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Conviction: The Policy Impact of L. Paul Bremer III

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Conviction: The Policy Impact of L. Paul Bremer III

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Thesis

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For my parents

Conviction: The Policy Impact of L. Paul Bremer III

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While serving as the Presidential Envoy to Iraq, historians, journalists, and students alike became acquainted with Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III for the first time. Those same observers judged Ambassador Bremer's work and effectiveness, without knowing anything about his previous career and how his prior experiences shaped his intellectual growth as a Foreign Service Officer. Therefore, this thesis effectively serves as an opportunity for observers of the Iraq War and historians to put the fourteen months Ambassador Bremer served in Iraq into a greater context. The Thesis tracks his early Foreign Service postings, through his enormous impact on the Cold War as Ambassador to the Netherlands, up through the bi-partisan report that he chaired, which is sometimes referred to as the "Bremer Report." His

career before Iraq allowed him to gain experience in diplomacy, studying terrorism, and preparing himself intellectually to understand and attempt to solve problems in different areas of the world and different sectors within government and out.

Additionally, the Thesis discusses two issues during Ambassador Bremer's time in Iraq. One of the issues, based on interviews with each party, re-explains the nature of the relationship between Ambassador Bremer and Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez. This discussion also presents evidence as to why difficulties at the time did exist, although the overall nature of them have been greatly exaggerated. Lastly, the Thesis discusses the decision to disband the Iraqi Army, and attempts to place that decision in the context of Ambassador Bremer's prior career and decision making.

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Introduction

Ambassador Lewis Paul “Jerry” Bremer III¹ is remembered as the Presidential Envoy to the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. He was the American face of the official occupation during his fourteen-month posting and, as the American leader in Iraq, took much of the public criticism for the United States’ failure to restore law and order and security. However, there has been no effort, be it scholarly or journalistic, to study his previous career and attempt to understand to what extent, if any, his prior experience in government service shaped his decision-making in Iraq.

The central question, or problem, that this thesis examines is how Ambassador Bremer’s previous government career informed his year in Iraq, by understanding and analyzing the roles he previously played over numerous administrations in Washington. Ambassador Bremer’s decisions in Iraq can be better understood within the context of his career. He has, throughout numerous positions and levels of authority, shown a level of independent thought, initiative, and willingness to change course that has helped to shape and define his career. By undertaking this task, the thesis can separate all of the partisan rhetoric and uninformed analysis often made about Ambassador Bremer, and can instead allow for an educated and informed understanding of his intellectual career and the numerous policies he helped shape.

¹ To his friends and colleagues, Bremer goes by the nickname “Jerry”, derived from him being born on St. Jerome’s day.

Chapter 1: Early Foreign Service Career

Ambassador Bremer's early years were to an extent shaped by his father, L. Paul Bremer Jr., who had served in the Navy during World War II. Later, he made a career change from teaching foreign languages to one in international business, rising to the position of President of Christian Dior Perfumes of America, and later in life a consultant to the Atlantic Cement Company, when he passed away at age 61.² As a result of his own experiences, Paul Bremer Jr. impressed upon his children two important beliefs: studying foreign languages, and public service. His son, L. Paul Bremer III, excelled in languages, studying both Latin and French. He was able to supplement his French skills garnered in the classroom by working in France for two summers during his college years at Yale, and then while studying at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris. Bremer also intended to serve his country. As noted by his sister Lynn, "Public service was just in his bones. He's a real patriot."³ After graduating from Harvard Business School with an MBA, Paul Bremer planned to make a career in business like his father. But first, he intended to complete a stint in government service. After applying to many different agencies, he was accepted into

² "L. Paul Bremer, Jr.," New York Times, accessed September 25, 2013, <http://ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/123368065?accountid=7118>.

³ "Bremer Recalls Chaos, Hope Discovered in Iraq," Leatherneck.com, accessed January 10, 2014, <http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-25300.html>.

the State Department, and then entered the Foreign Service.⁴ As Bremer himself notes, an initial five-year plan of government service turned into a career.

Ambassador Bremer's first posting was in Afghanistan, in 1966. At the time, King Mohammed Zahir Shah ruled the country and was in the midst of allowing an unprecedented political and democratic opening, following changes to the country's constitution through a loya jirga⁵. This loya jirga, which was convened in September 1964 by the King, Mohammed Zahir Shah, was an historic event, even by today's standards. The draft constitution it produced promoted equality between the sexes; it created an independent judiciary; and it also created an avenue for the creation of political parties.⁶ One of the parties founded amidst the democratic opening and that began to flourish was the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which had close ideological ties to the USSR. The party's last leader was Dr. Mohammed Najibullah, President of Afghanistan from 1987-1992. When the Taliban stormed Kabul in 1992, they went to the UN compound where he was staying. They

⁴ An article dated March 18, 2013, in the online version of the British newspaper *The Independent*, incorrectly identifies L. Paul Bremer III as having served in the Marine Corps. Prior to joining the Foreign Service, he had never served on behalf of the American Government or Armed Forces. The article can be accessed at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/paul-bremer-on-iraq-ten-years-on-we-made-major-strategic-mistakes-but-i-still-think-iraqis-are-far-better-off-8539767.html>

⁵ "Loya jirga" is an ancient Pashtun tradition that is a mass gathering, or a "grand council," to come together and is reserved for nationally significant events, like choosing a new President or drafting a new constitution.

⁶ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 38-41.

kidnapped him, castrated him, dragged him through the street, and hanged him from a telephone box.⁷ With his death, the party died as well.

At this time, the initial postings in a Foreign Service officer's career consisted of five "cones." These five cones, or jobs relating to a certain sector, were political, economic, administrative, commercial, and consular. Ambassador Bremer accepted an initial posting in the economic/commercial cone, because he had just completed his MBA at Harvard.

Bremer began working in the Embassy as a junior officer and was able to rotate among the cones, as was normal procedure, during his fifteen-month stay. Despite the flowering of political parties and relative political openness, Bremer recalls that there was not much work to be done on the political end vis-à-vis the United States; the current Afghan government and regime enjoyed the United States Government's support and in no way did the US Government advocate regime change.

Typically, Bremer's rotation should have taken place over two years and then allowed for a home leave before another posting. However, because of a scheduling error, he was immediately transferred to Blantyre, Malawi. This transfer, and its location, came as surprises to Bremer and the staff in Malawi. Malawi had only recently become independent, and Bremer admitted that he didn't even know where the country was, and because of its newly independent status, could not even find

⁷ "Flashback: When the Taliban Took Kabul," BBC News, accessed March 14, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1600136.stm.

the city on a map. A British colleague was able to inform Bremer about the city and its location, likely because the city is actually named after the Scottish village where David Livingstone⁸, a Scottish missionary and prominent European explorer of Africa, was born.⁹ Upon Bremer's arrival, a member of the staff greeted him by asking him, "What the hell are you doing here?"¹⁰ Until the old staff was reassigned, Bremer lived elsewhere in the city until assuming his permanent housing and work assignments.

Bremer fondly remembers Malawi as one of his favorite jobs in the Foreign Service. There had been previously been a USAID mission in Malawi, but it had closed for budgetary reasons. Upon taking up work at the Embassy, Bremer realized he was responsible for *all five* cones in the Embassy at once. That meant that, rather than working on just one sector within the Embassy, Bremer constantly moved between all five. Additionally, the Embassy had what were then called "self-help" funds. The Embassy distributed the funds to local self-help programs, for the purpose of purchasing doors for a school, or window frames for a local office. The local community first identified the need, and the Embassy then handed out the appropriate funds to compensate the locals. This gave Bremer the opportunity to drive all around the country and spend significant time with Peace Corp Volunteers

⁸ "Districts-South-Malawi," Wawamalawi.com, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://www.wawamalawi.com/south-blantyre.html>.

⁹ "David S. Livingstone," BBC, accessed March 15, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/livingstone_david.shtml.

¹⁰ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

and Malawi locals, while visiting different project sights and being able to see the finished product.

Malawi and its neighbors did not suffer from serious political crises during Bremer's post. Hastings Banda had been the President since 1964, and shortly after Bremer left the country in 1971, Banda obtained the title of President for life from his political party, the Malawi Congress Party. According to Banda's biography,

Within the 'Malawi tribe' the position Banda had come to hold was like that of one of the old *Maravi* kings, complete with divine right and absolute authority. So, as least, he saw himself, and so he wanted to be seen. At first, unlike a monarch, he was not Head of State for life. Nor, indeed, was this necessary, for Banda held the presidency of the Republic by being President of the Party, and he *was* President of the Party for life. For this reason the Constitutional Drafting Committee had rejected as undemocratic calls by party stalwarts at the 1965 convention, and at the many local meetings beforehand, that he should be formally installed as Life President of Malawi...In 1971, when the first presidential election was due to be held, such considerations were abruptly set aside. Parliament rubber-stamped a constitutional amendment which permitted him to become Life President of the Republic on 6 July, the seventh anniversary of Malawi's independence.¹¹

Even though Banda understood his position to be stable and to last for his own life, the move by Parliament granting him that status officially cemented him as President for Life.

In Bremer's estimation, the political environment was not nearly as dangerous then as it was in other neighboring African countries: "Banda was a relatively benevolent autocrat. He wasn't killing people and torturing them like Idi Amin. By the standards of recently independent African countries, he was pretty

¹¹ Philip Short, *Banda*, (London: Routledge Keegan and Paul, 1974), 281.

benign. People in the party [Malawi Congress Party] from time to time were thrown in jail for opposing policies, but would then be later released and sometimes even rejoined the party.”¹²

Even with the advantage of hindsight and history to judge, Bremer’s evaluation of Banda as “benign” should only be taken in relation to the surrounding African nations. By many accounts, Banda was eccentric. He appears to have repeatedly lied about his age, even into his 90’s; he gave diplomatic support to South Africa’s apartheid rulers, who lavished him with gifts and palaces in return; and importantly, contrary to Bremer’s estimation of his attitude toward political opponents or disloyal party members, he was not as forgiving as Bremer seems to remember. In Banda’s obituary, it is noted that, “When old friends and supporters from Britain and America visited him, he could still be the quiet, courteous doctor they had loved so much, but if they mentioned politics he would become enraged, even hysterical. Once, stamping his feet, he screamed at his visitor that his opponents should “Rot! Rot! Rot!” in jail.”¹³ Africa Watch, a human rights group, asserted that Banda’s rule over Malawi and the stability it provided, “has been bought at a terrible cost of human lives snuffed out or forced to endure years of detention without trial. The best and the brightest of Malawians are eliminated from the scene.”¹⁴

¹² L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

¹³ “Hastings Banda,” The Economist, accessed March 15, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/node/107513>.

