
Theses and Dissertations

Spring 2010

Unpacking descriptive representation: examining race and electoral representation in the American states

Christopher Jude Clark
University of Iowa

Copyright 2010 Christopher Jude Clark II

This dissertation is available at Iowa Research Online: <http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/478>

Recommended Citation

Clark, Christopher Jude. "Unpacking descriptive representation: examining race and electoral representation in the American states." PhD (Doctor of Philosophy) thesis, University of Iowa, 2010.
<http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/478>.

Follow this and additional works at: <http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd>



Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

UNPACKING DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION: EXAMINING RACE AND
ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES

by

Christopher Jude Clark II

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa

May 2010

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Caroline J. Tolbert

ABSTRACT

This research aims to understand how black descriptive representation comes about and why black descriptive representation matters, at the state level. What distinguishes this research from previous works is its simultaneous analysis of different forms of descriptive representation at the subnational level, rather than in Congress or at the local level. This research argues black descriptive representation can take four different forms: dyadic, collective, parity and caucus. An important and understudied mechanism for black descriptive representation is the formation of state legislative black caucuses and their potential to influence policy and behavior. Subnational descriptive representation need not have negative tradeoffs for black substantive policy representation, as has been found with minority representation in Congress (Lublin 1997). Black representation is akin to a diamond, and looking at it from only one perspective is similar to judging a diamond only by its color, instead of also judging it by its hardness and fluorescence, as well as its clarity, shape, and size. In short, this work recognizes the multifaceted nature of black representation in the states.

This research defines a theory of black descriptive representation as taking four different forms: dyadic, collective, parity, and caucus. Dyadic descriptive representation is the one-to-one relationship between a legislator and a voter, and heretofore it has received the most scholarly attention. This one-to-one relationship may occur between a minority citizen and their elected representation in Congress, in the state legislature, or in local government (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004), but this work focuses on dyadic descriptive representation in Congress. Although some argue that dyadic descriptive representation leads to better policy outcomes for blacks (Whitby 1997; Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004), and encourages blacks to engage in politics (Gay 2001; Gay 2002; Tate 2003; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Griffin and Keane 2006), others argue that dyadic descriptive representation is not only unnecessary to implement policies beneficial to blacks (Swain 1993), but also that it may

actually lead to poorer policy outcomes for the group (Lublin 1997). That is, there is a tradeoff between increasing the number of black representatives (descriptive representation) and passing policies beneficial to the group (substantive representation).

Collective descriptive representation is the relationship that an individual has with elected officials with whom they share a group identity. For blacks, collective descriptive representation may include the percentage of black lawmakers in the state legislature or Congress. An argument developed in this research is that collective descriptive representation in the state legislature, a topic rarely studied by scholars of race and ethnicity, may maximize both descriptive and substantive representation, and as a result, it may encourage black political behavior and lead to better policy outcomes for the group.

Both parity and caucus descriptive representation are extensions of collective descriptive representation in the state legislature. Parity descriptive representation examines the extent to which the percentage of blacks in the state legislature is equal to a state's black population and is a measure of racial equity in electoral representation. Caucus descriptive representation is the formal organization of black lawmakers within a state legislature. Almost no published research has empirically studied legislative black caucuses in the states (for an exception see King-Meadows and Schaller 2006).

Since the four forms of descriptive representation are distinct, the expectation is that they be caused by different factors. Moreover, this research builds on previous work by measuring and defining collective descriptive representation in all fifty states and is the first research to argue that state legislative black caucuses shape political behavior.

Abstract Approved:

Thesis Supervisor

Title and Department

Date

UNPACKING DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION: EXAMINING RACE AND
ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES

by

Christopher Jude Clark II

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in Political Science in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa

May 2010

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Caroline J. Tolbert

Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

PH.D. THESIS

has been approved by the Examining Committee for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science at the May 2010 Graduation.

Thesis Committee:

Caroline J. Tolbert, Thesis Supervisor

Vincent L. Hutchings

Tracy Osborn

Rene R. Rocha

Michael Hill

To Tiana and Kaya

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank a number of people for helping me reach this point. First, I want to thank Jesus for providing me with purpose, peace and perspective throughout the entire process; I would be lost without Him. Next, I want to thank my adviser, Caroline Tolbert, whose encouragement, creativity, boundless energy, and academic mentorship made this project what it is. I also want to thank my parents, Greta and Chris Sr., for their love and support over all of the years. I also want to thank my sisters, Chandra, Cherelle, and Chauntee, for their love and sense of humor, both of which have helped me throughout graduate school. I want to thank my many friends whose phone calls and emails encouraged me an umpteen number of times. Lastly, I want to thank the University of Iowa for providing me with not only a stellar education, but also enabling me to meet my beautiful wife, Tiana.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES		vi
LIST OF FIGURES		ix
CHAPTER 1	THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF BLACK DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION	1
	Introduction	1
	What We Know about Minority Descriptive Representation	7
	Theoretical Argument	12
	Multidimensions of Black Descriptive Representation in the American States	17
	Data and Methods	19
	Road Map	22
CHAPTER 2	DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AND BLACK POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT & PARTICIPATION	29
	Introduction	29
	Hypotheses and Research Design	32
	Results	36
	Discussion	40
CHAPTER 3	OBAMA, DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION, AND UNLIKELY BLACK VOTERS IN 2008	54
	Introduction	54
	Literature Review	56
	Data and Methods	59
	Results	61
	Discussion	64
CHAPTER 4	EXPLAINING COLLECTIVE DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION, 1992-2004	75
	Introduction	75
	Literature Review	76
	Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio	77
	Hypotheses and Research Design	78
	Results	81
	Discussion	82
CHAPTER 5	LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUSES IN THE AMERICAN STATES	92
	Introduction	92
	Conventional Wisdom about State Legislative Black Caucuses	95
	2009 NBCSL Annual Conference	97
	Legislative Black Caucus Influence Index	101

	Predicting Legislative Black Caucus Presence and Influence	103
	Legislative Black Caucus Influence and Black Political Behavior	106
	Conclusion	107
CHAPTER 6	EXPLAINING PARITY DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION, 1992-2004	125
	Introduction	125
	Literature Review	126
	Data and Methods	127
	Results	129
	Discussion	131
CHAPTER 7	CONCLUSION	145
	Introduction	146
	Summary of Findings	146
	Implications	148
	Discussion	150
APPENDIX A	APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 2	154
	Appendices A1-A4	154
	Appendices A5-A7	155
	Appendix A8	155
APPENDIX B	APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 3	162
	Appendices B1 and B2	162
	Appendices B3-B6	162
APPENDIX C	APPENDICES FOR CHAPTERS 4 & 6	167
APPENDIX D	APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 5	173
REFERENCES		181

LIST OF TABLES

Table		
1.1	Literature on Minority Representation	25
1.2	States Ranked by Black Population, and Parity, Dyadic, Collective, and Caucus Descriptive Representation	26
2.1	Regression Results for Knowing MC's Race	44
2.2	Regression Results for Knowing Majority Party in State Legislature	46
2.3	Regression Results for High Political Interest	48
2.4	Regression Results for Voting in 2008 Election	50
2.5	Regression Results for Approval of State Legislature	52
3.1	Distribution of Voting by Race and Likely Voter	66
3.2	Regression Results for Voting in Low Collective Descriptive Representation States	67
3.3	Regression Results for Voting in High Collective Descriptive Representation States	68
3.4	Regression Results for Voting by Unlikely Black Voters (ANES Black Subsample)	73
4.1	States Ranked by Collective Descriptive Representation	84
4.2	States Ranked by Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio	87
4.3	Regression Results for Explaining Collective Descriptive Representation	89
5.1	Founding Years for Legislative Black Caucuses	111
5.2	Seniority and Expertise of NBCSL Committee Chairs, 2009-10	113
5.3	NBCSL Committees' Representativeness and Resolutions, 2009	114
5.4	Black Caucus Index Influence in State, 2009-10	115
5.5	Legislative Black Caucus Influence Index and Democratic Majority in the State Legislature	117
5.6	States Ranked by Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio, Collective Descriptive Representation, Black Caucus Presence, and Black Caucus Influence	118

5.7	Regression Results for Legislative Black Caucus Presence and Influence in State	120
5.8	Black Caucus Influence Index and Voting for Blacks, by State	123
6.1	Parity Score and Black Population, by State	134
6.2	Black Population and the Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio, by State	137
6.3	Regression Results for Explaining Parity Descriptive Representation	139
7.1	Summary of Findings when Black Descriptive Representation is an Explanatory Variable	152
7.2	Summary of Findings when Black Descriptive Representation is a Dependent Variable	152
A1	Responses to Question on House Member's Race	156
A2	Whether Respondent Correctly Identifies House Member's Race	156
A3	Responses to Question on Majority Party in State Lower Chamber	157
A4	Whether Respondent Correctly Identifies Majority Party in State Lower Chamber	157
A5	Responses to Question on Political Interest	158
A6	Responses to Question on Voting	158
A7	Responses to Question on State Legislature Approval	159
A8	Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables	160
B1	Distribution of Responses on Voting in 2008 (ANES)	164
B2	Distribution of Responses on Voting in 2008 (CCES)	164
B3	Distribution of Respondents by Vote Frequency (ANES)	165
B4	Distribution of Respondents by Race (ANES)	165
B5	Distribution of Respondents by Voting in Primary or Caucus (CCES)	166
B6	Distribution of Respondents by Race (CCES)	166
C1	Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables for Parity and Collective Descriptive Representation, 1992 to 2004	168
C2	Years that Term Limits Impact States	171
C3	Number of Multimember Districts in State, by Decade	172

D1	Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables for Black Caucus Presence and Influence, 2009-10	174
D2	Calculating the Proportion of Black Committee Chairs and Co-Chairs, 2009-10	175
D3	Calculating the Proportion Black of the Democratic Party, 2009-10	179
D4	Proportion of Caucus Seats on NBCSL Policy Committees, 2009-10	180

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		
2.1	Dyadic Descriptive Representation, 110 th Congress	42
2.2	Collective Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures, 2006	42
2.3	Parity Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures, 2006	43
2.4	Probability of Knowing MC's Race for Blacks and Non-Blacks	45
2.5	Probability that Blacks Know the Majority Party in the State Legislature, by Empowerment Type	47
2.6	Probability of High Political Interest for Blacks and Non-Blacks, Varying Black Representation in the State Legislature	49
2.7	Probability of Voting for Blacks and Non-Blacks, Varying Black Representation in the State Legislature	51
2.8	Probability of State Legislature Approval for Non-Blacks, Varying Black Representation in the State Legislature	53
3.1	Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters, Varying Collective Descriptive Representation (ANES)	69
3.2	Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters, Varying Collective Descriptive Representation (CCES)	70
3.3	Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters who Reside Outside of the South, Varying Collective Descriptive Representation (ANES)	71
3.4	Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters who Reside Outside of the South, Varying Collective Descriptive Representation (CCES)	72
3.5	Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters, Varying Descriptive Representation (ANES)	74
4.1	Expected Change in Collective Descriptive Representation, Varying Black Population in State	90
4.2	Expected Change in Collective Descriptive Representation, Varying Legislative Professionalism	91
5.1	Percent Black Population in State and Black Caucus Influence Index	116
5.2	Probability of a Black Caucus in State, Varying Black Population	121

5.3	Expected Change in Black Caucus Influence Index, Varying Black Population in the State	121
5.4	Probability of a Legislative Black Caucus in State, Varying the Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio	122
5.5	Black Caucus Influence Index and Black Voter Turnout in 2008	124
5.6	Black Caucus Influence Index and the Black/White Turnout Ratio in 2008	124
6.1	Average Parity Descriptive Representation, 1992-2004	133
6.2	Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Black Population	140
6.3	Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Latino Population	141
6.4	Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Citizen Ideology	142
6.5	Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Legislative Professionalism	143
6.6	Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Term Limit Impact in States	144
7.1	Probability of a Black Caucus, Varying the Number of Multimember Districts	153

CHAPTER 1: THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF BLACK DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

Introduction

On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the nation's 44th president. But in the annals of history, it will be remembered more as the inauguration of the nation's first president of African descent. Stating that Obama's victory was inspiring and uplifting for African Americans would be an understatement. Between chattel slavery, Jim Crow, sharecropping, police brutality, and miscegenation laws, to name a few, the African American experience is inextricably tied to racial discrimination. Although Obama's victory in no way washes away the pain and dysfunction caused by years of racial discrimination, his victory is of paramount symbolic and substantive importance for blacks. From a symbolic perspective, not only is President Obama the only person who represents the nation's electorate, but he also represents the country in such international meetings as the G-8 Summit and the WTO. Both roles reveal the fallacy and folly of decades of black disenfranchisement. But does President Obama substantively represent the interests of black Americans?

It is ingenuous for blacks to believe that having a black president is the panacea because the American form of government, with its checks and balances and separation of powers, limits presidential powers. Although the president can issue executive orders, can pardon felons, and serves as the Commander-in-Chief, Congress holds the power of the purse, making it difficult for President Obama to implement all of his policy goals. The recent change in health care, however, is a policy victory for all Americans, especially since racial and ethnic minorities comprise more than half of the nation's uninsured (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010).

On the other hand, blacks should be able to exercise greater policy influence at the state level with increased black descriptive representation in state legislatures. In 2009, over 625 blacks served in state legislatures across the country (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 2010), which is far greater than one elected official in the

White House. With the devolution of power to the states in the past thirty years, state legislators may be more empowered than national legislators to make decisions that influence blacks' everyday lives (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006, 10). For instance, funding for schools, welfare programs, and sentencing laws are all matters state governments address. Despite the vast number of black state legislators and their increased importance in recent years, scholars have a myopic understanding of black representation in general, and especially black representation in the states.

Pitkin (1967) introduces the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation, arguing that the former is when a representative shares physical traits such as race, ethnicity or gender with their constituency, while the latter is when a representative shares policy views with their constituency. Although a landmark theoretical study, the work neither addresses the mechanisms needed to achieve representation, nor does it discuss representation in our federal system in terms of local, state and national government. Future works, however, have examined some of these questions, in particular looking at representation for blacks.

This research aims to understand *how* black descriptive representation comes about and *why* black descriptive representation matters, with a particular focus at the state level.¹ What distinguishes this research from previous work is its simultaneous analysis of different forms of descriptive representation, and more importantly, its emphasis on the formation of black state legislative caucuses and their potential to influence policy and behavior. This research develops a theory of black descriptive representation defined by four categories of representation: dyadic, collective, caucus, and parity. Previous scholarship has focused primarily on dyadic descriptive representation (a black elected official representing a black constituent), and largely ignored the other forms. This

¹ I use the terms "black descriptive representation" and "descriptive representation" interchangeably. I usually will say "black descriptive representation" when comparing blacks to other groups, but will use "descriptive representation" when addressing blacks alone.

research argues descriptive representation is multidimensional, and each form has particular strengths and weaknesses. An analogy may be useful. Black representation is akin to a diamond, and looking at it from only one perspective is similar to judging a diamond only by its color, instead by its hardness, fluorescence, luster, as well as its cut, size, and shape. In short, this work defines, measures, and shows the importance of the multifaceted nature of black representation subnationally and in Congress. It thus seeks to draw back the curtain and reveal the full range of the concept of minority representation. While the focus here is on African American descriptive representation, the theory presented can be applied to other minority groups, such as Latinos, Asian Americans, etc.

Dyadic descriptive representation is interested in the one-to-one relationship between elected officials and their constituents. When scholars hear the words “descriptive representation” it is the form that they often consider, as it is most commonly studied form of minority representation (Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Eisenger 1982; Howell and Fagan 1988; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gilliam 1996; Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998; Gay 2001; Gay 2002; Tate 2003; Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Griffin and Keane 2006; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Whitby 2007). For example, dyadic descriptive representation describes the relationship between a black elected official and all of the blacks who live in that representative’s city or district, either state legislative or congressional. There are mixed findings on the impact of black descriptive representation in local government. Some research suggests that it increases black employment rates (Eisenger 1982), trust in government (Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Howell and Fagan 1988; Bobo and Gilliam 1990), political participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Whitby 2007), and leads to greater satisfaction with quality of life (Marschall and Ruhil 2007). Conversely, others find blacks less engaged in politics and with lower evaluations of government despite the presence of a black mayor (Gilliam 1996; Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998; Howell and Marshall 1998; Spence, McClerking, and Brown 2009) and black judges (Overby et al 2005). Although local descriptive

representation is important, for the purposes of this research, dyadic descriptive representation refers to Congress.²

In sum, a number of scholars have examined the relationship between dyadic descriptive representation and substantive representation in Congress, and most agree that dyadic representation influences both black (and white) political behavior and policy outcomes that benefit blacks. The limitation, however, is they only focus on dyadic representation and ignore parity, collective, and caucus descriptive representation. Some research, however, examines the importance of the other forms of descriptive representation, such as collective descriptive representation (Owens 2005; Preuhs 2005; Preuhs 2006; Preuhs 2007; Griffin and Newman 2008), caucus descriptive representation (Menifield and Shaffer 2005; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), and parity descriptive representation (Hero 1998; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006). The next paragraphs introduce the less commonly studied forms of descriptive representation.

In contrast to dyadic representation, collective descriptive representation is the relationship between a citizen and all the elected officials in a representing government body of the same race/ethnicity, regardless of district level representation. Collective descriptive representation is measured by the percentage of African Americans serving in Congress or in a state legislature. Collective descriptive representation is the symbiosis of two concepts. On the one hand, it is an extension of collective representation, which is a concept first introduced by Robert Weissberg (1978). He writes,

“In short, even if we require an electoral connection between citizens and their representatives, there is no historical or theoretical reason to limit analysis to dyadic relationships. To focus exclusively on such questions as ‘does Representative X follow the constituency’s preferences on policies A, B or C?’ thus ignores several equally plausible ways of asking whether elected representatives represent.” (537)

² This research is more interested in national government than local government. Moreover, data limitations make it difficult to determine descriptive representation at the local level.

Collective descriptive representation is also derived from the concept of surrogate representation that is outlined in Mansbridge (2003). She writes, “Surrogate representation is representation by a representative with whom one has no electoral relationship.” In short, collective descriptive representation is influenced by Weissberg (1978) because it is interested in the entire black delegation in a legislature or Congress, and it is influenced by Mansbridge (2003) because it is representation that exists outside of a dyadic relationship.

A recent study examines collective descriptive representation in Congress, finding that as the black delegation increases, so does the probability that policies will be adopted that benefit blacks (Griffin and Newman 2008). This study is unique in that it moves beyond dyadic descriptive representation in Congress, but it says nothing of collective descriptive representation in state legislatures. With variation across fifty states, we can provide a more nuanced analysis of collective descriptive representation when studied subnationally.

Most research at the state level emphasizes the relationship between dyadic descriptive representation and policy outcomes. Black state legislators are more likely to introduce bills that benefit blacks (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Bratton 2002), especially bills that advance the socio-economic well-being of blacks through prohibiting discrimination in housing, education and employment (Haynie 2001). While these works look at individual legislators, other works examine how minority state legislators behave collectively.

One study explores the impact of collective descriptive representation on policy outputs, finding that states with larger black delegations tend to allocate a higher percentage of their budgets to welfare and health care (Owens 2005). Moreover, Rocha et al (2010) find African Americans and Latinos are more likely to vote over time (2000-2008) when residing in states with increased descriptive representation in the state legislature measured by percent black or Latino lawmakers, even after controlling for

minority population in the state and Democratic seat share in the legislature. This new research suggests that collective descriptive representation may matter for political behavior and turnout. Robert Preuhs (2006) argues that moderate to low racialized contexts improve substantive representation for blacks, while highly racialized contexts diminish substantive representation. He also finds that Latino descriptive representation leads to Latino substantive representation in non-initiative states and in states with higher levels of Latino political leadership (Preuhs 2005), and that states with larger Latino delegations generally spend more on welfare programs (Preuhs 2007). In short, minority state legislators, as a collective, are more likely to strive for substantive representation that benefits their group, and the contexts within which they work mediate their sway on policy outcomes. These works move beyond dyadic descriptive representation, but only one study addresses how collective descriptive representation may influence political behavior. Political behavior is the focus of this research.

Caucus descriptive representation is an extension of collective representation. Caucuses are a formalized, institutionalized version of collective descriptive representation. State legislative black caucuses promote policies beneficial to African Americans. Few have studied this form of representation, and most of the research involves single case studies that are descriptive in nature. Legislative black caucuses may formally organize a group's collective descriptive representation in government, overcoming the collective action problem of getting individual lawmakers to agree on policy (Krehbiel 1998), and as a result, it may lead to superior policy representation of black interests. In the summer of 2000, the *Journal of Black Studies* devoted a special edition to black caucuses, and five articles explore black caucus influence in five different states over an eighteen-year period. Charles Menifield and Stephen Shaffer's book, *Politics of the New South: African Americans in Southern State Legislatures* (2005) examines black representation in ten southern states over twenty years, and has mixed findings on the ability of black caucuses to influence policy. Also, Tyson King-Meadows

and Thomas Schaller's book *Devolution and Black State Legislators: Challenges and Choices in the Twenty-First Century* (2006) argues that in 2001 most black caucuses were able to exercise influence in the legislature. These few studies reveal the importance of black caucuses, but they fail to measure black caucus influence across fifty states, nor do they empirically test the influence black caucuses have on black political behavior.

Finally, parity descriptive representation is also an extension of collective descriptive representation, examining the extent to which representation in the legislature (subnational or Congress) reflects the demographics of the population represented by that institution. When studying blacks, this is measured as the percentage of blacks in a state legislature versus the black population in the state. Hero (1998) argues that states with larger minority populations will have greater levels of underrepresentation, and King-Meadows and Schaller (2006) find that minority population is negatively associated with parity descriptive representation, suggesting that parity descriptive representation is more likely in states with smaller minority populations. Orey, Overby, and Larimer (2007) examine parity in leadership positions, finding that states in which blacks comprise a larger proportion of the Democratic majority are more likely to achieve parity representation in leadership. Although these works focus on parity descriptive representation, they have methodological shortcomings, as they do not examine parity descriptive representation as an explanatory variable, as is done here.

What We Know about Minority Descriptive Representation

Most of the previous literature focuses on a single measure of dyadic descriptive representation in Congress. One research agenda examines the relationship between dyadic descriptive representation and political behavior. Most suggest that black descriptive representation leads to positive outcomes for blacks, with blacks being more approving of black members of Congress (Tate 2001; Tate 2003), more likely to contact their member of Congress (Gay 2002; Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2004), and liberal blacks being more inclined to vote when descriptively represented (Griffin and Keane

2006). In her important work on the relationship of descriptive representation and voting, Gay (2001) finds that black descriptive representation demobilizes whites and only rarely increases black political participation. One work finds that economic downturns attenuate the positive effects of black descriptive representation (Harris, Sinclair-Chapman and McKenzie 2006). For Latinos, those with a Latino member of Congress tend to have lower levels of political alienation (Pantoja and Segura 2003), while others find the greater the number of majority minority districts—both state legislative and congressional districts—in which Latinos reside, the more likely they are to vote (Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004).³ Together, these works indicate that dyadic descriptive representation is beneficial to Latinos as well.

The other major research agenda includes David Lublin (1997), exploring the relationship between dyadic descriptive representation and policy outcomes. Some scholars argue that black descriptive representation is unnecessary for substantive representation (Swain 1993), while others argue that increases in descriptive representation may actually decrease substantive representation for blacks (Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997). For Latinos, scholars find that party matters more than race, showing Democratic partisanship in Congress is the strongest predictor of whether someone will support Latino interests (Hero and Tolbert 1995). Lublin (1997) argues there is a tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representation for black in the U.S. Congress. In particular, he argues that packing blacks into legislative districts (i.e. majority black districts) leads to fewer Democratic officeholders overall, making it difficult to achieve substantive policy representation benefiting minorities. In addition, he says that once blacks comprise forty percent of a district that their member of Congress (MC) is more likely to represent black interests. Together, these findings suggest that majority black districts may weaken black substantive representation. Lublin's analysis is

³ This is the only work that looks at dyadic descriptive representation in states. Data limitations inhibit me from doing the same, as state legislative district level data are difficult to find.

limited to Congress, meaning that it may not be applicable to other forms of representation, namely collective, parity, and caucus descriptive representation. *An argument developed in this research is that collective and caucus descriptive representation, topics rarely studied by scholars of race/ethnicity, may not have the same tradeoffs as dyadic descriptive representation.*

Most scholars, however, argue that dyadic descriptive representation is important for black substantive representation. Black members of Congress may better respond to black interests (Whitby 1997), tend to have more liberal voting records (Grose 2005), and are more likely to mention race in their newsletters (Canon 1999). Hutchings, McClerking and Charles (2004) look at the ability of white MC's to represent blacks, finding that because of voting instability by southern white members of Congress, southern blacks may require descriptive representation in order to attain substantive representation. In terms of the effectiveness of black descriptive representation, some point to ability of black members of Congress to bring home pork to their constituents (Grose 2007) and hire black staff to work in Congressional districts (Grose, Mangum, and Martin 2007), while others argue that black representatives tend to have poorer committee portfolios and are less active than whites in Congress (Griffin and Keane, 2009). In sum, scholars have found evidence that both dyadic and collective minority descriptive representation matters.

Predicting Minority Representation in Government

Not surprisingly, the size of the black population is the best explanation for the election of black state legislators. Scholars find that states with concentrated black populations tend to have a greater number of black state legislators (Grofman and Handley 1989; Handley, Grofman and Arden 1998). There are also institutional explanations for the election of black state legislators, with more professionalized state legislatures generally having a greater number of black state legislators (Squire 1992). District type influences the ethnic composition of state legislators, with some finding

states with multimember districts generally have fewer black state legislators (Jewell 1982; Grofman, Migalski and Noviello 1986; Moncrief and Thompson 1992), and others arguing they may increase the number of blacks elected to office (Brockington et al 1998; Gerber, Morton and Reitz 1998). A recent study argues that multimember districts may no longer have a deleterious effect on minority representation (Cooper 2008), but also recognizes there are mixed findings. In short, it appears that majority black districts, legislative professionalism, and district type influence the election of black state legislators. Yet, how do these members organize themselves once in the legislature? Unfortunately, there is limited work on state legislative black caucuses.

State Legislative Black Caucuses

An important book and a journal special edition have focused on state legislative black caucuses, but in general few have studied this organization of minority elected officials. Charles Menifield and Stephen Shaffer (2005) examine black influence in ten states: Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. They perform a longitudinal analysis, exploring black influence from 1980 until 2000. The scholars have mixed findings on the ability of state legislative black caucuses to influence policy. In 2000, the *Journal of Black Studies* published a special edition on state legislative black caucuses from 1970-1988, in Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. These studies provide historical information on how black caucus influence has changed over time, and also look at the caucuses' ability to implement policies beneficial to blacks. Since both the edited book and journal special edition are case studies, they lack comparison to other states. Moreover, they lack statistical rigor, as the data are mostly descriptive.

Some scholars examine black influence in multiple states, employing statistical analysis. Nelson (1991) analyzes black leadership in forty-five state lower chambers, in 1982, 1984, and 1986, finding that states in which blacks exercise greater influence tend to spend more on mental health and hospitals. A study of forty-two states in 1989 and

1999 reveals that blacks have a higher number of committee chairs when they are a critical part of the Democratic majority (Orey, Overby, and Larimer 2007). Moreover, a study of forty-eight states from 1971 to 1994 finds that states with a greater number of black lawmakers tend to allocate a larger portion of their budget towards welfare (Owens 2005), and a study of five state legislatures in 1969, 1979, and 1989 shows that states in which blacks exercise greater influence tend to spend more on education, health, and welfare programs (Haynie 2001). Although these works do not examine caucuses per se, they indicate that a collection of black state legislators can implement substantive policies that improve blacks' lives.

To date, Tyson King-Meadows and Thomas Schaller's 2006 book, *Devolution and Black State Legislators: Challenges and Choices in the Twenty-First Century* is the only truly comparative work on state legislative black caucuses. Not only do the authors find that states with a greater number of black legislators tend to have a greater number of blacks on prestigious committees (126), but the authors introduce a measure of black caucus influence, which no other work has done. They argue that black caucuses can be pivotal in three different ways: simple majority pivotal, supermajority pivotal, and minority pivotal (119). When Democrats are in the majority, and the black caucus is essential to maintain this majority, then the black caucus is majority pivotal. For example, in 2010, Democrats make up 57.8 percent of the Alabama state legislature, blacks make up 25 percent of the legislature, making the black caucus simple majority pivotal. When Democrats have a supermajority (usually 2/3) and need the black caucus to maintain it, then the black caucus is supermajority pivotal. In 2010, blacks are supermajority pivotal in Arkansas state legislature, since they make up 10 percent of the body, and Democrats make up 72.8 percent of the body. Lastly, when Democrats are in the minority, and need the black caucus to maintain a veto-sustaining minority (usually 1/3), the black caucus is minority pivotal. The black caucus is minority pivotal in Georgia, as they make up 22 percent of the body, and Democrats make up 41 percent of the legislature. Later, the

authors show that in 2001, twenty-two legislative black caucuses were simple majority, supermajority, or minority pivotal.

Comparing the Literature on Black Descriptive Representation

Table 1.1 summarizes research on black representation discussed above, showing gaps in the literature. A number of works examine dyadic descriptive representation and political behavior, dyadic representation and policy/outcomes, or collective descriptive representation and policy/outcomes. No works, however, examine the relationship between collective descriptive representation and political behavior (see Rocha et al 2010 for an exception). Additionally, no research examines the relationship between parity descriptive representation and political behavior or policy outcomes, or caucus descriptive representation and political behavior. In the next section, I explain how this dissertation fills in these holes in the literature on minority representation.

Theoretical Argument

This research examines the varying forms of black descriptive representation — dyadic, collective, caucus, and parity — as both explanatory and dependent variables. It develops a theory of descriptive representation that argues all four forms provide varying benefits to minority populations. We cannot fully understand how minorities are represented in government without taking into consideration all four forms. Thus, previous research that has only examined one dimension has under-specified the concept of descriptive representation. Not only are the four forms of representation measured and operationalized differently, but they may also have different effects on politics.

As an explanatory variable, I argue that each form of descriptive representation may affect politics and the political behavior of black citizens differently. I compare parity and collective descriptive representation in the state legislature to dyadic descriptive representation in Congress, examining how they affect black political behavior and civic engagement. I do not include caucus descriptive representation in the comparison because it is highly collinear with collective descriptive representation and

including both would violate the regression assumption of high collinearity between explanatory variables (Lewis-Beck 1980). When examining descriptive representation as a dependent variable, I argue each form comes about through somewhat different processes; in particular, black population should have a different impact on collective and caucus representation, compared to parity representation since states with greater parity tend to have smaller black populations (Hero 1998; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006). I look for factors that account for parity, collective, and caucus descriptive representation, but ignore dyadic descriptive representation because scholars show that nearly all black members of Congress come from majority black districts (Lublin 1997; Canon 1999).

