The End of Civilizations: The Role of Religion in the
Evolution of Subnational Conflict, 1946-2007

by

Mark Owen Yeisley

Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date:_____
Approved:

_____
Joseph M. Grieco, Supervisor

_____
Bruce W. Jentleson

_____
Christopher F. Gelpi

_____
Guillermo Trejo Osorio

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Political Science in the Graduate School
of Duke University

2010

<u>ABSTRACT</u>

The End of Civilizations: The Role of Religion in the
Evolution of Subnational Conflict, 1946-2007

by

Mark O. Yeisley

Department of Political Science
Duke University

Date:_____

Approved:

_____
Joseph M. Grieco, Supervisor

_____
Bruce W. Jentleson

_____
Christopher F. Gelpi

_____
Guillermo Trejo Osorio

An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Political Science in the Graduate School
of Duke University

2010

Abstract

Conflict between states in an anarchic international system is generally the result of an inability among state leaders to successfully negotiate perceived power imbalances within the system. Interstate conflicts are relatively rare events and are generally short in duration; international pressures to quickly and permanently resolve conflicts before their effects are felt outside the region of conflict are often intense. In an increasingly global community, an international order in turmoil ripples through the global financial system, often leading to a weakening of state power within it.

Violent conflicts within state borders have been historically more common, with causative issues ranging from polity dissatisfaction or inequities in the economic structure of the state to disputes over territorial integrity and autonomy. Pressure to rapidly resolve conflict within states is differentially applied cross-regionally; however, where strategic interests of major-power states are involved, such conflicts are usually quickly addressed. Where no such interests exist, these conflicts can and do persist for decades, at often huge costs to state resources.

In the mid-1990s the number of ongoing subnational conflicts appeared to be trending upward and increasingly between dissimilar people groups; Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis posited that future conflict at the subnational and international levels would be increasingly between groups of differing civilizational origin. This study disputes this claim, intending instead to show that conflict between groups of dissimilar religious beliefs is more likely to escalate to violence than that occurring between civilizational groupings, especially after the end of the Cold War.

iv

This study covers nearly 200 countries during the period 1946-2007, including those granted independence within the period and new republics formed in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union. If Huntington's thesis is correct, states located along defined civilizational "fault-lines" should experience a higher incidence of violent conflict at the state level. States that contain sufficiently large populations from differing civilizations (defined as cleft states) should also be more conflict prone. The differential advantages gained during modernization processes in the post-Cold War era should result in an upward trend in such conflict after 1989.

This study uses conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, recording 1,670 conflict-years in over 100 countries within the observation period. Descriptive statistics suggest subnational conflicts have not become increasingly civilizational as Huntington described. Instead, conflict between dissimilar religious groups has become more common since the end of the Cold War. Multivariate analysis is used to estimate the relative importance of religious differences on the initiation of violent subnational conflict. In addition to the existence of religious cleavages, the salience of a number of realist variables is also considered.

Results show Huntington's theory to be insufficient to describe this evolution of subnational conflict. Civilizations are too broad to engender the necessary inclusivity in times of crisis, and the number of classifications theorized too narrow. However, results suggest religious cleavages to be equally weak predictors of future conflict likelihood at the subnational level. As in prior studies of civil wars, religion seems epiphenomenal in causative predictions of low-level subnational conflict initiation in the modern era.

Dedication

To my wonderful family: to my mother and father for their steadfast support, unwavering optimism and exuberance; to my little brother Matthew who did not live to see the work finished but was nonetheless a source of much strength and good humor; to our beautiful daughter Mollie and our wonderful grandchildren Kayla and Anthony, who constantly reminded me of the vital importance of a kickball game in the overall scheme of things, and finally to my gorgeous wife Jamie, whose unending patience, steadfast devotion, Christian love and ceaseless compassion quieted me during those many days of doubt.

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Acknowledgements

My years at Duke were filled to the brim with books and articles to read and digest, critical reviews and term papers to write and review, and thousands of hours of preparation to complete for the qualifying and preliminary exams. This by no means is to suggest that I was alone in the process. I am deeply indebted to so many for their help and support as I navigated this new road in my life. First I would of course like to acknowledge the multitude of graduate students and colleagues who helped introduce this new field of social science research to a seemingly intransigent physical scientist. Although too numerous to list here, I would nonetheless like to thank them all for their patience as I struggled to make sense of this new field in the waning months of 2006.

I offer a special thanks to my graduate student colleagues who graciously let a second-year student study with them for the qualifying exams. Without their assistance I would doubtless have struggled far more than I did, and their good humor, brilliant ideas and scintillating discussions helped make the process just that more bearable. To James Bourke, Katie Cochran, Gene Walton, Harriet Baker, Matt Falvey and Kiril Kolev, my grateful thanks for the many hours of studying and preparing for those exams. I also want to offer a special thanks to Carlton Henson; your friendship and good humor made a long and arduous journey more enjoyable.

I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Joe Grieco, who from the very beginning helped me craft a strategy that would allow me to finish a demanding schedule in just over three years. While I had many doubts about how to accomplish this, his patient demeanor, vital advice and kind words were a source of peace while I

1. Introduction, Purpose and Theory

1.1 Civilizations, Religion and Subnational Violence

Conflict between states in an anarchic international system is generally the result of an inability among state leaders to successfully negotiate perceived power imbalances within the system. When states feel they are in danger of losing their position of security within such a system, bargaining and diplomacy are employed in attempts to restore the balance of power to the satisfaction of concerned member states. When diplomatic efforts are unsuccessful, conflicts may escalate into militarized disputes that result in war. Such interstate conflicts are relatively rare events and are generally of limited duration; international pressures to quickly and permanently resolve such conflicts before their effects are felt outside the area of conflict are often intense. In an increasingly global community, an international order in turmoil ripples throughout the global financial system, often leading to a weakening of state power within it.

Subnational conflicts within state borders have been historically more common, with causative issues ranging from polity dissatisfaction or inequities in the economic structure of the state to disputes over territorial integrity and autonomy. A significant number of studies have examined the effect of ethnic differences among the populations of states to determine the causal power of this variable in predicting conflict at the subnational level. However, properly defining and operationalizing ethnicity has presented challenges to both comparative politics and international relations researchers.

This is so because the concept of ethnicity is highly variable in meaning both within and across countries. While race is a distinctive ethnic marker within the United States, language differences are the primary divide between Flemish and Walloon in

1

Belgium, and much of Western Europe is defined by religious affiliation. In Africa and

Central Asia tribal groupings are often the primary division, while Turkey is split along

language, territory and religious lines. This cornucopia of ethnic categories has made

generalizations of ethnicity difficult; this is further complicated by the fact that even

these few categories are generally never homogeneously distributed. Language,

religious and cultural differences span individual tribes, regional groupings and races.

1.1.1 The Clash of Civilizations

Samuel Huntington attempted to move beyond most of these intricate concepts

of ethnicity in the early 1990s. At the time the number of ongoing subnational conflicts

around the globe appeared to be on an upward trend and increasingly between dissimilar

people groups; his Clash of Civilizations (hereafter CoC) thesis posited future conflict to

be increasingly between a limited number of civilizational groupings.[1] The CoC theory

argued that the differential effects of modernization were causing an identify shift away

from more traditional nationalist views and towards more primordial religious identities.

These identities were associated with large-scale civilizational groupings, into which he

assigned the vast majority of the earth's population.

According to CoC theory, modernization was increasing on a global scale, yet

the effects of this process were distributed unevenly; while industrialized nations reaped

the economic benefits and became increasingly wealthy and secure, much of the

developing world either remained at low economic levels or declined. In the face of

rising disparity, those groups excluded would increasingly see themselves as at the

---

[1] The evolution of this work can be found in Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3), 1993 and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

mercy of a global community that was aligned against them, associating the process of modernization with the exploitive characteristics of Westernization. Convinced their governments were either unable or unwilling to address these issues, those governed would choose to transfer their collective identities away from those of the state and back to the communities within the civilizations from whence they sprang. Thus future conflict between and within states would become increasingly civilizational, especially after the end of the Cold War when restraining superpower influences waned.

1.1.2 The Debate over the Clash of Civilizations

This thesis has been repeatedly challenged at both the interstate and intrastate level. Perhaps the first to do so was T. Robert Gurr, who found no evidence that either civilizational or religious cleavages were becoming more salient as sources of what he termed "ethnopolitical conflicts".[2] From an interstate conflict perspective, Henderson found that while cultural factors were significant predictors of interstate war, "the most dangerous dyads" were those that were simultaneously dissimilar in terms of religion, territorially contiguous and similar in ethnic makeup.[3] Russett et al found that civilizational differences revealed little about the likelihood states would become embroiled in conflict; instead, military, political and economic indicators were more robust predictors of interstate conflict.[4] In reply, Huntington argued that these CoC

---

[2] Ted Robert Gurr, "People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System: 1994 Presidential Address." *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (3), 1994, p. 358.

[3] Errol A. Henderson, "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989." Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (5), 1997, p. 666.

[4] Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal and Michaelene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism déjà vu?" *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (5), 2000 examine militarized interstate disputes.

effects should be most pronounced in the post-Cold War era, and in intrastate conflicts rather than those between states.[5] He also stated that their study had examined only one year of the post-Cold War era; this, he argued, was not a representative sample of the period. However, Chiozza found similar results to those of Russett et al in a later test that did include the first eight years of the Cold War period.[6]

Other scholars have examined the veracity of the CoC from the vantage point of subnational conflict, although to a somewhat lesser extent. Fox examined CoC claims of rising levels of civilizational conflict within fault-line states in the post-Cold War era, focusing specifically on conflict both involving and between Western and Islamic civilizations. He found no difference in the amount of Western and Islamic involvement in civilizational conflict either during or after the Cold War; additionally, only a small minority was between Western and Islamic civilizations in both periods. However, he did find evidence that conflicts involving Islamic groups comprised a majority of the total, both during and after the Cold War.[7] While not directly testing the CoC theory, Fearon and Laitin found that weak central governments tended to create better conditions for insurgency, and found no support for causative arguments favoring ethnic or religious fractionalization.[8] In a study of ethnopolitical dyads within states, Roeder

---

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, "Try Again: A Reply to Russett, Oneal & Cox." Journal of Peace Research 37 (5), 2000, p. 609.

[6] Giacomo Chiozza, "Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946-97." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (6), 2002 examines violent and nonviolent conflict

[7] Jonathan Fox, "Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West." Journal of Peace Research 38 (4), 2001, p. 463.

[8] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." American Political Science Review 97 (1), 2003.

found that while civilizational differences did lead to an increased likelihood of conflict escalation in the 1990s, it did so to no greater extent than other ethnolinguistic divisions, and no more often than it had occurred prior to the end of the Cold War. Rather government discrimination in favor of one civilization or ethnolinguistic tradition was more likely to raise the overall likelihood of conflict escalation.[9]

In more recent attempts to test the CoC hypotheses Tusicisny examined both interstate and subnational conflict, arguing that previous tests of both (by many of the authors listed above) are limited in the number of conflicts they include and the period they cover. He finds the frequency and intensity of intercivilizational conflicts to be as high in the post-Cold era as before, but that the frequency of such conflicts is in decline. Territorial conflicts between civilizational groups are found to be increasing, yet have been doing so since the 1980s. He also finds no evidence for Huntington's claim that Islam has "bloody borders", especially in regard to conflicts with the West.[10] In another recent study, focusing on political repression, De Soysa and Nordas show that states with significant Muslim populations and those that are members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have *lower* levels of political terror than other non-Muslim states, refuting the "bloody innards" claim made in the CoC thesis.[11]

---

[9] Philip G. Roeder, "Clash of Civilizations and Escalation of Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflicts." Comparative Political Studies 36 (5), 2003, pp. 535-36.

[10] Andrej Tusicisny, "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer and Bloodier?" Journal of Peace Research 41 (4), 2004, p. 497.

[11] Indra De Soysa and Ragnhild Nordas, "Islam's Bloody Innards? Religion and Political Terror, 1980-2000." *International Studies Quarterly* 51, 2007, p. 938.

1.1.3 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this study is both to examine the validity of Huntington's claims of increasing civilizational conflict at the subnational level in the post-Cold War period, and to determine if religious, rather than civilizational differences are more salient in the process. Are CoC civilizations a proper means of categorizing these future cleavages, or are there more fundamental differences at work? In short, this study seeks to determine if religious differences, rather than civilizational groupings, are of more use in explaining the observed evolution of subnational conflict in the modern era. CoC civilizations, while a novel means of categorizing the global population, are both too broad in scope and too few in number to classify global ethnic groupings. Religion, however, may be a more useful discriminatory mechanism and thus a better predictor of modern subnational conflict. This research examines the evolution of subnational conflict from 1946 through 2007, with an emphasis on religious cleavages as a likely source of this type of conflict.

This study, though focusing only on subnational conflict, has direct ties to broader international relations theory. There have been only sixty-two interstate conflicts begun since 1946; of these only thirty have reached the level of war.[12] The number of interstate conflicts reaching war levels has also decreased radically in the last two decades; since 1990 only four (the battle over Kashmir, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the US-led invasion of Iraq) have met this criterion. War at the interstate level is rare and becoming more so,

---

[12] Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5), 2002.

making quantitative studies of these events quite challenging. However, by studying the processes that lead to conflict at the subnational level, it is possible to make reasonable inferences that may prove of use at the level of interstate conflict. If religious or civilizational differences are revealed to be of sufficient salience to contribute to conflict initiation between groups within state borders, it seems reasonable to assume that such differences may contribute to tensions between groups that straddle international borders. This research thus has implications for theories of the salience of ethnicity and religion in the conflict process at both the domestic and international levels.

1.1.4 The Impact of Religion

Little has been written about the impact of religion on international conflict prior to the new millennium; Philpott showed that between 1980 and 1999, only six articles from among some 1,600 published in four major international relations journals had listed religion as an important influence on international relations.[13] In part this was the result of Secularization Theory, which posited that religion would eventually become irrelevant as technology and modernization removed the need for God in modern life[14]. Rather than focus on religion, international relations theories have tended to focus instead on more realist variables, such as economic and military considerations.[15] With

---

[13] Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 9. The journals are *International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, World Politics and International Security*.

[14] Although this approach can be traced back to Marx, Nietzsche, and Weber (among many others), it has been a dominant approach in political thought through the late twentieth century as well. For more on the secularization debate, see Berger (1969), as well as *Sociology of Religion* 60 (3), 1999, which devotes the entire publication to this debate. Berger has since withdrawn his support for Secularization Theory.

[15] Jonathan Fox, "The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars: 1945-2001. *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (6), 2004, pp. 716-17.

the overthrow of Iran in 1979 by religious zealots and installation of a popular theocracy

belief in Secularization Theory began to wane. The rise of liberation theology across

Latin America in the 1980s saw Catholics become politically mobilized, demanding

social and political reforms. In the U.S., the import of religion in politics has been felt

since the Moral Majority began having a public impact on presidential election bids.

Although Secularization Theory was now in question, debate over the import of religion

in international relations remained minimal until after the events of September 11, 2001.

Fox, for example, notes that it is in the very nature of social science work to

reject the importance of religion. Early social science tradition established a desire to

mirror the scientific revolution's goal of replacing the theocratic with the rational; with a

decline of religion's importance in the world a similar drop in theoretical social science

would follow. Fox also argues a tendency for Western social scientists, steeped since

childhood in the notion of separation of church and state, to ignore the non-secular.

Finally, the difficulty in operationalization of religious variables has led some to use

crude measures for religious variables or simply refuse to measure religion at all.[16] After

9/11, however, theorists noted that instead of being in decline, religion has experienced

a nearly global resurgence. Religious organizations have been growing in the power

they possess to influence public debate and policy, even to the point of influencing

constitutions, and now exercise a "transnational influence on the policy of outside

---

[16] Jonathan Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations." International Studies
Review 3 (3), 2001, pp. 54-58.

states".[17] Despite the renewal of interest in the salience of religion in international relations, it is still a relatively understudied branch of political theory.

The debate over the salience of religion on subnational conflict has resulted in a larger theoretical body of work. Juergensmeyer argued religious resurgence in much of the Third World was an artifact of the adoption of post-independence Western ideology. As many of these governments began to falter in the provision of human rights and prosperity, their populations rejected them in favor of religious-based governments and demanded regime change[18]. Fox finds that religious factors by themselves explain little about ethnic conflict; when combined with separatist movements, however, religion becomes a more powerful factor, especially in ethnic rebellions.[19] Religion was also found to play a major role in reinforcing beliefs in afterlife rewards, providing additional impetus for membership in terrorist organizations.[20]

While Huntington claimed religion is a "primary defining characteristic" of CoC civilizations, he considered it only one part of a greater whole.[21] He defines his civilizations as having many common objective elements such as "language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and…the subjective self-identification of people".[22] Thus while he classifies nearly every CoC civilization by a religious moniker (Hindu, Islamic,

---

[17] Daniel Philpott, "The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations." *World Politics* 55 (1), 2002, p. 83.

[18] Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993, p. 29.

[19] Jonathan Fox, *Religion, Civilization and Civil War: 1945 through the Millenium*. New York: Lexington Books, 2004, pp 1-154.

[20] Laurence R. Iannaccone, "The Market for Martyrs." Unpublished manuscript, January 2006.

[21] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, p. 253.

[22] Ibid, p. 43.

Orthodox), he considers religious identification as only a partial explanandum in his predictions of both interstate and subnational conflict. Explanations of interstate conflict would continue to focus on issues of state power and security, while subnational conflict causes would focus almost exclusively on territorial disputes and questions of autonomy. Although Huntington argues against a "pure" primordialist view of religious identity, in which religious preferences are generally fixed and unyielding over time, he does suggest these cultural markers are very slow and difficult to change. This leads to his claim of the characteristic of fault line wars as being "almost always between peoples of different religions" and generally violent, protracted and difficult to settle on a permanent basis.[23]

1.1.5 The Limitations of Civilizations

I argue that civilizational categorizations within the CoC theoretical construct are imperfect indicators of past and future subnational conflict risk. While they provide the broadest possible characterization of identification, their very breadth limits their utility. As stated above, Huntington associated most of his civilizational groupings with a single dominant religion. However, the inclusion of nearly 1.2 billion under an Islamic category while ignoring religious diversity in the West and Latin America is highly problematic. For example, Huntington's Islamic civilization should be monolithic and united in both cultural and religious homogeneity; conflict within Islam, according to the CoC theory, should be greatly reduced in the post-Cold War era.

---

[23] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, pp. 252-55.

Yet Iraq has been engaged in sectarian strife for years; as of this writing over 100,000 Iraqi casualties have been reported since 2003.[24] It is estimated that nearly two-thirds of these deaths are fratricidal; most have been carried out by both sides of the Sunni-Shi'ia divide. This and other empirical evidence within Islam only weakens the arguments of CoC theory; sectarian Iraqi violence occurs *within* the Islamic civilization, yet is inter-religious (Sunni v. Shi'ia) in nature. Subnational conflict is usually not civilizationally based; it is instead linked more closely to factors that comprise CoC civilizations, namely religious beliefs. Such conflict is indeed more common between groups of dissimilar religious beliefs than between CoC civilizational groupings; when religious cleavages exist, conflict between these groups tends to be of greater duration and severity than those in which such differences between combatants are absent. I do not discount the utility of CoC civilizational differences for descriptive classification; however, a more refined approach to ethnicity is warranted in the examination of conflict causation. I argue that differences in religious belief, rather than in CoC civilizational characterization, may be better indicators of conflict at the subnational level in the modern era; it is this assertion that this paper will also seek to examine.

1.1.6 Operationalization of Religious Differences

How best to operationalize religious differences, with respect to the likelihood of such differences leading to conflict, has proven difficult. Studies of the relationship between religious differences and conflict, especially at the subnational level, have often focused on the presence of two or more religious groups of some size deemed to be

---

[24] Although accounts vary, casualties in the 100,000 to 150,000 range have been reported by the World Health Organization, the Associated Press, Iraq Family Health Survey and the Iraq Body count. Estimates as high as 600,000 have been reported by the British publication *The Lancet* (CNN, 10/11/2006).

sufficient to make conflict likely. These studies have often been rather simplistic in design, encompassing only a few religious groups and either subsuming or ignoring the rest. For example, Fox differentiates among Christian, Muslim and "Other" religious groupings in his study of religious groups and patterns of conflict; he does so to maintain a sufficient number of cases for a meaningful analysis.[25] Others have based religious cleavages on the population percentage the group encompasses within a given state; for example De Soysa and Nordas coded a religious group as being dominant within the state if it encompasses greater than eighty percent of the population total.[26]

However, difficulties arise with these methods – is a population percentage of a given ethnic group always "significant" at the 10% level? If religious differences are not salient within a population, does a religious "majority" of 80% still make them dominant? In what sense would such a group dominate another? Is this percentage even meaningful in the absence of historical cleavages? Do differing religious groups have a predilection for conflict merely because they coexist within the borders of a state? Measuring conflict likelihood based on such measures is in effect self-limiting; without historical evidence that supports such claims, predictions of religious-based conflict become less compelling.

Simple demographic snapshots offer little to the social scientist seeking to understand the dynamics of relationships between ethnic groups of any type without specific knowledge of the salience of the historical and doctrinal distances between

---

[25] Jonathan Fox, *Religion, Civilization and Civil War: 1945 through the Millennium*. New York: Lexington Books, 2004, p. 46.

[26] Indra De Soysa and Ragnhild Nordas, "Islam's Bloody Innards? Religion and Political Terror, 1980-2000."*International Studies Quarterly* 51, 2007, p. 931.

them. Without such knowledge, accurate predictions of intergroup behavior are not

possible. For example, if religious group size alone was salient, one should reasonably

predict Germany to have as much conflict with its Muslim minority as the Philippines,

with roughly the same sized religious demographic makeup, has had with theirs. Clearly

this has not been the case; the Philippine government has been in near constant conflict

with its Muslim minority since the end of World War II, yet Germany continues to

maintain positive and mainly peaceful relations with its minority Islamic population.

What is necessary is a measure of the salience of religious cleavages within

states, measuring the religious tolerance of both the state and the population towards

religious groups of all types and sizes. By combining both the geographic distribution

of religious groups and a measure of their tolerance for one another within states, a more

useful measure of conflict based on these cleavages should emerge. Data for the

percentages of religious groups within states are obtained from the CIA World Factbook

and other sources, while information of religious tolerance was extracted from Israel's

Religion and State Project, conducted by Bar Ilan University. Two measures of

religious tolerance are employed: the Government Regulation of Religion Index (GRI),

which scores official government restriction of religious practice, and the Social

Regulation of Religion Index (SRI), which scores societal attitudes toward other

religions in each country. To measure religious salience, each state is scored from one

to ten, with lower scores representing less regulation in each of the two categories.

1.1.7 Methodology and the Data Set

This study includes over 200 countries covering the period 1946-2007, including

those granted independence within the period and new republics formed in the wake of

the breakup of the Soviet Union. The study uses conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict

Data Program, which recorded 1,670 conflict-years in 100 countries in the observation

period discussed above. As will be discussed in detail in later chapters, several

important indicators of the likelihood of civil war are well-studied; these indicators

should also be highly significant in this study of smaller-scale subnational conflict. One

such indicator is the level of state economic success, measured in terms of per capita

Gross Domestic Product (GDP/pc); this should predict lower incidence of subnational

conflict as GDP/pc levels increase. Simply put, the higher the economic capacity of the

state, the more robust its institutional capacity should be, and the less likely groups

within it should choose strategies of violence to effect political change.

Population size is yet another significant indicator of civil war potential which

has a correspondingly significant indicator at the level of smaller-scale conflict.

Theories of civil war predict that the larger the population of a state, the larger the

cohort of likely participants will be. In addition, the larger a state's population, the

greater its demands will be on the host government in terms of social and political goods

and services. Thus, the larger the population, the more likely it is to have difficulties

meeting the demands of its population, and thus the greater the likelihood of small-scale

conflict initiation.

New states are also at greater risk of civil wars, as institutional capacity is often

low or nonexistent in its formative years; the lack of adequately trained police and army

personnel makes it likely that there will be difficulties policing and preventing violence

from occurring. New leaders, facing difficulties establishing and developing institutions

to effectively govern, often generate more patrimonial regimes, keeping the wealth in

the hands of a select few and investing little in institutional development. Finally, the task of simultaneously implementing statehood and nationhood policies is often difficult; ethnic and other differences often lead to internal security dilemmas that can lead to violence. It is posited here that these same problems will also lead to lesser episodes of domestic conflict; as such I expect that this variable will be positively associated with a higher likelihood of subnational conflict.

When groups decide to engage in violent conflict, many power uncertainties are removed, as each side learns the capabilities and weaknesses of the other. Knowledge gained in these conflicts allows each side to make more informed decisions about the other when grievances arise in the future. Thus, I expect a variable for prior conflict incidence to be positively associated with the likelihood of future subnational conflict.

To measure the effect of civilizational cleavages on the initiation of subnational conflict, two distinct measures are employed. States located along the CoC-defined civilizational "fault-lines" should be expected to experience a higher incidence of violent conflict at the state level, according to CoC theory. States that contain sufficiently large populations from differing civilizations (defined as cleft states in the CoC) should also be more conflict-prone. The differential advantages gained during modernization processes in the post-Cold War era should result in an upward trend in such conflict after 1989, if the CoC thesis is correct. Thus we should observe a higher incidence of subnational conflict along these fault lines and within cleft states than elsewhere, and the incidence of such conflicts should be increasing in the post-Cold War era. Also according to CoC theory, these conflicts should be longer in duration and more intense in terms of battle-deaths than their non-civilizational counterparts.

In similar fashion, conflicts between groups of dissimilar religions are examined to see if the hypotheses presented in CoC theory are applicable here. This study first identifies religiously cleft states (no religious "fault lines" were found to match those in the CoC hypothesis), then makes similar investigations to determine if these are more conflict prone than other states, if the incidence of conflict within them has increased in the post-Cold War period, and if they too are longer and more intense than subnational conflicts occurring in states where no such religious differences are observed.

Multivariate analyses are then performed to estimate the relative importance of secular and religious differences on the initiation of violent subnational conflict. In addition to the existence of civilizational and religious cleavages, the regulation of religion by both the state and the population, the salience of political and economic conditions, state newness, conflict history, population size, natural resource endowment as well as ethnic and religious fractionalization status are also measured.

Results show that Huntington's civilizations are simultaneously too broad in their specification and too few in number to accurately describe the evolution of subnational conflict in the post-Cold War era. Civilizational identification as defined by Huntington is too broad to engender inclusivity among its members in times of external crisis, and the number of civilizational classifications he lists is too narrow to provide the inclusivity necessary to adequately "fit" the actual number of people groups that exist. CoC fault-line states were not insignificant indicators of subnational conflict in either the pre- or post-Cold War eras. CoC-defined cleft states were, but only in the Cold War era; this may be due, however, to Huntington's criteria for identification of these states as cleft; of the twenty-four he identified, fully seventeen (71%) experienced

16

conflict, most of which occurred in the Cold War era. Neither CoC cleft nor fault-line states were significantly correlated with such conflict after the Cold War, as predicted.

Expected realist explanations of conflict were obtained; higher levels of GDP per capita were associated with lower levels of violence both prior to and after 1989. Neither ethnic nor religious fractionalization levels were significant indicators of subnational conflict after the Cold War; oil-producing states were similarly uncorrelated. States with larger populations were significantly more likely to engage in violence than less-populated states. While new states were not associated with greater levels of conflict during the Cold War, in the subsequent era the correlation was positive and highly significant. Unexpectedly, economic inequality was found to be a key indicator of subnational violence, but only in the Cold War era; after 1989 this type of inequality was an insignificant influence.

While it appears that treatise is only designed to refute Huntington's CoC theory, in fact it offers a more refined approach to his ground-breaking work. Instead of focusing on large-scale civilizational groupings, I concentrate instead on what Huntington termed the most important component of his civilizations – the religious makeup of the groups contained therein. If civilizations are too broad a classification, perhaps religious groupings will prove more useful in predictions of violent conflict at the subnational level, especially in the post Cold War era. I therefore intend to refine the predictions of CoC theory, rather than focusing simply on refuting them.

In the following sections I will discuss the evolution of identity construction and transfer theories, and how shifts in individual identity can have implications for conflict. I also cover Huntington's approach to shifting identities in response to the pressures of

17

modernization.   I then explore the utility of shifting to religious versus other identities,

and explore in detail the evolution of theories concerning identity-based conflict. I then

examine some of the literature that seeks to explain why some groups choose strategies

of violence in response to grievances. The focus then shifts as I offer a theoretical

approach explaining the utility of employing religious organizations when mobilizing

groups for political action and violence, exploring the advantages they offer in

mobilization, conflict initiation and sustainment, and conflict resolution. Finally, an

overview of the remaining chapters is then provided as a conclusion to this section.

1.2 Identity Construction and Transfer Theories

1.2.1 Identity Theories

There have been many theories on how individual identities are created and

sustained, but it is generally agreed they can be assigned to two very general categories.

The first describes identity as fixed and immutable in most circumstances, assigned at

birth and difficult to change under most conditions. Primordialist theory rests on the

assumption that humans naturally will seek membership within a group that shares

certain physical, socio-economic or geographical characteristics. According to this view

ethnic groups are ancient constructs, kinship groups that are perceived by their members

to be accepted facts of life[27]. Horowitz, for example, defined ethnicity in terms of both

objective elements (ancestry, race, skin color, religion, tribe) and *subjective elements*

(myths of collective ancestry, cultural stories that justify a bond of kinship). Ethnicity in

---

[27] Stephen Van Evera, "Primordialism Lives!" APSA-CP: Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association 12 (1), 2000, 20-22.

essence is "connected to birth and blood, but not absolutely so"[28]. This essentialist view

holds that animosities between groups are deeply rooted and of long standing, leading to

so-called "ancient hatreds" explanations of conflict between groups.

Within the second category, constructivist theories claim that identities are more

instrumental in nature, not inherent in human nature but moldable social qualities that

can be shaped and manipulated to meet the preferences of the individual, an external

actor, or some combination of the two. Varshney showed how elites have successfully

used ethnic cleavages as an instrument for mobilizing groups for political gain in

India[29]. Additional constructivist approaches focus on state-building processes; Weber

posits that France's transportation revolution, educational standardization and reform

and policy of universal conscription combined to transform a multiethnic mishmash of

peasants into modern Frenchmen[30]. Anderson's "imagined communities" are nations,

social constructs of people that imagine themselves part of a larger group, albeit whose

members they will likely never meet[31]. Constructivist theories claim that all social

identities are simply social constructions, capable of being both created and destroyed.

Although primordial theories of identity have all but been abandoned, there is

still much debate over how flexible identities really are, what forces act to shape and

---

[28] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 51-52.
For an additional primordialist view, see Clifford Geertz (ed.) *Old Societies and New States: The Quest
for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, New York: The Free Press, 1967.

[29] Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict" in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes *Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2007.

[30] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*, Stanford
California: Stanford University Press, 1976.

[31] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*,
London: Verso, 1991.

mold them, and whether they are able to be used in an instrumental fashion. Some researchers insist that identities are neither uniquely primordialist nor constructivist in origin; Laitin for example describes a Janus-faced approach to identity, arguing that identity is shaped by both cultural heritage *and* political processes[32]. In his theory a culturalist approach is melded with rational choice theory to show how British hegemonic influence determined the selection of identity markers among Nigeria's Yoruba. Thus culture is not as deeply rooted as primordialist arguments would have us believe.

Individual identities are constructed through individual interactions with others within a series of expanding social groups. The most basic of these is family, wherein the individual learns through family bonds of ties to race, ethnicity and historical background. Children are raised within the bonds of the family group, where the notion of who they are and how they fit into their specific community is introduced. As an individual matures, identification is further defined and strengthened in terms of gender, religion and social class through interactions with networks of friends, schoolmates, and others within the community. Expectations of behavior are learned based on these categories, and repeated exposure to consequences for compliant and non-compliant behavior reinforces identities. Finally, broader identification with groups such as civic organizations, political parties and national governments provide individuals with a sense of who they are within their specific nation; forming expectations of social, economic and political behavior.

---

[32] David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

1.2.2 Identity Shifts

Although individuals construct a given identity set over time, this does not imply that, once constructed, individual identities are not malleable, or even fully changeable. Rational choice theory posits that in a culture or society wherein exists multiple identity markers, individuals will choose identities that provide them with the greatest utility. In this way identities become political resources, and individuals learn which to employ to provide them the greatest chance of being welfare maximizers.[33]

For example, there is wide variation of language within the United States in terms of accent, mannerism and speech. Visitors to an area that differs greatly in these qualities often find themselves singled out for the communication patterns they employ. While traveling with southern relatives in New York City, I noticed the speech patterns of my companions attracted undue attention from some passers-by. When asking directions, I covered my accent and mannerisms and employed instead those I heard on the street; I found that responses were much more forthcoming when my status as an outsider was not so obvious. Changing my identity in response to this external stimulus thus had allowed me to better function within this environment.

Individuals thus choose to emphasize those identities which will afford them the greatest opportunity. In situations where identifying with a particular group provides some advantage, individuals will accentuate the trait that most identifies them with that group. For instance, in advanced societies less advantage may be derived from racial, ethnic or religious classifications; it is usually more beneficial to identify oneself based on social class, employment classification or political affiliation. The opposite is often

[33] David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 11.

21

true in less advanced nations where the majority of the population resides within a particular social stratum (usually poor and/or unemployed); in this case more benefit may be derived from identification with a particular tribe, ethnic or religious group.

But what prompts an individual to move away from a particular identity, to "shift away" from a group with which identification has been established, in lieu of another? Individual identities are socially constructed over time and are ordered in such a way that primary identities are those which individuals expect to bring the greatest levels of satisfaction within a given context. Thus, if a constructed identity begins to lose the utility it once possessed for an individual within a given context or situation, it may be discarded in lieu of another identity that replaces or exceeds the utility of the former. Similarly, if a situation or context changes and the new identity no longer represents an optimal source of individual satisfaction, it too may be replaced with another more useful identity.

This is by no means an unusual situation; there are a myriad of possible reasons for individual decisions to shift identity. Employment opportunities may force people to move to areas that are demographically dissimilar from those they are leaving; categories of identity in one location may starkly differ from another. To better fit in, individuals may choose to shift identities to create advantages for them within the new surroundings. In the United States, for example, race is a primary means of identification and the source of deep societal divisions. Under all but the most extreme treatments, it is impossible for an individual to change this identity marker. However, other identities exist that *are* malleable; changing one or more of these (such as religious choice, political party, etc.) may provide advantages within the new environment. In

much of Europe, Africa and South Asia differences other than racial are more likely to be divisive. The homogeneous nature of race in some of these regions means that identity is defined more often in terms of family, clan, tribe, language, caste or religion. When necessary, familial ties can be suppressed, new languages learned and religious affiliation changed or suppressed to maximize political and social opportunity and quality of life. There is empirical evidence that suggests these identity shifts, as theoretically described, are actually quite common.

For example, Posner found citizens and politicians in Zambia calculate their electoral odds and strategically select an ethnic identity (language or tribe) that will allow them to form a minimum winning coalition. During periods of multi-party competition, language identities are selected; multi-party election issues are centered at the national level, where no one tribe can form a minimum winning coalition, making language group differences salient. During single-party competition, tribal identities are used, since the focus of political competition devolves to the electoral constituency, where tribal differences are more useful (since most of the rural areas that span several tribes are linguistically homogeneous).[34] Even gender-based identities have proven malleable, and society is straining to keep up with the changes in norms and beliefs historically ascribed to gender.

1.2.3 Huntington's Theory of a Shift from National to Religious Identities

Huntington's CoC thesis proposed a major identity shift in which individuals would tend to shift identities away from nationality to one more primordial in character,

---

[34] Daniel N. Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

that of civilization[35]. He argued individuals were increasingly being subjected to the often differential effects of modernization, and on a global scale. As modernization increases, disparities between the haves and have-nots around the globe would increase. Why? As states modernized or were forced to compete in an increasingly modernizing world, their populations would be subject to the effects of this phenomenon. Global markets would increasingly dictate the pace of production and the allocation of capital and labor, and many within these markets would naturally capitalize on opportunities for profit. Elites and political leaders in developing nations have historically been well-positioned to reap large economic gains from increasingly open markets, while the working class gets left further behind economically.

In January 2009, for example, China's rapidly increasing gross domestic product made its economy the fourth largest in the world, surpassing that of Britain and France. But its Neo-Leninist ideology means the vast majority of the wealth is held by the state, with an immense patronage system keeping the bulk of the wealth and power within the hands of a small elite within the Communist Party system. Yet for the majority of China's rural population, modernization has had a much different effect; water shortages, deforestation and loss of arable land have forced more than 200 million rural laborers to urban centers to find work[36]. Modernization to many of those displaced does not equate with increased levels of prosperity and quality of life; rather it is associated with upheaval and continued economic distress. While the effects of modernization in advanced industrialized nations are generally beneficial, they can yield different results

---

[35] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3), 1993 and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

[36] CIA World Factbook, 2009, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

within the developing world. The efforts of India and China to modernize their nations, each with a billion-plus population, have placed great strains on billions of others worldwide. Increasing demands for oil, steel, and other commodities have led to rising fuel and food prices on a global scale; riots erupted in Spring 2008 in Haiti, Egypt, Mozambique and Bangladesh as the price of wheat nearly doubled, forcing many in these nations to go hungry.

While modernization and the development of the global economy have brought many benefits, the losers in the process are most often found among the poorest sectors. Thus while modernization brings benefits at the national level, in terms of increased political, economic and military power, it simultaneously can lead to an alienation of the state from those who benefit little (if at all) from the modernization process. Huntington argued that:

"At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer."[37]

Thus while modernization may indeed positively impact the state through an increase in fungible measures of power, the process by which these changes occur often has a quite differential effect on the population of these states. Those benefiting the least from the process of modernization often desire to seek better conditions. When the state either cannot or will not meet the needs of these individuals, they become dissatisfied, no longer identifying with an entity that seemingly cares little of their plight.

---

[37] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 1996, 79.

1.2.4 Other Causes of Shifts away from National Identities

While Huntington focused on modernization and individual responses to its effects, it can be argued that individual alienation from the state can occur due to a variety of other causes. Economic or political inequality, poverty, lack of political representation or a failure to meet popular demands (sovereignty or autonomy, for example) can lead to alienation from the state. In addition, many subnational groups exist that maintain little, if any, identification with the state. Modern Afghanistan, for example, was formed in 1747 when Ahmad Shah Durrani unified the Pashtun tribes, but tribal identities continue to remain stronger than nationalist ones to the present day.

Sub-Saharan African nations, formed during European colonial expansion, offered little to their indigenous populations who suddenly found themselves "labeled" as part of a newly formed state. As such, they often found few reasons to develop a national identity, and ruling elites were forced in some cases to create and foster identities based on tribe, religion or ethnic group; in order to more effectively rule[38]. Whatever the cause, when individuals no longer desire a nationalist identity, they will seek the identity that provides them with the advantages and social relationships they desire. Huntington argued that individuals would most likely shift their identities to those primarily based on religion, and it is with this portion of his hypothesis I most strongly agree.

---

[38] Daniel N. Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

1.2.5 Why a Shift to Religious Identities?

Why would those seeking to shift from nationalist-based identities find religious identities a useful substitute? What does religion offer individuals who feel abandoned by the state, and why would individuals choose religious identities over other cultural markers, such as race, ethnicity, tribe, regionalism or language? The answer lies in the unique set of benefits offered by religious organizations, benefits that are not available from other groups, be they racially, ethnically, civically or socially based. Individuals choose identities from within a set which has been socially constructed over time. National identities, as discussed earlier, are forged relatively late in the socialization process, and as such are not as deeply ingrained as other, more basic, identities of race, ethnicity, tribe or religion. It is likely, therefore, that national identities are more easily discarded for one (or more) of these earlier identities.

As individuals become increasingly dissatisfied with the state's ability or desire to meet individual desires for security, economic success, and social development and protection, they will often shift their identities away from the state to identities that prove more advantageous. They will seek to deepen identification with groups that maximize the benefits they seek, those for which the state is no longer making adequate provision. Therefore they will choose the group that is most able to provide the social, economic and political goods that have been lost. Religious groups, rather than those based on tribe, language, race or other groups based on social or civic mandates, are the best placed to offer these goods to their members, as will be shown later in this chapter.

Identity shifts away from nations and toward religion are thus common responses to individuals feeling ill-served by the state. In the developing world, differential effects

of modernization on individual well-being will make these identity shifts more likely in the future. Huntington's thesis was based squarely on this theoretical premise when he developed his civilizational arguments; while I disagree with his outcome, the theory of shifts to religious identities is also central to mine.

1.3 Identity-Based Conflict

Sociologists and political scientists have long examined the salience of identity in conflict between individuals and groups. How identities are formed, whether or not they remain static once created, and the importance of maintaining identities in various situations have also been studied. The In-group/Out-group Theory hypothesis, in which external conflict promotes internal cohesion, was first outlined by Georg Simmel in 1955. In it he showed how individuals who defined themselves as belonging to a particular group based on some characteristic might not see themselves as cohesive in times of peace, but when threatened from without would draw together more closely[39].

Lewis Coser refined the theory, arguing that individuals must first recognize themselves as belonging to a group prior to the existence of an external threat and must also perceive that threat as applying to the whole group. If they did so the group would become more cohesive and function as such when facing the threat; otherwise members of the group would assume the threat did not apply to themselves and do nothing[40]. But simply facing an external threat is not always enough; Hammerschlag and Astrachan showed that when individuals perceive group behavior to be useless to improve their

---

[39] Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*, New York: The Free Press, 1955.

[40] Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, New York: The Free Press, 1956.

situation, or if they believe individual strategies may indeed offer better opportunities for success, then disintegrative behavior was the norm[41]. Lott may have summarized it best when he argued that coordinated group behavior is best motivated in the presence of an external threat, when cooperative behavior is perceived as the best response, and when individuals cannot escape from either the threat or the group[42].

Stein argued group cohesion in the face of an external threat is highest when an external threat *equally and indiscriminately* affects all members of a group, when group action is perceived to alleviate or eliminate the threat, and the group has a pre-existing institutional hierarchy that enforces cohesion while providing emotional support to its members[43]. In the face of a threat affecting all members of the group, each member finds the greatest utility in mobilizing to meet the threat instead of opting out. Mercer states that identity theory defines human nature as naturally social, leading us to form "in-groups" that help build our social identity[44]. The more we identify with a group, the higher the probability we will discriminate against an "out-group". Walter avers that once fighting erupts, identities become fixed; this may explain why combatants cannot work well together[45]. Combatants fighting over issues that are tied to their identities

---

[41] C.A. Hammerschlag and B. M. Astrachan, "The Kennedy Airport Snow-In: An Inquiry into Intergroup Behavior." *Psychiatry* 34 (3), 1971.

[42] A.J. Lott and B. E. Lott, "Group Cohesiveness as Interpersonal Attraction: A Review of Relationships with Antecedent and Consequent Variables." *Psychological Bulletin* 64 (4), 1965.

43 Arthur A. Stein, "Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 20 (1), 1976.

[44] Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity." *International Organization* 49 (2), 1995.

[45] Barbara Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* (41), 2004.

(such as territory considered a historical homeland) will have greater difficulty reaching a settlement than those fighting over more negotiable political or economic issues.

What should be clear from this literature is that individuals seek to be recognized as part of a larger group, and thus align their thinking and actions along paths that support those of the group. The salience of group identity is clearly not limited to an individual's understanding of his or her place within the group. It can be reinforced from without, whether by other members of the in-group or by elite manipulation via broadcasts or other media dispersal; this was clearly demonstrated during the recent civil wars in Yugoslavia. Thus if an individual is convinced a situation has arisen which threatens the identity group to which he belongs, that the threat applies to all who belong to the group, and actions taken by the group as a whole can act to alleviate the threat, then individual participation in group action becomes more plausible. This may account for the many incidences where individuals leave their civilian lives to take part in violent conflicts which may lead to injury or death, even against the predictions of collective action theory[46].

1.3.1 Decisions to Choose Strategies of Violence

Differences in religion are one of the primary categories of identification and are often linked to conflict. This is especially true of monotheistic and conversion-focused religions (like Christianity and Islam) that seek to unite all under their religious umbrella. Smith argues that even in repressive regimes, religion provides organizational resources, reinforces shared identities and provides public legitimacy for many social

---

[46] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971 is an excellent reference if additional information on collective action theory is desired.

movements, establishing networks to transfer some dissatisfaction into a mobilizing force[47]. Thus religion can provide a basis for social mobilization to change what seems to be an unacceptable status quo. When states provide groups opportunities to politicize religious identities, it opens the door for social movements to politicize religion itself to attempt to accomplish their goals[48]. Religion becomes a powerful motivator and facilitator of social change, providing structural and normative support in the form of organizational networks and trust, to create social capital and seek political change through collective action processes. A key question remains, however; what drives individuals and groups to move from peaceful protest to violence?

