarian countries should make cases like Ukraine especially salient for social science research. Few countries in the world offer the same type of 'democratic victory' opportunities as Ukraine and a successful democratization effort after so many years of authoritarian rule does much to bolster the normative argument the democratic change can occur and be a positive force in a country. Second, Ukraine is important in a geo-political sense. The ability of Western powers to bring a former Soviet republic into the democratic fold strengthens the democratic movement, in general, and provides the democratic world with a potential ally in a region that is currently one of the most volatile in the world and will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

Additionally, from an academic perspective, democratization efforts in Ukraine are ripe for theoretical evaluations and real-world, fact-based advances in the way political scientists understand the way the world works. As Ukraine slowly charts its future course, political scientists will have the ability to examine the real-time effects of specific policy decisions by political actors and the reaction of the masses to these decisions. Today's access to droves of analytical data combined with political scientists' ability to travel extensively within Ukraine make it possible for Ukraine to be studied as an individual case, but also to be included as a valid part of much larger cross-national studies. The flexibility available to political scientists to use Ukraine as part of what Michael Coppedge would refer to as thick or thin studies is extremely useful (Coppedge 2012). In short, an in depth understanding of politics in Ukraine is extremely beneficial given today's political climate.

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, current characterizations of Ukrainian presidential elections in 2004 and 2014 appear to lack a complete explanation and accounting of the level of electoral manipulation that took place. A more thorough investigation of available electoral data shows that the story might not be as one-sided as it appears in some research. Second, through the use of a unique list experiment, I will show that electoral manipulation remains a salient topic in Ukrainian politics and continues to affect elections. Despite recent studies by noted scholars arguing that the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine were, for the most part, free of overt manipulation, new evaluations of this election show similar patterns of manipulation as those seen in the 2004 presidential election. This new evaluation of Ukrainian elections combined with an original list experiment administered to county level officials in Ukraine prior to the beginning of the November revolution shows that, contrary to the hopeful

views of some, electoral manipulation and the attitudes that foster electoral manipulation are alive and well in Ukrainian politics on all sides of the political spectrum.

Post-Soviet Ukrainian Politics

Since gaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine has struggled to adequately address and resolve fundamental differences between ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian. Ukrainian-speaking citizens, living largely in the western portion of the country, immediately desired to distance Ukraine from Russian control. Ethnic-Russians supported Ukrainian independence, but desired for the newly formed government to recognize the continued cultural connections between Russians in Ukraine and their friends and family in Russia. The lightning rod topic was the recognition of the Russian language as an official language in Ukraine. Many in the western portions of the country wanted to ban the use of Russian. This, of course, did not sit well with ethnic Russians living in Eastern Ukraine. The result of this cleavage among political elites and in society has been profound and continues to define Ukrainian politics today. Political elites and their parties are defined by the region of the country they represent. No other single issue has dominated Ukrainian politics to such an extent.

As with every other country in the world, Ukrainian politics do not occur in a vacuum. Political activity in Kyiv since Ukrainian independence has been heavily influenced by actors in other parts of the world, particularly those in Moscow (Simon 2006, Shulman 2007, Kuzio 2012). Unfortunately, this influence has not always guided Ukrainian governance in the most democratic of directions. Russia's influence on Ukrainian politics, particularly during Viktor Yanukovich's presidential administration, has proven to be detrimental to the democratization process that many had hoped would flourish after the Orange Revolution of 2004. Putin's meddling has encouraged behavior similar to that seen in Russian politics. While some argue that Putin's electoral successes are due in large part to policy positions, his electoral shenanigans

and attacks on democratic institutions within Russia have been well documented and often overshadow any policy positions that contribute to his continued reelection (Remington 2008, Colton and Hale 2009, Moses 2010, Treisman 2011, Goodnow, Moser et al. 2012, Smith 2013). Unfortunately, Putin-style political manipulation has also been observed in multiple Ukrainian elections. It is this type of fraudulent behavior that has drawn the ire of Ukrainian citizens and the attention of political scientists.

My previous argument for an increased focus on Ukrainian politics should not be taken as a claim that no work has been done on the subject. While Russia dominates the study of Eastern European politics, a number of works have focused on the political climate in Ukraine since 1991. Bohdan Harasymiw wrote an excellent article providing an in depth evaluation of the Ukrainian electoral system from 1994 – 2004. Harasymiw evaluates the foundations of the Ukrainian electoral system as well as the behavior of the Ukrainian electorate. The picture he paints is one of an unstable (and often contested) electoral system which chooses leaders by questionable methods and brings the legitimacy of the entire Ukrainian democratization experience into question (Harasymiw 2005). Birch and Wilson's study of the 1998 Ukrainian parliamentary elections in which the Communist Party won the large largest number of seats produced similar findings of a weak national party system (Birch and Wilson 1999). In short, the marks for Ukraine's early attempts at democracy are not high. And, unfortunately, the 2004 presidential election did nothing to bolster those evaluations.

2004 Presidential Election and the 'Orange Revolution'

The presidential election at the end of 2004 was a turning point for Ukrainian politics. Typical of elections in post-Soviet countries, the list of candidates in the first round of the election was extensive. Twenty-four (24) candidates participated in the election, with Viktor Yushchenko, the Western-leaning opposition candidate, and Viktor Yanukovich, Moscow's preferred candidate, winning virtually identical numbers of votes (39.90% and 39.26% respectively). Neither of them, however, won the required 50% to avoid a second-round run-off. Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine's outgoing president, was heavily invested in Yanukovich. Yanukovich served as Kuchma's prime minister for two years prior to the 2004 election and it was alleged by many that Kuchma used his position as president to give Yanukovich an advantage over opposition candidates. During the highly contested campaign, Yushchenko was given a potentially lethal dose of poison. The disfigurement on Yushchenko's face as a result of the poisoning was a constant reminder of the lengths to which people were willing to go to secure political advantage in Ukrainian politics. Contrary to exit poll results on election day, Yanukovich emerged as the second round winner and next president of Ukraine (Paniotto 2004).

This result, however, drew heavy criticism from international election monitors and Ukrainian citizens. Massive protests erupted in Western Ukraine and the streets of Kyiv. For weeks after the second round election, protesters occupied Independence Square in downtown Kyiv. Tents were constructed and a steady stream of supplies enabled protesters to express this dissatisfaction with the results of the November election in bitterly cold weather. Kyiv turned orange (the color of Yushchenko's campaign advertisements) in a matter of days reflecting both widespread support for Yushchenko and widespread disdain for the fraudulent electoral system. Caps, t-shirt, scarves, bumper stickers, banners, and billboards all reflected the surprising unity

of the Ukrainian people.¹ In a remarkable display of determination and coordination, protesters forced the hand of Ukrainian elites. Protester organizers were able to overcome collective action problems as well as free-rider issues and organized continuous demonstrations for extended periods of time (Moore 1995, Klandermans, Sabucedo et al. 2002). Having no choice but to concede to the people's will, the election results were nullified. Ukraine's highest court nullified the second-round election results and called for an unprecedented third-round of voting between Yushchenko and Yanukovich. The third round of voting was closely monitored by various groups (Landry 2011). Kuchma, feeling the pressure of international attention, stepped back from the election and refused to be as involved as he had been previously. Yushchenko won the third-round election by almost 7% (Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2007).

