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Citation in the French fiction film from the new wave to the present: imagining a new spectator

Franck Le Gac
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CITATION IN THE FRENCH FICTION FILM
FROM THE NEW WAVE TO THE PRESENT:
IMAGINING A NEW SPECTATOR

by

Franck Le Gac

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Interdisciplinary Studies – Ph.D. degree
in
Film Studies and French and Francophone World Studies
in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa

May 2010

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Charles Altman

ABSTRACT

At the turn of the 1960s, citation – a figure until then relatively rare in the fiction film – began to appear, if not frequently, at least with an insistent regularity. In breaching the self-contained world characteristic of most genres in the era of the classical fiction film, citation called forth spectators who would assume a much more significant share of hermeneutic work – not simply as the addressees of filmic narration, but also, alternately or simultaneously, as the witnesses of a certain type of representation unfolding in the present tense. While such double, or mixed spectatorial position has frequently been described and defined as a distinct sign of modernity in world cinema, citation has rarely found itself at the center of critical inquiries. Nor has it been defined with much precision comparatively with other intertextual modes.

“Citation in the French Fiction Film from the New Wave to the Present: Imagining a New Spectator” engages in this work of definition, underlining the specificities of a film citation with respect to literary citation, but also more generally to citation in discourse and language. Conceived as involving enunciation in part or as a whole, and affecting the expressive materials of cinema, citation thus goes beyond a mere diegetic appearance or a shared narrative form, by contrast to the reference or the remake, for instance. This in turn makes it possible, through the close analysis of a dozen fiction films, to isolate three major objects, the foci of a general function called “monstration.” Citation points to the reality recorded and used for fiction; it uncovers the gestures and technologies, but also the textualization

and discursive production at work in the fiction film; finally, it inscribes the present of spectatorial interpretation in the fiction film.

In examining the development of these critical faculties of citation over a period of a half-century, “Citation in the French Fiction Film from the New Wave to the Present: Imagining a New Spectator” opens further lines of questioning: first, the permanence, through citation or other figures, of dissociation and monstration in the fiction film, and ultimately a form of narrative fiction film more open to negotiation with the spectator – a type of work and a way to attend to images and sounds that may increasingly define cinema itself; second, the hypothesis that what citation involves within the fiction film may extend to the relation a certain understanding of citizenship has had with nationality in France historically, from the conception of signs to the model of community they implied. This early intuition explains the national scope of this corpus, and its ulterior developments constitute an investigation into the role played by cinema in the construction of French citizenship in the second half of the twentieth century.

Abstract Approved: _____

Thesis Supervisor

Title and Department

Date

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May 2010

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Graduate College
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Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

PH.D. THESIS

This is to certify that the Ph. D. thesis of

Franck Le Gac

has been approved by the Examining Committee for the thesis requirement for the Interdisciplinary Studies – Ph.D. degree in Film Studies and French and Francophone World Studies at the May 2010 graduation.

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INTRODUCTION

It goes without saying that not only can a work be corrected or various fragments from outdated works be integrated in a new one, but also that the meaning of these fragments can be altered and that what imbeciles persist in calling citations can be fixed in every way deemed appropriate.

Guy-Ernest Debord / Gil J. Wolman
 “Diversion. Instructions for Use”¹

To my knowledge, there has been no attempt whatsoever at a precise definition, let alone a systematic study of citation in the fiction film, nor a taxonomy of it and its main functions. As I set out on this project, it even seemed as though scholarly texts using citation as part of their argument indifferently meant allusion or reference, sometimes even resorting to the term to evoke parody or pastiche. Over the past decade, two significant publications on French cinema notably tended to conflate intertextuality with systematized referencing,² while a more recent collection of essays on art – including film – makes a distinction between reuse and citation in its title, leaving it to individual essays to redefine the terms through case studies, more or less explicitly (the remake is for instance one of the forms considered).³

An initial problem these approaches raise is that they exhaust the meanings of the films under consideration – at least apparently – by tracking down the slightest

¹ “Mode d'emploi du détournement,” first published in *Les Lèvres nues* 8 (May 1956), reprinted in Guy Debord, *Oeuvres* (Paris: Quarto/Gallimard, 2006) 221-29. [“Il va de soi que l'on peut non seulement corriger une oeuvre ou intégrer divers fragments d'oeuvres périmées dans une nouvelle, mais encore changer le sens de ces fragments et truquer de toutes les manières que l'on jugera bonnes ce que les imbéciles s'obstinent à nommer des citations.”] All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

² T. Jefferson Kline, *Screening the Text: Intertextuality in New Wave French Cinema* [1992] (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 2003); *French Cinema in the 1990s. Continuity and Difference*, ed. Phil Powrie (Oxford, New York: Oxford U.P., 1999).

³ *Emprunts et citations dans le champ artistique*, ed. Pierre Beylot (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004).

marks of other texts and films and opening up as many latent significations in their object of study. While they enrich the understanding of what some films draw upon and allow repressed or unreferenced models and influences to resurface, they also circumscribe a territory of interpretation based on objective identification and elucidation, subjecting the film and its texts to an intertextual “scorched earth” politics. Taken as a reserve of signification in waiting, a finite domain – despite claims to the contrary – the single film can serve all the better in the production of a network of meanings as long as this does not threaten its integrity and even brings it a certain stability. As to the position of the scholars themselves, the ability to recognize and pinpoint, inventory and make explicit – making in turn verification applicable to their work – bears with it a form of legitimation.

This choice of perspective involves another drawback: the community of intertextual readers or spectators assumed by it is open only to the degree that newcomers assimilate knowledge whose constitution they had no share in, and which they have to assume as their own. Not only does this implicit hierarchy place a knowledge of the film issuing from the university milieu above other, less institutional or informed interpretive modes. It also emphasizes the teasing out of factual detail, by definition easier to quantify, over more performative readings of intertextual phenomena, particularly those that disrupt enunciation in one or several ways. My early intuition of what citation in film, and particularly in the fiction film, could be like, thus consisted less in an access to meaning through an activity of referencing sources (a work that could in no way take place during the screening to begin with, at least not entirely) than in observing, describing, relating in the moment

of attending to the film. These strategies in the face of images and sounds, while by any means *learned*, still seemed more open, accessible, and democratic in their availability to audiences and their relation to the singular experiences of spectators than approaches resting on the mastery of previous knowledge, the requirement and acquisition of a certain sociocultural capital.

The production of citation, or rather, its *non*-production in film studies may thus be partly accounted for by the internal dynamics of the academic institution. Yet another evident reason is the sheer paucity of examples when it comes to the constitution of a corpus, a rarity further compounded by national limitations in this instance. Few are the fiction films in which images or sounds referring or alluding to other films are not subsumed under the necessities of diegesis, narrative, or discourse – which would make them references or allusions rather than citations, precisely; or, in the case of non-diegetic music, subordinated to an accompaniment, attunement, or amplification of the diegetic, narrative, and fictional logics. And in the few fiction films that do feature heterogeneous images and sounds, many do so at either end (to set the historical and contextual frame for the fiction, or to insert the story narrated back into a larger narrative, History more often than not). Audiovisual excerpts featured within the diegetic world and accessible solely from it are an example of such subsumption: they provide chronological indications, they connote, and they authenticate the period and socio-cultural milieu being depicted. In each case, citations are integrated into processes of signification in which their intrinsic qualities become incidental – a paradox if one remembers that citation originated in a time

period – the Renaissance – when it became problematic to keep meaning and the means of its production separate.

A consequence of the two factors mentioned above is that discrete components of fiction films borrowed and adapted from other fiction films, and even from works in other arts or media, receive mention (and much attention) as citations: a prop, a character, a setting or a location, a narrative sequence, a stylistic mark, a melody or a tune, etc. More often than not, allusion, reference, generic and aesthetic affiliation, assimilation, or integration would be more appropriate terms. If citation is to be understood as a perceptible relation between two texts or two films, it cannot involve less than some of the expressive materials from each (text, sound track, image track). This means, for example, that a film featuring a performer reciting verses from a Corneille play previously used in another film might be considered as a citation from the play, but not as a citation from the earlier film, unless the citing film actually borrows from its images or directly excerpts its soundtrack. In the words of some theoreticians of intertextuality, a relation of co-presence is at stake, involving (cited) utterances, certainly, but also the enunciation that allows it to occur – how the cited utterance produced as such embodies points of view on the fiction film imagined or considered prior to it, outside it.⁴

The confusion as to what “reuse” could indeed consist of in cinema may surprise in the context of an audiovisual medium whose creative process is threatened at every stage by the production of difference (and citation involves, among other things, the production of difference). Whether or not it owes to the

⁴ On the notion of co-presence as a requirement, a fiction and postulate that allows the functions of citation to be considered and theorized, see chapter 1.

influence of a study of intertextuality grounded in a rather classical model of narrative literary fiction would warrant a whole other investigation. In effect, the most precise efforts at thinking through reuse (“remploi” or “ré-emploi” in French) have issued from art history and architectural history over the past two decades, with respect to modern art and collage but also to the Antiquity and the Middle Ages.⁵

A synonym of quotation, citation should de facto be distinguished from either “reuse” or “reference.” As has already been suggested, “reference” stands on the more strictly semantic and figurative side of the spectrum. It does not require the “presence” of what is imported and, whether in the form of allusion or paraphrase, piecemeal or integral, it directs the attention to a textual, visual, or aural object without presenting it as such. By contrast, “reuse” best applies to arts whose materiality makes each work unique, since it involves recycling quite literally: an existing painting cut up and used in a modern collage, the spoliation of an ornamental element from one of Rome’s ancient monuments placed atop a later construction to capture some of the original’s aura. In some way, citation stands halfway between these two poles: what is cited appears exactly as it is, but only in the form of a duplicate, a reproduction. The “original” object or previous element in the series remains absent, a characteristic it shares with the object of a reference; still, it can appear as itself in the citing film because they share the same expressive materials, and the operation requires no transformation or translation. Accordingly, I

⁵ A temporary endpoint was the colloquium held at the Musée du Louvre on May 23-24, 2008, “L’Art de la reprise. Remplois, détournements et assemblages à travers l’histoire” [“The Art of the Repeat. Reusing, Diverting, and Assembling throughout History”], which also featured a series of screenings on the treatment of images as “matter” [“matière”].

would associate citation with arts that rely on technologies of reproduction, which obviously includes cinema.

The ambivalence of citation and the questions it raises fueled my initial interest: citation belonged in the film, yet its distinct visibility could not be denied; it clearly opened a gap in the fiction, and at the same time did not completely disrupt the progress of narration; and accordingly, begging interpretation, citation also appeared as a potentially indifferent sign, an excess that was available to willing spectators but by no means required any understanding. In genuine intertextual fashion, it stood between the discontinuity created by its presence and the many potential threads ever produced by countless spectators. The limitation of the corpus to French cinema did arise from these early considerations of citation, the modes of its advent, the forms it assumed, its implications for the integrity of the diegetic world and the consistency of the narrative, as well as the situation of the spectator.

More specifically, I sensed that there existed an interesting contemporaneity between the first instances of citation in the reigning format and mode of the feature fiction film and the early signs of fissuring in a national, Republican French narrative with the memory of the collaboration with the Nazis and the process of decolonization, which – also – involved allowing former imperial subjects to migrate towards the continent as new, if second-rate, French citizens. Yet on a more formal level, it also seemed as though the French citizen-subject, forged mainly during the Third Republic (1871-1940) thanks to a variety of state institutions and legislation

(the school system, the military, the French strand of secularism⁶), shared some elementary features with the spectator-subject posited by the classical fiction film: not a neutral model, yet a model whose positioning was barred from any inscription and thereby given as evident; a model that assimilated or integrated difference, assigning it a secondary place in the construction of an identity defined by an adherence to values and principles; but also, a model torn between this relational, philosophical subject seemingly abstracted from the determinations of history, and the recurrent temptations of identification with a national construction, its territories and landscapes, its central figures, its emblematic cultural productions, more often than not to ends of social cohesion.

In turn, the insertion of citation within the imposed framework of the fiction film, and frequently its narrative progression as the common ground shared by spectators, allowed – through careful analyses and hypotheses – to imagine new relations between the inherited and its transformation, the collective and the individual, the conventional and the singular, vested belief and critical distance. These parallels justified a restriction of the films considered to a national corpus, even as other examples of fiction films involving citation (from Germany, Yugoslavia, Canada, Italy...) were examined in the course of this research and appear in the second part of the filmography. Dropping the term “citizen” from the initial title of the dissertation, “Citation in the French Fiction Film: Imagining a New Spectator/Citizen,” does not mean that the historical and political dimensions of the

⁶ The term, “laïcité,” is best known for its practical applications, in particular in the French school system where religious signs deemed too “obtrusive” are banned. The rule has mostly concerned Muslim girls over the past twenty years, leading many to overlook the potentially wide-ranging implications of the philosophy – beyond public education, but beyond religious expression as well.

subject have been abandoned, quite the contrary. Simply, it seemed methodologically sounder to engage first in an examination of occurrences of citation in a number of fiction films so as to rely on as diverse a range as possible (even as it has kept expanding, the corpus to this day does not exceed twenty films). Also, since it was immediately evident that the films would not be enrolled in a discursive argument around the historical contestation of a national symbolic order – nor could they possibly be – I turned to a stance that involved imagination more explicitly, and that happened to correspond better to my own working interests. Rather than full-fledged chapters, which would have demanded expanding the scope of this dissertation, not so much across disciplinary boundaries as beyond the internal logic of the question of the powers of citation in a given context, I have chosen to lay out these hypotheses in a conclusion.

Four main parts precede this last section, in part preparing the groundwork for it. The first chapter examines how citation has been theorized in language and textuality; and how film as a medium and the fiction film as a mode necessarily alter, at least in part, these propositions in the corpus of French films considered. In so doing, this opening chapter lays out three important functions, which are referred to as “monstrative” and relate to three general objects: reality as the battleground of conflicting symbolizations; the instruments of these symbolizations, which the fiction film offers to perception or conceals from vision or audition; and the present of the situation in which and through which the spectator attends to the film, particularly in the movie theatre. These three objects of citation in the fiction film constitute the foci of the second, third, and fourth chapters, respectively. Finally, the closing section

draws parallels between these functions and issues in French citizenship. With French cinema often serving as a middle ground, a mediating environment, they are presented in the form of a few crucial questions, which open onto future avenues for research. The conclusion also assesses the changes in the status and function of citation over the period inherent in the corpus, raising the issue of the evolution of the figure and the persistence of a monstrative dimension in the fiction film, and more generally in cinema – perhaps even, *in fine*, of cinema as the constitutive site of monstration.

CHAPTER I
CITATION AND FICTION

I went to movies a lot. I would see third-rate, cheap movies that came out of Poverty Row in Hollywood. They had a stock footage library and would use the same images again and again. When there was a scene in New York introduced, you would see the same shot of the Brooklyn Bridge from the same position. And in a foreign locale there would be a classic cliché shot to represent that the tiny sets and exteriors were to be imagined to be there. Also it was cheaper to shoot in front of a rear projection screen in the studio instead of going out. People were walking in front of a movie! Cowboys would pick up their guns and point them, and up would pop shots taken from previous and larger productions: Indians attacking and things like that. So I became aware that there was a universal movie that was being made all the time!

Bruce Conner, in William Wees, *Recycled Images. The Art and Politics of Found Footage Films*.⁷

What makes a citation, and where does it begin? At the reading stage, when certain words seemingly cluster together more than others and appeal to our attention, our subjectivity? Or at the writing stage, when in search of a phrasing that eludes us or a sentence to support or illustrate our argument, we return to the texts of others with an impulse to cut and paste? Or even in the mere preference for a word or expression over another? Does it in fact begin even earlier, with language, once repetition, selection and combination of various units are involved? Or does it concern a discursive practice historically localizable, namely, the delimitation of utterances and the differentiation between the subject of utterances and the subject of enunciation, borne out of the Renaissance? And how does the word refer to distinct instances when approached within different modes (essay, historical narrative, fiction...) or media (print, audiovisual, electronic)? Antoine Compagnon

⁷ William Wees, *Recycled Images. The Art and Politics of Found Footage Films* (New York: Anthology Film Archives, 1993) 78.

acknowledges from the early pages of his essay on the subject⁸ that, considered phenomenologically or from the standpoint of enunciation, citation dissolves, with either attempt at definition soon being exhausted by generality and universality. According to Compagnon, any practice of the text relies on citation, from the ways in which readers, looking for their bearings or finding their attention caught by surprise at the turn of a sentence, accommodate themselves to a given text, to rewriting in its many forms – copying, rephrasing, cutting, pasting, crossing out... If no quotation marks are involved, the dynamic remains one of displacement and rearrangement. And precisely, whether or not texts feature indications of levels of enunciation or sources, their production puts into play the whole gamut of signifying units. It seems, in other words, that what citation entails for the text exceeds it to encompass language in general:

...enunciation is disseminated in the whole text. Ultimately, each word is inscribed on a different degree and summons a new subject to appear; each word should be framed with a specific sign. [...] Some texts reduce the number of levels and assume the integrity of their enunciation; they appear flat, without quotation marks or italics. Their subjects are undifferentiated; their polymorphism is not ordered.⁹

Some other operations typical of citation also lie at the foundation of language: selection and combination, repetition. With respect to repetition, however,

⁸ Antoine Compagnon, *La Seconde main ou le travail de la citation* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979).

⁹ Compagnon, *La Seconde main* 42. [“Mais l’énonciation est disséminée dans tout le texte. Chaque mot, à la limite, s’inscrit sur un degré différent, cite à comparaître un sujet inédit; chaque mot devrait être encadré d’un signe propre. [...] Certains textes réduisent les niveaux et assument l’intégrité de leur énonciation; ils se donnent à plat, sans guillemets ni italiques. Leurs sujets sont indifférenciés; leur polymorphisme n’est pas ordonné.”] A few years before, Roland Barthes had similarly described the text as “a new fabric of completed citations” [“un tissu nouveau de citations révolues”] in his article “Texte (Théorie du),” in *Encyclopedia Universalis* (Paris: Encyclopaedia Universalis, 1973) 372.

Compagnon – referring to Benveniste – emphasizes the fact that in language meaning is characterized by a capacity to integrate a unit at a higher level. Sentences constitute the largest units that may integrate: they do not need to be integrated to signify and mark the entrance into the logic of discourse, relating to one another through consecution. Accordingly, as citation relies on a contingent, not a systematic or necessary repetition, the fact of repetition it represents itself becomes significant:

And, under the regime of infinity, chance, and eventuality, the least repetition – one not forced but contingent, this time – is relevant and meaningful, it is a fact of language, a relation to analyze as such: it becomes a form capable of a function. Whereas in language there are only repeated things, in discourse there is the repetition of things.¹⁰

A citation, like a sentence, is not a sign in the linguistic sense; yet it becomes a sign – in the discursive sense – by dint of its repetition as an utterance, a repetition that initiates a relation between two texts.

To formulate a typology of these relations, Compagnon turns to the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce, not only for the general categories of signs that have come to represent it (the index, the icon – whether analogical or homological, the symbol), but also for their triadic structure, with the interpretant as a variable. Indeed, in Compagnon’s view, citation puts forward elements whose relation remains undetermined, open, virtual, infinite: apprehensible only through its singular actualizations, the advent of citation in another text instantiates an empty space awaiting interpretation, a meaning always to come – and implicitly leaves room for a possible, theoretical addressee. Citation thus does not so much posit an alternative to

¹⁰ Compagnon, *La Seconde main* 52. [“Et, sous le régime de l’infini, du hasard, de l’éventuel, la moindre répétition, non plus contrainte mais contingente, est pertinente et signifiante, elle est un fait de langage, une relation à analyser comme telle: elle devient une forme capable d’une fonction. Alors que dans la langue il n’y a que des choses répétées, dans le discours il y a la répétition des choses.”]

the linguistic sign as it makes visible and amplifies some of its characteristics: there are as many meanings to a sign as there are interpretants, and these interpretants may in turn be signs in the making. *La Seconde main* evidently does not engage in the production of proliferating meanings based on selected examples: rather, the book examines how the semiotic models that have dominated citation over time may help distinguish a number of textual practices, identifiable or not with periods in history.

The moment of the emergence of citation as a practice, a phenomenon of its own right in the late Renaissance and early classical period deserves mentioning.¹¹ Whereas previous modalities of repetition involved texts first and foremost, the rising value of citation is from that point on iconic, that is, citation relates the author of the citing text to the author of the cited text (image) or the cited text itself (diagram). The new stake is the representation of the subject of enunciation, its formalization in the text as ‘already there,’ a thinking that produced the text without being consubstantial to it. This represents a complete break from previous values of repetition, whose dominant paradigm was an effacement of the author of the ‘repeating text’ or of the repeating text itself in the face of a repeated text or author of a repeated text that constituted a decisive criteria for truth and/or for the validity of ideas. The only possible repetition, in that context, was the repetition of the reference text, through explanation, commentary and amplification of its substance.

¹¹ Antoine Compagnon devotes many pages to Montaigne as a transitional, and accordingly very complex, figure in relation to citation: Montaigne is a writing subject that does not differentiate between his own prose and that of others (no marks, and frequent indirect speech), does not care to authenticate the texts he cites, and does not concern himself with the letter of these texts. He emerges with his citations and through them, and is therefore a subject of enunciation always in the making, one that does not postulate a preexistent entity.

In the shift to an iconic relation as the dominant value of citation, and in the advent of citation itself as a full-fledged discursive phenomenon, the emphasis is also displaced, as Compagnon repeatedly underlines in his chapter, from a received truth that tolerates little variation in its expression (that can only be repeated by a writer whose individuality does not matter so much as long as the spirit is respected) to the criterion of authenticity (where the authority of the writer is premised upon his ability to recover and respect the integrity, the letter of a source and his capacity to turn it into an object of criticism – an authenticity of the citation that will often be confused with its truth as a statement). Indeed, the marks of citation themselves (mainly, the quotation marks and the blank spaces that separate citing and cited texts) are also marks of authenticity: they imply a suspension between two different texts, a change in enunciation with the temporary substitution of one direct speech for another direct speech. Yet they simultaneously constitute the framing by a text of another text, the construction of a subject through a play of encasement with a solicited object. The position of the subject of criticism, when it is not erased from enunciation altogether and posited as prior to it – as the place from which enunciation derives – is relegated to the background. And still, citation in actuality comes to dress, shape, define and substantiate the subject from which it apparently only depends as the object of meta-discourse – from which it apparently awaits interpretation in a hierarchy where it occupies a subordinate position. It is in that sense that it is predominantly iconic, as it provides an analogical or homological representation of the subject. This, as will appear later, carries important consequences with fiction.

The proliferating disquisition on citation offered by *La Seconde main* initially seems to leave little room for further developments, let alone contradiction. Even its opening phenomenological claim – citation is everywhere, whether it is marked or not – constitutes a productive proposition for cinema in that it can serve as an entry into a spectatorial practice based on images and sounds rather than narrative structures and discourses, with forms and figures disrupting sequences of meaning and story lines. Yet even on a material level, it could be argued that there is a citation as soon as there is a shot in cinema, an aspect which again may not strike the audiences of fiction films as evident when much production work consists in the attenuation or cancellation of variations on either side of the cuts. It is just as difficult not to see how Compagnon's parallel between language and discourse does not also bear on cinema and fiction: the tendency of discourse to mimic language so as to pass a contingent integration off as a necessity calls to mind the way in which the dominant model of narrative fiction film operates.

However, some of the perspectives adopted in *La Seconde main* create limitations in an examination of citation generally, and of its relation to film and the fiction film in particular. First, Compagnon chooses not to dwell on the morphology of the citation, its isomorphism or exomorphism when matched to other units, semiotic or linguistic. This is consistent with the focus of his study, which in the wake of Benveniste's distinction between recognition (that the utterance is the repetition of part of another text) and understanding (of the meaning of the utterance) privileges the form of the repetition and its inflection of interpretation(s). This dimension is not negligible or even secondary though, whether in assessing the

relation of citation to a citing text or the relation – through citation – of a citing text to a cited one (which is the core project of *La Seconde main*). Similarly, in film, the location of the cuts and their impact on the perception and understanding of what the shot figures or represents can hardly be overlooked in examining possible functions of the citation in the fiction film. Likewise, just as it is debatable that the meaning of citation itself would systematically take precedence over the meaning of the cited utterance, the fact that what a citation figures or represents would recede behind the meaning of the repetition of these images or sounds appears unlikely in a partly indexical medium. While citation means primarily by the fact that it displaces and repeats, what it means as an utterance in the secondary text is not altogether indifferent. It carries over denotative elements from the primary text, and in cinema the figures thus translated arguably retain a degree of remanence, even at one remove.

This helps outline another difference of approach from Compagnon's work: where *La Seconde main* turns to a previous text (assumed to be identified and known, since a citation from it in a new text is assumed to produce a given type of relation between the two, based on the Peircean typology), this research focuses on the functions citations fulfill in the next text, the work they help perform in it. In other words, this examines the same relation as does Compagnon, yet in a different direction: leaving behind the cited text or treating it only as what remains of it in the citation, it attempts to outline the new relations emerging in the citing text – relations which, for lack of a better term, I would label as projective, by contrast to the more retrospective relations examined in *La Seconde main*.

Accordingly, the relata (author and text) singled out by Compagnon do not assume the same relevance for the present work. When they do apply, as in Bernardo Bertolucci's *The Dreamers* (which cites some of Truffaut's and Godard's New Wave films in a way that could be described as indexical, an author absenting himself from his own film to hand it over temporarily to admired models), they do not significantly affect the interpretation that may be performed of the citing film, that is, they do not open on decisive functions. More importantly, as appears in the corpus of films constituted by this research, the anonymity of some of the sources of citations or their collective authorship (stock-shots, newsreels coming from *libraries*), along with the willful suspension of any information on them – in other words, a stricter emphasis on what they may figure or even represent – complicates the identification of relata in the first place.¹²

Finally, and partly for the reason just mentioned, Compagnon does not situate or found his argument in any mode or genre, since what interests him the

¹² For Compagnon, three main models govern the relation between citing text and cited text and serve as interpretants to the citation, but while one tends to dominate in any given instance, they all are involved to some degree in any citation. The *symbol*, which assigns contiguity, is related to its object through a law or an idea but does not share any existential or physical features with it. Compagnon locates it in the relation of cited text to citing text. By contrast, the *index* is a relation of effective, factual contiguity and consists, in this instance, in the citation of an author by a text whose author absents him-/herself from enunciation. Finally, the *icon* involves an effective similarity and exhibits some of the physical characteristics of its object, either through the *diagram*, a homological representation (here, between citing author and cited text) or through the *image*, an analogical representation (between citing author and cited author). To these three Peircean categories Compagnon adds the introversive semiosis, which relies on an assigned similarity between sign and object and originated in Roman Jakobson's attempt to define the sign of serial music in "Le Langage en relation avec les autres systèmes de communication," in *Essais de linguistique générale* [1963], vol. II (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1974). Indeed, while all other signs relate specific terms within the cited text and the citing text (from the dominance of the cited text itself in the symbol to that of the author of the citing text in the icon), the introversive semiosis blurs distinctions between identifiable loci in them. In semiotic terms, it makes it impossible for ground and representamen to stabilize around given morphemes or figures.

most is the relation of citation to the *cited* text – the form of the citation, as he refers to it. The function of citation (or the relation of citation to a second textual system) requires, not that the source text be clearly identified and well-known (with the drawback that uninformed or unaware readers or viewers would then be excluded from the process of interpretation and access to a ‘proper’ meaning), but that the specificity of the citing text be taken into account. Obviously, fiction – save for peritexts, usually preceding the narrative – rarely features citations acknowledged as such.

The question then arises of how citation may be approached in relation to the mode. In her early collection of essays devoted to the novel,¹³ Julia Kristeva writes of junction (between utterances) and translation (from speech to book, from a textual space to the other) as equally characteristic of the genre of the novel. Both relations involve the ‘speech’ attributed to the author-actor (which she calls narration) and that attributed to another (which she refers to as citation). For Kristeva, integration appears precisely in the context of a hierarchy that benefits narration, as the marks of its oral origins and its performative dimension are erased and become materialized only in absentia, through the object it constitutes with citation – in other words, when it disappears from the text to become its premise.

The process described does not seem unlike that at work with citation more generally during the period: a newly autonomous object, which until then could be subsumed by other terms without loss in descriptive or definitional precision, allows narration and enunciation to become discrete. This limited inscription in the text, as

¹³ Julia Kristeva, *Sémiotikè. Recherches pour une sémanalyse* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969).

Compagnon also indicates, partly removes the production of enunciation from scrutiny, simultaneously blocking the serial logic of citation, or at least preventing its possible representation as successive encasements so prized in baroque: with this subtraction, indeed, the possibility that narration may itself already be a citation is suppressed. In the instance presented by Kristeva, citation is thus the only visible element – citation is everywhere, since narration has disappeared from view.

Still, moving beyond strict narration to encompass enunciation, citation may also refer to the insertion of an heterogeneous element, one that does not merely indicate the intervention of an agency other than the narrator but would constitute a – flaunted – enunciative intervention in the fabric of the narrative fiction. This leads back to the postulate of co-presence and the assumption that the citing text (fiction, in this case) may be envisaged in a state of ‘pre-citation’ if the implications of citation are to be assessed as fully as possible.¹⁴ Yet this is after all a premise, an act of imagination of two objects either partly known, unknown, or even imaginary, an act that makes a certain understanding of citation – and enunciative procedures – possible. Fiction here thus becomes an antecedent, a unit whose coherence and completion are initially posited and whose texture citation would be inserted into and/or tear. It qualifies as what Laurent Jenny has called “a centering text that

¹⁴ Incidentally, ‘co-presence’ is a term often used in a slightly derogatory manner to suggest that other manifestations of intertextuality, those which supposedly rely on transformation, are more worthy of attention than citation – as though the apparent lack of transformation involved a kind of creative laziness, as opposed to a conception of writing as a craft involving skill. What is more, its intertextual label as a ‘relation of co-presence’ is paradoxical, in that it would have to consist in the co-presence of two absent texts, or perhaps two ideal texts, the cited text represented in a synecdochic manner by the citation, the citing text represented ‘before’ citation came to interrupt it.

retains the leadership in meaning-making”¹⁵ in an article that, quite ironically, restricts intertextuality to textual transformation or derivation and accordingly excludes allusions and reminiscences on the one hand, citation on the other. The former are seen as too superficial, discrete semantic elements unlikely to affect the text at a structural level; the latter is deemed a threat to the integrity of the citing text because of the internal resistance it opposes to it and the disruption it creates. Yet citation, as we will see in relation to fiction, also presents a range of alternatives from near integration to radical dissociation with consequences similar to those envisioned by Jenny:

Thus, either intertextual work will multiply the links meant to integrate the borrowed fragment on several levels at once; or, in an opposite movement, intertextual fragments will play out their ambiguity and project a range of virtual combinations onto the context.¹⁶

The level of integration required for fiction to operate is precisely a decisive aspect in Roger Odin’s research on fiction as a communicative mode broaching both literature and cinema. *De la fiction*, a compendium of his work on the subject,¹⁷ has relevance from the standpoint of citation as a relation and its potential effects on the interpretive work of the audience, since it straddles the line between form and (assumed or simply intended) consequences on actual reception. From the perspective of semio-pragmatics (a discipline that elaborates a model addressee from

¹⁵ Laurent Jenny, “La Stratégie de la forme,” in *Poétique. Revue de théorie et d’analyse littéraires* 27 (1976): 262. [“un texte centreur qui garde le *leadership* du sens”]

¹⁶ Jenny, “La Stratégie de la forme”: 273. [“Ou bien, donc, le travail intertextuel multiplierait-il les liens destinés à intégrer l’emprunt à plusieurs niveaux à la fois. Ou bien, par un mouvement inverse, les fragments intertextuels joueront de leur ambiguïté et jeteront vers le contexte un faisceau de virtualités combinatoires.”]

¹⁷ Roger Odin, *De la fiction* (Brussels: Éditions de Boeck Université, 2000).

close readings and/or viewings and from a comparative stance, and confronts it to actual, recorded instances of reception), fiction is not just a set of immanent characteristics: it is also a protocol between two parties absent to each other temporally and spatially. The activity of ‘fictionalizing’ (or of ‘documentarizing’, ‘fabulating’, etc., to mention major types of enunciation examined by Odin) thus involves a third space where the respective productions of meaning by enunciator and enunciatee may converge or not, creating an *impression* of communication of varying range and force. Assessing this aggregation of processes, Odin treads the (uncertain) line between a phenomenology of reading and viewing fiction (he uses the pronoun ‘I’ in his text both personally and impersonally) and the description of textual and figurative operations fostering fictionalization.¹⁸

Odin distinguishes five main clusters of operations, which constitute as many chapters in his demonstration: 1) figurativization and diegetization (the imagination of elements that can be named and described, and in turn their correlation into an environment, a story world); 2) narrativization (the production of micro-narratives or

¹⁸ Odin remains very evasive as to the interplay between the individual work of fiction and fictional traditions in fictionalization. Early in his book he states his doubts about the weight of the constraints exerted by texts on their readers, and yet much if not all of his argument rests on a good fictionalizing subject unquestioningly performing along instructions derived from the literary text or the film. This paradox is only apparent, as “in the semio-pragmatic approach, the enunciator is not a textual fact but a presupposition and construction by the spectator or the reader, and if there are indeed any marks, they are the enunciator’s as I construct it in the course of reading.” Odin, *De la fiction* 51. [“Pour l’approche sémio-pragmatique, l’énonciateur n’est pas un fait textuel mais une présupposition et une construction du spectateur ou du lecteur, et si traces il y a, ce sont celles de l’énonciateur tel que je le construis dans le mouvement de la lecture.”] The notion of a contract between absent parties has as a main consequence the imaginary elaboration by the spectator of what the fictive enunciator expects him/her to do; and, since the onus is on the spectator in Odin’s structure – all necessary elements of the fiction being in – the right – place, this contract ends up resembling a voluntary subjection. Another limitation in Odin’s argument may also be that it overlooks the often uneven balance of power between the forces shaping enunciation, backed up by a powerful mass-cultural industry and a long process of consolidation of productive – and interpretive – practices with respect to fiction films.

narrative effects even without a large, structuring narrative) and narration (the de-realization in time and space of figures and diegetic elements and their vectorization into sequences of actions and reactions); 3) phasing, or *mise en phase* (the sets of textual elements aimed at tuning the affective and emotional participation of the audience to the narrative through the use of expressive materials, and at ensuring the transmission of a coherent discourse and of specific values); 4) fictivization (the transformation of profilmic elements, time, and enunciation into signifiers of fiction, their abstraction from the moment in which they were recorded); and 5) the interplay and hierarchy between fictive and real enunciators in the enunciative structure of fiction.

The precision of the edifice, combined with its overall coherence, suggest a model grounded in a rather specific – and consequently bounded – historical context, at the same time as it sets a theoretical standard, a more prescriptive approach as to the requirements that would need to be met for fiction to operate in literature or film. Yet a number of films in this corpus, while they involve a fiction and even, for most of them, a narrative, do not qualify if we are to abide by the defining characteristics laid out by Odin. This owes to the recourse to citation, but not only; also at stake is perhaps what fiction may be or may do, and in that respect an assessment of some notions and terms upheld in *De la fiction* is in order. Odin's operations, considered independently from their place in his overall model, involve three kinds of relations: the relation of the reality recorded on film to fiction; the place of the representation

thus produced in a causal chain and in a temporal organization; and the way fiction addresses, or “contemplates,” its spectators.¹⁹

The fledgling stages in the process of fictivizing – figurativization and diegetization – involve a work of imagination based on a record of reality – at the level of discrete elements (human figures, objects, places...) in the first case, of a story world in the second. Such work is strongly driven by analogy in the fiction film, even though it is dependent on each spectator for its actualization:

In the operation of figurativization, the analogy is not *noted* but *presupposed*; the important thing is for me to consider what I am given to see as representing elements of a world, whether or not I have the possibility (or the curiosity) of checking its resemblance with these elements.²⁰

Later in the same chapter, Odin similarly describes diegetization as the elaboration by the reader or viewer of an “inhabitable space”²¹ – not just an environment in which the narrative will unfold, and which it will simultaneously shape, but one in which readers or viewers could also picture themselves living. This perspective draws heavily on the tradition of the Realist novel of the nineteenth-century and its carefully wrought verisimilitude. Besides the tacit acceptance underlying both processes, Odin constructs the figure as a site of tautological conformity in which the leaves of a tree could remain the leaves of a tree, while the

¹⁹ This succession, following the logic of increasingly large units analyzed by Odin in his book, may suggest an extremely integrative machinery. It is in fact also that, but the author of *De la fiction* never denies the fact that the areas examined also overlap to some extent.

²⁰ *De la fiction*, p. 19. [“Dans l’opération de figurativisation, l’analogie n’est pas *constatée* mais *présupposée*; l’essentiel est que je considère ce qu’on me donne à voir comme représentant des éléments d’un monde, que j’aie ou non la possibilité (ou la curiosité) de vérifier la ressemblance avec ces éléments.”] The prominence given to constituted knowledge [“presupposed”] and analogies equally precludes “noting” (with the observation and nomination it supposes) and imagining, which accompanies it.

²¹ *De la fiction*, 23. [“un espace habitable”]

diegesis has to be ascertained as conceivable, plausible, familiar almost. Admittedly, this is presented as a communicative protocol, first and foremost; but the work of imagination appears drastically limited, with no consideration given to alternative definitions of the figure (as the site of an open-ended play of re-nomination, for instance, an image or sound no more exhausted by language than it is determined by it). As to the diegesis, while common analogical ground with the reality experienced by spectators seems necessary for any effectiveness of the fiction (a notion itself not so evident, as will be seen later), the anthropocentric and ethnocentric restriction to the “inhabitable” rules out some genres such as science-fiction and horror – other than as sets of conventions easing the acceptance of unrealistic occurrences, that is. In the end, Odin does not seem to reckon that both figurativization and diegetization potentially depend on a work of metonymic and metaphorical relationality which plays a role even in the most prescriptive and closed fictions.

The second relation at stake in Odin’s exposition involves the place of figures and diegesis in narration, and how narration transforms them. In his view, narration rests on five operations : a) the construction of a semantic isotopy, which provides a coherence over the recurrences of characters, places, and actions and relies on redundant information; b) the temporalization of this isotopic ensemble, but in a relation of succession, not simultaneity (two contradictory events must not be construed as taking place at the same time, and the same action may be shown only once); c) its articulation in a large transformation, so that the end will not return to the exact point of departure and suggest a closed circle, but rather signify a progression, usually oriented towards a goal, a desirable result; d) a structuration and

hierarchization of the forces at play (human and non-human agents), so as to avoid that they proliferate or cancel each other out, and in the end produce either open-endedness or narrative self-dissolution; e) the syntagmatic organization of actions in a temporal succession which makes a narrative comprehensible (exposition coming early, action preceding the reaction, stasis concluding it). It is also reinforced, early on, by a more discrete transformation, *narrativization*: the assignation of discrete states of being or movements to what Odin, quoting Ricoeur, refers to as the “conceptual network of action;” and by one of the forms of *fictivization*, which cleaves the record of the profilmic from its own time to make it available for the time of a fiction.

Narration as a whole thus assigns direction, transformation, and destination as well as hierarchy and order; doing so, it wrenches away the ‘here and now’ of the sequences it uses to articulate them in the overall past of the narrative. This de-realization opens the narrative to a discursive encoding which in the present would remain open to negotiation. Once narration takes place, the only present left is that of enunciation: yet the fictional narrative (in its character as past, and thanks to the apparent evidence and indexical weight of the signifiers of film in the case of cinema) also serves to suppress this dialogic space from view. Another crucial dimension of narration is its simultaneous re-confirmation, its renewed identification – of protagonists and locations, particularly. At the same time, the temporal construction and the progression of the plot cannot tolerate a similar renewal or redundancy and are excluded from it. Changes have to be anchored in the same bodies or physical spaces; concurrently, alternative, or even parallel and digressive lines, should be

suppressed altogether or eventually brought back into the fold of a chosen main line. The dread of any phenomenon of doubling runs through Odin's theorization of narration, in which conflicting versions should be subject to resolution.

The third and last relation Odin examines involves fiction and its spectators: semio-pragmatics is, after all, premised on the effect(s) a text aims to have on its addressees, and an assessment of the success of formal strategies in that regard. *De la fiction* distributes this relation over two central processes, phasing and enunciation. Phasing (*mise en phase*) involves a type of privileged position in relation to the diegesis and the narrative (a position that will eventually foster receptivity to the discourse they also convey). It accordingly regulates the expense of signifiers around them so as to avoid excess or contradiction; and more broadly, so as to sustain the readerly or spectatorial desire to believe:

In a fiction film read as a fiction film, at all the important moments in the story being told, the film produces a positioning of the spectator *homologous* to the relations that manifest themselves in the diegesis. Phasing is a *relation of relations*: one and the same system structures both the *diegetic relations* and the relations that develop between the film and its spectator, that is, the *filmic relations*.²²

Such phasing relies on two types of operations, psychological and enunciative.

Psychological operations revolve around processes which psychological and psychoanalytic approaches to film have covered in much detail: on the one hand, adhesion to or rejection of certain values, represented by certain characters and their actions, as well as identification to or objectification of these characters; on the other

²² Odin, *De la fiction* 44. ["Dans un film de fiction lu comme un film de fiction, à tous les grands moments de l'histoire racontée, le film produit un positionnement du spectateur *homologue* aux relations qui se manifestent dans la diégèse. La mise en phase est une *relation de relations*: un même système structure à la fois les *relations diégétiques* et les relations qui s'instaurent entre un film et son spectateur: les *relations filmiques*."]]

hand, the launching of the narrative through the creation of a situation that introduces a gap and accordingly a dynamic between desire and its fulfillment, between the demand created and the opportune supply provided (which narration alone can put an end to, in this configuration). As to enunciative operations, they implement a regimen of containment (signifiers should be strictly limited to the demands of the narrative) and equivalence (for an impression of disorder to be produced on the spectator, *beyond* the sheer statements or actions by characters or narrator that testify to disorder, the signifier itself will connote disorder).²³ Such equivalence between diegetic relations and filmic relations hints at yet another modality of participation for the audience and shows how imbricated psychological and enunciative operations are: an experience of identification but on separate, parallel levels rather than around a similar point (as would a character's perspective also serving as a relay for the enunciator and the spectator, for example). Overall, phasing as a relation of relations is a principle of signifying (narrative) economy based on balanced proportions and positions in what is at bottom a work of homogenization and coherence.

