

Running head: NARCO-TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

**Narco-Terrorism in Central Asia: Fighting New Wars in an
Age of Globalization**

by

Cui Zheng

A thesis submitted to Webster University Thailand in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of MA International Relationship

Supervised by Dr. Kenneth B. Houston

November 2014

Bangkok, Thailand

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


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
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Narco-Terrorism in Central Asia: Fighting New Wars in an Age of Globalization

by
Cui Zheng

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
Committee Member (Second Reader)

10 / 12 / 2014
Approval Date



Site Director/Department Chair

4 / Dec / 2014
Approval Date



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12 December 2014
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ABSTRACT**Narco-Terrorism in Central Asia: Fighting New Wars in an Age of Globalization**

by

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Central Asia has been a hotspot of terrorist activities and the drug trade for at least a decade. There are reasons for the prolonged unrest in this region. First, Afghanistan, as the lair for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, is a seedbed of a terrorist threat, whilst also the world's biggest cultivation of opium. Given the opportunity that drug trafficking provides for financing terrorism it is unsurprising that the two, terrorism and narcotics trafficking, are combined. In the US Government's War on Drugs, the term 'Narco-Terrorism' is adopted to explain the known terrorist organizations engaging in drug trafficking to fund their activities. Countering the illicit drug trade is therefore vital to the overall struggle against international terrorism. Second, given the fragile status of the Central Asian states after obtaining independence following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, they were vulnerable to both transnational organized crime and extremism. Third, the deviant globalization, which enabled the local illicit drugs connect with the international trafficking groups, and the illegal service providers like money launderers, so that the drugs can reach the international markets like Europe.

The situation in Central Asia is described by Mary Kaldor, in her *New and Old Wars*, as a new type of war, which is characterized with the identity politics, predatory economy,

diasporas networks and globalization. The main actors of the new wars are non-state actors, which can be tackled only by a cosmopolitan approach with integration of international and national resources under greater institutionalized international cooperation. However, geopolitical disputes may undermine the prospects for cooperation. The competing interests of dominant state and organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization make it difficult to conceive the type of cooperation needed to deal with the increasingly transnational narco-terrorist threat. The paper will argue that realism is not the answer to narco-terrorism in Central Asia; a greater and institutionalized liberalist cooperation framework asserted by Mary Kaldor's new wars theory is needed to eliminate the roots of drug trafficking and terrorism.

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Acronyms

AEC:	ASEAN Economic Community
ANP:	Afghan National Police
AQ:	Al-Qa'ida
ATTA:	Afghan Transit Trade Agreement
CNPA:	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CNSC:	Central National Security Commission
CPC:	Communist Party of China
CSTO:	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DCA:	Tajikistan Drug Control Agency
DEA:	Drug Enforcement Administration
ETIM:	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
FARC:	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FAST:	Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams
FATA:	Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan
HDI:	Human development index
HQN:	Haqqani Network

HuT:	Hizb ut-Tahrir
IMU:	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
ISAF:	International Security Assistance Force
IRP:	Islamic Renaissance Party
ISIS:	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIU:	National Interdiction Unit
NRC:	NATO Russia Council
SCO:	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SIU:	Sensitive Investigative Unit
TAT:	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan
TTP:	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UNODC:	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UTO:	United Tajik Opposition

Introduction

At 9:00 pm on March 1, 2014, six men and two women, dressed in black and wielding knives, arrived at the Kunming train station, one of the largest in southwest China, and began slashing people at random (Xinhuanet, 2014). Before authorities could stop them, the assailants had killed 28 people and wounded another 113. The attackers are believed from China's Uighur ethnic minority, a Muslim Turkic group from Xinjiang, a western Chinese region beset by ethnic tension (Xinhuanet, 2014). The attack was clearly announced by Chinese government as a terrorist attack and the attackers are defined as terrorists (Xinhuanet, 2014). The attack shocked China, and promoted a counter measure "to crack down on violent terrorist activities in all forms" as instructed by President Xi Jinping (Xinhuanet, 2014). The Kunming attack is the latest example of a series of terrorist attacks conducted by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The ETIM is responsible for various terrorist attacks in China (Changing face of terror, 2013). As a response to the terrorism and other threats to national security, back to November 2013, the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was established at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee (Panda, 2013). The role of the CNSC in combating terrorism was also outlined in China's first national security blue book published on May 06, 2014 (Fu, 2014). However, the threat of terrorism was not listed in a high priority concerning the national security of China in this blue book. Instead, the book highlights the territorial disputes with Japan and Philippines, the tension in Korean Peninsula and the "Pivot to Asia Pacific" policy of the U.S. as the top urgent threats (the Center for the Studies of National Security Strategy, 2014, pp. 10-11; translation mine). When introducing the

terrorist threat of China, the book refers the Xinjiang Uighur separatists to the foreign manipulation from neighboring Central Asia. The reason for the unrest in Central Asia is described as the “intervention from the western powers” (the Center for the Studies of National Security Strategy, 2014, p. 11; translation mine). Furthermore, the terrorist attack in Kunming, was described by Chinese government as having been conducted by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a terrorist organization recognized as such by international organizations such as United Nations, European Union, and Governments of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan (Lopez, 2009). However, the United States Department of State, which soon after the 9/11 attacks classified it as a foreign terrorist organization, later took it off the list, saying ETIM had little organizational ability to carry out attacks. (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2004)The United States initially hesitated to declare even the Kunming attacks an act of terrorism and did so only upon chiding from Beijing (Prabhu, 2014).

The China case reflects the fact that realpolitik is still the dominating mentality of the great powers when handling the international affairs. However, the real-political hostility between China and the U.S will not reduce the importance of the threats from Central Asia posed to China. Indeed, Central Asia is vital to China. It is located on the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and "21st Century Maritime Silk Road". (Heng, 2014)Along the northern Silk Road, the cooperation has promoted rapid increase in trade volume between China and the four central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It jumped to 40.2 billion U.S. dollars in 2013, nearly 100 times than that of 1992. (Heng, 2014) The convergence of the transnational crimes in this region is posing serious dangers to China. Given the situation in China, a chaotic Central Asia may not be

less dangerous to China's security compared with the threats from Japan or the U.S. For the U.S., the point is not whether ETIM is really a terrorist group or not, instead, what is important is to give the priority of foreign policy to combating the criminal convergence in Central Asia instead of seeking real-political opportunities to contain the regional powers like China. This case reflects that *realpolitik* is the dominating mentality in the international affairs.

The most serious threat from Central Asia is narco-terrorism. The term "Narco-Terrorism" was created in 1983 to describe the terrorist-type attacks against the anti-narcotics police in South America. Narco-terrorism could be defined as the

"use of organized terror to secure control over a state by another state or organized criminal networks/or by insurgents or by a combination of any or all of them to achieve fixed political, economic or social objectives based on organizational and financial empowerment through drug trafficking(Bhattacharjee, 2008, p. 1)."

According to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), narco-terrorism is "a subset of terrorism, in which terrorist groups, or associated individuals, participate directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these activities (Walt S. M., 1998, pp. 29-32, 34-46)." The concept of narco-terrorism is debatable. Dissenting voices include several assertions questioning the nature of this concept and its political attempt. They argue that drug trade is only one method of terrorist financing, and the drug problem is not caused by terrorism. They believe the term "narco-terrorism"

confuses two different issues by combining the drug problem with terrorism with an attempt to take political advantage of the fear of terrorism. David Kaplan, for example, believes that charities are responsible for the bulk of terrorist financing; instead, drug trade is playing an obscure role in this (White, 2013, p. 81). Civil libertarians like Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy believe that if governments link drugs with terrorism, they can reinvent the meaning of crime. The drug dealers will become terrorists, and a frightened public will grant the government expanded powers for overreaching maneuvers (White, 2013, p. 81). However, this paper takes the stance that narco-terrorism is authentic in Central Asia, and the nexus between these two crimes will be elaborated in the section of “The Narcotic and Terrorism Nexus”.

Narco-terrorism is typical in Central Asia, after the 2001 “War on Terror” in Afghanistan, when the traditional terrorism financing had been tightened by the global anti-terrorist operations (Sanderson, 2004, p. 57). Religion, tribal culture, fragile governance, corruption and transnational criminal elements shaped the region as a cycle of insurgence, terrorist attacks and drug trade. This cycle poses very different dangers with the traditional threat and requires that the international community demonstrate its wisdom in tackling this problem. The paper will introduce the nexus between the illicit drug trade and terrorism in Central Asia, and reveal its impact posed to the world.

Kaldor’s new wars theory will be adopted by this paper as theoretical framework with the concept of deviant globalization asserted by Gilman, Goldhammer, and Weber as ancillary. The paper will explain the multiplier effect given by the negative effects of the globalization to the criminal nexus in Central Asia, especially to Afghanistan. The

multiplier effect is mostly from globalization's negative side, which is called "deviant globalization"(Gilman, Goldhammer, & Weber, 2011, p. 5). Deviant globalization is defined as an illicit economic phenomenon: "it is that portion of the global economy that meets demand for goods and services that are illegal or considered repugnant in one place by using a supply from some other part of the world where morals are different or law enforcement is less effective"(Gilman, Goldhammer, & Weber, 2011, p. 5).Deviant globalization has been always bound up with mainstream globalization.

It will be explained in this paper that narco-terrorism in Central Asia should be understood as a new type of war. Mary Kaldor, in her *New and Old Wars*, asserts that Afghanistan and Central Asia is experiencing a new type of war, which is characterized with the identity politics, predatory economy, diasporas networks and globalization (Kaldor, *New and old wars.*, 2012, p. 10). In such a new war, the main actors are non-state actors, which cannot be tackled by the traditional military and law enforcement methods. A cosmopolitan approach with integration of international and national resources under greater institutionalized international cooperation is required to turn the tide in Central Asia. To fight this new war, the realism mentality in international relations should be put aside and liberalism is the right answer to this crisis. A greater and institutionalized liberalist cooperation framework asserted by Mary Kaldor's new wars theory is the solution to narco-terrorism in Central Asia.

Research Question and Thesis Statement

After researching the narco-terrorism in Central Asia and the influence of globalization, the question posed is: is this nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism

an old type of complex crime that can be tackled by traditional military means and/or law enforcement methods, or a new phenomenon that can only be handled by a new thinking of war? After conducting research on this question, evidence indicates that an analytical framework can be set up based on Kaldor's new wars concept, which asserts a new type of war with non-state actors playing the main roles. In international relations, the new wars are marginalized by the mentality and decision making based on realist theory. Non-state actors are not given proper priority by the international decision makers, who regard sovereignties as the overwhelming majority of actors in international affairs. However, fighting the new wars in an age of globalization requires a cosmopolitan approach endorsed by a greater institutionalized international cooperative framework with liberalism as guidance.

Limitation

Certain limitations exist when conducting this research. Due to space limitations, the paper will not delve into the detailed domestic issues of every state in Central Asia. However, it will provide a general introduction of the states, with particular emphasis on Afghanistan. The space limitation will also limit the scope of illicit drug study in this region. Therefore, the study of this paper will focus only on the trafficking of heroin and opium in the geographical context of Central Asia. For the same reason, the paper will not touch the topic of state-sponsored terrorism, which is an important aspect of the deviant globalization. Discussion of Central Asia will be limited to the five "stans" plus Afghanistan with limited portions of Pakistan and Iran. Another limitation is the inconsistency of Afghan opium poppy cultivation data. The U.S. and the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates differ due to dissimilar methodologies for estimating poppy cultivation and opium yields. (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014, p. 83) The paper adopts the data mostly from UNODC reports for their neutrality.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative methodology and adopted different qualitative methods for data collection and analysis. For data collection, secondary sources such as peer-reviewed scholarly books, academic journals and periodicals, reports from international organizations and governments, and credible media and news sources were used to analyze the concept of new wars and its relationship to narco-terrorism in Central Asia. Figures of GDP per capita drawn from World Bank and the Corruption Perspective Index from Transparency International were adopted to illustrate the social and economic status of the Central Asian states. These indicators were selected to reflect the similarities between Central Asia states: they are commonly facing the severe corruption and poverty, which are breeding ground for narco-terrorism. They also reflect the differences of social and economic development between these states. The differences appear to be positively correlated with the impact these states suffer from narco-terrorism. The comparison of these indicators therefore can reveal that the solution to narco-terrorism in Central Asia has to be from the social and economic aspect. This conclusion then leads to the Kaldor's cosmopolitan approach as the solution of this issue. For data analysis, a comparative case study approach was employed to analyze narco-terrorism in various Central Asian states and their similarities. Comparisons will be used to explain the relations or contrasts between different states. Narco-terrorism in Central Asia has been the focus of academic

discussion for at least a decade; however, its importance is sometimes overlooked by the international community when the real political struggles are on the main stage of international affairs.

The research took the aspect of international cooperation to approach the analysis of narco-terrorism in Central Asia. Deeper, cross real political blocs, and institutionalized international cooperation will rule out the real political mentalities for solution providing to this issue and adopt liberalism as the theoretical framework of this paper. Research was conducted on the impacts of Central Asia's narco-terrorism to the region, the great powers and the world to reflect its severity. The study of this paper focuses on the so-called "Northern route" of heroin trafficking in Central Asia and explains the impact of narco-terrorism along the trafficking direction of this route. With this evidence, the study points to the conclusion that real political mentalities should be minimized when considering the solutions for this issue and calls for broader international cooperation.

The paper is presented in four parts: literature review, introduction to narco-terrorism in Central Asia and its impact on the region, the analysis of the efforts from international community to tackle this problem, and conclusion.

Literature Review

On May 27, 2014, United States President Barack Obama announced a plan to withdraw all but 9,800 American troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year and pull out the rest by the end of 2016 (Holland, 2014). This announcement marks the end of more than a decade of American military presence in Afghanistan triggered by the September 11 attacks on the U.S. But the situation in Afghanistan and the whole Central Asian region is totally different to the pre 9-11 era. A convergence of transnational crimes such as illicit drug trafficking and terrorism in Afghanistan and its neighboring states is threatening the region and even the world. In an era of globalization, the conflicts generated by this convergence will not be limited to the boundaries of the local states in this region; instead, they can easily spill across the international borders to other regions of the world (Krasner, 2004, p. 85). International crimes are truly global (Naim, 2003, p. 34).

The threat from Central Asia could be covered and de-emphasized by the international community when the realist balance of power game is returning to the world stage. The crisis in Ukraine is driving the two old Cold War enemies, Russia and the U.S., to once more having a geopolitical confrontation in Europe. The world is focusing on such a confrontation, and the dangers in Central Asia are regarded as a less important problem. However, given the sharply rising terrorist group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in Iraq after the U.S. military force withdrew; dangers of less prioritization of this kind of threat are obvious (Tribune, 2014). This paper will conduct research on the nature of the conflicts in Central Asia with globalization as a background.