The key argument is that along with dyadic descriptive representation, collective, caucus, and parity descriptive representation provide blacks with political empowerment. Previous works find that political empowerment changes blacks' attitudes towards government, and as a result, it encourages blacks to have higher levels of civic engagement and also makes them more likely to participate in politics (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2002; Tate 2003). Political empowerment may be symbolic, substantive, or both.⁴ An example of symbolic political empowerment is that merely having a co-ethnic representative leads to blacks feeling politically efficacious, and as a result, they are more inclined to participate and engage in politics. In terms of substantive political empowerment, black representatives are better able to represent black interests (Haynie 2001; Owens 2005; Whitby 1997; Canon 1999), leading to higher levels of black civic engagement and political participation among blacks in an effort to continue the positive policy benefits. Thus, this research argues that forms of political empowerment other than dyadic descriptive representation, namely collective, caucus, and parity descriptive representation may influence black political behavior, as they may provide symbolic or substantive representation for blacks.

⁴ I define symbolic political empowerment as descriptive representation without substantive representation, which is similar to Pitkin's definition of symbolic representation.

In addition, states with greater black representation ought to have a greater number of mobilization networks, which in turn should increase the likelihood that blacks participate and engage in politics (Leighley 2001), suggesting descriptive representation might affect black political behavior. Since each form of black representation provides a different type of political empowerment, each may have a different effect on black political behavior and each may differ in their ability represent black interests. How exactly do I expect the forms to differ in their ability to represent blacks?

I expect dyadic descriptive representation will lead to blacks feeling politically empowered. It provides symbolic representation, as it is the closest tie between a constituent and a prominent black elected official, and scholars argue that dyadic representation leads to substantive policies that benefit blacks (Whitby 1997; Canon 1999; Hutchings, McClerking, and Brown 2004), brings pork to majority-black districts (Grose 2007), and leads to hiring of black staff (Grose, Mangum, and Martin 2007), all of which may encourage black political participation and engagement. Lastly, since US House members run for office every two years, blacks with dyadic descriptive representation ought to be mobilized to participate in politics.

It is hypothesized that collective descriptive representation is an important form of black political empowerment. From a symbolic perspective, instead of one black elected official representing a constituent, this person now has the total black delegation to act on his or her behalf. Mansbridge (2003, 523) argues that minority legislators often feel a responsibility for representing their group's perspective even if a small number of their constituents are from that group (surrogate representation), and that the smaller the number of minority legislators, the stronger the desire to provide surrogate representation. For instance, all of the black state legislators in Florida act as surrogates for blacks in the state, regardless of the ethnic composition of the legislators' districts. Collective descriptive representation may also lead to substantive policy benefits for blacks. Minority state legislators are more likely to introduce bills that benefit their group

both individually (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Haynie 2001; Bratton 2002) and collectively (Owens 2005; Preuhs 2005; Preuhs 2006; Preuhs 2007; Griffin and Newman 2008), so we might expect that states with larger black delegations successfully represent black interests, and as a result, it might have positive spillover benefits for black political behavior. Also, states with a greater number of black legislators should also have a greater number of extant mobilization networks, leading to greater black political participation.

Caucus descriptive representation is an extension of collective descriptive representation, yet it is also distinct. While both collective and caucus descriptive representation may allow for symbolic representation for blacks, caucus descriptive representation might provide superior substantive representation than collective descriptive representation because the members' *cohesiveness* might give them leverage on policy outcomes (Holmes 2000; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006). As a result, caucus descriptive representation may have spillover effects for black political behavior. The same argument for the mobilization networks created by collective descriptive representation applies to caucus descriptive representation.

Finally, it is hypothesized that parity descriptive representation may also provide some form of political empowerment for blacks, albeit it less than the other forms. From a symbolic perspective, it is not likely that the average black citizen is cognizant of whether his or her state legislature has parity descriptive representation, making it difficult for blacks to value this form of representation. In terms of substantive representation, parity descriptive representation does not necessarily equate to adopting benefiting blacks. For instance, New Mexico in 1994 had a parity score of 0, but once it elected two black state legislators in 2000, its racial parity score jumped to .714. Therefore, even though New Mexico's parity score improved dramatically in a two-year period, it did not mean those two black state legislators were able to advance black interests in a legislature with 110 other members; thus, greater parity descriptive

representation in New Mexico did not lead to policy representation for blacks. On the other hand, a state like Illinois is ranked in the top ten of parity and top fifteen of collective descriptive representation, meaning that parity descriptive representation may sometimes be associated with better policy outcomes for blacks.

The number of mobilization networks in states depends more on collective descriptive representation than on parity descriptive representation. For example, Alabama ranks sixth in collective descriptive representation and ninth in parity descriptive representation, while Oregon ranks forty-first in collective descriptive representation and first in parity descriptive representation, and although Oregon has greater parity representation than Alabama, there are undoubtedly more mobilization networks that encourage black political participation in Alabama because of the greater number of black state legislators. In other words, parity descriptive representation in and of itself may do little for empowering blacks. I thus expect states with greater parity descriptive representation to have a weaker effect on substantive policies beneficial to blacks and to have fewer mobilization networks than other forms of representation, unless there is also higher collective descriptive representation. Why study parity descriptive representation? Scholars are interested in this question because the extent to which there is parity descriptive representation of blacks is an indicator of whether the state has racial equity in electoral representation, meaning that parity has important normative implications.

In sum, I expect each form of descriptive representation to have differential impacts on black political behavior since they are distinct, with parity being the weakest form of political empowerment. This research focuses on political behavior for African Americans, given the much larger published research on substantive policy benefiting minorities. Furthermore, instead of focusing on dyadic descriptive representation, I focus on whether collective, caucus, and parity descriptive representation influence black

political behavior, as they have been largely ignored in previous studies of black representation.

Multidimensions of Black Descriptive Representation in the American States

Thus far, the different forms of representation have been defined, but how the measures vary across the fifty states has not been shown. With that in mind, Table 1.2 elucidates the differences between the various forms of descriptive representation. Column two presents the average black population in each state from 1992 to 2004, showing that on average one in ten persons in each state is black. Column two shows that black population varies widely across the states, from more than thirty percent in Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi, to black populations of under three-quarters of a percent in Idaho, Maine, and Montana. Black population in the state matters because it leads to different expectations for descriptive representation. For example, someone in Louisiana might expect to have a black representative in the U.S. Congress or the state legislature, while someone in Idaho might be astonished to learn there is a black representative in his or her state.

Column three in Table 1.2 shows the average parity scores in states from 1992 to 2004, with a score of 1 indicating that there is perfect parity descriptive representation in the state legislature, or that there is the same percentage of blacks in the state legislature as there is in the state population. The findings show that on average, the national parity score is .640, which is consistent with findings that blacks are generally underrepresented in state legislatures (Jewell 1982; Haynie 2001).

Column four in Table 1.2 shows dyadic descriptive representation in the 110th Congress by state. Furthermore, it shows that on average, there is less than one black member of Congress per state, meaning that most blacks are represented by whites in Congress. It is important to note, however, that California, New York, and Georgia each have four black members of Congress; thus, blacks in these states are more likely to have dyadic descriptive representation in Congress than those who live in other states. Yet,

twenty-nine states do *not* have a black member of Congress in 2008, meaning that if scholars are interested in generalizing their findings on the importance of black representation for black political participation and civic engagement *across states*, then they will have a difficult task at hand because most states will not have a black US House member.

Conversely, collective descriptive representation in state legislatures is a form of political empowerment that a greater number of blacks experience and likely benefit from. Column five in Table 1.2 shows that from 1992 until 2004, on average, blacks make up seven percent of all state legislatures. Also, there is a great variation in levels of collective descriptive representation, ranging from zero black state legislators in Montana, North Dakota and Idaho, to black state legislators making up more than twenty percent of the legislature in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. In short, blacks are more likely to have collective descriptive representation in the legislature than they are to have dyadic descriptive representation in Congress, making a systematic examination of collective descriptive representation an important extension of the empowerment hypothesis.

Lastly, column six looks at the impact that black caucuses might have within the legislature. The measure is a combination of black proportion of the Democratic Party, the black proportion of committee chairs in the legislature, and the state caucus' proportion of seats on the National Black Caucus of State Legislatures (NBCSL) policy committees, in 2009-2010 (it is described in detail in Chapter 5). With a score of .950, Mississippi has the most influential legislative black caucus, and with a score of .033, Rhode Island has the least influential legislative black caucus. The larger the black proportion of the Democratic Party, the more dependent the Democrats are on blacks to vote along party lines, and blacks are able to exercise greater influence in the legislature. The number of committee chairs is important because it gives blacks agenda-setting and gate-keeping powers. Representation on NBCSL policy committees matters because

when black state legislators from across the country gather together to pass resolutions, they form a national policy agenda that is sent to the White House and Congress, and the states with greater representation have a greater say in this agenda-making process.

In 2010, thirty-three states have a legislative black caucus, and on average, the black caucus index score is .372. A score near zero indicates the black caucus lacks influence, while a score near three indicates the black caucus exercises great influence, so the score suggests that most legislative black caucuses exercise only a modicum of influence. But, it is important to note that this measure does not capture other extra-legislative activities that legislative black caucuses perform, namely constituency service, holding town hall meetings, and holding fundraisers to provide scholarships to black youth, all of which should increase black civic engagement and political participation.

Despite the presence of black caucuses in over sixty percent of states and despite them having some level of influence in most states, little scholarship has examined the impact of state legislative black caucuses. The next section discusses the data and methods used to perform the analyses presented in the following chapters.

Data and Methods

It is important to update the studies of descriptive representation's impact on political engagement of minorities with this new framework of a multidimensional definition of minority descriptive representation. Most of the works use either the National Black Election Study (NBES) or aggregate data to perform their analyses. Although both of these approaches have shed light on descriptive representation, both have shortcomings. The last NBES took place in 1996, making it outdated and ill-equipped to deal with the changes that have taken place in the political landscape in the thirteen years. Since 1996, there has been the second President Clinton term, eight years of President George Bush, and the Obama candidacy at the national level, not to mention the increase of black elected officials at the state and local level, all of which ought to influence minority attitudes toward government. Although Gary King's (1997) solution

to the ecological inference problem allows us to infer individual behavior from aggregate data, multilevel modeling that draws on large sample survey data merged with aggregate data is a superior approach to studying political behavior; instead of inferring individual opinion from aggregate data (Gay 2001). Multilevel modeling combines survey data (at the individual level) with aggregate data, meaning we can test the impact of political context on individual level decisions to participate in politics and on approving government. Multilevel modeling also allows a test of whether the varying forms of descriptive representation differentially affect black political behavior. The assumption of independence of observations is violated unless the researcher clusters standard errors by state (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007), which is done here.

This research draws on the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES), merged with state and congressional level data. The 2008 CCES has over 32,000 respondents, including robust samples within all fifty states and respondents from all 435 congressional districts. It also includes a large battery of questions comparable to the ANES or the General Social Survey (GSS). The CCES is an internet survey, while the ANES is an in-person survey, allowing a model comparison. Other than both being recent surveys, both have large samples of minority respondents, with over 3,000 black respondents in the CCES and over 500 in the ANES. In particular, the CCES has large samples of blacks within states, making it ideal for multilevel analysis.⁵ This research tests if blacks residing in states

⁵ This sample is constructed using a technique called sample matching. The researchers use the US Census to generate a set of demographic and political characteristics that should be mirrored in the survey sample. Then, using a matching algorithm, the researchers select respondents who most closely resemble the census data from a pool of opt-in participants. The sample is stratified to ensure large samples within states. More information regarding sample matching is available at http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl/cces/material/sample_matching.pdf. These data were collected over a three-month period from September to November of 2006 and 2008. The models are estimated using Polimatrix survey weights. Using this same technique, the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) produced more precise estimates than more conventional probability designs such as random digit dialed (RDD) phone surveys (Vavreck and Rivers 2008).

with more African American lawmakers in the legislature are more engaged in politics and more likely to vote than those who live in states with fewer black elected officials.

To date, no project has looked at whether there is a differential impact of descriptive representation in the congressional district (dyadic), compared to the state legislature (parity and collective). In sum, the methods this project uses to explore the impact of collective descriptive representation on political behavior are novel, and will show us the levels at which descriptive representation matters.

This project also contributes to our understanding of descriptive representation as a dependent variable. This is one of few works to examine parity and caucus descriptive representation for blacks, and it is the first to study them over time with rigorous statistics, using a pooled cross sectional time series model and logistic regression model, respectively. This research addresses methodological shortcomings present in previous works, namely problems with generalizability, lack of statistical rigor, and improper model specification. In terms of data sources, the number of black state legislators comes from the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, the size of state legislatures comes from *The Book of States*, black population in the state comes from the U.S. Census Bureau, and the National Black Caucus of State Legislatures (NBCSL) website provides the data for whether a state has legislative black caucus.

Lastly, a number of other variables might influence black descriptive representation in the states. These include Latino population in the state (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), the number of multimember districts (Jewell 1982; Grofman, Migalski, and Noviello 1986; Moncrief and Thompson 1992; Brockington et al 1998; Gerber, Morton, and Rietz 1998), whether the state has term limits (Reed and Schansberg 1995), and the professionalism of the legislature (Squire 1992). I also control for whether the citizens in the state are liberal, median age in the state, median income in the state, and the percent of high school graduates in the state, as they are common in state politics research.

Road Map

The remainder of the dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 uses the 2008 CCES to examine the relationship between dyadic, parity, and collective descriptive representation on citizen political knowledge, political interest, likelihood of voting, and approval of the state legislature. The key finding is that collective descriptive representation has a different effect on black political engagement than dyadic or parity descriptive representation, which suggests that it is an important form of political empowerment for blacks. These findings are different from previous works in that they move away from collective descriptive representation's ability to influence substantive policy outcomes, examining its secondary spillover effects on black political behavior. The chapter simultaneously compares the way different forms of black descriptive representation influence political behavior.

Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the relationship between black descriptive representation and voting in 2008 with a black presidential candidate (Obama), in particular looking at whether unlikely black voters choose to participate in the 2008 general election. This chapter uses both the 2008 ANES and 2008 CCES, and the expectation is that since states with higher levels of collective descriptive representation already have networks in place to mobilize black voters to participate in elections, that unlikely black voters in states with higher levels of collective descriptive representation will be more likely to vote than unlikely black voters in states with lower levels of collective descriptive representation. The analysis support this argument, suggesting that Obama's candidacy in and of itself did not mobilize unlikely black voters.

Chapter 4 explains the state-level factors that account for collective descriptive representation from 1992 to 2004, specifying a pooled cross-sectional time series model. The data come from many sources, including the US Census Bureau, the National Conference of State Legislatures, *The Book of the States*, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, and scholarly works. Although others explore collective

descriptive representation, the studies have methodological shortcomings, namely specification error, lack of generalizability, and failure to incorporate the dynamic (over-time) nature of black representation. The findings suggest that black population, legislative professionalism, Latino Population, state income, and median age influence subnational collective descriptive representation.

Chapter 5 examines caucus descriptive representation in 2009-2010, with the aim of developing an index of black caucus influence and understanding what demographic and institutional characteristics of states predict greater legislative black caucus influence. This chapter finds that states with larger black population and lower levels of education parity between blacks and whites are more likely to have a legislative black caucus, but black population is the only variable that accounts for whether a state has an influential legislative black caucus. The chapter discusses my experience at the NBCSL Conference, the annual meeting of black state legislators from across the country. The key argument and finding is that legislative black caucuses across the country are not only different in terms of their size and influence, but also are similar in their desire to represent black interests and similar in their policy goals. In addition, I introduce a novel measure black caucus influence, incorporating black influence in the state legislature, along with black influence in the NBCSL. Lastly, the chapter examines the relationship between influential legislative black caucuses and political behavior, illustrating that states with influential black caucuses have higher black turnout rates and also higher black-to-white turnout ratios than states without influential legislative black caucuses.

Chapter 6 is analogous to Chapter 4, except that it examines parity descriptive representation in the legislature. There is a key difference, however, in the expectations for black population. That is, states with larger black populations should have lower levels of parity descriptive representation (Hero 1998; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006). The results do not support this argument, however, showing that black population is positively associated with parity descriptive representation. Other significant variables

include Latino population, citizen ideology, legislative professionalism, and term limit impact.

Lastly, Chapter 7 concludes the analysis. Moreover, it summarizes the findings, discusses the implications of the findings, and it offers future research projects on black descriptive representation.

Table 1.1 Literature on Minority Representation

	Dyadic	Collective	Parity	Caucus
Behavior	Gay 2001; Tate 2001; Gay 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Tate 2003; Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2004; Griffin and Keane 2006			
Policy/Outcomes	Swain 1993; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Whitby 1997; Canon 1999; Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004; Grose 2005; Grose 2007; Grose, Mangum, and Martin 2007; Griffin and Newman 2008; Griffin and Keane 2009	Nelson 1991; Owens 2005; Preuhs 2005; Preuhs 2006; Preuhs 2007; Orey, Overby and Larimer 2007		Journal of Black Studies Special Edition 2000; Menifield and Shaffer 2005 (edited book); King- Meadows and Schaller 2006

Table 1.2 States Ranked by Black Population, and Parity, Dyadic, Collective, and Caucus Descriptive Representation

State	Percent Black in State	Parity	Dyadic	Collective	Caucus
Alabama	25.9 (6)	.867 (9)	1	22.5 (2)	.805 (2)
Alaska	3.90 (33)	.305 (42)	0	1.2 (37)	--
Arizona	3.47 (34)	.917 (7)	0	3.17 (33)	.058 (31)
Arkansas	16.0 (12)	.641 (27)	0	10.2 (15)	.235 (23)
California	7.39 (24)	.833 (13)	4	6.19 (23)	.215 (24)
Colorado	4.24 (31)	.843 (11)	0	3.57 (28)	.038 (32)
Connecticut	9.37 (21)	.716 (23)	0	6.72 (22)	.256 (21)
Delaware	19.0 (9)	.300 (43)	0	5.76 (25)	.207 (25)
Florida	15.1 (14)	.836 (12)	3	12.6 (10)	.496 (9)
Georgia	28.4 (4)	.616 (30)	4	17.5 (5)	.646 (5)
Hawaii	2.70 (38)	.169 (46)	0	.37 (44)	--
Idaho	.537 (47)	0 (50T)	0	0 (50T)	--
Illinois	15.2 (13)	.849 (10)	3	12.9 (8)	.6 (7)
Indiana	8.32 (22)	.902 (8)	1	7.52 (20)	.359 (16)
Iowa	2.02 (40)	.331 (41)	0	.66 (41)	.116 (29)
Kansas	5.90 (28)	.660 (25)	0	3.89 (27)	.149 (26)
Kentucky	7.29 (26)	.467 (35)	0	3.41 (29)	.131 (28)
Louisiana	32.1 (2)	.629 (28T)	1	20.2 (3)	.642 (6)
Maine	.517 (48)	.153 (47)	0	.07 (47)	--
Maryland	27.4 (5)	.687 (24)	2	18.9 (4)	.781 (3)
Massachusetts	6.32 (27)	.533 (32)	0	3.35 (30T)	.06 (30)
Michigan	14.3 (16)	.830 (14)	2	11.8 (13)	.353 (17)
Minnesota	3.10 (37)	.202 (44)	1	.64 (42T)	--
Mississippi	36.4 (1)	.644 (26)	1	23.4 (1)	.95 (1)
Missouri	11.2 (19)	.729 (18)	2	8.19 (18)	.246 (22)
Montana	.352 (50)	0 (50T)	0	0 (50T)	--
Nebraska	4.00(32)	.511 (33)	0	2.04 (34)	--
Nevada	7.32 (25)	1.047 (6)	0	7.7 (19)	.384 (14)
New Hampshire	.750 (44)	.823 (15)	0	.64 (42T)	--
New Jersey	14.5 (15)	.762 (16)	1	11 (14)	.333 (19)
New Mexico	2.42 (39)	.414 (39)	0	1.02 (38)	--
New York	17.5 (10)	.728 (19)	4	12.7 (9)	.486 (10)
North Carolina	22.0 (7)	.629 (28T)	2	13.8 (7)	.688 (4)
North Dakota	.644 (46)	0 (50T)	0	0 (50T)	--
Ohio	11.4 (18)	1.094 (3)	1	12.5 (11)	.457 (12)
Oklahoma	7.71 (23)	.434 (37)	0	3.35 (30T)	.124 (27)
Oregon	1.77 (41)	1.861 (1)	0	3.33 (32)	--
Pennsylvania	9.85 (20)	.717 (22)	1	7.05 (21)	.35 (18)
Rhode Island	5.12 (30)	1.074 (4)	0	5.39 (26)	.033 (33)
South Carolina	29.8 (3)	.582 (31)	1	17.4 (6)	.57 (8)
South Dakota	.665 (45)	.452 (36)	0	.27 (45)	--

Table 1.2 Continued

Tennessee	16.5 (11)	.727 (20)	0	12 (12)	.481 (11)
Texas	12.1 (17)	.726 (21)	3	8.76 (17)	.362 (15)
Utah	.861 (42)	.746 (17)	0	.68 (40)	--
Vermont	.516 (49)	1.465 (2)	0	.71 (39)	--
Virginia	19.8 (8)	.493 (34)	1	9.79 (16)	.411 (13)
Washington	3.41 (35)	.427 (38)	0	1.45 (35)	--
West Virginia	3.16 (36)	.404 (40)	0	1.27 (36)	--
Wisconsin	5.57 (29)	1.048 (5)	1	5.84 (24)	.265 (20)
Wyoming	.857 (43)	.177 (45)	0	.15 (46)	--
Mean	10.1	.640	.8	6.88	.372

Notes: The rank is in parentheses.

The parity score is percent black in the legislature divided by percent black in the state, from 1992-2004.

Dyadic representation is the number of black members in the 110th Congress.

Collective representation is the percent black in the legislature, from 1992-2004.

Caucus representation is the black proportion of the Democratic Party plus the black proportion of committee chairs or co-chairs for 2010.

Sources: I collect the data for black committee chairs from each state legislative website, and they are accurate as of January 2010.

“2010 Partisan Composition of State Legislatures.” *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2010. Web. 20 January 2010.

Amer, Mildred L. 2008 “African American Members of the United States Congress: 1870-2008.” *Congressional Research Service*.

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1993. “Black State Legislators with Gender.”

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1995. “Black State Legislators with Gender.”

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1997. “Black State Legislators with Gender.”

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1999. “Black State Legislators with Gender.”

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2001. “Black State Legislators with Gender.”

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2005. “Black State Legislators with Gender.”

Table 1.2 Continued

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. “Estimates of the Population of States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, 1990 to 1999.”

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division, 1. “Annual Estimates of the Population for the United States and for Puerto Rico, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006.”

CHAPTER 2: DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AND BLACK POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT & PARTICIPATION

Introduction

Pitkin (1967) introduces the concepts of descriptive and substantive representation, saying that the former is when a representative shares physical traits such as race, ethnicity or gender with their constituency, while the latter is when a representative shares policy views with their constituency. Since then, a number of scholars have studied descriptive and substantive representation, especially for minorities. Most works gauge the influence of descriptive representation from a dyadic perspective. That is, if an elected official from District A is an ethnic minority, then all of the people in District A who are of the same ethnic group have descriptive representation. While an accurate view of descriptive representation, it is also a parochial one. Instead of looking at descriptive representation from the one-to-one perspective of legislator to voter, it is feasible to think of descriptive representation at the state level. This chapter is interested in the impact that black representation at the state level, or collective and parity descriptive representation, has on blacks' political knowledge, political interest, voting, and evaluation of the state legislature, relative to dyadic descriptive representation.

It is important to study black representation at the state level, and collective representation in particular, to broaden our theoretical understanding of descriptive representation, as it may be an important form of political empowerment for blacks.

Mansbridge (2003, 523) writes,

“Representatives who are female, African American, or of Polish ancestry, who have a child with a disability, or who have grown up on a farm, in a mining community or in a working-class neighborhood, often feel not only a particular sensitivity to issues relating to these experiences but also a particular responsibility for representing the interests and perspectives of these groups, even when members of these groups do not constitute a large fraction of their constituents.”

Thus, an entire black delegation (collective descriptive representation) may represent a black person's interests just as one person does (dyadic descriptive representation), and as Mansbridge's argument suggests, most black state legislators may see themselves as

surrogate representatives for all blacks in their state. From a substantive representation perspective, collective descriptive representation may also provide blacks with deliberation on issues important to the group (Mansbridge 2003) and with policy outcomes that are favorable towards the group (Weissberg 1978), with both encouraging blacks to participate and engage in politics. Also, states with greater levels of collective descriptive representation may also have a higher number of mobilization networks, which may lead to greater black political participation and engagement. Although I do not expect parity descriptive representation to be an important form of political empowerment, including it in this analysis allows a comparison across dimensions of descriptive representation, which is a goal of this project. Moreover, including parity descriptive representation shows whether the various forms of descriptive representation differentially influence black political participation and engagement, which is a key argument in this research.

Understanding black representation at the state level is important for three reasons. First, it broadens our understanding of descriptive representation by recognizing there is more than the dyadic relationship between a legislator and a voter. Second, since collective descriptive representation may maximize benefit both descriptive and substantive representation for blacks, it ought to exert greater influence on the group's views toward government than dyadic descriptive representation. Finally, since the 1980's, states have become increasingly important in making decisions that influence people's everyday lives, causing some to suggest that state lawmakers are as important if not more important than national lawmakers (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006). Policy devolution in the past thirty years makes it vital to study black representation in the states. Since state legislatures wield great influence, they may affect people's political behavior just as members of Congress do.

In this chapter, I examine the impact that collective, parity, and dyadic descriptive representation have on political behavior in 2008. Dyadic descriptive representation is

measured in 2008, while collective and parity descriptive representation are measured in 2006.⁶ Although we know some about how dyadic descriptive representation in Congress empowers minorities' political behavior, we know less about how black representation in state legislatures might influence political engagement in general. To date, only one published work has examined the relationship between collective representation in state legislatures and political behavior (Rocha et al 2010). There is research that examines collective descriptive representation in Congress, finding that it leads to policy outcomes that benefit the group (Griffin and Newman 2008). Although this work is insightful, it focuses on policy outcomes in Congress, telling us little of the relationship between black representation in the state legislature and political engagement.

I expect collective descriptive representation to generally empower African Americans, leading to higher levels of political knowledge, political interest, a greater propensity to vote, and a higher evaluation of the state legislature among the group. Conversely, dyadic descriptive representation might influence black political knowledge, but it may have little effect on the other variables, especially voting since previous works find that having a black member of Congress does not significantly affect black voter turnout (Gay 2001; Tate 2003). I expect parity descriptive representation for blacks, on the other hand, to have a smaller effect on black political engagement, as it is the weakest form of political empowerment.

What is the distribution of black elected officials across states? Table 1.2 in the previous chapter reports that in the 110th Congress, forty blacks serve in fifty states, and Figure 2.1 visualizes the phenomenon, with darker colors indicating higher numbers. California, Georgia, and New York, at four members each, have the largest black

⁶ Blacks either have a black member of Congress or they do not, and since the CCES was in the field in 2008, it makes sense to look at dyadic descriptive representation for this year. Conversely, parity and collective descriptive representation are not dichotomous, and in addition, the benefits received from them will need to have taken place prior to the survey, which is why I use 2006 data for them.

delegations in Congress. But, more importantly, twenty-nine had no black members of Congress. This is likely because they lack a majority black congressional district, which is the way that nearly every black has been elected to Congress (Lublin 1997; Canon 1999). The upshot is that having a black member of Congress is an experience limited to those who live in states with a large enough black population to create a majority black congressional district, which excludes a large segment of the black population.

Black representation at the state level, on the other hand, is something that a larger portion of the black population experiences. Figure 2.2 depicts that in 2006, on average, about one in ten state legislators is black, and more importantly five states had blacks make up at least twenty percent of its legislature, and only five states had no black state legislators. On average, parity descriptive representation for blacks in 2006 is .718, meaning that the group is underrepresented in the legislature (see Figure 2.3). Yet, just as with collective descriptive representation, only five states have blacks without any parity descriptive representation. In short, descriptive representation in the state legislature is a form of representation that a greater number of blacks experience, and as a result it is ideal for examining the way blacks respond to descriptive representation.

The rest of the paper consists of four sections. The next section discusses hypotheses and research design. The third section presents the results of the analyses. The final section discusses the findings' implications on the study of minority descriptive representation.

Hypotheses and Research Design

I have four different measures of political engagement. First, I measure the person's level of political knowledge with two indicators: whether they can correctly identify their House member's race and whether they know the majority party in the state's lower chamber.⁷ Second, I look at a person's level of political interest, coding

⁷ The creation of this variable is discussed Appendices A1-A4.

those with a high level of political interest as one and all others as zero. Next, I measure whether the respondent voted in the 2008 general election, coding those who indicated they voted as one and all others as zero. Lastly, I measure whether the respondent approves or disapproves of the state legislature, coding those who strongly approve or approve as a one, while coding those who strongly disapprove or disapprove as zero. The exact wording of the questions used to formulate the hypotheses, along with the distribution of the responses can be found in Appendix A (Tables A1-A7).

Previous works find that blacks are more likely to contact a black member of Congress (Gay 2002; Banducci, Donovan, and Karo 2004), and that blacks tend to have a higher evaluation of government when descriptively represented in Congress (Tate 2001; Gay 2002; Tate 2003). Building on these findings, we might expect dyadic descriptive representation (through having a black member of Congress) to improve black political knowledge and participation. Moreover, since black members of Congress tend to come from majority black districts (Lublin 1997; Canon 1999), and since political parties are more likely to mobilize blacks in areas where blacks are concentrated (Leighley 2001), then we have additional reason to expect dyadic descriptive representation to encourage black political participation. Other works, however, suggest that having a black member of Congress does not significantly increase the likelihood that a black person will vote (Gay 2001; Tate 2003), or that if it does, then it only influences blacks who have a similar ideology as their member of Congress (Griffin and Keane 2006). In other words, dyadic descriptive representation might not influence whether a black person votes.

Collective descriptive representation may influence black political engagement and participation for a few reasons. Having an entire black delegation represent someone may provide symbolic representation. Also, collective descriptive representation is closely tied to substantive policy representation. That is, works find that a group of minorities is able to implement policy beneficial to their group (Owens 2005; Preuhs 2005; Preuhs 2006; Preuhs 2007; Griffin and Newman 2008), and as a result, minorities

may receive policy representation from collective descriptive representation and therefore be encouraged to participate and engage in politics. Moreover, since black state legislators tend to come from areas with a high concentration of blacks (Grofman and Handley 1989; Handley, Grofman, and Arden 1998), then political parties are just as likely to mobilize blacks to vote for black state legislators as they do for black members of Congress. In fact, parties may have even greater incentive to mobilize blacks since it may be easier to translate black seat share into influence in state legislatures compared to the US House, and recent work supports this argument. Using Current Population Surveys and the CCES, Rocha et al (2010) study black and Latino turnout from 1996 to 2008, finding that greater collective descriptive representation in state legislatures increases the propensity that the groups vote.

Unlike dyadic or collective descriptive representation, no work to date examines whether parity descriptive representation influences political engagement and participation. Since parity descriptive representation is the weakest form of political empowerment, I expect it to have a minimal effect on black political participation and engagement.