¹⁴ Scott Kraft, “AFRICA : U.S. Friends Left in Bind by Malawi’s One-Man Rule : President Banda, 94, has used repression to build stability. Washington urges democratic rule, but some want to wait until the

However, history has proven true Bremer's assessment of Malawi's security risk, or lack thereof, to the United States. The United States Government continually provided significant amounts of aid to Malawi throughout President Banda's rule. While serving as Vice President, Dan Quayle visited the country and lightly suggested Malawi allow for a more democratic opening. Banda's aides rejected this suggestion outright, by declaring that, "the stability of an autocratic system makes more progress than the tumult of democracy."¹⁵

Bremer ended his time in Malawi by making a formal recommendation, much to the dismay of the sitting American Ambassador, that the U.S. close its Malawi Embassy because, in his estimation, it was not necessary. As Bremer saw it, there were no reasons, especially related to national interest or security, which required the United States to maintain an embassy in Malawi. Instead, Bremer believed that, "the United States' main responsibility was to continue to protect the lives of the missionaries, aid workers, and Peace Corp volunteers throughout the country, which could be done through maintaining the Consulate's office."¹⁶ Bremer's recommendation was denied, likely never making it beyond the Ambassador's office.¹⁷

popular leader dies," *Los Angeles Times*, September 27, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-27/news/mn-2901_1_president-banda.

¹⁵ Scott Kraft, "AFRICA : U.S. Friends Left in Bind by Malawi's One-Man Rule : President Banda, 94, has used repression to build stability. Washington urges democratic rule, but some want to wait until the popular leader dies," *Los Angeles Times*, September 27, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-27/news/mn-2901_1_president-banda.

¹⁶ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

¹⁷ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

Working in Afghanistan and Malawi raised interesting questions in Bremer's mind, specifically in relation to issues related to the colonized vs. non-colonized question. As he recalls, a broad similarity between the two countries was that they both were highly tribalized and underdeveloped. Conversely, both countries had very different levels of infrastructural development, and very different historical experiences. As he recalls, "Afghanistan and its people seemed to pride themselves on never being colonized."¹⁸ The only roads and infrastructure in the country were either built by Americans or Russians, remnants of the 'great game' of centuries past. In contrast, Malawi, a former British colony, had reasonably good schools, roads, and hospitals. In Bremer's mind, these two countries posed an interesting thought exercise of what the value of being colonized was in relation to societal development. He is clear in that this debate is more appropriate between historians; he is careful to not draw any clear conclusions himself.¹⁹

However, decades later, the experiences of the countries have not changed. Afghanistan has been in a constant state of war since the Russian invasion in December 1979; and Malawi still struggles from severe underdevelopment, and suffers from very high rates of HIV/AIDS rates, with over 10% of the population between the ages of 15-49 living with the virus.²⁰

¹⁸ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

¹⁹ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

²⁰ "HIV and AIDs Estimates," UNAIDS, accessed March 15, 2014, <http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/malawi/>.

These first two postings are significant because, as in the case of any Foreign Service Officer, they taught Bremer many of the basic functions of how an Embassy operates. In his biography of Ambassador John Negroponte, who succeeded Ambassador Bremer in Iraq, author George Liebmann writes that Negroponte, “viewed [Paul] Bremer, who had no experience in the Third World, as not well suited to the Iraq assignment.”²¹ Contrary to that statement, Bremer *did* have experience in the third world, although even he himself does not see much of a connection between his experiences there and his year in Iraq: “It’s hard to compare Iraq and these two countries. Iraq and Afghanistan are different on any metric that you take; it’s a long list of contrasts. One similarity is the tribes. Afghanistan and Malawi are highly tribalized; other than that, I don’t think there is much.”²² The spirit of Negroponte’s criticism can be used as inspiration for a deeper discussion of appropriate characteristics for the Iraq CPA posting; however, he is wrong in his assessment of Bremer’s career.

Lastly, there is a rather significant memory of Bremer’s that is vital to understanding the beginning of his career. In reflecting back on his time in Afghanistan and Malawi, Bremer declared that, “I discovered that Washington didn’t really care much about what was going in those two countries.”²³ In a rigidly hierarchical and bureaucratic system like the State Department, this is an important

²¹ George W. Liebmann, *The Last American Diplomat: John D Negroponte and the Changing Face of US Diplomacy* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 242.

²² L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

²³ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

initial experience for Bremer. It allowed him a freedom to operate especially in Malawi, where Bremer remembered that, “It was a very small embassy and I had a great job because I had all of the cones. As long as there wasn’t a problem, the Ambassador and his deputy left me alone. I could do what I wanted. I could make a trip up country if I wanted.”²⁴ Undoubtedly, this initial experience instilled in him a freedom of thought in creating strategy and implementing solutions.

Chapter 2: State Department and Deputy Chief of Mission to Norway

While working as Deputy Chief of Mission in Norway, from 1976 to 1979, Bremer served under three different Ambassadors. He worked for Ambassadors Thomas Bryne, William Anders, and Louis Lerner. Interestingly, all three of these men were political appointees, and not career service officers. A question worth investigating is the relationship between an ambassador and his deputy, when one is a political appointee, and his subordinate a career officer. However, in the opinion of Bremer, that question is less relevant in relation to the capabilities and management styles of the political appointee. For example, Bremer remembered that Ambassador Anders,

Had been an Air Force Officer and an astronaut, and had a very clear background and sense of organized decision making and staffing. He expected that I would work with the staff to get him ready for meetings. He was very precise and an organized fellow.²⁵

In contrast his successor, Ambassador Louis Lerner, had a different background that resulted in very different management styles and overall results. According to Bremer,

Lerner was totally different. He was from a family in the Chicago area that owned small suburban newspapers. His mother was the owner and she had been one of the first people in the country to support [Jimmy] Carter for president. Her reward was to get her son made ambassador. He was much less disciplined and was somewhat trickier. It was trickier to act as his deputy because he was not as aware of the managerial aspects of his job. He was not a good

²⁵ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

manager.”²⁶

To conclude this issue, Bremer offered the following rules, by noting that,

There are two general rules. Number one, there is no rule. Secondly, in my experience, there was often quite an advantage for America to bring in people from outside. It’s not a magic art being a diplomat and that nobody can learn it. If a guy coming in from the outside had an interesting and different background, he could take a different look at things. It was very much situation dependent.²⁷

This quotation is important because it helps to clarify how Bremer generally views experts. Certainly, before undertaking any position, a certain amount of knowledge of the area or primary issue is tantamount to creating an effective solution.

However, Bremer here is declaring that finding a solution does not depend on a specific background; instead he is pointing to the necessity of a person to be intellectually flexible enough to be able to approach problems over a wide variety of issues. Undoubtedly, that is asking a lot of an individual; as is shown in the contrast between Ambassadors Anders and Lerner, not all people develop that skill throughout their life. Someone like Williams Anders, who was an astronaut, a businessman, and an ambassador, clearly had enough diversity in his career to demonstrate an ability to adapt to new intellectually challenging environments, whereas Bremer indicated that Lerner’s previous work did not afford him the same capabilities.

During this time period, Bremer also worked in the State Department, with

²⁶ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

²⁷ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

one prominent position being Assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from 1972-1976. Of great importance were the lessons Bremer learned from Secretary Kissinger, and how they impacted his career. Bremer recalled that,

Kissinger brought an intensity to the job that was unique. I wound up working on the staff of 6 different Secretary of States. Kissinger brought the greatest intensity to the job. It was a difficult time, with the resignation of the president. He relied very heavily on career diplomats. He brought a great deal of intensity and focus to details. He thought it was important as secretary to mobilize all of the resources of the State Department towards any problem. That was not always the case [with other secretaries], sometimes they just relied on an inner circle.²⁸

This quotation recalls similar themes in Bremer's discussion of what constitutes effective managers, based on his experience as DCM in Norway. Bremer's praise for managers who utilize all available resources is of interest because it is exactly this issue that he received criticism for while serving in Iraq. For example, journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran wrote that,

Although the CPA lacked a stable of veteran Middle East specialists from the State Department—Bremer hadn't asked for many of them and Powell hadn't sent many—there were a handful at the Viceroy's service: Hume Horan, a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia who spoke Arabic better than anyone else at State; Chris Ross, former ambassador to Syria and Algeria; Ron Neumann, a former ambassador to Bahrain; and Ron Schlicher and Tom Krajeski, two Arab-world experts who had run State's Iraq desk. But Bremer kept all of them at a distance. He limited his inner circle to O'Sullivan, Martinez, and Carpenter—none of who had any prior experience in Arab affairs or any knowledge of Arabic.²⁹

²⁸ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

²⁹ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone*, (New York: Random House, 2006), 219-220.

In relation to what he took from his experience at the State Department, Bremer believed that,

I think it [mobilizing all available resources] is probably what I took to Iraq. It was actually the case when I was Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, I was involved in interagency milieu. I worked with staff from all different government agencies. Not just mobilizing within the State Department, but within an interagency framework. Both of those played a role for me in Iraq.³⁰

Interestingly, this quotation brings up other examples during his career when he received criticism for doing exactly the opposite; for not listening to expert opinions and mobilizing the full force at his display. However, it is also similar to the qualities that he described that made Ambassador Anders successful. Bremer is saying that even if he did not speak Arabic or have expertise in the Arab world, he had experience working within the overall interagency framework that the job required, and that would allow him, with an intellectual flexibility to adapt to a new environment, to succeed.

³⁰ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

Chapter 3: Ambassador to the Netherlands (1983-1986)

On Thursday, June 9, 1983, Bremer sat before the Congressional Subcommittee on European Affairs, chaired by Senator Richard G. Lugar, to discuss his nomination to be Ambassador to the Netherlands. An important theme in the testimony was Bremer's belief in working hard to maintain the extraordinary economic ties between the Netherlands and America. At the time, Bremer noted that,

The United States has, according to the Department of Commerce, some \$8 billion invested in Holland, making us the largest investor. We have over one-third of all foreign investment in Holland. In fact, the Department of Commerce estimates that one out of every six jobs in Holland is owed to American investment there. The Department of Commerce also notes that more American companies have their European headquarters in Holland than anywhere else, except for Britain. There are by Commerce accounts 911 U.S. subsidiaries in Holland employing some 123,000 people. On their side, the Dutch have invested more than \$20 billion in the United States.³¹

Clearly, this type of post would be served best by having someone with Bremer's economic and diplomatic background.

At the end of the testimony, Senator Lugar brought up the important question of the Dutch decision on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) deployment, and the Dutch position on this, considering its membership in NATO. Bremer responded that the Dutch position would likely be influenced by talks on this issue in Geneva, being conducted by former U.S. Secretary of the Navy

³¹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Nomination: L. Paul Bremer, III, To Be Ambassador Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary Of The United States Of America To The Kingdom Of The Netherlands*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), 6-7.

Paul Nitze.³² President Ronald Reagan had specially appointed Nitze in 1981 to lead the U.S. delegation of the INF talks in Geneva.³³

Historically, neutrality, pacifism, and anti-militarism had been prominent elements of Dutch foreign policy, but the landscape shifted significantly when they decided to join the Western alliance against Soviet communism. Without even a debate in the Dutch Parliament, in 1957, Prime Minister Willem Drees approved the placement of U.S. nuclear weapons in the country. Then in 1979 NATO based 48 Pershing II missiles in the Netherlands. Amidst all of this, a growing peace movement that manifested itself into massive street protests soon formed, and the movement was subsequently given the name “Hollanditis”, by the American historian Walter Laqueur.³⁴

“Hollanditis” originally formed out of Dutch public opposition to NATO adding the neutron bomb to its arsenal. The Dutch Communist Party in the early fall of 1977 needed an issue to boost its political standing, and they organized around this issue. They received money from East Germany and the Soviets via East Germany, in order to finance this campaign. Additionally, Protestant Church Peace Councils made a conscious effort to organize activities against the continuation of

³² U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Nomination: L. Paul Bremer, III, To Be Ambassador Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary Of The United States of America To The Kingdom Of The Netherlands*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), 11-12.

