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Understanding the "New Nativism": causes and consequences for immigration policy attitudes in the United States

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UNDERSTANDING THE "NEW NATIVISM": CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES

by

Benjamin Richard Knoll

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

May 2010

Thesis Supervisors: Assistant Professor Rene R. Rocha
Professor Caroline J. Tolbert

ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to further understand the relationship between nativism, the opinion that the American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence, and the immigration policy preferences of the American public. It is argued that nativism is theoretically distinct from immigration policy preferences and should be operationalized and modeled accordingly. Disentangling nativism from its related policy preferences is essential for better understanding the role of nativism in driving immigration policy attitudes in comparison to other important factors such as economic threat, racism, and ideological conservatism. A variety of methods are employed in this analysis, including cross-sectional survey data analyses, an implicit association test, and a nation-wide survey list experiment. Using these methods, this project examines the determinants of nativism (including psychological factors), the nature of the relationship between nativism and immigration policy preferences, and how nativism might distinctly affect immigration policy preferences among Latinos and African-Americans. The conclusion discusses the implication of these results for the current public debate regarding the degree and effect of foreign influence on American society.

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Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

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PH.D. THESIS

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This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

Benjamin Richard Knoll

has been approved by the Examining Committee
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To Michael W. Rigby, my high school AP Government teacher, for sparking in me an excitement for American history, government, and politics.

To the migrant Hispanic agricultural workers of Virginia's Eastern Shore, for teaching me Spanish and getting me interested in this particular topic.

From the Garden of Eden to [the present day], no age or society seems wholly free from unfavorable opinions on outsiders.

John Higham
Strangers in the Land, 1955

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to further understand the relationship between nativism, the opinion that the American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence, and the immigration policy preferences of the American public. It is argued that nativism is theoretically distinct from immigration policy preferences and should be operationalized and modeled accordingly. Disentangling nativism from its related policy preferences is essential for better understanding the role of nativism in driving immigration policy attitudes in comparison to other important factors such as economic threat, racism, and ideological conservatism. A variety of methods are employed in this analysis, including cross-sectional survey data analyses, an implicit association test, and a nation-wide survey list experiment. Using these methods, this project examines the determinants of nativism (including psychological factors), the nature of the relationship between nativism and immigration policy preferences, and how nativism might distinctly affect immigration policy preferences among Latinos and African-Americans. The conclusion discusses the implication of these results for the current public debate regarding the degree and effect of foreign influence on American society.

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CHAPTER 1: THE "NEW NATIVISM"

Introduction

Throughout American history, unfavorable attitudes toward foreigners have always persisted in some form or another. The most famous early political manifestation of American nativism was the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted in 1798 by President John Adams in response to a rise in anti-French sentiments related to the French Revolution. These acts collectively increased the difficulty of the naturalization process and facilitated the deportation of any foreigner deemed to pose a threat to national security or who hailed from a country with which the U.S. was currently at war.

In the mid-19th century, nativism manifested itself in opposition to immigrants from countries whose cultures and political traditions were markedly different from the American norm, primarily Irish Catholics who were seen as maintaining loyalty to a foreign sovereign (i.e. the Pope) and possessing authoritarian, anti-liberal political ideals. Nativism persisted throughout the remainder of the 19th century and into the 20th, targeting in turn southeastern Europeans, Chinese immigrants, and American citizens of Germanic decent. In each case, nativist attitudes emerged in opposition to those groups who represented a perceived threat to the American way of life and its valued resources (see Higham 1955; Hofstadter 1955; Knobel 1996; Perea 1997).

In the late 20th and early 21st century, Hispanic[1] immigrants have emerged as the prime target of nativism in the American public. The Latino population in the United States, comprising both legal citizens and undocumented immigrants, is currently surging. Consequently Latinos have recently overtaken African-Americans as the

[1] For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms "Hispanic" and "Latino" will be used interchangeably to refer to individuals of Latin American background, including those Mexico, Central America, and South America. It is recognized, however, that generally-speaking, "Hispanic" implies Spanish-speaking while "Latino" is more inclusive.

country's largest racial minority group (Bernstein and Bergman 2003). As of 2007, it was estimated that the Hispanic population in the United States stood at 46 million, about 15% of the entire U.S. population, and had grown by nearly 30% in only seven years since the turn of the century in 2000. It is also now estimated that Latinos make up a sizable proportion of the population in several U.S. States: 44% of New Mexico, 36% of both California and Texas, 29% of Arizona, 24% of Nevada, 20% of Florida and Colorado, 16% of New York and New Jersey, and 15% of Illinois. Of the ten million Hispanics that entered the United States between 2000 and 2007, approximately four million were the result of international immigration while six million were the result of entering via native birth (Fry 2008).

There is also no sign that this rapid growth rate will slow any time in the near future. It was recently estimated that 82% of the increase in the U.S. population between 2005 and 2050 will be the result of international immigration, mostly from Spanish-speaking countries. By 2050, it is estimated that Hispanics will account for one-third of the American population and that one in every five people in the United States will be a first-generation immigrant. Furthermore, the same estimates indicate that Anglos will constitute a minority group in the United States by the year 2050 (Passell and Cohn 2008).

How the nation responds to these rapidly-changing demographics is obviously a topic of utmost concern for social scientists and American policy-makers. Signs of these changing conditions have already begun to manifest themselves. The recent influx of Latin American immigrants over the last several decades has been accompanied by a resurgence of negative sentiments toward immigrants and foreigners, similar to what occurred in the early 1990s (see Hofstadter 1955). This "new nativism" (Zeskind 2005; The New Nativism 2006; Navarrette Jr. 2007) represents one of the most significant social phenomena in recent history and carries broad implications for both public policy-makers and the future of race relations in the United States.

Nativist attitudes in the American public are actually more prevalent than conventional wisdom would suggest. A 2006 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center[2] found that 50% of respondents either mostly or completely agree that "our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence." In the same survey, 47% of respondents reported that they believe that "the growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values." These attitudes have real consequences for policy-makers. President Bush pushed immigration reform legislation in 2006 and again in 2007. It has been observed that both attempts failed in the Congress largely due to the intense nativist opposition from constituents as communicated to their elected representatives (Navarrette Jr. 2006b, 2006a). Coming to a better understanding, then, of the causes and consequences of nativism is crucial for understanding the state of contemporary American politics.

Why Nativism is Important

Before going any further, it would be helpful to briefly examine why exactly it is that we should care about nativism in the first place. I argue that a more comprehensive understanding of the causes and consequences of nativism is crucial to political scientists (and the general public) for several reasons.

First, as was briefly discussed earlier, we should care about nativism and its effects on racial policy preferences because our society is growing increasingly more diverse in terms of race and ethnicity. Consequently, the electoral clout and political influence of minority groups is growing as well. The motivations for supporting political policies that are seen as negatively targeting these minority groups carry real

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[2] Data from the "2006 Immigration Survey" conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Hispanic Center. The survey was in the field from February 8 – March 7, 2006 and has a sample size of 6,003. It oversampled about 800 from each of five major metropolitan areas with a high Hispanic population (Chicago, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Raleigh-Durham, and Washington, D.C.). This survey sampled roughly 800 African-Americans and 800 Latinos.

consequences for groups seeking political influence. For example, commentators have already noticed that the Republican Party is currently taking significant electoral risk by catering to its more nativist constituents. By supporting anti-immigrant legislation, the Republican Party might risk alienating Latinos and thus lose the support of the fastest growing minority group in the country. This bodes poorly for its future viability as a national party (Marcus 2006). This dissertation will examine the extent to which nativism in fact does drive immigration policy attitudes among Latinos as well as Anglos, which will help us determine important implications for partisan politics in a multiethnic society.

Second, this issue is important because political scientists have yet to make the conceptual or analytical distinction between nativism and immigration-related policy preferences. As will be discussed in great detail in this dissertation, this distinction is important and the mechanics of making that distinction will be discussed at length later in this proposal. For the time being, however, it can be argued that if nativism is indeed a strong determinant of anti-immigrant policies in the United States, it is important from a normative perspective to understand such sources, as policy-makers may then be better able to anticipate and respond to such attitudes when proposing and refining immigrant-related legislation in our state and national legislatures. Furthermore, understanding the sources of support for anti-immigrant policies is important because it helps us understand the true motivations for such support and would suggest ways to more effectively mitigate and temper such attitudes in the American public.

Third, nativism may be strongly associated with out-group racial prejudice. To date, most academic research on Anglo racial attitudes have focused on racism targeting African-Americans (see Kinder and Sears 1981; Bobo 1988; Sniderman, Brody, and Kuklinski 1991; Sniderman and Piazza 1995; Sears et al. 1997; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000, e.g.). These studies have attempted to explain attitudes of the dominant Anglo population of the United States toward governmental policies that would primarily affect

African-Americans. As will be explained in later chapters, scholars debate over whether conservative attitudes toward these racial policies are driven by more principled commitments to political ideologies or less admirable factors like racism and prejudice. This dissertation will break new ground by applying these theories of black public policy attitudes to see if they can be profitably employed to help understand Latino policy attitudes. While there have been some assorted studies focusing on anti-Latino racism on the part of Anglos (see Baretto and Woods 2005; Hero and Preuhs 2006, 2007), we have yet to understand to what extent attitudes toward immigration policy and guest-worker programs are driven by racism as opposed to principled ideological considerations or the rather fascinating attitude of nativism.

Furthermore, this project will also examine out-group racial prejudice among African-Americans and Latinos, which has received even less attention in academic literature (see Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hunt 2007; Powers and Ellison 1995; Gay 2004; and Rocha 2007 for notable exceptions). Understanding how racial attitudes are formed and expressed and how they differ among racial subgroups is vital to understanding inter-group attitudes and behavior in contemporary American politics, especially with the recent election of Barack Obama, the first racial minority to be elected United States president.

Fourth, coming to a better understanding of nativism is crucial because immigration policy is one of the most salient issues of contemporary American politics. Data collected from a 2008 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll (Redlawsk and Tolbert 2008) revealed that 85.7% of respondents (nation-wide) indicated that the issue of immigration was either somewhat or very important to their vote for president in 2008. Consequently, both Democratic and especially Republican presidential candidates were required to explain their position on undocumented immigration at length during the 2008 primary season. The importance of this issue among the public was not lost on policy-

makers. In 2007, former Illinois congressman and Chair of the House Democratic Caucus (and now White House Chief of Staff) Rahm Emmanuel declared:

> This [immigration] issue has real implications for the country. It captures all the American people's anger and frustration not only with immigration, but with the economy. It's self-evident. This is a big problem. For the American people, and therefore all of us [American political elites], it's emerged as the third rail of American politics. And anyone who doesn't realize that isn't with the American people. (Weisman 2007)

Because nativism may be a key determinant of immigration policy preferences, understanding its determinants will help us better understand the nature of immigration policy attitudes that have far-reaching consequences for the ability of American policy-makers to enact any sort of immigration reform proposals or alter the current immigration system in the United States.

The fifth and final reason is closely related to the fourth. As American society continues to grow and diversify, it may become increasingly difficult for elected officials to govern effectively in a multiethnic environment. Competing interests from a variety of demographic and economic cleavages may continue to increase the prevalence of inter-group hostility and conflict. This is already happening in some diverse states such as California, where rapidly-changing demographics have led to increasingly difficulty in the ability of the mass public and elected officials to reach any kind of political consensus on a number of racially-charged issues. A series of California ballot initiatives in the 1990s (including Proposition 187 which attempted to deny social services to undocumented immigrants, Proposition 209 which sought to end affirmative action, and Proposition 227 which targeted bilingual education) demonstrated the urgency and salience of finding a solution to inter-racial conflict in a diverse society (see Baldassare 2000).

Furthermore, the asymmetries of voter knowledge, engagement, and participation among minority groups in a rapidly-changing multiethnic society have real consequence for the pursuit of equality and representation for these disadvantaged groups (Citrin and

Highton 2002). Elected officials and policy-makers must be able to respond to these dynamic conditions if they hope to be able to maintain order, vitality, and harmony in contemporary American society. Understanding the causes and consequences of nativism in the mass public is essential to the achievement of this goal as nativism is one of the key sources of discord and conflict in our multiethnic environment that will only continue to diversify in the coming years and decades.

Current Objectives

The primary objective of this research is to better understand the determinants and effects of nativism in the mass public. Most of the previous work on nativism has been conducted by historians (examining nativism as a social movement during the late 19th and early 20th centuries) and is qualitative in nature. More quantitatively-oriented social scientists, on the other hand, have tended to focus their efforts on exploring the determinants of support for specific public policy preferences like bilingual education and immigration restrictionism. Up until this point, however, there have been few quantitative efforts made by social scientists to understand the determinants of the attitude of nativism itself in the general public. They have conflated the nativist attitude either with support for various immigrant-related public policies or with the policies themselves.

There are important reasons, however, to distinguish the nativism attitude from its policy manifestations. I will argue in this dissertation that nativism is an attitude independent from support for specific public policies. While it may very well be the case that nativism is one of the primary determinants of support for policies like official English or immigration restrictionism, they are not one and the same.

Consider, for example, that there are many legitimate justifications for supporting a restriction on immigration into the United States. The nativist explanation would be that people feel anxiety due to the threat that foreigners pose to a uniquely American way of

life, as manifested in its language, culture, values, and traditions, that might accompany an increased level of immigration. If this were the only motivation, researchers would be justified in conflating nativism with restrictionist immigration attitudes. This is not the case, however, as it could also be argued that incoming foreign immigrants exert a negative impact on the nation's economy because of their relatively lower socio-economic background. It could also be argued that in a post-9/11 world, increased immigration is a concern for national security and the threat of terrorism, resulting in a support for both a restriction on immigration as well as a U.S.-Mexican border fence. As there are other legitimate and non-nativist arguments in favor of immigration restrictionism, this crucial distinction must be made.

Isolating and examining the nativist attitude, then, is essential for arriving at a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between nativism and immigration-related policy preferences, as well as understanding more comprehensively the source of immigration restrictionism in contemporary American society. To do so, this dissertation will develop and test a multi-stage model of policy preferences to examine 1) the determinants of nativism in the mass public and 2) the extent to which nativism drives immigration-related policy preferences in comparison with other traditional factors.

This second point is important because it is commonly assumed in contemporary American society that people who oppose anti-minority political parties do so because of animosity or prejudice toward those minorities. As was explained previously, research on anti-minority political preferences has yet to arrive at a common agreement on the extent to which prejudice and antipathy drive anti-minority policy preferences in comparison with other potential explanatory factors. From a research standpoint, it is important to know if restrictive immigration policy preferences are being driven by economic concerns, racial concerns, or cultural (i.e. nativist) concerns as it helps illuminate how Americans feel toward anti-minority policy preferences. From a policy-making

standpoint, knowing why Americans would oppose more liberal immigration policies would help those on both sides better be able to tailor their legislation to more accurately address those concerns.

This dissertation will also examine how nativism and its effects differ among racial subgroups. Are African-Americans more likely to possess nativist attitudes because they are more often in direct competition with foreign immigrants for jobs, or are they more likely to sympathize with immigrants because of their shared minority status? Similarly, does nativism among Latinos increase as they become more and more assimilated into the American culture, or does it remain relatively low because they identify with foreign immigrants who are of a shared ethnicity and ancestry?

Chapter Outline

The proceeding chapter (Chapter 2) will summarize the outstanding literature on "nativism" and racial policy preferences more generally. A working definition of nativism will be presented, along with some relevant examples. Analysis of public opinion survey data will show just how prevalent nativism is in contemporary American society. This chapter will also explain the conceptual distinction between the nativist attitude and race-related policy preferences such as immigration restrictionism. This distinction will be supported with quantitative evidence from public opinion surveys. Finally, this chapter will address the important question of which groups in society are the primary targets of contemporary American nativism. Conventional wisdom would suggest undocumented Hispanic immigrants, yet there are important reasons to consider that nativism may also be targeting Europeans or Middle Easterners.

Chapter 3 will derive and test a theoretical model of the nativism attitude through multivariate statistical analysis. Data come from a number of courses, including a nation-wide "list experiment" and two separate national public opinion surveys. The hypotheses will be drawn from previous research in the fields of political science, history, sociology,

and psychology. Independent variables will include relevant demographic characteristics, social context, feelings about American national identity and multiculturalism, racial affect, and various psychological personality characteristics. Examining these psychological characteristics is especially important because it represents one of the first major attempts to move beyond the traditional explanations for Latino public policy attitudes, like education and social context, and toward more fundamental personality dispositions and characteristics as a possible source of these important policy attitudes.

Chapter 4 will incorporate the findings of previous chapters into a multi-stage model of immigration-related policy preferences. Nativism will be incorporated into a predictive model alongside other "traditional" determinants of immigration attitudes as demonstrated through previous research. These include racial attitudes, concerns about the effect of immigration on the economy, etc. This will enable us to determine if nativism is, as conventional wisdom would suggest, the key factor driving immigration attitudes in the American public. This chapter will also examine how the effect of nativism varies among different types of immigration policies.

Chapter 5 will continue the analysis of the psychological foundations of Latino public policy attitudes by reporting the findings of an "implicit association test" – an experimental method which tests subconscious positive and negative associations that respondents have toward symbols of foreign influence in American society. The goal will be to determine the extent to which immigration attitudes are driven by subconscious preferences for a traditional version of American culture, which individuals might not even be aware that they possess.

Chapter 6 will examine nativism and related policy preferences among Latino-Americans. Conventional wisdom would suggest that nativism should be virtually non-existent among Latinos, as the majority of immigrants in the United States are also Latinos. However, unlike African-Americans, Latinos are more rapidly integrating into the broader American culture and nativism may in fact be common among Latinos who

have more rapidly assimilated. This chapter will also include predictive variables unique to Latinos – panethnicity, country of origin, "linked fate" (when an individual perceives his or her interests to be linked to the interests of the group as a whole), and American acculturation.

Chapter 7 will introduce and attempt to solve competing expectations for the determinants of nativism among African-Americans. On one hand, competition with immigrants for jobs and government benefits might lead to higher levels of nativism amongst African-Americans. On the other hand, blacks might display lower levels of nativism due to the fact that they themselves constitute a separate ethnic/cultural group and do not perceive their cultural resources (language, values, traditions, etc.) to be threatened by foreigners. They also may perceive a common minority group status with immigrants, thus making them more welcoming toward them. This chapter will also introduce and test certain determinants of nativism which are unique to African-Americans, namely, racial alienation (when an individual perceives members of his or her own group as facing unfair treatment in larger social order) and "linked-fate".

The concluding chapter will summarize and synthesize the findings of the previous chapters. It will also discuss the implications of these findings for academic research on immigration policy attitudes, racial prejudice, and inter-group behavior. Further, this chapter will discuss the implications of these findings for American policy-makers as they struggle with the contemporary debate over immigration reform and the status of the roughly thirteen million undocumented immigrants currently in the United States. From a normative perspective, the conclusion will also discuss possible strategies for mitigating nativist attitudes in the American public and the implications that this has for the ability of elected officials to effectively govern in a multi-ethnic society.

CHAPTER 2: NATIVISM IN PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

Investigating the determinants of racial public policy preferences or attitudes toward racial/political out-groups is nothing new to political scientists. Some have argued that it is impossible to understand American politics without also understanding the tradition of racial inequality and racial attitudes among the mass public as well as among the elites who shape public policy (Hero 2003; Smith 1993). But what do we understand about the causes and consequences of nativism in the American public? First, this chapter will discuss the extant literature seeking to explain support for racial public policies in the United States. Second, we will turn to the progress that has been made in understanding more specific nativist attitudes. Afterwards, the primary theoretical arguments motivating the current research project will be developed and a theoretical definition of nativism will be given, along with an explanation of how nativism as an attitude is distinct from immigration policy preferences. The remainder of this chapter then examines the prevalence of nativism among the general American public and concludes by investigating the primary targets of the contemporary "new nativism" in American society.

Explaining Attitudes toward Anti-Minority Public Policies

Early research by sociologists and political scientists on the causes of racial political attitudes focused primarily on the size of the minority group in question and the desire of the super-ordinate group to maintain their privileged social and economic position (Key 1949; Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958). These studies focused primarily on understanding Anglo attitudes toward African-Americans as well as public policies which favor African-Americans, then the dominant minority group in the United States. Using

more sophisticated methodologies, this work was advanced in more recent decades (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Tolbert and Hero 1996, 1998, 2001; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Hero 2003; Giles and Buckner 1993; Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and Morris 1998; Welch et al. 2001; Rocha and Espino 2009). These studies sought to explain racial attitudes and associated political preferences at the state- and individual-level as a function of the racial make-up of the geographical area in question.

The more recent research is notable in that it began to move beyond focusing on attitudes toward African-Americans and started to include Latinos and Latino-related public policies as the key targets. Work on the effect of social context and race has fallen largely into two primary camps. The racial threat hypothesis (Giles and Buckner 1993; Meier and Stewart 1991; Tolbert and Grummel 2003) posits that a higher concentration of racial out-groups in one's geographic vicinity is associated with a higher prevalence of racial prejudice and opposition to public policies that benefit racial minorities. This is because the greater concentration of the relevant out-group increases the immediacy and salience of the threat that an out-group poses to an in-group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). On the other hand, the social contact theory (Oliver and Wong 2003; Welch et al. 2001) predicts that higher levels of racial out-groups in one's vicinity is actually associated with more pacific inter-racial attitudes and policy preferences because being surrounded by higher proportions of minorities leads to increased opportunities for inter-racial contact, resulting in increasing familiarity and a lowering of racial tensions.

Looking beyond social context, other scholars have examined the nature and effects of racism itself on driving racial policy preferences. While this may seem self-evident, there has been a great deal of debate over exactly how racism might interact with

attitudes toward affirmative action, school busing, welfare spending, etc. The "symbolic racism" argument (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears et al. 1997; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000; Henry and Sears 2002; Sears and Henry 2003; Tarman and Sears 2005) posits that even though old-fashioned biological racism may not be as prevalent in American society as it was several decades ago, anti-black prejudice in the form of "symbolic racism" still exerts a large effect on public policy preferences that benefit racial minorities. Those who are "symbolically" racist are not those who think that blacks are biologically inferior, but rather that they fail to live up to American traditional values of productivity, self-control, and the "Protestant work ethic." They would agree, for example, with the phrase: "if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites."

Others, such as Sniderman and Piazza (1995) disagree with the symbolic racism theory. They argue that attitudes on racial public policies are largely a function of ideology and education, not anti-black racism. They claim that people can be opposed to "racial" policy preferences, such as welfare or school busing, because of an ideological opposition to government intervention in certain social matters. In terms of welfare, for example, they argue that principled conservatives simply believe that it is not the government's job to provide monetary welfare to anyone, regardless of race or ethnicity (Sniderman, Brody, and Kuklinski 1991).

Aside from social context and racial prejudice, a third perspective advocated by Jack Citrin and his colleagues has taken a more philosophical approach, attempting to frame support for anti-immigrant public policies in terms of the liberalism-multiculturalism debate of the distinctiveness of American culture and society (Citrin 1990; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin et al. 1994, 2001). These competing

perspectives have more commonly been referred to as the "melting pot" and "salad bowl" explanations of American culture.

Classical liberals (the "melting pots"), in the tradition of John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and the classical Enlightenment thinkers, argue that there is one particular version of American culture to which everyone should subscribe. This is because, theoretically, a commitment to equality demands that all should be viewed the same before the state and the law. When everyone is viewed equally, no one may be treated differently based on group memberships. Thus, in the eyes of the government, all are granted equal consideration and no special exceptions are to be made for those who belong to minority groups or who claim special consideration. Those who subscribe to this view would, in turn, favor policies that encourage the laws to be applied uniformly to all individuals – with no considerations made for linguistic or ethnic minorities (Taylor 1994).

Classical liberals would argue that when immigrants come to this country they should be required to assimilate as quickly as possible to the language, norms, traditions, holidays, religious traditions, and "way of life." They argue that America was founded upon a set of Protestant, Anglo-Saxon values and traditions, and future immigrants should do their best to adapt to it (Huntington 2005). As John Jay wrote in Federalist No. 2:

> … Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people – a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence. (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1987)

Thus, classical liberals would argue that the long-term viability of a nation depends largely on its ability to foster a certain degree of cultural and linguistic homogeneity among its citizenry.

The multiculturalist perspective (the "salad bowl"), on the other hand, argues that there is no particularly distinctive "American culture." Instead, the distinctiveness of America is that a variety of cultures, backgrounds, viewpoints, and ethnicities can co-exist more or less peacefully within a single country. This perspective sees the growing number of immigrants with their own languages and unique cultures as an asset, not a liability. Individuals should maintain their separate cultures and traditions because that is what, ultimately, provides them with their dignity and feelings of self-worth. This identity-based self-esteem is a fundamental right that should not be forcefully threatened without violating the intrinsic value of human freedom (Kymlicka 1996; Glazer 1998; Hollinger 2006). This perspective would not only welcome new immigrants, but would also oppose official English, support bilingual education, and promote distinct ethnic traditions because all languages, cultures, values, and people are just as legitimate and valuable as others.

Consequently, Citrin (1990), Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) and Citrin, Haas, Muste, and Reingold (1994) model support for anti-minority sentiments and foreign policy as a function of a commitment to the liberal conception of American society and a rejection of the multiculturalism. They posit that those who are opposed to immigration and bilingual education are primarily those who believe that there is one particular version of American culture to which all Americans should subscribe. They argue that these deep-seated, fundamental views about the very nature of American society are superior predictors of policy attitudes than common socioeconomic predictors like education and income.

For example, Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) operationalize the liberal commitment to a particular version of America by creating an index based on survey

responses to "what it means to be an American." The index measure included believing in God, voting in elections, speaking English, trying to get ahead by one's own efforts, treating people equally, and speaking up for one's country. They show that not only is there a strong correlation between their "Americanism" measure and standard socioeconomic variables (like age), but also that when incorporated as an independent variable into a model of immigrant-related policy attitudes, the effect of their "Americanism" variable was greater than the standard socioeconomic predictors that had received support in the previous literature.

Thus, one of the goals of this project is to build upon and expand the work of Citrin and his colleagues by explaining support for anti-immigrant public policies as a function of deep-seated values about the nature of American society. Whereas these researchers focused on American national identity and a commitment to societal liberalism as the key independent variable, this study focuses on nativism, a distinct attitude which combines a commitment to a particular American way of life with the feeling that the particular way of life is threatened and needs to be protected specifically against foreign influence. This foreign influence can come in the form of individuals, groups, language, cultures, traditions, philosophies, etc. (Higham 1955).

Defining Nativism

It is evidently important to come to a broader understanding of the nativism attitude because it potentially is a key determinant in explaining attitudes toward such timely and controversial public policy preferences as immigration, official English, bilingual education, border security, etc. Consequently, there has been a great deal of research by historians and sociologists that has aimed at better understanding the specific causes of nativism, as opposed to particular immigration policy preferences. Most of the extant work on nativism, which will be discussed shortly, is historical (examining nativism during the late 19th and early 20th centuries) and qualitative in nature. More

quantitatively-oriented political scientists, on the other hand, have tended to focus their efforts on explaining the determinants of specific public policy preferences like official English, bilingual education, and immigration restriction (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin et al. 1997; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Branton and Jones 2005). While these studies are profitable for understanding the determinants of these particular public policy preferences, the nativism attitude itself has been largely understudied or overlooked by political scientists.

As was previously described, much of the academic work on nativism has been carried out by those in the field of history. For example, the pioneering work on the subject, *Strangers in the Land*, by John Higham (1955) describes and examines patterns in American nativism from the post-Civil War era period until the post-WWI era. He identifies three core elements of nativism: it is anti-radical, anti-Catholic, and pro-Anglo-Saxon (Higham 1955).

Hofstadter (1955) explains that the late 19th and early 20th century hostility toward immigrants was principally motivated by a perceived threat posed by the political culture and traditions of the growing immigrant populations. This new population, with its distinct cultures and languages, took a passive approach to political participation, having come from autocratic European countries. The willingness of the "ignorant" immigrants to depend on political bosses severely hampered the efforts of early Progressive reformists (9, 44, 175-85, 294). Indeed, Hofstadter (1955) concludes: "It would be hard to imagine types of political culture more alien to each other than those of the Yankee reformer and the peasant immigrant" (182). This phenomenon is further described by Hays (1995): "These hordes of newcomers maintained strange customs, spoke peculiar languages, dressed oddly, and practiced alien Catholic and Jewish religions; they had not the proper reverence for American values, symbols, and heroes" (99). These historians attribute turn-of-the-century nativism to a perceived threat to the traditional American political culture.

More recently, Dale Knobel's (1996) work examines nativism from colonial times to the present day. This book centers on nativism at the elite level, describing it not only as an ideology but also as a social movement that, through American history, has been maintained only through the efforts of a few select elites (Bennett 1988).

With the recent surge in Latino immigration to the United States over the past few decades, nativism has become a popular topic of inquiry for political scientists. Research in this area has focused primarily on determinants of attitudes toward public policies like immigration policy, official English laws, and immigrant-related ballot initiatives. These attitudes and preferences have been found to be affected by a variety of determinants including sociodemographic characteristics like age, race, education, and religion (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Knoll 2009a), economic anxieties (Citrin et al. 1997; Alvarez and Butterfield 2000), out-group stereotypes (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Fetzer 2000), and racial and spatial context (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Tolbert and Hero 1996, 2001; Hood and Morris 1998; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Branton et al. 2007; Fennelly and Federico 2008; Rocha and Espino 2009).

While these studies have done a masterful job of investigating the determinants of American policy attitudes, they collectively assume that "nativism" is synonymous with restrictionist immigration preferences or support for punitive ballot initiatives targeting undocumented immigrants. Alvarez and Butterfield (2000), for example, operationalize nativism with support for the 1994 California Proposition 187 which sought to deny undocumented immigrants access to most state social services. Branton, et al. (2007) also examine proposition 187, referring to it as a "nativist ballot proposition." Tolbert and Hero (1996), while not specifically using the word "nativism" to describe support for the same California ballot proposition, also examine the effect of racial context on support for anti-minority ballot measures. These same authors (2001) examine similar phenomenon in explaining support for a number of other racial policy measures such as

official English, affirmative action, and bilingual education as a function of the racial context in which the individual resides.

Tatalovich (1995), in one of the more well-known studies on the determinants of English-only laws in the United States, refers throughout his work to "nativism" in the abstract, but never seems to tack down a definitive definition of the concept. His book is entitled, "*Nativism Reborn? The Official English Movement and American States*," implying that nativism is synonymous with support for official English policies. The term "nativism" is also used throughout the book in reference to support for the language policies. However, nativism is also used as one of the independent variables explaining support for English-only policies (see page 189) and is operationalized as a contextual variable representing the rural/urban split in a particular area. It is thus unclear exactly what is meant by "nativism" in this work, not to mention whether it is the independent or dependent variable in the analysis.

Simcox (1997) makes a valiant attempt to operationalize nativism by examining the effect of various "nativist" determinants of immigration policy attitudes. In this study, nativism is operationalized by variables falling under three primary categories: perceived threat to resources (both cultural and economic), racism, and political attitudes toward isolationism (foreign-policy and political efficacy). These "nativism" variables include support for other public policy measures (bilingual education, protective trade policies) as well as more general racial and trust-related attitudinal measures. Again, the distinction between the nativism attitude and the policy preference is unclear.

Citrin, et al. (1994) attempt to construct a "nativism index" to predict American foreign policy attitudes, but once more, it suffers from the same attitude-policy confusion. This index attempts to measure the relative level of nativism vs. multiculturalism in the American public and defines a strong nativist as one who 1) strongly favors an official English law, 2) opposes bilingual education, 3) favors a "melting pot" over a "salad bowl" conception of American culture, 4) disagrees that

Latino or Asian immigration would improve American culture with new ideas and customs, 5) thinks that religious faith is important to one's American identity, and 6) supports immigration restrictionism. This definition of nativism includes several policy preferences, general immigration attitudes, and general behavioral measures such as church attendance. In essence, Citrin and his colleagues, along with the other researchers which have previously been discussed, have theorized nativism and its public policy manifestations as theoretically identical or, at least, interchangeable.

This discussion can be summarized in Table 2.1 which illustrates the various ways that nativism has been operationalized in previous studies by political scientists.[3] Again, these political definitions of nativism tend to merely conflate the attitude of nativism with immigration policy preferences. Thus, we can turn to historical studies on the subject to help construct a more accurate definition of nativism. In the aforementioned work by John Higham (1955), nativism is defined as "an intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., "un-American") connections. … While drawing on much broader cultural antipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into a zeal to destroy the enemies of a distinctly American way of life" (4, see also Perea (1997b) (1) who adopts this same definition).

Knobel (1996) discusses the various definitions and concepts that have been labeled as "nativist" by researchers and historians. At various times, nativism has been equated with "prejudice, discrimination, racism … etc." (xii). He argues that nativism is not, at its core, linked to race (xxv). "What we really want to know," he argues, "is why some people (and not others) were attracted to a particular version of American culture and were disposed to join organizations that discriminated between citizens and 'aliens'

[3] There are, of course, dozens of other studies that have investigated the determinants of support for anti-immigrant policy preferences. For the sake of brevity, however, (and to illustrate the attitude-policy preference conflation in the literature) Table 2.1 includes only those studies which specifically used the word "nativism" to describe support for the policy preferences.

on the basis of it" (xiii). Knobel admits that a specific definition of nativism is hard to arrive at, but that ultimately nativism "sits somewhere in the middle of the yardstick of bigotry with color prejudice at one end and indiscriminate xenophobia at the other" (xx).

Perhaps the most extensively-developed conceptualization of nativism has been advanced by sociologist Brian Fry (2006). This definition emphasizes a perceived threat to resources as the key attribute. Nativism, as he defines it, is "a collective attempt by self-identified natives to secure or retain prior or exclusive rights to valued resources against the challenges reputedly posed by resident or prospective populations on the basis of their perceived foreignness" (10). Fry argues that there are certain resources that natives believe belong to them by right of their nativity. These include economic resources (jobs or government benefits) and cultural resources (languages or traditions). Nativism is triggered when these resources are perceived to be threatened by those who are perceived to be "foreign." These threats could come in the form of competition with immigrants over jobs or the growing prevalence of the Spanish language and Latin American traditions and holidays in American culture.

Based on these various definitions, a general definition of nativism can be adopted which synthesizes the core elements of these previous conceptualizations. For the purposes of this dissertation, the core features of nativism are: when an individual 1) identifies something as being as distinctly "American" (specifically, a traditional American culture and "way of life") which, in turn, is 2) threatened by something distinctly "foreign," be it an individual, group, culture, or philosophy.

Disentangling Nativism from its Policy Manifestations

This review of the literature has served to illustrate two key points: 1) nativism per se has not been given detailed attention by political scientists; and, 2) the attention that it has received has merely conflated nativism either with support for various immigrant-related public policies or the policies themselves. There are important reasons,

however, to distinguish the nativism attitude from its policy preference manifestations. This next section contains conceptual arguments and empirical statistical evidence that nativism is an attitude distinct and independent from support for specific immigration policies. Furthermore, it is argued that nativism is a key determinant of immigration policy preferences instead of a conceptual and empirical equivalent. While it may be that nativism certainly drives support for policies like official English or restrictionist immigration measures, they are not one and the same.

From a conceptual standpoint, consider that there are a variety of legitimate reasons for supporting a particular governmental policy or preferring a particular political candidate. One may vote for a presidential candidate because of his or her stand on a specific issue important to the individual. Another may vote for the same candidate because of a shared racial, gender, religious, or other demographic characteristic. Another may also prefer the same candidate out of loyalty to the candidate's political party. While these individuals possess a number of different motives, their ultimate political preference is expressed identically. The same applies to policy preferences. There are numerous possible motives for supporting particular governmental policies. In this case, it is argued that there are a variety of reasons for which someone might take a conservative view on immigration policy preferences, among which nativism is only one.

This obviously presents a problem for the way that nativism has been operationalized by previous studies on the topic, as they have essentially modeled nativism as a dependent variable (either knowingly or unknowingly) using support for various political policies as a proxy. Instead, I argue in favor of a two-stage model[4]: that nativism is both a dependent variable with its own determinants distinct from those of

[4] Using the phrase "two-stage model" is meant to convey that there is an intermediary step that must be analyzed, i.e. traditional determinants → nativism → policy preferences. This does not refer to the two-stage least squares method of statistical estimation, although this procedure is later used to support the theoretical arguments as to the exogeneity of the variables in the first stage.

specific policy attitudes (stage 1) as well as an independent variable that exerts an effect on related policy attitudes (stage 2). See Figures 2.1 and 2.2.

John Higham (1955) illustrates this distinction between nativism and its policy manifestations in his discussion of the origins of immigration restrictionism in the 1890s. He discusses how nativists in the U.S. Congress tried in vain for several decades to make the naturalization requirements more difficult for arriving immigrants, therefore restricting them from the ballot box. Failing in that effort, they turned to immigration restriction:

> The springs of modern American nativism lay in the social and economic problems of an urban-industrial society. Few nativists could regard a limitation of the foreign vote as much of a remedy for these problems. … To cope with these dangers, the nativist was certain that the United States would have to reduce the stream of immigration. Restriction became his overriding aim. (98)

As can be seen, Higham explains immigration restrictionism as one of many possible policy manifestations of nativism, not as a conceptual equivalent.

A similar two-stage causal model is advanced by Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) in which they examine racial attitudes and support for "ethnic" public policies like bilingual education and affirmative action. As explained in a previous section, they construct a variable of "Americanism" which measures the extent to which individuals possess the attributes which were reported by those in the survey as being important to "making someone a true American." They model Americanism as a result of particular socioeconomic characteristics (low education and high age most heavily predicted high Americanism in the public) and then modeled racial attitudes and ethnic policy support as a result of Americanism and other socioeconomic variables. They find that Americanism explains most of the variation in these attitudes and demonstrate that most other traditional variables lose their explanatory power when Americanism is included in the model.

To further illustrate the conceptual distinction of nativism and public policy preferences, consider that there are many legitimate justifications for supporting a restriction on immigration into the United States. The nativist explanation would be that people perceive a threat to a uniquely American culture and way of life that might possibly accompany increased levels of immigration. If this were the only motivation, researchers would be justified in equating nativism with restrictionist immigration attitudes. There are other legitimate arguments, however, for restricting the level of immigration into the United States. A popular argument is economic in nature, citing that those who are likely to come to the United States hail largely from low socio-economic backgrounds and that their growing numbers will take American jobs, harm the national economy, and lower the economic standard of living. Alternatively, arguments can be made related to the importance of maintaining the rule-of-law and protecting the sovereignty of a country. For example, some may be concerned with undocumented immigration simply because it is a violation of federal law, not necessarily because they are anxious about the threat posed by immigration to a traditional American culture.

Furthermore, there are legitimate concerns about national security that accompany increased immigration to the United States. In the post-9/11 world, national security and the threat of terrorism have often been cited as a reason to increase security along the U.S.-Mexican border. For example, during a floor debate in the House of Representatives on HR4437, a 2006 "hard-line" immigration reform bill, Representative Michael McCaul of Texas gave the following justification of voting in favor of this bill: "It is our duty, indeed it is our responsibility as Members of this distinguished body, to do everything in our power to ensure that another 9/11 never occurs in this country again. This vital piece of legislation will greatly advance our efforts towards preventing terrorists from entering our shores."

Support for restrictive immigration policies is not motivated solely by traditionally conservative motives. There are some organizations who advocate

immigration restrictionism for fairly "progressive" or "liberal" reasons. For example, SUSPS (Support United States Population Stabilization) is a group within the Sierra Club that organized in the 1990s with the goal of lobbying the greater Sierra Club membership to officially adopt a conservative immigration policy stance. Their stated motive is a concern about the natural environment. As they explain on their website, "We support U.S. population stabilization purely for ecological reasons. This requires we reduce both birth rates and migration to the U.S. to sustainable levels" (SUSPS website a). They further explain: "This is an environmental issue, originating out of concern for the environment which we as Sierra Club members have fought long and hard to protect. Overpopulation and over-immigration are destroying our environment which we have fought so hard to preserve" (SUSPS website b).

Members of SUSPS go to great lengths to clarify that their support for immigration restrictionism is not driven by nativism or racism: "We are shocked and repulsed by the actions and statements of Neo-Nazis, xenophobes, and racists of any kind. We repudiate any support from people who have racial motives for reducing immigration" (SUSPS website b).

