Douglas MacArthur - An Administrative Biography

by

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(ABSTRACT)

For more than a half century Douglas MacArthur was a public servant of the United States. He is

best remembered as a general and soldier, especially for his leadership during World War II and

the Korean War. MacArthur was also the Superintendent of West Point, Chief of Staff of the

U.S. Army, Generalissimo (Commander) of the Armed Forces and Military Advisor (Minister of

Defense) to the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and Supreme Commander

Allied Powers and Military Governor of occupied Japan. In these positions he functioned not as

a soldier, but as a senior public administrator. The dissertation will begin by establishing the

military as a valid and unique field of Public Administration. Contributions of military

administration to the discipline of Public Administration will then be examined. The dissertation

will examine MacArthur's professional and academic training for his previously listed

administrative posts. A determination and analysis of MacArthur's theoretical and applied

approaches to Public Administration and General Management Theories will be made.

The analysis of MacArthur's performance in his administrative positions will be made against a

backdrop of contemporary Public Administration Theory.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Preface

Because this dissertation is an administrative biography, the basic methodological

approach has been that of historical research. First hand interviews and direct access to individu-

als directly associated with MacArthur are almost impossible because of their death or advanced

age. Access to the National Archives, and MacArthur's papers at West Point and the MacArthur

Memorial in Norfolk are readily available. My approach has been to conduct a detailed review of

the numerous available secondary sources. I did this to determine the primary sources that were

examined and provided a focus for additional research that was conducted. I then supplemented

the results of my secondary source search by a selective examination of primary sources.

MacArthur was keenly aware of his historical importance, and took great pains to insure that his

historical legacy would be left intact. MacArthur's extensive personal involvement in the

creation and preservation of documents chronicling his place in history posed problems in

conducting a historically neutral examination. Indeed a common criticism of previous research

and published works on MacArthur has been that they were biased for or against MacArthur.

This phenomenon is so recognized and accepted by scholars that D. Clayton James, the defini-

tive biographer of MacArthur, was criticized in a book review for being balanced and even-

handed in his coverage of so controversial an individual. Some of MacArthur's papers, such as

office diaries, briefing notes, and biographical summaries prepared for meetings with visitors or

dignitaries were prepared by his staff. There are also references by MacArthur and his staff to

articles and books he had read. These papers and documented references can be used without

reference to MacArthur's involvement in his history. These documents have been used to describe and analyze MacArthur's exposure to, and understanding of, managerial and administrative theory.

Reports that MacArthur wrote, or approved, although valuable historical documents, must be carefully analyzed. This is because, of their preparation for "external consumption." They thus might not always reflect reality, or what was considered in their preparation. In dealing with source documents prepared for external consumption, other primary sources, not written by MacArthur, will be used to corroborate MacArthur's personal documents.

The argument of this dissertation is that MacArthur had an identifiable administrative style. This dissertation shows that this administrative style not only complemented his military leadership style, but had a more lasting effect on current world events than his military exploits.

The objectives of the study are the subject of the opening chapter of the dissertation. This is followed by chapters describing and analyzing the four "administrative" periods of MacArthur's career as Superintendent USMA, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines, and Supreme Commander Allied Powers for Japan. The closing chapter relates MacArthur's administrative approach to contemporary Public Administration Theory. MacArthur's academic and professional education are analyzed to determine the basis for his administrative performance and his general approach to administration. Administrative and managerial aspects of MacArthur's career are identified that apply to contemporary administrative theory as well as current theory. This dissertation establishes that MacArthur was not only a military administrator, but a public administrator. It demonstrates that military

administration is not only part of public administration but an essential part of its theoretical

basis and praxis.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction, Background, and Purpose

Douglas MacArthur is unarguably one of the most famous generals in United States and world military history. His public career, which stretched over more than half a century, was entirely as a military officer. His generalship of American and allied forces in the Pacific during World War II, and the Korean War, will ensure him a prominent and permanent place in history. MacArthur was a complex, dynamic, and controversial figure whose personality and stature made him the center of a political and constitutional crisis at the very end of his career. Less known are the details of MacArthur's performance in several senior, primarily administrative, positions within the United States and Commonwealth of the Philippines Governments. His duties and responsibilities in these positions were similar to those of other defense and non-defense related senior civil servants. MacArthur served as the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy, an essentially administrative and academic position, from 1919 to 1922. He served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, the senior executive and administrative post within that service, from 1930 to 1935. He led, organized and managed the Commonwealth of the Philippines Armed Forces as a combination Secretary of Defense (his specific title was Military Advisor to the President) and Field Marshal (supreme commander) from 1935 to 1941.

He was, finally, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers and the Military Governor of Japan from 1945 to 1950. MacArthur's duties in these billets were more administrative, executive, and managerial than purely military in nature. An examination of MacArthur's preparation for, execution of, and effectiveness in these administrative positions should provide a profile of the man as a public administrator and executive.

Objectives, Goals, and Purposes

My dissertation will be an administrative biography of Douglas Macarthur as a senior public administrator. As an administrative biography this dissertation will not cover MacArthur's entire life nor even his entire public career. It will focus on those periods during which MacArthur's duties were the same, or similar to those of other public administrators. Purely military periods, where MacArthur functioned as a general, and not a public administrator, will only be referred to when they expand on or explain MacArthur's administrative performance. Douglas MacArthur spent his entire public career as a military officer. This dissertation will establish that as a military officer MacArthur was also a professional public administrator not only on constitutional and legal grounds but also functionally. His administrative biography will therefore examine the military's contributions to, and implementation of, the theories of administrative science and public administration.

Defining and establishing MacArthur's administrative theories will provide greater coverage of the least examined and understood facets of a historically important figure. More importantly, it will establish MacArthur's position as a significant public administrator. Additionally it will complement the political and historical biographies that are already available on

MacArthur. By a close examination of MacArthur from an administrative perspective, the dissertation will provide an insight into the military approach to administrative theory. It also will describe the influences of military organization and management theories and practice on administration and management theory. The dissertation will finally complement the general and administrative biographies already published on George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, other important military public administrators who were MacArthur's contemporaries. (Pogue 1963; Ambrose 1983; Hughes 1963) Because Marshall and Eisenhower both had historically significant public careers after their military retirement, their positions as public administrators are better known, more extensively chronicled and more easily defined. To those that were born in the "baby boom" after World War II, Eisenhower is better remembered as a president, and Marshall for his postwar recovery plan, than either is as a military officer. MacArthur is almost universally identified as only a military officer. It is doubtful that many people would even be able to identify what position MacArthur held after his final military retirement.

My initial objective will be to establish Douglas MacArthur as a public administrator. I will then show that military administration is an important field of the profession of Public Administration. I will develop this discussion from Hamilton's definition of the "administration of government" contained in *The Federalist No. 72*. I will then discuss the innovations of the Prussian General Staff System, and the impact of military engineering as they applied to the development of public administration theory. I will finish this discussion with an examination of the influence of military administration on the writings of Gulick and Urwick, and the latter development of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

My next objective will be to conduct an examination of MacArthur's performance as a public administrator. MacArthur's performance of duties as the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point (1919 to 1922), as Chief of Staff of the U.S.Army (1930 to 1935), as Field Marshal of the Armed Forces and Military Advisor to the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935 to 1941), and as Supreme Commander Allied Powers and United States Military Governor of Japan (1946 to 1950) will be analyzed. MacArthur's performance in these positions will be analyzed with close attention to his administrative approaches, techniques, organizational skills, and supervisory style. Changes that MacArthur initiated in the West Point curriculum, while he was Superintendent, will be analyzed against a backdrop of contemporary military and public administration theories. MacArthur's performance as Chief of Staff, Generalissimo, Military Advisor, and Military Governor will be similarly examined. In analyzing his performance in the latter duties, there will be an added emphasis in determining MacArthur's handling of political and non-military policy matters. MacArthur's performance in these latter positions will be compared to other public administrators in comparable positions.

The goal of this research into MacArthur's performance will be to determine his administrative and managerial style. I will attempt to establish managerial and administrative influences on MacArthur, as reflected in his writings and correspondence. From these sources I will attempt to determine his managerial and administrative views, precepts, and attitudes. My intention in conducting this examination and analysis of MacArthur's performance will be to provide a comparison of MacArthur's managerial performance and views against contemporary military and public administration theories. Through this comparison, I will attempt to ascertain

if MacArthur influenced, was influenced by, or practiced contemporary administration and management theories.

MacArthur the Public Administrator

Douglas MacArthur is universally known as a famous soldier, but he is not normally considered a public administrator. Other famous generals have served in government out of uniform in high public office, either as politicians or political appointees. Other military officers have served as military governors of occupied territories. Military officers of the United States have held concurrent commissions in the armed forces of foreign governments. This was common practice during the "Banana Wars" in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua between the two World Wars.

MacArthur was unique among the other military officers who served with foreign armed forces or were military governors. He did not hold a dual status in another country's military establishment and his powers were much broader. He headed the armed forces of the Common-wealth of the Philippines and acted as its *de facto* secretary of defense, after retiring from the United States Army in 1937. The armed forces of other trust territories, commonwealths, and possessions of the United States have always been administered as an integral part of the United States military establishment. Although local militia units, distinct from the U.S. military, were raised in U.S. possessions, they were usually officered by, and came under U.S. Military control and supervision. When MacArthur served in the Philippines, he was not part of the U.S. War Department or the Department of State. He worked with these executive departments, but he served as an officer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

When MacArthur served as the military governor of Japan he had a degree of authority and independence that went far beyond that of other military governors. In Europe, Germany was governed by four separate powers and General Lucius Clay, the United States Military Governor, came under the theater commander General Eisenhower. (Smith 1990) MacArthur was the United States military governor, as the senior officer of an occupation army, the theater commander, and the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) for Japan. As SCAP, he coordinated and administered personnel of other foreign governments independently of the Department of State. MacArthur was the driving force behind, supervised the drafting of, and was one of the authors of, the 1947 Japanese Constitution. He acted as Japan's chief executive, and, until the creation of the Diet, functioned as its law making body through the issuance of SCAP Directives. After the formation of the Diet, draft laws, that MacArthur caused to be written would routinely be rubber stamped into Japanese law. When the Japanese Government began to function on its own, he still exercised significant controls over its actions. Although it was United States occupation policy that the Japanese would administer their government under SCAP oversight, MacArthur had, and exercised, the power to control everyday functions of Japanese government and life. (JCS 1380/15) Even the Japanese people considered MacArthur as the leader of Japan. To some he was the George Washington of the new Japan, not one its founding fathers, but its only founding father. MacArthur's power and prestige as military governor extended beyond Japan, and its adoring vanquished populace. Dean Achenson referred to MacArthur as having the "attributes of a foreign sovereign. (Sebald 1965) *Time* termed Truman and MacArthur as "sovereign rulers of separate states." (*Time* Oct. 23, 1950)

In the judicial area, MacArthur was influential, through his review of the indictments and review and approval of sentences, in the war crimes trials conducted by the International Military Tribunal in Japan. Over a thousand military and political leaders of wartime Japan stood trial for war crimes. One hundred seventy four received death sentences. Seven of these 174 war criminals were executed. These executions occurred only after a personal review of their cases by MacArthur who approved and ordered the executions. MacArthur personally participated in the preparations of the indictments against the twenty-eight most important defendants. His supervision and oversight of these trials, plus magnanimous treatment of most of those convicted even won him praise in Japan.

In the Philippines, MacArthur, as Commander U.S. Army Forces Pacific, was directly responsible for the military courts-martial of two Japanese generals. These courts-martial were neither technically nor legally associated with the International Military Tribunal that conducted the previously discussed war crimes trials in Japan. MacArthur was the military court martial convening authority, review authority, and authority who ordered the executions of Generals Homma and Yamashita. These Japanese generals had fought against MacArthur during the war. MacArthur had been defeated by Homma in the Philippines in 1942. The destruction of MacArthur's B-17 bombers on the ground after almost a half day's prior warning of impending attack, the fact that MacArthur actually outnumbered Homma, and the much publicized "Bataan Death March" atrocities committed against the troops he had left behind were particularly galling to MacArthur. Yamashita had denied MacArthur his prophesied quick and easy liberation of the Philippines in 1944 and 1945. In these controversial legal cases, which were appealed to the Supreme Court, MacArthur acted in the roles of the accuser, the district attorney supervising the

prosecution, the approving authority for the verdict, the court of appeal, and the executing authority. Such a concentration of judicial power and responsibility in a single individual is unparalleled in United States legal and judicial experience. (Taylor 1981; Reel 1949)

While the military governor of Japan, MacArthur functioned as a lawgiver and constitutional author, founding father, chief executive, politician, and jurist. Allusions to his stature as a sovereign head of state, and not just a proconsul for a nation that he represented, were based on historically accurate observations of MacArthur's freedom of action and relative lack of effective supervision or review by his civilian and military superiors. His physical separation from the organs of his government, his universally acknowledged preeminence in his geographical area, his national government's preoccupation with Europe and post war demobilization, and his personality, stature, and intellect all contributed to MacArthur's unique freedom of action and authority. He acted as a *de facto* sovereign and head of state, unfettered by the traditional American constraints arising from the separation of executive, judicial, and legislative powers. His performance of these historic and broad public administration duties is not just a matter of historical fact. The country that he administered and shaped still bears his imprint in its constitution. This constitution, which MacArthur forged, was pivotal in the creation and implementation of the Japanese Government's policies during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Although the subject of great scrutiny and debate by an indigenous Japanese constitutional commission, which spent years on the project, MacArthur's Constitution remains in force and unchanged today. MacArthur's tenure as a public administrator in Japan is thus still a factor in contemporary world affairs. Douglas MacArthur was thus a Public Administrator, albeit one that wore a uniform.

The Military and Public Administration

<u>The Problem</u>

MacArthur's status as a member of the military is the underlying reason why he has not

been commonly considered a public administrator. Although the particular positions that MacAr-

thur held might qualify him as a public administrator, there are many that might take exception

to considering all military officers as public administrators. These reservations would seem

especially valid for those military officers which have not served in billets that have civilian

equivalents in the rest of the public sector. There are many historical, legal, political, academic,

and some would even argue, ethical reasons why administration as practiced by the military

establishment is not considered as public administration. From the Colonial Period up through

the early 1900s the militia, and its citizen soldiery, were considered the back bone of the military

establishment. The career soldier's job was to keep things together during peace time and provide

a base for training and the mobilization of the militia during war. Although former generals later

participated in politics, and were even elected to the presidency, the professional soldier was

politically emasculated and socially, and in many cases physically, isolated from the mainstream

society. Participation by the military in civil/public administration, and especially politics, was

discouraged by the society as a whole. In many ways the professional soldier was considered a

necessary evil, a potential danger to the democratic process, and a drain on national resources

when not actively employed in combat. The employment of the military in post Civil War

reconstruction, labor disturbances in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and the Veterans Bonus

March of 1932 did much to isolate the professional military establishment from elements of the

political and social population. The transformation of the officer corps from narrowly trained

specialists into academically and scientifically qualified professionals, during the late 1800s and early 1900s, resulted in a group that was essentially politically conservative in outlook and neutral in practice. This professional, conservative and politically inactive officer corps developed in an age that was witnessing the emergence of progressive liberalism. Even the participation in politics of popular military figures, such as Jackson, McClellan, Grant, MacArthur, and Eisenhower have always elicited dark fears of the general on horseback from within the society. Although these examples are American, the wariness or distrust that civilians and non-military public administrators hold towards the military is a common theme in democracies. In the United Kingdom, the Parliament has to re-approve the continued existence of the Army on an annual basis, the lingering result of a military officer turned head of government almost four hundred years ago. The dominance of the Prussian Junker General Staff officer, the prototype and model of the scientific military administrator and bureaucrat, over German Society from the mid 1800s to 1945, and the legacy of the French General Boulanger, the archetypical general on horseback, color western democracies' views towards military personnel as public administrators. (Huntington 1964, chapters 9- 10; Millis 1956, chapter III; van Creveld 1989, 141-145)

In order for military administration to be considered public administration it is not enough to rest its claim to inclusion in the field of Public Administration on constitutional, legal, and functional grounds, although this is also necessary. An understanding of the political, academic, and ethical interrelationships between the professional military and the rest of the field of public administration is required.

<u>The Military's Constitutional and Legal Basis</u>

The constitutional and legal basis of the military as part of the government, and therefore military administration as being "public" is clear and straightforward. The President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the military services are a part of the Department of Defense, an executive department. (Constitution of the United States of America, Article II Section 2; National Defense Act of 1947, as amended) In the debates that preceded the adoption of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton defined the duties and administrative functions of government in *The Federalist No. 72* when he wrote:

> "The administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the
>
> operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive or judiciary, but in
>
> its most usual and perhaps in its most precise signification, it is limited to execu-
>
> tive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department.
>
> The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the prepatory plans of finance, the
>
> application and the disbursement of the public monies, in conformity to the
>
> general appropriations of the legislature, **the arrangement of the army and**
>
> **navy, the direction of the operations of war**; these and other matters of a like
>
> nature constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the administra-
>
> tion of government."   (Cooke 1961, 486-487)

Publius's *The Federalist No.72* is not the only discussion of the military's roles and functions within the government. Hamilton was very concerned with the posture, place, and relationship of the military within the government. He took great pains to address, explain, and defend the need for a strong military in *The Federalist Numbers 23* through *No. 29.* (Green 1987, 333-335)

Between Hamilton's extensive discussion of the place and role of the military within the government, Article II of the Constitution, the various militia acts, and the National Defense Act of 1947, the status of the military as a governmental and public activity is well defined.

It would be hard to find someone who did not consider the military a part of the government. Conversely, despite its constitutional and legal status, it is also a common perception that the military, because it is not political, is not "public." The term "military" is not normally associated with the term "public." This "non-political/ non-public" premise does not apply to the Civil Service and Judiciary, also non-political institutions, which are universally considered public institutions.

There is no constitutional or legal question that the armed forces are Federal Government institutions. As governmental institutions, they are, by definition, public institutions. Despite their actual status as public institutions, the armed forces are commonly considered as something other than public institutions. This is an interesting phenomenon considering that the United States is alone among the major countries of Europe and Asia in never having had a history of private or proprietary military establishments. In the United States, the military function is essentially a Federal Government prerogative. When the states engage in military functions they do so under the Federal Government or with its permission and authority. (Constitution of the United States of America, Article I Section 8, Article I Section 10, Article II) This is in distinct contrast to the history of Asian and European governmental systems. Even up to modern times, these systems have allowed private armies, or the use of proprietary military organizations within the governmental military establishments. The military function in the United States has always been solely a public sector function.

<u>The Military's Functional Basis as a Field of Public Administration</u>

The obvious functional basis for the military to claim inclusion in the field of Public Administration would be that of national security. The rationale would be more than adequately provided by Hamilton's *The Federalist Nos. 23-29* and *The Federalist No.72.* This would be a rather narrow claim and would still allow military administration to be set aside from, not only the mainstream, but the rest of Public Administration. At best, the national security function could be considered a legal and valid public administration function, but still a special case. As a special case the military professional would still not always have a valid claim as a public administrator.

A broader claim for functional inclusion in Public administration would be to show that the military, separate from its national security role, has always functioned within the main-stream of Public Administration, and indeed provided a basis for the creation of the field itself. There is a basis for this type of claim and it is found in the Army's Corps of Engineers and in the Coast Guard. The Army Corps of Engineers is obviously a military organization, but it is one that since its inception has been involved in civil and non-military public functions. The Coast Guard, although normally under the Department of Transportation, except when transferred to the Department of the Navy during war, is a uniformed service. Not only a uniformed service, it is an armed service. Its subordination to a non-military executive department in no way reduces its military character.

Aside from the primary military mission of national defense, and the participation of various elements of the military in civil, or non-military roles, the remainder of the military has participated in "non-military" governmental functions. Disaster relief, training and participation

in social programs, assistance to law enforcement, governmental research and development,
development of national capabilities and resources, and post secondary school training and
education have all become military functions. The military, in its role of foreign internal defense
and nation building has even become an extension of the State Department's foreign policy. The
recent humanitarian relief operations in Bengala Desh, Somalia, and Rwanda, drug interdiction
operations in the Carribean and South America, and assistance to the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service and the Border Patrol along the Mexican border are all examples of military
involvement in Department of State, Department of Justice, and Department of the Interior
functional areas.

The Military's Non-Public Perception

The perception of the military as something other than public is understandable. The
military comes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) (64 Stat. 107). The UCMJ
is promulgated in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951 (MCM 1951), an Execu-
tive Order (Executive Order 10214, February 8, 1951). The UCMJ and its administrative provi-
sions, as contained in the MCM 1951, places individuals in the military under an additional
penal code separate from state and Federal penal codes to which they are also liable. Only under
unusual and very specific circumstances could the UCMJ be applied to civilians. The members
of the armed forces are thus subject to regulations and laws, and have certain restrictions placed
on their behavior that civilians do not. The armed forces, by policy and law, cannot participate in
many public and domestic activities. Department of Defense sponsored publications cannot
address domestic political issues. This is in contrast to publications sponsored by other Execu-

tive Departments. Participation by military personnel in unions is prohibited. Military personnel are required to have manuscripts addressing professional concerns reviewed by security authorities before they are submitted for publication. Military personnel who have served in sensitive billets are subject to having their personal travel reviewed and authorized if they are under a hazardous area restriction. Contacts with foreigners are reportable situations for those military personnel in certain billets, or with certain security clearances. These are all common concerns for the member of the military, but extremely uncommon for the average civil servant or civilian. Even after they retire, military personnel are prohibited from engaging in certain activities, or require official permission to engage in other activities in which the average civilian could freely engage.

Differences between the military and the remainder of the public sector reinforce the perception that the military is not really part of the public sector. The military establishment reinforces this perception by treating otherwise universally accepted concepts differently. For example, the public sector uses the term "personnel management." The military breaks the term "personal management" into the terms "leadership" and "personnel administration." The existence of distinctly military vocabularies and procedures further separates the armed forces from other public institutions. In the public sector, the management or executive function is separate from the judicial function. In the armed forces, the management and executive function is synonymous with the judicial function. In the military, the commanding officer is not only the senior executive responsible for the management and administration of the organization, but is vested with the non-judicial punitive powers, and in units of battalion, ship, squadron size, and larger, the judicial powers of courts-martial convening and review authority.

The term "government official," although correctly applying to the military officer, has a distinctly civilian, non-military, connotation in the United States. The perceived rigidity of military attitudes and procedures, plus the perceived lack of certain democratic rights and political involvement within the armed forces further differentiates the military from the rest of other public institutions

Military Administration and Public Administration's Theoretical Basis

The perception of the military, and military administration as divorced from public administration, is not restricted to popular perceptions alone. The same perceptions can be found in the theoretical works that are the basis of Public Administration Theory in the United States. Herbert J. Storing, in a detailed examination of the theoretical shifts and refinements contained in the four editions of Leonard D. White's *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, directly addresses the conscious exclusion of the military, and military administration, from the profession of Public Administration. (Storing, 1965; White, 1926, 1939, 1948, and 1955) Although Woodrow Wilson's definition of public administration held "every particular application of general law is an act of administration," White was not concerned with "operations peculiar to the special fields of administration" that were highly particularized procedures best left to specialists. (Wilson 1887; White 1926, footnote p.2; White 1939, 4; Storing 1965, 42) While Wilson's definition would allow the military, and military administration, to be encompassed in public administration as applications of general law, for example the various militia acts and the National Defense Act of 1947, White would exclude the military, the judiciary, and

other "specialized" elements of the government as being outside the field of Public Administration. For White:

> "They are however the primary substantive functions of administration and from one point of view it is artificial to describe public administration apart from these major functions."
>
> (White as quoted in: Storing, 1965. 42)

Storing appears to side with White in this view. In a footnote to his discussion of Wilson's and White's definition of what constitutes the field of Public Administration, Storing states:

> "It is unnecessary to deal with White's exclusion of military administration. It appears, indeed, to be a misapprehension to think that Wilson's definition of public administration requires the inclusion of military administration, which does not have as its end the detailed and systematic execution of public law. The army is not characteristically a law enforcement agency but acts in an area and seeks to accomplish ends that the law cannot reach. Whatever the difficulty in excluding military administration, it arises from White's definition of Public Administration, not Wilson's."   (Storing, 1965, footnote 42)

While White is concerned that Wilson's definition could cause the military, as well as the judiciary and civil arms of the government to be included in an analysis of public administration, Storing is able to accept Wilson's definition, yet still exclude military administration because it operates where the law cannot reach. In effect, Storing would hold that the Posse Comitatus Act, which bars military participation in civil law enforcement, also makes the military and military

administration something other than public administrators and public administration. Specific

discussion of the military function in the Constitution, the basic law of the land, as well as

numerous laws dealing with the use of the military in governmental activities, makes Storing's

position tenuous. Recent legislation dealing with the military's role in counter drug and counter

terrorist operations in consort with civil law enforcement agencies, makes Storing's position

moot. (U.S. Code. Vol. 10, secs. 371-388; Vol. 18, sec. 1385; Vol. 21, sec. 873; Vol. 22, secs.

2291(a)(2), 2392(b) and (c); Vol. 31, secs. 15-35 and 6505) White's and Storing's exclusion of

the military, and military administration, from the field of Public Administration, although it can

be argued as not valid, does accurately reflect an accepted theoretical point of view. This point of

view has persisted from public administration's "period of orthodoxy," during which the field's

theoretical heritage was confirmed, through the post war period, and into the "scientific-

technical" era. (Shafritz and Hyde 1987, 38, 123, 276) The implications this has had for the

inclusion of the military, and military administration into the field of public administration are

obvious. The military might consider itself as "public." Military administrators, such as Captain

Henry Metcalfe might contribute to the theoretical literature of the field with his *The Cost of

Manufactures and the Administration of Workshops, Public and Private*. (Shafritz and Hyde

1987, 8) Even accepted public administration theorists such as Gulick and Urwick might cite and

expound military examples. The bottom line was still: military administration was at best a

highly specialized form of administration but not a part of the academic basis of the profession

of Public Administration.

<u>The Military Ethic, the Military Mind</u>

The listing of differences between the rest of the public sector and the military, that are based on how the military defines processes or uses vocabulary, does not adequately explain the perceptions that the military has of the rest of government, or that the rest of the public sector has of the military. The different approaches to issues of service, management, and desirable behaviors that the miliary takes, relative to the rest of the public sector, can best be explained by describing what is the miliary ethic and what is the military mind. The fact that there are four different military services, five in war time when the Coast Guard transfers from the Department of Transportation to the Department of the Navy, each with its own history, traditions, customs, and policies does not prevent identification of general factors that could define the military ethic and mind. The fact that the military has evolved dramatically over the last hundred years also does not preclude constructing an archetype of the military ethic and mind.

Samuel P. Huntington, in his exhaustive and hallmark review of civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State* (1964), proposes analysis of the military mind can be approached from three viewpoints. The first, the military mind's ability or quality, normally emphasizes the low caliber of its intelligence, scope, and imagination. This presumed inferiority stemming from the nature of those recruited into the officer corps, military organizational biases against intellectual initiative, and the infrequency of opportunities in which to apply military skills. (Huntington 1964, 59) The second approach asserts that there are certain qualities that explain the uniqueness of the military mind. These qualities are most often manifested in a mind that is disciplined, rigid, logical and scientific, but which is not flexible, tolerant, intuitive, or emotional. The appearance of these qualities in other professions, in part or total, limits this approach in defining

the uniqueness of the military mind. (Huntington 1964, 60) The third approach, which offers the most promise, is to analyze the substance of the military mind. The substance being defined as the attitudes, values, and views common to the majority of the military. This analytical approach can be done by defining the military mind by content, or by defining the substance of the mind by source. The content of a military mind is often distilled, by those outside the military, down to bellicosity and authoritarianism. These values are held to define the military mind as being one that is anti-democratic, and that defines human and professional relationships as part of a chain of command. When defining the military mind by source, the existence of a professional military ethic, essentially non-dated and non-national in character, is cited as the basis for military values. This ethic, which is a measure of military professionalism, is based on accepted military functions, and though it is colored by social, economic, and political factors, there is a great amount of commonality in desirable attributes across various military systems. Because the requirement for a military presupposes conflict, the military view of man is held to be essentially pessimistic and accepts that there will always be uncertainty and evil. The man described by Hobbes is the model of man that the military mind addresses. The innate weakness of the Hobbesian man requires a system and ideals which control and make up for man's and nature's inherent weaknesses. The required system is conservative, not liberal, stresses the supremacy of society over the individual, and the importance of order, hierarchy, and the division of function. The military mind is in effect a Weberian ideal against which actual military personnel and groups can be measured. (Huntington 1964, 62-63, 78) The military mind, and the ethic that it is based on, are thus diametrically opposed to the liberal, progressive, and humanistic oriented theories of the civil service reform movement that was the cradle of American public administra-

tion. If the perceived model of the military mind is true, and as universal as perceived, the military in public administration would be as foreign as the Junker Prussian military was within the framework of the Weimar Republic.

James Stever traces the basis of American public administration theory from John Dewey's attack on Germanic State Theory through Wilson and Lippmzn's determination to divert the modern state "away from the path toward militarism,"to the National Institute of Public Administration's Public Administrative Theory, to the Administrative State Theory of postwar public administration.(Stever 1999, 38-42) These various administrative theories and theorists had a common liberal, progressive, and idealistic orientation. What Stever points out is that what begun as a liberal and inclusive public administration theory, developed into exclusive and bounded theories with military administrative theories and practice outside the bounds.(ibid., 36-41)

A lengthy discussion of the accuracy and extent that the qualities attributed to the military mind are present in individuals or military systems is not warranted. Like any model or archetype, the factors attributed to the military mind are present, to varying degrees, in the officer corps of the various services and nations. What is important is that the archetypical military mind, and the ethic that it is based upon, does not share the outlook and values of the progressive reform movement that was the breeding ground of modern American public administration. What is equally important is that the ethics and qualities manifested in the archetypical military mind do not disqualify those who hold these values from participation in the field of public administration. A military ethic and a military mind as exemplified by the Junker Prussian German General Staff would be disqualifying in American public administra-

tion. Because the Prussian General Staff, and the militaries of many third world countries, owed/owe allegiance only to an individual or its own sub-society, and not to the nation, or its laws, it would not meet Wilson's definition of what constitutes public administration. It also would not fit within our governmental system of checks, balances and civilian control of the military. The United States military, and those of many democracies, share common values and attitudes, but they also assume they have a requirement to operate under lawful authority and within their government's system. The conservatism, reliance on authority structures, and hobbesian view of man, reflected in the archetypical military mind, might insure an ethical tension between them and other public administrators, but it does not prohibit the military in the philosophical, ethical and academic development and practice of American public administration.

The Military's Contributions to Public Administration

The military's place in the field of Public Administration has been established on functional, legal, and constitutional grounds. Generally accepted perceptions of the status of the military, and, military administration, as a part of the field of Public Administration have also been presented. What is less accepted is the professional status of the military, and the academic and professional contributions of the military to the profession of Public Administration. James Stever asserts that a "glass wall" exists between American military and civil administration.(Stever 1999, 28) Stever further asserts that "One consequence of the barrier is that it impedes the communication and movement of those who practice public administration in America.(ibid.) If the military, and the individuals within the military, are to constitute a segment

of the profession of Public Administration, then they have had to contribute to the theory and praxis of the profession. If contributions to the theory and practice of the profession have not been made, the military constitutes only a group of public administration practitioners, and falls within White's grouping of specialists that falls outside the field of Public Administration. The individuals within the military could be military professionals, but not public administration professionals.

A myriad of scholars, including Walter Millis, J.D. Hittle, Martin van Creveld, and Samuel P. Huntington have rigorously established that the military officer is a professional. (Millis 1956, chapters II to V; Hittle 1961; van Creveld 1989, 45; van Creveld 1991, 101-102; Huntington, chapter 2) These writers have differentiated the regular military officer from the militia or reserve officers and the enlisted personnel. While many, for varying periods of time, might be practitioners of military art and science, it is the regular officer who holds the status as a professional. While possessing the training, skills, scientific basis, and ethics of the military profession, it can be argued that this does not make the military professional a public administration professional.

The military professional functionally, legally, and constitutionally functions in the same manner as the public administration professional. To be completely part of the Public Administration Profession, though, the military professional still has to contribute to the development of its theory and practice. To practice administrative theory or science only makes the military professional practitioners and not public administration professionals. Stever asserts that a "glass wall" separates civil and military administration.(Stever 1999) There is a wall between civil and military administration. It is a perceptional wall, accepted as reality by both communities, but it

is not a glass wall which is not penetrated. It is a porous wall. There have been exchanges across

the wall, in both directions. Because this cross pollenation between civil and military administra-

tion have not been readily recognized, the "glass wall" perception continues to exist.

The dismantling of Stever's "glass wall" can be initiated by establishing the military's

contribution to civil public administration theory. Despite perceptions of ethical and theoretical

orientation, the military has contributed to both the theory and praxis of public administration.

These contributions have been most marked in the areas of organizational, leadership, and

budgetary theory.

Leadership Theory

Although not commonly recognized by the field of public administration, a primary

contribution of the military has been in the area of leadership theory. Because military leader-

ship, if to be successful, has to work under the extremes of combat, crisis and uncertainty, its

applications to leadership in a cooperative, non-crisis, environment is commonly perceived to be

limited and, at times, inappropriate. Military concepts and practices, that work well when

subordinate input is neither possible, desirable, nor appropriate, are viewed as extreme and

inappropriate in situations where consensus is desirable. That consensus, or at least a majority

opinion, is a political reality in public administration, makes many aspects and concepts of

military leadership inappropriate in the public and political context. This does not make military

leadership models inapplicable in the practice of public administration. The military models of

leadership, because they are appropriate to crisis and environments of uncertainty, form the

boundaries of leadership theory in the practice of public administration. If individuals, or

organizations, that are primarily concerned with basic survival in a crisis situation, can be influenced into taking a particular action, then they can influenced in a situation, which utilizing Maslow's hierarchy, falls significantly below survival situations. Chris Argiris, Elton Mayo, and others of the participative management school, including the now popular Demming Total Quality Management movement, might define the desirable approach to leadership, but Clauswitz, Liddel-Hart, and S.L.A. Marshall, define the limits of leadership in the public sector. (Clauswitz 1956; Liddel-Hart 1967; Marshall 1947) That these leadership principles can be distasteful, and constitute the last resort in everyday administration, does not diminish their validity and appropriateness in a crisis situation.

Not all models and practices of military leadership and management are authoritarian and non-participative. Military leadership and management run the gamut from motivational and subordinate participative to unquestioning authoritarian forms of leadership. Because military leadership, in non-crisis environments, involves elements of subordinate motivation, feedback, and participation in the decision making process, the military has provided an environment where non-military leadership and management models and practices have been tested and evaluated. This has been especially true since World War II because of the military's heavy involvement in science and technology. The development of technologically advanced weapons, intelligence, communications, and logistics systems have had a dramatic impact on previous concepts of military training and leadership. To meet the challenge of operating, staffing, and leading a technologically advanced and diverse force, the military adopted and practiced accepted "scientifically" based models of training, motivation, management, and leadership. Individual performance counseling, Management by Objective (MBO), the employee feedback and

participative management Beneficial Suggestion Program, and Total Quality Management (TQM), are but a few of the non-military leadership and management programs that have been tested, evaluated, and adopted by the military. In testing and evaluating these programs, the military has provided the rest of the public administration community with valuable data on the use, validity, and limitations of these leadership and management theories. Military use of individually oriented participative forms of leadership and management have also provided perspectives on how motivational forms of leadership supplement more authoritarian forms, and when one form is more applicable or effective than other forms. Because the military leadership environment includes the ultimate test of leadership, influencing an individual or organization faced with physical survival, it is the ultimate testing environment for any leadership or management theory.

PPBS

Probably the most noteworthy example of military acceptance and use of a non-military model of management has been the employment of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) by the Department of Defense. Although once touted as the ultimate rational, compre-hensive, and scientifically rigid approach to resource management and allocation, PBBS is now viewed as dead by some, and of only limited use by other theorists and public administration practitioners. (McGowan 1988, p.262-264; Wildavsky 1966, p.308; Wildavsky 1969; Mushkin et al., 1969; Schick 1971) Although once mandated for all federal executive departments by President Johnson, the Department of Defense is the only large federal or state agency that made the system work and that still employs it in its, more or less, original form. (McGowan 1988,

p.264) The requirements for relatively large numbers of trained staff, voluminous supporting data, extensive and detailed documentation, and PBBS's lack of political and social sensitivity are commonly cited reasons for the failure, or inappropriateness of PPBS among federal and state agencies. To some extent all these criticisms are valid, but this does not explain why PPBS is still the keystone of Department of Defense budgeting and resources allocation, nor why it is also practiced in less rigorous forms in other governmental agencies. Is the defense establishment merely theoretically behind the rest of the federal government, or has it just made PPBS work because it meets the requirements of its environment?

In the twelve years before the adoption of the PPBS in the Department of Defense (DoD), defense spending had experienced 80% of the growth in federal expenditures. Defense spending in 1960 represented approximately 43% of the Federal Budget, 30% of total public expenditures, 12% of the Gross National Project (GNP), and 11% of private sector output. By 1980 defense spending was only 23% of the Federal Budget, 16% of public expenditures, 5% of the GNP, and 3% of private sector output. From 1960 to 1979 defense spending had experienced a real 10% drop while public spending had rose approximately 150%! (Beckstead 1982, pp 4 and 41; White and Hendrix 1982, pp. 4 and 112-123) Despite the "Reagan Buildup" defense spending has remained less than a quarter of the federal budget. Social security and entitlement programs, which are not easily reduced in the American political system, represent slightly over half of the federal budget, while interest payments on the national debt, and other non-defense governmental operational expenditures represent the final quarter of the federal budget. The critical factor is that the quarter of the federal budget, that is the defense budget, represents approximately three quarters of the annual adjustable budget. (White and Hendrix 1982, pp. 112-123) Even before the

imposition of Graham-Rudman-Hollings budget ceilings, and the requirement to provide off-sets

for new programs when budget caps have been reached, the defense budget has been under

intense scrutiny since the early 1970s. For congress, defense spending represents not only a

socially and politically sensitive area of the federal budget, but the area where it can be creative

and make the most changes. Because the majority of the federal budget is entitlements, that

effectively cannot be changed, the defense portion of the federal budget is annually subjected to

intense scrutiny and debate. Defense officials will state that PPBS is still used within the

Department of Defense for efficiency and scientifically based management reasons. Probably the

most important reason, though, is that PPBS provides the DoD witnesses testifying before

congress, and the DoD staff responding to congressional budget queries, with an encyclopedic

data base of rationales, cost benefit analyses, and supporting data for every program within the

defense budget. Current requests can be tied into established long term requirements, and the

interrelationships of various programs can be placed against a rigorously established and

integrated defense program.

I have personally been present at congressional budget hearings when other agencies

were not able to defend a line item to within fifty or even one-hundred million dollars. At the

same time, I could provide my witness, the Marine Corps Deputy Chief for Manpower or the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, with justifications to within fifty thousand dollars for every

line within the 3.7 billion dollar Manpower Marine Corps (MPMC) Appropriation. This

appropriation represented approximately half of the total Marine Corps budget request. (White

and Hendrix 1982, p.62-64) Even the General Accounting Office (GAO), Congressional Budget

Office (CBO), and congressional committee staffs are hard pressed to duplicate or counter the

amount of documentation and rationale that the PPBS provides the DoD programmers and budgeteers. Because resources represent the continued viability of a program, and the PBBS justifies resource decisions, the PPBS has become a vital part of the DoD resource allocation and budgetary process.

PPBS's continued use within the DoD is not completely explained by its success in resources allocation and budgetary defense. PPBS is able to succeed in the DoD because this executive department possesses a large body of professionally trained staff officers who have the experience and background to deal with detailed and integrated planning and programming. The processes and elements involved in military operational and contingency planning are not significantly different from those involved in the PPBS. The service department staffs have even integrated the DoD PPBS process into military strategic and theater planning. The force structure and programmed resources represented in the annual Program Objective Memorandum, the result of the yearly PPBS process, are identical to those in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCAP) upon which all military contingency planning is based. This linkage of resources planning, programming, and budgeting with military strategic and contingency planning further strengthens budgetary defense. This programmatic and military planning congruence also facilitates the military side of planning because it insures that strategy is based upon available resources. Carl Von Clausewitz, in his seminal *On War (Vom Krieg)*, stressed this linkage between resources and strategy as essential to success in war. The PPBS thus facilitates the basic mission and function of the Department of Defense and further explains the continued use of the PPBS within DoD.

The success of the PPBS within the Department of Defense, provides the rest of the Public Administration community with a real benchmark against which to measure the difficulties and advantages of the system. To be sure, many government programs and functions do not lend themselves to planning the seven to twenty years into the future that the PPBS requires. Other programs and functions that are not based on efficiency, or are not easily quantified, also could not easily profit from using the PPBS. At the same time the PPBS can consider non-efficiency driven values despite Wildavsky's and other critics concerns. Within the personnel portions of the military service programs are substance abuse, family care, non-military education, and other socially oriented programs that successfully compete with the more traditional elements of the defense budget. Because of changing priorities encountered in an All Volunteer Force environment, and executive department and congressional insistence that the military participate in Equal Opportunity, Environmental Protection, other socially oriented programs the DoD PPBS process has successfully integrated value driven programs with those that are efficiency or empirically driven. Because of continued DoD use of the PPBS this approach has addressed many of the valid shortcomings its critics addressed in the late sixties and early seventies. Readily available computing and data processing have reduced some of the more onerous and time consuming aspects of PPBS's documentation and record keeping requirements. PPBS is thus not dead, nor even dormant. It is alive, well, and developing in the Department of Defense. (CSIS Defense Organization Project 1985)

The Modern Staff System

The most significant contribution of the military to the theory and practice of Public Administration has been the staff system. Although overshadowed by transient in vogue management approaches, such as Scientific Management, various participative management and human relations approaches, Management by Objective, or, most recently, Demming's Total Quality Management, the staff system has provided a central core management approach in public administration. Because the staff system is so pervasive it has been taken for granted, has become transparent, and has almost lost its identity as a definitive approach to management. A review of various public administration theory and historical survey works reveals little or no mention of the terms "staff," "general staff," or "staff concept" either in the indexes, or within the included works. Shafritz and Hyde's *Classics of Public Administration* does not list these terms in their index, nor mention them in the period chronologies. Luther Gulick's *Notes on the Theory of Organization*, included by Shafritz and Hyde, includes military examples to explain the concepts of span of control and line versus staff functions, but does not explain the staff concept. (Shafritz and Hyde 1987; Gulick 1937, in Shafritz and Hyde 1987, 79-89) "Staffing" is addressed as part of Gulick's famous POSDCORB but in this sense does not address the staff concept, but the personnel function within an organization. (Gulick 1937, in Shafritz and Hyde 1987, 88) The *Handbook of Public Administration* edited by Rabin, Hildreth, and Miller neither lists staff related terms in the index nor substantively addresses them in the included works in the volume. (Rabin, Hildreth, and Miller eds. 1989) Chandler's *A Centennial History of the American State* lists two entries under the term "staff concept." Paul P. Van Riper, the author of chapter one of Chandler's volume, devotes a third of a page to a discussion of the General Staff

Act of 1903 and the adoption of the staff system during the emergence of the second administra-

tive state in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Indeed Van Riper states:

"The line and staff personnel arrangement, already a model for a few businesses

by 1900 became increasingly important in all civil affairs."

(Van Riper in Chandler 1989, 16)

Again, the reference is to a personnel arrangement, which the staff system entails, and not as a

management system which is its primary function.

The military staff system, upon which public administrative staff systems are based, is

much more than a personnel classification system setting up a dichotomy of those who actually

execute an agency's mission versus those who supervise or support mission execution. The *Stan-*

dard College Dictionary provides six definitions for the word staff. The first three describe rods

or shafts. The sixth describes a musical term. Definitions four and five address staff orga-

nizations as:

"**4**.*Mil*. A body of officers not having command but assigned in an executive or
advisory capacity to a military or naval unit or installation as assistants to the
officer in command. See *GENERAL STAFF* **5**. A body of persons associated in
carrying out some special enterprise under the supervision of a manager or chief:
the editorial *staff*."

(Harcourt, Brace & World, 1302)

Although using somewhat different wording, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary

essentially offers the same definitions. (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1990, 1146) These definitions are

significant in several respects. Both address the term staff in a functional sense and not just as a

personnel term. The emphasis is on assistants, or advisors, carrying out a specialized or

executive function for a commander or chief. The personnel dichotomy of line versus staff is

implied, but the provision of a function in support of an organization and its mission is central to

both definitions. The listing of the military form of the definition before the non-military general definition is significant in that it not only acknowledges the more common perception of the term, but that the military form of the word preceded the civil variation. The military definition also clearly states "a body of officers." This is more than a minor point because it defines the officer, and not other ranks as the member of the military organization, i.e. the staff, whose primary mission is administration. Huntington, DuPuy and DuPuy, Hittle, van Creveld, and Millis clearly differentiate the officer, as opposed to all military personnel, as the professional. (Huntington 1964, chapter 2; Dupuy and Dupuy 1977, 915-916; Hittle 1961; van Creveld 1991, 101-102; Millis 1956, 137-138) From various sources, addressing different facets of the military, it is the officer who is defined as both the professional and the primary administrator. The specific inclusion of officers as staff members, plus their status as professionals and administrators in a public function reinforces their status as public administration professionals.

Also significant about the above definitions of a staff is what is not said. The definitions do not address the planning function that is central to the military staff process, nor do they address the staff institution as a professional development system for the staff members. A simple collection of uncoordinated assistants working under an executive would not be a viable management concept, let alone one that rates as the military's most important contribution to theory and practice of public administration. It is important to understand why the modern staff system came about and why, as a management concept, it is a unique and effective management approach.

Huntington describes a modern staff system as a professional institution that collects and evaluates technical knowledge, and applies the knowledge practically in the management of

violence. (Huntington 1964, 25) Huntington's definition is correct, but overly broad, and at the same time limited to a military staff supporting a combatant command. Millotat states the function of a staff is to relieve the military commander of the load of administrative details of everyday business. The staff conducts research, then prepares studies, position papers, point papers, and decision papers for the commander's review, guidance, and decision. The staff then implements the commander's orders and supervises their execution. (Millotat 1992, 1) Hittle identifies staff functions as well as the elements, or characteristics, of a modern staff system. For Hittle, a staff's functions are to procure information for the commander, to prepare the details of the commander's plans, to translate the commander's decisions into orders, and insure their transmission to the troops. (Hittle 1961, 3) Hittle asserts that a modern staff system has to include: 1) a regular education system for the training of the staff officers; 2) a delegation of authority from the commander to act in his name; 3) the supervision of the staff and the execution of orders issued by, or through, a chief of staff; and 4) a set method or procedures by which certain parts of the staff perform certain specified duties. (Hittle 1961, 10) Although not directly stated is the strong inference that staff officers possess the authority, again in the commander's name, to check on and supervise the manner in which subordinate units carry out the orders issued by the general headquarters. (Hittle 1961, 70)

The modern staff is thus a management and planning agency, acting for the executive, or commander, under a chief of staff, composed of functionally organized professional officers, schooled in their duties, and governed by a set of specific approved procedures. It is a bureaucratic organization meeting most of Weber's characteristics for an ideal bureaucracy. (Weber, in Shafritz and Hyde 1987, 50) Indeed, the modern staff concept developed and matured during the

same period as did Weber's concept of a bureaucracy, reacting to many of the same influences, and sharing a common background in Germanic philosophies of logical structures and organizations.

The terms *staff, general staff, staff officer*, and the related term *chief of staff*, have been used by historians and other writers to describe personnel or groups throughout military history. Throughout most of military history these terms were applied in a loose sense to any assistants or aides, or groups of assistants or aides, to a commanding general. Although there might have been, in some cases, some specialization of tasks and sub-group coordination, the modern concepts of what constitutes a staff, a staff officer, and a chief of staff, did not come into existence until the mid-seventeenth to late eighteenth centuries. Prior to this period the concept of command was a very personalized thing, and those officers around a commander were only his aides or assistants. These aides would courier messages, conduct reconnaissances, offer advice, or even prepare orders, but with the exception of artillerymen and engineers, there was no accepted functional specialization and little rigid staff organization. Dependable sub-commanders were more utilized and depended upon on than an individual commander's staff for the organization and control of an army or fleet. Use or effective employment of those on the commander's personal staff was a function of individual leadership style and had nothing to do with any accepted management system. (Huntington 1964, 6; Hittle 1961, 35; DuPuy and DuPuy 1977, 9, 46, 221, 318, 342-343; van Creveld 1989, 114; van Creveld 1991, 101-102; Zook 1967, 163, 166; Griffin 1991, 5)

By the mid-seventeenth century the nature of warfare was changing rapidly. Effective command, control, management, and planning of warfare were becoming critical factors in

addition to the personal leadership style of the commander. The demise of feudalism, the rise of

nation states and their associated permanent standing armies, the widespread employment of

firearms, and the transformation of artillery from a specialized siege weapon into a maneuver

branch of field armies, all had a dramatic and modernizing effect on the nature of warfare. The

feudal levee, officered by nobility, and leavened with relatively small numbers of mercenary

engineers and artillerymen, organized on an ad hoc basis for a single campaign was becoming a

thing of the past. Technology and significant amounts of specialized logistics requirements

prevented armies from simply living off the land. The employment of standing armies armed

with firearms entailed prior planning in the areas of supply, maintenance, and transportation that

required expertise and experience that the regular line officers of the infantry, cavalry, or

artillery units did not possess. Martin van Creveld labels the period from 1500 to 1830 as *The

Age of Machines*. The old feudal military system, which had remained more or less static for

centuries, was not able to deal with the new machines of warfare and the logistical, training,

organizational, and employment considerations that the use of these machines represented. (van

Creveld 1989) Huntington additionally cites the growth in professionalism of the military from

the mid seventeenth through nineteenth centuries as a key element in the transformation of the

nature of warfare. This growth of professionalism of the military was both an effect of the

modernization of warfare and one of its causes. Huntington attributes the causes of military

professionalism, particularly in Prussia, to: 1) technological specialization growing out of

industrialization, urbanization and the resultant functional specialization and division of labor; 2)

competitive nationalism associated with the rise of nation states; 3) the conflict between

democracy and aristocracy with the concepts of the representative ideal and ability displacing

aristocratic prerogative; and 4) the existence of recognized and accepted sources of legitimate authority over the military. (Huntington 1964, 31-37)

It is commonly acknowledged that to Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden goes the honor of creating the first modern army and the first modern staff organization. (Huntington 1964, 26; Hittle 1961, 36-30) To his tactical innovations of the creation of field artillery, the perfection of linear tactics to include the oblique order, and techniques designed to increase the musket's rate of fire and effect, Gustavus Adolphus created a staff to manage the logistics and technology of modern war. He organized a supply service under what would latter be called a quartermaster, or quartermaster general. He utilized a chief of staff to manage the specialized staff officers in charge of the supply, transportation, military justice, and administrative services of his army. Kniphausen, Gustavus' Chief of Staff, did not have the far ranging and detailed responsibilities of latter Prussian chiefs of staff, but at the same time he was not just the senior officer in the commander's entourage. Kniphausen saw to the day to day detailed direction of the staff, and through the staff, the running of the army. This freed Gustavus Adolphus to concentrate on matters of strategy and policy. Gustavus also saw to it that his regimental staffs were identically organized and that there was a uniform set of procedures throughout his army. The Swedish staff system was imported into the French Army by Richelieu in 1639, and as modified by Bourcet in 1766, became the basis of Napoleon's staff system. The Spanish essentially copied the French system. Although the British followed the lead of the rest of Europe in organizing supply services and creating specialist support troops, they did not create a modern staff system until after their debacle in the Crimea in the mid 1800s. (Hittle 1961, 39-43; Huntington 1964, 26; Zook 1967, 163-165; Griffin 1991, 6) As Hittle asserts:

". . . historical evidence strongly supports the contention that all European staffs stemmed from the system of Gustavus." (Hittle 1961, 45)

It is not the staffs, or staff systems, of Gustavus Adolphus or of Napoleon that are most often identified with the terms "staff" or "general staff." Although Napoleon's staff is attributed by some as being the first complete and modern staff and staff system, it is the Prussian General Staff that is most commonly identified with the modern military staff system.

The Napoleonic staff was not a creation of Napoleon as much as a direct evolution of the French system that existed under Bourcet from 1766 to 1771 and latter from 1783. Although Napoleon maintained a "Great General Headquarters" staff under Berthier, his Chief of Staff, plus a smaller personal staff, *La Maison*, his personal command style did not fully utilize the capabilities of these staffs. The French staff organized by Berthier was superior to the Prussian system up until approximately 1810. There was a clear cut division of labor within the staff, canalization of effort, and delegation of authority with the Chief of Staff holding supervisory power. Clear cut procedures were stipulated by Thiebaut's staff manual published in 1800. (Hittle 1961, 96-98, 114) Entry to the staff was mainly based on ability. The only missing factor was a formal education system. For Napoleon an almost constant state of campaigning was both a reason not to have a formal staff education system and a substitute for it. (Hittle 1961, 114)

Two reasons explain why the Prussians, and not the French, are considered the true founders of the modern staff system. The first reason is that Napoleon did not fully utilize the tool at his disposal while the Prussians made their system the center of their military and eventually their governmental systems. Napoleon exercised a very personal style of leadership and used his staff more as a military office than a separate managerial body. Napoleon's

marshals, including Berthier, his Chief of Staff, were trained to obey and carry out orders. Napoleon's marshals were not allowed to act on their own initiative. (Millotat 1992, 25; Zook 1967, 163, 165; Hittle 1961, 104) Conversely, the Prussians de-personalized their system and rigorously used their staff system to its maximum potential. Huntington asserts that one of the revolutionary aspects of the Prussian system was that genius was held to be superfluous, even dangerous, and that reliance was placed on average men who succeeded by superior education with extensive experience within a totally rational system. (Huntington 1964, p.51) The second reason for the identification of the Prussians with the modern staff system is that once it was adopted in 1808, it remained in place until the end of World War II. The French staff system of Napoleon ended with Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. The French reverted to an aristocratically based and personality driven system that was not replaced with a modern staff system until the defeat of France by Germany in 1871. The French then adopted what was basically a Prussian staff system.

As with many radical or novel ideas, the Prussian staff concept, upon which the modern staff system is directly based, was a product of organizational and national crisis. Until 1806, the Prussian General Staff, although reflecting many unique national aspects, was essentially a modification of the Swedish and French staff systems. Frederick the Great had borrowed on existing models of military organizations and procedures. He coopted the Junker nobility into becoming a class of government military and civil servants, and created a modern nation in arms. The Prussian governmental and military systems of 1806, were a careful balance of the require-ments and privileges of a feudally based aristocracy versus a dominant monarchy which was bent on the creation and maintenance of a powerful nation state. Prussia's military importance

and capabilities were out of proportion to her natural resources and demographics. The Prussians were justly proud of their military heritage handed down from Frederick the Great. In 1806, though, the Prussians were routed and totally defeated by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena. (Hittle 1961, 51-56; DuPuy and DuPuy 1977, 773,742)   The Jena debacle caused the Prussian Government to conduct a complete review, of not only the Jena Campaign, but of the civil and military systems that provided and supported the field army for the campaign. Because the King of Prussia was both the head of the military and the head of government and the Prussian General Staff functioned as the governmental executive ministry for military matters, there was a broad and far reaching investigation as to what had gone wrong. For the purposes of the discussion at hand, one of the most sweeping reforms was the reorganization of the Prussian General Staff. This was completed by 1809. Among the many improvements that resulted from this reorganization were: strictly regulated competitive selection onto the staff based on examination; extensive preparatory schooling before assumption of staff duties, periodic rotation between staff and troop unit assignments, and the strict application of science and technology to the conduct of military operations through an extensive and rational set of staff procedures and instructions.

The Prussian General Staff that emerged from the Jena reforms was based on a logical division of labor, selection and advancement based on merit, extensive formal professional education of its members, and the requirement that the most efficient and technologically advanced methods and procedures be studied and mastered. There was an institutional stress on contingency planning reinforced by actual and simulated exercises in which plans were validated. (Hittle 1961, 46-65; DuPuy and DuPuy 1977, 773, 742, 821; van Creveld 1989, 144, 159) While Great Britain and France had cadet schools for entry level officers alone, only the

Prussians had the *Kriegsakademie*, a three year course of instruction for general staff officers, which had been created in 1810. Sharnhorst, the first Chief of the General Staff created the new Prussian General Staff in 1809 as part of his general army reorganization that took place from 1807 to 1814. The General Staff reorganization of 1821, under General Muffling, put the staff in the form it would remain in for the next one-hundred and twenty years. By 1821, the Prussian General Staff was the first modern staff system. The Prussian staff reorganization and maturation process took place in a Europe that was in the midst of the Industrial Revolution and experiencing significant urbanization. The Prussians not only formed a new tool to guide their army but they did it while they were entering the modern industrial age. Their staff system was a logical attempt to deal with modern technology in the context of a nation state. At the same time their former victors had abandoned what staff systems they had, or had re-adopted old forms better suited to period before the Napoleonic Wars. The Prussian General Staff studied logistics, rail and road transportation, the use of the telegraph in military command and control applications, and national mobilization procedures. At the same time other European military organizations were studying the optimal length of the lance and bayonet, and the proper proportion of light cavalry to heavy cavalry. While Europe studied the last war, Prussia studied the next war.

The value of the Prussian system was decisively demonstrated by the Schleswig-Holstein War of 1864, the Austro-Prussia War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. The efficiency, speed, and effectiveness of the Prussian General Staff in these conflicts clearly established the Prussian General Staff System as the premier military command, control, management, and planning agency in the world. (DuPuy and DuPuy 1977, 821, 941, 915; Hittle 1961, 78; Millotat 1992, 5; Millis in Preface to Goerlitz 1953, V-VI)

Although France would create a staff college in 1818 and Great Britain would follow

suit in 1857, they did not possess other requirements of a modern staff system. France would not

possess a modern staff system until after their defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871,

and the British had to suffer humiliations and catastrophes in the Crimean War of 1853-1854,

and again against the Boers of South Africa in the 1890s before they created a general staff along

Prussian lines. (Hittle 1961, 70; DuPuy and DuPuy 1977, 773, 821, 825-826, 832-835) Similar to

the fate of the British, it would take the glaring unpreparedness and obvious gross inefficiencies

of the United States military administrative and logistic support of the Spanish American War of

1898 to bring about the creation of a modern general staff system in the United States. From

1900 to 1903 the Army Reforms under Secretary of War Elihu Root brought about the establish-

ment of the Army War College (1900), the Command and General Staff School (1901), and

finally the Army General Staff (1903). (DuPuy and DuPuy 1977, 1011) The United States

General Staff System, unlike its Prussian relative, would take almost another fifty years to

mature. The final form of what constituted the United States general staff came about only with

the passage of the National Defense Act of 1947.

The Anglo-Saxon Democracies, i.e. Great Britain and the United States, were the last

major powers to adopt a general staff system, and did so only after a protracted period of military

and government resistance. The Prussian and later German General Staffs were both respected

for their efficiency and effectiveness and at the same time feared because they were perceived as

systems of overly powerful military elites that were unresponsive to democratic influences. To

the liberal democracies, the general staff system, as represented by the German General Staff,

represented "grimly expert professional militarism."(DuPuy and DuPuy 1977, 915; Millis in

preface to Goerlitz 1953, V) The tool was mistaken for its owner. The perception persisted

though, especially in the United States and Great Britain, that the general staff system was

undemocratic, politically dangerous, and represented a step towards militarism. Following allied

victories in World Wars I and II, one of the first steps that were taken was to abolish the German

General Staff and Japanese Imperial General Staffs. It is also noteworthy that one of the first

things the Germans did after their defeat in World War I was to reconstitute the general staff as

the *Truppen Amt* within the *Reichswehr*. The negative attitudes of the Anglo-Saxon Democracies

towards general staff systems have influenced their use within public organizations. During the

last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the Prussian General Staff system was being adopted

by the world's military as the modern staff system, the Progressive Liberal Reform Movement in

the United States was establishing the theoretical and philosophical basis for American Public

Administration. The selection by merit, professional education, divorcement from politics,

logical division of labor, and efficiency aspects of the modern military staff system were all

ideals of the Progressive Liberal Reform Movement. At the same time, the conservative, elitist,

and militaristic leanings of the Prussian Junkers, the creators of the modern staff system, were

diametrically opposed to the philosophical basis of the founding fathers of American Public

Administration. Although many governmental and even private public service organizations

employ the modern staff system, the identification of the management system as related to the

military is carefully avoided. This partially explains the transparency of this management

approach in the public sector.

The acceptance of the Prussian General Staff model by the rest of the world's military

powers goes far beyond adoption of a system that helped win wars. The modern staff system

represents a logical, efficient, and effective means of managing complex issues of technology, policy, strategy, and allocation resources. (Millis in Preface to Goerlitz 1953, V-VI) By freeing the executive of the details of administration and policy information development, the staff system encourages strategic and comprehensive decision making. The modern staff system provides the complex organization with the ability to deal with complex issues, and is indeed military administration's most important contribution to the theory and praxis of public administration.

Public Administration, as a profession and an area of academic study, emerged from the liberal reform movements of the United Kingdom and United States following the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Industrial Revolution saw not only an application of science and technology to manufacturing, but a restructuring of society. The post Industrial Revolution society was urbanized and depended on emerging transportation technologies for commerce and trade. The city managers and other public administrators were not only concerned with civil service merit reforms, but with the planning and management of complex governmental infrastructures. Civil engineering, which provided the scientific tool for the construction of the new governmental infrastructures, was only a partial answer. The other part of the solution was an organizational and theoretical approach to the increasingly complex and specialized functional areas which were becoming a part of the Public Administration environment. This theoretical and organizational approach was the modern staff system. The modern staff system was the military answer to the Industrial Revolution's impact on war. It was an organizational approach based on science, logic, functional specialization, and the maximization of the efficiency of the executive through a system that provided rational choices of highly

complex and difficult problems. Because of the conservative militaristic origins of the modern

staff system, and its identification with oppressive and aggressive regimes, the modern staff

system has been philosophically isolated from the liberal reform theories that provided the basis

of American, British, and European Public Administration theories. Nevertheless, the modern

staff system has provided the organizational and theoretical basis for Public Administration

praxis. Other organizational, management, leadership, and personal administration theories and

movements, have captured the attention of Public Administration theorists and practitioners.

Scientific Management, cooperative management approaches, PPBS, and Total Quality

Management are only some of the theories that have been dominant in the field of Public

Administration. In final analysis, though, they have all been applied to, and practiced in, public

organizations whose basic organization and structure were rooted in modern military staff

theory. Despite its roots in conservatively oriented military organizations, the focus on effi-

ciency, scientific approach, functional specialization , and political neutrality, that are its basis,

make modern staff theory not only complimentary to the rest of Public Administration Theory

but a core and essential part of this theory. Modern staff theory is thus the most important and

pervasive contribution that the military administration has made to the field of Public Adminis-

tration.

The foregoing pages have discussed military administration's constitutional, legal, and

functional basis. The non-public perception of military administration, that is commonly held by

the civil administrative theorists and practitioners, was also addressed. The exclusion of military

from the rest of public administration can be partially explained by widely held perceptions of

the military mind and its underlying ethical basis. Military administration's significant contributions to leadership, PPBS, and universally practiced staff theories were discussed at length.

The above referenced discussions were based on the writings of eminent, and widely read, military history and public administration theorists. The military's participation in, and contributions to the practice of public administration were well documented. The fact remains, though, that there is a pernicious and deep institutional bias within modern civil administration against the inclusion of military administration's inclusion under public administration's tent.

Stever's assertion that the dominance of liberal progressivism, which became exclusive rather than inclusive, resulted in a "glass wall" being inserted between civil and military administration, is essentially correct. For Stever the wall is non-porous and shatter resistant. The acceptance , by the military, of programming and performance budgeting theories into what is accepted Department of Defense PBBS practice, and staff theory by civil administrators indicates that the wall is indeed porous. What is most significant about Stever's glass wall is its transparency. Because the wall is transparent, it is not recognized. Therefore the negative effects of the wall have not been significantly discussed or addressed by public administration theorists and practitioners. The transparent wall that Stever describes is the basis for military administration's exclusion from the rest of public administration. Stever is correct when he asserts that the wall must be recognized, then torn down. The wall is creating problems that are "increasingly deleterious and sever" and "that its intellectual foundations, in retrospect, are indefensible."(Stever 1999, 30)

A primary objective of this dissertation is that the wall separating civil and military administration shall start to be torn down. This objective will be realized by establishing that

General Douglas MacArthur was a public administrator, and that the military administrative

theories he practiced were central to the context of public administration.

CHAPTER II

Literature Review

There is a wealth of both primary and secondary sources dealing with Douglas MacArthur. Not only was MacArthur famous as a soldier and general; but he was a central character in several historically significant events and periods. MacArthur was controversial and colorful. He was a figure whose intellect, vanity, and outspoken, aggressive personality all contributed to a larger than life, even heroic, mystique that has encouraged historical analysis. More than 380 books and over 400 articles deal with MacArthur as a significant or principal character. Approximately fifty of the books deal exclusively with MacArthur. Anthologies of MacArthur's speeches and early military writings have been published. (Whan 1965; Waldrop 1942) MacArthur himself wrote a book, an autobiography, and several articles. (MacArthur 1949a; 1949b; 1964) Several of his more famous speeches, such as his farewell addresses before Congress and at West Point, were latter published as articles. Because of his important command positions, MacArthur figures prominently in official World War II command histories dealing specifically with the South West Pacific Theater and the Pacific Theater in general. MacArthur also figured prominently in the official command histories dealing with the Korean War until the time of his relief.

Autobiographies

MacArthur is credited with two autobiographies. *Duty, Honor, Country: A Pictorial Autobiography* (1962, 1965), as its title suggests, is more of a collection of captioned pictures than a true autobiography. MacArthur's definitive autobiography, *Reminiscences*, is required reading for an understanding of the man, but it is not history. It is MacArthur's personal view of what his historical legacy should be. Although the publisher Henry Luce claimed *Reminiscences* ranked as one of the greatest historical writings of any age, numerous historians including Hansen Baldwin, Louis Morton, D. Clayton James, and Eugene L. Razor have taken issue with its accuracy, style, and content. (Baldwin 1964; Morton 1964; James 1970; James 1975; James 1985) Baldwin and Morton were particularly sharp in their book reviews of *Reminiscences*. Baldwin states:

> " There is throughout this book, the same tendency that was apparent in his life-an attempt to magnify his unquestionable achievements by dramatization and gener-alization, by the careful selection of figures, by overestimation of the enemy's strength and de-emphasis of his own." (Baldwin 1964, 59)

Baldwin recommends the book, not for its value as subjective history, but for its implicit subconscious portrait of the author. Morton argues that the book mainly reveals MacArthur's negative side by indirectly exposing MacArthur's ego, paranoia, sensitivity to criticism, conviction of his own rightness, tendency to place himself in the center of affairs, and tendency to take all credit for himself and to place all blame on others. (Morton 1964, 138) Morton considers MacArthur's writing as undistinguished, pompous, and self-righteous in tone and wonders how such an obviously talented person could have written so poor a book. (Morton

1964, 138) Like Baldwin, Morton lists a series of examples where he takes serious issue with MacArthur's statements or omissions. Morton also goes to some length to point out the similarity in text between MacArthur's *Reminiscences* and Courtney Whitney's *MacArthur: His Rendez-vous with History* (1956). This last argument calls into question whether *Reminiscences* is even an autobiography or a biography written with the subject's close coordination. Morton's closing statement may best describe not only MacArthur, but his autobiography. Morton wrote:

"He was always his worst enemy, and his autobiography will add nothing to his reputation. He should be remembered by his deeds, not his words"

(Morton 1964, 143)

D.Clayton James is more balanced in his criticism, but throughout his three volumes he notes instances where MacArthur's statements, or view of events, as contained in *Reminiscences*, differs from other historical sources. MacArthur's testimony before a congressional committee concerning hazing at West Point while he was a cadet, his probable vote and opinions at the Billy Mitchel Court-Martial, and his meeting with President Truman on Wake Island are several examples of where James points out that *Reminiscences* and indicated historical fact vary.

Official Histories

Although some historians have negatively categorized official histories as contemporary, collaborative and sanctioned history, the United States official histories of World War II have overcome this skepticism and have been praised as authoritative, candid, and exhaustive. (Razor 1994, 11) Ronald H. Spector, himself a distinguished history professor at George Washington University, has analyzed and reviewed the various United States official history series, and

although dubbing them "an improbable success story," concludes that they are on the whole accurate and reliable. (Spector 1990, 25-30; 1992, 91-93) Spector buttresses his analysis by asserting that other eminent historians such as Hansen Baldwin, Forest Poge, and D. Clayton James have given the official histories their enthusiastic support. Official histories that contain significant material on or about MacArthur include: the eighty volume *The U.S. Army in World War II* series and its eleven volume subset *The War in the Pacific*, the *U.S. Army in the Korean War*, the seven volume *The Army Air Forces in World War II* series, the fifteen volume *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II* and its condensed single volume edition *The Two Ocean War*, and the five volume *History of U.S. Marine Operations in World War II*. Great Britain's *The War Against Japan*, Australia's *Australia in the War of 1939-1945*, and New Zealand's *The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1929-1945: The New Zealand People at War* are foreign official histories with some coverage of MacArthur in them. All these official histories are focused on military history. The emphasis is on the planning and conduct of operations. They go into some detail on organization and logistics but do not stress administration or theory. They provide a good basis for understanding the wartime environment under which MacArthur worked but were used only for verifying information or providing background information for this dissertation.

Reports of General MacArthur, the one official history series that could have provided substantial information for this dissertation, has not enjoyed a reputation for candor, accuracy, and completeness. This four volume, 1600 page, series lists MacArthur as the author and Charles Willoughby, his longtime intelligence officer and staff member, as editor. This series was completed by the early 1950s but was held up by Department of the Army historians for thirteen

years. It was finally published by the Government Printing Office in 1966, two years after

MacArthur's death. The series contains much apologetics, casts the best possible light on all of

MacArthur's actions, and has been described as the MacArthur-staff point of view. (Razor 1994,

10, 148)

Biographies

MacArthur has been the subject of numerous biographies. They range from those

designed for juvenile literature through multi volume academic and historical tomes. A good

number of these biographies were written while MacArthur was on active duty, or in the first

few years after his relief and final military retirement, and are not only incomplete in not

covering his full life but also in their accuracy and objectivity. MacArthur's personality and cha-

risma, combined with his controversial and outspoken opinions have resulted in very few

unbiased and evenly covered biographies. The greatest number of his biographers have come

down either strongly for or against MacArthur.

