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THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

CASE STUDIES OF TAIWAN, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

by

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ABSTRACT

The evidence presented in this thesis supports the view that men and women participate in the labour force in qualitatively distinct ways and that, as a result, policies to increase female employment in the formal economy have an impact on economic development that is quite different from those whose aim is simply to increase employment with no regard to its gender composition. While it is well known that women's work is often underreported and undercounted, the thesis contends that women's "work" is also frequently defined incorrectly. From the point of view of development policy it is necessary to define women's work as embracing not only "productive" labour done for monetary gain, but also reproductive and volunteer work which, though not directly remunerated, have important feedbacks on other social, political and economic variables. Those feedbacks in turn may determine the success or failure of a particular "development" strategy.

This theory is applied to three "Asian miracle" developing countries, chosen because of their widely varied cultural, political and economic history and structures. The methodology employed is eclectic. Too often social research is bogged down in disputes between those who favour quantitative and those who favour historical-institutional analysis. In reality, especially when dealing with developing countries where there are serious problems of data quality, these two approaches can be mutually complementary. Therefore, in undertaking a comparative study of three cases, the thesis employs quantitative, historical-institutional and anthropological data along with information derived from interviews and field work.

The thesis demonstrates ample support for the hypothesis that women's labour has an importance over and above simply more hands at work, that the particular characteristics of female labour, not only produce direct payoffs in terms of development of certain types of manufacturing industries, but many indirect ones in terms of social variables like reduced fertility, increased life expectancy and greater educational attainment. However it also demonstrates that full actualization of these benefits in terms of economic prosperity, improved social welfare, and ultimately political democratization requires a state that is both willing and able (two distinct things) to implement social and economic policies designed explicitly to promote female employment in the formal economy.

Cette thèse présente la réalité que les hommes et les femmes participent de manières différentes dans la population active, en conséquence, les mesures prises dans le but de diminuer le chômage chez les femmes affectent le développement économique d'un état très différemment que celles prises pour diminuer le chômage global. En plus du fait que le travail des femmes n'est souvent pas déclaré, il est aussi souvent mal représenté. D'après les politiques de développement, il est nécessaire de définir le travail des femmes comme étant non seulement le travail effectué pour des gains monétaires, mais aussi celui accompli par la réproduction, qui affecte indirectement, mais de manière importante d'autres variables sociales, politiques et économiques, ainsi ses conséquencees peuvent indiquer le succès ou l'échec d'une politique de développement.

Cette théorie est appliquée à trois pays asiatiques en voie de développement, choisis à cause des grandes différences qui existent entre leur structures ainsi que leur histoire culturales, économiques et politiques. Souvent, une recherche dans cette domaine est ruinée par les disputes entre ceux qui favorisent des analyses quantitatives et ceux qui préfèrent des analyses historiques. En réalité, lorsqu'on analyse des pays en voie de développement, où la qualité des données n'est pas toujours intéressante, ces deux approches sont complémentaires. Ainsi, en comparant ces trois pays, cette thèse utilise des donnéees quantitatives, historiques et anthropologiques ainsi que celles obtenues lors des entrevues et de travail dans le milieu de recherche.

Cette thèse présente la preuve que le travail des femmes représente une plus grande importance qu'un simple statistique et que le travail féminim implique non seulement des effets directs sur le développement de certains secteurs économiques, mais en plus affecte certaines caractéristiques sociales telles que la fertilité, l'espérance de vie et l'amélioration du niveau d'éducation de la population. En plus, elle démontre que l'actualisation de ces avantages en termes politiques, économiques et sociales nécessite un état capable surtout prêt à implanter certaines mesures sociales et économiques désignées explicitement à encourager le travail des femmes dans la société.

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

This thesis is the result of a search that is both intellectual and personal. It reflects my intellectual concern about the deficiency in academic treatments of economic development with respect to gender issues; and it reflects my conviction, based on personal experience, about the importance of assuring women adequate access to economic resources. During the seven years spent developing the arguments in this thesis, I incurred many debts. I wish to thank, first and foremost, my supervisor, Professor Michael Smith. Not only was he a source of intellectual support, but, as chair of the Sociology Department during a critical time when my scholarship from the Islamic Republic of Iran was cut off, he went out of his way to help me find alternative means to continue my studies. He also demonstrated by his example the importance of tolerance of other points of view in maintaining a strong and healthy academic climate. I want to also thank other faculty members and staff of the department, particularly the current Chair, Professor Axel Van den Berg, and Sharon Barqueiro, for all their support.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This thesis addresses a particular debate current in development literature for the past two decades, specifically the position of women in the development process. This is not simply a quantitative question – how to increase the total number of workers and therefore the rate of growth of GNP (or GDP) by drawing on previously underutilized resources. It is also a qualitative one – specifically how do women, as distinct from men, participate in and contribute positively to an on-going process of economic development? In what ways are their economic roles, derivative in good measure from their social roles, different from those of men, and what difference does the difference make? Arguably the notion of a quantifiable improvement in the economic position of women should be built right into the very definition of "development."

This is an issue of the greatest significance today. In the world conference on women, the Beijing+5 session of the UN held in New York during June of 2000, the following facts were tabulated. Of the world's 1.2 billion people living below the poverty line, some 70% are women. During the last 21 years in 41 developing countries, the increase in the number of rural poor has been 17% greater for women than men. Twice as many women as men figure among the world's 900 million illiterates, which has obvious implications for employability and relative earnings. Similar disparities exist in health data, with the same probable consequences. Interestingly enough, more than 90 countries of the world have fewer than 10% women among their parliamentarians.[1] It would be a surprise if this political under-representation did not bear some relationship to the economic disparities.

These concerns are now widely shared. The UN Secretary General himself has insisted that women's equality is a prerequisite for development. As he put it,

> *...the gender divide is still widening. Women earn less, are more often unemployed, and generally are poorer than men. Women's work is still largely part-time, informal, unregulated and unstable. The fact that they have productive as well as reproductive roles is still too rarely recognized.*

The point of this thesis is to make that recognition explicit and to demonstrate the veracity of the Secretary General's further observation that "there is no development strategy more beneficial to society as a whole – women and men alike – than one, which involves women as central players."[2]

Yet, even if it is now widely accepted that it is important to involve women in the development process, it is rarely made clear whether this is a human-rights commitment or an instrumental, economic one. Clearly it can be both. But in this thesis, I have set aside the humanitarian, important though it is, as a central focus, and adopted the strictly instrumental. It makes sound economic sense to formulate development policy in such a way as to increase the percentage of women employed relative to the total female population of economically active age (the female employment ratio).

However, particularly in that more instrumental formulation, there is a serious deficiency in existing approaches. Over and over, major development agencies point to the importance of incorporating women into the development process as a mean to enhance growth. But the precise mechanism through which this takes place has remained largely in the shadows. Therefore, my objective is to show more clearly the ways in which increased *female* employment in the formal economy (as distinct from simply increased use of labour resources regardless of gender) contributes to economic growth. Policies that explicitly aim to increase the female employment ratio (FER) certainly have an important humanitarian dimension. But they also produce a payoff in terms of the economic process itself.

The thesis suggests that much of women's work has to date not been taken adequately into account, not just because it is unmeasured (by virtue of being located in the "informal" sector). Even more important, much of it falls into categories that are not traditionally accepted as "work." This, the thesis, argues is a mistake. It argues in favor of a broader definition of women's work and a deeper assessment of its economic contribution.

The thesis also takes the view that, in order to develop, many Third World countries must ensure that the state is strong and effective to carry out social measures. This seems to run counter to the trend of recent thinking on development issues which focuses on reducing the role of the state. **However, not only has that focus come under attack, with no less an institution than the World Bank moving to modify its former position in favour of a more proactive role of government, but it also, as this thesis will show, runs counter to the actual experience of a number of countries.** Their experiences show that a sustainable process of economic development requires government intervention not only in the sphere of the economy but of society as well.

This thesis examines a particular aspect of that government intervention, namely the need for policies that actively promote female employment in the formal labour force. However that intervention must be motivated, not simply by human-rights considerations, though they are important. It must also be instrumentally motivated. The thesis argues that for there a genuine and sustainable process of economic development to occur, the government must pay specific attention to the gender-composition of the formal labour force and the impact of the distinction between male and female labour.

Women perform three distinct types of work. The most obvious is productive – the earning of income in market-oriented activities, formal or informal, though clearly only the first is usually measured with any degree of accuracy.

However, as primary caregivers, women also perform reproductive work. This is not simply a matter of reproducing the future labour pool. Of course the role of reproducing the labour force is important. People do not enter the labour market simply as units of labour time. Rather they participate as social beings, which means that their early formation on the cultural, social and educational planes has a direct impact on their potential contribution to economic growth and development. However this is often recognized. What is not so well recognized is that when women, as caregivers, invest their physical energy and their financial resources in their families (typically much more so than do men), that crucial contribution is almost always neglected in economic

calculations. This aspect of women's work will have considerable positive impact on the future health and productivity of the labour force.

There is a third, distinct but related, type of work whose importance is also underestimated. Women's responsibilities for family welfare often takes them one step further into the community at large. Women are the dominant actors in the field of volunteer work, the whole range of community services including much health and welfare activity. This is particularly important in societies with poorly developed social infrastructure, especially when cutbacks in state expenditure are reducing it further. In fact a major trend of development orthodoxy is to laud the impact of the cutbacks in stimulating growth, while ignoring the crucial role of women's work in compensating for those cutbacks and cushioning the social repercussions. The reality is that many states in the developing world have been consciously using this aspect of women's work precisely for such ends. Those states often go so far as to set up, or encourage the establishment of, women's non-state organizations precisely as a vehicle to implement policy or to substitute for the lack of such policy. This, too, is rarely given sufficient consideration, perhaps because it is not amenable to simple quantitative analysis.

The fundamental point of departure of the thesis is that men and women participate differently in economic life in many "developing" countries, and that this distinction should be taken explicitly into account in articulating and implementing economic development policy. Many cross-national studies show that the persistence of stereotypes (positive and negative) about women, and their characteristics as workers, helps to persuade the state and the private sector to use women in certain sectors rather than others, generally in those where pay is low. Across the developing world women tend to be represented well only in certain sectors, and within those sectors only in certain types of occupations.

In addition, cross-cultural studies show that women have a different expenditure pattern from men. They identify with their communities and are therefore more inclined to spend their time and energy with and for their families and their communities, helping both

their households and their communities to improve collectively. Men, on the other hand, identify with their work place and their peer groups, spending their time and energy on luxuries and outside their household and immediate communities. As a result of women's role as mothers and caregivers, their expenditure and saving patterns are different from those of men. They tend to be more congenial to improving conditions economically as well as socially for their families and therefore making it more efficient for developing countries to put money into women's pockets, rather than those of their husbands.

Furthermore, an extremely important difference between male and female labour force participation lies in the indirect social consequences. Women are vital to a broadly based development process, not simply because of their direct income generating or income spending behavior, but also because giving more women economic resources by increasing the female employment ratio has a positive effect on such social variables as fertility rate, literacy, infant mortality and life expectancy. The case studies to follow attempt to assess the validity of this hypothesis.

This is *not* to argue that the state should attempt to replace men with women in the formal labour force as a means of addressing the current gender gap. Rather the process of encouraging female employment should be incremental. The state should undertake measures that favour increasing the participation of women in the formal economy in the context of policies to raise the overall level of employment.

Women's role as economic agents complements their role as primary caregivers both in a family and in a community setting. Therefore each extra unit of female labour employed is likely to produce greater "externalities" in terms of the success of social policy than would each extra unit of male labour employed. This is particularly important today when the definition of economic well-being is moving away from simple GNP per capita into incorporating broader measures of the quality of life including infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy rates. In addition more intangible benefits such as conferring greater social autonomy on women is a likely result of them having greater access to regular income in the formal sector and a chance to upgrade their skills and education.

That, too, will have positive feedback effects in terms of the health and education of the next generation. And certainly not least, any attempt to raise the female employment ratio in the modern, formal sector, which inevitably takes women away from their immediate and traditional environment, will be a critical step in controlling fertility and population growth, one of the major headaches faced by development planners today.

Granted, increasing female employment in the informal economy will also increase women's immediate access to economic resources. But employment in the informal sector is irregular, unregulated, and usually at very low wages. In addition it provides less opportunity for training and advancement. Hence any positive impact on the target social variables would be expected to be much less powerful (as well as, by definition, impossible to accurately measure.)

All of these distinctions in gender-based economic performance, both in earning and in spending income as well as their broader social consequences, are well substantiated by micro-studies of an anthropological nature cited in the specific case studies. But how all these mechanisms fit into a more general picture of macro and structural analysis for the economy as a whole has been neither examined nor elaborated with much analytical clarity.

My working hypotheses are as follows.

A. Other things remaining constant, I expect that increases in *female* labour force participation will lead to increases in GNP per capita (and in its rate of growth) over and above that which can be accounted for simply in terms of an increase in the labour force. The female labour force participation rate is defined as the percentage of total female population over a certain age (varying from 10-15 depending on the country) that is either working or actively seeking work. To simply relate GNP or GDP to employment would be largely tautological. The female labour force participation rate is more useful since it includes those who have been motivated and trained to search for work as well as those actually

working. It therefore captures the effects of government policies (or lack thereof) aiming to close the gender gap.

B. Other things remaining constant, I expect that an increase in the female employment ratio (women employed to total women of employable age) will lead to reductions in rates of fertility and infant mortality, while increasing life expectancy and educational attainment of the population as a whole. (These, in turn, have additional positive feedback on GNP per capita.) Here the female labour force participation rate (FLP) would be less useful. The strongest relationship between female participation and social variables will be found by relating female *employment* rather than participation. For example, it has been observed that women who are unemployed for a long period have an *increased* propensity to have children. Furthermore unless training and motivation are translated into actual employment, women will obviously not have the resources to commit to improving the educational attainment of their children. For all of these reasons, the of female employment ratio is a better measure than female labour force participation for estimating the impact of increased female participation on social variables. [1]

Clearly there are other important variables indicative of the quality of human development that might be affected directly by increased female employment. I have chosen the components of the Human Quality Life Index - infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy rate - because the data are readily available from international organizations. This allows for comparative trend analysis to go as far back as the post-World War II period. Additionally, I have included total fertility rate since population growth so often has a dramatic influence on poverty and can be a major hindrance to development. There are obviously other indicators which are important but: a) many of them, particularly those related to the environment, were created only recently; and b) they are often non-standardized and therefore are much more complicated to gather information on or to use for purposes of cross-country comparison.

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[1] Thanks to Professor Lee Soderstrom of the Economics Department of McGill University for clarifying this definition.

Furthermore by focusing the main body of statistical analysis on the overall social impact, the analysis does not make specific reference to the impact of changes in relative participation on the gender-gap per se. The female employment ratio is the independent variable for the analysis, rather than the dependent variable, which is the main theme of feminist literature. Hence, the causal relationship is examined in only one direction for the purposes of this statistical analysis.

Nonetheless, an important hypothesis this thesis attempts to demonstrate is that the state should give very strong priority to increasing female participation in the formal economy. It will through its policies thereby indirectly affect other critical social variables. However, much of the possible feedback from policies to increase female employment on the gender-gap will be picked up in the actual case study analysis using micro data.

The main statistical core analysis is not very meaningful unless put in a context that will include factors not subject to simple statistical measure but, nonetheless, essential to capturing the nature of the development process. This includes, as a central consideration, institutional factors related to the political context in which economic strategies are formulated, particularly the nature and ideological orientation of the state. In addition the development path is heavily influenced by factors such as colonial history, culture, economic structure and so forth that lie outside simple statistical examination. Included in this category is the role of women's political organizations, which can, under certain circumstances, have a strong impact on state policies.

Therefore, the methodology utilized for this thesis will be an eclectic one. Typically development studies tend to follow one of two approaches. Some are statistical-quantitative, while others are historical-comparative. Those following historical-comparative often find themselves at ideological logger-heads with those using more formal statistical-quantitative methods, seeing these more formalistic approaches as implicitly loaded with free-market bias. In turn those, whose approach is quantitative often regard historical and institutional studies as weak and inconclusive. In my view this

methodological division is a serious mistake. Particularly in a context where data is often poor and unreliable, and even definitions of what constitutes "work" are inconsistent, it is useful, sometimes critical, to assess the data and attempt to flush out its meaning, by paying attention to the political, social and historical context. On the other hand, given the complexities so often exhibited by developing societies, statistical data are often essential to really make sense out of trends and patterns. As a result I use both methodologies as complements rather than substitutes. In effect statistical, institutional and historical information reinforce each other and make the conclusions more credible.

Nonetheless, it is important to take full cognizance of the deficiencies of the available statistical data. While these are discussed in more detail in the main body of the text, in general they include the following, often interrelated problems:

1) Weak methodologies employed in the gathering of primary information. For example in Indonesia, I discovered by interviewing officials at the central statistical bureau, employment data are based on a survey of 6000 households – in a country with a total population of over 200 million scattered over nearly 8,000 islands of widely variable economic, social and ecological conditions.
2) Incompleteness of data collection. Apart from problems of simple failure to acquire information because of shortages of resources dedicated to the task, in cases such as the Philippines, large tracts of the country are under the control of guerrilla groups who permit no government officials or international bodies to collect up-to-date information.
3) Inconsistencies between sources. The percentages of total female labour given by the ILO for the Philippines, for example, differs noticeably from those presented in the World Development Indicator of the World Bank.
4) Political interference. Indonesia during the Sukarno era rejected the validity of the information collected under colonial rule while failing to implement systematically its own system. Similarly international data sources have for a long time omitted reference to Taiwan because of the conflict between Taiwan and the People's Republic over which had legitimacy. In other cases China, in two different

international data sources, can mean either Taiwan or the mainland without explanation.

5) Shifting categories. For example, in Iran after the Revolution, there was a change in the definition of work. Men were assumed to be heads of households and the household itself became a unit of production, with the result that, particularly in the agricultural sector, most of women's work was attributed to men. As a result the apparent female labour force shows a dramatic decrease. Turkey, at about the same time, did the opposite, breaking down the labour data accurately by sex to reveal a very high participation rate. The Philippines in the 1970s did much the same as Turkey.

Nonetheless, once these limitations are recognized, the data can still be helpful in describing broad trends. However, it also means that effective utilization of deficient data requires combining quantitative and historical-comparative forms of analysis.

The discussion in the thesis proceeds in the following order. After this, introductory chapter, Chapter II examines in detail mainstream theories of development. Mainstream development literature is sometimes an awkward composite of neo-classical economics and sociological modernization theory, while the main opposition voices have been Marxist-inspired, structuralist or feminist in orientation, sometimes all at once! As explained in detail in Chapter Two, the implicit assumption of the mainstream (neo-classical plus modernization) approach was that sufficient economic growth would more or less automatically solve such issues as absolute poverty and excess population growth, and provide a generally improved standard of living. That, in turn, was equated with a better quality of life.

According to this neo-classical paradigm, much of the development effort in earlier decades was dissipated as a result of it being mediated through highly inefficient state-led initiatives. It argues that structural changes in the form of a program specifically tailored to reducing state intervention and promoting free markets must be adopted. This neo-liberal trend (sometimes referred to as the Washington Consensus) has been responsible

for the structural adjustment policies, and the trend towards privatization and deregulation, which continued into the 1990s.

However, as the effects of structural adjustment programs combined with the impact of the debt-crisis continued to impoverish the working poor, once again there was a reaction. Alternative theories put their main emphasis on strengthening civil society and improving the quality of human life, rather than on the market, the corporate economy or even the state as the engine of development.

However this view has been subject to considerable challenge in recent years, with a call for a return to an activist role for the state. Therefore the second chapter ends with an attempt to more carefully define the concept of the, 'developmentalist state.' This is particularly important for what follows. The thesis argues that a developmentalist state can (though not necessarily will) accomplish the goal of increasing female labour force participation both directly (when the state takes the lead in breaking down traditional biases by employing increasing numbers of women in education and health services) and indirectly (when the state sets out to make more female labour available to private sector investors in such institutions as export processing and free trade zones).

Chapter III focuses on one of the most influential groups of theories alternative to the mainstream, namely feminist theories of development. Gender bias, feminists argue, is not only morally unacceptable but also economically and politically inefficient because current policies, even if they achieved higher per capita income (which they often failed to do) simultaneously increased female poverty. It has been mostly the views of feminists, which have been adopted recently by national and international development agencies in modifying the traditional neo-classical consensus. Going one step further, feminists of Marxist and socialist persuasion, mainly led by western intellectuals, insisted that even if per capita GNP increases, that does not automatically improve the quality of life, particularly for women. More recently representatives of women's groups in developing countries have asserted their own form of dissidence. They concur with the Marxist and socialist schools that GNP growth by itself will do little or nothing to raise

the quality of life. But they insist that each country or region has such unique characteristics born of distinct historical conditions, including their colonial legacy, that no simply western-derived model (or ideology) can be applied without serious qualification, if at all. It is for this reason that many of these critics of the modernization paradigm, and of the actions of the big international development agencies that implement that paradigm, have formed alternative development groups (usually in the form of NGOs) to conceive and implement strategies appropriate to their local conditions.

In the face of the battery of criticisms, even a powerful mainstream institution such as the World Bank began to move away from exclusive reliance on market-led development. Joined by other international agencies (though not the IMF), since the mid 1990s the World Bank has come to be very critical of the "Washington Consensus." This new trend within World Bank thinking was reinforced by the fact that true economic development only occurred in those Asia-Pacific countries that implemented programs of state-led development, precisely the opposite of what was called for in the Washington Consensus.

It is true, as feminist critics argue, that industrialization, modernization and overall GNP growth, under the auspices of policies that followed mainstream prescriptions, have been associated with a deterioration of women's access to employment and control of the means of production relative to men. This leads to increasing rates of poverty among women and, as a reflection of their declining economic importance, a marginalization of their political influence. However, the fact that women have failed to obtain their fair share of the distribution of the gains from economic development does not mean their contribution to the process has been minor.

In Chapter IV I put the assumption that incorporating women into development is beneficial to the process to a very simple and basic test. I use a bivariate analysis of the impact of female labour force participation (FLFP) as a percentage of the total labour force on growth of GNP per capita in the post World War II period for the entire developing world. GNP per capita is the most popular, although crude, indicator of

economic development. Contrary to widely held views, including those of Kofi Annan cited above, the results showed no relationship. However I then broke down the world into regions: Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa Sub-Sahara, the Middle East and North Africa. The results indicated that only in Asia is such a relationship positive. That was a striking result, since we also know that only in Asia, specifically the Pacific Rim countries of Asia, has sustained economic development occurred. The use of the Pacific Rim is also appropriate since only in this region has the model of the developmentalist state been applied. This distinguishes the region from much of Latin America and the Caribbean, from sub-Sahara Africa and the Middle East-North Africa. Where typically the state has been either, consciously minimalist in its economic role (particularly true of Latin America) or has been too weak to be able to act as a developmentalist state (particularly true in Africa[2]).

Since I wished to use gender specific cross-national data, I further limited the geographic span of the study. I chose countries that were regionally proximate, and subject to many of the same broad external economic and political forces, while showing dramatically different social and cultural characteristics which in turn are reflected in domestic economic structures. I chose Taiwan since it is an economically developed, small country of Chinese Confucianist background. I selected Indonesia because, up until the recent crisis, it was enjoying an extremely high economic growth and it is the largest Muslim country in the world. And I selected the Philippines. It is neither a large country nor has been particularly economically successful as compared to other Asia Pacific countries. It also differs from them in that it is a largely Christian country.

The three cases are distinguished in other economically significant ways. Taiwan is a small, relatively homogenous country with sparse natural resources. Indonesia is a large, extremely diverse country with a very rich natural endowment, mainly oil but also

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[2] The obvious exception is South Africa. But it is difficult to generalize from its experiences, given the unique influence of Apartheid and the military-national security dimensions of its policy until 1990. Arguably the South African state worked as a developmentalist state, albeit for a small and privileged minority, until the end of Apartheid, while it has failed to do so since, with the post-Apartheid dismantling of the national security and military dominated state structure. In a sense, post-Apartheid South Africa has returned to the African 'norm'.

minerals and timber. The Philippines lies somewhere in between, in size and in social diversity. Its resource endowment is also in the mid-category, with a greater emphasis on export-oriented agriculture than the others are. All three have dramatically different colonial histories, and this in turn has a major impact on the nature of the state structure.

Since these very different countries coexist in geographic proximity, and since they are part of a region that showed a positive relation between the female participation rate and growth in GNP per capita, they provide a good set of cases to put my theory to test.

Chapter V gives the historical background for all three of the test cases. It examines their colonial background, their social history and the institutional particularities of the role of women in each case. It sets out to increase understanding of the reasons why some have followed the developmentalist state model and others have not. It gives considerable attention to the influence of international political factors on local choices with respect to the role of the state. It examines both economic structure and political participation of women until the period just before World War II. It also treats briefly the impact of that war, a theme taken up in the next three chapters as well.

Chapters VI, VII and VIII consist of detailed examinations of the three selected cases with respect to the hypotheses using the three-fold methodology noted above.

Chapter VI focuses on Taiwan. It is the classic example of a developmentalist state in action, and is highly successful by most conventional economic criteria. Its success is based on labour-intensive manufacturing with a high female employment ratio. In many respects, it is the model against which the others are judged.

Chapter VII focuses on Indonesia. It is an excellent example of a **rentier** state, riddled with corruption and cronyism, with, for some time, the worst effects disguised by the continued inflow of revenues from exporting natural resources, especially oil. As a country leaning heavily to resource extraction, its production structure in the resource sector was biased heavily in favour of male labour force domination. On the other hand,

its manufacturing is, like Taiwan's, based largely on female labour. The relative participation of men and women therefore depends on the relative rate of growth of the resource versus the manufacturing sector.

Chapter VIII focuses on the Philippines. This country lacked both an ideological, Cold War-driven State apparatus of the intensity of that of Taiwan and the capacity of the state to live off resource rents as in Indonesia. In addition in large areas there is effectively no state control. It has a long history of plantation agriculture with relatively a low level of female employment, but the sector has been in decline for some time. The rising sector has been cheap labour-based industries in which women have played the dominant role. At the same time it has a strong dependence on remittances from its émigré population, which is increasingly female. Its informal economy appears to be larger relatively than that of Taiwan and perhaps larger than that of Indonesia. The service sector of the informal economy is also heavily dependent on female labour.

Chapter IX is summarizes the results of the work. The main hypothesis of an increase in female labour force participation rate correlating with an increase in GNP was, of course, confirmed in Chapter IV for the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The additional hypotheses that an increasing female employment ratio will be correlated with decreasing total fertility and infant mortality and increasing life expectancy and literacy measures. The conclusion summarizes the degree to which this is true. It assesses as well the secondary hypothesis about the importance of the 'developmentalist state', and with it the role of women's organizations in influencing state policy. Finally it draws certain broad conclusions about the state of development literature in general and the feminist critique in particular, that support the concerns raised by the Secretary General of the UN at the Beijing+5 conference.

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[1] *La Presse* 10/6/00

[2] See Appendix I for the full text of Annan Kofi's address.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Following World War II, the United States, through the Marshall Plan, proposed for Western Europe a set of reconstruction policies whose objective was to use rapid development of war-torn economies to rebuild European military power in the face of a (real or contrived) Soviet threat, and to curb the popularity enjoyed by the Communist parties in parts of war-ravaged Europe. Those European countries in turn passed on to developing countries certain principles of economic development based on mainstream theories.

These prescriptions for development offered by the North since World War II have been premised (exclusively before and still heavily now) on two major sets of theories: first, modernization, and second, neo-liberal economics. Advocates of modernization relied on the concept of an interventionist/developmentalist state for achieving growth from the outset of development efforts in the 1940s, thorough the 1950s, 1960s and much of the 1970s. However, neo-liberal economists, critical of state intervention, emphasized the market as being the engine of growth, which made an important impact on development strategies from the late 1970s through to the beginning of the 1990s (Balassa 1982; Bauer 1984; Bhagwati 1982; Lal 1983; Little 1982).

1. Modernization Theory

From the end of World War II until the 1970s, under the influence of modernization theory, economic growth and development were regarded as the same; finding ways to accelerate growth was at the top of the policy agenda for national and international development agencies; and growth (for most of the period when this paradigm has ruled) was measured by GNP or GDP per capita. Accelerated growth required capital formation, which could in turn be achieved through modernization.

At the center of the modernization process lay a distinction between the "traditional" and the "modern," not only involving a comparison of the North to the South but also within

developing countries. Two economists, Arthur Lewis and W.W. Rostow, both of whom took rising per capita income as the main measure for growth, had a particularly great influence on policy making based on modernization theory.

Lewis, like many in the 1950s, was preoccupied with the problem of poverty and employment, and, like them, saw the answer largely in terms of economic growth (Lewis 1954, 1955). Also like many others, he argued that when capitalists become rich, they invest back into the host economy. Such investment will in turn bring about growth, create employment opportunities and reduce poverty. In other words part of their wealth would soon trickle down to the poor (Streeten 1981: 108).

Lewis argued that in order to generate accelerated growth, it was deemed essential to push the rural population out of "traditional" production activities into a "modern" urban industrial sector (Roxborough 1979). Such a transition would accelerate growth because (according to the Lewis model): (a) the traditional over-populated rural subsistence economy had zero marginal labour productivity; and (b) labour from the subsistence sector would be gradually transferred into a modern urban industrial sector in which productivity was high. The rate of this transfer was determined by the rate of industrial investment and capital accumulation in the modern sector. Such investment was made possible by the excess of modern-sector profits over wages - on the assumption that capitalists reinvest their profits. This self-sustaining growth and expansion of employment would continue, it was argued, until all surplus rural labour was absorbed in the new industrial sector (Ranis and Fei 1961).

Rostow similarly based his theorizing on the concept of a dual economy (a traditional, rural-based non-commercial sector and a modern, urban manufacturing one). But his theory was more "historical" in nature. This is best illustrated by his five stages of economic development: traditional society; precondition for takeoff; self-sustaining growth; drive to maturity; and, lastly, high mass consumption. As a top advisor in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Rostow saw savings (either domestic or generated by foreign investment and foreign aid) as the key to reaching the stage of capital

accumulation, which in turn provides the basis for a "take off" into self-sustaining growth. (He defined the take-off in structural as well as quantitative terms.) As an interventionist of Keynesianism persuasion, Rostow recommended that the US in its foreign policy give support to states (rather than support free markets directly) to generate growth (Rostow 1956, 1960).

Rostow's prescriptions were widely accepted, particularly since they fitted the political priorities of the era. Moreover, by stressing foreign investment and foreign aid, they also seemed to counter one of the main weaknesses of other modernization theorists, namely their failure to take account of the need for external financial flows.

Among modernization theorists in general (Lewis in particular) there was been broad acceptance of the Harrod-Domar growth model (Domar 1947; Harrod 1939). It prescribed that every economy must save a substantial percentage of its GDP annually to replace capital goods and generate new investment. Countries able to push their savings rates up to the 15-20% range enjoyed especially fast growth. However the same rules could not be uncritically applied to developing countries. They had radically different economic structures and enterprise cultures, and their savings rates could not possibly achieve such levels. Simultaneously, though, a growing communist threat in the 1950s and 1960s and American involvement in two wars in Asia, Korea and Vietnam, made it very important for the United State and its European allies to take great initiatives – mainly in the field of development aid directed to and through states - to alleviate the poverty that helped foster social unrest and facilitated the appeal of communism.

Therefore under the influence of theorists such as Rostow who had become an influential advisor to the United States, aid came to play a dual role. Politically it was to be an important preventive medicine against communism. Economically it was to be used not just to remedy poverty directly, but also to instigate economic growth by offsetting the deficiency of saving/investment. The role of the state was important in delivering aid and in making sure that the funds given to the country were pumped into the economy. Just as Keynesianism was a popular policy guideline in Europe and America (no less a figure

than Richard Nixon declared in the early 1970s, "we are all Keynesians now"),[1] throughout the early and middle Cold War era, some type of international Keynesianism was implemented abroad. The United States and Western allies granted aid to the heads of states in many developing countries in rivalry with the Soviet Union and initiated development projects. They left it to these states, through intervention and planning, to achieve growth, alleviate poverty and prevent unemployment (Myrdal 1957).

Although modernization theory achieved a wide acceptance and became the foundation for development policy in, and the rationalization for foreign aid to, much of the Third World, it was subject to criticism. Critics argued that the model of accelerated growth, and the Lewis model that complements it, assumes that the rate of labour transfer, to and employment creation in, the modern sector is proportional to the rate of modern-sector capital accumulation (e.g. Singer 1979). Furthermore, the model assumed that surplus labour exists in rural areas and full employment in urban areas. This was questionable. In some rural locations there was little general surplus labour, and many developing countries' economies cannot absorb the current substantial unemployment in urban areas. This model also does not pay attention to the diversity of experiences within different developing countries. Nor does it take into account that the employment pattern is gendered.

The sexual division of labour is different in rural and urban areas. And migration from traditional to modern sectors has a gender pattern - in most cases men migrate to the urban areas disproportionately, while women usually stay behind (though there are exceptions to be discussed). Furthermore the degree to which women can act as an army of reserve labour in case of labour shortage, be confined to the home when there is labour surplus, or act as seasonal labour, varies from country to country and region to region, depending on cultural traditions and socio-political conditions as well as economic structure.

[1] Interview with Professor Robin Rowley, Department of Economics. Professor Rowley teaches the History of Economic Thought.

Throughout this period, development projects were blind to the gender composition of labour. Almost all aid went to men as the heads of households. Aid donor agencies' stereotypical assumption about men as the heads of households and as breadwinners while women were homemakers in some cases courted disaster. In many developing countries, women have been traditionally responsible for food and agricultural production. Yet aid donors gave fertile land to men who had no experience in farming, likely contributing, for example, to famines in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.

In addition, mainstream development theories (based on Ricardo's comparative advantage) touted that less developed countries (LDCs) would gradually move away from production of agricultural goods for export and shift into manufacturing consumer goods. Primarily for the internal market, and then for the external market, using their cheap unskilled labour (Little et al. 1970). Even if this were true, there remains a neglected gender issue. Women, much more than men, have been the source of cheap unskilled labour in developing countries and in export-processing zones. In fact this is increasingly so.

Modernization theory, though, was not purely economic. It also had a cultural component, based on the social theories of Max Weber and many of his modern followers. These sociologists put great emphasis on the role of culture. They argued that development can only be possible if the culture of a developing country is congenial, or made more congenial, to assimilating the norms of Western culture (Bellah 1957, Inkeles 1964, McClelland 1964). Equating modernization with Westernization, they assumed that social change or development is unidirectional and homogeneous.

One outstanding example is the work of Levy (1967). He identified certain cultural factors in Western countries that were, in his view, more congenial to development, along with a set of cultural norms that were an impediment. He argued that modernized societies are characterized, for instance, by a high degree of specialization of organization, interdependence of organizations, and emphasis on rationality, universalism, and functional specificity. On the other hand non-modernised societies

have social organizations that are not highly specialized, are relatively self-sufficient and, have social relations based on tradition, particularism and functional diffuseness.

Cultural modernization, particularly in its classical form, also had in common with economic modernization, its gender blindness, and therefore its neglect of the role of women. One exception was McClelland. In *The Achieving Society* (1964), he, like other modernization theorists, argued that it is the lack of (Western style) drive for economic advancement that is a barrier to progress. However, unlike the others, he situated this lack of "achievement motivation" as part of a traditional culture of patriarchy. He recognized that traditional patriarchy hindered female employment and therefore was a barrier to growth. But *The Achieving Society* looks exclusively at women's productive, as opposed to reproductive role, completely missing out how crucial women's social situation is in fostering "achievement motivation" in their children.

Modernization theory came under serious challenges in the 1960s and early 1970s. It was criticized as being out of touch with the obviously worsening economic conditions in many parts of the South. It was also attacked because it left out any consideration of the role of women who remained the poorest segments of the developing world. There was, however, one important exception.

2. Failure of Modernization: The Role of Population

In an attempt to explain the reason for the failure of the dominant school of policy-making based on modernization theory, some economists blamed population growth for the increase in poverty and unemployment (Galenson & Liebenstein 1955). It was argued that good policies had been swamped by a population explosion, itself partially a result of rising economic welfare (a position that sounds self-contradictory). This perspective was argued in spite of a set of theories; whose basis was that population growth was actually beneficial to development. Some of those taking the contrary position, argued that population pressure leads to technological innovations. Some, Simon Kuznets, for instance (1966), went so far as to define modern economic growth as a sustained increase in population without lowering per capita output.

Critics of modernization put forward an alternative explanation for poverty and population growth. They argued, first, that it was poor economic performance that had led to greater poverty, particularly in urban areas; and, second, that urban poverty had stimulated higher fertility because poor living conditions lead to parents wanting large numbers of children as an extra source of household income and/or a sort-of old age security scheme. In spite of these criticisms, most national and international organizations targeted fertility control as a means to enhance development. They therefore pushed family planning programs in the simplistic form of contraception rather than attempting to address the factors, such as high infant and child mortality rates, that encouraged women to bear more children. They did so in spite of many cross-cultural findings, which indicated that improving conditions for women and increasing female social status would bring down fertility rates further and faster. Instead of a female centered bottom-to-top strategy for population control, for the most part a top-to-bottom population planning, which does not take into account women as active agents, has formed the basis of many of the strategies used for reducing the total fertility rate (TFR).

However, as an economic crisis beginning in the early 1970s put many countries into even deeper economic problems, the failure of modernization theory to deliver on its promises became more and more noticeable. Although Marxist and structuralist (as well as world system/dependency) criticisms, of development had been formulated in the 1960s, the mainstream went completely in a different direction. It was neo-classical economists who persuaded the United States and its allies, as well as international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, to adopt a neo-liberal approach (Khan and Knight 1981; Lal 1983; World Bank 1981).

3. Neo-classical Economic Theory

Neo-classical economic theory (embodied in a set of proposals since referred to as the "Washington Consensus") became extremely influential, particularly after the accession to power of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Since the late 1970s, and throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, advocates of neo-classical economic theory pointed to

the failure of modernization with its interventionist agenda as an argument in favour of the free market. Neo-classical economics, unlike modernization, has been much more focused on micro level analysis. As Lal in the *Poverty of 'Development Economics'* (1983) argued, macro level theories miss out on micro economic details. This tendency of neo-classical economics to focus on the micro is very useful in terms of attracting attention to regional and case studies and therefore to regional differences (Oman 1994).

However, the main theme of neo-classical theorists that makes them distinct from modernization has been their advocating the limiting of government interference with the economy (Bauer 1984). Neo-classical economists argue that the free market is the best distribution method for limited resources. Their theoretical position is based on the notion of human beings as profit maximizing individuals. These individuals under a free market condition can have access to perfect knowledge about how they can best satisfy their own needs. And it is the marketplace that provides the mechanism for neutral transmitting of information. It therefore guarantees people's ability to fulfill their needs freely, maximizing human welfare. Some neo-classical economists go one step further and argue that under a free market economy, the freedom of individuals is guaranteed from the monopolistic power of the state and of powerful groups that run the state, therefore assuring democracy (Friedman 1962). In fact Friedman argues that laissez-faire capitalism is a necessary condition of political freedom itself. Since, under a market driven economy, the role of the state is limited, economic power is separated from political power, therefore reinforcing political freedom for individuals.