It is clear that there are several conceptual arguments for disentangling nativism from its policy manifestations. This distinction can also be demonstrated empirically by a bivariate examination of survey results from the 2006 Immigration Survey by the Pew Research Center.[5] Table 2.2 presents a cross-tabulation between a measure of nativist attitudes and another of immigration policy preferences. The chi-square value is significant, indicating that there is a statistically significant relationship between

[5] Data from the "2006 Immigration Survey" conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Latino Center. The survey was in the field from February 8 – March 7, 2006 and has a sample size of 6,003. It oversampled about 800 from each of five major metropolitan areas with a high Latino population (Chicago, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Raleigh-Durham, and Washington, D.C.). This survey sampled roughly 800 African-Americans and 800 Latinos.

increased nativism and immigration restrictionism, as would be expected. As can be seen, however, there is considerable variation within the cross-tabulation matrix. For example, a full 38.2% of those expressing strong nativist sentiments believe that immigration to the United States should be either kept at its present level or *increased*. Similarly, 61.9% of those holding strong anti-nativist feelings also support *decreasing* immigration or keeping it at its current level. Only about 60% of respondents fit the conventional wisdom by being both extremely nativist as well as having restrictionist preferences on immigration policy.[6]

Table 2.3 provides further bivariate evidence of the distinctiveness of nativism and restrictionist policy preferences. This table presents correlations ("r") between two separate measures of nativist attitudes and two particular immigration policy preferences. The correlations are all statistically significant, indicating that increased nativism is indeed correlated with more restrictionist immigration policy preferences, as would be expected. However, the average correlation between these nativism and policy variables is a modest r = 0.33. This does indicate a moderate degree of correlation, but certainly nothing to support the contention that nativism and immigration policy preferences are empirically indistinguishable and simply different ways to label a single attitude.

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[6] Converse (1964) would interpret these findings as simply a lack of constraint in the attitudes of the general public who are unable to competently match ideologies to particular policy preferences. In this case, however, there are compelling reasons to believe that the public would be more likely to accurately report their opinions toward nativism and immigration policy preferences in public surveys. Consider that the relative salience of immigration issues in the media during 2006 and the fact that immigration is a racially-charged "easy" issue (Carmines and Stimson 1980) might lead to more stable and reliable survey responses from the public. See also Alvarez and Brehm (2002) who argue that when survey respondents base their answers to survey questions largely on the basis of their deeply-held beliefs and values, their answers are relatively reliable. This argument is also supported by the symbolic politics theory which argues that opposition to racial public policies are primarily driven by subconscious attitudes developed during childhood socialization that tend to remain stable throughout one's adult life (Kinder and Sears 1981). Finally, the bivariate correlations reported in Table 2.3 remain essentially unchanged when limiting the sample to only those who are more likely to have higher levels of political sophistication (i.e. those with an education level of a bachelor's degree or higher). The average correlation between the nativism and policy opinions among this group remains the same at r = 0.33 ($N \approx 2{,}100$, limited to U.S. citizens only with a bachelor's degree or higher level education).

Conflating nativism with its policy preferences also carries with it practical methodological risks. If nativism and immigration attitudes are indeed distinct attitudes, it means that previous studies have excluded one of the key independent variables to predict public policy attitudes on immigration.[7] By conflating the attitude with the policy preference, and therefore omitting the original nativism attitude from the model, it risks biasing the estimates of the other independent variables in the model by perhaps overstating their effect on public policy preferences. If nativism is, in fact, one of the key determinants of immigration policy preferences, it may reveal that the effect of other traditional effects such as economics, social context, and demographics, is considerably weakened.

Finally, from a normative standpoint, conflating the nativism attitude with immigration preferences runs the risk of drawing inaccurate conclusions about the motives of those who support immigration restrictionism. It assumes that everyone who believes that future immigration levels into the United States should be decreased or that undocumented immigrants currently in the United States should be forced to immediately leave the country does so because they fear the effect of these immigrants on American culture and way of life. While this indeed is the case for some individuals (perhaps even many), there are also those who harbor conservative immigration policies for other reasons, such as those discussed previously. Understanding the true motives for immigration policy preferences at the mass level is important because knowing why their fellow-citizens feel the way they do toward immigration policy will allow others to more effectively tailor their arguments when engaging in persuasive speech and action in the public sphere in regards to the matter. It also allows lawmakers to shape immigration

[7] Indeed, Galindo and Vigil (2006) argue that nativism "has become a forgotten prejudice" and that the media portray anti-immigrant attitudes and remarks only through a racial lens.

legislation in a way that responds to the concerns of citizens as they truly are, instead of how they are merely assumed to be.

Isolating and examining the nativist attitude, then, is essential for 1) arriving at a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between nativism and immigration-related policy preferences, 2) understanding the motives of nativism in the first place, independent of policy preferences, and 3) understanding more comprehensively the source of immigration restrictionism in contemporary American society.

The Contribution to the Study of Race and Politics

The previous section discussed how nativism is distinct from immigration policy preferences and argued that nativism is a key determinant of these preferences. Aside from the conceptual, methodological, and normative concerns discussed previously, testing models of nativism as a distinct determinant prior to immigration preferences will make a significant contribution to a contentious debate in the political science literature as to the determinants of black racial policy attitudes.

Studies investigating the determinants of racial policy attitudes that specifically affect African-Americans have routinely modeled racial prejudice as a key independent variable of interest. Rather than assuming that anti-black racism is conceptually identical to a conservative preference on affirmative action or school busing, this entire branch of research has, over the past thirty years, sought to explain how much of the variation in these policy preferences is attributable to racism as opposed to other potentially powerful determinants. As explained earlier in this chapter, the focus of this debate has been over how anti-black racism should be theorized and measured. It has been taken as a foregone conclusion that racial prejudice is conceptually distinct as well as prior to attitudes toward black racial policies.

Kinder and Sanders (1996), for example, investigate the varying effects of racial group interests, individual interests, and symbolic racism on a host of racial public policy variables and find that all these factors play a role, but symbolic racism is the strongest variable affecting support for the racial policy preferences they examine. Several others have also examined the extent to which symbolic racism affects policies such as school busing (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; McConahay 1982; Sears and Kinder 1985), tax reform (Sears and Citrin 1982), affirmative action (Jacobson 1985; Henry and Sears 2002; Kluegel and Smith 1983), or a combination of several of these policies (Sears et al. 1980, 1997; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000; Tarman and Sears 2005). Others have examined the effect of symbolic racism on political candidate vote choice (Kinder and Sears 1981; Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990) or incorporated it into a multi-stage model of racism → policy preference → candidate vote choice (Sears 1988).

Of course, anyone familiar with this debate is aware of the strong opposition from Paul Sniderman and his colleagues who argue that opposition to racial public policies is a result of principled ideological conservatism instead of anti-black racism (Sniderman and Piazza 1995; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000). In this dissertation, I will refer to this theory as the "principled objector" argument. In response, Sears (1994) argues that opinions on racial public policies are a result of both political conservatism as well as symbolic racism. After a comprehensive review of the several studies on the topic, however, he argues that symbolic racism certainly overshadows, but does not eliminate, the effect of ideological conservatism on racial policy preferences.

To summarize: previous research on black racial public policy attitudes has examined the extent to which racism drives racial policy attitudes, with the arguments in the literature focusing primarily on 1) how to define and operationalize racism and 2) the extent to which racism drives racial policy preferences in comparison with other important factors like philosophical conservatism. To repeat, this body of literature has

always conceptualized racism as theoretically distinct from, and prior to, racial policy preferences.

The argument put forth herein is similar. Just as studies on racial public policy preferences have maintained the distinction between the attitude (racism) and the policy preference (school busing, affirmative action, welfare spending, etc.), I argue that the attitude (nativism) must be retained separate from the policy preference (immigration reform, in-state tuition for immigrants, etc.). Furthermore, after making this distinction, it should be modeled accordingly as nativism → immigration policy preference instead of nativism = immigration policy preference, as has been done so many times previously.

This line of research has important implications beyond a simple understanding of the determinants of immigration policy preferences. From a theoretical perspective, this ultimately is a question of the extent to which theories explaining black public policy preferences can be applied to understand Latino public policy preferences. Is the symbolic racism debate particular only to black politics, or can it also be used to answer important questions in the field of Latino politics? This has already shown to be the case with other theories in race and politics. For example, research in black politics on social context and group position (Key 1949; Blalock 1967; Blumer 1958) have been shown to also apply to Latino politics and the size of immigrant populations in a individual's demographic area (Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Hero 2003; Rocha and Espino 2009). If theories explaining support for black racial policy preferences can profitably be applied to explain Latino policy preferences, it speaks positively as to the ability to generalize theories on race and politics and apply them across racial and ethnic boundary lines.

How Prevalent is Nativism?

If nativism is to be disentangled from immigration policy preferences, it would be necessary to then isolate and examine the nativism attitude in more depth. Nativist attitudes in the American public are actually more prevalent than conventional wisdom

would suggest. A 2006 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center (see Footnote 4 for more details on the data source) found that 50.7% of respondents (U.S. citizens only) either mostly or completely agree that "our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence." Furthermore, 48.5% agreed that "the growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values." Furthermore, a 2008 nation-wide Hawkeye Poll conducted by the Political Science department at the University of Iowa (Redlawsk and Tolbert 2008) indicated that 44% of respondents agreed that "the growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values". (See Table 2.4 for complete responses to these survey questions.)

Of course, rarely have people cared to admit that they have racist, prejudiced, or bigoted opinions to surveyors (Berinsky 1999, 2002; Gilens, Sniderman, and Kuklinski 1998; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000). This often creates a "social desirability" problem, where individuals may be more likely to give an answer that is seen as socially acceptable or politically correct, rather than an answer which reflects their true attitudes.

To address this issue, a survey list experiment was included in the aforementioned nation-wide 2008 Hawkeye Poll conducted by the University of Iowa. This survey list experiment randomly separated respondents into two groups and asked each group the following question: "How many of the following statements to do you agree with about the growing number of newcomers from other countries?" Respondents were asked to report *only* how many of the statements they agreed with, not which specific ones they agreed with. The control group of respondents was given the following options: "1) They put a burden on social services such as housing, education, and health care. 2) They hurt American jobs. 3) They increase the danger of terrorism. 4) They contribute to crime." Notice that these are all trying to capture opinions toward immigrants, but specifically non-nativist opinions. Numbers 1 and 2 focus on economic threat, number 3 speaks to

national security concerns, and number 4 speaks to Latino stereotypes. The treatment group then received the same list, but with an additional fifth "nativist" option: "They threaten traditional American customs, values, and way of life."

This list experiment was motivated by the fact that other surveys may not be capturing latent nativist attitudes in the American public, as people may be hesitant to respond honestly to the surveyor with "politically incorrect" answers. By being asked to report only how many of the statements the respondents agree with, not which ones specifically, they are free to express their agreement with the nativist option without having to do so expressly. Theoretically, the difference of means between the two groups represents the number of respondents who reported agreement with the nativist list option. Response rates for the list experiment are illustrated in Table 2.5.

The mean number of responses for those in the control group was 2.11 (with a standard deviation of 1.50 and a standard error of 0.08). The mean of the treatment group receiving the nativist list option was 2.43 (standard deviation = 1.76, standard error = 0.10). The difference in means between the two groups is thus 0.32, indicating that 32% of survey respondents believe that newcomers "threaten traditional American values, customs, and way of life" (difference of means t-test significant at p=0.01, N=681). Interestingly, this figure remains virtually unchanged when excluding Latinos (p=0.01, N=644) and increases only slightly to 34% when measuring responses among non-Hispanic whites only (p=0.01, N=572).

Of course, more immediate to our concerns is how many individuals who explicitly profess non-nativist attitudes actually possess latent nativist attitudes when measured with the list experiment. This same procedure of calculating nativist attitudes can be restricted to particular sub-groups of interest, including the explicitly nativism measure. Recall that the 2008 Hawkeye Poll (Redlawsk and Tolbert 2008) included a measure of explicit nativism: "Which of the following do you agree with: "The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and

values, OR the growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society." Among those who stated that they believed that newcomers strengthen American society (56.2% of those sampled), a full 41.1% revealed latent nativist attitudes in the list experiment[8], suggesting that social desirability may indeed be an issue.[9]

By any measure, then, it appears that somewhere between 30%-50% of the United States public holds nativist attitudes in one form or another. Interestingly, nativist responses were higher among the *express* nativist survey responses and lower among the *latent* nativist survey responses. This finding suggests a few general conclusions. First, those who express nativist sentiments explicitly comprise a substantial portion of the American population. These individuals are not extremists on the fringe of society. Most of them are mainstream American citizens whose opinions and preferences are reflected by their elected representatives who wield the power to shape and enact immigrant-related public policies.

Second, it appears that unlike the problems encountered previously in trying to measure racial attitudes among the United States public, Americans are not as reluctant to openly express agreement with statements measuring a perceived threat to a distinctly American way of life. There are apparently many Americans who do not wish to appear as anything other than good, patriotic Americans when on the phone with telephone surveyors. When respondents are "tricked", however, through the use of a list experiment

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[8] Control group: mean=1.42, SE=0.11, N=153. Treatment group: mean=1.83, SE=0.14, N=141. Difference of means t-test significant at p=0.02.

[9] Although this figure is 34.4% among those who express explicit nativist attitudes. Control group: mean=3.09, SE=0.11, N=128. Treatment group: mean=3.43, SE=0.15, N=228. Difference of means t-test significant at p=0.06. While this seems to indicate that 34% of explicit nativists have latent nativist attitudes, compare the mean response averages between those with express nativist and non-nativist attitudes (1.62 vs. 3.24). Those who express explicit nativism have much higher average list experiment scores than explicit non-nativists, indicating that they are, on average, "bothered" a lot more by various impacts of immigration in the United States.

which separates out the various motives for anti-immigrant attitudes (nativism being one of them), we see what is a more realistic picture of true nativist sentiment in the United States – about 30% of the population, which is 15%-20% lower than most explicit survey nativism measures. This is a novel and important finding concerning the effect of social desirability on express survey response items. Contrary to previous research indicating that is it socially undesirable to admit racist sentiments, it is apparently *more* socially desirable in the mass public to indicate nativist sentiments expressly than is admitted implicitly through the list experiment.

The third and final conclusion that can be drawn from the results of the list experiment is further support for the argument made previously that nativism and immigrant-related policy preferences are not the same attitude. In 2008, a Gallop poll indicated that 74% of Americans think that immigration to the United States should be either decreased or kept at its present level (Gallup Polling). Similarly, in 1994 California Proposition 187 passed with almost 59% of the popular vote. If only 32% of Americans possess latent nativist attitudes, then we can account for only about half of the support for anti-immigrant public policies as a product of nativism. Again, distinguishing nativism from its policy manifestations and determining the relationship between the two is an essential task to understanding contemporary racial policy preferences in the American public.

Is it More than Just Latinos?

Conventional wisdom would suggest that when it comes to nativism in the American public, the primary target of such attitudes is Latino undocumented immigrants. After all, we rarely, if ever, encounter news stories detailing public outcry over the threats posed to our American way of life by the more than 100,000 illegal Canadian immigrants currently in the United States (Fix and Passell 1994).

But does the "new nativism" exclusively target Latino immigrants? Despite what the mainstream media and conventional wisdom would suggest, as of 2007 only about half (54%) of the foreign-born population in the United States is of Latin American origin (Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean). Nearly 27% of the foreign-born in the United States are from Asia (including the Middle East), while 13% are from Europe, and the remaining 6% are from either Canada, Africa, Australia, or New Zealand (Grieco 2010).

In a post-9/11 world, a strong argument could be made that nativism now targets Middle Easterners and Muslims. Indeed, American political elites, including President George W. Bush, asserted that the largest threat to the American way of life now comes primarily from radical Islamic fundamentalism. In his speech before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush described the "enemies of freedom" and the "American way of life" as terrorists who practice "a fringe form of Islamic extremism" (Bush 2001).

It could also be argued that the nativism of today includes a strong element of anti-European sentiment. The nativism of the 19th and early 20th centuries targeted primarily non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans, including the Irish, Polish, Slavs, and Italians (Higham 1955; Hofstadter 1955). In more recent times, a prominent periodical described that anti-Europeanism in the United States is driven by disapproval of Europe's declining population, increasing secularization, support of extensive state-based welfare programs, and the increasing influence of Islam in the European religious environment (Against anti-Europeanism. 2007). Perhaps there is no better illustration of lingering anti-European sentiment than the 2003 rebranding of "French fries" as "freedom fries" and "French toast" as "freedom toast" in the cafeteria menus of the U.S. House office buildings in response to France's weak support for the U.S. position on the Iraq War (Loughlin 2003).

Despite these arguments and examples to the contrary, there is also strong evidence supporting the contention that recent American nativism primarily targets only

Latino immigrants, not those from Europe, Asia, or the Middle East. Consider the following selections describing the current status of various minority groups and contemporary anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States.

First, Table 2.6 presents some basic summary statistics of the socioeconomic situation of Latin American immigrants and contrasts them to immigrants from both Europe and Asia. As can be seen, Latin American immigrants are not only the largest immigrant group currently in the United States, but they also rank far behind both European and Asian immigrants in these important socioeconomic indicators including home ownership, educational attainment and income. The point is that in the 19th and early 20th centuries, nativism tended to target the immigrant groups of the lowest economic status, namely, the Irish-Catholics and southern Europeans (Higham 1955; Hofstadter 1955). In the contemporary social environment, the immigrant group with the lowest economic status is from Latin American countries. Latinos are now the prime recipients of economic exclusion and social marginalization and ripe targets for negative out-group discrimination and nationalist scape-goating. (See Hero 1992 for a further description of the socioeconomic situation of Latinos in American society.)

This argument is further supported by a 2006 editorial in *The Nation* that describes the intensity of the nativist movement in the mid-2000s and identifies the target exclusively as Latino immigrants: "Over the past decade, millions of *Latino immigrants* have bypassed traditional urban destinations and put down roots in the American heartland. With large groups of newcomers moving to some of the most homogeneous, tradition-steeped places in the country, a backlash was predictable. But no one could have foreseen the breadth and fury of the new nativism[10] that has risen up from Middle America with an ominous roar. The prairie-fire spread of *anti-Latino* 'Americanism'

[10] Incidentally, the title of this dissertation was inspired by *The Nation*'s use of the phrase "new nativism."

makes it incumbent upon Congress to pass an enlightened immigration bill that is both sensible and humane" (The New Nativism 2006)

Leonard Zeskind, in a 2005 article describing the origins and targets of the "white nationalist" movement in the United States, documents how these recent nativist groups are concerned primarily with Latino immigration. He describes how one anti-immigration activist believed that the United States becomes a "nation at war 'every time a Mexican flag is planted on American soil.'" Another activist "believes a widely held demographic conspiracy theory called the 'Reconquista,' a supposedly covert plan by Mexico to take back the lands of the Southwest." Zeskin summarized the anxiety of these nationalist groups about immigration, whether legal or illegal, by saying, "differences between legal and illegal immigrants fade into a generalized belief that a *brown-skinned, Spanish-speaking* tidal wave is about to swamp the white-skinned population of the United States" (Zeskind 2005).

While these two examples describe the reactions of extremist populist groups, this focus on Latino immigrants is not limited to only fringe groups in society. Political elites also reinforce the notion that Latinos are the primary foreigners of interest in today's political environment. In 2007, Arizona Senator and Republican presidential candidate John McCain was questioned by a media reporter as to the motive behind the anti-immigrant sentiment in the caucus state of Iowa. He responded:

> It's the influx of illegals into places where they've never seen a Latino influence before. I was in a town in Iowa, and twenty years ago there were no Latinos in the town. Then a meatpacking facility was opened up. Now twenty percent of their population is Latino. So you get questions like "Why do I have to punch 1 for English?" "Why can't they speak English?" (Lizza 2007)

The elite focus on Latinos is not limited solely to politicos. Academics also recognize and reinforce the argument that Latino immigrants are perceived to be the key threat to the American way of life in recent years. Sam Huntington, well known for his *Clash of Civilizations* (1993) hypothesis, lays out his argument against Latino

immigration in his book entitled *Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity*. In this work, Huntington argues in favor of the classical liberal view of American national identity. America is a nation of settlers, not immigrants, and these settlers gave the United States a distinct cultural identity that ought to be promoted and protected against threats from foreign influence. He argues that the early Puritan and English settlers bequeathed to the United States a tradition of "the English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, the responsibility of rulers, and the rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the ability and the duty to try to create heaven on earth, a 'city on a hill'" (Huntington 2005).

Huntington goes on to argue that the distinct American identity, as described above, is now under siege from a number of different sources, including "a new wave of immigrants from Latin America and Asia, … the spread of Spanish as the second American language and the Hispanization trends in American society" (Huntington 2005). It is interesting to note that even though Asian immigrants are mentioned by Huntington, he emphasizes specifically the effects of Spanish and "Hispanization" as the key threats to American national identity.

Huntington underscores this preoccupation with "Hispanization" with his devotion of an entire chapter to "Mexican Immigration and Hispanization" (pages 221-256). He lays the blame for the "cultural bifurcation" in the United States squarely with Latinos, especially those from Mexico. Mexican-Americans, he claims, are currently arguing "that the Southwest was taken from them by military aggression in the 1840s, and that the time for *la reconquista* has arrived. Demographically, socially, and culturally that is well under way" (Huntington 2005). Thus, Mexican-Americans, and Latin American immigrants more generally, are not assimilating nor adapting in the same way that previous generations of immigrants did. Whereas the immigrants from Ireland, Italy, and Poland in the 19th and early 20th centuries did their best to learn English and adapt to

American culture, Huntington argues that these new Latino immigrants are doing their best to maintain their cultural distinctiveness as well as their loyalty to their countries of origin (Citrin et al. 2007).

After summarizing various statistics on the negative impact of Latino immigration to the United States, Huntington then assesses the consequences of a hypothetical cessation of Mexican immigration into the United States. He asserts that debates over official English, bilingualism, and multiculturalism would largely "fade away" and that the "wages of low-income Americans would improve." Additionally, "the inflow of immigrants would again become highly diverse, which would increase incentives for all immigrants to learn English and absorb American culture." Finally, Huntington argues that Mexican immigration is quite possibly one of the largest threats to the long-term security of the country. If such immigration were to permanently cease "the possibility of a de facto split between a predominantly Spanish-speaking America and English-speaking America would disappear, and with it a major potential threat to the cultural and possibly political integrity of the United States" (Huntington 2005).

As can be seen, there is a general consensus from media, political, and academic elites that the nativist organizations and those possessing nativist attitudes in the American public are predominantly thinking "Latino" or "Latino" when they think of "foreigners" and "immigrants". This consensus is not limited solely to elites, however. The American public largely shares this view, which can be demonstrated by a succinct analysis of public opinion survey data.

Table 2.7 reports the results of a poisson count regression model estimation using data from the list experiment in the 2008 Hawkeye Poll, as described earlier in this chapter. The analysis estimates the impact of six different groups of foreign-born populations from the 2000 Census in an individual's zip code. A control variable for those in the treatment group is included to account for the likelihood of a higher mean due simply to having five options to choose from instead of four. Also, this analysis is

limited to non-Hispanic white respondents and standard errors are clustered by state to account for the possibility that unobserved effects might cause correlation among those who live in the same geographical area.

Here we see that two groups have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a respondent scoring higher on the nativism list experiment. More undocumented Europeans in a respondent's zip code lead to lower nativist responses (possibly due to the geographical concentration of most foreign-born Europeans in the northeast which also tends to be a more liberal area of the country). Also, we see that the proportion of Asian immigrants (including Middle Easterners, Indians, Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, etc.) have no statistically significant effect on responses to the nativism list experiment. Most importantly, *illegal*[11] Latin American immigrants in one's zip code lead to more nativist responses. The size of the *legal* Latin American immigrant group produces no demonstrable impact. This finding is as would be predicted from previous findings on racial context and policy attitudes (Hood and Morris 1998; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Rocha and Espino 2009).

To look at it from another angle, the *growth rate* of the Latin American foreign-born resident and noncitizen populations in a respondent's state from 2000-2006 are included in the model with the same dependent variable (the nativism list experiment measure). More recent research has indicated that it is not the size of the overall minority population that matters but rather the rate at which that population is growing that has an important independent effect on attitudes toward immigrants and racial minorities (Hopkins 2009). Results are shown in Table 2.8.

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[11] Given the transient and undocumented nature of the illegal immigrant population in the United States, precise measures are difficult to arrive at. These variables are therefore operationalized using citizen/non-citizen (available from the U.S. Census) as a proxy for legal/illegal. There are estimates of the size of the illegal immigrant population in each state (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). These estimates correlate with % foreign-born Latino at 0.897 and with % foreign-born non-citizen Latino at 0.915. These proxies are thus argued to be perfectly adequate.

Again, it appears that the growth rate of Latin American foreign-born *undocumented* immigrants in one's geographic area is primarily associated with more nativist sentiments in the United States public. Interestingly, we see that the variable representing the growth rate of *legal* Latin American residents (those who are legal residents with green cards) approaches significance (p=0.065) and is negative, suggesting that the growth rate of legal immigrants actually leads to *lower* nativist attitudes. This is in line with expectations from Hood and Morris (1998) who, at the state level, find similar results when considering the size of the legal and illegal Latino population and its effect on Anglo immigration attitudes. (See also Rocha and Espino 2009 who show that Anglos respond differently to Latino group size depending on whether they are largely English-dominant or Spanish-dominant. See also Wilkinson and Garand 2007 who show that the rate of the growth of the Latino population in one's state is significantly associated with more conservative immigration policy attitudes, but not the growth of the Asian population.)

In contrast to contextual effects, we can also examine the effect of negative affect toward each of these particular groups and their effect on nativist attitudes in the United States. Table 2.9 presents the results of a simple analysis of negative affect toward blacks, Asians, and Latinos on specific nativism measures from the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey as described previously in this chapter. Each affect measure is a four-point ordinal Likert scale of favorability toward the group in question.[12] Again, this

[12] Question wording: "I'd like your opinion of some groups. As I read from a list, please tell me which category best describes your overall opinion of the group I name. (First,) would you say your overall opinion of [Blacks / Latinos / Asians] is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?" The question also asked for favorability toward Jews and Evangelical Christians. Each of these five items was randomized in the sample. These three prejudice measures are correlated with each other at approximately r=0.50. Despite this high degree of correlation between these three measures, further diagnostics revealed that multicollinearity does not pose a significant problem for this model, as the highest Variance Inflation Factor score was a mere 1.56.

sample is limited to non-Hispanic white citizens and standard socioeconomic controls for age, education, income, and gender are included in the model.

Here, we see that negative Latino affect independently contributes to nativist attitudes among non-Hispanic white Americans, whereas negative affect toward blacks or Asians does not. A calculation of predicted probabilities reveals that reporting more negative affect toward Latinos increases the probability of also indicating that you "strongly agree" that the American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence by 34.3%.[13]

For whatever the reason, this preliminary evidence appears to support the contention that it is primarily Spanish-speaking, Latin American undocumented immigrants who are driving the "new nativism" in the United States public. The remainder of this project, then, will theorize current American nativism primarily as an expression of desire to protect the distinctly American culture and way of life from perceived threats posed primarily by Latin American immigrants.

Conclusion

This chapter began by reviewing the existing political science literature investigating the determinants of support for racial public policies in the United States. It was argued that nativism as a concept has neither been well-defined nor well-measured by political scientists. It was also argued that nativism is an attitude independent from, and prior to, immigrant-related policy preferences, both conceptually and empirically. A theoretical definition of nativism was established: it is an individual-level attitude that 1) identifies a distinctly "American" culture and way of life which, in turn, is 2) threatened

[13] In other words, a person scoring the highest on the Latino racism scale is 34.3% more likely to indicate the highest nativism measure than a person scoring the lowest on the Latino racism scale, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

by something distinctly “foreign”. It was also shown that somewhere between 30% and 50% of the American public holds nativist attitudes in one form or another, depending on whether it is measured explicitly or implicitly. Finally, both qualitative and quantitative evidence was presented supporting the argument that undocumented Latin American immigrants are the primary target of contemporary American nativism.

Now that nativist attitudes in the mass American public have been defined, identified, and described, we can turn our attention to investigating its determinants. What is it that sparks a perception of threat from foreigners to the American way of life? The following chapter will seek to answer that question. A more comprehensive model of nativism will be developed and tested, employing a variety of different data sources and analyses.

Table 2.1. How "Nativism" Has Previously Been Defined by Political Scientists

Citrin, et al. 1994	An index of: • Support for Official English • Opposition to bilingual education • Opposition to multiculturalism • Religious conservatism • Support for immigration restrictionism • Belief that immigration harms American culture
Tatalovich 1995	Support of Official English policies at the state level
Simcox 1997	An index of: • Opposition to bilingual education • Support of trade protectionism • Symbolic racism • Salience of concern about crime • Opposition to welfare for immigrants • Support for international isolationism • Social trust
Fetzer 2000	1. Additive index of feeling thermometer scores toward Latino Americans and immigrants 2. Additive index of: a. Should immigration be increased/decreased/stay same? b. Deportation of law-abiding illegal aliens? c. Use army to guard U.S.-Mexico border fence? d. Should we admit more refugees? 3. Support for California Proposition 187
Alvarez and Butterfield 2000	Support for California Proposition 187
Branton, et al. 2007	Support for California Proposition 187

Table 2.2. Cross-tabulation of Nativist Attitudes and Prospective Immigration Level Preferences

	"Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?"			
"Our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence."	Decreased	Kept at present level	Increased	Total
Completely agree	61.8%	23.8%	14.4%	100%
Mostly agree	47.0%	38.6%	14.5%	100%
Mostly disagree	25.9%	52.0%	22.2%	100%
Completely disagree	16.2%	45.7%	38.1%	100%

N = 5,143, χ^2 = p<0.0001, limited to U.S. citizens only

*Source: "*2006 Immigration Survey" by Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Latino Center.

Table 2.3. Bivariate Correlations of Nativist Attitudes and Immigration Policy Preferences

	Nativism 1	Nativism 2	Policy 1	Policy 2
Nativism 1	1.00			
Nativism 2	0.47	1.00		
Policy 1	0.31	0.32	1.00	
Policy 2	0.35	0.33	0.31	1.00

All correlations are significant at $p < 0.001$, sample limited to U.S. citizens only, higher values correspond to higher levels of nativism or more conservative policy preferences.

Nativism 1: "Our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence." Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.

Nativism 2: "The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values." over "The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society."

Policy 1: Prospective immigration levels: "Should legal immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?"

Policy 2: Immigrant worker policies: a three-point ordinal variable representing preferences for 1) a conditional pathway to citizenship, 2) temporary guest-worker programs, or 3) immediate deportation.

*Source: "*2006 Immigration Survey" by Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Latino Center.

Table 2.4. Cross-tabulations of Nativist Attitudes in the United States

"Our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence."[a]	
Completely agree	16.0%
Mostly agree	24.8%
Mostly disagree	32.2%
Completely disagree	17.1%
"The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values OR… The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society."[b]	
Threaten customs and values	48.5%
Strengthen society	51.5%
"The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values OR… The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society."[c]	
Threaten customs and values	43.8%
Strengthen society	56.2%

[a] *Source:* 2006 Pew Immigration Survey, N=5,431, U.S. citizens only

[b] *Source:* 2006 Pew Immigration Survey, N=5,215, U.S. citizens only

[c] *Source:* 2008 Hawkeye Poll, N=1,518

Table 2.5. Nativism List Experiment Response Rates

	All respondents	Control group	Treatment group
0	21.9%	22.3%	21.6%
1	11.5%	13.5%	9.3%
2	22.6%	22.7%	22.5%
3	15.3%	14.3%	16.4%
4	19.8%	27.5%	11.4%
5	9.0%		18.8%
Mean	2.27	2.11	2.43
N	681	357	324

Source: 2008 Hawkeye Poll

Table 2.6. Socioeconomic Status of U.S. Foreign-Born Population by Region of Origin

	Foreign-born Latinos	Foreign-born Europeans	Foreign-born Asians	Total U.S. Population
% Home-owners	47.1%	67.8%	58.7%	67.3%
% High school degree	52.4%	82.6%	84.1%	84.0%
% B.A. degree	11.3%	34.7%	47.9%	27.0%
Median household income	$38,634	$52,057	$63,452	$50,007
% of total U.S. population	6.6%	1.6%	3.3%	100%

Source: 2005-2007 American Community Survey, administered by the U.S. Census Bureau

Table 2.7. Poisson Estimation of Immigrant Group Size and Latent Nativist Attitudes

% FB European citizen	1.858 (4.819)
% FB European noncitizen	-24.130*** (6.689)
% FB Asian citizen	-0.970 (3.379)
% FB Asian noncitizen	-0.447 (4.295)
% FB Latin American citizen	-1.827 (1.443)
% FB Latin American noncitizen	1.502* (0.628)
Treatment group dummy variable	0.126* (0.049)
Constant	0.914*** (0.047)
N	537
Prob > χ^2	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.021

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2008 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll

Note: Independent variables are % of each immigrant group in respondent's zip code according to the 2000 U.S. Census. Limited to non-Hispanic white respondents. Standard errors are clustered by state.

Table 2.8. Poisson Estimation of Immigrant Group Growth Rate and Latent Nativist Attitudes

% FB European citizen	0.371 (0.288)
% FB European noncitizen	-0.120 (0.323)
% FB Asian citizen	0.000 (0.402)
% FB Asian noncitizen	-0.204 (0.273)
% FB Latin American citizen	-0.177# (0.096)
% FB Latin American noncitizen	0.196* (0.092)
Treatment group dummy variable	0.153*** (0.045)
Constant	0.698 (0.487)
N	562
Prob > χ^2	0.005
Pseudo R^2	0.005

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2008 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll

Note: Independent variables are the factor rate of change of size of each immigrant group in respondent's zip code from 2000-2006. Limited to non-Hispanic white respondents. Standard errors are clustered by state.

Table 2.9. Ordinal Logistic Estimation of Negative Racial Affect and Nativist Attitudes

Anti-black affect	0.054 (0.087)
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.820*** (0.078)
Anti-Asian affect	0.122 (0.096)
Age	0.017*** (0.003)
Education	-0.241*** (0.042)
Income	-0.024 (0.032)
Female	-0.195* (0.080)
N	1,631
Prob > χ^2	0.000
Pseudo R^2	0.084

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens. Standard errors are clustered by geographic region. Cut-points omitted.

Figure 2.1. Previous Models of Nativism and Related Policy Preferences



Figure 2.2. Current Model of Nativism and Related Policy Preferences



CHAPTER 3: THE CAUSES OF NATIVISM

Introduction

In his historical analysis of nativist social movements throughout American history, Dale Knobel identified his primary question of interest as follows: "What we really want to know is why some people (and not others) were attracted to a particular version of American culture and were disposed to join organizations that discriminated between citizens and 'aliens' on the basis of it" (Knobel 1996). The previous chapter developed a theoretical definition of nativism (including how it differs from immigrant-related policy preferences), discussed its prevalence in contemporary American society, and demonstrated that its primary target is undocumented Hispanic immigrants. This chapter now addresses the question that naturally follows, as identified by Knobel (1996): What motivates people to perceive a threat to a uniquely American way of life from foreign influence?

This chapter will proceed by identifying and describing a number of potential determinants of nativism, with the goal of constructing a more comprehensive model than has been developed in previous studies. These determinants include traditional explanations of nativist attitudes, such as cultural and economic factors, as well as more novel determinants like social context and social-psychological personality traits. The empirical analysis finds that although contemporary nativist attitudes are driven by a variety of factors, anti-Hispanics racism and the social-psychological characteristics of social trust and authoritarianism exert the largest influence in predicting who believes foreigners threaten the American way of life.

The Causes of the New Nativism

One of the primary objectives of this research is to build and test a comprehensive model of the determinants of nativism. Because most previous political science research

on the topic has focused on explaining specific immigration-related policy preferences while overlooking nativism itself, we will look to previous studies from a range of fields including history and sociology, as well as political science, to obtain causal mechanisms and hypotheses about what drives nativist attitudes in the general public. The potential causes of nativism are grouped into four main categories: 1) racial and economic concerns, 2) social context, 3) attitudes toward culture and nation, and 4) social-psychological characteristics.

Racial and Economic Concerns

Racism. Although Knobel (1996) argues that nativism is not synonymous with racism, Higham (1955), Perea (1997a), Roberts (1997), Burns and Gimpel (2000), and Fry (2006) all argue, based on historical analyses and in-depth qualitative content analyses of historical documents and inter-personal interviews, that racism is a fundamental determinant of nativism in the United States. These authors describe how a prime component of the nativism ideology during the 19th and early 20th centuries involved the genuine belief that certain races are biologically inferior to others. The "superior race" was the Anglo-Saxon Caucasian race, specifically those from northern Europe. Those who hailed from southern or eastern Europe were considered to be of a less desirable racial composition, resulting in restrictions on immigration from Italy, Poland, the Balkans, etc.

Because racism has been identified as one of the key determinants of nativism by both historians and sociologists and due to the fact that the vast majority of "foreigners" currently in the United States are of Hispanic ethnicity, racism should constitute one of the largest components of the "new nativism." Today, we should expect that those expressing racist attitudes should be more likely to hold nativist attitudes than those who do not. We should expect that anti-Hispanic racism specifically should exert an effect on

individual-level nativism because it was demonstrated in the previous chapter that Hispanics (especially non-citizen Hispanics) are the predominant target of nativist attitudes in the United States, more so than Europeans, Asians, or Middle-Easterners.[14]

Economic competition. A second potential explanation for nativism is economic competition over scarce material resources (Knobel 1996; Perea 1997a; Fry 2006). This phenomenon has been examined at length in regards to specific race-related policy preferences, at both the individual- and aggregate-level. (Key 1949; Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin et al. 1997; Tolbert and Hero 1998; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Tolbert and Grummel 2003) This argument has support dating back to Hovland and Sears (1940) who argue that the frequency of black lynchings in the South tended to increase during times of economic depression and subside during times of prosperity.

Olzak (1994) examines race relations during the 1877-1914 period and argues that interracial tension between blacks and Anglos or European and Asian immigrants and Anglos was driven primarily by competition over economic goods such as jobs and housing. This competition, she argues, is not a product of inter-group differences or concerns over cultural assimilation.

Nativism is theoretically associated with the view that certain resources are "owned" by those who are legitimate residents of a country (Fry 2006). These include economic resources such as jobs and government benefits. Therefore, those who are worried about the effect of increased immigration on the American economy, the availability of jobs, or are competing with immigrants for low-income jobs should be

[14] A very legitimate objection could be raised that racism is not exogenous to nativism thus complicating the ability to argue that racism is a *cause* of nativism instead of vice-versa. This objection is discussed in-depth at the end of this chapter.

more likely to express nativist attitudes than those who perceive the economy as strong or are in higher-income brackets.

The economic competition hypothesis can also exert an effect through societal scape-goating, in other words, assigning blame for something negative happening in society to a prominent out-group (Abrams and Hogg 1990; Kecmanovic 1996; Staub 1999). When the economy is perceived to be unfavorable, a likely response is to blame a highly-visible out-group, specifically Hispanic immigrants. Professor Ian Lopez explains: "in the context of an economic downturn, the cultural response of that economic downturn will be to search for someone to blame, and that someone usually turns out to be a foreigner or someone perceived as foreigner" (Keck 2009). This effect has been demonstrated empirically by Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) who show that negative white attitudes toward racial minorities are most common among less educated individuals who live in low socio-economic geographic areas. They show that poor whites scape-goat and blame racial minorities for their poor economic conditions.

Some argue the effect of economic competition is overshadowed by cultural factors in explaining support for anti-immigration legislation in both the United States and Europe (Citrin 1990; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Fetzer 2000; McLaren 2002; Sides and Citrin 2007). Based on this research, it is expected that economic competition will exert a relatively lower, but still significant, effect on nativist attitudes in the American public.

Social Context

Racial threat vs. social contact. In a related vein, there has been a great deal of recent research examining the extent to which the racial make-up of the geographic area in which one resides is associated with the prevalence of racial attitudes and related public policy preferences (Giles and Buckner 1993; Hood and Morris 1997; Hood and Morris 1998; Welch et al. 2001; Tolbert and Hero 2001; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Rocha and Espino 2009). There is also a great deal of literature investigating this effect

from an aggregate level of analysis (Key 1949; Blalock 1967; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Tolbert and Hero 1996, 1998; Hero 2003).

The racial threat hypothesis (Giles and Buckner 1993; Meier and Stewart 1991) posits that a higher concentration of racial out-groups in one's geographic vicinity is associated with a higher prevalence of racial prejudice and opposition to public policies that benefit racial minorities. This is because the greater concentration of the relevant out-group increases the immediacy and salience of the threat that an out-group poses to an in-group (Tajfel and Turner 1986). While most research on this topic has focused primarily on black policy attitudes and the context of the African-American population, Tolbert and Grummell (2003) demonstrate this same phenomenon applies also to Asians and Latinos.

On the other hand, the social contact theory (Oliver and Wong 2003; Welch et al. 2001) predicts that higher levels of racial out-groups in one's geographic area is actually associated with more pacific inter-racial attitudes and policy preferences because being surrounded by higher proportions of minorities leads to increased opportunities for inter-racial contact, resulting in increasing familiarity and lowering racial tensions. Predictions on this variable based on results from previous research are thus mixed. The percent foreign-born Latino in one's vicinity may lead to more or less nativism depending on whether the effects of the racial threat or social contact hypotheses come into play.

