Re-evaluating Political Performatives of the PRC: Maoist Discourse – The Historical Trajectory of the *Laosanpian*

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The onset of the reform PRC was met with a global anticipation for the dawn of a new era but the discourse that is expected to accompany the adoption of market economy is still absent. There seem to be still a strong reliance upon Maoist discourse for articulating the guidelines for implementing the PRC reform policies. This dissertation will investigate the continued impact of Maoist discourse in reform policies implementation focusing on the *Laosanpian* texts which consist of Mao's early essays, "In Memory of Norman Bethune" (1939), "Serve the People" (1944) and "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains" (1945), compiled in the early 1960s and reaching fame at the height of the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976). The above examination of Maoist discourse is coupled with that of agents deemed responsible for the staying power and transmission of the pre-reform political performatives to the reform PRC.

In the past, Maoist discourse was commonly known as a homogenous political unit. The present study, however, argues that the *Laosanpian*, unlike the majority of revolutionary texts serves as an extension of traditional Chinese concepts as represented by *xiao* (filial piety) and *zhong* (loyalty) deemed by the present study as central to the inculcation and manifestation of the PRC individuals' habitus. Using the concepts from performative and practice theories focusing on Butler and Bourdieu's notions of insurrectionary acts and habitus respectively, this dissertation analyzes the impact of *chengyu* (four-character idioms), *xiao* (filial piety) and *zhong* (loyalty) on transmitting the Chinese value system from one generation to the next focusing on the texts of the *Laosanpian*. The above analyses are completed with interviews from two field studies conducted from the years 2010 to 2011 examining the sustaining and consumption of the pre-reform political texts in the reform PRC.

The preliminary study into the texts under review revealed standard patterns underlying the production and consumption processes of political performatives in the PRC. The manifestation of the revealed patterns are named antipodal structures by the present study, represented by pairs of opposite lexical units as in *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad), *gong/si* 公/私 (public/private) and *nei/wai* 内/外 (inside/outside). The discovery of antipodal structures has

provided a platform for showing that complementary dualism as represented in the manifestation of the *yin/yang* has a counterpart in ethical dualism responsible for structuring the major expressions of traditional Chinese concepts which serve as the roadmap for individuals of the PRC.

This study will argue that although the state shows reluctance to relinquish its control of the symbol producing domains, the new players, both national and foreign seeking to position themselves in the newly created market spaces do impact on the production and consumption of political performatives. One of the questions answered by this study is how the above observation plays out under the conditions where the 'social utility criterion' as represented by the maxim "Serve the People" continues to inform the implementation of the reform policies while sustaining the symbolic capital of the Yan'an simulacrum.

论文摘要

中国改革的初始恰逢全球对新时代曙光的期盼，但是理应相伴随的、适应市场经济的改革理论却依然缺乏。其改革政策似乎依然强烈地依赖于毛泽东主义。本论文集中探讨毛早期的三篇文章（1950 年代后期（1960 年代早期）被汇编成册并在文化大革命中家喻户晓的“老三篇”——即《纪念白求恩》（1939），《为人民服务》（1944）和《愚公移山》（1945）——对中国改革政策实施的持续影响，并分析其持久力的成因以及它在中国改革前到改革中的政治施为(political performatives) 的传输。

在过去，毛泽东主义被普遍当成是一个均等的政治统一体来论述。然而，本研究认为，与大多数革命文本不同，“老三篇”是对以“忠”和“孝”为代表的中国传统思想的拓展和延伸，而当前研究认为，“忠”、“孝”是灌输教育的中心和中国人个体习性的主要体现。利用表述行为与实践理论的概念，借用 Butler 和 Bourdieu 对于起义行为 (Insurrectionary acts) 与习性 (*Habitus*) 的见解，以“老三篇”为主要分析文本，本文主要探讨“四字成语”、“孝”和“忠”在中国价值观世代相传过程中的影响。上述文本分析与 2010－2011 年对于两个领域的采访研究是相辅相成的，调查分析了中国改革前政治文本在政府和教育机构改革中保持和消耗的方式。

文本的初步研究揭示了潜藏于中国政治施为中的生产，实施和消费过程中的标准模式。该模式在这项研究中称为“对映结构 (antipodal structures)”，表现在以善/恶，公/私及内/外为代表的相对的词汇单位里。对映结构的发现提供了一个平台，展现了以阴阳为表现代表的互补二元论 (complementary dualism) 在道德二元论 (ethical dualism) 层面有一个对应副本，而它的构建则成为中国人传统思想的主要表现标示。

本研究认为, 虽然国家不愿意放弃其控制生产领域的象征，但是国内外新手玩家寻求自己在新创建的市场空间的定位的确会影响政治施为的生产和消费。本研究回答的问题之一是在上述观测条件下，以“为人民服务”格言为代表的“社会效用准则(social utility criterion)”继续影响改革政策的实施，保持了延安精神的象征性资本。

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PREFACE

This study follows in the tradition of hermeneutics typical of cultural studies; it is not history but interpretation of history through discourse. The definition of cultural studies as used in this study relies on the characteristics described by Sardar (1995, p. 68), who states that "Cultural Studies is both the object of study and the location of political criticism and action in which a scholar not only would study an object but would also connect the study to a larger, progressive political project." This does not mean that the present study is not a historical one. It is of a kind which mainly uses the ideas of Lagerwey (2009) about history as a succession of paradigm shifts: when there is a collapse of an old and the emergence of a new system by a reflection on the old system and what was wrong with it. The process of bringing new order will present itself as political and social disorder and intense philosophical debate as the old social system collapses. Such a process is of rationalization by means of reflection. Insurrectionary acts are first acts of the mind and speech acts before they become the bodily acts that actually overthrow the system. By means of speech and mental acts, the contents of the old system are stripped from the now irrelevant rituals of the past and, by a process of abstraction and extraction, a new system is created which subscribes to the same values as the old one but does so in a more inclusive and in a more radically coherent (rational) manner.

The process described above reflects on the past three of the major paradigm shifts that Lagerwey (2009) sees in the Warring States, in the Six Dynasties, and in the Song-Yuan transition. The classic case of this is shown by Lagerwey (2009) in the introduction to *Early Chinese Religion* when the *Zhou* ritual system (*Zhouli*) was no longer of any relevance but was kept in place to serve as a template for establishing a more inclusive social order during the Warring States. The basic *Zhou* ritual system, the blood sacrifice as described by Levi (2009) had become defunct, and Warring States thinkers were left with two choices: throw it away like the *Fajia* thinkers urged, or convert the old rituals into means of self-cultivation to learn appropriate attitudes for maintaining social cohesion and political authority. Lagerwey (2013) points out that the conversion of the old in the making of the new is more productive because there cannot be an actual rupture in history; there is always continuity within rupture. Therefore the social and political rupture that is already there, as expressed by the chaos, has to be given new expressions that are more abstract and more inclusive, and that constitute a more rationally

coherent system of social and political practice. It is precisely this that I find in the ideals expressed in the *Laosanpian*.

The introduction of new expressions (insurrectionary acts) for establishing a new social system need to use familiar modes (conformity acts) which reflect on local culture and traditions and therefore are congruent with the frames of reference of all members of society. In this study the process is illustrated using the canon *Laosanpian* which served as the central text for routinization of the ideals of the Party. The individual texts of the *Laosanpian* have featured in diverse revolutionary movements of the Party as foundational material for emulating "correct" practice, in production campaigns, in illiteracy campaigns, in self-criticism sessions and Lei Feng study sessions, enabling these ideological ideas to be experienced and interiorized using familiar modes. The use of traditional and familiar materials in the form of texts, tales, and idioms for routinization is meant to result in predictable outcomes, where the ideals of the orthodox doctrine are experienced as second nature by individuals in society. The sequence that takes place during the process of routinization is that in which the head/elite disseminates orthodox ideals to the body, consisting of the larger circle which encompasses the "masses", with the aim of establishing a new and more inclusive social system. In practice the process of routinizing the ideals of the orthodox doctrine will facilitate the elite's control of an all-inclusive circle, the entire body of the masses in society.

The above suggested role of the *Laosanpian* in routinizing the ideals of the orthodox doctrine is thus an exercise in hermeneutics which helps explain the Chinese revolution and later the PRC as reflective of both rupture and continuity with respect to the prior paradigm shifts of the Chinese history. The term hermeneutics is used as a defined discipline of interpretation theory which includes the entire framework of the interpretive process, encompassing the written, the verbal, and the nonverbal (Shaklar, 2004). The hermeneutical undertaking in examining the *Laosanpian* does not delve into discussions of which style is best for interpretation of texts as per suggested definitions of hermeneutical circle (Heidegger, 1927), hermeneutical spiral (Schokel, 1998) and hermeneutical square (Shaklar, 2004), instead it supplements the central theoretical framework of this study which consists of performative and practice theories as argued by Bourdieu (1991) and Butler (1997) in their respective studies.

In summary, this study deviates from strict categorization found in other disciplines, where sociologists, for an example, in studying a text such as the *Laosanpian* would concern themselves with going beyond the official scripts and "front-stage" or "on-stage" language and performance to explore what transpires in informal relations. Furthermore, unlike the historian--who by definition wants to know what changes: before and after empire; before and after the revolution--or the ethnographer who sees the results of the historical process in a functioning social system (Lagerwey, 2010, p. 171), this study examines the trajectory of certain kinds of language and texts through various paradigm shifts. On the other hand, insofar as history may be defined as an ongoing process of rationalization, interiorization, individuation, and masculinization (Lagerwey (2010, p 176), it is impossible to ignore these mental events in a study that attempts to delineate the language and processes involved in establishing a new social system. By making comparisons with previous paradigm shifts, this study seeks to show the continuity in traditional Chinese values that may be discerned in China's fourth great paradigm shift. Only in this way can we trace the origins and explain the staying power of the language used to express the ideals of the orthodox doctrine of Chinese statecraft in the period from Yan'an to the present reform PRC.

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Keywords: antipodal structures, conformity acts, complementary dualism, cultural capital, cultural premises, empty signifiers, ethical dualism, fields, frames of reference, *habitus*, insurrectionary acts, interiorization, *Laosanpian*, Maoist discourse, performatives, ritual, rationalization, routinization, set-phrases, speech acts, slogans, social capital, symbolic capital and value system.

Chapter One – Introduction

1.0

Hu Jintao Report during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

After ninety years of hard work, our Party has united and led the people of all nationalities away from the poor and backward old China into a growing, strong and prosperous new China, with the great rejuvenation 《伟大复兴》 *of the Chinese nation to show bright prospects… Comrades! To achieve the great rejuvenation* 《伟大复兴》 *of the Chinese nation on the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics is entrusted to the numerous people with lofty ideals and is the ideal and the long-cherished wish of the revolutionary martyrs.*

2012 年 11 月 18 日人民日报 (People's Daily, 2012-11-18)

Shenzhen Special Zone Daily: Editors Corner (Daily commentator)

General Secretary Xi Jinping *when visiting the display of the* 《复兴之路》 *(road to national rejuvenation) installation, pointed out that: "the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream of the Chinese nation in modern times. This dream, which gathers a cherished wish of the Chinese people of several generations, reflects the overall interests of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, and is the common wish of every Chinese. To achieve the 'Great national rejuvenation'* 《中华民族伟大复兴》*China dreams to light the passion and drive of the 1.3 billion Chinese people. We leave this dream closer to carry forward the great cause of reform and opening up. On the road to realizing national rejuvenation, we, more than 10 million SAR builders feel the heavy historical responsibility."*

深圳特区日报 2012-12-06: 12th Edition, no. 10674

The two quotations above illustrate the type of rhetoric that can be expected to lead the reform of the PRC for the next ten years. The form and content of the language in these newspaper extracts seem to be a carryover of the rhetoric of the Yan'an, Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution eras. The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China declared that the maxim for the current ten year political era is 生态文明, 美丽中国 (Ecological Civilization – Beautiful China). In addition, the Congress announced that the modus operandi for the current political era under the leadership of the new Secretary General of the CCP, Xi Jinping, would be the 复兴之路 (Road to recovery). Subsequently, many of the major newspapers in China have adopted a common theme of 实干在复兴之路上 (Work on the road to recovery) to discuss topics ranging from the economy, culture, the military and sovereignty under the new CCP maxims (People's Daily, November 30, 2012, p. 1). Under the rubric of the 复兴之路 (Road to recovery), the People's Daily newspaper and other media outlets have urged the population to learn from the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in a similar fashion as they would from the 八荣八耻 (Eight Virtues and Eight Shames) 和谐社会 (Harmonious Society) maxims during the era of Hu Jintao. Moreover, the maxim chosen to articulate the ideals of the present political era is similar to that which came to life during the onset of the 1850s strife that heralded the fall of the Qing Dynasty and marked the beginning of the paradigm shift that culminated in the establishment of the PRC.

The aim of this study is to explore the continued use of traditional Chinese concepts and Maoist discourse in contemporary Chinese political discourse by examining the texts of the *Laosanpian*, a collection of Mao's early essays. The essays that make up the *Laosanpian*, "In Memory of Norman Bethune" (1939), "Serve the People" (1944) and "The Old Fool who Removed Mountains" (1945), were compiled in the late 1950s and gained fame during the height of the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976).[1] In this study Maoist discourse and the *Laosanpian* are used interchangeably where it is also argued that certain characteristics of the latter are responsible for the success and staying power of the former.

The reason for examining the *Laosanpian* in this study of political discourse in the PRC is bound to the text's continued role in guiding the implementation of China's reform policies

[1]On the popularity of the *Laosanpian* during the Cultural Revolution see Yan, in Heisey, R. ed. 2000. *Chinese Perspectives in rhetoric and communication.* "Critical analysis of Mao's Early Essays." cf. Yan, Jiaqi and Gao, Gao (1996). *Turbulent Decade, A History of the Cultural Revolution.* Sharps Library of Translation: University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Heng and Shapiro. (1983). An extensive elaboration on the historical trajectory of the *Laosanpian* from its origin to the present is undertaken in the coming chapters.

and cementing the social contract between individual citizens and the Party. For example, the first political maxim "Serve the People", which has served to articulate the ideals of the PRC since 1949, was extracted from the *Laosanpian*. Accordingly, this study seeks to examine the role that political maxims such as "Serve the People" play in the PRC.

The political maxims discussed in this study are manifest as signatures of political performances or, in other words, scripts of rituals representative of the status quo. At the onset of the reforms, the ideals of the PRC were articulated in the maxim of the "Four Modernizations". This was followed by the maxim of the "Three Represents" during the politically tumultuous 1990s and later, in 2002, by the "Eight Virtues and Eight Shames". As aforementioned, the current political period is represented by the maxim of "Ecological Civilization – Beautiful China" ushered in during the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. The implementation of these maxims has tended to be ubiquitous, fusing public spaces with those of political power.

The majority of studies that examine the influence of revolutionary discourse as the maxims mentioned in the above sections mostly focus on the central role of the revolution and the subsequent social movements. However, Esherick (2005, p. 62) and Perry (2008, p. 149) point out that these approaches tend to follow set patterns of cause and effect that ignore the empirical data and are bound by foregone conclusions. The above questions are addressed by examining the origins, apparent popularity and continued use of the texts collected in the *Laosanpian*. As this study treats the individual texts of the *Laosanpian* as representative of political performatives, the term "political performatives" needs to be clarified.

1.1.0 Political Performatives

The idea of the 'performative' stems from J. L. Austin's (1962) speech act theory, which states that when they are uttered, some words enact what they signify. Further to this, Butler (1997) uses the concept of speech acts to explain everyday political manifestations that incorporate human agency and the manner in which individuals/subjects are at once effects and victims of language. Butler points out that if we are formed in language, then that formative power precedes and conditions any decision we might make about it (p. 2). Butler further points out that a name is one of the first forms of linguistic injury we learn because being called a name is also one of the conditions by which individuals are constituted in language as subjects. Bourdieu (1991) addresses the idea of the performative when defining the notion of the *habitus* as the "knowledge

of the game" (p. 66). This knowledge involves learning rules through oral "discourse" and "bodily *hexis*", which work in symbiosis, with the former representing action and the latter the practice of the former (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 69).

The use of the term "political" in the expression political performatives follows the standard definition of political language as referring, "to words that serve to run organizations and societies" (A Greek–English Lexicon, 1996). In this sense, 'politics' signifies "of, for or relating to citizens", "civil", "civic" or "belonging to the state" (ibid.). In general, politics refers to the methodologies and activities associated with running a government, an organization or a movement. Accordingly, these characteristics can be observed in the texts examined in the present study, that is, they are able to serve as guidelines and actors in the game of political performance.

1.1.1 The Study Question

The basic question of this study is, what are the factors or agents that have enabled Maoist discourse, a product of a logocentric society, to help articulate and implement the reform policies in the current, supposedly econocentric society. In other words, is the reform of the PRC driven by a logocentric or econocentric model or a mixture of both? The answer to this question is partly discernible in the recent changes of leadership of the CCP, which are also framed by the maxims used to articulate the ideals of the PRC. In this case, continuity is reflected in the use of the language of Maoist discourse in framing the ideals that underlie the reform of the PRC.

1.1.2 Focus on Maoist Discourse

The persistence of Maoist discourse in the PRC has been examined by a number of scholars of Chinese studies, including Hsia (1961), Chuang (1963), Dittmer (1983, 1993), Apter and Saich (1994), Yan (2000), Ji (2004), Lu (2004) and Wang (2002). These authors suggest that the following factors are responsible for the staying power of Maoist discourse: i) the use of traditional Chinese concepts, ii) the cohesion of the CCP, and iii) that it is a medium that will stay in place as long as the present regime is in place. In the present study, traditional Chinese thought is seen as central to the establishment of the Chinese state throughout Chinese history. Moreover, this study builds on the findings of previous studies by examining and re-evaluating the political performatives of the PRC and their staying power. However, this study differs from the existing research in two ways. First, this study aims to show that a consistent pattern in the

use of certain rhetorical modes can be observed in the production of the expressions that articulate the Chinese value system and the making of the Chinese state. Second, this study highlights that these rhetorical modes and traditional Chinese concepts have been in use for so long that it is no longer possible to speak of Chinese identity without addressing the effects of the structures that serve to articulate the orthodox doctrine of the PRC. The explanation of this point relies on understanding the factors that influence the inculcation of the *habitus* within the Chinese cultural realm.

The texts of the *Laosanpian* are analyzed with respect to: 1) the manner in which Maoist discourse uses traditional Chinese concepts to articulate the ideals of the Chinese revolution by drawing on antipodal concepts; 2) the way in which traditional Chinese concepts are used to convey a theme of turning the world upside down in combination with establishing an ordered and prosperous society; 3) the relationship between traditional concepts and those used in Maoist discourse and in the language of the ancient and imperial Chinese state and; 4) how the continued use of political maxims since the inception of the PRC has resulted in the term *jingshen* (spirit) being used to legitimate the Party and articulate a summary code of conduct in political and social settings.[2]

1.1.3 The layout of the study

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The next section of this chapter presents the literature review, which examines the existing research on Maoist discourse. Section 1.7 of the Introduction outlines the theoretical framework where relevant performative and practice theories are discussed in relation to the persistence of the *Laosanpian*. It is argued that the *Laosanpian* has managed to both persist and change with the times not as a result of individuals conforming to the dictates of the texts, but because they express values that serve to articulate and stipulate social norms, particularly those relating to the family. The next section outlines the methodology, describing the processes of data collection and textual analysis methods that are used to examine the *Laosanpian.* In Chapter Two, the role of the *Laosanpian* in society today is elaborated by examining the tradition of individuals using various types of set-phrases,

[2] In the context of the PRC political performatives the lexical unit *jingshen* translates as (good conduct or practice). The lexical unit *jingshen* has since the Yan'an era come to mean towing the Party line. In current politics it has seen a return to the old discussion of the relationship between material civilization and spiritual civilization that dates back to the arguments between royalists and members of the New Culture Movement during the early 20th century. See (瞿秋白選集. 1985. 《现代文明的问题与社会主义》（1923.11.08）北京: 人民出版社: 新華書店發行. 第 1 版).

especially *chengyu* (four-character idioms), in their everyday undertakings. This analysis also reveals similarities between manifestations of *chengyu* and particular parts of the *Laosanpian.*

Chapter Three examines antipodal structures and *xiao* (filial piety) by tracing the trajectory of opposing lexical units, which work in pairs in constructing expressions that serve to stipulate "correct" and admissible forms of behavior and practice. In addition to tracing the historical implementation of antipodal structures, this chapter examines the resultant types of dualisms, arguing that each has a specific function in the interplay between the state, the party line and individuals in society.

Chapter Four uses the aforementioned antipodal structures and *chengyu* (four-character idioms) to analyze the *Laosanpian* and shows the manner in which the texts have been manifest since the Yan'an period. In Chapter Five, the manifestations of the ideals articulated in the texts of the *Laosanpian* are further examined in relation to areas such as the 'civil servant system' in reform PRC by focusing on the recruiting mechanism and popularity of this government body.

Chapter six examines the political term *jingshen* (spirit) which seem to serve as a summation for all political expressions and their meanings in accordance to the dictates of the Party. The study argues that the term *jingshen* like the *Laosanpian* has come to manifest as an empty signifier of the PRC politics. The section on *jingshen* is then followed by the conclusions of the study.

1.1.4 Literature Review

Maoist discourse: background – introduction

From 1949 to 1978, Maoist discourse and its symbols dominated the PRC's political, social, cultural, educational and economical fields and left limited space for other opinions.[3] The ubiquity of Maoist discourse has been interpreted in various ways and from different perspectives. For instance, Wang (2002) and Lu (2004) condemn the discourse as being oppressive and forced upon individuals of the PRC, while Pye, (1992), Apter and Saich (1994) and Ji (2004) treat Maoist discourse as a product of historical necessity. Recent studies regard the continued presence of Maoist discourse in reform PRC as a product of a bygone era and refer to it as a revival of the past in instances where it appears to resemble social movements of the pre-reform era (Womack ed., 2010).

[3] (Hsia, 1961, p. 23-25; Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 36, 80 & 81; Yan, 2000, p. 201)

The difference between Maoist discourse and the discourses of previous paradigm shifts is that the former is based on a clearly articulated inversionary principle of turning social norms and the status quo upside down while the latter expressed limited reforms (Apter and Saich. 1994, p. 234; Guo, Song and Zhou 2006, p. vii). The inversionary nature of Maoist discourse reflects the degree to which it intended to revolutionize the status quo from the bottom up, as witnessed in the rhetoric of the Chinese revolutionary and pre-reform eras (ibid.). However, the factors that have enabled this inversionary Maoist discourse to continue beyond the revolutionary and pre-reform eras, as evidenced in its persistence in reform PRC, remain unknown.

The dynamics of the conflict that resulted in the emergence of Maoist discourse were different than those previously experienced during regime changes in Chinese history (Spence, 1999, p. 277-289). As a product of those previous paradigm shifts, Maoist discourse inherited from the content and form of the ancient languages, which enabled it to form a united China. This was the culmination of a long and protracted process of rationalization, the roots of which are traceable to the victory of the Zhou over the Shang (Lagerwey, 2010).

In terms of recent history, Maoist discourse is regarded by several scholars as a continuation of the voices and ideas of the May Fourth Movement, which addressed the tangible issues affecting the majority of the Chinese people at the time (Spence, 1999, p. 299). The May Fourth Movement emphasized the negative effects of China's traditions, concluding that these inhibited the agency of individuals and prevented the realization of fully functioning citizenry (ibid., p. 301). The proposed remedy for ridding China of this malady was to educate the masses (ibid.). The rhetoric of the May Fourth Movement was embraced by the CCP, which managed the coherent application of the movement's political goals during the Yan'an period. The goal of educating the masses was central to the mobilization of the Party and in confronting the enemy, both ideologically and physically (Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 19 & 87). However, the goal of liberating the people from the constraints of the Chinese traditions proved hard to implement because the Party needed these traditions to build a platform on which to build popular appeal.[4] This was particularly evident in the strategies Mao devised for mobilizing the masses and educating cadres, which focused on establishing the peasantry as the vanguard of the Chinese revolution (Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 36, 109, 127-128; Judd, 1983, p. 128). Under these

[4] This view is accepted by the majority of Chinese scholars who conclude that the Party relied on Chinese traditions and ancient language to build a platform for liberating and governing the Chinese nation. See, Hsia, 1961, 1963; Dittmer, 1984; Lu, 2004; Yan, 2000; Spence, 2004; Ji, 2004, Fewsmith, 2010; Womack ed., 2010. The idea also resounds with the notion of the implementation of conformity acts.

circumstances, the Chinese traditions that Mao criticized were those that the Party considered extreme, in that they directly impeded the exercise of liberating the peasants from landlords and other repressive relationships (Mao, 1928, 1938). Nevertheless, this did not impede the party from implicitly using the traditions it found were useful to the aims of the revolution (Hsia, 1961, p. 23-25; Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 36, 80 & 81; Yan, 2000, p. 201).

The discourse of liberating the Chinese people from repressive traditions and oppression at the hands of a weak government and foreign powers was based on the themes of nationalism and communism, the former under the rubric of paradise lost and the latter under the Sinification of foreign ideologies (Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 33 & 90; cf. Schram, 1969, p. 131). At the center of these two undertakings, and with an emphasis on the use of correct and specific language, is a project to create a 'new man' through a process of re-education based on the ideals of the new China (ibid.). Maoist discourse, under the helm of Mao Zedong, can be seen to have emerged out of the collective desire to complete these three projects (ibid.). Further to this, however, the nationalist and communist goals seem to have worked hand in hand, resulting in two forms of Maoist discourse. On the one hand, Mao compiled political guidelines articulating the party line, centrally represented by the documents of the rectification movement of 1942-44. On the other hand, in texts such as the *Laosanpian*, Mao focused on addressing the moral and ethical requirements for an envisaged New China and communist society using the traditional Chinese concepts as a foundation.

1.2.0 Selection Criteria and Limitations

The criteria for selecting the texts analyzed in this study relate to examining the factors that have facilitated the main themes of Maoist discourse outlined above, namely, the Sinification of Marxism and the creation of the new man (Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 12, 130-133).

One limitation of the current literature is, as Dirlik (2012, pp. 17-27) has pointed out, that Mao's use of language has received greater attention from Chinese than foreign scholars. A further limitation is that the majority of the existing studies rely on the texts of the Yan'an rectification movement (1942-44) to examine Chinese politics and, thereby, fail to pay attention to the texts of the *Laosanpian*. This lack of attention to *Laosanpian* among scholars of Chinese studies constitutes the research gap that is the subject of the present study. To address this gap, the study of the political performatives used in the PRC begins by demonstrating that the texts of the Yan'an rectification movement and those of the *Laosanpian* are constitutive of Maoist

discourse. The final limitation that has affected this entire research is the lack of information to some basic facts of the texts of the *Laosanpian;* first is the criterion used for putting together the three articles which make up the *Laosanpian* collection, second, is lack of the origins of the name of the text collection and the actual person who named it (Mittler, 2012, p. 203; cf. Bergman, 1984, p. 48).

