

ABSTRACT

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 INSTITUTIONS, INTERVENTION AND
 ETHNIC CONFLICT

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Over the last fifteen years, the number of civil conflicts worldwide has declined and negotiated settlements have increased. The spread of democracy and greater international concern about domestic conflicts have encouraged states to adopt a negotiations-based approach to addressing minority grievances. In many conflicts, international intervention has played a significant role in facilitating dialogue and peace settlements. The complexities of cases of ethno political conflict suggest that a twin track approach, which looks at the domestic and the international levels of analysis, is critical. Yet, the existing literature on conflict management tends to study *either* international intervention *or* domestic institutions. Intersections between the two are ignored. Combining a cross-national analysis using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset with a case study of Sri Lanka, this research project examines the relative and combined impact of domestic institutions and international intervention on the management and de-escalation of conflict. Uncertainty and mistrust between

the state and minority groups drives political violence. Mitigating this uncertainty and building trust become essential for building peace. The extant literature fails, however, to recognize that the pathways to building trust and reducing uncertainty vary according to domestic political capacity. When the conflict-affected state is facing domestic institutional anarchy, coercive forms of international intervention, such as offering security guarantees through peacekeeping troops, become necessary. In contrast, where conflict co-exists with relative political stability and some measure of democracy, non-coercive intervention, such as mediation, becomes critical. In contrast to collapsed states, the challenge in such countries is to reform, rather than replace or create, institutions. Where the state is not facing a collapse of authority, facilitative intervention, such as mediation, can be a more cost-effective conflict management tool than high-cost, high-impact actions. This class of cases, which includes Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia and the Philippines, has not been adequately investigated in the existing scholarly literature. The arguments and findings presented here make an important contribution by focusing on the interactive role of domestic and international variables, particularly in relatively stable states.

MANAGING DISCONTENT: INSTITUTIONS, INTERVENTION AND ETHNIC
CONFLICT

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Over the last fifteen years, the number of civil conflicts worldwide has declined and negotiated settlements have increased. Systemic changes such as globalization, the spread of democracy and greater international involvement in domestic politics have altered the incentives of rebelling groups and the state to resort to violent challenges on each other. Both internal and external factors are encouraging states to adopt a negotiations-based approach to addressing minority grievances (Gurr 2000; Mason 2003). Among the cases of violent ethnopolitical conflicts identified by the Minorities at Risk dataset in the post Cold-War period, about half had signed agreements by early 2005. A number of these agreements represent an important (though not the final) step towards achieving peace in protracted episodes of violence between states and rebelling groups. Examples include the Indian government's power-sharing pacts with the Sikh community in the north and the Bodos in the northeastern part of the country, the Bangladeshi government's agreement with the Chittagong Hill Tribes, Papua New Guinea's settlement with the rebelling Bougainvilles, the Senegalese agreement with the Diolas and Mali's pact with the Tuareg. In some of these countries, such as Papua New Guinea and Mali, mediation by the international community played an important role in facilitating dialogue and settlement. In other cases, such as India and Bangladesh, the process of dialogue was a function of domestic initiatives, although intervention by neighboring countries did play a role in the history of the conflict. In other cases, such as Chad and Burundi, international intervention played a critical role in the peace process, but the weakness of domestic political institutions call for a more active role by the international

community. The complexities of cases of ethno political conflict and the arguments in the literature suggest that a twin track approach, which looks at the domestic and the international levels of analysis, is critical.

Yet, the existing literature on conflict management tends to study *either* international intervention *or* domestic institutions; that is, each factor is examined in isolation. As a result, the intersections between the two are unexplored. This leaves open certain important questions. In facilitating conflict management, do civil capacity and international intervention play the same role? What are the conditions in which one takes precedence over the other? This research project examines the relative and combined impact of domestic institutions and international intervention in conflict processes, specifically, in the management and de-escalation of conflict.

What conditions explain the management or resolution of civil wars?

Uncertainty and mistrust between the state and minority groups drives political violence. Mitigating this uncertainty and building trust become essential for building peace. Under conditions of relative political stability, non-coercive intervention, such as mediation, can play an instrumental role in overcoming trust barriers. When the state is facing domestic institutional anarchy, more coercive means, such as providing security guarantees, are required. The arguments and findings of this study make an important contribution to the extant literature by focusing on the interactive role of domestic and international variables. Interactive processes are particularly important in understanding the dynamics of war and peace in relatively stable states. This is a significant shift from the existing literature, which erroneously assumes that civil war affects only failed or failing states.

Linking Intervention to Local Capacity

Most existing studies examine either domestic or international factors, rather than exploring their combined impact (See, for example, Easterly 2000; Hartzell and Hodie 2003; Jeyaraj 2003; Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni and Stanton 2002b). Studies of international intervention do not consider local state capacity, often assuming that conflict-affected states have collapsed or failing political structures. Consequently, much of the literature focuses on high-impact intervention, such as sending peacekeeping troops or providing external security guarantees (Fortna 2003; Walter 2002).

In fact, conflict-affected states have a wide variation in the extent of local state capacity. Domestic anarchy is neither a necessary precondition for, nor an inevitable outcome of, civil war (David 1997; Lake 2003; Peceny and Stanley 2001). Contrast, for example, India and Sudan. Both countries have faced protracted civil wars but there is little doubt that the former, an enduring democracy with a fair performance on human development indicators, has far higher levels of state and societal capacity.

Situating international intervention within the relevant domestic, institutional context helps us understand the variations in the impact of third-party action on conflict management. When the state is not facing a total collapse of authority and legitimacy, engaging in more coercive forms of intervention might be not only unsuccessful but also counterproductive. Sri Lanka, El Salvador and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) are some examples of countries where non-coercive international intervention has helped reform or strengthen the existing institutional

framework with a goal towards the cessation of hostilities. This is in contrast to the forceful intervention undertaken in countries wracked by chaos, such as Sierra Leone or Haiti. In these cases, the weaknesses of domestic institutions necessitated a far more active form of international intervention. Understanding the simultaneous effects of the domestic and the international environments on conflict processes becomes particularly important as external intervention in civil war increases. In addition, an analysis of this interaction helps us understand the trajectories of conflict in countries with pre-existing, stable institutions. The arguments and findings of this research project are a significant shift from the existing literature which tends to focus on conflicts in failed, anarchic states where coercive international intervention becomes necessary.

How do variations in the capacity of conflict-affected states impact our understanding of the intersections between international and domestic processes? In collapsed states, which are usually the focus of scholarly and policy-oriented studies, international intervention acts as a substitute for internal political stability. Governments lack authority and legitimacy to an extent that makes the task of governance almost impossible. In such situations, international intervention acts as a substitute for internal institutions. In other words, it fills the vacuum left by the near-total absence of a domestic political structure. High-impact or coercive third-party action, such as sending troops or offering security guarantees, becomes a necessary step towards holding substantive negotiations and reaching credible agreements. Civil wars in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Bosnia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) occurred amidst a near-total collapse of government authority and

legitimacy. In Rhodesia and Bosnia, active international involvement facilitated an end to the conflict. In the absence of sustained third-party action to stop the hostilities, the conflicts in Rwanda and the DRC continued to escalate.

If the country has fairly stable and democratic institutions, the role of international intervention changes. In countries where political institutions are fairly stable and democratic, the state has an built-in capacity to provide credible commitments to minority groups. At the same time, the presence of armed rebellion against the state suggests that domestic institutions have somehow failed to provide credible guarantees to minority groups. International intervention becomes necessary to fulfill the mediatory role abdicated by local authority structures. In contrast to collapsed states, the challenge here is to reform, rather than replace or create, institutions. The United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and India, have all experienced rebellions while having at least partially democratic institutions and a central focus of control.¹

International Intervention in Democracies

By situating international intervention in the domestic political context, we can gain a nuanced understanding of the challenges of conflict management in democratic countries. Studies in international conflict suggest that, because democracies provide more information about decision-making processes and outcomes, the security dilemma and resulting conflict spirals are mitigated (Finel and Lord 1999; Grigorescu 2003). On the other hand, since democracies allow the open

¹ All of these countries had a Polity score of at least 5 out of a maximum of 10. Some of these countries could be considered stronger than others; for example, India has a more stable democratic structure than Bangladesh. Both these countries are more stable than the ones mentioned previously, such as Rwanda or the DRC.

expression of dissent, they might also send unclear signals to rebelling groups about the extent of consensus and political will in the government (Schultz 2001). These dynamics have a significant impact on civil war, a point that has not been investigated in the current literature. The research presented here will point to the complex relations between democracy and conflict management.

Theoretically, democratic regimes are more transparent, receptive to dissent and amenable to power sharing. These factors should make them more willing and able to compromise with rebelling groups. Where democratic institutions have been manipulated and weakened, however, the credibility of political structures declines. In such situations, the challenge of balancing competing claims to state power and resources becomes very complex. Electoral competition can make it difficult for the government to seek a compromise solution with rebelling groups, particularly if the latter are perceived to threaten national integrity and unity. Being receptive to international intervention, especially if it involves foreign military presence, can make the government vulnerable to accusations of weakness and trigger a nationalist backlash. Low- key intervention, which facilitates, rather than forces, the peace process is a more useful conflict management tool in such cases.

The findings of this study support the argument that trends towards democratization will facilitate a more negotiations-based approach to conflict management and resolution (Gurr 2000; Mason 2003). Democratic regimes tend to have a far higher probability of engaging in direct dialogue with rebelling groups. While democracies also have a positive relation with agreements, it is not as strong an association as we might have expected. Why is this case? Democracies have

decisional constraints that limit the ability of government to reach power-sharing agreements with minority groups. Disagreements and competition *within* the state can play a pivotal role in the conflict process. Reputational concerns prevent democratic governments from seeking agreements with conflicting parties. Recognizing the non-unitary characteristics of many, if not most, conflict-affected states will encourage third-party actors to adopt a more nuanced approach in their interventions. Facilitative intervention can help overcome some of these concerns.

While addressing questions of national security, realists in international relations view the state as a unitary actor. This approach has been challenged by liberal institutionalists, who have shown that the state includes divergent voices and interests. Similarly, in dealing with domestic security, the state tends to be rife with internal dissent. Issues of power sharing, autonomy, constitutional reengineering, and intervention create significant fissures within the government of a conflict-affected state. Contentious issues can become particularly public and bitter in democratic states.

Few studies consider the receptiveness of a country towards intervention in terms of local perceptions of sovereignty. In the Sri Lankan case, India's offer of security guarantees was greeted with intense popular opposition because it was seen as a threat to the country's integrity. Such perceptions are likely higher in countries with a greater degree of local state capacity and can exercise a direct influence on the efficacy of third-party intervention.

The Importance of Dialogue

Most studies focus on actual settlements and post-war conditions. Few, if any, studies prioritize dialogue between the parties directly involved in domestic conflict. As has been shown in international relations theory, dialogue between conflicting parties can help address credible commitment and uncertainty problems by lengthening the shadow of the future (Axelrod 1984). While holding negotiations does not necessarily lead to peace, it does have the potential to find avenues for future cooperation. By focusing on conditions facilitating negotiations, this study encourages a more thorough examination of the peace *process* rather than only exploring *outcomes* of violent conflict.

Non-coercive Intervention

The study will highlight the value of engaging in non-coercive intervention, such as mediation, questioning arguments that emphasize coercive action, such as sending military forces or offering security guarantees. While security guarantees are useful under certain conditions, non-coercive forms of intervention are more useful when the need is not to replace or create new political institutions but to reform existing ones. It is particularly helpful because mediation does not challenge the reputational concerns of the government or the state's sovereignty.

Research Design and Findings

A mixed-methods approach is used in this study. The cross-national, statistical tests discern general patterns in the relationship between domestic institutions, international intervention and conflict management. The dependent variable, conflict

management, has two separate components. Negotiations refer to the occurrence of substantive talks between the principal rebelling group and the state. An agreement refers to a signed pact between the conflict actors that attempts to develop a political solution to the conflict.

Among the domestic variables used in this study, democracy has a very strong, positive impact on negotiations. International intervention has a significantly positive relationship with the occurrence of negotiations. Military intervention has a strong, negative impact on the dependent variable. Both mediation and security guarantees have a strong, positive relationship with negotiations.

The examination of interaction terms yielded some interesting findings. While democracy and intervention have a strong, independent impact on negotiations, their intersection has no significant impact on the dependent variable. In other words, the presence of international intervention in a democratic regime has no systematic influence on the outcome variable. Although the independent effect of federalism on the probability of negotiations is non-significant, intervention in federal regimes has a strong negative impact on the probability of negotiations. In another interactive effect, as regime age increases beyond 15 years, intervention decreases the likelihood of talks between the conflict actors.

When examining agreements, we find that democracy is significantly associated with the outcome, but the strength of the association is less than with dialogue. Military intervention significantly reduces the probability of an agreement being signed, while security guarantees have a strong, positive impact. Brief

examinations of specific cases point to some intriguing interaction effects of domestic and international variables as well as distinct regional patterns.

The statistical tests show us some intriguing results regarding the intersection of domestic and international factors. They call for a deeper examination of specific cases where the intersections between domestic and international factors can be more closely examined. For example, it is surprising that intervention in federal regimes has a strong, negative impact on the likelihood of negotiations. Upon closer examination, we see that intervention in three rebellions in India, which is a federal regime, has determined this relationship. In all three rebellions, long-standing military intervention by neighboring countries has escalated the conflicts. The statistical findings regarding agreements also raise some intriguing questions which are best captured by an in-depth examination of pertinent cases.

Next, the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka is examined. The South Asian country has experienced a protracted ethnic rebellion, with a long history of international intervention, while also having long-standing democratic structures and competitive multiparty elections. The case highlights some of the challenges of conflict management in a poorly-functioning democracy. One would expect that the country would provide flexible mechanisms to address Tamil grievances. Instead, a pernicious culture of ethnic outbidding has destroyed the ability of domestic institutions to make credible gestures of reconciliation. This has created an institutional gap which international intervention can help bridge.

In the past, coercive intervention by neighboring India has had disastrous results. That experience highlighted the potential dangers of such action, particularly

in a country with a strong sense of sovereignty and nationalism. On the other hand, facilitative intervention has played an important role in enabling the conflicting parties to engage in dialogue with each other. At the same time, the Sri Lankan state's internal divisions have prevented it from taking decisive steps towards reaching a viable settlement. The case supports our statistical finding that democracies have a higher probability of holding negotiations, but also shows us some reasons why democratic regimes may find it more difficult to reach an agreement. In addition, it illuminates the role that electoral competition and public opinion can play in encouraging or impeding international intervention. It also helps us understand the complex interplay of third-party intervention, given a particular domestic institutional context.

Conclusion

This research project will use a mixed-methodology approach to address an important puzzle in the study of ethnic conflict management. Examining the intersections of domestic and international variables will enable us to develop a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of conflict and peace processes. The following chapters will discuss the pertinent literature in this field and elaborate upon the theory, hypotheses and research design. Next, the statistical findings are presented, followed by an exploration of some of those results through a case-study. Finally, I discuss the broader implications of the study and discuss some avenues for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter provides a discussion of the literature in the field of ethnic conflict management. Most existing studies ignore the intersections of domestic and international political dynamics (Saideman 2002a), creating a critical gap in our understanding of conflict and peace processes. The following section discusses the scope of the study by identifying ethnic groups and differentiating between conflict and violence. Next, I explore some of the explanations for the onset of conflict. The chapter then discusses the significance of dialogue and negotiated settlements. These dimensions have been subject to relatively little discussion in the existing literature. I discuss the dual importance of both international and domestic factors in facilitating negotiations and point out some limitations of the current emphasis on enforcement-oriented intervention. Finally, it is argued that a closer examination of the intersections between domestic and international intervention can make a valuable contribution to the literature.

What are we studying?

Ethnic groups

The following research relates to violent conflicts between politicized, ethnically defined minority groups and the state. Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, such as language, religion or some other indicator of a common origin (Horowitz 1985). Such a definition enables us to compare not on the basis of “perfect identity or even very close similarity, but rather a restricted range of

difference” (Horowitz 1985, 17). An ethnic identity incorporates a sense of shared culture or origin and recognition by self and others that one belongs to the group.

Some argue that ethnic groups are ascriptive, firmly bounded, persistent and rooted in considerable loyalty. Others contend that ethnic groups are malleable and formed for strategic reasons; ethnic solidarity is often based on material rewards. The reality often lies in between these two extremes (Horowitz 2001). Identities are malleable but also form the basis for deeply rooted loyalties and intergenerational affinities.

Members of an ethnic group have a strong sense of similarity, with roots in perceived genetic affinity, early socialization or both. For politically active groups, with whom this study is concerned, an underlying sense of collective identity based on a common culture and status exists (Gurr 1993; Horowitz 2001). The key to identifying an ethnic group is not the presence of a trait itself but the shared perception that the defining trait sets the group apart. This study assumes that, when a state is treating a minority group differently, whether in cultural, economic or political terms, the group will become self-conscious about its common bonds and interests. Such an assumption does not preclude the realization that collective identities are in fact situational; numerous cleavages can exist within a particular group (Gurr 1993); and class and ethnicity can overlap.²

Conflict and rebellion

The distinction between conflict and violence is an important one to note.

Conflict or the emergence of competing demands between groups is inevitable in

² An example of the class-ethnicity overlap is the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, which has been shaped by the deeply-entrenched caste-system in the country.

most pluralistic societies. If the conflict is expressed through institutionalized mechanisms of dialogue and bargaining, such as verbal or written statements or campaigns for legislative reform, one can surmise that the state does not have a conflict *problem*. On the other hand, if conflict is expressed violently, through guerrilla activity or civil war, this is far more damaging to the political, social, and economic fabric of the state.

Nonviolent dissent or protest activities are typically aimed at persuading or intimidating officials to change policies towards the group in question and show support on behalf of reform. In contrast, rebellion or violent dissent tries to mobilize enough coercive power that governments are forced to accept change. It aims at a fundamental overhaul of the government and intergroup power relations (Gurr 1993; Saideman et. al. 2002b). This study will concentrate upon ethnic conflict that is expressed through violent means, assuming that such incidences represent a particularly strong challenge to the legitimacy of the state.³

Why does violent conflict occur?

What causes ethnic groups to collide with the state? An extensive body of literature offers numerous explanations (Anderson 1983; Connor 1994; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Geertz 1973; Horowitz 1985; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Kaplan 1993; Varshney 2002). For the purposes of this study, we will view collective fear and uncertainty about the future as the root causes of violence (Fearon and Laitin 1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Lichbach, Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Group fears will arise when states fail to provide credible guarantees of protection for them. Credible

³ See Saideman et al. (2002) for an empirical assessment of the institutional variables that foster protest and those that encourage rebellion.

commitment problems arise because the state is unable or unwilling to assure a minority group that it will take concrete steps to protect its interests and security (Fearon 1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996). Both motivation and opportunity are necessary for conflict to arise (Gurr 2000). A group can feel a particular set of political, social and/or economic grievances, but will weigh the costs and benefits of mobilization before engaging in action. Through a combination of will and opportunity, it will choose its model of action – or inaction. I do not test this argument; rather, it is the starting point of the study.

Minority groups, particularly those that are facing some form of discrimination, have particular reason to fear the overwhelming power of the state (Horowitz 1985; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Saideman et. al. 2002b). These concerns are exacerbated when institutions do not incorporate diverse identities and interests; the regime is collapsing or undergoing radical change; repression levels are high; and levels of economic development are low. All these indicators represent weaknesses in state institutions and capacity. Group fears can lead to a pattern of escalating conflict, culminating in violence against the state.

Groups will be more secure and hence less prone towards rebellion if conditions to mitigate uncertainty exist. If the costs of rebellion are higher than anticipated benefits, there is little incentive to engage in violence. For example, an early, generous and credible offer of autonomy can avert the rise of secessionist movements. Thus, groups will look for benefits in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. These include access to decision-makers and the power to bloc harmful government policies (Ganguly 1996; Gurr 1993, 2000; Horowitz 1985; Kohli 1997;

Lake and Rothchild 1996; Lichbach 1995; Saideman 2002b; Walter 2002). In other words, states can effectively manage conflicts when they credibly reassure minority groups of their physical, cultural and/or economic security.

Managing ethnic conflicts

Growing importance of negotiated settlements

Can the recent decrease in the number and intensity of civil wars be explained by a growing preference for negotiated settlements? A number of studies have pointed to the rarity and difficulty of finding peaceful conclusions to civil wars (Hampson 1996; Licklider 1995; Walter 2002, 2003a). At the same time, a decisive military victory in a civil war is more likely to be followed by genocide and other repressive activities by the state (Licklider 1995). This, among other normative and policy reasons, indicates the need for more dialogue-based approaches to conflict.

In the post Cold War period, there has been a substantial increase in attempts to find negotiated settlements to ethnopolitical conflicts. Political leaders in democratic and nondemocratic regimes are increasingly likely to view strategies of accommodation as low-costs alternatives to forcible assimilation or repression. In both the domestic and the international arenas, there has been a notable increase in preference for dialogue between states and minority groups (Guelke 2004; Gurr 2000). In sum, even though it is undoubtedly *difficult* to find peaceful solutions to civil wars, such settlements are becoming more frequent.⁴ The skepticism regarding the barriers to finding negotiated settlements should be counterbalanced with the

⁴ Regan finds that civil wars driven by ethnic and religious issues are more likely to be settled by third-party intervention than revolutionary movements.

recognition that there have been negotiated successes in several ethnopolitical conflicts, including in India, South Africa, El Salvador, Ethiopia and Mozambique (Rothchild 1997).

Significance of negotiations

In studies of peace processes, scholars tend to focus on the features of the agreements themselves, rather than the background conditions that encourage parties to engage in talks (Werner and Yuen 2005).⁵ Several studies discuss the enforcement issues affecting the durability of agreements, such as the role of peacekeeping (Dubey 2004; Hartzell and Hodie 2003; Licklider 1995; Walter 2002; Werner 1999). While enforcement issues are important, an exclusive focus on this aspect limits our understanding of when, why and how warring actors choose (or reject) the option of the negotiating table rather than the battlefield.

The status of violent hostilities on the ground can exercise an important influence on the situation. Most notably, the concept of a mutually hurting stalemate is often used to explain when conflicting parties will choose to reach a negotiated settlement. Perceptions of stalemate are enhanced by either an escalation in hostilities or a political, economic or military turning point, which makes the parties aware of the futility of continued fighting (Druckman 2001; Modelski 1964; Preston 2004; Zartman 1983, 1995, 2000).⁶ The role of military stalemates is subject to some debate in the literature. In a cross-national dataset, Walter (2002) found some, albeit limited, evidence that stalemate influences negotiations. Preston (2004) uses case-study

⁵ Werner and Yuen (2005) are referring to international conflict; however, their argument is as relevant to civil wars.

⁶ See Holl (1993) for an interesting discussion of why battlefield conditions may not be germane to negotiations and settlements to civil wars.

analysis to argue that military stalemate is not a determining variable. Perhaps most importantly, estimates of the military situation, that is, the relative combat strength of the two parties are notoriously difficult to obtain. This limitation precludes this, as well as other studies, from providing a definitive exploration of the relationship between the military calculus and peace processes.

While ripeness helps us understanding when a settlement might be possible, it does not explain the broader conditions that facilitate *negotiations* between the conflicting parties. The considerable body of literature that discusses civil conflict duration (Hegre 2004) also does not help us build explanations of why and how conflicting parties eventually decide to begin, continue or terminate the negotiations that will eventually lead to a settlement.

Scholars in international relations have pointed out that repeated dialogue and exchange can lengthen the “shadow of the future”, increase anticipations of the benefits of future cooperation and build trust (Axelrod 1984). Even the problem of security dilemma can be overcome if communication facilitates empathy and perceptions of mutual gain (Jervis 1999). The occurrence of dialogue shows that the state is willing to view the opposing side as being at least somewhat legitimate or significant. Since both war and negotiations involve a transfer of information and can be viewed as part of the same bargaining process (Filson and Werner 2002), dialogue can be a valuable tool for communicating preferences and reducing uncertainty. Repeated dialogues can help build trust in the long run, even if the immediate outcome of the negotiations is not concrete (Lake and Rothchild 1998). Case studies

have shown that most settlements to civil wars have been the outcome of repeated instances of negotiations between the conflict parties (Hampson 1996).

It is, of course, possible that periods of dialogue are used by other sides to rearm or otherwise rebuild their military capabilities. In numerous instances, negotiations have failed to achieve peace or a compromise; several instances of failed talks in Israel and in Sudan are two examples of this. Nonetheless, they can create a space for dialogue and trust which could eventually lead to a settlement. Even when negotiations do not culminate in a peace treaty or even a ceasefire, they do indicate that parties are taking some steps towards an eventual settlement. By coming to the negotiating table, parties show recognition that a cooperative solution may yield more long-term benefits than continuing violence. For example, negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government indicate a growing realization that the costs of the decades-long conflict have become untenably high. When there is absolutely no dialogue between two warring parties, there is a greater cause for alarm. Conversely, frequent negotiations can facilitate the eventual build-up of trust. In short, some dialogue is better than no dialogue; and more dialogue is better than less.

The dual importance of domestic and international factors

While there is a robust body of literature on ethnic conflicts and civil wars, there is relatively little scholarly research on the de-escalation, management and resolution of conflict (Diehl 2002). Our understanding of peace processes can be improved by more systematic studies of both domestic and international factors that contribute to conflict management.

Domestic institutions

Among the biggest barriers to the peaceful settlements of conflicts are the uncertainty and mistrust that characterize relations between the parties (Fearon 1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Saideman et. al. 2002b; Snyder 1999; Walter 2002). If a minority group perceives that the state will not or cannot credibly commit to share power, the incentives for violence will increase. In theory, the problem of credible commitment is very difficult to surmount; the potential for reneging on an agreement is always present. Consequently, ethnic conflict can never be entirely *resolved* (Lake and Rothchild 1996). On the other hand, commitment problems can be mitigated if the parties find a commitment device or if the advantaged party can relinquish some of its impending advantage (Cetinyan 2002).

Political institutions can provide such a commitment device. By distributing power among players, institutions can also determine the outcomes of decision-making processes. They help shape the preferences and goals of decision-making actors and provide a source of both cooperation and conflict (Hall 1986). Because they establish patterns of rule and norm-driven behavior and constrain state behavior, political institutions play a critical mediatory role between minority groups and the state. “Institutions do not simply specify procedures, rules, and sites for political contestation; they also begin to generate predispositions to outcomes, given the number and size of ethnic groups “ (Varshney 2002: 36).

Violating the prescriptions of its own institutions will impose costs on the state, in terms of both domestic and international legitimacy. While institutions may be flexible and do not entirely constrain policy makers, they do help provide credible

commitments. This is because institutional credibility derives from a political cost. While policy-makers may shape, redesign – and even renege on- institutions, audiences can punish institutional defections. This gives them power that is determined by both rules and norms.

