ABSTRACT

HEIDEGGER AND DISCLOSIVE RHETORIC: TWO DIVERGENT PATHS IN IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE

By

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Martin Heidegger is a key philosophical thinker who has influenced contemporary scholarship in rhetorical theory. His concept of disclosure has become particularly significant because it is uniquely situated to explain the nuances of contemporary public political address. Yet the meaning and applicability of Heidegger's *rhetoric of disclosure* to explain new forms of political speech have been contested by two contemporary philosophers, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, who advance different interpretations of the nature of a rhetoric of disclosure—one highlighting rhetoric as immanence, the other transcendence. This thesis, then, examines the philosophical and rhetorical debate about the rhetoric of disclosure by focusing on Derrida's transcendent interpretation and Deleuze's immanent interpretation in an effort to clarify Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure and its usefulness for rhetorical studies. These divergent perspectives will then be applied to the political case study of President Barack Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech to assess how each contributes to our understanding of rhetorical theory and criticism.

HEIDEGGER AND DISCLOSIVE RHETORIC: TWO DIVERGENT PATHS IN IMMANENCE AND TRANSCEDENCE

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger is a key philosophical thinker who has influenced contemporary scholarship in rhetorical theory. His concept of disclosure has become particularly significant because it is uniquely situated to explain the nuances of contemporary public political address. Yet the meaning and applicability of Heidegger's *rhetoric of disclosure* to explain new forms of political speech have been contested by two contemporary philosophers, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, who advance different interpretations of the nature of a rhetoric of disclosure—one highlighting rhetoric as immanence, the other transcendence. This thesis, then, examines the philosophical and rhetorical debate about the rhetoric of disclosure by focusing on Derrida's transcendent interpretation and Deleuze's immanent interpretation in an effort to clarify Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure and its usefulness for rhetorical studies. These divergent perspectives will then be applied to the political case study of President Barack Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech to assess how each contributes to our understanding of rhetorical theory and criticism.

Heidegger's concept of disclosure emerges out of a rich philosophical tradition based in phenomenology and hermeneutics. Although much attention has been paid to Heidegger's writings on ontology, his concept of disclosure as it relates to rhetoric has been a recent methodological addition to existing rhetorical scholarship applying

Heidegger's ideas. In order to link disclosure to rhetoric, it is important to frame that connection through Heidegger's understanding of the roles philosophy and rhetoric play with one another. The relationship between philosophy and rhetoric is critical because both are inherently related to Heidegger's phenomenology project and mutually inform each other's practice. For instance, Heidegger drew heavily from ancient rhetorical theories in the courses he taught and volumes he published on Plato's and Aristotle's views on rhetoric and philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger begins in the crucible of ancient Greece because he thinks modern Western thinking is indebted to Plato's metaphysics and Aristotle's subsequent response to Plato's thought. As a result, both Aristotle and Plato form an early theory of phenomenology through their discussion of rhetoric.

The Binding of Rhetoric and Philosophy

The distinction between rhetoric and philosophy is a theme often explored in philosophy and communication courses. An analysis of this distinction usually begins with Plato's discussion of the nature of philosophy and rhetoric. In Plato's view, rhetoric is related to power, manipulation, and persuasion (McCoy, 2011). The art of rhetoric is partly defined by its ability to persuade the *hoi polloi* through cunning argumentation. The purpose of philosophy, on the other hand, is nothing less than the pursuit of eternal truth. To engage in philosophical reflection is to love the wisdom brought on by thoughtful contemplation. In one of Plato's most studied dialogues *Gorgias*, Plato uses the characters of Socrates and Gorgias to engage in an *elenchus*, a technique of the Socratic method, to argue about the differences between rhetoric and philosophy (McCoy, 2011).

It is also important to note that Plato does defend some uses for the role of rhetoric in public society. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates situates the true rhetorician as a noble lover of the good (McCoy, 2011). In opposition to "base rhetoric," noble rhetoric is interpersonal in nature and can be used for action and policy. Noble rhetoric can expand on truth and be used for the transmission of information to a community. As a result, the duty of rhetoric should not merely lie in the whimsical art of persuasion that separates us from truth, but in the public deliberation of the good in society. Also, the character, Callicles, in Plato's *Gorgias* defends rhetoric in a discussion with Socrates. Callicles presents a series of sophisticated arguments defending rhetoric at the cost of philosophy. For example, Callicles is the last of the interlocutors to argue with Socrates on the role philosophy and rhetoric play in everyday life. Callicles suggests that rhetoric provides a way to become intelligent in the affairs of the city, and that Socrates significantly over-estimates the role of philosophy in this context.

Through Socrates, Plato confronts three questions concerning rhetoric's relationship to philosophy. In brief, Plato wonders not only what the nature of rhetoric is, but whether rhetoric by its very nature is meant to divert an individual's relationship from the truth. Additionally, if rhetoric is a basic strategy of persuasion, does rhetoric distort a society's laws, and can an adequate conception of justice be based in rhetorical principles? Plato's attack on rhetoric comes in two forms: first, rhetoric manipulates our *doxa*, or public opinion, about political issues because rhetoric is more concerned with persuading the masses than revealing the truth; second, rhetoric cannot illuminate a justified *episteme*, or true knowledge, because rhetoric has no real relationship to knowledge.

At the heart of this issue is Plato's argument that rhetoric concerns itself with the *pistis,* or mere beliefs, of justice whereas philosophy illuminates the nature of justice itself. This distinction between having beliefs about justice (i.e., rhetoric) and revealing the nature of justice itself (i.e., philosophy) exposes rhetoric as a sham art. Rhetoric is a skill for the charlatan. A rhetorician manipulates language without the proper backing of truth or justice. Additionally, rhetoric is dangerous because it leads to an unjust society, and rhetoricians perpetuate the problem in a society's youth by indoctrinating them with the skills of persuasion rather than the discovery of eternal, transcendent truths that form the foundation of a knowledgeable community. Pursuing these transcendent truths is the highest good people can attain as a community, according to Socrates, because the community will create a just society. Socrates thought knowledge combined with the pursuit of transcendence can lead to a community that operates with an authentic conception of justice. Last, Socrates thought justice would also create an environment where each person could strive to maximize the potential of their lives within a community.

The relationship between philosophy and rhetoric has undergone seismic attitudinal shifts since ancient times and especially in the 19th century. Beginning with German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's scathing rebuke of Plato's conception of philosophy and rhetoric, contemporary scholars largely have altered their attitudes about the distinction between philosophy and rhetoric by seriously making an allowance for rhetoric as a justified mode of academic study (Rehg, 2013). This has been particularly evident in Communication Studies departments throughout the United States in the 20th century. With numerous scholarly communication journals and professional

organizations dedicated to the study of rhetoric, rhetorical theory has carved out its own corner in academia. Communication scholars often attribute the interest in rhetoric in the twentieth century to the linguistic turn in various academic disciplines like philosophy, political science, and comparative literature (Sung-Gi, 2011). Additionally, the rise of mass media and corresponding technological advancements in public broadcasting (i.e., television, radio, and the internet) puts a spotlight on how rhetoric functions in contemporary society (Lynch & Kinsella, 2013).

Rhetorical principles often are applied in Communication Studies scholarship to make sense of public political addresses and their persuasiveness. Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech is one recent example of significant political oratory where rhetoricians have paid particular attention to issues of race in campaign rhetoric. This speech became a momentous touchstone in defining Obama's political persona and stance on race through a complex invocation of metaphor and allusion. One theme explored in this speech is the relationship between the goals of civil liberties and modern institutionalized forms of racism in the U.S. legal system (Terrill, 2009). As some scholars have argued, Obama's speech on race was one of the first significant introductions to Obama as a politician and candidate for the U.S. presidency (Isaksen, 2011). Since rhetoric often forms the persuasive power of political speech-making, Obama's speech on race is studied today to understand modern race relations and its grounding within public address (Miller, 2013). Rhetoricians also have drawn from contemporary philosophy in order to discover new paths of understanding political public address. Similarly, Obama's speech is used in this thesis as a case study to examine two different interpretations of Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure through transcendence and

immanence. Although a brief literature review of transcendence and immanence as they relate to African American public address will occur in a later chapter, it is important to summarize Heidegger's views concerning rhetoric in order to provide a frame for understanding the immanent and transcendent qualities intrinsic to Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech.

Heidegger on Disclosive Rhetoric

The German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) is one thinker whose work has recently been adapted in rhetorical studies. Martin Heidegger is considered one of the most important thinkers in the modern age and also had a deep fascination with the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Heidegger wrote extensively on the pre-Socratics and emphasized the roles Heraclitus and Parmenides played to understand conceptions of being. Heidegger's well-known text, *Being and Time* (1962) expounds on our more contemporary relationship to ancient Greek thinking by exploring the nature of existence and time. Heidegger's engagement with Plato and Aristotle in particular created a rich vein for rhetoricians to extensively mine in the communication and rhetoric discipline.

A general search of Martin Heidegger's name in the academic database Communication & Mass Media Complete returns hundreds of results. Scholarly works that fully incorporate Heideggerian concepts include Craig R. Smith and Michael J. Hyde's (1991) essay on "Rethinking The Public: The Role of Emotion in Being-With-Others ." This article explores two of Heidegger's concepts called *being-with-others* and *das Man*. Being-with-others describes how human existence is necessarily communal. What it means to be human is defined by our existence with others. C.R. Smith and Hyde use being-with-others to explain how *dasein* interprets or finds meaning in the world

informed through this sense of communal understanding. The "publicness" of our existential condition creates an everydayness of being-with-others. Being-with-others helps to understand how the human condition is marked by conforming to our everyday practices with others. In this sense, there is no private, individual existence. Our existence is always already defined by the public. Humans are defined by our relationships and existence with other *dasein* (Heidegger's word for our human-specific existence or relationship to the world).

Heidegger was influenced by Edmund Husserl's writings on phenomenology and this, in turn, influenced Heidegger's thoughts on ontology and hermeneutics. Husserl's landmark texts, *Logical Investigations* (1900) and *Cartesian Meditations* (1931) played a vital role in Heidegger's early development of the role phenomenology would play in his philosophy. Heidegger even dedicates *Being and Time* to Husserl although Heideggerian phenomenology is quite distinct from Husserl's thoughts on the subject. Heidegger's infamous radical reinterpretation of Husserl's philosophy deviated from Husserl's reliance on a phenomenology of consciousness to one of *phenomenological ontology*. In a nutshell, Husserl's phenomenology is concerned with the descriptive, detached analysis of consciousness and the corresponding objects that are constituted by our mind.

Heidegger questions Husserl's reliance on pure consciousness as the original mode of our encounter with beings. Heidegger is suspicious of Husserl's thesis that our consciousness is a route towards the "things themselves," so Heidegger offers a more originary and primordial relationship to the world. While Husserl wondered how the world is constituted in our consciousness, Heidegger asks the prior question of what sort of ontology does one have to have to even constitute the world at all? Heidegger uses the

term *phenomenology* to describe a method of doing ontology. Our being can be revealed through a "phenomenological reduction." This is why Heidegger uses the term *dasein* as the entity to access a way of being. Heidegger moves from Husserlian consciousness to a method of phenomenology that uses a hermeneutical analysis of *dasein*.

Heidegger uses the term *dasein* in relation to temporality (hence, the title of *Being and Time*). Heidegger argues the being of *dasein* is necessarily temporal. One way that *dasein* is concerned with being is through Heidegger's use of the term *Das Man*. *Das Man* is Heidegger's word for the anonymous character of daily existence that is flattened by our social conformity to the community. To exist as *dasein* is to be a part of the everyday world of the "they," often translated as "the one." For example, das Man helps explain the sense of our existence that is inauthentic. *Dasein* often does what "one does" in particular circumstances. In this sense, humans are all das Man because people often do what is appropriate to a given situation. When one goes out to eat, one often uses the utensils that are provided. When one walks in a mall, one often walks on either side of the walkway. *Dasein* are always already situated by norms and social conventions. There is often no formal authority laying down the "official rules" of social convention, but *dasein* operates on conformity to these conventions nonetheless.

One recent study that incorporates Heidegger's concepts into rhetorical practice is Ben Highmore's (2013) article "Feeling Our Way: Mood and Cultural Studies." Heidegger uses the German word *Stimmung* to speak about *dasein* and our moods. Moods constitute how *dasein* find themselves in the world. *Dasein* is always in a mood. Although our moods change, moods are never absent from our basic constitution in the world. Highmore writes about Heidegger how moods are one *existentiale* or feature of

dasein that form the background through which a world becomes meaningful. Moods are a fundamental feature of *dasein* because the mood frames how the world "shows up" to *dasein*. Moods are not in our head as merely neuro-physiological phenomena or subjective states of the brain; rather, Heidegger is using the term *moods* to describe how the world is filled with practical meaning in our "pre-subjective" state. Highmore states moods are one of the basic ways human beings engage with the world.

> Consider how I currently experience my office. As I type these words, the computer keyboard does not appear to me as a conspicuous object of experience. Rather, it is seamlessly integrated into my activity, and my appreciation of its utility is inseparable from what I am doing. However, I do not take all my surroundings to be significant in quite the same way. Numerous other things that appear to me as practically significant do not solicit activities in the way that the keyboard does. For instance, the shoes sitting on the floor by my chair appear to me as functional but do not currently summon me to do anything. So we need to distinguish between having practical significance and being both significant and enticing. (p. 6)

In this sense, *dasein* and its world are inextricably bound together in a holistic web of significance and not separated from one another.

Heidegger's notion of *disclosure* is the fundamental way to understand how *dasein* relates to the world. For Heidegger, the world is "always already" relevant and meaningful to *dasein*. The world is not an alien, unintelligible place. To disclose the world is to inhabit a world that is infused with meaning already. For example, when *dasein* navigates the "world" of the kitchen, other purposes are necessarily implied like

cooking, cleaning, and using tools like cutlery. A kitchen is infused with meaning because the world of the kitchen overlaps with its uses and purposes. One fundamental feature of *dasein* is its ability to turn blank spaces into a world rich with meaning. *Dasein* has a world-building existence. To be *dasein* is to have a world that matters.

Heidegger is famous for asserting how one cannot divide, or carve off the world from, human existence. To exist is to necessarily have a world. One way of thinking about this idea is in modern philosophy. Heidegger partially reverses modern French thinker Descartes's famous line "I think, therefore I am" to "I am, therefore I think." Our particular existence as *dasein* is a pre-requisite to even know why thinking would be meaningful. This is important for our moods because what *dasein* finds significant is partially defined by our moods and how our moods "assail" us (Highmore, 2013). Moods fundamentally frame every act of communication. While moods are not the sole determinant of our being-in-the-world, our moods are always there with us and partially determine the ways in which things matter to *dasein*.

While Heideggerian concepts like moods, being-with-others, *dasein*, and das Man are by no means an exhaustive list of ways communication scholars have used Heidegger to understand rhetoric, these concepts in some measure have formed a basis for using Heidegger to theorize about rhetoric. One reason why Heidegger has been such a central figure in philosophy is that Heidegger is one of the few Western thinkers to think outside or beyond the Western tradition. Heidegger's writings shoot right to the core of what some of the fundamental assumptions are to the practice of rhetoric and philosophy. Heidegger primarily does away with a large portion of traditional Western philosophy and traces the origins of what he thinks are a mistake that begins in ancient Greece with

Plato. Heidegger is often called a "philosopher of being" because it is with Heidegger's discussion of *ontology* (the study of being or existence) that will begin a deep-seated shift in how communication scholars think about rhetoric from an ontological perspective.

Heidegger revitalized a particular field or mode of study in philosophy called ontology with his numerous writings on being. *Ontology* is the investigation into the nature of being and existence. To ask an ontological question is to ask a question concerning the nature of what it means to exist and wonder why is there something rather than nothing at all when it comes to thinking about our being. Although the study of ontology did not begin with Plato, Plato asked some of the most important questions concerning the nature of being. One of Plato's legacies in Western philosophy is his distinction between reality and illusion. Plato divides the world between the eternal and unchanging *forms* that result from true knowledge and the parasitic copies of sensation and experience that are only real as they participate in the Forms.

Heidegger begins from this basic conception of ontology and comes to critique Plato's understanding of how things come to exist and what it means to exist. Although a more in-depth discussion of Heidegger's fundamental ontology is explicated later, it is fruitful to outline a basic understanding of Heidegger's ontology here. In short, often in an introductory philosophy course, the instructor will ask metaphysical questions like, "Does the pen in front of me that I think I see exist?" One of Heidegger's contributions to philosophy is to interrogate a critical presumption in this question by wondering what it means to exist and what sort of existence must one have in order to wonder about existence at all. Heidegger's magnum opus, *Being and Time* (1962) attempts to puzzle out the meaning of being.

For Heidegger, the question of the meaning of being has been forgotten by the Western tradition from Plato onward. By forgotten, Heidegger means Western thinking has presupposed that being be understood in one limited sense and failed to ask the primordial question of existence itself. Although Heidegger's response to this question is explored in-depth in Chapter 2, one can already begin to understand how various scholars will come to adapt Heidegger's philosophy to rhetorical criticism. One area where this is especially evident is in what rhetoricians call Heidegger's *rhetoric of disclosure*. Heidegger's use of rhetoric goes part and parcel with his writings on being and lays the foundation for future scholarly work on Heidegger in the field of rhetoric.