³³ “Master Strategist of the Cold War,” Academy of Achievement, accessed March 15, 2014, <http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/nit0bio-1>.

³⁴ Paul F. State, *A Brief History of the Netherlands*, (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2008), 227-228.

the ongoing nuclear arms race.³⁵ The political debate became so intense that on March 4, 1978,

the Dutch defense minister, R. J. H. Kruisinga, a Christian Democrat, resigned in protest, saying that he could not agree to deployment [of the neutron bomb]. Four days later, the Dutch parliament passed a resolution declaring that production of the neutron bomb was undesirable, and the prime minister reported to Washington that, in these circumstances, he could not agree to deployment.³⁶

The movement spread further in 1979, as the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), the principal disarmament group, increased in popularity across the country, spreading its message of advocating for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Dutch soil as a first step toward global nuclear disarmament. Further, in late 1979, the IKV organized an anti-missile demonstration that drew a crowd of nearly 25,000 people.³⁷ In terms of Dutch popular opinion, a 1980 poll showed that, “65 percent of the public desired the removal of nuclear weapons from the Netherlands, while only 28 percent favored their continued presence.”³⁸ However, these overwhelmingly negative feelings towards nuclear weapons often took a back seat to a security reality. Historian Ruud van Dijk noted that, “A majority of the Dutch population would always oppose these new weapons. A larger majority would always support NATO membership and alliance.”³⁹

³⁵ Ruud van Dijk, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 9, 2014.

³⁶ Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb: Toward Nuclear Abolition*, (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 49.

³⁷ Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb: Toward Nuclear Abolition*, (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 67.

³⁸ Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle Against The Bomb: Toward Nuclear Abolition*, (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 67.

³⁹ Ruud van Dijk, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 9, 2014.

Ambassador William Dyess directly preceeded Bremer in the Netherlands. Dyess's position and strategy towards the Dutch, in relation to the placement of cruise missiles and the INF Treaty, failed, although he never saw it as such. Dutch Historian Ruud van Dijk noted that the Dutch then,

were increasingly uncomfortable with [Amb.] Dyess's approach. In one document, [former Ambassador to the Netherlands, and predecessor to Ambassador Dyess] Geri Joseph asks, 'How can we [the Americans] be hopeful?' The response was, 'Don't talk about it [INF Treaty] in public.' Dyess felt that he could hit the Dutch over the head every chance he could. It was not helping.⁴⁰

In later years, Dyess remained committed to his approach, naming his greatest accomplishment during his Foreign Service career as, "getting the Dutch on the right track in the INF."⁴¹ This statement is extremely vague; there also is no evidence that he did this. If anything, being recalled years early for someone championing a completely different approach would seem to indicate the opposite. Additionally, Dyess spoke bitterly about the end of his time in the Netherlands, even refusing to name Bremer as his replacement, saying that, "I left to make room for someone else. I was recalled."⁴²

The reason that the INF Treaty was of great importance to Bremer's mission was because the Dutch were the final holdouts to signing the agreement. At that point, the other countries in agreement to the treaty were Belgium, Great Britain,

⁴⁰ Ruud van Dijk, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 9, 2014.

⁴¹ William Dyess, Interview with Charles Taber, *The Association For Diplomatic Studies And Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project*, March 29, 1989.

⁴² William Dyess, Interview with Charles Taber, *The Association For Diplomatic Studies And Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project*, March 29, 1989.

Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Bremer understood that he needed to craft a new approach, because, as he saw it, “It was the Russian view that if they could keep the Dutch from keeping the missiles, they could open a crack in NATO solidarity.”⁴³

Upon becoming Ambassador, it was clear to Bremer that, despite the protests of Ambassador Dyess, he needed to construct a new strategy. Bremer recalled that, “My predecessor [Amb. Dyess] had the same mission. He took a public approach, and I could tell this was not the best way to deal with the Dutch.”⁴⁴ The State Department removed Dyess from his post because his approach was largely ineffective and clearly damaging the overall effort. This is also supported by Dyess’s subsequent protestations in his Oral History interviews, in which he expressed his surprise and unhappiness with being recalled before his agreed upon term of four full years.⁴⁵ Therefore in evaluating Dyess’s performance, Bremer, along with his Embassy team, developed a game-changing strategy.

As Bremer recalls, there was a significant obstacle to him, representing the American Government and needing to convince the Dutch of siding with America on this issue: “Ronald Reagan was President, and the Dutch thought Reagan was a joke.”⁴⁶ Bremer also recalled a poll in the Netherlands before the 1984 American elections that showed 80% Dutch support for the Democratic candidate, Walter

⁴³ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

⁴⁴ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

⁴⁵ William Dyess, Interview with Charles Taber, *The Association For Diplomatic Studies And Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project*, March 29, 1989.

⁴⁶ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

Mondale, and only 15% support for Ronald Reagan.”⁴⁷ To combat this, Bremer took the view that the Embassy needed to present to the public a friendly, non-hectoring image of America. Bremer and his wife visited all fifteen of the country’s provinces, in order to play on the Pro-American sentiment the Dutch people had of the American people. As he saw it, “We liberated the Netherlands in 1944. There was a lot of potential friendliness.”⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ Bremer never once discussed or mentioned cruise missiles during his tour around the country among the Dutch public, a complete reversal of his predecessor’s approach. He reserved that topic for his private dealings and conversations with various parts of the Dutch elite. “Privately, I spoke with everyone I could; journalists off the record, think tankers, Dutch parliamentarians, and the Cabinet.”⁵⁰ His mission, as he saw it, was to overcome the Dutch popular opinion of President Reagan and promote pro-American sentiment, while convincing Dutch politicians in private to accept the cruise missiles.⁵¹ This approach Bremer championed can be generally described as a “two-level” strategy, with half of his attention directed to the Dutch Parliament and policy thinkers, and the other half to the general public.

⁴⁷ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

⁴⁸ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

⁴⁹ By “we” Bremer is likely referring to the Allied Powers. To be more specific, it was the Canadian Army that first liberated the Netherlands from German occupation. The Canadians, in February 1945, approached from the East and advanced through the Reichswald Forest east of Nijmegen, a city in the East of the Netherlands.

Paul F. State, *A Brief History of the Netherlands*, (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2008), 198-199.

⁵⁰ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

⁵¹ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

Bremer's characterization of the Dutch people being pro-American is mostly correct, although some nuance exists. Even though the Canadians initially broke into Dutch territory to liberate the country, the Dutch people identified the America as the financier of the Allies, and, without America's presence in the war, believe liberation would never have come. As one Dutch scholar recalls, before he was about to come and study in America, his professor said to him, "No matter who you run into, they [America] are our liberators!"⁵² However, many Dutch did oppose America's policies in Central America in the 1970's, because they viewed it in many ways like Vietnam. Undoubtedly, enormous gratitude existed toward America at this time, for reasons related to liberation and also because of the role America played in constructing the Marshall Plan. By and large, the Dutch saw America as a global force for good. To them, criticism of America, while in some cases valid, was uncomfortable, given the overwhelmingly positive role America had played in the country and region as a whole over the previous forty years.⁵³

The significance of Bremer's change in strategy towards the Dutch, transitioning from the public approach of Ambassador Dyess, to his two-track method, cannot be understated. According to Dutch scholar Dr. Ruud van Dijk, "I can't remember a shift that was so significant in the way the American Ambassador

⁵² Ruud van Dijk, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 9, 2014.

⁵³ Ruud van Dijk, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 9, 2014.

and Embassy interacted with Dutch politics, and public society. Bremer deserves a lot of the credit for that.”⁵⁴

Importantly, this change in strategy was borne out of a deep cultural understanding of the Dutch. In order to prepare for the mission, Bremer spoke with all previous and living American Ambassadors to the Netherlands, as well as other Dutch people, in order to understand the country and environment in which he would be operating. Bremer recalled a saying the Dutch have about themselves, that they have “long toes.”⁵⁵ This means it is easy to step on these long toes, and thus easy to offend the Dutch. The grasp and understanding of culture is clear in the different approaches of Dyess and Bremer. The failure of Dyess to know and understand this produced a losing strategy; Bremer’s ability to grasp this cultural nuance unequivocally produced effective diplomacy, both public and private.

Bremer’s efforts culminated in Dutch agreement to the Treaty. The USSR, United States, and five other European countries signed the INF Treaty in 1987. It eliminated all nuclear-armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that had a range between 500 and 5,500 kms, as well as their infrastructure. At the time, it was the first nuclear arms treaty to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals, instead of just establishing allowable ceilings of weapons holdings. By May 1991, the treaty

⁵⁴ Ruud van Dijk, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 9, 2014.

⁵⁵ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

resulted in the elimination of 846 longer-and shorter-range U.S. INF missile systems, and 1846 Soviet INF missile systems.⁵⁶ The treaty is still in effect to this day.

On August 25, 1986, Ambassador Bremer officially left his post to become Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism.⁵⁷ John Shad, then the Chairman of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), succeeded Bremer in the Netherlands, further signaling the importance of having an Ambassador in place to work to maintain the mutual economic ties between the two nations.

⁵⁶ "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces," Federation of American Scientists, accessed March 1, 2014, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/>.

⁵⁷ "Past Ambassadors," AllGov.com, accessed March 15, 2014, <http://www.allgov.com/nations?nationID=3495#pastAmbassadors>.

Chapter 4: Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism

Ambassador Bremer never wanted to be Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism. He even did his best to avoid getting the job. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan requested that his Vice President, George H.W. Bush, organize an interagency commission to examine how the United States fights terrorism. The resulting conclusion of the commission was that the government needed one point of contact to coordinate all counter-terrorism activities, and that the job should be at the State Department and at the same level of Deputy Secretary of State. Soon after, Bremer started to get indirect “feelers” from the State Department of his interest in the job. Subsequently, he did a little research of who had previously been in that kind of position, which had never existed at the State Department. All of his predecessors who had taken this type of position had subsequently *not* then moved onto a good job, and some had not gotten another job at all. At this time, Bremer continued to receive feelers that then-Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, really wanted him to serve in this position. While processing this information, Bremer decided that his first priority was to stay on as Ambassador to the Netherlands through the Dutch elections of 1986 so that the Dutch would maintain the INF agreement.

While Bremer’s previous work experience in the State Department would seem to indicate he was an odd choice for the job, Bremer’s understanding of what job skills the job required told a different story. Previously, he had served as Executive Secretary for two years under Secretaries Haig and Schultz in the Reagan

years before becoming Ambassador to the Netherlands. This position is responsible for all interagency paper flow and decisions; Bremer described it as the “vortex”⁵⁸ of all the information flowing within the State Department, and then going to the Secretary of State. Consequently, this position has high interagency contact. When analyzing the new position, Bremer thought it needed someone who could operate in an interagency environment, which he had clearly shown he could. Bremer then recalls that Secretary Schultz also believed the person in the position needed to be someone who knew how to handle the bureaucracy the posting would entail. As time wore on, Bremer continued to refuse the position. Then, in December 1985, Bremer received word that Secretary Schultz wanted to have breakfast with him in Brussels; without even asking, the subject of the breakfast was crystal clear. Bremer then knew that not only was it impossible to refuse the Secretary of State and that he now had to take the job, but additionally he had decided that accepting the new job would be on the condition of remaining Ambassador to the Netherlands until after the elections in 1986. By staying on, Bremer would be in place to negotiate any new parts of the INF treaty should the sitting government be voted out. They were not, and Bremer subsequently resigned his post and accepted his new position stateside.