The capstone biographical study and analysis of MacArthur is D. Clayton James <u>The

Years of MacArthur</u>. (James 1970; 1970; 1985) This three volume work is considered by profes-

sional historians as the definitive biography of MacArthur. Professor Eugene L. Rasor, who has

completed a historiography and annotated bibliography on all that has been written on MacAr-

thur, cites James's work as the definitive and standard biography on MacArthur. Rasor further

states that James's three volumes have been universally praised. (Rasor 1994, 16,135-136) What

makes James's work almost unique, and at the same time problematic for the great majority of

writers who have come down solidly for or against MacArthur, is that he treats MacArthur in an

evenhanded and essentially unbiased fashion. Rasor notes that James's work has been praised for its "intensive and comprehensive research, restrained and balanced perspectives, judicious treatment, objectiveness, and sound historical assessments of MacArthur." (Rasor 1994, 16) Joseph G. Harrison, reviewing James' Volume III of *the MacArthur Years* for the *Christian Science Monitor*, states: "James's trilogy is the definitive MacArthur study to date. It is enormously detailed, carefully researched, and written with balance." (Harrison 1985, B1) Robert A. Devine cites the greatest strength of James is a "broad and balanced portrait of a controversial personality." (Devine 1985. 37) Charles M. Dobbs, in a review published in *Reviews of American History*, calls James's work a moderate interpretation between traditionalist history and that of the "New Left" school of history. (Dobbs 1986, 284-288) Forrest Pogue, himself the definitive biographer of MacArthur's contemporary George C. Marshall, noted that neither critics nor admirers of MacArthur will be pleased with James's biography. (Rasor 1994, 17) Although James is universally acknowledged as MacArthur's definitive biographer and is praised for his scholarly evenhanded approach, he is not without his critics. Brian Loring Villa complains that James's balanced approach, designed to avoid controversy, builds a structure of excuses for MacArthur therefore creating mischief. (Villa 1975, 494-498; Rasor 1994, 17, 192) Raymond L. Puffer criticizes James as being "strangely bloodless about the man himself, making little effort to relate his complex personality to his actions." (Puffer 1985, 137i) Considering the extent and nature of James's compliments for *The Years of MacArthur*, the criticisms, although valid, actually reflect the cause of the compliments. The controversy over the individual subject of a biography need only extend into the biography if the biographer is indeed judgmental and biased.

There are other biographies of MacArthur. The most widely read and best known biography of MacArthur is William Manchester's acclaimed: <u>An American Caesar</u>. (Manchester 1978) Manchester's work was a #1 National Best-seller and has been published repeatedly in both hardback and softback versions. Manchester appears to have relied heavily on James's research but stresses the extremes in MacArthur's personality and behavior. (Rasor 1994, 17) Manchester's work was published in 1978 before James's Volume III dealing with the period 1945 to 1964 was published in 1985. Several historians and reviewers have noted that Manchester's coverage of MacArthur's life after World War II is not in the same detail as the rest of *American Caesar*. (Rasor 1994, 18; Pogue 1979, 58) Manchester cannot be criticized, as James was, for balance. The emphasis on the controversial aspects of MacArthur's personality and actions makes much more enjoyable reading but not necessarily good history. Although the book jacket includes the required glowing short literary critic reviews, serious historians have been less than complimentary of Manchester's work as a piece of historiography. Forrest Pogue, in a scathing twenty-two page review in *International Review*, castigates Manchester for his excessive use of historically questionable sources, indiscriminate and shoddy use of sources, and in a litany of examples takes Manchester to task for his misstatements, overstatements, exclusions, inclusions, and generally inaccurate and over dramatized history. Poge considers that Manchester's lax approach to history has perpetuated numerous errors and created controversies where none had existed. (Pogue 1979, 58-80; Rasor 1994, 18) Russel F. Weigley, another eminent military historian, criticizes Manchester, a Marine combat veteran, for not addressing MacArthur's generalship but who instead participates in uncritical adulation of MacArthur's own "lofty" claims. (Weigley 1979, 571-576) Eugene Rasor determines the relative value of James's

and Manchester's works by stating: "The most scholarly and respected reviewers rave about the biography of Clayton James and dismiss the work of William Manchester." (Rasor 1994, 18)

Both James and Manchester do a solid job of reconstructing all the significant events of MacArthur's life. Both analyze them from contemporary as well as historical perspectives. These biographies supplement their historical examination of events by carefully detailing MacArthur's work and relaxation habits, his personal relationships, and even dietary habits. MacArthur's work habits and environment are the subject of much descriptive analysis. Not as well defined is MacArthur's theoretical approach to, and academic training in, management and administration. MacArthur is described as widely read and an avid student. A detailed description of what MacArthur read and studied is not available. There is much coverage of MacArthur's relationship with his staff, and principal subordinates, but MacArthur's managerial approach is less well described. There is no description of the specific administrative and managerial training that MacArthur received and studied.

There is a series of biographies, that because of the period or the subject that they cover, do not provide a complete study of MacArthur. A subset of this group is the biographies that members of MacArthur's staffs, or subordinates wrote following their association with MacArthur. These books are either autobiographies of the authors' periods of service under MacArthur, or historical reviews of the same periods. They provide first-hand observations of the inner workings and functioning of MacArthur's staffs. The insights gained from these sources must be carefully analyzed because it is well documented that many of MacArthur's principal assistants were extremely devoted to him and served under him for unusually long periods. Several of these can be particularly dangerous, from a historical point of view, because they drift from their

first hand observations of MacArthur to extrapolations of what MacArthur did, or later did. These extrapolations are based on the author's opinion of MacArthur, or on claims made by MacArthur or his principal staff members. On the positive side these books provide insights into MacArthur as an executive and administrator. They also provide an insight into the loyalty and awe that MacArthur engendered in those who served on his various staffs.

William Ganoe's *MacArthur Close-Up Much Then and Some Now* provides valuable and unique first hand observations of MacArthur's tour as Superintendent of West Point. (Ganoe 1962) Ganoe was MacArthur's adjutant at West Point. It is a memoir published almost forty years after the period it describes. In its final section Ganoe offers apologies in defense of MacArthur for periods that occurred well after MacArthur and Ganoe served together. In Ganoe's words MacArthur is "our greatest living American." (Ganoe 1962, 5)

The remainder of the MacArthur "staff" biographies were written by men who served with MacArthur during the late 1930s through his relief by Truman in 1951. Sidney Huff's *My Fifteen Years With MacArthur* (1951, 1964), Charles Willoughby's (written with John Chamberlain) *MacArthur, 1941-1951* (1954), Courtney Whitney's *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with Destiny* (1955, 1956, 1964, 1977) are biographies written by close staff confidants who served with MacArthur for extended periods of time. These authors extol MacArthur's every accomplishment and can find nothing questionable, let alone wrong, in any of MacArthur's actions or personality traits. Eugene Rasor credits these bio-graphical efforts with having an agenda of "rationalization, justification, and glorification of MacArthur and condemnation of anyone who criticize him." "They tend to be uncritical, apologetic, and fawning." (Rasor 1994, 20) Rasor's criticisms of these works are mild. Hansen

W. Baldwin asserts that Whitney's and Willoughby's works for their lack of objectivity and balance might as well be titled "MacArthur on MacArthur." (Baldwin 1956, Sect.7 p.1) S.L.A. Marshall, states Whitney's work

"is but another gospel done for members of the one true religion. It is laden with worship and hate. There is one hero, one valiant clairsentient, and selfless spirit. Apart from those who follow immediately in his train, the Republic is served by vagrants, nitwits, and marplots."

(Marshall 1956, 14)

Marshall's observations are concurred in by Richard Rovere's article and review of Whitney's work. Rovere asserts that MacArthur, Whitney, and the rest of MacArthur's inner circle, blamed any failures on cabals and dark plots directed against MacArthur. (Rovere 1956, 25-36)   At the same time Baldwin, S.L.A. Marshall and other historians value these "staff" biographies. Their authors had the cooperation of their subject and access to his papers previously denied to others. The authors also, as a function of their close and extended first hand observations, provide much insight and anecdotal information that would not otherwise be available. (Baldwin 1956; Marshall 1956)

There are also several biographical works by others who were attached to, or worked with, MacArthur's staff for shorter periods of three to four years. These authors were not part of MacArthur's inner circle but nonetheless had opportunities to make extensive and valuable observations of MacArthur and his primary staff members. Again, a reflection of MacArthur's ability to captivate and motivate his subordinates, these works are very positive, even glowing, towards MacArthur, but they are more balanced in describing the activity of those around him.

These works include: *The General: MacArthur and the Man Called "Doc"* by MacArthur's physician Roger Egeberg (1983, 1984), *The MacArthur I Know* by MacArthur's Army Air Corps Chief George C. Kenny (1951), *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* by MacArthur's State Department Representative during the occupation William Sebald, and Paul Rogers's *The Good Years: MacArthur and Sutherland* and *The Bitter Years: MacArthur and Sutherland*. (1990; 1990) Rogers was MacArthur's office manager, and as such worked under the supervision of Sutherland who was MacArthur's Chief of Staff. Sutherland and Rogers served with MacArthur from about the time of MacArthur's recall to active duty in the Philippines, just prior to World War II, until the end of the war. Rogers thus had a unique insight into the relationship between MacArthur and his principal subordinates.

Two other biographies stand out from the more than two dozen other biographies available on MacArthur. Both deal with MacArthur's tours of duty in the Far East. Carol Petillo's *Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years* (1981) focuses on MacArthur's several tours in the Philippines, and in a somewhat expose style analyses MacArthur from a psychoanalytic perspective utilizing the approaches of Freud, Erik Erikson, and George Vaillant. Although Rasor comments that not all of Petillo's psychoanalytic assertions are persuasive the work still gives valuable insights into what may have motivated and affected the personal side of MacArthur. (Rasor 1994, 19)

The second biography that stands out on MacArthur is Michael Schaller's *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (1989). Schaller's focus is on MacArthur's career between 1935, when he returned to the Philippines as Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines, and 1951, when he was relieved by President Truman. Robert Dallek called Schaller's work "the

most thoroughly negative biography of the general to date." Dallek adds that although the work

presents a powerful argument, based on primary sources, it is too much of a polemic to be

entirely convincing. (Dallek 1989, 12) One historian, whom I interviewed while developing

sources for this dissertation, termed Schaller's work a "hatchet job." Schaller does paint

MacArthur as an anti-hero, but he does provide primary and corroborating sources for his asser-

tions. Schaller's work is valuable if only because it is one of the few iconoclastic works written

about MacArthur. Only a few biographies, such as James's are balanced in their coverage.

Against this is a plethora of hagiographical works that Rasor terms a virtual genre. (Rasor 1994,

19) MacArthur was such a popular figure that there are a great number of biographical works

available that are not only uncritical, but un-researched, un-footnoted, and unusable. Those that

were written after World War II, and the Korean War are not only incomplete chronologically,

but did not have access to what are today readily available sources. MacArthur's fame also

generated juvenile and politically partisan biographies that are not reliable sources for historical

research. (Rasor 1994, 19-21)

Historical Works

There are also many historical works dealing with specific events or periods in MacAr-

thur's career. Most of these works deal with military history, but there are other works that

address non-military events. These latter works examine MacArthur as a historical figure, but

not necessarily as a soldier or general. The bulk of the non-military histories describe the

reconstruction of Japan after World War II and the political and constitutional ramifications of

MacArthur's relief by Truman. As with James's and Manchester's works, there is a focus on the

events and their effects. The Tokyo and Far Eastern War Crimes Trials are the subject of several

scholarly and partisan books and articles. MacArthur's involvement in both these series of trials

is a central and controversial issue in these works. The managerial and administrative approaches

that MacArthur used in affecting these events are less well covered. The histories are almost

completely bereft of any description or analysis of MacArthur's academic or professional

training. Numerous magazine articles, discuss the political but not the administrative aspects of

MacArthur's career. These works have a heavy emphasis on MacArthur's presidential aspirations

and his disagreements with President Truman.

Dissertations

A review of <u>Abstracts International</u> reveals that fourteen doctoral dissertations have been

written since MacArthur's death that list him as the subject or a key character. Five of the

dissertations had MacArthur as their primary or central subject. Three of these were in the

academic discipline of Speech and focused on MacArthur's public speeches and oratory. The

other two dissertations, with MacArthur as their central subject, were in the discipline of History.

One of these dealt with MacArthur's presidential campaigns in 1944 and 1948, while the second

covered MacArthur's years in the Philippines. This later work was subsequently published as a

book and is a secondary source for this dissertation. (Petillo 1981)

Summary of Literature

Currently available literature more than adequately covers the man and the events in his

life. MacArthur's military exploits have obscured his administrative accomplishments. MacAr-

thur's military accomplishments are now only history. His administrative accomplishment of drafting Japan's Post-War Constitution, still has a significant effect on current world events. MacArthur as the administrator, the manager, the public executive is not as well covered. This dissertation will focus on the administrative and managerial aspects of MacArthur's career. It will concentrate on the less well known administrative periods of his career. Although it will describe and discuss incidents and periods of MacArthur's life that have been written about elsewhere, it will do so from a different perspective and emphasis.

CHAPTER III

Professional Education, Training and Early Career

It has already been established, based on constitutional, statutory, and functional analyses, that MacArthur was a professional public administrator during his entire career as a military officer. His tenure as the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, from 1945 to 1951, is the period for which he will not only be remembered as a public administrator, but for which he will be most remembered. As a general, his victories in World War II and Korea are counterbalanced by his defeats and will always be overshadowed by his relief by President Truman over his conduct of the war in Korea. Despite his relief of command by Truman over military policy in Korea, his historical legacy as SCAP is intact and still the subject of positive research and analysis. D. Clayton James, MacArthur's definitive biographer, reinforces this assertion. He states:

> In deciding to undertake a biography of him, I did so with the conviction that a
> century hence MacArthur will be remembered as an administrator, rather than as a
> warrior.(James 1970, viii)

MacArthur's tenure as SCAP was the capstone and apex of his career as both a military officer and a public administrator. His tenure as SCAP occurred when he was from sixty-five to

seventy-one years old. This is a period in life by which time most individuals have retired. He

had in fact already retired from the U.S. Army during his tenure as the Military Advisor to the

President of the Philippines (1935-1941). If he had followed common practice when he stepped

down as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1935, he would have retired at age fifty-five, well below

the mandatory retirement age of sixty-four. It is somewhat unusual to describe the first forty-

three years of a man's career, and sixty-five years of his life, as the early and middle periods in

his career, but for MacArthur that is the case. If he had retired in 1935, he would have been only

a footnote in history. His tenure as Chief of Staff would not be remembered for what he had

accomplished, but only for what he had prevented others from accomplishing during the years of

military budget cutting between the World Wars. If he had retired after the end of World War II,

as he should have as an individual of sixty-five who had reached the mandatory retirement age,

his legacy would be that of a colorful and controversial theater commander. MacArthur's

enduring legacy will be as the public administrator, the law giver, the *de facto* ruler and re-

builder of a country, and not the recalled general. The period in his career leading to his

assignment as SCAP, representing a total career for most individuals, comprised merely the early

and middle parts of his career.

Attainment of general officer rank, for the overwhelming majority of military officers,

would mark the final stages of a career. Upon his promotion to Brigadier General in 1918, he had

just over fifteen years of commissioned service and was in his late thirties. Then and now, most

general officers have spent at least twenty-three to twenty-five years as an officer and are

somewhere around fifty years old. Most general officers serve only about a dozen years of active

service once they have attained their stars. MacArthur's active service as a general, in either the

U.S. Army or, from 1937 to 1941, in the Commonwealth of the Philippines, extended over thirty-

four years. He spent more time as a general then many generals spend in the Army over their

entire careers.

In MacArthur's case, one could argue that his early career extended up to his assignment

as Chief of Staff of the Army in November 1930. At this point he had been a general officer a

dozen years. Except for several months duty as the head of the United States Olympic Team, all

his experience, in any executive capacity, was the result of active service within the Army

structure. As Chief of Staff of the Army, later as Military Advisor to the President of the

Commonwealth of the Philippines, and Commander of the South West Pacific Theater during

World War II, he would serve as a senior executive or general at the national level of govern-

ment. As a senior government official, his duties in these positions would require that he

coordinate and work with other senior government officials and bodies outside the U.S. or

Philippine Armies. From a functional perspective, the period from 1930 to 1945, when he served

as a senior government official/general officer, defines the middle period of his career. The final

period of his public career began with his appointment as the Supreme Commander Allied

Powers (SCAP) in Japan in 1945 and ended with his relief in 1951.

MacArthur's Education and Training
as a Public Administrator

Considering current areas of academic study and professional training that are associated

with a career as a public administrator, MacArthur had only the most rudimentary career

preparation. He never studied political science, nor did his formal education provide him with

exposure to management, business administration, or public administration theories. It would not

be until 1907, four years after his graduation from West Point, that any meaningful coverage of political and social sciences occurred in the West Point curriculum. (Ambrose 1966, 247) Unlike many of his contemporaries and future subordinates, he never attended the Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth. He lacked the formal exposure to contemporary military administrative theories that those who had attended this course had gained. His early meteoric rise to general officer grade, barely fifteen years after graduation from West Point, deprived him of attending formal professional schooling after World War I. His total academic and professional preparation consisted of his cadet training, at West Point from 1899 to 1903, and advanced engineer specialty training, at the Engineer School of Application at what is now Fort MacNair, during 1906 and 1907.

MacArthur and Woodrow Wilson met several times, but there is no evidence that the young Major, in his mid thirties, discussed political science or public administration with President Wilson. He was present at more than several White House social engagements with President Wilson. He also had professional contacts with President Wilson such as when he and Secretary of War Baker briefed the President on utilization of the National Guard after the entry of the United States into World War I. (James 1970, 135; MacArthur 1964, 45-46) Despite repeated social and professional contacts with the father of Public Administration in the United States, available sources suggest they discussed only contemporary military issues. (James 1970, 130-134; MacArthur 1964, 37-48) A review of the small collection of personal correspondence and documents preserved in the MacArthur Memorial for the period before World War II does not indicate that he had read, or was aware of, any of the classics of Public Administration literature. To assess the accuracy of this statement, the reader should recall that most of

MacArthur's prewar personal papers did not survive the recapture of Manila from the Japanese. The most authoritative listing of his destroyed personal library and papers is a detailed Japanese inventory of his quarters conducted shortly after their capture in 1942. His extensive personal library, destroyed in Manila in 1945, did not contain any volumes considered as classics in the literature of Public Administration. There were several volumes that dealt with classical political theory and the Constitution of the United States, but their titles do not suggest that they addressed Public Administration or contemporary Political Science theories. (MacArthur 1964, 37-48; James 1970, 130-134, Chapter V; MacArthur Memorial Archives, Record Groups 1, 5, and 10) Before his assignment as Superintendent of West Point, in 1919, it is doubtful that he - was aware of, let alone studied any of the major writings on administration available at the time, e.g., Eaton's *Civil Service in Great Britain* (1880), Wilson's *The Study of Administration* (1887), Goodnow's *Politics and Administration* (1900), F.W. Taylor's *Principles of Scientific Management* (1911), or Willoughby's *The Movement Towards Budgetary Reform* (1918). Historical evidence and the nature of his academic interests indicate that he focused on literature concerning military history and applied military science. (James 1994; James 1970, 130-134; Manchester 1978, 133) MacArthur's preparation for a career did not include a study of contemporary political science or management theories. His formal education in government and governmental functioning was rudimentary at best, and focused on a single undergraduate course in Constitutional Law. (See Appendix A) By current, and even contemporary standards, he did not have a generalist's academic training that would have sufficed in the British Civil Service. Paradoxically, he had been well prepared for a career in his area of practice in Public Administration.

Using contemporary standards, MacArthur received programs of academic preparation and professional training that were among the best available for a public administrator. Despite outdated teaching methods, a very conservative and rigid curriculum, essentially unchanged since the Civil War, and extensive use of recent graduates as instructors, his West Point education, from 1899-1903, provided him with a basic education as a civil engineer. (Ambrose 1966, 240) Assignment to the Corps of Engineers, and subsequent professional training at the Engineer School of Application during 1906-1907, made him a state-of-the-art trained civil engineer. It also provided him with a knowledge of the administrative systems, and functions of a modern bureaucracy, i.e., the U.S. Army and specifically the Corps of Engineers.

As a military officer, operating in a narrowly defined career, he did not need a theoretical or practical knowledge of the Civil Service reform movement that dominated the period during which he attended his professional education and entry level training. Before World War I, MacArthur was a junior or mid-level officer in a highly specialized staff corps. His professional education and training effectively allowed him to practice in what is today the narrow field of civil engineering. It should be born in mind that civil engineering before World War I was a main stream area of practice for many public administrators at the state and local government level. Public Administration practice at the state, and particularly the local level, was heavily involved in building, management and planning the infrastructure requirements of a society experiencing rapid urbanization. Surface and waterborne transportation, and urban utility systems were major concerns of public administrators dealing with the demands that industrialization and urbanization were placing on state and local governments. The validity of the assertion that MacArthur's West Point education and professional training were a proper

preparation for a career in public administration rests not only on the content of the West Point

academic program's civil engineering orientation. The Army openly considered the Corps of

Engineers as an organization that was primarily concerned with civil functions. During the

period when MacArthur was a cadet, the administration of West Point stated:

> The Engineer Corps of the Army has been since the foundation of the Academy
> almost wholly composed of graduates of the Academy. Its most important work
> as a corps has been of a civil nature, connected with the river and harbor improve-
> ments and public works.
>   (Centennial of the United States Military Academy 1902, 486)

An examination of the West Point curriculum from 1899 to 1903 is valid because it

details MacArthur's educational preparation as a public administrator. It also provides a basis for

understanding his attempts to modify the same, essentially unchanged, curriculum sixteen years

later as the Superintendent of West Point. Appendix A depicts the course of study at West Point

while MacArthur was a cadet from June 1899 through June 1903. During this period the

curriculum was essentially static. The only changes that occurred were the replacement or

updating of a few text books or pamphlets. (Official Register(s) of Officers and Cadets of the

U.S. Military Academy: 1899, 30-32; 1900, 30-32; 1901, 31-32; 1902, 31-32; 1903, 31-32;

Centennial of United States Military Academy 1902, 223-467) West Point began its existence as

a military engineering school, but by the Civil War it was a military college that furnished most

of the regular officers for the Army. Although the primary mission of the Academy had evolved

into a cadet training school for the Army as a whole, conservatism and tradition were hallmarks

of the Academy and the academic curriculum remained heavily focused on engineering. (Forman

1950,134-135, 139; Ambrose 1966, XIV) *The Centennial of the United States Military Academy

at West Point*, published as part of the centennial celebration at West Point in 1902, the year

before MacArthur graduated, best summarizes the view of the West Point's administration

concerning the Academy's mission and importance when it stated:

> Before 1840, the Military Academy at West Point was almost exclusively the only
> source of formal academic instruction in engineering in the United States. Up to
> 1840- even up to 1850- nearly all the civil engineers had received their prepa-
> ration in this military school. From its establishment, in 1802, up to 1862 it
> prepared about 2000 students. Of these, 200 became civil engineers and about 230
> entered the military Engineer Corps. Among the former number are the most
> renowned civil engineers of the country.
>
> (Centennial 1902, 289)

A cursory review of Appendix A will leave an impression that a significant portion of

the curriculum consisted of applied military instruction of a non-academic nature. Such courses

as drill regulations, tactics, practical military engineering, and ordnance/gunnery, not found in

normal civil engineering or administration curricula, did not displace, but complemented, the

basic civil engineering curriculum. A significant portion of the drill regulations, tactics and

practical military engineering instruction occurred outside normal academic hours or terms. The

normal academic year comprised two terms, one extending from the beginning of September to

the end of December, and the second from the beginning of January to the first week of June.

During the academic terms, classes were in session five and a half to six days a week. There

were two academic periods in the morning that lasted from 8:00 a.m. to 12:15 p.m., and one

afternoon academic period that extended from 1:50 p.m. to 3:50 p.m.. An additional non-

academic period for military exercises/activities or supervised athletics occurred from 4:05 p.m.

to 5:40 p.m. (Annual Reports of the Superintendent USMA for 1899, 1900, 1901, and 1902,

1903; James 1970, 71-78) Individual daily class schedules might vary, but each cadet in a given

academic year took the same courses each academic term. Academic classes were conducted

using a rigidly uniform recitation and daily front board presentation system. (Centennial of the United States Military Academy 1902, 241-424; James 1970, 71-78; Forman 1950, 140) Summer camp, conducted from the second week of June through the third week of August, was an applied training period and was not a formal academic session. Most of the tactics courses, and the application exercises of the practical military engineering and ordnance/gunnery courses occurred at this time. Because fourth (first year), and third (second year) classes received few, if any, furloughs, the use of the summer camp period for applied exercises in these subjects did not significantly detract from the regular academic terms.

Theoretical aspects of the practical military engineering and the ordnance/gunnery classes, while specifically applying to military practice, were applicable to the practice of civil engineering. Civil engineering practices, such as levee, dike, dam, and tunnel construction, and the use of explosives, do not significantly differ from military engineering practices, such as bridging, fortification construction or breaching, and military demolition uses. The inclusion of the subjects taught in the practical military engineering and ordnance/ gunnery classes were not detriments to the core civil engineering curriculum at West Point. They were valuable periods of instruction in the application of engineering theory. They were periods of engineering practical application that engineering students in civilian schools did not receive. (Register(s) of Officers and Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy 1899; 1900; 1901; 1902; 1903; Forman 1950, 157-161)

Similar to the situation concerning the practical military engineering and ordnance and gunnery courses, a simple review of courses could lead to a conclusion that the drill regulations and tactics courses had little or no academic value. Most of the drill regulations and tactics

instruction focused directly on military operations and had little relevancy to the Academy's core

civil engineering curriculum. While not relevant to civil engineering, some lectures and classes

taught by the Tactics Department had direct relevancy to public administration practice. Besides

instruction concerning the organization and employment of companies, battalions, batteries,

troops and squadrons, these classes covered the internal administration of these units. The

curriculum also included lectures on records, reports, returns, property accountability and

control, and fiscal accountability. (Centennial of the United States Military Academy 1902, 385)

Although instruction in the subjects of personnel and logistics administration occurred in courses

with descriptions suggesting tactical unit employment, these subjects received adequate

attention. There was no instruction in theoretical approaches to personnel administration, but

courses dealing with the tactical handling of troops included coverage of general leadership

theory. (Centennial of the United States Military Academy 1902, 374-414) The Army General

Staff did not exist until MacArthur's last year at West Point, but the concepts of staff and line

functions, and staff functional responsibilities at the unit operational level received extensive

coverage. Instruction in such management theories as span of control and functional specializa-

tion also occurred in the curriculum presented by the Department of Tactics. These management

and administration practices had their basis in historical experience and contemporary practice

rather than on academic theoretical perspectives but this does not detract from their applicability

to MacArthur's professional education as a Public Administrator. Gulick proposed POSDCORB

as tenets of organization theory in the 1930s, but MacArthur had internalized these concepts in

his military and academic studies at West Point from 1899 to 1903. (Gulick and Urwick 1937)

While he did not have the benefit of exposure to academic theory, he had an understanding of the

application of many facets of public administration, management, and organizational theories.
He understood the concepts of division of work, span of control, executive functions, aggrega-
tion of work units, organization by vertical and horizontal process, systems of departmentaliza-
tion, and the limits and process of coordination. Gulick's "Notes on the Theory of Administra-
tion" would not appear until 1937, but the elements of Gulick's article were elements of Cadet
MacArthur's drill regulations and tactics instruction. (Gulick and Urwick 1937, 1-45) Fortunately
West Point, like most military institutions, based its instruction on the dominant military system
of the day, the Imperial German General Staff. (Forman 1950, 139) Because of West Point's
acceptance of Imperial German military theory and practices, MacArthur's West Point training
had exposed him to outdated pedagogical practices, but it also exposed him to the practice of the
latest organizational theories.

<div align="center">Ad Interim: West Point to West Point</div>

<u>A Company Grade Engineer Officer</u>

The sixteen years from June 1903, when he graduated from West Point, to June 1919,
when he assumed the Superintendency of West Point, were only a period of entry level praxis for
MacArthur, the public administrator. This was also a period of widely differing appreciations of
his performance of duties, and of a meteoric rise within the Army. While not central to this
dissertation, a review of MacArthur's assignments and performance of duties during the 1903 to
1919 period is valid because certain traits of his personality and leadership emerge that became
constants throughout his later career.

Following his graduation from West Point on June 11, 1903, MacArthur, a Second
Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers, spent two months of post graduation furlough in San
Francisco, where his father commanded the Division of the Pacific. As a member of the Third
Engineer Battalion, he deployed to the Philippines in September of 1903. His initial assignment
involved civil engineering duties in the Visayas, southern Philippines. His later assignment was
in the position of battalion disbursing officer in Manila from March 1904. He assumed the grade
of First Lieutenant in April of 1904 and, after contracting malaria, returned early to the United
States in October of 1904. Upon his return to the United States, he assumed an administrative
assignment at the District Engineer's Office in San Francisco from November 1904 to May 1905.
(See James 1970, chapter IV for chronology from 1903 to 1912) From May of 1905 to July
1905, MacArthur served with the California Debris Commission, a federal agency regulating
hydraulic mining. In July of 1905 he assumed the position of Acting Chief Engineer of the
Division of the Pacific.

From March 1905, Major General Arthur MacArthur, Douglas' father, was absent from
his command as an observer during the final stages of the Russo-Japanese War. His father then
served in a temporary assignment as a Military Attache to the American legation in Tokyo
during the Portsmouth Peace Conference, which negotiated an end to the war. (James 1970, 41)
His mother had joined his father shortly after the General's arrival in Tokyo. After only two
months as the acting Chief Engineer of his father's former command, the Division of the Pacific,
he became his father's aide for a grand reconnaissance of Asia. His mother would also accom-
pany her husband and son. The young Lieutenant joined his parents in Tokyo on 29 October
1905 and the MacArthurs began their eight-month tour. From October 1905 through June 1906,

when they returned to Tokyo, they visited various military and diplomatic facilities located in

Japan, Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Malaya, Java, Burma, India, southern China, Siam, and

French Indo-China. Following three weeks in Japan, they returned to San Francisco in August of

1906. Douglas spent another five weeks with his parents in San Francisco awaiting further

assignment. From October 1905 until October 1906, his sole military duties were as his father's

aide for the Asian tour. As a junior First Lieutenant, he had met the most influential foreign

military, diplomatic, and political leaders, including heads of state, on a close social basis. He, as

his father's aide, enjoyed special treatment and access to facilities and information normally only

extended to visiting royalty or high government officials. During this period his father attained

the grade of lieutenant general. As a lieutenant general, MacArthur's father was the highest

ranking officer in the Army, but not the Chief of Staff of the Army, the senior Army assignment.

(James 1970, 41-42, 110-111; Matloff 1969, 348-349) At this stage in their careers Lieutenant

MacArthur's West Point classmates were still on their initial operational unit assignments. Few

of them probably had direct and close access to majors or colonels, let alone generals, diplomats,

and heads of state.

In September 1906, MacArthur reported to the Engineer School of Application at Willets

Point, now Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. for the 1906-1907 academic year. He was one of

eleven students in the class taught by three faculty members. His assignment to this school was

"highly prized by ambitious junior officers" and occurred at least a year ahead of his peers.

(James 1970, 95) The Engineer School of Application was the equivalent of the Infantry and

Cavalry professional courses taught at Fort Leavenworth for those officers in the combat arms

branches. (James 1970, 95.) The curriculum at the school focused on advanced civil and electri-

cal engineering practices. While at the school, he had two significant additional duties. The first duty was nondiscretionary and involved administration of the engineer equipment depot of the Second Engineer Battalion also at Willets Point. The second additional duty was more discretionary. It involved being a social aide at the White House after normal duty hours. (James 1970, 96) Despite attending the 1907 summer session, MacArthur did not complete all the school's requirements upon his next assignment. In August 1907 he reported to the District Engineers Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He finally graduated *in absentia* on 28 February 1908 after completing the course requirements while stationed in Milwaukee.

MacArthur's duties in Milwaukee involved harbor and port improvements at Manitowoc, Two Rivers, and Sheboygan Wisconsin. Work on these construction projects occurred during the Fall, Spring, and Summer months when outside engineering construction was possible. The District Engineer gave his assistant primary responsibility for the project in Manitowoc from 23 November until the week before Christmas 1907 when weather forced suspension of work. During the winter months he had administrative duties at the District Office in Milwaukee. His mother and father had been living in Milwaukee since early 1907. His father was still on active duty as the sole Lieutenant General but had been without an assignment following long running feuds with the Department of the Army, the General Staff, and the future President Taft. (James 1970, 40-44.) Lieutenant MacArthur lived at home with his parents. Following disagreements with the District Engineer over work assignments, he was able to suddenly transfer out of Milwaukee shortly after the construction season had begun in April 1908. (James 1907, 98-99)

From July 1908 until December 1912, MacArthur's duty post was Fort Leavenworth Kansas. From July 1908 until the Fall of 1909 he commanded a company in the Third Engineer

Battalion. This was his first command of troops. Following a very successful company command tour, he became the battalion's adjutant, i.e., administrative officer, and later served as a professor of military engineering for the various schools at the post. He became a well-regarded expert in demolitions and wrote several practical and doctrinal publications on the subject. While at Fort Leavenworth, he participated in the divisional size maneuvers conducted in Texas, instructed at Fort Riley, Kansas. He also conducted consultation and observation trips to the construction sites of the Panama Canal. His 1908-1912 Fort Leavenworth tour was profession-ally very successful and it allowed him to establish a good reputation with many of his contem-poraries and seniors. (James 1970, 101-109) He pinned on his Captain's bars in February 1911. The one negative note for the 1908-1912 period was the death of his father in September 1912. The elder MacArthur had retired from the Army, shortly after President Taft's inauguration in June of 1909, a bitter man, the senior general in the Army, but without assignment since 1907. (James 1970, 41-42)

Washington, D.C. 1912-1917: A Springboard to Greatness

From December 1912 until August 1917 MacArthur served in Washington, D.C. This was a critical period in his career. He arrived as a junior Captain of Engineers, but departed as a Colonel of Infantry personally designated by the Secretary of War as the Chief of Staff of a division. No longer directly in the shadow of his father, he would reestablish contacts with and cultivate former subordinates of his father who were now generals in the Army or senior political appointees. He also would begin to establish a reputation outside the military in political and journalistic circles. The value of these military, political and journalistic contacts was not

immediately obvious. These contacts became important after MacArthur also established an impressive World War I combat record. The combination of his well-placed connections and wartime exploits would ensure his attainment of future high office.

When MacArthur reported to Washington in December 1912, he accepted an assignment as an assistant in the personal office of General Wood, the Chief of Staff. General Wood had served under MacArthur's father in the Campaign for Manila during the Spanish-American War. MacArthur would not secure an assignment to the General Staff until April 1913. This period, between December 1912 and April 1913, gave him, acting as General Wood's personal assistant, a valuable opportunity to understand the politics surrounding the General Staff and the Office of the Chief of Staff.

MacArthur joined General Wood's Staff at a critical time. The General had just won a bitter and drawn out battle with Adjutant General Ainsworth. Wood's victory over Ainsworth in February 1912 marked the beginning of the ascendancy of the Chief of Staff over the previously autonomous bureau chiefs. Before Root's reforms of 1903, the bureaus had operated directly under the Secretary of War and enjoyed strong power bases in the Congress. From the 1903 reforms until 1913, the bureau chiefs had successfully used their congressional allies to retain their independence from the Chief of Staff. Even after Wood's victory over Ainsworth the bureaus continued to control many Army functions without effective oversight by the Chief of Staff. It would take General Peyton March's general orders of 1917 and the Overman Act of May 1918 to formalize Wood's victory. The contest between the Chief of Staff and the bureau chiefs ended when General John Pershing assumed the office of Chief of Staff in 1921. Pershing firmly established the supremacy of his office over the entire Army. (Matloff 1969, 348-349, 379, 410)

MacArthur arrived at the Chief of Staff's Office after Wood's bitter victory and was thus personally untainted by the acrimonious feuds between the General Staff and the bureaus. What is more important, he arrived on the winning side. At the time he joined the Chief of Staff's Office, Taft was still President. Because of the feud that had existed between Taft and his father, his assignment to the Chief of Staff's Office, rather than the Office of the Secretary of War, was fortunate. The young Captain's position organizationally insulated him from direct contact with his father's former enemies.

During the short period that MacArthur served as one of the Chief of Staff's four personal assistants, he impressed General Wood who wrote him a personal commendation upon his transfer out of the office in April 1913. His primary accomplishment had been conducting a study and drafting a report concerning land rights disputed by the Panama Canal Company and the Republic of Panama. (James 1970, 112-113) From April to September of 1913 he served in a temporary assignment as the superintendent of the State, War, and Navy Building. On September 25, 1913 he accepted an appointment to the General Staff after a billet became available. Until World War II, the size of the General Staff was the subject of close monitoring and control. Assignment to the General Staff required the vacancy of a strictly controlled billet. James suggests that his assignment as a building superintendent was General Wood's way of keeping him available for assignment to the General Staff. (James 1970, 113) Upon assignment to the General Staff, MacArthur served in its mobile army division. This division had the responsibility for investigating and reporting "upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military operations." (James 1970, 114) He remained assigned to the General Staff until the Spring of 1916. He accomplished various and sundry staff duties that included the

drafting of national defense legislation and a study concerning motor transportation within the Army. From May 1 to August 20, 1916, MacArthur took part in the Vera Cruz Expedition. He initially participated as the personal representative of General Wood, the Chief of Staff and designated expeditionary force commander in case of war. Following this assignment he served as an engineer officer attached to General Funston's headquarters that controlled the operations at Vera Cruz. The most significant event of the Vera Cruz assignment, for MacArthur, was a controversy arising out of a personal reconnaissance he had conducted behind Mexican lines the during night of May 6-7. Through a convoluted process he received a recommendation for the Medal of Honor. After General Staff, Adjutant General, and Secretary of War reviews, the recommendation was denied without any award recognition being made. (James 1970, 117-127; MacArthur 1964, 40-43)

In December of 1915 MacArthur assumed the grade of Major. During the Spring of 1916, he transferred from the General Staff to the Secretary of War Staff. Here he became the military assistant in charge of the recently created bureau of information. This assignment effectively made him the Army's first public relations officer. (James 1970, 131) His position equated to functioning as a press censor. The uniqueness of this new position allowed him latitude in defining the scope and specific responsibilities of his duties. The Mexican Border/Pancho Villa Crises of 1916, and the Wilson Administration's shift toward defense preparedness during the Winter of 1915-1916 made MacArthur's dealings and relationships with the press a high profile assignment. His responsibilities for public relations involved him in the development of positions for, and review of, public defense policy. This involvement in policy and access to

policy makers, was unique for an officer of his rank and ran counter to the apolitical professional military officer stereotype then in vogue.

This assignment as the head of the War Department's bureau of information marked the beginning of MacArthur's accelerated rise in rank and status in comparison to his contemporaries and immediate seniors. After the declaration of war with Germany he became involved in recommending policy for the proposed wartime employment of the National Guard. During a meeting in August 1917, MacArthur provided Secretary of War Baker with a politically oriented solution for the formation of the first National Guard units for deployment to Europe. He suggested forming a division from units spread across multiple states rather than the politically sensitive option of initially employing a division formed on a single state's troops. His statement in support of his argument, that the division "will stretch over the whole country like a rainbow," was the genesis of the unit's name. The 42nd Infantry Division, composed of National Guard units from across the nation became the "Rainbow" Division. Its shoulder patch was a quarter circle arc of a rainbow. The briefing on the formation of a composite National Guard division also resulted in Secretary Baker appointing MacArthur a Colonel. He not only skipped over the grade of Lieutenant Colonel but, by his own request, his appointment to Colonel was in the Infantry Branch rather than in the Corps of Engineers where he had served since his commissioning. He also requested assignment as the new division's Chief of Staff. (James 1970, 133-135; MacArthur 1964, 45-46)

<u>World War I</u>

MacArthur Establishes Himself

MacArthur's exploits and experiences in World War I have no direct impact on his subsequent performance in assignments as a public administrator, but they insured that he would attain positions of senior leadership in the Army. His World War I assignments also provided him with his first opportunity to train, manage, and lead large numbers of personnel. Prior to World War I, his sole command experience had been of an engineer company of approximately one hundred troops at Fort Leavenworth. He had held this command for just over a year in 1908 and 1909. Although he had managed engineering projects in the Philippines during 1903 and 1904, in California for four months in 1905, and in Wisconsin during 1907, he had done so under the command of others and had not managed or led on his own. As a staff officer, he had pre-pared studies and reports that others had reviewed and approved. World War I would provide MacArthur with his first opportunities to manage and command large numbers of troops. His personal leadership style emerged during World War I, and his performance of duties insured his future rise to the highest offices of military and public administration.

The 42nd "Rainbow" Infantry Division

MacArthur's World War I experiences were totally involved with the creation, training, deployment, employment, and redeployment of the 42nd "Rainbow" Infantry Division. He had helped name the division. His recommendations on how the division should form resulted in his spot promotion to Colonel and his assignment as its Chief of Staff. The 42nd "Rainbow" Division's size and organization are important factors in understanding the complexity and

challenges involved in the division's formation. The division was a large and complex organization. The division headquarters, under a Major General, with a Colonel Chief of Staff, exercised control over two infantry brigades and one artillery brigade, each commanded by a Brigadier General. Each infantry brigade had two subordinate regiments while the artillery brigade had three regiments. Also under the division was a regiment of engineers, three machine gun battalions, and battalions or companies of supply, motor transport, chemical, and medical troops. An American infantry division had a total strength of from twenty-six to twenty-eight thousand troops. A U.S. Army infantry division was almost twice as large as allied or German divisions.

Upon the declaration of war in 1917 there were no infantry divisions organized along wartime tables of organization. Sixty-two divisions formed during World War I, and forty-three deployed to Europe before the armistice. (James 1970, 139-142; Matloff 1969, 375) The organization, training, and deployment of so many divisions were daunting feats for the Army. When the size and complexity of the divisions are considered, the feat becomes an amazing tribute to the planning and management capabilities of the military's administrators.

The 42nd Infantry Division was one of the first four assembled and formed by the end of 1917. In the case of the 42nd "Rainbow" Division, the troops and subordinate units were drawn from the National Guards of twenty-six states. The other three divisions were of a more homogeneous nature. The first comprised all regular Army units. Equal numbers of regular Army and Marine units comprised the second division, while the third had all New England National Guard units. The New England National Guard units had served in the same brigades, divisions, and corps since as far back as the Civil War. The regular units, both Marine and Army,

had strong unit identities and shared traditions. (Matloff 1969, 381) All four of the divisions formed by the end of 1917 faced daunting tasks of assembling troops, supplies, and equipment for formations that were significantly different from what had previously existed in the Army. These initial four divisions accomplished their formation and training under constraints of available facilities, supplies, and equipment. Because the 42nd Division originated from a much more disparate and diverse base of units that were more geographically dispersed, its creation involved additional challenges that the other three divisions did not face. The more homogeneous nature of the other three divisions gave them common backgrounds and traditions upon which to build a divisional identity and teamwork. The 42nd Division had no common traditions and teamwork. The 42nd Division had to forge a divisional identity from scratch, and simultaneously develop teamwork at all organizational levels.

MacArthur, as the Chief of Staff had primary responsibility for coordinating the organization of the division headquarters and the administrative and logistical support of its subordinate units. He was personally responsible for the direction of the thirty-three officers that made up the division staff. (MacArthur 1964, 53) Through the primary staff officers, who dealt with specific functional areas or operations, MacArthur could directly influence the logistical and operational support of the subordinate brigades and separate combat support and service units. Resolution of competing requirements and conflicts between various division staff elements and subordinate units was a constant and primary responsibility for the young Chief of Staff.

Not only did he have a Herculean task, but he had one that emerged and evolved as it occurred. A World War I infantry division had a larger and significantly different organizational

base from those previously fielded by the Army. Recent advances in science and technology had dramatically changed the type and quantities of the division's organic equipment. The newness and uniqueness of some equipment, light machine guns for example, meant that most of the troops had never previously handled or even seen the equipment that they would use in combat. Compounding the problem of training on new equipment was the challenge of training troops for a type of combat in which the Army had no experience. Gas warfare, trench warfare involving quick firing artillery and machine guns, and mechanization of some functions involved radical training and doctrinal reorientations for even the veteran regular soldiers. Integration and training on new equipment, and introduction to new forms of warfare added to the already difficult task of forming a divisional size unit. MacArthur had little or no established basis to work upon, and the disparate nature of his division made his task not only all the harder, but much more complex.

The 42nd "Rainbow" Division assembled at Camp Mills near Garden City Long Island, New York between mid-August and mid-September 1917. It began its deployment to Europe on 19 October, and had all arrived in France by 1 November 1917. From 7 November 1917 to 13 February 1918 the division was in training behind the front lines. This training was a require-ment because of the short time between the division's formation and deployment to Europe. It was also essential because nearly all of the division's artillery pieces, crew served weapons, and heavy equipment were of French or British manufacture. (Matloff 1969, 373-376; James 1970, 153)[1] Training in Europe also allowed the division to train with French veterans of trench warfare. Considering the abysmal record that the Army had established in forming division sized forces for the Spanish-American War, the maneuver division exercises in Texas, and, to a lesser

extent, the Mexican Border Incident of 1916, the forming and deployments of the early American Expeditionary Force (AEF) divisions went extremely well. The existence of a functional general staff, a uniform staff system within the Army, and specific lessons learned from the previously cited experiences all played a part in the exceptional ability of the Army to deploy twenty-nine divisions to the AEF, and over forty overseas, in less than a year and a half.

MacArthur's experience with the maneuver division in Texas had to be a significant factor in his success in coordinating the formation and deployment of the 42nd "Rainbow" Division in 1917. The maneuver division exercises in Texas during his 1908-1912 Fort Leavenworth tour was his only exposure to operations above the battalion level and stood him in good stead when he assisted in the formation of the 42nd Division.

Another important aspect, sometimes overlooked, is that the requirement to acquire and train on foreign equipment gave the newly formed AEF divisions some breathing room to iron out supply, manning, and other deficiencies while training in Europe. The requirement to train on foreign equipment also gave General Pershing a valid reason to avoid immediately committing individuals and small units into combat as fillers for the allied divisions. Pershing viewed national interests and allied victory as better served by commitment of large fresh American formations, e.g., divisions, corps and field armies. The French and British pressed for immediate piecemeal commitment of individuals and units of up to battalion and regimental size. The newly formed brigades and divisions that fought in the Spanish American War, and during the Mexican Border Incident had no such luxury of dedicated training time in which to meet their inadequacies.

The Nature and Environment of MacArthur's Duties

Probably the most important result of the pre-combat training period was the chance to perfect teamwork within the division. Teamwork is normally considered a result of training; but, like leadership, it has an intangible quality that takes time and experience to develop. This discussion of teamwork is not extraneous to the objectives of this dissertation. MacArthur, as the division Chief of Staff, had the primary responsibility, with the G-3 Operations Officer, to ensure that not only would the division meet its individual and unit training standards, but that the division staff and subordinate units could cooperate and work well with each other. His ability to coordinate division staff functions, resolve conflicting requirements, and effectively transmit the Division Commander's decisions into meaningful orders to subordinate units was critical to the division's combat effectiveness. MacArthur, as a colonel, was also responsible for monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of the three subordinate brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals. This was a particularly sensitive function because he was an extremely junior Colonel. Normal practice is, and was, for a division chief of staff to have seniority, or earlier date of rank over most, if not all, the other colonels in the division. Usually the chief of staff is a contempo- rary of the brigade commanders or even the division commander. His duties and responsibilities were not only many, varied, and complicated, but he accomplished them under pressing time constraints with sensitive political and personal considerations. MacArthur's critical responsibili- ties of forming an efficient division staff, and insuring that there was coordination between the staff and subordinate units, depended on his leadership abilities to develop and maintain teamwork and morale. It is a tenet of military leadership theories that the commanding officer is ultimately and personally responsible for all that does and does not happen within a unit. It is

also reality that it is the chief of staff who takes care of the myriad details, and furnishes information and recommendations to the commander, thus freeing the latter to concentrate on major mission decisions. The commander might be the brain of the unit organism, but it is the chief of staff that is the unit's brain stem and spinal column. It is the chief of staff who transmits the brain's orders to the organism and retransmits the organism's responses back to the brain.

MacArthur's division commander, until the division entered the front lines during February 1918, was Major General William A. Mann. Mann was a competent officer, but he was also approaching mandatory retirement age, and was not as physically capable as his thirty-eight year old chief of staff. General Mann's replacement was Major General Charles T. Menoher. Younger than Major General Mann, Menoher, in his late fifties, had graduated with General Pershing from West Point in 1886. Menoher, in common with most senior officers, believed that exercising command from an established command post was the most effective leadership approach for trench warfare. The combination of a large difference in age and leadership style between him and General Menoher had a direct influence on MacArthur's performance as the Chief of Staff. These factors gave him additional responsibilities, when it came to on-the-scenes coordination and supervision of activities. It also gave him the opportunity and freedom to move around the division area. If Mann and Menoher had been younger, physically active officers, or if they had leadership styles entailing personal observation from the front, their chief of staff would have had to manage from the rear. This statement does not in any way suggest that Mann or Menoher did not, or could not, carry out their command responsibilities. It only means that, because of the age, physical capabilities, and leadership style differences between MacArthur

and his division commanders, he was able to develop a lead-from-the-front, do-by-example

leadership style without being put into competition or conflict with his division commanders.

To The Front

MacArthur's introduction to combat on the Western Front came on March 19, 1918. He

accompanied French troops on a trench raid that he was only supposed to observe. The 42nd

Division did not enter the line until February 16, 1918 when it occupied a quiet sector of the line

near Luneville. Normal practice was to introduce new units into quiet sectors. By the end of

March, the 42nd Division would see significant defensive combat near Bacarrat. There were 268

days between February 16, 1918, when the 42nd Division entered the line and November 11,

1918 when the Armistice took effect. During this time, the 42nd Division participated in combat

for 162 days, the third highest total for the twenty-nine divisions assigned to the American

Expeditionary Force (AEF). It also suffered the third highest number of casualties, and advanced

the third longest distance of the AEF divisions. German intelligence reports rated the 42nd

Division as one of the three or four American divisions on a par with elite French and British

shock divisions. (James 1970, 238)

From February to November 1918, the period during which the 42nd Division partici-

pated in combat, MacArthur compiled an impressive combat record and received an unusually

large number of personal decorations. He received no less than seven Silver Stars, the third

highest award for valor; two Distinguished Service Crosses, the second highest award for valor;

and a Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award for meritorious service. He also twice

received the French Croix de Guerre. James and MacArthur also state that he (MacArthur) twice

received the Purple Heart for wounds received in combat, i.e., he suffered light gas attacks.

Because the Purple Heart, discontinued after the Revolutionary War, did not reappear until 1932,

and would not be awarded for wounds received in combat until World War II, he would have

worn two Wound Chevrons. (James 1970, 160, 239; MacArthur 1964, 50-71; Werlich 1974, 5, 8,

15) [2] He again received a recommendation for a Congressional Medal of Honor. This time he

received a Distinguished Service Cross instead. (MacArthur 1964, 67)

MacArthur's performance of duties led to his promotion to temporary Brigadier General

and command of the 84th Brigade of the 42nd Division in June of 1918, and to temporary

command of the 42nd Division, with a recommendation for promotion to Major General during

the closing days of combat in November of 1918. His command of the division was only from 11

to 22 November. The division did not participate in combat while he was its commander. He

reverted to command of the 84th Brigade, but was fortunate in that his unit remained in Europe -

until April 1919. His brigade performed occupation duties in the Artweiler District of Germany

near Remagen, the site of the famous World War II bridgehead. Assignment to occupation duties

was fortunate for MacArthur because he continued to fill a Brigadier General's command billet at

a time when the rest of the Army was demobilizing. Those officers with wartime promotions

were reverting to their prewar ranks in a rapidly shrinking Army. George Marshall, who was a

Captain before the war, had risen to Colonel but reverted to Captain in 1919. He would not be a

Colonel again until 1933. (Reference Guide to United States Military History 1919-1945, 189)

Eisenhower rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel but reverted to Captain, his prewar rank, not

to regain his previous rank until the late 1930s. (ibid., 165) Colonel George Patton reverted to

the grade of major. If MacArthur had followed the norm he would have reverted to Major, the

rank he held in 1917. (James 1970, 242) The net effect of occupation duty was that he retained a rank that his contemporaries would not attain until the late 1930s or even 1941. He had gained a fifteen to twenty year advantage on his contemporaries, and would be five or more years senior to those who had been his immediate seniors (i.e., senior Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels) before World War I. (James 1970, 263-264) MacArthur emerged from World War I as a hero, a Brigadier General, and an officer clearly destined for higher responsibilities.

MacArthur the Leader, Administrator Up To 1919

By the time MacArthur had assumed the superintendency of West Point in 1919, he had already established personal traits, a leadership style, an approach to assignments, and management habits that would become standard characteristics identified with him throughout his public career. One factor that would become a consistent aspect of MacArthur's personality and behavior was that his personal traits would not be average. They magnified themselves to the point of becoming extremes. MacArthur, both as general and public administrator, would not be a study of grey, or gently muted colors. He would become a study in black and white, a multi faceted study, a complex study, but always in black and white. The only thing grey in MacArthur's career would be the color of his cadet uniform at West Point.

MacArthur's career, up to 1919, had occurred totally within the Army and involved purely military duties. His duties as military press censor, immediately before World War I, while newly created, dealt with military matters. His exposure to and practice of public administration was purely that of military administration. He had participated in policy development and implementation as the press censor and when he participated in the mobilization of the National

Guard. He had organized, managed, and led large complex organizations. He had administered

government services as the occupation commander of the Artweiller District. In all these roles he

served as a military officer, operating within a military command structure, and performing

duties normally associated with the military. The only facets of his service that set MacArthur

apart from other military administrators were his early access to senior political leaders and

accelerated rise to general officer grade.

Personal Traits

Even in the initial stages of MacArthur's career he had developed certain personality

traits that would continue throughout his career. Perhaps the dominant trait he had acquired was

"an almost mystical bond of unity with the his family heritage and a burning desire to carry on

and surpass the achievements of his predecessors." (James 1970, 47) James, Schaller, and Petillo,

repeatedly stress the influence of his family on his actions and attitudes. (James 1970; Schaller

1989; Petillo 1981) MacArthur himself stresses his family heritage. He devotes the first twenty-

five pages of his autobiography, *Reminiscences*, to his family history. Indeed, he dwells on a

review of the history and traditions of the MacArthur branch of Scotland's Campbell Clan for the

first page and a half of his autobiography. He relates his childhood as a function of his father's

career. There are constant references to his father, until his death in 1912, and to his mother,

until her death in 1935. Not only did he accompany his parents during his father's tour of Asia,

but he lived with them while he served in the District Engineer's Office in Milwaukee. His

mother had rented a room just outside the Military Academy while he was a cadet. She lived

with him for the last few months of his Leavenworth tour in 1912, and during his assignment to

Washington, D.C. from late 1912 to 1917. The strength and depth of MacArthur's close family ties do not just rest with the fact that he spent an unusual amount of his adult life living with his parents. The importance of his family heritage was that it instilled in him a sense of uniqueness, of divine selection, which is normally associated with a member of royalty or an established aristocracy. James states:

> Just as his father became an aristocrat of the bench, General (Arthur) MacArthur became an aristocrat of the military elite- always dignified, usually formal, and never guilty of the common officers' vices . . . (James 1970, 43-44)

From his father's, grandfather's, and surviving brother's examples, and with his mother's constant and strong influence, he internalized a heritage based on both myth and reality. (James 1970, 47) His sense of inbred superiority and heritage manifested itself in a sense of honor and right to prerogatives that had both positive and negative effects on his career.

Positively, MacArthur's sense of heritage provided him with an extraordinary desire to succeed and provided him with self motivation in times of adversity. He always appeared self confident and he would always be an optimist concerning his own ability to lead or succeed. This self-confidence allowed him to act and be effective where others would hesitate. It gave him an advantage when dealing with others, especially his peers and seniors. All officers normally develop self-confidence with maturity and experience. Senior officers are usually self-confident. His self-confidence and belief in his ability to succeed had been present since he was a cadet. Although not specifically mentioned by his biographers, MacArthur's optimism and self-confidence probably made him a standout from his peers when viewed by senior officers. Perhaps it also explains his ability, as a very junior Colonel, to deal with Brigadier Generals and senior Colonels while he was the 42nd Division's Chief of Staff.

While MacArthur's senses of self-confidence and family heritage were great advantages they also had negative effects. His sense of heritage led him to develop a very rigid sense of honor. Often his sense of honor manifested itself as an acute sensitivity to criticism or to situations he felt sullied his honor or reputation. His senses of heritage and honor appeared to many as thin skinned vanity.

As a cadet, MacArthur had a serious confrontation with one of his professors, Colonel Edgerton, over a requirement to take a mathematics exam. MacArthur's sense of honor in this incident had manifested itself as a self righteous intransigence and an assumed right to special treatment. This incident could have potentially resulted in his premature departure from West Point. James states that this incident was: "the first known manifestation of MacArthur's acute sensitivity when his pride or honor seemed at stake." (James 1970, 77)[3] While assigned to the California Debris Commission during the Summer and Fall of 1905, and later to the District Engineer's Office in Milwaukee during the Winter of 1907-1908, MacArthur struck both his commanding officers as a junior officer who insisted on special privileges or assignments, These commanding officers felt he could be somewhat recalcitrant in carrying out orders. MacArthur's zone of acceptance for orders allowed for his own sense of status and propriety at the expense of obedience to lawful orders. During both these periods, a reason MacArthur did not willingly accept duty away from San Francisco or Milwaukee was his stated requirement that he had to spend more time at home with his parent(s). (James 1970, 90-91, 98-99) In these incidents, he - clearly felt that the system should bend to him and not he to the system. For a junior officer, with only three to five years service, this is an amazing attitude unless his senses of heritage, identity,

and position are considered. He was not just another junior officer, he was a MacArthur, a military aristocrat, one who by heritage was destined for greater things!

After MacArthur's Vera Cruz reconnaissance patrol of 6-7 May 1914, he received a recommendation for the Medal of Honor from a friend to whom he had told the story of his exploits. Through a unique series of actions this recommendation reached the Chief of Staff's Office where a board of senior officers considered and rejected the award recommendation. Rejection of the award rested on grounds that included: a lack of required corroborating witnesses, that the act had been taken counter to the local commanding general's policies, and that the action was not of sufficient merit to rate the award of the Medal of Honor. While the board's recommendation was under review by the Judge Advocate General and the Adjutant General, MacArthur wrote a letter directly to General Hugh L. Scott, the new Chief of Staff. In his letter he wrote that he was "incensed" over the "rigid narrowmindedness and lack of imagination" of the officers making up the review board. James best summarizes this incident in stating:

> But it seems highly doubtful that anyone, except his most uncritical friends, could have viewed his response as anything short of presumptuous and arrogant. More important, a pattern of behavior was becoming increasingly evident in him which would brand him as a pleader for special consideration and a sensitive, self-righteous protestor against any infringements upon what he felt were his pre-rogatives.
>
> (James 1970, 126)

As astute as MacArthur was in recognizing and taking advantage of social and political factors, the rashness and inappropriateness of his memorandum to the Chief of Staff concerning his award could appear mystifying. It is unless his family history, heritage and beliefs are consid-ered. His father had petitioned for almost three decades before receiving his Medal of Honor.

MacArthur, brought up in his father's and brother's shadows, closely identified himself with their success and position. His mother had inculcated and constantly reinforced in him his inherited superiority and status. For MacArthur, his memorandum was not only an opportunity to insure that he received the justice that his status demanded. It was a personal requirement because he felt the review of his award recommendation questioned his honor. The facts that he conducted his reconnaissance without approval, counter to standing orders, without the knowledge of any responsible authority, against only unorganized resistance by irregular troops, and resulted in no usable or tangible benefits were not the issues. The issue was his honor and status as a member of a family of military aristocrats.

Another trait of MacArthur's personality, one that probably related to his sense of heritage, was his careful cultivation of those whom he perceived as potentially beneficial to his career. Many junior officers cultivate their seniors. For MacArthur, it was not simply the cultivation of seniors, but cultivation of only those whom he considered his social peers, or whom he perceived as having substantial influence. As the son of a senior officer, it is under-standable that he would have social access to very senior individuals. What is abnormal is that he allowed the cultivation of very senior individuals to interfere with his regular duties. While assigned to the Engineer School of Application, he essentially ignored his primary duties and chain of command in order to establish and maintain important social contacts. These contacts were with individuals to whom other officers of his grade and position would not have had access. He was a lieutenant who maintained a social life befitting his lieutenant general father. He threw himself into his additional duties as a social aide to the detriment of his studies and his

relationship with his immediate senior, the commandant of the school. In a report to the Chief of

Engineers Major Winslow, the school commandant stated:

> ...Lieutenant MacArthur seemed to take but little interest in his course at the
> School and the Character of the work done by him was generally not equal to that
> of most of the other student officers and barely exceeded the minimum which
> would have been permitted . . . throughout the time Lieutenant MacArthur was
> under my observation, he displayed, on the whole, but little professional zeal . . .
> (Major E.E. Winslow as quoted in James 1970, 96)

James points out that in *Reminiscences*, MacArthur devotes only one sentence to his tenure at the

Engineer School of Application but devotes four paragraphs to describing discussions with

President Theodore Roosevelt and Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon. (James 19170, 96-97;

MacArthur 1964, 32-33) Indeed, concerning President Roosevelt MacArthur stated: "He was

greatly interested in my views on the Far East and talked with me long and often." (MacArthur

1964, 33). At this time he was only a First Lieutenant, and a junior one at that. Later during the

Vera Cruz incident, he did not report the results of his reconnaissance patrol to the commander at

Vera Cruz, General Funston, the only commander who could have benefitted from the informa-

tion. Instead he communicated directly back to General Wood, the Army Chief of Staff and

potential expeditionary force commander designate. Military etiquette demands that he should

have advised the senior on-scene commander. This etiquette should have applied even though

MacArthur was on a fact finding mission for General Wood. It is not only that he communicated

with General Wood, it is the nature of the communication that reveals his political nature in

dealing with those whom he decided were important seniors. On May 7, 1914, the day he had

returned from his patrol, MacArthur wrote General Wood briefly reporting his patrol but closed

his report saying:

> General Funston is handling things well and there is room for little criticism, but I
> miss the inspiration, my dear General, of your own clear-cut, decisive methods. I
> hope sincerely that affairs will shape themselves so that you will shortly take the
> field for the campaign which, if death does not call you, can have but one ending -
> the White House.
>
> (As quoted in James 1970, 121)

MacArthur's attention to the Chief of Staff goes beyond deference to a senior officer. Through-out his career he rarely deferred to another peer, repeatedly did not defer to his immediate seniors, but usually deferred to those he thought had influence on his further advancement. He clearly, from his early career, established a zone of acceptance that he observed in dealing with his seniors. Unlike most military officers, MacArthur's zone of acceptance did not include all legal or senior authority.

Leadership Style

MacArthur's leadership style was consistent during the two periods in which he exercised command or primary staff officer responsibility up to 1919. When he commanded an engineer company at Fort Leavenworth, and later when he was the Chief of Staff and a brigade com-mander in the 42nd Infantry Division, he had a reputation for being energetic, motivated and effective. He also became known for leading-from-the-front rather than directing-from-the-rear. While assigned to the 42nd Infantry Division, he also became noted for affectations in dress and behavior that, in various manifestations, would become MacArthur hallmarks. Before the 42nd Infantry Division entered the line in February 1918, He had always maintained a sharp and correct appearance in uniform. During the division's commitment to the Luneville Sector, MacArthur began wearing his service cover without the reinforcing metal grommet thereby achieving the World War I equivalent of the famous World War II "bomber crush." He also

substituted the normal trench coat for a short, non-regulation coat, and began wearing a muffler

and colorful turtleneck sweater. While visiting the front lines he rarely carried weapons,

preferring a riding crop instead. He seldom wore a helmet or carried a gas mask. (James 1970,

156, 159) The only recorded instance of MacArthur wearing a helmet is in a picture of General

Pershing presenting him with a Distinguished Service Medal at an awards ceremony at Remagan

Germany in March 1919. Even in this picture Pershing and the other officers are in regulation

coats while MacArthur sports his short coat. The other two officers receiving awards wear

identical pistol belts and magazine pouches that he does not. The immediate result of his

eccentricities of dress was a collection of nicknames such as "The Dude" and "Beau Brummell of

the A.E.F." A more lasting effect was that MacArthur became easily recognized and his

numerous visits to the front lines helped establish a reputation that set him apart from all his

peers and most of his seniors.

MacArthur's reputation reached beyond eccentricities of dress. He personally visited the

front lines more often than most, if not all, the division chiefs of staff in the A.E.F. (James 1970,

156) As a brigade commander he commonly observed operations from a forward observation

post.[4] His methods were in contrast to the common World War I practice. Brigade commanders,

divisional commanders, and principal staff officers, on both sides, normally operated from

well-fortified bunkers. The location of these bunkers, well back from the front lines, avoided

their exposure to enemy artillery preparation and counter-battery fires. The nature of available

land line communications, and the desirability of maintaining command and control during

enemy artillery fires made command from remote and heavily fortified bunkers a common and

effective solution. It also made commanders dependent on reports from others and isolated them

from conditions at the front. The result was less flexibility and more rigidity of command. His practices reinforced his heroic warrior image, and made him a better informed and flexible commander. He sacrificed having the total picture of activities for a clearer picture of what he considered the critical point of operations. For MacArthur's methods to work, someone had to remain in charge of the main command post. While he was chief of staff, General Menoher usually was present in the command post and he could act as Menoher's eyes at the front. In contrast, because of his leadership style, MacArthur's brigade chief of staff or division staff officers had to remain in their division or brigade command posts.[5]

There were also several questionable or negative aspects to MacArthur's "heroic warrior" style of leadership.

Because of the lack of mobile field communications, World War I commanders were forced to rely on the use of either runners, who were slow and vulnerable, or wire land lines communication nets that tied the commander to their termini. His leadership style would frequently deny him communications with the entire command and limit his influence to the immediate area in which he was located. The other chiefs of staff and brigade or division commanders did not choose to command and coordinate from bunkers in the rear out of cowardice. They did so because the rearward bunkers provided them with the communications and survivability required to command effectively in the environment of trench warfare. By World War II, mobile radios would allow commanders to observe from positions that were well forward but retain command through radio communications with their command posts to the rear. This was not true with MacArthur. When he left his command post, or that of one of his subordinate units, he could influence the situation only in his immediate vicinity. His leadership

style, although dramatic and motivating to his subordinates, was more appropriate to that employed during the American Civil War.

A second drawback to MacArthur's leadership style was that he did not do things that he strictly required others to do. A "Do as I say, and not as I do" approach to leadership not only can appear hypocritical, but, by setting up double standards, can lead to confusion concerning what are standards, and to whom they apply. Enforcement of discipline and military justice in a system of double standards can be difficult and confusing. "Do as I say, and not as I do" is not normally considered an appropriate or desirable leadership style. MacArthur seldom wore a helmet or carried a gas mask, but he strictly required those under him to do so. He also frequently visited the front lines but forbade other staff members from doing the same. Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Drum, a member of General Pershing's general staff assigned to observe the 42nd Division during its initial commitment to combat, observed:

> While the office and technical work of the staff is excellent, there is little outside work; that is, the staff does not mingle nor work in person with troops in any great extent.
> (Drum to Assistant G-3, A.E.F., March 27, 1918 as quoted in James 1970, 161)

At the same time, James correctly observes that it was only because MacArthur had so well organized the division staff that he was able to remain away from the command post visiting the front lines and participating in trench raids. James very astutely titled his chapter on MacArthur's experiences during World War I *Emergence of the Hero Image*. This chapter heading not only describes the predominant feature of his performance in World War I, it also captures the essence of MacArthur's approach to leadership.

West Point 1919-1922

Political and Theoretical Environment

When MacArthur returned to the United States in late April 1919, he learned from the Chief of Staff of his pending assignment as the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point. He initially objected stating that he was not an educator, but accepted the appointment. He immediately threw himself into learning the situation at West Point by a detailed examination of the files and records available at the War Department and the General Staff. (James 1970, 263-4) The United States, the Army, West Point, and even the basic nature and practice of war had changed dramatically during World War I. Barely two years earlier he had been a major, now he was to return to his Alma Mater as a Brigadier General just sixteen years after he had graduated. The situation at West Point had drastically changed, and the nation and the Army were in a period of dramatic change, even upheaval. He would assume the superintendency of an institution in crisis. Neither politicians nor society recognized that the Army was in crisis. Even if they recognized the crisis, it would not have been a problem worthy of attention. The nation, which was attempting to demobilize from a wartime to a peacetime economy, also faced significant economic, social, and governmental problems. Preoccupation with these economic problems had direct negative effects on the Army and West Point.

The Nation and the Army

At the end of World War I, the war to end all wars, few Americans, in or out of government, thought that there was any serious or significant threat to national security. It wouldn't be until the late 1930s that many Americans realized that militarism in Japan, Germany, and Italy

posed a threat to the United States. Even military planners, while recognizing the potential

threats, dismissed the German and Italian dictatorships as primarily a European problem.

Stereotypes, buttressed by feelings of racial superiority, and the vastness of the Pacific Ocean,

diminished the threat posed by Japanese militarism. Military strategists devised plans based on

single regional threats, and did not envision a return to global coalition warfare. (Shrader 1991,

3; Millett and Maslowski 1984, 361-362) Of more ominous impact to the Army between the

World Wars was a primary reliance on a naval strategy for defense of the Philippines, Panama,

and the Continental United States. (Matloff 1969, 204; Shrader 1991, 5, 8, 24; Millett and

Maslowski 1984, 361-362) A concise statement of the national attitude toward the Army in

particular and national defense in general was:

> A small army in peacetime was considered adequate. In the event of war, there
> would almost certainly be enough warning time, thanks to broad oceans and weak
> neighbors, to allow for the mobilization of America's enormous industrial and
> demographic resources.
>
> (Shrader 1991, 24)

The nation initially rejoiced over the military victory with an outpouring of gratitude for

the military's efforts, but this soon disappeared in the rush to demobilize and a general revulsion

to the carnage and destruction of World War I. Latent feelings, always present within the

American society, of anti-militarism, isolationism, and pacifism soon replaced any pro military

feelings that had developed during the war. (Shrader 1991, 4; Dupuy 1969, 204; Millett and

Maslowski 1984, 361-363; James 1970, 261) Because the National Guard had not yet reorga-

nized following its wartime employment, the Army had to commit regular troops to suppress

numerous labor and race related civil disorders between 1919 and 1921. (Matloff 1969, 406;

James 1970, 260) This employment of regular troops in civil disorders exacerbated already

developing anti-military attitudes among elements of the society. "America was tired of parading

doughboys by the time MacArthur returned from Europe." (James 1970, 259)

The Nature of War

Military theorists consider the American Civil War as the first modern war, but civilians

and military alike did not realize the totality of this war's implications until World War I.

Technological improvements had made the rifle, breach loading artillery, reliable fused shells,

rapid fire weapons, the submarine, and even military aviation, all present during the Civil War,

significant and even dominant factors in modern war.[6] Military practitioners also appreciated the

significant impacts on modern warfare of other

Civil War innovations such as railroads, telegraphs, and mass industrial production. Not as well

understood were the implications that modern transportation and communications posed on

accepted time and distance factors. Time and distance factors, associated with the movement and

logistic support of large bodies of troops, had been significant limitations in the practice of war-

fare. The tank and airplane, which were World War I innovations, were understood in purely

tactical terms and were not employed according to any comprehensive or mature doctrinal basis.