1.3.0 Presentation of the *Laosanpian* and other Maoist texts

Maoist discourse is defined as consisting primarily of the texts from the Yan'an rectification campaign (1942-44) and the *Laosanpian* 老三篇 'Three Old Essays' (1939-45). These two groups of texts seem to have served different purposes, with the former serving to define the orthodox ideology of the Party, that is, of eradicating and replacing the ideas of the old regime and implementing insurrectionary acts. The analysis of the texts of the rectification movement (1942-44) reviews the translations by Compton (1952) because these translations have served as the source material for Western studies of the Chinese revolution for more than four decades. Selden (1995), Hua (2000), Wang (2002), Shambaugh (2009) and Yeh (2010) use the documents of the rectification campaign to focus on the following themes: Mao Zedong's conversion of Marxist and Leninist thought; the rise of Mao Zedong; and the reform and remolding of the volunteer corps. On the other hand, Apter and Saich (1994) and Lucian Pye (1992) explore how the Yan'an discourse affords diverse forms of political capital to individual members of the Party. Together, the above studies examine the documents of the Yan'an rectification movement in a manner that enables the present study to look closer at the manifestation of Maoist discourse during the reform of the PRC. Before reviewing further studies on the origins and development of Maoist discourse, the texts of the rectification campaign are discussed in relation to Compton's comments in the 1950s.

1.3.1 The Rectification Campaign Movement 1942-44 Documents

> The significance of speeches and writings of Chinese communist leaders are the blueprints of the Chinese Communist movement, just as *Mein Kampf* was the blueprint of National Socialism in Germany. We ignore such material at our peril. We need to know the basic philosophy of the Chinese communist leaders in order to estimate their objectives and their ability to carry them out. (George E. Taylor, 1950, in Compton, B. 1952)

The above passage, which refers to the political writings of the CCP leaders during the Yan'an rectification movement, serves as a point of departure for the revaluation of the role of Chinese revolutionary discourse in the reform of the PRC. First, in this passage, Taylor compares Maoist discourse to *Mein Kampf*, and not to the *United States Declaration of Independence* or any other blueprints of Western democracy. This comparison reflects the cold war rhetoric within which the discourse of the CCP was interpreted. As Lu (2004) and Wang (2002) have shown, this classificatory stigma of coercive and inhibiting discourse has not completely subsided.

It is doubtful whether the above views by Taylor (1952) persist now that the PRC has become a member of the international community, as judged by its role in the world market and its signing of 298 multilateral conventions by 2008 since the onset of the reform, in contrast to only seven signed between 1949 to 1979 (Womack, 2010, p. 89; Yaqing, 2010, p. 261-2). Nonetheless, what seems to remain valid in Taylor's passage is the significance of the speeches and writings of the CCP leaders, which served as the blueprints of the PRC. The basic writings of the founding CCP leaders still serve to articulate the rationale of the PRC. While the style of political discourse may have since changed, the Yan'an rectification movement documents express goals, sources and an urgency that remain relevant to the PRC and its people. First, the urgency of Maoist discourse was to seek solutions to end China's suffering at the hands of foreign powers and to find a cure for the failed social system that started with the fall of the Qing dynasty (Spence, 1999, p. 5). Second, the goal of the Yan'an movement was to provide China with a coherent identity and to return it to its rightful place as a powerful nation (Yaqing, 2010, p. 253). In this sense, the documents of the Yan'an rectification movement continue to articulate the ideals of the PRC. That the documents of the Yan'an rectification movement continue to be manifest in the econocentric setting of reform PRC may question whether they are suited to the current era, as they are founded in a logocentric society where discourse was valued higher than monetary capital (Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 17, 107). However, the question remains whether the texts of the *Laosanpian* show similar characteristics as the documents of the Yan'an rectification movement in terms of articulated ideals and inherent capital.

1.3.2 The differences between the two groups of texts and the reasons for focusing on the *Laosanpian*

In contrast to the documents of the Yan'an rectification movement, the texts collected in the *Laosanpian* were subsequently used to standardize the ideals of the revolution and the later

orthodox doctrine because of their use of local idioms and language familiar to ordinary Chinese. Therefore, the *Laosanpian* texts can be seen to be closer to the masses and to depict traditional Chinese concepts and, thus, to have enjoyed greater popularity (Yan, 2000, p. 201-3) than the documents of the Yan'an rectification movement.

The primary differences between the two sets of documents stem from the fact the Yan'an rectification movement documents served to translate Marxism and Leninism into the thought of Mao Zedong, while those of the *Laosanpian* aimed to communicate the program of the CCP and the values of the New China to the masses by redefining Chinese family values, primarily by shifting individual allegiance from the private family to the Party and the nation (Dittmer, 1996, p. 190; Yan, 2000, p. 201, 202). On the few occasions where Maoist discourse has been studied separately, it has been to evaluate the existing ideology and not to examine the foundations and building blocks of the discourse (Liu, 2010, p.331). As a result, little attention appears to have been paid to the *Laosanpian* texts, the potency of which evolved as part of the revolutionary process both before and after the inception of the PRC. It is within the framework of the three projects of Maoist discourse identified in the previous sections and in an attempt at filling the gap highlighted by the scarcity of texts addressing the origins and manifestation of the texts of the *Laosanpian* that the literature review is conducted starting by answering the question; what is Maoist discourse?

1.4.0 What is Maoist Discourse?

Definition of Maoist discourse is problematic because it has largely been treated as synonymous with the thought of Mao Zedong (Liu, 2010, p. 331-333). However, according to Liu (2010), "Maoist discourse refers to Mao's ideology in circulation". Here, "circulation" is the key word that separates Maoism and Maoist discourse, which are usually regarded as a single entity. The presumption that the two are equivalents may lead to analytic discrepancies because ideology refers more to a set of objective ideas characterized by claims of consistency, cogency and logicality, whereas discourse emphasizes the exegetical interaction between interlocutors (Arendt, 1968, p. 168-69, cited from Liu, 2010, p. 331). While the Yan'an rectification movement documents explicitly address ideological and political matters, the *Laosanpian* lacks such direct engagement with ideological issues. Instead, the *Laosanpian* addresses revolutionary issues according to the premises of the Chinese value system, such as those that rely on the concepts of *xiao* (filial piety), *liangzhi* (innate knowing) and learning from role models. For this reason, in

this study, the documents of Maoist discourse are examined apart from the analysis of Maoist ideology. In order to further understand the aims of the present study it is necessary to review a select group of studies that has traced the development of the process of using traditional Chinese concepts in Maoist discourse.

1.4.1 Different styles and phases of Mao's Writings

Through his analysis of the factors influencing the development of Maoist discourse, Chen (1970) has drawn a succinct model of the phases and development of Mao's writing styles. Based on an analysis of texts from Mao's *Selected Works* written before, during and after the Yan'an era, this model distinguishes three distinct phases in Mao's writing, each marked by the particular personal circumstances, social demands and revolutionary pressures of the time (p. xxii). Chen points out that in the first phase, Mao's writing style is characterized by a combination of Europeanization, classical heritage and colloquialism. He also states that in contrast to other writers of this period, such as Lu Xun, Xu Zhimo and Zhou Zuoren, who tended to adopt more English influences, Mao's writing during this phase, is more influenced by classical heritage (Chen, 1970, p. xvi; Li Xiaobing, 1993, p. 1-5). Nonetheless, Chen (1970, p. 78) observes that despite the influence of classical heritage, Mao's writing during this period rarely features proverbs, with the one exception of "Peking coup d'état merchant" (1923), which later became part of the national language. This phase of Mao's writing indicates that his use and adaptation of proverbs, especially *chengyu* (four character idioms), later in the Yan'an era would be as a result of his personal development and the demands of the revolution.

The second phase of Mao's writing lasted through the civil war and the Long March, between 1927 and 1935 (Chen, 1970, p. xvii). In contrast to the Hunan and the Jiangxi Soviet periods, Mao's writing during this phase is shorter and crisper, with less reliance on classical language structures. Chen attributes this development to the pressures and the intensifying demands of the revolution, coupled with the level of education of the audience, which comprised peasants and soldiers in remote revolutionary bases. The third phase of Mao's writing starts in 1937 and is marked by biting irony and witticism, which are the result of the conditions and confidence gained during the Yan'an period (Chen, 1970, p. xvi; Li, 1993, p. 1-5). During that time, Mao focused on political and military strategies and avidly read Marxist philosophy and other leftist literature (Chen, 1970, p. xvi; cf. Schram, 1969, p. 61 - 64). Chen's analysis reflect

Mao's search for a popular idiom with which to address revolutionary ideals impact by his political development.

Schram (1969) analyses the popularization of Maoist discourse from the perspective of the Sinification of Marxist ideology during the Chinese revolution. His analysis focuses on the Yan'an era after 1937, the third phase of Mao's writing according to the categorization by Chen (1970). Schram points out that during this period Mao uses a range of classical allusions and examples of righteous ancient popular heroes, such as Li Mi (722–789) refused office so he could take care of his grandmother (p. 114).[5] As Schram further reveals, Mao is an extremely skillful practitioner of this kind of Sinification and this undoubtedly had a favorable effect on Chinese readers, and may also have made his writing appear more vivid and picturesque to foreigners (p. 113). In this way, Schram draws attention to two characteristics of Maoist discourse. First, that it uses traditional concepts to make Marxism relevant to the Chinese people and environment and, second, that this practice provides a window on the revolution for foreigners coming into contact with Chinese culture. Mao did not solely use readymade Chinese expressions to prove a point; he also altered particular idioms and included additional characters to suit the issue at hand (Schram, 1969, p. 113; cf. Li, 1993, p. 1). The passage below exemplifies Mao's use of remodeled idioms and proverbs, in this case in praising the efforts of the united forces of the Red Army and the KMT.

> *In former times people used to say,* "*He who reads Chu-ko's memorial on his military expedition and fails to shed tears is certainly not a faithful official; he who reads Li Mi's appeal to the Emperor and fails to shed tears is certainly not filial". Today we ought to say, "He who sees and hears how China's armies, forgetful of old enmities and mutually supporting one another, have intimately united, and is not moved, is certainly not a patriot".* [83] (p. 113).

In summary, while Chen (1970) focuses on the development of different styles and phases in Mao's writing, Schram (1969) addresses Mao's specific strategies for using traditional Chinese concepts and language.

Knight (1990) focuses on the Sinification and universalization of Marxism in Mao's writings. Knight points out that Mao in the text "On Contradictions, 1937", achieves this by

[5] Li Mi (722–789) was a scholar from the Tang dynasty discovered by the emperor as a child prodigy.

citing ancient scholars and heroes to define the concept of contradiction in a way that is relevant to the Chinese conditions. According to Knight, Mao merely strings together a number of quotes to reinforce his views. However, this study will show that Mao deliberately and systematically borrowed from ancient texts and traditional concepts to convey his thought. The studies by Chen (1970), Schram (1969) and Knight (1990) focus on the developmental phases and factors that influence Mao's writing and his use of ancient language and concepts for Sinification and simplification of Marxist theories for use in the Chinese revolution. However, the extant literature does not examine the influence of locality on the development of Maoist discourse which is the subject of the next section.

1.4.2 The Jiangxi Soviet (1931–1934)

Judd (1983) in the examination of the revolutionary activities in the "The Jiangxi Soviet" relates to the notion of the *habitus* when discussing the local popularization of revolutionary discourse. Judd points out that the projects that met with success in the Jiangxi Soviet were those that took local traditions into consideration and adapted them into materials for popularizing the revolutionary discourse. By tapping into local traditions to develop tools to popularize the revolutionary discourse, the Jiangxi Soviet authors effectively sought to combine the mission at hand with the local value system, that is, by implementing acts of conformity (cf. Bourdieu, 1991). Judd points out that the study on popularization of revolutionary discourse during the Jiangxi Soviet era laid the foundations for developing the policies for arts and culture during the Yan'an era, concluding that:

> The activists of the Jiangxi Soviet may well have been as effective as was reasonably possible in the absence of the profound restructuring of social relations in literature and art undertaken in the Yan'an period… In both their successes and their limitations, the dramatists and songsters of the Jiangxi Soviet prepared the way for the breakthrough of the Yan'an period. (Judd, 1983, p. 155-6)

1.4.3 Summary

The previous sections show that the popularization of the discourse and ideology of the Chinese revolution was a gradual process that reflected the local experiences of people who were bound by their historicity and future aspirations. Mao's writing combines classical, vernacular, English

and colloquial styles and the trials of the Jiangxi Soviet illustrate the dynamics between discourse, locality, people and practice in the generation of diverse forms of social and political power. This style of discourse would eventually enable the CCP to gain the support of the greater population of China.

1.4.4 The relationship between the old and the new

In their pioneering studies on the language changes that occurred during the early years of the PRC, Li (1959) and Hsia (1961) describe how Maoist discourse borrows from traditional Chinese idioms and how this facilitated its appeal and popularity. Li and Hsia also describe the tendency of the CCP to incorporate the themes and characters of ancient Chinese into the political propaganda of the 1950s and 1960s. The above scholars detected a pattern of interplay between the "king size and auxiliary terms", where the former refers to the Party's use of excerpts from ancient tales to articulate its ideals, while the latter refers to the production of spontaneous ad hoc slogans and phrases by the masses that emulate the original "king size terms" (ibid.). These findings suggest that the practical success of Maoist discourse was due to population's familiarity with the traditional tales that the Party used to articulate its ideals and principles, borrowing not only the form but also the contents of ancient tales on the practice of government to articulate its ideals.

The pioneering research of the 1960s led to a diverse range of studies in the 1990s and after, many of which focused on the influence of discourse on society. The majority of these studies conclude that the use of traditional Chinese concepts helped Maoist discourse encourage the practice of "One Speak" in the PRC, as presented in George Orwell's novel *1984* (Ji, 2004, p. 2; Lu, 2004, p. 96; Mittler, 2012, p. 198). For example, Lu uses rhetorical and cognitive linguistic concepts to examine the negative influences of Maoist discourse on individual citizens. Lu (2004, p. 71) suggests that Maoist discourse brought about changes that reflect the frequent use of military and violent expressions, contrary to the norms of traditional Chinese language claiming that Maoist discourse impeded people from settling matters peacefully by seeking the middle way, *zhongyong* 中庸, as was traditional in China before the revolution. Wang (2002, p. xxii, 52 & 59) takes a similar view, pointing out that Maoist discourse during and after the revolution is nothing but an instrument to disseminate "words that kill". Ironically, Wang (2002) is explicit in pointing out the ethical aspects of Maoist discourse, as reflected in the clear distinction between what people "ought to do and ought not to do". Even so, Wang ignores the

interplay of opposites framed by antipodal structures, the majority of which use ancient expressions to achieve their aims.

The studies by Hsia (1961), Li (1959), Lu (2004) and Wang (2002) represent a milestone in explaining the production and implementation of Maoist discourse and each, to varying degrees, attributes the power of Maoist discourse to the use of traditional Chinese concepts. Moreover, these studies implicitly note the existence of different forms of oppositions in Maoist discourse. However, further studies which examine the use of opposites in Chinese language and in Maoist discourse first need to be reviewed.

1.4.5 Perlocutionary Acts and the observed manifestation of opposite lexical units in the political discourse of the PRC[6]

Schoenhals (1992) examines the internal workings of Chinese political discourse by analyzing the production and manifestation of perlocutionary acts. His treatment of the abovementioned issues has three advantages that are relevant to the present study. First, Schoenhals discerns that the production of political discourse in the PRC is designed to maximize the effect of perlocutionary acts. Schoenhals (1992, p. 5) explains that perlocution, in its purest form, is the intentional use of language to affect the feelings, thoughts and actions of people. Schoenhals explains that the consensus within the party is that "perlocutionary acts" play a pivotal role in the attainment, consolidation and preservation of state power. This is also where the processes of inclusion and exclusion are politically expressed by the Party (ibid., p. 101). Schoenhals concludes that the form of the perlocutionary acts created the structure of political power in the PRC (ibid., p. 8).

Schoenhals' (1992) second observation relates to the strict patterns adhered to in the production of perlocutionary acts. Although he does not elaborate on the structural patterns employed in the production of perlocutionary acts, his analysis highlights the dependency of Maoist discourse on the use of antipodal lexical units. He notices that "there is a lot of 'razing' 破 (*po*)" in Maoist discourse, "which is how Mao at one time spoke of "criticism, i.e. revolution" and less use of 'erect' 立 (*li*), which is how Mao spoke of "the generation of convincing arguments" (ibid., p.104). Schoenhals' observation that Mao's work is inundated with expressions that use opposing lexical units is in concord with the argument that Maoist discourse

[6] Foundations of the notion "perlocutionary acts" are treated under section 1.7.1, 'Definitions of definitions of Speech Acts Theory' (p. 40).

manifests within the foundations of antipodal structures. The next section reviews a language engineering project that may offer insights into the dynamics of replacing the 'old' with the 'new' discerned in the production of Maoist discourse.

1.4.6 *Linguistic engineering*

This section discusses the connection between linguistic engineering and the central political power that is needed to apply it. In a study of linguistic engineering and Maoist discourse, Ji (2004) argues that although traditional Chinese concepts are part of the engineering process, they do not sufficiently explain the extent to which language was engineered under Mao Zedong. To support her argument, Ji (2004, p. 44-45) quotes Sun Yat-sen, who stated that, "The Chinese people have shown greatest loyalty to family and clan with the result that in China there have been family-ism and clan-ism but no real nationalism". Ji uses this statement to support the claim that notions of clan-ism and family-ism were displaced in 1949 when the CCP took over the role of the family. She further states that the displacement of clan and family led to the growth of a state which the Chinese people were no longer like *yipan sansha* 一盘散沙 (a sheet of loose sand) and that it was state power and not Chinese traditions that was the pre-requisite for the massive, centrally directed program of linguistic engineering.[7]

Ji's observations seem to overlook a seemingly central feature of the concepts of family-ism and clan-ism and their foundation in Chinese society. The central feature of the Chinese family model is the notion of loyalty, which historically has also been a source of conflict in understanding the making of the Chinese society. One argument to support the centrality of loyalty and its disputed position may be found in the expression *dayi mieqin* 大义灭亲 "place righteousness above family loyalty", which gained ground after 1949.[8] The expression was congruent to the ideals introduced during the inception of the PRC in 1949 where the logic of a public family seems to have provided a solution to an ancient Chinese problem of allocating loyalty. In this study, it is argued that the allocation of loyalty has accounted for a large part of the Party's success since the Yan'an revolutionary period.

Ji (2004, p. 44) is correct in stating that the CCP needed a central command from which to conduct linguistic engineering. However, it can also be argued that the processes of linguistic

[7] Translation: http://dict.youdao.com/

[8] The *chengyu: 'dayi mieqin* 大义灭亲' can still be seen today in various political documents when describing an individual's selflessness in relation to the people and the country.

and family engineering are intertwined and that they have evolved in tandem throughout the existence of the PRC. The idea of a new China with a new social order needed new idioms with which to express its ideals, those reflective of a move from an allegiance to the private family bound by *xueyuan* 血缘 (blood ties) to a public one bound by a belief in socialism *jiaoyuan* 教缘 (common belief) (Yan, 2000, p. 201). Moreover, the trajectory of Chinese history shows that in every paradigm shift, the nature of family values was altered before the new orthodoxy was established.[9] In a society where continuity and learning from precedent is paramount, it is not only the forms and patterns of tradition that are linguistically engineered, the content is also replicated, sometimes as it was, but at times twisted to fit the current requirements (Munro, 1996, p. 5, 17 & 19).

Ji (2004) uses the concepts of i) logocide (the practice of suppressing words that are incorrect) ii) semanticide (the abolition and substitution of old meanings), and lastly, iii) linguistic resurrection (the practice of reviving traditional terms) to describe different strategies of language engineering in revolutionary China (p. 4). However, from the point of view of Butler (1997) and Bourdieu's (1991) conceptions of the interconnections between society and language, the manifestation of these concepts must be seen to be culturally and contextually specific. Therefore, the linguistic changes related to these concepts should be studied within the premises of the social and political conditions within which they occur. Using the abovementioned concepts to explain Maoist linguistic engineering may help elucidate several characteristics of Maoist discourse that would otherwise remain obscure if the characteristics and patterns found in traditional Chinese concepts were left out.

In summary, first, Li (1959) and Hsia (1961) established that the pattern of borrowing from traditional concepts assisted in distinguishing "king size" from "auxiliary" terms. Second, Schoenhals observed that the discourse production emphasized maximizing the effects of perlocutionary acts, and that these were delivered with a higher frequency of *po* 破 compared to that of *li* 立. Third, Ji (2004) and Liu (2010) both observed that although Chinese traditional concepts assisted in establishing Maoist discourse, they were not sufficient to account for the extent of linguistic engineering that took place during Mao's time. These studies provide the background for examining the role of traditional Chinese concepts in the establishment and

[9] See Lagerwey, 2009, *Early Chinese Religion*, for details of the introduction of Buddhism and Daoism and the notion of *chujia* 出家 'leaving the family'. The system had an effect on families as females who had never left home before now had grounds to leave the family and follow new teachings.

success of Maoist discourse in focusing on individuals and the primary field within which they interact.

1.5.0 Theoretical framework

This study adopts a multifactorial and eclectic theoretical approach, in that it applies perspectives ranging from rhetorical analysis, ordinary language philosophy and practice and performative theories. From different perspectives, Lacan (quoted in Pluth, 2007), Althusser (1971), Foucault (1978), Bourdieu (1991) and Butler (1997) suggest that people play a central role in legitimating discourse, because their interaction with it enacts a process of subjugation, i.e. subjects are affected by discourse. In this respect, the manifestation of discourse does not imply that subjects are controlled by or control discourse, rather it suggests that the performatives within language have their own force within the world, and that subjects are an effect of their application. In other words, the subject is an integral part of a continuing chain of performativity (Lacan, 1955-6, Seminar III; Pluth, 2007, p. 4 & 46). This conception of the relationships between discourse and the subject serves as the logical framework for answering the following questions: What affords utterances the power to manifest as performatives, in some cases moving individuals to participate in diverse fields of society, while at times serving to articulate the rationale for establishing new social systems?

To answer these questions, this study draws on concepts from speech act theory coupled with the concepts from performative studies and practice theory that focus on the *habitus* and fields relying on the ideas by Austin (1962), Bourdieu (1984, 1991), Butler (1990, 1997). The aforementioned perspectives combine to provide a foundation for the rest of the study by clarifying what constitutes felicity conditions, that is, the conditions where agents give utterances their performative force by enabling those utterances to perform and alter practices and identities in diverse fields of society.

Although this study relies on the foundations of performative theory, it avoids the tendency of defining felicity conditions solely based on semantic correctness, argumentative structures and the norms of social institutions.[10] Instead, a definition of felicity conditions is suggested based on the idea of agents who are able to decode, interpret and construct meanings, such as when individuals interact with the messages embedded in a discourse and its symbols

[10] Such a proposition does not deviate from Austin's (1962) "Speech Act Theory"; instead it is intended as an expansion which enables a broader discussion of human agency by elaborating on the interdependency between language and people, with the latter being a product and, at the same time, the producer of the former.

(Fowles, 1996, p. 230).[11] The danger of validating utterances based on conventions, and skipping the diversity of the individual recipient, is that it overlooks the conditions of the power relations inherent in and between various fields (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 280). Bourdieu (1991) explains that in interacting with discourse, individuals legitimate or refute the discourse in accordance with their disposition.

The theoretical framework of this study is structured as follows. First, the speech act theories of Austin (1962), Derrida (1978), Bourdieu (1991) and Butler (1997) are elaborated. Next, the concept of the *habitus* is defined as an inherent set of dispositions that enable individuals to produce, interpret, apply, accept and/or refute meanings when interacting with the discourses and diverse practices that make up their daily lives. The idea of the field as a marketplace is central to this discussion of the *habitus*. In addition, the description of the concept of the field is intended to show that in the case of the PRC, the traditional Chinese family model serves as a foundation for the inculcation of the dispositions that come to form the *habitus*.

In this study, the Chinese family is regarded as a field within which individuals acquire the first building blocks of the dispositions that will follow them throughout their lives (Webb & Danaher, 2002). This primary inculcation, which takes place in the family home, is not rigid. Rather, it is flexible and dynamic to the point of being changeable. Nonetheless, even the changes that take place later in an individual's life are determined in accordance with the foundations inculcated within the initial family setting (ibid.). Although the notion that family serves as a primary field for inculcation of dispositions that last throughout a life of an individual is universal, in the present study the focus is on establishing its manifestations within the Chinese cultural realm. This study focuses on the different Chinese family values that come to determine the forms of cultural capital possessed by individuals.[12] The next section elaborates on the inculcation processes involving various concepts of performative theory, such as illocutionary acts, perlocutionary acts, felicity conditions, talkback, insurrectionary and conformity acts, are discussed, including the definitions of the concepts of the *habitus* and the field.

[11] Fowles (1996, p. 230) warns against the fallacy of a homogenous audience. He quotes Tyler (1987), who states that the "audience is a fictional concept and not a good one at that". He concludes by stating that treating members of society as one homogeneous group prevents an understanding of how individuals translate and use the discourse that they encounter in their everyday lives.

[12] Cultural capital in this instance should not be taken for the *habitus*, instead it refers to manners and norms that form the foundation of a given community or society (Bourdieu, 1991).

1.5.1 Speech act theory

J.L. Austin (1962) proposed the concept of the performative as part of his speech act theory, which suggests that particular words enact when they are uttered (p. 5-6). Austin stresses that rather than referring to things or describing them, these words perform, acting out what they state or utter (ibid.). For example, when a judge utters; "I hereby sentence you …", the judge not only announces the sentence, the utterance constitutes the passing of the judgment (ibid.). Likewise, uttering the word promise constitutes an act of promising (ibid.). Austin calls these types of speech acts illocutionary acts, utterances that when uttered immediately enact what they state (ibid. 98). Perlocutionary acts are another type of speech act. According to Austin, these utterances act as an after effect of a statement, that is, they do not perform what they signify immediately (p. 101 & 102). It is not easy to foretell when a perlocutionary act will finally be executed or what its influence will be, that is, their effects are unpredictable (cf. Butler, 1997, p. 3, 17; Fowles, 1996, p.183-185). According to Austin, perlocutionary acts depend on consequences, while illocutionary acts depend on conventions (ibid. p. 186-188).

Austin's speech act theory gave rise to a new breed of linguists who focused on ordinary language philosophy and viewed language as a social phenomenon or, in other words, a representation of social reality and a tool for acquiring and distributing diverse types of cultural, political, social and economic capital (Foucault, 1978, Derrida, 1978, Bourdieu, 1991, Butler, 1997). However, the factors that allow an utterance to perform as either an illocutionary or perlocutionary act are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Austin (1962) states that performatives are qualified and legitimized by felicity conditions that are acquired through context, such as being uttered by a judge, priest or mayor who is vested with the power to utter specific performatives (p. 240). Without such authority, an utterance would fail to act as a performative and would become infelicitous (ibid., p. 241). The examples that Austin (1975, p. 243) uses imply that felicity conditions constitute performatives and provides utterances with their performative force. Nevertheless, this assumption is problematic as it seems to suggest a static and rigid society that has no dynamics or conditions capable of giving new meanings to utterances (Butler, 1997, p. 34). In this sense, context and conventions seem to be limited to serving as instruments for qualifying utterances as performatives. Again, this line of thought presupposes a stable and rigid society where the notion of the proper takes an upper hand at the expense of other forms of agency, i.e. those deemed as improper (ibid., p. 67).