Gurr argues that bases of collective identity can be found in a number of variables that differentiate groups, including religion and national origin. What drives some groups to conflict is based first on the *salience* of group identity; the more closely they consider their identity to be related to that of the group, the more they are likely to define their interests in terms of that identity. This in turn makes these groups more cohesive, strengthening the ability of group leaders to mobilize them. If a group comes to believe they are being marginalized in some fashion as a result of their identification with a group, they will likely overcome any collective action obstacles and mobilize[49]. Merely mobilizing for political action does not necessitate an escalation to violence,

[47] Christian Smith, ed. *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism*, New York: Routledge, 1996.

[48] Stathis Kalyvas, "Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization. Beyond Christian Democracy." Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigeg, eds., *European Christian Democracy. Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.

[49] Ted Robert Gurr, *People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2000.

however. But since existing data sets on incidents of subnational conflict focus

primarily on cases of violent conflict, it is necessary to focus on conflicts that have

already escalated to this level of intensity.

What causes a group to view the salience of the disputed issue in such a way that

violence is seen as the only useful strategy? From bargaining theory it is known that

groups will choose alternative strategies to violence when available[50], so why do many

conflicts escalate? Some choose a structural approach, insisting that levels of state

capacity provide valuable clues for whether a nation will see rebellions turn violent; one

study claims that higher levels of state strength reduce the risk of civil war[51]. Weaker

states lack the capacity (lack of domestic institutions that can assist in conflict

prevention, a lack of unified central power, or the lack of an effective police or military

to prevent or quell violence) to either adequately police their populations and take

preventive measures that will quell violence before it starts or to crush it once begun.

Others examine the role of power imbalances and uncertainty; Walter and

Snyder show how uncertainty leads groups to view conflict as a necessary evil whenever

large domestic change is imminent and the lack of certainty of the motives of other

groups causes fear, even of annihilation. Groups that perceive themselves as being at

risk will sometimes choose preemptive violence because they lack the time and/or

---

[50] Geoffrey Blainey (*The Causes of War*, New York: The Free Press, 1973) argued that war only erupts when bargaining fails due to misperceptions over relative strength. James D. Fearon ("Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49 (3), 1995) claims that elite decisions to misrepresent information in the bargaining process can sometimes lead to war. Jonathan Kirshner ("Rationalist Explanations for War?" *Security Studies* 10 (1), 2000) disagrees, arguing that rational actors do *not* act alike in similar situations; perceptions of issue indivisibility, level of risk aversion and expected utility all can lead to differential outcomes in the bargaining process.

[51] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

experience to properly gauge the intentions of groups they fear will threaten them in the future[52]. As is the case between states when power imbalances occur, groups will attempt preemptive force when they believe the power imbalance will only get worse with time.

Almost commonplace at the end of the first decade of the new millennium, political terrorism has become the vehicle of choice for many wishing to make their demands known to both the state and the world through international media channels. Juergensmeyer believes some groups turn to violence in the form of acts of terrorism because they proxy as symbols of power in wars that cannot be won and for goals that cannot be achieved. These groups often give no thought to what would happen if they actually succeeded in their struggle, with the implication being that they neither expect or even seek to win the "war" they are engaged in. They are not focused on success for its own sake through these acts; they only wish to mobilize a larger audience[53]. With the media able to display almost instantaneous coverage of all but the smallest of events in real time, terrorism can get these messages to a larger audience in minutes.

Toft shows violence is most likely over issues that have no solution acceptable to the parties in a conflict, specifically issues of territory[54]. Both sides see disputed territory as indivisible; states desire national integrity and wish to avoid setting a precedent, while ethnic groups view it as an issue of homeland and will accept no

---

[52] Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds. *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*, Columbia University Press, 1999.

[53] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

[54] Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory, Princeton University Press, 2003.

compromise. Kahler and Walter depict territorial disputes as more prone to escalation to violence; militarized disputes over territory are more likely to involve a militarized response by the target state and escalate to war[55]. Collier and Sambanis claim opportunities to finance a rebellion, not specific grievances, will determine whether a group will determine if civil war is feasible or not[56].

Other domestic conditions that have been shown to lead to violence are extremes of inequality in both income potential and wealth, the perceived lack of either social or political representation and government repression. But there are many ethnic and minority groups that face these challenges daily and either choose to accept their conditions or mobilize and protest within established non-violent political channels. What compels individuals, the smallest and yet most vital components of groups, to risk sanctions that may include personal injury, imprisonment or even death by joining and participating in movements that involve violent confrontations with forces of the state? I argue that some religious organizations which possess sufficient levels of institutional capacity and provide social goods to their members may provide the answers we seek.

1.3.2 The Utility of Religious Organizations

Stein's arguments about the importance of an existing hierarchy within the group suggest that some religious organizations, which have varying degrees of established hierarchy, are well designed to enhance group cohesion. Many such organizations also have histories of providing social and emotional support to their members, especially in

---

[55] Miles Kahler and Barbara F. Walter, eds. *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

[56] Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds. *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, The World Bank, 2005.

times of crisis, which may reassure members that if conflict results in sanctions such as injury or death, social programs are in place to support any family members left behind. Other types of social organizations, lacking a similar hierarchy and often less likely to provide these support services, may have less impact on the decision process individuals use when making choices to join social movements. Thus religious organizations may offer additional utility for groups desiring to attract members to join a movement that often involve violence and a high likelihood of personal injury.

For example, Morris notes the myriad benefits the Southern Christian Leadership Conference brought to the Civil Rights Movement in 1950s America, in terms of skilled and charismatic leadership, an organized mass base, large financial support and meeting places to disseminate information and devise strategy.[57] In Latin America, the Catholic Church has served as a basis for social mobilization for indigenous peoples for more than two decades.[58] The hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church and the health, education and social services it provides to rural poor with little or no access to such services from the state makes it an ideal social mobilization source. Conversely, Sadowsky notes that the lack of cohesion among Islamic believers is one of the reasons that Islamic movements often lose against the state. Though they often are heavily invested in the provision of social networks that provide education, medical care and welfare, they often seek to insulate society from the state, rather than make it more

---

[57] Aldon Morris, "The Black Church in the Civil Rights Movement: the SCLC as the Decentralized, Radical Arm of the Black Church" in Christian Smith (ed.) *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism*, New York: Rutledge: 1996.

[58] Edward Cleary and Timothy Steigenga (eds.), *Resurgent Voices in Latin America: Indigenous Peoples, Political Mobilization and Religious Change*, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2004.

responsive.[59] Religious organizations are thus differentially capable of creating mass appeal for mobilization of populations, based on the cohesiveness of the religious organization and the benefits they are able to provide to their target populations.

1.4 The Impact of Religious Schisms on Subnational Conflict

The following discussion explains how religion can play a vital role in the process of political mobilization and conflict initiation at both the group and individual level. Elites seeking to mobilize others for potentially dangerous endeavors require well-organized institutional support, in-place and extensive communication networks and sufficient funding to initiate and sustain a protracted engagement. Individuals making rational choices to join movements such as these will be more likely to do so when the opportunity costs of doing so are sufficiently low. Religious organizations are often uniquely positioned to provide both the top-down institutional needs and the bottom-up individual social goods that make both mobilization and subsequent conflict a rational strategy for political change. I provide common scenarios in which religious organizations have strategic interests in offering these services, both to those wishing to mobilize for some cause, and to those considering joining these movements.

1.4.1 Theoretical Discussion

Many studies seeking the underlying causes of subnational conflict have been conducted; possible causal mechanisms have been numerous and varied. Weak states, underdeveloped "semi-democracies", repression, poverty and economic development, power imbalances and the security dilemma, territorial claims and simple greed have all

---

[59] Yahya Sadowsky, "Political Islam: Asking the Wrong Questions." Annual Review of Political Science 9, 2006.

been offered as reasons for group violence within the state[60]. While each of these has

been shown to play a part in *group* decisions to employ violence against other groups or

against the state, there remains a fundamental question that must be clearly answered if

we seek to better predict situations where violent measures are chosen. What motivates

individual decisions to overlook the often high opportunity costs of participating in

violent conflict? After all, while repression has provoked violence in some cases, there

are also many examples where repressive governments are not only peaceful, but

flourishing. Singapore, for example, makes no excuses for its heavy-handed domestic

policies (including human rights violations and breeches in the rule of law), yet its

citizens enjoy peace and prosperity (Singapore is currently ranked the 9th wealthiest

country in the world, in terms of GDP per capita)[61].

---

[60] For more on the impact of state capacity on civil war, see James Fearon and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003. Semi-democracies are covered by Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer. "Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92." *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (3), 2000 and in Nils Petter Gleditsch, 1995. 'Geography, Democracy, and Peace', *International Interactions* 20(4): 297–323. Ted Robert Gurr, *People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 2000 as well as Nicholas Sambanis and Annalisa Zinn. "From Protest to Violence: Conflict Escalation in Self-Determination Movements." Unpublished Working Paper, Yale University, Aug. 3rd, 2006 discuss the effects of state repression on civil war. The World Bank has multiple publications concerning the effect of poverty and poor economic development on civil war likelihood, including Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4), 2004. For more on power imbalances and the effect of the security dilemma on subnational conflict, see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. Princeton University Press, 1993; James D. Fearon "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49, 1995 and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." *International Security* 21 (2.), 1996. Territorial explanations of civil war are offered in Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton University Press, 2003 and Barbara F. Walter, "Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict." *International Studies Review* 5 (4), 2003. For more on the impact of greed on conflict initiation at the subnational level, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4), 2004.

[61] From the CIA World Factbook Country Comparison database at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html

On the other hand, the historical record is replete with examples of groups that choose strategies of violence (and have no shortage of individuals making decisions to participate) when there is seemingly no pressing need to do so. An obvious example is the upsurge of violence leading to full-scale ethnic cleansing that occurred in various parts of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. What drives some individuals to accept a status quo that manifests itself in poverty, limited political and cultural freedom, or discrimination, while others choose conflict in an attempt to change their status? What causes individuals to join rebel movements when the likely outcome is imprisonment, loss of income or even death for themselves and their families? When do rational actors determine that engaging in such behavior is the most logical course of action?

The CoC theory makes the claim that civilizational differences increase the likelihood that contentious issues between groups of differing cultures will escalate. I take the argument a step back in the process; explaining how religion plays an increased role in the process of political mobilization, conflict initiation and sustainment. Religious differences have often been sufficient to motivate groups to mobilize for purposes of protest over contentious issues. As discussed previously, religious identities are useful because they can be both "primordial" and unchanging from an individual perspective, and simultaneously malleable from a doctrinal standpoint. Horowitz describes religion outside of the modern Western world as "not a matter of faith but a

given, a given part of their identity, and for some an inextricable component of their sense of peoplehood."[62]

Religion is thus a fundamental identity for many groups, and is therefore seen by individuals as a critical part of who they are and to what group they belong. Kalyvas, on the other hand, refers to what he terms "unsecular politics", in which religious ideas and symbols are used as "instruments of mobilization".[63] In this way, political parties can *reconstruct* existing religious identities:

"Religious movements…do not merely mobilize existing religious identities, they reconstruct them by blending religious, social, economic and political concerns, by synthesizing traditional and modern appeals, and by mixing utopian millenarist messages with concrete political action."

Kalyvas rightly insists that if we are to understand the concept of religious mobilization, we must acknowledge that religious doctrines are really flexible and malleable statements that are often ambiguous in political meaning. Elites can thus use religious doctrine to shape religious identities to meet the exigencies of the situation they face.

Elites have long recognized the power of religious cleavages, but surmounting the collective action problem during the mobilization process is difficult. Conflict generally has its roots in non-violent events; social gatherings, posting of notices and the formation of groups of individuals with similar opinions on an issue all generally precede organized group action. When participation in these groups entails little risk, as is the case in all but the most repressive regimes, individuals will not have to make strategic decisions to join. However, even nonviolent dissent can lead to sanctions such

---

[62] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985 pp. 50-51.

[63] Stathis Kalyvas, "Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization. Beyond Christian Democracy." Thomas Kselmanand Joseph A. Buttigeg, eds., European Christian Democracy. Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.

as repression, imprisonment or even death; the cost of these possible consequences are often enough to prevent many from joining such movements.

Even when mobilization is successful and political movements begin, sustaining and efficiently controlling large numbers of individuals in the pursuit of a particular goal is often difficult. Organizations must be structured such that goals and strategies to attain them are clearly transmitted from the strategic to the tactical level in a manner that is unambiguous and that also allows a clear ability to monitor performance from above. These organizations should also possess sufficiently complete communication networks that will allow horizontal command and control and provide a rapid means of contacting all group members when the need to do so arises. Finally, organizations must possess the financial resources to both initiate the mobilization process and to sustain it for extended periods. Thus the most effective of these organizations will be hierarchical in nature, have well-established networks, and enjoy sufficient monetary resources.

Successful and sustained mobilization thus requires both some mechanism to overcome the collective action problem as well as the institutional capacity to manage a group once mobilized. I argue that modernization and the increasing loss of secular identity, along with the concomitant return to religious roots in the post-Cold War era, has allowed elites in many instances to take advantage of organizations that possess all these characteristics. Religious organizations in many cases can solve the collective action problem and allow movements to begin, can use their organizational capacity to manage movements once begun, and can act as a source of both resources and credible commitments that aid in conflict resolution.

1.4.2 The Utility of Religious Organizations for Mobilization and Conflict

Huntington claimed a religious resurgence was underway in the second half of the twentieth century; this pronouncement was vital to the underpinnings of his theoretical arguments.[64] Although this claim is empirically evident today, given the explosion of religious fervor that is increasingly being blamed for violent behavior by media sources; it was not so evident several decades ago. Secularization Theory, which suggested that religious needs would be supplanted by the technological advances offered through the modernization process, was begun over a century ago.[65] However, events of the second half of the 20th century forced a reconsideration; the conflict between Indian Hindus and Muslims became increasingly politicized, the Moral Majority became a powerful force in presidential election campaigns, Islamic clerics led a popular revolt to overthrow the Iranian government in 1979, and Catholic groups in Latin America mobilized indigenous groups for political action.[66] Clearly religion was not declining in importance; indeed, it seemed that a resurgence in belief was underway in many areas of the world. What is more, the cause of this resurgence was blamed by many on the same modernizing forces that were forecast to rid the world of religious belief in the first place. Modernization's dangers (social and economic inequality, for example) were now the source of this new fervor, or so it seemed to Samuel Huntington.

---

[64] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996, pp. 95-101.

[65] From Nietzsche's "God is dead" pronouncement to the work of P.L. Berger (*The Sacred Canopy*. New York: Anchor, 1967), Secularization Theory was a firmly held belief in the social sciences until the latter part of the twentieth century.

[66] Anthony Gill, "Religion and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, 2001.

If we consider plausible the evidence that a "Revanche de Dieu" is taking place on a global scale because of the differential effects of modernization, acknowledgement of the perils of creeping secularism and the inability of state institutions to meet the social and political needs of their constituencies, then it is equally plausible that a corresponding rise in the salience of religious institutions in society will follow. It is well established that political elites desire office, and once entrenched, wish to remain there. To do this, it is often necessary to eliminate or render ineffectual any political rivals that may threaten office-holders. Since in most situations this entails rallying support from among their constituents, elites will seek ways to garner this support and mobilize their constituents for political action.

1.4.3 Individual Utility of Religious Organizations for Mobilization

Elites know that to mobilize their constituents the collective action problem must be effectively overcome; they will therefore utilize organizations that possess the means to do so. Individuals have been shown to free ride in groups that provide public goods and will thus not participate in collective action themselves[67]. This has been shown to be particularly relevant in rebellions, where despite suffering serious grievances the vast majority will not rebel[68]. In the case of mobilizing for a public good such as clean air, pollution control, or global warming reduction, the costs of doing so are generally defined in terms of time, effort or material cost for each individual considering joining such a movement. Individuals must weigh decisions to join in terms of the loss of these

---

[67] Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.

[68] Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 12.

variables, but in doing so generally do not face threats of physical or psychological sanction.

In mobilizing against the state or in armed opposition to another group within the state, however, the likelihood of sanctions in response is higher, and individuals must weigh the costs of joining against the costs of the possible sanctions involved with such a decision. These sanctions can include the enactment of exclusionary practices and legislation that further exacerbates existing grievances, confinement for participants and their families, and injury or death if conflicts escalate to violence. Since the majority of participants in these mobilizations are male[69], there exists in addition to self-preservation the desire to keep family members for which they may be responsible supplied with sufficient social goods to allow them to prosper (or at least subsist at some level) and ensure they remain safe from harm during the conflict.

Religious organizations in many cases offer an ideal vehicle for elites to employ when wishing to mobilize individuals in such efforts and simultaneously solving such collective action problems. Why religious organizations in favor of others? Some provide social services to their congregations, both in addition to those supplied by the state, and in place of those in states than cannot or will not do so.[70] Religious groups have used churches to provide both physical security as well as social goods (including education, medical care and social welfare programs). With the availability of physical security these institutions can and do help both participants and their families avoid

---

[69] Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War." Paper prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London, April 26-27, 1999.

[70] Pipa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

capture or harm.[71] The provision of social goods to both likely participants in

mobilization and to the families they leave behind can lower substantially the

opportunity costs of joining such movements. Thus when religious organizations are

capable of providing both security and social goods to individuals weighing decisions to

join, and these individuals can expect the same services will be available to those they

leave behind; decisions to join may be made easier. Religious organizations thus can

provide many "bottom-up" benefits to individuals making strategic decisions to join

ventures that place them at substantial risk of sanction. Elites having access to such

organizations are able to increase the likelihood mobilization efforts will bear more fruit.

1.4.4 Institutional Utility of Religious Organizations for Mobilization

Inducing individuals to join such movements is only the first step in the process;

to be successful, movements must be both effectively controlled and sustained over the

time required to meet the goals of the group. Three general requirements must be met to

ensure these movements are best equipped to succeed. First, effective command and

control must exist to ensure the strategic goals of the group are met by the employment

of tactical actions of those "on the street". Translation of strategic goals to tactical

action is best done via an organization that is controlled from the top with a structure

that allows orders to be transmitted unambiguously to the lowest levels. Organizations

possessing a hierarchical structure are best suited for this task, since they allow both

rapid translation of orders from top to bottom while in turn allowing tactical actions to

be quickly evaluated for efficacy at the top.

---

[71] Arnold S. Kohen, "The Catholic Church and the Independence of East Timor" in *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001, pp. 43-51.

Second, an established network of communication within the organization must exist that will allow sufficient horizontal command and control to ensure both unity of purpose and unity of action. If the organization lacks sufficient means to communicate quickly with those in other areas then coordinated action becomes difficult, if not impossible. Missed opportunities for coordinated action limits the likelihood the group will succeed. Conversely, the lack of such communications capability also makes the group vulnerable to loss, limiting its ability to marshal forces when necessary for defense or offensive maneuver. Finally, organizations should ideally possess sufficient resources to allow them to initiate and conduct an extended mobilization, and the means to procure additional resources when necessary. As such, successful organizations for mobilization will possess the ability to strategically and quickly draw upon financial reserves.

Religious organizations are often structured in such a way that makes them ideally suited for this type of mobilization. Some, like the Catholic Church, are centralized and hierarchically organized, enhancing vertical command and control.[72] Many religious organizations also possess ready-made social networks in the form of local directories and e-mail listings, as well as regional and national contact sources[73]. Religious organizations are often major sources of funding, since voluntary religious giving is often seen by adherents as a sacred duty. Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Christian tenets all include providing a portion of income to the church when a need

---

[72] Stathis Kalyvas, "From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon." *Comparative Politics* 31 (2), 1998.

[73] Anthony Gill, "The Political Origins of Religious Liberty: A Theoretical Outline." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* Volume 1, Article 1, 2005, p. 19.

arises. Since religious organizations usually transcend geopolitical boundaries, support from same-faith diaspora is also a common practice. Religious organizations thus provide many "top-down" benefits to elites seeking to entice mobilize constituents into ventures that may place them at substantial risk of sanction.

It is the significant "top-down" and "bottom-up" benefits available from religious organizations that may explain why religious cleavages are increasingly being exploited in the post-Cold War era to mobilize individuals to join movements that often place them at substantial risk. Religious organizations in many instances possess qualities that make them attractive to elites seeking to mobilize support for risky ventures and for individuals weighing decisions to join them. In an era when religion is being increasingly used for identification purposes by those already marginalized by society and the state, it becomes a formidable tool for mobilization.

It should be stressed that these channels for social mobilization are generally used by elites seeking backing for social and political movements that may have nothing directly to do with religious issues. As was seen in the former Yugoslavia, elites were able to use long-standing *religious* divides to foment armed insurrection and violence in support of more traditional nationalist goals.[74] As Huntington noted, realist explanations of conflict, whether between groups or nations, will continue to be primary explananda for decisions to engage in violence[75]. In an era of religious resurgence, however, elites will increasingly note the benefits of using real or imagined religious cleavages to

---

[74] Paul Mojzes, *Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans*, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1994.

[75] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

mobilize constituents behind these realist issues. Though religion may not be the major issue over which groups fight, it will remain one of the primary motivators of subnational conflict.

1.4.5 Motivations for Religious Organizations to Mobilize Congregations

Missing from the discussion thus far is a satisfactory explanation for the involvement of religious organizations in mobilizations that may bring harm to their congregations. It would seem counterproductive for clergy to extol the virtues of such action, given its perilous nature; Gill showed that those who do are successful only to the extent that their flocks trust their choices[76]. However, Chong showed that individuals in a religious community have higher levels of trust among them because of the values they share[77]. Thus religious organizations that perceive actions to be just and necessary and that support the values of the community to which they belong would be more prone to motivate their congregations to participate.

In other situations, control of the church rests squarely with the leadership of the state. Church leaders may feel compelled to adapt to policy decisions mandated by the state in order to keep their positions within the church.[78] In other cases, churches that have been granted a monopolistic role maintained voluntary alliances with the state. Trying to decode why only some Latin American Catholic churches chose to oppose dictatorships, despite relatively similar negative effects on the poor across countries, Gill

---

[76] Anthony Gill, "The Political Origins of Religious Liberty: A Theoretical Outline." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* Volume 1, Article 1, 2005.

[77] Dennis Chong, *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

[78] Jeff Haynes, "Religion and Democratization in Africa." *Democratization* 11 (4), 2004.

found that where the Catholic Church had a monopoly in the religious market, church leaders tended to remain loyal to the state. Only in cases where a Protestant challenge made significant gains among a nation's poor did Catholic leaders in these states focus on their plight and bring vocal oppositions to oppressive dictators[79]. Thus participation levels in religious opposition and mobilization may be a product of moral imperative, state coercion or simply the decision mandated by the religious marketplace.

1.4.6 Utility of Religious Organizations for Conflict Resolution

The same qualities that make religious organizations useful for conflict initiation and sustainment may also be employed in their utility in conflict resolution. Because strong hierarchical religious organizations with well-established networks have the capacity to exercise effective control over their members and quickly and efficiently communicate with them, they are able to make credible commitments to states and other parties about the intentions of the movements they manage. This reduces uncertainty about future reneging on bargains and allows effective bargaining and agreements to be completed in the resolution process. Because of its centralized, authoritarian and hierarchical structure, the Catholic Church is particularly well equipped to send credible signals to political elites.[80] Indeed, the hierarchical structure of Catholicism was shown to be critical in sending a credible message to the Belgian government about the

---

[79] Anthony Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

[80] Stathis Kalyvas, "Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization: Beyond Christian Democracy." In Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigieg (eds.) *European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*, University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.

intentions of its congregations and the silencing of the more radical elements within

them during the 1884 electoral process[81].

Strong religious organizations also tend to be better at self-policing; it has been

shown that groups capable of absorbing the enforcement costs involved will self-police

and punish offenders themselves rather than facing external sanctions as a whole[82].

Because obedience to the leadership of the church is a key tenet of most religious

organizations, the ability to effectively monitor its membership and threaten expulsion

for behaviors banned by the church can create an effective deterrent. As religious

identities become more salient, the threat of permanent loss of these identities will force

individuals to avoid actions not sanctioned by the organization. In most cases, religious

membership is a prerequisite to enjoying the social provisions distributed by the church;

the threatened loss of near-term educational and medical benefits as well as other future

social welfare programs further strengthens the enforcement capability of the church.

1.4.7 Variability of Religious Organizations

As mentioned in the previous discussion, religious institutions vary widely, both

in institutional capacity and doctrine. Some religious organizations such as the Catholic

Church possess highly developed hierarchies that are easily adaptable to movement

coordination and control; others are loosely affiliated within a larger community or are

independent altogether. Some have extensive communication networks in place, while

others are more isolated. Some religious organizations have access to resource bases

---

[81] Stathis Kalyvas, "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties." *Comparative Politics* 32 (4), 2000.

[82] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90 (4), 1996.

that are able to support long-term movements internationally while others possess only limited funding from the state. In addition, the amount of social services provided not only shows marked variation across religions, but across regions as well.

This variability could be translated into the success of the movements these organizations begin and support. If a religious organization is capable of providing sufficient amounts of social goods to those considering joining these movements, then populating and sustaining them may be more likely. If an organization is hierarchical in structure, possesses extensive communication networks and has wide access to funding sources, the movement may be more likely to succeed. Conversely, the poorer the structural capacity of a religious organization, the less may be the chance mobilizations they sponsor will ultimately succeed.

1.4.8 Does Religion Matter?

I have outlined how Huntington's theory of shifting identities from national to religious identities in the face of mounting popular dissatisfaction with the disparate effects of modernization is both valid and important. Religion is a *fundamental* identity; a vital component of a person's sense of self that has been defended, often violently, for many thousands of years. Counter to primordialist claims, religious identity is neither immutable nor fixed; instead, it is malleable and subject to construction, from both within and without. This malleability allows both elites and political parties to use religious identities and mold them for political mobilization purposes. Religious organizations offer both top-down and bottom-up advantages to this mobilization process: they can help to solve collective action problems that work to keep individuals from participation in the process, the organizational structure possessed by many such

organizations can assist in the management of these social movements once begun, and in similar fashion can offer credibility and provide aid to the conflict resolution process. Religion thus offers far more as a source of identity and a mobilization resource than the civilizations outlined in CoC theory. I argue that subnational conflicts between groups of dissimilar religious belief should be increasing after the Cold War, be bloodier and longer in duration, and be more over territory than conflict between groups sharing a religion. Religious differences should be more important predictors of the likelihood, duration and intensity of violent conflict within states. Religion, as both an individual and institutional resource, is thus a powerful tool in the process of political mobilization for conflict.

1.5 Overview of Chapters

While there is not space enough in this project to make a more formal study of the effects of differing religious organizations (with varying levels of institutional capacity) on all cases of subnational conflict in the last sixty years, I focus instead on comparative impacts of civilizational and religious differences on the evolution of subnational conflict since 1946. Chapter Two outlines the methodological process employed, construction of the data set, and operationalization of key variables used in the project. A description of the statistical approach used to measure cultural effects, in terms of both Huntington's civilizations and my religious categorization, on subnational conflict is offered and discussed in detail. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dataset, the primary source of conflict data used in this study, is described as well.

I then explain the process of dividing instances of conflict into clearly distinct phases, expanding the set of conflict initiations from 170 in the original dataset into

more than 220 distinct cases of conflict that occurred within the period. I include

rationale for inclusion of variables for analysis, coding criteria and the process utilized

for describing civilizational and religious markers. Since there are only vague

references in most cases to assigning individual states to a particular civilizational

grouping in Huntington's work, a discussion of the decision process for the assignment

of more than 200 separate states into one of these categories is presented. A similar

discussion follows describing criteria for assigning religious identities to each of the

states and subgroups involved in conflict in the period. Finally, sourcing and rationale

for inclusion of additional variables in the analysis is outlined and supported.

Chapter Three includes an extensive overview of the evolution of subnational

conflict since the end of the Second World War. Descriptive statistics are included that

clarify the regional and temporal effects on subnational conflict. Preliminary findings

suggest that rather than experiencing an explosion of new conflicts after the end of the

Cold War, the peak in the early 1990s was the result of a steady accumulation of long-

term conflicts, some of which had been ongoing since the 1940s. While there were a

large number of conflict initiations at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, most of

these were short-term exchanges between groups seeking autonomy in Africa and

Eastern Europe and newly-formed states desiring to keep their borders intact.

Huntington's theses of civilizational conflict are then examined given the results

obtained from these initial statistics; comparisons of conflict initiations within and

outside of CoC fault-line areas are evaluated, as are conflicts in and outside of so-called

"cleft" states. Examining the CoC hypothesis concerning fault-line states, the evolution

of conflict within them has a distinct curvilinear aspect. From a high in the 1940s, CoC

52

"civilizational" conflict initiations within these states dropped steadily through the next three decades, then rose again beginning in the 1980s. The incidence of conflict within these states has been steadily rising since then, providing some support to Huntington's assertions that we should expect just such a rise. However, given that nearly seventy-eight percent of the world's population resides in these states, and that such conflict represents almost an identical portion of the total conflict observed globally, these results may be less meaningful than they appear.

Examinations are made to test the veracity of COC claims that wars within these fault-line areas will be bloodier and more protracted than those occurring elsewhere, just given their civilizational character. There is little evidence to suggest that either of these claims is true, either before or after the end of the Cold War. Similar results are found when examining the last of Huntington's claims about such conflicts, that they would be increasingly territorial in nature. I fact, no evidence is apparent that any of the CoC claims made concerning the evolution of subnational conflict after the Cold War have apparent merit.

Having challenged the hypotheses offered in the COC theory, comparisons are made using evaluations of the number of interreligious conflicts initiated over the same period. Each conflict initiation is coded as either intrareligious (occurring between groups that share a religious heritage) or interreligious (from dissimilar religious backgrounds); similar comparisons are then carried out. In each case, the results show that subnational conflict between groups of differing religions is becoming more frequent, lasts longer and is more intense than those conducted between groups that share religious beliefs.

53

In Chapter Four, multiple regression analyses are performed to determine the significance of religious and civilizational identification on the initiation of subnational conflict in this period. In keeping with studies of civil war initiation, economic levels, population size, state newness and prior conflict are all measured for their association with conflict initiation. In general terms, poorer and more populous states are more likely to experience conflict from within than other states. While new states are correlated with conflict initiation after the Cold War, this does not hold for the preceding period. States previously experiencing conflict between groups were more likely to see a recurrence, but only within the Cold War era.

The significance of religious and civilizational differences is then tested, with ambiguous results. Neither religious nor civilizational factors, for the most part, were significantly correlated with conflict initiation, with the exception of CoC-defined cleft states. This may be an artifact, however, of the selection process employed in developing the CoC theory. After 1989, religion seems to bear little correlation to the likelihood of conflict initiation within states.

Chapter Five concludes the project with an overview of the results of both the descriptive and quantitative studies, as well as opportunities for further research. One specific avenue of research to be continued is testing the theory of the significance of religious organizations on mobilization and conflict. While outside the scope of this admittedly limited work, analysis of the importance of organizational structure and social offerings on the decision matrices of elites considering "unsecular politics" and individuals debating joining religious movements in spite of the dangers involved will doubtless yield very interesting results. Another fruitful field of future research involves

investigating the rationale behind the large difference in conflict resolution rates in the Cold War and afterward.

The implications for policymakers are varied and important; the weak impact of democracy level on the likelihood of conflict initiation should move us away from the Clinton and Bush policies of "willy-nilly" democratization purely for national security purposes.[83] The lack of any proof of an upcoming civilizational divide sparking future conflict ameliorates the need to plan on a "West against the Rest" strategy of military and economic dominance. Finally, the importance of religion in an age of modernization, given the differential economic effects involved among the populations of the developing world, should be ignored at our peril. While religious differences alone are not enough to make us kill our neighbor, the skillful use of restructuring of religious identities by elites can make the choice to do so seem a calling from God.

---

[83] For example, the 2006 Bush National Security Strategy, which closely mirrors previous Clinton editions in this regard, states that "Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability, reducing regional conflicts, countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism, and extending peace and prosperity."

2. Data and Methodology

In this chapter I outline and describe the methodological process employed, construction of the data set, and operationalization of key variables used in the project. I begin with a description of the statistical approach used to measure the effects of culture, in terms of both Huntington's civilizations and my own religious grouping scheme, on subnational conflict. I then discuss the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dataset in detail, outlining the criteria for identification as a qualifying subnational conflict, the identification of groups involved, and measures of conflict intensity. I also include a detailed analysis of the process of dividing instances of conflict into separate and distinct phases, expanding the set of conflict initiations from 170 in the original dataset into more than 220 distinct cases of conflict that occurred within the period. I then progress into a detailed discussion of the project data set itself, to include rationale for inclusion of all variables for analysis, coding criteria and assignment for describing civilizational and religious markers. Since there are only vague references in most cases in the assignment of individual states to a particular civilizational grouping in Huntington's CoC work, a discussion of the decision process for the assignment of more than 200 separate states into one of these categories is presented. A similar discussion follows describing criteria for assigning religious identities to each of the states and subgroups involved in conflict in the period. Finally, sourcing and rationale for inclusion of additional variables in the analysis is outlined and supported.

2.1 Methodology Employed

The primary questions I seek to answer in this work are: have Huntington's predictions of increasing civilizational subnational conflict been validated in the first two decades of the post-Cold War era? Given the hypotheses set forth in CoC theory, can we expect to see the impact of civilizational differences increase since the end of the Cold War? In addition to theoretical explananda (political/economic status, population size, state newness and prior episodes of conflict) does the civilizational demographic of a state affect its propensity to experience subnational conflict, especially since the end of the Cold War? When such conflicts do occur, do civilizational differences between groups in combat correspond with greater numbers of battle deaths and longer conflict duration? Are these conflicts more likely to be over territorial issues, rather than over dissatisfaction with government? And if civilizational differences prove to be ambiguous indicators of subnational conflict, will religious differences prove more robust as likely explanatory factors?

Chapter Three uses descriptive statistics to allow comparison and trend analyses of the subnational conflict data during and after the Cold War. As Huntington's primary claims concerned the civilizational aspects of future conflict, I will concentrate first on evaluating the specific claims made concerning subnational conflict since 1989. These include the claims that a) conflict between groups of differing civilizations should be increasing after the Cold War; b) that said conflict would occur more often in fault-line

states than without; c) these conflicts would be more protracted and bloody than their non-civilizational counterparts and d) they would be primarily over territorial issues[1].

As mentioned in Chapter One, I argue that Huntington's civilizational approach is of limited value for two major reasons: the civilizations he describes are both too large to accurately classify the more than six billion people on earth and are simultaneously too narrow in terms of the number of different civilizations to properly separate them into distinct and useful groupings. The former charge concerns the inclusion of very different people groups under a single civilization. For example, he subsumes the global Muslim population under the rubric of an Islamic civilization and makes the claim that this shared identity will lead to a lessening of conflict between Muslims in the post-Cold War era. This prediction is obviously flawed, at least based on empirical data available since 1989. Besides the regional differences that exist across this grouping, Islam faces three major rifts that continue to produce conflict: the split between secular and fundamentalist Islam, the divide between Arab and non-Arab Muslim populations, and the major long-standing division between the Sunni and Shi'ia branches of Islam.

For example, violence erupted in Algeria after military-backed authorities stopped a parliamentary election wherein a fundamentalist Islamic party had allegedly been set to be declared victorious. Since 1992, over 200,000 Muslim casualties have been reported as violence between more secular government forces and the fundamentalist al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb continues. In Pakistan, many hundreds have perished since January 2009 between Sunni and Shi'ia radicalized groups that have

---

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

regularly targeted Muslim moderates. In Iraq, tens of thousands of Muslims have been

murdered and millions more displaced after nearly six years of violence between the

former Sunni ruling sect and the majority Shi'ia population. According to CoC theory,

such conflict should have been expected to diminish in the post-Cold War era. Despite

CoC claims of a unified Islamic civilization, no evidence exists that this might occur

anytime in the near future.

Similar distinctions can be made for the African civilization (here defined as the

geographical area encompassing Sub-Saharan Africa southward and the accompanying

island nations) which he does not recognize as a major civilization because of its lack of

a unifying culture, yet includes in the study because of the likelihood that such a shared

identity "may" someday develop. The division of the continent by the European

colonial powers at the 1884 Berlin Conference separated some previously unified groups

by new geopolitical boundaries while simultaneously thrusting many different tribal

identities into national "brotherhood". While conflict between these groups was kept

more or less under control by the occupying powers, after independence many of these

new nations erupted into violence that continues today.

The second charge takes aim at the limited number of "pigeonholes" that exist

under the civilizational moniker. While the majority of his civilizations are based firmly

on religious lines of demarcation, they are too few to adequately represent the

differences in religious identity that exist. For these reasons I argue that Huntington, in

his attempt to simplify explanations of future conflict in a multipolar and modernizing

world, overstated the importance of overarching civilizational identities. It is instead

both the fundamental nature of religious identity and its inherent malleability that make

it of vital importance in the politicization of religious cleavages. Religious organizations can then act to motivate and sustain political mobilization and conflict, and then aid in its ultimate resolution.

Thus testing Huntington's CoC hypotheses is only the first portion of this project. The second tests a refined theory that religious rather than civilizational differences are becoming increasingly used for purposes of mobilization and violent conflict. To do so, I evaluate the same claims made within CoC theory; that a) in the absence of superpower restraint, conflict between groups of differing religions will be increasing after the Cold War; b) that said conflict would occur more often in religiously "cleft" states than elsewhere; c) that interreligious conflicts would be more protracted and bloody than their intrareligious counterparts and d) they would be more often over territorial issues.

Once these simple descriptive statistics are collated and preliminary comparisons made between the CoC hypotheses and my own, a more robust examination is then performed. A primitive model is developed that examines the impact of general measures of conflict potential described in previous studies of civil war. These include measures of economic prosperity, population size, state newness and incidence of prior conflict.[2] The effects of regime type, economic inequality, resource endowment, ongoing conflicts, historical legacies and other causal variables are then explored. Multiple measures of civilizational and religious typologies are included, as are levels of religious/ethnic fractionalization and social and government regulation of religion. A variety of interaction terms are then repeatedly tested to determine the relative

---

[2] All model runs are performed individually on data from the Cold War period and from 1989-2007.

importance of the correlation of each of these factors with conflict initiation. To

determine the causal weights associated with each of the factors described above in a

pooled cross-sectional time series data set, a LOGIT model is employed. All models are

run using the STATA 10 statistical package; results and discussion of these models are

provided in Chapter Four.

2.2 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Dataset

Huntington referred to the likelihood of future *clashes* of civilizations; he was

not implying that these clashes would always escalate to war; indeed, he claimed it was

up to the more powerful states to ensure these clashes do not escalate[3]. Such clashes

could take many different forms: from initial grass-roots movements, verbal opposition

and passive resistance to more active and violent expression such as strikes, acts of

terrorism, riots, rebellion and civil war. While civil wars are generally widespread and

durable, resulting in large losses of life and property; strikes, riots, terrorist acts and

small-scale rebellions often result in much smaller damage paths. The very smallness of

the scope of these events has resulted in their omission in many important studies of

subnational conflict in the past. Why has this omission occurred so often?

Scholarly studies and data sets on subnational conflict have focused on cases that

meet generally agreed-upon requirements that define civil wars. One primary example

is the Correlates of War (CoW) project dataset, which codes as civil wars those that

meet an annual battle-death total of 1,000 people[4]. This data set was updated in 2000 to

---

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 208.

[4] For more information on the Correlates of War project, see J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972 and Melvin

define a civil war as one in which 1,000 battle deaths were recorded during the duration of the conflict[5]. Fearon & Laitin further classify a civil war as one in which at least 100 battle deaths per year occur, with at least 100 dead on each side to distinguish them from massacres; others follow similar coding procedures[6]. But restricting the cases of conflict to those that meet these criteria results in the omission of dozens of cases of lower-level conflict, such as the riots and rebellions discussed above. These omissions degrade the scientific analysis of all subnational conflict; their inclusion creates a more robust and accurate picture of the evolution of intrastate conflict in the modern era.

To most accurately test the CoC theory, it is then necessary to include cases of violent conflict behavior that do not meet classic criteria for civil war. For this reason I am utilizing the Uppsala Conflict Data Set, which includes cases of conflict in which at least 25 battle deaths are recorded per annum[7]. The updated 2008 data set includes all cases of subnational conflict meeting these criteria that occurred between 1946 and 2007, yielding the latest picture of the evolution of conflict since the end of the Second World War. This data set contains 170 cases of recorded subnational conflict covering 1,670 conflict-years[8]. The use of a data set that includes these additional conflict cases

---

Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980*, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982. Information about the project is available online at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/Datasets.htm.

[5] Meredith Reid Sarkees and Phil Schafer, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18 (1), 2000.

[6] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

[7] Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5), 2002.

[8] For the data set itself, see both http://www.ucdp.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm and http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Old-Versions/Armed-Conflicts-Version-4-2008-/

is significant for at least two reasons: it allows the inclusion of lower-level conflict that would otherwise go unrecorded (such as the conflict in Northern Ireland, for example), and provides additional statistical flexibility. In creating the data set the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) utilized CoW data and supplemented it with data from the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (which includes militarized conflicts where no actual violence is realized) as well as the KOSIMO dataset, which includes latent conflicts which could escalate into violence[9].

Although several definitions of armed conflict exist, the UCDP dataset defines it as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of the state."[10] Due to this stipulation some conflicts between groups where the government is either unable or unwilling to get involved, such as Rwanda in 1994 and Somalia since 1992, are not included in battle-death totals. However, as violence between groups generally attracts the attention of government forces to quell the disturbance in the name of state security, the actual number of such conflicts where the state is not at least eventually involved is small.

The UCDP defines a state as being either an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a territory or a non-recognized government whose sovereignty is not in dispute by the government that previously controlled the territory. The dataset

---

[9] For more information on the MID dataset see Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, 2004. For more on the KOSIMO dataset, see http://www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/index.html.

[10] Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5), 2002, 618-19.

recognizes two sources of incompatibility that lead to armed conflict: government (regime type, desire for regime change, or a change in its composition) and territory (a change in control from one state to another in an interstate conflict or desires for autonomy or independence in intrastate disputes)[11]. There are four types of armed conflict defined in the UCDP dataset: interstate conflict between two or more states, extrastate conflict between a state and a non-state actor located outside of the state's territory, internationalized internal conflict between a state and a non-state group within its borders with intervention from other states, and interstate conflict in which no such intervention exists. For the purposes of this study of subnational conflict, only those in the latter two categories were included.

In terms of casualties directly related to combat, conflicts are coded as minor (at least 25 battle-deaths per year but less than 1,000 battle-deaths for the duration of the hostilities), intermediate (at least 25 battle-deaths per year and more than 1,000 battle-deaths over the duration of hostilities, but less than 1,000 in any year of conflict), or war (at least 1,000 battle-deaths per year).[12] Where accurate data exist, start and stop dates for each conflict episode are included in the dataset. The names of the various groups in opposition to the state are named, but no other information about these groups is either available from or presented in this database.

While the relaxed coding rules on inclusion based on battle-deaths allows the data set to cover a much larger set of conflicts than would be found elsewhere, there

---

[11] Nils Petter Gledditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." Journal of Peace Research 39 (5), 2002, p. 619.

[12] Ibid, p. 619.

were many instances where separable cases of conflict were grouped under a single

conflict identification number. For example, all subnational conflict in Bolivia

occurring after WWII was grouped under a single "general" case; after careful research I

further split the conflict into three separate cases. These conflict-years (1946, 1952 and

1967) represent three distinct events: a 3-week long urban uprising against the Villaroel

government; a four-day coup by a leftist group six years later; and an eight-month

campaign by Che Guevara attempting to duplicate Castro's success in Cuba (similar

instances elsewhere ultimately generated a database of 225 separate conflict initiations

in the dataset).

2.3 The Project Dataset

The UCDP dataset has as its unit of analysis the conflict year, listing each case

of subnational conflict by the country and year in which battle-deaths were sufficient for

inclusion. These data would best fit in a dataset in which the country year is the primary

unit of analysis. The project dataset therefore includes all country years from 1946-

2007, the latest year for which data are available in the UCDP set, which is the primary

data source for this project. Some of the countries included did not exist in 1946;

country years in these cases begin with the year the country became an independent

entity. This was the case for nearly all African states, as most became independent in

either the 1950s or 1960s, as did many states in Asia. This results in an unbalanced

dataset, in which the number of countries in existence each year is not equal.

There are also several instances of countries that ceased to exist during the

project period. Examples include Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Serbia and

Montenegro, the Soviet Union, South Vietnam, South Yemen and Yugoslavia. The

project dataset thus contains 9,256 observations for the 1946-2007 period, representing 205 countries in total.   The dependent variable is the onset of conflict, coded as each initiation in the dataset. As noted earlier, there are 225 separate incidents of conflict initiation, with conflicts lasting as little as one day to more than sixty years (some of these are ongoing as of the time of this investigation). Of the 205 countries that existed at some point during this period, over half (103) were involved in subnational armed conflict at least once during this time, resulting in over 5.2 million fatalities and unknown millions of non-fatal casualties. For a listing of all countries extent during this period, see Appendix A.