Indeed, international affairs have been analyzed and explained by the scholars mainly from three schools: realism, idealism, and liberalism (Walt, 1998). Realism, as Walt describes, focuses on the shifting distribution of power among states (Walt, 1998). John Mearsheimer describes the international order as “anarchy” and that “the great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal” (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 29). The states, especially the great powers, in such anarchy, fear each other, and therefore, “there is little room for trust among states” (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 63). The states in our world today are still in anarchy, and the interactions between them can only be a zero-sum game (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 32). The concept of “balance of power” is used to describe the equilibrium status of the world we are living in (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 36). This concept reveals that, as far as the power can be well balanced, the realist world order will be regarded as stable. The unrest caused by the nexus of narcotic trafficking and terrorism in a region does not need to be addressed by the major powers as far as it does not pose significant dangers to the balance.

Morgenthau’s recognition of alliance actually drives realism away from absolute anarchy and realizes the possibility of international cooperation among the states (Morgenthau, 2006). But in realist theories, the alliances are only “temporary marriages”. The cooperation among the states, no matter for security or non-security purposes, no matter within or crossing alliances, has to give its way to the security concerns (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 40). Mearsheimer indicates in his article: “No amount of cooperation can eliminate the dominating logic of security competitions (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 43).” With this mentality in mind, it is difficult for the realpolitik to lead to an institutionalized international cooperation crossing the power blocs.

Similar mentality can be observed in Samuel Huntington's famous *The clash of civilizations*. Huntington asserted that the next pattern of international conflict after the Cold War era will be the clash between different civilizations, which will dominate global politics (Huntington, 2013, p. 3). States from different civilization compete for relative military and economic power (Huntington, 2013, p. 10). Huntington believed the "fault lines" between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries and will be the battle lines of the future (Huntington, 2013, p. 3). His theory takes a western stance, provides suggestion to the West to enhance the cooperation within its own civilization, to limit the expansion of others like Confucian and Islamic states (Huntington, 2013, p. 27). As a short term strategy, the West should even exploit the differences and conflicts between other major civilizations for its own benefit (Huntington, 2013, p. 27). This idea is very similar to the "containment" concept asserted by George Kennan in 1947 (Kennan, 1947). The difference is that the target to contain changed from the Cold War ideological enemy to the enemies from rival civilizations. The great powers could not cooperate due to the ultimate hostility among them (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 42). The ultimate hostility could be from the ideological rivalry in the Cold War, or the clash of the civilizations in the post Cold War era. Taking Central Asia as an example, this region had been the frontline of the balance of power between the eastern and western blocs during the Cold War. In the post Cold War world, the realists like Huntington regard this region as the "fault line" between Orthodox Russian and Muslim civilizations (Huntington, 2013, p. 13). Huntington's theory provides a hypothetical reason for the instability in this region, but does not explain the criminal nature of the unrest, since conflicts along the front lines between power blocs are the

norms for realists and the main actors in realist politics are states, not the non-state actors like drug traffickers and terrorists. Since the hostility is normalcy in realism, international cooperation in a realist world will be only temporary and limited.

In summary, realism takes a rational point of view to this world, believes that the imperfect is the result of human nature. It sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle for all pluralist societies and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good (Morgenthau, 2006, p. 4). It recognizes states as the main actors of international affairs, prioritizes the material power of states rather than international cooperation. Therefore realists may easily neglect the dangers from regional nexus that crime and sub/non state actors pose to the international relations in an era of globalization. The realist theories like “balance of power” and “clash of civilizations” even contribute to the conflicts in the hot spots like Central Asia.

Liberalism takes a very different world view with realism. Liberals criticized realist anarchy based on the conventional liberal democratic peace theory, Kantian liberal internationalism (Doyle, 1986). Despite its limitation, the theory paved the way for explanations of cosmopolitan cooperation. The cosmopolitan explanations and solutions are the key to the crisis in many of hot spots around the world, particularly where there is a convergence of transnational crimes such as in Central Asia.

Cosmopolitan explanation and approach are important in the era of globalization. Under globalization, the global environment and the international system are evolving at hypervelocity (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013, p. viii). Globalization has been defined as an “evolutionary, non-unilinear process that has multiple interrelated dimensions: ecology,

disease, demography, economics, technology, culture, politics, military, and society” (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011). The globalization has many aspects such as international political economy, environmental issues, transnational organized crimes, global national security, culture and human rights. In the book *The Globalization of World Politics*, globalization is recognized as injecting “four set of forces” into the world economy: internationalization, technological revolution, deterritorialization and liberalization (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011, p. 256). Globalization has always been accompanied by its dark side, the deviant globalization. All the four sets of forces mentioned above can be also applied to the deviant globalization. The most critical point to understand about deviant globalization is that it is inextricably linked to and bound up with mainstream globalization: “we cannot have one without the other” (Gilman, Goldhammer, & Weber, 2011). As the dark side of globalization, deviant globalization was created by globalization as our shadows created by our own bodies. The infrastructure of the global economy is dual-used and value-neutral. As these systems become increasingly efficient, interconnected, and indispensable, they help not only the formal global economy to grow but also its conjoined, deviant twin (Gilman, Goldhammer, & Weber, 2011). It will be impossible to explain the deviant globalization without understanding its origin from the formal globalization. At least for its economic dimension, globalization is driven and sustained by the global spread of market capitalism and neo-liberalism economic orthodoxy that transcend state boundaries and limit states’ control of their economics (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011). Therefore liberalism has its role to play and can better explain various phenomenon, including its

deviant elements, of globalization. The narcotic and terrorism nexus is the product of this deviant globalization.

Moises Naim, in his *The five wars of globalization*, highlights the trend of this criminal convergence. He lists the major transnational criminal activities as results of globalization: illicit drug trafficking, arms trafficking, violation of intellectual property right, alien smuggling, money laundering and terrorism (Naim, 2003, p. 28). The nation states have benefited from globalization, but unfortunately, criminal networks have benefited even more, since criminals can receive double bonuses. From one side, they can expand their illegal markets, and from another side, they can also enjoy the burdens imposed by globalization on governments of the nation states (Naim, 2003, p. 28). Governments of the sovereignties have to face pressure from the progress of globalization. The regional integration and treaties of free trade zones may lead to sharp increase in the number of transnational travelers. For example, the coming ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) committed the free flow of goods and investment, which will put much heavier workload on government authorities like customs or financial supervision divisions to monitor and supervise the flow of illicit goods and money than what they are handling today (ASEAN, 2008, p. 6). The free flow of skilled labor may increase the difficulty in the immigration control of the ASEAN member states (ASEAN, 2008, p. 15). Naim indicates that the traditional concept of sovereignty is restraining the states' efforts to suppress the crimes, since it restricts only the law enforcements but fails to limit the criminals (Naim, 2003, p. 34). Naim suggests that governments develop more flexible notions of sovereignty and strengthen the existing multilateral institutions for cooperation (Naim, 2003, p. 34). The regional institution like the "Regional Counter Terrorism

Structure” initiated by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a good example (SCO, 2013). There are scholars supporting Naim’s assertion. Krasner elaborates his opinion of “shared sovereignty” in his article *Sharing sovereignty: New institutions for collapsed and failing states* (Krasner, 2004, p. 85). Krasner describes the dangers the failed states pose to the world and explains that under globalization, when a state fails, the consequences are not limited to their borders (Krasner, 2004, p. 85). The conventional sovereignty and the norms of international legal sovereignty have proved inapplicable to today’s world when dealing with the dangers from non-state actors and failed states (Krasner, 2004, p. 101). Without globalization and its deviant twin, the narcotic and terrorism nexus may not reach the seriousness and may not be able to pose dangers the world is facing today.

Liberal theories, given the formal and deviant globalization as background, can better explain the convergence of transnational crimes in Central Asia than the realist ones. Liberalists deny the anarchy as a norm of international relations, and therefore recognize and promote cooperation and shared sovereignty among the sovereign states. With understanding of the nature of globalization, liberalists recognize non-state actors as a major force in the international relations. Given the fact that Afghanistan, a failed state, is located at the hub of Central Asia, international cooperation and a cosmopolitan approach via international cooperation are necessary to mitigate the harm and dangers in this region.

Mary Kaldor, in her *New and old wars*, asserts the concept of “new wars”, which differs from the traditional definition of war (Kaldor, 2012, p. 2). Kaldor explains the

new wars as new type violence with a blurring of the distinctions between traditional state-vs-state warfare, organized crimes and large-scale violations of human rights (Kaldor, 2012, p. 2). To differentiate her “new wars” concept from the traditional understanding of war, Kaldor compares it with the “old war”, the Clausewitzian concept of war. In Clausewitz’s notion, war is a rational instrument for the pursuit of state interest, as “the continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 87). It is defined as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 101). It is recognized as a construction of the centralized, rationalized, hierarchically ordered territorialized modern state (Kaldor, 2012, p. 17). Therefore, the Clausewitzian war is predominantly between states, the states are the main actors of wars and wars serve the interest of the states (Kaldor, 2012, p. 17). States set up standing armies to legitimate the monopolization of violence. With the monopoly of violence and state interest as the dominant legitimacy of war, a state can deny the violence conducted by non-state actors (Kaldor, 2012, p. 19). Wars are logically distinguished from crimes, as wars can be waged by sovereign states alone (Kaldor, 2012, p. 20). To finance a standing army, a state will have to collect tax from its citizens, as the exchange for the protection it provides to them (Kaldor, 2012, p. 20). As wars are difficult to be won by attrition, Clausewitz elaborates battles are decisive to the victory of the wars (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 55).

Kaldor’s new wars theory has globalization as its background. Globalization has influenced the characters of war (Kaldor, 2012, p. 3). Globalization undermines the sovereignty of states, “the territorial sovereignty is no longer viable” (Kaldor, 2012, p. 91). The new wars arise in the context of this erosion of the autonomy of the state and its

monopoly of legitimate organized violence (Kaldor, 2012, p. 5). In such context, the revenues of failed states will decline as the consequence of criminality, corruption and inefficiency (Kaldor, 2012, p. 6). Meanwhile, the political legitimacy of these states is disappearing and the right to use violence has been privatized (Kaldor, 2012, p. 6). The state will consequently lose its political legitimacy and fail, and non-state actors, such as diaspora nationalists, fundamentalists and transnational criminal groups, will arise and benefit from the consequences of globalization (Kaldor, 2012, p. 72). After the terrorist attack in September 11, the trend of globalization became clearer that it is no longer possible to insulate some parts of the world from others (Kaldor, 2012, p. 13). In a post Cold War era, the force of globalization bred “identity politics”. In Kaldor’s new wars context, identity politics means movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power (Kaldor, 2012, p. 79). Identity politics has various consequences. For example it can cause the new wars typically occur in the failed states and make it difficult to end them (Kaldor, 2012, p. 118). Unlike the old wars, new wars have fewer battles to fight; instead, much more civilians are killed (Kaldor, 2012, p. 106). New wars are also different from the old wars for their methods of financing. Because of the collapse of administrative system in the state, non-state actors likely take a predatory method to finance their violence and external sources are also keys for the finance (Kaldor, 2012, p. 113).

Indeed, the new wars theory describes a prospect that is typical in Central Asia. The states in this region obtained their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and most of them set up authoritarian types of governments (Berdikeyeva, 2009, p. 77). As Kaldor states, this is a breeding ground for the new wars (Kaldor, 2012). Due to the

collapse of ideological value system, identity politics had an opportunity to fulfill the vacuum of beliefs and convictions. Fragile economies heavily reduced the legitimacy of governments and caused a failed state: Afghanistan. Non-state actors like terrorist groups and tribal warlords therefore emerged (Zenn, 2013). To support their capacity to conduct violence, predatory systems were set up and external actors like transnational criminal groups involved in the internal conflicts (Wang, 2010, p. 12). The situation cannot be understood in traditional Clausewitzian terms based on geopolitical goals (Kaldor, 2012, p. 94). In this sense, the new wars actually take place in a context as the deviant globalization, or an “extreme version of globalization” as Kaldor indicated (Kaldor, 2012, p. 107). In new wars in Central Asia, convergence of transnational crimes poses great dangers to the neighboring regions and the world, since identity politics has a tendency to spread (Kaldor, 2012, p. 100). Afghan heroin can be transported to the destinations like Europe because of the common cross border tribal connections among Central Asian states. For example, Afghan drugs enter Pakistan via the Baluchistan province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and then travel by sea to the destinations (UNODC, 2011, p. 75). Along this route of trafficking, diasporas networks like Baluch and Pashtu are playing very important role (UNODC, 2011, p. 75). Not only cooperating with the international traffickers to relay the transportation (UNODC, 2011, p. 80), they are also harboring the transnational terrorist groups like Taliban and Al-Qaeda (UNODC, 2011, p. 76). Pakistan-based insurgents reportedly levy taxes on licit business and trade in this region(including supplies destined for the coalition) and there is growing evidence that this extends to the opiate trade. (UNODC, 2009, p. 18)Baluchistan and FATA are therefore becoming the most direct gateways connecting Afghanistan with international

markets via sea, and the dangers of narco-terrorism are therefore being spread to the world.

The international community, therefore, shall not let the traditional confrontations between the great powers cover up the dangers being generated by the identity politics and new wars in the failed states. Kaldor believes that the international community has no alternative than to intervene in the new wars in this region, “because outside involvement in various forms is already so extensive in this type of conflict, there is no such thing as non-intervention” (Kaldor, 2012, p. 125).

Kaldor’s assertion of intervention is different from the traditional peacekeeping missions. She names the approach as a “cosmopolitan” intervention with focus on the political responses, which have to override geopolitics or shorter domestic concerns (Kaldor, 2012, p. 121). The rule of law must be restored to reestablish the legitimacy of violence monopolized by the state government (Kaldor, 2012, p. 122). Cosmopolitanism, as a typical liberalist concept, was used in a Kantian sense, and Kaldor uses it as a combined respect for universal human principles to tackle the dangers posed by new wars (Kaldor, 2012, p. 123). For cosmopolitan approach, what needed is not peacekeeping but enforcement of cosmopolitan norms and legitimacy (Kaldor, 2012, p. 133).