Immigrant inflow. In contrast to the static, cross-sectional nature of the social context explanation, Muller (1997) describes that nativist impulses in society have increased at times when immigrant inflow to the United States has also been at higher levels. As the number of immigrants increase, so do fears over the threat those immigrants will pose to one's culture and way of life.

Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) show that public opinion toward immigrants tends to be tied to the immigrant growth rate. As immigration levels rise, so do negative opinions toward those newcomers. This is also supported by Hopkins (2009) who finds that voting behavior on local tax increases (whose benefits will partially fund education

and welfare for immigrants and low-income racial minorities) is not a function of the contextual racial diversity of the area, but rather *the rate at which the racial diversity is changing.* He finds that sudden demographic changes are behind opposition to racial public policies. Another paper applies this specifically to anti-immigrant attitudes and demonstrates that such attitudes are more common in communities that have undergone sudden influxes of immigrants, not where there already are large foreign-born populations (Hopkins 2007). Theoretically, we thus expect those who live in areas that have experienced a higher rate of immigrant growth to express more nativist attitudes than those who live in areas where the foreign-born growth rate has been smaller.

Classical Liberalism and Nationalism

Classical Liberalism. As described in the previous chapter, a nativist commitment to defending a particular version of American culture and traditions can be framed within the debate between the philosophies of classical liberalism and multiculturalism. Classical liberals argue that a nation should have a common culture and language. They would thus likely be more susceptible to perceived threats to that particular culture and language from foreign influence. As was discussed in detail in the previous chapter, Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) find that a commitment to classical liberalism, as measured by their "Americanism" index, strongly predicts immigration policy preferences among Californians. This is supported by Hero and Preuhs (2006) who explain the passage of pro-immigrant welfare legislation at the state level as a function of the presence of an "egalitarian tradition" within the state, as measured by the presence of more liberal civil rights policies in the 1960s. More recently, Ward and Masgoret (2008) find that New Zealanders who embrace the philosophy of multiculturalism have more favorable attitude toward immigrant groups in their country.

Thus, it is predicted that those who subscribe to the classical liberal philosophy will be more likely to express nativist attitudes. Also, because recent research has shown

that threats to a particular culture or way of life (as perceived by classical liberals) exert more of an influence on anti-immigrant policies in both the United States and Europe than economic determinants (Citrin 1990; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Fetzer 2000; McLaren 2002; Citrin and Sides 2008), it is expected that classical liberalism will exert a relatively higher effect on nativist attitudes in the American public than economic factors.

Nationalism. Knobel (1996) and Fry (2006) argue that another fundamental element of nativism is a strong ethnocentric orientation. In other words, nativists believe that there is something inherently unique, and superior, about their country and its heritage, language, culture, and institutions. Higham explains, "nativism translates into a zeal to destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life" (1955). As discussed previously, Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) address this phenomenon by attempting to define and measure an attitude of "Americanism" which they then show strongly predicts support for ending multicultural public policies like bilingual education. In a similar vein, it is expected that those who are more nationalistic will be more likely to express nativist attitudes as well.

The links between nationalism and attitudes toward immigrants has previously been investigated by de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003). They tease out a more nuanced understanding of this relationship by drawing a distinction between nationalism and patriotism. As they explain, patriotism "refers to an attachment to the nation, its institutions, and its founding principles" (175). On the other hand, nationalism is defined as "a belief in national superiority and dominance – that is, a commitment to the denigration of the alternatives to the nation's institutions and principles" (175).

By examining the effect of these two variables (and several control variables) on attitudes towards immigrants in fifty separate countries, de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) find that while feelings of nationalism are associated with a higher likelihood of possessing xenophobic sentiments, feelings of patriotism exerted no independent effect either way. Thus, they conclude: "the average nationalist is hostile toward immigrants.

However, the average patriot is no more antagonistic to immigrants than is the average citizen" (186). (See also Haubert and Fussell 2006 who show that a rejection of ethnocentrism in the United States is associated with a more positive evaluation of immigrants.) These findings will be re-tested herein by including measures for both nationalism and patriotism in the nativism models. It is expected that nationalism, but not patriotism, will exert an independent and positive effect on nativist attitudes in the American public.

Furthermore, because nationalism was identified by Higham (1955) as one of the three key determinants of American nativism, and because one of the key conceptual features of nativism is that the individual must feel that there is something definitively "American" or "nationalist" to defend, the nationalism variable should exert a relatively high effect on nativist attitudes in comparison with other factors.

Social-Psychological Characteristics

Seeking to move beyond previous research, I draw on theories from social psychology to help explain individual level attitudes toward foreign influence on the American way of life. It is very possible that nativism may be as much a function of individual psychological characteristics and certain patterns of cognitive processes as they are a function of socioeconomic characteristics and social context.

Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is a personality characteristic that predisposes individuals to submit to authority figures and/or institutions, have hostile and aggressive attitudes toward non-conformist groups, and to be more accepting of social norms (Altemeyer 1996). Adorno, et al.'s (1950) classic work, *The Authoritarian Personality*, was the first large-scale study examining the relationship between individual personality characteristics and predispositions toward intense nationalism, right-wing fascism, and anti-minority discrimination. Their goal was to explain the rise of fascism in Europe in the early 20th century. Although later shown to suffer from significant

methodological shortcomings, they explain that individual-level authoritarianism is a result of childhood experiences, specifically a strict upbringing on the part of the parents combined with a weak ego on the part of the child. Those who develop authoritarian personality traits are also more likely to harbor intense feelings of hostility targeting those who do not fit societal norms. In this view, it could be argued that nativism, including hostility toward foreign immigrants and foreign culture (which differs from the societal norm of the established culture) is associated with authoritarian personality characteristics.

Our understanding of the authoritarian personality and its connection to anti-foreign sentiment was expanded by Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996). He argues that since authoritarians are more likely to unconditionally accept guidance from their nation's leaders, they are also more likely to adopt anti-foreigner attitudes when those nation's leaders use immigrants as a scapegoat for domestic troubles. Furthermore, Altemeyer (1996) demonstrates specifically that anti-Semitism and "hostility toward foreigners" is strongly associated with individual-level authoritarianism. This is because those who rank high on the authoritarianism scale also are more prejudiced toward low-status out-groups. This effect is enhanced when the out-group in question is also highly visible in society. It should not be a controversial assertion that Hispanic immigrants are currently the most highly visible foreign out-group in contemporary American society, thus making them prime targets for authoritarian hostility.

The strong link between authoritarianism and attitudes toward foreigners has also been shown by Hetherington and Weiler (2009). Using a multivariate analysis of 2006 CCES data, they demonstrate that authoritarianism is one of the strongest predictors of opinions like "Immigrants should adopt American culture" or opposing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants currently in the United States (160-173). These results hold even when controlling for partisanship. They conclude: "Republicans and Democrats are now sorted in this issue domain" (170).

Based on the previous research on authoritarianism as described above, it is thus hypothesized that Americans with higher degrees of authoritarianism will be more likely to express nativist attitudes.

Emotional Instability. Emotional instability, or neuroticism, is one of the "Big Five" personality characteristics (Costa and McCrae 1985). Emotional instability is characterized by a tendency to worry, be excessively nervous, and be emotionally insecure. It has previously been demonstrated that emotional instability is linked to anti-minority attitudes. Olson and Evans (1999), for instance, examine neuroticism and societal attitudes and conclude that those who are "high in neuroticism [feel] a greater increase in positive affect after comparing [themselves] downward" (1506). These comparisons were made with other low-status groups in society. This would suggest that those who are high in neuroticism would be motivated to maintain an unfavorable opinion of immigrants and foreigners, as it would serve to boost their own self-esteem.

The link between negative out-group attitudes and positive self-esteem for those who are emotionally unstable has a great deal of established support. Social identity theorists Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that out-group disfavor is essentially motivated by desires to boost one's self-esteem and sense of self-worth. In the same vein, Fein and Spencer (1997) demonstrate that when self-images are bolstered, individuals are less likely to express negative evaluations of members of a stereotyped group. Furthermore, Stephan and Stephan (1985) argue that worry and anxiety are core components of out-group disfavor. They define inter-group anxiety as the "cognitive worry and physiological arousal that people may feel when interacting with members of an out-group" (157). They later show that inter-group anxiety, in the form of feelings of threat, is associated with more negative opinions of immigrants (Stephan et al. 2005). (See also Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1999; Stephan and Stephan 2000; Stephan et al. 2002; Stephan and Renfro 2004).

Emotional insecurity has also been argued to be a key feature of American nativism. While describing the roots and sources of the American nativist movement throughout history, Knobel (1996) describes the link between personal identity and national identity as one of the key psychological factors that influences nativism on the cognitive level. "Nativist activists," he writes, "came from all ranks and walks of life, but in their minds personal identity and national identity became joined. More to the point, they took threats to 'national' identity as threats to personal security" (Knobel 1996, 16). To Knobel, nativism was not so much about personal characteristics or class (after all, they came from "all ranks and walks of life") but rather those who were insecure about their self-image and thus respond by pegging their self-esteem to their national identity. This hypothesis is supported by Sniderman and Citrin (1971) who explain support for international isolationism as a function of poor self-esteem. Isolationists, they argue, are less inclined to support international involvement because it would risk lowering the power and prestige of their nation, which when linked to one's self-esteem, would result in a lower self-evaluation.

Based on these studies, it is thus hypothesized that those who are more emotionally unstable, as measured by a higher day-to-day level of fear and anxiety, will also express more nativist attitudes than those who are more emotionally stable and have lower anxiety levels.

Social Trust. Finally, there is reason to predict that levels of inter-personal trust are also independently associated with higher levels of anti-foreign sentiment in the American public. Social trust has been previously linked to higher levels of aggression toward out-groups in political settings. For example, Etheredge (1978) shows that U.S. foreign service officers in the 1970s who scored low on measures of inter-personal trust were more likely to have hostile views toward the Soviet Union and more likely to favor military force in foreign policy-making. Winter (2003) reviews studies that show this same personality connection between U.S. presidents in their views and military policy

orientations toward foreign countries. (See also Bartels 1994, 495-496; Brewer and Steenbergen 2002.)

Eric Uslaner (2002) argues that social trust is more than just an attitude that one learns from life experiences in dealing with others. Instead, he argues that trust is a manifestation of a more fundamental worldview based on optimism as opposed to cynicism and pessimism. Uslaner describes social trust as an attitude that manifests itself in faith in both unknown experiences as well as unknown individuals. Thus, the most salient characteristic of those with high social trust are those who have faith in complete strangers. The best survey measure of social trust, then, is: "Do you believe that most people can be trusted, or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?" Uslaner further demonstrates that social trust is associated with a wide range of political values and attitudes like government spending and enforcement of societal moral codes. His key argument is that rises in economic inequality in a society lead to lower levels of social trust among its citizens. Specifically in regards to the ramifications of attitudes toward minorities, Uslaner argues that high economic inequality between Anglos and racial minorities leads to less social trust between these groups, and thus Anglos are also less likely to support public policies and government programs that are designed to benefit societal minorities and marginalized out-groups.

Specifically regarding attitudes toward foreigners, Binning (2007) shows that lower levels of inter-personal trust are associated with support for restrictive immigration policies. Sides and Citrin (2007), building off Quillian (1995), also provide evidence that less social trust leads to less favorable attitudes of immigrants in the United States. Additionally, Citrin and Sides (2008) show that social distrust is associated with more native attitudes toward immigration in both the United States and Europe, but that its effect is greater in the United States. They argue, though, that the fact that social trust matters in both places is evidence that the social-psychological determinants of attitudes

toward foreigners are something common to humanity, and not unique to any particular country.

Based on these arguments and studies, it is therefore hypothesized that lower individual levels of social trust will be associated with higher levels of nativism in the American public.

Summary of Hypotheses

Table 3.1 summarizes the various independent variables and the direction of their hypothesized effect on individual-level nativist attitudes.

Data, Methods, and Analysis

The analysis presented in this chapter will employ data from three distinct sources: the "2008 Hawkeye Poll", a nation-wide public opinion poll administered by David Redlawsk and Caroline Tolbert (2008) during October 2008 (N=1,666), the "2006 Immigration Survey" administered by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and the Pew Hispanic Center (N=6,003), and the "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" (CID) survey conducted for the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University (Howard, Gibson, and Stolle 2005) (N=1,001). Also, it is important to note that the estimates from these analyses are restricted to non-Hispanic whites only, as Latinos and African-Americans will be analyzed in future chapters in this dissertation.

"2008 Hawkeye Poll"

As discussed in the previous chapter, the 2008 Hawkeye Poll (Redlawsk and Tolbert 2008) contained a nativism list experiment that was motivated by the concern that individuals might not feel inclined to express their true opinions toward immigrants to surveyors over the telephone. Because discussions about immigration can often take an

ethnic tone, people may feel hesitant to respond honestly to questions concerning ethnic out-groups.

This nativism list experiment randomly separated respondents into two groups and asked each group the following question: “How many of the following statements to do you agree with about the growing number of newcomers from other countries?” Respondents were asked to report only how many of the statements they agreed with, not which specific ones they agreed with, freeing them to indicate agreement with various statements without having to specify which ones. Half of the respondents were given the following options: “1) They put a burden on social services such as housing, education, and health care. 2) They hurt American jobs. 3) They increase the danger of terrorism. 4) They contribute to crime.” The other half received the same list, but with an additional fifth option measuring nativist attitudes: “They threaten traditional American customs, values, and way of life.” There were 681 individuals who completed the list experiment in the Hawkeye Poll, and it was ultimately shown that 32% of respondents indicated agreement with the fifth nativist option.

Using this list experiment, we can uncover the relationship between nativism and a wide variety of factors. This is done by comparing the difference of means between the control and treatment groups within a particular sub-group of the population. For example, the control and treatment groups can be compared within partisan groups: Republicans, Democrats, and Independents.

Table 3.2 presents the results of an analysis of the list experiment, separated out by relevant sub-groups. For each sub-group, the mean, standard deviation, and sample size (N) are displayed for both the control group (not receiving the fifth nativism option) and the treatment group (receiving the fifth nativism option). The percentage of the population choosing the fifth nativism option is displayed in the second column from the right (“% latent difference”), along with the level of statistical significance that the results are different from zero (means comparison t-test). The final column on the right shows

the amount of the population sub-group expressing explicit nativism on a separate question in the survey (as measured by agreement with the first option in the following question: "The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values, OR the growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society.").

There are a few general trends that can be observed from the results presented in Table 3.2. First, we see that Republicans[15], conservatives, older individuals, and those with less education all have higher levels of latent nativism (62%, 52%, 42%, and 52%, respectively). This comes as no large surprise and is consistent with previous findings on attitudes toward minority out-groups. It is interesting to note that ideological moderates have *higher* levels of latent nativism than even conservatives.

Furthermore, it appears that for moderates, their latent levels of nativism are 16% higher than their explicit measure, suggesting that social desirability may be exerting a stronger effect on moderates than either conservatives or liberals. Apparently, moderates are just as concerned about threats to a uniquely American way of life as are conservatives, but moderates are less willing to publicly say so (perhaps not as accustomed to expressing their opinions as committed ideologues). It is interesting also to note that the measures of social context (percent foreign-born in a respondent's zip code and rate of the foreign-born population in a respondent's state) have little effect on latent nativist attitudes. The amount of respondents with latent nativist attitudes is virtually the same in each category.

The second item to call to one's attention concerns the relationship between racism and nativism. It was originally hypothesized that racism would be connected with

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[15] The partisan variables for Republican and Democrat include Independents who claimed to lean toward one party or another. There were consequently very few "pure independents" to analyze (N=26), resulting in their exclusion from Table 3.2.

a higher prevalence of nativism. Here, racism is measured by asking survey respondents whether they think that Obama's policies will benefit whites over black, blacks over whites, or benefit both equally. If respondents indicated that they believe that Obama will benefit blacks over whites, it is interpreted to be evidence of anti-black racism (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000; Tarman and Sears 2005). Looking at the explicit measure, this seems to be the case: 67% of those who stated that they think Obama will benefit blacks over whites also *explicitly* state that immigrants threaten traditional American customs and values. Only 37% of those who claimed that Obama will benefit both racial groups equally also claimed an explicit nativist stance. This pattern is *reversed*, however, when looking at the latent nativism measure. Only 23% of those with explicit racial concerns expressed latent nativist preferences, while that number increases to 42% of those claiming no explicit racial concerns. It is important to note, however, that the average score for those with explicit racial concerns are already about one point higher.

The third trend that can be observed is that, for the most part, the differences between the explicit and the latent measures are not overly large. Generally speaking, sub-groups with higher explicit nativist attitudes also tend to have higher levels of latent nativism. On average, the explicit measures tend to be about eight percent higher than the latent measures. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are two possible explanations for this pattern. First, it suggests that among non-Hispanic white Americans, it is more socially desirable to *agree* with nativist sentiments than not. In other words, survey respondents may be afraid of expressing anything other than a red-blooded, patriotic attachment a particular American culture. However, it is also very possible that this pattern could be due to the question wording of this particular list experiment. Each of the five items tapped, in some degree, negative stereotypes about Latino immigrants. Therefore, it is possible that the respondents' negative attitudes toward immigrants were

more evenly distributed amongst the various options, artificially depressing the ultimate number of those who would express agreement with the final "nativist" list option.

"2006 Pew Immigration Survey"

The determinants of nativism can be further examined with an analysis of public opinion survey data containing questions on nativism and related variables of interest. The 2006 Pew survey was administered nation-wide by telephone from February 8th through March 7th, 2006. The total sample size is 6,003, with over-sampled metropolitan areas with higher Latino and immigrant populations: Chicago, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Raleigh-Durham, and Washington, D.C. Unfortunately, not every survey respondent received every survey question, including relevant independent and dependent variables in the models. Therefore, the "N"s featured in the models are significantly lower than the six thousand respondents included in the full survey: around 1,500. This is still more than sufficient, however, to conduct a multivariate examination of the data.

For this analysis, the same standard socioeconomic variables (age, education, income) are included as independent variables, with the addition of gender, perception of national economy, and frequency of church attendance. The same social context and partisan variables are included. Anti-Hispanic racism is also included, measured as a 4-point favorability thermometer. Two different measures of nativism are employed as dependent variables. The first asks respondents whether or not they agree that: "Our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence." The second asks respondents which of the following statements they agree more with: "The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values, OR the growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society." The models are weighted with a sample weighting and the standard errors are clustered by geographic region. Results are displayed in Table 3.3.

The analysis above presents initial support for some of the main hypotheses. Consistent with the economic threat hypothesis, those who perceive the national economy as doing poorer (in Model 2) and those with lower incomes (Model 1) are more likely to also profess nativist attitudes. Those who hold negative views of Latinos are also much more likely to have higher nativist attitudes as well. Social context also exerts an effect, with a higher proportion of foreign-born Latinos in one's immediate vicinity associated with lower nativism attitudes. Finally, several control variables are also significant, as older individuals, those with lower levels of education, males (in Model 1), and self-professed conservatives and Republicans (Model 2) are all more likely to admit agreement with nativist measures as well.

Interestingly, negative affect toward Hispanics exerts the strongest effect in both models, with the likelihood of expressing nativist attitudes increasing by an average of 58% between the two models as the individual moves from a very favorable opinion of Hispanics to a very unfavorable opinion, holding all other values constant at their mean. In fact, a Somer's D statistic of the effect of anti-Hispanic racism on nativism reveals that it explains 27.8% of the variation in nativism among non-Hispanic whites. Political ideology is the second strongest determinant of nativist attitudes, with the likelihood of possessing nativist attitudes increasing an average of 46% between the two models as people move from being strong liberals to strong conservatives. Age and education are next, at 35% and 34% respectively.

Social context also has a strong substantive effect, as individuals in areas with a foreign-born Latino population of 71.8% in their zip code (the highest value in the data) are 27% less likely to espouse nativist attitudes than those with no foreign-born Latinos in their immediate vicinity. This suggests support for the social contact hypothesis, in that

all other things being equal, those who live around immigrants are less likely to be concerned about threats to a perceived American culture and way of life.[16]

Taking the results from the 2008 Hawkeye Poll list experiment and the 2006 Immigration Survey together, we have preliminary support for the hypothesis related to racism and mixed support for the economic competition and social context hypotheses. Because of data limitations, however, these surveys are not able to test the hypotheses related to cultural competition, nationalism/patriotism, or the psychological determinants of nativism. For that, we must turn to an alternative data source which contains measurements appropriate to test these hypotheses.

"2005 Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey"

The "Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy" survey was conducted by door-to-door interviewers throughout 36 American states from May 16th to July 19th, 2005 and has an N of 1,001 adults. The CID survey is especially appropriate for the purposes of this chapter because it contains a strong battery of nearly 700 diverse survey questions which are able to more accurately measure both the dependent and independent variables in this analysis.

Dependent variable. Nativism will be operationalized by responses to the following survey question: "Would you say that America's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?" This is a ten-point Likert scale variable with higher values indicating an increasing agreement that America's culture life is undermined by people coming here from other countries.

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[16] Many researchers who investigate the effect of social context on political attitudes have acknowledged the possibility of a self-selection effect, i.e. those who hold more antagonistic attitudes toward a particular group are simply less likely to move into an area where the group is common (Welch et al. 2001). However, much research has also provided evidence in support of the argument that the causal arrow is more likely to point from context to attitudes (see the discussion in Oliver and Wong 2003, for example).

It is argued that this variable is an adequate operationalization of nativism because it contains both key elements of the definition as explained in the introductory chapter. By priming respondents with "America's cultural life" it identifies a way of life that is distinctly American. Additionally, the word "undermined" implies a condition of threat. Finally, "people coming to live here from other countries" brings to mind a general feeling of "foreignness", while not specific to any one particular group or nationality.

Independent variables.[17] Anti-Hispanic racism will be measured by a combined index of responses to survey questions measuring negative stereotypes toward Hispanics (e.g. "Hispanics are untrustworthy." or "It is hard to imagine ever being friends with a Hispanic."). Economic competition is an evaluation of one's personal economic situation.[18] Cultural competition is measured by an individual commitment to multiculturalism over classical liberalism, as captured by a series of questions asking a respondent's agreement with statements like, "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions" or that there is "probably only one [philosophy in the world] that is correct." Social context is measured by percent foreign-born Latinos in a respondent's state and the rate at which that population has changed from 1990-2006.

Patriotism is measured by one's pride and importance in being an American while nationalism is measured by beliefs that the government should not be criticized in times of war and that high school teachers should actively promote loyalty to the United States. Authoritarianism is a combined index of questions measuring attitudes toward obedience to authority, discipline, and a preference for strong leaders (Altemeyer 1996). Neuroticism (emotional instability) is captured by another index of general feelings of

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[17] Full explanations of variable measures and coding can be found in the appendix.

[18] Citrin, et al. (1997) showed that sociotropic evaluator measures of the national economy are more accurate than individual income or individual financial situation as predictors of attitudes toward immigration policy in the United States. Such a question, however, was not available on the CID survey.

worry, anxiety, and insecurity (e.g. "Something really terrible can happen to any of us at any given time of day.") Finally, social trust is a combined index of questions like "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" (the Uslaner 2002 measurement of social trust).

Controls. Several other controls will be included in the analysis to account for the effect that they have been shown to exert on immigration policy attitudes, and thus may also exert an independent effect of nativist attitudes as well. Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) demonstrated that women, those who are younger, and those who are more educated are more likely to espouse more liberal immigration policy preferences. Additionally, Knoll (2009a) shows that religion should be included as a control variable, as those who attend religious services more frequently, are also more likely to support more liberal immigration policy preferences. Political ideology is also included, as liberals have traditionally been more likely to support the interests of racial minorities, multicultural policies, and opposed to restrictionist immigration measures (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Swain 2006).

Method of Analysis. Two models will be estimated. The first contains the same variables as were included in the analysis of the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey, as discussed in the previous section. The second model will add the variables available in the CID survey measuring economic competition, nationalism/patriotism, and the various social-psychological characteristics. As the dependent variable is a ten-point scale variable, each model will be estimated employing standard OLS regression and the cases will be weighted with the sample weighting included in the CID dataset. The models will also be estimated using standard errors clustered by state to account for the possibility that unobserved effects might create correlation among those who live in the same geographic area. Furthermore, these models were evaluated for both multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. Summary descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and

control variables, along with the correlations between the dependent and independent variables, are presented in Table 3.4.

Results and Discussion. Results of both multivariate nativism models are presented in Table 3.5. To aid in interpretation, Table 3.5 also presents the substantive impact of each independent variable on nativist attitudes, as shown by the predicted probabilities. As can be seen, there appear to be varying degrees of support for four of the six key hypotheses. The variables measuring racism, economic threat, rates of immigrant inflow, and the social-psychological traits are all significant and in the expected direction. It is also interesting to note that individual-level education remains significant when including the variables unique to the CID survey in the model, but that its influence drops nearly in half. Also, whereas the Pew Immigration Data revealed ideology to be a strong predictor of nativist attitudes, the political ideology and partisanship variables lose their significance when the variables measuring cultural competition, patriotism, nationalism, and the social-psychological variables are included.

Perhaps most interestingly, levels of social trust are the single largest predictor of nativist attitudes in Model 2 of Table 3.5. Those who have low levels of inter-personal trust have, on average, nativism scores 27.2% lower (on an eleven-point scale) than those with high levels of trust. This is an important finding because (to the author's knowledge) social trust has never been included in a study investigating nativist attitudes before. The traditional explanations of education, economic threat, and ideology all lose their explanatory power when social trust is included in the model. Furthermore, the coefficients for both of the other social-psychological variables, authoritarianism and neuroticism, are significant and in the expected direction in Model 2. Indeed, authoritarianism exerts an effect (20.7%) of comparable size to that of anti-Hispanic racism. Neuroticism, while exerting a smaller effect similar to that of age, education, and economic threat, is also significant in the full model.

As would be expected, anti-Hispanic racism is also a strong determinant of nativist attitudes, as the nativism levels increase by 23.5% as individuals move from the minimum to maximum value on the racism variable, holding all other variables constant at their mean. The rate of change in the foreign-born Latino population is also significant. Nativist attitudes increase by 16.4% when individuals live in states with extremely high levels of immigrant growth rates. Finally, the economic threat hypothesis plays a role as well in determining nativist attitudes, as it increases the likelihood of expressing such sentiments by 11% as an individual's personal economic situation gets progressively worse.

Contrary to expectations, the nationalism hypothesis receives no support, as it is insignificant in both models (although it does approach significance at p=0.10). Further, the index variable measuring a commitment to classical liberalism is insignificant in the full model. The social context hypotheses, however, receive mixed support. The proportion of foreign-born individuals in one's geographic proximity seems to exert no independent effect on individual nativist attitudes after controlling for the growth rate of the foreign-born population and the other variables in the models. This finding concurs with the observation of Hofstadter (1955) who points out that spatial proximity to the out-group population is not always a prerequisite for nativism, as members of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s lived in more rural areas: "generally [Klansmen] lived in areas where they had little real contact with the Catholics and Jews against whom their voices were raised" (293). It does, however, support the findings of Hopkins (2009) who finds that attitudes toward immigrants are a function of sudden demographic changes in one's community, not necessarily the size of the demographic groups in question.

Summary of Findings

Table 3.6 presents a summary of the findings from all three data sets. Largely speaking, these results provide contemporary, statistical support for several of the

hypotheses derived from previous studies on nativism from the fields of sociology, history, and political science. The racial prejudices and perceived threats to economic resources that drove outbursts of nativism against Southern European, Catholic, and Chinese immigrants in the past also seem to drive the same nativist attitudes today that predominantly target immigrants from Latin America. It could indeed be argued from the evidence presented herein that the modern nativism phenomenon is, at least to some extent, merely "old wine in new bottles" (Perea 1997a).

But perhaps the more important findings of this analysis have to do with the results of the social-psychological variables. Individual-level social distrust, authoritarianism, and emotional instability all exert a strong and independent effect on nativist attitudes in the American public. Not only are they statistically significant, but one of them, social trust, exerts a stronger influence than the traditional determinants of nativism that have been identified by previous researchers.

Conversely, it is also important to note that some of the other determinants in Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.5 retain their significance even when controlling for the social-psychological variables. As we would expect, the effects are somewhat decreased when the psychological variables are included, but economic threat, education, and anti-Hispanic racism still retain their significance. This demonstrates that even among those who have personality characteristics which would predispose them to non-nativist attitudes, the effect of economics and racial attitudes can serve to spark nativist reactions to one degree or another. Thus, these findings suggests that individual-level nativism is driven by a combination of both internal and external factors and that understanding both are essential in arriving at a comprehensive explanation of the sources of contemporary American nativism.

The Primacy of Racism and Nativism

This chapter has argued that anti-Hispanic racism is an important determinant to understanding nativist attitudes in the American public. The statistical analyses have shown support for the fact that anti-Hispanic racism is the largest single factor predicting individual-level contemporary nativism. A legitimate objection to this argument and corresponding findings could be raised, however. There exists the possibility that endogeneity may be confounding the results presented thus far and obscuring our perspective of the relationship between racism and nativism.

Specifically, the argument could be made that, in reality, it is nativism that actually drives anti-Latino racism, not vice versa. Those who feel compelled to protect a particular form of the American way of life from foreign influence might then develop prejudice toward the particular racial/ethnic group which currently comprises the vast majority of the feared "foreigners" entering the United States – Latinos. This issue is further complicated by the fact that these concepts are also very similar, conceptually speaking. Whereas racial prejudice involves negative affect toward a particular group based on its race or ethnicity, nativism differs only in the fact that it targets a particular group based on its perceived "foreignness." If most foreigners are also of a non-white ethnicity, as is currently the case in the United States, it may prove difficult to distinguish the two concepts empirically, much less determine the nature of the relationship between the two. As Fry (2006) states: "Because notions of 'race' and 'Americanness' are intertwined, and our general understanding of what constitutes racism has become less clear since the 1960s, *it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish nativism from racism in a time when most immigrants are non-white*." (29, emphasis added, citations removed).

This is an important possibility because if nativism indeed drives anti-Hispanic racism, it would carry weighty implications for the future of Anglo-Latino relations in the United States. A relationship of this type would suggest that Latinos will always be perceived as "foreigners," no matter how "Americanized" they become. This would

apply not only to Latino immigrants, but also those who have been American citizens for many generations. The stability of the future of a multi-ethnic American society would be called into question.

Unfortunately, this question is ultimately impossible to answer definitively using the data and methods employed in this chapter and project. It is well-known that cross-sectional survey data analysis can demonstrate statistical association, but cannot conclusively prove causation. Purer experimental methods are ultimately necessary to investigate this matter to a more satisfactory degree. Conclusions reached from quasi-experimental cross-sectional data analysis are not invaluable, however, if they are driven by strong theoretical arguments. It is thus submitted that there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that the direction of causal arrow points from racism to nativism, as explained earlier in this chapter. These theoretical arguments will be examined below.

First, the seminal work on nativism, *Strangers in the Land*, by John Higham (1955) theorizes the relationship as one of racism driving nativism, and not vice-versa. He explains that the two concepts were not linked in the minds of the American public until the early 1900s. It was at that time that the pseudo-science of eugenics became popular in Europe and the United States. The goal of the eugenics movement was to preserve a "superior" race in the United States, and Anglo-Saxons were, not surprisingly, viewed as the race that needed to be preserved. The link to immigration and nativism was established at that time. As Higham explains: "From the eugenicists' point of view, the immigration question was at heart a biological one, and to them admitting 'degenerate breeding stock' seemed one of the worst sins the nation could commit against itself" (151). American eugenicists thus developed a strong nativist commitment as well. As can be seen, Higham (1955) believes that nativism has historically been driven by racism, not vice versa.

This counter-argument is supported by Roberts (1997) who examines the roots of immigration restrictionism in the United States and explains these policy preferences

primarily as a result of racial considerations. She explains that those who are opposed to foreign immigration into the United States are primarily concerned about trying to control the racial demographics of their home country. Her chief concern is the message that it sends to prospective immigrants, that their children are not deemed "worthy" to be added to the future community of American citizens. Roberts supports her contention by describing how Proposition 187 in California in the 1990s included a provision that would cut off medical care to undocumented immigrants, including pregnant mothers and newborns. She explains that this was in part a direct effort to limit the ability of Latino immigrants to reproduce themselves as a racial group in California. In sum, Roberts would also argue that the arrow points racism to nativism.

Having earlier described the difficulty of distinguishing nativism from racism, Brian Fry (2006) later argues that the likely relationship between the two is one of racism leading to nativism, not the other way around, but for reasons other than eugenics. He points to Blumer's (1958) theory of group position as a determinant of anti-minority prejudice. Put very simply, Blumer's theory states that racism is a result of a sense of threat to one's dominant group status. As the size of a subordinate group grows, so will the feelings of threat toward them from the dominant group who are motivated to maintain their privileged position. Fry argues that racial prejudice can lead to a perceived threat from foreigners if the race/ethnicity of those foreigners will threaten the dominant group's position of superiority as a result of their continued immigration into the country. He explains: "Foreigners can challenge a [native] group's position by threatening their racial dominance" (31). Fry, along with Roberts and Higham, see nativism as a partial result of racism, not as a cause of racism.

It could further be argued that if nativism is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of individual-level racism, racial prejudice would exist only toward racial groups who are perceived to be foreign. Indeed, if the arrow points from nativism to racism, then there would be no explanation for anti-black sentiment in the United States,

as they are not perceived by most to have "foreign" origins.[19] The fact that anti-black sentiment does exist in America, however, demonstrates that racism can exist in the absence of nativism, therefore showing that racism is exogenous to the development of nativist attitudes.

Additionally, Table 3.7 presents a simple model of nativist attitudes as a result of the presence of various foreign-born groups in the United States. This model shows that those who live in states with larger populations of foreign-born individuals from Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, where the majority of the inhabitants have lighter skin-tones, comparatively speaking, have lower nativist attitudes. In contrast, living in states with higher concentrations of Latin American immigrants, who tend to have darker skin-tones than Europeans and Australians, leads to higher levels of individual-level nativism.[20] If nativism were exogenous to racism, we would expect to see a negative effect for all foreign groups. Instead, we see evidence which suggests that American nativism is increase by the presence of foreigners who are of a non-white racial background and decreased by the presence of foreigners who have lighter skin tones.

This effect can be further demonstrated by replicating Model 1 of Table 3.5 using a measure for anti-black racism instead of anti-Hispanic racism. In this model, the racism variable remains positive and significant ($p=0.004$). Furthermore, when this same model is replicated using a measure of anti-black *symbolic* racism (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000; Tarman and Sears 2005), the variable remains positive and significant ($p<0.0001$). It is safe to say that anti-black racism, whether it be

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[19] The definition of "foreign" is, of course, completely relative. African-Americans technically are of foreign origin in that their ancestors came from Africa. It would be difficult to be credibly prejudiced against them on the basis of foreignness, however, as they have been in North America just as long, if not longer, than the dominant Anglo community in the United States whose ancestors originally hailed from "foreign" countries in Europe.

[20] Although we see that the presence of immigrants from Asia and Africa (who tend to have darker skin-tones) has no similar effect in this model.

traditional and symbolic, is exogenous to nativism, and both are shown to be significantly associated with individual-level nativism. This further boosts the argument that the direction of the arrow runs from racism to nativism.

Finally, the 2008 Hawkeye Poll (see Chapter 2 for details), contained both an latent nativism list experiment measure as well as an explicit measure of anti-black prejudice: "Do you believe that Obama's policies will benefit whites over blacks, blacks over whites, or will benefit both equally?" Recall that the list experiment gave survey respondents a list of items that might potentially "bother" them about newcomers in the United States, including concerns about crime, government benefits, etc. and asked to tell the surveyor how many of the items they agreed with. Respondents were randomly sorted into two groups – one group received four non-nativist reasons to be concerned about immigrants while the second group received an additional fifth reason: "They hurt traditional American customs and values." Among those who explicitly stated that they believed that Obama will favor blacks over whites (a measure of anti-black racial prejudice), the control group in the list experiment reported a mean of 3.02 on the list experiment measure (SD=0.17, N=61), while the treatment group reported a mean of 3.24 (SD=0.26, N=45). Thus, among those who are willing to admit anti-black prejudice, 23% also possess latent nativist attitudes.

In sum, despite the fact that the direction of the causal arrow between nativism and racism cannot be conclusively proven with the methods employed in this chapter, there are strong theoretical arguments favoring a conceptualization of racism as a determinant of nativism. As was the case in the previous section, future research is warranted to further examine the nature of this relationship, as it holds important implications for the future of American politics in a multi-ethnic society.

Conclusion

The objective of this chapter has been to identify, describe, and comprehensively evaluate a more comprehensive model of individual-level nativism in the American public. These determinants were derived from previous studies on nativist attitudes in the fields of political science, sociology, history, and social psychology. They included traditional variables such as economic threat, nationalism, and anti-Hispanic racism, as well as more recently identified variables such as social context, and psychological variables measuring specific personality traits such as inter-personal trust and authoritarianism.

An analysis of three separate data sources revealed that anti-Hispanic racism is one of the predominant predictors of contemporary nativist attitudes in the United States, along with social trust and authoritarianism. Contrary to expectations, the nationalism hypothesis received no support, and the social context variables received little support, as they were insignificant in two of the three data analyses. However, the Pew data analysis revealed some support for the social contact hypothesis while the CID data revealed support for the immigrant inflow hypothesis.

Perhaps the most important finding of this chapter, however, is that individual social-psychological traits are indispensable to understanding contemporary nativist attitudes in the United States. Nativism is as much a result of social trust, authoritarianism, and emotional instability as it is a result of racial attitudes, perceived threats to the economy, or socioeconomic variables like age or education. This suggests that a more in-depth examination of the psychological determinants of nativist attitudes is warranted, and a profitable avenue for future research.

The next chapter will move beyond an examination of the determinants of a perceived threat to a uniquely American way of life by incorporating nativism into a model predicting conservative immigration policy preferences. To what extent does nativism drive attitudes toward immigrant worker policies and access to social services, in comparison with other factors?

Table 3.1. Hypothesized Effect of Independent Variables on Nativism

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	EFFECT ON NATIVISM
Anti-Hispanic racism	++
Economic competition	+
Classical liberalism	++
Immigrant inflow	+
Social context	+ / -
Nationalism	++
Patriotism	Ø
Social distrust	+
Emotional instability	+
Authoritarianism	+

Table 3.2. Results of Nativism List Experiment

	Control mean	S.E.	N	Treatment mean	S.E.	N	% Latent nativism	% Explicit nativism
18-29	1.63	0.35	16	1.72	0.28	11	10	27
30-44	1.67	0.33	21	2.08	0.28	37	41	32
45-59	2.15	0.16	89	2.48	0.17	81	36	41
60+	2.31	0.11	176	2.72	0.15	141	42*	49
Less than college	2.43	0.12	168	2.95	0.15	131	52**	55
More than college	1.87	0.13	134	2.12	0.14	139	26	31
Less than $30K/year	2.58	0.23	45	2.98	0.24	44	40	56
Between $30-75K	2.28	0.13	137	2.74	0.19	93	46*	50
More than $75K/year	1.89	0.15	89	2.13	0.16	102	24	29
Republican	2.68	0.12	140	3.13	0.14	127	44*	56
Democrat	1.61	0.12	140	1.90	0.15	127	29	33
Conservatives	2.70	0.13	120	3.20	0.15	102	52*	60
Liberals	1.50	0.16	84	1.64	0.18	87	13	27
Moderates	2.06	0.15	93	2.62	0.18	78	56*	40
Obama will favor blacks over whites	3.02	0.17	61	3.24	0.26	45	23	67
Obama will favor both equally	1.88	0.10	222	2.30	0.12	210	42**	37
Over 15% foreign-born population in zip code	2.07	0.21	59	2.34	0.29	44	27	45
Under 15% foreign-born population in zip code	2.18	0.10	224	2.48	0.12	210	29	40

Over 50% foreign-born growth rate in state 1990-2006	2.02	0.15	107	2.36	0.17	102	34	40
Under 50% foreign-born growth rate in state 1990-2006	2.27	0.11	195	2.62	0.13	168	35*	46

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2008 Hawkeye Poll, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens.