2.3.1 Division of the UCDP Dataset into Logical Initiation Points

Division of the 170 general conflicts covered by the UCDP dataset into the 225 specific and separate conflict initiations within the project dataset followed a strict protocol. As discussed previously, the UCDP dataset divides incompatibilities leading to armed conflict into two categories, territory and government. In the case of territorial conflicts, the issue generally did not often change in terms of the territorial area under dispute or the desired challenger group's goal of autonomy or independence, but in many cases the separatist groups involved formed and dissolved several times, one group replacing its predecessor or splitting into multiple factions that often worked at cross purposes to each other. In government conflicts, regime change was usually the goal, but different groups with varying motivations and desired outcomes often arose to attempt to achieve change over a span that was a little as a single day (coup attempts in Burkina Faso and Chile, for example) to many decades in length. See Appendix B for a list of all conflict initiations, along with start/end dates, battle death counts and duration.

Unlike previous studies, no break-points were created based solely on temporal gaps in conflicts where annual battle deaths did not reach minimum levels for inclusion. Because of the close monitoring of conditions on the ground during the conflicts listed, it is possible to determine in almost all cases whether the conflict was ongoing but did not meet minimum battle deaths each year for inclusion. If the incompatibilities between challenger groups and the state that prompted the original conflict remained unchanged and evidence existed to suggest that conflict was ongoing but did not meet the requisite number of battle deaths in intervening years, then conflicts were considered active in those years. However, if challenger groups changed during a lull in the violence lasting several years or more because of capture, negotiation or dissolution of the group, then the conflict was coded as a new initiation if conflict resumed.

Because of the relatively low number of battle-deaths required for inclusion, long-simmering disputes (some stretching over multiple decades) have consistently met this level each year of the conflict period. For example, the conflict between the Communist Party of the Philippines and the government has continued for thirty-nine years since 1969; the conflict only missed inclusion in the UCDP dataset in 1996 and 1998. In other cases, several years of inactivity are noted between active conflict years; Peru's conflict with Sendero Luminoso was active annually between 1981 and 1999, yet no conflict years were recorded afterward until 2007, despite the ongoing efforts of the group to disrupt the government.

To determine which conflicts were continuous over temporal intervals required examining each case individually. The UCDP dataset includes extensive discussions of conflict continuation and disruption histories for most conflicts; these were used for

67

decisions on many new initiation cases. Additional data was gathered from other

sources when necessary; local and international news agencies, the US State

Department, the CIA World Factbook and other scholarly resources were all examined.

If both the issues at stake and the groups in conflict remained the same, and evidence

existed that the groups continued resistance but did not reach requisite levels of battle

dead in intervening years for inclusion in the UCDP dataset, the conflict was considered

active throughout the period. If the actors changed in the interim or the evidence

suggests the conflict ceased for that period and began anew, a new initiation was

recorded in the primary dataset.

2.3.2 Determination of State Civilizational Status

Once all cases were identified, each of the 225 were individually examined to

determine if they met the criterion identified earlier as being "civilizational". In other

words, each case was researched to identify whether the groups in conflict with their

respective government were from dissimilar civilizational groupings *as outlined in the

CoC theory*. This is not a trivial exercise; although Huntington describes seven major

civilizations (eight if African is included, and he is unsure even about that), the primary

method of categorizing each country is based on vague references to religious affiliation

and/or historical legacies. A map is included in his book, but there are multiple cases of

civilizational overlap within states, especially in sub-Saharan Africa; there are also

discrepancies between countries identified on the map and how they are defined within

the text. Bhutan, for example, is categorized as Hindu on the map but the text clearly

defines it as a Buddhist state. He also describes several states that fall outside of any

clear classification. Lone countries, including Ethiopia and Haiti, lack commonality

with any other country and do not fit a civilizational mold. Cleft countries contain more than one civilization within their borders; Sudan, India and the Philippines are just some examples.[13]

For the purposes of this project, I identify civilizational status of states based primarily upon the text of the 1996 work; if no mention of the state is made within the text, I use the provided map.[14] In cases where the map identifies the state as having multiple civilizations, as is the case with cleft states, I categorize them in terms of state religion if it exists, and civilizational affiliation of either the ruling party or population majority in cases where no clear civilizational grouping is evident.[15] Though Huntington noted only eight major civilizations, he includes Buddhist on his map; while he does not define it as a *major* civilization (since it did not survive the land of its birth, and has been adapted to fit the needs of cultures that practice it); he uses it in his identifications, as I do here. Thus while the CoC theory only listed seven or (possibly) eight civilizations, for the purposes of this study I shall use those eight, plus the Buddhist civilization, as well as an additional category (to be discussed below) for those that do not fit into any of the above categorizations.

Of the 205 countries that were in existence at some point during the period, fifty-five were categorized as belonging to the Western civilization. These included Canada and the United States in North America, thirty-five countries in Europe, Israel, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, East Timor and nearly a dozen

---

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, pp. 136-139.

[14] Ibid, Map 1.3, pp. 26-27.

[15] The CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ is used for both.

island nations in the South Pacific (although geographically separated, the countries in Oceania have historical, cultural and political ties to the West that do not exist with any other civilization). Thus the Western civilization is the largest in terms of number of states belonging to this group; with a population of over 958 million, they also make up over fifteen percent of the world's population.

The Latin American civilization of thirty-one countries consists of Mexico, all Caribbean nations including Cuba and the Bahamas, and both Central and South America (with the exception of Guyana and Suriname). These two countries are categorized by Huntington as cleft states, each having a Hindu majority and large African minority groups that are the result of their colonial legacies and ties to the slave trade. Early settlers establishing large plantations required substantial numbers of manual laborers to work their fields; the slave trade initially supplied a large portion of this work force. When slavery was outlawed early in the 19th century, plantation owners brought in large numbers of indentured servants and volunteers from India and the South Pacific to supplement the local labor force, explaining the strange demographic in this part of the world. Comprising more than 570 million people, Latin America is nonetheless one of the smaller civilizations.

Nineteen nations comprise the Orthodox civilization, from Russia and Kazakhstan in the east to Romania and the Ukraine in the west; over 290 million people reside here, making it one of the smallest of Huntington's civilizational groupings purely in terms of population (but certainly not in terms of geographical area). Greece, Cyprus and the Balkan states make up the southern boundary, with the northern limits located in Belarus. It is the only civilizational grouping that is in decline, and is expected to

remain so through the middle of the twenty-first century.[16] Of the nineteen countries included in this grouping, only Greece and Cyprus are expected to make population gains in the foreseeable future. One of the largest civilizations in terms of both geographical area and population, and covering forty-eight states in three continents, the Islamic civilization extends from Morocco in the west to Indonesia's Pacific islands. It covers all of North Africa and the Middle East (including Turkey), much of Central and South Asia as well as Malaysia and Indonesia. Its one and a quarter billion inhabitants are part of the fastest-growing demographic on the planet.

With just over a half billion inhabitants, the African civilization's thirty-two nations extend across sub-Saharan Africa southward, and include Ethiopia and the island nations of Madagascar, Mauritius, the Cape Verde islands and Sao Tome & Principe. Although large in terms of land area, the majority of the sub-Saharan continent is largely empty of people outside of metropolitan areas. Although geographically limited, the Hindu civilization's 1.2 billion citizens nonetheless make this civilization one of the largest of the group. However, India's 1.1 billion inhabitants make up over 97% of the total (Nepal's population is less than thirty million, and the South American nations of Suriname and Guyana, as discussed previously, total only 1.3 million between them. In terms of both geography and conflict history, the Hindu civilization has been dominated by India.

Five states make up the Sinic civilization, including China, Taiwan, the Koreas and Vietnam; in terms of population this is the largest civilizational grouping of the CoC theory with over 1.5 billion people. Japan is the lone state in the Japanese civilization,

---

[16] United States Census Bureau – International Data Base at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/ranks.html

and with its relatively small population of 127 million and land area, it is the smallest of

the civilizations described. The Buddhist civilization includes the remaining seven

states, from Myanmar in the west, Bhutan in the north and Cambodia in the east. In

terms of population it is larger only than Japan, and contains just over one hundred fifty

million people. See Appendix C for a complete listing of all civilizations and member

states.

2.3.3 Determination of Challenger Group Civilizational Status

Once the civilizational status of each state was established, perhaps the most

laborious task of this project began. Since the UCDP dataset records cases of conflict

involving forces of the state and a challenger group (or groups), the civilizational status

of each challenger group had to be determined for every one of the 225 cases of conflict

initiation recorded during the period. The UCDP project provides the names of each of

the challenger groups involved in each conflict; civilizational determinations were the

result of information obtained from the University of Maryland's Minorities at Risk

project, the Encyclopedia Britannica, as well as other scholarly resources. If a group did

not fit into one of Huntington's civilizational groups, they were categorized as "Other";

this occurred almost exclusively in India and Myanmar. Once the civilizational

grouping of each side of a conflict was established, the conflict was coded as

intracivilizational if both sides were from the same grouping and intercivilizational if

they differed. A listing of the civilizational categorization of each of these groups is

found in Appendix D.

2.4 Development of a Religious Classification System

A similar protocol was followed when making determinations concerning the religious affiliation of states and challenger groups. Because my theory proposes that civilizational groupings created in the CoC hypotheses are too broad to offer the utility necessary to evaluate cases of subnational conflict, I created a more refined list based on differences in religious affiliation, rather than in civilization. For example Christianity, a primary characteristic of the Western, Orthodox and Latin American civilizations, has approximately 2.2 billion followers worldwide. It can be further divided into Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant classifications. The Catholic Church worldwide has about 1.1 billion believers, or about 50% of the Christian population. The remainder of believers falls primarily under the Eastern Orthodox or Protestantism branches of Christianity; these three denominations account for the vast majority of Christian believers. Because a large portion of western civilization (i.e., Western Europe and the Americas) is either Catholic or Protestant, and the majority of Eastern Europe is Orthodox by faith, it is logical to include each of these religious identifiers for this project. This classification system allows finer resolution when determining group identities in subnational conflict.

Islam can be divided into multiple categories, but for the purposes of this project there are only two divisions, Sunni and Shi'ia. Shi'ia Islam emerged after the death of Husayn bin Ali in the seventh century, and has been a vibrant sect of the Muslim faith into modern times. Accounting for only 15% of the population, it nonetheless has large populations of believers in Iran, Yemen, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and India. Ahmadiyya, Sufiism, Alawite and Druze sects also exist, but all are comparatively small and are in some way related to the major Sunni and Shi'ia sects. Islam, like many other beliefs, is

73

a highly syncretized religion, with its adherents around the world combining elements of Islamic faith with local animistic or ancestor worship practices. Because of the great variety of these local practices, and the relation that most have to Sunni or Shi'ia Islam, only these two sects are included in this study.

As Huntington described, there are four other major religious groupings that exist today; Hindu, Buddhist, Sinic (Confucian) and Shinto beliefs are practiced by billions in Southern and east Asia. Hinduism is described as the oldest surviving religious belief system[17] and with one billion believers worldwide (the vast majority in India) it is the third largest religion after Christianity and Islam. Although Confucianism was widely denounced during the Cultural Revolution in China, it has made a resurgence in recent times. Though most Chinese do not follow the doctrine closely, Confucian teachings on morality permeate thinking in China, as well as elsewhere in the Far East. Buddhism is the next most followed religion with between 250 – 350 million adherents. Because of the animosities present between the state of Israel and the Arab states that surround it, Judaism is included in this study. With only 13-14 million adherents worldwide, it is the smallest of the religions included here, but its importance in regional geopolitics cannot be ignored.

Because of the great variety of syncretic religions that exist worldwide, it is impossible to include them all, or even attempt to differentiate between them, in a work of this scope. Thus where the religious identity of a group is indigenous to a region and fits no other major religious mold, or is a modified form of a major religious group listed above, but contains other indigenous belief sets as well, then this group is categorized as

---

[17] *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Encyclopedia*. Merriam-Webster. 2000, p. 751.

indigenous. In addition, groups that practice no religious belief or profess belief that no God exists (as in most of the Communist and Marxist movements that occurred during the Cold War) are categorized as atheist. Thus there are twelve religious categories available, in comparison to the nine civilizations used from CoC theory.

States are classified using the following protocol: if a state religion exists, the state is classified as being of that religious grouping. If no state religion exists, the religion of the majority people group within the state is used. If there is no clear majority group indicated, the religion of the party in power at the time of conflict initiation was used. In such cases there were times when the religious identification of the state changed over periods of time. If the government in power was Communist and was officially atheistic, the state was identified as being atheist during the period that administration held power (China and the Soviet Union are obvious examples).

As mentioned earlier, the UCDP data lists only the names of challenger groups; no other information is included. It was thus necessary to research religious affiliations of every challenger group. Data were obtained from the U.S. Department of State, CIA World Factbook, the Minorities at Risk Project, the Joshua Project (a research initiative under the United States Center for World Mission that keeps demographic information on over 16,000 people groups), and the Encyclopedia Britannica. Additional scholarly sources were used when more information was necessary for accurate classification. A listing of the religious categorization of each of these groups is found in Appendix E. Once the religious coding of each side in a conflict was established, the conflict was then coded as intrareligious if both sides were from the same grouping and interreligious if the groups differed in their beliefs.

2.5 Additional Variables and Controls

2.5.1 Ethnic and Religious Fractionalization

Ethnic diversity has long been assumed to have (usually negative) effects on the likelihood of peaceful coexistence within a state. From Horowitz forward, scholars have posited that as the ethnic makeup of a state become more varied, the likelihood of conflict between ethnic groups increases.[18] Most measures of ethnic diversity are in terms of ethnic fractionalization (EF), which is most commonly defined as the probability that two randomly selected individuals within a state population will be from differing ethnic groups. This is mathematically represented by $EF \equiv 1 - \Sigma^{n}_{i=1} (p_i)^2$, where p_i is given by $p_1, p_2, p_3, \ldots p_n$, (each p represents an ethnic group's share of the state's population). Initially done by the Soviets in the *Atlas Narodov Mira* (Atlas of Peoples of the World), it has been included in many scholarly publications[19]. Problems with this classification system, however, have led to more precise EF measures; in this study I employ the recent fractionalization measures developed by Fearon[20]. He derives measures for 160 countries having a population in excess of 500,000 in 1990, these data cover 78% of the states included in this study.

Additional data are found in Alesina et al in their 2003 study of ethnic and religious fractionalization in 190 countries; when included with those data above they

---

[18] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.

[19] Atlas Narodov Mira, Moscow: Glavnoe upravlenie geodezii i kartografi, 1964.

[20] James E. Fearon, "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country." *Journal of Economic Growth* (8), 2003. In this paper Fearon also notes several examples of the limitations inherent in using the 1964 Atlas Narodov Mira data.

cover 98.1% of the countries included in the study[21]. I chose these data to fill in the gaps left by Fearon both due to the close correlation that exists between the two data sets, and because Alesina et al do not set a lower limit on population when considering inclusion of countries or ethnic groups in the data set. Still, not all countries are included; six of these countries (Comoros, East Timor, Maldives, Montenegro, Sao Tome & Principe and Vatican City) are missing values. This accounts for 179 country years, or just under two percent. However, only two conflict initiations were recorded in these nations (both of these occurring in the Comoros), comprising only 0.9% of all conflict initiations. These country years are coded as "missing" in the data set.

Religious fractionalization values are obtained using data from the Encyclopedia Britannica, and were derived from Alseina et al (see above). They produced a listing covering 294 religions in 215 countries and territories. The same methodology is employed mathematically as given above; however, not all countries are equally covered in the data set. Fifteen countries (many of which do not exist today) are not included, accounting for 461 country years, or 5% of the data. Fourteen conflict initiations (6.2% of the total) thus have no religious fractionalization data associated with them; these are recorded as "missing" as well[22].

---

[21] Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* (8), 2003. Although this paper includes measures of fractionalization based on ethnicity, language and religion, only the first and last are used here.

[22] Religious fractionalization values are missing for Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, Maldives, Montenegro, Serbia, Serbia & Montenegro, Soviet Union, Vatican City, North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, Yugoslavia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Conflict initiations with no RF data include six in the USSR, four in North Yemen, three in the former Yugoslavia and one in S. Vietnam.

2.5.2 Economic Data

Prior studies of civil war have shown the higher the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP/pc) a nation has, the less likely the chance that individuals, which benefit from good economic conditions, will "upset the applecart" through active rebellion and conflict. Since the opportunity costs for wealthier people to engage in violent conflict are higher; we should expect that the wealthier the state, the less likely the chance of conflict escalation to violence[23]. Wealthier states are also more likely to possess the necessary infrastructure to handle challengers without resorting to violence[24].

I began with the Penn World Tables Version 6.2 for values of GDP/pc, which begin in 1950 and end in 2004[25]. This produced values for nearly 7,000 country years (75%). To supplement missing data, primarily in the earlier country years, I used the economic data derived by Fearon & Laitin; this adds an additional 13%, or 1,608 years of data[26]. Because civil conflicts often have deleterious economic effects, I used values lagged one year (except for the initial year recorded for each country). I kept each initial year at the same GDP/pc value so as not to eliminate data for these years, which account for nearly fifteen of the conflict initiation years. Even with this additional data, there are

---

[23] Paul Collier and Anka Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4), 2004.

[24] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

25 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.

[26] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, Additional Tables for "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." The authors use estimates of growth rate of per capita income from the 2001 World Development Indicators (published by the World Bank) as well as energy consumption estimates from the Correlates of War National Capabilities Data. For more information on additional estimates derived, see this explanation.

seven countries in the data set with no GDP/pc values; however, the vast majority of

country years are represented here with values of GDP/pc, enough to provide valuable

information on the importance of this variable to conflict initiation.

2.5.3 Economic Inequality Indicators

Income inequality has also been shown to be a two-edged sword in terms of

conflict potential. Poorer sectors will rebel when they perceive their lot may improve;

richer sectors of society may in turn rebel if they fear that redistribution will adversely

affect their portion of the pie[27]. Sen showed how reactions to inequality could lead to

violent responses from both sides of the economic divide. While the poor may rebel in

an attempt to better their situation via redistributive adjustments; the rich, cognizant of

the financial impact such redistribution would create, would be enticed to rebel as a

preventative measure[28]. Economic inequality is operationalized here through the Gini

index, originally compiled by Deininger and Squire[29] and updated and expanded by the

University of Texas Inequality (UTIP) Program[30]. While the Deininger & Squire (D&S)

data has often been criticized for having a paucity of data, the recent efforts of the UTIP

program have increased the number of observations in the post-WWII era immensely.

The D&S data, while providing a wealth of interesting data, have problems that

lessen its utility in social science research. First, it is based on an unbalanced set of

---

[27] Paul Collier and Anka Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4), 2001.

[28] Amartya Sen, *On Economic Inequality*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.

[29] Claus Deininger and Lyn Squire, "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality." *The World Bank Economic Review* 10 (3), 1996.

[30] James K. Galbraith and Hyunsub Kum, "Estimating the Inequality of Household Incomes: A Statistical Approach to the Creation of a Dense and Consistent Global Data Set." A presentation prepared for the International Association for Research on Income and Wealth, Cork, Ireland, 2004.

observations within the countries for which it provides data; most of these nations have less than 10 observations each. The sources of income inequality are not equivalent across regions; in Europe and North America income surveys are used, while expenditure surveys are employed in Asia. This results in equivalent levels of inequality for Europe and Southeast Asia; the former has fairly robust wage bargaining and relatively equal manufacturing pay, while the same pay in Southeast Asia is quite unequal.

The UTIP dataset, on the other hand, measures global pay inequality across sectors within each country, using data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The resulting dataset covers 3,200 country years from 1963-2002, and yields data with fewer gaps that is also consistent across space. Because of the relative density of data, the UTIP dataset allows better comparisons of inequality changes across both countries and over time. This was impossible to do with the D&S data, given the scarcity of data and the differences in source materials used.

Still, there were large gaps in the project data set when both of these resources were included. As noted in a recent paper, Fearon & Laitin noted the utility of using country-averages of Gini values to fill the gaps in missing portions of this data[31]. I employ a similar method, using calculated data from both resources when available and then using the average value of these data to fill in the remainder of the gaps. While it greatly improved the amount of data available for testing, missing country-year data still

---

[31] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003. The authors note that they "interpolated and extended as necessary the Gini coefficients assembled", but provide no further information on their method of doing so. However, they mention that simply using country averages produced "the same results" (79).

exists for forty-three countries, accounting for 1,406 country years (15.2% of the total)

and 28 conflict initiations (12.4%)[32]. While the coverage is far from perfect, an

expanded set of economic data should increase the model's ability to quantify the

importance of inequality in conflict initiation at the low levels measured in the UCDP

dataset.

2.5.4 Additional CoC Classifications

As mentioned in the previous section, Huntington theorized subnational conflict

would become increasingly common along his defined civilizational fault lines, but most

often within states where large populations representing differing civilizations existed

(so-called "cleft" states). To measure this, I included a dichotomous variable to code

whether a conflict was initiated within a fault-line state, and a separate variable to

identify if the conflict occurred within a state identified in the CoC theory as cleft.

To determine whether a state was located along a fault line, I used the map in the

1996 CoC work described earlier. Where identification was ambiguous, I coded states

as fault line if they were contiguous and their majority populations were of differing

CoC-defined civilizations. In all, 78 states were recorded as fault-line states; these

contain over 5.2 billion people (77% of the world's 6.77 billion total). A listing of all

---

[32] Missing country-year data for Andorra, Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brunei, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, East Timor, Georgia, East Germany, Grenada, Kiribati, North Korea, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Sao Tome & Principe, Serbia & Montenegro, Solomon Islands, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vatican City, Vietnam, North and South Vietnam, Yemen, North and South Yemen.

fault-line states is provided in Appendix F. Cleft states were identified directly from the

discussion provided in the CoC; a listing of these states is included in Appendix G.[33]

2.5.5 Historical Legacies – Previous Conflict

When groups come into conflict for the first time, uncertainties about the

capabilities, strengths and determination of each side exist. These uncertainties must be

revealed, whether through negotiation or, when that fails, through actual conflict to

adequately prepare strategies to resolve the conflict. As these qualities become known

through repeated diplomatic iteration or interaction via conflict, each side is able to

make better calculations of the utility of conflict in the future. For example if the state

(Side A) is able to determine that the challenger (Side B) is not easily intimidated by or

defeated in physical combat, Side A may choose instead to make additional attempts at

reconciliation via the diplomatic process in future disagreements.   Such attempts at

diplomacy may also appease domestic audiences that are opposed to violence in

response to challenges from Side B.

Similar information is made available to the challenger in these types of

exchanges and may affect future decisions to escalate conflict to violence. If the impact

of violent conflict on the challenger was previously felt in terms of high numbers of

casualties, it may intensify feelings of hatred and lead to renewed conflict later. On the

other hand, such high losses may lead challengers to believe the gains from fighting

outweigh the costs involved, leading them to choose decisions that do not involve

violence in the future. If groups have been in conflict previously, there is an increased

---

[33] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

likelihood that conflict will occur again if previously fractious issues were not successfully resolved or new contentious issues arise. Each side may feel agreements that ended the last round of fighting may have been made to their possible disadvantage; resumption of conflict can be seen as a means to correct this position. Because the information learned in initial conflicts between a group and the state affects future decisions to escalate, each year of conflict occurring between two groups is assigned a dichotomous value of zero if they have not previously engaged in conflict and one if they have engaged in violence in previous episodes.

2.5.6 Historical Legacies – Ongoing Subnational or International Conflict

Conflicts, including those involving violence, require manpower to fill the ranks and resources to initiate and sustain themselves. Since sides in a conflict cannot rely on inexhaustible supplies of either, both states and challenger groups are limited in the scope and duration of the conflicts in which they choose to become involved. For example, states challenged by subnational groups when they are already engaged in interstate or ongoing subnational disputes may not wish to divert valuable resources away from these conflicts. Instead, states may wish to negotiate rather than become further involved in violence, or alternatively may choose to crush a rebellion forcefully and quickly so as to return attention to conflicts already in progress. In addition, if a state is engaged in an ongoing conflict with another group, the state may see any additional challenge as undermining the legitimacy of the regime and use maximum force to crush the emerging rebellion quickly and completely, rather than have to fight a two-front war. Engagement in an ongoing interstate conflict increases the likelihood that states will use rapid force rather than negotiation to quickly end the dispute rather

than to divert manpower and resources to a local rebellion. A dichotomous variable for each has thus been included to examine the effect of ongoing violence on the initiation of subnational conflict.

2.5.7 Historical Legacies – Former Soviet Republics and Communist States

The legacies of being a vassal state within the Soviet Empire and experiments with communism also provide opportunities for conflict to arise once independence is achieved. Loss of the former patron state often leaves newly independent nations weak politically, institutionally and economically. Former Soviet vassal states have often retained old Communist leaders during transitions to more democratic regimes; desires to retain power, cronyism and corrupt practices have prompted challenges to the new regimes throughout Central Asia. A particular example can be found in Tajikistan, which descended into a seven-year war as southern Islamic forces struggled to eject the vestiges of the old Soviet regime that remained after independence. This was predicted in another study, as greater political opportunities were forecast to lead to ethnopolitical challenges by groups seeking autonomy or power within the newly independent state[34]. As such, a dummy variable is included to identify whether a state was at one time a Soviet vassal state or had a Communist government.

2.5.8 Historical Legacies – Former Colonial Possessions

As will be seen in the cases of South Asia and Africa, the pell-mell release of former colonies from their European masters after World War II led to, in many cases, almost immediate initiation of hostilities within them. Especially in South Asia, deals

---

[34] Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." *International Studies Quarterly* 38, 1994.

were struck with former colonial powers about internal autonomy for people groups that were not ethnically identifiable with the majority of the state's inhabitants.[35] After grant of independence, many of these new states immediately reneged on these agreements and swiftly (and in many cases brutally) crushed any attempts at secession or autonomy. The installation of a government loyal to its former colonial masters but locally unpopular can also lead to conflict, especially if the colonial power remains politically engaged.[36] Even in states where the transition to self-rule is smooth and equitable, internal conflict after independence has been almost a given - especially in Africa.

During the transition to the modern European state system, leaders focused first on establishing state sovereignty, strengthening border defenses and raising revenues for a standing army. Once statehood was relatively secure, leaders could turn their attention to creating a nation; uniting disparate populations into a single coherent people was a driving concern during much of Europe's early development[37]. In newly-independent African nations, state-building and nation-building were often attempted simultaneously, usually with poor results. As leaders realized they ruled a country of strangers, they often turned to kleptocratic methods of rule, reserving for themselves and their cronies a

---

[35] In India, agreements with the peoples of Assam, Bodoland, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura were made prior to independence; conflict with India over autonomy has lasted decades. Similar deals were made with the Arakan, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan peoples of Myanmar, yet violence has long persisted over the right to independence or autonomy.

[36] One example can be found in South Moluccas, which fought inclusion in the Indonesian state in 1950, and was supported by Dutch interests.

[37] Examples of this process have been outlined in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* and Eugen Weber's *Peasants Into Frenchmen*, both cited in Chapter One, as well as Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

lion's share of the international aid and development funds that flowed in. A dummy

variable is thus included to identify all former colonies set free after WWII.

2.5.9 New States

New states are often at an increased risk of conflict shortly after formation for a

variety of reasons, such as inexperienced leadership, weak organizational and political

infrastructure, delicate economic status and underdeveloped trade relationships. As

mentioned earlier, new states are often engaged in simultaneous state- and nation-

building processes, struggling to form a national identity and creating administrative

institutions to effectively govern. Finally, changes in relative power of groups within

the state after formation sometimes lead to challenges among them that foster political

instability and can lead to challenges that escalate to conflict.[38] A dummy variable is

included for the first year of its creation and for each of the following three years.

2.5.10 Percentage of Revenue Derived from Petroleum Exports

Many studies have noted the correlation of natural resource availability and the

likelihood of subnational conflict. Some have noted the desirability of control of such

resources as a way of financing rebellions and restricting state access to the funds

generated by these resources[39]. Others have argued that a surfeit of petroleum resources

only acts to increase the strength of state infrastructure, rendering the likelihood of a

---

[38] For more on the effect of shifting relative power among subnational groups see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. Princeton University Press, 1993; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49, 1995 and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." *International Security* 21 (2.), 1996.

[39] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4), 2001.

challenger seizing control of such an asset highly unlikely. If states receive a

sufficiently large portion of their GDP from the sales of oil or other extracted natural

resources, they are likely to place additional safeguards on the protection of these

assets.[40] Conversely, groups seeking to rebel may perceive that local control of these

supplies of wealth is a prize worth having and devote additional manpower to gaining

control of these facilities.[41]

There have been several cases of conflicts in the recent past in which oil reserves

have been found and exploited on traditionally minority group territory[42]. When the

inhabitants of such regions perceive that they are not reaping the appropriate benefits

from the extraction of this wealth, they are more likely to rebel – and states dependent

on this wealth may be more likely to react harshly. Resource wealth has been shown to

make conflict more likely, longer lasting and bloodier[43]. I have utilized World Bank

data which segregates the percentage of fuel exports as a percentage of total

merchandise exports, beginning in 1960 and continuing through 2006. As was done in

previous works, I have included a dummy variable for each year that states had more

than 1/3 of their exports in fuel[44].

---

[40] Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53 (3), 2001.

[41] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

[42] Included would be the 1990-91 and 1999-2005 conflicts in Aceh, Indonesia; the ongoing conflict in Cabinda, Angola; the fight over oil rights between the Ijaw and government forces in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

[43] Michael L. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases." *International Organization* 58 (1), 2004.

[44] Cf. Indra de Soysa and Ragnhild Nordås, "Islam's Bloody Innards?" Paper prepared for presentation at the Meeting of the Environmental Factors in Civil War Working Group, 21 Sep 2006 and James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

2.5.11 Effects of Regime Type and Democracy

Regime type is often cited as being an indicator of the likelihood of violent conflict onset. Democratically elected (and hence publicly accountable) leaders are less likely to respond to internal challenges with bloodshed when democratic norms dictate that negotiation or concessions would be preferable.[45] The institutional capacity of democracies also makes them better equipped to allow challengers to work within the political process for change than to attempt to subvert it, lessening the likelihood of conflict escalation.

It is well established that rebellions and large-scale conflicts like civil war can be greatly damaging to both the safety and security of the population. Violent conflict often leads to damage or destruction of structural systems, cities, neighborhoods, etc. It is also often costly in terms of life and limb; the ten-year conflict in Sierra Leone was infamous for the rape and pillaging of innocent civilians and the amputation of hands and arms by guerrilla forces. This was endemic throughout the conflict, despite the stated rebel goals of instituting democracy, ridding the country of corruption and 'freeing' the peasantry from government corruption.

Democratic leaders generally have large winning coalitions; keeping them happy motivates these leaders to pursue public goods in war, as distribution of private goods among so large a coalition is impossible. The most logical public good to strive for when faced with a potential or ongoing violence from a challenger group is thus security for its citizenry. For this reason democratic leaders will seek quick solutions to conflicts

---

[45] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003.

such as these, whether via negotiation or force of arms. Government systems with small winning coalitions, as in dictatorships or other autocratic regimes, prompt their leaders to seek private goods in war in order to divide the spoils among these small groups[46]. Thus we would expect democracies to be less amenable to conflict and desirous of rapid solutions to challenges to the state; more autocratic regimes would be more likely to seek resource acquisition at the expense of conflict resolution. To measure this variable, data from the POLITY IV dataset is included; the -10 to 10 democracy "scores" have been transformed to a 0-20 scale for ease of calculation.[47]

2.5.12 Population Size

It is generally well accepted that the larger a population, the larger and more diffuse the machinery of government has to be to effectively police and control it. As the population grows, so too grows the need for sufficient infrastructure to feed, house and provide economic opportunity for its citizens. Governments must meet the social needs of its growing population; adequate access to health care keeps birth and death rates at lower levels, sufficient levels of potable water lessen the chance of disease, and adequate food and distribution systems limit the chance of hunger.

However, when population growth exceeds the ability of a government to provide these basic necessities for survival, when economic conditions are poor and opportunities for improvement are limited, the likelihood of challenges to state authority often increase. Given that challengers to the state are most often young males,

---

[46] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003.

[47] The POLITY IV dataset and accompanying documentation are available on the web at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

specifically lower-income males with limited opportunity for upward mobility, then the

larger the overall population the larger the cohort of these possible challengers there will

be.[48] Larger populations also increase the statistical probability that casualties will be

greater within a given conflict, as more opportunities for noncombatants to come in

contact with combatant groups will arise.

Population data were obtained from the Penn World Tables Version 6.2 as a first

source, as this data covers 188 countries during the period 1950-2004[49]. I supplemented

this with World Bank estimates that provided additional data primarily for the years

2005-2006; these data cover 227 countries for the period 1960-2007[50]. For data

covering the years 1946-49 I used the data set compiled by Fearon and Laitin, which

used figures from the Correlates of War National Capabilities Data[51]. As mentioned in

the above referenced paper, the correlation between these sources is almost perfect, with

each correlating at or above 0.995. The combination of these three sources provided

data for 8,916 country-years, or over 96% of the total in this project.

2.5.13 Effects of Islam

Huntington's CoC theory contained one claim that raised more controversy than

any other; in it he argued that the incidence of ethnic conflict and wars in fault-line

[48] Paul Collier, "Doing Well out of War." Paper prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London, April 26-27, 1999.

[49] Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.

[50] Population data for the years 2005-2007 were obtained via Quick Query at http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135

[51] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

states were disproportionally distributed among the civilizations he identified. He

claimed in reference to violent conflicts that the:

"overwhelming majority…have taken place along the boundary looping across Eurasia and Africa that separates Muslims from non-Muslims. While at the macro or global level of world politics the primary clash of civilizations is between the West and the rest, at the micro or local level is between Islam and the others".[52]

This opened the way for his most hotly debated claim; that Islam's monotheistic focus,

expansionist aims and history, lack of a core state and strict laws regarding all responses

to anything inimical to Islam make it particularly susceptible to violence. Indeed,

Huntington's assertions that in the early 1990s Muslims:

"…were engaged in more intergroup violence than were non-Muslims, and two-thirds to three-

quarters of intercivilizational wars were between Muslims and non-Muslims."

led him to pronounce that "Islam's borders *are* bloody, and so are its innards" (emphasis in

the original). This statement alone has been the subject of much scholarly commentary

and heated debate.[53]

Is there any evidence that such a notion is plausible to be found in the evolution

of all subnational conflict since 1946? Although there have been many scholarly

rebuttals to the "bloody borders" claim, less has been written over that claim that

Muslims are more likely than other religious groups to be involved in violent

subnational conflicts[54]. The percentage of Muslims in a country has been found to be a

---

[52] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 1996 p. 255.

[53] For rebuttals to these claims, see for example Tony Smith, "Dangerous Conjecture." *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1997; Stephen M. Walt, "Building Up New Bogeymen." *Foreign Policy* 106, 1997; and Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal and Michaelene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism deju vu? Some Evidence." *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (5), 2000.

[54] Rebuttals to the "bloody borders" claim include Kishore Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence: What the West Can Teach the Rest." *Foreign Affairs* 72 (4), 1993; Shirleen Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* Westport, CT: The Center for Strategic

weakly positive indicator for conflict potential, but was overshadowed when the country

was an oil producer.[55] One recent example that focused on political terrorism found that

states with large Muslim populations that were members of the Organization of the

Islamic Conference were *less* likely to repress their citizens.[56] Another found religious

conflicts to be no more bloody than non-religious ones, and conflicts involving Muslims

(whether representing one or both sides of the conflict) are no more violent than those

involving other religions.[57] However, both these studies used only data from after the

Cold War; to determine trends in Muslim conflict involvement, data from the Cold War

period must be included as well.

2.5.14 Religious Variables

To measure the effect of religion on subnational conflict initiation, several

dummy variables were created.[58] For the purposes of this study, a minority religious

group is defined as one containing at least 5% of the total population. I identify

religiously "cleft" states as those possessing at least one religious minority; groups

smaller than this may have insufficient capability to successfully challenge a state,

inhibiting initial mobilization as individuals make strategic decisions to join. There are

---

and International Studies, 1998 and M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism." *World Politics* 55 (1), 2002.

[55] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

[56] Indra de Soysa and Ragnhild Nordås, "Islam's Bloody Innards?" Paper prepared for presentation at the Meeting of the Environmental Factors in Civil War Working Group, 21 Sep 2006.

[57] Ragnhild Nordås, "Regulating Religious Minorities: For Better or Worse?"Paper read at International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, March 2004.

[58] All religious variables were derived from data available in the CIA World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. Additional information was obtained from the Encyclopedia Britannica and other sources, as necessary.

159 such states, covering in varying density every region on earth; a majority (33) of these states are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. A listing of religiously cleft states can be found in Appendix H.

As discussed in Chapter One, simple population percentages are of minimal value when the salience of religious differences in a society is unknown. To measure the level of religious tolerance within states, data on state and social regulation of religion was extracted from Israel's Religion and State Project, conducted by Bar Ilan University. Two such measures are employed: a Government Regulation of Religion Index (GRI) and a Social Regulation of Religion Index (SRI), each scoring societal attitudes toward other religions within a country. Each state is given a score from one to ten in each index, with lowers scores representing less regulation.

The GRI measures the extent to which governments interfere with an individual's right to worship, the extent to which freedom of religion is protected, whether the state respects that freedom, the level of contribution of government policy support to the free practice of religion, whether foreign and other missionaries are allowed to operate, and whether proselytizing, public preaching or conversion is tolerated by the state. The SRI measures societal attitudes toward other or nontraditional religions, attitudes toward conversion to other religions, whether societal attitudes or religious clerics discourage proselytizing, whether existing or established religions attempt to shut out new religions and the extent of assertive religious

movements in that country.[59] Using these indices should help to determine the salience

of religious identity within a state, both at the level of the state and the individual.

2.6 Research Design

2.6.1 Testing CoC Intercivilizational Conflict Hypotheses

As outlined in the previous discussion, there are several hypotheses that can be

directly tested from the CoC claims. Because of the proximity of differing civilizational

groups and the differential group advantage gained during state modernization

processes, Huntington suggests fault line states will host more intercivilizational

subnational conflict than states not in these zones. This leads to the following initial

hypothesis:

H01: CoC fault-line states should experience more intercivilizational

subnational conflicts than states not in fault-line zones.

The CoC theory was written in response to events that occurred in conjunction with, and

soon after, the ending of the Cold War. Violence was erupting in Northern Africa, along

the edges of the former Soviet empire, and in the Balkans. Without the former presence

of superpower restraint, more of these factional wars would be expected to occur. This

leads to his follow-on hypothesis:

H02: Intercivilizational subnational conflicts should be increasing in the post-

Cold War era, with fault-line states experiencing a disproportional share of conflict.

Huntington claimed that fault-line wars would be more frequently over territory,

where the goal of at least one of the participating groups would be either territorial gain

---

[59] Data obtained from the website of the Association of Religious Data Archives, located on the web at
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_1_1.asp#

or freeing a given territory of a group considered undesirable.[60] This would be done via expulsion when possible, or by mass slaughter when necessary. Thus we would expect to see the following:

H03: Intercivilizational subnational conflicts should be increasingly over territory in the post-Cold War era.

Because of the increased identification of individuals with civilizational identities, and because of their often primordial and immutable characteristics, intercivilizational conflicts were predicted to be more vicious than those conflicts where religious cleavages do not exist. Since they involve what Huntington termed "fundamental issues of group identity and power"; these conflicts would be difficult, if not impossible, to resolve via normal channels of diplomacy and efforts at compromise. Combined with the observed intractability of most territorial conflicts, future subnational conflicts between groups of dissimilar civilizations would be "violent and ugly".[61] This leads in turn to the following hypothesis:

H04: The intensity of intercivilizational subnational conflicts, especially those involving territorial issues, will tend to be greater than that of intracivilizational clashes.

Finally, the CoC theory predicts when fundamental issues of identity are just as much in dispute as issues of historically and/or strategically important territory; conflicts between these groups will be lengthier. It will be more difficult to reach compromises that either side can agree to, and in the absence of capable third-party arbitration and enforcement, those compromises that do occur will frequently be reneged upon as long-

---

[60] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 1996 pp. 252-3.
[61] Ibid, pp. 252-3.

standing animosities are reframed as political issues. Thus these conflicts will be long

and consist of alternating periods of violence and quiet, until either exhaustion or

credible and enforceable mediation causes a cessation of hostilities. This produces the

last of the hypotheses concerning future conflicts:

     H05: The duration of intercivilizational subnational conflicts will tend to be

greater than that of intracivilizational clashes.

In short, we should find that CoC-defined fault-line states will experience more

instances of intercivilizational subnational conflict than states not located in these

geopolitical zones. Further, in the absence of superpower restraint this type of conflict

should be on the rise in the post-Cold War era, be most frequently over territorial issues,

and be longer and more violent than subnational conflicts elsewhere.

2.6.2 Testing Interreligious Conflict Hypotheses

     This project also seeks to test my claim that Huntington's CoC theory was based

on groupings that were simultaneously too broad for proper classification of the major

people groups of the world and too narrow in the number of available "pigeonholes" in

which to place these groups. In short, civilizations are too few to encompass the

diversity inherent in the global population and too broad to avoid lumping within them

disparate people groups that are historically hostile to each other.

     Instead, I argue that people groups are more accurately divided when careful

religious identification alone is used. Classifying them according to the twelve religious

divisions discussed previously yields a more precise picture of the historical

development of subnational conflict since 1946. The attempt to broaden this religious

classification scheme into an overarching civilizational system as was done in the CoC

theory likely has led to its failure in the many tests of the theory performed to date. By remaining below the civilizational level we should be able to examine more precisely the effect of religion on the evolution of subnational conflict in the modern era.

As was the case with the CoC theory, there are several hypotheses that can be directly tested from my theory. Huntington depended on the immensity of the territorial boundaries of CoC civilizations because they coincided roughly with a historical swath of conflict observable given the data from the post-WWII period. Described as a "boundary looping across Eurasia and Africa that separates Muslims from non-Muslims", this fault line zone was where Huntington claimed the "overwhelming majority" of intercivilizational conflicts were occurring.[62] While the historical record reflects that fact that many conflicts have indeed occurred within this roughly-defined region, it ignores a large number of conflicts that have occurred elsewhere, where no civilizational cleavage exists. When the population proportion is examined, it is clear that roughly three-quarters of the global community resides within this zone; a corresponding proportion of observed conflict seems self-evident. Thus civilizational "fault-line states" are less civilizational in character and more population-based; more conflict has occurred because the population density of these regions is much higher than elsewhere.

Instead, states that contain significant groups within their borders that are of dissimilar faiths should experience an enhanced propensity for subnational conflict. Due to both the quasi-primordial character of religious identity *and* its doctrinal malleability that enables it to be used in an instrumental fashion for purposes of mobilization, I expect to find that conflict between groups of dissimilar religions occurs

---

[62] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 1996 p. 255.

more frequently than between groups of the same religious belief. In particular,

religiously "cleft" states should be particularly susceptible to conflict, as they contain

minority groups sufficiently large to mount a successful challenge to the state. This

leads to the following hypothesis:

H06: Religiously cleft states should experience more subnational conflicts than states not possessing a significant religious minority.

During the Cold War superpower restraint kept most culture-based conflict

limited; subnational wars were more often fought as proxy battles for ideological

reasons. With the removal of this restraint in the post-Cold War era, conflicts between

groups of differing religious belief, or "interreligious" conflicts, should be increasing at

the subnational level, leading to:

H07: In the absence of intervening superpower authority, interreligious subnational conflicts should be increasing in the post-Cold War era.

Finally, Huntington described the importance of religious identification to civilizational

explanations of conflict. It follows, then, that the characteristics of intercivilizational

conflict, which he admits is largely based on religious differences, should closely mirror

those of the interreligious clashes described above. Thus we should observe that:

H08: Interreligious subnational conflicts should be increasingly over territory in the post-Cold War era, and should be of greater intensity and duration than conflicts between groups of similar religious belief.

In short, we should find that interreligious subnational conflict is more common

than conflict between groups that share a religious belief and should be on the rise in the

post-Cold War era. It also should be more frequently conducted over territorial issues,

be longer and more violent than intrareligious subnational conflicts. In order to test these hypotheses, a close examination of the UCDP dataset is conducted in Chapter Three. Descriptive statistics will be used for comparisons of intercivilizational and interreligious subnational conflict from both regional and temporal perspectives. The hypotheses of the CoC theory will be tested using these data, and a test of the refined model proposed in this study will be conducted as well. If my theory is valid, religious differences will prove more salient in predicting the likelihood of violent conflict, as well as its likely duration and level of violence. Predicting the most likely grievance over which these conflicts will be fought should also be possible.

In Chapter Four, a quantitative approach will determine the utility of religious differences as a motivating factor for, and a causal predictor of, subnational conflict. In addition to more secular causal factors like regime type, economic prosperity and population size, predictions based on religious demographics, fractionalization values and government and social regulation should provide valuable predictive power in future studies of subnational violence. Results and a discussion of all findings are included as well.

3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 The Evolution of Subnational Conflict in the Modern Era

3.1.1 Trends in Ongoing Subnational Conflict

Previous studies of conflict at the civil war level have shown that the number of ongoing civil wars trended linearly upward from 1945 to 1991, and then experienced an even sharper upturn during the turbulence following the end of the Cold War.[1] Similar results obtain from the UCDP data set of intrastate conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle deaths; an upward trend is visible through 1974, followed by a rapid rise in the number of ongoing conflicts through 1979. This number remained relatively steady throughout the 1980's, and was followed by another rapid rise from 1989-1992 (Figure 3-1 below).