Such work, however, may be achieved at all levels, only at a few, or even at one (with fictive enunciation, as we will see), and the boundaries between phasing and dissociation prove difficult for Odin to trace. His notion of *déphasage* attempts to

²³ Odin refers to Thierry Kuntzel's "Le Travail du film," on Ernest B. Schoedsack and Irving Pichel's *The Most Dangerous Game* (1932) to make his point: in the film, and in this specific instance, its second sequence, a diegetic event (a storm) justifies a loss in coordinates (horizontality and verticality, sharpness of figures and forms, legibility of relative positions in space), but such a loss also exists at an expressive level. Blur, reversal, cries rather than speech do not simply find their rationale in the diegesis, they also relate to signifieds more directly apprehensible, if less concrete and denotative: disorder, confusion, disorientation, irritation, fear...

corral autonomized elements back within a narrative framework, but does so by repressing the enunciative dimension of such elements: his reading of the super-8 film cited full-frame in *Muriel, ou le temps d'un retour*, its trembling, blurred, overexposed image and the uncertainty as to what it really represents or tells illustrates this. Indeed, the disorientation and discomfort of the audience faced with this heterogeneous sequence is interpreted by Odin as the equivalent (in filmic relations) of the crisis in moral values and the aporia that run through the diegesis (the world of a French provincial town, Boulogne-sur-Mer, during the 1954-62 war in Algeria). This departure from the description of processes towards the production of a hard and fast interpretation, a rare occurrence in the book, is indicative not so much of an operation of phasing taking place at a higher level as of its author's desire to disregard an anomaly. In fact, the split between diegesis and film signifier cannot be entirely transferred onto narrative necessity in this instance. Regardless of the validity granted to Odin's own discursive interpretation, it could have been produced without a visual citation in full frame and even more importantly, without maintaining a diegetic sound (the noise of the projector operated by Bernard). This split position between an outside and an inside of the diegesis brings up the question of the audience's relation to self-sufficient, closed-off diegetic worlds in general, mirrors the audience's own situation, and gives visibility to a dimension of enunciation not exclusively in the tutelage of fiction. It resists a function of sheer illustration or expression of the narrative, as far-reaching as this function might be. In *Muriel*, citation does work at a level higher than the one at which the fiction itself integrates, without for all that ruining the fiction. Introducing an alternation, a back-

and-forth movement between positions for the spectator, it tests the limits of the cohesive and unifying fictional model elaborated by Odin, but also and most importantly the restrictive contract it implies for the audience.

The other dimension of the relation between fiction and its audience is enunciation, a decisive aspect of “fictionalizing” to which it provides coherence and unity, integrating vertically the elements that have just been examined. These processes come under the umbrella term and neologism “fictivization.” As was briefly mentioned earlier, “fictivization” involves three levels: the ability of a given signifier to support fictionalization; the de-realization of events through narration; and finally, in a qualitative leap from “fictivizing” to fictive, the construction of a fictive enunciator as paramount to the mode. The initial level is derived from Christian Metz’s argument about the diversity of languages and the relation of their materiality to fiction. For Metz (and Odin), the degree of fictivization of a language is a function of its perceptive wealth and the presence or absence of what is offered to perception. In language and literature (even in the case of a poetry such as Francis Ponge’s, which Odin reads as an attempt to reconcile linguistic and semantic correlations with real correlations), words do not share any perceptual identity or analogy whatsoever with the – absent – objects they signify. In cinema the signifier does share such an analogy, but while the signified remains as absent as it is in literature, the signifier too is imaginary. This greater gap is what constitutes the high degree of cinema’s aptitude to “fictivize.”

The second stage in fictivization involves a loss of the present (since narration can occur only when what it has to recount has putatively happened) as well as a loss

of presence, a condition of language itself, which the perceptive wealth just mentioned may compensate to a degree. Both aspects may in interdependent and paradoxical ways reinforce the impression that the text is non-negotiable: the past, because it has happened; presence and the present, because despite its loss this past is represented with the force of an hallucination. The only real present, that of enunciation, remains in the meantime hidden and suppressed; the third level of fictivization, the construction of an enunciative structure, further contributes to this.

The role of the enunciative structure in fictionalization is rather complex and multilayered, but at its core lies the fact that a fictive enunciator caps it, holding it together. This enunciator, which positions the reader or viewer as a fictive enunciatee (who in return – and in anticipation, since the process is very much a circular one – accepts a suspension of his/her actual identity), intentionally pretends yet (to paraphrase Odin) without any intention to deceive. Conversely, the fictive enunciatee chooses to believe in such a pretense, which implies that fictive enunciation occurs in a third space (neither the text nor the real space of reception) where no questions are to be asked about who is telling, how, and how truthful or not such a tale is. Once the proposition “let us pretend that...” or “let us think as if...” has been at least tacitly accepted, the agreement is assumed to stand for the entirety of the narrative. For fictionalization to work, it has to unfold without interruption. Again, it can function only as an integrative, homogeneous, and continuous mode.

It is within this framework, under the aegis of the fictive enunciator, that three types of real enunciators coexist: a) the enunciator of real utterances is taken by the

reader or spectator as belonging to the same world as him/her (that is what makes its utterances real, not the fact that they would refer to real events, contexts, people); b) the enunciator of discourse (distinct from the real enunciator of utterances by its implicit nature, it functions to convey values through the narrative and embed a discourse in it); and c) the enunciator of production (which crystallizes the modalities of enunciation – source, form, truthfulness or falseness – all of which precisely cannot be questioned in the case of the fictive enunciator). All three types of real enunciator have to submit to the logic of the fictive enunciator for fictionalization to take place, albeit they relate to it differently.

How does citation alter this architecture, particularly in film? How does it affect this third, abstract space where writing and reading, filmmaking and ‘spectating’ meet, simultaneously constituting it? Does citation lend itself to a classification in major functions, and if so, which ones? To answer these questions we need to take yet another detour: what would a cinematic citation be like? What would in effect be cited, and how does cinema differ from language and literature in that respect? An initial observation, one that draws a line between literature and cinema, is the opposite relation their respective signifying materials have to citation. In the printed text it has to be marked, due to the capacity of – and the economic necessity for – the technology to absorb heterogeneous materials into its templates (at least in the pre-reprographic age). Print entails an assimilation, a subjection to its own rules, to its medium; it is not until late in its history that it was able, or could afford, to accommodate reproductions of material such as illustrations and

handwritten pieces alongside letterpress. From that perspective, citation would reintroduce a degree of heterogeneity and work against the grain of the medium.

By contrast, in cinema, the heterogeneity always looms in the material basis of the signifier (visual and sound tracks, editing, filming conditions and the integrity of the profilmic, etc.). There citation appears as a potential effect even before it occurs, and many occupations in cinema as an industry have to do with the erasure of differences or the conformation of certain parameters to a common standard. When an outside element is inserted it is almost impossible, for all the care involved, to work through it and obtain a segment indistinguishable from the look and sound of the film surrounding it. A hint of difference always remains, and resists homogenization. Direct citation in film can therefore hardly escape attention; flaunted or merely perceptible, its presence is manifest if not always strongly registered. Citation uncovers certain qualities of film as a medium: its composite nature and fragmentary character (when only one track or element of a track is being cited).

An additional difficulty (from the standpoint of the homogeneity of the fiction) has to do with the nature of the image in film, or at least its material basis. Derived until recently from a trace left by the light reflected by real objects on an emulsive surface (indexical value), the film image most often presented an analogy with previous figurative objects, its genuine referents (i.e., an iconic value, and more precisely an image in the Peircean, semiotic sense of the term). Put differently, its indexical value was enrolled in the service of its iconic value, to benefit the effect of presence and hallucination on the spectator, and notably the production of an

enunciator of real utterances. With the insertion of citation, as close as it appears to the citing film (with the stock shot, for example), the indexicality is not destroyed, but it is at the very least exposed as distinct from analogy, with its claim to exclusivity and accuracy largely curtailed, one means among others to figure and represent. It is not difficult to imagine that an effect of citation, in that respect, could be the destruction of an impression of presence so crucial in the work by the fiction film to maintain its audience in a single tense, that of its narrative. This new balance between indexicality and iconicity also has as a consequence to point out how much each film owes to other films, other texts, other media as much as to the world it registers, how partial it is to this world, and how much this world itself is always already traversed by codes that can – also – be cinematic.

These changes affect fiction and fictionalization from the bottom up, and the intrusion of citation in the fiction film is also the intrusion of an alien object in the directional and hierarchized structure that makes for a cohesive narration in Odin's theoretical organization. When the same performers appear in the citation and in the fiction, how can a degree of isotopy be maintained? Are they to be interpreted as the same character, or are they now, outside the fiction at hand, the objects of a meta-fictional reflexion on performance, public persona, archetypal situations? And how are they to be appraised in relation to the logic of actions? As mere subjective and mental inserts or as elements to be interpreted as objective events in the narrative, as flashbacks or flashes forward for example? This interpretation in turn raises the question of the place of these citations in the temporal syntagmatic succession of the narrative, their subjection to that order or their role of counterpoint and even

contradiction to the sequence of events depicted. These hypotheses in regard to narration all assume, however, that the citation can be recuperated and enrolled in the service of the fiction, at the cost of a relatively minor tear in the fabric of the fiction film. Yet even when that is the case, citation also necessarily “de-phases” to some extent characters and spectators, diegetic relations and filmic relations, narration and enunciation. As to the enunciative structure that favors the production of a fiction (fictionalizing) with spectators, it cannot but be called into question as well.

A couple of examples in Odin’s configuration illustrate the change. First, fictivization is hindered as the apparition of citation dialectically marks the fiction as absent and past. As Odin himself underlines, the perceptive richness of signifying materials in cinema potentially makes the realization of absence all the more striking and irreparable for a fictional reading to carry on. Similarly, the way citation affects the fiction introduces a sudden temporal shift, from the dominance of one past, that of the story itself (and despite, again, the impression of presence produced by the indexical and analogical dimensions of film as a medium), to a diffraction into multiple pasts: story, plot and narration, capture of the profilmic and shooting, editing and mixing.

The second example concerns a keystone in Odin’s theory, the construction by the spectator of a fictive enunciator which tops the edifice and keeps it together at the same time as it is disseminated throughout the film, at various levels and in a number of elements (props, sets, costumes as much as characters, values, story). Citation, whose image and sound tracks are not integrated in the fiction, raises the

possibility of a breach, an outside or an above to this enunciator: it is a signal that voluntary belief in the fictional assertions made by that enunciator may – temporarily or not – have become inadequate to approach the cited material. The fictive enunciator is also typically an entity from which no questions are to be asked (all the more since it is in part a fabrication fashioned by the spectator over the course of the fiction film so as to perform a fictional reading: raising questions or objections to it in the same breath would be self-defeating). Citation, in that respect, also consists in asking questions, notably as it materializes aspects of all three real enunciators (utterances, discourse, production) and in a sense resists a more conventional fictional reading by the spectator: one capped by the fictive enunciator, with any real utterances conveyed to its benefit and under its control. From that standpoint, citation may be the resurgence of a real enunciator of production, its inscription in the film and the related interrogations it elicits from the spectator (who, which discourse, truthfulness or falseness of the claims...); and of a real enunciator of utterances and discourse, as it makes these visible and audible outside the flow of the fiction.

This is not to say, of course, that as citation brings visibility or audibility to some dimensions of real enunciators, the work at hand simply consists in spelling out what these are (though it may occasionally involve that), and even less reconstructing the previous textual environment of the citations to outline their meaning in the new – citing – context. Rather, the confrontation of the occurrence of citation with the communicative model of fiction laid out in *De la fiction* aims to emphasize hypothetical functions of citation within the fiction film and, more

immediately, an examination of the necessary conditions for the work of citation to be possible at all.

An initial condition is undoubtedly interpellation, in its etymological sense of “interruption.” Citation suspends the narrative fiction film to call attention to another element, related to it or not, fictional itself or not. In this sense, it turns what conditions intertextuality – its perception by the reader and as a consequence the incitation given towards an intertextual reading – into a constraint. This shares obvious similarities with Michael Riffaterre’s “compulsory intertextuality,” one that does not depend on the reader’s subjectivity or desire alone but is prescribed as a reading practice through its inscription in the text itself. Without the work of investigation and interpretation indicated by such inscription, the text will likely rest partly unintelligible, and the reading will be incomplete. Riffaterre’s series of writings on intertextuality (based on studies of modern French poetry) strongly emphasizes the disruptive potential of the intertext for any text (particularly in its mimetic dimension) and sees such disruption as foundational of literariness.

One of the paradoxes (and probably abuses) of Riffaterre’s definition of the intertext and of its function is that it – also – relies on C. S. Peirce’s theory of the sign, and more particularly what opens it onto a meaning never completed, the interpretant. Where the interpretant was the site of serial endlessness in the Peircean triangle of representamen-object-interpretant, in Riffaterre’s poetics it becomes what gives stability to literature over time and creates a diachronic community of readers (in *The Production of the Text*, Riffaterre compares the enunciation of a text to the

performance of a score; the text serves as a limitative and prescriptive code).²⁴ This obviously creates problems, particularly insofar as the reader postulated by literariness is very specific socio-culturally and yet is raised to the status of a universal, competent reader of poetry. (S)he is, more importantly, a past reader (in the sense of a reader already sanctioned), and the agrammaticalities examined by Riffaterre do not so much call for a yet unknown reader, formed by a personal heuristics, as they sanction and seal the learned expert, the investigator whose rigorous exegesis or informed intuitions will lead to an understanding called for by the text, and therefore faithful to it. That this understanding does not have to be a 'what' (the text's signification) and may be a 'how' (the understanding of a form or a process) does little to mitigate the arrest placed on reading as a practice.

However, Riffaterre's work is important in regard to citation because of the resistance it postulates to the sheer communication and information immanent to the sociolect, a resistance it also examines as the specific work of the intertext.²⁵ Citation in film likewise rips through the surface of the fiction and any 'mending' demands that new relations be established beyond the narrative and the fiction at hand. Such relations do not merely refer in their variation to an invariant (they do not even

²⁴ In "La Trace de l'intertexte," published in *La Pensée* 215 (October 1981) Riffaterre writes (p. 5): "Je crois [...] que les fluctuations de l'intertexte ne relèvent pas du hasard, mais de structures, dans la mesure où une structure admet des variantes plus ou moins nombreuses, mais qui ramènent toutes à un invariant." ["I believe [...] that the fluctuations of the intertext do not owe to chance, but to structures insofar as a structure allows for a number of variants, all of which, however, bring back to one invariant."]

²⁵ While the interpretant (or its model) for Antoine Compagnon is what mediates between citing text and cited text (the citation), for Michael Riffaterre it is not materialized in the text but simply delimited by the gap opened within a text by its intertext. The connective, the syllepsis, the agrammaticality are only symptoms of this division, this split within the text: they are not taken by Riffaterre as signs of their own.

necessarily involve a key towards a set of interpretations), as we will see in examining other functions of the citation, and the specificity of its work in our corpus of films.

Indeed, for Riffaterre the interpretant is generally the distance of defamiliarization between a text and itself, a distance figured through that other pole, the intertext, whether it is known or simply assumed. The object of the Riffatterrian interpretive gesture is thus not signification but *signifiance*, a possibly unresolved, multiple relation that sets meaning within literary imbalance. While Riffaterre obviously leaves the door open to such ambivalence, he refuses what he sees as a defeat in the face of textual difficulties (often defused or dismissed, according to him, under the umbrella term of ‘ambiguity’): accepting the openness of textual relations and of certain interpretants does not preclude a precise and documented outline of their parameters, of their territory. That outline, which imposes boundaries and posits the interpretant as finite, stands at the crossroads between description, identification of a possible intertext, and interpretation. It validates literariness and places it beyond the private backgrounds and subjectivities of the readers as well as (such is Riffaterre’s argument, in any case) the time and place from which they have access to the poetic text.

Any shared interpretation thus depends on the universalization of a localized ‘correct’ reading practice, through its denial as localized. It also is very much tied to the term ‘trace’, with its archaeological and historical connotations: what may be reconstructed from a trace which is visible and heterogeneous in a given landscape is necessarily more limited, as an indexical relationship, than a purely arbitrary

relationship (where the readers' various investments and positions are given freer play). In the end, the Riffatterrian interpretant is barely negotiable: the heuristic impulse translates into a strongly delineated process of interpretation and, accordingly, into a limited range of interpretations to form a community that cuts across time as well as across the fleetingness of subjectivities, opinions, sociolects and ideologies in their diversity. Riffaterre assumes a history of long durations, if not of a certain permanence.

Like many other theoreticians of intertextuality, Riffaterre has conceived the literary text as a volume, by contrast with the assumed linearity and superficiality of what is often (conversely) termed 'communicative language'. This volume is at the core of the historical stability he posits in regard to reception and as a metaphor is tied to material heterogeneity in cinema: with citation the film is disclosed as composite, rather than sustained in its linearity and its analogical surface. The breach citation causes, just like the Riffatterrian agrammaticality, distorts the text or the film, cleaves it from itself, introduces difference in it: it creates a new equilibrium between mimesis and semiosis, and teases the reader or viewer into the production of relations. Indeed, the interpretant – just like citation – also constitutes a passage, not towards a real outside of the text (this possibility is precluded by Riffaterre's strongly neo-Formalist perspective), but towards other texts (and, in film, towards other figures as well).

Importantly, this passage is not diegetic or narrative, but semiotic or figurative in nature. If, with fiction in the place of poetry, it will occasionally be diegetic or narrative in its motivation, it will always also be enunciative. Finally, with such

passage comes a refiguration of the individual work as a node rather than as a closed entity, tying together in a singular space a variety of discourses, narrative segments, diegetic universes, characterizations, figurative modes... The interpretant for Riffaterre is the element that sets a text apart from the sociolect, from communicative, conventionalized language to tip it into the infinite domain of literature (and poetry). Similarly, citation will open a text, a fiction, a film onto their outside: other texts, other fictions, other films, which exist in a relation of continuity with them but are conventionally screened out, if hinted at, in the single work. Citation can become an obstacle in the path of an undiverted fictional reading or viewing, as well as a sign to a way (ways) out of it, towards a field where inside and outside coincide.

A second phenomenon consubstantial to citation within the fiction film is alternation. As it already appears from the discussion of *De la fiction*, the advent of citation disrupts an equilibrium based on the juxtaposition of distinct elements, some of which take precedence over others, however. If the fiction film remains a decisive, if loose, framework, citation introduces an heterogeneity which for a moment levels the hierarchy just as it makes some of its constituents perceptible. The alternation involves what the fiction film and the citation put into play respectively, but its primary interest lies with the changing positions it requests from the spectator: between a mimetic regime with its characters, diegesis, narrative and the belief vested in it, and a semiotic one, with its figures, textual systems, and the terms it presents to interpretation; between cinematographic images and/or sounds in their indexical and analogical dimension (with concrete objects as their referent) and in their

intertextual and interfilmic dimension (in all their aspects, from the *mise-en-scène* of the profilmic to framing to the type of cut, traversed as they are by codes, references, allusions, or even citation of discrete elements from other films); between recursive or transversal temporalities as opposed to linear and unidirectional ones – the temporality of stories, of plots, frequently, but also of the unwinding projection.

It is against the background of this double phenomenon – interpellation and alternation between a plurality of positions – that the major functions of citation within the fiction film come out, along with the heuristic work to which they incite. From my point of view, these functions all have to do with what I would broadly call monstration: before further elaborating on its implications in the following chapter, I should mention here that monstration has often been opposed to narration in the theoretical work done on the subject in film studies over the past two decades. André Gaudreault initiated the argument in his work on early film and developed it. Roger Odin later took up the reflection on the respective logics of showing and telling. Monstration for him is strictly separate from narration and even narrativization, which already ascribes direction or intention to figures and movements. He also considers the work of description, a form of monstration, as anchored in the here and now and open-ended, by contrast with the temporally autonomous, closed sequence of past events that in his view notably allows fictionalization. Monstration presents, and can accordingly describe, show, point out; and while it may dispense with narration, narration cannot do without it. This unequal relation is concealed by the subordination of monstration to narration in most fiction films. Where editing is involved, the progression of the narrative (in its classical inception) will require that

the work of monstration be channeled to its benefit: observation, verification, contemplation, with their correlatives of repetition, stasis, insistence – all of which are salient features of monstration – accord little with the transformative demands of narration and the consecution that it directs to that end.

Citation, then, carries a monstrative power beyond the limits of the single shot, across the cut and into editing itself: it disrupts the solidarity between consecution and (narrative) consequence to take stock of the fiction, its instruments, its processes. Also, since what is monstrated is sometimes actually missing, lacking, and is figured in the gap produced by the citation with the fiction – in other words, since what is monstrated is not always *there* to be seen or heard at last, monstration should be understood in a rather wide sense. What is monstrated may be, not so infrequently, inscribed in a place when what is to be pointed out cannot be seen or heard in the fiction film or in the citation, but between them. Monstration may accordingly be construed as encompassing three types of objects: the reality constructed by the fiction film (the more literal monstration); the semantic elements used or produced in the fiction film, from colors to voices to values embodied by the characters and narrative archetypes (a monstration that consists of exposition); and, much more elusive, spectators of the fiction film and their potential position(s) with regard to it (a relational, negative monstration, through inscription). These three types of objects are the focus of the following three chapters, respectively.

CHAPTER II THE HAND OF CITATION

The personality of the creator indeed *manifests itself* by his ‘choice’ of angles, his play with conventional rhetoric —insofar as what he wants to show differs from an anonymous spectacle and requires, in order to wholly appear, a new look, one more curious and devoid of prejudices, which alone will fully account for it. And the universe commands this look, yet at the same time the look compels and *creates* this universe; the universe of the creator is but the manifestation, the concrete efflorescence of his look and his mode of apparition —a look which itself is but the apparition of a universe.²⁶

Jacques Rivette, “We are no longer innocent”

In the film criticism of the young turks published in the 1950s, to look at and to show were two gestures inextricably linked, and they provided a decisive criterion in the distinction between genuine auteurs and film-makers. *Mise-en-scène* constituted the meeting ground between the world and its organization by a vision; it made the former more fathomable and gave the latter the concrete quality of figures and points of view. The insistence by these writers and future filmmakers on this mutual solidarity also subtended a polemical response to the conception of adaptation, and more generally to the hierarchical relationship that was then the official currency in French cinema, particularly in the “cinema of quality”: discourse ruled representation, just as representation dictated figuration. For Truffaut, as stated

²⁶ “Nous ne sommes plus innocents,” in *Bulletin du ciné-club du Quartier Latin*, January 1950, reproduced in Hélène Frappat, *Jacques Rivette, secret compris* (Cahiers du Cinéma – collection Auteurs: Paris, 2001), pp. 66-68. [“La personnalité du créateur *se manifeste* certes dans son “choix” d’angles, dans son jeu par rapport à la rhétorique usuelle, –dans la mesure où ce qu’il veut montrer diffère d’un spectacle anonyme, et nécessite pour tout apparaître, un regard neuf, plus curieux et libre de préjugés, qui seul en saura pleinement rendre compte. Et l’univers commande ce regard, mais le regard ensemble impose et *crée* cet univers; l’univers du créateur n’est que la manifestation, l’efflorescence concrète de son regard et de son mode d’apparaître, –ce regard qui n’est lui-même qu’apparition d’univers.”]

in his polemical intervention “A Certain Tendency in French Cinema,”²⁷ older directors such as Autant-Lara, Clément, Delannoy, Allégret and their scriptwriters Aurenche, Bost or Jeanson could not think in (film) images and sounds and systematically prejudged their objects (be they reality, society, or the novel to adapt). Invoking a notion of *cinégénie* and a faithfulness to the spirit rather than to the letter of the work at stake, they rewrote and replaced certain scenes. Yet in actuality, according to Truffaut, they imposed an agenda of faithlessness as to humankind, a lack of confidence and interest in the literary work, an all-out cynicism and a general tendency towards blasphemy and desecration of what they saw as established (especially clerical) values. In the more factual part of his diatribe, the young critic suggested that, while much of contemporary French cinema claimed to follow in the steps of *Madame Bovary*, few directors would in effect be able to speak as its author did when he identified with his main character. The Flaubertian simultaneity of distance and extreme proximity, of a world both depicted in minute detail and given shape in broad strokes, where the description of objective phenomena appears to meet and meld with the construction of a subjectivity for the narrator and/or main character, echoed the preoccupations of a generation impatient for French cinema to reconcile with both its (national) reality and the ambitions of a genuine art, looking to literature and painting. This Rivette, in the 1950 *Gazette* article already quoted above, had also called for:

The major error thus seems to be that of a common language, indifferent to its object, of a “grammar” applicable to any narrative, instead of a style made

²⁷ “Une certaine tendance du cinéma français,” in *Cahiers du cinéma* 36, January 1954, reprinted in English translation in *The French New Wave: Critical Landmarks* [1968], ed. Peter Graham, with Ginette Vincendeau (London: BFI/Palgrave – McMillan, 2008), 39-63.

necessary by it and for it —or even more, gradually created by it in the process of its expression.²⁸

To the illustration of a script or the demonstration of a thesis, the *Cahiers* group thus much preferred to look for a balance between narration and fiction, on the one hand, observation and monstration on the other, as they would in their own films later.²⁹ For the time being, as Rivette wrote, the look was perceptible in the object of its attention and its direction: it manifested itself in both the what and the how of monstration.

The text, in its language and its implications, appears almost programmatic for the New Wave in spite of its early date and carries important consequences for our focus on citation. First, from the perspective of auteurism, or at least the definitions of it that have come down to us in the course of fifty years of criticism and scholarship, Rivette's language appears more than ambivalent. While 'personality' and 'creator' suggest an identifiable demiurge at the source of artistic creation, such sense of agency is immediately weakened by an autotelic reflexive

²⁸ "La grande erreur semble donc, d'un langage courant, indifférent à son objet, d'une "grammaire" valable pour n'importe quel récit; au lieu d'un style nécessaire, nécessité pour celui-ci, plus: créé par lui au fur et à mesure de son expression." In Frappat, *Jacques Rivette, secret compris* 67.

²⁹ 'Monstration' is not a neologism, but a literal transfer from the French. I have borrowed it from André Gaudreault, who in his *Du littéraire au filmique* uses the term in contrast to *narration*, in the context of early cinema, and takes it himself from Betty Rojzman and her "Désengagement du Je dans le discours indirect," *Poétique* 41 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981). I will later explain how my use of the term differs from his – suffice it to say at this stage that, in the present chapter, it does not refer to a modality of narration. I also want to point out that, etymologically speaking, 'to show' comes from the term meaning 'to look at', 'to look' or 'to see' in Old English; and that 'monstration' could also be read literally, i.e., as what 'demonstration' undoes. Indeed, in demonstration, ideas or thesis take precedence over what has been observed, which comes to serve as sheer supporting evidence or illustration. Finally, my choice of the terms 'to monstrate' and 'monstration' in English has to do with the strong connotations of spectacle that 'to show', 'show' and 'showing' bear. My conceptualization of monstration is, in fact, antinomic to that of spectacle and I wanted to avoid any confusion in that regard.

verb, “manifests itself,” and the relativization of the meaning of the word “choice” through its bracketing between quotation marks. There is no *auteur* without an idea of the world, and this idea is materialized in the look, but the look in turn depends on the world, observed and attended to. If the *politique des auteurs* articulated a few years after this piece, whose ideas it systematized into a polemical, rhetorical weapon, could later be hijacked into an epistemology or a marketing instrument, it is in no small part due to the *Cahiers* critics themselves. Yet, at this early stage, the subject-auteur still involved an active creative force, the awareness that certain elements in the world captured on film were beyond its scope, and a strong sense of expectancy and curiosity about that world. In other words, individual creativity here is not so much a matter of personal expression as a particularly sensitive attunement to the situation at hand.

When they moved behind the camera, Rivette, Godard, and even Truffaut initially used citation to a similarly ambivalent effect, as far as the diegetic, formal, or stylistic manifestations of the creator went. While citations (and references of various kinds) constituted a pantheon of their favorite filmmakers, from Dreyer to Lang, simultaneously sanctioning their own self-image, they also made the tracing of any one author behind the work more complex and introduced heterogeneity in what has been the surest mark of the author in contemporary cinema, i.e. the diegetic universe linked to him. This strategy of emphasis on the work and its workings, more than on its human authors, may be traced as late as 1990, with Agnès Varda’s *Jacquot de Nantes* (released under the title *Jacquot* in English). The film, despite its biographical subject, was conceived as a collage with the collaboration of Jacques Demy and

employs citation in a manner that produces, not a life story of Jacques Demy alone, but the portrait of a hybrid subject that might be a composite of Varda and Demy, without one always being easily told from the other.

Second, the idea of the world and the world as image are defined in the negative, as what they should not be – conceived separately – in Rivette’s text. Within his logic, the world should neither serve as the demonstration of a preexistent idea nor as a repository of unrelated, shallow images. Hence the mention of both rhetoric and spectacle in Rivette’s article, which can be understood, respectively, as what is prejudged (a prejudice) and as what is designed for a known audience, shaped with the intent of satisfying a particular desire in it. What is more, both rhetoric and spectacle are finite, while reality is not: the movement underlying it is ceaseless and cannot be exhausted by the successive images it leaves, as the term ‘efflorescence’ suggests. Just as importantly, the work of contemplation and relation of its elements places every individual in the potential position of an auteur-subject, elaborating for itself an idiosyncratic relation to the world through an observation, an apprehension of it, and eventually a singular understanding of it. The conventional and the anonymous, one assumes, have become so because they have been derived and systematized from what initially must have constituted an anomaly. The suspension of one’s own mindsets and habits implicit for Rivette is thus a movement towards singularity and exception, away from widely shared assumptions and towards a phenomenological approach to the world.

Such world, and this is my third point, is referred to as a “universe” by Rivette, and this choice is also crucial to the deliberate ambivalence of his text.

Indeed, as I already pointed out, the term stands at the intersection of demiurgy and artistic practice: it thus connotes at once the most comprehensive and the most situated imaginable entity. Over the decades that followed the New Wave, the specificity of authorial universes initiated a gradual movement away from classical theories of film, particularly Bazin's and Kracauer's, which posited an organic (or holistic) reality, or universe, and a cinema to record and represent it. With the interdependence between look and universe elaborated on by Rivette came the possibility of such balance tilting towards the part of the creator. Indeed, with a generation whose education owed so much to films and to cinephilia, the universe assumed by their later films as New Wave filmmakers could not help but take stock of a real world not only availing itself of images and sounds as instruments of self-reflection and as entertainment, but whose very fabric was also made of images and sounds. Besides, that reality, already shot through by discourse and ideology as intensively as it had been since the beginnings of the industrial revolution, could no longer be taken for granted, in its supposed evidence, in the age of mass media. There is the loss of innocence Rivette affirms in his title: the world could be apprehended only through an idea of it (the creator's, or a preexistent one), which would be put to the test (a process not unlike scientific experimentation), put into play and confronted with its manifestations, including the films made in it.³⁰ The

³⁰ Further down in the same essay, Jacques Rivette writes: “- Univers et regard, l'un et l'autre une seule et même réalité; qui n'existe que par le regard que l'on prend d'elle et celui-ci n'a de sens à son tour que par rapport à elle; - réalité indissociable, où apparence et apparaître sont confondus, où la vision peut sembler créer la matière (travellings de Renoir), comme la matière impliquer la vision; sans antériorité, ni relation de causalité. Une seule et même réalité aux deux visages confondus et uns dans l'oeuvre créée.” 68 [“Universe and look, both one and the same reality, which exists only through the look taken at it, a look which itself takes meaning only in regard to that reality. Indissociable reality where appearance and

film, and within it the fiction film, thus stood at the juncture between creation and critique.

Fourth, looking and showing, observation and monstration, in that they introduce play (and relationality) in respect to the rules of cinematic grammar and syntax, also were full-fledged acts in the process of *making*. In the text quoted above, Rivette uses ‘play’ (“*jeu*”) in both an active and a passive sense, as he does other terms such as ‘look.’ Such play can be understood as both a loose space of motion and operation, without meaning and understanding being ‘tightened’ and unequivocal (as one would say of mechanical parts when too loosely assembled: “there is play between them,” “*il y a du jeu*”). Conversely, the play also is the active role of subjectivity in mediating between inherited forms and the creation of new ones. With some of the films and the citations they involve, making arises from such play: making meaning, several meanings, putting into relation, more often than not guided by the film and the directions it appears to provide.

It is in such a context that citation can in turn come to function as what linguistics calls a deictic: in language, those words whose meaning depends exclusively on the context in which they are uttered (yesterday, here, I, you...). The etymology of the word, which comes from the Greek *deiktikos*, *deiktos*, “demonstrative,” points to a more specific meaning, also often given for it, which has to do with words or expressions pointing something out (this, that, these, here is, look...). Citation, in emphasizing by repetition or isolation an image and/or a sound

apparition become confused, where vision may seem to create matter (Renoir’s tracking shots) just as matter may seem to imply vision; without precedence or causality of one towards the other.”]

– present, referred to, only implicit or even repressed in the diegesis, and by presenting it as such, *in se*,³¹ possibly full frame and full track, brings such a deictic function into fiction, thereby producing (among other things) an effect of monstration.

In French cinema, François Truffaut's short film *Les Mistons* (1958) ushered in the encounter, through the fiction film and a citation, between a universe and a look, observation and monstration.³² The diegetic world of *Les Mistons* is famously

³¹ This distinction is applied to cinema by Nicole Brenez in her article "Montage intertextuel et formes contemporaines du remploi dans le cinéma expérimental" ["Intertextual montage and contemporary forms of reuse in experimental cinema"], *CiNéMAS* 13:1-2, "Limite(s) du montage," Elena Dagrada, ed., Montreal, Fall 2002. Brenez herself recycles the terms from Salvatore Settis and his *Remplois. Usage et connaissance de l'Antique au Moyen-Âge* ["Reuse. Use and knowledge of Antiquity in the Middle Ages"], Paris, Macula, 2003: "Dans l'histoire de l'art, Brenez writes, le remploi constitue probablement la pratique à la fois la plus constante et la plus diverse quant à la fabrication des images. Le cinéma n'a cessé d'en intensifier les deux formes :

— *le remploi intertextuel*, c'est-à-dire *in re* ("en esprit"), où l'oeuvre initiale se voit imitée, en totalité ou par quelque aspect (motif, schème, *istoria*, etc.). [...]

— *le recyclage*, ou remploi *in se* (remploi de la chose même), dont le cinéma a institué certaines formes figées et inauguré quelques autres."

["In the history of art, reuse probably constitutes both the most constant and the most diversified practice as regards the making of images. Cinema has ceaselessly intensified its two forms:

— *intertextual reuse*, that is, reuse *in re* ("in spirit"), in which the initial work is imitated in totality or in some aspect (motif, schema, *istoria*, etc.). [...]

— *recycling*, or reuse *in se* (reuse of the thing itself), some fixed forms of which cinema has instituted and some other forms of which it has inaugurated."]

³² In his short *Antoine et Colette*, the second Antoine Doinel instalment and a part of the composite film *L'Amour à vingt ans* (*Love at Twenty*, 1962), Truffaut cites his own *Les Quatre cents coups* (1959) to illustrate an episode referred to by Antoine's friend René during their reunion in a café. Rather than intertwined with the fiction, the cited excerpt begins with a straight cut from the previous shot, reduced to only half of the widescreen frame (the other half briefly remains black). Antoine is thus isolated in an almost square frame before the citation from *Les Quatre cents coups* begins with him positioned similarly on the left and a wipe reveals the entirety of the scene with René sitting at the right. The scene ends with René's father leaving the room after scolding him, in a fade to black, before *Antoine et Colette* resumes where it had left off, at the café with the two friends conversing at a table. Truffaut thus relates two of his films over a black background, in a layout evoking the pages of a book figuring a larger oeuvre to come, around one character. *L'Amour en fuite* (*Love on the Run*, 1979) brings the process to a closure, citing directly all previous Doinel films. In *Antoine et*

saturated with film references, from the boys mimicking shootouts from gangster movies to the homage to the Lumière brothers' *L'Arroseur arrosé* and the reference to the tennis game in Jacques Tati's *Les Vacances de monsieur Hulot*. The reality represented is inextricable from the permanent influence it receives from cinema, an influence which on one occasion is articulated in its primary site, the movie theater. In the scene that features the citation, Bernadette (Bernadette Lafont) and Gérard (Gérard Blain) go see a film (which remains unreferenced in the diegesis or the credits).³³ The kids have been following the young couple for a while and their dismay at the spectacle of a love which they can neither understand nor experience moves them to disrupt the relationship as much as possible. Their chalk graffito, "Gérardette au cinéma," shown in close-up, serves as a form of intertitle to what follows (the voice-over narrator also reads it as though it were a public announcement). However, the first excerpt from *Le Coup du berger* appears without

Colette, the sole citation is more uncertain and involves sound alone. During one of the concerts attended separately by both teenagers, the orchestral music comes to take over the whole soundtrack, as they look at each other from across the aisle. For a moment, their emotions can no longer be ascribed to either their predispositions towards each other or to the music itself (after whose movements the editing is paced). This ambiguity lasts until long shots of the musicians reascribe the music to a source, but even past that point, a tension between the diegetic and non-diegetic status of the music, its use as an element of representation or as a citation, remains – all the more since it is not spatialized at all during the sequence. Even in its non-diegetic direction, it exists between an accord with, an amplification of the situation (the lovers' exhilaration) and a complete autonomization from it, which positions us as listeners also outside the fiction. Finally, the entire short film plays on the visibility of sources of sound as constructions, often in a playful way: Antoine (Jean-Pierre Léaud) works in a Philips record factory and, as he manipulates various records, Truffaut has the song or musical piece supposedly cut on each heard on the soundtrack.

³³ It is Jacques Rivette's 1956 short *Le Coup du berger*. The absence of an identifiable reference (*Le Coup du berger* was little known outside the circles of cinephilia at the time, and so were its main actors) points to a citation more serious than mere publicity for the work of a friend, as for instance the reference to Rivette's *Paris nous appartient* as the Doinels' Saturday evening entertainment in *400 Blows*. More than where they came from, then, it is likely for what they could do that Truffaut chose to excerpt these images and sounds.

any establishing shot of the space of the movie theater, creating an initial disruption. Indeed, the two excerpts from Rivette's film are cited full frame and full track and are extradiegetic, even if they remain assignable to and explainable through the diegesis. In the first, a young woman is shown entering the apartment of a young man who hastes to embrace and kiss her. In the second, the lovers are shown lying down and kissing on a sofa, with the woman taking her shoes off.³⁴

The object of citation, for literary theory, has been primarily a referent in another text, not an object from the physical world. With cinema, a recording technology that involves traces, this referent has to be approached and theorized differently, as it never recedes as far to the background as it may with literature or rhetoric. Rather, a new balance appears between the recording capacity of film and the mediation produced by that record. What is monstrated, then, in *Les Mistons*, is not only what Gérard, Bernadette and people at the movie theatre are watching. Or rather, what is monstrated is not only a 'what' that aims to convey information about the narrative and its characters, a token element used merely to contextualize, date and authenticate the diegetic world. It is a 'what' which, through citation, also interpellates (all the more since it has not yet been shown as appropriated by the fictional audience), and which instantiates another degree, another layer of images and sounds distinct from those of the fiction. Where, within another fiction, one would primarily see "part of the film watched by Gérard and Bernadette, which shows a young woman entering the apartment of a young man who immediately embraces and kisses her," what one sees in *Les Mistons* is "the excerpt of a film

³⁴ François Couperin's music is heard in both excerpts. In *Le Coup du berger*, it is produced as diegetic: Claude (Jean-Claude Brialy) is shown putting on a record.

showing a young woman entering the apartment of a young man who immediately embraces and kisses her.” It is therefore *also* around the cinematic image and sound, their production and their power (as well as their referent in reality) that monstration revolves in *Les Mistons*, which lays out elementary paths in that regard.

First, Truffaut’s short film evinces a significant difference between narration and monstration. Generally, while narration can operate without explicitly signalling itself to the reader or the viewer, there is no monstration without textual, visual or sound indications that something ought to be given attention of some sort. In other words a film, where it monstrates, must guide its spectator in such a direction. Without being flaunted so far as to belittle its own object, the gesture of monstration should still be unequivocal enough that the spectator, in addition to other positions, also place him/herself in the position of looking at something, of becoming a ‘monstratee.’ The break introduced by citation in the fiction, however, while diverting from the ongoing narrative and raising the question of its effect and its necessity, retains a share of ambiguity: one can certainly contemplate, but is that the most adequate attitude at a given moment? Often, an additional cue within the diegesis is needed in order to suggest that something is, among other things, being monstrated. Thus, in *Les Mistons*, the abrupt shift to these unknown images and sounds, apparently alien to the fiction, can initially serve only as a reminder that images and sounds as such should henceforth also be considered. It is only with the return to the diegesis and the representation of an audience attending to the same images and sounds within it that monstration appears more neatly as what the film has been performing (and is about to perform again). The characters serve the

function of another deictic in this context: by looking at the screen, they direct the spectators towards it and prepare them for a second excerpt.³⁵

Second, *Les Mistons* demonstrates how the citation of images and sounds within a narrative fiction, even when these are immediately justified in regard to it, produces a monstration always manifold in its objects. The referents of the citation itself, if not suspended, are severed from their original or previous context (in the case of *Les Mistons*, the couple becomes indeterminate, the lovemaking situation loses its coordinates, and all that may remain are the performers and a glimpse of their surroundings – at most, in terms of fiction and plot, generic characters and an archetypal situation). The juxtaposition of the citation to images and sounds directly fictional also enhances – through repetition or redundancy – elements which both may share, but which the fictional narrative would usually not showcase. In citing precisely the moments where the lovers in *Le Coup du berger* embrace and kiss, and in making them alternate with its own diegetic situation (Gérard and Bernadette reproduce what they see on screen, kissing in the dark), *Les Mistons* underlines a specific attitude towards images which reaches outside Truffaut's film to question the response of its own spectators. Citation also singles out its visual, sound and sometimes textual object(s), bringing attention to their formal and material qualities, presenting them outside a narrative or discursive continuum. What figured in

³⁵ Besides the character-spectator that indicates monstration within the fiction film (which is akin to the character-seer which Deleuze perceives as characteristic of the advent of the time-image, but quite distinct from the character-spectator which in countless fiction films serves a vicarious function), other diegetic or stylistic elements may come to indicate and/or confirm the monstrative role of citation. To mention a few: a character simply pointing something out, an arrow or a figured hand (also called an index or, more strangely, a fist in the vocabulary of typography), a still frame dwelling on its object past the necessities of the narrative action, a camera movement narrowing in on an object (a forward tracking shot or zoom-in, for instance), a voice-over commentary or narrative, or a text.

Jacques Rivette's film as a single shot is considerably shortened and split into two in this instance: the voice of the male character asking his mistress "enlève ton manteau," heard spatialized over a medium shot showing Gérard and Bernadette at a slight angle in the midst of other spectators, is the only element connecting the excerpts. The gradual build-up of seduction and desire is thus reduced to elementary, archetypal figures, an outset and an outcome, two images deprived of the narrative that justified them by their inscription in a temporal development and an unfolding of events. What is monstrated in this context is thus woven directly into the image and the sound tracks (narrative elements, discourse, forms of representation, materiality). It is in full view yet invisible. Citation, by isolating or repeating some of its elements, gives it a cruder visibility: the third chapter will consider this more critical aspect of its monstrative power.