Weak political institutions create the conditions both for the emergence of grievances and the opportunities for the rise of rebellion. When institutions systematically fail to act as impartial and reliable mediators between conflicting actors, group fears escalate, creating fertile ground for violent conflict. Well-designed political institutions could make it less possible or beneficial for political entrepreneurs to incite ethnic conflict. Institutions that promote power sharing; provide transparent and effective mechanisms for grievance redressal; prevent arbitrary action; and facilitate a sound macroeconomic and political environment should provide minority groups with fewer incentives for conflict.

Institutions that do not share power can both exacerbate grievances and provide the opportunity to mobilize violent action against the state. Political institutions that do share power can mitigate minority group fears by providing credible, accommodative measures for addressing group grievances. What is crucial is that group grievances be expressed through institutional mechanisms rather than violence. For this to occur, existing institutions must have the capacity and the will to address and ameliorate their problems. What kinds of institutions are most successful in managing ethnic group conflicts? The more centralized the state, the less control ethnic groups have over their affairs. This in turn creates more scope for fear and mistrust towards the state. Thus, institutions that allow power sharing, representation

and/or self-government are needed to reduce the probability of conflict. Such institutions encourage groups that are discontented to seek or accept offers of negotiations. In other words, accommodative institutions are helpful in encouraging conflicting parties to engage in dialog.

International intervention

International intervention refers to economic, military or diplomatic activity by a third-party actor, which aims to influence the course of an ongoing civil conflict. Since the early 1990s, international engagements have facilitated the settlement or containment of an increasing number of ethnonational wars (Gurr 2000). Third-party intervention can play an important role in conflict management. External action helps ameliorate the fears of minority groups and reduce uncertainty by either directly providing commitments or supporting offers made by the state. It can modify the costs and benefits of the conflict through providing information, offering incentives or threatening sanctions. External parties can help find creative and feasible solutions, while also encouraging states and groups to abide by international norms. Such actions will help enhance the credibility of the government as it seeks to find a solution. Both coercive and noncoercive intervention can help design and enforce institutional reform, thus assisting in the provision of credible commitments to minority groups (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hampson 1996; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Marshall and Gurr 2003; Mason and Fett 1996; Regan 1996, 2000, 2002a; Regan 2002c; Walter 2002).

Despite the growing role of international intervention, theoretical development in understanding third-party interaction in ethnic conflict is still lacking

(Carment and James 2004). The existing literature exhibits a considerable amount of debate. Given the numerous goals that motivate external intervention, it is difficult to evaluate its efficacy. Peace processes are often circuitous. An action that seems to be successful today could be rejected as an abject failure tomorrow (Stern and Druckman 2000). Differences in the operationalization of the dependent (such as conflict) and independent (such as intervention types) variables have resulted in differing explanations of the efficacy of intervention and its role in ethnic versus non-ethnic conflicts (Mason and Fett 1996; Regan 1996, 2002a; Walter 2002).

The effects of intervention are not necessarily benign. Cross-national studies have found weak or mixed evidence concerning the efficacy of third party intervention in managing conflict (Mason and Fett 1996; Regan 1996, 2000). External actors can exacerbate or lengthen, rather than mitigate, a conflict (David 1997; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002a). Some third parties might be interested in perpetuating a conflict; for example, in order to plunder resources, as was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even when the goal of the third party is conflict management, the unanticipated consequences of the intervention could prolong or intensify the conflict.

On the other hand, outside interventions can facilitate an end to violent conflict under certain conditions (Licklider 1993, 1995; Regan 1996, 2000). Walter (2002) argues that outside guarantees are necessary to maintain the stability of a negotiated settlement. Particular strategies of intervention, such as those that address poverty, might be more useful in reducing the length of a conflict (David 1997). Mixed strategies, such as combining mediation with other forms of intervention, have

been found to be effective in conflict management, suggesting that multi-pronged, coordinated intervention are valuable in ending hostilities and seeking negotiated settlement (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). The contradictory arguments should not be surprising, given the complexity of both the causes of and solutions to internal war (David 1997). Whether or not intervention is effective in achieving conflict management is an empirical question that requires further systematic enquiry through exploring generalizable hypotheses (David 1997; Regan 2002c).

Enforcement intervention: Is it necessary?

A large number of studies in both international and civil conflicts have discussed the benefits of heavy-handed or enforcement-based intervention, such as military action or providing security guarantees (Fortna 2003; Hampson 1996; Hartzell and Hodie 2003; Walter 2002). Scholars have argued that such strong action is necessary to overcome the chronic credible commitment problems that plague violent conflict.

Some recent studies have questioned this view. A focus on monitoring issues can lead us to neglect the distributional and political conditions that foster dialogue. Strong third-party intervention can create an ‘unnatural peace’ which merely shifts the problem of credible commitment to external parties. Such a peace is viable only so long as the external actors remain committed to monitoring and enforcement activities. Third-party enforcement operations are often successful in ending the violence but cannot assist countries with higher-order peace building, that is regime building and democratization (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hampson 1996; Peceny and Stanley 2001; Saideman 2002a).

A number of studies on interstate crises have indicated some negative unintended consequences of heavy-handed intervention aimed at forcing an agreement between warring parties. A “forced peace” discourages conflicting parties from seeking a long-term resolution based on mutual compromise. (Keashly and Fisher 1996; Kelman 1992; Princen 1992; Werner and Yuen 2005; Wilkenfeld, Young, Asal and Quinn 2003). A similar approach is now needed in the study of domestic conflict management in order to fully understand the benefits and facilitating conditions for a negotiations-based approach to conflict management.

The intersections of domestic and international conflict

One of the major gaps in the literature is the absence of studies examining the intersections of domestic and international factors in peace processes. Integrating our understanding of international relations and comparative politics will help us address this lacuna (Carment and James 2004; Saideman 2002a).

Most studies examining conflict management focus on either domestic or international factors. Why is it important that we examine the intersection between domestic and international factors in conflict management? Studies of international intervention that ignore the domestic institutional context often tend to assume that war-affected states mirror the state of anarchy found in the international system. In part, this has been a result of the post-cold war discourse of statehood as being a binary opposition of failed and successful states (Bilgin and Morton 2004). This dichotomy suggests that conflict-affected states are failed states with no central authority, legitimacy or ability to provide public goods. It is assumed that domestic anarchy and strife call for a third party to stabilize and monitor the situation through

heavy intervention. This can also lead to international actors assuming temporary sovereignty over the conflict-affected countries (Diehl 2002; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Fortna 2003). In one recent study, the authors argue that in countries that have been destroyed by civil war, a long-term international contribution to local security will be necessary (Fearon and Laitin 2004). This is a policy prescription in line with Walter's (2002) theoretical and empirical justification for security guarantees. Such studies tend to focus on the states where the near-total collapse of authority has rendered local capacities useless.

Empirically, state capacity in countries facing ethnopolitical violence is not uniformly weak. Not all countries that face rebellions are collapsing or failed states (David 1997; Lake 2003). For example, India is an enduring democracy with a federal structure. Yet, institutional weaknesses have encouraged numerous ethnic rebellions. Other examples include Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines. Many of these states occupy a middle ground between the supposed dichotomy of failed and successful states. Wars in such situations may be resolved without the heavy-handed stability guarantees that are touted in existing policy and scholarly studies.

Because of the literature's focus on high-decibel cases of state failure like Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we ignore cases of successful negotiated settlements, as has occurred in Bangladesh and Papua New Guinea (Carment and James 2003; Gurr 2000; King and Zeng 2001; Rotberg 2002). As a consequence of this limitation, most studies that offer discussions of the role and efficacy of international intervention provide little or no

discussion of local capacity. While scholars provide discussions of the internal and external motivations of interveners, they do not examine the domestic political and institutional dynamics that encourage or discourage a third party's involvement. Conversely, studies that examine the relation of domestic institutions to ethnic conflict do not examine the possible intersecting effects of international intervention (Cohen 1997; Kohli 1997; Reynal-Querol 2002; Saideman et. al. 2002b).

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) conduct a cross-national examination of United Nations-led peacekeeping efforts that includes a measure of local capacity. They find that higher-order peace building (such as strengthening of democratic institutions) is correlated with local capacity while basic peacebuilding (stopping the hostilities) is more dependent on muscular third-party intervention . Their measurement of local capacity is, however, purely economic. The authors do not consider the capacity of the state to accommodate diverse demands through, for example, democratic institutions. While this study is a valuable contribution to the literature in that it considers the impact of both local strength and international action, further investigation is needed on the accommodative dimensions of state capacity.

A number of studies in international relations have shown us that states are not unitary actors. Internal debates and rivalries affect most foreign policy decisions. This realization has not been adequately extended to examinations of international influences on civil wars. The state is often assumed to be a unitary actor with a single set of rational preferences (Cetinyan 2002; Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2003). In practice, governments wrestle with clashing demands and interests while attempting to resolve domestic rebellions. Such processes are often most visible and influential

in democratic regimes, where electoral competition and alliance politics often determine policy decisions. A recognition of intra-government differences is critical for a nuanced understanding of the effects and limitations of international intervention.

Scholars tend to assume that the conflict-affected state is a unitary actor (Carment and James 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004; Hartzell and Hodie 2003; Walter 2002). The case study explored in this study will challenge this assumption. The findings show that intragovernment divisions and public opinion can play a significant role in determining the relative success or failure of external involvement.

Regional patterns

Regional and geographical factors have been the subject of considerable study in the field of international conflicts and crises (Wilkenfeld et. al. 2005). Few studies focus, however, on regional differences in the resolution of civil war. This is an unfortunate oversight, given the large number of impressionistic accounts of geographical variations. For example, African states are often assumed to be less able or willing to resolve internal conflicts and the greatest recipients of large numbers of peacekeeping contingents. It has been alleged in the popular media that conflicts in Eastern Europe have received more attention in the West than those in Asia or Africa. The existing literature has not, however, explicitly addressed regional variations.

Understanding if there are patterns specific to geographical areas can enhance our understanding of the role of mediation or other forms of intervention in specific cultural settings (Leng and Regan 2003). In the literature on interstate conflicts, some prominent scholars have argued that negotiation is a universal process, with local

differences playing a marginal role (Zartman 1993; Zartman and Berman 1982). On the other hand, some recent studies have pointed out that international relations studies do not have an adequate understanding of regional differences and have also argued that regional variations in conflict resolution and crisis management argue against a “one-size-fits-all” approach to crisis management and conflict resolution (Lemke 2002; Wilkenfeld, Young, Quinn and Asal 2005).

Studies on the impact of intervention on civil wars have not considered regional variations at all (Fortna 2003; Regan 1996; Regan 2002b; Walter 2002, 2003b). The literature does highlight the high rates of political violence and low peace building capacities in Africa (Marshall and Gurr 2005; Young 2002). A comparison of Africa to other regions is, however, generally lacking (Collier and Hoeffler 2002) compare conflict in Africa to those in other regions and find that the incidences of war conflict in Africa have shown a rising trend while non-African developing countries have shown a decline. This, they argue, is not because of a mysterious “Africa effect” but because of divergent economic conditions. In the last decade, non-African developing countries have shown a far more rapid rate of economic development than those in sub-Saharan Africa. These authors do not, however, discuss the relative effects of intervention in other countries. In sum, the extant literature does not provide a basis for understanding if there are any significant regional variations in intervention and conflict management.

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the existing literature on conflict management. Existing studies suggest that democratic structures that promote democracy can

greatly facilitate negotiations (Gurr 2000). Third party intervention can also help peace processes by alleviating the concerns of the state and of minority groups (Mason and Fett 1996; Regan 2002a; Walter 2002). The literature provides few examinations of how domestic and the international variables work together to facilitate conflict management. This is an unfortunate omission. States facing conflict vary tremendously in their institutional design and capacity; consequently, the optimum intervention strategy also varies significantly. Few studies address the role of third parties in countries with functioning domestic institutions. The field would benefit from systematic investigations of how, if at all, domestic institutions and international intervention work together to arrive at specific outcomes. The vast majority of studies in this field focus on a single level of analysis, thereby ignoring the international and domestic complexities that influence the course of an ethnic conflict. This study will address this gap on the literature by focusing on the complementary and interactive role of the two levels.

Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses

Introduction

The review of the literature in the field showed that most existing studies ignore the intersections of domestic and international political dynamics (Saideman 2002). While the independent effects of the two factors have been examined, the extant literature does not situate international intervention in the context of domestic political institutions, or vice versa. This creates a critical gap in our understanding of conflict and peace processes. This chapter provides the theoretical framework with which to understand the complementary roles of external and internal conditions in peace processes.

Domestic and international determinants

If uncertainty and mistrust are among the principal causes of conflict, they also form the major barriers to finding solutions. Domestic and international variables can alter the incentive structure of a conflict, by mitigating the uncertainty, mistrust and fear of the future that underlines ethnic political violence. This is applicable to both agents, the rebel group and the state. The actors have similar incentive structures for continuing the conflicts, in terms of domestic and international legitimacy and rewards, such as power or financial resources. For the state, dialogue and accommodation are alternatives to forcible assimilation or repression, which can result in a high costs in terms of both domestic and international legitimacy. For the rebelling group, compromise can be a preferable option to the lives and resources lost to the conflict and can enhance the leadership's internal and external legitimacy.

Domestically, institutions that provide access to decision-makers and influence the allocation of resources helps mitigate the mistrust with which rebelling minority groups view the state. International intervention can help reduce the uncertainty characterizing the acrimonious relations between the two parties. Third parties can achieve this goal by facilitating dialogue and offering rewards or sanctions which alter the material or normative incentives of the conflict. This is an important function because high levels of mistrust that characterize relations between warring parties can pose a formidable barrier to negotiations, one which can only be overcome when an external party offers to play an active role in facilitating the peace process (Walter 2002). International interveners can, for example, help in communicating messages and positions, arrange for interactions between parties and offer rewards and punishments for reaching an agreement (Bercovitch 1984; Bercovitch and Rubin 1992; Crocker 1992; Stedman 1991). Some authors have argued that the credible commitment problems in civil wars are so acute that international monitoring of power sharing pacts and provision of security guarantees are the only ways to ensure that a sustainable peace agreement is attained (Walter 2002)

An integrative theory

Because of the increasing internationalization of intrastate conflicts, states and rebelling groups often have to engage in double-edged diplomacy (Moravcsik 1993), involving the simultaneous balancing of international and domestic concerns. Conflicting parties have to appeal not only to their domestic audiences, but also to their international constituencies. In other words, cross cutting alliances between international and domestic factors become crucial to the settlement (or not) of an

ethnopolitical conflict (Kubicek 1997). The pressures of both domestic and international politics determine the escalating and de-escalating patterns of rebellions.

Situating intervention within varying domestic political contexts can help us understand their complementary roles. As has been shown in the extant literature, in collapsed states, governments lack authority and legitimacy to an extent that makes the task of governance almost impossible. In such situations, international intervention fills the internal political vacuum. High-impact or coercive third-party action, such as sending troops or offering security guarantees, becomes a necessary step for holding substantive negotiations and reaching credible agreements. Civil wars in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Bosnia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) occurred amidst a near-total collapse of government authority and legitimacy. In Rhodesia and Bosnia, active international involvement facilitated an end to the conflict. In the absence of sustained third-party action to stop the hostilities, the conflicts in Rwanda and the DRC continued to escalate.

In countries where political institutions are fairly stable and democratic, the state has an built-in capacity to provide credible commitments to minority groups. At the same time, the presence of armed rebellion against the state suggests that domestic institutions have somehow failed to provide credible guarantees to minority groups. International intervention becomes necessary to fulfill the mediatory role abdicated by local authority structures. In contrast to collapsed states, the challenge here is to reform, rather than replace or create, institutions. This class of cases, which includes Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India and the Philippines, has not been investigated in the existing scholarly literature. Where the state is not facing a collapse of authority,

facilitative intervention, such as mediation, can be a more cost-effective conflict management tool than high-cost, high-impact actions. In countries where civil war coexists with stable, democratic institutions, external intervention is more beneficial if it works *with* existing institutions in building trust and affecting change. Because it does not challenge the reputation concerns of the government, noncoercive intervention such as mediation is more easily accepted by the recipient country. Identifying alternatives to high-impact intervention becomes particularly important given the relative rarity of external security guarantees.

Intervention in Conflict-affected Democracies

Understanding the complementary role of international and domestic factors becomes particularly important when we examine conflict processes in democratic countries. Theoretically, democratic regimes are more transparent, receptive to dissent and amenable to power sharing. These factors should make them more willing and able to compromise with rebelling groups. Where democratic institutions have been manipulated and weakened, however, the credibility of political structures declines. In such situations, the challenge of balancing competing claims to state power and resources becomes very complex. Electoral competition can make it difficult for the government to seek a compromise solution with rebelling groups, particularly if the latter are perceived to threaten national integrity and unity. Being receptive to international intervention, especially if it involves foreign military presence, can make the government vulnerable to accusations of weakness and trigger a nationalist backlash. Low- key intervention, which facilitates, rather than forces, the peace process is a more useful conflict management tool in such cases.

A number of studies in international relations have shown us that states are not unitary actors. Internal debates and rivalries affect most foreign policy decisions. This realization has not been adequately extended to examinations of international influences on civil wars. The state is often assumed to be a unitary actor with a single set of rational preferences (Cetinyan 2002; Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2003). In practice, governments wrestle with clashing demands and interests while attempting to resolve domestic rebellions. Such processes are often most visible and influential in democratic regimes, where electoral competition and alliance politics often determine policy decisions. Recognition of intra-government differences is critical for a nuanced understanding of the effects and limitations of international intervention.

The study will focus on the credible commitment problems faced by the *state*. Rebel groups also have commitment barriers. In the Sri Lanka case, for example, the rebel group LTTE's ability and willingness to commit to reconciliation through peace has often been questioned. In many cases, however, the state's commitment issues become more germane because it is the state that controls the status quo. For example, in separatist struggle underway in Kashmir, India, it is the Indian government that controls the territory under dispute. In order to have sustainable negotiations, therefore, it should be clear to the Kashmir rebel groups that the Indian government is willing to make a credible offer to compromise in terms of offering autonomy or amnesty to insurgents. It should be noted that the research presented here focuses on commitments made by the state to rebel groups rather than commitments made by the rebel group to the state.

Hypotheses

This study will explore the impact of domestic and international factors on two dependent variables, *negotiation* and *agreements*, both of which comprise essential elements of the conflict management process. In the existing literature, scholars have assigned numerous meanings and interpretations to the concepts of conflict management, resolution and de-escalation (Regan 2000). Some authors have viewed it as an absence of hostilities for a period of five years (Licklider 1995); while others have seen it as the ability to limit armed hostilities and resolve the conflict (Diehl 1993). Regan (2000) defines it as a cessation of hostilities for a period of six months, while many studies have focused on duration of conflict (Elbadawis and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002a).

Because this study takes a process-oriented approach to understanding conflict management, the focus will be on variables that contribute to substantive, political dialogue amongst warring parties. The first dependent variable, *negotiations*, looks at the occurrence or non-occurrence of substantive talks between states and rebelling groups. Negotiations must include discussions regarding a political solution to the conflict; this indicates that the key leaders are interested in discussing substantive issues (Walter 2002). Few existing studies prioritize and examine the relationship of dialogue to institutional or intervention variables. The second dependent variable is *agreement*, or the presence of a signed pact between the conflicting parties. The agreement offers a political solution to the conflict and can be viewed as a culmination of the negotiation process. Formal agreements often require a commitment of resources for creation and implementation, and they may contain

specific punishment provisions for noncompliance (Beardsley 2006). For these reasons, they mark an important step in the peace process.

Negotiations

Domestic political institutions

Institutions that provide for devolution of power and public access to decision makers will help mitigate conflict. This study will examine the impact of two kinds of institutions that provide for such access-- democracy and federalism.

In democratic regimes, the costs of peaceful mobilization are less, and the perceived benefits are greater, than in autocracies. Citizens can expect that mass protests can and will influence political decisions. Problems within democracies, such as scarcity of resources, the manipulation of institutions by political elites or the presence of groups with clashing interests, mean that democracy does not necessarily inhibit the tendency to rebel (Snyder 2000; Kohli 1997). We expect, however, that it will be an important predictor of dialogue. Why is this case? The answer lies in democracy's inherent structure, which facilitates and encourages compromise.

Struggles for control of democratic institutions can be a manifestation of conflicts over power and resources. This is particularly the case in countries with chronic resource scarcity or high levels of distributional inequalities. On the other hand, by establishing certain patterns and expectation of both rule and norm-driven behavior, democratic institutions encourage cooperative dialogue. When a democratic state offers to hold a dialogue with a rebel group, this is a more credible act than if the state is autocratic. For example, in India, a number of minority groups have resorted to violence with the intention of ultimately holding negotiations on autonomy. They

do not intend to wage a secessionist war against a powerful state, but are looking for opportunities to negotiate with the government. In contrast, rebel groups in Sudan would be suspicious of offers from the Sudanese government because of the latter's repressive history and therefore far less willing to engage in dialogue.

Commitment problems are a major barrier to negotiations. Such problems can, however, be mitigated if the parties can find a commitment device or if the advantaged party (in most cases, the state) relinquishes some of its advantages (Cetinyan 2002). Democracy provides such a device by allowing for competition and dialogue. Moreover, since democratic regimes tend to be more transparent, democratic statesmen find it difficult to mislead their negotiation partners. The uncertainty that is a barrier to negotiated settlements is a larger factor in autocratic countries (Moravcsik 1993). Furthermore, democracies tend to be more favorably disposed towards negotiation and, arguably, more sensitive to international criticism. There is greater certainty that the state will respond to peaceful demands and abide by commitments made in order to maintain the legitimacy of the government.

Hypothesis 1: The probability of negotiations is higher in democracies than in autocracies.

Federalism is a constitutional structure under which the state is divided into regions, which are called states, provinces or cantons (Lapidoth 1996). Federal systems can be present in both authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union, and democracies, such as the United States. Some authors argue that federalism gives greater salience to ethnic identities and solidifies ethnic division (Cornell 2002). Others argue that federalism, or other forms of regional autonomy, help alleviate

minority group concerns by providing a greater devolution of power (Gurr 1993, 2000; Horowitz 1985). This study hypothesizes that federalism will increase the probability of negotiations, because it provides a preexisting structure conducive to devolving power to localized units and promoting accommodation (Bermeo 2002). This, in turn, will encourage rebelling groups to respond positively to offers by the government or international actors to engage in dialogue.

Hypothesis 2: The probability of negotiations increases if the regime is federal

External Intervention

As discussed earlier, external intervention can play a valuable role in altering the cost-benefit structure of the conflict and in facilitating dialogue. It is also possible that third-party intervention exacerbates, rather than mitigates, a conflict. Intrastate conflicts and third party intervention operate in a dynamic and complex political and strategic environment and more systematic investigation is needed to understand the effects of third-party action (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000).

This study hypothesizes that, in the aggregate, external intervention will increase the probability of negotiations.

Hypothesis 3: In the aggregate, intervention will increase the probability of negotiations.

In order to fully understand the impact of third-party action, examining variations in the effects of different kinds of intervention will yield important insights.

Military intervention includes providing forces to assist either side to the conflict, training troops and/or providing weapons. Such action is usually targeted to

benefit a specific conflict actor and can occur with or without the consent of the parties. This form of intervention can have a decisive impact on the course of the conflict by altering the balance of military power. Military action does not, however, help alleviate the concerns that prevent parties from seeking a negotiated approach. By focusing entirely on the coercive dimension of the conflict, it does not encourage dialogue between conflicting parties, and, in fact, may deter talks between them. This is because military action does not alter the incentives of the conflict in such a way that the parties are encouraged to seek a negotiated settlement. Rather, such intervention may compel parties to perpetuate or escalate the conflict. For example, the Kashmir insurgency in India had its origins in local dissatisfaction with the corrupt and ineffective government. Pakistan's military intervention in the conflict, which involved providing resources and training to the rebels, escalated the violence to a point where neither side was willing to negotiate with the other. The involvement of neighboring state and non-state actors in the civil wars in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo have perpetuated these conflicts. Russian military involvement in Georgia has prevented a negotiated settlement in the Ossetian conflict by increasing the level of mistrust between the two sides. In all these cases, military intervention has been driven by hostility to the state affected by the conflict.

Hypothesis 3.1: Military intervention decreases the probability of negotiations.

Economic intervention includes financial support such as loans, grants and credits as well as embargoes and withholding of grants and credits. Such action is used by third party interveners to punish or reward conflicting parties for steps

towards or away from peace. Economic intervention will encourage actors to seek recourse to dialogue, by altering the costs and benefits of continuing the conflict.

Hypothesis 3.2: Economic intervention increases the probability of negotiations.

Mediation refers to credible offers from or incidences of a third party facilitating negotiations without resorting to force or legal arbitration. In its various forms, mediation is designed to help actors hold negotiations while they appear independent and strong enough to make demands on the opposing power. While mediation does not have the coercive power of economic or military action, it can contribute substantially to an atmosphere of mutual trust, by clarifying the issues and acting as a channel of communication between the conflicting parties. It can also exert normative external pressure on the conflicting parties. Mediation in numerous conflicts, including Bosnia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Sri Lanka illustrate the utility of this mechanism.⁷

Hypothesis 3.3: Mediation will increase the probability of negotiations.

Security guarantees refer to credible offers or incidences of protection for the parties in the conflict and/or terms of the ceasefire or peace agreement. They require the consent of the host government. In general, security guarantees take effect *after* some form of agreement is reached. However, offers of security guarantees to monitor a ceasefire or protect civilians can greatly aid the process of talk because they help establish an external credibility to the peace process.

Hypothesis 3.4: Security guarantees will increase the probability of negotiations.

⁷ Note that, for the purposes of this study, mediation refers to credible offers of such intervention and/or incidences of the same.

The question of ‘who intervenes’ is also an important one. In the period under study, the world system has been unipolar; that is, the power distribution has been balanced heavily in favor of the United States. US intervention will bring more resources and power to bear upon the conflicting parties, thereby exercising a greater pressure than other potential interveners. Thus, we expect that in conflicts where the United States has intervened, there will be a greater tendency towards holding negotiations.

Hypothesis 4: US intervention will increase the probability of negotiations.

Control variables

Three additional variables have been included in the statistical model. Polities that are undergoing regime changes and institutional upheaval will cause minority group fears to be exacerbated, as they will be more insecure about their position in the emerging regime. This helps explain the explosion of ethnic conflicts in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse. During times of regime change, the state will also be perceived to be weaker, thereby reducing the anticipated costs of engaging in violent action. As regimes grow older, their institutions will become more credible and policies will be less uncertain: patterns of state action would have been established. Some authors argue, therefore, that increasing regime age brings increasing territorial control and “a greater level of legitimacy that belongs by default to the regime in place”(Balch-Lindsay and Eterline 2000, 622).⁸

Hypothesis 5: Regimes that have persisted for a period of over fifteen years will have a higher probability of negotiations.