Figure 3-1: Ongoing Subnational Conflicts, 1946-2007

---

[1] This trend in civil war accumulation is discussed in both James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003 and James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3), 2004.

After 1993 the number of ongoing subnational conflicts experiences a sharp decline; while sixty-two conflicts were ongoing in 1992, by the end of the decade that number had dropped to forty-five, a loss of nearly one-quarter of its peak value. By 2007 the number of these conflicts has fallen to thirty-three, nearly half the total ongoing at the peak and returning to levels of conflict not seen since the mid-1970s. Although much has been made of the meteoric rise from 1989 through the early 1990s, little discussion has focused on the earlier jump noted above. In 1974 there were only twenty-five ongoing conflicts; five years later that number had climbed to forty-one, a 64% gain - what factors led to this sudden increase?

A large number of long-term conflicts erupted in the latter half of this decade; many of these would not be resolved until nearly the turn of the century. Wars in Angola and Mozambique, multiple insurrections over territory and government in Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ideological conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador, long-term struggles in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Iran as well as East Timor's fight for independence from Indonesia all began in the second half of the 1970s. This list is not exhaustive, but is nonetheless illustrative in outlining the multiple sources of strife responsible for boosting the number of ongoing conflicts observed. Although limited to mainly developing nations, subnational violence spanned the globe from Central America to Southeast Asia.

A second and more pronounced rise occurred from 1989-1992, when the total number of ongoing conflicts rose from forty-four at the end of 1988 to the peak of sixty-two in 1992. Although some explanations for this expansion have concentrated on the outbreak of hostilities within former Soviet vassal states after the breakup of the USSR,

this rise was not due *primarily* to this event. Indeed, this peak in ongoing subnational conflict is the product of two mechanisms: a steady increase in the number of ongoing conflicts that had accumulated over the previous five decades, and an unusually large number of both short (and long)-term conflicts initiated during this interval.

In 1989, the first year of the anomalous rise, fifty-one conflicts were ongoing, including five initiated in the 1940s. At the peak of the surge in 1992, nearly 70% of these were still ongoing; of all conflicts begun prior to 1989, twenty-seven were ongoing as of 1994 and fifteen are still in conflict as of this writing. Remarkably, nine of these conflicts originated before 1970; two of these (Karen province in Myanmar and Palestine, Israel) were initiated nearly sixty years earlier. But the sharp rise is only partly due to the accumulation of long-term conflicts not successfully resolved.

In addition, each year in this period experienced a higher number of initiations than at any time prior (or since). Eleven new conflicts were initiated annually from 1989-1991; twelve more were begun in 1992. Although nearly a quarter of these were short-term (on the order of days to months), most were long-term conflicts; of the forty-five begun during this short span, over a third persisted more than a decade, and five were ongoing as of 2007. However, only thirteen of the forty-five conflicts begun in this period were directly linked to the end of the Cold War; these include the outbreaks of violence in Azerbaijan and Georgia, separatist clashes in the former Yugoslavia and the Tajik civil war.

Of the thirty-two conflicts occurring during this period that were not directly connected with the demise of the Soviet Bloc, nearly all occurred in areas that had been prone to violence in previous decades. In 1989 and 1990, incidences of new conflict

were spread relatively evenly from the Americas to Europe, Africa and Asia. In the latter two years, however, these cases of subnational violence occurred primarily in Africa and Central Asia. While anti-government rebellions made up the bulk of African conflicts, long-duration separatist violence began in both India and Myanmar.

3.1.2 Trends in Subnational Conflict Resolution

The upward trend in ongoing subnational conflict, combined with the two periods of rapid increase discussed above, are thus explained by both a steady accumulation of unresolved clashes and an unusually high number of initiations in each period. Following the peak in 1992, however, a marked decrease in the total number of ongoing conflicts is evident that is without precedent in the modern era. What is responsible for this striking reduction in the number of ongoing conflicts? The answer is twofold; the first concerns the limited number of initiations that have occurred since the Cold War ended. This subject will be discussed in detail in the following section, but it is sufficient to note here that new conflict initiations have decreased dramatically since peaking in the early 1990s.

But this answer alone is insufficient to explain a decline of this magnitude. When trends in conflict resolution since 1946 are examined, however, another effect is revealed. Resolutions of subnational conflict in the postwar period remained remarkably consistent for the first five decades. From 1946-59 conflicts were resolved at the rate of just 1.9 per annum; in each of the following three decades that rate increased to just over 2.5 conflicts ending each year. During the 1990s, however, subnational conflicts were resolved at an astounding 6.1 conflicts annually, representing an increase of nearly 250% (see Figure 3-2). In 1991 alone a total of ten conflicts were

resolved; while four of these were short-term conflicts lasting less than a year, four were multi-decade events (three in Ethiopia and the civil war in Nicaragua) brought to a close. While the number of conflict resolutions has decreased to 3.8 per annum in the current decade, it is still markedly higher than prior to 1990.

Figure 3-2: Subnational Conflict Resolutions, 1946-2007

Also surprising is the number of *long-term* conflicts resolved during the last two decades. In the first two decades of the postwar period, roughly seventy percent of resolved conflicts were a year or less in duration, yet only three conflicts lasting longer than five years ended. In the following two decades only four conflicts greater than ten years' duration were successfully resolved, while in the 1980s only three long-term clashes ended (in Malaysia, Namibia and India's Tripura state). Ending subnational violence lasting for decades, at least prior to 1990, had proven difficult indeed.

What changed in the decades following is unclear, yet a large number of long-duration violent clashes were resolved. In the 1990s, for example, an incredible sixty-one terminations were recorded; of these ten were longer than ten years, three had persisted greater than twenty years, four were thirty years or more in duration and three had lasted for more than forty years. This trend has continued; since 2000 half of the twenty-six recorded cases of conflict resolution were for clashes lasting more than ten years. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the reason for this increase in successful conflict resolution at the subnational level. However, the evidence suggests that pressure to resolve such conflicts may be rising. In an increasingly interconnected multipolar world, international pressures to end domestic disputes may be more efficacious, given the ubiquitous nature of news reporting and the impact that national and regional unrest can have on international markets. Whatever the reason, the rapid post-Cold War decline in ongoing subnational conflict that we observe in Figure 1 is a product of both fewer initiations *and* a greater number of resolutions recorded in the last eighteen years.

3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Civilizational Conflict

3.2.1 Temporal Trends in Subnational Conflict Initiation

When the CoC theory was advanced, it is likely the dramatic increase in ongoing conflicts in the opening years of the 1990s was prompting theories that a striking shift in global conflict dynamics was already underway. A few pointed to the post-WWII period, when American prosperity and power became more widely known throughout the world via the media and markets, with America increasingly representing success,

wealth and power. As this influence waxed, the perceived loss of traditional reverence

and respect triggered accusations that America and the West were successful, yet

soulless.[2] Bernard Lewis described a clash of civilizations rooted in Muslim despair

over both secularism and modernism, and linked it to the rising number of ongoing

conflicts between Islam and the West observed since 1979.[3] But the total number of

conflicts being waged at any one point in time is essentially little more than a temporal

snapshot of domestic conflict writ on a global scale. A more useful result appears when

trends of conflict *initiations* are studied. Although the post-Cold War spike (1989-1992)

is quite evident, it is also quite apparent that there is no evidence of an upward trend in

subnational conflict initiations prior to the end of the Cold War (see Figure 3-3).

Figure 3-3: Subnational Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

[2] This concept, attributed to writers like Rainer Rilke and Martin Heidegger, is outlined in Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *The Atlantic Monthly* 266 (3), Sep 1990, p. 52.

[3] Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *The Atlantic Monthly* 266 (3), 1990.

Indeed, close inspection reveals an almost sinusoidal pattern; from a low in 1951 the numbers trend upward until 1966 then drop off again sharply. Another rise is noted until 1982, followed by yet another sharp decline, finally repeated in the huge increase of 1989-1992. The current decade suggests we are in a period of decline once again; only time will reveal whether a subsequent increase will follow. Examination of the initiation data by decade confirms the absence of a temporal upswing; no evidence of an increase in subnational conflict over time is evident (see Table 3-1 below). Unpacking the conflict data by period allows us to better understand within-decade trends; discussion of the conflict events of each decade is thus warranted.

Although the surge in conflict after WWII resulted in an average of nearly six conflicts yearly in the 1940s, most of this was a consequence of the war that preceded the period. Initially high levels of conflict were primarily due to the lingering effects of

Table 3-1: Average Conflict Initiations per Period

Period	Avg. Initiations
46-49	5.5
50-59	1.8
60-69	3.4
70-79	4
80-89	3.4
90-99	5.9
00-07	2.3
46-88	3.2

WWII, especially in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Greece struggled to remove a Nazi-imposed regime while the USSR consolidated its holdings in the Baltic States and attempted to establish a foothold in Iran. The creation of Israel began an ongoing conflict between itself and Palestine, while attempts to further spread Communism led to

violence in India, China, Myanmar and the Philippines. The British grant of independence initiated long-term territorial wars in India and Myanmar, some of which are ongoing today. The 1950s was a period of relative calm; on average less than two new subnational conflicts began annually. Of the eighteen that did begin, nearly half were short-term coups lasting less than a year. Communist movements erupted in Cuba, Indonesia, Laos, Vietnam and Malaysia; China began its ten-year struggle to occupy Tibet and Iraq's royal family were arrested and executed in a military takeover.

In the following three decades conflict initiations nearly doubled that of the 1950s, yet remained nearly static over the entire period at between three and four new initiations annually. Throughout the first two of these decades, violence increasingly broke out over issues of regime change, independence and autonomy. Short-term coups were attempted with great regularity, but often, as were the cases in the Philippines, Columbia, Cambodia and El Salvador, these conflicts dragged on for decades. Until the last year of the 1980s conflict initiations seemed to be in decline; only four new instances had begun from 1985-88. However, the final year of the decade saw an incredible eleven new conflicts begun; although this coincided with the Soviet repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1989 and the opening of Soviet vassal states in Eastern Europe, none of the conflicts begun in that year (with the possible exception of Romania) was directly attributable to the unraveling of Soviet power.

The last decade of the twentieth century has the highest average of the entire period; this is directly the result of the impact the first years of the decade have on the total. Thirty-four conflicts were begun in this three-year period, as much or more than had occurred in any *decade* prior, except the 1970s. Because these occurred

108

immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, speculation began as to whether the increase was directly attributable to this event. Only a third of these conflicts, however, were directly attributable to the ending of the Cold War. As mentioned above, no conflicts begun in 1989 were related; of 1990's eleven new initiations, only two (Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan) were related, and only three of the eleven that began in 1991 (violence in Georgia and the withdrawal of Slovenia and Croatia from the Yugoslavian Republic) were attributable to the end of the Cold War.

In 1992 seven of twelve conflict beginnings were related to the end of Soviet domination, over possible breakaway republics in Georgia, new violence in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a bid for independence in the Transdniestr region of Moldova and the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan. In 1993, when conflict initiation levels returned to more "normal" levels, four of the six initiations (an attempted Russian coup, a power bid in Azerbaijan and continuing episodes of violence in Bosnia) were directly related to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Of the three initiations the following year, only the Chechnya conflict was attributable to the end of the Cold War. Thus while some scholars attempted to tie the upsurge in violence from 1989-1993 with the move to a multipolar system, only a third of the cases were directly related to this event.

For the rest of the decade conflict initiations remain low at below three per year, and the downward trend appears to be continuing; in the first seven years of the new millennia the average is at its lowest level since the 1950s. However, a temporal plot of global conflict initiations alone yields an insufficient exploration of the evolution of subnational violence after 1945, as it does not include an analysis of regional effects. Such an analysis will help illuminate the regional differentiation in conflict of this type.

109

3.2.2 Regional Trends in Subnational Conflict Initiation

The globe can be divided regionally into eight elements, based on geopolitical and historical ties. These are North, Central and South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Central/South Asia and East Asia. A discussion of the contribution of each (with the exception of North America, due to the paucity of such events) to the total number of subnational conflict initiations sheds additional clarity in understanding the global evolution of this conflict over the last six decades. The contribution of Central America to the total (see Figure 3-4) is small and relatively evenly distributed. All initiations were over government policy or control and were generally short; exceptions include Guatemala's 30-year civil war and the civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The overall impact of conflicts in this region on the global total is small indeed.

Figure 3-4: Central American Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

110

South American conflict initiations are no more temporally polarized than their Central American counterparts; they are also relatively rare events that have occurred only sporadically during the entire postwar period. With a few notable exceptions such as the lengthy battles with the FARC in Colombia or Shining Path in Peru, nearly all of these conflicts have been short-term coups or rebellions by opposition groups seeking regime change. No such conflicts have occurred in this theater since 1992, when Hugo Chavez attempted a military coup against the Perez government (see Figure 3-5 below).

Figure 3-5: South American Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

The European contribution to global conflict levels is distinctive in its presence *and* absence; while contributing greatly to total subnational conflict levels in the 1940s and 1990s, the region remained nearly conflict-free during the remainder of the Cold War period. The large number of conflicts initiated in Eastern Europe beginning in

1991 and continuing through 1994 makes up a large portion of the total; in 1992 alone it constitutes half the total initiations observed that year. A similar pattern occurs in 1946, as Soviet consolidation of the Baltic States and the Ukraine accounts for half the observed total. Between those two periods is an almost complete lack of cases; France's 1961-62 battle with the OAS over Algerian independence, the "troubles" between the Catholic and Protestant population in Northern Ireland begun in 1971, and the Basque outbreaks of violence in the 1980s over their battle for independence from the government in Madrid are the only instances observed in Figure 3-6 below.

Figure 3-6: European Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

A different pattern emerges with respect to the evolution of conflict in the Middle East; while it steadily contributes across the entire temporal span, its most important contributions occur at three distinct points (see Figure 3-7). Conflict initiation

totals in the 1940s, 50s and 60s are largely boosted by conflict in this region, as are

conflict totals in 2005. But it is in 1979 that the greatest contribution occurs, with

conflict initiations in this region constituting five of the seven observed. The

insurrection led by the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, the start of the Iranian Revolution,

separatist violence in Iran's Arabistan region, the seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca

by Muslim reformers and the initiation of a Kurdish struggle for autonomy in Iran help

account for the unusually high level of conflict initiations that year. Other than the Iraqi

uprisings of 2004 and the resumption of conflict in Iran and Turkey the following year,

the region has remained quiet this decade.

Figure 3-7: Middle East Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

The importance of African subnational conflict in understanding the dynamic

nature of post-WWII subnational conflict evolution is shown in Figure 3-8. No conflicts

of this type were reported on the continent until the early 1960s, when independence

was simultaneously granted to a large number of formerly colonial states. Conflict often

closely follows the granting of freedom; between 1960 and 1986 African conflict starts

made up nearly fifty percent of the global total. During the period 1960-66, thirty

African nations were granted independence; of the thirteen subnational conflicts that

began during that same period, nine of them were in these newly independent states.

Figure 3-8: African Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

Subnational conflict events in post-independence Africa have contributed

massively to the number of conflicts begun from 1960 onward. Of the 185 new cases

that occurred, seventy-four originated on the continent. Given that the population of

Africa is approximately 15% of the global total, the percentage of conflicts occurring on

this relatively sparsely populated continent is much larger (at forty percent of the total)

than should be expected. This percentage has increased after the initial years of the

post-Cold War era; since 2000 the number of new African initiations has increased to

over forty-four percent of the global total.   Military coups and autonomy movements

make up over half; both an Islamist and indigenous religious movement are also present.

Due to the enormous range covered by the Asian landmass the central and

southern regions will be covered separately from East Asia and Oceania. From Figure

3-9 it is apparent the region's contribution to total conflict levels has been small but

steady. What is not readily visible is the unbalanced nature of conflict in this region; of

the thirty-eight instances of violent outbreaks, more than half have occurred in just two

states – Myanmar and India.

Figure 3-9: Central/South Asia Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

While it would seem obvious that with India's large population one could expect higher levels of conflict, violence has remained almost exclusively within the confines of disputed border areas in the north and east. Conflict began almost immediately after Indian independence and has remained a constant in its political landscape to the present day. A similar situation exists in neighboring Myanmar where separatist struggles also began soon after independence from Britain.

Finally, East Asia and Oceania's contribution has been small and confined nearly entirely to the first three decades of the period. Most conflicts have been ideological in nature, from the millions killed in the destruction of existing regime and replacement by Communist rule in China as well as bloody long-term struggles in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines, to smaller-scale insurrections in Thailand, Malaysia and

Figure 3-10: East Asia Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

116

Indonesia. Only five new events were observed since 1975: Bougainville's fight for independence from Papua New Guinea, right-wing insurgencies in Laos, and armed struggles for independence in Aceh, Indonesia and Patani, Thailand (see Figure 3-10).

Thus the "pattern" of subnational violence as a whole is simply the sum of its regional parts; a small but steady stream of conflict occurring in Central and South America as well as long-term conflicts begun in South Asia contributed to the steady growth observed in Figure 3-1. East Asia's ideological battles with several Communist movements influenced the amount of conflict observed over the first three decades, and Africa's post-independence initiations heavily influenced the total after 1960. Far from being the hotbed of violence touted in the CoC theory, the Middle East only moderately impacted totals; only in 1979 did the region produce a large percentage of the whole. Europe has remained relatively quiet, but the twin peaks of violence in the 1940s and early 1990s help explain the two maxima observed in global postwar conflict totals.

The explosion of conflict occurring from 1989-93 seemed to vindicate theories (including those of CoC) that the loss of a bipolar international environment would lead to high levels of conflict in a multipolar world.[4] In support of findings in studies of civil wars after WWII, the dramatic increase in conflict initiations observed in the UCDP dataset from 1989-1992 was not found to be a by-product of the end of the Cold War. Of the forty-five conflicts begun, only thirteen can be directly tied to this event, and more than half occurred during only one year – 1992. These thirteen involved the

---

[4] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1981 and John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, 2001 all provide theories of the dangers of a multipolar world to peaceful coexistence.

breakup of the former Yugoslavia (4), Azerbaijan (3), Georgia (3), Russia, Tajikistan and Moldova.

State-centered conditions favoring insurgency such as poverty, weak government and political instability within former Communist vassal states were offered as possible explanations for the upsurge.[5] However, Occam's Razor provides a simpler answer: higher totals for the years 1989-1992 were the result of a high number of initiations in Africa, Asia and the Americas that were not directly related to events triggered by the demise of the Soviet Union. Only in 1992 was there evidence that the majority of initiations were an artifact of the end of the Cold War, as seven of the twelve occurred in former Communist states, the result of internal power struggles and territorial disputes. Thus scholarly speculation that the move to a multipolar international system would likely lead to increased levels of interstate or subnational conflict seems unfounded. Rather, a temporary rise in subnational conflict globally, combined with a short period of conflict in Eastern Europe to decide geopolitical relationships in former Communist states, was responsible for the surge observed during the early 1990s.

3.3 The Case for Civilizational Conflict

3.3.1 Examining the CoC Theory – Descriptive Statistics

Having addressed the anomalous spike in conflict that may have helped prompt the CoC hypotheses; we can now examine the validity of each. According to Huntington, the weakening relationship of individuals with nationalist identities in an increasingly modernizing world wherein they find little of social value has led large

---

[5] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003

numbers of people in the developing world to abandon these identities in favor of more traditional religious associations. This, he posited, would lead to increasing polarization between civilizations primarily defined by religious character, particularly between Islam and the West. Having defined the major civilizations, he identified "fault line" states located along lines where these civilizations meet. It is both between and within these states that Huntington predicted higher incidences of conflict, given deteriorating intercivilizational relationships and the loss of the controlling influence of a bipolar world. In particular, he believed fault-line conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims in the post-Cold War era were increasing, and would continue to do so in the future.

Using these CoC predictions, two implications must follow: subnational conflict levels should be higher within these fault line areas than without, and cases of such conflict should be increasing, especially in the post-Cold War era, as civilizational rivalries are tested in the absence of superpower control. Based on these predictions, several questions must be answered before meaningful conclusions can be drawn. Are his civilizational fault line states based on valid historical record, or merely chosen in an ad hoc fashion? Are subnational conflicts historically more prevalent in these states, and are they truly civilizational in origin? Have they been on the increase since the end of the Cold War? Additionally, Huntington predicted the increased severity of such events, claiming that "cultural differences sharpen the conflict" and thus tends to be "vicious and bloody". He also stated these conflicts would more likely be over territory and would tend to be protracted. If true, we should find that fault-line states will experience more instances of conflict that are civilizational in nature. Instances of such

conflict should be on the rise since 1990, should originate more often over territorial issues, be more likely to lead to war, and be of longer duration.

The CoC "fault-line state" hypothesis is graphically depicted in Figure 3-11; civilizational clashes are likeliest between and within states that lie along the border separating civilizations, given the theory. In the Western hemisphere, CoC theory predicts an increased chance of conflict between the West (US) and Mexico in the north, and among Hindu, African and Latin American groups in Guyana and Suriname. We should also expect more incidences of conflict in the Balkans and Eastern Europe between Orthodox and Muslim groups, and along the line separating Orthodox Eastern and Western European states.

Figure 3-11: CoC Fault-line States

In Africa, conflict is most likely within mainly Muslim states located roughly along a line from Liberia and Sierra Leone to the Horn of Africa; then southward along the Muslim dominated coastal regions of Kenya and Tanzania. In the Middle East, Muslim and non-Muslim states that share a common border (Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan) should see higher levels of conflict, as should the Central Asian states, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh in Central and South Asia. In the Far East, conflict

should be more common between Muslim Indonesia and non-Muslim groups that border

them and lie within its borders, as well as between China and its non-Sinic neighbors.

Evidence derived from UCDP data suggests a somewhat different conclusion, however.

Using Huntington's definitions of civilizations and the map provided from his book,

seventy-eight fault-line states lie along CoC civilizational borders; these are listed in

Table 3-2 below.

Table 3-2: List of CoC Fault-line States

North America (2)	South America (4)	Middle East (9)
US	Brazil	Armenia
Mexico	Guyana	Azerbaijan
	Suriname	Cyprus
	Venezuela	Iran
		Israel
		Jordan
		Lebanon
		Syria
		Turkey
Europe (20)	Africa (20)	Asia (23)
Albania	Benin	Afghanistan
Belarus	Burkina Faso	Bangladesh
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Cameroon	Bhutan
Bulgaria	CAR	Cambodia
Croatia	Chad	China
Czechoslovakia (1946-92)	Djibouti	India
Czech Republic (1993-2007)	Eritrea	Indonesia
Estonia	Ethiopia	Kazakhstan
Finland	Ghana	Kyrgyzstan
Georgia	Guinea	Laos
Greece	Ivory Coast	Malaysia
Hungary	Kenya	Mongolia
Latvia	Liberia	Myanmar
Lithuania	Mali	Nepal
Macedonia	Nigeria	Pakistan
Montenegro	Sierra Leone	Papua New Guinea
Poland	Somalia	Philippines
Romania	Sudan	Sri Lanka
Russia (USSR through 1990)	Tanzania	Tajikistan
Serbia and Montenegro (2003-05)	Togo	Thailand
Serbia (2006-7)		Turkmenistan
Slovakia (1993-2007)		Uzbekistan
Ukraine		Vietnam
Yugoslavia (1946-91)		
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. (1992-03)		

Of the 225 conflict cases obtained from UCDP data, approximately seventy-eight percent occurred within these fault-line states during the period. This is not as remarkable as it seems; while fault-line states in the international system comprise forty percent of the global total, these states hold almost seventy-seven percent of the population as of March 2009 (5.2 billion of 6.77 billion).[6] It has been shown that states with larger populations are at greater risk for internal conflict[7]; while this does not take into account population demographics or spatial distribution patterns, it does suggest that conflicts will occur more frequently in more heavily populated states.

Given this, we should expect the percentage of conflicts within fault-line states would reflect the percentage of the population share that states lying within these zones contain. A graphical comparison of all states experiencing subnational conflict during the period can be made with states predicted by the CoC hypothesis, and is given in Figures 3-12 and 3-13 below.

Figure 3-12: Potential CoC Conflict States

---

[6] From the U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.php, as of March 31st, 2009.

[7] Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds, *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, The World Bank, 2005.

Figure 3-13: States in Conflict, 1946-2007

While cases of subnational conflict are recorded within many fault line states, there are a plethora of cases that have occurred elsewhere over the period. Indeed, while the CoC claims of conflict along the broad lines of Islam's dominion appear vindicated in this broad brush, the theory would have little to say about the amount of conflict within Latin America, from Mexico to Chile and Argentina. In addition, the vast majority of African states have seen conflict at least once; many have little to no Muslim population, do not border Muslim states and yet host some of the longest recorded cases on the continent. It seems that subnational conflict over the last sixty years, including those cases that do not meet civil war levels, is far more ubiquitous than Huntington's theory can explain.

If we restrict the conflict comparison to the period Huntington was referring to in the CoC theory, mixed results obtain. Conflicts initiated between 1990 and the present do not follow civilizational lines in most cases, but they make up a significant fraction of the total, and the percentage of them as compared to the whole is higher as well. In the Western Hemisphere, where it seems the CoC hypothesis is most closely matched, the conflict in the US was a symbolic gesture made by Islamic terrorists, not a result of

West-Latin American tensions with Mexico (whose peasant uprisings were not civilizational either). While no patterns are visible elsewhere, the Middle East and South Asia appear to possess patterns predicted by the CoC theory (Figure 3-14 below).

Figure 3-14: Conflict Initiations, 1990-2007

Russia's ongoing conflict with Chechen rebels is a clear clash between the more Orthodox north and Muslim groups in its southern regions, yet its roots lie in Russia's aims to suppress nationalism in its struggle to regain regional superpower status. The Iraqi insurgency continues to pit Sunni against Shi'ia (as well as Muslim against Western occupation forces). However, the violence has also been augmented by extremists from external sources, often for monetary gain. Baluchs and Kurds in Iran, both Sunni, are battling the Shi'ite government for representation, equal rights and autonomy. Muslim Patani insurgents are fighting the mainly Buddhist government in Thailand and Islamist movements have resorted to violence in Uzbekistan, Nigeria, Eritrea and elsewhere. As will be shown, however, a single depiction misses nuances that become clearer when the data are disaggregated temporally and spatially.

3.3.2 The Global Evolution of Subnational Conflict

From Figure 3-15 (following page) a more nuanced picture of broad conflict trends becomes apparent. In Central and South America, for example, military coups, rebellion and civil wars were commonplace in nearly all nations during the 1950s-1970s as military and authoritarian governments were challenged by a series of socialist movements inspired by (and often financed via) the USSR. As the cost of financing these rebellions became more onerous and democratic regimes became more firmly ensconced, these movements mostly came to an end by the 1980s. Africa's conflicts are nearly continent-wide from the 1960s onward, although initiations were no more frequent with the ending of US-USSR involvement. Conflict initiations were remarkably steady at just under two per year from 1960-2007. A similar history is also evident in the Middle East and Asia, as conflicts have regularly begun in Iran, Iraq, India, Myanmar and Indonesia. Europe's two periods of subnational conflict activity, in the 1940s during Soviet consolidation of its empire and in the 1990s as that empire dissolved, are evident as well.

Conflict Initiations, 1946-49

Conflict Initiations, 1950s

Conflict Initiations, 1960s

Conflict Initiations, 1970s

Conflict Initiations, 1980s

Conflict Initiations, 1990s

Conflict Initiations, 2000s

Figure 3-15: Global Conflict Initiations by Decade

As noted earlier, Huntington averred that because of civilizational differences and the increasing salience of civilizational identities, states located along fault lines would experience more conflict than states located outside of these zones. Due to the

loss of superpower influence, the number of post-Cold War fault-line conflicts would increase in the modern era, according to CoC theory.

Figure 3-16 depicts the number of fault-line conflicts that have occurred over the entire period; the dashed line represents the number of initiations in fault-line states. It is clear that initiations within fault-line states make up a large percentage of the total; however, as I discussed this may be due to the large population majority that resides within fault-line states. Thus the CoC claim that fault-line states are more conflictual than others located elsewhere is not surprising.

Figure 3-16: Total vs. Fault-line Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

But Huntington also predicted that fault-line states, in the absence of superpower restraint, would experience a *greater* number of conflicts after the Cold War. Figure 3-17 shows the variability of conflict within fault-line states for the entire period; at first

glance there appears to be no pattern suggesting fault-line states are engaging in conflict more now than before the Cold War ended. However, if a comparison of the percentage of conflicts occurring in fault-line states before and after 1989 is made, an interesting trend appears.

Figure 3-17: Percentage of Fault-line Conflict Initiations, 1946-2007

As seen in Table 3-3 below, the percentage of fault-line states initiating conflict was initially large; as discussed earlier, this is a relic of Soviet post-WWII consolidation of territory and bids for autonomy in Myanmar. A trend downward then began that persisted through the end of the 1970s; violence over ideology in South and Central America and over government in newly independent African states and the Middle East raised the number of instances occurring outside of fault-line areas, lowering the fault-line percentages. During the 1980s, conflict in these areas tapered off, yet instances of

hostilities beginning remained high within fault-line states. With the end of the Cold War, additional outbreaks in the Caucuses, Balkans and Central Asia during the early 1990s pushed these numbers even higher; there seems to be a continuing trend upward, at least for the first years of the new millennium.

Table 3-3: Percentage of Fault-line Conflicts

Decade	FL Initiations	% of Total
1940-49	17	77
1950s	11	61
1960s	19	56
1970s	21	53
1980s	21	62
1990s	40	68
2000s	14	78

Thus the temporal evolution of CoC fault-line states describes a curvilinear pattern, with a trend downward through the 1970s and a corresponding return to levels seen at the start of the period. While the number of violent outbreaks has considerably decreased since their peak in 1992, the *percentage* of fault-line conflicts has increased as a portion of the total. This increase is attributable to a marked rise in conflict initiations in Africa and Asia. In the 1980s violence broke out in eight sub-Saharan African nations; two of these on multiple occasions. With four new territorial conflicts in India and two new initiations in Sri Lanka, the Central Asian region was also beset by violence.

In the 1990s fifteen fault-line conflicts emerged in Europe as the Soviet Union imploded; eight new conflicts in Africa (four in Ethiopia alone), four initiations in India and multiple new cases of violence in South and East Asia all contributed to the slightly higher percentage of fault-line initiations in this decade. In the current decade,

continued violence in sub-Saharan Africa, the 9/11 attacks and outbreaks in Asia combine to yield the highest levels of fault-line violence yet noted. Thus the CoC hypothesis concerning a *post-Cold War* increase in fault-line violence is invalidated; the rise in conflict within these states is not an artifact of the post-Cold War era, but rather a continuation of a trend that has been in place since the 1980s.

3.3.3 The Protracted Nature of Civilizational Conflict

Implicit in the CoC hypothesis is that civilizational conflicts along fault lines will tend to be difficult to solve and thus protracted. As Huntington suggests:

"Involving fundamental issues of group identity and power, (fault-line wars) are difficult to resolve through negotiations and compromise. When agreements are reached, they often are not subscribed to by all parties on each side and usually do not last long. Fault-line wars are off-again-on-again wars that can flame up into massive violence and then sputter down into low-intensity warfare or sullen hostility only to flame up once again." [8]

If true, disaggregating conflicts by their duration should reveal a pattern suggesting that conflicts within fault line states tend to be of longer duration; a graphical depiction of long-duration conflicts is included in Figure 3-18 below. This graphic depicts long-duration subnational conflicts; grey-shaded states have experienced conflict lasting at least 10 years. Additional decades of conflict are marked in yellow, green, blue and red respectively, with red states experiencing conflicts lasting longer than 50 years; Israel, India, Myanmar and the Philippines are among those states with this dubious honor.

---

[8] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996, p. 253.

Figure 3-18: Extended-duration Conflicts, 1946-2007

While there appears to be little evidence of extended-duration conflicts aligning with CoC civilizational fault lines in Africa, Europe or the Western Hemisphere, Figure 18 clearly shows that extended-duration conflicts align well with CoC fault-line states in Asia and the Middle East. Evidence suggests the CoC civilizational boundary between "Islam and the rest" thus seems based on existing patterns of long-term conflict in these regions; though no proof exists, CoC fault lines were likely extended in the overall theory to include boundaries Huntington outlined in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. At the time the CoC hypothesis was made, conflicts in fault-line states were on average longer than those occurring elsewhere; the number of conflict-years occurring in fault-line states over the entire period is nearly triple that occurring in states outside of these zones. However, disaggregating the data by decade reveals this does not hold for conflicts occurring from 1990 on; this section of the theory thus appears to be based on previously observed patterns of post-WWII subnational conflict.

131

Figure 3-19: Average Duration of Conflicts, 1946-2007

After 1989, fault-line conflicts have been on average shorter or roughly equal in duration to those occurring outside of fault-line areas (see Figure 3-19). What is striking is the almost linear decrease in duration of fault-line wars over the last sixty years; conflicts initiated in the 1940s on average were nearly thirty years long. By the 1990s that figure was at just under six years, and conflicts begun in this decade have primarily been short. While examples of lengthy conflicts after 1989 in fault-line regions do exist (ongoing conflicts in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh and India, for example), most have been rapidly concluded. While an increased efficacy of international institutions in a more media-transparent and globally connected environment may be a reason, further study is needed to provide proof of this.

The first two decades of the period were dominated by long-term conflicts in Asia (particularly India and Myanmar) that in large part were not concluded until the 1990s or later. In the following twenty years Asia produced more long-term conflicts, but in fewer numbers; an explosion of cases in Africa during this time were dominated by short-term revolutions and coups. Low levels of conflict in the 1980s were followed by an abrupt rise in the 1990s, but these conflicts were primarily short-term challenges over claims of autonomy or regime change. It is too early to say if this trend has continued into the current decade, as many conflicts are ongoing as of 2007. What is clear is that the CoC hypothesis of long-duration fault-line wars in the post-Cold War era is unsupported by the data. From the 1990s, fault-line state conflicts have been on average of roughly similar duration or shorter than their non-fault-line counterparts. There is currently no indication that these conflicts in the 21st century will fulfill CoC claims of long duration based solely on civilizational differences.

3.3.4 The Bloody Nature of Civilizational Conflict

Huntington also claimed that because of their protracted nature, civilizational conflicts would be costly in terms of dislocation and death:

"…fault line wars, like other communal wars, tend to produce large numbers of deaths and refugees."

Further,
"Many of these contemporary wars are simply the latest round in a prolonged history of bloody conflicts…"[9]

Given these cases are becoming more common, what can be said of CoC claims that they will be more severe? There are only two categories of conflict intensity available

---

[9] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996, p. 253.

in the UCDP data: Minor (between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year) and War (at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a given year). These parameters lead us to conclude that a conflict resulting in 999 deaths is less intense than one in which only one additional fatality occurred, or that a one-day coup killing dozens was of the same magnitude as a year-long war killing many hundreds; each of these conclusions is obviously misleading.

Another difficulty with casualty counts lies in the maze of accounting practices that exist cross-nationally for counting the losses associated with conflict. These losses can be derived from combatant fatalities, battle-related deaths, and deaths caused by the ancillary effects of war.[10] While the first category is usually not problematic, accurately accounting for battle-related deaths (those caused directly by warring parties in active combat over issue contestation) among non-combatants is troublesome. Difficulties in getting accurate battle-related death information are many and make proper accounting impossible in some cases. They are often not included in census information, or are misreported (as homicides, e.g.) to avoid releasing damaging information to monitoring organizations or to avoid sanctions for war crimes such as genocide.

News sources are often vague in reports of war dead, tend to be biased in their reporting, and are often unable to get into areas where conflict is occurring (Myanmar is almost impossible for reporters to enter; those who did so after the July 2008 typhoon had to be smuggled into the country). Ancillary deaths from starvation or disease in war-torn areas are the most difficult to measure; effects can continue for years after a

---

[10] Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths." *European Journal of Population* 21, 2005; and Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "The Declining Risk of Death in Battle." *International Studies Quarterly* 50, 2006.

conflict ends and deciding where and when to place a cut-off point for these fatalities can be difficult. Because many subnational conflicts tend to occur in poorer nations where state capacity is limited, disaggregating deaths caused by the effects of war from those associated with normal difficulties in procuring adequate food and medical supplies is also problematic.

While CoW data records only aggregate combatant deaths, UCDP data records all battle-related deaths per annum in each case of conflict. However, the data are restricted by the categories described above; more precise estimates are available in a recent study of all such conflicts occurring from 1946-2002 and from updates to this data set available through 2005.[11] The study focuses on accurate estimation of battle-deaths per conflict, arguably the best measure for determining the number of fatalities directly attributable to the conflict itself, without restricting the number to active combatants only. These data were utilized in making the cross-national comparisons of the intensity of subnational conflicts for this project.

As noted by Huntington, because of the polarizing effects of religious identity and their protracted nature, civilizational conflicts should be expected to be more intense, producing higher numbers of casualties than intracivilizational wars. Thus we should expect to see that conflicts within CoC fault-line states produce higher numbers of battle-related deaths than those that occur in non-fault-line states. As with duration, the CoC hypothesis relating to battle intensity of fault-line wars seems vindicated by the data recorded prior to 1990, as shown in Figure 3-20. The difference in casualty counts

---

[11] Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths." *European Journal of Population* 21, 2005. Additional updates are available for years through 2005 at the Center for the Study of Civil War, PRIO at http://www.prio.no/CSCW.

seems striking, particularly in the 1940s when cases averaged nearly 100,000 deaths

each. Yet this is an artifact of the Chinese civil war, which recorded over 1.2 million

fatalities in its four years of conflict. This biases the set; without it a more

representative 19,800 deaths per conflict is recorded. Similar events skew the data in

the next three decades; Vietnam, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Afghanistan battle

deaths boost the average fatality count from the 1950s through the 1970s; excepting

these wars results in a count that is comparatively flat for the first five decades of the

period.

Figure 3-20: Average Battle-related Deaths per Conflict, 1946-2007

Huntington thus likely made the prediction that future cases would follow

patterns noted prior to 1990. Post-Cold War conflicts, both in and out of fault-line

areas, are producing far less total deaths than recorded in previous years. Figure 3-20

also makes clear that subnational conflicts occurring within fault-line states in the post-Cold War period are resulting in *less* casualties on average than those occurring elsewhere, which directly contradicts the claims in the CoC theory. It is interesting as well to note that far fewer conflicts after 1990 reach defined levels of war; only two of the eight that have begun since 2000 (the 9/11 attacks and the violence in Iraq) have done so. Given that the casualty count of the former was met in a single morning, it is reasonable to conclude that the severity of conflict between groups in these fault-line zones has *decreased* since the end of the Cold War, refuting this CoC claim.

3.3.5 The Territorial Nature of Civilizational Conflict

Although no specific claim was made about the contentious roots of future civilizational clashes, Huntington did say that more frequently the issue in fault-line wars would be control of territory:

> "The goal of at least one of the participants is to conquer territory and free it of other people by expelling them, killing them, or doing both, that is, by 'ethnic cleansing'."[12]

Examining the entire period, territorial conflict initiations have comprised the majority of total initiations only in the 1990s (see Table 3-4 on following page), although they did comprise half of all conflicts initiated in the 1940s. The territorial advantage occurred due to battles for autonomy in former Soviet republics and vassal states, yet this advantage was detected only in 1990 and 1992.

---

[12] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996, p. 252.

Table 3-4: Total Territorial Conflict Initiations

Decade	Territory	% of Total
1940-49	11	50
1950s	7	39
1960s	12	35
1970s	13	33
1980s	8	24
1990s	34	58
2000s	6	33

Territorial conflicts were no more prevalent than conflicts over government in any other decade (the data for all initiations is graphically displayed below). The percentage of territorial dispute initiations linearly decreased prior to 1990, suggesting that conflicts of this type were being successfully resolved in the post-colonial era.

Figure 3-21: Territorial Conflict Initiations as Portion of Total, 1946-2007

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large number of former vassal states were suddenly independent; within many of these, formerly repressed groups seeking autonomy and/or independence from the host state supplemented initiations occurring

138

elsewhere. A return to "normal" levels after 1992 suggests territorial conflicts are no more common than before.

Huntington, however, restricted CoC predictions of increasing territorial conflict to his fault-line states; examining this portion of the total number yields quite different results that show territorial issues comprise a larger percentage of the total of fault-line conflicts (see Table 3-5). However, CoC predictions of an increasing number of conflicts over territory in fault-line states after 1989 are not supported by the data; discounting the abnormally high number of territorial conflict initiations occurring in 1990 and 1992, the percentage of fault-line conflicts over territory has shown a steady decline over the entire postwar period.

Table 3-5: Territorial Conflicts in Fault-line States

Decade	Territorial	% of FL Totals
1940-49	12	71
1950s	7	64
1960s	9	47
1970s	10	48
1980s	7	33
1990s	27	68
2000s	5	36

3.3.6 Conclusions Based on CoC Predictions

Thus far the data provide little support for the CoC theory; while instances of subnational conflict are higher within defined civilizational fault lines, the presence of the vast majority of the world's population within them makes this claim rather uninteresting. Conflict cases within these zones are decreasing, yet the percentage of these conflicts is on the rise; however, this increase has been observed since the 1980s, suggesting that this portion of Huntington's hypothesis is unsupported. In addition, the increasing percentage of fault-line conflicts is also due to a decrease in conflict *outside*

139

of fault-line states; it is this decrease that was partially responsible for the increasing percentages in the 1990s, and not an increased incidence of fault-line conflict itself.

The data also suggest fault-line conflicts are shorter and no bloodier than those occurring elsewhere in the post-Cold War era. While they were historically longer and bloodier *prior* to 1990 (and likely informed the CoC hypotheses), fault-line state conflicts have been shorter and less bloody than their non-civilizational counterparts after 1989. The hypothesis that these conflicts would be more often over territory after the Cold War is also unsupported. While subnational conflicts are more common within fault-line states, no other CoC subnational conflict prediction was validated; the theory, at least in terms of subnational violence along civilizational lines, has limited merit.

3.4 The End of Civilizations?

3.4.1 Religion and Civilization

Huntington chose to narrow the CoC playing field to broad-based civilizations encompassing many millions (or billions) of souls. The list was narrowed to eight, including Sinic (China, Vietnam and Korea), Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox (Russia and much of Eastern Europe), Latin American, Western and (possibly) African. As we have seen, this sweeping categorization of the world's peoples into overlarge groupings to make prescriptive utterances about the future of warfare has not been validated in the nearly twenty years since the CoC theory was introduced. Hypotheses concerning fault-line states separating these civilizations have remained largely unsupported. But all of the civilizations described were loosely based on the

predominant religious affiliation of the states within them; Huntington in fact claimed that religion was a central and defining characteristic of civilizations.[13]

It is here that I depart from CoC theory to make the central claim of my theory; subnational conflict in the postwar period has not been defined by clashes between civilizations, but rather between groups with dissimilar religious beliefs. Religion, not civilization, often defines the sides we choose when debates over issues within states become conflictual. As I mentioned previously, Huntington's civilizational groupings are simultaneously too broad in terms of scope and too narrow in number to properly classify the major populations of the globe while keeping the theory generalizable enough to test and be useful. By refining civilizational categories into religious groupings and adding a suitable number of alternative classifications, better predictive results may result.

Huntington's civilizations have thus far not developed as the unifying megaliths described in CoC theory. Attacks against Orthodox Russians in Chechnya have not met with retaliatory measures against Muslims elsewhere in Eastern Europe; governments are not likely to allow ethnic tensions generated elsewhere to reach levels of violence within their own borders. Desire for admission to the European Union compels states in Eastern Europe to abide by the Copenhagen and Madrid Criteria, which mandate state protection of human rights and minorities.[14] While the Muslim world was united against what it perceived to be imperial (aka Western) aggression during the two Gulf wars, it

---

[13] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996, p. 47.

[14] Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, *A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change*, Routledge: Taylor and Francis, 2007.

has not united them in conflict against the West or anyone else. The cleavages among Muslims are deep; differences between secular and religious Muslims have been a primary source of conflict in many Muslim majority states (cf. Indonesia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia). The divide between Arab and non-Arab Muslims has prompted years of genocide in Sudan, and the Sunni-Shi'ia rift is likely to remain violent wherever these two groups coexist.

The lumping of states into the "West" and the omission of Buddhism in favor of an overarching Sinic civilization are also problematic. Huntington defines civilizations using religious distinctions elsewhere in the world; it would have been appropriate to do so in a similar manner for the West. Although he admits the nations of Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand were formerly known as "Western Christendom", he categorized this grouping as Western (despite acknowledging the disabilities of doing so). In a similar fashion Buddhism (like Christianity) is dismissed as a major civilization due to its failure to survive in the land of its birth and its assimilation into the cultures of nations into which it was transported. Finally, Latin America is differentiated from its European roots, although Huntington does admit that it could easily be classified as a subcivilization of the West. He describes the religious culture as historically Catholic, subsuming all its indigenous cultures within it.[15] But if religion is indeed the defining characteristic of all these CoC civilizations, then religious differences, not civilizational cleavages, should be found to be primary catalysts of conflictual behavior within states.