For the sake of parsimony and because I expect it is an important form of political empowerment, I only hypothesize relationships for collective descriptive representation, while controlling for parity and dyadic descriptive representation. The hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: As collective descriptive representation increases, blacks will have higher levels of political knowledge.

Hypothesis 2: As collective descriptive representation increases, blacks will have higher levels of political interest.

Hypothesis 3: As collective descriptive representation increases, blacks will be more likely to vote.

Hypothesis 4: As collective descriptive representation increases, blacks will be more likely to approve of the state legislature.

There are a myriad of individual level variables that may account for someone's political engagement. Since scholars find that those who are older and have higher socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), I control for the respondent's age, income, and education. Nearly every study of political engagement controls for gender, so I follow suit. Those with partisan attachments are more likely to participate in politics than political independents (Campbell et al 1960; Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Lewis-Beck et al 2008), so I control for whether the respondent is a strong Democrat, strong Republican or an independent. Previous research finds that the increasing polarization of political parties may dissuade political participation by moderates (Dionne 1991; Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2005), so I control for whether the respondent is liberal or conservative.

In addition, contextual variables may influence political engagement. Since scholars find that citizens who live in states with competitive elections are more likely to vote (Kim, Petrocik and Enokson 1975; Cox and Munger 1989), I control for the competitiveness of the presidential (i.e. battleground states) and congressional elections, coding each so that higher values indicate competitive races.⁸ The South generally has lower levels of political participation than the rest of the country (Key 1949), so I include a dummy/binary variable for the region. Furthermore, the professionalism of the state legislature may influence some forms of political engagement in both a negative and positive sense. Squire (1993) finds that citizens tend to have lower opinions of highly professionalized legislatures, while Maestas (2000) argues that elected officials in professionalized legislatures tend to be more responsive to constituent concerns. Lastly,

⁸ The variable is created by subtracting the vote margin from 1, meaning that highly contested races will be high. For example, in a race won by 2 percent, then the score would be .98 (1-.02).

the partisan makeup of the legislature may influence respondents' evaluation, so I include a control for the percentage of Democrats in the legislature (summary statistics can be found in Appendix A).

The data come from a number of sources. The bulk of the data are from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). The CCES is an opt-in internet survey of over 32,000 respondents that uses sophisticated weights to make it representative of the registered voter population, and it is ideal for this study for a couple of reasons. First, it has over 3,400 black respondents, enabling us to make far better inferences about the behavior of blacks than we could from surveys with much smaller black samples. Second, since the CCES was in the field just two years ago, it allows us to update the previous works on descriptive representation that use older data. For example, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) use the 1987 GSS, Gay (2002) pools ANES data from 1980-1998, and Tate (2003) uses the 1996 BNES; while these are landmark works, the world has changed since these surveys were in the field, so it is important to see if the empowerment thesis remains robust over time. In addition, subnational level data are merged into the CCES so that I can show the role context plays in shaping political engagement. State level data include collective and parity descriptive representation for blacks, presidential vote margin, congressional vote margin, the percentage of Democrats in the legislature, and legislative professionalism; the only district level variable is dyadic descriptive representation.

I use logistic regression analysis for each model. Furthermore, I cluster by state, which accounts the similarity between the states, I use weights because of the nature of CCES data, and I use robust standard errors.

Results

Political Knowledge

There is no support for the first hypothesis. Table 2.1 reports that collective descriptive representation has a positive, but insignificant impact on whether or not

blacks correctly identify their House member's race. The findings for parity descriptive representation also are insignificant, but surprisingly higher parity descriptive representation is negatively associated with blacks knowing their House member's race. The only significant racial variable is dyadic descriptive representation. When blacks have a dyadic descriptive representation they are much more likely to correctly identify the race of their MC, while non-blacks with a black House member are significantly less likely to correctly identify the race of their member of Congress. In a substantive sense, a black person with a black House member is about fifteen percent more likely to correctly identify the race of their member of Congress than a black person without a black House member (see Figure 2.4). Conversely, a non-black person with a black House member is about twenty percent *less* likely to correctly identify their House member's race than non-blacks without a black House member. In addition, those who are older, more educated, liberals, conservatives, strong partisans, and those who live in presidential battleground states are more likely to correctly identify their House member's race, but independents and those who reside in the South are less likely to know their House member's race.

Another measure of political knowledge is whether a respondent knows the partisan makeup of the lower chamber in his or her state legislature. Table 2.2 indicates neither collective, nor parity, nor dyadic black descriptive representation, has a statistically significant effect on whether a blacks or non-blacks know the majority party in their state's lower chamber. But, unempowered blacks, or those bereft of descriptive representation, are less likely to know the majority party in their state's lower chamber, and both collective and parity descriptive representation increase black political knowledge. Figure 2.5 illustrates the likelihood a black respondent knows the majority party in the state lower chamber, varying the different forms of descriptive representation. Although there is little difference between unempowered blacks and blacks with dyadic descriptive representation, a black respondent with a maximum level of collective descriptive is six percent more likely to know the majority party in his or her

state lower chamber than an unempowered black respondent. The effect for parity descriptive representation is even more pronounced; blacks with the maximum level of parity descriptive representation are twice as likely to know the majority party in his or her state lower chamber. For the control variables, older, wealthier, ideologically minded, better-educated, and strong partisans are more likely to know the majority party in the lower chamber, but women, independents, and those who live in states with competitive presidential elections tend to know less about the partisan makeup of the state lower chamber.

Political Interest

The results in Table 2.3 support the second hypothesis. Blacks who live in states in which there is greater collective descriptive representation tend to have higher levels of political interest. Figure 2.6 reveals that a black person moving from the minimum to the maximum number of black state legislators is ten percent more likely to have a high level of political interest. On the other hand, non-blacks in states with greater collective black descriptive representation are significantly less likely to have high levels of political interest. For non-blacks, moving from no collective black descriptive representation to a high level of collective black descriptive representation decreases the probability that they have a high level of political interest by five percent. Neither parity nor dyadic black descriptive representation is significant for either group. Moreover, those who are older, highly educated, affluent, strong partisans, and ideologically minded tend to have higher levels of political interest, while women, independents, and those who live in states with professionalized legislatures generally have low to moderate levels of interest in politics. In short, collective black descriptive representation tends to increase blacks' interest in politics, while having a negative effect on non-blacks' political interest.

Voting

Table 2.4 displays the results for, and more importantly supports, the third hypothesis. That is, blacks who live in states with higher levels collective descriptive

representation are more inclined to vote than those who live in states with fewer black state legislators. In a substantive sense, as the number of blacks in the state legislature increases from its minimum to its maximum, the likelihood that a black person will vote increases by twenty percent (see Figure 2.7). Antithetically, non-blacks who live in states with larger black delegations in the legislature are less inclined to vote than those who live in states with smaller black delegations in the legislature. Moving the minimum to the maximum number of black state legislators makes non-blacks eight percent less likely to vote. Just as with political interest, neither parity nor dyadic descriptive representation influences the likelihood that blacks or non-blacks vote in 2008. Those who live in presidential battleground states, older respondents, wealthier respondents, strong partisans, and ideologically minded respondents are more likely to vote, but those who live in the South, independents, and women are less likely to vote. It appears that not only the traditional individual level factors structure voter turnout, but also that political empowerment, measured as collective representation for blacks, accounts for the propensity that respondents will vote.

State Legislature Approval

Table 2.5 provides the results for the impact of black descriptive representation on whether someone approves of the state legislature. While it does not support Hypothesis 4, it provides marginal support that non-blacks who reside in states with higher levels of collective black descriptive representation are less likely to positively evaluate the state legislature. Figure 2.8 demonstrates that moving from the minimum to the maximum number of black state legislatures makes non-blacks about seven percent less likely to approve of the state legislature. Although neither parity nor dyadic descriptive representation influence approval of the legislature, blacks with higher levels of parity descriptive representation were more likely to approve of the legislature, and the relationship is not far from achieving statistical significance ($p=.199$). As for the control variables, women, strong Democrats, and respondents from the South are more likely to

approve of the state legislature, while more affluent, more educated, older, non-partisans, and citizens who live in states with professionalized legislatures are less inclined to approve of the state legislature. In short, the findings indicate that when it comes to approval of the state legislature, collective black descriptive representation does not lead to blacks positively evaluating the legislature, but it has a negative influence on non-blacks' evaluation of the institution.

Discussion

This chapter set out to show that black representation in the states, and in particular collective descriptive representation, is an important form of representation that has heretofore been understudied. In testing the first hypothesis, I find support for dyadic descriptive representation for blacks influencing political knowledge, with blacks being more likely know their House member's race, but non-blacks being less likely to know their House member's race. Although the goal of this research is to promote the study of collective representation, this finding is important because it shows that increasing black knowledge about Congress requires having representation in that body. As a result, it suggests that blacks will generally know little about Congress, as the majority of them have white representatives. In looking at other hypotheses, I find that blacks who live in states with high collective descriptive representation states are generally more likely to have high levels of political interest and are more likely to vote. In addition, I illustrate that non-blacks in states with high collective descriptive representation for blacks, tend to have lower levels of political interest, tend to be less inclined to vote, and tend to be more critical of the state legislature.

The findings have implications on the study of descriptive representation. The findings here indicate scholars need to study minority descriptive representation in a broader sense. That is, descriptive representation is pivotal to political behavior beyond whether someone has a black House member. Moreover, since collective descriptive representation in state legislatures is a form of political empowerment that may provide

blacks with symbolic representation, substantive representation, and create a greater number of mobilization networks — all of which may encourage black political participation and engagement — and because it is a form of political empowerment that most blacks experience, it is imperative to test how blacks respond to it. Although in most cases parity descriptive representation fails to attain a statistically discernible effect on political engagement, it does in one case — parity descriptive representation for blacks increases the likelihood that they know the majority party in the state lower chamber, suggesting that it not only has normative implications, but also substantive implications.

There are also implications on the study of political engagement and participation in a more general sense. Considering the tomes of research devoted to political behavior over the past fifty years, our finding that collective black descriptive representation (and in one case parity descriptive representation) in state legislatures helps to structure black political engagement in a positive sense and structures non-black political engagement in a negative sense is a novel finding. In essence, the findings in this chapter places black representation in the state legislature in general, and collective descriptive representation for blacks in particular, in the same company as other important explanatory variables for political behavior, namely socioeconomic status, age, partisanship and electoral competitiveness. Thus, it is critical that future studies of voting behavior account for the racial composition of state legislatures.

The strongest finding in this chapter is that collective descriptive representation for blacks encourages the likelihood that blacks will vote, but decreases the likelihood that non-blacks will vote. Since this election has the first ever black presidential candidate for a major party, it warrants closer examination. The next chapter takes a look at black voter turnout in 2008.


Figure 2.1 Dyadic Descriptive Representation, 110th Congress

Figure 2.2 Collective Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures, 2006




Figure 2.3 Parity Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures, 2006




Table 2.1 Regression Results for Knowing MC's Race

Variables	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-Values
Black*Percent Black in Legislature	.011 (.016)	.52
Black*Black House Member	1.587*** (.224)	.001
Black*Parity Representation	-.665 (.639)	.299
Black	-.398 (.393)	.312
Percent Black in Legislature	.015 (.013)	.219
Black House Member	-.952*** (.149)	.001
Parity Representation	-.331 (.252)	.189
Female	-.306*** (.043)	.001
Income	.035*** (.007)	.001
Education	.116*** (.016)	.001
Age	.031*** (.002)	.001
Strong Democrat	.118** (.063)	.06
Strong Republican	.26*** (.083)	.002
Liberal	.146** (.068)	.031
Conservative	.223*** (.054)	.001
Independent	-.425*** (.079)	.001
Presidential Vote Margin	2.1** (.985)	.033
Congressional Vote Margin	.169 (.158)	.285
South	-.48*** (.153)	.002
Constant	-2.2** (.884)	.013
Observations	31568	--
Log Likelihood	-14961.10	--
Pseudo R-Squared	.091	--
Wald χ^2	1490.09	--

Note: Description of variables can be found in Appendix A3.

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Figure 2.4 Probability of Knowing MC's Race for Blacks and Non-Blacks




Table 2.2 Regression Results for Knowing Majority Party in State Legislature

Variables	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-Values
Black*Percent Black in State	.008 (.016)	.606
Black*Black House Member	-.008 (.169)	.962
Black*Parity Representation	.695 (.603)	.249
Black	-.91** (.449)	.043
Percent Black in Legislature	.003 (.023)	.91
Black House Member	.11 (.12)	.361
Parity Representation	-.56 (.58)	.335
Female	-.709*** (.049)	.001
Income	.058*** (.004)	.001
Education	.233*** (.018)	.001
Age	.014*** (.002)	.001
Strong Democrat	.229*** (.052)	.001
Strong Republican	.239*** (.05)	.001
Liberal	.229*** (.057)	.001
Conservative	.319*** (.094)	.001
Independent	-.343*** (.045)	.001
Legislative Professionalism	.187 (.609)	.758
Percent Democrat in Legislature	-.005 (.009)	.584
Presidential Vote Margin	-4.15*** (1.38)	.003
South	.358 (.265)	.178
Constant	1.820 (1.345)	.176

Table 2.2 Continued

Observations	31471	--
Log Likelihood	-18858.71	--
Pseudo R-Squared	.099	--
Wald χ^2	1069.13	--

Note: Description of variables can be found in Appendix A8.

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Figure 2.5 Probability that Blacks Know the Majority Party in the State Legislature, by Empowerment Type




Table 2.3 Regression Results for High Political Interest

Variables	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-Values
Black*Percent Black in Legislature	.016** (.008)	.046
Black*Black House Member	-.066 (.129)	.61
Black*Parity Representation	-.176 (.31)	.57
Black	-.339 (.276)	.219
Percent Black in Legislature	-.009*** (.003)	.009
Black House Member	.049 (.092)	.593
Parity Representation	.028 (.081)	.73
Female	-.904*** (.032)	.001
Income	.08*** (.005)	.001
Education	.335*** (.011)	.001
Age	.03*** (.001)	.001
Strong Democrat	.706*** (.042)	.001
Strong Republican	.744*** (.051)	.001
Liberal	.548*** (.055)	.001
Conservative	.54*** (.05)	.001
Independent	-.406*** (.055)	.001
Legislative Professionalism	-.211* (.115)	.066
Presidential Vote Margin	.002 (.266)	.994
Congressional Vote Margin	.012 (.085)	.892
South	.072 (.065)	.272
Constant	-2.667** (.226)	.001

Table 2.3 Continued

Observations	31527	--
Log Likelihood	-17686.19	--
Pseudo R-Squared	.175	--
Wald χ^2	8797.98	--

Note: Description of variables can be found in Appendix A8.

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Figure 2.6 Probability of High Political Interest for Blacks and Non-Blacks, Varying Black Representation in the State Legislature




Table 2.4 Regression Results for Voting in 2008 Election

Variables	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-Values
Black*Percent Black in Legislature	.044*** (.012)	.001
Black*Black House Member	.019 (.189)	.922
Black*Parity Representation	.299 (.435)	.493
Black	-.452 (.335)	.177
Percent Black in Legislature	-.016** (.007)	.016
Black House Member	.012 (.119)	.918
Parity Representation	.041 (.17)	.81
Female	-.348*** (.058)	.001
Income	.106*** (.008)	.001
Education	.337*** (.027)	.001
Age	.029*** (.001)	.001
Strong Democrat	.763*** (.068)	.001
Strong Republican	.83*** (.101)	.001
Liberal	.24*** (.074)	.001
Conservative	.342*** (.095)	.001
Independent	-.964*** (.08)	.001
Legislative Professionalism	-.022 (.151)	.886
Presidential Vote Margin	1.421*** (.365)	.001
Congressional Vote Margin	.048 (.116)	.68
South	-.162* (.099)	.1
Constant	-3.368*** (.313)	.001

Table 2.4 Continued

Observations	25470	--
Log Likelihood	-12190.59	--
Pseudo R-Squared	.177	--
Wald χ^2	2064.40	--

Note: Description of variables can be found in Appendix A8.

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Figure 2.7 Probability of Voting for Blacks and Non-Blacks, Varying Black Representation in the State Legislature




Table 2.5 Regression Results for Approval of State Legislature

Variables	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-values
Black*Percent Black in Legislature	-.022 (.02)	.268
Black*Black House Member	-.061 (.162)	.706
Black*Parity Representation	.625 (.487)	.199
Black	-.008 (.363)	.982
Percent Black in Legislature	-.012 (.007)	.107
Black House Member	-.101 (.115)	.364
Parity Representation	-.09 (.167)	.592
Female	.351*** (.048)	.001
Income	-.012** (.006)	.036
Education	-.039** (.015)	.012
Age	-.006*** (.002)	.001
Strong Democrat	.317*** (.108)	.003
Strong Republican	.09 (.109)	.404
Liberal	.031 (.094)	.743
Conservative	-.151 (.115)	.189
Independent	-.473*** (.045)	.001
Legislative Professionalism	-1.648*** (.281)	.001
South	.263** (.109)	.016
Percent Democrat in State Legislature	-.003 (.004)	.509
Constant	.814*** (.295)	.006
Observations	25331	--
Log Likelihood	-16736.35	


Table 2.5 Continued

Pseudo R-Squared	.038	--
Wald χ^2	1336.83	--

Note: Description of variables can be found in Appendix A8.

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Figure 2.8 Probability of State Legislature Approval for Non-Blacks, Varying Black Representation in the State Legislature



CHAPTER 3: OBAMA, COLLECTIVE DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION, AND UNLIKELY BLACK VOTERS IN 2008

Introduction

In 2008, black voter turnout exceeded sixty percent, the highest rate since passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Current Population Survey, 2008). Studies of the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections show that Jesse Jackson's candidacy led to turnout of younger and lesser educated blacks — the two groups least likely to participate in politics — having higher levels of interest and participation in politics (Walters 1988; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989; Tate 1993). Thus, most believe that Barack Obama's candidacy played a pivotal role in mobilizing black voters. Based on the analysis of Jackson's campaigns, it is not likely that Obama equally mobilized each segment of the black population. What group of people did Obama mobilize? Theoretically, the increase in black voters came from one of two groups: unlikely black voters or first-time black voters. This chapter examines this question.

Since the 1980's, scholars have studied the impact of political empowerment on minority political attitudes and participation. Studies show that blacks tend to have higher levels of political efficacy, political trust, and political participation when represented by blacks in local (Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Eisenger 1982; Howell and Fagan 1988; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Marschall and Ruhil 2007) and national government (Tate 2001; Gay 2002; Tate 2003; Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2004; Griffin and Keane 2006). The argument is that black elected officials provide blacks with both symbolic and substantive representation, leading to higher evaluations of government and increased black involvement in politics. But in recent years, scholars find that the positive effects of political empowerment can wane with time (Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998; Spence McClerking and Brown 2009), low quality of life (Howell and Marshall 1998; Harris, Sinclair-Chapman and McKenzie 2006), stasis (Overby et al 2005), or lack of power (Gilliam 1996). Thus, political empowerment is only beneficial to blacks if it has already led to change in the status quo, or if they perceive it will lead to change in the status quo.

This chapter examines unlikely black voters who decided to vote in the 2008 election, a key group that led to record black turnout. It compares two competing hypotheses for how descriptive representation influences the likelihood that an unlikely black voter voted in the 2008 presidential election. One argument is consistent with the findings in the previous chapter; states with a greater number of black state legislators will be more likely to have unlikely black voters participate in the 2008 election. Blacks with higher levels of collective descriptive representation will value the symbolic and substantive representation that comes from political empowerment and desire to have that representation at the national level. There should also be better mobilization networks at the subnational level, which act as mechanisms that simplify the voting process for blacks. States with fewer black state legislators — and therefore less symbolic or substantive representation and fewer mobilization networks—will be less likely to have episodic black voters participate in the 2008 election.

The other argument is that Obama's candidacy especially mobilizes unlikely black voters in states with low collective descriptive representation because they have few opportunities to vote for co-ethnic candidates. Obama's candidacy has little effect on blacks in states with high collective descriptive representation, as they already have high levels of political empowerment subnationally.

Why does this chapter focus on collective descriptive representation and not on the other forms of political empowerment? Although state legislatures have become more influential in shaping policy directly affecting peoples' lives (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), and although blacks in most states have collective descriptive representation, to date, it is a dimension of black representation that has been understudied. However, the statistical models control for both parity and dyadic descriptive representation, and compare the findings from each type.

Exploring the relationship between black representation in the state legislature and voter participation in the 2008 election is important because it helps scholars

understand the factors that led unlikely black voters to participate in the 2008 presidential election. Moreover, it demonstrates that although black representation in the state legislature structures black political participation, it does so differently for unlikely black voters vis-à-vis likely black voters, showing the heterogeneity in the black community often ignored in studies of race and politics. Most research on the limitations of political empowerment examine local government (save Harris, Sinclair-Chapman and McKenzie 2006). This analysis applies the same argument to state politics.

This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I review the literature on black presidential politics and political empowerment. I describe the data and methods in the third section. In the fourth section, I discuss the findings. Lastly, I explain the implications of the findings on the study of black presidential politics, black political participation, and black political empowerment.

Literature Review

Black Presidential Politics

Considering the paucity of black presidential candidates, only a handful of works examine black presidential politics. Shirley Chisholm was the first black to make a significant run at the presidency. Her 151.25 delegate votes at the 1972 Democratic National Convention was a then record for an African-American, but due to limited financial resources and misogynistic attitudes of black political elites (Chisholm 1973), Chisholm's campaign floundered and failed to mobilize a large number of blacks.

Jesse Jackson's 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns received significantly more scholarly attention. Through their analysis of the 1984 National Black Election Study, Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson (1989) find that Jesse Jackson appealed to a large majority of the black electorate in 1984. Furthermore, two in ten blacks agreed that Jackson's candidacy mobilized blacks, increasing the registration and voting by those who do not normally participate in politics (151). Walters (1988, 181) argues that Jackson's 1984 campaign led to something previously nonexistent: black political

organizations participating in presidential politics at the national level. Moreover, he says that Jackson's support in 1984 was attributed to a dramatic increase in voter registration among black college students and other black youth (171). Lastly, Tate (1993) studies Jackson's influence in both the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections and finds that blacks behave differently in the two elections. In 1984, blacks who supported Jesse Jackson were more likely to vote in the general election, but in 1988, blacks who supported him were *less* likely to vote in the general election (120). She attributes the difference to blacks supporting anyone but Reagan in 1984, but not being willing to support Dukakis in 1988.

These studies suggest that black presidential candidates tend to mobilize the black electorate. But, there is an important caveat: black presidential candidates do not equally mobilize subgroups of black citizens. That is, blacks who are mobilized by black presidential candidates are those who would otherwise not participate in politics.

There is an important difference between Obama's presidential campaign in 2008 and previous black presidential candidates. Although the other candidates participated during presidential primaries and national conventions, Obama is the first black candidate to receive a major party nomination, making it especially important that political scientists understand his ability to mobilize infrequent black voters.

Political Empowerment

For nearly three decades, scholars have studied how black representation positively affects blacks. At the local level, having a black mayor (Abney and Hutcheson 1981) or black city administration (Howell and Fagan 1988) leads to greater trust in government. Moreover, having a black mayor is associated with higher black employment rates (Eisenger 1982). Marschall and Ruhil (2007) find that blacks with representation on school boards and city council tend to be more satisfied with neighborhood conditions, police services, and public schools. Bobo and Gilliam (1990) provide the seminal work on black political empowerment at the local level, using the

1987 General Social Survey to show that having a black mayor leads to blacks feeling more politically efficacious, being more likely to vote, and having higher evaluations of government. At the congressional level, blacks with a black member of Congress tend to have higher evaluations of government (Tate 2001; Gay 2002; Tate 2003), are more likely to contact government (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004), and are more likely to vote (Griffin and Keane 2006). The crux of the political empowerment argument is that blacks' attitudes and behavior change because of the positive benefits they gain from black representation in government.

Not all scholars agree that political empowerment positively affects blacks. Howell and Marshall (1998) find that high crime rates in New Orleans nullified the positive effects of a black mayor. In a longitudinal study of Cleveland, Los Angeles, and Atlanta, scholars argue that blacks' frustration with the inability of the government to meet their demands led to a decrease in political participation (Gilliam and Kaufmann 1998). Gilliam (1996) studies Los Angeles, and finds that only blacks within the governing coalition had a positive evaluation of Tom Bradley, suggesting that political empowerment only changes attitudes when people gain power or influence from it. In their study of African-American civic activism from 1973 to 1994, Harris, Sinclair-Chapman and McKenzie (2006) find that downturns in the economy negated any gains made by black political empowerment. Others find that the presence of black judges did not lead to blacks viewing the judicial system as more fair (Overby et al 2005). Finally, a recent paper shows that black political incorporation, measured as having a black mayor, decreases participation in local politics (Spence, McClerking and Brown 2009). A common argument in these papers is that the novelty of political empowerment eventually wears off, weakening its ability to positively affect black political attitudes and participation.

The shortcoming of these works is they either study local or national politics, and as a result, we are unsure whether political empowerment at state level has a similar

effect. This chapter fills that void, measuring political empowerment as collective black descriptive representation in the state legislature.

Studies of black presidential politics suggest that black candidates tend to mobilize those who rarely participate in politics (Walters 1988; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989), meaning that they may especially mobilize unlikely black voters. Existing mobilization networks in states with high collective descriptive representation may encourage unlikely black voters to vote in the election. On the other hand, having high collective descriptive representation may weaken the importance of descriptive representation for unlikely black voters, meaning they may be less likely to participate in the 2008 election. Together, these findings lead to two competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Unlikely black voters residing in states with higher levels of collective descriptive representation will be more likely to vote in 2008 than unlikely black voters who live in states with lower levels of collective descriptive representation.

Hypothesis 2: Unlikely black voters residing in states with higher levels of collective descriptive representation will be less likely to vote in 2008 than unlikely black voters who live in states with lower levels of collective descriptive representation.

Data and Methods

I use 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) and 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) to test these hypotheses. Each survey has a question that allows me to differentiate unlikely voters from likely voters, and each has large black samples from various states, with 550 black respondents from twenty-six states in the ANES and over 3,400 black respondents from forty-seven states in the CCES. This allows for a comparison of unlikely black voters' behavior in states with varying levels of collective descriptive representation. The survey data are merged with state-level data, namely collective descriptive representation, parity descriptive

representation, and whether the respondent lives in a battleground state. These data are also merged with district-level data, including whether the respondent has a black representative in the U.S. House of Representatives. The dependent variable is whether the respondent voting in the 2008 presidential election. The large state samples in the CCES are particularly important for multilevel analysis, while the face-to-face interviews used by the ANES provide the highest quality survey data.

The key explanatory variable measures whether the respondent is an unlikely black voter. I create four dummy/binary variables: unlikely black voters, likely black voters, unlikely non-black voters, and likely non-black voters, where unlikely non-black voters are the reference category.⁹ Table 3.1 lists the number of voters for each category. In the ANES, 62.5 percent of unlikely black voters voted, and in the CCES, 74.5 percent of unlikely black voters voted. Instead of including a three-way interaction term that is complicated and can lead to multicollinearity problems, these data are modeled as a two-way interaction term (likely voter* race) for two different subsamples, comparing turnout of unlikely black voters in states with below average collective descriptive representation (eleven percent or less), versus turnout of unlikely black voters in states with above average collective descriptive representation (greater than eleven percent). The results are thus presented in two different tables, one for respondents residing in states with low black collective descriptive representation and one for respondents residing in states with high black collective descriptive representation.

Other factors may account for unlikely black voters participating in the 2008 election. Since the aim of this research is to compare the different forms of black representation at the state level, I control for parity and dyadic descriptive representation. Since older, educated, and more affluent citizens are more likely to participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), the age, education and income of

⁹ See Appendix B for the distribution of the dependent variable and of the variables used to create the dummy variables.

the respondent is included. Leighley (2001) finds that minorities have higher levels of political participation when contacted by a political party, so I control for whether a party contacted the respondent.¹⁰ Since respondents with strong partisan attachments are more likely to participate in politics (Campbell et al 1960; Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Lewis-Beck et al 2008), a variable for partisan strength is included where strong partisans are coded as 1, and all others are coded as 0. Citizens who live in geographic areas with competitive elections are more likely to participate in politics (Kim, Petrocik and Enokson 1975; Cox and Munger 1989), so the models control for the presidential vote margin in the respondent's state. Respondents who reside in the South have been found to have lower levels of political participation (Key 1949), so a southern dummy is included. Finally, the models account for the respondent's gender.

I employ multivariate logistic regression with robust standard errors, clustering by state to account for the lack of independence between observations in the same states. Table 3.2 shows the results of the models predicting turnout of unlikely black voters using the ANES survey (left column) and CCES survey (right column) for individuals residing in states with low collective descriptive representation in the state legislature (first subsample model). Table 3.3 presents the results of the models predicting turnout of unlikely black voters using the ANES survey (left column) and CCES survey (right column) for individuals residing in states with high collective descriptive representation in the state legislature (second subsample model). We are thus interested in comparing across the surveys, but especially comparing Tables 3.2 and 3.3, which vary state contexts.

Results

Surprisingly, the findings generally support the first hypothesis. In low collective descriptive representation states, unlikely black voters are not more likely to vote than

¹⁰ For CCES models I use being contacted by House member as a proxy for being contacted by a political party.

unlikely non-black voters (see Table 3.2), but unlikely black voters residing in states with high collective descriptive representation are significantly more likely to vote than unlikely non-black voters (see Table 3.3). Unlikely black voters living in a high collective descriptive representation state compared to a low collective descriptive representation state, increases the probability of voting by twenty-seven percent, holding other variables constant (see Figure 3.1).¹¹ Figure 3.2 depicts the results for the CCES, showing that unlikely black voters living in high collective descriptive representation states are ten percent more likely to vote than those who live low collective descriptive representation states. These findings suggest that the mobilization networks present in high collective descriptive representation states are critical for encouraging the participation of unlikely black voters in presidential elections.

Region might also influence the political participation of unlikely black voters. Since most black state legislators serve in the South (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 2007), all southern states except Texas have high collective descriptive representation. As a result, the aforementioned findings may be driven by southern blacks participating at a higher rate than blacks in other regions, not by collective descriptive representation. To address this question, it is imperative to examine voting among unlikely black voters in high collective representation states like Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, and Ohio. Thus, I create a two-way interaction term (unlikely black voter* South) so that the coefficient “unlikely black voters” represents unlikely black voters who reside outside of the South, and then I analyze the data by two subsamples: low collective descriptive representation and high collective descriptive representation.¹² The results for the ANES show unlikely black voters who live in high collective descriptive representation states outside of the South are thirty-four percent more likely to vote than those who live in low collective descriptive representation state

¹¹ The findings are for blacks who are non-partisans.

¹² The findings are available upon request.

(see Figure 3.3). The results for the CCES reveal that unlikely black voters who live in high collective descriptive representation states outside of the South are eight percent more likely to vote than those who live in low collective descriptive representation states (see Figure 3.4). Results from both datasets indicate that region affects whether unlikely black voters participate in the 2008 election, with a pronounced effect among unlikely black voters outside of the South.