That modern war could be total war, in which political and societal factors were as important as

traditional military factors, was possibly the major doctrinal development of the American Civil

War. Few politicians or professional soldiers completely understood the total nature of modern

war. Most military writers could quote Clauswitz, and understand the effect of Sherman's March

to the Sea. Few understood that the changing nature of warfare also entailed changes in the

nature of leadership and those who practiced the art and science of war. A small isolated elite

could no longer exercise effective leadership when the total nation and society were involved in war. Total war involved more than military operations; it involved the society and the government. The era of small, isolated, and professional armies had ended. Management of a war effort that entailed participation of the entire society required leaders who were more than just expert technicians of the implements of war. It required leaders who understood the political, industrial, and demographic factors that furnished the implements of modern warfare. Modern warfare required new paradigms for training leaders and the practice of military leadership. MacArthur was assuming the head of the nation's military college during a period of shifting military doctrinal paradigms. That many of his fellow military professionals did not realize that a shift had occurred, or that they were unprepared or unwilling to accept it, would be a significant factor in his superintendency of West Point.

West Point in Crisis

West Point: Another Emergency Officer Training School

When MacArthur and his mother arrived at West Point in mid-June 1919, crisis awaited them. Because of the actions of General March, the Army Chief of Staff, the once proud Military Academy had become just another Emergency Officer Training School. (Fleming 1969, 303) Citing wartime emergency requirements, General March had reduced West Point's four year program to one year. March's objective was to produce one thousand officers per year rather than the class of two-hundred officers that West Point graduated each June under a standard four year program. (James 1970, 262) Before World War I, and later during World War II, it was customary to graduate the First, or senior, Class early and compress the training of the other classes

upon declaration of war. March's actions went much farther than the customary norm. The Class of 1917 graduated in April 1917, two weeks after the declaration of war. This was only two months early and in keeping with custom. The Class of 1918 graduated in August 1917, which was ten months earlier than normal but still within customary bounds. The Class of 1919 graduated in June of 1918 a full year early. While not stipulated in law or regulation, the Class of 1919's early graduation approached the limit of what had been customary. Beyond previous customary early graduations, the Classes of 1920 and 1921 had been scheduled to graduate on 1 November 1918, one year eight months and two years eight months ahead of their normal graduating dates. A new plebe class of eight-hundred was scheduled to report in November 1918. The November 1918 Plebe Class and the Class of 1922, which had only reported during the Spring of 1918 were scheduled to graduate in June 1919, three years ahead of the normal schedule. (Fleming 1969, 303-304) The net effect of quadrupling or quintupling the class size while simultaneously reducing the course to 25 percent of its previous length was that, except for its location, the World War I West Point program was basically little different from the other Emergency Officer Training Schools. West Point's wartime emergency course was twelve months long. The Officer Training Schools' courses lasted two to three months but included additional branch specific specialized training. Both systems focused on applied knowledge and not theoretical or academic studies. In their quest to meet the national requirement to furnish officers for wartime service, General March and the General Staff had come very close to destroying West Point as a military academy. (Fleming 1969, 303)

West Point as a School of Higher Education

Before World War I, West Point had been a bastion of tradition, and had consistently resisted any change to what its inbred and isolated faculty considered the apex of entry level officer training. (Ambrose 1966, XIV; Forman 1950, 142, 163) From a position of leadership in scientific and engineering education before the Civil War, West Point, through self-imposed isolation and conservatism, had become:

> ...a small, forgotten narrowly professional college tucked away in a corner of New York State, paying no attention to the outside world and receiving none in return.
> (Ambrose 1966, XIV)

During World War I, West Point essentially lost its status as even a narrow professional college. Immediately upon cessation of hostilities, the Superintendent, General Tillman, a seventy-two year old chemistry professor for thirty-one years who had been recalled out of retirement for the war, and the faculty tried to turn back the clock. Their intention was to reestablish, in its exact form, the prewar four year program. The 1917 academic program had no provision for electives, and was almost totally devoid of courses in political science, economics, management or other liberal arts courses even found in other engineering colleges. The 1917 academic program, with minor changes and additions, was similar to the programs that dated from the 1870s and 1880s. A review of the departmental histories contained in *The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, 1802-1902* (223-438) shows only minor changes in course offerings or text books took place after the 1870s. Additions to the program, such as the study of electricity, normally appeared as supplements to exiting subjects. Departmental organizations and names occasionally changed, but these administrative actions resulted in no significant change to the overall academic program. A comparison of the academic program that existed

when MacArthur was a cadet, from 1899 to 1903, and the 1917 academic program shows no substantive changes. (Appendix A; Appendix C) Not only was the academic program excessively narrow and outdated, but it relied on obsolete and discredited instructional techniques. The "front board recitation" and "class section" methods of instruction used at West Point relied on rote memorization and rigid proportional grading. Junior officers, themselves recent West Point graduates with little or no teaching credentials or experience, conducted the bulk of instruction. These instructors presented only rigidly controlled lectures and conducted the daily grading of front board recitations. The system at West Point did not allow cadets to meaningfully discuss instruction or ask questions. The cadets had to master the lesson before coming to class. The only questions tolerated were those that clarified minor points. (Fleming 1969, 305; Ambrose 1966, 263; Forman 1950, 134-137, 142, 157-163, 172) When MacArthur became Superintendent he did not have to study and learn the academic program and methods of instruction. He had already learned them as a cadet.

Superintendent Tillman had made reforms in the military training program to reflect World War I conditions, but he was as conservative as the rest of the faculty when it came to the academic program. With a few minor changes, the academic program that Tillman and the faculty proposed for West Point in 1919 copied the academic program of 1917. From having no meaningful academic program, the West Point Administration of November 1918 to June of 1919 was attempting to reestablish an obsolete curriculum taught with outdated pedagogic practices. (Fleming 1969, 303-306; James 1970, 262; Ambrose 1966, 238-247)

Leadership and Discipline in Crisis

The traditional disciplinary system at West Point depended on the prestige and influence of the upperclassmen. These upperclassmen were themselves motivated and controlled by a sense of tradition and responsibility instilled in them by previous upper classes. (MacArthur 1964, 80) The graduation policies of the war destroyed the traditional discipline system. Hazing, always a latent problem under the surface at the service academies, had reemerged as a serious problem. (Forman 1950, 170-172) Hazing flourished in an atmosphere where the First class was only months ahead of the plebes. Upperclassmen in name only, they had the power but not the instilled sense of tradition and responsibility that came with a systematic four year program of progressive leadership training. General Tillman's annual Superintendent's Report for 1918 was a veritable history of hazing at the Academy and showed that his awareness of the problem. (Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA, 1919) General Tillman even made recommendations to correct the problem which were later carried out by his successor MacArthur, but he and his administration proved unable to control the situation. (Ambrose 1966, 254) The suicide of a plebe during the Winter of 1918-1919, related to excessive hazing, brought West Point, and what was left of its system, under intense national and Congressional scrutiny. What Congress found was "a disorganized semi-disciplined cadet corps" at a "chaotic wavering West Point." (Fleming 1969, 304, 305)

The effects of disenchantment and distaste for anything military, the sorry state of West Point's academic and military programs, and the perceived existence of deplorable and widespread hazing threatened West Point's continued existence. Serious consideration was given to

abolishing the institution altogether, during the Congressional debate on the 1919 West Point

budget. (James 1970, 262; Fleming 1969, 303-305)

The Savior of West Point

Into the crisis at West Point "strode MacArthur, a heralded combat leader, but one

imbued with liberal ideas for reforming his profession." (James 1970, 261) At thirty-nine he was

one of the youngest and most junior general officers in the army. He had graduated from West

Point only just sixteen years before assuming the Superintendency. There were permanent

academic department heads who had been faculty members and even department heads during

his student days. Other temporary department heads had been fellow cadets with MacArthur but

were still lieutenant colonels or colonels. (Appendix B) General March had passed over dozens

of senior officers to appoint him Superintendent of West Point. (Fleming 1969, 305) General

March needed a progressive officer who could be persuasive and tenacious. This officer would

need a professional record that would allow him to effect a complete reform at West Point;

MacArthur filled the bill. (Ambrose 1966, 262) March's charge to MacArthur when he notified

him of his appointment was straight forward and succinct:

> West Point is forty years behind the times . . . (is) in a state of disorder and
> confusion . . . Revitalize and revamp the Academy.
> (MacArthur 1964, 77; James 1970, 261; Ambrose 1966, 260)

When MacArthur arrived at West Point, it was at its lowest point in its one-hun-

dred-thirteen-year history. The Corps of Cadets was in an uproar with low morale and little

discipline or deportment. The Class of 1922 had reported in June 1918 with a scheduled

graduation date of June 1919. Without prior notice or consultation, the War Department changed

their graduation to June 1921. In protest, over one hundred of the class resigned. (Ambrose 1966, 262) The War Department also recalled the November 1918 graduates, the Class of 1921, for additional training at West Point. Because they had graduated, they were 2nd Lieutenants and they bitterly and openly resented their return to West Point. (Ambrose 1966, 262; Fleming 1969, 304; James 1970, 263) Because of their commissioned status their billets were separated from those of the cadets. Their status was that of commissioned officers but they were also students. Their presence added to the confusion and low morale of both the staff and the cadets. As lieutenants they could not, and would not, resume their duties as the first class. Of the eight-hundred plebes that were to have reported in November 1918 only 357 had reported. Because of wartime clothing shortages these plebes were not even issued cadet grey uniforms but wore privates' uniforms with orange bands on their campaign hats. Due to the lack of an experienced upperclass, and wartime scheduling when they reported, the November 1918 plebes did not even receive the standard plebe indoctrination training. If MacArthur had asked for a parade and review when he assumed the Superintendency, he would not have reviewed the Corps of Cadets but three distinct groups in three distinct sets of uniforms with little in common to link them together.

In the area of academics, the conservative faculty was earnestly trying to reintroduce the old four year program. This was despite Congressional direction mandating a three year course of instruction. Subsequent Congressional authorization, signed into law in March 1920, reinstated a four-year program. The authorization for a four-year course encouraged the conservative Academic Board's desire to return to the program of 1917. The faculty members were not only comfortably familiar with the old curriculum, but they considered it the proven

epitome of a professional military education. (Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1920, 5) Immediate reinstatement of any previous program was an unrecognized pipe dream. The three classes that were present had no common academic or professional military training background and each required a uniquely tailored program in order to graduate. It would be 1921 before West Point could have a common academic program that applied to all four classes. The two-year period before all classes shared a single academic program provided the new Superintendent with a window of opportunity in which to make academic reforms.

MacArthur assumed the leadership of an Academy with a fractured Corps of Cadets and a crippled academic program. He faced an entrenched reactionary faculty, and a society and government that questioned even the Academy's continued existence. The one factor of organizational crisis from which he could benefit was that in a crisis it can be easier to carry out change.

MacArthur's Reforms

MacArthur's reforms fell into the three broad categories of academic reform, training reform, and leadership and discipline reform. The terms leadership and discipline are not normally considered to include each other. The term *discipline* has a distinctly negative tone, while *leadership* has a positive connotation. Used in the context of MacArthur's reforms they are corollaries to each other and not mutually exclusive.

MacArthur's ability to implement his reforms varied greatly. To carry out academic reforms, he required the cooperation and approval of the Academic Board. The Academic Board consisted of the Superintendent, the Commandant of Cadets, and the academic department heads.

The academic department heads fell into two categories. The "permanent" professors, commissioned by the President, headed the Departments of Engineering, Natural and Experimental Philosophy, Chemistry and Electricity, Drawing, Mathematics, Modern Languages, and English and History. (Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1920, 36) During his tenure as Superintendent, all but one of the permanent department heads were former graduates of West Point, and had at least ten years of teaching experience at West Point. The one permanent professor who was not a West Point graduate was also the only one with a Ph.D. (Appendix B; James 1970, 267) The other category of professor was "detailed" professor. The Secretary of War assigned these regular officers to tours of duty of three to four years at the Academy. Detailed professors maintained their regular commissions and branch assignments. They headed the Departments of Tactics, Law, Military Hygiene, Ordnance and Gunnery, and Practical Military Engineering. (Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1920, 36) The head of the Department of Tactics was also the Commandant of Cadets. As the Commandant of Cadets he was the officer in charge of cadet discipline and supervised the day-to-day administration and direction of the Corps of Cadets. (Appendix B) The permanent professors' future careers, barring some outrageous form of behavior or significant disability, did not depend on the Superintendent. The detailed professors, and their subordinate instructors, were regular officers. Their careers did not revolve around West Point. They were thus more responsive to the Superintendent who could effect their evaluations and follow on assignments. With few exceptions, the detailed professors were also Academy graduates and deeply infused with the traditions of West Point. The detailed professors were more responsive to the Superintendent, but were not in the

same position as a commander's subordinate staff officers and had their own individual votes on the Academic Board.

MacArthur's ability to enforce his reforms on the Academic Board was not solely a function of the ratio of the permanent to the detailed professors. Even if the five detailed professors had voted as a block with the Superintendent, which they did not, the seven permanent professors could still determine the outcome of any vote. He would find that Col. Fiebeger head of the Department of Civil and Military Engineering, Col. Wilcox head of the Department of Modern Languages, Col. Echols head of the Department of Mathematics, and Col. Reynolds a surgeon detailed as the head of the Department of Military Hygiene would form a hard core of conservatives. They would strongly resist innovation or reform of what they considered an almost sacred and perfect academic program based on that of 1917. Col. Carter of the Department of Natural and Experimental Philosophy, and Col. Robinson of the Department of Chemistry, Mineralogy and Geology, while not as conservative, tended to side with the hard core conservatives on issues of academic policy. Major Hines, thirty-one years old and acting professor and head of the Department of Ordnance and Gunnery, would exert little influence on the Academic Board. The only department heads that would share his desire to reform the academic program would be Col. Danford, the Commandant of Cadets and head of the Department of Tactics, and Col. Holt, the head of the recently organized Department of English and History and the faculty's only Ph.D. (Appendix B; James 1970, 266-267; Ambrose 1966, 266-267; Fleming 1969, 310)

The Board of Visitors, made up of distinguished former graduates or political appointees, had no direct voice in the approval or disapproval of academic policy. They were an influential

force because they could effect reforms through their positive or negative opinions to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, and elected officials. The Board of Visitors normally had their most direct effect during their annual visit during the week of final exams and in their attendant report. Besides the Academic Board and Board of Visitors, no faculty senate or other general body existed that could effect academic policies or reform.

The Superintendent could unilaterally make reforms in the areas of training, leadership, and discipline. As the senior officer at the Academy, MacArthur could change, without outside prior approval, those functions that did not address academics and related to service as a cadet or commissioned officer. The Commandant of Cadets had the authority to carry out reforms in leadership and discipline. During his tenure as Superintendent MacArthur enjoyed a close and cooperative working relationship with Colonel R.M. Danford, USMA Class of 1904. Their close cooperation, and mutually shared views, facilitated implementing reforms in the areas of morale, discipline, leadership, and military training. Because Col. Danford's Tactics Department supervised or conducted all military training, the rest of the conservative faculty had no voice in, or ability to resist, reforms in areas related to training. (James 1970, 275-280; MacArthur 1964, 80-82; Fleming 1969, 308-309; Ambrose 1966, 270)

One significant factor in the implementation of any reforms at West Point was the approval or disapproval of the senior former graduates. Because the Army was in many ways a closed or restricted society, the former graduates took an active interest in the academic and training programs at West Point. As was the case with the Board of Visitors, the former graduates did not have a direct effect on the implementation of reforms, but as individuals and a group, they could exert significant political and personal pressure on the Superintendent. As a

brigadier general who was only thirty-nine years old, MacArthur was neither as old, nor as senior as many of the former graduates that could and did scrutinize his reform program.

The Vision

MacArthur arrived at West Point with more than a realization of what he had to fix. He had a vision of where he wanted to take West Point through reforms in its academic and training programs. What was most important, he had a concept of the leadership, training, and background requirements of a modern military officer. He was not an academician, but he had familiarized himself with the various reports concerning the academy. He had also discussed the Academy's problems and solutions with those outside the War Department and he appears to have researched the state of pedagogy in the United States. (James 1970, 262; MacArthur 1964, 77-78) The archives at West Point and Norfolk do not reveal specific sources for MacArthur's knowledge of what and how other universities and colleges taught. His actions as Superintendent indicates he had acquired a knowledge of the contemporary state of higher education. He implemented curriculum changes and required the faculty to accomplish certain things in the process of his reforms that reflected what other institutions were doing. He clearly based his reforms on patterns of education that existed outside West Point. MacArthur had researched and was well read in what constituted contemporary modern higher education. His own references to academic reform showed an extensive knowledge of the subject. The recruitment of guest speakers at West Point acknowledged the leaders in the field of education. His specific recommendations for updating the curriculum reflected an understanding of accepted academic norms for curriculums and teaching methods. What experience he lacked in higher education, he had

made up for in research and study of the subject. (James 1970, 262, 274; MacArthur 1964, 82; Fleming 1969, 309-311; Ambrose 1966, 269-270)

MacArthur's academic reforms attempted to bring West Point back into the mainstream of American higher education pedagogical practice, but the most important thing that he brought to West Point was his vision of what kind of officer the institution had to prepare. Based on his observations of training for and participation in World War I MacArthur observed:

> Until the World War, armed conflicts between nations had been fought by a comparatively small faction of the population involved. These professional armies were composed very largely of elements which frequently required the most rigid methods of training, the severest forms of discipline, to weld them into a flexible weapon for use on the battlefield. Officers were, therefore, developed to handle a more or less recalcitrant element along definite and simple lines, and a fixed psychology resulted . . . Early in the World War it was realized . . . War had become a phenomenon which truly involved the nation in arms . . . Discipline no longer required extreme methods . . . Improvisation was the watchword. Such changed conditions will require a modification in type of officer, a type possessing all of the cardinal military virtues of yore, but possessing an intimate understanding of his fellows, a comprehensive grasp of world and national affairs, and a liberalization of conception which amounts to a change in his psychology of command.
>
> <div align="right">(MacArthur 1964, 79)</div>

This quotation from *Reminiscences* is not an analysis made in 1964 looking back at the post World War I period, but a deeply held and extensively explained expression of beliefs held in 1919. In lucid and direct terms MacArthur devoted the first page and a half of his initial Superintendent's Annual report to a discussion of the subject of the above quotation. (Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1920, 3-4) Millis, the DuPuys, and Huntington would argue that the changes that MacArthur attributes to World War I actually began during the Napoleonic Wars, and all were present in the American Civil War. Some of the lessons of the Civil War were viewed as special examples by military theorists until they were driven home by World War I.

Indeed, some military theorists viewed World War I in purely technological terms. They still did not acknowledge that World War I was a watershed event that proved societal and basic theoretical changes had occurred in warfare. While later criticized for not fully appreciating other innovations of World War I, such as armored and aerial warfare, MacArthur's 1919 writings on the nature and requirements of modern warfare predated other better known military theorists such as B. H. Liddel Hart, J. F. C. Fuller, and Heinz Guderian. A detailed listing of MacArthur's extensive personal library, as it existed in early 1942, does not suggest that he had read the works of these visionary military theorists. (MacArthur Archives, RG-1, RG-3) He was probably not aware of their writings until after World War II, but he evidenced an understanding of psychological and motivational factors applied to military leadership that the theorists of the Human Relations Approach would write about in the 1930s and 1940s. MacArthur evidenced no sophistication of theoretical thinking that would approach the concept of self actualization. He would have probably viewed participative management as a part of communist dogma, but he did have a well reasoned and defined understanding of the nature of the modern soldier. He understood the necessary requirements to motivate and lead that soldier. That he held and espoused these views in 1919 placed him among the few visionaries that understood World War I was more than a revolution in technology applied to war. He intended to train the cadets at West Point for the next war, not the last war. (MacArthur 1964, 79; James 1970, 264-265; Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1920, 3-4; Fleming 1969, 306)

MacArthur's Academic Reform Proposals

MacArthur's *Reminiscences* devotes only one paragraph to a description of his academic

reforms for West Point. In his words:

> ...scientific courses were brought up to date; classical courses were used as
> cultural foundations; a new course on economics and government was added;
> increased emphasis on history and world trends; studies into European conditions
> and the Far East; modern science, chemistry, electricity, aerodynamics, mechan-
> ics, languages, and a course of physical, mental, and moral training . . .
> (MacArthur 1964, 82)

This quotation, although accurate in describing academic changes made in reinstating a four-year

academic program, does not reflect his proposals for academic reforms. As what was already

becoming a common MacArthur trait, he personalized the organizations that he led, taking

personal credit for organizational accomplishments or actions that subordinates initiated and/or

accomplished.[7] In the case of the above quotation, updating the scientific courses was not his

central concern. The academic department heads had proven adept at updating their own courses.

The academic department heads were conservative in making changes to the program as a whole,

but they aggressively updated text book and course content in their narrow academic disciplines.

A review of the departmental histories in *The Centennial of the United States Military Academy*

at West Point, New York, 1802-1902 (246-486) and the departmental reports included in the

Annual Report(s) of the Superintendent USMA from 1902 through 1919 provide detailed and

specific examples of the updating of individual texts and courses. The academic department

heads' conservatism focused on the addition of new academic subjects, and the retention of

existing courses and subjects.

MacArthur's personal proposals for updating the West Point curriculum included adding

a new series of courses. He wanted to add courses in psychology, sociology, economics, and

political science. (Ambrose 1966, 259; Fleming 1969, 310, James 1970, 270-271) Additionally,

MacArthur proposed changes in the course content of existing courses. He wanted the study of

internal combustion engines added to chemistry, the emphasis of military art and science courses

to focus on battle studies of World War I vice the American Civil War, that more emphasis

should be placed on Far Eastern History, and that public speaking receive greater emphasis in the

English curriculum. (Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1921, 13, 15-17; Ambrose

1966, 270; Fleming 1969, 310)

MacArthur, besides his desired changes in the curriculum and in specific course content,

also proposed changes to the curriculum's teaching practices. Whereas curriculum changes were

the purview of the academic board, and changes in the content of a particular course were

heavily dependent on the agreement and cooperation of the concerned academic department

head, MacArthur had the authority to impose some of his academically oriented reforms that

were not part of the curriculum. He initiated the requirement that newly assigned instructors

spend up to a year at a civilian institution of higher learning before teaching academic subjects.

He also required faculty members, including the permanent professors, to visit civilian colleges

and universities thus keeping abreast of the state of pedagogy. He also exposed the faculty and

student to the cutting edge of higher education by a robust program of guest speakers drawn

from leading colleges and universities. (Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1921, 4-5,

16, James 1970, 271-272) MacArthur could force exposure of his faculty to modern pedagogy,

but he was less successful in implementing changes in the section (class) room. He was able to

modify the front board daily recitation method of instruction in only a few of the academic

departments. Most of the departments made no meaningful changes in teaching and student

evaluation methods. (James 1970, 274; Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1920, 34; *idem* 1922, 13; Ganoe 1962, 93)

The introduction of the slide rule in natural philosophy classes was a minor reform, but it did not meaningfully change basic instructional practices. MacArthur was, with the cooperation of Professor Holt, one of his few allies on the Academic Board, able to reorganize the Department of English and History. What resulted was a Department of English and a new Department of Economics, Government, and History. The newly created department did not make significant changes in the courses offered, but it did place the social sciences under a department whose head, Professor Holt, was more favorably disposed toward these areas of study. (James 1971, 270-271; Ambrose 1966, 269-170; Fleming 1969, 310)

MacArthur proposed sweeping reforms for many areas of West Point's academic program, but he did not address several areas of past criticism. MacArthur did not try to institute an electives program within the curriculum. Available documentation suggests that even his liberalized course proposals were part of a lock step curriculum that would apply to all cadets. In a widely publicized address, given in Boston during the Spring of 1920, Dr. Charles W. Eliot, the president emeritus of Harvard, had castigated West Point for its "completely prescribed curriculum." (As quoted in James 1970, 271 from New York Times May 9, 20 1920) A staff officer in the War Department rebutted Eliot's charges , but MacArthur did not publicly address the issue nor take steps to correct the problem. This is of interest since other of MacArthur's proposed reforms were in complete agreement with leading educators such as Professor Eliot. MacArthur also did not address a long standing criticism of West Point concerning its inbred faculty. He neither tried to bring in additional civilian faculty, nor even bring in military officers

who were not West Point graduates. (James 1970, 273) The reason he did not propose the

aforementioned reforms could have been his realization that they had little or no chance of

implementation. It could also have been, that despite his reputation as a "liberal innovator," he

was also deeply committed to preservation of the traditions and spirit of the "old West Point."

(Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1921, 1; James 1970, 274-275) For MacArthur,

academic programs and details of training were subjects that were not core elements of tradition

and were areas that should reflect the current developments in education and the practice of war.

When it came to issues of honor and tradition, he was as conservative as the rest of the academic

board. Traditions were handed down from one generation to another, and the caretakers of

tradition were not primarily the upperclassmen, but the former graduates that made up the soul of

the professional officer corps. MacArthur displayed these beliefs when he had the opportunity to

appoint a new Professor of Law. Despite a field that included several eminently qualified non-

graduates, he chose a former graduate and fellow cadet. MacArthur explained:

> All other conditions being equal, I think it advantageous to have a graduate of the
> Academy detailed as Professor of Law rather than a non graduate.
> (As Quoted in James 1970, 273 from a letter of D. MacArthur to E. H. Crowder
> Aug. 1920)

The final areas of MacArthur's reforms for West Point concerned training, discipline, and

the honor code. These were areas that fell beyond the purview of the Academic Board. The

Commandant of Cadets, under the direction and control of the Superintendent, administered

these areas. Even if the Commandant of Cadets did not agree with his reforms, MacArthur, as the

Superintendent, could have required their implementation. Not only was the position of

Commandant of Cadets a temporary professorship, but the functions of the position involved

administration of military discipline and training for which the Superintendent, as senior officer

at West Point, was ultimately responsible. Because MacArthur's Commandant of Cadets, Col. Robert M. Danford, was a close friend, former fellow cadet, and an avid supporter of his reforms, there was no conflict between the Superintendent and his Commandant of Cadets. (Appendix B; James 1970, 266)

Danford initiated a reform of the Cadet Honor System and the process for dealing with disciplinary infractions. MacArthur wholeheartedly endorsed these reforms and personally participated in their implementation. The reform of the Cadet Honor System became a central reform issue with MacArthur. His endorsement of Danford's initiatives and his further development of them became one of his most enduring accomplishments while at West Point. The honor system reforms separated the honor system from the disciplinary system. The intermingling of discipline and honor violations existed before these reforms. By the time MacArthur assumed the Superintendency, the honor system was trivialized and honored mainly in the breach. Technically an honor violation was always serious and a cause for expulsion, but at the same time any minor infraction of discipline could be considered an honor violation. By separating the honor and discipline systems, MacArthur, Danford, the faculty, and the cadets could all agree to a rigid inviolable honor system. The separation of the two systems also allowed for a discipline system that was sensitive to and appropriate for a whole range of disciplinary infractions. (Fleming 1969, 317)

MacArthur's revamping of the Cadet Honor System involved empowering the cadets themselves. Danford and he had personally met with cadet officers and convinced them of the need for, and the rationality of, the proposed reforms. His implementation of the Cadet Honor System reforms reflected his previously stated views on the changing nature of war, and the

changed nature of the soldiers, cadets, and junior officers that were populating the Army during

and after World War I. (MacArthur 1964, 79-81; Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA

1920, 6, 45-46; *idem* 1921, 8-9; James 1971, 276-277; Fleming 1969, 308, 317)

MacArthur's Cadet Honor System reforms also directly helped accomplish one of his

primary goals, that of abolishing hazing. Concurrent with the revamping of the Honor Code,

Danford and MacArthur, with input from, and the participation of, a cadet 4th Class Customs

Committee, established a set of guidelines for acceptable behavior toward plebes. Despite initial

resistance, the cadets acknowledged standards of upperclassmen behavior toward underclass-

men. By establishing a short list of five specific types of unacceptable behavior, he and Danford

allowed the upperclassmen a wide range of actions in dealing with plebes while also clearly

establishing proscribed behavior. (Fleming 1969, 308-309; James 1970, 276-278) Although no

formal system in which cadets have authority over other junior cadets could completely rule out

the possibility of hazing, there were no further incidents of serious hazing reported during his

superintendency. Through strengthening the Cadet Honor System, MacArthur and Danford did

much to reestablish not only a sense of honor in the cadets, but a sense of appropriate behavior

based on Academy traditions and a code of personal responsibility. By providing the cadets with

a reasonable and enforceable honor code, one in which they had participated in developing,

MacArthur reestablished an environment that did not tolerate excessive behavior. If this

excessive behavior, hazing, which the cadets had also had a hand in defining, occurred it would

be more difficult to hide. A cadet could not expect others to lie or cover up for a fellow class-

mate. The cadets accepted the lie, the honor violation, as anathema. MacArthur's willingness to

involve subordinates and cadets in the policy formulation and implementation process, while not

participative management in the modern sense, made him one of the more enlightened and pro-gressive military leaders of the inter-war period.

Parallel with the revamping of the Cadet Honor System, Danford revamped the administration of the cadet disciplinary system. The system in effect when Danford and MacArthur had arrived in 1919 had been in effect, basically unchanged, since just after the Civil War. It involved the impersonal writing of memos and counter memos between cadets charging infractions, cadets being charged, and the company tactical officers. In this system the memos and their attendant administration were the dominant features. Justice and discipline were side effects, if they occurred. The system encouraged the quibbling over written details and had no basis in regular army legal practice. What had begun as a system to encourage clear and concise written communication in the implementation of good order and discipline had developed into a system that mocked the efficient and expeditious execution of military justice. (James 1970, 278) Danford, with MacArthur's full support, abandoned the old system of "skin lists." He substituted a system where the company tactical officer personally interviewed the cadet accused of an infraction. These hearings, conducted in the company day room, were held within a day or two of the event, and in the presence of any accusers or witnesses. The tactical officer immediately decided the guilt or innocence of the cadet charged and awarded appropriate disciplinary measures. This procedure was identical to that conducted for minor offenses by company com-manders in the regular army. It not only insured fair and swift justice for the cadets, but taught them how to deal with minor offenses as commissioned officers.

Besides implementing reforms in the military justice, discipline, and honor systems, MacArthur completely revamped cadet military training and significantly reorganized the cadet

athletic and physical conditioning programs. While Danford, the Commandant of Cadets, had

initiated many reforms in the military justice, discipline, and honor systems, it was MacArthur

who personally revamped the military training and athletic programs. (Fleming 1969, 307, 309)

Attendant to these changes, he also changed the manner in which the system treated cadets. He

required the cadets to do certain things, and in return granted them certain privileges. While

military training and athletics do not appear related to personal requirements and privileges, for

him they were all part of his previously described vision of what the modern officer was and

should be. When MacArthur was a cadet, and when he returned as the Superintendent, a cadet

led a sheltered monastic life. (MacArthur 1964, 81; James 1970, 279) This cadet life style

acknowledged an accepted dogma concerning the training of an officer and a gentleman. In

reality it was a detailed set of rubrics based on eighteenth and nineteenth century military

practice. It had become institutionalized and rigidly adhered to at West Point since before the

Civil War. The cadet daily routine and military training program reflected the practice of

eighteenth century professional armies employing rigid linear tactics. If Frederick the Great of

Prussia had returned from the dead in 1919, he would have completely understood and felt at

home with the military training practices and environment at West Point. Although the cadet

uniforms were from the early 1800s, rather than Frederick's early 1700s, and the small arms were

modern, the content and practice of military training would have been immediately familiar to

Frederick. (James 1970, 279)

West Point was a self contained, self-sufficient military monastery for cadets. During the

four years they spent there, cadets only left West Point for brief furloughs several times in their

upper class years. Summer camp took place in a tent camp at Fort Clayton that was part of the

West Point reservation. Summer camp had more to do with a quaint recreation of Napoleonic era camp life or a Gilbert and Sullivan operatic imitation of military life than with contemporary military practice. Summer camp was a choreographed ritual of formal guard changes, parades, and social functions. A stylized recreation of the obsolete rituals, summer camp provided little useful training in actual military operations. (James 1970, 279)

MacArthur sent a series of shock waves through the former graduates and traditionalists. He abolished the summer camp at West Point. He granted unheard of privileges and chances for initiative to the cadets. He had the cadets train with regular army troops in realistic contemporary training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. (MacArthur 1964, 81)

MacArthur's liberalization of cadet life included the granting of six hour weekend leaves off the reservation, the creation of a first classman's club, limited fraternization of first classmen with officers of the post, the election of class officers by the three senior classes, and the institution of a regulated cadet newspaper. He also granted cadets a $5.00 monthly cash allowance and allowed cadets to accompany the football team to games beyond New York City. In return he required the cadets to read, and be prepared to discuss, newspapers furnished to them on a daily basis. MacArthur's objectives were to expose the cadets to the outside world in which they would have to exist as commissioned officers and to give them the experience of managing their affairs. (MacArthur 1964, 81) For MacArthur the cadet was "cloistered almost to a monastic extent" then "thrust into the world a man in age, but as experienced as a high school boy." (James 1970, 279) By modern standards, the new cadet privileges would seem minor, and even inconsequential, but to the conservative faculty and DOGs (Disgruntled Old Graduates) they amounted to a total abandonment of tradition and discipline. While MacArthur saw tradition in

terms of "Duty, Honor and Country" and his reforms as long overdue changes required to prepare the cadets for their service in the regular army, the conservative faculty and former graduates felt MacArthur was tearing the heart of a system perfected over a hundred and twenty years. What he viewed as outdated rubrics with only negative effects, his opponents saw as central truths to the Academy's time proven and perfectly developed system.

The institution of modern realistic training for the cadets, with the soldiers that they would shortly be leading, should have seemed an obvious improvement. Instead the abolition of summer camp at Fort Clayton resulted in howls of disbelief from the DOGs (Disgruntled Old Graduates), and resentment from the faculty, and their wives. The summer camp parades and hops were the primary summertime entertainment and social life for the faculty and their spouses. Even the cadets resented the conversion of their summers into realistic training. (James 1970, 279-280)

The gulf was so great between the two sides that there was no common ground upon which to propose compromises. (James 1970, 279, 283; MacArthur 1964, 80-81; Fleming 1969, 306; Ambrose 267, 271) The training reforms that were most accepted by the cadets, faculty, and former graduates, were MacArthur's reinvigoration of the athletic and physical fitness programs at West Point. Although his *Annual Report(s) of the Superintendent USMA 1920-1922* and *Reminiscences* (81-82) couches these reforms in a revolutionary context they were more evolutionary in nature. A well-organized athletic and physical fitness training program existed at West Point even when MacArthur was a cadet (1899-1903). Participation in sports was voluntary before he became Superintendent, but had been highly encouraged and wide-spread. What MacArthur required was mandatory participation in major sports at the intramural level. He

reinforced his proscribed policies for greater participation in athletics by his detailed, extensive,

and zealous involvement with Academy sports teams, especially the football team. MacArthur's

reforms in the Academy's sports and physical fitness programs were almost the sole common

denominators between himself, the conservative old guard faculty, and the disgruntled old

graduates (DOGs). James 1970, 282) MacArthur's Cadet Honor System and sports/physical

fitness reforms would be his only primary reforms that would survive under his immediate

successors at West Point.

The Institution Reacts

The environment at West Point did not favor reforms. West Point was an institution

populated by a historically conservative profession. West Point was an isolated institution deeply

steeped in tradition, with an entrenched and powerful faculty who saw their role as the guardians

of tradition. It existed in a society and political system that neither provided support nor even

cared about the institution, unless there was a scandal. Not surprisingly, MacArthur's progressive

reforms across all areas of the Academy's operations elicited a strong and preponderantly

negative reaction. A review of Appendices 3, 4, and 5 will indicate that MacArthur was able to

make only minor changes in the academic program. Instead of his proposed additions of courses

in psychology, sociology, economics, and political science, only a single combined course in

economics and government was added. Inclusion of the study of internal combustion engines, the

use of slide rules, and added emphasis on historical study of World War I and the Far East were

evolutionary changes that would have probably occurred whether or not MacArthur had been

Superintendent. Only minor changes occurred in the delivery of courses and the evaluation of

cadet performance. He successfully lobbied Congress for reinstatement of a four-year program, but he did not make significant changes in the prewar four year program. (MacArthur 1964, 82; Ambrose 1966, 259, 270; Fleming 1969, 310; James 1970, 270-271; Masland and Radway 1957, 87) It would not be until 1926, when a separate Department of Economics, Government, and History under Professor Hermon Bukema evolved, that meaningful changes occurred in the field of social sciences. Even the 1926 changes adhered to existing time allotments. It would be 1933 before the Academy became a baccalaureate degree granting institution. (Masland and Radway 1957, 87-88)

MacArthur's extensive changes to cadet training and exposure to the outside world were short lived. They were all abolished or extremely curtailed by his successor General Sladen. Fort Clayton's ceremonial summer camp reappeared, and cadet furloughs and monetary allowances disappeared. While MacArthur saw greater exposure to the outside world as a key element in cadet training, his immediate successors and many alumni, having perceived rampant radicalism in the society, saw less exposure of cadets to the society as a positive and desirable feature of the West Point training program. (James 1970, 283) MacArthur enjoyed eventual vindication with the reinstatement of his training and disciplinary reforms during the 1930s.

MacArthur's most enduring reforms were in the Cadet Honor Code and athletics/physical fitness programs. He dwelled on his physical fitness reforms in *Reminiscences* (81-83) but does not even mention the revamping of the Cadet Honor Code. Fleming (1969, 317), Ambrose (1966, 278), Forman (1950, 195), and James (1970, 276) all give significant coverage to MacArthur's revamping of the Cadet Honor Code and list it as one of his significant accomplishments as Superintendent.

MacArthur's successes in gaining support for changes at West Point from external sources were also limited. He made three proposals for significant change at West Point to the Congress. He proposed returning to a four-year course of instruction, doubling the size of the Corps of Cadets, and the provision of funding for a major physical plant rebuilding/expansion program. The reinstatement of a four-year course of instruction was his sole success. His architectural plan would later serve as a basis for the physical plant expansion. It would take decades before the expansion would take place and several specific projects would never materialize. (Ambrose 1966, 275-276; Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA 1921, 17-20)

The ephemeral nature of MacArthur's reforms was not unexpected. Upon learning, in January 1922, that Brigadier General Fred W. Sladen, a conservative in army politics, was his replacement as Superintendent, MacArthur confided in a letter to Colonel Ganoe, his Adjutant during most of his tour at West Point: "I fancy it means reversal of many of the progressive policies which we inaugurated." (Ganoe 1962, 157) He was correct; General Sladen would abolish nearly all of his reforms shortly after assuming the Superintendency. (Ambrose 1966, 282-283; James 1970, 289)

MacArthur of West Point

MacArthur has been called the "savior of West Point" and the "father of the New West Point." (Ganoe 1962, 167; James 1970, 259; Ambrose 1966, 283) Despite the rejection of most of his academic reforms, and the undoing of most of his training reforms, his imprint on the Academy has been historically significant and enduring. His place in West Point's history does not rest solely on his Cadet Honor code reforms. His real contribution to West Point was that he

broke its smug introspective isolation from academia and society. MacArthur forced the faculty

and staff to acknowledge their state of pedagogy as compared to other institutions of higher

learning. The Academic Board would deny him his academic reforms. General Sladen would

undo his training reforms. While undoing the reforms they debated their merits. This debate

forced Sladen and the Board to expose themselves to the nature and content of contemporary

education and training that MacArthur had proposed for West Point. The faculty could argue that

the West Point's academic and training programs perfectly matched the flat plain upon which

West Point stood, but MacArthur had shown the worlds of pedagogy and military training was

round. Like the cartographers of fourteenth and fifteenth century Europe, the faculty and staff of

West Point could resist change but could not stop it. MacArthur had not realized, or permanently

established his reforms, but he had put the institution over the edge of the slippery slope of

change. Even the inertia of a conservative faculty and hide-bound tradition would only delay the

eventual realization of his academic reforms and the reintroduction of his training reforms.

(James 1979, 293-294) MacArthur was the savior of West Point not for what he accomplished

but for what he prevented the institution from becoming. If the West Point of 1919 to 1922 had

returned to the West Point of 1917, it would have become an anachronism isolated from a

rapidly changing society. In the years of depression, isolationism, and anti-militarism, which

would define the late 1920s and 1930s, it would have been very possible that West Point would

have ceased to exist. Like Perry opening Japan, MacArthur had exposed West Point to the rest of

society and the world. Just as Perry had prevented Japan from ever returning to its isolationism,

MacArthur had irrevocably changed West Point. It is not an overstatement to assert that Douglas

MacArthur and Sylvanus Thayer are the two most important Superintendents in West Point's

history. Thayer gave birth to the Academy and MacArthur gave it new life when it was in danger

of dying. (James 1970, 293-294; Masland and Radway 1957, 87; Fleming 1969, 317, 319;

Devers 1964, 16-19; Ambrose 1966, 238; Forman 1950, 172, 187, 194-196)

MacArthur's Leadership and Administration of West Point

Because MacArthur was advocating progressive changes in a conservative environment

oriented on maintenance of the status quo, it would have been highly unlikely that all of his

reforms would flourish or survive. At the same time, his failure to carry out significant portions

of his reforms was not just a result of the faculty and institution's nature. MacArthur's personality

and leadership style, and his proposed reforms, engendered negative reactions from the faculty

and staff that contributed to his lack of success in carrying out his reforms. He was in a difficult

position when he arrived at West Point. Not only would he be leading an institution in crisis, but

he would be leading an institution composed of officers who should have been his seniors.

MacArthur had graduated from West Point only sixteen years previously. Several permanent

professors were instructors, or even full professors when he was a cadet. (Appendix B) All the

permanent professors were his seniors before World War I. At thirty-nine, MacArthur was

younger than most of the detailed department heads, and younger than all of the permanent

department heads. He would have normally been their junior save for his meteoric rise during

World War I.

MacArthur's approach to leadership of West Point was a combination of the flamboyant

lead-by-example/up-front approach he had displayed during World War I and an aloof superior

approach. He tended to make decisions in an abrupt manner that was neither collegial, nor based

on compromise. He seemed to prefer the *fait accompli* over the compromise. (James 1970, 266; Ganoe 1962, 50; Ambrose 1966, 265-266) Even when he acted in a premeditated manner, he did not always conduct prior coordination with the Academic Board. When he proposed his new curriculum to the Academic Board, he did so only after he had sent copies to eminent scholars, the press, prominent army officers, and the War Department. With endorsements in hand he then presented the proposed curriculum to the Academic Board. (Ganoe 1962, 127) He could resort to his enormous interpersonal skills and charm when he had to, but it appears he preferred to operate from a position of righteous correctness and superiority. (James 2970, 273; Ambrose 1966, 267) MacArthur's sense of the dramatic and dynamic leader worked well in motivating subordinates in the field, but put him into conflict with the conservative atmosphere and faculty at West Point. Even as an engineer lieutenant in Milwaukee, he had jealously protected what he defined as his prerogatives or privileges. He was a brigadier general and the Superintendent, but he had only one vote on the Academic Board. MacArthur's well-developed sense of his status, prerogatives, and privileges worked against any collegial form of leadership. The result was a negative reaction to his methods and his message. What developed was all but open warfare between him and his faculty. (Ambrose 1966, 267-268) The contest of wills between MacArthur and most of his faculty bred negative reactions and counter reactions not related to his reforms.

There is significant evidence that his personality, behavior, and style of leader-ship/management had negative impacts on his ability to have his reforms accepted by the faculty, cadets, and former graduates. MacArthur's bearing and behavior as Superintendent defined his leadership style. What is most important to a study of MacArthur, the public administrator, is

that traits that emerged during World War I remained during his Superintendency of West Point, and would become permanent fixtures of his approach to leadership and management.

While the Superintendent, MacArthur projected an aura of seriousness and majestic aloofness. (James 1970, 268) His egotistical personality further distanced him from the faculty. (Ambrose 1966, 266) Ganoe, his Adjutant and ardent admirer, described MacArthur's attitude as that of an aristocratic gentleman. Many faculty members, and even cadets, saw him as an arrogant, egotistical, individualist. (Ganoe 1962, 129-130; James 1970, 269; Ambrose 1966, 267) Whether he was an aristocratic gentleman, or an egotist, or both, his demeanor distanced him from those around him. This resulted in few people at West Point knowing what he was about or in understanding what were his aims or objectives. (James 1970, 269; Ambrose 1966, 267; Danford's Forward to Ganoe 1966, 7) Paradoxically, MacArthur could appear very warm and outgoing to his subordinates and close work associates. Danford and Canoe, his closest confidants at West Point, and Maher, a noncommissioned officer, all describe this other side of MacArthur. (Ganoe 1962, 129-132; Danford *ibid.*, 7; Maher and Campion 1951, 93) This anomaly in his demeanor toward the faculty as a whole, as compared to confidants or junior subordinates, suggests that he made a conscious choice of leadership styles while the Superintendent of West Point.

MacArthur continued several behavior patterns at West Point that had set him apart during World War I. Some of these behavior patterns reinforced negative views of him by the conservative faculty. Other positive behaviors went unnoticed by most of the staff and faculty, but indicated that he had a firm grasp on effective management techniques, and what functioning as an executive entailed.

As a matter of personal policy, MacArthur isolated himself from involvement in day-to-day routine administration. He effectively and extensively delegated tasks to trusted subordinates such as Ganoe and Danford. (Ganoe 1962, 43-48, 143, 155; Danford 1964, 14; Devers 1964, 18) He used his adjutant to control the access of others to himself. He religiously cleared his desk of pending actions before leaving work each day. (Ganoe 1962, 48, 78-80, 108, 121, 137) MacArthur's personalized delegation of authority and responsibility for projects and day-to-day administration not only freed him up for less mundane duties, but instilled his trusted subordinates with a sense of trust and confidence. His delegation of authority and handling of routine administration was a direct continuation of his behavior as Chief of Staff of the 42nd "Rainbow" Division.

Similar to his Wold War I behavior, MacArthur continued to wear non-standard uniforms and require others to do things that he himself did not do. He continued to sport his service hat without the regulation wire grommet. This gave his hat a distinctive casual crushed appearance. He further exaggerated this effect by his habit of wearing it cocked with its lower edge over his right eye. He also continued to wear his short non-regulation overcoat. While the rest of the staff and faculty wore highly polished boots He continued to wear cloth puttees and brushed but not highly polished field shoes. He also always carried a riding crop, with which he casually returned salutes. A riding crop, common for an officer on duty in a mounted unit, was decidedly out of place in a garrison such as West Point. (Ganoe 1962, 24; James 1970, 270; Ambrose 1966, 267) MacArthur's unique uniform appearance would have set him apart on any army post. At West Point the home of "spit and Polish" and punctilious military courtesy, where the slightest

deviation from regulations was abhorrent, his appearance in uniform and casual military courtesy were scandalous to many faculty and staff members.

MacArthur also continued his practice of requiring others to do things that he did not do himself. Part of his program for expanding the knowledge of the faculty concerning the state of contemporary pedagogy entailed required visits by the faculty to other institutions of higher learning. He mandated this policy despite some resistance from the faculty. (James 1970, 272; Ambrose 1966, 127) MacArthur had become widely read on the state of higher education, and especially embraced John Dewey's writings on the subject, but he personally did not visit any civilian schools. The net effect of his flamboyant appearance in uniform, the realization that he considered himself above regulations, and that he did not observe his own dictates to others, gave the impression that MacArthur considered himself "a law unto himself." (W.S. Nye as quoted in Ambrose 1966, 267)

At West Point, the faculty and staff schedules revolved around the rigid cadet academic routine. As very young bachelor superintendent, living with his widowed sickly mother, among an older and distant faculty, it was natural for MacArthur to establish a rigid routine and not to entertain. (Ganoe 1962, 140-141) By keeping a rigid schedule, MacArthur could control his environment, establish a buffer between himself and others with whom he had to deal, and control his workload. His rigid daily schedule allowed him to deal with his environment on his terms. At West Point it also reinforced his distant and aloof aura.

While MacArthur maintained his own rigid schedule he inserted himself into those of the faculty. He not only dropped in unannounced on the faculty in their offices, but he established a habit of unannounced visits to their classes. His section room visits gave him a first hand picture

of Academy operations, similar to his front line visits during World War I. Conservative faculty members viewed this habit as disruptive and an unwarranted intrusion in their affairs. (James 1970, 273)

MacArthur was the savior of West Point. He came to the Superintendency with a vision of how the Academy was supposed to prepare it cadets. He came with progressive proposals for change based on the contemporary state and practice of higher education, and he came with a mission and a zeal to succeed. What he did not do was change or modify his warrior hero style of leadership that he had practiced during World War I. At a conservative institution of higher education, he was neither very flexible nor collegial. He continued a pattern of carefully training his staff to accomplish the day to day administration and delegated authority and responsibilities to trusted subordinates. His management experience and training were from within the army, but he demonstrated a keen sense of the functions of an executive. By providing a vision, and enumerating goals to his subordinates, he was effectively able to delegate the day to day administration of West Point to others while he saw himself to the strategic objectives of curriculum and training reform. At the same time that he so clearly saw his mission, and directed his deputies to its accomplishment, he did not, or could not, see that his intensely personal style of decisive and dramatic leadership was counterproductive to accomplishing his mission.

Ad Interim: West Point to Washington

<u>Overview</u>

MacArthur's career from the summer of 1922, when he finished his tour as the Superintendent of West Point, to the fall of 1930, when he assumed the post of Chief of Staff of the

Army, was basically the uneventful drudgery of peacetime soldiering. His assignments during the 1922-1930 period included the command of organic combat units, but he acted in the role of commander of the senior headquarters to these units and did not exercise direct operational command over them. His titles during this period included the words "Commanding General" but his primary duties were as a military administrator. Except for command of a brigade, then a division of Philippine troops for two years, He was primarily concerned with the training, administration, and logistic support of Army personnel and units in the geographical areas that he commanded. The units of Philippine troops that he commanded, had been recently established and were assigned to garrisons in a training function. While he was in command of these units they were not committed to operations. His duties in these commands were thus more administratively, than operationally, oriented. His assignments from 1922 to 1930 were as a commanding general but he was essentially an administrator, albeit a military administrator.

Return to the Philippines: The First Time

Following his relief as the Superintendent of West Point, in June of 1922, MacArthur returned to the Philippines as the Commanding General of a newly formed administrative unit, the Military District of Manila. The Military District of Manila was a subordinate command of the Philippine Department, the military command responsible for all U.S. Army troops, units, and activities in the Philippines. The Military District of Manila was a "housekeeping" command but it included the 31st Infantry Regiment. The 31st Infantry was a regular U.S. Army unit and the largest American unit in the Philippines. MacArthur, his wife of less than six months, and her two children from a previous marriage arrived in Manila in early October 1922. The MacArthurs

had taken two months of leave and then had spent almost one month crossing the Pacific by steamer from San Francisco. He left his mother, who had lived with him throughout his tour at West Point, in Washington, D.C. with his surviving brother Arthur.

As a senior officer in a colonial government, MacArthur and his family enjoyed an elevated social status and life style. The demands of running the Military District of Manila were minimal and the MacArthurs found themselves with a considerable amount of leisure time. It had been fourteen years since he had been in the Philippines, and he devoted much of his available time to re-cultivating old friendships. (James 1970, 295-296) The United States Commissioner to the Philippines was General Wood, MacArthur's idol and the Army Chief of Staff who had sent him to Vera Cruz in 1914. The Commanding General of the Philippine Department, his senior commander, the Commanding General of the Philippine Division, the primary native Philippine military organization, and the colonel commanding the 31st Infantry Regiment were either former subordinates of his father or already knew MacArthur from previous assignments. (James 1970, 294-297)

MacArthur also renewed Filipino friendships with Manuel Quezon and Manuel Roxas, who both had risen to political prominence since he had met them in 1903-1904. His acceptance of Quezon, Roxas, and other elite Filipinos set him apart from most of the other senior Americans. His acceptance and cultivation of the Filipino elites caused consternation among elements of the American community. This consternation was probably due to the political orientations of some of his friends, such as Manuel Quezon, but was primarily the result of feelings of racial superiority prevalent in the American colonial administration and the American community in Manila. (James 1970, 296; MacArthur 1964, 84) While he socialized with Filipino elites, he did

not immerse himself in general Filipino society and culture. A review of MacArthur's corre-

spondence and records does not indicate significant travel outside the Manila area on other than

official business, contacts with ordinary Filipinos, or meaningful facility with the predominant

native language, Tagalog. (MacArthur Archives, Record Groups 1, 10, 17) This assertion

requires qualification. It is a probability, rather than a fact. This is due to the incompleteness of

MacArthur's pre-World War II records. His patterns of travel, friendships, and cultural emersion

in the Philippines during late World War II, and in Japan after World War II are well document-

ed. These records show that MacArthur's cultural contacts and emersion were limited to

extensive reading, contacts with indigenous elites, and confined to areas in and around the

national capitals. This discussion of MacArthur's foreign cultural emersion is not a negative

observation. His pattern of social contacts and interactions with indigenous cultures, established

in the Philippines from 1922 to 1925, would be consistent whenever he was abroad for the rest of

his career. MacArthur's contacts with foreign societies were greater than most of his fellow

senior military officers, and even many diplomats. The statement buttresses MacArthur's widely

attributed and accepted reputation as an Asian expert. MacArthur was an Asian expert, but only

at the national level of government.

Aspects of MacArthur's personal and professional life, which he had first established

while he was the Superintendent of West Point, and that would become constants for the rest of

his career, were rigid regimentation of his daily schedule and absorption in his work. These

personal traits were not immediately evident when he commanded the Military District of

Manila from October 1922 to May 1923, but became constants of his life after his assumption of

command of the 23d Brigade, Philippine Division in June 1923. (James 1970, 320) His schedule

undoubtedly maintained his privacy, which he always jealously guarded, and was a central and important management tool. His schedule put limits on the environment with which he had to deal. It focused his work, and that of his subordinates. MacArthur's schedule would become an especially important management tool during World War II and later in Japan, when as a man in his sixties and early seventies, it would insure that he had the energy to meet his extensive and pressing responsibilities.

MacArthur's 1922-1925 Philippine tour was routine and professionally rewarding. In June of 1923 MacArthur assumed   command of the 23d Brigade of the Philippine Division. The 45th and 57th Regiments of Philippine Scouts were the subordinate units of the 23d Brigade. The Philippine Scouts were the elite of the indigenous troops raised by the U.S. Army. They were part of the U.S. Army structure but they did not share the status or pay of American troops. While he was a brigade commander, there was a mutiny of these scouts within the Philippine Division. The mutiny ended with the arrest of over two hundred of the scouts. MacArthur avoided any taint from the mutiny. The problem was not only within his brigade, but the entire Philippine Division, and the American system of government and administration within the Philippines. The underlying causes: unequal status, pay, and treatment, were beyond MacAr-thur's control. (James 1970, 302-303) MacArthur made Major General in January of 1925 and assumed command of the Philippine Division. During the spring of 1925, he returned to the United States.

MacArthur devotes only a single page of *Reminiscences*, page 84, to his 1922-1925 Philippine tour. Three of the five paragraphs on this page are discussions of General Wood, Manuel Quezon, Major General Reed, the departmental commander, and Major General Bundy,

his division Commander. One paragraph, in which he also discusses Quezon, is an enlightened discussion of colonialism and its attendant racism. Contrary to some historical revisionism found in *Reminiscences*, all available evidence supports the fact that MacArthur strongly held these views during his 1922-1925 tour. (James 1970, 297; MacArthur Archives, RG-1, RG-10, RG-17)

The fourth paragraph on the page of *Reminiscences* devoted to his 1922-1925 tour discusses his command of the 23d Brigade of Filipino Scouts. MacArthur described the Filipino Scouts as "excellent troops, completely professional, loyal, and devoted." His comments accurately reflect the scouts' out-performance of American troops during divisional maneuvers in 1923 and on other occasions. He did not address their limitations in training, equipment, and re-sentment of their status. As with most negative events not reflecting credit on himself, MacAr-thur did not mention the mutiny. (MacArthur 1964, 84)

Between Tours in the Philippines

Upon his return to the United States, MacArthur assumed command of the IV Corps, an area command, headquartered in Atlanta on 2 May 1925. During the Summer of 1925, he transferred to Baltimore and assumed command of the III Corps. MacArthur's wife was part of Baltimore's high society, and they lived in regal splendor in his wife's mansion outside the city.

As a corps commander, his primary duties involved administrative oversight of the Army units stationed in his corps's geographical area, supervision of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Civilian Military Training Corps (CMTC) programs in his corps area, and the conduct of annual corps maneuvers. Because of the size and dispersion of the Army between the wars, corps maneuvers were more of a planning exercise than the movement and control of

large numbers of troops or units. Military assistance to civil disasters or disorders was also a

common corps commander's concern. MacArthur remained the III Corps Commanding General

until his transfer to the Philippines during the early Fall of 1928. Except for an occasional civil

emergency, his primary responsibilities during this period involved only routine peacetime

military administration.

The routine of III Corps administration included two periods of additional duty. One

period of temporary duty MacArthur found professionally dangerous and personally distasteful.

The other period was of little consequence professionally, but one in which he took extreme

pleasure and satisfaction.

General Billy Mitchell's Court Martial

For a seven week period during the Fall of 1925, MacArthur was a member of the famous

Billy Mitchell Court-Martial. Of the thirteen general officers assigned to the court-martial panel,

he was the youngest. None of the generals sitting on the court-martial had previous experience

with aviation. The original president of the court was Major General Summerall, the leading

candidate for nomination as the next Chief of Staff, which indeed he would become in 1926.

Another member of the court was Major General Sladen, MacArthur's replacement as Super-

intendent at West Point. MacArthur was one of the ten generals who heard the entire case and

finally delivered the verdict on Billy Mitchell. Summerall and two other generals were dismissed

for cause, i.e., prejudice against the defendant. (James 1970, 309-310)

MacArthur considered himself a friend, or at least fellow townsman, of Billy Mitchell,

but as a member of Mitchell's court-martial he found himself as part of the establishment's ulti-

mate method of dealing with his friend. He was in a very unenviable and politically dangerous

position that could directly effect his future assignments and possible promotions. MacArthur

devotes a page and a quarter to Mitchell's court-martial. Much of this coverage is an apologia of

how Mitchell was correct in his views, but a prophet whose message was not heeded because of

the way in which it was delivered. MacArthur also takes pains to suggest that he did not betray

his friend Mitchell as suggested by "certain rabid and irresponsible columnists." (MacArthur

1964, 85-86) Although the votes of individual members of a court-martial are not recorded,

James points out that most commentaries on the court-martial suggest that MacArthur probably

voted for acquittal, but later statements by Mitchell, and indeed MacArthur himself, leave

lingering doubts as to his actual vote. (James 1970, 310; MacArthur 1964, 86) MacArthur's

defense of his conduct in the Mitchell Court-Martial is strangely similar to his defense of his

testimony in front of a Congressional committee investigating hazing at West Point while

MacArthur was a cadet. (MacArthur 1964, 25-26; James 1970, 70-71) In the first instance

MacArthur professed he had not divulged the names of the hazers while the record indicates

otherwise. (James 1970, 71) MacArthur's discussion of airpower, while discussing the Mitchell

Court-Martial in *Reminiscences*, is also revisionist. As James points out:

> Actually his remarks about Mitchell's crusade such as "That he was right in his
> thesis is equally true and incontrovertible" were made in retrospect after four
> decades of progress by military aviation, which he began to appreciate fully only
> after the Second World War was underway.
> (James 1970, 311)

Burke Davis, in *The Billy Mitchel Affair*, reinforces James' assessment. (Davis 1967, 242-243,

267, 327; MacArthur 1964, 86) James' and Davis' assertions of MacArthur's contemporary

appreciation of the value of airpower, and his subsequent revisionist views are borne out by

MacArthur's own subsequent writings and actions as the Chief of Staff. (Hooker 1956, 62-63, 69, 72; Annual Reports of the Chief of Staff 1931-1935 as reproduced in Waldrop 1942, 42-307)

The Billy Mitchell Court-Martial is important for an examination of MacArthur's leadership and administration abilities. For a person who was normally forceful, dynamic, loquacious, and charismatic when in charge, he was strangely quiet and reserved during Mitchell's court-martial. As James puts it:

> MacArthur, never accused of lacking shrewdness in his rise to power in military circles, apparently saw his own dilemma in the Mitchell affair and opportunistically circumvented it by remaining silent.
>
> (James 1970, 310)

His behavior during the court-martial, and his sensitivity to his roll in it afterward, shows that MacArthur could be politically aware and sensitive. He could modify his normal demeanor and leadership style if the situation demanded it. It also points out that his normal "heroic" leadership style depended on lenient superiors or a lack of close supervision. MacArthur functioned best when he was in charge, and not when he was a team member. His leadership style was predicated upon superior power, privilege, or status. His previous relationships with senior district engineers in Milwaukee and San Francisco reinforce this assertion and point out that MacArthur could not play the role of a subordinate that he expected others to play to him. When in a role of a closely supervised subordinate, or just another member of a team, as in the Mitchell Court-Martial, he was not as dynamic, productive or effective. As had happened in his past, as a cadet questioning a requirement to take a test, or as a lieutenant dealing with senior district engineers, crises in his career developed when his sense of position and status clashed with his superiors. Future crises in his career, as Chief of Staff during both the Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations, and finally as SCAP in Japan and Commander in Chief in Korea, resulted from MacAr-

thur's independent heroic leadership style and sense of position. His leadership style and attitude

blurred the reality of situations. In these cases, MacArthur did not acknowledge his subor-

dination to higher authority, or consider that subordination binding. Hoover did not react to his

insubordination. MacArthur, just short of insubordination, backed down to Roosevelt. Truman

reacted to his insubordination and fired him. In each case, his sense of pride and position, and his

flare for dramatically conducting himself, prevented him from not acknowledging lawful and

binding authority. During the Mitchell Court-Martial, he showed that he could be conscious of

political and power relationships. As a member of the General Staff and the Secretary of War

Staff before World War I, and later when in contention for the position as Chief of Staff, he

proved very adept at analyzing political and power relationships. Crises occurred when MacAr-

thur's view of his position prevented him from correctly realizing that a superior could force his

obedience and cooperation. MacArthur's leadership style required clear reasons why he should

be an obedient subordinate. When he chose, he could be an effective subordinate, but his view of

self and his leadership style mitigated against it.

The other important factor, overlooked in many examinations of MacArthur's participa-

tion in the Mitchell Court-Martial, is his personal and direct involvement in the administration of

military justice in a high profile politically sensitive case. Most military officers have had

firsthand involvement in the administration of military justice. Most, have participated in a

court-martial by the time they attain field grade rank. From this perspective his participation in

the Mitchell is not significant. For MacArthur, though, his participation in Mitchell's court-

martial, should have exposed him to the administration of military justice involving the trial of

other general officers in a nationally significant case. This exposure to military justice applied to

general officers becomes significant later in his career when, as SCAP in Japan, he had Generals

Yamashita and Homma court-martialed. The Mitchell Court-Martial should have made him well

schooled in dealing with high profile courts-martial and the legal basis of the military justice

system. Because of his participation in Mitchell's court-martial, his later controversial actions in

the Homma and Yamashita courts-martial, which even brought him criticism from Supreme

Court justices, cannot be explained by a lack of knowledge or experience.

MacArthur's Olympics

In September 1927, the Chief of Staff, General Summerall, detailed MacArthur to the

Presidency of the U.S. Olympic Committee. For the next ten months, until the team left for the

Ninth Olympiad Summer Games in Amsterdam in July 1928, MacArthur retained his post as the

III Corps Commanding General, but devoted a significant amount of his time on his Olympic

duties. MacArthur's previous commitment to, and reinvigoration of, the athletic program at West

Point probably had much to do with appointment to this position. For him this assignment was

not only a welcome relief from peacetime corps area administration, but a distraction from the

collapse of his marriage to Louise Cromwell Brooks.[8]

MacArthur's stewardship of the 1928 U.S. Olympic Team was successful and essentially

uneventful. His management

and leadership of the U.S. Olympic Team displayed previously observed traits of personalized,

hands-on, up front leadership, and a penchant for his later famous purple prose. (James 1970,

330-331; MacArthur 1964, 86-87) His personalized heroic form of leadership worked well with

the athletes and showed that MacArthur preferred motivational forms of leadership rather than

standard military discipline. Similar to his performance as Superintendent at West Point, his involvement with the Olympics showed that his management and leadership style could be flexible and were effective outside strictly military environments.

Return to the Philippines: The Second Time

During the Fall of 1928, shortly after his return from the Amsterdam Olympics, MacArthur received orders to return to the Philippines as the Department Commander. His primary duties for the next two years involved overseeing training and maneuvers, inspections, equipment acquisition and replacement, and the normal routine of supply, management and administration of a peacetime overseas department. (James 1970, 339) Those tactical forces that fell under his department were led by subordinates who actually exercised operational command. MacArthur was the senior U.S. Army officer in the Philippines. He was primarily concerned with the administration of his department and not the direct tactical control of troops within that department.

MacArthur's primary billet related accomplishments were the acquisition of a chemical warfare company for the department, the successful prevention of the sale of U.S. Government oil storage facilities in Manila, and the provision of new billets for the 31st Infantry Regiment. As he had done since West Point, and in keeping with his Olympic involvement, he also upgraded and re-energized the athletic program in the department. (James 1970, 339)

The Goal Realized

On a personal level, MacArthur reestablished and strengthened his relationships with the Filipino elite. Unlike his father who feuded with the future President Taft, much to the elder MacArthur's professional determent, the son enjoyed a close and professionally rewarding relationship with Henry L. Stimson, the Governor General. Stimson had been Taft's Secretary of War when the elder MacArthur's career had fizzled. (MacArthur 1964, 88) In 1929 Stimson became President Hoover's Secretary of State and as such could weigh-in politically in the choice of the next Chief of Staff in 1930. This fact was not lost on MacArthur. He sent Stimson a fawning letter of congratulations with the prophesy that Stimson was destined for the White House. This prophesy was MacArthur's trade mark prophesy and benediction to influential acquaintances that were in positions of high power. (James 1970, 333)

MacArthur's political sense also showed itself in July 1929 when he politely declined nomination as the next Chief of Engineers on the grounds that the job required an officer with more recent engineering experience than himself. By accepting the Chief of Engineers position, he would have essentially removed himself from consideration as the next Chief of Staff. General Summerall the Chief of Staff, an ally was due to step down from the post in 1930. MacArthur also sent the newly appointed Secretary of War, Patrick J. Hurley, a letter that James describes in his introduction of the quoted letter as:

> an epistle packed with sycophancy, which was probably obvious to any reader
> except the vain, proud Secretary himself.(James 1970, 342)

MacArthur knew he was a serious contender for the nomination as the next Chief of Staff, and it appears that he took active measures to insure his selection. For a military officer he proved he could be very politically adroit. His cultivation of Stimson and Summerall, and his

outright pandering to Hurley were not accidents or isolated behavior. He wanted what his father had not attained, the senior military position in which an active officer could serve. He was in a good position to realize his goal. He was seventh in seniority of the eleven major generals on active duty. Although seventh in seniority, those who were senior to him had no more than two years to go before reaching the mandatory retirement age of sixty-four. Of the four major generals that had four years or more active duty remaining, and thus could serve a full tour as Chief of Staff, MacArthur was the youngest at fifty. He appears to have been the choice of the out-going Chief of Staff General Summerall. He also had the backing of his father's former subordinate, and his own mentor, General March, the World War I Chief of Staff. Another influential former Chief of Staff, General Pershing reportedly favored Major General Fox Conner. Pershing and March had competed for authority during World War I, and society rumors had MacArthur's 1922 reassignment from West Point to the Philippines resulting from Pershing's loss of the hand of Louise Cromwell Brooks to MacArthur. During the selection process for the new Chief of Staff, Pershing was in Europe working with the Battlefield Monuments commission. After some reluctance, Hurley, probably with Summerall's prodding, forwarded MacArthur's name for nomination as the next Chief of Staff in early August 1930. (James 1970, 291-293, 340-345; MacArthur 1964, 88-91).

MacArthur was successful in his quest for selection as the next Chief of Staff but he had also covered all his bases while in the Philippines. He had specifically requested reassignment to his previous command as the Commander of III Corps in Baltimore when he transferred from the Philippines in 1930. James cites MacArthur's reasons and request for this assignment as intriguing. He wrote the Adjutant General:

> I have never before made special application for station, and I earnestly solicit favorable consideration. The most impelling personal reason dictate the request. (MacArthur to the Adjutant General 7 July 1930 as quoted in James 1970, 342)

MacArthur had previously pleaded for special consideration in assignment when he sought orders to Milwaukee and San Francisco. His former wife had roots in Baltimore but lived in New York, and his mother lived in Washington. There were other major general positions available on the General Staff. Why then III Corps in Baltimore? III Corps was an independent command and was the closest one to Washington D.C.. This assignment would give him easy access to those who would make the next Chief of Staff selection in three to four years. Then he would be only fifty-three or fifty-four. He would be the senior major general in the Army and would still have at least ten or eleven years to serve before mandatory retirement at sixty-four.

This examination of MacArthur's posturing and maneuvering for the Chief of Staff's position is not just an interesting examination of an overly ambitious individual's goal attainment. It demonstrates that he was not the simple soldier that he portrays in his autobiography. It demonstrates that he was as astute a politician as he was a soldier and administrator. It demonstrates that he could be extremely capable of serving and using his civilian and political superiors when he acknowledged their influence and they met his purposes. Future career crises that MacArthur had, and almost had, did not result from a lack of political awareness but from a willingness on his part to accept information and views with which he did not agree. This facet of his personality would become the fatal flaw of MacArthur as the general and the senior public administrator. For the supreme egotist, it was not a lack of knowledge or understanding that would cause his career crises. His career crises stemmed from an unwillingness to accept those policies or orders of military and governmental seniors with whom he disagreed.

With his selection as the next Chief of Staff in August 1930, MacArthur entered into a new period in his career. He had reached the pinnacle of a normal career. For most military officers, this would be the final stage of their career. For MacArthur, though, he had just ended the beginning of his career; he was now beginning the middle period of his career as a senior administrator. During the first fifty years of life and twenty-seven years of commissioned service, he had established himself as a supremely confident and competent administrator with a very personalized form of heroic leadership style. What remained ahead was a transition to a senior leader and administrator who would have to work more as a politically controlled administrator than as a battlefield commander and troop leader.

1.   Infantry weapons are divided into the categories of individual and crew served weapons. Individual weapons normally consist of pistols, carbines, and rifles. Individual weapons are sometimes referred to as personal weapons. Crew served weapons are heavier, more complex than individual weapons, and require several individuals to operate, service, and supply them. Examples of crew served weapons are machine guns, mortars, flame throwers, and most anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Artillery pieces and tanks are not considered to be infantry weapons. Heavy equipment is a general term that is applied to motor transport, engineering, bridging, and material handling equipment. The term heavy equipment does not encompass weapons themselves but does include equipment that moves, transports, and supports weapons.

2.   Technically the Purple Heart was discontinued after the Revolutionary War and was not re-instituted until 1932. (Werlich 1974, 15) Originally envisioned as the junior award for meritorious service, the Purple Heart was changed to an award recognizing wounds received in combat by MacArthur when the award was re-instituted in 1932. When he re-instituted the award, by War Department General Order Number 3, MacArthur was the first person to be awarded the Purple Heart. (Borch 1996, 35) In 1918, MacArthur would have been awarded Wound Chevrons. Wound Chevrons should not to be mistaken for enlisted diagonal Service Stripes, or horizontal Overseas Service Stripes. These Wound Chevrons are clearly shown on MacArthur's uniform coats' right sleeves in World War I era pictures in numerous works in-cluding James's, Manchester's and MacArthur's. (James 1970, dust cover, 362-363; Manchester 1978, 640-641; MacArthur 1964, 184-185) During World War I the only Army Awards for hero-ism/valor were, in decreasing order of merit, Congressional Medal of Honor, Distinguished Ser-vice Cross, and Silver Star. The Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star were both originally authorized on July 9, 1918. The Silver Star was not recognized as a separate medal until 1932. From July 1918 to August 1932 the award was recognized by silver stars that were worn on the service ribbon of a campaign medal for the campaign during which the Silver Star was awarded.