⁸ Note that Saideman et. al. (2002) find that older regimes have a higher incidence of ethnic rebellion, but do not explain the possible reasons for this.

Minority group fears could be exacerbated in regimes that have lower levels of economic development. Why would this be the case? First, there is a considerable amount of state intervention inherent in many developing countries. Since such a state will manage a large proportion of the country's scarce resources, there will be intense competition over its control. This, in turn, will politicize cleavages and increase the state's vulnerability to violent ethnic conflict (Kohli 1991, 1997). This relationship will also hold in democracies. Minority groups will be particularly affected by this because of the fear that vote-seeking politicians will engage in ethnic outbidding in favor of other, potentially larger groups.⁹ Such forms of competitive mobilization would require mediation by institutions (Kohli 1997) that can reassure minority groups. In developing countries, institutions are often weak; that is, they tend to be corrupt and subject to personalized control by manipulative leaders. Moreover, low levels of GDP are also an indicator of low government capacity. The existence of such unstable, weak or unreliable institutions does little to alleviate the concerns of the ethnic groups. Noting the large number of studies that consider the role of development in conflict, a World Bank measure of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is included.

Hypothesis 6: Countries with higher levels of income will have a greater probability of negotiations.

Following (Beck, Katz and Tucker's (1998)) guidance on working with binary time series models, I include a measure entitled "time", which measures the number of years that have lapsed since the last negotiations. As the number of years since the

⁹ The practice of ethnic outbidding has been prevalent in Sri Lanka and is believed have been a direct trigger to the Tamil conflict.

last dialogue increases, levels of mistrust between the conflict actors grows. This, in turn, adversely impacts the likelihood of talks.

Hypothesis 7: The probability of negotiations will decline as the number of years lapsed since the last negotiations increases.

Interaction terms

This study will identify systematic patterns of the relationship between intersections of domestic and international variable and holding negotiations. When intervention occurs in democracies, it is supporting preexisting structures of sharing power. Third-party action in such conditions will, therefore, be more effective in facilitating dialogue than involvement in autocratic regimes. In the latter, rebelling groups already have low expectations from the state; the task of external actors is correspondingly more challenging.

Hypothesis 8: The probability of negotiations will be higher in cases where intervention is occurring in a democracy.

Similarly, intervention in federal regimes supports an extant structure of sharing power. In such a situation, third party action will be more effective in facilitating talks than in non-federal regimes. In the latter, there may be more resistance from the state to devolving power to local units.

Hypothesis 9: The probability of negotiations will be higher in cases where intervention is occurring in a federal regime.

Earlier, it was hypothesized that, as per capita GDP increases, the probability of negotiations also rises. Higher levels of income are generally associated with greater state capacity and less public discontent. When intervention occurs in a

wealthier country, it will be more effective in facilitating talks because the background conditions are more favorable than in a poor state.

Hypothesis 10: The probability of negotiations will be higher in cases where intervention is occurring in conjunction with higher income levels.

Regional patterns

Recall that the existing literature provides no examination of region-specific variations in the role of intervention and institutions in conflict management in civil wars. This is in contrast to a substantial body of literature on regional issues in international conflicts. Because there is little in the literature to suggest that regional variations do exist, the null hypotheses, therefore, hold that all three regions under investigation (Africa and the Middle East, Asia and the former socialist bloc) will exhibit similar patterns. Should these hypotheses be confirmed, we can conclude that conflict management in civil wars do not bear a systematic relation to the regions in which the conflicts are situated. If the hypotheses are rejected, that is, if regional differences do act as significant independent variables on our outcomes, then further investigation will be required to understand these patterns.

Hypothesis 11: Intervention will increase the probability of negotiations in all three regions.

Hypothesis 12: Military intervention decreases the probability of negotiations in all three regions.

Hypothesis 13: Economic intervention increases the probability of negotiations in all three regions.

Hypothesis 14: Mediation will increase the probability of negotiations in all three regions.

Hypothesis 15: Security guarantees will increase the probability of negotiations in all three regions.

Hypothesis 16: US intervention will increase the probability of negotiations in all three regions.

Hypothesis 17: In all three regions, regimes that have sustained for a period of over fifteen years will have a higher probability of negotiations..

Hypothesis 18: Countries with higher levels of per capita GDP will have a greater probability of negotiations in all three regions.

Hypothesis 19: In all three regions, the probability of negotiations will decline as the number of years lapsed since the last negotiations increases.

Agreement

The second part of the empirical analysis will focus on the conditions which determine a signed agreement. An agreement is a specific stage of negotiation process, when the conflicting parties find and agree upon a set of possible solutions to their conflict. Similar forces will influence the signing of the agreement as those that determine negotiations. To be clear, I am hypothesizing that, because agreements are a component of the negotiation process, their occurrence will be driven by similar factors as dialogue.¹⁰

¹⁰ Note that Walter (2002) argued that factors that encourage the initiation of dialogue are in fact different from those that facilitate a signed bargain.

The Independent Variables: Domestic political institutions

Democracy

Democratic regimes have an institutional structure that encourages negotiation and accommodation. Such countries also tend to have a greater sensitivity to international and domestic scrutiny. Consequently, there is greater certainty that democratic governments will abide by their agreements. Democracies will, therefore, have a greater probability of agreements between the state and the rebelling group.

Hypothesis 20: The probability of agreements is higher in democracies than in autocracies.

Federalism

Theoretically, federal systems provide a preexisting structure conducive to devolving power to localized units and promoting accommodation (Bermeo 2002). Because federal structures, by definition, provide power sharing arrangements, we expect that such polities will have a probability of reaching agreements with minority groups.

Hypothesis 21: The probability of agreement increases if the regime is federal

The Independent Variables: External Intervention

Military actions on behalf of either side does not alleviate the fundamental uncertainties underlining an ethnic conflict; nor does it mitigate the credible commitment problems that either or both sides are perceived to have. Following this argument, we expect that military intervention will have a negative impact on the probability of an agreement.

Hypothesis 22: Military intervention will decrease the probability of an agreement

For the reasons outlined in the discussion on negotiations, mediation and security guarantees are expected to exercise a positive influence on agreement, as will intervention by the United States.

Hypothesis 23: Mediation will increase the probability of an agreement.

Hypothesis 24: Security guarantees will increase the probability of agreement.

Hypothesis 25: US intervention will increase the probability of an agreement.

Two control variables are used in the models of agreements. For the reasons outlined above, both regime age and per capita GDP are expected to have a positive relation with the dependent variable.

Hypothesis 26: Older regimes will have a higher probability of signed agreements.

Hypothesis 27: As per capita GDP increases, the probability of a signed agreement will increase.

As with negotiations, we expect that agreements will have a higher probability of occurring as intervention interacts with certain domestic variables.

Hypothesis 28: The probability of agreement increases when intervention occurs in a democracy.

Hypothesis 29: The probability of an agreement will increase as intervention occurs in conjunction with higher levels of income.

Regional patterns

As with negotiations, we expect that agreements will exhibit similar patterns of occurrence and non-occurrence across the relevant regions.

Hypothesis 30: Military intervention decreases the probability of agreements in all three regions.

Hypothesis 31: Economic intervention increases the probability of agreements in all three regions.

Hypothesis 32: Mediation will increase the probability of agreements in all three regions.

Hypothesis 33: Security guarantees will increase the probability of agreements in all three regions.

Hypothesis 34: US intervention will increase the probability of agreements in all three regions.

Hypothesis 35: In all three regions, regimes that have sustained for a period of over fifteen years will have a higher probability of agreements.

Hypothesis 36: Countries with higher levels of per capita GDP will have a greater probability of agreements in all three regions.

Conclusion

The existing literature on conflict management fails to capture the full dynamics of the process because it considers international intervention and domestic institutions in isolation from each other. Studies of international intervention in civil war tend to ignore the domestic political context because it is assumed that civil war occurs in failed or failing states. As a result, the role of coercive intervention, such as providing security guarantees through peacekeeping forces, is overemphasized. Different domestic contexts and regional specificities creates variations in the role and efficacy of third party action. This nuance has been ignored in the literature.

When intervention occurs in countries with democratic or federal structures, the probability of success of intervention is higher. In countries where political violence co-exists with stable, democratic institutions, non-coercive intervention, such as mediation, plays a greater role in conflict management than more heavy-handed mechanisms. A number of hypotheses are developed in order to test the theoretical argument presented in this chapter.

Chapter 4: The Road Ahead: A Mixed Methods Research Design

This section enumerates the research design for this study, which combines a cross-national examination using the Minorities at Risk dataset with an in-depth case study of Sri Lanka. Such an approach will enable us to, first, identify some broad patterns in the relationship between domestic institutions, international intervention and conflict management. Second, we will be able to explore the complexities of the intersections between these variables through the qualitative chapter.

The following section provides a discussion of the mixed methods approach used in the study. Next, the methodology for the quantitative chapters is presented. The limitations of the statistical analysis are then enumerated, followed by a discussion of the case-study of Sri Lanka. The chapter concludes with thoughts on developing the research design for future projects.

The utility of a mixed-methods approach

Inference, or attempting to draw broader conclusions on the basis of specific observations, is the foundation of social science research (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). This study contends that a mixed-methods approach is the most useful approach in making inferential claims about the role of domestic institutions and international intervention in ethnic conflict management.

The discipline of political science has had a long standing debate between the relative merits of using quantitative and qualitative methods. In recent years, the contentious tone of this debate has given way, at least in part, to a productive spirit of cooperation. Social science researchers have increasingly come to accept the merits of

both approaches and have advocated a synergistic use of the two methods (George 2005).

Qualitative and quantitative research essentially follow the same logic of inference and therefore serve similar purposes. The differences between the two approaches are one of style, rather than that of method or substance (King et. al. 1994; Ragin 2004). This does not mean that one is a substitute for the other; rather, they are complementary tools. Quantitative approaches allow us to explain general patterns while in-depth, qualitative research provide for context. Since both context and universality are germane to social science, researchers should not abandon one in favor of the other. Combining two methods can enable us to arrive at bounded generalizations and develop mid-theory, providing a mechanism with which to explain both context and universality. In other words, the correlation based inferences of statistical research can be enhanced by the causal, process-based inferences of case analysis (Bunce 2000; Collier, Mahoney and Seawright 2004a; Collier, Brady and Seawright 2004b; King et. al. 1995; Przeworski and Teune 1970).

Using a mixed-method approach is particularly useful when studying a phenomenon such as civil war. In conflictual conditions, quantitative data is often partial and qualitative investigation is obstructed by political conditions (Boudreau 2003; Bunce 2000; Creswell 2003; Druckman 2005; Tarrow 2004). The statistical analysis presented in the study will help us identify the broader patterns of conflict management across a number of cases. Specifically, the findings will illuminate associations between specific institutional and intervention variables and the dependent variables under investigation. They also shed light on the interaction

processes in effect. The case study will then help to unpack the causal mechanisms involved and illustrate more closely the intersections between the domestic and international variables.

Statistical analysis

An important element of sound inferential research is to separate the systematic and random components of a phenomenon (King et al. 1994). Cross-national, statistical analysis provides a powerful tool with which to conduct such an exercise. Quantitative tests provide us with broad patterns of correlation across a range of cases. These correlations can help us in developing our understanding of causal mechanisms. Accordingly, the cross-national analyses presented in the following chapters will derive estimates of the net effect of specific independent variables across different cases and years (Tilly 2001).

Minorities at Risk

The cross-national analysis will be based on the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset. MAR tracks 284 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the world from 1945 to the present (<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/about.asp>). It is one of the most widely used datasets in the study of ethnic conflict, providing a source for both quantitative and qualitative studies (Blum 2005; Fox 2004; Gurr 1993, 2000; Johns 2004; Marshall and Gurr 2005; Regan and Norton 2005; Saideman et. al. 2002b). Per the definition provided by MAR, the study will focus on groups that meet the following conditions. First, it collectively suffers, or benefits, from systemic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a state. Second, the group has been

the focus of political mobilization in the defense or promotion of its self-defined interest in the post-World War II period. In limiting the study to such groups, we will be able to compare the efficacy of domestic institutions and international intervention in states that have broadly similar patterns of minority group mobilization. Such an approach meets Horowitz's (1985) suggestion that comparability is facilitated by defining a restricted range of differences (16-17). Moreover, the study assumes that ethnic groups are more likely than classes or economic groups to demand self-determination. This is because they see themselves as social groups with a sufficiently complex division of labor to sustain ambitions of territorial sovereignty (Kohli 1997): 328).

Case selection

Only those cases that are coded in MAR as having experienced local rebellions, small to large-scale guerrilla activity or protracted civil war for at least three consecutive years are included. Minor instances of political banditry, sporadic terrorism and campaigns of terrorism were excluded in order to focus on rebellions deemed to be of a significant threat to the government at the local or central level. The three-year minimum was stipulated in order to eliminate sporadic episodes of violence. The list of groups that were included in the dataset and the relevant time periods have been listed in Appendix A.¹¹

The time period for investigation is the post Cold War years of 1990-2000. A number of scholars have argued that the changes in the international system and the

¹¹ Rebellions in Afghanistan were not included because of paucity of data on independent variables. Somalia has been excluded because of the complete absence of an identifiable government. I do not believe that these exclusions had a significant impact on the results.

end of the superpower rivalry that marked the end of the Cold War have resulted in different conflict and peace dynamics. The propensity towards finding negotiated settlements to end civil wars has increased in the last two decades because of normative and strategic concerns. The spread of democratic structures and values may also have contributed to this shift (George and Bennett 2005; Gurr 2000; Marshall and Gurr 2005; Peceny and Stanley 2001); (Regan 1996). Data constraints limited this research project to the post Cold War period. Further research on conflict management processes in the pre-Cold War period will be undertaken in the future.

Coding procedures

Two dependent variables are investigated in this research program: negotiations and agreements. The dependent variable, *negotiations*, looks at the occurrence or non-occurrence of substantive talks between states and rebelling groups. Active negotiations involve face-to-face talks with the government and at least one major faction in the rebel group. This also includes incidences when agreements were signed. The negotiations must include discussions regarding a political solution to the conflict; this indicates that the key leaders are interested in discussing substantive issues (Walter 2002). Active negotiations can take place either in the presence of ongoing hostilities (for example, as had occurred in the Sudanese government's discussion with the SPLF) or in the presence of a reasonably effective cease-fire (for example, between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE). This is a departure from much of the existing literature, which tends to examine only those outcomes where violence has ceased for a specified period of time. The dependent variable was coded as a dichotomous variable with a value of (0) no negotiations (1)

negotiations. No existing study prioritizes and examines the relationship of dialogue to institutional or intervention variables.

Agreement refers to the presence or absence of a signed pact between the conflicting parties. The agreement must refer to a political solution to the conflict. It must be signed between the government and at least one major faction of the rebelling group. Information on these codes were gathered for every year between 1990 and 2000 from MAR group chronologies, Keesing's Archives, Lexis-Nexis news reports and individual case histories. Table 1 summarizes the dependent and independent variables used in this study.

Table 1: Description of variables

Dependent Variable	Type	Source
Negotiations	Dummy	Various news sources ¹²
Agreement	Dummy	Various new sources
Independent Variables	Type	Source
<i>International factors</i>		
Intervention	Dummy	Various news sources
Economic Intervention	Dummy	Various news sources
US Intervention	Dummy	Various news sources
Military intervention	Dummy	Various news sources
Mediation	Dummy	Various news sources
Security guarantees	Dummy	Various news sources
<i>Domestic factors</i>		
Democracy	Dummy	Polity IV
Federal	Dummy	Europa World Yearbooks 1990-2000; Saideman et al. (2002)
<i>Control variables</i>		
Regime duration ¹³	Dummy	Polity IV
GDP per capita ¹⁴	Scale	World Bank Development Indicators
Time (years since the last negotiations)	Scale	Based on dependent variable

Note: Appendix B provides the coding guidelines for the intervention variables.

Democracy was operationalized as a binary variable, based on the Polity IV dataset. Polity IV contains coded annual information on regime and authority

¹² These include MAR case chronologies, Keesing's archives, Lexis-Nexis news items and case histories.

¹³ Has the regime been in continuous existence, with less than a 3 point change in Polity characteristics, for at least 15 years?

¹⁴ GDP per capita adjusted to purchasing power parity (PPP) (constant 2000 US\$).

characteristics for all independent states (with greater than 500,000 total population) in the global state system and covers the years 1800-2000.

(<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/project.asp?id=18>). Countries that received a score equal to or exceeding 5 on a scale of -10 to 10 were coded as '1'. States with transitional scores or scores less than 5 were coded as '0'. Note that scholars have used different methods of conceptualization this complex concept. For example, Fortna uses the average Polity score of five years before the outbreak of war (Fortna 2004).

(Saideman 2002b) uses a scale from -10 to +10 for each year under study. The measure used in this study indicates whether or not the country in question met the minimum requirements of being a democracy. Other measures were also tested with similar results. This is a simplification of the nuances of the concept of democracy, but such an approach was necessary for the sake of achieving parsimony in the data analysis. Disaggregating this variable into various forms, such as presidential or parliamentary system, or whether the electoral system is based on proportional representation, runs the risk of fragmenting the dataset. In addition, such definitions do not address the nuances of democratic systems. For example, this research project will address the problem of ethnic outbidding in democracies as a factor that can prevent conflict management. The presence of this practice is not accounted for in cross-national datasets. In sum, the more complex features of democratic countries are addressed through references to specific cases.

Federalism is a constitutional structure under which the state is divided into regions, which are called states, provinces or cantons (Lapidoth 1996). Federal systems can be present in both authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union, and

democracies, such as the United States. Information on federalism was collated from Europa World Yearbooks 1990-2000 and Saideman et al. (2002). It is coded as a binary variable.

Intervention refers to diplomatic, military and economic activity, which aims to influence the course of an ongoing civil conflict. It is distinct from regular third party activity in that it is specifically a response to ongoing violence (Regan 1996, 2000). The coding process for this variable involved a detailed investigation of MAR group chronologies, case histories, Keesing's Archives and Lexis—Nexis news reports on a month-by-month basis. This information was then coded as an annual, binary variable.

The variable *intervention* was also disaggregated into various forms.

Economic intervention includes financial support such as loans, grants and credits as well as embargoes and withholding of grants and credits. *Military intervention* includes providing forces to assist either side to the conflict as well as other forms of assistance, such as training of troops (Regan 1996). Such action is usually targeted to benefit a specific conflict actor and can occur with or without the consent of the parties. *Mediation* refers to credible offers or incidences of a third party facilitating negotiations between the conflict actors without resorting to force or legal arbitration. *Security guarantees* refers to credible offers or incidences of protection for the parties in the conflict and/or terms of the ceasefire or peace agreement. They require the consent of the host government. Each of these variables was coded (0) if it did not occur and (1) if it did. Information on these variables was collated from MAR group

chronologies, case histories, Keesing's Archives and Lexis-Nexis news reports on a month-by-month basis. This information was then coded in annual, binary format.

Regime durability was included as a control variable. Polity IV's indicator of regime durability was recoded as (1) for all regimes that have endured for more than 15 years and (0) for all others. Some authors have used a slightly different time period, such as 20 years, to indicate regime age (Saideman et. al. 2002b). This study assumes that fifteen years is sufficient to build a continuity and stability to political institutions. Alternate measures of regime age were also tested (10 years and 20 years). The results were similar to that found for a 15 year measure. *Economic development* refers to a dollar measure of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), based on World Bank data. *Time* measures the number of years since the last negotiations

The following examples illustrate some of the coding choices made. For all cases of conflict involving India, democracy and regime age were coded as 1, because, per our coding guidelines, India was a democracy and had a regime age of over fifteen years. In the conflict involving Indonesia and the East Timor province, the country was coded as a democracy in 1999 and 2000, when it met our coding guidelines per the Polity database, and as a non-democracy for previous years. Beginning in 1998, when a regime age occurred in the country, regime age was coded as 0. The conflict received consistent international intervention during its course. The intervenors included Portugal which had colonized East Timor till 1975, the United Nations, which was concerned about the extent of human rights abuses occurring in the troubled province and Australia, which took an active role in maintaining peace in

the region. From 1995 through 1999, the international community mediated in the conflict. In 1998 and 1999, the United Nations (with Australia playing the lead role), provided troops to maintain security. This activity was coded as a security guarantee. An agreement was reached in the conflict in 1999, when Indonesia agreed to a referendum which would allow the East Timorese to choose between independence and local autonomy. It should be noted that this did not mark an end to violence in the province. On the contrary, when the referendum showed a significant support for independence, forces loyal to the Indonesia government embarked on a mission of extreme violence towards the East Timorese. This directly led to a United Nations/Australian peacekeeping mission which helped establish security in the area. Appendices A, B and C provide detailed information on coding guidelines and lists of the cases used.

For the analyses on negotiations, the dataset is structured as a pooled-cross-sectional, group-year format. Logit models are used to test the hypotheses.

The section on agreement follows a similar overall approach to that used in understanding negotiations, with some notable differences. In several conflicts, agreements are signed between conflicting parties, only to be reneged upon at a later date. For example, the internationally-brokered 1994 Lusaka Protocol was signed by both parties to the Angolan civil war, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the government. The agreement was not upheld by either side and the violence continued. In 2002, the death of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi and a series of UNITA losses on the battlefield marked a significant shift in the dynamics of the conflict. Fighting ended in March 2002 and a peace agreement was

signed later that year. In Sudan, a peace agreement was signed in 2002, but the war continued. More recently, the parties to the Sudanese conflict have reached a comprehensive peace agreement in 2005. These two cases illustrate the “back and forth” movement that marks many conflicts. In an attempt to address this, the data used in this chapter includes only the most recent signed agreement, if there is one, between the conflict actors. For example, the Angolan cases were coded as having an agreement in 2005, rather than in 1994.¹⁵ The structure of this dataset is cross-sectional, with one set of observations for each conflict.

Tests to assess the impact of interaction terms did not yield significant results (results not shown). This was likely the result of the small sample size. The use of interaction terms in statistical models can be problematic given a small sample size. In order to compensate for this, a discussion on the possible interactions between domestic and international variables is provided through assessments of specific cases. A related problem is the issue of selection bias. For example, interveners may join or exit the dialogue process for specific, predetermined reasons, such as a higher expectation of success. One way of addressing selection is to use a selection bias probit model. This model could not be used because of the small number of cases in this dataset. Explorations of cases are provided in the chapter to identify possible underlying factors driving the peace process, which may not have been explicitly identified in the statistical model.

¹⁵ It should be noted that this study does not examine the durability of the agreement, focusing instead on the conditions that have facilitated the most recent comprehensive peace deal.

Limitations of the statistical findings

Causal complexity and conceptual stretching

The statistical analyses will provide some interesting insights into the relationship between institutions, intervention and ethnic conflict. Cross-national research has, however, some inherent limitations that can be best overcome by going outside its boundaries. Because the quantitative analyses uses variables across groups, countries and times, it helps identify general patterns and correlations but cannot illustrate complex causal mechanism of a particular case or class of cases. Statistical tests show correlation, rather than causation (George and Bennett 2005). The critical independent variables, democracy and intervention types, and the dependent variables, negotiations and agreements, are nuanced concepts. The coding process highlighted the inherent difficulties in capturing their substantive content, given the range of contexts in which they occurred. Using such variables across time and space makes the analyses vulnerable to the fallacy of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). Case studies allow for conceptual refinement with a higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases (George and Bennett 2005).

Recall, for example, that the variable of democracy has been coded as a binary measure. The statistical analysis shows us that democracy is highly correlated with negotiations but has a weaker association with agreements. Surprisingly, intervention in a democracy does not have a significant impact, distinct from intervention in a non-democracy. These are intriguing findings. Why should a democracy have a high probability of dialogue but less so with agreements? If both intervention and democracy are independently associated with negotiations, why do they fail to have a

significant combined impact? The simple dichotomous indicator cannot capture the nuances of the concept of democracy; nor does it place this variable in various possible contexts. Yet, disaggregating democracy into different types lead to technical problems because of the loss of degrees of freedom, given the restricted sample size. These limitations restrict the ability of cross-national research to build causal theories of civil war processes and resolution of civil war resolution (Brady and Collier 2004a; Brady 2004b; Walter 2002).

The problem of inference

King et. al. (1994) claim that statistical analysis provide a powerful tool of inference. While this is true, generalizing from observational data can also create problems of valid inference. Conclusions drawn upon statistical analyses depend upon meeting several underlying assumption and may ignore conditions and contexts which have not been controlled for in the model. Because observational data provides only general information, it cannot make detailed causal inferences, particularly when complex and dynamic political processes are involved (Brady and Collier 2004b; George and Bennett 2005). For example, the statistical analyses provided in the following chapters enable us to understand whether our independent variable are associated with the occurrence of negotiations and agreements. The numbers do not, however, tell us what the substantive content of those negotiations and agreements were; nor do they capture the specific external and internal conditions that structured the outcome. Examining details of specific cases will enable us to make inferences that may affect a narrower range of cases, but with greater validity (George and Bennett 2005).

Interaction models

While statistical models can be used to test interaction effects (as they are in subsequent chapters), they require large samples. Elaborate models can lead to problems of multicollinearity and loss of degrees of freedom. In addition, nonlinear interaction become difficult to interpret. Some scholars have argued that the complexity of multiple interaction effects is best captured through process-tracing of specific cases (George and Bennett 2005; Tilly 2001).

The complementary role of a case study

The findings of cross-national analysis can be substantially strengthened if we complement our study with other tools, such as a richer knowledge of specific cases and context (Collier, Brady and Seawright 2004a). A case study approach is a detailed examination of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events (George 2005). While the large-n analysis will help us identify probabilistic relationships over a wide range of observations, turning towards a case-study will help us identify more intricate patterns applicable to a relatively smaller set of cases (Tilly 2001). Geddes (2003) has suggested that, when dealing with causal complexity, scholars should shift from trying to identify factors which contribute to outcomes to explaining relations among moving parties of processes, which in turn, lead to outcomes (Geddes 2003). On a similar note, Tilly (2001) has advocated a mechanisms-based approach which offer partial causal analogies of selective process, rather than overall laws. Case studies provide a platform with which to undertake such a task.

The in-depth analysis of a small number of cases facilitates a fine-grained, contextually sensitive analysis, which can enable researchers to address complex, difficult concepts. A close knowledge of specific cases can contribute to more valid inference, which limits the tendency to over generalize and avoids the pitfalls of oversimplification. It also allows for a greater focus on a sense of process and a probing of plausible causal links (Brady, Collier and Seawright 2004a; Brady 2004c; Lave and March 1975; Rogowski 2004), goals that are not easily achieved with large-N observational data. The knowledge of context can provide insight into potentially significant factors that are not among the variables formally being considered (Brady and Collier 2004b). Case studies examining causal processes can help illuminate quantitative analysis and interaction processes. While the statistical analyses provides us with the benefits of generality and parsimony, developing our findings through case-study research will help develop causality and contextual accuracy (Przeworski and Tuene 1970).