Another way to model these data is to create a two-way interaction (unlikely voter* collective descriptive representation), and to examine subsample of only black respondents. Table 3.4 displays the results from the ANES, showing that unlikely black voters without black representation are significantly less likely to vote, but that having descriptive representation makes them more likely vote, especially parity descriptive representation. Figure 3.5 presents predicted probabilities based on the model in Table 3.4, and it illustrates that an unlikely black voter without any black representation has a six percent chance of voting. But, having a black House member increases their probability of voting to thirty percent, having the maximum level of collective descriptive representation increases their probability of voting to over forty percent, and that having maximum parity descriptive representation increases their probability of voting to over ninety-five percent. In short, unlikely black voters bereft of black representation are not likely to vote, but those with black representation are more likely to vote. Parity, collective, and dyadic descriptive representation all improve the probability that an unlikely black voter participated in the 2008 elections.

Both modeling techniques suggest that black representation encourages the political participation of unlikely black voters. Moreover, both techniques show that black representation in the state legislature may influence black political behavior, with the first set of models emphasizing the importance of collective descriptive representation, while the black subsample model emphasizes the importance of parity descriptive representation, but continues to show the positive benefits of collective and

dyadic descriptive representation. In all five models strong partisans are more likely to vote than weak partisans or non-partisans, and in four of the five models, being contacted by a political party increases the likelihood that a respondent votes, showing the important roles that party identification and elite mobilization play in black political participation.

Discussion

This chapter set out to test whether Barack Obama's candidacy mobilized some black voters more than others. The analysis shows his candidacy may have had the greatest mobilization impact on unlikely black voters who live in places with greater black representation in the state legislature. The findings support the one of the key arguments outlined in the first chapter, namely that black representation may be an important form of political empowerment for blacks, and as a result, it may structure black political behavior. Surprisingly, parity descriptive representation, which I expected to be the weakest form of political empowerment, actually appears to have a pronounced effect on whether unlikely black voters participate.

The findings have implications on the study of black political participation. Previous work at the local level shows that being contacted by a party mobilizes blacks (Leighley 2001), and the findings extend this argument to the state level, indicating that elite contact is vital to black mobilization beyond the local level. In addition, scholars find that decline in voter turnout in recent presidential elections is because younger generations are less likely to vote (Lyons and Alexander 2000). Yet, these findings indicate that race may mitigate this trend, with unlikely black voters from states with high collective descriptive representation being willing to participate in elections in which there are black candidates.

There are also implications on the study of black presidential politics. Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson (1989, 237) say, "Both the solidarity based on a politicized sense of common fate and that based on an exclusivist black identity were aroused by the 1984

Jackson campaign. But they will be there for other candidates as well.” Obama’s presidential candidacy confirmed these scholars’ beliefs; he benefited from unlikely black voters, who likely possess a sense of common fate and high black identity, choosing to participate in the election. This suggests that in the future, other black presidential candidates will mobilize unlikely black voters. On the one hand, this is helpful, as increased political participation makes for a stronger democracy. On the other hand, this is unhelpful, as significant black presidential candidates are rare, making their ability to mobilize black voters sporadic at best.

Lastly, there are implications on the limitations of black political empowerment. This research finds the same limitations of political empowerment at the local level do not extend to the state level. That is, the findings show that the presence of a black candidate and thus the potential of descriptive representation is not enough to have unlikely black voters participate in politics. Instead, the benefits from symbolic and substantive representation, along with the mobilization networks that may come from electing a large number of black state legislators, must be present to encourage political participation by unlikely black voters. Just as work shows that Barack Obama’s candidacy did not fundamentally change white political attitudes (Hutchings 2009), these findings show the presence of a black candidate has not fundamentally changed how blacks participate in politics.

The previous chapters analyze black descriptive representation at the state level as an explanatory variables, showing how it shapes citizen political engagement. The next chapter studies black descriptive representation at the state level as a dependent variable, in particular focusing on state-level factors that account for collective descriptive representation.

Table 3.1 Distribution of Voting by Race and Likely Voter

ANES	
Voted in 2008	Number of Respondents in Category
Unlikely Black Voter	62.5% (120)
Likely Black Voter	94% (300)
Unlikely Non-Black Voter	46.1% (282)
Likely Non-Black Voter	93% (887)
Total	2009
CCES	
Unlikely Black Voter	74.5% (646)
Likely Black Voter	98.3% (1,676)
Unlikely Non-Black Voter	71.6% (8,742)
Likely Non-Black Voter	98.5% (14,820)
Total	32,801

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer].

The American National Election Studies (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].

Table 3.2 Regression Results for Voting in Low Collective Descriptive Representation States

Variables	ANES		CCES	
	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-values	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-Values
Unlikely Black Voters	-.165 (.284)	.562	.117 (.153)	.446
Likely Black Voters	2.1*** (.605)	.001	2.338*** (.308)	.001
Likely Non-Black Voters	2.106*** (.189)	.001	2.472*** (.138)	.001
Black House Member	.076 (.207)	.713	-.117 (.25)	.639
Racial Parity	.404 (.448)	.367	-.405 (.346)	.242
Presidential Vote Margin	-2.927** (1.266)	.021	.994 (.884)	.261
South	.17 (.127)	.181	-.328*** (.098)	.001
Party Contact	1.218*** (.282)	.001	.906*** (.126)	.001
Age	-.001 (.007)	.961	.013*** (.003)	.001
Education	.216*** (.052)	.001	.246*** (.035)	.001
Income	.013 (.013)	.308	.11*** (.014)	.001
Strong Partisan	1.184*** (.331)	.001	.915*** (.1)	.001
Female	.494** (.237)	.037	-.214* (.122)	.079
Constant	-1.36 (1.368)	.32	-3.002*** (.64)	.001
Observations	1027	--	13379	--
Log Likelihood	-375.91	--	-5219.05	--
Pseudo R-Squared	.328	--	.344	--

Notes: In CCES models, I use being contacted by the House as a proxy for party contact.

Sources: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer].

The American National Election Studies (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Table 3.3 Regression Results for Voting in High Collective Descriptive Representation States

Variables	ANES		CCES	
	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-values	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-Values
Unlikely Black Voters	1.462*** (.426)	.001	.462*** (.132)	.001
Likely Black Voters	2.612*** (.316)	.001	3.11*** (.264)	.001
Likely Non-Black Voters	2.426*** (.294)	.001	2.478*** (.15)	.001
Black House Member	-.057 (.362)	.876	-.052 (.11)	.641
Racial Parity	.543 (.93)	.56	.315 (.67)	.638
Presidential Vote Margin	2.115* (1.175)	.072	1.249 (1.153)	.279
South	-.23 (.312)	.46	-.144 (.241)	.551
Party Contact	.428 (.303)	.158	.764*** (.115)	.001
Age	-.001 (.01)	.95	.018*** (.003)	.001
Education	.251*** (.058)	.001	.198*** (.039)	.001
Income	.037* (.021)	.083	.131*** (.014)	.001
Strong Partisan	.93*** (.301)	.002	.827*** (.074)	.001
Female	.287 (.327)	.381	-.093 (.112)	.405
Constant	-6.269*** (1.169)	.001	-4.092*** (.857)	.001
Observations	893	--	10394	--
Log Likelihood	-319.24	--	-4187.05	--
Pseudo R-Squared	.324	--	.345	--

Notes: In CCES models, I use being contacted by the House as a proxy for party contact.

Sources: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer].

The American National Election Studies (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$

Figure 3.1 Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters, Varying Collective Descriptive Representation (ANES)




Figure 3.2 Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters, Varying Collective Descriptive Representation (CCES)




Figure 3.3 Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters who Reside Outside of the South, Varying Collective Descriptive Representation (ANES)




Figure 3.4 Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters who Reside Outside of the South, Varying Collective Descriptive Representation (CCES)





Table 3.4 Regression Results for Voting by Unlikely Voters (ANES Black Subsamples)

Variables	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-Values
Percent Black in Legislature* Unlikely Voter	-.027 (.040)	.5
Black House Member* Unlikely Voter	-1.181 (1.205)	.327
Parity Representation* Unlikely Voter	4.912*** (1.887)	.009
Percent Black in Legislature	.004 (.028)	.899
Black House Member	1.284 (.886)	.147
Parity Representation	-.095 (1.907)	.96
Unlikely Voter	-4.565*** (1.521)	.003
Age	.001 (.01)	.977
Education	.041 (.073)	.572
Income	.063 (.041)	.126
Strong Partisan	1.042*** (.368)	.005
Party Contact	.447 (.37)	.226
Presidential Vote Margin	-3.376 (3.027)	.265
Female	-.187 (.304)	.539
South	.099 (.591)	.867
Constant	3.694 (3.106)	.234
Observations	462	--
Log Likelihood	-172.30	--
Pseudo R-Squared	.252	--

Source: *The American National Election Studies* (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].

Figure 3.5 Probability of Voting for Unlikely Black Voters, Varying Descriptive Representation (ANES)



CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING COLLECTIVE DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION, 1992-2004

Introduction

Collective descriptive representation has received considerable attention from scholars. Some studies show that states with larger black populations tend to have more black state legislators (Grofman and Handley 1989; Handley, Grofman, and Arden 1998), which is not surprising. Some studies find that institutional variables, like legislative professionalism (Squire 1992), term limits (Reed and Schansberg 1995; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Penning 2002; Straayer 2002; Carey et al 2006) and multimember districts (Jewell 1982; Grofman, Migalski, and Noviello 1986; Moncrief and Thompson 1992; Brockington et al 1998; Gerber, Morton and Rietz 1998; Cooper 2008) impact the number of black state legislators as well. A recent study on collective descriptive representation for Latinos finds that states with term limits, citizen legislatures, and higher turnover in the legislature tend to have a greater number of Latino state legislators (Casellas 2009). These studies, however, have some limitations. In one set of research, the authors limit their analysis to fewer than fifteen states, which is problematic because it calls into question the generalizability of the findings. In the other set of research, the authors do not incorporate time into their research design, and as a result, they fail to recognize the dynamic nature of collective descriptive representation. This study improves upon these works by looking at collective black descriptive representation in all fifty states, from 1992 to 2004. In addition, this chapter argues that a novel measure of education, a black-to-white education parity ratio, might influence the election of black state legislators. To date, ratios have only been studied primarily as dependent variables, making this one of few to study one as an explanatory variable.

Understanding collective descriptive representation matters because states have become more powerful in making decisions that affect people's lives (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006) and it is a form of empowerment most blacks experience, making it important to understand the factors that account for the number of black state legislators.

Moreover, collective descriptive representation may provide symbolic and substantive representation, along with increasing the number of mobilizations networks in states, which may encourage blacks to participate in politics (see Chapters 1 and 2).

The rest of the chapter consists of five sections. The next section is a review of the literature on collective descriptive representation. Next, I introduce the black-to-white education parity ratio. The third section discusses the hypotheses and describes the research design. The fourth section outlines the findings. Lastly, I discuss the findings' implications on studies of subnational black representation.

Literature Review

Considering that racial prejudice makes whites reluctant to vote for black candidates (Reeves 1997), it is not surprising that scholars find the concentration of blacks in states tends to increase the number of black state legislators (Grofman and Handley 1989; Handley, Grofman, and Arden 1998). A number of institutional variables have been found to influence collective descriptive representation. Squire (1992) argues that states with professionalized legislatures generally have more black state legislators. The findings for term limits and multimember districts are mixed. Although most argue that term limits have no impact on collective descriptive representation (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Penning 2002; Straayer 2002; Carey et al 2006), some argue that term limits may decrease collective descriptive representation (Reed and Schansberg 1995). For multimember districts, some find that they tend to increase collective descriptive representation (Brockington et al 1998; Gerber, Morton and Rietz 1998), and others find that they decrease collective descriptive representation (Jewell 1982; Grofman, Migalski, and Noviello 1986; Moncrief and Thompson 1992). A recent piece argues that multimember districts no longer seem to decrease the number of black state legislators, but also recognizes that findings are mixed (Cooper 2008). Although these findings are informative and important, they have limitations.

One set of research examines too few states. Grofman and Handley (1989) and Grofman, Handley, and Arden (1998) only study states with a black population of ten percent or greater, and Grofman, Migalski, and Noviello (1986) only examine states that have a black population fifteen percent or greater. Other studies base their findings on fewer than twelve states (Jewell 1982; Moncrief and Thompson 1992; Brockington et al 1998), and in some cases, the authors only study one state (Penning 2002; Straayer 2002). The problem with looking at a smaller number of states that have larger black populations is that it makes it difficult to generalize the findings to all fifty states, especially for those with sparse black populations. For instance, if this study only analyzed states with at least a ten percent black population, then the six black state legislators serving in the Iowa state legislature would be omitted. One of the goals of this research is to understand collective descriptive representation in different state contexts.

The other set of research is problematic in how it measures time. Carey, Niemi and Powell (2000) and Carey et al (2006) examine survey data in a given year, so their studies say little on how term limits influence collective descriptive representation over time. Moncrief et al (1992) examine how term limits impact states over time, but the problem with this work is that it takes places before term limits impacted states.¹³ These works fail to understand the how collective descriptive representation shifts over time, and as an analysis of both time and space, this research will be able to uncover the dynamic nature of collective descriptive representation in the states, which no other work has done.

Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio

The black-to-white education parity ratio compares the equity of black and white educational outcomes, by state. It is the percentage of blacks who are over twenty-five and have earned at least a bachelor's degree, divided by the same population of whites.

¹³ In 1996, California and Maine were the first states to be impacted by term limits

This measure may be important for a couple of reasons. First, since black state legislators are highly educated (Holmes 2000; Orey 2000; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), states with a greater number of educated blacks would be able to draw from a larger candidate pool, and in turn, might have higher levels of collective descriptive representation. Second, I include this measure because Rodney Hero's work indicates the importance of ratios when studying minority politics. He finds that minority diversity leads to poorer overall graduation and suspension outcomes, but when examined as a ratio, it leads to better graduation and suspension outcomes for minorities (Hero 1998). In a later analysis, he finds states with higher social capital tend to have better overall graduation and suspension outcomes, but when examined as a ratio, it leads to poorer graduation and suspension outcomes for minorities (Hero 2007). Hero's work shows that minority outcomes must be understood in light of white outcomes; thus, I compare black educational outcomes to white educational outcomes, instead of merely examining black educational outcomes. What differentiates this work from Hero's is that I examine a ratio as an explanatory variable, not as a dependent variable. The next section introduces the hypotheses and describes the research design.

Hypotheses and Research Design

States with larger black populations (Grofman and Handley 1989; Grofman, Handley, and 1998) and professionalized legislatures (Squire 1992) tend to have a greater number of black state legislators. Also, black state legislators are highly educated (Holmes 2000; Orey 2000; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), but compete against whites for electoral seats, so greater education parity between blacks and whites may increase the number of black state legislators. Based on these arguments, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: States with larger black populations will have higher levels of collective descriptive representation.

Hypothesis 2: States with professionalized legislatures will have higher levels of collective descriptive representation.

Hypothesis 3: States with higher black-to-white education parity ratios will have higher levels of collective descriptive representation.

Other variables might influence collective descriptive representation as well. As aforementioned, studies show that term limits and multimember districts may affect the number of black state legislators, so I include them as control variables.¹⁴ Studies find that black state legislators represent districts with sizable Latino populations (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), and since blacks and Latinos both tend to vote for Democrats (Mindiola, Niemann and Rodriguez 2002), states with larger Latino populations might have higher levels of collective descriptive representation. I also include common controls in state politics research, namely the Berry et al (1998) citizen ideology score (updated on Richard Fording's website), where higher levels indicate more liberal citizens, along with state median income, state median age, and state education, measured as the percentage of residents over twenty-five who have a high school diploma.

The measure for collective descriptive representation is the number of black state legislators divided by the number of all state legislators; the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies provides the number of black state legislators, while *The Book of States* provides the total number of state legislators. Table 4.1 ranks states by collective descriptive representation, showing that on average, blacks comprise about seven percent of state legislatures. Mississippi has the highest level of collective descriptive representation, with blacks being nearly one in four state legislators. In five other states, more than one in six state legislators is black. Conversely, Idaho, Montana, and North Dakota rank in bottom of collective descriptive representation, as they fail to elect a

¹⁴ Because of mixed findings and desire for parsimony, I decide not to hypothesize a relationship for term limits or multimember districts.

single black legislator during the era examined, and in nine other states, blacks make up less than one percent of the state legislature. Lastly, there is a clear geographic trend to collective descriptive representation, with seven of the top ten states being in the South, while all of the bottom ten states are outside of the South.

The explanatory variables come from a number of data sources. Squire (2007) provides the measure of legislative professionalism, and the U.S. Census Bureau provides Latino population in state, median age in state, state education, and median income. Richard Fording's website lists the Berry et al (1998) citizen ideology score, along with updates. The NCSL provides term limits data, and two sources — Wasserman (2009) and state governments — supply the number of multimember districts in each state.¹⁵ See Appendix C (Table C1) for the description and distribution of the variables.

The black-to-white education parity ratio warrants additional discussion, given it is a novel explanatory variable. On average, the black-to-white education parity ratio is .644, meaning that for every one hundred whites who over twenty-five and have a bachelor's degree, there sixty-four blacks who are the same age and have the same education; thus, blacks generally have poorer educational outcomes than whites have (see Table 4.2). In three states — Vermont, South Dakota, and Maine — the black-to-white education parity ratio is above one, meaning that blacks are better educated in these states than whites are. At the other end, Louisiana, Virginia, Connecticut, and South Carolina all have ratios less than half a percent, which means for every black person with a bachelor's degree, there are two whites with an analogous level of education. It is difficult to ascertain the impact of the black-to-white education parity when looking at descriptive statistics alone; therefore, I employ regression analysis to understand the structural relationship between the explanatory variables and collective descriptive representation.

¹⁵ Peverill Squire collected data on multimember districts from 2001-2003, and he gathered the data by contacting state governments.

I run a pooled cross-sectional time series model with panel-corrected standard errors to uncover the variables that account for collective descriptive representation. First introduced by Beck and Katz (1995), panel-corrected standard errors address problems with panel heterogeneity, or the correlation between units. It does not, however, address problems with serial correlation (autocorrelation), which is the correlation between variables over time. In fact, the authors write, “Once the dynamics are accounted for or transformed away, TSCS analysts can estimate model parameters by OLS” (1995, 645). Serial correlation is problematic because it biases the standard error, leading to difficulty in determining statistical significance (Berry 1993). But, this is not a problem with this analysis. Methodologists find that when data are cross-sectional dominant, then it minimizes the threat of serial correlation (Stimson 1985, 926), and these data are cross-sectional dominant since there are fifty states and only seven years.¹⁶ Lastly, I include a dummy/binary variable for each year this accounts for the role of time in the model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).

Results

There is support for two of the three hypotheses. Table 4.3 demonstrates that states with larger black populations have higher levels of collective descriptive representation, supporting the first hypothesis. Moving from the minimum to the maximum black population in a state increases collective descriptive representation by twenty-three percent, which is easily the most important explanatory variable in determining the number of black state legislators (see Figure 4.1). Also, states with professionalized legislatures generally have higher levels of collective descriptive representation than states with citizen legislatures, supporting the second hypothesis. Figure 4.2 illustrates that moving from the minimum to the maximum of legislative professionalism increases collective descriptive representation by two and a half percent.

¹⁶ Although Stata does not have a test statistic for panel data that indicates autocorrelation, the output verifies there is no autocorrelation in the data.

Although the finding for the black-to-white education parity ratio lacks statistical significance ($p=.263$), it is in the hypothesized direction; states that have higher black-to-white education parity ratios have a higher level of collective descriptive representation.

A few of the control variables are statistically significant. States with larger Latino populations tend to have higher levels of collective descriptive representation, suggesting that Latinos may help elect black state legislators. Moreover, older populations tend to have higher levels of collective descriptive representation, which is a bit surprising since I expect older cohorts to be more reluctant to vote for black candidates than younger cohorts to be. More affluent states tend to have lower levels of collective descriptive representation, and this may be true because the states with the largest black populations are in the South, which is generally poorer than any other region. Lastly, it is worth noting that neither term limits nor multimember districts influence collective descriptive representation, and neither finding is surprising. The null finding for term limits corroborates the opinion of most scholars (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Penning 2002; Straayer 2002; Carey et al 2006), and the finding for multimember districts supports recent work that they may no longer influence black representation (Cooper 2008).

Discussion

This chapter has uncovered the factors that account for collective descriptive representation in state legislatures and has addressed the methodological shortcomings in previous research, and the findings have both theoretical and methodological implications on the study of subnational black representation.

From a theoretical perspective, black state population is the primary variable that accounts for collective descriptive representation, but it is not the *only* variable that matters. States with professionalized legislatures, larger Latino populations, and older populations generally have higher levels of collective descriptive representation, while wealthier states generally have lower levels of collective descriptive representation. In

particular, Latino population — with its growing trend — might be vital to increasing collective descriptive representation. This finding is consistent with previous research that argues the presence of a partisan electoral system encourages blacks and Latinos to form electoral coalitions (Rocha 2007), but is contrary to research that argues competition over scarce resources— electoral office in this case— makes it unlikely that blacks and Latinos will work together (McClain and Karnig 1990; Meier et al 2004). Although the relationship between blacks and Latinos is undoubtedly complex, these findings provide additional proof that the groups cannot merely coexist, but can actually coalesce.

This research has methodological implications on the study of black representation in the states. First, including black population as the only variable that explains collective descriptive representation (Grofman and Handley 1989; Handley, Grofman, and Arden 1998) is akin to specification error (omitted variable bias), which methodologists find not only biases the coefficients, but also incorrectly estimates the variance (Gujarati 1995). Therefore, it is not possible to understand the true relationship between black population and collective descriptive representation without statistically controlling for other relevant variables. Second, not only does this research examine all fifty states, allowing for generalizability, but it also adds the dimension of time, recognizing the dynamic nature of collective descriptive representation.

In closing, this chapter uncovers the factors that account for collective descriptive representation in state legislatures. This is critically important since state legislatures have become more influential in making policies that affect people's lives, it is a form of political empowerment that a large number of blacks experience, and it is a form of political empowerment that influences black political behavior. The next chapter explores caucus descriptive representation, introducing a new measure of black caucus influence, accounting for legislative caucus influence, and illustrating the impact influential caucuses have on black political behavior.

Table 4.1 States Ranked by Collective Descriptive Representation

States	Collective Descriptive Representation	Rank
Mississippi	23.4	1
Alabama	22.5	2
Louisiana	20.2	3
Maryland	18.9	4
Georgia	17.5	5
South Carolina	17.4	6
North Carolina	13.8	7
Illinois	12.9	8
New York	12.7	9
Florida	12.6	10
Ohio	12.5	11
Tennessee	12	12
Michigan	11.8	13
New Jersey	11	14
Arkansas	10.2	15
Virginia	9.79	16
Texas	8.76	17
Missouri	8.19	18
Nevada	7.7	19
Indiana	7.52	20
Pennsylvania	7.05	21
Connecticut	6.72	22
California	6.19	23
Wisconsin	5.84	24
Delaware	5.76	25
Rhode Island	5.39	26
Kansas	3.89	27
Colorado	3.57	28
Kentucky	3.41	29
Massachusetts	3.35	30T
Oklahoma	3.35	30T
Oregon	3.33	32
Arizona	3.17	33
Nebraska	2.04	34
Washington	1.45	35
West Virginia	1.27	36
Alaska	1.2	37
New Mexico	1.02	38
Vermont	.71	39
Utah	.68	40
Iowa	.66	41
Minnesota	.64	42T
New Hampshire	.64	42T

Table 4.1 Continued

Hawaii	.37	44
South Dakota	.27	45
Wyoming	.15	46
Maine	.07	47
Idaho	0	50T
Montana	0	50T
South Dakota	0	50T
Mean	6.88	--

Note: Collective descriptive representation is the number of black state legislators divided by the total number of black state legislators.

Sources: *Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 1993. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1995. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1997. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1999. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2001. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2003. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2005. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

The Book of the States. 1992-1993. Vol. 29. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1994-1995. Vol.30. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1996-1997. Vol. 31. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1998-1999. Vol. 32. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2000-2001. Vol. 33. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2002. Vol. 34. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

Table 4.1 Continued

The Book of the States. 2003. Vol. 35. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2004. Vol. 36. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

Table 4.2 States Ranked by Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio

States	Education Parity Score	Rank
Vermont	1.164	1
South Dakota	1.147	2
Maine	1.066	3
New Hampshire	.994	4
Idaho	.963	5
Montana	.947	6
West Virginia	.868	7
North Dakota	.826	8
Utah	.745	9
Minnesota	.731	10
Oregon	.721	11
Iowa	.713	12
Washington	.676	13
New Mexico	.674	14
Arizona	.651	15
Oklahoma	.649	16
Nebraska	.634	17
Tennessee	.630	18
Rhode Island	.616	19
Indiana	.612	20
Massachusetts	.604	21
Missouri	.602	22
Colorado	.601	23
Kentucky	.598	24
California	.594	25
Maryland	.593	26
Wyoming	.583	27
Nevada	.575	28
Arkansas	.568	29
Hawaii	.567	30
Texas	.565	31
Michigan	.556	32
Georgia	.543	33
Alabama	.542	34T
Kansas	.542	34T
New York	.539	36
Ohio	.536	37
New Jersey	.535	38
Pennsylvania	.534	39
Alaska	.526	40
Illinois	.523	41T
Florida	.523	41T
North Carolina	.521	43

Table 4.2 Continued

Mississippi	.512	44
Wisconsin	.508	45
Delaware	.502	46
Louisiana	.492	47
Virginia	.456	48
Connecticut	.431	49
South Carolina	.399	50
Mean	.644	--

Notes: The scores are the percentage of blacks that have a college degree divided by the percentage of whites that have a college degree, and are the average from 1992 to 2004.

Sources: *U.S. Census Bureau*. Census 1990 Summary File 3, P058. "Race by Educational Attainment."

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148A. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (White Alone)."

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148B. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (Black Alone)."

Table 4.3 Regression Results for Explaining Collective Descriptive Representation

Variables	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-values
Black Population	.663*** (.034)	.001
Legislative Professionalism	4.130*** (.517)	.001
Black-to-White Education Parity	.528 (.472)	.263
Latino Population	.032*** (.009)	.001
Citizen Ideology	-.002 (.007)	.722
Term Limit Impact	.159 (.333)	.633
Multimember Districts	.001 (.003)	.761
State Education	.009 (.024)	.725
Median Income	-.004** (.002)	.028
Median Age	.167*** (.056)	.003
1994	.812*** (.065)	.001
1996	1.560*** (.061)	.001
1998	1.546*** (.043)	.001
2000	1.407*** (.323)	.001
2002	1.580*** (.296)	.001
2004	1.665*** (.275)	.001
Constant	-7.339** (3.014)	.015
Observations	350	--
R-Squared	.889	--
Wald χ^2	28318.34	--

Note: Description of variables along with a complete list of sources can be found in Appendix C1.

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Figure 4.1 Expected Change in Collective Descriptive Representation, Varying Black Population in State





Figure 4.2 Expected Change in Collective Descriptive Representation, Varying Legislative Professionalism



CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUSES IN THE AMERICAN STATES

Introduction

In his seminal work on black political behavior, Hanes Walton, Jr. writes the following about legislative black caucuses:

“Because of the difficulties imposed upon blacks in the larger society and in these legislative decision-making bodies, black caucuses arise almost naturally to increase the political clout of black lawmakers and their constituencies.” (1985, 186)

A handful of scholars have since studied legislative black caucuses, especially at the state level. Most study one state legislative black caucus at a time (Miller 1990; Clemons and Jones 2000; Legette 2000; Orey 2000; Holmes 2000; Menifield 2000; Sullivan 2000; Wright 2000; Wielhouwer and Middlemass 2005; Briscoe 2005; Shaffer and Menifield 2005; Parry and Miller 2006) using descriptive analysis. Although these works provide historical information on black representation in a particular state, they are problematic because the findings lack generalizability or comparison across states.

A few scholars examine black influence in multiple states. As aforementioned, a study that spans twenty-four years and forty-eight states finds that a larger black delegation is positively related to spending more money on welfare (Owens 2005), and a study of five state legislatures in 1969, 1979, and 1989 reveals that states with larger black delegations tend to spend more on education, health, and welfare (Haynie 2001). A study of forty-five lower chambers from 1982 to 1986 finds that states with a larger number of black committee chairs tend to spend more on mental health and hospitals (Nelson 1991), and a study of forty-two states in 1989 and 1999 finds that states in which blacks comprise a larger proportion of the Democratic majority tend to have a higher number of black committee chairs (Orey, Overby, and Larimer 2007). King-Meadows and Schaller (2006) is one of the only works that studies *legislative black caucuses* in a comparative sense, finding that states with larger legislative black caucuses tend to have more representation on prestigious committees (126). Moreover, the authors argue that in

2001, twenty-two of the twenty-eight legislative black caucuses were “pivotal,” or in position to influence policy in their states, making this the first work to introduce a comparative measure of legislative black caucuses.

Although previous works contribute to our understanding of legislative black caucuses, they have limitations. First, no work to date examines legislative black caucuses from an inter-state perspective. That is, how do black state legislators relate to one another across states? Moreover, although these works have a comparative measure of black caucus influence, their measures are incomplete. They measure black influence as either seat share in the legislature (Owens 2005), seat share of the Democratic Party (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006; Orey, Overby, and Larimer 2007), the number of black committee chairs held (Nelson 1991), or both seat share in the legislature and number of committee chairs held (Haynie 2001). As a result, none of the works recognizes that there is another dimension to black caucus influence: serving on National Black Caucus of State Legislatures (NBCSL) policy committees. Representation on NBCSL policy committees matters because the body shapes the national policy black agenda in the coming, giving those with greater representation a larger say in the process. Furthermore, although previous works show that legislative black caucuses may successfully implement substantive policies beneficial to blacks, no work to date predicts the presence of a legislative black caucus nor shows the relationship between influential black caucuses and black political behavior.

This chapter examines state legislative black caucuses in 2009-2010 building on previous work. In particular, it shows how black state legislators across the country seek similar policy goals and introduces a new measure of black caucus influence in the legislature, combining seat share in the Democratic Party, black committee chairs, and membership on NBCSL policy committees. In addition, this chapter predicts the presence and influence of legislative black caucuses in states. Finally, it illustrates the relationship between influential black caucuses and black political behavior.