As an Ambassador, the new position (Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism) required congressional approval, which Bremer received, on October 15,

⁵⁸ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

1986.⁵⁹ By accepting the job, he took over for Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, whose position of Director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, was transformed into Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism.⁶⁰

From his confirmation hearing, a clear theme of Ambassador Bremer's time as Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism was international solidarity and forcing other countries, notably the Europeans, to join in the fight with America against terrorism. At this hearing, Bremer declared, "the struggle against terrorism likewise must be an international one."⁶¹ In attempting to build a broad coalition for sanctions against Syria for their continued support of terrorism,

"The idea is to have more of a united front in a civilized stand against states that support terrorism," a State Department official said. "Bremer's mission is to try to get more of a coalition of Western nations." Such efforts have not proved very successful in the past because European nations have been reluctant to rupture trade and economic relations just because the United States accused a nation of supporting terrorism.⁶²

In order to build broader coalitions, Bremer and the U.S. used diplomatic means. For example, the U.S. and their European allies withdrew diplomatic members from states accused of terrorism. In a speech given by Bremer in 1987, he noted that,

A growing political consensus among European governments has led them to take a number of measures against countries supporting

⁵⁹ Linda Greenhouse, "18 Are Confirmed Envoys By Senate," *The New York Times*, October 16, 1986, A15.

⁶⁰ "A Job Exchange," *The New York Times*, April 8, 1986, A28.

⁶¹ Richard Halloran, "Experts Assess Impact of Terrorism Surge," *The New York Times*, September 16, 1986.

⁶² Norman Kempster, "To Punish Syria, U.S. Needs Others' Support," *Los Angeles Times*, October 28, 1986, 10.

terrorism. Our allies have publicly stated that terrorist attacks can never be justified and are a disservice to any political cause. They have reduced the size of the diplomatic missions from countries supporting terrorism. For example, last November [1986] in the wake of terrorist trials in London and West Berlin that proved official Syrian involvement in terrorism, Britain broke diplomatic relations with Syria. The United States withdrew its ambassador to Damascus. The Federal Republic of Germany stopped its development aid to Syria. And the European community announced a series of economic, political, diplomatic, and security-related measures against Syria.⁶³

Clearly, Bremer and the Reagan Administration believed that within the architecture of calling for global (especially European) unity in fighting terrorism, there were diplomatic paths.

Bremer echoed this point further after leaving government, in a New York Times Op-Ed, entitled “Iran and Syria—Keep The Bums Out”, in which he railed against the voices at the time calling for the removal of Iran and Syria from the list of states that sponsor terrorism. In his conclusion, he commented on a particular news story where terrorists were demanding the release of two convicted Lebanese terrorists in exchange for two Germans being held hostage in Lebanon. He declared, “Any German wavering would be a blow to the no-concessions policy.”⁶⁴ Consistent from his past statements, Bremer demanded Germany to maintain the no-concessions to terrorists policy that the Reagan Administration had championed. By staying strong, Germany could maintain a united stand against terrorism by refusing to negotiate and concede to the terrorists’ demands.

⁶³ L. Paul Bremer III, “Terrorism and Intelligence: Problems and Preventive Strategy,” *Vital Speeches of the Day*, July 15, 1987, accessed September 30, 2013, 578-581.

⁶⁴ L. Paul Bremer 3d, “Iran and Syria—Keep The Bums Out,” *The New York Times*, December 17, 1991, A21.

Bremer's policy of attempting to get Europeans and the rest of the world on board is specifically relevant because it relates directly to the type of terrorism the United States was fighting at the time: state-sponsored. While there are indeed still state sponsors of terrorism today, the number has dwindled significantly, because many of the regimes in power during that time have been deposed or had their power weakened, with Libya and Syria clear examples. As terrorist groups have become more mobile and splintered off into geographically diverse cells, they have been harder to track but also more difficult to source. At that earlier time, more governments offered protection and finances in a variety of ways, which made attacking the state-sponsors, in a variety of ways, much more feasible and logical.

During his time as Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Bremer amassed fairly significant influence within the administration. There is one event of interest to illustrate this point. In 1988 Yassir Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was scheduled to address the United Nations in New York City. However, against the advice of all of his Near Eastern aides, Secretary of State George Shultz decided to deny Arafat's request for an American visa:

According to State Department officials, Shultz was persuaded by his counterterrorism chief, L. Paul Bremer III, that the United States should make a grand gesture against terrorism—especially in the wake of the Iran-Contra controversy, in which the Administration, albeit indirectly, violated its own rules against dealing with kidnapers and terrorists. By siding with Bremer, a former Ambassador to the Netherlands who has limited Middle East experience, Shultz rejected the stand of the department's Near East Bureau, which argued that

denial of a visa to Arafat would be interpreted as a slap against Palestinians and even against Arabs in general.⁶⁵

The reason for Bremer's decision can be explained with greater context.

On March 1, 1973, members of the Palestinian terrorist group Black September stormed the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Khartoum and kidnapped ten diplomats in total; among the ten were United States Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr. and his Deputy Chief of Mission, George Curtis Moore. The next day, March 2, the same terrorists executed both Noel and Moore, as well as a Belgian charge d'affaires, Guy Eid. While the United States never issued a formal indictment against Arafat for his role in issuing the kill code to execute the hostages on the grounds that an indictment under the current set of laws would have been unconstitutional⁶⁶, there is significant circumstantial evidence that points to his direct knowledge of the order.⁶⁷

There is a clear, straight-line, connection between Black September's responsibility for the assassination of the two American Diplomats and Bremer's decision to deny Arafat the American visa. Bremer recalled that,

There is no doubt that given the issue, all of the so-called "experts" in the Near East Bureau would have opposed denying him the visa. My view of Arafat generally was we knew that Arafat had been behind the assassination of the American ambassador in Sudan in 1973. I remembered that because I then was working for Secretary of State [William P.] Rogers and I remember being in the Operations Center

⁶⁵ Kempster, Norman, and Robin Wright, "Shultz Ignored Aides in Barring Arafat," *Los Angeles Times*, November 29, 1988, 6, 12.

⁶⁶ Howard Kurtz, "Prosecution Of Arafat Rejected" *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1986, A12.

⁶⁷ Howard Kurtz, "Senators Urge US To Indict Arafat In Diplomats' Deaths," *The Washington Post*, February 13, 1986, A10.

when Ambassador Noel was killed by PLO officers on the advice of Arafat.⁶⁸

This exact moment is captured in *Assassination in Khartoum*, when David A. Korn writes that,

Khartoum's telecom report 36 came off the teletype ticker in the task force room of the State Department's Operations Center at just before 3:00 P.M. Washington time. The room was crowded, as it had been for much of the day. The projector quickly put the Khartoum message on the screen so all could read it. It began: 'Embassy observers in a darkened house about a block from the Saudi embassy have reported about 5 bursts of sub-machine gun fire at about 8 shots each.' And it ended: 'We frankly now fear the worst.' A collective gasp arose from the group.⁶⁹

In the face of near unanimous opposition, Bremer advocated an unpopular decision and eventually won. Additionally, this illustrates another theme throughout Bremer's career. He does not accede ground to others, even if they are area or policy experts.

In November 1986, only three weeks after Bremer took the job, the public discovered that the Reagan administration had been selling arms to Iran, while using the money from the sales of arms to fund the Nicaraguan Contras, which was illegal. Disregarding the illegality of the operation, Iran Contra also had a disastrous effect on the Reagan administration's counterterror policy and directly on Bremer's work. The effect of the operation took out the basic framework of the "no-concessions" policy that the Reagan Administration had championed. As Bremer himself recalls,

⁶⁸ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

⁶⁹ David A. Korn, *Assassination in Khartoum* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 170.

The problem was Iran Contra. President Reagan had completely undercut the fundamental moral position that terrorism needed to be punished. The position was that we needed to punish states that sponsor terrorism. I did not, and still do not, believe that crime and punishment is adequate when there are state sponsors.⁷⁰

In spite of Bremer's own personal belief as to the best way to fight terrorism, he and the administration needed to rebrand their fight as a law and order one in order to regain credibility internationally. Additionally, Bremer recalled that it took nearly three or four months to convince President Reagan that breaking the no-concessions policy had been a mistake. During this time, Bremer described the rebranding as seeing, "terrorists as criminals; intelligence, track, apprehend."⁷¹ This approach is also reflected in speeches and public pronouncements by the administration during this time.

In the short term, Iran Contra certainly had a dramatic effect on the administration's credibility in fighting global terrorism. However, the re-branding and new approach in no way changed Bremer's belief as to how to fight terrorism. When facing state sponsors like Syria, Iran, and Libya, Bremer believed that dealing with terrorism on an individual, crime fighting basis in no way deterred states from future action.

Before leaving his position as Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, Bremer directly addressed Iran Contra by writing that,

Some may accuse us of hypocrisy in view of some of our efforts several years ago to secure the release of American hostages. Those

⁷⁰ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

⁷¹ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

efforts damaged the credibility of our “no-concessions” policy. But as the President and other top officials have made clear over the past 18 months, we will not repeat those mistakes. We have learned well the sad lesson that making concessions only results in more hostage-taking or other terrorist incidents. The only way to reduce terrorism is to make sure that it does not succeed. The simplest way to do this is to refuse to make the concessions that the terrorist demands. Firmness is not easy, but it works.⁷²

If anything, Bremer’s stint as Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism and Coordinator for Counterterrorism demonstrated his commitment to working within a well-defined, grand strategy. It is clear that he had a set of core beliefs, like upholding the no-concessions policy and refusing to negotiate with terrorists in any form, which did not waver, no matter the nature of the event that confronted him and the administration. This is no clearer than in his reaction among senior administration members about Iran Contra, and how he turned to lobbying the President to understanding just how calamitous the event was to the foundation of the administration’s core counterterrorism policy.⁷³

In early 1989, Bremer resigned.⁷⁴ He began a decade of work in the private sector, holding numerous different positions at a diverse array of companies. In addition to that, he continued to have a presence in Washington by offering testimony on numerous topics, and chairing commissions related to terrorism and national security.

⁷² L. Paul Bremer III, “U.S. Antiterrorism Assistance Program,” U.S. Department of State Bulletin 61, June 1988, 61-64.

⁷³ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

⁷⁴ “The New Regime,” *The Washington Post*, March 2 1989, A21.

Chapter 5: The 1990's

In 1989, Ambassador Bremer left government service and entered the private sector. He held an executive role, Managing Director, at Kissinger Associates, and later in the decade, worked at Marsh Crisis Consulting, a subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan. However, he remained active in government circles, offering his opinions on appropriate counter-terror methods through opinion editorials, and testimony in front of Congressional committees.

On July 15, 1991, Ambassador Bremer appeared in front of the Committee on Governmental Affairs to discuss, from his perspective, the advances made in the global fight against terrorism. His statement is of particular importance, because he spoke at length about Iraq. However, the subject of his discussion on Iraq is actually its *weakness*, and not its strength, in attempting to conduct global terrorist operations, by noting that, "Some people exaggerated Iraq's terrorist capabilities. While Saddam has used terror consistently for the past 12 years, Iraq's terror has been largely directed at her own people. But it lacked the structure or experience to conduct attacks causing mass casualties on innocent civilians."⁷⁵ Bremer also suggested that there may be evidence that the Iraqi government paid off Arab terrorist groups during the Gulf War to *not* attack United States targets, for fear of direct retaliation from the American Army.