Under the market apparatus, where there is a situation of free knowledge, those producers who do not produce efficiently and at the right price would exit the market because consumers would not purchase their products. Since the free market guarantees competition, then only those producers whose goods and services are the best would survive. In other words, the most competitive producers would profit and continue to produce. This mechanism guarantees that only those firms that are the most efficient continue to exist and therefore the whole economy would be efficient (Marshall 1920).

Furthermore, the market operates through a price mechanism determined by the level of demand and the supply. If there are any problems with the economy then it is important "get the price right" - itself a dominant theme in neo-classical writings on development (World Bank 1981; Lal 1983). Price determination, therefore, in the work of neo-classical economists, became an important issue and was used against Keynsianism, which argued in favour of intervention that would "artificially" affect prices. In this respect once again, the market operates, the neo-classical economist argued, as the best distributor of scare resources (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973).

The neo-classical approach therefore argued strongly for minimizing the role of the state, and not merely in terms of distributive efficiency. The state should also be limited in terms of taxation - taxes would be kept at a minimum whenever possible. Keeping taxes low, they argued, would encourage entrepreneurs to invest and provide incentives for the private sector, while high taxes work as a barrier for investment. Furthermore, the state should keep regulations concerning the economy at a minimum so that the market can operate freely. In their criticism of the state, the neo-classical economists add that states lack incentives for their public works, and often state-owned enterprises suffer from lack of efficient management. This seemed to have been well illustrated by the failure of centrally planned economies of the Soviet type. In addition, in many cases governments are subject to corruption and there are always administrative delays when important decisions must be made. These bureaucratic delays become costly (Bhagwati and Desai 1970; Lal 1983; Little 1982).

In addition to the critique of the state, neo-classical economists pressed for limiting trade unions since they, like the state, interfere with the smooth functioning of the market. Since unions can push up costs through collective action leading to wage increases above the competitive level, their activities must be limited, if not abolished totally. Furthermore, employment regulations, neo-classical theory points out, must be reduced or abolished to prevent interference with the labour-price mechanism.

Another important aspect of neo-classical theory is the reliance on the theory of comparative advantage, and the notion that promotion of specialization and free trade will achieve efficiency. If countries specialize in types of products for which they have maximum efficiency and then trade with one another, each economy will benefit. The choice of which sector(s) in which the country should specialize very much depends on the particular circumstance of each and every country (Little, Scitovsky and Scott 1970). But regardless of what types of goods and services in which any particular country specializes, under free trade goods and services can be freely exchanged on a world level. When there are no barriers to trade, all countries would benefit on continuous basis. Additionally, each country would have particular strength in one type or several types of products at the lowest price, which guarantees a "healthy" price mechanism. It is important that there should be no government regulation or tariffs to interfere with the most efficient production choices.

Not surprisingly, neo-classical economists were the most prominent critics of import-substitution where state regulations protected inefficient home industries. Since import-substitution had, by the 1970s and 1980s, caused obvious problems in many countries, and some, like Taiwan, had already abandoned the policy altogether, these criticisms were very effective. Following their criticism of import-substitution, many neo-classical economists argued for full liberalization of foreign trade as well as currency devaluation –overvalued currencies were very much associated with import-substitution. Neo-classical theorists pointed on the one hand to the "miracles" in Southeast Asia in countries that developed through export-promotion strategies; and they pointed on the other hand to failures such as India where self-sufficiency had continued to be pursued (Chen 1979; Khan and Knight 1981; Wolf 1988).

Yet another major contribution of neo-classical theorists to the emerging mainstream, one that was very influential in guiding policies of the IMF, was their adherence to monetarist macroeconomics. They argued that the problem of balance of payments instability and inflation in developing countries are caused by state intervention. In all countries, the central banking system can alter the money supply as it sees fit. However in many

developing countries, where the state cannot have high taxes since these countries are either too poor or their state apparatus not well enough administered to collect taxes, the state ends up with a budget deficit. The state then attempts to use the money supply to finance its own expenditures, often of the social spending type. The result was to increase the supply of money, relative to the demand for it, stimulating inflation (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973).

Based on this argument, neo-classical economists formulated a financial stabilization program. It called for limiting public expenditure in instances where raising taxes to meet the deficit was particularly difficult. It called for policies to encourage the shift of resources from the domestic to the foreign sector in order to generate foreign exchange. This was required to pay off the heavy foreign debts incurred by state borrowing after the world crisis of the early 1970s. Since those debts also made developing countries vulnerable to pressure from creditors – commercial banks and the IMF, for example - nearly all developing countries were either forced or persuaded to follow the Washington Consensus.

Under structural adjustment programs worked out by the IMF and World Bank, many states in the developing world throughout the 1980s made huge cutbacks in their social welfare expenditures. In nearly all African, in many Latin American countries, and in many other parts of the developing world, states cut their budgets for education, health care, unemployment benefits, food and shelter subsides. Many of them also were forced or persuaded to devalue their currencies. As currencies devalued, particularly in low-income countries, the price of basic goods such as food increased which further exacerbated poverty (Khan and Knight 1981).

As regards poverty and redistribution, although neo-classical economists were in favour of increasing welfare through the free market, they regarded income inequality as an incentive for growth. Some such as Bauer and Lal argued that governments should not intervene to redistribute income because it would work as a disincentive for saving and therefore limit investment, which in turn would mean fewer jobs and more poverty.

However, within this body of theory, not all would agree with Bauer and Lal. A more moderate view that emerged by the end of the 1980s when the more doctrinaire free market ideas came under intense criticism, calls for some degree of state involvement in creating welfare. More recently, there has also been a trend towards accepting some types of state interference in providing conditions for efficient resource allocation and accelerated private sector growth (Killick 1989).

The same distinction applies to neo-classical views on foreign aid. Those who adhere to laissez-faire and who are against government intervention *per se* reject the concept of foreign aid because it would require state intervention to spend it. The more moderate view however, regards technical assistance as useful (Killick 1989).

In addition, increasingly the IMF and World Bank, the bodies responsible for structural adjustment policies based on neo-classical development and modernization theory, have been severely criticized for demanding austerity measures. Public expenditure cutbacks throughout the developing world have had disastrous effects on general welfare in the form of rising poverty and growing income inequality. Although the neoclassical approach argued that this constituted a form of short-term-pain-for-long-term-gain, the critics insisted that poverty and inequality were more likely to be protracted.

The consequences were not gender-neutral. As state cutbacks hit many developing countries, many services previously provided by the state had been put on women's shoulders. Increasingly women have had to make up for the reduction in unemployment benefits, health care provisions and food and shelter subsidies. And many vital services previously performed by the government were left to women to carry out.

4. Critique of the Neo-classical Economics:

4.1 The Concept of Developmentalist/Interventionist State

A central part of the doctrine of the neo-liberal/economic orthodox theorists was that Southeast Asia developed because it opened its market to world trade. This was roundly criticized by a group of state-centred theorists who insisted that neo-classical economists

misinterpreted economic success in newly industrialized countries (Amesden 1985; Skocpol 1985; Evans et al 1985; Wade 1988; Castells 1992; Henderson and Appelbaum 1992). Originally, neo-classical economists argued that, contrary to the position of structuralists and the dependency school,[2] free trade, rather than the old import-substitution model, had been the real source of growth in the newly industrialized countries of Southeast Asia. However, critics noted that, far from the result of a free market, the economic success of Southeast Asian countries was due to the strong role played by the state. (Griffen 1973; Amesden 1985; Barrett and Whyte 1982; Evans 1985; Wade 1988 and Greenhalgh 1988) What had been true of later developers of a previous era, namely Germany and Japan was also, these critics insisted, true of South East Asia, namely the central role of the state in development planning. (Amesden 1985).

These critics articulated a quite different vision for the role of the interventionist-developmentalist state. Unlike the role of the state in centrally planned economies of the Soviet type that replaces the market, they argued that an interventionist-developmentalist state is essential in order for the market to operate smoothly. (Wade 1988: 130). They also insist, unlike the old advocates of import-substitution, on the primacy of the international rather that the internal market.

The need for state regulation to assure the proper development and functioning of the market is particularly strong when the market is underdeveloped. There are many ways that an interventionist state can smooth market operations. It can both stimulate and discipline entrepreneurial behavior. This can be attained, for example, through preventing

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[2] Most dependency theory was the work of social scientists from the South such as Raul Prebisch, Dos Santos, Cardoso along with the American Marxist, Paul Baran. The immediate cause was the demonstrable failure of development based on the notion of imitating the Western model. In their criticism of modernization theory, dependency theorists also reject the notions of stages of growth. Although most advocates of dependency theory are not rigid Marxists, in place of Rostow-type stages of growth, they suggest an important emphasis on historical analysis and social class.
Dependency theory argued that free trade leads to division of the world into core and peripheral nations, the cores being those countries which have already industrialized and are economically prosperous while ex-colonies become peripheral to the world economy and suffer deteriorating economic conditions within the international capitalist system. Core countries, the dependency theorists argued, prosper at the expense of LDC's. Free trade between countries with unequal political and economic power reinforces inequality rather than creating conditions for development. It was for that reason that Persist, for instance, promoted the idea of import substitution as an alternative to free trade.

monopolies and oligopolies so that genuine entrepreneurship can thrive. The problem of market power is greater in developing countries where a powerful agrarian class can try to form oligopolies to control production and marketing in order to avoid risks and maximize their profit. Therefore a developmentalist state is necessary to break concentrations of market power, ensure risk taking and channel resources to internal development as well (Evan 1985: 44-78).

State-centered theories have pointed out that what has occurred in Southeast Asia has been a dependent development based on international sub-contracting. They assert that the success of these economies has depended upon the willingness of MNCs to invest and on the strength of the state in these countries to regulate the opening of their domestic economies to the world market. In fact, Evans has elaborated the concept of triple alliance whereby the state remains in control of the relation and mediates the relationship between international investors and national firms (Evans 1985).

Evan's concept of the triple alliance was originally formed with reference to Latin America, which, after World War II, was performing much better than Southeast Asia. Yet more recently the reverse is true. The Southeast Asia NICs have operated with a highly interventionist state (Wade 1988: 114), while in Latin America, the free market has played a much more important role (Harberger 1988), and the effects of structural adjustment, especially in the 1980s, has created enormous obstacles to further development. Latin America in recent years has been characterized by a minimalist state, and a socio-economy in which a strong land-owning class has continued to play a major role in the political and economic sphere, preventing the state from being able to act effectively and independently. Therefore in Latin America, Evans' triple alliance of state, international capital and national investors has been ineffective (Evans 1992: 203-227). A very similar situation prevails today in the Philippines, which shared much of the colonial heritage of a Spanish-American colony, in sharp contrast to other parts of Southeast Asia. That absence of the triple alliance in the Philippines, analysts insist, has been a contributing factor to its high income inequality and massive poverty, to political

repression and instability, as well as to a capitalist development which has not enjoyed the type of sustainability illustrated by the NICs of South East Asia.

The fact that the Philippines shares so many characteristics of Latin America points to the importance of historical factors, particularly the history of colonialism, in determining whether a developmentalist state will emerge. Those countries that came under Japanese rule were able to free themselves from the domination of a large land owning class and implement an effective land redistribution that helped to create a more equitable society, and therefore made it easier for the state to penetrate into all social layers. On the other hand, where many countries started as Euro-American colonies,[3] they were left with a strong agrarian interest resistant to capitalist development and to industrialization. Furthermore, Japanese colonialism was more inclined to create a bureaucratic apparatus, the legacy of which was so vital to the formation of a developmentalist state in the Weberian sense that bureaucracy is a precondition for the creation of modern effective leadership (Evans 1985: 67).

There are many different ways that the state can intervene in the economy. These various ways can be divided into two different categories: direct intervention and indirect intervention. Appelbaum (1992) has pointed to various ways such interventions have taken place in Southeast Asian NICs and Meiji Japan.

The state can, and in fact has in the past in NICs, directly created new industrial sectors either through state companies or by supplying credit and financial guarantees, to private companies (Deyo 1987: 236). Indeed, in Taiwan and South Korea, the state owns such vital sectors as steel, shipbuilding and petrochemicals. Such industries, deemed necessary for a healthy modern economy, need heavy investment. It is not likely that private firms would be willing to invest huge amounts of money for the good of the national economy; and if they do, they expect such high returns that it would make products of such industries too expensive to be beneficial to the economy. In addition, the state can

[3] There were, of course, exceptions. Many French colonies were left with well-trained civil services. So too was India (and, to a lesser degree, the Sudan) by the British. But others have far less laudable records – the Portuguese and Belgians are particularly notorious.

directly invest in creating and refining new technologies through government research and development facilities, much as it has done in Taiwan's high technology sector. Additionally such a state can create favorable conditions for foreign investment through low taxes on corporate profits and provisions for industrial infrastructure (Barrett 1987).

There are a number of indirect ways, too, in which intervention can occur. For instance, the state in Taiwan encouraged firms to advance in the high technology sector and in high value-added goods through controlling credit via the banking system. Furthermore, through price control the state can discourage the emergence of domestic monopolies or near monopolies of supply. In addition, the state can protect the domestic markets either across the board or with regard to particular products by imposing restrictions on import of certain commodities. Taiwan has followed such a policy of import restrictions on a set of particular goods while liberalizing trade in certain other goods necessary for the national economy such as certain machine tools (Deyo 1987: 236). The state can also keep a close eye on the quality of production. If standards are not maintained, it can deprive the company of its guaranteed credit. This practice is particularly important with regard to goods for export. Southeast Asian NICs have also subsidized wages through public housing - the NICs have the world's largest public housing systems (Appelbaum 1992: 21-22).

A developmentalist state also can implement welfare measures. It is obvious that no agency other than the state has the ability and political accountability to provide social welfare programs. In many Southeast Asian countries, the states have been very committed to providing social welfare. In various countries such as Meiji Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the state has heavily invested in public health, housing and education. This heavy involvement in the social welfare programs, however, has not been matched by commitment to political democracy. Political repression rather than freedom have been the norm.

These states have built up their military and used it to guarantee civil obedience. Nearly all have used military power to suppress union activities and diminish collective

bargaining power (Barrett 1987; Appelbaum 1992: 14). It should be noted however, that as in the case of Japan, both Taiwan and South Korea have moved towards democratization once a certain level of economic development has been achieved. In addition, it can be argued that political suppression has been epidemic throughout the Third World countries. In this respect Southeast Asian countries have followed the general pattern; while after a certain level of economic success and sustainability has been reached, they have become more democratic. Thus, martial law in Taiwan was lifted in 1987. Since then democratic elections have been taking place.

While on the level of theory, state-centered analysis has been quite influential for some time, particularly in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, it has been harsh economic realities and the extent of the endemic crisis thorough the developing world which led to a change of emphasis on the part of the World Bank, long a strong advocate of neo-classical policies. Facing steadily mounting levels of poverty and income inequality, the World Bank became very explicably an advocate of state intervention. In its 1997 World Development Report, it states:

> *Development-economic, social and sustainable-without an effective state is impossible. It is increasingly recognized that an effective state-not a minimal one-is central to economic and social development, but more as partner and facilitator than as director. State should work to complement markets, not replace them.* (World Development Report 1997: 17)

Furthermore the recent failure of the IMF to deal adequately with the Indonesian crisis through its orthodox prescriptions may well signal a major change of heart in that institution as well. For example, the IMF for a long time condemned exchange controls, including the restrictions on capital flight imposed by Mahathir Mohamad during the 1997 crisis. Significantly Malaysia was the only country immune to the worst effects of the Asia crisis, and was the first to recover from its financial impact. In September 1999 the IMF actually came to praise the policy – though it is not clear that the IMF is actually shifting away from its fixation on market-oriented policies, as distinct from just putting on the best face in light of an embarrassing inconsistency with its orthodoxy.

Perhaps most serious of the failings of so much mainstream theorizing (much structuralist and Marxist theory has been in the past equally at fault in this respect) has been in its apparent blindness to gender issues. Yet one of the most widespread forms of economic inequality is that which exists between men and women. It is a simple fact, largely disregarded by neo-classical orthodoxy, that men and women do not have equal access to social and economic power, particularly in developing countries. In addition, there are barriers on the basis of gender to entry of women into certain types of production. No matter how efficient a particular female may be, certain occupations, both in the high and the low rank of the job scale, are considered "male jobs." Race and ethnicity are other, similar barriers that prevent entry of certain individuals into certain types of production.

Within mainstream economic theory, only one approach, that of Human Capital Theory (HCT), takes explicit recognition of gender. According to the theory, outlined by Gary Becker in his book *Human Capital*, human beings are assets in which investments can be made in order to improve productivity. "The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings." Human capital theory stresses the importance of on-the-job training, informal education and schooling as well as health. Becker and others following HCT recognize the role of women as mothers who are responsible for educating and taking care of children. The HCT recognition of women's reproductive role however, is only a fragment of a much larger picture. What is needed is a theory that takes into account women's triple role in terms of productive, reproductive and volunteer workers, all at the same time. To do that requires first a detailed examination of the criticisms of mainstream development theory offered by those writing from a feminist perspective.

CHAPTER THREE

GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

The previous chapter ended by pointing to a paradigm shift away from neo-classical theory to an emerging one which once again stresses the role of the state. The main reason for this shift was the economic realities of the 1990s. However the role of the state, and the need to revive it, was only one aspect of the neo-classical mainstream that came under attack. As poverty increased more among women than men (Roy et al. 1996), there came a wider appreciation of the need to incorporate gender issues into development. In spite of four decades of feminist activism and scholarly effort, the failure of mainstream theory to deal with gender issues adequately remained striking. Therefore this chapter represents an attempt to address that gap and to show how, in the context of an emerging paradigm, the issues of gender and development can be reconciled.

In the 1950s and 1960s the mainstream was gender blind. In line with colonial era thinking, the modernizers were aware of women's economic subordination but believed that as developing countries became modernized, the inequality of access to resources that systematically discriminated against women would diminish. (Tinker 1997: 33-42; Moser 1993; Sen and Crown 1987). Modernization theory took the position that with "modernization" (synonymous with Westernization) women in developing countries would become (like Western women) liberated and equal. This would of course beg the obvious question, whether or not it was really a completely accurate way to depict the situation of most women in the West. In much the same way they thought of the relationship between poverty and income inequality (that is to say, with rising GNP per capita, wealth would trickle down), modernization theorists (if they addressed the issue at all) assumed that gender inequality was a cultural problem, which had an economic solution.

This gender-blindness on the part of development planners by the late 1960s provoked a great deal of agitation by feminist researchers and political activists, who tried to influence major development agencies. But by the time the feminist movement was

strong enough to bring pressure on national and international organizations in the later part of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the rules of the game had started to change. The policy guidelines of neo-classical economists became dominant at the international level. In part in response to a paradigm that preached market rule and a minimalist state structure, the state throughout the developing world was increasingly restrained from interfering with the economy. Simultaneously it also left gender issues aside, while its policies of deregulation left those most vulnerable and most in need of state intervention, namely women, deprived of aid (Cagatay et al. 1995; Elson 1995 & 1993; Palmer 1992).

Ironically this domination of neo-classical theory coincided with the mushrooming of organizations designed to address gender issues. The gap between the two sides grew steadily. The split was also evident in major international organizations. On the one hand the World Bank wanted to decrease the role of the state, while on the other some organizations such as the ILO wanted some kind of universal laws and regulations that would create equal opportunity, for men as well as women (Tinker 1990; Young 1992; Moser 1993; Braidotti et al. 1994; Scott 1995).

The gap between gender-based activism and the development mainstream remains present to this day, hindering efforts to deal with gender issues. However not all the blame lies with mainstream economic development theory. While it may be true that the mainstream is gender-biased, it is equally true that feminist work has not been able to reach out to influence the mainstream. This in turn is related to the way that the field of gender-and-development itself was created, mainly as a reaction against the mainstream.

1. Historical Background: Gender & Development

The first time in the post war era that women's issues were raised in a public way and captured attention on an international level was in 1962 when the UN General Assembly instructed the Women's Commission (formed as a subcommittee of the Human Rights Commission in 1946) to prepare a report on the role of women in the social and development plans for member governments. By this time awareness of gender issues was gaining momentum throughout the world. Simultaneously, many female scholars, a

great number of them anthropologists, through their fieldwork, obtained a great deal of understanding of the realities of the lives of many women throughout the world. Thus, at three different levels – policy-making, political activism and scholarly endeavor -many women came to realize the negative consequences of mainstream development for women (Braidiotti et al. 1994; Scott 1995; Tinker 1997).

In addition, in 1970s, the publication of Ester Boserup's book, *Women and Development*, attracted a great deal of attention. Boserup, who ironically regards herself as a scholar rather than a feminist, took existing studies and illustrated how the division of labor between women and men shifted as economic development proceeded, with a gradual change from family production of goods and services to specialized production. By pointing out that the introduction of modern technologies and the expansion of cash-cropping benefited men, while often increasing women's work burden both in the family and as casual labor, she refuted the prevailing assumptions held by economic planners that their efforts had been beneficial to everyone. Her analysis of women's work in agriculture provided a basic justification for arguing that economic assistance should reach rural women as well as men (Boseup 1970).

The concern over gender and development therefore started off with efforts by feminists to illustrate how women were being left out of development projects. Consequently, many women scholars gathered massive data, mainly of an anthropological nature, to illustrate the result of development policies. Data from diverse societies demonstrated that, contrary to the principles of equality to which international agencies and donor countries of the Western capitalist world are committed, women had been and continue to be overlooked in development projects. As the development effort continues to fail women, many feminists persist in documenting negative aspect of development for women (Seagar and Olsen 1986; Brydon, and Chant, 1989; Townsend 1988; Afshar 1991; Gladwin 1991; Afshar and Dennis 1992).

However, within the body of feminist work there have been different types of thinking. In the beginning the majority was liberal feminists who sought not to change the underlying socio-political and economic structure, but merely to address women's issues within the

existing one. By contrast, Marxist and Socialist feminists have argued that unless inequality as a whole was addressed, gender inequality in particular would not be eliminated. More recently, an increasing number of feminist scholars and activists, mainly from the South, have come up with their own interpretation of development and how it should be achieved. The result is ongoing debates between feminists of different political standing, as well as between women from the North and those from the South (Tinker and Jaquette 1987; Sen and Grown 1987; Scott 1995).[1]

Nonetheless, in spite of ideological differences, feminists of all political persuasions seem united in their preoccupation with the negative effects of development. Furthermore, feminist work has tended to employ a methodology that is in direct contrast to that of the mainstream. Feminist scholarship has involved the application of more micro level anthropological methods as opposed to the mainstream tendency to use quantitative macro level analysis. Therefore, both the focus of feminist literature and the methodology used have built a major barrier between the mainstream and feminist work.

As discussed earlier, feminist work by and large focused on the negative impact of development. To reconcile feminist concerns over gender equality with mainstream development theory requires the reverse. Instead of documenting how women have suffered as the result of development, the objective of this thesis is to show how women contribute to the development process. However, to do so, requires first addressing the problem of definition and measurement of women's work.

2. Problems with Data on Female Work:

What constitutes "women's work" has been subject to great controversies and has caused a great deal of criticism by the feminists during the most recent decade. Even with statistical and development agencies it is defined differently in different societies. And

[1] These debates have made an impact on the gender and development discourse. One of the outcomes of such debates has been shift of emphasis from Women in Development (WID) in the 1970's and 1980's to Gender and Development (GAD). While the WID was concerned only with incorporating women into development process, the GAD takes into account issues concerning both sexes and focuses on men as well as women.

there are inconsistencies of definition even within one country over a period of time. As a result, a great deal of work that women do has remained unaccounted for, posing serious problems for female labor analysis (Beneria 1981; Boulding 1983; Folbre and Able 1989; Beneria 1992).

The dilemma stems from the very definition of work itself formulated in the International conference of Labor Force Statisticians in 1954. According to this definition, still accepted, work is defined in relation to the market - it is something done "for pay or profit" that increases GNP. But there are problems with such a definition particularly with regard to the work of women (captured in the often-cited irony about when a man marries his housekeeper and causes GNP to decrease). Since what is not paid for is not regarded as work, a high proportion of what women do, ranging between one-third to one-half as much as measured GNP, has been estimated to be unrecorded (Goldschmidt-Clermont 1983 and 1989). There are different mechanisms by which such under-numeration takes place. Agricultural work is one example.

Agriculture usually involves a large subsistence sector with all manner of transaction both outside the market and outside the official statistics (Boserup 1970; Beneria 1982; Waring 1988; Beneria 1992).[2] Furthermore, the fact that men are presumed to be the heads of the household means that much of what women do is counted as male work. In this sector what women do is often an extension of their job as housewives, and is therefore unpaid and uncounted. For example in much of Africa and South Asia women are not only responsible for what is cooked in the kitchen but what goes into the kitchen (Mies and Shiva 1993: 264-277). But the household is regarded as one unit, with intra-

[2] In addition, in the agricultural sector women engage in many different activities other than agricultural production. For instance, many grow a garden or keep poultry what is produced in the back garden is either consumed by the family or is bartered with the neighbors. Such production is very common particularly where subsistence economy predominates. In some cases women engage in producing handcraft or are able to make clothes and shoes, which is also either for home consumption or is exchanged. Or it can even be taken to the local market, which still often escapes from official statistics. In the agricultural sector many women do a whole range of such chores as indicated by the National Sample Survey of India in addition to their housework collection goods (fish, small game, wild fruits, firewood, cowing, cattle fee as such) (Folber 1986: 13). The primary sector which often has a huge substance economy, men are usually employed in much more gainful employment with a higher tendency for being subject to official data

household transactions outside the arena of economic analysis. Because men are regarded as breadwinners and household heads, the fruits of women's work are viewed as household production and often men are credited for the required labor when data is gathered (Folber 1986: 4).

The problem is partly rooted in the fact that the border-line between women's productive and reproductive work in developing countries is blurred. When the situation is hard for an impoverished family women's reproductive labor stretches to help the family make ends meet by engaging in activities that generate essentials for material survival, either for home consumption or for exchange. There are a great deal of goods and services that women produce for household consumption that are missing from the official data. There is small back-garden production, home-made processed foods, and a whole range of services such haircuts, dressmaking, nursing the sick, helping with children's education and such. These activities constitute work, that is unpaid and therefore unrecorded (Waring 1988).

This blurred borderline, whereby much of women's work is an extension of their role as mothers and wives and remains unaccounted for, is true of both rural and urban families (Conk 1981; Standing 1983; Chadeau and Roy 1986; Beneria 1992). As long as men are heads of household, non-waged family workers are seldom taken into account unless they are engaged in commercial production outside the family (Folber 1986: 13). Both in manufacturing and services women tend to be outside of the official data, especially where there is a family business. Many surveys indicate that women's work in this sector has been greatly underestimated (Boserup 1970; Beneria 1982; Beneria 1992; Chadeau 1985; Gardiner 1997).[3] Again as men are the heads of the households they are the ones that are regarded as gainfully employed and not women (Boulding 1983; Waring 1988; Beneria 1992).

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gathering. Women's unpaid, undervalued contribution to subsistence production and petty commodity production (Feldman 1991: 59) remain problematic.

[3] Deere's analysis of the 1976 Peruvian Peasant Survey for instance shows that 86% of women, rather than 38% initially measured were engaged in agricultural production (Rogers 1979: 165)

Due to pressure from women's organizations and feminist writers, there has been some recognition of the problem of undercounting women's work. The ILO has categories, now that register the number of unpaid family workers[4] as well as other categories such as working on one's own-account. Since the 1982, 13th International Conference of Labor Statistics, goods and services produced for household consumption that do not enter the market are regarded as work. That is why the category of unpaid family worker and self-employed has been added to the official statistics.

By so doing the ILO is attempting in effect to address a much bigger problem, that of the formal versus the informal economy. The size of the informal economy as a whole has expanded precisely in response to the implementation of the demands of neo-classical economic theory. Limiting the role of the state subsidy programs and liberalizing economic policies has increased the greater necessity for micro-enterprise, usually in the informal part of the economy, as a survival strategy. As employment in this sector is elastic, many women have created employment in petty trade and micro enterprises in order to deal with rising poverty.[5] Self-employment has expanded the informal sector very often as an attempt to relieve the pressure on the state to create employment (Feldman 1991). Informal employment in both service and manufacturing has increased faster than employment in the formal sector (Feldman 1991: 63).

Calculating the numbers, however, is difficult. Sometimes high female labor participation is observed in developing countries because micro data combine informal and formal, then extrapolate from it in order to form macro data (Beneria 1992). But there is still a problem since the definitions of formal versus informal economy and the borderline between categories of informal employment are fuzzy. Yet a higher percentage of women are in the informal economy and their percentage is growing (Moser 1978; Joekes 1987: 4; Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia 1995 and 1989; UN 1996 Report).

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[4] Unpaid family worker is anyone who reports herself as working but who is unpaid and works on a family farm or in some other kind of family-run enterprise (Mason 1995).

[5] In the case of Jamaica as many other places in the world petty trading activity by women has increased (Elson 1989: 76).

In addition to all of the difficulties with data on female labor, there is another problem where comparative research is involved. The definition of female labor in different countries is different and has changed over time. For instance, in the case of the Philippines in the 1970s the data show a sudden increase in the percentage participation of the female labor force, particularly in the agricultural sector, which can partly be explained by changes in official definitions. In addition, official policy and ideology regards those gainfully employed female workers as problematic.[6]

Nonetheless, despite such problems with definition and data, there are common patterns in undercounting women's work. Furthermore, policy makers on national and international levels continue to use these data constantly. To attempt to minimize the problem, this thesis will rely not only on official data but also on data of anthropological origin. Furthermore, separating the three aspect of women's work, productive, reproductive and volunteer, will in itself will give greater recognition of the character and extent of women's work.

3. Women's Work

3.1 Women's Productive Work

In dealing with women's productive work, it is important to remember that women's employment tends to be clustered in the type of production, which is non-mechanized, non-modernized and labor-intensive (Boserup 1970; Standing 1989; Joekes 1987: 64-79). With the exception of countries and regions where multinational corporations employ women as "cheap labor,"[7] sometimes in free-trade zones, this is true of both manufacturing and agriculture.

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[6] An example from two neighboring countries can illustrate the point. The participation rates for women in Iran and Turkey are dramatically different. However, both in Iran and Turkey women's share of the labour market in the agricultural sector is comparably large in reality. But the Turkish State automatically counts all women as agricultural laborers even though they might be unpaid family workers, where as in Iran they are not.

[7] Obviously what is "cheap" labour is a relative concept that could be defined in several different ways. In this thesis it is intended to mean both cheap relative to the country of origin of the investment, in the event of foreign investors and cheap in relation to male labour in the country under discussion. Again the term "cheap" is a comprehensive one, referring not just to direct monetary compensation but also a host of other factors including the regulatory demands of the state. Furthermore, because men are regarded as the main

Women's share of employment in manufacturing has increased considerably over the past few decades. This pattern exists all over the world except in sub-Saharan Africa (UN 1996) and in a few countries (such as Haiti and Jamaica) where severe economic crisis has squeezed women out of manufacturing jobs (Joekes 1987: 96). Other than these few cases, the role of women has been especially important in export industries. In fact for many countries throughout the developing world women's increasing employment in export-oriented manufacturing, both inside and outside free trade zones, has been a particularly important source of foreign exchange. In some cases, for example the Southeast Asian NICs, it has been the most important part (Elson and Pearson 1981; Diamond 1979; Kung 1994).

Typically women are mainly employed in labor-intensive sectors such as footwear, garments, plastics, food processing and electronics where the products are relatively cheap and the number of local producers large. (Joekes 1987: 91-92). One third of the labor force in manufacturing, both formal and informal, in low-income developing countries are women. Female labor force participation is highest in free trade zones, reaching 97% in some countries. But inside and outside the zones women's increasing share of employment in manufacturing in the labor intensive sector in particular has been largely due to the fact that women's wages are much lower than those of men. The wage gap between men and women continues to be striking. Women's earnings are on average 75% of those of men, and this may be an overestimate. In the Report of the U.N Commission on the Status of Women, Kurt Waldheim pointed out at the end of the International Decade for the advancement of women:

> *While women represent half the global population and one-third of the labor force, they receive only one-tenth of the world income and own less than one percent of world property.* (Morgan 1984: 1)

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income earner, and women are seen as secondary income earners, this becomes a rationalization for paying women less.

The United Nations Decade for the Advancement of Women World Survey indicated similar patterns in 1989. Nor is there any evidence the situation has changed in the 1990s –it may even have worsened in some parts of the world. (Terrel 1992: 387). As governments retreat from labor protection, working conditions, wages and job security deteriorate for women much more than for men since women are at the lower end of the job ladder and work very often on a part-time basis with no unions (Ibrahim 1989: 1097).

There are many reasons given for women's low wages. Some reflect social prejudice. Many managers argue that women's low wage is due to a "lower aspiration wages" factor (Standing 1989: 1080). Others claim that women are less skilled. Sometimes less skill means less education, though it is not clear that for labor-intensive manual labor formal education is always a crucial factor. Perhaps one of the most useful explanations put forward about the male-female wage gap is the segmented labor market theory. According to this theory the labor market is divided into two categories: one is "skilled", offering high pay, full time jobs and opportunities for advancement; the other is "unskilled", characterized by low pay, a tendency to be part-time, and providing little or no opportunity for advancement (Caine 1981; Cockburn 1985; Game and Pringle 1985). There have been criticisms of this dual labor market theory because of the rigidity of the two categories. Nonetheless, in analyzing women's labor as compared to that of men the theory can provide useful insight into understanding why women throughout the developing world continue to be paid less, work more as part-time workers, and do so at the lower end of the job ladder, with little prospect for advancement or skill enhancement.

The existence of the segmented/dual labor market also reinforces stereotypes about women based on their reproductive role (Anker 1997: 325). That reproductive role is used to justify practices such as a "marital masculinity premium" given to men in Taiwan. This male wage premium is a clear expression of the "breadwinner" ethic (Joekes 1987: 86). The fact that the number of single female-headed households is rising throughout the world seems to have little impact. Women's low wages may also be reduced (and the reduction rationalized) on the basis of another assumption about the

nature of female labor, namely that women's turnover and absentee rates may rise upon marriage. The facts behind such beliefs have been questioned. What little concrete information exists on labor turnover and absenteeism by sex indicates that there are such differences, but on average the differences are minor (Anker 1997). It is true that the bulk of family responsibilities are on women's shoulders and not on men's, which explains a slightly higher absenteeism among women. However, this is not universal - in some cases, female absenteeism is actually lower than men's (Humphrey 1985). Nonetheless, such a stereotype keeps female wage down.

Another stereotype about female labor, which helps justify their concentration in labour-intensive jobs, is that women are not fit to operate machinery. They are regarded as having less physical strength. That is complemented by the fact that machinery is expensive - hence it is better to make use of expensive machinery 24 hours per day to cover the capital cost as quickly as possible. This means night shifts are important; and women are not regarded as fit for night shifts. Night shift work supposedly means that when women go out to work at night they might be raped or be sexually abused or seduced. Even though many of these notions are stereotypes with little or no factual basis, belief in them both rationalizes and helps explain lower wages for women and their concentration in labour intensive tasks (Beller 1982; Chapman 1986; Terrel 1992).

In addition to stereotypes about women's frail physique disqualifying them from certain occupations, supposedly they have physical characteristics that give them a superior ability to work at repetitive jobs - which also have particularly low pay. In Southeast Asia in electronics, for instance, thousands of women have been employed (while men became the supervisors) allegedly because of their more nimble fingers. Something close to 80% of the electronics work force is female (Joekes 1987: 410).

There are more concrete and factually based reasons why women's wages are lower. Some countries impose certain types of requirements for employment of women such as day-care facilities and maternity leaves which makes female labour more expensive.

Where such legislation exists, women's wages are kept lower to compensate for such costs (Anker 1997: 319).

Another factor is social conditioning. Women in most cultures are raised to be modest, self-effacing and accepting of men's superiority (Wolf 1970). This produces a greater willingness to take orders, greater docility and a greater willingness to do monotonous/repetitive work with less inclination to complain publicly. Therefore women stay in low paid dead-end jobs much more than men would. They are also less likely to form unions. Furthermore there are those who are desperate for work, particularly women who are the head of single-income households (Standing 1989: 1080; Joekes 1987: 86-7). These traits are especially important in the rising employment of female labor in free trade zones where foreign capital is not prepared to take the risk of production disruption.

As women in low paid jobs continue to work without unions, men are kept quiet by working as supervisors and being given more power and financial advantages over women (Gannicott 1986; Standing 1989). Therefore, the nature of female labor not only increases profit for the economy but also guarantees production continuity and minimizes the risks of labor unrest among the total labour force.

Not least, as a result of the expansion of international commerce, business interests have sought to reduce labour costs. Reducing the price of labour is partly guaranteed by flexible arrangements by which during the down cycle, labour can be dismissed, and, during the up cycle, increased. Women's reproductive function has been used to increase this labour flexibility. When labour is in high demand, women are encouraged to leave home and join the labour force. During the down cycle, the opposite occurs. Women's family responsibilities make a good argument to send women back home when there is a reduction of demand (Anker 1997: 317-8). For example in Taiwan during the recession in the early part of the 1970s women's employment fell by fourteen percent compared with 8% of men (Joekes 1987: 96).

On top of these factors, there are certain structural ones, particularly the spread of downsizing and subcontracting. Prior to the 1970s the dominant trend was towards mass production, with specialization of function among a large labour force gathered in one place. But since the 1970s, a different model has become popular, one based on decentralization of production structures requiring even more flexible specialization and flexible employment arrangements. Two forms decentralization can take are homework and subcontracting (Rowbotham and Mitter 1994: 4). This model became even more prevalent with the triumph of the neo-classical approach during the 1980s and early 1990s. The attempt to get the price "right" in the context of international competition has led to the "casualization" of work, and with it a dramatic increase in subcontracting and homework. Not least, decentralization of production combined with sub-contracting and home-work has exacerbated the growth of the informal economy which remains unprotected by the state regulation and taxation, and therefore also outside union contacts and fringe benefits (Joekes 1987: 99; Beneria 1989: 184).

Decentralization of production sometimes means that production is broken down as much as possible into very basic tasks and then distributed among subcontractors. This type of low skill production brings wages down further (Beneria 1989: 181). It also makes women's cheap non-unionized labor increasingly desirable for investors seeking temporary employees and part-timers for subcontracting jobs (Standing 1989: 1079; Anker 1997: 329; Benton 1989; Beneria 1987). And this is often combined with a shift to home production.

As poverty has increased particularly sharply among women, many women take up homework jobs because of the possibility of combining childcare with homework (Naker 1997: 325-327). Such subcontracting of manufacturing work has been very important to investors who in turn contract with multinational corporations. Shoemaking in Asia is one example of subcontractors signing deals with major multinationals, and then putting the work out to home workshops dominated by women and often children as well. The Nike firm has achieved considerable notoriety in recent years precisely because of this.

As more women take up work at home rather than in factories, a great deal of the overhead costs associated with factory production are shifted onto the household. Entrepreneurs save a great deal by cutting down not only on the wage (along with utility charges and other elements of variable cost) but also on maintenance of buildings and similar fixed costs. According to conventional theory, these savings become profits in the pocket of entrepreneurs that presumably are reinvested into the economy, promoting further development – though clearly in reality a large number of other conditions have to be met for this to happen (Standing 1989: 1078-1079; Benton 1989; Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia 1989).