As of 2009-2010, thirty-three states have an organized legislative black caucus.¹⁷ Legislative black caucuses exist everywhere from southern states like Mississippi and Louisiana, to western states like Arizona and Colorado, suggesting that a large black population is unnecessary for the formation of a legislative black caucus. Table 5.1 provides the founding years for legislative black caucuses. About twenty percent of legislative black caucuses were formed in the 1960's, nearly half were formed in the 1970's, and the remaining ones formed in the 1980's. Thus, legislative black caucuses are a relatively new phenomenon. Considering that few blacks served in the state legislature prior to passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it follows that most black caucuses formed the following decade. In short, legislative black caucuses exist in states across the country, with a majority forming after passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Understanding legislative black caucuses is important for a number of reasons. Organized black caucuses have the potential to exercise great influence in the legislature, especially if they are pivotal, and since they exist in over sixty percent of states, political scientists should know the characteristics of states with legislative black caucuses. Comparing legislative black caucuses shows not only their differences, but also their similarities. Most blacks represent districts with larger black populations (Grofman and Handley 1989), and since these districts tend to be poorer and less educated than those non-whites represent (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), black state legislators might have similar policy goals *across* state lines, seeking to improve the socio-economic status of blacks. An improved measure of black caucuses influence allows scholars to determine if states with black legislators provide maximum substantive policy representation for their black constituents. Finally, by providing an improved measure of legislative black caucuses and showing its relationship with black political behavior, scholars may

¹⁷ This is according to the number of caucus chairs listed on the NBCSL website.

consider including such a measure in future models predicting substantive policy representation and minority political behavior.¹⁸

This chapter consists of seven sections. The next section reviews the literature on state legislative black caucuses. The third section describes my experience at the 2009 NBCSL Annual Conference where I observed black state legislators relating to one another across states. In the fourth section, I introduce a new measure of black caucus influence, showing the differences between black caucuses across states. The fifth section predicts the presence of both a legislative black caucus and an influential legislative black caucus in a state. The sixth section depicts the relationship between legislative black caucus influence and black political behavior. Lastly, I discuss the implications of my research on future studies of minority politics.

Conventional Wisdom about State Legislative Black Caucuses

Most study one state legislative black caucus at a time, and there is mixed evidence on whether these caucuses are able to influence policy. Studies find that legislative black caucuses have achieved policy success in North Carolina (Miller 1990; Sullivan 2000; Menifield, Shaffer and Brassell 2005), Tennessee (Wright 2000), Georgia (Holmes 2000; Wielhouwer and Middlemass 2005), Mississippi (Orey 2000; Shaffer and Menifield 2005), Alabama (Menifield, Shaffer and Brassell 2005), and Texas (Briscoe 2005) from the late 1970's until 2000. Conversely, studies find that legislative black caucuses in Florida (Tauber 2005), Louisiana (Menifield, Shaffer and Brassell 2005), and Tennessee (Menifield, Shaffer and Brassell 2005) have only experienced moderate success from 1980 to 2000. Lastly, analyses of South Carolina (Legette 2000; Menifield, Shaffer and Brassell 2005), Missouri (Menifield 2000), Arkansas (Parry and Miller 2006), and Virginia (Clemons and Jones 2000; Menifield, Shaffer and Brassell 2005) find legislative black caucuses generally lacked influence from the early 1970's until 2000. In

¹⁸ This chapter analyzes the bivariate relationship between influential legislative black caucuses and black political behavior; future works will explore the multivariate relationship.

this research two things differentiated successful legislative black caucuses from others: a larger black delegation and a higher number of black committee chairs.

These works provide a detailed historical account of black representation in a particular state, but they are limiting in the inferences they can make in terms of generalizability. First, although two-thirds of black legislators are from the South, black state legislators exist outside the region, but all these works — except Legette (2000) — examine southern states. In addition, these works are descriptive in nature. They compare the passage rate of bills blacks introduce to those non-blacks introduce, list the number of black leaders during the era examined, and provide demographical information on black state legislators. Yet, they fail to employ rigorous statistical controls to test legislative black caucus' ability to implement legislation beneficial to their group.

To date, only one book tests black caucus influence in different states. In their 2006 book, *Devolution and Black State Legislators: Challenges and Choices in the Twenty-First Century*, Tyson King-Meadows and Thomas F. Schaller (2006, 126) show that states with large black caucuses tend to have more representation on prestigious committees, yet also tend to spend less on TANF programs (156). A few other works examine black influence in the legislature collectively, but not necessarily legislative black caucuses. Scholars find that black influence in the legislature leads to greater spending on mental health and hospital programs (Nelson 1991), on welfare (Haynie 2001; Owens 2005), and on education and health (Haynie 2001). Others find that black influence is determined by the black proportion of the Democratic Party in the legislature, which makes blacks pivotal in legislative votes (Orey, Overby, and Larimer 2007). Although these works test collective descriptive representation rather than caucus descriptive representation, they provide additional evidence that a collection of blacks can exercise influence in state legislatures, both inside and outside of the South.

These works provide historical case studies about legislative black caucuses and show the variation between them, but they do not show how black state legislators relate

to one another across states. The next section fills this hole, using my experience at the 2009 NBCSL Annual Conference to observe black state legislators from across the country interact both socially and professionally.

2009 NBCSL Annual Conference

From December 2-5, 2009, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, black state legislators from across the country took part in the 33rd Annual NBCSL Conference. As a participant-observer invited by the Iowa Legislative Black Caucus, my goals in attending the conference were to understand how legislative black caucuses relate to one another across states and also to create an improved measure of black caucus influence; this section focuses on the first goal.

As the name suggests, the NBCSL is composed of black state legislators from states with caucuses, and it has the following objectives:

“To serve as a national network and clearinghouse for the discussion, dissemination and exchange of ideas and information among African American state legislators and their staffs; to provide research, training and educational services to African American state legislators and their staffs; to improve the effectiveness and quality of African American state legislators; and to serve as a strong, united and effective advocate for African American state legislators and their constituencies at the federal level (“Our Mission”).”

The last objective may be the most important — the NBCSL serves as the national voice for black state legislators, helping to set the policy agenda for the legislative black caucus in Congress (Congressional Black Caucus). Moreover, the NBCSL has professional staff and produces policy reports, making it parallel to the National Governor’s Association (NGA) or the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), which are two national-level organizations concerned with state-level politics. Through my experience at the conference two things became clear. First, regardless of region, there is genuine collegiality between black state legislators, and second, despite being from different states, black legislators share similar policy goals. With that in mind, the following paragraphs describe the collegiality between, and policy homogeneity of, black state legislators.

The collegiality was palpable throughout the conference, especially at social gatherings. There were three meals a day, and at each, vivid conversation and rich laughter filled the air. In addition to the food, an expected religiosity showed the camaraderie between black state legislators. That is, speakers addressed the audience at each meal, and at some point, most said things like “amen” or “turn to your neighbor.” Both of these statements are part of the call and response inherent in African-American religious tradition and therefore the speakers assumed the audience was familiar with the black church.¹⁹ It is unsurprising that religion played such a large part in the conference, as nearly all black state lawmakers practice Christianity (Haynie 2001; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006). In addition, at breakfast one morning, a speaker said, “The strength of the wolf is in the pack,” alluding to the NBCSL as the pack that unifies and organizes black state lawmakers. The collegiality between black state lawmakers also exhibited itself outside of meals. Conference organizers planned a social gathering each evening where a band played rhythm and blues, funk, or soul music, all musical genres associated with African-Americans, and it was common to see legislators singing and dancing along with the musicians. Through the breaking of bread, the participation in call and response, and grooving to the music, black state legislators from across the country undoubtedly enjoy one another’s company. This seems due in part that they share the arduous task of being an ethnic minority who represents other ethnic minorities in a majoritarian system dominated by whites.

The policy homogeneity of legislative black caucuses was transparent with the business aspect of the conference. The NBCSL has twelve policy committees, composed of legislators and legislative staff that meet to exchange ideas, network, and find solutions to issues facing all Americans (“Policy Committees”). Committees create

¹⁹ By call and response I simply mean that the speaker would say something, and then ask the audience to respond with either the same statement or some other predetermined statement. For example, if the speaker said, “We have come a long way, but we still have room to go, amen,” then the audience would respond, “Amen.”

policy resolutions that the NBCSL then debates. If passed, then the NSCSL sends them to Washington, D.C. for consideration in Congress and the White House.

Table 5.2 displays names of policy committees, along with the seniority and expertise of committee chairs. All but two of NBCSL's policy committees — gaming and youth — exist in the federal bureaucracy, suggesting they modeled their committee structure after the federal government. Seniority is a component of NBCSL committee chairs, with the average chair serving seventeen years in his or her state legislative body. The relationship between expertise and committee chairmanships is nebulous. In four of the states, an analogous committee is nonexistent. Moreover, of the states that have such a committee, half of the NBCSL chairs serve on the committee, while the other half do not. Therefore, a combination of seniority and expertise accounts for NBCSL committee chairs, although the former appears more important than the latter.

Table 5.3 displays the representativeness of NBCSL committees, along with the resolutions they submit. The best measure of a committee's representativeness is the difference between the number of committee members it has and the number of states it represents. For instance, a committee with ten members from ten different states is the most representative, while a committee with ten members from the same state would be the least representative. With a difference of one, the Emergency Preparedness/Homeland Security Committee is the most representative of black legislators from across the country, while the Health and Human Services Committee with a difference of thirteen is the least representative of black state legislators from across the country. On average, the difference between the number of committee members and the number of states represented is 5.5. In other words, on average, each NBCSL committee has five states that have multiple members, which may over-represent those states' views and interests. Policy committees varied in the number of resolutions they submitted. The Health and Human Services Committee proposed thirteen resolutions, while the Emergency Preparedness/ Homeland Security, Gaming, Law, International Affairs, and Youth

Committees submitted no resolutions. The median number of policy resolutions is one, showing that committees generally submitted few pieces of legislation.²⁰ Clearly, health is the NBCSL's most important issue in the coming year, coinciding with President Obama's recent overhaul to the nation's health care system. In sum, the NBCSL policy committees better represent the views and interests of certain states and also better represent certain policy matters.

Having similar religious preferences and fighting similar battles as ethnic minorities in white-dominated state legislatures builds collegiality among black state legislators. Moreover, since most blacks represent districts with a large concentration of blacks (Grofman and Handley 1989), and these districts tend to be of lower socioeconomic status than those non-blacks represent (Holmes 2000; Orey 2000; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), it leads to black state legislators sharing the policy goal of improving the socioeconomic well-being of blacks (Haynie 2001). Previous works measure black influence as the number of black committee chairs (Nelson 1991), as black seat share in the legislature (Owens 2005), as black seat share of the Democratic Party (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006; Orey, Overby, and Larimer 2007), and both black political incorporation and seat share (Haynie 2001). Measurement problems arise, however, because previous research limits its measure of black influence to the state legislature, failing to recognize that legislative black caucuses exercise influence nationally through the NBCSL when they gather together and pass policy resolutions. This is especially true given the important and dual arms of federalism and policy devolution, where national policy is increasingly administered by state government, or where state legislatures shape national policy agendas (Berkman 1994). The next section develops a new measure of legislative black caucus influence that not only looks at influence within the state, but also incorporates representation on NBCSL policy

²⁰ Since only seven of the twelve committees submitted resolutions, I look at the median number of resolutions, not the mean number of resolutions.

committees because NBCSL policy resolutions serve as the national black agenda, and states with greater representation play a larger role the resolution-making process.

Legislative Black Caucus Influence Index

To build a more comprehensive measure of legislative black caucus influence, I combine the black proportion of standing committee chairs in state legislatures, the black proportion of the Democratic Party in each state, and the state caucus' proportion of seats on NBCSL policy committees. For instance, in the Alabama legislature, blacks chair 18 of 49 committees, for a score of .367, make up 27 of 62 Democrats, for a score of .432, and the black caucus has 15 of 227 seats on NBCSL policy committees, for a score of .006, leading to a combined score of .805.²¹

Table 5.4 lists the thirty-three states by their legislative black caucus influence. The first three columns rank states by the black proportion of standing committee chairs in the state legislature, the black proportion of the Democratic Party in the state legislature, and the state caucus' proportion of seats on NBCSL policy committees, respectively. Column four combines the first three columns, showing the legislative black caucus influence index in each state. For each column, the state's raw score is presented with their rank in parentheses. Scores close to three indicate the black caucus generally exercises great influence in both the state legislature and the NBCSL, while scores near zero indicate the black caucus generally exercises little influence in either arena. The mean of the index is .372, meaning that legislative black caucuses generally exercise some level of influence in their states and in the NBCSL.²² Mississippi has the most influential black caucus, followed by Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Georgia. Conversely, Rhode Island has the least influential black caucus, followed by Colorado, Arizona, Massachusetts, and Iowa. As mentioned in the first chapter, it is important to

²¹ See Tables 2-4 in Appendix D for a complete list of calculations.

²² With a Cronbach's Alpha of .58, there is a moderately good fit between the three items that compose the index

note that this measure does not incorporate the influence legislative black caucuses have outside of the legislature, making it a conservative measure of black caucus influence. The next section explores what predicts black caucus presence and influence in states.

Figure 5.1 illustrates how the legislative black caucus influence index varies by black population in the state, showing a strong linear pattern between black population and black caucus influence. Moreover, many northern states, including Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, New York, Wisconsin, and Iowa, have more influential black caucuses than expected, given their black population. On the other hand, numerous southern states like Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Virginia, and Arkansas, have weaker black caucuses than expected given their population, which suggests that northern states are better able to translate their black populations into caucus influence than southern states are.

It is clear that black caucuses are most influential in the South where most black people live, which is consistent with the argument that minorities exercise influence where they have strength in numbers (Leighley 2001). Yet, it is important to note that many northern states have black caucuses that are more influential than expected given their black population, indicating that black state legislators have the ability to shape policy in places where they have smaller numbers. Although black population is important, it says little about the pivotalness of legislative black caucuses. To understand how legislative black caucus influence substantive policy, we must examine the partisan composition of the legislature.

Previous works argue that black influence is conditional upon a Democratic majority in the legislature (Nelson 1991; Orey, Overby and Larimer 2007), so Table 5.5 lists the legislative black caucus influence index, along with whether Democrats control the legislature. Of the states with the ten most influential black caucuses, seven of them have a Democratic majority in the legislature, corroborating previous findings that blacks are most pivotal when they are in the majority party. On the other hand, of the states

ranked in the bottom ten of legislative black caucus influence, seven of them have a Democratic majority in the legislature, showing that it is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for legislative black caucuses being pivotal.

This section introduces a new measure of black caucus influence in state legislatures. In addition, it reveals that states with larger black populations and with a Democratic majority in the legislature tend to have more influential legislative black caucuses, although the latter is not a sufficient condition. But, the data here are merely descriptive, and we need multivariate regression analysis to uncover the variables that truly account for caucus descriptive representation.

Predicting Legislative Black Caucus Presence and Influence

Racial variables other than black population might predict the presence and influence of a legislative black caucus. Table 5.6 ranks states by collective descriptive representation in the legislature and the black-to-white college education parity ratio, and it also lists whether the state has a legislative black caucus and lists its influence score. Every state ranked in the top thirty of collective descriptive representation (percent black in the legislature), except Nebraska, has a legislative black caucus, and every state ranked in the top ten of collective descriptive representation is also ranked in the top ten of black caucus influence, which is expected since collective descriptive representation is an aspect of the black caucus influence index.²³ Although the finding from Chapter 4 for collective descriptive representation ($p=.263$) lacks statistical significance, it indicates that states with higher levels of black-to-white education parity ratios tend to have a better descriptive representation for blacks. Therefore, one would guess that states with higher black-to-white education parity ratios should be more likely to have both a legislative black caucus and an influential legislative black caucus, as caucus descriptive

²³ Since collective descriptive representation is so highly correlated with both caucus presence and caucus influence, I do not include it as an explanatory variable; instead, I include black population in the state.

representation is an extension of collective descriptive representation. The hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: States with larger black populations will be more likely to have a legislative black caucus and to have an influential legislative black caucus.

Hypothesis 2: States with greater education parity between blacks and whites will be more likely to have a legislative black caucus and to have an influential legislative black caucus.

I use multivariate regression to test for multiple factors that may predict the presence of a state legislative black caucus and predict an influential legislative black caucus. For the former, states with a legislative black caucus are coded as 1 and those without one are coded as 0, and for the latter, the dependent variable is the black caucus influence index, ranging from .033 to .95. Black state legislators tend to represent districts with sizable Latino populations (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006, 53), so states with larger Latino populations might be more likely to have a legislative black caucus and an influential legislative black caucus. Scholars have mixed findings on the impact that multimember districts have on the election of black state legislators, with some saying that they decrease the number of black state legislators (Jewell 1982; Grofman, Migalski and Noviello 1986; Moncrief and Thompson 1992), some saying that multimember districts tend to increase the number of black state legislators (Gerber, Morton and Reitz 1998; Brockington et al 1998), and others saying they may no longer influence minority representation (Cooper 2008). Multimember districts ought to influence the number of black state legislators and therefore influence caucus descriptive representation. Squire (1992) finds that states with professionalized legislatures tend to have larger black delegations; thus, states with professionalized legislatures might be more likely to have both a legislative black caucus and an influential legislative black caucus. I also include the Berry et al (1998) citizen ideology score (updated on Richard Fording's website) where higher scores indicate that citizens are liberal, median age in

state, and state education measured as the percentage of the population over twenty-five that has a high school diploma, which are standard control variables in state politics.²⁴

Table 5.7 displays the results from regression analysis, uncovering the characteristics that account for caucus descriptive representation, measured as both caucus presence and caucus influence. The results support the first hypothesis; states with larger black populations are significantly more likely to have a legislative black caucus and have an influential black caucus, controlling for other state factors. Figure 5.2 illustrates that the probability of having a legislative black caucus is less than seventy percent for states whose black population ranges from zero to five percent, but states with a black population that exceeds eight percent is certain to have a legislative black caucus. Thus, moderately small black populations are associated with the presence of a legislative caucus. Figure 5.3 shows that states with small black populations have legislative black caucuses with lesser influence, while those with larger black populations have legislative black caucuses with greater influence.

There is no support for the second hypothesis. States in which there is greater education parity between blacks and whites are *less* likely to have a legislative black caucus. Figure 5.4 shows that the probability of having a legislative black caucus is close to one in states where there is low education parity, yet once education parity reaches .75, or that seventy-five blacks have a college degree for every one hundred whites with a college degree (for those who are over twenty-five), then the probability of having a legislative black caucus is near zero. This finding suggests that because states with greater education parity between blacks and whites tend to have smaller black populations, there is less need for a legislative black caucus to form. It also suggests that since blacks are equipped with greater education, they may instead exercise influence

²⁴ See Appendix D (Table D1) for a description of explanatory variables.

through business and local government. Education parity between blacks and whites has no discernable impact on black caucus influence.

Additionally, states with larger Latino populations, older populations, and more multimember districts are more likely to have a legislative black caucus. Considering the mixed findings on the effect of multimember districts on minority representation, it is surprising to find that they actually increase the likelihood that a state has legislative black caucus. On the other hand, black population is the only variable that has a significant relationship with both black caucus presence and influence, suggesting that black population ultimately has the biggest effect on whether legislative black caucuses exercise influence. This section indicates the factors that influence caucus descriptive representation, but says little about the relationship between influential legislative black caucuses and black political behavior.

Legislative Black Caucus Influence and Black Political Behavior

Table 5.8 lists the black caucus influence index, along with descriptive data on voting, by state. Column three displays that on average, black voter turnout rate in each state (64.9) is higher than the overall turnout rate in each state (60), showing that blacks were especially mobilized in this past election cycle. Moreover, black caucus influence appears to structure black voter turnout. Ten states rank in both the top fifteen of black caucus influence and the top fifteen of black voter turnout, which suggests that states with influential black caucuses tend to have higher black turnout. Figure 5.5 supports this idea, showing that most states with influential legislative black caucuses have higher black voter turnout rates, while most states with less effective legislative black caucuses have lower black voter turnout rates. Furthermore, eleven states rank in the top fifteen of black caucus influence and the top fifteen of the black to white voter turnout ratio, suggesting that states with influential black caucuses may help mobilize black voters to participate at a rate similar to white voters. Figure 5.6 corroborates this idea, illustrating that most states with influential black caucuses have a higher black-to-white turnout ratio

than states with less effective legislative black caucuses. Influential legislative black caucuses may encourage black political participation for the same reasons as collective and parity descriptive representation do. That is, caucus descriptive representation may be an important form of political empowerment for both symbolic and substantive representation, which may encourage black political behavior, and states with caucus descriptive representation should also generally have a higher number of mobilization networks in place, providing blacks with easier access to the ballot.

Conclusion

Breaking new ground, this chapter has developed a thirty-three state index that measures legislative black caucus influence, combining black seat share of the Democratic Party in the state legislature, the number of black committee chairs in the state legislature, and the state caucus' representation on NBCSL policy committees. As members of the NBCSL, black state legislators may serve on policy committees that in turn create policy resolutions that address important policy matters for blacks. Yet, not all NBCSL policy committees are created equal, with some being more representative and submitting more resolutions than others. Although states with legislative black caucuses and influential legislative black caucuses naturally tend to have larger black populations, it is surprising that states with legislative black caucuses also have lesser education parity between blacks and whites. Again, it may be that states with greater education parity between blacks and whites have a lesser need for a legislative black caucus because blacks exercise influence through business and/or local government. Moreover, there is not a significant relationship between education parity for blacks and whites and legislative black caucus influence, attenuating the finding for legislative black caucus presence. Also, this research finds that states with influential legislative black caucuses tend to have higher black voter turnout and a higher black-to-white turnout ratio, making it the first to indicate a relationship between caucus descriptive representation and

minority political behavior. The rest of this section explores the implications of this research.

This research has implications on the formation of legislative black caucuses. First, it shows that black population is the most important characteristic of states that have legislative black caucuses in 2010. While this finding may seem obvious, it indicates the point at which we should expect states to form a legislative black caucus: once the state's black population exceeds eight percent.

This research contributes to comparative state politics research. In their book *101 Chambers*, Squire and Hamm write,

“The methodological advantages of testing theories on multiple bodies rather than just one body are obvious. It is hard to argue against providing more cases and more variation of interest. Indeed, it is important to note that state legislatures provide impressive variation both cross-sectionally *and* longitudinally (2005,2).”

This research applies this approach to studying minority descriptive representation at the state level, something few scholars have done. By providing a new measure of legislative black caucus influence across states, it allows scholars to examine to the extent to which states with influential legislative black caucuses differ from states with weaker legislative black caucuses. Yet, it is also important to note that as part of legislative black caucuses, blacks are not monolithic. That is, black legislators' primary responsibility, just as their non-black counterparts, is to their constituency (Mayhew 1974). For instance, the Florida Legislative Black Caucus hosted the 2009 NBCSL conference, and as a result, each caucus member was expected to attend the meeting. Despite contributing money to the conference, the Florida Legislature called a special session to vote on a piece of legislation, and the session conflicted with the conference. Two black caucus members attended the special session in lieu of the conference, showing that legislators' allegiance is not solely with the black caucus.

Due to data limitations, previous research studied black caucuses chiefly from a descriptive and historical perspective. With the legislative black caucus influence index, however, scholars are now equipped to empirically test a number of questions concerning state legislative black caucuses. More so than collective representation, which assumes that blacks vote cohesively, caucus representation enables blacks to achieve their policy goals. Menifield, Shaffer, and Patrick (2005, 199) write,

“These caucuses are one of the keys to maintaining homogeneity among African Americans. They also serve as a tool to help black lawmakers prepare their legislative agenda and thus espouse the views of their constituents.”

By engendering vote cohesion and making black state legislators better lawmakers, legislative black caucuses ultimately provide black constituents with better representation. When it comes to political behavior, the data in this chapter suggest that having an influential legislative black caucus may be an important form of political empowerment since it may provide blacks with symbolic and substantive representation, and it may also be associated with a higher number of extant mobilization networks, leading to blacks having greater involvement in politics. Just as Squire’s legislative professionalism index (Squire 1992), Hero and Tolbert’s racial diversity measure (Hero and Tolbert 1996), and Berry et al’s citizen ideology score (Berry et al 1998), this index may serve as a key explanatory variable for substantive policy adoption and political behavior at the state level.

Lastly, this research has implications on racial redistricting. We know that most black state legislators come from majority black districts (Grofman and Handley 1989). Yet, increasing the number of majority black districts may also increase the Republican seat share (Hill 1995), which has two effects of legislative black caucus influence: it decreases the number of white Democrats and increases the black proportion of the Democratic Party. The former makes it more difficult for Democrats to attain the majority, and as a result, it limits opportunities for blacks to attain leadership positions. Conversely, the latter makes blacks even more pivotal to the Democratic Party, providing

them with leverage. If Democrats are the majority, then they need the black vote to maintain it, but if Democrats are the minority, blacks may threaten to vote with the Republican majority, especially with social issues (Menifield, Shaffer and Patrick 2005). Thus, with redistricting soon to take place in states, it is important that majority black districts be protected so that blacks are elected to office, but care should be taken to not pack blacks into districts because it may ultimately weaken legislative black caucuses.

This chapter has examined caucus descriptive representation, describing my experience at the NBCSL Conference, introducing a new measure of black caucus influence, explaining the state-level factors that account for black caucus presence and influence, and illustrating a relationship between black caucus influence and political behavior. The next chapter examines another extension of collective descriptive representation: parity descriptive representation.

Table 5.1 Founding Years for Legislative Black Caucuses

States	Year Founded
Alabama	1974 ^a
Arizona	1969 ^b
Arkansas	1989 ^a
California	1967 ^b
Colorado	1974 ^b
Connecticut	1972 ^a
Delaware	--
Florida	1982 ^b
Georgia	1975 ^a
Illinois	1969 ^f
Indiana	1979 ^b
Iowa	--
Kansas	1975 ^a
Kentucky	--
Louisiana	1977 ^b
Maryland	1970 ^b
Massachusetts	1972 ^a
Michigan	1977 ^a
Mississippi	1976 ^d
Missouri	1966 ^a
Nevada	--
New Jersey	1987 ^a
New York	1966 ^b
North Carolina	1983 ^a
Ohio	1967 ^c
Oklahoma	1979 ^a
Pennsylvania	1973 ^b
Rhode Island	1986 ^a
South Carolina	1975 ^b
Tennessee	1975 ^e
Texas	1973 ^a
Virginia	1969 ^a
Wisconsin	--

Note: States without a founding year did not reply to my phone calls or emails.

Sources: ^a means the data for founding year come from Miller (1979; 1990).

^b means data come from the state's black caucus website (See Appendix D1 for URL's).

^c means data are found on Facebook.

^d means data are found in Orey (2000).

^e means data are found in Wright (2000).

Table 5.1 Continued

^f means the data are from Chicago State University

“About Us.” *Legislative Black Caucus of Maryland, Inc.* Legislative Black Caucus of Maryland, Inc. n.d. Web. 3 February 2010.

“History.” *California Legislative Black Caucus.* California Legislative Black Caucus. 2009. Web. 2 February 2010.

“History.” *Florida Conference of Black State Legislators.* Florida Conference of Black State Legislators. n.d. Web. 2 February 2010.

“History of the IBLC.” *Indiana Black Legislative Caucus.* Indiana Black Legislative Caucus. n.d. Web. 3 February 2010.

“History.” *Pennsylvania Legislative Black Caucus. Pennsylvania Legislative Black Caucus.* n.d. Web. 5 February 2010.

“History.” *South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus.* South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus. n.d. Web. 5 February 2010.

“History.” *The New York State, Black, Puerto Rican, Hispanic, and Asian Legislative Caucus.* The New York State, Black, Puerto Rican, Hispanic, and Asian Legislative Caucus. n.d. Web. 5 February 2010.

“Illinois Legislative Black Caucus.” *Chicago State University.* Chicago State University Libraries. n.d. Web. 3 February 2010.

“Our History.” *Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus.* Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus. n.d. Web. 3 February 2010.

Table 5.2 Seniority and Expertise of NBCSL Committee Chairs, 2009-10

NBCSL Policy Committees (N=12)	Chair (State)	Years Served	Serves on Committee in State
Agriculture	Rep. Helen Miller (IA)	8	Yes
Business, Finance, and Insurance	Sen. Rodney Ellis (TX)	19	No
Emergency Preparedness/ Homeland Security	Rep. Cedric Richmond (LA)	10	Yes
Education	Rep. Greg Porter (IN)	16	Yes
Energy, Transportation, and Environment	Rep. Bill Crawford (IN)	37	No
Gaming, Sports, and Entertainment	Assm. Morse Arberry (NV)	24	No*
Health and Human Services	Rep. Joe Armstrong (TN)	19	Yes
Housing	Rep. Laura Hall (AL)	16	No*
International Affairs	Sen. Donne Trotter (IL)	16	No*
Labor, Military, and Veterans' Affairs	Rep. Sharon Beasley-Teague (GA)	16	No*
Law, Justice, and Ethics	Sen. Thelma Harper (TN)	19	No
Telecommunications, Science, and Technology	Sen. Arthenia Joyner (FL)	3	No
Youth	Rep. Gilda Cobb-Hunter (SC)	17	No
Mean	--	16.9	
Median	--	16	

Note: * means the committee does not exist in the state chamber.

Sources: The data on seniority and whether the person serves on the committee in his or her own state come from each state legislative website, and are accurate as of January 2010; a complete listing of state legislative websites can be found in the Appendix D2.

“Policy Committees.” *National Black Caucus of State Legislatures*. National Black Caucus of State Legislatures.” n.d.. Web. 23 January 2010.

Table 5.3 NBCSL Committees' Representativeness and Resolutions, 2009

Policy Committees	Number of Members	Number of States Represented	Difference	Number of Resolutions
Agriculture	13	9	4	9
Business, Finance, and Insurance	22	13	9	8
Emergency Preparedness/ Homeland Security	5	4	1	0
Education	22	14	8	8
Energy, Transportation, and Environment	16	13	3	4
Gaming, Sports, and Entertainment	17	11	6	0
Health and Human Services	27	14	13	13
Housing	17	12	5	1
International Affairs	20	14	6	0
Labor, Military, and Veterans' Affairs	10	8	2	1
Law, Justice, and Ethics	19	15	4	0
Telecommunications, Science, and Technology	17	13	4	6
Youth	22	15	7	0
Mean	17.46	11.92	5.5	3.84
Median	17	13	5	1

Source: "Policy Committees." *National Black Caucus of State Legislators*. National Black Caucus of State Legislatures. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.


