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Behind the Linguistic Landscape of Israel/Palestine: Exploring the

Visual Implications of Expansionist Policies

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Behind the Linguistic Landscape of Israel/Palestine: Exploring the

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Abstract

Behind the Linguistic Landscape of Israel/Palestine: Exploring the Visual Implications of Expansionist Policies

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The concept of the Linguistic Landscape (LL) is a relatively new and developing field, but it is already proving to illuminate significant trends in sociocultural boundaries and linguistic identities within heterogeneous areas. By examining types of signage displayed in public urban spaces such as street signs, billboards, and advertisements, scholars have gained insight into the inter and intra-group relations that have manifested as a result of the present top-down and bottom-up language ideologies. This paper applies LL theory to the current situation in Israel and the Palestinian territories through a discussion of the various policies that have shaped the Linguistic Landscape. It will begin my examining the Hebraicization of the toponymy after the creation of Israel, then discuss the conflict over the LL, which can be seen in several photographs where the Arabic script has been marked out or covered. Moving forward, this work addresses the grammatical errors on Arabic language signs, which reflect the low priority of Arabic education in Israel. Finally, this project expands upon the LL framework by looking at the economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territories and how it is

reflected in public places, such as supermarkets, which display an overwhelming presence of Hebrew.

Through the use of photographic evidence of the LL from the region which shows the prevalence of Hebrew place names, Israeli economic goods, and negative attitudes towards the use of Arabic on signage, this paper takes a multidisciplinary approach to examining the history and policies that shape the language that is visible in public urban spaces. The relationship between the state and the Linguistic Landscape sheds light on the power dynamics in this multilingual space. As Hebrew is given preferential treatment, despite the official status of both Hebrew and Arabic, Israel continues to dominate the social space with the use of Hebrew in order to assert their claims to the land. In addition to investigating the power dynamics that are reflected on visual displays of language in this region, this works serves as a meaningful contribution to the Linguistic Landscape by expanding its methodology and units of analysis.

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Introduction

Israel is a multiethnic and multilingual space, where the Hebrew-speaking Jewish majority is interacting with the Arabic-speaking Palestinian minority through a number of mediums that are visible to the public. As of 1948, Arabic and Hebrew are both official languages of Israel, though their disparate levels of use in the public arena suggest otherwise. The road signs and supermarket shelves across Israel and Palestine show the Israeli consolidation of power as Hebrew is increasingly more dominant on these visual units. In order to further investigate the policies that have shaped the language atmosphere of the region, this work will utilize the lens of Linguistic Landscape, a new and developing area of study. While the concept of the Linguistic Landscape (LL) has yet to develop a concrete theory and methodology to define the field, its approach is useful in determining the different influences at play in a multilingual atmosphere. Landry and Bourhis first defined the LL as "public road signs, advertising billboards, street names, place names, commercial shop signs, and public signs on government buildings" (Landry and Bourhis 1997: 25). Examining these items helps to determine the sociolinguistic trends of the public spaces within a multilingual community through using written text as a unit of analysis rather than spoken language, which is not always indicative of the same phenomena. Many of the subsequent descriptive studies on the subject have maintained the same focus to define the written classifications of public urban spaces. This approach is limited to "top-down" influences on defining the linguistic landscape that authorities put into place. However, others have expanded this definition of the LL to include "bottom-up" contributions to the sociolinguistic scenery as

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a means for the individual to define the space. "Bottom-up" items are defined as tokens and signs set up by associations or groups throughout society on the public scene (Ben-Rafael, Shohamy, Amara & Trumper-Hecht 2004: 12). These are often manifested in signs for personal businesses, offices, shops, and personal advertisements. Therefore, both top-down and bottom-up components of the linguistic landscape include various types of signage that mark public spaces.

The field of LL chose these units of analysis because they point to the status of a particular language in a given urban area and reflect the language policy of that territory, while shedding light on the relations between heterogeneous groups that reside within it. The role of the linguistic landscape is to "inform in-group and out-group members of the linguistic characteristics, territorial limits, and language boundaries of the region they have entered." (Landry and Bourhis 1997: 25). While former studies on the LL have only included public signs and advertisements, this study will aim to expand the parameters of the Linguistic Landscape. I will discuss the components of the traditional LL, such as street signs and place names, as well as the interaction of different group members with these items. In addition, written texts on items such as consumer goods are also useful determinants of historical and economic factors that reflect the power relations of a region, particularly Israel and Palestine. Similar to public displays of signs and announcements, consumer goods in shops serve the basic function of marking the linguistic territory and reflecting its inhabitants. Both in-group and out-group members interact with these elements during routine actions such as food shopping, giving them access to a representation of the sociolinguistic setting of the territory. Similar to

encountering road signs while driving, or choosing legal representation based on the represented language outside the lawyer's office, being a consumer in a store involves the same level of interaction with written text. Additionally, these objects reflect the power dynamics in a region; the dominant language on consumer goods reflects economic influence of the majority over the minority.

In their initial work that introduced the Linguistic Landscape, Bourhis and Landry categorize the LL as a useful lens to investigate ethnolinguistic vitality, especially in a bilingual atmosphere. They outline two functions of the LL: the informational function, which marks the geographical territory inhabited by a language community, and the symbolic function, which illuminates the power relationship within and between those language communities. They state that, "Having one's own language enshrined on most private and government signs should contribute to the feeling that the in-group language has value and status relative to other languages within the sociolinguistic setting" (Landry and Bourhis 1997: 27). This can lead to a decline in value of the minority language, causing speakers of that language to look down upon their own native tongue due to its absence from the public sphere. Additionally, it serves as another venue for the dominant group to assert their power over the minority, and "one can consider the relative position of competing languages in the linguistic landscape as a measure of how the dominant group treats the linguistic minorities inhabiting the given territory" (Bourhis, 1984, 1994). Landry and Bourhis investigated this phenomenon within francophone students in Quebec and a number of surrounding provinces in order to study the ethnolinguistic vitality of French and English. This pilot study concluded that the Linguistic Landscape

is in fact a distinct sociolinguistic factor, making it a viable variable in discussions of multicultural ethnolinguistic group dynamics.

Following Bourhis and Landy's pioneering study of the LL, Durk Gorter's *Linguistic Landcsape: A New Approach to Multilingualism* (Gorter et al. 2006) stands out as a significant contribution to the evolving field. Using the original definition by Landry and Bourhis, this work presents Israel as a case study in the chapter *Linguistic Landscape as Symbolic Construction of Public Space: The Case of Israel* (Ben-Rafael et al. 2006). Their chapter outlines a comparison between the visibility of Hebrew, Arabic, and English within homogenous and mixed Israeli cities, as well as East Jerusalem. They found that Hebrew signs with English translations dominated in the predominately-Jewish areas, Arabic-Hebrew signage was the most significant in Israeli-Palestinian mixed communities, while dual-language Arabic-English signs were the most prevalent in East Jerusalem. Their research concluded that the degree of visibility of the three languages on these LL items, public and private signs in the various localities, did not necessarily represent Israel's ethnolinguistic diversity. Rather, they served more of a symbolic function, highlighting the disparity of resources available to the groups within the public sphere. (Ben Rafael et al. 7-27) Several other studies have focused on the Linguistic Landscape in Israel/Palestine such as *A War of Words: Language and Conflict in the Middle East* (Suleiman 2004), *Linguistic Landscape: Expanding the Scenery* (Shohamy and Gorter 2009), and *Linguistic Landscape and Multiculturalism: a Jewish-Arab comparative study* (Ben-Rafael, Shohamy, Amara, Trumper-Hecht 2004). While the aforementioned chapter by Ben-Rafael et al. serves as a significant descriptive

investigation of official and ad hoc signs in Israel and the Palestinian territories, it does not analyze the factors that have created the Linguistic Landscape in this region. Their work, as well as others in the field, have attempted to utilize a quantitative methodological framework by choosing a sample size of signs. However, this number often has no apparent significance; in other words, claiming that the Hebrew language is dominant on 40 percent of signs in a particular area does not equate to real-life proportions of presence and power. Thus, rather than attempting to quantify linguistic displays in my research, I chose to examine prominent signs that had high visibility to the public and exemplified notable linguistic, political, and economic phenomena. As an out-group member, confrontations with these types of signs had a more profound effect than sorting out the relative visible presence of each language. After determining why each of these displays was unique, I chose to look behind them in order to explore what led to their manifestation.

The Jewish and Arab populations of Israel serve as a significant site for studying the symbolic and informative components of the Linguistic Landscape in several formats within the public arena. This work will contribute to the aforementioned works that focus on this region while introducing new potential mediums to incorporate in the LL literature. First, I will discuss aspects of the traditional Linguistic Landscape: street signs and place names. In order to provide context, I will examine the process of naming in modern-day Israel that resulted in the Hebraicization of the map, or the replacement of Arabic place names with words of Hebrew origin. Looking further into the signs that resulted from this process, I will investigate the source of written errors in the Arabic

translations on road signs through a discussion of the treatment of Arabic in the Israeli

public education system. Along with grammatical errors on signs, there are multiple

instances of defacement to the Arabic script on public signage with the use of markers

and/or stickers. By presenting photographs of this, I will look at street signs as a visual

arena for the conflict as a whole as well as analyze the actors in this fight for linguistic

visibility. Finally, I will introduce a new unit and arena of analysis: economic goods in

Israeli supermarkets. This section will examine the economic policies of Israel and the

Palestinian territories in order to explain the dominant presence of Hebrew on store

shelves throughout Israel proper, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Through an

examination of these LL items, it is evident that Hebrew has gained significant cultural,

economic, and political capital over Arabic, reflecting the status of majority-minority

relations in Israel. This study advances the field of Linguistic Landscape by looking

behind and beyond the signs to examine the micro-practices of an increasingly

expansionary government to shed light on the diverse actors involved in constructing the

LL. Previous works that have used the LL as a framework discussed the language

policies and ideologies that create top-down and bottom-up signs; this project delves

deeper by connecting the history, culture, and politics of Israel to the confrontation

between the eyewitness and the language. By making this connection, more knowledge

will be gained about the intricate complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian situation and its

linguistic embodiment in visual spaces.