In combining cross-national examination with an in-depth exploration of a specific case study relevant to the broader theoretical claims of this study, this research program provides for a bounded generalization and mid-level theory (Bunce 2000). This provides an ideal platform for exploring and understanding the complex processes underlining protracted ethnic conflicts. It avoids both sweeping generalizations and particularism.

Within-case analysis and process tracing

Qualitative research can take two forms: cross-case analysis and within-case analysis. Cross-case analysis involves the comparison of two or more cases.¹⁶ The approach adopted in this study is within-case analysis. Within-case analysis collects various forms of internal evidence about causation, often over a period of time, that are brought to bear upon an overall outcome within that case (Collier, Mahoney and Seawright 2004b). It is particularly useful in making causal inferences by focusing attention on processes and decisions within cases, thereby making implicit comparisons with other cases. This form of design can be valuable for gaining insights into complex political phenomenon that have not been adequately theorized (Munck 2004), such as the links between domestic and international factors in ethnic conflict management.

Process tracing is a valuable tool for conducting within-case analysis. It focuses on sequential processes within a particular historical case, identifying the reasons for a particular outcome or set of outcomes through a dynamic analysis of events (George and McKeown 1985; George and Bennett 2005).¹⁷ A number of scholars have advocated the use of within-case process tracing for addressing multiple interaction effects, complex causality and identifying variables that may have been missed in cross-national analysis (Collier 1993; Hall 2000; Laitin 2002; Munck 2004; Tilly 1997). It also helps us address non-linear outcomes by building

¹⁶ For a two-case comparison, see Dreze, Jean and Amartya Sen. 1989. *Hunger and Public Action*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. For an example of a multiple-case study, see Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman. 1995. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁷ These authors are strongly critical of King et. al.'s discussion of process-tracing as a means to increase the number of observations. They point out that the goal of process-tracing is to understand the decision-making processes within a particular case, not to provide for correlations across cases.

frameworks that show the interplay among actors, activities, and process (Druckman 2005)

Process-tracing involves a detailed historical narrative of the event under study. It is not, however, the same as an historical account. In presenting the historical narrative of the case under study, the analytical explanation will be couched in the theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design. The focus will be on providing a causal explanation of the important mechanisms at work and suggesting possible generalizations that can be made to other cases (George and Bennett 2005).

Case Selection: Sri Lanka

This study will examine the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka in order to explain the impact of domestic and international interactions upon the peace process, within the context of a relatively stable democratic polity. Since the 1980s, Sri Lanka has faced a protracted violent conflict, led by the militant Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE has demanded a separate and independent state for the Tamil minority population, which is concentrated in the north-eastern part of the country. The Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government (GoSL) has refused to acquiesce to this. The war has affected the vast social and economic potential of this country, once hailed as the next Singapore of Asia.

Process-tracing is particularly useful for explaining cases that are not predicted or explained adequately by existing theories (George and Bennett 2005). Often, a good case is *not* a typical case, one that confirms established arguments and opinions. Rather, it is a telling case where the particular or peculiar circumstances

encourage us to reformulate our previous understanding of a given phenomenon (McKeown 2004) and develop a more complex, causal argument. Examining the Sri Lankan conflict will help us identify some generalizable patterns in the role of intervention in a stable state, while also highlighting some of the anomalies of the specific case (Rogowski 2004).

Recall that the research program outlined here aims to study the impact of intervention on ethnic conflict processes, while situating intervention in the domestic political institutions. The goal of such an examination is to understand the role of intervention in countries where existing political institutions are relatively stable and democratic. Such an approach marks a significant shift from the extant literature which assumes a state of institutional anarchy in conflict-affected states. In this context, Sri Lanka makes a particularly intriguing case because it is distinct from the failed states that often constitute explorations of intervention in civil wars.

Why is Sri Lanka an appropriate choice for this research program? First, the country has been a stable democracy since independence. Despite flaws in the democratic system and governance mechanism, the country has had an active, multiparty system and regular elections with a turnover of power. It also has a stable bureaucratic and juridical structure. In most of the country, the government enjoys territorial sovereignty and sufficient military capability. Despite the long-standing conflict in the Jaffna peninsula, the rest of the country has experienced ‘regular’ life and a strong civil society (Hironaka 2005; Luttwak 2001). An examination of the Sri Lankan case will illustrate the ways in which democratic institutions may help or

hinder the peace process. The case highlights some of the challenges of conflict management in a democracy, marked by the practice of ethnic outbidding.

Although the Sri Lankan case has not been extensively discussed in Western media and policy circles, it has had a long history of international intervention, both military and diplomatic. The case illustrates many of the challenges and opportunities presented by third party-action in a country with preexisting political institutions. Sri Lanka, therefore, provides us with an excellent platform with which to study the multiple interaction effects that are the focus of this study. The findings of this case will compensate for the limitations of the statistical analyses in investigating multiple interaction effects and causal complexity.

Selection bias

While random sampling is not appropriate for small-n research, avoiding selection bias is an important factor in scientific research. As such, cases that capture the full range of variation on the dependent variable provide the strongest basis for making valid inferential claims. Case studies are often criticized for excessive particularism and selecting on the dependent variable. As a result, cases show little variance and do not have adequate generalizability (Collier et. al. 2004b; Geddes 2003). However, even a single case can provide this variation if, over time, the dependent variable has undergone changes or if it can be compared to other cases within the larger research agenda (King et. al. 1994). The approach undertaken in this study is an in-depth exploration of the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka, from its roots in the 1940s till present day. During this time, there was significant variation in both our

dependent variables, negotiations and agreements. Thus, variance is achieved in this case study.

Generalizability

Historians often view efforts to generalize from historical case studies with circumspection, because the contextual specificities may be diluted. Yet, for the purpose of social science research, it is both possible and desirable to generalize from unique cases by treating them as members of a class or type of phenomenon. Researchers should try to formulate the idiosyncratic dimensions of specific cases in terms of general variables (George and Bennett 2005).

An in-depth exploration of a particular case is useful for developing and evaluating causal explanations if it is part of a larger research program (King et. al. 1994). The Sri Lankan case can be compared to the statistical findings also presented in this study, as well as to the extant body of literature, both qualitative and quantitative, on conflict management processes (Brady 2004a; Rogowski 2004). As such, the qualitative chapter will help us evaluate and expand upon our statistical findings. Keeping in mind that specific remedial policies vary with each conflict (Byman 2002; Horowitz 1985), the case study will explore, in detail, the relative impact of different variables. Such an approaches will help us focus on understanding and explaining causal processes imbedded in the Sri Lankan cases and suggests its applicability to other cases with a similar institutional background, that is, states with fairly stable, democratic governments.

Approach for case study

As stated above, the Sri Lankan case will be examined using the technique of process-tracing. Process-tracing adopts a historical approach: the history of the case is meticulously tracked and then placed in an analytical, theoretical context. Such an approach can contribute a great deal to political science because it can help us identify the boundaries of generalizations (Elman and Elman 1997) and develop our causal theorizing.

Since the purpose of the study is to explore the domestic-international mechanisms at work, rather than uncover new information, publicly available secondary sources formed the core of the data collation process. Information on the conflict was collated on a monthly basis, from 1983 till present day, using case histories and news reports available through the Lexis-Nexis database and Keesing's Contemporary Archives. Particular attention was paid to news reports and analyses in two Indian publications, *Frontline* newsmagazine and *The Hindu* newspaper. Both of these are highly respected publications, based in the southern Indian city of Chennai (formerly known as Madras), the capital of Tamil Nadu. Because of the historic links between the Tamil populations in India and Sri Lanka, the conflict has been extensively covered in the publications. In addition, Mr. N. Ram, the editor-in-chief of the publications and one of the most respected journalists in India (<http://www.chennaionline.com/chat/celebchat/15ram-profile.asp>) has played an instrumental role in the drafting of the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1987 and is a recognized expert in the conflict. Reports in *The Hindu* and *Frontline* were compared to the array of news reports available through news databases and case histories. This

was done in order to ensure that information obtained was as objective as possible. Appendix D outlines the chronology of critical events in the Sri Lankan case. Some readers may question the need for such detail in a social scientific, rather than historical, study. A detailed, chronological approach to a case provides important information for theory based analysis and is becoming increasingly popular in conflict management studies (Druckman 2005). This approach was deliberately chosen in order to carefully track the changes in the state's preference for dialogue on the basis of electoral or other domestic compulsions and the international environment. For example, the willingness of the conflict actors to engage in talks in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks can only be understood with a detailed knowledge of both the domestic political situation and the changes in the international environment that occurred as a result of the attacks. The inconsistencies that have plagued the Sri Lankan government platform on engaging in talks with the LTTE are also a result of a complex process. They have been determined by changes in the balance of power between the ruling and opposition parties, with electoral calculations and the interests of smaller parties playing a pivotal role. At the same, third party intervention in the conflict has modified some of the effects of domestic conditions. In sum, understanding the complex domestic and international environment that promoted (or impeded) the decision-making process is best captured by a detailed analysis of how events have unfolded through the course of the conflict.

Future directions

Statistical analysis

The quantitative analysis involved incorporating set of new variables on international intervention into the existing MAR dataset. This was a time-intensive activity, as each case-year required a meticulous examination of historical data. As mentioned above, the process of coding made the researcher aware of the subjectivity of the concept of intervention. For example, the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka was initially a security guarantee, which then became an unwelcome military incursion. This illustrates the fact that boundaries between different types of intervention can be amorphous. A closer examination of each case, perhaps in consultation with individual case experts, may help improve the conceptual accuracy of the cross-national codes.

Information on the dependent variables, negotiations and agreements, was also gathered from examining historical data. A stringent definition of agreement was adopted. An agreement would have to be a signed pact between the government and the rebelling group detailing a political solution to the conflict. While adopting such strict boundaries helps in attaining conceptual clarity, it excludes the study of more tacit agreements that may be as efficacious. It is possible, for example, that insurgents in established democracies do not seek a formal, signed agreement, because they trust the power sharing ability and willingness of the state. In developing this research agenda, a broader typology of negotiated settlements may help illuminate the more subtle nuances of a given process.

It is evident from the Sri Lankan case that conflict processes are marked by shifting sands. The interests of the rebelling groups and the state change in response to both domestic and international conditions. In addition, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion that marks civil war can lead to a frequent renegeing of agreements, as has been the case in Sudan and Angola. International commitments are also often revoked because the intervener no longer finds it in its interest to continue in the conflict. For example, the promised United Nations peacekeeping forces in Angola have barely materialized. The lack of collective international will to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, despite the presence of United Nations forces, is well known. The statistical model does not provide detailed information on these shifts. One way of addressing this shortfall is to examine a single case in a detailed, temporal fashion, for example, through a monthly or yearly event analysis. In-depth case studies can also compensate for this shortcoming.

The current examination does not make explicit reference to modifications of rebelling group demands as a response to domestic or international pressure. For example, the GAM insurgents in Aceh, Indonesia have recently modified their demand of secession to agreeing to autonomy arrangements within the country. This change has happened in response to both international pressure and the perceived legitimacy of the democratic Indonesian government. The Sri Lankan case is comparable to this situation. Assessing how and why group demands might change over time is a useful avenue for future study.

The dataset used in this study does not examine the role of military stalemate. As the literature review pointed, the role of this variable is subject to some debate.

One of the biggest challenges in examining this dimensions is that military stalemates in civil wars are notoriously difficult to operationalize (Walter 2002; Preston 2004). Military environments are often fluid and deceptive, subject to the perceptions of the combatants (Preston 2004, 81). The difficulties of operationalizing this variable also affects to its theoretical utility.

Finally, as noted above, interaction effects are difficult to model, given the restricted sample size. Two solutions come to mind. First, researchers can use the statistical model to identify only broad processes of correlation of interaction and independent terms. They can then develop these findings by relying on case studies. This has been the approach used in this study. Second, more sophisticated statistical models are being developed in the field can be used in the future to garner more robust findings from quantitative analysis (George and Bennett 2005).

Qualitative analysis

The qualitative analysis in this study involves a process-tracing of the Sri Lankan case. It is argued that the findings of the case-study can be generalized to other countries with a similar institutional structure. The strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within- case analysis and cross-case comparisons with a research program (George and Bennett). This study aims to do that by juxtaposing the broad patterns uncovered by the statistical analysis with the in-depth study of the Sri Lankan case. The argument that domestic political capacity plays a critical role in determine the relative efficacy of international intervention would, however, be substantially strengthened with the addition of more case studies.

Additional observations will help us identify the boundaries of generalizability in this context. In addition, process-tracing always involves the challenge that more than one causal mechanism is at work. It is important, therefore, to consider alternative processes (George and Bennett 2005). An exploration of similar or contrasting cases will help address this limitation.

Some unaddressed questions

In the interests of parsimony, there were certain issues that were not addressed in this study. First, no assessments were made about the normative legitimacy of the claims of any rebelling group. Second, the focus was only on the interaction between the state and minority groups, with emphasis on the state's decisions. Intergroup relations and the strategic decision-making process of rebelling groups were not addressed. We assumed that the collective action problems of potential dissenters have been surmounted. Rational individuals will engage in collective dissent if the anticipated benefits outweigh the costs (Lichbach 1994)). The collective action problems of international actors and their possible solutions are not addressed. Finally, questions relating to power parity and bargaining (Lichbach, Davenport and Armstrong 2004) are also not examined. While these are important questions, they are beyond the scope of this investigation.

Conclusion

The research design used in this study provides a powerful tool with which to understand the interactions of domestic and international factors in facilitating conflict management. Mixed methodologies are becoming an increasingly popular

tool in conflict studies (Druckman 2005; Walter 2002), but have thus far not been used to examine the research question presented here. Consequently, this research project will make a valuable contribution to the emerging literature on negotiated settlements to civil war, by shedding light on interactive processes between domestic capacity and external action.

Social science research is inherently uncertain (King et. al. 1994).

Researchers are compelled to accept the fact that not all analytic goals can be achieved simultaneously. In any given research agenda, trade-offs are made between accuracy, generality, parsimony and causality (Przeworski and Tuene 1970). The findings of this study will establish the foundation for further empirical analysis and theoretical development which, the researcher hopes, will contribute to our collective understanding of conflict and peace processes.

Chapter 5: Can We Talk? An Integrated Approach to Negotiations

This chapter undertakes a cross-national examination to show the relative impact of domestic and international variables on negotiations. Among domestic variables, democracy has the strongest impact on dialogue. Mediation and security guarantees greatly increase the probability of the negotiations, while military intervention decreases it. Interaction effects are also tested to gauge the impact of the intersection of domestic and international variable on negotiations. Intervention in federal regimes or regimes that have sustained for over fifteen years tends to decrease the probability of negotiations. Contrary to our expectations, intervention in democracies has no systematic impact on the outcome variable. The implications of these findings are discussed in the concluding section of this chapter.

The Dependent Variable: Negotiations

Recall that our definition of negotiations involve face-to-face talks with the government and at least one major faction in the rebel group. Active negotiations can take place either in the presence of ongoing hostilities (for example, as had occurred in the Sudanese government's discussion with the SPLF) or in the presence of a reasonably effective cease-fire (for example, between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE). The dependent variable was coded as a dichotomous variable with a value of (0) no negotiations (1) negotiations. The independent variables are a combination of international and domestic variables as well as interaction terms. For ease of reference, the hypotheses to be tested here are given below.

Table 2: List of Hypotheses

Number	Hypothesis
1	The probability of negotiations is higher in democracies than in autocracies.
2	The probability of negotiations increases if the regime is federal.
3	In the aggregate, intervention will increase the probability of negotiations.
3.1	Military intervention decreases the probability of negotiations.
3.2	Economic intervention increases the probability of negotiations.
3.3	Mediation will increase the probability of negotiations.
3.4	Security guarantees will increase the probability of negotiations.
4	US intervention will increase the probability of negotiation
5	Regimes that have persisted for a period of over fifteen years will have a higher probability of negotiations.
6	Countries with higher levels of per capita GDP will have a greater probability of negotiations.
7	The probability of negotiations will decline as the number of years lapsed since the last negotiations increases
8	The probability of negotiations will be higher in cases where intervention is occurring in a democracy.
9	The probability of negotiations will be higher in cases where intervention is occurring in a federal regime
10	The probability of negotiations will be higher in cases where intervention is occurring in conjunction with higher levels of income.
11	Intervention will increase the probability of negotiations in all three regions.
12	Military intervention decreases the probability of negotiations in all three regions.
13	Economic intervention increases the probability of negotiations in all three regions.
14	Mediation will increase the probability of negotiations in all three regions.
15	Security guarantees will increase the probability of negotiations in all three regions.
16	US intervention will increase the probability of negotiations in all three regions.
17	In all three regions, regimes that have sustained for a period of over fifteen years will have a higher probability of negotiations.
18	Countries with higher levels of per capita GDP will have a greater probability of negotiations in all three regions.
19	In all three regions, the probability of negotiations will decline as the number of years lapsed since the last negotiations increases

Patterns

Under the selection criteria used for this paper, there were 56 groups engaged in rebellion in 32 countries. The data is structured in country-year panel format. The total N is 475, which represents number of cases of rebellion multiplied by the years that each rebellion continued. Appendix A provides a list of the conflicts assessed. For the relevant cases, data was collected on the occurrence or non-occurrence of conflict management and intervention.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of cases of negotiations versus those that did not. Of the total N of 475, 191 cases had dialogue while 284 did not.

Figure 1: Frequency distributions of negotiations (Total N: 475)




Figure 2: Cases of intervention





Figure 3: Intervention by type



Figures 2 and 3 show the frequencies for the intervention-related variables used in this study. It should be noted that several cases had more than one form of intervention. About 55% of the cases in the dataset experienced some form of intervention. Approximately 38% of the cases had military intervention; and 23% had some form of economic intervention. The United States intervened in only 18% of the cases. Mediation occurred in 31% of the cases coded. Security guarantees were the least common form of intervention, used only 9% of the time.

Given the high costs of undertaking military action, it is notable that a fairly large proportion of cases experienced military intervention. Economic and US intervention, as well as mediation, were used in roughly equal proportions. Security guarantees were used the least frequently. This is not surprising, given the sustained costs and responsibilities that the provision of such intervention requires.

Figure 4: Frequency distribution of binary domestic variables





Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution for domestic variables with binary values. Of the cases used in this study, about 46% have had a durable regime, lasting

15 years or more. 36% of the cases are procedural democracies. Only 18% of the observations belong to federal regimes. The time lapsed since the last negotiations ranges from one year to a maximum of eleven years. Conflicts where eleven years have passed since the last direct dialogue include India (Kashmiris), Turkey (Kurds), Iran (Baluchis) and Iraq (Shiites). Note that not all of these conflicts are active at the time of writing.

Regional patterns of distribution show some interesting findings. Cases were group by region in four categories: Asia, Middle East and Africa, Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics and the Americas. Figure 5 shows the distribution of cases, by region.

Figure 5: Distribution of cases, by region



Asian and African/Middle Eastern cases are evenly distributed, at 40% and 44%, respectively. Fifteen percent of the observations are from the former Soviet bloc

while only 7 cases (1%) are in the Americas. All of the America cases refer to the Mayans in Mexico.

Figure 6: Distribution of cases, by region




Figure 6 shows the region wise distribution of intervention. The former Soviet bloc received the maximum proportion of intervention. 85% of the observed cases had active international involvement. 77% of the cases in Africa and the Middle East received some form of intervention. Cases in Asia had a relatively low level of international interest, at 36%. Mexican cases received intervention 29% of the time.

Logit analysis

The statistical technique used in the paper is logit regression. Table 3 provides two models. Model 1 looks at the impact of the institutional and control variables as outlined above, as well as the impact of a dichotomous indicator of intervention. Model 2 examines the impact of disaggregated forms of intervention-- that is, US intervention, military intervention, security guarantees, economic intervention and mediation.

In Model 1, the logit model that will predict the likelihood of conflict management and determine the relative impact of each independent variable is the following:

$$P(\text{Conflict management} = 1 | x) = G(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ democracy} + \beta_2 \text{ federalism} + \beta_3 \text{ intervention} + \beta_4 \text{ regime age} + \beta_5 \text{ GDP per capita} + \beta_6 \text{ time since last negotiations} + u)$$

In Model 2, the logit model that will predict the likelihood of conflict management and determine the relative impact of each independent variable is the following:

$$P(\text{Conflict management} = 1 | x) = G(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ democracy} + \beta_2 \text{ federalism} + \beta_3 \text{ military intervention} + \beta_4 \text{ US intervention} + \beta_5 \text{ mediation} + \beta_6 \text{ security guaranteed} + \beta_7 \text{ democracy} + \beta_8 \text{ regime age} + \beta_9 \text{ GDP per capita} + \beta_{10} \text{ time since last negotiations} + u)$$

Table 3: Logit results of negotiations

	Model 1	Model 2
<i>International factors</i>		
Intervention	.583* (.261)	
Economic intervention		-.119 (.364)
Military intervention		-.897** (.323)
US Intervention		.333 (.435)
Mediation		2.232*** (.362)
Security guarantees		2.864*** (.846)
<i>Domestic factors</i>		
Democracy	.832** (.270)	1.342*** (.314)
Federalism	.021 (.356)	
<i>Control variables</i>		
Regime Age	-.426 (.269)	-.566* (.282)
GDP per capita (log)	-.438* (.180)	-.793*** (.220)
Time	-.400*** (.077)	-.248*** (.077)
Constant	.520 (.340)	.363 (.343)
Pseudo R-squared	.143	.288
LR Chi-squared	76.57***	155.83***
Number of observations	396	398
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.		
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001		
Note: These models do not have the original N because of some missing data on independent variables.		

Table 4: Probability values for models 1 and 2

Variable	Probability for Model 1	Probability for Model 2
Baseline probability	40%	32%
Intervention	54%	--
Military intervention	--	16%
Mediation	--	81%
Security guarantees	--	86%
Democracy	60%	64%
Regime Age	30%	21%
Time	1%	4%
GDP per capita	26%	13%

Note: For all the dichotomous variables, the probabilities are shown when their values are at 1. For GDP and time, the probabilities are shown at their maximum values.

First, the main findings of the models are outlined, followed by a discussion of the substantive implications of the results. Model 1 confirms the expectation that, in the aggregate, intervention has a positive and significant impact on negotiations. As hypothesized, democracies show a greater likelihood of experiencing dialogue; however, federalism has no significant impact. All three control variables are significant, but the effects were not in the anticipated direction for two of them. Older regimes had a negative effect on the probability of negotiations, although this was significant only at the 0.11 level. Increasing per capita GDP has a negative relation with the dependent variable, as does time lapsed since the last negotiations.

Model 2 assesses the impact of the different forms of intervention. Military intervention has a strong, negative impact. Mediation and security guarantees are both positively related to the dependent variable. On the other hand, economic actions and intervention by the United States does not have a systematic and significant link to negotiations. Democracy continues to have a positive impact. The effect of the control variables remains the same as in Model 1.

In order to facilitate interpretation, Table 4 presents the distinct effects of different variables on the probably of negotiations. Only the probability of statistically significant variables are shown. Model 1 assesses likelihood values when we consider intervention in the aggregate. Here, the baseline probability of negotiations occurring when all dichotomous variables are held at their minimum variables and all interval values held at their mean values is 40%.¹⁸ When any form of intervention occurs, the probably of dialogue increases to 54%. In democracies, this

¹⁸ In this model, all but two variable (log of per capita GDP and time elapsed since last negotiations) are dichotomous.

likelihood increases to 60%, the highest net impact of any of the variables. As regime age increases beyond fifteen years, the probability falls (contrary to our hypothesis) to 30%. As time lapsed since the last negotiations increases, the likelihood of dialogue drops substantially to only 1%. As per capita GDP increases, the probability of dialogue falls to only 26%.

Model 2 examined the impact of different intervention types on the occurrence of dialogue. Here, the baseline probability when all dichotomous variables are held at their minimum variables and all interval values held at their mean values is 32%. Military intervention reduces the likelihood of intervention by half, to only 16%. In contrast, the occurrence of mediation and security guarantees seem to have an almost equal impact on dialogue, increasing it to 81% and 86% respectively. Democracy changes the likelihood to 64%. As regime age increases, the probability drops to 21%. As time lapsed since the last negotiations increases to the maximum of 11 years, the probability drops to 4%. As log of GDP per capita increases, the likelihood of dialogue decreases to 13%.

Table 5: Logit Models of Negotiations with Interaction Terms

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intervention	.851** (.373)	.881*** (.303)	1.053*** (.348)
Democracy	1.218*** (.463)	.819*** (.273)	.856*** (.274)
Federal	-.129 (.373)	.481 (.432)	-.214 (.369)
Regime age	-.410 (.271)	-.432* (.271)	.303 (.435)
GDP per capita (log)	-.434** (.180)	-.413** (.181)	-.374** (.184)
Time	-.393*** (.077)	-.388*** (.077)	-.403*** (.077)
Intervention in democracies	-.545 (.524)		
Intervention in federal regimes		-1.321** (.647)	
Intervention and regime age			-1.114** (.522)
Constant	3.001** (1.365)	2.827** (1.356)	.093 (.402)
Pseudo R-squared	.145	.151	.151
LR Chi-squared	77.67***	80.94***	81.19***
Number of observations	396	396	396

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
 *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01¹⁹
 Note: These models do not have the original N of 475 because of some missing data on independent variables.

¹⁹ It is a matter of some debate whether variables attaining significance at the .10 level should be considered as being statistically significant. Following the precedent of Walter (2002) and Fortna, Virginia Page. 2004. Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? *International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War. International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2):p269-292.this study will view them as having a sufficiently high degree of significance to be noted.

Table 5 examines the impact of interaction terms on the occurrence of negotiations. The results assess whether the impact of intervention changes if it occurs in a democracy, a federal state or in a regime that has endured for fifteen years or more. Model 3 looks at the interaction of democracy and intervention. Is intervention more successful in facilitating negotiations when it occurs in a democracy? The interaction is insignificant, while the independent impact of democracy and intervention remain consistent. In other words, the interaction of democracy and intervention does not have a systematic impact on our outcome variable. Model 4 assesses whether intervention has a stronger impact on federal regimes. The results show that the interaction term has a strong negative impact; that is, when intervention occurs in a federal regime, the probability of negotiations is negative. In Model 5, intervention in older regimes shows a negative impact on our dependent variable. While intervention has an independently positive impact; as the regime becomes older, intervention decreases the possibility of negotiations. In sum, the results of all three tests run contrary to the hypotheses outlined earlier. To facilitate interpretation, Table 6 shows the distinct effect of different variables on the probability of conflict management. Only the probability effects of statistically significant variables are shown. The baseline probability of conflict management occurring when all dichotomous variables are held at their minimum values and all interval values held at their mean values is 35% when we consider intervention in federal systems and 32% when we consider intervention in older regimes.²⁰ This increases to 56% and 57% in models 4 and 5 respectively, when any form of

²⁰ In the model, all but two variables (GDP per capita and time elapsed since last negotiations) are dichotomous.

intervention. regimes that are 15 years or older have a low probability of negotiations at only 18%. When we combine intervention and federalism, there is a negative impact on the probability, which is reduced to 14%.