The Orange Revolution was a watershed event in Ukrainian politics. A country run by bribery and corruption for so long rarely alters course and responds to public opinion in such a short span of time and to such dramatic ends. The events of 2004 also provided social scientists with the unique opportunity to evaluate repeated elections with identical candidates in the same geographical location over a very short period of time. The ability to compare the second-round elections which are generally assumed to have been heavily manipulated in favor of Yanukovich (and subsequently produced a Yanukovich victory) with third-round elections that were heavily monitored and produced the opposite result is a dream for political scientists seeking to investigate electoral manipulation. One of the most comprehensive works done on the subject was Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin's 2009 book that looked at the "forensics of election fraud" in both Ukraine and Russia (Ordeshook, Myagkov et al. 2009). The authors found considerable evidence of Putin-style ballot box stuffing as well as the altering of election results

¹ The author is actually a proud owner of a 'Tak (Yes) Yushchenko' scarf and a bright orange t-shirt with a sketch of Yushchenko's face on the back. The scarf still functions properly while the t-shirt has, apparently, shrunk in the wash.

in the second-round election. The marker used to identify potentially fraudulent districts was the presence of unusually high turnout. Their overall finding was very revealing. According to the authors, turnout in districts won by Yushchenko increased slightly from round one to round two, but the distribution of district turnout levels remained virtually the same. Yanukovich districts, on the other hand, enjoyed a substantial increase in turnout from round one to round two and the turnout was no longer roughly normally distributed but displayed bi-modal properties. In other words, the authors claim that electoral manipulation on the part of the Yanukovich camp significantly altered the election results and enabled Yanukovich to win the second-round election. Ordeshook and company are not alone in the findings of electoral fraud in the second round of the 2004 presidential election. It is widely accepted among academics that Yanukovich's victory was due largely to this manipulation (Kuzio 2005, Tuduroiu 2007, Lane 2008). Yanukovich's victory was short lived and the democratic process in Ukraine seemed to get a shot in the arm by massive public protest.

The Collapse of the Orange Coalition and the 2010 Presidential Election

The euphoria of democratization, however, failed to last. Yushchenko appointed Yulia Tymoshenko as his first prime minister. What had once been a fruitful relationship (perhaps due more to having a common enemy in Yanukovich than to commonalities in policy platforms) quickly deteriorated into inner-government squabbles between competing factions. Each accused the other of questionable behavior and, eventually, Yushchenko dismissed the Tymoshenko government in a live television broadcast. The 2006 parliamentary election saw a drastic shift in the party alignment. Yanukovich's Party of Regions obtained a majority of seats

while Yushchenko's 'Our Ukraine' party lost a tremendous amount of seats in parliament (Kuzio 2006). Tymoshenko attempted to vie for prime minister. However, the Orange Coalition quickly disintegrated as Yushchenko's party and Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc were unable to agree on who would occupy various cabinet positions (BBC 2005-09-09). Even though these two parties combined held more seats than Party of Regions, they were unable to effectively counter the Yanukovich government because of continued hostilities. In what many saw as a bizarre turn of events, Yushchenko eventually appointed Yanukovich as prime minister. He remained prime minister until the 2010 presidential election.

As in the 2004 election, a large field of candidates competed for the presidency (Commision 2014). Tymoshenko and Yanukovich were the obvious front-runners after the first round of voting, but neither of them were able to secure the required majority to avoid a second round run-off. In the lead up to the election, both candidates accused the other of planning to manipulate the election. However, both also stated that a repeat of 2004 was undesirable and the results would be respected (Interfax 2009). Much to the disappointment of Tymoshenko, Yanukovich won the election by three percentage points, 48.95% to 45.47%. The sting of defeat being too much, Tymoshenko claimed that Yanukovich won due to vote manipulation and filed a petition in court to have the election results nullified. A statement by Tymoshenko to the Higher Administrative court in 2010 summarized her position:

“At the very least there was rigging of votes using the main methods of falsification, and I think that for history this lawsuit with all the documentation will remain in the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine, and sooner or later, an honest prosecutor's office and an honest court will assess that Yanukovich wasn't elected President of Ukraine, and that the will of the people has been rigged (Tymoshenko 2010).”

Tymoshenko defiantly announced on national television that Yanukovich was not the democratically elected president and urged opposition lawmakers to refuse to work with Party of

Regions. Not surprisingly, less than a year later, criminal investigations had been initiated against Tymoshenko and she was convicted of abuse of power and imprisoned in 2011.

Given the turmoil that enveloped the 2004 presidential elections and the hostile political environment that ensued under Yushchenko, it is no surprise that the 2010 presidential election was closely watched by many to see if fraud was once again used as a tool to secure office by the Moscow-backed candidate. International monitors descended on Ukraine to observe the election. After the election results were finalized, researchers began to look for signs of manipulation. Employing similar techniques to those used in their investigation of the 2004 election, Ordeshook and his fellow authors looked closely at the 2010 election for signs of electoral manipulation (Lukinov, Myagkov et al. 2011). In agreement with outside observers, the academic community claimed that Yanukovich's victory in the 2010 election, while not necessarily a positive development for democracy in Ukraine, was the result of free and fair elections (Colton 2011, Kuzio 2011, Lukinov, Myagkov et al. 2011).

Ukrainian Presidential Elections Revisited


Evaluating electoral manipulation is no easy task. Researchers are far from reaching a consensus on the causes, effects, and measurements of electoral manipulation (Lehoucq 2003). Not only does electoral manipulation vary from country to country, it can vary substantially from district to district within one country. Perhaps the simplest way to begin the reevaluation of Ukrainian presidential elections over the past decade is by a simple comparison of election data trends with another country whose elections have been thoroughly studied. The obvious choice for comparison in this case is Russia. Significant numbers of academic studies continue to show that electoral manipulation in Russia is the rule, not the exception. However, while manipulation and fraud are obvious, the practice is not universal throughout the country. Considerably higher numbers of incidents of fraud have been found in ethnic republics and portions of the country with rich resource endowments (Goodnow, Moser et al. 2012). While experts disagree as to the specific form of Putin's manipulation (ballot box stuffing, changes in elections results, vote buying, and polling station intimidation) or the extent to which a combination of these manipulatory methods exists, the markers of manipulation are continually the same (Birch 2010, Simpser 2012).² Regions of the country composed of primarily ethnic Russians see turnout close to the national average, typically in the mid-60% range. Vote share for Putin (or Putin's party,

² I contend that, while there might have been a time when election results were changed after ballots were cast to favor Putin, the majority of electoral manipulation in Russia today is simple ballot box stuffing. After several consecutive elections where results were obviously manipulated, voters begin to realize that their votes are not being counted fairly. As shown by Simpser in his 2012 article and Sarah Birch in her 2010 article, this realization has the effect of depressing turnout. Rational actors participate less in elections when they believe their votes do not count or are severely discounted. As turnout is depressed, the manipulator (Putin in this case) has more room to manipulate the election by adding more ballots to the ballot box. The more ballots Putin can add to the ballot box, the higher vote share for Putin or United Russia will be in the final count. Obviously, this rationale requires a more serious explanation than the one provided in this footnote, but it is important to have at least a basic grasp of electoral manipulation in Russia to fully understand why turnout and vote share are so intimately related in Russia and, arguably, Ukraine.