Chapter 1: Naming Post-Palestine: the Hebraicization of a Contested Toponymy

In order to further discuss the Linguistic Landscape in Israel, we must first consider the process that created the most visible aspect of the LL: place names on road signs. This section will focus on the Hebraicization of the toponymy before, during, and after the creation of the state, which replaced Arabic place names with the recently revived Modern Hebrew language. By examining photographic and historical evidence from the linguistic landscape, I will demonstrate the stages of this process within Israel as well as its continuation as it spreads into the present-day Palestinian territories. In order to address the success of this (re)-naming program, I will be analyzing an interview with Israeli-Arab university students regarding the utility of using original Arabic names. While the process of renaming the preexisting map of Israel served to establish a connection between the incoming Jewish population and their new home, it also erased the Palestinian historical narrative by removing their toponymy and replacing Arabic villages with Hebrew settlements, reflecting the geographic consequences of the conflict itself.

Prior to the creation of Israel in 1948, the contested land was under the auspices of England, and was known as the British Palestinian Mandate. During the Mandate period, which lasted from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 to Israeli independence, approximately 3,700 Arabic names dominated the local topography while a little more than 200 Hebrew names were sprinkled throughout in order to designate the Jewish settlements that existed among an Arab-Palestinian majority (Azaryahu and Golan 2001:

183). Originally, the Zionist mission did not aim to create an exclusively Hebrew-Jewish map; rather, they desired a landscape in which Hebrew, English and Arabic all received equal treatment. However, patriotic-purism took over the process of naming, resulting in a complete overhaul of the pre-existing system. David Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel and an important figure in the progress of Israeli nationalism, stated in 1951, "No names of places that existed should be included in the new map. When we will build in the ruined place a new settlement we will give it a name and publicize it in maps." (Ibid. 192) Similar to signs in the linguistic landscape, maps are also a reflection of an underlying ideology and can reinforce the legitimacy of a proposed nomenclature. They also exist as a form of standardization as the language used reflects the power situation of the place depicted on the map. The following photo depicts the 1942 map drawn by the British during the Palestinian Mandate period, with a second map transposed above to show the forthcoming Hebraicization of place names instituted by the Place-Names Committee of Israel. This particular image is a representation of the co-existing systems of naming that were competing for recognition, reflecting the territorial conflict between the new state of Israel and the pre-existing Arab population. The names transcribed in English are of Arabic origin, while the new Hebrew names are written in Hebrew script:

Figure 1.1: Hebraicization of Arab Villages

During Israeli state building, Zionist leaders were faced with a choice about the national language that would be spoken by the new Jewish population. After consultation, it was decided that Hebrew would be the national language of the Jewish state, in order to renew the relationship between the new Jew and their former homeland, in which Ancient Hebrew was the spoken vernacular. This bolstered ideology allowed Hebrew to succeed and take its place as the next official language of Israel instead of

other prominent languages spoken by Jews such as Yiddish, German, and Russian. The process of reviving Hebrew began in the late 19th century, and by the 1920s Hebrew was a native and public language of the Jews in the area. According to Spolsky and Shohamy, "The New Hebrew, quite distinct in myriad ways from the varieties that preceded it, and bolstered by the ideology was a core component in the building of the new nation." (Spolsky and Shohamy 1999:14). The British Rule made Hebrew an official language of Mandate Palestine, alongside English and Arabic, which heightened its status as it became a language of instruction in public schools. The new Jewish communities arriving to the land, both before and after the creation of Israel, were forced to learn and speak Hebrew in order to enter public Jewish life, as it had become the language of work, education, and cultural activities (Ibid. 1999: 16).

Today, Arabic and Hebrew are the official languages of Israel. However, the language policy of the state is not comprehensive, which has resulted in an unequal relationship between the two Semitic languages. Both Arabic and Hebrew can be used by members of the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, and printed money, postage stamps, and Knesset laws are written in both Arabic and Hebrew. Despite both having official legal status, Hebrew definitely enjoys preferential placement over Arabic. According to the Citizenship Law of 1952, "'some knowledge of Hebrew'" is required for Israeli citizenship; however, it is not necessary for immigrants to have any knowledge of Arabic. Additionally, the Chamber of Advocates Law of 1961 requires a "'sufficient knowledge of Hebrew'" in order for one to register as a law clerk. (Amara 1999: 90). In predominately Arab schools in Israel, Arabic is the language of instruction, while Jewish-

majority schools primarily teach in Hebrew. As a result, the two languages are separate, and thus many Arab students fall behind in their Hebrew proficiency. Arabic is an optional foreign language in Jewish schools, while Arab students typically study English as their second language (Amara 1999: 92). Because Hebrew has a higher official status than Arabic, Israelis as well as Arabs consider it to be more legitimate; and as it became increasingly standardized and regulated, in forms such as signs and maps, that legitimacy has increased. According to Grillo (1989), "In contemporary nation-states, a legitimate language is generally inseparably bound to the definition of the national culture and collective history" (Ben-Rafael 1994: 12). Therefore, the rise of the Hebrew language rose alongside Jewish nationalism and legitimacy, allowing it shape the culture of the collective Israeli population. Additionally, it succeeded in solidifying itself as the true official language of Israel after experiencing a multi-front battle; first, it had to defeat other languages spoken by Jewish migrants. After winning this battle, Hebrew continued on to gain prestige over Arabic, an indigenous language that was spoken by the majority before the creation of Israel.

The Zionist national project consisted of a radical process of Hebraicization that not only involved the revival of the Hebrew language as the national spoken language of the new state of Israel, but also consisted of redrawing the map to reflect Hebrew dominance over the geography. Many Jews who migrated to Israel following the Zionist movement during the early to mid-20th century considered Palestine to be a no-man's land, lacking a native population. In order to perpetuate these perceptions, the Zionist project established the Names Committee in the 1920s with the responsibility of either

replacing original Arab names for villages and areas or creating new ones where a name did not previously exist. After the creation of the state in 1948, the project was further institutionalized with a name-change to the "Israel Place-Names Committee" which was responsible for continuing the naming project with the use of Zionist or biblical nomenclature. This process resulted in the "nativization" of the new Jewish population in Israel by creating the illusion of deep historical ties to their new home. I refer to this as an illusion because in many instances an Ancient Hebrew name did not preclude the Arabic one that was widely used by local populations before the Hebrew naming project, alluding to the absence of a pre-existing Hebrew-speaking population. The founders of the state viewed the existence of Arabic names in a Jewish state as a cognitive dissonance, believing that, "'the conventional names should be replaced by new ones…since, in an anticipation of renewing our days as of old and living the life of a healthy people that is rooted in the soil of our country, we must begin in the fundamental Hebraiciziation of our country's map.'" (Azaryahu and Golan 2001: 184). Thus, replacing the Arabic nomenclature completely with Hebrew was fundamental to the progress of the state in order to establish a firm connection between the people and its land. Between 1925 and 1951, the committee designated 415 Hebrew names to newly founded settlements, 108 of which were historical names, or ancient names that were restored, 120 were commemorative for Zionist figures, and 187 were symbolic and taken from Biblical or Talmudic Hebrew (Azaryahu and Golan 2001: 183).

As these Zionist and biblical place-names were perceived to be original and legitimate by the incoming Jewish population, they became normalized and standardized.

"Naming a place functions as a public claim. Repeating a name, standardising it, and displacing former names normalises it." (Peteet 2005: 157). Through their repetition by this new population and their continued use in subsequent generations, a new historical narrative was created and effectively erased the pre-existing Palestinian claim to the land. According to a former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, this act was a "'declaration of war'" on Palestinian heritage, effectively creating a "narrative of origin" for the Israelis (Peteet 2005: 158, Benvenisti 2000). After the Names Committee and Israel Place-Names Committee decided on the new map for Israel, they further standardized these names by transcribing them on street signs, composing a significant aspect of the Linguistic Landscape of the Jewish state. As the linguistic landscape of an area is studied in order to gain understanding about the community that it represents, one would gather from the presence of Hebrew place-names on signs that the population has a legitimate claim to public space. Due to the ancient biblical nature of some of the place names, it could also be assumed that that population has a deeply rooted historical claim to that land, effectively neglecting the prior presence of a Palestinian population that did not have the opportunity to standardize its place vocabulary.

During my research in the region, I took note of several of these Hebrew place-name signs that asserted Israeli control while ignoring the Arab past of the area. While some of these locations date back to the creation of the Israeli state, other photographs of this aspect of the linguistic landscape point to the continuation of re-naming ideologies and practices. In fact, as documented by Hanna Bitan, the coordinator of the Israeli Governmental Names Commisson, 7,000 Hebrew names were determined up until 1992

(Azaryahu and Golan 2001: 192). This means that after the intense process of naming that lasted from 1925-1952 during the initial establishment and nativization of Israel, the committee continued to name 6,585 additional places. The original mandate for the Names Commission limited its Hebraiciziation to Israeli territory only, disallowing the continuation of the policy to the other Israeli-controlled territories. However, after the 1967 War, in which Israel gained significant territory in the Golan Heights and West Bank, a Hebrew toponymy was instituted in places of dense Jewish settlement for the sake of consistency. Following the de-facto annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981, the entire area adopted a Hebrew nomenclature. (Azaryahu and Golan 2001: 189). Thus,

> In the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate *naming* as the official imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, agents bring into play the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles. (Bourdieu 2003: 249)

Israel has gained a monopoly over the production of a common sense, or common system of toponymy, by acquiring the lands it has (re)named through prior struggles, or wars.

The following photographs display evidence of the Hebraicization of the linguistic landscape and its continuation outside of Israel proper. This photograph depicts a road sign from East Jerusalem, which points to the Israeli settlement of Pisgat Ze'ev. The settlement was established in 1984, after the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem were extended further east. Settlers built the village on a hilltop, known previously by Arabs as Ras at-Tawil. The original name chosen by Israel was a Hebrew translation of the area's original Arabic name, Pisgat Tal. However, they instead chose

the name Pisgat Ze'ev in honor of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, a prominent leader of Zionism.[1]

The Arabic text on this sign is a transliteration of the Hebrew name Pisgat Ze'ev, rather

than a translation of the name into Arabic or the use of the area's original Arabic title.