Table 5.4 Black Caucus Index Influence in State, 2009-10

States	Proportion Black of Democratic Party	Proportion Black of Committee Chairs or Co- Chairs	Proportion of Caucus Seats on NBCSL Policy Committees	Black Caucus Index Influence Score
Mississippi	.495 (3)	.385 (1)	.07 (3)	.950 (1)
Alabama	.432 (5)	.367 (2)	.066 (5)	.805 (2)
Maryland	.314 (8)	.357 (3)	.11 (1)	.781 (3)
North Carolina	.327 (7)	.321 (4)	.04 (10)	.688 (4)
Georgia	.547 (1)	.015 (25)	.084 (2)	.646 (5)
Louisiana	.352 (6)	.242 (6)	.048 (6T)	.642 (6)
Illinois	.290 (10T)	.266 (5)	.044 (9)	.600 (7)
South Carolina	.514 (2)	.038 (21T)	.018 (20T)	.570 (8)
Florida	.448 (4)	0 (33T)	.048 (6T)	.496 (9)
New York	.241 (13)	.232 (7)	.013 (23T)	.486 (10)
Tennessee	.290 (10T)	.125 (14T)	.066 (4)	.481 (11)
Ohio	.292 (9)	.143 (13)	.022 (14T)	.457 (12)
Virginia	.233 (14)	.160 (10)	.018 (20T)	.411 (13)
Nevada	.175 (18)	.20 (8)	.009 (26T)	.384 (14)
Texas	.188 (17)	.152 (11)	.022 (14T)	.362 (15)
Indiana	.174 (19)	.163 (9)	.022 (14T)	.359 (16)
Michigan	.268 (12)	.067 (20)	.018 (20T)	.353 (17)
Pennsylvania	.153 (21)	.149 (12)	.048 (6T)	.350 (18)
New Jersey	.215 (16)	.105 (17)	.013 (23T)	.333 (19)
Wisconsin	.114 (25)	.125 (14T)	.026 (11T)	.265 (20)
Connecticut	.109 (26)	.125 (14T)	.022 (14T)	.256 (21)
Missouri	.224 (15)	0 (33T)	.022 (14T)	.246 (22)
Arkansas	.143 (22)	.083 (18)	.009 (26T)	.235 (23)
California	.173 (20)	.038 (21T)	.004 (29T)	.215 (24)
Delaware	.125 (23)	.082 (19)	0 (33)	.207 (25)
Kansas	.123 (24)	0 (33T)	.026 (11T)	.149 (26)
Oklahoma	.098 (27)	0 (33T)	.026 (11T)	.124 (27)
Kentucky	.088 (28)	.030 (23)	.013 (23T)	.131 (28)
Iowa	.068 (29)	.026 (24)	.022 (14T)	.116 (29)
Massachusetts	.051 (31)	0 (33T)	.009 (26T)	.06 (30)
Arizona	.054 (30)	0 (33T)	.004 (29T)	.058 (31)
Colorado	.034 (32)	0 (33T)	.004 (29T)	.038 (32)
Rhode Island	.029 (33)	0 (33T)	.004 (29T)	.033 (33)
Mean	.225	.121	.03	.372
Cronbach's Alpha	.58			

Note: Rank is in parentheses.

Sources: See Tables 2-4 in Appendix D.

Figure 5.1 Percent Black Population in State and Black Caucus Influence Index



Note: The dashed lines represent the mean of the variable.
Adjusted R-Squared is .75.

Table 5.5 Legislative Black Caucus Influence Index and Democratic Majority in the State Legislature

States	Black Caucus Influence Index	Democratic Majority in State Legislature
Alabama	.805 (2)	Yes
Arizona	.058 (31)	No
Arkansas	.235 (23)	Yes
California	.215 (24)	Yes
Colorado	.038 (32)	Yes
Connecticut	.256 (21)	Yes
Delaware	.207 (25)	Yes
Florida	.496 (9)	No
Georgia	.646 (5)	No
Illinois	.600 (7)	Yes
Indiana	.359 (16)	No
Iowa	.116 (29)	Yes
Kansas	.149 (26)	No
Kentucky	.131 (28)	Yes
Louisiana	.642 (6)	Yes
Maryland	.781 (3)	Yes
Massachusetts	.06 (30)	Yes
Michigan	.353 (17)	Yes
Mississippi	.950 (1)	Yes
Missouri	.246 (22)	No
Nevada	.384 (14)	Yes
New Jersey	.333 (19)	Yes
New York	.486 (10)	Yes
North Carolina	.688 (4)	Yes
Ohio	.457 (12)	No
Oklahoma	.124 (27)	No
Pennsylvania	.350 (18)	No
Rhode Island	.033 (33)	Yes
South Carolina	.570 (8)	No
Tennessee	.481 (11)	No
Texas	.362 (15)	No
Virginia	.411 (13)	Yes
Wisconsin	.265 (20)	Yes

Note: Rank of black caucus influence index is in parentheses.

Sources: See Tables 2-4 in Appendix D for legislative black caucus influence index.

“2010 Partisan Composition of State Legislatures.” *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2010. Web. 20 January 2010.

Table 5.6 States Ranked by Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio, Collective Descriptive Representation, Black Caucus Presence, and Black Caucus Influence

State	Collective Descriptive Representation	Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio	Black Caucus Presence	Black Caucus Influence
Alabama	25 (2)	.553 (38)	Yes	.805 (2)
Alaska	1.67 (38)	.527 (43)	No	--
Arizona	2.22 (34T)	.729 (10)	Yes	.058 (31)
Arkansas	10.37 (17)	.601 (27)	Yes	.235 (23)
California	10.83 (16)	.610 (26)	Yes	.215 (24)
Colorado	2 (36)	.597 (28T)	Yes	.038 (32)
Connecticut	8.02 (22)	.431 (49)	Yes	.256 (21)
Delaware	8.06 (21)	.560 (35)	Yes	.207 (25)
Florida	16.25 (9)	.546 (41)	Yes	.496 (9)
Georgia	22.46 (4)	.597 (28T)	Yes	.646 (5)
Hawaii	0 (50T)	.653 (19)	No	--
Idaho	0 (50T)	1.077 (1)	No	--
Illinois	17.51 (8)	.544 (42)	Yes	.600 (7)
Indiana	8 (23)	.646 (21)	Yes	.359 (16)
Iowa	4 (31)	.648 (20)	Yes	.116 (29)
Kansas	4.24 (28)	.550 (39)	Yes	.149 (26)
Kentucky	5.07 (26)	.657 (18)	Yes	.131 (28)
Louisiana	18.06 (7)	.500 (47)	Yes	.642 (6)
Maine	0 (50T)	.901 (5)	No	--
Maryland	22.87 (3)	.644 (22)	Yes	.781 (3)
Massachusetts	4.5 (27)	.594 (31)	Yes	.06 (30)
Michigan	14.86 (11)	.559 (36)	Yes	.353 (17)
Minnesota	1 (41)	.643 (23)	No	--
Mississippi	28.74 (1)	.519 (45)	Yes	.950 (1)
Missouri	9.64 (19)	.590 (33)	Yes	.246 (22)
Montana	0 (50T)	1.008 (3)	No	--
Nebraska	4.08 (29)	.617 (24)	No	--
Nevada	11.11 (15)	.593 (32)	Yes	.384 (14)
New Hampshire	.24 (43)	.904 (4)	No	--
New Jersey	12.5 (14)	.549 (40)	Yes	.333 (19)
New Mexico	1.79 (37)	.763 (9)	No	--
New York	16.04 (10)	.595 (30)	Yes	.486 (10)
North Carolina	18.82 (6)	.563 (34)	Yes	.688 (4)
North Dakota	0 (50T)	.683 (14)	No	--
Ohio	14.39 (12)	.558 (37)	Yes	.457 (12)
Oklahoma	4.03 (30)	.659 (17)	Yes	.124 (27)
Oregon	2.22 (34T)	.709 (11)	No	--
Pennsylvania	7.51 (24)	.526 (44)	Yes	.350 (18)
Rhode Island	2.65 (32)	.666 (15)	Yes	.033 (33)
South Carolina	21.76 (5)	.419 (50)	Yes	.570 (8)
South Dakota	0 (50T)	.857 (6)	No	--

Table 5.6 Continued

Tennessee	13.64 (13)	.663 (16)	Yes	.481 (11)
Texas	8.84 (20)	.614 (25)	Yes	.362 (15)
Utah	0 (50T)	.804 (8)	No	--
Vermont	.56 (42)	1.036 (2)	No	--
Virginia	10 (18)	.514 (46)	Yes	.411 (13)
Washington	1.36 (39)	.699 (13)	No	--
West Virginia	2.24 (33)	.836 (7)	No	--
Wisconsin	6.06 (25)	.436 (48)	Yes	.265 (20)
Wyoming	1.11 (40)	.705 (12)	No	--
Mean	8.13	.649	--	.372

Notes: This measure only looks at the 2000's, while the measure used for parity and collective representation looked at both the 1990's and 2000's.

The rank for each category is in parentheses.

Sources: "Caucus Chairs." *National Black Caucus of State Legislatures*. National Black Caucus of State Legislatures. 2006. Web. 2010 January 20.

"Number of African American Legislators, 2009." *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures." 2009. Web. 10 February 2009.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148A. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (White Alone)."

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148B. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (Black Alone)."

Table 5.7 Regression Results for Legislative Black Caucus Presence and Influence in State

Variables	Legislative Black Caucus Presence		Legislative Black Caucus Influence	
	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-values	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-Values
Black Population	1.493*** (.510)	.003	.025*** (.004)	.001
Black-to-White Education Parity	-101.172*** (26.761)	.001	-.026 (.349)	.942
Latino Population	0.461*** (0.106)	.001	.003 (.002)	.312
Legislative Professionalism	20.306 (16.752)	.225	.234 (.18)	.203
Multimember Districts	0.136** (0.063)	.032	.001 (.002)	.899
Citizen Ideology	-0.010 (0.053)	.848	-.002 (.002)	.276
Median Age	4.483*** (0.881)	.001	.017 (.013)	.212
State Education	-0.362 (0.272)	.184	.001 (.007)	.849
Constant	-77.971** (31.220)	.013	-.666 (.918)	.474
Observations	50	--	33	--
Log Likelihood	-4.311	--	--	--
Pseudo R-Squared	.865	--	--	--
Wald χ^2	29.60	--	--	--
R-Squared	--	--	.78	--
F-statistic	--	--	14.73	--

Note: Description of the variables can be found in Appendix D (Table D1).

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Figure 5.2 Probability of a Black Caucus in State, Varying Black Population




Figure 5.3 Expected Change in Black Caucus Influence Index, Varying Black Population in the State




Figure 5.4 Probability of a Legislative Black Caucus in State, Varying the Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio




Table 5.8 Black Caucus Influence Index and Voting for Blacks, by State

States	Black Caucus Influence Index	Black Turnout Rates (Percent Voted)	Black/White Turnout Ratio
Alabama	.805 (2)	62.5 (14)	1.002 (12)
Arizona	.058 (31)	51.5 (25)	.784 (26)
Arkansas	.235 (23)	43.1 (31)	.771 (28)
California	.215 (24)	63.8 (13)	.973 (16T)
Colorado	.038 (32)	54.4 (24)	.772 (27)
Connecticut	.256 (21)	48.4 (28)	.707 (30)
Delaware	.207 (25)	62.2 (15)	.899 (22)
Florida	.496 (9)	50.1 (27)	.798 (24)
Georgia	.646 (5)	65 (12)	1.025 (9)
Illinois	.600 (7)	60.4 (20)	.960 (20)
Indiana	.359 (16)	59.2 (21)	.972 (18)
Iowa	.116 (29)	--	--
Kansas	.149 (26)	51.3 (26)	.788 (25)
Kentucky	.131 (28)	60.6 (18T)	.963(19)
Louisiana	.642 (6)	66.2 (11)	.918 (21)
Maryland	.781 (3)	66.9 (9)	1.026 (8)
Massachusetts	.06 (30)	47 (29)	.696 (31)
Michigan	.353 (17)	70.2 (6)	1.056 (6)
Mississippi	.950 (1)	72.9 (3)	1.070 (4)
Missouri	.246 (22)	73.4 (1)	1.131 (3)
Nevada	.384 (14)	71.1 (5)	1.156 (1)
New Jersey	.333 (19)	56.2 (23)	.878 (23)
New York	.486 (10)	45.7 (30)	.767 (29)
North Carolina	.688 (4)	67.2 (8)	.988 (13)
Ohio	.457 (12)	68.9 (7)	1.057 (5)
Oklahoma	.124 (27)	61.6 (17)	1.017 (10T)
Pennsylvania	.350 (18)	60.6 (18T)	.973 (16T)
Rhode Island	.033 (33)	--	--
South Carolina	.570 (8)	72 (4)	1.146 (2)
Tennessee	.481 (11)	58.1 (22)	1.051 (7)
Texas	.362 (15)	61.8 (16)	.976 (15)
Virginia	.411 (13)	66.6 (10)	.977 (14)
Wisconsin	.265 (20)	73.1 (2)	1.017 (10T)
Mean	.372	64.9	.95

Note: The black populations in Iowa and Rhode Island are too small to estimate black turnout.

Sources: See Tables 2-4 in Appendix D for information on the black caucus influence index.

U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population Survey. Table 4B. "Reported Voting and Registration of the Voting-Age Population, by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for States: November 2008."

Figure 5.5 Black Caucus Influence Index and Black Voter Turnout in 2008





Figure 5.6 Black Caucus Influence Index and the Black/White Turnout Ratio in 2008



CHAPTER 6: EXPLAINING PARITY DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION, 1992-2004

Introduction

Of the different forms of descriptive representation, parity is the most understudied and thereby least understood. In his 1998 book, *Faces of Inequality*, Rodney Hero writes less than a page on the topic, arguing that parity should be likely to occur in homogenous states, and King-Meadows and Schaller (2006) use statistical analysis to show that states with larger minority populations tend to have lower levels of parity descriptive representation, supporting Hero's argument. Orey, Overby and Larimer (2007) examine whether there is parity in the number of black committee chairs, in 1989 and 1999, finding that larger black delegations tend to have a higher number of black committee chairs. These works are informative, but they do not study all fifty states, nor do they examine the dynamic nature of parity descriptive representation. Thus, this chapter examines the state-level factors that account for parity descriptive representation in the fifty states, from 1992 to 2004.

Of the various forms of representation, I hypothesized that parity would be the weakest form of political empowerment and would not lead to a greater number of mobilization networks in and of itself (see Chapter 1), but that it arguably has the most important normative implications, as it indicates racial equity in electoral representation in state legislatures. Some empirical findings, however, suggest that parity descriptive representation is positively associated with blacks being more likely to know the partisan composition of their state legislature and being more likely to approve of their state legislature (see Chapter 2), along with unlikely black voters being significantly more likely to vote in 2008 (see Chapter 3), showing that parity descriptive representation may be both normatively and substantively important.

The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. The next section provides a brief literature review on parity descriptive representation in state legislatures. The third section describes the data and methods. Next, the fourth section displays the results of the

analyses. The last section discusses the implications the findings have on the study of descriptive representation.

Literature Review

Limited research examines parity descriptive representation in the state legislature. Hero (1998) writes that higher minority diversity is related to high underrepresentation in legislatures because legislatures in homogenous states have few minorities, leading to minimal departures from parity (82). In other words, states with larger black populations should be less likely to achieve parity descriptive representation. King-Meadows and Schaller (2006, 81) study thirty states in 2001, finding that minority population has negative and nearly significant relationship with parity descriptive representation. Lastly, Orey, Overby and Larimer (2007) examine parity descriptive representation in black committee chairs in legislature, finding that blacks are overrepresented as chairs of social services committees, underrepresented as chairs of important committees (i.e. money committees), and that states with larger black delegations are more likely to have a greater number of black committee chairs.

The shortcomings of these works are twofold. First, none of them examine parity descriptive representation in all fifty states, which is important for generalizability. Second, none of them examine parity descriptive representation over time, and as Figure 6.1 displays, it increases from .59 in 1992 to nearly .7 in 2004. Thus, with its increasing trend, it is important that scholars understand the factors that continually and consistently influence parity descriptive representation.

Since Hero (1998) and King-Meadows and Schaller (2006) argue that having a higher minority population has a negative effect on parity descriptive representation, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: States with larger black populations will have lower levels of parity descriptive representation.

I also expect the black-to-white education parity ratio to influence parity descriptive representation. In Chapter 4, I find that a higher black-to-white education parity ratio is positively associated with collective descriptive representation (see Table 4.3).

Employing analogous logic— that black educational outcomes should increase the number of black state legislators (Holmes 2000; Orey 2000; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), but must be compared to whites since they are the primary group that compete against black candidates — I propose a second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: States with greater black-to-white education parity will have higher levels of parity descriptive representation.

Data and Methods

The measure for parity descriptive representation is percent black in the state legislature divided by percent black in the state, and the data come from a number of sources. The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies provides the number of black state legislators, *The Book of the States* provides the size of legislature, and the Census Bureau provides data on black population in the state.

How well do states achieve parity representation? Table 6.1 ranks states by parity descriptive representation and also lists the black population. On average, parity descriptive representation is .640, supporting previous findings that blacks are generally underrepresented in state legislatures (Jewell 1982; Haynie 2001; King-Meadows and Schaller 2006). In total, forty-four states under-represent blacks; Idaho, Montana, North Dakota have the lowest levels of parity descriptive representation because they have no black state legislators in the era examined. A handful over-represent blacks; Oregon has the highest level of parity descriptive representation, with a percentage of black state legislators nearly double the black population, followed by Vermont, which has a percentage of black state legislators nearly one and a half times its black population. Four states — Wisconsin, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Ohio — have parity descriptive representation within a tenth of a percent of one, making them the states that most closely

achieve racial equity in electoral representation. Six states ranked in the top ten of parity descriptive representation are also ranked in the bottom half of black population, which again suggests that black population has a negative relationship with parity descriptive representation.

The Census Bureau provides the data on state black population and the black-to-white education parity ratio in the state, the key independent variables. Table 6.2 lists black population and black-to-white education parity ratio in each state. Of the states ranked in the top ten of black-to-white education parity ratio, West Virginia, at a mere 3.16 percent, has the largest black population. Moreover, of the states ranked in the bottom ten of the black-to-white education parity ratio, seven have a black population greater than fifteen percent. In short, the data suggest that black population and black-to-white education parity have antithetical effects on parity descriptive representation.

Other social demographic variables may influence parity descriptive representation. Since black and Latino elected officials are more similar in their policy preferences than Latinos and whites are (Whitby and Gilliam 1998), black state legislators tend to represent districts with sizable Latino populations (King-Meadows and Schaller 2006), and both groups tend to vote for Democratic candidates (Mindiola, Niemann and Rodriguez 2002), states with larger Latino populations may have higher levels of parity descriptive representation. Also, I include the citizen ideology score introduced in Berry et al (1998) and updated on Richard Fording's website where higher values indicate liberal citizens, median age in state, state median income, and state education, measured as the number of people over twenty-five who have a high school diploma, as they are common in state politics research.

Institutional variables may also account for parity descriptive representation. The findings in Squire (1992) suggest blacks benefit from professional legislatures, meaning that professionalized legislatures may generally have more black state legislators than citizen legislatures have. With term limits, however, the antithesis seems true. First

introduced in 1990, by 2004, term limits impacted representation in twelve states.²⁵ Although most scholars argue that they have little influence on minority representation in state legislatures (Moncrief et al 1992; Penning 2002; Straayer 2002; Carey, Niemi and Powell 2000, Carey et al 2006), others argue that term limits actually detract from minority descriptive representation (Reed and Schansberg 1995). Thus, term-limited states may be less likely to achieve parity representation. Next, scholars have different thoughts on the impact multimember districts have on minority descriptive representation, with some arguing multimember districts detract from minority representation (Jewell 1982; Moncrief and Thompson 1992), some arguing they increase minority representation (Gerber, Morton and Reitz 1998; Brockington et al 1998), and some arguing they may no longer effect minority representation (Cooper 2008). Either way, multimember districts should influence parity descriptive representation.²⁶ See Appendix C1 for a description of explanatory variables.

I run a pooled cross-sectional time series model with panel corrected standard errors to understand the factors that lead to greater parity representation in state legislatures.²⁷ Moreover, I use year dummies since research finds they measure the influence of time in the model (Beck, Katz and Turner 1998).

Results

There is no support for either hypothesis. In fact, instead of black population having a negative effect on parity descriptive representation, states with larger black populations actually tend to have greater levels of parity descriptive representation (see Table 6.3). To be exact, for every unit increase in black population, parity descriptive representation increases by .007. Figure 5.2 illustrates that moving from the minimum to maximum of black population increases a state's parity score by .25, holding all other

²⁵ See Table C2 in Appendix for data on which states have term limits, along with the year they took effect.

²⁶ See Table C3 in Appendix for data on multimember districts.

²⁷ See discussion in Chapter 4 on why serial correlation is not a problem in this study.

variables constant. Despite being inconsistent with my hypothesis, the findings are consistent with previous research arguing that large black populations are needed to elect blacks because racial prejudice among whites makes them reluctant to vote for black candidates (Reeves 1997). Moreover, the results demonstrate that states with higher black-to-white education parity ratios generally have higher levels of parity descriptive representation, which is in the hypothesized direction, but lacks statistical significance ($p=.32$).

Two social demographic control variables attain statistical significance: Latino population and citizen ideology. Figure 6.3 indicates that moving from the minimum to the maximum of Latino population increases the parity descriptive representation by .2, holding all other variables constant, suggesting that Latinos support black candidates. The effect of citizen ideology is even more pronounced. Moving from its minimum to its maximum increases parity descriptive representation by .4 (see Figure 6.4). Thus, states with generally liberal citizens better achieve parity descriptive representation than states with generally conservative citizens.

Two institutional variables are statistically significant, namely legislative professionalism and term limit impact. Figure 6.5 displays that moving from the least professionalized to the most professionalized legislature, parity descriptive representation increases by roughly .25, supporting the findings in Squire (1992). Next, Figure 6.6 shows that parity descriptive representation is .1 lower in states impacted by term limits, compared to those not impacted by term limits. Thus, this contradicts the seemingly overwhelming evidence that term limits do not influence minority descriptive representation (Moncrief et al 1992; Penning 2002; Straayer 2002; Carey, Niemi and Powell 2000, Carey et al 2006). One explanation for this finding is that this study examines fifty state legislatures over a twelve-year period, after term limits have taken

effect, providing a superior analysis of the impact term limits have parity descriptive representation in state legislatures than previous works.²⁸

Discussion

A number of state-level factors account for parity representation. Contrary to the expectations, states with larger black populations tend to have higher levels of parity representation. Thus, blacks are needed to elect blacks, for both collective and parity descriptive representation. Although there is no support that the black-to-white education parity ratio influences parity descriptive representation, there is a positive association between the variables. The rest of the chapter discusses the findings' implications on the study of descriptive representation.

The findings have implications on the impact non-black variables have on black representation. Short of a precipitous baby boom within the black community, black population will remain relatively stable in coming years, making non-black variables the best means to achieve parity descriptive representation. Therefore, shifts in Latino population, in citizen ideology, and the professionalism of legislatures may be the best means to increase parity descriptive representation. Conversely, although it has been nearly a decade since the last state adopted term limits, a number of states may choose to do so in the future, which might portend doom for achieving parity descriptive representation in state legislatures.

There are implications on representation in general. Parity descriptive representation has important substantive and normative implications. Parity descriptive representation is positively associated with blacks knowing the partisan composition of the state legislature and with approving of the state legislature (see Chapter 2), and unlikely black voters with higher levels of parity descriptive representation are significantly more likely to vote (see Table 3.4), showing that it may have a substantive

²⁸ In the Chapter 4, I outline in great detail how previous works fail to look at the impact of term limits once they take effect.

effect on black political behavior. From a normative perspective, the hope in a democratic republic is that people are represented at a rate similar to their population. Why? Simply put, parity descriptive representation is an indication of racial equity in electoral representation. Thus, with its substantive and normative importance, it is paramount that scholars understand the characteristics that predict parity descriptive representation.

Figure 6.1 Average Parity Descriptive Representation, 1992-2004




Table 6.1 Parity Score and Black Population, by State

States	Parity Score	Rank	Black Population	Rank
Oregon	1.861	1	1.79	41
Vermont	1.465	2	.516	49
Ohio	1.094	3	11.4	18
Rhode Island	1.074	4	5.12	30
Wisconsin	1.048	5	5.57	29
Nevada	1.047	6	7.32	25
Arizona	.917	7	3.47	34
Indiana	.902	8	8.32	22
Alabama	.867	9	25.9	6
Illinois	.849	10	15.2	13
Colorado	.843	11	4.24	31
Florida	.836	12	15.1	14
California	.833	13	7.39	24
Michigan	.830	14	14.3	16
New Hampshire	.823	15	.750	44
New Jersey	.762	16	14.5	15
Utah	.746	17	.861	42
Missouri	.729	18	11.2	19
New York	.728	19	17.5	10
Tennessee	.727	20	16.5	11
Texas	.726	21	12.1	17
Pennsylvania	.717	22	9.85	20
Connecticut	.716	23	9.37	21
Maryland	.687	24	27.4	5
Kansas	.660	25	5.90	28
Mississippi	.644	26	36.4	1
Arkansas	.641	27	16.0	12
Louisiana	.629	28T	32.1	2
North Carolina	.629	28T	22.0	7
Georgia	.616	30	28.4	4
South Carolina	.582	31	29.8	3
Massachusetts	.533	32	6.32	27
Nebraska	.511	33	4.00	32
Virginia	.493	34	19.8	8
Kentucky	.467	35	7.29	26
South Dakota	.452	36	.665	45
Oklahoma	.434	37	7.71	23
Washington	.427	38	3.41	35
New Mexico	.414	39	2.42	39
West Virginia	.404	40	3.16	36
Iowa	.331	41	2.02	40
Alaska	.305	42	3.90	33

Table 6.1 Continued

Delaware	.300	43	19.0	9
Minnesota	.202	44	3.10	37
Wyoming	.177	45	.857	43
Hawaii	.169	46	2.70	38
Maine	.153	47	.517	48
Idaho	0	50T	.537	47
Montana	0	50T	.352	50
North Dakota	0	50T	.644	46
Mean	.640	--	10.1	--
Median	.652	--	7.31	

Notes: The parity score is the percent black in the legislature divided by percent black in the state, from 1992 to 2004, and the data are the average from 1992 to 2004.

Sources: *Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 1993. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1995. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1997. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1999. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2001. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2003. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2005. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

The Book of the States. 1992-1993. Vol. 29. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1994-1995. Vol.30. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1996-1997. Vol. 31. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1998-1999. Vol. 32. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2000-2001. Vol. 33. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

Table 6.1 Continued

The Book of the States. 2002. Vol. 34. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2003. Vol. 35. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2004. Vol. 36. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. "Estimates of the Population of States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, 1990 to 1999."

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division, 1. "Annual Estimates of the Population for the United States and for Puerto Rico, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006."

Table 6.2 Black Population and the Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio, by State

States	Black Population	Rank	Black-to-White Education Parity Ratio	Rank
Alabama	25.9	6	.542	34T
Alaska	3.90	33	.526	40
Arizona	3.47	34	.651	15
Arkansas	16.0	12	.568	29
California	7.39	24	.594	25
Colorado	4.24	31	.601	23
Connecticut	9.37	21	.431	49
Delaware	19.0	9	.502	46
Florida	15.1	14	.523	41T
Georgia	28.4	4	.543	33
Hawaii	2.70	38	.567	30
Idaho	.537	47	.963	5
Illinois	15.2	13	.523	41T
Indiana	8.32	22	.612	20
Iowa	2.02	40	.713	12
Kansas	5.90	28	.542	34T
Kentucky	7.29	26	.598	24
Louisiana	32.1	2	.492	47
Maine	.517	48	1.066	3
Maryland	27.4	5	.593	26
Massachusetts	6.32	27	.604	21
Michigan	14.3	16	.556	32
Minnesota	3.10	37	.731	10
Mississippi	36.4	1	.512	44
Missouri	11.2	19	.602	22
Montana	.352	50	.947	6
Nebraska	4.00	32	.634	17
Nevada	7.32	25	.575	28
New Hampshire	.750	44	.994	4
New Jersey	14.5	15	.535	38
New Mexico	2.42	39	.674	14
New York	17.5	10	.539	36
North Carolina	22.0	7	.521	43
North Dakota	.644	46	.826	8
Ohio	11.4	18	.536	37
Oklahoma	7.71	23	.649	16
Oregon	1.77	41	.721	11
Pennsylvania	9.85	20	.534	39
Rhode Island	5.12	30	.616	19
South Carolina	29.8	3	.399	50
South Dakota	.665	45	1.147	2

Table 6.2 Continued

Tennessee	16.5	11	.630	18
Texas	12.1	17	.565	31
Utah	.861	42	.745	9
Vermont	.516	49	1.164	1
Virginia	19.8	8	.456	48
Washington	3.41	35	.676	13
West Virginia	3.16	36	.868	7
Wisconsin	5.57	29	.508	45
Wyoming	.857	43	.583	27
Mean	10.1	--	.644	--

Notes: Black population is measured as the average percent black in the state, from 1992 to 2004.

Black-to-white education parity score is the average percent black in the state with at least a bachelor's degree divided by the percent white in the state with at least a bachelor's degree, from 1992 to 2004.

Sources: *U.S. Census Bureau*. Census 1990 Summary File 3, P058. "Race by Educational Attainment."

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. "Estimates of the Population of States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, 1990 to 1999."

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division, 1. "Annual Estimates of the Population for the United States and for Puerto Rico, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006."

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148B. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (Black Alone)."

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148A. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (White Alone)."

Table 6.3 Regression Results for Explaining Parity Descriptive Representation

Variables	Coefficients (Standard Errors)	P-values
Black Population	.007*** (.002)	.001
Black-to-White Education Parity	.192 (.194)	.323
Latino Population	.005*** (.002)	.007
Citizen Ideology	.004*** (.002)	.008
Median Age	.003 (.016)	.845
Median Income	.001 (.001)	.383
State Education	-.001 (.005)	.772
Legislative Professionalism	.354*** (.108)	.001
Term Limit Impact	-.096* (.056)	.087
Multimember Districts	-.001 (.001)	.633
1994	.085*** (.015)	.001
1996	.118*** (.013)	.001
1998	.102*** (.008)	.001
2000	.041 (.062)	.509
2002	.050 (.055)	.359
2004	.063 (.049)	.379
Constant	-.029 (.701)	.197
Observations	350	--
R-Squared	.082	--
Wald χ^2	5727.51	

Note: Description of variables along with a complete list of sources can be found in Appendix C1.

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .10$.

Figure 6.2 Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Black Population




Figure 6.3 Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Latino Population




Figure 6.4 Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Citizen Ideology




Figure 6.5 Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Legislative Professionalism





Figure 6.6 Expected Change in Parity Descriptive Representation, Varying Term Limit Impact in States



CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Introduction

Barack Obama serving as the nation's 44th president has provided scholars of race and representation with fodder for years to come. We will be able to study whether having a black president increases the political efficacy of the group, to discern whether President Obama's relationship with the Congressional Black Caucus is significantly different than previous Democratic presidents, and gauge whether having a black president changes non-blacks' attitudes towards blacks, to name a few potential research areas for political scientists interested in empirical analyses. For political theorists, one potential research area is to extent to which having a black president signals that America is a post-racial society. Although these are all interesting and important questions, this project indicates that scholars should not to be too quick to ignore black representation at lower levels of government. First, there is greater variation in black representation in the states, compared to representation in Congress. In fact, in 2006, all but five states had some amount of black representation in the state legislature. Also, with devolution in recent years, states are central in making decisions that influence peoples' lives. Lastly, collective descriptive representation may maximize both descriptive and substantive representation for blacks; it does not have the tradeoffs that dyadic descriptive representation has. This project recognizes the historical and political significance of a black president, but it also recognizes that black representation is important beyond the national level, especially black representation in state legislatures.

This last chapter is divided into three sections. Next, I summarize findings for black descriptive representation in the states as an explanatory and dependent variable. Then I discuss the broad implications the findings have on the study of race and politics. Lastly, I describe future research projects that result from this dissertation.