The above view can be challenged by using the example of performatives aimed at changing the status quo, those that do not rely on established authority but instead seek to establish new forms of legitimacy or those that point to the application of concepts that are not deemed to be the norm in a given society, such as in calling for a revolution of one kind or another. The subject of felicity conditions has engaged scholars from various disciplines, including philosophy and political, cultural and gender studies. The studies by Derrida (1977), Bourdieu (1991) and Butler (1997) are relevant to the present study of the relationship between traditional Chinese concepts and Maoist discourse since the Chinese revolution.

It can be suggested that all words manifest as performatives when uttered, whether they are proper names, nouns, verbs, adjectives or prepositions. This stems from the fact that all words refer to something, an object, action or concept that is in time and space. Therefore, all words are signifiers whose purpose is to perform, as in the case of naming (Derrida, 1997). For example, the practices of naming, gendering, dictating and classifying are all acts of performing identities (Butler, 1993). Moreover, this conception does not contradict the earlier definition of performatives as words that act when uttered. Instead, this definition provides a broader perspective for analyzing the discourses that underlie diverse social practices.

The discussion on what constitutes a performative can best be summarized by answering the initial question of what are performatives and why are they important to the present study? First, performatives are words that act when uttered. However, certain conditions need to be in place for these utterances to perform. Austin's (1962) original theory suggests that context constitutes the felicity conditions that give speech acts their performative force. However, Bourdieu (1991, p. 44-45) argues that social norms and the dynamics between dominant and dominated groups, that is social conventions, are a key factor in giving speech acts their performative force. Butler (1997, p. 161) discusses felicity conditions in relation to injurious language where an act of talking back constitutes an insurrectionary act. She suggests that the felicity conditions reflect the relationship between the uttered performative and the mind of the addressed individual, which renders the utterance felicitous or infelicitous. Here, Butler distances herself from the practices of the judiciary, which are representative of the orthodoxy and can at times disenfranchise particular groups (ibid.). Butler (1997) concludes that:

> The speech act, as a rite of institution, is one whose contexts are never fully determined beforehand, and that the possibility for a speech act to take on a non-ordinary meaning, to function in contexts where it has not belonged, is precisely the political promise of the

> performative, one that positions the performative at the center of a politics of hegemony, one that offers an unanticipated political future for deconstructive thinking. (p. 161)

In this regard, the concepts of performative and practice theories are important because they demonstrate both the autonomy and the constraints that individuals in any given society face. When applied to the PRC, these concepts dispel the myth of the people as victims of revolutionary discourse and its symbols. Instead, based on the abovementioned theories, this study argues that discourses and symbols in general emerge and are manifest based on their utility value and perish once they have lost their usefulness. The next section examines different types of performatives and the conditions necessary for their application in diverse fields under varying circumstances. The aim is to show that words can acquire new meanings in relation to an individual's needs and the prevailing circumstances, as Derrida (1977) suggests in the description of the notion of 'break force' and Butler (1997) conceives in the idea of insurrectionary acts. In short, the emergence and demise of performatives is determined by the needs of the individuals in a given field or society.

1.5.2 Insurrectionary and conformity acts

Butler (1997, p. 145) sees the insurrectionary potential of words when they break from their ordinary meanings and draws from Bourdieu's conception of the speech act as a rite to show that some invocations of speech can serve as insurrectionary acts. Butler points out that:

> To understand such speech acts one must understand language not as a static and closed system whose utterances are functionally secured in advance by the 'social positions' to which they are mimetically related. The force and meaning of an utterance are not exclusively determined by prior contexts of positions; an utterance may gain its force precisely by virtue of the break with context that it performs. Such breaks with prior contexts or indeed with ordinary usage are crucial to the political operation of the performative. (ibid.)

Using Derrida's idea of break force, Butler suggests that a break is made possible by changing social dynamics and is not only bound by the iterability of words. This provides a sound platform for arguing that the force of performatives stems from the manner in which they are used and

understood by individuals, which is not necessarily tied to context or conventions. Butler (1997) goes on to offer the following definition of insurrectionary acts:

> Insurrectionary acts may be declared to be a result of the process of resignification where utterances apply to new contexts, speaking in ways that have never yet been legitimated, and hence producing legitimation in new and future forms. (p. 139)

This brief definition of insurrectionary acts suggests that new expressions can emerge from the crises that individuals consciously or unconsciously face in their everyday interactions with discourse. However, in cases where individuals conform to the encountered discourse by, for instance, adhering to routinized orthodox ideals, insurrectionary acts have to give room to conformity acts (a concept later elaborated upon in the next section).

Commenting on the possibility of re-signifying utterances, Derrida (1977, p. 23) defines the performative based on the ability of an utterance to leave its original context and still exert force in new contexts. Derrida calls this ability the 'break-force', where the notion of iterability takes primacy over the other features that characterize an utterance, including social constraints (ibid., p. 24-25). Derrida stresses that the ability of words to leave behind prior meanings, i.e. their 'break force', and acquire new ones is fundamental to a word being meaningful in its new context (ibid., p. 67). Although Derrida's idea of a break force helps in the understanding of the process of re-signification, it seems to place less importance on social factors as meaning is conceived solely in terms of iterability. As a result, Derrida fails to emphasize the manifestation of discourse as an expression of power between dominant and dominated groups.

Bourdieu (1991, p. 345-350) directly opposes the playfulness of deconstruction with an account of social power that remains structurally committed to the status quo. According to Bourdieu, felicity conditions are determined by social authority and this authority, in turn, affords performatives their performative force. Bourdieu states that a performative uttered by a person with delegated powers is a proper performative. This ritual is different from the failed performatives uttered by what Bourdieu calls imposters; people with no delegated authority to utter performatives (ibid. p. 352-354). It is important to note the difference between Austin and Bourdieu's delegations of authority. For Austin, delegation is found in the context and conventions that maintain the status quo (p. 14-15). In contrast, Bourdieu argues that it is found in the power that is vested in social conventions (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 75-76, 105-62).

Alternatively, Butler partially acknowledges the significance of the break-force, but extends it to what she calls insurrectionary acts. This newly defined concept of insurrectionary acts is a synthesis of the notion of the break force and the universal ability to utter performatives irrespective of context and convention. In this sense, insurrectionary acts cover a wide dimension of power found in the discourses of social, cultural and economic production (Butler, 1997, p.78).

Butler's (1997) formulation of what qualifies as a performative starts with a critique of Austin's reliance on set conventions (p.82). She also criticizes Bourdieu's reliance on social authority, which she suggests creates foreclosure and leads to the assumption that societies are static structures that have no room for introducing new utterances and ideas, except through individuals delegated with authority (p.84). Butler further opposes Bourdieu's reliance on institutional power and shows that unauthorized authority can be acquired through an utterance that previously did not possess authority, but which raises concerns and social awareness when uttered (p. 78). She also states that conducting a "non-qualified" liturgy may give rise to a "new liturgy" that contains new meanings that are capable of empowering those disenfranchised by the former and "proper" liturgy. In short, this new and suggestive liturgy is a manifestation of insurrectionary acts, a re-signification of meanings that may translate into new forms of power and legitimation (p. 147). Bourdieu (1991, p. 50-51) emphasizes the reproduction, rather than the transformation of the status quo, stating that transformation is limited, as the discourse of the dominated tends to reflect complicity with the disenfranchisement of the dominated groups. It is here that Butler finds Bourdieu's ideas to be resistant to change.

According to Butler's notion of insurrectionary acts, speech from the margins of society has the capacity to move to the center, where it can offer new meanings and the possibility of introducing newly rationalized ideas in place of those that have become obsolete (Butler, 1997, p. 145). For this reason, the concept of insurrectionary acts may explain how Maoist discourse came to acquire new meanings after shifting from the margins of power in the 1930s and 1940s and becoming the orthodox discourse during the pre-reform and reform PRC.

However, in this study, current Maoist discourse is seen as using old and familiar idioms and concepts to introduce new ideals, which enabled the ideals and principles of a planned economy/logocentric model to play an important role in introducing the rationale of the market economy/econocentric model as witnessed in reform PRC. The following section discusses the concept of conformity acts in an attempt to offer a possible explanation as to the logocentric prominence in the current supposedly econocentric setting of the reform PRC.

1.5.3 Conformity Acts - routinization

The re-appropriation of words by giving them new meanings can be a powerful tool for opposing injustice and for devising new solutions to the problems at hand. However, insurrectionary acts do not constitute a final solution or an end in themselves. Instead, the processes of formulating and consolidating the achievements gained by using insurrectionary acts also need to be taken into account. An example of the need to consolidate the gains made by insurrectionary acts is the process of rationalization. When new ideals and principles are expressed using insurrectionary acts, the novel expressions alone are not sufficient for the job at hand, as they must be understood in specific social fields and by the individuals concerned. In the case of the disenfranchised, solutions that are suggested for their empowerment need to be in the language and modes they understand. Conformity acts are capable of expressing currently shared problems through examples and language familiar to the group concerned to win support for the proposed solutions. In Bourdieu's language, this process is one of applying symbols that are congruent with the local *habitus*, tap into the individuals' frames of reference and appeal to their cultural premises or value systems (Fowles, 1996; Lagerwey, 2010 & 2011).

The dissemination of new discourses and ideals of newly established orthodoxies, which consists the process of routinization, has to take place through conformity acts. The need to consolidate insurrectionary acts by using conformity acts lies in the danger that the mere invocation of insurrectionary acts may recall the prior acts or injustices they have helped to correct (Butler, 1997, p. 98). Furthermore, in the practice of routinization through conformity acts, individuals come to experience new ideals and principles as second nature or as Bourdieu puts it, "ones second nature of ritual, like a fish in water", in which the power of a particular discourse manifests in stealth mode (Bourdieu, 1992, p.27; cited in Webb & Danaher, 2002, p. 18; Bourdieu, 1991, p. 357). The success of a given discourse, through either insurrectionary or conformity acts, relies on the legitimacy it is afforded by society. However, this success is incomplete in the sense that in interacting with and legitimating discourse, people are constrained by the fields within which they exert their practice. The next section outlines Bourdieu's concept of the field as a playground or marketplace for capital and hierarchies (Bourdieu, 1991, 1993 & 2000; cf. Webb & Danaher, 2002). This discussion of the concept of fields may help understand how the re-invention and repositioning of Maoist discourse has proceeded during the different phases of the PRC.

1.5.4 Fields as Marketplaces

> A field is always a site of struggles in which individuals seek to maintain or alter the distribution of the forms of capital specific to it. The individuals who participate in these struggles will have differing aims - some will seek to preserve the status quo, others to change it – and differing chances of winning or losing, depending on where they are located in the structured space of positions. However, all individuals whatever aim and chances of success, will share in certain common fundamental presuppositions. All participants must believe in the game they are playing, and in the value of what is at stake in the struggle they are waging. The very existence and persistence of the game or field presupposes a total and unconditional 'investment', a practical and unquestioning belief, in the game and its stakes. (Bourdieu, 1991, p.14)

1.5.4.1 Definition

In the above passage, the field refers to a marketplace bound by the common belief that it offers the possibility of obtaining gains. The examples of the ideas that sustainability of discourse is determined by those who benefit from it is revealed in the examination of Maoist discourse in lower level education school textbooks, and the recruitment mechanism for the civil servant system, especially the entry-examination materials.

These two fields have been selected as objects of study because they reflect two specific social stages in the PRC: the dependent state during a student's formative years and the independent state of being in a career that involves constant interaction with discourses packed with traditional, political and popular culture idioms. These states allow the study to observe whether individual decision making is a conscious and calculated act or whether it inculcates idioms of culture and history that play an implicit but decisive role in daily life (see above, Bourdieu, 1991). The choice of examining the fields or marketplaces of the PRC is meant to show that individuals through the *habitus* in place are accomplices in legitimating the social agents that constitute the norms of society. The next section starts by defining the *habitus* and then goes on to discuss the concept's manifestation within the Chinese family structure.

1.5.5 Definitions of the *Habitus* and *Structuring structures* – the applicative form of the *habitus*

Bourdieu uses the term "structuring structures" in three separate definitions of the *habitus* (Jenkins, 2011, 68): the 1968 study (p. xxx), the *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977: p. 72) and later in *The Logic of Practice* (1990, p. 53). In two of the three instances, Bourdieu states that structuring structures are the functioning or applicative mode of structured structures. In this sense, the structuring structures serve as secondary instances of the concept of the *habitus*, which functions as a guide and replicating engine of practice. In the first instance, Bourdieu defines the *habitus* as follows:[13]

> A system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the *achievement of innately diversified tasks*, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems. (Bourdieu, 1968, p. xx)[14]

In the second instance, the *habitus* is defined as follows:

> The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment . . . produce *habitus*, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations.... [T]he practices produced by the *habitus* [are] the strategy-generating principle. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72, cited in Lizardo, 2009, p. 7)

In the third instance, the *habitus* is defined as follows:

> Systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a

[13] Bourdieu, P. 1990. *The Logic of Practice* (p. 53). The definition of the *habitus* as is, in *The Logic of Practice* is the third and fully developed version. The first version was that used in Bourdieu (1968: xx) and the second one is that which is found in the *Outline of a Theory of Practice* 1977, p. 72. Although there are some slight changes throughout the development of this concept, the basic argument is constant, which points out that "The *habitus* is the systems of durable, transposable dispositions" and that humans have no conscious control over how to apply the dispositions inherited from the present past. In short, the *habitus* does not control humans but it is a rough guide that may help in discerning the path upon which individual practice is inclined to take form.

[14] Cursive style is added by the present author to mark the expression that is replaced by the term 'structuring structures' in later definitions.

> conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively `regulated' and `regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53)

There are three consistent points is these definitions of the *habitus* that are relevant to the present study. First, from the beginning the *habitus* is defined as a system. A system refers to an organized body of things that function together to achieve a given goal, i.e. it is a set of interacting and interdependent components forming an integrated whole. Second, the *habitus* is conceived as being composed of durable and transposable structured structures. Third, the *habitus* consists of several structured structures that are "predisposed to function as structuring structures" and which function interdependently as a system in guiding individual and collective practice. The examination of the concept of structuring structures is central to explaining the trajectory of the ancient rhetorical modes observed in the PRC's political performatives. This application of Bourdieu's notion of structuring structures implies that these structures are responsible for the preservation of the fields within which the *habitus* is manifest and, thereby, serve to perpetuate the value system in place.

Bourdieu's texts focus less on the idea of structuring structures as perpetuators of value systems and more on the persisting tendencies of social classes. For this reason, the concept of structuring structures in this study represents a departure from Bourdieu's usage in that the structures are seen to enable the ancient Chinese value system, rather than the actual social classes, to be manifest in contemporary China and is thus used in the analysis of the antipodal structuring structures manifest in the production of the PRC political performatives.

1.5.5.1 Definition of the term Antipodal and its relation to the present study

According to several Standard English dictionaries, the term antipodal refers to the antipodes or points situated at opposite sides of the earth, such as "antipodean latitudes"; "antipodal regions of the earth" and "antipodal points on a sphere". In this respect, antipodal refers to the relation of opposition along a diameter (Collins English Dictionary, 2009).

This definition of antipodal reflects how antipodal structuring structures are conceived to influence the fields within which they are manifest. The existing antipodal structures prepare the next generation to be inculcated into the recurring social norms and, in this way, continue a

perpetual generational cycle of similar values. As with the poles of the globe, in Chinese culture (with the emphasis on the PRC) antipodal structures ensure the production and maintenance of "admissible" values, either as conformity or insurrectionary acts. In this sense, antipodal structures can be seen to consist of two opposing lexical units that are manifest in two distinct modes: either each side of good or bad is set to override the other, resulting in an ethical dualism, or the two sides of good and bad combine to produce a whole, resulting in a complementary dualism, as is witnessed in the case of the *yin/yang*. The prominent antipodal structures whose interplay are reflective of the above described forms of dualisms are *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad) and *gong/si* 公/私 (public and private).

The use of the relationship between *gong* 公 (public) and *si* 私 (private) as a structure for examining the political discourse of the PRC reveals that the two opposing lexical units do not imply a 'contradiction', but serve to delineate accepted forms of behaviour and practice. In all, the term antipodal is intended to indicate opposing lexical units that work in concert or symbiosis to define the playing field and expressions of the orthodox value system (cf. Bourdieu, 1991, p. 63). The type of dualism manifest in Chinese culture is best represented by the terms *yin* and *yang*, which are complementary and do not repel each other, but combine to form a whole, the "*Dao*". Lagerwey (2010, p. 49) portrays the differences in the manifestation of dualisms between the Chinese and Western cultures using the table below:

Table 1:

- Body	Soul
- Matter	Spirit
- Letter	Spirit
- Outer	Inner
- Ritual	Myth
- Space	Time
- Female	Male

In regard to the dualisms listed in Table 1 above, Lagerwey points out that:

> If, in the West everything in the left hand column is inferior to what is in the right, in China, it is a matter of priority and what we may call elementary 'set theory': that which is on the

> left is prior to that which is on the right, and encompasses it. Ultimately, in China likewise, patriarchy rules, and the male is superior to female, but the route followed by the Chinese to get to that point of view is very different from the West: everything in the right hand column is *inside* its counterpart on the left. (Lagerwey, 2009, p. 50)

In this regard, as the type of dualism found in the PRC influences the construction of the *habitus*, the Chinese antipodal structures create different "limitations of the game" than those witnessed in Western cultures.

1.5.6 *Habitus as a limitation of the game*

According to Webb and Danaher (2002, p. xii), the concept of the *habitus* expresses, on the one hand, the way in which individuals "become themselves" by developing attitudes and dispositions and, on the other hand, the ways in which those individuals engage in different kinds of practices. For example, the artistic *habitus* disposes the individual artist towards certain activities and perspectives that express the culturally and historically constituted values of the artistic field. The following quotations present similar shorthand definitions of the *habitus*:

"*Habitus* is a disposition that is not static but a dynamic ability inculcated in all agents of society" (Bourdieu, 1991, cited in Hillier and Rooksby, 2005).

"We learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies…" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 141, cited in Hillier and Rooksby, 2005).

According to these descriptions, the *habitus* is all encompassing, leaving almost no room for individual autonomy in decision-making, for even in attempting change one does not manage to rid oneself of the *habitus*. This raises the question of whether the *habitus* is a factor that determines individual lives or whether it is, as Mackinnon (2004) puts it, "our little prison".[15]

In attempting to mitigate the perceived rigidity of the *habitus*, Bourdieu states that, "the *habitus* is not a fate, not a destiny" (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 45). He insists that the *habitus* has to be understood as dispositions that prepare individuals to act and respond in a certain manner when making choices and decisions. Bourdieu explains that, "dispositions are long lasting: they tend to perpetuate, to reproduce themselves, but they are not eternal. They may change because of

[15] Mackinnon (2004) cited in Hillier and Rooksby, 2005, p. 155.

historical action oriented by intention and consciousness and using pedagogic devices" (ibid.). To describe this change of *habitus*, Bourdieu uses the example of correcting someone's pronunciation, which would then help them participate in a new field. Accordingly, Bourdieu warns that his own work should not be read as dogma, but instead as a gymnastics book, a guide to practice (Webb & Danaher, 2002, p. 39).

1.5.7 Ritual platform for the production of the Chinese *habitus*

How are daily rituals structured into the *habitus* and how do individuals respond to this structuring? Does the field of the *habitus* change in accordance with individuals' dispositions and practices? To answer these questions, the next section examines the Chinese family as a cultural field. In this study, the family is conceived as the foundational field for inculcating the social norms and values that are found in daily rituals and which form the dispositions that come to constitute an individual's *habitus.* The inculcation of traditional values and social norms within Chinese culture seems to be manifest in a unique manner, as witnessed in the manner that family values are used to describe different fields of society including extra-familial relationships, public office and formal education (Webb & Danaher, 2002, p. 21; Giskin & Walsh, 2001, p, 1).

In this study, it is suggested that examples of the link between the family and the *habitus* can be observed in imperial times, where the logic of governing the whole empire was embedded within family values. It seems that this tendency persists in the PRC (Che, 1979, p. 1 & 40). To evaluate this tendency, two foundational precepts are examined in the form of set-phrases from the feudal ethical code: *sangang wuchang* 三纲五常 (three cardinal guides and five constant virtues) and *sancong side* 三从四德 (three obediences and four virtues). These phrases, which stipulated family relations and reflected the political and philosophical rationale of imperial China, seem not to have left the Chinese cultural realm entirely, as recent attempts at changing the government rationale have centered on tampering with their meaning.

Starting from the Yan'an period, the CCP explicitly condemned China's reliance on traditional values, especially those that stipulated social hierarchy based on the feudal ethical code. Implicitly, however, this involved re-engineering the traditional precepts and the language used to express them to the CCP's own advantage (Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 31). According to the present theoretical framework, the CCP used the traditional Chinese precepts and traditional set-phrases as conformity acts to gain the appeal of greater numbers of Chinese citizens. Through the re-engineering of traditional values and language, the CCP managed to transfer the logic of

family relations and individual allegiance from the family unit to the Party (Ji, 2004, p. 21). This example reveals that the Chinese idea of the family is at the core of the Chinese value system and that when attempts are made to tamper with traditional and philosophical precepts, the family as the basic social unit seldom remains untouched, described in the next section as the foundational field within which the inculcation, manifestation and maintenance of the *habitus* takes place.

1.6.0 Chinese Family as a Cultural field

Webb and Danaher (2002, p. 21) define cultural fields as series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, designations, appointments and titles that constitute objective hierarchies, and which produce and *authorize* certain discourses and activities.[16] They go on to state that cultural fields are instituted by, and out of, the conflict that arises when groups or individuals attempt to determine what constitutes capital within a particular field and how that capital is to be distributed (ibid.). The Chinese family can be seen to represent such an institution, and appears to play a key role in defining and replicating hierarchies that then play out in various fields of society. The assertion, change and compromise of social values take place within the logic of the family structure, in accordance with what is at stake, the maintenance of hierarchical roles and the demands of the capital in place or to be acquired. Capital in this instance refers to anything that has value and translates into the ability to make things happen (ibid. p. 86) and may take a cultural, social, political, symbolic and/or economic form. The next section defines the Chinese family and the factors that set it apart from other cultures and shows that the Chinese family is a basic and logical unit of practice in both the micro and macro levels of Chinese society.

1.6.1 The logic of the Chinese Family structure and extra family networks

The structure of the Chinese family differs from that of other cultures in the way it serves as a foundational field for inculcating and transferring social traditions in that tends to be manifest within the logic of *gong/si* 公/私, where 公 (public) takes primacy over *si* 私 (private), and are strongly reliant on the notions of *rong* 荣 (virtue) and *chi* 耻 (shame) which serve as a framework that guides and legitimates all practice. This definition of the Chinese family is

[16] Cursive writing is used to emphasize that the word 'authorize' refers to the dispositions that individuals acquire through the inculcation of the *habitus*. In this sense, authorization manifests as an internal disposition that determines inclinations in decision-making, that is, in accepting or refuting propositions contained in discourse or any other form outside the self.

supported by a vast body of literature showing that the individual is subordinate to the rule of the many and that it is within this context that morality and general correctness in society is measured (Che, 1979, p. 1 & 41; Baker, 1979; Chao, 1983; Giskin & Walsh, 2001; Boden, 2009).

国是大家，家是小国

"A nation consists of everyone; a family is a small nation". [17]

The Chinese family is not limited to the individual members that constitute the family unit. Instead, the definition of the family includes individual family members' relations with one another and how these relations go beyond the family unit in acquiring and consolidating capital (Boden, 2009). Outside networks also function as part of the family unity with similar sets of hierarchies. This system repeats itself until the differences between bloodline and other types of relations become fuzzy, to the extent that it is unclear where the line of kinship ends and the extra-familial networks begin with respect to the exchange of diverse forms of capital (Giskin & Walsh, 2001, p. 1). Accordingly, the traditional family model is expanded to include what, in the present study, is termed the 'public family' or what Wechsler (1985) calls a 'political family'. These broader conceptions of the family are bound by the common belief that arose with the onset of the Chinese revolution and have remained in place to this day (Yan, 2000, p. 201). While this definition of the family may seem novel to those outside of China, these relationships serve a purpose in the PRC that is inseparable from the everyday lives of individuals (Che, 1979, p. 41; Giskin & Walsh, 2001, p. xi). To understand this type of relationship, the next section examines the lexical unit *jia* '家' that denotes the family and discusses its interconnectedness and performativity.

The Chinese idea of the family serves almost as a philosophical concept in that the word family includes other dimensions that signify (homeland) *guojia* 国家, (individuals) *renjia* 人家, (homestead) *jia* 家, (everyone) *dajia* 大家 and (family members) or (clan) *jiaren* 家人 (Pickle, 2001). The fact that all the above terms have *jia* 家 in common offers a window into the meaning of the Chinese family (in its macro sense, as in *guojia* 国家 'homeland'). This logic is reflected in the folk saying, *guojia shi dajia, jiashi xiaojia* 国是大家, 家是小家, which signifies both that a homeland, is inclusive of everyone or is a big family and that a household is a small family.

[17] A Chinese folk saying encountered in both the institutionalized and everyday language settings.

The different uses of the word *jia* 家 defy the logic of the nuclear family and instead evoke a sense of assimilation where diverse social groups are brought together under the logic of *gong* 公 (public). This logic starts with *jia* 家 and ends up in the bigger *jia* 家, the foundation of *datong* 大同 (great harmony, an ideal or perfect society, great unity) (Lu, 2010). The unity and balance that is created through the logic of the word *jia* 家 is at the center of the Chinese nation's constant quest for order through the use of the maxims, precepts and set-phrases that have defied change and have stood the test of time through the paradigm shifts that have occurred throughout Chinese history (see, Lai, 1972, 1978; Baker, 1979). For this reason, the family has come to represent in Chinese society and culture all that is proper and morally correct, as articulated in the majority of the traditional precepts and set-phrases encountered both in classical and revolutionary texts (Giskin and Walsh, 2001, p. 32, 124; Che, 1979, p. 33, 41; cf. Lai, 1972).

A further illustration of the assimilative effects of the word *jia* 家 is the use of the word *fumu* 父母 (parents) to refer to relations beyond those of a private family. This can be seen in the link between the word *fumu* 父母 (parents) and the name used to refer to chief officials at the county or local levels as *fumuguan* 父母官, which also shows the replication of the logic of the family in other social fields (Baker, 1979; Boden, 2009; Lagerwey, 2010). In imperial times, officials acted as 'public parents' with the emperor, as the Son of Heaven, serving as a parent for the whole empire and his subjects as his children. Wei (2002, p. 71) observes that feudal rulers used the system of family ties to strengthen the centralized bureaucracy and that family values in present-day China have not made a clean break with that past. The combination of terms such as *fumu* 父母 and *fumuguan* 父母官, coupled with the need for order as represented by the balance of the *yin and yang*, 阴阳 creates a platform for the reproduction and transformation of values as witnessed within the premises of the logical structure of the Chinese family (cf. Bourdieu, 2000, p. 216). The Chinese family values that serve as the "limitation of the game" and as the "structured structures" of the Chinese *habitus* (ibid.; Webb & Danaher, 2002, p. 24) are discussed in the next section.