Figure 1.2: Pisgat Ze'ev

While Pisgat Ze'ev has been the standardized name of this settlement for almost

thirty years, photographic evidence shows that this process of laying claim to territory

through naming is still occuring. This upcoming photo is a road sign from within the

Israeli-controlled areas of the West Bank, between the Palestinian towns of Ramallah and

Birzeit. The Hebrew name tops each sign, followed by Arabic, and then English. On the

sign pointing towards Jerusalem, the Arabic translation consists of both the transliterated

Hebrew name, Yerushalim, as well as the Arabic name, al-Quds, in parantheses. This

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[1]http://www.jerusalem.muni.il/jer_sys/picture/atarim/site_form_atar_eng.asp?site_id=2277&pic_cat=4&icon_cat=6&york_cat=9&type_id=197

structure connotes that the Hebrew name is the true name, while the Arabic version is listed as an afterthought. This reflects Israel's expansionist goals as they insist on claiming Jerusalem as their true capital. Furthermore, the remainder of the place names on this sign board are Israeli settlements. The Arabic portions of these signs only include the transliterated Hebrew name, without reference to their historical origins and previous Arabic names.

Figure 1.3: West Bank Directional Sign

Each of the settlements listed on this sign have their own individual stories of conflict and turmoil between the Jewish settlers and the local Palestinian population. For example, Bet El, one of the larger Jewish settlements in the West Bank with a population of over 6,000 residents, has been the focus of international attention recently due to

illegal construction of new outposts. Originally privately-owned Palestinian land of the al-Bireh and Dura al Qar' districts, Bet El was acquired by the state of Israel by military order and later taken over by 17 Jewish settler families in 1977. According to the leading Israeli news source Ha'aretz, recent discoveries made by the World Zionist Organization in October of 2013 revealed that approximately 250 structures had been built illegally, causing them to cease all land transactions. Complaints and petititions had been submitted by Palestinian landowners in prior years accusing the settlers of building on private Palestinian land, causing 30 apartment units to be demolished. [2] The dispute over Bet El land continues to this day while the international community continues to criticize all settlement building activities in the West Bank. Despite local and international disapproval of Bet El's expansion efforts, this street sign signifies that Israel recognizes its legitimacy without acknowledging the surrouding Arab towns and districts that are under threat of settler appropriation. The name Bet El translates to "The House of God" in Hebrew, referring to Genesis 28:19 in which Jacob dreamt of angels on a ladder stretching to Heaven, upon which God promises to Jacob the land of Canaan. The Bet El settlement is adjacent to the Palestinian village Beitin, which is believed to be the ancient site of this biblical covenant (Robinson and Smith 1838 449-450).

In addition to its tacit support of settlement expansion, several aspects of this sign point to the continuation and expansion of Israeli (re)naming policies. Firstly, it is located in the West Bank, on a road that connects Palestinian villages and cities, as well as Jewish settlements. It is important to note that it is illegal for Israeli citizens to enter

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[2] http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.552422

Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank, and most Israelis do not enter the West Bank at all unless they have relatives or friends that reside in settlements. Because Israeli citizens are not viewing these signs, they are not related to the original motives or naming which were to establish a historical connection to the land for immigrants to Israel. Also relevant to this discussion is the fact that Israel declared Jerusalem to be its capital, although the majority of the international community has not recognized this declaration and maintain their embassies and consulates in Tel Aviv. The use of the Hebrew name Yerushalim on the Arabic portion of the sign pointing towards the city signifies that Israeli leadership is asserting its ownership over the holy city, while only including the Arabic name as an afterthought in parentheses. While the Jewish settlement population is continuing to grow and build in the West Bank, further encroaching on Palestinian land, the Israeli state is attempting to translate this dominance over land into legitimate power of naming. As Bourdieu states,

> In the symbolic struggle for the production of common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate *naming* as the official imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, agents bring into play the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles. (Bourdieu 2003: 224)

In its efforts to produce a new categorization of the land, Israel is utilizing its status as a legitimate regional authority to create a Linguistic Landscape that reflects its interests for changing the social composition in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Through Israel's ongoing naming efforts that began before the creation of the state in 1948, they have succeeded in erasing the Palestinian historical narrative from the Israeli-Arab memory. This is evident in interviews with university students conducted in

2006 by Dafna Yitzhaki, in which she held focus group sessions with three distinct types of community members: religiously observant Jews, secular Jews, and Israeli Arabs of Druze, Muslim, and Christian affiliation. She posed questions to the students regarding the use of Arabic and Hebrew in the public sphere in order to gain insight on their feelings towards the language policies in Israel. Of particular interest to this study is an interview with Israeli-Arabs regarding the use of original Arabic names on street signs. The transcript is as follows:

> J: Of course the [road] signs should state the original names
> R: But no one knows the original names
> J: I can ask my grandfather
> M: The original name can be written in brackets
> J.: I have an example, take 'Ben Ami', the sign says 'Ben Ami', but originally it's 'Um al-Faraj'
> R.: But we don't know it as 'Um al-Faraj', we know it as 'Ben Ami'
> J.: Why shouldn't it state the original name?
> R: What will you say 'I want to go to 'Um al-Faraj'?
> B: It's important just to write the original names
> R: But we don't know them
> J: The elders know them
> R: It's just a road sign, not a history lesson (FG- 4, 251–261) (Yitzhaki 2010: 346)

In this focus group discussion, the participants use Ben Ami as an example of an Israeli town that was previously an Arab village. Prior to 1948, the town existed as Um al-Faraj, an Arab-Muslim village. During the War of Independence it was demolished by Operation Ben Ami, and the Jewish town was established in 1949. It is evident from this discussion that the participants are unaware of the history of Ben Ami, signifying that Israeli efforts to cover pre-existing histories have succeeded. Although participant J claims that the elders know the original names in Arabic, it is clear that the younger generation is not aware of them.

Throughout this dialogue, it seems that each speaker has taken a firm position on the subject and is not willing to succumb to the points of view presented by the other interlocutors. Participant J consistently tries to convince R that stating the original names on the signs is important; however, his reasons are not enough to sway R's insistence that using the Arabic names is impractical and outdated. In fact, J does not provide evidence for why the Arabic names should be written, simply claiming, "It's important". R maintains that no one knows this town as Um al-Faraj, and therefore it is insensible to refer to it as such. Appealing to logic and utility, R consistently asserts that if the majority of people do not know or use the Arabic name when referring to Ben Ami, then it does not make sense to start calling it Um al-Faraj. In the last line of the discussion, R clarifies his stance on the utility of these road signs by saying, "It's just a road sign, not a history lesson". It is clear from this final line that J and R are not only basing their arguments on the use of the Hebrew or Arabic name, but also on the significance and value of a road sign. However, it is signs such as the road sign for Ben Ami that help to compose the Linguistic Landscape (LL) of the region, giving us an insight into the sociolinguistic characteristics of the area. Therefore, the sign for Ben Ami is not "just a sign"; on the contrary, it points to the political hegemony of Israel and their preference for Hebrew place names in order to erase knowledge of pre-existing Palestinian towns and villages.

Exploring agency in this conversation also reveals notable perspectives on the language policies of Israel. Throughout the conversation, the participants do not mention the state once as an actor. The respondents give no agency to the Israeli government for

the status of Arabic place names, and the speakers never mention *who* is creating the signs that are the focus of the conversation. The use of passive voice throughout the conversation highlights this lack of attributing agency to Israel. For example, speaker M says, "The original name can be written in brackets", rather than saying, "The state can write the original name in brackets". Instead, they give agency to the sign itself. Speaker J states, "Of course the signs should state the original names" and later, "The sign says 'Ben Ami'". They completely ignore the presence of the national authority that exists not only to create the names that appear on these signs, but also the municipal authority that creates and installs the physical signs. Therefore, the signs themselves determine the identity of these places, rather than the state that has designed the policy reflected on the signs.

This policy has clearly been effective as there is a clear disconnect between this particular group of university students and their national historical narrative. Although this sample of youth is unaware of the history of Ben Ami, speaker J brings up the generational differences by claiming that his grandfather knows the old names, as do other "elders". These elders did not pass on this information to the subsequent generations, leaving the youth unaware of the pre-Israel reality that existed on the same land. The Palestinian-Arabs that endured the War of Independence and remained in Israel after 1948 are referred to by many different labels, pointing to their complex identity. Commonly named Israeli-Arabs by scholars and the media, they struggle between their citizenship, which is Israeli, and their national identity, which is Palestinian/Arab (Pinson 2008: 201). Because the elders may have lived during the War

of Independence or heard first-hand accounts from their families, they have a stronger connection to the land as Palestine. The current generation is faced with different issues of identity because the original linguistic landscape in terms of place names does not exist in their collective memory. They are only exposed to the Hebrew replacements, causing the original Arabic naming system to lose all utility. In the conversation from Yithaki's study participant R states rhetorically, "'What will you say 'I want to go to 'Um al-Faraj'?'", evidencing that the name 'Um al-Faraj' has no referential value meaning, so the local population cannot use it sensibly in daily conversation. Therefore, this exchange also displays how Israeli-Arab youth confront their complex identity. In this case, R is clearly aligning with his civic identity as an Israeli by placing no importance on the display and use of the original Arabic names, while J is attempting to cling to his native ancestry by pushing for the use of Palestinian toponymy.

This exchange between Arab youth living in Israel helps to trace the process of Hebraiciziation of the map that began in the 1920s, a feat that resulted in the loss of the Israeli-Arab claim to historical spaces. While the various committees in charge of creating the Hebrew toponymy have produced a nationalist and patriotic connection between the Jewish people and the land of Israel, they simultaneously overwrote a pre-existing system of place nomenclature that composed the Palestinian historical narrative. As a result, the linguistic landscape, which is composed of street signs, is dominated by a Hebrew toponymy, representing Israeli dominance over the land and the institutions that control it. Because this process of naming was perpetrated by the state, which has the "monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence" (Bourdieu 2003: 249), the Hebrew system of

naming has been regulated and standardized. As Israel continues to expand territorially into the disputed Palestinian territories, primarily the West Bank, it is perpetuating the Hebraicization of the contested land. Thus, the changes evidenced by photographs and interviews reflect the shift in the Linguistic Landscape from Arabic to Hebrew, which will eventually evolve into a shift in the physical landscape as Jewish settlement persists despite international scrutiny and fragile peace negotiations.