Table 6: Probability values for Models 4 and 5

Variable	Probability Model 4	Probability Model 5
Baseline probability	35%	32%
Intervention	56%	57%
Democracy	54%	51%
Regime Age	26%	39%
Per capita GDP	23%	22%
Time	1%	1%
Intervention in federal systems	14%	---
Intervention in older regimes	---	15%

Note: For all the dichotomous variables, the probabilities are shown when their values are at 1. For GDP and time, the probabilities are shown at their mean values.

Regional patterns

Recall that the study had hypothesized that regional attributes would have no discernible impact on the relationship between our variables. The statistical tests counter this expectation. A preliminary model was run which indicated that differences exist between the three regions (results not shown). In order to more closely understand attributes specific to each region, logit models were developed for each area. Table 7 presents these results. In Asia, intervention in the aggregate does not attain significance. Interestingly, tests to examine the determinants of intervention showed us that the probability of intervention is lower in cases in Asia (results not shown). Democracy has a very high impact on the likelihood of dialogue in Asia. Per capita GDP and time lapsed since the last negotiations both have a negative impact. In Africa and the Middle East, intervention in the aggregate does not have a systematic impact on dialogue. Democracy and regime are not significant, while per capita GDP and time lapsed has a negative relation. In the former Soviet bloc, only time lapsed since the last negotiations shows a negative relation to the dependent variable.

The results of this model seem somewhat unclear. A closer examination of specific forms of intervention might illuminate the variations between regions more clearly. Table 8 presents these results.

In Asia, international factors, military intervention has a strong negative relations with dialogue, while mediation has a positive relation, although only at the .11 significance level. Interestingly, security guarantees, which have an overall strong relation, do not have a systematic impact on cases in Asia. Among domestic factors, democracy has a positive relation with dialogue. The three control variables have a negative relation with negotiations, consistent with the overall pattern, although regime age was significant only at the .11 level. In Africa and the Middle East, consistent with the overall data, military intervention has a negative relation while mediation and security guarantees have a positive association with our dependent variable. In contrast to cases in Asia, democracy has no significant impact. Among the control variables only per capita GDP has a significant impact on negotiations. Regime age and time are insignificantly associated, but their direction of impact remain positive. In the former Soviet bloc, security guarantees was dropped from this model by the statistical software (STATA) because of inadequate variation. Mediation was found to be highly associated with negotiations. Democracy had no significant relation with the occurrence of dialogue. Among control variables, time has a negative relationship with the dependent variable, but this is significant only at the .11 level. The log of GDP per capita has a statistically insignificant relationship with our dependent variable. None of the cases examined were over fifteen years of age; this variable was dropped from the analysis.

Table 7: Logit models of negotiations for each region

	Asia	Africa & Middle East	Former Soviet Bloc
Intervention	-.104 (.424)	.356 (.418)	1.099 (.829)
Democracy	2.336*** (.809)	.419 (.622)	1.099 (.829)
Federal	-.743 (.606)	---	-.827 (1.351)
Regime age	-.655 (.601)	.231 (.420)	--
GDP per capita (log)	-1.240* (.689)	-.661*** (.268)	-.030 (.819)
Time	-.347*** (.077)	-.388*** (.077)	-.458* (.266)
Constant	8.740* (5.332)	4.607** (1.886)	.093 (.402)
Pseudo R-squared	.198	.121	.293
LR Chi-squared	39.30***	28.89***	23.67***
Number of observations	149	180	60

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
 Note: For Africa, federalism was dropped due to collinearity, none of the cases were federal. For the former Soviet Republics, regime age was dropped due to the same reason.

Table 8: Logit models of negotiations for each region

	Asia	Africa & Middle East	Former Soviet Bloc
<i>International factors</i>			
Economic intervention	.578 (.661)	.036 (.621)	-.656 (.953)
Military intervention	-1.777* (.752)	-1.160** (.454)	.402 (.974)
US Intervention	.186 (.961)	-.835 (.759)	.729 (1.141)
Mediation	1.600 (.936)	2.937*** (.616)	2.815** (.919)
Security guarantees	1.469 (1.490)	3.867*** (1.210)	—
<i>Domestic factors</i>			
Democracy	2.292*** (.758)	.448 (.948)	.884 (.965)
Federalism	.021 (.356)		.550 (1.605)
<i>Control variables</i>			
Regime Age	-1.015 (.571)	-.560 (.568)	—
GDP per capita (log)	-1.569* (.693)	-.940** (.364)	-1.061 (.954)
Time	-.3.08** (.123)	-.136 (.121)	-.517 (.301)
Constant	11.024* (5.433)	.363 (.343)	7.292 (7.476)
Pseudo R-squared	.339	.358	.384
LR Chi-squared	25.14***	85.52***	30.99***
Number of observations	149	180	60

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
 Note: For Africa, federalism was dropped due to collinearity. For the former Soviet Republic, regime age was dropped due to collinearity. Security guarantees was dropped due to inadequate variation.

Table 9 presents probability values for the region-specific models. For Asia, the baseline probability of negotiations organization when all binary variables are held at their minimum value of 0 and all interval variables are held at their mean values is 24%. When democracy is introduced, this likelihood is increased to 72%. Regime age leads to an fifty percent drop to 11%. On the other hand, mediation increase the likelihood to 55%. Military intervention and per capita GDP both reduce the probably of negotiations to 7% while, when time is increased to its maximum value, the probability of negotiation drops to 1%. For Africa, the baseline probably of negotiations is 35%. Mediation increases this to 89% while security guarantees change the likelihood of dialog to a high 93%. Military intervention and GDP both reduce the likelihood of dialogue to 15%. For the former Soviet bloc, the baseline probability is 23%, while mediation increases the likelihood to 73%.

Table 9: Probability values for regions

Variable	Probability for Asia	Probability for Africa	Probability for Socialist Bloc
Baseline probability	24%	35%	23%
Democracy	72%	—	—
Regime Age	11%	—	—
Mediation	55%	89%	73%
Security guarantees	—	93%	—
Military	7%	15%	—
Time	1%	—	—
GDP per capita	7%	15%	—

Note: For all the dichotomous variables, the probabilities are shown when their values are at 1. For GDP and time, the probabilities are shown at their maximum values.

Discussion

The statistical tests present evidence in support of both domestic and international variables. Among political institutions, there is strong and consistent evidence that democratic institutions greatly increase the probability that negotiations will be held between the government and rebel groups. This supports our earlier theorizing that democracy helps reduce some of the commitment barriers to negotiations.

As theorized, military intervention has a significantly negative impact. Clearly, military intervention does have a direct and often immediate impact on the actual costs of fighting. We can interpret this finding to mean that military action

does little to encourage dialogue between the warring actors and in fact discourages it. Because of its fundamentally coercive nature, it does little to address the fear of the state and minority group towards each other. Most third-party actors are not seen as purely neutral. In such a situation, third-party military actors are viewed with particular suspicion.

As expected, mediation has a consistently strong impact on negotiations. As a form of intervention, it is specifically designed to build trust, facilitate communication and provide reliable information (Rothchild 1997). The role of mediation in conflict has been studied fairly extensively in international conflicts, but remains to be understood in domestic conflicts. As international non-coercive intervention in civil wars continues to grow, this is a promising area of future study. This would be a particularly useful area in which to apply the two-level approach, assessing bargaining involving domestic actors on the one hand, and third-party actors on the other.

In the model developed in this paper, the strongest single determinant of conflict management is security guarantees. This finding confirms and extends the argument that credible international guarantees can contribute greatly to both building and sustaining dialogue and eventual peace (Walter 2002). As elaborated by Walter (2002), security guarantees provide tangible international commitments to maintaining the terms of the talks and/or the peace settlement. It follows, therefore, that such guarantees will help provide influence on the occurrence of negotiations. We should note, however, that security guarantees occur very rarely; it is the least used form of intervention. Given the reluctance of the international community to

provide such intervention, alternate forms of effective action should be examined more carefully.

The consistently negative association between regime age and negotiations is interesting. It is possible that regimes that are more durable are more repressive and therefore less likely to initiate negotiations. More durable regimes might also experience a hardening of sentiments and deeply entrenched mistrust between conflict actors. Younger states could be more open to restructuring power distribution through talks because the elites in such conditions do not yet have entrenched interests.

The negative association between GDP and dialogue is also notable, although the strength of this relationship is not very high. Wealthier countries might be less inclined to negotiate with rebel groups because they have greater resources to withstand domestic insurgency and/or international pressure. The inverse link between time lapsed since the last negotiations and the occurrence of negotiations at present time is not surprising. It is to be expected that the longer a conflict continues without dialogue, the less the chance that parties will be willing to trust each other enough to engage in direct talks.

The interaction effects of intervention with domestic variables showed some surprising results. First, third party action in democracies has no systematic effect on negotiations. This finding runs counter to our expectation that international interveners would find it easier to facilitate talks in a polity which already has a system that encourage accommodation. Our results could indicate that because democracies are already inclined towards dialogue, external intervention, in the aggregate, does not have a significant additional impact. In other words, the value

addition of intervention might be greater in autocratic regimes, where the problems of credible commitment is more acute than in democracies.

The specific type of intervention is also significant. In several of the cases where intervention occurred in a democracy, including India, Turkey and Georgia, the third party action was in the form of military assistance to a particular conflict actor. In others, including Moldova, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea, intervention took the form of mediation. The relationship between different intervention forms and regime type would be more closely captured through case study examinations.

Contrary to expectations, intervention in federal regimes has a negative impact on the probability of negotiations. The magnitude of this effect is particularly surprising given that the independent effect of federalism on our outcome variable is insignificant. Interestingly, only about 5% of our cases show intervention in a federal regime. Upon closer examination, the significance of the relationship is determined by three rebellions, occurring over several years, in India. In all three rebellions, there has been repeated military assistance to the militant group by neighboring countries. India's democratic, power-sharing structures encourage minority groups to rebel while seeking autonomy and absorption into the mainstream. The Indian state has addressed some of these grievances and rebellions by creating new states within its federal system, in order to give specific groups greater autonomy. At the same time, India's hostile neighboring environment, particularly its bitter enmity with Pakistan, has exacerbated some of its internal violence. The Indian state has often refused to negotiate with certain militant groups, particularly in the troubled province of Kashmir, which it views as being secessionist and allied with Pakistan. It is more

willing to engage in dialogue with groups that have a milder demand. A fuller exploration of the intersections of intervention and domestic politics in India is beyond the scope of this chapter. The findings of the statistical tests indicate the need for more detailed examinations of significant cases.

Intervention in regimes that are older than fifteen years also yields a negative impact. The cases that influence this relationship include rebellions in China, Laos, India and Indonesia, with the latter two exercising the greatest impact. Why do older regimes have a negative reaction to intervention? In the case of India, the intervention has been in the form of military action by hostile neighbors. India has historically been resistant to external facilitative intervention, as it views such offers as a threat to its sovereignty. Political elites could have a greater resistance to change in older regimes, as they have entrenched interests in the current distribution power. They may also view external facilitative intervention as a challenge to their domestic repressive and/or accommodative capacity. Understanding these links in greater detail necessitates exploring and comparing relevant cases.

Contrary to our hypotheses, regional differences do exist. In Africa and the Middle East, where levels of democratization and institutional capacity are the lowest, international intervention, both in terms of security guarantees and mediation, play the greatest role. In Asia, which has seen a significant increase in democratic countries since the 1970s and where regime age tends to be fairly high, democracy plays a crucial role in facilitating dialogue. Mediation also tends to be important, while security guarantees do not. The former Soviet bloc, which has seen a great deal of regime change in the last fifteen years, has, like Africa, benefited greatly from

intervention. These regional attributes support the finding in the international relations literature that regional variations do exist in conflict resolution (Wilkenfeld 2005) and challenge the idea that local differences do not override the universal determinants of negotiations. The findings also indicate that, where rates of political violence are particularly high and local peace building capacities are low (such as in Africa), active and coercive international action can make a significant difference. The results present here challenge the “one size fits all” conflict management strategies that have been advocated in some studies (see, for example, Walter 2002). It is important to note the criticism that our understanding of regional patterns are often limited by a lack of clarity on the criteria by which we operationalize a particular region; for example, the specific countries that should be included in the “Middle East”. Although regional patterns are of a great deal of interest in the fields of international relations and comparative politics, the literature has not adequately addressed this question (Lemke 2002). In future research focusing on regional variations, a more enhanced understanding of what, specifically, is a region would be developed.

Conclusion

This chapter conducted the first stage of analysis of the impact of international intervention and domestic political institutions on holding negotiations. Democracies have a greater probability of having a negotiation-based approach to resolving conflicts than non-democracies. Among intervention strategies, mediation and security guarantees have the greatest impact. Military intervention tends to decrease the probability of a negotiated settlement. The intersection of intervention with

regime age, democracy and federal yielded some interesting and counterintuitive findings, which merit closer examination through case studies. Contrary to our null hypotheses, regional variations exist in the relative impact of domestic and international variables, thus highlighting a significant gap in the extant literature.

The findings of this chapter suggest that both domestic and international variables play an important role in negotiations. This supports the initial argument that an integrated two-level approach is a more fruitful approach to understanding conflict management than attempting to prioritize one over the other. The next chapter illustrates the effects of our independent variables on the signing of agreements and finds some interesting contrasts to the results of this section.

Chapter 6: Can We Agree? Understanding the Determinants of Agreements

In Chapter 5, we assessed factors that determine the occurrence of direct talks between conflict actors. Direct talks referred to incidences of face-to-face negotiations, with or without the signing of a political agreement. Not all negotiations result in an actual agreement between conflicting parties. This chapter focuses on the conditions which do determine a signed agreement. An agreement is a specific stage of negotiation process, wherein the conflicting parties find and agree upon a set of possible solutions to their conflict. The hypotheses postulated expect that similar forces influence the signing of the agreement as those that determine negotiations. The findings show that, while there are some similarities between the determinants of the two dependent variables, the conditions that influence the *outcome* of a peace process (a peace agreement) is distinct from the process itself, that is, holding negotiations.

Hypotheses

For ease of reference, the hypotheses to be tested here are listed. In light of the findings regarding the determinants of negotiations, some of the hypotheses have been revised.

Hypothesis 1: The probability of agreements is higher in democracies than in autocracies.

Recall that no systematic link was found between federalism and the occurrence of dialogue. This was a counterintuitive finding, given that, theoretically, federal systems provide a preexisting structure conducive to devolving power to localized units and promoting accommodation (Bermeo 2002). As discussed earlier,

the large number of conflicts in India, a federal democracy, exercises a strong influence on this relationship. Because federal structures, by definition, provide power sharing arrangements, we expect that such polities will have a probability of reaching agreements with minority groups, notwithstanding the absence of strong association with negotiations.

Hypothesis 2: The probability of agreement increases if the regime is federal.

We have established that military intervention had a negative impact on the probability of negotiations. We argued that this was because military actions on behalf of either side does not alleviate the fundamental uncertainties underlining an ethnic conflict; nor does it mitigate the credible commitment problems that either or both sides are perceived to have. Following this argument, we expect that military intervention will have a negative impact on the probability of an agreement.

Hypothesis 4: Military intervention will decrease the probability of an agreement

As hypothesized and confirmed in Chapter III, mediation and security guarantees are expected to exercise a positive influence on agreement.

Hypothesis 6: Mediation will increase the probability of an agreement.

Hypothesis 7: Security guarantees will increase the probability of agreement.

The earlier findings showed that intervention by the United States does not have a systematic influence on negotiations. Because of its hegemonic position, the United States has strong reputational concerns when it intervenes in a conflict. It may therefore seek to act only in those conflicts where the probability of success is fairly high. This is one reason that it was not closely involved with the Palestine-Israel negotiations that led to signing of the Oslo Accord (Hancock 2001). We expect that

US involvement will have a positive relation with the presence of an agreement for the following two reasons. First, US intervention presupposes that there is ripeness to the conflict that makes the actors more ready for an agreement. Second, US intervention will bring more resources and power to bear upon the conflicting parties, thereby exercising a greater pressure towards agreement than other potential interveners.

Hypothesis 8: US intervention will increase the probability of an agreement.

We found that regime age has a negative relation with negotiations. Older regimes have more established patterns of behavior and entrenched elite interests. In such cases, there is greater unwillingness on the part of the regime to negotiate power sharing agreements with rebelling groups, as this may alter the status quo. As a result, regime age will have a decreased likelihood of signed agreements.

Hypothesis 9: Older regimes will have a reduced probability of signed agreements.

Recall that our original hypothesis had suggested that, as income levels increase in the state, the probability of a signed agreement decreases. The tests on negotiations showed that the opposite process was at work: dialogue has an inverse relation with per capita GDP. This was a counterintuitive finding. It suggests that increasing wealth might be an indicator of the availability of resources by the state to repress, rather than negotiate, with rebels. In other words, wealthier nations will be less inclined to reach agreements with rebelling groups because the state finds itself in a position of relative strength in comparison with the minority group.

Hypothesis 10: As per capita GDP increases, the probability of a signed agreement will fall.

Results

Fifty-six conflicts were used for the examination in this study. Of these, two conflicts were located in Iraq, one involving the Shiite population and the other, the Kurds. Because of the close involvement of the principal intervener, the United States, as a direct party to the conflict, the Iraqi cases were dropped from the analysis.

Figure 7: Frequency of agreements




Figure 7 shows the frequency of agreements. A substantial proportion of cases, forty-eight percent, have had signed agreements by early 2005. These figures supports findings by other scholars that a significant number of civil conflicts have led to a signed bargain (Gurr 2000; Walter 2002), although the relative strength and durability of the agreements vary. Appendix B lists the cases that do and do not have signed agreements.

It should be noted that the figures presented above do not include tacit agreements. For example, India has ongoing conflicts with different minority groups, such as the Assamese, the Bodos, Nagas, Scheduled Tribes, Tripuras and Kashmiris. The democratic structure of the Indian political system gives room to members of these groups to be absorbed into mainstream conventional politics. Many minority groups agitate for reforms through both conventional and militant means. Aware of this, the Indian government does not seek formal agreements with every, or even the most significant, rebel groups. Offering specific group leaders the opportunity to be absorbed into mainstream politics is often enough to prevent an escalation in the conflict. Other conflicts, such as that by the Igorots in the Philippines, have tapered off into low level hostilities. The strict definition of agreements used in this study is designed to provide conceptual clarity and rigor. In the process, however, some of the more complex nuances of peace processes may have been ignored.

Figure 8: Frequency of intervention, by type




Figure 8 provides data on the frequency of different types of intervention. Intervention occurred in 74% of the cases, with military action being the most frequently used form of action. Third-party actors used mediation in 33% of the cases, while security guarantees were in force in only 26% of the cases. This figure highlights the relative rarity of security guarantees as a conflict management tool, given the cost of such action. The United States had a relatively low level of involvement in ethnic conflicts, occurring in 20% of the cases.

Figure 9: Regionwise distribution of agreements




Figure 9 provides the regionwise distribution of agreements. In the former Soviet bloc, 63% of the cases of conflict had a formal agreement. In Africa, 55% of the cases had an agreement, while in Asia, the proportion fell to only 39%. The Americas recorded only one case of ethnic rebellion, the Mayans in Mexico.

Logit analysis

Since the data presented in this chapter is cross-sectional, with a binary dependent variable, a logit model is used. The models were also run to test for the relative impact of specific regions, namely, Asia, Africa and the Middle East and the former Socialist Bloc. The results were not significant because of the small sample size. Regional effects are discussed through reference to specific cases.

Table 10: Logit models of agreement

<i>Intervention</i>	
Military intervention	-2.86** (1.42)
US Intervention	1.28 (1.81)
Mediation	2.24 (1.65)
Security guarantees	6.10** (2.64)
<i>Institutions</i>	
Democracy	3.42* (1.25)
Federalism	.371 (1.73)
<i>Control variables</i>	
Regime Age	.262 (1.25)
GDP per capita (log)	-4.74*** (1.84)
Constant	32.74*** (12.61)
Pseudo R-squared	.541
LR Chi-squared	40.42***
Number of observations	54

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01

Table 11: Probability values for signed agreements

Variable	Probability
Baseline probability	10%
Military intervention	2%
Security guarantees	87%
Democracy	57%
Per capita GDP	1%
Security guarantees and democracy	99%
Mediation and democracy	86%

Table 10 shows the results of the logit tests.²¹ Overall, our model is significant at the .001 level. As hypothesized, military has a significant, negative relation with agreement. Security guarantees have a positive impact on our dependent variable, as does the presence of democracy. As per capita GDP increases, the probability of reaching a signed agreement decreases. Our hypotheses on US intervention, regime age and federalism must be rejected: none of these variables had a significant impact on the dependent variable.

In order to facilitate interpretation of the logit results, Table 4 presents the changes in predicted probability as the value of each independent variable moves for its minimum value to its maximum. Only the values of the significant variables are shown. The baseline probability of reaching an agreement when all binary intervals are held at their minimum value of 0 (non-occurrence) and all interval variable is held at their mean is only 10%.²² This reflects the inherent difficulty in reaching an agreement in a conflict situation, where uncertainty and credible commitment problems are high.

If military intervention occurs, the probability of having a signed bargain drops sharply to only 2%, showing a strong negative relation between the two variables. When security guarantees are offered, the likelihood of an agreement being signed shows an eight-fold increase to 87%. In democracies, the possibility increases

²¹ It should be noted that collinearity between two of the variables, mediation and security guarantees, affected the strength of the findings. When mediation is incorporated into the model in the absence of security guarantees, it is significantly and positively associated with agreements. When mediations is excluded, the strength of the coefficient of security agreements is increased by a substantial amount. We can conclude that mediation and security guarantees do tend to occur together, but among these, security guarantees has the stronger impact. No other variables were found to be highly correlated.

²² This model has only one interval variable, the log of per capita GDP.

almost six-fold to 57%. When per capita GDP increases to its maximum value, the probability of having an agreement drops to only 1%. When both security guarantees and democracy are held at their maximum values, the probability of having an agreement reaches 99%. A combination of both mediation and democracy yields a likely success rate of 86%. While the interaction terms are not significant, the substantive influence of these terms are important for the purposes of this study and will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Discussion

Negotiations and agreements: What's the difference?

The initial discussion had argued that negotiations and agreements are part of the same process, and will therefore be influenced by the same determinants. The findings of this study support this argument, but only in part.

Table 12 compares the conditions that encourage negotiations to those that facilitate agreements.

Table 12: Factors encouraging negotiations and agreements

Negotiations	Agreements
Democracy (+)	Democracy (+)
Military intervention (-)	Military intervention (-)
Security guarantees (+)	Security guarantees (+)
Per capita GDP (-)	Per capita GDP (-)
Mediation (+)	
Intervention in federal regimes (-)	
Intervention in older regimes (-)	

Recall that, in the analysis of the determinants of negotiations, democracy, security guarantees and mediation were significantly and positively related to the

dependent variable. Military intervention, per capita GDP and intervention in federal and older regimes were negatively related to holding dialogue. The cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of agreements finds that democracy and security guarantees play an important role in both outcomes. Military intervention and per capita GDP have a negative impact on our dependent variable. Mediation has an important impact on negotiations but not agreements. Similarly, the interaction variables had some impact on negotiations but not on agreements. The technical difficulties of incorporating interaction terms into datasets with a limited number of cases may have been the reason for this. Overall, we may conclude that negotiations and agreements share a number of determinants but also have some distinctive determinants.

The relative strength of mediation and security guarantees

Mediation significantly increases the probability of dialogue but does not have a consistently strong impact on signing an agreement. The high level of correlation between mediation and security guarantees indicates that the two variables often occur together. Overall, security guarantees have a stronger influence on agreements. In substantive terms, however, mediation *is* an important factor.

First, as demonstrated earlier, mediation plays an important role in facilitating dialogue, which is a valuable precedent to signing agreements. A process-oriented approach to conflict management should take into account the background conditions that facilitate the final outcome. From such a perspective, mediation is a critical variable. Second, security guarantees occur less frequently than mediation. Given the

high cost of the former, its relative infrequency is not surprising. It is possible that security guarantees are only offered in cases where the likelihood of reaching an agreement are already high. From a policy perspective, this calls for a closer examination of possible alternatives to such costly intervention, such as mediation. In addition, security guarantees are often paired with mediation, indicating that there might be a synergistic impact of the variables that has not been illustrated in the statistical tests.

Given that negotiations are a significant prelude to formal agreements, the conditions that encourage the former are important overall determinants of the peace process. Studies in international crises have suggested that facilitative mediation, which gives actors room to develop their own solutions, may have more long-term success than more directive tactics, such as manipulative mediation (Wilkenfeld et. al. 2003). A similar dynamic is at play in domestic conflicts. Because the actors in a civil war must share territory and governance structures, it is essential, albeit challenging, for them to build mutual trust. It may be more beneficial for the parties to try to find a sustainable common ground through negotiations than directed external action.

In order to understand the relative impact of mediation and security guarantees in reaching an agreement, a closer look at relevant cases will be helpful. Only two conflicts have had security guarantees with no corollary incidence of mediation. In all other cases where security guarantees were offered, mediation occurred as well. In countries such as Sudan and Indonesia, the two forms of

intervention worked concomitantly to achieve agreement between the conflicting parties.

What of the conflicts that involved security guarantees, but not mediation? Both conflicts were related to the UNITA-led civil war in Angola.²³ The United Nations (UN) has been the lead security guarantor in Angola. The UN mission to Angola is acknowledged to be a very weak and marginal actor. In the years following the Lusaka agreement of 1994, the security guarantees offered by the international community were completely ineffective in maintaining the peace. In the wake of the renewed peace efforts in 2002, a UN Mission in Angola was formed in August 2002, which ended in 2003. This mission, too, played a marginal role. Angolan leaders have claimed that it is the relatively minor involvement of the international community that has lent greater credence to the peace talks that facilitated the 2002 accord. There can be little doubt that international pressure and the framing of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol have played an important role in the current peace process. They were not, however, *sufficient* conditions for ending the war. It is also significant that the leaders of Angola have not welcomed strong international intervention, seeing it as a challenge to Angolan sovereignty. This illustration does not intend to argue that international intervention has been futile in the Angolan case. It does however, show the limitations of security guarantees.²⁴

External guarantees can greatly mitigate the credible commitment problems of conflict actors and are undoubtedly an important tool of conflict management (Walter

²³ It should be noted that the model was tested excluding Angola, but this did not impact the overall greater impact of security guarantees.