The Distinguished Service Cross was modeled on its British equivalent while the Silver Star was the equivalent of the British award Mentioned in Dispatches. A Mention in Dispatches, as the junior recognition of valor, was recognized by a device worn on the appropriate British campaign medal. (Werlich 1974, 5, 8) It should be noted that the re-institution of the Purple Heart, and the upgrading of the Silver Star to an award with service ribbon and medal took place while MacArthur was the Army Chief of Staff. MacArthur was thus the senior military officer who would have instituted and/or approved the actions upgrading these awards. (Annual Report of the Chief of Staff Fiscal Year 1932, 116-118)

3.   The incident involved a requirement to take a mathematics exam at the end of the 1901 academic year when MacArthur was a third class, i.e., sophomore, cadet. It was customary that cadets with a certain average were exempt from final exams. MacArthur was not on the list of those cadets excused from the mathematics exam, although he knew he had the required minimum average. "Enraged," he went to the quarters of Lt.Col. Wright P. Edgerton, the head of the Mathematics Department, to argue his case. Lt.Col. Edgerton advised MacArthur that, in addition to the minimum average, a cadet had to have taken two thirds of the quizzes. MacArthur was one quiz short of this requirement because of hospitalization for a minor illness. The young, brash, and angry cadet boldly asserted that the Lt.Col. Department Head should have told him of the additional requirement and allowed him to make up the quiz.

> "Edgerton, who had come to the academy only eight months before MacArthur and may have lacked the assurance of the older, established professors, patiently tolerated the cadet's effrontery."

MacArthur stated he would not be present for the exam. Edgerton did not respond and "the exasperated cadet saluted and stormed back to his barracks." Just before the examination MacArthur received notification that Lt.Col Edgerton had excused him from the exam. James 1970, 76-77)

4.   An observation post, in common World War I usage, was a small protected position, usually camouflaged or concealed, from which a small number of officers could observe no-man's land or enemy positions. Observation Posts (OPs) were used by commanders to conduct visual reconnaissances and terrain orientations. They were also used by artillery forward (fire control) observers. At night or during periods of reduced visibility OPs were referred to as Listening Posts (LPs). Command Posts (CPs) were located far enough to the rear that artillery bombardments of the front line positions would not involve the CPs. CPs were heavily protected positions that might hold several dozen personnel. They usually had multiple and redundant means of communication and were the locations from which actual command and control of operations were conducted.

5.   Because of the limitations of World War I tactical communications, a commander or observer positioned in, or near, the front lines could expect to communicate only with units in their immediate vicinity or with command posts to the rear. If a commander went forward, the chief of staff would have to remain at the command post to exercise command. Primary staff officers normally only visited the front lines during lulls in activity. During operations or combat they had to remain at the command post in order to support the commander, chief of staff, or

deputy/assistant commanding officer who exercised actual control of operations.

6.   Although the Turtle, a one-man semi-submersible submarine, was used against the British fleet in the Hudson River during the Revolutionary War, it did not meet with success and had no meaningful effect hostilities. The CSS Hunley managed to sink a Union warship, although at the cost of its own loss. Hunley's success encouraged further development of the submarine into a practical military weapon before the beginning of World War I. In the field of military aviation, the Union Army routinely used tethered observation balloons during the Peninsular and Richmond Campaigns.

7.   A graphic example of MacArthur's personalization of organizations he headed is provided by a review of the *Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA* submitted by the various Superintendents from 1898 through 1922. MacArthur's predecessors consistently opened each report with a highlight of the previous years's major events or concerns, and a summary of the Academy's accomplishments. This opening portion by the Superintendent was followed by individual reports, in their entirety, by each of the individual academic department heads. The Superintendent then added a closing summary before signing the report. MacArthur's first annual report of 1920 only contained unsigned edited summaries of the various academic department reports, although it did contain the entire report of the Board of Visitors. The report of the Board of Visitors was not normally an included in the Superintendent's annual report. In this case the report of the Board of Visitors buttressed assertions MacArthur made in the body of his report concerning the academic program. MacArthur's final annual report of 1922 was totally a personal statement of the Superintendent and had even done away with edited summaries of the departmental reports. Although correctly the study of a scholar trained in semantics, the pronouns used in the reports by MacArthur's predecessors tended to be of the third person with the emphasis being on the institution rather than individuals. MacArthur's reports contain "I"s and "we"s with the emphasis changed to MacArthur himself or of MacArthur as part of a collective decision. MacArthur's predecessors submitted reports that were collegial in nature. MacArthur's reports were plainly his own personal reports in which MacArthur was the sole spokesman for the institution. (*Annual Report of the Superintendent USMA*, 1898 through 1922)

8.   The couple had legally separated during August 1927, with MacArthur remaining in residence at Louise's family mansion outside Baltimore while she moved to New York. She would latter divorce MacArthur in Reno in June of 1929 after MacArthur had returned to the Philippines without her in 1928. MacArthur only mentioned the marriage, and not his wife's name in one sentence of twenty-one words in *Reminiscences*. (James 1970, 319-323; MacArthur 1964, 83)

CHAPTER IV

Middle Career: Chief of Staff to Theater Commander

The Environment on Mount Olympus[1]

<u>The Nation</u>

MacArthur became the Chief of Staff of the Army during November 1930. The nation was in the second year of the Great Depression. Almost eight million workers were unemployed and the rates of bank failures, business failures, and other economic indicators pointed to worsening, not improving, economic conditions. Congress and President Herbert Hoover, the "Great Engineer," did not appear able to effectively address the continuing economic crises. The congressional elections of November 1930 reduced the Republican control of the House to a plurality of one, which would be lost a few months later. The Senate had equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats. A coalition of maverick Republicans and Democrats exercised effective control of the House rather than the President's Republican Party majority. The Government was in crises, not only because of fragmented control within the Legislative Branch, but also because of a growing lack of faith and increased fears of national chaos within the electorate. (James 1970, 351-352; Millett and Maslowski 1984, 373; Matloff 1969, 414-415; Shrader 1994, 3-4)

Civil-Military Relations

MacArthur became the Chief of Staff during a period when civil-military relationships were undergoing fundamental changes. His own political conservatism, his close identity with the historically conservative professional officer corps, and his extended absence from the United States during the 1920s mitigated against his realization of the nature and extent of these shifts in civil-military relationships. Although he very astutely recognized the changing nature of the American soldier, and the nature of leadership required of military officers in the post World War I environment, he did not understand that civil-military relationships were changing. MacArthur's writings and actions while he was chief of staff suggest that he reacted to the effects of these changes but did not grasp their underlying causes. An understanding of the changing nature of civil-military relationships is of central importance to an examination of MacArthur as the Chief of Staff. As the Chief of Staff, he was one of the two senior military officers, along with the Chief of Naval Operations, responsible for coordinating political and military rela-tionships.

Samuel P. Huntington, in *The Soldier and the State* (1964), his renowned study of civil-military relations, describes the late 1920s and 1930s as a period during which the American officer corps was growing out of touch with and alienated from its society and civilian govern-ment. Huntington describes the earlier period from 1918 to 1925 as one of "abortive identifica-tion with society" for the military. He states:

> After 1918 the military made every effort to continue the wartime identification
> with American society and to expand the Neo-Hamiltonian link with the Ameri-
> can community. Particularly in the Army, the war professional officers viewed the

war as ushering in a new era of civil-military relations."The 'splendid isolation' of

the Regular Army," proclaimed the *Infantry Journal*,"is a thing of the past." The

Army was to become a participating member of American Society . . . The urge to

belong, to be accepted, to identify with the community at large, was the primary

goal of the military officers as they stressed the necessity of "getting close to the

people." (Huntington 1964, 283)[2]

Military officers applauded the National Defense Act of 1920, with its emphasis on the civilian

National Guard and Reserve components, as the legal recognition of the new orientation of civil-

military relations. The previous discussion of MacArthur's writings on the nature of military

leadership, while he was the Superintendent of West Point, accurately reflects this prevalent and

popular view. (Annual Report[s] of the Superintendent USMA 1919-1922) Huntington even

quotes MacArthur in defining this period:

> The instruction of the civilian components in particular required a new type of
>
> officer with a new outlook. It was essential, in the words of General MacArthur,
>
> that the officers have "an intimate understanding of the mechanics of human feel-
>
> ing, a comprehensive grasp of world and national affairs, and a liberalization of
>
> conception which amount to a change in his psychology of command" (Annual
>
> Report of the Superintendent USMA 1920, 4; Huntington 1964, 285)

The professional officer corps viewed the initial negative reactions, to what they

considered a responsible and modest military program in accordance with the recently passed

National Defense Act of 1920, as emotional reactions to the carnage of World War I. They did

not consider them negative reactions to the American military establishment. It was felt, that by

educating society in the nonmilitary benefits of a reasonably sized and affordable military force,

the society would reciprocate and identify with its citizen soldier based Army. The military

stressed its roles in humanitarian assistance and in training responsible citizens over its conven-

tional role of wartime preparedness. Officers detailed to reserve duty were encouraged to

become socially involved in fraternal, business, and community organizations in order to blend

in with middle-class business America. Most professional military officers considered pacifists

as either "sentimentalists with an unreasoned opposition to war," taxpayers wishing to reduce

expenditures, or hard core political radicals. (Huntington 1964, 285) It was also felt, that because

the "services reflected the true will of the American people," the society as a whole would

recognize the need for a properly sized and funded military establishment. (Ibid.) A corollary to

the belief that the services embodied societal goals was the view, held by many military

professionals, that opponents to a modest and reasonable military program were political

outcasts.

The above professional officers' views of the military in society were the basis for, and

the assumptions behind, the military's postwar campaign for universal military training. The

Army's leaders considered universal military training as an essential element of a military based

on the citizen soldier. The military aspects of this training received less emphasis than those

areas that involved training in civic responsibilities and skills that were useful to the society. The

Army's attempts to realize universal military training through creation of civilian training camps

and Reserve Officer Training Units at universities engendered political controversies with a

whole range of pacifist, religious, and educational organizations. Those groups that reacted to the Army's attempts to carry out civilian military training programs did not accept the well meant and sincere arguments of the military officers at face value. In return the military officers denounced all the motives and activities of those who opposed their programs.

What the professional officers did not realize was that the basis for anti-militarism had its roots in both reform and business liberalism. Reform liberalism, arising in the populism of the 1880s and 1890s, became the progressive movement and formed the basis of the New Freedom and later the New Deal. (Huntington 1964, 289) Basic tenets of the progressive reform movement, with its populist roots, clashed with military ideals that many considered represented Prussian General Staff attitudes. The ideals of business pacifism, dominant in the 1920s, also ran counter to military preparedness and its associated diversion of valuable national resources form other more useful and economically profitable uses. On the one hand, the business pacifists considered the military profession to be "backward and primitive" with "no utilitarian justification for maintenance of exclusively military institutions." The liberal reformers attacked military expenditures as "sheer waste" which should be "used for the reform purposes of improving human welfare." The reformers also stressed the conflict between military values and the humanitarian values of liberalism. (Huntington 1964, 291-292) While the military remained wed to Neo-Hamiltonianism and sought societal identification, the dominant philosophies of reform liberalism and business pacifism favored isolationism and internationalism. The object of the military's affection had rejected the suitor, but the suitor did not accept or understand the rejection. Huntington sums it up:

> But it went beyond this to reveal sharply the antagonism between the soldier and
> the modern intellectual. The intellectual associated the military with war and

hated them because war was a sorry reflection on the strength of the human intellect. The great virtues of the soldier - Honesty, Duty, Faith, - disqualified "him utterly from ever being a modern intellectual." The World of the scholars, writers, and liberals had nothing but scorn for the professional military man." (Huntington 1964, 311-312; quoting J.H. Burns, *Infantry Journal*, XLVII (September-October 1940), 419-423)

Professional military officers did not realize the failure of the military's attempt to identify and integrate with society until late in the 1920's. It only slowly dawned on the professional officer corps that the problem was more than simply educating the rest of society. Simple misinformation, the failure of Congress to reflect national sentiment accurately, or the agitation of isolated pacifist misfits could not explain the depth and breadth of anti military feelings. (Huntington 1964, 287) The professional officer corps of the late 1920's and early 1930's realized that there was anti militarism, but their writings and reactions do not suggest they fully understood its nature, or causes. MacArthur, and most other senior officers, fulminated and railed against anti military actions and events. They saw sinister "red" inspired plots, but they did not understand the real nature of the problem. This lack of understanding would be a factor in MacArthur's effectiveness as the Chief of Staff and his ability to relate to the politicians and civilian administrators with whom he had to deal.

The Army

The Army that MacArthur was to head was also in crisis. Professional military officers understood and acknowledged some aspects of the Army's crisis. Civilian officials, even inside the War Department, were primarily concerned with the economic crisis. The national economy and the government's attempts at austerity were keenly felt and acknowledged as primary causes for the Army's budget crisis.

Most of the Army's ills could be traced to money -or rather the lack of it. A U.S.

public, ignorant of peacetime requirements for national defense, remained

apathetic, almost inert, in the face of mounting crises abroad. Minuscule appropri-

ations for military purposes were given grudgingly, even during the prosperous

1920s; after the stock market crashed, chronic government deficits discouraged

anything beyond bare-bones maintenance of the modest military establishment so

reluctantly tolerated. (Collins 1972, 12)

The military officer corps well understood, though not without resentment, that the requirement

to make do with World War I stocks of outdated and obsolescent equipment, and the constant

threat of reduced force structure levels were effects of the budgetary crisis. Anti-military atti-

tudes, resulting from a revulsion to the carnage of World War I, and a historical national

antipathy toward a large military establishment had persisted through the economic boom of the

1920s. The Great Depression exacerbated these anti-military attitudes. Military and naval

mobilization and force level plans, drafted and put into law during the early 1920s when the

painful lessons of pre-war readiness and mobilization were still fresh, never materialized. The

economic boom of the 1920s should have made the realization of the readiness and mobilization

plans possible. "The constraints on economic planning (by the War Department) were political,

not technical." (Millett and Maslowski 1984, 379; Shrader 1994, 3-5) Pacifism and isolationism

became *de facto* national policies. United States participation in, and ratification of, several

international military and naval disarmament conferences, and their resultant treaties, imple-

mented and institutionalized these new national policies. A reborn peace movement, whose

domestic lobbies included idealists, organized labor, and reform groups, believed international

agreements could avoid future wars through denying national governments the tools to wage

aggressive warfare successfully. By the reduction of military forces, through treaties, to the

minimum level required for national defense, military spending would decrease. The savings

realized by reduced military spending would then be available for diversion to politically popular

social and economic priorities. The curious combination of isolationism from international

entanglements, but reliance on international disarmament treaties as a means to prevent future

wars, led the United States to place primary reliance on its military potential rather than an

extant capability. (Millett and Maslowski 1984, 362-364; Shrader 1994, 29-31) The anti-

militarism of society and the growing threat of communism, the "red threat," were almost

fixations within the General Staff. Career Army officers of the inter-war period, conservative as

a group, saw the rise in labor unrest and political dissension, as communist inspired, rather than

as an effect of the economic crisis. (James 1970, 384)

Not even acknowledged, let alone understood, were other aspects of the military crisis.

Less obvious to Army planners and strategists were the implications of United States defense

policy that relied on the fleet and Mahanian concepts of seapower. (Millett and Maslowski 1984,

363) Large U.S. Army garrisons in the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, and the Philippines

complemented one of the three goals of inter-war United States foreign and defense policy, i.e.,

fleet defense of overseas possessions. [3] The overseas garrisons' structure and support had a valid

mission associated with the national defense policy. The overseas garrisons could develop

strategies and conduct training in support of real world contingency plans. The bulk of the U.S.

Army lacked such a clear mission and orientation for doctrinal employment.[4] Other than

providing the basis for wartime mobilization, the Army in the Continental United States did not

have a doctrinal focus for its training, employment, and force structure. A single exception was the limited Army Air Corps mission of attacking naval vessels off the coasts. This mission provided the Army Air Corps with the procurement requirement for the multi-engine long range B-17 bomber. The speed, defensive armament, and range of the B-17 provided the Army Air Corps with a platform upon which it could develop strategic bombing doctrine and tactics. That the B-17 later became the backbone of United States Army Air Corps' strategic bombing campaign during World War II was a more fortunate than deliberate result of its limited coastal defense mission. Those elements of the Army that did not have coastal or overseas possession defense missions had no specific missions and functions against which to equip and train.

The U.S. Army also lacked a recognized reason to revamp, reorganize and update its equipment holdings and organizations. The extremely restrictive economic constraints that faced the inter-war Army constrained and discouraged the development of new strategies and doctrines that relied on new equipment, such as tanks, armored and amphibious vehicles, and aircraft. Unlike its European counterparts, the U.S. Army lacked a dangerous potential enemy that bordered its territory. The United States had participated only in the final eighteen months of World War I. Its forces had experienced heavy combat for only the last seven months of the war. It had not participated in the blood baths of Verdun or Passchendaele. It had not endured the four years of trench warfare that had bled white the European armies. America's exposure to the carnage of World War I had been relatively light.[5] The lessons of World War I were not as obvious to the American people, their government, or even their military, as they were to the Europeans. (Weigley 1973, 219-221) While European armies experimented with new forms of technology and warfare to prevent or avoid the carnage of World War I, the United States fell

back on long accepted concepts of mass mobilization on a force structure similar to the one fielded for World War I. (Millett and Maslowski 1984, 366; Weigley 1973, 221; Matloff 1969, 407-409)

Contemporary national security policies in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., and Japan provided their armies with doctrinal employment objectives against which to train and equip their forces. Later criticisms of inter-war U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff, and the Army as a whole, to develop armored, amphibious, and airborne warfare capabilities, which other foreign armies developed during the same period, do not address the lack of a clear-cut mission for the inter-war U.S. Army. (Millett and Maslowski 1984, 362-367; Matloff 1969, 409-411; Shrader 1994, 3-5, 29-31) The lack of a clear cut doctrinal objective was a crisis for the Army, but it was one that was neither obvious nor acknowledged. The drafts of individual "colored" war plans by the General Staff and the Joint Army-Navy Board addressed inter-service relationships, and general Army employment requirements, but did not fill the void of central doctrinal employment objectives for the Army.

American military and governmental leaders were not ignorant of doctrinal and equip-ment trends elsewhere in the world, particularly in Europe. In 1927, Secretary of War Dwight Davis visited England and witnessed the maneuvers of the British Army's Experimental Mechanized Force.[6] In response to the Secretary's queries and prodding, the U.S. Army set up a similar force under Major Adna Chaffee at Fort Meade Maryland. Although short lived, the initial armored/mechanized force reemerged, following MacArthur's tenure as Chief of Staff, as a similar force at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Twice while the Chief of Staff, MacArthur would visit Europe and see at first hand the doctrinal and equipment innovations in the European military

establishments. While he was Chief of Staff, he would devote significant portions of his official writings to the status and development of armored/ mechanized and air warfare. Widespread discussion of aerial warfare and doctrine did not stop with the Billy Mitchell Court-Martial. The roles, missions, and equipage of military aviation would become one of the most significant and addressed aspects of MacArthur's tenure as Chief of Staff.

A lack of knowledge or exposure to aerial and armored warfare were not contributing factors to the Army's failure of not developing these emergent means of warfare. The Army did not recognize the need to develop such doctrines and capabilities. The "Jomonian" theorists of the American Civil War embraced military maneuver as the dominant strategy and didn't realize that warfare had changed to a "Clauswitzian" paradigm of total war. Similarly, the American Army between World Wars I and II embraced the mass mobilization of civilian soldiers and did not accept the efficacy of smaller armies formed around armored and mechanized cores. With no recognized need, there was no acquisition of the equipment on which to train and develop emergent doctrines. Weigley sums it up:

> An Army less battered, with deeper reserves of manpower, doubted prophecies of victory with small mechanized armies. (Weigley 1973, 220)

The U.S. Army continued the tried and true practices of the past, best elucidated by the well known and accepted Colonel Naylor, which relied on mass mobilization of a citizen army that emphasized numbers of men and equipment over smaller mechanized forces supported by independent air arms. (Ibid.)

Four Stars and an Army

On November 21, 1930 MacArthur assumed the brevet the rank of General and ascended to the office of Chief of Staff of the United States Army.[7] (Jones 1970, 347; MacArthur 1964, 89) In a move that underscored the influence of his mother on his life and career, he authorized the installation of an elevator and the construction of a sun porch in his quarters at Fort Myer as one of his first official acts as the Chief of Staff. Similar to the period when he was the Superintendent of West Point, his mother shared his quarters while he was Chief of Staff. (James 1970, 347)

MacArthur's Concerns and Goals as Chief of Staff

MacArthur and his chief biographers all agree that the central, dominant, and even driving concern during his tenure as Chief of Staff was the economic crises called the Great Depression. (MacArthur 1964, 99-101; James 1970, 351; Petillo 1981, 155-156; Shaller 1989, 14) Because of the tightly constrained or decreasing fiscal environment that existed until the final year of his tenure as the Chief of Staff, MacArthur could only make innovations that amounted to re-allocations of existing resources. He not only lacked a margin above his existing resource base against which to plan or program any improvements, reorganizations, or innovations, but he was forced to expend most of his efforts against attempts to reduce the Army's existing resource base. He was further frustrated in making significant improvements in the Army because he had to divert existing human, fiscal, and equipment resources against economic recovery rolls and missions that had nothing to do with conventional military functions. This diversion of military resources for civilian economic recovery purposes resulted from over-

whelming political pressures but was also a successful stratagem for protecting these resources from reductions or elimination.

MacArthur's *Reminiscences* devotes less than thirteen of its 438 pages to his tenure as the Chief of Staff of the Army. (MacArthur 1964, 90-103) Much of this is anecdotal coverage of several incidents of his relationships with administration luminaries. He also devotes significant attention to anti-war activists, and his budget battles. More than a third of his coverage as Chief of Staff is a defense of his participation in the Bonus March incident. (Ibid., 92-97) *Reminiscences*, unlike its coverage of his tour of duty as the Superintendent of West Point, does not address MacArthur's goals or objectives upon entering the office of Chief of Staff. He stated:

> But little by little, step by step, my main purpose of formulating the basic outline of a broad plan for the United States to meet an inevitable war took shape. (Ibid., 90)

This quotation is of interest for two reasons. First, MacArthur admits that he entered the office of Chief of Staff without a set of specific goals and objectives. Second, although he alludes to the formulation of a main purpose, he did not go on to specifically outline the elements of his broad plan. Instead, he listed the accomplishments made while he was Chief of Staff.

> We brought out an Industrial Mobilization Plan and a plan for the General Mobilization of Manpower encompassing all citizens, both still in effect. We redesigned the military defense of the United States- the "Four Army Plan"- the basic principles of which still prevail. We evolved the independent striking arm which became the forerunner of our present Air Force. We forecast the independent armored land force and developed a school for it at Fort Knox. (Ibid., 91)

It is possible to determine MacArthur's central concerns and goals as the Chief of Staff from two related sets of documents. These document sets are the annual budget submissions and the *Annual Reports of the Chief of Staff* that supported, explained and defended the budget submissions. Appendix F displays the time lines and major budget document submissions related

to the War Department during the period that MacArthur was the Chief of Staff. Appendix G

details the War Department's budget requests, the War Department's level of funding within the

Presidential Budget Submission, final Congressional action on the War Department's portion of

the Presidential Budget Submission, and any subsequent Executive Department recisions on the

War Department's appropriation. Appendix H shows the breakout of the War Department, or

U.S. Army, annual Budgets by accounts.[8] Appendices F and G include those budget submissions

that MacArthur either planned or executed. Appendix H covers only the period that MacArthur

was the Chief of Staff, but it also coincides with the *Annual Report(s) of the Chief of Staff* that he

wrote.

A review of Appendix F shows that MacArthur assumed the office of Chief of Staff just

before the Presidential Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 1931. Because of his assignment

overseas, he had no impact on the development of the Fiscal Year 1931 War Department

Request, defense of that request during the Budget Bureau markup, or final formulation of the

Fiscal Year 1931 Presidential Budget. Upon assuming office, his budgetary involvement was

limited to executing the final seven months of the Fiscal Year 1930 War Department Appropria-

tion, and defense of his predecessor's Fiscal Year 1931 request that had survived the Budget

Bureau markup and formulation of the Presidential Budget Submission. Conversely, his

departure from the office of Chief of Staff during the Fall of 1935 meant that the Fiscal Year

1936 budget was a product of his concerns and guidance.

Appendix G shows a consistent trend of Executive Department reductions in the War

Department Budget Request throughout MacArthur's tenure as Chief of Staff. Congressional

authorizations further reduced the War Department's requests from Fiscal Years 1931 through

1934. Only in fiscal years 1935 and 1936 did Congress authorize funding of War Department

Requests above Presidential Budget Submission levels. Even then the Congressional increase

did not restore the level of funding to the War Department Request nor even equal the Fiscal

Year 1931 War Department Request level. Only in Fiscal Year 1937, when the War Department

Request was $467 million, the Presidential Budget Submission for the War Department was

$383 million, and the final War Department Authorization was $388 million, did the Army

funding level even equal those before the Great Depression. (James 1970, 448-449, 460;

Waldrup 1942, 418) This is all the more significant when the involvement of the Army in non-

military economic recovery operations is considered. Throughout the first half of the 1930s,

Congress reduced military spending but increased War Department non-military funding. (James

1970, 363) If only funds actually related to military activities are considered, the War Depart-

ment's budgets for the period from 1930 through 1935 were actually significantly lower than

pre-depression levels.

Appendix I is a summary of the *Annual Reports of the Chief of Staff* for Fiscal Years

1931 through 1935, i.e., those written by MacArthur. These reports represent the Chief of Staff's

official priorities and concerns in support of the War Department portion of the Presidential

Budget Submission. A review of the subjects discussed in MacArthur's annual reports shows that

he did not limit his discussions to line items in the War Department Request. Besides the normal

summary of the state of the Army, he discussed other pending legislation, military equipment

and doctrinal developments, to include aerial and armored warfare. He also provided tutorials on

mobilization planning and internal Army organization. His annual reports were a combination of

budget support documents, tutorials on military affairs, and preemptive strikes on what he

viewed as dangerous legislation.

MacArthur's *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff for Fiscal Year 1931* is unique among

his five reports because it does not begin with an acknowledgment of the effects of the Great

Depression. This report is also different in that it is primarily a tutorial on the Army, its legal

basis, and the position of the Army within the society. MacArthur states:

> ...it is my purpose in this report, Mr. Secretary, to discuss trends rather than
> isolated incidents to point out the axial road the Army is following toward the
> fulfillment of its legal mission, rather than to describe the many bypaths utilized
> by particular elements in order to arrive at their final destination. (quoted in
> Waldrop 1942, 43)

It is, by far, the shortest report. The body of the report is only thirteen pages long. Appended to

the report is the Chief of Staff's address to the War Policies Commission given on May 13, 1931.

This address is thirty-two pages in length. It is not only a tutorial on the status of the Army and

on mobilization and war planning, but an explanation of recent organizational changes within the

Army. The address included recommended legislation to address problems identified in the

address.

The body of the Fiscal Year 1931 report addresses several issues that would become

recurrent themes in future reports. These issues included Army strength, i.e., numbers of officers

and enlisted personnel, the financial condition of the troops, the stagnation of officer promotions,

and the status of the National guard and Organized Reserve civilian components. These items

were all discussed in just over four pages of the report. Another recurrent annual report item, the

mechanization of the Army, received three pages of discussion. The Fiscal Year 1931 does not

address military aviation in any depth, but this subject would become a central issue in the

reports that followed. A review of MacArthur's *Report(s) of the Chief of Staff* for Fiscal Years

1931 through 1935 show that the following topics consistently received attention:

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Table 1.-- Subjects by Coverage and Frequency, Report(s) of
          the Chief of Staff Fiscal Year(s) 1931-1935
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Subject	Pages of Text	Fiscal Years
Personnel (Combined)	54	31,32,33,34,35
(End Strength)	(32)	31,32,33,34,35
(Promotions)	(16)	31,32,33
(Financial Conditions)	(6)	31,33
Civilian Components	25	31,32,34,35
(National Guard/Reserve)		
Planning	24	31,32,33,34,35
(War and Mobilization)		
Army Organization	17	31,32,33,34,35
(4 Army Plan/Corps)		
Aviation/USAAC	16	32,33,34,35
Armored Forces/	14	31,32,33,34,35

(Appendix I)

Proper Prior Planning Prevents . . .

Table 1. lists subjects in order of descending coverage but does not claim to be a listing by

descending order of importance to MacArthur. Twenty-one of the twenty-four pages devoted to

planning were all in the Fiscal Year 1931 report. Nineteen of these twenty-one pages on

mobilization planning were part of the address to the War Policies Commission, May 13, 1931.

This address was an attachment to the basic Chief of Staff's report. Excluding these nineteen

pages gives the subject "planning" a total of only five pages of coverage in Fiscal Years 1931,

1933, and 1934. It also appears that MacArthur used his tutorials on mobilization planning and

the 1920 National Defense Act as general justifications for supporting the total War Department

Budget Requests. Although updating and modernizing mobilization plans was one of his

accomplishments as Chief of Staff that MacArthur cited in *Reminiscences,* it does not appear that

mobilization planing was a central issue during his tour as Chief of Staff. (MacArthur 1964, 80)

Updating mobilization plans were of primary concern to the Army, but the basis and general

elements of U.S. Army and War Department mobilization planning between the world wars were

essentially unchanged. If the Army had mobilized between 1931 and 1935, it would have been a

similar reenactment of the World War I experience. War and industrial mobilization plans were

updated during MacArthur's tenure as Chief of Staff. The volume of detailed and painstaking

work by the General Staff was large, but industrial mobilization planning was a primary duty of

the Assistant Secretary of War and a function of the entire War Department. The plan that

emerged from the update of the early 1930s was the result of routine staff work and not a unique

or special accomplishment of the Chief of Staff or the General Staff under his supervision.

MacArthur showed keen interest in mobilization planning and actively supported the plan

revisions, as demonstrated by his inclusion of this subject in two of his *Annual Report(s),* but the

inclusion of updating mobilization plans as a major accomplishment of his tenure as Chief of

Staff was more a case of looking back at what was done rather than a major objective or concern

at the time he occupied the office.

To Have An Army You Need Soldiers

MacArthur's central concern throughout his tenure as the Chief of Staff was the manning

and end strength of the Army, particularly of the regular officer corps.[9] James concisely defined

MacArthur's central concern as Chief of Staff and his approach to budgeting when he stated:

> For the next five years MacArthur faithfully assumed Summerall's stance of
> reluctant acquiescence in budget reductions because of the fiscal emergency and

dogged resistance to any imbalancing of the distribution of funds in favor of one arm. MacArthur, however, was more concerned about protecting the personnel of the military establishment, i.e., the numbers of officers and enlisted men, their pay, allowances, and other benefits, since he feared that any imbalance in appropriations would be in favor of materiel over personnel, not simply one arm over another. (James 1970, 355-356)

Petillo confirms James assessment in stating:

The major problem facing the Army was also the major problem facing the nation: the budget crises. As a result, one of MacArthur's primary duties was to shape an expenditure plan each year, defend it in Congress, and then learn to live with the cutbacks that invariably followed. Within these confines, he established two major policies. His primary concern was that the officer corps, which he believed was an absolute necessity for an expandable army in time of crisis, not be pared down. Secondarily, and as an outgrowth of this initial assumption, he was determined that what little funds were available would be divided equally between all arms of the military. Since some branches, particularly the air and mechanized units, clearly needed more money, he would later be criticized when World War II made the deficiency obvious. But without the advantage of hind sight, it is likely that few Army planners would have handled the depleted resources any more effectively. (Petillo 1981, 158)

Because his chief concern was defense of the Army's personnel base, particularly its officer corps, and this concern was tied to the national budget crisis, MacArthur's major advisaries were officials within Hoover's and Roosevelt's administrations who controlled the budget process, and congressmen who favored technology over troop strength. The departure of Billy Mitchell, the conservative nature of the General Staff, and the relative obscurity and lack of seniority of the principle proponents of air power and armored mechanization allowed MacArthur a free hand in implementing his "force structure first, new equipment second" policies within the Army. The existence of an Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Secretary Davison, from 1931 to 1933, meant that he faced some institutional resistance to his policies at the War Department level. (Appendix J) This resistance was negated though by MacArthur's close relations, and mutual respect with President Hoover and Secretary of War Hurley, and later close relations with Secretary of War

Dern during Roosevelt's administration. (James 1970, 352-354, 416-417) Where MacArthur did face significant administration resistance to his policies and initiatives were from within the Bureau of the Budget and in the presidentially approved Treasury Department initiatives to cut outlays of previously appropriated monies. Although MacArthur was close to Hoover and had the respect of Roosevelt, neither president could resist the need to reduce spending that was not conducive to economic recovery. With no war on the immediate horizon, both presidents acted in accordance with Kipling's *Tommy* rather than in accordance with their own Chief of Staff's counsel and warnings.[10] Appendix G shows a clear pattern of reductions in the War Department's budget requests by the administration. These reductions were made by the Budget Bureau acting on pressure from the Secretary of the Treasury and President. Although some of the civilians acting on the War Department budgets almost certainly had an antipathy toward the military, reductions in military spending and pressures to reduce the size of the military were primarily the result of the deep economic crisis and not politics, pacifism, or Communism.

Outside of the administration, MacArthur's primary opponents were on the congressional appropriations and authorizations committees. Although MacArthur traded barbs and fulminated against all types of pacifists, clergy, academics, and various other groups opposed to his military policies, it was in the Congress that the size and shape of the Army rested. The Chief of Staff's struggles with Congress was waged along two fronts. First MacArthur had to fight off cuts in his budget or in particular functions or categories. Appendices Seven and Eight indicate that he did not prevent cuts in his budget requests. He was not able to restore reductions made by the administration. Although Congress restored administration cuts in the Fiscal Year 1936 War Department Request, this was done after MacArthur had departed the position of Chief of Staff.

(Appendix F) At best He was only able to limit the size of successive fiscal cuts. In the area of preventing cuts to specific areas of manning or operations, MacArthur was more successful. He successfully avoided cuts in military pensions, officer strength, and the proposed abolition of the Army Transport Service. (Appendix I; James 1970, 357-359, 362, 371, 426-428)

The second front on which MacArthur fought budget battles with Congress was over the distribution of funds between the various arms and whether available funds should be spent on new materials and equipment using new technologies or on troop strength. It was in Congress that airpower and armored mechanization proponents, ineffective in pushing their programs from within the Army, had strong and powerful allies. Chief among congressional advocates for spending more on technology and less on troop strength was Representative Ross A. Collins of Mississippi, the Chairman of the Military Appropriations Sub-Committee. Collins proposals concerning air power and mechanization, and their levels of funding, caused these subjects to become central issues during MacArthur's stewardship of the Army. Collins and MacArthur's debates over troops versus planes and tanks prevented decisions on these subjects from being made by default or in a vacuum. MacArthur's positions concerning airpower and mechanization, and the importance of end strength versus technology were thus well documented and the result of much thought. What lack of meaningful opposition to force structure and doctrine MacArthur encountered from within the Army and the War Department was more than made up for by Ross A. Collins. MacArthur's views on troop strength, particularly officer strength, and balanced budgeting between branches, form the basis for analyzing his actions and positions concerning aerial and mechanized warfare.

The Minutemen

The subject of "civilian components," i.e., the National Guard and organized reserves, was a central issue for MacArthur for several reasons. First, the National Defense Act of 1920 based ground based defense requirements on a small active Army with initial mobilization accomplished by relying on a relatively large reserve force. Reserve mobilization of the vaunted citizen soldier would provide sufficient forces to meet initial requirements and allow enough time to induct and train conscripts. The basis of both mobilization and general war plans rested on an available and trained National Guard and a pool of individual reserve officers. Reserve officers were the products of the Reserve Officer Training Corps units at various colleges and universities. Lacking an enlisted reserve component until the last year of MacArthur's tenure as Chief of Staff, and denied the universal military training it so coveted until just before World War II, the National Guard and organized reserves (officers) were absolutely essential to the Army's ability to meet its statutory missions under the 1920 National Defense Act. (Waldrop 1942, 42-45, 51-53, 55-64, 92, 118-123, 210-213, 221-222, 265-282, 293-296)

The issue of civilian components affected the size of the Army that was MacArthur's most important concern. There were a significant number of officers assigned to the various ROTC units.[11] The National guard, although under state control until mobilized, also had a large number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men assigned to them. National Guard units such as horse cavalry and horse drawn artillery units had regular Army troops and guardsmen, who were essentially on active duty, assigned to them for the daily care and feeding of the horses. A normal guardsman might train only on the weekends and two weeks each year, but his mount processed forage for the entire year! The officers and enlisted men assigned to the

civilian components were well trained seasoned veterans. They would fill key leadership positions in newly formed units during mobilization when recalled reserves would fill their billets in the training establishment. These active duty soldiers assigned to the civilian components were also a key factor in the Army's ability to mobilize.

It was discussed earlier that the dominant factor in military-civilian relations from 1918 to the early 1930s was an earnest attempt by military professionals to identify and integrate with the civilian society. The civilian components provided the professional officer with a bridge to the civilian society. The ROTC units were among the ivory towers of academia and the National Guard units existed in the towns and cites of America. Regular officers assigned to the civilian components were the Army's ambassadors to the civil sector; they were the front-line in civil-military relations.

The final factor in MacArthur's keen interest in the civilian components was that upon mobilization they would become part of his active Army. MacArthur considered the civilian components a key issue in his annual reports, because of the emphasis on citizen soldiers in the 1920 National Defense Act, the significant numbers of active duty soldiers assigned to the civilian components, the Army's attempt to identify with society, and finally every guardsman and reserve was a soldier in mufti.

Reorganizing the Legion

When MacArthur became the Army Chief of Staff, his office was less than thirty years old and represented the senior position within the Army for less than fifteen years. General Wood had won the battle with Adjutant General Ainsworth thus establishing the Chief of Staff's

nominal authority over the Bureaus just before World War I. Wood's victory was not final or complete. During World War I, General Pershing, as the Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, operated openly independent of the Chief of Staff's control. Pershing was even senior to Wood in date of rank to general. A return to peacetime operations and the ascendancy of Pershing to the position of Chief of Staff resolved the immediate issue of who was the senior officer in command of the Army. The underlying potential problem of command and control of the Army remained when Pershing retired from the Army. In military terms there was a problem of unity of command. This commonly accepted principle of war requires clear unambiguous chains of command where each individual and unit answers only to one senior commander. The concepts of administrative control and combat command grow out of the principle of unity of command.[12] The authority of the Chief of Staff was clear and universally acknowledged during peacetime. The question of the authority of the Chief of Staff over the commander of forces in the field upon mobilization was less well defined. World War I had pointed out that control of mobilization, and strategic logistics required a large staff and an officer in charge to coordinate and control military activities in the continental United States. World War I also demonstrated the requirement for a commander and large staff to coordinate and control forces in a theater of operations. Although military professionals understood the concepts of administrative control and combat command, World War I experience had shown that there was a lack of unity of command and a vagueness of authority between the senior field commander, General Pershing, and the Chief of Staff, General Wood. (Matloff 1969, 379)

MacArthur, who always paid close attention to his personal authority and prerogatives, determined to resolve the issue of wartime unity of command. He addressed the issue at two

levels. He reorganized the peacetime structure of the Army to reflect its wartime organization. He also developed a plan that formalized the authority of the Chief of Staff upon mobilization and deployment of forces to a theater of operations in the field.

MacArthur's efforts to formalize the role of the Chief of Staff in case of war actually originated in a World War I draft General Staff plan. The new Chief of Staff revitalized and updated the plan that envisioned the Chief of Staff becoming the commanding general of all field forces during a war. The Chief of Staff would command through a large staff patterned on Pershing's American Expeditionary Force staff of World War I. This field staff would coordinate field operations while the remainder of the General Staff would remain in Washington to coordinate mobilization and the raising, training, and equipping of forces. Inter-war mobilization planing by the general staff envisioned civilian manned agencies providing the great bulk of strategic logistics and resources planning and management. The elements of the General Staff that did not deploy with the Chief of Staff, would deal with force generation, training, and deployment issues under the Deputy Chief of Staff. This command arrangement mirrored General Wood's proposed role during the Veracruz Expedition and Pershing's command structure during World War I. Because the Chief of Staff also became the Commanding General there was no tension between the two billets as there had been between Wood and Pershing. Although this arrangement solved the problem of wartime unity of command it did not survive General George G. Marshall's reorganization of the General Staff at the beginning of World War II. MacArthur's reform was more of a personal arrangement for command responsibility than a reorganization of the General Staff and provision for coordination of the General Staff with deployed armies. Indeed, the organization of the General Staff remained stable during his tenure

as Chief of Staff. (Appendix J) Although MacArthur's reform solved the problem of unity of

command it created significant potential problems of span of control. As both the Chief of Staff

and the commanding general of forces in the field, he would face significantly different

responsibilities over vast distances. He would have to either command the deployed armies, as

Pershing had done, or coordinate and manage national strategic military activities, as Wood had

done. Given contemporary means of communications, the deployed Chief of Staff, in his role as

commanding general of the armies, would have had little effective control over the Deputy Chief

of Staff and remainder of the General Staff in the United States. MacArthur's plan also implicitly

assumed a one theater war. This is an interesting omission considering the existence of the

colored war plans that addressed both Asiatic and European campaigns. MacArthur's plan did

not provide for another world war. Modern historians pay little attention to MacArthur's plan for

wartime command and control of the Army. Histories addressing the planning for the command

and control of forces for World War II almost exclusively comment on Marshall's reorganization

of the General Staff. Marshall decentralized operating responsibilities by creating the Army

Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces as new field commands. These

commands allowed for a significant reduction in the size of the War Department Staff and the

abolition of the various chiefs of arms staffs. The field commands handled the day to day

administration of the principle elements of the Army. After Marshall's reorganization of the

General Staff, the Chief of Staff concentrated on the management of the General Staff in dealing

with issues of national military planning, strategy, and coordination. Marshall not only addressed

the issue of unity of command but also issues of span of control and efficiency. (Waddell in

Shrader 1994, 251-252; Matloff 1969, 429) Marshall had the advantage of having to deal with

the management of a war in multiple theaters, but MacArthur should have considered the implications of United States envolvement in another World War. He had relied on his own experiences, and orientation on personal command responsibility. His plan would have been more usable and lasting if he had studied British and French experiences with the command and control of forces in several theaters of a world war. The examples were available for his study; he just did not avail himself of them.

MacArthur's other approach to organizational reform, which matched peacetime administrative force command structures to those required in case of mobilization or war, was much more successful and lasting. His "Four Army Plan" was a major organizational reform that survives today in modified form. When he became the Chief of staff, the nine corps area commands were the primary agencies for normal training and mobilization. They all reported directly to the Chief of Staff. They were administrative commands based on arbitrary territorial lines. There was no horizontal command network controlling the corps, and they lacked a wartime operational mission. During the Summer of 1932, MacArthur reorganized the corps under four numbered armies. The Armies assumed wartime North American defense missions. The provision for standing operational corps and armies also provided for a complete mobilization force structure. The First Army had the defense mission for the North-eastern states and coast. The Second Army had defense responsibilities for the North-central states and the Great Lakes, while the Third Army's area included the Southern states and Gulf Coast. The Fourth Army was responsible for the defense of the Western States and the Pacific Coast. Although some armies had no serious threat to defend against, the Second Army for example, they were operational and administrative headquarters and that provided for mobilizing corps and armies.

Because the previous corps area headquarters were only administrative headquarters the highest echelon that existed upon mobilization before the "Four Army Plan" was the division. In that national military mobilization required the formation of corps and armies, the "Four Army Plan" addressed total mobilization force structure requirements. By also assigning the numbered armies operational missions, the plan finally gave the continentally based units a basis for organization, doctrine, and tactics. The numbered army commanders, the senior corps commander in each army area during peacetime, not only had the responsibility for the training of tactical units as field forces, they were responsible for establishing viable operational corps and army headquarters. The establishment of these echelons of command provided invaluable training in the organization and operation of these echelons and reduced the time during wartime mobilization previously required to bring these units into existence. MacArthur's "Four Army Plan," although modified by Marshall, was a major structural improvement for the Army and greatly facilitated mobilization for World War II. (James 1970, 367-368, MacArthur in Waldrop 1942, 168-174) Today's Third Army, mobilized for the 1991 Gulf War with its Eighteenth Airborne and Seventh Corps, can be traced back to the 'Four Army Plan."[13]

MacArthur made a third organizational reform while he was Chief of Staff. It was not as dramatic or extensive as the other two, but it showed that he had a firm grasp of managerial principles and the functions of an executive. During his first year as Chief of Staff, he created the General Council. The General Council included the heads of the various General Staff divisions, the chiefs of arms and services, and representatives of the Assistant Secretaries of War, and the commandant of the Army War College. The General Council was an advisory body under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chief of Staff. Previously the various chiefs of arms or services and

General Staff division heads had unilateral and direct access to the Chief of Staff. The Deputy

Chief of Staff attempted to insure the proper staffing of items brought to the Chief of Staff's

attention. Despite the efforts of the Deputy Chief of Staff, it was still common for improperly

staffed and fragmented issues to reach the Chief of Staff. The formation of the General Council

did not change the composition of the General Staff or the offices of the chiefs of arms or

services. It did, though, coordinate their activities and those of the General Staff as a whole with

the offices of the Assistant Secretaries of War. The formation of the General Council not only

reduced the work load of the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, but insured that items

reaching the Chief of Staff were properly coordinated and represented the entire staff's views.[14]

The General Council also facilitated intra and inter-staff coordination by insuring that all

important issues, i.e., those worthy of the attention of the Chief of Staff, were available for

comment by the General Staff divisions, arms and services offices, and the offices of the two

Assistant Secretaries of War.

MacArthur Versus Chaffee, Guderian, de Gaulle et al.

The discussion of mechanization is significant in that it documents that MacArthur's

intimate awareness of the potential roles, missions, and preferred organization of armored and

mechanized forces from the time he assumed the office of the Chief of Staff.[15] He mentioned the

forecasting of an independent armored force as one of the accomplishments as Chief of Staff.

After examining the conflicting theories of: 1.) a separate mechanized force or 2.) mechanization

of the existing arms based on their individual requirements, he chose option 2. (Waldrop 1942,

51) He backed up his decision by disbanding Major Adna Chaffee's Experimental Mechanized

Force at Fort Meade shortly after his rise to Chief of Staff. Later examinations of the U.S.

armored force in World War II cite this decision dispersing mechanization throughout the

combat arms rather than concentrating on the creation of a mobile armored striking force, as the

principle reason that retarded development of modern armored vehicles. The lack of modern

equipment not only resulted in the continued use of obsolescent armored equipment but stymied

and frustrated the development and implementation of armored tactics that utilized modern

equipment. The net effect was that the U.S. Army fell far behind major European powers in

armored warfare tactics, techniques, and employment. MacArthur, and not the U.S. Army, was

responsible for this situation.

> In 1931 the American Army had reached its nadir at a strength of only 134,000
> and the Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, was heard to plead with
> congress in 1932 (after he had disbanded yet another Experimental Armored
> Force)" They suffer tremendously from one thing and one thing only - that
> Congress will not give them enough money to equip them properly with modern
> tanks." Nevertheless, MacArthur was infected by the same doubts as his contem-
> poraries regarding tanks, seeing them either as a substitute for horses or as an
> adjunct to infantry, but not as an element for decision in their own right. Faced
> with the choice of spending limited money on manpower or tanks he not unex-
> pectedly opted for the former. (Macksey 1970, 21)

James acknowledges the effects of MacArthur's decisions on the development of

American armored forces and doctrine but asserts, that because of the virtual stagnation of funds

throughout the early 1930s "American tank development could not have progressed far even if

had received more emphasis." (James 1970, 358) James reinforces his assertion by citing two

accepted works on the Army during the depression and the development of American armored

forces.[16] An examination of available alternate courses of action, and a study of the economic

conditions that existed for major European armies that did develop modern tactics and doctrine,

does not support James' assertion.

American Majors Adna Chaffee and George Patton, European military visionaries such as Britain's Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, Captain Basil Liddel Hart, and Brigadier P.C.S. Hobart, France's Colonels J.B. Estienne and Charles de Gaulle, and Germany's Heinz Guderian considered the same factors and all chose option 1. Even if only Major Chaffee's single mechanized battalion continued to exist, it would have provided the required laboratory and test bed for the development of armored doctrine. As it was, with the demise of Chaffee's battalion, the Army was left with several scattered companies of mainly obsolescent tanks. It is ironic that at the time the Army possessed seven American designed and manufactured Christie tanks, arguably the most advanced tank of its time. Because of a lack of U.S. Army interest, Christie would sell his design to the Soviet Union where his tank became the basis of the BT series of tanks that the Soviets mass produced and upon which they tested and developed their armored doctrine. Christie's tank, which the U.S. Army abandoned, was the basis of the Soviet T-34, one of the four most important tanks of World War II.[17]

An army that was predominantly horse drawn conducted the vaunted German blitzkrieg of 1939 and 1940. The few panzer divisions mainly possessed light Panzerkamphwagen I and II tanks that were decidedly inferior to the Polish 7TP, French Souma, and British Matilda II tanks that they faced. The German Army had maintained small mechanized units at battalion and regimental strength under economic conditions as severe as those that faced the U.S. Army. The French Army maintained armored forces throughout the depression despite a national defense strategy based on the static defenses of the Maginot Line. The maintenance of mechanized forces, even with marginal equipment, was the primary reason that the European armies out

paced the U.S. Army in the development of armored doctrine and the ability to practice armored warfare.

MacArthur's *Annual Reports* of 1931 and 1933 through 1935 were consistent in his views of mechanization. They show that he not only had reservations about the value of tanks, but that his conservative approach to mechanization effectively stalled U.S. Army development of modern armored equipment and doctrine. (Appendix I; Waldrop 1942, 49-51, 190, 229-230, 300; Shrader 1994, 41) It also documents that, contrary to later revisionist statements in *Reminiscences*, he did not favor an "independent armored land force." (MacArthur 1964, 90) MacArthur, the visionary on the nature of modern military leadership, and innovator of military education, was as blind to the importance of armored and mechanized forces to future warfare as the Navy admirals after the Civil War were to armored steam-powered vessels. MacArthur based his mechanization decision on the same premises as the admirals'. It was more important to conserve the conventional force than accept a smaller though more potentially powerful innovative force based on new technology. His decision took the Army down the wrong fork in the road. By abolishing the Experimental Mechanized Force, he destroyed the laboratory for doctrinal development. By decentralizing mechanization to the various combat arms, without maintaining any totally mechanized force, he insured uncoordinated and fragmented development of U.S. Army mechanized doctrine. America possessed world class visionaries in the field of armored warfare, but Chaffee and Patton had no place to ply their trade because of MaCArthur's 1931 decisions concerning mechanization.

MacArthur and Mitchell: Act II

Somewhat related to innovations in weaponry and emergent doctrines was the issue of military aviation, specifically the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC). Although not a topic of discussion in his first *Annual Report*, this was a central issue during MacArthur's tenure as Chief of Staff. When he became the Chief of Staff, the proponents of armored forces and mechanization lacked a separate combat arm or branch as a power base. This was not the case for the proponents of military aviation. They not only had the U.S. Army Air Corps, but the attention of the public, thanks to Billy Mitchell's Court Martial, and adherents of military aviation in powerful positions within the Congress. From 1931 to 1934, one of the two Assistant Secretaries of War had military aviation issues as his sole responsibility. (Appendix J)

Military Aviation was one of MacArthur's central theme for several reasons. The two main reasons were resources and control. Because military aviation depended on its equipment, and because the size, speed, range, and capabilities of aircraft were rapidly improving, there was immense technological and doctrinal pressure to acquire the latest in aviation technology. This emergent technology cost money. Aircraft were also different from other primary military and naval weapons systems, such as artillery and ships, in that they wore out, or became obsolescent, within a decade rather than decades.[18] The cost of acquisition, ownership, i.e., operations and maintenance, and replacement of aircraft were all high. The cost of maintaining aircrew minimum standards was also high. While gun-drills on crew served weapons and annual live fire requalification of ground based weapons systems were relatively inexpensive, aircrews required weekly and monthly flight experience to maintain minimum safety levels. This constant training wore out already rapidly depreciating aircraft. For no other reasons than the cost of new and

emergent technology and the inherent costs associated with aircraft, the U.S. Army Air Corps represented a constantly increasing pressure for additional resources. During an economic depression, with flat or falling resource bases, the Air Corps was more than a minor consideration for the new Chief of Staff.

The issue of control of the U.S. Army Air Corps was not really about the U.S. Army Air Corps. It was about an independent air service, or air force, with its own cabinet level secretary. Such an independent air service/force would draw personnel, equipment, and other resources from the extant air arms of the Army and Navy. Adherents of Naval Aviation saw their future tied to the fleet, and therefore the Navy, and thus operated within the Naval establishment to procure their equipment and ships in competition and cooperation with the main line Navy. The specter of an independent air service/force was more of a threat to the Army. At least the U.S. Army Air Corps had to submit their budget requests through the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. An independent air service would have been in direct competition with the Army for funds and other resources. The creation of an independent air service would mean the wholesale transfer of the U.S. Army air Corps to the newly created air service.

Aviation issues were significant themes in the *Annual Report(s) of the Chief of Staff* from Fiscal Years 1932 through 1935. After acknowledging the adverse impacts of the depression, the Fiscal Year 1932 report immediately addresses six issues pending legislation before Congress. (Appendix I) One of these six issues was the creation of a separate sub-department of Air. MacArthur argued that the proposal intended to save money but would actually cost more in the short term. (Waldrop 1942, 90) Four pages out of sixty-two page 1933 *Annual Report* dwelt on the Air Corps portion of the budget. While acknowledging the value and utility of airpower,

MacArthur points out the relative immunity of the United States to air attack, and emphasizes that the Army ranks seventeenth in size in the World. He closes this discussion by asserting that the current budget request is sufficient within the context of total Army needs. (Waldrop 1942, 195-199)

In what he thought would be his last *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff* for Fiscal Year 1934, MacArthur devoted eight of the report's forty-three page to the U.S. Army Air Corps. Appended to the report was another seventeen pages of congressional testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee concerning the creation of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force . (Waldrop 1942, 236, 393-411) MacArthur's discussion of military aviation, and his appended congressional testimony, was part tutorial on the proper roles and missions of military aviation, part assertion that the Army budget met all of the Air Corps needs, and part preemptive move to forestall the creation of a separate air force. This discussion addresses the significant issues concerning the U.S. Army Air Corps during MacArthur's tenure as Chief of Staff, and his positions on these issues.

The *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff Fiscal Year 1934*, with its appended testimony, is the definitive statement of MacArthur's views on military aviation and airpower until at least the middle of World War II, i.e., 1942 to 1943. MacArthur's goals for, and concerns about, military aviation were two-fold. First, he was adamant that military aviation receive only its fair share of the Army budget. Secondly, he was also adamant in his opposition to the creation of a separate air service and/or a separate department of air. (James 1970, 355, 359; Waldrop 1942, 237-238) Similar to his views on, and actions toward, an independent armored force, MacArthur was not against aviation, he was conservative in his approach to aviation doctrine. He resisted increased

resources for the Army Air Corps above his budget submissions, but did so to maintain a fair balance of resources between the various branches and not out of a simple hostility to military aviation. These positions resulted in constant conflict with the Air Corps' military and congressional proponents. MacArthur, despite several revisionist statements in *Reminiscences*, did not appreciate or understand the value of military aviation until well into World War II when he was involved in his leap frog attacks in the Southwest Pacific Theater during 1943 and 1944.[19] (-Pettillo 1981, 158) At one point while he was Chief of Staff he went as far as to offer up military aviation as part of a Hoover Administration disarmament conference proposal.

President Hoover, in an attempt to energize disarmament negotiations that had dragged on without progress during the first months of 1932, proposed the abolishment of all offensive weapons and the reduction of standing armies by one third. Pierrepont Moffat, Secretary of State Stimson's primary advisor on disarmament, and Norman Davis, the head of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, visited MacArthur on April 4, 1932 to discuss the administration's proposals. According to Moffat:

> (MacArthur) kept us for three-quarters of an hour developing his theories as to the future of the Army. Briefly he made a few essential points: (1) That aviation was the newest branch of the service and the most expensive. Between 25 and 35 per cent of our Army budget was already devoted to aviation Trubee Davison [Assistant Secretary of War] was constantly coming back demanding an additional 15 to 20 million dollars each year. (2) Its value as an instrument of war was still undemonstrated . . . (3) That the whole tendency of war, since the idea of the Prussian staff had become generally accepted, was to regard it as a struggle between whole nations rather than between professional organizations. Effectively to arm all nations or to provide the Army and Navy with weapons that could subdue an entire nation was beyond the economic scope of any power and was more than any other factor driving the world into bankruptcy . . . In his idea, our ultimate aim should be to obtain an agreement on the part of all nations that they would give no government support in any form to aviation. In other words, to give up military and naval aviation in their entirety and not to subsidize

> directly or indirectly civilian aviation. He felt that this was too radical a solution but felt it should be the ultimate goal. (Hooker 1956, 63-64)

MacArthur's proposal was startling to his State Department guests but it was not a casual or momentary idea. In a subsequent meeting with an incredulous Secretary Stimson, also in Moffat's presence, the Chief of Staff maintained his position. After MacArthur's departure, Moffat quoted Stimson as saying:

> he [MacArthur] was predominantly concerned with his budget and was not thinking when aviation had been useful. (Hooker 1956, 69-70)

Stimson was right, but MacArthur's discussions with Moffat and Stimson go further and suggest that his views on aviation were not simply a function of budget concerns. By his own statements, he acknowledged his doubts about the efficacy of military aviation, his concerns about aviation's undue impact on the Army's force structure, and alluded to his concerns over control of aviation. Assistant Secretary of War Davison, to whom he alluded in his discussion with Moffat, was the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, an office that existed only from 1931 to 1933. (Appendix J) Usually the sole assistant secretaries concerned themselves with issues of munitions and equipment procurement and did not interfere with the Chief of Staff's organization of the Army or his budget submissions related to specific branches and combat arms. From 1931 to 1933 MacArthur had to deal not only with Representative Ross A. Collins, an avid proponent of military aviation and chairman of the important and influential subcommittee on military appropriations, but with an equally avid and aggressive aviation advocate Assistant Secretary Davison. Davison's independence from the Chief of Staff's control, and his ability to influence force structure through budget allocations to a particular branch or arm, were the incarnations of MacArthur's worst fears of a separate independent air service.

As with the discussion of armored and mechanized forces, it was not that the Chief of Staff lacked a knowledge of the issues concerning military aviation; it was that he did not agree with the proponents of airpower. MacArthur saw the Army Air Corps as just another combat arms branch whose resource requests required balancing against the requirements of the other branches. He saw military aviation in terms of tactical support for the rest of the fighting forces, and therefore properly part of the Army and under his control as the Chief of Staff. He belittled the idea of a separate air force and therefore was not a proponent of strategic bombing or deep interdiction doctrines that did not directly support other branches of the Army or Navy. (Shrader 1994, 41) Whereas MacArthur's decisions concerning armored warfare did have an immediate and long term effect on the development of that form of warfare, his decisions might have delayed some organizational realignments and command and control arrangements but they did not delay the development of American air warfare doctrine. Mitchell's Court-Martial had let the genie out of the bottle. The U.S. Army Air Corps possessed a well-established base and had powerful congressional and even administration advocates. The best MacArthur could hope for was to control the unruly child who needed new toys and had big friends. Considering the voracious appetite that the airpower enthusiasts had for resources, and the rapidly improving nature of aircraft designs, MacArthur's opposition to a larger better equipped USAAC was in the best interests of the Army as a whole and a wise and courageous decision at the time. Given free reign, basing their needs on theories that later would be debunked, air power disciples of Emilio Douhet and Billy Mitchell schools could have seriously, even disastrously, imbalanced the Army force structure.[20] On the other hand, MacArthur is not listed as a forward leaning visionary in

any histories of American air power, and he cannot claim to have had the best interest of military aviation at heart.

Caesar Crosses the Rubicon: The First Time

"The most poignant episode during my role as Chief of Staff was the so-called Bonus March." (MacArthur 1964, 92) It was not only the most poignant episode, but it was the most controversial and publicised incident of MacArthur's career up to World War II. A study of the Bonus March also provides a clear picture of MacArthur as an administrator and leader. MacArthur's behavior during the Bonus March of 1932 toward senior civilian authorities, including the President, showed stark parallels to his behavior as the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) and Commander in Chief of United Nations Forces in Korea in 1951.

Numerous articles and books provide excellent coverage of, and insight into, the Bonus March. In *Reminiscences*, MacArthur devotes thirteen pages to the coverage of his five -year tenure as Chief of Staff. Five of the thirteen pages are devoted to this single two-month period. (MacArthur 1964, 92-97) James, in his usual complete and detailed manner, covers and analyzes the incident in a chapter of thirty-two pages. (James 1970, Chapter XIV, 382-414)

For the purposes of this study an in-depth historical review of the Bonus March is both inappropriate and unneeded. Academically qualified and recognized historians have more than adequately examined this incident. For the purpose of providing a basis for further discussion of MacArthur as a leader and public administrator, Tables 2 and 3 are provided below. Table 2 provides a listing of the primary participants while Table 3 provides a chronology of events for the Bonus March incident.

Table 2.--Principal Personalities 1932 Bonus March

Herbert Hoover:	President. At time of Bonus March he was physically isolated in the White House and fearful of the Bonus Marchers.
Charles Curtis:	Vice President and member of the five person Capital Police Board.
John Nance Garner:	Speaker of the House and member of the Capital Police Board. He effectively controlled the three patronage members of the board (both Sergeants at Arms and Capital Architect).
S.J. Nash:	Captain and senior uniformed member of the Capital Police Force. Nash and Glassford, see immediately below, were not even on speaking terms and there was little effective coordination between the Capital Police and the Washington, D.C. Police.
Pelham D.Glassford:	Superintendent of the Washington, D.C. Police, and a retired Army Brigadier General who had fought in France in 1918. He was respected by Bonus Marchers, whom he treated with respect and moderation.
Wright Patman:	Texas Representative who authored a bill authorizing early payment of Veterans' Bonus.
Herbert B.Crosby:	Influential Washington, D.C. Commissioner and retired Army general. He was fearful of Bonus Marchers and favored early and decisive action against them.
Patrick J.Hurley:	Secretary of War. He felt the Bonus March was a Communist controlled event and favored decisive action against the marchers.
Douglas MacArthur:	General and Chief of Staff U.S.Army.
G..Van Horn Mosley:	Major General U.S. Army, Deputy/Assistant Chief of Staff U.S. Army. He was anti-Semitic, fascist, and virulently anti-communist.
Perry L.Miles:	Brigadier General U.S.Army, Commanding General 16th Infantry Brigade, Fort Myers, Washington, D.C. He was the officer in actual command of the Army units involved in the Bonus March.
D.D.Eisenhower:	Major U.S. Army, Assistant to the Chief of Staff and one of two staff officers to accompany MacArthur throughout July 28, 1932.
Walter W.Waters:	Former artillery sergeant who led 300 jobless veterans from Oregon to Washington D.C in early May 1932 thus triggering the Bonus March. He acted as the head of the Bonus March.

John T.Pace:	Bankrupt Detroit contractor and leader of approximately 200 hard core communists attempting to incite/co-opt the Bonus March.
James Ford:	Negro candidate for vice president on the Communist ticket. He was arrested on the afternoon of July 29 in Washington proper with forty-two other communists who were attempting to mount a protest after the eviction of the Bonus Marchers from Washington and Anacostia.

<div align="right">(James 1970, Chapter XIV; Daniels 1971)</div>

Table 3.-- Chronology of the Bonus March

1924-1931

1924	Veterans' lobby, over Coolidge's veto, coordinates passage of a bonus act authorizing adjusted compensation certificates for World War I veterans redeemable in 1945 with an average value of $1000 per veteran.
1930-1931	Veterans begin to pressure for early payment of bonus because of Great Depression. Congress, over Hoover's veto, passes legislation to pay 1/2 of bonus.
Fall 1931	Representative Wright Patman of Texas introduces legislation to pay rest of bonus.
Dec. 1931	Non-violent hunger march in Washington, D.C. by 1,500 with some Communist involvement.

1932

Jan.	Non-violent unemployment legislation march in Washington, D.C. by 12,000 jobless led by a Pittsburgh priest.
Mar.	Police panic and fire into demonstrators at Ford's River Rouge Plant at Dearborn, Michigan killing 5 and wounding 50. Communist agitators take over funerals and incite protests.
May	Walter Waters and 300 Oregon veterans depart for Washington, D.C. to demonstrate for early bonus payment.
Late May	Walters' veterans, now swollen to approximately 900 arrive in

Washington, D.C. With the arrival of the veterans, dubbed the Bonus Expeditionary Force (BEF), in comparison to the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) of World War I, the Bonus March begins. Walters assumes effective leadership of the BEF.

Early June
The Army positions a T-4 Armored Car and a T-6 Truck Mount 75 Millimeter Gun, with 100 rounds of shrapnel ammunition, behind the White House using a cover story that they are only in transit elsewhere.

June 8
MacArthur addresses University of Pittsburgh graduation and labels all demonstrators against the established order- whether pacifists, leftists, or bonus marchers as Reds or puppets of Communism. (James 1970, 390; Pittsburgh *Post-Gazette*, June 9, 1932)

June 10
Official Army evolvement begins in the Bonus March incident when MacArthur directs the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) to direct the nine Corps Area Commanders to report, by coded message, information on bonus marchers originating or passing through their areas. There was particular emphasis placed on reporting the names and numbers of Communists among the marchers.

June 12
G-2 reports that only three of 26 identified Bonus March leaders are Communists. Brigadier General Miles reports:
> ...the greater part of the bonus marchers have thus far resisted all attempts of the Communists to gain control of them, but there are a number of well-known Communists leaders here and they are claiming credit for the instigation of the march. (As quoted in James 1970, 391)

June 15
The House passes the Patman Bill.

June 17
The Senate defeats the Patman Bill.

Late June
BEF swells to more than 22,000. Approximately 200 Communists under John T. Pace attempt to join the BEF but are an ostracized element relegated to the fringes of the BEF camps.

Early July
"Transportation Bill" passed and signed which authorizes train fares home for marchers. The amount of the fare would be deducted from a marcher's bonus when it was paid. Six thousand take the offer.

Mid July	BEF shrinks to 10,000 diehards. MacArthur and Miles update "White Plan," the secret War Department plan for employment of the Army in Washington, D.C. during civil unrest. The plan, based on General Staff and Judge Advocate General submissions, designated key protected areas and set forth policy toward demonstrators. (See Daniels 1971, 158 for summary of plan)
July 14	Commissioner Crosby, Police Superintendent Glassford, Admiral Butler (Commandant Washington Navy Yard) meet with MacArthur in his office to discuss BEF. Major General Moseley and Brigadier General Miles are in attendance.
July 16	District Commissioners instruct Glassford to use force, if necessary, to prevent demonstrations/parades within several blocks of White House.
July 21	Commissioners order Glassford to evacuate BEF occupied buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue by July 22 and all BEF encampments by noon on August 4.
July 26	MacArthur meets with Waters for the second time. MacArthur later claims B.E.F. would pull back upon the arrival of the Army. Waters maintained that MacArthur stated that he would allow the B.E.F. to make an orderly retreat.
July 27	President Hoover calls Secretary of War Hurley, MacArthur, Attorney General Mitchel, and Secretary of the Treasury Mills to a meeting to discuss Bonus March. It is agreed that the old armory and other BEF occupied buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue will be cleared then demolished on July 28.

July 28, 1932

Early A.M.	Approximately 1,100 veterans remain in the buildings scheduled for demolition.
10:30 A.M.	Glassford's police surround the buildings to be demolished.
10:40 A.M.	Evacuation of veterans is underway with little resistance. About a score of Communists suddenly appear and throw bricks. Glassford is hit by a brick but remains and demonstration is quelled. Glassford departs and reports to commissioners that police are in control. Later Commissioners claim Glassford requested troops.

Glassford maintained that troops would be needed only if rest of BEF camps had to be cleared.

1:00 P.M.	Commissioners request President to call out Federal troops. Hoover grants telephonic approval but asks for a letter to confirm the request.
1:30 P.M.+-	War Department receives telephonic request from Commissioners for troops.
1:35 P.M.	MacArthur places telephone call putting troops on alert.
1:40 P.M.	MacArthur places a telephone call to Brigadier General Miles ordering him to bring troops into the city (Assembly area is Ellipse behind White House).
2:00 P.M.	Unit reports show that all units have commenced movement to the assembly area. Units involved: 2d Squadron, 3d Calvary Regiment, about 200 men under Major Surles with Major Patton as Executive Officer; 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, about 300 men under Lieutenant Colonel Kunzig; 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Tank Regiment, five tanks under 1st Lieutenant Childs, and elements of Captain Dailey's 29th Motor Transport Company and Captain Alexander's Headquarters Company Washington for a total of about 600 men. The 1st Battalion 12 Infantry Regiment under Colonel Taylor and a National Guard Coast Artillery unit (Searchlights) under a Major General Stephen later joined the operation that evening for a total troop commitment of 793.
2:15 P.M.	While clearing a partially demolished building amid some brick throwing, a policeman trips, falls, and fires his revolver. Two bonus marchers are killed and three policemen are injured. This incident is later used to justify calling out Federal troops but occurred after the call out of troops. Executive Branch messages, documents or announcements at the time concerning the call out of troops do not reference the 2:15 P.M. incident.
2:55 P.M.	Hurley's typewritten order to MacArthur implementing "White Plan" is received by the General Staff. Written by hand in ink on the order is the time of receipt. (See Daniels 1971, 164-165; James 1970, 397; MacArthur 1964, 94 for Hurley's order to MacArthur.)
2:00- 3:00 P.M.	MacArthur changes from a white business suit into his service dress uniform with ribbons and badges and notifies Miles that he,

the Chief of Staff, will accompany the troops. Glassford confers with MacArthur at the assembly area on the Ellipse behind the White House. MacArthur stated to Glassford:

> We are going to break the back of the B.E.F. Within a short time we will move down Pennsylvania Avenue, sweep through the billets there, and then clean out the other camps. The operation will be continuous. It will be done tonight. (As quoted in Daniels 1971, 167 referencing a speech given by Glassford to a Veterans Rally in Philadelphia November 3, 1932)

4:00 P.M.	Troops complete assembly at the Ellipse.

4:30 P.M.   MacArthur and Miles lead troops East along Pennsylvania Avenue against 3,000+- B.E.F. marchers between 2d and 4th Streets. Within a half hour the area is cleared. Marchers throw bricks while the Army employed sabers, bayonets and numerous tear gas grenades and candles. In the second phase of the operation the troops continue to sweep to the South East to the 11th Street Bridge. One infant dies of tear gas ingestion. By nightfall the troops have reached the 11th street Bridge when thy break for evening meal.