United Russia, UR) is typically in the same range for these raions (Moser, Smith et al. 2013). An interesting phenomenon begins to occur as turnout percentages increase. In almost a 1-to-1 ratio, every increase in turnout in a raion (Russian electoral districts roughly equivalent to counties in the United States) results in an increase in vote share for Putin and UR. Figures 1a and 1b show this trend very clearly with vote share graphed as a function of turnout in every raion in Russia's 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections (Goodnow, Moser et al. 2012). Of course, being that vote share is a percentage, it would be logical (if not obvious) to note that, in those raions where UR's vote share was exceedingly high (90+%), opposition parties experienced vote share that was incredibly low, with all opposition parties having to share less than 10% of the vote (and often times less than 5%). Just as he presumably planned, Putin's party won these high turnout/high vote share raions in convincing fashion.

While detecting electoral manipulation based on a relationship between turnout and vote share does not require mathematical skills above seventh grade pre-algebra and, arguably, fails to identify specific raions where manipulation took place, this method provides an easy and effective manner in which to begin the identification of manipulatory trends in elections. In countries such as Russia and Ukraine without compulsory voting laws, it is reasonable to assume that an exceedingly high turnout percentage in a polling district constitutes potentially fraudulent behavior. The question argued by most researchers is not whether high turnout is an indication of fraud, but at what point turnout is considered high and at what point turnout is considered fraudulent. This is an important delineation for researchers interested in pinpointing exactly where and to what extent elections are manipulated. This is, of course, a subjective measure and each researcher must go to great lengths to convincingly identify and define the specific turnout number that he considers to be the point between actual and manipulated turnout. This paper

Figures 1a and 1b: Turnout and Vote Share for Select Parties in 2007 and 2011
 (Goodnow, Moser et al. 2012)




benefits from not having to make that type of distinct delineation. The purpose of this paper is not to identify specific voting districts where manipulation occurred, but instead to present broad trends in Ukrainian elections that point to manipulatory behavior and an atmosphere that continues to reward such behavior. With that goal in mind, a specific

percentage at which turnout switches from valid to fraudulent is not needed. Instead, it can be assumed that, as turnout percentages in voting districts get farther away from the national average turnout, the likelihood that the electoral process in that district was manipulated increases. The identification of electoral manipulation in Russia and, I argue, Ukraine lies in a simple premise. An increase in turnout accompanied by an increase in vote share for a specific party or candidate indicates that election results were manipulated in some form or fashion. Assuming the above argument to be true, an evaluation of vote share as a function of turnout for the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine reveals very interesting, and potentially controversial, results.

As previously discussed, discrepancies in the second round of the 2004 election between Yushchenko and Yanukovich are well documented. Figure 2 very plainly shows (in our vote

Figure 2: Turnout and Vote Share for Yanukovich in the 2004 Presidential Election



share vs turnout format) what others have noted about this election. As with the Russian election examples, there appears to be a correlation between an increase in turnout and an increase in vote share. In Territorial Voting Oblasts (TVO, Ukrainian voting districts) located in the south and

east of Ukraine, increases in turnout result in direct increases in vote share for Yanukovich, with a grouping of TVOs in the upper right-hand corner of the graph showing extremely high turnout and extremely high vote share for Yanukovich. This result is in line with the Putin-style electoral manipulation that has been documented by researchers such as Ordeshook and company. What has apparently been overlooked by previous researchers, however, is that unlike the Russian example where only one party benefits from any increase in turnout, this correlation runs in two directions. If the argument holds that an increase in turnout accompanied by an increase in vote share for a specific party or candidate is a sign of electoral manipulation, then it must be noted that an increase in turnout in western TVOs was accompanied by an increase in vote share for Yushchenko.³ While there is not the same grouping of TVOs at the extreme for Yushchenko as for Yanukovich, we can assume that electoral manipulation in favor of Yushchenko also took place in this election. The U-shape of the points in the chart clearly shows that both candidates enjoyed an increase in vote share as turnout increased. If Yanukovich had been the sole recipient of this turnout bump, Figure 2 would more closely resemble Figures 1a and 1b which show a single candidate/party as the primary benefactor of the increase in turnout in Russia. The trend of electoral manipulation by both parties has, to date, been underreported in both academic writing and news reports.


Although both Yanukovich and Timoshenko loudly proclaimed their expectations of electoral fraud by the other, the 2010 presidential election was determined to be, mostly, free and fair by observers and researchers. Once again, however, a comparison of vote share as a function of turnout seems to tell a different story. Figure 3 shows similar results in the 2010

³ Figures 2 and 3 only show vote share for Yanukovich. Because both figures present the results of second round elections that were contested between only two candidates, it is unnecessary to show vote share for each candidate. It can be assumed that vote share gained by one candidate is lost by the other and vice versa. Therefore, high vote share for Yanukovich naturally means low vote share for the opposition candidate. Low vote share for Yanukovich implies high vote share for the opposition candidate.

election as those seen in the 2004 election. There is a definite increase in vote share for both candidates as turnout increases. This, again, suggests that both candidates benefited from electoral manipulation of some form or fashion.

There are, of course, a few differences between the 2004 and 2010 elections. First, there are no TVOs that recorded turnout in excess of 90%. In fact, a cursory comparison of Figures 2 and 3 shows that overall turnout in the 2010 election was lower than in 2004. The explanation for this decrease in turnout no doubt involves a number of factors, most which are beyond the

Figure 3: Turnout and Vote Share for Yanukovich in the 2010 Presidential Election



scope of this paper. However, the reduction in overall turnout did not remove the trend of vote share increasing as turnout increases. Therefore, using the relationship between turnout and vote share as an indicator of fraud is as valid for the 2010 election as it is for the previously discussed Russian elections or the 2004 presidential election. Second, the distribution of TVOs in 2010 is slightly different than in 2004. As previously noted, several TVOs in the 2004 election reported a combination of extremely high turnout (95%+) and extremely high vote share for Yanukovich (also 95%+). While there was evidence of manipulation on the part of Yushchenko as well, there

were not as many TVOs with such extreme results in favor of Yushchenko. The 2010 election appears to be a bit more balanced in its results. The lack of a cluster of TVOs for one candidate and not the other seems to suggest that Yanukovich and Timoshenko equally benefited from manipulation.

Competing Explanations for Electoral Manipulation

It is possible that other explanations for the correlation between turnout and vote share exist, one dealing with turnout and the other with vote choice. Ukraine is a highly divided country. Voting tends to be starkly divided between those in the western portions of the country who favor closer ties with Western Europe and those in the south and east who favor stronger relations with Russia. Candidates have typically sought to align themselves and their platforms with either one position or the other with the topic of Ukrainian nationalism playing a divisive role in campaigns. The counter argument to my claim of electoral manipulation says that strong partisan attitudes among the electorate result in increased turnout. In this argument, the increase in turnout is due to mobilization of supporters by each candidate in partisan areas of the country. While there appears to be some basis for this argument, it fails to hold up to serious scrutiny. There do not appear to be any areas of Ukraine that do not possess strong partisan attitudes. If mobilization is determined by partisanship, we should see high turnout in all TVOs, not just a select few. Anecdotal evidence of crowded polling stations and long lines would accompany this argument. None of those anecdotal stories exist. Of course, what is defined as 'high turnout' is subjective. Regardless of what threshold is chosen, if strong partisanship drove up turnout in Ukraine, Figures 2 and 3 would not be U-shaped. Instead, all TVOs would have roughly

identical turnout numbers. As it stands, both 2004 and 2010 elections have a large number of TVOs with turnout that is more than one standard deviation above the national average (Smith 2014).