Table 3.3. Logistic Regression Estimation of Nativism Attitudes, Pew 2006 Survey

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.
Female	-0.176* (0.089)	-0.044	-0.058 (0.152)	-0.014
Age	0.018*** (0.004)	0.335	0.019*** (0.005)	0.361
Education	-0.237*** (0.040)	-0.339	-0.232*** (0.032)	-0.331
Income	-0.086* (0.038)	-0.170	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.074
Economic threat	0.070 (0.083)	-0.053	0.486*** (0.112)	-0.348
Church attendance	0.046 (0.049)	0.057	0.003 (0.073)	0.004
% FB Latin America	-2.946 (1.519)	-0.234	-4.020*** (0.990)	-0.307
FB Latin American change	-0.046 (0.418)	-0.013	-0.189 (0.399)	-0.052
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.867*** (0.087)	0.560	0.948*** (0.123)	0.594
Ideology (liberal +)	-0.563*** (0.073)	-0.507	-0.454*** (0.135)	-0.424
Republican	0.152 (0.317)	0.038	0.504** (0.192)	0.125
Independent	-0.339 (0.396)	-0.083	0.185 (0.271)	0.046
Constant	-0.859 (0.813)		-0.260 (1.130)	
N	1,498		1,441	
Pseudo R^2	0.168		0.179	

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Independent variables are % of each immigrant group in respondent's zip code according to the 2000 U.S. Census. Limited to non-Hispanic white respondents. Standard errors are clustered by state.

Table 3.4. Summary Descriptive Statistics of CID Survey Variables

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Correlation with Nativism
Nativism	3.95	2.46	0	10	1.00
Anti-Hispanic prejudice	2.43	0.77	1	5	0.42*
Economic threat	1.77	0.82	1	4	0.21*
Classical liberalism	2.62	0.48	1	4.33	0.12*
% Foreign-born Latino	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.15	0.02
Immigrant inflow	1.36	0.21	1.04	2.05	0.02
Nationalism	0.63	0.20	0.23	1	0.33*
Patriotism	4.45	0.68	1	5	0.15*
Authoritarianism	2.67	0.59	1	4.75	0.34*
Emotional instability	2.83	0.61	0.67	4	0.34*
Social distrust	5.49	1.96	0	10	-0.33*
Ideology (liberal +)	5.05	2.30	0	10	-0.17*
Republican	0.44	0.50	0	1	0.07
Independent	0.13	0.33	0	1	0.11*
Education	3.36	1.59	0	6	-0.37*
Female	0.55	0.50	0	1	-0.03
Age	46.88	16.82	18	90	0.05
Income	5.71	2.40	1	11	-0.15*
Church attendance	3.43	1.63	1	7	-0.05

* correlation is significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level, N=538, cases restricted to those with non-missing values

Source: 2005 “Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy” Survey

Table 3.5. OLS Regression Estimation of Nativism Attitudes, CID 2005 Survey

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.
Female	-0.071 (0.218)	-0.007	-0.068 (0.222)	-0.007
Age	0.004 (0.006)	0.032	0.015* (0.006)	0.108
Education	-0.380*** (0.056)	-0.228	-0.227*** (0.064)	-0.136
Income	0.048 (0.047)	0.048	0.067 (0.049)	0.067
Economic threat	0.416*** (0.109)	0.125	0.368** (0.109)	0.110
Church attendance	0.006 (0.073)	0.004	-0.057 (0.067)	-0.034
% Foreign-born Latino	1.787 (5.185)	0.026	-5.690 (3.983)	-0.082
Immigrant inflow	-0.589 (0.760)	-0.060	-1.627* (0.629)	-0.164
Anti-Hispanic prejudice	0.956*** (0.159)	0.382	0.586*** (0.168)	0.235
Ideology (liberal +)	-0.090* (0.034)	-0.090	-0.039 (0.033)	-0.039
Republican	0.546* (0.266)	0.055	0.166 (0.290)	0.017
Independent	0.595* (0.256)	0.059	0.320 (0.249)	0.032
Authoritarianism			0.553* (0.215)	0.207
Emotional instability			0.350 (0.190)	0.117
Social distrust			0.272*** (0.046)	0.272
Classical liberalism			-0.249 (0.177)	0.083
Nationalism			1.133 (0.669)	0.088
Patriotism			0.207 (0.202)	0.083
Constant	2.539 (1.363)		1.111 (1.667)	

Table 3.5 — continued

N	593	538
R^2	0.259	0.350

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2005 "Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy" Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizens respondents. Standard errors are clustered by state. Predicted probability figures indicate the % change in the dependent variable on a 10-point scale, holding all other figures constant at their mean values.

Models 1 and 2 were replicated substituting an estimation of the size of the undocumented immigrant population the respondent's state (Pew Hispanic Center 2006) for the % foreign-born Latino variable derived from Census data. The results remain substantively the same, with the following exceptions in Model 2: the coefficient for immigrant inflow is no longer significant and the coefficient for emotional instability is positive and significant at 0.084.

Table 3.6. Summary of Findings

Independent variable	Expected Direction	List experiment results	Pew Survey results	CID survey results
Anti-Hispanic prejudice	++	+	++	++
Economic threat	+		+	+
Classical liberalism	++			Ø
% Foreign-born	+ / -	Ø	-	Ø
Immigrant inflow	+	Ø	Ø	+
Nationalism	++			Ø
Patriotism	Ø			Ø
Authoritarianism	+			++
Emotional instability	+			Ø
Social distrust	+			++
Controls				
Ideology (liberal +)	-	-	--	Ø
Republican PID	+	+	+	Ø
Independent PID	?		+	Ø
Education	-	-	-	-
Female	-		mixed	Ø
Age	+	+	+	+
Income	-	-	mixed	Ø
Church attendance	-		Ø	Ø

Table 3.7. OLS Regression Estimation of Nativism Attitudes, CID 2005 Survey

	B (SE)
% FB Europe	-41.429** (15.298)
% FB Oceania	-751.016*** (251.198)
% FB Africa	128.059 (89.949)
% FB Latin America	12.428* (5.748)
% FB North America	-32.926 (97.338)
% FB Asia	8.853 (16.164)
Constant	4.345*** (0.340)
N	707
R^2	0.095

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2005 "Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy" Survey

Note: Independent variables are % foreign-born from each global region in respondent's state as of the 2000 U.S. Census. Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are clustered by state.

CHAPTER 4: NATIVISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES

Introduction

Any observer of American politics will agree that there is a great deal of disagreement in public attitudes toward immigration policy in the United States. Perhaps more than any other recent issue over the last several years, immigration reform policies have sparked intense passion, support, and opposition from different groups and individuals in society. Why is it that some people take a more "hard-line" approach to immigration policies while others are more accommodating to newcomers to the United States? In addition to cable news pundits and political observers, this question has been the topic of much attention in academic circles in recent years.

As was earlier discussed in detail in Chapter 2, scholars have uncovered a number of factors that influence individual immigration attitudes, including gender (Hughes and Tuch 2003), age (Wilson 1996), education (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Hoskin and Mishler 1983), religion (Knoll 2009a), partisanship (Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006), economic competition (Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Citrin et al. 1997), social context (Tolbert and Hero 1996; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Hood and Morris 1998), national identity (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990), and even media cues (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). Until now, however, immigration policy attitudes have not been modeled as a consequence of the more basic attitude of nativism – the feeling that the American culture and way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.

The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to this oversight by investigating the effect of nativism on immigration policy attitudes in the United States and compare this effect to other traditional factors such as individual-level education and social context. In previous chapters it was argued that nativism and immigration policy preferences are distinct concepts and need to be treated as such by social scientists. It was further argued that nativism is a cause of immigration policy attitudes, not a conceptual or empirical

equivalent. Thus, a multi-stage model of immigration policy preferences will be developed and analyzed empirically. A variety of immigration policies will be included in this analysis, including attitudes on what the government should do with undocumented immigrants already in the country, proposals to change the U.S. Constitution to end "birthright citizenship" for the children of undocumented immigrants, and cutting off immigrants from access to social services.

In short, this chapter will show that immigration policy attitudes in the United States are indeed a result of nativism, but also a product of other important factors such as political ideology and attitudes toward Hispanics in general. It will also be shown that there are significant differences in the determinants of various immigration policy attitudes, and that some policies tend to be "more nativist" than others.

A Multi-Stage Model of Immigration Policy Preferences

The argument. The importance and nature of a multi-stage model of immigration attitudes was described previously in Chapter 2. Therefore, an inordinate amount of time will not be devoted here to explaining or justifying the multi-stage model of immigration attitudes that will be analyzed in this chapter. It will be helpful, however, to briefly review the central arguments before proceeding with the analysis.

First, nativism as a concept has previously been examined by many academic historians who have investigated the nativist social movements, political parties, and mass public attitudes throughout American history (Higham 1955; Knobel 1996). Studies by political scientists, aiming to analyze the determinants of nativism in the U.S. public, have instead used immigration-related policy preferences as a proxy for nativism. In essence, these scientists have assumed that everyone who supports restrictions on immigration levels, official English laws, a border fence with Mexico, or other conservative immigration policies, do so exclusively because of an underlying nativist orientation. (For a review of these studies, see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). In response, it was

argued that this may very well be the case for some, if not a majority. It was also argued, however, that there are other reasons for opposing pro-immigration policies, including concerns about the economy or national security, maintaining a rule-of-law, a simple ideological objection to multiculturalism, or, in one interesting case, for ecologically progressive concerns about the sustainability of the natural environment.

For these reasons, it was previously argued that a more comprehensive model of immigration policy preferences must include nativism as a key intervening variable (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).

Statistical relationships. Chapter 2 also included some simple bivariate statistics that illustrated the nativism-immigration policy distinction (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3). These indicated a wide diversity of opinion between nativism and immigration policy preferences. For example, it was shown that approximately 40% of those who express strong nativist attitudes also report moderate-to-liberal preferences on prospective levels of immigration, and that about 60% of those with low nativist feelings support moderate-to-conservative policy preferences. Furthermore, the average correlation between these two attitudes in a 2006 Pew survey was $r = 0.33$. A distinct relationship, yes, but a one-to-one association, no.

We can further examine the relationship between nativism and immigration policy preferences by information presented in the following table. Table 4.1 reports the bivariate correlations ("r") and Somers' D statistics of the relationship between nativism and a host of immigration-related policy preferences. In terms of straight correlations, the policy with the strongest association with nativism appears to be support for the Minutemen border guards ($r = 0.40$), while the "least" nativist policy is denying the children of undocumented immigrants access to a public education ($r = 0.23$), a range of 17% between the minimum and maximum correlations.

The Somers' D statistic in Table 4.1 indicates the amount of variation in a dependent variable (immigration-related policy preferences) that can be explained by the

independent variable (nativism). For example, knowing a respondents' level of nativism improves the likelihood of predicting their opinion on prospective immigration levels by 29% in both the 2005 CID and 2006 Pew surveys. Not an inconsequential amount, but again, it leaves more than two-thirds of the variation unexplained. We see here that nativism is most helpful in explaining opinions on what to do with those already in the U.S. illegally the most (31%), while least helpful in explaining attitudes on children's access to education (16%).

Precedent for a multi-stage model. A similar multi-stage model of racial public policy preferences is not without precedent in political science research. In Chapter 2, it was described in some detail how previous studies in the field of race and politics have operationalized racism and modeled it as a determinant of racial policy preferences. As was explained, research on racial public policy preferences has focused on the extent to which racial prejudice drives opposition to public policies designed to benefit racial minority groups, specifically African-Americans. These policies include affirmative action, school busing, and welfare spending. This research has conceptualized racism as the key factor influencing support for racial policy preferences. At no point has racism been argued or conceived to be conceptually or empirically identical to conservative racial policy preferences. Rather, the primary argument has focused instead on how to define and measure racism in the first place.

On one side, David Sears, Donald Kinder, Lynn Sanders, and their numerous colleagues have argued that symbolic racism (the belief that African-Americans fail to adhere to the traditional American values of productivity, self-control, and the "Protestant work ethic") is largely responsible for attitudes toward racial public policy preferences in contemporary American society (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). On the other side of the debate, Paul Sniderman and his colleagues argue that those who oppose pro-minority policies do not do so out of racial prejudice, but rather out of simple philosophical objections to using government for that particular purpose

(Sniderman, Brody, and Kuklinski 1991; Sniderman and Piazza 1995; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000). While the debate has not yet been resolved to either side's satisfaction, Sears (1994) concludes that views on racial public policy attitudes are at least partly attributable to symbolic racism and partly to ideological conservatism. He maintains, however, that symbolic racism is definitely the stronger of the two factors. (See Chapter 2 for a more complete discussion of this debate as well as the references to key works in the literature on the topic.)

As explained in previous chapters, the argument in this research endeavor is similar. Previous research has conceptualized racial prejudice and racial policy preferences as distinct attitudes and then investigated the extent to which racial prejudice drives black public policy attitudes among whites in comparison with other factors like ideological conservatism. In a similar vein, the current research conceptualizes nativism and immigrant-related policy preferences as distinct attitudes and then seeks to investigate the extent to which nativism, as well as anti-Hispanic racial prejudice, drives immigration attitudes among whites in comparison with other factors, including ideological conservatism.

The remainder of this chapter will specify and analyze a multi-stage model of immigration policy preferences to determine the extent to which nativism manifests itself in the immigration attitudes of the American public when compared to other factors that have been identified and examined by previous research.

Data and Methods

The analysis in this chapter will use data from the "2006 Immigration Survey" conducted by the Pew Research Center and Pew Hispanic Center, one of the surveys featured in the previous chapter. While this survey contains fewer independent variable measures than are available through other surveys (like the "Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy" survey analyzed previously), the 2006 Pew survey sample size is

superior and more nationally representative. The variables it does contain are also argued to be perfectly adequate for a concise specification of a multi-stage model of policy preferences. Further, because this chapter focuses on analyzing immigration attitudes among Anglos, all data analyses and statistics are limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens. African-American and Latino attitudes will be analyzed separately in later chapters.

Dependent variables. Three policy questions will be used to measure immigration preferences of the American public. They are as follows (full question wording is available in Appendix B):

1. What should be done with undocumented immigrants already in the U.S.? Should they be allowed to stay in the U.S. permanently, be required to go home after working for a period of time, or should they all be required to leave immediately?
2. Should undocumented immigrants be eligible to receive social services from state and local governments?
3. Should the U.S. Constitution be amended to end birthright citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants born in the U.S.?

These questions are representative of three different types of common immigration policies: immigrant worker policies (#1), economic policies (#2), and symbolic policies (#3). Each variable is coded so that higher values correspond with more conservative policy preferences in each domain. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.

Independent variables. As discussed previously, a number of previous studies have identified factors that influence public attitudes on nativism and immigration policy preferences and will thus be included in this analysis. These variables were discussed in detail in the previous chapter and will thus be reviewed only briefly. Basic summary statistics for each variable can be found in Table 4.4.

Standard demographic characteristics such as gender (Hughes and Tuch 2003), age (Wilson 1996), and education (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Hoskin and Mishler 1983) will be included as it has been previously found that females, younger individuals, and those with more education have more liberal immigration policy preferences. Further, Knoll (2009a) finds that those who attend religious services more frequently, as well as those belonging to minority religions (particularly Jews and Latter-day Saints) are also more likely to have more liberal immigration preferences. Individual-level Catholicism will also be included as the Catholic Church has taken an active role in promoting pro-immigrant policies in recent years (Pomfret 2006).

Political partisanship will also be included, as it is predicted that conservatives and Republicans (including Independent-lean-Republicans) will be more likely to have more conservative policy preferences. Moreover, including political conservatism in the model will serve as a direct test of the Sniderman argument (Sniderman and Piazza 1995) that opposition to racial public policies is a matter of principled political ideology instead of the less-noble motive of racial prejudice (or in this case, nativism). Along the same lines, a measure for anti-Hispanic racism is also included. Advocates of the symbolic racism theory (as discussed earlier) argue that racism is a fundamental determinant of racial public policy preferences. It was also shown in the last chapter to be a significant determinant of nativist attitudes. This measure will be included, then, to test the extent to which anti-Hispanic racism drives nativism vs. directly affecting immigration policy preferences.

The economic competition hypothesis (Olzak 1994; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997) will be measured by levels of family income as well as by perceptions of the state of the national economy, as Citrin, et al. (1997) found that sociotropic economic evaluations matter more than personal financial situation in determining immigration attitudes. The effect of social context (Tolbert and Hero 1996; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Hood and Morris 1998) will be measured by including the percent foreign-born

Latino in the respondent's zip code as well as the foreign-born Latino growth rate in an individual's state from 2000 to 2006 (Hopkins 2007, 2009).

Method of analysis. The multi-stage model of immigration policy preferences will be estimated using a "block recursive" method. Essentially, a series of models with the same dependent variable are estimated. Each model adds progressively more independent variables in a causal order, with the assumption that variables in a previous block are exogenous to those in preceding blocks.[21] In this way, one can calculate the total, direct, and indirect effects of each independent variable on a final dependent variable of interest. This method is explained in detail by Davis (1985) and featured in Miller and Shanks (1996), *The New American Voter*, and more recently in studies on opinions toward flag burning (Hanson 2008) and gay rights (Egan, Persily, and Wallsten 2008). If a variable is statistically significant in an earlier model and becomes insignificant in a later model, it is concluded that the variable exerts its influence through the intervening variables that were introduced in the later model. In this case, the primary question of interest is the extent to which the variables previously identified as exerting an effect on immigration policy preferences retain or lose their substantive effect and significance when nativism is introduced in the model as a key intervening variable. The blocks of the multi-stage model are thus:

> **BLOCK 1 – Demographic and long-term social characteristics:** female, age, education, income, perception of national economy, church attendance, Catholic,

[21] The most serious concern about using this method is that anti-Hispanic racial prejudice may not be exogenous to nativism in the United States. This topic was discussed at length in the previous chapter where it was argued that racism is indeed prior to nativism for a variety of reasons, based on both historical analysis and empirical statistical analysis. To further test this argument in the context of a multi-stage model, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis was performed, using racism as an instrument for nativism in Model 3 in Table 4.5. Nativism remains independently significant in the second model, indicating that in this case, anti-Hispanic racism is exogenous to nativism and that nativism exerts an independent effect on policy preferences in a way that is completely independent of anti-Hispanic racism. Results of the 2SLS model are presented in Table 4.10.

LDS, Jewish, percent foreign-born Latino in zip code, and factor change in foreign-born Latino population in state 2000-2006

BLOCK 2 – Values and political orientation: Block 1 variables, anti-Hispanic affect, political ideology, and political partisanship (Republican and Independent)

BLOCK 3 – Nativism: Block 1 variables, Block 2 variables, and nativism

As described in Davis (1985), these blocks are set up in a causal order. It is theorized that the variables in Block 1 "trigger" (or at least influence) the variables added in Block 2 which, in turn, trigger the variables newly included in Block 3 which then lead to the dependent variable of interest. For this study, it is hypothesized that socioeconomic characteristics like age, education, and social context determine values like and ideology and Latino affect which then determine nativism which, finally, determines preferences for immigration policies.

Two final notes: because the Hispanic affect question was given to only half of the Pew survey respondents, the analyses will be restricted to those cases which include this variable. Also, to make interpretation of these multi-stage models as simple as possible, only the substantive effect (as measured by predicted probabilities), direction of the arrow, and statistical significance of each variable will be reported. The logit coefficients and standard errors for each model are available in Appendix C.

Results

Immigrant Worker Policies. Table 4.5 reports the results of the block recursive model estimation of the immigrant worker policy dependent variable. Model 1 contains the basic demographic and long-term social context variables including age, gender, education, religion, percent foreign-born Latino, and the rate of change of the foreign-born Latino population in the respondent's state. Model 2 adds in variables representing political orientation and personal values like anti-Hispanic affect and political ideology. Model 3 includes all previous variables and includes nativism to predict conservative

immigration policy preferences. Again, these models are set up in a theoretically causal order – the variables in Model 2 are theorized to be at least partially determined by those in Model 1, and those in Model 3 at least partially determined by those in Models 1 and 2. Variables which are significant in earlier models but lose their significance with proceeding models exert their influence indirectly through the variables added in the later models. Model 3 indicates the direct effect of the significant variables on immigrant worker policies, specifically, support for requiring all undocumented immigrants to immediately return to their countries of origins instead of being allowed to work for a certain period of time or creating a pathway to eventual citizenship.

In Models 1 through 3 we can ascertain that some of the usual demographic characteristics such as education and religion exert their influence both directly and indirectly on immigrant worker policy preferences. For example, individual levels of education, which have long been shown to have a strong effect on immigration attitudes, does so only indirectly through both political ideology and anti-Hispanic racial affect. The economic threat hypothesis also receives support, in that it exerts its effect directly on policy preferences, independent of the various variables added in Blocks 2 and 3. Further, it appears that some of the various religious variables, specifically frequency of church attendance and Judaism, also exert a direct affect on immigrant worker policy preferences.

The more principal variables of interest in the analysis are added in Model 3 of Table 4.5. First, it appears that immigrant worker preferences are chiefly influenced by a combination of three central determinants: nativism, political conservatism, and anti-Hispanic affect. As would be expected, individuals are 26% more likely to prefer immediately sending undocumented immigrants back to their countries of origin, as levels of nativism move from their lowest to highest levels. Interestingly, there is more to the story than simple nativism. Political conservatives are 23% more likely to have conservative immigrant worker preferences and those with higher levels of anti-Hispanic

affect are 35% more likely to report such preferences. These effects are just as strong (ideological conservatism) and stronger (negative racial affect) than the effect of nativism.

Also, the block recursive model indicates that political conservatism operates almost entirely independent on immigration policy preferences (its effect decreasing by only 5% when nativism is included in the model) while it appears that negative racial affect has both a direct and indirect effect on immigration preferences. Approximately a quarter of the effect of anti-Hispanic affect operates indirectly through nativism, while the remaining three-quarters exerts its influence directly and independently on immigrant worker preferences.

Substantively, these results indicate that each of these "big three" determinants operates autonomously and independently in shaping immigration preferences in the U.S. public. Those who like Latinos and hold low nativist attitudes are still significantly more likely to report more conservative policy preferences if they are simply more ideologically conservative. The same holds true for those who like Latinos and are politically liberal, but high on nativism, and for those who are politically liberal and low on nativism, but have generally unfavorable attitudes toward Hispanics. Each of these three variables drives conservative policy preferences independent of the others at approximately the same magnitude, although for this particular policy, negative racial affect appears to be the dominant factor.

Economic policies. Table 4.6 reports the results of the block recursive model for the economic immigration policy featured in this analysis: whether or not undocumented immigrants in the U.S. should be eligible for social services from state and local governments. The results indicate that while nativism still influences economic immigration policy preferences, social context and political ideology are the two key determinants of social service eligibility attitudes. Ideological conservatives are 40% more likely to say "no" and those with high levels of foreign-born individuals in their

communities are 32% more likely to say "yes" when asked whether or not immigrants should be eligible for government benefits.

Economic threat also exerts a sizable influence, although in a different way than normally theorized. The traditional explanation is that those with lower incomes will be more opposed to pro-immigrant policy preferences because those individuals are the ones competing with the immigrants for scarce economic resources like jobs and government benefits. Here we see, however, that it is those with *higher* incomes that are more opposed to government benefits for undocumented immigrants. Apparently, the economic "threat" in effect is the threat to the pocketbook, as those with higher incomes are the ones who, through their tax payments, principally fund government services in the United States.

Again we see, however, that nativism, conservatism, and racism all influence attitudes toward immigrant eligibility for governments services. This time, however, the effect of racism and nativism are weaker than when considering immigrant worker policies.

Symbolic policies. Finally, we will examine a symbolic immigration policy. Symbolic policies are those that tends to have more wide-spread popular appeal but that are not considered by most political elites to be feasible or even legitimate or possible. This analysis considers support for a proposal to amend the U.S. Constitution to eliminate the provision in the 14th Amendment that all people born in the U.S. are granted automatic citizenship. Those who support this proposal argue that many immigrants come to the U.S. illegally and give birth to their children on American soil so that their children are born U.S. citizens, making it easier for they, themselves, to eventually attain citizenship. Therefore, they argue that eliminating this provision from the Constitution would remove a major incentive to illegally immigrate to the United States.

Table 4.7 reports the block recursive model of determinants for ending birthright citizenship in the U.S. Constitution. Unlike the previous two policies that have been

examined, the single largest determinant of this particular immigration policy is nativism, the feeling that America's culture and way of life need to be protected against foreign influence. Support for amending the Constitution increases by a probability of 41% as individual-level nativism increases from its minimum to maximum value. Again, we see that anti-Hispanic affect and political ideology exert a sizable influence, but to a much lesser extent, and also partially through an indirect effect through the nativism variable. Education remains significant in the final block of the multi-stage model, indicating that those with lower levels of education, all other things being equal, are more likely to support amending the Constitution to end birthright citizenship. Its effect drops significantly in the final model, however, showing that the influence of low education exerts most of its effect through nativism.

It is also worth noting the absence of significance for most other variables in Block 1 of this model. Support for ending birthright citizenship appears to be almost entirely a product of nativism, negative racial affect, low education levels, and political conservatism. Due to the fact that nativism is the strongest variable in this model, and at a rate almost double that of its influence in the previous two policy models, it might be fair to say that ending birthright citizenship is a "more nativist" attitude than advocating a mass deportation policy or a hard-line welfare eligibility policy.

Discussion

Table 4.8 presents a summary of findings of the three analyses presented above. The substantive effects of each independent variable on each of the three corresponding policy variables are shown. A few interesting generalizations can be observed from the results summarized in Table 4.8. First and most important, while negative Hispanic racial affect, political conservatism, and nativism all play a role in determining immigration-related policy attitudes, the magnitude of the effect of each variable varies depending on the policy in question. Racial affect appears to be a stronger factor in immigrant worker

and symbolic immigration policies, while political conservatism is strongest when explaining economic policies. Also, (and not entirely surprising) nativism is the strongest explanation of symbolic immigration policies.

Second, social context appears to exert an effect only on attitudes toward economic policies, and in a more liberalizing direction. More Latino immigrants in one's area are associated with a greater willingness to allow those immigrants access to government benefits and social services. This shows support for the social contact hypothesis (Welch et al. 2001). While this variable is consistently a significant predictor of immigration policy attitudes in previous research, it seems to lose its explanatory power for most issues once nativism and racial attitudes are accounted for in these models.

Third, these results provide evidence in favor of a multi-stage causal model of immigration policy preferences. Not all traditional determinants of immigration policy attitudes (like education, age, social context, economic threat, etc.) exert their influence directly. Some variables, like education and age, influence immigration attitudes largely through intervening variables like racism and political ideology. Others, like education, influence policy attitudes indirectly at several stages of the causal chain, although for education, always in liberalizing direction.

Fourth, from a theoretical and methodological standpoint, these results suggest that previous research which has theorized nativism but operationalized immigration policy attitudes has not quite examined what the researchers thought they were examining. These results suggest that using immigration policy preferences as a proxy for individual-level nativism leads to a variety of conceptual and methodological headaches. First, if a researcher substitutes immigration policy preferences as a proxy for nativism, the attitude under examination will represent more than just nativism. That nativism will be an element of the proxy measure is true, but it will be just as much a product of racism and conservatism (and to a certain extent, economic threat) as it is about nativism.

Second, if policy preferences are used as a proxy dependent variable for nativism, then nativism itself will necessarily be omitted as a key independent variable. Aside from seriously mis-specifying the model, it will ignore what has been shown here to be one of the key determinants of immigration policy attitudes.

Fifth, these results speak to an important aspect of public debate over immigration reform in recent years. It has often been the case that those who support liberal immigration policies in the United States tend to attack and label those whose favor conservative policies as "nativists" or worse, "racists". Conservatives defensively respond that their support of such policies is "nothing personal" but rather is motivated by a sincere commitment to conservative political principles, often motivated by economic or rule-of-law concerns.

Which side is correct? If the results presented here are accurate, it would appear that both sides are correct to a degree. The "big three" factors of conservative immigration policy determinants in the American public appear to be nativism, anti-Hispanic racism, as well as political conservatism. Therefore, for liberals to assume that conservative immigration preferences are always driven entirely by nativism and racism is not only stereotypical, but also draws unfair conclusions about those who support such policy views. On the other hand, for conservatives to continue to argue that racism and nativism have nothing to do with calls for a mass deportation of illegal immigrants or amending the Constitution to end birthright citizenship is naïve, not to mention disingenuous. From a normative standpoint, more elevated, civil, and respectful discourse would certainly be beneficial as the public continues to debate the role of immigration in contemporary American society.

The "Principled Objector" Argument

Before concluding this chapter, it would be profitable to briefly examine Sniderman's "principled objector" argument. Throughout this and other chapters,

numerous references have been made to the scholarly debate between the symbolic racism argument as described by Sears and his colleagues (Sears et al. 1980, 1997; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000) and the arguments made by Sniderman and his colleagues (Sniderman and Piazza 1995; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000). In short, Sears argues that opposition to public policies that benefit racial minorities (primarily African-Americans) is a result of symbolic racism – believing that blacks are no longer disadvantaged by society but rather that they disadvantage themselves by their own failure to adhere to a disciplined work ethic and an unwillingness to abandon a "victimization" mindset. Sniderman, in response, argues that opposition to these policies is, in fact, not racially motivated, but instead primarily a result of political conservatism – a belief that government should be limited as much as possible in economic affairs, preferring equality of opportunity over equality of outcomes, and a general "color-blind" approach to political governance.

In an interesting attempt to reconcile these competing explanations, Sniderman, et al. (1991) offer the possibility that both sides are correct, but that a major difference exists depending on levels of education. They present evidence to support the view that low-educated individuals are opposed to racial public policies largely due to racism and high-educated people oppose racial public policies not out of racism, but because of principled political conservatism.

In this chapter, we have seen support for both arguments. Opposition to government policies that benefit Hispanic immigrants appears to be motivated by racial concerns *and* political conservatism, as well as nativism. Apparently, one *can* be a "principled objector" to pro-immigrant policies for reasons other than racism or nativism, including ideology and economic concerns. It would be interesting to briefly test the possibility raised by Sniderman, et al. (1991) that individual levels of education are responsible for these different motivations when it comes to immigration policy preferences. Sniderman's argument would predict that these "principled objectors"

(motivated by conservatism or economic concerns) are the more highly educated while those who are motivated by racism or nativism tend to be those with lower levels of education.

Table 4.9 presents two replications of Model 3 in Table 4.5, the fully-specified final block of the immigrant worker preferences recursive model. The education variable is excluded, instead represented in the split between the two models. The first model is limited to those with less than a college education; the second includes only those who have a college degree or higher. As before, only the substantive effects of the variables, in terms of predicted probabilities of the logit estimates, are shown (full logit models are available in Appendix C).

First, it appears that Sniderman's central arguments hold true when it comes to immigration policy preferences. Only those with less than a college degree are motivated by racism when opposing pro-immigrant public policies. We also see that political ideology is insignificant in the less-educated model (although it does approach significance at p=0.075). Similar to Sniderman's findings regarding black racial policy preferences, the immigrant-related policy preferences of those with less education are motivated by anti-Hispanic racial affect while those with more education are motivated more by political ideology.

Perhaps the most interesting result is that nativism appears to drive opposition to pro-immigrant policies among *both* the less- and highly-educated, and at a rate nearly identical for each. Unlike racial attitudes, nativism does not appear to split along education lines, as those on both ends of the education spectrum are equally influenced by perceived foreign threats to a uniquely American culture and way of life. This same result is observed for the economic threat hypothesis, as those who are highly-educated and less-educated are both equally likely to be influenced by concerns about immigration to the national economy.

It is sometimes argued, however, that research findings which seem to indicate that those with more education are less likely to be influenced by racial bias is simply a function of social desirability – more intelligent people know how to "hide" their biases better when answering survey questions, in order to give a more socially acceptable response. If this is indeed the case, apparently individuals do not perceive admitting nativist attitudes to be socially undesirable. (This topic will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.) Indeed, for the well-educated, nativism may be considered to be a more "appropriate" or "legitimate" motivation for opposition to pro-immigrant policies as opposed to pure racial prejudice. This conclusion is supported by the findings derived from the nativism list experiment, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. The list experiment revealed that levels of latent nativism are actually lower than levels of explicit nativism, suggesting that individuals wish to appear more nativist than they actually are, possibly out of a desire not to appear as anything less than a good patriotic American.

In any event, the results presented in this chapter contribute to the symbolic racism vs. principled objector debate by showing that the conclusions of the various arguments on both sides may not be completely applicable when explaining support for policies that benefit non-black racial minorities. When it comes to Hispanic immigrants, at least, neither racism nor ideology presents a complete picture of immigrant-related policy attitudes. Only by incorporating both elements from the previous debate (racism and ideology), and adding nativism, can we come to a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that shape immigration attitudes among the American public.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to develop and test a multi-stage model of immigration policy preferences among non-Hispanic whites in the United States. It has been argued that nativism and immigration policy preferences are distinct attitudes, and that previous research has been misguided in using attitudes toward immigration policy as a proxy for

individual-level nativism. Using a 2006 nation-wide survey of immigration attitudes, a recursive block method was utilized to estimate the effect of traditional explanations of immigration policy attitudes on various pro-immigrant policies, including the key intervening variable of nativism.

The results indicate, generally speaking, that immigration policy attitudes in the U.S. are a product of a set of three key variables: nativism, anti-Hispanic racism, and political conservatism. Contrary to conventional wisdom, these three variables exert an independent effect on immigration policy attitudes, at a magnitude roughly equivalent in size (with some variation depending on the particular policy). Thus, neither liberals nor conservatives are entirely correct in accusing the other of being motivated strictly by racial or ideological reasons. We might take the normative position, for argument's sake, that racism and nativism are "illegitimate" reasons to support conservative immigration policies while ideological conservatism and economic concerns are more "legitimate" (or, at least, socially acceptable). Under these conditions, these results indicate that the origins of anti-immigrant policy attitudes in the United States are attributable to both the "legitimate" and "illegitimate" motives (Bosniak 1997).

Furthermore, some of the traditional determinants of immigration policy attitudes (education, social context, age, etc.) have been shown to instead exert their influence only indirectly through other intervening variables such as racism, nativism, or conservatism. A series of three specific policy preferences were individually investigated and important differences among the determinants were found, indicating a great deal of heterogeneity among the various factors that influence support either for or against different immigrant-related policy preferences.

Finally, it was argued that these results contribute to the debate over the role of racism in driving attitudes toward racial public policies. Contrary to those who argue that racism either 1) predominantly determines racial policy attitudes or 2) that it does not influence them at all, these results indicate that, when it comes to Hispanic racial policies

at least, both racism and ideology play an important role in shaping attitudes, along with the indispensable factor of nativism.

As important as the results presented in this chapter are to our understanding of support for immigration policy preferences, they are limited in that we are forced to rely on the validity of survey data responses for our answers. Many of the variables included in these models, especially racial attitudes, are undoubtedly influenced to a degree by social desirability. After all, it may be difficult for some to admit racial or cultural biases to surveyors over the telephone. The next chapter will address some of these concerns by taking advantage of a recent innovative method to gauge implicit attitudes and their effect on immigration policy preferences.

Table 4.1. Relationships between Nativism and Various Immigration Policy Attitudes

Public policy preference	Somers' D	Correlation with nativism	N
2005 Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey			
Should immigration to U.S. be increased, decreased, or stay the same?	0.29	0.38	675
Should immigrants be required to speak English to come to U.S.?	0.21	0.28	702
2007 Pew Values Survey			
Do you oppose legal status for immigrant workers and eventual citizenship?	0.22	0.28	680
Do you support a 700-mile fence along the U.S.-Mexican border?	0.22	0.30	678
2006 Pew Immigration Survey			
Should immigration be increased, decreased, or stay the same?	0.30	0.35	3,773
Earned citizenship, guest-worker program, or mass deportation?	0.31	0.36	3,527
Should undocumented immigrants be eligible for social services?	0.19	0.31	1,893
Should we end birth-right citizenship in the Constitution?	0.25	0.33	3,841
Should children of illegal immigrants be denied access to public schools?	0.16	0.23	1,924
Do you approve of the Minutemen [the self-appointed monitors of the U.S.-Mexican border]?	0.29	0.40	2,615
Should children of illegal immigrants get in-state tuition at public colleges? (Illinois sample only)	0.20	0.28	484
Should local police be required to check immigration status? (Illinois sample only)	0.25	0.32	499

Note: All correlations significant at $p \leq 0.05$. Samples limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens. Question wording for the nativism variables for all three surveys can be found in Appendix B.

Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for Immigration Policy Attitude Dependent Variables

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Immigrant worker policies	3,592	1.03	0.80	0	2
Eligibility for social services	1,940	0.77	0.42	0	1
End birthright citizenship	3,939	0.46	0.50	0	1

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey.

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens. Full question wording and coding can be found in Appendix B.

Table 4.3. Frequency Tabulations for Immigration Policy Attitude Dependent Variables

What should be done with illegal immigrants currently in U.S.?	
Leave immediately	30.2%
Stay temporary but eventually leave	36.6%
Stay permanently	33.2%
Should illegal immigrants be eligible for social services?	
No	76.9%
Yes	23.1%
Should we change the Constitution to end birthright citizenship?	
Yes	45.8%
No	54.2%

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey.

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens. Full question wording and coding can be found in Appendix B.

Table 4.4. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Female	0.51	0.50	0	1
Age	50.13	15.74	18	96
Education	5.15	1.49	1	7
Income	5.82	2.13	1	9
Economic threat	2.35	0.82	1	4
Church attendance	3.57	1.57	1	6
Catholic	0.25	0.43	0	1
Latter-day Saint	0.02	0.16	0	1
Jewish	0.03	0.18	0	1
% Foreign-born Latino	0.05	0.06	0	0.34
Foreign-born Latino change rate	1.28	0.16	0.95	2.05
Anti-Hispanic affect	2.00	0.70	1	4
Ideology (liberal +)	-0.20	0.92	-2	2
Republican	0.35	0.48	0	1
Independent	0.34	0.47	0	1
Nativism	2.46	0.93	1	4

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey.

Note: N=1,484. Limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens and cases with non-missing values. Full question wording and coding can be found in Appendix B.

Table 4.5. Block Recursive Model Predicting Support for Requiring All Undocumented Immigrants to Immediately Leave the Country

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
		Demographic and long-term social characteristics	
Female	**-0.031**	-0.019	-0.010
Age (older +)	**-0.006**	-0.081	-0.108
Education (higher +)	**-0.197*****	-0.077	-0.031
Income (higher +)	**0.036**	0.056	0.064
Economic threat	**0.107***	0.132**	0.142**
Church attendance (higher +)	**-0.043**#	-0.113**	-0.125***
Catholic	**0.003**	0.017	0.012
Jewish	**-0.063****	-0.103*	-0.101#
Latter-day Saint	**-0.190**	-0.171	-0.154
% Foreign-born Latino	**-0.142**	-0.106	-0.074
Foreign-born Latino change rate	**0.036**	0.033	0.043#
			Values and political orientation
Anti-Hispanic affect		**0.454*****	0.347***
Ideology (liberal +)		**-0.277****	-0.225*
Republican		**0.044**	0.035
Independent		**0.032**	0.022
			Nativism
Nativism			**0.256*****
Pseudo R-squared	0.027	0.090	0.111
N	1,446	1,414	1,394

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Cell entries are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of each variable in the model of choosing an option to require all undocumented immigrants to immediately leave the country, instead of allowing them to stay to work for an amount of time or eventually become legal citizens. Numbers indicate the change in probability of selecting "leave immediately" as the variable in question moves from its minimum to maximum value, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

Bolded values indicate the effect of the variable on conservative immigration policy preferences before consideration of any intervening variables.

Table 4.6. Block Recursive Model Predicting Support for Making Undocumented Immigrants Ineligible to Receive Benefits from State and Local Governments

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
		Demographic and long-term social characteristics	
Female	**-0.032***	-0.011	-0.005
Age (older +)	**0.101**	0.048	0.012
Education (higher +)	**-0.203*****	-0.102	-0.066
Income (higher +)	**0.116****	0.107**	0.117**
Economic threat	**-0.119#**	0.010	-0.006
Church attendance (higher +)	**0.043**	-0.068*	-0.066*
Catholic	**0.050***	0.056#	0.046
Jewish	**0.120*****	0.070*	0.066*
Latter-day Saint	**-0.322****	-0.224	-0.193
% Foreign-born Latino	**-0.382*****	-0.333***	-0.324***
Foreign-born Latino change rate	**-0.016**	-0.023	-0.010
			Values and political orientation
Anti-Hispanic affect		**0.203*****	0.145**
Ideology (liberal +)		**-0.473*****	-0.399***
Republican		**0.089*****	0.084***
Independent		**0.012**	0.012
			Nativism
Nativism			**0.210*****
Pseudo R-squared	0.064	0.154	0.175
N	1,508	1,474	1,450

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Cell entries are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of each variable in the model of preferring that undocumented immigrants *not* be eligible for social services. Numbers indicate the change in probability of selecting "do not support" as the variable in question moves from its minimum to maximum value, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

Bolded values indicate the effect of the variable on conservative immigration policy preferences before consideration of any intervening variables.