4:30-11:15 P.M.   MacArthur is contacted once personally by Major General Moseley, then again on Moseley's orders by Colonel Wright, Secretary of the General Staff, relaying President Hoover's order through Secretary of War Hurley that the Army was not to cross the 11th Street Anacostia River Bridge or force the evacuation of the B.E.F. Anacostia Camp (Camp Marcks) (Daniels 1971, 170-171; Moseley, "The Bonus March transcript," 15 pages, January 24, 1938, Moseley Messages, Library of Congress) Major Eisenhower stated:

> In neither instance did General MacArthur hear these instructions. He said he was too busy and did not want himself or his staff bothered by people coming down and pretending to bring orders. (As quoted in James 1970, 401)

11:15 P.M.   Army troops cross the 11th Street Anacostia River Bridge and after a short halt, of less than five minutes, advance on Camp Marks, the B.E.F. Anacostia Flats Camp. Fires break out and the 1,100 structure/tent camp is cleared and destroyed within a half hour.

11:00-11:30 P.M.   MacArthur, against Eisenhower's recommendation, departs the

area of the 11th Street Bridge in order to return to the War Department and hold a press conference. MacArthur states in *Reminiscences (95)* that he briefed Hurley and President Hoover at the White House "about 11:00 o'clock."

July 29

12:00 Midnight	The Army disperses two hundred marchers on the South side of Camp Marcks. the Army bivouacs in place with Coast Defense search lights illuminating the former B.E.F. camp.
12:00 Noon	The Army returns to downtown and clears stragglers. Troops clear the last pocket of marchers at approximately 5:00 P.M. One of the last demonstrations is conducted by twenty Communists under James Ford the Communist Party vice presidential candidate.
Early Evening	The Army returns to barracks. The operation is over. The Army did not fire any bullets but expended over 2,000 tear gas grenades and candles. One child died of tear gas inhalation. Twelve soldiers were injured; four by bricks, two burned by tear gas grenades that were thrown back by marchers, and six burned by faulty tear gas grenades that they were using. Police pistol fire killed two marchers.

(Unless specifically cited in the table: James 1970, Chapter XIV; Daniels 1971; Record Groups 94 and 98 National Archives)

Probably the most obvious factor in MacArthur's involvement in the Bonus March

Incident was his personal and heroic style of leadership. From the choice of his uniform, to his

dramatic poses captured in photographs, to his florid description of events at his press confer-

ence, the young and dashing Chief of Staff purposefully and consistently depicted himself as the

heroic crusader. He personally and prominently accompanied the troops, and did so in a

conspicuous service dress uniform. The officer in charge of the eviction force, in accordance

with the "White Plan," was Brigadier General Miles, the Commanding General of the 16th

Brigade. Under provisions of the "White Plan," Brigadier General Miles reported to the Chief of

Staff, but the 16th Brigade normally fell under a major general commanding the III Corps in

nearby Baltimore, Maryland. The size of the force, if the troops were all of the same unit, would

have normally required a lieutenant colonel in command. There was no valid command and

control reason for MacArthur to lead the troops evicting the Bonus Marchers. Eisenhower was

completely correct when he warned MacArthur that it would be "highly inappropriate" for the

Chief of Staff to accompany the eviction force. (James 1970, 399) MacArthur claimed that "In

accordance with the President's request, I accompanied General Miles." (MacArthur 1964, 95)

Available records, private papers, and extensive research by historians do not substantiate this

claim. MacArthur also claimed that he accompanied the troops:

> not with a view of commanding the troops but to be on hand as things progressed,
> so that he could issue necessary instructions on the ground. (James 1970, 399)

With an available plan, which he personally reviewed and approved, a brigadier general brigade

commander at the scene, and a major general corps commander available if needed, it is difficult

to imagine what could demand the presence of the Chief of Staff with the eviction force. It is

also evident, that despite his claim that he was not there to command, by the time the troops reached the 11th Street Bridge, MacArthur was exercising command.

The controversy of MacArthur's personal participation in the eviction of the Bonus Marchers is deepened by the uniform that he wore. The morning of July 28 MacArthur wore a white civilian business suit. This was common practice for general officers assigned to Washington. The practice was in accordance with the wishes of President Hoover, a devout Quaker. (Daniels 1971, 166) After issuing the deployment order for the troops, MacArthur sent an orderly to Fort Myer to pick up a uniform. By the time that he was present on the Ellipse, by 3:00 P.M., he was wearing a service dress uniform with a barracks cap, ribbons, and badges. This uniform is clearly shown in pictures of the Bonus March eviction. This uniform was not a full dress uniform with medals, as some of MacArthur's detractors would claim. It was also not the officer's summer field service uniform comprising shirt without service ribbons, field scarf (tie), riding breeches, high laced boots, and campaign hat worn by the rest of the officers, including Brigadier General Miles. In MacArthur's defense, James argues that Mrs. MacArthur, his mother, simply provided the driver the normal uniform that would be worn for a Washington, D.C. function and that it was appropriate for him to wear his "Chief of Staff's uniform." (James 1970, 399) Although there is, and was, no such specific "Chief of Staff's" uniform, there is much merit to James' argument. The fact remains, though, that MacArthur's appearance in a service dress uniform, the civilian equivalent of a business suit, while the rest of the officers and troops wore the field service uniform, the civilian equivalent of shirt and trouser working clothes, made him stand out. He was certainly over dressed for the occasion, and his dress as well as his

posture and expression, captured in pictures of the eviction operation, depict an imperious overly dramatic martinet.

Why, then, the inappropriate presence at an operation that others should have controlled? Why the ostentatious uniform and the overly dramatic poses? The answer is simple, and it was predictable. Douglas MacArthur was playing the heroic leader. He was acting the same role, in the same manner, as he did in France in 1918, and as the Superintendent of West Point. He was not the modern general operating from the rear and communicating via phone or radio to his subordinates. He was the heroic Napoleonic or American Civil War general who led his troops from the front and communicated his orders in person. Like the heroic generals of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, who rode to the sound of the guns, MacArthur made himself conspicuous and took fire. The fire he took was not musketry but ridicule and criticism.

MacArthur justified his actions during a press conference at the time of the incident, and later in *Reminiscences* by stressing Communist participation and control of the Bonus Marchers. He also claimed that he was dealing with a "riot" and an "uprising." He used the claims of the Communist leaders concerning their involvement as rationale for his own actions. (MacArthur 1964, 95-97) These statements are not just the revisionist history of a vane individual. They reflect the manner in which MacArthur processed information and made decisions.

MacArthur, along with the bulk of the General Staff and high political appointees in the Hoover Administration, sincerely believed that labor and other dissenters, if not Communists themselves, were pawns of the Communists. They saw demonstrations as a Communist ploy to draw the Army and the government into a confrontation which would be used to foment revolution. They saw the civil unrest as incipient revolution, and not as a reaction to economic

conditions. Senior military and civilian policy makers saw the December 1931, January 1932, and the Bonus March demonstrations as Communist inspired and controlled. They considered any large demonstrations in Washington, D.C. as serious threats to national security. They saw things in red and white, not black and white. This discussion of the Hoover Administration's views on civil unrest is important to a study of MacArthur as a leader and administrator for two reasons. During the Bonus March, and throughout the rest of his career, MacArthur would demonstrate a consistent pattern of selectively filtering provided information or intelligence. Selective filtering of information is a normal and required human activity, but MacArthur took it to an extreme. He did not use intelligence so much to formulate positions as to reinforce his own opinions. He took selective filtering to an extreme because he would accept wild and unsubstantiated reports that conformed to his views, while at the same time totally discounting verifiable reports from reliable sources that conflicted with his views of the situation. During the Summer of 1932, the majority of his corps commanders consistently reported that communist influence of the Bonus Marchers was minor and ineffective. Only the corps commander at Fort Sam Huston, Texas consistently reported significant Communist involvement. (James 1970, 390; Daniels 1971, 159-161) General Miles, the brigade commander with whom the Chief of Staff planned the eviction, directly and specifically reported that the marchers were not Communist controlled. (James 1970, 391) Although MacArthur's military exploits in World War II, and later in Korea, will not be the subject of detailed study in this work, MacArthur displayed a consistent behavior of only accepting that intelligence that reinforced his own views. Edward Drea in *MACAR-THUR's ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan*, an in-depth study of MacArthur's use of intercepted and decrypted Japanese communications, time and again documents this

behavior. MacArthur did use intelligence to formulate policy and make decisions. The problem was that once he had formulated a policy. or made a decision, he used intelligence only to reinforce his actions and not to change or modify them.

Vanity and elitism were not the only causes for MacArthur's use or abuse of intelligence. MacArthur, unlike the great majority of the field grade and general officers in the Army, had never attended the Command and General Staff College, or the Army War College. Although he understood and effectively used the staff system, he was not a school trained staff officer. Implicit in the staff system was a specialization of labor and a resultant deference to experts or specialists in their field. Even though senior officers always retained the authority to override a specialist or staff officer, the system encouraged deference by senior officers to staff officers and specialists. The specialist sorted out the details and the commander made decisions based on the staff's recommendations. Although MacArthur effectively used his various staffs to reduce and manage his workload, he does not appear to have deferred to specialists. MacArthur personalized his staffs, made himself, rather than the organization or mission, the center of staff activity, and required the utmost in loyalty from his staffs. He did use the staff system to examine alternatives. Once he had made a decision he would not brook his staffs or their individual members from acting as a check or balance. MacArthur was his own best intelligence officer, operations officer, logistics officer et cetera. This lack of deference to expert advice and lack of tolerance of dissenting points of view was his Achilles heel. MacArthur's selective acceptance of intelligence concerning the Bonus Marchers is a prime example of his incomplete use of the military staff system. This was not an isolated incident. Later examples of selective use of intelligence that resulted in crises were: his wishing away the Japanese threat and capabilities as the Military

Advisor to the President of the Phillippines, his belief in a brief and easy recapture of Luzon and Manilla during World War II, and the discounting of the entry of Chinese Communist forces into the Korean War in late 1950. These incidents were not just related to vanity and egotism, they were the result of a commander using the staff system as a personal support system rather than as a system to support a commander in maximising the potential of an organization in accomplishing its mission. In the latter case, a staff officer will be willing to offer dissenting views or warnings for the good of the organization or its mission. In the former case the commander's wishes or opinions are the primary motivating force. The commander's personality and desires are always important to a military staff, but at the same time they cannot be the only forces driving the operation of a military staff. The personal staff, i.e., aides de camp, drivers and orderlies have their sole attention focused on the commander as an individual, but the remainder of the executive and special staff officers also have to consider the good of the organization and the unit's mission. [21] MacArthur tended to make the whole staff his personal staff. MacArthur also tended to form opinions and make decisions in a decisive early manner. The lack of an effective means for staff officers to provide warnings or alternative points of view in MacArthur's various staffs was a serious flaw and was directly related to MacArthur's heroic leadership style.

MacArthur as Chief of Staff

MacArthur became the Superintendent of West Point when that institution was in crisis. He became the Chief of Staff of the Army when that institution was in crisis. Much of the crisis at West Point was self induced and the result of voluntary isolation from the rest of society and

academia. Although many of MacArthur's reforms did not long survive his departure, he had

started West Point down the slippery slope of change and reform. The conservative faculty and

"Disgruntled Old Dogs" won the battle, but it was a pyrrhic victory because MacArthur won the

war.[22] While even vilified after his departure as superintendent, MacArthur went down in

history as "the Savior of West Point." The crisis that faced MacArthur when he inherited the

leadership of the Army was primarily the result of external factors related to the Great Depres-

sion. These factors were beyond his control; they were forces he could only deflect, reduce, or

accommodate. Valid criticisms concerning a lack of insight into air and armored/mechanized

warfare have to consider the draconian budgetary pressures that were facing the Army's

leadership. In hindsight MacArthur's positions concerning these emerging forms of warfare were

wrong because other foreign leaders faced with similar budget decisions made positive decisions

concerning air and armored forces. MacArthur's accomplishments as the Chief of Staff were

more a measure of what he prevented from happening than what he accomplished.

MacArthur was the Chief of Staff during the Army's inter-war nadir. Although he insured

the updating of mobilization plans and he introduced the innovative and long-lasting "Four Army

Plan," his primary accomplishment was his prevention of the nadir from becoming lower, the

umbra from becoming darker. Petillo summarizes MacArthur's tenure as the head of the Army by

stating:

> As the Chief of Staff between 1930 and 1935, MacArthur met with uneven
> success. Both the economic and political situations in the United States frustrated
> his plans, and his response to the Bonus Expeditionary Force tarnished his public
> image. His career ascent seemed likely to diminish when he returned to regular
> military duty at the end of his service in the War Department. (Petillo 1981, 246)

MacArthur's Persona as Chief of Staff

Significant factors in MacArthur's successes and failures as the Superintendent of West Point were his personality, bearing, leadership style, and interaction with those outside the normal military chain of command. At West Point, the faculty and alumni were elements of the organizational environment with whom he had not successfully dealt. As head of the Army, his organizational environment included political appointees within the administration, the Congress, and those non governmental organizations and groups with positive and negative interest in military preparedness. As Chief of Staff, he was in an open environment where his seniority and military reputation did not always matter. In many areas he was not the dominant leader but just another player in a game whose rules he could not influence. This was a dramatically different environment from the closed and rigidly structured Army. How did MacArthur react to this environment? Petillo states:

> MacArthur managed to offend nearly everyone before his tenure as Chief of Staff ended. (Ibid., 156)

Petillo accurately assesses MacArthur's stewardship of the Army and provides an insight into underlying problems that inhibited MacArthur in the attainment of his objectives, i.e., his personality, demeanor, and bearing. As the Chief of Staff, he was not in a purely military position. He was a military service chief, and the senior military advisor to the Secretary of War and the President. He was also the senior military officer who had to deal with the Congress. He was not just a military officer; he was a government officer. MacArthur could be quite charming when he found it to be to his advantage. He could also be very astute politically, as he had shown in his quest for the appointment as the Chief of Staff. Unfortunately, his own sense of heroic leadership, his propensity for florid speech, his egotism, and extreme sensitivity to criticism

made it easy for many to view him as a pompous, paranoid martinet. MacArthur considered

religion and patriotism as equal concepts, and equated a strong commitment to national defense

as an integral part of patriotism. All else was evil, radical, communist, or Bolshevist. (Karnow

1989, 262, 268; Petillo 1981, 159-161; Schaller 1989, 14-15) James, although not as directly as

Karnow, Petillo, or Schaller, implicitly agrees with the other three historians. In his detailed

coverage of MacArthur's behavior in dealing with his critics and protagonists in the budget

battles, defense versus pacifist debates, and arguments over mechanization and aviation during

his tour as Chief of Staff, James provides examples of the behaviors cited by the other historians.

James even agrees with Eisenhower's appreciation of MacArthur who said:

> (MacArthur) had an obsession that a high commander must protect his public
> image at all costs and must never admit his wrongs. (As quoted in James 1970,
> 413)

Eisenhower provided further insights concerning the Chief of Staff he served for most of the

1930s when he observed:

> (MacArthur) lost himself in work . . . most of his friends whose companionship
> he really enjoyed were the officers with whom he worked in the War Department.
> Except for his mother, General MacArthur's life in Washington was almost
> entirely centered around the Army, which he loved. (Ibid., 443)

What emerges is the picture of a general who was genuinely concerned with the good of

his service, but who viewed those that disagreed with him as not just wrong or misguided but as

somehow evil or radical. MacArthur's personnal and heroic style of leadership, his egotism,

pomposity, and overly florid public speech distanced him from the politicians and public with

whom he had to interact. Petillo notes that:

> Although his [MacArthur's] position was not extreme, the General's public
> statements on the matter [pacifism] resulted in widespread personal attack.

MacArthur did not participate in Washington's social life, and his conservative Republican

political orientation was a further reason for social isolation when FDR's Democratic, liberal,

and progressive administration took office in March 1933.

Although his demeanor, attitudes, lack of social life, and bearing worked against him in

the political and public aspects of his office, he could be very politically astute and effective. The

best example of political astuteness and his willingness to accept distasteful alternatives in

pursuit of defending a goal involves the Army's involvement in the Civilian Conservation Corps

(CCC). Army involvement in the CCC caused MacArthur to balance partially shielding the

Army from personnel cuts against using his personnel for non military purposes. He was very

predictable and consistent in his single-minded goal of defending personnel end strength,

particularly the officer corps, from further reductions. What he was willing to do to avoid

further reductions is a measure of his determination to avoid these cuts.

A Different Kind of Corps

Roosevelt's "Hundred Days" legislation package of Spring 1933 included a proposal for

an emergency conservation corps. This corps would employ large numbers of young men while

also developing national parks and conserving natural resources. The development and imple-

mentation of the proposed legislation were in the hands of Secretary of the Interior Howe. The

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) bill, introduced barely three weeks after FDR's inauguration,

envisioned Secretary Howe controlling, through a director, a program involving the Departments

of Interior, Agriculture, Labor, and War. The War Department's contribution to the program

involved enrolling CCC recruits, putting them through a two-week conditioning program, and

transporting them to their Forest Service Camps. Initial plans called for 250,000 CCC volunteers in place by July 1, 1933. MacArthur initially balked at participating in a program that would divert Army personnel and resources into what he considered a non military function. There was also criticism of War Department participation in the program based on ideological and political grounds. (James 1970, 417-418)

Despite his initial misgivings, MacArthur took immediate and decisive action. He ordered the General Staff to plan for the Army's participation and directed decentralized control and management of the program at the corps level. On March 24, 1933, a full week before the passage of the CCC bill, the Chief of Staff presented the President with proposed regulations for the CCC. FDR and Secretary Howe approved the proposed regulations and the War Department's plan for its participation in the CCC. Delays, confusion, and incomplete coordination by the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, and Labor resulted in May 1933 projections indicating that only 115,000 volunteers would be in the camps by the July 1, 1933 deadline. Facing total failure of the program, CCC Director Robert Fechner requested Secretary Howe and FDR to put the Army in charge of CCC mobilization. In just over a week, the General Staff provided a comprehensive CCC mobilization plan to Director Fechner. The decentralized execution of the plan allowed the corps commanders to carry out their duties effectively and rapidly. By June 30, 1933, the Army realized FDR's goal. (James 1970, 419-421) The Army's participation in the CCC justified the existence of the General Staff as a planning agency, demonstrated the need for and potential uses of war reserve stocks, and the efficiency, management, and administrative abilities of the General Staff and the officer corps. The nature of the CCC's missions and functions, and the Army's success in planning and executing CCC mobiliza-

tion, demonstrated that the professional officer could function as a public administrator. Involvement in the CCC, a high profile program of the "New Deal," not only made part of the Army indispensable to the administration, but partially shielded it from potential budget and personnel cuts. The performance of the Army in support of one of FDR's pet programs provided MacArthur with leverage within the administration that he would later use in countering Secretary of the Interior Ickes and others who would offer up Army resources in the 1934 to 1935 budget battles.

MacArthur's participation in the CCC showed that he could be decisive, flexible, and farsighted. He correctly realized that the Army could not escape participation in the CCC despite his own aversion to the use of military personnel and resources for civil functions. He efficiently and rapidly coordinated the General Staff's planning for CCC mobilization. Most importantly, he, despite his own tendencies to assume personnal control, decided to give decentralized control of CCC mobilization to the corps commanders. As a senior public administrator, he accurately - analyzed his organizational environment, he correctly identified key issues that required decisions, he efficiently used his staff, and he properly decentralized execution to subordinates who had the resources, communications, and logistics to execute the program. For MacArthur, the CCC represented a positive victory in an environment of rear guard actions fought to avoid reductions and eliminations in his force. It was not only a positive victory, it supported the Chief of Staff's ultimate goal of preserving his Army's personnel base.

The Chief of Staff and Public Administration

A search of MacArthur's personal and official records during his time as Chief of Staff, does not show that he had any personal contact with any of the prominent public administration or political science theorists of the 1930s. There is no mention of Elton Mayo, J. Donald Kingsley, William E. Mosher, those associated with the Brownlow Committee's report, or Chester Barnard in MacArthur's papers or in his personal library as it existed up to 1941. (MacArthur Archives RG-1) There are references, including *Reminiscences*, to MacArthur's attendance at social events during FDR's first administration, but there are no indications that he met the above mentioned social science theorists. Considering MacArthur's conservative Republican attitudes and established patterns of social contacts, it is unlikely that he cultivated those whom he considered progressive reformers or "New Dealers." Indeed, there are references to antipathy, even animosity, between MacArthur and members of FDR's administration and those supporting the "New Deal." (Petillo 1981, 160; Shaller 1989, 18; James 1970, 429-430) From the above, it is possible to assert that although MacArthur might have been aware of some of the social science theoretical works published in the late 1920s and early 1930's, he probably did not read or study them. MacArthur's use of his staffs, his "Four Army Plan," creation of the General Headquarters Air Force and General Staff Council, and redefinition of the authority of the Chief of Staff during wartime were not the result of academic study or exposure to contemporary organizational theories. His tenure as Chief of Staff predated publication of the Brownlow Committee's report, Barnard's *Functions of the Executive* or Merriam's *Reorganization of the Executive.* MacArthur's approach to organizational issues had its basis in his military training and experience. Unity of command, span of control, lines of authority, and perpendicular versus

horizontal organizational structures were all concepts already known to MacArthur. If there was a particular orientation in MacArthur's organizational reforms that differed from established Army practice, it was that his reforms stressed his personal responsibilities over organizational mission requirements.

MacArthur was an effective Chief of Staff, but he did not significantly change the office or the Army in the manner of Wood or Marshall. The severe economic conditions that persisted during most of his tenure contributed to a lack of citations of MacArthur in the major historical studies of the office of the Chief of Staff. Although it is hard to establish and measure, MacArthur's most important contribution while heading the Army was his prevention of further reductions to the Army's force structure or budgets. His positive actions in preventing negative initiatives resulted in an algebraic zero. Despite great efforts, he managed only to maintain the status quo.

The Field Marshal of the Philippines

MacArthur faced a personal dilemma as his normal four year tour as Chief of Staff approached its end during the Summer and Fall of 1934. Roosevelt's extension of his tour to mid 1935 not only extended the dilemma, but bought him additional time to plan and arrange his fate.[23] The young chief of staff was a conservative Republican in an administration of liberal Democrats. He had established close, cordial, and mutually respecting relations with both the Secretaries of War for whom he worked. His relationships with the rest of the FDR administration's cabinet officers were, at best, more distant and official. With some administration officials he had bitter and recriminating relationships, as was the case with Secretary of the Interior

Harold Ickes, a close FDR confidant. The Bonus March and a libel suit against columnist Drew

Pearson, which he dropped rather than face having his Eurasian mistress made public, had

damaged his professional, public, and political images.[24] He was no longer the *Beau Brummel of*

the AEF or the young dashing boy general war hero. MacArthur faced early retirement at age

fifty five, or seven years of service as a corps or department commander under a Chief of Staff

who would be up to ten years his junior in rank. He had already commanded several corps and

the Department of the Philippines. For the vain, egotistical Douglas MacArthur, corps or

departmental command were not palatable alternatives.

   MacArthur had previously campaigned for appointment as the Governor-General of the

Philippines, but the Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 1934 abolished that position and replaced it

with a High Commissioner. The Governor-General of the Philippines had enjoyed wide and

unfettered powers and was too distant from Washington to suffer close supervision or oversight.

The Tydings-MacDuffie Act established the Philippines as an internally self-governing common-

wealth with a president and a National Assembly. The High Commissioner was still the senior

United States government representative in the Commonwealth, but most of the previous

governor-general's administrative and governance responsibilities were now in the hands of

commonwealth authorities. (James 1970, 471-474; Karnow 1989, 253-256; Petillo 1981, 168)

        Shortly after the passage of the Tydings-MacDuffie Act, Manuel Quezon, then Filipino

Senate President, arrived in Washington to discuss future Philippine and United States intergov-

ernmental relationships. One of his primary concerns was the military defense of the common-

wealth. Quezon desired the establishment of a military mission that would develop an overall

defense plan for the islands and assist in the formation of a Filipino military establishment. The

military mission would exist separately from, and in parallel with, the Department of the Philippines that would still control and administer U.S. Army units during the commonwealth period. Quezon based his request for a military mission on a 1926 law that provided for the assignment of United States military officers to certain Latin American countries as military advisors. Discussions between Quezon, MacArthur, Secretary of War Dern, and Senators Tydings and MacDuffie, determined that modifying the existing legislation was very possible. There was a consensus that the requested military mission was in the best interests of both governments. (James 1970, 479-480, fn. 1 and 2 480, and fn. 3 481) Beyond establishing that MacArthur thought the Philippines were defensible, Quezon asked him if he would accept the post as his military advisor and head the United States military mission. The Chief of Staff responded affirmatively to both his long time friend's questions. (James 1970, 481-482; Petillo 1981, 169-70; Karnow 1989, 270; Friend 1965, 162) MacArthur even drafted the bill for Quezon to present to Secretary of War Dern for the legislation required to amend the existing law. (James 1970, 480) [25] In late December, MacArthur confirmed his acceptance in correspondence to Quezon, who had returned to the Philippines. He also confirmed his acceptance of Quezon's offer during discussions with Secretary Dern and FDR concerning his relief as Chief of Staff of the Army. (James 1970, 480-481) Five months later, during May 1995, Senators Tydings and MacDuffie steered a bill through Congress amending the previously enacted legislation permitting military advisors in selected Latin American countries to include the Philippines. During June 1935, he replied to a letter from Quezon, who had heard that MacArthur was being considered for the post of High Commissioner, by stating": As for me, I have never given it (the high commissionership) a thought." (as quoted in James 1970, 487) On July 17, 1935, Secretary

Dern sent a memorandum to FDR proposing that MacArthur depart for Manila in October, while still retaining his rank of general and his office as Chief of Staff. Dern recommended that his relief as Chief of Staff should be effective December 15, 1935. Dern alluded to MacArthur's Four Army Plan as a precedent for the Deputy Chief of Staff's assumption of War Department administrative activities when the Chief of Staff took to the field. FDR approved the actions recommended in the memorandum on July 18, 1935. On September 18, 1935, Secretary Dern issued Special Orders No. 22 carrying out the President's decision. (James 1970, 485, 490-491; MacArthur Archives, RG-18)

Despite the diminished status and authority of the position of high commissioner, and his verbal and written acceptance of Quezon's offer, MacArthur earnestly maneuvered to obtain that position during the Summer of 1935. He was frustrated to discover that the law required his retirement from the Army in order to become the High Commissioner of the Philippines. (James 1970, 486-490) He went as far as to lobby for a change in the law in a September 9, 1935 letter to FDR. Shortly thereafter, in a September 26, 1935 letter to FDR, he attacked the motivations and intentions of George Murphy, the incumbent Governor-General of the Philippines whom he considered his competitor for the high commissionership.[26] Murphy, alerted to MacArthur's letter, countered with a letter of his own to FDR setting his record straight. Shortly thereafter FDR decided to appoint Paul V. McNutt as the first High Commissioner of the Philippines. (Jones 1970, 488-490; Karnow 1989, 270)

Although not specifically admitted in *Reminiscences*, MacArthur's probable motivation for seeking the High-Commissionership, and the reason behind the arrangements he orchestrated concerning his relief as Chief of Staff, was the retention of his four star rank of General upon

stepping down as the Chief of Staff. If he remained within the Army command structure, even as

the Military Advisor to the Philippines, he would have to revert to Major General upon leaving

the billet of Chief of Staff.[27] The position of High Commissioner was outside the Army structure

and the Department of War. If the assumption of the high commissionership had not entailed his

retirement from the Army, there would have been the possibility of retaining his four star rank of

general. After all, his father had maintained the rank of lieutenant general on detached service

while the Chief of Staff of the Army was only a major general.

The Plan

Even as he continued his attempts to attain the high commissionership, MacArthur

earnestly jumped into preparing to become the Military Advisor to the President of the Philip-

pines. He set in motion planning for the creation of the military mission, and the drafting of plans

and proposed commonwealth legislation associated with the office and functions of the Military

Advisor. Majors Dwight D. Eisenhower and James B. Ord, assisted by a special working group

of officers at the Army War College, assumed the responsibilities for creating the required plans

and documents. (Long 1969, 47) Eisenhower and Ord, two of the Chief of Staff's closest

assistants, were later to accompany him to the Philippines as his primary general staff officers.

Eisenhower later summarized the planning for the military advisory mission in a June 1942

memorandum to then President-in-exile Manuel Quezon. This memorandum was written the day

before Eisenhower, then a major general and chief of the Operations Division of the General

Staff, departed Washington to assume command of all United States forces in Europe. The memo

is a matter-of-fact third person history of the military advisory mission under MacArthur. Table

4, below, summarizes the memorandum's main points.

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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Table 4.--Defense Plan for the Commonwealth of the           │
│           Philippines                                         │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Components of Plan:                                           │
│     1.   An introductory speech for the President of the     │
│          Commonwealth to give before the National Assembly.  │
│     2.   A draft bill for establishment of the defense system.│
│     3.   A comprehensive training, organization, and equipment│
│          plan extending over the ten-year period of          │
│          commonwealth status.                                │
│                                                              │
│ Basic Elements of Plan:                                      │
│     1.   Establishment of ninety training centers.           │
│     2.   Absorption of significant portions of the existing  │
│          Constabulary to serve as commissioned and noncom-   │
│          missioned officers in the training camps.           │
│     3.   Induct trainees under universal conscription based  │
│          on six months for privates, one year for           │
│          noncommissioned officers and specialists, and       │
│          eighteen months for those accepting commissions in  │
│          the Reserve Corps.                                  │
│     4.   Accumulate savings each year for purchase of reserve│
│          equipment during later part of ten year program.    │
│     5.   Initiate an Air Corps Training program.             │
│     6.   Establish an officer training school on the West Point│
│          pattern.                                            │
│     7.   Establish administrative and logistic groups using  │
│          Constabulary officers engaged in similar duties.    │
│     8.   Develop a Marine Force (Navy) based on small motor  │
│          torpedo boats.                                      │
│     9.   Provide for yearly refresher training for units and │
│          graduates of previous training.                     │
│                               (Morton 1948, 103-104)         │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Underlying the plan were several key assumptions. The existence of assumptions in

military planning is of primary concern when executing a plan. The difference between a plan

and an order, which directs execution of a plan, is the presence of assumptions in a plan. The

translation of a plan into an executable order requires addressing and verifying each of the plan's

assumptions. If an assumption reflects reality, there is no problem. If the assumption does not

reflect reality, the plan requires modification, or the commander has to decide to proceed with

plan execution despite changed resources or conditions. Assumptions are therefore a primary

concern of a commander in approving a plan, and validation of assumptions during execution is one of a commander's principal responsibilities.

The defense plan for the Philippines, which MacArthur personally approved, and subsequently claimed as his own, assumed a ten-year period for full implementation, minimum annual fiscal resources of 15-20 million pesos (equivalent to approximately $8 million), universal military conscription, and a five-year implementation period before all elements of the plan would be functioning at full levels. (Morton 1948, 104; Long 1969, 47) At the end of the ten-year period the Philippines would possess an air force of 250 light bombers costing $10 million, a naval force of fifty or more motor torpedo boats costing about $5 million, a regular ground force of 19,000 costing $30 million, and a reserve force of up to 400,000 costing $35 million. (Morton 1948, 104; MacArthur 1964, 103; Friend 1965, 163-164; New York Times May 29, 1936; Philippine Magazine 36 (July 1939), 286-287) MacArthur's defense plan assumed that the primary activities planned for 1936 included only building the training camps, organizing the training cadres, establishing the support infrastructure, and creating the Filipino Military Academy at Baguio. Although the plan envisioned full training loads of thirty-five thousand trainees a year, divided into two semiannual classes, it envisioned calling up only 3,500 in the first draft scheduled for January 1, 1937. This reduced draft would allow for evaluation of the training cadres and validation of the training program and its methods. Each succeeding six-month draft would have increased numbers of trainees. The plan assumed that it would take five years before the camps were operating at their full annual training load of thirty-five thousand trainees. The plan called for the creation of a savings account in the initial years through the reduced training loads. This account would allow for the purchase of reserve

equipment in the final years of the program. Because Baguio would reflect the West Point program, it would take four years before the graduation of the first class of lieutenants. The proposed defense program acknowledged the fiscal constraints of the Filipino Commonwealth's economy and reflected the logistical and terrain constraints of the Philippine Archipelago. Ten small divisions, of around 7,500 men each with a minimum of transport and a dependence on improvised services, were the basic building blocks of the ground force. The force, built upon an establishment of 10,000 to 20,000 regulars, depended on wartime mobilization of reserves who would serve for up to thirty years. (Long 1969, 47; Morton 1948, 104) The plan provided for a total defense force of 200,000 by the end of the ten-year commonwealth period. The total force would eventually increase to between 250,000 and 300,000 as the reserve force matured. (Morton 1948, 103-107)[28]

The Military Advisor and His Office

MacArthur assumed the position of Military Advisor to the President of the Commonwealth the Philippines in complete control of his own fate. He had a close friendly relationship with the only authority to whom he had to answer, President Quezon. He had written his own contract, which even allowed him to take a leave of absence if the position of High Commissioner were to become available. Although FDR would later clarify that the High Commissioner was the senior United States officer in the Philippine Commonwealth, MacArthur did not directly answer to the High Commissioner, or the Commanding General of the Philippine Department, the senior military officer in the commonwealth. The first law the Filipino National Assembly passed was the exact draft of the legislation that Eisenhower, Ord, and the Army War

College group had created under MacArthur's supervision. (MacArthur Archives, RG-1) The office he assumed, the authority he exercised, his objectives and assignments, and the resources he required were all of his own design. The new military advisor was not assuming an office and working environment of someone else's making; he was operating in an environment that he had designed, created, and at least initially, controlled.

War Plan Orange

There was one further influence on the new Military Advisor's environment; it was War Plan Orange, the joint Army-Navy plan in case of war with Japan. The Joint Board of the Army and Navy reevaluated and updated War Plan Orange after the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. MacArthur, as the Chief of Staff, was completely aware of this revision and personally approved it for the Army. This revision of the plan remained in effect until the Fall of 1941, and was the official and accepted United States military strategy and policy document for defense of the Philippines. (James 1970, 473-474; Karnow 1989, 272; Friend 1965, 161-162; Long 1969, 55) MacArthur's defense plans for the Philippines should have had their basis in War Plan Orange. For the ten-year period during which MacArthur was building an indigenous defense force, War Plan Orange was the umbrella under which he would operate. MacArthur had assured Quezon of the defensibility of the Philippines in 1935. In 1939 he reiterated this assessment in replying to an article by Elihu Root that asserted that the Philippines would fall to a Japanese attack in a week. (Karnow 1989, 272; Friend 1965, 164) MacArthur's claim that the Philippines were defensible flew in the face of the prevailing opinions of most of his nation's military and naval strategists. His Filipino defense plans also contradicted the version of War Plan Orange

that he himself had approved. Although there was some leeway for interpretation, War Plan Orange envisioned the defense of only the Manilla Harbor area, and then for only six months. There were no provisions for reinforcement of the garrison in the Philippines, and naval planners estimated that retaking or reinforcing the Philippines through the Japanese Mandate islands could take two to three years. (Karnow 1989, 272; Friend 1965, 161-162; James 1964, 474)

A lack of congruence with War Plan Orange was not the only basic flaw in MacArthur's Filipino Defense Plan. U.S. Army strategists in the War Plans Division of the General Staff took issue with MacArthur basing his plan on the Swiss defense model. Army strategists pointed out that the Swiss model assumed a compact land area with significant natural obstacles and restricted avenues of approach. The Philippines, on the other hand, was a sprawling archipelago with its surrounding seas providing unlimited access to its islands by any naval power. The topography and geography of Switzerland favored the Swiss defenders. The same factors favored an attacker in the Philippines. Although terrain provided the defenders advantages on some islands, a naval power could isolate individual islands, prevent concentration of widespread reserve forces, and attack at will at the point of their choosing. (Karnow 1989, 272, Friend 1965, 162) MacArthur was aware of these criticisms of his plan's basis. Despite the availability of hindsight, he held to the basis of his plan in *Reminiscences* where he stated:

> My plan for building a defense for the Philippines was a simple one, patterned after the citizen-soldier system of conscription effectively established in Switzer-land. (MacArthur 1964, 103)

In MacArthur's defense, it is arguable that he was only referring to a form of conscription, and not a national defense plan. But MacArthur went on:

> The country's ten military areas, each would annually train 4,000 men. A small professional force would oversee their development. Training would occur at one

> hundred and twenty-eight camps, with trainees attending those closest to their
> homes. (Ibid.)

MacArthur's plan was the Swiss plan and not just a form of conscription policy. While War Plan

Orange envisioned a concentration of forces around Manilla Harbor, MacArthur's plan not only

organized training across the width and breadth of the Philippines, but also garrisoned the ten

light divisions throughout the archipelago.

Karnow offers an additional critique of why MacArthur's reliance on the Swiss model

was inappropriate. Although the Swiss came from three different ethnic groups, the Swiss had a

sense of nationalism and a society and an economy that was basically homogeneous. The

Filipino society on the other hand was not homogeneous but deeply divided by class and

economic factors. In May 1935 there had been a significant large rebellion near Manilla. The

Sakdalista Rebellion was a violent and dramatic example of the fractured nature of the Filipino

society. Karnow stated:

> Presumably an expert on the Archipelago, MacArthur must have been aware of
> the ferment. But he seemed blind to its revolutionary potential. He was a conven-
> tional officer assigned to create a conventional army capable of waging a conven-
> tional war against a conventional enemy. (Karnow 1989, 275)

Eisenhower, the Military Advisor's Chief of Staff, and one of the individuals who actually

drafted the plan,"doubted from the start that an army could be cobbled together." (Ibid.)

MacArthur had created his environment as the Military Advisor. He would have his own plan to

carry out; not one forced upon him. He was to be the Military Advisor on his own terms. The

problem was that his internal organizational environment did not acknowledge the actual

external environment. It is a significant issue in examining MacArthur's tenure as the Military

Advisor, that he was not only aware of the true nature of his external environment; but that he

had helped design it. Theodore Friend offers an explanation of MacArthur's appreciation of his

internal and external organizational environments. He stated:

> He answered (Quezon's question on the defensibility of the Philippines), it
> appears, out of great contempt for War Plan ORANGE and great confidence in
> himself. Friend 1965, 162)

Implementing the Plan

When MacArthur arrived in the Philippines during the Fall of 1935, he only had a very

small staff of two general staff officers, Majors Eisenhower and Ord, a personal physician, Major

Hunter, and a personal aide, Captain Davis. (James 1970, 485) At best, a staff of this size could

only provide oversight of the defense plan's implementation. The temporary assignment of

regular U.S. Army officers and Philippine Scouts from the Department of the Philippines, and

the reliance on former Philippine Constabulary officers to provide actual administration of the

training program ameliorated the inability of MacArthur's small staff to administer the defense

program. Appendix K depicts the actual manning of the Military Advisor's office during October

1937. It depicts a staff of nineteen officers. It also shows that several positions were added to the

initial staff, such as line numbers 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, and 13. There were also enlisted personnel

attached to the staff for staff administrative and secretarial support. The size of the staff varied,

primarily as a result of semiannual training requirements and the level of augmentation from the

Department of the Philippines. During late 1938 Department of the Philippine augmentation was

at its highest pre-1941 levels with thirty-four officers and ninety-four enlisted personnel detailed

to MacArthur's staff. (James 1970, 553-554)[29] For an organization, which was initially function-

ing as the Filipino equivalent of the United States War Department, it was a small staff restricted to planning and oversight. It was not a staff that could directly manage and execute operations.

The office of the Military Advisor was in the Intra-Moros, Manilla's ancient walled sector, at Number 1 Calle Victoria. This placed MacArthur and his staff apart from the rest of the other Filipino government agencies, the Commanding General of the Department of the Philippines, and the High Commissioner. The location of the Military Advisor's offices reinforced his independence, but would later complicate his access to, and coordination with, other United States and Filipino officials.

The death of MacArthur's mother on December 3, 1935, just under two months after his return to the Philippines, his budding relationship with Jean Faircloth, his future wife, and his initial workload in setting up the Office of the Military Advisor and the infrastructure for the defense plan, resulted in MacArthur having a very restricted social life. He reestablished his previous social pattern of interaction with the most important Filipino elites, particularly the Quezons, but most of his time was spent at No.1 Calle Victoria, or in his air-conditioned penthouse atop the Manilla Hotel. MacArthur's work habits as the Military Advisor were:

> Unlike his earlier days in the chief of staff's office when he put in long, grueling
> hours, MacArthur as military advisor relied more completely on his assistants and
> was often away from his office. Eisenhower said that the general usually came to
> his office about eleven in the morning, stayed until nearly two, took an hour and a
> half or longer for lunch, returned to his office about three-thirty, went home about
> two hours later, and sometimes came back to his office a few hours in the eve-
> nings. (James 1970, 557)

James goes on to point out that MacArthur worked seven days a week, and that it does not appear that he took any leave or vacation while he was the Military Advisor. (Ibid.) MacArthur occasionally traveled outside Manila, such as to the Military Academy at Baguio in the mountains North of Manilla, or to Clark Field a short distance North-North East of Manila, but available records indicate he did not travel extensively outside the Manilla area. (James 1970, 494-496; MacArthur Archives, RG-1) Reports and correspondence indicate that Eisenhower and Ord traveled extensively, and that they conducted the high level coordination and on-site visits for the Military Advisor's Office.

From the moment that the Tydings-McDuffie Act was signed into law, there was a divergence of opinion in the Philippines concerning the need for, and the viability of, a defense force. Upon assuming the office of the Military Advisor, MacArthur had to defend his defense program constantly. MacArthur's immense stature as a military and Filipino expert, his close relationship with Quezon, and Quezon's energetic support for the defense program tended to quiet some critics. (Friend 1965, 164) The defense program, approved by passage of Commonwealth Act Number 1, the National Defense Act, consumed 22 percent of the annual Philippine National Budget. While MacArthur was the Chief of Staff of the Army, the War Department's budget amounted to only 5 percent of the United States Federal Budget. (Friend 1965, 165) The size alone of the Filipino defense budget insured debate. Some Filipino elites were concerned that the presence of arms, and those who knew how to use them, spread throughout the predominantly rural commonwealth, would make future rebellions more likely and serious. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, growing concern for the Japanese threat fueled attacks on MacArthur's defense program. Some felt the presence of a large Philippine defense establishment

would antagonize the more powerful Japanese. The willingness and ability of the United States to defend the Philippines, especially after independence, were other Filipino concerns. After the Japanese rout of Chiang Khi-Shek's Kuomintang forces in 1937, the best equipped and trained Asian army after the Japanese, many Filipinos, including Manuel Quezon, developed serious doubts about the ability of MacArthur's defense program to provide a credible defense. (Friend 1965, 167) Some Filipinos thought neutrality was an alternative that not only promised a better means of deflecting Japanese expansionism, but was a lot cheaper from a budgetary perspective, than the military advisor's plan.

The constant questioning of his defense plan's viability was a significant, even the significant, factor in MacArthur's tenure as the Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines. The need to constantly defend his program made MacArthur's normally optimistic appreciation of his capabilities and ability to succeed even more optimistic. Criticisms from others made it impossible for him to admit shortcomings in his plans or accomplishments. MacArthur appears to have used inflated claims of Filipino military capabilities as not only a manner of deflecting criticism, but as a way to provide a more credible threat against aggression. From the very beginning of his tenure as Military Advisor, MacArthur's statements concerning Filipino military capabilities were in direct opposition to the appreciations of his staff. (Karnow 1989, 275; Friend 1965, 165; James 1970, 509) A prime example of the divergence of MacArthur's view of reality, and that of his staff, is the report he gave to the National Assembly dated April 27, 1936. (MacArthur Archives, RG-1) In this report MacArthur claimed:

> Six months have elapsed since the National Assembly passed and you approved the National Defense Act of the Philippines. During these months considerable progress has been made . . . (p.5)

In short, the character and adequacy of Philippine defenses will be the common source of important forces and influences that are certain, during years to come, to act and react with far-reaching results throughout the world. (p.7)

The Philippine Defense System guarantees, if efficiently administered, a maximum of protection at a minimum of defense. (p.20)

The per capita costs imposed by the defense plan are lower than for the same purpose in any other country. (p.29)

The first element of strength in this situation is the geographical isolation of the Philippines. (p.41)

...Philippine defenses will present to any potential invader such difficult problems as to give pause even to the most ruthless and powerful. (p.41)

Eisenhower remarked that this report was:

...far too optimistic. Actually we had barely gotten started, and there was no Philippine Army to speak of. Few of the camps had been built, and the system of registering the Filipinos for training had barely begun functioning. (James 1970, 504)

Karnow is more blunt in his assessment of the report. He stated:

The absurd estimate, partly contrived to quiet skeptics, also reflected his belief in his own infallibility, since any project he undertook would by definition succeed. (Karnow 1989, 275)

The need to defend the defense plan and demonstrate observable progress caused Quezon to require that the January 1937 draft would be for 20,000 rather than the 3,000 as originally planned. This requirement to train immediately at full levels abrogated several key assumptions underlying the plan. The intention of limiting the first draft to 3,000 was to test and verify the training organization. The plan did not envision full annual training levels of 35,000 trainees, split between two semiannual classes, until five years into the plan. Quezon's required 20,000 man January 1937 draft not only exceed the maximum planned training load for a semiannual class, but meant that the savings that would have resulted from reduced initial training loads did

not occur. There is no indication that MacArthur ordered rewriting of the plan although several

of its underlying assumptions had changed. MacArthur did not adjust the overall objectives and

timing of his plan based on Quezon's requirement to immediately train at full levels. He did not

learn from the lessons brought to light during the first semiannual training period. MacArthur

maintained that the training period had gone "exceedingly well," while Eisenhower, who had

actually observed significant amounts of the training termed the training "disappointing" to "very

unsatisfactory." (James 1970,513-514) Among the causes for this failure Eisenhower cited:

> ...defects were traceable to neglect on the part of cadre officers and in some
> instances to distinct failures on the part of our Army Headquarters. (James 1970,
> 514)

Eisenhower's first hand observations found:

> ...training camps to be ramshackle affairs in which the rookies, most of them
> uneducated farm boys, hated discipline, disobeyed orders and even mutinied.
> (Karnow 1989, 275)

Eisenhower was particularly concerned about the Filipino officers noting that:

> ...the native officers, supposedly the spine of the makeshift army, who impressed
> him as indolent, corrupt and quarrelsome. (Ibid.)

MacArthur did not learn from the experiences of the first semiannual training period, or modify

his plan. His acceptance of another 20,000 man draft for the second training period scheduled for

July 1, 1937 supports this assertion.

Manuel Quezon was not only MacArthur's closest friend and supporter in the Philippines,

and his nominal superior, but a similar personality who craved adulation, power, and recogni-

tion. They considered each other as brothers. Both practiced a charismatic, heroic, and histrionic

form of leadership. In an Asian culture, where position, power, and charisma were important

attributes, MacArthur and Quezon's leadership styles and personalities engendered awe, trust,

and allegiance. (Karnow 1989, 271-272) Their leadership styles also required strong personali-

ties, engendered vanity, and gave much value to form over substance. Both men faced a problem

of relating their outward construction of their environments to reality. MacArthur was able to

concentrate his energies in an area where he could frame the accepted reality, i.e., military force

development. As an acknowledged expert in his own area, he answered only to Quezon, although

he had to convince the National Assembly of his competency and veracity. Quezon faced a much

different environment. He had to maintain political power. The maintenance of this power not

only dealt with internal issues but external considerations which he had little power to influence.

Quezon had to face the reality of an aggressive and expansionist Japan. While his Military

Advisor promised a credible defense by 1945, Quezon watched the Japanese invasion of

Manchuria in 1937. The Japanese occupation of Taiwan, within bomber range of Luzon, made

Manilla vulnerable to air attack in the event of hostilities with Japan. There were large numbers

of Japanese in the Philippines, especially in Mindanao, the principal island of the Southern

Philippines. Although Quezon was not privy to War Plan Orange, he could easily observe that

the United States commitment to defense of the Philippines was level at best. Despite his close

friendship and affinity for his field marshal, Quezon, had to face the reality of the Japanese

military, naval, and economic threats. Quezon, like any politician, relied on the maintenance of

perceptions that he had a vision for his country, and that he held a unique ability to lead. Despite

the eloquent assurances of his Military Advisor concerning the capabilities of the emerging

military establishment, Quezon accepted the reality and implications of Japanese expansionism.

Quezon was MacArthur's sole senior authority, but MacArthur was not Quezon's only

military advisor. Eisenhower and Quezon had developed a close and trusting relationship.

Quezon sought out Eisenhower's counsel on military matters and even provided him with an

office in the Malacanang Palace, Quezon's executive mansion. (Karnow,1989, 275) MacArthur

was always a visitor to Malacanang Palace, but Eisenhower, his Chief of Staff, had access there

on his own right. Quezon's relationship to Eisenhower gave him a frame of reference against

which to measure his Military Advisor's reports and claims.

> Eisenhower was vital as a liaison with Quezon- who, wary of MacArthur's flights
> of fancy, respected Eisenhower's integrity. He gave Eisenhower an office in
> Malacanang palace and counted on him for the unvarnished truth. (Karnow 1989,
> 275)

The Reality

It would be possible to measure MacArthur's effectiveness as the Military Advisor to the

President of the Philippines, and the value and appropriateness of his plan, by the success of the

Filipino armed forces in repelling the December 1941 Japanese invasion of the Philippines.

Although this is an easily calculated measurement, it is overly simplistic, and in some ways

inappropriate. MacArthur's supporters could rightly argue that the invasion came four years

before the end of the period required to bring his plan to fulfillment. The practical elimination of

the battle fleet at Pearl Harbor had also changed the entire military balance in the Pacific and

also a principal assumption of MacArthur's plan. At the same time the rapid collapse of the

American and Filipino forces into the Bataan Peninsular and Corregidor closely parallels Elihu

Root's prophecy concerning the defensibility of the Philippines. Even a cursory review of the

1941-1942 Japanese invasion of the Philippines indicates that MacArthur's defense plan was

seriously flawed and did not even begin to provide the defensive capability he had constantly

touted.

Michael Schaller, a historian who is very critical of MacArthur, provides a frame work for measuring the success of the Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines and his defense plan. Schaller states:

> Ultimately, MacArthur's defense program depended on strong support from Washington, close cooperation with his staff, Quezon's faith and backing, and the deferral of the Japanese threat for several more years. (Shaller 1989, 39)

Although Shaller's criteria for the success of the Filipino defense program does not address the validity of the plan's basis, i.e., the Swiss model, it does provide a framework for examining MacArthur's success in marshaling his assets and acquiring the required support and resources for his plan.

The Military Advisor and Washington

MacArthur's support from Washington should have depended on cultivation of two separate avenues of access to FDR's administration. Because he was only directly responsible to Quezon, MacArthur was not bound to a single point of access to the United States chain of command. MacArthur could gain access to FDR's administration through either the State Department or the War Department. On the one hand he had direct access to the High Commissioner and through him the Secretary of State. MacArthur's Filipino defense program had important ramifications to the nation building of the Philippines and foreign relations with Japan. Both these issues were of key interest to the State Department and strong State Department support of his defense program could have had significant benefits. Available records do not indicate that MacArthur coordinated extensively, or effectively, with the State Department. His relationships with the two High Commissioners while he was Military Advisor were not close. Contacts were

infrequent and formal at best. (Schaller 1989, 41) As a military officer serving within the War

Department, he would not have had extensive or close contacts with the State Department or its

representatives, except on a personal basis. MacArthur continued this pattern of coordination

with the State Department while he was the Military Advisor. In doing so he denied himself an

alternate access to FDR's Administration and a source of potential support. MacArthur, always

one to create and control his own environment, had constructed his world strictly along military

lines. As the Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines, he could have functioned in

political and diplomatic affairs, but he chose not to do so. This self-imposed environment would

later deny him support from political and diplomatic sources when Harold Ickes the Secretary of

the Interior attempted to extend Interior Department influence into areas MacArthur considered

within the purview of the Filipino defense program. (James 1970, 523)

MacArthur's other access to the FDR Administration was through the Department of

War. MacArthur was much more active in utilizing this access. He and his staff, principally

Eisenhower and Ord, coordinated extensively with the Department of the Philippines, various

War Department offices, and the Chief of Staff of the Army in their quest for supplies, equip-

ment, munitions, and personnel augmentation. The Department of the Philippines was particu-

larly cooperative in providing personnel augmentation, joint training, and available logistical and

staff support. (Morton 1948, 105-106) Although relations with the Department of the Philippines

were "sensitive but reasonably harmonious" while Major General John Hughes was the depart-

mental commander from 1938 to 1940, they were particularly close and supportive when Major

General George Grunert assumed that post in 1938. Hughes had occassionaly chafed at MacAr-

thur's drafts for personnel, but Grunert and MacArthur had a relationship built on mutual respect

and admiration. (James 1970, 53-55) Support of the new Filipino army was in the Department of the Philippines own self interest because the Filipino military establishment was considered akin to the National Guard and would come under the department's command in case of declaration of a national emergency during the commonwealth period.

The War Department was less consistent in readily supporting MacArthur's requests for equipment and munitions. This was initially due, in part, to security concerns over the possibility of the weapons and ammunition easily falling into the hands of various rebels and insurrection-ists. It was also due to priority being given to the defense of Hawaii and the Canal Zone. Eventually the War Department provided sufficient light infantry weapons to arm the ten light infantry divisions envisioned in the Filipino defense plan. Sufficient ammunition to support training remained a problem, but this was also a problem for the entire U.S. Army during the prewar period. (James 1970, 544-549; Morton 1948, 105-106)

MacArthur's problems in garnering support for his defense program from the FDR Administration were twofold. First there was the anti-military and isolationist biases held by many liberal progressive reformers in the Democratic Party. These biases would prevail until after the beginning of World War II in Europe, and would stifle not only MacArthur's plans for defense of the Philippines, but the entire U.S. military until 1940. MacArthur's failure to cultivate Paul V. McNutt, the High Commissioner until 1939, came home to roost when McNutt, a pacifist by nature and politics, returned to the United States and roundly castigated MacArthur for militarizing the Philippines. McNutt did not limit himself to criticizing the Field Marshal of the Philippines; he effectively blocked or delayed arms and munitions shipments for a period after his return. (James 1970, 544) Although munitions would normally be considered a military

matter under the cognizance of the War Department, the military itself was an ethical, political and diplomatic issue during the inter-war years. MacArthur's self-imposed isolation and disdain for the politicians in power denied him potential support for his Filipino defense program.

The second principal problem facing MacArthur in gaining support from Washington was the widespread belief that his program had no chance of success. General Malin Craig, MacArthur's successor as Chief of Staff, and the General Staff's War Plans Division were critical of the Filipino defense plan from its outset. The War Plans Division objected to the plan on the following points:

1.) Because the Philippines lacked the capability and resources to produce the munitions and supplies required to maintain modern military and naval forces and, unlike Switzerland, the Philippines were an archipelago with unlimited seaborne access, any military establishment maintained by the Government of the Philippines would be wholly ineffective. This situation was irremediable.

2.) The only value of a Filipino military establishment was as a supplement to U.S. forces.

3.) A more plausible use of a Filipino military establishment would be in an internal defense role and the Philippine Constabulary already met that need, and could do so at significantly less expense, and

4.) The U.S. should clearly announce at an early date whether it was willing to defend the Philippines in case of hostilities. This announcement would then provide a frame of reference for formation of a Filipino defense force patterned on paragraph 3.) above.

(Embrick to CofS, December 2, 1935, War Plans Division 3389-29 as quoted in James

1970, 502-503)

The last point reflected the concern of the military planners that Filipino defense plan did not

acknowledge the assumptions inherent in War Plan Orange. Many of the military planners would

have agreed with a later assessment that:

> The notion that 36 torpedo boats and 100 bombers could prevent invasion by
> Japan, possessor of the third largest navy in the world and of a highly trained and
> growing army, was naive. (Long 1969, 48)

Besides Brigadier General Embrick, the head of the War Plans Division, major generals

Simonds, Nolan, Malone, Conner, Brown, and Mosely concurred with the above assessment, and

Chief of Staff General Craig officially approved it. (James 1970, fn 29, 503) Several of the above

named officers were normally avid supporters of MacArthur. The prevailing opinion of the

General Staff did not change when George C. Marshall relieved Malin Craig as the Chief of Staff

in 1939. Even Eisenhower and Ord, the Military Advisor's long time assistants, and primary

general staff officers had doubts and reservations concerning the Filipino defense plan. (James

1970, 509)

A combination of pacifist and isolationist opposition to MacArthur's plan on moral and

philosophical grounds, distaste by many for its political and diplomatic ramifications, and

disbelief by many influential leaders in the War Department that the plan was feasible, contrib-

uted to a widespread lack of support for MacArthur's plan within FDR's administration. What

support the administration had given to his plan began to diminish after 1937. Only last minute

attempts to shore up Filipino defenses as war approached in 1941 reversed this trend. (Shaller

1989, 39)

A dramatic indication of the waning support in Washington for MacArthur and his Filipino defense plan during 1937 was the sudden move to force MacArthur's retirement during the Fall of that year. During August of 1937, General Craig notified MacArthur that he was to return to the United States after two years for reassignment within the War Department. Shortly thereafter MacArthur applied for retirement citing his desire to open up a promotion slot, poor health, that his work as military advisor was nearly complete, and repugnance at having to accept a corps command or lesser command. Because he did not occupy a War Department billet, MacArthur was not denying any brigadier general promotion to major general. He had not suffered bad health since his brief illness while on occupation duty in Germany in 1919. He was also less than two years into what he himself had designed as a ten-year defense plan. James states that these reasons "were artificially contrived," and that General Craig understood the real reason was MacArthur's unwillingness, or inability to serve under former subordinates. In October the War Department approved MacArthur's request and announced that he would retire December 31, 1937 with the rank of general. Even James, the ultimate authority on MacArthur, was not able to determine precisely who was responsible for forcing MacArthur into retirement. He does state that neither General Craig nor Secretary of War Woodring were responsible. James does suggest that Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, and one of MacArthur's arch detractors within FDR's administration, may have engineered the plot as a means of transferring administration of the Philippines from the War Department to Interior. Ickes was able to realize this desire in 1939. James also suggests that FDR might have considered talk of MacArthur being nominated as the Republican presidential candidate in 1940 when he took final action in approving MacArthur's retirement. (James 1970, 520-524; Shaller 1989, 38) Although MacAr-

thur remained in the Philippines, he did so as an employee and officer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. When he retired, he lost official access to Washington in his own right. With his retirement he also turned over formal input for U.S. military policy toward the Philippines to military officers in the Department of the Philippines and the General Staff that believed his plan had no chance of success.[30]

The Military Advisor and His Staff

MacArthur's heroic leadership style, self-confidence, amazing determination, optimism, and charm had always engendered awe, respect, and devotion in his subordinates. His staff in Manilla from 1935 to 1941 was no exception. Gavin Long, in his study of MacArthur as a military leader states:

> Generally MacArthur seems to have won the admiration and devotion of the little
> staff over which he presided, although his chief of staff, Eisenhower, did not find
> his postures entirely congenial . . . Few of his subordinates, however, seem to
> have been immune from his charms. (Long 1969, 51)

Eisenhower and Ord were the heart of MacArthur's staff until Ord's death in a plane accident in 1938 and Eisenhower's departure in 1939. These two officers were not only competent and professional staff officers, but they had maintained the ability to be respectfully critical and maintain a sense of balance and reality. They were able to do this in the face of MacArthur's overly optimistic and tailored views of the progress of the Filipino defense plan. Eisenhower had served directly under MacArthur in the Chief of Staff's office and the general had to pressure his assistant to accompany him to the Philippines. Ord had been Eisenhower's choice, not the general's, and Ord and Eisenhower worked closely and effectively with each other. (James 1970, 485-486)

> Both were loyal to MacArthur and were working hard to carry out his plan, but in private they speculated anxiously on certain questions. (James 1970, 509)

> General MacArthur's amazing determination and optimism made us forget these questions at times, but they kept coming back in our minds. (Eisenhower interview with James, James 1970, 509)

Ord and Eisenhower were indispensable to MacArthur because, although they were loyal, they were also willing to tell the emperor when he had no clothes. Their replacements were cut from different cloth.

MacArthur depended very heavily on Eisenhower. As chief of staff, he organized and ran the military advisor's office and staff. Eisenhower, the supremely capable staff officer, translated MacArthur's ideas into reality by providing the detailed completed plans, orders, and documents for MacArthur's signature. Because of MacArthur's work habits as the military advisor, Eisenhower exercised most of the day to day executive and administrative direction of the military advisor's mission. As a result of the extremely limited travel of the Military Advisor outside the Manilla metropolitan area, Eisenhower and Ord were his eyes and ears. Quezon's aforementioned close and trusting relationship with Eisenhower recognized the above dynamics within his military advisor's office.

Eisenhower and MacArthur were extremely different personalities and exercised distinctly different styles of military leadership. MacArthur's flamboyant posturing did not sit well with Eisenhower. He even went so far to later state, when asked if he had met MacArthur:

> Not only have I met him, madam, but I have studied dramatics under him for five years in Washington and four in the Philippines. (Clark Lee as quoted in Long 1969, 51)

Both men also put an extreme value on loyalty. It appears though that MacArthur

demanded absolute loyalty of his subordinates whereas Eisenhower gave equal importance to

loyalty extending down as well as up the chain of command. A minor incident, that in retrospect

marked the beginning of the end of Eisenhower's working relationship with MacArthur,

demonstrated the difference in the two officers' concepts of loyalty. During January of 1938

MacArthur decided that Filipino morale and support for his military program would improve if

he staged a military demonstration and grand parade in Manilla. MacArthur planned to bring

Filipino units from all ten military districts to the capital, conduct military demonstrations at a

camp setup on the city's outskirts, and then stage a military grand revue parade downtown.

Despite warnings from Eisenhower and others on his staff that this project was unfeasible from a

budgetary aspect, the Military Advisor directed that planning for the event go forward. It was

Eisenhower's impression that MacArthur had advised Quezon of the planned event. When

Quezon asked Eisenhower about movement of Filipino units from remote outlying areas into the

Manila area, he reacted with surprise when told of the planned demonstration and parade.

Quezon immediately called MacArthur and ordered him to cancel the planned events where-

upon:

> the military advisor, "Exceedingly unhappy" and visibly upset," chastised Eisen-
> hower and Ord for actually setting the plan in motion. Eisenhower claimed that
> "General MacArthur denied that he had given us an order - which was certainly
> news to us." Tempers exploded in the military advisor's office, and commented
> Eisenhower, "this misunderstanding caused considerable resentment - and never
> again were we on the same warm and cordial terms." (James 1970, 525-526)

Later that month Ord died in an aircraft accident. Eisenhower then began in earnest to obtain

orders back to the United States. He would leave in 1939. Ord's and Eisenhower's replacements

were to remain with MacArthur as close personal assistants throughout World War II and into

the occupation of Japan. They would prove to be capable, trusted, and loyal assistants, but they would deny MacArthur possibly the most valuable qualities that Ord and Eisenhower had brought to his staff. Ord and Eisenhower were capable and loyal, but most of all they had the courage to disagree with MacArthur and voice to him reservations or problems with his policies or directives. They functioned as the loyal opposition, but within MacArthur's staff.

Ord's replacement was Major Richard K. Sutherland. He would later become the chief of staff when Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Marshall arrived as Eisenhower's replacement in 1939. Sutherland was a capable officer but his personality was "brusque, short-tempered, autocratic, and of a generally antagonizing nature." (Lee and Henschel 1951, 161) George C. Kenny, MacArthur's wartime Army Air Corps commander, summarized Sutherland as:

> ... egotistic, like most people, but an unfortunate bit of arrogance combined with his egotism had made him almost universally disliked. However he was smart, capable of a lot of work . . . he knew so many answers that I could understand why General MacArthur had picked him as his chief of staff . . . (Kenney 1949, 26-27)

Gavin Long asserts that:

> Sutherland was the wrong kind of chief of staff for MacArthur, whose foibles he would but nourish. (Long 1969, 52)

MacArthur brought two of his most capable, trustworthy, and loyal assistants with him to the Philippines in 1935. Despite a reputation for engendering awe and respect within his staffs, he had lost both of his most valuabe aides by 1939. Like any senior officer, he had the privilege of selecting and retaining his primary staff officers. The staff that he assembled in the Philippines by 1939 was to provide the nucleus of his staffs for the rest of his military career. The problem was that the staff he had assembled by 1939, although capable, loyal and dedicated to himself, lacked personalities, such as Ord and Eisenhower who could cover his foibles, not

nurture them. MacArthur, by losing the confidence and dedication of Eisenhower and Ord, and by not seeking out replacements with their qualities, allowed, even encouraged, a change in the nature of his staff. Future criticisms that MacArthur's closest staff officers were blindly loyal syncopants, and alter egos of their chief have a basis in fact. MacArthur kept the support and dedication of his staff in the Philippines, but he changed the nature of his staff in the process.

Quezon and His Military Advisor

Quezon and MacArthur had been close friends and associates since 1922. Quezon had specifically sought out MacArthur as his military advisor in 1934. They referred to each other as "brother." Quezon had given MacArthur free reign in creating his office, its plan, and his compensation. Quezon had made MacArthur a field marshal. The relationship between the president and the head of his nation's military could not have been closer. From 1935 through 1937 MacArthur enjoyed the complete trust, confidence and support of Quezon, but that changed.

In June 1938, Quezon and a small party made a secret visit to Japan. MacArthur was neither a part of the party, nor aware of the trip before he read about it in the Filipino press. During the trip, officially described as a vacation, Quezon met with high ranking Japanese officials. American newspapers alleged the purpose of the trip was an attempt by Quezon to obtain a formal Japanese pledge that recognized Filipino neutrality.

During 1939, Quezon officially repudiated the defense program and privately repudiated his "brother" and military advisor. In May, Quezon had the National Assembly create a Department of National Defense. Henceforth MacArthur would have to go through Teofilo Sison, the

new Secretary of Defense, in order to order munitions, enroll trainees, or negotiate contracts for military construction projects. (James 1970, 537; Karnow 1989, 276)[31] Quezon even required MacArthur to make appointments with him through Jose Vargas, his private secretary. (Karnow 1989, 276) These actions effectively curtailed or eliminated much of MacArthur's authority and control over the Filipino military establishment. In September, Quezon slashed MacArthur's 1941 budget request cutting the recruit training load in half, closing sixty-one training camps and all but one officer training camps, and discontinuing further military construction and armaments acquisition. Quezon later went as far as to withdraw free franking privileges form the Military Advisor's office. (James 1970, 539; Karnow 1989, 276) In a speech to the National assembly, during the early Fall, and later during a speech celebrating the founding of the Commonwealth to a large audience in Manila's Rizal Stadium, Quezon stated that the Philippines were not defensible and thus did not warrant the expenditure of further resources on defense. (James 1970, 537) In private, Quezon explored the possibility of having FDR recall MacArthur to the new High-Commissioner Francis B. Sayre upon his arrival in late 1939. Quezon withdrew the suggestion when Sayre prudently requested it in writing. (Karnow 1989, 276)

By 1939 MacArthur was isolated from Quezon and essentially replaced by Filipinos officials appointed by Quezon. MacArthur's loss of Quezon's confidence was partially the result of a lack of flexibility on MacArthur's part to changing Filipino perceptions and political realities. MacArthur appears to have assumed a constancy in his relationship to Quezon. He does not appear to have realized that he was not only working for a politician, but that he was also part of the Filipino political process. The political process in a representative form of govern-

ment is in a state of constant flux, but MacArthur had constructed his world, and his military program, based on constants.

Although Quezon and MacArthur shared many personality traits, Quezon as a political animal realized his political survival depended on adapting to change and compromise. Compromise was not a normal part of MacArthur's vocabulary.

By 1938 Quezon, through access to Eisenhower, realized that the glowing reports of his military advisor were not reality. The disappointing reality of Filipino military capabilities and potential had to be considered against the fiscal drain the military program was making on the economy, and the political costs of the program. The growing and increasingly ominous Japanese threat exacerbated Quezon's economic and political concerns with the program.

In some instances MacArthur had proved adept at accepting political realities. When Quezon demanded a full military draft for the initial training program, MacArthur demurred without protest even though the acceptance of Quezon's demand seriously threatened the basis of the Filipino defense plan. He also had not modified his military program despite the abrogation of one of its basic assumptions. MacArthur's tendency to "demonize" his opponents probably prevented him from realizing that domestic and political support for his dense program was eroding. By refusing to modify the scale or orientation of his program, MacArthur created a situation that would cause a rift between himself and Quezon. MacArthur's requests for increased funding in 1938 and 1939 supports this assertion. Although, from a purely military standpoint, the higher than planned 1937 training loads warranted increased funding. At the same time higher defense spending requests were indefensible politically and in the context of Filipino budgetary constraints.

The Nadir

The Military Advisor's unwillingness to realistically evaluate his program's progress, inflexibility in modifying it in the face of military, political, and fiscal realities, and isolation from his parent government, host government, and domestic Filipino politics, were the root causes of the failure of his Filipino defense program. By mid 1939, MacArthur and his defense program were becoming irrelevant. Some historians, such as Schaller, characterize the Field Marshal of the Philippines as isolated, bitter, ineffective, and idle after 1939. (Schaller 1989, 41-42) Pro-MacArthur historians and writers tend not to address the period between 1938 and 1941. Other than mentioning anecdotal incidents covering the period, MacArthur does not address this period in *Reminiscences*. Even James, Long, and Karnow, in balanced coverage of this period, depict a person and his program adrift in a limbo of unrealized goals. When MacArthur had assumed the superintendency of West Point, and the Office of Chief of Staff of the Army, it was the organizations that had reached their nadir, not their leader. From 1939 to mid 1941 it would be MacArthur that was at his nadir. Both he and the organization that he led had become irrelevant, isolated, and ineffective with little hope of future success. MacArthur had not changed. The professional and personality traits that had contributed to his effectiveness and successes as West Point's superintendent and the Army's Chief of Staff were unchanged and still his driving forces. Other personality traits had also not changed. While his supreme self-confidence and aloof military aristocratic air had initially helped establish himself as the Military Advisor to Quezon, they had also contributed to his inability to properly recognize the changing nature of his organizational environment. This lack of flexibility was a critical flaw in an

environment that was beyond his ability to control. As a public administrator, MacArthur had

placed his personal views, needs, and requirements as an executive above those of the organiza-

tion that he led. He not only personalized his staff, a desirable condition to some extent for all

leaders, he personalized the organization and its objectives. Because the leader's personality,

traits, and behaviors had long been constants, the ability of the Office of the Military Advisor to

the President of the Philippines to organizationally deal with a fluid environment was limited.

Attacks on the effectiveness and the value of the defense program, and its managing organiza-

tion, were thus direct and personal attacks on the executive. The ability of the executive to deal

with attacks on the organization, and the organization's ability to separate itself from attacks on

its executive were extremely limited. This situation created an organizational crises that,

MacArthur, its executive never fully realized or addressed. The period from 1939 to 1941 was

the nadir of MacArthur as both a military officer and public administrator.

Redemption and Return to the Abyss

The period from July 17, 1941, when he returned to active duty as the commander of U.S.

Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), until March 11, 1942, when he departed Corregidor in

defeat for Australia, was a period of dramatic rise and fall for MacArthur. During this nine-mon-

th period he garnered the appointment as the senior Army commander in the western Pacific,

was given great latitude in preparing the Philippines for possible Japanese Invasion, then was

surprised and decisively defeated by a numerically inferior Japanese force. Unlike Admiral

Kimmel, the senior naval officer at Pearl Harbor, MacArthur did not suffer public personal

vilification, disgrace, and ignominious forced retirement. After his evacuation to Australia, on

FDR's orders, he received the award of the Congressional Medal of Honor and gained command of the South West Pacific theater of operations. MacArthur's participation in World War II is the most extensively covered portion of his career and is properly the subject of military historians rather than public administrators. World War II was the interregnum of MacArthur the public administrator. The war not only redeemed MacArthur as a general, it set the stage for his redemption as a public administrator.