Summary of Findings

Chapters 2, 3, and 5 examine black descriptive representation as an explanatory variable, and Table 7.1 lists the significant findings for collective, parity, and dyadic descriptive representation. With dyadic descriptive representation, it influences citizen knowledge about Congress, makes blacks slightly more likely to know the partisan composition of the state lower chamber, and also makes unlikely black voters more likely to vote (see Table 3.4). Although this is important and meaningful, dyadic descriptive representation is not something common for blacks to experience, with only twenty-one states having a black US House member in 2008. Black representation in the state legislature, on the other hand, is something that a greater number of black experience and appear to benefit from. Surprisingly, parity descriptive representation is significantly related to blacks knowing the partisan composition of the state legislature and with unlikely black voters choosing to vote in 2008, and it is positively related to blacks approving of the state legislature. It thus appears that parity descriptive representation is a more important form of political empowerment than expected. As expected, collective descriptive representation leads to blacks having significantly higher levels of interest in politics, being significantly more likely to vote, and it is significantly related to unlikely black voters choosing to vote in 2008. Lastly, the data in Chapter 5 states with influential legislative black caucuses have generally have higher black turnout rates, suggesting that it is a form of political empowerment that encourages blacks political participation. In sum, black representation in the state legislature appears to be an important form of political empowerment that may structure black political behavior, which corroborates the argument outlined in first chapter that collective will matter more so than the other two forms. Also, it lends support to the idea that various forms differentially affect political behavior, providing evidence that the forms of representation are both conceptually and empirically distinct.

Chapters 4 through 6 examine black descriptive representation as a dependent variable. Table 7.2 displays important findings from these chapters, and there are a number of things to note. I begin with similarities between the various forms of descriptive representation. As expected, black population has an effect on descriptive representation for all three forms. Moreover, Latino population has a positive and significant relationship with each form of descriptive representation, and as aforementioned, with Latino population growing at a faster rate than black population is, it may be that Latinos will play a key role in electing black state lawmakers in the years to come. States with professionalized legislatures tend to have higher levels of both collective and parity descriptive representation, supporting previous findings (Squire 1992). Also, states with older populations tend to have higher levels of collective descriptive representation and are more likely to have a legislative black caucus, but this is surprising since I expect older populations to have conservative views on race. One potential explanation is that older populations attempt to redress racial discrimination, and as a result, have higher levels of black representation.

The various forms of descriptive representation also have starkly different explanatory variables. The most obvious difference is the influence of the black-to-white education parity ratio. Even though the relationship with collective and parity descriptive representation lacks statistical significance, it is positively associated with the two, but it has a strong negative association with caucus descriptive representation. One potential explanation is that education parity between blacks and whites encourages the election of blacks, which increases collective and parity descriptive representation, but since caucuses exist in states with few black elected officials — like Iowa, Rhode Island and Massachusetts — and states with few blacks tend to have lower levels of education parity, a negative relationship surfaces between caucus descriptive representation and education parity between blacks and whites.

Parity descriptive representation has two significant relationships that are unique: states impacted by term limits generally have lower levels of parity descriptive representation, yet states with liberal citizens tend to have higher levels of parity descriptive representation. The finding for the impact of term limits may be because four states impacted by term limits — Oklahoma, Maine, Montana and South Dakota — all have low parity descriptive representation. For citizen ideology, it may be that states with liberal citizens may make efforts to elect blacks to office so that there is racial equity in representation.

Lastly, multimember districts and median income have unique influence on caucus descriptive representation. For multimember districts, the negative relationship appears to add to the cacophony of voices on the relationship between it and black representation. But, as Figure 7.1 shows, the actual impact of multimember districts is minimal. Moving from the minimum to the maximum number of multimember districts decreases the probability of a black caucus by .001, or virtually nothing. Thus, black population and education parity are more important for caucus formation than district type is. For median income, it is negatively associated with collective descriptive representation. A plausible explanation is that southern states have the largest number of black state legislators, but they are also generally poorer than states in other regions.

Just as with black descriptive representation as an explanatory variable, the findings for examining black descriptive representation as a dependent variable suggest that collective, parity and dyadic descriptive representation are distinct, as they have different explanatory variables. In short, the results demonstrate again that black representation is multi-dimensional.

Implications

This project revitalizes study of political empowerment. With a vast number of works looking at descriptive representation and with arguments about the novelty of political empowerment, it seemed that the empowerment hypothesis was on its last leg.

But, this study reveals additional dimensions to political empowerment, namely collective, parity, and caucus descriptive representation. The hope is that incorporating state-level black representation into the discussion of race and representation will galvanize scholars to reassess the state of the empowerment hypothesis.

The findings have implications on the study of political behavior. Although tomes have studied what influences peoples' attitudes, propensity to vote, or likelihood of contacting respondents, this study brings race to the forefront, indicating that collective, parity, and caucus descriptive representation may structure citizen political behavior in an analogous fashion as education, income, ideology, or partisanship, suggesting that existing mobilization networks in these states and the positive benefits that the black representation engenders encourage black political participation. Du Bois argued that race was the defining issue of the 20th century (2003, 3), and it appears that it may also be the defining question of the 21st century.

There are also implications on the importance of majority black districts. With reapportionment taking place after the 2010 census, and with a conservative Supreme Court that does not consider it a priority to protect majority black districts, redistricting may soon come under fire. Now, black population is clearly the best explanation for black descriptive representation, but if districts are redrawn such that majority black are cracked, then it may not be the death knell for black representation in states. That is, improved education for blacks, greater professionalism in the legislature, and larger Latino populations — with questions about citizenship aside — may also increase black representation in states.

This study has implications on Barack Obama as a black president. The findings reveal that black representation in the state legislature, not simply the presence of a black candidate in the election, encourages unlikely black voters' political engagement and participation. So, with President Obama serving a minimum of three more years and a maximum of seven more years, what does this say about political engagement and

participation for blacks? As Hutchings (2009) suggests with whites' racial attitudes, it may mean more of the same for African-American political participation.

Finally, there are implications on the study of legislative black caucuses. To date, legislative black caucuses have been grossly understudied area, yet this research shows that they exist in most states and that number of blacks exercise influence in state legislatures. The findings are the first to show a relationship between influential black caucuses and black political behavior, showing that caucus descriptive representation matters for African Americans. With a governing body like NBCSL that serves as the penumbra organization for over 500 black state lawmakers and that meets annually to form a national-level black policy agenda, it is imperative that scholars incorporate black caucuses into future studies of bill introduction, agenda-setting, and policy making, along with black political behavior, at the state level. There are other future works that come out of this research, and I turn to them in the next section.

Discussion

Future works will use empirics to show the veracity of the arguments made throughout the dissertation, namely that collective and caucus descriptive representation have symbolic and substantive meaning for blacks, and both lead greater mobilization for blacks. Showing that blacks with either form of political empowerment have higher levels of political efficacy would suggest the importance of symbolic representation. Although existing works argue that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation (Nelson 1991; Haynie 2001; Owens 2005), none of these examine policy outcomes since 1990, making it important that I show the relationship still exists in the present day. For the mobilization argument, I can study whether blacks in states with greater levels of collective and caucus descriptive representation are more likely to be mobilized, using party contact as the dependent variable. Supporting these two arguments would show the strength of robustness of the theory that drives the dissertation.

In addition, I could perform a study that examines relationship between influential legislative black caucuses and the adoption of NBCSL policy committees in states. I could create a policy index of the 2009 NBCSL policy resolutions, and then see whether states with influential legislative black caucuses are more likely to introduce or pass analogous bills in their respective state legislatures.

This work focuses on the ability of political empowerment to encourage black political behavior, with the idea that linked fate makes race salient to most blacks (Dawson 1994). But, blacks are not monolithic, and with class playing a critical role in shaping blacks' everyday lives (Wilson 1980; Hooks 2000), upper and middle class blacks may respond to political empowerment differently than poorer blacks. Thus, future works will analyze black political behavior by class subsamples to parse out whether the impact of black political empowerment is mediated more by race or by class.

Table 7.1 Summary of Findings when Black Descriptive Representation is an Explanatory Variable (for Blacks)

Dependent Variables	Collective	Parity	Dyadic	Caucus
Knows MC's Race	ns	ns	(+)	--
Knows Majority Party in State	(+)	(+)	(+)	--
Lower Chamber				
Political Interest	(+)	ns	ns	--
Voting	(+)	ns	ns	(+)
Voting for Unlikely Voters	(+)	ns, (+)	ns, (+)	--
Approval of State Legislature	ns	ns	ns	--

Notes: ns stands for not significant.


I have the category “ns, (+)” and “ns, (-)” because different models may give different results.

Table 7.2 Summary of Findings when Black Descriptive Representation is a Dependent Variable

Explanatory Variables	Form of Black Descriptive Representation		
	Collective	Parity	Caucus
Black Population in State	(+)	(+)	(+)
Black-to-White Education	ns	ns	(-)
Parity Ratio			
Latino Population	(+)	(+)	(+)
Legislative	(+)	(+)	ns
Professionalism			
Term Limit Impact	ns	(-)	ns
Multimember Districts	ns	ns	(+)
Citizen Ideology	ns	(+)	ns
Median Age in State	(+)	ns	(+)
Median Income in State	(-)	ns	ns
State Education	ns	ns	ns

Notes: ns stands for not significant.

Figure 7.1 Probability of a Black Caucus, Varying the Number of Multimember Districts



APPENDIX A APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 2

This appendix is organized as follows: the first four entries, A1-A4, discuss the creation of the political knowledge variable; entries A5-A7 discuss the dependent variables of political interest, voting, and approval of the state legislature; and A8 provides summary statistics for the explanatory variables.

Appendices A1-A4

The political knowledge variables indicate whether the respondent correctly identifies the race of their House member and/or if the respondent knows the majority party in the state's lower chamber. The CCES has no such variable, so I used the congressional district and state information provided in the CCES to create variables that indicate both the race of their House member and the majority party in the state's lower chamber. Respondents who correctly identify the race of their House member are coded as one, while those who do not are coded as zero. A similar coding scheme is employed for whether the respondent correctly identifies the majority party in their state's lower chamber. Those who answer not sure are coded as zero. Here is the exact wording of the question used to create the variable for correctly identifying the race of their member of Congress, "What is the race or ethnicity of your member of the U.S. House of Representatives?" Table A1 shows that most people think their member of Congress is white. But what is the distribution of the created dependent variable? Table A2 shows that eight-two percent of people correctly identify their House member's race.

Here is the question wording for the variable used to measure whether a respondent knows the majority party in the state lower chamber, "Which party has a majority of seats the state's lower chamber?" Table A3 shows the distribution of the variable, indicating that most people answered not sure to who was the majority party in the state lower chamber. But were people correct? The answer is no. Table A4 shows that a mere 42 percent of respondents correctly identified the majority party of their state's lower chamber.

Appendices A5-A7

The other dependent variables are relatively straightforward. The wording for the political interest question is, “(What is your) level of interest in politics/current events? Very much interested, somewhat interested, not much interested, not sure?” Table A5 shows that most people said they were very much interested in politics; these are the people coded as one in the study. The wording for the voting question is,

“Which of the following best describes you? I did not vote in the election this November, I thought about voting this time but didn’t, I usually vote but didn’t this time, I attempted to vote but did not or could not, I definitely voted in the November General Election.”

Table A6 shows that 88 percent of respondents said they plan to vote; these people are coded as one. Lastly, the question wording for approval of the state legislature is, “Do you approve of the way the state legislature is doing its job?” The distribution of the respondents is in Table A7; 34.5 percent of respondents are coded as one.

Appendix A8

This entry only provides summary statistics, requiring no further information.

Table A1 Responses to Question on House Member's Race

Race	Number of Respondents in Category
White	75.1% (24,501)
Black	6.57% (2,143)
Hispanic	3.84% (1,251)
Other	1.91% (623)
Not Sure	12.58% (4,102)
Total	100% (32,620)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer]

Table A2 Whether Respondent Correctly Identifies House Member's Race

Correctly Identifies House Member's Race	Number of Respondents in Category
Yes	82.2% (26,979)
No	17.8% (5,821)
Total	100% (32,800)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer]

Table A3 Responses to Question on Majority Party in State Lower Chamber

Party	Number of Respondents in Category
Republicans	24.0% (7786)
Democrats	33.2% (10,478)
Neither	1.5% (482)
Not Sure	41.3% (13,376)
Total	100% (32,392)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer]

Table A4 Whether Respondent Correctly Identifies Majority Party in State Lower Chamber

Correctly Identifies Majority Party in State Lower Chamber	Number of Respondents in Category
Yes	58% (19,006)
No	42% (13,784)
Total	100% (32,800)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer]

Table A5 Responses to Question on Political Interest

Responses	Number of Respondents in Category
Very Much Interested	65.3% (21,404)
Somewhat Interested	26.3% (8,612)
Not Much Interested	7.4% (2,424)
Not Sure	1% (314)
Total	100% (32,754)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer]

Table A6 Responses to Question on Voting

Responses	Number of Respondents in Category
I did not vote in the election this November	7.3% (1940)
I thought about voting this time- but didn't	1.8% (457)
I usually vote, but didn't this time	1% (247)
I attempted to vote but did not or could not	1.1% (307)
I definitely voted in the November General Election	88.8% (23,372)
Total	100% (26,323)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer]

Table A7 Responses to Question on State Legislature Approval

Responses	Number of Respondents in Category
Strongly Approve	3.8% (1,259)
Somewhat Approve	30.7% (10,049)
Somewhat Disapprove	25.5% (8,335)
Strongly Disapprove	19.5% (6,360)
Not Sure	20.3% (6,642)
Total	100% (32,645)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer].

Table A8 Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables

Variables (N=32,800)	Description	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range
Black*Percent Black in the Legislature ^a	An interactive variable that indicates the percent black in the legislature for a black respondent	1.37	4.495	0-27.01
Black*Black House Member	An interactive variable that indicates when a black respondent has a black member of Congress	.030	.171	0-1
Black*Parity Representation ^a	An interactive variable that indicates the level of parity representation for a black respondent	.077	.234	0-1.35
Black	Indicates a black respondent	.104	.305	0-1
Percent Black in Legislature ^a	Indicates the percent black in the legislature	9.872	6.262	0-27.01
Black House Member	Indicates whether a respondent has a black member of Congress	.073	.260	0-1
Parity Representation ^a	Indicates the level of parity representation for a respondent	.718	.244	0-1.35
Female	Indicates a female respondent	.508	.500	0-1
Income ^b	Indicates the amount of money a respondent earns	8.64	3.722	1-15
Education	Indicates a respondent's level of education	3.341	1.456	1-6
Age	Indicates a respondent's age	49.58	14.982	18-100
Strong Democrat ^b	Indicates whether a respondent is a strong Democrat	.269	.443	0-1
Strong Republican ^b	Indicates whether a respondent is a strong Republican	.205	.403	0-1
Liberal	Indicates whether the respondent is liberal	.217	.412	0-1
Conservative	Indicates whether a respondent is conservative	.348	.476	0-1

Table A8 Continued

Independent ^b	Indicates whether a respondent is an Independent	.113	.317	0-1
Legislative Professionalism ^a	Squire's legislative professionalism score	.257	.153	.027-.626
South	Indicates whether a state seceded from the Union	.292	.455	0-1
Percent Democrat in State Legislature ^c	Indicates whether Democrats are the majority in the state legislature	52.96	11.75	24.8-87.5
Presidential Vote Margin ^a	1 minus the vote margin between majority party presidential candidates in state	.859	.087	.549-.999
Congressional Vote Margin	1 minus the vote margin between top two congressional candidates	.66	.243	0-.9977

Notes: ^a means it is a state level variable and therefore excludes the 69 DC respondents. In total, there are 32,731 respondents in these categories.

^b means that there are fewer respondents because they chose to not answer.

^c 285 respondents from DC and Nebraska are excluded because Nebraska is a non-partisan legislature and DC does not have a state legislature. In total, there are 32515 respondents in this category.

^d 180 respondents come from districts with only one candidate, leaving 32620 respondents in this category.

Sources: The data on presidential and congressional vote margin come from each state legislative website.

Amer, Mildred L. 2008 "African American Members of the United States Congress: 1870-2008." *Congressional Research Service*.

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2007. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Squire, Peverill. 2007. "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 7(2):211-227.

The American National Election Studies (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].

The Book of the States. 2008. Vol. 40. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

APPENDIX B APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 3

This appendix is organized as follows: entries B1 and B2 provide the exact wording of the question used as the dependent variable and also list the distribution of the dependent variables in both datasets, and entries B3-B6 lists the distribution of the variables used to create the “likely voter by race” variables.

Appendices B1 and B2

The wording of the question used as the dependent variable in the ANES is, “So far as you know now, do you expect to vote in the national elections this coming November or not?” Table B1 shows eight-seven percent of respondents say that they intend to vote in 2008. The wording on the question used as the dependent variable in the CCES is,

“Which of the following best describes you? I did not vote in the election this November, I thought about voting but didn’t, I usually vote but didn’t this time, I attempted to vote but did not or could not, I definitely voted in the November General Election.”

Table B2 shows that eight-eight percent of respondents intend to vote in 2008.

Appendices B3-B6

In the ANES, the question used to show whether the respondent is a likely voter is, “How often would you say you vote? Always, nearly always, part of the time, or seldom?” Table B3 shows that forty percent of respondents vote part of the time or seldom, and these people are coded as unlikely voters. The question to determine the respondent’s race is, “What racial or ethnic group or groups best describe you?” Table B4 shows that twenty-five percent of respondents are black, making seventy-five percent of the respondents non-black. In the CCES, there is not a question on vote frequency, so I use a question on voting in primaries and caucuses as a proxy, and the question is, “Did you vote in the Presidential primary or attend a caucus between January and June of this year?” Table B5 shows that about sixty-two percent of respondents voted in the primary or caucus, making them likely voters and the other thirty-eight percent unlikely voters.

Table B6 lists the racial distribution of respondents, and shows that about eleven percent of the respondents are black, making about eighty-nine percent of the respondents non-black.

Table B1 Distribution of Responses on Voting in 2008 (ANES)

Voting in 2008	Number of Respondents in Category
Yes	76.26% (1,603)
No	23.74% (499)
Total	100% (2,102)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: *The American National Election Studies* (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].

Table B2 Distribution of Responses on Voting in 2008 (CCES)

Voting in 2008	Number of Respondents in Category
Yes	88.79% (23,372)
No	11.21% (2,951)
Total	100% (26,323)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer].

Table B3 Distribution of Respondents by Vote Frequency (ANES)

Vote Frequency	Number of Respondents in Category
Always	34.14% (788)
Nearly Always	26.52% (612)
Part of the Time	12.44% (287)
Seldom	26.91% (621)
Total	100% (2,308)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: *The American National Election Studies* (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].

Table B4 Distribution of Respondents by Race (ANES)

Race	Number of Respondents in Category
Black	24.79% (572)
Asian	1.52% (35)
Native American	1.13% (26)
Hispanic or Latino	18.81% (434)
White	51.41% (1,186)
Other	2.34% (54)
Total	100% (2,307)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: *The American National Election Studies* (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].

Table B5 Distribution of Respondents by Voting in Primary or Caucus (CCES)

Voted in Primary or Caucus	Number of Respondents in Category
Yes	61.84% (20,282)
No	38.16% (12,518)
Total	100% (32,800)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer].

Table B6 Distribution of Respondents by Race (CCES)

Race	Number of Respondents in Category
White	75.71% (24,834)
Black	10.42% (3,419)
Hispanic	8.47% (2,779)
Asian	1.2% (395)
Native American	.91% (297)
Mixed	1.4% (458)
Other	1.8% (592)
Middle Eastern	.08% (26)
Total	100% (32,800)

Note: Total number of respondents in parentheses.

Source: Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer].

APPENDIX C APPENDICES FOR CHAPTERS 4 & 6

There are only three entries for this appendix chapter. Table C1 provides summary statistics for explanatory variables that account for parity and collective descriptive representation; Table C2 provides data on term limits in states; and Table C3 provides data on multimember districts in states.

Table C1 Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables for Parity and Collective Descriptive Representation, 1992 to 2004

Variables (N=350)	Description	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range
Black Population	Indicates percent black in state	10.1	9.46	.311-36.82
Black-to-White Education Parity	Indicates parity in college education between blacks and whites over 25	.644	.186	.385-1.365
Latino Population	Indicates percent Latino in state	6.4	8.16	.5-42.1
Citizen Ideology	Indicates citizen ideology in state, higher values mean citizens are more liberal	47.98	14.78	8.45-95.97
Legislative Professionalism	Squire's legislative professionalism score	.193	.128	.027-.659
Term Limit Impact	Indicates the years in which term limits caused members to leave office	.114	.319	0-1
Multimember Districts	Indicates the number of multimember districts in state	9.63	18.94	0-82
State Education	Indicates the percent of state population over 25, that has at least a high school diploma	80.5	5.5	67.1-88.3
Median Income	Indicates median income in state (measured in hundreds)	343.6	84.44	201.36-551.46
Median Age	Indicates median age in state	33.92	2.19	26.2-38.9

Sources: The data for multimember districts in 2001 and 2003 were collected by Peverill Squire by contacting each state.

Fording, Richard C. "State Ideology." *Richard C. Fording's Home Page*. University of Kentucky. n.d. Web. 3 March 2010.

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1993. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1995. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1997. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Table C1 Continued

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 1999. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2001. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2003. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 2005. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

Squire, Peverill. 2007. "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 7(2):211-227.

The Book of the States. 1992-1993. Vol. 29. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1994-1995. Vol.30. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1996-1997. Vol. 31. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 1998-1999. Vol. 32. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2000-2001. Vol. 33. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2002. Vol. 34. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2003. Vol. 35. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

The Book of the States. 2004. Vol. 36. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

"The Term Limited States." *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2009. Web. 20 February 2010.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 1990 Summary File 3, P058. "Race by Educational Attainment."

U.S. Census Bureau. 1990 Summary File 3. "Median Household Income in 1989."

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. "Estimates of the Population of States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, 1990 to 1999."

Table C1 Continued

- U.S. Census Bureau.* Population Estimates Program. Population Division, ST-99-21. "Estimates of Median Age of the Population for the U.S., Regions, Divisions, and States: July 1, 1999 (includes April 1, 1990 census median figures)."
- U.S. Census Bureau.* Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148A. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (White Alone)."
- U.S. Census Bureau.* Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148B. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (Black Alone)."
- U.S. Census Bureau.* 2000 Census Summary File 1, GCT-P5. "Age and Sex: 2000."
- U.S. Census Bureau.* 2000 Census Summary File 3. "Median Household Income in 1999."
- U.S. Census Bureau.* Population Division, 1. "Annual Estimates of the Population for the United States and for Puerto Rico, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006."
- Wasserman, Scott. 1999. "Multimember Districts." *National Conference of State Legislators*.

Table C2 Years that Term Limits Impact States

State	Year of Impact
Arizona	2000
Arkansas	1998
California	1996
Colorado	1998
Florida	2000
Maine	1996
Michigan	1998
Missouri	2002
Montana	2000
Ohio	2000
Oklahoma	2004
South Dakota	2000

Note: The data are for the House. Term limits impact the Senate later because senators serve longer terms.

Source: "The Term Limited States." *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2009. Web. 20 February 2010.

Table C3 Number of Multimember Districts in State, by Decade

State	Multimember Districts from 1992-2000	Multimember Districts from 2001-2004
Arizona	30	30
Arkansas	2	0
Georgia	0	33
Idaho	35	35
Maryland	44	44
Nevada	5	0
New Hampshire	74	82
New Jersey	40	40
North Carolina	25	0
North Dakota	49	47
South Dakota	35	35
Vermont	52	52
Washington	49	49
West Virginia	40	39

Sources: The data for multimember districts from 2001 to 2004 come from Peverill Squire who collected the data from each state.

Wasserman, Scott. 1999. "Multimember Districts." *National Conference of State Legislators*.

APPENDIX D APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 5

There are four entries in this appendix. They are as follows: Table D1 provides summary statistics for variables the regression analysis, and tables D2-D4 calculate the black caucus index.

Table D1 Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables for Black Caucus Presence and Influence, 2009-10

Variables (N=50)	Description	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range
Black Population	Indicates percent black in state	10.52	9.52	.67-37.18
Black-to-White Education Parity	Indicates parity in college education between blacks and whites over 25	.649	.147	.42-1.077
Latino Population	Indicates percent Latino in state	9.86	9.83	1.14-44.9
Legislative Professionalism	Squire's legislative professionalism score	.183	.115	.027-.626
Multimember Districts	Indicates the number of multimember districts in state	9.26	20.13	0-91
Citizen Ideology	Indicates citizen ideology in state, higher values mean citizens are more liberal	52.78	16.49	22.56-93.94
Median Age	Indicates median age in state	35.53	1.9	27.1-38.9
State Education	Indicates the percent of state population over 25, that has at least a high school diploma	81.9	4.5	72.8-88.3

Sources: The data for multimember districts in 2001 and 2003 were collected by Peverill Squire by contacting each state.

Fording, Richard C. "State Ideology." *Richard C. Fording's Home Page*. University of Kentucky. n.d. Web. 3 March 2010.

Squire, Peverill. 2007. "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 7(2): 211-227.

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148A. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (White Alone)."

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148B. "Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (Black Alone)."

U.S. Census Bureau. 2000 Census Summary File 1, GCT-P5. "Age and Sex: 2000."

U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division, 4. "Estimates of Resident Population by Race and Hispanic Origin for the United States and States, July 1, 2008."

Table D2 Calculating the Proportion of Black Committee Chairs and Co-Chairs, 2009-10

State	Number of Black Committee Chairs or Co-Chairs	Number of Committees	Proportion of Black Committee Chairs
Alabama	18	49	.367
Arizona	0	26	0
Arkansas	2	24	.083
California	2	53	.038
Colorado	0	18	0
Connecticut	3	24	.125
Delaware	4	49	.082
Florida	0	26	0
Georgia	1	65	.015
Illinois	24	90	.266
Indiana	7	43	.163
Iowa	1	39	.026
Kansas	0	47	0
Kentucky	1	33	.030
Louisiana	8	33	.242
Maryland	5	14	.357
Massachusetts	0	18	0
Michigan	3	45	.067
Mississippi	35	91	.385
Missouri	0	60	0
Nevada	4	20	.20
New Jersey	4	38	.105
New York	16	69	.232
North Carolina	18	56	.321
Ohio	6	42	.143
Oklahoma	0	33	0
Pennsylvania	7	47	.149
Rhode Island	0	22	0
South Carolina	1	26	.038
Tennessee	3	24	.125
Texas	5	33	.152
Virginia	4	25	.160
Wisconsin	8	64	.125

Sources: I gather the data by visiting each state legislative website to determine which committees had black chairs or co-chairs, and the data are accurate as of January 2010.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. "2009-2010 Senate, Joint, and House Committee Listings." *The 186th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts*. The 186th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 2010. 22 January 2010.

State of Alabama. "House Standing Committees." *Alabama House of Representatives*. Alabama House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.

Table D2 Continued

- State of Alabama. "House Standing Committees." *Alabama State Senate*. Alabama State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Arizona. "Standing Committees." *Arizona State Legislature*. Arizona State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Arkansas. "Committees." *Arkansas House of Representatives*. Arkansas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Arkansas. "Committees." *Arkansas State Senate*. Arkansas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of California. "Assembly Committees." *California State Assembly*. California State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of California. "Senate Committees." *California State Senate*. California State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Colorado. "Committees Meeting During Session." *Colorado House of Representatives*. Colorado General Assembly. 2010. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Colorado. "Committees Meeting During Session." *Colorado State Senate*. Colorado General Assembly. 2010. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Connecticut. "Committees." *Connecticut General Assembly*. Connecticut General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Delaware. "Committees." *Delaware House of Representatives*. Delaware General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Delaware. "Committees." *Delaware State Senate*. Delaware General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Florida. "Committees." *Florida House of Representatives*. Florida House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Florida. "Committees." *Florida State Senate*. Florida State Senate. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Georgia. "Committees." *Georgia House of Representatives*. Georgia General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Georgia. "Senate Committees." *Georgia State Senate*. Georgia General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Illinois. "Committees." *Illinois House of Representatives*. Illinois General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Illinois. "Committees." *Illinois State Senate*. Illinois General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.

Table D2 Continued

- State of Indiana. "Standing Committees." *Indiana General Assembly*. Indiana General Assembly. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Iowa. "Committees." *Iowa General Assembly*. Iowa General Assembly. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Kansas. "Committees." *Kansas State Legislature*. Kansas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Kentucky. "Standing Committees." *Kentucky State Legislature*. Kentucky State Legislature. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Louisiana. "Committees." *Louisiana State Legislature*. Louisiana State Legislature. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Maryland. "Roster and List of Committees." *Maryland General Assembly*. Maryland General Assembly. 2010. Web. 22 January 2010.
- State of Michigan. "Standing Committees." *Michigan House of Representatives*. Michigan House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 22 January 2010.
- State of Michigan. "Standing Committees." *Michigan State Senate*. Michigan State Senate. n.d. Web. 22 January 2010.
- State of Mississippi. "House Committees." *Mississippi State Legislature*. Mississippi State Legislature. n.d. Web. 24 January 2010.
- State of Mississippi. "Senate Committees." *Mississippi State Legislature*. Mississippi State Legislature. n.d. Web. 24 January 2010.
- State of Missouri. "Committees." *Missouri House of Representatives*. Missouri House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 24 January 2010.
- State of Missouri. "Committees." *Missouri State Senate*. Missouri State Senate. n.d. Web. 24 January 2010.
- State of Nevada. "Committees of the 75th (2009) Session of the Nevada Legislature." *Nevada State Legislature*. Nevada State Legislature. 2010. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of New Jersey. "Committees." *New Jersey State Legislature*. New Jersey State Legislature. n.d. Web. 13 February 2010.
- State of New York. "Committees, Commissions, and Task Forces." *New York State Assembly*. New York State Assembly. n.d. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of New York. "Committees." *New York State Senate*. New York State Senate. n.d. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of North Carolina. "Committees." *General Assembly of North Carolina*. General Assembly of North Carolina. n.d. Web. 26 January 2010.

Table D2 Continued

- State of Ohio. "Standing Committee Listing." *Ohio House of Representatives*. General Assembly of the State of Ohio. 2010. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of Ohio. "Committees." *Ohio State Senate*. Ohio State Senate. n.d. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of Oklahoma. "Standing Committees and Subcommittees." *Oklahoma House of Representatives*. Oklahoma House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 27 January 2010.
- State of Oklahoma. "Standing Committees." *Oklahoma State Senate*. Oklahoma State Senate. n.d. Web. 27 January 2010.
- State of Pennsylvania. "Standing Committees." *Pennsylvania House of Representatives*. Pennsylvania House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 27 January 2010.
- State of Pennsylvania. "Standing Committee Members." *Pennsylvania State Senate*. Pennsylvania State Senate. n.d. Web. 27 January 2010.
- State of Rhode Island. "Committee Memberships." *State of Rhode Island General Assembly*. State of Rhode Island General Assembly. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of South Carolina. "Committees." *South Carolina House of Representatives*. South Carolina House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of South Carolina. "Committees." *South Carolina State Senate*. South Carolina State Senate. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Tennessee. "House Committees." *Tennessee General Assembly*. Tennessee General Assembly. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Tennessee. "Senate Committees." *Tennessee General Assembly*. Tennessee General Assembly. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Texas. "House Committees." *Texas State Legislature*. Texas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Texas. "Senate Committees." *Texas State Legislature*. Texas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Virginia. "House of Delegates: 2010 Session Standing Committees." *Virginia House of Delegates*. Virginia House of Delegates. 2010. 28 January 2010.
- State of Virginia. "Standing Committees." *Senate of Virginia*. Senate of Virginia. n.d. 28 January 2010.
- State of Wisconsin. "Standing Committees of the Wisconsin Assembly." *Wisconsin General Assembly*. n.d. 28 January 2010.
- State of Wisconsin. "Standing Committees of the Wisconsin Senate." *Wisconsin General Assembly*. n.d. 28 January 2010.