Table 4.7. Block Recursive Model Predicting Support for Amending U.S. Constitution to End Birthright Citizenship for Children of Undocumented Immigrants

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Demographic and long-term social characteristics			
Female	**-0.024**	0.001	0.010
Age (older +)	**0.178***	0.113	0.069
Education (higher +)	**-0.298*****	-0.216***	-0.136*
Income (higher +)	**0.019**	0.046	0.056
Economic threat	**-0.055**	0.002	0.001
Church attendance (higher +)	**-0.010**	-0.073	-0.098
Catholic	**0.022**	0.028	0.026
Jewish	**0.100**	0.060	0.080
Latter-day Saint	**-0.162**	-0.116	-0.072
% Foreign-born Latino	**-0.142**	-0.099	-0.028
Foreign-born Latino change rate	**0.032**	0.038	0.063*
			Values and political orientation
Anti-Hispanic affect		**0.426*****	0.297***
Ideology (liberal +)		**-0.268*****	-0.188***
Republican		**0.085***	0.072#
Independent		**0.068**	0.064
			Nativism
Nativism			**0.408*****
Pseudo R-squared	0.028	0.073	0.110
N	1,518	1,488	1,462

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Cell entries are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of each variable in the model of supporting an amendment to the U.S. Constitution which would end the "birthright citizenship" provision. Numbers indicate the change in probability of selecting "support" as the variable in question moves from its minimum to maximum value, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

Bolded values indicate the effect of the variable on conservative immigration policy preferences before consideration of any intervening variables.

Table 4.8. Summary of Findings

Independent variable	Immigrant Worker Policies	Economic Immigrant Policies	Symbolic Immigration Policies
Female			
Age (older +)			
Education (higher +)			-14%
Income (higher +)		12%	
Economic threat	14%		
Church attendance (higher +)	-13%	7%	
Catholic			
Jewish		-19%	
Latter-day Saint			
% Foreign-born Latino		-33%	
Foreign-born Latino change rate			6%
Anti-Hispanic affect	35%	15%	30%
Ideology (liberal +)	-23%	-40%	-19%
Republican		8%	
Independent			
Nativism	26%	21%	41%

Note: Cell entries are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of each variable in the model of supporting the particular policy in question. Numbers indicate the change in probability of support as the variable in question moves from its minimum to maximum value, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

All predicted probability entries correspond to coefficients that are significant at $p \leq 0.05$.

Immigrant worker policy dependent variable: support for requiring all undocumented immigrants to immediately leave the country.

Economic immigrant policy dependent variable: support for making undocumented immigrants ineligible to receive benefits from state and local governments.

Symbolic immigration policy dependent variable: support for amending the U.S. Constitution to end birthright citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants.

Table 4.9. Predicting Support for Requiring All Undocumented Immigrants to Immediately Leave the Country, by Education

	Less than a 4-year college degree	4-year college degree or more
Female	-0.007	-0.017
Age (older +)	-0.094	-0.108#
Income (higher +)	0.110	0.071
Economic threat	0.136*	0.133*
Church attendance (higher +)	-0.170***	-0.030
Catholic	0.017	-0.004
Jewish	-0.278***	-0.030
Latter-day Saint	-0.165	-0.018
% Foreign-born Latino	-0.098	0.007
Foreign-born Latino change rate	0.049	0.054
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.394***	0.184
Ideology (liberal +)	-0.204#	-0.261**
Republican	0.027	0.016
Independent	0.015	0.009
Nativism	0.245***	0.260***
Pseudo R-squared	0.100	0.098
N	713	681

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Cell entries are predicted probabilities based on ordinal logit estimations of each variable in the model of choosing an option to require all undocumented immigrants to immediately leave the country, instead of allowing them to stay to work for an amount of time or eventually become legal citizens. Numbers indicate the change in probability of selecting “leave immediately” as the variable in question moves from its minimum to maximum value, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

Table 4.10. 2SLS Model of Immigration Policy Preferences

	Stage 1: Nativism dependent variable	Stage 2: Policy dependent variable
	B (SE)	B (SE)
Female	-0.036 (0.057)	-0.008 (0.077)
Age	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)
Education	-0.100*** (0.020)	0.046* (0.021)
Economic perception (better +)	-0.045 (0.035)	-0.055 (0.037)
Church attendance	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.041* (0.018)
% Foreign-born Latino	-0.486 (0.356)	-0.014 (0.683)
Immigrant inflow	0.125 (0.171)	-0.054 (0.128)
Ideology	-0.227*** (0.027)	0.001 (0.053)
Republican	0.118 (0.079)	0.048 (0.122)
Independent	0.088 (0.066)	0.027 (0.072)
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.383*** (0.036)	
Predicted probability of nativism		0.809*** (0.054)
Constant	1.721*** (0.307)	-2.648*** (0.322)
N	1,487	1,487
Adjusted-R^2	0.241	

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizens respondents. Standard errors are clustered by geographic region. The predicted probability nativism variable is from the Stage 1 regression where the dependent variable is nativism and the independent variables are as shown in the table. Anti-Hispanic racism is the instrumental variable in Stage 2.

CHAPTER 5: IMPLICIT NATIVIST ATTITUDES, "PRINCIPLED OBJECTORS", AND THE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY PROBLEM

Introduction

Thus far this dissertation has examined the nature and prevalence of nativism in contemporary American society, as well as its effect on immigration policy preferences of the non-Hispanic white American public. It has been shown, among other things, that contemporary nativism is driven by such factors as negative Hispanic affect, social context, and various psychological characteristics like social trust and right-wing authoritarianism. It was further shown that, contrary to conventional wisdom, nativism is but one of several determinants of conservative immigration policy preferences, along with racial attitudes, concerns about the economy, and principled political conservatism. In effect, it was shown that there are those who oppose pro-immigrant policies for (normatively-speaking) less "legitimate" motives like racism and nativism, and also for more "legitimate" motives like concerns about the effect of immigration on the economy, national security, welfare spending, etc. (the latter two as proxied by political conservatism) (Bosniak 1997).

These results lead to two important questions. First, are those who oppose pro-immigrant policies but claim to eschew nativism *really* motivated solely by principled philosophical objections (Sniderman and Piazza 1995)? In other words, are they simply trying to avoid the "socially unacceptable" answer when reporting their levels of nativist preferences in an attempt to save face to the interviewer (Berinsky 1999, 2002)? Second, is it *really* "socially unacceptable" to hold and profess nativist views in contemporary American society? In other words, is there the same stigma associated with being a nativist as there is with being a racist?

This chapter seeks, among other things, to investigate and offer possible answers to these two important questions. The analysis in this chapter will extend the findings of

previous chapters by measuring and examining individual nativist attitudes that are not accessible through standard telephone survey interviews. Through the use of an innovative psychological measurement tool, the implicit association test (IAT), we are able to measure "automatic preferences" or "implicit attitudes" toward nativism, i.e. biases in favor of a particular version of American culture over a version of American culture blended with influence from foreign cultures. This measure will allow us to see if those who take the "principled objector" stand are truly non-nativist or if they have more deep-seated nativist biases of which they themselves might not have even been aware.

Implicit Attitudes and the IAT

Most analyses of public opinion survey data rely on self-reported answers given by respondents to interviewers, either over the phone, in person, through the mail, or on the Internet. These answers represent (theoretically) opinions that are consciously and deliberately accessible by the respondents and are (hopefully) honest and accurate reflections of their true thoughts and feelings. Because the answers to survey questions are clearly communicated by the respondents, they are referred to as "explicit" preferences, opinions, or attitudes.

"Implicit" attitudes, on the other hand, are "'the introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) trace of past experience that mediates R' where R refers to the category of responses that are assumed to be influenced by that construct (Greenwald and Banaji 1995, 5)" (Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji 2007, 266). In simpler language, implicit attitudes are "mental associations that are so well-established as to operate without awareness, or without intention, or without control" (IAT Corporation). That is to say, individuals possess attitudes, based on previous life experiences (and often formed at an early age), of which they may not even be consciously aware of, but that can still "rub off" on their attitudes and behaviors toward other objects. For example, an individual with an "implicit bias" against African-Americans may be more likely to vote against a

black political candidate, even though he or she is not aware of their anti-black bias. This effect remains even when controlling for other factors such as partisanship and self-reported explicit racial attitudes (Greenwald et al. 2009).

As can be imagined, measuring an individual's implicit biases may prove to be extremely helpful in explaining their political preferences or behaviors. Capturing an implicit bias would also significantly improve the quality of survey analyses. Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007) explain that measuring implicit cognition "could reveal associative information that people were either unwilling or unable to report. In other words, implicit cognition could reveal traces of past experiences that people might actually reject because it conflicts with values or beliefs, or might avoid revealing because the expression could have negative social consequences" (266). They go on to explain that "even more likely, implicit cognition can reveal information that is not available to introspective access even if people were motivated to retrieve and express it" (266).

Thus, an instrument that is able to measure implicit biases and preferences would be able to reveal implicit attitudes that individuals possess, but that 1) they consciously reject because of disagreement, embarrassment, or shame, 2) they consciously accept but deliberately hide so as not to appear prejudiced, or 3) they are simply unaware that they possess such attitudes. Regardless of the motive, however, incorporating an individual's implicit attitude into a theoretical model has the potential to significantly improve the predictive power of the model in explaining certain societal attitudes or behaviors.

The implicit association test (IAT) is one method of measuring these implicit attitudes. The IAT was first introduced by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1995) and has since been used to measure implicit attitudes in a variety of different fields, including psychology, neuroscience, and market research (Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji 2007). In the field of political science, IATs have been used to help predict attitudes toward political candidates (Karpinski, Steinman, and Hilton 2005) and voting preferences

(Friese, Bluemke, and Wänke 2007; Arcuri et al. 2008). While IATs have been used extensively to measure racial attitudes and biases (Phelps et al. 2000; Rudman and Lee 2002; Vanman et al. 2004; Cunningham et al. 2004; Amodio and Devine 2006; Green et al. 2007; Glaser and Knowles 2008; Greenwald et al. 2009), they have not yet been used to identify and measure implicit American nativist preferences.

To briefly explain how the IAT works: using a personal computer, respondents are presented with images or words representing two distinct concepts or objects, as well as words representing "good" ("marvelous", "pleasure", "beautiful", etc.) and "bad" ("horrible", "agony", "terrible", etc.). Respondents are required to press certain keys to associate the "good" and "bad" words with each of the two objects. The basic idea is that if an individual is able to more rapidly associate the "good" words with the images representing Object A than he or she can associate "good" with Object B, it shows an implicit, automatic bias or preference in favor of Object A over Object B.[22] (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998; Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji 2007)

It is important to know that many people mistakenly believe the IAT to be a "lie-detector, revealing associations that are more 'real', 'true', or accurate than self-report[ed measures]" (Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji 2007, 282). Research conducted with the IAT has revealed that explicit and implicit preferences are certainly related, but very distinct, attitudes (Cunningham, Preacher, and Banaji 2001). Each is a "true" attitude in the sense that each has predictive validity independent of the other. A recent meta-analysis of 122 IAT studies revealed that the average correlation between implicit and explicit attitudes

[22] At the end of a series of repeated attempts, the respondent is then given a score indicating their level of implicit bias for Object A over Object B, generally ranging from -1.5 to 1.5, with positive values indicating the preference for Object A and negative values for Object B. A score of 0 indicates no implicit preference for one over the other. While there are no specific cut-points, a score of 0.15-0.35 conventionally indicates a weak automatic preference for Object A, while 0.35-0.65 indicates a moderate preference, and a score higher than 0.65 indicates a strong automatic preference.

toward the same object is r=0.21 (Greenwald et al. 2009, 24).[23] In sum, it would be incorrect to assert that the IAT measures are somehow "better" or "more accurate" than self-reported explicit measures. "Each is a real assessment – one is intended to measure products of introspection [attitudes that an individual is consciously aware of], the other is not" (Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji 2007, 283).

The IAT is not without its criticisms, however. For example, some (Rudman et al. 1999; Ottaway, Hayden, and Oakes 2001; Dasgupta, Greenwald, and Banaji 2003) have examined whether the IAT simply measures personal familiarity with the objects in the test rather than an actual preference either for or against the objects (i.e. an IAT score may reveal an anti-Asian racial bias simply because an individual has had little exposure to Asians or Asian culture). Others have argued that the IAT scores are a function of associations that individuals have been exposed to in their environments rather than individual attitudes or preferences. In other words, the IAT captures implicit societal, not individual, stereotypes (Karpinski and Hilton 2001). Other criticisms include concerns over the order of stimulus items, previous experience with the IAT, "fakeability" (i.e. can an individual deliberately "fake" their results to "beat the test"), and even whether a respondent is right- or left-handed (Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji 2007).

Generally speaking, proponents of the IAT believe that, although these criticisms are not unimportant, sufficient evidence has been published addressing each of these concerns. They maintain that, criticisms aside, the IAT remains a valid measure of implicit attitudes. (See Nosek, Greewald, and Banaji 2007 for a review of these criticisms, as well as responses and relevant citations in defense of the IAT.)[24]

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[23] Implicit-explicit correlations are highest between political preferences (r=0.54) and lowest between racial preferences, specifically black-white (r=0.12).

[24] Professor Anthony Greenwald's personal website also contains a lengthy discussion of each criticism, counter-arguments to those criticisms, and lists of numerous published studies defending the validity of the IAT against each of those criticisms. This website can be accessed at:

Using the IAT method, then, we can address three key questions in this chapter. First, what is the nature and prevalence of implicit nativism and how does it compare and contrast with explicit nativism? Second, do those who are the "principled objectors" (i.e. conservative on immigration policy preferences but explicitly non-nativist) have higher levels of implicit nativism than those who are liberal in their policy views and non-nativist? Third, based on these findings, is it really socially unacceptable to be "nativist" in contemporary American society? In other words, should we worry about the accuracy of self-report nativist attitudes on survey questionnaires?

Data and Methods

In order to examine each of these three questions, this chapter will analyze data from the 2009 "Personality and Immigration Attitudes" survey conducted by the author. This survey contained an IAT instrument measuring implicit nativist attitudes (as will be explained shortly) as well as several questions measuring explicit levels of nativism, policy preferences, demographics, and other independent variables featured in previous chapters (see Appendix D for complete question wording). This survey was in the field from October 12 through December 11, 2009, and sampled undergraduate, graduate, and professional students at the University of Iowa. Respondents were recruited for this survey via a mass-distribution email that was sent to all students at the institution. Incentive to participate was provided in the form of the option to be entered into a random drawing for a $50 prize upon completion of the survey. A follow-up reminder was sent three weeks after the initial recruitment email was distributed. A total of 834 individuals completed the survey. As with previous chapters, this analysis will restrict its cases to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens, which reduces the usable N to 625.

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http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_validity.htm. See also Appendix E for a discussion of possible objections to the IAT procedure as utilized in this particular study.

Because this survey was distributed only among students the University of Iowa, the sample is unrepresentative of the American population at large in a number of respects. On the whole, this sample disproportionally represents females, younger individuals, and less frequent church attenders. Respondents are also slightly more liberal than the nation at large, although the distribution of political partisanship is roughly equal to the national distribution. Survey respondents are also, on average, significantly less nativist than at the national level, explicitly speaking, as only about a quarter of respondents indicated agreement with the standard nativism measure as opposed to about a half of respondents nation-wide in the Pew 2006 Immigration survey. They are also much more liberal on immigration policy preferences, with about one-half of respondents saying that immigration into the United States should increase, nearly 30% higher than the national average. A summary of the descriptive statistics of the key variables can be found in Table 5.1.

In order to measure implicit nativist attitudes, this IAT was designed in such a way as to measure a preference for a particular "traditional" version of American culture over a version of American mingled with foreign influence. Recall that this particular IAT measures associations of "good" and "bad" with two objects. In this case, the first set of objects included a series of eight images of symbols representing "American culture," specifically designed to represent traditional American values and stereotypes. They included images of the Statue of Liberty, Uncle Sam, apple pie, baseball, the Constitution, etc. The second set of objects included an equal number of images representing "Latino-American culture." These images included a U.S. flag together with the Mexican flag, a bilingual voter registration sign, a Hispanic grocery store in a downtown American urban area, and a walking taco saluting the American flag while wearing a *sombrero*. (Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the images used for each object).

It is important to note that these images are not designed to measure implicit preferences on United States vs. Mexico, Anglos vs. Hispanics, English vs. Spanish, or

even American citizens vs. immigrants. Instead, these images were specifically designed to measure implicit nativist preferences. Recall from previous chapters that nativism is defined as when an individual 1) identifies something as being as distinctly "American" (specifically, a traditional American culture and "way of life") which, in turn, is 2) threatened by something distinctly "foreign" – be it an individual, group, culture, or philosophy.

The first set of images displayed in Figure 5.1 was specifically chosen to represent the first part of the nativism definition: commonly accepted symbols of distinctly traditional American customs, values, and way of life. The second set of images displayed in Figure 5.2 was specifically chosen to represent American culture being blended with influence from a foreign culture, specifically Latino culture.[25] Each image contains a symbol of traditional American culture (U.S. flag, voting, etc.) juxtaposed with symbols of Latino culture (Mexican flag, Spanish language, Latino food, etc.). Thus, the extent to which an individual reveals an implicit preference for the images in Figure 5.1 over Figure 5.2 can be interpreted as an implicit preference for a pure, traditional American culture over an American culture being threatened by foreign influence, i.e. nativism as it is defined above. (See Appendix E for a more detailed description of this particular nativism IAT procedure.)

Analysis and Discussion

Question 1: What is the nature and prevalence of implicit nativism and how does it compare and contrast with explicit nativism?

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[25] There are, of course, other cultures that are "foreign" to American culture, thus warranting inclusion in this set of images. It was shown in Chapter 2, however, that contemporary American nativism primarily targets Hispanic immigrants and Latino cultures. Thus these images were restricted to only those representing Latino culture in some way.

Before turning to how measures of implicit nativism can help answer the "principled objector" and "social desirability" problems, it would first be profitable to briefly examine the distribution of implicit nativist attitudes among survey respondents and how it compares with the distribution of explicit nativist attitudes. Figure 5.3 displays a histogram distribution of the implicit nativism measure among survey respondents.

Respondents in the survey revealed implicit nativism scores ranging from -0.94 to 1.51. The mean score was 0.53 with a standard deviation of 0.42 (N=596). As can be seen in Figure 5.3, these scores were distributed in more or less a standard bell-shaped normal curve, with the mean and modal values in the 0.5-0.6 range. This indicates a moderate-to-strong average level of implicit nativism among survey respondents. Taking the cut-off point of 0.15 as a "weak" level of implicit nativist preferences, nearly 80% of all respondents displayed some level of implicit nativism, with nearly 30% of all respondents in the "moderate" range and more than 40% in the "high" range. It is interesting to note that 9% of respondents (again, among non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens) revealed implicit preferences in favor of Latino-American culture over American culture.

To contrast this measure of implicit nativism with a measure of explicit nativism, Table 5.2 displays a histogram distribution of responses to the following question: "Some people say that our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. Do you strongly agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or strongly disagree?" Table 5.2 displays a very different distribution than that of the previous implicit measure. Here, only about 23% of respondents indicated agreement with the explicit nativism measure. On a 1-4 scale, the mean was 1.81 with a standard deviation of 0.89 (N=607).

To examine the extent to which these two attitudes are related, Table 5.3 displays a cross-tabulation of implicit and explicit nativism. The implicit nativism measure is broken down into the following categories: "anti-implicit nativism", "neutral", "weak implicit nativism", "moderate implicit nativism", and "strong implicit nativism". The chi-

square value is significant, indicating that there is a positive relationship between levels of implicit and explicit nativism. However, both explicit nativists and explicit non-nativists alike were both more likely to possess at least a moderate degree of implicit nativism. About 64% of strong explicit non-nativists revealed at least a moderate level of implicit nativism while about 85% of strong explicit nativists revealed the same level.

Furthermore, these two measures are positively correlated at $r=0.23$, $p<0.0001$. This level correlation is nearly identical to the average implicit-explicit correlation of $r=0.21$ reported in the meta-analysis of 122 different IAT studies, as discussed previously (Greenwald, et al. 2009). This correlation is also higher than the average correlation for implicit-explicit racial attitudes but lower than implicit-explicit political preferences. Finally, a Somer's D statistic between the two variables is significant at 0.26, meaning that knowing one's implicit nativism score increases the likelihood correctly predicting a person's level of explicit nativism by 26%.

Predictive Validity. While it appears that these two measures of nativism are definitely related, the association is weak enough to suggest that either or both attitudes might independently exert an effect on explicit immigration policy preferences. To examine this possibility, Table 5.4 reports the results of a concise OLS regression model of immigration policy preferences among survey respondents, using independent variables from the models in the previous chapter, with the addition of the implicit nativism IAT measure.[26] The dependent variable in the model is an additive index of eight different immigration policy attitudes (e.g. immigrant worker policies, birthright citizenship, bilingual education, etc.) recoded on a 0-1 scale, with higher values indicating more conservative preferences (more information available in Appendix D).

[26] The variable coding and question texts for the dependent and independent variables are given in Appendix D.

Observe in Table 5.4 that the key variables in this model (nativism, anti-Hispanic affect, economic threat, and political ideology) are significant and in the same direction as those observed to be significant in the national survey analyzed in the previous chapter. We also see that the coefficient for implicit nativist attitudes is significant and positive. This is an indication that that those with an automatic preference for American culture over Latino-American culture, even controlling for explicit nativism and the other key variables, have more conservative immigration policy preferences.

It is interesting to note that the substantive effects of the implicit and explicit attitudes are almost exactly the same. Holding all other variables constant at their mean, strong explicit nativists have policy scores 18.7% higher than strong explicit non-nativists. Those with the highest levels of implicit nativism have policy scores 18.4% higher than those with the lowest levels of implicit nativism. (Compare the effect of 14.9% for anti-Hispanic affect, 12.7% for economic threat, and 24.4% for ideology.)

Apparently, immigration policy preferences are affected just as much by explicit as implicit nativist attitudes, and (in this model, at least) each exerts an effect second only to political ideology in driving immigration policy preferences. This offers support that one can truly be a "principled objector" and oppose liberal immigration policies for ideological reasons, as the variable remains significant even when implicit nativist attitudes are included in the model.

In sum, this analysis revealed a few key points. Generally-speaking, survey respondents revealed remarkably low levels of explicit nativism and moderately high levels of implicit nativism. Further, three different bivariate measures (cross-tabulation, correlation, and Somer's D) revealed a significant and positive relationship between these two variables, in that those who have higher levels of implicit nativism are also more likely to have higher levels of explicit nativism, although the strength of this association is only weak-to-moderate. It was also shown that both variables are significant predictors

of immigration policy preferences, and that each exerts an effect nearly identical in magnitude.

Question 2: Do the "principled objectors" (i.e. conservative on immigration policy preferences but explicitly non-nativist) have higher levels of implicit nativism than those who are liberal in their policy views and explicitly non-nativist?

In the previous chapter it was shown that conservative immigration policy preferences are driven just as much by anti-Hispanic affect and political philosophical conservatism as by levels of explicit nativism. This led to the consideration of the possibility that people were simply misrepresenting their nativist preferences to interviewers out of a desire to appear "socially appropriate" or "politically correct" (Berinsky 1999, 2002; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000). The use of the IAT was conceived as a way to determine whether or not those who hold conservative immigration preferences, but profess to be non-nativists, were actually "closet-nativists" who were simply hiding their true attitudes. In the section above we have observed preliminary evidence that this might not be the case. Factors such as political ideology and economic concerns remain significant even when levels of implicit nativism are included in a predictive model of policy preferences.

This section will further investigate this question. The "Personality and Immigration Attitudes" survey contains a ten-item battery of questions designed to measure an individual's level of "social desirability." For example, respondents are asked to answer to agree or disagree with statements like: "I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake," "I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings," "I like to gossip at times," or "there have been occasions when I took advantage of someone." Each item is designed in such a way that, with very few exceptions, every normal person would have to admit, if answered honestly, to agreeing with at least at some point in their lives (complete question wording available in

Appendix D). To the extent that respondents disagree with those statements, it is interpreted as a desire to give "socially desirable" answers to survey questions.

The ten-question social desirability battery used in this study is the same recommended by Fischer and Fick (1993) as a concise alternative to the 33-question battery originally proposed by Crowne and Marlowe (1980). Theoretically, those who are not willing to admit that they "sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget" will also not be willing to admit other potentially socially undesirable attitudes, like anti-foreign nativism.

Each survey respondent therefore has a measure of "social desirability" associated with their answers to the other survey questions. Together with the implicit nativist measure, we can determine the degree to which the "principled objectors" possess implicit nativist attitudes and also whether or not they are more likely to worry about "social desirability."

To assess the first question, a simple t-test was conducted on levels of implicit nativism between those with liberal and conservative immigration policy preferences, including in the sample only those who profess low levels of explicit nativism and favorable views of Hispanics (eliminating both the racism and explicit nativist motivations). Those with the conservative preference would therefore be the "principled objectors" because they say they are non-nativists and non-racists, but still have restrictive immigration policy attitudes.

The results of the t-test indicate that the "principled objectors" have, on average, a statistically significant implicit nativism score ($M=0.68$, $SD=0.05$) nearly 0.24 higher than those who have liberal immigration policy preferences ($M=0.44$, $SD=0.02$); $t(408)=-3.73$, $p=0.0002$. This is not an overwhelming magnitude, but sufficient to make a difference between the conventionally accepted standards of "weak", "moderate", and "strong" implicit nativist biases.

Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007) explain that there are three reasons why an IAT score and an explicit measure may differ for individuals. They either 1) are not aware of their implicit attitude, 2) are aware but actively reject their implicit attitude because they do not believe it to be representative of their true beliefs, or 3) are aware of their implicit attitude and believe that it accurately represents their true beliefs, but choose instead to give what they perceive to be a "socially acceptable" response (282). Because we have access to a measure of an individual's desire to appear "socially acceptable," we are able to determine whether or not the "principled objectors", who have higher levels of implicit nativism, fall into categories 1 and 2 (unaware of their attitudes or aware and disagree) or category 3 (aware and agree, but hide), as described above. Another t-test was thus conducted between levels of social desirability among the "principled objectors" who have weak-to-strong levels of implicit nativism.

The t-test revealed no significant difference in levels of social desirability between those who have liberal (M=0.43, SD=0.01) and conservative (M=0.47, SD=0.04) immigration policy preferences, who also have low levels of explicit nativism and racism, but higher levels of implicit nativism; t(310)=-1.03, p=0.31. In other words, the "principled objectors" (who were shown to have higher average levels of implicit nativism) are no more likely to feel motivated to give the socially desirable answer to survey questions than those who possess liberal immigration policy views. In essence, this evidence suggests that the "principled objectors" are not lying to appear "socially acceptable." Rather, they have implicit nativist attitudes of which they are either not even aware or actively reject as not conforming to their actual belief system.

This conclusion can also be evaluated from a multivariate perspective. Table 5.5 reports the results of an OLS regression estimation of the same concise immigration policy attitudes model as analyzed previously. The only difference is that the cases in this model are restricted only to those with low "social desirability" scores – those that are, in general, not afraid to admit socially unacceptable answers. Even among those who are

willing to express "socially unacceptable" opinions, the effects of the key variables in the model remain unchanged, in both significance and substantive magnitude. Those who are not very likely to misrepresent themselves to surveyors are still driven just as much by ideology and economic concerns as they are out of cultural and racial concerns.

In sum, this analysis offers further evidence to support the contention that there are true "principled objectors" when it comes to immigration policy preferences. In the previous chapter it was shown that, using data collected from standard telephone surveys, conservative immigration policy preferences are driven primarily by nativism, negative affect toward Hispanics, and principled philosophical conservatism. It was argued that this supports Sniderman and Piazza's (1995) "principled objector" argument that individuals can support anti-minority policies for reasons other than racism. The evidence presented in this chapter adds further support to this conclusion, showing that the "principled objectors" on immigration policy are likely not simply lying for socially acceptable reasons. Thus, it is likely that they are instead being influenced sub-consciously by implicit nativist attitudes that they may not even be aware that they possess.

Question 3: Is it really socially unacceptable to be a "nativist" in contemporary American society?

In her examination of the connotations of the meaning of the word "nativism", Linda Bosniak (1997) explains that there various reasons to oppose immigration into the United States, some of which are considered by society to be "legitimate" while others are deemed to be "illegitimate." She argues that these reasons can be placed on a spectrum of legitimacy, and that motives dealing with maintaining a rule of law or economic concerns are on the "legitimate" end of the spectrum and that all motives on the "illegitimate" end of the spectrum (including racial or cultural concerns) are those which fall under the "nativist" category. In essence, she argues that the word "nativism"

itself implies illegitimate motives – that one cannot call something "nativist" without at the same time condemning it (283).[27]

The definition of "nativism" that has been adopted in this dissertation involves no implication of societal legitimacy, but rather is simply defined as a perceived threat to a distinctly American way of life from foreign influence. Before concluding this chapter, we will briefly examine whether this definition of nativism is considered to be "politically incorrect" or not. In other words, is it acceptable in mainstream American society to publicly state that one feels that their version of American culture is being threatened by foreign influence?

Conventional wisdom would argue yes. Despite the fact that nativism is technically race-neutral in the abstract, it is associated to one degree or another with anti-Hispanic racial attitudes in the minds of many Americans (see previous findings in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation). Because racial attitudes are a "socially sensitive" topic (Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000), the possibility exists that other attitudes associated with race would also suffer the risk of misrepresentation in public opinion surveys. This possibility, as was discussed at the outset of this chapter, led to the examination of the "principled objectors" in this and the previous chapter. The evidence presented thus far has shown that nativism is but one of many predictors of conservative immigration policy attitudes in the United States, whether measured implicitly or explicitly. This would suggest that at least some people are willing to "own up" to possessing nativist attitudes, and previous evidence presented in this dissertation supports that conclusion.

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[27] She further points out that the "legitimate" motives for immigration restrictionism are often criticized as merely "masking" the *real* motives of racial or cultural concerns (Bosniak 1997, 289). As we have seen in this chapter, however, these "legitimate" motives are often accurate representations of the motives of the "principled objectors."

In Chapter 2 it was shown that, according to several surveys by the Pew Research Center organization, that roughly one-half of the American public is willing to verbally state to a telephone reviewer that they agree that "our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence" or that "the growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values." The fact that one-half of America is willing to explicitly and publicly state something casts immediate doubt on its status as a "socially unacceptable" opinion. In contrast, only 15% of survey respondents in this same survey were willing to admit that they had an unfavorable opinion of Hispanics, only 10% were willing to admit unfavorable opinions toward African-Americans, and only 6% were willing to admit unfavorable opinions of Jews.

Chapter 2 also reported the results of a nation-wide list experiment which showed that about 32% of Americans possess *latent* nativist attitudes. That is, 32% of Americans indicate that they agree that newcomers to this country "threaten traditional American customs, values, and way of life" when they are not forced to directly say so to the telephone interviewer (see Chapter 2 for more detail of the list experiment). Interestingly, in that same survey, 44% of sample respondents professed agreement with the nativist threat statement when asked to do so explicitly. It was speculated (although not confirmed) that this might be due to a "reverse social desirability" effect, in that it may in fact be more socially desirable to appear a "good, patriotic American," therefore artificially inflating measurable levels of explicit nativism in the American public.

This possibility can be further examined using the "Personality and Immigration Attitudes" survey featured in this chapter, which contains a measure of social desirability for each respondent. A t-test of explicit nativist attitudes between those who are likely to give the socially acceptable answer ($M=0.20$, $SD=0.02$) to those who are not ($M=0.25$, $SD=0.02$) reveals no significant difference between these groups; $t(604)=1.64$, $p=0.10$.

This suggests that social desirability does not significantly affect nativist response answers on survey questions.[28] Even if we were to accept the p-value as statistically significant, it demonstrates what conventional wisdom would suggest, that those who are likely to give the socially acceptable answer have slightly lower levels of explicit nativist attitudes.

Furthermore, when social desirability is incorporated, along with the other standard variables included in the nativism model analyzed in Chapter 3, into a multivariate model predicting levels of explicit nativism, the coefficient does not attain statistical significance (results not presented). This means that when taking a number of other factors into consideration, social desirability has no independent effect on explicit nativist responses.

We can find further support for this argument by reviewing the results of the "Sniderman" test from the previous chapter, where it was shown that among those with higher levels of education (i.e. a 4-year college degree or more), racism was not a significant predictor of conservative policy preferences. However, nativism was a significant factor with an effect nearly identical in size to the effect that it exerts among those with lower levels of education. Even those who are highly-educated, who are more likely to be able to "hide" their biases to display socially acceptable opinions, were still shown to be affected by nativism when analyzing their immigration policy preferences.

Finally, in the meta-analysis of IAT results discussed earlier in this chapter (Greenwald et al. 2009), it was shown that, generally-speaking, explicit and implicit attitudinal measures are both equally useful in explaining social opinions and behavior, but that the "predictive validity of self-report [explicit] measures (but not IAT measures)

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[28] As would be expected, the t-test is significant ($p=0.06$) and in the expected direction when comparing levels of affect toward Hispanics instead of explicit nativism. This supports the argument that social desirability affects responses toward racial attitudes but not necessarily nativist attitudes.

was sharply reduced when research topics were socially sensitive." It was also established that "IAT measures had greater predictive validity than self-report measures for [topics] involving interracial behavior and other intergroup behavior" (Greenwald et al. 2009, 28).

It was demonstrated earlier in this chapter that both implicit and explicit nativist attitudes are significant predictors of immigration policy preferences among survey respondents included in the analysis, and that the substantive effect of each was nearly identical. If nativism were a socially sensitive topic, we should expect that the implicit nativism measures would out-perform the explicit nativism measures in predicting policy attitudes. Such was not the case. Again, the fact that both measures are equally useful in predicting policy attitudes suggests that nativism is not considered to be a "socially undesirable" topic, at least amongst these particular survey respondents.

In sum, the evidence presented in this section provides strong support for the argument that the American public does not consider nativism to be a socially sensitive topic. Many Americans are more than willing to profess nativist opinions and preferences, and they apparently are not worried about negative social sanctions for doing so, as they might for professing negative racial or ethnic views. Given how common this attitude appears to be and the frequency with which it is expressed, even among those who are likely to misrepresent themselves for socially desirable reasons, it could even be argued that nativism is a "mainstream" attitude in contemporary American society.

From a practical standpoint, this would suggest that social desirability should not present much of a concern to researchers attempting to obtain reliable measures of nativist attitudes in the American public. The explicit measures generally seem to be an honest and accurate reflection of American attitudes. This lends increased confidence to the analyses and results presented in this dissertation, which rely almost exclusively on public opinion survey data to support their conclusions.

The evidence presented in this chapter further suggests that the "added value" of including measures of implicit nativism in models of immigration policy attitudes appears to be negligible. This is because the r-squared value for the model reported in Table 5.4 (0.5249) decreases only by 0.001 when implicit nativism is omitted (0.5259).[29] In other words, a predictive model of immigration policy attitudes that includes implicit nativism accounts for only 0.1% more of the variation in the dependent variable than a model without this variable. Furthermore, the coefficients of the remaining variables are virtually unchanged in magnitude, significance, and direction. Thus, while using the IAT is certainly useful to helping sort out questions of social desirability and "principled objections," standard public opinion survey analysis remains an adequate tool for examining the relationship between nativism and immigration policy attitudes in the mass public.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has extended the findings of previous chapters by introducing a novel method of measuring nativist attitudes among survey respondents. Moving beyond standard explicit survey response measures, this analysis introduced an "implicit nativism" attitude, as measured by an automatic preference for symbols representing a traditional American culture over a version of American culture blended with foreign influence (specifically, Latino cultural influence).

This analysis revealed several important findings. First, it was shown that implicit nativism is fairly common, with nearly 80% of survey respondents displaying at least a

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[29] A similar is effect is shown when replicating this model with a logit estimation, using a binary version of the continuous dependent variable used in Table 5.4 (divided at the 0.5 mark, 28.1% in the "conservative preferences" category). The r-squared value decreases by 0.02 when excluding the nativism IAT variable. Further, the proportional reduction in error (PRE) score decreases by 0.05 (0.483 to 0.435). Notably, these models correctly predict 87.3% and 85.5%, respectively, of the cases in the model.

slight preference for a traditional version American culture. Levels of implicit nativism are positively correlated with levels of explicit nativism (albeit only weakly), and both attitudes exert an independent effect on immigration policy preferences among survey respondents. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the "principled objectors" (the explicit non-nativists who have conservative policy preferences) do indeed possess higher levels of implicit nativism. However, they are likely not deliberately misrepresenting their nativist attitudes on surveys, but rather are most likely unaware that they even possess such implicit nativist attitudes. Finally, it was shown that those who are aware of their explicit nativist attitudes are likely not hesitant to report honest assessments of these attitudes to survey interviewers. Thus, we can have confidence in the findings of survey data measuring levels of nativism and immigration policy preferences among the American public.

The bottom-line conclusion of this chapter is that implicit attitudes matter in driving immigration policy attitudes. Impressions and opinions formed at an early age toward one's own cultural symbols and traditions do affect how people feel toward the extent to which their culture should be protected against influence from other cultures. These impressions matter even when individuals are unaware that they have such implicit attitudes.

However, this analysis has also made clear that implicit preferences for one's own culture are not the end of the story. Indeed, a Somer's D statistic calculation reveals that knowing one's level of implicit nativism reduces the error in predicting their immigration policy preferences only by 22%. Thus, nearly four-fifths of the variation in policy preferences is attributable to reasons *other* than implicit nativism. As was argued in the previous chapter, there are a variety of reasons why people would hold restrictive immigration policy preferences, and all must be recognized and incorporated in order to accurately understand why individuals think the way they do on this important issue.

Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Respondents

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Female	624	0.60	0.49	0	1
Age	616	25.16	7.68	18	57
Education	624	4.50	1.43	1	6
Family income	527	5.25	2.40	1	9
Church attendance	620	2.86	1.49	1	6
Democrat and leaners	625	0.55	0.50	0	1
Republican and leaners	625	0.22	0.42	0	1
Political ideology (conservative +)	585	2.45	1.12	1	5
Explicit nativism	607	1.81	0.89	1	4
Implicit IAT nativism	596	0.53	0.42	-0.94	1.51
Prospective immigration levels (more restrictionist +)	506	1.58	0.65	1	3
Immigration worker policies (more conservative +)	571	2.33	0.87	1	4
Immigrant access to social services (more restrictive +)	539	0.70	0.46	0	1

Source: 2009 Personality and Immigration Attitudes Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents.

Table 5.2. Distribution of Explicit Nativism Measure

"Some people say that our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. Do you completely agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or completely disagree?		
	Percent	N
Completely disagree	46.62%	283
Somewhat disagree	30.81%	187
Somewhat agree	17.96%	109
Completely agree	4.61%	28
Total	100.00%	607

Source: 2009 Personality and Immigration Attitudes Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens only

Table 5.3. Cross-tabulation of Explicit and Implicit Nativist Attitudes

	Nativism IAT Score					
"Our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence."	Prefer Latino culture	Neutral	Weak IAT Nativism	Moderate IAT Nativism	Strong IAT Nativism	Total
Completely agree	12.5%	12.45%	10.62%	32.23%	32.23%	100%
Somewhat agree	3.87%	13.81%	12.15%	23.20%	46.96%	100%
Somewhat disagree	2.00%	7.00%	10.00%	22.00%	59.00%	100%
Completely disagree	0.00%	0.00%	15.38%	15.38%	69.23%	100%

N = 580, χ^2 = p<0.0001, limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens only

Source: 2009 Personality and Immigration Attitudes Survey

Table 5.4. OLS Regression Predicting Conservative Immigration Policy Attitudes

Independent variable	B (SE)
Explicit nativism	0.062*** (0.015)
Implicit IAT nativism	0.077** (0.024)
Economic threat	0.128*** (0.029)
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.050** (0.018)
% Foreign-born Latin American	0.080 (0.288)
Ideology (conservative +)	0.061*** (0.013)
Republican	0.105** (0.034)
Independent	0.040 (0.043)
Female	-0.036# (0.020)
Age	0.000 (0.001)
Education	-0.002 (0.009)
Income	0.002 (0.004)
Church attendance	-0.006 (0.007)
Constant	-0.027 (0.067)
N	353
Adjusted-R2	0.525

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2009 Personality and Immigration Attitudes Survey

Note: Dependent variable is an additive index of immigration policy preferences with greater values corresponding to more conservative preferences (see Appendix D for more details). Limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens only.

Table 5.5. OLS Regression Predicting Conservative Immigration Policy Attitudes – Limited to Low "Social Desirability" Scores

Independent variable	B (SE)
Explicit nativism	0.067*** (0.018)
Implicit IAT nativism	0.080* (0.032)
Economic threat	0.136*** (0.036)
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.043# (0.023)
% Foreign-born Latin American	-0.050 (0.342)
Ideology (conservative +)	0.057*** (0.016)
Republican	0.110* (0.045)
Independent	-0.023 (0.055)
Female	-0.034 (0.026)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)
Education	0.000 (0.011)
Income	-0.002 (0.005)
Church attendance	-0.022* (0.009)
Constant	0.069 (0.083)
N	202
Adjusted-R^2	0.541

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2009 Personality and Immigration Attitudes Survey

Table 5.5 — continued

Note: Dependent variable is an additive index of immigration policy preferences with greater values corresponding to more conservative preferences (see Appendix D for more details). Limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens only.