New wars theory has been widely debated since it was asserted. The debate focus on the questions like that whether new wars are “new” and whether new wars are war or crime (Kaldor, 2013, p. 1). Patrick Mello questions the theory on the basis of its “newness”. He questions the truth of the transformation of war and whether the traditional conceptions of warlost their validity (Mello, 2010, p. 1). He believes that the

empirical foundation of the new war proposition remains contested (Mello, 2010, p. 2). Stathis Kalyvas asserts that the characteristics of new wars described by Kaldor can be better interpreted as civil wars instead of a new type of warfare (Kalyvas, 2001, p. 99). Edward Newman takes a similar stance considering civil wars and internal conflicts are better terms than “new wars” (Newman, 2004, pp. 173-189). Kaldor defends her theory by arguing that the “new” in “new wars” has to be understood as a research strategy and a guide for policy (Kaldor, 2013, p. 1). She emphasizes that the new wars are wars in the globalization era and the term “new” is a way to exclude “old” assumptions about the nature of war and to provide the basis for a novel research methodology (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). The main new elements have to do with globalization and technology (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). New wars theory has also been questioned for its definition of the contemporary violence as war. An important critic is Mueller, who argues that the armed conflicts in the failed states are basically remnant of old wars and fought by “residual combatants” (Mueller, 2007, p. 114). Shaw calls the mass of violence “degenerate wars” (Shaw, 2009, p. 12). Kaldor agrees with the opinion that the line between wars and crimes is becoming blurry, and argues that new wars can be described as mixtures of war, crime and human rights violations (Kaldor, 2013, p. 6). It is called ‘war’ to describe that when organized violence in the service of political ends, it legitimizes criminal activity (Kaldor, 2013, p. 6). Some scholars even deny the existence of the new wars by arguing that it is just a misperception of the traditional warfare in the new world and the overemphasis on the impact of globalization. Shearman and Sussex, by referring to the war in Chechnya, question the new wars theory for its key elements as identity politics, main actors, methods, and economics (Sakwa, Shearman, & Sussex, 2005, p. 201). On the contrary,

there are scholars siding with Kaldor. Holsti focuses his study on the internal conflicts of weak or failed states (Holsti, 1996). Gray introduces his understanding of new wars from the technological perspective, by arguing that the new technology and science used in wars pose new dangers to the world (Gray, 1998). As summarized by Newman, the debate demonstrates that both wars and scholars' understanding of wars have changed (Newman, 2010, p. 24).

It can be observed from the debate that Mary Kaldor's new wars theory is applicable to various postmodern conflicts. However, it highlights the distinction between new and old types of wars. The point is to change the prevailing perceptions of war of the policy makers. It reveals the growing illegitimacy of the new wars and the need for a cosmopolitan political response, which put individual rights and the rule of law as the centerpiece of any international intervention (Kaldor, 2012, p. 3). The theory captures well and explains the characteristics of the conflicts in Central Asia.

Drug Trafficking

Illicit drug trafficking, terrorism, and globalization are the indispensable elements to understand the situation in Central Asia. The first element is illicit drug trafficking. Narcotic trafficking in modern history can be at least traced back to the "Opium War" in 1839, when the British Empire expanded its opium trade to the Qing Empire of China (Perdue, 2011). Opium was exported by the British East India Company to China with armed backup of the British Empire under the name of free trade. The pattern of illicit drug trafficking today is totally different with the Opium War but with one character remained same: it is still money oriented. The illicit drugs are generally flowing from

poor states as the states of origin into the rich ones. For example, the cocaine market seems to be expanding towards the emerging economies in Asia (UNODC, 2013). Trafficking has become collectivized. In an assessment conducted by National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice in 2010, compared with local illicit drug traffickers, organized trafficking groups, especially Mexican groups, “constitute the greatest drug trafficking threat to the United States” (National Drug Intelligence Center, 2010, p. 9). The trafficking is also becoming professional and entrepreneurial. In May 2014, a reporter from China Central Television (CCTV) interviewed the drug clandestine labs in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (CCTV, 2014). The traffickers told CCTV that they were working overtime, running a mass narcotic production to satisfy the “market demand” from the carnival celebration and the coming FIFA World Cup (CCTV, 2014). Even the Brazilian police force conducted the "pacification program," a raid to remove drug gangs from the city ahead of the World Cup in March 2014, the narcotic supply was barely affected (Westcott, 2014). The transportation of trafficking is also becoming diversified and organized. To reach target markets in countries far away, traditional land transportation could not satisfy the trafficking. According to UNODC, the maritime seizures of narcotics are where the quantities lie. Based on reported data for 1997-2011, the quantity of each maritime seizure was on average almost 30 times larger than the seizure by air, and almost four times larger than by road and rail (UNODC, 2013, p. 17).

UNODC lists the major drug categories as: opiates, cocaine, amphetamine-type stimulants, cannabis, and new psychoactive substances (UNODC, 2013, pp. x-xii). The trafficking organizations are motivated by economic benefits. Although the drug cartels constantly conduct assassinations and terrorist style attacks on the authorities, they are

rarely considered as terrorist groups since there is no ideological aim in their plan (Valencia, 2011). The impact of illicit drug trafficking is severe. In 2011, between 167 and 315 million people aged 15–64 were estimated to have used an illicit substance in the preceding year (UNODC, 2013, p. 1).

UNODC highlights several trafficking hubs: Pakistan, West and Central Africa, East and South-East Asia, West and Central Africa, East Africa, West Africa (UNODC, 2013, p. 24). Central Asia is certainly a hotspot of narcotic trafficking. In Central Asia, the major illicit drug trade is opiates (UNODC, 2013, p. 18). Afghanistan is involved in the full narcotics production cycle, from cultivation to finished heroin to consumption. Drug traffickers trade in all forms of opiates, including unrefined opium, semi-refined morphine base, and refined heroin (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2013, p. 83).

Terrorism

The second element is terrorism. Defining terrorism is not a technical but a political issue (Durnagöl, 2009). There is no universal definition of terrorism. The U.S. State Department defines the term “terrorism” as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents”. For the term of “international terrorism”, the State Department gives it definition as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country” (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014). The United Nations has recognized the term “international terrorism”, however, it has no internationally-agreed definition of it. The Sixth Committee of UN General Assembly is reviewing the draft of a comprehensive

convention concerning international terrorism, and the universal definition of this crime is expectedly to be adopted in this convention (The Sixth Committee of UN General Assembly, 2013). UNODC, as the agency responsible for combating international terrorism, has also no definition of this crime. However, UNODC previously had a basic description of terrorism as its working definition: "Act of terrorism is peacetime equivalent of war crime" (UNODC, 2014). This definition was adopted from Alex Schmid, who has the complete version of terrorism definition, which is widely accepted as the academic consensus definition.¹ This definition is used as working definition in this paper.

There is no doubt whatsoever, September 11, 2001 was a turning point in dealing with international terrorism. The attacks showed that terrorism can lead to more casualties and destruction than conventional war conducted with technologically advanced systems (Durnagöl, 2009, p. 51). Therefore, terrorism appears to be not only a problem for a few countries, but also it is a problem affecting the whole world. Violence and terror can no longer be isolated to a particular region or society or group of people, it is now a global issue with a global dimension (Durnagöl, 2009, p. 52).

¹Alex Schmid defined the terrorism as: "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity). or selectively (representative or symbolic targets). from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled). victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s).), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought"

There is also no universally agreed list of international terrorist groups. The UN is maintaining only a list concerning the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) to oversee the implementation by States of the three sanctions measures (assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo) imposed by the Security Council on individuals and entities associated with the Al-Qaida organization (UN Security Council Committee, 2014). The U.S. State Department holds a longer list of "Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014). Among the organizations in the list, there are at least several are mainly based in Central Asia: Haqqani Network (HQN), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Al-Qa'ida (AQ) and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The main target of these organizations is to overthrow the secular governments in Central Asia and set up a united "caliphate" state in this region (Stein, 2013, p. 2). Using IMU as an example, Central Asian leaders see a growing regional threat from an increasingly independent IMU and believe it is capable of infiltrating Central Asia (Zenn, 2013). Indeed, a series of attacks demonstrate that IMU, being allied with Taliban, is not only active in Central Asia, but also appears to be increasing its operations in Russia and China (Zenn, 2013).

Globalization

The third element is globalization. During the Cold War, the problems of transnational organized crime and terrorism were relatively insignificant, and often considered separate phenomena (Wang, 2012). Deviant globalization provides a force to enable the spread of terrorism and expansion of the drug cartels. Terrorism and narcotic trafficking are no longer restrained by the borders of sovereign states or ideological blocs like in the Cold War era. Not only the expansion in trade, transportation network, tourism,

but also expanding personal mobility, especially the growth of mass media, and global telecommunications, the growing integration of the global financial system which have provided opportunities to launder money, and invest in other licit or illicit activities has made easier for drug traffickers (Durnagöl, 2009, p. 59). Terrorism appears to be not only a problem for a few countries, but also it is a problem affecting whole world. The much smaller world gives way to the convergence of different trans-boundary crimes.

The deviant globalization in this sense can be interpreted as the “extreme version of globalization” asserted by Mary Kaldor. (Kaldor, 2012, p. 107) It is not only the force escalates the transnational nature of different crimes, but also catalyst for the nexus of different kind of international crimes. It enables the convergence between drug trafficking and terrorism via technical advance and shadow facilitators. It injects external support to the local illicit non-state actors in Central Asia. This deviant force is the precondition of narco-terrorism and new wars.

Narco-terrorism in Central Asia is posing immediate dangers to the national security of the states in this region (Firth, 2005). Moreover, with the continued financial support from the narcotic proceeds, the terrorist organizations may further expand their sphere of influence to the neighboring states like Russia and China (Zenn, 2013). Paralleling this, Afghan heroin is trafficked from the Central Asia region via the so-called “northern routes”, the FATA, and by maritime exploiting the framework of Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA), to every continent of the world (UNODC, 2011, p. 8). With the protection and tactical support provided by the terrorists, the drug traffickers can largely

expand their illegal business. The deviant globalization is providing catalysts for this trend.

The international community has not forgotten this region. Since the “war on terror” began in 2001, there have been various international operations conducted by joint forces from a number of states. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the NATO Russia Council (NRC) all have put efforts to mitigate the insurgencies in this region (UNODC, 2011, p. 32)(NRC, 2013) (SCO, 2013). However, the efforts seem being weakened and the united cooperation cross the great powers is still missing. For example, the NRC announced on April 01, 2014 that the cooperation between the two partners, NATO and Russia had been suspended due to the conflict in Ukraine (NRC, 2014). The unrest in Central Asia is facing the danger of escalation from west. From west, the armed conflict in Ukraine may further spill into Transcaucasia and bring impact to Central Asia. The civil war in Syria, and the newly rising Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) may provide more inspiration to the insurgents in this region. When the great powers are focusing on the Cold War-like confrontation in Ukraine, realism seems obtain its revival in the international relations. However, given the dangers posed by the criminal convergence in Central Asia, international community needs a more constructive and joint solution for this crisis. Kaldor’s assertion of cosmopolitan approach may find its ground to provide such solution.

The literatures on the subject clearly show that the phenomenon of narco-terrorism cannot be answered by realism paradigms. Nation states and regional organizations, with focus only on their sovereignties and real political interests, cannot contain the globalized

narco-terrorism. Greater international institutionalized cooperation asserted by Mary Kaldor's new wars theory vindicates the liberal interpretation of state relations and provides a solution to narco-terrorism in Central Asia.

Narrative

The Narcotic and Terrorism Nexus

The technology dimension of globalization is an important reason for this nexus. And this idea is supported by Kaldor's theory, which regards technology as a major new element of new wars (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4). Since the earlier stage of terrorism, the technological progress had played an important role in the process to help terrorism become "transnational". Back in the late 1960s, the expansion of commercial air travels and the emerging television broadcasting gave the way to terrorism to easily spread across national borders (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011, p. 368). The technological revolution in the past decade has enabled the terrorist groups to promote their extremism via internet and online video footages (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011, pp. 373-374). Indeed, technologies have facilitated terrorists from several aspects like coordination, security, mobility and lethality of their attacks (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011, pp. 374-376). The technology also enabled the terrorist groups and drug cartels to overcome the geographic distance. The Mexican drug cartel, Los Zetas, is an example for its nexus with terrorism by cooperating with Hezbollah (Recorded Future, 2011). Without the technological advances, their cooperation cannot be achieved, given the barriers of communication and international law enforcement. All these actually also impose burdens on the authorities of governments when enforcing the law (Naim, 2003).

Another precondition for the nexus is the fragile status of some states. Where the State can no longer provide employment, build houses, pave roads or police the streets, or where the police are so woefully underpaid that they supplement their incomes from corruption, sometimes turning on the very citizens they are meant to protect, in such cases, private armies and mini-states might fill the vacuum left behind by a retreating state (Firth, 2005). Because of the opportunistic nature of crimes, the fragile or weak states, especially those in conflict, can more likely catch the fancy of the criminals. And deviant globalization has worsened the situation. In states currently in some form of ongoing conflict, illicit networks often choose to align themselves with anti-regime elements, providing funding to antigovernment or terrorist groups in order to prolong or sustain the conflict environment in which they flourish (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013, p. 64). The predatory nature of the “new wars” actors is combined with the financial support from outside, and consequently causes the prolonged conflicts in fragile states. The consequences of this situation are very serious. Deviant cartels worldwide have demonstrated that they can effectively control large urban spaces like the favelas of Brazil; can provide social services to local constituencies like Hizballah is doing in Lebanon; can tap into the global illicit marketplace to underwrite their activities and acquire weapons and other supplies; can use the illicit income to bribe the local government officers (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013, p. XV). By doing so, as new wars theory explains, these non-state actors have heavily deprived the monopoly of violence and legitimacy of the governments.

The third element is the existence of the so-called market. The networks are also known as “fixers” or “shadow facilitators” (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013, p. 75). In fragile

states, several different models of organized crime can be detected. Some local organizations primarily concern with local crime, some have global reach, and with the facilitation of the transnational logistical networks, fragile states can be utilized as transit points for transnational organized crime (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011). As a byproduct of globalization, the logistic skills provided by the transnational logistical networks are vital for the local criminals to access the world market. The networks are also known as “fixers” or “shadow facilitators”, who enabled the convergence between local criminal groups and transnational groups (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013, p. 75). Not as generally believed, the local criminal organizations usually have no capacity to access the outside world market. Instead they must turn to specialized individuals, the shadow facilitators, who can navigate specific links to the illicit supply chains (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013, p. 75). The nexus between terrorist groups and illicit drug cartels heavily relies on these facilitators. These individuals are the crucial bridges among different worlds and they operate the illegal flows of the cash, sophisticated weapons, chemicals, and other materials that need to be transported (Miklaucic & Brewer, 2013, p. 75). The case of Viktor Bout is one of the most famous stories of shadow facilitators. Bout was arrested in Bangkok, Thailand in 2008 for the charge of conspiring to sell weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a terrorist organization involving with drug trafficking (MacKinnon, MacKinnon, & Campbell, 2008). Before being arrested, Bout had already set up a global network, which was even capable to provide shipping service to Iraq on behalf of the U.S. government (MacKinnon, MacKinnon, & Campbell, 2008). He received a sentence of 25 years imprisonment in 2012 (Schmidle, 2012).