Figure 1: *Stereotypical Characteristics of Female Versus Male Work*

Women	**Men**
part-time	full-time
less skilled	more skilled
docile	create labour unrest
need day-care services	no social overheads
absenteeism because of family responsibilities	regularity of work
natural precondition for repetitive work	propensity for heavy work

Manufacturing has not been alone in witnessing a major increase of female labor participation. It has also been true in the service sector. Although the dynamics are slightly different, nonetheless, there are strong similarities. Women are still in low paid jobs and more likely to be clustered in areas dictated by their reproductive function. Women as mothers and wives continue to perform the same type of services for the society as whole. Therefore the number of women employed as teachers, nurses and social workers is much higher than for men. Although clearly women employed as nurses, for example might be expected in some cases to be paid more than men in some of the more menial industrial jobs, nonetheless women employed as teachers, nurses or

social workers typically earn less than men in roughly equivalent professions. (Schultz 1990: 457-481).

Again, the dual labor market theory helps to explain female segmentation into types of employment typically regarded as female. Women are elementary school teachers rather than university professors; they are nurses and midwives rather than doctors; secretaries rather than mangers or administrators (Safa 1977; Schmink 1977). The result is that the economy in many developing countries has benefited from women's low wages to improve social welfare. In fact, some types of welfare programs were extended in many developing countries precisely because it was possible to employ women with low salaries. The assumption is that women work for "pocket money." An alternative explanation, that there are an increasing number of single-headed households desperate for work at any wage, is not adequately taken into account in formulating state policy.

There are other, less traditional, sectors in which "pink-collar" low-wage jobs are increasing. For instance, a growing international financial sector and the accompanying services (telecommunication and the like), along with insurance and tourism can be provided at low cost because of low female salaries. This clearly benefits the international trade position of other sectors, including the heavy industries where a better-paid male labour force dominates production. And it also benefits foreign investors in sectors relying on these services (Broadbridge 1991; Sinclair 1991).

However most of the female contribution to the work force in the service sector comes in working class jobs that reflect women's reproductive labour activities. That is why women dominate as housekeepers, cleaners, cooks, waitresses, laundresses etc. (Moser 1987; Castells and Portes 1989: 12). These women come from low-income families, frequently from the rural areas. In times of poverty they are more willing to take up such jobs to make the ends meet, even if it requires migration to the cities. Many women who move to the cities also work as street vendors, expanding the underground economy, and some end up in prostitution (Turner and Ash 1975; Barnett 1976; Lee 1991).

The economy in many countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, (Thailand is the most notorious) has benefited a great deal from prostitution. Under the cover of the tourist industry, the state in some developing countries has used its women to attract male sex tourists from the wealthier countries. In addition they export women as prostitutes, though usually with the pretense they are bound for other more reputable roles. The Philippines is a good example where many women have left the country as maids and housekeepers, but many also have headed as "entertainers" to Europe and Japan. In the case of Cuba, too, women who can find foreign sponsors are allowed to leave the country under the category of artists.[8] This category, though, is often a euphemism for prostitution.

Whether the women end up in "respectable" occupations or in prostitution and street peddling, whether in the informal or the formal sectors, this internal migration by which women from low-income families' head to the cities combines with strong family ties that induce them to send much or most of their earnings home. It therefore provides low-income families with an important financial lifeline. If they also go abroad this provides an important source of foreign exchange for the country (Sen 1994: 45). If they move abroad with official sponsorship, these women also pay tax to their home governments and provide the state with some revenue collected through taxes. And in both cases the flow of remittances from abroad to very poor rural families helps alleviate income disparities, raising the purchasing power of the rural poor (Pong 1991: 132), and therefore having a stimulatory effect on the economy as a whole (Kung 1994; Salaff 1994; Ong 1987; Arrigo 1984; Diamond 1979; Wolf 1992).

3.2 Women's Reproductive Work

Even when women do not work outside home they still contribute to the economy by alleviating poverty. As Dalla Costa and James (1970) have argued, women's free labor in the household reduces what a worker, particularly in an urban job, has to be paid. If workers had to purchase such services as food, laundry or even sexual gratification, it is possible that his wage demands would increase considerably to cover the cost of

[8] Based on several interviews that I conducted in Cuba.

obtaining the same goods and services from the market. If women's unpaid work at home, measured by comparable market price and wages for the substitute worker, were actually paid, it might force a major increase in legal minimum wages (Goldschmidt-Clermont 1982). Women's unpaid work at home however, does not mean that their productive work will automatically disappear. In fact many women perform a "double day" - a full day at work in addition to their work at home (United Nation 1996). Therefore they contribute doubly to investors profits – working cheaply themselves and subsidizing wages of male workers through their unpaid work at home.

In recent decades the impact of structural adjustment programs, with rising food prices and reduction of other subsidies such as state sponsored health care and education services, has increased the burden on low-income families. Furthermore, under structural adjustment, unemployment has been exacerbated in many parts of the world. However, in the context of rising poverty, women, as the main caretakers of their families allowed, acted to prevent a major reduction of food and welfare services. In fact in many ways women have made up for the shortcomings of the state welfare function. For instance, as subsidized food decreased, many women bought cheaper food that usually requires more preparation time or traveled further to market to obtain better prices or came up with alternative menus that would provide the same nutritional values (Elson 1989: 70).

Cross-culturally women are more responsible for "household management," for making certain that members of the households are fed, clothed and cared for. While in general men are regarded as breadwinners and women as managers of that income, "stretching" the husband's cash contribution using housekeeping skills becomes a great asset to family well being. Very often when that income is far from enough, women undertake one of three possible alternative strategies – they themselves go out to work to bring an additional income; they produce food or clothing themselves; or they engage in bartering goods and services to compensate (Elson 1989: 70). [9]

With privatization of social services, private practice by doctors means that private patients get better access to services. That means the poor are squeezed out. Since maintenance of members of the family has fallen into the domain of women's unpaid work, they are responsible for strategies to cope with the losses of health care services. (Gardiner 1997) As Diane Elson points out:

> *... mothers do not 'scrap' their children or leave them to rot untended just because the state has decided or been forced by the international agencies to cut down on its social expenditure to balance its budget.* (Elson 1989: 68)

Maintaining human capital is a cost absent from macroeconomic calculation but, nonetheless, it is a cost that women cover through their unpaid work.[10]

The key to understanding the importance of this offset to the loss of welfare state functions is the difference between male and female expenditure patterns.[11] Many cross-cultural studies have shown that women's income is almost exclusively used for collective family needs, particularly children's education and nutrition. Whereas men tend to retain a considerable portion of their income for personal spending and to use if for such things as alcohol and tobacco (Rogers 1980; Charlton 1984; Hoodfar 1988; Summers 1992, Eviota 1992: 152). There is research, for instance, in India that showed that increasing working women's wage improves child nutrition while the same increase on men had no effect. Also there is a fairly large and increasing proportion of poor households headed either temporarily or permanently by women. Given women's lower incomes, this exacerbates the impoverishing effect of single-parenthood (Loutfi 1987:

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[9] In some cases there has been an overlap between home work and income generating activities such as some home-based services such as baking cooking sewing services such as repairs printing photography haircutting giving injections (Tipple 1993: 521-539) to supplement income.

[10] While it is true that many countries in the South have suffered the effects of structural adjustments in the 1980's and 1990's, women through their reproductive role have reduced the loss to human capital to a great extent.

[11] Feminists who have done work on inter-household resource allocation such as Elson (1990: 88) point to the fact that, as women's access to resources increases, there is a change in the dynamics of family expenditure. As noted in this quote, "The household is a site of conflict as well as cooperation; of inequality as well as mutuality; and conflict and inequality are structured along gender lines." It is now widely accepted that not all, household resources are necessarily or automatically pooled together.

112-3). In such situations, because of women's particular expenditure pattern, the family survives.

The difference of expenditure patterns between men and women stems from the fact that women, especially as mothers, identify themselves first with their families and then with their neighborhood – which in turn leads them into concern with their communities. By contrast, men's identity as bread-winners tends to be focused outside their community, particularly when they are in an urban setting. It tends to be focused on their work environment and the social connections linked to that work environment. This in turn helps to explain the difference in expenditure patterns, the fact that men are more prone to use income for luxuries of vices while women more reliably will spend on family needs (Rogers 1980; Charlton 1984; Hoodfar 1988; Summers 1992; Eviota 1992: 152; Hoodfar 1997). This pattern is likely to continue among low-income communities in particular. As a result this aspect of women's unpaid work will continue to be crucial to family survival.

Furthermore, the traditional view that women's expenditures on the basic needs of their families is merely consumption has been subjected to considerable criticism. It has been pointed out that spending money on children's education and health ought to be viewed as an investment. Indeed, children's education and health is argued to be the most important investment that a family makes for the economy as a whole.

As an example, there is evidence that the more women, such as Mende women in Sierra Leone, have control over economic resources, the more expenditure on education increases and the more girls benefit. The case of Gujarat State in India suggests that when women earn an income there is more equality within the family, which further increases investment in education and the health of the family (Jejeebhoy 1995: 8-9). Women's investment in education is more crucial in low-income families. When the family is very poor, education for children might mean just the primary level. Very often girls are encouraged to drop out in order for the boys to continue their higher education, depending on the availability and the cost of higher education. Yet over and over again

education has proven to be very important for development. When the family is better off as a result of women earning income, however, what women earn very often gets spent on higher education.[12] Not only do women with access to income earned by themselves spend it on the family but the economic empowerment both gives an example and helps favour the possibility of education for girls (Cain et al. 1979). Higher education for girls in return further increases employment possibilities for women, therefore enhancing human capital.

Moreover, as women's access to resources increases, their general status rises.[13] Numerous studies have shown that increasing women's status decreases fertility. Furthermore, where women enjoy higher social status as a result of greater access to economic resources, they have more chances of learning how to both survive themselves, improve their own and their families health and gain better access to family planning information and services (Balchin 1994: 12-13; Becker 1991; Rindufuss and Brewster 1996).

In many parts of the world, women and female children traditionally receive less food than male (Folber 1986: 240). Changes in the bargaining power between men and women within the household, affects the allocation of food between male and female children. Therefore as women's power increases, there is also a higher chance that girl children will survive. Cross-cultural studies also indicate that working women have a greater autonomy from their husbands and in-laws (Chaudhury 1982: 71-106; Youssef 1982; Dixon 1975: 15). And when women do have more decision-making powers, because of expenditure/investment pattern differences, again children benefit. Children of working mothers are always better fed. As a result infant mortality decreases and as children grow into being healthy adults life expectancy increases. Additionally, women with income can and do provide for better medical care, with the same results. (Mason 1997: 450; Caldwell 1979 and 1986; Subbarao and Raney 1993).

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[12] As participation increases education, education in turn increases productivity not only in the formal sector but also in the informal sector as well. (Ballora: 1992)

As shown by research on Nepalese families, women's employment outside the village increased their domestic decision-making role, from which female children often benefit (Acharya and Bennett 1982: 37). Even econometric analyses have indicated that female child mortality decreases as women's access to resources through employment increases (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; Schultz 1982). When the girl child has a better chance of survival, it helps to further reduce the fertility rate. The striking difference between boys' and girls' mortality rates due to nutritional and medical neglect of girls and the sex bias against women typical of the Indian subcontinent has been one of the reasons that fertility there has not declined (Joekes 1987: 14).

Furthermore, cross-cultural analysis indicates that as the opportunity cost of raising children increases, women tend to limit their families. With a general increase in the level of female employment, there is no doubt that the opportunity cost of raising a family increases enormously (Standing 1981: 177). It is obvious that however low the wages for women, they receive a higher pay than they get at home (effectively zero). This differential is greater in urban areas than in rural ones. In addition, in rural settings the types of jobs are much more susceptible to combining childbearing and employment (Smith 1981). An increasing number of educated women who live in urban areas face a conflict between their roles as wife-mother and as worker, as well as increasing opportunity costs (Stokes et al. 1983: 313). As Becker (1960) and Schultz (1973) illustrate, when the relative costs of raising children increases against the purchase of goods, many couples face a dilemma due to their declining expenditure power. Becker & Lewis (1974) and Nerlove (1974: 200-218) argue further that in many cases as female participation increases, the result shows up as child quality versus child quantity. Many other studies have pointed to an inverse relationship between the 'price' of children and desired family size. There can be no doubt based on an array of research and cross-country analyses that the economic cost of children to household income in many developing countries is an important factor in limiting fertility (Tinda 1979).

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[13] It is true that this may not happen and there cases where the income earned is handed over to men. Nonetheless, unless there is an income it is impossible to imagine any change of power structure within the

Fertility also decreases with high female participation, particularly in the formal market, which brings about a tendency for delaying marriage. When women's participation rate in labor in the formal market is high, it is usually coupled with an increasing educational level and an awareness of the health implications of multiple births. Therefore there is a tendency to increase spacing between births, further limiting fertility (Joekes 1987: 15; Freedman 1995: 12). Within the formal market in particular it is often hard to combine child rearing particularly young children with work.

3.3 Women's Volunteer Work

The third type of women's work falls into the volunteer category, usually provided collectively. Women's organizations in turn fall into several distinct categories in terms of their support and orientation.

Some are initiated and supported by the state in order to carry out state policies. These are very important in many developing countries. For example, after the revolution in China, many women's organizations were set up in urban and rural areas to implement revolutionary policies designed to increase productivity. The same applies to a country like Iran during the Shah, when the Shah's sister founded the Iranian Women's Organization. Members of state-initiated organization are usually middle class educated women from urban areas. The objectives of such organizations can vary tremendously. For instance, in the Iranian case, they had educational and vocational programs for low-income families. Many middle class women also worked voluntarily for the organization in programs designed to limit fertility. Similar organizations have existed throughout the developing world, where the state utilized women, usually from middle class backgrounds, to help implement economic policies. Such organizations not only carry out social functions, without the need for state financial assistance, but they can bring women into the labor market while preventing them from forming autonomous organizations (USAID 1999).

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family)

In some cases state-initiated organizations have been further empowered by international links. Under the UN policy of "adjustment with a human face," for example, UNICEF mobilized women to implement a program called "glass of milk" in Lima. The program was entirely carried out by women in their "free time."

In many other parts of Latin America, during the worst days of the structural adjustment policy, women's voluntary work was used as a means of survival and in order to deal with deteriorating conditions. For instance, women's volunteer groups set up communal kitchens particularly in Bolivia and Peru during the 1980s. The number of collective kitchens grew from 600 in 1985 to 1550 in 1988 number of women involved from 100,000 in 1985 to 250,000 in 1991 in Lima alone (Mosse 1993: 160). This type of women's volunteer work has shown an enormous capacity in dealing with poverty and in providing for social welfare, saving the state the financial burden of dealing with problems while also helping to keep the lid on social discontent.

Some women's organizations are purely non-governmental, though sometimes they emerge from earlier, state-sponsored ones. There are whole ranges of such organizations from small village charity types to nationwide umbrella organizations. An example of the small informal organization is the type formed recently in Cuba (quite distinct from the state) which carries out educational support services, making sure in some cases that teachers eat properly so that they have enough strength to provide children with high quality education.[14] On the other side, some are very large, sufficiently to cover an entire country. One such is *Arrow* (Asian-Pacific Resource & Research Center for Women), an organization based in Kuala Lumpur, which focuses on issues such as women's health and reproductive functions.

Between these two categories, state-initiated and non-governmental, there are a range of intermediate types. The most notable situation is when state-initiated organizations break away and become autonomous, like the example of women's organizations in post-revolutionary Iran (Hoodfar 1999). The state attempted to mobilize women to deal with

[14] From an interview conducted in Cuba.

environmental problems by initiating and supporting small groups of women. These volunteers then became independent pressure groups agitating for legal changes that would give women equal rights. But even when such organizations get "out of hand" and become civil rights groups they are still important to the economy in an indirect way through their actions as agents of civil society (Lele and Tettely 1996: 1-41). Very often political unrest is a great menace to economic development. When women's groups lobby for change it means there are avenues for a much less dramatic change, one that is much less disruptive to economic development.

As this chapter has demonstrated, when attempting to assess the contribution increased female labour force participation makes to a broadly-based process of economic development, it is not enough to focus merely on the quantity of labour supplied. To be sure, increasing female labour force participation will directly increase economic growth, by the standard measures, but so too will a similar increase in the male labour force participation rate. What must be stressed, however, is the *qualitative* difference resulting from increasing female rather than male labour, including taking into account the impact of women's reproductive rather than just productive roles. These distinctions are summarized in the chart below:

Figure 2:

Productive

→Low wage worker, usually in labor intensive sectors

→Non-unionized and flexible

→Second income earner in low-income household

Reproductive

→Subsidizing workers wages through unpaid home work

→Saving/expenditure pattern improves welfare

→Reducing infant mortality

→Increasing life expectancy

→Increasing educational level

→Reducing total fertility rate

Volunteer

→Implementing state economic policy

→Low cost welfare and social programs

In the next chapter, the impact of female labor on development will be examined at a macro level across the world.

Chapter Four

WOMEN AND WORK: A GLOBAL SURVEY

The core of this thesis argues that increasing participation by women in the formal economy has a positive impact over and beyond the merely quantitative. It is more than just an increase in the number of units of labour available. Rather women's work is quite different from men's, and therefore increases in female participation have effects qualitatively distinct from those of male. Such differences suggest a country could obtain net benefits from policies that favor promoting female as distinct from male labour force participation and employment.

The previous chapter dealt with definitions of women's work. The current one continues by a more careful definition of the term "development" then goes on to narrow down the set of cases in which the main hypothesis can be tested.

There are many ways that development has been defined. But the modernization and neo-classical mainstreams have viewed development as largely synonymous with economic growth. Therefore the level of GNP or GDP per capita has been regarded as an important, if not the most important, indicator of such growth. This is well illustrated by the fact that the World Bank Development Report has always categorized countries into high, medium and low-income groups by taking GNP per capita as their distinguishing measure. This in fact is one of the major grounds for which both modernization and neo-classical approaches have come under attack by many different schools (Martinussen 1977: 37, Sen 1999).

Some of those criticisms will be dealt with later in this chapter; and they will be incorporated into the analysis in subsequent chapters. However, in undertaking a more general analysis of the impact of female labour on development on a global basis, in this chapter GNP per capita alone will be used to simplify the exercise. Given the limited

objective of narrowing the field for testing the main hypothesis, such a basic measure will suffice.

1. World Analysis:

A statistical analysis of the relationship between average female labour force participation during the years 1980-1984 and average GNP per capita growth over the period 1985-1995 was conducted using the World Bank database. The reason for the difference in time frame over which the averages were taken reflects the fact that fluctuations in GNP per capita growth figures were much greater than those in female labour force participation rate (FLFP). Correlating the average female participation rate in one period with average economic *growth* rate in the next period avoids the problem of reverse causality. In addition, the lag enables the analysis to exclude effects *from* economic growth on female labour force participation. Taking female labour force for the earlier period ensures that the causality—if there is any—has to be FLFP→GNP only. Such analysis takes into account all aspects of women's work, indirect as well as direct contribution. Since, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter, a great deal of women's contribution is through their reproductive and volunteer work (via different mechanisms such as fertility reduction and expenditure pattern), inevitably there is a time lag for such factors to have an impact.

Moreover, the indirect effects on growth would seem to depend more on the *level* of female participation than on its *growth.* The principal literature on female employment indicates the existence of a global pattern (Boserup 1970, Charlton 1981, Schmick, Bruce and Kohn 1986, Monsen 1991, Jabbra 1992, Rathgeber 1992, Schultz, 1992). There are places where female employment the formal economy has been high and others where it has been low. The rate shows very little increase over the time for which comparable global data is available. Furthermore, my comparison at this stage is essentially cross-sectional, not long-term historical. Historical comparisons are left for the detailed case studies.

The results of the regional analysis are illustrated by table 1 and figure 1. These show that the correlation for the world sample is -0.02, which indicates that there is no relation between the two variables. The scatter-plot figure (1) for all LDCs suggests that where there is a very high level of FLFP, there is a very wide range of growth rates. This means that some countries with apparently high female participation rates (Sub-Saharan Africa, for example) are doing very poorly indeed. These results have been confirmed by earlier results in which I took the same variable but slightly different years even though the data sources were different (See Appendix II). This is possibly caused by various confounding variables that obscure the underlying relationship. A wide range of variables, other than female labour force participation, obviously affects the GNP per capita. These include the level of industrialization, the nature and significance of a country's natural resource base, and, of course, simply the quality of the data on female employment. These factors will be taken into account when detailed case studies are examined in future chapters.

Table 1: *Female Labour Force Participation and GNP per Capita Growth*

	Correlation FLFP 80-84/GNP growth 85-95
Whole sample	-0.02
Asia	0.80
Africa	-0.08
Latin America	-0.17
Whole Middle East	0.52

Figure 1: *Female Labour Force participation by GNP Per Capita: World.*



Source: Wold Development Indicator (1998)

Number of Observations: 64 countries

However, it is clear from the initial analysis, and from the literature, that there would be expected to be sharp contrasts in regional patterns. Therefore the next step was to divide the world into regions. At this point interesting results occurred. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, high FLFP bears no relation to the rise of GNP per

capita. On the other hand, the Middle East shows a positive relationship between the level of FLFP and increasing GNP per capita, although the participation rate is extremely low. And Asia shows an even stronger positive relationship.

These results confirm the fact that there are confounding variables that could affect the result from the world sample. In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, for instance, the relatively high level of female participation is due to their prominent role in the traditional agricultural sector. However, African countries have a very low level of industrialization, which puts them among the poorest of the world both in income level and growth record. These countries are mainly agricultural of the traditional sort.

In Latin America and the Caribbean the relationship is also negative. Most Caribbean countries, like those in Sub-Saharan Africa, have high female participation rates and low growth; while for most of the Latin American continent, high FLFP is associated with high GNP per capita growth. The Caribbean, like Sub-Saharan Africa, has a predominant agricultural sector with high FLFP. In Latin America, there is a mixture of countries. Those of Central America have a Caribbean-African pattern of high FLFP coupled with low growth, while in other parts of Latin America high FLFP is associated with substantial increases in per capita income. Furthermore the entire region of Latin America and the Caribbean has a huge informal female share of employment whose absence from the official statistics causes some confusion about the reliability of the results.

The correlation for the Middle-Eastern and North African countries is also confounded by the fact that female labour force participation is the lowest in the world, while oil revenue has brought a great deal of income. In fact, due to the existence of oil, labour in general has not been as important as in non-oil producers. As a result, the importance of female labour has been even more marginal. This remained true even though, for the chosen time period, many oil producing countries were experiencing low and sometimes-negative income growth. The positive correlation is largely due to the coincidental fact that, on the one hand, the oil-producing countries that also had disproportionately low female

participation happened to have a bad growth record during this period. On the other hand, non-oil producing countries in that region had a relatively higher female participation rate and during that period have a better economic performance.

The results from the Middle East and North Africa, with the world's lowest female force participation rate, are therefore curious. The only other region of the world that shows a positive relationship between FLFP and increase in GNP per capita is Asia. Again, the regional results have been confirmed using other data sources. These results are in fact very interesting because it is only in Asia that there has been significant broadly based sustainable growth as opposed to the type of growth based on the export of raw material. Within Asia it is Southeast Asia that has for the period under analysis shown a consistent high growth rate, unmatched by any other region of the world. The results are indicated both in table 1 and figure 2.

Figure 2: *Female Labour Force Participation by GNP Per capita by GNP Growth Asia*



Sources: World Bank Development Indicator and World Development Report 1997.

2. Choosing Case Studies:

Southeast Asia is not only the only region where sustained, broadly based development has taken place, it also has relatively high, but widely varying both in level and character, FLFP. Therefore it is the ideal region for examining the linkages between the level and character of female participation and economic growth and development. To conduct an in-depth and detailed analysis of cases over a long period of time, three within Southeast Asia were chosen. In examining these cases a more comprehensive understanding of development beyond simply GNP growth per capita will be adopted. For taking one single, purely economic, indicator as a measure of development can be misleading. Furthermore, there is a need to take account of factors other than FLFP that affect economic performance and the level of development. Therefore, the thesis will choose as case studies countries that are very different from each other in as many respects as possible.

2.1 Defining Development

Many have criticized the simple equation of economic growth with development. Such criticisms date back to the 1960s and the 1970s. It was in response to such criticisms that the Human Quality Life Index was created, by Morrison (1982). This index takes into account such factors as the level of infant mortality, life expectancy and educational levels. In fact some critiques go even further to insist that, to define development in broadly human terms, also requires paying attention to political rights, the status of women and, more recently, environmental concerns.

It is quite legitimate and extremely desirable to incorporate measures like political freedom, gender factors and environmental issues as part of the concept of development. However, broadening the meaning of development to such an extent would mean that a quantitative and qualitative analysis of case studies over a long period of time (since the World War II) would be beyond the scope of the current thesis. Furthermore, for the purpose of comparative work, quantitative data on such indicators as the Gini index,

human development, democratic rights indicators, status of women indicators and environmental indictors dating back further than the 1990s are simply absent. Therefore for purposes of this thesis, to measure the impact of women on development, the components of the Human Quality Life Index will be used along with per capita GNP and total fertility rate (which is excluded from the HQLI). Although issues relating to the status of women are examined in the case studies, there was insufficient consistent data over a long period of time to construct a meaningful a quantitative index of such complexity.

2.2 Three Case Studies

As mentioned above, to take account of factors other than female labour force participation which affect per capita GNP, this thesis has selected three countries that differ economically, socially and politically as widely as possible: Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan. While Taiwan has been economically successful over a long period of time, Indonesian economic performance has put the country into the category of medium income countries, while the Philippines is the only country in the region to experience negative income growth for a certain time during the post World War II era. Other comparative factors will be divided into two categories. The first will be "static" factors such as the size of the country, the colonial history, nature of land reform, the nature of the state, and the prevailing religion. The second is "dynamic" factors such as economic development strategy and the nature of industrialization.

As far as the static factors are concerned, Taiwan is a small country, basically one island with a small population. Indonesia, by contrast, is a large country spread over 8,000 inhabited islands and constitutes the fourth most populous country in the world. The Philippines lies somewhere in between. Taiwan was a colony of the Japanese that implemented a very successful land reform. Indonesia was a Dutch colony with no land reform. The Philippines was a Spanish-American colony very much like the Latin American countries, which also had no land reform. The three cases also represent three very important and quite different world religions, Christianity in the Philippines, Islam in Indonesia and Taoism/Confucianism in Taiwan. But most important of all is the nature

of their state. Taiwan has had a strong state committed to charting a unique course of broadly integrated economic development. Indonesia, though long ruled by military autocrats, basically followed the classic dual-economy model, with huge export income from capital-intensive resource exploitation in one sector controlled by the state, while most of the population was left to traditional forms of subsistence economic activity. The Philippines lacked both a commitment to development by the state and a lucrative resource to generate export income.

Comparative Background

Country	State	Colony	Religion	Size	Land reform
Taiwan	Strong	Japan	Confucianism	Small	Effective
Indonesia	Weak	Dutch	Islam	Large	Not-effective
The Philippines	Weak	Spain America	Christianity	Medium	Not-Effective

Of all these factors, the nature of the state and its economic development strategy is singled out in the subsequent discussion as having special importance. This includes decisions as to how to use the labour force, particularly the female component. In this respect, all three countries have evolved through three phases (that are identical to those experienced by many other countries of the world).

First came an import substitution, inward-looking phase. Note that its exact manifestation and its duration are very different in the three cases. In Taiwan it was very short, ending by the end of the 1950s; and import-substitution meant largely the substitution of imported manufactured goods. In Indonesia the period lasted into the 1960s, but after the 1970s went through an important change – initially the focus was on substituting agricultural production, while in later years the government also began to develop certain indigenous manufacturing, including such sectors as automobiles. In the case of the Philippines, inward looking strategy never really began or ended. During the pre-Marcos period, there seems to have been a brief flirtation with import substitution, which

continued into the early Marcos period. After the imposition of martial law in 1971, the power of the old landed elite, which had pressed for restrictions on foreign control, waned, and the economy began to open. However there was never a major industrialization drive.

Country	Import-substitution Inward Looking	Export-promotion Outward Looking	Restructuring/ Structural Changes
Taiwan	1946- early 1959	1960-early 1990s	Early 1990s
Indonesia	1950s –1960s	1960s-late 1980s	From 1989
The Philippines	1940s-mid 1960s	1960s-late 1980s	From 1980s

As far as, export promotion and outward-looking strategy are concerned, in Taiwan the state set up manufacturing for export to the world market. The state also created a favorable atmosphere for foreign companies to invest by setting up free trade zones. The Indonesian State opened doors to foreign companies to set up firms either by themselves or as joint ventures. Indonesia also set up free trade zones where foreign companies, many from Taiwan and Korea, produced manufactured goods for export. In the Philippines, the influence of the local land owning class decreased and a new class of industrialists in alliance with foreign firms invested in free trade zones mainly to produce manufacturing for export.

During the period of structural changes, Taiwan had already reached a certain level of industrialization and, increasingly, Taiwanese entrepreneurs went offshore to invest in the production of manufacturing goods, while inside Taiwan they specialized in high tech. In Indonesia, under the pressure from the World Bank and IMF, the state adopted several free market reforms, such as deregulation and reductions in social spending. For the Philippines restructuring came earlier than Indonesia. The huge debt built under Marcos made the Philippines very vulnerable to the World Bank and the IMF. As a result, free market reforms not only started earlier than in Indonesia but were more profound.

In all three case studies, women have a very high rate of employment, but with major differences. In Taiwan the percentage of women is very high in manufacturing compared to agriculture and services. In Indonesia, women are overwhelmingly employed in the agricultural sector. It is true that women are well represented in manufacturing, but this sector accounts for a low percentage of total employment. And in the Philippines women are mainly in the service sector. In addition, Taiwan has, high female *formal* employment participation, (as the informal sector is relatively very limited) while both Indonesia and the Philippines have high *informal* female employment.

Country	GNP Growth	Economic base	Natural resources
Taiwan	High	Labour-intensive Manufacturing	Does not rely
Indonesia	Medium high	Dual economy Labour-intensive Capital –intensive Manufacturing	Oil, mining Timber
The Philippines	Medium	Manufacturing & Agriculture	Arable land

In the following chapters, these different patterns of female labour force participation will be examined for these three cases within the context of the particular nature of the state and its economic strategy. The analysis will start with a historical survey of the pre-World War II era, covering both political and economic history with particular reference to the role of women.

CHAPTER FIVE

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In this chapter the historical experiences of the three selected cases are examined under four headings: (1) general socio-political background; (2) economic structure: (3) social structure with particular reference to the role of women in the economy; and (4) the origin and role of women's organizations.

Taiwan

1.1 General Socio-Political Background

The population of Taiwan is of Malayo-Polynesian origin, primarily from a, fishing, hunting and gathering community, who settled around 1500. At that time the population was scattered among a set of distinct village-communities without any general governing structure and with little or no long-distance trade. The division of labour by gender is unknown.

By the mid-17th Century many Chinese, mainly farmers, had migrated to the island where they cultivated rice, sugar cane, indigo, grain plants and potatoes. They also hunted deer and fished. The Chinese intrusion led to isolated acts of trade with the small indigenous communities, bringing them into the world of international exchange. Deer skin and sugar became the major exports to Japan, while dried fish and deer meat was shipped to China (Eto 1964). After the overthrow of the Ming dynasty trade was followed by formal conquest (Joktik 1964: 193). Although the intent of the Chinese was to use the island as a stepping-stone for restoring the Ming dynasty, in fact the occupation turned into a permanent one. The Chinese continued to dominate except for a brief period of Dutch and Portuguese control.

With the arrival of European imperial control came substantial changes in patterns of government and trade. While the Chinese had used Taiwan as a resource base, for the Dutch East India company it was more a base for long-distance trade, particularly the exchange of Chinese tea, raw silk and silk products, lacquer and porcelain to Java, Japan and Europe in

exchange for gold and gold objects and silverware, copper and copper goods and other goods such as porcelain (Beckmann 1973: 38; Ho 1978). Simultaneously the Dutch sought to promote an increase in domestic agricultural production to feed their soldiers. The economic base evolved from hunting and gathering to slash and burn agricultural practice. At the same time the demographics began to change. More Chinese arrived, and the indigenous people were driven further inland (Eto 1964: 44).

The Dutch had a policy of assimilating the natives. To that end they set up schools and churches and were able to co-opt headmen of some of the villages. To cover expenses they demanded high taxes from native villages and made the Chinese subject to capitalization tax. In the mid 17th century the Chinese rebelled, many were killed and their rebellion crushed (Beckmann 1973: 47-49). But in the 1660's, Cheng Chen-Kung (or Koxinga), the founding father of today's Taiwan, managed to defeat the Dutch and establish the first Chinese-run government (Chang 1973: 59).

For the next two centuries migration of Chinese from the mainland accelerated. The result was extensive sinicization. (Knapp 1980: 55-68). Over the same period, the remaining aboriginal people became incorporated into the sinicization process through inter-marriage, or were beaten back into the highland regions. Although there were periodic uprisings of the indigenous population, Taiwan's sinicization continued without interruption up to the late 19th century when the Japanese defeated the Chinese and took over. Today out of the total population of 20,659,000 only about 250,000 aboriginals remain, mainly residing on reservations in the mountainous central and eastern regions (Lin 1989: 283-300).

Sinicization of Taiwan does not mean that ethnic conflict has been absent from the history of the island (Eto 1964: 47; Kuo 1973: 183). The majority of Chinese are Fukinese and Hakka Cantonese; there have been ethnic conflicts between these two groups, even though both sub-groups migrated to Taiwan at the same time (Walker 1973: 362). The Hakka with their own dialect today constitute 85% of the population.[1]

[1] The Hakka own 85% of the small firms in Taiwan and have been the main group to stand against the Kuomindang (Hsiung 1996: 24-5).

Since the aboriginal people of Taiwan are nearly extinct, this work will not include an examination of the nature and socio-economic fabric of the aboriginal population. The discussion is confined to the social and political dynamics of the dominant Chinese migrant-colonizers who in turn were colonized by the Japanese, albeit for a relatively short period of time.

Towards the end of the 19th Taiwan was ruled by a reform oriented Chinese governor who installed a postal service, telegraph lines, railroads, and seaports. By the time Taiwan was handed over to Japan it was already very modernized (Wei 1973: 442). The handover brought a great deal dissatisfaction among the Chinese both inside Taiwan and on the mainland. It is no coincidence that the same year saw the first sparks of the modern Chinese revolution led by Sun Yat-Sen (Lein 1973: 165).

Although following the Sino-Japanese war the Chinese government quickly moved to hand over Taiwan to Japan, the transition was far from smooth (Lamley 1973: 300). In fact the Sino-Japanese war was a smaller affair than was the ensuing Taiwanese armed resistance. In the north, where an independence movement had proclaimed Taiwan a republic, the war ended quickly. But in the south the armed struggle was protracted (Kublin 1973: 318; Eto 1964: 55).

In 1920 there came a new rebellion led by Taiwan Seinen (young Formosa), which called for Formosan autonomy. With a large following among farmers and factory workers, the movement eventually constituted the Formosan Communist Party (Joktik 1964: 163). Over the 1920's the number of people annually arrested or executed ran at 3400 (Kublin 1973: 317-352).

While the Japanese had to face great resistance, it did not stop them from improving living conditions in Taiwan. They installed many reforms. Improved sanitation controlled diseases and reduced death rates. They also brought in extensive welfare and education programs. In

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Kuomindang (Hsiung 1996: 24-5).

fact living condition for many farmers were, if not better than those of Japan were, almost as good (Kublin 1973: 317-358).

Japan's rule ended on October 15, 1945. Even before then, the Cairo agreement of 1943 had ceded Taiwan back to the Chinese Nationalist government. However the outcome of the Chinese Civil War prevented that agreement from being implemented.

1.2 Economic Structure

In 1624 the Netherlands East Indian Company seized Taiwan and opened up trade relations. Tea, raw silk, silk products and porcelain went via Taiwan from China to Java and Japan and on to Europe while European merchandise returned to Japan and China. The Dutch also encouraged Chinese migrants. Their slash-and-burn farming techniques were intended not simply to increase agricultural production but to deprive the indigenous people of their means of livelihood.

In the early 17th century, after the Ming dynasty had already been defeated on the mainland by the Manchus, Ming loyalists drove the Dutch from Taiwan. The leader of Ming loyalists brought 25,000 troops to Taiwan to encourage further settlement and agricultural cultivation. From this time, agriculture with the products traded for domestic consumption replaced foreign trade as the foundation of the island economy. Under the special system of land tenure created by the Chinese to encourage further migration of main land Chinese at the expense of the local population, tenants were given rights not seen on the mainland. For instance the tenant could to lease or sell surface rights (Lin 1989: 285-286). This process of steady migration and settlement continued until the Chinese defeat in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895.

One of the most important characteristics of early Japanese domination was a significant land reform (Auty 1997: 447). Rather than forming large agricultural farms, the Japanese mainly worked with the existing peasant sector. They expropriated estates of the larger

absentee landlords and redistributed the land to middle sized landlords who were actually resident on the lands (Amesden 1985: 81). The Japanese also introduced a new system of tenure, which was halfway between full ownership and tenant status. (Grabowski 1988: 55). Furthermore, under the Japanese, irrigation networks were expanded (Myers 1984: 439). By the 1930's a "green revolution" had taken place in which new farming techniques and chemical fertilizers were used to increase rice and sugar production for export to Japan (Ching et al. 1964: 555-70; Ho 1968: 313-40; Kublin 1973: 352; Amesden 1985: 81). Thus, Taiwan became Japan's food supply depot as well as a good market for Japanese consumer and capital goods (Ho 1987: 29) In addition, the Japanese build infrastructure, expanding the system of roads and railways. The Japanese also improved the educational system and health care provisions (Ogden 1993: 48).

Japanese colonialism therefore was very different from that of the Europeans. The Japanese put in place many conditions that were beneficial to Taiwan's later development (Ranis 1979). This positive impact of the Japanese era has put Taiwan in a much different position than other countries in Asia (Lin 1989: 283-297) It certainly set Taiwan apart from those countries of the region where European and American colonization (Indonesia was a Dutch colony, and the Philippines a Spanish and American one) took place.

1.3 The Role of Women in the Economy

Under Chinese rule Taiwan's economic structure was founded on agriculture using an imported land tenure system. Although the land tenure system changed during Japanese rule, production of agricultural products, rice in particular, for the colonial power, was still the economic backbone. Production of rice has traditionally depended on the Chinese family structure, relying heavily on women's labour. This Chinese family structure is based on the Confucian precepts of filial piety and ancestor worship. This patrilineal extended family performs many savings, investment, and production functions as a unit. Although numerous religions have been introduced into Taiwan from many parts of the world, nonetheless

Chinese Confucianism has remained by far the most dominant, and with it the economic role of the extended family.