However, through its recourse to citation *Les Mistons* also performs an operation for which the term "monstration" relies on an absence and is almost synonymous for "inscription," since it aims at something that is not readily visible or verbalized: the situation of exhibition in which the spectator is involved. This obviously has to do with the diegetic audience, and its particular status in any fiction film: it often serves as a deictic, pointing an audiovisual object to his/her attention. In *Les Mistons*, the diegetic audience appears *after* the citation has been watched, 'unguided,' a first time. Citation thus implicitly points to an extra-diegetic audience as well, regardless of the presence or not of an audience in the diegesis. With the reaction of the two main characters, who soon forget the film to begin kissing, the citation (which, again, reduces a development over time to its starting point and its

desirable end), its images and sounds, take on a mere stimulative value that they do not have in the original Rivette short film. In sum, they become part of a diegetic viewing situation which, through their direct citation to the spectators of *Les Misons*, asks the question of their own approach and reaction to them: are they to identify with the audience and emulate it or, facing these excerpts frontally (and not vicariously, through the characters), are they to decline to reproduce the behavior of the represented viewers and to treat them as full-fledged visual and sound objects?³⁶ In other words, *Les Misons*, through the interplay between its fiction and its direct citations (but it would also be true of its citations if taken alone) points out a situation of spectatorship in which the question is asked of whether to deny or downplay the twin acts of looking and listening in favor of vicariously following a fictional narrative and espousing, to various degrees (including to the point of imitation), the points of view it offers. Such monstration, which could be called the monstration of an enunciative situation, also occurring outside the film proper, will constitute the focus of the fourth chapter. What is monstrated there, while registering fleetingly – at best – in the film, is also a reality, but one tied to the present of the projection rather than to reality as recorded and mediated, to which I now turn.

The term ‘monstration’ has a history of its own which requires a brief account at this stage. As I mentioned earlier, André Gaudreault extensively uses it in *Du*

³⁶ This assumes that, when one is to identify with a point of view, the identification will work all the better as the activity of viewing gets downplayed, which remains difficult to do when a) the point of view of the camera and that of a character are strictly one and the same (Robert Montgomery’s *Lady in the Lake* presents a famous case); b) the character is not engaged in the exact same activity as that of the film’s spectator, i.e., viewing. In either case, the ‘buffer’ between the fiction and the viewing situation is removed, be it the representation of the character or the various actions the audience can – through him/her – experience vicariously (this is obviously less the case with watching a film). Or, to put it in different terms, primary identification is no longer covered over by secondary identification.

Littéraire au filmique, grounding his definition of monstration and his subsequent theoretization of narration and film in a rereading of Plato's *Republic*. Writing in the context of live theater, with an oral narrator present on stage along with the performers, Plato distinguishes between three types of narrative: the *haplê diègèsis*, in which the narrator assumes the telling of the story, without the characters acting or speaking out any of the events recounted; the mixed *diègèsis*, where the voice of the narrator alternates with direct interventions by the characters; and the *mimèsis*, which tells the story entirely by way of characters' actions and voices, with the narrator completely withdrawn. Gaudreault proceeds to adapt this distinction to cinema, which according to him relies on both the Platonic *diègèsis* and *mimèsis*: on the one hand, a narrative fiction film rests on the temporal articulation of fictional material in sequences (through editing), and the abstract entity that can be implied from the overall organization of the fiction is, indeed, the equivalent of a narrator (a 'mega-narrator,' so extensive is the reach of its assignments); on the other hand, film also is *par excellence* a medium that records and shows, and like characters on stage in ancient Greek theater as well as in contemporary dramas, it monstrates in only one time, the present (from the perspective of its audience) or the past (from the point of view of the moment of its production). In cinema, for narration to take place, a shift is required from what Gaudreault refers to as 'unipunctuality' to an articulation of several times together.³⁷

³⁷ For Gaudreault, monstration is therefore a modality of narration tied to a unity of time: the performance in theater, the shot in cinema. He articulates his theorization around the historical shift from early, presentational cinema (in which the shot often is a narrative unit in itself) to a narration produced through editing (where shots make narrative sense mainly in their relation to one another). Before further discussing the merits and problems of this dual, theoretical-historical object, it can be noted that the unity at stake is not the same

In Gaudreault's conception, monstration both partakes of narration (when it is understood as an enunciative mode) and complements it (when narration is understood as the inscription of a narrator in the fictional 'text,' as in the Platonic *haplê diègèsis* and mixed *diègèsis*). In fact, if one follows his argument on specific instances of single shots, it seems that his understanding of the term varies depending on the context: if, as he writes, the Lumière brothers' *L'Arroseur arrosé* monstrates, since it narrates in an uninterrupted run of the camera (and indeed has been staged to that effect), monstration also is, at the level of an entire film, the 'raw' or primary material and/or process which narration comes to organize and structure. Such ambiguity as to whether monstration is in the end narrative or not is what Roger Odin critiques in *De la fiction*. For Odin, monstration and narration are distinct enunciative modes and can be located at various levels of the fiction film. He comes to the conclusion that the agent of monstration (the *monstrateur*) simply is not an agent of narration, even in the single shot. For him, in any unit, no matter its scope or size, each agency meets a separate function:

I shall redefine the monstrator as the agency I consider responsible for the way in which the content of the shots is given for me to see. For a spectator, the *monstrator* is an agency of presentation whereas the *narrativizer*, which works the very flesh of the image from within, is an agency that produces a feeling of narrativity.³⁸

between arts: production and reception in theater (performance), production alone in cinema (shooting and editing). Besides this discrepancy in Gaudreault's reasoning, I would also add that, from the perspective of reception, narration transforms the absolute past of the event recorded into the relative pasts of the fictional universe.

³⁸ Odin, *De la fiction* 33. ["Je redéfinirai le monstrateur comme l'instance que je considère comme responsable de la façon dont le contenu des plans m'est donné à voir. Pour un spectateur, le monstrateur est une instance de *présentation* alors que le *narrativiseur* qui intervient dans la chair même de l'image est une instance qui produit un sentiment de narrativité."]

Indeed, Odin identifies, in the smallest possible unit (a portion of a shot, a section of the frame), *narrativization* at work: the fragments of a story awaiting narration.

Refuting the necessary connections between shot and monstration or editing and narration established by Gaudreault, Odin also points out that monstration can also occur over several shots according to a certain protocol.³⁹ This appears in keeping with the premise that citation, which evidently implies editing and even montage, can effect monstration (reconsidered as an enunciative mode alternative to narration). With another substantial distinction, however: just as Gaudreault seems captive to his extensive knowledge and study of a specific historical moment, Odin also makes many of his inferences from a model that is all but transhistorical, i.e. the classical fiction film. Indeed, speaking from the perspective of semiopragmatics, which has production and reception mutually inform each other and rests on an impression of communication (mostly on the part of an understanding spectator), Roger Odin elaborates an architecture of what he terms ‘fictionalizing processes’ (diegetization, narrativization, narration, etc.). These processes, detailed in the previous chapter, rely on the succession and junction of real and fictive elements at all levels, with fictive elements always integrating or capping real elements pertaining to lower levels. The work of ‘fictivization’ as a whole cannot withstand any disruption or arrest in its operations without incurring a form of nullification.

Consequently, monstration has to be subdued to narration if a fictional text or a

³⁹ Odin makes this concession, but limits it to the documentary (and documentarizing reading), not fiction. Conversely, for him, the organization of the profilmic space and *mise-en-scène*, the relationship between the frame and the action(s) being represented can articulate different temporalities within the single shot. An obvious example consists in showing the same character at two moments of its existence (confront the adult with the child he used to be) within the same shot.

fiction film is to function at all (Odin cannot conceive fiction without narration). By contrast, the present research assumes that, as its etymology (from the Latin infinitive *monstrare*, ‘to show’) suggests, monstration need not be limited to an ancillary role in regard to narration for fiction (or, to recycle Odin’s terminology, a ‘fictionalizing reading’) to be produced on the basis of a fiction film.⁴⁰

On the contrary, as the analysis of citation in *Les Mistons* pointed out, monstration can constitute an alternative, even if a temporary one, to the operations of fictional storytelling and may have as its objects a documentary reality, an aspect of representation or discourse, or even the situation of film spectatorship. This is in fact crucial to the type of monstration of interest to me here: indeed, no matter what its object may be with citation, it relates to some aspect of the fiction, one that, due to narration, may precisely have passed unnoticed (or may pass unnoticed, since citation also precedes, in the films examined, the object it means to show). To monstrate comes, in a sense, after the fact – at least the time elapsed between seeing something and pointing it out, at most the time separating the capture of a profilmic situation and that of its projection in the theater. This last point is ironic when one considers Plato’s objections to unadulterated *mimesis*. Besides the fact that the

⁴⁰ Roger Odin circumscribes rather strictly the cases where monstration may have the upper hand over narration in the fiction film, as he writes that “in the single-shot narrative, the monstrator is constructed as the primary enunciator. The narrator comes to inscribe its work within the limits set by monstration. Conversely, in the narrative unfolding over several shots, the narrator lays down its law upon the monstrator: choices of the duration of shots, of framing, of the type of cuts, etc. *Some conflicts might arise between these two agents and threaten the smooth functioning of narration.*” [my emphasis] [“Dans le récit en un seul plan, c’est le monstateur qui est construit comme l’énonciateur premier; le narrateur vient, lui, inscrire son travail dans les limites fixées par la monstration. Inversement, dans le récit en plusieurs plans, c’est le narrateur qui impose sa loi au monstateur: choix de la longueur des plans, du cadrage, du type de raccord, etc. Des conflits peuvent naître entre ces deux instances et mettre en péril le bon fonctionnement de la narration.”] Odin, *De la fiction* 34.

narrator should not stoop to assuming the voice of one of the characters, especially if that character is literally ignoble or of low extraction, there is also an important stake in the process: the blurring of the identity of the speaker, the dissociation between the narrator and his own voice, the destabilization of the meaning of 'I,' even in the context of a live performance. For Plato monstration, or rather *mimesis*, has therefore to be controlled and framed quite stringently. What to do, then, of an art where such (relative) guarantee offered by the copresence between performers and audience is no longer there? Or worse, that even rests on their reciprocal absence to one another?

In the fiction film, particularly in its classical inception, potential attention to the marks of a *narrator* (this time, the Latin noun Gaudreault employs to refer to its overarching enunciator) is often diverted thanks to decoys such as the representation of an inter- or intra-diegetic character, or the diegesis – the filmed reality in which the narrative seems to unfold according to a logic proper to the world itself. It seems that citation, and accordingly citation in its monstrative function (in other terms, the sudden passage from *narrator* to *monstrator*) would, rather than further confounding enunciation with its material, give visibility to the distinction and articulation between the two. In sum, where citation is a factor of ontological uncertainty in Platonic discourse, it performs a work of demystification and separation in the fiction film by figuring both a type of enunciator and some aspect(s) of fiction that were more or less apparent before. Revealingly, as André Gaudreault elaborates on the single shot as the limitation of monstration, he singles out two types of shots that, in his view, are exceptions: the freeze frame and a shot which would be made only of strictly different photograms. While one may conceivably not think spontaneously of

the latter as monstrative (even though in effect, citation monstrates by introducing difference – on a scale larger than that of the photogram), the former seems close to an epitomy of the gesture of showing in cinema, along with immobile framing. That Gaudreault would precisely exclude it from the field of ‘his’ monstration only underlines further how steeped in narration his conception remains. By contrast, in assuming with Odin that monstration can occur over several shots, I also posit (unlike Odin) that the filmic *monstrator* may substitute for the filmic *narrator* over any stretch of the fiction film – without necessarily breaking the fictional contract, but almost certainly putting forth a new version of it.⁴¹

Monstration is not, however, antithetical to fiction, one of whose entries it may easily provide. Monstration remains deictic in its operations; it does not rely on a progressive integration, but rather on a principle of accumulation and addition that it leaves up to the audience to construe. From the perspective of narration, it evokes stasis and repetition of the same as well as an absence of directionality, a process potentially without end. When embedded in narration, it represents the potential threat of an arrest, a swelling, and a puncture in an enunciative structure reliant on unity. In addition, for Odin (as for many theoreticians of fiction), fiction is a regime of belief (or of suspension of disbelief, to use a common expression) which implies that monstration as an enunciative mode subservient to narration has as its central

⁴¹ In fact, in many theorizations of the fiction film, the very possibility of fiction outside narrative is unthought and seemingly unthinkable, and any enunciative modes other than narration are described in regard to it and to how they can serve it – never as autonomous modes. From the perspective of such theorizations, citation would thus perform a double dissociation: not only does it unmoor the gesture of showing and its various objects from narrative aims, but it also places such gesture on a par with narration and designates its objects as not inherently narrative, as having an existence of their own, with meanings not settled and rarely unequivocal.

function the designation of the diegetic world as real, regardless of its degree of construction. Yet, as monstration emancipates itself from narrative demands, dwells on description, perhaps even to the point of a complete defamiliarization with what is shown, it seems that the endpoint is not by necessity a real world but also, and perhaps primarily, a possible one. The way this world is recorded, figured and represented can then also become the object of monstration.

The work of citation, in regard to monstration in the classical fiction film, could therefore be rephrased as follows within Odin's framework: 1) It separates at the same time as it exposes them as separate the logics of monstration and editing, even in fiction. Citation intervenes within the single shot, sections it partly or completely to monstrate what ran through it, but it also monstrates, through an effect of montage with the fiction that precedes and follows, something that a single sequence of images tended to downplay. Editing thus acquires a monstrative value, not just in documentary, as Odin writes, but also in fiction. 2) Citation also distinguishes very clearly the logics of reality and of a diegetic and cinematic world. The former can only be mediated, gathered in fragments, never reconstructed through the latter – even more, it should not be, since such diegetic and cinematic world has already been, often in large part, mediated – most notably through representation and re-nomination.

In pointing to the real world, to the material reality that gave rise to the fiction film, in trying to redirect our attention towards it, citation becomes the point of articulation of two possible scenarios. What is monstrated may simply be featured in the citation, or not. In the first instance, the citation involved doubles, repeats,

creates a redundancy, magnifies, amplifies a similar object, individual or space that already appeared in the fiction. It can also bring to light, unveil, reveal what remained obscured, concealed, hidden, repressed in the fiction and its treatment of reality. In the second possibility, when what is already clearly monstrated, brought out, emphasized in the fiction would seem to make the monstrative value of the citation irrelevant, the question arises of a reality that evades encapsulation in any single representation and requires to be grasped in between two points – which fiction and citation constitute. These two options can belong to a temporal continuum and be anchored to one and the same character or place, but more importantly they are also related to redefinitions of reality through the distinct representations they convey or suggest of it.

Two films in our corpus are emblematic of a resort to citation as the recorded fragment of a reality whose visibility is at stake. Alain Resnais's 1959 *Hiroshima mon amour* assumes an impossibility, on the part of the classical fiction film, to monstrate the reality whose experience it aspires to transmit. The film does in fact offer a methodical critique – through examples and counterexamples – of the shortcomings of a fictional narrative that would only rest on an identification to one point of view or to an affect or state of mind based on reconstruction and reenactment. Jean-Luc Godard's 1963 *Les Carabiniers* goes further than merely assuming a fictional incapacity or imperfection in the monstration of reality: exchanging the traditional functions of fiction and documentary in very specific domains, it suggests that the very role of the classical fiction film, at least in one of its generic inception – the war film – is to hide and suppress the access to significant aspects of reality. *Les*

Carabinieri proceeds to produce counter-representations of reality precisely thanks to a recourse to citation.

As to the second option, when citation does not work to monstrate dimensions of reality screened or omitted in the fictional narrative, but seems to prolong the fiction, to take over from it in the treatment of a motif or an action with only the texture of the sound or image changing, it is best embodied by two films from the 1990s. Such an approach, which involves a conception of reality as marked by permanent change, a series of transient states that evade capture, logically turns to citation as a second term, the possibility to figure an ‘in-between’ with fiction. The change cannot be shown merely through long takes, because it has to do with more than the mere passing of time, i.e. with a qualitative transformation of reality, a redefinition and remapping of it that often originates in the subjectivity of a character.

In *Jacquot de Nantes*, the reality shown thus slips, thanks to the imagination of a boy, from a world ruled by a strict division of labor and the perpetuation of inherited knowledge to a world where thinking and making inform each other, and where the re-enchantment of reality implies its reinvention and its transformation – most notably a mutual circulation from reality to imagination (from fiction to citation) and possibly their inversion. *Irma Vep* figures a global reality which thanks to citations encompasses images and sounds as active components, not as sheer reflections. Characterized by speed, kinesis and sensorial impressions, this reality can be travelled in any direction and provides a space for some individual characters to escape the roles they have been assigned, including – literally – in the shooting of the

film that constitutes the subject matter of Assayas's work. Such reality also appears unstable in that its representation dissolves the boundaries between past and present, questions cinema as (national) cultural capital, and opens a crisis in the attempts by its (French) protagonists to consolidate it.

Hiroshima mon amour revolves, throughout its fifteen-minute opening sequence, around the question of what has been seen or not by its female protagonist – and yet, as a fiction, it has the particularity at that early stage of not being fully fledged. Resnais purposely withholds essential information about the main characters: identity, location, time, and more crucially, bodies and faces. The fiction does not visually depict any recognizable reality over its prologue: the fragmented bodies, owing to framing and a make-up texture that shifts from minerality to a sweat forming on the skin, assume human form slowly and gradually. Voices alone carry the possibility of a budding fictional narrative (or narrativization, as Odin would have it), and the advent of a monstrative citation does in this instance respond to them. As the dialogue between the man and the woman unfolds in its own, barely glimpsed, almost abstract space, a sequence of fictional, documentary and newsreel footage also develops.⁴² Like the characters-spectators of *Les Mistons* or *Irma Vep*, the

⁴² No excerpt cited is identified in *Hiroshima mon amour*, be it in the credits or during the film. As will also often be the case with Godard in his own practice of citation, Resnais chooses to emphasize what is cited and how, rather than its source (and its source meaning). Analyses of the film often refer to Kaneto Shindo's *Children of Hiroshima* (1952) and Hideo Sekigawa's *Hiroshima* (1953), both fiction films, as sources for some of the footage shown in Resnais's film. During preproduction, as Resnais was still working on a documentary project on the nuclear bomb, he also managed to see what had been done in Japan already, and the quality of the documentary films he viewed led him to abandon the idea and direct his efforts towards a fiction film. Nevertheless, if he cited any of these documentary films in *Hiroshima mon amour*, he also refrained from providing any titles or credits for them. Apparently, none of them had been distributed in Europe until then (Resnais also entertained the idea of having them distributed himself).

couple of *Hiroshima mon amour* serves a deictic function, directing the viewers' attention to the cited images and their object. Unlike them, they perform such a function not through the direction of their look but through their speech.

The film experiments with a particular modality of monstration: the main site for spectatorial identification – the face of the character – remains invisible, just as the representation of characters-spectators would be suspended for the duration of the citation in other cases. The difference in Resnais's film is that the voices never pause for more than a few seconds, accompanying images as does the music by Georges Delerue and Giovanni Fusco. This does not mean, however, that the experience of attending to a reality through citation is altogether sacrificed to the benefit of vicariousness: the relation between voices and cited images is more that of a parallel than one where the former would direct an interpretation of the latter. In a segment where the spectator has to compare and confront the discourse of the man and the woman with excerpts from fiction films made about the nuclear bombing as well as newsreel footage shot in the city in the aftermath of the attack, the voice and image tracks also work to produce and establish two paradigms in the monstration of reality.

From its very beginning, the well-known exchange between the man and the woman centers on whether she has seen everything or anything in Hiroshima, which she repeatedly claims she has, despite his refutations. Her first assertions relate to places and people of the scarred city, filmed by Resnais and his crew: the hospital, the patients, the museum, its objects and curio. In this overture, his questioning of what it means to actually see something opens onto several levels. Her testimony is

obviously one of them, since he rejects the very immediacy of her experience and the elementary way in which she names the locations she has visited. The radical character of his denial – it touches the possibility of a shared experience of reality – appears all the more unsettling as the images of what she recounts methodically accompany her description. The principle of a double status of the image, its function of interface between character and audience in the case of citations that also stand for films watched by a diegetic public, also operates in this instance. The images of Hiroshima, at this early stage, represent her own experience of the place while being presented to the audience full-frame. Accordingly, the recurring negations of the male protagonist also affect the perception by this audience of what exactly is shown, how to know it, how to best name and describe it, and to what degree trust should be placed in what the woman says.

This proves all the more crucial since, as she goes on, it turns out that she herself has learned about Hiroshima mostly through traces, secondhand sources and, at the museum, through representations, reconstructions, and reenactments of the event. She concedes at that point that these are incomplete replacements but constitute the principal link in respect to the nuclear bombing: "...the photographs, the reconstructions, for lack of anything else. The photographs, the photographs, the reconstructions, for lack of anything else. The explanations, for lack of anything else."⁴³ These, as important as they are, become problematic in that they encourage a form of identification to imagined emotions and reactions in the face of the

⁴³ ["...les photographies, les reconstitutions, faute d'autre chose. Les photographies, les photographies, les reconstitutions, faute d'autre chose. Les explications, faute d'autre chose."]

destruction of the city and its inhabitants, but also of its long deadly aftermath:

“Reenactments have been done as seriously as possible. Films have been made as seriously as possible. The illusion, quite evidently, is so perfect that tourists cry. You can always laugh. But what else can a tourist do but cry, precisely?”⁴⁴

The refutation of the man, then, takes on a new significance: if she has not seen Hiroshima (as historical event), it is not only because she was not there when it happened, or because it left traces while carrying with itself the destruction, not only of a place, its inhabitants, a whole environment, but also of the very traces and of the memory of destruction. It is also because, he appears to suggest, she has seen it from a position not her own, through newspapers accounts, the radio, newsreels at the cinema, artifacts at the museum. Yet most of all, she has approached it through fictionalized accounts such as the ones cited as she brings up the perfection of the illusion and the tourist-like relation to them – a relation to the world that stops at visually representable effects of the bombing or emotions rooted in individuals, without taking the chance of engaging them with language. In these fictional images, the destruction of Hiroshima is represented through the reactions of some of its inhabitants, played by actors: two stand out, a man in a state of shock gesticulating in front of the camera, with smoke and flames in the background, and a woman extracting herself from the rubble, pushing aside the tiles that block her way out. Other fictional shots feature crowds stumbling through the debris or waddling in the water, and victims in tatters among the rubble. Almost all rely on a mobile frame –

⁴⁴ [“Les reconstitutions ont été faites le plus sérieusement possible. Les films ont été faits le plus sérieusement possible. L’illusion, c’est bien simple, est tellement parfaite que les touristes pleurent. On peut toujours se moquer. Mais que peut faire d’autre un touriste que justement pleurer ?”]

slightly high-angle tracking shots that scan the set from the side, allowing the spectator to survey the scene. As to the expressions of human figures, whether addressed frontally at the viewer from within the fiction or firmly anchored in the reconstruction of the event, they all borrow from the dramatic register of the expression of pain and terror. In addition, images and sounds in these excerpts lean towards illustration: their value is assessed in respect to a narrative and symbolic construction already known by the audience and widely shared, even internationally.

The turning point of the citation sequence comes with yet another of his refutations. To her “I have always cried on Hiroshima’s lot. Always,” he replies, “No, you have not. What would you have cried on?”⁴⁵ as the citation of a new type of footage begins. A first panning shot – an extreme long shot – reveals a razed city, rubble as far the eye can see, and no human figures peopling the landscape. The exchange of assertions and refutations continues, but a visual break takes place at this point, as though, along with the city resuming life from ground zero, documentary footage constituted a new departure in apprehending what took place, a new way to look at it. The importance of memory in the films of Alain Resnais is a common trope, and indeed the problem of not forgetting (in regard to both love and Hiroshima, the intimate and the collective⁴⁶) comes up in the sequence and is even partly articulated around monstration. Indeed, her words in the second half of the

⁴⁵ [“– J’ai toujours pleuré sur le sort d’Hiroshima. Toujours. – Non. Sur quoi aurais-tu pleuré?”]

⁴⁶ A fruitful comparison for *Hiroshima mon amour* would be fiction films in which a much briefer historical context is placed before the story begins, or even punctuates it. Not only are these inserts often completely separate from the characters (who are then limited to acting *over* a historical *backdrop*), but they do also – often with an impersonal, didactic voice-over – serve to authenticate a fiction, that is, partly to deny its character of fiction while reinforcing in actuality a rigid separation between fiction and reality, or fiction and documentary.

citation sequence (over the documentary images), consist less of redundancy and naming in respect to the montage of images. On the contrary, they assume a metaphorical relation to these images, diverging from them in their referent on several occasions: as she explains how some flowers, which she enumerates, grew again soon after the disaster, shots of wounded and burned children being tended succeed one another. Further on, the fears of contamination linked to the rain and the food she tells about, because of the invisibility of such threats, create a tension with images of the banality of everyday life (save for the shot of fish being thrown away and buried). A metonymical association between the cited image of a malformation of the hand of a young person and the hand of the woman laid on her lover's back complements the exchange between speech and images, the tension between similarity and difference. The association anticipates her later reminiscence of the German soldier she loved during the Occupation of France by the Nazis (the moving hand of her sleepy lover on the bed also brings back to her memory the image of the hand of the dying soldier, laid in the same position and moving similarly). It also redefines the question of the relation of monstration to language: to see does not perforce involve naming, at least not in the sense of identifying, referring an image to words, conforming it to them. In a sense, the coming of the actress to Japan for a role in "a film on peace" involves both learning and unlearning: her intent look, her curiosity, her methodical reassurance as to what she has seen may not be the best testimonies that she has seen (nor the best deictics for the spectators of *Hiroshima mon amour*).⁴⁷ The advent of an actual attention to reality and its

⁴⁷ After the introduction, as the fiction begins with the lovers in the hotel room, she answers

constructions, the introductory sequence of the film suggests, might be in free association more than in a conscious intensification of the human look cast upon it. Citation initially seems to comfort the second attitude, as it comes to reinforce a discourse on tourism as an alienated and superficial look – and its parallels in fiction – and strictly adheres by moments to the account of the female protagonist in the documentary section. Not so paradoxically, the moments of furthest distance between the voice and the image seem to monstrate reality more fully. It is as though the simultaneous dissociation/juxtaposition between the ways to figure the reality of the world gave it renewed visibility and virginity and emancipated the audience from the constraints of a unified viewpoint on it.

Godard's fifth feature film *Les Carabiniers* (1963), adapted from the eponymous play by Italian playwright Beniamino Joppolo, also creates a gap in order to monstrate some realities of war through citation. However, unlike *Hiroshima mon amour*, it does not do so by introducing a discrepancy, a distance between the sound and image tracks. Instead, Godard displaces cited images from their frame of reference (newsreels and documentary footage from World War II) to turn them into imported monstrative elements in the genre of the war film. Additionally, the filmmaker recycles the construction of space as well as the notions of consecution and causality of classical narrative editing to bring to visibility the relations of distant realities usually occulted by the genre. The two anti-heroes of the film, Ulysse (Marino Masé) and Michel Ange (Albert Juross, a.k.a. Patrice Moullet), leave for the

a query from him about the reason she came to Hiroshima, which does not seem entirely professional: "Well, for instance, you see... Being a good observer... I think it can be learned." ["Par exemple, tu vois, de bien regarder. Je crois que ça s'apprend."]

war after receiving a draft order from the king delivered by two soldiers driving a Jeep. They leave behind them two women, Vénus (Geneviève Galéa) and Cléopâtre (Catherine Ribeiro), to whom they send letters from the front. These letters (cited from actual correspondence of soldiers by Godard), are handwritten over a black background and often stand in counterpoint to the racketeering and humiliations to which the two protagonists submit the people they have ‘conquered.’

Citation in *Les Carabiniers* is but one means towards monstration, which relies on all the resources film has at its disposal, text as well as sound and images, from fiction or from heterogeneous footage (stock shots and documentary or newsreel footage), spanning a wide range of their possible relations. What *Les Carabiniers* seeks to make visible is twofold: the consequences of war through their filmed records; and a more implicit reality, available only in fragments or even inaccessible through one type of images because of its scale and the immateriality of the forces that subtend it.⁴⁸ Alongside stock shots used to more critical ends, citational sequences also resort to the context-specific newsreels or documentaries, with their wealth of visible and often unstaged details. These excerpts come without the original sound (voice over commentary) or captions, that is, without the discourse they might have helped support. They thus turn out as elemental and general as the stock shots, but these characteristics are vested on the side of the reality they represent, not on the side of discourse – at least, not immediately.

⁴⁸ The line is evidently thin between a reality “gathered” out of disparate citations, monstrated insofar as it is given a figure (a question which pertains to this chapter), and a critical use of citations aiming to bring out the manipulation of images in the production of narrative and discourse (which will be examined in the next chapter) – and still more generally, with the rhetoric of Godard’s film itself.

In the fourth, sixth, eighth, and ninth sequences, the shots cited from documentary films and newsreels repeatedly and insistently show the two principal outcomes of war, material with the ruins, human with the corpses. This function of demystification, pointing out the trivial and the unheroic on the battlefield, is fulfilled by the text in the first, second, and third sequences (“Before the battle, soldiers are scared” comes for instance after the first sequence). Graphic depictions of the war in the style of Voltaire’s *Candide* or Céline’s narrator Bardamu in *Voyage au bout de la nuit* are also the substance of other intertitles. Citation brings the evidence of images to this, particularly in isolating the images of corpses and depriving them of any context, and emphasizes the irreducibility of death to its representation. Replacing the acted-out simulation of death characteristic of fiction, these imported documentary shots also gain additional reality from the proximity of stock shots of planes and weapons whose assembling makes them more abstract and derealizes them.⁴⁹ In a sense, such footage becomes the reality of a former reality become fiction through successive losses in reference and identification as well as through repeated processes of renaming. The accumulation of bird’s eye views, long shots of the impact of weapons or medium long shots of these weapons at the outset of an action (firing and launching) also make it easier to engage into a fantasy of war, while the shots of corpses set a limit to such fantasy – as did images of the survivors

⁴⁹ Godard had already experimented with the confrontation of fiction and documentary, of the real with its various constructions in *À bout de souffle* with the insertion (rejected by the censorship commission and eventually edited out) of a long shot of De Gaulle and Eisenhower and their motorcade on the Champs-Élysées. The juxtaposition of actual and important figures with fictitious characters had then been deemed inappropriate. Where *À bout de souffle* thus destabilized the codes of the representation of power through fiction, in *Les Carabiniers* it is a documentary record that comes to question how fiction represents (or fails to represent) certain events.

of Hiroshima. The intrusion of reality into the fiction through this footage is further reinforced by Godard's use of the sounds of guns, weapons and planes matching the ones seen on images – an argument he made in his defense of the film after accusations of sloppiness came from film critics in the daily press and newsmagazines.⁵⁰

The realism of the soundtrack is one element in a relation of consequence between text and sound. “We landed in Italy and punctuated our progress with a thousand corpses” can be read with the sound of blasts accompanying it (end of seq. 2). “We saw grenadiers and generals die without batting an eyelid, their bellies open, their uniforms drenched in blood, their eyes holed” is announced and accompanied by the noise of explosions and plane engines slightly before the fourth sequence, as though the tableau it depicted was the outcome of the attacks these sounds referred to. From that sequence on, following a gradation of sorts, this causality also involves a relation of sound to image. In seq. 4, two shots of a dead body and one shot of a building collapsing respectively follow stock sounds of a firing machine-gun and a long stock shot of a bomber dropping a dozen bombs. Sequence 6 is quite similar, as it begins with stock shots of a city seen from the sights of a bomber, a black missile and a white missile (two very brief shots with the weapons pointing at opposite directions), followed by a shot probably filmed from a vehicle driving by heaps of rubble. The editing of these sequences sets up an equation between what the initial

⁵⁰ “Feu sur *Les Carabiniers*,” *Cahiers du cinéma* 146, August 1963, reproduced in *Jean-Luc Godard par Jean-Luc Godard*, vol. 1, ed. Alain Bergala (Paris: Cahiers du cinéma, 1998), 238-41.

stock shots represent and what the last shots “on the ground” show, a strong suggestion that the latter be interpreted as the outcome of the former.

At the same time, using the codes of classical montage, one of whose axioms is the conflation of consecution and causality, to produce one space out of visibly heterogeneous ones (and out of different expressive film materials, text, sound and image), Godard plays with the dual nature of the audiovisual citation to redefine and expand the boundaries of the reality *Les Carabiniers* monstrates. A citation of recorded images and sounds refers both to the reality they captured and to the entity of which such images and sounds were previously a part. What could until then be deemed a monstration of the reality of war occulted or simply reenacted by the war film becomes – with an injection of documentary within a fiction – the monstration of a larger reality that encompasses war but is by no means limited to it. In the eighth sequence, the shot of a line of cars driving through a destroyed city with bystanders looking on, with three shots of dead bodies following it, do not come after shots of planes or weapons abstracted from their environment, but after the scene of Michel-Ange at the theater, trying to enter the two-dimensional space of the film projected (a naked woman in her bath), and tearing down the screen. A ‘buffer’ in the form of a black image separates this representation of a confusion between fiction and reality from the cited documentary footage described above. This device, creating a suspension between two shots, one diegetic and the other ‘imported’, hinders a mechanical linearity that might narrow interpretation down to the simple idea that confusion between fantasy and reality leads to a denial of horror that simultaneously allows it to take place. Still, its interpretation as causality remains an open possibility

and participates in a career-long preoccupation for Godard, i.e. the notion that images and sounds, pertaining as they do the realm of the symbolic, can nevertheless have actual material consequences, hurt and kill – particularly when they serve as diversions from reality rather than as the contested terrain of its definition. The misrecognition by Michel-Ange of the naked woman in the film as present has as its equivalent the misrecognition by both him and Ulysse of the postcards and collector pictures as claims to the ownership of what they represent, when they return from the war. Conversely, they fail to perceive the war as a real event with actual consequences, as their puerile behavior and their correspondence with the women also indicate.

The possible causality figured between images and sounds, from fiction to citation or from citation to fiction, thus widens the scope of the reality monstrated: initially encapsulated in the shot (ruins and corpses), it now becomes – with the eighth sequence – a larger ensemble in which citation gives visibility to a possible effect of the confusion between fantasy and reality. It points to the fact that, where some see their attitude towards audiovisual representations as relevant only with respect to these representations, that attitude actually belies a larger relation to the world as an object of – sometimes violent – appropriation. Besides the effect of representations on reality itself, the one-to-last, eleventh sequence relates fiction and citation in a configuration that one shot alone could not translate. Again, it has to do with appropriation: Ulysse, perhaps temporarily returning to the civilian zone for a leave, goes to a Maserati car dealer but is denied the purchase by the salesman (Barbet Schroeder) because he does not have any money and had not foreseen he

would need more than a mobilization order from the king to leave the place with an automobile. He assaults several passers-by to try and rob them, and stabs a man whose wallet he steals. His victim falls to the ground, arms spread out; the following three shots are a citation from wartime documentary or newsreel footage that shows dead men in the same position on the ground, framed differently. As with sequence 8, music introduces and accompanies the citation: in this instance, the song “La Der des der” replaces barrel organ music. More indirectly than weapons, a drive to own and consume, not only symbolic substitutes as in the eighth sequence, but real possessions, is articulated in the eleventh sequence as a main cause for war. Again, citation comes to monstrate the invariable result of different determinations bearing on it. Montage is no longer forbidden when it comes to monstrate reality, because such reality can no longer be scanned within the single, continuous shot idealized and theorized by André Bazin. The record alone does not suffice and requires for a fuller, more comprehensive monstration, a relation between records assuming a distinct status, from primary (the fiction) to secondary and further levels (the citation). Citation then monstrates, as with *Les Carabiniers*, what would be repressed components in the reality which fiction (the genre film, in this case) ambitions to represent.⁵¹

⁵¹ Godard then wrote that “this film is a fable, an apologue in which realism only serves to rescue and reinforce the imagination” (“Ce film est une fable, un apologue où le réalisme ne sert qu’à venir au secours, qu’à renforcer l’imaginaire.” Cf. “*Les Carabiniers*. Mon film, un apologue,” *L’Avant-scène Cinéma* 46, March 1st, 1965, reprinted in Bergala, ed., *Godard par Godard* 237). The word “imaginaire” should not be taken as an equivalent for fiction here. Fiction opens onto the “imaginaire,” or imagination, precisely and only because elements imported from records of reality come to open it up. The filmmaker’s efforts to lessen the contrast between fiction and citation and integrate them into a film did not completely succeed: the image and the sound of either one of them can be perceived very distinctly, and one may wonder whether such residual heterogeneity does not better serve the creative and

The films examined thus far appear, in their recourse to citation, to assume reality as an entity. Even when citations stress relationality with the fiction in order to monstrate, it is as though an emerging relation would allow, through synthetic work, to reconnect the dots, to solve a puzzle and gain understanding of a whole. Agnès Varda's *Jacquot de Nantes* (1990), which relies on biographical material on Varda's longtime companion and fellow filmmaker Jacques Demy, then dying of AIDS, could easily make that ambition its own: to write a life as one, to narrate a story around one subject and to seek out and produce a continuity around that same subject. Varda mobilizes several strategies in what she terms an "evocation", the main of which is a fiction, shot in black-and-white,⁵² with three actors playing Jacques Demy between ages 8 and 18, when his passion for films and cinema transformed into a calling to become a filmmaker. The fictional narrative is interspersed by three other types of images: documentary color footage of Jacques Demy testifying about that part of his life, confirming, adding or bringing a counterpoint to the events depicted in the fiction, but also of a silent Demy whose body Varda scrutinizes with a lens designed for macrocinematography set up on a 16mm camera; and excerpts from a number of Demy's films, from *Lola* to *Bay of Angels* to *Umbrellas of Cherbourg* as well as *The Young Girls of Rochefort*, *Donkey Skin*, *A*

critical power of *Les Carabiniers*. The integrative force, in many war films, of a subjectivity – be it the consciousness of a character or of a narrator – that imparts meaning upon the horrors of war was criticized by Godard in "Feu sur *Les Carabiniers*." It seems that the uneven visual and sound make-up of *Les Carabiniers* prevents, at least on that level, such integration from taking place.

⁵² This comes with a few exceptions, as when color footage from Demy's films 'leaks' into the shots preceding or following it in the fiction; or when a spectacle, operetta or film, seen as wondrous by Jacquot, creates a break in his everyday life and is represented in color.

Room in Town and *Parking*.⁵³ The extreme close-ups of Demy are perhaps the ‘odd shots’ in what might otherwise appear as a classic tribute to an artist: Agnès Varda slowly scans her fellow filmmaker’s hair, his face and hands, the threads of different colors of his wool jacket, dwelling on his eye at the end of one of the shots. With a scale that produces a 1:1 ratio between what is filmed and its rendition on film frames, the body of the filmmaker suddenly assumes a distance and an appearance that make it unrecognizable. “I just had to [...] make a film of him for myself, of fragments of his body as an increasingly silent landscape, with me wandering through his hair as in a forest where a dragon roams,” Varda declared as a justification for the technique employed.⁵⁴ Getting lost, shedding one’s coordinates in regard to a familiar figure, shifting distances thus do not just owe to the work of death, slowly disfiguring and altering a close companion, but also to the adoption of different points of view. Macrocineamatography also epitomizes and takes to its extreme one of the chief effects of monstration, estrangement: the gradual assumption by what is monstrated of new, often disquieting appearances that detach it from linguistic and visual conventions and make visible the arbitrary character of widely accepted notions of what it is.

Monstration in *Jacquot de Nantes* does not reside in the use of macrocinematography alone. A recurring sign comes to indicate a similar gesture within the biographical fiction itself, specifically at its junctures with the film

⁵³ These excerpts involve either bright colors or – in three instances – a straight black-and-white image, with *Lola*, *Bay of Angels* and his earlier documentary *Le Sabotier du Val de Loire*.

⁵⁴ In *Collège au cinéma*, issue 42, written by Danielle Parra (CNC-Film de l’Estran: Paris, date unknown). “Il fallait bien [...] que je filme pour moi sur lui des fragments de son corps comme un paysage de plus en plus silencieux, me promenant dans ses cheveux comme dans une forêt où rôdait un dragon.”

excerpts. This sign belongs to the diegetic world: it is the painted hand that directs visitors and customers to the Demy garage, inside the mews, the private residential lot where Jacquot's family lives along other families. It is therefore doubly monstrative: diegetically, as has just been pointed out; and from an enunciative standpoint, since it brackets film citations as if to call attention to them. A deictic, it comes to announce heterogeneous film footage, for which it also requests specific attention (a different type of attention from that devoted to the narrative, evidently). This shot of the hand sign reappears (with one exception) at the end of each excerpt, to complete the gesture of showing, to bring it to a close, doubling the visible mark of heterogeneity between fiction and citation and, often, the shift from black and white to color.

The citations in question in *Jacquot de Nantes* showcase moments of change, even temporary, in the daily life of an individual character and their translation into singing and movement (Lola in *Lola*, Delphine in *The Young Girls of Rochefort*, Geneviève in *The Umbrellas of Cherbourg*), sometimes more emphatically than others with camera movement and extradiegetic music (Jackie sitting at the gaming table in anxiety in *Bay of Angels*). One also features a momentous event in the public life of a community, liable to alter it dramatically: the demonstrators face the police in Nantes in *A Room in Town* in the same street where Jacquot could read, years before, the announcements by the Gestapo that as a retaliation for acts of resistance, several men chosen at random would be executed. More simply, several citations excerpt moments in daily life (frequent in Demy's films) when an involuntary poetry seeps into otherwise banal gestures, attitudes or speech and transfigures them (Guy's

comment on the engine in *The Umbrellas of Cherbourg* or Donkey Skin's cake-baking in the eponymous, modernized version of Charles Perrault's tale). There is no constant relation between fiction and citation in the film, however: the distance can run from imitation to the utmost transformation. For instance, the shot of the singer at the restaurant, performing "Ah je ris de me voir si belle," from Gounod's *Faust*, is followed by the shot of a doll, and by a backward tracking shot of the scene emptied of its protagonists. These shots precede the excerpt from *Lola*, with no evident biographical or even signifying relation between them save for the spectacle of which both women are the centre. Besides this rather free association between biographical fiction and citation, two other types of articulations link them in *Jacquot de Nantes*. Literalism is one of them, as when Jacquot's father tells a customer that "the engine still knocks on starting,"⁵⁵ an idiosyncratic expression in a scene of transaction also found at the beginning of *The Umbrellas of Cherbourg* with Guy, the mechanic, as its protagonist. The exchange, as many involved in the movements from fiction to citation, takes place in a liminal space – here, between the repair platform for the car and the garage hall that leads to the exit. Another type of articulation relies on metonymy. Such is the case with one of the scenes involving Jacquot's "aunt from Rio," who comes back one day to visit her relatives in Nantes after marrying a rich man and settling down in Brazil. A variant of the American uncle, she arrives in a luxury car, decked with jewelry and dressed in the latest fashion, and takes the Demy family to the restaurant, where she tells them of her life during these years when she was away. Her account of an eccentric life, far from the daily routines of her brother

⁵⁵ "Le moteur cliquette encore à froid."

in a French provincial city, includes her interest for Russian roulette and gambling. The citation is inserted at that point, as the shot of the hand leads to a shot (on a scale similar to that of the aunt at the restaurant table) of Jackie Demaistre (Jeanne Moreau) in *Bay of Angels* (1961), anxiously looking at the spinning wheel, amplified by the piano accompaniment of Michel Legrand.