Chapter 2: Second Language Education in Israel

As previously noted, both Arabic and Hebrew are official languages of Israel, while English lost that status after the end of the British Mandate period. Although the Israeli government recognizes both of these Semitic languages, Arabic and Hebrew receive disparate treatment in the education system. As Zionist initiatives pushed the renewal and nativization of the Hebrew language, the Hebrew curriculum developed in tandem as a way to instill the new national language not only to new Jewish citizens, but also to the Arab preexisting Arab population within Israel. In contrast, the quality of Arabic language instruction in Israel reflects an attitude that confirms the superiority of Hebrew and its predominant role in forming the vitality of the Israeli ethnolinguistic nation. Students are required to take a second language in the Israeli school system and most choose to study English, the instruction of which is much more advanced and often taught by native speakers or those with near-native proficiency. The results of unsatisfactory Arabic pedagogy appear on signs across Israel, helping to shape a Linguistic Landscape categorized by a preference for Hebrew and negligence of Arabic. This section will consider the history of Modern Hebrew in Israel as well as the education policies regarding Hebrew and Arabic instruction. These factors, along with the low priority of translation in Israel, serve as an explanation for the Arabic translation errors on municipal signs across the country. These errors are a visual reminder of the devaluation of Arabic in Israel's ethnolinguistic atmosphere which promotes Hebrew hegemony and the importance of English as a second language.

When European Jews began to migrate to Palestine during the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, they encountered a multilingual and multinational atmosphere resulting from a mixture of Arabs, Ottoman government officials, and pre-existing Jewish populations. The Arabs in the area spoke dialectal Arabic varieties and mostly resided in the villages and smaller towns, while the main language of administration and government was Turkish. During contact situations with Arabs, Sephardic Jews spoke in Arabic, while internally communicating in a Spanish Jewish variety called Judezmo. As Ashkenazi Jews began to arrive from Europe, they brought with them a variety of native tongues, such as Yiddish, German, Russian, and Polish. While Zionism began to develop among European Jews, it also started to influence the language ideologies of new immigrants in Palestine. Zionist thought emphasized the creation of a "New Hebrew" that would be spoken in a "newly redeemed land" (Spolsky and Shohamy 1999:14). Specifically, those who settled in the kibbutzim and in Tel Aviv carried this ideology with them and played a large role in shaping the use and advancement of Hebrew in the land that later became Israel. Hebrew became further developed and standardized as its use grew in public and administrative settings. Two new Jewish colonies, Zikhron Yaakov and Petach Tikvah, began to teach Hebrew in schools in the late 1890s, and it became the only sanctioned public language in Tel Aviv. Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Hebrew was made an official language alongside English and Arabic by the newly-established British Mandate of Palestine. British officials allowed the Arab and Jewish communities to implement

public education in their respective school systems, while English acted as a *lingua france* in common spaces (Spolsky and Shohamy 1999:14-15).

Since the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, English lost its status as an official language, and the Israeli Department of Education sets the curriculum for both Jewish and Arab predominate school systems.[3] In Jewish towns and cities, Hebrew is the language of instruction, while instructors speak in Arabic and Arab schools.   All public schools in Israel have English language instruction from the third year of primary school until the second year of secondary school. The Ministry of Education has also made Arabic instruction compulsory in Hebrew-dominant Jewish schools for grades seven through nine; however, students can choose to replace Arabic with French classes. Furthermore, out of those who do decide to study Arabic, only two percent continue with the language past grade nine. (Schmidt, Inbar and Shohamy 2004: 217-218)   Thus, although Arabic is the **only** other official language in Israel other than Hebrew, it is not a required subject of study for public school students.   Rather, the Israeli Department of Education considers English to be the most important second language for Hebrew speakers; despite its labelling of Arabic as a "compulsory language", this is clearly lip service as students have the choice to opt out of Arabic instruction in favor of a language that is non-native to their country.

In addition to the lax practices of the school administration towards Arabic, the pedagogical methods themselves do not adequately address the needs of a second

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[3] The situation in East Jerusalem is an exceptional case; the curriculum varies between schools. Most use the Palestinian Authority curriculum while others have begun to adopt the Israeli curriculum. (For more on this: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/world/middleeast/for-arabs-in-israel-curriculum-choice-is-politically-charged.html)

language Arabic student. Instructors teach only Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), a higher literary register of Arabic, without incorporating dialect into the curriculum. They treat MSA like a dead language rather than a useful mode of communication; this approach is further demonstrated by the use of Hebrew as the instructional language in Arabic classrooms (Uhlmann 2010: 292). Additionally, most Arabic instructors in Israel do not have a high proficiency in Arabic. As a result, Israeli students of Arabic have received a background on Arabic grammar but have a passive understanding of the language and cannot express themselves in a meaningful manner. On the other hand, English language classes are taught in English by advanced or native speakers who emphasize correct usage and cultural competency. In order to succeed in matriculation exams, Israeli students must excel in English and Hebrew, while Arabic is not a factor. However, native Arabic speakers in Israel are given the option to take the exam in Arabic, but due to its poor quality of instruction, they are often not prepared to produce the necessary written language skills on exams. There is a lot of support for students entering the Israeli school system with a background in English in order to maintain and enrich their language skills. Those who speak Arabic at home, mostly Arab Israelis, do not receive extracurricular assistance to help nurture their native language. (Ibid. 293-294) This lack of assistance to native Arabic speakers stifles their language learning as they continue to receive their primary practice in the household, which does not cultivate literary or analytical practices.

The effects of the Arabic education situation in Israel are visible throughout the Linguistic Landscape as in-group and out-group members encounter inaccurate Arabic

translations on signs. These errors are often phonological, resembling a typo that was left by negligence. It is evident from these transgressions that a native speaker did not create the Arabic portions of these signs and the work was instead left to a government-hired translator. The following image depicts the red warning signs that the Israeli government places at all entrances into Area "A": those that are under complete Palestinian Authority security and municipal control. These signs are targeted at Israeli citizens in order to remind them that they are not allowed to enter Area "A" according to Israeli law because of the potential for danger.

Figure 2.1: Area "A" Warning Sign

There are several notable aspects of these signs, which appear numerous times both between the border of Israel and the West Bank and within the West Bank before entering larger Palestinian towns and cities. Firstly, we note the word choice used to discourage Israelis to enter these areas is quite severe and menacing. The phrase "dangerous to your lives" is a definitive statement that asserts the danger that would await an Israeli citizen in Area "A". It does not simply propose the possibility of violence, but rather stresses a guarantee of danger. Also, several errors occur between translations and within the Arabic text. The following phrase, which is the third line of the text, contains grammatical mistakes:

الدخول للمواطنين الإسرائيليين ممنوعة وخطرة
Ɂad:uxu:l lɪlmuwɑ:tˤɪni:n ɁalɁɪsræ:Ɂi:li:j:i:n mamnu:ʕa wa xatˤʕɪra.
Entrance for Israeli Citizens is forbidden and dangerous.

The Arabic word for entrance, /Ɂad:uxu:l/, is a masculine and singular term. However, the two adjectives that follow, /mamnu:ʕa/ and /xatˤʕɪra/ are conjugated to modify a feminine noun. Thus, this statement lacks noun-adjective agreement, a basic concept in Arabic. There is also a clear typo in the last line of Arabic text:

وتشكل مخالفة جنائبة في حقهم
Wa tuʃak:ɪl muxæ:lafa ʒɪna:Ɂɪba fi: ħaqhɪm
And constitutes a criminal violation of their rights.

The word /ʒɪna:Ɂɪba/ contains a typo; it is not a word in Arabic. The word should read /ʒɪna:Ɂi:ja/, or جنائية. In addition to that, the Arabic translation is different from the Hebrew, which states that the entrance of Israeli citizens in Area "A": "constitutes a criminal violation"; the Hebrew version does not mention rights. The mentioning of rights here is redundant; the Arabic already states that entrance into these territories is a

criminal violation. Thus, the English, Arabic, and Hebrew version of the warning on this sign vary slightly from one another. The differences and errors on this sign are not necessarily significant, but do not exhibit a full command of Arabic. The inconsistent capitalization in the English portion of the sign could point to a deficiency there as well.

The next piece of photographic evidence was captured at a light rail station in West Jerusalem, marking the station for the City Hall. The name "city hall" is written in Hebrew, Arabic, and English; however, the Arabic writing contains an error. It is written as البلدية /ʔalbaladi:ja/ with the Arabic character 'hamzat qaṭ'' (ء) on top of the prenominal definite article 'alif laam' (ال). The definite article in Arabic does not take a 'hamzat qaṭ''.

Figure 2.2: Light Rail for City Hall

The following photo displays a similar phonological error regarding the lettering of a street name. This photo was taken in Tel Aviv at the intersection of Allenby and Gedera Streets. Allenby Street is a main thoroughfare in Tel Aviv and is currently a main

commercial center stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to Ha'Aliya Street. Allenby Street emerged as a symbol for development and modernity after its first paving in 1914, but its use as a main public transportation route and low-rent shopping district has contributed to its declining appearance.[4] On this sign for Allenby Street, the Arabic text is written as "شارع النبي", or in English /ʃaːriʕa ʔanːabi/. Although this Arabic translation contains all of the required phonemes, the word Allenby is not structurally correct. Rather than reading as Allenby, upon first glance it appears to say /ʔanːabi/, which is the Arabic word for the Prophet, usually referring to the main Prophet of Islam and messenger of Allah, Muhammad. The proper Arabic transliteration of Allenby would be "آللنبي" or "آلنبي". The first character, an alif maːdːa, /آ/, allows the alif, or "a" sound in Arabic, to be read as a long vowel sound. To any Arabic speaker, even one with an elementary grasp of the language, this street appears to be named after the Prophet Muhammad rather than the British general Edmund Allenby.