As is common in traditional Chinese society, women in Taiwan are taught to cultivate the 'four virtues': morality, skill in handicrafts, feminine appearance and appropriate language (Cohen 1988: 107). However Chinese commitment to Confucian principles (enshrined in the practice of ancestor worship of the husband's family) means that, although women's work is essential to the economy, women cannot challenge their subjugation within the extended family. According to the concept of filial obligation, girls are regarded as liabilities, as a drain on family income and resources because they marry and have to leave their natal family (Wolf 1977). In order to deal with this future negative impact, "loss" girls must fulfill their filial obligation from the time they are able to work. They are socialized to work hard, hand over the fruits of their work, and be docile. Therefore girls work much harder than boys. On the other hand, boys are assets since they bring into their families women whose productive and reproductive labour is to serve the husbands' family. Girls are discouraged from bonding with their mothers and are subject to harsh living conditions to assure that they will be submissive daughters-in-law.

This tradition, wherein girls are docile, hard working and loyal to the patriarch of the family, in conjunction with exogamy, which separates women from their natal family, has provided a background for the present composition and comportment of today's Taiwanese women workers (Wolf 1977; Gallin 1984: 76-92; Bello & Rosenfell 1990; Kung 1994). Women must still work hard outside and inside the home, and hand over without question the fruits of their work as their tribute to their families, natal or post-natal. As in Mainland China, women in Taiwan did not have land ownership right.

1.3 Women's Organizations

This background, which the Japanese occupation and colonization period was neither long enough not repressive enough to seriously change, has had a significant impact on women's organizations. Not surprisingly, unlike their sisters

in pre-Communist Mainland China, Taiwanese women did not have any significant record for forming independent organizations that would be able to mobilize women for nationalist and feminist causes.

Indonesia

2.1 General Socio-Political Background

Indonesian history goes back much further than that of Taiwan. Some 7,000 years ago, the islands were settled by people of Mongolian stock, followed by successive waves of people from China, Thailand and Vietnam. Ancient religious roots in animism gave way to Hinduism from India at approximately 200 AD; this was but the first of many outside cultural influences. Around 700 AD, Buddhist missionaries arrived though Hinduism continued to be strong. In fact the Hindu Majapahit Kingdom was formed in East Java in 1294. For a time the kingdom had considerable control over the archipelago. Muslims had arrived in Java in the 11th century but not until the 15th and 16th centuries did Islam become state religion. As the kingdom of Majapahit declined after the late 14th Century, old satellite kingdoms converted to Islam. At present 87% of Indonesians are Muslim. By the 15th century the center of power moved to Melaka, which had become the trade center.

When the Europeans arrived, Indonesia was broken into many kingdoms and principalities. In the late 15th and early 16th centuries the Portuguese waged war and captured Maluku. That gave them control of a trading empire that stretched from Maluku to Melaka. But it was the Dutch in the 17th century who achieved final victory over Indonesia, which they controlled until World War II when the Japanese took over.[2]

The Japanese occupation provided the foundations on which Indonesia's independence would be built. The Japanese did not repress independence movement. Indeed, the emerging leader, Sokarno, was free to campaign. At the same time the Japanese allowed Indonesians to

[2] While Hinduism and Buddhism was still practiced, and Islam came to dominate; the presence of the Portuguese has been responsible for creating a minority of Catholics. In addition, under the control of the Dutch some Indonesians were converted into Protestantism. Consequently in addition to different ethnicities,

work in their government bureaucracy, providing them with the infrastructure for their future state. They also organized a militia youth army. When, at the end of the war, the Japanese were forced to leave, the Dutch, supported by the British military, attempted to resume control. Indonesia under the leadership of Sokarno and with the help of both the Indonesian Communist Party PKI and the Muslim parties entered into a bloody war, first against the British, then the Dutch. The brutality with which the British and Dutch tried to suppress the independence movement attracted the world's attention. And Sokarno skillfully played on a combination of world sympathy and Soviet support to win independence in 1949 (McGawley 1959; Collinwood 1992; Booth et al. 1990).

2.2 Economic Structure

Before Dutch colonization, the Portuguese had been actively trading with the inner islands (such as Kalimantan and Celebes). Soon they "discovered" the outer islands (namely Java and Sumatra) where the economy was based on wet-rice production (Geertz 1963).[3] Once the Dutch moved in, they opened trade with Bengal, Japan and Formosa (Taiwan). Java became *de facto* a huge estate using forced labour to cultivate export crops, which were exchanged for manufactured goods imported from Europe.

The main concern of the Dutch was to extract the maximum profit from Indonesian commercialized agricultural for the world market, without fundamentally changing the general economic structure of the archipelago as a whole, or altering its social fabric (Geertz 1968: 48; Palmier 1985: 1-12). They also attempted to leave room for the indigenous economy. In other words, they created a "dual" economic system. The way the "dual economy" worked, the export sector was carefully administered, while, the indigenous family and land-ownership structure was preserved to grow basic food crops. Therefore family-unit agriculture, home industry and petty trade co-existed with plantations and factories.

Indonesia is a country with many different religious minorities

[3]Java and Sumatra volcanoes provided a highly fertile soil which meant a greater population density (Fryer, 1970: 295)

Plantation agriculture, chiefly concerned with coffee, pepper, spices and sugar for export, mainly belonged to the nobility, hand-picked by the Dutch. But there was a second group of plantation-farmers, of growing importance. The Company would lease land to Chinese employees and cede them seigniorial rights over people in the villages. Meanwhile landless locals would work on the estates. The resulting power permitted the Chinese migrants to become intermediaries between the indigenous population and the colonial power. (Geertz 1968: 50-52).

By the 1860's plantations were set up in the outer islands as well as to produce tobacco, rubber, tea, coffee and coconut (O'Malley 1990: 161-162). Peasants were forced to work on plantations through the institution of Tanam Paksa (compulsory planting). By mid-20th century, Indonesia produced most of the world's quinine and pepper, over a third of its rubber, a quarter of its coconut and almost a fifth of its tea, sugar, coffee and oil.

As colonial production expanded along with forced cultivation, the *pribumi* (Indonesian indigenous population) began to resist their Chinese overseers and, even more strongly, their Dutch colonial masters. This resistance however, did not challenge the basis of economic structure, which continued unchanged into the 20th century. From the early decades of this century however, limited manufacturing producing goods such as textiles was established, though its growth was hampered by the brief Japanese colonization, and the sector became stagnant during the immediate post independence period.

2.3 The Role of Women in the Economy

As the colonial economy expanded, rice production became less labour intensive. That freed labour for work on plantations. This had a direct impact on women's work. From the earliest period under Dutch East India Company domination, women had a significant presence in the labour intensive sector. As late as the early 20th century, studies indicate that an average of 50%-80% of women's time was spent on various aspects of rice production (Locher-Scholten 1987: 82). But the demand for labour was so great that female labour, in addition to continuing to dominate rice production, became necessary for night work in sugar, tea and

coffee factories. Night shifts were also common during the harvest of sugar cane and cassava, in the fiber, palm (oil) and tobacco industries and in salt production. (O'Malley 1990: 139; Locher-Scholten 1987: 91).

During this time in Java 43.4% of the labour force was paid female workers. Scholten argues that the percentage of employed women was not a function of population density but depended on the availability of women who were willing to work, mainly married women (Locher-Scholten 1987: 85-6). Where there were more married women, participation was higher. In contrast to Taiwan, where women were family laborers, Indonesian women working in the cash crops sector were paid.

In addition to agricultural production, women, along with men, went into trade and industry. In some areas as much as two thirds of employed women were in trade and industry, particularly in traditional production such as bamboo-craft and in the modern textile industry. In Mandura and East Java 92% of textile work was in the hands of women, while it has been estimated that up to 72% of the labour force in woodwork, bamboo craft and food making was also female. Furthermore 68% of workers in luxuries such as sweets production were women, as were 54% in mixed retail trade (Locher-Scholten 1987: 86-7).

The extent to which women were engaged in trade and the nature of their activities varied according to their access to the means of production. Similarly, income generated from trade depended on their access to the market and market places. Some had direct access to the local market. Others, though, had to carry their products to neighboring villages and towns. Many women prepared dried herbs and carried them on their back, traveling to wherever they could be sold, a practice that has survived until today. And many women still carry for sale merchandise they have made, such as basketwork and pottery, as well as garden products they have grown. Many women, too, set up tiny restaurants.

The importance of women in trade becomes more crucial since, unlike Taiwan where women have had no independent economic existence separate from their families and were

not paid, Indonesian women have for long been in charge of their own income and property. The fact that Indonesian women were both able to be independent wage earners and to exercise control over income they generated enabled them to function as welfare agents. There is evidence that women took part in *arisan*, which is a female exclusive rotating saving/credit system, to raise money for families' needs. Furthermore, since they could bring additional income to the family as independent wage earners, their participation in the labour market had an income redistribution effect, much needed in the economically polarized society of the colonial era.

Women were not only economically more independent than in many other parts of Asia, but they enjoyed a more important role in political leadership. In ancient Indonesia, there is evidence that kings, unlike in China and India, were sometimes succeeded by daughters or nieces. From 1641 to 1658, the Atjeh throne was occupied by a woman; and during the anti-colonial revolts of late 18th and early 19th century, many women identified with Atjeh were involved in combat (Suleiman 1960: 45). Tjut Nua Dien, widow of the Achehnen hero, Teuku Umar, was killed in action. She is regarded as one of the heroes of the nationalist movement. By other accounts, southern Sulawesi women have ruled as queens - one example is the Buddhist Queen Rajapatni in 1350. Several women also reigned in Java in the period before colonial rule (Suleiman 1960: 46).

There is also evidence that in parts of Indonesia a matrilineal/matriarchal system was dominant. Under such circumstances, women enjoyed the same rights as men and had more power over the society since agricultural land belonged to the matriarch. Mamoks (female head of the household/the matriarch) would bring their daughter's husband into their own household. The matron's role in the family council was also important, particularly before the Dutch were able to penetrate the indigenous social structure. Women became "Kepala Warrie" who managed the indivisible family goods. Under these matriarchal or semi-matriarchal systems there is no dowry; and in-laws stay with the mother's side in big family houses where the matrilineal joint family live together. The mamok gives rice sawah (rice

paddy) to those who want to marry. In some parts of Java women are known to own large properties and workshops and to be influential in the village council.

Matrilineality and mamoks still exist in parts of Indonesia today. But this type of family structure, and the traditional distribution of power it represented, has been in decline ever since the Dutch, in conformity with their own social structure, sought to appoint men as heads of the household, as village chiefs and in other leadership roles. Under Dutch colonialism and forced cultivation, especially in Java, economic as well as political authority was placed in the hands of these appointed male village chiefs who exercised autocratic power, ruled by heredity, and were in charge of deploying manpower.

2.4 Women's Organizations

By 1900 however there was a resurgence of women's political power. Women organized to take up the cause of nationalism and of women's rights, challenging both colonialism and the sexual hierarchy. In fact, at the turn of the century, Indonesian women were among the most politically active in the world. Compared to English suffragettes, a women's movement mainly composed of upper class ladies, the Indonesian women's organizations were mass-based, and many village women came to organize and fight on both fronts, for national independence and for female equality. In 1916 they published the Patri Merdeka (the free woman) newspaper; and in 1928 the First Indonesian National Women's Congress (an umbrella organization) held a nation-wide meeting in which several thousands of women gathered. These organization were also very effective in addressing practical issues such as the fight against illiteracy, in teaching crafts and in setting up community cooking programs to free women from their daily cooking and save their time for social programs and political activities. In 1928 the women's congress called for the creation of a "Mother's Day" to highlight the importance of women's reproductive role. The women's congress worked together with the nationalists, which had a very "feminist" agenda, to denounce polygamy. (Vreede-De Stuers 1960: 100)

During Japanese rule, the women's movement was allowed to operate. From 1942, women of all classes came together to fight illiteracy, run co-operative kitchens and engage in different types of social work. Furthermore, at the end of the war, they organized a sovereignty march. As the Dutch tried to resume power, nationalism escalated, and fighting broke out. Women's organizations participated both on the battlefield and behind the front lines. It was during this time that women founded Indonesia's Red Cross. They organized themselves into teams of nurses and liaison officers, set up soup kitchens and mobile clinics (Vreede-de Stuers 1960: 89-99).

Because the Indonesian women's movement was in some ways demanding the restoration of rights that women had before colonialism, it was always closely linked to the nationalist movement. However there were several distinct factions fighting for national liberation, of which the two strongest were the Communists and the Islamic groups. Inevitably there were similar splits within the women's movement. For example, in the early 20th Century, a Muslim women's club was formed that mobilized women to campaign on women's rights issues with regard to customary and Islamic law. Simultaneously, prominent Muslim male leaders took up the cause of setting women free of *adat* (customary laws) and adapting their role to the modern world.[4] There were also currents that took a more liberal and reformist orientations, some of which were feminist in the Western sense, and still others which were Communist. Many nationalists and communists who revolted against the government were jailed between 1920 and 1929, a large number of which were women.

In addition to these different ideological trends within the nationalist movement, there was a class element. While the upper class urban women had earned the right to vote (because they owned property) under the colonial administration in the early 1940's, only after independence was full enfranchisement implemented. The fact that the nationalist and

[4]Alongside independent associations, most large nationalist or religious organizations formed sections for women's members. The Islamic reform association led by Muhammadijah 1912 Hadji Ahmad Dahlan was against ancient methods of teaching the Koran. He wanted divorce to be decided by men and women equally, he sought girls to engage in sports and along with his followers established several hospitals, polytechnics and institutions of higher education with their doors open to women.

feminist movements were so closely tied was essential in breaking down those barriers. Consequently when Sukarno came to power in the first independent government, women continued to be active, agitating for protection of female factory workers and better social security for women and children.

The Philippines

3.1 General Socio-Political Background

The Philippines has a long history of colonization and settlement. The Njegritos and others settled in the Islands around 25,000 BC; Malays arrived about 2000 BC; while from 400-1400 AD Chinese, Arabs and Indians controlled parts of the economy and the land. (Kurian 1992: 1577-78) The modern history of the Philippines starts with Spanish conquest to such an extent that the country was named after the Spanish King, Philippe II. Starting from the mid-15th Century, soldiers and Roman Catholic priests from Spain sought converts among the population. Spanish colonial rule lasted until the Spanish American War in the late 19th Century, after which the country passed under American rule. After a brief Japanese occupation, the country became independent after World War II (Ogden 1988: 78-81).

While the Filipinos are really of varied ethnic background (further complicating the situation, many are actually mestizos of mixed Spanish, local and Chinese race), their common history of European conquest has given the great majority of them a common sense of national identity (Kurian 1992: 1575). Even the Chinese population, unlike that of Taiwan (where it dominated the whole island) or of Indonesia (where it remained quite separate) have integrated into the country's social matrix. More than four hundred years of colonialism has not only profoundly affected the broader society and economy, but has had significant consequences for the position of women in the labour force.

3.2 Economic Structure

In pre-Hispanic society, the subsistence economy was based on wet-rice production on communal land. This is a sharp contrast to some parts of Asia, such as China, where land was the property of the patriarch. This communal mode of existence was common among

all of the inhabitants of the archipelago except the hunting and gathering peoples of the mountains. Wet-rice farming in the Philippines, as elsewhere, is labour-intensive and depends heavily on the work of women.

After the Spanish conquered the Philippines in the early 16th Century, communism began to disintegrate. Along with Catholicism and a colonial mode of domination, a Europeanized class structure slowly came into being. The privatization of land ownership created a social hierarchy and exacerbated gender inequality. Large tracts of land were awarded to Spanish friars and imperial soldiers, who then put local chiefs and their descendants in their *encomienda* and made them responsible to collect tribute. The Catholic Church was one of the largest landowners. Overall power, both economic and political, came to be wielded by a coalition of Spanish officials, senior clerics, descendants of pre-colonial village chiefs (*datus*) and Chinese *mestizos*, people of mixed Chinese and European descent (Phelan 1959; McGovern 1997).

Under the new male-dominated hierarchy, Filipino men were regarded as heads of households and were therefore responsible for paying tribute. High tribute payments often led men to force their women into hard labour to help meet their obligations. Just as in Spanish America, although the system of forced labour directly targeted men, women were indirectly forced to work hard to meet their husbands' production quotas and tribute obligations.

Later, as the Spanish consolidated control through a formal colonial administration, export-oriented cash crops replaced subsistence production. Spanish rule also assisted the penetration of commerce by Chinese and mestizo merchants, which further weakened the indigenous economy (de la Costa 1965). With the diversion of labour and other resources to haciendas producing export crops such as sugar (Crouch 1984: 40), rice production fell, the price of rice increased and the Chinese were able to sell imported rice below local cost. This further increased the importance of Chinese merchants. In addition Chinese merchants and, later on, the British during their short period of control, imported

cheap textiles, undercutting the local production. The decline continued to the point that on the eve of the American takeover, textiles had become the islands' largest import (Heyzer 1986: 92-111). The decline of rice and textiles in which women were mainly involved was then followed by a more general decline of the economy as a whole when Spanish rule came to end.

The American colonial rule maintained the same general economic structure. The Philippines economy was geared to the production mainly of agricultural products for the American market (Crouch 1984: 40; Schimer et al. 1987). The main agricultural production remained rice, corn, coconut, sugar cane and tobacco (Bureau of the Census 1954). However, during the American period, manufacturing grew somewhat compared to agriculture. Furthermore, the agricultural sector became more mechanized. The Americans imported agricultural machinery and tractors to increase productive of export-oriented agriculture, particularly sugar.

However in one respect the US period saw a major change in the structure of the labour force. The Americans attempted to expand education and build an indigenous civil service. Therefore employment in education and in the bureaucracy expanded considerably.

The outbreak of World War II changed the political dynamic of the region; American rule over the Philippines' economy was interrupted by Japanese control. In contrast to Taiwan where the short Japanese period of control provided a good basis for industrialization, in the case of the Philippines it caused economic upheaval, rising unemployment, food shortages, hunger and disease. When the war ended and the Americans resumed control, they faced protests by organized labour and a peasant uprising (Kurian, 1992: 1578).

The situation contrasted sharply with that in Indonesia. The Japanese control had provided a breathing space for the nationalist movement, and enabled it to challenge and

quickly oust the Netherlands, a declining force in the world. When the Americans resumed control over the Philippines, America was the pre-eminent world power. It was able to quickly reassert control over organized labour and suppress the peasant uprising (Szanton 1996: 103-4). Again, unlike Indonesia, although nominally gaining independence, in fact the Philippines remained very much an American politico-military protectorate and economic dependency for several decades. In fact, until the early 1990's, America's largest air force and naval bases in Asia were located in the Philippines.

3.3 The Role of Women in the Economy

Women were historically employed prominently in two main categories of work. One was wet-rice farming which, in the Philippines as elsewhere, is labour-intensive and depends heavily on the work of women. The other was traditional light crafts, such as weaving, spinning and dying cloth, as well as pottery, food processing and oil extracting. But they also had other functions (Eviota 1992).

During the pre-Spanish period, it was women who were the main agents of trade with merchants from neighboring islands and from China (Osb 1991). Their dominance of trade also meant that women in the Philippines enjoyed more freedom of movement than was typical of much of Asia. This central economic role was accompanied by a relatively greater social role, for instance in the sphere of religion. Until Islam penetrated the Philippines from the south, animism was the most common religious belief. And within animistic belief, women acted as religious intermediaries (Babaylanes) who conducted rituals - when men did become Babaylanes they had to dress as women. Babaylanes were, not only, part-time religious functionaries and diviners but also healers, astronomers and interpreters of culture. However, political leadership remained overwhelmingly in the hands of men - who were also warriors – even though sometimes women could inherit a position of chief (Pineda-Ofreneo 1998: 100).

Although women in the pre-colonial era had little political power, they did have considerably more economic and social influence. That was partly because of communal ownership of land, coupled with the dominant role of women in agricultural labour. It was partly a reflection of their importance in religion. Women such as babaylanes or catalonas had knowledge of herbal medicines, which gave them power over reproduction and the health of the community. They presided over rituals such as weddings, births and funerals. And as astronomers and diviners, they acted as advisors to the chief, foretelling the outcome of political events (McGovern 1997: 24-25).

After the Spanish had conquered the Philippines, communism began to disintegrate. With the Spanish rule and the establishment of the colonial economy, Filipino men became heads of households and therefore responsible for paying tribute. Under Spanish rule, too, a debt peonage system was imposed on local communities. The debtor rendered unpaid labor service. When he or she was unable to repay what was owed for a private debt or legal fine, he or she usually became a peon. That status could in theory be eliminated by repaying the debt – though in practice that was very difficult.

Sometimes this debt-servitude practice made women a commodity for repayment (McGovern 1997: 225). Moreover, like indigenous women in Spanish America, women were indirectly forced to work hard to meet production quotas imposed on men. Furthermore, Filipino women had to provide free services in the religious establishments, pounding and husking rice and sewing garments for the priests. Added to this many women were left alone to raise their families as the Spanish took their men to fight Muslims in the South and the Dutch, or as slaves in plantations.

During the early period of the Spanish rule there are records that in Bulacan near Manila, as many as 4,000 women were engaged in weaving and spinning cloth. (Diaz-Trechuelo 1966) The number of women involved in home industry and textile production remained high throughout the Spanish colonial rule (Alzona 1934: 129). However, female unemployment increased when, first the Chinese, then the British (during their short

period of occupation), were able to flood the market with imported cloth. Local textiles, a field that had employed half of the country's female laborers, declined to the point that the Philippines, once one of the textile centers of the world, registered in 1893 textiles as the single largest import category (Szanton 1996).

In addition, Chinese trade had undermined the role of women as local traders. Before the mid-1700's it was peasant women who were mostly involved in the market. They traded items which they had made or processed - salt, dried meat, needlework, woven mats, coarse brown sugar, cloth, blankets and jewelry. They also bought and sold rice, tobacco, poultry, fruit and vegetables and exchanged gold, which they had panned. But as the role of the Chinese increased along with commercialization of the economy, trade and larger market transactions came to be handled predominately by men. Chinese and, later, Chinese mestizos replaced women. However, unlike other areas of South East Asia, indigenous merchant women in the Philippines were limited more by shortage of capital than by cultural restrictions. Women of the landowning class were known to have owned family stores and retail shops in Manila, employing a retinue of hawkers, sellers and cooks. But this was also gradually taken over by Chinese merchants. (Eviota 1992: 54; Szanton 1996)

During the Spanish period the general decline of the economy in the rural area sent many impoverished Filipino women to the cities where a great number of them entered domestic services or other types of services such as prostitution. During this period, Manila became the principal brothel center of Asia. However many found employment in the labour-intensive section of the colonial export economy, such as tobacco and cigar manufacturing which was run as a state-regulated monopoly (Alzona 1995: 110). In Manila (much as in Mexico under Spanish rule) women were specifically recruited because the colonial authorities believed they were better suited to the work - they took greater care, and with women there was less risk of theft or fraud (de Jesus 1980). Toward the end of the tobacco monopoly in the 1880's, 30,000 women were employed in Manila alone, though under male supervision and administration (MacMickin 1967).

Nonetheless, despite this growth in the export of cash crops and in manufacturing, the last 100 years of Spanish rule was a period of the impoverishment of the masses. The number of unemployed increased. As the local economies weakened and rice production decreased, the population was hit by food shortages. This was further exacerbated by the fact that colonists, clergy, Chinese mestizos and Filipino principals had taken control of most of the land. The changing structure of land control along with food shortages and growing unemployment particularly in the rural areas led to mass migration to urban areas especially Manila. By the end of the 19th century, with the days of Spanish rule numbered, there was massive decline of the rural economy.

Whereas, in the past, poverty had been common in the rural sector, as Spain declined as a world colonial power, urban manufacturing also went into depression, spreading mass poverty to men as well as women. Many contemporary records indicate an increase in the number of prostitutes who had formerly been cigar workers, domestic maids, tradeswomen and dressmakers, while those past the age of prostitution became beggars. While men and women suffered from impoverishment in the colonial era, women seemed to have had more to lose. Male observers on the scene had noted that Filipino women were more industrious than men: they took little leisure, while men spent considerable time in cockfights, drinking and gambling (Eviota 1992).

American colonial rule operated along the same principles as Spanish. The economy was based on the production of export crops for the U.S. market. Export of abaca-fibre, a source of coarse cloth is an example - the U.S. Navy obtained 40% of its abaca from the Philippines. Formerly this was mainly an artisanal product by female weavers for the Filipino working class, while the small export sector depended on male labour. But with wider commercialization, abaca drew more women into the work – weaving, spinning and trading - which was formerly male dominated. (Szanton 1996) During the US colonial rule women also became more prominent in harvesting tobacco as well as doing most of the work for cigar production.

Female employment in the agricultural-export sector increased at the beginning of the US colonial rule but quickly declined as the demand for Philippines textiles for the US market plummeted during the Great Depression. In 1903 70% of the one million weavers were women, but by 1939 an immense reduction in female employment had taken place. Not only had the general demand for the Philippines textile decreased, but also the mechanized mills, that did the weaving women generally did, were imported into the country. This meant that new jobs were created for men rather than women, although overall the employment rate also fell. The result was a decrease in real income for both men and women (McGovern 1997: 31). The decline of the household-based textile industry was accompanied by a decline of the artisanal production of other consumer items such as shoes, slippers, neckties and ready-to-wear clothes (Eviota 1992: 69).

3.4 Women's Organizations

Direct female involvement in anti-colonial struggles goes back at least to mid-18th century (Heyzer, 1986: 125-127). Many women were involved in fighting the Spanish. During the 1896-1899 revolution, Filipino women, like their sisters in Indonesia, took part in the anti-colonial battle not only in the front line but also helping the resistance movement indirectly. Peasant women who distributed food to the Filipino soldiers formed a group called the Mothers of the Revolution. Women set up temporary hospitals for the wounded and nursed them throughout the revolution against first, the Spanish, and then, the Americans (Alzona 1993: 15-16).

The fact that, compared to the rest of the world, education among Filipino women was high affected the way women were organized for their rights. The large number of educated women and their high participation in white-collar urban work made property rights an important political issue. Due to women's political agitation, the Spanish Civil Code, which had denied women the right to inherit property, was changed in 1938. One-year later family laws were revised so that a married woman could have full civil rights without having to earn her husband's permission for her economic and social activities.

The most notable political campaign that women undertook was their battle for enfranchisement, won in 1937, three decades after men. In many respects the feminist movement in the Philippines at this time was very much led by middle-class women, as it was in other Asian countries. However, prominent men often supported these actions. Even the American Governor General in 1918 was in favor of female suffrage. Although the Philippines suffragette movement started as a bourgeois phenomenon, it soon mobilized women of other classes (Manlogon 1995: 79). The Women Citizens League was organized in 1928 by the first Filipino woman to graduate as a doctor of medicine, who was also the first woman to be awarded a chair at the University of the Philippines. The suffragette battle was won through mass based mobilization (Jaywardena 1986: 155-166).

However, after the struggle for the right to vote was won, women's mass-based organizations did not move into collective action on a broader social and economic front in an effort to change the position of women in the labour market or affect the distribution of income. Rather the women's movement became fragmented. Rural and urban poor women continued to campaign for social welfare and labour issues, often making radical political demands, while the middle class women and women from the land owning class (like liberal feminists in the West) accepted the Philippines social structure and only sought political equality with their men in an otherwise (in their view) just and legitimate social structure. While the latter organized along professional lines, the former agitated around issues concerning labour legislation, labour rights, unemployment, income disparity as well as massive urban and rural poverty. Clearly the class division reduced the impact of gender-based political demands on the prevailing distribution of economic power and wealth, and weakened the potential for mass-based women's groups to influence the position of women in the labour market, and in the development process as a whole.

CHAPTER SIX

TAIWAN

As explained in Chapter Two, Taiwan has often been thought of as a model country in which the state has been interventionist with respect to the development process. Taiwan achieved remarkable economic success, up to the current Asian crisis, with a relatively advanced level of social welfare and a high participation of women in the formal labour force. Therefore the intent of this chapter is to examine how and to what extent Taiwanese women have actually contributed to this economic success.

In the first section, therefore, I look at the Taiwanese State structure and its economic strategy since World War II. In the second, I examine women's contribution to different sectors of the economy. In the third section, women's indirect contribution to economic development will be reviewed. This section starts with an examination of the impact of the female employment ratio (FER) on the total fertility rate. The third section goes on to look at the correlation between FER and other social indicators, namely, infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy rate as well as primary and secondary education, while controlling for GNP. After this statistical examination, I discuss women's volunteer role and their contribution to social welfare through state-initiated organisation. This chapter ends with a look at the way in which women's rising public engagement in the formal labour force and in state-initiated organisations has facilitated women's autonomous political organisation. The formation and growth of such women's organisations has increasingly been responsible for pressure on the ruling KMT to address women's issues pertaining to social welfare as well as their other political demands.

Section One: State Structure and Development Strategy

1.1 State Structure

One of the most important reasons that state centre theorists (Amesden 1985; Wade 1986; Deyo 1987; Appelbaum 1992; Salaff 1992; Park et al. 1995; Auty 1997) have identified Taiwan as a developmentalist state is the historical legacy of Japanese colonialism.

Amesden has argued that Taiwan inherited from the Japanese occupiers the policy of establishing state monopolies, along with a general interventionist approach to shape and transcend the market. During the 1930s, the Japanese established in Taiwan industries to support their military ambitions - production of chemical and metallurgical products for example – along with creating new roads, and manufacturing facilities for automobiles, trucks and bicycles. In the final analysis the Japanese left behind an economy, which was much more developed than many other parts of the world under colonial rule.

The Japanese also engaged in a very comprehensive land reform, which freed Taiwan from a strong agrarian interest (Evans 1985: 40). Particularly between 1926 and 1940, there was a marked increase in agricultural production. As a result, when the KMT came into power, it did not have to face a powerful interest group rooted in the land-owning class. The absence of such a quasi-feudal landlord class facilitated land redistribution and the introduction of new agricultural technologies that raised productivity while simultaneously redistributing income (Amesden 1985: 75-107). Furthermore, Taiwan inherited an efficient bureaucratic apparatus that facilitated the creation of a developmentalist state.

At the time the KMT arrived, Taiwan's independence movement was very strong. In an attempt to consolidate its power, in 1947 Chiang Kai-Shek troops killed thousands of Taiwanese and much of the leadership of the mainland opposition to the KMT (Fei et al. 1981: 59; Ogden 1993: 48). For the next several decades, Taiwan lived under martial law, supported by a repressive police force and networks of political informers. (Mancall 1993) Because the KMT regarded Taiwan as the stepping stone for the re-conquest of China, until well into the 1970s, the military budget remained very high, and with it state encouragement to industries that would support the KMT militarily (Croll 1980; Evans 1985; Ogden 1993; Dessus et al. 1995).

The KMT used their power, civil and military, not only to guarantee political domination but also to implement their economic strategies. For instance, when the KMT decided to enforce a massive land redistribution program, effectively finishing what the Japanese

had started, the army and the police made sure that large landowners sold their properties below the market price. The KMT also used their military and police power, and the pretext of an ongoing (technical) state of war with China, to make sure that labour unions remain under control. Strikes were non-existent the 1950s, 1960s and much of the 1970s (Amesden 1985: 75-107). In the 1970s, with Chiang Kai-Shek's death, a modest process of political liberalisation began in which native Taiwanese were slowly incorporated into the political and economic decision-making process. This process accelerated in 1987 with the lifting of martial law. That same year the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formed in the 1970s but long outlawed, was finally allowed to campaign publicly (Evans 1985).[1] Since the election of 1987, these opposition groups have gained further power. Support for DPP in particular has since grown (Dessus et al. 1995: 16). In 1989, liberalisation went further when a law was passed that permitted non-governmental organisations, particularly those concerned with human rights and environmental issues, as well as women's organisations, to be more active publicly.[2]

These liberalisation trends continued into the early 1990s. Along with them came an effort, particularly under president Lee Teng-Hui, to reduce the traditional policy of state interventionism, and integrate the island more fully into the world market (Oscar 1998: 6-8). This new trend very much followed World Bank and IMF prescriptions for liberalisation and deregulation. However, during the 1990s, Taiwan's growth rate dropped to 3% per annum. Although rates of growth dropped in many Asian countries, in the 1990s, the decline in Taiwan was particularly remarkable compared to the double-digit rate of growth achieved in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s under the old interventionist-state policies.[3]

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[1] From the outset the DPP attracted Taiwanese Chinese and native Taiwanese who until the 1970s were completely left out of the political process since the KMT was very much made of migrant Chinese from mainland after the World War II.

[2] Since 1993, there has been yet another major shift in Taiwan's politics when the KMT split into two, a new faction separated itself from the old KMT to move away from patronage and corruption and the New Party is now refuses large donations from big business. (Oscar 1998: 6-8).

[3] There is no doubt that Taiwan very strongly wants to be incorporated even more into global capitalism. In fact, while still encouraging small business, the government now wants to turn Taiwan into a regional base for economic transactions of the region "Asia-Pacific Regional Operation Center" (Eugenia 1966: 32-35).

1.2 Economic Strategy

The first item on the KMT development strategy agenda was to continue the Japanese land redistribution policy – this policy of promoting agricultural small-holdings was also consistent with Sun Yat Sen's criticism of monopoly capitalism (Amesden 1985: 75-107). The KMT promoted the use of fertilisers and new seeds as well as introducing multiple cropping and encouraging diversified farming. In addition, it promoted the establishment of co-operative institutions. The result, as early as the 1950s, was a large increase in agricultural exports (i.e. sugar, rice, bananas, canned pineapple, tea, etc.) to Japan in particular. However, since the 1950s, the agriculture sector has been in decline while manufacturing has been encouraged (Lee et al. 1982: 310-350).

Manufacturing had already started under Japanese rule (Little 1988: 23-45). However, the Japanese had concentrated mainly on industries that would service the Japanese war machine. The sole important exception was textiles. In its early development strategy, the KMT continued the Japanese policy of encouraging textiles, but added the food-processing industry as well. Again following the policy guidelines of Sun Yat Sen, the KMT played a significant role in promoting enterprise-level corporatism by encouraging dispersed rural industry (Deyo 1987: 199). While private ownership of small enterprises was advocated, the government also engaged in central planning; the party used these two different ways of managing the economy eclectically (Haggard 1987: 115). The state owned much heavy industry such as petroleum refining, aluminium production and fertilisers as well as steel (Haggard 1987: 136) while small enterprises flourished.

It should be noted that from the 1950s into the 1970s, Taiwan's economy also benefited from economic and military aid from the United States (Mancall 1993: 5). In the years immediately after KMT came into power, US aid accounted for half of gross investment.[4]

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[4] The KMT further was able to moblize American's helped for their initial rural development through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction which was established in order to win the peasantary. KMT defeat in mainland China had given the KMT a good lesson. The KMT in this sense used American aid to reassert its power and in their quest to combat communism the KMT was able to moblize US aid and use it for Taiwan's capital formation (Mancall 1993: 5). It should be added that Taiwan had a geopolitical advantage because the Americans had a great interest in developing Taiwan as a show case, against communist China. Nonetheless, the same geopolitical advantage was present for other countries such as Iran during the cold war, under the threat of Soviet Union, where the Americans had a great interest and

Simultaneously American military assistance based on Taiwan's front-line position against Communist China helped to maintain the repressive institutions that kept down strikes in the emerging industrial sector, and generally enhanced the KMTs political power.

Although the KMT strategy was based on central planning and state direction, its objectives were to achieve a decentralised industrialisation. It encouraged networking relationships between firms, between firms and the state, and between firms and the world economy through trading companies, mainly Japanese. Through this mechanism, while Taiwan has been able to be incorporated into the international market, the state has remained in control. This situation is dramatically different from that in many Latin American countries, where the state has been unable to dictate the terms of international economic integration.

After the initial period of post-war modernisation (actually an extension by the KMT of Japanese policy) the post-war period can be divided into three phases: a) import substitution; b) export-promotion; and c) restructuring. Taiwan, like many other developing countries, started off with a relatively short-lived import-substitution policy. This stopped by the beginning of the 1960s. The country moved to export-promotion until the late 1980s. Then it entered a period of restructuring.

Taiwan's import-substitution strategy started in the late 1940s and continued until 1959. Initially the objective was to help form a class of independent small capitalists based on their acquisition of old Japanese facilities in order to carry out the task of industrialisation (Amesden 1985). Taiwan was far from alone. Import-substitution was a popular policy among newly independent countries at the time. It could be regarded as a form of economic nationalism, which aimed to create a national entrepreneurial class producing for the home market under government protection. This was widely regarded as a viable means to switch from an agricultural based economy to an industrial one.

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provided assistance but the state was not able to channel this aid through sound policies into sustainable growth.

Phases of Taiwanese Development

1905-1955	-Early modernization of agriculture.
	-Development of other primary or extractive industries.
1949-1959	-Import substitution.
	-Development of modern secondary manufacturing industries.
1960-1989	-Export-promotion, labour intensive.
	-Establishment of Free Trade Zones.
1990s	-Structural change to more technology intensive.
	-Shifting labour intensive production to other countries of region.

During the import-substitution phase high tariffs were combined with government subsidies to infant industries to encourage local production of finished goods, while barriers were imposed against the import of foreign made luxuries. Other imports were restricted using a licensing scheme. The emphasis was on consumer goods - textiles, clothing, wood and leather products, which had been already initiated by the Japanese in the 1930s (Little 1988: 31). The KMT also used taxation and exchange rate policy to discourage the agrarian sector for the benefit of the industrial one (Lee 1982: 310-350).

Import-substitution survived for a while because successful land reform and redistribution of income provided the home market with purchasing power. With the home market assured, investors found the industrial sector highly profitable. That in turn helped cause a doubling of the manufacturing sector's size during the period from 1950 to 1958.

Soon, however, problems with import-substitution plagued the economy. The basis of import substitution was its emphasis on the protected domestic market, a multiple exchange rate system and strict import controls. In the long run these policies produced economic inefficiencies. For instance, protection meant that some enterprises could operate without having to perform at maximum efficiency. Licensing opened avenues for corruption. Taiwan's relatively short import-substitution period ended with the

promulgation of the Program for Improvement of Foreign Exchange and Trade control in 1958. The multiple exchange rate system was eliminated, the currency devalued and import restrictions were ameliorated (Lee et al.1982: 310-350).

At that point Taiwan, like many other developing countries (in fact it was among the first) switched to export-promotion. Since the 1960s, many countries, particularly small ones, found it difficult to survive on their own resources and with their home market. Accordingly export-promotion was a virtual reversal of the logic of import-substitution. The idea was that each country would specialise in producing for the external market and in return import what it needed for its home market. Although the fundamental rule appeared to be similar to the classical law of comparative advantage, in fact in this case the process was state-initiated and centrally planned.

In Taiwan, the KMT focussed on labour-intensive light industry, producing non-durable consumer goods such as textiles, food processing, footwear and electronics. Although they were initially created for domestic consumption, after 1960, their main orientation became the export market (Li 1988, Clark 1989). The Taiwanese industrial structure that emerged was comprised of a large number of local enterprises set up with family savings and co-operative savings networks, supported by government-controlled bank credits. Many of these firms have been located in the rural fringes of metropolitan areas, where family members work on the land and in the industrial shop at the same time. It is in these types of enterprises that women, as unpaid family workers, have made an impressive contribution as cheap flexible labour (Haggard 1987: 123).