Through the few examples of juxtaposition between citation and fiction in *Jacquot de Nantes*, some provided by Demy, some imagined by Varda herself, a number of relations emerge between the biographical and the filmographic, based upon the slightest or the most ample premise – a sentence heard, a gesture, a word, a type of space, a location. Citations do not point to a reality they would share with the fiction, or to which both would refer (an attempt to recapture a childhood by all possible means, songs, film posters, fiction, documentary testimony, body of work taking its inspiration from it). They point, rather, to what lies between them and which a more or less discrete common element supports and suggests: a reality which cinema, with its ability to record and reproduce movement, can never totally account for simply because of the disjunction between looking and making (or showing), directing one's eyes and directing one's hands.

In that respect, *Jacquot de Nantes* seems to announce and indicate monstration only to renounce it (or a certain form of it) immediately because of an object that eludes the logic of the biography and even of the diegesis in its evidence and unity. It is as though, in a reversal of the modalities of monstration examined so far, the part of the film closest to the real events depicted (a reconstruction with actors, sets, props) had as one of its functions to monstrate the translations of everyday life into

later films. The variable scope and nature of these translations prevent a consolidation of the biographical enterprise and subject through citations (the supposed solidarity between the artist's life and his work). Still, the evocation announced by Varda in the opening credits allows for points of passage to be drawn between them. What is monstrated in *Jacquot de Nantes*, then, and which the painted hand stands for without replacing it, is not explicitly present on the image and on the sound tracks. It involves the gap between a given "material" (one's life, family, social milieu, national culture, etc.) and what is made of it – the films being, not only productions in the life of an individual subject, separate from it once completed, but also extensions of it and records of its transformation by the artist in his/her resistance to life as simply handed down and accepted in its apparent evidence.⁵⁶ The avoidance of an unequivocal relation of monstration in Varda's film, despite the recurrent shot of the hand, has to do with the avoidance of biography, its assumption and construction of a finite object. Like life, reality is conceived as a continuum and citation can monstrate it only insofar as it participates in the figuration of a passage, a notion so central to Demy's own childhood in Nantes and to his aesthetics.

Indeed, other elements such as the citation of popular tunes or classical music, and the testimony of Demy himself, which in most biographical works would serve to authenticate as well as flesh out the individual experience being recounted,

⁵⁶ The black-and-white biographical fiction could be construed as the given, definite reality usually not represented in Demy's films, assumed to be outside the theater – including the life of the spectator; the citations could then stand for reality as an idea or an ideal of reality, a poeticization and even sublimation of it, usually residing in the films by Demy themselves. From this perspective, Varda's film would accommodate the two definitions of reality in a larger ensemble (with an ideal reality borrowing from a given reality and translating it – maintaining points of contact with it, in any case). The process of transformation from one to the other, in *Jacquot de Nantes*, is left to the audience in the space opened between fiction and citation, the place of the hand-look itself.

further open *Jacquot de Nantes* in other directions. Such opening most notably plays with chronology and family ties: already, diegetic objects and gestures echo one another – the coffee mill and the crank of the projector or the camera, to mention but one. Citations, likewise, make it possible to travel Demy's life in several directions because they are part of a figurative system which, including the more conventional basis of the biographical reconstruction, treats life and the reality that encompasses it as elements intrinsically *in the making* through a narrative and a diegesis by necessity uncompletable. Any monstration taking place thus has to take stock of this aspect: citations cannot repeat an aspect of the reality overlooked in the diegesis, since that aspect has not only always and already passed: it also does not exist outside the intervention of the filmmaker's eye and hand. For Demy (and for Varda), no reality can exist and be talked about without an individual engagement with it, and citations monstrate the distance of a transformation between whatever reality was given, how it was looked at – and a later stage in what it was turned into.

One exception in the system of citations within the film points to this dynamic between a reality showed and looked at, and a reality reconfigured and translated. In an excerpt from *A Room in Town*, Edith Leroyer (Dominique Sanda) consults a fortune teller. After the citation, the hand from the Demy garage is not there, however, to lead us back into the fiction. It is a shot in extreme close-up of Jacques Demy's eye that follows; tilting down, the camera comes to a stop on a hand laid on Demy's shoulder. A medium shot then reveals it to be Varda's. When, in the next shot, the return to the fiction is effected, another medium shot shows Jacquot's mother similarly laying her hand upon his shoulder in the family kitchen. This

different transition back into the fiction sheds light on both the status of the reality (and what gives rise to that status) and on what the shot of the painted hand condensed. The eye and the hand do not stand in opposition or separate as would an eye that surveys, maps out and projects a transformation that a hand (hands) would then have to execute in a division of labor that concerns creator and technicians alike.⁵⁷ Similarly, the eye of the spectator is not summoned as a mere witness to events that s/he would have previously accepted as real. Once the eye has been shown some thing, and has seen and observed it, it needs the relay of a hand, even a metaphorical, a mental hand, to arrange or rearrange elements in a layout that can produce meaning to him or her. The look, following monstration, does not proceed otherwise: it follows in the steps of another look, as one repeats a gesture, ‘to see’ what it feels like and to try and experience part of what was monstrated – with the inevitable part that one has to complete on one’s own, through the work of one’s own hands, always with a different result. Reality, in this instance, becomes the space of passage between what we are told it is, what we are shown and given, and what we see and make of it – since we are indeed asked to look at it for ourselves.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ The refusal of this division between eye (or brain) and hand runs through the New Wave: in what its filmmakers refused (the strict hierarchy of the studios at the time); and in the substance of their formative years. Indeed, for the *Cahiers du cinéma* lineage, writing about films was already a way to exert their critical and creative eye, it was a gesture that contained their passage behind the camera. Similarly, the ‘craftsmanship’ lineage of the New Wave, which might include Varda, Demy, and Resnais, involved a concrete practice and a play with certain tools (photography, animation, comic books and amateur cinema) of which their later feature-length works constituted the continuation. In *Jacquot de Nantes*, the scene of the teacher at the technical high school, instructing his students of the insuperable difference between intellectual and manual work, is also what Jacquot refused when he left to dedicate himself to cinema.

⁵⁸ The diegetic universe in *Jacquot de Nantes* is itself inscribed with this active role of the *regard*, of the eye that splits the surface uniformity and continuity of reality and transforms its very perception. First, many of the shots or scenes in color (besides film excerpts, obviously)

Olivier Assayas's *Irma Vep* (1996) involves citations in a way that relate it to *Jacquot de Nantes*: though not biographical, the film involves a character based on a real person, Maggie Cheung, played by the Hong-Kong actress herself, and raises – through excerpts from other films – the question of the place and effectiveness of images and sounds within reality, and more particularly how they constitute sites of passage from one mode of experience to another for the individual (character or spectator). More sensorial and kinetic in its choice of citations and in the way these are edited than *Jacquot de Nantes*, *Irma Vep* also displays, in its diegesis, an anxiety about the circulation of images and sounds in an era of global communication. If the New Wave represented a moment when images and sounds had moved beyond the status of mere diegetic elements integrated into characterization and narration to become parts of the very fabric of the fiction film and address the spectator directly, *Irma Vep* takes charge of this legacy to raise the issue of (French) identity in a reality ever more fleeting, with the acceleration of the transmission and consumption of

are clearly edited so as to appear linked to Jacquot's point of view – they often function in shot/reverse shot pairs. Second, the diegetic universe itself revolves around 'sills': the opening between the garage with its cluster of apartments and the avenue where one really steps into the larger city; the window between the kitchen and the entrance lobby of the apartment; the passage Pommeraye in Nantes, a literal passage which, like all passages, rests on a thin boundary between public and private, outside and inside, the open and the concealed; the hand itself, of course, singled out from the diegesis to be turned into an enunciative sign. I will also add here that the notion of passage, of shift in the *regard* from a shared or conventional apprehension of reality to a personal one is antithetical to spectacle, which separates the onlooker and his/her object, implementing a strict dichotomy between their roles, favoring witnessing and consumption rather than appropriation and participation. It is difficult not to see Demy's career-long resistance to a musical built on spectacular numbers in this light. Songs become singing and find their way into the everydaylife which they continuously metamorphose. Varda in *Jacquot de Nantes* shows a family life where spoken words and singing likewise form a continuum in the communication between characters; and when she represents cinema through one of its main artefacts (posters), she does so without idealization: the posters are enclosed in a wooden frame, protected from vandals by a wire netting. Cinema, as a spectacle, can also work to maintain spectators into passive roles, and there is also imprisonment in what first appears as an escape.

visual and sound data. Indeed, reality as redefined by the New Wave included images and sounds as full-fledged, active elements, not just as reflections and records always gauged according to their faithfulness to an original or a source. This conception, however, depended on a context in which cinema still was a dominant paradigm in the way images and sounds were approached, perceived, consumed, understood, interpreted, thought about. In other words, that reality involved images and sounds as active elements shaped by (and shaping in return) social, political and economic relations. Such actions and reactions have not altogether disappeared in *Irma Vep*, but their succession has considerably picked up in rapidity – beyond the conscious grasp of individuals, it seems –, and have integrated an (economic) sphere of communication where the range of possibilities they offer has been narrowed down. Assayas's film could then also be seen as an attempt to give a figure to this new reality while ambitioning to suggest alternatives and forms of resistance to it, particularly in its attention to and monstration of how images and sounds circulate in the contemporary world.

The central citation, which concerns a musical piece, is all the more important as it first sounds and appears to be extradiegetic, both technically (it occupies the entirety of the soundtrack) and discursively (it accompanies and amplifies what is seen in the image). Two thirds into the film, Maggie visits René Vidal (Jean-Pierre Léaud) at his place after his nervous breakdown. The project of the television remake of *Les Vampires* no longer seems viable in the form the director had foreseen, and his lead female performer now appears to believe in it more than he does. At the end of their conversation René, under the effect of the sedatives he

has been prescribed, becomes unconscious and Maggie sneaks out through the window to avoid the crowd of friends, collaborators and police waiting in the apartment's entrance. In a sound bridge that lasts several seconds, Sonic Youth's "Tunic (Song for Karen)"⁵⁹ gradually grows louder and runs through the following shot before it surprisingly turns out to be diegetic.⁶⁰ Indeed, Maggie Cheung has come back to her hotel and put on music that she is shown listening and dancing to in her room (whether it is the same as the one heard on the soundtrack at that point is not clear because there are no other – diegetic – sounds mixed in with it). She has also put on the latex outfit she wears in the remake of Feuillade's film and, as if in a trance, she goes out into the hallway and up the stairs, hides from a couple of customers and from a hotel staff to sneak in the room of a woman stranded in Paris (Arsinee Khanjian), who is arguing over the phone, naked on her bed, with a lover being kept back somewhere else. While the woman is absorbed in her conversation, Maggie steals her jewelry and leaves the room, only to get to the hotel rooftop and throw her loot out in the pouring rain. The status of the music is thus twofold: it helps Maggie imagine and adopt a temporary different persona for herself, that of her role in the film she is shooting, but *outside*, in her own life, non-professionally and as pure play. Still, the music is also provided to the audience of *Irma Vep* directly (and in actuality reconstructed in the next shot as spatial), comparably to the images watched by characters in the diegesis in *Les Mistons* or *Paris nous appartient*. This is not so much in order to confront this audience with the lyrics or the harmonic and

⁵⁹ From the album *Goo* (UMG Recordings, 1990).

⁶⁰ The diegetic nature of the music can be grasped only after the shot has ended, when Maggie leaves her room, closing the door, and the next shot shows her in the hallway with the song still playing, spatialized this time.

melodic form of the song as to monstrate and figure the shift taking place in the reality depicted, the passage performed by Maggie from a type of reality bound to the assignments and strictures of professional work and social obligations, to a reality in which she assumes a clandestine identity whose boundaries and finalities remain elusive.

Maggie's contract is eventually rescinded by the production and René is replaced by José Murano (Lou Castel). This turn of events retrospectively confirms the particular status that the Hong-Kong actress holds in Assayas's film: a figure whose familiarity with the audiovisual culture of simulacra and hyperstimulation (especially in terms of rhythm and pace) enables her to tackle it unreservedly and even to redirect it towards personal metamorphosis, if not liberation. By contrast, a number of other episodes (and citations) in *Irma Vep* bring up the conservatory attitude of the French characters towards reality while simultaneously confronting its audience with the same images and sounds. In the second instance of monstration through citation (and voice-over), for example, René Vidal points out what he sees as the central characteristics of Musidora's movement in Louis Feuillade's *The Vampires* and the modernity of her acting style. The presentation of the excerpt full frame begins after he is shown inserting a tape in his VCR with Maggie Cheung sitting next to him. Still in voice-over, he also explains to her the action going on in the same clip (presumably) that is presented to the viewers of *Irma Vep*, acting as a modern-day, cinephilic lecturer. The clip ends without his voice, however, and without the non-diegetic music of *The Vampires*, which has ended earlier: there remains just silence on the soundtrack. Later in the film, as the project of a remake of *The Vampires* begins to

fizzle out and a conflict erupts between René and his assistant director, Maggie is taken by the film's costume maker Zoé (Nathalie Richard) to a dinner party at Mireille's (Bulle Ogier) and Roland's (Jacques Fieschi). With a few friends, Roland is watching the tape of an old militant film they worked on together. Zoé, visibly melancholic about a period which she did not live through, insists that they should be proud of their work, then excitingly directs Maggie's attention to the television screen and shouts, "Oh, look!" What is presented in the citation that follows (which the spectators of Assayas's film are again encouraged to presume is what Maggie, Zoé and their company are also watching) is a series of documentary images with accompanying music (no human voices or noises). The first shot shows the face of a woman, before subsequent shots represent a woman putting leaflets together, a man walking towards the camera, the two filming and editing images together. One shot also shows a slogan handwritten on a white sheet,⁶¹ and the last shot represents papers coming out of a press. Zoé's voice is not heard over the images as was Vidal's, and the audience is left to pick out what she insisted was to be watched.

Vidal's and Zoé's reactions, which serve as deictics in a very minimal way, as a raw gesture, remain very superficial and point to barely more than the images and sounds playing in front of them. In spite of the fact both are involved in the film industry, they keep images and sounds at bay and, lacking attention, do not appear

⁶¹ The citation comes from *Classe de lutte* (1969), a film made by the SLON-Medvedkine group and the workers at the Rhodiacta plant in response to Chris Marker and Mario Marret's *À bientôt j'espère* (1967), which depicted their strike. The written message reads as follows: "Le cinéma n'est pas une magie. C'est une technique, et une science. Une technique née d'une science et mise au service d'une volonté: la volonté qu'ont les travailleurs de se libérer." ("Cinema is not a form of magic. It is a technique, and a science. A technique which sprang from a science and serves a will: the workers' will to liberate themselves.").

to fully engage with them (judging by the vague language that they use to refer to their working materials, at any rate: ‘modern’, ‘political’).⁶² In *Irma Vep*, however, they remain the better instances on a paradigm of spectatorship that also includes José Murano (Lou Castel), the director brought in to replace René after his nervous collapse. Recentring the remake of *The Vampires* towards what he sees as a French tradition running from *Les Mystères de Paris* and Eugène Sue to the mystery novels set in the Parisian *faubourgs*, Murano drops Maggie Cheung as the female lead and hires Laure (Nathalie Boutefeu), her stand-in, as a replacement. He then proceeds to watch the Feuillade serial. Towards the end of *Irma Vep*, another clip from *The Vampires* appears without transition after José Murano offers the part of Irma Vep to Laure, as if this time the citation had been unmoored altogether from a diegetic context. After the excerpt (Irma Vep onstage at the cabaret), it turns out that it was also being played on a television, but to an absent spectator. A panning shot reveals that Murano has fallen asleep, with his cat moving indifferently about his armchair.⁶³ These characters remain evasive (or have fallen completely unconscious) in approaching images and talking about them, with a represented reality that by far exceeds what they highlight in it.

⁶² Their reactions to the films cited appear all the more inadequate as, from *Les Vampires* (the frantic dance of Irma Vep in the “Chat huant” cabaret, her confrontation with Moreno) to *The Heroic Trio* to *Classe de lutte*, these all involve a strong – political, poetic, sensorial – engagement between their characters and the world in which they act.

⁶³ Sleep and generally loss of consciousness are connoted negatively in *Irma Vep*. Besides José Murano’s slumber in front of his television, René Vidal is put under medication and experiences recurring dizziness after he leaves the shoot – both being tied to their downfall as artists. By comparison, the waking dream is central to the apprehension of cinema’s power to transform individuals in a state of availability in *Irma Vep*, as was obvious with Maggie Cheung’s metamorphosis.

The fact that Vidal, commissioned by a television channel, is remaking *The Vampires* indicates that he is possibly trying to perform a work of imagination towards Feuillade's material. It appears, in this case, as though his adaptation remains literal, his choice to cast a Hong Kong movie star in the title role being a major but isolated twist in a work of illustration in color of the famous serial. A remake, for Vidal (or for its commissioner, television), remains a matter of adjusting images and sounds to a script, and in that light Assayas's resort to citations may be seen as a means to bypass those limitations of the remake in favor of a more affective, material movement between images.⁶⁴

Citations in *Irma Vep*, in their mode of insertion, put forth two propositions: a monstration that keeps its object at bay, and considers it separately from the point of view; and a monstration which takes into account the fact that it unfolds at the same time as its object, and is tied to it in a way that blurs the distinctions between them. The two citations mentioned above express this diegetically, as we have seen, since once the gesture of showing them or something in them has been performed, the narrative proceeds for the characters as we watch the citation (in each case, the citation is the occasion for an ellipsis in the fiction). Characters consume and move

⁶⁴ While Assayas's film has the television remake of a silent classic film serial as its central event, it does not itself assume the position of a remake. It is in a character and its possibilities that *Irma Vep* is interested, the remaking of that character in a different time-period, the performance of similar gestures anew, the actualization of an urban myth more than that of a narrative. The remake as it is practiced in the film industry in Hollywood and in France tends to remain cosmetic and simply contents itself with updating the technology, the narrative and the actors' bodies for a newer or younger audience. For Assayas, it is the figurative and narrative possibilities that Irma Vep as a character offers that matter: her elusive identity, her ability to go through metamorphosis and circulate freely in a social order, transgress its boundaries, her liminal position between the underworld and the political and economic establishment, but also between fantasy and realism, in fictional terms.

on, but the audience of *Irma Vep* dwells. Yet the citations in question are also brought to express this in the editing pattern: the straight cuts that introduce and end them isolate them from the interrupted or the resuming narrative and further reinforce this disjunction with it – while at the same time leading spectators to relate the two and do this work of observation. However, other citations and other diegetic elements suggest an approach to reality alternative to this objectification which posits an irremediable difference between images and reality. Two other citations suggest a continuum between the diegesis and the images and sounds that circulate in it; and between what we take to be real and the elements that have long been thought as its mere reflection. The first has to do with a film excerpt from Johnny To's 1992 Hong Kong fantasy and action film *The Heroic Trio* and occurs at the beginning of the film, after Maggie Cheung, who has just arrived in Paris, is driven by line producer Desormeaux (Alex Descas) to René Vidal's place. As Maggie slams the cardoor closed, a sound transition is effected between the central position and the increasing intensity of the door's sound and – into the citation – the sound assigned to a projectile hurled forward by one of the characters facing the camera (the visual effect is one of a fast backward tracking shot away from that character). Interestingly, what is clearly given as the citation of visual material from a heterogeneous source is smoothed over by the shared salient characteristics of the sounds across the cut. The clip's end, in that regard, already informs on the difference previously mentioned between Maggie Cheung and the French characters in *Irma Vep*: images and sounds are taken as full elements of life by her, if not in an organic way, certainly in her perception and apprehension of the world, while they tend to keep them at a

distance, to objectify them as things that are commanded, organized, viewed essentially in a relation of subservience to reality. This is what Assayas points out when, quite abruptly, the frontal shot of a hand holding a remote control succeeds that of the fall of one of the action female heroes in the *Heroic Trio* excerpt. Tilting up, the camera reveals that the hand is René Vidal's and anchors the clip in the diegesis *a posteriori*. He takes on, in this instance, both the role of a director figuring enunciation in *Irma Vep*, giving it visibility, and that of a director within the diegesis who contents himself with the use of images and sounds as working documents, not genuinely as real elements liable to affect him.

It is no accident that the source reference for *Irma Vep*, Louis Feuillade's serial, was loved by the Surrealists for the back-and-forth slippages between the everyday, common, respectable petty bourgeois city and its counterpart, the criminal underworld of strange creatures, masked gangsters who had sworn to ruin that world and always sought to infiltrate it. The growing impossibility to tell one from the other and to rest on a secure feeling of knowing what was what and who was who constituted, for the audience of *Les Vampires*, whether with a literary bent or not, an undeniable attraction. It is a similar refusal to distinguish and hierarchize between a hypothetical real world and its many putative imitations, and even in many instances to restrict images and sounds made to that simple status, that pervades Assayas's film. *Irma Vep* already assumes reality as permanently crisscrossed by movements between positions and identities, movements that films still initiate or facilitate in the era of global communications. The stress on a citation isotopic with the preceding fiction thus loses of its urgency: Assayas is less interested in the scope of the

transformation between two given points than in the raw fact of its existence, and even in its banality. Across the artificial divide between reality and the artifacts that circulate in it – films, among other things – there exist continuities both sensorial and perceptive (the car door and the projectile hurled forward) along with metamorphoses (the nightly incursion inside the hotel and the gratuitous theft), which are also departures from hermeneutic frameworks imposed on one's relation to reality. The figuration of a passage between regimes is not altogether erased: the window of René Vidal's apartment is a striking image of the change in the way Maggie apprehends the world that surrounds her. It is not the window opened onto the world of classical film theory, but a threshold whose crossing seems more suspicious and transgressive – as it was in *The Vampires*, along with chimneys and underground tunnels. Cinema as an institution in *Irma Vep* – with the shooting of the remake – offers a wealth of such passages. The most salient involves the shift from filming (a shot shows us the action going on, with the crew in the foreground doing their work and observing) to projecting (the dailies of the shot that would follow the one previously seen, in which an unconscious Irma Vep was pushed from a window and delivered to another group in charge of keeping her hostage). The first few seconds before and after the cut from the fall to the 'delivery,' from the making of a scene to its projected follow-up shot, are completely silent. Again, the realization that the images seen are the 'dailies' happens in retrospect, or at least gradually, as coughs and breathing noises emerge on the soundtrack. It is with the next shot, a frontal long shot of the screening room with the film's crew sitting as lights go up, that the contextualization of the images takes place. The spectators of *Irma Vep* have at that

point followed a path not unlike the one undergone by Maggie Cheung in the episode of the hotel. As the character passes through the window, so we pass from spectators of *Irma Vep* to spectators also doubled, and faced with the spectators within the film.⁶⁵ If Vidal holding the remote control also figured the one possible dominant enunciator that any film produces, this scene of projection may figure the work a film tries and gets its spectators to do, the fact that a film also watches its audience and directs it. More importantly, it points out that spectators also have a degree of freedom in choosing from which position, from which role outside themselves they would like to be looked at, and would like to look at themselves. For Maggie, suddenly slipping into Irma Vep's clothes, it is a role she had only accepted, not chosen until her arrival on the set; as she chooses it truly, it becomes in excess of a shooting and a doomed film. For José Murano, asleep in front of his television while Irma Vep seems to both fire up her audience at "Le Chat huant" and to hail him, it is a lost role, a lost possibility to switch realities and pull away from the defeat that filling in for René represents for him. For us, spectators of *Irma Vep*, as for some of its other characters, it asks the question of an alternative attitude or not in the face of reality, images and sounds included: treating it as a movement, as a circulation, as a permanent transition,⁶⁶ or as a series of stable states, as a set of nameable elements

⁶⁵ Olivier Assayas' long interest for the International Situationist movement and Guy Debord in particular surfaces in this particular instance (he served as editorial director on the *Oeuvres complètes* DVD set and helped re-release the films of the philosopher in French theaters in 2005). This almost frontal shot of the cast and crew watching the dailies refers to a still image used at the beginning of *In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni* (1978), with Debord confronting the film audience in voiceover.

⁶⁶ This is one of the recurrent issues with Assayas's films, which tread the fine line between a cinema that calls for a reconsideration of the status of images and sounds, including their epistemological status, and a cinema reliant on sheer energetic expense, on a permanent stimulation of the audience that leaves little to no place for hermeneutic work – in which the

that constitute a given culture, as a patrimony. In the end, the reality assumed by the protagonists of *Irma Vep* is one whose experience can be commodified, accumulated, reiterated and reinforced – including through images and sounds that become fetishized objects and rallying points for a collective – often national – identity and sense of belonging. By contrast, the self-construction of Maggie Cheung as a person/character hybrid, the initial idea by René Vidal to place an Asian actress in a French fictional context to see how she evolves in it, and the articulation of continuity through certain citations (essentially sound citations) point to another definition of reality, whose audiovisual components may make it more resistant to predefinition, capitalization, and predictability. Not unlike *Jacquot de Nantes*, *Irma Vep* resorts to citation (with examples and counterexamples) to monstrate a reality that exists only as movement and can be figured only as what takes place between any two points. Reality, in both films, is thus approached as something always to come, as a permanent passage eased by the sound as much as by the image. It is not intangible, but it remains very unstable and threatens the audible and visible material representation needed to produce a fictional narrative and a diegesis. Symmetrically, and often simultaneously to this work of de-familiarization performed on reality, citation also brings to the surface textual and material elements otherwise integrated by and into the narrative fiction film.

time allowed to think between fiction and citation is reduced to nothing or even denied. Another example is his 2002 *demonlover*, this time with video games and the Internet as the media of choice. An obvious issue is Assayas's ambiguous use of citation: an opening onto alternative hermeneutic regimes, it may just as well be construed as the mere representation or flaunting of a discourse on Frenchness and the French cinema preexisting it.

CHAPTER III
THE DISSOCIATION OF THE FICTION FILM:
AUDIOVISUAL MATERIAL, TEXT, AND MEANING

Mon oncle d'Amérique and *On connaît la chanson*, through citation on distinct tracks (image and sound), sanction a vision of reality as increasingly scripted and even replaced by a variety of preset symbolic elements or structures. In *Hiroshima mon amour* citation could still monstrate what already had a place in the fiction and create a resonance with it: if the hand of the Japanese lover led to a reminiscence of the hand of the German lover, both also entered into relation with the deformed, spur-like hands of a victim of the nuclear bombing that appeared in one of the cited documentaries. One object of the film still was the construction, or reconstruction, of a human universality whose resilience found a place in a monistic conception of the world. In *Mon oncle d'Amérique* and *On connaît la chanson*, it is the fragmentation of the world, its alienation from itself, and the movement depersonalizing human actions and speech that citation points to – for all the sometimes desperate efforts characters put into the affirmation of their individuality and their struggle for a semblance of cohesiveness. What citation figures in respect to the diegesis in these films is no longer an aspect of it, and by extension of the reality it stands for, interpretable as integral to the whole, but something definitively separate from it. Where citation had commonality as a horizon in *Hiroshima mon amour*, *Mon oncle d'Amérique* and *On connaît la chanson* aim to bring out an absent or hidden object, to a dual end: to critique how representation in the narrative fiction film distorts or screens reality and its experience; and to pave the way for a re-imagination of reality, once these

element(s) of representation have risen to the level of consciousness and have been reconsidered in their relativity.

Formal dissociation, figuring the extent to which idiosyncratic experiences of reality are shaped and increasingly replaced by technological reproductions, thus incidentally and conversely suggests to what degree technological possibilities are mustered to produce an impression of organic consistency in reality. The constructed homogeneity of the image and sound tracks, by way of a hermeneutic reversal, comes to be perceived as the consequence of a homogeneity in the world it recorded, not as the product of a desired, ideal representation that would account for the apparent seamlessness of an assemblage of samples. In other words, the association of cinema with raw recording tends in this instance to downplay or even conceal its dependence on cutting and pasting together, not to mention the fact that some of its applications (super 8mm, for example) have also traditionally carried connotations of a reality captured spontaneously, seemingly with minimal mediations of any sort. Yet citation is reversible in the objects it can monstrate: if, on the one hand, it comes to encapsulate a dimension of reality (what is recorded in it, unwittingly or not) and accordingly allows to imagine this reality stripped of it, on the other hand, it also has the aptitude through that excision to give a figure to – and thereby expose – the material and technological conditions, the images, the discourses and the narratives that make up the configuration of reality that is the diegetic world and its texture.

In her survey of reuse in experimental cinema, Nicole Brenez names this effect anamnesis: “it consists in collecting and placing side by side images of a similar nature in order to make them signify, not something else than what they say, but

precisely what they show that we refuse to see.”⁶⁷ In the cases at hand, which involve the inscription of citations over fiction films, I would slightly amend Brenez’s formulation and point out that the images placed side by side are not necessarily of a similar nature, although they should have enough in common that one could function as a repetition, an inflection, a critique, or a re-figuration of the other. Besides, images can signify, *say* explicitly what was only implicit before, only after (and because) they have been opened up, exposed as what they are, in a signifying process that has to be assumed by a given audience as well. The film, experimental or not, may be conceived as a machine, yet only interpretation can set it into motion. Finally, it is also what these images may hide, omit or lack that citation and juxtaposition are to bring out – often to the degree that images and sounds will assume a plurality of figures and meaning they hardly involved beforehand.

As the previous chapters have shown, and no matter the degree to which the diegesis announces it beforehand or justifies it a posteriori, citation constitutes the most visible trace of the gesture of editing in cinema. Perhaps more than in verbal language, it is emblematic of enunciation as a whole because of the variety of the expressive materials it relies on. Just as the appearance of the camera or of some of the crew in the frame would inscribe shooting as a phase of production in the finished work, citation effects what the phraseology of modernism in the arts has termed self-reflexivity with respect to selecting, cutting, and pasting footage together.

However, rather than taking the trope at face value – a reminder, addressed to

⁶⁷ Nicole Brenez, “Montage intertextuel et formes contemporaines du remploi dans le cinéma expérimental” (“Intertextual Montage and Contemporary Forms of Reuse in Experimental Cinema”) *CiNéMas* 13:1-2 (2002): 53. [“Il s’agit de rassembler et d’accoler des images de même nature de façon à leur faire signifier non pas autre chose que ce qu’elles disent, mais exactement ce qu’elles montrent mais que l’on ne veut pas voir.”]

spectators, that absorption in the diegetic world is supported by a conscious activity akin to reading – it may make more sense, literally, to read it further as a “request” from the film to confront specific questions. More specifically, what objects do narrative fiction films resist displaying, and what do they show to screen these objects? Among these, what is properly material, related to images and sounds as such, and what does belong to textual meaning as an “intangible”?

What the gesture of citation first makes obvious is the fact that citation is also its own object: with it, the inextricable relation of image and sound as constituents of cinema with what they may mean is reaffirmed. The selection it effects over preexisting material can cut through explicit and implicit meanings without restriction, further stressing the make-up of the sound and image tracks. Such a reaffirmation is not by definition gratuitous: in some films of the corpus, it takes place against the background of narrative and discursive predominance, with images serving in an ancillary role that suppresses their specificity and uses them as stand-ins. An initial element worthy of consideration is therefore the possibility that sections of a fiction film may simply be reduced (or be reducible) to the barest syntactical and representational functions, i.e., to tokens. The token, understood as a sign whose signifying power is greatly weakened and little related to its figurative and material specificity, thus assumes at least two forms in the syntax of the classical fiction film.

On the one hand, the joint, or “buffer” image, does not serve any other purpose than smoothing out the cut between two units (shots, sequences or scenes), whether or not a shift in location is involved in the diegesis. Such an image is

symmetrical to a pictogram, or could perhaps be seen as a pictogram by default: while it does not abstract the sign and does not necessarily require a simplification and a reduction in the signifying elements of the image, it should allow the communication of elementary information to proceed as smoothly and unimpeded as possible *through it*, from the shots that precede it to those that follow it. The buffer image does not mean anything in the fiction that could not be conveyed just as well or even better by text, or any other signifying material.⁶⁸ Sometimes, as in the case of the cutaway shot, it is not even necessary to the narrative economy and simply bespeaks a technical or continuity flaw that requires masking.

On the other hand, the “capture” consists in the indiscriminate record of a reality it ambitions to represent in totality and which it extensively translates into data: at the same time, it is a (metonymic) substitute for the impossible possession of that reality as a whole. The postcard would be an extreme instantiation of this type of token image, encapsulating as it does the whole of a reality into a single, “perfect” image, while at the other end of the spectrum satellite photographs of the earth, regardless of their use (military, recreational, intelligence gathering...),

⁶⁸ This could be accounted for in several ways. One of them is that the frequent occurrence of a text on the screen constitutes a reminder that what the image (and the sound) convey may in part be textualized. ‘Syntactic’ images, including some stock shots used to bridge narrative gaps or create transitions in the footage, thus serve to maintain a modicum of visual homogeneity and diegetic consistency. It is also interesting to note in that respect that one of the most salient stylistic elements common to all New Wave filmmakers was a flaunting of the text, from the literary sources of adaptations to credits to having their characters engage in the simple activity of writing notes and letters. And often, paradoxically, what could be assumed to be ‘the same’, image and text, resulted in a tension, a difference, an opening even when juxtaposed or edited in succession. With *Les Carabiniers* and its countless handwritten titles, Godard opted for discrepancy and an overall resistance to alignment between texts and images. By turns, the text – itself a series of citations from actual letters sent by soldiers engaged in different wars – contradicts indications of places in the image or stretches their diegetic plausibility to the limit, provides the gruesome details of battle scenes, conveys the non-heroism, the cynicism, and the despair witnessed on the front, and exposes the naiveté and fear experienced by the fighters.

complemented by web cameras or surveillance cameras, revive fantasies of a totalizing image of the world, supported by increased storing and archiving capacities.

Les Carabiniers and *À bout de souffle* (if less conspicuously) provide critical examples of these two instances of the token and resort to citation to bring out their respective roles in the fiction film. In *À bout de souffle*, two stock shots (one of Notre-Dame cathedral, the other of the Louvre museum and the Tuileries gardens) introduce a change of location, yet not in the conventional sense for the narrative fiction film. Neither the city nor the neighborhood where the action takes place change across sequences: seen in her hotel room in St-Michel before these stock shots, Patricia and Michel are then shown sitting at a terrace near Notre-Dame before Michel steals a car to take her to her interview at the airport. The stock shots of both monuments are thus redundant establishing shots, as nothing in the development of the narrative justifies any “establishing.”⁶⁹ They bring out an important element of narrative economy, the establishing shot, which epitomizes a movement or action (destination, point of arrival, or a given phase, as with an aircraft at cruising altitude representing a trip, a change in location, or the setting for

⁶⁹ Alain Resnais’s *Mon oncle d’Amérique* also features several shots establishing the locale of a scene or sequence, all of which outdoor, some famous and iconic – the Eiffel tower, the Maison de la Radio – some others generic and less remarkable – the textile factory where René Ragueneau (Gérard Depardieu) works, the building where Janine Garnier (Nicole Garcia) has her apartment. All these shots are in fact still photographs. The scriptwriter of the film, Jean Gruault, stated that this was a reference to Ozu, who frequently made this type of inserts in his own films; a more general semantic and formal parallel also invites us to think of such shots as postcard shots. Also, where Godard points to the textual nature of establishing shots by inserting some where they do not introduce information and prove distracting, Resnais chooses to forego citation of stock shots. He maintains a diegetic logic for these shots, but “reduces” them visually to still images, thus underlining the distinction of their status with respect to the rest of the fiction film – emblematic images, whose way of figuring a place and the perception of movement do not matter as much.

the scene immediately following). In other words, the establishing shot stands in for the string of shots that could or would have depicted the movements of one or more characters, or refers to a space that the audience will most likely have to reconstruct from memory, picture from secondhand knowledge, or imagine. In that regard, citation consists in the intrusion of a piece of unwanted and useless information, making visible the restrictive, summarizing function that some elements have in the economy of film narration: to show only so much so that one doesn't have to show more, not to show because something would need to be attended to. It also implicitly underlines the irrelevance of such images as images, since they are limited to communicating information for which words or text would have sufficed (in the case of *À bout de souffle*, the couple do discuss the café in the hotel room before heading out). Usually a mere – and therefore discrete – “connector” between actions, the establishing shot appears overblown and ostentatious in such a visual context, its presence further emphasized by the music that accompanies it, and which starkly contrasts with Martial Solal's score for the film.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ A token in that it stands in for something else but holds little to no value on its own merits as an image, the cited footage still represented a playful opportunity for Godard in at least another way. Indeed, the occurrence of the citation immediately follows a shot that ends with Patricia and Michel kissing, and can also assume a “masking” value, a mock act of censorship leaving it to the audience to imagine the “missing” footage. In that respect, it also foreshadows the shot of the airplane that Godard was to substitute for a shot of Macha Méril's body in his negotiation with the censorship committee over *La Femme mariée*, re-titled *Une Femme mariée* (1964). Besides, such a mark of enunciative intervention is not without recalling television interludes from the 1950s to the 1980s, which signaled either a technical problem with broadcasting or a failure on the part of programmers to “fill the time” allotted to them (in that respect, they are also related to the cutaway shot, trying to smooth over a failed attempt at producing a sense of continuity). The hypothesis of the citation as “filler” in this instance obviously lacks evidence, given its brevity, yet it remains an interesting hypothesis on the film and its first rough cut – as a trace of Godard's initial anxiety about reaching the 90-minute mark with *À bout de souffle*, recounted by Alain Bergala in his *Godard au travail: les années 60* (Paris: Cahiers du cinéma, 2007).

In *Les Carabiniers*, Godard's choice of point of view on this type of images is symmetrical. Rather than citing images that would only establish the obvious and signal semantic paucity, the filmmaker undermines the status of establishing shots as framing devices for the audience's understanding of the narrative. What precedes or follows them in the fictional narrative belies the information they aim to deliver. For instance, the fifth series of stock shots (two shots of the sphinx, full-face and in profile) follows an intertitle reading, "The King demands that the people now and forever meditate on the heroic fight of its sons at the fringes of Europe and Oceania."⁷¹ Later, after an intertitle has situated the latest battle in the city of Rostov and Michel Ange and Ulysse have been shown entering a house and exploding grenades inside, a stock shot of the Statue of Liberty appears. A reverse shot representing the two men saluting connects them to the monument, again creating a discrepancy between the previous explicit location and this one. The abrupt shifts in location, derided on a picaresque mode by the titles themselves, work counter to the laws of verisimilitude in the construction of a fictional space, whose conventional dimension is brought out by the absence of transitions and the lack of justification in the action or in character psychology. In a sense, the scene takes place where spectators are told it takes place as they tacitly agree to a number of possibilities at the beginning of the film. The stock shots of the Statue of Liberty and the sphinx, interfering as they do with spatial integration, do not perform a function unlike that of titles reading "New York, U.S.A." or "Egypt." They replace these textual indications without adding much to them and without allowing for so much as a

⁷¹ "Le Roi demande que le peuple se recueille pour l'éternité devant l'héroïque combat de ses fils aux frontières de l'Europe et de l'Océanie."

reinterpretation. They are, quite literally, out of place. The disjunctive role of citation in *Les Carabiniers*, in that respect at least, results from an amplification of the principle of a text indicating a change of time and location in any fiction film in general. The stock shots precisely represent the possibility of figuring purely textual aspects in a film narrative that would resort to images and sounds as seamlessly and homogeneously as possible. This critique of the dominance of the verb in cinema is hardly isolated in Godard's work, as it has recurred throughout the decades, in various forms, to the present day and his lament over television as radio in disguise, for instance.⁷²

These stock shots also hold other possibilities, however, and lead to the second type of "indifferent" images, captures, whose value depends on the apparent faithfulness and comprehensiveness of the record of reality they constitute. In this case, the image becomes insignificant, not owing to the inadequacy of the signifying material it mobilizes or to its intrinsic characteristics, but to the transparency it purports with respect to the referent. Certainly, the 'postcard shots' examined do not

⁷² In the end, a stock shot with a narrative value has to be an *indifferent* image, an image that should be generic enough to replace text without looking like text. Its specificity and singularity as an image are paradoxically its lack of specificity and singularity. It simply serves to maintain a visual continuity. The sequences of stock shots resting on accumulation examined in the previous chapter bear this out: the interchangeability and the possibility of random meaning-making appear through repetition and serial or logical construction, bringing attention to the "qualities" of the stock shot when more than one or two brief shots are edited together. This in turn implies that the stock shot does not depend on production alone for its definition, as its place in the organization of production in Hollywood and in the contemporary industry of images might suggest. Such a definition requires that concrete uses and semantic or linguistic aspects also be taken into consideration: in theory any shot, regardless of whether it has been thought of and produced as part of a stock, is liable to be described and used as such, even if a lack of specificity arguably favors more discrete insertions. Jean-Luc Godard exploits this ambivalence, in turn emphasizing the stock shot conceived as a stock shot and turning into a stock shot a shot that, due to its likely source (documentary or newsreel footage), must have previously been defined more or less precisely.

seem to belong in that category at first glance. In terms of legibility and codes of representation, postcards appear much closer to the textual communication of a pictogram than to the (potentially) brimming and confused reality of a documentary record. At the same time, they are also metonymic: they stand in for all that has been seen, traveled, scouted perhaps, in a given place, and whose actual rendering would be too difficult to encompass for the tourist or the soldier. The limited range of views postcards present also bears witness to the fact that they not only show a space, but an aggregation of other spaces not themselves represented, yet present by extension in the select available ones. The quantitative gap between space recorded and capture, almost maximal with the postcard, reduced significantly with extensive records consisting of moving images, thus leaves the elementary – metonymic – relation untouched. The metonymic dimension of the stock shots in *Les Carabiniers* stresses the sense of a possible, mental type of “ownership” – in the sense of a mastery by the spectator of the coordinates of any diegesis and the knowledge of places and travel times. The substitution of symbolic gains and spoils from conquests for real, looted possessions by Michel Ange and Ulysse as they return from the war (postcards and collectible images, precisely) illustrates, within the narrative, just such an equivalence between virtual and actual conquests, by the tourist or the spectator and by the soldier, respectively.⁷³

The stock shots of the sphinx and of the Statue of Liberty in *Les Carabiniers* thus play with the kinship between establishing shot and postcard as metonymic

⁷³ Michel Ange tellingly takes a photograph as a soldier in the fifth sequence – presumably that of the sphinx – that shortly afterwards appears in the form of a postcard received by Cleopatra and Venus.

images – standing in for a larger but impossible representation, whose possession is itself equated with a possession of its referent: the world, mastered visually and fathomed by the (mind's) eye, of which a systematic comprehension and knowledge is assumed to be possible, or is at any rate fantasized as a possibility. These stock shots, which are displaced and implausible establishing shots, also point to the dialectical relationship between establishing (or master) shot and all the shots that take place in the space they are supposed to represent in a more or less condensed form. While establishing and master shots set the frame for the actions or events that are to follow, delineating boundaries as well as the space and even providing a general view of relative positions of objects, characters, and sub-spaces, they also depend for their effectiveness and credibility on a conformation by subsequent shots and scenes. The fact that they serve as “blocking” devices, stringently assigning narrative developments to specific locations, makes them hierarchically dominant at a structural level in the classical fiction film. However, as soon as this hierarchy is disturbed, either by a plurality of mutually incompatible suggested locations for the plot or by a failure by shots and scenes previously “mastered” or “established” to confirm and consolidate, often through redundancy, their establishing shot or their master shot, the relationship between each type of shot proves to run both ways. The plasticity of diegetic space appears potentially unlimited, and rather distinct from narrative logic. More pointedly, establishing shots turn out to participate not only in a work of visual metonymy, but also to hold a function in the narrative economy of the fiction film. Accordingly, the value of stock shots of famous sites as captures, as records standing in for an impossible object of possession (mental or physical) also

points to the value of narrative as a parallel instrument in producing, if not a sense of grasp or mastery of a world otherwise difficult to encompass and read, at least the belief that it can be understood.