The argument that vote share in Ukraine elections is due to strong partisanship also fails to provide an adequate explanation of electoral trends in the 2004 and 2010 elections. This argument states that the highly partisan nature of Ukrainian politics combined with the stark geographic West/East divide leaves little grey area for voters. If a voter goes to the polls in western Ukraine, the odds that the voter supports the Western-leaning candidate are very high. Odds are equally high that a voter in the south or east of Ukraine decides to support Yanukovich. This is, in essence, a geographic argument. Voter location determines vote choice. However, stating that partisanship drives turnout that is slanted toward one candidate fails to explain the large number of TVOs that are located in partisan areas of the country that do not show unusually high vote share levels for either candidate. If high levels of vote share were caused by increased desire on the part of voters to support a specific candidate in partisan parts of the country, Figures 2 and 3 would look very different. Instead of a U-shaped graph, one could expect to see two clusters of TVOs, one that reflects high vote share for Yanukovich at all levels of turnout and another that reflects high vote share for the opposition candidate at all levels of turnout. This is not, however, what the data reflect. Instead, Figures 2 and 3 clearly reflect a Ukrainian political system in which both sides employ electoral manipulation.

Current Political Climate in Ukraine

This is, unfortunately, no surprise. Given the continued climate of corruption in Ukraine, it would be surprising to see an electoral system free of manipulation. Ukraine sits at a crossroads, its future direction yet to be determined.⁴ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has been forced to grapple with a communist (and often authoritarian) past while trying to establish for itself a more democratic future. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was courted by western nations with high hopes of developing a government built on a foundation of democratic principles. However, Ukrainian governments through the 1990's and early 2000's continually failed to live up to European and American standards, being riddled with corruption, fraud, and bribery. Corrupt governance continued to be the rule, not the exception, until the dramatic events of the 'Orange Revolution' in 2004 (Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2005). In weeks of peaceful protest, tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens braved harsh, wintry conditions to show that they had had enough of the fraudulent methods that had permeated Ukrainian politics to that point. Focusing on the presidential election held that year, Ukrainian citizens demanded that the fraudulent election results be thrown out and a new election held. Ukraine's highest court sided with the protesters and ordered new elections. These new elections produced a new winner. Democracy had seemingly won the day.

Since the 2004 presidential election, the quality of Ukrainian elections has been closely monitored. National elections in 2006 and 2010 were deemed to be free and fair by election monitors and academic experts (Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2007). Claims of electoral fraud by losing parties appeared to be unsubstantiated by evidence. It appears as if Ukraine has

⁴ The experiment portion of this paper was approved by the University of Texas IRB. Preregistration was completed through the E-GAP website. The final version of this paper does not vary in any significant manner from the preregistration description of the project.

successfully begun to move away from its manipulatory past and has begun to take seriously some of the core ideals of democratic governance. At least, this is what statistical analysis of Ukrainian elections shows (Lukinov, Myagkov et al. 2011).

But, is Ukraine really becoming more democratic? Do elections free of manipulation mean that Ukrainian politicians have turned the corner and embraced the competitive democratic model? In June and July 2013, I spent four weeks in Kyiv, Ukraine and interviewed several people who are intimately familiar with the inner working of Ukrainian national politics. The picture painted by these interviews is much less encouraging than statistical analysis leads us to believe. A representative from the United States embassy (who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not allowed to go on record with any type of official American position) explained how electoral manipulation by the party of power (Party of Regions) had moved away from actual election day fraud (stuffing ballot boxes or changing vote numbers) to more subtle forms of fraud that were perpetrated either before or after the election. Opposition candidates were not allowed to register as candidates for the election. Even those who were registered were denied equal access to radio and television. An interview with Oleksandr Chernenko, the Chariman of the Board of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, corroborated much of the embassy employee's assessment.⁵ Chernenko explained how opposition candidates are denied the ability to advertise on the many state-owned television and radio stations. Additionally, opposition candidates are often faced with relentless investigations by tax agents for supposed violations. In extreme cases, these candidates are criminally prosecuted for various crimes. After elections have occurred, the Party of Regions applies enormous pressure to non-Party of Regions parliament members in attempts to make them change parties after being elected to

⁵ The Committee of Voters of Ukraine is an independent, non-partisan organization interested in promoting democratization in Ukraine by independent, non-governmental election monitoring. The Committee of Voters of Ukraine is the Ukrainian equivalent of GOLOS in Russia.

parliament. This strong-arm tactic was so successful that a law had to be passed restricting parliament members from changing party affiliations for a certain amount of time after being elected. A third interview with Stuart Mackenzie, a prominent businessman in Ukraine for the past twenty years, brought to light the struggles faced by private business in Ukraine. Mackenzie stated that it was not uncommon for high-ranking government officials (or those with connections to high-ranking government officials) to enter successful private businesses, especially those that provided financial support to opposition parties, with an ultimatum: surrender a large portion of your business or your business will be shut down.

It became very evident through these personal interviews that the statistical results generated by Ordeshook and others claiming free and fair elections in Ukraine are perhaps overlooking some of the more subtle issues in modern-day Ukrainian politics. Almost ten years have passed since the Orange Revolution and Ukraine is still plagued by reports of fraudulent behavior in governmental actions. While outward signs show Ukraine moving towards a more democratic (i.e. less fraudulent) form of government, a closer inspection reveals a strong undercurrent of manipulation and fraud that continues to this day.

Although Ukraine appears to be relatively democratic on election day when the world is watching, what goes on behind scenes is decidedly less democratic. This raises an important question. Is Ukraine really becoming more democratic or is the government simply becoming better at hiding their manipulatory practices? This study seeks to better understand the foundations of fraudulent behavior by examining the relationship between federal and raion (county) level actors in Ukraine. By employing a list experiment as part of a more general survey, this study strives to move away from observational techniques that struggle to accurately assess true attitudes regarding socially undesirable behavior. The findings of this study begin to

answer whether Ukraine is, in fact, more democratic than it once was. Unfortunately, the results are not encouraging. While raion administrators in the control group resoundingly dismissed the legality of electoral corruption when explicitly asked, the behavior of raion administrators in the treatment group was altered when presented with the corruption prompt. The findings of this survey experiment show that electoral manipulation is still a very active part of Ukrainian politics.

Background and Theory for Survey Experiment

While democracy is defined in many ways, most definitions and discussions of democracy follow the assumption that less fraudulent elections is a sign of more democratic governance (Weingast 1997, O'Donnell 2001, Diamond and Morlino 2005, Coppedge 2012). It is simply difficult to imagine a system being free, fair, and representing the voice of the people while operating under coercive leadership and corrupt practices. Those ideas are incompatible. Measuring the amount of democracy in a country is a tricky task with answers that vary depending on who is holding the yard stick. Even so, there are some things that can be agreed upon regardless of the measure. An electoral process free of manipulation is one of those things.