Before operationally defining Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure, it is important to know how the ancient Greeks influenced Heidegger's understanding of the role of rhetoric in our daily lives. First, Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmann argue in *Heidegger and Rhetoric* (2006) how rhetoric is at the heart of what Heidegger calls his "fundamental ontology." Since the human condition is produced by our shared contexts with one another as a being-with-others, rhetoric itself binds *dasein* with a world that is meaningful. Gross and Kemmann argue, "Human beings simultaneously compose discursive institutions and are composed by them" (p. 11). If rhetoric is understood as a kind of discursive practice, that is to say rooted in shared moods, then it becomes difficult to divorce the act of rhetoric itself from our being-with-others.

In Plato's *Gorgias*, Gorgias suggests that rhetoric "confers on everyone who possesses it not only freedom for himself but also the power of ruling his fellow-countrymen." Stuart Elden argues in "Reading Logos as Speech: Heidegger, Aristotle and Rhetorical Politics" (2005) that Heidegger can be rhetorically connected to the

ancient Greeks. Elden writes that rhetoric for Plato is linked to power and manipulation, but Heidegger interprets rhetoric to mean that "the rhetor is the one that has the proper power over *dasein*" (p. 296). What Heidegger means here by the "proper power" is that it should be understood in the ancient Greek context, as Heidegger will adapt Plato and Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric, as between *techne* (art, craft, or skill) and *praxis* (process or practice). Rhetoric is not merely an art but also not simply a practice. Rhetoric usually implies a political role for the ancient Greeks because civic participation was vital to the health of the *polis* (city-state). For Heidegger, rhetoric articulates the civic relationship between argument and ethos. Rhetoric implies a moral dimension which is necessarily a human concern, a concern of *dasein*. This is why Heidegger thinks rhetoric itself requires a proper power because rhetoric is the vehicle by which *dasein* relate and learn from one another as *dasein*.

Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure merges out of his thoughts on rhetoric and phenomenology. Rhetoric itself is often defined by its capacity to persuade. Heidegger's use of the rhetoric of disclosure is similar to Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as using the available means of persuasion. Aristotle and Heidegger would agree that rhetoric often carries an ethical and political valence. An important distinction for Heidegger, and ultimately where he departs ways with Aristotle, is the role rhetoric will play in Heidegger's use of the term "disclosure" (Polt, 1999). World-disclosure refers to how the world becomes intelligible to *dasein* by virtue of our ontological condition (i.e., the world only makes sense on a holistically structured background of meaning). For example, world-disclosure is meant to delineate the sort of ontological status *dasein* comes to experience. To have a world necessarily implies an existence like ours.

Heidegger thinks this is evident because *dasein* have the capacity to care about its world. *Dasein* cannot separate their world because *dasein* are defined by their world-disclosing nature. It is important to note that while Heidegger himself does not explicitly connect rhetoric to the term disclosure, there are scholars who argue that the two are inextricably bound together (Kompridis, 2011). It is on this nexus between rhetoric and world-disclosure that Heidegger's legacy lies with rhetoricians' use of Heidegger in the discipline of rhetoric.

I argue that Obama's speech on race is heavily imbued with disclosive rhetoric. Throughout his text, Obama invokes the relationship between Black experiences of White authority and systemic racism. Disclosing rhetoric attempts to connect the basic ways Blacks experience the world that remains invisible to White perceptions. It is important to note that Obama often pragmatically walks a thin line between offending Whites in their implicit (and explicit) privilege of a system that often excludes Blacks from basic rights that calls for a movement to uproot racism. Obama's speech utilizes persons' experiences of race to show how *dasein* disclose a world with oppression and historical understanding. One clear example of disclosure is Obama's deployment of potent narratives about Black injustice. One question that emerges about disclosive rhetoric is the persuasiveness or rhetorical force it can display in combination with the power of narratives. Although the existence of disclosive rhetoric is not unique to public political address, disclosive rhetoric forms a significant impact on different methods of political persuasion. Rhetoric and world-disclosure have a long history and retain an intimate relationship to speech.

Although an analysis of disclosive rhetoric and Obama's speech will occur in Chapter 3, it is important to trace the connection between rhetoric and disclosure as a recent emergence in rhetorical criticism. One contemporary example of world-disclosing rhetoric is with Canadian philosopher and rhetor, Ian Hacking. Hacking argues in his book, *Styles of Scientific Reasoning* (1985), that world-disclosing arguments are a distinct form of rhetoric that Hacking calls "styles of reasoning" (p. 145). Although Hacking has modified his writing about different styles of reasoning for the past couple of decades, and his thoughts about the concept have changed over the years, there are some common strands uniting Hacking's writing. First, logical reasoning like induction and deduction are not styles of reasoning because they aim to *preserve* the truth. Styles of reasoning are a form of disclosive rhetoric because they serve to create the possibility of *discovering* the truth. While deductive reasoning is largely ahistorical, styles of reasoning emphasize the historical layers within rhetoric itself and how rhetoric is used in a particular group, society, or age. For example, certain rhetorical styles can die out and become inaccessible to later generations. Fragments of writings from Pre-Socratic thinkers like Parmenides are difficult to parse not merely because of translatability, but the underlying reasoning being deployed within these fragments is lost because the rhetorical style does not carry the same meaning for contemporary readers. A more recent example could be text messaging. The distinct forms of intelligibility (or styles of reasoning) in a text message would be quite different from an academic paper because how language is used and disclosed ground the way people think about persuasion and rhetoric. Put simply, text messaging is more like "fingered speaking" while academic research uses different forms of rhetoric to enhance formal education.

It is important to note that Hacking (1985) is primarily concerned with styles of reasoning in scientific paradigms. Hacking shows how styles of reasoning in conjunction with world-disclosure attempt to reveal ontological dimensions in order to clarify the background of meaning on which the rhetoric implicitly depends. Emma Aiken-Klar (2013) addresses the implications of Hacking's research.

> Hacking challenges us to consider how objectivity has been manufactured. For him, two essential features of styles of reasoning shape how we constitute truth and experience the world. First, our styles of reasoning determine the criteria of evaluation by which they are judged. And second, our styles of reasoning create the subject matter they claim to study. What Hacking means is that not only do we invent the rules to decide what counts as "true" and what counts as "false" but we use these rules to determine what we actually study in the first place. What we conceive of as logic and truth are not actually timeless certainties, but are created by and within a system of sense-making of our own design. History bears this out. In mid-17th century Western Europe, the bills of mortality for the Plague of London and the record-keeping system developed for suicides in Paris led to a new way of thinking, a new kind of knowledge and a new way of organizing the world: data collection, probability and the relative frequency of events. Reality and truth were henceforth defined through statistical reasoning. (p. 4)

Styles of reasoning are connected to world-disclosure and rhetoric by highlighting the need for understanding the informal nature of arguments, claims, assertions, and language. For Heidegger, as well as for Hacking, this sort of rhetoric is necessarily an

ontological concern because one cannot divorce how rhetoric is used from ways that *dasein* exist in the world.

Obama's speech on race in "A More Perfect Union" speech is one example of the permutation between rhetoric and disclosure by emphasizing the impact narratives have on the stories we tell ourselves about American history and the basic ways *dasein* relate to its political world. Obama's speech is filled with personal narratives of himself and others and their relationship to politics. This emphasis on narrative and the lack of formal argument alters the way audiences relate to Obama and his candidacy. Obama's use of disclosure frames the way his campaign rhetoric is understood as persuasive. What makes Obama's speech a fascinating text is its double-use of transcendence and immanence within disclosive rhetoric. The concepts of *transcendence* and *immanence* and their relation to disclosive rhetoric and phenomenology also must be explained to understand their recent emergence in rhetorical studies.

Understanding Immanence and Transcendence

Daniel Smith is one recent scholar who links Heidegger's philosophy to rhetoric through the two concepts of immanence and transcendence in his chapter titled "Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought" (Patton & Protevi, 2003). Using 20th century French rhetoric, D. Smith deploys Heidegger's writings as a way of understanding the concepts of immanence and transcendence. One primary question he ponders is what role immanence and transcendence play in the rhetorical tradition (a question at the center of this thesis as well). Specifically, Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure provides a way of adding immanence and transcendence to the rhetorical lexicon in order to understand other forms

of human communication, specifically public address. If human communication is one basic way *dasein* relates to the world, Heidegger provides a language to speak about our relationship to others through the disclosure of the world. D. Smith concludes that immanence and transcendence leave a trace throughout rhetorical scholarship. Heidegger and his ontological framework thus sets up new ways to understand rhetorical strategies grounded in immanence and transcendence.

Heidegger's phenomenology is the foundation for a "rhetoric of disclosure" and carries an important contribution to how scholars conceive of rhetoric and the practice of rhetorical criticism. Two leading contemporary French philosophers, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, have drawn extensively from Heidegger's ontology but end up with divergent interpretations of Heidegger, one deriving a principle of "immanence" and the other a principle of "transcendence." What is insightful about these two deviating paths is how Heidegger, Derrida, and Deleuze have been used in the field of rhetoric since they offer very different rhetorical strategies to explain what is ultimately two ways of dealing with Heidegger's ontology through his rhetoric of disclosure.

Derrida and Deleuze have come to be seen as two highly influential thinkers on contemporary rhetoric and have a strong influence on Communication Studies scholarship. Again, a simple search of Derrida's and Deleuze's names in Communication & Mass Media Complete brings almost 500 results, and their writings often are explored in graduate level Communication courses. Although tracing Derrida's and Deleuze's philosophical lineage to Heidegger is primarily a historical task, many Communication scholars have yet to address the two divergent paths Derrida and Deleuze take with respect to Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure. Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure

combined with immanence and transcendence is significant because Derrida and Deleuze occupy a special interdisciplinary approach to understanding modern forms of rhetoric. Derrida identified rhetoric as occupying a fluid place in current scholarship and is inherently interdisciplinary in understanding its various forms. Likewise, Deleuze utilized classical rhetors like Aristotle and Plato to understand politics, race, and science.

Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure has the potential to explore additional ways *dasein* speak about their world. Given the many worlds *dasein* navigates, disclosive rhetoric incorporates the fundamental ways *dasein* think and speak about the world that matters to them. For example, socio-political discourse in America is often infused with strategies of persuasion where Heidegger's disclosive rhetoric illuminates other tactics speakers use to persuade. Using transcendent and immanent rhetoric, President Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech is one recent notable campaign speech that deploys an interesting array of tactics to persuade a modern audience. It is important to remember that Obama's speech on race reset his campaign against Hillary Clinton as the Democratic nominee and infused a discussion of race into the public sphere. Obama's speech is uniquely situated as a test case to illuminate immanence and transcendence in disclosive rhetoric because race is one of the most dominant forms of identity that *dasein* use to relate to their world, and Obama's speech is one of the last political speeches in recent memory to analyze modern day racism in a public national forum. Although a review of literature will situate Obama's speech in relation to African American public address, it is a fair question to ask why Obama's speech would function as a test case for disclosive rhetoric.

While Heidegger has a lot to say about how *dasein* disclose a world that is infused with meaning from the beginning, he largely ignores race as an element that situates our relationship in disclosing the world. It should be said at this point that Heidegger himself hardly discusses the issue of race because he thought he had found a way of describing an ontology that was prior to the phenomenology of race. And while many of Heidegger's journals have yet to be translated into English, race is a topic that Heidegger does not seem to confront in any meaningful way.

This is not to say that scholars of race were not tremendously influenced by Heidegger. For example, Cornel West writes in his essay "Philosophy and the Afro-American Experience" (2003) that Heidegger is particularly influential on theories of race by emphasizing acts of interpretation that are grounded in how people disclose the world phenomenologically through time. For example, West states "Afro-American philosophy appropriates from Heidegger the notion of philosophy as interpretation of what it means to be for people who, as a result of active engagement in the world, reconstruct their past, make choices in the present and envision possibilities for the future" (p. 9). West cites Heidegger as one of the main thinkers who aids in new ways to conceptualize race even though race is not explicitly on Heideggger's mind. West uses Heidegger's structure for acts of disclosure (fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception) to argue that race is more biological fiction than biological fact because disclosure comes before interpretation. Heidegger's notion of disclosure is important because the implications of this argument according to West means interpretative reality is steeped in concrete historical situations functioning through a background of meaning that requires engagement with the world. This radically dis-locates the prior understanding of race as

an essence "inside" the body. By uniting race with time, Black experiences become acts of disclosure that have a history. In a way that Heidegger did not quite anticipate, he articulated a position for an emancipatory Black politics grounded in phenomenology.

West (2003) is not without his criticisms of Heidegger, however. For example, West argues that Heidegger underestimates how current perceptions of historical pressures might limit Black engagement with fighting racism. Since *dasein* always has a history, Heidegger fails to articulate the crucial social and historical forces that produce what kind of choices are available to African Americans to fight structural racism. Although this thesis will attempt to articulate how immanence and transcendence could be ways out of this problem by providing rhetorical tools to analyze structural racism, it is still important to note that Heidegger's disclosive rhetoric on its own may be an inadequate prescription for understanding African American public address. In the end, West asserts that Heidegger needs to add the notion of power and relationships between people to his conception of phenomenology.

Not all scholars agree with West's assessment of Heideggerian phenomenology ultimately falling short of truly understanding issues of race. Linda Martín Alcoff argues in her book *Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self* (2006) that Heidegger's discussion of disclosure allows for a way of understanding race as more indeterminate and fluid than previously assessed. Martín Alcoff states that Heidegger's phenomenology simultaneously resists the postmodern thesis that race is an empty category while also not locating race completely in biology. The way *dasein* disclose the world permits African American experiences to be lived in the body while also being disclosed in the cultural moment. This connection between body and culture allows for a

way to understand race that emphasizes the constraints West thinks are absent. Robert Bernasconi, in his essay "Crossed Lines in the Racialization Process: Race as a Border Concept" (2012), also defends Heideggerian phenomenology as a way to think about race. Bernasconi argues that Heidegger's phenomenology combined with hermeneutics helps to create new terms to discuss the way people use and speak about race. For example, Bernasconi uses race as a "border concept" to show that legal or scientific accounts of race risk essentialism that phenomenology can circumvent. By locating race in history while also understanding that race manifests itself in the real concrete social conditions of human interaction suggests a Heideggerian phenomenological approach accounting for relationships of power that keep race as an iterable experience.

In the end, race scholars often use Heidegger to ground their argument that race is the combination of discourse and behavior. Immanence and transcendence offer new ways of understanding discourse and behavior through disclosure. Although transcendence and immanence are explored in-depth in subsequent chapters, some basic definitions will help explain how this distinction can lead to a better understanding of disclosive rhetoric and race. In brief, *transcendence* is often defined by a distinct separation or split between various sorts of entities or phenomena while *immanence* is explained through holism and connection of such phenomena. Religious discourse is one area imbued with immanent and transcendent disclosive rhetoric. For example, various Western religions often use transcendent rhetoric in their religious discourse to explain humanity's relation to God. While God takes residence in a separate ethereal plane, people strive to bring this relationship closer through prayer or worship. Immanence, on the other hand, is sometimes used in Eastern religious practices that emphasize the inter-

connectedness of humanity with nature. Various forms of Buddhism, for example, do not seek to close a gap between believer and a deity, but rather explain how human beings seek joy through inner-directed meditation. It is not surprising that Derrida's later writings would turn towards Western religious discourse while Deleuze would draw from Eastern religious practices. While Heidegger's influence on Derrida and Deleuze is generally well known, scholarship on Heidegger's rhetorical influence on these two thinkers is still in its infancy in Communication Studies programs, and this void of scholarship is particularly acute in the two different paths Derrida and Deleuze take on transcendence and immanence. In short, both Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure and Derrida's and Deleuze's expansion of the theory through immanence and transcendence are underdeveloped in rhetorical theory and criticism.

This thesis focuses on the rhetorical underpinnings of Deleuze's immanence and Derrida's transcendence as two avenues to extend and possibly correct our understanding of Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure. New research needs to develop a better understanding of how transcendence and immanence impact discussions of rhetorical discourse and how these terms offer a new vision of Heidegger and rhetorical theory. This thesis posits that race is one primary form of public existence in our life-world that could illuminate the power of disclosive rhetoric in political address. With the rising popularity of using Heidegger to understand modern rhetoric, there is a lack of theory about whether disclosive rhetoric can open up space to understand African American public address despite Heidegger's silence on the subject. Given that Derrida and Deleuze are arguably two of the largest French inheritors of Heideggerian ontology, this thesis argues that their respective paths of transcendence and immanence create the

means to understand disclosive rhetoric of race that Heidegger leaves uncovered. As a brief example, prominent Black legal scholar Derrick Bell (2008) uses critical race theory as a form of disclosive rhetoric to make visible the "rhetoric of color-blindness" imbued in the U.S. legal system. Bell combines disparate elements of Heidegger and Derrida to advance a perspective on discrimination and Black suffering through disclosive rhetoric.

Given that African American public address is one of the primary ways people relate to discussions of race, transcendence and immanence understood through Heidegger's disclosive rhetoric may provide an additional lexicon similar to critical race theory on uncovering racism and discrimination in the United States. This thesis attempts not only to bridge the gap between Heidegger and explorations of the rhetoric of disclosure but to help explain how immanence and transcendence are useful distinctions for comprehending diverse rhetorical strategies on African American public address today.