Figure 5.1. IAT Images Representing Traditional American Culture

Figure 5.2. IAT Images Representing Traditional American Culture Blended with Latino-American Culture

Figure 5.3. Distribution of Implicit Nativism Scores



Note: N = 596, mean=0.53, SD=0.42, limited to non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens only

Source: 2009 Personality and Immigration Attitudes Survey

CHAPTER 6: NATIVISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES AMONG LATINO-AMERICANS

Introduction

Previous chapters have provided an extensive examination of the determinants of nativism and its subsequent effect on immigration policy preferences, but only among the dominant racial group in the United States: non-Hispanic whites. While we have arrived at a much more comprehensive understanding of Anglo immigration attitudes, we still have yet to examine nativism and its consequences for America's two largest minority racial/ethnic groups: Latinos and African-Americans. This chapter will now examine the dynamics of how nativism is formed and operates differently among Latinos while the proceeding chapter will focus on African-Americans.

This is an important issue to consider because of the increasing numbers of Latinos and blacks in the United States. These growing groups will continue to yield more and more political influence that implies significant consequences for inter-racial relations and support for racial public policies in the United States (Hero 2000; King and Smith 2005). According to the U.S. Census bureau, there are now approximately 37 million African-Americans in the United States, about 12% of the entire population. Also, the approximately 46 million Latinos in the United States comprise about 15% of the nation as a whole. As these groups continue to grow their influence over American public policy will correspondingly develop. Knowing the political preferences of these groups regarding immigrants and immigration is essential to understanding how contemporary policy-makers can govern in a multiethnic society (Smith 1993; Baldassare 2000).

The causes and consequences of nativism specifically among Latinos are important to understand because, as has been said, Latinos have recently become the largest minority group in the United States and will soon be the largest minority voting

bloc in the country. Will native-born Latinos, because of their shared ethnicity and common ancestry, feel a sense of sympathy with immigrant foreigners which would cause them to oppose anti-immigrant legislation and those who support it? Or will native-born Latinos eventually assimilate into the broader American culture and thus feel just as threatened by foreigners as native-born Anglos?

Conventional wisdom would suggest that nativism should be virtually non-existent among Latinos, as it would be analogous to looking for anti-black racism among African-Americans.[30] Because Latinos perceive themselves to be of the same ethnic group as the clear majority of the immigrant foreigners in the United States and often have friends and family who are non-natives, Latino nativism should be rare and certainly not systematic in its occurrences.

On the other hand, Glazer (1998) points out that unlike African-Americans, Latinos are successfully integrating into the broader American culture. Branton (2007) explains that as this assimilation progresses, it may be possible that the political opinions of Latinos and Anglos will eventually be indistinguishable. From this perspective, it could be argued that nativism may in fact be very common among Latinos who have assimilated into the broader American culture. They might be just as likely to perceive the immigrant foreigners as an "out-group" posing a threat to America's culture and way of life. Latino-Americans may perceive immigration by other Latinos as a threat to their efforts to become accepted by mainstream American society.

This chapter will examine this question in greater detail, discussing previous research on the topic, analyzing the determinants of nativism among Latinos, and examining the extent to which nativism drives conservative Latino immigration policy

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[30] This is, or course, not a perfect analogy because nativism and racism are not identical attitudes. They both involve negative affect toward a specific social target, however, and thus the similarity is sufficient to make the point.

attitudes, if at all. It will be shown that while nativism and anti-immigrant policies are indeed less prevalent among Latinos, there remains a non-trivial segment of the Latino population hostile toward foreign immigrants, and that this aversion is associated with higher levels of American acculturation and proximity to other Latinos.

Previous Research

Previous research on Latino public opinion and policy attitudes are plentiful (Garza 1985; Cain and Kiewiet 1987; Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Garza et al. 1992; Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996; Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Leal et al. 2005, 2008; Citrin et al. 2007; Sanchez 2008). Generally speaking, this branch of research has revealed that Latinos tend to be more liberal on certain policy issues and vote slightly more Democratic. Yet in many areas, they are indistinguishable in their political attitudes from Anglos. Previous research on Latino attitudes specifically toward immigrants and immigration policy, however, is scarce, to say the least. To the author's knowledge, only six articles have specifically examined immigration attitudes among U.S. Latino citizens.

Two of these articles, de la Garza, et al. (1992) and Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997), investigate the effect of social context on policy attitudes. Their principal finding is that context matters, and that a higher % undocumented immigrant population in a respondent's state is associated with more conservative immigration policy preferences. They also examine respondents' ancestral countries of origin and find that those from Central America (including Mexico) tend to have more liberal immigration attitudes.

De la Garza and DiSipio (1998) report the results of several bivariate analyses of surveys sampling Mexican-Americans in four U.S. states, including California. Their key finding was that Mexican-Americans are *much* more likely than Anglos to support what the authors call "incorporation" policies – those that help immigrants incorporate themselves into American society. These specifically included language policies – Mexican-Americans were, in general, very supportive of bilingual education programs

and very opposed to Official English in comparison with other Anglos or African-Americans.

More recently, both Sanchez (2006) and Branton (2007) have examined the effect of "American acculturation" on Latino immigration policies. They find that as Latinos become more acculturated to American society (as measured by number of generations their family has been in the United States and their facility with the English language) the differences between them and Anglos toward immigration policies decrease. In other words, increased acculturation is associated with more conservative policy attitudes.

In this same vein, Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2010) examine the competing effects of American acculturation, economic competition, country of origin, and social context on immigration policy attitudes among Latinos in the United States. Employing an analysis of Pew survey data, they find support for Sanchez (2006) and Branton (2007) in that acculturation is associated with more conservative policy preferences. They further find that this factor exerts the strongest effect of the several variables they include in their analysis. Other interesting results include a null finding on the economic competition hypothesis, that Mexicans are more liberal in their policy preferences, and that the presence of other Latinos tends to drive down support for liberal immigration preferences.

It is important to note, however, that their analysis was conducted on a sample of *all* Latinos in the United States, including immigrants and non-citizens as well as citizens. Only 37% of the respondents in their data indicated that they were U.S. citizens (this jumps to 48% if those who are currently applying for citizenship are included). Indeed, as far as can be determined by this review of the literature, all these analyses have examined the opinions of all Latinos in the United States and have not limited their results purely to Latino U.S. citizens. Thus, the conclusions reached by their analyses may not be representative of Latino-Americans specifically, who are the key group of

interest when investigating the origin and effects of nativism, which by definition is limited only to citizens of the United States.

In sum, this review of the literature reveals that while a number of factors unique to Latinos have been investigated by these scholars (social context, country of origin, linked fate, and acculturation), none of these studies has, as of yet, investigated the determinants of *nativism itself* among American Latinos, nor has nativism been incorporated into a model of immigration policy preferences among Latinos. Furthermore, these studies have included non-citizens in their analysis of Latino immigration attitudes which, for self-evident reasons, may bias the results in a pro-immigrant direction and make it difficult to speak to the attitudes of native Latinos toward immigrants. Additionally, other variables specific to Latinos, including panethnicity and linked fate, have not yet been examined in the context of attitudes toward foreigners or immigration policy in any great detail. This chapter seeks to address these questions in an effort to shed more light on the relationship between ethnicity, nativism, and immigration attitudes among Latino U.S. citizens.

Key Variables and Hypotheses

For the most part, this analysis will examine the same factors featured and discussed previously in Chapter 3, in addition to several variables specific to Latino-Americans.[31]

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[31] A number of variables from the Anglo model of nativist attitudes will not be included in this analysis, such as nationalism, patriotism, and the various psychological traits of authoritarianism, social trust, etc. This is simply due to limitations of the data set. Racism will also be excluded from this analysis, because the vast majority of Latinos perceive themselves to be of the same race/ethnicity (notwithstanding the academic disagreements as to definitions and the race/ethnicity distinction) as the bulk of the foreign-born population currently in the United States. Thus, there is no theoretical reason to expect that racism is related to Latino nativism and thus will not be included in the Latino analysis. Indeed, in the 2006 Immigration Survey by the Pew Research Center, only 2% of Hispanics reported having "very unfavorable" views of fellow Hispanics. Furthermore, a variable for cultural competition will not be included because even native Latinos may still possess an affinity for Latin-American culture, as well as the fact that no satisfactory

Economic competition. A perceived threat to American jobs and the economy was shown in previous chapters to be an important factor in predicting attitudes toward both nativism as well as immigration policy among Anglos. This perceived threat to jobs might also exert a strong impact on the attitudes of Latino-Americans who are, on average, in a lower socio-economic position than Anglos and thus are more likely to compete for the same types of jobs.

There is historical precedent for this economic competition argument among Latinos. César Chávez, one of the most prominent Latino activists in the history of the United States, was strongly opposed to the Bracero Program (1942-1964) which brought in millions of migrant workers from Mexico to work in agricultural firms. Chávez, and the United Farm Workers (UFW) union, which he organized, took the position that increased immigration of migrant workers into the United States would not only drive down wages for farm workers but also severely harm the ability of Latino-Americans to find agricultural jobs in the first place. This opposition only intensified as employers used the Bracero migrants as strike-breakers when the UFW organized and carried out strike campaigns. (Ferriss and Sandoval 1998)

Previous empirical research on this hypothesis has shown mixed results. Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997) found that the economic threat hypothesis holds for Latinos just as it does for Anglos. Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2010), however find that the effect of economic competition washes out when other important variables like acculturation and social context are included in the model. Expectations for this variable are therefore mixed. If this variable is significant, it is expected that it will affect Latinos in a manner similar to Anglos, in that those with lower incomes or who perceive the economy to be doing poorly are more likely to express more negative anti-immigrant

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variable exists in the data set being used in this analysis (for a description, see the data and methods section).

nativist attitudes. With the presence of other variables in the model, however, it may end up with a null result. Relevant variables will therefore be included to evaluate these competing expectations.

Panethnicity. In regards to Latinos, the term "panethnicity" refers to when an individual identifies primarily with a "Latino" or "Hispanic" ethnic group identity over a particular nation-of-origin identity (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). Masuoka (2006) reports that Latino panethnicity is associated with higher levels of education, native-born status, perceived discrimination, and more frequent involvement in politics. Regardless of where it came from, however, panethnicity may, once present, play an important role in driving nativist attitudes among Latino-Americans.

It is expected that native Latinos who possess higher degrees of a "panethnic" identity will be less likely to express nativist sentiments than those who possess lower degrees. This is because native Latinos who feel a strong panethnic identity will extend their in-group circle to include all those of Latin American origin, including to those who are foreign Latino immigrants and those who are from a different country than that of their ancestors. The out-group threat from foreigners will then disappear once the foreign immigrants are considered part of the in-group.

Sanchez (2006) provides evidence that can be applied to support this theory. He shows that Latino group consciousness is associated with more liberal immigration policy attitudes. Although group consciousness and panethnicity are not conceptually identical, they are both similar in that each involves Latinos of different nationalities adopting a unified, overarching group identity of being "Latino." The primary difference is that with group consciousness, a supremely Latino identity is promoted only instrumentally as an agent of political mobilization, whereas panethnicity occurs more naturally and has intrinsic worth (see definitions in Jones-Correa and Leal 1996 and Sanchez 2006, as well as Padilla 1984, 1985).

This hypothesis is disputed, however, by Jones-Correa and Leal (1996) who argue and present evidence that panethnicity "does not have an influence on respondents' attitudes toward other Latin American-origin groups." Also, Sears, et al. (2003) argues that ethnic identity is not associated with out-group disfavor, although social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) argues that in-group favor is automatically accompanied by out-group disfavor. Panethnicity will thus be included as a key independent variable in this analysis in order to determine which of these views receives more support when it comes to nativism and immigration attitudes.

American Acculturation. Latinos in the United States possess varying degrees of "acculturation." This is defined as the extent to which Latinos are "Americanized", i.e. speak English, consider themselves Americans before any other nationality, have families who have been in the United States for several generations, etc. Branton (2007) demonstrates that more American acculturation is associated with more conservative immigration policy preferences among Latinos.

Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2010) include several measures of "ethnic attachment and assimilation" in their model of Latino immigration policy attitudes including facility with the English language, experience with discrimination, U.S. citizenship, and generations of family in the United States. They find that nearly every measure of acculturation affects their factor index of "general immigration attitudes" (a combined scale of three separate immigration policies), with the exception of personal discrimination experiences and whether or not the respondent is a naturalized citizen.

It is thus expected that because Latinos who are more acculturated consider themselves to be more "native" and more American than their recently-arrived counterparts, they will have a higher interest in preserving traditional American customs, culture, and way of life and will therefore exhibit higher levels of anti-immigrant nativism. As with previous studies, different conceptualizations of acculturation will be

included in this analysis, including American cultural assimilation, economic assimilation, and number of family generations in the United States.

Linked Fate / Racial Solidarity. Although there is a degree of disagreement as to how these terms should exactly be defined, the terms "linked fate" and "racial solidarity" essentially refer to the perception that one's self-interest is pegged to the interests and success of the majority of one's own ethnic group (Dawson 1995). Among African-Americans, this is also known as "black identity, black separatism, black autonomy, or even black nationalism" (Welch et al. 2001). Sniderman and Piazza (2004) argue that "linked fate" is one form of racial solidarity. While this concept has been studied extensively among African-Americans (Dawson 1995; Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2003; Sniderman and Piazza 2004; Simien 2005; White 2007), it has received little to no attention among Latinos, as the focus has traditionally been on group consciousness and panethnicity.

With this variable, it is expected that higher levels of "linked fate" among Latinos will be associated with lower levels of nativism. This is because native Latinos who perceive their personal success to be tied to the success of all Latinos in the United States will be motivated to maintain attitudes that are more favorable to other Latinos, even if they happen to be immigrants. They will thus take a more accepting view of the influence of foreign immigrants on America's culture and way of life.

Social context. While the effect of social context on nativism and immigration attitudes has been examined both in this dissertation and in previous research (Giles and Buckner 1993; Welch et al. 2001; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Oliver and Wong 2003), the relationship under examination has been the effect of the size of a minority racial group on the attitudes of the white majority. Less clear is the effect of the size of a minority racial group on the attitudes of other members of the *same* minority group. How might the magnitude of the Latino population in an area affect the attitudes of other Latinos toward immigrants and their subsequent effect on American society?

Bledsoe, et al. (1995) and Welch, et al. (2001) identify three distinct hypotheses about social context that could affect African-American attitudes. While these hypotheses were not originally intended to explain Latino attitudes, they may still be of value because the hypotheses are general enough to apply to virtually any minority group. First, the social density hypothesis predicts that as percent black increases in an African-American's geographic area, feelings of black racial solidarity would also increase because they feel emboldened by the larger size of their in-group. Second, the social salience hypothesis predicts that racial solidarity increases as percent black actually *decreases* because they are more frequently reminded of their out-group status and thus strengthen their salient in-group identification (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Third, the identity supremacy hypothesis posits that social context does not affect black feelings of racial solidarity because group identity is so important that it transcends others environmental factors and is not affected by the racial context of one's geographic vicinity.

These same hypotheses can be applied to Latino attitudes. The social density hypothesis would predict that as percent Latino in an individual's area increases, Latino nativism would correspondingly increase. This is because the larger size of the salient in-group (Latino-Americans) would reinforce in-group identity and serve to increase out-group (immigrants and foreigners) hostility. The social salience hypothesis, on the other hand, would predict that as the percent Latino increases, Latino nativism would decrease because their in-group identity would not become threatened, thus negating the associated increase in out-group hostility. Finally, the identity supremacy hypothesis would predict that the percent Latino will not affect levels of Latino nativism because feelings of American national identity are strong enough to overpower demographic environmental factors. There has been some previous support for at least one of these hypotheses. While not discussing their results within this theoretical framework, Rouse, Wilkinson, and

Garand (2010) find support for the social density hypothesis in terms of the effect of the size of the percent Latino population on Latino immigration policy attitudes.

There is a second dimension to consider, however, regarding the effect of social context. While the hypotheses discussed above pertain to the effect of the size of the native Latino population on the attitudes of other native Latinos, there is also the effect of the Latino immigrant population to consider. The effect of social context may differ depending on whether the relevant groups in question are comprised of native Latinos or foreign-born Latinos. It is likely that, in a manner similar to Anglos (Rocha and Espino 2009), native Latinos might distinguish between fellow Latinos based on immigrant status when forming their attitudes toward immigrants as well as immigration policy preferences.[32]

Expectations for the effect of the percent foreign-born Latino population on Latino nativist attitudes based on previous research are mixed. On one hand, Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997) found that percent foreign-born (including immigrants from all parts of the world, not just Latinos) is associated with higher levels of immigration restrictionism among native-born Latinos. They argue that this finding supports the racial threat hypothesis. A forthcoming article by Rocha, et al. (2010), on the other hand, finds that the size of the foreign-born population does not affect Latino attitudes toward immigration policy in Texas, but that a higher % native Latino population leads to more liberal attitudes. Furthermore, both Welch, et al. (2001) and Bledsoe, et al. (1995) show evidence in favor of the social density hypothesis among African-Americans, in that a higher percent black leads to more racial solidarity (and thus logically more favorable in-

[32] Although Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2010) argue that Latinos do not distinguish between illegal and legal immigration. They base this conclusion on the results of several associational tau-b statistic tests of cross-tabulations of variables including affect toward legal and illegal immigration and policy preferences. The relationship between the variables for legal and illegal immigration was significant at $p < 0.0001$.

group evaluations of fellow African-Americans). This racial solidarity effect might also apply to Latino-Americans, in that a higher percent Latino population might lead to more favorable in-group attitudes toward other Latinos, even if they happen to be immigrants.

The question is whether or not the presence of *all* Latinos (including both foreign-born and native-born Latinos) might invoke a feeling of racial solidarity (and consequent positive evaluation) amongst Latinos, or whether it is simply the percent foreign-born Latinos that would affect these attitudes. Both variables will be included, then, to test these expectations and to determine the effect of both Latino groups (foreign-born and native) on the attitudes of Latino-Americans.

Country of Origin. In a previous examination of this last variable, Branton (2007) provides evidence that, all else being equal, Mexicans and Central Americans have more liberal immigration policy preferences while Puerto Ricans and Cubans have more conservative immigration policy preferences. Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2010) also show that Mexicans are more liberal in their attitudes toward immigration than Latinos from other countries such as El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Spain, Cuba, or South or Central America. These findings can be profitably applied to derive expectations for nativist attitudes among American Latinos.

First, since Puerto Ricans are native Americans and have been for more than a century (ever since the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898), they consider themselves "natives" with claims on the native cultural resources and may thus possess more nativist attitudes. Second, Cubans in America are ardently pro-American and politically conservative because of the historical legacy of the U.S.-Cuban relationship, and may thus possess more nativist attitudes as well. Third, because Mexicans and Central Americans are more likely to have friends and family members who are among the "immigrant foreigners", or at least, know that they are not many generations removed from that particular out-group themselves, they therefore should espouse lower nativist sentiments.

Data and Methods

The nature of nativism and associated immigration policy attitudes among Latinos will be analyzed using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey conducted by Luis Fraga, John Garcia, Rodney Hero, Michael Jones-Correa, Valerie Martinez-Ebers, and Gary Segura. This survey was conducted between November 2005 and August 2006 on Latino households nation-wide and has an N of 8,634.

Dependent variable. The dependent variable (nativism) is measured with the following question: "Which comes closer to your own views? Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents OR immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing, and health care." This will thus be a dichotomous variable coded "1" if the respondent preferred the second statement and "0" if the respondent preferred the former.[33]

The other dependent variable in the two-stage model of immigration preferences is a measure of preferences on immigrant worker policies. Respondents were asked: "What is your preferred policy on undocumented or illegal immigration? Should there be: 1) immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants, 2) a guest worker program leading to legalization eventually, 3) a guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the country, but only temporarily, 4) an effort to seal or close off the border to stop illegal immigration, or 5) none of these." After excluding the respondents

[33] In preceding chapters, nativism was operationalized by a number of different variables depending on availability. Chapter 3 used the following question: "Would you say that America's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?" Chapter 4 employed the following: "Some people say that our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. Would you say you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with this?" This measure of nativism from the LNS survey is less preferable than either of the previous two measures, as it emphasizes attitudes toward immigrants over a perceived threat to a uniquely American way of life from foreign influence. While this is less than ideal, it is the closest proxy measure available. In the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey (referenced in previous chapters), this measure of nativism correlates with the measure used in Chapter 4 at $r = 0.34$ among U.S. Latino citizens.

who answered "none of these," this variable was collapsed into a binomial variable coded "1" if the respondents answered 3 or 4 and "0" if they answered 1 or 2. Thus, the variable is a general measure of whether or not the respondent feels that undocumented immigrants may remain in the United States permanently or must eventually return to their home countries.

Independent variables. The economic competition hypothesis will be tested by including a variable measuring a respondent's views of the national economy (see Citrin, et al. 2007) as well as a measure of household income levels. The social context hypotheses will be tested by including both the percent Latino and percent foreign-born Latino in a respondent's state as of the 2000 U.S. Census. Latino panethnicity is operationalized by responses to the question: "Of the three previous terms, 'Latino/Hispanic', '[nationality of country of origin]', or 'American', which best describes you?" If the respondent chose "Latino/Hispanic" over the other two identity measures, this will be considered an indicator of panethnicity. The linked fate hypothesis will be assessed using an ordinal measure created from responses to the question: "How much does your 'doing well' depend on other Latinos/Hispanics also doing well?" Respondents could choose between one of four options: nothing, little, some, or a lot. Additionally, dummy variables will be included indicating whether or not the respondent's ancestry hails from Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, or any Central American country.

American acculturation is measured with three separate factor index scores of various measures of integration into American society. The first contains combined measures of cultural assimilation: native birth in the United States, proficiency with English, and a strong association with American identity. The second contains combined measures of economic integration: registered to vote, home ownership, and length at current address. The third contains measures of the number of generations that the respondent's family (parents and grandparents) has been in the United States.

Controls. Standard controls will also be included for sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, education, religion), as well as political partisanship in the policy model. Theoretically, it is expected that these variables will exert similar effects on nativism and immigration attitudes as observed among Anglos, with one important exception. Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997) and Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle (1984) demonstrated that the effect of education on immigration attitudes works the opposite for Latinos as opposed to Anglos. Whereas higher levels of education are associated with more liberal immigration attitudes among Anglos, it was shown in these studies that for Latinos, education is associated with more conservative immigration preferences. This was attributed primarily to a version of the economic threat hypothesis – that more highly-educated Latinos are more successful in a country's economy and thus perceive an increased threat to that economy from undocumented workers. It is likely, however, that more education is associated with higher levels of integration and acculturation, and that this is what explains that finding. Since variables for both economic threat and American acculturation are included in the model, it is expected that the effect of education should wash out in the presence of those other variables.

Method. Because both dependent variables are binomial, a logistic regression method will be employed to evaluate two separate models: 1) the effect of determinants of nativism among Latinos and 2) the effect of nativism on immigration policy attitudes in comparison with other traditional explanations. Standard errors will be clustered by state and the analysis will be limited to Latino U.S. legal citizens, as it would make little sense to include Latino immigrants (be they documented or undocumented) in an analysis of nativist attitudes or immigration preferences. The weighting variable is also applied to make the analysis more representative of the nation at large. Table 6.1 presents basic summary statistics of the various dependent, independent, and control variables to be included in the analysis.

Analysis

Descriptive Statistics. Table 6.2 presents tabulations of native Latino support for two immigration policies (immigrant worker and bilingual education) as well as nativist anti-immigrant sentiments among respondents in the NLS 2006 study. As would be expected, Latino attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy are much more liberal than among their Anglo counterparts. Only 13.4% of native Latinos say they agree that immigrants are a burden rather than an asset to American society.[34] This is nearly 40% lower than among non-Hispanic whites who were asked the same question in the 2006 Pew Immigration survey, as featured in previous chapters.[35]

In terms of policy, a full 32% of native Latinos support what is essentially an unconditional amnesty for undocumented immigrants currently in the country and another 44% support an earned pathway to citizenship. Only 24% support requiring undocumented immigrants to return to their countries of origin, either immediately or eventually. Again, contrast these figures with those among non-Hispanic whites: while 33% support an eventual path to citizenship for those currently in the country, a full 59% favor requiring immigrants to return to their home countries (nearly half of those saying they should leave immediately). Attitudes toward bilingual education are more diverse, with 46.5% of native Latinos saying that they support ending bilingual education for students after one year in the United States.

Predicting Nativism among Latinos. Moving on to the multivariate analysis, Table 6.3 presents the results of a logistic regression model predicting anti-immigrant

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[34] Compare this figure with 30.3% expressing the same sentiment among 432 Latino-American respondents from the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey. Compare also: 45.9% of 442 Latino-Americans in the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey expressed agreement with the statement: "Our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence," the measure of nativism in Chapter 4. The measure of nativism used in this chapter is thus lower than similar measures from comparable populations in other surveys.

[35] More precisely, 51.3% of non-Hispanic whites indicated agreement with the statement.

nativist attitudes among Latino citizens. Coefficients, standard errors, and the substantive impact of each variable (predicted probabilities) are displayed. The results displayed in Table 6.3 show strong support for some of the key variables and no support for others. First, the largest predictor of nativist attitudes among native Latinos is their level of American cultural assimilation. Specifically, being born in the United States, having a proficient command of the English language, and identifying strongly as an American increase ones likelihood of professing anti-immigrant nativist sentiments by nearly 19%, holding all other factors constant.[36] Another measure of acculturation, family generations in the U.S., is also significant, as those whose families have been in the U.S. for longer amounts of time are roughly 5% more likely to express anti-immigrant nativist sentiments.

There are some interesting findings in regards to the social context variables. All other things being equal, native Latinos who have higher levels of other non-immigrant Latinos in their geographical area are 11% *more* likely to profess nativist sentiments while those who reside in areas with higher levels of foreign-born Latinos are 4% *less* likely to agree to the same. Support for the foreign-born Latino finding is weaker, however, as the coefficient for this variable is significant only at p=0.09. Even with this softer standard of significance this is an important result in that it shows that Latinos respond to the heterogeneity of the Latino community in the United States in varying ways.

From these results, it seems that Latino-Americans respond to higher levels of fellow Latino-Americans according to the social salience hypothesis. The more they come into contact with fellow Latinos, the less positive they are in their evaluation of the

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[36] So as not to overstate these results, the likelihood increases from 1.9% to 20.7%. Thus, even those who are highly acculturated are still nearly 80% likely to say that immigrants strengthen American society as opposed to imposing a burden.

effect of immigrants on American society. However, the more Latino-Americans come into contact with *foreign-born* Latinos, the more positive their evaluations are toward that immigrant group. Not only is this contrary to how African-Americans respond to the presence of fellow African-Americans (who generally act according to the social density hypothesis, see Welch et al. 2001, 5), but also in a manner more similar to non-Hispanic whites. Indeed, these results are generally consistent with the effects of the social contact hypothesis, which has been shown to receive strong support among Anglos (see Welch et al. 2001, 6 and Oliver and Wong 2003, e.g.).

We see varying support for the economic competition hypothesis. The variable representing economic assimilation is not significant, nor is the variable measuring evaluations of the United States national economy. Levels of household income, however, appear to be weakly associated with stronger nativist attitudes. Those who make less than $15,000 per year are 7.6% more likely to profess anti-immigrant nativist attitudes than those who make more than $65,000 per year, although the significance level for the coefficient is barely above the traditional standard 0.05 standard ($p=0.06$). Combined, these results indicate only small support for the economic threat hypothesis, in that native Latinos with lower incomes feel a stronger sense of threat from immigrants who may compete for the same types of jobs.

Furthermore, there is no support for the panethnicity hypothesis, as those who identify primarily as “Latino/Hispanic” as opposed to “American” or with their countries of origin are neither more nor less likely to profess feelings one way or another regarding the effect of foreign immigrants on American society. We do see, however, that those whose families or ancestors hail from Mexico are 9% less likely to profess anti-immigrant attitudes, and that those from Puerto Rico, Cuba, or Central America are neither more nor less likely to have an opinion either way. With the exception of the age variable (those who are 97 are 12% more nativist than those who are 18), all other socioeconomic control variables are insignificant in the model.

It is worth noting that the variable for education is insignificant, suggesting that earlier findings on the effect of education on attitudes toward immigration (Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1984; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997) were indeed tapping levels of acculturation and assimilation, as proxied through levels of education. Once acculturation and economic assimilation are accounted for, education plays no independent role in shaping attitudes toward the effect of immigrants on American society.

Predicting Immigration Policy Preferences among Latinos. Now that the determinants of nativism among Latinos have been analyzed, we can turn our attention to examining the role of nativism in driving immigration policy preferences among Latino-Americans, focusing especially on the role of nativism. Table 6.4 presents the results of a concise logistic regression model of Latino attitudes toward immigrant worker policies.[37] Again, positive values on the coefficients indicate a preference to require undocumented immigrants to eventually or immediately return to their countries of origin.

Here, we see that anti-immigrant nativism is by far the single largest determinant of conservative immigration policy attitudes among Latino-Americans. Those who feel that immigrants are a burden on American society are 42% more likely to believe that immigrants must return to their home countries. Furthermore, this effect is enough to "tip the scales" of policy preferences, as those who possess anti-immigrant nativist sentiments are 60.5% likely to agree that undocumented immigrants should be required to return to their countries of origin, while the Latino non-nativists are only 18.5% likely to do so.[38]

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[37] The variables included in this model are those which have been consistently shown through numerous research studies to affect Anglo attitudes toward immigration policy, with the addition of anti-immigrant nativism.

[38] It should be noted that this finding could possibly be an artifact of the question wording for this particular nativism measure, which is choosing the latter of: "Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents OR immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing, and health care." It is possible that this question taps a more negative bias toward immigrants as opposed to a perceived threat to America's culture and way of life. This would naturally be

While the finding that anti-immigrant nativists are more likely to prefer more conservative immigration preferences may not be overly surprising, the finding that nativism is the largest determinant of conservative immigration attitudes *among Latinos* certainly is surprising. It was shown previously that nativism is indeed lower among Latinos than among Anglos in the United States. For those few nativist Latinos, however, their immigration policy preferences are strongly driven by nativism as opposed to other traditional factors. This stands in strong contrast to Anglo-Americans, for whom it was shown in previous chapters that their policy preferences are shaped just as much by racism, political conservatism, and economic competition as by nativism.

It is also interesting to see that several traditional determinants of nativism are *not* significant in this model. We see that the percent foreign-born Latino is insignificant, suggesting that while social context may drive native Latino nativist attitudes, it no longer independently affects policy attitudes once nativism is incorporated as a key intervening independent variable.

Furthermore, the economic threat variable is also insignificant. This suggests that the perceived threat to "American" jobs from foreign immigrants also has no independent demonstrable effect on driving immigration policy attitudes among native Latinos. It should be noted, however, that one measure of economic threat is a significant predictor of immigration policy attitudes. Latino-Americans with higher incomes are about 6% more likely to express more conservative policy attitudes, suggesting that they feel slightly threatened by the increased taxes they may have to pay to support government services for an increased amount of undocumented immigrants in the United States. This

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more likely to result in stronger anti-immigrant policy preferences. While ideal nativism measures in the NLS study are not available (see the previous discussion), a replication of this same model using comparable variables among approximately 400 Latino-Americans in the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey revealed that nativism is still significant, but at a much weaker level – changing the likelihood of supporting a mass deportation policy by only 12% (compare 5% for income, not significant, 18% for age, significant at p=0.11, and 4% for partisanship, not significant).

is also important because it was previously shown that those with higher incomes have lower levels of individual-level nativism. Apparently, high-income Latinos feel no threat to American society from foreign immigrants, but they do feel a threat to their pocketbooks that might accompany more lenient immigration policies.[39]

Whereas it was shown in previous chapters that political conservatism exerts an important independent effect on immigration policy preferences among Anglos, ideology appears to exert no effect on Latino attitudes. Contrary to Anglo preferences on immigrant worker policies, however, partisanship *does* appear to be a driving factor instead of ideology. In this model, Republicans are nearly 8% more likely to support conservative immigrant worker policies, even after controlling for nativism and socioeconomic status.[40]

Finally, we see some interesting differences between Anglos and Latinos in terms of sociodemographic characteristics. Like Anglos, older Latinos exhibit more conservative immigration preferences than younger Latinos. Unlike Anglos, however, gender and education are insignificant in the concise model. This is notable because education is traditionally one of the strongest predictors of immigration attitudes among non-Hispanic whites in the United States (Hoskin and Mishler 1983; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). It is also notable because it was shown to be associated with more conservative policy preferences among Latinos (Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle 1984;

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[39] Another possibility for this finding is that more affluent Latinos are simply better at masking their non-socially desirable attitudes to telephone surveyors. They might be willing to admit preferences for conservative immigration policies, but perhaps not willing to admit personal biases against a fellow ethnic group. This is assuming, of course, that social desirability works to produce different answers among different groups, depending on the target in question.

[40] This could also potentially be at least partially attributable to a lower level of constraint between ideology and partisanship among Latinos than exists among Anglos in the United States. The two are correlated at r=0.49 among non-Hispanic white U.S. citizens and r=0.23 among Hispanics citizens in the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey.

Hood and Morris 1997). Once nativism is accounted for, education again has no independent effect.

Discussion

Table 6.5 presents a summary of the hypotheses for the effect of the various independent variables on predicting Latino-American nativist attitudes, as revealed in this analysis. We find mixed support for these hypotheses, with some receiving greater support than others. The key finding is that, as has been shown in previous research (Sanchez 2006; Branton 2007; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand 2010), levels of American acculturation and assimilation are one of the strongest predictors of anti-immigrant nativism among Latino-Americans. This analysis has also revealed that other factors are important, including feelings of Latino racial solidarity, social context, and country of origin (specifically Mexico). It is interesting that other more traditional determinants of Latino attitudes, such as economic competition and panethnicity, are not significant predictors of nativism among Latinos in the United States.

One important lesson to be learned from this analysis is that, despite conventional wisdom on the matter, Latino attitudes toward foreign immigrants and immigration policies are not monolithically liberal. While it is true that Latinos are *more* liberal on these issues than Anglos, there is a non-trivial portion of the Latino population who view immigrants as a threat to American society and would prefer a more punitive and "hard-line" approach to immigration policy in the United States. Moreover, as is the case with Anglos, Latinos also vary in their approaches toward different types of immigrant-related policies. It was shown here that a majority of Latinos support a more liberal position on immigrant worker policies, but that, surprisingly, nearly half of all Latino-Americans support ending bilingual education programs for immigrant children after they have been in the country for one year.

Another important lesson from this analysis is that the effect of social contact is just as important for driving Latino attitudes as it is for Anglo attitudes. Latino-American attitudes toward foreign immigrants are driven just as much by the size of the Latino population as by demographic characteristics like age, income, or country of origin.

Further, this analysis demonstrates that it is important to distinguish between relevant demographic groups when assessing the effect of social context on political attitudes. We not only see here that Latinos react to the presence of foreign-born Latinos and native Latinos differently, but that the effect is *opposite* for each group. More native Latinos in one's area lead to more anti-immigrant sentiments among Latino-Americans. This suggests, contrary to the predictions from news pundits and commentators, that as the population of the United States grows more racially and ethnically diverse it will not necessarily adopt increasingly liberal immigration policy preferences. Indeed, it is possible that Latinos will actually become *more* conservative on immigration in coming decades as the proportion of Latino-Americans continues to increase relative to the proportion of undocumented Latino immigrants in the United States.

Perhaps the most important lesson from this analysis comes from the finding that anti-immigrant nativism is the single largest predictor of conservative immigration attitudes among Latino-Americans. This effect far outweighs the effect of nativism on Anglo immigration attitudes as demonstrated in Chapter 4. While a clear minority (only about a quarter) of native Latinos feel that more restrictive immigration policies are appropriate, it seems that among this minority these preferences are driven mostly by concerns to protect American society. Indeed, native Latinos who are the most integrated into American society are also the most likely to perceive that their society is coming under threat from foreign immigrants.

To restate the point, it is possible that Latino-American attitudes toward foreigners, their effect on American society, and immigration policy attitudes will continue to grow more conservative as Latinos become increasingly more assimilated and

"mainstream" in American society. As Branton (2007) predicted, Latino immigration attitudes may even eventually become indistinguishable from those of the American population at large, even if those attitudes relate to policies that happen to affect foreigners of the same racial/ethnic status.

Summary and Conclusion

The introduction to this chapter posed the following question: "Will native-born Latinos, because of their shared ethnicity and common ancestry, feel a sense of sympathy with immigrant foreigners which would cause them to oppose anti-immigrant legislation and also those who support it? Or will native-born Latinos eventually assimilate into the broader American culture and thus feel just as threatened by foreigners as native-born Anglos?"

This chapter's analysis revealed that anti-immigrant nativism among Latino-Americans is driven primarily by levels of American cultural assimilation and social context, with more modest effects exerted by linked fate and country of origin. It was also revealed that even though a clear minority of Latinos support conservative immigration policy preferences, those that do so are driven predominantly by nativism and at a rate much higher than among Anglos.

These results imply that there are two answers to the original question posed at the outset of this chapter. For now, it seems that a shared ethnicity and common ancestry encourage most Latino-Americans to view foreign immigrants and their effect on American society and culture in a generally positive light. However, these results also suggest that this will not always be the case. A growing native Latino population and rising levels of Latino cultural assimilation may eventually lead to a greater incidence of negative evaluations of the effect of immigrants on American society. The pro-immigrant bias of the Latino population in the United States may eventually disappear altogether.

While this analysis of Latino-American attitudes has been enlightening, we still have yet to examine nativist attitudes among the nation's second-largest (yet historically most salient) minority group: African-Americans. The proceeding chapter will take up this question and analyze the determinants of nativism among blacks as well as the degree to which nativism drives immigration policy attitudes in comparison with other traditional factors.

Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Respondents

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Correlation with nativism	Correlation with immigration policy preferences
Nativism	3,291	0.13	0.34	0	1	1.00	
Immigration policy	3,007	2.06	0.89	1	4	0.38*	1.00
Economic threat	3,291	2.35	0.77	1	3	-0.02	-0.07*
% Hispanic	3,291	0.19	0.11	0.03	0.42	0.07*	0.03
% foreign-born Hispanic	3,291	0.08	0.04	0.01	0.15	0.01	-0.01
Panethnicity	3,291	0.35	0.48	0	1	-0.04	-0.10*
Linked fate	3,291	2.74	1.16	1	4	-0.11*	-0.19*
Cultural assimilation	3,291	0.62	0.90	-1.32	1.50	0.22*	0.32*
Economic assimilation	3,291	0.02	0.95	-2.20	3.36	0.06*	0.13*
Generational assimilation	3,291	0.15	1.09	-0.77	2.61	0.13*	0.15*
Mexican	3,291	0.59	0.49	0	1	-0.03	-0.05*
Puerto Rican	3,291	0.18	0.38	0	1	0.05*	0.07*
Cuban	3,291	0.06	0.24	0	1	0.00	0.03
Central American	3,291	0.10	0.29	0	1	-0.04*	-0.07*
Age	3,291	43.26	15.88	18	90	0.08*	0.08*
Female	3,291	0.53	0.50	0	1	-0.01	-0.07*
Education	3,291	4.34	1.76	0	7	0.02	0.12*
Income	3,291	4.24	2.07	1	7	0.00	0.13*
Church attendance	3,291	3.28	1.29	1	5	-0.02	-0.07*
Catholic	3,291	0.68	0.46	0	1	0.00	-0.06*
Republican	3,291	0.23	0.42	0	1	0.04*	0.13*
Independent	3,291	0.18	0.39	0	1	-0.05*	-0.08*

* Correlation significant at $p \leq 0.05$, limited to U.S. citizens, cases restricted to those with non-missing values

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Table 6.2. Frequency Tabulations for Latino-American Attitudes toward Foreign Immigrants and Immigration Policy

Which comes closer to your own views? Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents, OR Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing, and health care.	
Immigrants strengthen country	86.57%
Immigrants are a burden	13.43%
N	4,856
What is your preferred policy on undocumented or illegal immigration? Should there be: Immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants, a guest worker program leading to legalization eventually, a guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the country, but only temporarily, or an effort to seal or close off the border to stop illegal immigration?	
Immediate legalization	32.05%
Guest worker program, eventual legalization	43.99%
Guest worker program, eventually leave	15.25%
Seal the border	8.7%
N	4,321
I'm going to ask you about some policy issues. Please tell me how strongly you support or oppose the following policies. Your response can be: strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose.… Replace multi-year bilingual instruction in schools with instruction only in English after one year.	
Strongly support	21.47%
Support	24.99%
Oppose	26.56%
Strongly oppose	26.98%
N	2,161

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Note: Limited to U.S. citizens.