Although recent Ukrainian elections appeared to be free of overt manipulation, the interviews I completed made it evident that election day activity failed to tell the whole story. The purpose of this study is to begin the process of revealing true attitudes about electoral manipulation in Ukraine. If the country is, in fact, becoming more democratic, we should expect to see government officials moving away from fraudulent practices and see them become more accepting of the results of free and fair elections, regardless of whether those results are positive or negative for them personally. If the country is not becoming more democratic, as I expect,

attitudes regarding electoral manipulation should persist, even if these attitudes are not as brazen and obvious as before.

This study attempts to address several hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: Raion administrators continue to participate in corrupt behavior.

Viktor Yanukovich won the presidential election in 2010 in, what is generally accepted to be, a free and fair election. However, completing one or two elections without massive fraud does not prove that fraud is a thing of the past. It could be argued (rather convincingly) that Yanukovich won the 2010 presidential election, not because the system was more democratic and fair, but because there was no serious competition and, therefore, no need for massive manipulation. According to Chernenko, Yanukovich's reelection bid in 2015 will be considerably more difficult due to the declining popularity of his administration. Chernenko expects a noticeable increase in electoral manipulation by Yanukovich operatives in an attempt to retain Yanukovich in power.⁶ If electoral manipulation is a thing of the past, this kind of behavior from Yanukovich's party will not be possible. Unfortunately, I suspect that the lack of manipulation in 2010 should not be interpreted as a sign of change, but instead as a sleeping giant.

Hypothesis 2: Attitudes regarding corruption will be geographically driven.

The party of power in Ukraine is the Party of Regions. This party has its power base in the eastern parts of Ukraine and has close ties with Russian politics. The Party of Regions was the party that perpetrated and, initially, benefited from fraud in the 2004 presidential election. Electoral manipulation appears to be, shall we say, the name of the game for this party. Therefore, I expect electoral manipulation to be most salient in the areas of Ukraine controlled

⁶ It is important to note that this interview was conducted in June 2014, eight months prior to Yanukovich's ouster from power. Obviously, Chernenko's predictions of Yanukovich's viability as a 2015 presidential candidate are inaccurate now.

by the Party of Regions. One point should be made. It is possible that more manipulation takes place in central raions than eastern or western raions. This is because western raions are squarely aligned with opposition parties and eastern raions are aligned with Party of Regions. The actual battleground states (to use American lingo) are the central raions and this is where I would expect to see the majority of actual manipulation. However, my hypothesis does not deal with actual manipulation. It deals with attitudes regarding the practice of manipulation. I hypothesize that raion administrators in eastern Ukraine are more accepting of the practice than others.

Hypothesis 3: The longer a raion administrator is in office, the less positive his views and acceptance of corruption.

The longer an administrator is in office, the less interested he is in engaging in electoral manipulation. It is important to point out that raion administrators are appointed by the president. It can be expected that newly appointed administrators will be willing to show their appreciation for receiving a valuable government appointment by doing everything possible to keep those who gave them the position in power. Long-standing raion administrators have, in essence, paid their dues.

Survey Method and Design

Eliciting truthful responses from survey respondents regarding socially undesirable behavior has proven to be a very difficult task for social scientists (Zdep, Rhodes et al. 1979, Kuklinski, Cobb et al. 1997, Presser and Stinson 1998, Bernstein, Chadna et al. 2001, Corstange 2009). Because surveys are tools that allow respondents to self-report behavior and beliefs, it can be expected that respondents will be hesitant to truthfully report attitudes on sensitive issues,

such as electoral corruption (Gingerich 2010). Respondents' efforts to conform to social norms bias survey results and hinder our ability to accurately study behavior. Obviously, survey responses that fail to reveal true attitudes and beliefs are of little use to social scientists. A myriad of methods have been employed by social scientists in attempts to elicit truthful responses from survey respondents. List experiments, such as the one in this survey, provide researchers with a viable alternative for gathering this sensitive information from respondents (Corstange 2009, Blair and Imai 2012).

The basic idea of a list experiment is simple to understand. Respondents are divided into control and treatment groups. The control group is provided with a question and a list of responses (referred to as control responses). The respondent is then asked to state *how many* of the provided responses, if any, accurately answer the question. The respondent is not given the ability to state which response(s) answer the question, only how many of the responses apply. The treatment group is presented with the same question and an identical list of responses as the control group. However, an additional response is added to the control responses for the treatment group. This additional response is the socially sensitive item in question. Again, the respondent is asked to state *how many* of the provided responses, if any, answer the given question.

An example of a simple list experiment is perhaps appropriate to better understand the setup (Sniderman, Tetlock et al. 1992). In a list experiment designed to test racial attitudes, the following question was asked of the control group:

Now I'm going to read you three things that sometimes make people angry or upset. After I read all three, just tell me HOW MANY of them upset you. (I don't want to know which ones, just how many.)

- (1) The federal government increasing the tax on gasoline*
- (2) Professional athletes getting million-dollar-plus salaries*

(3) Large corporations polluting the environment

How many, if any, of these things upset you?

The treatment groups received an identical question and the same three choices as the control group. However, the following fourth choice was added to the list:

(4) A black family moving next door to you

The hope of survey administrators is that the list experiment will allow respondents to reveal attitudes about socially sensitive topics in an anonymous fashion. In the above example, respondents in each group can choose any number responses without saying which responses they are choosing. While considerably more complicated statistical methods are being invented to evaluate the results of list experiments, the typical method for evaluation is a simple comparison of means. The number of responses selected is averaged across all respondents in each group and these means are compared. Random assignment of respondents to each group implies that, if the treatment group did not receive the fourth response option in the example above, the mean of each group should not be statistically different. In other words, random assignment allows us to assume that the mean of each group is the same if both groups were given only the control response options. Therefore, any statistically significant difference in the means between the groups can be directly attributed to the fourth response option presented to the treatment group. If there is no statistically significant difference in the two means, then the researcher can say that the sensitive response option had no effect on respondents. If there is an effect, the mean of the treatment group will typically be higher than the mean of the control group. This seems logical considering that the treatment group list has one more response option than the control list. If respondents in the treatment group include the sensitive option as one of

their responses, it can be expected that the treatment mean will be higher than the mean of the control group who only had three options from which to choose.

This list experiment deals with the attitudes of raion administrators regarding electoral manipulation, an understandably sensitive topic. The survey was intentionally designed to give the impression that I was interested in the various duties of local administrators. My goal was to avoid highlighting the corruption aspect of the survey as much as possible. Respondents were randomly assigned to either the control or treatment groups. The control group received the following question and list of control responses:

Leaders of local governments around the world are involved in a variety of activities, many of which are unique to local government positions. Some of these tasks are done in response to constituent requests. Other tasks are done at the request of state or federal politicians who have some control over the political situation in local politics. I want to present you with a list of activities in which local government leaders often engage. After reading all of the choices, respond with HOW MANY of these activities you have engaged in during your time as head administrator of your raion. I do not want to know which activities you have participated in, just HOW MANY.