Figure 2.3: Allenby/Al-Nabi Street

It is clear from the previous photographs that those who translated the places, streets, and warnings on the signs did not have a strong command of the Arabic language. This is not only due to the underdeveloped nature and small enrollment in the Arabic education program in Israel, but it is also affected by the nature of the translation industry. According to Shakhar Pelled, an Israeli translator with twenty-five years of experience, "The profession isn't officially recognized. There are no criteria for working in it, and no one needs to pass an exam to become a translator. There's no one regulating the business and no official rates."[5] Because of the lack of regulation, the rates for translation have dropped, causing subpar results. Private translating firms have cornered the market and due to the competition, the prices for translated works has dropped. These private firms compete to gain contracts with the Israeli government, who often choose the firm with the lowest price tag without considering the quality and experience of the translators (Haaretz 2014). Rather than vetting and training in-house translators, government agencies subject their documents and public displays to the abilities of amateur freelance workers. Based on the prior discussion, it is unlikely that native Israelis who attended the public school system will have a firm grasp on the Arabic language due its low priority and out of touch curriculum.

The visual evidence of the low priority of Arabic in education can be attributed to the low value of the Arabic language in terms of what Bourdieu refers to as "cultural capital". According to Bourdieu, institutional recognition of the cultural capital that an agent possesses, in this case Arabic, allows us to compare the academic qualifications of

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[5] http://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.573730

the different languages, which reflect their economic worth. Examining the compared

cultural value of Hebrew, Arabic, and English by measuring their institutional worth in

the Israeli education system tells us the "value of a given academic capital" and "the

value for which it can be exchanged on the labor market" (Bourdieu 2008: 51). It is

evident from the treatment of Arabic by educational institutions in Israel that it does not

have significant economic worth, and thus cultural capital. The results of these

educational policies reflects this as Allon Uhlmann has stated that,

> In calculating university-entrance scores, universities add
> bonus points for preferred matriculation subjects such as
> English. Arabic attracts no bonus. This means that Arabic is
> of greatly reduced value as cultural capital, a vicarious
> measure of the marginalization of Arabs in the Jewish state.
> (Uhlmann 2010: 295)

Uhlmann creates a parallel between the devaluation of Arabic in the Israeli education

system as a reflection of national policies to keep the Arab population on the periphery,

while their native tongue lacks the cultural capital to foster opportunities for progress in

the greater economic market. Unlike native Hebrew speakers, they do not receive benefits

from Israeli universities for speaking their first language, an official language of the state.

Arab Israelis must master English and/or Hebrew in order to progress in Israeli society.

The Linguistic Landscape can be used here as a lens through which we can further

examine the symbolic market of languages within Israel. Blatant errors on public signs

alert both in- and out-group members to the disparity between the statuses of Hebrew,

English and Arabic as well as the lack of domestic investment in translation efforts.

Noting simple grammatical errors in the Arabic translations on signage in Israel points to

the larger issue of the declining institutional and economic worth of Arabic, despite its status as an official language of the state. In an effort to further nativize and unite the Jewish population of Israel, the Zionist-influenced government has successfully marginalized the Arab minority by weakening the prestige of their native tongue. Right-wing members of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, have presented initiatives to remove Arabic and English from the road signs altogether, only leaving transliterations of the Hebrew names.[6] This would further the Zionist ambitions to Hebraicize the entire topography while limiting the possibility of Arabic spelling errors.

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[6] http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106921797

Chapter 3: Conflict over the Linguistic Landscape

While public road signs are examples of "top-down" shaping of the linguistic landscape, "bottom-up" actors who seek to make their mark on the marking of public spaces have manipulated them in many instances within Israel and Palestine. This has resulted in the realization of the political conflict through a power struggle over signage as the municipalities compete with various private citizen groups in order to preserve their policies. Based on my photographic evidence, it seems that those who actively try to change the linguistic landscape are fighting back against authority to reshape the linguistic representations of heterogeneous Israeli society, effectively making a visible statement about the government's efforts to use sign policies to categorize the landscape. These grassroots actors are targeting their efforts towards signs that have been put into place by "top-down" forces, rather than signs for private business or advertisements, reflecting a discord between the government sign policies and their audience. The disproportionate resources of public groups and private citizens plays a role in this struggle because, "while the public space is viewed as a 'free zone', major contestations and battles as to who is eligible to participate in it and in what ways, take place in very intensive actions" (Shohamy and Waksman 2012: 111). Therefore, private citizens are claiming their right to participate in public spaces as a rebuttal to the efforts of municipal forces to control the categorization of these "free zones". This issue is often exacerbated in large urban centers, particularly those with adversarial minority and majority groups.

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The conflict is manifested especially in parts of Jerusalem, where supporters of both groups are fighting over public language displays.

While much of the literature on Linguistic Landscape deals with areas of conflict and majority-minority relations, not many studies have shed light on the physical realizations of that conflict on signage. In their introduction of the field of LL, Landry and Bourhis (1997) mention instances in which the minority in-group, whose language is underrepresented in the public sphere, take action and participate in graffiti campaigns to mark public signs. This has occurred in the Basque Country in France and Spain, Quebec, Catalonia and Wales (Hicks 2002). However, in all of these cases, it is members of the minority reacting against the dominance of the majority in-group. This contrasts with the case in Israel and Palestine, where members of the Jewish Israeli majority react to the presence of Arabic on street signs. This situation is not paralleled in much of the LL literature, however, after a thorough review of LL-focused studies, a discussion on minority languages in Norway (Puzey 2008) also stands out as an example of physical and visible manifestation of the competing linguistic ideologies. Norwegian, a North Germanic language with many similarities to Danish and Swedish, is the most commonly spoken language in Norway. In addition to Norwegian, a small minority (approximately 10-20,000 out of a total population of 4.7 million) speak a Sámi variety, which is a group of Finno-Ugric languages. Sámi speakers inhabit an area that extends between the borders of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Sámi identity can be complex and based on linguistic, ethnic, familial, professional, or residential affiliation (Puzey 2008: 21-22). In the late nineteenth century, the Norwegian state attempted to further integrate

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the Sámi people through a process called *fornorskningspolitikk*, which reintroduced the use of Sámi in schools and initiated efforts to preserve Sámi culture and heritage. Another Finnish dialect, Kven, is still spoken by a group of about 2,000 descendants of Finnish migrants that arrived in the northern part of Troms County in the 18th century (Puzey 2008: 22).

In 1990, Norway implemented the Place-Name Act, which established a committee of place-names consultants who distributed spelling and naming responsibilities on three different levels across Norway- state, country, and municipality. Regarding minority languages such as Sámi and Kven, it was decided that names should be written according to their native spelling rules (Puzey 2008: 25). The Sámi and Kven names would be used together with Norwegian names on maps, signs, and registers, despite the fact that Norwegian names may not exist in places with predominant Sámi and Kven populations. There has been a visceral reaction to the use of Sámi language on road signs in Gáivuotna-Kåfjord area in Troms County, where it is written on municipal boundary signs and two tunnel names. On one bilingual municipal boundary sign, the Sámi portion has been destroyed or removed at least five times, but has been replaced after a considerable absence. On more violent occasions, locals have shot at the Sámi portion of this boundary sign, but it is more commonly painted over or removed. The roads authority has had its hands full with bilingual signs in Gáivuotna-Kåfjord; in the south, one did not last longer than ten days, while in the north, where the Norwegian language is stronger, a bilingual sign remained untouched for only four days. The roads authority installed a Plexiglass encasement over the sign, which did not last, and they

have looked into bulletproof materials as well for the signs. According to Kuzey, "The sign has become a symbol for the animosity between the two cultures and of the 'consequences of the assimilation politics'" (Anderson 2004: 127; Kuzey 2008: 34).

Figure 3.1: Vandalized Sign in Gáivuotna-Kåfjord

Within the Sámi community, views are split in support and against the use of their language on public signage. Some community members grew to appreciate the invisibility that they experienced prior to the Norwegian federal policy of *fornorskningspolitikk*, which they feel has drawn more attention to their differences as a cultural group rather than their integration progress. They view signs as a visual reminder to themselves and to external groups of their presence, reminding the public of previous tensions. Meanwhile, others firmly support the use of Sámi signs in order to maintain the presence of historical Sámi place names. Much of the younger generation does not remember the Sámi names, diminishing the historical and cultural value of the Sámi place

names (Kuzey 2008: 38-39). This case is different from the Israel/Palestine study because the defacing and repairing of public signs seems to be coming from one side of the population- Norwegians with a nationalist perspective who prefer heterogeneous language policies are battling Norwegian municipal authorities who are trying to uphold state policies. In Israel and Palestine, private actors from multiple factions of the Jewish Israeli majority are participating in the tampering of "top-down" municipal signs. Additionally, the municipality is not able to keep up with retouching the damaged signs. This can be seen in the below photos; the marker lines and sticker remnants appear to be quite weathered.

While travelling around the West Bank and Jerusalem, I came across a number of signs and other public text displays that were targeted by vandals. In all of the instances that I saw, the Arabic portions of the text were modified while the Hebrew and English sections remained pristine. The following photos depict a public historical exhibit located outside of the Jaffa Gate of the Old City of Jerusalem. This exhibit greets tourists and residents alike as they exit the Old City and enter the modern and predominately Jewish West Jerusalem. It is an informational and pictorial spread containing old photos of city life under the British Mandate, before Israel received independence in 1948. On the following photos, the Arabic portion of the photo description has been crossed out with black marker:

Figure 3.2: Marked out Arabic by Jaffa Gate

Figure 3.3: Marked out Arabic by Jaffa Gate 2

While the source of this graffiti is not known with certainty, further photographic evidence points to the ideological origins of the markings. The following photo is from the same exhibit and not only shows the same erasing of the Arabic, but also the remnants of a Zionist party sticker.

Figure 3.4: Zionist Sticker by Jaffa Gate

The full, intact sticker is visible in the following picture of a street sign for Tsahal Square, which is located just outside of the Old City walls in Jerusalem between the Jaffa and Damascus Gates.