1.6.2 Chinese family values

> "When there are correct households then all under heaven is fixed".
> (Book of Changes 37, Jia ren: Commentary on the Decision, p. 159, trans. Legge)
> cf. Lindsberg et al. (2009).

The above quotation from the *Book of Changes* reflects the reliance on the logic of *jia* 家, the 'Chinese family', in ordering all relations. Furthermore, the two concepts relating to family values that seem to transcend all spaces and fields and influence all individuals within Chinese culture are those manifest in sustaining the logic of *jia* 家, namely, *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) and *zhong* 忠 (loyalty). The order in which these concepts are placed is in accordance with their sequential prominence under the logic of public versus individual, as manifest in the notion of *gong/si* 公/ 私. In Chinese culture, filial piety is central to the answer to the basic question of "how do I fulfill my obligations honorably?", in contrast to the modern Western logic of "how do I fulfill my individual dreams?" (Lindsberg et al., 2009, p. 11; cf. Baker, 1979, p. 26).

Such relationships are reflective in a decorum that consists of a slow, tedious but necessary dance to maintain the practice of filial piety *xiao* 孝 and to prevent loss of face *mianzi* 面子 for all members of the family (Lindberg (2009, p. 31). This practice can be observed in stories, idioms, proverbs, sayings and decrees from imperial times to the present, such as the 2004 legislation that adapted the concept of filial piety 孝 to the social insurance and welfare systems for senior citizens (Chou, 2010). Lastly, the emphasis placed on the notions of honor and shame, as reflected in the dictum 礼义廉耻 *liyilianchi*, serves as the foundation of all the other concepts relating to individual practice in the PRC.[18] The notions of honor and shame seem to follow the individual from their primary inculcation, in the micro field of dispositions, *jia* 家, to the macro state, as in *guojia* 国家. It is within the framework of the replication of the values of the smallest unit of society, private family for establishing order in the all-inclusive public family, *guojia* 国家 (nation), in which the production, implementation and consumption of the PRC political performatives are examined.

[18] The logic of teaching through 礼义廉耻 (rituals, honor and shame) serves as a foundation for understanding the need of value-laden solutions. It functions as the five constants with each character serving to direct the form of conduct an individual should follow, for details and examples see Chapter Four, "Analysis of the *Laosanpian*".

1.6.3 Summary

This section on the theoretical framework began by defining felicity conditions, stating that the discourse is afforded legitimacy by individuals as agents that decode and interpret the messages and symbols found in texts in accordance with their needs, value systems and/or cultural premises (Bohannan, 1995; Lagerwey, 2009). This section also set the foundation for identifying the apparent duality in the implementation of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety), which seems to be manifest within the framework of the logic whereby *gong* 公 (public) takes primacy over *si* 私 (private), and is strongly reliant on the notions of *rong* 荣 (virtue) and *chi* 耻 (shame), which serve as a framework guiding and legitimating all forms of practice. The section also established that these sets of opposites constitute a foundation for the type of *habitus* witnessed in the PRC, the influence of which is so vital to the Chinese culture and value systems that even the exercise of liberating the Chinese people required the use of idioms and precepts that were framed by these antipodal structures. Lastly, this study argues that the complementary dualism manifest in the notion of *yin/yang* has a counterpart in the ethical dualism that is as old as Chinese history, but gained prominence during the Chinese revolution. The next section presents the methods used in this study.

1.7.0 Methodology

Because of the nature of the topic, this study uses an eclectic research methodology, which borrows from several disciplines in attempting to answer the following question: why and how have the texts of the *Laosanpian* continued to appeal to the Chinese people ever since their production during the Yan'an era. A combination of the results from data collection processes and textual analysis was used to examine the use of traditional Chinese concepts and language and the staying power of Maoist discourse. The analysis of the *Laosanpian* also draws on the results from the two data collection missions to Beijing conducted between 2010 and 2011.

1.7.1.1 Research Methodology

The research methodology uses the form of multiple cases, with each case having more than one unit of analysis, as shown in Figure 1.0 below.



Figure 1.0 (Adapted from Yin 2009, p. 40)

The data collection missions are divided into two categories. First, the formal categories are used to examine institutionalized instances of the production, reproduction, distribution and consumption of discourse. During the course of the study, a further classification emerged in relation to the first category, whereby the production and reproduction of political discourse were separated from the consumption of discourse and the training of specialist professionals. The first group in the formal category consists of institutions that specialize in reproducing and distributing the materials of political discourse. These institutions are directly linked to or work under the mandate of the government, through the People's Education Press and Publishers, the National Film Archive Institute and the Beijing Media University. The second group from the first category consists of institutions that consume political discourse, as represented by the Beijing Normal University, the Learn from the Spirit of Lei Feng Research Forum and the Beijing Review. The institutions in this last group, which consume political discourse and train political professionals, are found to display an awe and reverence in the manner in which they treat the political discourse of the PRC. This goes beyond the "normal" treatment of discourse and exhibits a reliance on decorum that borders on the religious in the way the texts are handled. This group is observed to draw on the ancient notion of separating those who possess *zheng* (correct spirit) from those with *xie* (evil spirit), which also reflects the *nei/wai* distinction.

The investigation/data collection processes from the informal categories consist of interviews with graduate and post graduate students in different settings in Beijing. The aim was to examine the manner in which the students regarded the texts they had read throughout their student life, which provided another opportunity to discern the moral value of the *Laosanpian.* The informal category also included interviews with the general public. In the end, the informants consisted of females aged 20 to 40, as the intended male informants in this age range

were impossible to approach and were left out of the study. This lack of male informants from the general public was compensated by the number of male informants in the graduate student group.

The two informal categories had similar units of analysis, which consisted of the sub questions from the main question of the study, that is, "Why and how have the texts of the *Laosanpian* continued to appeal to the Chinese people ever since their production during the Yan'an era?" The sub questions were as follows. "What do you know about the texts of the *Laosanpian*?" "What influence do you think the *Laosanpian* had on the reform of the PRC?" "Do you think the texts play the same role during the current era of 'Eight Virtues and Eight Dishonors' as they did during the pre-reform era?" Finally, "Do you think 孝 (filial piety) has a role in sustaining the political doctrine of the PRC?" Depending on the reaction of the informants, this last question was sometimes worded differently, as "What role does 孝 (filial piety) play in building and maintaining a harmonious society?" Although the last version was preferred by the informants, it was problematic because the informants would try to explain Hu Jintao's concept of the 'Harmonious Society', instead of describing the current role of 孝 (filial piety) in society. To relate these research questions to the overall perspective of this study, the next section links the questions to the methodology of the study.

1.7.2 Linking methodology to the question of study

The analysis of the *Laosanpian* is tied to the two working questions of study. First, what enables the discourse of the pre-reform era to continue to manifest in reform PRC? In other words, what are the conditions that enable a logocentric era discourse to continue to manifest in an econocentric era? The second question is, why is an almost religious importance still attached to the tales of the *Laosanpian*, as shown in the findings of the data collecting sessions? The second question reflects a gap in the research on Chinese political discourse that relates to the connection between individuals' frame of reference and the lasting appeal of revolutionary discourse (Dirlik, 2012, p. 20). Previous studies have mostly focused on what the texts seem to represent or what category they fall under, rather than on what the texts do or how individuals in society engage with the texts in their everyday lives. As stated in the section on the theoretical framework, the latter question is paramount as it represents the pre-requisite for the manifestation of any discourse in society, political or otherwise.

1.7.3 Links to unexpected and unwritten messages

The choice of informants for this study was also in line with the intended research population and the methods of data collection. The primary research data consists of all the materials relating to the texts of the *Laosanpian* extracted from primary and secondary sources, starting with the materials from the Yan'an era and extending along the trajectory of the pre-reform and reform PRC. The data population included lower and higher primary textbooks which contained some of the tales of the *Laosanpian* and other revolutionary texts related to the trajectory of the PRC political history. Similar type of data was mined from the materials meant for the recruitment and entry-exams of the civil servant system. The two last data sources are elaborated upon in chapter five, "Everyday workings of the *Laosanpian* in the reform PRC."

The data collection process revealed more than the collected material written on the texts, as discerned in the openness or secrecy of the informants at the mention of the word *Laosanpian.* These extra-lingual messages from the informants have shaped much of this study and have contributed to a deeper understanding of the underlying meanings embedded in the texts of the *Laosanpian*. The data collection sessions also revealed insights into how to approach the *Laosanpian* and political performatives in general, in a way that could not have been achieved by reading endless books. Understanding these extra-lingual messages and the insights into the manner of treating the *Laosanpian* require an understanding of the Chinese language phenomenon of *chengyu* 成语 (four-character idioms), the definition, history and role of which is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Two – *Chengyu,* Four-character idioms

2.0.0 *Chengyu* "Four-character idioms" as a foundation for formulaic language and ethical dualism.

The section on the theoretical framework concluded that the staying power of Maoist discourse is attributable to its congruency with popular consciousness and the fact it articulates the solutions that led to the establishment of the PRC. This chapter follows in the footsteps of earlier studies, especially those by Li (1959), Hsia (1961) and Apter and Saich (1994), which state that Maoist discourse achieved success because it borrowed from traditional ancient tales and Chinese traditional language expressions, as represented in set-phrases, idioms, puns, proverbs, fables, sayings, four-character idioms and couplets. This chapter examines and elaborates one form of

Chinese set-phrase, the *chengyu* 成语 (four-character idiom) (henceforth referred to as '*chengyu* 成语') and attempts to answer the following research questions: What conditions enabled the traditional expressions to be used in the production and implementation of Maoist discourse? What characteristics of the borrowed traditional expressions contributed to the success of Maoist discourse? And, why does Maoist discourse stand apart from other texts that borrowed from *chengyu* 成语? It is imperative to note that *chengyu* 成语 were not the only traditional language expressions that were used as rhetorical tools for the production of Maoist discourse. Nonetheless, *chengyu* 成语 are prominent in the discourses of the Yan'an revolutionary, pre-reform and reform PRC eras.

This chapter is structured as follows. The first section reviews the literature relating to *chengyu* 成语. The next section discusses the importance of researching foreign language expressions to understand people and culture. This is followed by an outline of the definitions, sources and different types of *chengyu* 成语. The next section focuses on the political implementation and manifestation of *chengyu* 成语 in ancient China and during reform PRC. The final section discusses the use of *chengyu* 成语 in education and summarizes the chapter.

2.0.1 Introduction to *Chengyu* four-character idioms

The rationale underlying this chapter is that Maoist discourse remains congruent with contemporary Chinese consciousness, that is, it continues to serve to articulate solutions for individuals in diverse fields of the reform PRC. This chapter describes the trajectory of *Chengyu* 成语 from ancient times to the present to show their prominence in Chinese culture. *Chengyu* 成语 are regarded by both national and Western scholars to be representative of the expression of Chinese culture. The phenomenon, which is revered in Chinese communities, is regarded as an expression of wisdom, morals, customs, norms and traditions and is seen to have acted as a carrier of Chinese cultural values from ancient to contemporary times. However, studies of Chinese set-phrases such as *chengyu* 成语 are scarce in the English language (Nall, 2009, p. 23), which appears to account for the limited discussion on the subject. The reason for this limited attention may also reflect why *chengyu* 成语 are not approached on a 'theoretical, scientific basis' in studies of Chinese political discourse. Nonetheless, there is a plethora of Chinese-English *chengyu* 成语 dictionaries, which are helpful in showing the distribution and uses of

idioms in various fields of Chinese society (Brown et al., 1920; Lai, 1972, p. 78; Morris, 1981; Lip, 1984; Longman English-Chinese Dictionary, 1998; Lin and Leonard, 2000; Shi, Wang & Zhang, 2006; Moss, 2006). In consulting the Chinese-English *chengyu* dictionaries, it is apparent that Chinese idioms with ancient origins still hold a significant position in people's daily lives and continue to serve as symbols of knowledge and scholarship in the PRC. The next section discusses the studies that examine *chengyu* 成语 and their manifestation in diverse fields of Chinese society.

2.1.0 Reviewing the Literature on *Chengyu* 成语

Studies by Lee (1978) in sociolinguistics, Myers (1991) in ethnolinguistics focusing on business language, Wu (1992) in cognitive studies, Zhao (2000) in translation studies and Nall (2009) in cultural studies are representative of the research over the last three decades on the subject of *chengyu* 成语. These studies start from the premise that *chengyu* 成语 are an expression of the history and collective memory of China and conclude that *chengyu* 成语 should be included in the teaching of Chinese language to enable foreigners to better understand Chinese culture. Myers (1991) and Zhao's (2000) in-depth studies examine the importance of understanding the workings of *chengyu* 成语 among foreigners who have dealings with China, as the *chengyu* 成语 are seen to represent the underlying structures of Chinese cultural premises. All the above mentioned studies apply diverse methods for categorizing *chengyu* 成语 and investigating how they are manifest in different social fields. Myers's study is discussed in later sections of this chapter. Lee (1978, p. 43-63) describes ten categories of *chengyu* 成语 in accordance with their use. Nall (2009, p. 2-6) uses numerals and links to Chinese cosmology to describe different classes of *chengyu* 成语. Nonetheless, while these categorizations are helpful, they are limited, as Ni (1990) warns that *chengyu* 成语 continue to defy any form of strict classification.

Certain categories of *chengyu* 成语, especially those that define, guide and serve to express the Chinese value system, reveal a tendency of adhering to the patterns of antipodal structures as may be witnessed in the following examples: *gongzheng wusi* 公正无私 (impartiality), *chijiu yingxin* 辞旧迎新 (out with the old, in with the new), *tuichen chuxin* 推陈出新 (get rid of the stale and bring forth the new), *ciqi bifu* 此起彼伏 (as one falls another one rises), *wuzhong shengyou* 无中生有 (out of thin air), *neichi waisong* 内紧外松 (be intense in the inside and

relaxed on the outside), *rongru bujing* 荣辱不惊 (blame not the *jing*), *shanshan wu e* 善善恶恶 (love the good and shun the evil), *qichi daru* 奇耻大辱 (an abyss of disgrace) *heibai fenming* 黑白分明 (a clear distinction between black and white), reveal a reliance on the following antipodal lexical units: *gong/si* 公/私 (public/private), *rong/chi* 荣/耻 (virtue/shame), *xin/jiu* 新/旧 (new/old), *da/xiao* 大/小 (big/small), *nei/wai* 内/外 (inside/outside) and *li/yi* 利/义 (gain/righteous). Although there are many more such pairs in the Chinese lexicon, these examples show the typical structuring of expressions in *chengyu* 成语.

2.1.1 Connecting *Chengyu* 成语 to Maoist discourse

Li (1957), Hsia, (1961) and Apter and Saich (1994) connect Maoist discourse to ancient language expressions and lay a foundation for examining the manner in which *chengyu* 成语 are incorporated into Maoist discourse and the effects of this borrowing. The seminal studies by Li and Hsia serve as a foundation for examining how language changed in China during the 1940s and 50s, because they were the first to observe that the change in language, although professing a break from the past, occurred within traditional Chinese culture. Hsia and Li discuss how Maoist discourse borrows from traditional Chinese idioms and how this has facilitated its appeal and popularity. They focus on how various forms of traditional language, such as fables, proverbs, idioms and sayings, are used to construct new political expressions and to give tales of ancient heroes' new meanings that express the rationale of the new ideology. Although their studies do not focus solely on *chengyu* 成语, they represent the first step towards using ancient Chinese expressions as an analytical framework for analyzing Maoist discourse, which they simply refer to as communist discourse.

In this study, however, the different forms of ancient language are not treated uniformly. This is done to allow room to examine the characteristics of traditional Chinese modes of expression by focusing on *chengyu* 成语. The observed characteristics of *chengyu* 成语 are those that seem to facilitate cultural continuity, transferability and malleability, coupled with the adherence to the rhetorical patterns found in antipodal structures. The continuity and transferability of *chengyu* 成语 are illustrated in Yan's (2000) study on the borrowing of expressions from ancient Chinese concepts and themes in the *Laosanpian*, which concludes that these tales acquired their appeal and staying power thanks to their use of historical figures, such

as Sima Qian 司马迁 (ca. 145 or 135 BC – 86 BC) and traditional tales such as Yugong Yishan 愚公移山 (The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains). The next section discusses why this study focuses on the workings of *chengyu* 成语 to examine the manifestation and implementation of Maoist discourse in reform PRC.

2.1.2 The purpose of examining *Chengyu* (four-character idioms)

This section highlights the qualities and characteristics of *chengyu* 成语 in framing, guiding and legitimizing how individuals act in Chinese society. It also examines how *chengyu* 成语 affect individuals from childhood, where they serve as a vehicle for inculcating dispositions, to adulthood, where they serve as a guide for practice in the form of the *habitus*. The following passages endeavor to first place *chengyu* 成语 within the premises of performative and practice theories, by showing that *chengyu* 成语 are not only manifest as performatives in their own right, but in the process also serve as legitimating agents that allow other utterances to perform. That is, this process provides utterances outside *chengyu* 成语 with a performative force.

These three characteristics of *chengyu* 成语 (i.e., their capacity to act on their own right, their ability to serve as legitimating agents for other utterances and their transferability and malleability), are qualities that Maoist discourse inherited during its conception. This raises the question of how Maoist discourse managed to inherit these characteristics and whether they are inherited by all the discourses that use *chengyu* 成语. The answer to the latter question is a negative, as not all discourses that use *chengyu* 成语 inherit their characteristics; at the very least a discourse may acquire limited legitimacy to manifest within a given field of the Chinese community. However, in response to the first question, Maoist discourse can be said to have both adopted the form of *chengyu* 成语 in its composition and to have borrowed their content in the helping to articulate and combine the ideals of the Party with those of the Chinese value system.

Here, the analysis of *Chengyu* 成语 not only pertains to the manifestation of Maoist discourse in the history of the PRC, but also to its role as a source of cultural signifiers that serve as a vehicle for inculcating the corresponding Chinese social values. These two premises for examining *chengyu* 成语 imply that they are able to serve as a window for understanding the internal dynamics of Chinese society, as suggested in the following quotation:

"Si duo dicunt idem non est idem"

"If two languages say the same thing, it is not the same thing".

Translation: Stone, J. (2006)

People visiting or working in a new country are often perplexed when they use what seem to be correct local language and expressions, but still fail to communicate with their hosts. The 'Latin proverb' above eloquently articulates the reason strangers fail to communicate in their new environments. Lee (1978, p. 146), citing the experiences of the clergy in China, and Myers (1991, p. 5), using examples from business scenarios, warn that ignoring these misunderstandings may limit what a host country has to offer. If new comers or scholars fail to understand a society's underlying cultural premises, the dynamics that drive the culture or nation will remain obscure. For this reason, studies of the proverbs and associated folklore of different cultures are able to indicate the outside influences to which the cultures have been subjected in the past and can illuminate their ways of thought and social characteristics to a greater extent than studies of other cultural factors (Elwell-Sutton, 1954, p. 8). As stated in the volume of Asian Proverbs (2011), proverbs and idioms are a guide to nature and morality, which comprise the very ethos of the people they serve to instruct. These characteristics of proverbs and idioms equally apply to *chengyu* 成语 because they not only represent the past but also serve as a guide to today's practices and tomorrow's aspirations.

Lai (1972, p. vii) suggests that the frequent use of *chengyu* 成语 in spoken and written Chinese language is probably because Chinese are taught from childhood to look upon the ancient sages as role models for all times. Lai further points out that as a result of the idealization of the great historical figures through *chengyu* 成语, the past has become the model for the present, and the words of the ancients are quoted and their action cited to provide guidance for the present and future. This point is further elaborated by Munro (1996, pp. 7 & 55). Lai (1978, foreword) states that when learning about Chinese culture, it is "important to understand proverbs from their origins because they are not always translatable, and when they are translated based on their semantic values they are often very flat and lose their meanings". This passage encapsulates the role of *chengyu* 成语 within the Chinese community as a whole and indicates that *chengyu* 成语 serve as a medium for inculcating the dispositions that form the *habitus* of Chinese society.

Lip (1984) emphasizes that the study of proverbs can lead to a fuller understanding of a culture or nation. Lip also points out that over the course of thousands of years of history and culture, the Chinese have accumulated a wealth of terse sayings, proverbs and idioms. These various expressions have survived numerous historical changes, such as the rise and fall of dynasties and cultural revolutions. During this time, *chengyu* 成语 have adapted to the new environments without losing their value, at times acquiring new meanings, and in the process more sayings have become part of the stock of *chengyu* 成语 (Lip, 1984). The ability of *chengyu* 成语 to keep up with the times, to serve as break force for expressing new meanings and to assimilate new phrases can be observed throughout the trajectory of Maoist discourse and is discussed in the chapter analyzing the texts of the *Laosanpian.* The next section defines *chengyu* 成语 according to their origins, sources, implementation and manifestation.

2.2.0 Definitions of *Chengyu* 成语 (Four-character idioms)

There are several definitions of *chengyu* 成语, all of which concur that *chengyu* 成语 play an important role in the everyday lives of Chinese people. The following definitions of *chengyu* 成语 have been proposed by Chinese and Western scholars. The *Jiuyong Chengyu da cidian* 九用成语词典 (2004) defines *chengyu* 成语 as a collection of four-character words that convey a complete philosophy and history of China. The Chinese – English Dictionary (1997) defines *chengyu* 成语 as set-phrases (usually composed of four characters). The meanings of some *chengyu* 成语 are obvious, as in *xiaoti dazuo* 小题大做 'trivial topic, long article' and *houlai jushang* 后来居上 'latecomers move ahead'. However, some can only be understood by knowing their sources or the stories behind them, such as with *chaosan musi* 朝三暮四 'three in the morning, four in the evening' and *beigong sheying* 杯弓蛇影 'the shadow of a bow in a cup mistaken for a snake'. Cihai 辞海 (2006) defines *chengyu* 成语 as the Chinese vocabulary in its entirety passed down through ancient set-phrases. These ancient set-phrases combine extracts from famous classical works and popular oral history with meaningful insights, which are often implied in their literal meanings. The style of the four-character idioms is identifiable through their simple composition and succinct meanings. In Cihai 辞海 it is concluded that *chengyu* 成语 have a closed structure that cannot be increased or decreased and generally have a word order that cannot be changed without destroying the meaning.

The above mentioned definitions of *chengyu* 成语 reveal three common themes. First, *chengyu* 成语 are regarded as bringing ancient history and values into contemporary Chinese society. Second, *chengyu* 成语 are considered to be an important rhetorical tool for dominant groups and for the community at large. Third, *chengyu* 成语 play an important role in all Chinese communities, both at home and abroad. The following studies provide further definitions of *chengyu* 成语.

Ni (1990) and Zhou (2000) agree on the conciseness of *chengyu* 成语. Ni (1990, p. 5) defines *chengyu* 成语 as concisely structured phrases that contain a complete history. He illustrates this by using an example of where *chengyu* 成语 serve as "prefabricated materials" for efficiently and precisely conveying meanings. Zhou (2008, p. vii) further emphasizes how *chengyu* 成语 are useful as subjects, predicates and adverbs, are reflective of ancient and modern grammatical rules and are unique for being a "treasure house" that embodies the vast character of Chinese culture.

Xin (2005, p. 9) simply defines *chengyu* 成语 as expressions of wisdom and knowledge. He points out that *chengyu* 成语 have five basic features. First, they serve as carriers of fully-grown history. Second, they constitute complete meanings, without the need for any addition. Third, they have a stable structure that at times defies current grammatical rules and, yet, continue to make sense and carry more weight than other Chinese expressions. Fourth, *chengyu* 成语 have the capacity to function as and play the role of any grammatical component. Lastly, *chengyu* 成语 are context dependent rather than grammatically dependent. In other instances, *chengyu* 成语 are defined under the umbrella of proverbs and their four character form is used to differentiate them from other types of set phrases, as in Lee (1978, p. 12-42). In summary, the above definitions agree on the ubiquitous and concise nature of *chengyu* 成语 in expressing the norms, traditions and values of Chinese culture. The next section briefly discusses the sources and different types of *chengyu* 成语.

2.2.1 Sources and types of *chengyu* 成语 (Four-character idioms)

Chengyu 成语 originate from written and oral traditions (Ching, 1964; Lee, 1978; Wu, 1992, 1995; Munro, 1996; Rosenhov, 2003; Ji, 2004; Nall, 2009). Some *chengyu* 成语 have arisen out

of pragmatic and historical events, as with the examples originating from Mao's Yan'an era speeches of the 1930s and 40s. The four-character phrases and *chengyu* 成语 from the Yan'an era later became part of the stock of political performatives that served to articulate the ideals and principles of the PRC.[19] The addition of the Yan'an revolutionary phrases to the stock of *chengyu* 成语 is in accord with Lip's (1984) observation that the phrases that mark historical events eventually become part of the stock of traditional expressions such as *chengyu* 成语.

Gunthner (2001, p. 266) points out that *chengyu* 成语 currently serve as indices to the classics of Chinese literature and the Confucian canon, such as *Lunyu* (Analects), *Shujing* (Book of History) and *Shijing* (Book of Odes), which confirms that most *chengyu* 成语 in use today have their origins in ancient times. This view is supported by Wu (1995, pp. 65-6) and by the observation that the majority of Chinese have difficulty reading and writing classical characters (De Francis, 1985). Hence, word of mouth must have played a major part in transmitting *chengyu* 成语 in history and in delineating practices through the ages.

Lastly, all the above mentioned studies agree that *chengyu* 成语 originate from allusive and non-allusive sources. Forms of allusive *chengyu* 成语 are contained in tales, myths, fables, legends and historical events, and continue to be used by the population at large in both written and oral forms, as witnessed in *chengyu* in allegories such as *yugong yishan* 愚公移山 and other tales. Sources of non-allusive *chengyu* 成语 include historical facts and quotations from ancient and classical literary works, such as the *chengyu* 成语 from the *Lunyu* 论语, *Shiji* 史记, *Liji* 礼记 and other classical historical texts. The next section presents statistics showing the distribution of *chengyu* 成语 throughout Chinese history.

2.2.2 Statistics of the distribution of *chengyu* 成语

The widespread use, manifestation and implementation of *chengyu* 成语 can be witnessed in the figures relating to their distribution and publication. The following figures are taken from various dictionaries and studies and serve as a testimony to the ubiquity of *chengyu* 成语. Nall (2009, p. 16) shows that *chengyu* 成语 constitute 90% of all Chinese proverbs. According to Ni (1990, p.11), there are almost 5,500 *chengyu* 成语, of which 4,600 can be traced to a specific time in

[19] See Table 10, Chengyu and Four-Character Phrases, in Appendix 1

Chinese history. These numbers align with those found in contemporary Chinese dictionaries and other encyclopedic sources. Ni elaborates on the timeline for *chengyu* 成语 using figures from the 'Chinese *Chengyu* Dictionary' (Shanghai Education Publishers in *Chengyu* 成语 1978/05). The first edition of the dictionary states that 3,128 *chengyu* 成语 (68% of the total) originated in the Han dynasty, 690 (15%) in the Wei Jin, Southern and Northern dynasties, 414 (9%) in the Sui and Tang dynasties, 276 (6%) in the Song dynasty and, lastly, 92 (2%) in the Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. These figures are confirmed by those found in the 4th edition of the *Chinese Chengyu Dictionary* (The Commercial Press 1981/03), which contains a total of 3,345 *chengyu* 成语. These figures demonstrate the steady interest in and importance of *chengyu* 成语 throughout the different stages of Chinese history. The next section outlines the diverse implementation of *chengyu* 成语, using examples from informal and ordinary to specific and formal settings.