Immanence and transcendence have an important role in Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure that can be illuminated through Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech. Exploring the meaning of immanence and transcendence is the purpose of Chapter 2; it is separated into four parts by methodically laying out Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure, African American public address, Derrida's use of transcendence, and Deleuze's use of immanence. Chapter 3 consists of an analysis that uses these principles and applies them to President Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech. A transcendent and immanent analysis is applied to this speech separately while also comparing these two modes of analysis side by side. Chapter 4 addresses the implications of the analysis, and identifies

a direction for future scholarship based on Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure concerning public address generally and African American public address specifically.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Two landmark articles in rhetorical scholarship operationalize Heidegger's thoughts regarding rhetorical criticism. Michael J. Hyde and Craig R. Smith's (1979) article titled "Hermeneutics and Rhetoric: A Seen but Unobserved Relationship" establishes the role hermeneutics play with rhetoric and how the epistemic function of rhetoric provides a theoretical direction for rhetorical criticism. Hyde and C.R. Smith's article is one of the first examples applying Heidegger to illuminate a study of rhetoric by communication scholars. Hyde and C.R. Smith argue that the relationship between hermeneutics and rhetoric is necessarily ontological. As a result, an ontological approach through phenomenology helps understand how "the primordial function of rhetoric is to 'make-known' meaning both to oneself and to others. Meaning is derived by a human being in and through the interpretive understanding of reality. Rhetoric is the process of making-known that meaning" (p. 347). Since rhetoric and interpretation go hand-in-hand, Hyde and C.R. Smith particularly focus on the intrapersonal and interpersonal relationship between understanding and interpretation in Heidegger's writings on the "hermeneutical situation."

They highlight the role understanding plays when human beings interpret meaning. For example, they assert that "the development of understanding is a function of how human beings 'work-out' the linguistic possibilities that constitute and are

projected in understanding" (p. 348). Specifically, they identify three interdependent intrapersonal modes of understanding: Fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. These three terms delineate how human comprehension is related to Heidegger's hermeneutics.

Fore-having is the "linguistic possibilities" that interlocutors have in advance before interpretation takes place. Interpretation does not arise *ex nihilo*. An interpretation takes place within a cultural background and horizon of meaning that situates any determination of meaning. Fore-having acts as the frame of intelligibility or "parameters of rationality" that provides the *reasonableness* of an assertion. Navigating the rhetoric of a culture presupposes a fore-having that acts as a kind of guide to structure understanding.

Fore-sight orients fore-having in acts of interpretation. Fore-sight is a point of view that guides our interpretation and operates "in advance" so meaning can be realized. Fore-sight orients us to the world so our interpretations can make sense. Hyde and C.R. Smith use the example of having a prejudice. A prejudice acts as a fore-sight of understanding because a prejudice ontologically situates what shows up as meaningful when we interpret others.

Last, fore-conception structures the possibilities of fore-sight in advance of our interpretation of assigning meaning. Hyde and C.R. Smith use the example of a "categorical system that … is used in conducting some scientific experiment or rhetorical analysis as an ontic example of fore-conception" (p. 352). Combining fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception together acts as a "fore-structure" of understanding. These tenets provide a vocabulary to understand how our consciousness (non-Cartesian) arises

out of a fore-structure that is related to the ontological relationship between hermeneutics and rhetoric.

Because understanding comes through interpretation, rhetoric can make meaning known. Rhetoric operates the hermeneutical situation in time and "if the hermeneutical situation, being the primordial signification of hermeneutics, is the functional relationship of 'understanding-interpretation-meaning,' the rhetoric is the hyphen (-) binding the relationship" (p. 353). Phenomenologically speaking, one cannot separate rhetoric from how meaning arises through our ontological relation to the world.

Hyde and C.R. Smith also use Heidegger to discover the role rhetoric plays in interpersonal communication. When meaning is created or made-known in communication through interpretive understanding, that meaning expresses itself as a "derivative mode" called an *assertion*. Assertions also have three interdependent functions called pointing-out, predication, and communication (p. 355). The authors use the example of the assertion "the steps were too steep." Communication between two people highlights the meaning of rhetoric in this assertion in a different way than the intrapersonal use of fore-structure. Hyde and C.R. Smith go on to claim: "For example, in the assertion 'The steps were too steep,' the something being talked about is not only 'steps' but steps that are interpreted as being 'too steep.' Unless one can communicate how one relates to what is being pointed out and predicated, one's communication cannot be realized and shared" (p. 356). Since rhetoric's function is the making-known of meaning, rhetoric plays a vital role in any act of communication, especially in acts of disclosure.

Hyde and C.R. Smith argue that Heidegger's understanding of rhetoric fulfills an epistemic function important for rhetorical criticism. If rhetorical scholarship wants to derive meaning from an ontological-hermeneutical perspective, they remind us that "a rhetorical critic . . . might look to those speeches for values, attitudes, and appeals which would help form a picture of the actual consciousness of the time" (p. 357). It is with this notion of consciousness that helps frame Heidegger's understanding of rhetoric as forming the presupposition of *dasein* to form their linguistic possibilities. In this sense, Heideggerian interpretation is necessarily rhetorical because it takes place within the scope of hermeneutics. What this means, then, is that the epistemic role rhetoric plays in our world helps situate the meaning of rhetoric as it can be applied to human discourse.

Heidegger's work continues to be utilized in more recent rhetorical scholarship, and often in contrast to the views of Aristotle. One dominant theme concerns Heidegger's understanding of rhetoric in relation to Aristotle's discussion of the "everydayness" of rhetoric. Communication scholars commonly cite a specific passage from Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1962) that emphasizes rhetoric as a daily activity and practice rather than a discipline of research (Mailloux, 2006). Heidegger states in *Being and Time* (1962) that "Contrary to the traditional orientation of the concept of rhetoric according to which it is some kind of 'discipline,' Aristotle's *Rhetoric* must be understood as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being-with-one-another" (p. 130). Like Aristotle, Heidegger's deployment of rhetoric as a kind of everyday relation to the being of others establishes a fundamental relationship between humans and communication.

Steven Mailloux is one recent communication scholar who attempted to operationalize Heidegger's thought on rhetoric to everyday speech. In his article titled "Places in Time: The Inns and Outhouses of Rhetoric" (2006), Mailloux uses Heidegger's writings on rhetoric to analyze academic discourse within collegiate institutions. Mailloux frames Heidegger's use of rhetoric with Heidegger's argument on how our moods are interwoven in practical discourse. Mailloux emphasizes this understanding by researching how everyday rhetoric slips in and out of academic discourse and our private and public lives. Since our moods overlap with the everyday lives inside academia, Heidegger's understanding of rhetoric provides a practical account of how individuals relate to others as *dasein* in academic settings. Rhetoric within Heidegger's conceptualization expresses why rhetoric is uniquely situated to understand the various strategies *dasein* use with other people in relation to persuasion. Mailloux deploys Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle and rhetoric to conclude that the slipperiness of language and our moods are often at play in our everyday private and public lives. For example, Mailloux states:

> A rhetorical hermeneutics of the everyday will follow the transfer of specialized disciplinary jargon into non-academic public and private spheres. To take one example close to home, the term "deconstruction," as associated with Jacques Derrida, has migrated promiscuously across several cultural domains. It has moved from being a rather arcane bit of academic jargon into non-academic elite and popular cultures and even into everyday speech: from *Of Grammatology* to the scholarly *Deconstruction in a Nutshell* to the popularization Derrida for beginners through newspaper and magazine articles to a DC comic book called

> Justice League Europe and a character named "Deconstructo" to a Star Trek: The Next Generation episode in which Lieutenant Reg Barklay complains about using the ship's transporter and the "idea of being deconstructed molecule by molecule." Now, the rhetorical path of this term is in no way as direct as I'm suggesting by this list of appearances, but my point is simply that rhetorical study can attend to such movements, translations, and misappropriations. In such cases, this study becomes a critical analysis of traveling rhetoric from specialized academic disciplines through specialized non-academic public spheres into everyday practices and back again. (p. 63)

Mailloux's research is an example of operationalizing Heidegger's understanding of rhetoric as traversing boundaries in areas that are sometimes unpredictable. Last, Mailloux begins to connect how different life-worlds overlap and form different ways in which we disclose the world that mutually implicate one another.

One connection between Hyde and C.R. Smith's article concerning the epistemic role of rhetoric in rhetorical criticism and Mailloux's emphasis on everyday discourse is how these authors ground Heidegger's discussion of rhetoric through ontology and hermeneutics. Heidegger emphasizes the relationship between the role language plays in communication and ontology as well. Rhetoric comes to guide the relationship between language and interpretation that frames any act of human discourse. Jeffrey Powell's (2010) article "Heidegger and the Communicative World" assesses Heidegger's discussion of speech as discourse. Heidegger's word for discourse, or *rede*, is not just private cognitive thoughts that can be turned into public spoken propositions. Discourse, for Heidegger, is related to our being-with-others and how speech opens up shared

spaces. Powell further contends that Heidegger's understanding of discourse is important for discussions of political speech. Much like Aristotle, Heidegger argues that communication is important for how a community forms political speech and it is on the basis of discourse that *dasein* are political beings by their very existence (Powell, 2010). Powell cites Heidegger's understanding of discourse as a new ontology for rhetoric and how *dasein* discloses their environment. Since discourse opens the shared spaces that *dasein* creates, rhetoric functions as the basic way we navigate communication and how we disclose other *dasein*.

One term that unites communication scholarship together is how Heidegger's thought is specially attuned to how *dasein disclose* the world and creates meaning from a world through language. One recent study specifically highlights Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure. Michael J. Hyde is considered one of the foremost American rhetoricians on Martin Heidegger and connecting Heidegger's ideas to the discipline of communication studies. One of Hyde's most notable works, *The Call of Conscience* (2008), concerns Heidegger and the rhetoric surrounding the euthanasia debate. In this text, Hyde writes about conscience and how it is related to Heidegger's notion of disclosure. In order to understand Heidegger's use of the term disclosure and its rhetorical implications, the literature is based in Hyde's treatment of the term in his discussion concerning the nature of experience.

Heidegger's nuanced understanding is often informed by the particularities of the German language. For example, there are two different words for the word "to experience" in German. The word *erleben* means "to live" and carries the connotation of an internal or psychological emphasis. For example, Hyde contends that when someone

says, “that was quite an experience,” they are not merely explaining their participation in an event, but also attempting to describe some psychological state (i.e., fear, pleasure, etc.). The other sense of the German word for “experience” is found in the word *erfahren*. This sense has more of an external connotation by highlighting how one moves or travels. For example, *erfahrung* is more about the participation in an event and the transformation that results from this journey than about the experience of a psychological condition. For example, the joy of traveling abroad and experiencing new cities cannot be merely summed up through an explanation of psychological emotions. Traveling itself plays a role in how joy is experienced and emotions are felt through the lived experiences people have in real-time in a world that is meaningful.

These internal and external senses of “experience” in German are important to how scholarship speaks about human conscience and our disclosure of the world in English. Heidegger is particularly suspicious of the way scholarship uses the word “experience” contained in the *erleben* sense. Although human beings do often explain their conditions in subjective terms and psychological attitudes, Heidegger does not think this is the primary way human beings are engaged in the world. Heidegger argues that *erleben* highlights human experiences as isolated, temporary affairs that detach our bodies from the external world (Heidegger, 1962). Heidegger often reminds his readers in *Being & Time* how our primary engagement with the world is more fundamental than the second-order experience of psychological states. Hyde argues rhetorical scholarship should move away from understanding human conscience in the *erleben* sense and instead approach human experience as a fundamental disclosure of world. Hyde connects

experience to Heidegger's disclosure by showing how the call of conscience and the practice of rhetoric frame our everyday narratives about the issue of euthanasia.

Hyde argues that theories of conscience show a distinct connection between the call of conscience and the practice of rhetoric (Hyde, 2008). Hyde conceptually links our conscience with the ancient Greeks. He writes about Socrates' conscience as the "prophetic voice" from within and how the "conflict between philosophy and rhetoric that begins with Socrates is, to be sure, a matter of conscience" (p. 15). When writing about rhetoric, Hyde connects the ancient Greeks' thoughts about conscience to Heidegger's turn towards ontology. Hyde emphasizes Heidegger's phenomenological approach to ontology with disclosure.

> For Heidegger phenomenology is a way of thinking devoted to interpreting, analyzing, and describing how the immediate content of experience actually presents itself. It seeks to disclose with "demonstrative precision" the appearing or "presencing" of some phenomenon, "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (p. 58)….
>
> Phenomenology, in other words, attempts to generate a discourse that is especially attuned to the way in which some phenomenon happens, to how it reveals or manifests itself within the temporal horizon of human understanding. (p. 23)

The discourse of phenomenology is necessarily a discourse of disclosure. Heidegger's uses a rhetoric of disclosure to speak about the ways *dasein* relate to the world by presenting that which shows itself or gives itself over for "presencing." Hyde uses Heidegger's conception of disclosure by linking disclosure to Heidegger's understanding of language and truth.

Hyde argues that phenomenology and by implication rhetoric for Heidegger is a truth-telling activity (2008). Heidegger uses the word "truth" not to mean an evaluation or deliberation of some speech act. For example, truth is more than merely evaluating a proposition in terms of observable phenomena or some state of affairs. For Heidegger, truth is the original act of disclosing that brings out, or presences the world and gives itself for understanding. Heidegger thinks the essential being of language is discourse. As Hyde writes, "Phenomenology goes about telling the truth by 'letting-something-be-seen' with its discourse. Heidegger identifies such a disclosure or evocative use of discourse with what he defines as the 'essential being of language' (Logos): its 'saying' power, its capacity to 'speak' by pointing to and showing us something" (p. 23). Hyde argues that Heidegger thinks rhetoric is necessarily an act of disclosure because *dasein* call forth the world and disclose to other *dasein* in order to create understanding.

Hyde uses the particular example of Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address to explain what Heidegger means by a rhetoric of disclosure. A rhetoric of disclosure is a combination of saying, showing, and understanding. Audiences must listen to what Lincoln has to say (not necessarily in the literal sense) in order for him to reveal a sense of understanding. Rhetoric is a truth-telling activity in that saying opens up the world to us through our being-with-others. Heidegger posits that for rhetoric to matter or have meaning, rhetoric must disclose the world to us as revealing truths rather than merely informing us about the truth. Truth is not merely an epistemic confirmation, but a revealing or opening up of the world through our constitution in the world. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address is a marvelous act of rhetoric in that this speech altered or changed how people related to questions of human equality and freedom after the Civil War. The

speech is significant not for its delineation of facts or enumeration of truth, but for the way Lincoln's rhetoric changed the way human beings experienced issues of race and what it meant to relate to other humans (or to experience people as *dasein*). In this sense, Lincoln's rhetoric of disclosure revealed an appreciation or understanding to the political world that until then had remained foreclosed. The Gettysburg Address opened up the possibilities for human equality to be considered. Our disclosure of the world of rights, equality, and slavery had fundamentally been altered by Lincoln's rhetoric. A rhetoric of disclosure, then, can fill in the gaps left by persuasion. Since this thesis will analyze Obama's speech on race, it is first important to address immanence and transcendence and then relate these concepts of disclosure to race.

Rhetoric of Disclosure

Heidegger calls his investigation into being "fundamental ontology." Heidegger's methodology for examining *dasein* and its corresponding being is through the ways *dasein* comes to disclose the world. Derrida and Deleuze in particular were both influenced by Heidegger's writings on ontology and partially frame the way they write about transcendence and immanence in relation to phenomenology. In order to understand how Derrida and Deleuze use the terms *transcendence* and *immanence*, the next sections delineate Derrida's understanding of transcendence and then Deleuze's understanding of immanence.

Derrida on Transcendence

Jacques Derrida is an Algerian born French philosopher and rhetorician who died in 2004 and stands as one of the most prolific writers of the twentieth century. His commentaries concern such wide-ranging topics as philosophy, art, sovereignty, politics,

the nature of grieving, and the writer James Joyce. Born in 1930, Derrida is the third of five children who descended from a Sephardic Jewish family in the French controlled province of El-Biar, Algeria. Widely famous for his founding texts on deconstruction, Derrida also wrote influential texts on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and Plato's use of rhetoric in the dialogue *Phaedrus* in his prominent text *Of Grammatology* (1967). Although Derrida's academic career began in the late 1950s when French academics were divided on phenomenological and rhetorical approaches to discourse, from the beginning Derrida criticized both approaches. He fundamentally altered and created a unique deconstructive interpretation of language that traversed many disciplinary boundaries. It is from Derrida's provocative understanding of contemporary rhetoric and language that he engages in the question of transcendence and its corresponding relationship to a rhetoric of disclosure.

Extending from Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and passing through Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to Derrida's writings on deconstruction, are Derrida's views on transcendence, although Derrida thoroughly subverts and reframes its long-established practice (Hill, 2007). One of Derrida's main influences concerning his understanding of transcendence comes from his reading of Heidegger. Transcendence, in its original and ontological form according to Heidegger, resides in the *koinon* ("the common" in Greek) and is derived etymologically from the Latin *transcendere* meaning to climb over, or surmount. Ontologically, transcendence forms the general category of Being that is "above" or "beyond" beings (Inwood, 2000). One simple way to understand transcendence in Heidegger and Derrida is to relate transcendence through a theological understanding.