²⁴ Information on the Angolan case was gathered from MAR, Keesing's Archives and the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Norway (<http://www.cmi.no/about/index.cfm>)

2002). At the same time, such actions merely shift the problem of credible commitment from internal parties to external ones (Saideman 2002a). This is, at best, a short-term solution. Moreover, external parties are generally reluctant to offer security guarantees because of the enormous costs involved. Thus, while noting the importance of third-party security guarantees, alternate forms of intervention should also be explored.

Military intervention

Military intervention has a deleterious effect on both negotiations and agreements. It is often designed to benefit one side over the other. In contrast to security guarantees, military action can be undertaken without the host government. Such action fails to address the problems of mistrust and uncertainty that drive civil conflicts. It should be noted that, in several of our cases, military intervention was undertaken by a biased third party actor (often a neighbor) that had its own interests in perpetuating and/or exacerbating the conflict. Military intervention in the Kashmiri and Assamese conflicts in India as well as conflicts in Turkey (Kurds), Georgia (Ossetians) and Ethiopia are examples of this. In other countries, such as Bosnia and Indonesia, military intervention was undertaken by the international community in order to protect the minority groups from governmental repression. In both cases, sustained military presence became essential in order to overcome the intense mistrust that characterized the conflicts. At the same time, the coercive intervention was part of a larger plan to bring peace. In sum, the intentions that drive military intervention vary widely and can be an important factor in determining the outcome of such action. In general, coercive action of this nature does not help drive

negotiations or agreements, except when it is accompanied by non-coercive intervention.

The deleterious impact of military action poses some interesting policy challenges. How does military action affect the negotiations process? Should military action be taken even if it exacerbates mistrust and precludes dialogue, at least in the short-run? Are there cases where coercive steps are absolutely necessary to prevent a further deterioration? These are some empirical and normative avenues for future research.

Democracy

As hypothesized, democracy is a strong determinant of both negotiations and agreements. At first glance, this is not a surprising finding, given that democratic structures provide pre-existing structures for sharing power. Democratic governments are, by their very nature, more receptive to dissent and more willing to address minority grievances. It should be noted, however, that the association between democracy and agreements is not totally straightforward. Case contextualization is important. If India is excluded from the dataset, the significance of democracy as an independent variable falls from the .06 level to .10 level, although the relationship remains positive. The large number of conflicts in India, a democratic developing country, clearly has a significant influence on the cross-national relation between democratic structure and an agreement. Certainly, the relative success of the Indian government in managing minority groups grievances is worthy of study and emulation by other developing countries. At the same time, it is worthwhile to ask why, overall, we do not see *an even greater* association between preexisting

democratic structures and agreements. This seems to be a counterintuitive finding , given that scholars have argued that the spread of democracy helps mitigate civil conflicts (Gurr 2000; Mason 2003).

To be clear, the argument being made at this stage is that the relationship between democracy and peace processes is very complex. The results show that, even without Indian cases, democracies have a far higher probability of holding dialogue than non-democracies. They also have a greater incidence of signing agreements, although the strength of this relationship is not as high as with dialogue. The question therefore arises: why is this relationship not as strong as we may expect it to be? What are the dynamics that could prevent a democracy from signing a powersharing agreement even after it has engaged in dialogue? What role does international intervention play in this process? The case study of Sri Lanka, a democratic country with a history of negotiations but not agreement, will illustrate some of these processes.

It is also important to note that, in some cases, democracies do not need formal agreements to make credible commitments to rebelling groups. The Indian government, for example, has a history of negotiating with mainstream political leaders belonging to militancy-affected states. At times, it has successfully offered militant leaders the opportunity to enter regular politics. These actions are possible because India's democratic structure allows for the absorption of opposing voices into the political system. In such situations, although the condition of having a signed agreement with a militant group has not been met, the conflict has been managed through negotiations. In other cases, decisional constraints in democracies may make

it more difficult for governments to sign definitive agreements with militants. Understanding peace processes that have not yielded signed bargains can yield valuable insights into the different ways in which credible commitments can be made. The progress, or lack thereof, from negotiations to agreements is a complex dynamic, which is examined in greater detail in the study of Sri Lanka.

Interaction effects: Can we discern any systematic effects?

Although the interaction effects did not yield significant results, we can still examine the intersection between domestic and international variables by examining specific cases. Table 5 shows the list of democratic countries which reached agreements *without* the assistance of security guarantees.

Table 13: Democracies that signed agreements without external security guarantees

Country	Group
Moldova	Gagauz
Mali	Tuareg
Senegal	Diolas
India	Sikhs
India	Bodos
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tribes
Papua New Guinea	Bouganvilles

In Papua New Guinea and Mali, mediation by the international community played an important role in facilitating dialogue and settlement. This suggests that international non-coercive intervention can play a critical role in the peace process. In Bangladesh and India, the process of dialogue was primarily a function of domestic initiatives, although intervention by neighboring countries did play a role in history of the conflict. Similarly, in Mali, while the state of democracy is not strong, the lure of electoral politics has helped facilitate the peace process. In Senegal, India, Moldova and Papua New Guinea, the democratic political systems were strong incentives for

the rebel groups to enter the mainstream process. An examination of these cases shows us that, when the domestic political context is reasonably stable and democratic, external security guarantees become unnecessary. This fact has been rarely noted in existing studies of civil war.

What, then, of the role of international intervention in non-democracies?

Table 6 lists countries which reached agreements in the absence of *both* democracy and external security guarantees.

Table 14: . Non-democracies that signed agreements without external security guarantees

Country	Group
Niger	Tuareg
Chad	Southerners
Burundi	Hutus
Djibouti	Afars
Myanmar (Burma)	Rohingyas
Myanmar (Burma)	Kachins
Myanmar (Burma)	Mons
Myanmar (Burma)	Nuba

These cases reveal a mixed pictures. Overall, they do tend to support the argument that international intervention is essential for a viable peace agreement in countries where domestic political institutions do not lend themselves to credible powersharing arrangements. In Niger, Chad and Burundi, mediation played a critical role in reaching agreements. In Chad and Burundi, the stability of the peace processes has been hampered by the absence of security guarantees. In Chad, the peace process has been facilitated by active intervention diplomatic and economic interests; however, the situation there remains unstable in the absence of strong domestic institutions and heavy international action. In Burundi, active mediation by South Africa and, in particular, of Nelson Mandela played an instrumental role in having the conflict actors sign a peace treaty. The absence of a ceasefire agreement and the

chronic weakness of the country's institutions ensured, however, that the peace process continued to falter. In 2003-2004, prospects seemed to greatly improve because a ceasefire agreement was signed and a United Nations-sponsored observer mission was assigned to the country. The Burundi case illustrates the need for heavy-handed intervention in a weak state. This stands in stark contrast to countries like Senegal or India.

Of the eight cases listed in Table 14, four are in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma. Like India, the large number of ethnic conflicts in Myanmar, an authoritarian polity, exercises a strong impact on the results. Myanmar is a highly diverse country, affected by numerous ethnic conflicts and one of the world's most secretive and brutal regimes. Several groups have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government in exchange for some sort of localized administrative authority. These agreements do not represent a great willingness of the Myanmar ruling junta to share power. Rather, they are a reflection of two factors. First, the regime has vastly superior military power, forcing rebel groups to compromise. Second, the striking diversity of the country makes it prudent for the junta to reach ceasefire arrangements with various ethnic minorities. Most organizations that represent minority groups are banned and face severe restrictions on their activities. Thus, the agreements signed between the Burmese government and the rebel groups cannot be seen as an example of credible powersharing arrangements. Brutal repression continues to mark the government's attitude towards the minority groups. In many ways, the structure and nature of Myanmar politics defies categorization or generalizations.

Table 15 compares the determinants of negotiations and agreements, if conflicts in Myanmar is removed from the dataset. The exclusion of this country from the dataset increases the significance and strength of democracy in the overall model. Mediation also attains positive significance.

Table 15: Factors encouraging negotiations and agreements, without Myanmar

Negotiations	Agreements
Democracy (+)	Democracy (+)
Military intervention (-)	Military intervention (-)
Security guarantees (+)	Security guarantees (+)
Per capita GDP (-)	Per capita GDP (-)
Mediation (+)	Mediation (+)
Intervention in federal regimes (-)	
Intervention in older regimes (-)	

Table 16 shows the list of non-democratic countries where agreements were facilitated by security guarantees.

Table 16: Non-democracies that signed agreements with external security guarantees

Country	Group
Bosnia	Serb
Bosnia	Croat
Sierra Leone	Temne
Democratic Republic of Congo	Tutsis
Angola	Bakongo
Angola	Ovimbundu
Sudan	Southerners
Sudan	Nuba

In all of the above countries, the absence of democratic structures prevents the state from making sustained and credible power sharing overtures to minority groups. In these cases, security guarantees become a *substitute* for the absence of domestic institutional power sharing arrangements. Should the external guarantor revoke its security arrangements, it is likely the peace agreement would falter almost

immediately. The kind of intervention that has been called for in these countries are very different from those that do have reasonably strong, pre-existing political structures.

National income

As hypothesized, per capita GDP has a negative relationship with agreements and negotiations. An examination of cases with higher or lower than mean levels of per capita GDP does not reveal a systematic pattern. It is possible, as suggested earlier, that income levels are positively correlated with repression capabilities of the government. Wealthier states might be reluctant to negotiate with rebel groups because they feel more assured of a military victory. Further investigation of this variable is necessary in order to capture the true relationship between national wealth and the peace process.

Conclusion

This study examined the factors that determine the occurrence of signed agreements. Security guarantees and democracy exercise a strong, positive influence on agreements. Military intervention and increasing per capita GDP reduces the probability of an agreement being signed. Mediation has a positive relationship with the outcome variable, if the conflicts in Myanmar, which did not have mediation, are excluded from the analysis. If the Myanmar cases are included, the relationship between mediation and agreement loses significance. While interaction terms were not significant, this could be the result of sampling restrictions. A case-by-case

approach reveals some interesting insights into the possible interaction effects of domestic and international variables.

The differences between the conditions that facilitate the two outcome variables highlight the complexities of the peace process. What are the internal and external conditions that encourage democracies to hold negotiations with rebelling groups? Why do these negotiations fail to reach a settlement? The effect of regime type on the peace process has been subject to surprisingly little research. It is particularly interesting that democracies tend to have a stronger relationship with negotiations than with agreements. The results of this chapter call for further examination of the conditions under which dialogue between the conflicting parties can be converted to peace settlements. The findings of this study call for a deeper exploration of this dynamic, which is provided by the case study of Sri Lanka.

Chapter 7: Double-Edged Diplomacy: A Case Study of Sri Lanka

Introduction

The statistical findings in the last two chapters pointed to some intriguing intersections between international and domestic factors. The results suggested that the peace process in a protracted ethnic conflict is determined both by the actions of external actors in which the state is situated and the domestic political structure. The fact that democracies have a higher occurrence of negotiations but a weaker association with agreements is intriguing. Also surprising is the absence of a systematic effect of intervention in a democracy on dialogue between conflict actors. This chapter will explore the challenges of intervention in a conflict-affected democracy.

Why are democracies more amenable to dialogue but less so to agreements? Theoretically, democratic regimes are more transparent and receptive to both dissent and power sharing. These factors should make them more willing and able to compromise with rebelling groups (Gurr 2000; Mason 2003). Where democratic institutions have been manipulated and weakened through the practice of ethnic outbidding, the credibility of political structures declines. Ethnic outbidding occurs when political parties compete with each other to stake claim to an exclusionary, ethnonationalist platform. If ethnic outbidding comes to characterize the functioning of the democracy, institutions can no longer mediate conflicts between groups. The challenge of balancing competing claims to state power and resources becomes very complex. Electoral competition can make it difficult for the government to seek a

compromise solution with rebel groups, particularly if the latter are perceived to threaten national integrity and unity.

What role, if any, can international intervention can play in such countries? External interveners often have to grapple with deep divisions *within* the conflict-affected government. The lack of a unitary voice in the state poses challenges for third parties that have not been adequately examined in the existing literature. Being receptive to international intervention, especially if it involves foreign military presence, can make the government vulnerable to accusations of weakness and trigger a nationalist backlash. Low- key intervention, which facilitates, rather than forces, the peace process is a more useful conflict management tool in such cases.

This chapter will undertake a detailed analysis of the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka in order to assess the intersections between domestic and international factors. Examining the Sri Lankan case will enable us to understand the role of different forms of coercive and facilitative intervention, allowing us to explore some of our statistical findings regarding the efficacy of third-party action. Additionally, the case will shed light on the effect of intervener bias, resulting from India's close interest and involvement in the conflict.

Sri Lanka

The tiny island nation of Sri Lanka has a population of about 19 million people. While the last all-island census was taken in 1981, estimated statistics released by Sri Lanka's Central Bank suggests that the ethnic composition of the country is as follows: 74 per cent Sinhalese, 12.6 per cent Sri Lankan Tamils, 5.5 per cent Indian Tamils and 7.1 per cent Muslims (deVotta 2004; Rotberg 1999;

<http://www.priu.gov.lk/TourCountry/Indextc.html>). Since 1980s, Sri Lanka has faced a protracted violent conflict, led by the militant Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE has demanded a separate and independent state for the Tamil minority population. The Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan government (GoSL) has refused to acquiesce to this. The rebellion has mainly affected the northeastern part of the country. Other parts of the country have also suffered from the violence associated with the conflict and the economic havoc it has created. The devastating effects of the war have affected the vast social and economic potential of this country, once hailed as the next Singapore of Asia.

Political institutions

Sri Lanka has several of the main “ingredients” of our study. First, the country has reasonably strong political institutions (Hironaka 2005). Sri Lanka inherited an effective bureaucratic and juridical structure from the British. In most of the country, the government enjoys territorial sovereignty and sufficient military capability. Despite the long-standing conflict in the Jaffna peninsula, the rest of the country has experienced ‘regular’ life and a strong civil society (Hironaka 2005; Luttwak 2001).

Specific to the concerns of this study, Sri Lanka is a long-standing democracy with an active and competitive multiparty system. Among the two kind of institutions examined in our quantitative analysis (federalism and democracy), our quantitative analysis found that democracy has a significant, positive impact on the occurrence of negotiations. We had suggested that democracy is an important predictor because it provides transparent power-sharing mechanisms to overcome the commitment

problems that can be a barrier to negotiations. There are, however, some concerns that have been expressed regarding the efficacy of developing countries and their ability to mediate conflicts (Kohli 1991; Snyder 2000). Given Sri Lanka's long history with competitive party politics, a close examination of this case will illustrate the ways in which democratic institutions in a developing country may help or hinder the peace process.

History of intervention

Although the Sri Lankan conflict has been subject to relatively little discussion in Western media and policy circles, it has had a long history of international intervention. Broadly speaking, there have been two major phases of external action. The first phase involved a high level of diplomatic and military intervention by the country's powerful neighbor, India. This intervention culminated in India's controversial, and ultimately failed, military incursion and subsequent withdrawal in 1990. The next major phase of intervention began in 1997 and has involved mediation by Norway.²⁵

The following section will provide a brief history of the conflict from the period of British colonial rule till the riots of 1983, which led to a dramatic escalation in the intensity of the conflict. Next, I will present a brief examination of active Indian military intervention, ending with the withdrawal of Indian peacekeeping troops in 1990. The following sections will provide a description of events following the withdrawal and the current phase of Norwegian intervention.

²⁵ There was a minor and unproductive intervention by Britain in 1997-98. Japan, a major donor to Sri Lanka, has also been interested in seeing a resolution to the conflict. India has continued to play an influential role, but with a diminished intensity of involvement.

A Brief History of the Conflict

Prior to 1948, Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) was a British colony. As in many of its other colonies, the British encouraged the development of a small group of cosmopolitan officials, who would be conversant in English and have a sense of loyalty to the government system. As a result of historical concentration of educational facilities in the Jaffna Peninsula, Tamils, who were in a majority in this area, came to dominate this English-speaking group. Much of the Sinhala population was excluded from this elite circle, in part because the Sinhala Buddhist priesthood discouraged Western education. Notwithstanding some episodes of political disagreement between leaders of the two communities, relations between the two communities was largely harmonious during, and immediately after, British rule (Bullion 1995; Snyder 2000; Tambiah 1986).

Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain through a peaceful transfer of power in 1948. From its inception, it was a parliamentary democracy. While the first few post-independence years were marked by a great deal of optimism, ethnic strife was soon to become a scarring and permanent feature of Sri Lankan politics.

The issue of language quickly became a deeply divisive one. In the 1950s, Sinhala and Tamil leaders held discussions on giving both languages, Tamil and Sinhala, equal and official positions in the country. This was met with opposition from Sinhala nationalists who sought primacy for their language. This period was marked by intense political campaigning by Buddhist monks, who were at the forefront of Sinhala nationalist politics. Their actions were reciprocated by Tamil

politicians who resorted to their own brand of chauvinism. Suspicious of Sinhala domination, they sought autonomy for their community. The rhetoric of the time fuelled fears on both sides of the ethnic divide regarding the other group's intentions (Austin 1995; Bullion 1995; Snyder 2000; Tambiah 1986).

Acquiescing to the demands of the Sinhala nationalists, the government enacted the Official Language Act in 1956, which instituted Sinhalese as the sole official language. This was met with a great deal of opposition from the Tamil population. In response, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, held discussions with the leader of the Tamil Federal Party, S. Chelvanayakam. These talks led to the signing of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam (B-C) Pact in 1957. The agreement called for greater status being accorded to the Tamil language and devolution of powers between the two communities. News of the agreement led to the proposed Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958. News of the legislation led to a violent backlash from Sinhala nationalists. This led to another bout of ethnic outbidding, as rival political leaders tried to attract the Sinhala vote by attacking Bandaranaike's attempts at power sharing. In 1959, Bandaranaike was assassinated by a Buddhist monk. By the time of his assassination, ethnic outbidding had become a standard feature of Sinhala politics. The main political parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLPF) competed with each other to prove they were the true defenders of Sinhala dominance. Sri Lankan politics became marked by competing and clashing claims of Tamil and Sinhala nationalism. As a result, significant parts of the B-C Pact lay abandoned, fuelling fears among the Tamils (Bullion 1995; DeVotta 2004; Snyder 2000).

The UNP won the election of 1965; subsequently, contrary to its pre-election, pro-Sinhala rhetoric, it signed a power sharing pact with Tamil leaders. As had happened with earlier such agreements, the pact collapsed under public pressure. As the Sri Lankan economy faltered and unemployment increased, the government increasingly resorted to populist moves fuelling Sinhala nationalism.

A new constitution in 1972 established the Republic of Sri Lanka. The constitution emphasized the unitary nature of the state. It also made Buddhism the foremost religion and Sinhalese the dominant language. In 1973, the government introduced a system of positive discrimination in favor of Sinhalese candidates in university admissions, resulting in a fall in educational and employment opportunities for educated Tamil youth.

In 1977-78, a new presidential-parliamentary style of government was established wherein the President of the country was invested with expansive powers. Theoretically, this system would encourage power sharing. In practice, however, it would only lead to a paralysis in decision-making amidst power struggles between the Prime Minister and the President. Successive governments in Sri Lanka would support greater rights for Tamils but back down in the face of Sinhala opposition. As a result, Tamil groups looked upon government proposals with cynicism and demands for a separate state became more entrenched.

It was during this period that Tamil militancy came to the fore. Young Tamil activists were influenced in part by the violent actions of the ultra nationalist leftist student movement of the JVP. The JVP insurrection helped provide the catalyst for the radicalization of the Tamil youth, by demonstrating the weaknesses of the Sri

Lankan government (Bullion 1995). The Tamil New Tigers was formed in 1972; this group was to become the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976.

1983 marked a significant escalation in ethnic polarization and violence. On 23 July 1983, Tamil militants killed thirteen soldiers in Jaffna. This was followed by indiscriminate rioting in Colombo, where Tamil civilians were brutally attacked and killed. Politicians and government officials openly participated in the violence and President Jayawardene showed little, if any, regret for the situation. The riots directly led to the creation of a large Tamil refugee population, both within and outside the country. There was an exodus of Tamils to Europe, North America and neighboring India. The incidents also led to a marked radicalization of the LTTE.

The Tamil diaspora that had been displaced after the 1983 riots helped create a global militant movement. The movement had strong bases in India and in several Western countries. The group evolved into one of the world's most disciplined, well-funded and well-organized militant organizations. The LTTE has waged a brutal and effective campaign against the Sri Lankan forces (DeVotta 2004; Sislin and Pearson 2001).

Intervention by India: From Security Guarantor to Military Intrusion

Because of the island's geographical location and strong kinship links between the Tamil populations in the two countries, India has a long-standing interest in political developments in Sri Lanka,. As demands for autonomy grew among Sri Lankan Tamils, the central Indian government became concerned with the impact this would have on India's restive southern state, Tamil Nadu. India's position over the conflict was, however, riddled with internal contradictions. On the one hand, officials

believed that the growth of Tamil militancy might encourage secessionist movements in India's own troubled provinces. On the other hand, India's central government and the state government of Tamil Nadu were playing their own brand of ethnic outbidding. Political parties in Tamil Nadu vied with one another to support Tamil autonomy and secessionist demands. The central government supported these moves in order to garner Tamil votes. Additionally, the Indian government was concerned with Sri Lankan President Jayewardene's post-1977 pro-Western policies and sought to enhance its own influence over the country. As a result, the Indian government adopted a muddled, twin-track policy. LTTE and other militant groups were initially trained by India's intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing. At the same time, India became a mediator between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil militants (Bullion 1995).

In December 1984, the Jayewardene government dropped a proposal it had developed to give more autonomy to the Tamils. The draft legislature was to have set up provincial councils and a second legislative chamber for the Tamils. The proposed Bill had been attacked by the Buddhist clergy and Sinhala-Buddhist organizations. This had alarmed politicians fearful of losing their support base. The agreement was also opposed by the Tamil United Liberation Front for falling short of its demands for regional autonomy. The proposal was abandoned despite international pressure from India, the US and the World Bank (De Silva 1984; UPI 1984)).

Relations between India and Sri Lanka improved when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi came to power in 1984. In a seemingly significant breakthrough, he

convinced President Jayewardene to hold talks with separatist Tamil groups, including the LTTE, under Indian mediation (Silver 1985a). Sri Lankan authorities met with representatives of five major Tamil guerrilla groups in Thimpu, Bhutan for two rounds of talks from July 8-13 and August 12-17. The first round of talks went off fairly amicably, with the government agreeing to free 600 Tamil guerrilla suspects and lift a night curfew in Jaffna. During the talks, there were discussions over the creation of provincial councils in the Tamil areas of the north and east of the island. However, the councils' power over key subjects such as law and order and land settlement were contentious issues over which no agreement was reached (Elliott 1985b).

During this time, however, each side criticized the other for violating the ceasefire and procuring more weapons. On August 17, the Tamils withdrew from the talks following an outburst of violence in the northern Sri Lankan town of Vavuniya. At the same time, relations between the Indian government and the Tamil militants also deteriorated. India ordered the deportation of some militant leaders, including Anton Balashingham, a key figure in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The government also arrested a number of Tamil sympathizers who had protested the deportations. These actions fuelled discontent and suspicions among Tamils against Rajiv Gandhi's government. While the move was designed to pressure the Tamils to move towards a peaceful settlement, it may have served to reduce India's credibility amongst the minority group (Jenkins 1985). These episodes were followed by an escalation in violence between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan forces.

As the talks floundered, Jayewardene resorted to nationalist rhetoric to placate Sinhala nationalists. He announced that he would not compromise with terrorists. At this time, the two sides reflected a high degree of intransigence. The Sri Lankan government was unwilling to offer anything more than devolution of power at the level of district councils; but this was not adequate for the Tamils (Tenorio 1985). During the talks, President Jayewardene's ability to make concessions was hampered by a new alliance between his Sinhalese rival, the People's Alliance, and the Buddhist clergy. Sinhala nationalists launched a campaign against the peace talks and threatened to expel Tamils from Kandy, a major center of Buddhist pilgrimage in Sri Lanka. In sum, neither side was willing to compromise (Elliott 1985c; Silver 1985c, d; Weisman 1985). Following the collapse of talks, new fighting erupted between the two sides..

The Indian government continued with its efforts. It held negotiations with both sides; however, there were no direct meetings between the conflict actors. On June 18, 1985 a ceasefire was established between Tamil extremists and the security forces with the help of Indian negotiators. The latter convinced the Sri Lankan government to agree to the Tamil demand that the ceasefire monitoring team be constituted with both Tamil and Sinhala members (Silver 1985b).

In October 1985, Rajiv Gandhi met Jayewardene at the Commonwealth meeting and tried afresh to persuade him to negotiate a permanent treaty. In New Delhi, a working paper was developed to propose a devolved form of provincial government; however this was rejected by the LTTE for not addressing their needs and demands adequately. In the meantime, the Sri Lankan government set up a

national armed reserve force with powers of compulsory recruitment, increasing concerns that the government was seeking a military, rather than a negotiated, solution (1985; Elliott 1985a; Press 1985)).

By 1986, talks had broken down completely and there was a marked escalation in violence in the Jaffna Peninsula. This period also witnessed deterioration in Indo-Sri Lankan relations. The Sri Lankan government accused the Tamil Nadu government of patronizing the Tamil militants. In a controversial move, the Indian government violated the ongoing economic blockage of Jaffna by air-dropping food over the region. At the same time, the two governments held secret talks, leading to the signing of the 1987 peace accord, wherein an Indian peacekeeping force would be sent as a security guarantor in the Jaffna region.

The accord was met with extreme opposition from both Tamil militant and Sinhala nationalists. Tamil militants were enraged that discussions leading to the pact excluded their direct involvement. They were also suspicious of the fact that the accord gave primacy to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. Sinhala nationalists were unhappy with Indian involvement, which they viewed as a “selling out” to Indian dominance. The extent of Sinhala hostility to the accord can be gauged by the violent backlash against the government led by the JVP (Tambiah 1992).

Per the terms of the Accord, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to the Jaffna Peninsula to help maintain peace. From the outset, the IPKF operation was poorly managed and executed. By October 1987, relations between the IPKF and the Tamil population had deteriorated to the extent that India launched Operation Pawan (Wind) as a full-scale assault on LTTE. Thus, the IPKF’s role changed from a

security guarantor and a protector of Tamils to an enemy force, hated alike by the Tamils and the Sinhala. This was accompanied by an increasingly confrontational relationship between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayewardene. Jayewardene realized that the situation with IPKF was becoming politically untenable for him. The Indian Prime Minister was, however, unwilling to withdraw the troops. Paradoxically, Jayewardene himself was supplying arms to the LTTE to fight the IPKF (Bullion 1995).