2.2.3 Implementation of *chengyu* 成语 in society

"Proverbs mostly survive because they form part of the language of the common folk".

Lip (1984)

众志成城

众志成城这可能是四川汶川地震发生后大家看得最多，听得最多，说的最多的一个词，一句话。每听一次，每说一次这个词（这句话）都令我心潮澎湃，血脉喷张，令我对正处于灾难中的同胞感同身受，令我生起无比的信念和意志：坚信我们大家一起团结一致一定会克服一切困难，没有任何困难可以难倒我们中国人！ 北京 2011/02

Zhongzhi chengchengyu 众志成城 (Strength is in numbers)

This idiom may be the most cited and heard from when referring to the Sichuan, Wenchuan earthquake. Each time one hears the idiom there is a surge of emotions, making one feel as if, in spirit, one is right among the compatriots affected by the earthquake, the idiom strengthens my will and belief that together we will overcome all difficulties and that there is no difficulty hard enough to defeat us, the Chinese people. (Beijing 2011/02)

This statement is a response from an interviewee during the field study in Beijing. The question posed to the informant was, "when and under what circumstances do you use *chengyu* 成语". Although the immediate answer was, "这是很难说" (this is hard to explain), after a few seconds of silence the informant then used the Sichuan earthquake as an example to explain the use of *chengyu* 成语.

Character of the above *chengyu* 成语 '众志成城,' (九用成语大词典, 2004, p. 1194).
This is a positive idiom referring to the notion that there is strength in unity.
Occasion: Sichuan, Wenchuan Earthquake
Origins: *Guo Yu. Zhou Yu.* 国语 周语
Simile: *wan zhong yi xin* 万众一心 (ten thousand people resolute in their action)
Antonym: *yi pan sansha* 一盘散沙 (a plate of scattered sand)

2.2.3.1 *Analysis of the passage on Sichuan earthquake*

The central themes expressed in the above statement are those of unity, emotion and identity. The unity theme is depicted in the title *chengyu* 成语, "众志成城" (Strength is in numbers). Emotion is evoked in the passage through the mention of two other idioms in succession, *xinchao pengpai* 心潮澎湃 (surge of emotions) and *xuemai pengzhang* 血脉喷张 (blood surges) ((九用成语大词典, 2004, p. 90). These two emotive idioms serve to connect the speaker to the victims of the earthquake; a connection expressed by yet another idiom, *gantong shenshou* 感同身受 (empathizing with others) (ibid., p. 307). The last theme drawn from this statement is that of identity, in that the informant expresses a resolute belief in the ability of the Chinese people to persevere and overcome all difficulties and that no difficulty is capable of defeating the Chinese people. All the idioms mentioned in this passage reflect positive, emotive and complimentary characteristics. Finally, the idioms used and the statement as a whole are indicative of the antipodal notion of *gong* 公/*si* 私, which is expressed in the speaker's feeling of togetherness (*gong* 公) with the victims of the earthquake and in last sentence, which states that "together (*gong* 公) we will rise and persevere until we conquer all our difficulties".

This example demonstrates the ability of *chengyu* 成语 to assist in forming and expressing a concise and complete message that connects a personal feeling of empathy towards a people in

crisis with a sense of national identity. To paraphrase Lakoff and Johnson (2003), it seems as if *chengyu* 成语 express the "words we live by", words that serve as expressions and triggers of our complete selves. Why it is possible for *chengyu* 成语 to have such an appeal and be so readily available to the Chinese community? The next section discusses the different implementations of *chengyu* 成语, starting with their use by Chinese nationals and their effects on foreigners and in education.

Lee (1978, p. 43) analyzes ten different categories of *chengyu* 成语, starting with the *chengyu* 成语 that serve as a foundation for the smallest unit of Chinese society, the 'family' *jia* 家, and extending to those that stipulate the values and conduct of everyday life. It is no accident that Lee starts his analysis by using the example of *sangang wuchang* 三纲五常 'three cardinal guides and five constants', because the manifestation of this *chengyu* 成语 transcends the private family and serves as a guide for social behavior in general. In examining *chengyu* 成语 this study observed that despite the potency of this language phenomenon, individuals who interact with it, either in the context of the *jia* 家 (homestead) or *guojia* 国家 (homeland) are not passive receptors of whatever messages they receive. Rather, as Lee (1978, p. 50) points out, these individuals use the "strategic effectiveness of proverbs to gain from the way they enable the speaker to align cultural beliefs and knowledge against an adversary in conversation".

The general use of *chengyu* 成语 is no longer limited to the Chinese culture in which this form of expression originated. For instance, Chinese have been observed to use *chengyu* 成语 as a strategic tool when dealing with foreigners during the recent PRC economic boom and in diplomatic circles where their use has now gone beyond the confines of Chinese culture. As a result of the interaction between foreigners and Chinese, *chengyu* 成语 have become a concern for whoever wants to have dealings with China. The analysis of the use of *chengyu* 成语 in the dealings between nationals and foreigners in reform PRC implies that *chengyu* 成语 play a role in marking the border between those inside and outside the Chinese cultural circle, as a manifestation of the antipodal structure of *nei/wai* (inside/outside). All the above definitions of *chengyu* 成语 have hinted on their potency the next section some of its rhetorical features.

2.3.0 *Chengyu* 成语 as a rhetorical tool

Chinese discourse and rhetoric cannot be examined without mentioning the central role played by *chengyu* 成语, as their form offers a sense of authority to the speaker or writer who uses them, as illustrated by the scholars discussed at the beginning of this chapter. *Chengyu* 成语 have been described in previous sections as carriers of traditional wisdom and values. However, *chengyu* 成语 do not only disseminate cultural information. Lee (1978, p. 4) suggests that *chengyu* 成 also enable individuals to structure more convincing statements and to become socially dominant. Ni (1991, p. 112-113) stresses a similar point as Lee above in elaborating on positive versus negative and complimentary versus derogatory categories of the *chengyu* 成语 expressions while pointing out that and pointing out that these allow speakers to either evade or win a confrontation. Ni elaborates on this categorization by showing that positive and complimentary idioms serve to express assurance, approval, honor and enthusiasm, while negative idioms express disgrace and shame and are usually of a derogatory nature. Ni also notes that some *chengyu* 成语 are neither positive or negative nor complimentary or derogatory, but are simply neutral in character. Ni, further warns that these categories have "a varying sense of emotional color", which may render any categorization relative, as the elements found in each category may be mixed, combined, separated and moved to any of the other categories. In sum, as the next section demonstrates, *chengyu* 成语 tend to elude rigid categorization.

2.3.1 Diverse characteristics of *chengyu* 成语 use

In his characterization of *chengyu* 成语, Ni (1991) concludes that as rhetorical tools, all idioms have their own characteristics. For example, some are applied in expressing irony or wit, such as *daomao anran* 道貌岸然 'to be sanctimonious'. Ni further points out that some idioms are used in negative statements and to express disagreement, such as *xiangti binglun* 相提并论 'to be mentioned in the same breath'. Ni's final categories contain idioms that express humility, such as in the face saving maneuver *ganbai xiafeng* 甘拜下风 'to candidly accept defeat' and those used to praise or encourage selfless actions, such as *dagong wusi* 大公无私 'apply oneself selflessly' and *nengzhe duolao* 能者多劳 'able men are always busy' (p. 365). The above categorization of *chengyu* 成语 suggests that it can be used to convince, evade or even humiliate, as in accepting defeat allowing the speaker to either gain social dominance or save face.

2.4.0 *Chengyu* 成语 in education

Of the approximately 3,500 *chengyu* 成语 that apply in everyday settings, students from pre- and primary school focus on mastering around 2,500 (学生分类成语多功能词典, 2008, p. 9). Nall (2009, p. 10-11) points out that the PRC formal education system requires that graduates are able to make proper use of a substantial proportion of the more than 20,000 *chengyu* 成语 listed in the larger dictionaries (cf. Yang et al., 2006, p. 755). Nall further quotes Wang (1998, p. 71) who states that although *chengyu* 成语 are widely used informally to describe situations in everyday life, they are revered as the "cream of the Chinese language" and as reflecting the height of culture, hence their prominence within the education system.

Lin Shansen (2008, *foreword*) states that the 4000 *chengyu* 成语 contained in his dictionary collection serve as part of the standard and/or extracurricular teaching and reading material for primary and middle schools. Chen Yongyou, He Sanxi and Wang Anqi (1986, p. 438) highlight that although most *chengyu* 成语 contain "feudal ethical impurities", they have managed to defy time and are still applicable to contemporary reality and continue to enhance the value of education. Another example of the use of *chengyu* 成语 in education relates to the education that takes place within a home, where children are taught different rhymes and idioms in the process of memorizing the rules, norms and values of society using *Dizigui* and *Sanzijing*. In summary, all the reviewed studies indicate that *chengyu* 成语 continue to be used as educational tools for both young and old because they are structured as containers of knowledge and ancient wisdom.

2.5.0 Summary of *Chengyu* 成语

This chapter has revealed the widespread use of *chengyu* 成语 and the important role they play in framing the various types of logic that guide practice in Chinese society. *Chengyu* 成语 continue to influence Chinese culture and society in that they not only serve to structure values and norms, but also to transfer these qualities to future generations and to sustain the Chinese value system. These characteristics of *chengyu* 成语 are used to examine the role of traditional Chinese concepts in the production and implementation of Maoist discourse. Furthermore, it is argued that the use of *chengyu* 成语 in Maoist discourse facilitates the implementation of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety), which is a traditional Chinese concept that also sustains the manifestation of

antipodal structures. Finally, this chapter has also revealed that *chengyu* 成语 act as performatives that serve to inculcate Chinese values into everyday practice and function as legitimating agents that allow other utterances to perform. The next chapter examines one of the traditional Chinese concepts upon which *chengyu* 成语 are manifest, *xiao* 'filial piety'.

Chapter Three – The foundation of the Chinese family model - *Xiao* 孝 (filial piety)

3.0.0 The role of antipodal structures in expressing the concept of *xiao* 'filial piety'

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concept of *xiao* (filial piety) and prominence of antipodal lexical pairs in the articulation of the Chinese value system and political doctrines at the height of the different paradigm shifts in Chinese history, namely, the fall of the *Zhou* ritual system (*Zhouli*), the Warring States, 5th century Buddhism, the early Tang Dynasty, the late Ming Dynasty and the Chinese revolution. This exercise also aims to reveal how the processes of internalization and rationalization served as vehicles in ushering in each new paradigm shift, which tend to be more inclusive as history unfolds (Lagerwey, 2009, p. 36). In all the above mentioned processes, *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) seems to act as permanent factor in framing the continuities and changes of expression of the Chinese value system and political doctrines. The next section examines the meaning of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) and its definition in the Chinese classics and by contemporary Western scholars of Chinese Studies.

3.0.1 Definitions of filial piety

The definition of the concept of filial piety is divided into three sections. This section examines the classical definitions from the *Liji* "Book of Rites", *Analects, Mencius* and *Xiaojing.* The second focuses on the definitions by scholars of Chinese Studies, which leads to the interpretations of filial piety found in the texts from the late Ming dynasty, focusing on the works of Yu Chunxi (1553–1621) and his ideas in the *Xiaojing* as narrated by Lü (2006). The third section examines the influence of filial piety in contemporary China by focusing on the Chinese revolution and reform PRC using texts from Ikels (2004), Knapp (1996) and Chou (2010), including other studies relevant to the subject matter.

The concept of filial piety stipulates the relationships among the members of a family, including their behavior, hierarchies, reciprocities and inherent duties, and is likely to explain why any changes in political rule reflect the structure of the family. The perception of the family

has been fundamental to how the Chinese have understood life since the beginning of history (Baker, 1979, p. 11; Che, 1979, p. 24; Giskin & Walsh, 2001, p. 125-126). Furthermore, the family as guided by the rules of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) is central not only to the governance of China, but also in constituting a moment of collective memory in which Chinese individuals relate and express their own culture and identity (ibid.).

In the *Liji* "Book of Rites", it is stated that sons should practice filial piety by taking care of their parents without any complaints. The *Liji* also stipulates that even when sons have acquired office they have to be with their parents at least once in the morning and once in the evening during meals (*Liji* "Classic of Rites" 10.1, 4, 7, 10-11, 13-15). Van Voorst (1994, p. 151) echoes Legge's (1885, p. 449-457) comments on "The Actions of Filial Piety" in the *Liji,* that *xiao* (filial piety) signifies reverence (obedience) for living ancestors, and extends itself to the worship of dead ancestors. The "Book of Rites" goes into great detail in laying down the rules for proper filial conduct and stressing the qualities of deference, obedience and faithfulness to parents.

The opening passage of the *Liji* has implications still observed to this day, in that it places the stipulation of the precepts of filial piety in the hands of the ruler. This stipulation has two further implications. First, it articulates family rules that have been stipulated since the beginning of time by the sovereign and implies that the sovereign plays the role of parent to his subjects. Second, it suggests a hierarchy presented in the manner stated below:

> "The sovereign king orders the chief minister to send down his lessons of virtue to the millions of the people…". (see above, *Liji* "Classic of Rites")

This study argues that these implications position the concept of *xiao* (filial piety) as an instrument of government, rather than as a tool for merely stipulating the relations in a private family unit. Furthermore, it is argued that the redefinition of filial piety since Confucian times has laid a foundation for the establishment of an all-inclusive form of government, as witnessed in its current role in the shift from the ideals of the Chinese revolution to those of the current reforms of the PRC as elaborated later in the present chapter.

In the *Analects*, Confucius not only stresses the actions of filial piety as stipulated in the *Liji* "Book of Rites", but also emphasizes the attitude with which these acts are supposed to be carried out, stating that, "The attitude must be that of genuine reverence when practicing *xiao*

(filial piety)" (*Analects*, 2.5-8; 4.18-21; 13.18.). In stressing the importance of reverence when practicing filial piety, Confucius uses the example of the difference between the support of one's parents and the support humans give to animals:

> Tze-yu asked what filial piety was. The Master said, 'Filial piety nowadays means the support of one's parents. But dogs and horses likewise are able to do something in the way of support. Without reverence, what is there to distinguish the one support given from the other?' (*Analects*, 2.7)

This passage uses the difference between humans and animals to show the significance of the act of nurturing, that is, of nourishing the spirit. The idea of nurturing or giving care with reverence to aging parents features strongly in recent studies on the government's attempts at legislating filial piety in the PRC (Chou, 2010; Song, 2008; Wang, 2008). However, the notion of reverence is not the only dimension that Confucius emphasized; as he goes on to discuss a subject that until then had not been addressed in relation to filial piety. The new form of loyalty mentioned by Confucius, which stipulates that sons are to show total loyalty to their parents even if they have wronged society, has shaped the discussion of filial piety to this day. The conversation between the Duke of Sheh and Confucius in passage 13.18 of the *Analects* directly relates to this discussion:

> The Duke of Sheh informed Confucius, saying, 'Among us here are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father stole a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact'.
>
> Confucius said, 'Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this'. (*Analects*, 13.18)

This short passage has had a long influence in the history of China because it portrays the conflict of being filial to one's parents while at the same time showing loyalty to the sovereign, thereby giving rise to the question of what happens when the parent has wronged the emperor. Does the son act disloyally to the sovereign or unfilially towards his parents? In his later texts, Mencius addresses this question by explicitly condemning an emperor for not standing by his father in a time of difficulty and instead letting his father wander in distant shores (*Mencius*, Book, 1).

3.0.2 Definitions of filial piety by scholars of Chinese Studies

Knapp (2005, p. 3) defines filial piety as a value that is central to family life and states that the centrality of the family to Confucian politics made filial piety a lynchpin of the entire social order. The socialization of children through filial piety was reinforced by the larger culture of the state. Furthermore, commenting on the Yuan Dynasty texts *The Twenty-four Filial Exemplars* (Guo Jujing, 1260-1368), which were used from AD 100 until the 1949 CCP takeover of China to spread the meanings of filial piety among all social classes, Knapp points out that the enduring popularity of these texts was due to the effectiveness with which they illustrated the paramount cultural value of *xiao,* which has shaped nearly every aspect of Chinese social life, including attitudes toward authority, patterns of residence, conceptions of self, marriage practices, gender preferences, emotional life, religious worship and social relations. Knapp goes on to point out that, in fact, during the imperial age in China, good behavior was largely defined in terms of whether or not one was a filial son or daughter. Knapp concludes by stating that *xiao* (filial piety) has had such an extraordinary influence in Chinese culture that some students of Confucianism claim that the concept was and still is the basis of East Asian religiosity, a theme which is repeated several times in the late Ming scholars' discourses of filial piety. Chou (2010, p.3) defines filial piety in a similar manner as Ng (2000) in stating that historically, the family has been the source of support and care for elders. Chou's definition concludes by stating that filial piety, which entails respecting, obeying, pleasing and offering material and nonmaterial support to parents, has been a fundamental tenet in Chinese culture.

Although scholars of Chinese Studies have identified various meanings of filial piety, the idea of unconditional obedience and care for one's parents, including emotional care, is central to the definition of the term. However, what drives adult children to adhere to the rules stipulated in filial piety? Besides the fear of shame, which is usually cited as a motivation for adult children to take care of their parents, what other factors are involved in the practice of being a filial child? To answer this question, this chapter examines other traditional Chinese concepts that relate to filial piety for factors that may influence how individuals relate to the concept. This will also help provide a basis for the discussion of the late Ming scholars' discourses on filial piety and their interpretations of the *Xiaojing.*

The first concept relating to filial piety is expressed in the "Virtues of a Superior man" (*Analects* 14.1-6) from the "Confucian Ethics". The passage of "Virtues of a Superior man" was later connected to the theory of *liangzhe* 良知 (innate knowing) by Wang Yangming (1472–

1528), which has further convinced people of the innate power of filial piety. These two concepts are examined together to show the multidimensional features inherent in filial piety and may explain why this concept has been able to be reengineered and implemented without even being mentioned by name, as was the case during the Chinese revolution.

3.0.3 Ethics in Confucianism – Virtues of Superior Man

Van Voorst (1994) presents the Confucian views on the "Virtues of a Superior Man" as follows. Confucius taught the self-cultivation of knowledge and virtue, asserting that when one reaches moral and intellectual maturity, one becomes a superior man. Although the Chinese term for superior man *junzi,* generally means 'prince's son', Confucius taught that education could make even a commoner become a superior man. Neo-Confucianism applies these phrases to the closely related goal of becoming a sage (ibid., p. 151).[20]

There are two aspects worth observing in Van Voorst's account of Confucianism. First, the 'nobility term' *junzi* is reinterpreted to encompass a new kind of prince, the educated man. Here, a hereditary title is used to identify a social standing that is no longer reflective of a noble family, but an educated individual. Therefore, Confucius's definition of a 'superior man' uses a private feudal title to serve in the greater public sphere.

The definition of the "Virtues of a Superior man" in the Confucian sense also suggests that the reinterpretation of the title *junzi* (prince) was manifest in a vertical movement. In the Confucian sense, it is the educated scholar knights who become *junzi* and distinguish themselves from the common man, or *xiaoren*, who is identified in some classical texts as lacking the ability to become a *junzi* (Graziani, 2009). It is within the antipodal notion of *xiaoren/daren* (superior man/inferior man) that the limitations of the manifestation of *gong* are observed in the Confucian definition of the "Virtues of a Superior man". While the interplay between the notions of *xiaoren/daren* has persisted to the present era, it has been also opposed by the new doctrines and theories that have emerged over the course of Chinese history. For example, Wang Yangming's theory of *liangzhi* 良知 (innate knowing) states that all people have an innate capacity to

[20] The theme of *junzi* runs through the remaining chapters. Just as the term was borrowed from the princely title by Confucians during the Warring States to refer to a 'Superior man' during the Chinese revolution, it went through yet another transformation where its characteristics were used to describe *hao ganbu* 'good cadre'. In this study, the term *hao ganbu* is regarded as a continued expression and manifestation of *junzi* 君子, the 'Superior man', from the Chinese revolution.

separate good from evil and, therefore, are capable of learning and becoming virtuous men (Cua, 1982; Needham, 1986).

Besides the change in the signification of the term *xiaoren* (inferior man), other features of filial piety related to the "Virtues of a Superior man" continued to manifest throughout the Chinese revolution. For instance, bottom-up forms of obedience and the spirit of perseverance were prominent features of filial piety during the Chinese revolution. The way total obedience and perseverance connect to the explication of the "Virtues of a Superior man" is witnessed in the following passages from the *Analects:*

1.1 The Master said, 'Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and application? Is it not delightful to have friends come from distant quarters? Is he not a man of complete virtue, who feels no discomposure though men may take no note of him?'

1.2 The philosopher Yu said, 'Few are those who being filial and fraternal are fond of offending their superiors. There have been none, who, not liking to offend their superiors have been fond of stirring up confusion. The superior man bends his attention to foundation. That being established, all practice courses naturally grow up. Filial piety and submission – are they not the root of all benevolent actions?'

1.3 The Master said, 'Fine words and an insinuating appearance are seldom associated with true virtue'.

1.4 The philosopher Tsang said, 'I daily examine myself on three points: whether in transacting business for others, I have been faithful; whether, in dealings with friends, I have been sincere; whether I have mastered and practiced the instructions of my teacher'.

1.6 The Master said, 'A youth, when at home, should be filial, and away from home he should be respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and cultivate the friendship of good people." When he has time and opportunity, after the performance of these things, he should employ them in the arts'.

1.7 Tze Hsia said, 'If a man withdraws his mind from the love of beauty, and applies it as sincerely to the love of the virtuous; if in serving his parents, he can exert his utmost strength; if in serving his prince, he can devote his life; in his dealings with his friends, his words are sincere – although man may say that he has not learned, I will certainly say that he has'.

These passages from the *Analects* discuss different aspects of filial piety and are testimony of the central role it played in defining most aspects of conduct in ancient China. Filial piety seems to continue to be manifest as second nature in the social, political and educational fields of reform PRC. To put the above passages into perspective it is necessary to outline the successive historical processes of rationalization and internalization that preceded the actual take over by the new social systems and political doctrines starting with the fall of the Zhou dynasty and its 'advanced' ritual system, the *Zhou li.*

3.1.0 The Zhou dynasty

Examining the rise and collapse of the *Zhouli* provides a foundation for understanding a system that ushered in a dialogue that took 250 years to concretize. This exercise may help shed some light on why various ancient Chinese philosophical schools searched for solutions to the future in the rites established during the Zhou dynasty, the *Zhouli*. Here, it is suggested that the development of the process of rationalizing in ancient China is better understood by observing the collapse of the admired ritual system of the Zhou dynasty and the rise of the subsequent political doctrines. In this context, rationalization refers to the effort to find solutions to acute social problems by abstracting from the ideas of earlier, defunct or failing social systems and integrating radically new ideas into old ideas, thereby giving the latter ideas a new lease of life (Lagerwey, 2009). The process of rationalization thus involves synthesizing ideas and turning them into a new coherent social and political model (ibid.).

The ideology and legitimacy of the Zhou dynasty was expressed in terms of the Heavenly Mandate, *Tianming* (Perry, 2002). The Zhou dynasty legitimated its position by stating that the Heavenly Mandate had left the Shang because its kings had abandoned the Ways of Heaven (ibid.). The introduction to the *Tianming* ushered in a new theodicy which purported that any man of virtue had the right to rule, implying that the Heavenly Mandate was within the reach of any man of virtue (the notion of able man). Coupled with the rhetoric of the *Tianming*, the Zhou

Dynasty adhered to strict rituals which served to mark the unity, hierarchy and common identities of the ruling classes through blood sacrifices to Heaven and the Zhou ancestor *Houji*. Levi (2009) provides a detailed explanation of the ritual system of the Zhou, whose fall left room for the emergence of the Spring Autumn Period and the Warring States where ancient thinkers attempted in vain to emulate the system and spirit of the Zhou.

In *Early Chinese Religion*, Lagerwey (2009, p. 19) describes Levi's account of the Zhou as follows:

> Jean Levi uses an overarching religious explanation of the manner in which the multifarious Warring States changes occurred. Explication of the ceremony of the Zhou begins with the account of the 'Archaic system' of the Zhou, which summarized as 'the politico-cosmic structuring of society by means of sacrifice'. Jean Levi shows concretely what he means by an analysis of the sacrifice to Heaven and the 'cascade of leftovers': two red bulls were prepared for the sacrifice, one for Heaven and the second for the divine ancestor of the Zhou, *Houji*. The bull for Heaven was shot by the king, its blood presented as an offering, and the whole bull burned. The second bull, on the contrary, was cooked and then served to 'ever-widening' circles, with each successive group eating the meat left over by the preceding, hierarchically superior group. To be 'a meat eater' (*roushizhe*) thus meant having a fixed place in the sacrificial and kinship hierarchy – only kin could worship the common ancestor and, therefore, rule over the territory – and it meant being obliged to those above one, the source of one's meat. It was this perfect system whose 'rites collapsed and music decayed' in the Eastern Zhou (770-256 BCE).

Lagerwey (2009) further concludes that the collapse of the *Zhouli* was an inevitable result of the disintegration of the Zhou polity, in which power was based on kinship and the worship of the common ancestor provided the religious linchpin of society. However, the very precision and coherence of the system almost certainly explains why, in the period of transition to the bureaucratic empire, so many thinkers sought to extract from the system its ethical, aesthetic, and intellectual principles to create a system suitable to the new environment (ibid.).

3.1.1 The collapse of the *Zhouli*

The *Zhouli* evolved over a period of 250 years, during which time it developed codes of social behaviour and established norms for the family, groups and society. According to Sun (1997, p.

39), three central characteristics of *Zhouli* enabled it to serve as the main tradition of early China or, in other words, the rites of primitive Chinese clan society. First, during the Western Zhou (1100-771 BCE), the religious nature of these rites was reduced and a secularized corpus was introduced into the political and economic arenas. Second, a set of social and political institutions was developed, which constituted a social estate system that combined social and family order. Third, detailed oral and written regulations on everyday conduct were introduced at every level and within every institution of Chinese society (ibid). The *Zhouli* "rites" were also used by the king as a form of administration that functioned as a Chinese "constitution". In this sense, the rules of the *Zhouli* served as a guide to judge and for historical experience, and lost their power when the *Zhouli* was no longer followed and the sacrifices no longer offered.

Lagerwey (2009, p. 10) points out that the fall of the Eastern Zhou (770-256 BC) saw the rise of powerful peripheral states and the emergence of a new *shi* 士 class that had until then occupied the bottom rung of the aristocracy. He further points out that this was a time of political volatility and social mobility, when "the rites were in disarray, and music had collapsed". According to Constance Cook, this "caused a shift from historical to mythical founder deities and a focus on nature worship" (ibid.). This shift in political power was accompanied by other social factors, which provided a fertile growth for teachings that were more inclusive than those of the previous regime.