⁷⁵ U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Terrorism: Interagency Conflicts in Combating International Terrorism*. (S.HRG. 102-493), (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992), 109.

Further, Bremer made an important argument in describing the advances that Europeans have made in fighting terrorism. He argued that cooperating has increased dramatically among governments. Without mentioning himself, Bremer noted that throughout the 1980s, “our government played an important role in encouraging this trend toward international cooperation, largely through quiet contacts between our intelligence agencies and policing forces and in confidential diplomatic exchanges.”⁷⁶ Another important link to this trend towards cooperation likely also stemmed from a changing public perception of the Marxist-Leninist groups operating in Western Europe at the time. In his discussion of this transformation, Bremer specifically noted the increase in civilian casualties, as well as the overwhelmingly negative reaction to the Bader-Meinhoff assassination of German businessman Hans Martin Schuyler, and the Italian Red Brigade’s kidnapping and assassination of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. He then juxtaposed the European public’s reaction to those killings, and put them on par with the American reaction to the seizing of America’s Embassy in Tehran in 1979. This is a powerful argument to understand the shift in attitudes of the public and their governments in Western Europe towards recognizing and fighting terrorism within their own borders.

On August 5, 1996, Bremer published an opinion editorial in the *Wall Street Journal*, directly engaging the Clinton Administration and giving, in bullet point

⁷⁶ U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Terrorism: Interagency Conflicts in Combating International Terrorism*. (S.HRG. 102-493), (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992), 113.

form, ten immediate actions the president should take if “President Clinton means to get serious about the fight against terrorism.”⁷⁷ The piece was written in direct response to the terror attacks over the previous two months, notably the Summer Olympic bombing in Atlanta, Georgia, and the Khobar Towers bombing in Khobar, Saudi Arabia. In all, the ten suggestions Bremer makes, acting in the role of President Clinton, are an interesting combination of future and past policy recommendations related to counter-terrorism. His first two recommendations, which read, “The director of the FBI is to take immediate steps to double within 60 days the number of informants the bureau has working against terrorists based in the U.S.”, and, “The director of Central Intelligence is to restore all budgetary and personnel cuts made in recent years to the CIA’s counterterrorism effort, with the specific goal of doubling its operations to penetrate foreign-based terrorist groups within 120 days”, are both precursors to a controversial recommendation made by the National Commission on Terrorism, a commission that Bremer chaired, in 2000. In relation to the past, Bremer specifically targets states and the state sponsors of terrorist groups, using strong language throughout. For example, in bullet point number five, Bremer writes,

The secretary of state will send a diplomatic message to Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi tonight through the Belgians informing him that within seven days he must turn over to us the Pan Am 103 bombers, close down all terrorist training camps, expel all terrorists from Libya, and cease construction on his new chemical weapons plant. If not, Libya will bear the full brunt of American anger. The Defense

⁷⁷ “Terrorists’ Friends Must Pay A Price,” Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/sep96/bremer.htm.

Department is to move elements of the Sixth Fleet into the Gulf of Sidra, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to provide me updated lists of Libyan targets, both within 48 hours.⁷⁸

In the following point, number six, Bremer writes, “The secretary of state is to send a telegram tonight to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad noting that we will reconsider our relations with Syria unless his country immediately closes the terrorist training camps in the Bekaa Valley.” He does not elaborate as to what “reconsidering relations” entails. In number nine, he writes,

The secretary of state will tell the government of Sudan tonight that it has seven days to close down all terrorist camps under its control and to deliver to the Egyptians the men who tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak last year. Otherwise, the Sudanese will feel our anger. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will target known Sudanese terrorist camps within 48 hours.⁷⁹

These recommendations are all consistent with Bremer’s past view on effective means of counterterrorism, and thus do not represent a shift in thinking. Of particular note here is Bremer’s willingness, at any moment, to act unilaterally. The two most consistent themes from his time working in counterterror in the Reagan Administration, to this point, are his willingness to use force, and the targeting of both individual groups, and their state sponsors.

Two years later, on October 8, 1998, Bremer, along with Kim Holmes, John Bolton, and Peter Rodman, gave testimony assessing the Foreign Policy record, six years in, of the Clinton Administration. In his statement, Bremer identified the three

⁷⁸ “Terrorists’ Friends Must Pay A Price,” Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/sep96/bremer.htm.

⁷⁹ “Terrorists’ Friends Must Pay A Price,” Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/sep96/bremer.htm.

things that needed to make up any effective counterterrorism policy: “first, a clear sense of what the threats to U.S. interests are; second, a willingness to act on those threats, even if alone; and third, intense attention from the top down in the Administration.”⁸⁰ Also of note, Bremer called for a renewed discussion on the ban, issued by President Ford, preventing the United States from assassinating terrorist leaders.

One of the more significant aspects of Bremer’s testimony and prepared statement is his willingness to call for unilateralism, something his Op-Ed from years earlier also reflected. In his testimony here, he brings up unilateralism on more than one occasion and, by doing so, echoes some of the future rhetoric of the George W. Bush administration post-9/11. For example, he notes,

In summary, Mr. Chairman, this is a fight [against terrorism] we cannot win alone. We are going to need support, but we need to be ready to act alone. And I think in the end, it comes down to a question of willpower. The fight against terrorism in some ways resembles the Second World War. It is going to be a long twilight struggle, carried out in many battlefields around the world, and America must have a coherent strategy and show leadership if we are going to win.⁸¹

Bremer’s suggestion of fighting terrorism resembling the Second World War is clearly an overstatement; however, the reason for it is likely because of the lens through which he sees terrorism appropriately being fought. He does not support a law and order approach; rather, during his time in government, he dealt with state-

⁸⁰ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Assessing The Administration’s Foreign Policy: The Record After Six Years* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), 13.

⁸¹ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Assessing The Administration’s Foreign Policy: The Record After Six Years* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), 15.

sponsors of terrorism and advocated military threats and action, as well as diplomatic action, as the appropriate course of action. Even in that context, it is difficult to see how fighting terrorism could resemble the Second World War, especially in light of Europe's history of lagging behind in supporting the United States in the global fight against terrorism.

Also, rather bitinglly, Bremer notes that, "there is no substitute for American leadership, since most of our allies, regretfully, would rather do commerce than counter-terrorism."⁸² Bremer uses recent historical precedent to argue for unilateralism, arguing that more support from Europeans came only after America launched unilateral attacks on Libyan terrorist camps. Finally, in an eerily prescient comment that Vice President Richard Cheney would repeat on Meet the Press, on Sunday, September 16, 2001⁸³, Bremer declares, "The fight against terrorism resembles the Cold War in one respect—it is going to be a long struggle fought in the shadows."⁸⁴

⁸² U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Assessing The Administration's Foreign Policy: The Record After Six Years* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), 62.

⁸³ "The Vice President appears on Meet the Press with Tim Russert," The White House, accessed March 17, 2014, <http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/newsspeeches/speeches/vp20010916.html>.

⁸⁴ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Assessing The Administration's Foreign Policy: The Record After Six Years* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998), 68.

Chapter 6: National Commission on Terrorism and 9/11

By Congressional Public Law 277, Congress mandated the National Commission on Terrorism. Congress created the commission to evaluate “practices for evaluating and punishing terrorism directed at American citizens,”⁸⁵ especially in light of the recent terrorist attacks on the U.S. Embassies in East Africa.⁸⁶ Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA) authored the language that specifically created the commission.⁸⁷ Ten members comprised the committee, although one member had to be replaced before the committee began its deliberations.

At the time, Salam Al-Marayati worked as the Executive Director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council in Los Angeles. After being appointed to the commission, a number of influential Jewish Organizations, including the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, an umbrella agency for fifty-five Jewish bodies, voiced their objection to his appointment.⁸⁸ In their criticism of him, they pointed specifically to statements issued by the Muslim Public Affairs Council. For example, one read, “Because the Palestinian people have no avenues to redress their grievances, some of them have been pushed beyond the margins of

⁸⁵ “Countering The Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report from the National Commission on Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>.

⁸⁶ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

⁸⁷ “Independent Panel To Review FBI’s Post-9/11 Response To Terrorism, Radicalization,” Congressman Frank Wolf, accessed April 23, 2014, <http://wolf.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/independent-commission-to-review-fbis-post-911-response-to-terrorism#.U1xqa167Wa4>.

⁸⁸ “Antiterrorism Panel Drops Muslim Member,” *Christian Century*, July 28-August 4, 1999, 739.

society and have adopted violent reactions to express their despair and suffering.”⁸⁹ Officially, Congressman Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO) withdrew Al-Mayati’s name from the commission, citing a longer than usual background check required for him to join the panel. Gephardt explained that the dismissal was not for political reasons, but because Al-Mayati’s security clearance would take one year, longer than the life of the six month commission.⁹⁰ However, Al-Mayati’s wife previously worked in the Clinton Administration, in a position that required FBI clearance.⁹¹

Both Muslim and Jewish groups, as well as Congressmen, condemned the decision by Congressman Gephardt. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee called the decision “shameful”⁹², and Rabbi Emeritus Leonard Beerman declared that,

this assault on Al-Marayati by a consortium of Jewish organizations is for me, as a rabbi and as a Jew, an appalling display of ignorance, mindlessness, and arrogance. In an attempt to dishonor a good man, I think these organizations have dishonored themselves.⁹³

Lastly Congressman David Bonior (D-MI), the man who originally recommended Al-Marayati serve on the commission, “regretted” the decision.⁹⁴ To replace Mr. Al-Mayati, the commission appointed Juliette Kayyem, a Lebanese Christian, to join the

⁸⁹ Laurie Goodstein, “Gephardt Bows to Jews’ Anger Over a Nominee,” *New York Times*, July 9, 1999, A1.

⁹⁰ “Antiterrorism Panel Drops Muslim Member,” *Christian Century*, July 28-August 4, 1999, 739.

⁹¹ “Antiterrorism Panel Drops Muslim Member,” *Christian Century*, July 28-August 4, 1999, 739.

⁹² Laurie Goodstein, “Muslims Denounce Gephardt For Withdrawing a Nominee,” *New York Times*, July 10, 1999, A10.

⁹³ Tom Tugend, “Liberal Jews Blast Gephardt For Rescinding Arab Appointment,” *The Jerusalem Post*, July 13, 1999, 5.

⁹⁴ Laurie Goodstein, “Muslims Denounce Gephardt For Withdrawing a Nominee,” *New York Times*, July 10, 1999, A10.

committee. At the time of her appointment, Kayyem already had the proper security clearance, from her previous work as a Justice Department lawyer working as counsel in the office of the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.⁹⁵ However, her appointment garnered criticism, because of her religion. Ibrahim Hooper, the spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic Relations, declared that, “we’re disappointed that the commission won’t have a Muslim representative. This leaves the issue of Muslim exclusion from the political process unresolved.”⁹⁶

Aside from Ambassador Bremer and Ms. Kayyem, eight other members served on the commission. Maurice Sonnenberg acted as the Vice Chairman. Other notable members included James Woolsey, former CIA director, former Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-CA), and Wayne Downing, retired U.S. Army General.⁹⁷

The National Commission on Terrorism published its findings in June 2000. The first chapter of the report is significant because it builds on some of Bremer’s Congressional testimony from 1991 identifying the transformations that terrorism had been undergoing. Fast forward another ten years, and the Commission’s analysis is an important addendum to Bremer’s prior work. The Commission’s especially prescient evaluation of the changes of modern terrorists is succinctly summarized at the conclusion of the first chapter, by declaring that,

⁹⁵ Laurie Goodstein, “Arab Named To U.S. Panel On Terrorism,” *New York Times*, July 31, 1999, A6.