MacArthur the general, military hero, and theater commander will only be addressed in this study when his World War II exploits explain or affect his post war performance as a public administrator in Japan. In his forward to *The Years of MacArthur, Volume II 1941-1945* James captures the essence of MacArthur during the war years when he wrote:

> As was true of the treatment of his career to 1941, excessive adulation or cruel disparagement has characterized nearly all biographical and other official writings about MacArthur's role in the war against Japan . . . He will prove to be a skilled administrator who can organize and inspire his headquarters personnel to maximum efforts, yet at the same time coddle some inept staff officers and permit Sutherland to become a virtual Rasputin. He will diligently endeavor to turn over civil affairs to the Commonwealth officials as rapidly as Philippine areas are liberated, but will become throughly embroiled in the cauldron of Philippine politics . . . He will demand the utmost loyalty and obedience from his subordinates, yet will be continuously critical of the decisions of his superiors. (James 1975, vii-vii)

James also sets the stage for MacArthur as the public administrator when closing the introduction to his volume on MacArthur's war years by stating:

> MacArthur's most significant contributions were made when he served as an administrator during the Japanese occupation. The proof of this thesis must await the concluding volume of the study. (James 1975, x)

As with Professor James' concluding volume, the proof of this thesis must await its concluding chapter.

1.   Olympus refers to James' Chapter XII title in *The Years of MacArthur Volume I, 1880-1941* (1994) which describes MacArthur's ascension to the post of Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

2.   Huntington describes the *Neo-Hamiltonian* Period as extending from 1890, when A.T.Mahan published *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, to 1920, when former Army Chief of Staff Leonard Wood was rejected in his bid to become the Republican nominee for President. Neo-Hamilton-ians included Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Albert J. Beveridge, A.T. Mahan, Herbert Croly, Leonard Wood, Henry Adams, and Brooks Adams. They were neither liberals, in the sense of Jefferson, Jackson, Spencer or Wilson, nor were they conservatives in Calhoun's mold. They mixed both liberal and conservative political and economic policies. They combined elements of military and civilian thinking, and were the first important American social group to consciously incorporate elements of the professional military ethic. Key elements of Neo-Hamiltonian thought were the emphasis on power and the primacy of national interest. Neo-Hamiltonianism was centered in the Republican Party. (Huntington 1964, 270-271)

3.   "By the time the internationalist foreign policy died in the presidential election of 1920, the outlines of postwar American diplomacy and national security policy had emerged. In strategic terms the Fourteen Points and associated idealistic sentiments shrank to three goals: defending the continental United States and its overseas possessions from foreign attack, deterring European intervention in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, and preserving China's sovereignty and territorial integrity." (Millett and Maslowski 1984, 361)

4.   On June 30, 1931 the U.S. Army had 12,180 officers and 119,888 enlisted men. Of these 1,915 officers and 36,080 enlisted men were in the overseas garrisons of Hawaii, Panama, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, China, and Alaska. Of the 9,750 officers and 83,600 enlisted men in the Continental United States there were only about 3,000 officers and 55,000 enlisted men assigned to tactical units. (Annual Report of the Chief of Staff Fiscal Year 1931 in Waldrop 1942, 96-97)

5.   The ten month Battle of Verdun in 1916, basically a French versus German campaign, resulted in 542,000 French and 434,000 German casualties and little net change in the front lines. The British Passchendaele Offensive of 1917 resulted in a five mile British advance over a three and a half month period at the cost of over 300,000 British and 8,500 French casualties against German losses of over 260,000. Total United States losses during its eighteen months of participation in World War I were 50,585 dead and 205,690 wounded. British Empire losses were 908,371 dead and 2,090,212 wounded plus 30,633 civilian dead. French losses were 1,357,800 dead and 4,266,000 wounded plus 40,000 civilian dead. Germany suffered 1,808,546 dead and 4,247,143 wounded. There were several days during the War when casualties on both sides approached total United States casualties for the entire war. (DuPuy and DuPuy 1977, 959-960, 970, 990)

6.   In the United Kingdom the air service is the Royal Air Force and the naval service is the Royal Navy, but the Army does not carry the title *Royal*, although many of its regiments do carry that title. Some of the oldest regiments trace their lineage back to Oliver Cromwell's *New Model*

Army which fought royalists and therefore were not *Royal.*

7.   Brevet promotions were temporary promotions. Until World War I they were normally awarded for conspicuous acts of valor or meritorious service. Custer, for example, was actually a Lieutenant Colonel when he died at the Little Big Horn, but was referred to a "General" because he had been awarded a brevet promotion to Brigadier General during the Civil War. When other awards for valor, such as the Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star were created, the custom of granting brevet promotions as an award for valor or service died off. When the office of Chief of Staff was firmly established, the incumbent received a temporary promotion to the grade of General and wore four stars. The senior permanent grade within the Army was Major General with the rank insignia of two stars. Under current law, the Defense Officers Personal Management Act (DOPMA)(10 U.S.C.), Major General and Rear Admiral Upper Half, pay grade O-8 with the rank insignia of two stars, are the senior permanent grades. Those officers that are Lieutenant Generals and Vice Admirals, pay grade O-9 with three star insignia, and Generals and Admirals, pay grade O-10 with four star insignia, are temporarily appointed to a billet of that rank. If officers in these grades are transferred to another billet that is not a pay grade O-9 or O-10 billet they revert to Major General or Rear Admiral Upper Half. The retention of three star or four star rank upon retirement requires the approval of Congress.

8.   The Miscellaneous Account, listed in Appendix H, includes War Department costs. The difference between the War Department Budget and the U.S. Army Budget are these War Department costs.

9.   *Manning* is a term that usually applies to the level or extent of filled billets. *Manning* is normally an internal service decision and is accomplished by taking authorized *end strength* and *man-year* totals and apportioning them to individual units, types of units or activities. *Manning* is normally used as one of the basses for individual unit combat readiness. *End strength* is a term which specifies the number of personnel actually present on the last day of the Fiscal Year. *End strength* is specified in authorization acts and is a legally binding number. *Man-years* is the result of taking the actual number of days personnel are present and dividing by 365. *Man-years* is a statistic that is used in budgeting. By tracking *man-years* against a particular cost for an activity or class of personnel, fiscal requirements or expenditures against appropriations can be determined. *Man-years* is also a term used to describe specific activities or categories of personnel, i.e., a certain type of training involved X number of *man-years* or Patients, Prisoners, Trainees, and Transfers (P2T2), an actual DoD line item, involved X number *man-years*.

10.   You talk o' better food for us, an' schools, an fires, an' all:
         We'll wait for extry rations if you treat us rational.
         Don't mess about the cook-room slops, but prove it to our face
         The Widow's Uniform is not the soldier-man's disgrace.
               For it's Tommy this, an'Tommy that, an'"Chuck him out, the Brute!"
               But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot;
               An' it's Tommy this, an Tommy that, an' anything you please;
               An' Tommy ain't a bloomin' fool you bet that Tommy sees!
               (Fourth stanza: *Tommy* by Rudyard Kipling)

11.   There were about 325 ROTC units in the early 1930s with more than 225 being senior units located at colleges and universities. They produced over 6000 reserve officers each year and had a total enrollment of over 85,000 students. (Matloff 1969, 412)

12.   Current documents such as the *Unified Command Plan*, an Executive Order, and the Joint Chiefs' of Staff *Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* define the concept of unity of command for the armed forces. These documents are based on the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1947, USC title 10, as amended. When MacArthur was Chief of Staff, his statutory authority was based on the National Defense Act of 1920. This legislation did not address unity of command in great detail but stressed the organization of components and forces.

13.   Current war plans, Annex J (Force Allocations) of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), allocate the Eighteenth Airborne Corps and the Third Corps to the Third Army acting as the ground force component for U.S. Central Command USCENTCOM). Because of logistic considerations, the Seventh Corps in Germany replaced the Third Corps for Operation Desert Storm. The majority of divisions forming Seventh Corps were organic Third Corps units (Third Armored Division, First Cavalry Division, and Third Armored Cavalry Regiment) Only the First Armored Division and First Infantry Division were organic Seventh Corps units.

14.   There were eight General Staff division heads, twelve chiefs of arms or services and two bureau chiefs that re-ported to the Chief of Staff through the Deputy Chief of Staff. In a normal tactical headquarters there would have been three to five subordinate commanders and four to six primary staff members who had direct access to the commander and chief of staff. The span of control of the Chief of Staff of the Army was significantly larger than normally encountered in the Army. (Appendix J)

15.   The term *mechanization*, as used in pre-World War II literature is inclusive of the contemporary terms *armored* and *mechanized*. Former Warsaw Pact forces use the terms *tank* and *motorized* for *armored* and *mechanized*. In current usage an armored unit has the majority of combat battalions or brigades/regiments formed on tank battalions with the minority of battalions consisting of mechanized elements using lighter armored wheeled or tracked vehicles. The reverse is opposite for mechanized units. In both cases, supporting artillery, engineer and reconnaissance/cavalry units are mechanized units that possess comparable cross country capabilities with their supported armored or mechanized units. As used in MacArthur's annual reports the term *mechanization* to include provision of motor vehicles to all Army elements. Even in the early 1930s most doctrinal writers would have referred to his use of the term *mechanization* in this manner as *motorization*.

16.   James cites John W. Killigrew, *Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929-1936* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1960), Chapter IV, 9-17, 20-21 and Mildred H. Gille, *Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of the Armored Force* (Harrisburg 1947), Chapters II and III.

17.   It is commonly accepted that the Soviet T-34, the German Panzerkamphwagen V Panther and Panzerkamphwagen VI Tiger I/Koenig Tiger II, and the American M4 Sherman were the most important tank designs of World War II.

18.   The 1903 Springfield Rifle was the primary U.S. rifle from 1903 until 1942. The M1911 45 Calibre Automatic pistol saw service from 1912 to 1991. The M-101 105mm Artillery piece, first introduced in 1937, based on a successful German design of 1918, was used by the U.S. Marine Corps until the mid 1990s. Iowa class battle ships, designed in the late 1930s, built in the early 1940s, were still in commission in the early 1990s. Not a single aircraft type purchased during MacArthur's tenure as Chief of Staff, 1930-1935, saw action during World War II. The B-17 Flying Fortress bomber, P-40 Warhawk pursuit (fighter) aircraft, with which the U.S. Army Air Corps entered World War II, were all procured after MacArthur had left the office of the Chief of Staff.

19.   Leap frog attacks involved bypassing Japanese strong points, amphibious and air dropped landings at undefended or lightly defended points the isolation of bypassed enemy garrisons by air and naval forces. In the Pacific Oceans Area, under Admiral Chester Nimitz, this same strategy was referred to as "island hopping." For example the Gilbert, then the Marshall Islands were attacked and seized but the Carroline Island Group were completely bypassed when the Palau Group was attacked. In MacArthur's Theater, he never directly attacked the main Japanese base at Rabaul. He seized lessor defended areas of New Guinea, and New Britain thus isolating Rabaul.

20.   Interwar airpower advocates, faced with temporary technical constraints on aircraft engine power, saw multi-engined aircraft as inherently faster, long-ranged, and higher flying than single engine aircraft. Out of this grew the belief that bombers could fly faster than fighters and thus need only minimal self defense protection. For the same reasons the French, British, Germans, Japanese, and Russians all entered World War II with large numbers of heavy multi-engined, or large single engine multi crew fighters. By the eve of World War, technology had provided more powerful compact engines which allowed lighter single-engined fighters such as the A6M Zero, Hawker Hurricanes, Supermarine Spitfires, Messerschmidt BF109s and P-40 Warhawks witch could catch and outmaneuver their two engine and four engine opponents. Disastrous losses of American B-17s at Schwinefurt and the decimation of Fairey Battle, Messer-schmidt BF-110, Ki-45 Koryus heavy fighters in the opening years of the War brought home the fallacy of these theories.
     Airpower enthusiasts claimed that bombing alone could reduce the will of enemy military and civilians to resist resulting in victory without ground combat. Indeed, the Italian garrison of Pantellaria, an island between North African and Sicily, did capitulate after being bombed twice in preparation for the Sicily invasion in 1943, but the Royalist anti-Fascist commander was already looking for an honorable way to surrender. The allied Bombing Survey, conducted after World War II established that bombing by itself did not cause the enemy to capitulate, but could harden their will to resist

21.   Modern staff systems normally break the staff into three elements. The first element is the commander's personal staff. Aides de camp, drivers, orderlies, and secretaries are members

of the personal staff. Their mission is to provide administrative and personal support to the commander. The general staff, sometimes referred to as the executive staff, is broken into functional areas, such as personnel and administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, and sometimes planning. These are the staff sections (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4)at battalion regiments, and brigades, the general staff sections (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, etc.) at divisions, corps, and armies, or the joint staff sections (J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, etc.) at joint or unified commands, i.e. those commands with multiple services or national elements. The executive staff officers focus on their functional areas and although they respond to the commander and the chief of staff their orientation is on the unit and its mission. Special staff officers, such as the chaplain, the judge advocate general, engineers, etc., normally work under the supervision of an executive staff officer or the chief of staff. Their focus and orientation is narrow and within their own area of expertise.

22.   The term derives from King Pyrrhus of Epirus in Greece who invaded Southern Italy in 281 B.C. He won the battles of Heraclea (280 B.C.) and Asculum (279 B.C) against the Romans, but at such heavy cost that the Romans decisively defeated him at the Battle of Beneventum in 275 B.C. After his victory at Heraclea he is quoted as saying: "One more such victory and I am lost." The term "pyrrhic victory" is the basis for the saying " He won the battles but lost the war." (Dupuy and Dupuy 1977, 59-60)

23.   MacArthur maintained that he was surprised by his extension as Chief of Staff. (MacArthur 1964, 102) He took his extension in office as a mandate to guide the pending Army budget through the next legislative session. (James 1970, 447) Eisenhower, a MacArthur aide for the majority of his tour as Chief of Staff, and latter his Chief of Staff while he was Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines, also believed that MacArthur's extension was related to the pending budget and legislative packages to be debated before Congress in 1935. (James 1970, 494, fn 19) FDR's decision to extend MacArthur flew in the face of many influential advisors who recommended his relief because of the Bonus March incident and his perceived disloyalty to FDR's administration. FDR had hedged on naming a new Chief of Staff during October and November 1934, the two months preceding MacArthur's four year anniversary in the post. On December 12, 1934 FDR decided "General Douglas MacArthur be retained as Chief of Staff until his successor has been appointed."(as quoted in James 1970, 447) In reply to questions FDR made it clear that the extension was not an reappointment for four more years. It was understood that the extension was probably for a maximum of one year. On July 17, 1935, Secretary of War Dern recommended December 15, 1935 as the date for MacArthur's replacement as Chief of Staff. On July 18, 1935 FDR approved Dern's recommendation. On September 18, 1935, Dern issued Special Orders No. 22 implementing FDR's approval of his recommendations (James 1970, 484-485,490-491; MacArthur Archives, RG-18) From October to December 15, 1935, when he would step down as Chief of Staff, MacArthur would be in Manilla setting up the office of Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Drum would run the Army on a day-to-day basis. On October 1, 1935 ,MacArthur, with a small staff departed Washington for the Philippines. On October 2, 1935 FDR appointed Malin Graig as the next Chief of Staff. In latter explaining his actions to Post Master General Farley on November 16, 1935 FDR is quoted as saying:

    He (MacArthur) didn't know about it (MacArthur's October 2, 1935 replacement).
    You see General Douglas MacArthur, during his service as Chief of Staff, had

been trying to have all his favorites placed in responsible positions. He was arranging it so that he would be succeeded by Major General George S. Simonds.

Last spring Simonds had for years left to go before retirement and could have served out the term of a Chief of Staff. I had to think fast, so I asked MacArthur to stay until October on the representation that I needed him to assist in the formulation of the legislation relative to the War Department.

MacArthur stayed. When October rolled around Simonds only had three and a half years to serve and that eliminated MacArthur's man. If I told Dern about it he might have mentioned it innocently, to someone in the War Department and pressure might have been brought to bear to force the appointment of Simonds while he still had four years to go. Consequently, I waited;

then when Dern and MacArthur left the country, I made the appointment. (Farley in *Farley's Story*, 55, as quoted in James 1970, 493-494.)

24.   In 1934 MacArthur filed a libel suit against Robert S. Allen and Drew Pearson. The suit sought $250,000 for each of seven charges of alleged libel against the two columnists for depicting MacArthur's ouster of the Bonus Army as "unwarranted, unnecessary, arbitrary, harsh, and brutal" manner. The charges also involved allegations that MacArthur had attempted to oust Assistant Secretary of War for Air Woodring following several Army Air Corps aircraft crashes during the "Air Mail Episode" of 1934. Pearson responded to the law suit by finding incriminating or embarrassing information to use against MacArthur. MacArthur had taken a Erasion mistress named Isabel Cooper during his last tour in the Philippines before becoming the Chief of Staff. He had set Isabel up in a hotel in Washington during 1931, but attempted to break off the affair in 1934 and offered Isabel a steamship ticket back to the Philippines, which she refused. Pearson discovered the affair and obtained some of MacArthur's melodramatic and very personal love letters to Isabel. Pearson contacted MacArthur and threatened to expose the affair and support a suit against MacArthur by Isabel. MacArthur, supposedly horrified that his mother would find out about the affair, withdrew his suit, paid Allen and Pearson's legal expenses and agreed to a $15,000 settlement with Isabel Cooper in return for his letters. The settlement and return of the letters appears to have been handled by Pearson. The two columnists neither retracted their charges nor apologized for them. Isabel Cooper remained in the United States, latter married and divorced, failed in an attempt at a Hollywood career, and died of a barbiturate overdose in 1960. There is no mention of the incident or Isabel anywhere in MacArthur's papers or autobiography. (James 1970, 412, 439; Shaller 1989, 18-20; Petillo 1981, 164-166; Karnow 1989, 269-270)

25.   Although James states that MacArthur drafted the law, there is evidence that two of his assistants, Majors Dwight D. Eisenhower and James B. Ord, heading a special study group from the Army War College, were actually the drafters of the proposed legislation that MacArthur provided to Quezon. There is no question that they, and their Army War College group, provided the drafts of the Philippine Defense Plan and the National Defense Act, which was the first legislative act of the new National Assembly of the Philippines and which implemented *MacArthur's* Philippine Defense Plan. (James 1970, 480; Morton 1948, 103-107)

26.   Frank Murphy was the Governor-General of the Philippines from 1933 to 1935 and held that office at the time the Tydings-MacDuffie Act took effect. He thus became the first High Commissioner. His replacement, Paul V. McNutt, was the first High Commissioner to be appointed and ratified to that post. Murphy, an ardent New Deal progressive liberal and pacifist later served as a Supreme Court Justice. (Karnow 1989, 449-450)

27.   The assertion that MacArthur's interest in a diminished high commissionership in order to maintain his rank of general is buttressed by his maneuvering to retain that rank until after he arrived in Manila as the Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines. (James 1970, 490-493; Schaller 1989, 27) In the MacArthur Archives there is an unsigned *Memorandum of the Terms of Agreement For Military Advisor To The President Of The Philippine Commonwealth Government*, dated _____ 1935. (Folder 2, Box 1, RG1) This five paragraph, page and a half document was to be signed by Manuel Quezon and Douglas MacArthur. It does not have a letterhead or document code to indicate its authorship or exact drafting date, but its 1935 date indicates that it was drafted in the United States before MacArthur departed for the Philippines in early October 1935. The first two paragraphs of the agreement reflect MacArthur's primary concerns, to wit:

> 1.   The Military Advisor will function directly with and be responsible to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth alone. His functions will deal with the National Defense and his duties and responsibilities will be fixed and determined solely by the President of the Philippine Commonwealth.
> 2.   He will be given the title and rank of Field Marshal General, a grade analogous to that held by senior officers of contiguous countries.

<div align="center">(Folder 2, Box 1, RG1)</div>

        If this document had been in force when MacArthur arrived in the Philippines as a General, retaining his Chief of Staff's rank, he could have immediately assumed the rank of Field Marshal and thus avoided reversion to Major General. This document belies MacArthur's inference in *Reminiscences* (107), that his appointment was at the initiative of the Philippine government. This document also pre-dates President Quezon's forwarding letter of MacArthur's *Report on National Defense in the Philippines* to the National Assembly, dated June 18, 1936. In this forwarding letter, Quezon notified the Speaker of the National Assembly of his decision, citing section 95 of Title IV of the National Defense Act, to appoint MacArthur to the rank of Field Marshal. MacArthur's fixation with retention of his temporary rank of general is further revealed in his discussion of returning to active United States service during July 1941. He stated:

> "I was given the rank of lieutenant general, although my retired rank was that of a full general. Bureaucracy has a strange way of working sometimes, but I had reached a stage in life when I cared little for the reasons of administrators" (1964, 109)

This comment was disingenuous for several reasons. First, he knew full well that his rank upon return to active duty was not an administrative decision by a bureaucrat but was based on law. The Chief of Staff was still the only general with four star rank insignia. Second, his permanent rank upon retirement was Major General. He retired with the four star rank of general because of a provision in law that allowed an officer, upon confirmation

by the Senate, to retire at the highest rank successfully held. General was his retired rank not his permanent rank. Finally, what rank he held appears as one of the central issues in his life.

MacArthur's unwillingness to serve under his nominal juniors was succinctly stated in his letter of retirement dated September 10, 1937 when he wrote General Malin Graig his successor as Chief of Staff:

> I have, therefore, nothing left along constructive lines to offer and I find the
> thought repugnant of resuming a subordinate *routine* command after having been
> the military head of the Army *for so long a time*.
> (italicized words were handwritten) (RG-1)

MacArthur's obsession with rank and status is also reflected in his negotiations for his total compensation as the Military Advisor. As an active duty United States officer he would continue to receive the pay and allowances of a major general from the United States government. MacArthur assured that his pay would be at least the equivalent of the compensation of the High Commissioner. In addition to his general's pay he negotiated a salary of $18,000 and an expense account of $15,000 per year plus the use of a luxurious suite atop the Manila Hotel. His total compensation as the Military advisor was thus above those of the President of the Philippines or the High Commissioner, both of whom were his seniors in rank and precedence. (Shaller 1989, 27; James 1970, 482; MacArthur Archives, RG-18, RG-1)

28.   Eisenhower's memorandum to Quezon states the size of the reserve force was initially going to be 200,000, eventually growing to 300,000. (Morton 1948, 104-105) The 400,000 reserve force figure is MacArthur's as stated in two articles in the New York Times (May 29, 1939) and the Philippine Magazine (36 (July 1939), 286-287). Annual training rates and the number of those trained available for mobilization in 1941 favor Eisenhower's estimated reserve strength. The MacArthur numbers were contained in articles replying to former Secretary of War Elihu Root. Root an acknowledged expert on Filipino affairs, asserted that the Philippines would fall to a Japanese attack in a week and take five years and $25 million to re-take. (Karnow 1989, 272; Friend 1965, 164) The overstatement of the Filipino military strength could have well been a conscious attempt, by MacArthur, to help protect the Philippines by creating inflated perceptions of Filipino military capabilities.

29.   Prior to his retirement from the Army on December 31, 1937 MacArthur could make personnel drafts on the Department of the Philippines. Shortly after that date the War Department required him to request augmentation through the Department of War/General Staff.. The requirement to meet MacArthur's personnel drafts chaffed Major General Lucious R. Holbrook, the departmental commander 1937 and Major General John H. Hughes, the departmental from 1938 to 1940. Major General George Grunert, who assumed departmental command in 1940 was more personally disposed to meet MacArthur's requests. Department of the Philippine augmentation of MacArthur's staff became a moot point when MacArthur was called out of retirement in July 1941 and assumed command U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) (James 1970, 553-554, 558)

30.   MacArthur's status upon retirement was summarized by Secretary of War Woodring in a January 1938 to FDR memo as follows:

> ...On December 31, 1937, General MacArthur ceased to officially represent the

United States as Military Advisor to the Government of the Philippine Islands and accepted employment in a private status with that Government...

It is the desire of the War Department to further to the utmost the establishment of an adequate native national defense for the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands, and to disturb as little as possible the existing relations between the War Department and that Government. General MacArthur in his status as a retired officer may not exercise command, and is no longer a military representative of the United States with the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands...In the future, since the letter of instructions to General MacArthur has lapsed with his retirement, requests from the Philippine Government for additional personal, material, or services will be transmitted to the Commanding General, Philippine Department, for submission to the War Department. (Woodring to FDR, January 21, 1938, PPF 4771, FDRL as quoted in James 1970, 525)

31.   Jones states the creation of the Filipino Department of Defense dates from implementation of Quezon's request by the National Assembly. (James 1970, 536) Karnow discusses the creation of the Filipino Defense Department in discussion of Quezon's actions in 1940. (Karnow 1989, 276) Both are correct. The act was passed in 1939, but became fully implemented in 1940.

CHAPTER V

Shogun

Setting the Stage

World War II had been good to MacArthur. The Japanese had surprised and effectively

destroyed his air forces on the ground, more than a half day after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

They also defeated his army with a numerically inferior force. His Philippine defense system

proved to be a hollow and ineffective shell. Despite these epic failures, the Field Marshal of the

Philippines did not face the disgrace and humiliation of Admiral Kimmel, his counterpart in

Hawaii. Despite his defeat in the Philippines, he emerged from that disastrous campaign as a

national hero. Douglas MacArthur also achieved his lifelong dream, his driving ob-session, the

award of the Congressional Medal of Honor. He commanded a theater of operations throughout

the war. He was the senior Army officer in the Pacific, and was one of the few officers to

achieve five-star rank. By the end of World War II, he was the designated commander of all

ground forces involved in the planned invasion of Japan. From the edge of the abyss of defeat,

humiliation, and ignominy in the early Spring of 1942, MacArthur, by the late Summer of 1945,

was arguably the most revered and respected American general. He stood poised to climax his

career with the invasion of Japan and the final defeat of the Axis. Indeed, he had returned!

From MacArthur's perspective, though, World War II had been a constant struggle. He

considered himself the victim of Rainbow 5, the American war plan that he had helped to

develop, and an allied strategy of "Germany first." Although well aware of the implications of Rainbow 5, he felt betray-ed by the denial of the reinforcements he needed to defend the Philippines. MacArthur had constantly fought with Admirals King and Nimitz over force and matériel allocations for the Pacific. He was an Army commander in what the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered primarily a naval theater of war. (Esposito 1972, 115-119) As the Commander in Chief of the South West Pacific Theater, he was only the equal of Admiral Nimitz, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Oceans Area, which included the North Pacific, Central Pacific, and South Pacific Areas/Theaters. (Matloff 1969, 500-501) Functionally and geographically MacArthur's command was only a subset of a theater of war that was not the pri-mary effort of the Allies.

Despite the many honors heaped upon him, MacArthur considered that he had been repeatedly slighted. George Marshall's advancement to General of the Army had a date of rank two days senior to his. Eisenhower's advancement to that same rank occurred only two days after his own promotion. (Perret 1996, 435) His former very junior subordinates were now his peers. While he commanded two armies, the Sixth and Eighth Armies, which never simultaneously fielded more than a dozen divisions, Eisenhower commanded all the naval, ground, and aviation units in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). Eisenhower's subordinate American ground commander, Omar Bradley, commanded an army group of three armies (American First, Third, and Ninth Armies), totaling more than twenty divisions and almost one and a half million men. Bradley's force alone approached the size of MacArthur's entire command. Eisenhower's command also included Field Marshal Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group (Canadian First and British Second Armies), Dever's Sixth Army Group (American Seventh and French First

Armies), and the Fifteenth Army Group (American Fifth and British Eighth Armies) in Italy.

While MacArthur commanded less than a dozen divisions in the field, Eisenhower, his aide of

only four years before, commanded a much larger force of all allied ground, air, and naval units

in the (ETO). (Esposito 1972, 59-69) The maximum strength of MacArthur's command during

World War II was a million and one half men with a ground force of twenty-one divisions.

Although a sizeable command by any standard, MacArthur's force paled by comparison with the

two million Americans in thirty-four divisions assigned to Eisenhower's ETO. When MacAr-

thur's wartime command was at its largest, there were still more than 3.5 million men and

twenty-four combat divisions in the United States. Eisenhower's ETO was the planned destina-

tion for most of this strategic reserve force. (Matloff 1969, 466) Although the biggest fish in his

own pond, MacArthur was extremely frustrated that his was not the largest pond. A review of

his own *Reminiscences*, and the works of authors such as Hunt, Willoughby, Huff, and Whitney,

repeatedly bemoan the fact that the JCS and others in Washington did not realize the true

importance of MacArthur's theater and frustrated his rapid conclusion of the War by denying him

the resources that he so rightly deserved. James best captures MacArthur's perception of his ill

treatment by those directing the war in Washington.

> OWI's Robert Sherwood, who visited MacArthur on March 10, 2945, reported
>
> back to Roosevelt that he "was shocked by the inaccuracy of the information held
>
> by General MacArthur and his immediate entourage about the formulation of high
>
> policy in Washington. There are (sic) unmistakable evidence of an acute persecu-
>
> tion complex at work. To hear some of the staff officers talk, one would think that
>
> the War Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff-- and possibly even the White

House itself-- are under the domination of 'Communists and British Imperial-

ists'"Sherwood continued, "This strange misapprehension produces an obviously

unhealthy state of mind, and also the most unfortunate public relations policy that

I have seen in any theater of war."

Although he did not place Marshall or Eisenhower in the above categories,

MacArthur had become convinced since 1941 that these two generals headed a

faction in the War Department that had conspired to deprive him of adequate

logistical support and a greater strategic role. (James 1975, 717)

James' appreciation of MacArthur's beliefs concerning his frustrated role in the war, and

his perceived lack of support by his seniors is important. It documents a constant in MacArthur's

beliefs, attitudes, and relationships with his seniors that existed not only during the war, but

would continue throughout the remainder of his public career. An almost total physical isolation

from his seniors and Washington from 1935 to 1952 exacerbated these beliefs.

MacArthur was not without successes in dealing with his adjacent and senior command-

ers during the war. He garnered significant naval and air support for his leapfrog amphibious

landings in the Southwest Pacific Theater. During the Fall of 1944, he convinced General

Marshall and President Roosevelt to invade the Philippines during the Winter of 1944/1945

rather than Taiwan as proposed by Admirals King and Nimitz. The recapture of the Philippines

would not only fulfill a solemn vow, but would put MacArthur in charge of the largest ground

campaign up to that time in the Pacific. It would also provide him a base large enough to marshal

the proposed invasion of the Japanese homeland.

MacArthur's success in convincing the national command authority to invade the Philippines, rather than Taiwan, was crucial to his appointment as the commander for the invasion of Japan, and eventually as the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan. The Taiwan invasion would have occurred in the Pacific Oceans Area under Nimitz. Development of Taiwan, rather than the Philippines, as a staging area for the Japanese invasion would have left MacArthur in the backwaters of the war in the Pacific. He would be left with conducting supporting operations in Java and the Philippines. As it was, MacArthur emerged from the Philippines Campaign a conquering hero. He was a general with a staff that had controlled multiple armies. His command occupied a staging area sufficiently large to mount the invasion of Japan. Even if MacArthur believed that he was the victim of dark powers in Washington, he had to admit that he had won the most important decision. Yes, the war had been good to MacArthur.

MacArthur assumed his duties as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan as the single most important and powerful individual in the entire Pacific Basin. The allied powers had granted him sole executive authority over Japan. Although in the planning stage, there was, as yet, no allied commission or authority that could challenge his authority. With the capitulation of Japan, MacArthur essentially became the only theater commander for the United States in the Pacific. Admiral Nimitz would not be able to challenge SCAP's strategies and policies as he had when MacArthur was the commander of the South West Pacific Area. SCAP's authority was unique for a public administrator. He was an appointed, not elected, official but he would serve as the executive and the supreme legislative and judicial authority for a country. The only authorities that could challenge him were the President of the United States, the Secretary

of War, and after 1947 the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Allied Council

for Japan. These authorities, all located in Washington, D.C., could not provide detailed

oversight of SCAP, and could only react to his most important or significant acts.

The occupation of Japan, and MacArthur's stewardship as SCAP has been the subject of

voluminous articles and books. The following discussion of MacArthur as the supreme public

administrator of Japan will not address the complete history of MacArthur's performance as

SCAP. To put MacArthur into prospective as a public administrator, I will examine only his

performance as an executive and a jurist. As an executive MacArthur enjoyed unique power as

an American official in that he was also the supreme legislative authority for Japan. Even after

the Japanese diet came into existence, SCAP had the authority to modify, suspend or abrogate

the Diet's actions. MacArthur was the single ultimate legislative and executive authority in

occupied Japan. The examination of MacArthur, the executive and legislator, will concentrate on

his organization of his administration and his formulation and implementation of general

occupation policy. The emphasis on this examination of MacArthur's execution of his executive

and legislative duties will concentrate on the organization for, and development of, policies. It

will not constitute a review and discussion of all aspects of occupation policies. This review of

MacArthur as an administrator of justice will address his dual roles as an international and

national military administrator of justice. On the international level he functioned as the admini-

strator and overseer of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. At the national level,

as the Commander in Chief of U.S. Army Forces for the Far East (CinCUSAFFE) he organized,

oversaw, and extensively influenced the minor Japanese war criminal trials held at Yokohama

and Manila. The examination of MacArthur as a public administrator will conclude with an

examination of his unique and pivotal role as a law giver, the father of the postwar Japanese

constitution.

Organization of the Occupation

MacArthur's staff organization for the occupation of Japan was an outgrowth and

development of his South West Pacific Area (SWPA) Staff. The SWPA Staff dated from the

Spring of 1942 with MacArthur's arrival in Australia. The original SWPA Staff was a reorgani-

zation and expansion of the remnants of the staff evacuated with him from the Philippines. These

evacuated staff members, known as "the Bataan Gang," would form the central core, and most

influential element, of MacArthur's staffs until his relief of command and final military retire-

ment in 1951.

On April 4, 1945, MacArthur assumed the position of Commander in Chief Army Forces

in the Pacific (CINCAFPAC). As such, he commanded all U.S. Army units in the entire Pacific

Theater, minus those in the Alaskan Command and the South East Pacific Area. (Rad WX 62733

(TS), JCS to MacArthur, April 4, 1945) [1] [2] MacArthur's SWPA and AFPAC Staffs were normal

theater or service general staffs. These staffs had four general staff sections plus special staff

sections that reported to the chief of staff and/or under the cognizance of the general staff

sections. The general staff sections were the G-1(Personnel and Administration), G-2 (Intelli-

gence), G-3 (Operations), and G-4 (Logistics). (See Chart 1, Appendix L for the AFPAC Staff

organization.) It was also possible for theater staffs to include a G-5, Military Government/Civil

Affairs section. [3] It is important to note that MacArthur's SWPA and AFPAC Staffs did not

include military government or civil affairs general staff sections. [4] Most of the SWPA was

Australian or other Commonwealth territory. Australian or Commonwealth officials resumed administration of these areas upon their liberation. Liberated areas of the Philippines did not experience military administration and reverted to Filipino control when practicable after combat operations had ceased in a particular area.

MacArthur's initial AFPAC Staff was organized as a military command and control staff for planning and conducting the invasion of Japan. In the Spring of 1945 it was the almost universally held assessment that the invasion of Japan would be a costly and protracted struggle. (MacArthur 1966, 1; Esposito 1972, 166) Nonmilitary aspects of a future occupation, following a cessation of hostilities, did not influence the structure of the AFPAC Staff. Occupation administration was not one of that staff's primary considerations.

The AFPAC Staff's preoccupation during the Spring and Summer of 1945 was planning and preparing for Operation "Downfall," the forced occupation of Japan. Initially there were two principal subsets to Operation "Downfall." Operation "Olympic," planned for November 1945, envisioned the Sixth Army assaulting Kyushu, the Southernmost of the main Japanese islands. For "Olympic," Sixth Army would comprise four corps of nine divisions, with another corps of three divisions in reserve. Operation "Coronet," scheduled for March 1946, had Eighth and Tenth Armies, with First Army in reserve, assaulting Honshu, the largest Japanese island, around Tokyo. The force for "Coronet" was to include fourteen assault divisions and an additional eleven divisions in reserve. Based on Japanese resistance to the Marinas, Ryukyus (Okinawa), and Iwo Jima amphibious operations, planners estimated approximately one million Allied casualties would result from an invasion of the Japanese main islands. (Esposito 1972, 163-167; Yoshida 1962, 36-37) The size and complexity of the planned invasion of Japan drove the

organization of MacArthur's AFPAC Staff. The anticipated casualties, protracted duration, and detailed planning required to conduct such an operation completely overshadowed any preparations or planning for the following occupation of Japan. MacArthur and his staff focused almost entirely on the job at hand. Various interagency staffs and specialized civil affairs/military government schools, all in the continental United States, conducted all planning and preparations for the Japanese Occupation before the Spring of 1945.

July 1945 marked the beginning of a reorientation in MacArthur and his staff's activities with the initial publication of Operation "Blacklist." This operation was a contingency plan for the occupation of Japan in case of the collapse of the Imperial government. Planning for "Blacklist" had begun in May 1945. It called for the three-phased peaceful occupation of fourteen areas of Japan, and three to six areas of Korea. "Blacklist" planned for the employment of twenty-two divisions and two regimental combat teams. The troop list for "Blacklist" was the third primary subset of "Downfall." The execution of "Blacklist" could occur during, or after, partial execution of either "Olympic" or "Coronet." (Reports of General MacArthur, Vol.1 Supplement, 1-6, Plates Numbers 2-4). Although "Downfall" envisioned the unopposed occupation of Japan, it was a military operation, and its initial objectives were militarily and not administratively driven. "Olympic" and "Coronet" remained the primary foci of activity for MacArthur and his staff during the summer of 1945 because "Downfall" was still a contingency operation. The unexpectedly rapid capitulation of Japan, following the two atom bomb attacks and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, dramatically changed MacArthur's priorities. Operation "Downfall" became the primary focus of the AFPAC Staff and its commander in chief.[5]

SCAP Staff Organizational Forms

From October 1945, when the Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC) Staff turned over its responsibilities for the planning and execution of the Japanese occupation to the newly organized SCAP Staff, until 1951, upon MacArthur's relief by President Truman, the SCAP Staff existed in three different forms through four reorganizations. Counting the original AFPAC Staff, which technically administered the occupation from the Japanese capitulation until October 2, 1945, there were four forms and five reorganizations of MacArthur's staff during the occupation.[6]

With President Truman's announcement of Japan's unconditional surrender and MacArthur's appointment as SCAP, the AFPAC Staff began a mutation that in a month and a half resulted in the formation of a technically separate SCAP Staff. The SCAP Staff that came into being on October 2, 1945 was really a Siamese twin of the AFPAC Staff. (See Charts 1, 3, and 8, Appendix L) Although each of the two staffs had its own separate organization charts, missions, and functions, they shared key individuals and staff sections. The Chief of Staff (CofS), Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCofSs), Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACofSs) of the general staff sections, the Adjutant-General, and their staff sections served both technically separate organizations. The SCAP Staff of October 1945 was essentially the AFPAC Staff with ten additional special staff sections for occupation administration added below the general staff echelon. Those special staff sections that already existed in July 1945, and were associated with military theater command, remained solely within the AFPAC Staff structure. Military Government detachments, which monitored but did not formulate or ad-minister occupation policies, remained under the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA). EUSA came under the AFPAC Staff's operational and administrative

control. Military Police units, which insured both military and civil security, also came under EUSA and the AFPAC Staff. (See Charts 2, 5, and 7, Appendix L)

The initial staff organization of October 1945 provided the Chief of Staff with two Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCofSs), one of which was specifically associated with military operational responsibilities. This arrangement did not have the occupation oriented special staff sections formally reporting to the second DCofS, which in practice they did. Thus, on paper, the Chief of Staff was the common reporting senior for fourteen or more staff sections. Considering the specialized, even unique, and widely disparate functions of the special staff sections, this was a wide span of control. The Chief of Staff's control of the first organizational form of the SCAP Staff was effective in practice despite a wide span of control on paper for two reasons. First: the general staff sections exercised oversight over specific special staff sections. Second: the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, who split operational and support/administrative responsibilities, significantly reduced the Chief of Staff's workload. The first organizational form of the SCAP Staff remained in effect until August 1946.

Charts 8, 9, 12, and 13 of Appendix L depict the second and fourth, also final, SCAP Staff organizational forms. Under this staff organizational arrangement, the Chief of Staff oversaw the four assistant chiefs of staff of the general staff sections and the Deputy Chief of Staff. A single Deputy Chief coordinated the special staff sections associated with day to day occupation administration. Those special staff sections that directly supported MacArthur as SCAP, such as the Diplomatic and Public Information Sections, reported directly to the Chief of Staff. Although general staff sections exercised oversight and influence over special staff sections, such as the G-2's effective control of the Civil Intelligence Section, they still had to

coordinate through the Deputy Chief of Staff who answered, through the Chief of Staff, to MacArthur. The second, and also fourth and final organizational form, made the Chief of Staff's span of control more realistic and effective by reducing it to the four general staff sections and the Deputy Chief of Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff who coordinated and oversaw the ten to fourteen special staff sections involved in occupation administration still had a numerically wide span of control but his oversight and coordination responsibilities focused solely on occupation administrative matters. (James 1985, 52) The SCAP Deputy Chief of Staff's responsibilities included those normally associated with an Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Government and Civil Affairs, G-5. His military government functions were limited to policy development and staff oversight. SCAP military government activities continued to consist of only policy enforcement oversight and reporting functions conducted by Eighth Army units under AFPAC/FEC Staff control.

In both the first and second organizational forms MacArthur insured unity of command and effective span of control for himself by the dual responsibilities he assigned his long-standing key confidants as general staff officers in both his SCAP and AFPAC/FEC Staffs. MacArthur was thus able to exercise his allied and national command responsibilities by dealing with a single Chief of Staff and the same set of general staff officers. The first and second/fourth staff organizational arrangements insured unity of command, i.e., one senior for each subordi-nate, preserved the standard staff practice of the separate identification of general and special staff responsibilities, and maintained the overall staff coordination authority of the Chief of Staff.

The third SCAP Staff organizational scheme existed during 1948 and 1949. (See Charts 10 and 11, Appendix L.) This simplified staff scheme had the general and special staff sections reporting to the Deputy Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff oversaw the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Public Information and Diplomatic Sections. The Allied Council for Japan still had direct access to MacArthur. This arrangement saddled the Deputy Chief of Staff with the inordinately large span of control that had been the Chief of Staff's in the first staff organizational form. It also blurred the relationship between general and special staff sections. During this period the Far Eastern Command Staff maintained a standard general staff/special staff organizational arrangement. [7] Because the FEC Staff had responsibilities for military operations and United States theater command and control responsibilities, this third SCAP Staff organizational form only applied to occupation administration planning and oversight functions. The Far Eastern Com-mand's Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) continued military government oversight and civil affairs functions under a normal general staff/special staff organizational arrangement. Although the SCAP Assistant Chiefs of Staff for the general staff sections were technically at the same level as the special staff sections, and thus should have had the same access to MacArthur through the Chief of Staff as the special staff sections, the prestige and influence of the "Bataan Gang" remained strong. The general staff sections enjoyed a status of being the more equal among equals. The large span of control for the SCAP Deputy Chief of Staff, the apparent diminishment of the SCAP general staff sections to special staff section status, and the disparity between SCAP and FEC Staff organizational forms were probably all contributing factors in returning from the third to the second SCAP Staff organizational form by 1950. (See Charts 12 and 13, Appendix L)

There was one SCAP Staff organizational form that almost occurred during the first two months of 1946. It would have subordinated the various special staff sections under specific general staff officers. (Taylor 1950, 144; James 1985, 52) This organizational form would have violated normal theater staff practice by making general staff officers responsible for specialized, narrow, and nonmilitary oriented staff functions. During normal military operations, the cognizant areas of special staff officers can fall under the general purview of general staff officers. Oversight by the general staff officers does entail the direct subordination of the special staff officers. The special staff officers, and their sections, have to coordinate on issues that affect the general staff sections, but the special staff officers administer their sections and retain their responsibilities for specific functions. Issues of supply, maintenance, transportation, and procurement, whether these functions are to support military or military government/civil affairs operations, are the bailiwick of their respective special staff officers. These areas would also be issues of interest to and oversight of the G-4, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics. Similarly, military government/civil affairs planning and operations would be the specific concerns of the military government and civil affairs special staff officers, but would also be subject to the general oversight of the G-5 general staff officer. The G-3, Assistant Chief of Staff for Opera-tions and Training, would also be concerned when military government or civil affairs activities affected normal military operations. The special staff officers in these examples would still retain the primary responsibility for their specific areas of expertise, but would coordinate with the various general staff officers when the specialized activity overlapped the general staff officers' areas of responsibility. By having the special staff sections directly assigned to the general staff sections, the general staff officers, not the special staff officers would ultimately be responsible

for the specific specialized areas of activity. Without a G-5, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Government/Civil Affairs, as with MacArthur's AFPAC, FEC, and SCAP Staffs, general staff officers would have had responsibilities for specialized nonmilitary functions for which they had no training, professional knowledge, or experience.

The proponents for subordination of the special staff officers under specific general staff officers did not acknowledge that MacArthur's staffs functioned in both military and occupation arenas. The SWPA and AFPAC Staffs had functioned efficiently without an Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, but had no significant involvement in civil affairs or military government functions. The requirements of occupation administration had changed the basic missions and orientation of the AFPAC and SCAP Staffs. (Taylor 1950, 144) Many officers who had served on the old SWPA and original AFPAC Staffs, though, felt comfortable with the existing G-1, 2, 3, and 4 staff structures and did not understand the need or functions of a G-5 staff section. They did not acknowledge that certain special staff functions extended across several general staff areas of responsibility. They also did not accept that certain special staff functions required training and expertise for effective oversight not found in general staff officers. The communications/signals special staff section, for example, directly supported all the general staff sections, not just the G-3, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training. Similarly, the special staff section for civil affairs directly affected the G-2 intelligence, G-3 operations, and G-4 logistic staff functions. The unique and specialized nature of large scale civil affairs programs required specially trained personnel with professional qualifications not normally found in the general staff sections. It was an organizational weakness in MacArthur's staffs that he did not have a dedicated Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 for Military Government and Civil Affairs. All other

American theater and sub-theater commands that were involved in occupation duties had a G-5

general staff section. (Taylor 1950, 141) The existence of a Deputy Chief of Staff who focused

on the missions and functions of the military occupation of Japan under the second and

fourth/final SCAP Staff organization forms partially mitigated this organizational weakness in

MacArthur's staff. Assignment of the special staff sections associated with occupation adminis-

tration directly under a general staff officer, as proposed in early 1946, would have been a major

departure from normal military staff procedure. It would have encouraged significant inefficien-

cies and confusion in occupation administration. This proposed subordination of special staff

functions was the product of personality driven intra staff politics and not, as claimed, a stream-

lining of staff organization. (James 1985, 52)

<u>The Personal Dynamic</u>

An underlying issue behind the proposed subordination of special staff officers to

specific general staff officers was the relationship of MacArthur's "Bataan Gang" to the special

staff officers. The original "Bataan Gang," and their replacements, were all professional military

officers with a long affiliation with MacArthur. Considering MacArthur's personality, they were

his alter egos and close personal confidants. They also monopolized the general staff officer and

principle assistants' billets in MacArthur's SCAP and AFPAC/FEC Staffs. On the other hand the

special staff officers involved in occupation administration were mainly reserve or temporary

officers with educations and backgrounds associated with civil or business administration. Many

of these officers had civil affairs and/or military government training at the School for Govern-

ment of Occupied Areas at Charlottesville Virginia in preparation for their assignment to the

SCAP Staff.[8] They were public administrators in uniform. As the occupation continued, many military special staff officers left and civilians took their places. These civilians had less in common with MacArthur and his "Bataan Gang" inner circle than the reserve, or temporary, military officers whom they replaced.

Philip H. Taylor captures the feelings of the reserve and temporary officers toward the "Bataan Gang." Taylor, a professor of international relations, had served during World War II as a staff officer in the War Department (1941-1942) then as an infantry officer (1943-1944) before assignment to the SCAP Staff as the editor of the Monthly Summary for Japan during 1945 and 1946. He subsequently served at the School for Occupied Areas, Charlottesville, Virginia in 1946. Taylor asserts that initiative was discouraged and morale was low among those profession- ally trained civil affairs and military government officer assigned to the SCAP Staff. He states:

> Repeated failures to penetrate the "brass curtain" which surrounded the Chief of
> Staff were further disheartening, and the very large majority of military govern-
> ment officers returned home disgusted.
>
> Their places were taken by civilians, . . . Many were from wartime
> agencies in Washington, few were qualified, and practically all lacked experience.
> Those of professional distinction quickly discovered the hopelessness of the
> situation and quit . . .
>
> In his ivory tower the Supreme Commander is insulated from both the top
> American advisors and Japanese officials by a small circle of trusted subordi-
> nates. They are with one or two exceptions, distinguished by their mediocrity . . .

> To say that they are all "yes men" might be unfair, but in their devoted loyalty to their chief they become almost fanatical in the proposition that MacArthur can do no wrong. It can be reasonably assumed that they tell the Supreme Commander only what they decide he wants to hear, and they are the main source of information he receives. (Taylor 1950, 145)

Taylor also observes that the "Bataan Gang" was not the only reason for the relatively unimportant positions of the trained military government and civil affairs officers within the SCAP Staff. He asserts, and a review of Appendix L and the SCAP telephone book confirms, that practically every SCAP Staff section had a Regular Army officer as its head. (Taylor 1950, 144; Appendix L, Charts 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12; MacArthur Archives RG-5, Box 121, James 1985, 40-41) The backgrounds and outlooks of these Regular Army officers were more in line with those of the "Bataan Gang" general staff officers than the special staff officers who were their subordinates.

> If not directly, then indirectly, the general staff officers still exert by far the greatest influence in the Supreme Commander's Headquarters. (Taylor 1950, 144)

> James addresses the plight of the civilians who replaced the military government and

civil affairs trained officers in detail. He cites Robert K. Hall, the Chief of the Education Division within the SCAP Staff, and a former professor who stated:

> We of the academic world were put into insignificant places . . . The Occupation Headquarters was marked by dissension. The army was jealous of the civilians, as the civilians were of the officers. (James 1985, 50)

James also quotes former civilian occupation officials as saying that: "The Army resented the presence of the civilians whom they looked upon as spies." (James 1985, 53)

There is a basis for both groups' animosity and distrust for each other that was the result of MacArthur's leadership and management style. During the occupation's initial phases, despite the presence of a large number of experts in military government and civil affairs, MacArthur relied heavily on his Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff and his four regular general staff officers. (James 1985, 40) It was very clear to all in the SCAP Headquarters that personal relationships and Regular Army status carried much more weight with the SCAP then training, expertise, and experience in a particular field of occupation administration. It was the common assessment of the military government/civil affairs officers and their civilian replacements that:

> The top brass knew little of the situation . . . only a handful enjoyed more than a casual knowledge of Japanese civilian affairs and fewer still were ardent students. (James 1985, 55)

and:

> The old man rarely turned down a sound progressive idea, but it was hard to get an idea before him. (James 1985, 55)

At the same time, the "Bataan Gang" and other Regular Army staff officers had to endure numerous visiting special study groups and commissions of civilian experts. MacArthur insisted that these visitors brief him personally on their findings. These groups of visiting civilian experts became one of his most reliable sources of information on Japan. (James 1985, 55) Information is always power. The combination of sole possession of information and direct access to MacArthur that these civilian study groups enjoyed, in a staff where personal access and relationships were the prime determinants of status, made the civilian experts, envied, feared, and even spies in the eyes of the Regular Army officers. Civilians on the SCAP staff, like their visiting compatriots, did not have the same values and background as the tightly knit regular military officers. The *regulars* viewed the civilians as temporary outsiders in their world.

A central factor in the SCAP Staff organization was not just its organizational form but, as it is with all human organizations, the interpersonal relationships of its members. What made MacArthur's staffs different from other military staffs involved with occupation administration, was not so much the absence of a G-5 general staff section but that the interpersonal dynamic overshadowed normally accepted staff forms. MacArthur as the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Military Advisor to the President of the Philippines had established a pattern of personalizing his staffs. MacArthur, not the mission or task was the primary, even sole, concern of his staff. The total personal loyalty that he demanded of his subordinates reflects MacArthur's approach to the concept of a unit's and its staff's mission. Those subordinates that he most trusted, and to whom he gave access, would naturally have an unusual amount of influence. Because of the undue amount of influence that the general staff officers enjoyed due to their personal relation-ships to MacArthur, the proposed subordination of special staff sections to specific general staff officers would have been a natural acknowledgment of the importance of the "Bataan Gang" within the SCAP Staff. It would also have resulted in an over consolidation of authority and functions within the staff. It would have seriously diluted any remaining influence the special staff officers had enjoyed under the second/final organizational forms where they came under a Deputy Chief of Staff. Considering the administrative, ver-sus military nature of the occupation, the proposed reorganization could have had extremely negative effects on the efficiency and effectiveness of SCAP occupation administration.

One constant of staff organization throughout MacArthur's tenure as SCAP, was his tight control over his staffs. The unity of command, commonality of policies between the SCAP and AFPAC/FEC Staffs, and the requirement for SCAP to have to deal with only one set of primary

assistants outweighed the negative effects of the dominance of the "Bataan Gang." Reliance on one set of principal assistants greatly simplified MacArthur's span of control over many and diverse command responsibilities. Most important, his tight control of his staffs insured that he could impose his will and make his personal imprint on the occupation. MacArthur's reliance on a few trusted assistants, whose importance de-pended on their loyalty and personal relationships to himself, explains the positive and negative dynamics of the SCAP Staff's organization and functioning. The tight personal control MacArthur required was worth the internecine squabbling and dissension that existed within the staff. That this dissension existed, and that it offered the Japanese a chance to affect SCAP policies were probably unknown to MacArthur. He was the focus; his personal success was the mission. Occupation administration was not the primary mission and function of the SCAP Staff. Its primary concern was to support its commander and not the command's mission. This personalization of the SCAP Staff's mission continued a pattern of leadership and administration that MacArthur had imposed on the General Staff, the Military Advisor's Staff, and the SWPA Staff. All general officers attempt to personalize their staffs and commands. Identification with, and loyalty to, a commander or executive are common objectives of both military and civilian leaders. Substitution of the command's mission by a total orientation on the commander is a distinguishing and consistent factor in MacArthur's leadership style. It was the dominant force in the organization and functioning of the SCAP Staff.

SCAP and Occupation Policy

It is possible to assert that all Japanese occupation policies had their basis in three documents. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for

Japan, dated 22 September 1845 (SWNCC 150/4/A), and the Basic Directive for Post-Surrender

Military Government in Japan Proper dated November 8, 1945 (JCS 1380/15, WX59252,

WX68524, WX68469) do indeed encompass the entire range of initial occupation policies.

(Mayo in Wolfe 1984, 3-4; Martin 1948, xi; National Archives RG 218)[9] National occupation

policy objectives contained in these three documents can easily be identified by sampling the

various SCAP Instructions (SCAPINS) which MacArthur and his staff used to forward policy

decisions to the Japanese Government. At the same time it would be an over simplification, and

even inaccurate, to assert that these documents define the totality of the occupation policy

process. These documents represent only the final product of a process that had stated as far back

as 1939. The importance of these documents rests on the fact that they represented a consensus

of all national and departmental agencies involved in postwar planning. Although published after

his death, these documents bear the mark of Franklin D. Roosevelt whose foreign policies and

views on postwar reconstruction dominated their development. (Mayo in Wolfe 1984, 9) While

these documents accurately frame occupation policies up through 1947. They do not as accu-

rately or completely reflect occupation policies after 1948. From 1945 through 1947, disarma-

ment, demobilization, repatriation, reparations, and trial of war criminals were included

objectives of occupation policies. During 1948 and 1949 there was a reversal of occupation

policies that stressed economic reconstruction of Japan so that it could participate as an ally

during the emergent cold war. The goals of demilitarization and democratization of the Japanese

society and government were constant policy objectives throughout the occupation but these

issues had a different focus after the 1947/1948 *reversal of course*. (Taylor 1950, 148-149; Feary

1950, 5-6) Probably the most important issue in examining MacArthur as a public administrator

is that these documents set forth only basic objectives and goals. SWNCC/JCS policies listed

and expanded on the general policies of the above three basic documents, but it was MacArthur

and his staff that took the SWNCC/JCS policies and turned them into the specific policies that

constituted the administrative goals of the occupation.[10]

SCAP's Role in Occupation Policy Formulation

MacArthur's *Reminiscences*, and biographies written by former staff members and other

writers, directly state, or strongly imply, that MacArthur himself was the source of occupation

policies. (MacArthur 1964, 282-283; Whitney 1956, 213; Huff 1964; Whilloughby 1966; Hunt

1964) Whitney goes as far as giving a detailed description of his boss setting forth basic

occupation policies while striding up and down inside his personal aircraft, Bataan, en route to

Atsugi, Japan. (Whilloughby 1966, 231) Historians disagree with these accounts. For example,

Marlene J. Mayo asserts:

> Contrary to general belief, then and now, General MacArthur's role and that of his
> general staff in planning the initial goals of the Allied occupation of Japan were
> minimal . . . MacArthur, however much he chaffed at guidelines and restraints,
> largely complied with his JCS orders in the opening stages of the occupation.
> (Mayo in Wolfe 1984, 4)

James confirms Mayo's assertion concerning the source of basic occupation policies and

contends that there was no prior consultation with MacArthur concerning these policies before

their promulgation. He states:

> On August 29, while stopping at Okinawa en route to Japan MacArthur received a
> radiogram containing the substance of a SWNCC-prepared document entitled
> "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," which following Truman's
> approval on September 6, was sent in full to him as a directive from the Joints

> Chief of Staff. Although MacArthur was amenable to most of the ideas stated
> therein, he had not been consulted during its formulation and had no knowledge
> of it until the day before he landed in Japan. (James 1985, 11)

Contrary to James, Mayo states that:

> ...its (U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan) probable contents had been
> known to him and his general staff in advanced draft form since late August,
> when they were about to leave the Philippines for Japan. (Mayo in Wolfe 1984, 4)

Although James' and Mayo's opinion about when MacArthur became aware of the

proposed occupation policies involves only several days, or a week at most, both agree that

MacArthur was aware of the policies he would administer before his assumption of duties as

SCAP and, because of his lack of extensive prior knowledge of these policies, he was not ex-

tensively involved in their formulation. Considering MacArthur's distrust of the Washington

bureaucracy, could this lack of involvement in policies he was to carry out be another example

of dark cabals plotting against him? Circumstantial evidence suggests that the SWPA/AFPAC

commander's lack of involvement in occupation policy planning resulted from his concentration

on military operations within his own theater and planning for "Operation Downfall," the

upcoming invasion of Japan. Although the planning for "Operation Blacklist," the unopposed

occupation of Japan, had begun in May 1945, and the plan was first published in July 1945,

MacArthur's SWPA Staff, and its successor the AFPAC Staff, lacked any special staff section

associated with occupation activities until the creation of the Military Government Section

within the AFPAC Staff on August 5, 1945. This special staff section was in existence less than

two weeks before the focus of the AFPAC Staff's activities changed from a forced invasion to a

peaceful occupation of Japan. When MacArthur stopped in Okinawa en route to Atsugi on

August 29, 1945, his only staff section with a primary orientation on occupation functions had

been in existence for only about three weeks. MacArthur's lack of substantive participation in

occupation policy planning was due to an almost total focus on military operations and the lack

of a staff equipped, or trained, to plan for or develop occupation policies.

This does not mean that SCAP and his staff did not have a role in initial occupation policy and

planning. Mayo also states:

> Well informed about personalities and policies behind the initial recommenda-
> tions, the General's chief contributions in the crucial early days were in determin-
> ing priorities and timing reforms as he exercised, in his highly assertive and
> colorful manner, the usual discretionary authority of a theater commander and
> gathered essential information on conditions in Japan. (Ibid., 5)

National Occupation Policy Formulation

Unlike MacArthur's staffs, authorities in Washington had a well established, extensive,

and effective occupation policy planning apparatus. General planning for postwar policies began

within the Department of State in 1939 with the breakout of World War II in Europe. Lacking its

own intelligence and research organization, the State Department initially relied on semiformal

arrangements with several private organizations such as the Brookings Institution, the Council

on Foreign Relations, and the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. These

private organizations conducted research into and recommended postwar policies until the State

Department created its Division of Special Research in February of 1941. (Ibid., 7) The first

stage of post war policy planning involved research into, and the drafting of position papers

concerning the basic principles and general framework for postwar policies. This initial stage of

postwar policy planning extended from early 1942 to the Fall of 1943. FDR's Advisory Commit-

tee on Postwar Foreign Policy and its five subcommittees conducted this policy planning.

Secretary of State Hull headed the Committee and the Division of Special Research provided its

research staff and secretariat. (Ibid.) After Secretary Hull resigned in late 1943, the national

postwar policy apparatus underwent a restructuring that introduced an interdepartmental

approach to postwar planning. Within the Department of State, the older geographic units plus

economic and cultural elements joined with the Division of Special Research in the development

of diplomatic policies. During this second stage of postwar interdepartmental policy develop-

ment, the State Department coordinated policy development with the Departments of War, Navy,

and the Treasury, the President's Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, and representatives

from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Foreign Economic Administration (FEA), and the

Office of War Information (OWI). During this period the War Department created its Civil

Affairs Division to conduct planning for the operation of military governments in occupied

areas. The creation of this division within the War Department coincided with the creation of

regional civil affairs/military government training centers and a flagship campus for the overall

development of civil affairs and military government training at the University of Virginia at

Charlottesville. The Navy Department created the Occupied Areas Section that later became the

Military Government Section. The War Department played the dominant role in this training

because it was the lead agency in Civil affairs/military government doctrinal development and it

provided most of the personnel and resources for these activities.

With the creation of the State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), in February

1945, postwar policy planning entered its third, also final, stage. The creation of SWNCC

formalized the interdepartmental approach initiated by the State Department from late 1943 to

late 1944. (Ibid. 6-8) SWNCC was the highest authority for the formulation of policy statements

for presidential approval. It also provided guidance to the JCS in the transmission of national policies to the theater military commanders. (Mayo in Wolfe 1948, 37; Martin 1948, 5-6)

From January 1942 to the Summer of 1945 national postwar policies planning was in complete accord with and focused on the policy views of FDR. These views, enunciated in FDR's specific dictates, speeches and summit diplomacy, instilled a unity of effort and national agency consensus in postwar policy development. FDR's tendency to bypass the State Department and his "uncongenial" Secretary Hull encouraged an interdepartmental approach by the career diplomats who normally would have been the primary source of foreign and international policies. (Mayo in Wolfe 1948, 8) FDR, and his diplomatic, economic, and military advisors, created a unified, focused, and effective postwar policy apparatus. FDR's policy formulation apparatus insured attaining a consensus after a recognized and accepted policy development process. This is not to say that there were not competing factions within the various departments, or between departments on specific policy goals and implementation measures. It does mean that FDR exercised effective control of policy development and that his views established the goals for national postwar polices.

The Shogun and Policy Implementation

The initial occupation policies radiogrammed to MacArthur on August 29 and subsequent policies transmitted to SCAP throughout the occupation were normally in the forms of goals or objectives. Even when particular policies dealt in very restricted subjects, such as fishing or a particular resource's management, they still were in the form of desired objectives. State War Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) policies transmitted to the SCAP by the

JCS did not normally detail the execution of policy, and "the devil is in the details." Although MacArthur and his staffs had little to do with general occupation policy development, they did have a significant impact on policy implementation through the timing, prioritization, implementing details, and oversight reporting of nationally developed occupation policies. As a United States theater commander, MacArthur carried out JCS directed occupation policy much the same as he carried out JCS directed strategic military policy. A notable difference is that MacArthur agreed with occupation policies, whereas he had often been at odds with national military strategies and policies.

The primary reason for MacArthur's unusual deference to occupation policies generated in Washington is that these policies represented a consensus of the national military, diplomatic and political leadership. They were not just the policies of the JCS. Even the *Far Eastern General* had little maneuver room in accepting policies that all the major agencies and organizations within the Executive Branch had approved. These policies represented the consensus of substantive experts in their fields of administration, something that MacArthur and his initial occupation staffs could not claim.

Because MacArthur administered policies that already represented a national consensus, he did not meet with significant external political or administration resistance to his actions. Even those who objected to certain policies realized that their arguments were with Washington and not the Supreme Commander in Tokyo. The inter-service rivalries that had plagued the Pacific Theater during the war were essentially absent during the occupation of Japan. Civil affairs and military government operations were under the doctrinal and functional control of the War Department and its successor, the Department of the Army. Although Marine and Navy

forces had played a prominent part in the planning and execution of Operation "Downfall," the peaceful occupation of Japan, they had only a minor part in the subsequent administration of occupied Japan. The U.S. Army Air Corps, and after 1947 the U.S. Air Force, logistically supported the occupation, but other than administering its bases, like the Navy and Marines, it did not have a significant role in occupation administration. MacArthur had made the senior State Department representative in Japan his Diplomatic Advisor and a member of his SCAP Staff. In doing so he avoided the necessity of having to deal with an ambassador, normally the senior United States Government representative in a foreign country. Although he did not directly explain the reasons for his choice of residence while SCAP, MacArthur's choice of the former embassy clearly and dramatically asserted his role as the supreme authority for not only the Allied Powers, but also for the United States government. (Sebald and Brines 1965, 42, 45-46, 103) Within Japan MacArthur reigned supreme; there was no other individual or group that could provide an effective check or balance to SCAP's authority. Early in the occupation, MacArthur had outmaneuvered and neutralized the only potential challenge to his authority, the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ). After briefly attending its first meeting, he acted without prior coordination, or even notification of the Council, routinely presenting it with *faits accomplis* that it had little choice but to accept. (Sebald and Brines 1965, 54-55, 62-64, 102-103; James 1985, 39) The Far Eastern Commission (FEC), located in the United States, dealt with the Department of State and had its policies transmitted to SCAP through the JCS. (Sebald and Brines 1965, 55) The physical separation of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) from MacArthur's realm, and insertion of the Washington bureaucracy between MacArthur and the Commission, prevented the FEC from effectively meddling in or curtailing his authority.

MacArthur's acceptance of nationally developed occupation policies, and the lack of an effective check or balance of SCAP's authority by the Allied Council for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission, would indicate that occupation pol-icy administration should have been monolithic in nature and bereft of dissent. This was not the case. Inconsistencies in the administration of universally accepted general policies, and dissent about what constituted the proper specific actions required by these policies were rife within the SCAP Staff. MacArthur's *Bataan Gang*, and most of the regular Army officers, constituted a conservative, rigid and pragmatic faction that occupied the highest and most powerful positions within the SCAP Staff. These were the professional soldiers who had fought the war. They viewed the occupation as a military activity. The professional soldiers viewed occupation policies narrowly and enforced the *letter of the law*. They generally had little knowledge of Japan or the Japanese, and restricted their contacts with the Japanese to official functions. Below the general staff officers were a large body of temporary and reserve officers and, later, their civilian administrator replacements. This group was generally liberal, idealistic, had academic or administrative backgrounds, and were more in touch with the situation in Japan. They also had a more proactive and encompassing view toward policy objectives. The occupation, for them, represented a chance to implement social and democratic theories while rebuilding Japan. (Yoshida 1962, 43) Comprising school-trained civil affairs and military government officers, and later civilian subject matter experts, these individuals were the ones that developed the detailed administrative policies. They were the ones who directly administered the occupation. As discussed when describing the organiza-tion for the occupation, this second group was also the element within the SCAP staff that felt most isolated from MacArthur.

There was one further dynamic in the political orientations of the principal architects and enforcers of occupation policy. This was the changing nature of American national politics. Principle occupation policy development occurred while FDR, the father of the "New Deal," was the President of the United States. Many of the individuals that formed the professionally trained military government and civil affairs cadres came from academic and public administration backgrounds that were heavily influenced by liberal and "New Deal"policies. Implementation of the occupation policies, though, occurred under a supreme commander who while he embraced the progressive liberal occupation policy objectives, remained a conservative Republican in his political and social outlooks. With the exception of his diplomatic advisor, Harry Emerson Wildes, the supreme commander had a dedicated core of principal assistants, between himself and his "New Dealers," who were basically conservative in their outlooks, although not as closely identified with the Republican Party as was their boss. These political, social, and governmental orientations within the occupation administration remained constant throughout the occupation. What did change was the dominant political and social orientation within the American government. Although Truman was a Democrat, he was not overseeing an expansion of government but was more concerned with a postwar demobilization which involved the elimination of agencies and the relaxation of government control in areas associated with wartime administration. Although FDR had won reelection to a fourth term, Congress was now more heavily influenced by Republicans than liberal "New Deal" Democrats. (Passin 1990, 109) Truman would win reelection in 1948, but the shift of Congress to the Republican Left from the Democratic right would continue. The shift in American national politics and the intensifying cold war resulted in a shift of the national government's orientation from the liberal "New Deal"

orientation of the original occupation policies to more pragmatic concerns. These included

insuring the containment of occupation costs, and the reconstruction of a Japan that could

function as an ally in the Far East. (Taylor 1950, 148-149; Feary 1950, 3-6)

Although MacArthur was probably unaware of the rift in philosophical approach to

occupation policies, and its effect on his occupation's administration, the Japanese were not.

(James 1985, 51, 53-55; Wildes 1954, 24; Keenan in James 1985, 300; Passin 1990, 109)

Shigeru Yoshida, who occupied high posts in the Japanese government throughout the occupa-

tion and was the Prime Minister from 1946 to 1947 and again from 1949 to 1955, described how

the Japanese ex-ploited the philosophically opposed groups within the SCAP Staff.

> The antagonisms which on occasion arose between these two sets of Occupation
> officials, stemming from differences in the nature of their tasks, was therefore
> quite comprehensible.
> However, although this antagonism existed, it was Government Section
> which was in charge of the work of actually directing the Japanese Government,
> so that, willy-nilly, it was with this section that we had the most to do. But the
> Army Staff men usually supported us, for reasons already outlined, and their
> Second Section helped to temper the, at times, rigorous demands made by the
> Government Section not only in the matter of the police reform but on such
> questions as the purging of people from public life. (Yoshida 1962, 43-44)

MacArthur was not the creator of Occupation policies; he was their implementor. He did,

though, exercise considerable power and authority in setting forth the numerous spe-cific

implementing policies that carried out the general policy objectives transmitted from Washing-

ton through the JCS. Similar to most issues that involved decision making or the exercise of

authority during the Occupation, MacArthur tightly controlled policy development at the highest

levels. The extent of his authority, the lack of effective domestic or international challenges to

his power, the dominance of his service in civil affairs/military government activities, and the

single service composition of his staff put MacArthur in total control of specific policy formula-

tion within Japan. The one area where SCAP did not reign supreme was in policy implementation and enforcement. Although he exercised total control over the drafting of the numerous policies implementing JCS general directives, MacArthur, unknown to himself, did not exercise effective control over their implementation and enforcement. Because of the deep division of his staff between the professional military officers and the temporary officers/civilian experts, the Japanese were able to modify and even ignore specific occupation policies.