In that respect, some other stock shots in *Les Carabiniers* may be reassessed as attempts, in addition to the idea of an extensive visual recording as a symbolic conquest of the real, to critique the role narrative itself plays in the illusion of an apprehension of the real as a whole – more particularly through closure mechanisms in editing. In the film, Godard opens several shot/reverse shot series without bringing any one of them to a conclusive end. The second series constitutes a case in point. After a single warship is shown firing in a mock establishing shot (an extreme long shot) in which it occupies the centre of the frame, three long shots of white and black guns shooting from opposite sides of the frame, seemingly at each other, alternate (their difference in color might be an effect of light, and they could very well have been filmed on the same boat, as the initial shot seems to suggest).

This is one of a number of variations on the editing pattern of shot/reverse shot. Besides abruptly moving away from a face-off in the course of its unfolding (the second sequence ends with an intertitle, “We landed in Italy and punctuated our progress with a thousand corpses”⁷⁴), *Les Carabiniers* also involves decoupling editing and narration, in the form of an obvious play with numbers or with screen direction. In the first sequence the fighter planes do not share much of a resemblance across shots and can not be assumed to belong in the same spatial and temporal unit. Their number in the frame structures the citational sequence: from three planes to two and

⁷⁴ “On a débarqué en Italie et jalonné notre passage de mille cadavres.”

one before, in the last shot, the dropping of the bombs is represented. The blast is heard over the intertitle that follows, and like many gunshots on the soundtrack, it also recurs independently from or “off” of the visual representation of military attacks. This takes sound effects themselves towards a rhythmic pattern, and away from the realistic depiction of war, with the simulation of the accidental characterizing it; or from spectacle, in which image and sound typically reinforce each other. Somewhat similarly, Ulysse is represented aiming his gun upwards at the end of the eighth sequence, later in the film. The shot that precedes shows one fighter plane while the one that follows, after he has presumably fired, shows five of them, as though he had caused them to multiply.

Another play with abstraction and away from narrative requirements occurs in the sixth sequence with the early stages of a bombing, as a pilot seen from the back of his cockpit zeroes in on a target. This is never followed up, since shots of anti-aircraft missiles aiming at opposite directions are then edited in (and inexplicably look as if they are responding to each other). Expectedly, the confrontation is again never brought to a conclusion and turns out to be part of a larger play on directions on the screen, alternating left to right and right to left, and ending with a lateral tracking shot from a vehicle on the ground, the sidewalk and destroyed façades flashing by from left to right in the frame.

Finally, the tenth sequence, comprising just one shot of a submarine with the noise of the ocean and bleeps heard on the soundtrack, is one of several examples of isolated images (mostly of weapons), their main objects evading localization and therefore unable to serve as establishing elements to anything or anyone else. In the

absence of a *visible* causality, be it internal or external (the connection or re-connection of the stock shots to the diegesis), and of an integrative logic (the exchange of fire in the second sequence solved in the destruction of one of the opponents, for example, before the narrative proceeds to the following episode in the battle), these stock shots thus lay bare the modalities of a construction of action, space, and discourse in cinema – a construction whose important functions involve producing a legible reality, that is, one preferably not perceived as potentially infinite, impervious to complete series and exhaustivity, and in the end to figurative possession.⁷⁵

Citation, in the previous cases under examination, exposes the types of images both recording and narration rely on to produce a sense that reality can be apprehended as a whole, that the multiplicity of phenomena and events that make it up may be understood and read unequivocally. The images and the sounds cited, whether restrictive (referring all the shots of a sequence to an establishing or master shot or, one could imagine, to an ambient sound running throughout the sequence, as with gunshots and explosions to indicate a situation of war) or expansive and metonymical (the capture, which due to its incapacity to be exhaustive always aims to inscribe the excess within its limits), bring out some conventions of framing and editing as they crystallized in classical cinema. They emphasize a characteristic of some “syntagmatic” images, indirectly related to the attempted seamlessness of the cuts intensely analyzed and critiqued by the film theory of the 1960s and 1970s: even “cleaned up” and structured as easily identifiable signifiers, images and sounds

⁷⁵ An exception to this is the causality – this time all too visible because flaunted – with the fourth sequence and its unadulterated cause and effect link – side by side, bombs dropped followed by a building collapsing after an explosion, in a similar screen direction.

always retain a degree of instability with respect to the production of a given meaning. They may convey information on a location or situation, or rather, they may make it possible to interpret some of its components as conveying information on a location or situation: they are not bound to any one meaning, as their displacement in *À bout de souffle* and *Les Carabiniers* attests. Neither can they quite be reduced to the text they are meant to cover over or to the titles of property, or captions, of a reality for which they allegedly serve as records. Indeed, whether buffers or captures, they can retrospectively appear as tokens in the narrative fiction film precisely because these two films use them differently, in a place where they normally do not belong. While the disruption of filmic narrative conventions does not necessarily and suddenly create the conditions for a wealth of figurative possibilities to open into these images and sounds, the suspension of the indifferent passage of narrative lines through and by them makes them available for alternative interpretations – including a distanced examination of their more typical function.

This examination re-considers the cited images and sounds for what they are, in their material and technological specificity, prior to looking at the conventions they have served. The suspension of meaning, however brief and hypothetical, precedes the re-inscription of another meaning. Still, at a higher level of analysis, some codes also involve such material and technological specificity in the fabric of films, notably when it comes to the interpretation of which mode they pertain to (fiction or documentary) and the connotative power of images and sounds bearing the imprint of specific film technologies – 16-mm and light shooting equipment, for instance. With *Les Carabiniers* Jean-Luc Godard sought to give the images he had

shot the look of war newsreels, and heightened contrast through his choice of film stock and the postproduction treatment of the film. The blurring of boundaries between the conventional visual codes of documentary and those of fiction at the time the film was made was pushed further by the conjunction between budgetary limitations and the decision not to reconstruct and shoot actual battle scenes. Emphasizing the interchangeability and generic nature of the representation of war in cinema, the cited stock shots of artillery, warships, and bombers implicitly left to fiction elements that war newsreels and war footage could not or would not show: the living conditions and the experience of soldiers on the front, but also the way the war dovetailed with a predatory economic logic, including in the behavior encouraged in individuals on both the military fronts and the civilian zones.⁷⁶ In the eleventh sequence the juxtaposition of a shot of Ulysse's stabbed victim lying on the ground with footage of the corpses of victims of the war in similar positions on the ground makes the connection as plain as possible. The attenuation of visual differences between fiction and documentary through a treatment of the film stock appears with more – meaningful – evidence at that point. In sum, the fictional images take on some of the truth value associated with the look of documentary footage and newsreels, while the limits of fiction in depicting some real experiences are underlined by the outright replacement of original footage by cited images from actual wars and their casualties.

⁷⁶ Conversely, what fiction cannot show as performed but only provide an imitation of, death, is strictly represented through documentary war footage in the film. The only exception is the man stabbed by Ulysse; even at the end of the film, as Ulysse and Michel Ange are trapped by the carabinieri and gunned down when they ask for what the king had promised them, their death is not shown. Only the entrance to the shed where they are executed by the officers is presented, with an intertitle following. Similarly, earlier in the film the deaths of young communist insurgents take place off the frame.

Les Carabiniers thus articulates a relation between fiction and documentary that appears contradictory: on the one hand, the film assigns a clear territory to each mode – military operations and the consequences of wars to documentary, underlying forces and symptoms usually ignored to fiction. Or, to put things differently, citation in its occurrences figures a certain permanence in repetition, a certain commonality and even universality in war at the same time as it effects a diegetic and narrative rupture with a fiction invested in the invention of figures for what is traditionally omitted, or even censored. On the other hand, the boundary between fiction and documentary is blurred beyond the sheer visual ‘look’ they assume in the film: in its lessened differentiation between what belongs to either mode, *Les Carabiniers* also blurs the values associated with them respectively (staging and spontaneity, pretense and truthfulness), rejecting a common separation and hierarchy. Indeed, fiction is traditionally framed by reality, not only in the fabric of single films (with the rituals of opening and closing credits, but also of a presence of reality in fiction in the most controlled, malleable and reconstructed form – as working material, never as such in a raw form), but also in cinema as a whole. The institution simultaneously suspends the parameters of everyday life and brackets the ‘fictional moment’ with obscurity and silence in a dedicated space to avoid excessive porosity.

Yet for Godard fiction can be a force of re-imagination and questioning about what is given reality, and documentary a scientific instrument to apprehend that reality as it exists through the recording capacity of film: both then hold a potential to provide access to a – situated – truth. When the censors required the filmmaker to

edit out the shots of de Gaulle and Eisenhower driving down the Champs-Élysées with their motorcade, they likely objected to and targeted the fact that the American and French heads of state risked becoming fictitious characters among others in the story of Michel Poiccard and Patricia Franchini (or even worse, fictitious intruders in the document on the romance between Poiccard and Franchini). Reality was engulfed in the fiction and equalized by an image that, contrary to *Les Carabiniers*, did not even offer the slightest difference in perception between the two: in the absence of a possible distinction, these parts of the shot had to go. The cuts remain and figure the separation of what had been captured in a single take, which followed from Patricia and the policeman shadowing her on the sidewalk before slightly tilting up to catch the motorcade, only to eventually return to the two characters amidst the crowd gathered on the sidewalk.

Another dividing line between fiction and documentary surfaces in *Muriel, ou le temps d'un retour* (Alain Resnais, 1962), though these are much more contrasted visually in this work. The film is split in its middle by a long 8mm sequence which, in relation to the fiction (the voice track, specifically), undoes the connotative meanings associated more or less consciously to light shooting equipment, in the heyday of *cinéma vérité*. The footage, which runs for more than two minutes, features scenes from everyday life among French soldiers living in Algeria: training, eating meals, hanging out, maneuvering, posing for the camera, taking a boat trip, relaxing in a café, playing pranks on each other, talking to Algerians, who also occasionally pose for the cameraman. The sequence is not uniformly banal and innocuous – at the end of it, French soldiers can be seen breaking a door open, and at another point they

are shown operating a rocket launcher. Still, the editing pace remains quite fast overall and most of the shots convey a sense of industrious, unremarkable duty, not that of a full-fledged war in which torture was practiced routinely.

Obviously, the citation and the voice-over that runs alongside it can perform a critique of the 8mm footage because their joint appearance produces a break (visual, but also narrative) with what precedes – H  l  ne Aughain (Delphine Seyrig) and Alphonse Noyard (Jean-Pierre K  rien) discussing their failed love story at the Liberation, filmed in crisp detail and in color by cinematographer Sacha Vierny.⁷⁷ Likewise, even though the identity of the voice-over becomes clear before the end of the citation, the return to the fiction and Bernard (Jean-Baptiste Thierr  e) facing the screen where he just projected the reel to his neighbor is held off until the last images of the sequence have been shown. Neither the images nor the voice track can be assigned to a specific physical source. They play off of each other, as the image does not have its own soundtrack and the voice lacks its own image. As far as images are concerned, it is difficult to conceive that they would have circulated without the sanction of military authorities. Any sensitive or subversive content may have been filtered out from the variety of shots presented in the citation; it is also quite conceivable that these images may have been produced by the Service Cin  matographique des Arm  es itself, ensuring that the public representation of French military presence in Algeria be one of peaceful and even happy cohabitation with the local population. In any event, the doubt on the origins and references of the

⁷⁷ The choice of color to show postwar Boulogne-sur-Mer was itself related to documentary concerns, as at the time opting for black and white film presented the risk of “poeticizing” the urban environment, all the while failing to convey the commodification of life during the period, and in which color – as dull as it could be – played a key role.

footage (Resnais does not provide any information in the credits here any more than he did in *Hiroshima mon amour*) makes the figure of citation crucial, for it prevents trading off the absence of contextual information for another semantic process, diegetization. In that case – the limitation of the footage to a collection of personal films brought back by the fictional character from his service in Algeria and to his personal memories – the recorded images might fully play out as screens to historical truth. Indeed, and paradoxically, these apparently innocuous, familiar, intimate and – to a degree – *private* images are in fact strongly official and public. The cultural association of 8mm cinematography with indexicality, due to equipment assumed to be too unsophisticated to allow much manipulation of reality, is counterbalanced by the commentary running alongside it: what is shown gradually ceases to be “what has been filmed” to become “what was filmable,” what was authorized by the state to be filmed or, when filmed, to be circulated. In order to figure what they largely dissimulate and hide *as images* (and not as the attributes of a character, be it representative of real events), these images must be presented distinctly from the fiction.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ In preventing the misrecognition of such images as truthful, the citation and the voice-over perform a work that otherwise fails to take place within the diegetic universe. Indeed, *Muriel, ou le temps d'un retour* is rich in misrecognition, and accordingly in misnomers. To mention the most important: Muriel is the first name given to the woman tortured, but it is unlikely to have been her real name, as Bernard acknowledges. Her identity remains uncertain: whether she was a resistant fighter from mainland France on the side of independence fighters or an Algerian woman engaged in the resistance of her people is not indicated. Another discrepancy involves H el ene and Bernard, who are not mother and son as could be assumed from their similar last name, but stepmother and stepson, and Alphonse and Fran oise, who turn out to be lovers, not uncle and niece as Alphonse had initially claimed. Finally, Alphonse lies about his past in Algeria as a caf e owner and conceals the fact that he is running away from his wife. As to objects in general, their status is unstable and they prove deceptive signs: for example, when Fran oise enters H el ene’s apartment (which the antique dealer also uses as a store, thereby living in furniture that *looks* like her own but might always

On the side of the fiction itself, what the male voice heard over the cited images tells and how it tells it assumes the characteristics of a recorded documentary testimony: the conscious effort at recollection, memories presented as factual and in the present tense, a hypothetical addressee who could be an invisible yet present interviewer, or simply the person gathering evidence. The emotion that occasionally makes the voice hesitate, slow down or accelerate the pace of the description, choke or dry up with anger sounds like that of a real individual reliving an event rather than that of a fictional character. Such circumstantial textual uncertainty lends the narrative the weight of a *real* testimony, that of any soldier returned from Algeria, albeit it does so temporarily and not with the complete exclusion of the fiction, since the name Muriel has come up earlier several times. This ratio of reality designates in large part what is missing from the super-8 footage: the very public role of the conscripts in Algeria, their activity on behalf of the state and French citizens, the torture, the imbalance of power and the abuses resulting from it. The fiction, “limited” to sound, produces alternates to the images on all accounts and each of its apparent characteristics: indexicality as – also – a discursive production (through the type of film stock used in the citation, and through the assumed equation – for lack of additional information – between a speaker and a first-person testimony borrowing from the codes of documentary); as a mode of representation (frequent or permanent direct address to someone not perceptible on the image or the sound track); and as a byproduct of subject matter (insignificant actions and everyday routines shown in the citation; minute, sometimes trifling details of Muriel’s agony

be up for sale), she walks to the fire to warm her hands up, only to realize that it is a simulacrum, a fake fire that relies on electrical power for its glow.

in the voice-over description). In between these dissociated components, an imagination of what is not shown of reality, beyond the imposed obviousness of indexicality, can emerge – one (brief) manifestation of which is the sound recording that will eventually be discovered and played on Bernard’s tape-recorder towards the end.

In *À bout de souffle* and *Les Carabiniers*, citing is a means of moving pieces playing a specific role in classical editing practice out of the place traditionally allotted to them. The operation brings to light the former irrelevance of images and sounds, their reduction to barely more than captions (to a place or an object) or indices (to a reality considered as potential property or object of mastery, and whose conquest is first and foremost achieved through the notion of the visible). It also emphasizes, in the new context of the citations and through a play of difference in texture from the fiction, the semantic associations carried – in given historical contexts – by a type of grain or contrast in the image or the timber of the human voice on the soundtrack. *Muriel*, from that perspective, contributes to a reversal of contemporary paradigms: the image of deception, while not in the black and white of documentary authenticity and “grit,” is an amateur image, while the image of truth, filmed in color with the crispness and care of a cinematography as might be found in costly studio productions, has to assume the drabness and grey shades of a reconstructed postwar provincial town. These two initial gestures by citation look, in a sense, to the twin opposites of dismissal and reliance, when it comes to the properties of images and sounds. In both instances, there appears to have been a common concern not to let verbalization and textualization rise to the surface of the

tracks, particularly the image. The capture adheres to what it has been recorded from; the caption, in its genericity, allows the analogy between object and word to go unnoticed; and the material specificity of images and sounds relies on connotation which, as Barthes pointed out in *S/Z*, may be approached as the beginning of a code which will never be reconstructed. These previous films put on display a concern for the preservation of an impression of autonomy of the diegetic world, the existence and integrity of the world in which the narrative supposedly develops, and the crucial continuity in the material texture of the film in both these respects. In two other films by Resnais, *Mon oncle d'Amérique* and *On connaît la chanson*, the work of signification to which images and sounds are put becomes the object of a systematic inventory bearing on entities of different scope and on different levels.

From its very beginning, *Mon oncle d'Amérique* figures in part the principle underlying its narration in images and sounds: a moving source of light seems to sweep at random across a grid of small square images, with words uttered by a variety of voices, male and female (those of the three main characters and that of Dorothee, as the voice-over narrator). These voices come up at irregular intervals, as if the light beam 'hitting' images simultaneously triggered a matching source of sound. This initial sequence, to which a final series of shots responds at the end of the film, announces the fiction – constituted of samples, of fragments seemingly arranged together from a pool of possible choices, all scripted, performed and recorded for the film. Five minutes into the fiction, however, heterogeneous footage begins to appear in the form of extremely brief excerpts. While the first three instances (footage of Danielle Darrieux, Jean Marais and Jean Gabin) merely

illustrate the voice-over commentary introducing the characters and naming their favorite actors, the following (over twenty in total) do not assume the same literal value – they signal a departure from the diegetic realm altogether. The apparition of these images, accompanied mostly by brief musical chords by Arié Dzierlatka, without voice-over or explanations of any sort, produces a sharp contrast in texture from the fiction film – besides the time span evident in the passages between black and white and color. The difference comes out all the more starkly as one or several relations are established on other levels. The repeatability and reproducibility of some components of the fiction film is a prominent one: they involve all at once text and verbal language (whether materially audible and visible, or not), narrative structures (coupling, resolution), discourse (common sense, commonplaces, sayings and proverbs), and the body and its performances (gestures and postures, expressions, acting codes, physical taxonomies and their variable significations).

The first noticeable element thus teased out from the cover of the profilmic and the apparent unicity of the recorded event has to do with recurring narrative structures, as well as the spectatorial expectations they simultaneously create and thrive on. In one instance, *Mon oncle d'Amérique* foretells part of its own story through a citation, giving an early figure to a romance whose narrative allure usually rests on a degree of pretense on the part of the narrator: i.e., that the relationship remains uncertain, faces obstacles, and will at best be gradual – in other words, that it is not preordained and is not the desired outcome that served as the starting point to the writing process. Resnais's film, by contrast, asserts the advent of such a romance at the end of the first half-hour, and repeatedly resorts to citation to mark the

anticipation characteristic of any fictional narrative, in the twin senses of wish fulfillment and prediction. When Jean Le Gall (Roger-Pierre) comes with his wife Arlette (Nelly Borgeaud) to congratulate Janine (Nicole Garcia) for her stage performance as Julie de Lespinasse, Janine announces in voice-over and in retrospect, with the certainty brought by the use of the near future in the past, that the evening was about to change her life dramatically. A citation showing characters looking at themselves in a mirror, played by Jean Marais and Danielle Darrieux (Janine and Jean's favorite actors, respectively, as the audience has known since the first minutes of the film), is then inserted, giving away the course which Janine's life, and the plot are to take. Presenting this archetype in the guise of a black and white film, *Mon oncle d'Amérique* gives visibility to the recurrence over a long duration, if not to the permanence, of certain narrative structures – most notably those based on the eventual (re-)union and coupling of male and female characters. Following this citation, two others show Danielle Darrieux in a close-up, her eyes closed, in an embrace with an unidentified actor, then kissing with Jean Marais, as if to confirm the realization of the characters' desires, and potentially those of the audience.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ In the introduction of Nicole Garcia's character Janine, at the very beginning of the film, the voice-over mentions an "affair with a high-ranking civil servant from the national public broadcasting administration" ["liaison avec un haut-fonctionnaire de la radiodiffusion"]. Simultaneously, a photograph shows Janine embracing a man seen only from the back – presumably Jean, who remains anonymous at that point. As to Jean, in one of the brief autobiographical sequences in which characters preface, comment or interpret in voice-over images of their youth, he recounts his idyll with Arlette, who was to become his wife and was a more enterprising girlfriend than the others he had had. According to Jean, upon learning of his decision to move to Paris, Arlette had implored him not to leave her and had pressed him to confirm his feelings toward her. As a result, Jean says, he had told her he loved her, just so that he would have some peace and quiet. The budding romance, starting with a misunderstanding and sealed by default, is immediately followed by a citation of Danielle Darrieux kissing a man, a partial confirmation of Jean's confession (cited in the voice-over introducing the characters) that he was faithful to only one woman his whole life, Danielle Darrieux, as well as a dual figure of permanence: the ideal woman unsatisfyingly

Another structuring, archetypal narrative which *Mon oncle d'Amérique* seeks to make visible is that of opposition and rivalry, struggle and conquest. Besides images of love and thought or brooding, several citations involve conflict and opposition, the first showing Jean Marais punching another man in the face as the voice-over introduces the character of Janine: "After seeing Jean Marais at the Comédie Française, [Janine decided she] wanted to become an actress but faced the opposition of her family."⁸⁰ In fact, the three main characters share a period of self-affirmation that puts them at odds with their families, as they refuse the paths carved out for them and apparently reject their respective sociocultural milieux (provincial upper middle class, Communist Party, Christian farming community). More significantly, they soon find themselves in a situation of sentimental and professional competition. Thus Janine, who replaced one of her friends in the stage production around Julie de Lespinasse, clashes with the director when performances of the play come to an end after a year of success. Shutting herself up in her dressing room, she refuses to hear what her fellow performers and the director have to say. As she stubbornly stands in front of the mirror, looking down at her hands, an insert shows Jean Marais dashing forward towards an unseen interlocutor and seemingly refuting a point with a

sought after in affair after affair, and by whose comparison all actual women pale; and the force of union as an archetypal scenario, notably conveyed in films, and which the characters enact even when they do not particularly desire it. Short scenes shown in brief shots also illustrate the need for associating with and caring for another being instilled at a young age (according to Henri Laborit's commentary): René with a puppy dog, Janine with her doll, Jean with Arlette. This specific citation, in its emphasis on mimicry and identification, appears akin to the citation in *Les Mistons*, which concentrated its effect more strongly within the diegesis and the location of the movie theatre, absent in *Mon oncle d'Amérique*.

⁸⁰ "Après avoir vu Jean Marais à la Comédie Française, veut devenir comédienne mais se heurte à l'opposition de sa famille."

sweeping gesture of the hand. Later, in an argument which forces both husband and wife to lay bare their respective preferences and no longer dress these up in apparent concern for each other's well-being, René and Thérèse (Marie Dubois) end up brutally asserting their personal choices. René chases Thérèse, who has left the room; a citation immediately follows of a shouting and gesticulating Jean Gabin, pointing his finger and moving forward (towards the right of the frame and an unseen opponent, as with Jean Marais in the citation just mentioned).

These two fundamental structures of union and opposition, illustrated in *Mon oncle d'Amérique* by several scenes in the life of the characters, and underlined as such through a doubling by citation, are also indirectly the subject of Professor Henri Laborit's thoughts on the fundamental needs of animate beings. He explains that two of these needs are consumption (in which he includes coupling and reproduction) and the response to a potential sanction or penalty, which in his view may be either flight or fight (or competition). Scientific discourse may therefore be seen as consolidating and naturalizing two widespread narrative strands, were it not for the fact that, from the beginning of the film, Laborit himself is treated as a character, with an introduction in voice-over and still images of his life comparable to those used for Jean, Janine, and René. His only privilege is that he is shown at the same time as he talks about his social and cultural background. Yet he does so in the third person, and that is precisely the effect just referred to: Laborit is an object of his own discourse, no more and no less than the fictional characters in the film. His discourse accordingly becomes, if not a subjective, at least a relativized expression almost on a

par with what other protagonists may say or show of themselves (or with what may be said or shown of them).

With its hybrid status, at once diegetic and extradiegetic, scientific discourse becomes a narrative possibility and a vision of life among others, while still serving a demystifying function comparable to that of citation: figuring within the same work the systematic recurrence of certain structures, and opening them to critique.⁸¹ Like citation, it issues from outside the diegetic world and clearly involves a level of enunciation outside even narration proper. Yet it is also related to the diegetic world, if not as a material “interface” as in other films (characters attending to images and sounds, with these same images and sounds directly given for spectators to attend to, either before or after being featured in the diegesis), at least on a semantic and narrative level, since scientific discourse – like the three actors featured in the citations – partakes of characterization in *Mon oncle d’Amérique*.

Another implication of this equation between scientific discourse and narrative structure is that the unconscious, unknowing, or mindless reproduction by human beings of patterns of behavior aimed at coupling (sometimes through possession and dominance) or struggle and opposition is itself often fostered and nourished by mass-consumed fictional narratives.⁸² One of the tenets of Laborit’s

⁸¹ With *Les Carabiniers*, through a schematic use of stock shots of military weapons aiming at opposite directions, Godard had already brought out such an elementary structure in narrative, depriving it from any conclusive and legible outcome, i.e., the victory of an identifiable party.

⁸² In a review of the film for *Positif*, Robert Benayoun articulated the dilemma Resnais confronted the audience with as follows: “For a long time the spectator fears (but the fears s/he experiences are an element of manipulation in Resnais’s montage) that Laborit’s theories might encroach too much on the lives of our three heroes and deprive them of the novelistic thickness which the often archetypal action attributes to them relatively early.”

theory stated in the film is the fact that the conservation of social and cultural structures of dominance could not find a better outlet than the illusory sense, for each individual, that his/her achievements are primarily personal, rather than allowed and sanctioned by the community to maintain its hierarchies in place. The protagonists of a story, acting and setting things into motion in their environment, whether in reaction to previous events or with a desired outcome in mind, or both, do not in fact so much act as they enact – a type of scenario, to a large degree preordained, and which could also have been performed just as well by many other individuals. *Mon oncle d'Amérique* unveils fictional structures as supportive of and participating in the symbolic structures often guiding social control, reinforcing early imprints and early channeling left by the group on the nervous system of its individual members. The film thereby touches on another cornerstone of both fictional characters and modern Western conceptions of the individual: an irreducible uniqueness and originality, endowed with rationality and freedom. As it happens, “we are the others,” Laborit asserts, much more than we are I’s.⁸³ Resnais,

Robert Benayoun, “Le Retour au pays natal. Sur *Mon oncle d'Amérique* d’Alain Resnais,” *Positif* 231 (June 1980): 35. [“Longtemps le spectateur redoute (mais les craintes qu’il ressent sont un élément de manipulation dans le montage de Resnais) que les théories de Laborit n’empiètent trop sur les vies de nos trois héros et ne les prive de cette épaisseur romanesque que l’action, volontiers archétypique, leur prête relativement tôt.”]

⁸³ Jean-Pierre Oudart reviewed the film for *Cahiers du cinéma*, suggesting that “Le film fait parfois advenir ces êtres singuliers avec la force d’étrangeté de fragments de vérités déniées, il les voue à effectuer en nous-mêmes une *spectrographie* qui nous fait ressembler à ces quantités de velléités, de constructions symboliques, de territoires qu’ils déplacent en eux, dans leur identité incertaine. Ils nous font un peu ressembler au temps qu’il a fallu pour composer la nôtre.” Jean-Pierre Oudart, *Cahiers du cinéma* 314 (July-August 1980): 50. [“The film sometimes summons these singular beings with the uncanny force that fragments of denied truths may hold; it destines them to perform a *spectrography* of ourselves, which makes us look like these countless vague desires, symbolic constructions, territories they carry with them, in their uncertain identities. They make us look a little bit like the time it took us to put our own together.”] While such an assessment holds when it comes to language and cultural

as the known observer of human unsubstantiality, absences, memory loss, and evaporation, but also as the filmmaker and editor of their paradoxical articulation, takes the figuration of reproduction to the domain of body language and expression.⁸⁴

Indeed, throughout *Mon oncle d'Amérique*, citations double or prolong movements, postures, gestures, facial attitudes performed by the three main actors (Gérard Depardieu, Nicole Garcia, and Roger-Pierre).⁸⁵ In the case of Gérard Depardieu, the lineage with an acting tradition also embodied by Jean Gabin is obvious: trained in the music-hall, both actors represent a subtle but physical and sometimes brute style of performance. Images of Gabin as a young actor and as an older statesman of French cinema also produce a subtext for the character of René Ragueneau, caught up as he is between a fatum (dreams of a different life repeatedly defeated) and a position of authority and power (temporary as it may be) that marked Gabin's roles of the 1930s and 1950s, respectively. It is not irrelevant either that the more dominant characters in the film have as their "stand-in" actors in parts

constructions, it omits what may be the most important site of defamiliarization of humankind in Resnais's film: its animality, approached from a liminal standpoint between neurology and symbolic language.

⁸⁴ In *Muriel* the dialogue was already the site of a human communication threatened by utter depersonalization as the characters, particularly Hélène Aughain, expressed themselves from a position not their own through expressions betraying common sense, the construction of what others may or may not think, appearances, paraphrases.

⁸⁵ This type of experimentation lies at the centre of at least two other films, Nicole Védres's *Paris Mil Neuf Cent* (1947) and Alain Fleischer's *Un monde agité* (2000), both of which could be called montage films or compilation films. Using shots from multiple films, documentary (Vedres's emphasis) as well as fictional (in Fleischer's case), these films resort to visual repetition (and, in the case of *Paris Mil Neuf Cent*, to a commentary in voice-over) to bring out the "master" or archetypal political, economic, social, and cultural events of the period at hand (*Paris Mil Neuf Cent*) or the narrative situations, movements, and gestures occurring over and over again in short fiction films of early silent cinema (*Un monde agité*). Resnais was assistant director on Nicole Vedrès's film and did much archival research for it.

involving a form of aristocratic distinction (whether in costume dramas or not) as well as, in the case of Jean Marais, the righteousness of the upholder of the law. Yet, and this is perhaps more salient in the parallels between the body languages of René Ragueneau and that of various characters played by Gabin, the semantic associations around given expressions and movements appear strikingly stable over time, as stable perhaps as verbal language. As Janine Garnier seizes the opportunity to replace a friend of hers in the cast of the play based on the letters of Julie de Lespinasse, her stepping forward on the stage towards an invisible being, her face hopeful but her lips quivering with intensity at the plea she is addressing to her absent lover are also displayed in the brief, silent clip of Jean Marais that instantly follows the scene.

Likewise, as René takes advantage of the prominent position he has earned through personal merit and self-teaching in a textile business, lecturing a young apprentice on ambition and dedication, a citation follows that shows a white-haired Jean Gabin in a similar position: sitting at a desk and looking up towards someone he is addressing, apparently in a similarly commanding tone, in an image which is exactly symmetrical to that representing Depardieu, but with the eyes looking in the same direction (at the left looking right, at the right looking right). Later in the film, his new rival manager in the company asserts his increasing authority by calling on him to punch in every morning, like anybody else. Before René swiftly turns round in indignation, Jean Gabin is shown performing exactly the same movement with the same facial expression, placing Depardieu and his role in a form of archetypal, dynamic space travelled time and again before him by performers (and potentially, by viewers as well).

Finally, two elements carry a particular importance, as they are repeated through several citations: a pensive attitude, always embodied by Jean Gabin, whether with downcast eyes, an expectant, observing look, a wistful look and a lowered head, brooding by the fireplace, or walking in the street; and a man – Jean Marais – carrying a woman, an unconscious character played by Danielle Darrieux at first, a different woman on two other occasions, asleep then awake, as if in a situation of chivalrous courtship. Both elements involve a distinct relation to the production of meaning through the juxtaposition of fiction and citation, one marked by more instability and even undecidability, to which we will return later. They also point to a pattern, with respect to the fiction as well as to each other: save for the excerpt of Gabin walking by a fence covered with posters, all citations follow the fictional moment they double and situate the physical expression in a lineage linked at once to performance and to larger forms of interpersonal communication.⁸⁶

These different images, besides emphasizing the relative stability of signifiers rooted in acting codes and facial expressions, some of them dating back to *Le Brun*

⁸⁶ As with the work of giving some narrative strands a visual figure (union and coupling, for example), Resnais was also concerned with the production of an impression of permanence, of patterns observed over a long duration with respect to the body language of performers: “I had the idea of the films. I wanted extremely well-known actors to provide perfect examples of behavior. Yet we needed actors who had had rich professional lives spanning several generations, which would give them an immortal appearance. There are not so many such stars, after all. So Gruault decided that these would be Marais, Darrieux, and Gabin – not because they represented a personal choice on his part or mine, but rather because it was the most plausible choice for each of our three protagonists, Jean Le Gall, Janine Garnier, and René Ragueneau.” [“C’est moi qui ai pensé aux films. J’ai voulu qu’il appartienne à des acteurs extrêmement connus de fournir des exemples parfaits de comportement. Mais il nous fallait des acteurs qui aient eu de riches vies professionnelles, étalées sur plusieurs générations. Ce qui leur donnait un aspect immortel. Des stars de ce niveau il n’y en a pas tellement en fin de compte. Alors Gruault a décidé que ce seraient Marais, Darrieux, Gabin, non pas parce qu’ils représentaient un choix personnel de lui, ou de moi, mais parce que c’était le choix le plus vraisemblable pour chacun de nos trois héros, Jean Le Gall, Janine Garnier, et René Ragueneau.”] Robert Benayoun, “Sur *Mon oncle d’Amérique*. Entretien avec Alain Resnais,” *Positif* 231 (June 1980): 42.

and Lavater, as well as specific movements or postures, also convey generic meanings. More pointedly, they make it possible for these generic, more impressionistic, “uncompleted” meanings to circulate through them. The few examined so far could thus be labelled “love,” “enmity,” “sadness,” “anger,” “protection,” “domination,” “defiance,” “thoughtfulness,” etc. They lend a visual figure to notions and concepts, which themselves serve to accommodate certain prejudices, received bits of wisdom, commonplaces and stereotypes. These get mentioned in Henri Laborit’s discourse as it reaches its conclusion, towards the end of the film itself:

That unconscious – which is not the Freudian unconscious – is the most dangerous. Indeed, what one calls the personality of humans, of individuals, is built upon a hodge-podge of value judgments, prejudices, commonplaces that they cling to and which, as they get on in years, become ever more rigid and are less and less called into question.⁸⁷

On connaît la chanson, using a verbal means of expression (the song) in a heterogeneous relation to the dialogue and human speech, makes such preoccupations even more evident, and bares formulas of the masks they wear in narrative fiction films (faces, bodies, and actions).

The film substitutes short excerpts from French songs created between the 1930s and the 1990s for passages in the dialogue. In *On connaît la chanson*, the songs cited are never presented as belonging to a favorite repertoire of the character at hand: the only rationale behind their selection is in all cases irremediably semantic *and* in line with the diegesis, character psychology and the narrative. Such an

⁸⁷ “C’est cet inconscient-là – qui n’est pas l’inconscient freudien – qui est le plus dangereux. En effet, ce qu’on appelle la personnalité d’un homme, d’un individu se bâtit sur un bric-à-brac de jugements de valeur, de préjugés, de lieux communs qu’il traîne et, à mesure que son âge avance, deviennent de plus en plus rigides et qui sont de moins en moins remis en question.”

alignment on the level of meaning only adds to the aural perception of material discrepancy, and the musical transitions from and back to the spoken dialogue by Bruno Fontaine play an ambiguous role in that regard.⁸⁸ A dissociation takes place every time a character breaks into song, or rather every time the recorded voice of a singer takes the place of the performer's, emphasizing the heterogeneity of the soundtrack as well as its autonomy from the image track. This formal rupture also gives a concrete, material – if literal – figure to the circulation of ready-made opinions, clichés, maxims, statements and even situations in culture, particularly in the mass-media. It seizes on the moments in fiction when the subjective expression of characters borders on the platitude, the commonplace, the conventional, the impersonal,⁸⁹ effecting the separation between the assumed source of speech and the object of expression as a figure of alienation, of “non-appropriation,” of ventriloquism.

⁸⁸ This was, in any case, their explicit function, as explained in interviews by Resnais and Fontaine: to ease the return to speech by the actors, leading the sung interludes and their accompaniment back into the realm of extradiegetic sound where they normally belong. Yet it appears that these short interventions by the composer also have the function, or at least the side effect, of signifying the permeation of reality, and of the characters' minds, by mass-diffused tunes, and the messages they carry. At several points in the film, the air of a song played or to be played can be heard over a scene, as though, even when they do not “speak through” the characters, these songs were always around, available, ready to “reconstitute.”

⁸⁹ At one point only does the film maintain the boundary between the appearance of a personal expression, “improvised” along the way by the character, and a more formulaic expression arising from the recorded song and its repetition. As Claude (Pierre Arditi) and Odile (Sabine Azéma) have dinner at a restaurant, two friends are conversing at another table. One of them (Charlotte Kady), recounting a recent break-up with her boyfriend, plainly says, citing Edith Piaf's words, that “non, rien de rien, non, je ne regrette rien.” The trailer for the film, directed by Agnès Jaoui, expands on the same principle. It consists of all main actors explaining the subject of *On connaît la chanson* in front of the camera, but using only song lyrics, delivered as actual speech, with various tones, emphases, rhythms. Conversely, as Nicolas – who suffers from hypochondria – consults his third doctor and the same song is heard as in the first two instances (Ouvrard's famous “Je ne suis pas bien portant,” “I'm not well”), he takes up the last sentence of the refrain and song title in speaking, without one of the musical transitions by Bruno Fontaine.

In *On connaît la chanson* these irruptions of recorded songs may be grouped in three categories, based on the type of textual elements they try and bring out in the soundtrack. They range from the relative specificity of situations to more general attitudes and stances to the outright impersonality of the saying. First, some of the song excerpts provide brief descriptions or narratives from everyday life in which mostly anyone could recognize a personal experience. In some cases, the songs include spoken passages. That is the case with Charles Aznavour's "Et moi dans mon coin" ["alone, in my corner"] lip-synched by Pierre Arditi, as his character Simon sees his wife Odile catching up with her ex-boyfriend Nicolas from the kitchen where he is preparing coffee, and later reflects on the evening with Odile (on the part of the song that is a mock dialogue, with Aznavour answering hypothetical questions from an unheard partner, and claiming that he spent a wonderful evening). Spoken passages are also prominent in Michel Jonasz's "Je veux pas que tu t'en ailles" ["I don't want you to go"] where their gradual rise in intensity in the verse (a man pleading his lover not to leave him) even leads to the refrain. The Aznavour song also holds particular interest with respect to situations, as it is one of several cited song segments that can be construed as internal: despite the visual and aural representation of speech, the diegetic context suggests that it constitutes a thought, a muted feeling, an inward conversation of the character with himself. Similarly, as Marc and Camille, alone in an apartment he has her visit as they wait for Odile to show up, engage in a game of mutual seduction, they do so mostly through looks and gestures. Their conversation is sparse and interrupted with several blanks, and excerpts from "Et le reste" ["and the rest"], a duet between Arletty and Aquistapace

which provides the full narrative and dialogue of a gradual attraction, comes to give a caption, and a voice, to their nuptial dance.⁹⁰ The sound cleaves the image between what is seen and what should be construed, indicating to the audience that the song should be interpreted as an absent image, coming to interpret and contest that of a face pregnant with feeling but silent. In such instances, citations from songs are figures of interiority, to the point sometimes of going beyond the simple vocalization by the character of a state by erupting in a fantasy sequence. Desperately in love with Camille, sharing her passion for history, Simon accompanies her to a parade of the Garde Républicaine, which she loves watching. The next shot abruptly shifts to a close shot of Simon in the gear of the Garde, riding a horse and lip-synching Alain Bashung's "Vertige de l'amour," itself an exercise in potentially serial, infinite metaphorization.

Another trope of the songs cited in Resnais's film is the typical, "model" attitude or the life lesson, sometimes even on a prescriptive mode, in the imperative, urging an hypothetical addressee to adopt them, whether generally or in the face of specific circumstances. Formulated in the first person or – more rarely – in the second person as an interpellation, these songs consolidate certain generic stances: "Je me donne un mal de chien" ["I work hard at it"], "J'aime les filles" ["I like girls"], "Dans la vie faut pas s'en faire... Moi je m'en fais pas" ["In life you should not worry... I take it easy"], "J'm'en fous pas mal" ["I could care less"], "mal-aimé, je suis le mal-aimé, les gens me connaissent tel que je veux me montrer"

⁹⁰ Other songs whose content involves situations include Johnny Hallyday's "Quoi, ma gueule?" ["Are you looking at me?"], Eddy Mitchell's "Je vous dérange?" ["Am I in the way?"], Ouvrard's "Je ne suis pas bien portant" ["I'm not feeling well"], Michel Sardou's "Cette impression de déjà vu," and Henri Garat's "La Tête qu'il faut faire" ["the face I should pull"].

["unpopular, I am unpopular, people only know me by what I let them see"], and even "ce soir je serai la plus belle pour aller danser..." ["tonight I'll be the most beautiful to go dancing"]; or, in the second person, "Amusez-vous, foutez-vous de tout, la vie est si courte" ["Have fun, don't give a damn about anything, life's so short"], "t'en fais pas, mon p'tit loup, c'est la vie, ne pleure pas, oublie-les, les petits cons qui t'ont fait ça..." ["Don't worry, chum, it's life, don't cry, forget the little jerks who did that to you..."], and "Résiste! Prouve que tu existes!"⁹¹ Along with the songs in the previous category (the register of a personal experience of a situation), but more forcefully and more consciously, they call for a positioning (and implicitly, a validation) on the part of the listener.⁹²

Third, some more impersonal songs veer towards the maxim, accepted "truths" about life and the world as it goes, the enunciation of general rules and principles, between commonplaces and common wisdom. They are either phrased in the form of a sentence with the impersonal pronoun "on" as the subject ("on ne peut pas plaire à tout le monde et à son père" ["One cannot please everyone and one's

⁹¹ From this point of view, Téléphone's song "Ça, c'est vraiment toi" holds a particular place, since it addresses a "you" (a shifter) without communicating any "content," without any injunction other than the assignation of an identity in an unspecified "ça." The citation is a literal example of the bind between given meanings and specific signifiers which the film aims to bring to light and to dissociate. Lip-synched by Pierre Arditi-Claude as he addresses Camille after she has suffered another dizzy spell at his housewarming party, the song, which grows into a chorus, has all guests of the party gather around the young woman lying on the couch and almost threateningly telling her that the doubt-ridden and confused self she has just displayed is her true self.