The emergence of the *Shi* 士 class also became a destabilizing factor for the once powerful *wu*, whose techniques had been universally feared, as they challenged the established techniques of self-cultivation (ibid., p. 13). Romain Graziani (2009) states that, "Self-cultivation presupposes without explicitly stating it a deep faith in human moral liberation and in the possibility of perfecting oneself". Importantly, the practice of self-cultivation provided a space for individual subjects to enact their own development and was no longer the reserve of the royalty. The rise of the *Shi* 士 class and their notion of self-cultivation not only challenged the definition of status and social meanings, but also resulted in an emphasis on expressions reflective of a clean break from the past weaknesses of the Eastern Zhou. For instance, Pines (2009, p. 10) points out that while the court scribes preferred ritualized reality over historical facts and hoped to preserve the deteriorating ritual order through their judgment of political actors, with the appropriation of the *Annals* by Confucius or his disciples, history writing bifurcates into "sacred" and secular traditions. As the new writings addressed living contemporaries rather than ancestors, the texts came to serve as guidelines for the wider

population and were interpreted as a politico-ethical commentary on the course of events (ibid., p. 11).

The introduction of texts that addressed the living facilitated processes of internalization which, in turn, translated into means through which rational principles were internalized in the form of rituals, the chanting of slogans and other forms of repetitive practice. That is, as a process of learning or knowing by practice. The terms that carried redefined and new meanings for the elite, spoke of ritual that was no longer about buying the assistance of the gods with sacrifices but about ethical training and socialization, which again is another instance of *gong* 公 (private) reigning over *si* 私 (private). Lagerwey (2009, p 15) points out that the self-cultivation that emerged as a vehicle for personal discovery and subjectivity during the Warring States differs from the Cartesian conceptions of mind and matter and intentionality that are central to the Western reflection on the self as an "autonomous agent", but irrelevant to the Chinese discovery of self as "a purely vital activity". As Lagerwey observes, the lack of separation between mind and body is central to the patterns of duality manifest in Chinese culture. While the self is advocated as an "autonomous agent" in the West, in China the self, *si* 私 (private), is an integral part of the many *gong* 公 (public) spaces and, as such, is a function of all the oppositions encountered in Chinese culture.

It is in the manifestation of the self *si* 私 (private) while abiding to ritual prescriptions that require subordination to the many *gong* 公 (public) that ethical dualism thrives. This statement is witnessed in the practice of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) which serves as a foundation of admissible relationships in Chinese society. Another such instance which is reflective of ethical dualism in the practice of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) is found in *Lunyu* (2.7) stipulating that serving one's parents without reverence (*bujing* 不敬) is not a moral action. This statement reflects the importance of separating the correct from the incorrect and reveals that *xiao* is to be understood as a complete combination of physical practice and spiritual reverence. In short, the practice of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) is not complete if not delivered with reverence. Here, the focus is on *jing* 敬 (reverence), which completes the act of being filial. That which lacks such reverence, *bujing* 不敬, does not qualify as having taken care of one's parents physical and spiritual needs.

The redefined terms and new meanings that emerged during the Warring States period were meant to ensure the proper ritual attitudes of fear, awe, yielding and reverence, and to help produce virtuous dispositions and channel behavior into non anti-social forms. The four ritual

attitudes fit the definition of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) at the time and perhaps to this day, in that they mark the continued lack of separation between the spheres of the self and the many and between the spiritual and physical.

3.1.2 Reverence, fear and grief as signifiers of the new theodicy

The implications of the three terms reflect the authentic manner of performing ritual and were crucial to the success of the emerging theodicy of the Warring States. Csikszentmihalyi (2009, p. 521) states that reverence, *jing* 敬, is the optimal spiritual attitude in ritual contexts and sacrificial contexts, while grief, *ai* 哀, is appropriate to funerals.[21] As each ritual is accompanied by a given set of attitudes, it is not the act of going through the motions that matters but the attitude that is demonstrated while carrying out the ritual.

During the Warring States period, the terms *wei* 畏 (fear or awe), *jing* 敬 (reverence) and *cheng* 诚 (sincerity or grace) not only related to the cultivation of the self, but also to distinguishing a 君子 (superior person) from the *xiaoren* 小人 (lesser person).This distinction should not be viewed in terms of the exclusion of a lesser man, but according to the logic of the emerging notion of self-determination that was later to evolve into Wang Yangming's theory of *liangzhi* 良知 (innate knowing). Csikszentmihàlyi (2009, p. 26) further describes this distinction by citing the following passage from the *Lunyu*:

> The gentleman 君子 in contrast to *xiaoren* 小人 (lesser person) is awed by three things; *tianming* 天命 (ordinances of Heaven), *daren* 大人 (great man) and *shengren zhiyan* 圣人之言 (words of sages). A 小人 (lesser person) does not recognize *tianming* 天命 (mandate) and so is not in awe of it, he is improperly familiar with great people, and he deprecates the words of the sages. *Lunyu* 16.8

Csikszentmihàlyi (2009, p. 527) concludes that if the rituals of the *dao* 道, *ci* 词, and other sacrifices to the ghosts and spirits are not carried out in a proper manner, then there will be neither sincerity nor gravity. This is why the gentleman is respectful, reverent, frugal, retiring, and yielding towards the ritual. Furthermore, the principles of reverence in relation to the proper conduct by a *junzi* 君子 (superior man) in opposition to that of *xiaoren* 小人 (lesser person)

[21] See *Lunyu* 3.26 and 19.1.

indicate that the concept of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) is foundational to stipulations of conduct that are framed by expressions of praise and blame. In the period that followed, the Chinese family model and *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) were again at the center of social change, witnessed during the introduction of Buddhism to China.

3.2.0 The role of Buddhism in China

The changes in the meaning of and attitude towards ritual witnessed during the Warring States seem to have occurred around the conceptual field of the Chinese family and its central guiding concept of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety). Despite their differences, Confucianism and Daoism agreed on the importance of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) in stipulating family relations and sustaining social order. However, the introduction of Buddhism transformed the meaning of this traditional Chinese concept. The concept of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) is examined in relation to the introduction of Buddhism to China to show the expanded use of the expression in articulating the Chinese value system and political doctrines. Just as the Confucian *shi* 士 class managed to redefine and expand the notions of *daren/xiaoren* 大人/小人 to include a cultivated/educated individual and borrowed the term *junzi* 君子 (superior man) to transform the position of the subject in society, Buddhism broke the traditional barriers and introduced new and more inclusive values into the Chinese system by focusing on the notion of *nei/wai*. John Kieschnik (2010, p. 15) points out that Buddhism brought values that were new to China and "made a number of enduring contributions to Chinese civilization, most prominently the doctrine of karma and rebirth, the practice of venerating icons, scriptures, and relics, and a vastly expanded pantheon". However, it is still not clear how Buddhism, a foreign teaching, managed to establish itself in a society based on 'family values' (Lagerwey, 2010, p. 15). This question offers an opportunity to examine how Buddhism succeeded in making the transition from *wai* 外 to *nei* 内, that is, in turning from a foreign teaching to a local religion which at times served as state religion.

The acceptance and the success of Buddhism in China was due to the fact it understood and accepted the values that were already in place and augmented them while making a strong foundation for its own teachings. There were two principal notions that Buddhism had to adhere to before establishing itself in China. First, the logic of the 'Son of Heaven' as the supreme spiritual and political being was dominant in China (Gang, 2010). The basic principle that religion should be subject to political control and should serve the interests of the state had not

varied throughout the preceding dynasties (Lagerwey, 2010, p. 5). Second, Buddhism had to adhere to the principle of *xiao* (filial piety), which helped to make the new teachings appear worthy in Chinese society. Nonetheless, the growing presence of Buddhism was both supported and opposed. Supporters praised Buddhism by arguing that the threat of spiritual punishment was a powerful encouragement to do good and pointing to its ability to provide "benefits in the nether world" (ibid.). Opposition groups, such as the Huan Xuan (369-404) of the Jin, opposed Buddhism's presence on the basis that it was "harmful to order and administration", "contaminates customs" and "uses the resources of the country" (ibid).

Another issue that bothered the opponents of Buddhism was the question of whether Buddhists ought to kowtow to the emperor, thereby demonstrating his superiority over Bhudda, who according to the basic principle of Chinese rule was inferior to the "Son of Heaven". The solution to this problem was devised by Faguo 法果 (fl. 396-409), who stated that the Emperor Daowu reflected the continuity of the basic principle in that he was "the 'living Tathagata' [Thus-come-one]" (Lagerwey, 2010, p. 6). This solution enabled the Buddhists to show their *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) as children to the sovereign or, in other words, their unquestioned loyalty to the Emperor and, thus, to gain acceptance into the Chinese realm.

Li Yuqun (2009, p. 18) states that the practice of the symbolic expression of the Emperor's supremacy can be witnessed in 460, when the great Yungang cave project was initiated by the Liangzhu meditation monk Tanyao. Li Yuqun states that, "By modeling the images of the Buddha on the Northern Wei emperor, he announced that the emperor was the Buddha of that age" (ibid). Elevating the Emperor to such a high spiritual level not only enhanced the powers of the 'Son of Heaven', but also served to place Buddhism in a favorable position among the rulers.

As to the question of how Buddhism handled the second principle of adhering to *xiao*, this was successful as Buddhism practice of *xiao* proved to be beyond that which was the norm in Chinese society. Lagerwey (Lagerwey, 2010, p. 37) comments that although a society created by "leaving the family", Buddhism avoided the label of *wuxiao* 无孝 (not filial) because in using the notion of *gongde* 功德 (merit) to protect the state, the people and those that had gone to the netherworld. As a result, Buddhism managed to bring together opposite ways of thought. What had started as two incompatible sides was slowly brought together using conformity acts founded in Chinese values and traditions. The combination of these two seemingly opposite systems, one founded around family values and the other founded in leaving the family, resulted in a unity that

helped consolidate the power of Buddhism in China. The final result is an example of a complementary dualism.

The unity of the opposites witnessed in the case of Buddhism's acceptance in China provided a space for the people and the elite to join because the new teachings proved to extend the practice of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) beyond what had been previously experienced in Chinese culture. Notably, Buddhism allowed individuals to leave the family home without the guilt of *wuxiao* 无孝. As Lagerwey (2010, p. 36) points out, becoming a Buddhist meant offering clear and volitional consent to becoming an obedient member of a like-minded community.

3.2.1 Control and freedom

Like all other teachings, Buddhism did not have power outside the purview of the political elite, let alone superiority to it. As Li Gang pointed out, the reunification of China led immediately to the reassertion of the dynastic control of religion (Lagerwey, 2010, p. 47). Throughout dynastic China, the control of Buddhism oscillated between two extremes. Li Gang recounts some of the hallmarks of the freedom and control of Buddhism during dynastic China, starting with when Yao Xing 姚兴 (r. 393–415) established an office for the clarification of Buddhist profundities. Later on, a system of imperial control of Buddhism was initiated in the south, under Emperor Wen (r. 424–54) of the Song. Lagerwey (2010, p. 6) points out that as the Sui and Tang extended their control, the "Buddhist administration was increasingly confined to management of temples". However, total control over religion was not possible, and different emperors tended to choose their favorite teachings. Therefore, while one emperor would declare Buddhism a state religion, another would later demote it and replace it with Daoism. The system of promoting and abolishing different teachings by demoting one as "illicit" (*yinsi* 淫汜) in favor of another, reflects the manifestation of two extremes through the promotion of the correct form of *zheng* 正 and the banishment of the other as evil, *xie* 邪.

Different teachings were consistently classified according to the *zheng/xie* 正/邪 opposition, which is proof of Gang and Lagerwey's arguments that religion in China was meant to serve the state and nothing else. Lagerwey (2010, p. 7) points out that while the interaction among the different teachings are portrayed with the emperor seated between the high gods of the two religions, the interaction was not free of slander from any side. The first and most remarkable instance of this slander is Liang Wudi's statement after converting from Daoism to Buddhism in the year 504:

> In confusion and error 迷荒, I once served Laozi. For generations this was transmitted, and I was influenced by this biased dharma 邪法. But not that the good emerges, I reject error and turn back 会迷近, I set aside old cures and return to the correct awakening 正醒: I make the vow that, in future, lads will renounce the secular life, propagate the doctrine of the scriptures 终教, and convert 化度 all sentient beings so that they together accomplish Buddhahood. I would rather drown in the evil paths of the right dharma 政法 than follow the teaching of Laozi and ascend temporarily to heaven. (Lagerwey, 2010, p. 8)

During the same year, it was decreed that of the 96 religious paths, only Buddhism was right 正, and all others were evil 邪. Li Gang provides another example of this religious slander by the Northern Qi Emperor Wenxuan (r. 550 – 60) who, after the Daoists had been ordered to shave their heads and become Buddhists, announced that, "The dharma gate is not dual; the true principle 真宗 is one".

According to Lagerwey (2010, p. 46), Buddhism brought a more inclusive system that engaged the elite and the masses in the process of salvation using scriptures that pronounced values that lay the foundation for a society based on *jiaoyuan* 教缘. The Buddhist contribution to China paralleled that of establishing a political family, which like the Confucians during the Warring States, relied on *xiao* 孝 as a foundation for establishing a much wider and more inclusive family connected through *jiaoyuan* 教缘 instead of blood relations (*xueyuan* 血缘) and locality (*diyuan* 地缘) (p. 50). Furthermore, Buddhism had a significant effect on the conception of the Chinese family, which further indicates the central role of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) and antipodal structures *nei/wai* 内/外 (inside/outside) and *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad) in the successive paradigm shifts in Chinese history. Lagerwey (2010) summarizes the influence of Buddhism in China by stating that, "Buddhism as something that happened to China: it steamrolled China, and when China stood up again, it was a radically different place" (p. 46). In conclusion, Buddhism was successful in China because its practices proved to be compatible with *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) and its introduction was a step further towards a more inclusive society. The concept of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) was yet to undergo another expansion as a tool of political legitimacy in the following paradigm shifts by the early Tang Dynasty emperors, a subject elaborated in the next section.

3.3.0 The Tang Dynasty move from the doctrine of *tianxia weijia* 天下为家 to that of *tianxia weigong* 天下为公

The early Tang dynasty emperors used the doctrine of *tianxia weigong* (Heavenly mandate for all) in seeking the legitimacy to establish a stronger empire and to administer the realm (Wechsler, 1985, p. 225) In using the maxim *tianxia weigong*, the early Tang dynasty emperors demonstrated a return to the practice of the Chinese mythical sage kings Yao and Shun, who had instituted a system of succession to the throne based on merit rather than inheritance. The main

goal of this exercise was to win the hearts and minds of the generals who served the Tang emperors in a bid to find efficient solutions for administering the ever-growing empire.

3.3.1 Formation of 'Political Families' during the early Tang Dynasty

The early Tang dynasty did not invent the doctrine of *gong,* which indicates a preference for a more inclusive form of government, as represented in the maxim *tianxia weigong.* The early Tang implementation of *tianxia weigong* borrowed from an ancient idea, which stipulated that the power of government was not limited to the few and that any capable 'virtuous' individual could become a ruler irrespective of hereditary titles. In seeking legitimacy, the early Tang dynasty moved away from the doctrine of power centered on the private family towards one based on a public and political family (Wechsler, 1985, p. 140). The concept as such comes from the Confucian canon, in the "Evolution of Rites" (Li-yun) section of the *liji* 礼记 *Book of Rites,* which reads:

> When the Great Way was practiced the world was shared by all alike [*tianxia weigong*, 天下为公]. The worthy and the able were promoted to office and men practiced good faith and lived in affection. Therefore, they did not regard as parents only their own parents, or as sons only their sons…. Now the Great Way has become hid and the world is the possession of private families [*tianxia weijia,* 天下为家]. Each regards his parents as only his own parents, as sons only his sons; goods and labor are employed for selfish ends. (Wechsler, 1985, p. 82)

The composition of this statement can be seen to rely on antipodal structures that are framed by the concept of the family and the field within which it manifests, that is, society and its practices. Accordingly, the Confucian canon provides evidence of the central role of family as a framework for establishing social systems and reveals that the rhetorical patterns discerned in the above extract were in existence long before the Tang dynasty, as the following analysis of the "Evolution of Rites" (Li-yun) section of the *liji* 礼记 *Book of Rites* intends to show.

3.3.2 Analysis of the move to an inclusive form of government using antipodal structures

Tianxia weijia vs. *Tianxia weigong*

In the above extract, the logic of *tianxia weijia* is placed in opposition to that of *tianxia weigong*, such that the "Great Way" is contrasted with the "Great Way become hid", a "Shared world" is contrasted with "possession of private families" and the parents and sons who belonged to all in society are said to have become a "belonging of oneself." The final implicit opposition is in the warning against regarding the self (interests) before the interests of the many, as expressed in the line "Goods and labor are employed to selfish ends". The oppositions employed in this extract reveal that the antipodal structure of *gong/si* (public/private) functions as a tool that helps in governing society using the family framework. Furthermore, the notions of unity and individual subordination to the will of the many not only express the benefits of collective action, but also delineate the consequences of not adhering to these notions.

3.3.3 *Nei/wai* 内/外 (inner circle/outer circle)

The analysis thus far has focused solely on one antipodal structure of *gong/si* and yet to discuss *nei/wai*, which can be regarded as superordinate to the former. This additional antipodal pair is important because although the family, as a concept, is manipulated through the use of the notion of *gong/si*, it is only within the antipodal structure of *nei/wai* that individuals are defined as members or non-members of this social unit. In addition to reflecting the required forms of behavior, as is the case with the antipodal unit *gong/si*, the antipodal structure of *nei/wai* functions first and foremost by providing subjects with identities or discarding them as non-subjects/beings. This function is what links an individual to a group or nation and it is for this reason that the antipodal structure *nei/wai* can be seen to link the previous paradigm shifts to the main subject of this study, Maoist discourse in general and the texts of the *Laosanpian* in particular.

The antipodal structure *nei/wai* plays a prominent role in the expressions that frame the logic of understanding the world in various texts of Chinese philosophy. For instance, *nei/wai* is manifest in two separate ways in the early Tang dynasty's implementation of the *tianxia weigong* doctrine. The first instance is that observed in the change of rituals and symbolic acts. As Wechsler (1985, p. 113) points out, where participation was previously limited to members of the dynastic family, it was now expanded to encompass a greater number and variety of participants. Moreover, the rituals that were previously linked to the dynastic house began to be manipulated for political ends, thus leading to political expediency prevailing over blind loyalty to family tradition (ibid., p. 225). In particular, the manipulation of the rituals led to the increase

of altar rites, as in early Tang times suburban altar rites came to play a central role in confirming imperial authority (ibid., p. 228-229).

The suburban altar rites were important to the manifestation of the concept of *nei/wai* in that they were not dedicated to the lineal ancestors of the dynastic founder, but to Heaven in the form of *Haotian Shangdi* and also to the gods of the earth, which were deities that belonged to the people in general rather than any specific family or class (ibid., p. 226). These altar rites were carried out in the open air, outside the capital, on grounds not exclusively associated with any one house (ibid., p. 227).

In short, in contrast to the rites in the ancestral temple, which were performed in the imperial compound and were thus exclusive to the members of the imperial family, the suburban altar rites were all-inclusive. In this sense, the creation of the suburban altar rites expanded the circle of *nei* to include the many that previously belonged to the *wai.* This suggests that the manifestation of *gong* also relies on the implementation of *nei*, reflects on the extension of the inner circle to accommodate the many. Wechsler (1985) observes that in regards to the changes in ritual practices, the notion of *gong* 公 (public) is used to express a spirit of magnanimity and cooperation that transcends the parochialism of family and kinship ties.

Another change that reflects the preference for an all-inclusive social system was the practice of burying loyal servants with their lords. Although this had long been a tradition in China, the early Tang emperors extended it beyond anything previously known (Wechsler, 1985, p. 228). During the early Tang dynasty, burials were prestige symbols manipulated as part of the normative power of a ruler. This practice reflected the extension of the family circle by including bonds beyond those of blood relations *xueyuan* 血缘， which originally united the dynastic family. This translated into widening the circle of *nei* to encompass those previously in the *wai,* resulting in what Wechsler calls a "political family" bound by a common interest, *jiaoyuan* 教缘.

The importance of granting meritorious generals a tomb in the imperial burial grounds, especially in the context of imperial China, lay in the fact that burial was seen to constitute one of the three foundational moments in the life of an individual, the others being birth and marriage (Baker, 1979, p. 39). Furthermore, in accordance with Chinese religion at the time, and perhaps to this day, to be buried in the imperial tomb was tantamount to being immortalized. This practice also recurred during the Chinese revolution, as is depicted in the texts examined in this study. In accordance with the precepts of *xiao* (filial piety) that stipulate reciprocity, the generals who were promised a burial in the imperial tomb and their families incurred an eternal debt to

their rulers. This obligation relating to the concept of *xiao* (filial piety) is discussed in the next chapter, during the analysis of the *Laosanpian*. First, however, is a discussion of the change in ritual during the Song Neo-Confucianism.

3.3.4 The change in ritual meanings – Antipodes and internalization

While Levi, Csikszentmihàlyi and Graziani focus on the changes in the ritual attitudes that gradually centered on the individual subject, Tillman (1992, 47) describes the virtues of a 'superior man' and the qualities that prevent people from acquiring *ren* 仁 (humaneness). Tillman explains that, "what is called the principle (理) of love is the mind of Heaven and Earth to give birth to things and that from which they are born and therefore, humaneness (*ren* 仁) is the chief of the four virtues and can also encompass them" (ibid). He identifies egoism, jealousy and cruelty as factors that block the manifestation of this primordial principle which gives birth to our world. He points out that in acquiring *ren* 仁 (humaneness), nothing is more important than overcoming the ego. Tillman (1994, p. 51) presents the ego alongside notions of 為 (interference), 私利 (personal advantage) and 慾 (desire) in opposition to those of 無為 (noninterference), 義 (rightness) and 理 (principle). The latter group represents the *shan* 善 (good) entities, which stand for the benefit of the many. The positioning of the idea of the ego, which translates to *si* (private) in opposition to *gong* 公 (expansive partiality or public), reflects the fact that the emerging teachings of the Warring States were meant as a move towards a more inclusive social system than those of prior dynasties. The tendency of placing *si* (private) in opposition to *gong* (public) in expressions for delineating social principles and admissible practice laid the foundations for contemporary China.

Reflecting on the 12th Century discussions on the opposition between selfishness, *si* 私, and expansive partiality, *gong* 公, Tillman points out that Lu Jiuyuan (1139–1192), who became known for powerful lectures, gave a famous speech at the Bailu Academy in 1181 in which he described 君子 (superior person) as a person who understood 义 (knowing what is right) in contrast to 小人 (lesser person) whose main concern is 利 (profit). In one of his stone inscriptions, Zhu Xi (1130 - 1200) advises against becoming a victim of selfish tendencies, as these leave people as perpetually lesser persons. The inscription reads, "I sincerely hope that you can deeply reflect about yourself, that you do not allow yourself to become a petty person, and

that you be fearful of the climate of advantage seeking and desires, and even come to despise it" (Tillman, p. 192).

The Daoist perspective provides an even broader platform for understanding the notion of 私 (private) as 恶 (bad) and 公 (public) as 善 (good), as witnessed in Lü Zuqian's description of the relation between the mind and the Dao, which states, "A mind outside of the Dao is not the mind, and a Dao outside of the mind is not the Dao" (Tillman, 1994, p. 123). Lü Zuqian goes on to explain that, "The 人心 (human mind) is the self-centered mind, if a person is self-centered, will be annoyed and ill at ease. The 道心 (Dao mind) is the good mind, the original mind… This is where to exert one's disciplined effort". This quotation introduces the inadmissibility of the private, which is described as 人心 (human mind) and the combination of the mind and the Dao (道心) as representative of the whole. Lü Zuqian not only describes good and bad in terms on private and public, but also defines individual well-being in relation to being good, stating that, "if a person is self-centered, he will be annoyed and ill at ease" (ibid).

In summary, the changes of attitude towards ritual during the time of the Warring States are reflected in the increased focus on self-cultivation as a way of distinguishing *xiaoren* 小人 (lesser person) from *junzi* 君子 (superior person) and for seeking a larger space and role for the individual subject in society. The Warring States era can be described as introducing a model of the family based on *jiaoyuan* 教缘 and focusing on the notions of *da/xiao* 大/小. The introduction of Buddhism to China was further extend the sphere of individual agency based enabling individuals to focus on the self while serving the many as in leaving the family home to engage in the practice of a greater good. The next section presents yet another instance where *xiao* (filial piety) is at the center of the search for solutions to a failing social system, in this case in the late Ming dynasty.

3.4.0 The Late Ming Dynasty discourse of *xiao* 孝 filial piety and the *Xiaojing*

Late Ming cosmic interpretations of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) and the *Xiaojing* 孝经

As described in Lü Miaofen's (2006) study of the religious dimensions of Ming scholars, the late Ming dynasty discourse on filial piety centers on the ideas of Yu Chunxi (1553–1621) and some of his contemporaries. Lü Miaofen's perspective offers another dimension of the manifestation of filial piety, as it treats the concept in relation to cosmological premises that attribute it with powers of creation and the suggestion that humans are derivatives of heaven and earth. Moreover, this perspective may help unravel an apparent mystery discerned in the metaphysical themes of the *Laosanpian,* where the protagonists of all three articles have departed to the netherworld.

During the late Ming dynasty, central power was weak and scholars began to engage in the search for solutions to help establish a functioning and harmonious society. Lü Miaofen (2006, p. 2) states that one group of scholars focused on reviving the *Xiaojing* and developing new ideas of filial piety. The scholars suggested that the decline in the moral standards was precisely because the teachings of the *Xiaojing* had been abandoned and the idea of filial piety needed to be reinterpreted to make it relevant to the then current conditions. Lü Miaofen further points out that the prominent late Ming scholar, Yu Chunxi, discussed and borrowed from ancient ideas and from various schools of thought, especially Daoism, Buddhism and Confucianism, in advocating the idea that filial piety was not only meant for stipulating family relationships, but was the source of all creation, the spirit which people could communicate with and the means of joining with the Dao. The idea of filial piety as the source of creation of heaven and earth and idea that people were a derivation of the first creation were held by the majority of prominent scholars in the late Ming dynasty.