Table D3 Calculating the Proportion Black of the Democratic Party, 2009-10

State	Number of Blacks in the Legislature	Number of Democrats in Legislature	Proportion Black of Democratic Party
Alabama	35	81	.432
Arizona	2	37	.054
Arkansas	14	98	.143
California	13	75	.173
Colorado	2	58	.034
Connecticut	15	138	.109
Delaware	5	40	.125
Florida	26	58	.448
Georgia	53	97	.547
Illinois	31	107	.290
Indiana	12	69	.174
Iowa	6*	88	.068
Kansas	7	57	.123
Kentucky	7	80	.088
Louisiana	26	74	.352
Maryland	43	137	.314
Massachusetts	9	178	.051
Michigan	22	82	.268
Mississippi	50	101	.495
Missouri	19	85	.224
Nevada	7	40	.175
New Jersey	15	70	.215
New York	34	141	.241
North Carolina	32	98	.327
Ohio	19	65	.292
Oklahoma	6	61	.098
Pennsylvania	19	124	.153
Rhode Island	3	102	.029
South Carolina	37	72	.514
Tennessee	18	62	.290
Texas	16	85	.188
Virginia	14	60	.233
Wisconsin	8*	70	.114

Note: * means that the NCSL lists the states as having black state legislators, which is inaccurate. I believe these are the only the errors of their kind in the NCSL data.

Sources: "Number of African American Legislators, 2009." *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2009. Web. 10 February 2009.

"2010 Partisan Composition of State Legislatures." *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2010. Web. 20 January 2010.

Table D4 Proportion of Caucus Seats on NBCSL Policy Committees, 2009-10

State	Number of Caucus Seats on NBCSL Policy Committees	Total Number of NBCSL Policy Committee Seats	Proportion of Caucus Seats on NBCSL Policy Committees
Alabama	15	227	.066
Arizona	1	227	.004
Arkansas	2	227	.009
California	1	227	.004
Colorado	1	227	.004
Connecticut	5	227	.022
Delaware	0	227	0
Florida	11	227	.048
Georgia	19	227	.084
Illinois	10	227	.044
Indiana	5	227	.022
Iowa	5	227	.022
Kansas	6	227	.026
Kentucky	3	227	.013
Louisiana	11	227	.048
Maryland	25	227	.11
Massachusetts	2	227	.009
Michigan	4	227	.018
Mississippi	16	227	.07
Missouri	5	227	.022
Nevada	2	227	.009
New Jersey	3	227	.013
New York	3	227	.013
North Carolina	9	227	.04
Ohio	5	227	.022
Oklahoma	6	227	.026
Pennsylvania	11	227	.048
Rhode Island	1	227	.004
South Carolina	4	227	.018
Tennessee	15	227	.066
Texas	5	227	.022
Virginia	4	227	.018
Wisconsin	6	227	.026

Source: "Policy Committees." *National Black Caucus of State Legislators*. National Black Caucus of State Legislators. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.

REFERENCES

- “2010 Partisan Composition of State Legislatures.” *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2010. Web. 20 January 2010.
- Abney, F. Glenn and John D. Hutcheson, Jr. 1981. “Race, Representation, and Trust: Changes in Attitudes after the Election of a Black Mayor.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45: 91-101.
- “About Us.” *Legislative Black Caucus of Maryland, Inc.* Legislative Black Caucus of Maryland, Inc. n.d. Web. 3 February 2010.
- Amer, Mildred L. 2008 “African American Members of the United States Congress: 1870-2008.” *Congressional Research Service*.
- Ansolabehere, Stephen. *Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2008*. Common Content. [Computer File] Release 1: February 2, 2009. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. [producer].
- Banducci, Susan A., Donovan, Todd, and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2004. “Minority Representation, Empowerment and Participation.” *Journal of Politics* 66(2): 534-556.
- Barreto, Matt A., Nathan D. Woods, and Gary M. Segura. 2004. “The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout” *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.
- Barreto, Matt A. 2007. “Si Se Peude! Latino Candidates and the Mobilization of Latino Voters.” *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 425-440.
- Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. “What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data.” *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 634-647.
- Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. “Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable.” *American Journal of Political Science* 42(4): 1260-1288.
- Berkman, Michael B. 1994 *The State Roots of National Politics: Congress and the Tax Agenda, 1978-1986*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Berry, William D. 1993. *Understanding Regression Assumptions*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording and Russell L. Hanson. 1998. “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93” *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 327-348.
- Bobo, Lawrence, and Frank Gilliam. 1990. “Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment.” *American Political Science Review* 84(2):377-393.
- Bratton, Kathleen A. 2002. “The Effect of Legislative Diversity on Agenda Setting.” *American Politics Research* 30(2): 115-142.

- Bratton, Kathleen A. and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 658-679.
- Briscoe, Michelle G. 2005. "Cohesiveness and Diversity among Black Members of the Texas State Legislature." In *Politics in the New South: Representation of African Americans in Southern State Legislatures*, eds. Charles E. Menifield and Stephen D. Shaffer. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 131-155.
- Brockington, David, Todd Donovan, Shaun Bowler, and Robert Brischetto. 1998. "Minority Representation under Cumulative and Limited Voting." *The Journal of Politics* 60(4):1108-1125.
- Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority Minority Districts Maximize Black Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" *American Political Science Review* 90(4): 794-812.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Canon, David T. 1999. *Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carey, John M., Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda Powell. 2000. *Term Limits in the State Legislatures*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Carey, John M., Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell, and Gary F. Moncrief. 2006. "The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(1): 105-134.
- Casellas, Jason P. 2009. "The Institutional and Demographic Determinants of Latino Representation." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 34(3): 399-426.
- "Caucus Chairs." *National Black Caucus of State Legislatures*. National Black Caucus of State Legislatures. 2006. Web. 2010 January 20.
- Chisholm, Shirley. 1973. *The Good Fight*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Clemons, Michael L., and Charles E. Jones. 2000. "African American Politics in Virginia." *Journal of Black Studies* 30(6): 744-767.
- Commonwealth of Massachusetts. "2009-2010 Senate, Joint, and House Committee Listings." *The 186th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts*. The 186th General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 2010. 22 January 2010.
- Cooper, Christopher A. 2008. "Multimember Districts and State Legislatures." In *Democracy in the States: Experiments in Electoral Reform*, eds. Bruce Cain, Todd Donovan, and Caroline Tolbert. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 134-146.
- Cox, Gary and Michael C. Munger. 1989. "Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 1982 U.S. House Elections." *American Political Science Review* 83(1): 217-231.

- Dawson, Michael. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dionne, E.J. 1991. *Why Americans Hate Politics*. New York: Touchstone.
- Du Bois, W.E.B. 2003. *The Souls of Black Folk*. New York: Barnes and Nobles Classics.
- Eisenger, Peter K. 1982. "Black Employment in Municipal Jobs: The Impact of Black Political Power." *American Political Science Review* 76(2): 380-392.
- Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope. 2005. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Fording, Richard C. "State Ideology." *Richard C. Fording's Home Page*. University of Kentucky. n.d. Web. 3 March 2010.
- Gay, Claudine. 2001. "The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 589-602.
- Gay, Claudine. 2002. "Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship Between Citizens and Their Government" *American Journal of Political Science* 46(4): 717-732.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R., Morton, Rebecca B., and Thomas A. Rietz. 1998. "Minority Representation in Multimember Districts." *American Political Science Review* 92(1): 127-144.
- Gilliam, Frank D. 1996. "Exploring Minority Empowerment: Symbolic Politics, Governing Coalitions, and Traces of Political Style in Los Angeles." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(1): 56-81.
- Gilliam, Frank D. and Karen M. Kaufmann. 1998. "Is There an Empowerment Lifecycle." *Urban Affairs Review* 33(6): 741-766.
- Griffin, John D. and Michael Keane. 2006. "Descriptive Representation and the Composition of African American Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 998-1012.
- Griffin, John D. and Brian Newman. 2008. *Minority Report: Evaluating Political Equality in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Griffin, John D., and Michael Keane. 2009. "Are African Americans Effectively Represented in Congress?" *Political Research Quarterly* 20(10): 1-12.
- Grofman, Bernard, and Lisa Handley. 1989. "Black Representation: Making Sense of Electoral Geography at Different Levels of Government." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 14(2): 265-279.
- Grofman, Bernard, Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Noviello. 1986. "Effects of Multimember Districts on Black Representation in State Legislatures." *Review of Black Political Economy* 14(4): 65-78.

- Grose, Christian R. 2005. "Disentangling Constituency and Legislator Effects in Legislative Representation: Black Legislators or Black Districts?" *Social Science Quarterly* 86(2): 427-443.
- Grose, Christian R. 2007. "Black-Majority Districts or Black Influence Districts? Evaluating the Representation of African Americans in the Wake of *Georgia v. Ashcroft*." In *Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation and Power*, ed. Ana Henderson. Berkeley: Berkeley Public Policy Press, pp. 3-26.
- Grose, Christian R., Maurice Mangum, and Christopher D. Martin. 2007. "Race, Political Empowerment, and Constituency Service: Descriptive Representation and the Hiring of African-American Congressional Staff." *Polity* 39(4): 449-478.
- Gujarati, Damodar N. 1995. *Basic Econometrics*. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Gurin, Patricia, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson. 1989. *Hope and Independence: Blacks' Response to Electoral and Party Politics*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Handley, Lisa, Bernard Grofman, and Wayne Arden. 1998. "Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates." In *Race and Redistricting in the 1990's*, ed. Bernard Grofman. New York: Agathon Press, pp. 13-38.
- Harris, Frederick C., Valeria Sinclair-Chapman, and Brian D. McKenzie. 2006. *Countervailing Forces in African-American Activism, 1973-1994*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Haynie, Kerry L. 2001. "African American Legislators in the State Legislatures." New York: Columbia University Press.
- "Health Reform and Communities of Color: How Might it Affect Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities?" *Kaiser Family Foundation*. Kaiser Family Foundation. 2010. Web. 29 March 2010.
- Hero, Rodney. 1992. *Latinos and the U.S. Political System: Two-Tiered Pluralism*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Hero, Rodney. 1998. *Faces of Inequality: Social Diversity in American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hero, Rodney. 2007. *Racial Diversity and Social Capital: Equality and Community in America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hero, Rodney, and Caroline Tolbert. 1995. "Latinos and Substantive Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives: Direct, Indirect, or Nonexistent?" *American Journal of Political Science* 39(3): 640-652.
- Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1996. "Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 851-871.

- Hill, Kevin A. 1995. "Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans?" An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States." *Journal of Politics* 57(2): 384-401.
- "History." *California Legislative Black Caucus*. California Legislative Black Caucus. 2009. Web. 2 February 2010.
- "History." *Florida Conference of Black State Legislators*. Florida Conference of Black State Legislators. n.d. Web. 2 February 2010.
- "History of the IBLC." *Indiana Black Legislative Caucus*. Indiana Black Legislative Caucus. n.d. Web. 3 February 2010.
- "History." *Pennsylvania Legislative Black Caucus*. *Pennsylvania Legislative Black Caucus*. n.d. Web. 5 February 2010.
- "History." *South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus*. South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus. n.d. Web. 5 February 2010.
- "History." *The New York State, Black, Puerto Rican, Hispanic, and Asian Legislative Caucus*. The New York State, Black, Puerto Rican, Hispanic, and Asian Legislative Caucus. n.d. Web. 5 February 2010.
- Holmes, Robert A. 2000. "The Georgia Legislative Black Caucus: An Analysis of a Racial Legislative Subgroup." *Journal of Black Studies* 30(6): 768-790.
- Hooks, Bell. 2000. *Where We Stand: Class Matters*. New York: Routledge.
- Howell, Susan E. and Deborah Fagan. 1988. "Race and Trust in Government: Testing the Political Reality Model." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52(3): 343-350.
- Howell, Susan E., and Brent K. Marshall. 1998. "Crime and Trust in Local Government: Revisiting a Black Empowerment Area." *Urban Affairs Review* 33(3): 361-381.
- Hutchings, Vincent L., Harwood K. McClerking and Guy-Uriel Charles. 2004. "Congressional Representation of Black Interests: Recognizing the Importance of Stability." *Journal of Politics* 66(2): 450-468.
- Hutchings, Vincent L. 2009. "Change or More of the Same? Evaluating Racial Attitudes in the Obama Era." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73(5): 917-942.
- "Illinois Legislative Black Caucus." *Chicago State University*. Chicago State University Libraries. n.d. Web. 3 February 2010.
- Jewell, Malcolm. 1982. "The Consequences of Single- and Multimember Districting." In *Representation and Redistricting Issues*, eds. Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert B. McKay and Howard Scarrow. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, pp. 129-135.
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 1993. "Black State Legislators with Gender."
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 1995. "Black State Legislators with Gender."

- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 1997. "Black State Legislators with Gender."
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 1999. "Black State Legislators with Gender."
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 2001. "Black State Legislators with Gender."
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 2003. "Black State Legislators with Gender."
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 2005. "Black State Legislators with Gender."
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*. 2007. "Black State Legislators with Gender."
- Key, V.O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Knopf.
- Kim, Jae-On, John R. Petrocik, and Stephen N. Enokson. 1975. "Voter Turnout Among the American States: Systemic and Individual Components. *American Political Science Review* 69(1): 107-123.
- King, Gary. 1997. *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- King-Meadows, Tyson and Thomas F. Schaller. 2006. *Devolution and Black State Legislators: Challenges and Choices in the Twenty-first Century*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Legette, Willie M. 2000. "The South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus, 1970 to 1988." *Journal of Black Studies* 30(6): 839-858.
- Leighley, Jan. 2001. *Strength in Numbers? The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minorities*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1980. *Data Analysis: An Introduction*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. *The American Voter Revisited*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Lilley, William, Laurence J. DeFranco, and Mark F. Bernstein, eds. 1998. *The Almanac of State Legislatures: Changing Patterns 1990-1997*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Lilley, William, Laurence J. DeFranco, Mark F. Bernstein, and Kari L. Ramsey, eds. 2008. *The Almanac of State Legislative Elections*, 5th Ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

- Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lyons, William, and Robert Alexander. 2000. "A Tale of Two Electorates: Generational Replacement and the Decline of Voting in Presidential Elections." *Journal of Politics* 62(4): 1014-1034.
- Maestas, Cherie. 2000. "Professional Legislatures and Ambitious Politicians: Policy Responsiveness of State Institutions." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25(4): 663-690.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes'" *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 628-657.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *American Political Science Review* 97(4): 515-528.
- Marschall, Melissa J, and Anirudh V. S. Ruhil. 2007. "Substantive Symbols: The Attitudinal Dimension of Black Political Incorporation in Local Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 17-33.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McClain, Paula D., and Albert K. Karnig. 1990. "Black and Hispanic Socioeconomic and Political Competition." *American Political Science Review* 84(2): 535-545.
- McClain, Paula D., Niambi M. Carter, Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto, Monique L. Lyle, Jeffrey D. Grynawski, Shayla C. Nunnally, Thomas J. Scotto, J. Alan Kendrick, Gerald F. Lackey, Kendra D. Cotton. 2006. "Racial Distancing in a Southern City: Latino Immigrants' Views of Black Americans." *Journal of Politics* 68(3): 571-584.
- Meier, Kenneth J., Paula D. McClain, J.L. Polinard, and Robert D. Wrinkle. 2004. "Divided or Together? Conflict and Cooperation between African Americans and Latinos." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(3): 399-409.
- Menifield, Charles E. 2000. "Black Political Life in the Missouri General Assembly." *Journal of Black Studies* 31(1): 20-38.
- Menifield, Charles, and Stephen D. Shaffer, eds. 2005. *Politics of the New South: African Americans in Southern State Legislatures*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Menifield, Charles E., Stephen D. Shaffer, and Brandi J. Brassell. 2005. "An Overview of African American Representation in Other Southern States." In *Politics in the New South: Representation of African Americans in Southern State Legislatures*, eds. Charles E. Menifield and Stephen D. Shaffer. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 157-178.
- Menifield, Charles E., Stephen D. Shaffer, and Barbara A. Patrick. 2005. "Politics in the New South: Looking Ahead." In *Politics in the New South: Representation of African Americans in Southern State Legislatures*, eds. Charles E. Menifield and Stephen D. Shaffer. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 179-200.

- Miller, Cheryl M. 1990. "Agenda-Setting by State Legislative Black Caucuses: Policy Priorities and Factors of Success." *Policy Studies Review* 9(2): 339-354.
- Mindiola, Tatcho, Yolanda Flores Niemann, and Nestor Rodriguez. 2002. *Black-Brown Relations and Stereotypes*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Moncrief, Gary F., and Joel A. Thompson. 1992. "Electoral Structure and State Legislative Representation: A Research Note." *Journal of Politics* 54(1): 246-256.
- Moncrief, Gary F., Joel A. Thompson, Michael Haddon, and Robert Hoyer. 1992. "For Whom the Bell Tolls: Term Limits and State Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17(1): 37-47.
- Nelson, Albert J. 1991. *Emerging Influentials in State Legislatures: Women, Blacks, and Hispanics*. New York: Praeger.
- "Number of African American Legislators, 2009." *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2009. Web. 10 February 2009.
- Orey, Byron D'Andra. 2000. "Black Legislative Politics in Mississippi." *Journal of Black Studies* 30(6): 791-814.
- Orey, Byron D'Andra, L. Marvin Overby, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2007. "African-American Committee Chairs in U.S. State Legislatures." *Social Science Quarterly* 88(3): 619-639.
- Overby, L. Marvin, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce, Charles E. Smith, Jr., and John W. Winkle III. 2005. "Race, Political Empowerment, and Minority Perceptions of Judicial Empowerment." *Social Science Quarterly* 86(2): 443-462.
- "Our History." *Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus*. Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus. n.d. Web. 3 February 2010.
- "Our Mission." *National Black Caucus of State Legislatures*. National Black Caucus of State Legislatures. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- Owens, Chris T. 2005. "Black Substantive Representation in State Legislatures from 1971-1994." *Social Science Quarterly* 86(4): 779-791.
- Pantoja, Adrian D., and Gary M. Segura. 2003. "Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive Representation in Legislatures and Political Alienation Among Latinos." *Social Science Quarterly* 84(2): 441-460.
- Parry, Janine A. and William H. Miller. "The Great Negro State of the Country? Black Legislators in Arkansas: 1973 to 2000." *Journal of Black Studies* 36(6): 833-872.
- Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Penning, James M. "Michigan: The End is Near." 2002. In *The Test of Time: Coping With Legislative Term Limits*, eds. Rich Farmer, John David Rausch Jr. and John C. Green. Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 33-45.

- “Policy Committees.” *National Black Caucus of State Legislatures*. National Black Caucus of State Legislatures. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- Preuhs, Robert R. 2005. “Descriptive Representation, Legislative Leadership, and Direct Democracy: Latino Influence on English Only Laws in the States, 1984-2002.” *State Politics and Political Quarterly* 5(3): 203-224.
- Preuhs, Robert R. 2006. “The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States.” *Journal of Politics* 68(3): 585-599.
- Preuhs, Robert R. 2007. “Descriptive Representation as a Mechanism to Mitigate Policy Backlash: Latino Incorporation and Welfare Policy in the American States.” *Political Research Quarterly* 60(2): 277-292.
- Primo, David M., Matthew L. Jacobsmeier, and Jeffrey Milyo. 2007. “Estimating the Impact of State Policies and Institutions with Mixed-Level Data.” *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 7(4): 446-459.
- Reed, W. Robert, and D. Eric Schansberg. 1995. “The House Under Term Limits: What Would It Look Like?” *Social Science Quarterly* 76(4): 699-716.
- Reeves, Keith. 1997. *Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Candidates and Racial Politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rocha, Rene R. 2007. “Black-Brown Coalitions in Local School Board Elections.” *Political Research Quarterly* 60(2): 315-327.
- Rocha, Rene R., Caroline J. Tolbert, Daniel C. Bowen, and Christopher J. Clark. 2010. “Race and Turnout: Does Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures Increase Minority Voting?” *Political Research Quarterly*. Forthcoming.
- Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.
- Shaffer, Stephen D., and Charles E. Menifield. 2005. “Representation of African Americans in the Contemporary Mississippi Legislature.” In *Politics in the New South: Representation of African Americans in Southern State Legislatures*, eds. Charles E. Menifield and Stephen D. Shaffer. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 107-130.
- Spence, Lester, Harwood McClerking, and Robert Brown. 2009. “Revisiting Black Incorporation and Local Political Participation.” *Urban Affairs Review* 45(2): 274-285.
- Squire, Peverill. 1992. “Legislative Professionalism and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17(1): 69-79.
- Squire, Peverill. 1993. “Professionalization and Public Opinion of State Legislatures.” *Journal of Politics* 55(2): 479-491.
- Squire, Peverill. 2007. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited.” *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 7(2): 211-227.

- Squire, Peverill, and Keith E. Hamm. 2005. *101 Chambers: Congress, State Legislatures, and the Future of Legislative Studies*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- State of Alabama. "House Standing Committees." *Alabama House of Representatives*. Alabama House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Alabama. "House Standing Committees." *Alabama State Senate*. Alabama State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Arizona. "Standing Committees." *Arizona State Legislature*. Arizona State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Arkansas. "Committees." *Arkansas House of Representatives*. Arkansas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Arkansas. "Committees." *Arkansas State Senate*. Arkansas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of California. "Assembly Committees." *California State Assembly*. California State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of California. "Senate Committees." *California State Senate*. California State Legislature. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Colorado. "Committees Meeting During Session." *Colorado House of Representatives*. Colorado General Assembly. 2010. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Colorado. "Committees Meeting During Session." *Colorado State Senate*. Colorado General Assembly. 2010. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Connecticut. "Committees." *Connecticut General Assembly*. Connecticut General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Delaware. "Committees." *Delaware House of Representatives*. Delaware General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Delaware. "Committees." *Delaware State Senate*. Delaware General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Florida. "Committees." *Florida House of Representatives*. Florida House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Florida. "Committees." *Florida State Senate*. Florida State Senate. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Georgia. "Committees." *Georgia House of Representatives*. Georgia General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Georgia. "Senate Committees." *Georgia State Senate*. Georgia General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Illinois. "Committees." *Illinois House of Representatives*. Illinois General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.

- State of Illinois. "Committees." *Illinois State Senate*. Illinois General Assembly. n.d. Web. 20 January 2010.
- State of Indiana. "Standing Committees." *Indiana General Assembly*. Indiana General Assembly. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Iowa. "Committees." *Iowa General Assembly*. Iowa General Assembly. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Kansas. "Committees." *Kansas State Legislature*. Kansas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Kentucky. "Standing Committees." *Kentucky State Legislature*. Kentucky State Legislature. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Louisiana. "Committees." *Louisiana State Legislature*. Louisiana State Legislature. n.d. Web. 21 January 2010.
- State of Maryland. "Roster and List of Committees." *Maryland General Assembly*. Maryland General Assembly. 2010. Web. 22 January 2010.
- State of Michigan. "Standing Committees." *Michigan House of Representatives*. Michigan House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 22 January 2010.
- State of Michigan. "Standing Committees." *Michigan State Senate*. Michigan State Senate. n.d. Web. 22 January 2010.
- State of Mississippi. "House Committees." *Mississippi State Legislature*. Mississippi State Legislature. n.d. Web. 24 January 2010.
- State of Mississippi. "Senate Committees." *Mississippi State Legislature*. Mississippi State Legislature. n.d. Web. 24 January 2010.
- State of Missouri. "Committees." *Missouri House of Representatives*. Missouri House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 24 January 2010.
- State of Missouri. "Committees." *Missouri State Senate*. Missouri State Senate. n.d. Web. 24 January 2010.
- State of Nevada. "Committees of the 75th (2009) Session of the Nevada Legislature." *Nevada State Legislature*. Nevada State Legislature. 2010. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of New Jersey. "Committees." *New Jersey State Legislature*. New Jersey State Legislature. n.d. Web. 13 February 2010.
- State of New York. "Committees, Commissions, and Task Forces." *New York State Assembly*. New York State Assembly. n.d. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of New York. "Committees." *New York State Senate*. New York State Senate. n.d. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of North Carolina. "Committees." *General Assembly of North Carolina*. General Assembly of North Carolina. n.d. Web. 26 January 2010.

- State of Ohio. "Standing Committee Listing." *Ohio House of Representatives*. General Assembly of the State of Ohio. 2010. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of Ohio. "Committees." *Ohio State Senate*. Ohio State Senate. n.d. Web. 26 January 2010.
- State of Oklahoma. "Standing Committees and Subcommittees." *Oklahoma House of Representatives*. Oklahoma House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 27 January 2010.
- State of Oklahoma. "Standing Committees." *Oklahoma State Senate*. Oklahoma State Senate. n.d. Web. 27 January 2010.
- State of Pennsylvania. "Standing Committees." *Pennsylvania House of Representatives*. Pennsylvania House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 27 January 2010.
- State of Pennsylvania. "Standing Committee Members." *Pennsylvania State Senate*. Pennsylvania State Senate. n.d. Web. 27 January 2010.
- State of Rhode Island. "Committee Memberships." *State of Rhode Island General Assembly*. State of Rhode Island General Assembly. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of South Carolina. "Committees." *South Carolina House of Representatives*. South Carolina House of Representatives. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of South Carolina. "Committees." *South Carolina State Senate*. South Carolina State Senate. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Tennessee. "House Committees." *Tennessee General Assembly*. Tennessee General Assembly. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Tennessee. "Senate Committees." *Tennessee General Assembly*. Tennessee General Assembly. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Texas. "House Committees." *Texas State Legislature*. Texas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Texas. "Senate Committees." *Texas State Legislature*. Texas State Legislature. n.d. Web. 28 January 2010.
- State of Virginia. "House of Delegates: 2010 Session Standing Committees." *Virginia House of Delegates*. Virginia House of Delegates. 2010. 28 January 2010.
- State of Virginia. "Standing Committees." *Senate of Virginia*. Senate of Virginia. n.d. 28 January 2010.
- State of Wisconsin. "Standing Committees of the Wisconsin Assembly." *Wisconsin General Assembly*. n.d. 28 January 2010.
- State of Wisconsin. "Standing Committees of the Wisconsin Senate." *Wisconsin General Assembly*. n.d. 28 January 2010.
- Stimson, James A. 1985. "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(4): 914-947.

- Straayer, John A. 2002. "Colorado: Lots of Commotion, Limited Consequences." In *The Test of Time: Coping With Legislative Term Limits*, ed. Rich Farmer, John David Rausch Jr. and John C. Green. Lanham: Lexington Books, pp. 61-74.
- Sullivan, Brenda. 2000. "Even at the Turning Tide: An Analysis of the North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus." *Journal of Black Studies* 30(6): 815-838.
- Swain, Carol M. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tauber, Steven. 2005. "African Americans in the Contemporary Florida Legislature." In *Politics in the New South: Representation of African Americans in Southern State Legislatures*, eds. Charles E. Menifield and Stephen D. Shaffer. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 43-72.
- Tate, Katherine. 1993. *From Protest to Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tate, Katherine. 2001. "The Political Representation of Blacks in Congress: Does Race Matter?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(4): 623-638.
- Tate, Katherine. 2003. *Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and their Representatives in the U.S. Congress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- The American National Election Studies* (ANES; www.electionstudies.org). 2008 ANES Panel Study [dataset]. Stanford University and University of Michigan [producers and distributors].
- The Book of the States*. 1992-1993. Vol. 29. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.
- The Book of the States*. 1994-1995. Vol.30. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.
- The Book of the States*. 1996-1997. Vol. 31. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.
- The Book of the States*. 1998-1999. Vol. 32. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.
- The Book of the States*. 2000-2001. Vol. 33. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.
- The Book of the States*. 2002. Vol. 34. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.
- The Book of the States*. 2003. Vol. 35. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.
- The Book of the States*. 2004. Vol. 36. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.
- The Book of the States*. 2008. Vol. 40. The Council of State Governments: Lexington, KY.

- “The Term Limited States.” *National Conference of State Legislatures*. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2009. Web. 20 February 2010.
- Tolbert, Caroline and Ramona McNeal. 2003. “Unraveling the Effects of the Internet on Political Participation?” *Political Research Quarterly* 56(2): 175-185.
- U.S. Census Bureau. Current Population Survey, Table A1. “Reported Voting and Registration by Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex and Age Groups: November 1964 to 2008.”
- U.S. Census Bureau. 1990 Summary File 3. “Median Household Income in 1989.”
- U.S. Census Bureau. Census 1990 Summary File 3, P058. “Race by Educational Attainment.”
- U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division. “Estimates of the Population of States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, 1990 to 1999.”
- U.S. Census Bureau. 2000 Census Summary File 1, GCT-P5. “Age and Sex: 2000.”
- U.S. Census Bureau. 2000 Census Summary File 3. “Median Household Income in 1999.”
- U.S. Census Bureau. Population Estimates Program. Population Division, ST-99-21. “Estimates of Median Age of the Population for the U.S., Regions, Divisions, and States: July 1, 1999 (includes April 1, 1990 census median figures).”
- U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148A. “Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (White Alone).”
- U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 3, P148B. “Sex by Educational Attainment for Population 25 Years and Over (Black Alone).”
- U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division, Table 1. “Annual Estimates of the Population for the United States and for Puerto Rico, April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006.”
- U.S. Census Bureau. Population Division, Table 4: Estimates of Resident Population by Race and Hispanic Origin for the United States and States, July 1, 2008.
- Vavreck, Lynn, and Douglas Rivers. 2008. “The 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties* 18(4): 355-366.
- Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Walters, Ronald. 1988. *Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach*. Albany: State University Press.
- Walton, Hanes. 1985. *Invisible Politics*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Wasserman, Scott. 1999. “Multimember Districts.” *National Conference of State Legislators*.

- Weissberg, Robert. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 72(2): 535-547.
- Whitby, Kenny J. 1997. *The Color of Representation: Congressional Behavior and Black Interests*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Whitby, Kenny J. 2007. "The Effect of Descriptive Representation on Black Electoral Turnout in the 2004 Elections." *Social Science Quarterly* 88(4): 1010-1023.
- Whitby, Kenny J. and Frank D. Gilliam, Jr. 1998. "Representation in Congress: Line Drawing and Minorities." In *Great Theater: The American Congress in the 1990's*, eds. Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Wielhouwer, Peter W., and Keesha M. Middlemass. 2005. "Black Representation in Georgia." In *Politics in the New South: Representation of African Americans in Southern State Legislatures*, eds. Charles E. Menifield and Stephen D. Shaffer. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 73-106.
- Wilson, William Julius. 1980. *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*, 2nd Ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wolfinger, Raymond, and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wright, Sharon D. 2000. "The Tennessee Black Caucus of State Legislators." *Journal of Black Studies* 31(1): 3-19.