---

[15] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996, pp. 45-48.

3.4.2 Religious Categorization

Since the salience of religious identity has been posited to be rising at the expense of nationalist identities, my focus will be on groups whose religious beliefs differ. Thus it is necessary to refine these categories to both accurately represent the diversity existing between religious groups in different locations and better reflect specific cases of conflict observed. Buddhism is included; civilizational debate aside, it is an accepted religious group with more than 300 million adherents. In addition, many of the longest cases of subnational conflict since WWII involve Buddhist governments and/or minorities.

Although Islam has over a billion adherents, it is practiced with great variety and is separated into several divisions. While sects like the Sufi and Ahmadiyya are well-established, the primary division within Islam has historically been between the majority Sunni (85%) and Shi'ia sects (roughly 15%). The animosity present in many parts of the globe between Sunni and Shi'ia is well documented, and makes defining Islam as a single religious grouping untenable. In addition, it has been shown that Islamic principles and tenets are often altered to accommodate regional political reality, while Muslim identity has been differentially shaped based on historical processes affecting regions.[16]

Although the physical separation of the West and Latin America were important to the generation of CoC theory, here I consider geopolitical boundaries less important. One reason lies in the fluid and dynamic nature of religious belief, which increasingly spans boundaries of states and continents in an increasingly transient global population.

---

[16] Shirleen Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* Westport, CT: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998.

Concentrating only on religious differences, I eliminate both the West and Latin America as categories and identify both as predominantly and historically Christian. I then split Christianity into the separate categories of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism; this eliminates the need for a separate Orthodox "civilization". While there are valid arguments that differences exist among Christian groups in terms of religious doctrine and practice from nation to nation, including many examples of syncretism, for the purposes of this study it is useful to identify them simply by these three categories.

Sinic, Japanese (Shinto) and Hindu states are identified as appropriate, and do not differ from the CoC theory. No Jewish civilization was included in Huntington's work; its lack of numbers, historical affiliation with Christianity and Islam and lack of national boundaries for most of its existence were the primary reasons given for its omission.[17] However, the creation of a Jewish state after WWII and the concentration of its population from diaspora abroad make it necessary to include it as a separate group. In addition, the geopolitical significance of the existence of a Jewish state has been a source of inter- and subnational conflict for six decades; its inclusion is thus vital.

The African civilization is not used here, as the religious affiliation of groups in African states can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy using existing sources. The majority of the population of African states in terms of religious belief is either Muslim, Christian, or indigenous; a single category is insufficient for explanations of religious-based conflict. All people groups in Africa are thus recognized as subgroups of Islam or Christianity as appropriate; if African tribal ritual is the primary religious practice, the

---

[17] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996, p 48.

group is identified as indigenous. Since there are often dozens (or hundreds) of religious

identities within the indigenous category, no further division is feasible. Where tribal

religions are practiced in other regions, a similar identification scheme is employed.

3.5 Descriptive Statistics of Interreligious Conflict

I use the term interreligious to describe conflict when it is between groups of

dissimilar religious belief; if the groups belong to the same religion, conflicts between

them are termed intrareligious. When states and groups involved in each of the 225

subnational conflicts documented since 1946 are identified by religious affiliation, it

becomes clear that interreligious group conflict is neither a new phenomenon nor a rare

one (see Table 3-6). With the exception of the 1980s, approximately half of all conflicts

at the subnational level have been interreligious in nature.

Table 3-6: Interreligious Conflicts

Decade	Interreligious	% of Total
1940-49	13	59
1950s	9	50
1960s	19	46
1970s	17	53
1980s	10	32
1990s	28	47
2000s	9	50

After a nadir in the 1980s, the number of interreligious conflicts rose sharply; a

large portion of interreligious conflicts occurring in the 1990s was an artifact of the

USSR's collapse. South Lebanon erupted in violence lasting seventeen years, as did

Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea in Africa; Asia saw conflict begin in Nepal, Myanmar and

India. While the number of religious conflicts declined sharply after 1999, this was due

to a sharp drop in *total* initiations. When a trend line is included it is clear that conflict

between differing religious groups is on the rise since 1990 (see Figure 3-22 below).

Figure 3-22: Interreligious Conflicts as Portion of Total, 1946-2007

3.5.1 The Increasing Incidence of Ongoing Interreligious Conflict

Subnational conflict in the new millennium has dramatically decreased; in its

first seven years only eighteen initiations were recorded, the quietest decade since the

1950s. When combined with a large number of conflict resolutions, this has resulted in

a marked reduction in the number of ongoing conflicts; Figure 3-23 depicts a decrease

that matches previous studies of civil war. Interreligious and intercivilizational conflicts

are included; this shows interreligious conflict has historically been more prevalent than

conflict between civilizations. Since 1993 the percentage of interreligious conflicts to

the total ongoing has also been rising, from fifty-seven percent in 1993 to almost

seventy-one percent in 2006 (three new intrareligious conflicts initiated in 2007 have

reduced this number slightly). Thus interreligious conflicts are becoming more common

in the post- Cold War era, yet they do not follow CoC civilizational rifts.

146

Figure 3-23: Intercivilizational vs. Interreligious Conflicts, 1946-2007

3.5.2 The Spatial Distribution of Interreligious Conflict

When mapping the distribution of conflict where religious cleavages exist, an interesting pattern emerges. States experiencing subnational conflict where religious cleavages are present closely follow some CoC-defined civilizational fault lines. It is easy to visualize the boundary he describes looping across Asia and central Africa; yet no evidence exists for any civilizational boundary between Eastern and Western Europe.

Figure 3-24: Interreligious Conflicts, 1946-2007

147

Figure 3-25: Interreligious Conflicts, 1990-2007

In Figures 3-24 and 25 states experiencing interreligious conflict initiations are shown; the presentations are somewhat misleading in that they depict the entire expanse of a country as being in conflict (an artifact of the presentation device used here). When the state is small, this presents little difficulty; however, large states appear consumed with conflict when in reality only small areas of the country may be involved. This is certainly the case with both the US and Russia, where the conflict was centered in the northeast for one day in the former and in the extreme southwest in the latter.

A better comparison of the evolution of interreligious conflict in the pre- and post-Cold War eras can be found in Figures 3-26 and 27. The former depicts those that occurred prior to 1990, while the latter shows the pattern of both ongoing conflicts of this type along with new initiations occurring from 1990-2007. From the figures it is clear that conflict between religious groups has remained relatively static in terms of geopolitical area prior to and after the Cold War.

148

Figure 3-26: Interreligious Conflicts, 1946-89

Figure 3-27: Interreligious Conflicts, 1990-2007

Interreligious conflict has occurred mainly within a line of states in Asia and Africa where large groups of differing religious background live in close proximity, remarkably similar to lines the CoC theory describes. The only exceptions are seemingly unique events including the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. and the Kongo Kingdom uprising in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The distribution of conflict with no religious dimension is apparently random and follows no discernable pattern. With the exception of North America, Australia and most of Old Europe (France's trouble with the OAS during the 1960s and difficulties resolving the Basque situation in Spain are the only exceptions), no region has been immune to this variety of conflict since the Second

World War (see Figure 3-28). What is clear is that clashes between religious groups in the modern age are *not* merely a product of the post-Cold War era, are increasingly a larger portion of the total number of subnational conflicts and are endemic to large sections of Africa and Asia. Thus interreligious, not civilizational, subnational conflict comprises a significant portion of the total number of subnational conflicts observed since World War II; in addition, it is becoming more common in the post-Cold War era and thus far has been concentrated primarily in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 3-28: Intrareligious Conflicts, 1946-2007

3.5.3 The Protracted Nature of Interreligious Conflict

As shown previously, CoC civilizational conflicts were historically longer than those occurring elsewhere until the 1990s, when they became roughly equal in length with those fought elsewhere. Differing results are found when comparing conflicts where religious cleavages exist with those that do not. As shown in Figure 3-29 below, interreligious conflicts have consistently been greater in duration than their counterparts, and continue to be lengthier in the post-Cold War era (although less so than previously). For example, in the first two decades interreligious separatist movements in Myanmar, the first of many pro-independence conflicts in northeast India and lengthy conflicts in

150

Lebanon and Israel began. Ten new interreligious conflicts beginning in the next two

decades lasted longer than twenty years; four of these are still active as of this writing.

Figure 3-29: Average Duration of Interreligious vs. Intrareligious Conflicts

In the 1980s over half lasted more than a decade, and five of these were coded as

ongoing at the end of 2007. Of the twenty-eight interreligious conflicts begun in the

1990s, eleven have lasted more than a decade; four were coded as active in 2007.

Since most of the interreligious conflicts initiated since 2000 are coded as active,

no positive determinations are yet possible about their protracted nature. What is

evident, however, is that interreligious conflicts have been historically longer on average

than their counterparts, and the trend of duration has been consistently downward for

both types since the 1980s. As discussed earlier, the cause of this decline may be in part

due to international institutions, where state membership and economic advantage are

often tied to political stability and respect for minority rights. Long-duration conflicts

initiated after 1990 have been mainly located in nations that would benefit less from inclusion in such institutions, and where the international community is unwilling to get involved in peace operations for strategic or geopolitical reasons.

3.5.4 The Bloody Nature of Interreligious Conflict

Due to the expansive and rigid nature of religions like Islam and Christianity, violent clashes in which sides are drawn along religious cleavages may be less likely to find common ground. Conflicts over issues that result in polarization along such existing religious cleavages should thus be longer and more intense. We have already seen that interreligious conflicts have been longer on average than their secular counterparts. Thus we should also expect interreligious conflicts to be more costly in terms of battle-related deaths. Figure 3-30 compares the total number of battle dead per year with those that fell in conflicts involving groups with differing religious beliefs.

Figure 3-30: Total Battle-deaths per Year, 1946-2005

152

By and large the patterns of battle dead in interreligious conflicts follow those of all conflicts until 1979, when the average percentage of interreligious battle deaths drops from three-quarters of the total to less than fifty percent. Interreligious conflicts since then have been bloodier, accounting for nearly three-quarters of all battle dead. Although such a short span of time does not allow one to draw meaningful conclusions as to future patterns of interreligious conflict, it is obvious that these conflicts historically produce the preponderance of battle deaths. During the period 1946-2005, beyond which no data yet exists, over 5.1 million fatalities have been recorded in the 225 subnational conflicts initiated. Interreligious conflicts account for nearly 3.6 million of this total, or seventy percent of the total number of recorded battle deaths.

Huntington's assertions that conflicts where civilizational cleavages are present would result in higher levels of battle deaths have been largely unsubstantiated. Yet in most cases where religious differences existed, conflicts have resulted in more fatalities. Still unclear is whether interreligious conflicts are becoming bloodier after the Cold War. While the percentage of battle deaths in interreligious conflicts rose quickly from 1990 until mid-decade (mostly due to separatist violence in the former Yugoslavia), this percentage dropped quickly as these conflicts were resolved. It was not until 2001 that interreligious conflicts again made up a significant majority, mainly due to large numbers of casualties in Chechnya and the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Significant fatality levels in both Kashmir and in Iraq after the US-led invasion have also contributed to the higher levels of such deaths. Rather than trending upward, the higher percentages instead appear to be a product of dwindling violence in several long-

duration conflicts where religious differences are not present, coupled with a large

number of deaths in a relatively small number of interreligious clashes.

3.5.5 The Territorial Nature of Interreligious Conflict

Huntington asserted that conflicts between civilizations would increasingly be

over territory, especially in the post-Cold War era; this was found to be unsupported

earlier in this paper. It remains to test whether interreligious clashes have historically

occurred with greater frequency over territorial issues, and if the trend is positive after

the end of the Cold War. There were 225 separate incidences of conflict recorded from

1946-2007; of these ninety-one were identified as having territorial issues as the primary

incompatibility. In Figure 3-31 it is clear that with the exception of two periods,

government was the source of the majority of conflict initiations in each decade. The

higher proportion of territorial cases in the 1940s is an artifact of the world war that had

just ended; half of the twelve cases were the result of Soviet consolidation of territory

gained during WWII. A similar reversal occurred during the 1990s as several formerly

Soviet states clashed over territory in short-lived but often violent turf battles. Given

that territorial grievances have led to violence less often than those over government, we

can discern whether they are more likely to spark conflict when religious cleavages

exist.

Figure 3-31: Total Initiations by Incompatibility Type, 1946-2007

A different picture emerges when cases of recorded interreligious conflict are disaggregated (see Figure 3-32); in every decade except for the present, territory has been the primary issue of contention in conflicts between groups of differing religions. Though the number of cases of conflict involving government appear greater after 2000, it is very likely to be reversed by the end of the decade. Violence has erupted again in South Lebanon, Nagorno-Karabakh continues to simmer, and rebels in disputed areas of India and Myanmar are currently preparing for new rounds of battle against the state.

Type of Conflict

Figure 3-32: Interreligious Initiations by Incompatibility Type, 1946-2007

When the divisive issue is government, religious divides have been noted far less often. In the 1940s and 1990s the incidence of conflict over territory was again the result of the respective rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its concurrent consolidation (and loss) of its satellite territories; in all other decades (see Figure 3-33 below) cases of territorial conflict where religious divides were not present were few. One likely reason for this is that territorial grievances are not as salient when religious cleavages do not exist, making violent clashes over territorial issues rare. Another possibility is that governments are more often challenged when a majority of the population finds them to be unpopular; this would imply that religious differences tend to take a backseat to larger and more salient political grievances in these cases.

156

Figure 3-33: Intrareligious Initiations by Incompatibility Type, 1946-2007

3.6 Islam's "Bloody Innards"

So far the CoC theory as it applies to subnational conflict appears unsupported in

nearly every category we have examined. Huntington admitted that fault line wars have

been unevenly distributed among the world's civilizations, but also claimed that the

"overwhelming majority…have taken place along the boundary looping across Eurasia and Africa that
separates Muslims from non-Muslims. While at the macro or global level of world politics the primary
clash of civilizations is between the West and the rest, at the micro or local level is between Islam and the
others". [18]

This opened the way for his most hotly debated claim; the CoC hypothesis includes the

notion that Islam's monotheistic focus, expansionist aims and history, lack of a core

state and strict laws regarding all responses to anything inimical to Islam make it

---

[18] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York:
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996, p 255.

particularly susceptible to violence. Indeed, Huntington's assertions that Muslims had

been

"far more involved in intergroup violence than the people of any other civilization" and could only

lead one to conclude that "Islam's borders *are* bloody, and so are its innards"[19] (emphasis in the

original) has been the subject of much scholarly commentary.[20]

Is there any evidence that such a notion is plausible to be found in the evolution

of all subnational conflict since 1946? Although there have been many scholarly

rebuttals to the "bloody borders" claim, little has been written over the claim that

Muslims are more likely than other religious groups to be involved in violent

subnational conflicts. In recent research, the percentage of Muslims in a country has

been found to be a weakly positive indicator for conflict potential, but was

overshadowed when the country was an oil producer.[21] One recent example that

focused on political terrorism found that states with large Muslim populations that were

members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference were *less* likely to repress their

citizens.[22] Another found religious conflicts to be no bloodier than non-religious ones,

and conflicts involving Muslims (whether representing one or both sides of the conflict)

---

[19] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996, pp 256-58.

[20] See for example the arguments in Tony Smith, "Dangerous Conjecture." *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1997; Stephen M. Walt, "Building Up New Bogeymen." *Foreign Policy* 106, 1997 and Bruce M. Russett, John R. Oneal and Michaelene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism deju vu? Some Evidence. *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (5), 2000.

[21] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

[22] Indra de Soysa and Ragnhild Nordås, "Islam's Bloody Innards?" Paper prepared for presentation at the Meeting of the Environmental Factors in Civil War Working Group, 21 Sep 2006.

are no more violent than those involving other religions.[23] However, these last studies

used only data from after the Cold War; to determine trends in Muslim involvement data

from the entire period must be examined.

Muslim involvement in intrastate conflict was noted for every region; with the

exception of the Americas, this involvement has been significant in every region of the

globe. Table 3-7 provides a listing of all conflict initiations according to the religious

affiliation of those involved. Of the 225 recorded conflict initiations, Muslims were

involved in 103, or forty-six percent of the total. Fifty-five of these involved Muslims in

conflict with other Muslims; in thirty additional cases they were the challenger group in

a country with a majority religion other than Islam.

Table 3-7: Religious Affiliation of Groups in Conflict

Religious Group	Total	Challenger
Islam	103	30
Catholic	68	9
Orthodox	34	9
Protestant	23	6
Buddhist	24	2
Hindu	16	1
Indigenous	22	11
Judaism	2	0
Atheist	36	29

When displayed as a single religious group, Islam has the greatest involvement

in conflict over the period, and as a challenger group is only closely followed by atheist

Communist movements. But what if Islam is segregated into its primary sects, as

Christianity has been divided? Sunni Islam is still involved in more conflicts than any

other religious group; only Catholicism and Orthodox totals are combined would they be

involved in more conflicts since WWII than Sunni Islam (see Table 3-8). Thus Islam,

---

[23] Ragnhild Nordås, "Regulating Religious Minorities: For Better or Worse?" Paper read at International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, Mar 2004.

whether unified as a single entity or divided into its major sects, is a participant in a

larger number of conflicts than any other religious grouping. It would seem

Huntington's assertions, at least in terms of numbers of subnational conflicts in which

Muslims are involved, were correct – Islam's "innards" appear to be bloody indeed.

Table 3-8: Religious Affiliation of Groups in Conflict, Islam Disaggregated

Religious Group	Total	Challenger
Sunni	93	32
Shi'ia	15	4
Catholic	68	9
Orthodox	34	9
Protestant	23	6
Buddhist	24	2
Hindu	16	1
Indigenous	22	11
Judaism	2	0
Atheist	36	29

3.6.1 The Protracted Nature of Islamic Conflict

Are subnational conflicts involving Muslims also more protracted, to further

validate the "bloody innards" claims? Muslim states can be defined in several fashions;

all states in which Muslims make up a simple majority of the population are shown

graphically in Figure 3-34; member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

(OIC) are depicted in Figure 3-35 (with Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,

Mozambique, Togo, Uganda, Guyana and Suriname now included).

Figure 3-34: Muslim Majority States

Figure 3-35: OIC Member States

Yet simple majorities or membership in international organizations are poor determinants of conflict potential between people groups within a state. As discussed previously, studies have shown that groups will not conflict as often when their relative numbers approach parity; conversely, when a people group is below a certain size they cannot pose a reasonable risk to majority groups or the state under most conditions. When states possessing a Muslim population of 10% or greater (see Figure 3-36) are included, a more refined picture of the potential for conflict involving Muslims emerges.

Figure 3-36: Muslim Minority States

Table 3-9 shows some of the longest conflicts recorded have indeed occurred in countries with significant Muslim minority populations. Muslims have been involved more often in long-duration conflicts lasting greater than ten and twenty years than any other religious group. Only Buddhist groups (almost exclusively in territorial conflicts

within Myanmar) had more clashes lasting greater than forty years. The evidence thus strongly suggests that Muslim groups are involved more often in long-duration conflicts than any other group.

Table 3-9: Conflict Duration by Religious Affiliation

Religion	>10	>20	>30	>40	>50
Islam	33	14	7	3	1
Catholic	14	8	2	0	0
Orthodox	7	2	1	0	0
Protestant	4	3	1	0	0
Buddhist	12	7	6	5	1
Hindu	12	2	0	0	0
Indigenous	9	2	2	0	0
Judaism	2	0	0	0	1
Atheist	13	6	4	2	0

3.6.2 The Bloody Nature of Islamic Conflict

The duration of subnational conflicts appears to set Muslim conflicts apart; can they also be discerned by their capacity for violence? Figure 3-37 again shows states with significant Muslim populations; Figure 3-38 depicts all states meeting civil war criteria in at least one year of subnational conflict. With the exception of the US (which was attacked by Muslim extremists and is only included in the UCDP data set for the attack and the subsequent GWOT), there appears to be a correlation between such states and the tendency for civil conflicts to accelerate to war.

Figure 3-37: Muslim Minority States

162

Figure 3-38: Muslim Conflicts Reaching War

Figure 3-39: Total Conflicts Reaching War

However, if we depict all conflicts in which requirements for civil war were met (Figure 3-39 above), it is clear many states without significant Muslim populations also experienced war at this level. Such a crude measure of war potential, however, does not readily depict which conflicts were truly violent, and which may have only rarely reached war levels of battle-related deaths in their lifespan. If we map out which states were at war for a majority of the conflict, we can better depict which were truly violent in scope. In Figure 3-40, states are yellow if they experienced conflicts less than twenty years' duration yet were at civil war levels at least 50% of the time; red depicts conflicts that are twenty years or longer and met civil war levels at least ten of those years. From

this simple illustration it appears no correlation exists between states with significant

Muslim populations and violent conflict that reached civil war levels.

Figure 3-40: States at War for Extended Periods

If we examine conflict intensity in terms of battle deaths, Islam is second only to

the Atheist category, and only narrowly leads over Buddhism (Table 3-10). However,

Atheism and Buddhism each include the 1.2 million dead in the four-year Communist

campaign to control China, which accounts for a majority of each category's total.

Excluding that single conflict, it is clear that Islam is engaged in conflicts more often

that result in large numbers of battle dead. Given that Islam was found to be involved in

more subnational conflicts of longer duration and greater intensity than other religious

groups, CoC claims of Islam's "bloody innards" appear to have empirical support.

Table 3-10: Conflict Intensity by Religious Affiliation

Religion	Battle Deaths
Islam	2,067,473
Catholic	1,204,008
Orthodox	674,760
Protestant	397,712
Buddhist	1,974,973
Hindu	126,022
Indigenous	460,423
Judaism	18,230
Atheist	2,457,120

3.7 Conclusions

Huntington derived his CoC theories based on the creation of overarching people groups defined as civilizations, which were in most cases primarily based on religious groupings. His predictions of civilizationally-based subnational conflict, however, do not appear (at least as of this writing) to be verified, based on the nearly two decades of empirical evidence gathered since the end of the Cold War. Although civilizational fault line states have seen a greater number of cases of subnational conflict than those states located elsewhere, the fact that a majority of the earth's population lives within these states makes this fact uninteresting at best. No other CoC prediction of subnational conflict was validated: civilizationally-based conflicts have not been increasing in the post-Cold War era, they are less lengthy and violent than their counterparts, and they are less often over territory.

However, if we refine CoC theory and focus on religious rather than civilizational differences, more interesting observations emerge that lend credence to the new theory. Interreligious conflict has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War, the percentage of interreligious conflicts is greater than that of intercivilizational violence, interreligious conflicts are longer, bloodier and more often over territory than those conflicts occurring between groups of the same religion. Finally, Islam was shown to have been involved in more conflicts over the study period; of these, conflicts were longer and bloodier on average than those not involving Muslims. In the following chapter we will examine in greater detail the causal relationships between subnational conflict and the secular and religious variables that are possible causes of this type of conflict in the modern era.

4. STATISTICAL ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Multivariate Analyses and Results

4.1.1 Testing Theoretical Causal Mechanisms

To discover the causal "weight" different variables possess that may influence the occurrence of conflict initiation at the subnational level, a plethora of analytical models were developed and tested. Because of the binomial nature of the dependent variable (conflict either initiates or doesn't), a Logit analysis was performed using the STATA 10 statistical package. I employ a stepwise methodology, first creating a "basic" model that includes variables historically shown to be important in causal processes leading to civil war initiation and that I theorize will also be important causal instruments in subnational conflicts at smaller scales. I then create a series of expanded models that test the relative import of both secular and religious variables for substantive significance in predicting the likelihood of subnational conflict initiation. I test both basic and expanded models in the sections below, and provide results and rationale for the findings within each of the following sections.

From a subnational perspective, Huntington's CoC theory claimed that cleft and fault-line states should be expected to experience more conflict, due to civilizational rifts, than those located elsewhere. Due to the inherent limitations of CoC theory, I posit that religious, rather than civilizational, differences will be more salient when predictions of such conflict are conducted. Accordingly, I expect CoC fault-line states will be no more likely to experience conflict than other states, both before and after the Cold War period. CoC-defined cleft states, however, are likely to be significant

166

predictors; as Huntington created this list of countries, the cleavages he lists for each are far more often religious, rather than civilizational, in origin. For example, he argues along purely religious lines when he includes Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Tanzania in his list of cleft countries.[1] Many of the other cleft states listed are also divided along religious lines. Thus I expect that CoC-defined cleft states will be more likely to have experienced conflict, in keeping more with the religiously oriented thesis I present.

When testing my refined theory of cultural derivation of subnational conflict, I expect that ethnic and religious divisions will be significant predictors. In addition, religiously cleft states (those having a religious minority of at least 10%) will also be more likely to experience conflict than those where such divisions do not exist. Also expected is a greater risk of conflict when state governments and their populations attach a higher salience to religious differences in their respective nations. In short, I expect that variables that operationalize religious differences and their relative importance both to states and their populations will provide more predictive power when forecasting subnational violence than Huntington's civilizational indicators. This refinement of CoC theory, it is hoped, will prove to be more beneficial for explaining patterns of internal state violence in the modern era, both during and after the Cold War. A series of models now follows to test these theories and see which, if any, have merit.

---

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, pp. 137-138.

4.1.2 Basic Model Analyses

An initial model was developed to determine the relative causal impact of a variety of independent variables on the dependent variable, specified as the initiation of subnational conflict. The basic model consists of an economic variable (GDP per capita, or GDP/pc) and population size, both of which are represented here as the log of their respective actual values. State newness, a dummy variable indicating whether a state was less than 5 years old (either since gaining independence or after creation of the state), was also included.

	Baseline	Regime, Oil	EF, RF	All Included
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.329***	-0.322***	-0.243***	-0.234***
	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.073)
Ln Population	0.263***	0.221***	0.289***	0.259***
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.052)
New State	0.881***	0.878***	0.931***	0.947***
	(0.253)	(0.261)	(0.257)	(0.265)
Prior Conflict	0.472***	0.514***	0.329*	0.393**
	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.189)	(0.189)
Democracy Level		-0.002		-0.004
		(0.012)		(0.012)
Oil Producer		0.203		0.024
		(0.283)		(0.289)
Ethnic Fractionalization			0.975	1.166***
			(0.634)	(0.333)
Religious Fractionalization			-1.012	-0.597**
			(0.801)	(0.336)
Ethnic*Religious Fract.			0.698	
			(1.266)	
Constant	-3.895***	-3.505***	-4.963***	-4.801***
	(0.629)	(0.667)	(0.772)	(0.788)
Observations	8163	7340	7744	6999

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-1: Basic Estimation Models 1946-2007

168

Finally, a dummy variable indicating whether forces of the state and the opposition group in question had previously clashed was also included. These four variables have proven to be important in previous studies of civil war initiation. Initial results for the period 1946-2007 are presented in the baseline model of Table 4-1 above (left-hand column).

Results from the initial basic model suggest that each of these four variables is a powerful and statistically significant indicator of subnational conflict over the entire period of study. GDP/pc is both strongly negative and highly significant, suggesting that richer countries are less likely to see opposition groups select strategies of violence to address grievances. As discussed earlier, the higher national per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP/pc) is, the less likely the chance that individuals, which benefit from good economic conditions, will "upset the applecart" through active rebellion and conflict. Since the opportunity costs for wealthier people to engage in violent conflict are higher; we should expect that the wealthier the state, the less likely the chance of conflict escalation to violence[2]. Wealthier states are also more likely to possess the necessary infrastructure to handle challengers without resorting to violence[3].

As GDP/pc rises, so does the likelihood that political institutions exist that allow greater access to the political process, making the selection of violent strategies to force change less viable. Higher levels of GDP also suggests the state may have a greater capacity to govern itself, that institutional capacity is higher and thus police and army

---

[2] Paul Collier and Anka Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4), 2004.

[3] James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

resources are more capable of preventing or containing any violent opposition that may

erupt. High levels of detection and prevention technology mean states have less chance

of being surprised by subversive and damaging activities carried out against them and

are capable of direct action to prevent any such groups from successfully doing so. It

also is reasonable to assume that the higher the income potential a population has the

smaller the chance will be that they will perceive economic factors as grievances.

As mentioned previously, most opposition groups are composed of young males;

the larger the population, the larger this segment of the population is likely to be. In

addition, as the population of a state increases, so too does the responsibility toward this

increasing population. States with large populations face greater challenges in caring for

and meeting the needs of larger groups; we should thus see conflict probability increase

as population size increases. The coefficient for this variable is indeed positive and

highly significant, as would be expected from the theory.

States in their formative years often face challenges that can lead to domestic

instability; consolidation of the political process, the building of political and social

institutions, and the establishment of state- and nation-hood are often fraught with

difficulty. Thus we would expect new states to be more at risk of outbreaks of violent

conflict than older established states. Finally, changes in relative power of groups

within the state after formation sometimes lead to challenges among them that foster

political instability and can lead to challenges that escalate to conflict.[4] This is borne

---

[4] For more on the effect of shifting relative power among subnational groups see Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Princeton University Press, 1993; James D. Fearon "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49, 1995 and David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." *International Security* 21 (2.), 1996.

out by the model data as well; new states are far more likely to experience an initiation of domestic conflict, as the coefficient is large, positive and statistically significant.

Finally, any incidence of prior conflict is also positively correlated with conflict initiation; since each side will have gained knowledge of the capabilities and resolve of their opponents during previous episodes of violence, there is thus less uncertainty in committing to strategies involving violence against them in the future. Thus these four variables provide a powerful predictive baseline for modern subnational conflict.

Column two shows the results when regime type and a dummy for oil-producing states are included; the level of democracy a state possesses is a weak and insignificant predictor of internal violence potential. This is likely due to the overwhelming influence of GDP/pc which is also included in this model. Further exploration of the causal power of democracy on internal conflict will be performed later. A dummy variable coding states that derive a significant percentage of their annual revenues from oil export is also an insignificant predictor. States with large oil reserves are no more likely to have experienced subnational conflict than those without such resources. Very little impact is noted on the substantive significance of the four variables from the basic model.

Column three shows results from a model including both religious and ethnic fractionalization values, as well as a variable representing an interaction between the two. Neither was statistically significant when the other was set to zero (although their effects are opposite in sign); further testing confirms that ethnic fractionalization is a significant indicator when some degree of religious fractionalization is present, however. The final column shows the results when all variables are included; while no substantive changes were noted in variables included in the first two models, the

171

coefficients for religious and ethnic fractionalization are large and highly significant. As

the level of ethnic fragmentation increases, so does the likelihood of conflict initiation.

Conversely, the greater the level of religious fractionalization, the *smaller* the chance of

conflict beginning. Ethnic diversity thus leads to a higher incidence of conflict

initiation, while religious diversity is associated with a smaller chance of domestic strife.

What is now necessary, however, is to divide the data set into the two periods I seek to

analyze and examine the results of these models on each set of conflict data.

This model is the same as that presented in Figure 4-1 above, but for the Cold

War period (1946-1988) only. Results of this model are displayed in Figure 4-2 below.

	Baseline	Regime, Oil	EF, RF	All Included
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.439***	-0.466***	-0.284***	-0.301***
	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.105)
Ln Population	0.236***	0.198***	0.274***	0.247***
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.066)
New State	0.216	0.120	0.183	0.115
	(0.365)	(0.388)	(0.369)	(0.395)
Prior Conflict	0.417*	0.467**	0.230	0.304
	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.247)	(0.249)
Democracy Level		0.007		0.005
		(0.014)		(0.015)
Oil Producer		0.134		-0.180
		(0.405)		(0.414)
Ethnic Fractionalization			1.756***	1.663***
			(0.413)	(0.424)
Religious Fractionalization			-0.566	-0.624**
			(0.408)	(0.417)
Constant	-2.974***	-2.479***	-4.987***	-4.582***
	(0.852)	(0.895)	(1.023)	(1.089)
Observations	5228	4826	4877	4517

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-2: Basic Estimation Models 1946-1988

Results from the initial basic model suggest that GDP/pc and population size are again strongly significant indicators; wealthier countries tended to avoid internal conflict while more populous states were more susceptible. However, the coefficient for new states is now weakly positive and insignificant; this suggests that state newness has little predictive power in the Cold War era. The coefficient for prior conflict remained strongly positive, yet its significance was somewhat reduced. This is not an unreasonable result, as the likelihood of two groups having participated in conflict prior to any year in this first half of the data set is markedly less than in the second half, when more time had elapsed since the beginning of the period of study.

Column two again reveals the level of democracy a state possesses to be weak and insignificant in terms of predictive value; as is the coefficient for oil-exporting states. In this model the coefficient for prior conflict remains strongly positive, and its significance has increased slightly. Column three reveals a higher level of ethnic fractionalization to be a positive and significant predictor of conflict, while religious fractionalization is of opposite sign and insignificant. The final column shows the results when all variables are included; again GDP/pc and population size remain significant, but most other variables are now insignificant. An important exception is noted for the coefficients for religious and ethnic fractionalization, both of which are now large and highly significant.

Thus subnational conflicts recorded during the Cold War era most often occurred in states with lower levels of economic wealth and in those states with large populations. Although prior conflict was a positive indicator, its significance varied widely when other variables were introduced. In contrast to prior studies of civil war where

173

fractionalization of ethnic and religious populations was not shown to be significant, the

new measures used here, which are much denser in terms of annual coverage, were

indeed found to be significant. Ethnic fractionalization, long theorized to have a

positive impact on internal conflict, is indeed a strongly positive indicator. Religious

diversity, however, seems to have the opposite effect.

Additional models were run using the data from the post-Cold War era; results of

these are presented below in Figure 4-3. Again, economic strength is strongly

associated with lower likelihood of conflict, while population size is both strongly and

positively correlated with a higher likelihood of violence. The basic model, shown in

	Baseline	Regime, Oil	EF, RF	All Included
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.481***	-0.434***	-0.488***	-0.476***
	(0.119)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.152)
Ln Population	0.284***	0.219***	0.298***	0.248***
	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.089)
New State	1.993***	1.968***	2.158***	2.159***
	(0.359)	(0.367)	(0.368)	(0.377)
Prior Conflict	0.342	0.366	0.321	0.363
	(0.290)	(0.288)	(0.302)	(0.300)
Democracy Level		-0.014		-0.006
		(0.021)		(0.022)
Oil Producer		0.354		0.414
		(0.407)		(0.417)
Ethnic Fractionalization			0.284	0.193
			(0.576)	(0.581)
Religious Fractionalization			-0.716	-0.531
			(0.587)	(0.598)
Constant	-2.701**	-2.264*	-2.693*	-2.282
	(1.135)	(1.209)	(1.389)	(1.461)
Observations	2935	2514	2867	2482

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-3: Basic Estimation Models 1989-2007

the left-hand column, now shows the coefficient for state newness to be strongly

positive and highly significant; given the number of conflicts that occurred in former

Soviet possessions during the 1990s, this finding does not seem surprising. Unlike

during the Cold War, previous conflict between groups in conflict is no longer

significant, although it is still positively correlated. This again is unsurprising, as many

groups chose strategies of conflict in the post-Soviet era when seeking territorial and/or

political autonomy from former masters. The second column includes measures of

regime type and oil export revenue; as with the previous Cold War model, these

variables continue to be insignificant. The results of the model including ethnic and

religious fractionalization values (see column three) are surprising; although these

coefficients still hold the same opposite sign as before, they are no longer significant. It

seems that measures of ethnic or religious variability within nations are not significant

explananda of subnational conflict. Further implications, however, may arise when

measures of the salience of these differences is included in later models.

4.1.3 The Importance of Economic Strength

Indicators that have proven useful in previous studies of subnational conflicts at

the level of civil wars have also proven useful in the smaller conflicts under study here.

Economic development, population size and the relative newness of states have been

shown to be significant indicators of conflict potential. While incidence of prior conflict

was weakly significant in the Cold War era, that significance was no longer evident in

the two decades that have elapsed since. States that export significant quantities of oil

are also no more likely to engage in conflict than those that do not. However, the impact

of democracy level and ethnic/religious diversity may be overshadowed by the large and

significant impact of GDP/pc. To test the relative importance of each, the following

models will include interaction terms that interact GDP/pc with regime type, ethnic and

religious diversity measures.

	Baseline	GDP*Dem	GDP*EF	GDP*RF
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.308***	-0.038	-0.573**	-0.317
	(0.102)	(0.148)	(0.226)	(0.195)
Ln Population	0.266***	0.250***	0.263***	0.266***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)
New State	0.100	0.003	0.126	0.102
	(0.395)	(0.399)	(0.394)	(0.396)
Democracy Level	0.007	0.202**	0.010	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.084)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.733***	1.570***	-1.476	1.732***
	(0.412)	(0.415)	(2.447)	(0.412)
Religious Fractionalization	-0.650	-0.408	-0.670*	-0.781
	(0.411)	(0.428)	(0.407)	(2.586)
GDP*Democracy Level		-0.029**		
		(0.012)		
GDP*Ethnic Fract.			0.495	
			(0.375)	
GDP*Religious Fract.				0.020
				(0.384)
Constant	-4.711***	-6.340***	-2.953*	-4.653***
	(1.056)	(1.251)	(1.695)	(1.550)
Observations	4517	4517	4517	4517

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-4: GDP Interaction Models 1946-1988

The results when the effects of GDP/pc are interacted with regime type, ethnic

and religious fractionalization values are displayed in Figure 4-4 above. Baseline values

are displayed in the first column as a reference. The coefficient for GDP/pc remains

both strongly negative and highly significant, as expected. The coefficient for

population size is still strongly positive and significant, as is the coefficient for ethnic

fractionalization. None of the other variables are significant in this model, which covers the Cold War period. In the second model, GDP/pc is interacted with regime type; the first term shows that when democracy level is set to zero (fully autocratic state), the coefficient for GDP/pc is still negative, but is now small and insignificant. In autocracies during the Cold War, the economic prosperity level was an insignificant predictor of subnational conflict. Conversely, when GDP/pc is set to zero, the coefficient for regime type is now positive and highly significant. In poor states, therefore, regime type was an important predictor of conflict in this era; the higher the level of democracy, the more likely conflict was to occur. Thus in situations where democratic states were poor, it was more likely groups would seek change via violent means. The interaction term is negative and highly significant; thus when states were both democratic and had higher levels of economic prosperity, they were less likely to engage in violence during the Cold War. All other variables remain essentially unchanged when this interaction term is measured.

In the third model, GDP/pc is interacted with the ethnic diversity term; the coefficient for GDP/pc is still strongly negative and significant, suggesting that in states that are ethnically homogeneous (EF=0), the impact of economic status was stronger – the higher the level of GDP/pc, the less likely states were to engage in conflict in this period. When GDP/pc is set to zero, the coefficient for ethnic diversity is now negative and insignificant, suggesting that when states are poor, ethnic diversity matters little in predicting internal violence. The interaction term is positive, yet also insignificant; states that were both poor and ethnically diverse were no more likely to engage in violence during the Cold War than other states. Interestingly, the religious

177

fractionalization coefficient remains negative but is now significant; however, the level

of significance barely reaches the p > 0.1 level, and thus is only a weak predictor. The

last column displays the results when GDP/pc and religious diversity are interacted.

When states are religiously homogeneous, GDP/pc had little predictive power in

forecasting conflict. When states were poor, religious diversity also had little impact on

conflict proclivity. The coefficient for the interaction term was also insignificant;

economic level and religious diversity had no combined impact on subnational violence

likelihood.

	Baseline	GDP*Dem	GDP*EF	GDP*RF
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.471***	-0.388	-0.877***	-0.403
	(0.145)	(0.281)	(0.305)	(0.259)
Ln Population	0.279***	0.278***	0.272***	0.278***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.086)
New State	2.089***	2.082***	2.017***	2.104***
	(0.372)	(0.372)	(0.374)	(0.375)
Democracy Level	-0.011	0.043	-0.006	-0.010
	(0.021)	(0.159)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.333	0.303	-5.704	0.298
	(0.574)	(0.579)	(3.984)	(0.586)
Religious Fractionalization	-0.750	-0.714	-0.551	0.564
	(0.573)	(0.582)	(0.584)	(4.165)
GDP*Democracy Level		-0.007		
		(0.020)		
GDP*Ethnic Fract.			0.799	
			(0.524)	
GDP*Religious Fract.				-0.172
				(0.539)
Constant	-2.386*	-3.012	0.696	-4.653
	(1.440)	(2.332)	(2.461)	(1.550)
Observations	2482	2482	2482	2482

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-5: GDP Interaction Models 1989-2007

Figure 4-5 above displays the results of GDP interaction terms for the post-Cold War period. Baseline values are again displayed in the first column as a reference. The coefficient for GDP/pc remains both strongly negative and highly significant, while the coefficient for population size is still strongly positive and significant. The coefficient for state newness is now both strongly positive and highly significant as had been shown earlier. However, the coefficients for ethnic and religious fractionalization are now both insignificant; this suggests that neither ethnic nor religious diversity had a substantive impact on subnational conflict in the post-Cold War era. In the second model, GDP/pc is interacted with regime type; when democracy level is set to zero (a fully autocratic state), the coefficient for GDP/pc is still strongly negative, but is now insignificant. Therefore in autocratic states after the Cold War, the economic prosperity level was an insignificant predictor of subnational conflict. When GDP/pc is set to zero, the coefficient for regime type is weakly positive, yet insignificant. In poor states, regime type was therefore not an important predictor of conflict in this era. The interaction term is also weakly negative and insignificant; states that were both democratic and had higher levels of economic prosperity have been no more likely to engage in violence after the Cold War. All other variables remain essentially unchanged when this interaction term is measured.

In the third model, GDP/pc is interacted with the ethnic diversity term; the coefficient for GDP/pc is still strongly negative and highly significant, suggesting that in states that are ethnically homogeneous (EF=0), the impact of economic status was even stronger – the higher the level of GDP/pc, the less likely these states were to engage in conflict in this period. When GDP/pc is set to zero, the coefficient for ethnic diversity is

179

strongly negative yet insignificant; when states are poor, ethnic diversity matters little in predicting internal violence in the post-Cold War era. The interaction term is large and positive, yet also insignificant; states that were both poor and ethnically diverse were no more likely to engage in violence after the Cold War than other states. The level of religious fractionalization coefficient remains negative and insignificant. The last column displays the results when GDP/pc and religious diversity are interacted. When states are religiously homogeneous (RF=0), the coefficient for GDP/pc was still negative, yet it had little predictive power in forecasting conflict. When states were poor, religious diversity also had little impact on conflict prediction. The coefficient for the interaction term was also insignificant; economic level and religious diversity had no combined impact on subnational violence likelihood.

To conclude this section, the effect of GDP/pc on democracy level, as well as levels of ethnic and religious diversity, was large and varied between the Cold War era and the postlude. During the former period, democracy level mattered; poorer states were more likely to engage in subnational conflict when they were more democratic (more autocratic states are assumed to be more likely to repress such movements). In contrast, wealthier and more democratic states tended to avoid such conflict; this is likely due to the possible economic and social losses involved when selecting strategies of violence. Ethnic fractionalization also mattered during this period, and was a strongly positive indicator of conflict likelihood. In the current era, this has changed; while economic success tends to limit the likelihood of violence, now newer states have been much more prone to conflict than more established regimes. Democracy level is no longer a significant predictor, nor is a higher level of ethnic or religious diversity. This

last seems to contradict both the CoC theory and the more refined version I offer here; additional model testing will help clarify these initial findings.

4.1.4 Other Substantive Variables

Previous studies of civil war have also identified other variables that may have causal leverage on conflict initiation, the following models will test whether they have any substantive predictive power when examining subnational conflict at a scale smaller than that of civil war. These include levels of economic inequality, the presence of ongoing subnational or international conflict, historical legacies such as being formerly a Communist vassal state or a colonial possession, identification as an Islamic state, and finally whether a state has "failed". The following models will test the importance of these variables in each of the two periods. Results from models performed using Cold War era data are displayed in Figure 4-6 below; output of former Communist states is not included, as there were no such states in conflict within this data period.

In addition to the three substantive variables used in all models thus far, a variable measuring economic inequality level is now included. Although its effect is small, it is both positive and highly significant; this suggests that during the Cold War the greater the level of economic inequality a state possessed the higher the likelihood of conflict. The second model also includes dummy variables that indicate whether a state was engaged in either subnational or international conflict when the conflict between the government and this new group was initiated.

	Baseline	Ex. Conflict	Legacies	Islam/Fail
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.352***	-0.344***	-0.311***	-0.321***
	(0.094)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Ln Population	0.358***	0.280***	0.358***	0.266***
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.067)
New State	0.116	0.089	-0.005	0.169
	(0.411)	(0.416)	(0.417)	(0.416)
Economic Inequality	0.058***	0.054***	0.051***	0.047***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Ongoing Subnational		1.602***		
		(0.296)		
Ongoing Interstate		0.300		
		(0.379)		
Former Communist			N/A	
Former Colonial			0.355	
			(0.222)	
Failed State				1.122***
				(0.218)
OIC Member State				0.241
				(0.256)
Constant	-7.130***	-6.435***	-7.282***	-6.342***
	(1.360)	(1.421)	(1.392)	(1.432)
Observations	4736	4736	4734	4736

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-6: Additional Substantive Variable Models 1946-1988

The coefficient for ongoing subnational conflict is both strongly positive and highly significant; states that were currently battling one internal adversary were more likely to see another group initiate conflict. This is logical, the more so when groups are geographically distinct; the state is forced to widely deploy its forces, making them potentially less effective and giving challenger groups a greater chance of success. No such significance is accorded the coefficient that measures the impact of ongoing interstate conflict; when a state is involved in an external conflict it will waste little time

crushing any internal opposition, rather than diverting its forces away from what may be an existential threat from without.