Table 6.3. Logistic Regression Estimation of Latino-American Nativism

	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.
Economic threat	-0.048 (0.069)	-0.009
% Hispanic	2.863*** (0.518)	0.115
% foreign-born Hispanic	-3.486# (2.083)	-0.044
Panethnicity	-0.004 (0.151)	0.000
Linked fate	-0.144** (0.050)	-0.041
Cultural assimilation	0.930*** (0.110)	0.188
Economic assimilation	-0.069 (0.077)	-0.035
Generational assimilation	0.143* (0.056)	0.049
Mexican	-0.973** (0.356)	-0.098
Puerto Rican	-0.403 (0.251)	-0.034
Cuban	-0.060 (0.419)	-0.005
Central American	-0.396 (0.335)	-0.032
Age	0.016*** (0.005)	0.122
Female	-0.162 (0.129)	-0.015
Education	-0.020 (0.055)	-0.013
Income	-0.076# (0.040)	-0.043
Church attendance	-0.026 (0.041)	-0.010
Catholic	0.072 (0.156)	0.007
Constant	-1.971*** (0.560)	-0.009
N	3,291	

Table 6.3 — continued

Pseudo R^2	0.107

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 National Latino Study

Dependent variable: Latino-American anti-immigrant nativism

Note: Limited to U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Cell entries in the second column are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of the effect of each variable in the model on the dependent variable, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

This model was replicated substituting an estimation of the size of the undocumented immigrant population the respondent's state (Pew Hispanic Center 2006) for the % foreign-born Latino variable derived from Census data. The results remain substantively the same, with the following exceptions: the coefficient for the social context variable (% undocumented immigrant) is insignificant, Puerto Rican now negative and significant at p=0.091.

Table 6.4. Logistic Regression Estimation of Latino-American Immigration Policy Attitudes

	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.
Nativism	1.908*** (0.172)	0.420
Economic threat	-0.078 (0.094)	-0.028
% foreign-born Hispanic	-0.632 (1.420)	-0.015
Age	0.014*** (0.004)	0.185
Female	-0.236 (0.147)	-0.041
Education	-0.013 (0.038)	-0.016
Income	0.057* (0.023)	0.059
Ideology (conservative +)	0.019 (0.026)	0.020
Republican	0.423*** (0.129)	0.078
Independent	-0.255 (0.156)	-0.042
Constant	-2.091*** (0.327)	0.420
N	2,115	
Pseudo R^2	0.115	

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 National Latino Study

Dependent variable: Latino-American immigrant worker policy attitudes

Note: Limited to U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Cell entries in the second column are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of the effect of each variable in the model on the dependent variable, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

This model was replicated substituting an estimation of the size of the undocumented immigrant population the respondent's state (Pew Hispanic Center 2006) for the % foreign-born Latino variable derived from Census data. The results remain substantively the same, with the following exceptions: the coefficient for household income is significant at 0.10, Independent partisanship is negative and significant at p=0.058.

Table 6.5. Summary of Findings

Independent variable	Expected Direction	Results
Economic competition	+ / Ø	(+)
Panethnicity	-	Ø
American acculturation	+	+
Linked fate / racial solidarity	-	-
% Latino	+ / - / Ø	+
% foreign-born Latino	+ / -	(-)
Country of origin – Mexico	-	-
Country of origin – Central America	-	Ø
Country of origin – Cuba	+	Ø
Country of origin – Puerto Rico	+	Ø
Education	+	Ø

Note: results presented in parentheses indicate only weak support for the finding, as the result was significant at $p<0.10$, but not $p<0.05$.

CHAPTER 7: NATIVISM AND IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES AMONG AFRICAN-AMERICANS

Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the prevalence and determinants of nativism and immigration policy preferences among Latino-Americans. This chapter will focus on these same questions among the nation's second-largest, but traditionally most salient, racial minority group: African-Americans[41]. The causes and consequences of nativism among African-Americans are important to understand because the ability of African-Americans and Latinos to form coalitions in order to achieve political goals largely depends on their mutual perceptions of each other and, to a certain extent, the amount of "good will" that they have toward working together (Kaufmann 2003). African-Americans with strong nativist attitudes may find it more difficult to foster this good will toward Latinos who often support more liberal immigration policies and generally support a more accommodating stance toward immigrants in the United States, hampering their ability to work collectively in the political arena.

This chapter will thus introduce, discuss, and attempt to solve competing expectations for the determinants of African-American nativism. Some might predict that because of their relatively lower socio-economic status, African-Americans should be more nativist than Anglos because they are more often in direct competition with foreigners for economic resources such as jobs and government benefits. Others might argue, however, that because of their distinct minority status, African-Americans should be less nativist than Anglos because they themselves constitute a separate ethnic/cultural group and do not perceive their "native" cultural resources to be threatened by foreigners.

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[41] The terms "African-Americans" and "blacks" will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

They also may perceive a common minority group status with immigrant groups, thus mitigating out-group disfavor. This analysis will attempt to determine which of these two views is correct, and will also introduce and test certain determinants of nativism which are unique to African-Americans, namely, racial alienation and "linked-fate." This analysis will also determine the extent to which nativism drives African-American attitudes on immigration and other immigration-related policy preferences, compared to other traditional factors.

To briefly preview the main findings, it will be shown that blacks are at once slightly more nativist and restrictionist in their policy preferences than either Anglos or Latinos, but also more liberal in terms of policies toward immigrants who are already in the United States. It will also be shown that African-American nativist attitudes are driven primarily by economic concerns, with additional influence from social context, anti-Hispanic affect, and racial alienation. Finally, as was shown previously to be the case with Anglos, evidence will be presented in support of the argument that nativism is an important, but not exclusive, cause of conservative immigration policy preferences among African-Americans.

Previous Research

There is a plethora of research focusing on describing and explaining the relationship between African-Americans and Latinos in the United States (Falcon 1988; Hero 1992; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994; McClain and Karnig 1990; Meier and Stewart 1991; McClain and Tauber 1998; Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2003; Kaufmann 2003; Meier et al. 2004; Gay 2006) While these studies are certainly not unimportant, the remainder of this review will focus specifically on literature seeking to explain African-American attitudes specifically toward foreigners and United States immigration policy.

While there have been fewer investigations into the determinants of African-American attitudes toward immigration policy, there has been more development in this area than is the case with Latino immigration attitudes, as discussed in the previous chapter. Generally speaking, these studies investigating black immigration policy attitudes have made arguments that fall into one of two camps. Either blacks feel positively toward Latino immigrants because of their shared minority status, or they feel negatively toward Latino immigrants because they compete for the same jobs, government benefits, and political positions.

In the first camp (positive inter-racial relations), Jackson, et al. (1994), examine a 1988 survey of African-Americans in Los Angeles (the "Los Angeles Racial Group Consciousness" (LARGC) study, N= 489). They show descriptive statistics indicating that 83.3% of blacks in Los Angeles perceive themselves to be either very or fairly close to Latinos (compare 62.4% for Asians, 69.7% for Jews, and 84.7% for whites). In contrast, however, only 16.9% of black respondents indicated that they believe that Latino immigrants have changed Los Angeles "for the better" (compare 24.9% for Asian immigrants).

Thornton and Mizuno (1999) analyze data from the 1984 Black Election Study and find that, in general, blacks are more supportive and positive in their evaluations of foreign immigrants than whites. Espenshade and Hempsted (1996) further find that blacks are more liberal in their immigration policy preferences than their white counterparts in the United States. Morris (2000) examine African-American voting on California proposition 187 and finds that a slight majority of blacks (53%-46%) voted against cutting off government benefits to undocumented immigrants in the state. Finally, McClain, et al. (2008) examine at the effect of black elite opinion on black residents of Durham, North Carolina toward the issue of illegal immigration. They find that, in general, black elites perceive immigration to be more of a problem than among those they

represent. African-Americans in Durham were found to be fairly positive in their views of foreign immigrants in the community.

In contrast to these more optimistic findings, Diamond (1998) conducts a historical analysis of the relationship between African-Americans, immigrants, and immigration policy in the United States that stretches from the early 19th century to the present. He explains that blacks and immigrants have been competing since the 1820s – each group began to move into urban areas in the country and began to compete for the same types of jobs. This competition was further exacerbated throughout the 19th century as most European immigrants monolithically supported the pro-slavery Democratic Party. This led to strong anti-Catholic and anti-Chinese sentiments among most blacks in the United States. Black elites, however, were fairly supportive of immigrants in the United States, seeing the inconsistency of opposing other minority groups when they themselves were seeking more fair and equal treatment in American society.

This pattern continued into the 20th century, as black leaders, fresh from the civil-rights conflicts, strongly supported other minority groups in America, including Latino immigrants and refugees. Even today, African-American representatives in the U.S. Congress and state legislatures are some of the most reliable pro-immigrant votes, as voting on Latino interests and immigration tends to split along partisan lines (Knoll 2009b), and nearly 100% of African-American representatives are Democrats. According to Diamond (1998), however, the growing numbers of Hispanic immigrants continue to create antagonism among the black "masses" as they continue to compete for jobs and political influence in American cities.[42]

[42] There are numerous other studies which focus on the economic competition between blacks and Latino immigrants, but they will be discussed in the next section where the key hypotheses (including economic competition) are identified.

As was the case with the previous section, the bulk of these studies have focused on black attitudes toward either Latinos as a racial group or toward political preferences on immigration levels or access to government services. To date, these studies have overlooked or excluded nativism, the perceived threat to a uniquely American culture and way of life, in their analyses. They have also subsumed Latino-Americans and Latino immigrants under the same umbrella, thus obscuring any differences that might emerge based on reactions to these particular groups. Thus, the remainder of this chapter will seek to answer the following questions: 1) how prevalent is nativism among African-Americans in the American public?, 2) what drives nativism among African-Americans?, and 3) to what extent does nativism drive immigration policy preferences among African-Americans, in comparison with other traditional factors, especially economic competition?

Hypotheses

As was the case in the previous chapter, this analysis will examine some of the same variables introduced and discussed in the previous chapters on the determinants of nativism and policy preferences among Anglos, with the addition of theoretical variables specifically hypothesized to affect African-Americans.

Economic Competition. In a review of the determinants of racial public policy preferences in the United States, Krysan (2000) argues that "group conflict" is the only major theory that can explain attitudes of racial minorities toward racial public policies. This is because symbolic racism and principled philosophical objections cannot be applied to in this context. While arguments could certainly be made that this may not be the case when discussing Latino-specific policy attitudes, the main point remains important: African-Americans make up the chief social group in American society that regularly competes with Latino immigrants for material and positional goods.

While one branch of the research discussed previously paints a rather positive view of blacks' perceived competition with Latino immigrants, numerous scholars have also argued that economic competition is the chief determinant of anti-immigrant attitudes among African-Americans. For example, Miles (1992) describes how black labor unions in Los Angeles throughout the 1980s fiercely criticized liberal immigration policies and the influx of Latino immigrants into California, as it was believed to result in fewer jobs and a lower availability of government welfare benefits. Without specifically examining whether or not this is actually the case, Johnson and Oliver (1992) report that a strong majority of blacks at the very least *believe* that undocumented immigrants take away their jobs. Thus, even if empirical studies were to show evidence to the contrary, it is the perception of job competition that drives the anti-immigrant attitudes.

Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn (1997) further describe the results of a 1994 Los Angeles survey in which a majority of both whites and blacks say that they believe that they would have less political and economic influence if immigration continued at its current rate. They also find that a majority of blacks perceive a zero-sum world in that "more good jobs" for Latinos and Asians would result in fewer good jobs for blacks.

Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez (2003) qualify this economic competition argument by tying it to the size of the immigrant population in the area. Based on a series of surveys in Houston, Texas, they indeed find that blacks perceive Latino immigrants to be taking away jobs. Yet they also find that blacks in general do not become upset about it until there are enough Latinos in their vicinity to be perceived as actually threatening the availability of those jobs. Gay (2006) qualifies this hypothesis in another way, arguing that blacks actually react to the economic status of Latinos instead of themselves or fellow blacks. She shows evidence that when blacks live in areas with Latinos that are more economically affluent, they tend to adopt more anti-Latino attitudes.

More recently, Rouse, et al. (2008) examine African-American attitudes toward foreign immigrants, immigration policies specifically, and affect toward Latinos and

Asians in the United States. They find evidence in favor of the inter-racial economic competition hypothesis. Blacks who perceive the national economy or their personal economic situation to be doing poorly are more likely to adopt more anti-immigrant attitudes.

This view does have its detractors, however. Citrin, et al. (1997), for example, find that while economic concerns are important to driving immigration attitudes in the United States, these concerns are no more likely to influence blacks than they are whites. In essence, they argue that economic competition does not affect blacks any differently than other racial groups. In fact, Morris (2000) finds evidence that economic threat indeed drives black attitudes on immigration, but in a manner opposite than expected. He reports that it is the higher-income blacks who were more likely to vote in favor of California Proposition 187. Those with higher incomes feel more of a threat to their pocketbooks through the increase in government services of which immigrants are perceived to have taken advantage. Finally, Sniderman and Piazza (2004) argue that since African-Americans largely share the same commitment to traditional American values as Anglos, there is no longer an effect of economic competition over scarce resources between blacks and Latinos.

These competing expectations will be tested, then, by analyzing the effect of economic competition on nativism and immigration policy attitudes among African-Americans. Findings from Miles (1992), Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn (1997), and Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez (2003) would all predict that those with lower evaluations of the national economy or with lower incomes would have heightened levels of nativism. They would also predict that because of the salience of inter-group economic competition to minority groups, the effect of economic competition should be stronger for African-Americans than for Anglos. On the other hand, Morris (2000) would predict that higher nativism levels are instead a result of higher levels of income and more

favorable views of the economy. Finally, Sniderman and Piazza (2004) would predict that economic competition and nativism and/or immigration attitudes are unrelated.

Social Context. For African-Americans, the expectations are similarly mixed regarding the % immigrant variable for the same reasons (racial threat vs. social contact) which were explained in-depth in previous chapters. (Morris 2000; Rouse et al. 2008)

There is an additional contextual variable that may also affect African-American nativism: the proportion of African-Americans in the community. It is expected that for African-Americans, a higher percent black in one's immediate geographic area will be associated with higher levels of nativism. This is because of a combination of Bledsoe, et al.'s (1995) racial solidarity hypothesis, Blumer's (1958) group position hypothesis, and Turner and Tajfel's (1986) social identity theory. (Welch et al. 2001) Both Blumer (1958) and Bledsoe, et al. (1995) argue that when African-Americans constitute a majority of the population in an area, they are more likely to experience more intense feelings of racial solidarity, i.e. pro-black in-group identification. Social identity theory predicts that as in-group identification increases, out-group antagonism also increases because individuals are motivated to maintain positive in-group evaluations, which are formed only in comparison with other relevant out-groups. This may result in increased out-group hostility toward foreigners, especially those of a different racial background.

As with the economic competition variable, expectations for the effect of social context are therefore mixed. The racial threat hypothesis (Giles and Buckner 1993; Tolbert and Grummel 2003) would predict that a higher percent foreign-born Latino in one's geographic area will be associated with stronger nativist attitudes among African-Americans. The social contact hypothesis (Welch et al. 2001) predicts the opposite. Furthermore, it is also expected that a higher percent black in one's geographic vicinity will be associated with stronger nativist attitudes among blacks as well.

Racial Alienation. This is defined by Bobo and Hutchings (1996) to be the perception that members of one's group are facing unfair treatment in the larger social

order. Schuman, et al. (1998) show that African-American perceptions of discrimination (racial alienation) have been persistent throughout the last several decades. Racial alienation may be associated with higher levels of nativism among blacks. This is because, as found by Bobo and Hutchings (1996), that an increased feeling of racial alienation among African-Americans is associated with an increased perception of inter-group competition between themselves and other racial minority groups, especially Hispanics. It is therefore expected that African-Americans who feel alienated and oppressed are more likely to hold nativist sentiments than those who do not because they perceive a heightened sense of inter-group competition with foreign immigrants.

Linked Fate / Racial Solidarity. As was discussed in the previous chapter, linked fate is the perception that one's self-interest is pegged to the success of one's ethnic group's interests (Dawson 1995). It was shown that linked fate among Latinos is significantly associated with lower nativist attitudes. In terms of its effect on African-Americans, however, expectations are again mixed. Mindiola, et al. (2003) and Sniderman and Piazza (2004) all argue that linked fate among African-Americans increases in-group favor but does not affect out-group disfavor. This would argue that linked fate has no affect on African-American nativism. In contrast, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) predicts that in-group favor automatically leads to increased out-group disfavor, for reasons discussed previously. Thus, increasing levels of linked fate should be associated with increased nativism among African-Americans.

Data, Methods, and Analysis

This portion of the analysis will employ data from three separate sources. Unfortunately, no single data source currently exists (to the author's knowledge) that contains acceptable measures of nativism, immigration policy preferences, racial alienation, and linked fate. Therefore, the key variables will have to be analyzed separately using data containing measures for that particular variable without

incorporating them into one comprehensive model. Of course this solution is less than ideal, but is believed to be preferable to any alternative option given the data currently available.

The effects of economic threat and social context will be analyzed using the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey, as described in previous chapters. This survey sampled nearly 700 non-Hispanic blacks in the United States and contains good measures for both nativism and associated policy attitudes. Racial alienation and its relationship to nativism will be analyzed with the "2007 Values Update Survey" by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. This poll was in the field from December 12, 2006 – January 9, 2007 and has an N of 175 non-Hispanic blacks. Racial alienation and its relationship to immigration policy preferences will be analyzed with the "October 2007 Race Survey" also by the Pew Research Center. This poll was in the field from September 5 – October 6, 2007 and has an N of 1,007 non-Hispanic blacks. Finally, the relationship between linked fate and immigration policy preferences will be analyzed with 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1996). This survey was completed between September 9, 1996 and January 6, 1997 and has an N of 1,216.

Descriptive Statistics. This portion of the analysis will analyze responses from the 2006 Pew Immigration Survey. Before delving into the multivariate statistical analysis, it would be useful to first examine some frequency distributions of the prevalence of nativism and conservative immigration preferences among African-Americans. The nativism and policy measures are similar to those used in previous chapters using the Pew Survey.[43] The distributions for these variables are presented in Table 7.1.

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[43] Nativism is measured with a binomial variable constructed from a question measuring whether or not the respondent agrees or disagrees that: "our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence." The policy variables measure opinions toward prospective immigration levels, immigrant worker policies, and immigrant access to social services.

Here, we see that 56.8% of non-Hispanic blacks either mostly or completely agree that the American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. That is only 6% higher than among non-Hispanic whites in the same survey, but it is a statistically significant difference at p=0.004. We see also that blacks are only slightly more liberal than Anglos when it comes to guest-worker policies, as they are only about 1% less likely to express a preference for a mass deportation policy and only about 5% more likely to prefer an earned pathway to citizenship (these differences are significant only at a less restrictive degree of significance, p=0.07). Blacks also appear to be more liberal than Anglos when it comes to access to government benefits. 64.5% of blacks say that immigrants should not be eligible to receive government welfare benefits. While this constitutes a majority on the conservative side of the question, it is 13% lower than among Anglos.

Despite being more liberal on immigrant worker policies, blacks appear to be much more conservative when it comes to prospective immigration levels. Nearly half of all black respondents (49.3%) say that immigration into the United States should be decreased while only 17.9% say increased (compare to 36.9% and 19.5% for Anglos). It seems that blacks are slightly more likely than Anglos to oppose immigration into the United States and to perceive a threat to a uniquely American culture and way of life. However, once the immigrants are here, they are much more likely than Anglos to support more liberal pro-immigrant policies such as providing a pathway to citizenship and granting access to government benefits.

It would be profitable to briefly examine one final comparison to add to our understanding specifically of the economic competition hypothesis. When asked whether they think that immigrants take jobs that Americans do not want or rather if immigrants take jobs that Americans *do* want, 21.4% of non-Hispanic whites and 34.8% of non-Hispanic blacks reported that they think that immigrants take jobs away from Americans. While it seems that a majority of both blacks and whites feel that immigrants fill jobs that

Americans do not want, this sentiment is about 13% lower among blacks, suggesting that they do perceive more direct economic competition with immigrant workers than do Anglos.

Social Context and Economic Competition. In order to analyze the determinants of African-American nativism, Table 7.2 reports the results of the logistic model estimation containing a concise multivariate model predicting nativism. The analysis is limited to non-Hispanic black U.S. citizens and the data is weighted by a sample weighting and standard errors are clustered by geographic region to account for over-sampling in several large metropolitan areas. Due to the binomial nature of the dependent variable, a standard binomial logistic regression method is used.

Three variables are significant, and all in the expected direction. First, the variable representing levels of family income is significant and negative, indicating that those with lower incomes are more likely to espouse nativist attitudes. Specifically, those with very low incomes (less than $10,000 per year) are nearly 34% more likely to express nativist attitudes than those making more than $150,000 per year. This is in line with the economic competition hypothesis, and supports the findings of Rouse, et al. (2008) who show that economic concerns are a strong predictor of anti-immigrant sentiments among African-Americans. This finding can also be contrasted with Citrin, et al. (1997) who show that levels of personal income are not significant predictors of immigration attitudes among Anglos, but rather perceptions of the national economy. For blacks, it seems that income rather than sociotropic economic evaluations are chiefly associated with a perceived threat to the American way of life from foreign immigrants.

Second, the only social context variable that achieved significance is that of percent foreign-born Latino in a respondent's zip code. Higher levels of Latino immigrants in one's community are associated with higher levels of individual-level nativism. In Chapter 3 it was shown that in one survey, this same variable is associated with *lower* levels of nativism among Anglos. Social context apparently exerts an opposite

effect among blacks than Anglos. Whereas the social contact hypothesis seems to work for Anglos in regards to foreign immigrants, the racial threat hypothesis holds true for blacks. Again, this is in line with previous research (Morris 2000; Rouse et al. 2008). It is also interesting to note that neither the growth rate of the immigrant population nor the percent black variables are significant in this model.

Finally, the anti-Hispanic affect variable is significant and in the expected direction. Blacks who have an unfavorable view of Hispanics are more likely to perceive a threat to the American way of life. Perhaps most interesting, however, is that while the effect of racism is strong, it is no stronger than the effect of the other two significant variables in the model. Blacks who have very unfavorable views of Hispanics are 22% more likely to express nativist attitudes. Not only is this significantly less than the 59% observed for this same variable among Anglos using the same survey in Chapter 3, but it is less than the effect of either social context of personal income (33.7% and 25.3%, respectively). It appears that while anti-Hispanic affect is an important determinant for nativism among African-Americans, its effect is much smaller than among Anglos, and exerts a smaller effect in comparison with other factors than is the case among Anglos as well.

To summarize: economic competition, social context, and anti-Hispanic racism work together at to explain African-American nativism. Economic competition affects those with lower incomes but not negative national economic evaluations, social context works in a way opposite that of Anglos (racial threat instead of social contact), and anti-Hispanic racism is a relatively small factor in driving nativism as compared to Anglos.

Predicting Immigration Policy Preferences among African-Americans. We can now turn our attention to analyzing the extent to which nativism drives immigration policy preferences in comparison with other traditional factors. Table 7.3 presents the results of a concise logistic regression model predicting attitudes on two different policies: immigrant-worker preferences and prospective immigration levels. These results

indicate that nativism is an important predictor of conservative immigration policy attitudes among blacks, but at a rate no stronger than the effects of anti-Hispanic racism, political conservatism, or economic competition. In the first model, levels of nativism are associated with a 28.3% increase in the likelihood of preferring a mass deportation policy option and a 23.4% increase in the likelihood of saying that future immigration to the United States should be decreased.

Anti-Hispanic affect is significant, but only at a less strict standard of p=0.07. If we were to use the more strict standard of p=0.05, we could conclude that racism exerts no independent effect on immigration policy attitudes among blacks once accounting for nativism, ideology, and economic competition. Either way, as with nativism, its effect is smaller than among Anglos (27.4% and 26.5% for the two policies in question, compared to 34% for the same type of policies examined among Anglos in Chapter 4).

Political conservatism drives black attitudes toward immigrant worker policies but not future immigration levels. Those who are strong conservatives are 25.3% more likely to favor a mass deportation policy than strong liberals. This effect is similar to the effect of ideology on Anglos (compare results in Chapter 4). Finally, economic competition exerts a strong independent effect on black attitudes to prospective immigration levels but not immigrant worker policies. Those who perceive the national economy as doing poorly are 30.3% more likely to say future immigration into the United States needs to be decreased. This is stronger than the effect of either nativism or anti-Hispanic affect in this model. It is interesting to note that individual income levels drive nativist attitudes, but sociotropic economic evaluations are what effect immigration policy attitudes (Citrin et al. 1997).

Racial Alienation. As stated in the previous chapter, racial alienation is the perception that members of one's group are facing unfair treatment in the larger social order. It has been previously demonstrated that racial alienation among blacks is associated with a higher perception of inter-group competition with Hispanics (Bobo and

Hutchings 1996), which may be associated with higher levels of nativism and/or more conservative attitudes toward immigration. Unfortunately, ideal data to analyze this hypothesis is not currently available, but data from existing Pew surveys can be used to offer an exploratory answer to this hypothesis.

We can first examine this relationship from a bivariate perspective, using data from the Pew "2007 Values Update Survey." Racial alienation is measured by asking respondents whether they agree or disagree that "in the past few years there hasn't been much real improvement in the position of black people in this country" (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). The nativism measure asks respondents whether they agree or disagree that "The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values." Among the 175 non-Hispanic blacks sampled in this survey, nativism and racial alienation are positively correlated at r=0.21 (p=0.067). A chi-square test from a cross-tabulation of these two variables further reveals evidence of a positive relationship (χ^2= 21.83, p=0.009).

With only 175 usable cases, the Pew "2007 Values Update Survey" does not contain sufficient responses to conduct a desirable multivariate analysis of the effect of racial alienation on either nativism or immigration attitudes. We can, however, profitably examine the Pew "October 2007 Race Survey." This survey has an N of 1,007 non-Hispanic blacks, contains perfectly appropriate measures of racial alienation, and also has an adequate general measure of immigration attitudes (but not nativism). As a measure of racial alienation, respondents are asked "how often do you think blacks are discriminated against when they apply for a job / try to rent an apartment or find a house to buy / apply to a college or university / eat at restaurants and shop in retail stores? Almost always, frequently, not too often, or hardly ever?" Responses to these four questions were combined into a factor index score of perceived discrimination (values range from -2.45 to 1.83 with a mean of 0.04 and a standard deviation of 0.97).

Attitudes toward immigration are measured by responses to the following question: "how big a problem is illegal immigration to your local community – a very big problem, a big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all?" (31% of non-Hispanic blacks reported that illegal immigration is either a big or very big problem). While this question admittedly does not directly measure the respondent's preferred immigration policy option, it can safely be assumed that those who view illegal immigration as a larger problem are also more likely to have conservative preferences on the issue (Neiman, Johnson, and Bowler 2006; Knoll, Sanborn, and Redlawsk 2009). To aid in substantive analysis and interpretation, this variable will be collapsed into a binomial variable coded "1" for "big problem" or "very big problem" and "0" for "small problem" or "not a problem."

Results of a multivariate model of immigration attitudes among non-Hispanic black U.S. citizens are presented in Table 7.4. Additional variables are included to measure the economic competition hypothesis (whether or not the respondent agrees or disagrees that "black Americans would have more job opportunities if there were fewer immigrants"), racial affect ("is your overall opinion of Hispanics very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?"), social context (percent foreign-born Latino and percent black in respondent's zip code), as well as standard socioeconomic and partisan controls.

First, we can observe in Table 7.4 that levels of racial alienation (as measured by perceived discrimination) do indeed exert a positive and significant effect on immigration salience among non-Hispanic blacks in the United States. The likelihood of viewing immigration as a big problem (thus also more likely also to take a conservative view on the issue) increases by 36% as levels of racial alienation move from their smallest to largest value, holding all others constant at their means. Second, we can see that economic competition, anti-Hispanic affect, and social context all exert an effect on immigration salience similar to that observed previously, although in differing

magnitudes (in this model, social context is the largest factor while economic competition is the smallest).

By any measure, then, it seems that there is moderately strong evidence in support of the contention that when African-Americans perceive their group to be facing unfair treatment in American society (i.e. more racial alienation), they are more punitive in their evaluations of immigrants and their effect on the American culture and way of life.

Linked Fate. It was previously discussed that "linked fate" or "racial solidarity" refers to the perception that one's self-interest is pegged to the success of the ethnic group to which an individual belongs. It was also previously discussed that expectations for the effect of linked fate on black nativism and immigration attitudes are mixed because while some (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2003; Sniderman and Piazza 2004) argue that although linked fate effects evaluations of fellow blacks, it does not affect attitudes toward other racial groups. On the other hand, social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) would predict that linked fate would be associated with more negative views of out-groups, including foreign immigrants.

This hypothesis will be analyzed using data from the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate 1996). Linked fate is measured with responses to the following question: "do you think what happens generally to Black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" (Questions QV1 and QW1). If respondents answer "yes," they are then asked to indicate whether they believe this is the case "a lot," "some," or "not very much." These questions were combined into a single index measure of linked fate ("no," "yes, not very much," "yes, some", and "yes, a lot"). Unfortunately, this survey contains no adequate measure of nativism, but it does contain two immigration policy questions. The first asks if "allowed immigration should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now" (recoded so that higher values correspond with a preference to decrease prospective immigration levels). The second asks whether or not immigrants, in regards to

government services, should be "eligible as soon as they come here" or should they "have to wait a year (or more)" (recoded so that higher values indicate a preference to have immigrants wait).

From a purely bivariate perspective, linked fate is not significantly correlated with either policy preference (r=0.27 and r=0.50, respectively). To briefly examine this relationship from a multivariate perspective, Table 7.5 presents the results of two models predicting attitudes toward these two immigration policy questions. In addition to linked fate, variables are also included for the economic threat hypothesis (perception of the state of the national economy) and racial affect (a 100-point feeling thermometer toward Hispanics). Standard socioeconomic and political variables are also included.

Again, we see that individual levels of linked fate among African-Americans have no relationship with their views on immigration policy preferences (although we again see support for the racial affect variable as well as the economic competition hypothesis when it comes to government services). This confirms the findings of Mindiola, et al. (2003) and Sniderman and Piazza (2004) in that higher levels of linked fate (a form of racial solidarity) amongst African-Americans apparently do not lead them to hold any more conservative positions on immigration policies.

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter was originally framed as an examination of two competing arguments. On one hand, it is reasonable to predict that African-Americans should exhibit stronger anti-immigrant attitudes because of the competition they provide for government services and low-income jobs. On the other hand, arguments can be made that African-Americans should actually be pro-immigrant because of their shared racial/cultural minority status in American society. Rather than answer the questions definitely one way or another, the analysis presented in this section presents evidence in favor of both perspectives.

First, in terms of their attitudes toward the effect of foreign influence on American society and foreign immigrants, it seems that, in general, African-Americans are only *slightly* more nativist than Anglos and are also slightly more restrictionist in their immigration preferences. Once immigrants are here, however, African-Americans are actually more likely than Anglos to favor pro-immigrant policies. It seems that blacks, when considering the effects of immigration in the abstract, are largely influenced by the possibility of competition that these immigrants might provide. It has also been shown that as more and more immigrants exist in the community, blacks are driven to express stronger nativist sentiments.

However, it has also been shown that blacks are more liberal in their attitudes toward government action regarding undocumented immigrants once they arrive in the country. They are more likely than Anglos to support an earned pathway toward legalization and more supportive of giving immigrants access to government benefits. Based on this evidence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that, even though blacks might not welcome immigrants as neighbors with open arms, they understand that, as a fellow minority group, they are in similar political situations in the United States and that what is good for one group will be good for the other.

In terms of what drives African-American attitudes toward immigrants and their effect on American culture, the traditional explanation of inter-group conflict (economic threat) seems to hold sway in this case. It has been shown that economic threat is a strong predictor of black nativist attitudes, in addition to the racial threat social context phenomenon and simple anti-Hispanic racial affect. These factors are also useful in explaining Anglo nativist attitudes as well, but to a different degree. For Anglos, racial affect exerts a much stronger effect than among African-Americans. And economic competition, while present, works at a much weaker level than among African-Americans. Also, social context works in a manner *opposite* for Anglos than for blacks.

While being around more Latino immigrants make Anglos less nativist, it serves to make blacks more nativist.

It has also been shown that nativism is an important predictor of black immigration policy attitudes, but to a degree no stronger than anti-Hispanic affect, philosophical conservatism, or economic competition. This is similar to what was previously shown to be the case among Anglos, where nativism is definitely an important, but not exclusive, factor in driving conservative immigration preferences. In this, Anglos and blacks are more similar.

Finally, an exploratory analysis was conducted on the effects of two variables unique to African-Americans: racial alienation and linked fate. There is preliminary evidence to support the conclusion that when blacks perceive a greater amount of discrimination by society as a whole, they react with more negative views of immigrants and their effect on American society. This is in line with previous psychological research on scape-goating, where individuals seek for a salient out-group to blame for their personal circumstances (Willis 1981; Duckitt 1992; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). Additionally, it seems that levels of African-American "linked fate" have no demonstrable relationship with their attitudes toward immigration policy.

To conclude, black attitudes toward the influence on American culture from foreigners present a difficult dichotomy to reconcile. These results suggest that so long as the African-American community and immigrant community continue to occupy a similar disadvantaged situation in American society, blacks will continue to be torn between viewing immigrants as a competitor for economic and political status and viewing immigrants as an important ally in gaining recognition and influence in the political system. Indeed, given the history of inter-racial conflict in the United States, this represents no easy choice and will continue to shape American race relations for years to come.

Table 7.1. Frequency Tabulations for African-American Nativist Attitudes and Immigration Policy Preferences

Some people say that our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. Would you say you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with this?	
Completely agree	23.34%
Mostly agree	33.43%
Mostly disagree	25.90%
Completely disagree	17.32%
N	664
Should illegal immigrants be required to go home, or should they be granted some kind of legal status that allows them to stay here? [Should it be possible for some illegal immigrants to remain in the U.S. under a temporary worker program under the condition that they would eventually go home, or don't you think so? / Should they be allowed to stay only as temporary workers who must eventually return to their home countries, or should it be possible for them to stay in the U.S. permanently?]	
Stay permanently	38.08%
Stay temporarily	33.12%
Leave permanently	28.80%
N	625
Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?	
Increased	17.90%
Kept at present level	32.81%
Decreased	49.29%
N	637
Should illegal immigrants who are in the U.S. be eligible for social services provided by state and local governments, or should they not be eligible?	
Eligible	64.46%
Not eligible	35.53%
N	332

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic black U.S. citizens.

Table 7.2. Logistic Regression Estimation of African-American Nativist Attitudes

	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.
Female	-0.351 (0.221)	-0.087
Age	0.008 (0.014)	0.121
Education	0.010 (0.075)	0.015
Income	-0.130# (0.076)	-0.253
Economic threat	0.291 (0.235)	0.208
% foreign-born Latin American	3.182* (1.563)	0.337
Immigrant growth rate	1.334 (0.954)	0.337
% black	-0.075 (0.365)	-0.018
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.305* (0.129)	0.221
Constant	-2.403 (1.640)	
N	273	
Pseudo R^2	0.056	

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Dependent variable: Nativism ("Our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.")

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic black U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Cell entries in the second column are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of the effect of each variable in the model on the dependent variable, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

Table 7.3. Logistic Regression Estimation of African-American Immigration Policy Attitudes

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.
Nativism	0.581* (0.290)	0.283	0.319* (0.135)	0.234
Economic threat	-0.154 (0.295)	-0.072	-0.420*** (0.101)	-0.303
% foreign-born Latin American	-2.478 (2.868)	-0.156	-0.565 (1.620)	-0.071
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.489# (0.268)	0.274	0.370# (0.204)	0.265
Ideology	-0.387*** (0.084)	-0.253	-0.223 (0.183)	-0.218
Republican	0.133 (0.542)	0.023	0.894 (0.819)	0.207
Independent	-1.150*** (0.135)	-0.164	-0.262 (0.210)	-0.065
Female	-0.009 (0.266)	-0.002	0.090 (0.315)	0.023
Age	-0.030* (0.013)	-0.303	0.008 (0.007)	0.135
Education	-0.137 (0.090)	-0.144	-0.118 (0.086)	-0.174
Income	0.118 (0.083)	0.161	-0.035 (0.034)	-0.069
Constant	-1.710 (1.135)		-0.432 (1.015)	
N	249		254	
Pseudo R^2	0.116		0.085	

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Dependent variables: Model 1 – support for requiring that all undocumented immigrants immediately return to their country of origin. Model 2 – support for decreasing prospective legal immigration levels.

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic black U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Table 7.3 — continued

Cell entries in the second column are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of the effect of each variable in the model on the dependent variable, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

Table 7.4. Logistic Regression Estimation of Effect of Racial Alienation on African-American Immigration Policy Salience

	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.
Racial alienation	0.444** (0.145)	0.360
Economic competition	0.285* (0.113)	0.175
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.383** (0.147)	0.255
% foreign-born Latin American	4.508** (1.506)	0.522
% black	-0.599 (0.512)	-0.123
Female	0.186 (0.202)	0.039
Education	-0.028 (0.066)	-0.046
Age	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.237
Income	-0.013 (0.061)	-0.021
Church attendance	-0.073 (0.067)	-0.074
Party ID (Republican +)	-0.013 (0.076)	-0.017
Ideology (conservative +)	-0.147 (0.114)	-0.124
Constant	-0.956 (0.666)	
N	509	
Pseudo R^2	0.124	

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2007 Values Update Survey

Dependent variable: "How big a problem is illegal immigration to your local community – a very big problem, a big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all?"

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic black U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by state.

Table 7.4 — continued

Cell entries in the second column are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of the effect of each variable in the model on the dependent variable, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

Table 7.5. Logistic Regression Estimation of Effect of Linked Fate on African-American Immigration Policy Preferences

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.	B (SE)	Predicted Prob.
Linked fate	0.097 (0.083)	0.072	-0.030 (0.076)	-0.012
Economic threat	0.120 (0.151)	0.060	0.222# (0.129)	0.060
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.010# (0.005)	0.251	0.017* (0.007)	0.193
Education	-0.012 (0.050)	-0.024	0.029 (0.075)	0.032
Age	0.014** (0.006)	0.314	0.014** (0.007)	0.165
Female	0.467* (0.197)	0.116	0.150 (0.171)	0.021
Income	0.050 (0.035)	0.125	0.055 (0.047)	0.073
Ideology	-0.091 (0.133)	-0.046	0.158 (0.166)	0.043
Party ID	0.058 (0.172)	0.029	0.345 (0.272)	0.080
Constant	-1.714** (0.634)		-1.051 (0.721)	
N	515		501	
Pseudo R^2	0.027		0.035	

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 1996 National Black Election Survey

Dependent variables: Model 1 – "Allowed immigration should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now". Model 2 – In regards to government services, should immigrants be "eligible as soon as they come here" or should they "have to wait a year (or more)"?

Note: Standard errors clustered by state.

Cell entries in the second column are predicted probabilities based on logit estimations of the effect of each variable in the model on the dependent variable, holding all other variables constant at their mean.

CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION – IMPLICATIONS FOR ACADEMICS, CITIZENS, AND POLICY-MAKERS

Nativism and Immigration Policy Attitudes among Anglos

The primary objective of this dissertation has been to provide an in-depth analysis of the causes and consequences of nativism among Americans. Because of their dominant status in American society, the first several chapters focused specifically on non-Hispanic whites. Chapter 2 began with the argument that nativism, as an individual-level attitude, has traditionally been conflated with conservative immigration policy preferences by political scientists. It was shown, both conceptually and empirically, that nativism is a distinct attitude from restrictive policy preferences and that nativism should instead be modeled by researchers as an independent variable driving policy attitudes. This chapter also set forth a working definition of nativism ("an individual-level attitude that 1) identifies a distinctly "American" culture and way of life which, in turn, is 2) threatened by something distinctly "foreign") and presented evidence that Latino immigrants are the primary target of nativist attitudes in contemporary American society.

Chapter 3 examined the determinants of nativism in the American public, i.e. why it is that some people feel that their American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. The key finding of this chapter was that contemporary American nativism is largely a result of right-wing authoritarianism, social distrust, and anti-Hispanic affect. To a lesser extent, nativism is also driven by perceived threats to the American economy, an aversion to multiculturalism, a feeling of national superiority, and the size of the immigrant population in one's vicinity (more immigrants being associated with less nativism, but a more rapid immigrant growth rate being associated with more nativism). Also, certain demographic characteristics like age and levels of education play an important role. This chapter also argued and presented evidence that racism is theoretically prior to nativism and should be modeled as such. Ultimately, this chapter

showed that American nativism is more a product of static individual personality traits than variable environmental or political factors.