Lü Miaofen refers to the omnipotent position the late Ming scholars attributed to filial piety as a cosmological reinterpretation of the concept, which had previously only served for stipulating family relationships and their inherent obligations. He further points out that in terms that resonated with the Apocrypha of the *Xiaojing* (*Xiaojing Wei*), Yu Chunxi stated that filial piety existed in the chaos (*hundun*) before the division of *yin* and *yang*. In this sense, filial piety was seen as the great principle (*da yi*) of the cosmic creative force:

> Filial piety was in the midst of chaos. From it heaven was born; so,
> Heaven bears the principle of filial piety. From it earth was born; so,
> Earth bears the principle of filial piety. From it human beings were born; so,

> human beings bear the principle of filial piety.
> Because [filial piety] is eternally luminous, it is called the constant method
> of heaven. Because it is perpetually beneficial (afforded by earth),
> accord with all under heaven; it is called the practical duty of man.
> In sum, filial piety is the constant and unchangeable in heaven and
> Earth; it is the great method (*da fa*) which has neither beginning nor end; it is the innate knowing (*liangzhi*) inherent in all human beings (ibid.). (Lü, 2006, p. 6)

Lü Miaofen (2006, p. 7) points out that the above extract has a close resonance to Daoism and other popular religions in the late Ming era. The extract suggests that filial piety is extended into an all-encompassing cosmological concept, to which there is no life or practice outside it. This may imply the manifestation of inclusive (*gong*) over exclusive (*si*) practice, as also witnessed in the Ganying chapter of the *Xiaojing*, which states that:

> "Perfect filial piety and fraternal duty reach to and move the Spiritual intelligences and diffuse their light on all within the four seas. They penetrate everywhere". (ibid)

In his interpretation of the *Ganying* chapter, Yu Chunxi quoted many popular stories about the sympathetic resonance between the spirit and the common people, due to their sincere filial piety. According to the late Ming dynasty scholars, the *Xiaojing* is interpreted with the aim of showing the all-encompassing powers of filial piety, whose spirit is not the reserve of a select few but is a domain that is accessible to all. The difference between Yu Chunxi's interpretation of filial piety and those of other previous texts is commented on by Lü Miaofen, who states that texts such as "*Twenty-four Filial Exemplars*" do not regard the spiritual benefits as being achievable through the practice of filial piety or that ordinary people can reach the spirit through their own actions. The reason for this omission may be that the "*Twenty-four Filial Exemplars*" was written according to the logic of the *Liji* "Book of Rites", that is, as orders from the sovereign stipulating the behavior of his subjects. These orders did not include the notion of self-cultivation or that of 'innate knowing'.[22]

[22] See the sections on the notion of total obedience, as stipulated in the *Liji* "Classic of Rites" 10.1, 4, 7, 10 – 11, 13-15, in the present chapter,.

Based on the premises discussed above, the work of Yu Chunxi can be regarded as an insurrectionary manifestation that reflects the antipodal structure of *gong/si* and, thereby, opens new spaces for practice, which are based on an inclusive doctrine as opposed to an exclusive one. Although Yu Chunxi did not explicitly mention the antipodal structure *gong/si* in his writings, Lü Miaofen observes that he, "downplayed the role of the emperor to emphasize that all humans irrespective of status had the ability of reaching the Spirit (of the *Dao*) through their own acts" (Lü, 2006, p. 7). The next section examines the thoughts and contributions of other Late Ming scholars that helped augment Yu Chunxi's ideas and his interpretations of the *Xiaojing* and *xiao*.

3.4.1 Luo Rufang (1515–1588)

Luo Rufang was a member of the *Lixue* School during the late Ming dynasty. His relevance to the ideas of Yu Chunxi start with his connection to the theory of 'innate knowing', where he proposed that one should follow the natural responses of the mind (Lü, p. 22). Luo Rufang's ideas are reflected in his understanding of the natural affections of filial piety, namely fraternal and parental love (*xiao di ci*), as a manifestation of innate knowing or human nature endowed by heaven (Lü, p. 23). Like Yu Chunxi, Luo Rufang understood filial piety to be a universal power responsible for the conduct of the Heavens, as expressed in the passage below:

> The mandate of heaven is never-ending. It continually engenders.
> [The bloodline] is passed down from parents, to oneself and on to
> one's sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons, and great-great-grandsons.
> Parents, brothers, and all descendants embody this ever-lasting heavenly mandate, And this mandate is the quintessence of filial piety, and fraternal and parental love (*xiao di ci*). From a diachronic perspective, this relationship links the ancient past to the present; from a synchronic perspective; it constitutes families, the state and all institutions under heaven. (Lü, p. 24)

These ideas helped to accentuate Yu Chunxi's views on filial piety although, as Lü Miaofen (2006, p. 25) points out, Luo Rufang did not call filial piety the Spirit. Rather, he spoke of filial piety as equivalent to *Dao*. Moreover, although Luo Rufang did not say that filial piety existed before the cosmic creation, he did view filial piety as a natural law ascribed to all human beings. If Luo Rufang did not explicitly connect his ideas to the *Xiaojing*, his disciple Yang Qiyuan

accomplished the task and, in the process, carried out an analysis that further helped to cement Yu Chunxi's ideas on filial piety.

3.4.2 Yang Qiyuan (1547–1599)

Yang Qiyuan was a famous late Ming scholar. His ideas on filial piety and emphasis on the *Xiaojing* texts brought him closer to Yu Chunxi. Like Yu Chunxi, he believed that the Spirit could be attained by reciting the *Xiaojing* text, no matter one's social status. He claimed that the *Xiaojing* was more effective than the Buddhist and Daoist texts, and it may therefore be deduced that he regarded the *Xiaojing* as a religious text (Lü, 2006, p. 27). In this sense, Yang Qiyuan departs from Yu Chunxi's analysis by using the concept of filial piety and the *Xiaojing* to support the ideal of not killing (ibid.), which sets him and his work apart from the rest of the Ming scholars of that time. Yang Qiyuan does not only focus on the creation, as do the rest of his contemporaries, but also the preservation of creatures (ibid.). What further sets Yang Qiyuan and his work apart from his fellow Ming scholars are his efforts to synthesize the Three Teachings based on the themes found in the *Xiaojing* (ibid.). In this sense, Yang Qiyuan's ideas seem to reveal the extent to which other schools of thought influenced the Confucianism scholars of the late Ming dynasty. Moreover, during this period, although the Confucians remained true to their school of thought, they nevertheless welcomed ideas that helped establish order and harmony in society. Notably, Wang Yaming's theory of *liangzhi* (innate knowing) had an important influence on the ideas of the late Ming scholars.

3.4.3 Wang Yangming (1472–1528)

Wang Yangming is a Ming Neo-Confucian philosopher whose two main philosophical concepts are innate knowledge and knowledge as action. This section focuses on the concept of innate knowing in conjunction with the discussion of filial piety. Wang Yangming developed the idea of innate knowing from the then mainstream Neo-Confucianism of Cheng-Zhu, arguing that every person knows from birth the difference between good and evil, stating that such knowledge is intuitive rather than rational (Lü, 2006, p. 24). Wang Yangming's revolutionary idea played a central role in the interpretation of filial piety among the late Ming scholars. The practice of filial piety was seen to be embodied in the innate knowledge of the precepts of Chinese culture, which according to Wang Yangming should come naturally to individuals. The theory of innate knowledge became so influential that in many late Ming dynasty interpretations

of the *Xiaojing*, the term *liangzhi* "innate knowing" was used as a synonym for filial piety (Lü, 2006, p. 13). The concept of innate knowing served as both the base and the goal for learning. The claim of individual innate capacities for practicing filial piety also served as both the base and the goal for learning in general. In this regard, the concept of innate knowing can be seen to persist in the political maxims of the present PRC and in the manner in which individuals engage with them in society.

3.4.4 *Liangzhi* 良知 'Innate knowing'

The difference between the reengineering of ideas by the late Ming scholars and that by the CCP during the Yan'an revolutionary era stems from the fact the CCP fails to mention the very concepts and structures the Party relies upon for achieving change, unless when criticizing. During the Yan'an revolutionary era, filial piety was instead dealt a blow under the umbrella rhetoric condemning backward and inhibiting Chinese traditions. Similarities between the works of the late Ming dynasty scholars and the *Laosanpian* can be found in their reliance on a traditional concept that escaped condemnation during the Chinese revolution, 'innate knowing' and 'knowledge as practice'. The two concepts which reveal congruency to the ideal of combining abstract knowledge and physical labor were heavily relied upon as a tool for lifting the political consciousness of the cadres and the general members of the Party.

3.5.0 Via the revolution to an inclusive imperial state

The ideas by Yu Chunxi and his contemporaries discussed above were not novel, as similar thoughts on filial piety can be found in the arguments concerning the *Xiaojing* traditions in the Han and Six Dynasties (Lü, 2006, p. 20). Numerous texts indicate that the *Xiaojing* was used as a religious text, such as when people recited the text for curing diseases or buried the text with the dead. The few studies that do mention the *Laosanpian* also point out that these texts were treated religiously and that people recited from them day and night (Heng & Shapiro, 1983, p. 178; Yan, 2000, p. 198; Liu, 2010, p. 22).

The pragmatism manifest during the Chinese revolution and the combination of diverse ideas became a de facto modus operandi when the Party sought solutions for liberating the people. Similar tendencies, albeit in different forms, are discernible during the previous

paradigm shifts in Chinese history.[23] Lü Miaofen (2006, p. 20) makes a similar observation in commenting that Yu Chunxi's discourse on *Xiaojing* is a wonderful example of the pragmatism and populism of late Ming culture. The next section discusses the link between the late Ming dynasty scholars' interpretations of the *Xiaojing,* filial piety and the texts of the *Laosanpian.*

3.5.1 The relationship between the *Xiaojing* and filial piety and the texts of the *Laosanpian*

The late Ming dynasty scholars' discourse on the *Xiaojing* and filial piety expressed lofty ideals of an egalitarian society in which all people had the capability to be one with the Dao and the ability to evoke the Spirits. Moreover, the arguments of the late Ming scholars seem to suggest that adhering to filial piety is the prerequisite to life itself, as life without such piety lacks the essence of what is human.

The rhetoric of essentialism suggested in the description of filial piety as the creator of heaven and earth and as essential to human life is repeated, albeit in a different manner, during the Chinese revolution. For instance, the notion of being filial to the parent figure is a constant theme in all three texts of the *Laosanpian*. In the text, "Serve the People", Zhang Side is depicted as having a father son relationship with the Party. In the last tale, "The Old Foolish Man who Moved Mountains", the theme of a father figure leading his offspring into action and the reliance on his offspring in carrying on with the task at hand even after his demise, is the driving force of the text. Given the apparent similarity between the late Ming dynasty scholars' interpretations of filial piety and the manner in which the concept was treated during the Yan'an revolutionary period, the focus now turns to the relationship between filial piety and the demands of reform PRC and its relationship to the texts of the *Laosanpian*.

[23] 'Pragmatism' is used in this study as an ad hoc term when referring to the mixture of Chinese traditional forms of knowledge and decision making as influenced by *Daoism,* Buddhism and Confucianism, coupled with imported Communist and Western theories, all of which were at play during the Chinese revolution.

3.6.0 The influence of filial piety in reform PRC

Implicit and explicit manifestations of filial piety

Filial piety seems to have two main types of influence in the PRC today. First, it has implicit effects that are embedded in the centralized hierarchical society of the PRC, where each and every work unit functions within the family framework. Second, it has explicit manifestations that can be observed in the teaching of filial piety in schools and through media broadcasts (Cheung & Kwan, 2009; Shiwowang, 2008, p. 5, cited in Chou, 2010).

Establishing filial piety as a working concept in reform PRC has proven to have several identifiable foundations, the first being the promulgation of laws that use the concept, second, the grassroots efforts to use traditional structures in remote communities to solve local disputes in today's rapidly changing China and, third, the grassroots initiatives for solving the problem of senior citizens' social welfare with government support, as witnessed in the case of the Feeding Scheme Agreement, hereafter referred to as the FSA (Chou, 2010). The FSA also serves as an example for showing the government's further attempts at legislating filial piety. In regard to the legislative tendencies that relate to filial piety, Ikels (1996, p. 107) points out that in China, the Inheritance Law (1985) allows a testator to leave property to whomever he or she wishes, subject only to the provision that disabled dependents be left with a requisite share. However, while the law is in place, as it lacks references relating to the concept of filial piety, it has been hard to follow. Ikels (1996) comments that although laws have been introduced in an attempt to change the mind-set of the people, the cultural understanding that inheritance reflects the level of support persists in Chinese society. Further legislative changes that have attempted to promote the logic of filial piety are "The Marriage Law of 1981" and the "Law on Protection of the Rights and Interests of Older Persons 1996". As Chou (2010, p. 5) points out, these are all clearly a mandate for supporting children's legal responsibility for their parents, that is, the practice of filial piety. In some cases, such as the FSA, the government is required to follow and support the initiatives of individual communities.

3.6.1 The FSA as an example of a grassroots government joint-venture

The FSA was developed in Dafeng, Jiangsu Province, in the mid-1980s. Government promotion has helped spread the use of the FSA in rural areas. FSAs are now appearing in cities, although they are not yet widespread (Chou, 2010, p. 11). Chou goes on to state that as a voluntary contract between aged parents and adult children concerning parental provisions, the FSA

represents a major innovation and concerted effort by central and local governments to meet the challenge of providing support for the rapidly increasing elderly population (ibid.). The FSA is representative of a grassroots initiative that is supported by the central government and although it is taken as a voluntary scheme, it states that those who violate its terms are punishable by law (ibid).

3.6.2 Why governments support filial piety schemes and programs

Guo and Cai (2009) point out that if the concept of filial piety lacked potency, in purely fiscal terms the government might have opted for raising taxes to cope with the aging population. Instead, however, the government chose to legislate a concept that is embedded in the minds of the population and its success can be discerned by the fact the FSA is currently spreading like wildfire. The success of the FSA may be viewed as reflecting the continued influence of traditional concepts on Chinese society. Finally, in sum, the evidence presented in chapter suggests that as long as filial piety continues to be manifest, either in its original or adapted forms and whether solving regional or national crises, its appeal and strongest features are those embedded in the antipodal structures that continue to shape the people and social order of the PRC.

3.7.0 Summary of antipodal structures in filial piety

The central thesis and arguments of Yu Chunxi and his contemporaries reveal a subject rarely dealt with in the PRC, that is, the religiosity inherent in the structures that serve as the foundation for articulating the current political and social doctrines. The current legal regulations and individuals' compliance with the rules of the orthodox doctrine also indicate the continuous manifestation of filial piety. The testimony to this observation is the exercise of using filial piety, albeit implicitly, as a foundation for both the rhetoric and the rationale for carrying forward the Chinese revolution. The explicit use of filial piety is witnessed in the government's efforts to legislate filial piety to establish a platform of social welfare for the fast growing elderly population. Thus far, the discussion of filial piety has focused on the historical trajectory of the concept and its role during the various paradigm shifts that have occurred throughout Chinese history. The next chapter examines how the concept is used to rationalize the establishment of a new China during the Chinese revolution through the texts of the *Laosanpian*.

Chapter Four – The construction of Power from Yan'an to Beijing

4.0.0 The presentation and analysis of the *Laosanpian*

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the foundations and characteristics that have enabled Maoist discourse to maintain its staying power from the Yan'an era to the present reform PRC. The chapter examines the *Laosanpian* 老三篇 "Three Old Essays", which comprises the texts "In Memory of Norman Bethune" (1939), "Serve the People" (1944) and "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains" (1945). Concepts from the performative and practice theories and the idea of antipodal structures are used to argue that the Maoist discourse presented in the *Laosanpian* continues to articulate the ideals of the orthodox doctrine of reform PRC.

4.0.1 Presentation of the *Laosanpian* 老三篇 "Three Old Essays".

Presenting and examining the *Laosanpian* is a challenge because, unlike the rest of Mao's political essays and articles, this text has received limited scholarly attention, except for passing mention in a handful of studies in reference to the texts' place on the periphery of some central historical events (Heng & Shapiro, 1983; Apter & Saich, 1994, p. 77-78; Liu, 2010, p. 22; Mittler, 2012, p. 198-249). Here, however, it is argued that the *Laosanpian* can be seen to have played a central role in the majority of the historical events that have taken place since the establishment of the PRC, during which time the text has enjoyed high visibility in the corridors of political power and has been popular with the masses. The *Laosanpian* was published after the 1959 *Lushan* Conference and just before the Cultural Revolution. The stories and meanings contained within the text are more intricate than what is currently known to the world outside the PRC. In the past, the *Laosanpian* has variously been referred to as a weapon of struggle for Lin Biao, as representative and the core of Mao's thought, as a catalyst for the personality cult of Mao Zedong and as a tool for the propaganda of the Cultural Revolution (Yan, 2000; Yao, 2010).

Since its inception, the *Laosanpian* has presented consistent themes that have stood the test of time and the tribulations of the PRC's various political and social movements (Yan, 2000, p. 204). The following historical account presents the *Laosanpian* as part of the canon of Chinese political discourse, the 'magna carta' of China's political and social ideals of building a united and an independent nation. In the process, the ups and downs of the *Laosanpian* within the Chinese political arena are examined. The three individual texts have prior and after the *Laosanpian* collection featured in all of the five paradigm shifts/political movements since the

1940s, namely, the establishment of the PRC; the 1950s' the Great Leap Forward; the 1959 Lushan Conference; the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and the onset of the reform of the PRC (Liang & Shapiro, 1983; Yao, 1998; Mittler, 2012). What is the power behind the *Laosanpian*? Is it to be found in the folktale structure of its individual pieces? Is its power inherent in its advocating the ideal of a national family, or in the promises that are weaved in the tapestry of the traditional fables and allegories? Or is it simply that the text continues to be relevant to the people of the PRC because of the potential benefits it carries for the individuals it addresses and who in turn engage with it? This chapter addresses these questions by unpacking the *Laosanpian* into recognizable packages to help elucidate its power and the culture from which it originates.

4.1.0 A historical account of the *Laosanpian*

Laosanpian comprises the essays "In Memory of Norman Bethune" (1939), "Serve the People" (1944) and "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains" (1945), written and delivered by Mao Zedong during the Yan'an period.

In 1938, Dr. Bethune 白求恩, a member of the Canadian communist Party, came to China to assist in the anti-Japanese war. He was stationed in the mountains of Yan'an, where he operated on wounded soldiers, until he died of blood poisoning in 1939. It was on the occasion of his funeral that Mao read the article *Jinian* Bai Qiu'en 纪念白求恩 "In Memory of Norman Bethune". In his speech, Mao urges the Red Army, cadres and all CCP members to learn from Dr. Bethune's spirit of selflessness, hard work and internationalism. Mao concluded that this was the spirit of communism, interpreted here as a bond in common belief, *jiaoyuan* 教缘, which transcended all borders and was stronger than blood family ties, *xueyuan* 血缘. In 1944, Zhang Side 张思德, a Red Army soldier, died in an accident when a kiln he worked on crumbled. Mao ordered that he be brought to the base for burial. During Zhang Side's funeral, Mao read the essay, "Serve the People". In his speech, Mao introduced the Party and the two Red Army battalions, explaining that Zhang Side was a member of the Party and the army. Mao followed by defining and classifying death into two types, condemning death in the service of the oppressors while praising that which occurred in benefitting the people. Mao went on to explain the mission of the CCP and the Chinese revolution, in the process pointing out that the Party welcomed criticism from everyone, including non-Party members, and concluded by stating that in a revolution it was not possible to avoid sacrifice but unnecessary sacrifice was to be avoided.

On June 11, 1945, during the closing session of the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Mao delivered a speech and used the allegory, Yugong Yishan 愚公移山 "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains", to express the spirit with which the Chinese people should persevere in the struggle for independence. In the speech, Mao praised the achievements of the congress and the strides the revolution had made. Mao urged cadres to go back to their areas and teach the masses about the resolutions of the congress. Mao went on to use the two mountains in the allegory, "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains", to predict the fall of the imperialist countries and the nationalist government of the KMT. In the speech, Mao ensured the Chinese people that perseverance and sacrifice were the prerequisites for the triumph of the Chinese Revolution.

4.1.1 *Laosanpian's* rise to the center-stage of the Cultural Revolution

During the 1959 Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai fell out of favor with the central committee for criticizing Mao's policy of the Great Leap Forward (Li and Lok, 1995, p. 227; Yan, 2000, p. 226). Lin Biao took over from Peng Dehuai to lead the Central Military Commission. Immediately after taking his position as military leader, Lin Biao began to favor a more political and ideological education for the army (ibid., p. 227). Shortly after, he proclaimed that the *Laosanpian* was a shortcut to the study of Marxism, Leninism and the thought of Mao Zedong and advocated for the military to study these documents as part of their political education (Li and Lok, 1995; Yan, 2000, p. 200). He stated that 99% of studying Marxism-Leninism consists of studying the thought of Mao (ibid., p. 226). Lin Biao came up with the slogan, "Mao Zedong's Thought, the highest peak of Marxism-Leninism in modern times" (ibid.). It was also at the Lushan Conference that Deng Xiaoping opposed the claim by Lin Biao that all of Mao's thought was embodied in the *Laosanpian* and that it provided a good understanding of Marxism. Deng Xiaoping repeated the same statement during the Third Session of the Tenth CPC Central Committee, on the occasion of redefining and evaluating Mao's thought (see "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982", p. 55).[24]

Lin Biao's proclamation promoted the reading of the *Laosanpian* first within the army and later, during the Cultural Revolution, by the masses in their *tiantian du* 天天读 (everyday

[24] See details of the Lushan Conference for background circumstances surrounding the demotion of Peng Dehuai and the rise of Lin Biao in the: *40 Years of Chinese Communist Party Rule*, p. 247. 第 1 版. 北京: 光明日报出版社 : 新华书店北京发行所发行; Beijing : Guang ming ri bao chu ban she : Xin hua shu dian Beijing fa xing suo fa xing 1989.

study sessions) (Liang and Shapiro, 1983, p. 175; Li and Lok, 1995 p. 226; Yan, 2000, p. 198; cf. Guo, Song, and Zhou, 2006). During the Cultural Revolution, the *Laosanpian* became compulsory reading for everyone in China. Some people memorized the whole text, while the illiterate memorized and recited key phrases (ibid.) Instructions on how the *Laosanpian* was to be studied were published in print and in phonograms (Yan, 2000, p. 200). During the Cultural Revolution, two more texts were added to the *Laosanpian* and it was referred to as *Laowupian* (Li and Lok, 1995 p. 227). Nevertheless, the *Laowupian* and the additional texts were short lived, as the original *Laosanpian* continued to enjoy popularity. To this day, people can still be heard mentioning the *Laosanpian*, while nothing is heard of the *Laowupian*.

During the Cultural Revolution, the *Laosanpian* made further inroads into the political and educational institutions. One such example was when the *Laosanpian* became part of the school curriculum along with other writings by Mao. At primary school level, years 1-3 read from the quotations of Mao Zedong and years 4-6 read from the *Laosanpian* (Li and Lok, 1995 p. 226; Yan, 2000, p. 198). The presence of the *Laosanpian* in the schools during the Cultural Revolution reflective of the patterns discerned during this study are confirmed by Maguer (1974, 44, 47) who points out that the "ununiformed education when the schools resumed in 1967, in provinces and municipalities but the teaching of the *Laosanpian* was guaranteed from kindergarten when it was based on pictures and continuing to the higher levels when the method of instruction became more and more complicated."

Since the Cultural Revolution, although more material has been added to the school history curriculum, the *Laosanpian* has continued to be part and parcel of history education (see "People's Education Publishers", 2010).[25] The text "Serve the People" is the most read text of the *Laosanpian* at primary school level.[26] The allegory "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains" has also been published in its original form in children's books, minus the comments from Mao. This version is read all over the country, and continues to maintain a strong connection to the *Laosanpian*. The essay "In Memory of Norman Bethune" has been repeatedly published by different institutions since 1957. The 60th Anniversary of the PRC has seen a new wave of publications of "Serve the People" and "In Memory of Norman Bethune", with the latter gaining a firm footing within popular culture. The publication of the individual texts of the

[25] This conclusion was reached after reading the "People's Education Publishers – Ten Sets of Publishing History" (2010) see Appendix 2. In combination with the archive records of the primary and secondary school textbooks published materials, see Table 5 in Chapter 5 of the present study.
[26] See Appendix 3 - A list of early publications of the *Laosanpian*.

Laosanpian in school textbooks started in 1950 and continues to this day, as demonstrated by the figures presented in Chapter Five.[27] Next section is an account of the only study that dedicates itself to the analyses of the *Laosanpian* by Yan (2000)

4.1.2 Replication of the Yan'an Movement

"A Critical Analysis of Three of Mao' Early Essays" Yan (2000) examines the *Laosanpian* asking the questions as to why were the texts promoted during the Cultural Revolution and how they were made relevant to the masses and to the revolution. On the first question Yan suggests that Mao sought to replicate the successes of the 1930s and 1940s revolutionary period when the Party managed to mobilize the masses for the common goal (p. 200). Yan suggests that the turmoil and failures of the Great Leap Forward is one of the reasons that saw Mao sought to establish the Cultural Revolution in an attempt to save his position as the supreme leader and the *Laosanpian* came in as suitable texts for mobilizing the masses to his ideology (ibid.).

Yan (2000, p. 201) points out that the Cultural Revolution movement and the *Laosanpian* were made relevant to the masses through Mao's use of the logic of a family-centered value system as the foundation of Chinese society. Yan further points out that throughout the *Laosanpian*, Mao implicitly defines a non-traditional idea of the family that is based on a common belief in communism. In addition Mao used the notion of ancestor worship for making the messages of the *Laosanpian* more appealing to the Chinese people (ibid.). Yan states that the widespread of ancestor worship among the Chinese people with its notion of reciprocity between the living and the dead, where the living must worship the dead by making offerings ritualistically would encourage many young Chinese individuals to devote themselves selflessly to the revolutionary cause given the possibility of being immortalized (ibid.). Such logic is derived from the observation that it was a common practice in China to deify the meritorious and worship them ritualistically (Hsu, 1970).

Yan (2000) analyses conclude by suggesting that because of the nature of the Cultural Revolution, the people in China have grown weary of politics, and thus the lack of support and failures of uprisings that seek to establish democratic reforms. The above analyses help lay foundations for further research but its conclusions seem to imply that the *Laosanpian* is no longer manifest and that it belongs to the past, exactly the opposite to the thesis of the present study which argues that the *Laosanpian* persists and plays an important role in implementing the

[27] See Table 5.

reform PRC policies. While Yan were limited his study to pointing at the reasons why and how the *Laosanpian* was promoted and made relevant to the masses, this study examines the foundation of the reasons he cites and the logic upon which traditional Chinese concepts impact performatives that serve to articulate the Chinese value system and the orthodox doctrine. In a sense the present analysis expands on Yan's (2000) introductory study of the *Laosanpian* only this time the focus is on examining the themes, the use of *xiao* (filial piety), the use of *chengyu* (four-character idioms) and antipodal structures that frame the texts.