The third model in column three examines the effect of historical legacies, in this case that of former colonial possessions, since no post-Communist states in conflict existed during this period. The coefficient is insignificant; thus there was no substantive impact of being a former colonial possession on conflict during the Cold War. The final model includes whether a state has been classified as failed; the coefficient is both large and highly significant, suggesting that the lack of institutional robustness and social protection is highly correlated with conflict initiation. States no longer capable of providing basic services to their populations were at much greater risk of conflict than those with the institutional capability to do so. State membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference had no substantive impact on decisions to engage in violence.

Results of the models executed with post-Cold War data are displayed in Figure 4-7 below. The first model again includes economic inequality; as opposed to the Cold War era, there is now no substantive impact of this variable. The inequality coefficient is both weakly negative and insignificant; clearly conditions of economic inequality, though just as prevalent today, have remained uncorrelated with conflict initiation since 1989. The existence of ongoing subnational conflict, however, retained its impact on conflict after the fall of the USSR; it remains strongly positive and highly significant. Neither a Communist or colonial legacy has any substantive impact on conflict, however; both of these coefficients are weakly positive and insignificant.

183

	Baseline	Ex. Conflict	Legacies	Islam/Fail
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.583***	-0.478***	-0.564***	-0.366***
	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.152)	(0.148)
Ln Population	0.315***	0.136	0.319***	0.157*
	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.082)	(0.087)
New State	1.681***	1.670***	1.646***	1.583***
	(0.477)	(0.481)	(0.597)	(0.495)
Economic Inequality	-0.019	-0.024	-0.020	-0.028
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Ongoing Subnational		2.093***		
		(0.404)		
Ongoing Interstate		0.177		
		(0.611)		
Former Communist			0.105	
			(0.533)	
Former Colonial			0.130	
			(0.342)	
Failed State				1.665***
				(0.317)
OIC Member State				-0.114
				(0.298)
Constant	-1.241	-0.431	-1.484	-1.635
	(2.009)	(2.042)	(2.108)	(2.094)
Observations	2512	2512	2512	2512

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-7: Additional Substantive Variable Models 1989-2007

Failed states, however, remain highly correlated with conflict initiation in the post-Cold War era; the coefficient is both strongly positive and highly significant. Clearly state failure and the concurrent loss of social and political goods that accompany it are major motivators for challenger groups to protest in violent fashion. The coefficient for OIC membership is now negative and remains insignificant; this suggests Islamic states have been no more prone to subnational violence than non-Islamic nations.

Economic inequality is not a function of the level of economic success a state has achieved; inequality of this type exists in poor kleptocratic regimes in Africa and wealthy nations like Singapore and the United States. It is reasonable, therefore, to examine if the likelihood of conflict changes when a state is wealthy or poor and inequality exists. The level of economic capacity of a state can also impact state capacity to defend itself from challenger groups; wealthier states should be more capable of fielding sufficient police and military assets to counter more than one threat within its borders simultaneously. State wealth may also impact decisions to rebel violently if states are seen to fail; poor states do not generally provide adequate levels of social goods and services through government programs. If these states fail, the status quo for the population may indeed remain intact, obviating a need or desire for rebellion. Finally, inequality levels may impact the likelihood of conflict if states fail; if there is a sizeable contingent of wealthy citizenry within a state, rebellion to restore the status quo may be a reasonable option.

Figure 4-8 below displays the results from interactions designed to measure such impacts discussed in the previous section, for the Cold War period. The first column shows the effect when GDP/pc is interacted with economic inequality. The coefficient for GDP/pc is still large and negative, yet it has lost its significance. When inequality levels are zero, GDP/pc is an insignificant explanandum of conflict. This is understandable, since when all a state's population are equally wealthy (or poor), groups should not resort to violence to better their situations. If these groups were to succeed in bettering their own plight, others could consider the economic status quo within the state upset, and a domestic-level balance of power conflict could arise. This could in turn

185

	Baseline	Ex. Conflict	Legacies	Islam/Fail
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.828	-0.311***	-0.390***	-0.307***
	(0.516)	(0.102)	(0.121)	(0.098)
Ln Population	0.345***	0.285***	0.266***	0.263***
	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)
New State	0.140	0.076	0.157	0.181
	(0.412)	(0.418)	(0.416)	(0.416)
Economic Inequality	-0.020	0.055***	0.045***	0.058***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)
GDP/pc*Inequality	0.011			
	(0.012)			
Ongoing Subnational		3.778*		
		(2.197)		
GDP*Ongoing Subnational		-0.345		
		(0.350)		
Ongoing Interstate		0.345		
		(0.381)		
Failed State			-0.182	2.756*
			(1.305)	(1.466)
GDP*Failed State			0.201	
			(0.198)	
Inequality*Failed State				-0.037
				(0.033)
OIC Member State			0.217	0.222
			(0.257)	(0.256)
Constant	-3.738	-6.759***	-5.812***	-6.896***
	(3.842)	(1.453)	(1.531)	(1.505)
Observations	4736	4736	4736	4736

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-8: Effects of Interaction Models, 1946-1988

translate into violence between the new haves and the remainder of the have-nots,

making decisions to unilaterally pursue better conditions less likely.

The coefficient for economic inequality is now negative and insignificant; when

GDP/pc is set to zero and states are poor, high levels of inequality are unlikely to occur,

making inequality an unlikely explanandum for violence. The interaction term is small,

positive and insignificant; it seems inequality is not an important causal effect when the economic situation in a state is higher. This is likely also a relic of the institutional capacity of wealthier states, which often provide more social goods and services to their populations, and also have a greater capacity to successfully counter challenger groups before violence can erupt.

To test the effect of wealth on group strategic decisions to initiate violence when states are already in conflict with other groups, GDP/pc was interacted with the dummy variable for the existence of ongoing subnational conflict. Whether or not conflict exists, GDP/pc is still negative and highly significant; this speaks to the robust predictive power of this variable, the wealthier the nation, the less likely it was to have seen conflict. The coefficient for ongoing conflict is still strongly positive, yet it has lost some significance. In poor states, groups were more likely to initiate violence when the forces of the state were already engaged in conflict with another group. This is logical, as poorer states are generally expected to have less warfighting capacity than wealthier states, and may choose to negotiate with the new challenger rather than fight. Groups initiating conflict in these situations can do so with greater impunity and less resources, knowing the likelihood of prolonged conflict is low and negotiated success is higher. The interaction term is negative, as expected, but insignificant; wealthier states with greater capacity are more formidable opponents, so the likelihood of additional violence should be lower. However, the lack of significance indicates that wealthier nations did not have high incidences of ongoing conflict, so the likelihood of multiple internal conflicts was low.

State failure has been theorized to be a powerful indicator of subnational conflict likelihood, both during and after the Cold War. When interacted with GDP/pc, however, the coefficient measuring wealth remains strongly negative and highly significant. This is due to the low percentage of wealthy states failing during this period. The coefficient for state failure when GDP/pc is zero is negative and insignificant. Populations in poor states generally receive little in social goods from the state; when such states receive a "failed" classification, there is generally little or no change to the plight of the population of these states. The interaction term is positive, yet insignificant; as GDP/pc rises, states that fail are more prone to conflict, yet not significantly so. It is apparent that while state failure is an important predictor of conflict potential, economic capacity is a far more reliable explanandum. It should be noted that this state failure variable, obtained from the Political Instability Task Force, is endogenous with the dependent variable; state failure is defined as those states experiencing either revolutionary or ethnic war, as well as those states undergoing adverse regime change, genocide or politicide.[5] Accordingly, the significance of this variable in this and all other models must be adjusted; GDP/pc is a more powerful predictor and remains a primary substantive independent variable.

Finally, the interaction between inequality and state failure is examined; results are displayed in the right-hand column of Figure 4-8. Economic inequality remains both positive and highly significant; clearly inequality among groups remains an important

---

[5] Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc A. Levy, Monty G. Marshall, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Colin H. Kahl, Pamela T. Surko, John C. Ulfelder, and Alan N. Unger in consultation with Matthew Christenson, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Daniel C. Esty, and Thomas M. Parris. *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings*, McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 30 September 2000.

predictor. State failure is also strongly positive and significant; however, as discussed

above, this variable has a high level of endogeneity with the dependent variable and may

thus be less significant than it appears. The interaction term, however, is weakly

negative and insignificant; when a state is already at war or is experiencing genocide or

politicide, inequality is likely not to matter to groups seeking relief from these issues.

	Baseline	Ex. Conflict	Legacies	Islam/Fail
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-1.716*	-0.639***	-0.581***	-0.352**
	(0.895)	(0.154)	(0.192)	(0.148)
Ln Population	0.301***	0.140	0.133	0.146*
	(0.081)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.088)
New State	1.723***	1.699***	1.449***	1.558***
	(0.478)	(0.484)	(0.505)	(0.499)
Economic Inequality	-0.236	-0.033	-0.035	-0.013
	(0.170)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.031)
GDP/pc*Inequality	0.027			
	(0.021)			
Ongoing Subnational		-4.629*		
		(2.715)		
GDP*Ongoing Subnational		0.882***		
		(0.343)		
Ongoing Interstate		0.217		
		(0.613)		
Failed State			-2.099	3.216*
			(2.153)	(1.939)
GDP*Failed State			0.488*	
			(0.276)	
Inequality*Failed State				-0.036
				(0.044)
OIC Member State			-0.125	-0.124
			(0.297)	(0.256)
Constant	8.052	1.180	0.635	-2.299
	(7.464)	(2.145)	(2.434)	(2.264)
Observations	2512	2512	2512	2512

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-9: Effects of Interactions Models, 1989-2007

Figure 4-9 above displays the results of the same models applied to conflict data from the post-Cold War era. The first column displays the results of the interaction between economic wealth and inequality; when inequality does not exist, GDP/pc is still strongly negative, but it has lost some of its significance. Wealthier states were still less likely to face challenger groups in violent conflict, but the importance of high GDP was not as great as it was during the prior period. In poor states economic inequality was still negatively associated with conflict, but the coefficient was insignificant. Inequality has not been a salient issue in states experiencing internal violence since 1989. The interaction term is weakly positive yet insignificant; economic inequality is much less a predictor of conflict in this period than economic wealth.

When ongoing subnational conflict did not exist, GDP/pc remained a powerful negative impact on group consideration and implementation of violence. In poor states ongoing subnational conflict was a strongly negative predictor of subnational conflict. Without monetary resources, groups within the states desiring to agitate cannot afford to purchase sufficient arms and resources to equip and sustain a prolonged conflict, and thus remain quiescent. However, when states are wealthier, the effect of ongoing conflict was largely positive and highly significant. This may be explained by the lack of superpower influence after the Cold War; without the restraining effects of the US and former USSR, groups with monetary resources choosing strategies of violence have been able to obtain weapons and other resources from diaspora and other support groups both internally and abroad. Evidence for this can be found in the Balkans during the 1990s, when despite embargoes Serbian nationalist groups gained access to weapons, petroleum and other supplies from supporting groups in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

Wealthier states retained a low likelihood of experiencing conflict when states were not classified as failing. Interestingly, the coefficient for failed states that were poor was also strongly negative, but was insignificant; this is likely a relic of the endogenous nature of the explanatory variable. The coefficient for the interaction term is strongly positive and significant, suggesting that wealthier states that become classified as failed are more likely to choose violence to restore the status quo. Again, however, caution must be taken because of the endogeneity present in the failed state variable. When inequality is interacted with state failure, its significance does not change; whether states are classified as failed or not, economic inequality is a non-substantive conflict predictor in the post-Cold War era. State failure alone remains strongly positive and significant, but the endogenous relationship it shares with the dependent variable makes the utility of this explanandum less apparent.

4.1.5 Regional Effects

It is reasonable to state that different regions of the world tend to share both secular (economic) and cultural traits. For example, Central and South America are both relatively low-income states that are primarily Catholic in religious belief; the Middle East and North Africa are similar in economic status and in Islamic culture. Sub-Saharan Africa is largely poor and indigenous, while Eastern Europe is mostly middle-income and Orthodox. The West, to include Western Europe, North America and much of Oceania, is predominantly Christian and middle class.

	1946-88	1989-2007
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.313***	-0.569***
	(0.102)	(0.171)
Ln Population	0.351***	0.324***
	(0.063)	(0.081)
New State	0.169	1.630***
	(0.367)	(0.414)
Eastern Europe	-1.151	0.774
	(1.080)	(0.638)
Central/South America	1.395***	0.348
	(0.469)	(0.670)
Middle East/North Africa	1.630***	0.037
	(0.472)	(0.723)
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.333***	0.117
	(0.486)	(0.722)
Central/South Asia	1.274***	0.306
	(0.469)	(0.681)
East Asia/Oceania	0.586	0.526
	(0.463)	(0.727)
Constant	-5.904***	-2.454
	(1.215)	(1.895)
Observations	5228	2935

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-10: Regional Effects Models

Measuring regional effects is useful for determining the strength of other substantive variables; as has been noted previously, if both the coefficients and relative significance of primary variables change little with the addition of all but one regional dummy variable, then we can assume that these primary independent variables offer sufficient explanatory power in the model.[6] In addition, inclusion of these dummy variables allows examination of the regional variation in conflict initiation both during

---

[6] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." American Political Science Review 97 (1), 2003.

the Cold War period and after. The results of models depicting both of these periods are included in Figure 4-10 above.

None of the primary independent variables changes either in magnitude or significance when these regional dummies are included, lending additional credence to their utility in the model. During the Cold War, only Eastern Europe and East Asia/ Oceania were insignificant regional predictors of conflict. In the post-Cold War era, no regions have been more susceptible to subnational conflict. As was noted above, each of these regions shares specific cultural (i.e., religious) traits; given that none show more proclivity for conflict than another, it is again suggested that religion may not hold the level of explanatory power assumed in either the CoC or my refined theory.

4.1.6 Testing Religious Causal Mechanisms

In the following models, I retain the "secular" variables that have been shown to be robust predictors thus far. Measures of wealth, population size, state newness and inequality are used as a baseline to then test the relative significance of civilizational and religious variables on the incidence of subnational conflict for each period. Huntington claimed that the proximity of groups of differing civilizational status would lead to an increased incidence of conflict between them; the greatest risk would thus be found within fault-line states lying along the borders between civilizations and within cleft states having large numbers of different civilizational groups within their borders. I test these claims in models that measure their significance individually and combined; I also test the significance of religiously cleft states, those that have minority religions that comprise at least 5% of the total state population. Results of these models are displayed below in Figure 4-11.

	CoC Cleft	Fault-line	Rel. Cleft	Combination
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.265***	-0.346***	-0.325***	-0.259***
	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.102)
Ln Population	0.276***	0.353***	0.349***	0.284***
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.073)
New State	0.062	0.116	0.130	0.074
	(0.412)	(0.411)	(0.411)	(0.412)
Economic Inequality	0.060***	0.058***	0.053***	0.057***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
CoC Cleft States	0.720***			0.694**
	(0.273)			(0.289)
CoC Fault-line States		0.045		-0.112
		(0.233)		(0.251)
Religiously Cleft States			0.592*	0.493
			(0.344)	(0.348)
Constant	-7.190***	-7.124***	-7.517***	-7.514
	(1.376)	(1.358)	(1.383)	(1.406)
Observations	4736	4736	4736	4736

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-11: Effects of Religious and CoC Variables, 1946-1988

GDP/pc, population size, and economic inequality remain significant explananda; none of the secular variables substantially deviate from the basic models previously examined. This again lends credence to the stability of these variables and of the basic model itself. Model 1, displayed in the left-hand column, includes a dummy variable that records if a state was identified as cleft in the CoC theory. The coefficient is both large and highly significant; suggesting the Huntington's hypotheses about the proclivity these state will have to experience subnational conflict may be correct. However, Huntington identified these states primarily because of the religious divides that exist within them and the conflict that had previously occurred along these cleavages. The significance thus attached to this variable may stem primarily from the

fact that these states had seen conflict in the Cold War era; this finding thus is not surprising given these facts. If this result is repeated within the data from the post-Cold War era, then perhaps more credence can be attached to Huntington's cleft states.

The coefficient for a dummy variable identifying CoC-defined fault-line states is positive, yet weak and insignificant. This suggests that states lying along Huntington's fault lines were not significantly more apt to engage in subnational conflict during the Cold War simply because of their geopolitical position than other states. The third column depicts the relative importance of religiously cleft states, which I defined earlier. The coefficient for a dummy variable identifying such states is large, positive and significant; this lends additional credence to my theory that religious, not civilizational differences are responsible for higher levels of conflict during the Cold War. The right-hand column depicts results when all three variables are included; CoC cleft states remain highly positive and significant predictors, while the coefficient for fault-line states is now slightly negative. The coefficient for religiously cleft states, while still strongly positive, is now insignificant; clearly the weight of the cleft states Huntington identified is greater than that of the variable measuring states cleft purely along religious lines.

Figure 4-12 displays the results from similar models performed on conflict data recorded in the years since the end of the Cold War. Coefficients for GDP/pc, population size, and state newness are again significant explananda; once more none of the secular variables substantially deviate from the basic models previously examined. The model including the coefficient for CoC cleft state depicts it as now being negative and no longer significant; Huntington's theory of cleft states does not hold in the post-

195

Cold War era. This lends further credence to suggestions that the cleft states Huntington

identified were marked within CoC hypotheses largely because of the existence of

previous conflict that had been recorded within these states.

Dependent Variable	CoC Cleft initiation	Fault-line initiation	Rel. Cleft initiation	Combination initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.608***	-0.520***	-0.597***	-0.555***
	(0.138)	(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.146)
Ln Population	0.350***	0.266***	0.320***	0.310***
	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.095)
New State	1.767***	1.488***	1.687***	1.587***
	(0.488)	(0.489)	(0.476)	(0.493)
Economic Inequality	-0.022	-0.019	-0.019	-0.023
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
CoC Cleft States	-0.294			-0.420
	(0.381)			(0.384)
CoC Fault-line States		0.507		0.582*
		(0.325)		(0.327)
Religiously Cleft States			-0.166	-0.127
			(0.383)	(0.386)
Constant	-1.227	-1.575	-1.039	-1.433
	(1.989)	(2.006)	(2.065)	(2.024)
Observations	2512	2512	2512	2512

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-12: Effects of Religious and CoC Variables, 1989-2007

The coefficient for a dummy variable identifying CoC-defined fault-line states is

positive, yet insignificant; once again suggesting that states lying along Huntington's

fault lines are not significantly more apt to engage in subnational conflict because of

their geopolitical position in the current era. The third column depicts the relative

importance of religiously cleft states; the coefficient for a dummy variable identifying

such states is now negative and insignificant; unlike in the previous period, the existence

of religious divides itself is no longer a sufficient explanandum in the current one. The

196

right-hand column with all three variables included again shows the coefficient for CoC cleft states to be negative and insignificant, as is the coefficient for religiously cleft states. That of Huntington's fault-line states, however, is now positive and significant. This indicates that the geopolitical position of states has correlated well with conflict initiation since the Cold War ended, yet may have more to do with population distribution, rather than with civilizational divisions, as I suggested in the last chapter.

What is clear is that simple cleavages, whether based on civilizational or religious divides, have not been important in predicting outbreaks of subnational violence in the last two decades. Neither CoC-defined states at risk nor those with significant religious subgroups have been inherently more conflict-prone in recent years. The evidence thus far suggests that cultural differences, at least in terms of religious affiliation, may not have the level of effect predicted by Huntington in his CoC theories. However, measures of religious demographics may not provide an adequate analysis; as I have argued earlier, the salience of religious differences must also be tested. If the population of a state is religiously heterogeneous and yet religion is not a salient cleavage, then religious conflict may not follow. The following models will test if such salience is indeed important.

Measures of religious salience are obtained from Bar Ilan University's Religion and State Project; they compile two indices that measure religious salience within states. The Government Regulation of Religion Index (GRI) measures the extent to which governments interfere with an individual's right to worship, the extent to which freedom of religion is protected, whether the state respects that freedom, the level of contribution of government policy support to the free practice of religion, whether foreign and other

197

missionaries are allowed to operate, and whether proselytizing, public preaching or conversion is tolerated by the state. The Social Regulation of Religion Index (SRI) measures societal attitudes toward other or nontraditional religions, attitudes toward conversion to other religions, whether societal attitudes or religious clerics discourage proselytizing, whether existing or established religions attempt to shut out new religions and the extent of assertive religious movements in that country. Each state is given a score from one to ten in each index, with lower scores representing less regulation. The data collected covers 175 states and covers the period 1990 through 2002; no model data will thus be presented covering the Cold War era.

The results of these models that include religious regulation are presented in Figure 4-13 below. The first column shows the results of a baseline model for reference; state wealth, population size and state newness are all significant explananda for conflict in the latter period. Column two shows the results when a measure of government regulation of religion is included; the coefficient is positive, but small and insignificant. Government regulation of religion seems to offer no substantive predictive power for conflicts of this type after the Cold War. Column three depicts a model including a measure of social regulation of religion; this coefficient is slightly more positive and is now statistically significant, suggesting an increased level of religious social regulation is correlated with a greater likelihood of violence. The right-hand column depicts results when both are included in the model; neither coefficient now has substantive significance and the coefficient for government religious regulation is now weakly negative.

	Baseline	GRI	SRI	Combination
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.583***	-0.595***	-0.608***	-0.622***
	(0.135)	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.144)
Ln Population	0.315***	0.261***	0.207**	0.208**
	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.101)
New State	1.681***	1.713***	1.660***	1.695***
	(0.477)	(0.493)	(0.488)	(0.494)
Economic Inequality	-0.019	-0.005	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Government Regulation		0.014		-0.034
		(0.046)		(0.067)
Social Regulation			0.086*	0.112
			(0.049)	(0.071)
Constant	-1.241	-1.449	-0.928	-0.755
	(2.009)	(2.085)	(2.089)	(2.114)
Observations	2512	2421	2421	2421

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-13: Effects of Religious Regulation Variables, 1989-2007

As with some of the non-religious variables tested in previous models, there is a likelihood that much of their explanatory power is subsumed under one or more of the major substantive variables. The following models will test the relative importance of each by including interaction terms; the next sections will provide a discussion of these findings. Results of these interaction models, displayed in Figure 4-14 below, measure the relative import of CoC and religiously cleft states as well as that of Huntington's CoC-defined fault-line states.

The first model depicts the results when GDP/pc and CoC cleft state variables are interacted; while the coefficient for GDP/pc remains negative and highly significant, as one would expect, the coefficient for CoC cleft states is now insignificant. When states are poor, the geopolitical location is positively associated with conflict, yet this is

not a significant indicator. The interaction term is weakly negative and insignificant; cleft states are more likely to engage in conflict, but only when they are poor. This places more of the significance of CoC cleft states on their level of prosperity, rather than geopolitical location, as I have theorized.

	CCleft*GDP	FL*GDP	RC*GDP	
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.258***	-0.219	-0.091	
	(0.116)	(0.147)	(0.294)	
Ln Population	0.275***	0.347***	0.347***	
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.062)	
New State	0.064	0.137	0.131	
	(0.412)	(0.412)	(0.411)	
Economic Inequality	0.061***	0.059***	0.054***	
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	
CoC Cleft States	0.910			
	(1.485)			
CoC Fault-line States		1.539		
		(1.349)		
Religiously Cleft States			2.436	
			(2.272)	
CoC Cleft*GDP/pc	-0.031			
	(0.236)			
CoC FL*GDP/pc		-0.222		
		(0.197)		
Rel Cleft*GDP/pc			-0.259	
			(0.309)	
Constant	-7.252***	-8.056***	-9.241***	
	(1.457)	(1.559)	(2.505)	
Observations	4736	4736	4736	

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-14: Effects of Religious and GDP Interaction Variables, 1946-1988

Model two depicts results when variables for GDP/pc and Huntington's fault-line states are interacted; when states are not located in fault-line areas, the coefficient for GDP/pc is still negative, but is now insignificant. This correlates with the majority

of fault-line state conflicts noted in the Cold War period, as discussed in Chapter Two. The coefficient for CoC derived fault-line states is strongly positive, yet insignificant; poor states located in these areas are likelier to engage in internal conflict, but not significantly so. The interaction term coefficient is negative and insignificant; the impact of wealth on both fault-line and other states keeps the likelihood of conflict lower. The last model shows the results when GDP/pc and religiously cleft state variables interact; when states are not religiously cleft, the effect of wealth is negative on conflict initiation, but not substantively so. This may be due to the effect of religiously cleft states, the coefficient of which is largely positive, yet also insignificant. The interaction term is negative; the effect of wealth on conflict prevention trumps the impact of religious demographics, at least during the Cold War.

Corresponding results for the post-Cold War era are presented in Figure 4-15 below. The negative effect of GDP/pc on conflict initiation in this period is starkly evident in all three models. In Model one, the coefficient for this term is strongly negative and highly significant; while the coefficient for the dummy variable depicting CoC cleft states is also strongly negative, it is not substantively significant. Wealthier states in the latter period are highly unlikely to have experienced conflict, despite any deep civilizational or religious cleavages they may have. The interaction term is also insignificant, suggesting that designation as a CoC cleft state does not make conflict any more likely in this period. Wealth is also a strong inhibitor of conflict in the second model, which interacts variables for GDP/pc and fault-line states; the coefficient is again strongly negative and highly significant. The coefficient for fault-line states with low GDP/pc is strongly negative and highly significant as well; fault-line states in the latter

201

period are strongly disassociated with subnational conflict. This corroborates evidence

found to this effect in the discussion in Chapter Three.

	CCleft*GDP	FL*GDP	RC*GDP	
Dependent Variable	initiation	initiation	initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.641***	-1.097***	-0.844***	
	(0.148)	(0.252)	(0.323)	
Ln Population	0.359***	0.257***	0.320***	
	(0.094)	(0.085)	(0.083)	
New State	1.707***	1.347***	1.649***	
	(0.498)	(0.488)	(0.478)	
Economic Inequality	-0.021	-0.018	-0.022	
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	
CoC Cleft States	-2.099			
	(2.830)			
CoC Fault-line States		-6.418***		
		(2.259)		
Religiously Cleft States			-2.544	
			(2.775)	
CoC Cleft*GDP/pc	0.234			
	(0.361)			
CoC FL*GDP/pc		0.892***		
		(0.295)		
Rel Cleft*GDP/pc			0.292	
			(0.341)	
Constant	-1.063	2.964	1.122	
	(2.003)	(2.469)	(3.229)	
Observations	2512	2512	2512	

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-15: Effects of Religious and GDP Interaction Variables, 1989-2007

However, the coefficient for the interaction term is both strongly positive and

highly significant; this suggests that wealthier fault-line states have been more likely to

have experienced internal conflict in the post-Cold War period than those states that

were wealthy (yet not fault-line) states, or poor states located in fault line zones. This is

more an artifact of the economic level of states involved in subnational violence during

this period. A significant minority of "fault-line" states initiating conflict during the 1990s were wealthy advanced nations (Venezuela, Indonesia, Russia and its satellites). A majority of states in conflict in the new millennium (Macedonia, Thailand, Uzbekistan and the U.S.) were also economically advanced; in addition, no data existed for six of the poorer nations in conflict. Thus, the positive and significant coefficient is a product of a large number of economically well-off states engaged in violence since 1989. Finally, Model three depicts results from the interaction of religiously cleft states and GDP/pc. Once again, the effect of wealth in states that are not religiously cleft is a significant inhibitor of internal violence. While the effect of religious cleavages in poor states is also negative, it is not significant. Religious cleavages in wealthier states, depicted in the interaction term, are positively associated with conflict, but not significantly so.

The CoC-derived and religious variables examined, when interacted with the measure of wealth used here, denote little in the way of causal importance in forecasts of subnational violence during the Cold War period. Of more import were the substantive measures of wealth, population and economic inequality. Wealthier states located in fault-line areas were positively associated with conflict initiation in the post-Cold War era, yet the effect of GDP/pc was generally more important than the contribution of the religious variables studied. The individual impact of CoC fault-line states was shown to be significantly negatively correlated with conflict in the latter period. Thus far there is little evidence that civilizational or religious differences are positive markers for internal violence in the modern age.

As a final check, I interact the two variables for religious regulation with GDP/pc, to disentangle any effects they may have apart from that of state wealth. Each variable is modeled separately to determine their individual effects; because they are never isolated in reality, a third model is executed that measures their impact together.

Dependent Variable	GRI initiation	SRI initiation	Combination initiation	initiation
Ln GDP/pc (lagged)	-0.839***	-1.087***	-1.126***	
	(0.222)	(0.298)	(0.306)	
Ln Population	0.261***	0.206**	0.209**	
	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.102)	
New State	1.708***	1.573***	1.626***	
	(0.492)	(0.489)	(0.496)	
Economic Inequality	-0.010	-0.017	-0.019	
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	
Government Regulation	-0.434		-0.098	
	(0.329)		(0.439)	
Social Regulation		-0.616*	0.570	
		(0.369)	(0.493)	
Gov. Reg*GDP/pc	0.061		0.007	
	(0.042)		(0.057)	
Soc. Reg*GDP/pc		0.091*	0.090	
		(0.048)	(0.065)	
Constant	0.664	3.068	3.465	
	(2.504)	(2.948)	(3.007)	
Observations	2421	2421	2421	

Notes: Standard errors of coefficients are given in parentheses below each; * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and *** denotes $p < 0.01$. Unless specifically noted otherwise, all models use Logit regression performed using the STATA 10 program.

Figure 4-16: Effects of Religious Regulation and GDP Interaction, 1989-2007

The results are displayed in Figure 4-16 above; in the first model depicting the interaction between wealth and government religious regulation, the coefficient for GDP/pc remains strongly negative and highly significant in the absence of such regulation. In states with low wealth, the impact of government regulation is negative, yet insignificant. When states are wealthier, the impact of the interaction term reveals

that it is only weakly positive and insignificant. Wealth is an important indicator of

conflict likelihood in the post-Cold War era, but government religious regulation is not.

In the second model, wealth is interacted with social regulation of religion;

again, the coefficient for GDP/pc is strongly negative and highly significant. In poor

states, religious regulation has a strongly negative and significant impact on conflict

initiation. However, in wealthier states, the impact is weak, yet positive and significant.

Thus social attitudes toward religion can have an impact, albeit a weak one, on violent

conflict within nations. The third model includes both variables and their interaction

effects; although the impact of GDP/pc is large and significant, none of the other

variables (separately or together) have any substantive impact.

The religious regulation variables examined here, when interacted together with

GDP/pc, provide little proof that levels of religious intolerance are useful indicators of

conflict in the modern age. Although wealthier states with higher levels of social

intolerance for religious diversity were positively associated with conflict initiation, the

impact was quite small. Again there seems little evidence that the salience of religious

differences, whether held by state institutions or at among the populations of a state, are

promising indicators of the potential of future subnational violence. Given the available

data on subnational conflict, even at levels much lower than those of traditional civil war

criteria, it appears that neither Huntington's clash of civilizations or this paper's attempt

to refine those arguments along religious lines have been validated in the two decades

after 1989.

4.2 Conclusions

Results of multivariate analysis indicate that some traditional explananda for civil war initiation are also quite useful for explaining conflict initiation at less intense levels. The level of economic success, population size, state newness (limited institutional capacity) and economic inequality each significantly affect the likelihood that subnational violence will occur. However, the impact of each differs when examining the evolution of this conflict type during and after the Cold War. Economic capacity, measured here as the level of per capita Gross Domestic Product, is an equally powerful predictor of internal peace in both periods. In wealthier states, political institutions are often more robust and allow grievances to be aired via a political process, rather than through violent means. In addition, individuals with greater access to wealth will less often choose strategies of violence to affect change when personal economic standing may suffer as a result. In short, wealthier states were shown to be less associated with internal violence than their poorer counterparts both during the Cold War and after.

Population size, shown to be an important variable when analyzing civil war initiation, also has utility in examinations of smaller-scale domestic conflicts. Young males make up the majority of groups involved in violence against the state; the larger the population, the larger this cohort is likely to be. In addition, the larger the state population, the greater the strain on the regime to provide adequate goods and services to the large population it serves. If the state fails to provide requisite levels of these goods, the likelihood of grievances arising will increase; if these grievances are not addressed in a satisfactory manner, conflict can eventually erupt in an attempt to force

the state to meet this need or to replace the regime. As was the case with low economic capacity, states with larger populations are more likely to have engaged in conflict of this type in both of the periods examined herein. However, other substantive explananda used were differentially important in predicting such conflicts in each of the two periods.

For example, during the period prior to the fall of the USSR state newness was not a significant predictor; although coefficients were generally positive in most models, they were never substantively significant. In contrast, instances where prior conflict has occurred with the forces of the state and a challenger group, the likelihood of future conflict initiation during the Cold War era was significant. In addition, higher levels of economic inequality were shown to be positive predictors of internal conflict in this period. The exact opposite was true of the post-Cold War era; state newness was highly significant, while prior incidence of conflict and economic inequality were not. It is outside the bounds of this project to postulate the rationale for these differences; future study to discover the reasons behind them would doubtless increase our understanding of subnational conflict initiation mechanisms in the modern era.

Ethnic fractionalization, shown in prior studies of civil war to be a less significant predictor of conflict, was a powerfully predictive tool in this study. This is likely because of the greater density of data gathered for this project; when more classic values of ethnic fractionalization are supplemented by data from recent studies, problems historically associated with data scarcity in prior studies disappeared. However, ethnic diversity was shown to be positively predictive only for the Cold War era; no such relationship was observed in the following period. In a similar fashion,

207

religious diversity was shown to have a negative effect on conflict initiation potential in the Cold War era; again, no such relationship was apparent in the post-Cold War period. States with high levels of oil exports were not significantly associated with conflict in either period.

The robustness of the variable measuring economic capacity was then explored; the salience of regime type, when measured along with GDP/pc, was insignificant. But when interacted with this economic variable in the Cold War era, more democratic states were shown to be likely to experience conflict when they are poor; wealthier democracies were less likely to explode into violent internal conflict. This is likely due to variations in regime type; autocratic regimes are more likely to repress, keeping incidence of internal violence low. While similar tendencies were noted in the following period, these effects were not found to be statistically significant.

Additionally, ethnic diversity was found to be of little import in conflict prediction when states were poor; such diversity was not a significant factor in conflict initiation in poor states during the Cold War. Neither were states likely to engage in conflict when they were both poor and ethnically heterogeneous; it follows that groups in poor states will engage in violent behavior more often because they are economically distressed rather than because they are ethnically diverse. Again, no such relationship was observed using data collected on conflicts occurring in the following period. Religious fractionalization levels were also not observed to impact the likelihood of conflict in the modern era.

Other substantive variables were also tested, including the existence of ongoing subnational or international conflict, historical legacies of Communist or colonial rule,

and categorization as an Islamic state. Ongoing subnational conflict was found to be a highly significant predictor of conflict initiation in both periods; when states are occupied with other challenger groups, the likelihood of new challengers initiating strategies of violent opposition was high. This was not the case with international conflicts; states involved in such struggles will often attempt to quickly crush these movements or reach agreements with them rather than engaging in what could become protracted violence. States should desire more peaceful outcomes rather than divert valuables resources and manpower away from what could well be existential threats from other states. In both periods historical legacies were found to be insignificant indicators of conflict potential, as were states that were identified as Islamic, via membership in the Organization of Islamic states.

State failure, as determined by the Political Instability Task Force project, was highly correlated with conflict initiation in both the Cold War era and after. However, this high correlation must be regarded with some degree of suspicion; involvement in ethnic or civil wars constitutes two of four indicators for inclusion as a failed state. Thus the endogenous nature of this variable makes it less useful; as such no further claims will be made concerning the importance of state failure in this project.

Tests of the importance of regional effects were performed; these are useful both for testing the robustness of the theorized primary explananda of subnational conflict, and for examining the variability of conflict across regions. In the Cold War era, Central and South America, the Middle East, Africa and Central/South Asia were highly significant positive predictors of conflict initiation. Interestingly in the period following, no regions were statistically positive conflict predictors; as noted in Chapter

Three, conflict in the two decades following 1989 has been ubiquitous in terms of geographic region. Many of these regions share specific cultural and religious traits; the lack of a significant regional difference in the post-Cold War era lends support to the argument that cultural influences on conflict in the modern era may have been overstated.

When the focus is shifted to examine CoC and religious variables, results emerge that cast more doubt on culture-based theories of subnational conflict in the post-Soviet era. Although Huntington's cleft states are strongly positive predictors of conflict likelihood in the Cold War era, they become negative and insignificant in the period that follows. This is not surprising when the inclusion criteria for cleft states in CoC theory are examined; many of the states he included in this category had experienced violence in the Cold War years. It appears that the extrapolation of this conflict potential into the modern era, as Huntington posited in the CoC theory, was without the merit he accorded it. Similar results obtain from observations of religiously cleft states; while positive and significant predictors in the former period, they become insignificant in the latter. Fault-line states are not found to be associated with conflict in either period, contradicting this portion of the CoC theory as well. No further insight is gained when testing interactions of these variables with GDP/pc in the Cold War era; in the following period, however, poor fault-line states were negatively and significantly associated with conflict. Wealthy fault-line states were positively and significantly associated with conflict after the Cold War; this, however, as I argued previously, is most likely an artifact of a large percentage of quite wealthy states in fault-line areas experiencing conflict after 1989, rather than any civilizational association.

Thus simple cleavages, whether they are civilizationally or religiously based, appear to offer little substantive predictive power in the modern era. The next step was to test the salience of religious diversity; if cultural differences exist yet no vital import is attached to these cleavages, it follows that conflict based on cultural cleavages will likely be minimal. Using data from Israel's Religion and State project, government and social religious regulation data was then examined to explore the impact of religious tolerance on conflict. The data set only spans the period from 1990 to 2005, so no tests of this data for the Cold War era are possible. No substantive correlation was observed with varying levels of government regulation of religion; the relationship, although positive, was very weak and insignificant. Social regulation of religion was positive and significant, but the impact was again weak. To test whether these correlations were being subsumed under the impact of GDP/pc, interaction models were again performed to test the individual significance of each.

Findings indicate that economic status is a far more robust predictor of conflict potential; government regulation of religion had only a weakly positive effect on violent outbreaks, and was not statistically significant. Social regulation was found to have a negative yet significant effect when states were poor; more regulation (less religious tolerance among the population) surprisingly correlated with *fewer* cases of violent conflict. In wealthier states, higher levels of social regulation were associated with a greater likelihood of conflict, but the effect was quite small and only weakly significant.

There is thus little evidence that religious differences, even when tolerance levels are low, are important predictors of subnational conflict in the modern era. Despite the bold predictions of clashing civilizations laid out in Huntington's classic theory, no such

211

evidence seems apparent in the nearly two decades following the fall of the Soviet Union. Even the refined theory of rising salience of religious cleavages presented here fails to produce the results expected. What matters is wealth, population, experience and equity: wealthier states fight less; populous states fight more, especially when political and social institutions are weak and economic parity among groups is low.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

5.1 Project Summary and Conclusions

"God is dead." Such was the pronouncement of Friedrich Nietzsche, and many in the social sciences have since set out to prove him right. Secularization theorists posited that with the continuing advancement of science and technology, the need for religion to help explain the unknown and offer solace from an uncertain future would diminish, and one day disappear altogether. Declining attendance at religious services in the latter half of the twentieth century, especially among advanced democracies in the Western world, seemed to bolster these arguments. It was widely assumed that Karl Marx was prescient when he declared religion to be the opiate of the masses.

The events of February through April 1979 caused many scholars to reconsider these arguments. Within a few short months the Iranian people had overthrown a secular regime and replaced it with a hard-line theocracy. In the following decade states in many different regimes suffered violence as fundamentalist movements vied for control of the state. Conflict in Sudan, Algeria, the Philippines and elsewhere forced a re-examination of Secularization Theory. The assassination of Anwar Sadat by Islamic militants in 1981, the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Dhahran, increasing religious violence in India, Pakistan and Africa all pointed to a major resurgence in religious fervor unpredicted by Secularization Theory. The attacks on the United States in 2001 precipitated the War on Terror, a U.S.-led initiative to destroy al-Qaeda, a worldwide religious movement that has openly declared a jihad, or holy war, on the West and a

desire to see Islam become a global religion. It was in this era of increasing religious violence that Samuel Huntington came to develop his theory of future global conflict.

His 1993 Clash of Civilizations theory sought to explain this increase in religious salience and conflict by tying the differential effects of modernization to identity shifts away from nationalities and toward more fundamental civilizational identities. Samuel Huntington placed the majority of the world's population within eight major groups, and claimed that future conflict, albeit over many traditional issues such as territory, would nonetheless be between populations within these groups. Future conflict, both between and within states, would become increasingly civilizational, especially after the end of the Cold War when superpower influences waned.

Much scholarly work emerged challenging CoC hypotheses and thousands of pages of academic articles and books followed. Many of these works found evidence suggesting the theory was wrong, primarily using data comparing interstate conflicts both before and after the Cold War. This study is different, in that the main focus was not just to add yet another voice to those disparaging Huntington's work. Instead I attempted to refine Huntington's arguments, moving below the overarching level of civilization and instead focusing on one of the major components of CoC civilizations, religion. I argued that religious differences, rather than civilizational groupings, would yield greater utility in explanations of the observed evolution of subnational conflict in the modern era. The CoC civilizations, I argued, while a novel means of categorizing the global population, were both too broad in scope and too few in number to classify global ethnic groupings.

Why religion, rather than civilization? Secularization Theory had pronounced religion as having little import; the social sciences seemed determined to reject religion in its quest to elevate the rational above the spiritual. International relations scholars thus focused on realist explanations of war; grievances over security, territory, and access to the political process replaced religious and cultural explananda. Yet a group of young religious zealots led the Iranian Revolution, installing a theocracy and ousting a corrupt dictator. Latin American Catholics began to politically mobilize in the following decade, as Liberation Theology swept the region. U.S. politics was increasingly impacted by the political power of groups like the Moral Majority, which influenced both presidential elections and political appointments. Finally, a series of attacks on American interests culminated in the events of September 11, 2001 and forced a retrenchment among those espousing Secularization Theory.

Huntington argued that these and other events were a portent of the rising salience of cultural differences emerging in an increasingly modernizing world in which divisions between haves and have-nots were becoming increasingly stark. Rising inequality among these groups would engender shifts away from traditional national identities as states were perceived as unable to restore an equitable balance. Civilizations, rather than states, would become the largest cultural grouping in the future; emerging cleavages would thus force alignments along civilizational, rather than nationalist lines. Muslim would ally with Muslim, regardless of geostrategic location; cross-national Hindu brotherhood would unite populations regionally, and Westerners, in the face of perceived threats from without, would naturally unite in common defense

against those that were civilizationally different – especially without the restraining influence of the Cold War powers.

But this has not been the case, at least within the first two decades since the fall of the Soviet Union. Iraq continues to suffer from sectarian warfare; if the body count has fallen in recent years, it is more due to the effectiveness of previous ethnic cleansing that has occurred since 2003. Algerian fundamentalists continue to engage in violent conflict against more secular Muslim believers, despite the alleged CoC civilizational ties. While violence between cultures is occurring, as in the separatist movements in Chechnya and southern Philippines, there is no attendant outpouring of support for either side from groups with similar civilizational identities in other states. It was the interreligious nature of many of these conflicts that led me to theorize that religious, rather than civilizational, differences were the likely source of subnational conflict. I posited that this might help to explain the negative findings of researchers disputing the CoC hypotheses.

My research focused, therefore, on refining Huntington's theory by examining religious rather than civilizational differences. Because of the heavy weight religious identification was given in developing the CoC theories, my theory sought to refine rather than refute CoC theory. I thus sought to explore if differences in religious belief, rather than in CoC civilization characterization, would provide greater predictive power for conflict at the subnational level in the modern era. Huntington had identified seven (or eight, if the African civilization is included) major civilizational groups in his theory; here I include the Buddhist civilization as well. Although he did not categorize it as a major civilization, Huntington did indeed stress its importance as a civilizational group,

216

and included it in the map of civilizations presented in the opening pages of the book. Along these civilizational lines he defined so-called "fault-line" states; because of their location along lines separating civilizational groups, these states would be especially susceptible to violence from groups of differing civilizational status within their borders.

In contrast to previous studies of the importance of religious difference on the initiation of subnational violence, I identified twelve belief categories in this study; this differentiation allowed flexibility not found in previous studies that limited the number of religious categories, sometimes to as few as three. Christianity, a religion that defined both Latin America and the West in CoC theory, was divided into three major categories: Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Protestantism. Many sects are subsumed under the rubric of Islam, but for purposes of clarity only Sunni and Shi'ite subgroups were included.