⁹² While the melody of a song could be argued to reinforce the signifying work of the lyrics, it does so in a way that seems comparable to the role of non-diegetic music in the narrative fiction film, playing on connotation. Such connotation, produced by a nonverbal art, further inhibits the work of circulation between text and music as *separate* and *distinct*, not unlike what happens with visual elements (appearance of the image, organization of objects, bodies or events within the frame as though they simply happened to be recorded) with respect to the narrative, discourse, and ideology – all textual elements whose manipulation by the viewer (phrasing, assessing, 'responding') the image often limits.

father”], “on ne peut pas être sincère” [“One can’t be sincere”]) or presented in the form of general statements introduced and asserted by “c’est” (“c’est dégoûtant mais nécessaire” [“it’s disgusting but necessary”], “avoir un bon copain, c’est c’qu’y a de meilleur au monde” [“to have a good chum is the best thing in the world”], “l’amour c’est comme un refrain” [“love is like a tune”], “c’est pas la peine d’aller chercher plus loin faut laisser faire et c’est très bien” [“No need to look for things somewhere else, you might as well let them happen”], “il y a mille coquilles de noix sur ton chemin qui coulent et c’est très bien” [“there are a thousand nut shells flowing on your path, and that’s how it should be”]); presented in the form of prescriptions by “il faut” (“il faut être un petit peu faussaire/masquer et truquer/pour ne pas trinquer” [“You have to be a little bit of a forger/conceal and cheat/if you don’t want to take the rap”], “dans la vie faut pas s’en faire” [“In life you shouldn’t worry”]); or simply wide-ranging in their claims (“avec le temps, avec le temps va tout s’en va” [“With time, with time everything goes”]).

In general, the songs thus seem to convey a rather clear notion, the transmission of ways of thinking and ways of speaking through the productions of mass-culture (songs, but also fiction films). To articulate this, *On connaît la chanson* relies on two complementary aspects: the songs remain justified by the diegesis and fit the dialogues and the situations *semantically*, but several voices (each performer in the cast, and those of all the singers s/he lipsynchs) are synchronized with each body, occupying the part of the soundtrack normally devoted to the voice of that body. What is destabilized at the level of the homogeneity and consistency of the diegesis and the characters, materially speaking, does not threaten the coherence of

the narrative or of the discourse. It threatens even less – and actually reinforces – the critical proposition of Resnais’s film (which is distinct from the discourse of its narrative, as it weighs on the montage of elements rather than directly upon the events occurring in the story). If bodies and voices do not match, images and texts never cease to – except for two notable cases, two songs by Serge Gainsbourg, “Quoi” [“What”] (sung by Jane Birkin) and “Je suis venu te dire que je m’en vais” [“I have come to tell you I am leaving”] (sung by Gainsbourg himself), both of which open breaks in the formal strategy just underlined and arguably introduce more play between images and text than suggested by the critical logic.

“Quoi” is the only song excerpt whose original performer – Jane Birkin – appears in the film, with her unnamed character (Nicolas’s wife) lip-synching to her own voice. The match between voice and body, “compensating” the fact that French is not Birkin’s native language, and that she does not speak it with fluidity and ease, points to the paradox of alienation: willingly choosing a position or moving between positions unfamiliar to oneself appears to produce a better self-adjustment, whereas immersion in one’s own language seemingly opens the door to easier identification with and adoption of the songs as one’s own, to the risk of alienation. In fact, the character of Nicolas’s wife appears for just one scene, as she is always “away,” “over there” in England, waiting for a signal from her husband that his professional situation is settled, and she and the children can join him in Paris. She appears as the most grounded character, with a certain assurance of who she is and what she needs to do, prodding Nicolas to determine his own position, to situate himself. This paradox encapsulates that of the film itself: in the uncomfortable alternation between

occupying the imaginary space carved out in the fiction and the real space of the listener of the songs, with a personal history and memory of some of them *besides* and *outside* the film, the spectator may be spared an outright self-misrecognition. At the same time, however, the match between Jane Birkin's character in the image and Jane Birkin's – singing – voice on the soundtrack also gives a further, troubling expression to self-alienation, as such a match figures a division within the same: we may know that it is her actual voice, yet the film has already, at that point, accustomed its viewers to reading a disjunction between voices and bodies, and the sound and the image tracks as parallel lines matching each other only by means of tricks and artifice.

In that light, the interpretation of the relationship between song and character, as well as song and performer, appears reversible: the most perfect match from the point of view of material seamlessness between tracks, when it appears as the result of an elaborate fabrication, could become the sign of the deepest division within the character. The accompanying piece to the scene involving Jane Birkin “singing” “Quoi” at the railway station would in that respect be the opening segment, where von Choltitz (Götz Burger) becomes the ventriloquist for a Josephine Baker song – a maximal mismatch in gender, political, and ideological terms, but a song whose lyrics fit perfectly in diegetic terms (once the convention of song citations is accepted, of course). Indeed, von Choltitz, the Nazi officer, did not execute Hitler's order of destroying the French capital, the lyrics suggest, because like Josephine Baker he had two countries, his own and Paris. The play between apparently contradictory, or at any rate very different associations and identifications is indeed another reason for

the particular status of “Quoi” in the film. Heard in relation to three different performers at two distinct moments of the action, the song is the only such case, save for the “choral” sequences or duet (all characters preparing for the evening in front of their mirror to the tune of Sylvie Vartan’s “La plus belle pour aller danser;” and “Avoir un bon copain,” first sung by Simon alone addressing Nicolas, then by both men during the housewarming party). Distinct characters are thus shown in juxtaposition with the same song, whether or not they identify with it, its singer, or its composer in the depicted situations; and – in this case – regardless of whether or not the lyrics, with their title in the form of a question, and their content (the imaginary sparring of a lover with the absent one) particularly suit the moments of uncertainty in the plot that they accompany.

A consequence of this relative autonomy, notably illustrated by the circulation of “Quoi” between several characters, is the severance of a temporal and spatial identification between reproduced voice and represented body that entails important effects. Within the fictional world, the character is produced, not on the principle of an alignment along or isotopy of similarities in gender, age, nationality or culture, etc – that is, not on analogy, as is normally the case. Instead, the association of differences on a formal level suggests that the production of meaning and the use of language hold precedence with respect to the constructed integrity of specific contexts of enunciation (the identity, place, and time of given speakers, writers, performers even). Utterances and modes of enunciation, expressions and performances may thus be endorsed and reprised by an infinity of differing subjects – with the consequence that the spectrum between subject and object may be traveled

potentially on end. Different figures within the fiction assume similar words, or assume similar words to voices from the past, or even assume similar words to other figures they are seemingly opposed to in every possible way.

This relational play, centered on the characters, has at its core a dynamic between competing appearances; between the same appearances and the multiple texts that may come out of them; and between image, sound, and text. Such a dynamic goes much beyond them to involve narrative, and more largely visual and textual complexes in the cinema, with citation serving at once as the divider and the double. A function of citation in *On connaît la chanson*, as has been seen, is the expression of interiority, a kind of “ghost” dialogue or monologue of characters to themselves. Similarly, at the very end of *Mon oncle d’Amérique*, citation is used to split appearances, but in a more contrapuntal manner. Janine, shocked by the revelation that Jean’s wife is in perfect health even though she had told her she was in the terminal phase of a cancer and had begged her to let Jean return to his home temporarily for that reason, drives back to Brittany to ask Jean for explanations. The citation that intercuts the scene where she is seen at the wheel of her car, a determined look on her face and a body language conveying poise, is one of a character played by Jean Marais desperately hanging on to a rock as the rushing water of a torrent threatens to sweep him away. The image is decoupled from itself through the second image that serves as a caption of sorts for it: the thoughts, or the state of mind of the human figure escape legibility, as the face and the body fail to betray them. That is not the case with the following, and last citation of the film, which again features Jean Marais in an acrobatic stunt (falling backwards and rolling

down stairs). After Jean admits to Janine that Arlette confessed to him what she did to bring him back home and adds that, while initially angry, he finds her gesture admirable, Janine cannot contain herself this time and bursts out, hitting him repeatedly.

Divisions within the characters between their appearance and what is put forth as a metaphor of their inner state also open up narrative possibilities, creating uncertainty about outcomes. Going back yet again to *On connaît la chanson* – but it decidedly seems as though the two films function as a diptych – citation literalizes these “forks” in the narrative, for instance with – yet another – Gainsbourg song, “Je suis venu te dire que je m’en vais.” The title (and refrain) repeatedly manifest an *intention to act* on the part of Claude (Pierre Arditi), who has until then lacked the resolve to leave Odile (Sabine Azéma) for his lover but has finally decided to do so. When Odile, shaken by the news that Marc (Lambert Wilson) has sold her an apartment whose view will soon be obstructed by a new building, turns to him, Claude breaks into the first few words before abruptly cutting to Pierre Perret’s lyrics “t’en fais pas, mon p’tit loup/c’est la vie, ne pleure pas./Oublie-les, les p’tits cons/qui t’ont fait ça.” “Je suis venu...” is thus used to represent the virtualities of narrative, and give a figure to initiated twists and turns left uncompleted or unrealized – an interest for Resnais, who has consistently approached the willpower and motivation of characters as driving forces for the action with irony, as in *Mon oncle d’Amérique*, and has otherwise shown more interest for possible variations than for the single line, as epitomized in the diptych *Smoking/No Smoking*.

In some cases, though, the play on characterization and narrative through montage, whether consecutive or simultaneous, maintains them in a movement that can be decided only *outside* the film itself as an object. The writing of the film (considering montage as a stage of writing) paradoxically sets limits on the predetermination – by writing – of the signification of the materials film has at its disposal. Resnais, most evidently with *Mon oncle d'Amérique*, as well as Godard (with early experiments on fiction, image, and music), “loosened” the relation between the signifying elements of cinema within fiction, leaving open the question of their historical (re-)arrangements.

A gradual uncertainty about identification and objectification, and more widely about the relation between diegetic characters and their role models – performers appearing in citations – thus affects the interpretive work involved in *Mon oncle d'Amérique*, subtly destabilizing it by blurring what seemed all the more evident as it had been spelled out by the voice-over. No single relation to the main characters can be ascribed with certainty, it turns out, as the film nears its last part. With citation unmoored from the diegesis and the narrative logic structuring it (which is never the case in *On connaît la chanson*), a new interpretive position, more figurative in nature, suddenly appears superimposed to that assumed by the characters from within the story world, and in fact initially endorsed by narration. The slippage may be observed with precision over a series of citations involving Jean and Janine, whose cinematic idols are Danielle Darrieux and Jean Marais. The first citations, as we have seen, are straightforward, reinforced as they are by the voice-over: Jean likes to say that he has been faithful to only one woman during his existence, Danielle

Darrieux, while Janine decided she wanted to become an actress the day she saw Jean Marais perform at the Comédie Française. Already, the respective relations are not exactly symmetrical: Jean seems to have turned Darrieux into an object of distant but intense love while Janine's own attraction to Marais would fall within a phenomenon of identification.

Following Jean's voice-over narration of his first serious relationship with Arlette (Catherine Frot), whom he takes to the family island, a citation shows Danielle Darrieux kissing another man, which on the surface suggests a parallel between the two women and would confirm a dominant strand of objectification (Darrieux being the ideal woman, the one Jean seeks in all women). Things turn out very differently soon thereafter: when Jean and Janine meet after her stage performance, Janine can be heard saying in voice-over, "I was then far from imagining the changes that evening was to bring in my life." The citation that immediately follows begins to confuse positions, however. The excerpt involves a shot of Jean Marais and Danielle Darrieux reflected in a mirror, with Darrieux's character coming from behind and laying her hand on the shoulder of Marais's character, who closes his eyes in response to her gesture. The diegetic logic may hold in the case of Janine's identification with Marais, since his reaction is in sync with Janine's comment on the soundtrack; but there remains Darrieux, who until then had been construed as an objectified figure and suddenly has to be identified with Jean, one way or the other.

The next excerpt further troubles the initial alignment without confirming the one immediately preceding it – in fact, it may even be read as contradicting it.

Danielle Darrieux, whose face denotes relief, throws herself in the arms of a man – seen over the shoulders, from the back only – and closes her eyes. In the scene preceding the citation, Jean's wife Arlette has just allowed him to leave the apartment after a violent argument, and the sense of relief on the part of Darrieux's character would simultaneously express Jean's own relief with the apparent end of his marriage and the clashes with Arlette. An identification with, rather than an objectification of, Danielle Darrieux, consolidates at this point. Or does it? Diegetically, indeed, there is a possibility that the citation represents a fantasy of Jean's – Janine awaiting him, a situation he can imagine only in the figure of Darrieux.

Another citation soon prolongs the series, to conclude it temporarily. The two stars are shown kissing; they occupy the same positions in the frame as their respective admirers Jean and Janine kissing in the previous shot, returning to a hypothesis of identification with the opposite gender. The tension between diegetic and extradiegetic, objectification and identification, narrative and metanarrative commentary creates an uncertainty as to a choice of interpretation. On the one hand, the narrative context provides information which, through a degree of redundancy, leads to a coherent but preordained fictional environment and meaning – the strategy being one of cross-checking. On the other hand, the mere play of formal correspondences, sometimes as simple as positions in the frame, introduces alternative possibilities without clearly opting for any of them, leaving them available for association and development. To the disruption brought to the identity of and the identification with the same, these few citations in *Mon oncle d'Amérique* come to add

the unbalance of simultaneous signifying possibilities, with interpretive positions operating from both within and without the parameters of the fiction: within a given – past – time which may be entered and assumed as one’s own, and without it, which would be within the present of enunciation and reception.⁹³

Jean-Luc Godard’s *Une Femme est une femme* and, more forcefully and intentionally, *Vivre sa vie*, extend the questioning of the image beyond the diegesis and the narrative, bridging across to the spectator. Godard’s choice of the (female) face as a locus of signifying uncertainty, fleetingness and infinity is not without antecedents. As *Mon oncle d’Amérique* shows with several of Gabin’s moments of wistful interiority, citations can unmoor figures from the diegetic meanings and narrative necessities in which they were encased to turn them into figures of thought.⁹⁴ In *Une Femme est une femme*, a whole song by Charles Aznavour, “Tu

⁹³ A consideration of paratexts also seems essential to any thinking on Resnais’s practices with respect to meaning-making and interpretation. The filmmaker has consistently had a hand in much of the material around and about his own films (posters, interviews, etc.), and these should be taken seriously, if not at face value. To the strategy of confronting spectators with their own position through specific formal elements such as citation, Resnais has repeatedly added a shrewd attitude towards the media which often takes their specificity into account (unlike Chris Marker, he does not refuse to appear on camera: he simply will not do so *while* being interviewed). In short, he uses paratexts to his films as extensions for the hermeneutic work these already call upon the audience to do, extending the sphere of interpretation and the present tense of enunciation from the movie theater into a larger arena. Accordingly, there are numerous examples of statements by Resnais contradicting (apparently or actually) assumptions about his films or even his own assessment of the interpretive work they make possible, as well as “false leads” to get the audience to attend to the films in ways different than the ones prescribed by critical or media discourses.

⁹⁴ In his review of the film for *Positif* already mentioned, Robert Benayoun also focuses on the isolated images of objects, first presented without narrative or discursive necessity, regardless of the characters to which they are related (these relations are disclosed, or simply appear, later). For Benayoun, the possibility of parallel stories running through the images of these objects and told by them is inscribed in a larger history (the history of art, in particular), and the critic points to Magritte and his captions such as “Ceci n’est pas une pipe” to illustrate his point. Robert Benayoun, “Le Retour au pays natal. Sur *Mon oncle d’Amérique* d’Alain Resnais,” *Positif* 231 (June 1980): 35-42.

t'laisses aller" ["You're letting yourself go"] runs through a sequence of shots of Anna Karina's character looking at a picture on the café table or at Alfred (Jean-Paul Belmondo), alternating with shots of Belmondo's character and the juke box itself. Justified diegetically (Alfred has put a coin in the juke-box), the song temporarily assumes an extradiegetic autonomy and comes to occupy the whole soundtrack, as does the face of the character, which little by little becomes Anna Karina's face – before a shot of the juke-box recurs to disrupt this process. The sequence involving – again – Anna Karina through her character Nana in *Vivre sa vie* relies on a similar setup: a café, a juke-box (with the additional joke that the author of the song being played, Jean Ferrat, is the one who puts the coin in the machine), a character looking – at what is going on in the café, in this case. Again, the lyrics of the song, "Ma Môme," *might* be about Nana – but they *just* might. As far as the production of meaning is involved, there occurs what Emmanuel Burdeau, commenting on the juxtaposition of frontal shots of Anna Karina with the song, sees as a paradox. There is no pure image (no image without text) and, one might add, there is no pure sound (no sound without text, but also, no sound without image). Still, their respective autonomy can arise only from such an impurity, such an arbitrary cohabitation, as Burdeau writes about the image: "Said, written, or sung, a text is needed [...] to force it [...], letting it out of its enclosure, to conquer its autonomy: its capacity to live on and breathe without the help of an inscription or a caption."⁹⁵

⁹⁵ "Dit, écrit ou chanté, il faut [...] qu'un texte, la faisant sortir de son enclos, la force [...] à conquérir son autonomie: sa capacité à vivre, respirer sans le secours d'une inscription ou d'une légende." Emmanuel Burdeau, "Un clip de Jean-Luc Godard," *Cahiers du cinéma* 598 (Feb. 2005): 72-3.

These two sequences in *Une Femme est une femme* and *Vivre sa vie* thus show a character thinking, raising the possibility of a given – and improbable – actualization (the lyrics of the song playing simultaneously in the diegesis, then “over” it) to infer the infinity of other texts that could “speak” the images, or better, put them in play. In this case, the sound, starting along the image and with it, is soon divided, separated from it; and the reduction of the interaction between image and sound tracks, the resistance by the latter to any integration in the former, also accounts for the autonomy perceived by Burdeau. Any actualization remains a mere possibility in the types of montage to which Michel Chion refers under the term “audiodivisuel” in his *Un Art sonore, le cinéma*, expanding the notion of acousmatic sound he developed in the 1980s.⁹⁶ With the alternation between the concordant signs that point to a whole fictional universe and play down marks of its construction, and what Chion describes as sheer “concomitance” resulting in lacks and divisions, the citation allows a new set of inscriptions to appear in the fiction film: those involving spectatorial activity, its modes, and its effects.

⁹⁶ *Un art sonore, le cinéma. Histoire, esthétique, poétique* (Paris: Cahiers du cinéma, 2003) 413: “In other words, sound – even realistic sound – does not close the question raised by the image, an image which it divides and by which it is divided. To take an example, the sound heard makes the spectator all the more sensitive to unheard sound, hinted at by images. Conversely, the image divides the totality of heard sounds into several zones, preventing the constitution of a soundtrack.” [En d’autres termes, le son, même réaliste, ne comble pas la question posée par l’image, une image qu’il divise, et réciproquement. Par exemple, le son entendu rend d’autant plus sensible aux sons qu’on n’entend pas, et que l’image suggère. D’autre part, l’image divise l’ensemble des sons entendus en plusieurs zones, empêchant la constitution d’une bande-son.”]

CHAPTER IV
OUTSIDE THE FICTION FILM: THE CALL TO SPECTATORS

Monika's look, which is repeated by Léaud and Seberg at the end of *400 Blows* and *Breathless*, suddenly made spectators exist differently. Until then, spectators had been imprisoned in a dark theater, watching images that could almost exist without them. And there, suddenly, there was a moment in cinema that made spectators exist more powerfully, as though they were going to break free of the movie theater, which they did in fact do with television, for instance.

André S. Labarthe, round table with Jean Douchet and Luc Moullet,
"It All Started in Brittany" (1998)⁹⁷

The citations examined so far have a share in a relation of monstration that symmetrically involves the construction of reality and the constituents of the fiction films themselves. The previous two chapters dwelled on what was possibly being exposed, frequently critiqued, more rarely re-imagined and refigured: yet monstration as a gesture implies, if not a complying, at least a complicit spectator. It is to such a putative audience and the work presented to them by the films and citations that this chapter looks. Obviously, citations did not simply enter the classical fiction film, ushering in modern cinema and performing a radical break from previous hermeneutic and exhibition-related contexts. Rather, they relied on dimensions already inherent in certain cinematographic genres, in the film apparatus – more particularly, its technological dimension – and in other arts. A genealogy of these, along with a (re)consideration of some cited excerpts, will help emphasize the

⁹⁷ ["Le regard de Monika, qui est repris par Léaud et Seberg à la fin des *Quatre cents coups* et d'*À bout de souffle*, fait tout à coup exister le spectateur autrement. Jusqu'alors le spectateur était emprisonné dans une salle obscure, regardait des images qui pouvaient exister presque sans lui. Et là, tout d'un coup, il y a un moment dans le cinéma qui fait exister plus fort le spectateur, comme s'il allait s'échapper de la salle, ce qu'il va faire d'ailleurs avec la télévision par exemple."]. Round table moderated by Antoine de Baecque and Charles Tesson, in "Nouvelle Vague: une légende en question," special issue of *Cahiers du cinéma* (Dec. 2008): 18.

consequences of citation for the spectator in front of a fiction film – consequences which citation, conversely, contributed to make visible or audible and call into question.

As established with the introductory examples of this research, citation does not involve only content, the fragment of a larger object: the mark of a movement, it is a relation between texts, or films. In *Les Mistons* as well as *Paris nous appartient* (but also in *Vivre sa vie*, *Une femme douce*, *Mes petites amoureuses*, or *Irma Vep*), the monstrative role assumed comes with and is reinforced by a diegetic audience that serves as a deictic, directing a certain kind of attention to images and sounds of the fiction provided to the audience through the citation. The sheer representation of a diegetic audience is therefore never just a representation: it also entails changes for the spectators of the fiction film, all the more so when used alongside this “shared” object.⁹⁸ In classical cinema, and particularly in the wake of the development of synchronous sound and the soundtrack, the hermeneutic position of the spectator has mostly been integrated in the fiction film (except for specific subgenres relying on frontal spectacle and borrowing from a theatrical model). This integration rests on an inconspicuous symbolic inscription (and viewing context): as a consequence, the situation of that particular historical spectator has often been tagged as voyeuristic, as it consisted in enjoying a spectacle with the benefit of a position never openly acknowledged and rarely questioned. However, besides the possible changes effected

⁹⁸ Most of the time, evidently, the mere, passing representation of the audience (at the movies, at the theater...) serves the fiction and its narrative entirely, integrating the action. Even a film such as Woody Allen’s 1985 *The Purple Rose of Cairo*, despite the fact that the entire plot revolves around the relationship between those who watch and those who are watched (positions which even change throughout the film), never produces the slightest ambiguity towards its own audience. The film keeps at bay a world whose porosity with respect to the screen is its very subject and narrative backbone.

by citation in the structure of the film (continuity editing) or at the level of individual shots, what is represented of the diegesis can already and similarly pose a threat to this sense of exemption.

That one or several of the characters engage in an activity close to that in which the audience of the film are themselves involved (attending a play at the theater, watching television, watching a film at the movie theater...), and that the shot or the scene lingers on beyond what is strictly needed for descriptive or narrative purposes, are not insignificant facts. Such moments mirror the spectators' own occupation, reminding them of it and lessening the interest of a voyeuristic position, since everything offered to the attention is part of a public, if personal and intimate, activity and merely repeats the apparently familiar and routine present of the movie theatre. Without the spectacle of secrecy and privacy or an experience lying beyond the powers of spectators, the lure of vicariousness diminishes considerably while the chance of a redundancy appears: in effect, spectators enjoy the representation of a situation as a spectacle even as they engage in precisely the same kind of activity as that depicted in it.

For the real spectator, this complicates and even subverts, be it for a moment, the operation of imaginary absorption into the fiction. In a fictional configuration devoid of citation, it would point to a kind of reversal: peeking at the characters-spectators, actual spectators would also be peeking at themselves, their voyeurism turned back on them and their activity publicized, literally. The dullness or the weakness of such a public spectacle would perhaps exhaust the drive to see without being seen or cancel it out by exposing it; more confrontationally, characters-

spectators could end up looking back at the camera, as they did otherwise without the mediation of any citation.⁹⁹ Importantly, with citation, the shot-reverse shot chain is maintained in a sense, even if at some point the object of the look no longer belongs to the diegesis but marks an exit from it: the fiction leads to the confrontation of the real spectator with heterogeneous images and sounds, rather than carrying out the confrontation itself. In the terminology of psychoanalytic film theory, the pole of secondary identification (the characters) lends a figure to the framework of primary identification, as the two seemingly come close to coinciding: what the character is seeing becomes, across the cut to the citation itself, what the real spectator now has to see. If identification remains, if its principle is accepted as decisive in the psychic activity of spectators, it undergoes a radical shift in this particular instance, since the advent of citation results in the equation that assuming the position of characters means assuming their own directly, if only for a matter of seconds or minutes in the fiction film.

Additionally, and without necessarily a contradiction, real spectators are also confronted with a double, in a sense. They may legitimately feel as though there are two candidates for the same position *within the fiction* – and that they have been barred from securing it long before the film even began, that the sense such a position was theirs was a misperception based on the non-figuration of a source for the point

⁹⁹ As it takes place in a fiction film, citation puts the real audience in a position not unlike the one created by a look at the camera, since the images and sounds attended to no longer address spectators “from the side,” as if incidentally, as the fabric of a world that does not explicitly acknowledge their position of onlookers-auditors. Images look at viewers and sounds listen to them to the extent that the audience can no longer assume a position – symbolically integrated in the fiction film while at the same time not acknowledged or inscribed in it – that produces them as unified subjects whence perception and understanding of the fiction film supposedly originate.

of view, on a “nobody’s point of view.” This is actualized when citation comes into play as what the characters are assumed to be watching, but a fictional “coincidence” then opens on concurrent actions and, eventually, on a sense for the real audience of the fiction film that their symbolic inscription has changed statuses, from invisibility to insignificance and irrelevance. From then on, two connected and often consecutive strategies develop: conveying and emphasizing the fact to real spectators that they are occupying a place not their own (because diegetic spectators hold it, but *also*, because it was fashioned and shaped for typical subjects, not actual, singular spectators), raising the question – without answering it – of what place they can then create for themselves; and, in a prodding and provocative manner, depicting much more explicitly the behavior of the diegetic audience as a way to dare the real audience to mimic it or deviate from it by inventing its own path. The former option finds a perfect illustration in two scenes of *Irma Vep*, while the latter appears forcefully in *Les Mistons*, as the second chapter has already shown.

In Assayas’s film, the vanishing and reappearance of a diegetic audience before and after two occurrences of citation (one endogenous – the dailies of the film whose shooting is the subject of *Irma Vep*, the other exogenous – an excerpt from SLON’s 1969 *Classe de lutte*) give a figure to the problem of the real audience’s inscription in the fiction, the assumption of preset points of view. The dailies involve a scene in which Irma Vep is sedated and made prisoner by a rival gang; unconscious, she is pushed off a window by two of her enemies, then “received” by their acolytes waiting outside in a car and driven away. The physical passage through the window constitutes a transition leading back towards the fiction. A dark

screen apparently ensues – in itself, a typically reflexive moment for any audience – with sounds of people coughing and clearing their throat being heard louder and louder on the soundtrack until lights go back up and the film’s cast and crew appear as spectators. Besides presenting images whose origin and nature are uncertain (the dailies are silent and in black and white), the scene includes a long shot of the group in a screening room – that is, resembling the spatial configuration of the supposed theatrical audience of the film itself. The existence of a position on the images and sounds watched by the spectators of *Irma Vep* prior to the experience of its actualization during the screening is affirmed from within the fiction, assuming the form of a public comprising a director, his actors, and his technicians – that is, the protagonists of the production process in the film industry. This figuration alone may be telling as to the role real spectators are expected to play, in general terms, the notion that their task is to be that of an active party in a form of delayed, but nonetheless important production in the process of meaning-making.

René Vidal (Jean-Pierre Léaud)¹⁰⁰ breaks the heavy silence that follows the viewing with a fit of anger directed mostly at his cinematographer Markus (Bernard Nissile), who has just asked him what he thinks of the work done that day. Lacking

¹⁰⁰ Vidal’s violent reaction to the images, his dissatisfaction expressed in insulting rather than argumentative terms, do recall another moment in his assertion of creative control. When he introduces Maggie to *Les Vampires* at his home, acting as a pedagogical lecturer, the citation of Louis Feuillade’s classic is abruptly interrupted – a break justified immediately afterwards in the fiction through Vidal’s handling of the remote control. The points of view articulated on images and sounds to which fictional and real audiences (through the citation) are both confronted is thus not the only strategy in goading real audiences to react; another is the reaffirmation of the filmmaker’s power in deciding what is cited and how – particularly how long it lasts, since the desire to see or hear more will likely be experienced. Egged on by such a display of power (and symmetrically, its own powerlessness), any audience has to confront and respond to the frustration of citation – looking for the entire ensemble(s) from which the fragment was sampled, or proceeding to expand it on the resources of its own imagination, to mention two possible options.

proper context and competences, the possibility of situating oneself with regard to these images and comparing one's position with René's reaction remains difficult. It is as elusive a task as with other audiences briefly represented in the film – the preparations for the dinner at Mireille (Bulle Ogier) and Roland's (Jacques Fieschi) place, for instance. All that is shown of the moment is former militants casually seated on a couch and on some spare chairs, watching what they participated in, back in the late 1960s; and Zoé's brief flash of enthusiasm as she stops by the television set. The audience of *Irma Vep* is left to confront the short passage from *Classe de lutte* (including the citation on cinema as science, not magic) on their own ground, a fact emphasized by the elliptical construction chosen by Assayas, and which has the fiction resume at the close of the dinner with the cluster of almost empty dishes and bottles on the table. Not only does the excerpt of a political film from the late 1960s raising the issue of the constitution of a collectivity of the oppressed and the conditions for a successful struggle substitute for the archetypal scene of French cinema (the meal) and a collectivity already given. It also points out to spectators – in an otherwise problematic gesture that implies that the fiction is an autonomous world proceeding on its own – that they always remain definitively outside the fiction, no matter how perfected and seamless the marks of their inclusion may be. The order represented between audience and citation is different, but the advent of citation confirms in this case, as in that of the dailies, that the focus has shifted from empathy or identification to the elaboration of a subjective response and a comparative stance. Stripped of its contextualization and situation, the object of the visual and aural attention of diegetic spectators presents itself to the spectators

of the fiction film without a mediation, a relay. In the cases at hand, it takes different forms: point of view with a delayed unveiling that there is indeed a “source,” and disappearance of a point of view before it fully materializes.

By contrast to the strategy of rarefaction or of delayed representation of a diegetic audience that might serve too easily as a pivot for identification and mediation (and whose main *raison d'être* is to place the real audience at one remove from the diegesis), *Les Mistons* opts for a surplus of such representation, but with a twist – the challenge to the real audience to prolong the chain of imitation and reproduction. A central scene in Truffaut’s short film revolves around the young couple, Gérard (Gérard Blain) and Bernadette (Bernadette Lafont), as they go to the movies followed by the brats, who want to disrupt as much as they can a romance which they view with a mix of envy and pique. A represented audience allegedly watches the same images as the ones excerpted by the citation, already presented to the spectator of *Les Mistons*. Two shots of Gérard and Bernadette follow the first clip from Jacques Rivette’s *Le Coup du berger*: a medium shot shows them at a slight angle from the front, in the midst of other spectators, before they are framed in a medium close up from behind. After the second clip (which shows the lovers lying down on the bed), another medium close-up of Gérard and Bernadette – still from behind – reveals that they are kissing as are their counterparts (on the screen, in the cited excerpts). In a way, they are doing the work vicariously for the real spectators of *Les Mistons*, performing what these may (or may not) do with the image: mimicking, emulating the acts it represents, identifying with its human figures, and therefore bypassing these images, using them as mere channels. The representation of an

audience preemptively performing an attitude in response to the image is thus also the displaced representation of a certain status of the image – a means towards an end of stimulation, not considered for its intrinsic qualities – one that the real audience could accept and endorse, thereby consciously replicating what is represented, again becoming a redundant audience (in both senses of similarity and of excess), or not.

Whether or not a fiction film interrupted by a citation takes the care, as with *Les Mistons* or *Irma Vep*, to figure such a stance towards images, changes little in a sense. When spectators (mis-)take an image in its strict representative and communicative dimension, as something that reproduces and is to be reproduced, they only repeat a viewing that has previously been done, and only see what has already been seen. Sometimes, the emphasis falls on the sheer fact that another spectator has attended to the images and sounds of the fiction, perhaps even producing them as a point of view; some other times, the stress will be on the use, the functional value of these images and sounds with a specific “foil audience.” In *Les Mistons*, Gérard and Bernadette still are possible surrogates, but ones that more forcefully and frontally highlight that they are doing things for the viewers, standing in for them – and that while they may keep doing these things, the issue is raised that they could also do something else and adopt a different approach towards the fiction film.¹⁰¹ In a way, *Les Mistons* resorts to the scene in the movie theater to figure the

¹⁰¹ Guy Debord uses a related strategy in *In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni* (1978). The image of an audience appears on the screen as a *still image* (a photograph), alongside a scathing commentary on the status of spectators in contemporary society: “in the icy mirror that is the screen, spectators presently cannot see anything that calls to mind the respectable citizens of a democracy. [...] ...this public, so utterly deprived of freedom, and which has endured everything, deserves less than any other to be spared.” [“...dans le miroir glacé de

determinations, the set paths which fictions can often become for the interpretations they make possible for their audience. Without always relying on as active a principle as the one evinced by this short film, the figuration of an audience, of characters so close to real spectators in their activity and attitude, always produces a certain malaise that adds to the disruptive force of the citation.¹⁰²

Conversely, a genealogy – or a topography – of what citation puts into play that already existed in a different form before its appearance in the fiction film, would involve a model of spectacle dependent on a direct and frontal presentation to the spectator. The look to the camera in modern cinema has previously been discussed as akin to citation as a figure inscribing spectators in the fiction films and their constitutive materials. In classical cinema, more often than not, this model has assumed the guise of a stage show taking place within the diegesis. Accordingly, examples are countless in cinema in general, and in French cinema in particular – all the more since fiction films granted such spectacular moments a place of choice during the interwar period and in the years immediately following the Second World

l'écran, les spectateurs ne voient présentement rien qui évoque les citoyens respectables d'une démocratie. [...] ...ce public si parfaitement privé de liberté, et qui a tout supporté, mérite moins que tout autre d'être ménagé."] Guy Debord, *Oeuvres* (Paris: Gallimard/Quarto, 2006) 1334-35.

¹⁰² In *Les Mistons*, the diegetic audience is represented both as such in medium to long shot (referring to a collective activity and position) and through two of its members in medium shot (referring to a specific reaction to what is screened): the sequence thus functions on both levels, i.e., the representation of an activity similar to that of the real audience and the representation of a specific positioning towards what is being screened that challenges individual members in the real audience to endorse it (and opt for self-effacement) or invent another position towards images and sounds. With other films, such as Godard's *Vivre sa vie*, the choice of close-ups as reaction shots opens onto more possibilities, the accentuation of expressivity or a form of neutrality (either arguably leading to a questioning, in the first case what in the projected images and sounds so touches the character, in the second case what type of reaction may be read or not on the character's face, whose interpretation often remains undecidable).

War, as Ginette Vincendeau and Dudley Andrew have emphasized.¹⁰³ An evident landmark could be Jean Renoir's *La Règle du jeu* (1939), for its status as a bridge towards modern cinema as much as for the centrality of the spectator/spectacle relation in it. The performers in question are not figures like Jean Gabin or Josephine Baker often garnering attention in contemporary star vehicles, but anonymized characters. During the pivotal scene of the variety show initiated and staged by Robert de la Chesnaye at the country estate, the famous dance of the dead is shot with the edges of the frame matching the boundaries of the little theater. It constitutes a point-of-view shot, as it has previously been established as what the guests are attending to, but it evidently confronts the audience of the film with the same skit as well, briefly leaving out any reminder of the surrounding scene. Beyond the confines of the platform in the ballroom, and despite its brevity, the number thus seems to address the audience of the film directly, without the proscenium arch serving as a frame within the frame to anchor it as firmly in the fiction as it did others. The noise of guests chatting and moving around during the dance is also played down, allowing the tune on the Pianola to "fill" the soundtrack almost entirely. The grotesque figures of death, engaged in various contortions to a piece executed by the piano as the player watches on, and while husbands, lovers, and wives chase each other in the "wings," confront film spectators simultaneously.

In one of the later films of the New Wave, a similar scene takes the idea slightly further: without exiting the fiction film, yet still taking the performance of a

¹⁰³ See Ginette Vincendeau, "The Art of Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Classical French Cinema," *The French Cinema Book*, eds. Michael Temple and Michael Witt (London: BFI, 2004) 137-52; and Dudley Andrew, *The Mists of Regret. Culture and Sensibility in Classic French Film* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1995).

song from a diegetic context to a de-spatialized environment, Agnès Varda's *Cléo from 5 to 7* made her title character's "face-to-face" with the spectators of her film a more ambiguous moment than did some of her contemporary fellow filmmakers with an unadulterated look to the camera. As Bob (Michel Legrand) and Plumitif (Serge Korber) come to her place to rehearse some of the songs for her new album, a moody Cléo, unsettled by the wait for the results of her tests for cancer, launches into singing "Sans toi." As if taken away by her own performance, she soon appears to forget her assistant Angèle (Dominique Davray), the lyricist, and the piano player and composer to look in the distance, beyond them, *as much as* into the camera. The look is not quite as straight and inquisitive as those of Antoine Doinel (Jean-Pierre Léaud) at the end of *400 Blows* or Patricia Franchini (Jean Seberg) in the last shot of *Breathless*. However, the assertion of the character's subjectivity associates the look that she returns for the first time with a vocal performance that gains in power and abstraction in the course of its progression, taking up the entirety of the soundtrack (with the orchestration) in the last segment of the song. Until then, she had been content to be an object of admiration often expressing her wishes through her assistant or with a simple nod of the head. The moment at which she decides to put an end to a definition imposed by others and affirm herself is not merely a narrative episode for Varda, even if Cléo, in the face of her partners' reaction, leaves them in the apartment and goes out for a walk in the streets of Montparnasse. The event has to reach outside the fiction *as well*, if momentarily and partially, to raise the question of the actual spectator's own position, in particular with regard to Cléo's body, identity, and expression. The status of sound in this instance comes close to that of a

citation, in the mode of its enunciation (the break with diegetic sound in an audible shift to de-spatialization with the music) and its association with a frontal address on the part of a character. The shift in the song in *Cléo de 5 à 7* constitutes a passage through a neutralized space, one that is no longer contextualized in the diegesis and reaches into theatricality, with Cléo confronting directly the spectator as a participant or accomplice in her crisis before she engages in a gradual process of emancipation.

In both *La Règle du jeu* and *Cléo from 5 to 7*, a diegetic moment reaches the limits of what may be shown or made audible in the film without quite inscribing the position of the spectator in it – particularly with Varda’s film, since Cléo’s face is shown in close-up. The two films (undoubtedly along countless other examples) provisionally create a situation in which the position of the diegetic audience or witnesses becomes that of the audience of the film – and, due to a reverse shot that lasts substantially longer than others and insists on the spectacle as object of attention, raises the question of the real audience’s own position with respect to that spectacle, and by extension to the spectacle of the film. Citations, then, simply reuse the potential of direct address of spectacles, taking it to another level to create a split between the diegesis and the confrontation with images and sounds that exceed it.

These twin notions – representation of the audience and representation of a spectacle – announce citation in their effects, which are tied to a theatrical model. Citation constitutes a synthesis of such effects, but it also rests on an important alteration: the dissociation between the fiction film and its audience does in fact materialize through a division in appearance and texture in the film itself, as citation affects film as a visual medium, in its pictorial dimension and its technological

components. Painting and photography thus also appear relevant when considering dissociation, and the stakes raised by citation in relation to the audience of a fiction film. Two texts have touched on the power of the painting or the photograph as diegetic objects threatening to reach spectators directly, *beyond* the fiction film: Dominique Païni's short introduction to the proceedings of the conference held at the Louvre in 1991 on the painted portrait in cinema,¹⁰⁴ and Raymond Bellour's classic piece on the photograph as a figure of stillness in the fiction film, written and published a quarter of a century ago.¹⁰⁵

Reflecting on the usual mediocrity of paintings appearing in fiction films, Païni suggests that they belong to the general contract between fiction film and spectators, putting to the test the latter's belief in the validity of the character's (sometimes obsessive) relation to the portrait and the person it represents – but ultimately, in order to reinforce this same belief. Rather than distracting the audience with a powerful work of art, filmmakers thus often opt for paintings of lesser interest to direct the attention to the referents of these images, where dramatic tension lies and on which identification with the characters depends. Besides the possibility of a fascination exerted by art, which the commonplace look of the paintings attempts to avert, Païni also emphasizes that the stillness of this type of image (like that of photographs) always evokes the possible arrest, the freezing and consolidation of the

¹⁰⁴ Dominique Païni, "A Detour for the Gaze," *Iris. Revue de théorie de l'image et du son* 14-15 (Fall 1992): 5-6.

¹⁰⁵ Raymond Bellour, "The Pensive Spectator," trans. Lynne Kirby, *Wide Angle* 19:1 (1987): 6-10. Bellour's central examples are Max Ophüls's *Letter from an Unknown Woman* (1948) and Alfred Hitchcock's *Shadow of a Doubt* (1943). "Le Spectateur pensif" originally appeared in *Photogénies* 5 (April 1984) and is reproduced in Raymond Bellour, *L'Entre-Images. Photo. Cinéma. Vidéo*. (Paris: La Différence, 1990).

moving image of cinema, but also the breaking, the jamming, or simply the regular ending of the run of the film in the projector. The disappearance of the spectacle, of the fictional world, haunts the fiction film through elements such as the painted portrait, which comes to disturb the suspension of disbelief and even conjures up a terror in the audience, from Païni's viewpoint:

Since it is a declared illusion, an overdetermined representation, a painted portrait abruptly reminds the spectator of his/her role as exterior viewer. Nothing is more terrorizing than this threat of being wrenched from a dream. Sometimes, on the contrary, it is a relief. In either case, we are extracted from the fiction.¹⁰⁶

Païni does not envision other aspects of the portrait that could equally poke holes in the tacit fictional contract: the look of the painted subject, addressing spectators as do the performers on stage, or the play on artifice and degree of reality – which somewhat qualifies the “terror” of the audience in the face of a still image. Still, his identification of the specific challenge posed by the portrait as a work of art matters for the object that is citation. While more “democratic” in the indifference that can be applied to the scope and identity of cited objects, citation forcefully literalizes the power that may be that of a strong, or auratic work of art appearing in a fiction film. The notion seems to be verified even in the choices of images or sounds performed in citation: when they issue from anonymous, little-known, or run-of-the-mill sources, the emphasis shifts to what citation can effect on fiction, whereas a canonical excerpt will tend to privilege a reconsideration of what it involves, and why it occupies such a central place in culture and in imagination. The long clips from Carl Theodor Dreyer's *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (1928) featured prominently in Jean-Luc Godard's

¹⁰⁶ Païni, “A Detour for the Gaze” 5.