In theological terms, God's being in Western religious discourse is often conceptualized as a higher order form of existence from the being of humanity because transcendence begins the category of Being with the thought that humanity is derived from lower beings. Aristotle, along with his medieval inheritors, understood transcendence in this ontological sense as well, although Heidegger adds to this Aristotelian picture of transcendence by specifying its theological form: ontological conceptions of transcendence are how some higher order of Being has transcended beings. A simple example occurs in the various practices of Christianity: God the creator transcends His own self-created beings. Additionally, and of upmost importance to conceptualizing transcendence as this form of separateness just described, transcendence presumes that a lower realm is descended from a higher one. The material world is separated from but acquires meaning through its relation to God or the spiritual heavens. Derrida is one contemporary inheritor and commentator to this history of transcendence (Lawlor, 2003).

Differance is a type of transcendence that will eventually come to define Derrida's later writings on religious discourse through his deconstruction of medieval "negative theology" (Patton & Protevi, 2003). Negative theology, according to Derrida, is the structural logic of transcendence. To put negative theology in context requires comparing negative theology with its modern day counterpart.

Christianity exemplifies a positive theology in that Christianity attempts to reveal the Father in the Son through the Spirit; it endorses the deity to be spoken to and spoken of affirmatively. Negative theologies are similar to positive theologies insofar as they both reflect on how predicates are attributed to God (i.e., good, light, beauty, love, etc.),

but negative theologies contend that these same predicates cannot be properly be *ascribed* to God as such. Predicates ascend to God by way of denying the sufficiency or capacity of speech to illuminate God's divine presence. Because God transcends the world, God also transcends our language about the world. If we are to speak of God we can only do so by negative affirmations, literally by denying the predicates revealed in positive theologies. When describing his understanding of transcendence, Derrida often imitates the syntax of negative theologies (God is neither this nor that), but it does not follow from this practice that it is divine. Even the most negative of negative theologies, Derrida suspects, covertly construes God as full presence, and therefore gets entangled in the rhetoric of transcendence in religious discourse (Reynolds & Roffe, 2004).

Additionally, Derrida begins his conceptualization of *Being* from Meister Eckhart's writings on negative theology (Marrati, 2005). Derrida's writings on negative theology link his deconstructive project to a path of transcendence affirmed through differance. Again, negative theology defines the essence of Being with negative claims, according to a rhetorical structure of transcendence. For example, Eckhart wrote about God in terms of what "God is not" rather than in terms of what "God is." Understanding God with positive affirmations such as "God is" puts Being on the same level as humanity, which denies God one essential ontological characteristic: that of being beyond God's own created Beings. Writing about God, or Being, in terms of what "He is not" keeps God distinct from Being and not controlled by Being itself or outside His authorial control. Negative theology seeks the importance of Being by canceling the positive designations of God through negation (Hill, 2007).

For example, to designate God with the predicate "benevolence" is at the same time to enclose God in a worldly transcendence of predication that reduces God to a being closer to that of humanity. To say both God and humanity participate in the same being of "benevolence" diminishes God's eminence to our earthly realm. To correct this, negative theology seeks to address this problem by enunciating what God "is not" in order to save God from a rhetoric of transcendence polluted by the discourse of the physical world. The concern for theologians broadly, and for Derrida in context to transcendence, is how to preserve the eminence of God in relation to language. Derrida's inheritance of transcendence comes to the forefront as a rhetorician in his writings on negative theology by highlighting what is beyond both what "God is" and "God is not" through disclosure.

Heidegger emphasizes the role of transcendence quite differently from Derrida although there are areas that overlap. Heidegger's main project is to think beyond Husserl's phenomenological reduction in consciousness to the finalization of being itself. What does it mean to reach towards a finalization of being? Heidegger is particularly interested in the ontology of human disclosure. Heidegger attempts to overcome Husserl's representational model of the mind by writing about the finitude of *dasein* and our "being-in-the-world."

In short, Heidegger locates time as the fundamental structure of what it means to experience the possible given-ness of something. Time structures the letting-be-present of our being in the world. For example, Heidegger wonders what sort of being encounters the world at all. What sort being must one have to experience a world of objects? For Heidegger, transcendence is one feature of human existence that considers

these type of questions. Transcendence is related to the transcendental structures of human experience and what makes those experiences discursively possible. With *Being & Time*, Heidegger attempts to overcome the limitations of Kant's transcendental system and Husserl's phenomenological reduction by thinking through the possibilities of human experience structured by time that bears a transcendent relationship to our striving towards being.

Derrida's and Heidegger's writings on transcendence overlap by emphasizing the relationship between human beings and their world. While Heidegger relates being to transcendence, Derrida uses transcendence as a structure to think through our relationship to language. Both Heidegger and Derrida locate language as a feature of being, but it is with Derrida that deconstruction and transcendence takes root. Derrida takes Heidegger's understanding of transcendence and reshapes the term anew by emphasizing the movement of transcendence in language and rhetoric itself. For Heidegger, transcendence is not a movement within language but a feature of the relationship that comes to define our relationship of disclosing a world.

One way of understanding the distinction between Heidegger and Derrida on transcendence is with the word horizon. For Heidegger and Derrida, transcendence is related to metaphysics but it is with Heidegger that transcendence takes an existential and phenomenological connotation. Horizon articulates the bounds of our relation to discourse through context. Derrida explores this point further in his deconstructive writings on looking at the possibility and impossibility of meaning and language. For Heidegger, horizon is more related to disclosure than language and Heidegger often speaks of the horizon as the possibility of meaning when disclosing a world. Derrida

uses the term horizon to explore the limits of language and the meaning of what is expressible. Transcendence for Derrida is articulated as the immanence within transcendence because transcendence highlights relation and the fundamental *aporia* between language and expression.

At this point, some preliminary terms that define a transcendent analysis and speak to Derrida's conception of transcendence inherited from Heidegger are defined below and express the logic of transcendent disclosure.

The Concepts of Transcendence

1. *Separation* is the articulation of delineation and distinction. Separation attempts to articulate differences and the priority between differences. For example, separation identifies oppositional rhetoric through contrast. Separation uses oppositional rhetoric as a way to show distinction in order to highlight difference.

2. *Division* is a comparison of distinct categories while providing priority and/or privilege. Division is distinct from separation in that while separation highlights difference, division shows the reduction of one category to another through how *dasein* come to rhetorically wield contrasting experiences.

3. *Horizon* emphasizes the contextual relationship in transcendence between the act of interpretation and relating interpretation through rhetoric. *Horizon* grounds meaning in the possibilities of discourse. Put in another way, *horizon* sets the conditions of possibilities in the available means of rhetoric. Similar to Aristotle, Heidegger uses *horizon* as the transcendental condition of rhetoric grounded in hermeneutics and phenomenology.

4. *Presence* often describes or highlights truth in a text. The presence of logos provides a kernel of substance or truth that is instantiated in the text itself. Often the presence of logos contrasts with the absence of logos. The presence of logos is a way of producing essence in rhetoric. For example, when a speaker has presence, audiences often feel this is because that speaker stands in relation to the truth. The permutation of identity, authenticity, and power provide a speaker with tools to transform an audience.

Deleuze on Immanence

Gilles Deleuze is one of the few thinkers who powerfully confront the task of immanence. Gilles Deleuze never ceased to write on the immanent-transcendent divide throughout his academic career. Born in 1925 in Paris, Deleuze lived and taught in France for most of his life. Similar to Derrida, Deleuze was never content to just write on philosophical themes. He spent his entire writing career connecting rhetorical and political subject matter in most of his works that would transform disciplines not steeped in academic philosophy. Deleuze often had discussions with notable French luminaries like Michel Foucault and Felix Guattari. Deleuze wrote influential texts like *Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus* (1972) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980) with Felix Guattari. Deleuze eventually developed lung cancer after years of smoking and after having a lung removed along with a tracheotomy, found it difficult later in life to write or even speak. Deleuze committed suicide in 1995 by throwing himself out of a window, allegedly due to a debilitating depression over the lack of the ability to communicate with others.

In contrast to Derrida's notions of transcendence, Deleuze's divergent project of immanence stretches all the way from Baruch Spinoza's religious writings on

immanentism through Friedrich Nietzsche's conception of the eternal return (Dooley & Kavanagh, 2007). Immanence, derived from the Latin *in manere* (to stay within or to dwell-in), carries theological undertones much like transcendence but corresponds to the divine as existing within the world rather than outside or beyond it. In resistance to transcendence, immanence emphasizes points of connections over forms of separation (Williams, 2005). Indeed, for Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza to whom Deleuze is heavily indebted, God is not some external being existing in a separate realm, but resides in the world here and now. It is this notion of a "resident-within," or "within-ness" that is the theological hallmark of immanence. The rhetorical conception of immanence becomes clear when people consider that there is no transcendent outside or external cause to the world in which humans exist (Massumi, 2002).

Deleuze and Guattari's text *What is Philosophy?* (1996) identifies three main strategies Western thinking has resurrected to keep transcendence continually alive in contemporary thought. The first and most typical strategy is one found in Plato's thought. Plato holds that appearances are necessarily attributed with secondary characteristics founded in the originary Form/Idea (i.e., God). This Platonic strategy is evident when Forms lay the ground for the structural relation between God and humanity (i.e., how humans merely represent the secondary qualities bestowed by God to humanity). The second strategy, erected by modern thinking, begins with Descartes but extends through Kant. Modern philosophy begins with the notion of the transcendent Subject. Skepticism in the eighteenth century would eventually bring transcendence down from the heavens and into the individual, literally being deflected from the Platonic Form to Descartes' *cogito* (Dooley & Kavanagh, 2007). The final and third installment

of transcendence is found in twentieth century phenomenological rhetoric that took the transcendent Subject and transformed it into that which became immanent to transcendent subjectivity itself. Rhetorical examples began with Edmund Husserl's early writings on phenomenology as a "lived experience." All these recent strategies seek to find immanence within transcendence itself, all of which made Deleuze suspicious with this rhetorical framing of immanence (Patton & Protevi, 2003).

Deleuze also questions the rhetoric surrounding transcendence, mainly for the very reason Derrida preferred it: while the Derridean task of negative theology is to preserve transcendence so that negating all predicates of God can preserve God's eminence above all predication, Deleuze adopts an immanent path of *univocity*. This rejection of Derrida's negative theology led Deleuze to reject transcendence completely for the immanent rhetoric of univocity (May, 2005). Deleuze aligns himself with Duns Scotus's interpretation of ontology in that he sees it historically extending from Spinoza to Nietzsche. Duns Scotus uses Being in the univocal sense, or in other words, to say that "woman is," "chair is," or "God is," uses the word "is" in all the same ontological sense. While transcendence seeks to make a distinction between different kinds of existences for God and humanity, an immanent univocity attempts to show that God does not have a different mode of being from humanity. Univocity is the radical denial of ontological transcendence and was equivocated to atheism back in the 13th century. Deleuze argues that Spinoza utilizes Duns Scotus's univocity to claim that God and nature are ontologically the same entity. Univocity expunges Being from transcendence by denying the "beyondness" transcendence requires to make the ontological distinction between humans and God in the first place.

Deleuze's text *Difference and Repetition* (1968) is a functional explanation of the ontological implications of univocity. It is no surprise that Derrida's writings do not contain any explication of immanence because Derrida seeks to stake out an ontology that retains the movement of transcendence within Being while Deleuze writes to obliterate any trace of transcendence from Being itself (Bell, 2006).

Deleuze has a multi-faceted definition of immanence. Deleuze's conception of immanence begins with the third and eleventh chapters of his monograph on Spinoza. Here the idea of immanence originates in Spinoza's affirmation of the univocity of Being in contrast to the Scholastic thesis of an analogical relation, according to which Being is not said of God and humans in the same way.

> The concept of univocal Being is perfectly determinate, as what is predicated in one and the same sense of substance in itself, and of the modes that are in something else. Thus it is the idea of immanent cause that takes over, in Spinoza, from univocity, freeing it from the indifference and neutrality to which it had been confirmed by the theory of divine creation. And it is in immanence that univocity finds its distinctly Spinozist formulation: God is said to be the cause of all things in the very same sense that he is said to be the cause of himself. (Patton, 1996, p. 133)

The principle of immanence is nothing other than a generalization of the ontology of univocity, while excluding any transcendent notion of Being. Through Spinoza's idea of an immanent cause, Being is freed from the risk of inertia and immobility by making Being equal to itself. Being is not divided or separated. Spinoza's immanent cause remains in itself. With a striking etymological figure that displaces the origin of the term

"immanence" from *manere* (to remain) to *manare* (to flow out), Deleuze returns vitality and life to the concept of immanence.

Immanence for Deleuze is always a "flowing forth." Yet this flow, far from leaving itself, remains unremittingly within itself (D. Smith, 2005). A metaphor that helps illustrate this idea of flowing forth but retaining a within-itself is evident in the example of a constantly moving Mobius strip. A Mobius strip is a strip that has only one side and if followed, forms an endless loop when rotated. This is similar to immanence in that there are no clear boundaries of a beginning and end point. One cannot orient a position on a Mobius strip and, as such, there are no clear ways to decipher movement other than a mere flowing forth. Cause and effect cannot be clearly delineated from one another because both are internal to each other's movement. This is why Deleuze can state with an expression that shows his full cognizance of the decisive position that immanence would later assume in his thought that immanence is the very vertigo of all disclosive rhetoric (D. Smith, 2005). To speak about how people disclose the world can be reduced to an axiomatic tautology: people disclose the world because disclosing is what people do.

What is Philosophy? (1996) provides an example of this vertigo discussed above. The eventual consequences of the concept of immanation are drawn out through the idea that the plane of immanence has no subject. It is immanent not to something, but only to itself: immanence is only immanent to itself and consequently captures everything, absorbs all, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be immanent. Whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to something, this "something" reintroduces the transcendent which Deleuze tried to avoid at all costs.

One example here is the main assumption of medieval theology. God was never immanent "in" our earthly realm but immanent "to" it. God could effect change here on earth but humanity could not alter God. Thus, although God was immanent to humanity, God was not immanent within humanity. The risk here is that the plane of immanence, which in itself exhausts all Being and thought, will instead be referred to something like a fungible existing object. The third example of the plane of immanence in Chapter 2 of *What is Philosophy?* presents the entire history of Western rhetoric, from Plato to Husserl, as the history of this risk. Deleuze strategically makes use of the principle of immanence to trace a line of immanence within the history of rhetoric and specify his own position with respect to the tradition of twentieth century philosophy. Starting with Husserl, immanence becomes immanent to a transcendental subjectivity, thus transcendence reappears at its core.

> This is what happens in Husserl and many of his successors who discover in the Other or in the Flesh, the mole of the transcendent within immanence itself. In this modern moment we are no longer satisfied with thinking immanence as immanent to a transcendent; we want to think transcendence within the immanent, and it is from immanence that a breach is expected. The Judeo-Christian word replaces the Greek logos: no longer satisfied with ascribing immanence to something, immanence itself is made to disgorge the transcendent everywhere. (Patton, 1996, p.133)

But immanence is not merely in jeopardy by the problem that transcendence creates. This problem is rather something like a necessary fantasy for Deleuze, where immanence itself produces on its own and to which every speaker is susceptible even as they try to

adhere as closely as possible to a plane of immanence. Immanence itself and how we speak immanently configure a strategy in how *dasein* relates to the world.

In a similar fashion to Derrida's concepts of transcendence, immanence articulates a different kind of connection to a world through discourse. It is from Deleuze's fundamental reconceptualization of disclosure through immanence where one can find a new sort of disclosure rhetoric.

The Concepts of Immanence

1. *Connection* expresses an emphasis on the interplay between ideas, thoughts and actions by showing a relationship of related categories. For example, race and class are immanently connected because both categories not only illuminate an understanding of one another but also mutually implicate each other through various acts of rhetorical disclosure. In this sense, race is unintelligible without class (and vice versa). Both are connected by being fundamentally experienced together.

2. *Identification* situates a holistic relationship in the understanding of self. Specifically, identification attempts to explain how each rhetorical act is simultaneously an act of sameness and difference. For example, to identify with a particular issue or subject of discussion is not merely bound by how an audience thinks about itself or a list of static, personal characteristics and traits. Identification explains the process of creating whole out of part without seeing whole and part as two distinct modes of separation. For instance, an individual may "speak as a Democrat" while also invoking the ideals of rights, justice, and virtue. In this sense, these ideas carry a structure of iterability because what it means to be a Democrat is bound by each articulation and utterance of Democrats

themselves. In this sense, being a Democrat is always on-the-way or constantly becoming. Identification is necessarily a dynamic (as opposed to static) creation of self.

3. *Dwelling-within* describes participation in acts of disclosure. When *dasein* discloses its environment (i.e., school, coffee shop, work place, sports stadium, etc.) *dasein* also dwell in the possibilities of the situation. For example, an announcer at a baseball game affords different expectations than the speaker who sits beside me. Dwelling attempts to explain the context of rhetoric by framing the possibilities of different types of discourse that frame the intelligibility that could result.

4. *Flowing* is the highlighting of mutual influence between ideas, thought, and action. For example, the explanation of cause and effect interactions requires both an explanation of cause and effect and their relationship. A cause flows into an effect because a cause creates the condition for an effect. The concept of flow challenges rhetoric as merely directional. Flow looks at the exchange between speakers and the conditions that necessarily alter both parties.