Figure 3.5: Zionist Sticket at Tsahal Square

There is a sticker obscuring the name of the square in Arabic, which is from the political party Otzma Le'Yisrael, or Strength to Israel party. According to their social media page, they are a party of "NO COMPROMISE" that opposes a two-state solution and supports Jewish sovereignty over all of the land of Israel. They claim to be "strong right-wing".[7] The next photo shows another street sign in West Jerusalem where the Arabic script has been covered by a sticker promoting Otzma Le'Yisrael. The subsequent photo shows a sign on the same street that has not been covered by writing or a sticker.

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[7] https://www.facebook.com/OtzmaLeyisrael/info

Figure 3.6: Zionist Sticker at Jaffa Street

Figure 3.7: Jaffa Street Untouched

Because the municipality has not taken action to repair the signs, private citizens have taken the matter into their own hands and are conducting vigilante missions to restore the Arabic text. The following photo shows a street sign in Jerusalem that has been retouched by Romy Achituv, an Israeli, and his two American accomplices that form a "maintenance group" whose mission is to counter ultra-nationalist efforts to obstruct Arabic script on signs. According to an article in *The Jewish Daily Forward* from July 8, 2009, the group had retouched approximately fifty signs that had been vandalized in order to cover up the Arabic scripts. [8] It is unknown whether their efforts persist until today. This battle over street signs began in 1999 after a Supreme Court decision stipulating that Arabic should be included in all towns in Israel with a mixed Jewish and Arab population. The case was initiated through an appeal by the Arab activist group *Adalah:* The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (Trumper-Hecht, 2009; Shohamy, 2006). According to Israeli political sociologist Sammy Smooha, the backlash against the Arabic usage on signs stems from a fear of "the feeling of binationalism, that the Jews have no exclusive monopoly on the town."

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[8] http://forward.com/articles/109097/graffiti-war-erupts-over-israel-s-road-signs/

Figure 3.8: Restored Arabic at Haim Arlozorov Street

In another instance of "bottom-up" participation in the linguistic landscape, a group of Israeli activists interfered with the red warning signs that now exist before entering "Area A", which are sections of the West Bank under complete Palestinian civil and security control. After the breakout of the Second Intifada, or Palestinian Uprising, in September 2000, The Israeli Defense Forces banned the entry of Israeli citizens into Palestinian-controlled territory for safety concerns.[9] According to a 2013 report from the Israeli Defense Forces, in 2012, well after the post-Intifada tensions eased, the IDF allowed Israeli citizens to enter "Area A" through the Gilboa crossing, which is in the northern part of the West Bank near the city of Jenin.[10] The IDF has not published a report on access and borders since, so the current laws concerning the entry of Israeli citizens into "Area A' are uncertain. However, the red warning signs still remain at entry

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[9] http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/idf-mulls-lifting-ban-on-israelis-entering-palestinian-controlled-west-bank-1.302689
[10] http://www.cogat.idf.il/Sip_Storage/FILES/4/4194.pdf

points into Palestinian-controlled territories. These trilingual signs show warnings in Hebrew, Arabic and English (in order of top to bottom) which read as follows: "This Road leads To "Area A" Under The Palestinian Authority The Entrance For Israeli Citizens Is Forbidden, Dangerous To Your Lives And Is Against The Israeli Law." This past year, on July 13, 2013, the group "We do not obey" attempted to replace these threatening signs with messages of peace and hospitality. The following photo depicts the original[11] sign as well as its replacement by "We do not obey"; below it is a clearer picture of the activists' sign.

Figure 3.9: Activists Cover Area "A" Warning Sign

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[11] https://fbcdn-sphotos-b-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-frc3/t1/263312_672001806146725_1728467758_n.jpg

Figure 3.10: Activists Cover Area "A" Warning Sign 2

The text has been changed to read,

> WOMEN SAY NO TO THE RULES OF OCCUPATION
> CIVLIAN ZONE: NO ENTRY TO THE ARMY!
>   THIS ROAD LEADS TO
> PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENTS
>   ISRAELI CIVILIANS DO NOT BE AFRAID
> COME AND VISIT PALESTINIAN
> SETTLEMENTS
> REFUSE TO BE ENEMIES!

While still directing the same audience, Israeli civilians, the activists have changed the tone and message of the text by encouraging Israeli citizens to enter "Area A" and engage with their neighbors. Additionally, this activist group has not only chosen to change the words in the sign text but they have also changed the order of the three languages; Arabic

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[12] Images courtesy of Crack in the Wall

is now on top, followed by Hebrew, followed by English. [13] By placing Arabic first, the group is making a statement about the power structure of the area. Although the original red sign claims that the forbidden territories are under control of the Palestinian Authority, by placing Hebrew on top Israel is reasserting the source of the sign and that, ultimately, they control entry into "Area A". According to a spokesperson from the group "We do not obey", they chose to engage in this act of civil disobedience as a means to "express our protest against this method of threats and intimidation. The signposts that are supposedly for our 'security' violate the surrounding environment and their only purpose is to scare and to cause conflict between Jews and Arabs."[14] In addition to its coverage in the left-leaning Israeli +972 Magazine, the Palestinian-based Arabic-language news website Jerzim published a story on the activitieson the same day: July 15, 2013. Regarding the differences between the two signs they said, "There is a disparity evident through a comparison between what the Occupation Army is disseminating with its messages in red and the invitations in white of the Palestinian activists who are extending the hand of peace".[15] The IDF removed the white signs shortly after their installation.

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[13] https://scontent-b.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-ash3/t1/1017692_673118472701725_116749426_n.jpg

[14] http://972mag.com/israeli-activists-replace-threatening-military-signs-with-messages-of-peace-and-resistance/76431/

[15] Original Arabic text from interview read:

ويأتي في رسائل جيش الاحتلال الحمراء أن دخول الإسرائيليين إلى المناطق الفلسطينية يعرض حياتهم في خطر ويترتب عليها مخالفة جنائية

Source: http://www.jerzim.com/2013/07/%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B9/

Based on the photographic examples of bottom-up participation and activism in the Linguistic Landscape, it is worth noting that the main participants and/or leaders are Israeli, and not Palestinian. Therefore, the oppressed minority is not visibly reacting to the affront of the Arabic writing on the signs or to the negative messages displayed on the red warning signs. Additionally, there was no evidence in the same areas of Arab citizens defacing the Hebrew language displays. Thus, the group in power is participating in this linguistic activism, while the minority is on the sidelines. This is similar to the Norway study on the Sámi linguistic situation; the Norwegians are consistently damaging the Sámi section of the signage while the Norwegian municipal workers are responsible for repairing and protecting the signs. The Sámi population in that region have expressed neutrality and the desire to be left in peace, stating a distaste for the attention that this sign-war has garnered. Being a member of the majority in power allows Israelis and Norwegians to have the privilege to protest against top-down displays of linguistic significance. While native Sámis wish to maintain a level of invisibility, the surrounding Norwegians are compelled to fight back against language policies that support recognition of this minority group. Those who fight back are met with a response from municipal forces in an effort to carry out this policy effectively by repairing the damaged signs. The case in Israel illuminates the complexity of the internal political landscape; some Israelis choose to cover the Arabic writing with marker or a Zionist-themed sticker, while others respond by restoring the Arabic script by bypassing municipal powers who do not consider sign restoration a priority. This point contributes to the shift in discussing the situation in Israel and Palestine; although it was long

considered by external forces to be a struggle between two main actors, it is becoming clearer through multiple types of analysis that the internal fragmentation in each entity is contributing significantly to the present reality.

Based on these photos, it is clear that the Linguistic Landscape has become a visible stage for the conflict to manifest as opposing members of the minority and majority group fight for control over the categorization of public spaces. It has also become a medium to display the internal divisions within Israeli society regarding the treatment of Arabic; as some fight to shroud its existence, others work to create a visual recognition of its official status by refurbishing the damaged signs. The previous example showing crossed-out Arabic text on the historical exhibit in the Old City of Jerusalem depicts a struggle over the right to depict the history of the holy city as the Jewish population attempts to block out the Arabic narrative. This theme continues onto street signs as Zionist party stickers shroud the Arabic script, sending an unwelcoming message to its speakers. Although supporters of these initiatives have defaced a number of Arabic road signs, there are other members of the majority who are fighting back against their fellow citizens in order to restore the original text. In those instances, looking at the efforts of these activists through the perspective of the Linguistic Landscape highlights the complexity of the issue and puts domestic disputes on display for in- and out-group members.

Chapter 4: The Language of Exchange

Although this area has not been explored previously within the parameters of the Linguistic Landscape, analyzing the implications of economic policy on the presence (or lack thereof) of languages in a multicultural setting can also help to illuminate the power relations between groups. This aspect of the LL is prevalent in public spaces such as grocery stores, where both in-group and out-group members have access to displays of economic goods that can reflect the dominance of one economic entity over another. Photographic evidence from the West Bank, Israel, and Gaza Strip shows the overwhelming presence of Israeli goods and Hebrew labels. In the rare case that an Israeli supermarket sells a product made in the Palestinian territories, a Hebrew label disguises its origins in order to appeal to Israelis. Labels that say, "Made in Palestine" or support the Palestinian cultural initiative tend to dissuade Israeli Jews from purchasing the product (Scheinlin 2012).[16] In addition to these ideological norms, there are also stipulations placed on product labels for imports into Israel that maintain the dominant presence of Hebrew. Although the Palestinian territories sold $300 million of produce in Israeli supermarkets in 2011, an Israeli label adorned the packaging and labels (Media Line).[17] In addition to these regulations, Israel has consistently contributed to the stalling economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by placing barriers on local business growth through checkpoints and blockades that prevent product movement. As a result, the

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[16] http://972mag.com/are-israelis-boycotting-palestinian-goods/37117/
[17] https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=wDWjCJKioVw

Israeli economy has benefited greatly as their products have gained prestige and the region and Palestinian goods have no chance of competing.