⁹⁶ Laurie Goodstein, “Arab Named To U.S. Panel On Terrorism,” *New York Times*, July 31, 1999, A6.

⁹⁷ “Countering The Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report from the National Commission on Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>.

They [terrorists] operate in the United States as well as abroad. Their funding and logistical networks cross borders, are less dependent on state sponsors, and are harder to disrupt with economic sanctions. They make use of widely available technologies to communicate quickly and securely. Their objectives are more deadly.⁹⁸

Of interesting note, especially considering some of the arguments by the Bush Administration before the Iraq War, is the absence of any mention of Iraq. The first chapter details the current global landscape of terrorism, and mentions Iran as still being a state sponsor; that the regimes of Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan “provide funding, refuge, training bases, and weapons to terrorists.”⁹⁹ The report also mentions, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba, as well as Afghanistan a second time, recommending to add it to the list of state sponsors of terrorism. But the report fails to mention Iraq even once. This point was seconded when Bremer was later nominated, and subsequently accepted, the position as Presidential Envoy to Iraq. The *New York Times* noted that, “Over the years, Mr. Bremer has not been known to single out Iraq or its president, Saddam Hussein, as major terrorist threats. On the terrorism commission [NCT], Mr. Bremer was more concerned about criticizing Pakistan’s leaders for providing safe havens to terrorists than about attacking Mr. Hussein, commission members said.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ “Countering The Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report from the National Commission on Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>.

⁹⁹ “Countering The Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report from the National Commission on Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>.

¹⁰⁰ James Dao, “At the Helm in Shattered Iraq: Lewis Paul Bremer III,” *New York Times*, May 8, 2003, A16.

In the second section, entitled “Good Intelligence is the Best Weapon Against International Terrorism”, the Commission presented one of the more controversial recommendations. The Commission concluded that, “The Director of Central Intelligence should issue a directive that the 1995 guidelines will no longer apply to recruiting terrorist informants. That directive should notify officers in the field that the pre-existing process of assessing such informants will apply.”¹⁰¹ This recommendation derived from the CIA internal ban on recruiting spies who had a history of human rights abuses. In Bremer’s own words, the justification for this recommendation was that, “if you want to find out what a terrorist group is up to, you have to have a spy in the terrorist group.”¹⁰² And as Bremer sharply added, “You can have the most effective chain of spies you want in a city, but if they are all going to the country club or the League of Women Voters, they are not going to tell you very much about terrorism.”¹⁰³

This is one of the more interesting recommendations in the report, for two reasons. First, the Commission alleges that because of policies like this one, “The CIA has created a climate that is overly risk averse. This has inhibited the recruitment of essential, if sometimes unsavory, terrorist informants and forced the United States

¹⁰¹ “Countering The Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report from the National Commission on Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>.

¹⁰² “New Terrorist Threats and How to Counter Them,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed November 1, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/new-terrorist-threats-and-how-to-counter-them>.

¹⁰³ “New Terrorist Threats and How to Counter Them,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed November 1, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/new-terrorist-threats-and-how-to-counter-them>.

to rely too heavily on foreign intelligence services.”¹⁰⁴ This criticism does not seem to agree with some of Bremer’s past policy recommendations, namely increased coordination among allies in fighting terrorism, something the Commission commends as a recent advance in the global fight against terror. It would appear that in this case, the United States should be taking the lead and not relying on a broader base of cooperating allies; however the Commission does not go into detail regarding the extent to which this CIA policy has caused the United States to rely on foreign intelligence services.

The second reason this recommendation is peculiar is because the CIA itself disagrees with the recommendation. In a lengthy statement released through the Heritage Foundation, Bremer writes that the CIA formally does not agree with the recommendation, because they declared that it is not necessary; Bremer disagreed and instead wrote, “I think they [CIA] simply don’t know what is actually happening out in the field.”¹⁰⁵ Bremer and the commission did not elaborate on the difference in opinion. According to Bremer, the rule indeed was subsequently loosened, but to what extent he does not know.¹⁰⁶

The CIA recommendation is also connected to another shift in the counter-terrorism landscape that the commission identified. While the committee pointed

¹⁰⁴ “Countering The Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report from the National Commission on Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>.

¹⁰⁵ “New Terrorist Threats and How to Counter Them,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed November 1, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/new-terrorist-threats-and-how-to-counter-them>.

¹⁰⁶ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

out certain states that needed to step up their counter-terror efforts, namely Greece and Pakistan, the committee wisely understood the growing power of non-state terrorist actors. As the report states, “the FTO [Foreign Terrorist Organization] designation process correctly recognizes that the current threat is increasingly from groups of terrorists rather than state sponsors.” This understanding of the growing power in the capabilities of non-state terror groups correctly foreshadowed the increasing role these types of groups played in the ensuing decade.

The final section of the report is entitled “Prepare to Prevent or Respond to Catastrophic Terrorist Attacks.” In this section, Bremer and his colleagues highlight that, “Given the trend toward more deadly terrorist attacks and indications that mass casualties are an objective of many of today’s terrorists, it is essential that America be fully prepared to prevent and respond to this kind of catastrophic terrorism.”¹⁰⁷ In relation to this section, Bremer admitted that 9/11 shocked him, but did not surprise him.¹⁰⁸ The Commission details significant upgrades that government officials, from the federal to the state level, can make in order to be better prepared in the event of a catastrophic terror attack. The Commission especially believed in an increased role for the Department of Defense and that it should, “establish a unified command structure that would integrate all catastrophic

¹⁰⁷ “Countering The Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report from the National Commission on Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>.

¹⁰⁸ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

terrorism capabilities and conduct detailed planning and exercises with relevant federal, state, and local authorities.”¹⁰⁹

Without a doubt, one of the most significant conclusions with long-term ramifications of the report is understanding and documenting the change in motivations that, in the committee’s estimation, had dramatically changed the fight against terrorism. Bremer succinctly described this historical change by attempting to understand how the overall number of terrorist attacks have dropped, while the number of casualties has risen sharply. Bremer writes that, when discussing terrorist groups from the 1960s and 70s,

What we [NCT] found were Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups organized along typical Marxist lines, very tightly cellular, tightly controlled with precise political, secular objectives...They would conduct terrorist acts to get public attention to their cause but they did not want to kill so many people that they alienated people from their cause, because they thought people could be brought to support their objectives. So the objective of terrorist acts in the 1970s and into the middle 1980s was to get attention for the cause...The conclusion our commission reached is that many of these groups now are working from different motivations. They are not working from the motivation of trying to persuade people of the wisdom of their particular political cause. They are acting instead for ideological or religio-ideological or apocalyptic objectives.¹¹⁰

The commission arrived at this point through a close study of the available, both classified and unclassified, materials and evidence. Upon entering the commission, Ambassador Bremer did not have any notions of what conclusions

¹⁰⁹ “Countering The Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report from the National Commission on Terrorism,” Federation of American Scientists, accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>.

¹¹⁰ “New Terrorist Threats and How to Counter Them,” The Heritage Foundation, accessed November 1, 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/new-terrorist-threats-and-how-to-counter-them>.

exactly the commission would come to. Initially, the group read and analyzed open source materials about Islamic Extremism. After drawing on his own experience, Bremer knew that the terrorists from the 70's and 80's could be treated as criminals. There were no mass casualties; the goal was to get publicity.¹¹¹

In retrospect, looking back, it is now clear that the Hezbollah bombing of the Marine barracks was a shift in tactics because they were not directed at civilians. We could see that, particularly in bin Laden, that he was taking about something different. He was no longer talking about getting American troops out of Europe. He did not have a narrow tactical goal. He wanted to re-establish the caliphate and was calling for mass attacks. We spoke to everyone in the intelligence community and we visited our counterparts in the Middle East and talked to an awful lot of people and had a lot of classified and unclassified material, and the report reflects a new threat.¹¹²

In analyzing the NTC Report, this analysis appears to be the most significant conclusion, because it has the most relevant implications. It speaks directly to a drastic shift in motivation due to a change in ideology, and thereby also implicitly calls on governments to retrain their counterterror analysts and forces to fight a new type of foe. Much like the United States government and its intelligence agencies needed to refocus their efforts and capabilities after the fall of the Soviet Union, the NCT points to the decade of the 1990s as a fundamental re-shaping of how the current form of terrorism needed to be fought. To put it simply, terrorists were no longer using terror as a means of policy communication; they were now willing to die for their cause, and maim large groups in the process.¹¹³

¹¹¹ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

¹¹² L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

¹¹³ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

There is one final aspect of great significance related to this report. Shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks, President George W. Bush signed into law, with broad bi-partisan support (passing by a margin of 98-1 in the Senate and 357-66 in the House of Representatives),¹¹⁴ the United States Patriot Act. According to Maurice Sonnenberg, the Vice-Chair of the NCT, of the twenty-five recommendations that the commission made in their final report, twenty of them were incorporated into the Patriot Act.¹¹⁵

On September 10, 2001, Ambassador Bremer recounts having lunch with another member of the National Commission on Terrorism, former Representative Jane Harman (D-CA). He recalls sharing with Representative Harman his frustration with not only the Clinton Administration, but also with the George W. Bush Administration's failure to seriously consider any of the Commission's recommendations on altering the national intelligence structure to better protect the American homeland against terrorism.¹¹⁶ Together, they decided to try to schedule a meeting with Vice President Richard Cheney, to discuss the report and lobby for the implementation of its suggestions. The next day, the world changed forever.

Tragically, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were the realization of Ambassador Bremer's greatest fear. His own commission had predicted mass

¹¹⁴ "The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty," Department of Justice, accessed March 22, 2014, <http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm>.

¹¹⁵ Roy Gutman, *How We Missed the Story: Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the hijacking of Afghanistan*. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), 255.

¹¹⁶ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

casualties in the American homeland. In a cruel coincidence, a picture of the World Trade Center was on the cover of the report, in reference to the previous attack on that same building in 1993.