The goal of an immanent and transcendent analysis is not only to create a rhetorical lexicon to understand the strategy of disclosure in speech, but to illuminate concrete examples of disclosure in rhetoric. As will be seen in Obama's speech "A More Perfect Union," Obama asks Americans to move beyond the status quo by reducing racial tensions through transcendent and immanent relations to each other as *dasein*. In the next chapter, immanence will attempt to resolve our fundamental separation from one another in a different way by de-emphasizing hierarchy and highlighting the inter-connectedness of quality interpersonal relationships. Before an application of transcendence and

immanence to race can take place, a literature of review of African American public address will take place first in order to understand the context of racial rhetoric.

Race and Disclosure in African American Public Address

African American public address and political speech-making are two scholarly areas that overlap. African American public address has a long history in American political history. Significant African American speeches occurred as early as the 1700's, and include Jupiter Hammon's speech, "An Address to the Negroes in the State of New York" (1787), and Abraham Johnstone's speech, "Address to the People of Color" (1797). Contemporary to Pre-Civil War African American speeches often included themes of marginalization, freedom, rights, and liberty (Olmstead, 1998). A plethora of research has chronicled African American public address through the tropes of marginalization and racism in the United States, but contemporary research often questions how to methodologically approach African American public address (Anderson, 2005). Questioning the assumptions that lie behind the academic analyses of Black speakers has allowed rhetoricians to undertake more intersectional approaches to speeches made in political contexts.

Kate T. Anderson (2005) analyzed the methodological ways academia has approached race and alternative speech styles. In her article "Discourses of Difference: Applied Methodologies for Evaluating Race and Speech Style," Anderson examined how speech style is racially identified and the dominant methodological approaches for analyzing African American public address. Anderson asserts that speech scholars too often "treat race as an unproblematic category attached to speakers" (p. 179). By questioning the epistemological foundations of race and speech-making, Anderson argues

that the inclusion of a discursive approach to public speaking allows for a more comprehensive understanding of speeches made by African American speakers.

Anderson's research highlights analyses of race and public address that promote the idea that rhetorical criticism should be neutral or allow for more "objective" interpretations of public statements. She fears this type of research masks ideological commitments to particular views of language and speaking. Anderson takes cues from a socio-linguistics perspective that questions "research goals [that] influence what one seeks to find, which in turn influences the ways that one designs research questions, methods, and analyses" (p. 180). She contends the conceptualization of language and its effects on a community should also be informed through the various ways African Americans actually speak rather than the mere application of theory. She goes on to assert that connecting theory to public discourse is often an ideological rather than an epistemological decision made by a scholar.

Anderson concludes with the notion that public speaking made by Black speakers often includes layers of meaning that might be lost on White audiences. For example, public speaking in African American communities often includes underlying messages about who is "in" and "out" of a particular speaking environment, and that the categories of dialect play a role in "authentic" identification towards Black speakers and audiences. Given that language use is socially created in diverse and unexpected ways, the techniques of speaking must be included in methodological approaches scholars make toward analyses of African American public address.

Critical Race Theory has also been one of the most pervasive and dominant approaches for understanding African American political address. Begun by a small

coterie of Black scholars and lawyers, Critical Race Theory attempts to understand and improve the position of nonWhites with respect to institutional mechanisms of suffering in law, rights, and politics (Crump, 2014). African American public speakers often speak about themes that address marginalization and racism in the United States. Critical race theorists often rely on differing communication models to approach institutional narratives unique to Black suffering.

Audrey P. Olmstead's (1998) article "Words are Acts: Critical Race Theory as a Rhetorical Construct" attempts to chronicle the different ways critical race theory has been used to understand African American public address and assesses why critical race theory has emerged as one of the strongest perspectives on political speech-making by Black politicians. Critical race theory has emerged as one of the unique ways that race is explored in communication research. Olmstead traces the history of critical race theory to analyze the emergence of different strategies Black speakers have used to chronicle Black suffering.

Olmstead utilizes certain tropes of critical race theory in his scholarship that emphasizes narratives from the "voices at the bottom" and the communication skills of African American speakers that challenge the ideologically rigid categories of race. Critical race theory emphasizes the analysis of disclosive rhetoric and race in political contexts. For example, Olmstead mentions critical race theorists who highlight how language can be used to reshape political realities. Olmstead's addition to critical race theory attempts to move the debate about African American public address from discussions of laws and rights to challenging everyday hegemonic discourse. Olmstead creates a rhetorical model that shifts away from the paradigm of legal scholarship and

towards a narrative-based model that enumerates three stages of rhetorical conceptualization within disclosive racial discourse. These three stages are naming, instituting, and enforcing.

Naming is a "broader act of consciousness as the self-named agent proceeds to define his or her world" (p. 326). The process of naming can create emancipatory forms of social reality that are vital to fighting various forms of racism. For example, ex-slaves often changed the name given to them by their White owners as a way of fostering a new identity and creating new rhetorical strategies for the African American naming-process. Naming also necessarily confronts the dynamic, iterable nature of how language alters the social reality in which people may find themselves. This is particularly crucial since the naming-process is often a way of being "raced." Olmstead articulates how racism simultaneously includes "speech and conduct" (p. 326). Naming highlights race as a social construction in the on-going process of being "raced" by discourse. As a result, African American speakers are raced through the naming-process of authorship, and the history of discourse is always an "acted upon ideology" that situates Black public speaking. In this way, how we disclose African American names frames an understanding of race itself. This is evident in the various discourses surrounding Barack Obama's name as a term of Blackness but also as one of misidentifying him as a Muslim. The naming process combined with disclosure can overlap on racial and religious grounds.

Next, *instituting* is the process of acting to change the social conditions that exist. Although naming opens up new linguistic possibilities to change racial boundaries, it is with instituting that dominant institutions are changed. African American public address

is the process by which Black speakers can institute the power to create "group meanings, to legislate their language, [and] create ideas and organizations strong enough to change the dominant society" (p. 326). Thus, African American speeches often target racism in the United States as way to expose how restrictions of liberties affect nonWhites. Instituting new forms of discourse make manifest how Whites have limited nonWhites' institutional life opportunities through "legislation [and] restricting places where Blacks might eat, sleep, work or travel, or it might be accomplished through less formal means such as exclusionary membership rules in clubs and organizations or, simply, through everyday discriminatory behavior" (p. 327). Instituting in everyday racial discourse emphasizes new narratives by which Black speakers can archive suffering and recount their experiences in a hegemonic narrative that reduces them to the margins. Disclosive rhetoric necessarily includes an ideological movement.

It is important to remember that critical race theory grew out of the struggles of the Civil Rights era, and Olmstead notes that it is almost impossible to consider African American speeches without also considering the backdrop of how "Black people had made strong economic and social progress in the 1960a which peaked in the 1970s, but that minority groups had lost economic ground during the 1980s [and by] the end of the decade, Black joblessness, underemployment, poverty, and crime were at record levels" (p. 327). Critical race theorists as well as Olmstead contend that these forms of despair were partially due to a complex system of institutional subjugation that became codified in various forms of rhetoric.

Race and *A More Perfect Union*

President Barack Obama's speech, "A More Perfect Union," has emerged as one of the most famous and popular examples of African American public address in recent memory. The speech was delivered on March 18, 2008 and is generally considered one of Obama's most politically significant speeches. NBC News considered the speech the best political speech in the past decade in 2009 ("DECADE'S TOP 10", 2009). Additionally, the speech was an instant Youtube sensation with over a million views in the first day the speech was posted online. Of the many themes explored throughout the speech, the speech is known for its discussion of race, White privilege, inequality, and the intersections of politics and racial injustice. This speech was vital for Obama's election as President of the United States because he was also fighting a scandal that developed from his ex-pastor's comments on race which Obama eventually denounced. Obama employed a variety of strategies to comment upon the political scandal in which he was embroiled while simultaneously speaking about the state of race relations in America and American campaign politics. To traverse between these two poles, Obama engaged various rhetorical tropes in order to communicate effectively as a public speaker.

Numerous communication scholars have studied the rhetorical significance of what the media dubbed Obama's "race speech." For example, Robert E. Terrill's (2009) article, "Unity and Duality in Barack Obama's A More Perfect Union," analyzes Obama's use of a "doubling" rhetoric to negotiate the challenges of speaking about race in public address to White America while simultaneously discussing racial inequality in the United States. Using W. E. B. Du Bois's term "double consciousness," Terrill applies the common African American experience of looking at oneself through the eyes of

White society by exploring the alienation often felt by Blacks when attempting to confront the various ideals of Blackness and corresponding White perceptions. Additionally, this feeling of double consciousness is further problematized given Obama's biracial identity. Terrill argues Obama created a "doubled rhetorical style" through political discourse by speaking about one's "American-ness" as an African American.

> A doubled political style also addresses a doubled public. Du Bois articulated a central experience for many persons of color: One ever feels his twoness, an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. But Obama broadens the application. In a perceptive op-ed piece in the *New York Times*, David Brooks describes Obama as a sojourner, being continually in . . . but not of the institutions and organizations with which he is associated. Another form of insincerity, this ability to stand apart accounts for his [Obama's] fantastic powers of observation, Brooks observes, and his skills as a writer and thinker. (p. 367)

The confrontation of "twoness" in Obama's speech creates a distinct political style in rhetoric on race in American public address by speaking to the unique situation of negotiating race and existing within institutions that often constrain productive discussions of racial identity.

Terrill's article is not the only significant work to come out of Obama's so-called race speech. Judy L. Isaksen's (2011) study called "Obama's Rhetorical Shift: Insights for Communication Studies" also analyzes Obama's rhetorical strategies. Isaksen

explores Obama's rhetoric in four specific ways. First, she argues that Obama uses a distinct rhetorical strategy to tactically disavow race through feel-good multiculturalism in order to decrease White fears concerning his potential presidency. Second, Isaksen thinks Obama's "A More perfect Union" speech alters Obama's rhetorical strategy concerning race by clearly affirming race through the legal movement of critical race theory. Third, given critical race theory's influence on Obama's early formative legal years before becoming Senator from Illinois, these experiences helped Obama formulate specific racial rhetoric that would later come to fruition in his speeches. Finally, Isaksen uses Obama's rhetorical turn as a public speaker on race as a path for communication scholars to study deliberative racial rhetoric. Isaksen's analysis is important because it locates Obama's speech as a rich text for understanding modern rhetorical theory today and identifies new concepts Obama deploys to illuminate the difficulty of speaking about race in political campaigns.

Last, Judy C. Miller's (2013) recent study on "A More Perfect Union," entitled "From the Parlor to the Barnyard: Obama and Holder on Race," explores Obama's speech as a contemporary example of public discourse on race and directly connects transcendence to racial deliberation. Miller uses a Burkean analysis of the terms "parlor" and the "barnyard" as metaphors of different rhetorical forms Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder use to discuss public issues on race. This is significant not only because a Burkean analysis often includes Burke's understanding of transcendence to analyze rhetoric, but also uses transcendence to understand discourses on race. Miller uses Obama's speech to demonstrate the dialogic and agonistic forms of public address to understand the different strategies used to speak about race by African American authors.

Miller deploys Burke's discussion of "dialectic democracy" through his writings on the human barnyard in *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1969). As Miller writes, "The Human Barnyard features agency: flurries, flare-ups, Give and Take, pressure and counter pressure, endless competition, and strife. It is in this process of 'antagonistic terms, confronting each other as parry and thrust,' that the potential for trans-formation exists" (p. 354). Burke's barnyard emphasizes the chaotic confrontation between speakers where harmony is not the goal. Through separation and difference, Burke's barnyard attempts to express dialectic democracy as a discordant public speaking process.

Miller also utilizes Burke's understanding of the parlor to "suggest the ongoing character of the dialectic process, but actually captures the sense of give and take that exists within a more closed universe of discourse. The parlor features the scenic, contextualist nature of rhetoric" (p. 354). Miller understands Burke's parlor as a metaphor for creating conversation and context in public deliberation. While the barnyard opens up possibilities for transformation, parlor works through the slower process of context and constraint.

Miller applies Burke's parlor metaphor to Obama's speech as a demonstration of how race is used in a formal political oratory format. This is significant because Miller's article is one of the first examples to relate Obama's discussion of race to a Burkean perspective on African American public address. Miller argues that Obama uses the parlor format to discuss race in three ways: direct response, private revelation, and expression of private feelings. Although an extensive analysis of Obama's "A More perfect Union" will occur in Chapter 3 in relation to disclosive rhetoric, a preliminary

sketch of recent scholarship to Obama's speech is considered here to set the stage for how contemporary rhetoricians conceptualize Obama's racial discourse.

Direct response is one rhetorical strategy Obama uses to bridge the racial divide. Obama begins his speech by directly responding to his critics. For example, Obama responds to various critics that he is either "too Black" or "not Black enough" and responds to questions political pundits had been asking on whether Obama is a racially divisive politician. As Miller states "It is as if Obama is taking that pause to let people in on what they might have missed before entering the parlor, but they are getting a singular perspective" (p. 355). Obama invokes a previous conversation that some audience members may have not been privy to, but continues that conversation by getting people up to speed. This strategy has the double effect of responding to criticism head on while framing the questions in a way that suits the frame of the speaker. Miller contends this tactic allows Obama to not be defensive and frame his responses as a confession. By directly responding to these questions, Obama flips the burden on pundits by asking why they would even pose such racially divisive questions. Obama sometimes frames the origin of such questions to be more partisan and petty rather than honest, sincere questions asked by American voters. This also frames the questions to be more judgmental than genuine.

Obama's direct response is related to his *private revelation* about his history with Reverend Wright. The act of privately revealing his political and religious relationships to another African American leader allows Obama to claim that he is providing inner access to his private sanctum of relationships while also putting that relationship in context. Miller backs up this claim by stating, "Obama's personal

experience of the church and his personal experience with Rev. Wright are explained as representing his relationship with the Black community as a whole, and this synecdoche allows him to express the private feelings of the community in a publicly cathartic way" (p. 360). Obama's speech allows him to assuage White fears of "secret Black hatred" for the United States by publicly condemning Reverend Wright through cathartic disclosure.

Obama's *expression of private feelings* is framed by his comments on the current reality of racism and discrimination in America. Obama asserts a generational divide that exists for Wright's experience of anger due to racism and more modern forms of anger in the Black community. Obama connects himself with these modern experiences that have let go of the bitterness and hate but still hold public suspicions about institutional inequities in America. Obama speaks of the way these public suspicions are quite different when African Americans speak with other African Americans, as opposed to when White audiences are present. Miller cites various lines from Obama's speech that describe "the anger of Blacks to an audience including Whites, and the resentments of Whites to an audience including Blacks," but Obama "merges the public and private, imbuing the public speech with the intimacy of private conversation in a way that allows for the catharsis of confessing one's feelings to a friend" (p. 361). As a result, Obama creates his candidacy for President as the natural progression for America to publicly work through race relations on its path towards "a more perfect union."

Miller's analysis is significant because Burke's barnyard and parlor metaphors are, I argue, conceptually related to transcendence and immanence. Although Miller uses Burke's notion of the parlor to understand Obama's speech, both the barnyard and the parlor are present in many forms of African American address (i.e., Miller also uses

Burke's barnyard to understand Holder's speech). Burke's use of the term barnyard and parlor have been used by communication scholars to understand modern forms of rhetoric and Burkean analysis, at least for transcendence, is not far off from the transcendent and immanent interpretations from Heidegger.

Burke often uses the term barnyard in relation to his discussion of consubstantiality. People are consubstantial, or "substantially one," when our interests are shared while simultaneously unique. Transcendence highlights this act of relation through separation. To identify with others is to become consubstantial with them but also gives rise to the implications of division. Burke relates the barnyard to rhetoric by showing how "the Rhetoric must lead us through the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard, the Give and Take, the wavering line of pressure and counter pressure, the Logomachy, the onus of ownership, the War of Nerves, the War" (p. 354). Burke's barnyard metaphor emphasizes the role transcendence plays in rhetorical processes. Transcendence sets up a hierarchical relationship with others through division. This relationship is why striving for perfection or some higher state of being is related to rhetoric's ability to persuade. Transcendence necessarily includes the logic of bridging the separation people feel as human beings. Rhetoric is a mode of bridging the gap between two people and an attempt to nullify this division with one another.

Burke's use of the term parlor is related to immanence. In Burke's book, *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (1973), he discusses the parlor as an "unending conversation." The parlor is a space where we enter into a conversation that rages and abates. The conversation relies on us but does not require us. Burke uses the parlor as a

metaphor for coming into a conversation late, but once you find your place you enter into the fray. Eventually the conversation ceases but the discussion continues elsewhere, or by you, at a later date. For example, Obama enters into the public discussion concerning race with his speech on Reverend Wright and eventually the speech ends but the conversation carries on in the press and by voters. Obama will enter into racial deliberation again and the parlor of race relations in the Unites States carries on. Parlor is conceptually related to immanence in that there is no clear beginning or end (much like the Mobius strip example used later in this chapter). Parlor is defined by its constant movement or the back-and-forth in the flow of rhetoric. Immanence also carries on in such way that prioritizes movement over stasis. Immanence constantly carries the movement of speech that comes to define everyday rhetoric in that everyday rhetoric is often of-the-moment.