Currently, the Paris Protocol still defines the economic relations between the Palestinian Authority, which representatives of both parties signed in April 1994 after the first stage of the Oslo process. The Oslo Accords were the result of secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which created an interim government for the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the Palestinian Authority. Although the Accords were supposed to expire after five years by replacing the PA with the Palestinian Legislative Council, the two parties could not agree on a comprehensive agreement before 1999. Thus, the Palestinian Authority is still the governing body of the West Bank while other elements of the Oslo Accords remain intact, such as the Paris Protocol. The Paris Protocol created a "customs union" between the Palestinian Authority, which effectively maintained the status quo of Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy. By creating a type of "free-trade" agreement with the Palestinian Authority, Israel was able to circumvent setting boundaries between itself and the PA, in order to avoid any allusion to sovereignty for the Palestinian people. The Paris Protocol also gave Israel control over international imports entering the Palestinian Territories, including the import taxes, such as the Value Added Tax (VAT). Upon receiving the imports and associated taxes, Israel transfers the goods and funds over to the PA. In the past, particularly during instances of Palestinian unrest and uprising, Israel has withheld the taxes from goods meant for the Palestinian Territories as a means of punishment and pressure. Although the agreement largely favored the Israeli side, the PLO was not in any

place to reject the agreement. Israel had stipulated that if the passing of this agreement

failed, then it would no longer allow Palestinians to work within Israel. During the time

of signing, the economy of the Palestinian territories was weak and did not provide

substantial job opportunities to meet workers' needs. At the beginning of the Oslo

process in 1992, 115,600 Palestinians held work in Israel. This number has since declined

due to marginal growth of the Palestinian economy, as well as periods of unrest including

the political turmoil following the signing of the Oslo Accords and the second intifada, or

Palestinian uprising, which took place in the early 2000s (Farshakh 2002:13-14). As of

August 2012, approximately 80,000 Palestinian workers from the West Bank were

employed in Israel.[18] According to the CEO of the Palestine Investment Fund, the entire

Oslo process, including the Paris Protocol of 1994, as well as continuing settlement

construction, have "prevented sustainable growth" and economic development is

"impossible under the limits imposed by the occupation" (Sprusansky 2012).

Despite the existence of this "customs union" that is still in place between the

Palestinian Authority and Government of Israel, the volume of goods transferred on

either side is vastly unequal. During 2011, the reciprocal trade between Israel and the PA

reached $4.3 billion. However, according to Arieh O'Sullivan of the Media Line, exports

from Israel to the territories amounted to $3.5 billon, meaning that the sale of Palestinian

products to Israel clocked in at a mere $816 million (O'Sullivan 2012).   A 2012 report

from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics claimed a slightly different figure,

stating that the total value of exports amounted to $720 million while imports totaled $4.2

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[18] http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Number-of-Palestinian-workers-in-Israel-rises

million.[19] Approximately 87.5% of all Palestinian exports go to Israel due to restrictions on movement and limited access to international markets. The Palestinian Authority does not have autonomous access to a seaport or an airport; thus, all goods must travel through Israel. The travel restrictions in the form of checkpoints and roadblocks both within the West Bank and upon entering Israel have significantly hindered the movement of goods and thus the Palestinian economy. The Palestinian economy has traditionally relied on agricultural goods, but their limited access to water has stalled growth in this sector. Additionally, due to the frequent changes in checkpoint and roadblock locations, some farmers are required to attain visitors' permits from Israel in order to tend to their farmland.[20] (Chalabi 2013) It is estimated that Israel's restrictions in the West Bank, including territory limitations, access to water resources, and checkpoints and roadblocks, have resulted in a $3.4 billion annual loss. This amounts to 35% of the Palestinian Authority's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). (Ibid.)

In addition to placing physical limitations on movement of Palestinian products within the West Bank and Israel, they have also placed high standards and sanitation requirements on incoming goods. In order to decrease the possibility of competition between Israeli and Palestinian goods, Israel has restricted the import of various items to the Palestinian territories so that they cannot export products that would meet these standards. Therefore, rather than implementing an outright ban on the sale of Palestinian goods in Israeli supermarkets, Israel has set standards that Palestinian food industries

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[19]http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/512/default.aspx?tabID=512&lang=en&ItemID=788&mid=3171&wversion=Staging

[20] Israel consistently rejects these permits; 49% were accepted in 2011, 29% in 2012. (Chalabi 2013)

simply cannot meet in order to maintain Israeli economic hegemony and control the options on the market. For example, in 2009, Israel placed restrictions on chemical imports to the West Bank that prevented Palestinian businesses from acquiring hydrogen peroxide at 35% concentration levels, an ingredient that coats and sanitizes the 'TetraPak' packaging materials. As a result, these companies can only import hydrogen peroxide at a 17% concentration, a level that does not meet 'TetraPak' equipment sanitation standards. This regulation has particularly affected the three top dairy producers of the West Bank: al-Juneidi (based in Hebron), al-Jebrini (based in Hebron), and al-Safa (based in Nablus). (Wikileaks March-May 2009) This ban has not only affected the productivity levels of these dairies, but it is also creating a food safety concern. According to the al-Jebrini company, who packages 30% of their products in 'TetraPak' materials, they face increased risk during the warmer summer months while transporting their products. Without the necessary sanitizing agent, their milk products were in danger of spoiling during the long trip from Hebron to the Gaza Strip, due to the wait periods at the various checkpoints between the two locales. The ban has also stalled production at al-Juneidi; after spending $3 million to install a computerized quality monitoring system to ensure the sanitation quality after switching to the 17 percent hydrogen peroxide, they must suspend production when the alarm sounds in instances of high levels of bacteria. Facing decreases in output and increases in sanitation risks, al-Juneidi has consistently appealed to the Government of Israel to import hydrogen peroxide at the appropriate levels without success.[21] (Wikileaks May 2009)

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[21] http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09JERUSALEM860_a.html

In addition to the fluctuating restrictions on chemical imports, Israel has also interfered with the raw materials being used in other production facilities in order to decrease competition with West Bank producers. The National Beverage Company (NBC), 15% of which is owned by Coca-Cola, is one of the top U.S. economic investments in the West Bank and also uses the 'TetraPak' packaging materials for a line of juice cartons. NBC, in collaboration with Coca-Cola's Atlanta headquarters, has furnished the necessary documentation to prove the necessity of the higher concentration hydrogen peroxide and offered to cooperate with the Israeli government on security safeguards. These requests have been consistently denied. In addition to this crucial chemical import, Israel also rejected NBC's aluminum imports from Europe to be used for drinking can rims. This decision forced NBC to use an Israeli aluminum producer, effectively cutting out the competition from the European firm. (Wikileaks March 2009) According to Palestinian-American Chamber of Commerce Chairman Kareem Shehadeh, "There is no list of prohibited items one can refer to, there is no transparency in these decisions, there are no written procedures for appeal…in fact, there is no system."[22] Because the system is nonexistent, Israel is able to arbitrarily deny or approve requests for appeals to the import regulations without providing substantial support for their decisions.

While Israel is preventing West Bank facilities from maximum production capabilities due to import regulations, they are also preventing them from accessing a large buyers' market in Israel proper through domestic import standards and guidelines.

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[22] http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09JERUSALEM516_a.html

The Paris Protocol also stipulates that Palestinian goods entering Israel and East Jerusalem must meet Israeli certifications for health and safety. Israel does not accept Palestinian Authority standards or certificates; an Israeli government official must conduct the inspection of products according to Israeli stipulations at all dairy, meat, and pharmaceutical production facilities. However, because it is illegal under Israeli law for an Israeli citizen to enter Palestinian cities, which are within Area "A", there is no way for officials to conduct these investigations. Thus, Palestinian products are effectively banned from entering Israeli markets due to their inability to meet the required standards. In prior years, five West Bank/Gaza dairy facilities were granted permits to import and sell their products in East Jerusalem, but not the rest of Israel. Many of the producers surveyed in a study by the Palestinian Trade Center claimed that Israel did not allow the products to leave East Jerusalem and enter Israel proper in order to protect Israeli producers from competition. Israel has since rescinded those permits and the five producers have had difficulty renewing them. (Palestine Trade Commission 2010: 4) In the same study, all of the producers in the West Bank and Gaza stated that one of their main impediments to entering the Israeli market was finding out the precise requirements for entry into Israel and East Jerusalem. Some dairy producers believed that there was a quota on the number of dairy/meat producers that could enter the market and thus decided against applying for a permit. According to Israel, this is not true; however, they have not been transparent about their reasoning for granting permits to the five dairies that have been able to sell in East Jerusalem. (Ibid. 5)

In regards to processed foods, or non-dairy or meat items, Israel does not subject them to the same inspection standards. Therefore, those producers can access the Israeli markets but are not able to sell in most Israeli supermarkets because they are not kosher-certified. In order to receive this certification, a rabbi must visit their facilities in the West Bank, which is highly unlikely due to the legal restrictions on travel in Area "A" and security concerns. (PTC 2010:14) A kosher certification is not a legal requirement on imports into Israel; however, products lacking one will have access to a much smaller market. (Food and Agricultural Import Regulations and Standards 2012: 5) Due to the legal and consumer restrictions placed on Palestinian goods produced in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the Palestinian economy has missed a huge opportunity for growth and development. The Palestinian-origin population in Israel and East Jerusalem forms a sizable potential buyers' market. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, there are 208,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and 1.2 million Palestinian residents of Israel proper. The average wage of Palestinians residing in Israel is approximately 2.8 times higher than a Palestinian in the West Bank, meaning that the purchasing power of Palestinians in Israel is estimated at 6 to 7 times higher than that of the West Bank. (PTC 2010: 15). By placing impossible criteria on Palestinian exports that are largely misunderstood by producers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel has successfully thwarted potential competition and suppressed the growth of the Palestinian economy.

The following photos depict various supermarket displays in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The first two images are of dairy and hummus shelves in an Israeli

supermarket. Upon first glance, one notices the absence of any Arabic writing on the product labels. According to Israeli product label standards, all import product labels must use Hebrew as the primary language. English can be present as well, as long as it is a direct translation of the Hebrew, as is the regulation for any foreign language. However, Hebrew must always be the largest language on the labels. There is no mention of Arabic in the Food and Agricultural Import Regulations and Standards of Israel.[23] As a result, Hebrew is the dominant language on visual displays in Israeli supermarkets, embodying the successful erasure of the preexisting Palestinian industries, which have been replaced by pseudo-native Israeli producers. The following images show the prominence of these manufacturers.