The terrorist groups and drug cartels are not natural partners. The different aims and motivations of the two entities make them difficult for collaboration (Wang, 2010, p. 13). Other important distinctions are motivations and aims. The organized criminals are not concerned with influencing and affecting public opinion; they are involving in organized crime to their solely to criminal profits and illicit wealth. On the other hand, terrorists are engaging in either terrorism activities or criminal activities in order to seek their political ends (Wang, 2010, p. 13). Older terrorist groups may not welcome the organized criminal groups. The older crime groups usually reject association with terrorists. Good examples are the Hong Kong triad and Russian Mafia. They both have stable financial income and try not to bring the attention from the authorities (Wang, 2010, p. 13). Another reason is the old terrorist groups have stable sources of finance, therefore do not need the drug money.

However, some newer transnational crime groups, often originating in ungovernable regions, are now establishing their links with terrorist groups to either seek protection or take advantages of the chaos of war and dysfunctional state functions and generate huge profits from cooperating with terrorists (Wang, 2010, p. 13). The Mexican drug cartel, Los Zetas, is engaging in the cooperation with Hezbollah (Recorded Future, 2011). The cooperation may be seen between old and new organizations. A CNN report reveals the maneuvers of Iran-sponsored Hezbollah in Latin America (Brice, 2013). Hezbollah has been in the tripartite borders of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay since the mid-1980s, where they have established a safe haven for fundraising, money laundering, and other terrorist-oriented activities (Valencia, 2011).

The cooperation between criminal and political groups remains in the tactical or strategic phase, there is not enough evidence to test and verify that these two groups have converged into one single entity displaying natures and characteristics of both groups at the same time (Wang, 2012, p. 17). The linkages between the two crimes are related to certain states, either in economic transition or failing states, because the criminal activities and the intersection of both groups are least risky in these regions (Wang, 2010, p. 18). This is typically true in Central Asia. A symbiotic relationship exists between the insurgency and narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the fountainhead of the general unrest in this region. The fragility in this state is at least partly the product of the conflicts of the great powers. For example, FATA was originally the product of the conflict between the British Empire and Russia in the 19th century (FATA Research Center, 2012). It was created as a buffer zone between the two empires. Afghanistan has also gone through three massive invasions by the Britain Empire in 1826, Soviet Union in 1979 and the U.S. in 2001 (Ritscher, 2014). The consequences of these wars and armed conflicts are serious. Opium cultivations became the financial sources of the fighting groups (Lacouture, 2008, p. 12). UNODC indicated in its 2009 report that since 1995, “the opiates trade is a major component of Afghanistan’s economy (UNODC, 2009, p. 101).” Afghanistan is maintaining its position as the lead producer and cultivator of opium globally (UNODC, 2013, p. 30). The chaos caused by wars also resulted in various armed groups including “warlords, tribal leaders, religious leaders (mullahs), foreign jihadists, mercenaries/semi-private militias, Pakistani/Afghan Taliban and criminal organizations (UNODC, 2009, p. 102).” It is not a surprise to see the overlap of these two insecure factors. UNODC reports that southern and western Afghanistan produced 82%

opium of the world in 2013 (UNODC, 2013, p. 17). This area is also where the insecurity is. Almost all opium farmers in this area pay 10% “tax” to Taliban and mullahs, who are controlling or heavily influencing this area (UNODC, 2009, pp. 106-107). Narco-terrorism has been formed in Afghanistan and expanded to other states in Central Asia. Traffickers provide weapons, funding, and other material support to the insurgency in exchange for the protection of drug trade routes, fields, laboratories, and their organizations. Some insurgent commanders engage directly in drug trafficking to finance their operations (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2013, p. 83).

The Introduction of Narco-Terrorism in Central Asian States

Drug Trafficking in Central Asia

Central Asia has been once coined by Zbigniew Brzezinski as “the center of world power (Brzezinski, 1998, p. xiii).” Its importance is reflected by its position between Russia, China, and Iran, and in the crossroads of the trade and energy routes, along with the region’s vast energy resources (Karampampas, 2012, pp. 3-7). The idea of Central Asia as a distinct region of the world was introduced in 1843 by the geographer Alexander von Humboldt (The Encyclopedia of Earth., 2014). In the narrow sense, Central Asia today can be defined as five “stans”, which obtained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. (Akiner, 2001, pp. 187–208). The independence of these five states was passive. It was the product of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), created by the three original signatories of the U.S.S.R.’s founding 1922 constitution: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (Olcott, 1992). The abrupt independence and lack of proper

political arrangement gave these five states a challenging situation. Their economies were still highly linked as the result of the impacted Soviet coordinating structures. For example, after the independence, southern Kazakhstan was still getting its electricity from Kyrgyzstan like the arrangement during the Soviet era (Olcott, 1992). Without the financial aids from Moscow like in the Soviet era, the five states failed to set up proper political and economic systems to deliver the basic needs and security to their people. This fragility weakened the legitimacy of the state government and therefore provided a precondition to the transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking.

Besides the Soviet economic legacy, which caused fragilities, the five “stans” were also affected by Stalin’s map-making skills. The border demarcations were sufficient to ensure that no Soviet republic would have an easy transition to nation statehood (Olcott, 1992). Although each republic was named for a local nationality, none was a “national homeland” (Olcott, 1992). In the period from 1959 to 1970, at least two million Soviet citizens had been relocated from other republics into Central Asian (Mehendale & Atabaki, 2009, p. 66). As of 2011, the “stans” are still home to about 7 million Russians and 500 thousand Ukrainians (Hakeem, 2012)(Peyrouse, 2008, p. 4). In the post-Soviet era, the disputed polices issues between the ethnic Russian and local populations in the fields like language; education and culture had been observed. (Peyrouse, 2008, pp. 9-11)The Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Tajiks also have border claims on one another, with large irredentist populations on which to base them. On May 7, 2014, clashes occurred along the disputed border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, injuring as many as 60 people (Vinson, 2014). The Fergana Valley located in the tripoint of Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is another key disputed territory responsible for the tension among the

three states (Stratfor, 2013). Given the conflicts between the different ethnic groups like local Central Asian populations versus the Russian migrants, and also the tensions among the local nations like Tajik versus Kyrgyz, the social order in the five states is turbulent and vulnerable to the influence from outside world.

In the broader sense, the concept of Central Asia can be extended to include other states like Afghanistan, Pakistan and even the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China. While this broader concept is adopted in this paper to better explain the complexity of this region, but due to the space limitation, the analysis of the paper will be focused on only the five “stans” plus Afghanistan. In this broader Central Asia, the security situation is more complex. The biggest opiate and heroin export state, Afghanistan is located in the hub of this region (UNODC, 2013, p. 30). According to the data of UNODC, between 2002 and 2009, heroin seizures in Afghanistan increased by almost 70 per cent, “yet this was still less than 1 per cent of the total estimated amount manufactured in Afghanistan during this period (UNODC, 2013, p. 31). Opiate and heroin are exported from Afghanistan through the so-called “northern route”, which starts from Central Asia and then reaches the destination of consumer states like Russian Federation and Europe (UNODC, 2013, p. 44). The weak law enforcement structures in these countries, coupled with their highly porous borders, make them natural for use as drug transit states (Kugler & Frost, 2001, p. 752).

For example, in 2009, “approximately 90 tons of Afghan heroin were trafficked into Central Asia: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (UNODC, 2013, p. 44).” Heroin trafficking therefore has significant impact on the fragile

security of the states in this region. For this reason, in contrast to the positive perspective of the "Silk Road Economic Belt", Central Asia is named as "the new Silk Road of death" for its flood of narcotics (Caryl, 2010)

Terrorism in Central Asia

On the other hand, Central Asia is also the breeding ground for the terrorist groups. There are not only local and international terrorist groups like IMU, but also local insurgent groups like the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) or Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). The groups are motivated by different ideologies like ultra-nationalist separatism and religious extremism. Narco-terrorism, the convergence of narcotic trafficking and terrorism became a tumor on the security in this region. Using the Fergana Valley as an example, this tripoint has interlocking and overlapping borders of the three states. Its complex topography provides hidden ways and locations for the small guerrilla style narco-terrorism groups and makes the counterinsurgency operations extremely difficult. Even in the Soviet era, it took Soviet red army more than a decade to eliminate banditry in this area (Johnson, 1990, p. 26). The next part of this paper will introduce narco-terrorism in Central Asia, including Afghanistan and the five "stans", along the direction of the northern route of Afghan drug trafficking.

The Case of Afghanistan

On May 5, 2014 Turkmenistan's President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov met with Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe and they both affirmed their desire to complete the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan (TAT) rail line "as soon as possible" (Vinson, 2014). The project broke ground last June and is scheduled to be

finished in mid-2015. However, the progress of the construction is far behind the schedule due to the concern on the stability in northern Afghanistan to serve as a transit link (Vinson, 2014). It can be interpreted from this event that Afghanistan is really a security concern impeding the development in Central Asia.

Indeed, Afghanistan is the hardest hit by narco-terrorism in this region. In Afghanistan, “the insurgents and drug lords are working together to undermine the Afghan government and fund their respective operations through the opium trade (Lacouture, 2008, p. 11).” The latest statistics show that the illicit opium poppy cultivation in 2013 was at the highest level since 1998 with the main increase observed in Afghanistan, where the area of opium poppy cultivation increased 36 per cent, from 154,000 ha in 2012 to 209,000 ha in 2013 (UNODC, 2014, p. 21). There is a symbiotic relationship between drug traffickers and the insurgency in Afghanistan, and both groups have an interest in prolonging the instability of this state. Narco-terrorism is a norm in Afghanistan’s criminal world. For example, in 2009, 99% of all opium produced in Afghanistan came from seven provinces in the south and west, which were controlled by the Taliban and other anti-government forces. (UNODC, 2010, p. 30) The insurgent groups profit from taxing, donations and direct involvement from the illicit drug trade. Taliban insurgents, for example, earn at least US\$125 million annually from the opium economy through taxation of cultivation, production, and trafficking, which is nearly 70 percent of its income (Lacouture, 2008) (UNODC, 2010, p. 30). Additionally, the Taliban is also receiving arms and money from traffickers and drug lords in return for protection (Lacouture, 2008). Afghan illicit drugs are traveling to the neighboring states,

together with the roughly overlapping transnational terrorism expansion. Afghanistan has consequently become the origin of narco-terrorism in Central Asia.

The reasons behind this phenomenon are complex. Internally, the poverty, corruption, and inadequate governance all contribute to narco-terrorism. Poverty is widely spreading in Afghanistan and many farmers are driven to the illicit economy in order to survive (Lacouture, 2008). With an 80 percent poverty rate, and a per capita income of only \$800, Afghanistan was ranked 169th out of 187 countries by the UN Development Project in terms of its Human development index (HDI), locating in the category of “low human development” (United Nations Development Program, 2014). Opium cultivation took advantage of the poverty and became the major economy of Afghanistan. There’s no any other sector in the legal economy of Afghanistan that can provide the profits and employment similar to opium. Some 400,000 people are entering the opium workforce every year (Speri, 2014). Poverty has thus made opium cultivation, production and trafficking a way of life (Lacouture, 2008). For example, in FATA, the Taliban stipend is more than double the amount of a well-paying unskilled job, hence it has created opportunities for potential recruitments (UNODC, 2011). Compared with the farmers living on opium cultivation, the poverty among the public officers can cause more impact to the state.

With the general low income among the public officers, government of Afghanistan has very limited control and accountability mechanisms to put on the officers. Consequently, bribery has become a “social practice” in people’s daily life. Afghan people have got used to presenting a gift to the officers when requiring any public service

and the line between such gifts and corruption is very blurred. UNODC, in a survey of Afghan corruption in 2012, indicates that in 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service and the total cost of bribes paid to public officials amounted to US\$ 3.9 billion (UNODC, 2012, p. 5). The corruption at this level does not cause a strong dislike among the public. The UN survey shows that 68 per cent of citizens interviewed in 2012 considered it acceptable for a civil servant to top up a low salary by accepting small bribes from service users (UNODC, 2012, p. 5). Such environment resulted in severe corruption, both at a low level among border guards and police as so-called “common corruption” and upward to the “grand corruption” among senior officials. Many central, provincial, and district level government officials are believed to directly engage in and benefit from the drug trade (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014, p. 86). It is not surprising to see that the justice sector is mostly affected. Corrupt practices in the justice sector range from facilitating drug activities to benefiting from drug trade revenue streams. Under this corrupt culture, less than a fifth of corruption cases reported to the authorities resulted in a formal procedure and the majority of claims did not lead to any type follow up. (UNODC, 2012, p. 6) Corruption is an immediate cause of narco-terrorism. For example, twenty-four per cent of cases in which bribes were offered to the police were related to the release of imprisoned suspects or to avoid imprisonment. (UNODC, 2012, p. 5) This helps the traffickers or terrorists to easily get rid of legal sanctions. Corruption also resulted in severe security vulnerabilities. Afghan heroin seizure rate in 2008 was less than 1%, which was contributed by high levels of corruption among border guards and police (UNODC, 2010, p. 31). Besides this,

few drug traffickers are ever brought to justice, and among those that have been convicted, a certain number of them have been pardoned (UNODC, 2010, p. 31).

The inadequate governance of Afghan government is another important reason for narco-terrorism. In May 2014, a massive landslide buried a remote Afghan village in the northeastern province of Badakhshan with fatalities around 2,700 people (The Atlantic, 2014). The rescue mission conducted by the Afghan government has been criticized widely for its chaotic organization and preparation (Harooni, 2014). Without strong governance from the central government, the basic needs of the local people like disaster relief cannot be satisfied, and the real power at the local level can easily fall into the hands of insurgent groups like Taliban or tribal militants. Therefore, the insecurity is no longer confined to southern and western Afghanistan. An example was observed in the northern Kunduz province where the Taliban had staged resurgence and posed threat to a vital NATO supply line (UNODC, 2010, p. 30). A number of clashes between Tajik security forces and Al-Qaeda linked groups were reported in 2009, along with other related incidents in the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan borders with northern Afghanistan (UNODC, 2010, p. 30). Given the absence of state governance, informal forms of governance moved in to replace the state. Once the State can no longer provide employment, build infrastructures or conduct the policing on the street, or if the police are so underpaid to resist incomes from corruption, privatized military forces like tribal militants might fill the power vacuum.