In common with other countries pursuing such a path, Taiwan's "liberalisation" of international trade was not an attempt to move towards a free market. Rather export-promotion was a development strategy implemented through monetary and fiscal policy designed to make exports more profitable (Amesden 1985: 75-107; Grabowski 1994: 535). Taiwan was the first country to set up Free Trade Zones (FTZ). In 1964 the government established the Kaoshiung zone into which Japanese firms moved to benefit from Taiwan's low wages, particularly from a labour force that was largely female

(Berger & Hsiao 1988; Li 1988; Clark 1989; Wiltgen 1990; Castells 1992; Brinton et al. 1995: 1107).

Taiwan has put great emphasis on joint ventures, while protecting the domestic investor at the same time. Moreover, the state has further provided assistance for domestic enterprises through state supported trading companies. Official trade representatives in major cities around the world have taken up the job of negotiations (Deyo 1987: 237). The KMT also imposed regulations restricting MNCs in certain aspects of marketing and in profit-repatriation (Deyo 1987: 236). Unlike similar efforts in Latin America, in Taiwan the state has been able to both restrict and manage foreign capital in ways that support its development strategies through different mechanisms.

Particularly in the early stages of the export promotion phase, MNCs operated through sub-contracting. The government encouraged American firms such as K-mart and medium size Japanese firms to enter into subcontracting with local private enterprises (mainly small family-owned firms which relied heavily on mainly, young unskilled women) to market their products abroad (Amesden 1985).

From 1955 until 1960 manufacturing grew at 11% a year. The share of manufactured products in total exports rose from 28% in the 1960s to 77% in the 1970s. And manufacturing employment rose at 8.3% from 1965 until the mid-1970s (Lee et al. 1982:311). During the first part of the export-promotion era, rapid growth was concentrated in food processing and textiles. When those sectors began to decline, particularly after an international economic crisis in the mid-1970s, the government began promoting the electrical and electronics industries to take up the slack (Fei 1981).

In the 1980s protectionism in the main market countries increased, this resulted in Taiwan being struck by another economic crisis around the end of the 1980s. This crisis led Taiwan towards a new development strategy. The government shifted its policy orientation towards "restructuring" – an effort to reduce state interventionism. On the one

hand, it has adopted deregulation, privatisation and devaluation. On the other, Taiwanese investors have invested offshore.

That shift to offshore investment, in fact, had already been in progress by the time the new crisis hit. As Taiwan's economy had expanded, wages had risen. Where previously women could be used as a huge pool of cheap labour, by the late 1980s a rising level of general prosperity pushed up their wages to the point where Taiwanese's women were no longer competitive in the world market.

Since the early 1990s, Taiwanese entrepreneurs began to employ women in neighbouring countries such as China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia for their labour-intensive manufacturing. In China alone it is estimated that 15,000 Taiwanese companies operate with an investment of more than $10 billion, mostly making items like toys, garments and shoes for export (Salaff 1984: 5; Teseng 1994: 34-35). As a result of the emergence of a female labour surplus at home, the Taiwanese government adopted policies aimed to send women back home. Simultaneously however, the government has concentrated its efforts on high technology (Haggard 1987: 123). One of the ways that the KMT was able to initiate high tech industries was to set up Hsinchu, "Science-based Industrial Parks", to serve as a model for high-tech economic initiative (Chow 1997: 2). With the help of the government, Taiwan now produces goods and services that are technology intensive. As manufacturing becomes more technology-intensive, fewer women are employed.

Thus, as Taiwanese investors using women in China produce stuffed toys and running shoes, in Taiwan itself they make three-foot electronic cars for children and fashion shoes that compete with Italy (Bowring 1994: 37-39.)

Since Taiwan, unlike countries like the Philippines, did not have a major problem of international debt, it has not been pressed as hard to follow economic policies based on liberalisation of the market recommended by international creditors. Nonetheless, since the early 1990s Taiwan has not been immune to pressure to further privatise, deregulate

and devalue (Dessus 1995: 17). Pressures for liberalisation have been intensified recently because Taiwan is competing directly with China to become the trading gate for all of South East Asia.

Section Two: Women's Direct Contribution

2.1 Women's Productive Role

Agriculture: Since the KMT chose to continue the Japanese policy of agricultural reform, a green revolution took place in Taiwan during the late 1940s and 1950s. This green revolution had major consequences for female labour. Because the green revolution was based on land redistribution, it meant that the number and percentage of farmers who owned their own land increased. Therefore, family farms become more common. Increasingly, small land holding became the dominant pattern, farmers worked on their family land and women's participation as unpaid family labour on family farms increased. This increase was simultaneous with a decrease in the number of people working as day labourers - small land holding did not require day labourers and female labourers were busy with their own land. Even today, especially in Southern Taiwan, most rural women work full-time on family farms (Cohen 1976: 54).

Another outcome of the policy of green revolution was mechanisation of agriculture, the spread of the use of machinery and of pesticides and industrial fertilisers. It is common in farming when technological advance occurs and less "unskilled" labour is required that women's participation in agriculture is reduced. Taiwan was no exception, women had dominated the labour-intensive "unskilled" section and technology advancements permitted men to take over from women. The state monitored and encouraged these changes. Putting men in charge had a dual purpose. According to feminist literature, it was easier for the state to police the farm sector with men entrenched as the head of households. In addition, as the demand for labour in agriculture fell, preference was given to men to fill the declining number of jobs. Consequently, during the 1940s and 1950s the percentage of women in the sector decreased. From 1946 to 1966 the percentage of women in the agricultural sector declined from 31.03 to 27.67. This reduction in female labour was another extremely important factor encouraging Taiwan's transition from an

agricultural economy to manufacturing. The labour-intensive nature of industrialisation required an influx of cheap flexible labour necessary for Taiwan's industrialisation.

Although the increase in female share of employment in manufacturing took place during the period of import-substitution, when export-promotion came into full effect the percentage of women in manufacturing skyrocketed. One would expect that this increase in manufacturing employment would decrease the percentage of women in the agricultural sector. But this did not happen. From 1966 to 1967, the female share of employment in agriculture increased from 27.56 to 31.44, a trend that continues throughout export-promotion. This increase could be explained by the fact that while men left the agricultural work in order to get better paid jobs, women, many of them married, picked up the slack. This meant that many of them had to cope with the double burden of productive and reproductive labour at the same time.

The increase in female share of employment in the primary sector was obviously due to the fact that more women entered the agricultural/primary sector to compensate for the loss of men. Furthermore, as the state focused more on the manufacturing/secondary sector, it was no longer particularly interested in advancing farming methods. The state stopped pumping more resources into advancing the agricultural sector. As a result, since the 1960s the primary sector has increasingly declined in importance.

As regard to fishing[5], forestry and mining the number of women employed has been insignificant (Stokes 1983: 318), but so has been the total production of these two sectors within the primary sector as a whole

Manufacturing: From the early part of the import-substitution phase, the percentage of women employed in manufacturing slowly increased from 10.08 in 1946 to 11.82 in 1959. However, as the state switched from import-substitution to labour-intensive export-promotion a huge increase of female employment occurred. In the course of one year,

[5] As far as the fishing communities are concerned, women together with their children participate in pulling in fishing nets (Diamond 1969: 13-18).

1965-66, the percentage of women in manufacturing doubled a sudden jump that was not matched with a corresponding decline in the agricultural sector. In fact in the same year the percentage of female labour force increased in both manufacturing and agriculture. This major increase was not matched by a decline in the tertiary sector. What explains this huge increase is the fact that export-promotion policy peaked in the mid-1960s, the period that can be taken to represent the "take-off" period for Taiwan.

State policy for improving comparative advantage required cheap labour to produce goods for the international market; and labour shortage brought many women into the labour force. As Taiwanese industrialisation was rural based and small scale, it was young unmarried women from nearby villages that became the main labour source. During this phase of export-promotion, many companies set up bus services to take young unskilled female workers to nearby factories.

As far as cities and major industrial centres were concerned throughout the early stage of export-promotion, migrant females provided the factory work sources. These migrant workers were placed in dormitories built in major industrial centres with extremely poor and severely overcrowded conditions. These low-cost, cheaply maintained dormitories contributed to keeping labour costs down and therefore helped raise profit rates. High profits, in turn were reinvested by entrepreneurs, helping to further the economic growth.

In spite of low pay and poor conditions, many young women continued to migrate to these industrial centres. Apart from the obvious economic motive, migration was facilitated by two cultural factors. First, because of Taiwanese family structure, which is exogamous, girls are brought up with the notion they will have to leave home. They are prevented from establishing close ties with their natal families. This prepares them emotionally to leave their families when the need arises. At the same time, due to filial obligation, girls are obliged to pay back their natal families. Filial obligation played an important role in sending young women from low-income rural parts of Taiwan to the industrial centres (Wolf 1970). These young women in turn send a large percentage of their income to their families. These remittances were extremely significant to the

survival of low-income rural families during the early part of the export-promotion period.

There have been other factors important in raising the female share of employment other than low pay and subservience Women were traditionally involved in weaving and spinning and food processing. Therefore, women were thought to have better skills in these two industries, which happened to be the most crucial ones to Taiwan's industrialisation. This preference for women to work in textiles and food processing was further reinforced by the fact that the nature of Taiwan's development at the early stage was labour intensive. Both the state and management prefer to employ women for labour-intensive tasks for reasons such as the belief that women have qualities like manual dexterity (Kung 1994: 25). In addition, the repetitive nature of labour intensive manufacturing required patience, another supposedly innate characteristics of women, which made them much more attractive to employers than men were (Anker 1998).

Another important characteristic of female labour in general is their lower propensity to engage in strikes. Labour docility was further guaranteed when young women were encouraged to look at the company mangers as their new fathers. Further, under martial law, no collective action was allowed. Female workers unable to form unions did not campaign to raise their wages or ask for changing conditions and remained docile. As there was an abundance of migrant young female labour there was little bargaining power any individual dissident could use. The percentage of women as of the total labour force rose from 10% to a third in the course of one decade. By the early 1970s, during Taiwan's take off, more than 40% of the labour force in this sector was female (as indicated in the appendix 40.35 in 1971). This was an important component of the country's comparative advantage.

In addition to factory work, the early part of export-promotion is also identified with the establishment of Free Trade Zones (FTZs to entice foreign companies to invest in Taiwan. These FTZs offered cheap labour, mainly women. Foreign companies found the offer attractive. Again, these women were mostly young and unmarried and were paid low

wages (Haggard 1987: 115; Deyo 1987: 182). In fact, many young women preferred to work in factories and away from home since it provides space for relative freedom (Castells 1992: 44). This willingness made them even more subservient to their factory's authorities.

Therefore, in the period prior to the early 1970s crisis, women constituted the bulk of the labour force in the most important manufacturing sectors of Taiwan, namely, food processing, textiles and leather goods (Stokes 1983: 318; Berger & Hsiao 1988; Li 1988; Clark 1989; Wiltgen 1990; Castells 1992; Brinton et al. 1995: 1107). In this period a large number of women worked as apprentices (Ho 1978: 212). Manufacturing accounted for 37% of labour absorption between 66-71. These young women were not only cheap but were also a source of flexible labour as the depression of 1974-5 proved, at that time female workers were sent back home without compensation (Salaff 1984: 2; Amesden 1985: 75-107), a situation that happened again during 1978-81 recession (Salaff 1984: 2; Wiltgen 1990: 174).

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, during the early part of the 1970s, a world economic crisis hit Taiwan and many firms had to close down. Female workers, whose employment had peaked in 1973, were laid off en masse. In some cases such as television manufacturing companies, up to one third of the labour force was laid-off, all of them women without any compensation (Kung 1994: 48). The state ban on organisation and trade unions under martial law guaranteed that there was no resistance. Labour dismissal without compensation was very widespread. (Li 1988: 99; Kung 1994: 48) With the help of the US military, the state and its army was in full control of the situation.

Although it is true that military power was primarily responsible for the smooth redundancy of a large number of workers, there was another factor at work. Labour unrest is more common when income disparity is high and there is a lack of basic welfare. However Taiwan was an equitable society and the state did provide for many basic needs. There was a minimum level of social welfare and the gap between the poor and the rich was not huge.

Table 1: *Average Monthly Female Wage as a Percent of Male Wage, by Industry*

	1973	1978	1984	1988
Agriculture	—	56.8	51.9	55
Mining	37.2	65.8	53.6	55.2
Manufacture	54.4	61.0	61.1	57.6
Utilities	68.5	75.1	74.0	81.6
Construction	65.4	75.8	68.0	71.9
Commerce	—	72.6	68.0	68.4
Transport	71.7	71.2	75.0	76.7
Financial Services	—	59.2	68.0	65.1
Social and Personal	71.3	72.7	75.7	72.8

Source: Directorate-General (1974: 682) (1978) (1984); Liu (1985: 61-62);

After the 1970s crisis the government, in an attempt to bring the economy back to its feet again, shifted away from textile and food processing (the decline in the latter was also closely associated with the decline of agricultural production) to electrical production. By the end of the 1970s the percentage of women in manufacturing, this time producing electrical machinery, increased. Again women's "natural" characteristics such as dexterity ("nimble fingers") were very important for employing women for electronic production. As much as 80% of total labour in electronics were women (Li 1988: 98; Stokes 1983: 318; Wiltgen 1990: 169; Ho 1978: 211; Park and Johnston 1995). Table 1 shows that in manufacturing the average monthly female wage is barely half that of men. It also indicates that the situation does not improve dramatically in the 1980s.

In order to ensure a supply of cheap unskilled labour, the government also put limitations on higher education. Upon the 1974 recommendation of the Economic Planning Council annual enrolment in senior middle schools was reduced to match vacancies in universities and colleges (Kung 1994: 41).

After the crisis, the new phase of industrialisation and the booming economy was characterised by an increase in sub-contracting. This was because Taiwan has relied on small firms - in fact up to 80% of Taiwanese firms have been small to medium scale (thirty employees or less are small and between thirty and one hundred is medium). The state has from the early period of export-promotion encouraged small firms through several measures such as bank credits. This high percentage of small firms has meant that a large proportion of firms is family owned and family run, relying on a kin network. In these types of firms women play a great role (Deyo 1992: 300). Furthermore, with this increase in sub-contracting, the composition of the female labour force changed – more married women entered it (Wiltgen 1990: 174; Hsiung 1996: 43). In addition, as higher education became important for the population as a whole, and there was a general rising standard of living, girls stayed more at school. As the percentage of young unmarried women who went into higher education, increased labour scarcity was compensated with a higher percentage of married women entering the labour market.

The high employment rate of married women is particularly important. From the late 1970s, a great deal of production has been taking place in satellite factories. The result is is a large number of export- oriented small-scale factories, which specialise in various aspects of production through sub-contracting networks and small-scale family-centred enterprises operating through the local neighbourhoods (Hsiung 1996: 145). In Taiwan, thousands of small companies, many of which rely on family members and primary social networks linked to part-time agriculture activity, have acted as the engine of development throughout the export-promotion stage (Castells 1992: 44). Married women working part-time or full time are among those who are mostly over-represented as unpaid female worker in small family businesses and factories (Salaff 1984: 2; Hsiung 1996: 39, 42-43). The KMT successfully used paternalism in its satellite factories to make sure that, not

only is production efficient, but it is also low cost and there are no labour strikes (Hsiung 1996: 89-111). It is obvious that women working for their family firm would combine their productive and reproductive role in the most efficient way. They would not put the family's income in jeopardy by a unionisation attempt and would settle for low pay.

The entrance of married women into manufacturing solved the problem of securing an adequate labour supply during the period of economic recovery after the early 1970s crisis, and set a trend which continued into the next two decades (Hsiung 1996: 39). The state has used its paternalistic power to continue to bring women into the labour force as cheap flexible labour through a particular program called "the Living-Room as Factories program" (Cheng and Hsiung 1992: 243). "Living Room as Factories," referred to as the family subsidiary employment program, aimed at bringing the surplus labour of communities and families into productive work from the early period of export-promotion. It has been particularly popular as sub-contracting has become important. According to this program many "idle" women were given the opportunity to turn their living rooms into "factories."

In order to make Living Room as Factories a successful program, the KMT actually conducted a survey to measure the nature and extent of surplus labour in various communities to find out how local communities can be mobilised into higher productivity at the national level. The Living Room Factory program was formed because the KMT surveys suggested that there were a great number of "idle" women. The state then provided special loans for families intending to purchase machines to do homework and set up day-care centres. The government also organised workshops for housewives to be trained so that family's living rooms could be converted into factories (Hsiung 1996: 47-65).

This "Living Rooms as Factories" arrangement, along with other forms of sub-contacting, was very important to production after the 1970s. Women produced goods at home that would be collected. They were paid according to their output. Sub-contracting had two benefits for entrepreneurs. First, the costs of production are cut since

infrastructure costs are born by the worker - the entrepreneur saves on such items as building, utilities, and heating as well as health insurance, day-care services etc. Second, the entrepreneur avoids the risk of strikes since the isolated nature of this work makes it very difficult for the workers to engage in any type of collective action. In addition, since there is no employment as such, merely a contractual relation, the cost of the business cycle is born by labour rather than by the investor. When the business cycle is up, the investor can make contracts with individual workers who are in abundant supply; and during a down cycle the investor can simply stop making new contracts without having to pay unemployment benefits.

Figure 1: *Total Female Employment Ratio*



Source: Statistical Yearbook of Republic of China, various years

Figure 1 shows the overall trend in the female employment ratio. It rises sharply until the early 1970s, then decreases because of the depression. It picks up again in the late 1970s until the end of the 1980s. It begins to decline in the early 1990s due to (a) a relative change in the economy from manufacturing to service and (b) a decline in total

employment in manufacturing as it shifts from labour to technology intensive production. (The data for the mid to late 1990s are not published in compatible form.)

During this period, the gender composition of the labour force yet again transformed. As the state encouraged technology intensive goods that no longer relied on cheap unskilled labour, the demand for female labour in manufacturing declined. (This is reflected in the declining percentage of female as the total labour force since the late 1980s, as shown in appendix. II) During the same period, there was a shift of production from labour to capital-intensive production inside Taiwan. At the same time many Taiwanese investors invested outside Taiwan using cheap unskilled labour, mainly women from the neighbouring countries, in main land China, Indonesia and the Philippines. As a result the domestic labour intensive sector plummeted (Salaff 1994).

Figure 2: *Female Share of Employment in Manufacturing*



Source: Statistical Yearbook of Republic of China, various years

Figure 3: *Manufacturing as Percentage GDP*



Source: Statistical Yearbook of Republic of China, various years

During the earlier period when Taiwan needed flexible cheap labour to provide the basis of its economic miracle, Taiwanese women were there to do the job. In the figure below we see how women's role in manufacturing increased dramatically. In figure (2) below we see a jump in the female share of employment in the 1960s. It illustrates that much of the employment of female has been due to increase in the female percentage of labour in manufacturing. Manufacturing has been the most important source of female labour employment and the impact of their contribution comes into effect by the end of the 1960s, rises through the 1970s and stabilises in the 1980s as illustrated in figure 2.

Since structural changes began in the late 1980s, the economy as a whole has moved away from labour intensive to technology intensive production. Simultaneously, the service sector has become important, a pattern very similar to other industrialised countries. The restructuring period has also been characterised by a high percentage of women in service industries. Within the service/ tertiary sector it has been trade and commerce in particular that has had a high female percentage growth (ref. to tables from Directorate-General various dates in the appendix). Since the restructuring, investment in Taiwan's neighbouring countries, Indonesia, the Philippines and particularly more recently mainland China, has increased. Currently much of the services expansion is related to commerce, insurance, and trade in which women play a big role (Hsiung 1992: 47-65).

Figure 4: *The Gross National Product per Capita by the Year*



Source: Statistical Yearbook of Republic of China, various years

While it is true that manufacturing for export has been reduced, export-promotion is still part of the state policy. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, increasingly more sophisticated technology-intensive consumer goods are produced for export. Once export-promotion and labour-intensive industrialisation brought rising female participation in factory work, it also broke down social and cultural barriers towards women in other fields. As a result they found it easier to enter service jobs with low pay such as shop assistant, waitress and barber in the cities (Lang 1996: 103; Stokes et al. 1983: 318).

Service: Women's labour has also been important in the face of the expansion of social services to which the state has been committed. More education, health care and social workers have meant that more women, particularly married women, have been employed to provide welfare for the population. One third of young married women have been in white-collar occupations such as teaching (Brinton 1995: 1114).[6] In spite of women's

entry into male jobs, it must be noted however, that women still lag behind in employment in high rank jobs. There are still political barriers to their entry into such jobs - for instance, women are prevented from taking civil service exam and high rank government jobs diplomatic services and international journalism (Hsiung 1992: 242).

As indicated by table 2, the female wage is still 70% of that of males in personal services. Since 1982, as women are increasingly better educated, there are more women in white-collar jobs and their number is exceeding those engaged in the blue colour jobs.

Other than the jobs mentioned in the service sector, there is another category of service workers that must be considered - sex workers. Normally prostitution is among the least regulated professions. But, in the case of Taiwan, where the government has had a strong hold over the economy, the informal economy has been relatively small. The Taiwanese government has controlled the sex industry as part of its tourist promotion policy. The American military presence during and after the Korean and Vietnam Wars, along with heavy investment in the aircraft industry, increased the sex trade throughout Southeast Asia. The number of cities that provided rest and recreation (R&R) for the United States army grew after the 1950s and 1960s. In fact the Taiwanese state was able to channel aid from international agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations for its "tourist industry," which was really aimed at promoting sex tourism by single men (Cheng and Hsiung 1992: 244-246).

Starting in the 1950s, there was a rising number of single male tourists and a corresponding increase in registered brothels. As male tourists increased, not only registered brothels, but commercial sexual services under various guises, including barber shops, bath houses, massage parlours, bars, coffee houses and restaurants (labelled by the government as specialised businesses - see table 2 below) increased as well (Cheng and Hsiung 1992: 244-245). These figures however, do not fully reflect the extent of prostitution since part of the sex industry is in the sphere of the informal economy. Since late 1980s there has been a great deal of pressure on the government by religious and women's organisation to stop prostitution and therefore, it is now much more part of the

informal rather than the formal economy, and therefore not well reflected in official statistics.

However the fact that the state initially encouraged prostitution makes it clear that a strong state is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for promoting female economic advancement in a healthy way. It was only once women were able to make their collective voice heard that the Taiwanese State stopped its open and active encouragement of prostitution.

Table 2 outlines the increases not just in brothels but also in businesses that are often closely related to prostitution. Though it is impossible to know just what percentage so functioned, sometimes hotels fronted for prostitution rackets, cafes formed pick-up locales, cabarets were used as lead-ons for prostitutes, and waitresses sometimes used their position to solicit prostitution clients on the side.

Table 2: *Types of Businesses Possibly Involved in Sex Trade in Taiwan* (1946-1973)

	Hotel	Tea & Coffee Room	Restaurant W/Waitress	Cabaret	Brothel
1946	866	—	—	11	216
1947	969	—	—	—	—
1948	932	—	—	—	—
1949	902	—	—	—	—
1950	801	—	31	—	—
1951	842	346	56	—	—
1952	892	546	88	—	—
1953	961	786	86	—	—
1954	1,093	930	54	—	—
1955	1,137	930	52	—	—
1956	1,251	1,001	—	—	—
1957	1,326	984	—	—	249
1958	1,479	1,043	—	—	349
1959	1,576	1,030	—	3	424
1960	1,671	963	—	8	463
1961	1,782	1,002	—	11	476
1962	1,897	793	—	15	453
1963	2,014	825	—	17	412
1964	2,143	801	—	27	529
1965	2,272	859	—	32	509
1966	2,403	756	—	31	489
1967	2,949	765	76	46	636
1968	2,662	629	163	33	452
1969	2,802	596	449	25	384
1970	2,864	568	429	25	355
1971	2,916	511	372	25	337

1972	2,974	485	342	25	319
1973	2,997	451	407	25	311

(Table 2 Continued)

Source: Directorate-General (1974: 188-189)

Other than prostitution, women's role in Taiwan's informal economy is much smaller compared to other parts of the region and Asia as a whole. There are several reasons for this. One is that, since the Taiwanese state has had a strong hold over the economy, the proportion of the informal economy as a whole has been comparatively much smaller than in many other countries in Asia. The state has been able to control most cash transactions in the productive sector and to incorporate market activities into its formal sector. Furthermore since there has been a labour shortage in the formal sector, the need for the informal economy has been small, a situation very different from many other developing countries where high unemployment drives many into the informal economy.

In addition, state public housing has eliminated the traditional infrastructure that in most developing countries cultivates the informal economy. Public housing, which broke up old neighbourhoods, meant that there was no space for women to share childcare with their extended kin or their neighbours. Women under such circumstances have found themselves in a situation where they had to use day care, which is expensive, compared to neighbourhood childcare. Additionally, the cost of new houses and a new life style that complements it (Deyo 1992: 301), have left little choice but working in the formal economy where jobs are always better paid and have been abundant.

The informal economy, however, must be separated from the underground economy and the black market where illegal transactions take place, which by definition are outside statistical data collection and would be outside the scope of this work. However, it is a common cross-cultural practice that men play a much bigger role in the underground economy than women. Fewer women than men are in organised crime; and their criminal

activities are largely limited to prostitution and street vending of smuggled goods such as cigarettes.

Section Three: Women's Indirect Contributions

3.1 Reproductive Role

One of the ways in which women have contributed to the economy in an indirect way has been remittance from young female workers. Many girls and young women who were employed in manufacturing during the early time of Taiwan's industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s provided their low-income families in the rural areas with the means of survival. Survey after survey has documented huge remittance that daughters working in FTZ or other industrial centres sent to their families (Kung 1994; Sallaf 1994; Ong 1987; Arrigo 1984; Diamond 1979; Wolf 1992). Although these remittances have been part of the income from young women's productive work, since they are linked closely to the operation of the extended family, they can be considered indirect rather than direct contributions. This is especially true because of the role of filial obligation in the Chinese cultural tradition. Filial obligation meant that many daughters sent a great percentage of their earnings to their families. These remittances have been so important to low income households that they accounted at times for up to 1/8 of household income for poor farmers. This pattern of behaviour has been a very effective way of narrowing the earnings gap between social classes (Wiltgen 1990) and has itself been an important factor to Taiwan's economic development.

It is by now an established fact that increasing jobs for women in the formal economy reduces the total fertility rate (Goldstein 1972: 75-95; Stokes et al. 1983: 314). (This is discussed at length in Chapter III.) The declining total fertility rate has very impressive, dropping from 5.7 in 1960 to 1.7 in 1997. As illustrated in the following figure 5, a high and rising female employment ratio since the 1960s has corresponded with a steady decline of the total fertility rate. There are several reasons for this change. As women have entered the labour market, the marriage age has risen. More women have been marrying after the age of 25 and the birth rate sharply declined in the 1970s (Salaff 1984: 8). A rising marriage age is itself influenced by female independence associated with

high participation rate in the formal economy. Working women tend to delay child bearing and/or space out births at greater intervals to reduce the conflicts between working and caring for children (Lin et al.1973: 332).

Figure 5: *Female Employment Ratio and Total Fertility Rate*



Source: Statistical Yearbook of Republic of China, various years

Furthermore, cross-cultural analysis indicates that as the opportunity cost of raising children increases women tend to limit their families. With a general increase in the level of female employment, there is no doubt that the opportunity cost of raising a family has increased enormously, which helps to explain declining fertility. An increasing number of educated women who live in urban neighbourhoods face a conflict between their roles as wife-mother and as worker, as well as increasing opportunity costs (Stokes et al. 1983: 313).

Another contributing factor has been a rise in education level for women, which is partially determined by rising formal sector employment for women. Cross-national data indicate that as educational levels increase there is a tendency for the total fertility rate to drop. The state has had a policy of increasing educational levels, particularly since the restructuring period, as technology intensive goods became more important. Increasing technology intensive production required a highly educated labour force. Under such circumstances, smaller families with highly educated children are preferred. The state in fact set up motherhood workshops to teach women how to better raise their families.

Other than the female employment ratio its impact on the total fertility rate, state policy has been an important contributing factor. The government has increasingly been in favour of family planning and has implemented several measures to ensure it. Abortion for instance was legalised as early as 1956 (Li 1988: 70). During the 1960s about 450 family planning programs health stations where family-planing workers worked were established (Chow 1974: 107-126). The China Family Planning Association operated a mobile IUD team for poor people and the Chinese Red Cross provided field nurses (Li 1988: 75). There is no doubt that there are other factors influencing the fertility rate such the as reduction of infant mortality.

Not only have young women contributed to the general welfare of their families, but cross cultural studies indicate that women have a much higher tendency to spend their income on family welfare, as compared to men, who tend to spend a larger part of their income on luxuries. Taiwan is no exception. In fact greater women's access to employment has progressively increased women's income, which in turn has been spent more on the welfare of their families. In the theoretical chapter different ways in which women's high income contributes to family welfare is discussed. The same applies to Taiwan. Working women's greater autonomy translates itself into the decision to allocate earned income to children's welfare. As a result, children from families with working mothers are better fed and better educated, resulting in a lower infant mortality rate and higher life expectancy, as well as educational attainment.[7]

[7] Cross-cultural studies indicate that working women have a greater autonomy from their husbands and in-laws (Chaudhury 1982: 71-106; Youssef 1982; Dixon 1975: 15). And when women do have more decision-making power and money they spend it on their children. Children of working mothers are always better-fed and as a result infant mortality decreases and as children grow into being healthy adults they live longer and life expectancy increases. Women with income can and do provide for better medical care, which is then reflected in increasing both infant mortality and life expectancy (Caldwell 1979 and 1986). In addition, working mothers are capable and willing to take care of their female children. This is because economic dependency to male and girl child is not regarded such an economic loss like in situations where women relay on their men for their survival (Cain et al. 1979). Econometric analysis has indicated that female child mortality is inversely related to women's labour force participation (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; Schultz 1982).

Data on infant mortality and life expectancy indicates a dramatic change. Life expectancy has risen from 65 years in 1952 to 73.5 in 1987. In addition, the percentage of the aged has increased from 2.46% in 1951 to 5.54% in 1987 (Lin 1991: 172). As important as female employment is to infant mortality and the life expectancy of the population as a whole, state policy is also an important element. The Taiwanese government has doubled its health care expenditure between 1971 and 1993 (Dessus 1995: 21). Since the two indicators rely heavily on the state budget, in this analysis the impact of women's labour on infant mortality and life expectancy is examined by controlling for GDP.

Again with reference to the literature discussed in the theoretical section, cross cultural surveys point to the fact that women rather than men spend their time and energy on improving not only their family's health but also other aspects of human capital, mainly education. Not only mothers but, in the particular case of Taiwan with its filial obligation, working daughters have played an important role in the welfare of their families and the society at large. By providing for their families, many young women have been able to assist other members of their families to continue with higher education. Some of these other members of the families have themselves been women, which in turn reduced the number of unskilled labour, a trend that caused the entry of married women into the labour market in the 1970s (Sallaf 1994).[8]

Literacy as well as primary and secondary education, infant mortality and life expectancy are dependent on state policy and the level of GDP per capita. For this reason, analysis of the role of female employment and its impact on the educational level and the other variables mentioned, should include a control for GDP per capita.[9] The following table summarise the relationship between the female employment ratio and all of the social

[8] Education is both a cause and an effect of female employment. While it is true that educated women are more likely to be in the labour force, it is also true that the more women are employed, the higher the chance of girls getting more education, for two reasons. One is that working mothers have a higher tendency to send their girls for higher education; the second is because of the income that educated working women bring in, making it more logical to extend girls, education for their future economic return.

[9] Taiwan started with a higher literacy rate than many other countries of the region due to the Japanese rule, by the end of the Japanese rule total literacy was high and up to 70% to 80% of children school age enrolled in high school (Mancall 1993: 2). Total literacy rate during the following period of KMT rule increased from 45% to 90% by the early 1980s (Lin 1991: 172).

variables. The data used for partial correlation are national data extracted from Statistical Yearbook of China various years and can be found in appendix II.

It is very interesting that the result of statistical analysis reflects and confirms the literature on the role of women in general and in Taiwan in particular. The results have an extra importance since Taiwan is a country in which data quality is extremely high and the results are therefore very reliable.

Table 3: *Partial Correlation of Female Employment Ratio on Social Variables Controlling For GNP/GDP Per Capita*

	Female Employment Ratio
Life Expectancy	.7948
	P=.000
Infant Mortality	-.8023
	P=.000
Primary Education	.2951
	P=127
Secondary Education	.7326
	P=.000
Tertiary Education	.7874
	P=.000

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Republic of China, various years

Table 3 indicates that after controlling for GNP per capita, the female employment ratio explains 63% of the increase in life expectancy, 64% of the decrease in infant mortality, 84% of the increase in primary education, 53% of the increase in secondary education and 61% of the increase in tertiary education. These results are very strong indications of the impact of an increased FER on all of these social variables.

Before the section on women's reproductive work ends, it should be mentioned that there is another indirect way in which women have contributed to the economy, namely through their saving pattern in *diau hwei*. *Diau hwei* is a betting club whereby women who know and trust each other gather and put their savings together. At the end of each period, every woman is allowed to bet by bidding with a certain interest rate, and the one that bids the highest can borrow the total sum. Each woman can only bet once. If no one from among those who have not yet had their turn can beat the interest rate, then the sum will go at a lower interest rate and the rate is subject to negotiation. Men generally do not take part in *diau hwei* for two reasons. One is that *diau hwei* relies on a great deal on trust. Since women are much more involved in their communities than men and have greater access to kinship networks, it is much more feasible for them to establish trust. The second reason is that *diau hwei* involves small amounts of money. *Diau hwei* was either handed over to male members of the family to invest or used to pay tuition fees for children. When money from *diau hwei* is raised for investment, it can be regarded as women's direct contribution to the economy. When it is used for family welfare, it becomes indirect.[10]

3.2 Volunteer Work

Up to now we have looked at women's productive and reproductive work. In this section, the chapter examines a third dimension of women's work, their communal work. In this section we discuss the way in which the state has utilised this aspect of female work to carry out its policies through state-initiated organisations. Such programs have functioned in different ways. What they have in common is that they have all involved subsidising certain public goods and services, freeing the state's resources to carry out other tasks.

Among such organisations are the Women's Department and the Chinese Women's Anti-Aggression League, which is a semi-official institution that focuses on projects that are an extension of women's reproductive work (Hsiung 1996: 47-65). As Diamond (1972) cited by Cheng and Hsiung (1992) points out their programs organised the sewing of

[10] There is very little literature on this institution and my data comes from several interviews that I have conducted with Taiwanese who live in Montreal.

clothes for military personnel; this was particularly important in the 1950s and 1960s when state expenditure on the military was high. The program also has arranged for collection and donation of cash and clothes and foodstuff for military dependants (Cheng and Hsiung 1992: 254).

Perhaps the most striking of all these efforts was the establishment in 1968 of the Community Development Program, initially an eight-year program that was repeated over and over. There are two particularly important projects under this program; one is the previously discussed "Living Rooms as Factories" and the other is Mothers' Workshops. Under these projects courses were organised to teach women about "leisure" activities, planning and social services. The purpose of these courses was to encourage women in their leisure time to organise themselves to visit the elderly, orphans, the handicapped, the mentally retarded and families of military servicemen or families in poverty.

These Mothers' Workshops had another major purpose, to prepare and motivate women to deal with social problems caused by modernisation and urbanisation. As programs became extended several times the emphasis on social welfare and ethics and mortality grew. The aim was to improve the basic infrastructure of local communities, fight poverty, improve civilian life and advocate traditional values and ethics. (Needless to mention, these traditional values are ones that advocate female subordination to their families.) With modernisation and increasing problems associated with the breakdown of community, such as rising crime rates, women were encouraged to take care of the well-being of their communities in their "free time" in programs that act as community watch. These activities certainly saved the state part of the cost of dealing with crime.

Furthermore, the Mothers' Workshops Program has organised courses in local communities for a wide variety of matters such as promoting ethics and morality, sanitation and public health, homemaking and productive skills and social services. These courses educate women in skills such as nutritious cooking and taking care of the elderly with chronic diseases, again capitalising on women's reproductive role. The state, by

using women's voluntary work, has not only ensured delivery of an efficient service but also managed to save expenditure on health.

This program since the 1990s has intensified the stress on women's reproductive work in order to respond to the changing economic realities of the restructuring period. Since the 1990s, with declining demand for labour, the state has used these workshops to encourage women to become better wives and mothers and spend more time at home. Emphasising women's role as wives and mothers has a dual purpose. Since the demand for labour in the 1990s is for higher skilled workers, the program, by encouraging women to stay at home and take care of their children, reduces the rate of unemployment. At the same time by encouraging women to do so, it also encourages the children go on to further education and become highly skilled labour. Such courses as the ones designed to enhance women's feminine etiquette teach women what it means to be women in the traditional sense. To supplement this state definition of woman-hood other courses on flower arranging, interior decoration, folk dancing and make-up reinforce these notions as feminine ideals. The Mothers workshops financed by government since 1977 has published ten volume textbooks called *Mama Duben* (Mothers' Readers).

While the state has been able to use women for its social and economic policies, women in turn, as a result of being in the labour market and being engaged in public affairs, have put pressure on the state to change its policies to respond to their demands. For example, Mothers' Workshops were designed by the government but were, nonetheless, run by women. Since the 1960s many women have been engaged in state initiated programs. However this very public engagement that initially was designed to guarantee female submission, nonetheless provided the means for women to learn to organise themselves around political issues in ways that were not necessarily in line with what the state wanted. In fact, as women's entry into the labour force escalated and women's public role in state-initiated organisation and the KMT party increased, the experience of public work became a fertile ground for a radical political campaign on women's rights.

As discussed in the theoretical chapter, although women's labour force participation contributes to development, women can in turn benefit from formal labour force participation. In the next section we will review different ways in which organised resistance and women's organisation, born out of their public life engagement related to their employment and volunteer work, has enabled them to bring pressure on the government, demanding change and guaranteeing equal rights.

Although the women's movement in Taiwan has not been as impressive as it had been in Mainland China (Lin 1989: 12-23) the situation has changed dramatically since the late 1980s and the 1990s. This low initial profile could partly be explained by the repressive nature of the government and its complete ban on all civil organisations. Although in theory women had already been given equal rights in the constitution, in practice women have been subordinated by much civil law such as the family law, property ownership and child custody rights.

It was during the 1970s that the present women's movement began. Prior to that actions were much more individualistic. The catalyst came when Hsiu-Lein, who campaigned on issues such as sexual awareness and the role of women in society and the work place, was imprisoned on the charge of inciting a female riot with one of her speeches. During the 1980s popular attention to women's rights increased. Women's organisations began to flourish and Awakening magazine, the most prominent feminist magazine, was published first in 1982. Awakening Foundation then became legal after the 1989 Civic Organisation Law, which in turn followed the lifting of martial law in 1987. At this time many educated women joined feminist groups. Feminist groups together with Christian organisations have been very successful in mobilising women around human right issues.

One of the important factors, which has helped to shape the women's movement, has been its ties with international women's movement. These were reflected in three international conferences on the role of women in developing countries organised by the National Taiwan University, Soochow University and the United Daily News and China

Tribune. As a result a movement, which at first attracted only the middle class and educated women, now attracted wider support (Bih-er 1991: 26-31).

Prostitution, particularly child prostitution, was the first issue that mobilised women's groups, along with the Christian organisations (Cheng 1995: 22). In 1987 a red-light district march against teenage prostitution and native girls' abduction for prostitution was organised (Lin 1989: 12-23). Those women who organised the march also have published papers such as the Pioneer Press New Feminism. The other organisation that has been active on child prostitution has been Women's Rescue Foundation together with Homemakers' Unions (Underwood 1995: 48-53).