In order to understand how race is related to Heidegger's notion of disclosure, a consideration of immanence and transcendence is necessary to show how Derrida's and Deleuze's interpretation of Heidegger create a new ontology of African American public address.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYSIS

There are particular arenas of human communication that lend themselves to immanent and transcendent analysis. Political speeches provide a fertile environment to explore the diverse rhetorical strategies politicians employ in order to inform and persuade. In our technologically mediated society, political speeches are experienced in a variety of formats and alter the way individuals digest politically charged content. Political speeches also are often performed under a series of constraints which include time, situation, and medium of delivery. These factors combine to make political speeches significant public events where rhetorical strategies require preparation and arduous planning. Immanent and transcendent analyses offer explorations into how political rhetoric frames meaning and exercises its effects. This is especially evident in the way race informs American public address. Race is also a significant theme through which to gauge the workings of immanent and transcendent disclosures.

"A More Perfect Union" is a unique example of public racial deliberation from the perspective of immanence and transcendence. For example, the analyses on Obama in the literature review highlight *explanatory* approaches to understand Obama's rhetoric concerning race. Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure parts ways with existing scholarship by emphasizing Obama's speech through new possibilities on how speech alters the way race becomes *intelligible*. Obama's speech attempts to re-code the relationship between

politics and race by highlighting how race is disclosed through public deliberation in his 2008 presidential campaign. In the sections that follow, both an immanent and transcendent analysis will be conducted not only to understand how immanent and transcendent rhetoric operate within a speech, but to also incorporate a Heideggerian approach to illuminate the broader understanding of the text.

The uniqueness of Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure is not primarily historical or explanatory in nature. Disclosive rhetoric opens ways of experiencing the world that speech makes possible through our phenomenological confrontations with other people. Immanent and transcendent rhetoric offers two different ways of understanding how people disclose the world in speech and what that means for persuasion in public address. After the speech is analyzed through transcendent and immanent perspectives, respectively, a comparison of both analyses will also be conducted to highlight the major similarities and differences of both rhetorical approaches.

Transcendence and Aspiring Towards a More Perfect Union

A transcendent analysis highlights the rhetoric that separates or creates distinctions between social categories. This separation often acts as a rhetorical mechanism to show priority or hierarchy between binary oppositions. Political speeches typically make comparisons to highlight a candidate's priorities. Sometimes this is done to show a weakness in an argument or for a rhetorical effect on an audience. This is especially the case when speaking about race in contemporary American politics. Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech creates, produces, and reifies comparative hierarchy for rhetorical and strategic purposes to show the troubled past of American discussions concerning race. While Obama uses immanent rhetorical tactics to highlight

racial connection, Obama frames his rhetoric of American exceptionalism through a transcendent lens. In the analysis that follows, Obama interweaves immanent racial tropes and transcendent rhetoric. He also attempts to confront racism while simultaneously using America's fraught racial history to highlight American exceptionalism.

Separation and *division* are two uses of transcendence that can operate within and outside of rhetoric through contrast and hierarchy. Transcendent rhetoric often deploys a comparative function to show the stark relationships between different experiences and highlight the operational priority given to one side of a binary. For example, during the civil rights era, advocates often used hierarchal separation to show how Blacks were contrasted with Whites in daily speech to make difference visible. By making differences visible, racism serves a discursive function of social control. The use of racial epithets by the Ku Klux Klan, for example, in the late 1800s were often coded not just to call out the "higher and lower races" in quasi-scientific language, but also to emphasize the phenomenological separation between Blacks and Whites in daily speech practices. This is particularly evident during the era of segregation, where water fountains used the colored/White binary on signs to implicitly draw a priority to Whites that had a discursive effect on the way real privilege operated by an explicit division between races. In this sense, transcendent rhetoric creates a new phenomenological experience that discloses a world that can concretize racism into our daily practices. The simple act of relating to the use of water fountains and the discursive power of naming carries a phenomenology of power.

Although the prior examples used separation and division as transcendent rhetoric in a frame that is oppressive, transcendent rhetoric can also be wielded to expose structural racism to fight opposition. It is with this second strategy that Obama sometimes uses transcendent rhetoric to forge new associations in order to discuss racism in America. Obama employs transcendent relationships to counter traditional and oppositional tactics used during America's past.

In the first line of the speech, he cites the Preamble to the Unites States Constitution: "We the people, in order to form a more perfect union." Immediately following this line, Obama notes how close he and his audience are in proximity to Independence Hall and connects the signing of this document to the "original sin of slavery" (Obama, para. 2). This is important for a couple reasons. First, Obama is already connecting what many scholars argue is America's major contribution to political rhetoric in the U.S. Constitution by noting the unfinished practice of slavery during the same time period. Second, Obama utilizes the deference provided by this historical document to remind Americans of the division between the colonies and how the challenge of emancipation was left for future generations in 1787. This brings the reality of disclosing racism in the past and connects the experience of racism in the present. The disclosure of Independence Hall reminds us how race is experienced in time and across history.

The opening lines of Obama's remarks provide a transcendent framing of United States history and slavery. Obama uses rhetorical comparison not only to contrast the past with the present, but to prioritize the continuing legacy of discrimination through creating a hierarchal relationship between the reality of our ideals and the reality of their

time." This difference between prior struggles over two hundred years ago and the struggles that exist today aids Obama's discussion of race by using the historical background offered by America's past. Obama adds the notion of social forces and structural pressures that constrain human action. The idea of what is possible and what is ideal highlights the experience of racism as a structural constraint. Delineating the challenges of the past with the present allows Obama to produce a connection with the struggles of today that expresses a different type of phenomenology of racism. Without denigrating the U.S. Constitution, Obama uses this document to show how fractured discussions of race have been in America right from the beginning. As Obama notes, "And yet words on a parchment would not be enough to deliver slaves from bondage, or provide men and women of every color and creed their full rights and obligations as citizens of the United States" (Obama, para. 4). Obama connects this past/present binary with his campaign. He goes on to state just two lines later, "This was one of the tasks we set forth at the beginning of this campaign—to continue the long march of those who came before us, a march for a more just, more equal, more free, more caring and more prosperous America" (Obama, para. 5). The division between past and present props up the expressed struggle for rights with Obama's campaign. The association between these two historical epochs allows Obama to use his campaign as the continuation of a centuries-long fight for civil rights. Using hierarchal and comparative rhetoric sets a priority on framing how Obama will confront his campaign struggles with Reverend Wright's prior comments concerning race in America.

Before discussing Wright's words, Obama engages in another contrast between the division of his biracial identity and his own American story. Obama briefly

summarizes his family's racial and geographical background, separating each individual narrative as distinct. For example, he connects his father's ancestry in Kenya and his mother's upbringing in Kansas while bridging a tie to his immediate family's blood lines. Obama remarks, "I am married to a Black American who carries within her the blood of slaves and slaveowners—an inheritance we pass on to our two precious daughters" (Obama, para. 7). Relating race to blood, Obama shows how blood forms a major cultural signifier for the way Blacks experience race. Race is felt in the body because race is necessarily a historical experience that can be traced and inherited. Heidegger's notion that *dasein* is always already historical connects with experiences of race that is embodied through time. This transcendent relationship is significant because Obama attempts to use the distinctness of individual experiences as a mechanism for struggle and identity. As a result, transcendence operates within the rhetorical strategy of utilizing our individual placement inside and outside of racial narratives that emphasizes the embodied cultural spaces of slavery.

Transcendent rhetoric doesn't merely operate in Obama's speech through separation, division, and hierarchy. The notions of horizon and presence also aid in understanding Obama's transcendent use of political speech. Horizon emphasizes between-ness in rhetoric rather than within-ness. Being "within" often expresses a co-habitation or intermingling of how experiences come together. "Between," in contrast, attempts to define a relationship between these experiences. Between exposes a relationship while simultaneously tactically uses the relationship itself to define the nature of an association. Presence often works in tandem with horizon by analyzing what resides in the entities that come to define the relationship. Often the logos within a text

reflects the logical order or reason in a text. Presence also implies an absence. If the power of speech is meant to present one as a rational speaker, this also implies that some speech is absent the power of presence that truth is meant to supply. Presence comes to define what makes a speech memorable and divides what is rationally self-evident from what is absent, or forgettable, in a speech.

Horizon and *presence* are evident in Obama's discussion of Reverend Wright in his speech. It is important to provide some background and context on Obama's relationship with Wright and why their relationship emerged as a minor political scandal. ABC News reviewed prior sermons in March 2008 of Reverend Jeremiah Wright while Wright was the senior pastor of Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago, of which Obama was a member (Ross and El-Buri, 2008). Obama had met Wright in the 1980s as a community organizer and even had Wright officiate his wedding to Michelle Obama on October 3, 1992. Obama would officially end his association with Wright's church in 2008 over the inflammatory comments made by Wright during past sermons once the ABC News report became public.

There are a couple of notable uses of rhetoric in Wright's sermons that captured the attention of the news media. Most of the controversial excerpts were taken from two sermons titled, "The Day of Jerusalem's Fall" in September, 2001, and "Confusing God and Government" in April, 2003. Although multiple lines from both speeches attained national news coverage, one line often is emphasized from Wright's Jerusalem's Fall sermon that occurred just after the September 11th plane crashes into the Twin Towers in New York: "We bombed Hiroshima, we bombed Nagasaki, and we nuked far more than the thousands in New York and the Pentagon, and we never batted an eye . . . and now

we are indignant, because the stuff we have done overseas is now brought back into our own front yards. America's chickens are coming home to roost" (Obama, para. 13). This line, among others (i.e., "not God bless America, but God damn America"), would eventually be endlessly played in the national coverage concerning Wright's sermons.

Obama would later comment on Wright's sermons in his "A More Perfect Union" speech by stating, "words that degrade individuals have no place in our public dialogue, whether it's on the campaign stump or in the pulpit. In sum, I reject outright the statements by Rev. Wright that are at issue" (Obama, para. 13). Although Obama's speech would address many themes concerning race and inequality in America, the speech was primarily framed as a response to the Wright scandal. This is borne out by the significant portions of commentary Obama spends discussing Wright in the middle sections of his speech.

Obama's rhetoric concerning Wright provides fertile ground to discuss horizon and presence as modes of transcendent rhetoric. Obama begins his discussion of Wright by condemning him: "I have already condemned, in unequivocal terms, the statements of Reverend Wright that have caused such controversy" (Obama, para. 13). Obama lists a series of questions that may be on American's minds concerning the Wright controversy. First, Obama engages in horizon rhetoric by clearly delineating the portions where he agrees and disagrees with Wright on the context of race relations in America. While Obama does connect with Wright's concern for racial inequality in America, he cannot follow Wright to some of the conclusions he draws about the nature of government. In this sense, the portions where Obama approves of Wright's comments transcend on the basis of logos. This is significant for notions of horizon because transcendent rhetoric

divides logos into presence. Obama tactically maneuvers the rhetoric in Wright's speech that carries over into Obama's thematic use of racial inequality while rejecting the medium by which Wright attempts to get his message across. Obama draws a parallel between Wright's sermons and Obama's speech. This is important because Obama does not identify Wright's power within his rhetoric but between Wright's and Obama's concerns for racial injustice. Although Obama connects himself to Wright and doesn't deny a relationship with Wright's thoughts, Obama tactically chooses the phenomenological frame that will participate in Obama's disclosive rhetoric.

For example, there are a couple of places in Obama's speech where Wright takes center stage. Obama attempts to balance the poles of rejecting and accepting Wright's claims. In this sense, Obama tries to make present the discourse in Wright's speech that misidentifies structural racism. This creates a challenge for Obama to simultaneously reject portions of Wright's speech that are unflattering to American exceptionalism while confronting America's racist past. See comment

> But the remarks that have caused this recent firestorm weren't simply controversial. They weren't simply a religious leader's effort to speak out against perceived injustice. Instead, they expressed a profoundly distorted view of this country—a view that sees White racism as endemic, and that elevates what is wrong with America above all that we know is right with America; a view that sees the conflicts in the Middle East as rooted primarily in the actions of stalwart allies like Israel, instead of emanating from the perverse and hateful ideologies of radical Islam. (Obama, para. 14)

Obama presents Wright's vision as distorted, as lacking the wrong language to articulate what "we know is right with America." Obama attempts to distill the portions of Wright's comments that have power, while rejecting the rhetoric that is left behind as distorted, or lacking presence. Obama attempts to navigate between Wright's acceptance of injustice in the world and Wright's distortion of that injustice. Obama's use of horizon helps him angle his message that accepts and rejects Wright by using the phenomenology that has presence in Obama's overall narrative on race.

The main challenge presented to Obama concerning Wright's sermons is how to transcendently maneuver between portions that add to Obama's perception of race in America while responding to the manner in which Wright espoused his perception of race. Obama creates two competing narratives on race while not disavowing completely his ex-pastor's comments on the state of racial injustice. Obama teases out the portions that are inflammatory (i.e., chickens coming home to roost) and participates in the presence of Wright's speech that articulates the division and separation of discussions about race past and present in America (i.e., America is a country racially divided). A transcendent perspective allows for a more nuanced strategy of absorbing and deflecting criticism. Obama's words speak to the simultaneous incorporation and deflection of Wright's inflammatory rhetoric to enrich Obama's discussion of civil liberties. A transcendent analytical approach allows a speaker to challenge a simplistic binary approach to public address and allows for subtly interweaving multiple themes to mutually reinforce one another. Transcendent speech often uses aspiration and ideals to deflect criticism by utilizing hierarchy and priority. For example, Obama deflates criticism that Wright's rhetoric is internal to Obama's understanding of America's place

in international affairs. For those who oppose Obama, the Wright scandal was meant to highlight inside access to Obama's corrupt thought processes and bankrupt political influences. Instead of apologizing or being defensive with his rhetoric, Obama uses a potent form of transcendent disclosive rhetoric to stay on the offensive that we as a nation are fundamentally flawed on issues concerning race and need to come together to form a "more perfect union."

Examples of this transcendent rhetoric include an analysis that emphasizes metaphors that highlight a movement from imperfection to perfection. The title of Obama's speech "A More Perfect Union" suggests that although Americans have yet to achieve a union of harmony and accord, Americans also must strive to move beyond the present condition. Obama seems to suggest that only by striving to be better than we are by recognizing systemic racism can America move past its bloody past. It is here that transcendence points to the future as a movement of surpassing the past by locating oneself in the present. Transcendence emerges out of Heidegger's historicity of *dasein*. A phenomenology centered on the issue of race and racism that includes transcendence provides an embodiment of race that is difficult to ignore because it puts *dasein* at the center of the intelligibility of race. Race becomes the way the world becomes disclosed through the location of the body's relationship to the world. This highlights an epistemic way of knowing the world through the ontological function of how people exist and experience the world. It is important to note that the temporality of transcendence is not meant to suggest a prescription that the future is necessarily better or presents an overcoming of the past. Rather, transcendence locates us in space and time in ways that tie us to the future and the past given the possibilities of the present.

Immanence and the Dwelling of Race

An immanent analysis pays attention to the way language and rhetoric interweaves or dwells within human communication. Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech also draws upon the interweaving and interlocking nature of rhetoric by identifying racial themes in the American experience that cannot be divided from other experiences. Immanent rhetoric often exposes the fundamental connections between people by expressing mutual influences. Throughout Obama's speech concerning racial inequality and White privilege he shows how these experiences also cannot be divorced from how racism occurs and efforts to overcome racism.

One of the concepts that aids in understanding an immanent analysis is *dwelling-within*. Dwelling pays particular attention to the way individuals disclose the world around them and the possibilities that afford this disclosure. Dwelling highlights the context of the particular situation by framing our awareness. This is important because context often frames meaning in communication. *Connection* is another concept that helps form an immanent analysis. Immanence often forges connections between *dasein* by showing the interplay within ideas, thoughts, and action. More than this, connection expresses unity where sometimes human perceptions only see separation. By zooming out or in, a particular rhetorical disclosure often can change where meaning is derived and what is ultimately privileged by a communicator. Connection sometimes shows the mutual reciprocity that occurs between people and makes some forms of human communication possible. While transcendence expresses separation through relation, immanence shows how our multiple relationships are implicated in a shared history.

Obama's speech expresses immanence in his use of political rhetoric. Obama's discussion of race is one way to understand an immanent analysis. Obama explicitly speaks about race and his campaign early into the speech when he says:

> This is not to say that race has not been an issue in the campaign. At various stages in the campaign, some commentators have deemed me either "too Black" or "not Black enough." We saw racial tensions bubble to the surface during the week before the South Carolina primary. The press has scoured every exit poll for the latest evidence of racial polarization, not just in terms of White and Black, but Black and Brown as well. (Obama, para. 42)

The phrases "too Black" and "not Black enough" were not the first time Obama had discussed his race on the campaign trail but is one of the first significant times Obama speaks about race in the context of whether he has the proper racial credentials in "being Black." The immanent concept of dwelling can set up this analysis by showing how race is not just phenomenological, but cuts across how speakers construct an identity and how others perceive their racial identity. It is interesting to note that the Blackness that Obama infers is not binary but a spectrum. Being "too Black" or not "Black enough" suggests a way of being Black through ontological gradations. These gradations cause problems for Obama's identity in a political context since race and having the proper "credentials" is important to how one can dwell phenomenologically inside race.

In one sense, Obama's campaign is momentous because it leads to his being the first Black president. There were multiple public discussions in the media about Obama's racial ties to the past. Obama's race is connected with discussions about his upbringing with White grandparents, his biracial identity, the so-called scandal

surrounding his long-form birth certificate in Hawaii, the elite academic institutions where Obama became educated, and his relationship to the legal profession. In an immanent analysis, the rhetoric surrounding these themes dwell-within the discussion of Obama's race. In this light, we can see how phenomenologically race is built through the effects of discourse and behavior. Race emerges out of the ways we speak and the actions we take. Immanence help explain how race is built within disclosive rhetoric through our phenomenological relationship with power, institutions, and relationships.