The tribal nature in Afghanistan is another favorable element of narco-terrorism. In the north, once heroin reaches the Badakhshan, Takhar and Kunduz provinces, trafficking

into Tajikistan will be potentially easy “because these provinces are populated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks with trade, tribal, familial and linguistic connections across the border (UNODC, 2011, p. 29).” In southern Afghanistan two main ethnic groups control heroin trafficking across the border with Pakistan: the Baluch and the Pashtoons (UNODC, 2011, p. 29). Most of them cross the border without any documentation and many of them maintain permanent residences on both sides of the border. Heroin therefore can be trafficked by these tribes from eastern Afghanistan into FATA (UNODC, 2011, p. 29). The tribes allied with groups like Taliban and provided assistance to the insurgency (Jones, 2008). The Taliban are benefiting from the heroin taxation. In return, heroin is smuggled under heavily armed Taliban escort to the Hilmand, Nimroz and Kandahar borders. (UNODC, 2011, p. 29) Drugs are then trafficked into Pakistan through its FATA and will travel further through territory under the influence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other Al-Qaida linked groups before reaching the consumption markets in China, India and other international destinations via sea and air (UNODC, 2010, p. 31). Tribal nature in FATA is also providing benefits to Taliban. Taliban regularly ships arms, ammunition, and supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Many suicide bombers came from Afghan refugee camps located in Pakistan, and improvised explosive device (IED) components are often smuggled across the Afghanistan- Pakistan border and assembled at safe house in provinces like Kandahar. The Taliban also uses roads such as Highway 4 in Kandahar province to transport fighters and supplies between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And the leadership structure of most insurgent groups were based in Pakistan (Jones, 2008, p. xiii). With the drug money, Taliban terrorists are becoming more and more aggressive. On August 5, 2014, a gunman wearing an Afghan army uniform opened

fire at an officers' school near Kabul, killing a two-star U.S. major general Harold Greene (Fredericks & Prendergast, 2014). Even the Taliban did not claim the credit from this attack, its spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid praised the "Afghan hero soldier who turned his weapon against foreign invaders," in a statement (Fredericks & Prendergast, 2014). During the April election in 2014, the Taliban have continued to launch violent attacks aimed at disruption. The attacks include abductions, killing and suicide bombings (Schultheiss, 2014). The relationship between terrorist organizations, corruption, decentralized governance, and poverty has coalesced into a "truly narco-terrorism-driven system (Lacouture, 2008, p. 7)."

The narco-terrorism in Afghanistan has been affected by external elements. The most important external influential factor is the force of deviant globalization. Deviant Globalization has provided all the forces to the illicit activities as globalization provided to the legal economy. The internationalization and deterritorialization give the leeway to the illicit drug traffickers to more easily move their illegal substances from one location to a far destination. For example, as a product of global trade, the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) provides opportunity to transnational drug traffickers an access from landlocked Afghanistan to transport the domestic heroin via marine time transportation. The 2010 ATTA signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan allows goods for import and export on the three land border routes linking Afghanistan with Pakistan (Torkham, Ghulam Khan and Chaman/Spin Boldak) to transit through the port of Karachi (Pakistan) exempt from duties or customs tariffs and screening (UNODC, 2011). Under this agreement, once cargo enters any of these entry ports, customs officials consider it to be domestic cargo not subject to inspections while sealed, potentially presenting opportunities for

traffickers (UNODC, 2011). Besides the ATTA between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the recently signed Eurasian Economic Union agreement between the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the Republic of Belarus attracts more concerns from the international community, since it might facilitate more trafficking of Afghan opiates (RT, 2014). These three states have a combined population of 170 million people and a GDP of 2.7 trillion dollars (Tasch, 2014). Its predecessor, Eurasian Customs Union, had already allowed the customs between the member states to be removed much like in the Schengen Area in Europe (Turkish Weekly, 2009). Therefore, once heroin enters Kazakhstan it is very difficult to seize it (UNODC, 2011). Another effect is the international “shadow facilitators”, who are helping the narco-terrorists to launder their illicit income. In Afghanistan, 80 to 90% of the economy is still in irregular forms, a system called Hawala has significant role to play in international money transfer. In this system, money is paid to a broker in one state, and this broker authorizes the same amount to be paid out in another (UNODC, 2010, p. 29). A *Wall Street Journal* report in 2010 indicates that more than \$3 billion in cash has been openly flown out of Kabul International Airport in the three years (Rosenberg, 2010). The narcotics trade and corruption are major sources of illicit revenue and laundered funds. (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2013, p. 56) And this is just a tip of the iceberg, since millions might have been moved in other ways undetected. It is believed that the high ranking officials’ involvement made the open and hidden cash flows possible (Rosenberg, 2010). Indeed, the larger traffickers and corrupt officials have more interests to have their money laundered internationally. Without the shadow facilitators, the illicit income can never be enjoyed by them. Further to this, the terrorist groups are also benefiting from the money

laundering. Given the example of Taliban, which earns a sizable portion of its operating expenses from the opium trade, its funds that can easily be moved abroad to avoid detection or seizure and to purchase the weapons and other items it needs (Rosenberg, 2010). Taliban encouraged opium production as its financial source. In 2007, more than 80 percent of the total opium production was generated from locales with a permanent Taliban presence (Freeman, 2012, p. 101).

Another external factor is Afghanistan's proximity to different criminal sources. Firstly, it is close to the Middle East where potential hubs of money laundering are located. In the nearby financial hub of Dubai, given the proximity to Afghanistan, the presence of a South Asian diasporas and large informal financial systems, Dubai is particularly exploited by criminal gangs and terrorist groups (UNODC, 2010, p. 29). Another case was seen in Qatar. In March this year, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain announced that they had withdrawn their ambassadors from Qatar, condemning Doha for its alleged financing of terrorism (Saab, 2014). Besides the financial elements, proximity to the supply of precursor chemicals is another severe factor, which has an impact on the narco-terrorism in Afghanistan. Heroin can be derived only from chemically processed opium, which is why it requires chemical intervention for production (UNODC, 2011, p. 91). These chemicals are named as "precursor chemicals". For heroin, the most important and indispensable precursor chemical is acetic anhydride. Afghanistan is sharing a 76 kilometers depopulated border with China, the largest chemical producer in the world. China is the supplier of various daily necessities of Afghanistan. Due to the low capacity of identification of the border security control in Afghanistan, large quantities of acetic anhydride are smuggled into

Afghanistan by mixing with other commodities. According to the official statistics of China, 80 percent of acetic anhydride detected in the adjacent Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China was on the way to Afghanistan. The Free Trade Area agreement between China and Pakistan had also been utilized by traffickers to smuggle acetic anhydride and other chemicals to Afghanistan (UNODC, 2009, pp. 68, 74-75). The trafficking routes of illicit drugs can also be dual use. Diverted acetic anhydride is reaching Afghanistan through numerous smuggling routes, with some overlapping with heroin trafficking corridors and infrastructure across the borders of Afghanistan (UNODC, 2011, p. 91).

As the origin of narco-terrorism in Central Asia, it can be observed that the internal and external elements of this crime are interlinked in Afghanistan. Corruption weakened the border security; weak border control facilitated the flows of precursor chemicals and illicit drugs; the extravagant drug profits supported the terrorist activities; and the terrorists received facilitation from the global money launderers to further enhance their abilities in both drug trafficking protection and terrorist operations. Narco-terrorism is dragging Afghanistan into a vicious cycle of poverty, corruption and crimes.

The situation in Afghanistan also matches the new wars described by Mary Kaldor. Kaldor mentions in her book that the new wars occur in situations when a state's revenue declines because of the criminality, corruption and inefficiency (Kaldor, 2012, p. 6). This is exactly the case of Afghanistan, where the authority of the central government has been severely impacted by the bad governance and inefficiency. According to new wars theory, this is the precondition for the violence to be privatized, and the legitimacy to be

jeopardized (Kaldor, 2012, p. 6). In Afghanistan this can be seen as the warlords and terrorist groups actually controlling the southern provinces and the opium cultivation. Kaldor's assertion of the concept "identity politics" and its relation to the tribal culture can also be proved in Afghanistan. Kaldor defines the "identity politics" as "movements which mobilize around ethnic, radical or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power (Kaldor, 2012, p. 79)." Indeed, the ethnic or diasporas groups are the organizational foundation of the insurgent movement, which was motivated by a mixture of ethnic identities and religious extremism. Given the fact that the U.S. military occupation will end by 2014, the Taliban may have ambition to rebuild its regime in Afghanistan. Groups like Al-Qaeda and IMU have the similar goal to build a unified theocratic Islamic state in Central Asia. Given the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the threat from the terrorists to claim state power is real and immediate. Elements of globalization such as regionalization, transnational criminal facilitators and international illicit supply have enhanced narco-terrorism and brought insecurity to Afghanistan. The power of globalization thus empowered the identity politics and further weakened the legitimacy of the central government of Afghanistan. Kaldor identifies the new wars as a "predatory social condition" (Kaldor, 2012, p. 113). When Taliban forces the farmers to plant opium, and uses violence to collect "tax" and protection fee from the traffickers, such predatory nature is obvious. Because of this nature, narco-terrorism has its intention to prolong the chaos and unrest. Identity politics also has its tendency to spread (Kaldor, 2012, p. 116). In Afghanistan, the diasporas connections along the borders with Pakistan and other Central Asia states motivated and enabled the expansion of narco-terrorism. The spill-over of the conflicts in Afghanistan then can bring the unrest to neighboring states

(Kaldor, 2012, p. 102). As explained above, narco-terrorism is evident along the northern route of trafficking. New wars theory thus can well explain the phenomenon of narco-terrorism in Afghanistan.

Tajikistan

When illicit drugs leave their origin, Afghanistan, the best transit state for the traffickers is Tajikistan. One reason is the favorable geography along the border river between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Pianj River, which can be easily crossed in most seasons (UNODC, 2011, p. 44). Sharing a 1,350kilometers border with Afghanistan, since the 1990s, Tajikistan has undergone growing exposure to this heroin production center. (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 23) The porous border allows an estimated 90 tons of heroin each year to pass over to Tajikistan and other Central Asia republics along the northern route. (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 23)Corruption is another reason for narcotic trafficking. In 2005, the Tajikistan Drug Control Agency (DCA)'s image was tarnished by the arrest of its chief, Ghaffar Mirzoyev, who was charged for "murder, corruption and involvement in major drug trafficking." (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 91) Corruption has infiltrated into every layer of the society. As reported by Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization, "many activities, from dealing with the traffic police to settling a case in court, ensuring entry into university, or seeking a military draft waiver, require illegal payments (Foroughi, 2012)."Certainly the border security had been compromised by corruption. Along the Afghan-Tajik border, guards havebeen implicated in drug running. Often border guards are bribed and unwilling to resist well-armed smugglers (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 90). The five years civil war may provide explanations

for the current situation in Tajikistan. The war had been fought between the Moscow-backed government and the Islamist-led opposition during 1992 to 1997, in which up to 50,000 people were killed and over one-tenth of the population fled the country (BBC News, 2013).

The consequences of the war are horrible. Tajikistan's economy has never really recovered from the civil war, and poverty is widespread (BBC News, 2013). Sixty-Five percent of Tajikistan's population lives below the poverty line (Caryl, 2010). All institutions of this state have been hollowed out, "leaving it with no resilience to cope with natural disasters, economic crises or political shocks (International Crisis Group, 2011)." This vulnerability resulted in serious drug trafficking and terrorist activities. It was during the war that the population of ethnic Tajiks straddling both sides of the border with Afghanistan began heavily to take part in the trafficking (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 23). By the late 1990s, Tajikistan had become a major hub for heroin trafficking, recording ever higher seizures and some of the world's lowest retail prices for the drug (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 23). According to CIA's *World Factbook*, Tajikistan seizes roughly 80% of all drugs captured in Central Asia and stands third worldwide in seizures of heroin and raw opium (CIA, 2014). A third of Tajikistan's GDP is from the heroin industry, according to U.N. estimation (UNODC, 2011, p. 48). The illegal profit from drug trafficking is appalling. According to the UN, drug traffickers commonly use couriers to smuggle heroin into Tajikistan at US\$150 to 200 per kg of heroin. In 2009, the average price of high-purity heroin at the Afghanistan-Tajikistan and the Afghanistan-Uzbekistan borders was \$4,500 per kg. (UNODC, 2011, pp. 30-31)

The high profits attracted the local and transnational insurgent groups to get involved. Many of Tajikistan's currently prominent crime figures were military leaders during the civil war including the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) members (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 88). Such a convergence of leadership posed serious threat to border security. A *Newsweek* report described the border security in this way: "Saying Tajikistan's borders are 'soft' would be too kind," the report mentioned "the place is effectively run by a coalition of feudal warlords largely financed, directly or otherwise, by the drug trade (Caryl, 2010)." The convergence of the crimes, however, is not limited within the drug trafficking and insurgent groups. Corruption allowed groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to gain influence in Tajikistan by building "contacts in Tajikistan's highest echelons of power, who are bribed to protect narcotics routes (Berdikeeva, 2009, pp. 89-90)." IMU had attempted to free up smuggling routes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000. Although the group was largely destroyed during the war against Taliban regime in Afghanistan, recent reports point to its resurgence (Zenn, 2013). Narco-terrorism is playing a significant role in the unrest of Tajikistan, when corruption, crime and terrorism are combined.

Because of the presence of narco-terrorism, Tajikistan has also become a key transit point for opiates and heroin to reach Russia, which has the largest estimated consumption of the drug in the world, at around 70 tons a year (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 23). Once in Tajikistan, opiates usually move north through Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan before transiting via Kazakhstan into the Russian Federation (UNODC, 2011). Under the protection from corruption and armed insurgents, trafficking is undertaken in a semi-public way: "bulk shipments leave Dushanbe by train, plane and highway, and in at least

one case, via diplomatic pouch (Caryl, 2010).” Narco-terrorism has made Tajikistan not only a hub of drug trafficking, but also a destination for illegal migrants, weapons and explosives from Afghanistan. The flows of arms and drug trafficking are moving together (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 92).

Uzbekistan

The next segment on the northern route is Uzbekistan. Sharing a quite small 137 km boundary with Afghanistan and bordering all the Central Asian states, Uzbekistan is an important hub on the drug trafficking route (UNODC, 2011, p. 44). Most of the drugs come from Tajikistan with smaller quantity from Afghanistan (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 86). Uzbekistan is not only a transit route, but also a market, for illicit drugs, because of its largest population in this region. It is estimated that there are 120,000 heroin users in Uzbekistan (UNODC, 2011, p. 47). Uzbekistan is the most populous Central Asian state (BBC News, 2014). As a state with rich natural resources like oil, gas and gold and the biggest harvest of cotton in the world, Uzbekistan is still very poor. Institutionalized criminality and corruption caused widespread poverty and unemployment (BBC News, 2014). Contrasting with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan’s corruption problem is mostly concentrated on the dictator style president Islam Karimov, who has ruled the state since 1991. His family controls almost all the commercial life of this state. Karimov’s daughter, Gulnara Karimova, for example, is reported recently under house arrest, waiting for a trial of “involvement in an organized criminal operation that is believed to have bilked the state out of tens of millions of dollars (Lillis, 2014).” Under such situation, corruption and criminality are becoming institutionalized, the National Security Service (SNB), has

also contributed to the corruption, giving the criminals enough leeway to take control over key economic fields. In a recent report by Radio Free Europe, some 40 officers serving in SNB had been dismissed or arrested for the charge of corruption (RFE/RL's Uzbek Service, 2014).