This anti-prostitution campaign has extended since into a more fundamental criticism of the state policy. Feminist organisations have raised complaints about the way that the state has promoted prostitution as part of the tourist industry since the late 1980s. Women protested against the way that the government has closed its eyes to commercialised prostitution, while criminalizing individual prostitutes. They have also protested against, government-issued tourist booklets that stress female submissiveness, caring and nurturing (Cheng and Hsiung 1992: 244-245). On the banner carried by women during their protest against the International Lions Club in Taipei was written "Welcome to Taiwan for Friendship but not for Sex Tours" (Cheng and Hsiung 1992: 244-245).

The other issue that has raised much criticism of the government, with the aim of changing legislation has been violence. Recently, some women's non-governmental organisations such as Modern Women's Foundation (established in 1987) have campaigned against violence. Today even older women who a few decades ago would not protest are involved in collective action against violence. The women's shelter, Good Shepherd, is another organisation, which has provided abused women with legal advice (Cheng 1995: 21). These efforts have brought pressure on the government to change laws.

Perhaps one of the most important by-products of women's organised campaigns has been on the issue of the right to equal pay. It started as in the early 1980s with an article about women's unpaid work in the leading feminist magazine, an article about the value of women's work in the house. The value of the work women carry out doing daily chores such as cooking, laundering, cleaning, caring for the elderly, tutoring children was calculated to be at the time to be the equivalent of a university professor (Cheng and Hsiung 1992: 250). Since then many campaigns around equal pay have been carried out by organisations such as the Awakening and Rainbow. They have been so effective that they have managed to secure an Equal Employment Bill.

Slowly, too, women are entering jobs that are regarded to be male (Salaff 1992). This process is having an impact on top jobs such as computer scientists as well as professional and technical workers, administrative and managerial works. The professional and technical sectors have seen very high employment growth rates among women during recent years (Zeglich 1997: 599). The number of women in "male's jobs" has also increased at the low end of the labour market, such as taxi driving.

Since the 1980s the number of women's organisation has been growing and they are now much better focused and more capable of raising public attention. One of the most striking facts about Taiwanese working women has been the wage gap between men and women. As the number of professional women increases they are bringing more pressure on the government to address the problem. As a result the Labour Standards Law has recently be revised. A remarkable improvement in rights and benefits in the work-place as well as other measures such as changes in maternity leave rights have come into effect (Bih-er 1991: 26-31).

Not only written laws but also unwritten laws and practices such as single and no-pregnancy rules, a souvenir of the Japanese occupation an exercise that forces women who have children to withdraw from their work, has been targeted. Awakening has challenged this unwritten law through rejection of discriminating regulations in firms and has gained success especially in professional organisations (Huang 1997: 14). In

addition, issues pertaining to sexual harassment have been addressed by Pink-Collar solidarity.

After action taken on labour rights, the most important issue has been women's real political participation. Whereas a few decades ago women would follow their husband's or her father's voting behaviour, increasingly women not only vote independently but as a social groups are putting pressure on the political machinery to address gender issues (Bih-er 1991: 26-31). Since the late 1980s women have particularly targeted political parties and are now an important political constituency. In fact today all the candidates for public office have women's concerns in their campaigns. Work place equality and equal benefits have increasingly become political demands that women collectively are making and they are not shy to use the mass media to get attention (Bih-er 1991: 26-31).

Women's political pressures have been raised to the point of constitutional change. In response to their demands, in 1994 an amendment to the constitution gave women a fairer place in the society such a clause to "protect dignity of women and safeguard their personal safety". This constitutional change has since been used to negotiate equality between the sexes in the workplace (Huang 1997: 5). Since 1994 interpreting the constitution has meant that the husband no longer has the complete right to property and of custody of children of the family; married couples can now have separate assets; and the wife's property does note automatically go to her husband. On divorce the father is no longer guaranteed the right to custody, this is now decided by the court.

Increasingly, as a result of organised women's campaigns, the political parties have been forced to take up women's issues. In the 1996 election the KMT prepared a Women's Policy White Paper to address women's welfare, measures such as equality of access to social participation and protection from violence are notable examples. The issue of the importance of women's political role has been reinforced by the result of the recent election when the former political prisoner Ms Lu, was elected as second in command of president Chen Shui-bian. Lu started the first feminist association and spent more than five years in jail. She was a founding member of the Democratic Progressive Party and was an

important figure in politicising president Chen. The president admits that Ms Lu had been behind his recent victory. Currently women hold 25% of the seats in Taiwan's legislature and one-third in Taipei's city council (The Gazette, April: 2000).

As we have discussed in the last section it is apparent that women's contribution to tightening the regulatory framework of the economy has been accompanied by their empowerment to build organised resistance towards repressive state policies. It is very important that such civil organisations gather strength in order to guarantee not only gender rights, but also democratic rights as a whole as increasingly women's organisations in Taiwan are establishing closer links with environmental organisations challenging state policy in all spheres.

CHAPTER SEVEN

INDONESIA

The chapter on Indonesia will deal basically with the same issues as the previous one. However, there will be some differences in the way issues are discussed, reflecting the important structural, social, economic, cultural and political distinctions between the two countries. An examination of more than a hundred sources on the political economy of Indonesia and on the nature of its female labour force, interviews conducted with Indonesian scholars in Montreal and with scholars from Canada and the United States who work on Indonesia and a field research trip involving interviews with government officials and NGOs, all led to the conclusion that there is very little, if any, macro analysis of the role of women in the Indonesian economy.[1] There are micro studies of anthropological nature but no sources that contain statistical data on female labour in the context of the country's political economy since the 1960s. This is quite unlike the case of Taiwan, where there is a wealth of data compiled by government agencies. Therefore the macro data on which this chapter is based have been compiled uniquely for this thesis from a wide variety of sources.

Section One: State Structure and Development Strategy

1.1 State Structure

After World War II, an independent Indonesian government headed by Dr. Sukarno, leader of the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI) assumed power. It was however; a period of considerable political turmoil in which many other parties of various political persuasions entered the government in various combinations. Sukarno himself was influenced by a blend of Javanese, Western and Muslim socialist ideas with Indonesian nationalism. Although initially nationalism formed a powerful cohesive to keep the country together, soon after independence, regional, ethnic and geographic diversity became problematic (Glassburner 1962: 113-131; Mackie 199: 31).

One of the ways that Sukarno sought to deal with the problem of diversity was establishing the principles of *Pancasila*, a religious-ethical code of conduct. Indeed it remained a sort of state quasi-religion into the Soharto era. However, even *Pancasila* could not offset the effect of separatist movements. *Militant Sarul Islam*, for instance, was particularly bitter about the failure to create an Islamic state and waged guerilla warfare in West Java. In addition, outside of Java, there was great resistance towards Javanese dominance (Myint 1984: 45; Bowie and Unger 1997: 47; Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 209-221).

This diversity of political influences was to some degree reflected in civilian coalition governments. One of the major political forces of the post independence era was the PKI, (Indonesian Communist Party) which ruled at times side by side with the PNI, Sukarno's party. As political parties proliferated and coalitions succeeded each other, the task of managing the newly independent country became increasingly complex. As a result, by the mid-1950s, Sukarno became very critical of Western style democracy. In 1957 with the help of the army he gave himself total power under the name of "Guided Democracy." This system was based on a Javanese village model of discussion and consensus and it brought nationalism, Islam and Communism together as an ideology implemented under army surveillance (Frederick and Worden 1993: 54-5).

However the attempt at compromise pleased none of the constituent groups. The Communists became dissatisfied because, although Sukarno was seemingly committed in principle to bringing about some degree of equality and welfare, he did not have the bureaucratic machinery or resources to do so. Unlike the Japanese in Taiwan who had educated the population, the Dutch had left Indonesia largely illiterate. But even if the necessary human capital and the kind of bureaucratic tradition needed for egalitarian reforms had been present, there are doubts about the degree to which Sukarno was in fact genuinely committed to such ideas, doubts which his extravagant life style and zeal for palaces tended to confirm. Thus, Sukarno's opulent life style alienated the Communists;

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[1] Others have come to the same conclusion vis-a-vis limitations inherent in the data on the Indonesian female labour market (Benjamin 1996: 85).

the confusion over *Pancasila*, among other things, damaged his popularity; and his attempt to redistribute land turned the elite, many of whom were influential with the army, against him. In addition, the West became worried after Sukarno's foreign policy provoked a war with Malaysia in the mid 1960s (Glassburner 1962: 113-131; Crouch 1984; Turner et al. 1997).

All the above elements, together with American connivance, finally created the conditions for the mid-1960s coup. Close to half million men and women were slaughtered. While nominally a purge of Communists, in fact much of the killing took place in areas like East and Central Java, Sumatra and Bali where Sukarno's regime had challenged the big landowners. (Lev 1966; Crouch 1978) Those who supported land reform were accused of being Communist agents and imprisoned or killed. Many women were also raped, imprisoned and murdered, particularly those who belonged to *Gerwani*, a nationwide women's umbrella organization for political action. Followers of *Gerwani* were accused of being part of the PKI (Communist Party) women's wing. Some of those imprisoned were not released until the fall of the Soharto regime in late 1990s.[2] (KOWANI 1980)

During the period following the bloodbath, backed by ruthless army suppression of any type of political dissidence, General Soharto replaced "Guided Democracy" with the "New Order." His power was soon consolidated further by the new income generated by the export of oil and other natural resources to the West. The rising hard currency earnings permitted Soharto to address such crucial matters as food shortages (McConald 1980; Crouch 1984: 75-89).

However seeds of future problems were not long in showing themselves. In 1974 Muslim dissidents, labour organizations, women's groups and students joined together in what became known as the "Malari Riot." This brief but major uprising shocked the regime. There was further embarrassment from the scandal over corruption in *Pertamina* – the Indonesian state oil company. Senior members of the army and government were

[2] Interviews with leading members of Kalyanmitra.

implicated in the theft of huge sums of oil revenues, prompting more political protest. However, Soharto and his army successfully co-opted all the major dissident organizations and managed to restore control over the country (Brenson 1993).

After this period of political turmoil, Soharto was solidly in charge of the country's internal affairs and enjoyed a great deal of Western support. The West lent massively while turning a blind eye to things like the brutal invasion of East Timor. The channeling of some of the export income from the country's rich resource base into poverty alleviation programs appeased local dissidence. And the local Chinese community, which collected a grossly disproportionate share of the new wealth, became a solid base of support of the regime until the late 1990s (Anata et al. 1988: 72; Bowie and Unger 1997).

Then came the Asian crisis. Indonesia already suffered from a gross disparity in its income distribution, and the fact that the economy plunged into depression brought the problem to the fore. All of the long-simmering tensions came to the surface in riots and mass demonstrations. The government collapsed, and Soharto was forced to step down. For a while power was transferred to Amin Rais, a Soharto cabinet minister and influential member of the Golkar party (Soharto's party). Then, in 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of the largest Muslim organization, Nethzatol Ulama or NU came to power with the support of Megawati Sukarnopotri (the daughter of Sukarno), the leader of the nationalist and secular PNI (a party backed by religious minorities and more secularly oriented Muslims) (Cohen 1999: 26-27).

The problem is that Wahid's newly elected government, another awkward coalition of diverse former opposition forces, has had no clear policy agenda. Its policies have really taken the form of short-term crisis management rather than the kind of long-term planning the country desperately needs to recover economically and politically. Thus, the state in Indonesia, not just historically, but even up to the present day, bears little resemblance to the "developmentalist state" model in Taiwan.

1.2 Economic Strategy

Similarly it would be misleading to think of Indonesian economic strategy in the same terms as that of Taiwan. Although the Indonesian government has come up with several five year plans (*Repelitas*) since independence, these were more rhetorical than real. They set economic targets, but never committed the resources necessary to meeting them. In particular during Soharto's long regime, *Repelitas* were often used as pretexts for the corruption and cronyism of the state machinery and the army, and worked largely to the short-term gain of Soharto's family, the rich Chinese and selected foreign investors (Mackie 1989: 3-34; Nasuation 1995: 3-40).

In terms of development strategy, the post-independence era can be divided into four periods: Sukarno from 1949-1965; the initial Soharto stage, from 1965 to the late 1980s; Soharto's second period of free market policies; and the new government of Wahid since 1998 (Myint 1984: 39-83).

Phases of Indonesian Development

Sukarno 1949-1965	Nationalist "import-substitution" policy
Soharto I 1965-1987	Export promotion
Soharto II 1987-1995 II	Restructuring (free market policies)
Wahid-Megawati 1998	No clear economic policy (de facto status quo)

During the first period when Sukarno came into power, there was already an economic crisis. Most fertile land had been turned to production for export. Hence the population could not be fed by what was produced on the remaining land.[3] The period following

[3] In fact rice shortages are not a modern phenomenon. They were common at least as early as the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. (Turner et al. 1997)

independence was characterised by further deterioration, not only of agriculture but also manufacturing (Steinberg 1971: 292-311; Little et al. 1993).

To address such economic problems, a nationalist policy was implemented to force the return of foreign-owned plantations to local landlords and their previous owners. The production of export crops like rubber, indigo and sugar was stopped. The government aimed to replace them with food products, rice in particular, for local consumption. When Sukarno tried to go further and transfer land, not just to local landowners, but also to peasants, he encountered fierce and ultimately successful resistance (Bowie and Unger 1997: 46-47).

Under "Guided Democracy" Sukarno had sought to give the peasants better social conditions and tenant farmers a fairer share of their rice crops, as well as to redistribute land. When the government could not deliver on its promises, the PKI (Communist party) encouraged peasants to seize land. Nor did small owners receive much assistance or protection from the state. The government attempted to control the distribution of fertilisers, for instance. But the distribution to the farmers ran into administrative difficulties because of local state official corruption. As a result the farmers had to buy fertilisers on the black market (Higgins 1957). Their ability to do so was hampered by low incomes. For the government had not matched fertiliser control with control over final markets in rice. As a result Chinese merchants paid the farmers low prices, then resold on the urban markets. The farmers were left with the worst of two worlds – an inefficient and corrupt government distribution mechanism for fertilisers, which often failed to satisfy their demands, and a Chinese merchant-dominated "free market" for their products, which kept their earnings low. Together the result was a growing scarcity of rice, which in turn meant higher prices, which soon took on the dimensions of a national crisis (Crouch 1984: 175-89).

Thus, unlike Taiwan where the Japanese had already started a green revolution and the KMT was very efficient in delivering services to the farmers, Indonesia's attempt at land reform was very limited and largely ineffective.

While agriculture failed to provide the population with their basic food needs, manufacturing did not improve either. The Dutch in the early part of the 20th century had encouraged very little manufacturing other than textiles for the local market. Tobacco and tea factories were for the imperial market. However after independence, all manufacturing and natural resources were nationalised. Nationalisation of factories previously owned by foreigners, run now by an ineffective short-staffed government, exacerbated the downward spiral – with one important exception. The nationalisation of oil, and the formation of *Pertamina*, was probably one of the greatest accomplishments of the independent state (Kurian 1992; Keum 1992: 170-73; Brenson 1993).

Although, there were instances of nationalisation, it would be misleading to argue that Sukarno's regime had any real long-term economic policy. Sukarno, like many other heads of newly independent countries, favoured a nationalistic strategy of import-substitution, but it was incoherent and contradictory. In practice it meant little more than substituting home grown agricultural products for imports, and had little to do with the manufacturing sector (Myint 1984: 39-82).

Against the background of the lack of a comprehensive economic plan, Indonesian poverty worsened. Nor was the situation helped by the diversion of scarce resources into military equipment during the conflict with Malaysia in 1963. As Sukarno sought to create a political zone independent of the great powers, the US cut off aid. Heavy military expenditure on the one hand, and lack of viable economic policy combined with low foreign currency reserves due to declining exports on the other, led to a national economic crisis. Government subsidies to the public sector decreased, resulting in an increase in public transport, electricity, water and postal charges. Inflation ran at 500% (Nasuation 1995: 3-40; Turner et al. 1997: 29). Finally in the midst of a general economic crisis a coup brought down the government in 1965.

After the Soharto coup the government moved to introduce Western style economic reforms. The economic strategy switched increasingly to export promotion, particularly

of natural resources – mainly oil, timber and minerals. Such exports brought a great influx of wealth, at the expense of much environmental ruin. But despite the change, despite the growth of manufacturing, Indonesia, unlike Taiwan, remained largely an agricultural economy. Particularly outside of Java and Bali, most people's means of earning their subsistence did not change. They remained part of agricultural or fishing communities with little or no technological advances (Frederick and Worden 1993; Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 109-221). While the rich parts, particularly the urban areas of Java have benefited from the export of natural resources, in the less prosperous parts of Indonesia, where most of the resources are located, the population continues to rely on hard work in traditional sectors. In these sectors, women play a very large role.

The main thing that distinguished the first Soharto era from the post-independence one was its export-promotion policy. From the outset, Soharto opened the country to trade with the West. Alongside the export of oil, wood and minerals, during the period between the late 1960s and the late 1980s other types of manufacturing (oil and wood products are identified as manufacturing in most references) such as textile and paper increased. But once again there was a big difference in the patterns of development followed by Taiwan and Indonesia (Hobohm 1995: 3-40).

Indonesia followed a dual export pattern. There was a clear distinction between the capital-intensive and the labour-intensive sectors. The capital intensive one, run by senior military officers and by Soharto cronies, was financed by the revenue from the export of oil and other natural resources, and from heavy borrowing from international lenders. Because of heavy subsidies and other forms of government assistance, this sector – which included even relatively high-tech items like automobiles and helicopters - continued to grow right up until the beginning of the crisis in the late 1990s. Most of the markets, though, remained local (Bresnan 1993; Keum 1992; Hill 1992).

The second section was labour intensive manufacturing for export. Growth here was assisted, not by lending but by investments from other countries in South East Asia, mainly Japan, but increasingly Taiwan and Korea. It was in the second, labour-intensive, export-oriented sector that female labour became particularly important (Islam and Chaudhury 1999).

As noted above, the Soharto era can be divided into two periods. The first, during which the state was more involved in the economy, lasted from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. The second stage started in the late 1980s when the state was forced by pressure from creditor countries and from the IMF and World Bank, to adopt market-oriented policies. What they meant was that the Soharto government, whose commitment to state-led development had always been much weaker than that of Taiwan, and badly distorted by corruption and cronyism where it did occur, withdrew even further from economic planning. The increasing free-market orientation forced the closure of "inefficient" industries. That, together with the concurrent slashing of state expenditures on the social welfare system, once again exacerbated the problem of widespread poverty and made the income disparities, already notorious, even worse (Booth 1992; Hill 1992; Toye 1995: 55-64; Aswicahyono et al. 1996: 340-363).

During the crisis of the late 1990s, a new government took office, but it would be difficult to describe its economic strategy as innovative. The IMF remains the most powerful determinant of economic policy. To the extent that the government has much scope for autonomous decisions, it is hampered by its internal incoherence. As a result, individual ministers issue completely conflicting policy statements. For example, in February, 2000 the Minister of the Environment declared his intent to force a major multinational mining company to rewrite the contract it had drawn up with the previous regime in order to stop further ecological damage and ensure Indonesian interests were respected – only to be publicly contradicted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who declared the existing contract to be sacrosanct. Similar confusion occurred around the activities of other foreign and joint venture companies in the lumber and mining sectors.[4]

In addition to internal contradictions, the current government lacks the operational means to implement dramatic economic changes. The civil service is underpaid, the judiciary corrupt, information flows to the central government are limited and unreliable, and, recently, the government undertook to devolve power down to the regions in a

[4] Information in this paragraph is based on field research and interviews conducted in Indonesia.

constitutional transfer that would seem to largely preclude Indonesia following the "developmentalist state" model in the future.

Section Two: Women's Direct Contributions

2.1 Women's Productive Role

Agriculture: Indonesia is still heavily reliant on agricultural production. This sector continues to employ the bulk of the labour force, many of them women. Over the entire post-independence period there has been little change in the structure of agriculture. Sukarno's inability to tackle large land ownership meant that women from low income and small land-owning families had to toil as agricultural labourers. However, women were traditionally the mainstay of rice production, and their knowledge and expertise was retained. Given the lack of access to capital resources, cheap (or free) female labour was critical in realising Sukarno's national ideal of self-sufficiency in rice production (Elliot 1997).

In addition, women aided the development process throughout the entire post-independence period by their role in creating and running co-operative institutions. Among them was the rotating credit association run by women, known locally as *arisan*. These associations have provided each member in turn or in need with credit and emergency funds (Geertz 1961: 16; Stuers 1960: 159). Such institutions have been particularly important to the most marginal sectors of the economy as well as those parts of Indonesia, which have been left out of state support other than programs such as migration.

In order to deal with a population problem, the Soharto government encouraged migration, particularly of women, to less populated and less prosperous islands. This policy had one immediate and one more long-term objective. By facilitating (sometimes using the threat of force) the movement of women to less prosperous, less population-dense, areas, the pressure on the resources of richer islands would be lifted. And having a higher percentage of women in less densely populated islands would bring down

population increase in the future (1990). The fact that living conditions were harsher in these islands was irrelevant to the state policy makers.

Moreover, although agriculture has remained an important part of the economy, there has been very little modernization of agriculture and large land ownership has remained intact. The agricultural sector therefore has two characteristics; one is that it has remained labour intensive, and the second is that the number of landless peasants available to meet needs of labour intensive agriculture is high (Manning 1989). This process has meant that the female share of employment in the agricultural sector has also remained high. In fact it is higher now than in the mid 1960s.

Figure 1: *Female Share of Employment by Sector*



Sources: Census (1961, 1980, 1990), Household Sample Survey (1976-1997)

Commercialization of agriculture by large landowners required a large pool of landless labour, mostly female. Thus, the emergence of commercial agriculture went hand in hand with the decline of traditional forms of agricultural organization. *Bawan*, a traditional

sharecropping system whereby women and children from the same or adjacent villages are authorized by the owner to participate in the harvest and receive payment in the form of harvest share has been in decline for sometime (Naylor 1994: 529; ADB 1986). The labour shed by the decline fed the supply of plantation workers. At least initially, with commercialization and the decline of traditional sharecropping, wage workers actually got higher incomes than on their own land – though that may no longer be true in the context of the current crisis (Naylor 1994: 509-535).

However, not all labour in the agricultural sector is paid. On the contrary, unpaid family workers may be even more important. Furthermore, the percentage of women working as unpaid family labour has actually been increasing while the sector as a whole has been in decline. Nonetheless, despite the relative decline, the vast majority of Indonesians rely on this sector for their survival (Grijins et al. 1994: 25).

Manufacturing: As far as manufacturing is concerned, the percentage share of women in employment has been relatively high since independence. In fact, a high percentage of women have been in this sector since the pre independence era, and they continued to be engaged in it, well into the Soharto period (Hatagalung et al. 1994: 149). By the beginning of the 1990s, the female proportion of the manufacturing labour force came close to 50% (see the appendix). In this the country superficially resembles Taiwan. However, unlike Taiwan, the share of female employment in manufacturing started to decrease in the last decade. Furthermore, manufacturing employs a small percentage of the total labour force, particularly as compared to agriculture. Indonesia's manufacturing, too, has a high percentage in the categories of refined petroleum, liquefied natural gas and wood products (World Indicator 1999), which are very capital intensive and male-labour dominated. Therefore, although, the overall share of women seems high in manufacturing employment, the total number of women in this sector is relatively insignificant compared to the agricultural sector (Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics; Census 1961, 1971, 1980, 1985).

In terms of employment patterns, capital intensive manufacturing in sectors such as automobiles and television production (Frederick 1992: Appendix) typically employ men rather than women, while women are concentrated in labour-intensive sectors such as cigarette making and textile manufacturing (Anata 1988: 92). It is also typical of labour intensive manufacturing that wages are lower than in the capital-intensive sector. The availability of cheap female labour has been increased further by the government efforts to modernize traditional sectors like the batik industry, which have therefore been shedding labour (Wolf 1996).

With the decline of traditional manufacturing, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, many women entered factory employment in free trade zones (FTZ) where the government has actively encouraged foreign and domestic investment. In the year 1979 alone, foreign multi-national and domestic investors set up 72 FTZ factories where only women were employed. After the devaluation in the mid-1980s, more multi-national enterprises (MNEs) moved to Indonesia's FTZs. Like other FTZ factories throughout the South, these rely on cheap 'unskilled' and relatively docile female labour, preferably that of unmarried girls and women between the ages of 12 and 24, many of whom came from landless peasant families (Wolf 1992: 91). Indeed, Indonesian women have the lowest wage level in Asia, a prime reason for the attraction of foreign investment. Table 1 compares the wage level that prevailed in Indonesia at the start of the 1990s to that of other countries in the region.

Table 1: *Average Wage Per Hour for Female Workers*

(U.S.$)

Hong Kong	1.15
Singapore	.79
South Korea	.63
Taiwan	.53
Malaysia	.48
Philippines	.48
Indonesia	.19

Source: Wolf 1996: 41

Thus, in addition to the fact that Indonesia, under the auspices of the structural adjustment programs, undertook perhaps the most radical program of deregulation and privatization in the world (Utrecht and Sayogyo 1994: 48-49; A Brief Situation Analysis of Women 1995), there were other factors attractive to foreign investors from newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia. One major factor was its abundance of cheap female labour. In addition, foreign multi-nationals could employ women as sub-contractors. Sub-contracting became more common in the 1990s, particularly among women in the textile, garment and footwear industries (Smyth 1993: 7; Grijins et al. 1994: 191). The increase in this sector is reflected in figure 1.

Service: However, after agriculture, it is the service sector, which has experienced the largest increase in the female share of employment. Figure 1 show that community work, (for women that mainly means teaching, nursing and social work) has grown in total volume. But the increase in community work is insignificant in comparison to other sectors. Although, during the Soharto era, such community jobs increased as part of the general welfare program, the share of women employed does not match the overall increase. What has increased significantly compared to other sectors, however, is the trade and hospitality sector.

As far as trade is concerned, there are differences between women from high income and low-income households, as well between urban female traders and rural ones. Many women from urban areas with access to capital, for instance, tend to be engaged in higher return trade items, such as garments (batik) (Djajadiningrat-Nieuwwnhuis 1987: 43-52; Grijins et al. 1994: 123; Elliot 1997). Women from high and middle-income families engage in a wide range of activities such as acting as the middle-person buying goods from other women and reselling them. From the lower income groups there are women engaged in dressmaking and carpentry in urban areas, as well as at the village level.[5]

[5] During my interview with one of an American expatriate women in Jakarta, who taught at Jakarta International School, I learned about women from high income families who travel to India to bring jewellery to sell in private parties to other women from high income groups as well as to the Chinese and expatriates.

Women from very poor households are very often driven into petty trade (Hardjiono 1985).

Since women in Indonesia have traditionally played a large role in trade, with improving infrastructure more women can travel further and have access to a wider market. Increasingly, women, especially those at the bottom of the social strata, namely from rural low-income households, travel outside their villages to sell goods. These self-employed women sell products (on a small-scale) such as traditional beverages, vegetables and fruit, (Smyth 1992: 47) as well as processed perishable food such as rice cookies or smoked fish and local herbs (Titi and Utrecht 1992). Some female market traders sell daily necessities as well as factory products in the lower-price range such as tooth paste, powder, combs, hair clips, etc. (Utrecht 1992: 41). Many of the women who sell herbs operate as *dukon* - a knowledgeable woman who prescribes and sells herbal remedies in both urban and rural areas (Puntowanti 1992: 187-202).

It is interesting that all three types of women, those from high, middle and low-income households, reinvest their income in their families. Those from high-income groups use these supplementary incomes for providing better educational opportunities for their children, while those from low income groups are driven into small trade to provide for the basic needs of their families as an extension to their homemaking role in handling a small budget.

Next to trade, and the urban equivalent, working as sales staff, the largest component of the female labour force in the urban service sector is in "hospitality," working in hotels and restaurants. In fact, as the number of foreign companies and joint ventures has risen, the volume of the services related to them has increased the demand for female labour, especially in highly populated islands, such as Bali. Many women are employed in the tourist industry and related work, such as laundry, cooking, cleaning and the like (Ranad 1992; Cukier et al. 1996).

Moreover, the tourist industry has increasingly benefited from female labour in another way, namely in the recent increase in the number of female entertainers and sex workers. Their opportunities for employment have been bolstered by the existence, in some neighboring countries like Singapore, of strict laws about prostitution. The price for the service of a sex worker in Batam, Indonesia, for instance, is one quarter that of Singapore. In fact the proximity of the island of Batam to Singapore and Malaysia prompted the Indonesian government to encourage the sex industry there (Gavin 1998: 49). There have been similar increases in other tourist areas such as Bandung and Indramayu (Jones et al. 1998: 46-47).

The table below indicates the increase of registered prostitutes. However, it is likely a serious underestimate. Even though the number of registered prostitutes has risen dramatically in the past decade (Jones et al. 1998: 52) this number is in addition all those who are not registered, many from upper and middle class households. (With the higher class of prostitutes, a clear definition and registration are considerably more difficult.) Most often however, sex workers come from low-income families. Many poor women from rural areas migrate to the cities in search of jobs and end up becoming sex workers. However they tend to send part of their income back to their families. Those who migrate outside of the country similarly send remittances to their families, and those remittances have been a useful source of hard currency for Indonesia.

Table 2: *Number of Registered Prostitutes, Indonesia, 1984-1995*

1984-1985	48057
1985-1986	56571
1986-1987	59290
1987-1988	56524
1988-1989	62660

1989-1990	64441
1990-1991	49679
1991-1992	52389
1992-1993	47454
1993-1994	65059
1994-1995	71281

Source: Lin 1998: 52

Although many women migrate to neighboring countries as sex workers, the largest category of migrant workers is comprised of maids. Becoming a maid is a practice that is becoming increasingly popular both inside the country and among the émigré population. Many women, chiefly young unmarried women between the ages of 12 and 25, who can not find work in hotels and restaurants and who refuse to be prostitutes work as maids, often in foreign countries.[6] The Middle East is a popular destination. The remittances of émigré maids are also an important source of family income. Although the actual numbers have not always been accurately captured in the official statistics, the Trade Union Congress estimates that today 1.5 million Indonesian migrant laborers exist in Malaysia alone, that women make up a significant portion of these migrant workers and most of them are maids. The number of migrant maids has been so high that recently the mass media began referring to Indonesia as a nation of servants (Anata 1988: 87; Working Group of Indonesian 1995: 42).

Table 3: *Total Indonesian International Labour Outmigrants by Sex*

Year	Female	%	Male	%	Total
1969-1974	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5624
1974-1979	3817	23%	13235	77%	17052
1979-1984	55000	57%	41410	43%	96410
1984-1990	198735	68%	93527	32%	292262
1990-1994	442310	68%	209962	32%	652272
Total	699862		358134		1063620

Source: Santos et al. 1995: 93.

[6] During several interviews with high-income women, I realised that the number of their maids has grown during the recent crisis.

It is difficult to track accurately the numbers of sex workers and maids, and therefore the data are sketchy. They are in fact likely serious underestimates since Indonesia, unlike Taiwan, has a huge informal economy with a high level of female participation (Papanek 1983: 79; Anata et al. 1988; Rachbini 1991). This is not just a coincidence; the government has had a special interest in deliberately encouraging the informal economy. Government officials up to the ministry level have described the informal sector as a safety valve in times of economic hardship. The government has encouraged female employment in particular in this sector in order to alleviate poverty under the system of *bapak anagka* or foster parents, providing credit and technical guidance, raw materials and other measures (Brief Situation Analysis of Women 1995). In addition to the traditional forces encouraging growth of the informal economy, there has been the impact of the generally rising level of poverty since the mid-1990s and then the post-1997 crisis.

The informal cash economy, however, must be distinguished from the non-cash informal economy. As the Indonesian climate and soil is rich, many women, in urban as well as rural areas, produce subsistence goods for family consumption. Although no one has effectively measured the extent and range of the non-cash informal economy, it suffices only to visit the country to see how important it is in order to understand the concept. Vegetable gardens tended by women are commonplace even in the cities, on very limited land.

Yet another aspect of the non-cash informal economy ties very closely with the formal. Many women in the formal as well as the informal sectors have to rely on the work of their extended families, usually older women, for childcare and other housework duties (Smyth 1993: 7). The work of these older female family members is essential to permitting younger women to work for cash, is largely unremunerated (except for the occasional gift), and therefore uncounted. In effect, this unpaid labour of older women is a logical extension of reproductive work done when they were younger.

Section Three: Women's Indirect Contribution

3.1 Reproductive Role

The previous section noted in passing the way women's paid and unpaid work is channelled into the well being of the household. In this respect Indonesia is no different from any other part of the world. Since this aspect of women's work has been discussed in earlier chapters, this section will restrict itself to examining the impact of women's participation in the economy on the fertility rate. In this chapter, unlike that dealing with Taiwan, there will be no regression analysis of the impact of female employment on infant mortality, life expectancy and education because of poor data quality. There are simply too many missing figures for the results to be meaningful. For all variables other than female labour I used data from the UNESCO Statistical Year Book. (UNESCO does not carry data on labour.)

As indicated by the figure below, the participation of women in the labour force has always been high - the growth in the female employment ratio is compared to Taiwan is not very significant. Nonetheless, even though the increase in total participation of women is not high, the total fertility rate has decreased in accordance with the hypothesis - it drops marginally more or less in line with the overall increase in the female employment ratio.[7] This reflects the efforts of the government and NGOs in the area of birth control.

[7] Given the number of missing values for TFR, I have taken five-year averages and interpolated for the missing values. Therefore, the result must be taken with some degree of caution.

Figure 2: *Female Employment Ratio and Total Fertility Rate*



Sources: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (various years), using most recently reported data. For employment figures Census (1961, 1980, 1990), Household Sample Survey (1976-1997).

The state put a great effort into mobilizing women of all classes, especially in the rural areas. Volunteer organizations such as the PKK, (Family Welfare Movement) which currently has two million members have conducted extensive programs aimed at family planning (Indonesia Country Report). In fact the PKK effort to bring down fertility has been so significant that the organizations have been granted both UNICEF's Maurice Pate Award and the World Health Organization's Sasakawa Prize. State-initiated organization have also mobilized many women from high income households to promote safe motherhood, nutritional standards and other community-based programs such as health clinics for mothers and children. Such measures have decreased infant mortality, which in

turn leads to a reduction of fertility (Department of Information 1985; Sabekti et al. 1985: 43).

The government has taken other measures to control population growth. An expanding literacy program is certainly an important one; the number of girls who have entered secondary education has increased markedly over the years. In addition, the state increased the minimum marriage age: it is now 16 for girls and 19 for boys. Improved education and a higher minimum age for marriage has in turn led to women having their first child at a later age, with the obvious effect of decreasing fertility rate (Titi 1995: 15). Furthermore, certain cultural characteristics have been encouraged by the state. For instance, Indonesian society, unlike that of China or India, is not obsessed with producing male children (Office of the Minister of State for the Role of Women 1996: 49).

Other than strictly state-initiated organizations, there have also been Muslim organizations supported by the state. The most important is the Muhamadiah.[8] Its female branch, known as Aisyiyah, is very active in providing family planning measures. Funds are raised by charitable contributions and upper-income class women volunteers staff it. (Aisyiyah Mengangkat Martabat Wanita 2000) A more "conservative" Islamic group with a very large membership among the rural poor, Nethzatol Ulama (NU), also has a family planning program run by its Fatayat (young women) and Muslimat (older women), branches. Indeed, unlike the case of Christian clerics in the Philippines, for example, these Islamic scholars and clerics in Indonesia in general have taken a very progressive attitude towards family planning. Like their counterparts in places like Iran, these "conservative" religious groups have been very influential in bringing down the total fertility rate. The Indonesian religious authorities have supported contraceptive and other measures of fertility control (with the obvious exception of abortion), as well as encouraging the mass mobilization of female volunteers to provide information to poorer women (Williams 1990: 35).[9]

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[8] There are two important Muslim organisations in Indonesia, one is Muhamadiah to which Soharto belonged, the other one is N.U., which the current president has been the leader.

[9] The source of data is interviews in Indonesia and Montreal with leading members of the organization.

Figure 3: *Female Employment Ratio, Infant Morality and Life Expectancy*



Sources: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (Various years). For data on employment Census (1961, 1980, 1990), Household Sample Survey (1976-1997). Indonesian Statistical Bureau.

Figure 4: *Female Employment Ratio and Educational Attainment*



Sources: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (Various years). For data on employment Census (1961, 1980, 1990), Household Sample Survey (1976-1997). Indonesian Statistical Bureau.

The female employment ratio increases sharply up to 1988, then levels off. During that period, there is a very shape decline in infant mortality and a relatively sharp rise in life expectancy. After this period, when the structural adjustment programs begin, not only does the female employment ratio level off, but so does the improvement in life expectancy – it still rises but only marginally. At the same time infant mortality continues to decrease, but at a much decreasing rate, then levels off in the 1990s.

Primary and secondary education both rise along with female employment until the mid-1980s, then level off, again in line with the trend in the female employment ratio.

3.2 Volunteer Work

The scope of volunteer work that women have performed in Indonesia is extremely impressive. The state in Indonesia has made a great deal of effort to mobilize women to engage in a wide range of volunteer activities in rural as well as urban areas. The history of current state initiatives dates at least back to the time of the coup. When Soharto came into power, he slaughtered many political activists, many from Gawani (the nationwide umbrella organization). Then, in the early 1970s, when he attempted to consolidate his power, he also set out to bring women's organizations under his control. He appointed the wives of his senior army officers as leaders of the PKK and the wives of top bureaucrats as leaders of Dhrama Wanita. They were then given the job of teaching women from lower income groups the "correct" values of being a woman (a doctrine called "*Ibuism*"). (Djajadiningrat-Nieuwwnhuis 1987: 43-52) These values included the notion that women should be supportive of their husbands and of the "Father State." While PKK became more focused on the rural section, Dhrama Wanita became active in the urban areas. (Wieringa 1985; Smyth 1997)

These organizations have performed a wide range of activities to combat poverty. The PKK since 1975 has encouraged mutual self-help. It has aimed to "educate" women to become better caregivers, and to conserve and preserve the environment. It has engaged women in family planning programs along with programs designed to provide basic health care. The PKK has also raised charity funds from women of medium and high income to help poor families with clothing, housing, and home economic planning. Since the drop in the growth rate in the mid-1990s, these organizations have been used even more vigorously to deal with poverty (Utrecht and Sayogyo 1994: 48-49).

It is obvious that these organizations carried out an enormous amount of services, which otherwise the state would have to perform. In the context of the economic deterioration of the 1990s and with the erosion of state services due to structural adjustment, these volunteer programs were stretched as far as they could be to fill in as the state withdrew from its welfare functions. As the role of such organizations increased and international

links, for example with the International Women's Conference in Nairobi and Beijing, became more profound, the women's organizations in Indonesia began to formulate a much more critical and independent perspective.