- 1. Discussed economic policy in your raion with constituents and the raion administration's efforts to improve economic conditions in your raion.***
- 2. Met with foreign dignitaries to discuss housing policy.***
- 3. Engaged in direct communication (in person meeting, telephone or e-mail communication) with oblast administrators at least once a month.***
- 4. Evaluated the performance of government workers employed in your office.***

The treatment group received the same prompt and control response choices. However, the following sensitive response item was added to the treatment group list:

- 5. Received some gift or benefit from a private citizen or a government official for changing national election results or obstructing an opposition party candidate from participating in a national election.***

Electoral corruption takes on many shapes and sizes in Ukrainian government. This response choice was written in such a way as to cover as many variations of electoral manipulation as possible. Because of this, the response was a bit longer than the others.

The response choices were designed in such a way as to avoid ceiling and floor effects. Ceiling effects may occur when respondents choose all possible responses. Floor effects may occur when respondents choose none of the possible responses (Blair and Imai 2012). In order to avoid these problems, control responses were intentionally created to either apply to most of the respondents (response choice 1) or very few of the respondents (response choice 2).

The remaining questions in the survey asked respondents to think about various aspects of their job, including but not limited to, interactions with constituents, participation in elections, meetings with superiors, and party affiliations. The results of these questions are discussed below.

Survey Distribution

On November 20, 2013, raion (county) administrators in all raions in Ukraine were presented with this survey. Raion rada (county council) head administrators also received the survey. The total number of recipients was 1097. These administrators are political figures appointed by the president of Ukraine. This survey included, among other things, a list experiment that sought to evaluate attitudes about corruption in government. My interest in the sensitive item of electoral corruption pointed me towards the list experiment as my chosen tool in this survey. I expected respondents to be unwilling to discuss corruption openly due to social desirability pressures. Other questions in the survey examined the amount of guidance and communication provided to raion administrators by oblast (state) administrators. Raion administrators were also asked about the content of their interactions with constituents. All respondents received an initial e-mail, written in Russian, inviting them to participate in the

survey.⁷ Raion administrators then received three reminder e-mails (also in Russian) encouraging them to participate in the survey. The survey was closed on December 9, 2013. A total of seventy-two (72) respondents either partially or completely finished the survey. Partially completed survey results are included in the analysis of this survey for two reasons. First, all of the partially completed surveys included answers to the list experiment, the most important part of the survey. Second, responses to the list experiment question can be analyzed effectively even without considering responses to other questions in the survey. Of course, the ideal situation would be one in which geographic location, party affiliation, and years of service (all questions asked in the survey) were each used independently as moderators in our analysis of list experiment results. However, the small number of responses received makes that sort of statistical analysis futile. The point still remains that, regardless of whether or not respondents completed the entire survey, partial answers that include answers to the list experiment are valid and, therefore, included in this analysis.

Results

The findings from this survey potentially support Hypothesis 1. The list experiment shows that electoral manipulation is still accepted as a viable tool in the political toolbox of local Ukrainian politicians. However, the results are a bit counter intuitive. As explained above, results from a typical list experiment are evaluated by comparing the mean of the control group to the mean of the treatment group. It is expected that, if there is an effect from the sensitive response option presented to the treatment group, the mean of the treatment group will be

⁷ English and Russian versions of the e-mail are available in the appendix. I chose to offer the survey in Russian instead of Ukrainian because it is certain that everyone in the Ukrainian government knows Russian. It is not a certainty that everyone knows Ukrainian. Were this survey given again, I would have included an option for the respondents to choose their preferred language.

statistically higher than the mean of the control group. The results of this survey are exactly opposite. Instead of the treatment group having a mean that is higher than the control group, the mean of the treatment group is lower than the control group. This might seem like seem like a useless or unhelpful result. As I explain later, even though the difference in means is in the opposite direction from what was expected, the results still point to an attitude of electoral corruption among local Ukrainian politicians. The results of the list experiment can be seen in Table 1. The mean of the control group responses was 3.00. The mean of the treatment group responses was 2.28. This is a difference of 0.78, which is statistically significant at the $p=0.10$ level.

Interpretation of these findings can be difficult. What is immediately obvious is that the sensitive response option, response 5, had an effect on respondents. The presence of the fifth response choice in the treatment group caused respondents to say that they had been involved in *fewer* activities than respondents in the control group. There are several possible explanations for this result. It is possible that those who received the treatment are simply less productive and engaged in their jobs than those in the control group. Random assignment makes that assumption difficult to sustain. Another possibility is that respondents in the control group were especially excited to prove to American professors exactly how important they are by claiming to have done all four activities even if that was not the case.⁸ This could have led the respondents in the control group to respond with higher numbers of activities in which they participated than was actually the case. I find it difficult to believe that many raion level administrators met with foreign dignitaries to discuss housing policy. Yet, half of the respondents chose that as one of

⁸ I suspect that there was a certain degree of this type of behavior. If, in fact, respondents in the control group claimed to have participated in *more* activities than was actually the case, it could be argued that the format of the list experiment did not, in fact, allow people to avoid answering due to social desirability pressures, but, instead, encouraged local administrators to exaggerate due to social desirability pressures. This is an interesting turn of events for the list experiment and one that should be studied more closely.

their responses.⁹ Again, random assignment makes this explanation seem rather implausible. If this were the only explanation and raion administrators were really interested in appearing more important, that trend should have carried over to the treatment group, as well. In other words, at

Table 1

# of Responses Chosen	Control Group (%)	Treatment Group (%)
0	3 (9)	7 (28)
1	3 (9)	3 (12)
2	2 (6)	3 (12)
3	9 (26)	4 (16)
4	17 (50)	4 (16)
5		4 (16)
Mean	3.00	2.28
N	34	25
Difference in Means	0.72	
p-value	0.10	

Each group was given a list of activities in which local government officials are potentially involved. The control group was given four options with a separate question asking directly about corruption. The treatment group was given five options, one of which was the corruption prompt. This table shows the number of respondents who claimed to have participated in the given number of activities. The mean of each group is displayed as well as the number of respondents in each group. A t-test compared the means of each group. The mean of the treatment group was higher than the mean of the control group. This difference was statistically significant at the 0.10 level. In essence, the difference between the mean of the two groups shows that those in the treatment group do admit to participating in electoral manipulation during the course of their job as a local administrator in Ukraine.

Table 2

Do you think accepting gifts or other benefits from private citizens or government officials for changing national election results or obstructing an opposition party candidate from participating in a national election is an acceptable part of the responsibilities of being the head administrator of a raion?	
YES	NO
2	22

This question was asked of each respondent in the control group. Not all respondents answered this question. The explicit prompt regarding electoral manipulation produced virtually universal responses. The universality of rejection of manipulatory practices can be compared with the implicit responses given in the list experiment to see that, while manipulation is socially undesirable, it is very much an accepted practice. It can be assumed that the two respondents who answered yes were either exceptionally honest or unable to understand the question.

⁹ Half of the respondents chose all responses.

least half of the treatment group should have claimed to participate in four or five of the given responses. That was not the case. While I suspect that this behavior is part of the explanation for the mean in the control group, it does not completely explain the difference between the control and treatment groups.