Figure 4.1: [24] Dairy Shelves in Israel

[23]http://agriexchange.apeda.gov.in/IR_Standards/Import_Regulation/Food%20and%20Agricultural%20Import%20Regulations%20and%20Standards%20%20NarrativeTel%20AvivIsrael812012.pdf
[24] Photo Credit: Jesse Berkowtiz

Figure 4.2: Hummus Shelves in Israel

As is evident from these store shelves, Arabic is not present on any of the labels both due to the labeling restrictions themselves as well as the inability of dairy products and processed foods to pass Israeli inspection and make it to the supermarkets. In the second photo posted above, hummus is the most prominent food item. Upon entering this supermarket and approaching the shelf, the consumer, whether they are an in- or out-group member, is aware of the significance of hummus in the Israeli diet. According to a survey by Tzabar, Israel's largest hummus producer, 95 percent of Israeli homes have a tub of hummus in their refrigerator (Hirsch and Tene 2013: 37). Although today hummus is considered to be part of the national cuisine of Israel, it did not always have this high popularity. Hummus was originally an Arab dish, mostly prepared in homes long before

[25] http://daniakatz.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/IMG_3501.jpg

the creation of Israel in 1948. It grew in popularity during the 1950s along with the growth in Mizrahi Jews in the area who opened up a number of *hummusiya* restaurants, that served hummus alongside falafel and roasted meat. After noticing the surge in popularity, the Eretz Israeli Food Produce Company started to produce a canned hummus to be sold in stores under its Telma brand. From then on, hummus became a crucial part of the Zionist national project to nativize incoming Jews in the area. Israel began a quick process of state-directed industrialization that allowed the food industry to flourish and the hummus market to bloom. Therefore, Israel was able to support rapid economic development while creating a concept of a national cuisine for the new state (Hersche and Tene 31-35). As Alona Nitzan-Shiftan put its, the colonizer has depended on the culture of the colonized, in this case the Palestinians, in order to define an "authentic" national identity "of visceral ties to the place" (Nitzan Shiftan 2006:155, Hirsch 2011:620). Israel was so successful in building its hummus industry that it not only dominates the shelves of stores in Israel proper, but it has also become an option in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The following photo shows Israeli hummus made by Miki's Deli, one of the main producers in the region, which is located in the town of Rishon Lezion, just south of Tel Aviv.[26] This photo was taken in the Gaza Strip, showing that Israeli products are composing a significant portion of the Linguistic Landscape in Gazan supermarkets. As was discussed earlier, Palestinian food producers in the West Bank faced difficulty when trying to transport their food items to the Gaza Strip due to the physical barriers and

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[26] http://www.mikidelicatessen.co.il/?CategoryID=238

checkpoints, as well as the lack of sufficient sanitation chemicals. Therefore, Gazans have no other option than to support the economy of Israel by purchasing a natively Arab product, which has instituted the blockade that prevents them from receiving goods from the West Bank or other Arab countries.[27]

Figure 4.3: Hummus Shelf in Gaza

The following two photos also depict store shelves within the Gaza Strip, which hold products such as baby formula and cleaning products, all adorned with Hebrew labels showing their Israeli origin.

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[27] http://48refugee.blogspot.com/2012/02/gaza-story-tasting-gaza.html

Figure 4.4: Cleaning Products in Gaza

Figure 4.5: Baby Formula in Gaza

[28] http://images1.ynet.co.il/PicServer3/2014/03/04/5193568/5193547099495640360no.jpg
[29] http://images1.ynet.co.il/PicServer3/2014/03/04/5193569/51935480991091640360no.jpg

Elior Levy of Ynetnews describes Gaza as a "captive market" which allows Israel to control the movement of goods both in and out, enabling them to give preference to Israeli companies and in turn boost their economy. The value of Israeli imports into the Gaza Strip totaled $375 million in 2012 while businesses from Gaza face great difficulty when trying to export into Israel. Israel has placed very strict criteria on Gazan companies and only accepts large-scale import operations. As a result, small businesses in Gaza have no opportunity for growth and typically fail. Prior to the blockade, 85 percent of Gazan exports went to Israel and the West Bank; now selling goods from Gaza is banned in Israel. [30] Therefore, the absence of Arabic product labels in Gazan grocery stores is a direct reflection of the blockade as residents of the Gaza Strip have no choice but to purchase goods from Israel.

The situation in the West Bank is markedly different as Israeli products compete with those made locally in grocery stores. The following photos show Israeli and Palestinian products side-by-side, giving consumers a choice. In the first photo, depicting a variety of hummus, the products on the left are all from al-Juneidi, the dairy located in Hebron. The right is Tzabar hummus, which is currently Israel's largest hummus producer.

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[30] http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4496994,00.html

Figure 4.6:[31] Hummus Shelf in the West Bank

This next photo shows water from Ein Gedi, an Israeli company, and Jericho water, which is based in the West Bank.

Figure 4.7: [32] Bottled Water Shelf in the West Bank

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[31] http://bodyontheline.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/dsc00002.jpg
[32] http://bodyontheline.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/dsc099991.jpg?w=300&h=225

While it would seem obvious for Palestinians living in the West Bank to purchase locally-made goods rather than support Israel, there is still clearly a market for the latter. According to the blogger who took the above photos, "I have heard common complaints from people in the boycott movement here that some people have some gross notion that somehow Palestinian products are inferior to Israeli versions"[33]. While no one has conducted an official opinion poll on this hypothesis, we can guess Israeli products have gained a type of prestige among Palestinian consumers due to the stricter standards that Israel places when certifying food products. Thus, the same Israeli regulations that prevent West Bank-made goods from entering Israel allow the Israeli economy to benefit from a Palestinian consumer preference for their products.

Through a number of policy measures, Israel has been able to solidify its economic influence in the region by boosting its industries while limiting opportunity for growth and development in the Palestinian territories. By maintaining the Paris Protocol of 1994, Israel is able to exercise dominance over the Palestinian Authority by controlling their imports and thus withhold tax revenues when the PA does no oblige with Israeli interest. The Paris Protocol has allowed for an unbalanced trade system, under the guise of a "customs union", to flourish as Israeli imports maintain a significant presence in West Bank and Gazan supermarkets. Additionally, Israel is able to place arbitrary and opaque restrictions on imports to the Palestinian Authority, which has stalled economic production in the West Bank by limiting the acquisition of necessary materials. The absence of these materials has led to substandard and unsafe products, particularly in the

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[33] http://bodyontheline.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/clevage-points/

dairy industries, who are subsequently unable to export their goods because of regulation violations. However, even if these dairies were able to export their products to Israel, the intricate checkpoint and barrier system in place throughout the West Bank poses a major obstacle to safe transport. This combination of policies has allowed Israeli food producers to maintain a strong visual presence not only in Israel proper, but also in the Palestinian territories. Examining the Linguistic Landscape of supermarkets helps to illuminate the legal implications of these policies, as Hebrew has become the primary language on the stock shelves, symbolizing the powerful presence of Israel in this domain of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip

Conclusion

The previous chapters and photographs serve as a meaningful contribution to the Linguistic Landscape literature, which has proven to be a significant variable in determining the sociolinguistic implications of written text in the public arena. However, the current framework only presents a surface-level analysis of the factors behind the production of signs in multilingual areas. My study looks beyond language policy in order to reveal the deeply embedded educational, economic and historical events and decisions that have resulted in the overwhelming presence of Hebrew. The LL lens has allowed me to explore the complex situation in Israel and the Palestinian territories, which serve as a meaningful stage on which interlingual relationships play out between disparate populations. By looking at the continuing Hebraicization of the map in Israel and the West Bank, it is evident that the Israeli-Jewish majority has claims over defining and categorizing place in the region. Further examining the source of Arabic language errors on public signs led to an investigation of their source, which is the low quality of Arabic education in Israel due to its low linguistic capital. Arabic is also devalued on public street signs as bottom-up actors attempt to remove it from the public sphere entirely by shrouding it with Zionist stickers or black marker. Responses from left-wing activists who attempt to restore the original Arabic or replace warning signs with welcome messages also participate in shaping the LL and highlighting the complex political reality. Finally, a new approach to going inside the grocery store and researching the policies that have implications on the items that are visible to in- and out-

group participants is a useful addition to the LL literature and can be incorporated into future studies in the field.

Overall, these categories of language displays embody the sociocultural situation in Israel and Palestine by creating visual representation of the power dynamics in the region. Israel does not have a detailed language policy, so examining the economic, educational, and economic policies put in place by the majority Jewish government play a larger role in shaping the Linguistic Landscape. All of these policies help promote the ethnolinguistic vitality of Hebrew, which Giles et al. (1977) describes as, "the sociostructural factors that affect a group's ability to behave and survive as a distinct and active collective entity within multilingual settings". As the Hebrew-speaking population gains cultural, political, and economic capital, the status of Arabic continues to decline, reflecting the Palestinian position within the region. Thus, the Israeli government has been able to consolidate its power through a variety of policies to spread its influence and gain prestige in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, despite its role as colonizer and occupier. The LL of these territories symbolizes this power relationship as Hebrew maintains high visibility in multiple domains. The LL is described as a "social context in which more than one language is present. It implies the use…of more than one language and thus of multilingualism" (Gorter 2006: 25). However, the trends in the LL of Israel do not indicate an atmosphere that fosters multilingualism. Rather, the various policies and actions that reflect a growing interest in the ethnolinguistic vitality of Hebrew alone reflect a possible monolingual future for the region if the Arabic-speaking population remains in their current subordinate position. Israel has aggressively achieved a

cooptation of Palestinians' land, language, and food through government policies that support a nationalist and expansionist agenda. Scholars have considered this feat through a variety of lenses, but using the Linguistic Landscape as a framework provides an additional layer to the complex reality by explaining visual linguistic representations of power in a multilingual space. Future LL studies should continue to look behind their units of analysis in order to reveal the apparatuses through which dominant actors solidify and display their power. This will further develop the methodology and theoretical implications of this burgeoning field, creating a useful paradigm through which to view ethnolinguistic struggles.

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