Hindu, Buddhist, Sinic (or Confucian) and Shinto (Japan) religious groups were also added to this list, as was Judaism, since Israel's geopolitical importance and nearly continual conflictually-based involvement with other Muslim regional groups made it a vital part of any project of this type. To provide a more complete representation of all religious groups worldwide, an indigenous category was then created; to represent those groups having no professed religious belief (whether voluntarily or by state decree), an atheist category was also included. This study therefore classified twelve religious categories in all, providing what I hoped was additional explanatory leverage over CoC's nine civilizational groupings.

Categorical religious classification has also been performed in previous studies of this type, yet the utility of such an approach is questionable. Does the mere existence

217

of a minority religion serve as a source of possible conflictual behavior between this group and that of the majority religion? Measuring conflict likelihood in this fashion is self-limiting; without adequate evidence that the salience of religious divisions exists within a state, making predictions of future conflict between these groups is at best uninformed and not scientifically rigorous. I operationalize measures of religious salience via data gathered from Israel's Religion and State project, which collects statistics on government and social regulation of religion for 170 countries worldwide.

I sought to answer two primary questions – were the CoC hypotheses bearing fruit in the nearly two decades following the Cold War? If they weren't, then would religious cleavages, rather than civilizational differences, better validate Huntington's theories of culture-based conflict at the subnational level? As a primary data source, subnational conflict initiation cases were extracted from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which classifies conflicts as those that result in at least twenty five battle deaths. Two hundred twenty five cases of subnational conflict initiation between 1946 and 2007 were obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Dataset, the primary USDP record of these events.

An analysis of the descriptive statistics obtained from examining the data was performed in Chapter Three. As had been observed in previous studies of conflict at the level of civil war, a steady increase in low-level subnational conflict occurred through 1974, followed by a series of rapid rises in the following two decades. A large jump in ongoing conflict cases was observed from 1989 through 1992, followed by a sharp decline. It was theorized elsewhere that this four-year jump was an artifact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War; further examination revealed

218

instead that the peak was due to an unusual number of conflict initiations, primarily in Africa and Asia. Theories that this surge was directly tied to the end of the Cold War and the loss of former Soviet possessions were thus unsubstantiated by the data; clashes involving former Soviet vassals accounted for only a small portion of the total observed.

One unexpected finding arose from an examination of the precipitous drop in ongoing conflict totals observed after 1992. During the first two decades of the study period, conflicts were resolved at a rate of just under two per year; this rate increased slightly through the 1980s. During the following decade conflicts were resolved at an astonishing rate of over six per annum, or nearly triple the rate observed earlier. These were not only resolutions of short-term violence that had begun during the surge in some conflict initiations begun in the 1990s; many other conflicts, some ongoing for decades, were also brought to successful conclusions. This rate, while dropping to nearly four per year in the current decade, is still nearly double that observed previously. Although it is postulated that increased global transparency and desires for more stable regional markets in an increasingly interconnected global network, no further exploration of this anomaly was performed here. It is, however, an area of great interest and worth devoting resources to further study and understand it.

Evidence also suggests that while conflict initiations spiked in the four-year period ending in 1992, no upward trend was noted in the years prior to this event or in the post-Cold War afterward. Instead, a marked decrease was noted in the years since the surge took place, with an average of just two new initiations annually since 2000, the lowest noted since the 1950s. An examination of regional trends revealed differences in the spatial and temporal distribution of conflict; while subnational violence in the

Americas has been relatively uncommon and evenly distributed across time, such conflict in Europe was unique to two distinct periods. Violence arose after 1946 as the USSR consolidated its holdings, and conflict arose again in the 1990s as many former Soviet vassals attempted to establish permanent territorial borders among their neighbors.

Far from being a hotbed of conflict as some pundits have described, the Middle East, with few exceptions, has seen primarily low levels of conflict across the period. One notable exception occurred in 1979, when five of the seven observed conflicts were initiated in this region. Indeed, other than the continuing sectarian strife in Iraq and the resumption of conflict in Iran and Turkey in 2005, the region through 2007 has been quiescent. In stark contrast is Africa; while no conflict of this type was observed prior to 1960, the grant of independence to most African nations was followed by dozens of incidences of internal violence. Of 185 instances of conflict initiation since that date, forty percent (74) have occurred on this continent. This percentage has increased since the end of the Cold War; in the modern era forty-four percent of new initiations have occurred there. Given the relatively sparsely populated nature of this continent, this figure is large indeed.

The contribution of Central and South Asia to the global total has been rather small but persistent; the region has experienced a nearly unbroken period of violence since the end of the Second World War. However, this does not imply that conflict has been widespread; indeed, more than half of these conflicts have erupted in only two states – India and Myanmar. In each country, separatist violence has persisted since the grant of independence from Britain sixty years before. Across East Asia, conflict was

confined primarily to the first three decades of the study period; however, some of the most intense violence was recorded during that period. Nearly one and a half million perished during the Chinese civil war, millions more died in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Since then the region has been relatively quiet; only five new initiations were recorded in over three decades, including two bids for independence in Aceh Indonesia and Patani Province in Thailand.

The increasing level of subnational violence over the study period was thus the sum of a small but steady stream of conflict occurring in Central and South America as well as Asia. East Asia added to the total in the first three decades; Africa substantially increased the yearly total after 1960. The Middle East only moderately impacted totals across the era; only in 1979 did the region record a large percentage of total initiations. Europe remained relatively quiet, but high levels of violence in the 1940s and early 1990s help explain the two maxima observed in global conflict totals.

The dramatic increase in conflict initiations observed from 1989-1992 was not found to be a byproduct of the end of the Cold War. Of the forty-five conflicts begun, only thirteen can be directly tied to this event, and more than half of these occurred in only one year. Thus scholarly speculation that a move to a multipolar international system would lead to higher levels of conflict so far appear unfounded. Rather, a slow but continual rise in subnational conflict, coupled with a short period in which tests of geopolitical relationships within states in Eastern Europe accompanied a large increase in internal violence in Asia and Africa, was responsible for the surge in conflict observed during the early 1990s.

Testing the validity of the many hypotheses offered within CoC theory followed; while a large percentage of conflicts occurred in CoC-defined civilizational fault-line states during the Cold War period, this likely informed the theory itself. Additionally, fault-line states contain more than three-quarters of the global population; this number mirrors closely the percentage of conflicts that occurred within these states. In the post-Cold War era, conflicts are not found to follow these fault lines in the majority of cases; this places doubt on the validity of this portion of the CoC theory. The one region in which conflict follows the civilizational divide described in Huntington's work is in the Middle East and South Asia, but no other regions were found to hold similar patterns. Thus Hypothesis 01 is validated, in that fault-line states experience a higher percentage of subnational conflict than states located elsewhere; these results, however, because of the proportional amount of the global population they contain, are not surprising. But Hypothesis 02 is unsupported; conflict within these states has thus far not occurred at a disproportional rate in the post-Cold War era.

Territory was not the primary grievance over which conflicts were fought during the majority of the entire period. Only during the 1990s did groups fight more over territory than over grievances concerning the government. If we restrict the focus to fault-line states only, there is evidence that territory was the primary contentious issue; Soviet consolidation of territory gained during the Second World War accounted for most of the observed cases. However, territorial grievances as a cause of conflict decreased during the next four decades; it was only in the 1990s that territory again became the primary grievance for violence initiated. In the current decade, territorial

disputes again make up a minority of observed cases; invalidating Hypothesis 03, which predicted that subnational conflicts over territory would increase after the Cold War.

The evolution of conflict intensity was then examined; empirical data revealed that until the 1980s conflicts within fault-line states were indeed more violent in terms of battle deaths than those fought elsewhere. Yet during the last two decades the level of violence in terms of battle deaths has decreased, and conflicts fought outside these fault-line states comprise the majority of lethal casualties. This finding invalidates the claim of Hypothesis 04, which predicted such violence would increase in the post-Cold War era. CoC theory also forecast increasingly long-lived conflict between civilizations; this too was not substantiated as the average duration of conflicts greatly decreased in the last four decades, with fault-line conflicts lasting less long than violence initiated elsewhere. Thus this CoC hypothesis is unsupported as well; of the five testable hypotheses, only one was supported empirically, and may be merely an artifact of the data used to develop this portion of the CoC theory.

Thus predictions of culture-based conflict based on CoC-defined civilizations were found to have little support given the available empirical data. Conflict between differing religious groups was examined next, with quite different results. Interreligious conflicts, those between groups of differing religious belief, were found to comprise a large percentage of the total in all but one decade. During the first four decades of this study, interreligious conflict made up a slight majority of the total in three of the four decades. This percentage reached a nadir in the following decade, yet has climbed steadily in the final two decades; interreligious conflict comprised half of all observed initiations in the current decade. Although I am unable to positively validate the claim

made in Hypothesis 06, in which interreligious conflicts comprise the majority of all cases, Hypothesis 07 is validated – conflict of this type has indeed been increasing in the post-Cold War era. Hypothesis 08, in which interreligious conflicts should be territorial in nature, and of greater intensity and duration, is largely supported in both periods. They are longer on average, more intense, and with the exception of the current decade, more over territorial grievances.

One final test of the CoC theory was conducted, evaluating the contentious claim that Islam has "bloody innards". In terms of participation, Muslims were involved as either the challenger group or forces representing the state in forty-six percent of the total cases observed since 1946, more than any other group. Sunni Muslims were involved in 93 of 225 total incidents of subnational violence, followed by Catholics with involvement in 68 cases. Conflicts in which Muslims were involved were also longer; in those lasting more than twenty years Muslims were involved twice as often as the nearest category. Only in conflicts lasting longer than forty years were they less likely to be involved; in these cases Buddhist groups were involved in half.

In terms of intensity, however; those conflicts in which atheist groups were involved generated more battle deaths. However, a large percentage of these deaths were recorded during the Chinese civil war, which biases the results. Conflicts in which atheists were involved totaled 2.4 million deaths over the entire period; those involving Muslims totaled just over two million. Catholics were also involved in conflicts with high casualty totals; with over one million deaths recorded, they can also be considered to have "bloody innards". Huntington's assertions about Islam's involvement in intense conflict, however contentious, are indeed supported by the empirical data.

224

Multivariate analysis of the data was then conducted to examine the differential import of both traditional independent causal variables and those representing both CoC theory and that presented here. I chose a theoretical approach to subnational conflict that closely mirrors previous studies of civil war; I posited wealthier countries to be less likely to experience violent conflict. Larger populations would increase the chance of violence, as would new states with underdeveloped political and social institutions; lastly, groups that had states previously in conflict with challenger groups would be more prone to conflict resumptions with these groups.

Multiple model runs show these four substantive variables to be powerful predictors of subnational violence at lower intensity conflict as well. States with higher levels of GDP/pc were far less likely to be plagued with violent unrest in both periods; more populous states were conversely more likely to be plunged into deadly civil unrest. The remaining two variables were also important, but differentially so; while prior conflict was a significant predictor of future violence in the Cold War era, it was not so in the period following. State newness was shown to be insignificant in forecasting conflict initiation during the Cold War, but was highly salient after.

I tested additional variables for possible causal power; because of their resource endowment, oil-exporting states have been previously theorized to be more susceptible to conflict. However, repeated testing revealed this to be unfounded; no significant predictive power was obtained. Regime type has also been shown to be useful in tests of civil war likelihood; when GDP/pc was controlled for, democracies were shown to be less likely to experience subnational violence. The existence of alternative avenues of peaceful challenge to government policy and higher expectations of participation in the

political process make choices of strategies of violence less likely in more democratic states. However, this effect was only manifested during the Cold War; in the following period, democracy level was insignificantly correlated to conflict initiation.

Economic inequality had been shown in previous studies of civil war to be an ineffective predictor of violence; however, data scarcity and measurement error have long plagued data sets that measure this variable. A robust inequality data set from the University of Texas was employed here, with quite different results. During the Cold War, economic inequality was positively and significantly associated with conflict; however; this relationship did not extend into the period following, where inequality was found to be insignificant. Legacies of colonial rule or Soviet domination were insignificant in both periods; so too was the existence of ongoing international conflict. However, when states were involved in subnational conflict with other groups, initiations were more likely – again in both periods. To test for the effect of Islam on subnational violence, national membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference was used to operationalize this variable; no significance was derived from such membership. Tests of regional variability show that in the Cold War era Central and South America, the Middle East, Africa and Central/South Asia were all positively associated with conflict. In the period following, no regions were statistically positive conflict predictors; this lack suggests that cultural influences on conflict in the modern era may be overstated.

To test for the effect of religion, fractionalization values of ethnic and religious diversity were employed. While ethnic diversity was shown to be positively associated with conflict in the Cold War period, religious fractionalization was correlated with less

226

likelihood of conflict. Neither of these variables was substantively significant in the period following the Cold War. When dummy variables for Huntington's cleft and fault-line states were included, cleft states were positively correlated with conflict, but only in the Cold War era; in the following period they were insignificant. Religiously cleft states; while positive and significant predictors in the former period, also become insignificant in the latter. Fault-line states are not found to be associated with conflict in either period, contradicting this portion of the CoC theory as well.

In the period following the Cold War, poor fault-line states were negatively associated with conflict, while wealthy fault-line states were positively associated with conflict. This is primarily due to a large percentage of wealthy states in fault-line areas experiencing conflict after 1989, rather than any civilizational association. Government religious regulation data available after the Cold War shows no substantive correlation with conflict; social regulation of religion was positive and significant, but the impact was quite weak. When states were poor, social regulation was found to have a negative yet significant effect; more regulation (less religious tolerance among the population) correlated with *fewer* cases of violent conflict. In wealthier states, higher levels of social regulation were associated with a greater likelihood of conflict, but the effect was quite small and only weakly significant.

Despite Huntington's contentious predictions of clashing civilizations in the future, little evidence seems apparent to support his theories in the nearly two decades following the end of the Cold War. Even the refined theory of rising salience of religious cleavages presented here fails to produce the results expected. When it comes to subnational conflict, especially at low-intensity levels, what matters is wealth,

227

population, experience and equity: wealthier states tend to fight less, instead desiring to protect the economic status quo. Populous states fight more, especially when political and social institutions are weak and economic parity among groups is low; larger numbers of young males within these states provide fertile ground in which discontent can flourish. In the modern era, a lack of robust government and social institutions makes conflict more likely; states in their formative years are also prone to violence. As of this writing, any substantive impact of religion on subnational conflict has yet to be revealed. Although the salience of religion seems to be on the increase, given ongoing efforts by fundamentalist groups such as al Qaeda, it is realist rather than religious issues that appear to continue to drive groups to conflict in the new millennium.

5.2 Foreign Policy Implications

This study focused solely on subnational conflict, yet has direct ties to broader international relations theory. There have been only sixty-two interstate conflicts begun since 1946; of these only thirty have reached the level of war. The number of interstate conflicts reaching war levels has also decreased radically in the last two decades; since 1990 only four (the battle over Kashmir, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the US-led invasion of Iraq) have met this criterion. Wars at the interstate level are rare and becoming more so, making quantitative studies of these events quite challenging. However, by studying the processes that lead to conflict at the subnational level, scholars can make reasonable inferences that may prove useful at the level of interstate conflict.

Huntington argued civilizational differences would in the future be of sufficient salience to contribute to conflict initiation between groups within state borders; it seems

reasonable to assume that such differences may contribute to tensions between groups that straddle international borders. This research thus has implications for theories of the salience of ethnicity and religion in the conflict process at both the domestic and international levels.

Subnational violence has impacts that often stretch far beyond the borders within which they occur; many of these impacts have detrimental effects on regional stability and trade. In a global marketplace becoming ever more interconnected, regional impacts can translate into transnational unrest, endangering trade at the international level. The loss of such trade can translate into the equivalent of billions of dollars; rational actors should therefore seek to minimize the number of these conflicts. There would be utility in employing international and regional organizations to press for peace in these war-torn regions; states in conflict could be pressured from without to seek negotiated settlements to avoid disrupting international commerce. In addition, states seeking membership in international and regional organizations must often meet stringent requirements that require proof of protection of civil and political rights of minority groups within their borders. The desire for entrance to the organizations may indeed be providing sufficient impetus for states to seek swift resolution to these internal disputes; future studies to verify this claim would doubtless prove useful.

The implications for policymakers of the results of the multivariate analyses performed here are varied and important. The significant yet weak impact of democracy level on the likelihood of conflict initiation should move us away from the Clinton and Bush policies of democratization for national security purposes. Far more salient is the level of economic success in conflict prevention; more attention should likely be paid to

improving economic conditions in poor countries to prevent such conflicts before they begin. Even economic inequality appears not to be a catalyst for violence in the new millennium.

In addition, international monitoring of and assistance to new states in their formative years is imperative; the global community has a stake in the development process of such states in preventing a descent into violence that could last decades and have implications far beyond its borders. While it seems counterintuitive, states with high levels of petroleum resources also appear to be unlikely sources of internal unrest; what matters is economic success, not resource endowment, in forecasting possible incidences of future domestic violence.

Although in the early years following the demise of the Soviet Union it initially appeared that former Communist states were more at risk for outbreaks of subnational violence, this historical legacy was not significantly associated with domestic conflict. Neither these nor former colonial possessions were found to be more prone to violence since the end of the Cold War. It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that additional focus on these states may not be necessary; foreign policy should focus on economic advancement for these states, as should be the case for any other developing nation.

One significant finding was the proclivity of states engaged in subnational conflict with challenger groups to be challenged again from other groups within the state. There are states in conflict as of this writing that have been engaged in violence within their borders for six decades; India, Myanmar, Israel and others have been nearly continually at war since their inception. Foreign attention needs to be directed at ending these conflicts if we wish to avoid additional outbreaks from within their borders. But

no region is exempt from internal violence in the aftermath of the Cold War; focusing on Africa or Asia to the exclusion of other regions will likely allow conflict to spring up in areas where international attention is lacking. One need only look at popular uprisings in Iran, Thailand and Peru to note that though violence may be declining globally, it is still very much a reality in locations throughout the globe.

The lack of any proof of an upcoming civilizational divide sparking future conflict appears to ameliorate the need to plan on a "West against the Rest" strategy of military and economic dominance, as Huntington was wont to suggest in the CoC theory. States divided along religious or civilizational lines have shown no greater likelihood to engage in internal violence than any other. Although a lack of social tolerance of religious diversity appears to be linked to conflict initiation in the modern era, the effect of this variable was weak at best.

Thus the importance of both civilizational and religious differences in the new millennium, despite the warnings of Samuel Huntington, is overshadowed by realist issues. While coverage of fundamentalist attacks continues to generate sensationalist audience fodder in the international media; these attacks appear to be more the tools of terrorist activism than the strategies of opposition groups seeking to change the circumstances in which they find themselves. Instead these groups continue to fight for what they have sought for generations; they seek a better economic future for their children and themselves, they desire to regain or protect territorial homelands, and they desire greater participation in the political process in the nations in which they live. It is therefore vital that more advanced nations continue to strive to aid these peoples in their struggles to better themselves.

5.3 Opportunities for Future Research

This section concludes the project with an overview of possible opportunities for further research. This study concludes that religious differences may not be as salient as predicted by those siding with cultural explanations of subnational conflict; additional research using alternative measures of religious demography at the subnational level may reveal additional data that may further support or refute the conclusions drawn within. Only twelve religious categories were measured in this project; additional specification of religious gradation in both numbers of included religious groups as well as levels of religious participation may lead to further insight into this question. In addition, alternative measures of religious regulation that test the salience of religious toleration may clarify the importance of religious diversity at the intrastate level.

One specific avenue of research to be continued is testing the theory of the significance of religious organizations on mobilization and conflict, offered in the closing pages of Chapter One. While outside the scope of this admittedly limited work, analysis of the importance of organizational structure and social offerings on the decision matrices of elites considering "unsecular politics" and individuals debating joining religious movements in spite of the dangers involved will doubtless yield very interesting results. If future studies can relate varying levels of religious organization to success in mobilization, conflict initiation and the conduct of war, as well as conflict resolution, we may be able to make better forecasts of the likelihood of the success of these movements. In addition, both nations and non-governmental organizations may be able to target these religious organizations to help ameliorate subnational conflict or even prevent it before it begins.

Although multivariate analysis suggests the limited impact of religion on subnational conflict in the modern age, the seemingly increasing salience of religion, especially in the developing world, makes this a useful area for future study. Given the variability of organization, network density and resource availability among religious organizations, is there a correlation between these variables and elite use of these organizations for mobilization and sustainment of social movements? Does empirical evidence exist that suggests religious organizations are differentially able to overcome collective action problems and encourage their members to join these movements, based on the level of social services available to members making strategic decisions to join them? Are some religious organizations better able to make credible commitments that facilitate peace agreements between insurgent groups and the state, based on empirical evidence since 1946? Further investigation of these questions seems warranted, given the continuing rise in religious fervor observed in the last few decades.

Another area where additional research is needed involves investigating the rationale behind the anomalous rise in conflict resolution rates in the years following the Cold War. What precipitated a rise of nearly three hundred percent in conflict resolution rates after 1989? This was not an artifact of the short duration of conflicts associated with the end of the Cold War; many conflicts continue to be resolved as of this writing. Instead, a large number of conflicts lasting multiple decades were ended in rapid succession in the first decades of the post-Cold War era. It is at least possible that with the increasing density of global news networks, conflicts are more readily brought into the public eye, making their presence and impact known in greater detail by a larger population share.

The end of the Cold War offered many the promise of a new global era of peace; instead, a rash of new conflicts beginning in 1989 seemed to foretell a different story, one in which conflict would be on the rise instead. Samuel Huntington provided a most intriguing future, one in which China would rise to challenge the economic might of the U.S. and Islam would seek to challenge the rest of the world for religious dominance. While the jury is still out on Chinese ambitions in the twenty-first century, it appears that Huntington's arguments, whether based on religious or civilizational differences, are thus far unfounded. While additional time may provide support to his theories, as of now they remain only one of many possible futures.

Appendix A

COUNTRIES USED IN PROJECT DATASET

North America	Central/S. America and Caribbean	Middle East/N. Africa	Western Europe
Canada	Antigua & Barbuda	Algeria	Andorra
United States	Argentina	Bahrain	Austria
	Bahamas	Egypt	Belgium
	Barbados	Iran	Denmark
	Belize	Iraq	Finland
	Bolivia	Israel	France
	Brazil	Jordan	Germany
	Chile	Kuwait	Germany, West
	Colombia	Lebanon	Greece
	Costa Rica	Libya	Iceland
	Cuba	Morocco	Ireland
	Dominica	Oman	Italy
	Dominican Republic	Qatar	Liechtenstein
	Ecuador	Saudi Arabia	Luxembourg
	El Salvador	Sudan	Malta
	Grenada	Syria	Monaco
	Guatemala	Tunisia	The Netherlands
	Guyana	Turkey	Norway
	Haiti	United Arab Emirates	Portugal
	Honduras	Yemen, North (1946-89)	San Marino
	Jamaica	Yemen, South (1967-89)	Spain
	Mexico	Yemen (1990-)	Sweden
	Nicaragua		Switzerland
	Panama		United Kingdom
	Paraguay		Vatican City
	Peru		
	St. Kitts & Nevis		
	St. Lucia		
	St. Vincent & Grenadines		
	Suriname		
	Trinidad & Tobago		
	Uruguay		
	Venezuela		

Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Central Asia	East Asia and Oceania
Albania	Angola	Afghanistan	Australia
Armenia	Benin	Bangladesh	Brunei
Azerbaijan	Botswana	Bhutan	Cambodia
Belarus	Burkina Faso	India	China
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Burundi	Kazakhstan	East Timor
Bulgaria	Cameroon	Kyrgyzstan	Fiji
Croatia	Cape Verde Islands	Myanmar	Indonesia
Cyprus	Central African Republic	Nepal	Japan
Czechoslovakia (until 93)	Chad	Pakistan	

Czech Republic (93-07)	Comoros	Sri Lanka	Kiribati
Estonia	Dem. Rep. of Congo	Tajikistan	Korea, North
Georgia	Republic of Congo	Turkmenistan	Korea, South
Germany, East	Cote d'Ivoire	Uzbekistan	Laos
Hungary	Djibouti		Malaysia
Latvia	Equatorial Guinea		Maldives
Lithuania	Eritrea		Marshall Islands
Macedonia	Ethiopia		Micronesia, F.S.
Moldova	Gabon		Mongolia
Montenegro	Gambia, The		Nauru
Poland	Ghana		New Zealand
Romania	Guinea		Palau
Russia	Guinea-Bissau		Papua N. Guinea
Serbia	Kenya		Philippines
Serbia and Montenegro	Lesotho		Samoa
Slovakia	Liberia		Singapore
Slovenia	Madagascar		Solomon Islands
Soviet Union	Malawi		Taiwan
Ukraine	Mali		Thailand
Yugoslavia (1946-91)	Mauritania		Tonga
Yugoslavia, Fed. Republic	Mauritius		Tuvalu
	Mozambique		Vanuatu
	Namibia		Vietnam (1946-53, 75-07)
	Niger		Vietnam, North (1954-74)
	Nigeria		Vietnam, South (1954-74)
	Rwanda		
	Sao Tome & Principe		
	Senegal		
	Seychelles		
	Sierra Leone		
	Somalia		
	South Africa		
	Swaziland		
	Tanzania		
	Togo		
	Uganda		
	Zambia		
	Zimbabwe		

Appendix B

LIST OF CONFLICT INITIATIONS, 1946-2007

	Country	UCDP ID #	Start Date	End Date	Casualty Count	Intensity	Duration (years)
1	Afghanistan	137	4/27/78	Ongoing	559,500	5	30
2	Algeria	191	6/1/91	Ongoing	92,017	4	17
3	Angola	131	1975	4/4/02	159,475	5	16
4	Angola (Cabinda)	192	1991	Ongoing	592	1	17
5	Argentina	50	9/16/55	9/19/55	500	1	.011
6	Argentina	50	4/1/63	9/22/63	25	1	.417
7	Argentina	50	8/11/74	1977	2984	2	4
8	Azerbaijan	193	Jan 92	12/31/05	19,290	3	14
9	Azerbaijan	201	6/4/93	3/17/95	800	1	3
10	Bangladesh	126	2/1/75	11/9/92	3,500	2	18
11	Bolivia	1	6/1/46	7/21/46	1,000	2	.167
12	Bolivia	1	4/9/52	4/12/52	600	1	.011
13	Bolivia	1	3/1/67	Oct 67	82	1	.667
14	Bosnia & Herzegovina	194	4/27/92	1995	40,413	4	4
15	Bihac Krajina, B&H	202	10/3/93	8/7/95	900	1	2
16	Croatian Republic of B&H, Bosnia & Herzegovina	203	4/30/93	4/1/94	13,687	3	2
17	Burkina Faso	165	10/15/87	10/15/87	100	1	.003
18	Burundi	90	10/18/65	10/18/65	50	1	.003
19	Burundi	90	1991	9/7/2006	8,555	3	16
20	Cambodia	103	4/2/67	1998	341,500	5	32
21	Cameroon	158	1960	1961	500	1	2
22	Cameroon	158	4/6/84	4/9/84	500	1	.011
23	CAR	222	10/1/01	2006	219	1	6
24	Chad	91	7/1/66	Ongoing	39,436	4	42
25	Chile	125	9/11/73	9/11/73	2095	2	.003
26	China	3	1/1/46	10/1/49	1.2 mil	5	4
27	China (Taiwan)	18	2/28/47	3/24/47	28,000	4	.083
28	China (Tibet)	39	10/7/50	4/23/59	76,000	4	10
29	Colombia	92	1/1/64	Ongoing	28,681	4	44
30	Comoros	167	11/26/89	11/29/89	27	1	.011

31	Comoros (Anjouan)	213	9/3/97	9/6/97	56	1	.011
32	Congo, Dem Republic (Katanga)	68	7/1/60	1962	783 est	1	3
33	Congo, Dem Republic (South Kasai)	69	8/1/60	1962	450 est	1	3
34	Congo, Dem Republic	86	5/1/64	11/5/67	30,743	4	4
35	Congo, Dem Republic	86	8/17/77	6/15/78	919	1	1
36	Congo, Dem Republic	86	10/18/96	Ongoing	149,000	5	14
37	Congo, Dem Republic	254	2/1/07	Ongoing	116	1	1
38	Congo, Rep.	214	11/3/93	2002	9,791	3	10
39	Costa Rica	27	3/3/48	4/20/48	2,000	2	.167
40	Cote d'Ivoire	225	9/19/02	12/31/04	1,200	2	3
41	Croatia	195	1992	11/12/95	950	1	4
42	Cuba	45	7/26/53	4/20/61	5,307	3	9
43	Djibouti	184	11/12/91	12/31/99	540	1	9
44	Dominican Republic	93	4/24/65	8/21/65	3,276	2	.333
45	Egypt	196	3/10/93	12/31/98	1,179	2	6
46	El Salvador	120	3/25/72	3/25/72	300	1	.003
47	El Salvador	120	1/1/79	12/31/91	55,000	4	13
48	Equatorial Guinea	142	8/3/79	8/3/79	185	1	.003
49	Eritrea	130	4/30/97	12/31/03	391	1	7
50	Ethiopia	70	12/13/60	12/17/60	662	1	.014
51	Ethiopia	70	6/2/76	5/28/91	48,000	4	16
52	Ethiopia (Eritrea)	78	3/15/64	5/28/91	200,000	5	28
53	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	133	9/1/76	1983	32,031	4	8
54	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	133	1/1/96	Ongoing	10,000	3	12
55	Ethiopia (Afar)	168	6/3/75	5/28/91	500 est	1	17
56	Ethiopia (Afar)	168	6/1/96	1996	25 est	1	.5
57	Ethiopia (Somali)	211	1/18/96	12/31/99	550 est	1	4
58	Ethiopia (Oromiya)	219	1/1/77	Ongoing	2,949	2	31

59	France	73	4/22/61	6/30/62	2,360	2	2
60	Gabon	87	2/18/64	2/19/64	30	1	.006
61	Gambia	149	7/30/81	8/5/81	650	1	.019
62	Georgia	185	9/22/91	12/31/93	240	1	3
63	Georgia	197	8/14/92	12/1/93	2,500	2	2
64	Georgia	198	6/8/92	8/12/08	977	1	17
65	Ghana	98	2/24/66	2/25/66	27	1	.006
66	Ghana	98	12/13/81	12/13/81	50	1	.003
67	Ghana	98	6/19/83	6/19/83	26	1	.003
68	Greece	4	3/1/46	10/16/49	154,000	5	4
69	Guatemala	36	7/18/49	7/19/49	40	1	.006
70	Guatemala	36	6/18/54	6/27/54	48	1	.027
71	Guatemala	36	1/1/65	12/31/95	46,300	4	31
72	Guinea	111	9/1/00	12/31/01	1,400	2	2
73	Guinea-Bissau	216	6/7/98	5/10/99	1,850	2	1
74	Haiti	186	4/2/89	4/11/89	30	1	.027
75	Haiti	186	9/30/91	10/1/91	250	1	.006
76	Haiti	186	2/9/04	2/28/04	300	1	.054
77	India	29	9/18/48	1951	4000 est	2	4
78	India (CPI)	29	1/1/69	12/31/71	150	1	3
79	India (CPI)	29	1/1/90	Ongoing	914	1	18
80	India (Nagaland)	54	1/1/56	6/15/68	1,893	2	13
81	India (Nagaland)	54	7/1/92	Ongoing	550	1	16
82	India (Mizoram)	99	9/1/66	1968	1,500	2	3
83	India (Tripura)	139	1/1/78	8/12/88	1,175	2	11
84	India (Tripura)	139	1/1/92	12/31/06	741	1	15
85	India (Manipur)	152	7/1/82	Ongoing	1,208	2	26
86	India (Punjab)	156	1/1/83	12/31/93	18,875	3	11
87	India (Kashmir)	169	12/11/89	Ongoing	26,501	4	19
88	India (Assam)	170	5/29/90	Ongoing	1,112	2	18
89	India (Bodoland)	227	3/16/90	12/31/04	743	1	15
90	Indonesia (South Moluccas)	40	8/5/50	11/30/50	5,000	3	.333
91	Indonesia	46	1/1/53	12/31/61	34,444	4	9
92	Indonesia (West Papua)	94	7/28/65	12/31/78	11,500	3	14
93	Indonesia (East Timor)	134	12/7/75	12/31/98	33,525	4	24
94	Indonesia (Aceh)	171	9/8/90	7/31/91	1800	2	1
95	Indonesia (Aceh)	171	1/8/99	8/15/05	4197	2	7
96	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	5/1/46	8/31/46	25	1	.333
97	Iran (Azerbaijan)	7	1/1/46	11/30/46	25	1	.917
98	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	1/1/66	12/31/68	300 est	1	3
99	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	1/1/79	12/31/96	8,002	3	18

100	Iran	143	1/1/79	12/31/01	8,000	3	23
101	Iran	143	8/7/05	Ongoing	28	1	3
102	Iran (Arabistan)	144	10/3/79	1980	1000 est	2	2
103	Iraq	62	7/14/58	2/8/63	2,375	2	6
104	Iraq (SCIRI)	62	8/1/82	12/31/96	12,381	3	15
105	Iraq	62	4/4/04	Ongoing	17,600	3	4
106	Iraq (Kurdistan)	74	12/01/61	12/31/96	84,450	4	36
107	Israel (Palestine)	37	1/1/49	Ongoing	16,959	3	59
108	Israel (South Lebanon)	251	11/9/90	8/14/06	1,271	2	17
109	Kenya	153	8/1/82	8/21/82	318	1	.057
110	Laos	65	9/1/59	2/22/73	23,500	3	15
111	Laos	65	12/1/89	12/31/90	55	1	2
112	Lebanon	63	5/15/58	7/31/58	1,400	2	.25
113	Lebanon	63	9/2/75	10/13/90	144,100	5	16
114	Lesotho	217	9/4/98	10/31/98	114	1	.167
115	Liberia	146	4/12/80	4/14/80	27	1	.008
116	Liberia	146	12/25/89	8/18/03	12,657	3	15
117	Macedonia	223	5/1/01	8/13/01	145	1	.333
118	Madagascar	114	1/1/71	4/1/71	128	1	.25
119	Malaysia	64	1/1/58	12/31/81	429	1	24
120	Malaysia (North Borneo)	83	1/1/63	1966	2,000	2	4
121	Mali	177	8/1/90	12/31/94	261	1	5
122	Mali	177	8/31/07	Ongoing	39	1	1
123	Mauritania	253	1975	1978	6,500	3	4
124	Mexico	205	1/2/94	1/12/94	74	1	.030
125	Mexico	205	6/28/96	6/28/96	34	1	.003
126	Moldova	199	3/29/92	7/21/92	650	1	.333
127	Morocco	115	7/10/71	7/11/71	264	1	.006
128	Morocco	135	9/1/75	12/31/89	6,500	3	15
129	Mozambique	136	1/1/77	10/4/92	109,749	5	16
130	Myanmar (Karen)	23	2/1/49	Ongoing	14,927	3	59
131	Myanmar (CPB)	24	2/1/48	12/31/94	24,173	3	47
132	Myanmar	25	1/1/48	12/31/94	1,125	2	47
133	Myanmar (Mon)	26	2/1/49	12/31/96	1,093	2	48
134	Myanmar (Kachin)	34	1/1/49	12/31/50	285	1	2
135	Myanmar (Kachin)	34	2/1/61	10/1/92	17,723	3	32
136	Myanmar (Karenni)	56	7/29/57	12/31/57	290	1	.417

137	Myanmar (Karenni)	56	1/1/92	12/31/05	318	1	14
138	Myanmar (Shan)	67	11/15/59	Ongoing	12,214	3	49
139	Myanmar (Wa)	228	3/16/97	3/1997	100	1	.083
140	Nepal	62	2/1/60	12/16/62	250	1	3
141	Nepal	62	7/13/96	11/21/06	11,021	3	11
142	Nicaragua	140	2/3/78	7/19/79	10,000	3	2
143	Nicaragua	140	12/1/81	12/31/89	30,000	3	9
144	Niger (Air/Azawad)	178	10/1/92	12/31/97	428	1	6
145	Niger (East Niger)	212	2/6/96	11/29/97	61	1	2
146	Niger	255	7/1/07	Ongoing	81	1	1
147	Nigeria	100	1/15/66	7/29/66	25	1	.583
148	Nigeria (Biafra)	107	7/6/67	1/12/70	75,000	4	4
149	Nigeria (North Nigeria)	249	12/1/04	12/31/04	52	1	.083
150	Nigeria (Niger Delta)	250	6/5/04	9/29/04	500	1	.333
151	Oman	61	7/1/57	8/26/57	32	1	.167
152	Oman	121	1/1/72	12/31/75	2000	2	4
153	Pakistan	116	3/25/71	3/26/71	50,000	4	.006
154	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	129	1/1/74	7/5/77	8,800	3	4
155	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	129	8/1/04	Ongoing	379	1	4
156	Pakistan	209	6/1/90	1996	371	1	7
157	Pakistan	209	7/15/07	Ongoing	578	1	1
158	Panama	172	10/3/89	10/3/89	75	1	.003
159	Papua N. Guinea (Bougainville)	174	5/26/89	12/31/96	323	1	8
160	Paraguay	22	3/1/47	8/20/47	4000	2	.417
161	Paraguay	22	5/5/54	5/5/54	50	1	.003
162	Paraguay	22	2/3/89	2/3/89	200	1	.003
163	Peru	95	8/3/65	12/31/65	136	1	.417
164	Peru	95	8/15/81	Ongoing	30,984	4	27
165	Philippines	10	7/1/46	5/31/54	9,000	2	9
166	Philippines	10	9/1/69	Ongoing	26,000	4	39
167	Philippines (Mindanao)	112	8/20/70	Ongoing	42,295	4	38
168	Romania	175	12/16/89	12/23/89	909	1	.022
169	Russia	204	10/3/93	10/4/93	193	1	.006
170	Russia (Chechnya)	206	12/11/94	10/7/07	97,400	4	13

241

171	Russia (Dagestan)	220	8/25/99	9/24/99	350	1	.083
172	Rwanda	179	10/1/90	7/19/94	5,500	3	4
173	Rwanda	179	5/25/97	3/1/02	4,259	2	6
174	Saudi Arabia	145	11/20/79	12/4/79	269	1	.038
175	Senegal	180	1/1/90	12/31/03	1,644	2	14
176	Sierra Leone	187	3/23/91	11/10/00	12,997	3	10
177	Somalia	141	4/9/78	4/9/78	520	1	.003
178	Somalia	141	1/1/82	Ongoing	67,014	4	26
179	South Africa (Namibia)	101	8/26/66	12/31/88	25,000	4	23
180	South Africa	150	1/1/81	12/31/88	3,775	2	8
181	Soviet Union (Estonia)	11	1/1/46	12/31/48	667	1	3
182	Soviet Union (Latvia)	12	1/1/46	12/31/46	735	1	3
183	Soviet Union (Lithuania)	13	6/1/46	12/31/48	7,720	3	3
184	Soviet Union (Ukraine)	14	1/1/46	12/31/50	17,569	3	5
185	Soviet Union (Armenia)	181	1/19/90	12/31/91	800	1	2
186	Soviet Union (Azerbaijan)	182	1/19/90	1/20/90	142	1	.006
187	Spain	147	10/3/80	12/31/92	245	1	13
188	Sri Lanka	117	4/5/71	6/9/71	1,630	2	.25
189	Sri Lanka	117	2/1/89	2/28/90	5,025	3	2
190	Sri Lanka (Eelam)	157	8/11/84	Ongoing	55,389	4	24
191	Sudan (South Sudan)	85	1/1/63	1/31/72	20,000	3	10
192	Sudan	113	7/22/71	7/22/71	38	1	.003
193	Sudan	113	7/2/76	7/2/76	300	1	.003
194	Sudan	113	5/17/83	Ongoing	55,853	4	25
195	Suriname	186	7/1/86	1/31/88	300	1	3
196	Syria	102	2/23/66	2/23/66	300	1	.003
197	Syria	102	6/16/79	2/2/82	15,450	3	4
198	Tajikistan	200	5/10/92	11/9/98	41,400	4	7
199	Thailand	43	6/30/51	7/1/51	25 (est)	1	.006
200	Thailand	43	10/1/74	12/31/82	4,404	2	9
201	Thailand (Patani)	43	1/1/03	Ongoing	807	1	5
202	Togo	163	9/23/86	9/24/86	30	1	.006
203	Togo	163	10/1/91	12/4/91	25	1	.25

204	Trinidad & Tobago	183	8/1/90	8/1/90	30	1	.003
205	Tunisia	148	1/27/80	1/27/80	41	1	.003
206	Turkey (Kurdistan)	159	8/15/84	Ongoing	36,219	4	24
207	Turkey	188	7/13/91	12/31/92	50	1	2
208	Turkey	188	6/18/05	12/31/05	30	1	1
209	Uganda	118	1/25/71	Ongoing	122,382	5	37
210	U.K.	119	8/1/71	8/18/98	3,149	2	28
211	United States	224	9/11/01	Ongoing	7,415	3	7
212	Uruguay	123	4/1/72	12/31/72	53	1	.75
213	Uzbekistan	221	8/17/00	12/31/04	235	1	5
214	Venezuela	80	7/3/62	7/31/62	400	1	.083
215	Venezuela	80	2/4/92	2/4/92	183	1	.003
216	Vietnam (South)	52	4/1/55	12/31/64	162,890	5	10
217	Yemen	33	3/1/48	3/14/48	4000	2	.038
218	Yemen	33	10/1/62	3/15/70	50,000	4	9
219	Yemen	33	5/1/80	5/31/82	300	1	3
220	Yemen	164	1/13/86	1/23/86	11,500	3	.030
221	Yemen (South Yemen)	207	4/28/94	7/7/94	5,500	3	.25
222	Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	189	7/4/91	7/12/91	63	1	.035
223	Yugoslavia (Croatia)	190	8/2/91	12/31/91	9,050	3	.417
224	Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	218	2/28/98	6/3/99	4,500	2	2
225	Zimbabwe	122	2/23/73	12/31/79	19,404	3	7

Appendix C

LIST OF COUNTRIES BY CoC CIVILIZATION IDENTIFICATION

Western	Latin American	Orthodox	Islamic
United States	Antigua and	Armenia	Afghanistan
Canada	Barbuda	Belarus	Albania
	Argentina	Bosnia and	Algeria
Andorra	Bahamas	Herzegovina	Azerbaijan
Austria	Barbados	Bulgaria	Bahrain
Belgium	Belize	Cyprus	Bangladesh
Croatia	Bolivia	Georgia	Brunei
Czechoslovakia	Brazil	Greece	Burkina Faso
Czech Republic	Chile	Kazakhstan	Chad
Denmark	Colombia	Macedonia	Comoros
Estonia	Costa Rica	Moldova	Djibouti
Finland	Cuba	Montenegro	Egypt
France	Dominica	Romania	Eritrea
Germany	Dominican	Russia	Gambia, The
Germany (East)	Republic	Serbia	Guinea
Germany (West)	Ecuador	Serbia and	Guinea-Bissau
Hungary	El Salvador	Montenegro	Indonesia
Iceland	Grenada	Soviet Union	Iran
Ireland	Guatemala	Ukraine	Iraq
Italy	Haiti	Yugoslavia	Jordan
Latvia	Honduras	Yugoslavia, Fed.	Kuwait
Liechtenstein	Jamaica	Rep.	Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania	Mexico		Lebanon
Luxembourg	Nicaragua		Libya
Malta	Panama		Malaysia
Monaco	Paraguay		Maldives
Netherlands	Peru		Mali
Norway	St. Kitts and Nevis		Mauritania
Poland	St. Lucia		Morocco
Portugal	St. Vincent and the		Niger
San Marino	Grenadines		Oman
Slovakia	Trinidad and		Pakistan
Slovenia	Tobago		Qatar
Spain	Uruguay		Saudi Arabia
Sweden	Venezuela		Senegal
Switzerland			Seychelles
United Kingdom			Sierra Leone
Vatican City			Somalia

			Sudan
Australia			Syria
East Timor			Tajikistan
Fiji			Tunisia
Israel			Turkey
Kiribati			Turkmenistan
Marshall Islands			United Arab
Micronesia, F.S.			Emirates
Nauru			Uzbekistan
New Zealand			Yemen
Palau			North Yemen
Papua New Guinea			South Yemen
Philippines			
Samoa			
Singapore			
Solomon Islands			
Tonga			
Tuvalu			
Vanuatu			
African	**Hindu**	**Sinic**	**Buddhist**
Angola	Guyana	China	Bhutan
Benin	India	North Korea	Cambodia
Botswana	Nepal	South Korea	Laos
Burundi	Suriname	Taiwan	Mongolia
Cameroon		Vietnam	Myanmar
Cape Verde		North Vietnam	Sri Lanka
Central African		South Vietnam	Thailand
Republic			
Congo, Dem. Rep.			
Congo, Republic			
Cote d'Ivoire			
Equatorial Guinea			
Ethiopia			
Gabon			
Ghana			**Japanese**
Kenya			Japan
Lesotho			
Liberia			
Madagascar			
Malawi			
Mauritius			
Mozambique			
Namibia			
Nigeria			

Rwanda Sao Tome & Principe South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe			