A third, and more likely, explanation for the variation in means between the groups is that the corruption prompt given to the treatment group affected the manner in which these respondents answered the question. This effect, however, was not the expected one. Instead of claiming to participate in the same number of activities as the control group *plus* some amount of respondents claiming to participate in the corrupt activity (i.e. the mean being higher in the treatment group), it appears as if respondents in the treatment group were so put off by the presence of the corruption prompt that they actually claimed to participate in fewer of the control activities than the control group. The treatment group actually chose to admit to being involved in fewer activities than the control group.

The mode of responses in each group also helps explain this counter intuitive result and what it might mean. The modal response in the control group was all four response choices (17 out of 34 respondents). The modal response in the control group was zero response choices (7 out of 25 respondents). In short, the modal responses for the control and treatment groups were exact opposites. The modal response of the control group is interesting for several reasons. First, the experiment was designed in such a way that it is highly unlikely that 50% of respondents have actually participated in all four activities. This leads me to believe that the respondents sought to increase the stature of their positions in the eyes of foreign professors by claiming to do more than they really did. This is a logical act on the part of the respondents and completely unexpected by the researcher. Second, the modal response of the control group

demonstrates where we should expect the modal response of the treatment group to be were the corruption prompt removed. This allows us to see just how much of an effect the corruption prompt had on respondents. Not only was involvement in the maximum number of activities *not* the modal response of the treatment group, it was exactly opposite of the modal response for the treatment group. The modal response of the treatment group was involvement in *zero* activities.

This decision by the treatment group to choose fewer of the response choices must be attributed directly to the presence of the corruption prompt. However, the interpretation for this behavior is difficult. It could be argued that respondents were so offended by the idea of the corruption prompt that they attempted to distance themselves from it as much as possible. Therefore, respondents in the treatment group chose fewer response options, almost like a form of protest against corrupt practices. This line of thinking makes it seem as if the respondents (both individually and collectively) were saying, “We are so offended by the very fact that you mentioned corruption that we are choosing to intentionally scuttle your survey efforts by responding with fewer activities than we actually do.” In order for this to be the case, there would have to be some broad understanding among raion administrators in Ukraine about how list experiments work and how to derail the process. Considering that many American political scientists, specialists in this type of research, do not know how list experiments work, I find this highly doubtful. Additionally, if respondents were not participating in corrupt behavior, it is doubtful that they would feel so strongly about it that they would be willing to scuttle a survey simply because a corruption prompt was presented to them. Typically, someone who is not involved in questionable behavior simply states that they are not involved.

A more logical explanation is that attitudes about corruption and electoral manipulation are still very active and relevant. Respondents in the treatment group responded differently

because they wanted to ensure that they did not admit to corrupt behavior in any manner. Raion administrators were put off by the corruption prompt and wanted to ensure that no one could claim that there was even the possibility that they were involved in corrupt practices. 52% of respondents in the treatment group claimed to have participated in two or fewer activities. 50% of respondents in the control group claimed to have participated in all four activities. The effect of the corruption prompt in reducing the self-reported activity of raion administrators is evident and reflects the fact that electoral manipulation continues to be a hot button issue that is on the front of politicians' minds.

In an ideal situation, further analysis of the list experiment results would include interaction terms and moderating terms such as raion location (east, west, center), party affiliation, and time in office. Due to the low number of respondents who answered any of the survey questions and even lower number who answered all the survey questions, no meaningful inferences could be gleaned from this information. The results of any statistical analysis would lack external validity and would be findings only in the narrowest of senses. Therefore, statistical evaluation of moderating factors is not performed. This, of course, means that hypotheses two and three remain unanswered.


Included in this survey was a set of questions designed to gauge what topics local officials discuss with both constituents and oblast (state) and national officials. The survey questions were as follows:

Thinking about some of your more recent interactions with citizens in your raions, which of these have been a topic of discussion?

Thinking about some of your more recent interactions with oblast and national officials, which of these have been a topic of discussion?

The answer choices for each question were the same: the economy, health care, retirement pensions, housing, corruption, or none of the above. Multiple responses were accepted from each respondent for these questions. Figure 4 represents the results of these questions. With the possible exception of the economy, none of the answer choices vary significantly between citizen or oblast officials. In other words, it appears as if local officials discuss the same things with their constituents and their superiors. That could simply be a function of being provided with a limited number of topics in this survey from which to choose. It could also mean something more encouraging. Perhaps topics that concern citizens and are discussed between citizens and

Figure 4: Topics of Discussion with Citizens and Oblast/National Officials



This bar chart represents the percentage of total raion administrator responses to each prompt. This was determined dividing the number of respondents that chose each answer by the sum of all respondent choices. For example, there were a total of 69 res

raion administrators are taken by these administrators and passed on to their supervisors. It would be a positive sign for representative democracy if that were truly the case.

Limitations of the List Experiment

There are a number of issues with this list experiment that deserve attention. The first is the miserably low response rate. Obviously, interpretations of results from this experiment are tricky (at best) with so few participants. There are a number of potential explanations for this, none of which resolve the underlying issue, but at least provide a better understanding of the results. First, list experiments were designed to focus on socially undesirable behavior. My experiment went one step farther and actually focused on illegal activity. It would not be difficult to imagine that participating in illegal activity brings about even more stress and less willingness to reveal one's behavior than participating in socially undesirable behavior. Second, I remain skeptical that the respondents were completely confident in the confidentiality of their responses. Obviously, a belief on the part of the respondents that their answers would remain confidential is vital to receiving, first, any response at all and, second, truthful responses. The fact that the survey dealt with such a hot button issue (corruption) in a country that is known for corrupt elections undoubtedly made the respondents a bit hesitant to answer the survey questions.

Should the opportunity present itself to employ a similar experiment in the future, there are a few steps that could be taken to possibly increase response rate. First, the direct mention of corruption could be removed from the question. Of course, it would be essential that the question still deal with the topic of interest, but more people might be willing to respond if the obvious was avoided. Second, partnering with an educational institution in Ukraine could potentially give greater validity to the survey. It is likely that universities in Ukraine field

surveys to elite actors on a regular basis. Receiving a survey similar to the one I administered only from a Ukrainian source could increase response rates.

Another potential issue with this list experiment is the effects of floor and ceiling effects. For reasons explained above, a considerable number of respondents in the control group (50%) stated that they had participated in all the listed activities. At the same time, 25% of the treatment group stated that they had participated in *none* of the listed activities. The list of activities was designed in such a way as to avoid these types of responses. However, I was obviously unsuccessful in this attempt. Because of the manner in which the list was designed, if we assume that any respondent who answered with a floor or ceiling response answered dishonestly, an interesting result occurs. When the means are recalculated and another t-test is run, the results show that the corruption prompt was effective. The mean of the control group was 2. The mean of the treatment group was 3.167. The difference in these means was statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. Simply dropping these floor and ceiling responses is not, of course, the ideal step in this situation. However, it does provide an interesting measure of behavior for those whom, I assume, responded more honestly.