Separating race from other cultural or social signifiers that construct racial identity as meaningful can be tricky. Again, Obama remarks how he is "too Black" for some White audiences and "not Black enough" for some Black audiences. The perceptions of Obama's race are framed within how Obama's race also dwells within his character, history, and action. On an immanent understanding, one is never born into a race, one "becomes raced" by themselves and through others. Race is immanently folded within the possibilities of the situation. An immanent analysis is productive in explaining why some White audiences consider Obama Black because their disclosive rhetoric contains within it the possibility of Obama's Blackness. What this means is Obama's race, along with race in general, is a dynamic, iterable rhetorical event that begins in the ways we create discourse. Dwelling-within helps explain how race is produced, created, or made rather than merely biological. In this sense, every instantiation or invocation of race is a necessary alteration of what race means and how race becomes understood.

What this means for Obama is evident in his deployment of the phrases "too Black/not Black enough." While these utterances certainly didn't originate in Obama's speech, Obama uses these terms to highlight the immanent nature of race. Obama goes

on the offensive about race in America. Obama shows the unsettled nature of race in his rhetoric by expressing how race and action cannot be separated or carved off from one another. Race dwells within the possibilities that are afforded by the context of the situation. In Obama's context, racial identity is blurred and indistinct. Obama will not come to alter this context later in his speech. Obama leaves this discussion of race and his racial identity unsettled, which is why the spotlight on race in his campaign is unsettling for some Americans because of the fragility of race.

Obama uses the immanent concept of connection to bring race full-circle in his speech.

> I can no more disown him than I can disown the Black community. I can no more disown him than I can my White grandmother—a woman who helped raise me, a woman who sacrificed again and again for me, a woman who loves me as much as she loves anything in this world, but a woman who once confessed her fear of Black men who passed by her on the street, and who on more than one occasion has uttered racial or ethnic stereotypes that made me cringe. These people are a part of me. And they are a part of America, this country that I love. (Obama, para. 22)

Obama attempts to unite or connect his perceptions about Wright, his grandmother's experience of fear, and the nation as a whole. Obama posits a positional shift in how an audience sees discrimination or unacceptable speech in part to how these particularities form a coherent whole on identity and the American experience. This phenomenological connection explains how *dasein* relates to race. What people attend to, or disclose, defines what is possible for how *dasein* make connections between seemingly disparate

experiences. Obama cites William Faulkner's famous line, "The past isn't dead and buried. In fact, it isn't even past" (Obama, para. 26). Obama connects past with present as a coherent, unified whole on how perceptions determine the disclosive frames of racial injustice. By shifting our attention from part to whole, or vice versa, new connections between events aid our understanding of seeing racial injustice anew.

Identification and *flow* also can aid in understanding how an immanent analysis operates. Identification situates a holistic relationship in the understanding of self. Specifically, identification attempts to explain how each rhetorical act is simultaneously an act of sameness and difference. Identification is not primarily concerned with ways people create identities as it is with the process of how identities are forged from our environment and actions. *Flow* is related to identification in that flow highlights the mutual influence between ideas, thought, and action. The concept of flow emphasizes the transactional or bi-directional nature of disclosive rhetoric. Flow looks at the exchange between speakers and the conditions that necessarily alter both parties. Flow isn't about causality so much as it is about the interaction or give-and-take between communicators.

Toward the end of his speech, Obama comments on the various struggles of Americans to express the concept of flow. Obama interweaves racial inequality with the struggles of all Americans:

> For the African American community, that path means embracing the burdens of our past without becoming victims of our past. It means continuing to insist on a full measure of justice in every aspect of American life. But it also means binding our particular grievances—for better health care, and better schools, and better jobs—to the larger aspirations of all Americans: the White woman struggling to

> break the glass ceiling, the White man whose been laid off, the immigrant trying to feed his family. (Obama, para. 38)

Obama uses the term "binding" to bring together the various grievances Americans have that have held individuals down due to discrimination and structural inequities. Obama directly confronts perceptions of victimization and how communities use victimization to create identities in themselves and others. Identification helps explain the construction process of identity as a rhetorical act of creation. Victimization and grievances are not merely parts in how people think about themselves and others, but are themes that necessarily alter what it means to be an individual "individuated" by a community. Our experience of race flows through each specific articulation of disclosive rhetoric that frames and alters how race becomes intelligible.

Choosing different ways a group experiences suffering helps to explain the identification process with issues of victimization. Obama purposefully uses the identity of being White or an immigrant in the context of suffering (i.e., breaking the glass ceiling) not merely to inform that everybody suffers, but that suffering is a part of what identification means to various social groups. Obama goes on to say, "In the White community, the path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that what ails the African American community does not just exist in the minds of Black people; that the legacy of discrimination—and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in the past—are real and must be addressed" (Obama, para. 41). Identification explains how suffering has an iterable structure in that the process of being an individual occurs over time and through time. One's perception of suffering, for example, still comes to define the identification process and perceptions on whose grieving is seen as legitimate. The

legitimacy of suffering is framed phenomenologically. Here Obama's use of identification rhetoric creates or produces a way to see suffering from Whites and Blacks as not oppositional, but as mutually informed through each other's perception on what suffering means.

One clear example of flow in Obama's speech transpires near the end where his now famous line, "I'm here because of Ashley," occurs. I quote the section in full so the concept of flow can be seen in Obama's deployment of immanent disclosive rhetoric near the end of his speech.

> There is one story in particular that I'd like to leave you with today—a story I told when I had the great honor of speaking on Dr. King's birthday at his home church, Ebenezer Baptist, in Atlanta. There is a young, twenty-three year old White woman named Ashley Baia who organized for our campaign in Florence, South Carolina. She had been working to organize a mostly African American community since the beginning of this campaign, and one day she was at a roundtable discussion where everyone went around telling their story and why they were there. And Ashley said that when she was nine years old, her mother got cancer. And because she had to miss days of work, she was let go and lost her health care. They had to file for bankruptcy, and that's when Ashley decided that she had to do something to help her mom. She knew that food was one of their most expensive costs, and so Ashley convinced her mother that what she really liked and really wanted to eat more than anything else was mustard and relish sandwiches. Because that was the cheapest way to eat. She did this for a year until her mom got better, and she told everyone at the roundtable that the reason

> she joined our campaign was so that she could help the millions of other children in the country who want and need to help their parents too. Now Ashley might have made a different choice. Perhaps somebody told her along the way that the source of her mother's problems were Blacks who were on welfare and too lazy to work, or Hispanics who were coming into the country illegally. But she didn't. She sought out allies in her fight against injustice. Anyway, Ashley finishes her story and then goes around the room and asks everyone else why they're supporting the campaign. They all have different stories and reasons. Many bring up a specific issue. And finally they come to this elderly Black man who's been sitting there quietly the entire time. And Ashley asks him why he's there. And he does not bring up a specific issue. He does not say health care or the economy. He does not say education or the war. He does not say that he was there because of Barack Obama. He simply says to everyone in the room, "I am here because of Ashley." (Obama, para. 57)

To understand this section, it is important to remember that flow shows mutual influence between communicators in their disclosure by highlighting the transactional nature of communication. More than this, flow emphasizes the give-and-take between humans as not merely transactional but frames how *dasein* comes to disclose each other as communicators.

Obama's short story concerning Ashley has a couple of immanent rhetorical effects that can be understood through flow. The power of the story comes through the elderly Black man's identification with Ashley and her struggle and how he implicitly stands with Obama's campaign. The flow between the elderly man and Ashley has

rhetorical resonance because their conversation translates over into Obama's speech with an audience. Presumably, Obama thinks the story creates fidelity with the audience because the audience can identify with Ashley's story. This story would have a subtle, different feeling or reaction if the story does not include the elderly man and his response to the story. In fact, it is because of the elderly man that he acts as rhetorical substitute with the audience. When the man says, "I am here because of Ashley" the audience is meant to identify its corresponding rhetorical force through more than identification with Obama's campaign. This specific phrase flows the narrative interaction between Ashley and the man through the audience and Obama. "I am here because of Ashley" could also be immanently flowed as "I am here because of Obama." This is not sleight of hand rhetorical manipulation. Immanence flows within communication to create identification. Overall, Obama successfully shifts the beginning of the speech concerning racism writ large to Ashley's story and the elderly man's reaction. This movement from general to specific flows the story's narrative force and caps the speech with the particularities of human suffering and achievement. The immanent connection to human suffering frames the relationship of race through identification.

Immanence is unique in that it emphasizes interconnectedness. Often immanence emphasizes active metaphors of movement. For example, while a transcendent analysis of Obama's speech title "A More Perfect Union" would emphasize pursuit of perfection, an immanent analysis highlights the movement in time. Perfection is always "on-the-way." Our present is interwoven with our pursuits. This is significant because immanence doesn't treat time as discrete units. Time is our phenomenological engagement with disclosive rhetoric. Time is simultaneous in that we must consider

temporal context of speech utterances. Obama's deployment of time throughout his speech expresses why race is necessarily temporal. His speech understood through immanence conceptualizes the state of America as on-the-way. Obama identifies his place in history as a part of this movement of history. In the end, immanence is unique in how it emphasizes our dwelling inside the world by being interconnected in time with others through the phenomenology of our ontology.

Dasein and the Disclosure of Race

In many ways, disclosive rhetoric is related to *dasein* and public speech. As one may recall, *dasein* is German for "there-being." Heidegger uses the term to emphasize the fundamental relationship between humans and the way they ontologically disclose the world. For *dasein*, the world is always already "there" ready to be used. Heidegger's distinction between *vorhandenheit* and *zuhandenheit* is one way we can understand *dasein* and its relation to speech.

According to Heidegger, one fundamental aspect of *dasein* is to be world disclosers. Heidegger argues *dasein* primarily uses its world as a tool rather than as an objective-based representational thinking activity. This forms the heart of the distinction between *vorhandenheit* and *zuhandenheit* and why *zuhanden* is prioritized by Heidegger over *vorhanden*. *Vorhnadenheit* emphasizes *dasein* as a tool-using being. *Dasein* situates its world as equipment that is ready-to-hand. What this means is that our world is an environment ready for use and the contemplative reflection about a world of objects is secondary to the primary way we use the world. *Zuhandenheit* highlights the primary way *dasein* navigates the world of tools while *vorhandenehit* is the secondary mode of

analysis that turns the world of tools into a space of objects. The world is a tool before it becomes an object.

This distinction is important for the world of speech. Our own voice and bodies become tools for speech whether we are persuading or informing others around us. While the discipline of Communication Studies turns speech into an object to be analyzed, when we speak, we use our voices as a tool in real-time. Heidegger's notion of *dasein* is implicated in the discussion of transcendence and immanence since both terms help to illuminate the relationship *dasein* has to public speaking. Both *dasein* and disclosure are intrinsically related to immanence and transcendence through Obama's discussion of race.

Immanent and Transcendent Rhetoric in Public Address

This section compares immanent and transcendent analyses to see what emerges from their similarities and differences. After this comparison has taken place, a justification for the use of immanent and transcendent analyses in rhetorical scholarship will be articulated.

Similarities Between Transcendence and Immanence

There are a couple of notable similarities between transcendent and immanent applications. First, there is an overlap in how the analyses often show the interweaving or interaction between communicators. Both attempt to take stock of how communication occurs and the impact rhetoric has on speakers and an audience. For example, both transcendence and immanence specifically speak to Obama's rhetorical strategies and the different ways people credit identification with a speaker. This focus on interaction between communicators highlights the transactional nature of

communication and helps explain what sometimes occurs beyond the explicit content of rhetoric. Both analyses also explain linear communication. Obama's speech is linear in that the rhetoric is directed at the audience without real-time interaction.

Immanence and transcendence can be used with transactional communication models to help illuminate how rhetoric occurs in both forms. For example, when *dasein* disclose a world, it is often through the relationship between people. Often relationships between people carry a certain notion of power that may be judicial, racial, and political. Disclosure rhetoric can articulate how racism is more than just mere subjugation; subjugation is often begun in the ways we relate. These relationships are shaped by discourse and disclosure frames the way discourse takes place. With transactional modes of interpersonal communication, the relationship of power and race mold speakers in their interaction of discourse.

It is important to note that immanent and transcendent analyses are not prescriptions for human action. They are phenomenological descriptions of rhetorical disclosure. What this means is communicators might engage in acts of self-disclosing rhetoric through transcendence or immanence, but this is not to suggest an imperative or deontological responsibility to act. Rather, immanence and transcendence help explain what rhetorical strategies are being used and their corresponding results on an audience. People can engage in immanent or transcendent rhetoric, but this should not presume an endorsement or productive use of human communication. Even hate speech and other forms of problematic speech might use immanent and transcendent rhetoric to exclude and cause hurt.

Transcendence and immanence emphasize the parts versus the whole in human communication. This occurs not merely in the distinction individuals make between ideas, but also the interaction between part and whole. This is evident in the emphasis on constructions of identity. Both analyses aid in explicating the process of communication about how particular and universal themes in speech communication interact with one another to show the impact rhetoric can have on an audience in determining the rhetorical force of our public and private assertions. Additionally, applying both analyses helps delineate the part versus whole in speech communication in particular because immanence and transcendence are inherently interactive and center on acts of human disclosure.

Derrida's conception of transcendence and Deleuze's use of immanence both stem from Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure in that communication requires acts of disclosure that use context to determine intelligibility in our interactions with others. It is in our interactions with others that communication comes to be defined. Obama's speech or political discourse in general, requires disclosing acts of our attention, awareness, and moods. Both immanent and transcendent rhetoric in Obama's use of language and comparisons between individual social groups make evident how disclosure comes to define the possibilities of understanding acts of communication. What this interaction means then is that the heart of communication lies within our disclosing interactions with other *dasein*. For Obama, transcendent and immanent relationships expose racial inequality while also helping to explain the causes of racial inequality. Injustice, stereotypes, and hate speech are not produced in a vacuum, but emerge out of how dasein discloses its environment. This is how a phenomenological account of discrimination

might be helpful because then the ways racism becomes intelligible in different spheres (i.e., home, workplace, etc.) allows for the creation of understanding the historicism of racism.

Transcendence and immanence both produce alternative conceptions of understanding that are located in the basic ways *dasein* form perceptions about the world. It is in our perceptions about the world that disclosure frames our experiences through immanent and transcendent modes of reference. While both analyses carry more differences than similarities, both attempt to explain how rhetoric and disclosure mutually implicate each other in our basic phenomenology. Our communication as phenomenology forms a new path towards experiencing rhetoric as our primary constitution in the world. The world is "worlded" through rhetoric, and immanence and transcendence explore two distinct but similar avenues on how the "worlding" process of our environment takes place at the level of engagement with others. It is also important to recognize the differences between an immanent and transcendent approach to disclosure.

Difference Between Transcendence and Immanence

There are a couple of differences between immanence and transcendence that can be defined through what gets prioritized in our acts of disclosure. One way of understanding this priority is through process and result. Immanence highlights the relationship between entities, or the process of communication. Transcendence focuses more on what emerges out of, or is the result of, human communication. Although both analyses are disclosing forms of rhetoric, both emphasize different rhetorical elements and strategies in ways speakers talk about the world.

These various strategies are evident in the applications to Obama's "A More Perfect Union speech." The transcendent application highlights a priority on the result or response in what emerges out of Obama's rhetoric. For example, in Obama's discussion of Wright, he speaks about areas of agreement and disagreement with Wright's commentary. Although he disagrees with the way Wright spoke about the aftermath of 9/11, Obama does agree that Black communities have grown out of racial injustice that can help explain an aura of distrust about the role government plays in interacting with minority groups. This notion of what emerges out of the interaction between Black communities and their government is evident in that Obama prioritizes the effect, or result, of this communication. The result is hostility, suspicion, and general mistrust, not only of Blacks towards institutions, but of Whites towards Blacks. Obama begins his speech about the nation's "sins of slavery" by showing what slavery wrought in the present day: "I am here because of Ashley." Ashley's story and the elderly Black man's response emerge out of, or transcend, America's original sin of slavery. This is not to say it covers over or absolves America of this sin, but Obama's transcendent rhetoric of disclosure focuses on the uniqueness of experiences in the present day of Whites and Blacks.

Immanence, on the other hand, concentrates on the process of communication without giving priority to what emerges out of, or results from, ways audiences disclose others. Immanence defuses means/ends or process/result-oriented communication through how both sides of a binary implicate one another. This is especially evident in Obama's discussion of victimization. Obama focuses not on the agents or causes of victimization, but instead holistically approaches victimization through mutual

understanding. For Obama, victimization is a process, not merely the result of past transgressions. Or, rather, viewing victimization as the product of prior transgressions is not a productive avenue towards overcoming racial injustice. By working through victimization, America can begin to repair itself. Obama's use of immanent rhetoric understands victimization through the human experience rather than as an effect of human misery whereby Whites or Blacks might claim authority over who is allowed to grieve and be called a victim.