Along with state initiated organizations there are other types that are neither state initiated nor completely autonomous. Aisyiyah is the most notable example. Aisyiyah has close links to the Golkar party, (the party of the Soharto regime), but is not a state-institution (Wieringa 1985). The two other major Islamic women's organizations, Fatayat and Muslimat, have been quite independent. All three have carried out social welfare policies in their attempt to combat poverty and increase female social and economic empowerment. Their activities included setting up vocational training programs, providing micro credits or emergency loans for small business, literacy programs using Islamic teachings, bursaries for higher education, day care centers, programs to teach women how to provide nutritious meals on limited budgets, extra-curricular programs for adolescents, neighborhood safety networks, community activities for the young and unemployed, building parks for the neighborhood and so forth.[10]

Religious organizations have had a very large membership and therefore have been extremely important for social development. Fatayat and Muslimat currently have close to six million members.[11] Their role was particularly important in the face of the recent collapse of Soharto's regime. These two continued to provide welfare measures. Since the NU (also to some extent Muhamadiah) were independent of the state and relied on funding from their members' charitable contributions, their services managed to continue during and in the aftermath of the political crisis. In this sense these organizations not only subsidized the state but, in the absence of it, acted de facto as the state (Fatayat Welfare; Suara Aisyiyah 2000).

Women's organizations in Indonesia have been very different from those in Taiwan. There, state initiated organizations eventually became autonomous, partly due to rising

[10] The information comes from my field research, and interviews with the leading activists.
[11] The numbers come from the central office in Jakarta and are approximations.

female labour force participation. In Indonesia women's labour force participation was high all along and, in the face of state repression of their organizations, the only ones that survived autonomously up until the mid 1980s were the religious ones, Fatayat and Muslimat. Then, after the mid-1980s, other small organizations were formed. One of the most notable examples was Kalyanamitra, born in 1985 as a resource and documentation center. Initially having a low profile, Kalyanamitra soon became the most important women's organization, taking a leading role in the protests that led to the downfall of Soharto (Smyth 1997).[12]

Because of the current government's inability to carry out welfare functions adequately, these women's organizations are currently of particular importance. But these organizations have gone beyond social welfare and are now very active in advocating women's rights' issues. Many have formed alliances with sectors of the newly elected post-Soharto government. Kalyanamitra, for instance, is working closely with the Ministry of Women's Empowerment to campaign on many issues such as equal pay. At the current moment, both religious organizations and secular ones have found the momentum to focus on gender issues (Jakarta Post, 23 November 1999)

But, much as in Taiwan, many of these organizations have gone beyond women's issues and have extended their campaigns to wider political matters. Koalisi Prempuan, for instance, in the strife-ridden state of Aceh, has not only been concerned with rape cases but also is engaged in conflict resolution in areas where violent clashes have occurred on a regular basis. They have mobilized local women's organizations to mediate between the army and separatist groups.[13] Many others such as *Lembaga Studi dan Pengembangan*, LSPPA (Institute for Women and Children Studies) have combined many different issues: micro credit to help women in rural areas, organizing talks by progressive Muslim scholars for the urban middle class, environmental action and much more. In fact since Soharto dismantled the main institutions of an independent civil society and eliminated any real political parties, once he fell there was an obvious void. As a result, Indonesia

[12] Siti Aripurnami, one of five founding member of Kalyanamitra, gave me this information. There appears to be no written history of the organization in English.

has been badly in need of the means for re-constructing civil society. In this task, women's organizations play a crucial role. Their role is all the more important given the recent emergence of powerful separatist and ethno-religious organizations that distrust the state even under the new regime. Women's organizations are able to work in harmony with all of these disparate groups.

Although many of these developments are positive, they are unfortunately often quite unique to Indonesia. As the next chapter will show, the problems facing women in the Philippines are much the same, but the women's movement there has been much less effective in facing them and in mobilizing to counter them.

[13] Interview with one of the leading members Tati Krisnawati.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PHILIPPINES

From the point of view of state structure and policy, the Philippines differs substantially from the two previous cases. Unlike Taiwan, it does not fit the model of the previously mentioned 'developmentalist state'. Yet, unlike Indonesia, neither does the state take a minimalist approach. Particularly during the Marcos regime, the state was heavily involved in the economy, but on behalf of a set of crony capitalists close to the regime, rather than in pursuit of some larger ideological-economic goal, as was true in Taiwan. An examination of the Philippines shows that it not enough to have a state involved in the economy. Rather the specific nature of the involvement is of great importance. Furthermore, the state structure in the Philippines, although autocratic, was once again a direct contrast to that of Taiwan. In the Philippines it was incapable of real control over the society. Many parts of the Philippines were (and continue to be) run by guerrilla groups, the most notable of which are the New People's Army and Islamic separatists. Those zones, completely or partially out of formal state control, have evolved their own quasi state in which the guerrilla groups have their own army and taxation systems, and provide social welfare programs.

Since the state in the Philippines has, by and large, been incapable or unwilling to implement a sound development strategy, the simple categorization used before must be modified. In the early post-war years, there was a flirtation with import-substitution, but it amounted to very little. During the long and notorious regime of Ferdinand Marcos, there were efforts to promote exports, but the results were haphazard, inconsistent and, compared to Taiwan, a failure. Subsequently the country has gone through the throes of drastic structural adjustment – privatization, liberalization, devaluation and down sizing

of the state structure – that has created massive poverty and inequality. This, in turn, has, much like in Indonesia, fed political dissent and separatist insurgencies.

Partially due to the weakness of state policy, not just in the later period when there was a deliberate withdrawal from economic regulation, but during the earlier period when the state was supposed to be more active, the *direct* contribution of women to the formal economy has been less than in the case of Taiwan, where women's labour was crucial to its "take off," or Indonesia, which has not been subjected to the same great waves of female migration in search of work abroad. In the absence of any real "take off" in the Philippines, directed by a state committed to integrating women into the formal labour market, the emphasis is more on women's indirect contributions.

Section One: State Structure and Development Strategy

1.1 State Structure

At the end of World War II, American dominance under a military regime with a token Filipino president was restored. In 1946 the country was formally granted independence under conditions that assured the continuation of US political and economic interests (Goodno 1991). A new president, bolstered by US financial and military aid, committed the country to counterinsurgency against the *Huk* movement (Kerkuliet 1997: 151), the vestiges of the anti-Japanese guerrillas who also opposed the restoration of American control. Although he died shortly after assuming office, his successor continued the same policy. In 1947 a Military Bases and Military Assistance Agreement was signed with the US, which further strengthened US military intervention (Crouch 1984, Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 241)

The US presence took many forms. The most obvious was military, both in terms of major bases and in terms of assistance in counterinsurgency. But, in addition, the US was active politically, mainly through an alliance of American agribusiness with the land

owning class (Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 241). The Philippines economy during the post-independence era remained dominated by a set of export-oriented agribusiness interests often referred to as the sugar bloc (Olson 1982, Haggard 1995). This orientation was further entrenched after the Cuban revolution, when the U.S. shifted the former Cuban sugar quota to Nicaragua and the Philippines. The two forms of American control reinforced each other indirectly as well (Bowie and Unger 1997). The large plantation owners had a history of brutal exploitation of the local farmers who in turn often supported the *Huks* rebels. Although the insurgency never attained its objectives, nonetheless, the government failed to gain any real political legitimacy and/or to earn the trust of the bulk of the rural population.

In 1951 a US-Philippines mutual defense treaty was signed as a prelude to intensification of the counterinsurgency campaign. Backed by a new Filipino defense secretary, Ramon Magasysay, by 1954 the rebellion was essentially brought under control. Having earned the gratitude of the US, Magasysay defeated the incumbent in the presidency race. Under his regime, and that of his successor, the status quo, and the politico-economic power of the sugar bloc, was entrenched. In 1961 with the victory of Diasado Macapagal, there was an apparent shift in the direction of economic and political development, although in reality it turned out to be rather shallow (Golay 1961; Stauffer 1985: 247-8).

The Macapagal victory can be taken as the first manifestation on the political level of the growing power of an industrial elite, frustrated by the directions taken by the export-oriented land-owning class. Macapagal's appeal for a government to represent the good of the "common man" seemed to be an attempt to mobilize the country's nationalist forces to stand against the old agrarian elite. Implicit in that appeal was a challenge to the structure of US-Philippines relations, which had been historically based on the preferential entry into the US market of the products of the old land-owning class. Although Macapagal wrapped his campaign in rhetoric designed to appeal to peasants

and workers, the real beneficiaries were the rising industrial elite (Goodno 1991; Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 241).

In power Macapagal challenged laws and regulations that protected the sugar bloc. In 1962 he negotiated an agreement with the IMF to remove import controls which the agrarian powers had used to block the inflow of machinery that would have modernized agriculture, yet he issued public calls for people to buy locally made manufactured goods (Golay 1961). Still, his power was insufficient to effect the transformation. In fact he was constantly trying to play one set of interests off against another. The failure of his strategy paved the way for Ferdinand Marcos, backed by US business interests, to defeat him in the 1965 election. The Marcos regime lasted until 1986, making Marcos the first president to have stayed more than one term. During that period, the economic strategy shifted from a rather erratic flirtation with elements of import-substitution more towards an export-oriented one, albeit quite weak compared to that of Taiwan or even Indonesia.

At first Marcos, like his predecessor, played the nationalist card to appeal to the rising industrialists and to the left. He broke from the long-ruling Liberal party and established a party that was more nationalist in rhetoric. (It was even called the Nationalist Party.) Although the US was initially nervous about the upstart party, Marcos quickly placated it by involving the Philippines militarily in Vietnam and opening the economy to more foreign (in practice American) business control (Crouch 1984: 44; Goodno 1991).

Nonetheless, during his several terms in office, there was a substantial shift in the nature of economic power. Using the resources of the state, huge foreign borrowings from commercial banks and international lending agencies, and infusions of US foreign and military aid, he restructured leading sectors of the economy around a set of giant enterprises run by a new class of cronies. Among the most important innovations was financial and commercial centralization of the sugar and coconut industries, a direct challenge to the power and privileges of the old land-owning elite. To further ensure his

rule, Marcos established a strong base in the army, cemented by cronies who accumulated huge wealth on military contracts (Crouch 1984: 39, Hutchcroft 1998).

But once again, changes were not nearly as deep-rooted as they appeared on the surface. Marcos gave the impression of staging a major challenge to the old agrarian class, even to the point of staging his "green revolution" based on land redistribution during the 1970s. Land reform then was limited to rice and corn farms and did not touch the really large holdings of the sugar bloc. In addition, the farmers had to pay for the land that they were allocating, putting them in a difficult financial position. As a consequence, the peasants were left angry and disillusioned, and many then joined a new rebellion launched by the New People's Army (NPA). Throughout the Marcos regime the NPA and other, mainly Islamic groups, kept the political and military pressure on the government. That provided Marcos in 1972 with a pretext to declare martial law. And it served as both an excuse for further extensions of his power, and a reason for the US to increase the flow of military aid (Goodno 1991; Hutchcroft 1998).

To win further support among the major Western powers and Japan, Marcos opened the economy to foreign firms, giving the right to foreigners to sit on the boards of directors of state corporations. He also established free trade zones. And the US extended its Military Bases Agreement until 1991. All this served to guarantee Marcos's reelection time after time. Nonetheless the rapacity of his regime, the anger of the old agrarian elite, concerns of international debtors and fears of the Pentagon about the failure to make any progress against the New People's Army, combined to unseat him from power in 1986. Following a popular revolt over the results of an election widely perceived to have been rigged, he left the country and Cory Aquino, widow of an assassinated opposition leader and a leading figure among the old sugar aristocracy, took power. The era of "structural adjustment" began (Bowie and Unger 1997).

During his two decade rule Marcos certainly enjoyed a great deal of power. Although there were important political weaknesses – some areas were firmly under guerrilla control and the old agrarian aristocracy remained estranged – nonetheless, using the military emergency as a rationalization, he created a state potentially capable of taking a strong lead in the development process. However, ability and willingness are two quite different things. Not only did the state under Marcos not act as a developmentalist state but also the nature of his regime discredited the very notion of state interference in the economy. Privatization and liberalization became increasingly appealing as ways to deal with the state monopolies created to serve the political and financial needs of Marcos and his cronies (Jackson 1988; Timberman 1991; Howes 1992; Hutchcroft 1998).

Cory Aquino managed to mobilize support of the left and other reformist groups. She brought a great deal of hope and liberal reforms, and promised to abolish state monopolies. She was challenged both by the military which attempted coups and Marcos cronies eager to restore themselves to power. However, in short order her debts to the old agrarian class were called-in, and her promises of popular reform went unfilled. The real significance of Cory Aquino's term of presidency, however, was in the economic field. After Marcos had discredited the concept of state intervention the counter idea of freeing the economy from the state appealed not only to the industrialists but also to the general public. It was, therefore, not surprising that Cory Aquino implemented many free market policies under the aegis of the IMF and World Bank. During the regimes of her two successors, much the same policies have continued (Tiglao 1999: 38-39).

However, as is typical of the Philippines, once again the changes were a matter of degree, not of kind. Many of the Marcos era supporters maintained their holdings, and the old agrarian elite, though temporarily restored to a greater share of power, was doomed by changes in the world economy to long term decline. All of this occurred while the new industrialist group that Marcos and his predecessor had attempted to encourage, continued its rise. To some degree the old tension between the groups is fading as the old

agrarian elite begins to interact economically with the new industrialists. The most important long-term legacy of the Aquino era seems to be the impact of structural adjustment in creating a state that reduces its social services, curtails its regulatory activities and laid the framework for the rapid economic growth based on private foreign investment during the 1990s (MIDWEEK 1988: 18; Briones 1998: 32-33).

The steady reduction of social services since the end of the Marcos era together with the impact of structural adjustment on income distribution and employment have served to reactivate the main challenge to the Philippines state that dates back to the late 1940s. Poverty and economic disparity have helped mobilize the rural population to challenge that state with the result being that guerrilla controlled zones continue to operate. One of the strongest is based in Negros where the decline of sugar has produced economic devastation while the state has failed to introduce alternatives. Although there is no way of knowing just how large the guerrilla controlled areas are, it is estimated that 63 of 73 provinces have parts ruled by guerrilla groups, many of them belonging to the NPA. In addition to NPA zones there are Muslim insurgents in the South that are forming alliances to work for independence (Crouch 1984: 43-46; Goodno 1991).

In these zones armed civilians form the military and party officials collect taxes, donations or membership fees. In fact some of the mining and logging companies have been known to pay taxes to the NPA. In return, these groups organize schools, health clinics and other social programs the state fails to provide. Overall, the state expenditure as the share of GNP is about half of many Asian developing countries. (Timberman 1991: 338-339) The state has not been able to defeat the NPA or similar groups because it has not been prepared to deal with chronic poverty prevalent in many parts of the country, not to mention Manila itself. Nor has the state been able to negotiate peace. In fact, more recently there has been so much support for these groups in places such as Mindanao that the state may in fact lose further control of greater parts of the country (Bowie and Unger 1997: 103; Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 242).

1.2 Economic Strategy

The Philippines went through three distinct strategies of economic development that are closely tied with the nature of the political leadership. During the first, pre-Marcos stage, policies were geared, loosely and largely ineffectually, towards the idea of import-substitution. The second period roughly corresponds to the Marcos era. Particularly during the 1970s, to the extent policy had much coherence, it could be loosely described as export promoting. The last period, after his downfall, was marked by free-market oriented policies: privatization, deregulation, currency devaluation and structural adjustment.

Phases of Filipino Development

Prior to Marcos	1946-1965	Flirtation with Import-substitution
Marcos	1965-1986	Export Promotion
Since Aquino	1986 to now	Restructuring

It is questionable whether the Philippines had any real import-substitution period for three reasons. One is that, as indicated in Table 2, the traditional, colonial-era pattern of heavy reliance on agriculture for export continued. The sugar bloc wanted continued access to the American market and was, therefore, more internationalist in orientation. Second, in the absence of any real land reform up until the 1970s, the power of the old agrarian elite was sufficient to block any effort to promote seriously the domestic manufacturing of non-traditional goods (Hutchcroft 1998: 15 – 29; Horton et al. 1996: 224). Third, the continued power of American economic and political interests played a significance role by making the grant of U.S. economic aid conditional upon policies that

would continue to assure U.S. businesses a preferential position in the Philippines home market. The U.S. had guaranteed access to Filipino market and its exports to the country were duty free, while the peso was tied to the U.S. dollar (Golay 1961). Under the Bell Trade Relations Act, U.S. citizens were given equal standing with the Filipinos over extraction of the countries national resources (Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 241). Furthermore, in 1962 American pressure forced the government to accept an IMF deal that called for removal of import controls. For all these reasons, import substitution remained more rhetorical - for example, calls by the winning candidate in the 1957 presidential election for a "Filipino First" policy - than real. Although such calls for economic nationalism captured the frustration of the rising industrial class, they were never seriously transformed into genuine policy. (Goodno 1991: 79; Pernia 1993: 164; Pineda-Ofreneo 1988: 103)

This lack of political will was exacerbated by the distribution of income. The great majority of Filipinos had little purchasing power while the wealthy elite preferred foreign goods. In addition, even where the state implemented policies that should have promoted import substitution, corruption often made it easy to circumvent import controls. (Montes 1990: 91)

All these factors made import substitution a vague notion rather than a political and economic commitment. This was a stark contrast to the case of Taiwan where, even though the U.S was politically and militarily present, the state initiated a policy of economic autarky.

As shown in Table 2, during the period after Marcos came to power and attempted to promote exports of manufactured goods, the share of agriculture in total exports dropped dramatically (Pernia 1993). It should be noted, however, that the decline in the percentage share of agriculture for export does not automatically mean non-traditional manufacturing grew, as it did in the case of Taiwan. Rather it implies that some degree of

processing of agricultural production occurred. Much of the increase of the share of manufacturing compared to agriculture represents such developments as the replacement of coconuts with coconut oil. The general growth of food processing has a similar impact. This is one reason why agriculture continues to keep the same share of the total GDP from the 1960s into the Marcos year of export promotion, while manufactured exports seem to rise so dramatically Table 2.

This increase in manufacturing (mainly throughout the 1970s) during the period of export promotion under Marcos is shown in Table 2. This increase is disproportionate to the major increase in the percentage share of exports during the export promotion period from 8.96 from 1970-74 to 12.16 in 1975-79. This increase is the largest increase in the modern economic history of the Philippines. Apart from food processing, textiles and electronics account for much of this increase (Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 244-245). Furthermore, as in the case with Indonesia, mining and logging activities are defined as manufacturing. Therefore, part of the expansion of manufacturing is explained by increased activities of mining and logging companies. This helps explain why, in spite of a massive increase in this sector, unemployment remains high. Again, in direct contrast to Taiwan, where the increase in manufacturing output was matched by a sharp increase in employment in manufacturing, in the case of the Philippines (as in Indonesia) increasing manufacturing is not matched by a rising employment rate for men or for women.[1]

This increase in the share of manufacturing for export is also clearly related to the expansion of the free trade zones. During the period of export promotion, as Marcos granted tax havens to foreign investors, investment in these zones grew. These zones were concentrated in Metropolitan Manila and Batan. There, foreign companies produced not only garments and electronics, although these two were the most important, but also furniture, wood products, shoes and leather goods (Kurian 1992: 1587-88). These zones

[1] The unemployment rate has been high around 9% (ILO 1999), while underemployment is estimated at more than 20% (Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 247).

have employed a great many women who are paid a minimal salary. Furthermore, not only do free trade zones produce non-traditional manufacturing goods for export, there is some agribusiness production for export in them that may well be captured in statistics of manufacturing rather than agriculture. (As an example of agribusiness, Dole and Del Monte began operations in canning and processing during the period of Marcos.)

In the period of restructuring of the 1980s, the post-Marcos governments, faced with economic crisis, went along with IMF and World Bank policies of devaluation while foreign ownership outside and inside the zones increased (Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 62; Bello 1988:18). The Aquino regime further implemented privatization programs - selling off government-controlled or government-owned corporations to the private business sector, - and deregulation, for example by reducing restrictions on bank lending and investment. In addition, deregulation of labour laws helped produce a flexible job structure that became an important factor of cost competitive production of tradable goods (Lim 1993; Briones 1998). These measures attracted foreign firms and investors, which ultimately led to further increase of the share of manufacturing for export.

Tables for this section are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicator CD. They show that while total exports grew dramatically, there has also been a significant increase in the percentage of exports accounted for by manufacturing. At the same time the data show that manufacturing as a percentage of total economic activity has changed very little. At first glance this appears a contradiction. However, part of this may be explained as a shift within the manufacturing sector towards exports relative to the domestic market. Moreover, since GDP has enjoyed a steady increase, (except for a brief period of negative growth during the debt crisis of the 1980s), the fact that manufacturing is stagnant as a total percentage of GDP, nonetheless is compatible with absolute growth of the sector.

However, it would be misleading to argue that the Philippines has enjoyed the same type of sustainable industrialization as Taiwan. It has relied on foreign investment and technology, particularly from neighboring countries such as Taiwan. And its pattern of development, outside the free-trade zones, has not been as labour intensive as in Taiwan. Furthermore the import content of exports from the Philippines appears to be much higher.

Furthermore there has been insufficient "trickle-down" effect on the employment situation, at least with respect to the modern sector. On the contrary, despite per capita income growth in the 1990s, unemployment and underemployment remain widespread, among men and women, in the urban and the rural areas alike.[1] Furthermore, even into the 1990s, approximately half of the country's 66 million population still make their living the traditional occupations of agriculture and fishing (Collinwood 1993; Pernia 1993). The Philippines, like parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, has experienced the phenomenon of "jobless growth." Moreover unemployment in the countryside has further exacerbated unemployment in the urban areas as many migrate to cities or, in the absence of jobs in the cities, to other countries. In fact migration has become an important factor of the Philippines economy; and the percentage of female migrants has increasingly exceeded that of men's.

Table 1: *Major Sectors of the Economy as Percentage Total GDP*

Year	1960-4	1965-9	1970-4	1975-9	1980-4	1985-9	1990-5	1995-7
Agriculture	52.29	50.75	39.08	28.96	23.36	23.01	18.30	16.61
Manufacturing	20.44	20.37	25.90	25.54	25.04	24.00	24.26	22.70
Service	46.65	45.81	36.77	35.20	37.12	41.54	45.03	47.67

Source: World Development Indicator 1997

[1] This, of course, is why female labour force participation, which includes the unemployed. is a less effective indicator than the ratio of females employed for purposes of predicting changes in social variables like educational attainment.

Table 2(a): *Manufacturing and Agriculture as Percentage of Total Exports*

Year	1965-9	1970-4	1975-9	1980-4	1985-9	1990-5	1995-7
Agriculture	27.97	19.79	8.82	5.50	4.42	1.53	1.15
Manufacturing	6.47	8.96	17.16	23.40	31.91	46.90	56.59

Source: World Development Indicator 1997

Table 2(b): *Exports $US in Billions*

year	1980-4	1985-9	1990-4	1995-7
export	1.70	2.61	4.61	12.45

Source: World Development Indicator 1997

Section Two: Women's Direct Contribution

2.1 Women's Productive Role

Agriculture: In general the agricultural sector as a percentage of GDP has been in decline since the 1950s. Nonetheless it has remained an important source of employment. However, employment in agriculture has remained mainly male. Although the share of women has risen, the absolute number of women employed remains low. This overall low rate of employment of women is not typical of the rest of Asia. It is, however, quite typical of Latin American countries which, of course, share a common colonial history (Spanish and American) with the Philippines. In Latin American countries the female working population constitutes about half of the labour force in the manufacturing and services but only a quarter of that in agricultural. See Table 3 and Figure 1 (Alonza et al 1996).

In the Philippines, the gender pattern of agricultural employment, the mode of production and the choice of crops with an emphasis on export crops, reflects the colonial legacy

(Sidel 1997: 948). For a long period of time, land remained (and remains) controlled by a set of large, quasi-aristocratic landlords. In the case of sugar, the most important crop, production takes place in *haciendas* where men have traditionally been employed as plantation workers. Their women and children work as auxiliaries to the men, as members of the patriarchal household rather than as workers in their own right, and usually in peak season. Although the family really works as a collective, in a cooperative way, women are mainly unpaid – the wage is given to the men. (Eviota 1992) One recent survey showed that one-third of the labour-force in sugar production was female, but that they were mainly wives and daughters of resident and casual workers. When women work as daughters or wives of male workers, rather than in their own right, their labour is often unrecorded since it is usually unpaid labour. This could explain to some extent the low level of female employment in this sector. In those relatively few instances where women are paid in their own right, they work in 'lighter' tasks at lower pay (Horton 1996: 103).

Table 3 and figure 1 indicate the long-term increase in share of female employment in this sector. In the year 1976 there is a sudden jump; this could be due to a change in the definition of work. However, NEDA 1989 (The Philippines Statistical Yearbook) suggests that there was in fact a real increase in the number of women employed in this sector after the mid 1970s, something explained by decreasing employment opportunities in urban areas in the period following the declaration of martial law (Horton 1996: 245).

The steady increase in female employment in agriculture is due to the growth and development of agribusiness. Marcos had encouraged transnational firms to invest in agriculture, both in basic food crops and more luxurious fruits for export. Like the export-oriented manufacturing sector, agribusiness, MNCs were established in FTZs. As the volume of agribusiness activities increased so did the share of female labour. As agriculture in the countryside stagnated, more women sought work in these FTZs. In turn the low wages paid to women attracted more foreign investment into the FTZs.

Table 3: *Share of Female Employment by Sector*

Year	Agriculture	Commerce	Manufacturing	Service	Total
1960	14.80	48.00	53.90	51.10	25.60
1965	21.30	57.10	53.30	55.10	32.10
1970	19.50	56.10	54.50	57.70	31.90
1975	21.90	57.60	46.90	61.00	34.10
1978	26.50	54.50	47.70	65.60	37.00
1985	26.30	56.60	48.70	67.50	38.10
1990	25.20	55.60	45.70	63.70	37.00
1995	26.10	55.50	47.00	66.00	37.40
1997	26.30	57.70	45.90	64.60	37.70

Source: ILO Labour Database.

Figure 1: *Share of Female Employment by Sector*



Source: ILO Labour Database.

Manufacturing: Prior to Marcos, the manufacturing of traditional goods was done mainly for internal consumption, although there were some exceptions such as the production of abaci for the U.S market. During the early period, women made up more than 50% of the labour force. Since the early 1960s, however, there has been a slight decline of the percentage of women in this sector (from around 53% in the 1960 to about 45-47% in the 1990s) illustrated by Figure 1. This trend is very similar to the situation in Indonesia where more than 40% of the labour force in this sector is comprised of women. But it is different from Taiwan where the percentage of women rose dramatically during its export promotion era, albeit gradually falling off thereafter.

During the Marcos era's export-promotion drive, resources shifted from manufacturing for the internal market to manufacturing for the external one. Many FTZs were established, mainly around Metro Manila and Batan. In them foreign companies have produced mainly garments, textile and electronics, with some furniture, wood products, shoes and leather goods in the Batan zone (Standing 1989: 1077-1095; Wood 1991:168-189; Kurian 1992: 1587-88).

In both Metro Manila and Batan electrical machinery and electronic components have showed the greatest growth (Tidalgo 1988:163; Hutchison 1992: 471-489). By 1991 electronics made up 10% of all exports (excluding tourism) (See Table 4) generating $US 1.75 billion in 1991 alone (Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 61). Other manufacturing sectors that increased substantially were food, beverages and tobacco, textiles, clothing and footwear, wood and furniture, paper, printing, and chemicals. However, semi conductors and garments have constituted the largest share of export of manufactured goods since the late 1980s. The bulk of companies producing micro-electronics have been foreign and their main attraction to the Philippines has been cheap labour (Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 61).

Interestingly, it seems that the higher the growth rate of the sector, the greater the share of females in total employment. Semi-conductors and electronics have the highest proportion. But women also constitute the majority of workers in tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, leather, footwear, electrical machinery, professional and scientific equipment. In 1978 women produced 54% of non-traditional exports. Ten years later their share increased to 59% (NEDA 1989; Horton 1996: 252-254).

Table 4: *Commodity Composition of Philippines Exports % Total*

Item	1989	1992	1994
Semi-conductors	8.2	9	10
Electrical products	3.5	4.9	5.2
Electronic microcircuits	4.7	3.9	5.2
Apparel of textile	2.4	3.5	3
Garments	9.7	11.1	10.6
Coconut oil	4.4	4.9	2.4
Copper metal	4.1	2.2	2
Shrimp &Prawns	3.1	2.1	1.9
Others	59	57.9	59.7

Source: Islam and Chaudhury 1999: 245

Opportunities for women in the FTZs are directly related to the low wages prevailing in the national economy. The average wage in the Philippines is much lower than in other countries of the region like Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (O'Conner 1987: 122-3). And, of course, since women get even lower average wages than men, the more women available for employment in the FTZs, the greater their attraction to outside investors, and the greater the evident success of the export-promotion strategy (World Development Report 1997). The proportion of women workers in the FTZs has been recorded to be as high as 85%. A 1980 survey of working conditions in Batan indicated that 40% of women received less than minimum wages compared to 17% of male workers. (Hayzer 1986: 42; Horton 1996: 269)

Apart from the ability of the FTZs to attract surplus rural female labour, women's wages have been kept low by a number of other factors. One is the fact that the state imposed

restrictions on the formation and activities of labour unions, both inside and outside the FTZs (Horton 1996: 254). The suppression of unions – along with other forms of dissent - was particularly successful after the imposition of Martial Law in 1972. US military aid to the Philippines therefore also had an indirect but important role in assuring the supply of cheap labour to the FTZs.

Moreover, deregulation has meant less legislative control over production processes, which in turn meant less invested in improving labour conditions or assuring fringe benefits that had formerly been guaranteed through legislation. Unionization efforts were further discouraged in the FTZs by the threat by the foreign firms that they would shift elsewhere. As a result, not only have attempts at labour organization with a view to improving wages and working conditions been largely a failure, but observers insist that the situation of workers in terms of wage rates and working conditions has actually deteriorated (Foo and Lim 1989; Lim 1993: 204).

Many companies in the FTZs have their own ways of keeping female labour under control. For example many have created a "family" atmosphere – the factory is portrayed as a kind of family, with managers as father figures and male supervisors as brothers who then impose discipline. Discipline and hard work is combined with self- indulgence in recreation, such as beauty queen shows organized by factory managers (Grossman 1979; Wong and Kuo 1984; Lim 1987). As recreation and social life become tied to factory work, there is little room for outside activities.

Another factor contributing to the maintenance of low wages is the propensity by employers to ensure that most of their female laborers are young and single. Not only are they easier to exploit, but they also have higher productivity. They are particularly favored because of their visual acuity, dexterity and docility. Many of these young women are sent by their families in the impoverished rural areas to work in FTZs to

fulfill their filial obligation. Since their incomes are essential for family survival, they are all the less likely to protest conditions (Pineda-Ofreneo 1998: 104).

These female workers are employed as long as their vision and health allows. The companies can dismiss their workers when their vision has blurred and they can no longer meet production quotas. The companies pay no compensation or retirement benefits, and the women leave without any skill easily saleable elsewhere. In addition their health may be impaired by exposure to toxic chemicals. Electronics is regarded as a particularly high-risk work but companies are never responsible for any kind of work-related damage (Lim 1993: 175).

The recent trend towards deregulation and privatization both inside and outside the zones has brought wages down further with a resulting further drop in production cost. (Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 62) That effect is reinforced by other measures such as substituting part-time or temporary workers or sub-contracting to small and informal enterprises for full-time wage work. (Pineda-Ofreneo 1981; Sinay-Aguilar 1983; Catalla 1985) The result is to further cut, if not completely eliminate, whatever various fringe benefits and unemployment benefits might have existed, and to reduce even further the opportunities for union action. Subcontracting is particularly attractive to the companies since it makes it easier to throw the burden of any economic downturn onto the labour force. Subcontracting is widespread in industries such as electronics, clothing and footwear with particularly high female employment. (Pineda- Ofreneo 1988: 158-64; Lim 1993: 204-5; Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 24) In this respect the Philippines has been very much like Indonesia with the possible difference that the conditions are even worse than in Indonesia since the state in Indonesia provides more welfare measures than it does in the Philippines.

Services: The service sector recruits the greatest share of female labour (see Table 5). Employment in this sector, however, has a very different pattern from both agricultural

and manufacturing. The agricultural sector employs low-income women from the rural areas. The manufacturing sector draws its workers from both rural and urban low-income groups. The service sector, by contrast, draws on women from both urban and rural low-income households and on middle class urban women.

Table 5: *Ratio of women to total workers in service sector by occupation*

Occupation	1960	1970	1975	1986
Professional	51.1	56.8	59.3	66.3
Administrative	14.5	28.5	20.9	21.4
Clerical	23	37.9	41.7	52.2
Sales	50.7	56.9	51.6	67.3
Service	66.1	66	62.4	59.4

Sources: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics for 1960, 1970, 1975
NEDA, Philippine Statistical Yearbook 1989.

This section will deal first with middle-class women in the urban areas. At the top of the female job ladder are educated women employed in professional and administrative jobs. In fact the percentage of women in professional and administrative jobs is higher than in other countries in the region (Human Development Report, HDR 1999).

There is another category of well-paid middle-class women, those in trade and commerce. These women predominantly remain in "feminine" tasks - food processing, restaurants and pastry shops, clothing and such female-oriented services as modeling schools, song and dance studies, sewing schools, personality academies and craft shops (Eviota 1992: 28). Middle-class women in the Philippines, as in other parts of the world, tend to spend their income on such items as private education for their family.

However, the largest group of women in the middle-class service sectors is teachers, nurses and clerical workers. The Philippines has for a long time benefited from women in these jobs, with low wages. In practice the state has been able to offer education and health as part of their welfare programs because of teachers and nurses who are poorly paid compared to male professional employees. These women not only subsidize welfare for the country as a whole, but, as in other places in the world, increase the income of lower middle-class households, therefore helping to create and maintain a middle class. This is economically and socially important in a country with huge income disparities.

As far as the women from low-income households are concerned, they work in trade and sales as well as hotels and restaurants. However, the official number of women in these jobs does not capture the actual numbers since a great deal of such services fall into the category of the informal economy. Even though the official numbers underrepresent the true numbers, there are still large numbers of women in these jobs. As poverty increases and the effects of structural adjustment hurts those at the bottom of the social ladder, the number of women who work as sales waitresses, cleaners, petty traders and peddlers as well as maids and prostitutes are on the rise.[3]

With 27% of the Philippines population living on one dollar a day (HDR 1999: 146) many women are driven into the informal economy where they can create their own employment. In fact, the government has been aware of the importance of the role of women in poverty alleviation and their activities in the domain of trade. Since the 1980s the state has created an infrastructure to facilitate the burgeoning formal and informal trade sector by allocating sites for mobile markets and simplifying licensing procedures (Lim 1993). There has also been an increase in the number of night markets/bazaars (*pasaar malam)*, a phenomenon spreading throughout the ASEAN countries. Pay in the petty trade formal or informal economy is very low and women in informal trade are worse off than maids (Protes and Sassen-Koon 1987; Sassen-Koon 1983; 1984).

Maids are another category of the service sector, which has a huge pull on female labour. These women, usually young, migrate into the cities to generate an income for their impoverished families in the countryside. In fact, domestic service continues to be a large recruiter of women - two out of three workers in domestic service, according to the National Census and Statistics Office in a 1978 survey, were women and one out of five women workers were maids (Kwitko 1996).

Apart from domestic services, prostitution either inside the country or outside is a prominent occupational "choice" for rural women from low-income backgrounds. Whether working in the urban areas or abroad, these women remit a large part of their earnings to their families. Since prostitution is supposedly illegal in the Philippines (though the government has, in certain periods, actively promoted it), the exact numbers are hard to obtain. But it is estimated that female sex workers number 500,000. (Estimates of their share of GDP run from 2% to 14% and are therefore of little credibility.) (Lim 1998: 7 Pineda-Ofreneo 1998: 118) Apart from their contribution to their families' incomes, sex workers support other occupations – from pimps to taxi drivers (ILO 1989; Lim 1998: 5). These women also benefit hotels and restaurants, and all the institutions of the tourism sector.

However the role of rural women in the tourist and hospitality sectors goes beyond prostitution. They can also be found as barbershop girls, massage girls, hostesses in Japanese lounges or Karaoke bars and working in escort services (Lim 1998: 5; Hosoda 1996; ILO 1998). The tourist industry has thrived on the image that Filipino women are more subservient, and therefore eager to serve, compared to Western women (Lim 1993: 190; Lim 1988; ILO).

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[3] The 1984-5 economic crisis is a good example of a sudden increase in the number of women in services to 6.9% for women as compared to 3.8 for men (Heyzer 1989)

The reasons for the remarkably high proportion of Filipino women in the prostitution and hospitality sector are rooted in the country's relations with the US. For many years it was host to a very large American military presence, around which the modern hospitality sector originally took shape. It began with economic bases, the largest being in Asia, increased briefly during the Korean War, then greatly accelerated during the Vietnam War (Astorga-Garcia 1989: 38; Hosoda 1996: 166). At their peak during the Vietnam War, the American bases held up to 70,000 soldiers and 10,000 sailors. Nor was this simply an underground phenomenon. On the contrary, prostitutes, some as young as 12, were registered and had to pay taxes to the state. During that time the American military supported the creation of 137 Offices of Social Hygiene to certify prostitutes – that ensured control of diseases, smooth delivery of service and the ability of the state to collect taxes (Pineda-Ofreneo 1998: 118).

Even after the Vietnam War, the state remained an important beneficiary of the industry. In 1979 it set up the Bureau of Women and Minors at the Ministry of Labour, one of whose functions was to educate prostitutes (though not in so many words) as to how to be cooperative and genteel to clients. It produced a 'Self-Development Guide for Women Workers in the Entertainment Industry' which stated: "Be loyal to your employer" and ended with the advice, "Your work, more than any kind of work is full of hazards and temptation Always look up to the Almighty for help and guidance." (Eviota 1992: 139)

Nor did the end of the wars in South East Asia end the American military demand. In 1991, the year that American bases were finally closed, 615 registered rest and recreation (R&R) centers employed 11,600 registered women as entertainers and twice as many as unregistered workers (Pineda-Ofreneo 1998: 102)[4] Undoubtedly prostitutes figured prominently among them. However by then it was the civilian market that was by far the most important.

Men from other countries come to the Philippines for sex tourism. The Japanese have had the highest proportion (29%) followed by Australians, Americans and Europeans. There are now direct flights linking Japan to Cebu Island. (Pineda-Ofreneo 1998: 108; Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 82-129; 172-256) It has been estimated that up to two-thirds of males who fly to that destination are on sex-tours, compared to about 2% for business purposes.

A more refined form of prostitution is comprised of "hospitality women." This is a relatively small but fast growing sector. (Pineda-Ofreneo 98: 103). Hospitality women are the only ones that have formal employment status and are officially recognized under labour law as workers. They are therefore the only ones that carry valid health cards in bars, nightclubs or massage parlors (Lim 1998: 5).

One reason for the general increase in the number of sex workers is the fact that the trade pays better than other service jobs that fall into the category of professional work. As far back as 1973, a survey found that many of the women working as massage girls were former teachers and nurses. Many of these women, of course, were (and are) heads of single parent households.[5] Therefore as poverty has increased more women are prone to take up the job of sex worker for several reasons. Rural women with no training have few options beyond being domestic or sex workers. And urban women who do have some training chose the sex trade because of desperately low pay in more respectable professions.