In December 1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa, an ally of Jayewardene, became President of Sri Lanka. An outspoken critic of the Accord, Premadasa demanded an immediate withdrawal of Indian troops. He was supported in his demands by Sinhala nationalists and the Buddhist clergy. By now, national opposition to Indian presence was fierce. Towards the end of his own term, Rajiv Gandhi agreed to the withdrawal, which was finalized by his successor, V.P. Singh (Bullion 1995).

The IPKF operation was a disastrous peacekeeping mission. It served only to entrench the hostilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government and to tarnish the reputation of the Indian army. The departure of the IPKF ended the fragile ceasefire. The LTTE declared the onset of Eelam War II and a new phase of military hostilities started. “Not only did the Indian intervention fail to achieve its goals; it was actually *counterproductive* [emphasis in the original]”. The Tamils’ experience with the harshness of the IPKF operation cemented their commitment to fighting for an independent state (Bose 1994).

The Indian intervention shows the limitations of third-party action, even when the actor in question is a powerful one. India’s diplomatic initiatives failed because of its own muddled position and because of perceptions of bias. During much of the

time, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) believed that the Indian government was in favor of the LTTE. During the IPKF operation, however, it was clear to the LTTE that Indian troops were there to fight the group. In sum, *both sides* to the conflict resented and mistrusted Indian involvement, destroying any credibility that India might have enjoyed. In addition, the experience of Indian involvement showed that, in the absence of direct talks between the conflicting parties, little progress can be achieved. Finally, the failure of India's military excursion underlines the dangers of such action, particular in countries with a strong sense of sovereignty and national identity, such as Sri Lanka

Failed Peace Moves

During the earlier phase of the conflict, the military situation on the ground was unstable. The conflict actors were unwilling to discuss a peace without first attempting to gain a military victory. In the 1990s, it became more apparent that a military victory was unlikely; at this time, the conflict actors became more receptive to the idea of a negotiated settlement.

In 1994, the left-wing People's Alliance (PA), under the leadership of Chandrika Kumaratunga, won parliamentary elections in a virtual landslide. One of the PA's principal election planks had been a promise to initiate talks with the LTTE. The party's victory showed significant popular support for peace moves. After coming to power, Kumaratunga lifted the ongoing embargo on the LTTE-dominated Jaffna peninsula and called for dialogue with the militant group (Economist 1994). In October 1994, as a significant confidence-building measure, the Sri Lankan government (GoSL) released 13 LTTE prisoners. These moves were welcomed by the

international community, including India, the United States and the European Union. The GoSL also announced that it would curb the emergency powers that had given the army and the police wide powers of search, arrest and detention since the early 1970's. In announcing these steps, Kumaratunga had to override the objections of the military. Despite her apparent sincerity in moving the peace process forward, there were concerns that she would not be able to actually implement reforms. She enjoyed only a slim majority in the parliament and it was more than likely that others in her party would resist surrendering political power to the Tamils (Burns 1994). The first round of talks centered on relaxing economic sanctions on rebel strongholds in the north and opening a safe land route for civilian traffic to and from the Jaffna peninsula.

During this period, the two sides continued to engage in military hostilities, raising doubts on the viability of the peace talks (Eliatamby 1994; File 1994). While initial talks between the LTTE and the government were welcomed by the war-weary population (Ram 1998), the optimism was short-lived as talks faltered. The LTTE's intransigence was highlighted on October 24 when presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake and at least 56 others were killed in a massive blast triggered by a LTTE suicide bomber. The attack occurred just two weeks before the presidential elections, scheduled for November 9, 1994. In response, the government suspended peace talks with the group (Jayasinghe 1994).

After winning the presidential election, her second electoral victory in three months, Prime Minister Kumaratunga announced that she would resume talks with

the Tamil Tigers rebels. One of her main campaign platforms had been seeking peace with the militants and her victory indicated public support for this.

In July 1995, information was released that, in an attempt to satisfy Tamil rebel demands for self-rule, the government was proposing to make Sri Lanka a federation of eight regions, each with wide powers. One region would be Tamil-dominated. Almost immediately, the move was opposed by the powerful Buddhist clergy (Eliatamby 1995). A day after both Tamil rebels and the government praised the new peace plan, fresh violence left at least 200 rebels dead (Cruetz 1995). Thus, the first part of 1995 was dominated by heavy fighting, despite some indications that the government was considering the devolution of powers. Each side blamed the other for the failures of successive offerings of a truce. During this time, international support for the Sri Lankan government grew as many outside parties blame the LTTE for the continuing violence (1995).

During the intense fighting in 1995, the Sri Lankan army seemed to gain the upper hand. At this time, the GoSL was following a twin-track strategy of offering devolution while also hardening its military stance (Nicholson 1995). In December 1995, the Sri Lankan scored one of its biggest victories over the LTTE by capturing Jaffna, but a political solution to the conflict remained elusive (Max 1995). Many analysts believed that the depiction of this capture as a conquest deepened the rift between the two communities, making the possibility of a negotiated settlement even weaker (Hosain 1995). During this time, there were no direct negotiations between the conflict actors.

In sum, the ongoing policy of ethnic outbidding ensured that the government was unable and unwilling to offer tangible autonomy to the Tamils. For its part, the LTTE was also not committed to the peace process. When the group declared Eelam War III in 1995, it became evident that the militants had been using the 1994 ceasefire to regroup and rearm. In sum, there was an absence of credibility of either side in terms of a sincere commitment to the peace process.

In 1997, the Sri Lankan government made a renewed push for peace by trying to obtain a broader consensus on devolution while continuing its military activities against the LTTE. Then British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Liam Fox, engaged in shuttle diplomacy to encourage the two sides to try to work a bilateral approach towards resolving the conflict. The Fox initiative tried to iron out the differences between the two major political parties in Sri Lanka. Under the Fox mediated arrangement, the government was required to consult the opposition leader and keep him informed of any efforts to resolve the conflict with the LTTE. The opposition was obliged not to undermine any such effort and to guarantee the continuance of the policy if and when it came to power (Jeyaraj 1998).

As before, neither the opposition nor the ruling party seemed to show a commitment to abiding by the spirit of cooperation to which they had both agreed. The two sides did not wish to share the credit or the responsibility for the peace process. After a turnover of power in Britain, the new British government began to lose interest in being involved in the peace process; thus, there was also a lack of sustained third-party interest (Jeyaraj 1998). The LTTE, too, continued to arm itself, underlining its own reluctance to follow a negotiations-based approach. The Sri

Lankan government's postponement of provincial elections and renewed military operations in the north underscored the lack of credibility of its peace overtures. In sum, neither the government nor the LTTE were showing a serious commitment to finding a negotiated solution to the crisis.

Norwegian Intervention

From 1998, the two sides appeared more willing to engage in dialogue. This was facilitated by a growing interest from Norway (Rotberg 1999), and a realization that the conflict had reached a position of political and military stalemate. In 1999-2000, the Sri Lankan government faced a number of military setbacks against the LTTE. This was accentuated by the Indian government's refusal to help the Sri Lankan military despite a request from President Kumaratunga. On the diplomatic front, the GoSL seemed to be gaining ground over the LTTE. The United States released a strong statement supporting the GoSL and saying that an independent Tamil state would lack international recognition (Subramaniam 2000c). This was significant not only in the political boost it gave to the government; but also in its reiteration to the LTTE that its attempts to win international legitimacy for its secessionist campaign were failing. This realization was to have an important bearing on its actions in subsequent years. Thus, international pressure pushed both sides in the conflict towards attempting to find a political solution.

Norway began to take an increasingly active role in the peace process, holding meetings with senior members of both the Sri Lankan government and opposition, as well as with LTTE members. An official announcement was made that the Scandinavian country would facilitate discussions between the two sides. Sri Lanka's

interest in Norwegian involvement was encouraged in part by India's support of the same. India had in the past expressed a strong disapproval of the involvement of bigger powers, such as the United States, in the conflicts of the region (Jeyaraj 2000).

An important dimension to the latest peace process was growing cooperation between the government and the Opposition leader, Ranil Wickremesinghe. The political rivals met on several occasions to agree to a draft constitution that would provide Tamils some devolution. The proposed new constitution was, however, a victim of the ethnic outbidding that has plagued Sri Lanka for decades. Hardline Buddhist monks and other Sinhalese nationalist opposed the proposal on the grounds that it relinquished too much to the Tamils. In response to its pressure, Kumaratunga postponed the vote on a constitutional reform bill in August 2000 (Ganguly 2004). Keen to avoid losing the nationalist vote, both the President and the Opposition leader publicly declared that they would take decisive steps only after consultation with Buddhist monks (DeVotta 2004). The growing strength of Sri Lankan nationalist parties, such as the JVP contributed to the unwillingness of the leading parties to take bold decisions on the conflict (Subramaniam 2000a, b).

Tamil parties, already unhappy with what they perceived was a watered down proposal giving Tamils only limited powers, responded to this move with increasing mistrust. Even those Tamil parties that had earlier supported the proposed new constitution now opposed it. It became apparent that the government would not be able to get the required two-thirds majority in Parliament to pass the new constitution, and the proposals were shelved.

Despite this setback in the domestic setting, Norway continued in its facilitative efforts. From the outset, Norway faced difficulties in getting the two parties to even engage in talks. As a precondition for holding talks, the LTTE demanded the removal of the ban on it. On the other hand, the government demanded that the LTTE should first drop its demand for a separate state and suspend its armed struggle. The GoSL and Sinhala nationalists were suspicious of Norway's overtures to the LTTE. These groups alleged that the Scandinavian country was biased in favor of Tamil separatists. As before, neither side seemed committed to holding substantive talks aimed at finding a compromise to end the conflict.

In mid-2001, two developments threatened the future of the talks. First, the military hostilities increased with a renewed battle for Jaffna (Ganguly 2001; 2001). In July 2001, Sri Lanka was devastated by a LTTE suicide attack on the international airport in Colombo (Jeyaraj 2001). Second, instability within the GoSL threatened the peace process. After one of her allies walked out of the governing alliance, President Kumaratunga lost her parliamentary majority. In order to re-establish her position, the President stepped up attacks on the opposition UNP, accusing them of being too soft on the LTTE (Jayasinghe 2001c). This prevented a consensus from building on one of the key demands of the LTTE. The Tigers had asked that a ban on their organization be lifted as a precondition for direct dialogue. The ruling party insisted, however, that the ban would be lifted only after negotiations began (Jayasinghe 2001a). There was disagreement between the PA and the UNP on this point. As the PA's position looked increasingly shaky, President Kumaratunga became more intransigent on this point in an attempt to garner favor with the Sinhala nationalists (Jayasinghe 2001b). In sum,

the efforts of the Norwegian mediation team were stymied by the political instability in the country.

2001 And After: A Shift In Perspective

Despite these setbacks, international opinion in India, Canada and the US continued to support a peace process. Donor countries and international organizations began to exert pressure on the government of Sri Lanka to work towards a negotiated settlement. The terrorist attacks of September 11 marked a distinctive shift in the LTTE's position. On the one hand, there was a hardening of international sentiment and policy towards militant organizations. Access to funds was tightened in several Western countries in which LTTE had a base. On the other hand, sympathizers of the LTTE questioned the viability, effectiveness and legitimacy of its militant activities. As a result, the group showed an increasing preference for dialogue with the GoSL, even though it did not dilute its military strength. Some of this change in perspective was reflected in Prabhakaran's annual speech in late 2001. He emphasized LTTE's willingness to cooperate with Norway and made only limited references to the Tamil Eelam state (Ganguly 2004).

In December 2001, the UNP won the parliamentary elections and Ranil Wickeremisinghe, who had promised to hold talks with the LTTE, became Prime Minister. A significant breakthrough was achieved by the Norwegians in March 2002, three years after they had begun their intervention into the conflict. The two sides signed a historic and unprecedented ceasefire agreement and agreed to hold direct talks to discuss a resolution to the conflict. The agreement provided for the creation of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), led by Norway and comprising

members from European countries, which would oversee the ceasefire. Many experts believe that the agreement was, to a great extent, encouraged by strong internal and external support for dialogue in the aftermath of the events of 9/11.

Wickeremesinghe's rival, President Kumaratunga criticized the terms of the ceasefire. Nevertheless, the UNP's success in the local elections held in late March 2002 showed a strong popular endorsement of the moves initiated by the new prime minister (Economist 2002). In a move that highlighted the importance of international intervention, Wickremesinghe said that he would rely on the support of world opinion to withstand the opposition from the President and hardline Sinhala parties (Jayasinghe 2002).

In July 2002, Sri Lanka's economic reforms minister, Milinda Moragoda, met Anton Balasingham at the residence of Norway's ambassador to Britain. This was the first time that representatives of the two sides had officially met in the current phase of the conflict. The talks discussed the modalities of the forthcoming negotiations. Exact scheduling of the talks had been delayed because the LTTE had demanded the prior withdrawal of the military from all schools and places of worship in the north-east (2002c). Despite the difficulties in holding direct talks, the truce monitors expressed satisfaction with the progress of the terms of the ceasefire agreements, though voicing concern over continuing child recruitment by the LTTE. The government gave in to a long-standing demand of the Tigers, by initiating legal moves to lift the ban on the organization. This was done after assurances that the ban would not be lifted in other countries, such as India and the United States (2002b).

Eventually, two rounds of direct talks were held in Thailand in September and October 2002. Since there was a great deal of contention on whether the conflict actors were prepared to discuss an interim administrative structure for the north-east, the bulk of the initial discussions focused on drawing up a mutually acceptable agenda for future talks. The GoSL and LTTE representatives also discussed rehabilitation work and security issues such as the withdrawal of the military from certain Tamil-dominated areas (2002d). In addition, the two sides also agreed on some measures to defuse tensions between Muslims and Tamils. In a significant move, the LTTE announced during the course of these negotiations that it was seeking autonomy and not a separate state (2002a). This was its first shift from its earlier, uncompromising secessionist stance.

While these talks generated optimism and were encouraged by both India and the United States, concerns remained on the impact of domestic politics on the negotiations. In particular, the bitter rivalry between Prime Minister Wickeramasinghe and President Kumaratunga was expected to be a major impediment (Sambandan 2002a).

In other developments in 2002, LTTE leader Prabhakaran addressed a press conference, his first in twelve years. This highlighted the group's desire to garner international legitimacy by projecting a softer image. Reiterating his commitment to the peace process, Prime Minister Wickeramasinghe visited the Jaffna Peninsula, accompanied by Buddhist monks. At Jaffna, he was met by US official Christine Rocca. Her presence underlined US support for the peace process.

In further talks held in December 2002 in Oslo, Norway, the two sides made a major tactical shift by agreeing to explore a federal structure to Sri Lanka (Jeyaraj 2003). Previously, the LTTE had been adamant in its secessionist stance. The agreement in Oslo indicated that the group was finally willing to seek a solution within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. For its part, the GoSL had earlier been very reluctant to explore federalism. Sinhala nationalists viewed the concept with a great deal of suspicion, concerned that it would directly lead to a break-up of the country. The shift in its position indicated a new willingness to compromise. The Oslo summit also underlined the LTTE's continuing quest for international legitimacy. The group was very welcoming of the presence of the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and British Overseas Development Minister Claire Short at the meeting. Additionally, the group sought to send representatives to various democratic federal countries to study various models which could be applied to a reconstituted Sri Lanka (Jeyaraj 2003).

These positive developments were accompanied by warning signals on the ruptures within Sinhala political circles. Almost immediately after the ceasefire agreement was signed by the Prime Minister, President Kumaratunga accused the government of violating the spirit of consensus on which the peace process was based, by failing to submit the ceasefire document to her for approval. President Kumaratunga added that she was opposed to lifting the ban on the LTTE, a demand to which the Prime Minister had agreed, before any progress was made in the talks. She also alleged that terms of the ceasefire violated the sovereignty of Sri Lanka by giving considerable powers of monitoring to the Norwegians. A more hostile reception was

given to the agreement by the JVP, which accused the government of betraying the country and making it a colony of Norway(Sambandan 2002b).

In April 2003, apparently piqued by the US's refusal to lift the ban on it, the LTTE unilaterally suspended the negotiations . It also refused to attend the international donor conference in Tokyo which was to discuss future loans and aid to Sri Lanka. The Norwegians continued their attempts to keep the peace process going by talking to both the Sri Lankan government and the Tigers. Despite its pull-out from direct talks, the LTTE showed a continued interest in the peace process. The ceasefire stayed in place, despite some minor violations and continuing allegations that the LTTE was recruiting children as soldiers. On October 31, 2003, the LTTE presented its much awaited counter-proposal outlining an Interim Self-Governing Authority for northeastern Sri Lanka. This was a significant step, as in the past, the LTTE had awaited the government's offers rather than offer some of its own.

Four days after the counter proposals were presented, the peace process received a major challenge. On November 4, 2003, exercising her constitutional powers, President Chandrika Kumaratunga took over the portfolios of Defense, Interior and Mass Communication, and prorogued Parliament. Kumaratunga's move, while legally correct, highlighted the bitter opposition between her and Wickremesinghe and the danger that this rivalry posed to the peace process. In response, the Norwegian government formally put the peace process on hold, as it was unclear as to who held the reins of decision-making in the Sri Lankan government. Kumaratunga was also critical of alleged Norwegian bias in favor of

LTTE, thereby questioning the Scandinavian county's continued intervention in the conflict.

In the 2004 elections, the PA came back into power with the support of the nationalist JVP. This cast doubt on the PA's ability to push forward a settlement with the LTTE. The JVP has consistently and vociferously opposed moves to recognize the LTTE and share power with Tamils. At the same time, Kumaratunga's government has shown an interest in continuing the peace process. After assuming power, the President said that she welcomed Norwegians into the peace process. In a major shift in policy, the governing alliance announced that it would recognize the LTTE, thereby implying that it would not fight the LTTE's entry into mainstream politics as the principal representatives of the Tamil minority. While the ceasefire continues to hold, it appears increasingly shaky amidst several violations. The direction of the peace process is unclear without a strong political direction from the Sri Lankan government. At the same time, the LTTE's violent activities, including the 2005 assassination of the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister casts doubts on its commitment to the peace process.

Domestic and International Pressures

There are at least three compelling reasons for the parties to the conflict to seek a negotiated settlement. First, there is a tangible war weariness amongst the population of the country. Second, it is equally evident that the conflict has reached a military stalemate, with neither side in a position to score a compelling victory. Third, international pressure to resolve the conflict by peaceful means is strong. This

pressure includes both political and financial incentives. Both the GoSL and the LTTE stand to gain from procuring substantial amounts of international financial assistance for post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and development (Jeyaraj 2003). Furthermore, leading politicians from both parties acknowledge that the Tamil population has been wronged in the past and devolution is necessary. Yet, the path of peace has been filled with vacillation, both from the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.

Given the strong incentives to continue the peace process, why has the Sri Lankan government been so unwilling to commit to it? One obvious reason is the mistrust of the LTTE. Many domestic and international officials and leaders are skeptical of the LTTE's interest in co-existing in a united Sri Lanka. LTTE's predilection toward violence, including assassinating dissenting Tamils, does not reflect a sincere commitment to a democratic governing process. The LTTE has been criticized for continuing to violate the ceasefire, procure arms and forcibly recruit children as soldiers. The LTTE is also mistrustful of the government's intentions, as are many Tamil civilians. Consequently, each side's negative perceptions get reinforced, creating a formidable obstacle to the peace process (DeVotta 2004, 189).

The second, and equally important reason, is the structure of Sri Lankan politics. Just as denying Tamils equal rights and status had been the hallmark of Sri Lankan politics in earlier decades; scuttling the peace process has become an integral part of recent party politics. The party in power will support the peace process; the one in opposition will cast doubt on the ruling party's commitment to a united Sri Lanka. As a result, the credibility of the government's assurances to the Tamils is

very low. Ironically, the two principal parties, the UNP and the PA, have very few substantive differences on the peace process. They agree that the conflict has reached a military stalemate and that a decisive victory is unlikely. They also concur that a negotiated settlement is necessary for Sri Lanka's economic and social progress (DeVotta 2004; Rotberg 1999). Yet, each party questions and challenges the other's peace moves and refuses to give the support necessary for a settlement to be reached. "While the Tiger desire for absolute power in the Tamil areas has kept the war going, the competition for political power between the P.A. and the UNP has prevented the war from ending" (Mannikkalingam 2002).

The Sri Lankan case highlights the challenges of conflict management in a democracy. Statistically, we found that democratic institutions greatly increase the probability that substantive negotiations will be held between the government and rebel groups. We had posited that democracy can help mitigate commitment problems by allowing for a structure of competition and dialogue that will encourage the state to share power. In Sri Lanka's case, we do see the occurrence of talks between the two actors, but a failure to convert this into a viable formal or informal settlement. Sri Lanka's electoral politics has been marked by ethnic outbidding from the outset. The constitution of Sri Lanka has made it almost impossible for any single party to gain an absolute majority in Parliament. Furthermore, the power relationship between the president and Prime minister is structured so that there is an inevitable tension between the roles of the two leaders. These factors have created a situation where no government is strong enough to push through a peace agreement; and no opposition is willing to support the government in its attempts to secure such an agreement.

Uncertainty therefore becomes a constant and defining feature of politics in Sri Lanka, and one that has affected every stage of the peace process. It may be true that democracies are more transparent in their negotiations (Moravcsik 1993). This does not, however, lead to stability, particularly where democratic institutions are governed by the politics of expediency and shifting alliances.

In the international scenario, it is evident that the international community would not support LTTE moves to establish a separate state. Such recognition would violate the international norms against secessionist movements. It might also send a signal that terrorism can yield benefits (DeVotta 2004; Jackson 1990; Hironaka 2005). These are issues about which both India and the United States are particularly sensitive. This has worked to the advantage of the Sri Lankan government, as the LTTE seems to have finally abandoned its secessionist platform. In addition, there are significant financial incentives for both sides to arrive at a peace settlement. Thus, international pressure has been key to encouraging a more negotiations-based approach to the conflict. We therefore find support for our position that mediation and noncoercive intervention can greatly help facilitate dialogue.

In contrast to Norway's intervention, India's military intervention has had a highly detrimental impact on Sri Lankan politics. The disastrous peacekeeping operation had a far-reaching effect. It not only failed to meet immediate objectives; but also created a long-term suspicion and antipathy toward foreign intervention. This, in turn, has led to popular mistrust of Norwegian intervention, a sentiment that is commonly manipulated by political elites. The IPKF debacle shows the far-reaching pitfalls of a poorly planned and coercive intervention. In countries with

functioning political institutions, noncoercive, facilitative intervention might be more useful in dealing with civil conflicts. Such third-party action entails fewer risks and costs for both sides. In addition, it does not threaten the sovereignty and national pride of the recipient country, thereby making such action more welcome.

Noncoercive intervention, such as mediation, represents a low-cost alternative between inaction and risky large-scale military intervention (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 1999).

The twin international-domestic influences on the conflict are illustrated in Figures 10 and 11.

Figure 10: International Dimension




Figure 10 shows the effect of international intervention on the conflict. Third-party action has had a strong and direct effect on negotiations between the LTTE and the government. During the phase of Indian military intervention, relations between the LTTE and the GoSL were particularly weak and there were few negotiations. When intervention took a more diplomatic, facilitative nature, we witnessed periods

of substantive talks between the two sides. This was the case during the Thimpu talks in the mid-1980s and the Norwegian push towards peace from the late 1990s.

International intervention has, however, had a weaker influence on the dynamics of intra-Sinhala politics. While the party in power tends to adopt a more conciliatory position, the one in opposition follows a more belligerent and critical path. This, in turn, impacts the progress of talks between the government and the Tamil separatists.

Figure 11: Domestic Dimension




Figure 11 shows the process at work in the domestic dimension. The structure of Sri Lankan politics, which precludes either party from gaining an absolute majority in Parliament, and the practice of ethnic outbidding dominates mainstream Sinhala politics. The situation is exacerbated by the influence of the Buddhist clergy and the growing importance of the left-wing nationalist JVP, with which the current ruling party has an alliance. The intricacies of domestic politics has played a major role in the interactions between the Government and opposition. There have been times that the two sides have attempted to cooperate on peace plans; however, these have always been thwarted by the exigencies of party politics. In turn, the unwillingness to

cooperate has affected the peace process by making the government's offers less credible.


Institutions can and do play an important role in maintaining ethnic peace. In order to play a constructive role, however, they should be treated by citizens as impartial mediator. When institutions are not trusted to be consistent and impartial and one community has the ability to change the rules of the games, people will tend to lose confidence in such institutions. In Sri Lanka, political institutions have been weakened and manipulated to the extent that ethnic outbidding has become a standard feature of Sri Lankan politics, creating an atmosphere of extreme mistrust (DeVotta 2004, Horowitz 1985; Snyder 2000). In such a situation, external intervention that is perceived to be impartial becomes essential in that it can fulfill the mediatory role abdicated by domestic institutions.

Previous peace efforts have been obstructed by two factors, the LTTE's extremism and domestic politics. Under international pressure, both economic and political, the LTTE's position has softened, as has that of the Sri Lankan government. Regional and international players have played an instrumental role in this change. What remains missing, however, is a domestic consensus on a viable settlement. While third-party action has been successful in convincing the LTTE and the government of the need to reach a negotiated settlement, it has not been able to affect a substantial change to the ethnic outbidding characterizing Sri Lankan politics. Even in states that are classified as strong or moderately strong, negotiations to end conflicts can require a significant amount of courage and diplomacy. This is because leaders in a position to negotiate an end to conflicts need to consider popular support

and their political survival (Hironaka 2005). In such a situation, interveners can drive fruitful negotiations by arguing that a peaceful settlement will yield mutual rewards (Zartman 1983). Crucially, however, interveners should recognize that the negotiating state is not unilateral and may in itself be wrestling with competing claims. The negotiations process must therefore involve interstate, intergroup and intrastate bargaining. In sum, a viable negotiations process leading to a settlement must involve a consensus, or at least a broad agreement, at three levels.

First, the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka should find a common ground. Second, the Government of Sri Lanka must be able to get the support of its domestic constituencies, including supporters and the Opposition. Finally, any agreement between the conflict actors must secure the approval and support of principal actors in the international community. The case study of Sri Lanka shows that international intervention, even when driven by major powers, does not have a deterministic influence on conflicts because of the particular issues and constraints of the domestic political process. A settlement to the conflict will be possible only with successful negotiations at both the domestic and the international levels.

Figure 12: Three Levels of Agreement



Implications of Findings

The Sri Lankan case provides a challenge to the conventional understanding that democracies are more able and willing to negotiate with minorities. The literature on international conflict has long argued that democracies generate distinctive patterns and outcomes because of the public nature of political competition within democratic polities. In particular, many scholars have argued that public deliberation and participation makes democratic governments vulnerable to criticism from domestic opponents, thus being adversely impacted in terms of decisive moves (Schultz 2001). When there is strong domestic consensus on a particular decision, the credibility and strength of the decision can be very high. Conversely, in the absence of such consensus, credibility signals are very weak. This finding calls for a more

careful analysis of the links between democracy and negotiated settlement and of explorations of the possible ways in which third-party intervention can contribute to this process.