Immanence highlights connection because Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure is built into the way human beings cope with others. While transcendence defines the ways we interact with others, immanence is intimately connected with our moods and relationships. Immanent rhetoric often includes the fundamental ways *dasein* interact with one another while transcendent rhetoric attempts to define and categorize that relationship. As a result, immanence is connected with intimacy while transcendence is connected with categorization. This implies that immanence operates best by highlighting connection horizontally while transcendence attempts to create vertical priority. Immanence also multiplies connections while transcendence divides through separation. These two distinct forms are significant because they create different effects and strategies for rhetorical understanding in how *dasein* disclose the world. Obama's speech is important as an incorporation of both transcendent and immanent strategies because he doesn't rely on partisanship as his primary persuasive tactic. Obama's speech attempts to both move beyond the scandal while also utilizing Wright's comments as a moment for reflecting on the state of America's relationship on race. Now that an application of both immanence and transcendence to Barack Obama's speech is

complete, the next chapter will draw some social and rhetorical implications of this analysis.

CHAPTER 4

IMPLICATIONS

Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure is a recent addition to rhetorical theorizing. Although a rhetoric of disclosure has yet to be applied to many arenas of human communication, disclosure research has been budding in various areas of Communication Studies. Chapter 2 reviewed how scholar Michael J. Hyde applied Heideggerian disclosure to issues in bioethics. It seems that disclosive rhetoric thus far has been centralized around ways that human beings cope or confront one another in speech situations and plays a role in how audiences think they ought to be treated by one another through discourse. This is particularly evident in ethical communication where Hyde uses Heidegger's concepts to provide illumination around controversial topics (i.e., euthanasia and free speech). Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn concerning the theoretical and social implications of a rhetoric of disclosure.

I will first assess the theoretical implications of Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure and Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech and then relate this notion of disclosure to Derrida and Deleuze's conception of immanence and transcendence. Second, the social implications about disclosive rhetoric stemming from Obama's speech will center around how Derrida and Deleuze's conceptions of transcendence and immanence mutually support a broader understanding of Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure. By formulating these theoretical and social implications of disclosure, I will address conclusions about

where and how Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure might be relevant for future rhetorical scholarship. Finally, some limitations to Heidegger's phenomenology will be discussed.

Theoretical Implications

A rhetoric of disclosure emphasizes the ways human beings (or *dasein*) relate to one another. One of the ways human beings relate is through discourse. Discourse often frames our understanding of others and can provide empathy and hostility in our communication. What is particularly notable is how disclosure discourse is en-framed. A rhetoric of disclosure is meant to explain how people en-frame their interactions with others through our relationship to others and the world. Heidegger is particularly concerned with the various ways that *dasein* exists in the world and how *dasein* relate to one another through discourse. Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure helps explain this relation through our ability to be world-disclosers.

For Heidegger, *dasein* cannot understand how human beings disclose the world without a comprehension of how *dasein* uses its world as tools and through the coordinated practices that open up distinct, contextualized worlds. For a pilot, discourse is related to an environment of specific objects (i.e., cockpit, thrusters, dials, etc.) and the accessibility that these objects afford in negotiating a broader horizon concerning flying (i.e., speaking to air traffic control, telling mechanics about problems with the plane, etc.). In this sense, a rhetoric of disclosure makes available the discursive space of speaking about flying. This is why the world of flying is distinct from but informed by the ways that human beings communicate. Our micro-worlds overlap on the broader worlds in which human beings co-habitate. This creates a space where communication is possible, but not undifferentiated. Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech is a

particular political discursive space that opens up new possibilities to speak about race in America.

This disclosure allows for some preliminary theoretical conclusions to be drawn concerning Obama's speech. Political speech-making is one micro-world that rubs up against the broader world *dasein* all share. One way this occurs is when disclosure informs speech discourse. If disclosure helps create the possibilities of new worlds, speech-making provides concrete mechanisms for these worlds to materialize. For example, Obama's speech attempts to navigate the precarious ground of speaking about issues of race without offending voters. Although Obama certainly is not the first to negotiate the polemic that sometimes exists between politics and race, Obama is altering the way that debate is understood through disclosive rhetoric. Literally, Obama uses a national platform to create a discursive space using the public world that *dasein* already understands against the backdrop of racial inequality. Again, Obama is not the first to make a national speech on race, but is one of the few politicians to discuss race openly in a political context with a viable African American presidential candidate. Rhetoric of disclosure attempts to identify and highlight how the public world and *dasein* negotiate shared overlapping spaces where different attitudes and moods exist. In this way, Obama's speech can be considered a success in that it not only altered the debate concerning political discussions of race but allowed voters to en-frame Obama's relationship to voters. For this reason, Obama's race speech is often highlighted as one pivotal turning point that worked in Obama's favor in his pursuit for the presidency. On a theoretical level, politics and race are two discursive possibilities that can illuminate

ways of thinking about our public shared world while at the same can obfuscate or foreclose other possibilities that remain hidden.

For Heidegger, speakers cannot separate discussions of race from discussions of politics because both overlap the possibilities of intelligibility in discourse. Rhetoric of disclosure is one element in the creation of the structure of this intelligibility. For example, what shows up as offensive/inoffensive speech is partially filtered through the conditions of intelligibility in discourse. What this means, then, is that disclosive rhetoric shapes what is possible in speech-making. One example of how intelligibility frames discursive possibilities in Obama's speech is that a highly publicized political speech concerning race and White privilege is made contemporary while linking its discourse in time. Obama utilizes the rhetoric from the era of Civil Rights and liberties in order to make racial inequality more palatable for Whites while speaking to the challenges of being Black in the United States. One theoretical concern of disclosive rhetoric may be that using certain forms of discourse to make one's views palatable to another community may re-entrench stereotypes rather than fundamentally challenging the prevailing power structure.

Although a rhetoric of disclosure helps explain our relationship to the world, our experience of the world is shaped by perception. Since disclosive rhetoric is informed by these perceptions, different ways people interact using disclosure could continue forms of discriminatory practice. What if the disclosure individuals use to identify with (or against) social groups includes an inheritance of other forms of discriminatory behavior? These perceptions could generate an archive of speaking and acting that rhetors use to reify oppression. For example, sexual encounters between Southern elite White women

and Black slave men were sometimes used as instruments to simultaneously fight colonial patriarchy while at the same time perpetuating White supremacy (Allain, 2013). The intersection of power in race and gender relations collides by using some forms of emancipatory practices to subvert other identities. This is significant because some filters of rhetoric hide patterns of social oppression. Much like a spotlight puts heightened awareness on one issue, other issues can be left out in the dark.

But just as a new world opens up, other worlds can become hidden. Rhetoric of disclosure attempts to confront this idea by looking at ways that speeches foreclose possibilities of human action as well. For example, by creating new ways of speaking about race as the central theme of his speech, Obama might also have cut off other more productive ways of speaking about race. Immanent and transcendent rhetoric simultaneously open up and close off ways of disclosing our worlds. When Obama connects racial equality with the creation of a more perfect union, Derrida's and Deleuze's notions of immanence and transcendence may help us to understand what aids and hinders productive social discourse about race in America.

Social Implications of Disclosive Rhetoric

Disclosive rhetoric that uses the Derridean structure of transcendence emphasizes separation and hierarchy. The title of Obama's speech is transcendent itself. The words "more perfect" emphasize a scale or spectrum of perfection and how Obama's discourse is meant to move racial equality towards this perfection. Perfection isn't merely hierarchal but highlights rhetorical separation. Obama discloses the nature of racial inequality through rhetorical acts of moving beyond the sins of the past to an "enlightened future." This transcendent configuration of race discourse in Obama's

speech highlights equality. Equality-based disclosive rhetoric is productive when configured transcendently because it softens the challenge to the dominant discourse about race. Equality through transcendent disclosure seems to be perceived as less confrontational to White America while a disclosure concerning rights may have been seen as a larger challenge to Whiteness. Again, using language that makes one's argument palatable to the dominant power structure may sweep larger issues under the rug rather than confronting discrimination itself.

We see this again with the interaction between upper-class White women in the South and Black male slaves. Female sexuality was a heavily regulated system that included moral expectations of virtue and purity. Not surprisingly, Southern White women sometimes transgressed the patriarchal expectations of Southern society through illicit affairs with Black male slaves. Laws concerning extra-marital affairs between White women and Black slaves were severe. Physical violence and beating of "guilty parties" were common. Without making a direct comparison, White women and Black men shared an experience of societal restriction and regulation. It is important to note that while elite White women went back to the plantation, Black men went back to the fields. The opportunity of sex carried the simultaneous challenge to patriarchal expectations while re-entrenching social and systemic forms of racism.

Obama uses transcendent notions of race to hierarchize separation and inclusion. The challenge for Obama as a Black male politician attempting to gain favor from White voters is asserting his comments in a non-abrasive manner on race relations. One unfortunate byproduct about making racial equality palatable to White voters may be that the rhetoric of disclosure is more easily absorbed by dominant ideology. One valid

concern may be that while transcendent rhetoric softens the blow of challenges to the dominant status quo, transcendent disclosure may also be more easily absorbed by hegemonic counter-narratives. In this sense, transcendent rhetoric creates a counter-narrative that can be contrasted with more traditional narratives (i.e., racial narratives in politics) that alter the way traditional narratives are disclosed, but these counter-narratives may just be another form of deflection rather incorporation on altered beliefs. Indeed, while Obama's speech was seen as a success in discussing racism openly, rhetoric about race in America remains largely unchanged and not significantly different from 2008 when the speech was delivered. Immanent rhetoric seems to engage in rhetorical practices that make it harder for narratives to be co-opted by the status-quo by emphasizing unity rather than hierarchy and separation.

Disclosive rhetoric that uses the Deleuzean structure of immanence expresses connection and internal togetherness. Obama utilizes immanent rhetoric when emphasizing racial and national healing. Immanence attempts to connect disparate categories and show their interrelatedness. For example, Obama connects the Iraq war, racial injustice, and bigotry under one banner to show how these national manifestations are a common struggle for Whites and Blacks. By uniting these various struggles together, immanence evokes a rhetoric of disclosure that attempts to de-categorize and break down hierarchy. While this could be helpful with marginalized communities who don't embrace or identify with the struggles of other marginalized communities who comprehend their struggle through commonalities, Obama spends the latter half of his speech connecting these immanent themes to his campaign. Obama uses immanence strategically to show how his campaign is a continuation of challenging the status quo.

Obama interweaves campaign rhetoric (i.e., Ashley's story) to the re-contextualization of racial inequality. What this means is that an immanent rhetoric of disclosure connects public, shared worlds together by emphasizing their overlapping nature. Of course, Obama will spend a significant amount of time connecting his campaign to these new discursive spaces which then alters the way these worlds overlap. One limitation here may be that categorically absorbing disparate community voices together may water down their distinctness.

Obama is not the first politician to immanently weave his own campaign to national transgressions, but immanent disclosure helps to identify the ways these connections take place. Politicians often have to balance campaign rhetoric with current events in order to include their own narratives into the national discussion. Immanence aids in understanding how public political themes are folded into national narratives. For example, Ashley's story is one that acts as a feel-good contrast with the more serious discussion of racism all the while contextualizing the national response to the Wright scandal. Obama is presented with a variety of issues that are hard to address in one speech. Obama successfully turns the Wright scandal into a referendum on structural racism in the United States while ending his speech on perceiving him as proper presidential material. Immanence on a theoretical level attempts to interweave discordant themes into a unification of common cause. Immanent rhetoric aids in dissecting political speech by showing how these connections are made and then transforming them into new ways of disclosing our political worlds.

Overall, transcendent and immanent rhetoric are two different ways of using disclosure. These two strategies are used simultaneously or in a singular fashion.

Obama's speech utilizes both to separate out and re-contextualize contrasting themes for campaign success. In this sense, defining immanent and transcendent disclosive rhetoric as useful depends on what challenges a speaker must overcome. It would seem that transcendent rhetoric is more useful when defining one's message in contrast to dominant narratives and then emphasizing how a message moves beyond the problems of the status quo. This is particularly evident in political speeches when politicians often contrast their arguments and campaign narratives with competing political foes. Even when two candidates' views are not fundamentally different, competing for votes requires the use of contrasting rhetoric where transcendent disclosure may help. It is important to remember that Obama was still campaigning in March 2008 against fellow democrat Hillary Clinton for the Democratic Party presidential nomination. Transcendent rhetoric helps voters disclose differences between party candidates by expressing the spectrum on where a candidate's views stand. In the national election where Obama's and McCain's views were more distinct, transcendent disclosure may function differently in order to woo additional votes through contrasting perceptions in a different context.

Immanence is called for when issues of national healing and resolving transgressions are at stake. Obama's subtle maneuver was to make the Wright scandal a moment to hold a referendum on race in America. Immanent rhetoric seems to be policy-oriented in that it seeks to resolve transgressions through action. Immanence uses active metaphors like "coming together" and "change." Immanence seeks to tell an audience where we go from here, how to keep the dialogue going. In the end, defining either transcendent or immanent disclosive rhetoric as more useful depends on the context of

where communication occurs and what the goals of a speaker are for altering attitudes and beliefs.

Political campaign rhetoric provides fertile ground to analyze immanent and transcendent rhetoric because speakers have to use a variety of persuasive and informative techniques. Additionally, campaign rhetoric provides a rich text for public declarations of immanent and transcendent disclosure. One challenge of applying a rhetoric of disclosure to political rhetoric is understanding the historical context of political utterances. For example, the immanent and transcendent discourses in earlier political campaigns may be rhetorically different from campaigns of today. It may be difficult to parse immanent from transcendent forms of rhetoric if context is misunderstood. A more recent example is evident when forms of disclosive rhetoric on issues concerning rights or civil liberties may create confusion on how transcendence and immanence are utilized in a particular situation.

The rhetoric of disclosure has led to different interpretations framed by transcendence and immanence. This thesis attempted to demonstrate that an understanding of Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure can be interpreted through the tropes of transcendent and immanent rhetoric. Additionally, using Obama's "A More Perfect Union" speech as exemplar, this thesis also attempted to catalog what immanent and transcendent rhetoric looks like in political public address. It is useful at this point to think that Heidegger's disclosive rhetoric is heightened and illuminated through transcendent and immanent forms of rhetoric by providing further explorations in how speakers confront the world that shapes them. If disclosure concerns itself with how people relate to the world, transcendence and immanence explain why the meaning

behind our rhetoric makes the world phenomenologically meaningful. Obama is not strictly concerned with explaining how we come to disclose race relations. Obama spends the majority of his speech explaining issues of race through responding to the question on why race relations matter to a country torn by racial division. It is evident that Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure has an explanatory force that is maintained through transcendent and immanent context. This is important in understanding disclosure because an either-or approach of using transcendence or immanence is repaired through the simultaneous approach of using both strategies together. Transcendence and immanence mutually inform and contrast an understanding of disclosive rhetoric. Obama's speech is ample evidence that comprehending political speech requires unpacking immanent and transcendent forms of public speaking.

Future Considerations and Limitations

There are many ways to judge how and where disclosive rhetoric might be applied to future forms of rhetoric. First, this thesis primarily analyzed political discourse through speech-making and race. Future research could apply Heidegger's rhetoric of disclosure to alternative modes of discourse and see whether immanent and transcendent rhetoric illuminate results worth investigating. An immanent and transcendent analysis might open new rhetorical possibilities for communities that center on discussions of identity and rights. This is particularly evident in the recent emergence of debates around gay marriage, immigration, and gun rights in the United States. The way communicators speak about how they disclose the world around them might create new ways of thinking about how these communities relate to other communicators on these controversial issues.

This thesis endeavored to apply Heidegger's notion of phenomenological disclosure to rhetorical discourses on race. Although some scholars have used Heidegger to illuminate discussions of race, there is still a debate about how Heidegger's phenomenology fits into racial discourse. Transcendence and immanence is meant to open up this area by showing that race, bodies, and politics overlap and provide a way into this debate by focusing on the disclosure of phenomenology. Other fruitful avenues may find that other phenomenological approaches suit discussions of race. For example, French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty extends Heidegger's phenomenology by adding the notion of perception and how it frames discourse. By looking at perception, Merleau-Ponty's use of the body and perception might generate an additional vocabulary that builds on Heidegger's understanding of disclosure.

Notably, Heidegger is largely silent on how the body fits into disclosure. Given how much the body plays a role in different forms of communication (i.e., nonverbal), combining Heideggerian phenomenology with other forms disclosure may prove productive by connecting the power of speech with the embodiment of presence. One area where this may illuminate other ways of using disclosure and race is through performance. Performance often creates different strategies or ways of embodying the deployment of race that phenomenology may be utilized to show additional mechanisms of power and discourse.

Although this study focused on race, using a phenomenology of gender through immanent and transcendent discourse could offer additional research for feminist and queer studies. Again, Heidegger is largely silent on gender but phenomenology is a broad paradigm and feminist scholars have already begun to use Heideggerian

philosophy for feminist discourse that is specific to phenomenology. Phenomenology understood through an immanent and transcendent lens might build an intersectional bridge to race but also highlights different kinds of relationships that disclosure and gender play in interpersonal communication.

Last, it is important to remember our humanity in human communication. Communication between people creates, produces, and invents different ways *dasein* disclose what it means to be human to each other. If rhetoric is an art of persuasion, then rhetoric forms the basic ways individuals respond to other people. A rhetoric of disclosure attempts to explain more than just the content of how communication occurs, it also attempts to explain the event of communication. Disclosive rhetoric helps to explain the interactive elements contained within human communication that go beyond mere recognition of one another as people. Heidegger humbly suggests that rhetoric is the basis for what it means to be human and comes to define our being as beings who communicate.

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