Vivre sa vie (1962) exemplify this – akin to expressive portraits, precisely, with their medium close-up shots and close-up shots of Falconetti and Antonin Artaud. So do, to a lesser extent, the brief flashes from classic French cinema in Alain Resnais’s *Mon oncle d’Amérique* (1980). The observation also holds for sound: even in a sequence that so insistently questions the legibility of Anna Karina’s face as a character in Godard’s *Une femme est une femme* (1961), Charles Aznavour’s classic tune “Tu t’laisses aller” imposes its lyrics and melody. Conversely, Olivier Assayas taps into the instrumental intensity of a Sonic Youth song, “Tunic (Song for Karen),” to add expressivity to the moment where Maggie Cheung literally becomes her character Irma Vep, slipping from a version of reality (a fiction) to another one. In both instances, the music is justified diegetically (juke-box, CD player) *while* exceeding the expressive boundaries of the diegesis.

No such dilemma as the risk of a spectator fascinated by art can be found in Raymond Bellour’s text on “the pensive spectator.” More immediate in the relation to its object, photography concerns him insofar as it shares a technological basis with cinema and haunts it figuratively as the repository of another time. This entails a mode of spectatorship tied to a dissociation of the fiction film, about which Bellour observes, in a remark that could equally apply to citation:

A division erupts in the filmic illusion: at the same time that I am borne along by the narrative, with the part the photo plays, I am put into direct contact with the photograph.¹⁰⁷

Of course, the display of a photograph within a fiction film affects the perception of the run of the film itself in the projector, as the object represented suddenly appears

¹⁰⁷ Bellour, “The Pensive Spectator” 7.

capable of impeding or suppressing that very movement. It affords a pause in the work of the spectator in a way citation, simply replacing the fiction with other footage and requiring simultaneous, retrospective, and consecutive thinking, cannot. If anything, citation reinforces the sense of an irresistible forward movement and accumulation, adding more images and sounds to those already attended to in the fiction film. What is more, Bellour considers the photograph mainly in its implications for the spectator, either from within the time of the fiction (“a past of the past, a second, different time”¹⁰⁸) or in the present of the address. By contrast, the citation – through a kind of contagious proximity – relativizes the time of the fiction: both fiction and citation appear as completed, past, and the spell of the fiction as present and presence is greatly reduced, if it does not vanish altogether.

Still, these nuances cannot obscure the important point of contact: like the photograph (and like spectacle, as was already seen), the citation hails viewers and temporarily forces them to exit the fiction, dividing their position. Bellour notes that these photographs often constitute, after all, looks to the camera in a cinema that systematically banned them. Similarly, when citations are made up of excerpts from films one or more characters are also supposedly watching, the spectators’ attention splits between attending to what the characters are watching from within the fiction, and directly facing what they are watching. Summoning spectators as such, besides the subjects of fiction already called upon by the film and tacitly asked to endorse the imaginary position carved for them in it, the photograph, like the citation, necessarily *also* opens on a different space:

¹⁰⁸ Bellour, “The Pensive Spectator” 6.

The photo subtracts me from the fiction of the cinema, even if it forms a part of the film, even if it adds to it. Creating a distance, another time, the photograph permits me to reflect on cinema. Permits me, that is, to reflect that I am at the cinema.¹⁰⁹

In spite of the intractable progression of the run of the film in the projector, the screening is again “inhabited” by the spectator – just as, when the citation displaces the fiction, it also returns the spectator to a situation of more conscious activity. Like the photograph, but from outside the fiction, the citation holds the possibility of opening competing time(s) within the film and in the experience of attending to it. In effect, these multiple times (and images and sounds) require the time of the screening to be put in relation and interpreted, symbolically re-separating the moments of production and reception, the space of shooting and editing and that of attending and interpreting (themselves potentially forms of production and writing). Paradoxically, even though spectators may experience an excess of images and sounds with the advent of citation, that excess reintroduces a form of decision that is theirs to make and, in the dissociation involved, approaches a situation of temporal freedom that would have reading, more than classical cinema, as a horizon.

The hybridity suggested by Bellour’s description, and which also holds for citation, decidedly evokes some of the conditions of the silent era,¹¹⁰ when the work of interpretation on the part of the audience depended both on what was projected on the screen and on the various forms of accompaniment available in the theatre

¹⁰⁹ Bellour, “The Pensive Spectator,” 7.

¹¹⁰ As could photographs, in fact, and this is where theatrical and pictorial arts share some effects with citation.

(music, lecturer¹¹¹). With the advent of synchronous sound in the form of the addition of a soundtrack parallel to the film strip in the late 1920s, the entire “site” of interpretation for the audience was gradually transferred from the space of the movie theatre (where meaning could be negotiated in the present) to the screen (where it could be wholly encoded in the film as a past, completed production). A whole apparatus consolidated around the sound film, from a complete extinction of the lights to an etiquette of silence among the public to a series of liminal steps (attractions, newsreels, short film, previews) prior to the entry into the centrepiece of the show, with the feature – fiction – film and the moment of the opening credits.

For the duration of the film, everyone was thus encouraged to relinquish any reflexive consciousness of the screening, the site and circumstances of exhibition, to borrow the – visual and auditory, narrative, discursive, and ideological – position fashioned at the production stage for an ideal spectator-subject. While citation differs significantly from silent cinema in that the audience is re-addressed in its individual components – as a gathering of singular beings – the film still reaffirms and relocates crucial aspects of film viewing in the very site where it takes place, in the present. In

¹¹¹ In some of the films under consideration, a character serves *de facto* as an “inside” lecturer to cited images: René Vidal (Jean-Pierre Léaud) in *Irma Vep* comments on a clip of Feuillade’s *Les Vampires* for Maggie Cheung, who is our surrogate in the fiction, like Bernard’s neighbor in *Muriel*. In Resnais’s film, indeed, Bernard (Jean-Baptiste Thierrée) serves as a lecturer, one that does not “explain” the images but rather tells of what they hide. In the absence of diegetic clues and of any contextualization of the cited images (neither character is identified until after the clip, when the fiction returns in its entirety and the diegetic protagonists of the improvised screening appear), it is the film *on and behind the screen* (sound) which divides the fiction and places the spectator *also* firmly within the space of attendance, the theatre (a confrontation with unspecified images). This formal inscription of an uncompleted hermeneutic work in the film through a fragmentary text, putting the onus of interpretation partly back on the viewers in the space and time of reception, harking back to some elements of the silent film screening, may be seen as the rejection by modern cinema of a division of hermeneutic labor, an insuperable separation between production and reception.

a context where the space and the time of the fiction film are the centre of attention, the substitute even for our own, and the perception of the present of the screening is downplayed, the intrusion of citation thus marks a sharp break, a wrecking of the patient elaboration that had begun with the entrance in the theatre. In terms of effect, it may be compared to the ending credits – without the lights gradually going up again, but with a much more sudden, unexpected, and violent disappearance of the diegesis (from the sound, the image, or both).

These preliminary developments point out to what degree citation, as object and as gesture, opens the fiction film onto cinema as a whole, diachronically and synchronically, and onto some characteristics of other arts and media. Accordingly, they also inflect the spectator of the fiction film with positions or situations encountered more usually by visitors of museums, beholders of photography albums, readers, theatre audiences – or models of film audiences of past eras. These solicitations arguably affect spectators as individuals, in the successive re-positionings they have to negotiate; the type of hermeneutic work they are called upon to perform; and their situation as individuals and as a collective, as individuals within a potential collective. And indeed, the first and primary consequence of citation in the fiction film (especially, but not only, classical) is a suspension on several levels, which transforms the nature of attending to it.

The primary suspension occurs at a perceptual level, as citation punctures the fabric of images and sounds of the fiction film, with more or less jarring effects. Even in the case of minimal discrepancies – either because cuts between fiction and citation involve similar types of footage, or the footage has been altered and

transitions created to reduce the gap – the sense that a change has taken place is unmistakable, if not always consciously articulated by the audience. Where the audiovisual equivalents of quotation marks and colons in the genres of the essay or the documentary maintain a comfort as to a delegation by a source of enunciation to allow another, heterogeneous source to be expressed, citation in the fiction film comes potentially without being announced and without assignment to an origin, within or without the diegesis. The story world in the fiction film typically gives itself as a positivity: it derives its force from the fact that any negativity is denied. With this break in the homogeneous signifying material of the fiction film, the position of the spectator as discrete witness and narratee becomes much more difficult to sustain: it becomes more akin to a role of assessing differing documents around a single object. The destination of a discourse in narrative form, and the nature of the materials used to that end, have to be taken charge of.

Following this evident, elementary suspension, the effect of presence of the represented objects, dependent on the indexical and analogical powers of film technology and reinforced by the projection apparatus, is also put on hold. The diegetic environment, given – confirmed – as past and separate by the interruption caused by the citation, sees its apparent integrity and spatio-temporal coherence and unity disrupted, even so mildly. Claire Denis's *L'Intrus* (2004), which makes clear the similarity of character and context across time, still has citation point to a prehistory which we do not know and will not know about. Its citation does not exactly have the effect of suspending the fiction altogether, since the film cited (Paul Gégauff's 1962 *Le Reflux*) was never completed nor released, and is not known as a work of its

own. Yet the presence of a younger Michel Subor in it, in the same setting (French Polynesia), underscores the possibility of several materials (and temporalities) in the constitution of a fictional world, and qualifies the immediacy, the quasi-hallucinatory force that formal appearance and texture often produce through their homogeneity. While partly recuperable from within the internal logic of the diegesis (Subor's character had a son with a Polynesian woman long ago), this type of citation opens on a concurrent, figurative logic at the same time as it gives visibility to the process of narration. It substitutes a divided attention to possibly contradictory, conflicting episodes for the absorption in an apparently cohesive spatio-temporal world, bringing the spectator to mediate – between intra-diegetic elements, at the very least – and to articulate narrative choices possibly made. Again, the citations from *Le Reflux* are in that respect a good example: the uncertainty as to their relation to the present (reminiscing or dream on the part of the main character, flash-back on the part of the narrator) indicates that, while their interpretation as syntagmatic remains possible, they may just as well be alternative units on a paradigmatic axis and bear hypotheses that are not necessarily diegetic. In other words, since Gégauff's images show a different grain and texture, a different color from those of *L'Intrus* – since they are “other,” intruding images – the intradiegetic conjectures they are liable to give rise to can also more generally lead outside the realm of fiction. The spectator, in such a configuration, is asked to consider the universe depicted in the fiction film from one more remove, since the effect of presence – produced when nothing in the signifying material of the film stands out as heterogeneous from the fictional world – is made relative by the presentation of

another time within it, perhaps even of elements alien to it. Incidentally, this suspension through citation of a cohesive story world that usually works to produce a symbolic absorption of the spectator is not unlike the other time Raymond Bellour identifies in the photograph shown to Uncle Charlie in Alfred Hitchcock's *Shadow of a Doubt*. It introduces a form of reflexivity, if one limited to the dynamics of the diegesis itself.

A third type of suspension involves the different times at play in the fiction film – story, plot – as well as their indexation on the time of the screening – itself never acknowledged as a time of its own, but integrated instead in the time of the story and the time of the plot. This is the case even in instances where the citation closely corresponds in terms of duration to the ellipsis in a – linear – story, Robert Bresson's *Une femme douce* and Jacques Rivette's *Paris nous appartient*, typically, as we have seen before, because the citation roughly stands for images and sounds which characters are shown or assumed to be attending to as well. It may also happen, as with Benoît Jacquot's *À tout de suite* (2004) and the Gaumont footage of everyday Paris interspersed in the fiction film (for what must have been the last newsreels produced by the company in the 1970s), that the objects of citations produce a parallel line that could be construed as contemporary context. These citations serve as markers of place, as markers of time (they can stand for intervals of a few days to a few months in the story), while also creating a distance between the intimacy of the female protagonist and the bank robber and terrorist she has fallen in love with, and a general climate in France, in Europe, in North Africa, an apparent indifference to and separateness from their concerns.

While aligned chronologically with the unfolding time of the story, citations thus also shape the time of the plot to some degree, as they come to play the part of the imperfect tense in producing a general past, an atmosphere in their generic representation of a period. These crystallizations, not only of places, but also of a certain duration, thus constitute ellipses of a particular kind: they fulfill that role even though in effect they suspend the fiction film, and the plot. In other words, they partake of the work of the plot, but from outside, and even as they *also* mean its temporary voiding. Likewise, in *Irma Vep*, citations participate in this simultaneous suspension of and substitution for the plot: virtually all of them appear in a disruption of and an abrupt transition from the scene preceding them before appearing as elements in a later scene (the exception would be the SLON excerpt already mentioned, which is announced and “previewed” in the diegesis, then also serves an elliptical function towards the end of the dinner). Heterogeneous, yet paving the way for a scene that does not immediately follow the previous one, citation thus also makes visible the common narrative operation that belongs to the plot and consists in accepting the cut (or another transitional device, wipe, dissolve, fade to black...) as a temporal reduction.

The suspension performed by citation also affects the understanding, even general, of the kind of enunciation model the fiction film relies on, since the intrusion of heterogeneous material raises the question of a paramount, overall point of view bringing together all others into a whole that could be named a fiction. In genres where citation has been commonplace, religious or literary exegeses, essays, argumentative pieces, its appropriation as a heterogeneous discourse into a new text

has allowed the subject of that same text's enunciation to assert its own existence as a boundary, a framework. Controlling the alterity of utterances, placing them in a hierarchy where it occupies a prime place, this subject treats them as objects of its own discourse and contains their potentially infinite expansion. In much of what constitutes fiction there can be no such reassurance through hierarchy (figured in the opening and closing quotation marks) because from the very beginning discourse and rhetoric are denied or made discrete. When citation appears, it tends to be on equal terms immediately with, not the "framing text," but what becomes the other text: at the same time as the fact of an enunciative agent presiding over narration is revealed or recalled to the viewer, it is given as relative by the co-presence of citation. Again, citation may be defined here as a revealing device for what is always there yet invisible: for fiction depends not only on a narrative form of enunciation, but on a discursive one as well, which in this instance is left uncompleted and becomes open for a work of relationality for the spectator. In the fiction film, citation materializes the separation, or the distinction, between types of enunciation at work in it, while its advent also produces – to various degrees – a hybrid form of enunciation open to further elaboration, finished only temporarily at the stage of production.

In that respect, citation could even be considered as blurring the degree of authorship, real or perceived, of directors over their fiction films. Unless citing itself becomes a stylistic hallmark, citation disrupts the consistency of style, diegetic universe or atmosphere, narrative forms, clashing with or simply failing to coalesce with those. It potentially complicates the criteria on which auteurism has typically depended: the excerpts from Jacques Demy's films appearing in and providing the

structuring biographical material for the diegesis of Agnès Varda's *Jacquot de Nantes*, and footage from Paul Gégauff's unfinished film as inspiration for and fictional material in Claire Denis's *L'Intrus* testify to this. Similarly, even in films clearly referable to a single filmmaker such as André Téchiné's *Les Temps qui changent* and Jean-Luc Godard's *À bout de souffle* or *Les Carabiniers*, the question is raised as to what one is to make of these images and sounds (computer-assisted animation for an architectural project, promotional film, or stock shots) neither shot by the films' authors nor assignable to anyone in particular, either because they originated from a corporate structure, or because their value was deemed to lie entirely in the object they represented, where no personal craft or art needed crediting.¹¹² Citation therefore lies at a paradoxical intersection: even as it manifests perhaps most forcefully the prerogatives of filmmakers, a surplus of control, i.e., the power to cite images and sounds not their own in their own fiction film, it is also in itself an active practice of "offloading," of transferring some of that power and responsibility for interpretation and meaning to the still distant audience, known only virtually at the production stage.

The suspension of an enunciation revolving strictly around the requirements of the fiction necessarily marks a return, then, to the only time whose experience the

¹¹² In a round table on the cinema of the 1990s organized by *Cahiers du cinéma* in 2003, French critic Jean-Marc Lalanne, overstating the dilution of authorship in a global circulation of images, went as far as to state that "today, the author can no longer be identified with an individual, the one who makes the film. Since we are also witnessing an acceleration of recycling and hybridation, we can no longer ascribe films to filmmakers." ["Aujourd'hui, l'auteur n'est plus identifiable à une personne, celle qui signe la mise en scène. Comme on assiste aussi à une accélération du recyclage et de l'hybridation, on ne peut plus référer les films à des cinéastes."] "Conversation sur le cinéma des années 90. Le cinéma dont on hérite," round table with Olivier Assayas, Patrice Blouin, Jean-Michel Frodon, Thierry Jousse, Jean-Marc Lalanne, *Cahiers du cinéma* 582 (September 2003): 72-76, 74.

spectator may shape, the present of the projection in the theatre (which becomes a time of deliberation and arbitration between the separate, different times and tenses – figured by citation, or rather, by the articulation between fiction and citation). It consequently means the suspension of another suspension, i.e. disbelief, and the audience’s imaginary investment in the world, the figures, the events and the actions of the fiction. Suspension of a suspension, rather than a resumption, a return to disbelief: indeed, citation does not take the spectator back to a pre-screening situation, to a time where incredulity was not yet denied and repressed. In the formula “I know, but...,” the “but” cancels out the “I know” and the two terms are juxtaposed, yet mutually exclusive. Arguably, the relation could be complementary: maintaining a consciousness of the fact that a fiction is being attended to, *while* allowing oneself to consider it, not as a state of obliviousness to reality, but as a mere hypothesis being considered, played with thanks to the intrusion of citation and in relation with it. Citation has turned a fiction that claimed the entirety of the hermeneutic space into a relative, albeit important element among others, displacing but not cancelling it.

In the film theatre itself, the corollary of these many suspensions, of the loosened determination of meaning they imply, is a much more uncertain and unpredictable interpretation – in the manner as well as in the resulting object. Fragmenting the relatively consistent and homogeneous symbolic position from which the fiction film is usually proposed to spectators, they turn an apparently ineffable and stable vantage point into a perspective at once more palpable and more fleeting – a perspective also made relative by the juxtaposition of different materials

through citation. The fiction film loses at least part of the function of “framework”¹¹³ it fulfilled: more than a dominant place in a hierarchy, the exclusivity of the fiction film on the production of meaning rested on an apparent “organicity” of the whole, which gives way to a circulation, an alternation between parts opened by citation. This alternation – but one could also think of it as a simultaneous process between equally important poles¹¹⁴ – involves fiction, citation(s), and each individual viewer’s own memories tied to given visual or aural excerpts. In the successive confrontations with images and sounds sampled from a variety of sources, and not integrated into the diegesis, spectators have to readjust to ever new kinds of extracts potentially requiring starkly differing hermeneutic protocols. The gap between these and the fiction may be slight, as with Robert Bresson’s *Une femme douce*, in which another fiction is cited (a costume drama tinged with eroticism, Michel Deville’s 1968 *Benjamin ou les mémoires d’un puceau*). Yet it may also be quite important and/or rest on numerous and contrasting types of materials, as with Arnaud Desplechin’s *Rois et reine* (2004),¹¹⁵ Olivier Assayas’s *Irma Vep* (1997), or Jean-Luc Godard’s *Les Carabiniers* (1963), all of which feature documentary footage whose status remains

¹¹³ Or, to put it differently, citation introduces a shift from a meaning posited as a premise to a framework for meaning to be possible, the conditions for the production of meaning.

¹¹⁴ This is even more obvious in the cases when citation is partial, leading the spectator to heed the image of the fiction at the same time as the sound of citation, and vice versa.

¹¹⁵ In the scene where the citations appear, Ismaël’s therapy session with his analyst, Desplechin also presents a line from Yeats’s poem in English on the image (then a word from it), adding yet another, not quite isotopic layer of meaning. The images and sounds cited figure a free adaptation of Ismaël’s dream that does not exactly concur with his own rendition; and in one of his – verbal – interpretations of his own dream, a disappointing one in his opinion, he relates to an allusion to a verse from “The Circus Animals’ Desertion” he cannot even recall very precisely, and whose French translation he disagrees with and discusses, precisely. Interestingly, in the transcription on the image, Desplechin, whether intentionally or not, misquotes Yeats, printing “Now that my ladder’s gone/I lay down where all the ladders start,” then “lay down” again – instead of “lie down” in the poem.

uncertain (reenactment or not, stock shot or referenced event, television or cinema...). Taken separately, all these positions or poles could still offer the opportunity for ready, or even customary personal adherences or identifications on the part of spectators. However, their interference changes the way any will be apprehended: the advent of citation introduces not only an interruption or a distraction from the fiction (in which case the fiction would be assumed to be fully and identically recoverable), but also a structural, and therefore qualitative, transformation.

This transformation in the spectator's position has to do with the distance citation produces: circulating and negotiating between the various images and sounds dissociating the fiction, that spectator can never return to the fiction (or to the next citation, for that matter) unchanged. In the serial process opened, any return to either a position of identification or a position of observation and interpretation is likely to be a return to a slightly altered position, every time. Any appraisal of what is seen or heard necessarily carries with it, and to different extents, the experience and knowledge accumulated since the beginning of the screening, perhaps more particularly with respect to identification with the characters of the fiction and the overall point of view developed by the film on its action. For Raymond Bellour, still writing about photography, such distance arises within a general alignment between the spectator and the character as to the photograph they are looking at. In a sense, spectators identify with the character *while* retaining their own, different position:

Finally, the hero himself confirms the fascination of the photograph in its ability to rivet the gaze. One is tempted to say that, as a character, he adds to the image, even if the film discourages this. What the photos bear witness to

upsets him; he is, at the very thought of what they suggest, petrified. I who identify with him am, like him, petrified. But not in the same way.¹¹⁶

The effect described here comes close to the monstration and the deictic effect as a crucial function of citation detailed in the second chapter, even if the photograph (and the character holding the photograph) appear but fleetingly – long enough to serve as an opening for the trained eye of the film scholar, certainly, but far from the disruption and the duration which citation can bring. For Raymond Bellour, identification remains, structured around the very object at the centre of the scene, the photograph. Yet the feeling of petrification experienced by both character and viewer splits on *what either sees in the photograph*: for one, the revelation of a family situation, for the other, the technology of the still image that subtends the cinema and always looms as a threat beneath the run of film frames in the projector. In a way, the distance is already there for the film scholar, the curious and avid cinephile as practiced analysts. It is not the product of a dialogical, and even dialectical circulation between the position of the character and that of the spectator faced with the same object. One could have imagined that the moment, even brief, of a direct confrontation on the part of the audience would lead for instance to a more conscious, subtle form of identification: one perhaps more akin to role playing and experimenting with points of view than the tacit identification fostered by the classical fiction film. Allowed, but not prodded by the photograph within the fiction to reflect that he is at the cinema, Bellour leaves intact a separation between the regimes of narrative fiction and monstration and does not venture into an examination of – critical – ways in which the latter could affect the former.

¹¹⁶ Bellour, “The Pensive Spectator,” 7.

By contrast, in a text published in *Communications* in 1975, Roland Barthes does take into consideration the possibility of such a critical distance and even contemplates a discrepancy between sound and image characteristic of partial citation:

Certainly, it is always possible to conceive an art that will break the dual circle, the fascination exerted by film, and undo the ties, end the hypnosis of verisimilitude (of analogy) through some recourse to the critical eye (or ear) of the spectator; isn't this what is involved in the Brechtian effect of distanciation? Many things may help to come out of hypnosis (imaginary and/or ideological): the very methods of epic art, the culture of the spectator, or his/her ideological vigilance: unlike classical hysteria, the imaginary disappears as soon as it is subjected to observation, or so it goes.¹¹⁷

Yet Barthes immediately closes this parenthesis to suggest that, in the cinema, even the vague consciousness of a "situation" (the ray of light of the projector in our back, the obscurity, the presence of other spectators) partakes of a fetishism, the enjoyment of what he calls "a loving distance."¹¹⁸ Far from producing the conditions of a critique of the role assigned to spectators by the fiction film, the elements reminding them of the present situation they find themselves in are instantly recuperated by individual narcissism:

For such is the narrow range – at least for the subject speaking here – where filmic sideration, cinematographic hypnosis take place: I have to be in the story (verisimilitude calls on me), but I also have to be *elsewhere*. A slightly detached imaginary: this is what, like a scrupulous, conscious, organized – in

¹¹⁷ ["Certes, il est toujours possible de concevoir un art qui rompra le cercle duel, la fascination filmique, et déliera l'empoisement, l'hypnose du vraisemblable (de l'analogique), par quelque recours au regard (ou à l'écoute) critique du spectateur; n'est-ce pas cela dont il s'agit dans l'effet brechtien de distanciation? Bien des choses peuvent aider au réveil de l'hypnose (imaginaire et/ou idéologique): les procédés même de l'art épique, la culture du spectateur ou sa vigilance idéologique: contrairement à l'hystérie classique, l'imaginaire disparaîtrait, dès lors qu'on l'observerait."] Roland Barthes, "En sortant du cinéma" ["Upon Leaving the Cinema"], *Communications* 23 (1975): 106.

¹¹⁸ ["une distance amoureuse"] Barthes, "En sortant du cinéma": 107.

a word: difficult – fetishist, I demand from the film and the situation where I go look for it.¹¹⁹

As he himself acknowledges, Barthes writes of a desire that finds its origins in a spectator built out of a singular experience, in which the attraction exerted by the movie theatre counts as much as the film screened in it. Still, his argument presents a parallel to Bellour's in the lack of concern for how verisimilitude and distance (through the sense of situation, in this instance) play out as a relation, as though they remained hermetically separate. What was given with the photograph for Bellour is here given with the movie theatre, as a premise: it does not arise from the interaction between the two, even though Barthes carves out openings in his own text, providing an entry into a more conscious and critical (and less narcissistic) approach to the experience of attending to a fiction film.¹²⁰ This is perhaps where he should be taken at his word, notably when he evokes Brecht, for in doing so he almost literally describes a most frequent effect of citation: the questioning of verisimilitude, precisely, as well as the conventions of representation and identification.

Indeed, if one is to gauge citation as the driving force in a circulation between the fiction film and the spectator's own position – including the situation of attending

¹¹⁹ ["Car telle est la plage étroite – du moins pour le sujet qui parle ici – où se joue la sidération filmique, l'hypnose cinématographique : il me faut être dans l'histoire (le vraisemblable me requiert), mais il me faut aussi être *ailleurs* : un imaginaire légèrement décollé, voilà ce que, tel un fétichiste scrupuleux, conscient, organisé, en un mot : difficile, j'exige du film et de la situation où je vais le chercher."] Barthes, "En sortant du cinéma": 105-106.

¹²⁰ The difficulty of both Bellour's and Barthes's texts – besides their brevity – to effectively account for the work of the spectator, as a response to a salient diegetic object and to the circumstances of a screening (and involving both), may paradoxically be an effect of the fact that, even with the advent of citation, the film apparatus perfected by and suited to classical cinema remains in place, if not the type of fiction film it had been designed to serve and strengthen. Arguably citation, as a leap into the space of reception designed at the stage of production, dialectically depends on this apparatus (projection in a public space, dark and silent as the film is screened).

to it in the theatre – that would alter both and emphasize more conscious movements of thought (observing, describing and naming,¹²¹ comparing and relating), the theorization by Brecht of his aesthetics becomes critical. *A Short Organum for the Theatre*,¹²² a synthesis published in 1948, with revisions added in 1954, lays out well-known principles: the rejection of the strict separation enforced between the audience and the stage in a bourgeois conception of theatre, particularly in the experience of the play as providing a taste of the ideal, of the unattainable to a profane audience – a substitute for one’s life, an experience by proxy; de-familiarization, notably in the treatment of a subject (a unique occurrence reproduced as a common event, a tragic development approached as a comedy, etc.); multiple and contradictory characters, stripped of any pretence that they unfold chronologically and psychologically in a

¹²¹ Naming becomes especially important as a critical, or more conscious gesture on the part of the spectator if one approaches fiction, not in opposition to what would be reality, but as one possible translation of reality among others, as Jacques Rancière writes in his recent *Le Spectateur émancipé*: “There is no real in itself, but configurations of what is given as our real, as the object of our perceptions, of our thoughts, and of our interventions. The real is always the object of a fiction, that is to say, a construction of space where what may be seen, said, and done meet and take shape. It is the dominant fiction, the consensual fiction which, denying its status as a fiction, parades as the real itself and draws a simple dividing line between the realm of this real and that of representations and appearances, opinions, and utopias. Art and its fictions as well as politics and its actions look further into this real, they fracture and multiply it in a polemical fashion.” [“Il n’y a pas de réel en soi, mais des configurations de ce qui est donné comme notre réel, comme l’objet de nos perceptions, de nos pensées et de nos interventions. Le réel est toujours l’objet d’une fiction, c’est-à-dire d’une construction de l’espace où se nouent le visible, le dicible et le faisable. C’est la fiction dominante, la fiction consensuelle, qui dénie son caractère de fiction en se faisant passer pour le réel lui-même et en traçant une ligne de partage simple entre le domaine de ce réel et celui des représentations et des apparences, des opinions et des utopies. La fiction artistique comme l’action politique creusent ce réel, elles le fracturent et le multiplient sur un mode polémique.”]. Jacques Rancière, *Le Spectateur émancipé* (La Fabrique éditions: Paris, 2008) 83-4.

¹²² See Bertolt Brecht, *A Short Organum for the Theatre*, in *Brecht on Theatre*, ed. and trans. John Willett (New York, London: Hill & Wang and Methuen, 1964), reproduced in *Marxist Literary Theory*, eds. Terry Eagleton and Drew Milne (Oxford, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 107-35.

determined time mimicked by the play; a palimpsest-like approach to acting that takes into account all stages in the preparation of the role, and may integrate the actor's earlier insights in the finalized performance; and, perhaps most important in our argument, a calling into question of the actor's identification with the character s/he is to play through the introduction of the notion of monstration, the idea that the actor *shows* as much as s/he acts, or pretends to be. The dual function of the actor, the dissociation between a fictional protocol and a deictic one, implies in turn a dual attitude on the part of spectators, between assuming a time and a position not their own and being addressed as themselves or hailed in the present of the performance – precisely because the playwright or the director has taken a position himself *without* orchestrating a form that assumes the spectator's position as the *same*. In *A Short Organum* Brecht postulates, not a suppression of identification altogether, but rather a circulation between what is and what is to come, the given state of social affairs and the transformation of society, of the world in and through theatre. In his revisions, but already in the first edition of the book, he allows that identification could be a useful instrument for the actor during rehearsals and had produced extremely pointed and precise reproductions; by comparison, while he implicitly accepts that for the spectator it could be a point of departure, he rejects the position that views it – as in much of the theatre of his time – a destination, the expression of a desire to repeat the enjoyment of a position previously experienced.

The Brechtian spectator thus perpetually has to relate the various elements presented on the stage, since these relations are bounded (in the fable), but not necessarily given in advance. Similarly, with the intrusion of heterogeneous elements

in the audiovisual fabric of the fiction film, the spectator accustomed to a certain degree of continuity, seeing his/her symbolic place in the fiction film suspended, and faced with the uncertainty that the citation will provide a new one (or the apprehension that any such place would soon be suspended as well), has the possibility – or not – to enter the play of shuttling back and forth between objects that beg to be interpreted. While the interruption and scission affect distinct elements in the two arts – *mise-en-scène*, the performer's parts, and acting in theatre, the expressive materials in cinema, paramount to everything else (*diegesis*, narrative, framing and editing, discourse) – the movements of alternation they engage their audience in remain very comparable.¹²³

The questions addressed by the Brechtian practice of theatre to cinema, and to the importance of citation in a strategy of defamiliarization for the film spectator, fall – at this stage – into three categories: 1) the introduction of “dissident” temporalities into the fiction, or rather, their reactivation, their return to visibility (this is what Raymond Bellour saw, in a minimal form, in the photograph as a diegetic still image), possibly following a narrative logic of flashback or flash forward; 2) the change of status, even discrete or barely perceptible, of the spectator, who shifts from a position of symbolic integration to one of witness, of observer of a work in

¹²³ More specifically, Brecht insists that what is taken as “natural” is only the projection of one's own position onto different places, different times, different societies, and different arts, as well as the result of entrenched conventions. It only makes sense, then, – since Brecht's theater does not erase the symbolic and spatial gap between public and performers, transforming instead the relationship between the two – that his focus and efforts would bear on writing, acting, and *mise-en-scène* to attain de-familiarization. Conversely, with the “naturalness” of cinema greatly depending on its recording technology *and* a production system organized around the homogenization and conformation of elements (temporal and spatial construction, color, continuity editing, etc.), citation, affecting first and foremost the “skin” of the film, and indirectly but strongly all that depends on it, would constitute an instrument of choice in a strategy of de-familiarization.

progress, an event; and 3) the process of permanent reinterpretation, more particularly, but not only, when a “displaced” element, an element “out of place” intrudes upon the stage or in the unfolding of the fiction film.

But other questions, more directly related to the moment of the “performance,” that is, the screening, are also raised by Brecht’s theorization of theatrical practice when its implications are translated in the context of cinema. First, the German playwright assumes as one of the duties of theatre a receptivity to contemporary societal, economic, and political phenomena, a use of these phenomena as its working material; and in return, an ability to affect its audience (taken to stand for the social group the playwright has in mind). The co-presence of performers and public in the event of the representation is undoubtedly central in the belief in the effectivity of theatre. What, then, to make of an art that relies on a temporal gap, a mutual absence to each other of those who produce and those who receive? Is citation but a call without defined addressees, or one addressed at random at an audience whose blurred and shifting contours make it unknowable? Second, contemporary with the rise of industries of mass culture, does Brechtian theatre sufficiently take stock of their focus on targeting individuals, the control of their time, their privileging of distribution to turn them into consumers, to the detriment of their capacity for idiosyncratic interpretation, and meanings? Finally, how much room is there in Brecht’s thought for the irreducibly singular subjective experience of each audience member? Or in other words, how broad and general are the intentions of a play, how much interpretive leeway do they allow their audience?

Brecht's reflexion does not address two significant aspects, one owing to the historical context in which it developed (the place it accords individuals, be it in the subjective experience they bring to the theater or the degree of "dissensus" they may leave the performance with); and the other because its full consequences were not obvious, perhaps not even imaginable, in his lifetime (the proper strategy in the face of the multifaceted, but increasingly privatized and atomized onslaught of a mass culture that does not need a collective presence in front of a shared spectacle to synchronize its subjects). To both limitations, and translated in the realm of the cinema, citation puts forth a proposition. Taking stock that it operates in a medium of absence and temporal discrepancy, it simultaneously reflects and plays on the fact that the associations and interpretations of spectators may at best be guided, never thoroughly planned and controlled. And while citation constitutes a symbolic leap in the present of reception on the part of the film, it would be presuming too much to impute to it the power to disrupt or open up a private, individual context of film viewing not as strictly determined spatially and temporally as the film theater. This is not to say, however, that in cinema and its classical exhibition apparatus, and therefore *from within* the sphere of mass media (by contrast to the theater), citation cannot also foster the production of a singular meaning by spectators, de-phasing signifying materials and suspending the fictional narrative and the configuration of the real it constitutes. In fact, citation opens the possibility, figured in its relation with the fiction film, of the fabrication, the fashioning, the making in an almost manual sense, of an interpretation proper to the single spectator, and which alone can serve as the basis for collective meaning.

In *De la misère symbolique*, Bernard Stiegler devotes an entire chapter to *On connaît la chanson*, a chapter tellingly titled “As Though We Defaulted, or How To Find Weapons Starting from Alain Resnais’s *On connaît la chanson*.”¹²⁴ For Stiegler, the songs cited in the film are comparable to ghostly returns that turn characters into ventriloquists and open up the time of narration. Doing so, they also attract spectators into a rigid, formalized, mechanical and repetitive time, that of the song, thereby depriving them of their own time as they watch the fiction film. That the time of the fiction film would be their time in the first place is debatable within the framework of this argument. But Stiegler also sees the songs as reverberating from character to spectator, implicitly raising the question of whether the members of an audience would allow themselves or not to endorse the attitude towards the products of the culture industry figured in the “lip-synching characters.” Indeed, for Stiegler, lip-synching is implicitly a figure for mind-synching, and the surest sign that it has long since taken hold. Yet the more complex dimension of his reading of hypermodernity has to do with the topography of memory and sensorial experience –

¹²⁴ [“Comme si nous faisons défaut ou comment trouver des armes à partir de *On connaît la chanson* d’Alain Resnais”] Stiegler, *De la misère symbolique. I. L’époque hyperindustrielle* (Paris: Galilée, 2004) 41. To default, in judicial terms, is of course not to appear in a court of law at an appointed time. While “faire défaut” may also be simply translated by “to be absent” or “to be missing,” the fact that a citation is also a summons to appear in court echoes both Stiegler’s formulation and a work by Jean-Luc Godard made on the occasion of *Voyages en utopie, Jean-Luc Godard 1946-2006*, an exhibit he presented at the Centre Pompidou in Paris in 2006. The 55-minute video, *Vrai faux passeport*, bears as a subtitle, “29 citations à comparaître pour passer en jugement” [“29 citations to appear in court and stand trial”]. Since it is made entirely of citations and raises the issue of identifying (and be identified as a certain kind of spectator, with a socio-cultural baggage) or examining them for what they show (and return to a certain candor with respect to images and sounds), *Vrai faux passeport* could be seen among other things as a genuine proposition for an ethics of the spectator. Where Stiegler considers the failure to appear from the standpoint of the spectators’ presence to themselves, Godard’s work – in my view – addresses it as a liberating perspective: not being where media producers and distributors would have them be.

how these may be reclaimed, or, more specifically, what the strategic sites are in order to do so.

The task he also carries out in “The War Over Time,” a piece published in *Cahiers du cinéma* at the same time as *De la misère symbolique* came out and focused more specifically on the role of cinema in the media sphere and the notion of retention (borrowed from Husserl) as a strategic site for both the control of minds and the resistance to such control.¹²⁵ Primary retentions involve the present of perception: each consciousness will select and associate different elements, forming distinct expectations, or “protentions.” Secondary retentions constitute the past of consciousness, the ability to remember and conjure up sounds and images in imagination. More structured and more reflexive, they filter primary retentions based on the fact that some things have already been seen or heard, with the hindsight such an experience provides. Since this memory is embodied, these retentions participate in the formation of pulsions and elementary desires – which is why, according to Stiegler, they represent such a decisive object for large-scale industries and marketing in their efforts to rationalize and systematize consumption. In this enterprise, their weapons of choice are tertiary retentions, a misnomer in the sense that they imitate the work of secondary retentions, yet do so as objective arrangements, an exteriorized memory aiming to serve as a prosthesis for the subjective relations that make up the individuals’ own memory. These tertiary retentions thus provide ready

¹²⁵ “La Guerre du temps,” *Cahiers du cinéma* 586 (January 2004): 78-80.

memory objects that can assume the form of songs, films¹²⁶ – “temporal industrial objects,” in Stiegler’s words.

These objects are thus always already completed, and their effectiveness is all the more formidable as they succeed in passing as the individual’s own retentions without even relying on a tacit agreement, let alone a conscious decision. Their paradox is that they involve the counterfeiting of an original that does not exist: they preempt the formation of such an original, in actuality preventing it.¹²⁷ Against the conspiring, Stiegler argues, cinema has a strategic importance: it operates from within the sphere of mass media and produces temporal industrial objects itself, yet it can also become the site of an aesthetic experience susceptible to fight conditioning on its own turf. Against the tendency of cultural industries to try and substitute for artists and homogenize the criteria for secondary retentions, tapping into the compulsive need for repetition – but a repetition without difference, the critic suggests that films can be the receptacles of a singular time, one that could again be the projection of the unexpected that underlies any expectation, any desire, individual as well as collective. Stiegler does not engage in film analysis, and the possibility of his reading of *On connaît la chanson* as one such film has to remain at the

¹²⁶ A problem in Stiegler’s argument is precisely his association of song and film even though their respective managements of time(s) differ significantly: the short format, the repetition of verses, and the use of rhythm are obviously important in the popular song, while the length of the screening in cinema, despite a total lack of control by the spectator, is probably not the decisive aspect in the manipulation of time, since it varies and first and foremost serves the temporal necessities of the fiction, story and plot.

¹²⁷ They are always already there perhaps in another sense as well, the fact that within modern mass-media content is always at hand, easily accessible. The threat to desire may thus also lie in the shift Jean-Luc Godard has identified from production to distribution, from a dynamic of mutual, if uneven and unbalanced, desire to an economy of permanent and pervasive availability, which yields indifference.

level of conjecture. His idea of a community of sensibility emerging out of an aggregation of singular desires also seems to translate rather quickly the work of personal interpretation into a collectivity of meaning. Relaying Stiegler's theorization, an observation of forms and figures in Resnais's film (including its resort to citation, evidently), insofar as they point to an act of subjective, singular fabrication, should take stock of the following elements.

The first is that the popular songs that impose their time on us and belong to the tool kit of the cultural industry – in what Stiegler refers to as the synchronization of affects and consciousnesses – are never cited in extenso in the film. The supposed enjoyment by the spectator of their tempos and their melodies is frustrated by their rapid interruption, paradoxically made even more audible by the transitions composed by Bruno Fontaine to ease the return to the voices and sounds of the fiction. The pleasure found in the familiarity and repetition of a tune and the enjoyment of the tune itself is not allowed by Resnais to unfold and run its course. While the effect of a non-completion of the song for the spectator is not easy to gauge, it is hard not to see a parallel between the desire to join the character singing (or virtually, the potential chorus of other spectators) and the secondary identification with a given character – and accordingly, between the break from the song and the break in the adherence to a point of view. Both imply the questioning of a common object already given in the constitution of a singular position, and consequently the coalescence of positions into a community. Deprived of the possibility to round off, even mentally, the performance of the song, the spectators in question are left with an incomplete object which, barring a virtual reconstruction of

it for themselves (that is, a reproduction of an assumed original), has to be replaced with something else – another song as a response, a different continuation of the song in question (the transitions also open that possibility, after all), another dialogue in the place of that which follows in the fiction – anything which can lead viewers to assume a participation in the making of a new object, one that would help them perform a work of meaning in the present. At the same time, these abbreviated versions of songs, the bits presented are enough to bring up the different, individual memories among the audience they might be attached to – an ability that sounds organized in a melody or simply arranged in recognizable patterns seem to possess more than images. Even without the identity of the singer or even the words, these few chords can conjure up the “expected unexpected” mentioned by Stiegler *also* from the involuntary memory of each individual audience member.