The conflict between the secular regime, and the opposition Islamic movement was also seen in Uzbekistan. In 1992, Karimov government cracked down the IMU, and a number of IMU members fled to Tajikistan and some reportedly to Afghanistan (Stein, 2013, p. 3). Many of them took part in Tajikistan's civil war, on the side of the UTO (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 2). Fleeing Uzbek militants set up affiliations with the transnational terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda in this period of time. The training camps under the control of Al-Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Tajikistan provided military training to IMU militants. In total, during the 1990s more than a thousand militants received military training (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 3). Surviving the U.S. "War on Terror" in 2001, IMU reorganized its structure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, leading an army with up to 4,800 militants, which include Chechens, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and Uighur militants of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement from China (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 4). In spite of its experiences in Uzbekistan, the IMU's ideas, ideology, tactics and strategies were all formed in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region (Kucera, 2013)." These facts made IMU a truly transnational terrorist organization. But IMU never gave up its goals in Uzbekistan. IMU's updated goals are bringing back a caliphate than about specifically overthrowing the government of Uzbekistan and targeting the United States (Stein, 2013, p. 11). In its self-promoting efforts, IMU blamed the corruption of the secular Uzbek government and

called for justice as a posture to obtain support (Stein, 2013, p. 11). IMU successfully maintain and secure narcotics transportation interests through terrorist activities and has become a leading trafficker of opiates from Afghanistan into Central Asia. (Wang, 2010, p. 14) Even though the IMU was a radical Islamic terrorist organization and the members were extremists, the group was mainly profiting from the drug trade which contradicts with Islam and the Koran (Stepanova, 2005, p. 167). IMU has a long history of enjoying drug profits. In late 1990s and early 2000s the IMU was controlling the Afghanistan-Kyrgyzstan drug route effectively. In that period, IMU controlled up to two-thirds of the opiates entering Kyrgyzstan (Makarenko, 2000, pp. 16-17). Furthermore, the organization was handling 70 percent of the heroin and opium traffic through Central Asia (Burgess, 2002, p. 1). IMU is continuing to fund their operations through the opium trade, despite the fact that since OEF the IMU's significant involvement in drug trafficking has been greatly reduced (Falkenburg, 2013, p. 8). It can be observed that narco-terrorism, by providing additional financial source to IMU, enabled it to be self-contained. The poverty and corruption also gave leeway to some other active terrorist groups such as Akramiyya and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 5). Under such a severe security situation, opiates are continually trafficked from Uzbekistan to the next segments like Kyrgyztan and Kazakhstan, while the terrorist groups could obtain more transnational flexibility. The leaders in this region expressed concerns for the possible terrorists' revival in Central Asia after the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) withdrawal from Afghanistan (Zenn, 2013).

Kyrgyzstan

Afghan drugs' next transit point will be another state in unrest, Kyrgyzstan. The Tulip Revolution in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan ousted the then president Askar Akayev (BBC News, 2014). The regime change did not bring durable stability to this state. Civil tensions came to a head in April 2010, and Akayev's successor, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was toppled (BBC News, 2014). These two coups created a power vacuum and uncertainty. Organized crime figures therefore had tried to come out of the shadow to "legalize" themselves and openly seek power-sharing. As Berdikееva described: "all branches of power began to give in to criminal structures in terms of authority and influence." (Berdikееva, 2009, p. 94) The drug trade is a profitable business for these organized crime groups and the geography makes Kyrgyzstan a convenient route, known as "Kyrgyz corridor", for such trafficking (UNODC, 2012, p. 72). Another "convenient" factor for drug trafficking is corruption. Kyrgyzstan is one of the most corrupt states in this region. Its rank on the Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index 2013" is 150 in the 175 states listed (Transparency International, 2014). For the drugs from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is the preferred route given the current instability situation and ease for the trafficking activities (UNODC, 2012, p. 14). As Caryl's report mentioned: "A smuggler has to be stupid or unlucky get caught in this country. Fourteen narcotics officers are responsible for the entire city of Bishkek, the capital, where a quarter of Kyrgyzstan's 4 million people live. The squad has two cars and a single computer (Caryl, 2010)."

Besides the political instability and corruption, Kyrgyzstan also has ethnic tensions between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek ethnic groups. The tensions had been translated into violence twice in 1999 and 2010, costing 2,000 lives (BBC News, 2014). A UN report in

2012 regards the drug trafficking and organized crime as sources of this kind of conflicts. It points out that the inter-ethnic clashes that occurred in Osh and Jalalabad in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 have been used by ethnic Kyrgyz criminal groups “to assume predominance over ethnic Uzbek criminal groups and to control the drug routes through this part of Kyrgyzstan (UNODC, 2012, p. 8).” The case reflects the opportunities the ethnic clashes provided to criminals. Narco-terrorism can be observed in this state as well. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir also exploited the pre-existing ethnic fault lines. Since 2010, Hizb ut-Tahrir has operated in northern Kyrgyzstan. The ethnic clashes helped this organization for its recruitment since a number of people fled from Osh and Jalalabad who held grievances against the government for its failure to prevent the ethnic riots became the most susceptible recruits for Hizb ut-Tahrir (Zenn, 2012). After the ethnic rioting in 2010, Hizb ut-Tahrir reemerged in Kyrgyzstan. (Zenn, 2012). IMU is also benefiting from the drug trade. There have long been reports that Kyrgyzstan’s opiate trade is helping fund arms purchases and other needs for IMU (UNODC, 2012, p. 73).

The consequences of narco-terrorism are serious. Along with narcotics, IMU and other insurgents has spilled insecurity over the border crossing into Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, finally resulting in a low-level conflict in both countries in 2009-2011 (UNODC, 2012, p. 11). Other related crimes like money laundering in Kyrgyzstan and smuggling of radioactive materials from or through Kyrgyzstan are also big concerns. (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 99)

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan is the least populous state in the five “stans”. This state is mainly made up of desert and had been long isolated under an autocratic dictator Saparmurat Niyazov until his death in 2006 (BBC News, 2013). After Niyazov, the promised political reform has not been fulfilled for years. As a result of long isolation, even with the world's fifth largest estimated reserves of natural gas, much of Turkmenistan's population is still impoverished (BBC News, 2013). Turkmenistan has a peripheral role for the northern route (UNODC, 2012, p. 14). Trafficking through Turkmenistan appears to feed the Balkan route through the Islamic Republic of Iran rather than the Northern route (UNODC, 2012, p. 8). Only small quantities of drugs transit via this state to Kazakhstan (UNODC, 2011, p. 44). Very little information, official or otherwise, exists on organized trafficking groups in Turkmenistan. UNODC has available data indicating that Afghan heroin is mainly trafficked to Turkmenistan for local use (UNODC, 2011, p. 47). In 2009, an estimated between 70-75 tons of heroin reached Kazakhstan, mainly from Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent from Uzbekistan, while very limited amounts of heroin were likely trafficked from Turkmenistan (UNODC, 2011, p. 45). The Turkmen route is facilitated by the presence of approximately one million ethnic Turkmens in the Hirat, Badghis and Faryab provinces of Afghanistan (UNODC, 2011, p. 47). Although the borders between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan are more vulnerable to trafficking, Turkmenistan is not a preferred transit state of trafficking due to the flat terrain of the border areas, which makes it easy to monitor (UNODC, 2011). Regular patrolling on the Turkmenistan side and a strong government intelligence network increase the risk of detection to the traffickers (UNODC, 2011, p. 45). Similar to drug trafficking issue, terrorist activities are also difficult to judge due to limited information. There is very

limited information concerning the activities of Tablighi Jamaat (Rotar, 2013). The presence of narco-terrorism in this state is thus not identifiable as it is in other Central Asian states.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is the biggest state and also the most developed one in Central Asia. There has been major foreign investment in the Caspian oil sector, bringing rapid economic growth, averaging about 8% in the decade since 2000 (BBC News, 2014). Its booming oil industry has attracted large international companies and also created domestic corruption (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 83). The booming economy also brought the problem of illicit drug abuse to Kazakhstan. The UNODC *World Drug Report 2013* indicates 1% of the adult population are users of heroin or other “opiates” (UNODC, 2013, p. 14). Kazakhstan does not share any common border with Afghanistan, therefore the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz criminal groups smuggle heroin through the southern borders into this state (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 81).

The economic prosperity also makes Kazakhstan an ideal hub for financial crimes like money laundering, the indispensable segment of narco-terrorism’s criminal chain. Kazakhstan is possibly the only Central Asian country that could face serious problems of money laundering, mostly because Kazakhstan’s comparatively well-developed financial system in the region, which “combined with a significant organized crime presence, puts it at risk for money laundering (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 83).” The growth of the transnational organized criminal groups in Kazakhstan brings together the Kazakh criminal world “with various terrorist and extremist groups (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 82).”

The suicide bombing in Taraz that killed 8 people on the 12th of November, has not only stunned the country, but has also raised its death toll to no less than 30 people, only in 2011 (Karampampas, 2012, p. 3). Even though, Kazakhstan does not appear to face the problem of religious extremism to the extent its neighbors like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do. (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 82) But there were estimated 200 Kazakhstanis fighting in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region with IMU, Jund al-Khilafah, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and other militants from East Turkistan (Xinjiang, China), Turkey and Uzbekistan (Zenn, 2012). Fraudulent documents and terrorist financing cases in 2011 and 2012 reveals that there are financial and logistics networks facilitating Kazakhstanis fighting in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region with operatives back home (Zenn, 2012). According to Kazakh political analyst Rasul Zhumaly, “Kazakh fighters abroad all have the goal to come back home and sooner or later connect with the extremist underground of Kazakhstan (Zenn, 2012).”

Summary

The segment above reveals that the narco-terrorism nexus has contributed to the regression of political governance in the five “stans” and Afghanistan. It has been demonstrated that along the northern route of trafficking, the states are facing more or less a common threat from narco-terrorism. The reasons of narco-terrorism’s emergence in these six states are complex. Berdikeeva summarized them as “the combination of state weakness, institutionalized crime, endemic corruption, inadequate and incompetent law enforcement and poverty (Berdikeeva, 2009, p. 99).” Nonetheless, similarities can be observed in Figure 1. In the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, all the six states rank

below 140, with three of them in the last 10 (Transparency International, 2014). Except Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, all other four states are facing serious poverty, with GDP per capita less than USD 2,000 annually. The least developed, poorest and most corrupt state is Afghanistan, which is the state mostly impacted by narco-terrorism as well.

This fact indicates that the narco-terrorism in Central Asia has its social and economic reasons. Because of this, solutions provided in traditional way cannot address the problem well. China announced on October 31, 2014 that it will provide non-reimbursable assistance of 1.5 billion Yuan (\$244 million) in the upcoming three years to Afghanistan (Xinhua, 2014). Following the financial aid, China maybe also seeks bigger influence in this state. Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang also presented five-point proposals for the solution of Afghan issue, emphasizing the “Afghan-led Afghan-owned peace process”(Xinhua, 2014). Given the sophisticated security situation in Afghanistan, simple financial aid without deep and detailed plan may not touch the root of the security problems. China may benefit real political interest from this investment, but the contribution it has for Afghanistan’s security is doubtful. Compared with this kind of financial aid, what Afghanistan really needs is Kaldor’s cosmopolitan approach, which overrides geopolitics or shorter domestic concerns and put individual rights and the rule of law as the centerpiece of any international intervention (Kaldor, 2012, p. 3).

At the same time, the political rivalry of elite and clans in post-Soviet Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have all resulted in criminalized state structures, in which power holders could access to the additional resources provided by criminal groups (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 9).The political instability, corruption and poverty formed the internal

precondition for narco-terrorism. The proximity to the origin of heroin and opiates production, the transnational Islamic terrorist movements like IMU provided external boosters for this crime.

Table 1

Index of basic economic and corruption perspective data.

States	GDP per capita ¹ (USD)	Human Development Index ² (HDI)		Corruption Perceptions Index ³ 2013	
		Rank	Value	Rank	Score
Afghanistan	678	169	0.468	175	8
Kazakhstan	13,172	70	0.757	140	26
Kyrgyzstan	1,263	125	0.628	150	24
Tajikistan	1,037	133	0.607	154	22
Turkmenistan	7,987	103	0.698	168	17
Uzbekistan	1,878	116	0.661	168	17

Note: 1. Data retrieved from the World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>

2. Data retrieved from UNDP: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>

3. Data retrieved from Transparency International: <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/>

Impact of Narco-terrorism

The narco-terrorism in Central Asia is becoming a tumor to the security of the world. It is posing double impact to the global security. Terrorism and the drug trade in Central Asia have their motivation to facilitate and rely on each other. Under the protection of

armed terrorists, the Afghan heroin and other opiate drugs are exported to the neighboring states like Russia and China. The deviant globalization further facilitates the narcotics to distant destinations in most regions of the world. The illicit possession from narcotic trafficking is providing terrorism financing in return to the terrorists, who are enabled to conduct further attacks in various locations in the world. The FATA and Balochistan province of Pakistan have been enjoyed by Taliban and other insurgent groups like Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, and al Qaeda as safe heavens. From there, the terrorism has expanded to destination in Europe with a range of international terrorist attacks and plots. Examples are the July 2005 attacks on London's mass transit system, the foiled 2006 plot against transatlantic commercial aircraft flights, foiled plots in 2007 in Germany and Denmark, and the 2008 arrests of terrorist suspects in Spain(Jones, 2008, p. xiv).

There are estimated around 16.37 million illicit opiates users, including opium, heroin and morphine, according to the statistic in 2012 (UNODC, 2014, p. 2). In the same year, the estimated number of HIV among people who inject drugs is up to 1,667,000(UNODC, 2014, p. 7). Such impact to human health and security is contributed mostly by Afghan heroin. Given the trend of decline of the heroin produced in Myanmar, Afghan heroin is matching the demand of the global heroin market. The opium production in Afghanistan accounts for 80 percent of the global opium production with quantity of 5,500 tons(UNODC, 2014, p. 21). Besides the traditional northern route to Russia, Afghan heroin is trafficked to Europe via the Balkan route and to China and other markets via the southern route (UNODC, 2014, p. 24). The earlier data indicates that in 2011, 77 tons of Afghan heroin reached Western and Central Europe, 40 tons entered China, 44tons made

it to Africa and 25 tons entered South-East Asia (UNODC, 2011). Although the latest statistics indicate reduction of demand from Europe and the expansion of the southern route, the growth and decline do not significantly reduce the impact of heroin trafficking from Afghanistan (UNODC, 2014, p. 24).