Conclusion

A discussion of democratization in Ukraine could not come at a more crucial time. What began as protests focused on Ukrainian foreign policy, quickly spiraled into violent demonstrations against government excess and corruption. Upwards of 700,000 people demonstrated on a single day in Kyiv alone. The massive crowds brought international attention to the state of democracy in Ukraine. Concerns about the lack of democratic governance were bolstered when government security forces violently cracked down on protesters in November

2013. By February 2014, the stress from continued and escalating protests was taking its toll on the government. Opposition leaders, supposedly speaking for the people, demanded concessions from Yanukovich, including amnesty for protesters and rescheduling of the March 2015 presidential election to an earlier date. Sensing that his position as president was in danger, Yanukovich agreed to concessions, but this only strengthened the protesters' position. Nothing short of the resignation of Yanukovich would satisfy the protesters. Government orders for police sniper teams to open fire on protestors in February 2014 effectively sealed the fate of the Yanukovich government. Over 100 protesters were killed and many more were wounded. Unable to withstand the pressure from citizens and elites, the government collapsed and Yanukovich fled the country.

The victory for the opposition parties and demonstrators was short lived. Within several weeks, Putin invaded the Crimea, initiated a questionable ballot referendum giving Crimean citizens the opportunity to vote for Russian annexation, and shortly thereafter signed a bill that, at least according to Russia, officially recognized Crimea as part of the Russian Federation. Since that time, what seemed like a worst-case scenario has deteriorated even further as Eastern Ukraine has exploded in discontent stoked by Russian propaganda and the presence of the Russian military. Russian Special Forces have led occupations of multiple government buildings while Russian media, sometimes the only media accessible to those in Eastern Ukraine, continually warns ethnic Russians of their impending and dreadful fate should Ukrainian nationalists retain control of the government in Kyiv.

This situation obviously presents Western countries with a significant dilemma. Military confrontation with Russia is not desirable for anyone and many countries, including the United States, have made it clear that military intervention is not an option. Economic sanctions that

truly force Putin to change his behavior also negatively affect the bottom line of many Western businesses that operate in Russia. Each day it appears more and more as if Putin will succeed in annexing Eastern Ukraine. Putin's popularity has soared within Russia as he continues to play the 'tough guy' role, claiming that his actions are simply a reaction to Western aggression and arrogance. Western governments are timid and the people of Russia seem to feel as if the strength of the Russian people is once again being shown on the world stage. It appears as if there is nothing to stop the slide of Eastern Ukraine into Russian control.

How does Ukraine react to and recover from these events? The findings of this paper do not bode well for the future of Ukrainian politics and, possibly, the Ukrainian nation. Contrary to previous studies, I find that *both* the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections suffered from manipulation by *both* sides. As much as the West would like to believe that pro-Russian politicians are responsible for the electoral fraud in past Ukrainian elections and as much as Tymoshenko might play the role of the victim in the 2010 presidential election, evidence shows that pro-Western Ukrainians are also responsible for a portion of the manipulation that has led to the continued political instability in Ukraine. It seems as if there are very few 'good guys' to be found in Ukrainian politics. The lure of corruption and power has proven too powerful for elite actors on all sides of the political spectrum.

The pessimistic view asks a startling question: can Ukrainian democracy accommodate both ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian views and function effectively? Or, must the country be divided in order for democracy to survive? Since 1991, one thing has become exceedingly clear. No politician has been able to successfully overcome the ethnic cleavage between Ukrainians and Russians. Perhaps, if democracy is to succeed in Ukraine (or what is left of Ukraine after Russia annexes the eastern portions of the country), it can be done only when the

government is asked to focus on the needs of ethnic Ukrainians without having to consider ethnic Russians. Of course, this scenario is one that, arguably, only Russia desires. However, considering the tremendous influence that Russia has in the region, Russia often gets what Russia desires. And, simply dividing Ukraine along ethnic lines does not ensure that the new Ukrainian state will function more democratically than the old one. Again, the findings of this paper show that Western-leaning Ukrainian politicians also participated in electoral manipulation.

The optimistic view of the current situation in Ukraine asks a different question: assuming that Russia does not annex Eastern Ukraine and the country maintains its territorial integrity, is this an opportunity for Ukraine to ‘right the ship’ and take significant steps towards effective and legitimate democratization? The argument that Ukraine is inhospitable to ethnic Russians is a fairy tale composed by the Putin regime. Should Ukraine be able to withstand the current onslaught of Russian aggression, it is possible that Western support and intervention could enable Ukraine to start down a new path of democratization. It is obvious that a considerable number of the Ukrainian people are tired of ‘business as usual’. The enthusiasm for honest governance that removed an obviously corrupt president from power can hopefully inspire a new government to change course and ensure Ukrainians that a better future awaits them.

Appendix

- E-mail sent to survey recipients.

My name is Tony Smith. On behalf of Dr. Michael Findley and Dr. Bethany Albertson, greetings from the University of Texas at Austin. Dr. Findley and Dr. Albertson, professors at the University of Texas, are collecting information about politics in various countries around the world, including Ukraine. They have created a short survey that will help gather pertinent information about local government in Ukraine. You have been chosen to receive this survey because you are the head administrator of your raion. By completing this survey, you will help us learn more about the important work done by local government bodies such as yours in various countries around the world. Your opinion is extremely valuable and we would greatly appreciate it if you could take five minutes to complete this very simple survey.

Please feel free to contact me using the information listed below should you have any questions regarding this survey. If you have any questions about your rights or are dissatisfied at any time with any part of this study, you can contact, anonymously if you wish, the Office of Research Support by phone at 512.471.8871 or e-mail at orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu.

To find the survey, please click on the following link: LINK PLACED HERE.

Respectfully,

Tony L. Smith

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Government Department
University of Texas at Austin

Добрый день. Меня зовут Тони Смит. От имени доктора Майкла Финдлей и доктора Бетани Элбэртсон, привет из Техасского Университета в Остине. Доктор Финдли и доктор Элбэртсон, профессора в Университете Техаса, собирают информацию о политике в различных странах мира, включая Украину. Они создали краткий опрос, который поможет собрать необходимую информацию о состоянии местного самоуправления в Украине. Вы были выбраны, для этого опроса, потому что вы являетесь руководителем администрации вашего района или руководителем районной рады. По завершению этого опроса, вы поможете нам узнать больше о важной работе, проводимой органами местного самоуправления, таких как ваша. Ваше мнение очень ценно, и мы будем очень признательны, если вы могли-бы найти пять минут, чтобы ответить на этот очень простой опрос.

Пожалуйста нажмите по ссылке для ответов на вопросы:

Survey Link

Ответьте нам пожалуйста в течении 10 дней.

С уважением,

Тони Смит

Tony Smith
Government Department
University of Texas at Austin

- Statistical Analysis

While much more complex statistical methods are becoming available for list experiment analysis, I utilized simple means comparison tests for this project. To simply determine whether or not the sensitive item has an effect on respondents (the goal of this study), the means comparison test is sufficient. Had the response rate been higher, I would have engaged in more substantial statistical analysis. However, given that only twenty-five (25) respondents completed the survey in its entirety, very little (if anything) is to be gained by spending time on complex statistical analysis. The t-test was done using R. The following is the R code that was used:

```
#####  
## Code For Ukraine Project ##  
## Tony L. Smith      ##  
## t1s2345            ##  
#####  
  
## Loading car library  
library(car)  
  
## importing data  
  
data <- read.csv("Ukraine.csv")  
  
## attach the file  
attach(data)  
  
## summary of data  
summary(data)  
  
## ttest  
t.test(listcontrol, listtreat)
```

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