On the day of 9/11, only hours after the two towers collapsed in southern Manhattan, Ambassador Bremer appeared on the local New York NBC News affiliate, as a counter-terrorism specialist, to discuss the attacks. Bremer was quick to agree with a co-host that Bin Laden was a prime suspect, but interestingly also pointed out the possibility that either Iran or Iraq had a significant role in planning and execution. Considering his previous work, mentioning Iran was hardly a surprise; mentioning Iraq, however, was surprising. He also discussed the only real way to get reliable intelligence from a terrorist organization as having a mole on the inside, which he also pointed out, was the goal of the NTC's main recommendation of easing CIA restrictions on the recruitment of spies. In what could be the first public mention of the phrase, Bremer brands the day as being the day that the terrorists declared war on the United States. However, most striking about the interview was his closing statement, in which he declared,

It is a day that will change our lives, it's a day when the war...that the terrorists declared on the United States and after all they did declare war on us, has been brought home to the United States in a much more dramatic way than we've seen before, so it will change our lives. I do think it's important and I'm sure the President and his colleagues when they start talking about this it's important to hit some balance. The American way of life is not threatened by these people, unless we threaten it ourselves. If we start throwing away the democratic freedoms and the civil liberties that are at the heart of our society, that's what they're after, and that's what we can't allow to have happen. And we've got to go about our business, people have got to

move around, I was diverted on a plane this morning, I was trying to get to New York and wound up in Baltimore, and in a way was sort of relieved to see business as usual going on among people. We have to go on with our lives. It's not to say we don't take it seriously; we take it very seriously. But it's not something where we can all jump in a foxhole somewhere and hope the world doesn't come and bother us. We have to find a balanced response, one that makes it absolutely clear as the President said this morning, that we are not going to tolerate this act of war, this will have consequences for the people who did it, very, I hope, very severe consequences, I hope the most severe military response we can come up with. But we also have to remember that we've got a way of life to protect, and that this doesn't threaten us, it's not an existential threat to the United States.¹¹⁷

The day after 9/11, Bremer penned an article entitled "The New Face of Terrorism", which struck on similar themes he brought up in his work on the NCT.

In his estimation, Bremer describes this new face of terrorism as,

Now, we are witnessing the emergence of religio-ideological terrorism similar to the radical Iranian fundamentalism of 1979. To these terrorists America is the Great Satan, the symbol of global capitalist corruption, pornography and drugs. Whereas the secular terrorists of the 1980s hated America for whom we supported, these thugs hate America for what we are. They seek not a shift in American policy but the destruction of American society. To them it is a real Holy War.¹¹⁸

These last two quotations by Bremer appear to be contradictory. Said only a day apart, Bremer is first advocating resuming life as usual, while still taking the attack seriously. In the second quotation, he describes the attack as representative of a Holy War. Considering these attackers had just penetrated the American homeland,

¹¹⁷ "Paul Bremer Interview NBC, 12:46 9/11," [July 3, 2008] Video clip, accessed February 10, 2014. Youtube, www.Youtube.com, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j2pW6WZhZrQ>.

¹¹⁸ "The New Face of Terrorism," New Perspectives Quarterly, accessed January 25, 2014, http://www.digitalnpq.org/global_services/global%20viewpoint/09-12-01bremer.html.

killed over 3,000 people, and shocked the world economy to the core, Bremer's argument to resume life as normal is much less persuasive.

Two days later, on September 14, Ambassador Bremer made an appearance on the Canadian Television Channel CBC, being introduced as a former Ambassador and the Chair of the "US National Commission on Terrorism". In the video Bremer is noticeably distraught, markedly different from his appearance days earlier on local New York television. The reason is most likely revealed at the 4 minute mark of the video, when he states that,

What is personally to me heartbreaking, and my company Marsh McLennan, had more than 1,700 people in the South Tower of the World Trade Center, of whom we only can account for 1,000 now. But it's personally heartbreaking to me that the National Commission on Terrorism, a bi-partisan commission which I chaired, made a number of recommendations to the President and Congress fifteen months ago, none of which have been carried out.¹¹⁹

Ambassador Bremer does not argue that the recommendations from the report, had they been implemented, would have prevented 9/11. While appearing on CNN September 14, 2001, he explicitly says, "I don't argue that had done [*sic*] these things this wouldn't have happened. I think that's not the case. But as we pointed out in this report, there was a risk-adverse culture had been created [*sic*] in the intelligence community. And we focused on the CIA, but I think that it's also been true in the FBI."¹²⁰ However, Bremer does believe that had there existed, as there

¹¹⁹ "Paul Bremer Interview CBC, 9/14, 08:15," [November 30, 2009] Video clip, accessed February 10, 2014. Youtube, www.Youtube.com, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMRjMEVj5o>.

¹²⁰ "America's New War: How Should America Respond to Terrorist Aggression?," CNN.com Transcripts, accessed September 25, 2013, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0109/14/cf.00.html>.

does now, the amount of inter-agency cooperation on intelligence sharing (as he and his committee recommended), it is more likely that conversations among the hijackers would have been picked up.¹²¹ He is also fair in pointing out that not only did the Clinton Administration fail to heed the recommendations, but so did the Bush Administration. However, drawing on his long career in the United States Government, Bremer knew how difficult it would be to lobby a sitting government to take into consideration a report conducted by an outside commission and chaired by him, an outsider.

The second important piece of Bremer's television appearance was his declaration that,

We really have, in the last 10 years, seen a falling away from the kind of Western resolve that was developed in the 1980's to deal with terrorism. Countries have gotten lax, including and perhaps even especially the United States over the last decade, and it's gotta [sic] stop. We're going to have to take advantage of this outpouring of grief and sympathy and support we've seen in Canada and Europe to really mobilize a new international approach to terrorism.¹²²

This analysis is significant because it is essentially a summation of the role he played during the 1990's in criticizing the Clinton Administration and US foreign policy more broadly for, as he sees it, the falling away from the resolve the Reagan Administration built and inspired among European allies. If anything, Bremer's views remain remarkably consistent here. Not only is his criticism consistent, but

¹²¹ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

¹²² "Paul Bremer Interview CBC, 9/14, 08:15," [November 30, 2009] Video clip, accessed February 10, 2014. Youtube, www.Youtube.com, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMRjMEVj5o>.

his view of how to approach the problem is as well: here, he is calling for a new, broad approach to fighting this enemy, seeking help from international allies, under a grand new strategy.

Chapter 7: Iraq

Ambassador Bremer's legacy will always be headlined by the fourteen months he spent in Iraq. The criticism of him during this period is deep and widespread; many criticisms are specific, arguing that he failed to have regional and linguistic knowledge, while others are more general, accusing him of simple incompetence. These criticisms fail to recognize the tremendous work and grueling hours Bremer spent in Iraq, in an attempt to reconfigure an incredibly complicated country previously sown together by a brutal and oppressive dictator, from the most difficult diplomatic post in recent American history.

Ambassador Bremer first received the call to serve in Iraq from the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. While various news outlets have suggested Bremer's initial recommendation came from either Secretary Rumsfeld, or from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a Senior Government Official stated that Bremer's initial recommendation came from the Vice President's Office.¹²³ Ambassador Thomas Pickering expressed surprise at Bremer's selection, noting that he did not have what Pickering deemed as the requisite background for this particular post; Bremer was, in his estimation, "*too* efficient, and not likely to be engaged in understanding Arab attitudes and cultural fascinations, something vital to serving in the Arab world."¹²⁴ Undoubtedly this is something Ambassador Pickering knows well, having served as American Ambassador to Jordan from 1974-

¹²³ Senior Government Official, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 12, 2014.

¹²⁴ Thomas Pickering, Interview by Author, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., January 6, 2014.

1978. Then King Hussein described Pickering as, “the best American Ambassador I’ve ever dealt with.”¹²⁵ This criticism was similar to that levied by Ambassador Bremer’s successor in Iraq, Ambassador John Negroponte. According to his biography, Negroponte, “viewed Bremer, who had no experience in the Third World, as not well suited to the Iraqi assignment. Henry Kissinger was Bremer’s major patron; he owed his appointment to Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld.”¹²⁶

The public press on Bremer at the time of his appointment seemed to be more positive. A news article that was stocked full of quotations praising Bremer by a diverse set of colleagues gave the impression that, although he may have been picked partly out of ideological loyalty¹²⁷, he certainly had the “chops” and respect to get the job done. Dov Zakheim, then Undersecretary of Defense, noted that, “He[Bremer]’s somebody everyone can work with”; a former Ambassador and college friend Richard Fairbanks described him as “smooth but tough.” The perception of Bremer as someone “everyone can work with” undoubtedly stems from his experience working in an interagency environment while at State. A common criticism was related to his NCT Report recommendation of easing CIA prohibitions on recruiting human rights abusers, and how that would impact his approach to dealing with Iraqi leaders and politicians; however, those criticisms

¹²⁵ Charles Mohr, “Bush’s Selections for the United Nations, the C.I.A. and Top Economic Posts; Thomas Reeve Pickering, U.S. Representative to the United Nations,” *New York Times*, December 7, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/07/us/bush-s-selections-for-united-nations-cia-top-economic-posts-thomas-reeve.html>.

¹²⁶ George W. Liebmann, *The Last American Diplomat: John D Negroponte and the Changing Face of US Diplomacy* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 242.

¹²⁷ This view was also shared by former Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Thomas Pickering, Interview by Author, Personal Interview, Washington, D.C., January 6, 2014.

were expressed in weak, rhetorical questions.¹²⁸ Ultimately, they became moot after Bremer signed into law de-Ba'athification, eliminating any chance for alleged human rights abusers from the Ba'ath Party to hold political office in Iraq post-2003.

Ambassador Bremer arrived in Iraq as the Presidential Envoy to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the replacement of the dissolved Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), led by General Jay Garner. Garner had fairly extensive experience within Iraqi Kurdistan, being assigned there after the war in 1991. At that time, he assisted in establishing a governing authority in the territory the Kurds had under their own control. He also, during the same time period, was put in charge of Operation Provide Comfort, a Kurdish resettlement operation.¹²⁹ General Garner was given a six-month term to fill at ORHA and expected to be replaced upon completion of that term. In Ambassador Bremer's opinion, the Bush Administration did not treat General Garner fairly, saying that, "Garner had worked very hard and been loyal [to the administration], but was thrown out unceremoniously."¹³⁰

Absent from Ambassador Bremer's career before Iraq is extensive experience dealing with the military. One Former Senior Government Official bristled at the validity of this criticism, asserting that any other diplomat would not have had extensive military experience, absent a tour of duty working in the Pentagon. By

¹²⁸ James Dao, "At the Helm in Shattered Iraq: Lewis Paul Bremer III," *New York Times*, May 8, 2003, A16.

¹²⁹ "Profile of Retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner," ABC News, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=79540>.

¹³⁰ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

any account, civil-military experience is an important one, considering the job Bremer undertook to restore stability and governance in Iraq. As a result, there has been a common criticism by outsiders that Bremer and Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the top military commander in Iraq during Bremer's time at the CPA, did not mesh well, thus negatively impacting the overall mission. Colonel Paul Hughes described the dynamic between the two men by remarking that, "[General] Sanchez and [Ambassador] Bremer never clicked; they were like oil and water. There was mutual disdain. And at this [senior] level, personalities matter. They should have been taken into account, when appointing them."¹³¹ To be even clearer, a Senior Government Official described the pair as "hating each other."¹³² Bremer and Sanchez had not met until both were in Iraq. And from there, it has been perceived, the relationship only began to sour.¹³³

The popular belief that Sanchez and Bremer "hated each other", or did not mix well, is not an accurate assessment of this relationship. The popular perception, crafted by people who were not involved in the relationship on a day-to-day basis and who formed their own opinion based on narrow snapshots and second hand feedback, claimed that the relationship between Bremer and Sanchez was strained. Certainly, the fractured command structure between the CPA and the military contributed to this. In some cases, the guidance Sanchez received from Washington ran counter to what Bremer wanted on the ground. But overall, to describe the

¹³¹ Col. Paul Hughes, Interview by Author, Personal Interview, Washington D.C., January 8, 2014.