Most of the great powers are suffering from the narco-terrorism. They are either affected by heroin or terrorist attacks, or both. At the end of the northern route, the biggest victim is Russia. Data in 2009 shows approximately 90 tons of Afghan heroin were trafficked into Central Asia. Of these 90 tons, 75 to 80 tons were trafficked into Russia (UNODC, 2011, p. 44). This makes Russia the biggest consumer of heroin in the world (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 23). Other states along this route, despite their roles as transit hubs for Russian consumption, are also suffering the impact caused by Afghan heroin trafficking. Central Asian heroin abuse has seen significant increase over the first decade of the 21st century. The abusers in this region are estimated to consume 11-12 tons of pure heroin annually. Some 35,000 hectares of opium poppy cultivation are currently needed to feed this region (UNODC, 2011, p. 8).

Another new victim along the southern route is China. The illicit drug trafficking is following the economic prosperity. China has been years the destination of the heroin from the “Golden Triangle”, where Thailand, Myanmar and Laos are bordering. Given the decline on Myanmar’s supply after the drug suppression operations in sub-Mekong region, it is not surprising that Afghan heroin is increasingly trafficked into China and other South-East Asian countries to meet the gap of domestic consumption needs (UNODC, 2011, p. 14) (UNODC, 2013, p. 22). The trafficking to China has been

attributed to the ATTA, which is facilitating heroin from Afghanistan through to Karachi for onward export in containers (UNODC, 2011, p. 87). With the supplementation from Afghanistan, heroin abuse in China has not decreased following the decline in opium production in Myanmar. In 2009, among the 5.8 tons of heroin seized in China, 81 percent was seized at seaports and originated entirely from Pakistan. In the same year, UNODC estimated that China had between 1.8 and 3 million opiate users, who consumed 55-60 tons of heroin (UNODC, 2011, p. 67). The bidirectional and complementary illicit economy between China and Afghanistan determines that the same trafficking route by sea is dual use. From one side, the marine route is facilitating the bilateral trade between the two states. From the other side, the route is utilized by the traffickers to conceal and smuggle their illicit drugs under the name of lawful trade. As mentioned, there are precursor chemical trafficked in the reversed direction from China to Afghanistan for the purpose of heroin production. The seaports and airports of Afghanistan's immediate neighbors like Pakistan "have become increasingly used for acetic anhydride trafficking (UNODC, 2011, p. 10). China has been also suffering severely from terrorism in Central Asia. Besides the attacks in various locations in China, the borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are also vulnerable to penetrations by the ETIM militants. China has long claimed the unrest in Xinjiang Autonomous Region to have an Islamist dimension with ties to cells in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan. Several of the more infamous incidents than the Kunming attack: the Urumqi bus bombing in 1997, the Aksu bombing in 2010, and the Hotan and Kashgar attacks in 2011 were all carried out by Uyghur's separatists or terrorists (Prabhu, 2014). The national security blue book of China also calls for the concerns of "threat from narcotics and terrorism nexus" along the mentioned

borders (the Center for the Studies of National Security Strategy, 2014, p. 352; translation mine).

Along the Balkan route, Afghan heroin is trafficked to its final destination, Europe. However, before reaching Europe, an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran has become the first victim of this route. UNODC's report indicates that in 2009, among the estimated 145 tons of heroin trafficked into Iran, 16 tons were consumed and 23 tons were seized and the balance was trafficked onwards along the Balkan route to Western and Central Europe (UNODC, 2011, p. 39). The quantity of heroin for local consumption has left severe consequences in Iran. According to UNODC's data, from 2005 to 2009, the number of heroin users in Iran had increased to 120,000, with a leap of 140 percent (UNODC, 2011, p. 15). To deal with the influx of Afghan heroin, the Government has spent over US\$600 million to "dig ditches, build barriers and install barbed wire to stop well-armed drug convoys from entering the country (UNODC, 2010, p. 31)." The violence of the drug trafficking under protection of terrorist militants had resulted in the deaths of more than 3,500 Iranian border guards in three decades before 2010 (UNODC, 2010, p. 31).

The impact of Afghan drugs caused to the world is multiplied by globalization. The local terrorist groups cannot provide the convoys to distant destinations. Besides marine transportation, given the lack of global connections of the Afghanistan drug traffickers, the drugs have to be handed off to the respective cross border ethnic nationals. Using the northern route as an example, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and other ethnic groups crossing the borders of each segment of the route are responsible for the further trafficking of heroin

into Russia, Iran, Europe, and Asia (Lacouture, 2008). A newer trend saw West African networks increasingly transport Afghan heroin from Pakistan into East Africa for onward shipment to Europe and elsewhere (UNODC, 2010, p. 13). It can be observed that the diversification of trading routes has been utilized by traffickers and played crucial role in assisting the growth of the illicit drug economy. (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, pp. 8-9)

When Afghan heroin is poisoning the world, it is also trafficked to the U.S., in unverified quantities. But it is generally estimated that the Afghan heroin supplies has very limited share in the heroin market in the U.S. It is because heroin manufacture in Mexico eliminated the need to import Afghan heroin (UNODC, 2011, p. 73). The Afghan heroin doesn't have a strong impact on the U.S., but it doesn't mean the U.S. is free from the impact of narco-terrorism. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of U.S. has linked nineteen of the forty-three officially designated foreign terrorist organizations to some aspect of the global drug trade, and believes that up to 60 percent of terror organizations are connected with the illegal narcotics trade (Braun, 2008). Although individual terrorist attacks can be performed at relatively low costs, terrorist organizations need to be able to finance considerable substantial structural costs to sustain themselves and to promote their ideologies (Gómez, 2010). Such costs may include the purchase of weapons, vehicles and explosive material, the subsistence living costs for the members, reliable channels of communication, training, travel costs, propaganda costs and charitable activities to win a constituency. It is not cheap to maintain a terrorist group. Terrorist groups prefer drug trafficking as their financial source because of its easily accessible infrastructures. The ease to benefit from drugs

gives them stable financial sources to pose continued threats to the U.S.-led coalition force in Afghanistan and even the homeland of the member states of the force.

Indeed, the case of the Taliban can reveal the strength it obtained from illicit drugs. Most of the heroin trafficked to both Pakistan and Iran have to pass through Taliban strongholds. The figures in 2011 show that in 2009, as much as 275 tons of heroin were trafficked under the protection and involvement of the Taliban (UNODC, 2011, p. 30). Taliban can benefit from it by imposing a taxation of 10 percent on the trafficking. The tax can be paid either directly as cash, or indirectly through food, guns, vehicles or other items (UNODC, 2011, p. 30). Taliban commanders collect the full 10 percent tax in some districts they dominate, while in others, commanders and local Mullahs share the take (Peters, 2009, p. 18). In addition to drug traffickers, the Taliban is also collecting taxes from heroin laboratory owners, opium farmers and traders (UNODC, 2011, p. 30). The Taliban has rigorous system to monitor their financial sources. In areas where the Taliban are dominant, the village-level Taliban sub-commander will hand out written receipts for the amount of opium collected to the commanders (Peters, 2009, p. 18). Taliban commanders have alternative channel to keep track of how much farmers and other members of the local community are earning by maintaining informants in each community, paying the equivalent of USD 10 a tip for information. The Taliban also profited from the protection they provided to the opium trade. The Taliban's main protection provided to drug trade were providing security for opium crops as they grew and then protecting drug shipments as they leave the farm area (Peters, 2009, p. 20). These fees can charge to the traffickers is up to 20 percent of the consignment, according to a survey (Peters, 2009, p. 20). In the extreme case of protection, the Taliban have come

to protect drug labs being raided by the ISAF Force (Peters, 2009, p. 20). As a result, the Taliban enjoyed a total income around US\$155 million in 2009 from the drug trafficking (UNODC, 2011, p. 30). At the same period of time, the financial income was supporting several thousand full-time Taliban fighters in Taliban, with estimates ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 (Jones, 2008, p. 39). Similar to Taliban, other terrorist groups like the Pakistan Taliban and the Haqqani network are also benefiting from the drug possession through taxation, coercion, facilitation and direct involvement in trafficking (UNODC, 2011, p. 35).

With the presence of narco-terrorism, the drug trafficking cannot be simply a criminal issue. When drug trafficking became their vital source, the terrorists groups stubbornly resisted any attempted drug suppression missions conducted by Afghan government and international force. The fight against drug trafficking in the country is thus becoming increasingly violent. In the two years of 2007 and 2008, 1,412 national police were killed by anti-government militants, and the number was 639 in 2009 (UNODC, 2011, p. 32).

Narco-terrorism is providing terrorist military ability to the drug traffickers for protection, in exchange of the illicit drug profit for terrorist financing. The impact from the convergence is multiplied by the deviant globalization and posing severe threats and dangers to almost all the continents in the world. The great powers, no matter what disputes and confrontations are among them, all suffer the impact. The U.S. is confronting Russia in Ukraine and China in South China Sea, with the Iranian nuclear crisis pending in the Middle East. However, none of the great powers, global or regional, could be free from this impact. Russia is the top consumer of heroin in the world; the U.S.

is facing serious terrorist attacks from the extremist groups in Central Asia; China, not only is consuming heroin from Afghanistan, but is also under the attacks from the Uyghur separatists who were trained in Afghanistan. The ideologies, cultures or real-political stances of a victim state have are not the basis for drug traffickers or terrorists to select their targets.

International Cooperation and Its Vulnerabilities in Combating Narco-Terrorism

With the narco-terrorism situation in Central Asia, the international community does not overlook this issue. Narco-terrorism, as a direct threat to the neighboring states, has drawn attentions from the great powers like China and Russia. The attack of 9/11 made Central Asia a significant priority for U.S. national security. Since then, the U.S.-led international force has been fighting two simultaneous wars, the “War on Terror” and “War on Drugs”, in Afghanistan.

Driven by mixed interests from security concerns to real political motivations, the great powers have established several co-existing security mechanisms in this region. The major mechanisms include the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) advocated by China, and the U.S.-led NATO force in Afghanistan. However, the disputes and nonblack of confidence restrained any institutionalized cooperation between the organizations. Some observers believe that such unrest in Central Asia will reorient geopolitical alliances in the region. But Prabhu disagrees this and believes it is unlikely such an alliance will materialize. He argues that the complex relations between the countries in the region, their mutual animosity and suspicion, “raise the threshold for cooperation above the potential for

Islamic terrorism in Central Asia to be a serious threat (Prabhu, 2014).”Since there is no commonly agreed standard of terrorism identification, the great powers and the organizations they formed have different opinion on the designation of terrorist groups. The ETIM case clearly demonstrates this kind of dispute between China and the U.S. Further to this, there are various real political issues concerning ideology, value, geopolitics and strategies among the great powers driving them from cooperation to confrontation. In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has experienced the tension from real political wrestling. For twelve years, Kyrgyzstan has been unique in the world in hosting both the U.S. and Russian military bases. But in 2014, the U.S. closed its air base established in 2001 to support its operations in Afghanistan. President Atambayev refused to renew the lease with the U.S. after Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed in September 2012 to write off Kyrgyzstan's debt to his country. At the same time Mr. Atambayev agreed to a 15-year extension to Moscow's lease on the Kant air base(BBC News, 2014). Hence, even all these organizations claimed their missions as combating terrorism, but as Mearsheimer indicates: “No amount of cooperation can eliminate the dominating logic of security competitions.”Indeed, with the real political power competition or “balance of power” ideas in mind, the policy makers of the great power cannot pursue cross organizations cooperation. Such mentality can contribute nothing to the solution of narco-terrorism in Central Asia. To pursue multiple, trans-organization cooperation, realism is not the right answer.

At the regional level, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a good example to demonstrate how realism limited further cooperation between the great powers. The SCO was founded in 2001 as a regional multilateral cooperation

organization (SCO, 2013). The organization was formed based on the mechanism since 1996, when the five founding states, China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan established annual summit in Shanghai. The organization is based on two agreements: the Agreement on Strengthening Confidence in the Military Field in the Border Area and the Agreement on Mutual Reductions of Armed Forces in the Border Area (SCO, 2009). In the sense of *realpolitik*, the two agreements established mutual trust and facilitated the solutions of border disputes left by the collapse of the Soviet Union among the five states. Hence, the SCO is regarded as a positive contribution to the stability of Central Asia. Up to now, all the Central Asian states, in narrow and broad sense, are either member, or observer states of the SCO. Besides the five founders, in 2001, Uzbekistan became the first state to join the organization. Afghanistan and Turkmenistan are now respectively observer and guest attendant. At the September SCO summit in Dushanbe, four observer-states, India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia, had been given the green light for full member status to the six-member organization (TASS, 2014).

Given the narco-terrorism in Central Asia, the SCO has its Executive Committee of “the Regional Counter Terrorism Structure” as the permanent counter terrorism body based in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan (SCO, 2013). The organization regards the “three evil forces”: terrorism, separatism and extremism as the major security threat in Central Asia. The organization conducted several joint military drills named “Peace Mission Series” since 2005, including significant anti-terrorism elements. The latest “Peace Mission 2014” in August 2014 is regarded as “detering the ‘three evil forces’” (Telesur, 2014). The cooperation did not remain on paper. The joint operations along the borders between member states resulted in significant suppression on the terrorist

activities. In January 2014, eleven Uighur militants were killed by Kyrgyz border guards when crossing Kyrgyz-China border from China side (Solovyov, 2014). More frequent patrols along the border caused the siege of the militants in Kyrgyzstan, after they succeed to avoid the detection of the China authority.

By realizing the dangers from narco-terrorism, the SCO has also conducted drug suppression operations as its strategy to “cut the terrorism financing channels from drug trafficking” (Narcotics Control Bureau, 2012). On 21 April 2006, the SCO announced plans to fight cross-border drug crimes under the counter-terrorism rubric (Xinhua, 2006). In 2009, the SCO and Afghanistan announced the “action plan of SCO member states and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on fighting terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime”(SCO, 2009). Afghan heroin and other illicit opiates has become the focus of the security concerns of the SCO. A series of training and capacity building programs were conducted to facilitate the enforcement on the drug and precursor chemical trafficking. During November 2008 to August 2010, according to China police, at least four transnational “control delivery” operations had been successfully conducted jointly by China and other Central Asia SCO member states, with total seizures of heroin 6.7 kg (Narcotics Control Bureau, 2012). In the three years from 2009 to 2011, with the cooperation among the SCO, total Afghan heroin seizures reached 3 tons in China (Narcotics Control Bureau, 2012). The cooperation within the SCO is sound and on the right track. It has successfully broken several segments on the insurgents-drug trafficking-terrorism financing-terrorist attacks cycle in Central Asia.