During, and immediately after the occupation much was written about the potentially severe effects of several proscriptive occupation policies such as the dissolution of the *zaibatsu* and the purge of those politicians and industrialists who had supported the militarists during the war. Even before the occupation was over, many of those purged had returned to public life and the *zaibatsu* still existed. It would be easy to attribute these failures in policy to inappropriate or unenforceable policies. These were not failures in the policies but in their enforcement. The liberal and idealistic elements of the SCAP Staff saw these policies as required elements of the democratization process of Japan, one of the primary occupation goals. The pragmatic and conservative military professionals saw a strong industrial base with experienced leaders as essential elements of the Japanese becoming an ally in the Cold War. The short range requirements of the Cold War and the 1948 election won out.

MacArthur's Achilles heel in policy matters was his own staff. MacArthur's failure to recognize a crucial weakness in his own staff was a direct result of his own personality and leadership style. He controlled his environment, but it was a closed, not an open system. What he held as reality was not the entire environment in which he existed. The blind loyalty of his primary subordinates, and his own isolation within a rigid schedule and controlled environment

prevented MacArthur from realizing that the Japanese were avoiding or modifying his policies by manipulating the philosophical differences within his own staff. Because MacArthur demanded total and personal loyalty, those whom he trusted, and to whom he gave access, could not, or would not, tell him that there was a problem within his staff. Because MacArthur had made himself the embodiment of the organization it would have meant that MacArthur had a problem, and that was anathema. Those willing to tell SCAP that problems existed did not have access to MacArthur. Everyone but the emperor knew that he had no clothes.

MacArthur the Jurist

As a military officer, particularly as a commanding officer, MacArthur's duties involved the administration of military justice. Field grade commanding officers are the convening and initial review authorities for summary and special courts-martial while general officers exercise these powers for general courts-martial.[11] MacArthur had also sat as a member of a high profile case, the Billy Mitchell court-martial. While a theater commander and as SCAP, he had at his immediate call, within the legal sections of his staffs, qualified judge advocate general officers. He was not a trained jurist, but neither was he a stranger to, or ignorant of, military justice.

While SCAP, MacArthur functioned as a jurist at several levels and in several capacities. As SCAP, he, through his staff legal and government sections, functioned as the final court of appeal for Japanese judicial decisions. Like the rest of the Japanese Government during the occupation, Japanese courts administered themselves, but under the watchful eye of SCAP civil government and staff authorities. Even after the new Japanese Constitution had been approved and implemented, the final approval of Japanese judicial decisions rested with MacArthur as

SCAP. SCAP Instructions (SCAPINS) to the Japanese Government could force the review of judicial decisions and interpretations of laws. Although a review of SCAPINS and SCAP documents shows that this SCAP authority was rarely used, it was available if the letter or intent of occupation policies were not being carried out by the Japanese legal and judicial authorities. While SCAP authorities did not sit as formal review panels, nor were they an official part of the judicial system and appeals process, they could, in MacArthur's name, force the review, suspension, or abrogation of Japanese judicial decisions. That this power was possible, even though rarely invoked, gave MacArthur the effective power of the ultimate court of the land. MacArthur was the ultimate check and balance to the Japanese judicial branch.

MacArthur also had judicial responsibilities at an international level that extended beyond the borders of Japan. While the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was not a part of MacArthur's SCAP staff, the prosecution and defense sections that tried cases before the tribunal were MacArthur's subordinates. The IMTFE, which tried major war criminals, the equivalent of the Allied War Crimes Trials in Nuremberg, was an international body representing eleven nations. MacArthur, as the senior international executive authority in Japan where the IMTFE sat, saw to the organization and support of the IMTFE. He issued its guiding directives, reviewed its decisions, and carried out its sentences. This authority rested on President Truman's instructions to MacArthur, as approved by all eleven nations participating in the tribunal. (Piccigallo 1979, 10, fn4) Although he did not directly participate in its proceedings, MacArthur had a certain amount of influence over the IMTFE because the prosecutors were part of his staff. They were sensitive to SCAP policies concerning involvement of the Emperor in the trail, and as to who should and should not be charged with war crimes. In effect,

MacArthur acted as a federal or district attorney in American domestic law enforcement. He determined who would be prosecuted, what charges would be presented, and in which manner the accused would be tried. Prosecutors also relied heavily on other sections of the SCAP staff for information concerning alleged crimes/criminals and for support in the discovery and presentation of witnesses and evidence. Although available evidence indicates that he avoided direct participation and involvement in the IMTFE proceedings, outside of his responsibilities to provide procedural policies and support to the tribunal, he actively participated in the review of the sentences and the imposition of punishments.[12]

MacArthur's involvement in war crimes trials was not limited to the IMTFE. While the IMTFE was an international body which dealt with major war criminals, all of whom faced charges of crimes against humanity, MacArthur, as the Commander in Chief of U.S. Army forces in the Far East (CinCUSAFFE), directly and completely controlled the trials of all the lesser war criminals. In meeting his responsibilities as a United States military theater commander, MacArthur had his GHQ USAFFE set up military courts in Yokohoma, just South of Tokyo, and in Manilla. The differences between the IMTFE and the military war crimes courts in Yokohoma and Manilla were significant. Whereas the IMTFE handled only a handful of defendants, in a single proceeding, the military courts dealt with more than 1,400 defendants in almost five hundred trials.[13] The IMTFE was made up of distinguished internationally known jurists while the military war crimes courts were composed of serving army officers, few of whom had any formal legal training or experience. The IMTFE proceedings lasted some two and a half years. The courts-martial normally lasted several days, sometimes weeks, and the sentences, including numerous executions, were carried out by military authorities shortly after the trials. Although

SCAP would review the findings of the IMTFE, the members of this tribunal were not answerable to MacArthur. The members of the military courts-martial were appointed by MacArthur, or his area commanders, and were thus under his command. The IMTFE proceedings contained procedural safeguards, rigidly applied rules of evidence, and were not directly affected or interfered with by MacArthur or his staff officers. All eleven nations involved in the IMTFE had approved the directive which the JCS sent to SCAP on September 22, 1945. When MacArthur set up the IMTFE, he was only following, to the letter, instructions from Washington and the allies. In contrast to IMTFE procedures, the procedures and oversight of the courts-martial all originated in MacArthur's USAFFE headquarters. Truman had granted MacArthur the authority to try common war criminals but did not, nor did the JCS, tell him how to do it. The critical difference, though, between the IMTFE and the military courts-martial in Yokohoma and Manilla was that while MacArthur had not interfered in the IMTFE's proceedings, he took an active and detailed role in several of the military courts-martial. This last point is significant in a study of MacArthur as the senior public administrator in the Far East. SCAP's handling of the IMTFE was a model of judicial detachment and executive oversight. SCAP's review of the IMTFE sentences and his grants of leniency won him praise and respect even from the Japanese. SCAP's supervision of the Japanese courts and his oversight of the IMTFE reinforced his image as the all knowing, an all-powerful leader of a nation. Conversely, CinCUSAFFE's handling of the Yamashita and Homma courts-martial, the two most famous military war crimes cases, brought him almost universal criticism, and even scorn. MacArthur's direct and detailed involvement in these two courts-martial paints a vivid and entirely negative picture of a vengeful

zealot who would go to almost any length to use any legal pretext as an excuse for executing two generals who had beaten or frustrated him on the field of battle.

The courts-martial of Generals Yamashita and Homma not only reached the Supreme Court of the United States but have been the subject of extensive legal debate in numerous books and articles. (In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 1946) While MacArthur's participation in the IMTFE trail in Tokyo was limited and completely in line with his role as the senior allied executive on site, his involvement in the courts-martial of Yamashita and Homma was extensive, controversial, and the single most important factor in their subsequent extensive legal debate. (Taylor 1981, 130-135; Branch 1990, 14; Minear 1971, 110-111, 164; Bien 1989, 16-17, 19)

MacArthur's charges against his former battlefield antagonists were new and unique. The charges against Homma and Yamashita went far beyond the scope of the charges against the war criminals tried before the international tribunals in Tokyo and Nuremburg.(Bien 1989, 26-30; Justices Murphy's and Rutledge's dissents in In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1. 1946) They went beyond any directed guidance from Washington. MacArthur was personally involved in their drafting. Existing records do not indicate that MacArthur asked for, or received, any legal advise on their preparation from outside of his command. The principle charges against Yamashita and Homma were that each had "unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as a commander to control the operations of members of his command" and had "permitted them to commit brutal atrocities and other crimes." (James 1985, 94) These charges, as defined by the courts-martial/military commissions, did not require that the defendants actually commit a war crime or order the commission of war crimes by their subordinates. These charges did not even require positive knowledge of the defendants that war crimes were being, or had been, conducted

by their subordinates. These charges held the commander personally responsible for their subordinates' actions reasoning that because the war crimes had been so severe and widespread, the commander must have been aware of these crimes, and thus should have prevented their occurrence. (Branch, 1990, 27; Bien 1989, 9; Taylor 1981, 137, 165, 174; Piccigalo 1979, 60) The principle charges against Yamashita and Homma established new military case law that would stand until the My Lai Massacre courts-martial of the early 1970s. (Bien 1989, 29)

General Homma had defeated MacArthur in the Philippines in 1942. Homma had accomplished his victory with a force that was actually smaller than the American-Filipino force that he faced. MacArthur's indecision the first day of the war had cost him his air forces. He had made other decisions, such as initially trying to defend at the landing beaches, then precipitously withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsular before evacuating his supplies and equipment that had facilitated Homma's victory. Homma had dramatically shown that MacArthur's Filipino defense program was a hollow, ineffective, and unrealistic exercise. Unfortunately for Homma, troops under his command, but without his knowledge or supervision, committed extensive atrocities against the defeated Americans and Filipinos during the infamous Bataan Death March. MacArthur's prestige and honor were as much victims of the 1941-1942 Philippine Campaign as were his troops on the death march. Three years later, Yamashita, the "Tiger of Malaya" who had defeated the British General Percival in a manner similar to MacArthur's own defeat by Homma, would offer MacArthur unexpectedly sustained and effective resistance as he fulfilled his promise to return to the Philippines. The carefully planned victory parade through Manilla was first rescheduled then cancelled after the city had been ravaged and destroyed while being liberated. Similar to Homma's knowledge and control over the Bataan Death March, Yamashita

was not aware of, nor did he have any control over the Japanese naval force that engaged in an orgy of atrocities during their defense of Manilla.

The case against Homma was the strongest. He was the victor, and although he was personally removed from the location of the atrocities committed during the Bataan Death March, his army and his command and control system were intact. The atrocities that his troops committed occurred after the cessation of organized resistance against unarmed prisoners of war. Homma also faced charges of not granting quarter in his assault on Corregidor, but MacArthur had attempted to limit the effect of the imminent surrender of Wainwright's command by the last minute transfer of forces from Wainright to other American commanders in the Southern Philippines. Homma had demanded the surrender of Wainright's entire force, and when this did not occur he had continued his assault of Corregidor. (Esposito 1972**)**

Yamashita had a much stronger case in defense against accepted war crimes. Not only was he physically removed from the site of the atrocities, Manila, but he could not have exercised effective command and control over the troops that committed the atrocities. Even if he had been aware of the atrocities and had tried to prevent them, devastating American control of the air, the fragmentation and isolation of his own forces and tenuous, or nonexistent, communications would have prevented Yamashita from exercising effective control of his forces. Anticipating the inability to effectively command and control his forces once the Americans had landed, Yamashita had organized his forces into independent groups that would statically defend in place for the maximum length of time. Yamashita depended on his subordinates executing orders issued before they became decisively engaged. Yamashita had correctly anticipated that he would not be able to influence events once his forces were engaged. The

Japanese naval commander in Manila violated Yamashita's direct orders to withdraw from the city. Yamashita was unaware of the atrocities conducted by the Imperial Japanese Naval force in Manila and would not have been able to exercise his authority in the city had he tried. (Esposito 1972, 155-159; Branch 1990, 7)

Although Homma's charged war crimes occurred in 1942, and the prosecution's case was stronger against him, Yamashita's court-martial occurred first. Yamashita was already in the Philippines, and the atrocities that the defenders of Manila had committed were still the focus and central interest of the Filipinos. Because it was the first court-martial to try MacArthur's greatly expanded concept of a commander's personal responsibility, Yamashita's court-martial is legally and historically more significant than Homma's subsequent court-martial. Yamashita's conviction established case law, and the results of his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court limited and determined the outcome of Homma's subsequent appeal of his conviction. Table 5. is a chronology of General Yamashita's court-martial. Table 6. is a similar chronology of General Homma's court-martial.

Table 5.-- Chronology of General Yamashita's Court-Martial

Oct. 7, 1944   Yamashita assumes command of 120,000 of 300,000 Japanese in the Philippines nine days before MacArthur invades the Southern Philippines. (Esposito 1972, 145)

Dec.20, 1944   American landings on Luzon (Ibid., 150)

Jan. 6, 1945   Remaining Japanese forces in Philippines, including naval garrison in Manilla, come under Yamashita's command. (Branch 1990, 6)

Jan. 11, 1945   President Roosevelt signs the "Military Order Governing the Establishment of Military Commissions for the Trail of Certain Offenders Against the Law of War, and Governing the Procedures for Such Commissions." (USC Title 3; War Crimes Working File, RG 107, National Archives) This executive order, resting on Ex Parte Quirin (317 U.S. 1, 1942) established a theater commander's authority to conduct military courts-martial of war criminals.

Feb. 2, 1945-
Mar. 4, 1945   Battle for Manila. Naval commander defends the city despite Yamashita's order to withdraw. Yamashita is isolated at Baguio in the Mountains to North-West of Central Luzon Plain. (Esposito 1972, 155-159; Branch 1990, 7)

Aug. 17, 1945   MacArthur is formally authorized to apprehend war criminals by the War Department. (WARCOS to CINCAFPAC, 17 Aug., 1945, file 000.53#1, box 763, RG 331, National Archives)

Sep. 3, 1945   Yamashita surrenders to U.S. Army.

Sep. 12, 1945   MacArthur receives a radiogram from President Truman, through the JCS, ordering that those persons already charged by either American or UN agencies were to be arrested, tried, and if convicted, punished. (JCS to MacArthur 12 Sep.1945, 000.5 War Criminals, sec. 1, Box 763, RG 331, National Archives)

Sep. 24, 1945   MacArthur orders Lt.Gen. Styer to "proceed immediately" with the trial against Yamashita. (USAFPAC (U.S. Army Forces Pacific) to USAFWESPAC (U.S. Army Forces Western Pacific), 000.5, Yamashita Box 763, RG 331, National Archives). MacArthur issues "Regulations for the Trial of War Criminals" (AG 000.5 (9-24-45)JA, Yamashita file, Box 2003, RG 331. National Archives)

Sep. 25, 1945 Yamashita charged as war criminal.

Oct. 8, 1945 Yamashita arraigned. Bill of particulars cites 64 charges. The charges were personally prepared by MacArthur and his USAFPAC staff judge advocates. (Lael 1982, 73)

Oct. 27, 1945 Fifty-four additional specifications (charges) are added by an initial bill of particulars. (Ibid., 82)

Oct. 29, 1945 Yamashita's court-martial convenes. The defense moves for a two-week delay to respond to the additional charges of October 27 but the motion is denied. (Ibid.)

Oct. 29, 1945-
Nov. 20, 1945 Nineteen days of the prosecution's case.

Nov. 12, 1945 General Marshall, MacArthur's Deputy Chief of Staff, advises Yamashita's court-martial/military commission that MacArthur was "disturbed by reports of possible recess" and "doubts need of Defense for more time" and "desires proceedings completed (at) earliest practicable date." (Marshall to Maj.Gen. Whitlock, DC/S for Administration, CINCAFPAC 12 Nov., 1945, Radiograms, Box 1945, RG 331, National Archives)

Nov. 25, 1945 Defense appeals to U.S. Supreme Court with a petition for *certiorari* and requests writs of *habeas corpus* and prohibition.

Nov. 27, 1945 Filipino Supreme Court rejects a defense motion appealing courts-martial ruling denying a continuance in order to call more defense witnesses. (Lael 1982, 91-92)

Dec. 5, 1945 Defense rests its case. (Ibid., 94)

Dec. 7, 1945 Yamashita found guilty.

Dec. 8, 1945 MacArthur notifies the War Department that he believes the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction and that he intended to dispose of the case in accordance with his own September 24, 1945 regulations. (Ibid., 99)

Dec. 12, 1945 Lt. Gen. Styer, CG USAFWESPAC, a subordinate command of MacArthur's USAFPAC, approves the initial Staff Judge Advocate's review of Yamashita's court-martial. (Ibid., 97-98)

Dec. 17, 1945 The U.S. Supreme Court agrees to consider the defense appeal of November 25. (Clerk of the Supreme Court to Secretary of War, 20 Dec. 1945, 000.5 (10-4-45), Box 311, RG 165, National Archives)

Jan. 7-8, 1946 Three of Yamashita's defense team (Colonel Clarke, and Captains Sandberg and Reel) argue their appeal against the Solicitor General (J. Howard McGrath)in front of the Supreme Court. Captain Reel questioned the legality of the military commission which tried the case because of the cessation of hostilities and the functioning of a legal Filipino Government voided MacArthur's authority as a wartime theater commander to appoint such a commission. Colonel Clark questioned the court-martial's authority to convict Yamashita because he had not been charged with a traditional or recognized violation of the law of war, i.e., a commander's personal responsibility for the actions of their troops. Captain Sandberg asserted that the verdict should be invalidated because the directive governing the military commission and its operations, i.e., MacArthur's "Regulations for the Trail of War Criminals of Sep. 24, 1945,"constituted such extreme departures from the basic standards of fairness that (Yamashita) did not have a fair trail." (Yamashita vs. Styer, U.S. Supreme Court Report, 90 L. Ed. 499) Solicitor General McGrath countered that Ex Parte Quirin (317 U.S. 1, 1942) established the Presidents' authority to appoint a military commission outside of a combat zone and that hostilities only ceased to legally exist upon the signing of a formal treaty, which had not yet occurred. McGrath then asserted that Articles 1 and 43 of the annex to the Fourth Hague Convention, Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, and Article 26 of the 1929 Geneva Red Cross Convention all imposed responsibilities on commanders for the actions of their troops. McGrath closed by warning the justices of the political and legal ramifications of interfering with the war crimes process which was an executive rather than judicial concern. (Ibid.)

Jan. 12, 1946 Eight justices debate defense and government positions.(Justice Jackson had not taken part in the proceedings.) Chief Justice Stone, and Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and Reed agreed with Solicitor General McGrath's arguments. Justice Black disagreed with McGrath's legal reasoning but agreed with his conclusions. Justice Burton had misgivings with the government's case and Justices Rutledge and Murphy had serious misgivings with the government's case. It was agreed that Chief Justice Stone, who had written the Ex Parte Quirin decision would write the majority opinion. (Lael 1982, 103-104)

Feb. 4, 1946 The Supreme Court announces its decision. Chief Justice Stone was joined by Justices Frankfurter, Reed, Douglas, Black, and Burton. Justices Rutledge and Murphy filed very strongly worded dissents. Stone refer-

enced Ex Parte Quirin in arguing that Congress by passing the articles of war had sanctioned the trial of war criminals by the military; therefore military commissions are not courts and their actions are not reviewable by the Judiciary. Application of the habeas corpus power to Yamashita's case limited the Court's review to only two questions. The first question was: did the government have the right to detain Yamashita? The second question was: did the military tribunal/commission/court have the lawful authority to try and condemn Yamashita? Stone, after briefly addressing five issues, concluded that the two questions had been successfully answered. (Ibid., 109-110) The central point of Justice Rutledge's dissent was that the charges against Yamashita were legally invalid. Justice Murphy in a very strongly worded dissent agreed with Rutledge that no valid charges existed, but also attacked the lack of standards displayed by the court-martial, and asserted that the proceedings "bears no resemblance to justice or to military reality." (In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 1946)

Feb. 5, 1946   MacArthur reviews Yamashita's court-martial. He is aware that the Supreme Court had upheld the government's case but he does not wait for formal notification, nor does he wait for access to the two dissenting opinions that are being sent to him. MacArthur concludes "The results are beyond challenge." (James 1985, 97; Press release Feb. 4, 1946, MacArthur Archives RG 10)

Feb. 23, 1946   Yamashita is hanged at Los Banos Prison outside Manila after President Truman refuses a defense request for executive clemency. (James 1985, 97)

Table 6.-- Chronology of General Homma's Court-Martial

Sep. 1945   General Homma is placed under house arrest then taken into custody at his home in Japan.

Jan.-Feb. 1946   A five-week court-martial in Manila.

Feb. 11, 1946   Homma is found guilty as charged. Defense appeal to U.S. Supreme Court is subsequently denied.

Mar. 11, 1946   Homma's wife meets with MacArthur to appeal for her husband.

Mar. 24, 1946   MacArthur reviews Homma's court-martial and approves the sentence.

Apr. 13, 1946 Homma is shot by firing squad at Los Banos Prison outside Manila. MacArthur's press release states: "No judicial process was ever more free from prejudice." (James 1985, 100)

The courts-martial of Yamashita and Homma were not just the trials of generals whose troops had committed atrocities, they were the trials of generals who had personally been successful against, and who had frustrated and embarrassed Douglas MacArthur. Their trials, in the historian Richard Minear's words were truly victors' justice. Unfortunately for MacArthur, whatever justice and consolation he sought in his prosecution of his former foes, was paid for at further expense to his reputation and legacy which in the trials he was trying to restore. As with much of MacArthur's legacy, his administration of justice as SCAP was a study of extremes. On the one side, his organization and oversight of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was a model restraint and judicial behavior. This is in stark contrast to his complete lack of judicial restraint and fairness in the trials of Generals Yamashita and Homma. Unfortunately, for an individual who was so concerned, even obsessed, with his legacy, historical and legal histories have concentrated their coverage of his judicial responsibilities during the trials of his vanquished foes.

The Law Giver

Many great men have led armies and nations, but it is the very few, even the exceptional, who can claim the title of "law giver," the creator of a nation's constitution. In what he himself claimed as probably his single most enduring act, MacArthur gave the Japanese their current constitution. (James 1985, 134) Shigeru Yoshida, a minister in the Higashikuni and Shidehara Cabinets, and himself Prime Minister from 1946 to 1947 and again from 1949 to 1955, although a critic of how and why the current Japanese constitution evolved stated:

> The revision of the Constitution was perhaps the most important single reform undertaken after the termination of the Pacific war. (Yoshida 1962, 129)

George Blakeslee, a senior State Department official whose "General Principles Applicable to Postwar Settlement with Japan," written in 1943, provided the basis for United States policy concerning Japanese constitutional reform reinforces Yoshida's opinion. He stated:

> The Japanese constitution . . . is probably the single most important accomplishment of the occupation . . . (Blakeslee 1953, 13)

Despite much criticism, debate, and official inquiry, the "MacArthur Constitution" remains, unchanged since its adoption more than fifty years ago, the Constitution of Japan.[14] While not its principal author, although he personally drafted and edited several significant portions of the doc-ument, MacArthur's decisions, decisive actions, detailed guidance, and close supervision of the process were the driving forces that created the postwar Japanese Constitution. (James 1985, 119-139) Even his harshest critics have to concede that without MacArthur the current Japanese Constitution would not exist. (Quigley 1959, 141)

MacArthur's constitution was not only one of his most important and enduring acts; it was one of his most controversial and extensively debated actions. Some Japanese and American authors assert that SCAP undemocratically imposed a document of foreign and inappropriate concepts and language on the Japanese. They further argue he exceeded his authority and violated the intent and letter of the Potsdam Agreement and his own government's national policies. These authors also propose that SCAP acted with undue haste, his actions were duplicitous and dishonest, and that he oversaw a process accomplished by subordinates who lacked the professional and academic backgrounds to undertake such an important action. (Quigley 1959; Yoshida 1962; Ward 1956; Kotani 1990; Igarashi in Thompson 1988)

Despite these numerous and sometimes accurate criticisms, these authors are at a loss to explain the continued commitment of the Japanese to "MacArthur's Constitution." Unlike some of his actions, such as the courts-martial of Generals Homma and Yamashita, his participation in the "Bonus March," and his role in the development of American armored and aerial warfare doctrines that have tarnished and diminished his stature, further re-search into "MacArthur's Constitution" has dispelled long held commonly accepted beliefs concerning his role in the creation of the Japanese Constitution. (Williams 1965; Takayanagi 1959; Braibanti in Wolfe 1984) As MacArthur the general recedes into the shadows of history, MacArthur the law giver remains an important figure in Japanese constitutional and national history.

It is possible to assert that the Japanese constitution of 1946 came about in a short thirteen-day period. This period, extending from February 1 to February 13, 1946, was when MacArthur and the SCAP Government Section actually drafted the document which, with minor subsequent modifications, would become the current Japanese constitution. It is also arguable that the period of Japanese constitutional change began with the occupation in September 1945 and ended with the enactment of the new constitution in May 1947, i.e., approximately a twenty-month period. Japanese constitutional reform was an integral element of postwar policy planning and thus began during the period immediately following the entry of the United States into World War II. A review of wartime policy planning documents indicates specific substantive discussions about Japanese governmental and constitutional reforms began with an agenda paper developed by the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy of the Department of State during March 1943. (Notter File National Archives, Diplomatic Section, hereafter referred to a Notter File, Box 57) If March 1943 marks the beginning of Japanese constitutional reform,

then the process extended over a fifty-month period. It would also mean that Japanese constitu-

tional reform was not just the result of the occupation. Table 7, below, provides a chronology of

the Postwar Japanese Constitution's development and it will provide the basis for discussing

MacArthur's role in its development.

Table 7.-- Chronology of the Postwar Japanese Constitution's
Development

March 1943-   Sub-Committee on Political Problems of Advisory Committee on
               Postwar Foreign Policy, Department of State publishes its "Agenda
               Paper on Postwar Foreign Policy," including political reforms
               required in Japan. (Notter File, Box 57)

July 1943-   Dr. George Blakeslee submits "General Principles Applicable to
               Postwar Settlement with Japan" to Territorial Sub-Committee of
               Advisory Committee on Post War Foreign Policy which sets forth
               five principles that have to be incorporated in a reformed Japanese
               political structure. (Notter File, Box 57, T-357A (Re-
               vised)September 29, 1943)

October 1943-

               Dr. Hugh Borton submits "Japan Postwar Political Problems." This
               paper, expanded upon in May 1944, is a "remarkably accurate and
               prescient form of the basic principles subsequently incorporated in
               SWNCC 228 and 228/1, Reform of Japanese Government System,
               November-December 1945." (Notter File, Box 65, T-381, October
               6, 1943; Ward and Sakamoto 1981, 19-20)

April 7, 1945-

               SWNCC approves SWNCC 90,"Japanese Political Structures Under
               Military Government During the Post-surrender Period." (SWNCC
               90 series later replaced by SWNCC 228 series)(National Archives,
               RG 353, Box 20)

October 4, 1945-

               Prince Kanoe, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, meets with MacAr-
               thur for a second time to discuss required reforms in the Japanese
               governmental system. Translation errors result in an exchange
               concerning the need to reform the 1890 Meiji Constitution. Prince
               Kanoe takes MacArthur's reply concerning a need to reform the
               Meiji Constitution as a mandate. George Atcheson, Political Advi-
               sor to SCAP, i.e., State Department representative, sends a radio-
               gram to the Secretary of State requesting guidance concerning
               Japanese Constitutional reform. (Ward and Sakamoto 1987; James
               1985, 120)

October 1945, 2d Week-

The Privy Council appoints Prince Kanoe to lead a commission that will determine if the Meiji Constitution requires modification and, if so, identify proposed modifications. Prince Kanoe's principal assistant is Professor Soichi Sasaki, a noted Japanese constitutional scholar. Historians also refer to this commission as the "Sasaki Commission." (James 1985, 120.) The SCAP Government Section begins functioning but it will not participate in Japanese constitutional reform until February 1946.

October 9, 1945-   Kijuro Shidehara becomes the Japanese Prime Minister. MacArthur "pointedly advised" Shidehara of the necessity for "liberalization of the constitution." (Ibid., 121)

October 13, 1945-   Shidehara sets up the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Revision under Minister of State Joji Matsumoto to determine "whether the constitution needed to be revised, and if so to what extent." Historians also refer to this Committee as the "Matsumoto Committee."

October 1945, 2d-3d Weeks-

Prince Kanoe consults several times with George Atcheson and Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, MacArthur's Military Secretary, concerning Japanese constitutional reform. (Ibid.)

October 16, 1945-   The Secretary of State replies to Atcheson's radiogram. This reply is essentially a compilation of Dr. Borton's papers of October 6, 1943 and May 9, 1944. This State Department reply was the first specific guidance and information on Japanese constitutional reform received by SCAP, who had access to all radiograms into and out of Japan. (Ward and Sakamoto 1987, 25)

October 22, 1945-   The State Department submits the draft of "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System" SWNCC 228 to SWNCC for consideration. Dr. Hugh Borton was SWNCC 228's principal author. (McNelly 1967 177; National Archives, RG 353, Box 40)

November 1, 1945-   Reacting to Japanese and domestic American criticism of Prince Kanoe's part in constitutional reform, because of Kanoe's wartime activities, MacArthur attributes Kanoe's "mandate" as a "misunderstanding" and dissociates SCAP from the Kanoe/Sasaki Commission's work. Kanoe later commits suicide in December 1945 when he is about to be charged as a war criminal. (James 1985, 120-121)

November 7, 1945-   George Atcheson, MacArthur's Diplomatic Advisor, sends Dean Acheson, the Under Secretary of State, a message via a diplomatic pouch. (Diplomatic pouch contents, unlike radiograms were not available to MacArthur or his staff.) Atcheson advises Acheson of MacArthur's order to breaks off all discussions with the Japanese concerning constitutional reform. Atcheson opines that MacArthur and the Chief of Staff or the *Bataan Gang* "who act as a "Privy Council" or *genro* want to keep the State Department out of the matter of constitutional reform in Japan." Atcheson included a proposed press release, drafted by him at MacArthur's behest, concerning Japanese constitutional reform objectives of the United States. He requested that the State Department release a message concerning Japanese constitutional reform. The State Department does not heed Atcheson's advice. (Ward and Sakamoto 1987, 26; James 1985, 121; *Foreign Relations of the United*, hereafter referred to as FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, 837-841)

November 8, 1945-   Atcheson, via a radiogram, formally notifies the Secretary of State of MacArthur's order to cease discussions with the Japanese concerning constitutional reform and that he will comply with this order. (Ibid.)

November 27, 1945- SWNCC approves initial draft of SWNCC 228.

December 4, 1945-   SCAP receives the Draft of SWNCC 228. (Williams 1965, 667)

December 13, 1945-   Atcheson receives two SWNCC reports, SFE-142 and SFE-142/1, from the State Department that essentially constitute the SWNCC 228 draft of December 27, 1945. Atcheson promptly advises MacArthur and his Chief of Staff of their contents. In his forwarding memo, he strongly recommends releasing the contents of the two reports to the Matsumoto Committee through the SCAP Government Section. MacArthur does not act on this recommendation. (Ward and Sakamoto 1987, 27; FRUS, vol. 6, 882-884)

December 28,1945-   GHQ SCAP receives SWNCC 228/1, a JCS prepared two-page annex to the fourteen page SWNCC 228, setting forth short and long term concerns in implementation of SWNCC 228. (Williams 1965, 667; James 1985, fn. 25,739)

January 7, 1945-   SWNCC formally approves SWNCC 228. MacArthur receives SWNCC 228 on January 9, 1946. Note: SWNCC and JCS send SWNCC 228 to MacArthur as guidance and not as a directive, but

the wording clearly indicates that the document is United States policy. (Ward and Sakamoto 1987, 27, 30; James 1985, 123)

January 12, 1946-	SCAP directs the Japanese government to hold the first postwar elections not earlier than March 15, 1946. The government subsequently schedules the elections for April 10, 1946. (James 1985, 125)
January 17, 1946-	The Far Eastern Advisory Commission meets with the SCAP Government Section and determines that SCAP is not engaged in or planning to be involved in Japanese constitutional reform. (Ibid., 126)
January 30, 1946-	MacArthur meets with the Far Eastern Advisory Commission and advises them that he has ceased any actions concerning Japanese constitutional revision and that the creation of the Far Eastern Commission, scheduled to meet for the first time in Washington on February 26, 1946, has taken the matter out of his hands. (James 1985, 126; Maki 1980, 71)
February 1, 1946-	-*Mainichi Shimbum*, one of Japan's largest papers, publishes, what it claims, is the Matsumoto Committee's draft of a revised Japanese constitution. -The Matsumoto Committee submits two documents to SCAP. The first is a "Gist of the Revisions of the Constitution." The second is a "General Explanation of the Constitutional Revisions Drafted by the Government." -MacArthur concludes the Matsumoto Committee draft, as published by the *Mainichi Shimbum*, is "nothing more than a rewording of the old Meiji Constitution." -MacArthur directs Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the SCAP Government Section, to prepare a detailed answer to the Matsumoto Draft. -General Whitney prepares a brief for MacArthur setting forth SCAP's authority concerning revision of the Japanese constitution. (James 1985, 126-127)
February 3, 1946-	-MacArthur reverses his decision to issue a detailed repudiation of the Matsumoto Committee draft, as published in the *Mainichi Shimbum*, and orders General Whitney to have the government Section immediately prepare a draft revision of the Japanese constitution. -MacArthur hands Whitney a handwritten note of specific items he wants included in the draft constitution. (Ibid. 127-128; SCAP Political Reorientation I, 98-102)

-Whitney sets up a steering committee composed of Colonel Charles Kades (chairman), Commander Alfred Hussey, and Milo Rowell, his primary assistants, and nine working groups made up of twenty-one members of the Government Section. (James 1985, 130)

February 4-10, 1946- The Government Section, relying on MacArthur's note, SWNCC 228, and a volume of national constitutions, borrowed from the University of Tokyo, drafts a proposed new Japanese constitution. (Ibid., 131)

February 10, 1946- MacArthur approves the proposed draft with one minor change. (James 1985, 131; Maki 1980, 73)

February 13, 1946- Whitney and the steering committee submit a draft of the proposed constitution to a group of Japanese cabinet members that includes Yoshida and Matsumoto. Whitney tells the Japanese that MacArthur is prepared to submit the draft directly to the Japanese people if the Cabinet is unable to prepare a suitable draft. (James 1985, 131; Yoshida 1962, 132-133; Maki 1980, 75-76)

February 13-March 3, 1946-
The Japanese cabinet debates the SCAP or, as some cabinet members refer to it, the "MacArthur Draft." Yoshida and Matsumoto oppose compromise while Prime Minister Shidehara advocates a conciliatory position. The debate only ends when Emperor Hirohito personally endorses the SCAP draft. (James 1985, 131; Yoshida 1962, 133-135)

March 4, 1946- The Japanese Cabinet submits a draft constitution to SCAP. After thirty-six hours of discussions, the SCAP Government Section and the Japanese Cabinet work out the differences between their two drafts. Except for a concession to the Japanese for a bicameral legislature most differences are only of a textual nature. (James 1985, 131-132; Yoshida 1962, 135; Maki 1980, 77-78)

March 5, 1946- Emperor Hirohito issues an Imperial script endorsing the new draft though aware it was only a slight modification of the SCAP draft. An hour later the Cabinet agrees to support the new draft constitution. (Ibid.)

March 6, 1946- The Cabinet publishes the draft of the new constitution along with a statement supporting it. MacArthur immediately issues a supporting statement. Neither statement indicates the extent of SCAP involvement in the drafting of the new constitution. (Ibid.)

April 10, 1946-   The Japanese hold their first postwar elections. Yoshida's Liberal Party wins a majority of the seats in the Diet, with Shidehara's Progressive Party, the other main conservative party, next in strength. (James 1985, 132; Yoshida 1962, 138)

May 23, 1946-   Yoshida succeeds Shidehara as Prime Minister.

Summer 1946-   The proposed constitution undergoes free, open, and extensive debate by both houses of the Diet. (James 1985, 132; Yoshida 1962, 138-141; Inoue 1991, 31-33)

August 4, 1946-   The House of Representatives approves the proposed constitution by a vote of 421 to eight. (James 1985, 133; Yoshida 1962, 141-142)

October 6, 1946-   The House of Peers approves the proposed constitution by a vote of 298 to two. (Ibid.)

October 29, 1946-   The Privy Council, which still exists as a legislative approval body under the Meiji Constitution pending its replacement with the new constitution, approves the new constitution. (Ibid.)

November 3, 1946-   Emperor Hirohito promulgates the new constitution as a revision of the Meiji Constitution to provide "legal continuity." (Ibid.)

May 3, 1947-   The new constitution takes effect.

A study of the entire period from early 1943, when the State Department published its "Agenda Paper on Postwar Foreign Policy," to November 1946, when Emperor Hirohito promulgated the new constitution, is essential to put MacArthur's participation in that process in prospective. If only the two-month period from January 17, 1946, when the Far Eastern Advisory Commission met with the SCAP Government Section, to March 6, 1946, when the Japanese Cabinet published the draft of the new proposed constitution, is considered, the criticisms concerning MacArthur's and his staff's qualifications for, and involvement with, the drafting of the new constitution are essentially valid. In meetings with the SCAP Government Section from 17 January, and with MacArthur himself on 30 January, the Far Eastern Advisory Commission had received consistent assurances that SCAP and his staff were not actively planning or involved in Japanese constitutional revision. For members of this commission, some of whom had been involved in the State Department's policy development for the Potsdam Declaration and the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, which created the Far Eastern Commission, the statements made by MacArthur and his staff were significant and important. The members of the commission, and policy makers in the State Department, considered free and unfettered self-determination by the Japanese in the areas of constitutional reform and reorganization of their government as not only objectives of the Potsdam Declaration but essential if the Japanese were to truly transform their system from a radical militaristic oligarchy into a democracy. Although American domestic politics was moving from the liberal Democrat "New Deal" toward conservative Republican ideals, the State Department policy makers involved in initial postwar policy implementation were the same liberal progressives that had developed those policies during

FDR's last two administrations. The manner used in making the constitutional reforms was as important a consideration as the outcome of the reforms. For Borton and Blakeslee, both heavily involved in postwar foreign policy development and the creation of the Far Eastern Commission, MacArthur's dramatic and rapid about face on February 3, 1946 in ordering his Government Section to prepare a draft constitution could easily appear as a duplicitous and devious act. For, what Justine Williams called, "the Quigley School," MacArthur's rapid and decisive actions during the beginning of February 1946 not only deprived the Japanese of any substantive self-determination in constitutional reform, but also simultaneously skirted, ignored, and enfeebled the Far Eastern Commission. (Williams 1965, 667; Quigley 1959, 140) By only examining the period from January to March 1946, MacArthur appears to have ignored the Potsdam Declaration and thus his own country's foreign policies. MacArthur's imperial manner and history of taking dramatic and personal control of situations fits nicely with his apparent involvement in Japanese constitutional reform for the limited two-month period under discussion. A cursory examination of the professional qualifications of the SCAP Government Section personnel who participated in drafting the new constitution would also buttress the arguments of Quigley and his adherents. General Courtney Whitney, Colonel Charles Kades and others were trial lawyers. Their previous legal practices had not brought them into contact with United States, let alone Japanese, constitu-tional law. They had been practicing attorneys and were not legal scholars or professors of constitutional law. MacArthur, Whitney, and the SCAP Government Section had indeed acted decisively, with great haste, and with little meaningful coordination with Washington or the Japanese during the beginning of February 1946. They had also pressured, even blackmailed, the Japanese government into accepting, almost without revision, their draft of the new constitution

during the last half of February and the beginning of March 1946. If only the two-month period of

January 17 to March 6, 1946 is considered, Japan's new constitution was indeed MacArthur's

Constitution and little self-determination and democracy were involved in its creation.

    Justin Williams, in a 1965 *American Political Science Review* article, completely and

systematically refutes the hypotheses of Quigley and his adherents concerning MacArthur's

involvement in Japanese constitutional reform. (Williams 1965, 665-679) Although Williams uses

the results of Professor Kenso Takayanagi's 1958 (Japanese Diet) Commission on the

Constitution to refute many of Quigley's hypotheses, the key document he cites in MacArthur's

defense is "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System (SWNCC 228). (Williams 1965, 667;

Takayanagi 1959; Maki 1980) Williams' argues that SWNCC 228 justified and explained many of

MacArthur's actions. It not only establishes that SCAP acted in accordance with national policy

but that, although his direct involvement in producing a new Japanese constitution only lasted

over a two-month period, his actions were the direct result of policy planning and development

that stretched back to early 1943. Williams states:

> Although SWNCC 228 is the master key to an understanding of what happened to
> the Meiji Constitution, this singularly important Washington policy paper appears
> to have been examined by no more than a half-dozen scholars and comprehen-
> sively treated by none of them. The first published reference to it was made in
> 1953 by one of its authors, George H. Blakeslee; in 1955 Hugh Borton another of
> its authors, gave Washington credit for suggesting to MacArthur the principles to
> be incorporated in the new Constitution . . . Ardath Burks and Theodore McNelly
> in more recent studies on Japanese government and politics, like Blakeslee, quote a
> single sentence from SWNCC 228 . . . (Williams 1965, 667)[15]

Quigley, and his adherents, had criticized the visible portion of the iceberg without addressing,

acknowledging, or even understanding, that part of the iceberg that made the visible portion

possible.

Williams and Takayanagi directly address and conclusively dispel several long held "erroneous and harmful surmises." Japan's Commission on the Constitution, under Takayanagi's chairmanship, conducted an exhaustive seven -year investigation, from August 1957 to July 1964, and published a report of more than nine hundred pages. The commission members interviewed almost all the major participants involved in the reform of the Meiji Constitution and conducted extensive research of United States and Japanese archives. The commission's report is not always complementary to MacArthur and his SCAP Staff, and devoted significant attention to proposed changes in "MacArthur's Constitution." Despite their obvious displeasure on how their new constitution came into being, Takayanagi and his commission

found that: 1) SCAP had the authority to take his actions concerning Japanese constitutional revision, 2) SCAP considered its draft constitution a model upon which the Japanese could draft a similar document incorporating the SCAP document's forms and principles, 3) that the "MacArthur draft" was advisory and not mandatory, 4) that SCAP and its draft did not violate the Moscow Agreement of December 1945 establishing the Far Eastern Commission, and 5) that MacArthur was following his government's policies. (Williams 1965, 665; Takayanagi 1959; Maki 1980, Part Four Chapter 2) Takayanagi's, and his commission's, main objections were: 1) that the draft constitution was of foreign, not domestic, origin, 2) that MacArthur forced undue haste in the drafting of the constitution, 3) and that although he was authorized to take his actions, MacArthur did not notify his home government in advance of his decisions. (Maki 1980, 62-75; Williams 1965, 668; Takayanagi 1959)

Justin Williams takes up where the Takayanagi Commission left off. He persuasively demonstrates that SWNCC 228 not only authorized MacArthur to take his actions, but that

MacArthur precisely followed specific procedures in the document concerning implementation of

Japanese constitutional reform. Williams points out that paragraph 7 of Appendix B "Discussion"

of SWNCC 228 provides for three increasingly direct methods of insuring Japanese constitutional

reform. The first, and preferred method is:

> (the necessary changes) should be initiated and carried into effect by the Japanese
> Government out of a desire to eliminate elements of the national structure which
> have brought Japan to the present pass and to comply with . . . the Potsdam
> Declaration. (SWNCC 228, Appendix B)

The second method provides that:

> Failing such spontaneous action by the Japanese, the Supreme Commander should
> initiate the reforms which this Government considers necessary. (Ibid.)

The third and most direct method states:

> Only as a last resort should a formal instruction be issued . . . specifying in detail
> the forms to be effected. (Ibid.)

There is no SCAP Instruction (SCAPIN) that deals with specific constitutional reform. SCAP

never implemented the third alternative authorized by SWNCC 228. MacArthur's draft of a

proposed new Japanese constitution, even to a critical Takayanagi Commission, clearly falls

under the second proposed method stipulated by SWNCC 228. Takayanagi, James, and Williams

all confirm, in great detail, that MacArthur attempted to follow the preferred first alternative in

his discussions with Prince Konoe and Prime Minister Shidehara during October 1945. (James

1985, 120-121; Williams 1965, 669-670; Takayanagi 1959; Maki 1980, 66-69) Only four months

later, when the proposed Japanese draft constitution, as published in the Mainichi Shimbum and

outlined in the "Gist of the Revisions of the Constitution" and "General Explanation of the

Constitutional Revisions Drafted by the Government," fell clearly short of the required necessary

changes envisioned in SWNCC 228, did MacArthur implement the second method of Japanese

constitutional reform.

Defending MacArthur's haste in creating and gaining approval for a new Japanese

constitution is harder than demonstrating that he acted within his authority and his government's

policy. MacArthur created the situation that caused him to react in haste. When Japanese

constitutional reform first became an active issue in October 1945 during SCAP's discussions

with Prince Konoe and Prime Minister Shidehara, and the subsequent creation of the Sasaki and

Matsumoto Commissions, MacArthur's only staff officer with direct access to expertise in

constitutional issues was George Atcheson, his Diplomatic Advisor. SCAP's Government Section,

the staff organization that would later play a prominent part in Japanese constitutional reform was

only coming into existence during October 1945. Atcheson, as a professional diplomat, could

provide SCAP with access to State Department experts such as Blakeslee and Borton who

strongly influenced the formation of the United States policy that MacArthur would receive as

SWNCC 228. Atcheson's November 7, 1945 communication to Under Secretary of State Dean

Acheson, opining that MacArthur desired to exclude the State Department from participating in

Japanese constitutional reform, is probably accurate. (James 1985, 121; FRUS 1945, vol. 6, 837-

841) Throughout his career, MacArthur had always attempted to control his own environment. He

had always strongly resisted interference from what he considered outside sources. When

MacArthur ordered Atcheson to cease discussions with the Japanese on constitutional reform

issues during November 1945, and dissociated himself, and the SCAP Staff, from the Sasaki and

Matsumoto Commissions, he set in motion the chain of events that would eventually result in the

requirement to hastily draft the new Japanese constitution in February 1946. The Moscow

Agreement of December 1945, which set up the Far Eastern Commission, should have alerted

MacArthur to the reality that Japanese constitutional reform would not be an issue solely

controlled by SCAP. Unlike the Allied Council for Japan, which he had successfully neutralized,

the Far Eastern Commission would be beyond his control and the effects of his charisma. Direct

consultation with the Sasaki and Matsumoto Commissions in December, after SCAP had received

the draft of SWNCC 228, could have avoided Japanese constitutional drafts in February 1946 that

did not meet minimum United States policy objectives. This coordination, had it occurred in

December 1945 and early January 1946, could have shown to the FAR Eastern Advisory

Commission, which visited Japan in January 1946, that he, SCAP, was completely in accord with

the Potsdam Declaration and the Moscow Agreement. MacArthur's reaction was not to coordinate

but to act. His decision of January 12, 1946, directing Japanese elections some time after March

15, 1946 was the final act that resulted in the accelerated drafting of a new Japanese constitution

during February 1946. Whether MacArthur's lack of involvement in Japanese constitutional

reform from November 1945 to February 1946 was a result of his desire to exclude the State

Department, or an overly optimistic belief in the Japanese Government's ability to break with the

past and draft a constitution according to his initial limited guidance is a moot point. MacArthur

created a series of events that finally resulted in the requirement for him to act in a decisive and

rapid manner. He had set his own stage; the haste in having to produce a draft constitution for

Japan during a two-week period in February 1946 was the result of his own actions, or lack of

actions.

The lack of academic training and experience in constitutional law by MacArthur and his

staff are for Quigley and others a factor in the production of a flawed document. (Quigley 1959,

140) If the period of development for the new Japanese constitution extends back to 1943, when Blakeslee and Borton published their initial policy papers on Japanese constitutional reform, another primary criticism of the new constitution becomes moot. By focusing solely on the events and participants that were in Japan, Quigley and other critics of the Japanese constitutional reform process do not consider the extensive involvement by academically and professionally qualified experts in the State Department's postwar policy committees. Because MacArthur and his staff based their draft constitution on SWNCC 228, they inherited the combined expertise of the State Department's policy planners. Although Blakeslee and Borton did not write the "MacArthur Constitution," they were prime contributors in its development. SWNCC 228, the result of their policy development efforts, was the basis of that constitution.

The one criticism of "MacArthur's Constitution" that is most enduring, and appears to be the primary concern of the Japanese themselves, is the foreign origin of the document. The foreign origin of the new Japanese constitution is the basis of criticism of the document from several approaches. For Blakeslee, Borton, and other postwar policy planners the major fault of the document is not its content but the per-ceived manner in which SCAP imposed it on the Japanese. These academics and diplomats saw indigenous constitution reform by the Japanese, within internationally accepted norms, as the *sine qua non* of any new Japanese constitution. For these critics, Japanese developments of the document and international review of the process by the Far Eastern Commission were absolute requirements for true democratic reform of the Japanese government system. Acceptance of the Japanese reforms by the countries that had participated in the defeat of the Japanese militarists also depended on substantive participation by

the Japanese in the process. These diplomatic and academic critics of the "MacArthur Constitu-

tion" see the process of Japanese Constitutional reform as important as the new constitution itself.

Japanese critics of their new constitution, such as former Prime Ministers Shidehara and

Yoshida and Professor Takayanagi, appear less concerned with the exact process of their

constitution's reform and more with the fact that their new constitution is a transplanted foreign

document. (Kotani 1990, 7) The non democratic nature of the postwar constitution's drafting and

its foreign origin are indisputable facts. SCAP documents, Japanese documents and the memoirs

of key participants make it clear that the SCAP Section, under MacArthur's close supervision and

guidance, produced a draft constitution which, with little substantive change, became the new

Japanese constitution. American and Japanese critics of the foreign origin and undemocratic

development process of the new constitution do not readily acknowledge that two separate

Japanese committees, working for almost five months, were unwilling and unable to produce

constitutional reform that even approached the minimum requirements of SCAP or the allied

powers. For SCAP and the allied powers, Japanese constitutional reform was not merely the

curbing of military control over the civilian government. United States and allied requirements, as

spelled out in the Potsdam Declaration, included substantive participation by the populace in their

government. Democratic reforms required by the allies meant that the Japanese constitutional

authors should have addressed issues of sovereignty, decentralization of power, and who had the

franchise to vote after constitutional reform. The career politicians, bureaucrats, and academics

closely associated with an Imperial system that were entrusted with constitutional reform were

conservative, entrenched in the Meiji Constitution's form of government, and thus unable to

consider seriously or to address the issues inherent in constitutional reform that would meet the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration.

Critics of the foreign nature of "MacArthur's Constitution" do not readily admit that the Meiji Constitution, which it replaced, was itself of foreign origin and imposed upon the people without any democratic participation on their part. The Meiji Constitution was modeled on the German Constitution. The Meiji Constitution was not the result of a popular movement or a conscious attempt to provide for a new system of government and establishment of individual and governmental responsibilities and rights. The Meiji Constitution was an attempt by former Tokugawa bureaucrats to "adopt a constitutional government to gain respect from Western nations." (Inoue 1991, 49) In 1881, fourteen years after the resignation of the last Tokugawa shogun and the Meiji Restoration, a group of oligarches, lead by Ito Hiribumi, argued for adoption of a constitution on the Prussian model only after the new government had firmly established itself. From June 1887 to March 1888, Ito and three others, worked with the German scholar Carl Friedrich Herman Roesler to produce the draft that became the Meiji Constitution. Ito and his colleagues worked in complete secrecy with Roesler. The rest of the government and the Japanese people were un-aware of the drafting of the new constitution. The Privy Council, a thirty-person body that functioned as a personal cabinet for the Emperor, adopted the draft after extensive debate and revision. The Privy Council presented the adopted draft to the Emperor who, in turn, promulgated the Meiji Constitution to the Japanese people as a "gift" on February 11, 1889. The Meiji Constitution did not create a governmental system; it only officially recognized it. The new governmental system included an elective lower house, but only 1 percent of the population formed the electorate. (Inoue 1991, 46-51; Henderson 1969, xii) The Meiji Constitu-

tion, and its governmental form was, like its "MacArthur Constitution" replacement, of foreign origin. Unlike its replacement, the Meiji Constitution involved no democratic involvement in its adoption, and was the product of Meiji oligarchs who were even less responsible to outside influences than MacArthur and his staff.

Critics of the foreign origin of the new Japanese constitution have also stressed the undemocratic nature in which SCAP, particularly Colonel Courtney Whitney, imposed the "MacArthur Draft" on the Japanese government. These critics concentrate on Whitney's February 13, 1946 meeting with Japanese cabinet members in which he, Whitney, told the Japanese that MacArthur was prepared to submit the SCAP draft directly to the Japanese people if the cabinet could not produce a suitable draft. (James 1985, 131; Yoshida 1962, 132-133) Threatening to bypass the Japanese government if it does not accomplish a certain action is heavy-handed, undemocratic, and an implied imposition of foreign power. Submitting the proposed constitution to a plebiscite of the entire electorate, an electorate that would be much more broad and inclusive than the one that had elected the incumbent politicians, is hardly undemocratic!

The foreign origin and undemocratic manner in which SCAP presented the new constitution to the Japanese are important considerations that have driven popular perceptions of the new constitution's appropriateness for the Japanese. It is arguable that these almost universally accepted perceptions are accurate or even valid. Professor Takayanagi, in his constitutional study commission's voluminous and exhaustive report, clearly establishes that the "MacArthur Draft" was advisory, not proscriptive or directive, in nature and its intent was only to provide the Japanese government a model upon which to prepare its own draft that included certain fundamental principles and basic forms. (Williams 1965, 665; Takayanagi 1959) Critics of the foreign

constitution also do not readily acknowledge that it was the focus of free, open, and intensive debate by both houses of the government and the Privy Council throughout the summer of 1946. If the new constitution was of foreign origins it gained acceptance by all the consultive and elected bodies of the Japanese Government well after Whitney's arm twisting threat had lost its meaning or effect. Japanese acceptance of the "MacArthur Draft" was not so much a reaction to Whitney's threat as the realization that if they did not rapidly come up with an acceptable draft constitution, they would have to deal with a multinational commission, the Far Eastern Council (FEC), rather than just SCAP. The presence of the other Asian governments and especially the Soviet Union on the FEC made the prospect of effectively dealing with the FEC more compli-cated and potentially dangerous from a domestic perspective than dealing with MacArthur and his SCAP staff that had given the Japanese a certain amount of autonomy and maneuver room in addressing their concerns. The Japanese preferred dealing with SCAP if for no other reason than that they could negotiate with MacArthur and the SCAP Staff in a bipolar cooperative environ-ment rather than in the complex, potentially divisive, multipolar environment that would result from the involvement of the FEC. MacArthur had his own reasons for concluding Japanese constitutional reform before the involvement of the FEC and the Japanese had theirs.

There is a final factor, less well discussed or understood, that has made the "MacArthur Draft" a much less of a foreign constitution to the Japanese. Whitney furnished the Japanese cabinet members the SCAP draft in English. The Japanese government then created an official Japanese draft and returned it to MacArthur's staff for review and concurrence. A Japanese-American woman interpreter on the SCAP Staff then reviewed the document to insure that the Japanese version's grammar and usage reflected the intent of the English draft. This review

resulted in negotiations of several phrases and word choices mainly associated with the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship, but the disagreements were not extensive nor deemed critical. Several Japanese/Japanese-American scholars assert that the translation of the SCAP draft into Japanese, and the grammar and usage reflected in the final and official Japanese text of the constitution were significant and effective Japanese government actions in creating a document that met domestic political and cultural values. The Japanese took a document drafted by foreigners, in the English language, and created a constitution that the Japanese politicians and people could accept. Kyoko Inoue after examining the linguistic and cultural differences between the constitution's American drafters and its Japanese translators concludes that the Japanese version is much more compatible with Japanese social and political values than the English version. (Inoue 1991, 2) She demonstrates that American misconceptions of the Japanese culture concerning the status and power of the Emperor and the Shinto religion required constitutional changes that were not only unwarranted, but not understood by the Japanese. (Ibid., 3-4) Inoue contends that the core issue in the misunderstanding or even the awareness of these linguistic and cultural differences was the almost total dependence of the Americans on interpreters and translators, the great majority of whom were Japanese. (Ibid., 4)Not only did the overwhelming majority of the Americans involved in the drafting of the new constitution have little or no knowledge of Japanese language and culture, they assumed the fundamental principles and basic forms expressed in English in their draft were universal constructs that did not require explanation or justification. The United States Constitution and the English draft of the new Japanese constitution express the people's commitment to a democratic government and their command to that government not to infringe on individual rights and liberties. The Meiji Constitution, the only

Japanese constitutional benchmark they had to measure against, asserts the authority and responsibility of the government to determine and act in the best interest of the people. Under the Meiji Constitution, the government gave rights to the people. In the English version, rights belonged to the people and were not government grants. The Japanese did not "hold these rights to be self evident."

Inoue contends that language, particularly ambiguities in translations, played an important part in Japanese-American discussions and agreements. These affected not only discussions on a new constitution but relations between SCAP and the Japanese government in general. (Ibid., 6) She exhaustively demonstrates how apparently subtle nuances in translation resulted in significant changes in the Americans' intended meaning for the document. For example, the SCAP English version stated that "the Emperor . . . shall be subject to" while its Japanese version is translated to read "the Emperor . . . will be placed under the restraint of." The words "shall" and "subject to" have a much stronger and binding meaning then the translation "will" and "restraint." Similarly the English version states "the ultimate form of government" but the Japanese translation equates to "the definitive form of government." Again the intended strong and definite statement in the English version became weaker and less binding in the Japanese translation. (Ibid., 7) Through several other specific examples Inoue demonstrates that although the new constitution affirms a joint commitment by the people and the government to maintain a democratic society and political system the document, in its official Japanese form, still conveys the idea that the government has the authority and responsibility to rule in the best interests of the Japanese people. (Ibid., 2) The English draft and an English translation of the official Japanese draft do not yield the same document. The Japanese, through their translation of the SCAP draft, were able to

make the new constitution more closely fit their societal and linguistic values. They were able to

maintain certain legal and governmental approaches of the Meiji Constitution as well.

Inoue concluded that the linguistic discrepancies between the SCAP draft and the official

Japanese draft were of two kinds. She contends that the most numerous discrepancies were the

result of a change in elocutionary force between the two texts. She states:

> The English text, to a considerable extent, speaks to its audience in the same
> language as the U.S. Constitution: it commits the people to creating and maintain-
> ing a democratic political system, and commands the government not to infringe
> the rights and liberties of the people. In contrast, the Japanese text speaks to its
> audience in a language much like that of the Meiji Constitution. In that Constitu-
> tion, the Japanese government, in the name of the Emperor, asserted its authority
> and responsibility to create a modern governmental system . . . Thus, the Japanese
> version does not suggest, as the English version does, that the people are in some
> sense prior to the government. (Inoue 1991, 267)

Inoue notes that this change in elocutionary force between the two texts came about without any

debate and that neither side noticed the change. It came about when the Japanese translated the

initial SCAP draft into modern colloquial Japanese. Inoue asserts that the Japanese translators did

not intend to diverge from the SCAP draft but that their cultural biases, word usage, and

background in a governmental system rooted in the Meiji Constitution created a translation that

indeed changed the SCAP draft's theoretical basis and intent. Inoue also asserts that this change in

illocutionary force contributed to the acceptance of the Japanese text and is a factor in it survival,

unchanged, for more than forty years. (Ibid.)

Inoue's second factor in the difference between the SCAP draft and the Japanese text is the

misunderstanding of key American democratic ideals by the Japanese. The role of religion, the

basis of sovereignty, the concepts of individual dignity, and the essential equality of the sexes

were dramatically different concepts for the Japanese. The Americans saw Shinto as a state-

sponsored religion while the Japanese saw Shinto as a manifestation of the commonly held values of the people and the government. The government did not sponsor Shinto but accepted it as a part of the culture and environment in which the government existed. Similarly the Japanese, well aware that the Emperor had little political power, did not understand or recognize the American concept of sovereignty. For the Japanese, the Emperor's position was not just a governmental construct; his position had a cultural, historical, and societal basis. The Japanese concept of the Emperor as a sovereign did not include the American concept of sovereignty as the basis of political and governmental power. Because the Japanese society was much more homogeneous and tightly knit, the Emperor was considered more the head of an extended family than the sole recipient of sovereign power. This concept of the Japanese nation as an extended family also contributes to the Japanese misunderstanding of the American concept of individuality and political equality of the sexes. For the Japanese, the individual existed within a family and a society which not only stipulated roles and responsibilities for the individual but provided that individual with protections and support. Under the American model these were functions of a basic law, i.e., a constitution. The American concept of individual dignity, in its translation from English to Japanese, became the Japanese concept of honor. (Ibid., 167-169)

MacArthur's role as a law giver will ensure his legacy as a great man and a leader. As with most of his important actions as a general and public administrator, MacArthur's role in the creation of the 1947 Japanese constitution was dramatic, controversial, and initially misunderstood. Takayangi, Inoue, and Williams' research have resulted in the correction and reevaluation of previously popular and inaccurate portrayals of the actions and motivations of MacArthur and his staff in the creation and adoption of the 1947 Japanese Constitution. This research also

indicates that the Japanese, as they were able to do with many SCAP directives and policies, were able to modify, limit, or reform MacArthur and his staff's decisions and actions. A review of MacArthur's *Reminiscences,* and accounts of other Americans, such as Whitney, Willoughby, Borton, and Williams, who were involved in occupation administration and policy development indicates that MacArthur and his staff were completely unaware of the Japanese reform of their constitutional reforms. (Inoue 1992; Yoshida 1962; James 1985) Despite the controversy around his actions, and Japanese modifications of them, even MacArthur's harshest critics cede to him the honor of being a lawgiver, and the father of the Japanese Constitution. Few public administrators can claim this honor, and for MacArthur it was his ultimate act as a public administrator.

1.   Rad WX 62733 (TS) is an abbreviation for <u>Ra</u>dio <u>W</u>ireless Transmission (X is abbreviation for transmission) number 62733 which was classified <u>Top</u> <u>S</u>ecret. This abbreviated form of citation will be followed for further citations of JCS directives to MacArthur as SCAP.

2.   The Pacific Theater included the Nimitz's Pacific Oceans Area and MacArthur's South West Pacific Area. The Pacific Oceans Area was subdivided into the North Pacific Area, Central Pacific Area, and South East Pacific Area. Army and Army Air Corps units stationed in Alaska comprised the Alaskan Command, a subordinate command of the North Pacific Area. After 1942, both the Alaskan Command's and South East Pacific Area's combat activities were limited to routine security patrolling. The primary functions of the South East Pacific Area entailed logistics support and lines of communication maintenance functions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization of the Pacific Theater of War during the Spring of 1945 was along service and not geographical lines. MacArthur assumed command of all Army and non-strategic Army Air Corps forces, while Nimitz assumed control of all Navy forces. Marine divisions, although Naval forces, would come under MacArthur for the planned invasion of Japan. A special force, Twentieth Air Force, under General Spaatz, who was directly answerable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, controlled all heavy strategic bombers, i.e., the B-29s in the Marianas Islands. (Esposito 1972, 167) This arrangement, politically and personality driven, violated the precept of unity of command. MacArthur, Nimitz, and Spaatz had no common commanding officer in the theater, and JCS lacked the communications and presence to coordinate operations within the theater at operational and even strategic levels.

3.   MacArthur's perceptions concerning a lack of support are not borne out by available statistics. Because of the Allies failure to agree early on concerning a cross-Channel invasion, the number of divisions committed to Europe did not exceed those in the Pacific until October 1943. (Matloff 1969, 465) The nature of ground combat operations in the Pacific also required fewer divisions. Even the large island operations in the Pacific, such as Leyte, Luzon, Guadalca-

nal, New Guinea, the Mariannas, and Okinawa were normally conducted by one or two corps with fewer than a half dozen divisions. (Esposito 1972, 137, 138, 145, 150, 154, and 167) By contrast operations in Europe were conducted at the army level with a half dozen divisions being the minimum not maximum force normally employed.

A lack of logistic support was not always a result of national priorities. Throughout the Pacific campaign MacArthur's logisticians were plagued by an inability to offload shipping and utilize matériel that had reached the theater. The use by MacArthur's command of scarce shipping as floating warehouses was a bone of contention between the Southwest Pacific Theater Commander and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a majority of the war. (James 1975, 341, 354-356, 396, 501-503, 710-711, 721-728) For example, use of shipping as floating warehouses the South-West Pacific rose from 70 ships in January 1944, to 112 ships in May 1944, and to 190 ships in November 1944. (Ibid. 501)

4.   A military government special staff section was created as part of MacArthur's Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC) Staff in Manila on August 5, 1945. This special staff section began theater planning for implementation of Joints Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) developed and approved national military government/civil affairs policies. This special staff section within the AFPAC Staff was disbanded upon official creation of the SCAP Staff on October 2, 1945. Neither the military government section within the AFPAC Staff or the ten to fourteen special staff sections within the SCAP Staff had general staff section status, i.e., G-5 Military Government/Civil Affairs Section, nor did they administer these functions. (Taylor 1950, 141-143, Reports of General MacArthur, Vol.1 Supplement, 71-76.)

5.   Many historical accounts of the final capitulation of Japan understate the importance and implications of the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan. Militarily, the crushing and rapid defeat of the Japanese Manchurian armies was possibly as important as the military effects of the two atom bomb attacks.   Until the Soviet Manchurian offensive, the bulk of the Japanese Army was garrisoned in China, and had not been engaged by the Allies. The defeat of the Japanese Manchurian armies removed any possibility of a strategic reserve for the defense of the Japanese home islands. The Japanese defeat of the Russian Army in the Russo-Japanese War had heralded the ascension of Japan as a World power. The defeat of the Japanese by Zhukov at Khalkin Gol, along the Mongolian-Manchurian border in 1939, had been the first defeat of a Japanese Army by foreigners. Zhukov's victory had shocked the Japanese into maintaining a large force in defensive positions along the disputed border for the remainder of the war. The specter of a vengeful Russian horde participating in the assault and occupation of the home islands would have been anathema to the Japanese government. (Yoshida 1962, 52-53)

The power of the individual atomic bombs came as a great shock to the Japanese but other cities in Japan such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya had suffered more land area devastated and people killed by conventional fire bombing than Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tokyo had more land area destroyed and population killed in a single conventional fire bombing raid than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined! Conventual bombing had already devastated most of the major industrial areas in Japan by the time the time the atom bombs had been dropped. The Imperial Japanese Navy and its merchant marine had essentially ceased to exits due to aerial mining of Japanese home waters and submarine warfare throughout what remained of the

Japanese Empire. The atom bombs provided the severe psychological shock, and threat of more devastation to come, that made it possible for the more moderate elements in the Japanese government and the Emperor to force acceptance by the military fanatics of their defeat which had already been accomplished by conventional means.

For the United States, and particularly MacArthur, the most important implication of the dramatic, albeit late, entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan was the specter of active and extensive Soviet participation in the occupation and administration of Japan. MacArthur had effectively relegated his Australian and New Zealand allies to a secondary remote area of the war, i.e., mop up and containment operations in New Guinea and Indonesia. Other Commonwealth forces were concentrated in the China-Burma-India Theater, a British area of influence but one far removed from the Philippines and Okinawa, the primary areas of late Pacific land operations. Although Royal Navy carriers had participated in the Okinawa Campaign, MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had effectively relegated the Commonwealth to a secondary status in the war against Japan. If MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to limit a trusted and long term allies' participation in the Japanese Occupation, the thought of sharing occupation authority with the Soviets was probably as anathema to them as it was to the Japanese.

6.   General Headquarters Supreme Commander Allied Powers General Orders Numbers 1 and 2 (GHQ SCAP GOs Nos. 1 and 2), of October 2, 1945, formally created the SCAP Staff. GHQ SCAP GOs 3 through 13, also approved and promulgated the same day, created the ten initial special staff sections that exercised occupation administrative duties. These special staff sections were: Economic and Scientific, Civil Information and Education, Natural resources, Public Health and Welfare, Government, Legal, Civil Communications, Statistics and Reports, Civil Intelligence Sections, and the Office of the Procurement Agent, which had the status of and operated as a special staff section. Subsequently established special staff sections were: the Office of Civilian Personnel, and International Prosecution, General Accounting, and Civil Transportation Sections. (GHQ SCAP GOs No. 16 of November 14, 1945; No. 20 of December 8, 1845; No. 4 (amended) of 24 January 1946; No. 10 (amended) of March 8, 1946; No. 18 of April 18, 1946; and No. 35 of September 7, 1946) The Civil Intelligence Section was discontinued May 3, 1946 and its duties transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACofS G-2) by GHQ SCAP GO 22 of May 3, 1946, then reactivated as a separate special staff section under the cognizance of the ACofS G-2 on August 29, 1946. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) was not a part of GHQ SCAP but reported to MacArthur as a separate operating Agency. The Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) was also separate from GHQ SCAP and communicated directly to MacArthur. The Diplomatic Section was an outgrowth of the Office of the U.S. Political Advisor for Japan. It became an integral section of GHQ SCAP, and technically was the State Department's representation on the SCAP Staff although, in reality, Ambassador Sebald really only answered to MacArthur. (Reports of General MacArthur, Vol. 1, Supplement, 76-78)

7.   The AFPAC Staff, a service specific staff, was replaced by the Far Eastern Command (FEC) Staff during 1947. The FEC was a joint, i.e., multi-service command, but the composition of the FEC Staff remained the same with all key billets being filled by U.S. Army officers. Naval and air planning were handled by Navy and Air Force commands subordinate to the FEC. (Chart

4, Appendix L)

8.   Philip H. Taylor cites approximately 2,000 military government trained military officers as participating in the occupation of Japan. Taylor does not explain or justify this number but given the number of military government teams fielded by the Eighth Army under the AFPAC/FEC Staffs, and the occupation oriented billets found in the SCAP special staff sections, this number is reasonable. (Taylor 1950, 144)

9.   See Endnote 1, Chapter V, above. WXs 59252, 68524, and 68469 were the radio wireless messages which transmitted JCS 180/15 to GHQ SCAP. The JCS, SWNCC, and other national and departmental agencies organized their policy and position papers with in numbered series with slashes (/) indicating a particular document's version. Each document had a unique two to four digit number but the numbering series applied only within a particular agency. In this case JCS 180 was the document identifier for the document entitled *Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper*. The version of this document that was approved and signed on November 8, 1945 is identified by the */15*. This same document within the SWNCC system was identified as SWNCC 52. JCS 1380/15 was the same as SWNCC 52/7. Occasionally a SWNCC/JCS document would be forwarded to GHQ SCAP that contained additional guidance or information. In such cases it was common to append a slash and letter to the document and version designation, i.e., *SWNCC 150/4/A*. JCS document designations will normally be used in following citations because these were the ones used in the radio wireless messages sent to GHQ SCAP. (National Archives RG 218)

10.   It is a simple matter to trace the policy objectives of the Potsdam Declaration, the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, and the Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Govern-ment in Japan Proper through other SWNCC/JCS policies into SCAPINS which implemented SCAP occupation policies. In Record Group (RG) 5, Box 72, Folder 9 of the MacArthur Archives are documents entitled *Allocation of Staff Responsibilities for Execution of JCS Directives to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers*. The various updates of this document list the individual radio wireless messages that dealt with policy issues, a description and citation of the SWNCC/JCS policy document addressed in the message, and the assignment of the staff section responsible for that policies implementation. National policy implementation can then be confirmed by cross referencing the policies specified in the wireless messages against the SCAPIN Catalog Volume I and SCAPIN-A (SCAPIN-Administrative) Catalog Volume II in RG 5, Box 72, Folder 6. Individual SCAPIN, staff codes, subject titles and references contained within the SCAPIN allow positive identification of a particular specific SCAPIN with element of the three basic occupation policy documents. The allocation of staff responsibility document not only allows the tracking of national occupation policies into specific SCAP policies but it clearly demonstrates the extent and depth of MacArthur's control over policy development within the SCAP Staff.