Migrant Workers: Although it is important for other ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, the phenomenon of the migrant worker plays a particularly important and, over much of the last three decades, an increasing role in the Philippines. These migrant workers make an important contribution on several levels. Most directly they send

[4] There are now many Amerasian children as a result of American military presence and since the late 1970s this new mestizo generation in themselves are in high demand for prostitution.

between 30% to 70% of their income home. In a ten-year period from 1985-1994, a total of 5,254,000 or a yearly average of more than half a million Filipinos were deployed overseas as contract workers. It is estimated that they have contributed U.S.$ 19 billion to the Philippines economy, an average of close to a billion dollars each year. Migrant workers also contribute to the economy by paying taxes as well as consular and passport fees. Within the ranks of migrant workers, women, whose professions range from nurses and doctors to domestic and entertainment workers, played an increasing role (Islam and Chaudhury 1999; Cohen 1991: 32-33; Kwitko 1996: 108-150; Rivera 1996: 34). Table 6 illustrates the increase of the number of Filipino women working abroad.

Table 6: *Filipinos Residing Abroad, 1981 – 1994 (In Thousands)*

Year	Women	Men	Total
1981	28,517	20,350	48,867
1982	32,201	31,752	63,953
1983	24,665	17,816	42,481
1984	24,581	16,970	41,551
1985	26,860	18,409	45,269
1986	28,930	20,408	49,338
1987	32,429	23,921	56,350
1988	33,424	24,642	58,066
1989	32,914	22,789	55,703
1990	37,484	25,424	63,208
1991	37,863	24,808	62,671
1992	39,035	25,137	64,172
1993	40,165	26,248	66,413
1994	38,353	26,184	64,537
Total	457,721	314,858	772,579

Source of Basic Data: Commission on Filipinos Overseas

[5] In 1979 prostitutes in Manila reported average earnings of $7 to $10 a day, which was then not only higher than the minimum wage but more than earnings of a factory operator or a sales clerk (Eviota 1992).

This process of "feminization" of out-migration started in the mid-1960s to the early 1970s with emigration of health service workers, and continued to increase thereafter. Of an estimated 7,5000 professionals who left yearly, about four out of ten were nurses during the 1960s and 1970s. From the mid-seventies an average of one out of six professional or technical workers who migrated have been female while the national average for female professional and technical workers were one out of every 20.

Although other professions became more prominent, the high foreign demand for Filipino nurses continued, particularly from American hospitals. By 1988 nurses working abroad outnumbered those in the country. In addition to nurses, teachers, midwives, secretaries and clerks figure prominently in the category of skilled female out-migrants (De Dios 1992: 42; Hosoda 1996: 166; Eviota 1992: 143).

Since the 1980s the relative number of "unskilled" migrant workers has also increased. This, however, is a bit illusory - the "unskilled" migrant female workers are not necessarily unskilled. Teachers and nurses migrate abroad as domestic help since they earn more money in other countries as they would at home.[6] There has been a particularly active market for Filipino domestic workers since the 1980s and 1990s in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia as well as in the Middle East and certain European countries (Fawcett 1984; Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 43). In Kuwait approximately 2 out of 3 domestic helpers are Filipino: they have effectively replaced Turks and women from other Mediterranean regions.

Along with domestic work, an increasing number of women enter the migrant labor force as entertainment workers, a category largely restricted to women under 23. In fact those in this category may well outnumber domestics. Although the data are sometimes unclear, it seems that since the mid-1980s close to half the emigrating female workers

[6] They earn close to six times what they would earn in the Philippines if they practicing their profession as physicians, nurses, medical personnel, engineers, scientists and teachers and 20 times more as a domestic help.

have left the country as artists and entertainers (often prostitutes) (Matsui 1991: 5; Hosoda 1996: 163-177). Japan, followed by Hong Kong, has been the primary destination.

Table 7: *Domestic Servant Work Permits Issued by Local Emigration Department*

Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Indonesians	192	394	86	437	524	498	585
Filipinos	3743	60	2902	534	1158	5340	6460

Source: Chin 1999: 105

There is another, sometimes overlapping category of women who migrate as brides. The primary destinations have been Australia, Western Europe especially Germany and the US. Within this category there are certain "growth markets" – Australia and Britain have been topping the list of destinations for mail-order brides in the last two decades. In many instances the category shades into prostitution, both voluntary and involuntary. (Astroga-Garcia 1989: 38; Hosoda 1996: 166) Today there are many bureaus for mail-order brides in Metro Manila, some of which are fronts for sending prostitutes to other countries, Japan prominently among them (Gabnet 1993).

In almost all cases the motive for emigration is to help one's family (Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 32). In some cases a father will decide that his daughter will emigrate. Given the tradition of filial obligation, it is expected that emigrant daughters will provide more help in the form of remittances than sons. (Trager 1984: 273-4; Pineda-Ofreneo 1998: 104; Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 32-33) As in the case of Taiwan, repayment of obligations to parents is deeply rooted in cultural values. And the migration of daughters is viewed as a temporary sojourn, with the main aim of remittances to permit their families back home to remain as a unit (Lim 1993: 200). The migrant worker's remittances are extremely important as a source of foreign exchange and of domestic demand. However, since much of the remittances return through black market channels to

evade taxes, it is difficult to get accurate estimates of just how large they are. Furthermore, migration of both legal and illegal sector workers is an indicator of a deterioration of the economic and social position of women in the Philippines.

Section Three: Women's Indirect Contribution

3.1 Reproductive Role

As in the case of Indonesia, because of lack of reliable data on the Philippines, there was little to be gained by running a regression analysis of the impact of the female employment ratio on infant mortality, life expectancy as well as educational indicators. Poor data quality is partly due to the fact that much of the increase in female employment has occurred in the informal rather than the formal economy.

The Philippines has one of the highest total fertility rates in Asia. In the Philippines 60% of the population is under the age of 20 (Collinwood 1999) and the average family size is 5.7. Under Marcos the government established the National Population Commission (POPCOM) in an attempt to bring down the total fertility rate (Dixon-Muller and Germaine 1994). His government also limited maternity benefits to the first four children and set up free family planning services. With his downfall and subsequent cutbacks due to structural adjustment policies, free family planning services and other measures have been slashed dramatically. The number of female population control workers fell from around 10,000 to only 200 under Aquino (Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 67.).

Figure 2: *Female Employment Ratio and Total Fertility Rate*



In the Philippines, unlike Muslim Indonesia, there was an added complication from the power of the Catholic Church. Marcos was able to persuade the Church to stifle its criticism of his decision to eliminate the ban on contraceptives, but abortion has remained illegal unless to save the mother - abortion is still murder and practitioners, like drug traffickers, face life imprisonment (Tadiar 1989: 89-92).

Other factors beyond the active role of the state and the passive, partial acquiescence of the Church have contributed to the slow decline of the total fertility rate. Unlike Taiwan where women's participation has increased in the formal labour force, in the Philippines, women's participation has increased much more in the informal economy. There their pay is low. Under conditions of poverty, children are regarded as a source of income. In fact, the rate of child labour in the Philippines has been among the highest in the region. (ILO 1999) Furthermore, the informal economy mobilizes the extended family network

to make work and child rearing more compatible. This is in contrast to Taiwan where women have had to rely on day care centers to permit them to work in the formal economy. (Medina 1992; Peterson 1993; Dixon–Muller and Germain 1994: 208-215) Despite this, as the hypothesis suggests, the total fertility rate has declined as the female employment ratio has increased. However the decline has been relatively slow, paralleling the relatively slow increase in the female employment ratio. This is shown in Figure 2.

With respect to the relationship between the female employment ratio and infant mortality and life expectancy, figure 3 shows a much stronger relationship that was true with the fertility rate. Female employment rises dramatically until the mid-1980s, then fluctuates around a relatively stable level. Infant mortality drops sharply until the 1990s, then continues down but at a much slower rate. Life expectancy follows the increase in the female employment ratio upwards until the mid 1980s, then continues to increase marginally. Once again the results are consistent with the hypothesis.

Figure 3: *Female Employment Ratio, Infant Mortality and Life Expectancy*



As far as education is concerned the level of total education in the Philippines has been high compared to its neighbors, a reflection of American colonial policy and an active role of the Catholic Church.

Figure 4: *Female Employment Ratio and Educational Attainment*



The state spends a large proportion of budget on education, even more than on health, for example. In 1990 education took up 14% of the national budget while the corresponding number for health in the same year was 3.2[7] (Chant and McIlwaine 1995: 69). And the Church still runs 38% of secondary education.

[7] One of the main reason for high education level however, is that women are relatively higher educated than many other countries. In fact has been little difference between men and women and literacy rate among urban and rural (Eviota: 1992: 94). The figures for male literacy are 89.0 and for female literacy 87.5. Further women have a much higher proportion of the age group enrolled in secondary education than either Malaysia or Thailand (both of which have higher GDP) (Hotrod 1996: 245). This high educational level is matched by a high profile of women in high civil service compared to all the neighboring countries, in fact female have an a slight majority of in civil service profession (Horton 1996).

As figure 4 shows, illiteracy in the Philippines was always fairly low, the result of a commitment by the American colonial authorities to education, something which the Church also supported before and after independence. Nonetheless the illiteracy rate shows a definite downward trend, primary education rises strongly and steadily while secondary education, always relatively high, remains largely unchanged.

3.2 Volunteer Work

Much as in Taiwan and Indonesia, in the Philippines women's volunteer work has had a very high profile, deliberately encouraged by government action. In 1975, partly in response to the declaration of an International Decade on Women, Marcos created the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) headed by Imelda Marcos. At least in rhetoric, NCRFWs objective was to work toward the full social, economic, political and cultural integration of women at the regional, national and international levels on a basis of equality with men.

Some measures were actually taken to advance equality for women. For instance, under the auspices of NCRFW, the Department of Labour and Employment set up a Bureau of Women and Young Workers, which theoretically looks after the protection and welfare of women workers. The Department of Social Welfare and Development adapted measures to prevent and eradicate the exploitation of women in any form, including prostitution. It also ran programs to promote the acquisition of skills for the unemployed. (Horton 1996: 266-267)

However, the NCRFW also had another role, which was carrying out state policies. Particularly during the Marcos era, the state used NCRFW both as a showcase for international organizations and donor agencies and as a policy implementation tool. Like the PKK in Indonesia or Motherhood workshops in Taiwan, leadership of the NCRFW

was vested in women from wealthier and more educated backgrounds, and its operation reflected more their class than their gender interest (Heyzer 1986: 145). One of its principle roles was to implement state policies on population control, by mobilizing women to run birth control information programs and distribute contraceptives.

However, in general, the state in the Philippines has been rather ineffective in many social issues. This weakness is greater than could be accounted for simply by the impact of structural adjustment and economic liberalization. It is in part explained by the fact that the Philippine State has always had its hold over the national territory weakened (certainly relative to Taiwan and even Indonesia) by warlords or guerrilla groups. Compared to Taiwan and to some extent Indonesia, there has been much less attempt on the part of the state to mobilize women in policy implementation. On the contrary, much of the effort put forward by women's organizations has been to deal with lack of state action on social programs in rural and urban areas. Women's organizations such as AMIHAN and KMP, both peasant women's organizations in different areas of the country, have become particularly active in those areas where poverty, greatly exacerbated by structural adjustment programs, has been the worst. They have, along with other civil and political organizations, effectively replaced the state in providing for social welfare needs. Together with urban based organizations such as GABRIELA ("General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms Integrity, Liberty and Action"), these women's groups are putting a great deal of effort in setting up schools, day-care centers and health clinics (Tiglao-Torres 1990: 13-18; Fajardo 1990: 21; Herrera 1997: 33). They are also effective in promoting income-generating activities through initiatives to set up credit and consumer goods cooperatives. To replace state-based programs run by the public service, these organizations rely on kinship, friendship and church networks, what McGovern calls chain mobilization by people already known and trusted in the community to initiate and run social welfare programs (Lindio-McGovern 1997: 82).

However in some regions effective functioning also requires cooperation with the guerrilla groups. That has made them occasional targets of the state security apparatus and the military. Starting in the Martial Law era, key personnel in these women's organizations have been killed or imprisoned. Others were forced to go underground.

Although since the mid 1980s there has been a revival of women organizations, (Eviota 1992: 95) they have had to overcome great obstacles and remain fragmented compared to women's organizations in Taiwan or Indonesia. Therefore they have not succeeded in making meaningful changes either to the laws or politics of the country. It is true that when Aquino came into power there was constitutional change to assure equality before the law for women (article II, Section 14) (Quisumbing 1990: 43-54), but in the face of the state so dramatically withdrawing from economic regulation, even a constitutional change means little. The military and the paramilitary groups supported by the army continue to be powerful in the rural regions where women's organizations are very important source of support for the poor. And they continue to target women's organizations, accusing them of being communists or fronts for the New People's Army.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the impact of increasing female employment on economic and social performance in three countries of the Asia-Pacific Region in light of mainstream and feminist-critical development theory. The three country-cases were chosen according to the results of a bivariate regression of the impact of increased female labour force participation on per capita GNP growth in developing countries. The thesis then examined the three cases in detail to illustrate the mechanism through which such a process takes place. However, to obtain a closer fit between female employment and the key social variables, it chose to work directly with employment data rather than labour force participation rates in the detailed case studies. Therefore it assessed the effect of an increase in the female employment ratio on fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy, and education. It did not, however, restrict itself to the standard definition of women's work – rather it used an expanded definition in order to assess the impact of reproductive and community-based work on the economic development process.

The methodology chosen was an eclectic one. Where possible, formal statistical analysis was employed. But, given data problems due to lack of availability, problems of quality, inconsistencies, definitional irregularities etc., this had to be supplemented with comparative-historical, much of it informed further by ethnographic research. The data had to be fleshed out with interviews of scholars, NGO activists and policy makers, and with the results of field research. In short, the thesis employed virtually all the methodologies normally used by social scientists singly or exclusively. They all proved to be useful and complementary in filling gaps and cross checking consistency.

What this thesis has demonstrated is that the general hypothesis seems sound. An increase in the ratio of women employed to total female population over the age of 15 produces economic payoffs, not just directly in terms of per capita income, but indirectly through a host of social variables. This is particularly the case if three conditions are met (and data quality can be depended on to accurately reflect the real employment situation):

1) the state conforms to the "developmentalist" model;
2) women's participation is high in the *formal* economy;
3) women's organizations are effective in pressuring the state to tailor an *activist* policy stance to meeting specifically female needs.

Clearly the results varied from country to country. Taiwan, which provides a model of a developmentalist state, has certainly been an economic success. The state adopted an export-oriented manufacturing strategy which relied heavily on its female labour; and, at the same time, it instituted comprehensive welfare measures. High employment of women in the formal sector brought down the total fertility rate. In addition, there has been an improvement in the components of the Human Quality of Life Index - composed of infant mortality, life expectancy and education. These results are maintained even when the statistical analysis controlled for per capita GNP. Furthermore, state-initiated women's organizations provided the base out of which eventually evolved real feminist NGOs. These organizations in turn became advocates of women's rights, along with other concerns such as increased democracy and environmental responsibility. This has culminated with the recent election of a formerly imprisoned leading feminist, as vice president of Taiwan.

The results from Indonesia were different from those of Taiwan. It did enjoy an extremely high rate of economic growth. But, as a huge country, which relied on the export of its natural endowments such as oil and timber, it followed to some degree the rentier state model rather than developmentalist state model. It therefore did not adopt any effective policy for industrialization. As a result it has a dualistic economic structure. One sector, fed by the revenues generated from natural resource exports, is linked to an expensive army, which drained the country's financial resources. The other is based on labour-intensive export-oriented manufacturing. Foreign companies finance investments in this sector mainly, though not exclusively, in FTZs with a high proportion of female employment.

For Indonesia, the hypothesis about improving the "human quality of life index" (infant mortality, life expectancy and education) indicators was not subject to regression analysis due to the poor quality of data on female employment. Instead I examined the trend in the female employment ratio compared to the trend in changes in fertility, infant mortality and life expectancy. The female employment ratio increases sharply up to 1988, then levels off. During that period, there is a very sharp decline in infant mortality and a relatively sharp rise in life expectancy. After this period, when the structural adjustment programs begin, not only does the female employment ratio level off, but so does the improvement in life expectancy – it still rises but only marginally. At the same time infant mortality continues to decrease, but at a much decreasing rate, then levels off in the 1990s. The total fertility rate, too, behaves in accordance with the hypothesis, albeit not dramatically - it drops marginally more or less in line with the overall increase in the female employment ratio. Primary and secondary education both rise along with female employment until the mid-1980s, then level off, again in line with the trend in the female employment ratio.

While the relationships do hold, in most cases they are not as strong as in Taiwan. This likely reflects the fact that in Taiwan, the Developmentalist State has in general a stronger commitment to social welfare.

It is true that the Indonesian State pumped some of its revenue into human quality improvements such as health care and education. But the state, particularly under the pressure of international organizations such as the IMF, had to withdraw from the economy. The result was an increase in poverty resulting in social and political upheaval. Women's participation has been increasing in the informal economy in response to rising poverty and state social welfare cutbacks. Women have cushioned some of the negative aspects of state reduction of expenditures in these areas, not only through their productive labour in the informal economy, but also through their reproductive labour. This has involved increasing their efforts to address declining formal standards of living. At the same time, their concern over the well being of their families has taken them en masse into NGOs, both state-initiated and Islamic (since other forms of civil organization were

suppressed under Soharto). These organizations compensated partially for state inadequacies in social welfare programs. Moreover, in the context of mounting social and political unrest and the substantial reduction of the state's welfare activities, these organizations also acted to mediate between radical groups and the state. But, unlike in the case of Taiwan, where the NGOs brought pressure on the government to democratize, those in Indonesia had to use much of their energy performing basic welfare functions and political mediation rather than broader political reform. This it means that they have not necessarily been able to improve the conditions for women.

In the case of the Philippines, the state has been even weaker than that of Soharto's Indonesia. It did not have access to the type of revenues generated by the export of natural resources which Indonesia did. In addition, due to its colonial structure and powerful oligarchic interests, it has been unwilling to take an activist role in the economy. That helps explain why its economic performance has been weaker than Indonesia's. However, the Philippines development strategy bears some resemblance to that of Indonesia in so far as foreign companies have been encouraged to set up FTZs and produce manufacturing for export with a high female share of employment.

As in the case of Indonesia, the thesis does not use a regression analysis of the impact of the increase in female employment on human quality life indicators because of poor data quality. This and the fact that women's share of increased employment has gone up faster in the informal economy rather than the formal one. In the case of the Philippines, like that of Indonesia, the thesis examined the trend in the female employment ratio compared to the trend in fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy and educational attainment. The results, once again, broadly confirmed the hypothesis.

Female employment rose dramatically until the mid-1980s, then fluctuated around a relatively stable level. Infant mortality dropped sharply until the 1990s, then continued down but at a much slower rate. Life expectancy followed the increase in the female employment ratio upwards until the mid 1980s, then continued to increase marginally. Fertility was the least responsive – it dropped, but quite slowly. This likely reflected the

continued influence of the Church and its teachings against birth control, which clearly would offset to some degree the normally positive impact of increased female employment. Nonetheless, there was an overall decrease in fertility roughly coinciding with the increase in the female employment ratio.

Finally with respect to education, illiteracy in the Philippines was always fairly low, the result of a commitment by the American colonial authorities to education, something which the Church also supported before and after independence. Nonetheless the illiteracy rate shows a definite downward trend, primary education rises strongly and steadily while secondary education, always relatively high, remains largely unchanged.

As in Indonesia, Filipino women's participation has also increased in the informal economy, especially in the service sector, to deal with the rise of poverty exacerbated by the effects of structural adjustment policies since the 1980's. This increase in informal activity has been supplemented by the remittances of female migrant workers that have, during the recent decades, exceeded those of men.

Furthermore, unlike Indonesia where state-initiated and Muslim women's organizations were successful in implementing state policies such as fertility control, Catholic church influence has, as noted above, been partly responsible for a failure to do likewise in the Philippines. Nor have women's organizations been able to bring about much fundamental political change – the state is unwilling to accommodate them, and in any event is so weak as a consequence of corruption and insurrection, there seems little that it could do.

In all three cases, women's "productive" work (the type that directly generates money income) is much more significant than that of men in the export of manufactured goods, the type of production that has been crucial to industrialization in the post-war period. FTZs overwhelmingly employ women in preference to men, a factor that is deliberately encouraged by the state to attract foreign investment. In addition, their reproductive role has been important in all three cases in different ways, by bringing down the fertility and infant mortality rates as well as by increasing life expectancy and the literacy rate.

Finally, women's volunteer work, as manifested in state-initiated organizations as well as NGOs, in all three cases, has been proven to play a significant role in social welfare improvement and political mediation in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines. While social welfare, including those related to women's rights and democratization emerged in the case of Taiwan.

Both the nature and the degree of the impact of both direct and indirect contributions, however, depend on the nature of the state and its development strategy. When the state is committed to economic intervention with a view to fast-tracking development, as in the case of Taiwan, women's direct contribution is channeled into increasing the general economic wealth of the country. The state had an explicit policy of creating the infrastructure to encourage the use of large numbers of women in the manufacturing sector in both free trade zones and the rest of the economy. On the other hand, in the case of a rentier state like Indonesia or a weak state like the Philippines, although women are important in manufacturing, the manufacturing sector is only a small part of the economy, and the state's role is far less aggressive than that of Taiwan in promoting economic opportunities for women.

On the other hand, women's indirect contribution has had, at least superficially, quite similar effects in the three cases. In each region we see that, the greater the effort of women in their reproductive and volunteer work, the less the social welfare obligations of the state. The difference is that Taiwan deliberately created a comprehensive welfare state which consequently freed women from some of these responsibilities, and the state-initiated women's organizations played a much more systematic and integrated role in promoting state initiatives like "motherhood workshops," aimed to improve human capital. However, in Indonesia and the Philippines, not only did the withdrawal of the state from already more limited welfare functions throw more of a burden on women, the various NGOs play a much less coordinated role, reactive rather than proactive, in the current economic and political crisis.

Remarkably, the obvious importance of women's indirect contribution, even more so than their direct one, remains poorly treated, if treated at all, in mainstream development literature. The neglect of this contribution is partly due to the limited nature of the definitions of "work." Not only does the standard definition of work dismiss or take for granted women's indirect contribution, it also fails to calculate the real costs of radical market-oriented policies. When state welfare functions are cut back, someone must pay the price, and the price is not simply in terms of income reduction, but also in terms of the supply of human capital for the formal labour market.

It is not therefore surprising that, today, after decades of efforts by scholars, activists and policy makers, poverty is increasing much more rapidly among women than among men. The alarming facts about the socio-economic condition of women in the developing world have convinced many of the urgency of the problem. This was well articulated by the remarks of Kofi Annan in the Beijing+5 conference in New York in June of 2000. However, it is one thing to be aware of a problem, quite another to diagnose its origins, and yet another to articulate adequate policies to address it. The Secretary General and others are raising awareness; this thesis hopes to help diagnose causes and perhaps in a modest way, also point to the general direction in which the solutions may lie.

5 June 2000

Appendix I: Speech of Kofi Annan

Press Release
SG/SM/7430
WOM/1203

SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN ADDRESS TO 'WOMEN 2000' SPECIAL SESSION, SAYS FUTURE OF PLANET DEPENDS UPON WOMEN

Following is the statement of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the General Assembly special session "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-first Century" on 5 June:

Five years ago, delegates and non-governmental organizations went to Beijing to right wrongs and promote rights. To show the world that when women suffer injustice, we all suffer; that when women are empowered, we are all better off. The conference was a success: the result was the Beijing Platform for Action. Five years later, you have come to New York to review the progress made, and to press for further results.

Undoubtedly, there has been progress.

Violence against women is now illegal almost everywhere.

There has been worldwide mobilization against harmful traditional practices such as so-called "honour killings" -- which I prefer to call "shame killings".

In many countries, new health strategies have saved thousands of women's lives. More couples now use family planning than ever before.

And a record number of women have become leaders and decision makers -- in cabinets, in boardrooms and here at the United Nations.

Above all, more countries have understood that women's equality is a prerequisite for development.

But at the same time, much remains to be done. For instance:

In economic terms, the gender divide is still widening. Women earn less, are more often unemployed and generally are poorer than men. Women's work is still largely part-time, informal, unregulated and unstable. The fact that they have productive as well as reproductive roles is still all too rarely recognized.

Most countries have yet to legislate in favour of women's rights to own land and other property.

And even though most countries have legislated against it, violence against women is still increasing -- both in the home and in new types of armed conflict

which target civilian populations, with women and children as the first casualties.

Of 110 million children who are not in school, two thirds are girls. And more girls than boys drop out of school early.

Beside those old challenges still unmet, there are new ones. Let me give two examples: First, the spread of AIDS is taking a devastating toll on women and girls. In the worst hit cities of southern Africa, 40 per cent of pregnant women are HIV-positive, and more than one child in 10 has lost its mother to AIDS. Grandmothers are caring for orphans; young girls are kept out of school to care for sick relatives. The social fabric that women have worked so hard to hold together is being destroyed. Secondly, trafficking of women and children, an outrage dating back to biblical times, has now become a worldwide plague.

These challenges demand immediate action. I have asked Member States, when they gather for the Millennium Summit in September, to adopt specific goals for halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS. And the High Commissioner for Human Rights has called for a concerted international campaign against trafficking, through a rights-based approach and the development of a solid legal regime.

All these challenges, old and new, are part of the complex, interconnected world we now live in. They can be met only if we enable women to build on the best this new world has to offer, rather than condemn them to suffer the worst of it. That means, above all, that women must be educated and enabled to play their part in the global economy. It is lack of education that denies girls the information they need to protect themselves against HIV. And it is often the lack of job prospects that forces women to risk infection through early sexual relations.

Equally, it is the absence of economic opportunity that leads many women to want to migrate, and thus become a target for trafficking; their lack of education will make them vulnerable to trafficking, however much we legislate against it. Education, in other words, is both the entry point into the global economy and the best defence against its pitfalls.

Globalization involves technological changes which favour higher skilled workers over less skilled ones. This is widening even further the gap between men's and women's earnings. Only education will enable women to close the gap.

Already, large numbers of women are engaged in global production, from textiles to data processing. But most of them work in appalling conditions, for near-starvation wages. This will only change when women are making economic decisions -- as managers, entrepreneurs and employers, labour leaders and employment lawyers -- and when they are making social and political decisions, as community leaders, negotiators, judges and cabinet ministers.

Already women form the main agricultural labour force, in Africa and many other parts of the world. Yet most women are still denied the right to credit, land ownership and inheritance. Their labour

goes unrecognized and unrewarded. Their needs are not given priority. Their role even in household decision-making is restricted.

Here too education can make the difference, enabling women to champion their sisters' rights to land, to credit, to marketing facilities and technology, and to an equal say in land reform.

Once they are educated and integrated into the workforce, women are better equipped to choose the time they marry and the number of children they have. They and their children can get better nutrition, health care and education. And their example will inspire others, as parents get the message that girls are worth investing in -- at least as much as boys.

Indeed, study after study has confirmed that there is no development strategy more beneficial to society as a whole -- women and men alike -- than one which involves women as central players.

I hope that in the course of this century, we will also prove that the best strategy for conflict prevention is to expand the role of women as peacemakers. In the United Nations itself, we must find ways to appoint more women in peacekeeping and peacemaking positions.

And that is why, in my Millennium Report, and again at the World Education Forum, I challenged governments to make girls' education their priority. Indeed, I believe that implementing the Beijing Platform will be crucial to achieving all the Millennium goals I have asked the world's leaders to adopt on behalf of all the peoples of the world.

Five years ago, you went to Beijing with a simple statement: "We are not guests on this planet. We belong here." Five years on, I would venture that we all know that this is an understatement. I hope this Session will put the world on notice that not only do women belong to this planet, but that the future of this planet depends on women.

* *** *

Appendix II:
Taiwan: Selected Data

Female Employment Ratio, 1965 to 1990

	POPULATION 15+ YEARS		EMPLOYED		
		Females		Females	
Year	Total	n	Total	n	%FER
1965	6869	3301	3763	1029	31.17
1966	6948	3442	3856	1065	30.94
1967	7212	3580	4050	1165	32.54
1968	7482	3719	4225	1252	33.66
1969	7787	3867	4390	1334	34.50
1970	8115	4022	4576	1396	34.71
1971	8444	4181	4738	1447	34.61
1972	8763	4341	4948	1577	36.33
1973	9070	4496	5327	1837	40.86
1974	9383	4564	5486	1835	40.21
1975	9712	4818	5521	1802	37.40
1976	10043	4984	5669	1831	36.74
1977	10375	5151	5980	1982	38.48
1978	10784	5333	6231	2048	38.40
1979	11092	5504	6432	2126	38.63
1980	11378	5664	6547	2191	38.68
1981	11698	5833	6672	2224	38.13
1982	12013	5990	6811	2301	38.41
1983	12263	6126	7070	2509	40.96
1984	12544	6267	7308	2647	42.24
1985	12860	6420	7428	2709	42.20
1986	13161	6565	7733	2912	44.36
1987	13432	6700	8022	3057	45.63
1988	13696	6840	8107	3064	44.80
1989	13955	6966	8258	3110	44.65
1990	14219	7102	8283	3108	43.76
1991	14496	7240	8439	3165	43.72
1992	14711	7370	8632	3252	44.12
1993	15807	7522	8745	3323	44.18

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China (various years). All absloute figures are in thousands.

Taiwan Social and Development Indicators

YEAR	% growth	TFR	Infant Mortality	Life Expectancy Male	Female	Avg.	Total % Illit.
1960	-	5750	32.43	62.31	66.40	64.36	
1961	-1.27	5585	32.70	62.62	67.03	64.83	
1962	6.69	5465	31.27	63.19	67.52	65.36	
1963	9.59	5350	28.43	63.90	68.28	66.09	29.8
1964	13.48	5100	25.53	64.54	69.06	66.80	29.1
1965	7.18	4825	23.67	65.12	69.76	67.44	28.2
1966	8.83	4815	22.10	65.18	69.74	67.46	27.6
1967	12.40	4220	21.14	65.31	69.87	67.59	26.1
1968	13.98	4325	21.34	65.22	70.01	67.62	23.6
1969	10.31	4120	19.46	66.34	70.89	68.62	21.6
1970	12.49	4000	17.41	66.66	71.56	69.11	20.6
1971	13.73	3705	15.96	67.19	71.08	69.14	19.4
1972	17.55	3365	16.40	67.56	72.30	69.93	18.3
1973	42.34	3210	16.21	67.57	72.48	70.03	17.3
1974	23.68	3045	14.08	67.80	72.76	70.28	16.7
1975	6.19	2830	13.86	68.27	73.42	70.85	15.8
1976	17.42	3075	12.88	68.70	73.59	71.15	15
1977	15.01	2700	12.40	68.69	73.85	71.27	14.2
1978	20.69	2710	11.30	69.15	74.32	71.74	13.5
1979	21.35	2660	10.98	69.36	74.48	71.92	12.8
1980	22.40	2515	11.02	69.56	74.54	72.05	12.3
1981	14.30	2455	10.05	69.74	74.64	72.19	11.6
1982	-1.03	2320	8.99	69.86	74.86	72.36	11.1
1983	6.40	2155	8.34	69.90	75.08	72.49	10.6
1984	11.10	2050	7.53	70.46	75.53	73.00	10.1
1985	3.60	1885	7.37	70.82	75.81	73.32	9.6
1986	20.32	1675	6.63	70.97	75.88	73.43	9.2
1987	33.16	1700	5.62	71.09	76.31	73.70	8.8
1988	20.10	1850	6.24	70.99	76.21	73.60	8.3
1989	19.62	1680	6.08	71.10	76.48	73.79	7.9
1990	6.10	1805	5.90	71.33	76.75	74.04	7.6
1991	10.87	1720	5.39	71.83	77.15	74.49	
1992	17.16	1730	5.63	71.79	77.22	74.51	
1993	3.97	1760	5.32	71.62	77.59	74.61	
1994	7.33	1755	5.67	71.83	77.82	74.83	
1995	7.06	1775	7.41	71.93	77.79	74.86	
1996	3.85	1760	7.49	71.89	77.77	74.83	
1997	3.03	1770	7.09				

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China (various years).

($US millions GNP per capita)

	School Enrollment		
YEAR	1st level	2nd level	3rd level
1960	1888783	355274	35060
1961	1997016	409562	38403
1962	2097957	463364	44314
1963	2148652	525364	51707
1964	2202867	594432	64010
1965	2257720	663753	85346
1966	2307955	714083	113855
1967	2348218	785313	138613
1968	2383204	921166	161337
1969	2428041	1028752	184215
1970	2445405	1154597	203473
1971	2456615	1238291	222505
1972	2549743	1323253	251058
1973	2431440	1374075	270895
1974	2406531	1433755	282168
1975	2364961	1505993	289435
1976	2341413	1539154	299414
1977	2319342	1563321	308583
1978	2278726	1572687	317188
1979	2256363	1593147	329603
1980	2233706	1605567	342528
1981	2213179	1627652	358437
1982	2226699	1663643	375696
1983	2242641	1682364	395153
1984	2273390	1677924	412381
1985	2321700	1678767	428576
1986	2364438	1691516	442648
1987	2400614	1707270	464664
1988	2407166	1742116	496530
1989	2384801	1767835	535064
1990	2354113	1818301	576623
1991	2293444	1870315	612376
1992	2200968	1909625	653162
1993	2111037	1941241	689185
1994	2032361	1947022	720180
1995	1971439	1935613	751347
1996	1934756	1908935	795547
1997	1905690	1874747	856186

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China (various years).

Appendix III:
Indonesia: Selected Data

Female Employment Ratio and Social and Economic Indicators

	FER	TFR	GNP p.c.	Infant Mortality	Life Expectancy	Enrolment Ratio* 1st level	2nd level	Adult Illit. (%)
1960	31.06			150.0	52.2			
1965		5.9			45.9			
1966		5.5	40.0		44.3			
1967		5.6	50.0	125.0	45.1			
1968		5.5	60.0	122.0	55.9			
1969		5.5	70.0	120.0	46.7			
1970		5.5	80.0	118.0	47.4	87.4	21.4	
1971	37.0	5.4	90.0	116.0	48.2	90.2	21.3	43.4
1972		5.4	90.0	114.0	49.0	91.7	21.9	
1973			120.0			93.3	22.6	
1974			160.0			93.6	23.3	
1975			220.0			93.5	24.8	37.1
1976	51.6		270.0			94.7	25.9	
1977	40.2	4.7	320.0		52.7	96.7	27.0	
1978	45.4		370.0			104.4	28.8	
1979			410.0			111.2	30.4	
1980	37.1		490.0	109.0		114.6	34.7	32.7
1981			560.0			117.3	37.0	
1982	44.2		590.0			116.6	39.9	
1983		4.1	570.0		56.2	119.3	42.2	
1984			550.0			120.9	44.7	
1985	38.3		520.0			120.4	47.2	
1986	44.5		530.0	71.0	59.8	119.2	53.1	19.9
1987		3.3	520.0	75.0	60.2	119.5	53.5	
1988	52.7		530.0			119.2	52.9	
1989	51.7		540.0			118.3	49.7	
1990	44.6		570.0	71.0	59.8	116.7	48.2	18.4
1991			620.0			115.4	47.5	
1992	49.1	2.9	680.0	58.0	62.7	116.2	47.9	
1993		2.8	740.0	56.0	63.2	117.3	48.5	
1994	50.9					116.8	51.9	
1995				55.0	63.4	116.8	53.8	
1996	51.4	2.7			66.0	116.9	55.8	
1997	49.9			52.0	66.0			11.2
1998		2.7		49.0	64.8			11.5

Gross enrolment ratio. Values exceed 100% because standard age groups are used as the denominator.

Sources: World Bank, World Tables (various years), UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (various years), using most recently reported data. Data for 1997-98 are projections. Data for female employment are from ILO based on census (1961, 1980, 1990), Household Sample Survey (1976-1997) and Human Resource Profile in Indonesia 1999.

Female Share of Employment by Sector

Year	Agriculture	Community	Manufacturing	Trade/Hospitality
1971	264.73	41.20	26.82	42.62
1976	352.58	51.57	35.60	62.53
1977	296.94	50.94	41.71	67.76
1978	315.45	63.95	38.56	77.09
1980	288.34	71.45	46.80	66.79
1982	315.93	71.25	60.22	85.54
1985	341.42	83.17	57.96	93.45
1986	376.44	100.18	56.06	97.56
1988	405.58	114.02	59.97	106.49
1989	412.84	88.69	73.35	108.91
1992	420.48	94.92	80.74	116.50
1997	358.49	126.38	112.15	172.21

Source: ILO based on census (1961, 1980, 1990), Household Sample Survey (1976-1997).

Appendix IV:
The Philippines: Selected Data

Female Employment Ratio and Social and Economic Variables

Year	FER	GNPpc	TFR	Infant Mortality	Life Expectancy	edu1	edu2	Illit
1960	27.21	247.9					26.0	28.1
1961		265.8						
1962		156.4	6.9	76.0	54.5			
1963		168.4						
1964		176.3						
1965		186.8	6.8		56.0	113.0	41.0	
1966		198.8	6.8	71.2	55.7			
1967		213.9	6.7	70.0	56.2			
1968		229.2	6.6	68.8	56.5			
1969		244.4	6.5	67.6	56.8			
1970	34.00	188.5	6.4	66.4	57.2	109.4	47.1	17.4
1971		199.5	6.3	65.2	57.5	107.3	47.6	
1972		209.0	6.1	64.0	57.9	105.6	48.1	
1973		261.3	6.5			106.9	48.0	
1974		310.0	5.9			104.7	50.7	
1975	24.27	366.2	5.3			105.7	54.1	16.7
1976		408.2	5.7	54.0		107.1	57.2	
1977		457.7	5.7	62.0	59.9	106.3	60.8	
1978	46.80	519.1	5.3			108.9	63.0	
1979		624.5	5.0	52.2		106.3	64.5	
1980		670.4	4.8		61.1	113.8	59.7	16.7
1981		719.6		51.0		111.6	61.5	
1982		726.4	4.7	60.0	61.9	110.6	63.6	
1983	50.09	630.5				110.0	65.4	
1984		571.9		47.4		108.5	66.4	
1985	47.95	546.7	4.4		59.3	107.9	63.7	12.3
1986		560.0		45.0		109.8	66.8	
1987	49.68	610.0	4.3	53.0	64.0	110.5	68.4	
1988	47.92	632.4				112.4	71.7	
1989	47.35	687.8		43.8		115.3	72.9	
1990	47.53	704.0	4.0		64.4	114.3	72.5	10.3
1991	47.05	712.7		43.0		113.0	74.0	
1992	47.83	822.0	3.9	44.0	66.3	111.9	76.2	
1993	51.85	824.5	3.9	42.2	66.7	109.9	77.5	
1994	47.32	957.3		38.8		109.8	78.8	
1995	49.04	1084.0	3.7	37.4	65.6	114.5	78.2	5.4

1996	48.96	1199.7	3.6	66.0	116.4	78.1

Source: ILO Labour Database. Original data sources: Census (1960, 1970, 1975), Labour Force Sample Survey (1975, 1977) and Household Sample Survey (1965, 1974, 1978-97).

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