Citation, by cutting off the fiction film – as far as voice and sound effects on the soundtrack are concerned – and triggering a set of ever-different associations between a shared, already known cultural object and multiple personal experiences, thus reopens an intermediate, “third” space at the juncture between itself, fiction and subjectivity – a space available for interpretation and re-appropriation on the part of singular spectators. To borrow Husserl’s terms by way of Stiegler one more time, it reintroduces the unexpected, a formal accident in the standard arrangements of tertiary retentions; as an intrusion in the fabric of the fiction film, it goes even as far as to issue a call beyond the spatio-temporal realm of production, into that of reception, contesting the very apparatus that – in cinema at least – has typically worked towards symbolic integration and, as a consequence, towards the

synchronization of consciousnesses. The meaning of fabrication with citation should thus be understood not as a mere metaphor for the intellectual work it demands, the understanding of manual labor and manual work in a figurative sense. Nor should it be perceived as involving only the space of interpretation newly opened by its advent in the film: it also paves the way for a refashioned, retooled apparatus, appropriated and amended by the spectator. Besides the production of an idiosyncratic interpretation as object, it entails a new apprehension of a mnemotechnology, cinema, the adaptation of existing industrial tools to suit the needs of one – of many “ones.”¹²⁸

These connections between eye, hand, and brain fostered through citation are most central in Agnès Varda’s *Jacquot* (1991) and Jacques Rivette’s *Paris nous appartient* (1959-61). In Varda’s film, the monstration of reality points to it as a passage (between fictions, in the sense that reality is always mediated and symbolized, and whether or not these fictions are tacitly accepted, consciously chosen or shaped). Citations from Demy’s work, in relation to the biographical part of the film, figure a transformation of daily life that can take as a starting point the marvelous in it, but does not necessarily do so. Cinema as entertainment in the sense of turning away, diverting attention from the reality of life through a separation

¹²⁸ Borrowing the idea of organology from Deleuze, Stiegler proposes the creation of a general organology that would jointly study the three dimensions involved in human aesthetics: the body and physiological organization; artificial organs such as tools, techniques, objects, instruments, works of art; and social organizations proceeding from the articulation of the previous two, bodies and artifacts. He underscores the extent to which the gradual control by private corporations of artificial organs since the 19th century – especially when it comes to information technologies – has affected the sense of self, of the subject as a locus of production. In that regard, citation may also be viewed as a remediation, however partial or incomplete, launched from the work itself, incited by it.

between spectacle and audience is refused in favor of an integration, a blending of entertainment and existence where either one ceaselessly feeds into the other. On a larger scale, the structure of the film and the ordering of the fiction suggests a continuation between life and death, the latter a simple continuation and transformation of the former within the realm of spectacle. Varda, in the collage she submits to spectators in the form of *Jacquot*, also allows the possibility for them to take hold of the pieces making up the film and making an object of their own – an object that would not be a remedy to the anxiety in the face of death, of a life running towards an inexorable end, nor a suppression or a denial of that kind of experience, but a modest reappropriation and affirmation of presence through a gesture, an action involving a “making.”

With *Paris nous appartient*, the title itself and the quotation appearing at the end of the credits, when the train enters Gare d’Austerlitz (“Paris Belongs to Us,” then “Paris does not belong to anyone,” both from Charles Péguy¹²⁹), encapsulate a program: a provocative statement from an anonymous source (perhaps speaking for the author of the film and his audience, perhaps the message of a private secret organization), daring any addressee to vindicate it or prove it wrong, depending on the interpretation made of it; and the second assertion that at once voids any act of exclusive reclaiming and affirms the open and unlimited nature of the process of interpretation (since the city, the *cit * does not belong to anyone in particular, precisely). The narrative itself tells of a conspiracy whose agents are so disseminated and dematerialized (or even fantasized by some of the characters and putative

¹²⁹ On Rivette and his aesthetics of “l’entre-deux” [“the in-between”], see H l ne Frappat, *Jacques Rivette, Secret Compris* (Paris: Cahiers du cin ma/ ditions de l’ toile, 2001) 196.

victims, it appears at certain points of the film) that it becomes impossible to ascertain, let alone foil it. Taken as the story of an initiation – that of Anne, the main character – the film also traces the failure of a misplaced investigation looking for exterior, physical causes where much of the manipulation takes place in individual actions apparently chosen consciously and freely, without visible constraints and identifiable powers to exert them. The conspiracy is talked about at length in Rivette's feature, but no image comes to serve as its representation, and no diegetic element as univocal evidence.

On the part of the protagonists, the inability to come to the realization that the most crucial site for the conspiracy is their own relation to reality – a reality that includes works of art, and therefore films – is one object of the citation's apparition. As I argue in the second chapter, the moment of citation operates as a revealing device for a postwar reality whose drastic changes characters sense but fail to see for what they are and thus to act accordingly. The behavior of the audience assembled at Degeorges's place, in that regard, functions as a foil for the spectator of Rivette's film, a model to which a contrasted reaction is assumed – an attention to Lang's film through the citation, but also potentially to any film, not as a diversion from the real but as a path towards it, as winding and indirect as it may prove. Still, that option remains one interpretation among many possible, and the film gives its spectators a chance to perform what its characters grope to do without much success: to make sense, to interpret between excerpts from *Metropolis* and the diegesis of *Paris nous appartient* (and notably the historical shift already mentioned from localizable, top-down to disseminated, internalized control), but also between these two objects and

their own position. Obviously, *Metropolis* and *Paris nous appartient*, through the play of citations from the former, produce a number of points of view from which to (re)consider each other. What they monstrate of the spectator's position, though, is in two senses *what lies between*: the work of interpretation between the images from *Metropolis* (the magus-scientist and the mass of slaves)¹³⁰ and between these images and the fiction film 'accommodating' them (the movement upward and the horizontal movement, the visionary and the blind, the following and the resistance, the reception and the interpretation) is, figuratively, the space of spectatorship itself.¹³¹ The various figures shown in the fiction and in the citation all have to do with monstration, the act of pointing out, and delineate the space of possibilities in

¹³⁰ Interestingly, Rivette performs a selection from Lang's film (in which the episode illustrates the parable told by Maria), taking out intertitles and changing the order of two shots. The citation resulting from it thus omits too precise a contextualization and discourse (one excised intertitle reads, "But the hands that built the Tower of Babel knew nothing of the dream of the brain that had conceived it."), substituting a rather generic caption for it ("Babel," an intertitle that normally appears later in the sequence in the form of a scansion and in a typographic gradation). This is a typical side effect of any citation: wrenched from its original context, fragmented, rid of some explanatory elements, its order recast, "de-semanticized" in a way, it can be re-semanticized, that is, reinterpreted more freely in different manners and directions. In this particular case, Rivette's gesture is also significant in that it takes away precisely the elements of Lang's film that his own puts back in play, pointing to a different historical moment and to a new outcome: the Christlike mediator embodied by the corporate owner's son, who aims to be the heart connecting the hands that work and the brain that conceives and directs, is done away with in an era of pervasive, increasingly individualized mass-media, as are the *designers* of the project for the tower. A diegetic figure in *Metropolis*, the figure of the mediator disappears altogether in *Paris nous appartient*, which also leaves out a reconciliation between classes. Still, Lang's film prefigures the displacement and refiguration of power from the authoritarian tycoon to technology and machines: workers rebel against their boss only to give in to the fascination of a robot that assumes the traits of Maria.

¹³¹ It should also be noted that an anonymous citation opens *Metropolis* as well, in the form of an epigram: THE MEDIATOR BETWEEN HEAD AND HANDS MUST BE THE HEART! What follows thus has to be colored by the statement, and even taken as an illustration, an allegory of it, guiding the possible range of interpretation, whereas contradiction and generality emerged out of the title and opening Péguy citation in *Paris nous appartient*.

which the spectator of *Paris nous appartient* may both figure himself or herself and perform, to various degrees, that work of interpretation. The process of meaning-making is the place from which one looks at what has been monstrated, i.e. the place of a new spectatorship.

In Fritz Lang's film, the place of the machines in the existence of the workers also produces – for the latter – the sense of an absence of localizable control, but the intervention of the son between them and an unknown father and godly figure eventually redeems that impression.¹³² In Rivette's 1960 Paris, while individuals do intensely communicate horizontally, they do so through the prism of their fear, not in order to substitute a democratic and participatory relation for the conspiracy, regardless of its reality. Neither do they have a figure of mediation to direct them, be it in the form of returning them to themselves. The same goes with the public figured at the private screening of *Metropolis*: the lateral discussion taking place between people in the group shown frontally in two separate medium long shots takes the film as a pretext. Spectators are shown laughing and talking aloud, in a state of distraction away from the film and unengaged by it, unwilling to allow it to affect

¹³² While the son could well stand in for the filmmaker in Lang's own stance on the cinema, Rivette pulls back from that type of position, managing an hermeneutic space but without providing an interpretive key, let alone a meaning. The film is typically an unfinished object, not to be retrieved as complete, as the characters seem to believe about the conspiracy. It assumes a shared work, a diegesis which one does not have to enter completely (one can't, in fact). It has become impossible, beyond the talk between characters, to solve the "plot," at least not until the primary question has been answered: does the conspiracy arise from each individual's sheer investment in it – is it always produced somewhere else and alien to them, but adopted by them as their own, in which case the fiction itself constitutes a comment on what the citation performs? Or does it actually exist? *Paris nous appartient* raises the question by making its own images and sounds undecidable. The ending accentuates this undecidability, refusing to choose between representation of reality, hallucination, or narrative option: there might be a conspiracy because it is talked about (the plot exists), and people indeed die (whether by accident or not), but the proof is not there unequivocally in the image.

them and create a new community out of them. Also, the screening takes place with the lights up, not in the dark, and seems much closer as an apparatus to television than to a theatrical screening. Each individual can thus retain his or her habitual position – the masses of *Metropolis*, whether enslaved or not, have been replaced by smaller groups, themselves atomized, but for all that not any better at resisting injunctions which, in the meantime, have become increasingly internalized.

The work of monstration of *Paris nous appartient* is thus tied to its thematization of the disappearance of an external, organized coercion of the masses by power in favor of more discrete and dispersed means of control. What is monstrated in the *Metropolis* sequence is a type of relationship to images in which indifference has replaced fascination, but where manipulation remains all the more possible as it is no longer voiced. The public of Rivette's film sits at the crossroads between the art house cinema then emerging in Europe and in the United States, which was in part a cinema that made possible the assertion of a socio-cultural status, of a taste almost in spite of the film at stake; and television viewing, then causing a steep decrease in theatrical attendance and resting on the weakening of an attention that drew on a prescribed common space and time.

That common space and time involved not only the spectators, but also production and reception which, in classical cinema, have typically been assumed to bear a strong relation to each other: the producers propose a type of film they suppose on generally safe ground to answer the wishes of the public, gauge the actual response at the box-office, try and replicate or alter depending on the success, in an endless, back-and-forth process of adjustment. Citation, which emerged in modern

cinema, does not simply take stock of and epitomize the fictitious dimension of this double vision of a homogeneous response to films marketed on a mass scale and of a production and reception occurring in a similar environment, with relatively close cultural landmarks. It also exploits it as a positive force, figuring the mutual absence of filmmaker and spectator – a characteristic of cinema since its inception (in France as in other countries, the early 1960s mark the beginning of a double uncertainty that will culminate in the 1980s: as to the effective presence of the spectator in the theater, and as to the time and space of reception in general). But citation also plays on the fact that, despite appearances to the contrary, cinema has become (if it had not always been) an art and medium addressing an individual, be it in a public context and as an element, rather than a member, of a collective audience. Moving beyond the increasing de-phasing or gap between traditional producers and film audiences, it is part of an aesthetic that uses such a difference to reach out to the spectator, not by injecting presence where absence is the rule, or complementing screenings with a dose of live performance, but by marking its quality (and the film's) as a past, *unsolved* and *unsolvable*, that keeps on questioning new presents (and audiences) for answers. Not prejudging its actual success in doing so, it functions on the mode of an involuntary reach, by accident.

The main effects of citation developed so far – suspension of the fiction film in several of its parameters, alternation in the symbolic positions offered to the spectator, emphasis on the making of a singular interpretation in an almost material sense – point to the (re-)formation of separate spheres in the processes of interpretation and production of meaning, a more balanced rapport between the two

ends of filmmaking, author(s) and audience(s). As a consequence the spectator, partly orphaned from the comfort of the fiction and its assignment of positions, expelled from it and returned to himself or herself, also becomes – again – a lonely spectator. Or rather, s/he has to trade the illusion of a consoling “being together” for the genuine singularity in whose construction s/he may more actively participate.¹³³

The re-individualization of the hermeneutic process and outcome, if it does not suspend the community of interpretation projected by the fiction film altogether, gives precedence to a community of interpretation to come by focusing primarily on the single spectator – who alone can be the elemental unit to form it with others eventually. These two aspects – individual and collective – become more volatile with the advent of citation, since in a sense citation represents a recognition from within the film that production and reception remain irrevocably separate, that to the hackneyed, unanswerable question of the intentions of the filmmaker corresponds the symmetrical mystery of the spectator’s interpretive framework and actual response. Citation, as *Jacquot* epitomizes, scrambles the notion of a single filmmaker-auteur and the identity of that filmmaker as inferable from style, diegetic environment, mode of mise-en-scène, editing patterns, discursive range, etc. Untying conventional and logical associations, manifesting gaps previously covered over or sutured, it also gives up on a finite, preordained process of interpretation (whether

¹³³ Maggie Cheung (the character) in *Irma Vep* provides a figure for this process, as she takes on a part that would normally be in the custody of Western actresses and has to adjust an acting style usually better suited to action films. Yet as a performer she evidently accepts and learns a script written by someone else and depends on the producers, who have the power to evict her from the shooting to replace her with a different actress and will end up doing exactly that. In the meantime, however, she has appropriated the part in a manner that exceeds the film and contributes to a reinvention of herself: her departure from the fiction film corresponds to the creation of a fiction of her own.

because of the illusory nature of a presumption to guide and control that interpretation or out of principle ultimately depends on the filmmaker's assertions and the form of the citation).¹³⁴

This loneliness, this absence from the fiction comes, therefore, with the converse question, raised by the filmmaker and the film: the opening manifested by citation, the absence it makes possible and prepares, might as well be the symptom of an uncertainty on the part of the filmmaker as to whom s/he is addressing: where are the spectators, what are they doing, how are they watching? The fiction also represents its outside through a dialectical relation with the citation, hypothesizing it, as was observed about *Les Mistons* and *Irma Vep* earlier. While the *mise-en-abyme* in Truffaut's short film comes to question the mimetic force of visual representation (the action that turns the kiss into an embrace), Assayas's own film raises a complementary question, in a sense: what can an image do when, simultaneously, the filmmaker refuses mimeticism and when the audience absents itself from hermeneutic work? From the New Wave on, the anguish on the part of filmmakers as to the scope and the activity of their audience was recurrent (attendance started

¹³⁴ A historical distinction would be that, at the time of the New Wave, the leap into the present of reception by way of citation could quite safely expect to reach a spectator in the circumstances of a movie theater screening, and was – like the fiction film as a whole – thought of accordingly. Television was still a rarity in France. From the 1980s on (VHS, private television channels), and more intensively in the 1990s and the 2000s (cable and satellite television, the internet, DVDs, and now cell phones), citation not only takes part in a production context for which the spectator has become elusive, but also shuffles between media and modes of reception. To the theoretical postulate of an open-ended interpretation and renunciation of a control on it has responded an actual, empirical uncertainty as to where, when, how, what is made of the citation, and who does it. What could be called a Cassandra symptom seems to operate here: citation, as a gesture or as a figure, could be addressed to the spectator by the filmmaker knowing that the spectator would probably ignore it over and over again. And of course, if by chance the spectator responded to the address and made something of the citation, the filmmaker would still be bound to know nothing of it.

dropping in France only at that time, by contrast to the United States), and citations as interfaces between the diegetic world and the world of reception (for lack of a better term) became a privileged tool in mirroring the activity of the spectator while avoiding a wholly vicarious relationship between spectator and character.

This chapter began with the notion that, as a rhetorical device, citation needed to be perceived as such and, more important still, called for a cooperative, if not a compliant, spectator. It may seem contradictory, then, to end with the notion that citation could at best signal a disjunction, an impossible encounter between the production and the reception of a film, a bridge towards the unknown spectator whereby the filmmakers would reverse part of the work of interpretation on the side of the audience, in a series of successive futures unknown to them. The conceptualization of the audience as more or less implicit in the design of a work of art is the subject of an essay by Jacques Rancière published in 2008, *Le Spectateur émancipé*. I have tried to avoid using sentences such as “the spectator thinks...” or “the spectator feels...,” relying instead on the spectator as a modeled object from the perspective of the film (“the citations in this fiction film confront the spectator with...,” or “dare the spectator to reproduce a similar attitude”) without presuming an automatic, standard reaction or interpretation in actuality. Still, if the presence of citation within a fiction film does not necessarily entail an interventionist, effective, almost performative conception of film, it does approach the singular spectator in a different way than classical fiction films have, raising questions about the evolution of cinema as a medium and about the individual members of its audience on which Rancière’s argument may shed light.

Le Spectateur émancipé takes as a starting point a previous work by Rancière, *Le Maître ignorant*,¹³⁵ an exposition of the theories of early nineteenth-century teacher and philosopher of education Joseph Jacotot, who created a scandal in his time by claiming that an ignorant person could teach another what s/he himself did not know and by opposing intellectual emancipation to the instruction of the people. Rancière's premise, following in the footsteps of Jacotot, is quite simple: ignorance as such does not exist (no one lives without a number of things s/he has constituted out of personal experience). It is the production by a dominant class of a gap whose abolition is the promise out of which that same class derives its power to educate others. For of course, as soon as a gap is indeed abolished, new ones necessarily appear in order not to disrupt the social hierarchy a given education model helps perpetuate.

Le Spectateur émancipé goes back to this production of ignorance to question a number of practices in theater and the visual arts in the second half of the twentieth century, which take for granted that a problem lies with the spectator. First, s/he is wrong for being a spectator in the first place, as the position supposedly involves passivity and separation from the spectacle. The work of art resting on this type of separation should thus have its own abolition as its aim and force the spectator to renounce his/her position and de facto become an actor in the performance thus instituted. The problem may also have to do, not with the situation of spectacle itself, but with the attitude of the spectator towards the world s/he lives in. S/he thus presumably comes to attend to the work in a state of lack (of knowledge, of

¹³⁵ Jacques Rancière, *Le Maître ignorant. Cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle* [1987] (Paris: 10/18, 2004).

awareness as to the – social, economic, political – dynamics and ills that operate in his/her society...), and therefore needs to be “taught,” shown by the artist through the work of art what s/he ignores – so that, this is usually the related assumption, s/he may change it. Second, both of these complementary propositions posit art and reality as two distinct spheres, whether they seek to use such difference as a weapon or as a gap to be cancelled. For Rancière, this distinction is not only artificial and difficult to argue convincingly, it is also regularly recuperated by those in power to claim the status of reality for the fictions they produce or support, simultaneously discrediting dissenting views or representations as fictions, precisely. Third, and even though Rancière does not formulate it in detail, his repeated mention of a regime of “sensoriality” grounded in the individual human body as the basis for an emancipation articulated only afterwards does call into question the primacy of understanding (through consciousness, reason, the intellect) over the senses and perception. This in turn entails the notion that assigning a place to better the spectator or cancel him/her out as such is too programmatic to fulfill such a promise of emancipation, not to mention the obvious fact that it offers only a difference in degree (a better position, but one still preordained).

Citation, within this configuration, may appear to belong in a system that presupposes a bad spectator, or again – conversely – the very existence of a spectator as bad. It works, after all, against the habits, positionings, imaginary investments consolidated in classical cinema for several decades, even if these may not always be the primary preoccupations of filmmakers. And quite obviously, through citation the films in question manifest an intention, however evasive, to reach into the present of

the projection and affect the hermeneutic conditions in a way which, as we have seen, contests the function of the very apparatus that emerged with sound cinema. More than the spectator, though, it may be the fiction film itself – in its classical inception – that it designates as problematic; and devoid of the accusatory tone of a discourse that would discredit a certain way to attend to fiction films, citation, with its lack of specificity with regard to meaning, constitutes a call *to* spectators for other, new spectators, uncertain, subject to elaboration. In that sense, the choice of the word “citation” – by contrast with reference, which appeals to the specialist, the connoisseur, the community of knowledge already constituted – is crucial. This concerns the regimes of representative mediation (which according to Rancière postulates a spectator that must be reformed through an alternative form of mimesis) and ethical immediacy (which means to abolish spectacle and spectators altogether, doing away with re-presentation).

Yet the unknowable spectator which citation calls for, I would argue, has more to do with the aesthetic regime of art defined by an intrinsic separation, in Rancière’s view. Here the work of art relies on suspension, in two ways: issuing from a given historical context, the work – once cut loose from it, traveling through the centuries and wrenched from the web of functions and meanings originally attached to it, will still reach an addressee unexpectedly; or a work of art, in the very process of its creation, will feature a space or spaces unsaturated with relations of all kinds, leaving it available for potential addressees in the contemporary moment or in successive futures. Suspension is thus the passive or active suspension of all determinable relations, and the acceptance – perceptible in its very form – that the

production of meanings, of interpretations it gives rise to are beyond its realm, that its powers exist in reverse proportion to the effect sought on the spectator as structuring its very form. In that sense, citation – apprehended as a suspension, and opening spaces for new relations to form – may be a possible site in such an aesthetic regime. And as a consequence, the new spectator it helps imagine, rather than the actual historical French citizen considered as I set out on this work, now looks more like a hypothesis. Responding to specific aesthetic, discursive, and spectatorial conditions from the immediate post-WWII period on to this day, it would leave questions about the ties between spectators and citizens open, emerging from films and cinema and addressed to an evolving French citizenry, rather than constitute a set of critical models.

CONCLUSION

“Today, the cinema could say, ‘mission accomplished, there you have your little autonomous individuals. They are even the only film audience left. But organizing collectively a public made of individuals ‘personalized’ beforehand, that’s like trying to square the circle.”

Serge Daney¹³⁶

“During the 20th century, cinema has been the art that allowed souls – as they said in Russian novels – to live their story intimately in History. Never again will this fusion, this adequacy, this desire for fictions and History together be seen. [...] Having lived through fifty years of cinema, it is normal that I would end up relating it to my own life as well as to the lives of my contemporaries. The cinema alone has held together this ‘I’ and this ‘we’.”

Jean-Luc Godard¹³⁷

This research has, in the course of its progression, been marked by two arcs – two gradual realizations. On the one hand, it started with the sense that citation was bound to have an impact on the spectator of the fiction film, and even that this specific impact had been, if not planned, at least prepared as far as the conditions of its possibility were involved. In a sense, this perspective did not completely differ from the paradigm of classical fiction, the “representative model of linked-up actions and expressive codes suited for subjects and situations,” in Jacques Rancière’s

¹³⁶ Jean-Michel Frodon, “Un entretien avec Serge Daney,” *Le Monde* 7 Jul. 1992, 2. [“Aujourd’hui, le cinéma pourrait dire: mission accomplie, vous l’avez votre petit individu autonome. C’est même lui qui constitue ce qui reste de public de cinéma. Mais organiser collectivement un public composé d’individus préalablement ‘personnalisés,’ c’est la quadrature du cercle.”]

¹³⁷ Interview with Antoine de Baecque, *Libération* 6 Apr. 2002, reprinted in François Nemer, *Godard (le cinéma)* (Paris: Gallimard, 2006) 138. [“Le cinéma, au XXe siècle, a été l’art qui a permis aux âmes –comme on disait dans les romans russes– de vivre intimement leur histoire dans l’Histoire. On ne verra plus jamais une telle fusion, une telle adéquation, un tel désir de fictions et d’Histoire ensemble. [...] Ayant vécu cinquante ans de cinéma, il est normal que je finisse par le relier aussi bien à ma propre vie qu’à celle des hommes de mon temps. Seul le cinéma a tenu ensemble ce ‘je’ et ce ‘nous’.”]

words,¹³⁸ matter being given shape with a calculated expressive and communicative effect. As the last chapter pointed out, this perspective shifted towards a less voluntary, less ‘interventionist’ view of the figure of citation, a form of impassivity that raises the possibility of a new spectator while simultaneously stopping short of a prescriptive power.

On the other hand, there were the functions of citation which, in the chronological order of the corpus, did not change so much over time (the later films, as I hope to have shown, still evince an ambition to “monstrate” different objects on different levels). Rather, they became less salient, more difficult to identify in a changed landscape. Moving from the dominant audiovisual art form and medium to a content provider among others in media networks where its place is more and more negligible, cinema now involves many outlets for films – of which the theater is probably no longer the most prominent.

Translated from a dominant exhibition context and a clear protocol for the spectator to an economy of distribution that flows “contents” towards customers at all times and in many formats and devices, the fiction film does not necessarily occupy a privileged place in the attention of potential spectators. As a consequence, the putative functions of citation may be weakened in proportion. Rather than the initial shocks of modern cinema, citation may thus simply represent a barely noticeable snag in the mesh of fast-changing images and sounds circulating nowadays, a perception in passing. In a few cases, one could even argue that it serves to point to that circulation itself, a weakened case of monstration that comes close to

¹³⁸ Jacques Rancière, *La Fable cinématographique* (Paris: Seuil, 2005) 15. [“[le] modèle représentatif des actions enchaînées et des codes expressifs appropriés aux sujets et aux situations”]

a reinstatement of mimesis that would now encompass, not only the characters and the narratives, but the audiovisual environments in which they take place and the environments in which exhibition occurs, conflated for the occasion. Olivier Assayas's *Irma Vep* may thus also be read as a narcissistic celebration of the new state of global audiovisual affairs despite explicitly proposing a contrary thesis, while even a more ambitious film such as Claire Denis's *L'Intrus* does not altogether avoid the criticism of merely putting (unseen, or little seen) archival material back in circulation under the guise of giving its fictional world added volume and fleshing out its title and the book that inspired it.¹³⁹

Any hypothesis on the relations between the spectator-subject and the French citizen-subject therefore has to begin from the acknowledgment of evolving, perhaps weakened functions. As an opening in the fiction film, a dissociation performed on the narrative in images and sounds, the paradigmatic opening of alternative possibilities and meanings, citation may be construed within a larger framework of resistance to apparent isotopies between signifier and signified, a resistance to directions of interpretation as well. In other terms, it implies a refusal to validate the historical subject of production as the correct subject of a reception that would ceaselessly sanction it and reconfirm it over time. Interestingly, this opening of concurrent and overlapping times in the fictional narrative began in the late 1950s, with directors who – as critics – already called into question the cinema of their elders, seen as too limited to the flat illustration of texts. These texts, in the cinema of

¹³⁹ Jean-Luc Nancy, *L'Intrus* (Paris: Galilée, 2000). The essay appeared in English in a shortened and revised version as "The Intruder," in Jean-Luc Nancy, *Corpus*, trans. Richard A. Rand (Bronx, NY: Fordham U.P., 2008).

quality, were also quite frequently national historical narratives and literary classics that participated in the (re-)consolidation of a collective identity through the production of sites of identification: landscapes, monuments, historical, fictional, or mythical figures, narrative structures, male and female performers, etc. Contested yet never supplanted by the New Wave, this French strand of the heritage film continued in the 1960s and afterwards, expanding its historical territory to include (and rewrite) the period of the Occupation (Gérard Oury's 1966 *La Grande vadrouille* is, to some extent, a heritage comedy) and the postwar period. The repetition of certain marks of Frenchness, the neglect of others, combined with a pervasive lack of interest in contemporary society and colonial wars, indicate a desire for, if not an attempt at stabilizing a given historical French subject, reconciled and consensual, one that would not be as affected by the transformations of the world.

Beyond cinema, which thus contributed to assign a past identity to the present, the 1950s were also a moment of importation and development of various polling, statistical, and marketing techniques in French society, with citizens ceaselessly reminded in the press and in modern media of the general opinion on an infinity of topics, and permanently provided with a collective portrait of the national (continental) community. This very intensive barrage of diachronic snapshots in the mass media has been examined and commented by Kristin Ross in *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies*,¹⁴⁰ and its most precise critic in cinema was Jean-Luc Godard, notably in *Masculin Féminin*, with Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin also diverting the format of the polling interview in *Chronique d'un été* (1961). These mentions do not simply aim to

¹⁴⁰ Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies. Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996).

establish connections between the appearance of a figure in a new cinema and the context of a France saturated with redundant meanings about its present and its past, and where the control by the state of popular and individual memory was to become ever tighter over the following decades. On the one hand, the wedge driven into the fiction film and its plot through citation since the New Wave, on the other hand, the active part taken by a body of French fiction films in the 1940s and 1950s in both repeating a certain number of historical French markers and screening contemporary issues from view, cannot but suggest that the questioning force of citation within fiction might extend to the contest over the form to be assumed by the French citizen-subject.

I see this questioning as involving two levels. First, citation constitutes, among other things, a figuration of difference no longer integrated or assimilated, reaffirmed as difference – from a background, a dominant paradigm, a network of signification where its place poses a problem again. Taken strictly as an utterance or from the point of view of what it represents, it corresponds to what is commonly termed “image” in a wide sense – a constituted object with more or less explicit boundaries and a number of characteristics, including what is considered its referent(s). This approach of citation in isolation is of course not sufficient, as it does not look beyond its object to engage in a work of relationality and maintains citation in the place of an intruder, an element which neither fits in nor ‘makes sense.’ As the focus of a fixation, an insistence that meaning be inherent to it as a sign, and a refusal to contemplate, not only other meanings, but also the new relations these other meanings involve, citation calls to mind other instances: in cinema, obviously,

but also in the representation by communities of their daily environment, of their territory, of their assumed lineage.

In France, the recurring anxieties and obsessions of the past decades over the setting up of chain restaurants and their excessively brash signs may be cited as an example. Another would be in Switzerland, where the interdiction to build minarets in the future was recently approved by referendum. Linked to a concern over the soundscape of the European city (the fear that calls to prayer would be issued from minarets), these cases raise questions both about which images exactly are the images of Europe, since they seem non-negotiable when confronted to some instances of heterogeneity – since they excise, or ex-cite as heterogeneous some attempts at altering them. Similarly, the Muslim head scarf – an emblematic focus of battles over the neutrality of some public spaces, particularly schools, in the last two decades – has often been restricted by its opponents to a sign of religious proselytism and of the oppression of women, while the individuals who advocated the right to wear it underscored its polysemy and its personal dimension, unrelated to any ambition to exert pressure on peers or gain new converts. On either side, it seems as though the stakes of identity had gradually led the debate over secularity (*laïcité*) to revolve around signs, frozen and crystallized as a result.

The limitation of *laïcité* to the question of religion and the transformation of the debate into a competition for the supremacy over interpretation, regardless of the merits of either side, seemed to arrest the definition of this cornerstone of French republicanism around the time when church and state had been separated, in 1905. Little consideration was given to how the (limited) appearance of head scarves

displaced conventional notions of a public space open for debate, in which a wide range of ideas could be discussed without pressures being exerted or positive or negative bias affecting any of the spiritual, religious, political, philosophical options in presence. Instead, the argument gradually narrowed down to the meaning of a sign, taken as stable and univocal, whether in good or in bad. In other terms, *laïcité* was approached in historical terms and too often restricted to the context that had seen it emerge. Some wanted to uphold and perpetuate this original context. Others, who were a very small minority in metropolitan France at the time this body of legislation was enacted, did not see why they should be subject to an unaltered implementation of it – especially at a time when they did not see their side of the tradeoff materialize (the relegation of individual beliefs, affiliations, opinions to the realm of the private sphere as a guarantee for equality).

This certainly gave visibility to the fact that, as neutral as *laïcité* could ever be, it still depended on the use of force by the state to impose it. Yet, and it is my second point, it also obscured another possibility for thinking a secular space – one where meaning is not taken as a unit but as a relation, and therefore where it is not affixed to a particular sign but circulates, opens the possibility of establishing new relations, becomes serial without the intervention of any hierarchy to block its proliferation at any point. This calls to mind the structure of the Peircean sign, evidently, and the way interpretants are as many potential signs in becoming; but even more immediately and directly, I would suggest that it also constitutes an alternative version of *laïcité*, more theoretical and formal yet by no means minor. If indeed this political philosophy has defined itself historically against and in relation to religious

power (and not insignificantly, the power to assign certain meanings to signs, ban other meanings from them, ban certain signs...), the freedom of consciousness and expression, a critical examination that would distance itself as much as possible from personal and collective determinations, are its more general contributions.

Consequently, the French inception of secularity potentially applies to any power, authority, or even exertion of influence that threatens the free exercise by the individual of the faculties just mentioned. It may appear as relevant and legitimate when public space is being transferred to the management of commercial interests as it did when the Catholic church and the French state were tied by a treaty granting Catholicism a privileged status among the religions present in France. That exercise can hardly be conceived separately from the ability to interpret signs, negotiate them, refigure them freely from one's own position. Within that framework, citation is one intrusion among others and can serve alternately as a figurative reminder of the seriality and endlessness of meaning, a trigger or primer to a process of interpretation to come – not necessarily an endpoint. In other words, far from being limited to an – analogical – iconic sign, *laïcité* also opens onto a more neglected – diagrammatic – iconic sign, and more interestingly on the Peircean symbol. Citation in the fiction film raises the issue of an image not already there, meaningful, ascribed, but of an image as something never completely formed, a relation to come. This is where it partially overlaps with citizenship, its abstraction and its universal aspiration, by contrast to nationality, its representations and its narratives. The questioning effected by citation in the fiction film, considered in the potential extensions for an alternative politics of *laïcité* and French citizenship, autonomized from nationality, thus

constitutes a source of interrogation as to the nature of time, of point of view, of space, place and situation in the experience of cinema – and, in the case of France, in the experience of a citizenship where cinema has so often been summoned.

In temporal terms, citation introduces an alternative, disruptive time in the fiction film, retrospectively exposing the time that existed prior to its interruption as one coherent whole. From the standpoint of the narrative and the diegesis, at least in the dominant model derived from classical cinema, citation involves an operation of restitution, the perpetual sabotaging act by art (and the artist) to give back to images and sounds the infinite movement and profusion which the desire for order always strives to stop. This is the dialectic of intertextuality, and more acutely of citation, as we have seen: discontinuity replaces continuity, until a new continuity is construed out of discontinuity, and so on... In *La Fable cinématographique*, Jacques Rancière discusses the aesthetic regime of art that appeared at the dawn of the nineteenth century as the identical coexistence of two opposites (the work of the artistic idea and the impassible, powerless presence of sensible things). He argues that attaining this co-presence requires “the long process of de-figuration which, in the new work, contradicts the expectations borne by the subject or the story, or, in the older work, re-views, re-reads, and re-organizes elements.”¹⁴¹ Citation does not necessarily undo the causal relations which Rancière, referring to Deleuze, sees as the hijacking by the human brain of the interval between action and reaction; but breaking the unified

¹⁴¹ Jacques Rancière, *La Fable cinématographique* (Paris: Seuil, 2001) 15. [“le long travail de la défiguration qui, dans l’oeuvre nouvelle, contredit les attentes dont le sujet ou l’histoire sont porteurs, ou bien, dans l’oeuvre ancienne, re-voit, re-lit et re-dispose les éléments.”]

time that functions in solidarity with this type of cause-and-effect construction, it makes room for that undoing to be possible.

Additionally, the disruptive time figured by the advent of citation also makes possible yet another time, the present of the spectator. In this re-opening of an interpretative gap, the end of its negation, of a compression of the present into the past of narration, a re-distribution of the roles of eyes and hands also takes place. They trade abilities and powers, and in the process significantly impair the dominance of the eyes as guiding assembly and organization by the hands. The eyes can touch but no longer see, groping in their attempt to create an arrangement; and the hands, granted a form of vision, also inherit the immobility, the distance that characterize the eyes. Again, Rancière returns to Deleuze and his imagination, out of Tod Browning's *The Unknown*, of self-mutilation as epitomizing creative thought, a constant undoing of appropriation. Assuming for a moment an equivalence between the narrative fiction film and representative democracy – in the sense that once the tacit contract has been more or less consciously entered, it is not subject to re-negotiation until an appointed time – one may see citation as an untimely but opportune opening that affects the film not just at the point of the interruption, but leads to re-considering it more generally. Accordingly, transposed in the realm of a politics (*une politique*) now subject to the political (*le politique*) – to use Rancière's terms – citation also opens productive paths for imagining the resurgence of the present of the citizen into “the vision” s/he is regularly offered and invited into by candidates to government; into legislation – typically a projection of the past onto and into the future, a conformation of the latter by the former; and into elected

representation itself. The disruption of the imposed time of an existing image through the interruption by another existing image, it allows for language to work its way within the interval, before other, as of yet unknown images, appear, in turn giving way to more possibilities in a potentially endless, serial process.

Citation also gives a form to several points of view within the fiction film, points of view which, depending on the type of film in classical cinema, could be more or less apprehensible as such: within, of, and on narration, primarily. In that regard, it may in part be read as a symptom, if not of the failure, at least of the limitation of that cinema to make room for the spectator's own position, to allow for divergence and dissent out of the experience of a shared fiction film. This was a trope of *Cahiers* criticism, taken up in part by Serge Daney in its wake: great filmmakers, and that appeared more sharply with those working within the system, were the ones who had a point of view that was never quite co-extensive with that of the industry that financed them. And in carving out singular points of view, they raised the possibility for the spectators to experience the film as an event and situate themselves with respect to it at the same time. The division, or de-phasing, that affected the fiction at some stage made a continued symbolic identification and integration within the film more complicated.

These instances, however, never constituted a significant alternative; and the fact that splits and contradictions remained within the overall fabric of the narrative and the diegesis made it perfectly possible for them to remain unheeded by the audience. In the diffuse topography of the classical fiction film, citation also made some of its intentions or effects clear, monstrating what was no longer visible as well

as the formal means and discourse used and produced by that cinema. Yet the paradox of monstration, if it became more difficult to overlook, more pressing with citation, remained untouched: the object of monstration is perceived, seen or heard, but never exactly the way the agency of monstration had produced it as seen or heard. The gap, slight as it may sometimes be, is essential in the production by any spectator of a singular point of view and the ensuing confrontation with the points of view of others through processes I have previously referred to: nomination and description, analysis, interpretation. The same gap, downplayed or suppressed in the classical fiction film and by the apparatus that supports it, is also figured by citation – among numerous possibilities. It points to a multiplication of differences, to argument and disagreement as a corollary of a democracy of sovereign individuals, by contrast to the consensus often presented as crucial to its operations, but which embodies a specific conception of it.

This notion of *disensus*, which Rancière – again – has elaborated on across several works, and more particularly in *Aux bords du politique*, also entails that democracy come out of practices resting on a premise of equality, not a preconceived political subject; and that its exercise is not reserved to a professional expertise. From that standpoint, citation serves as the reminder of a strategy rarely used in (French) politics and the culture of citizenship: not content with simply countering a discourse or an ideology, a political view and its concrete manifestations, it would also open a breach in the very notions, however expressed, on which these rest as on solid foundations. And importantly, not based on the very knowledge preceding them, the

logic in which they are imbricated, but on the postulate that they warrant definition and negotiation.

Finally, citation returns spectators – to some degree – to the present of enunciation, to the space of the movie theatre, to their own positions as spectators and the situation they are part of, with one another. This involves a dis-alignment, an autonomization of the audience from the projector beaming behind them; and of the three domains where citation may question citizenship from the position of cinema, it is certainly the one that has received the most institutional support in the history of French cinema. The cine-club, even in its strongest adherence to a love object, the film, remains an extension of and a movement beyond the circumstances of the screening itself, into a socialized moment of comparative description and analysis. Its successors, the *maisons de la culture* and the *art et essai* circuit of theatres, have consistently received public funding from the state, and more recently from local governments. Also, despite current uncertainties as to its permanence, the French school system has been offering for close to twenty years a relatively regular, if modest introduction to cinema, from grade school to high school, in which the space of the theatre is pivotal. Beyond the – important – concern of showing films in the conditions for which they were made, and in the same media, these public policies rest on a consistent assumption, i.e., something takes place (or may take place) in the movie theatre that cannot occur in the privacy of the home, and which the state, in a somewhat schizophrenic manner, sees as its mission to support.

This may have to do with one of the linchpins of French citizenship – socialization – which to this day constitutes the decisive criterion for naturalization,

for instance. It then all depends on the kind of socialization involved in this public support of cinema through a presence in the curriculum and outside commercial circuits. Does it aim to enlist in a common history and facilitate the acquisition of landmarks in French culture, with the individual film a mere supplement amplifying a pre-existing set of landmarks? Does it serve the education system and participate in a kind of continuous adult training in French citizenship, an adjunct in space and time to the *éducation nationale*? Or does it take part, in spite of its sponsors and against its apparatus in a sense, in a general interrogation of the film as an object and the modes of interpretation elicited by it? And by extension, does it call into question the formation of (national) communities and the governments arising from them?

One may suspect a strong bias of the state for the first option, and certain historical developments in the economy of French cinema would seem to support it. For one, the 35-mm format was sanctioned as the sole acceptable standard for obtaining a distribution visa on the commercial circuit, itself structured around the feature film and the “single-bill” show – until recent successes by documentary feature films, this in effect would have been a feature fiction film, the mode where national self-fantasies and narratives could best be deployed. As if to confirm this, the New Wave (and with it citation) attempted to elaborate a cinema where things would not fit completely, where divergence or contradiction always prevented the isotopy of the constitutive elements of the film. On occasion this took place outside the established sites of exhibition and formats (Rohmer, Rivette, and Godard all used 16mm at some point). More interestingly, it involved a “pedagogical gesture” (for lack of a better expression) addressed at the willing spectator: besides the taste for

insolence and indocility inherited from Vigo's *Zero for Conduct*, which these filmmakers admired, the introduction of divisions in typical markers of Frenchness (the accents of performers used, the adaptation in French settings of American genres, etc.), the New Wave could be read as a conceptualization of cinema, and the theatre, as an alternative to the classroom, one where things would be unlearned before learning could be possible again, and differently. Godard is emblematic in that respect, as his exploration of learning found its first major expression with the mutual teaching of *La Chinoise* and included the practical exercise shot in video for television, *France Tour Détour Deux Enfants* (1977-78), in which the critical relation of two children to school is paralleled with that of the spectator in front of the television. His cinema is also shot through by the concern that recorded objects and figures be considered as openly and widely as possible, working through verbalization rather than serving as illustration to a verbal discourse. Citation, within that framework, is a sign that calls, not for understanding, the access to existing knowledge, but rather, calls on the spectator to do something with it – it is a call for autodidacts, and therefore implies a less easily definable social and political configuration. At the moment, both cinema and citizenship in France are undergoing deep transformations: cinema, with a more private exposure to films, outside the movie theatre, a trend towards competitiveness of the French film industry on the national and other markets to the detriment of a conception of cinema as art and social practice, the popularity of shorter formats; citizenship, with a dissolution of the national into smaller and/or de-territorialized affiliations, and an uncertainty as to its foundational values. The question may be, then, not so much whether citation

may remain a forceful figure for the functions examined here, but more widely whether these functions are already being assumed by other figures in the artistic and media landscape taking shape. And in turn, how these figures may or may not question redefined practices of citizenship remains to be seen.

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