However, the SCO is not simply regarded as an anti-terrorism organization. The military cooperation among the member states is not limited to anti-terrorism, but has expanded to include increased military cooperation and intelligence sharing (Scheineson, 2009). And this caused misgivings to other organizations in this region that whether the SCO is a military alliance seeking opportunity to undermine the real political interests of other powers (Scheineson, 2009). As the result, there is no significant cooperation between the SCO and other important forces like the presence of the U.S. military force and the ISAF in Afghanistan. In the opposite, the membership admission of the SCO reveals the rival mentality. The application from the U.S. to join the SCO was rejected in 2005 (Cohen, 2006). There is no overlapping of membership between the SCO and the “western” organizations like NATO or European Union. Turkey is the only state with full membership in that NATO has participated in the SCO summits as an observer state since its application was admitted in 2012 (Xinhua, 2012). But the states, which are more isolated by the international community, such as Iran, are more acceptable to the SCO (RT, 2013). There is no significant cooperation between the SCO and the U.S.-led NATO in Central Asia to deal with their common enemy, narco-terrorism.

At the domestic level, the U.S. military force and the ISAF are fighting the war on terror and the war on drugs in Afghanistan. Lacouture had a vivid description of the arrangement of the two simultaneous wars: “in working with the Afghani government, NATO and the U.S. are continuing to fight two separate wars: the war on drugs, and the war on terror (Lacouture, 2008, p. 11). Indeed, the war on drugs is mainly led by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA has deep and close cooperation with the local Afghan police force on enforcing the drug suppression laws. The Counter

Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) was established as an independent body within the organizational structure of the Afghan National Police (ANP) under the Ministry of the Interior to enforce the drug suppression laws (Jenzen-Jones, 2011). Under this structure, the DEA is working with two special force teams in Afghanistan for drug enforcement: SIU and NIU. The NIU (National Interdiction Unit) is the commando force of the CNPA mentored and trained by the DEA. According to the DEA, the NIU has become a successful example, due to its “better education level, strict selection and intensive training (DEA, 2014).” The NIU is supported by the CNPA’s Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), which is also sponsored by DEA (Jenzen-Jones, 2011). NIU is also supported by primarily DEA Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FASTs). The FAST teams are all composed by DEA agents and intelligence research specialists, who are mandated to “provide guidance to their Afghan counterparts, while conducting bilateral investigations (Jenzen-Jones, 2011).”

The previous strategy adopted by the DEA in Afghanistan is opium eradication. However, the policy has failed. The poppy eradication measures have backfired as local producers see their only livelihood disappear, eroding support for Western intervention. (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 18). In a survey of Taliban fighters, it was found that “a huge number of them had personal experience with poppy eradication. There’s a strong correlation between people who have their fields eradicated and people who decide to take up arms and fight the government (Speri, 2014).” The farmers who lost their means of livelihood in the eradication were driven to join the Taliban. Even if the eradication can significantly reduce the productivity and yield of opium poppy, it can barely hurt the terrorists and drug traffickers. For example, the UNODC’s data shows that

the Afghan opium production decreased by 48% in 2010, from 6,900 tons to 3,600 tons, due to a disease in the opium plants. However, because of the decrease in opium production, fresh opium prices increased from US\$48 per kg in 2009 to US\$128 per kg in 2010 at the opium poppy harvest time as May and June. By December 2010, opium prices had reached US\$240 per kg (UNODC, 2011, p. 14). It is clearly demonstrated that simple eradications could not hurt the traffickers and the terrorist who benefit from the drug trade. They can obtain the same profit at higher drug price with smaller quantity traded. There is need to adopt better policy which can get at the root of the problem. In 2012, the U.S. signed agreements with the Afghan government laying the groundwork for a Kandahar Food Zone in 2013. It is a multi-sector drug reduction program that combines elements of alternative development, law enforcement and eradication, public information and drug treatment (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2013, pp. 86-87). Twenty million dollars are anticipated to be provided over two years to develop the Alternative Livelihoods component of the Kandahar Food Zone, a comprehensive approach to counternarcotics in the province, integrating its activities with U.S.-funded Counter Narcotics Public Information, Drug Demand Reduction, and Governor Led Eradication programs (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2013, pp. 86-87). With these strategies and policies, the DEA is performing well in its mission against the drug trade. However, narco-terrorism in Central Asia will require more sophisticated solution. Among the international force, NATO, the ISAF and the American military force have no drug mission in Afghanistan. They have interest primarily on the terrorists and have both resisted taking an active role in counternarcotics operations within Afghanistan. Reasons that have been cited in

defense of this sentiment mirror the comments of former NATO Commander U.S. General James Jones that counternarcotics enforcement is “not a military mission (Lacouture, 2008).”Therefore the drug enforcement is relying only on the DEA. When encountering terrorism related cases, the DEA will have to require support from the military forces. What the DEA will get from the ISAF include intelligence sharing, defensive support to eradication and interdiction actions (Lacouture, 2008).It is not difficult to judge that under this arrangement, the dual campaigns to fight war on drug and war on terror are suffering from insufficient coordination and inefficient mandates. The law enforcement and military knowledge and advantages cannot be effectively combined and fully utilized.

The international presence in Afghanistan has its policy influenced also by the real political issues. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in Afghanistan is an arrangement to align the law enforcement capacity of Afghanistan and its neighboring states. It is responsible for the training of these states, with the purpose to up the level of counter terrorism and counter drugs of all the states in Central Asia to make them on the same page (NRC, 2013). This is to avoid the outstanding performance of Afghanistan to push the crimes to neighboring states. The NRC combines expertise from NATO, the DEA, and Russia to provide training in Central Asia. But due to the tensions between Russia and NATO, the council ceases to exist except in name (NRC, 2014). The influence can be seen also in the relation between the DEA and Iran. The DEA mostly coordinates via its state agents with NATO, the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) of UK, and other states, except Iran. With the lack of cooperation with the international force, Iran has become the victim on the Balkan route.

There is international cooperation in Afghanistan and Central Asia. International organizations and forces have involved deeply into the roots of the narcotic and terrorist activities to tackle the problem. However, the increase of drug trafficking and the revival of the Taliban demonstrate that the present cooperation is far behind enough. The UNODC's *Afghanistan opium survey 2013* indicates the net opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2013 increased 36% than 2012, equals to 31% increase of the total farm-gate value of opium (UNODC, 2013, p. 4). Actually with the presence of the mentioned organizations and cooperation, the opium cultivation in Afghanistan increased from 8,000 hectares in 2001 to 209,000 hectares in 2013 (UNODC, 2013, p. 5). At the same time, the Taliban started mass attacks to Afghan National Army and police forces in Afghanistan's Ghazni province in September, 2014 (Daily Times, 2014). The *Daily Times* believes the Taliban terrorists are "ready to begin fighting as soon as NATO's presence is no longer a factor for them to calculate (Daily Times, 2014)." Further to this, the real politics among the great powers and lack of mandates between the military and the law enforcement forces led to failure on the application of their full strength to combat narco-terrorism. The weakness in combating narco-terrorism requires a greater institutionalized cooperation mechanism. This mechanism should be a cross-organization, integrated mechanism with the participation from multiple organizations like the SCO and NATO, and the influence from the real politics should be minimized.

There have been various efforts in this direction. The Global Commission on Drug Policy report suggests to "begin the transformation of the global drug prohibition regime. Replace drug policies and strategies driven by ideology and political convenience with fiscally responsible policies and strategies (GCDP, 2011)." The report *Transnational*

Organized Crime and Fragile States focused on building democratic and law-abiding institutions and the establishment of a strong rule of law in a fragile state like Afghanistan. It suggests macro-level institution building has to be accompanied with the micro development of local communities such as education, community safety, work and health as the basic building blocks of resilience (Miraglia, Ochoa, & Briscoe, 2012, p. 20).

The UNODC also realized that the social and economic conditions need to be improved in Afghanistan and the other poorest areas in Central Asia region. The drug traffickers and anti-government elements found in these areas, where security and the rule of law are weak, “more fertile ground to promote illicit drug production and to recruit young males in the ranks of armed and drug trafficking groups (UNODC, 2011, p. 94).” The UNODC, therefore, suggested the states of consumption of Afghan heroin work with the states in Central Asia to conduct a balanced approach to reducing the supply and demand in line with the principles of shared responsibility. The narcotic and terrorism nexus is posing a non-traditional threat to the regional states. The non-state actors are challenging the traditional military and law enforcement suppression from the states. All these mean that terrorism and the simultaneous narcotic trafficking will not be easily stopped by one or several states in this region. Instead of leaving Afghanistan and its neighbors bear alone the burden of stopping the drug trade, the UNODC required the states of consumption to “create the strongest demand pull to strengthen their own efforts to reduce opiate consumption (UNODC, 2011, pp. 10-11).” As a response, the international community subscribed to the principle of common and shared responsibility in the fight against opium and heroin trafficking from Afghanistan in 2003, and The commitment became known as the “Paris Pact”, focusing on enhanced border control and

law enforcement among countries affected by the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan (UNODC, 2014). The Paris Pact unites more than 70 States and international organizations in the fight against Afghan opiates. The principles of the pact translated into the “rainbow strategy”, which is a regional response to the threat posed by Afghan opiates. Its contents range from drug control, border security, to the precursor chemicals control, illicit financial flows and drug-related HIV/AIDS epidemics prevention (UNODC, 2014). It acknowledges that “a national problem demands a regional solution, and therefore engages both Afghanistan and neighboring states (UNODC, 2014).” At the regional level, this translated into counter narcotics information-sharing and joint cooperation initiatives like the Triangular Initiative (involving Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) and Operation TARCET (UNODC, 2011, p. 3). All these efforts can be summarized as the cosmopolitan approach in Kaldor’s new wars theory. These efforts can bring solution to the narco-terrorism in Central Asia only when there is a proper mechanism established. Greater institutionalized cooperation is the precondition for Kaldor’s cosmopolitan approach.

Kaldor called the military conflict in Afghanistan a typical new war. Since the insurgents in Afghanistan have the main aim to exert influence over local communities through fear and intimidation (Kaldor, 2012, p. 169). Terrorists like Taliban are benefiting from every segment of the illicit drug supply chain by providing protection, taxation and coercion. The narco-terrorism nexus has actually become a predatory political economy in this state, given the fact that Taliban has set up shadow governments for almost every province of Afghanistan (Kaldor, 2012, pp. 170-175). In this sense, the

traditional war tactics, with focus on the military defeat of enemies, can merely help to sustain the peace and order. Kaldor's new wars are both global and local and this is certainly true in Afghanistan. Both sides of the conflicts, the insurgents and Afghan government are relying on the outside support. The support can be the international force like the ISAF or the DEA on the Afghan government's side, or it can be the shadow facilitators who are helping the local drug traffickers to launder their illicit drug income. The force of the globalization, both positive and deviant, can be observed in this state. The new war theory is also true in Afghanistan and Central Asia in the sense of its identity politics. What the insurgent groups have in common is their opposition to the American occupation (Kaldor, 2012, p. 164). The motivations can be different from ethnic, racial to religious, like the "three evil forces" asserted by SCO. Narco-terrorism is where the predatory economy meets the identity politics. Containing two major elements of new wars, narco-terrorism in Central Asia needs to be explained and tackled by Kaldor's new wars theory.

Conclusion

Kaldor's cosmopolitan approach contains an improvised combination of military and law enforcement tactics. Its force would have to be professional and civilized (Kaldor, 2012, p. 139). This can overcome the existing difficulties of mandates and integration of expertise with the ultimate goal to establish a strong administration of the state Afghanistan. The concept of a strong state administration is vital to the fragile Afghanistan. It not only can reestablish the legitimacy of the government, but also can function as a sound platform to interact and cooperate with international counterparts. But to conduct these kinds of tactics and reach the goal of strong state administration, the

reconstruction of legitimacy is required as a precondition. Reconstruction in the new wars sense means the rebuilding of formal political economy (Kaldor, 2012, p. 145). Kaldor emphasized that the reconstruction should be viewed as a strategy to achieve peace instead of the implementation after peace established (Kaldor, 2012, p. 145). And to conduct the reconstruction, greater international institutionalized cooperation is the only solution. There has to be a cross-organization, integrated mechanism set up to tackle the narco-terrorism in Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan, and the influence from the real politics should be minimized.

Such a cooperation mechanism may sounds naïve, given the fact that the great powers like China, Russia, and the U.S. are confronting one another globally. But the rising of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) gave the great powers a lesson that even they chose to ignore the internal unrest in a region, the escalation of the violence and dangers will finally bring their attention back. After a long fierce rivalry in Syria, the great powers, the U.S. and Russia found the real beneficiary from their confrontation went to the terrorists. Conversely, all the regional and global powers are facing more dangers and threats from the terrorists. By the end, Russia, China, the U.S., Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran are all facing the same threat from ISIS, no matter what stance they took in the real political rivalry. The ISIS case reveals the impact of regional non-state actors like terrorist groups can pose to the world. The same argument can be applied to the narco-terrorism in Central Asia. No matter how tight the political relation between the U.S. and Iran, the drug trade is undermining the societies of both the U.S. and Iran. Whatever hostilities China holds towards the U.S., the terrorists groups from Central Asia are targeting these two great powers indistinguishably. Under the globalization, narco-

terrorism is like a double-edged sword, which can reach any destination with either edge, drug trafficking or terrorist attack. Such a sword does not choose the target based on their political stances.

Narco-terrorism is depriving the legitimacy of governance from the governments of Central Asian states. The state apparatus is strong when its enforcement arms like military and police are well organized, disciplined and legitimate. But narco-terrorism is a deconstructive force, which utilizes the corruption and fragility of a state to deconstruct the organized forces to be a mass of individuals. The narco-terrorism groups can therefore obtain the legitimacy of violence and may replace the legitimate governments. With the help of globalization, the power of deconstruction can be projected to far destinations. The Lee Rigby murder case in London demonstrates the trend of this kind of deconstruction, instead of randomly killing innocent people, the terrorists started to reach their enemy's backyard to target the enemy troops, whom they cannot defeat on the battlefield (Dodd & Howden, 2013).

Facing the narco-terrorism and its hotbed in Central Asia, the international community needs to understand that Central Asia is fighting a new war in an age of globalization, and a cross-organization, integrated mechanism under greater institutionalized international cooperation is needed but does not yet exist. When the great powers are calculating the number of ships, tanks and missiles to reach the real political strategic balance with their rivals, the narco-terrorists are also calculating their illegal income, which will facilitate their next attack to our homeland.

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