11.   Field grade officers are majors/lieutenant commanders, lieutenant colonels/commanders, and colonels/captains. A summary court-martial is a one officer court and handles the equivalent of a magistrate or justice of the peace court misdemeanor cases. A summary court-martial conviction is not a federal felony conviction and can not result in a punitive discharge. A special-

court martial, up through the 1970s, was a three to five officer panel. A special court-martial is now presided over by a military judge, who is a fully qualified judge advocate general officer, and three to five officers who determine quilt or innocence and any penalties. A special court martial conviction is a federal felony conviction and can result in a bad conduct punitive discharge. A general-court martial can only be convened by general officers after a formal Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 32 hearing, which the equivalent of a grand jury hearing. A general court-martial also has a military judge and a three to five officer panel. A general court-martial can award a dishonorable punitive discharge, and even the death penalty. In all cases, the officer initially ordering, or convening, the court-martial, conducts the initial review of the court-martial. Reviews can reduce or suspend but not increase awarded punishments. Bad conduct and dishonorable discharges are automatically reviewed up to the Court of Military Appeals, a panel of civil judges at the federal circuit court of appeals level sitting in Washington, D.C. (UCMJ Title 10 USC; Manual for Courts-Martial)

12.   There were 28 defendants before the IMTFE. Fourteen of these were Imperial Japanese Army generals, seven of whom had been governmental ministers during the war and nine of whom had commands during the war. The defendants also included three Imperial Japanese Navy admirals, five civilian career diplomats, three civilian bureaucrats, one civilian politician, and one civilian propagandist. Sentences awarded by the court included seven executions by hanging, sixteen life sentences, one twenty years sentence and one seven years sentence. One defendant was found to be mentally unfit to stand trial, and two died during the two and one half years proceedings. (Minear 1971, 5-6) On March 7, 1950, MacArthur directed that Shigemitsu Mamoru be released after forty-eight months of his seven year term. On April 7, 1950 he directed the release of the surviving prisoners who were serving life terms. (Ibid., 172)

13.   Allied military war crimes trials, including those under MacArthur's supervision, through out the Pacific Ocean and Asian areas tried over 5,700 conventional war criminals, not all of whom were Japanese. These trials resulted in nine-hundred and twenty executions. (Minear 1971, 6) Statistics for trials tried under United States jurisdiction are:

	Yokohoma	China	Manila	Pacific Islands	Total
No. of Cases	319	11	97	47	474
Defendants	996	75	215	123	1409
Convictions	854	67	195	113	1229
Acquittals	142	8	20	10	180
Death Sentences	51	10	92	10	163

(Piccigallo 1979, 95)

14. "Japan's present fundamental law-often termed the "MacArthur" or the "Whitney Constitution" after its two most eminent progenitors-is a case in point." (Ward 1956, 981)

15.   Williams faults Burks and McNelly in their use of a single sentence from SWNCC 228 because they use their citations to assert that MacArthur's actions were contrary "to the spirit if not the letter of Washington's orders." Williams effectively argues that a complete understanding of the document reveals that MacArthur utilized the second of three authorized options only after the first had failed. (Williams 1965 668; Burks 1964, 26; McNelly 1963, 39)

CHAPTER VI

Eclipse

In little more than a year, during 1917 and 1918,
MacArthur had catapulted himself from being a colorful, but
obscure, junior field-grade officer within the Department of
War's bureaucracy to prominence as one of the Army's most deco-
rated and youngest general officers. He become a general after
only fifteen years commissioned service, but would serve thirty-
two years a general officer. His tenure as a general was longer
than many generals' entire military careers. Along with Eisen-
hower and Marshall, two former subordinates who had risen to
equal or senior positions, he had established himself as a senior
public administrator. As SCAP, he effectively functioned as the
chief executive of a country. Within his own country's executive
branch only the Chairman of the JCS, the Secretaries of the Army
and of Defense, and the President of the United States were his
seniors. For a while in 1948 it even appeared that he might have
a chance at attaining the presidency itself. When the Korean War
began SCAP assumed the mantel of Commander in Chief of the United
Nations Command (CinCUNC). It appeared that MacArthur, once the
boy general, then the oldest serving general at seventy years of
age, would cap both his public administration and military ca-
reers with additional triumphs and laurels. Japan under SCAP's

direction and leadership was rapidly establishing itself as a vigorous and vibrant democracy. It was only a matter of time before a peace treaty would end its occupation and reestablish it as an independent and sovereign nation. Many Japanese, in awe of their foreign Shogun, would consider MacArthur as the father of the new democratic Japan. MacArthur's amphibious assault at Inchon, during September of 1950, was a stroke of military genius and a triumph of leadership. It, alone, would ensure his legacy as one of his nation's, and the world's, truly great generals. The U.N. advance to North Korea's border provinces with China, during the Fall of 1950, promised additional plaudits and laurels for his generalship. Six months later President Harry S. Truman relieved him of command. Although there was an immediate and large out-pouring of support from members of Congress and the American people, MacArthur rapidly receded from public power and prominence. He lived out his remaining thirteen years as the Chairman of the Board of the Remington Rand/Sperry Rand Corporations. His chairmen-of-the-board duties mainly involved three or four working luncheons a week. The day-to-day management of the corporation was handled by chief executive officers. (James 1985, 662-65)

Although some writers have concentrated on the nine-and-a half month period of MacArthur's involvement in the Korean War when chronicling his downfall, it can be argued that his problems with President Truman began almost as soon as MacArthur became SCAP. MacArthur had never met Truman when the President appointed

him as SCAP. On several occasions MacArthur declined Truman's
invitations to return to the United States for a hero's recogni-
tion or meetings. Truman's contacts with SCAP were through offi-
cial correspondence. MacArthur's overstated policy arguments and
purple prose, not his legendary personal presence, were what
Truman had to use in forming his opinion of MacArthur. Truman and
SCAP would only meet each other once, for just more than five
hours, at Wake Island during October 1950. Unlike Roosevelt,
Truman was not the fellow patrician and member of a preordained
elite, which would have allowed MacArthur to relate to Truman
despite their political differences. Until Truman's election as
president in 1948, MacArthur was not only a difficult subordi-
nate, but a significant political threat to Truman. Table 9,
below, provides a chronology of the Korean War up to MacArthur's
relief by Truman. Although a detailed review of the Korean War is
beyond the scope of this work, Table 9 provides sufficient detail
of MacArthur and Truman's participation in that conflict to
explain the reasons for MacArthur's relief. An examination of his
relief is required because MacArthur's personality, leadership
style, and unique position as SCAP, the underlying causes for his
relief, were also key elements in his success as SCAP and as a
public administrator.

Table 8.--- Chronology of the Korean War up to MacArthur's

Relief

(The phases listed in this chronology of the Korean War reflect

Vincent J. Esposito's coverage of that conflict in *The West Point*

Atlas of American Wars, Vol. II, 1900-1953. (Esposito 1972)

Unless otherwise noted, all times are Korean local time.)

Phase 1: North Korean Assault/ U.N. Defensive (June 25-September

14, 1950)

-25 June: 4:00 A.M. North Korea launches a surprise

assault on the Republic of Korea/South Korea (ROK).

-26 June: President Truman authorizes MacArthur,

through the JCS, to supply the ROK ammunition, to pro-

tect the evacuation of American dependents, and to

employ U.S. air and naval forces against North Korean

Army (NKA) forces inside the ROK. MacArthur assumes

control of all U.S. forces in the ROK.

-27-28 June: Seoul falls to NKA.

-29 June: 6:00 a.m.-6:15 p.m., MacArthur flies to and

from Suwon, to view conditions at the front. (Suwon is

about thirty miles South of Seoul) [16]

-30 June: a JCS message authorizes MacArthur to conduct specified combat actions. A subsequent 1 July message authorizes the commitment of U.S. ground forces to combat in the ROK.

-4 July: Suwon falls to NKA.

-5 July: first engagement of U.S. ground forces. Task Force Smith, a battalion-sized unit, conducts a delaying action South of Suwon and North of Osan, approximately forty miles South of Seoul.

-7 July: the U.N. Security Council passes a resolution authorizing the U.S. Government to direct a U.N. Command in Korea under both U.N. and national flags. Truman names MacArthur as the Commander in Chief (CinC) United Nations Command (UNC). Truman, in accordance with the U.N. resolution, becomes the executive, under U.N. auspices, for U.N. operations in Korea.

-10 July: the JCS notifies MacArthur of his appointment as CinCUNC.

-20 July-20 September: defense of the Pusan Perimeter in the extreme South-East of the ROK.

-31 July-2 August: MacArthur, his Air Force and Naval commanders, and thirteen staff officers, visit Formosa for meetings with Chaing Kai-shek, the leader of Nationalist China.

-3 August: the JCS, in a strongly worded message, advise MacArthur that his discussions with the Nationalist Chinese, and his subsequent statements concerning his visit involved "political" issues that required approval at the "highest levels" of the U.S. Government. The following day, Secretary of Defense Johnson, on Truman's orders, sternly reminds MacArthur of Truman's 27 June policy statement concerning Formosa and warns him that only the President as the Commander in Chief can authorize preventive actions against the Chinese mainland. (James 1985, 454.)

-17 August: the VFW ask MacArthur for a statement to be read at their annual "encampment" to be held in Chicago on August 28, 1950. MacArthur responds on 20 August explaining his views on Formosa. MacArthur's message to the VFW is published in the *New York Times* on August 29 and in *U.S. News & World Report* on September 1, 1950. Truman reacts angrily to MacArthur's airing policy issues in a public forum. Truman discusses removal of

MacArthur from his CinCUNC duties but retaining him as SCAP. Secretary of War Johnson, on Truman's instructions, sends a strongly worded message to MacArthur concerning properly clearing any statements concerning official policies.

11 September: Truman approves National Security Council policy document 81/1 (NSC 81/1). This document authorized U.N. forces to advance to the 38th Parallel, prohibited ground operations in North Korea if Russia or China intervened prior to U.N. forces arriving at the Parallel, prohibited any air, naval, or ground operations across the Soviet or Manchurian borders, provided that it not be policy to use non ROK forces in the Northern provinces of North Korea, and that MacArthur was authorized to prepare contingency plans for the occupation of North Korea. JCS sent NSC 81/1 to MacArthur on September 15, 1950. JCS sent an implementing directive to SCAP/CinCUNC on September 27, 1950.(FRUS 1950, VII, 685-693, 781-782, and 792-793)

-12/13 September: midnight, MacArthur, selected subordinate commanders, and staff officers depart Sasebo, Japan, aboard USS McKinley for the Inchon landings.

Phase 2: U.N. Offensive (September 15-November 24, 1950)

-15 September, 6:30 a.m.: landings at Inchon, thirty
miles West of Seoul, commence.

-20 September: U.N. forces breakout of the Pusan Perim-
eter. MacArthur returns by aircraft to Tokyo from Ko-
rea.

-26 September: troops from the Inchon lodgement (7th
Infantry Division) and those breaking out of the Pusan
Perimeter (1st Cavalry Division) linkup South East of
Seoul. NKA organized resistance in the ROK ceases,
although cutoff elements of the NKA continue guerrilla
warfare in the mountainous areas of the ROK.

-28 September: Seoul is recaptured after a one week
battle. MacArthur proposes to the JCS and Truman that
they authorize U.N. forces to cross the 38th Parallel,
providing that there is no danger of Chinese Communist
or Russian intervention.

-29 September, 10:00 a.m. 1:30 p.m.: MacArthur flies to
and from Seoul for ROK Government restoration ceremo-
nies. Truman, through the JCS, authorizes MacArthur to
allow U.N. forces to cross the 38th Parallel.

-1 October: U.N. forces effectively control Korea South of the 38th Parallel. The ROK 3d Division crosses the parallel on the East coast.

-6 October: the U.N. General Assembly approves the advance of U.N. forces into North Korea.

-8/14 October: Chinese Communist Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) units secretly cross into North Korea.

-9 October: U.N. forces cross into North Korea.

-15 October: MacArthur and Truman meet for their first and only time at Wake Island.

-19/20 October: Pyongyang falls to U.N. forces. MacArthur abolishes Sonchon-Songjin limit-of-advance restraining line in North Korea. The JCS object that this is in violation of September 27, 1951 instructions implementing NSC 81/1.

-26 October: the ROK 6th Division reaches the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and Communist China.

-25 to 30 October: PLA forces engage the 6th and 8th ROK Divisions approximately thirty miles South of the Yalu River.

-1 November: the PLA conducts assaults against the U.S. 1st Calvary Division in the west-central border area below the Yalu River, then withdraws. MacArthur and his staff maintain that the PLA has not intervened in the war, but that only individual Chinese volunteers are fighting with the NKA.

-5/6 November: Russian built jets make their first appearance over North Korea.

-21 November: the U.S. 7th Infantry Division reaches the Yalu River in the North-Eastern border area. U.S. 1st Marine Division elements near the Chosin Reservoir, in North-Eastern North Korea, engage and destroy the PLA 124th Division. MacArthur continues to maintain that only Chinese volunteers are fighting in North Korea.

Phase 3: Chinese Communist Offensive in North Korea (November 25-December 31, 1950)

-25 November: the PLA, with remnants of the NKA, launch a general offensive in North Korea. By the first week of December the Eighth Army on the West Coast is forced back to the 38th Parallel while suffering heavy casualties. On the East Coast, the Tenth Corps is forced back into a lodgement around the North Korean port of Hungnam.

-1 December: MacArthur in a *U.S. News & World Report* interview strongly expressed frustration with Washington's policies, argued that his forces had not been routed, and blamed Washington imposed restrictions as the root cause of his military reverses. MacArthur and his staff expressed the same views in a series of private interviews and correspondence with other media sources.

-5 December: Truman issues two directives addressed to "officials of the departments and agencies of the executive branch" in response to MacArthur's public criticism of his policies. The first directive required all government personnel to clear, in advance, any public statements concerning foreign policy with the State Department, and those concerning military policy with the Department of Defense. The second directive ordered officials and commanders abroad "to exercise extreme

caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other public media in the United States." MacArthur immediately tests these policies by requesting permission to release a statement critical of intelligent officials responsible for not warning him in advance of Chinese belligerency. (JCS to MacArthur, December 6, 1950, Truman Papers; JCS to MacArthur, December 8, 1950, RG-6, MacArthur Archives)

-4/8 December: General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, confers with MacArthur as a representative of the JCS.

-23 December: General Walker, the commander of the Eighth Army and senior commander in Korea, is killed in an automobile accident. He is replaced by General Ridgeway.

-30 December: MacArthur asserts to the JCS that the only alternative to accepting his recommendations for expansion of operations, to include military targets along the Manchurian border area, is to accept annihilation or evacuation of his forces. (MacArthur to JCS, December 30, 1950, Ridgeway Papers U.S. Army Military

History Institute; FRUS, 1950, VII, 1630-1633) MacArthur's "dilemma" message of December 30 causes a policy review in Washington which seriously considers his recommendations, but results in no basic changes to U.S. foreign or military policies.

-31 December: U.N. forces have withdrawn to defensive positions along and below the 38th Parallel.

Phase 4:   Second Communist Invasion of South Korea (January 1-24, 1951) U.N. forces are forced to fall back to defensive positions along the 37th Parallel. Seoul and Suwon fall for a second time.

-10 January: MacArthur transmits to the JCS what is latter called his "evacuate or die" message. MacArthur states:

> My query therefore amounts to this: Is it the present objective of United States political policy to maintain a military position in Korea - indefinitely, for a limited time, or to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?
>
> As I have pointed out before, under the extraordinary limitations and conditions and conditions imposed upon the command in Korea its mili-

    tary position is untenable, but it can hold for
any length of time up to its complete destruction
if overriding political considerations so dictate.
(MacArthur to JCS, January 10, 1951, RG-6, MacAr-
thur Archives)

-13 January, 1951: Truman sends MacArthur a letter
explaining the ten U.S. national and international
purposes that are the basis for the current U.S. Gov-
ernment policies. (Truman to MacArthur, January 13,
1951, in *Truman Memoirs II*, 493, 495)

-15/20 January: General Collins, Chief of Staff of the
Army, and General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, confer with MacArthur, his staff, and General
Ridgeway, the Commanding General of the Eighth Army in
Korea. In their report to General Bradley, the Chairman
of the JCS, Collins and Vandenberg indicate that MacAr-
thur's dilemma of expansion of the war or face annihi-
lation, or evacuation is false. They also state that
Ridgeway has reinvigorated the Eighth Army and that it
is capable of tactical success against the PLA.

-15 January: General Ridgeway launches Operation Wolf-
hound, a regimental sized reconnaissance-in-force oper-
ation, which confirms that the PLA/NKA do not have

significant forces South of the Han River and Seoul.

U.N. forces are therefore in no immediate danger.

Phase 5: U.N. Counter Offensive (January 25-April 21, 1951)

-25 January: Ridgeway launches a U.N. offensive to regain a line along the 38th Parallel.

-9 February: PLA/NKA abandon Seoul.

-7 March: MacArthur makes his "die for a tie" statement while visiting Suwon, South Korea.

-8 March: Representative Joseph Martin, House Minority Leader, requests MacArthur's comments on a speech he, Martin, had given on February 12, 1951.

-14 March: U.N. forces reoccupy Seoul.

-15 March: MacArthur publicly answers a press query concerning holding up at a defense line along the 38th Parallel.

-20 March: JCS notifies MacArthur of the content of a peace initiative that Truman was about to make to the

Communist Chinese government. (JCS to MacArthur, March 20, 1951, RG-6, MacArthur Archives)

-20 March: MacArthur sends a letter to Representative Martin in response to Martin's March 8, 1951 letter.

-24 March: MacArthur issues a public statement, which he latter claims is a "routine statement" and "military appraisal." The statement claims military victory and calls for the PLA commander to accept cease fire terms along U.N. objectives and guidelines. The statement is widely accepted as "an arrogant challenge to the pride of Communist China" and also a challenge to his Washington superiors. (James 1985, 586)

-5 April: Representative Martin reads MacArthur's March 20, 1951 letter on the house floor and releases its contents to the press. The letter is highly critical of Truman's policies and a limited war strategy in Korea.

-9 April: After discussions with Secretary of Defense Marshall, JCS Chairman Bradley, Secretary of State Acheson, and Ambassador Harriman, Truman decides to relieve MacArthur of all his commands.

-11 April: MacArthur is relieved of command. Due to communications problems between the JCS and Ambassador Muccio in Korea, Secretary of the Army Pace is unable to notify MacArthur in person. MacArthur is notified during a luncheon that the press has reported his relief.

-14 April: MacArthur is replaced by General Ridgeway, the Eighth Army commander in Korea.

-16 April: MacArthur departs Japan.

-19 April: U.N. forces reach and cross the 38th Parallel.

After MacArthur's Relief, the remainder of the Korean War constituted three additional phases. They are listed below to provide a chronological perspective of MacArthur's participation in that conflict.

Phase 6: Communist Spring Offensive (April 22-May 19, 1951)

Phase 7: U.N. Offensives (May 20-November 12, 1951)

Phase 8: Period of Armistice Talks (November 13, 1951-July 27, 1953)

MacArthur's relief by President Truman is considered by many as the end to the most serious threat ever posed by the military to the concept of civilian control of the armed forces. Another "boy general," McClellan, was a surly, outspoken general, but he did not directly challenge Secretary of War Stanton or President Lincoln. He only dawdled and procrastinated in carrying out their instructions. McClellan did run against Lincoln for the presidency, but only after he had left the army. In the late 1940s, the "Admirals' Revolt" would witness naval proponents challenging Secretary of Defense Johnson's strategic dependence on air power, but they would do so through congressional allies in the budget debates in the halls of the Capitol. MacArthur's challenge to his commander-in-chief occurred while he was a serving general officer. Although MacArthur repeatedly argued his alternative policies through the JCS, his lawful chain of command, he also openly criticized and debated his president's policies in the press. True to well-established patterns in his career, he made policy decisions and took actions which effected established policies, not only without permission, but without prior warning or consultation with his superiors. MacArthur led his commands in Japan and Korea in a fashion similar to his leadership during the "Bonus March" of 1932. In 1932, a president had told him to reestablish peace and order in Washington. MacArthur considered the order not to cross the Anacostia River as civilian meddling in a military operation. Although MacArthur had obediently, and even eagerly carried out Washington's policies during the

occupation of Japan, the Korean War was a different matter. It
was a military operation and he was the United Nations general in
charge. MacArthur's first crossing of the Rubicon was actually
the Anacostia River. By force of will and acquiescence of his
president, his career survived that crossing. His second crossing
of the Rubicon, twenty-one years later, involved his attempts to
conduct military operations across the Yalu River. His career
ended when he attempted to cross the Yalu; this time there was no
acquiescence from the president.

During his testimony before Congress concerning his relief,
MacArthur maintained that all his actions were those of an obedi-
ent military servant, and that his relief was a surprise and
unforeseen event. He would have the world believe that his relief
was the work of a cabal of communists and enemies within the
military and government. A review of Table 9 reveals that he had
consistently protested, circumvented, and tested policies which
the JCS and the Truman Administration had transmitted to him.
MacArthur had on several occasions received direct and unambigu-
ous orders to refrain from criticizing and debating Washington's
policies in public. MacArthur was well aware that he should have
cleared public policy related statements with Washington prior to
their release. When MacArthur debated strategic decisions during
World War II, he could persuasively claim that as a theater
commander he was only vying with other theater commanders for
resources. During the Korean War, he was the only theater com-
mander, and his policy disagreements were not with other theater

commanders but with the national command authority. President Truman, by the Constitution, was the head of the national command authority. The JCS was only a conduit for the Commander-in-Chief's orders.

In his own carefully controlled environment, insulated from the outside world by a daily routine and totally loyal inner circle, MacArthur fought the Korean War on his terms. His long absence from his homeland, and his own imposed isolation from everyday life, not only in the United States but also in Japan, denied him any feed-back from the real world. This was exacerbated by the tight control he allowed his staff to exercise in granting access to himself. With the departure of General Eichleburger in 1948, MacArthur lost the only person who was willing, or able, to question his decisions and policies. James asserts that the year of 1948 actually was the beginning of a process that would lead to MacArthur's relief in the Spring of 1951. James states:

> Although Douglas MacArthur's assets were many.... increasingly since 1948 questions had been raised about his abilities. In retrospect that year seems to have been a pivotal one in his career because of three crucial developments: the MacArthur-for-President campaign, the departure of Eichelberger, and the adoption of NSC 13/2. ....When Eichelberger left Japan, MacArthur lost his principle remaining confidant from World War II who had dared to disagree with him and to dis-

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sent from the concurrence seeking, "groupthink" behav-

ior of the inner circle of senior officers around the

Supreme Commander. ....more and more after Eichel-

berger's exit MacArthur's channels of information nar-

rowed and his source of fresh, objective thinking de-

clined. (James 1985, 370)
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1.   From June 25, 1950 through April 11, 1951, the nine and a half month period of his direct involvement in the Korean War, MacArthur made fifteen trips to Korea. With the exception of his trip to view the amphibious landing at Inchon during September 1950, he would normally depart Tokyo Haneda Airport aboard his personal aircraft at, or shortly after, dawn, spend eight to ten hours in Korea, then return to Tokyo Haneda by nightfall. For his trip to witness the amphibious landings at Inchon, he flew from Tokyo Haneda during the afternoon of September 12 to the Southern Japanese port of Sasebo, and boarded the U.S.S. McKinley at midnight September 12-13. He remained aboard ship during the landings of September 15, toured the beachhead on September 17, and returned to Tokyo Haneda from Seoul Kimpo on September 20, 1950. Although he was away from Tokyo for eight days, and in Korean territorial waters for six days on this trip, he was ashore in Korea for less than three days. He spent a total of twenty days in Korea during his fifteen trips. Eight of the fifteen trips were made in the three month period before his relief by President Truman. MacArthur's fifteen trips to Korea during the war were:

1.   June 29, 1950 to Suwon(thirty miles South of   Seoul),
2.   July 27, 1950 to Taegu(central South Korea),
3.   September 15-20, 1950 to Inchon then Kimpo,
4.   September 29, 1950 to Seoul,
5.   October 20, 1950 overflew drop zones North of Pyongyang North Korea,
6.   November 24, 1950 to Swanju, North Korea,
7.   December 11, 1950 to Yonpo (on the Northwest coast of North Korea),
8.   January 20, 1951 to Taegu,
9.   January 29, 1951 to Suwon,
10.   February 13, 1951 to Suwon,
11.   February 20, 1951 to Wonju(East Southeast of   Seoul),
12.   March 7, 1951 to Suwon,
13.   March 17, 1951 to Wonju,
14.   March 24, 1951 to Yongdungpo (immediately South of Seoul), and
15.   April 3, 1951 to Kangnung (on the East coast just below the 38th Parallel).
(James 1985, 425-426, 446, 473-475, 483, 496, 530-534, 543, 574)

Epilog

A primary objective of this work was to establish Douglas
MacArthur as a public administrator, and by so doing establish
that military administration and military administrators were
part of mainstream public administration. If military administra-
tion, not just the administration of conquered nations, is ac-
knowledged as a valid component of public administration, the
"glass wall" separating military and civil administration should
be dismantled. MacArthur's stewardship of Japan after World War
II is an example of a successful and close integration of civil
and military administration. MacArthur's administration of the
Japanese occupation is not only essential to a study of the
praxis of public administration, but should be the basis for
theories on civil-military relationships. At the same time the
Japanese occupation provides a positive example of civil-military
administration, it also provides a negative example of what can
happen to the military administrator who does not understand the
constitutional, legal, and political constraints on their power.
The limits of military authority and activities are studied in
depth at the military war colleges and staff colleges, but are
much less well understood or addressed by civil administrators.
This study, of MacArthur the general functioning as MacArthur the
public administrator, should assist both the civil and military

administration communities in understanding that they are more complementary, than separate, entities of the same body, i.e., public administration.

A key factor to evaluating MacArthur as a public administrator is an understanding of MacArthur's administrative style. The foci of MacArthur's approach to administration were three accepted areas of Public Administration theory: leadership, organizational environment, and staff functioning/organization/relationships. For MacArthur these three foci were all interrelated. His dynamic "heroic" leadership style worked best in a tightly controlled and bounded environment, which was enforced by a staff organization always controlled by a small coterie of fiercely loyal, if not sycophantic aides.

MacArthur's three foci of administration were the secret of his success, yet were the cause of his downfall. When MacArthur was able to motivate his subordinates and enthrall his superiors, he accomplished noteworthy acts of leadership. His reformation of West Point after World War I, the Inchon Landing during the Korean War, and his leadership of the Japanese Occupation are examples of ability to enforce his will on events despite resistance and various competing interests. These leadership triumphs were also the result of MacArthur's creation of an environment where he, not the mission at hand, was the focus of activity. MacArthur used his tightly controlled environments as a method of restricting access to himself and therefore avoid becoming involved in details of administration that would tax his stamina

and affect his focus on key executive functions. MacArthur was able to practice his style of leadership, and create his administrative environment, through his staffs. For MacArthur, his staff was not an organizational tool, but a personal organization that had himself, not the organizational mission, as the focus of its activities. MacArthur's various staffs were "Prussian" in organization and functional responsibilities, but completely "Napoleonic" in their orientation.

The same administrative foci that served MacArthur so well during most of his career were the root cause of his downfall. When MacArthur's staff fiercely isolated him from influences they perceived as unfriendly, disloyal or antagonistic, MacArthur's environment deviated from reality, and his dynamic, although egocentric, leadership style brought him to the brink of disaster. His crossing of troops over the bridge into Anacostia during the Bonus March, his confrontation with Roosevelt over the Army's budget, and finally his confrontation with Truman over Korean War policy are examples of when MacArthur's staffs, his unrealistically bounded environment, and his egocentric leadership style served him in a negative rather than positive manner.

MacArthur's success as a general, and as a public administrator, were owed to his dynamic and inspirational leadership style, his ability to demand and receive total loyalty from his immediate subordinates, and his ability to organize his environment through his staff. These factors had been constants since his assumption of the Superintendency of West Point. By

carefully controlling his environment, he was able to conserve his energies for strategic, not tactical, matters. Although there appears to be no evidence that MacArthur read, or indeed knew of, Chester Bernard's concepts of the functions of an executive, his career from 1919 through 1951 clearly indicates that he understood and practiced what Bernard had preached. MacArthur identified his environment, he controlled it and he conserved his energies for those strategic matters that were key to his organization's success and survival. By the time MacArthur was SCAP and CinCUNC he was in his late sixties and early seventies. His reliance on a controlled environment was not just the result of entrenched habits but was a vital element in allowing a person of his age to bear the heavy burden of the duties and responsibilities that were his.

Just as MacArthur had acknowledged elements of participative management and the Human Relations school while he was Superintendent of West Point, he practiced Bernard's functions of the executive and Gulick and Urwick's principles of management. The only time he allowed himself to become mired in the tactical minutiae of everyday management was when he felt that his reputation, honor, or authority had been questioned. The one significant area of contemporary Public Administration theory that was beyond MacArthur's grasp was Simon's theory of "satisficing." Douglas MacArthur considered himself too great a figure of history to "satisfice;" he always attempted to maximize. He was not color blind, but his world was one of blacks and whites.

There is no direct evidence that MacArthur read any of the classics of Public Administration. Available records indicate that the only Public Administration theorist with whom MacArthur came into contact was Woodrow Wilson. Although he had significant numbers of public administrators on his SCAP Staff, and noted organizational theorists such as Edward S. Deming visited Japan while he was SCAP, there is no direct evidence that MacArthur met with Deming or discussed public administration theories with any of his staff experts in the field. Even within his own profession, MacArthur was not as well educated as his peers. Other than his studies as a cadet at West Point, he had only attended an engineer branch school at Fort Myers as a junior officer. He was not a graduate of the Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth or the Army War College at Carlyle Barracks. Despite his almost total lack of formal study of, or exposure to, organizational and management theories, MacArthur demonstrated, throughout his career, a grasp of applied Public Administration theories. On a day-to-day basis, he lived and breathed leadership. Authority, command and control, and the motivation of subordinates were constant considerations for MacArthur. In truth, he did not consider this orientation the requirement for a public administrator, but rather the core concerns of a general officer. From his enlightened recognition of the changing environment of military leadership at West Point, to his expert grasp of staff organization and functions in the complex military and administrative environment that existed during the occupation of Japan,

MacArthur demonstrated a clear grasp of prevailing organizational and management theories. As James prophesied, MacArthur's enduring legacy will not be that of a general, a soldier, a warrior, but that of an administrator, an executive, and a law giver. Whereas Eisenhower and Marshall left military careers to become public executives and administrators, MacArthur decisively demonstrated that a military career and a public administration career could be synonymous. MacArthur established that the military officer was a public administrator. Herein lies the importance of an examination of MacArthur as a public administrator. Other famous generals went on to successful careers as public administrators, but they did so as former generals. Dwight D.Eisenhower and and George C.Marshal are the two most famous generals since the emergence of Public Administration as an acknowledged profession and field of academic study to cross over from being a general to be a public administrator. As Stever asserts, there is at least a glass wall between military and civil administration.(Stever, 1999) I would maintain the wall is actually porous, with a significant amount of theory and practice passing through. The important thing, though, is not that the wall is actually glass or porous, but that, as Stever establishes, it is perceived and accepted as real. A study of Eisenhower and Marshall's careers, although beneficial as case studies of important and effective public administrators, does not chip away at the perceived reality of the glass wall separating military and civil administration. Marshall and Eisenhower left their military

careers behind and crossed over from the "dark side" to become public administrators. What makes a study and understanding of MacArthur unique and important to the field and practice of public administration is that MacArthur not only developed as an effective public administrator while a military officer, but that his entire public administration career was while he was a military officer. [1] Not only was MacArthur's entire governmental career served as a military officer, but his education, training and approach to administration were based on military models. MacArthur, as SCAP, functioned as a general, an executive, a judge, and a legislator at the same time. There was no glass wall in MacArthur's career. As SCAP, he served as both a civil and military administrator. A study of Douglas MacArthur's career should help tear down the wall that separates civil and military administration.

There have been many famous public administrators that have served in multiple areas of Public Administration. Wilson was an academic administrator before becoming the president and head of the Executive Branch. Taft served as the chief executive and also a Supreme Court justice. A long litany of military officers have become legislators, secretaries within the Executive Branch or even its chief executive. MacArthur not only personally functioned as a legislator, a jurist, and an executive, but did so as a military officer. As SCAP, he practiced public administration across the width and breadth of the field of Public Administration. What is more important, he did so by combining what was

commonly accepted as military and main line Public Administration theory, and practice. He used a military staff organization but integrated civilian administrators and functions into its organization. Many of his military civil affairs officers were in reality civil administrators wearing a uniform but practicing their trade in exactly the same manner as their "main line" public administrators out of uniform. A study of MacArthur's administration of occupied Japan is essential to a comprehensive study of Public Administration praxis be cause it demonstrates that Stever's Glass Wall is a perception and not a reality. By exposing the transparency of the glass wall, its existence will be recognized. Recognizing that the wall between civil and military administration is a perception and not a reality, will lead to the wall being dismantled. It is thus fitting that Douglas MacArthur's lasting legacy is that of a public administrator.

1.   Although it can be asserted that MacArthur was not a military officer from the time of his retirement from the U.S. Army in 1937 until his return to active duty in 1941, he was a Field Martial in the Philippine Army during that period of time and was thus a military officer, although not a U.S. military officer.

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DEPARTMENT	COURSE OF STUDY
FIRST YEAR **4th CLASS**	
MATHEMATICS	Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry, Determinants, Conic Sections, Logarithms.
MODERN LANGUAGES	English Composition & Rhetoric, English Grammar, French Grammar, French Literature.
DRILL/REGULATIONS	School of the Soldier- Infantry Company & Battalion, School of the Cannoneer-Siege & Light Artillery, Applied Tactics- Infantry & Marches, Drill and Fire Regulations.
Use of Sword	Fencing, Military Gymnastics.
SECOND YEAR **3d CLASS**	
MATHEMATICS	Conic Sections; Solid Geometry; Spherical Projections, Shades, Shadows, and Perspective; Differential Calculus; Integral Calculus; Theory of Least Squares.
MODERN LANGUAGES	French Grammar, French Literature, Spanish Grammar, Spanish Literature.
DRAWING	Plane Geometry, Points Paths, Topography and plotting of Surveys, Descriptive Geometry, Linear & Isometric Projections, Field Surveying.
DRILL/REGULATIONS	School of the Soldier- Infantry Company & Battalion, School of the Cannoneer- Light Artillery, School of the Trooper- Cavalry & Equitation, Small Arms, Services of Security & information, Infantry Tactics & Marches, Firing Regulations.

DEPARTMENT	COURSE OF STUDY
PRACTICAL MILI-TARY ENGINEERING	Construction of Pontoon, Spar, & Tres-tle Bridges.

THIRD YEAR 2d CLASS	
NATURAL & EXPERI-MENTAL PHILOSOPHY	Analytical Mechanics, Practical & Gen-eral Astronomy, Elements of Wave Motion- Sound & Light.
CHEMISTRY, MIN-ERAL OLOGY, & GEOLOGY	General Chemistry, Heat (Thermo Dynam-ics), Anatomy & Phisology, Electricity & Magnetism, Mineralogy, Geology.
DRAWING	Freehand & Landscape Drawing, Mechani-cal & Architectural Drawing, Military Drawing, Building Construction, Work Drawings & Isometric Sections, Stereoptician, Engineering & Ordnance Drawing.
DRILL/REGULATIONS	School of the Soldier- Infantry Com-pany & Battalion, Infantry Drill, School of the Cannoneer- Sea Coast Artillery, Light Artillery Drill, School of the Trooper- Calvary Troop & Squadron. Security & Information Ser-vices, Infantry Tactics & Marches, Small Arms Regulations.
PRACTICAL MILI-TARY ENGINEERING	Pontoon Bridges, Laying of Gun Plat-forms, Construction of Revetments & Obstacles, Military Signaling.

FOURTH YEAR 1st CLASS	
CIVIL & MILITARY ENGINEERING	Civil Engineering, Field Fortifica-tions, Attack of Fortifications, Stereotomy.
LAW HISTORY & HISTOR-ICAL GEOGRAPHY	Elements of Law, International Law, Military Law. Constitutional Law. World History & Geography.

DEPARTMENT	COURSE OF STUDY
PRACTICAL MILI-TARY ENGINEERING	Demolitions: Pontoon, Trestle, & Spar Bridges; Siege Materials & Works; Mounted & Foot Reconnaissance; Field Telegraphy & Signaling.
NATURAL & EXPERI-MENTAL PHILOSOPHY	Practical Astronomy.
DRILL/REGULATIONS	School of the Soldier- Infantry Company & Battalion, School of the Trooper-Calvary Troop & Squadron, Equitation, School of the Battery- Light & Horse Artillery, Services of Information & Security, Service Etiquette, Practice Marches- Infantry, Cavalry, & Artillery,
ORDNANCE & GUNNERY	Ordnance, Gunnery, & Ballistics.

Sources: Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point 1902, 223-505; Official Registers of Officers and Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point New York 1899 through 1903.

APPENDIX B
Academic Departments/Chairs USMA
When MacArthur Was Superintendent (1919-22)

(Departments listed in order of creation.
Department with permanently appointed professor/chair indicated by #)

DEPARTMENT	Dept.Chair	At USMA 1899-1903	Remarks
TACTICS	Col. R.M.Danford	Yes	USMA Class of 1904. Cmdt. of Cadets since Aug. 1919.
#CIVIL & MILITARY ENGINEERING	Col. G.J.Fiebeger	Yes	Prof.: May 1896 to Jun. 1922. USMA Class of 1879.
#NATURAL & EXPERI-MENTAL PHILOSOPHY	Col. C.C.Carter	No	Prof. since Aug. 1917. USMA Class of 1899. Graduated before MacArthur arrived.
# MATHEMATICS	Col. C.P.Echols	Yes	Assoc.Prof.: Dec. 1898 to Jul. 1904. Prof. since Jul. 1904. USMA Class of 1891.
#CHEMISTRY,MINER-ALOLOGY, & GEOLOGY (Chem. & Electronics)	Col. W.Robinson	Yes	Instr./Asst. Prof. of French: 1899-1903. Asst.Prof.: Jul. 1907 to Oct. 1911, Prof. since Oct. 1911. USMA Class of 1887.
# DRAWING	Lt.Col. R.L.Avery	No	Relieved By Col. Alexander Mar 1920. USMA Class of 1908.
	Col. R.G.Alexander	No	USMA Class of 1907.
#MODERN LANGUAGES	Col. C.DeW.Willcox	No	Prof. since Sep. 1910. USMA Class of 1885.

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DEPARTMENT	Dept.Chair	At USMA 1899-1903	Remarks
LAW	Lt.Col. G.V.Strong	Yes	USMA Class of 1904. Relieved June 1922 . USMA Class of 1904.
PRACTICAL MILITARY ENGINEERING	Capt. J.S.Smylie	No	Acting Chair until appointment of Lt.Col. E.L. Daley Aug. 1920. USMA Class of 1915
	Lt.Col. E.L.Daley	No	USMA Class of 1906.
ORDNANCE & GUNNERY	Maj. C.Hines	No	Acting Chair until appointment of Lt.Col. C.D. Mettler Aug. 1920. USMA Grad.
	Lt.Col. Mettler	No	USMA Class of 1906.
MILITARY HYGIENE	Col. F.P.Reynolds	No	Prof. since June 1919. Not a USMA Grad.
ENGLISH & HISTORY	Col. L.H.Holt	No	Prof. since July 1910. Not a USMA Grad. PhD.
Economics/Government & Political History	Col. L.H.Holt	No	Acting Prof. since Department created Aug. 1921.

Sources: Superintendent USMA Annual Reports for 1920. 1921, and 1922; Official Registers of Officers and Cadets U.S. Military Academy 1889 through 1903 and 1919 through 1922.

APPENDIX C
Course of Study USMA Academic Year 1916-1917
By Subject, Academic Weights, and Year

Subject (Listed in Curriculum Order)	4th Class Fresh.	3d Class Soph.	2nd Class Jr.	1st Class Sr.	Subj. Total
Mathematics	175	250			425
English	75				75
History	75				75
Survey (Practical Military Engineering)	40				40
Drill/Regulations	25	20	40	15	100
Conduct	50	75	100	125	350
French		175			175
Drawing		50	75		125
Hygiene		25			25
Natural & Experimental Philosophy			300		300
Chemistry, Mineralogy & Geology			225		225
Spanish			50	100	150
Civil & Military Engineering				300	300
Ordnance & Gunnery				150	150
Law				150	150
Practical Military Engineering				10	10

Subject (Listed in Curriculum Order)	4th Class Fresh.	3d Class Soph.	2nd Class Jr.	1st Class Sr.	Subj. Total
Column Total	440	595	790	850	2675

Source: Superintendent USMA Annual Report for 1920, 26.

APPENDIX D
Course of Study USMA Academic Year 1919-1920
By Subject, Academic Weights, and Year

SUBJECT (Listed in Curriculum Order)	4th Class Fresh.	3d Class Soph.	2nd Class Jr.	1st Class Sr.	Subj. Total
Mathematics	225	150			375
French	90	100			190
English	75	100			175
Survey	40				40
Military Efficiency & Conduct	25	50	75	100	250
History		100			100
Drawing		100			100
Tactics		25			25
Practical Military Engineering		25			25
Natural & Experimental Philosophy			300		300
Chemistry, Mineralogy & Geology			250		250
Spanish			100		100
Hygiene			40		40
Civil & Military Engineering				150	150
Law				150	150
Military Art & History				150	150

SUBJECT (Listed in Curriculum Order)	4th Class Fresh.	3d Class Soph.	2nd Class Jr.	1st Class Sr.	Subj. Total
Ordnance & Gunnery				150	150
Economics & Government				150	150
Column Total	455	650	765	850	2720

Source: Superintendent USMA Annual Report for 1920, 26.

Comparison of Courses of Study USMA
Academic Years 1902-1903, 1916-1917, 1919-1920
By Subject and Academic Weights

SUBJECT (Courses listed in Alphabetical order)	1902-1903	1916-1917	1919-1920
Chemistry, Mineralogy & Geology	225	225	250
Conduct (Military Efficiency & Conduct)	125	350	250
Soldierly Deportment & Discipline	20		
Military Efficiency	130		
Civil & Military Engineering	300	300	150
Drawing	125	125	100
Drill Regulations Tactics	115	100	25
Economics & Government			150
English	50	75	175
French	150	175	190
History	100	75	100
Hygiene		25	40
Law	150	150	150
Mathematics	400	425	375
Military Art & History			150

SUBJECT (Courses listed in Alphabetical order)	1902-1903	1916-1917	1919-1920
Natural & Experimental Philosophy	300	300	300
Ordnance & Gunnery	150	150	150
Practical Military Engineering	45	10	25
Survey		40	40
Spanish	85	150	100
Column Total	2470	2675	2720

Sources: Superindendent USMA Annual Reports: 1903, 1920; Official Registers of Officers and Cadets USMA: 1903, 1917, 1920.

Appendix F

Budget Time-line and Submissions Fiscal Years 1930-1937

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YEAR:    1930       1931       1932       1933       1934       1935
MONTH: JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND
        FY31

        ..............
        ^ ^^          FY32
        WDR            ..............
         BB       ^ ^^          FY33
        MARK        WDR            ..............
         PB        BB       ^ ^^          FY34
             MARK        WDR            ..............
              PB        BB       ^ ^^          FY35
                  MARK        WDR            ..............
                   PB        BB       ^ ^^          FY36
                       MARK        WDR            .............
                        PB        BB       ^ ^^
                            MARK        WDR
                             PB        BB
                                 MARK
                                  PB
        ^                       ^
     MacArthur                MacArthur
    Assumes CoS               Departs CoS


WDR:  War Department Request      BB MARK: Budget Bureau Mark     PB: Presidential Budget Submission
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Appendix G

War Department Budgets Fiscal Years 1930-1937
(By Request, Budget Bureau/Presidential Budget, Enactment, and Withheld)

($ Millions, Waldup figures in parentheses.)

FISCAL YEAR	WAR DEPT. REQ.	BUDGET BUREAU BUDGET	ENACTED BY CONGRESS	WHITHHELD
1931	362		347 (347)	-
1932	351	343	340 (335)	-
1933	331	316	305 (304)	-
1934	321	278	277 (277)	51
1935	206		(281)	-
1936	361	332	356	-

(James 1970, 354-356, 359-362, 426-428, 434, 448-449, 460; Waldrup 1942, 418)

Appendix H

Army Budget by Accounts For Fiscal Years 1931-1935

($ Millions)

Fiscal Year	Maintenance	Equip/Arms	Training	Pub. Works	Miscl.	Total
1931	214	37	8	64	25	347
1932	211	40	3	53	16	335
1933	199	28	10	36	30	304
1934	183	12	8	24	51	277
1935	205	15	6	25	20	281

Maintenance: Military and Civilian Pay, Subsistence, and Forage.

Equip/Arms: New Equipment/Armaments; Replacement, Modernization, Maintenance and Repair of Equipment.

Training: Direct Charges Only.

Pub. Works: New Construction, Maintenance, and Operation of Army Plant.

Miscl.: Includes Departmental Costs, Refunds, Sea Coast Defense, Research and Development, and Procurement Planning.

(Data submitted by Rep. Walter G. Andrews, Congressional Record May 24,1940, 10364, as quoted in Waldrup 1942, 418)

APPENDIX I

**Summaries of Annual Reports of the Chief of Staff
Fiscal Years 1931-1935[1]**

Annual Report of the Chief of Staff Fiscal Year 1931
(July 1, 1930-June 30, 1931)

Page(s)	
42-84	"War Plan for Today's War, Planned Yesterday"
42	Review of duties of the Chief of Staff
42-45	Discussion of war plans- most important duty of the Army. Two parts: 1) development of plans and, 2) undertakings to improve Army in order to perform in assumed situations. Basic peacetime function is only to provide minimum force to sustain until mobilization. Assurance of time to mobilize is an indispensable commitment.
45	Discussion of munitions reserves.
46	Discussion of development of new weapons, and dispersion of Regular Army into small detachments.
47	Review of Army Strength.
48	Discussion of financial condition of troops and stagnation of officer promotions.
49	Discussion of the adverse effects of quartering federal prisoners on military reservations.
49-51	Discussion of mechanization. Two theories: 1) a separate mechanized force or, 2) each of the existing arms (infantry, artillery, cavalry) mechanize based on their individual requirements. Chose option 2.
51-52	Discussion of citizen components (National Guard and Organized Reserve).
53	Discussion of administrative considerations.
53-54	Discussion of the General Staff, under Chief of Staff, the Munitions Staff, under Assistant Secretary of War, and the Chiefs of Arms and Services. Discussion of the formation of the General Council as a coordinating organization for the various War Department staffs.
55-87	Attached address to War Policies Commission given May 13, 1931.
	Part I, pp. 55-64, titled "Promotion of Peace," discussed mission of nation at war, burdens of war, General Mobilization Plan, three factors affecting speedy mobilization, Selective Service, and procurement of munitions.
	Part II, pp. 64-84, titled "Industrial Planning," discussed results of a failure to plan, the two general classes of industrial plan, basic planning considerations, description of manufacturing, raw material planning, selection and training of personnel, relationship of Army procurement versus distribution of civilian economic burdens, industrial war plan considerations, war

Annual Report of the Chief of Staff Fiscal Year 1934
(July 1, 1933-June 30, 1934)

Annual Report of the Chief of Staff Fiscal Year 1935
(July 1, 1934-June 30, 1935)

-Creation of an enlisted reserve: pp. 297-300.
-Munitions procurement policies: p. 300.
-Procurement and organizational requirements (mechanization, motoriza-tion, rifles, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, Chemical Warfare Service, ammunition Reserves): pp. 300-301.
Civilian component training: pp. 301-303.

304-307   Concluding remarks.

1.   The Annual Reports of the Chief of Staff as reprinted in *MacArthur on War: His Military Writings*, edited by Frank C. Waldrop, New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1942. All page citations are as per Waldrop's work and not the original documents or the Congressional Record in which they were reprinted.

Organization and Manning of the General Staff 1930-1935

(Abbreviations listed at bottom of table)

Position	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
President	Hoover	*	*	*	Roosevelt	*
Secty. of War	Hurley	*	*	*	Dern	*
Asst.Secty. of War	Davison	Payne	*	*	Woodring	*
Asst.Secty. of War(Air)	No Position	Davison	*	*	No Position	No Position
CoS (Gen)	Summerall	MacArthur	*	*	*	*
A.CoS (MGen)	Wells	Mosley	*	*	Drum	*
A.CoS G1 (BGen)	Bowley	*	Moses	*	*	*
A.CoS G2 (Col)	Ford	Smith	*	*	VACANT	VACANT
A.CoS G3 (Bgen)	King	*	*	MGen. Collins	Hughes	*

Position	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
A.CoS G4 (MGen)	Booth	Callan	*	*	*	*
Position	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
A.CoS War Plns.Div. (BGen)	Simmons	*	Tracey	Kilbourne	*	*
AG (MGen)	Bridges	*	*	*	McKinley #	*
A.AG	McKinley	*	*	*	Conley	*
IG (MGen)	Rivers	Drum	Preston	*	*	*
QM General (MGen)	Cheatham	DeWitt	*	*	*	Bash #
A.QMG (BGen)	Bash	*	*	*	*	Gurney
A.QMG (BGen)	Rethers	Whitehead	*	*	*	*
A.QMG (BGen)	Pope	*	Williams	*	*	Gibson
Surgeon Gen (MGen)	Ireland	*	Patterson	*	*	*
A.Surg.Gen (BGen)	Fisher	*	Mumsom	VACANT	Teudy	*
A.Surg.Gen (BGEN)	Darnal	*	Delaney	VACANT	Delaney	*

Position	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Chief of Finance (MGEN)	Carmichael	*	*	Coleman	*	*
C of Engrs. (MGen)	Brown	*	*	*	Markham	*
A.C of Engrs (BGen)	Deakne	Pillsbury	*	*	*	*
C of Ord. (MGen)	Williams	Hof #	*	*	*	Tschappat #
A.C of Ord. (BGen)	Hof	Tschappat	*	*	*	Schull
A.C of Ord. (BGen)	Ruggles	Beider	*	*	*	Shinkle
C Sig.Off. (MGen)	Gibbs	Carr	*	*	*	VACANT
C Chem. War.Scv. (MGen)	Gilchrist	*	*	*	Brigham	*
C Bureau Ins.Affs. (BGen)	Parker	*	*	*	Cox	*

Position	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
C Militia Bureau C N.G. Bureau (MGen)	Everson	*	Leach	*	(Bureau Renamed) Leach	*
C Chaplains (Col)	Yates	*	*	*	Brosteo	*
C Cavalry (MGen)	Crosbey	Henry	*	*	*	Kromer
C Field Artillery (MGen)	Austin	Bishop	*	*	*	Biene
C Coast Artillery (MGen)	Herd	Gulick	*	*	*	Hask
C Infantry (MGen)	Fuqua	*	*	*	Croft	*
C Air Corps (USAAC) (MGen)	Fechet	Turner	Foulois #	*	*	*
A.C USAAC (BGen)	Foulois	*	Westover*	*	*	No Position
A.C USAAC (BGEN)	Lahm	Pratt	*	*	*	*

A.C USAAC	Gillmore	Danforth	*	*	*	Chaney

(Official Army Register(s), The Adjutant General's Office, 1930-1935)

<u>Abbreviations and Symbols</u>

* = Same, # = Previously A.Cos in same Bureau

Abbreviations:

Secty. - Secretary	CoS - Chief of Staff	A.CoS - Assistant Chief of Staff
G1 - Personnell	G2 - Intelligence	G3 - Operations
G4 - Logistics	AG - Adjutant General	IG - Inspector General
A.C - Assistant Chief	Ins.Aff. - Insular Affairs	N.G. - National Guard
C - Chief	USAAC - U.S.Army Air Corps	

Appendix K

Table of Organization and Manning, Office of the Military Advisor
to the President of the Philippines (October 1937)

Line No.	Billet	Incumbent
-	Military Advisor	Maj.Gen. MacArthur
1	Chief of Staff	Lt.Col. Eisenhower
2	Deputy Chief of Staff	Lt.Col. Ord
3	Advisor-Procurement, Storage & Distribution of Supplies	Maj. Harrison
4	Advisor-Engineering Affairs	Lt.Col. Hoge
5	Adjutant & Administrative Officer	Capt. Davis
6	Advisor-Marine Affairs	Lt. Huff USN (Ret.)
7	Inspection Staff	Lt.Col. Ramee * Maj. Brian * Capt. Whatley ** Lt. Bache *
8	Advisor-Air Corps Matters	Lt.Col. Lee
	Air Corps Instructors	Capt. Lewis Lt. Parker
9	Advisor-Signal Matters	Capt. Corderman
10	Temporary Advisor- Medical Organization	Lt.Col. Blesse
11	Temporary Instructor Flight Surgery	Lt.Col. Simpson
12	***	
13	Special Assistants to the Military Advisor	Maj. Hutter Capt. Fellers ****

(Source: Office of Military Advisor Memorandum dated October 23, 1937. MacArthur
 Archives RG 44)

*   Additional Duty
**   Detached Service
***   All active duty officers of Philippine Scouts are primarily responsible to the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army. Since they are officially attached to the Office of the Military Advisor. They may, when occasion demands, be given special assignments by the Chief of Staff to the Office of the Military Advisor.
****   Assignment of duties requires the personal approval of the Military Advisor.

Appendix L
Organizational Charts: SCAP 1945-1951

The following organizational charts were published by SCAP during the Occupation of Japan in *Selected Data on the Occupation of Japan, 1950:*

1.   Plate No. 23, Organization of General Headquarters, Army Forces in the Pacific (GHQ, AFPAC), 6 April 1945.

2.   Plate No. 25, The Machinery of the Occupation of Japan from the Far Eastern Commission through SCAP to the Japanese People, December 1948.

3.   Plate No. 26, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ, SCAP), 31 December 1947.

4.   Plate No. 28, General Headquarters, Far Eastern Command (GHQ, FEC), December 1947.

5.   Plate No. 66, Military Government in Japan, January 1946-July 1948.

6.   Plate No. 67, Functions of Military Government Units in Japan, July 1948.

The following organizational charts were published as an appendix in *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945-1952* by Ward and Schulman (1947). The charts were drawn from *The SCAP Official History of the Occupation , Monograph 2 (1952)* as edited by Ward and Schulman:

7.   Staff Functions of SCAP (Adjutant General omitted) October 1945.

8.   GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, Japan, 26 August 1946

9.   GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, Japan, 10 December 1947.

10.   GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, Japan, 5 June 1948.

11.   GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, Japan, 23 July 1949.

12.   GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, Japan, 1950.

13.   GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo, Japan, 1951.

Charts 3 and 9 are essentially the same. They are both included to allow a comparison of what was publically acknowledged as the SCAP organization and what was the officially approved organization as set forth in the semi-official *History of the Occupation* at the conclusion of the occupation. Because charts seven through thirteen are from the same source, and they cover the entire period of the Japanese Occupation, they allow a year by year of the SCAP organization.

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
PLATE NO. 23
Organization of General Headquarters, Army Forces in the Pacific, 6 April 1945

PLATE NO. 25

The Machinery of the Occupation of Japan from the Far Eastern Commission through SCAP to the Japanese People, December 1948.

PLATE NO. 26

General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 31 December 1947

PLATE NO. 28

General Headquarters, Far East Command, December 1947

Organization of Eighth Army Military Government Section, January 1946

PLATE NO. 66
Military Government in Japan, January 1946—July 1948

SENIOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFFICER

EXECUTIVE (EXECUTIVE AND ADJUTANT)

Detachment Commander

CIVIL EDUCATION

Surveillance, encouragement and assistance in:
Public and Private Education
Reorganization and Decentralization of School System
Adult Education
Teacher Training
Screening of Teachers
Arts and Monuments
Religion

PUBLIC WELFARE

Surveillance, encouragement and assistance in:
Public and Private Welfare Programs
Welfare Institutions
Penal Institutions
Reform Schools
Welfare Training Programs
Relief Supplies
Welfare of Foreign Nationals
Disaster Operations
Social Insurance Programs

LEGAL AND GOVERNMENT

Japanese Laws
Japanese Constitution
Japanese Courts
Purge of Officials except Teachers
Governmental Activities Parties
Elections
Special Investigations
Assist in Military Occupation Court Matters

CIVIL INFORMATION

Guide and assist in:

Development of Local Information Media and Organizations
Planning, Conducting Local Information Programs
Reinforcing National Information Programs

PUBLIC HEALTH

Surveillance, encouragement and assistance in:
Public Health Program
Preventive Medicine
VD Control
TB Control
Distribution and Use of Medical Supplies
Port Quarantine Activities
Medical Education
Hospitalization
Nutrition Surveys
Narcotic Controls
Nursing Affairs
Veterinary Affairs
Sanitary Affairs
Dental Affairs

UNIT ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Personnel
Training
Supply
Mess
Motors
Quarters
Mail
Post Exchange
Special Service
Recreation
Discipline

ECONOMICS

NATURAL RESOURCES

Surveillance of:
Agriculture
Land Reform Program
Fishing
Mining
Forestry
Petroleum Production and Distribution
Salvage of Japanese Military Materials
Electric Power
Water Chlorination
Communication
Transportation
Release of Waste Oils
Civil Property
Organization of Farm Cooperatives
Dissolution of Agricultural Association

LABOR

For Civil Industry:
Labor Relations and Education
Strikes
Trade Unions
For Occupation Forces:
Procurement
Processing
Supervision
Labor Reports

COMMERCE AND TRADE

Import-Export
Supervision
Coordination
Storage, Release and Rationing of Imported Food
Price Control and Rationing
Fish and Vegetable Control Program
Staple Food Collection
Storage and Inter-Prefectural Shipment
Surveillance of Textile Programs
US Army Scrap and Waste

MANUFACTURING AND INDUSTRY

Encourage and Stimulate Critical Industries
Surveillance of Restricted Manufacturers
Reparations—Custody, Control, Inventory and Maintenance
Military Installations
Coordinate Return to Japanese Government

PLATE NO. 67

Functions of Military Government Units in Japan, July 1948

STAFF FUNCTIONS OF SCAP (AG OMITTED) OCTOBER 1945

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
[Commander-in-Chief]
Gen. Douglas MacArthur

MILITARY SECRETARY
Brig. Gen B.F. Fellers

AIDES DE CAMP
Brig. Gen. B.M. Fitch

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL PROCUREMENT AGENT
Col. H.A. Brenn

CHIEF OF STAFF
Lt. Gen R.K. Sutherland

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
Maj. Gen. R.J. Marshall

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS
Maj. Gen.S.T.Chamberlain

GENERAL STAFF

G-1 Brig. Gen. M.J. Gunner

G-2 Maj. Gen. C.A. Willoughby

G-3 Brig. Gen. W.E. Chambers

G-4 Maj. Gen. L.J. Whitlock

SPECIAL STAFF SECTION

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION Brig. Gen. E.R. Thorpe

GOVERNMENT SECTION Brig. Gen. W.E. Crist

ECONOMIC & SCIENTIFIC SECTION Col. R.C. Kramer

NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION Lt. Col. H.G. Schenck

STATISTICAL & REPORTSSECTION Col. C.H. Unger

LEGAL SECTION Col. A.C. Carpenter

CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin

PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE SECTION Col. C.F. Sams

CIVIL INFORMATION & EDUCATION SECTION Col. K.R. Dyke

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
(GHQ, SCAP)
TOKYO, JAPAN, 26 AUGUST 1946

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

SUPREME COMMANDER [Commander-in-Chief] Gen. Douglas MacArthur

CHIEF OF STAFF Maj. Gen. P.J. Mueller

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF Maj. Gen. P.W. Clarkson / Maj. Gen. L.J. Whitlock

AIDES-DE-CAMP Maj. Gen. H.B. Wheeler

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

LEGAL SECTION Col. A.C. Carpenter

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DIPLOMATIC SECTION Mr. G. Atcheson, Jr.

CIVIL TRANSPORTATION SECTION Brig. Gen. P.S. Besson, Jr.

NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION Col. H.G. Schenck

CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin

EXECUTIVE FOR ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS Brig. Gen. A.P. Fox

ECONOMIC & SCIENTIFIC SECTION Maj. Gen. W.F. Marquat

GENERAL ACCOUNTING SECTION Col. H.Y. Brown

GENERAL STAFF SECTIONS GHQ, AFPAC (LIMITED) FUNCTIONS FOR SCAP)
G-1. Maj. Gen. E.M. Almond
G-2. Maj. Gen. C.A. Willoughby
G-3. Brig. Gen. C.A. Russell
G-4. Maj. Gen. H.E. Eastwood

GOVERNMENT SECTION Brig. Gen. C. Whitney

EXECUTIVE FOR ADMINISTRATION & SOCIAL AFFAIRS Brig. Gen. W.A. Beiderlinden

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION Col. H.T. Cresswell

PACIFIC AIR COMMAND U.S. ARMY / **ALLIED AIR FORCES**

PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION (SCAP SECTION OF PRO AFPAC) Brig. Gen. F. Baker

CIVIL INFORMATION & EDUCATION SECTION Lt. Col. D.R. Nugent

OFFICE OF GENERAL PROCUREMENT AGENT Col. W.G. Donald

COMMANDER, NAVAL ACTIVITIES, JAPAN / **ALLIED NAVAL FORCES**

SECRETARIAT Col. L.A. Diller

PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE SECTION Col. C.F. Sams

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION(SCAP SECTION OF AFPC AG) Col. J.B. Cooley

EIGHTH ARMY / **ALLIED LAND FORCES**

OFFICE OF CIVIL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN Brig. Gen. P.H. Tansey

STATISTICAL & REPORTS SECTION Col. C.H. Unger

STAFF SECTIONS

OCCUPATION FORCES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
(GHQ, SCAP)
TOKYO, JAPAN, 10 SEPTEMBER 1947

SUPREME COMMANDER (Commander-in-Chief) Gen. Douglas MacArthur

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

AIDES-DE-CAMP Col. H.B. Wheeler / Col. L.E. Bunker

CHIEF OF STAFF Maj. Gen. P.J. Mueller

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF Maj. Gen. E.M. Almond / Brig. Gen. A.P. Fox

LEGAL SECTION Col. A.C. Carpenter

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DIPLOMATIC SECTION Mr. W.J. Sebald

SECRETARIAT Lt. Col. F.J. Sackton / Lt. Col. M.F. Brennan

PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION Brig. Gen. F. Baker

GENERAL STAFF SECTIONS GHQ FEC (LIMITED FUNCTIONS FOR SCAP)
G 1 Brig. Gen. W.A. Beiderlinden
G 2 Brig. Gen. C.A. Willoughby
G 3 Brig. Gen. W.H. Maris
G 4 Col. H.E. Eastwood

EXECUTIVE FOR ADMINISTRATION & SOCIAL AFFAIRS

EXECUTIVE FOR ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS

CIVIL TRANSPORTATION SECTION Brig. Gen. F.S. Besson, Jr.

NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION Col. H.G. Schenck

REPARATIONS SECTION Brig. Gen. W.K. Harrison, Jr.

REPARATIONS TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Brig. Gen. G.I. Back

ECONOMIC & SCIENTIFIC SECTION Maj. Gen. W.F. Marquat

GOVERNMENT SECTION Brig. Gen. C. Whitney

GENERAL ACCOUNTING SECTION Col. H.Y. Brown

STAFF SECTIONS

OFFICE OF CIVIL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN Brig. Gen. P.H. Tansey

STATISTICS & REPORTS SECTION Col. C.H. Unger

PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE SECTION Col. C.F. Sams

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION (SCAP SECTION OF FEC AG) Col. R.M. Levy

CIVIL INFORMATION & EDUCATION SECTION Lt. Col. D.R. Nugent

OFFICE OF GENERAL PROCUREMENT AGENT Col. K.H. Lewis

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION Col. R.S. Bratton

OCCUPATION FORCES

EIGHTH ARMY

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCES ARMY COMPONENT (BCOF)

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST AIR FORCES (FEAF)

FIFTH AIR FORCE

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCES AIR COMPONENT (BCAIR)

HEADQUARTERS U.S. NAVAL FORCES FAR EAST (NAVFE)

NAVAL ACTIVITIES JAPAN (NAVJAP)

TG 96.8 (BRITISH SUPPORT GROUP)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
(GHQ, SCAP)
TOKYO, JAPAN, 10 SEPTEMBER 1947

SUPREME COMMANDER
(Commander-in-Chief)
Gen. Douglas MacArthur

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

AIDES-DE-CAMP
Col. H.B. Wheeler
Col. L.E. Bunker

CHIEF OF STAFF
Maj. Gen. P.J. Mueller

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
Maj. Gen. E.M. Almond
Brig. Gen. A.P. Fox

SECRETARIAT
Lt. Col. F.J. Sackton
Lt. Col. M.F. Brennan

PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION
Brig. Gen. F. Baker

GENERAL STAFF SECTIONS GHQ
FEC (LIMITED FUNCTIONS FOR SCAP)
G-1 Brig. Gen. W.A. Beiderlinden
G-2 Brig. Gen. C.A. Willoughby
G-3 Brig. Gen. W.H. Maris
G-4 Col. H.E. Eastwood

STAFF SECTIONS

DIPLOMATIC SECTION
Mr. W.J. Sebald

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

LEGAL SECTION
Col. A.C. Carpenter

EXECUTIVE FOR ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS

GOVERNMENT SECTION
Brig. Gen. C. Whitney

ECONOMIC & SCIENTIFIC SECTION
Maj. Gen. W.F. Marquat

NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION
Col. H.G. Schenck

CIVIL TRANSPORTATION SECTION
Brig. Gen. F.S. Besson, Jr.

CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Brig. Gen. G.I. Back

REPARATIONS SECTION
Brig. Gen. W.K. Harrison, Jr.

REPARATIONS TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION
Col. R.S. Bratton

EXECUTIVE FOR ADMINISTRATION & SOCIAL AFFAIRS

CIVIL INFORMATION & EDUCATION SECTION
Lt. Col. D.R. Nugent

OFFICE OF GENERAL PROCUREMENT AGENT
Col. K.H. Lewis

GENERAL ACCOUNTING SECTION
Col. H.Y. Brown

OFFICE OF CIVIL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN
Brig. Gen. P.H. Tansey

PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE SECTION
Col. C.F. Sams

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION (SCAP SECTION OF FEC AG)
Col. R.M. Levy

STATISTICS & REPORTS SECTION
Col. C.H. Unger

OCCUPATION FORCES

EIGHTH ARMY

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCES ARMY COMPONENT (BCOF)

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST AIR FORCES (FEAF)

FIFTH AIR FORCE

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCES AIR COMPONENT (BCAIR)

HEADQUARTERS U.S. NAVAL FORCES FAR EAST (NAVFE)

NAVAL ACTIVITIES JAPAN (NAVJAP)

TG 96.8 (BRITISH SUPPORT GROUP)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
(GHQ, SCAP)
TOKYO, JAPAN, 5 JUNE 1948

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
(GHQ, SCAP)
TOKYO, JAPAN, 23 JULY 1949

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

SUPREME COMMANDER (Commander-in-Chief) Gen. Douglas MacArthur

CHIEF OF STAFF Maj. Gen. E.M. Almond

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF Brig. Gen. A.P. Fox

AIDES-DE-CAMP Col. L.E. Bunker Col. S.L. Huff

PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION Col. M.P. Echols

SECRETARIAT Lt. Col. J.J. Lapage

EXECUTIVE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS Brig. Gen. G.U. Keyser

DIPLOMATIC SECTION Mr. W.J. Sebald

EXECUTIVE FOR ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS Brig. Gen. W.K. Harrison, Jr.

OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-1* Brig. Gen. W.A. Beiderlinden

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2 Brig. Gen. C.A. Willoughby

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-3* Brig. Gen. W.H. Maris

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-4* Maj. Gen. G.L. Eberle

STATISTICS & REPORTS SECTION Col. C.H. Unger

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION Col. R.M. Levy

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION Col. R.S. Bratton

CIVIL INFORMATION & EDUCATION SECTION Lt. Col. D.R. Nugent

STAFF SECTIONS

OFFICE OF CIVIL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN Brig. Gen. J.F. Conklin

GOVERNMENT SECTION Brig. Gen. C. Whitney

LEGAL SECTION Col. A.C. Carpenter

ECONOMIC & SCIENTIFIC SECTION Maj. Gen. W.F. Marquat

NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION Lt. Col. H.G. Schenck

PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE SECTION Brig. Gen. C.F. Sams

OFFICE OF GENERAL PROCUREMENT AGENT Col. K.H. Lewis

CIVIL TRANSPORTATION SECTION Brig. Gen. F.S. Besson, Jr.

CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS SECTIONS Brig. Gen. G.I. Back

REPARATIONS TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

RESTITUTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE

NOTE: *PERFORM LIMITED FUNCTIONS FOR SCAP AS PRESCRIBED IN CIRCULAR 11, GHQ, SCAP, 17 MAY 1949.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
(GHQ, SCAP)
TOKYO, JAPAN, 1950

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN (ACFJ)

SUPREME COMMANDER
(Commander-in-Chief)
Gen. Douglas MacArthur

AIDES-DE-CAMP
Col S.L. Huff
Col. L.E. Bunker

CHIEF OF STAFF
Maj. Gen. E.M. Almond

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
Maj. Gen. A.P. Fox

LEGAL SECTION
Col. A.C. Carpenter

DIPLOMATIC SECTION
Mr. W.J. Sebald

SECRETARIAT
Lt. Col. J.H. Chiles

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
Col. M.P. Echols

EXECUTIVE FOR ECONOMIC & INDUSTRIAL AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER
Brig. Gen. L.L. Williams

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
Maj Gen W.A. Beiderlinden

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
Maj. Gen. C.A. Willoughby

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-3
Brig. Gen. E.K. Wright

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-4
Maj. Gen. G.L. Eberle

EXECUTIVE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS
Brig. Gen. G.V. Keyser

STAFF SECTIONS

NATURAL RESOURCES SECTION
Lt. Col. H.G. Schenck

ECONOMIC & SCIENTIFIC SECTION
Maj. Gen. W.F. Marquat

CIVIL TRANSPORTATION SECTION
Col. H.T. Miller

CIVIL COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Brig. Gen. G.I. Back

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
Maj. Gen. W.P. Shepard

OFFICE OF CIVIL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN
Brig. Gen. J.F. Conklin

RESTITUTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE

GOVERNMENT SECTION
Brig. Gen. C. Whitney

CIVIL INFORMATION & EDUCATION SECTION
Lt. Col. D.R. Nugent

PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE SECTION
Brig. Gen. C.F. Sams

CIVIL HISTORICAL SECTION
Col. W.L. Mitchell

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION
Brig. Gen. K.B. Bush

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
(GHQ, SCAP)
TOKYO, JAPAN, 1951

Vitae

William J. Tehan III was born January 23, 1945 in Queens, New York. He served in the United State Marine Corps from June 1962 to October 1991 raising to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree (Political Science and History) from the University of Mississippi in 1967, and a Master of Public Administration degree from the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1976. He was the Distinguished Graduate of the 1979-1980 class of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He published a paper, *Alternative Defensive Doctrine for Employment by Light Infantry,* which was awarded the Clifton B. Cates Award by the United States Navy League for best research and writing by a professional military education student during Academic Year 1979-1980. He earned a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Public Administration from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in 2002.