Having examined the causes of contemporary American nativism, Chapter 4 turned to its consequences, specifically toward immigration policy attitudes in the American public. To what extent are immigration restrictionists driven by nativism as opposed to other important factors? The results of this chapter indicate that nativism is indeed associated with more conservative policy preferences, but that anti-Hispanic affect and principled political conservatism are just as important. Thus, it seems that there are certainly many Americans who oppose liberal immigration policies out of a concern to maintain America's traditional culture and values, but there are also many others who do so simply because of a negative opinions toward Hispanics, and still others because of conservative political concerns (like rule of law or fiscal approach to welfare spending). It was further shown in this chapter that some of the traditional determinants of immigration policy attitudes (like education and social context) exert their effect on policy attitudes only indirectly through the mediating variable of nativism.

Chapter 5 extended the findings of Chapter 4 by introducing a measurement of "implicit nativist attitudes", or subconscious preferences for traditional American cultural symbols over Latino-American cultural symbols (i.e. American culture "blended" with foreign influence). It was shown that, while not everyone possesses explicit nativist preferences, most people do possess at least some degree of implicit nativism. It was also shown that people are generally not hesitant or embarrassed to admit their explicit nativist opinions. Indeed, despite conventional wisdom on the matter, a concern about a perceived foreign threat to the traditional American culture is not a "socially undesirable" attitude, but rather is quite "main-stream" in America today.

Thus, perhaps the most important finding of this chapter concerns the "principled objectors," those who hold conservative immigration policy preferences, but not because of racism or nativism, but rather because of more "legitimate" motives like concerns

about the economy, national security, etc. The findings of Chapter 5 indicate that these "principled objectors" are indeed being honest, and not simply masking their "socially unacceptable" biases. Apparently, there are immigration restrictionists who are racists, those who are nativists, and those who are neither racists nor nativist, but simply ideologically conservative.

Nativism and Immigration Attitudes among Latino- and African-Americans

The first portion of this dissertation focused specifically on the Anglo (non-Hispanic white) population in the United States and their attitudes toward protecting a traditional version of American culture against foreign influence and immigrants. Chapters 6 and 7 focused instead on the two largest racial/ethnic minority groups in the United States, i.e. Latino-Americans and African-Americans. Tables 8.1 and 8.2 summarize the effect of certain independent variables examined throughout this dissertation and their effect on nativism and conservative immigration attitudes, respectively, among Anglos, Latinos, and African-Americans.

As can be seen, there are some important similarities and differences among each racial group. Generally speaking, Latinos are less nativist and more liberal in their immigration preferences than either Anglos or blacks. They are least likely of the three groups to be affected by economic concerns. Latinos are also most likely to be affected by their attitudes toward co-ethnic individuals. Unlike the effect of African-American context on other African-Americans, Latinos are affected by the presence of other Latinos, as well as their perception of the degree to which they share a common interest ("linked fate") with the Latino population at large.

Perhaps most interestingly, the few Latino-Americans who do possess more conservative immigration preferences are driven predominantly by nativism, whereas nativism is but one factor among many for Anglos and African-Americans. Further, when it comes to actual policies, Latinos are affected by economics in a manner opposite that

of Anglos or blacks. Lower-income Latinos actually favor more liberal immigration preferences while lower-income Anglos and blacks favor more conservative policies.

These chapters also showed that blacks, generally speaking, are more nativist and more restrictionist in their policy attitudes than either Anglos or Latinos, but they are more likely than Anglos to support more liberal policies toward the immigrants who are already in the United States. Their attitudes are influenced by the economy and concerns about jobs at a rate higher than among either Anglos or Latinos, and they are driven less by anti-Hispanic racism than are Anglos. Interestingly, social context works opposite for blacks than for Anglos or Latinos. Being around more foreign Latino immigrants tends to drive blacks to take a more negative view of the effect of immigrants on American culture, while this leads to more positive evaluations from Anglos and fellow Latinos. Finally, when African-Americans perceive themselves to be discriminated by society at large, they tend to react by increasing out-group disfavor toward the competing immigrant social group instead of reaching out to this group, which in many respects is in a similar situation to their own.

All in all, these results present both an optimistic and pessimistic view of inter-racial immigrant relations in the United States. Pro-immigrant optimists can take heart that as the Latino immigrant population continues to grow in the United States, it will likely produce increasingly favorable attitudes among Anglos and other Latinos, who collectively comprise nearly 90% of the entire U.S. population (assuming that the Latino immigrant population does not grow too quickly – it was also shown in Chapter 3 that nativism intensifies among Anglos as the immigrant population growth rate also increases). Optimists can also be encouraged by the finding that Latinos and African-Americans both have a more liberal view toward government policy regarding undocumented immigrants and that as these minority groups continue to gain political clout they will have an increasing ability to shape government policy affecting immigration and immigrants.

Pro-immigrant pessimists, however, will be quick to note that as Latinos become increasingly accustomed to life in the United States, their memories begin to fade and they begin to increasingly identify with other American citizens instead of immigrant newcomers, even if they do share a common ethnicity. The results of this dissertation would also suggest that it may also prove difficult for blacks to adopt more pro-immigrant attitudes if the immigrant population continues to grow at a rapid pace or if they continue to view themselves as victims of an "oppressive" American society.

Implications for Academics and Political Science

The results presented in this dissertation yield a number of important implications for political science research. First and foremost, the evidence presented in these chapters provides strong evidence that researchers should stop conflating nativism with conservative immigration policy preferences. Nativism should be considered conceptually and empirically distinct from public policy preferences and included as either a key independent or control variable in any multivariate analysis of immigration policy attitudes in the American public. Should the appropriate question wording not be available, researchers should make every attempt to find a suitable proxy variable which measures (at least to some extent) a perceived threat to American culture from foreigners, perhaps with a general variable measuring general support for multiculturalism.

Second, these findings contribute to the debate between the "symbolic racism" (Sears et al. 1980, 1997; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000) and "principled objector" (Sniderman and Piazza 1995; Sniderman, Crosby, and Howell 2000) camps in explaining support for racial public policies. The key argument in this debate has been whether individuals oppose pro-black policies (like welfare or affirmative action) simply because of racial prejudice, or instead, out of concerns for the proper role of government intervention in spending and social policy. The weight of the evidence seems to support the contention that "modern" or "symbolic" racism accounts for most of the variation in

racial public policy support, although Sniderman and his colleagues continue to vehemently disagree, citing principled philosophical objections to racial public policy preferences. Indeed, recent studies on symbolic racism (Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000; Tarman and Sears 2005) show that coefficients representing ideological conservatism do not completely lose their significance in models predicting racial policy attitudes, even when symbolic racism is included.

This dissertation has applied the theories and expectations of this debate to help explain support for Latino public policies (or more specifically, immigrant-related public policies). These findings provide evidence in favor of both perspectives. The symbolic racism argument is that personal aversion to blacks no longer is based on opinions of biological inferiority, but rather that blacks do not conform to traditional American values of the Protestant work ethic and self-discipline. In a way, the nativism argument is similar – some may hold negative opinions of immigrants because they do not conform to traditional American customs or values like speaking English, belonging to a Protestant religious denomination, or participating in one's democracy. This dissertation has provided evidence that some Americans oppose pro-immigrant policies for all three key reasons: nativism, racism, and principled political conservatism. All three must be recognized in any comprehensive explanation of support for Latino public policy preferences.

Third, we have observed a great deal of heterogeneity in the nativist and immigration policy attitudes of racial minorities: Latinos and African-Americans. Most analyses of racial public policy preferences account for racial minorities with a straight-forward dummy variable, assuming that all (or most) Latinos or African-Americans will monolithically feel the same on a given issue. This dissertation has shown that this is an overly simplistic view of things, and that, ideally, each racial sub-group should be analyzed separately to uncover the differences and similarities of support for racial policy preferences among these different groups.

Fourth, these results would argue that psychological traits are important in driving racial policy attitudes and should be included more routinely as independent variables in predictive multivariate models. While measures for authoritarianism, social trust, and "Big Five" personality characteristics (like emotional instability) are not often included in public opinion surveys, every effort should be made to include them where available, and to acknowledge the possible effect of their omission where not available. Further, researchers should seek to include relevant psychological measures when designing survey questionnaires, as they are essential to understanding the antecedents of socio-political attitudes in the American public.

Implications for Citizens and Policy-Makers

These findings also carry implications for members of the American public as they seek to contribute to public discourse on appropriate government policies dealing with immigrants and immigration levels. These findings also carry implications for policy-makers as they write and shape government legislation on the matter.

First, pro-immigrant activists should not merely assume that their opponents are purely anti-Latino bigots or racists. There are, of course, those who are motivated out of negative racial attitudes, but there are also many who have principled concerns about the effect of immigration on the nation's economy, the ability to afford funding increased welfare spending that accompanies increased immigration to the United States, or concerns about national security. Pro-immigrant supporters would do well to give their opponents the benefit of the doubt and also give appropriate attention to their concerns (when they are not racially motivated) and adjust their arguments accordingly.

Second, anti-immigrant activists, for their part, should be willing to admit that racism and nativism often *do* drive more restrictive immigration preferences. To continue pretending that everyone in their camp has only the noblest of motivations is naïve, to say the least. Anti-immigrant activists, then, should make an effort to shape and tailor their

arguments (as well as their own attitudes) to avoid prejudiced or racial motivations of any kind, instead focusing on the more legitimate concerns to the economy and national security. They should loudly condemn their colleagues who do make racist or bigoted justifications for opposing increased immigration or for proposals to provide a pathway to citizenship for those immigrants already in the United States.

There are also important implications for policy-makers. As of the time of this writing, the Obama administration has sent signals that it intends to move forward with comprehensive immigration reform legislation sometime during 2010. It was shown in Chapters 3 and 4 that the perceptions that immigrants harm the economy and take American jobs is an important independent predictor of both nativist attitudes and conservative immigration policy preferences. This would suggest that, should the Obama administration wish to garner public support for an immigration reform bill, they might consider pushing such legislation only *after* the current economic recession is over. Alternatively, they must make a concerted effort to address the economic concerns of the American public in any reform legislation proposal. Indeed, these findings suggest that high unemployment figures and the shortage of job openings in the United States may hamstring public support for any immigration reform plan.

Additionally, the findings of this dissertation would suggest that, should the Obama administration or Congress decide to act on a comprehensive immigration bill, they should be sure to address the various motives of opposition to their efforts, either in the bill itself or in their public persuasion efforts. In addition to addressing the economic consequences of the bill, they will also have to speak to the cultural consequences of immigration reform. It has been shown in this dissertation that approximately half of the United States public holds a nativist concern about threats to a distinctly American way life from foreign influence and foreigners. Thus, government leaders will somehow need to address these concerns if they wish to gain public support for this bill. This might

include provisions to help immigrants more quickly assimilate into American culture (perhaps increased funding for English-learning community courses).

Toward a Solution: Can We "Temper" Nativism?

One cannot use the word "solution" without implying that a problem exists. This, in turn, would imply that nativism is a negative thing, normatively-speaking. The evidence presented in this dissertation (see Chapter 5) suggests that nativism is not considered to be a socially unacceptable attitude by many Americans. These individuals would likely argue that wanting to protect their traditional American culture from foreign influence is, in fact, a very "positive" thing.

However, there are also many who would argue that nativism is not a noble opinion, but rather something that should be denounced. Linda Bosniak (1997), in fact, argues that one cannot call something "nativist" without simultaneously condemning it. We have seen in this dissertation that nativism is often provoked by anti-Hispanic racism, and to many Americans nativism carries strong racial overtones. Additionally, nativism is commonly viewed in an unfavorable light in the historic sense, as there is common agreement that the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Chinese Exclusion Act, and the anti-Catholic populism of the late 19th century were not chapters in American history of which we should be proud.

Assuming that we adopt the latter position and identify nativism as something to be resisted, the question then arises: what can be done to "temper" nativism in contemporary American society? Based on the findings of this dissertation, a cynic might reply: "very little." Consider that nativism has existed in some form or another since the beginning of the American republic. Anti-French sentiments during the Adams administration ran rampant. The Chinese, Irish, Germans, Japanese, and now Hispanics have, at one point or another, been on the receiving end of nativist hostility. Indeed, as John Higham put it, "from the Garden of Eden to [the present day], no age or society

seems wholly free from unfavorable opinions on outsiders" (1955). Because nativism has perpetually existed throughout history, it seems unlikely that such a perspective can be eliminated within a single generation, or even several centuries.

Cynics might also point to the results found in Chapter 3, where it was shown that nativism is primarily the result of personality traits such as authoritarianism and social trust. These personality characteristics are formed at an early age and are relatively stable throughout the life-span (Digman 1990, 432-434; Costa and McCrae 1988). If authoritarianism and distrust cannot be eliminated, it would suggest that nativism cannot be totally eliminated either. It could be argued that nativism and the fear of outsiders is simply part of the human condition. If this is indeed the case, there is little hope for tempering, let along eliminating, nativism in contemporary American society. Robert Altemeyer, one of the foremost researchers on right-wing authoritarianism, said as much in one of his summary works on the subject (Altemeyer 2007, Chapter 7). He argues that it is very unlikely that authoritarians can be "converted", and so he recommends a more productive strategy of trying to understand the authoritarian point of view and then to politely, but constructively, offer alternative viewpoints, especially in the public sphere.

Optimists, however, can certainly take heart with some of the findings presented in this dissertation. For example, personal education has routinely been shown in previous studies to exert a "tempering" effect on conservative immigration attitudes. This dissertation has shown that higher levels of education are associated with significantly lower levels of nativism. Unlike personality characteristics (which are relatively stable), education is something that *can* be changed in America. Making higher education more accessible and promoting post-high school education is one important thing that society could do to lower levels of nativism in the United States. Promoting education would also further the goal of maintaining American competitiveness in a globalized economy.

Furthermore, this dissertation has presented evidence in favor of the social contact hypothesis (Welch et al. 2001; Oliver and Wong 2003). When individuals have more

interaction with foreigners and immigrants, they become less hostile toward them and individual levels of nativism correspondingly decrease (at least, this is the case among Anglos and Latinos). Government and social institutions alike could conceivably create opportunities for increased interaction between natives and foreigners in the United States. Colleges and universities could allocate more resources to study abroad and international exchange programs that would promote more interaction with foreigners. Local governments could provide more opportunities for social interaction between people from various neighborhoods in a community, especially from those neighborhoods where immigrants tend to be concentrated. Churches and synagogues could form more racially integrated congregations and promote inter-racial service and volunteer opportunities. The list goes on.

Finally, it was shown in Chapter 5 that most people have at least a slight level of implicit nativism, a sub-conscious preference for a traditional version of American culture. These implicit preferences are formed early in life and it has been shown that they have an independent effect on immigration policy attitudes. A concerted effort could potentially be made by government, institutions, and parents to provide an environment where small children are presented with a more "inclusive" version of American culture. If children are taught from the beginning to value and appreciate the contributions of all cultures to the American social fabric, they might potentially develop lower levels of implicit nativism and thus also exhibit less explicit nativism as they grow and develop into participating American citizens.

Conclusion

Despite the future potentials of "tempering" nativism in the United States, nativism remains a very real and prevalent attitude in American society at this point. Citizens and elected officials alike must recognize and respond to this fact if they hope to effect any change in the status of immigrants or influence immigrant-related legislation

and policies in local, state, and national governments. Hopefully, the findings of this dissertation can help with this goal, as it has shed some light on the nature and effects of nativism in the American public. Further research on this topic is certainly warranted, as it will help continue to illuminate our understanding of this important issue. For the way with which we as a nation respond to newcomers and foreigners will strongly influence how effective America will be as a world leader and global citizen of the 21st century.

Table 8.1. Determinants of Nativism: Anglos, Latinos, and African-Americans

Independent Variable	**Anglos**	**Latinos**	**Blacks**
Economic competition	+	Ø / +	+
Context - % foreign-born Latino	Ø / -	-	+
Context - % Latino		+	
Context - % black			Ø
Anti-Hispanic affect	++		+
Latino panethnicity		Ø	
American acculturation		+	
Country of origin – Mexico		-	
Racial alienation			+
Linked fate / racial solidarity		-	
% Nativist	50.8%	45.9%	56.8%

Note: Summary results for Anglos from Chapter 3 of this dissertation, Chapter 6 for Latinos and Chapter 7 for African-Americans.

Table 8.2. Determinants of Conservative Immigration Policy Attitudes: Anglos, Latinos, and African-Americans

Independent Variable	Anglos	Latinos	Blacks
Nativism	+	++	+
Economic competition	Ø / +	-	+
Social context - % foreign-born Latino	Ø / -	Ø	Ø
Anti-Hispanic affect	++		+
Conservative ideology	+	Ø	+
Republican partisanship	+	+	Ø
Racial alienation			+
Linked fate / racial solidarity			Ø
% agree that undocumented immigrants must eventually return to country of origin	58.7%	26.6%	53.0%
% agree that future immigration into U.S. should decrease	36.9%	30.5%	49.3%

Note: Summary results for Anglos from Chapter 4 of this dissertation, Chapter 6 for Latinos and Chapter 7 for African-Americans.

APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 3 VARIABLE CODING

Data sources

This appendix contains a more detailed explanation of how the variables in the "2005 Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey" (Howard, Gibson, and Stolle 2005) were coded for the analysis found in Chapter 3.

Question wording

Racial prejudice. This is an index of questions based on negative stereotypes of Hispanics: "I find it difficult to understand the customs and ways of Hispanics."; "It is hard to imagine ever being friends with a Hispanic."; "More than most groups, Hispanics are likely to engage in crime."; "Hispanics are untrustworthy."; "Hispanics are selfish, and only look after the interests of their group."; "Generally speaking, Hispanics are too lazy for their own good."

Each survey question is thus incorporated into a single index variable with each component variable given equal weighting. The final variable is a 1-5 Likert scale index with higher values corresponding with higher degrees of prejudice.

Economic competition. This variable is measured by a question asking for the respondent's evaluation of their personal economic situation: "Which … comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?" The response categories are: "living comfortably on present income, coping on present income, finding it difficult on present income, finding it very difficult on present income." This is thus a four-point ordinal scale with higher values indicating more difficult economic situations.

Classical Liberalism. The classical liberalism variable is an index of three separate variables measuring the respondent's commitment to the philosophy of classical liberalism over multiculturalism. The three variables that make up this index are: "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions."; ""It is

better for a country if there are a variety of religions among its people."; "Of all the different philosophies that exist in the world there is probably only one that is correct."

The responses to each variable are on a five-point Likert scale and the three responses were averaged with equal weight to create a single 1-5 scale measure. Higher values indicate disagreement with questions 1 and 3 and agreement with question 2.

Immigrant inflow is the % change in the foreign-born Latino population in a respondent's state from 1990-2006 as per the U.S. Census and related American Community Survey.

Social context is the percent foreign-born individuals from Latin America in a respondent's state as per the 2000 U.S. Census.

Nationalism is measured by an index variable constructed from the following two survey items: "Requiring that high school teachers defend America's policies in order to promote loyalty to our country" (this is a 4-point Likert scale of agreement) and "When America is at war, people should not criticize the government" (this variable is a 5-point Likert scale of agreement.) Note that these are not simple patriotism measures along the lines of "it makes me proud to be called an American." De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) found that nationalism, but not patriotism, leads to more negative evaluation of immigrants in the United States. They argue that nationalism variables must capture a feeling beyond simple affection for one's country, but involving a more chauvinistic belief in the superiority and infallibility of one's country. This attitude is captured reasonably well by the variables described above.

Patriotism is constructed from the following two survey items: "It makes me proud to be called an American" (a 5-point Likert scale of agreement) and "Being an American is a very important part of how I see myself" (this is also a 5-point Likert scale of agreement). Both the nationalism and patriotism variables are thus a 0-1 scale variable with each component variable given equal weighting. Higher values indicate a greater degree of nationalism or patriotism, respectively.

Authoritarianism is an index of responses to the following variables which are based on previous measures of authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1998): “What our country needs is one political party which will rule the country.”; “The party that gets the support of the majority ought not to have to share political power with the political minority.”; “What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.”; “Most people who don’t get ahead just don’t have enough willpower.”; “Our country would be better off if we just outlaw all political parties.”; “A few strong leaders could make this country better.”; “An insult to your honor should never be forgotten.”; “The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.”

The responses to each variable are given on various Likert scales of different sizes and the eight variables were incorporated into a single 1-5 index variable with each variable weighted equally. Higher values indicate agreement with the component variable questions. The Cronbach’s alpha statistic is 0.68 among non-Hispanic white citizens.

Emotional instability, as measured by feelings of worry, anxiety, and insecurity, is an index of responses to the following variables: “It is usually unwise to trust people before getting to know them.”; “No matter where you are, it is important to be cautious to avoid being harmed.”; “Something really terrible can happen to any of us at any given time of day.”

The responses to each variable are given on various Likert scales of different lengths and the three variables were incorporated into a single 0-4 index variable with each variable weighted equally. Higher values indicate agreement with the component variable questions.

Social trust is an index of the following variables: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (This is the (Uslaner 2002)measurement of social trust.); “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try

to be fair?"; "Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?"

The responses to each variable are given on various Likert scales of ten points each and the three variables were incorporated into a single 0-10 index variable with each variable weighted equally. Higher values indicate agreement with the component variable questions.

APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 4 VARIABLE CODING

Data sources

The primary data source for this chapter is the "2006 Immigration Survey." Two additional data sources were used for the variables featured in this chapter's analyses. The first is the "2007 Values Update Survey," a nation-wide telephone survey administered by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. This poll was in the field from December 12, 2008 through January 9, 2007 and has an N of 2,007. The second is the "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" survey conducted for the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University (Howard, Gibson, and Stolle 2005). This door-to-door survey was conducted throughout 36 American states from May 16 through July 19, 2005 and has an N of 1,001 adults.

Question wording: Pew 2006 Immigration Survey, selected independent variables

National economic perception: "How would you rate economic conditions in this country today… as excellent, good, only fair, or poor?" Higher values correspond with poorer economic evaluations.

Social context – percent foreign-born: Amount of foreign-born individuals living in the respondent's zip code, as indicated in the 2000 U.S. Census.

Social context – foreign-born rate of change: This was calculated as the factor increase in the amount of foreign-born individuals living in the respondent's state from 1990 to 2006, according to the 1990 U.S. Census and 2006 American Community Survey which is administered by the U.S. Census Bureau. While a more localized geographic area would be desirable, such information is not available from the 1990 Census.

Anti-Hispanic affect: "Would you say your overall opinion of Hispanics is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?"

Nativism: "Some people say that our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. Would you say you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with this?"

Question wording: Pew 2006 Immigration Survey, dependent variables

Prospective immigration levels: "Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?"

Immigrant worker policies: This variable was constructed from a series of three questions: (1) "Should illegal immigrants be required to go home, or should they be granted some kind of legal status that allows them to stay here?" If the respondent answers "required to go home" they are then asked: (1a) "Should it be possible for some illegal immigrants to remain in the U.S. under a temporary worker program under the condition that they would eventually go home, or don't you think so?" If the respondent answers "granted some kind of legal status" they are then asked: (1b) "Should they be allowed to stay only as temporary workers who must eventually return to their home countries, or should it be possible for them to stay in the U.S. permanently?" From these responses, a three-level ordinal variable was created, assuming that the reform measures could be conceptualized as being more or less "liberal", mass deportation being least liberal and earned legalization being most liberal. Value of "0" – Respondent favors simple deportation (answered "required to go home" in question 1 and "don't think so" to question 1a). Value of "1" – Respondent favors a guest-worker program (answered "required to go home" in question 1 and "temporary worker program" in question 1a; answered "granted some kind of legal status" in question 1 and "temporary worker program … eventually return" in question 1a). Value of "2" – Respondent favors an earned legalization (liberal/comprehensive) program (answered "granted some kind of legal status" in question 1 and "possible for them to stay in the U.S. permanently" in question 1b).

Eligibility for social services: "Should illegal immigrants who are in the U.S. be eligible for social services provided by state and local governments, or should they not be eligible?"

Birthright citizenship: "Would you favor changing the Constitution so that the parents must be legal residents of the U.S. in order for their newborn child to be a citizen, or should the Constitution be left as it is?"

Support for the Minutemen: "There are now some groups of people called 'Minutemen' who are looking for illegal immigrants along the Mexican border in order to report them to authorities. Do you approve or disapprove of what these groups are doing, or haven't you heard anything about them?"

Question wording: Pew 2007 Values Update Survey

Nativism: "The growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten traditional American customs and values." "Please tell me if you completely agree with it, mostly agree with it, mostly DISagree with it, or completely disagree with it."

Immigrant workers: "One proposal would allow undocumented immigrants who have been in the U.S. for several years to gain legal working status and the possibility of citizenship in the future. Would you favor or oppose this proposal?"

Border fence: "Would you favor or oppose building a fence along 700 miles of the border with Mexico?"

Question wording: 2005 Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey

Nativism: "Would you say that America's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?" This is a ten-point Likert scale variable with higher values indicating an increasing agreement that America's culture life is undermined by people coming here from other countries.

Official English: “For each of the following statements please tell me how important you think it is in deciding whether someone born and raised outside of the United States should be able to live here. Use a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means extremely unimportant and 10 means extremely important. How important should it be for them to be able to speak English?”

Prospective immigration levels: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?”

APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 4 BLOCK RECURSIVE MODELS – FULL REPORTING OF STATISTICAL RESULTS

Table C.1 Block Recursive Model Predicting Support for Requiring All Undocumented Immigrants to Immediately Leave the Country (corresponds to Table 4.5)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
Female	-0.152 (0.136)	-0.098 (0.132)	-0.054 (0.151)
Age (older +)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)
Education (higher +)	-0.154*** (0.035)	-0.064 (0.053)	-0.027 (0.054)
Income (higher +)	0.023 (0.039)	0.037 (0.037)	0.043 (0.040)
Economic threat	0.180* (0.086)	0.235** (0.086)	0.254** (0.099)
Church attendance (higher +)	-0.043# (0.025)	-0.118** (0.038)	-0.132*** (0.037)
Catholic	0.015 (0.150)	0.088 (0.131)	0.063 (0.152)
Jewish	-0.340** (0.421)	-0.632* (0.467)	-0.624# (0.452)
Latter-day Saint	-1.321 (0.507)	-1.238 (0.565)	-1.082 (0.569)
% Foreign-born Latino	-1.539 (1.069)	-1.168 (0.961)	-0.807 (0.926)
Foreign-born Latino change rate	0.060 (0.043)	0.057 (0.045)	0.076# (0.044)
Anti-Hispanic affect		0.727*** (0.105)	0.559*** (0.095)
Ideology (liberal +)		-0.380** (0.124)	-0.308* (0.129)
Republican		0.226 (0.199)	0.180 (0.244)
Independent		0.166 (0.156)	0.113 (0.165)
Nativism			0.450*** (0.101)
Constant	0.452 (0.442)	-1.282* (0.649)	-2.160** (0.701)
Pseudo R-squared	0.027	0.090	0.111
N	1,446	1,414	1,394

Table C.1 — continued

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Table C.2. Block Recursive Model Predicting Support for Making Undocumented Immigrants Ineligible to Receive Benefits from State and Local Governments (corresponds to Table 4.6)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
Female	-0.187* (0.084)	-0.067 (0.089)	-0.035 (0.099)
Age (older +)	0.008 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)
Education (higher +)	-0.228*** (0.043)	-0.118 (0.077)	-0.076 (0.079)
Income (higher +)	0.081** (0.030)	0.081** (0.032)	0.091** (0.031)
Economic threat	-0.236# (0.126)	0.021 (0.092)	0.014 (0.073)
Church attendance (higher +)	0.049 (0.035)	-0.086* (0.042)	-0.086* (0.042)
Catholic	0.307* (0.148)	0.377# (0.197)	0.312 (0.225)
Jewish	-1.449*** (0.418)	-1.100* (0.532)	-0.983* (0.471)
Latter-day Saint	0.908** (0.353)	0.521 (0.422)	0.499 (0.393)
% Foreign-born Latino	-3.523*** (0.514)	-3.250*** (0.731)	-3.213*** (0.906)
Foreign-born Latino change rate	-0.031 (0.059)	-0.050 (0.061)	-0.022 (0.063)
Anti-Hispanic affect		0.494*** (0.121)	0.348** (0.136)
Ideology (liberal +)		-0.706*** (0.111)	-0.607*** (0.111)
Republican		0.594*** (0.097)	0.577*** (0.089)
Independent		0.077 (0.169)	0.077 (0.175)
Nativism			0.457*** (0.111)
Constant	1.329 0.522	0.738 0.564	-0.300 0.779
Pseudo R-squared	0.064	0.154	0.175
N	1,508	1,474	1,450

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Table C.2 — continued

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Table C.3. Block Recursive Model Predicting Support for Amending U.S. Constitution to End Birthright Citizenship for Children of Undocumented Immigrants (corresponds to Table 4.7)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
Female	-0.097 (0.146)	0.002 (0.157)	0.041 (0.159)
Age (older +)	0.009* (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)
Education (higher +)	-0.205*** (0.043)	-0.146*** (0.038)	-0.092* (0.038)
Income (higher +)	0.009 (0.026)	0.023 (0.027)	0.028 (0.025)
Economic threat	-0.073 (0.062)	0.003 (0.068)	0.001 (0.069)
Church attendance (higher +)	-0.008 (0.035)	-0.059 (0.040)	-0.079 (0.048)
Catholic	0.089 (0.097)	0.114 (0.102)	0.105 (0.093)
Jewish	-0.690 (0.456)	-0.485 (0.517)	-0.296 (0.490)
Latter-day Saint	0.400 (0.280)	0.238 (0.366)	0.322 (0.343)
% Foreign-born Latino	-1.137 (1.056)	-0.785 (0.950)	-0.217 (0.991)
Foreign-born Latino change rate	0.044 (0.031)	0.052 (0.035)	0.087* (0.043)
Anti-Hispanic affect		0.610*** (0.115)	0.409*** (0.122)
Ideology (liberal +)		-0.278*** (0.047)	-0.192*** (0.034)
Republican		0.344* (0.160)	0.291# (0.169)
Independent		0.274 (0.169)	0.258 (0.190)
Nativism			0.580*** (0.095)
Constant	0.311 0.435	-1.167 0.469	-2.427 0.448
Pseudo R-squared	0.028	0.073	0.110
N	1,518	1,488	1,462

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Table C.3 — continued

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

Table C.4. Predicting Support for Requiring All Undocumented Immigrants to Immediately Leave the Country, by Education (corresponds to Table 4.9)

	Less than a 4-year college degree	4-year college degree or more
	B (SE)	B (SE)
Female	-0.033 (0.213)	-0.127 (0.235)
Age (older +)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.012# (0.006)
Income (higher +)	0.062 (0.046)	0.069 (0.062)
Economic threat	0.207* (0.094)	0.323* (0.136)
Church attendance (higher +)	-0.154*** (0.044)	-0.043 (0.120)
Catholic	0.073 (0.209)	-0.030 (0.202)
Jewish	-2.004*** (0.502)	-0.137 (0.718)
Latter-day Saint	-0.880 (0.594)	-0.236 (0.551)
% Foreign-born Latino	-0.893 (0.875)	0.097 (2.069)
Foreign-born Latino change rate	0.074 (0.046)	0.130 (0.085)
Anti-Hispanic affect	0.586*** (0.103)	0.381 (0.244)
Ideology (liberal +)	-0.238# (0.134)	-0.471** (0.159)
Republican	0.120 (0.284)	0.112 (0.218)
Independent	0.066 (0.278)	0.066 (0.300)
Nativism	0.384*** (0.109)	0.559*** (0.159)
Constant	-2.189** (0.748)	-2.796*** (0.855)
Pseudo R-squared	0.100	0.098
N	713	681

$p \leq 0.10$, * $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

Source: 2006 Pew Immigration Survey

Table C.4 — continued

Note: Limited to non-Hispanic white native-born U.S. citizen respondents. Standard errors are sample weighted and clustered by geographic region.

APPENDIX D: CHAPTER 5 VARIABLE CODING

Data sources

This chapter analyzed data collected from the 2009 "Personality and Immigration Attitudes" survey conducted by the author. This survey was conducted from October 12 through December 11, 2009, and sampled undergraduate, graduate, and professional students at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa. Respondents were recruited for this survey via a mass-distribution email that was sent to all students at the institution. Incentive to participate was provided in the form of the option to be entered into a random drawing for a $50 prize upon completion of the survey. A follow-up reminder was sent three weeks after the initial recruitment email was distributed. A total of 834 individuals completed the survey.

Question wording: 2009 Personality and Immigration Attitudes Survey

Immigration policy preference index: This is an additive index constructed from responses to the following questions: "Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?", "Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be regarding ILLEGAL immigrants currently residing in the United States? Should the government: 1) deport all undocumented immigrants 2) allow undocumented immigrants to remain in the U.S. as guest workers for a limited time 3) allow undocumented immigrants to become citizens if they meet criteria like learning English and paying their back taxes 4) allow undocumented immigrants to become permanent residents with no requirements?", "Should illegal immigrants who are in the U.S. be eligible for social services provided by state and local governments, or should they not be eligible?", "Should the children of illegal immigrants who are in the U.S. be permitted to attend public schools, or don't you think so?", "Would you favor changing the Constitution so that the parents must be legal residents of the U.S. in order

for their newborn child to be a citizen, or should the Constitution be left as it is?", "Would you favor or oppose building a fence along 700 miles of the border with Mexico?", "Do you favor or oppose bilingual education programs in public schools?", and "Would you favor or oppose making English the official language of the United States?" Each question was recoded to a 0-1 scale (higher values corresponding with more conservative preferences) and averaged over the number of questions that respondents gave answers to. When this variable was used in the t-tests, it was split into a dichotomous variable at the 0.5 mark (71% liberal preferences and 29% conservative preferences). The Cronbach's alpha statistic for these eight items is 0.79.

Social desirability index: This is an additive index constructed from responses to the following questions: "Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. 1) I like to gossip at times. 2) There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 3) I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 4) I always try to practice what I preach. 5) I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 6) At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. 7) There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 8) I never resent being asked to return a favor. 9) I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 10) I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings." Each question was recoded so that higher values corresponding with agreement to the socially acceptable answer in each case, then added and averaged over the number of questions to which respondents gave answers, creating an index on a 0-1 scale. When this variable was used in the t-tests, it was split into a dichotomous variable at the 0.5 mark (54.7% not afraid to express socially undesirable views, 45.3% afraid to do so). The Cronbach's alpha statistic for these ten items is 0.65.

Explicit nativism: "Some people say that our American way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. Would you say you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, or completely disagree with this?" (Higher values = more nativism.)

Economic threat: "Do you think the immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?" (Higher values = take American jobs.)

Anti-Hispanic affect: "Would you say your overall opinion of Hispanics is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?" (Higher values = more unfavorable.)

Percent Foreign-born Latino: This is the percent foreign-born from Latin America (both citizens and non-citizens) in the zip code where the respondent indicated that they had "lived the longest", as per the 2006 American Community Survey. This variable was chosen instead of their current location because the transient students in the sample are more likely to have been affected by the social context of their home areas as opposed to their recent and temporary educational location. Also, the vast majority of respondents lived in the same zip code, creating little variation in the variable measures for the contextual data of their current location.

Ideology: "In general, would you describe your political views as… very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?" (Higher values = more conservative.)

Partisanship: "In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a… strong Republican, weak Republican, Independent, but lean Republican, Independent, Independent, but lean Democrat, weak Democrat, strong Democrat, no preference, or some other party?" From these responses, dummy variables were created for Republican (strong, weak, and Independent lean Republican) and Independent (pure Independents).

Gender: "Are you male, female," or don't know/refused?

Age: "What is your age?" (open-ended)

Education: "What is the last grade or class that you completed in school? 1) High school graduate (Grade 12 or GED certificate) 2) Technical, trade, or vocational school AFTER high school 3) Some college, no 4-year degree (including associate degree) 4) College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree) 5) Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college (e.g., toward a master's Degree or Ph.D.; law or medical school)" (Higher values = more education.)

Church attendance: "Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services... more than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, seldom, or never?" (Higher values = attend more often.)

APPENDIX E – IMPLICIT NATIVISM IAT PROCEDURE

The implicit nativism test procedure was designed using the basic flower-insect IAT template included with the computer program "Inquisit version 3.0.3.2" distributed by Millisecond Software (http://www.millisecond.com). Two separate Inquisit scripts were used in the survey, one containing the IAT procedure and the other containing the survey questions. The scripts were hosted on Millisecond Software's servers and data was collected online rather than through laboratory computers. Although this resulted in a self-selection effect in the respondents who participated, it also facilitated the completion of over 800 surveys in a relatively short time-frame.

After viewing the consent language at the beginning of the survey, respondents were presented with the following instructions:

> Put your middle or index fingers on the E and I keys of your keyboard. Pictures or words representing 'American culture' and 'Latino-American culture' will appear one-by-one in the middle of the screen. When the item belongs to a category on the left, press the E key; when the item belongs to a category on the right, press the I key. Items belong to only one category. For example, a picture of the American flag corresponds with 'American culture' while a picture of the American and Mexican flags together represents 'Latino-American culture.' If you make an error in matching the words with the images, an X will appear - fix the error by hitting the other key. This is a timed sorting task. GO AS FAST AS YOU CAN while making as few mistakes as possible. Going too slow or making too many errors will result in an uninterpretable score. This task will take about 5 minutes to complete.

Respondents were then required to press either the "E" or "I" keys to sort the images (as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2) into the categories of either American culture or Latino-American culture. After this "block" of sorting trials, the categories were replaced with "Good" and "Bad" and respondents were required to sort the following words into each category: "Marvelous", "Superb", "Pleasure", "Beautiful", "Joyful", "Glorious", "Lovely", "Wonderful", "Tragic", "Horrible", "Agony", "Painful", "Terrible", "Awful", "Humiliate", and "Nasty".

In all, respondents completed seven separate "blocks" of sorting trials, with each block containing a different set of category combinations. The seven blocks proceeded as follows:

Table E.1. Nativism IAT Procedure Blocks of Sorting Trials

Block	Number of trials	Items assigned to the left-key response	Items assigned to the right-key response
1	20	American culture	Latino-American culture
2	20	Pleasant words	Unpleasant words
3	20	American culture + pleasant words	Latino-American culture + unpleasant words
4	40	American culture + pleasant words	Latino-American culture + unpleasant words
5	40	Latino-American culture	American culture
6	20	Latino-American culture + pleasant words	American culture + unpleasant words
7	40	Latino-American culture + pleasant words	American culture + unpleasant words

After survey respondents completed the IAT procedure, they were shown the debriefing language, as well as their IAT score. They were then asked to complete a series of explicit survey measurements on their opinions toward immigration policy, explicit nativism, attitudes toward Hispanics, various demographic characteristics, and others. Respondents were asked to provide their email address if (and only if) they desired to be entered into a drawing for a $50 cash prize for completing the survey.

After the two-month data collection period had ended, the author downloaded the survey data from the Millisecond Software website. The IAT implicit nativism score was constructed according to the "D_biep" format as described in Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek (2003). The SPSS script to construct the D_biep measure is available from Dr. Greenwald's website at: http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/iat_materials.htm.

One potential concern is that because of the way the procedure is designed, respondents tend to demonstrate a bias toward the combination first presented to them (in

the case above, "American culture" + "Good"). Nosek, et al. (2005), however, demonstrate that completing 40 trials in Block 5 tends to compensate reasonably well for this effect. Furthermore, in this particular procedure, respondents were randomly sorted into two different groups. The first group received the procedure with the blocks ordered as displayed above. The second group switched Blocks 1 and 5 and Blocks 3-4 and 6-7. Additionally, there was only a 0.06 difference in IAT scores between the two groups (t-test significant at p=0.08). This, combined with the fact that nearly 80% of respondents (including those who received the "Latino-American culture" + "Good" combination first) received a pro-American culture IAT score, provides evidence that the order of combined tasks does not represent much of a concern for this study.

Another potential concern arises due to the order of the implicit vs. explicit measurements. On one hand, completing the IAT procedure first and receiving a score that one does not like or agree with may potentially produce biased explicit measures as the individual attempts to compensate for their undesired IAT score. On the other hand, completing the self-report measures first may prime individuals toward certain opinions and mental conditions which may bias their IAT score. In this particular survey, all respondents received the IAT score first, followed by the self-report survey questionnaire. Based on extensive testing of the issue, Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007) argue and cite studies which demonstrate that the effects of such ordering concerns are minimal. Furthermore, the fact that nearly 25% of survey respondents reported explicit nativist attitudes (among a sample that is disproportionately young and better educated), even after receiving an implicit nativist score, shows that compensation for undesired IAT scores might not be much of a concern in this instance.

For a comprehensive treatment of the design and procedure of the IAT, please consult Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) and Nosek, Greewald, and Banaji (2007). To get a better idea of how IATs operate, please also consider taking an IAT for yourself: https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/takeatest.html.

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