¹³² Senior Government Official, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 12, 2014.

¹³³ Senior Government Official, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 12, 2014.

relationship as fraught with tension or in any way adversarial is not the truth and not an accurate assessment.¹³⁴

When promoted to become lead Commander of ground troops in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez was the most junior Lieutenant General in the entire army. In his own words, he writes that, “On June 15, 2003, I was the youngest three-star general in the U.S. military—only three days in that position, in fact. I had been vaulted up two levels of authority to take command of this situation in Iraq. The burden I felt was unimaginable.”¹³⁵ To be clear, at all times during his time in Iraq, General Sanchez was never outranked by any other commanders. However, this burden was increased because Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld removed much of Sanchez’s staff, in order to make the size of the staff commensurate with that of a 3-star General. This deprived Sanchez of necessary bodies on the ground. One month after assuming command, he sent a memo to CENTCOM quantifying “the overall fill rate for CJTF-7 is 37%. [And] only one of thirty critical requirements has been filled.”¹³⁶

A reason for the perceived animosity between Bremer and Sanchez undoubtedly resulted from the lack of clarity as to who had primary authority. The United States Government did not lay out who had the highest authority in Iraq, whether the CPA or the Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), the coalition ground

¹³⁴ Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 21, 2014.

¹³⁵ Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, *Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 199.

¹³⁶ Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, *Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 209.

forces in Iraq. According to Ambassador Bremer, Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, attempted to solve this issue by awarding Bremer's orders to the military the weight of "Commander's Intent".¹³⁷ According to the United States Combined Arms Center, Commander's Intent is defined as,

a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired result without further order, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.¹³⁸

In other words, Bremer had the right to set the overall mission; it was the Army's job to achieve it. The only problem is that Sanchez never saw, or heard of, any such order.¹³⁹

As Ambassador Bremer saw it, Wolfowitz's order gave him the authority to shape the overall military's mission, while giving the military the right to arrive at the desired end result as they saw fit. This was seen by Bremer and others in the administration as the best option in trying to create cohesion among the civil and military sides. However, as is clear from Sanchez's book, he did not always implement Bremer's orders to the letter. As a result, the lines of communication were not clear between the two sides. This became extremely problematic when,

¹³⁷ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

¹³⁸ "Commander's Intent," United States Army Combined Arms Center, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=33978>.

¹³⁹ Lt. Gen. Sanchez offered the following to further clarify this issue: "Any "commander's intent" would be communicated through the military chain of command to the CJTF7 commander. Furthermore, any directive coming from the DepSecDef [Wolfowitz] that would alter the existing chain of command would have been of such importance and criticality that it would have been institutionalized in a SECDEF and CJCS order/directive to CENTCOM/CJTF7." Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Interview by Author, E-mail Correspondence, March 24, 2014.

five or six months into the occupation, it was clear there was an insurgency. An integral, or possibly even *the* integral ingredient of effective counter-insurgency theory (COIN) is unity of command, which not only was not happening, but really was never going to, considering the lack of clear command structure between the CPA and CJTF-7.¹⁴⁰

An important point to clarify is when exactly the US understood an insurgency was forming. The bombing of the UN Building on August 19, 2003, is the accepted point at which point it became undeniable that the US Army faced a growing and powerful insurgency.¹⁴¹ However, Colonel Paul Hughes remembered seeing signs of the insurgency very soon after arriving. He recalled that,

There are things that all militaries do. They either fight, or train. Standing on the Republican Palace at night, we could see their flares signaling our troop movements. We also saw leaflets and monetary rewards for things done, like killing soldiers or destroying tanks.¹⁴²

At one point, Sanchez writes of essentially ignoring orders from Bremer, during the discussion of how to implement de-ba'athification, from a military perspective:

It wasn't long before Bremer and the military started knocking heads. We went back to him on multiple occasions and told him that his de-Baathification policy was flawed, that it wasn't working, and that no appeals had been processed. But Bremer refused to take any corrective actions...Our soldiers had been working on setting up governing councils, restoring key elements of the infrastructure, and reestablishing some of the schools. Clearly, we had to involve some

¹⁴⁰ Senior Government Official, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 12, 2014.

¹⁴¹ Senior Diplomatic Official, Interview by Author, Personal Interview, Washington D.C., January 6, 2014.

¹⁴² Col. Paul Hughes, Interview by Author, Personal Interview, Washington D.C., January 8, 2014.

former members of the Baath Party in the process. Bremer got quite upset by this idea and fired off a number of memorandums addressed to me and my subordinate commanders. "I understand you are not following my orders," he wrote. "You will not allow Baathists to participate in government or civil operations. Any exceptions to the de-Baathification policy will be personally approved by me." ...I was ordering our soldiers to persist with the work at hand and wasn't particularly worried about repercussions. Somebody had to stand up and do the right thing. Besides, we would likely have already reestablished many of the functions and capacities across the country by the time Bremer would be able to impact our progress.¹⁴³

The last sentence of the lengthy excerpt is, simply put, rather telling. General Sanchez ignored portions of the de-ba'athification order, and saw Bremer in this case as an *impediment* to progress.

Independently of each other, Bremer and Sanchez did not characterize their working relationship as adversarial; rather, Bremer remembered it as "frank, open, workmen-like" and remembers getting along "fine with him."¹⁴⁴ On a daily basis, after Bremer's morning Arabic lessons, Sanchez was the first meeting he had. If anything, Bremer believes any friction may have come from their collective staffs. From his own experience, he recalls significant friction existing between the staffs of Secretaries of Defense and State, and how that can sour a relationship.¹⁴⁵ This appears to be an accurate assessment. There was situational friction between Bremer and Sanchez's staff, because members of Bremer's staff, who were ex-

¹⁴³ Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez with Donald T. Phillips, *Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 185-186.

¹⁴⁴ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

¹⁴⁵ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 13, 2014.

military, felt that they could task directly in the field, something General Sanchez quickly squashed.¹⁴⁶

As mentioned above, Bremer took on the difficult task of learning Arabic during his short stay in Iraq. This is not surprising, considering his upbringing, and his previous language training in his other Foreign Service posts. However, learning Arabic to him was more than symbolic; in his words,

I had had practice of learning a local language throughout my Foreign Service career. I learned Norwegian, Dutch and two local dialects in Malawi. Language gives you an insight into culture that you cannot get from books. It was a carry on from what I viewed as my professional obligation to learn the language of any country I was living in. And by the time I was leaving there, I could understand a bit. Basically what we often worked on were stories about the history of Iraq. One of the impressions that I came away with was the pride that Iraqis have in their culture. It just gives you an angle that can't get otherwise.¹⁴⁷

Bremer's attention to culture is important, and likely something he learned from his career interacting with different cultures in a variety of different countries. This approach of his is also reminiscent of his time in the Netherlands. He learned Dutch to the point that he even did TV interviews in Dutch and was able to read the newspaper in the morning before meeting with his media attaché.¹⁴⁸

Undoubtedly, a consistent theme in Iraq that is representative of Bremer's entire career is the decisiveness with which he acted, even if it was without popular support. An instructive example is his decision to disband the Iraqi Army. While Bremer wrote a defensive Op-Ed explaining that it was not just him, but he and the

¹⁴⁶ Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 21, 2014.

¹⁴⁷ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

¹⁴⁸ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, April 22, 2014.

upper echelon of the Bush Administration, who crafted the order to disband the Iraqi Army, recent evidence seems to suggest otherwise.¹⁴⁹ In a recent BBC documentary, Walter Slocombe, then Senior Advisor for Security and Defense to the CPA, says he informed Bremer that, “I told Ambassador Bremer getting rid of Saddam’s Army, particularly getting rid of the formal institutions, was a part of a general policy of making clear that the old Saddam system was being dismantled and would not be allowed to come back as such.” Bremer then says, “So Slocombe said there’s no, the pre-war plan is gone. [sic] We have to basically start from scratch. We have to build an army.” Shortly thereafter, in a video conference with the National Security Council, Frank Miller, then Special Assistant to President Bush, recounted the scene:

Jerry Bremer was brought into the meeting. He said to the President that he was about to sign an order, which was going to disband the regular Iraqi Armed Forces. There was a moment of shock, silence, around the table. This was of course completely contrary to the views that we had been operating under. So the President paused for what was probably the longest ten seconds of my life, and then said, “Well Jerry, you’re the guy on the ground, you do what’s right.”¹⁵⁰

Much has been written about Ambassador Bremer’s tour in Iraq, by journalists, authors, and by himself. These two examples, with new evidence and insight, are meant to present a greater understanding. It is important to understand the dynamic between Sanchez and Bremer, because until now, the relationship has been

¹⁴⁹ L. Paul Bremer III, “How I Didn’t Dismantle Iraq’s Army,” *The New York Times*, September 6, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/06/opinion/06bremer.html? r=2&>.

¹⁵⁰ “The Iraq War After The Fall Series 1 Episode 2 BBC Full Documentary,” [June 5, 2013] Video clip, accessed March 2, 2014. Youtube, www.Youtube.com, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjuDf-tI3E>.

analyzed on incorrect assumptions; and the lead up to disbanding the Iraqi Army is instructive because it is reminiscent of a theme that has run through much of Ambassador Bremer's career. Even in the face of great scrutiny or opposition, he has pursued objectives that he believes are right, even at the expense of field experts and in some cases, majority opinion. At times the commitment to strategy has brought him great success; but in Iraq, his pursuit of rebuilding the country in the way he saw fit led him to make such a drastic change that there was no room for flexibility or nuance when it backfired.

Conclusion

As Bremer notes on page one of his Iraq memoir, when he arrived, “Baghdad was burning.”¹⁵¹ He entered the most challenging diplomatic assignment in recent American history. He never had an opportunity to conduct a pro-American charm offensive like he had in the Netherlands many years before. Nor did he have ample amount of time to prepare for the posting. With the Bush Administration scrapping General Jay Garner’s plan to install a transitional government, it became clear an occupation was coming, and with that, any pro-American sentiment flew out the window.

Even more troubling was the failure of the Bush Administration to commit an appropriate number of bodies, competent or not, on the administrative side of the occupation. Additionally, according to General Sanchez, “Ambassador Bremer did not have any capacity in most of the provinces until late 2003.”¹⁵² Ambassador Pickering noted that Bremer just did not “have enough Americans around to do it.”¹⁵³ As Bremer himself notes, “There never were enough people in general. There was not enough of anything. Of course we could have used more people. It’s true.”¹⁵⁴ Bremer was put in an impossible situation; he was trying to sew a country back together that was quickly coming apart day by day and needed more and more people to accomplish the job. However, Bremer was working on behalf of an

¹⁵¹ Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle To Build A Future of Hope*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 3.

¹⁵² Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, March 21, 2014.

¹⁵³ Thomas Pickering. Interview by Author. Personal Interview. Washington, D.C., January 6, 2014.

¹⁵⁴ L. Paul Bremer III, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, January 8, 2014.

administration that was poised to sell a quick victory and an even lighter footprint back home.

In conclusion, this work has attempted to place Ambassador Bremer's year in Iraq in greater historical context. By understanding his career and the intellectual impact he has had over numerous administrations, his decision making in Iraq gains the appropriate context it always should have had. When examined in this light, his decision to disband the Iraqi Army becomes clearer; it is consistent with his past strategy making and decisions that, even if they ran against popular convention, were still implemented by him, or his superior, with conviction.

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