Appendix D

CIVILIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION OF GROUPS IN CONFLICT

	Country	UCDP ID #	Country Civilization	Challenger Civilization
1	Afghanistan	137	Islamic	Islamic
2	Algeria	191	Islamic	Islamic
3	Angola	131	African	African
4	Angola (Cabinda)	192	African	African
5	Argentina	50	Latin American	Latin American
6	Argentina	50	Latin American	Latin American
7	Argentina	50	Latin American	Latin American
8	Azerbaijan (N-K)	193	Islamic	Orthodox
9	Azerbaijan	201	Islamic	Islamic
10	Bangladesh (Chittagong)	126	Islamic	Buddhist
11	Bolivia	1	Latin American	Latin American
12	Bolivia	1	Latin American	Latin American
13	Bolivia	1	Latin American	Latin American
14	Bosnia & Herzegovina	194	Orthodox	Islam
15	Bihac Krajina, Bosnia & Herzegovina	202	Islamic	Orthodox
16	Croatian Republic of B&H, Bosnia and Herzegovina	203	Islamic	Orthodox
17	Burkina Faso	165	Islamic	Islamic
18	Burundi	90	African	African
19	Burundi	90	African	African
20	Cambodia	103	Buddhist	Buddhist
21	Cameroon	158	African	African
22	Cameroon	158	African	African
23	CAR	222	African	African
24	Chad	91	African	Islamic
25	Chile	125	Latin American	Latin American
26	China	3	Sinic	Sinic
27	China (Taiwan)	18	Sinic	Sinic
28	China (Tibet)	39	Sinic	Buddhist
29	Colombia	92	Latin American	Latin American
30	Comoros	167	Islamic	Islamic
31	Comoros (Anjouan)	213	Islamic	Islamic
32	Congo, Democratic Republic (Katanga)	68	African	African

33	Congo, Dem Republic (South Kasai)	69	African	African
34	Congo, Democratic Republic	86	African	African
35	Congo, Democratic Republic	86	African	African
36	Congo, Democratic Republic	86	African	African
37	Congo, Dem. Republic (Kongo Kingdom)	254	African	African
38	Congo, Republic	214	African	African
39	Costa Rica	27	Latin American	Latin American
40	Cote d'Ivoire	225	African	Islamic
41	Croatia	195	Western	Orthodox
42	Cuba	45	Latin American	Latin American
43	Djibouti	184	Islamic	Islamic
44	Dominican Republic	93	Latin American	Latin American
45	Egypt	196	Islamic	Islamic
46	El Salvador	120	Latin American	Latin American
47	El Salvador	120	Latin American	Latin American
48	Equatorial Guinea	142	African	African
49	Eritrea	130	Islamic	Islamic
50	Ethiopia	70	African	African
51	Ethiopia	70	African	African
52	Ethiopia (Eritrea)	78	African	Other
53	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	133	African	Islamic
54	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	133	African	Islamic
55	Ethiopia (Afar)	168	African	Islamic
56	Ethiopia (Afar)	168	African	Islamic
57	Ethiopia (Somali)	211	African	Islamic
58	Ethiopia (Oromiya)	219	African	Islamic
59	France	73	Western	Western
60	Gabon	87	African	African
61	Gambia	149	Islamic	Islamic
62	Georgia	185	Orthodox	Orthodox
63	Georgia (Abkhazia)	197	Orthodox	Orthodox
64	Georgia (South Ossetia)	198	Orthodox	Orthodox
65	Ghana	98	African	African
66	Ghana	98	African	African
67	Ghana	98	African	African
68	Greece	4	Orthodox	Orthodox
69	Guatemala	36	Latin American	Latin American
70	Guatemala	36	Latin American	Latin American
71	Guatemala	36	Latin American	Latin American

248

72	Guinea	111	Islamic	Islamic
73	Guinea-Bissau	216	Islamic	Islamic
74	Haiti	186	Latin American	Latin American
75	Haiti	186	Latin American	Latin American
76	Haiti	186	Latin American	Latin American
77	India (CPI)	29	Hindu	Hindu
78	India (CPI)	29	Hindu	Hindu
79	India (CPI)	29	Hindu	Hindu
80	India (Nagaland)	54	Hindu	Other
81	India (Nagaland)	54	Hindu	Other
82	India (Mizoram)	99	Hindu	Other
83	India (Tripura)	139	Hindu	Islamic
84	India (Tripura)	139	Hindu	Islamic
85	India (Manipur)	152	Hindu	Other
86	India (Punjab)	156	Hindu	Other
87	India (Kashmir)	169	Hindu	Islamic
88	India (Assam)	170	Hindu	Hindu
89	India (Bodoland)	227	Hindu	Hindu
90	Indonesia (South Moluccas)	40	Islamic	Western
91	Indonesia	46	Islamic	Islamic
92	Indonesia (W. Papua)	94	Islamic	Western
93	Indonesia (East Timor)	134	Islamic	Western
94	Indonesia (Aceh)	171	Islamic	Islamic
95	Indonesia (Aceh)	171	Islamic	Islamic
96	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	Islamic	Islamic
97	Iran (Azerbaijan)	7	Islamic	Islamic
98	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	Islamic	Islamic
99	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	Islamic	Islamic
100	Iran	143	Islamic	Islamic
101	Iran	143	Islamic	Islamic
102	Iran (Arabistan)	144	Islamic	Islamic
103	Iraq	62	Islamic	Islamic
104	Iraq (SCIRI)	62	Islamic	Islamic
105	Iraq	62	Islamic	Islamic
106	Iraq (Kurdistan)	74	Islamic	Islamic
107	Israel (Palestine)	37	Western	Islamic
108	Israel (South Lebanon)	251	Western	Islamic
109	Kenya	153	African	African
110	Laos	65	Buddhist	Buddhist
111	Laos	65	Buddhist	Buddhist
112	Lebanon	63	Western	Islamic
113	Lebanon	63	Western	Islamic
114	Lesotho	217	African	African

115	Liberia	146	African	African
116	Liberia	146	African	African
117	Macedonia	223	Orthodox	Islamic
118	Madagascar	114	African	African
119	Malaysia	64	Islamic	Islamic
120	Malaysia (N. Borneo)	83	Islamic	Islamic
121	Mali (Azawad)	177	Islamic	Islamic
122	Mali (Azawad)	177	Islamic	Islamic
123	Mauritania	253	Islamic	Islamic
124	Mexico	205	Latin American	Latin American
125	Mexico	205	Latin American	Latin American
126	Moldova	199	Orthodox	Orthodox
127	Morocco	115	Islamic	Islamic
128	Morocco	135	Islamic	Islamic
129	Mozambique	136	African	African
130	Myanmar (Karen)	23	Buddhist	Buddhist
131	Myanmar (CPB)	24	Buddhist	Buddhist
132	Myanmar (Arakan)	25	Buddhist	Islamic
133	Myanmar (Mon)	26	Buddhist	Buddhist
134	Myanmar (Kachin)	34	Buddhist	Other
135	Myanmar (Kachin)	34	Buddhist	Other
136	Myanmar (Karenni)	56	Buddhist	Other
137	Myanmar (Karenni)	56	Buddhist	Other
138	Myanmar (Shan)	67	Buddhist	Buddhist
139	Myanmar (Wa)	228	Buddhist	Other
140	Nepal	72	Hindu	Hindu
141	Nepal	72	Hindu	Hindu
142	Nicaragua	140	Latin American	Latin American
143	Nicaragua	140	Latin American	Latin American
144	Niger (Air/Azawad)	178	Islamic	Islamic
145	Niger (East Niger)	212	Islamic	Islamic
146	Niger	255	Islamic	Islamic
147	Nigeria	100	Islamic	African
148	Nigeria (Biafra)	107	Islamic	African
149	Nigeria (N. Nigeria)	249	Islamic	Islamic
150	Nigeria (Niger Delta)	250	Islamic	African
151	Oman	61	Islamic	Islamic
152	Oman	121	Islamic	Islamic
153	Pakistan	116	Islamic	Islamic
154	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	129	Islamic	Islamic
155	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	129	Islamic	Islamic
156	Pakistan	209	Islamic	Islamic
157	Pakistan	209	Islamic	Islamic
158	Panama	172	Latin American	Latin American

159	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	174	Western	Western
160	Paraguay	22	Latin American	Latin American
161	Paraguay	22	Latin American	Latin American
162	Paraguay	22	Latin American	Latin American
163	Peru	95	Latin American	Latin American
164	Peru	95	Latin American	Latin American
165	Philippines	10	Western	Western
166	Philippines	10	Western	Western
167	Philippines (Mindanao)	112	Western	Islamic
168	Romania	175	Orthodox	Orthodox
169	Russia	204	Orthodox	Orthodox
170	Russia (Chechnya)	206	Orthodox	Islamic
171	Russia (Dagestan)	220	Orthodox	Islamic
172	Rwanda	179	African	African
173	Rwanda	179	African	African
174	Saudi Arabia	145	Islamic	Islamic
175	Senegal	180	Islamic	Islamic
176	Sierra Leone	187	Islamic	Islamic
177	Somalia	141	Islamic	Islamic
178	Somalia	141	Islamic	Islamic
179	South Africa (Namibia)	101	African	African
180	South Africa	150	African	African
181	Soviet Union (Estonia)	11	Orthodox	Orthodox
182	Soviet Union (Latvia)	12	Orthodox	Orthodox
183	Soviet Union (Lithuania)	13	Orthodox	Orthodox
184	Soviet Union (Ukraine)	14	Orthodox	Orthodox
185	Soviet Union (Armenia)	181	Orthodox	Orthodox
186	Soviet Union (Azerbaijan)	182	Orthodox	Islam
187	Spain	147	Western	Western
188	Sri Lanka	117	Buddhist	Buddhist
189	Sri Lanka	117	Buddhist	Buddhist
190	Sri Lanka (Eelam)	157	Buddhist	Hindu
191	Sudan (S. Sudan)	85	Islamic	African
192	Sudan	113	Islamic	Islamic
193	Sudan	113	Islamic	Islamic
194	Sudan	113	Islamic	African
195	Suriname	186	Latin American	African

196	Syria	102	Islamic	Islamic
197	Syria	102	Islamic	Islamic
198	Tajikistan	200	Orthodox	Islamic
199	Thailand	43	Buddhist	Buddhist
200	Thailand	43	Buddhist	Buddhist
201	Thailand (Patani)	248	Buddhist	Islamic
202	Togo	163	African	African
203	Togo	163	African	African
204	Trinidad & Tobago	183	Latin American	Latin American
205	Tunisia	148	Islamic	Islamic
206	Turkey (Kurdistan)	159	Islamic	Islamic
207	Turkey	188	Islamic	Islamic
208	Turkey	188	Islamic	Islamic
209	Uganda	118	African	African
210	United Kingdom	119	Western	Western
211	United States	224	Western	Islamic
212	Uruguay	123	Latin American	Latin American
213	Uzbekistan	221	Islamic	Islamic
214	Venezuela	80	Latin American	Latin American
215	Venezuela	80	Latin American	Latin American
216	Vietnam (South)	52	Sinic	Sinic
217	Yemen	33	Islamic	Islamic
218	Yemen	33	Islamic	Islamic
219	Yemen	33	Islamic	Islamic
220	Yemen	164	Islamic	Islamic
221	Yemen (S. Yemen)	207	Islamic	Islamic
222	Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	189	Orthodox	Western
223	Yugoslavia (Croatia)	190	Orthodox	Western
224	Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	218	Orthodox	Islamic
225	Zimbabwe	122	African	African

Appendix E

RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF GROUPS IN CONFLICT

	Country	UCDP ID #	Country Civilization	Challenger Civilization
1	Afghanistan	137	Sunni	Sunni
2	Algeria	191	Sunni	Sunni
3	Angola	131	Indigenous	Atheist
4	Angola (Cabinda)	192	Indigenous	Catholic
5	Argentina	50	Catholic	Catholic
6	Argentina	50	Catholic	Catholic
7	Argentina	50	Catholic	Catholic
8	Azerbaijan (N-K)	193	Shi'ia	Orthodox
9	Azerbaijan	201	Shi'ia	Shi'ia
10	Bangladesh (Chittagong)	126	Sunni	Buddhist
11	Bolivia	1	Catholic	Catholic
12	Bolivia	1	Catholic	Catholic
13	Bolivia	1	Catholic	Atheist
14	Bosnia & Herzegovina	194	Orthodox	Sunni
15	Bihac Krajina, Bosnia & Herzegovina	202	Sunni	Orthodox
16	Croatian Republic of B&H, Bosnia and Herzegovina	203	Sunni	Orthodox
17	Burkina Faso	165	Catholic[1]	Catholic
18	Burundi	90	Catholic	Catholic
19	Burundi	90	Catholic	Catholic
20	Cambodia	103	Buddhist	Atheist
21	Cameroon	158	Protestant	Protestant
22	Cameroon	158	Protestant	Sunni
23	CAR	222	Indigenous	Indigenous
24	Chad	91	Catholic	Sunni[2]
25	Chile	125	Catholic	Catholic
26	China	3	Buddhist	Atheist

---

[1] Although Sunnis and Indigenous believers make up a large portion of the population, in this case it was a coup involving Catholic rebels led by Blaise Campaore who assassinated Catholic President Thomas Sankara.

[2] Sufi Islam is the dominant religious group in northern Chad, which is predominantly Muslim. Because of the prevalence of Sunni Islam in North Africa, and due to the limitations of this project, it is coded as Sunni.

27	China (Taiwan)	18	Buddhist	Buddhist
28	China (Tibet)	39	Atheist	Buddhist
29	Colombia	92	Catholic	Atheist
30	Comoros	167	Sunni	Sunni
31	Comoros (Anjouan)	213	Sunni	Sunni
32	Congo, Democratic Republic (Katanga)	68	Catholic	Catholic
33	Congo, Dem Republic (South Kasai)	69	Catholic	Indigenous
34	Congo, Democratic Republic	86	Catholic	Catholic
35	Congo, Democratic Republic	86	Catholic	Catholic
36	Congo, Democratic Republic	86	Catholic	Catholic
37	Congo, Dem. Republic (Kongo Kingdom)	254	Catholic	Indigenous
38	Congo, Republic	214	Indigenous	Indigenous
39	Costa Rica	27	Catholic	Catholic
40	Cote d'Ivoire	225	Indigenous	Sunni
41	Croatia	195	Catholic	Orthodox
42	Cuba	45	Catholic	Atheist
43	Djibouti	184	Sunni	Sunni
44	Dominican Republic	93	Catholic	Catholic
45	Egypt	196	Sunni	Sunni
46	El Salvador	120	Catholic	Catholic
47	El Salvador	120	Catholic	Catholic
48	Equatorial Guinea	142	Catholic	Catholic
49	Eritrea	130	Orthodox	Sunni
50	Ethiopia	70	Orthodox	Orthodox
51	Ethiopia	70	Orthodox	Atheist
52	Ethiopia (Eritrea)	78	Orthodox	Sunni/Cath/Prot
53	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	133	Orthodox	Sunni
54	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	133	Orthodox	Sunni
55	Ethiopia (Afar)	168	Orthodox	Sunni[3]
56	Ethiopia (Afar)	168	Orthodox	Sunni
57	Ethiopia (Somali)	211	Orthodox	Sunni
58	Ethiopia (Oromiya)	219	Orthodox	Sunni
59	France	73	Catholic	Catholic
60	Gabon	87	Catholic	Catholic
61	Gambia	149	Sunni	Sunni
62	Georgia	185	Orthodox	Orthodox

---

[3] Sufi Islam is the dominant group in Afar, but due of the limitations of the project it is coded as Sunni.

63	Georgia (Abkhazia)	197	Orthodox	Orthodox
64	Georgia (South Ossetia)	198	Orthodox	Orthodox
65	Ghana	98	Protestant	Protestant
66	Ghana	98	Protestant	Protestant
67	Ghana	98	Protestant	Protestant
68	Greece	4	Orthodox	Atheist
69	Guatemala	36	Catholic	Catholic
70	Guatemala	36	Catholic	Catholic
71	Guatemala	36	Protestant	Catholic
72	Guinea	111	Sunni	Sunni
73	Guinea-Bissau	216	Sunni	Sunni
74	Haiti	186	Catholic	Catholic
75	Haiti	186	Catholic	Catholic
76	Haiti	186	Catholic	Catholic
77	India (CPI)	29	Hindu	Atheist
78	India (CPI)	29	Hindu	Atheist
79	India (CPI)	29	Hindu	Atheist
80	India (Nagaland)	54	Hindu	Protestant
81	India (Nagaland)	54	Hindu	Protestant
82	India (Mizoram)	99	Hindu	Protestant
83	India (Tripura)	139	Hindu	Sunni
84	India (Tripura)	139	Hindu	Sunni
85	India (Manipur)	152	Hindu	Protestant
86	India (Punjab)	156	Hindu	Indigenous[4]
87	India (Kashmir)	169	Hindu	Sunni
88	India (Assam)	170	Hindu	Hindu
89	India (Bodoland)	227	Hindu	Hindu
90	Indonesia (South Moluccas)	40	Sunni	Protestant
91	Indonesia	46	Sunni	Sunni
92	Indonesia (W. Papua)	94	Sunni	Protestant
93	Indonesia (East Timor)	134	Sunni	Catholic
94	Indonesia (Aceh)	171	Sunni	Sunni
95	Indonesia (Aceh)	171	Sunni	Sunni
96	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	Shi'ia	Sunni
97	Iran (Azerbaijan)	7	Shi'ia	Shi'ia
98	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	Shi'ia	Sunni
99	Iran (Kurdistan)	6	Shi'ia	Sunni
100	Iran	143	Shi'ia	Shi'ia
101	Iran	143	Shi'ia	Sunni
102	Iran (Arabistan)	144	Shi'ia	Shi'ia

---

[4] The Punjab challenger group is nearly all Sikh; however, since Sikhism is found concentrated in very few other locations this religious group is included in the Indigenous category.

103	Iraq	62	Sunni	Sunni
104	Iraq (SCIRI)	62	Sunni	Shi'ia
105	Iraq	62	Sunni	Shi'ia
106	Iraq (Kurdistan)	74	Sunni	Sunni
107	Israel (Palestine)	37	Judaism	Sunni
108	Israel (South Lebanon)	251	Judaism	Shi'ia
109	Kenya	153	Protestant	Protestant
110	Laos	65	Buddhist	Atheist
111	Laos	65	Buddhist	Atheist
112	Lebanon	63	Catholic	Sunni
113	Lebanon	63	Catholic	Sunni
114	Lesotho	217	Catholic	Catholic
115	Liberia	146	Indigenous	Indigenous
116	Liberia	146	Indigenous	Indigenous
117	Macedonia	223	Orthodox	Sunni
118	Madagascar	114	Indigenous	Indigenous
119	Malaysia	64	Sunni	Atheist
120	Malaysia (N. Borneo)	83	Sunni	Atheist
121	Mali (Azawad)	177	Sunni	Sunni
122	Mali (Azawad)	177	Sunni	Sunni
123	Mauritania	253	Sunni	Sunni
124	Mexico	205	Catholic	Catholic
125	Mexico	205	Catholic	Catholic
126	Moldova	199	Orthodox	Orthodox
127	Morocco	115	Sunni	Sunni
128	Morocco (W. Sahara)	135	Sunni	Sunni
129	Mozambique	136	Catholic	Atheist
130	Myanmar (Karen)	23	Buddhist	Buddhist
131	Myanmar (CPB)	24	Buddhist	Atheist
132	Myanmar (Arakan)	25	Buddhist	Sunni
133	Myanmar (Mon)	26	Buddhist	Buddhist
134	Myanmar (Kachin)	34	Buddhist	Indigenous
135	Myanmar (Kachin)	34	Buddhist	Indigenous
136	Myanmar (Karenni)	56	Buddhist	Protestant
137	Myanmar (Karenni)	56	Buddhist	Protestant
138	Myanmar (Shan)	67	Buddhist	Buddhist
139	Myanmar (Wa)	228	Buddhist	Indigenous
140	Nepal	72	Hindu	Hindu
141	Nepal	72	Hindu	Atheist
142	Nicaragua	140	Catholic	Catholic
143	Nicaragua	140	Catholic	Catholic
144	Niger (Air/Azawad)	178	Sunni	Sunni
145	Niger (East Niger)	212	Sunni	Sunni
146	Niger	255	Sunni	Sunni

147	Nigeria	100	Sunni	Cath/Protestant
148	Nigeria (Biafra)	107	Sunni	Cath/Indigenous
149	Nigeria (N. Nigeria)	249	Sunni	Sunni
150	Nigeria (Niger Delta)	250	Sunni	Protestant
151	Oman	61	Sunni [5]	Sunni
152	Oman	121	Sunni	Sunni
153	Pakistan	116	Sunni	Sunni
154	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	129	Sunni	Sunni
155	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	129	Sunni	Sunni
156	Pakistan	209	Sunni	Sunni
157	Pakistan	209	Sunni	Sunni
158	Panama	172	Catholic	Catholic
159	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	174	Catholic	Catholic
160	Paraguay	22	Catholic	Catholic
161	Paraguay	22	Catholic	Catholic
162	Paraguay	22	Catholic	Catholic
163	Peru	95	Catholic	Catholic
164	Peru	95	Catholic	Atheist
165	Philippines	10	Catholic	Atheist
166	Philippines	10	Catholic	Atheist
167	Philippines (Mindanao)	112	Catholic	Sunni
168	Romania	175	Orthodox	Orthodox
169	Russia	204	Orthodox	Orthodox
170	Russia (Chechnya)	206	Orthodox	Sunni
171	Russia (Dagestan)	220	Orthodox	Sunni
172	Rwanda	179	Catholic	Catholic
173	Rwanda	179	Catholic	Catholic
174	Saudi Arabia	145	Sunni	Sunni
175	Senegal	180	Sunni	Indigenous
176	Sierra Leone	187	Sunni	Sunni
177	Somalia	141	Sunni	Sunni
178	Somalia	141	Sunni	Sunni
179	South Africa (Namibia)	101	Catholic	Catholic[6]
180	South Africa	150	Protestant	Protestant
181	Soviet Union (Estonia)	11	Atheist	Orthodox
	Soviet Union			

---

[5] The majority (75%) of Oman's population is Ibahdi Muslim, an early offshoot of Islam. Because of its similarities to Sunni Islam, and because there are only two variants of Islam listed for this project, Oman is coded as Sunni.

[6] The majority of the population is either Lutheran or Roman Catholic, but the entry is coded as Catholic for this project.

182	(Latvia)	12	Atheist	Orthodox
183	Soviet Union (Lithuania)	13	Atheist	Orthodox
184	Soviet Union (Ukraine)	14	Atheist	Orthodox
185	Soviet Union (Armenia)	181	Atheist	Orthodox
186	Soviet Union (Azerbaijan)	182	Atheist	Sunni
187	Spain	147	Catholic	Catholic
188	Sri Lanka	117	Buddhist	Atheist
189	Sri Lanka	117	Buddhist	Atheist
190	Sri Lanka (Eelam)	157	Buddhist	Hindu
191	Sudan (S. Sudan)	85	Sunni	Christian/Indigen.
192	Sudan	113	Sunni	Atheist
193	Sudan	113	Sunni	Sunni
194	Sudan	113	Sunni	Catholic
195	Suriname	186	Protestant	Indigenous
196	Syria	102	Sunni	Sunni
197	Syria	102	Sunni	Shi'ia[7]
198	Tajikistan	200	Orthodox	Sunni
199	Thailand	43	Buddhist	Buddhist
200	Thailand	43	Buddhist	Atheist
201	Thailand (Patani)	248	Buddhist	Sunni
202	Togo	163	Indigenous	Indigenous
203	Togo	163	Indigenous	Indigenous
204	Trinidad & Tobago	183	Catholic	Sunni
205	Tunisia	148	Sunni	Sunni
206	Turkey (Kurdistan)	159	Sunni	Sunni
207	Turkey	188	Sunni	Atheist
208	Turkey	188	Sunni	Atheist
209	Uganda	118	Indigenous	Indigenous[8]
210	United Kingdom	119	Protestant	Catholic
211	United States	224	Protestant	Sunni[9]
212	Uruguay	123	Catholic	Catholic

[7] The Alawite make up a large percentage of the Shi'ite population of Syria; however, for the purposes of this project they will be characterized as Shi'ia.

[8] The Catholic and Protestant majority is divided almost evenly; however, each of these religions is heavily influenced by local religious beliefs. They are thus coded as indigenous for this project.

[9] The coding of combatants as Sunni in the U.S.- led GWOT is not an indictment of Sunnis over any other sect of Islam or an indictment of Islam over any other religious or secular group that may espouse terrorist tactics. It is coded as Sunni because many of those who organized and carried out the 9/11 attacks were Sunni in belief, as well as to fit within the restrictions imposed by this project.

213	Uzbekistan	221	Sunni	Sunni
214	Venezuela	80	Catholic	Atheist
215	Venezuela	80	Catholic	Catholic
216	Vietnam (South)	52	Buddhist	Atheist
217	Yemen	33	Shi'ia	Shi'ia
218	Yemen	33	Shi'ia	Sunni
219	Yemen	33	Sunni	Sunni
220	Yemen	164	Sunni	Sunni
221	Yemen (S. Yemen)	207	Sunni	Sunni
222	Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	189	Orthodox	Catholic
223	Yugoslavia (Croatia)	190	Orthodox	Catholic
224	Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	218	Orthodox	Sunni
225	Zimbabwe	122	Indigenous	Indigenous

Appendix F

LIST OF FAULT-LINE COUNTRIES

Fault-line States (78 Total)

North America	Europe	Africa	Central/South Asia
Mexico	Albania	Benin	Afghanistan
United States	Armenia	Burkina Faso	Bangladesh
	Azerbaijan	Cameroon	Bhutan
	Belarus	CAR	India
Central America	Bosnia/Herzegovina	Chad	Kazakhstan
None	Bulgaria	Djibouti	Kyrgyzstan
	Croatia	Eritrea	Myanmar
	Estonia	Ethiopia	Nepal
South America	Finland	Ghana	Pakistan
Brazil	Georgia	Guinea	Sri Lanka
Guyana	Greece	Ivory Coast	Tajikistan
Suriname	Hungary	Kenya	Turkmenistan
Venezuela	Latvia	Liberia	Uzbekistan
	Lithuania	Mali	
	Macedonia	Nigeria	
Middle East	Montenegro	Sierra Leone	East Asia and Oceania
Cyprus	Poland	Somalia	Cambodia
Iran	Romania	Sudan	China
Israel	Russia	Tanzania	Indonesia
Jordan	Serbia	Togo	Laos
Lebanon	Slovakia		Malaysia
Syria	Ukraine		Mongolia
Turkey			Papua New Guinea
			Philippines
			Thailand
			Vietnam

Appendix G

LIST OF CoC CLEFT STATES

Cleft States (24 Total)

Country Name	Rationale
Azerbaijan	Armenian Orthodox (N-K) and Muslim state
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Catholic Croats, Bosniak Muslims, Orthodox Serbs through 2007 (UN peacekeepers still there)
China	Han Chinese, Tibetan Buddhists, Turkic Muslims
Croatia	Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs until 1998
Estonia	Russian minority
Ethiopia	Orthodox state, large Muslim minority (Oromo, Somali)
Guyana	Hindu majority, African and mixed/Indian minorities
India	Large Muslim minority
Indonesia	Muslims and Timorese Christians
Kazakhstan	Orthodox minority in Muslim state
Kenya	Muslim north and coastal regions, Christian interior
Latvia	Russian minority
Macedonia	Muslim minority in Orthodox state
Malaysia	Chinese and Malay Muslims
Nigeria	Muslim north, Christian south
Philippines	Catholic state, Muslim Mindanao
Singapore	Chinese and Malay Muslims
Slovenia	Catholic Slovenes and Orthodox Serbs in 1991
Sri Lanka	Tamil Hindus, Buddhist Sinhalese state
Sudan	Muslim north, Christian south
Suriname	Hindu majority, large mixed and African minorities
Tanzania	Christian animist mainland, Arab Muslim Zanzibar
Ukraine	Uniate (Catholic) west and Orthodox Russian east
Yugoslavia	Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox populations until 1991, post 1991 Serbs & Monenegrins ethnically nearly identical in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but Kosovo Muslims are not

Appendix H

Alphabetized list of Religiously Cleft States (159)

C – Catholic; O – Orthodox; P - Protestant
Sh – Shi'ia; Su – Sunni
B – Buddhism; H – Hindu; J – Judaism
I – Indigenous; A – Atheist; T - Taoist

State	Demographic
Afghanistan	Su80%, Sh19%
Albania	Su48%, O25%, Sh16%, C10%
Angola	C55%, I30%, P10%
Antigua & Barbuda	P56%, C36%
Argentina	C70%, P9%, Su2%, J1%
Australia	C45%, P19%, O3%, B2%, Su2%, A2%
Austria	C74%, P5%, Su4%, O2%
Azerbaijan	Sh64%, Su32%, O3%
Bahamas	P78%, C14%
Bahrain	Sh57%, Su27%, H7%, P5%, C4%
Bangladesh	Su88%, H10%, C1%
Barbados	P65%, C30%
Belarus	O80%, C14%, P2%
Belgium	C57%, P26%, Su4%, A2%
Belize	C55%, P36%, H2%, J1%
Benin	C27%, Su24%, I22%, P11%
Bhutan	B66%, H27%, I5%
Bolivia	C78%, P19%
Bosnia and Herz.	Su40%, O31%, C15%, P4%, A2%
Botswana	P62%, I23%, C5%
Brazil	C74%, P16%
Brunei	Su50%, I10%, B9%, P1%
Bulgaria	O85%, Su13%
Burkina Faso	Su60%, I24%, C17%, P3%
Burundi	C65%, I23%, Su10%, P2%
Cameroon	I40%, C20%, P20%, Su20%
Canada	C44%, P29%, Su2%, J1%
Cape Verde Islands	C85%, P10%, Su3%
Central African Rep	P51%, C29%, Su10%, I10%
Chad	Su57%, C20%, I17%, P6%
Chile	C70%, P18%, A2%
China	I37%, B14%, A8% ,P2% ,Su2% ,C1%
Colombia	C80%, P16%
Dem. Rep. of Congo	C55%, P30%, I10%, Su1%

Republic of Congo	I48%, C45%, P5%, Su2%
Costa Rica	C75%, P13%
Cote d'Ivoire	Su35%, C30%, I30%, P4%
Croatia	C85%, O6%, Su1%
Cuba	C40%, P18%, A6%
Czech Republic	C47%, P10%, A5%
Dominica	C61%, P30%
Dominican Republic	C70%, P18%
Ecuador	C85%, P12%
Egypt	Su90%, O9%
El Salvador	C48%, P37%
Equatorial Guinea	C87%, P6%, I5%
Eritrea	Su50%, O30%, C13%, P2%, I2%
Estonia	O16%, P15%, A5%
Ethiopia	O45%, Su45%, C5%, I5%, P5%
Fiji	P56%, H28%, C9%, Su3%
France	C51%, Su8%, A4%, P3%, J1%, B1%
Gabon	C68%, Su12%, I10%, P5%
Gambia, The	Su90%, C7%, P2%, I1%
Georgia	O85%, Su10%
Germany	P32%, C31%, Su4%
Germany, West	P32%, C31%, Su4%
Ghana	P43%, Su16%, C15%, I15%
Grenada	C53%, P47%
Guatemala	C68%, P25%
Guinea	Su85%, I7%, C6%, P2%
Guinea-Bissau	Su50%, I40%, C8%, P2%
Guyana	P36%, H33%, C15%, Su7%
Haiti	C55%, P40%
Honduras	C63%, P23%
Hungary	C58%, P18%, J1%
India	H81%, Su12% ,I4%, Sh1%, C1%, P1%
Indonesia	Su88%, P6%, C3%, H2%, B1%
Iran	Sh89%, Su9%
Iraq	Sh62%, Su35%, P2%
Israel	J73%, Su16%, P2%
Jamaica	P60%, C6%
Jordan	Su92%, O6%
Kazakhstan	Su51%, O35%, A9%, P2%, C2%
Kenya	P45%, C33%, Su10%, I10%
Kiribati	C52%, P40%
Korea, North	A16%, I12%, P1%
Korea, South	B23%, P18%, C11%
Kuwait	Su70%, Sh16%, P9%, H3%
Kyrgyzstan	Su80%, O11%, A5%

Laos	B53%, I39%, P2%, C1%
Latvia	C22%, P20%, O15%
Lebanon	Sh28%, Su28%, C26%, O8%
Lesotho	C45%, P40%, I10%
Liberia	I40%, P34%, Su20%, C6%
Liechtenstein	C76%, P7%
Macedonia	O65%, Su32%, P2%, C1%
Madagascar	I52%, C20%, P20%, Su7%
Malawi	P60%, C20%, Su13%
Malaysia	Su60, B19%, C6%, H6%, P3%
Marshall Islands	P81%, C8%
Mauritius	H50%, C21%, Su16%, P11%, Sh1%
Mexico	C88%, P8%
Micronesia, F.S.	C50%, P47%
Mongolia	I32%, B24%, A8%, Su5%
Montenegro	O74%, Su18%, C3%
Mozambique	C24%, P22%, Su20%
Myanmar	B74%, I11%, P5%, Su4%, H2%, C2%
Namibia	P74%, C16%, Su2%
Nauru	P46%, C33%
Nepal	H81%, B11%, Su4%, I4%
The Netherlands	C16%, P14%, Su6%
New Zealand	C29%, P27%, B2%, H2%, Su1%
Nicaragua	C59%, P22%
Niger	Su85%, I8%, Sh7%
Nigeria	Su47%, P25%, C15%, I10%, Sh3%
Oman	Sh75%, Su25%
Pakistan	Su78%, Sh18%, H1%
Palau	C42%, P29%, I9%
Panama	C75%, P15%
Papua N. Guinea	P65%, C30%, I3%
Paraguay	C90%, P7%
Peru	C85%, P11%
Philippines	C83%, P6%, Su6%, I3%
Qatar	Su75%, Sh8%, C9%, H3%
Romania	O87%, P8%, C5%
Russia	O70%, Su15%
Rwanda	C57%, P37%, Su5%
St. Kitts & Nevis	P70%, C28%
St. Lucia	C68%, P27%
St. Vincent & Gren.	P75%, C13%
Samoa	P74%, C20%
Sao Tome & Principe	C70%, P7%
Serbia	O85%, C6%, Su3%, P1%
Serbia & Montenegro	O67%, Su19%

Seychelles	C82%, P11%, H2%, Su1%
Sierra Leone	Su60%, I30%, P7%, C3%
Singapore	B43%, Su15%, P10%, T9%, C5%, H4%
Slovakia	C73%, P9%, A4%, O1%
Solomon Islands	C54%, P38%, I5%
South Africa	P73%, C7%, Su2%
Sri Lanka	B70%, H15%, Su7%, C6%, P2%
Sudan	Su70%, C16%, I11%
Suriname	H20%, P21%, C20%, Su14%
Swaziland	P65%, C25%, Su1%
Sweden	P82%, A12%, Su5%, C1%
Switzerland	C42%, P35%, Su4%, A1%
Syria	Su74%, Sh16%, O6%
Tanzania	I35, Su31%, C25%, P5%, Sh4%
Thailand	B87%, Su6%, I2%
Togo	I33%, C28%, P20%, Su14%
Tonga	P67%, C16%
Trinidad & Tobago	C26%, P25%, H23%, Su6%
Turkmenistan	Su89%, O9%, A1%
Uganda	C65%, P20%, Su12%
Ukraine	O16%, C9%, P2%
UAE	Su65%, Sh11%, P9%, H7%, B2%
United Kingdom	C39%, P14%, Su1%, A1%
United States	P51%, C24%, Su2%, J2%
Uruguay	C54%, P20%
Uzbekistan	Su88%, O9%, Sh1%
Vanuatu	P57%, C26%, I4%
Venezuela	C92%, P8%
Vietnam	B49%, C10%, P2%, A7%
Yemen, N. (1946-89)	Su65%, Sh35%
Yemen, S. (1967-89)	Su65%, Sh35%
Yemen (1990-)	Su65%, Sh35%
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep	O85%, P6%, Su3%, C1%
Zambia	P61%, C26%, I7%, Su1%
Zimbabwe	I55%, P33%, C7%, Su1%

Note: Data on religious demographics were obtained from the Religion and State Project, which can be found at www.thearda.com/ras and clicking on "National Profiles"

REFERENCES

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* (8), 2003.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

Berger, Peter L. *The Social Reality of Religion*. London: Faber and Faber, 1969.

Bideleux, Robert and Ian Jeffries. *A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change*. Routledge: Taylor and Francis, 2007.

Blainey, Geoffrey. *The Causes of War*. New York: The Free Press, 1973.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003.

Chiozza, Giacomo. "Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946-97." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (6), 2002.

Chong, Dennis. *Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Cleary, Edward and Timothy Steigenga (eds.) *Resurgent Voices in Latin America: Indigenous Peoples, Political Mobilization and Religious Change*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2004.

Collier, Paul. "Doing Well Out of War." Paper prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London, April 26-27, 1999.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (4), 2004.

Collier, Paul and Nicholas Sambanis, eds. *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*. The World Bank, 2005.

Coser, Lewis A. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. New York: The Free Press, 1956.

Deininger, Claus and Lyn Squire. "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality." *The World Bank Economic Review* 10 (3), 1996.

de Soysa, Indra and Ragnhild Nordås. "Islam's Bloody Innards?" Paper prepared for presentation at the Meeting of the Environmental Factors in Civil War Working Group, 21 Sep 2006.

Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49, 1995.

Fearon, James D. "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country." *Journal of Economic Growth* (8), 2003.

Fearon, James D. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (3), 2004.

Fearon, James and David Laitin. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 90 (4), 1996.

Fearon, James and David Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97 (1), 2003.

Fish, M. Steven. "Islam and Authoritarianism." *World Politics* 55 (1), 2002.

Fox, Jonathan. "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations." International Studies Review 3 (3), 2001.

Fox, Jonathan. "Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West." Journal of Peace Research 38 (4), 2001.

Fox, Jonathan. *Religion, Civilization and Civil War: 1945 through the New Millennium.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004.

Fox, Jonathan. "The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars: 1945-2001. *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (6), 2004.

Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21, 2004.

Galbraith, James K. and Hyunsub Kum. "Estimating the Inequality of Household Incomes: A Statistical Approach to the Creation of a Dense and Consistent Global Data Set." A presentation prepared for the International Association for Research on Income and Wealth, Cork, Ireland, 2004.

Gill, Anthony. *Rendering Unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Gill, Anthony. "Religion and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, 2001.

Gill, Anthony. "The Political Origins of Religious Liberty: A Theoretical Outline." *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* Volume 1, Article 1, 2005.

Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, 1995. "Geography, Democracy, and Peace." *International Interactions* 20(4): 297–323.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (5), 2002.

Goldstone, Jack A., Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc A. Levy, Monty G. Marshall, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Colin H. Kahl, Pamela T. Surko, John C. Ulfelder, and Alan N. Unger in consultation with Matthew Christenson, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Daniel C. Esty, and Thomas M. Parris. *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings*, McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 30 September 2000.

Gurr, Ted Robert. "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." *International Studies Quarterly* 38 (3), 1994.

Gurr, Ted Robert. *People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2000.

Hammerschlag, C. A. and B. M. Astrachan. "The Kennedy Airport Snow-In: An Inquiry into Intergroup Behavior." *Psychiatry* 34 (3), 1971.

Haynes, Jeff. "Religion and Democratization in Africa." *Democratization* 11 (4), 2004.

Henderson, Errol A. "Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989." Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (5), 1997.

Henderson, Errol A. and J. David Singer. "Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92." *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (3), 2000.

Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten. Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006.

Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence O. Ranger. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985.

Hunter, Shirleen. *The Future of Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* Westport, CT: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3), 1993.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Try Again: A Reply to Russett, Oneal & Cox." Journal of Peace Research 37 (5), 2000.

Iannaccone, Laurence R. "The Market for Martyrs." Unpublished manuscript, January 2006.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *The New Cold War?* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Terror in the Mind of God*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

Kahler, Miles and Barbara F. Walter, eds. *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*. Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Kalyvas, Stathis. "From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon." *Comparative Politics* 31 (2), 1998.

Kalyvas, Stathis. "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties." *Comparative Politics* 32 (4), 2000.

Kalyvas, Stathis. "Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization. Beyond Christian Democracy." Thomas Kselman and Joseph A. Buttigeg, eds., *European Christian Democracy. Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003.

Kirshner, Jonathan. "Rationalist Explanations for War?" *Security Studies* 10 (1), 2000.

Kohen, Arnold S. "The Catholic Church and the Independence of East Timor" in *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

269

Lacina, Bethany and Nils Petter Gleditsch. "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths." *European Journal of Population* 21, 2005.

Lacina, Bethany and Nils Petter Gleditsch. "The Declining Risk of Death in Battle." *International Studies Quarterly* 50, 2006.

Laitin, David D. *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict." *International Security* 21 (2.), 1996.

Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *The Atlantic Monthly* 266 (3), 1990.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. *The Rebel's Dilemma*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.

Lott A. J. and B. E. Lott. "Group Cohesiveness as Interpersonal Attraction: A Review of Relationships with Antecedent and Consequent Variables." *Psychological Bulletin* 64 (4), 1965.

Mahbubani, Kishore. "The Dangers of Decadence: What the West Can Teach the Rest." *Foreign Affairs* 72 (4), 1993.

Mearsheimer, John. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton, 2001.

Mercer, Jonathan. "Anarchy and Identity." *International Organization* 49 (2), 1995.

Minorities at Risk Project. "Minorities at Risk Dataset." College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ on: 2 Jan 2009

Mojzes, Paul. *Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1994.

Morris, Aldon. "The Black Church in the Civil Rights Movement: the SCLC as the Decentralized, Radical Arm of the Black Church" in Christian Smith (ed.) *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism*. New York: Rutledge: 1996.

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006.

Nordås, Ragnhild. "Regulating Religious Minorities: For Better or Worse?"
Paper read at International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, March 2004.

Norris, Pipa and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Philpott, Daniel. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Philpott, Daniel. "The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations." *World Politics* 55 (1), 2002.

Posen, Barry R. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. Princeton University Press, 1993.

Posner, Daniel N. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Roeder, Philip G. "Clash of Civilizations and Escalation of Domestic Ethnopolitical Conflicts." Comparative Political Studies 36 (5), 2003.

Ross, Michael L. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53 (3), 2001.

Ross, Michael L. "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases." *International Organization* 58 (1), 2004.

Russett, Bruce M., John R. Oneal and Michaelene Cox. "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism deju vu? Some Evidence. *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (5), 2000.

Sadowsky, Yahya. "Political Islam: Asking the Wrong Questions." *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, 2006.

Sambanis, Nicholas and Annalisa Zinn. "From Protest to Violence: Conflict Escalation in Self-Determination Movements." Unpublished Working Paper, Yale University, Aug. 3rd, 2006.

Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Phil Schafer. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18 (1), 2000.

Sen, Amartya. *On Economic Inequality*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.

Simmel, Georg. *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*. New York: The Free Press, 1955.

Singer, J. David and Melvin Small. *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972.

Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982.

Smith, Christian, ed. *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism*. New York: Routledge, 1996.

Smith, Tony. "Dangerous Conjecture." *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1997.

Stein, Arthur A. "Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20 (1), 1976.

Toft, Monica Duffy. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton University Press, 2003.

Tusicisny, Andrej. "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer and Bloodier?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (4), 2004, p. 497.

Van Evera, Stephen. "Primordialism Lives!" APSA-CP: Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association 12 (1), 2000, 20-22.

Varshney, Ashutosh. "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict" in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press, 2007.

Walt, Stephen M. "Building Up New Bogeymen." *Foreign Policy* 106, 1997.

Walter, Barbara F. "Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict." *International Studies Review* 5 (4), 2003.

Walter, Barbara. "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* (41), 2004.

Walter, Barbara F. and Jack Snyder, eds. *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*. Columbia University Press, 1999.

Waltz, Kenneth: *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1976.

Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Owen Yeisley was born November 26, 1960 in Bourne, Massachusetts. After graduating with honors from Texas A&M University in 1990 with a degree in Meteorology, he was commissioned in the United States Air Force and assigned to Ramstein AB Germany. He then attended Colorado State University and graduated with honors with a Master of Science in Satellite Meteorology in 1996. After a series of advanced weather assignments, including supporting Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and ENDURING FREEDOM, he attended Air Command and Staff College and graduated with honors with a Master of Arts in Military Operational Art and Science degree in 2004. In 2006 he was selected to attend Duke University for a PhD in Political Science and has since been reassigned as an Academic Instructor at Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama.

Lieutenant Colonel Yeisley's awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf clusters, the Air Force Commendation Medal Lieutenant with four Oak Leaf clusters, the Army of Occupation Medal and the Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal. He has been an Officer of the Year at the Squadron, Group, Wing and Numbered Air Force levels. Lieutenant Colonel Yeisley is married to the former Jamie Leah Marler of Destin, Florida. They have one daughter, Mollie Sue Yeisley, and two grandchildren, Kayla Lynn and Anthony.