The case study also challenges our previous understanding of when and why governments seek to negotiated settlement with rebel groups. Using cross-national analysis, Walter (2003) shows that governments are less likely to negotiate if territory is at stake and if the state is also facing other, potentially disgruntled minority groups. In other words, if the state is concerned that conceding to one group will encourage other secessionist groups; it will not seek to negotiate with such groups. Walter (2003) contends that if a country has only one significant challenger (as is the case in Sri Lanka), it is rational for the government to negotiate rather than bear the high costs of fighting. It is often argued that conflict actors are more receptive to negotiation when a military stalemate has been reached (Rothchild 1997; Zartman 1985).

The Sri Lankan cases, however, belies these arguments. First, the country is unlikely to face significant threats from minority groups other than the Tamil. Second, the conflict has been at a mutual stalemate for several years and it is evident that a military victory is unlikely, if not impossible. Third, the conflict has reached a stage where secessionism – that is, actual loss of territory- is far less likely than before. Fourth, the financial incentives for ending the conflict are enormous. The Sri Lankan government is unwilling to negotiate because of its reputational concerns with its own domestic voters rather than with other minority groups or external audiences. In other words, its intransigence or unwillingness is driven by electoral

compulsions. Such a situation poses unique challenges to the international community. It calls for intervention that seeks to restructure a pernicious culture of politics without replacing pre-existing political institutions.

The above argument also challenges the emphasis on coercive and high-impact intervention, such as peacekeeping forces or security guarantees. Recent literature has argued that, in order for civil conflicts to be resolved, credible commitments have to be provided by third-party actors in the form of security guarantees. This is essential to tide over the mutual distrust that marks civil war (Walter 2002). Walter's landmark study, however, assumes that the state is a unitary actor in dealing with rebel groups. The Sri Lankan case highlights the fact that the state's internal divisions can be as germane to the conflict as external factors. A similar situation can be found in other civil conflicts, including those in India, the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Indonesia. External intervention in such cases must therefore take into account not only the direct actors to the conflict (that is, the state and the rebel group) but also the internal and international constituencies that influence each of the actors. In the Sri Lankan case, the constituencies for the government include the opposition parties and Sinhala nationalist interest groups. The constituencies for the LTTE include diaspora groups that have been the organization's critical funding base. For both actors, international donors, institutions and norms also constitute determining influences. Addressing questions of conflict management and resolution necessitates a closer examination of these forces.

Finally, it should be noted that a country with fairly strong and established political institutions might not be receptive to coercive forms of intervention. In Sri

Lanka, the IPKF operation was viewed with hostility not least because of the danger it posed to Sri Lankan sovereignty. Subsequent third-party intervention has also been frequently challenged on grounds of sovereignty and national pride. Furthermore, Sri Lanka's long history with democratic traditions might mean that the country's political elites are not as open to restructuring the constitutional landscape as, perhaps, in a newer country such as Macedonia. Being open to high levels of intervention might make the GoSL vulnerable to allegations of weakness, a costly stigma during elections. In such circumstances, third-party intervention might be more beneficial if it worked *with* existing institutions and civil society groups in building trust and effecting change without challenging the reputational concerns of the Sri Lankan government.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The concluding chapter first summarizes the findings and theoretical contribution of this study. Second, some avenues for future research are identified. This study has examined the interconnections between international and domestic politics in ethnic conflict management. Using the Minorities at Risk database, a cross-national examination was undertaken in order to identify the broad relations between institutional and intervention variables and conflict management. Second, the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka was explored in order to develop the intersections of domestic and international variables.

Linking Intervention to Local Capacity

The existing literature on conflict management has not explored the intersections between domestic and international factors. Studies of international intervention do not consider local state capacity, assuming that conflict-affected states have collapsed or failing political structures. Consequently, much of the literature focuses on high-impact intervention, such as sending peacekeeping troops or providing external security guarantees (Fortna 2003; Walter 2002). This study makes an important contribution to the literature by highlighting the fact that conflict-affected states have a wide variation in the extent of local state capacity. This, in turn, exercises a critical impact on the role and efficacy of third-party action. The statistical findings highlighted the important roles of democracy and mediation, as well the significance of security guarantees. While supporting the existing literature's arguments in favor of security guarantees, this study pointed out that, under certain political conditions, mediation can play a critical role. Democracy and

international intervention have a strong, positive impact on the likelihood of negotiations. When intervention is disaggregated into its various forms, we find that military action greatly reduces the probability of dialogue, while mediation and security guarantees increase it. While democracy and intervention have a strong, independent impact on negotiations, their intersection has no significant additional impact on the dependent variable. In other words, the presence of international intervention in a democratic regime has no systematic influence on the outcome variable. Although the independent effect of federalism is non-significant, intervention in federal regimes has a strong negative impact on the probability of negotiations. As regime age increases beyond fifteen years, intervention decreases the likelihood of talks between the conflict actors.

Among the determinants of agreements, democracy has a strong, positive relation with the outcome variable, although the association is not as strong as with negotiations. Military intervention significantly reduces the probability of an agreement being signed, while security guarantees have a strong, positive impact. If negotiations had been held in the previous year, the likelihood of an agreement being signed increases significantly. The statistical tests show us some intriguing results regarding the intersection of domestic and international factors. However, as the research design suggests, the complexities of the interaction between the various variables are best captured by an in-depth examination of pertinent cases.

Intervention in a democracy: The Sri Lankan case

In order to tease out the domestic-international intersections, I examine the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, ethnic outbidding has destroyed the ability

of domestic institutions to make credible gestures of reconciliation. This has created an institutional gap which international intervention can help bridge. Sri Lanka's experience with military intervention from India highlights the potential dangers of such action, particularly in a country with a strong sense of sovereignty and nationalism. On the other hand, facilitative intervention has played an important role in enabling the conflicting parties to engage in dialogue with each other. The case supports our statistical finding that democracies have a higher probability of holding negotiations, but also shows us some reasons why democratic regimes may find it more difficult to reach an agreement. It also shows how electoral competition and nationalist public opinion can impede the peace process. The Sri Lankan experience highlights the complexities of managing conflict in a democracy.

Contribution

The principal contributions of this research project are as follows.

The importance of negotiations

Few, if any, studies prioritize dialogue between the parties directly involved in domestic conflict. Most studies focus on actual settlements and post-war conditions. By focusing on conditions facilitating negotiations, this study encourages a more thorough examination of the peace *process* rather than only exploring *outcomes* of violent conflict.

Interactive processes

Most existing studies examine either domestic or international factors, rather than exploring their combined impact (see, for example, (Easterly 2000; Hartzell 2003; Saideman 2002b). This research project highlighted the interactive processes that occur between domestic and international factors in facilitating (or impeding) conflict management. This is particularly important in understanding the peace process in countries with pre-existing, stable institution.

Non-coercive intervention

Third, this study challenges arguments that emphasize coercive action, such as sending military forces or offering security guarantees. The findings presented here acknowledge the benefits of heavy-handed intervention under certain conditions, but also highlight the value of engaging in non-coercive intervention, such as mediation. The case study of Sri Lanka shows that such actions can be particularly beneficial in countries where the need is not to replace or create new political institutions but to reform existing ones. Such reform should occur without challenging the state's sovereignty and the reputation concerns of its government.

Democracy and conflict management

The complex relations between democracy and conflict management are highlighted in this study. The existing literature does not adequately examine this fascinating dynamic. The findings presented here support the argument that trends towards democratization will facilitate a more negotiations-based approach to conflict management and resolution (Gurr 2000; Mason 2003). Democratic regimes tend to

have a far higher probability of engaging in direct dialogue with rebelling groups. At the same time, democracy is not as strong a determinant of agreements. Democracies have decisional constraints that limit the ability of government to reach power-sharing agreements with minority groups. The case study of Sri Lanka highlighted the difficulties of balancing electoral compulsions with the need for compromises with rebel groups. Reputational concerns might prevent democratic government from seeking agreements with conflicting parties. Facilitative intervention can help overcome some of these concerns.

Sovereignty and intervention

Few studies consider the receptiveness of a country towards intervention in terms of local perceptions of sovereignty. In the Sri Lankan case, India's offer of security guarantees, which later turned into military intervention, was greeted with intense popular opposition because it was seen as a threat to the country's integrity. Such perceptions are likely higher in countries with a greater degree of local state capacity and can exercise a direct influence on the efficacy of third-party intervention.

Conflict states as unitary actors

Our examination of the Sri Lankan case clearly showed that the state is not a unitary actor. Disagreements and competition *within* the state can play a pivotal role in the conflict process. This challenges the view of the state as a unified entity. Recognizing the non-unitary characteristics of many, if not most, conflict-affected

states will encourage third-party actors to adopt a more nuanced approach in their interventions.

In dealing with domestic security, democratic states tends to be rife with internal dissent. Issues of power sharing, autonomy, constitutional reengineering, and intervention create significant fissures within the government of a conflict-affected state. Contentious issues can become particularly public and bitter in democratic states, such as in Sri Lanka.

Directions for Future Research

The findings of the study contribute to the ongoing research program on the role of international intervention in civil wars. In attempting to answer some puzzles in this field, the study also raises certain questions for further examination.

Globalization, Transparency and Negotiations

(Mason 2003) has suggested that globalization has helped develop a more negotiations-based approach to conflicts. One of the indicators of globalization is increasing membership in international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization. Participation in such organizations can, at times, put pressure on governments to be more transparent in their policies. This transparency is also transmitted to domestic societal actors. Governments seeking greater international legitimacy may seek to convince both domestic and international actors of their credibility and transparency (Grigorescu 2003). This could have a direct or indirect impact on the state's ability to hold negotiations with rebelling group. Does increasing global interdependence increase a regime's likelihood of seeking

negotiated settlements to domestic conflicts? Does it encourage the state to be abide by human rights norms when dealing with minority groups? These are some promising areas of future research.

The Role of Track II Diplomacy

State-led intervention has been the focus of this research project. A considerable body of case study evidence shows that non-state, Track II diplomacy played an important role in several cases, including Rhodesia and Northern Ireland. Third parties can often play a valuable role in inducing willingness to reach a settlement by working with conflict actors behind the scenes, away from the negotiating table. Such tactics are particularly valuable in encouraging parties to reexamine their interests and find a mutually acceptable solution, while saving face in public (Hancock 2001; Preston 2004). Under what conditions is low-decibel, non-state intervention more useful? Does it have a particularly important role to play in cases like Sri Lanka, where state-to-state action can generate greater political opposition? Or, do non-state actors exercise a greater impact on post-conflict reconstruction rather than in facilitating negotiations and agreements? These are some research questions which can help us better understand conflict management processes.

Negotiations and Agreements

The results of this study partially confirmed the expectation that negotiations and agreements share similar determinants, while opening up areas of future research. The statistical findings show us that mediation and democracy help both outcomes, but have a stronger relation to agreements. The Sri Lankan case explored this

puzzling finding by showing how democratic processes might impede the process of agreement. Both the Sri Lankan and other cases discussed briefly throughout the study highlighted some of the potential pitfalls of high-decibel intervention in facilitating peace processes. As mentioned earlier, this study adopted a stringent definition of agreement, focusing only on signed agreements. It is possible that, in a large number of conflicts, more tacit bargains help attain peace. A broader typology of negotiated settlements might help illuminate such processes and help us develop our understanding on the similarities and differences between holding talks and reaching a potentially viable settlement.

Conclusion

If uncertainty and mistrust are among the principal causes of conflict, they also form the major barriers to finding solutions. Numerous studies, both in academic and policy circles, have shown that international intervention can play both a highly constructive and a very destructive role in civil wars. This study has identified some opportunities and challenges for third party actors, particularly in democratic states. The findings presented here should provide a foundation for further empirical research and theoretical development in understanding the role of third-parties in ethnic conflict management.

Appendix A: Countries and groups experiencing rebellion

Country	Group	Years of rebellion
Angola	Bakongo	1998-2000
Angola	Cabinda	1991-2000
Angola	Ovimbundu	1990-1995, 1998-2000
Azerbaijan	Armenians	1991-2000
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tribes	1990-1996
Bosnia	Croats	1992-1995
Bosnia	Serbs	1992-1995
Burundi	Hutus	1990-2000
Chad	Southerners	1992-1994
Croatia	Serbs	1992-1996
Democratic Republic of Congo	Tutsis	1996-2000
Djibouti	Afars	1991-1995
Ethiopia	Afars	1996-2000
Ethiopia	Oromo	1992-2000
Ethiopia	Somalis	1993-2000
Georgia	Ossetians	1991-2000
Georgia	Abkhazians	1992-2000
India	Assamese	1990-2000
India	Bodos	1990-2000
India	Kashmiris	1990-2000
India	Nagas	1990-2000
India	Scheduled Tribes	1990-2000
India	Sikhs	1990-1993
India	Tripuras	1991-2000
Indonesia	Acehnese	1990-2000
Indonesia	East Timor	1990-1995

Indonesia	Papuans	1990-1992
Iran	Baluchis	1990-1995
Iran	Kurds	1990-1994
Iraq	Kurds	1990-2000
Iraq	Shi'is	1991-2000
Laos	Hmong	1990-1996
Mali	Tuareg	1990-1992
Mexico	Mayans	1994-2000
Moldova	Gagauz	1991-1995
Moldova	Slavs	1991-1997
Morocco	Saharawi	1990-1995, 1999-2000
Myanmar (Burma)	Kachins	1990-1992
Myanmar (Burma)	Karen	1990-2000
Myanmar (Burma)	Mons	1990-1997
Myanmar (Burma)	Rohingyas	1991-1994
Myanmar (Burma)	Shans	1990-2000
Myanmar (Burma)	Zomis	1990-1993
Niger	Tuareg	1990-1997
Papua New Guinea	Bouganvilles	1990-1997
Philippines	Igorots	1990-1993
Philippines	Moros	1990-2000
Russia	Chechens	1990-2000
Rwanda	Hutus	1995-2000
Rwanda	Tutsis	1990-1994
Senegal	Diolas	1992-2000
Sierra Leone	Temne	1991-2000
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils	1990-2000
Sudan	Nuba	1990-2000
Sudan	Southerners	1990-2000
Turkey	Kurds	1990-2000

Uganda	Acholi	1990-1998
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Appendix B: Agreements

1. Conflicts with signed agreements

Country	Group	Year of agreement
Angola	Bakongo	2002
Angola	Ovimbundu	2002
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tribes	1997
Bosnia	Croats	1995
Bosnia	Serbs	1995
Burundi	Hutus	2000
Chad	Southerners	1997
Democratic Republic of Congo	Tutsis	2002
Djibouti	Afars	2001
Georgia	Abkhazians	2004
India	Bodos	2003
India	Sikhs	1992
Indonesia	Acehnese	2005
Indonesia	East Timor	1999
Mali	Tuareg	1995
Moldova	Gagauz	1995
Moldova	Slavs	1997
Myanmar (Burma)	Kachins	1994
Myanmar (Burma)	Mons	1995
Myanmar (Burma)	Rohingyas	1994
Niger	Tuareg	1995
Papua New Guinea	Bouganvilles	2002
Senegal	Diolas	2004
Sierra Leone	Temne	2001
Sudan	Nuba	2005
Sudan	Southerners	2005

2. Conflicts with no signed agreement

Country	Group
Angola	Cabinda
Azerbaijan	Armenians
Croatia	Serbs
Ethiopia	Afars
Ethiopia	Oromo
Ethiopia	Somalis
Georgia	Ossetians
India	Assamese
India	Kashmiris
India	Nagas
India	Scheduled Tribes
India	Tripuras
Iran	Baluchis
Iran	Kurds
Laos	Hmong
Mexico	Mayans
Morocco	Saharawi
Myanmar (Burma)	Karen
Myanmar (Burma)	Shans
Myanmar (Burma)	Zomis
Philippines	Igorots
Philippines	Moros
Russia	Chechens
Rwanda	Hutus
Rwanda	Tutsis
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils
Turkey	Kurds
Uganda	Acholi

Appendix C: Coding Guidelines for Intervention²⁶

GENERAL CODES

Variable 1: INTERVEN

DID INTERVENTION OCCUR?

International intervention are convention-breaking grants or withdrawals of economic or military assistance and diplomatic activity in an ethnic rebellion. The apparent purpose of these activities should be to influence the course of an ongoing civil conflict with an emphasis on ending the violence. The focus on convention-breaking is important because it enables us to distinguish between intervention to stop or resolve a conflict and regular economic, political or diplomatic activity (Regan 1996, 2000).

Values and Illustrations

- (0) No
- (1) Yes

Variable 2: THIRDPART

WHO INTERVENED?

Which entity intervened? The intervener could be one state, an international organization or a private organization.

In the case of a single state as the intervening entity, the country code is assigned. If the intervener is a non-state actor which is an organization such as the UN, regional organizations, OPEC and so on, it is coded 996. If the entity was a nonstate actor such as a NGO, it was coded 998. If the intervener was an event involving more than one state (e.g. military alliance or arms deal), it was coded 997. In case of multiple interveners, code all.

For the list of country-codes, see Table 1 above.

Variable 3: INTERDATE

When did the intervention start and end?

²⁶ Based in part on ICB coding guidelines, available at www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/

Variable 6 TYPEINTERVENTION TECHNIQUES

A variety of intervention techniques can be used. This variable identifies the techniques used.

Values and Illustrations

- (0) No intervention
- (1) Economic only
- (2) Military only
- (3) Diplomatic only (Specify mediation or other; specify other)
- (4) Economic and military
- (5) Economic and diplomatic
- (6) Diplomatic and military
- (7) All three

Variable 7: USINVCONTENT OF U.S. INTERVENTION

This variable assesses U.S. intervention.

Values and Illustrations

- (0) U.S. did not intervene
- (1) U.S. economic activity - economic involvement, e.g., financial aid, or the withholding of aid from an actor
- (2) U.S. military - covert activity, e.g., support for anti-government forces; and military aid or advisors, without participation in actual fighting
- (3) US diplomatic and political activity- political activity, including statements of approval or disapproval by authorized government officials; propaganda, mediation
- (4) Multiple forms of intervention
- (5) US was an actor

Variable 8: NEGOTDID NEGOTIATIONS OCCUR?

A rebellion was coded as having experienced negotiations, if the following two conditions were met. First, the leaders or representatives of the state and rebelling group(s) had direct or indirect negotiations. Second, they were willing to discuss both a ceasefire and a political solution to the rebellion.

- (0) No negotiation
- (1) Negotiations

Variable 9: REBEND
DID THE REBELLION END?

This is a dichotomous variable indicating an end to the rebellion for a period of at least one year. If a rebellion between the same actors broke out after a period of one year, it is coded as a new rebellion.

Values and Illustrations

- (0) Ongoing rebellion
- (1) Rebellion ended No armed hostilities for a period of one year.

Variable 10: CONFMG
WAS THERE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT?

Conflict management is coded as being present when both REBEND and NEGOT are coded as 1.

- (0) No conflict management
- (1) Conflict management

Variable 11: FOROUT

FORM OF OUTCOME

This variable refers to the form of the outcome of the rebellion at its termination point.

Values and Illustrations

- (1) Formal or semi-formal agreement - formal agreement, including treaty, armistice, cease-fire; semi-formal agreement, including letter, oral declaration, a meeting leading to an agreement.
- (2) Tacit understanding - mutual understanding by adversaries, neither stated nor written.
- (3) Unilateral act - an act by an actor, without the voluntary agreement of its adversary(ies), which terminates the rebellion .
- (4) Imposed agreement
- (5) Rebellion faded
- (6) Other

Variable 12: GEOG
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF CRISIS

Rebellions crises were grouped into regions according to where they took place.

Values

- (1) Asia
 - (2) Former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe
 - (3) Africa and the Middle East
 - (4) Americas
-

INTERVENTION SPECIFIC CODES

Variable 13: MEDIATE

Variable Description: Did mediation occur at some point in the rebellion?

Values:

- (0) No mediation
 - Mediation occurred
 - (9) Cannot be determined, missing data
-

Variable 14: MEDNUM

Variable Description: How many mediators were there?

Coding Information: Was there a single mediator or mediation team, or were there multiple instances of mediation during the course of the crisis? If there were multiple instances, please list them in the comment box next to this variable on the codesheet.

Values:

- No mediation
- Single mediator or mediation team
- Multiple instances of mediation
- (9) Cannot be determined, missing data

Variable 15: MEDWHO

Variable Description: Who was the primary mediator?

Coding Information: Code this variable only for the mediator who was the most active in this crisis. Specify which mediator in the comment box next to this variable on the codesheet (for example, if a regional organization, specify which).

Values:

No mediation
International governmental organization
Regional governmental organization
Private transnational organization
Single state
Group of states (list on codesheet)
Private individual
Cannot be determined, missing data

Variable 16: MEDSTART

Variable Description: If mediation occurred, on what date did it begin?

Coding Information: Specify the year and month. Code for the primary mediator identified in MEDWHO.

Variable 17: MEDEND

Variable Description: If mediation occurred, when did it end?

Coding Information: Specify the year and month. Code for the primary mediator.

Variable 18: ECOINV

Variable Description: Did economic intervention occur in the rebellion? Mention types of intervention.

Values:

(0) No economic intervention
(1) Intervention occurred
(9) Cannot be determined, missing data

Variable 19: ECOWHO

Variable Description: Who was the primary intervener in economic issues?

Coding Information: Code this variable for the intervener who was the most active in this crisis. Specify which mediator in the comment box next to this variable on the codesheet (for example, if a regional organization, specify which). If there were multiple instances of economic intervention in a given year, code for the most active one and indicate this in the comment section at the end of the codesheet.

Values:

(0) No economic intervention

- (1) International governmental organization
 - (2) Regional governmental organization
 - (3) Private transnational organization
 - (4) Single state
 - (5) Group of states (list on codesheet)
 - (6) Private individual
 - (9) Cannot be determined, missing data
-

Variable 20: ECOSTART

Variable Description: On what date did economic intervention begin?

Coding Information: Specify the year and month on which economic intervention began. Code for the primary intervener.

Variable 21: ECOEND

Variable Description: When did economic intervention end?

Coding Information: Specify the year and month when economic intervention ended. Code for the primary intervener.

Variable 22: MILINV

Variable Description: Did military intervention occur in the rebellion?

Values:

- (0) No military intervention
 - (1) Intervention occurred
 - (9) Cannot be determined, missing data
-

Variable 23: MILIWHO

Variable Description: Who was the primary intervener?

Coding Information: Code this variable only for the intervener who was the most active in this crisis. Specify which intervener in the comment box next to this variable on the codesheet (for example, if a regional organization, specify which). If there were multiple instances of economic intervention in a given year, code for the most active one and indicate this in the comment section at the end of the codesheet.

Values:

- (0) No intervention
- (1) International governmental organization

- (2) Regional governmental organization
- (3) Private transnational organization
- (4) Single state
- (5) Group of states (list on codesheet)
- (6) Private individual
- (9) Cannot be determined, missing data

Variable 24: MILISTART

Variable Description: When did military intervention start?

Coding Information: Specify the year and month of the most active form of intervention, for each year of intervention. Code for the primary intervener.

Variable 25: MILIEND

Variable Description: When did the military intervention end?

Coding Information: Specify the year and month on which the most active form of intervention ended. Code for the primary intervener.

ADDITIONAL CODES

Variable 26: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Variable Description: Did negotiations occur?

Coding Information: See below.

Values:

(0) No negotiations

(1) Active negotiations with active hostilities.

Active negotiations involve face-to-face talks with at least one major faction (e.g. in Sudan, talks that do not include SPLF are not considered). The negotiations must include discussions of a political solution to the conflict. Code presence of active hostilities from MAR. Exclude very low levels of rebellion (0, 1, 2).

(2) Active negotiations and cessation of open hostilities for a period of at least one year (i.e. MAR code for relevant year must show presence of 3 or above level of rebellion).

(3) Signed bargain: Signed agreement involving a political solution (Not just ceasefire). At least one major rebelling group should be involved. Signed bargain must include cessation of open hostilities in the year that it was signed or the subsequent year. If the bargain is signed undergoing ongoing hostilities in that or the subsequent year, code as (1).

(4) Ongoing peace.

Variable 27: SECURITY GUARANTEES

Variable Description: Were security guarantees offered by external actor?

Coding Information: Security guarantees involved a promise to enforce or verify postagreement behavior.

Values:

(0) No

(1) Yes

Variable 28: SECURITY GUARANTEES WHO

Variable Description: Who offered the security guarantee?

Coding Information: Country or organization code of actor(s) offering the security guarantee.

Appendix D: Chronology of Events in Sri Lanka, 1948-2005

Year	Event
1948	Ceylon gains independence from Great Britain, and is established as a parliamentary democracy
1956	Official Language Act enacted, making Sinhalese the sole official language
1957	Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact signed, calling for greater recognition of Tamil linguistic and other rights.
1958-1959	Opposition from Sinhalese nationalist against Tamil language status and devolution of power to the Tamil community
1959	Sri Lankan President Bandaranaike assassinated by Sinhalese nationalist Buddhist monk. Ethnic outbidding becomes entrenched practice in Sri Lankan politics
1960s-early 1970s	Constant backtracking by government on devolving power to the Tamils. Economic problems make the government resort to populist moves to placate Sinhalese nationalists
1972	Republic of Sri Lanka is formed through new constitution. Constitution asserts domination of Sinhalese-Buddhist community.
1973	Positive discrimination in favor of Sinhalese candidates leads to further fall in education and employment for Tamils.
1976	Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE) emerges as a key voice for Tamil militant nationalism.
1983	Widespread anti-Tamil riots in capital city of Colombo. The government shows little, if any concern. Tamil exodus out of the country. LTTE gains in popularity and strength.
1984	Sri Lankan government drops a proposal to give more autonomy to the Tamils
1985	Indian mediation facilitates talks between Tamil militants and Sri Lanka, but these talks break down after two rounds.
1985	Cordial relations between LTTE and Indian government weakens as India increases repression of LTTE members and sympathizers in India.
1986	Complete breakdown in relations between LTTE and the government, as violence escalates
1987	Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord provides for a peacekeeping force to be sent from India to Jaffna. LTTE gives reluctant consent, but expresses strong dissatisfaction with the terms of the accord.
1987-1990	Rapid deterioration of the situation in Jaffna, as Indian troops become embroiled in a brutal fight with the LTTE. At the same time, violent Sinhalese protests against presence of

	Indian troops creates a situation of virtual civil war in the southern part of the country.
1998	Norwegian intervention begins
2001	Post 9/11 events give new push to peace talks
2002	Talks between the two parties and the establishment of a ceasefire
2003-2004	Increasing belligerence between the two parties and breakdown in talks
2004-2005	Increasing international concern at situation; violence escalates between the two sides although neither actor admits to a breakdown in the ceasefire.

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