4.1.3 *Laosanpian's* fall from political center-stage

On July 21 1977, Deng Xiaoping spoke at the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party on the topic of "'Mao Zedong's thought' must be correctly understood as an integral whole". This was the first step towards removing Maoist discourse from the center stage of politics. Deng Xiaoping stated that:

> Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought constitute the guiding ideology of our Party. 'Mao Zedong's thought' has sprung from and developed Marxism-Leninism. But Lin Biao negated Mao Zedong's thought by saying that it was fully embodied in the 'three constantly read articles'. He even severed Mao Zedong's thought from Marxism-Leninism. This was a gross distortion of Mao Zedong's thought and most detrimental to the cause of the party and socialism in China and to the cause of the international communist movement. (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982, p.55)

Deng's move was an attempt at distancing the CCP from the stigma of the Cultural Revolution, a task that could not be accomplished using the old definitions of Mao's thought, with its solipsistic claim to understand the world (Fewsmith, 2010, p. 232). Removing the *Laosanpian* from the center of formal politics helped to signal the beginning of a new era. The exercise of sidestepping the *Laosanpian* enabled the texts of the collection to be independently routinized by professionals from diverse fields and specialties. The formal rebuking of the *Laosanpian* as the center-piece of Mao's thought does not seem to have influenced the public's use of the texts, as witnessed by its continued use in diverse fields of society to the present day. Moreover, this officially rebuked collection of texts continues to influence the implementation of the current

reform policies. The next section briefly discusses how the *Laosanpian* has been preserved in both its institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms.

4.1.4 Manifestation of the values of the *Laosanpian* during the reform era

The *Laosanpian* continues to exert its influence in all fields of reform PRC, albeit in a different manner than in the pre-reform era. First, while in the past the collection was published as one unit, today the individual texts are treated separately. Second, in the past, the texts inundated the entire public sphere, while today they are manifest within specialized fields such as in education, the legal system and various government institutions, as shown in Chapter Five. However, as in the pre-reform era, the maxim "Serve the People" continues to be used to articulate the principles of the PRC. The individual texts of the *Laosanpian* are also included in the primary and middle schools textbooks materials.[28] The setting up of a "folklore database" by the ministry of culture in Beijing to collect materials from the revolutionary period, such as folk songs and poems relating to the Chinese revolution, has provided a new platform for appreciating the *Laosanpian* as part of the "National Intangible Heritage".[29]

The instances referred to above reflect the institutionalized forms of preserving the *Laosanpian.* There are other instances where the preservation of the *Laosanpian* has a ring of informality, such as when a combination of institutionalized and non-institutionalized efforts result in former political symbols and discourses entering the field of popular culture or when revolutionary artifacts enter the public domain. These instances include Internet discussions on the texts of the *Laosanpian*[30] and where individual texts from the *Laosanpian* are used as source materials or depicted in soap operas, movies and novels. Although the individual articles of the *Laosanpian* tend to be produced as independent pieces during the reform era their legitimacy is to be found in the achievements that led to the establishing of the PRC and the liberation of the entire Chinese nation.

The essay "In Memory of Norman Bethune" has continued to be published since its inception and its popularity began to swell after the 1990s. It received its highest exposure during a 2006 Television series titled "Dr. Bethune", which was the most expensive TV series produced at the time (Sixty-seven years on, Canadian idealist moves China again, 2006). The commemoration and emulation of the text "In Memory of Norman Bethune" has taken various forms, including

[28] See Appendix 2, "Ten sets of the history of school textbooks publishing". People's Education Publishing, 2010.
[29] Beijing Folklore Authority, The Ministry of Culture of the PRC, 2011.
[30] See Appendix 6.

the establishment of the "Bethune Medal" by the health ministry in 1991, which is the highest individual honor awarded by the national health system (Norman Bethune Prize, 2009). The medal has been issued since 1994. "In Memory of Norman Bethune" has also been institutionally recognized with the establishment of a research institution focusing on subjects relating to the spirit of sacrifice and voluntarism (Brief Presentation of The Spirit of Norman Bethune Research Branch, 2009). On October 31, 2009, the National People's Congress standing committee on the promotion of ideological and political work established "The Spirit of Norman Bethune Research Branch" (白求恩精神研究分会) in Beijing's Great Hall of the People (ibid.).

In summary, the preservation of the *Laosanpian* suggests that it has tended to be used as a source of model emulation and that it can be seen to be making a comeback during the current era. The next section analyzes the individual texts of the *Laosanpian* divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the title and the transformations it has undergone since the texts were first published. The second part focuses on the individual texts of the *Laosanpian.*

4.2.0 Analysis of the title - *Laosanpian*

The lexical units, *lao* 老 and *san* 三, contained in the title *Laosanpian* can be regarded as having enabled the text collection to connect to the reform of the PRC by representing the morality of the Yan'an era as embodied in the rhetoric of the traditional Chinese concepts they convey. Furthermore, the positioning of the lexical units *lao* 老 and *san* 三 in the title of the *Laosanpian* reflects the continued preference and the success of the notion of *gong* 公 (public) over *si* 私 (private) in the present paradigm shift which is the culmination of the processes of the Chinese revolution.

4.2.1 Analysis of the lexical unit *lao* 老 'old'

The lexical unit *lao* 老 "old" is polysemous, as it is connected to at least five different meanings. First, the term refers to things that are old and that have outdone their usefulness. The second meaning relates to food that is overcooked or inedible because it is no longer fresh (现代汉语词典, 2010, pp. 817-22). The third sense of the term is usual occurrences, as in *laoyangzi* 老样子 'as usual'. The fourth meaning relates to old age and connotes the characteristics of *jingyan* 经验 'experience', *zhihui* 智慧 'wisdom', *zhong* 忠 'loyalty', and *bangyang* 榜样 'model characteristics'. The fifth and last meaning relates to familiarity and hierarchy, be it among

family members, work brigades or any other group of people, expressed in *laoda* 老大 or *laoyi* 老一 'the eldest one', *laoer* 老二 'the second one', *laosan* 老三 'the third one' and *laowai* 老外 'the foreigner', etc. In both the *Modern Chinese Lexicon* (汉语成语大全, 2011) and the *Volume of Complete Chinese Chengyu* (现代汉语词典, 2010) the majority of the definitions of *lao* 老 are imbued with positive characteristics. This positivity is reflected in the affirmative and reverential connotations that *lao* 老 brings to the expression *laoren* 老人, which refers to 'family elders' whose wisdom and experience are to be emulated and learned by the young.

In summary, the meaning of the lexical unit *lao* 老 in the title *Laosanpian* goes beyond its semantic value and expresses a symbolism that lends authority to all three articles of the *Laosanpian.* Li (1995, p. 227) suggests that the *Laosanpian* is referred to as 'old' because the texts were written before the communist takeover of China. The present study suggests that a combination of various meanings of the term *lao* 老 as outlined in the above sections reflect the social and symbolic position it attributes to the texts to which it serves as a title.

4.2.2 Analysis of the *san* 三 'three'

Historically, the number *san* 三 'three' (*san* hereafter) has taken several different linguistic forms, such as a noun, concept, saying, proverb and political slogan. This section examines the ways in which *san* has been used as a rhetorical tool during the reform of the PRC and provides a brief account of the term's trajectory in Chinese history and culture. In the studies by Li (1957), Li and Lok (1995) and Guo, Tian and Ma (2008), *san* features more frequently either as a term topping numeral or as a word meant for as guide to better understanding of the Party and the PRC. All the above mentioned studies point out that *san* is also used more frequently as a rhetoric tool for expressing 'political correctness' than any other numeral as witnessed in pre-reform political texts and the tendency seem to persist in politics, education and popular culture in reform PRC. Miranelli (2009, p. 15) points out that three and four continue to be the favorite numbers in the post-Mao era and refers to the use of *san* in Deng Xiaoping's speech calling on intellectuals to support the Party's efforts to implement the doctrine of *sige xiandai hua* 四个现代化'Four Modernizations' and Jiang Zemin's socio-political campaigns of the *sanjiang* 三 讲

'Three stresses' and *sange daibiao* 三个代表 'Three Representatives'.[31] Miranelli (2009, p. 6) concludes that the use of this numerical rhetoric can be considered as part of the CCP's major project of preserving power and socio-political stability through the realization of the reform policies.

These observations suggest that the use of *san* in the title of the *Laosanpian* may have double signification, one explicit and the other implicit. Implicitly, *san* relates to symbolic value, as used in traditional, religious and philosophical instances of Chinese history.[32] This suggestion stems from the frequent reliance on the symbolism embedded in *san* to depict matters of natural phenomena and personal relationships in society. The power and symbolism of the character *san* is also witnessed in its use in aligning or grouping characters, objects, pictures in threes in diverse media settings in political, public, educational and commercial spaces (Boden, 2008, p. 194).

The arrangement and dissemination of information using *san* can be traced to ancient China. For example, *san* is used to express the belief systems of various religious and philosophical schools. In Daoism*, san* is used to express the essence of the universe and the alignment of things through the dictum *yi sheng er, er sheng san, san sheng wanwu* 一生二，二生三，三生万物 (Lau, 1963). The character *san* 三 (three) is further used for stipulating what may be called the Daoist code of conduct, the *sanbao* 三宝 'Three Treasures' or 'Three Jewels' and s*anli* 'Three Etiquettes' (Lip, 1992, p. 19). In Confucianism, similar symbolism is observed where *san* is used symbolically in the construction of ethical precepts that serve to stipulate human relationships, starting with those within the family, which are then used to signify social relationships. The ethical precepts *sangang wuchang* 三纲五常 (three virtues and five constants) and *sancong side* 三从四德 (three obediences and four virtues) also make use of *san* to frame the

[31] See Deng Xiaoping's speech titled, "Emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future", read during the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on December 13, 1978. The *sige xiandai hua* 四个现代化'Four Modernizations', own definitions and the historical period .The *sange daibiao* 三个代表 'Three Representatives' Jiang Zemin, 2000, own definitions and the historical period. The 三讲 *sanjiang* 'Three Stresses campaign' refers to an internal ideological rectification campaign of the Party members in the reform PRC. Jiang Zemin launched the campaign that lasted from 1998 to 2000, stating that the campaign was necessary for 讲学习 *jiang xuexi* "stress study", 讲政治 *jiang zhengzhi* "stress politics" and 讲正气 *jiang zhengqi* "stress righteousness". The campaign was intended to strengthen discipline within the communist party and consolidate support for Jiang Zemin.

[32] The observation reflects on a basic characteristic of Chinese culture where tradition, religion and philosophy tend to fuse and manifest as one entity. One such practice may be witnessed in the Daoist dictum; *Sanjiao, sanbao, sangang wuchang, yisheng er ersheng san, sansheng wanwu* may all be classified under all the three above categories. (see *Daodejing. http://ctext.org/dao-de-jing; accessed, 2012-10-20*)

logic of the messages they bear. The relationships stipulated in these ethical precepts reflect the structure of Confucian society, where individuals are expected to conform to their social stations in accordance with a clearly defined hierarchy (Boden, 2008, p. 23-5).

Lip (1992) points out that in addition to being a popular number often used in set phrases, popular sayings and proverbs, *san* is a *yang* 阳 number that represents the wood element and the east direction. The following are examples of traditional sayings taught in schools to stress the importance of the natural elements and human virtue, which reveal deeper structures that signify the logic of the Chinese teachings about everyday life: *tianyou sanbao: ri, yue, xing* 天有三宝：日，月，星 'heavens have three precious elements: sun, moon and stars'; *renyou sanbao:* 人有三宝：神，气，精 'man has three treasures: spirit, breath and vitality'; and *diyou sanbao: shui, huo, feng* 地有三宝：水，火，风 'the earth has three precious elements: water, fire and wind' (ibid. p.16). In Chinese culture, which emphasizes order and where balance and harmony are of paramount importance, *san* is used to express the systematic combination of teachings, as in the term *sanjiao huiyi* 三教会一 (the three teachings), which refers to the combination of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism (Paracka, Jr., 2012, p. 73-98).

The term *san* is commonly used in Chinese classical literature, children's literature, fiction, educational materials and political discourse to express diverse kinds of relationships and concepts. While a full examination of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this study, the dominant use of *san* in sayings, proverbs, four-character idioms (*chengyu*) and general set phrases is of significance to the meaning of the title *Laosanpian*. Nall (2010, pp. 44-63) provides detailed statistics on the dominance of *san* within the stock of *chengyu*. The statistics show that *san* is dominant when used as a single numeric in *chengyu* and that it is only second to the number *yi* 一 'one' in terms of the frequency of the single numbers that express *yang* 阳 in *chengyu. San* tends to be used less frequently in the *chengyu* that contain more than one numeral (ibid., p. 64).

In summary, traditionally, *san* was used to signify the rules of conduct and types of relationships in the family, which were then replicated in other fields of social practice. Moreover, the ancient use of *san* has been carried over to contemporary China through various means and therefore continues to influence both the Chinese culture and politics.

4.2.3 Summary of the *Laosanpian* title

The analysis of the terms used in the title *Laosanpian* reveals a deliberate use of traditional lexical units as rhetorical tools for framing political discourse. Because the terms *lao* 老 'old' and *san* 三 'three' are polysemous in nature and are frequently used to express traditional Chinese concepts, they connect the title *Laosanpian* to expressions that signify the Chinese value system. Finally, the lexical units *lao* 老 'old' and *san* 三 'three' are not only found to convey traditional Chinese rhetorical modes within contemporary political discourse, they also demonstrate the latter's dependency on the former. In all, the title *Laosanpian* can be seen to reflect the use of ancient symbolism in contemporary political discourse. However, the analysis thus far has not examined the combined themes of the *Laosanpian*. Therefore, the next sections examine the contents of the individual articles.

4.3.0 Rhetorical analysis of the *Laosanpian* texts

The three texts of the *Laosanpian* each focus on a specific theme. "In Memory of Norman Bethune" addresses the idea of transcending borders and time in an effort to establish an international family. The essay also focuses on a strong work ethic and a spirit of selflessness as the primary qualities for conducting the revolution. "Serve the People" focuses on the theme of the Party as a parent, with the people taking the role of children within the principle of an all-inclusive public family. The last essay, "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains", uses an ancient allegory to depict the idea of a multigenerational family and a spirit of perseverance as prerequisites for the success of the Chinese revolution.

Furthermore, this study intends to show that antipodal structures and *chengyu* 成语 (four-character idioms) play a recognizable role in connecting the three texts to traditional Chinese concepts and in legitimizing the need for a revolution and a new social system. The original tales and the trajectory of the *chengyu* used in the *Laosanpian* are analyzed in relation to the three articles to elucidate the embedded symbolic, cultural and political capital that has been borrowed to construct the political performatives of the PRC.

The ordinary four-character phrases that help support the themes and messages of the *Laosanpian* are also examined. The four-character phrases and repeated lexical units tend to combine in framing the massages of the texts under examination. It should be noted that the classification of four-character phrases, idiomatic expressions and traditional four-character idioms is a difficult subject that has engaged a variety of Chinese scholars. Cao (2010, p. 136)

points out that despite the extensive studies that have been conducted since the 1980s, there is still no consensus as to the categorizations of the expressions formed using four character and three character-phrases. He further states that scholars have tended to avoid this problematic area and instead focused their efforts on differentiating between *sanzi yu* 三字语 (three-character phrases) and *siziyu* 四字语 (four-character phrases).[33] This problem stems from a lack of concise instruments that show how ordinary four-character phrases transform or qualify as *chengyu.*

To overcome these difficulties, in this study, any unit of four characters that constitutes a unified meaning is categorized as a 'four-character phrase', whether it be political, technical or traditional. Moreover, the *chengyu* dictionaries from the period when the texts emerged are used to determine which four-character phrases qualify as *chengyu*. In addition, all four-character phrases that originate from the texts under study or those that emerged after the texts were published are treated as simple four-character phrases.

Any repeated lexical units are termed 'keywords' because they seem to flank the primary messages and are more frequently related to expressions of *shan* 善 (good) than *e* 恶 (bad).[34] The keywords are categorized into *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad) in accordance with the argument that themes and messages of the *Laosanpian* rely on the use of antipodal structures. Furthermore, the aforementioned manifestation of rhetorical devices and strategies is illustrated in Tables 2, 3 and 4 below, which summarize the structure of each individual text. The rhetorical analysis of the three texts of the *Laosanpian* is based on Chinese people's familiarity with *chengyu* (four-character idioms) and ordinary four-character phrases. This is also in accordance with the analysis of the presentation and examination of *chengyu* (four-character idioms) in Chapter Two. In the following analyses, the English version of the original text is first presented, followed by an examination of the four rhetorical structures and devices used in the texts. The *chengyu,* four-character phrases and repeated keywords divided into *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad) categories found in each text are then listed in table form, followed by a summary. Finally, the original Chinese version of the text is presented, with the *chengyu* and four-character phrases highlighted in green and yellow respectively. The order of analysis is in accordance with the chronology of the production of the texts.

[33] See Zhou, J. (1997). "Four-character phrases and three-character phrases". 周荐 《论四字语和三字语》

[34] See Tables 2, 3 and 4 below which illustrate the *chengyu* (four-character idioms), ordinary four-character phrases and repeated keywords found in *Laosanpian* laid out in *shan/e* 善/恶 categories.

4.3.1 First Text

In Memory of Norman Bethune

(*December 21, 1939*)

Comrade Norman Bethune, a member of the Communist Party of Canada, was around fifty when he was sent by the Communist Parties of Canada and the United States to China; he made light of travelling thousands of miles to help us in our War of Resistance against Japan. He arrived in Yenan in the spring of last year, went to work in the Wutai Mountains, and to our great sorrow died a martyr at his post. What kind of spirit is this that makes a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own? It is the spirit of internationalism, the spirit of communism, from which every Chinese Communist must learn. Leninism teaches that the world revolution can only succeed if the proletariat of the capitalist countries supports the struggle for liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples and if the proletariat of the colonies and semi-colonies supports that of the proletariat of the capitalist countries. Comrade Bethune put this Leninist line into practice. We Chinese Communists must also follow this line in our practice. We must unite with the proletariat of all the capitalist countries, with the proletariat of Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and all other capitalist countries, for this is the only way to overthrow imperialism, to liberate our nation and people and to liberate the other nations and peoples of the world. This is our internationalism, the internationalism with which we oppose both narrow nationalism and narrow patriotism.

Comrade Bethune's spirit, his utter devotion to others without any thought of self, was shown in his great sense of responsibility in his work and his great warm-heartedness towards all comrades and the people. Every Communist must learn from him. There are not a few people who are irresponsible in their work, preferring the light and shirking the heavy, passing the burdensome tasks on to others and choosing the easy ones for themselves. At every turn they think of themselves before others. When they make some small contribution, they swell with pride and brag about it for fear that others will not know. They feel no warmth towards comrades and the people but are cold, indifferent and apathetic. In truth such people are not Communists, or at least cannot be counted as devoted Communists. No one who returned from the front failed to express admiration for Bethune whenever his name was mentioned, and none remained unmoved by his

spirit. In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border area, no soldier or civilian was unmoved who had been treated by Dr. Bethune or had seen how he worked. Every Communist must learn this true communist spirit from Comrade Bethune.

Comrade Bethune was a doctor, the art of healing was his profession and he was constantly perfecting his skill, which stood very high in the Eighth Route Army's medical service. His example is an excellent lesson for those people who wish to change their work the moment they see something different and for those who despise technical work as of no consequence or as promising no future.

Comrade Bethune and I met only once. Afterwards he wrote me many letters. But I was busy, and I wrote him only one letter and do not even know if he ever received it. I am deeply grieved over his death. Now we are all commemorating him, which shows how profoundly his spirit inspires everyone. We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness from him. With this spirit everyone can be very useful to the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people.

4.3.1.1 Rhetorical analysis of "In Memory of Norman Bethune"

"In Memory of Norman Bethune" contains nine units of *chengyu*, three of which are used to describe the doctor's selfless devotion, while the remaining six portray the kind of behavior that is opposite to that required to run a revolution. The first *chengyu* Mao uses is 不远万里 (to make light of traveling from afar), which originates from the first book of *Mencius.*[35]

[35]梁惠王上: 孟子見梁惠王。王曰：「叟不遠千里而來，亦將有以利吾國乎？」
Liang Hui Wang I: Mencius went to see King Hui of Liang. The king said, "Venerable sir, since you have not counted it far to come here, a distance of a thousand li, may I presume that you are provided with counsels to profit my kingdom?"
孟子對曰：「王何必曰利？亦有仁義而已矣。王曰『何以利吾國』？大夫曰『何以利吾家』？士庶人曰『何以利吾身』？上下交征利而國危矣。萬乘之國弑其君者，必千乘之家；千乘之國弑其君者，必百乘之家。萬取千焉，千取百焉，不為不多矣。苟為後義而先利，不奪不饜。未有仁而遺其親者也，未有義而後其君者也。王亦曰仁義而已矣，何必曰利？」
Mencius replied, "Why must your Majesty use that word 'profit?' What I am provided with, are counsels to benevolence and righteousness, and these are my only topics". If your Majesty says, "What is to be done to profit my kingdom?" The great officers will say, "What is to be done to profit our families?" And the inferior officers and the common people will say, "What is to be done to profit our persons?" Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and the kingdom will be endangered. In the kingdom of ten thousand chariots, the murderer of his sovereign shall be the chief of a family of a thousand chariots. In the kingdom of a thousand chariots, the murderer of his prince shall be the chief of a family of a hundred chariots. To have a thousand in ten thousand, and a hundred in a thousand, cannot be said not to be a large allotment, but if righteousness be put last, and profit be

Mao uses this *chengyu* to describe the mission and journey that led Dr. Bethune to China during the midst of the anti-Japanese war. The combined meanings of the *chengyu* as used by Mao not only reflect the distance travelled by Dr. Bethune but also portray the doctor as a member of the Chinese revolution and political family. The function of the *chengyu* in this instance reflects the antipodal structure of *nei/wai* 内/外 (inside/outside). Although Dr. Bethune is a foreigner, in light of his sacrifice and dedication he can be considered a member of the Chinese revolutionary family. In its original use in the *Mencius*, the *chengyu* 不远万里 (to make light of traveling from afar) reflects on the preference of the notion of *yi* 义 righteousness over *li* 利 (profit), which is discerned from Mencius's answer to a question posed by King Hui of Liang. Mao's use of this *chengyu* can be seen to set a foundation for praising proper and criticizing improper practices, a theme that runs through the whole article.

The *chengyu* 以身殉职 (to die in one's post) closes the second sentence with a tragic note describing the death of Dr. Bethune and the sentiment with which it should be treated. The origins of the second *chengyu* are also found in the *Mencius*, which advocates the principle of never giving up even in the face of difficulties. This *chengyu* is derived from a response to Gong Sun Chou who regards Mencius' principles as rigorous and difficult to live by.[36]

Mao accomplishes two tasks through his use of these two *chengyu*. First, he invokes the ancient values embedded in the original tales of the *chengyu*. When these values are placed in the larger contexts of the revolution and Dr. Bethune, a foreigner sacrificing his life for the cause of the Chinese people, they exhort the notion of ultimate sacrifice as the only correct way of serving

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put first, they will not be satisfied without snatching all. There never has been a benevolent man who neglected his parents. There never has been a righteous man who made his sovereign an after consideration. Let your Majesty also say, "Benevolence and righteousness, and let these be your only themes". Why must you use that word – 'profit?'" Source: http://ctext.org/mengzi/liang-hui-wang-i

Note: The original *chengyu* speaks of "a distance of a thousand li" but through times it has transformed and is presently referred to as "a distance of ten thousand li".

[36]Gong Sun Chou said, "Lofty are your principles and admirable, but to learn them may well be likened to ascending the heavens – something which cannot be reached. Why not adapt your teaching so as to cause learners to consider them attainable, and so daily exert themselves!"

Mencius answers that, "A great artificer does not, for the sake of a stupid workman, alter or do away with the marking-line. Yi did not, for the sake of a stupid archer, charge his rule for drawing the bow. The superior man draws the bow, but does not discharge the arrow, having seemed to leap with it to the mark; and he there stands exactly in the middle of the path. Those who are able, follow him". (*Mencius* Jin Xin I: 41).

Mencius concludes by stating that, "When right principles prevail throughout the kingdom, one's principles must appear along with one's person. When right principles disappear from the kingdom, one's person must vanish along with one's principles. I have not heard of one's principles being dependent for their manifestation on other men".

盡心上: 孟子曰：「天下有道，以道殉身；天下無道，以身殉道。未聞以道殉乎人 者也。」(*Mencius,* Jin Xin I: 42).

the revolution. Mao complements the second *chengyu* with a rhetorical question, which when contrasted with Dr. Bethune's sacrifice, also presents the ultimate sacrifice not as an option but as necessity for reaching the goals of the revolution.

The third positive *chengyu* 精益求精 (strive for perfection), which features in the third paragraph, is derived from the *Analects* 1.15. This passage was later used by Zhu Xi to describe the conduct of a superior man, emphasizing that superior men strive for perfection even when already considered perfect by others.[37] Mao uses the *chengyu* to praise Dr. Bethune's professionalism and constant search for perfection. In accordance with the original meaning from the *Analects*, the use of this particular *chengyu* further portrays Dr. Bethune as a *junzi* 君子 (superior man) who, despite difficult conditions, does not compromise his personal or professional principles.

The first three *chengyu,* stand in opposition to the remaining six, which describe selfish and irresponsible behaviors. Mao uses the remaining *chengyu* to describe improper and selfish types of behavior, witnessed in the emphases of the *e* 恶 (bad) expressions in the second paragraph, which reflect on the inadmissibility of selfish practices. The use of clustered negative *chengyu* in this paragraph is an implicit manifestation of the *gong/si* 公/私 antipodal structure, where denigrating private interests implies the admissibility of practices that are of benefit to the public. This understanding is derived from the sentence in which Mao concludes his criticism of private/selfish interests, stating, "In truth such people are not Communists, or at least cannot be counted as devoted Communists". The connectedness and interdependence between antipodal structures can be observed in this sentence through the use of the opposition of *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad) to determine the premises of *nei/wai* 内/外 (inside/outside).

In "In Memory of Norman Bethune", the spaces between the *chengyu* are filled using ordinary four-character phrases and the repetition of one, two and three word expressions. Besides shaping the messages in the texts, these devices also serve to link and position the

[37]子貢曰：「貧而無諂，富而無驕，何如？」子曰：「可也。未若貧而樂[1]，富而好禮者也。」子貢曰：「《詩》云：『如切如磋，如琢如磨。』其斯之謂與？」子曰：「賜也，始可與言詩已矣！告諸往而知來者。」

Xue Er: Zi Gong said, "What do you pronounce concerning the poor man who yet does not flatter, and the rich man who is not proud?" The Master replied, "They will do; but they are not equal to him, who, though poor, is yet cheerful, and to him, who, though rich, loves the rules of propriety". Zi Gong replied, "It is said in the Book of Poetry, 'As you cut and then file, as you carve and then polish'. - The meaning is the same, I apprehend, as that which you have just expressed". The Master said, "With one like Ci, I can begin to talk about the odes. I told him one point, and he knew its proper sequence". (*Analects,* 學而: 15).

narrator to the *shan* 善 (good) side of the story. The *shan* 善 (good) side of the story follows a trail of repeated keywords that seem to converge around the lexical unit *jingshen* 精神 (spirit), which is repeated nine times in the text. The expression *jingshen* 精神 (spirit) seems to play a central role in marking and separating the positions of good and bad. For instance, *jingshen* 精神 (spirit) is used in the rhetorical question posed which asks; "What kind of spirit is this that makes a foreigner selflessly adopt the cause of the Chinese people's liberation as his own?" *Jingshen* 精神 (spirit) is also used in the rhetorical answer that follows from this question and when Mao encourages Party members to learn from the spirit of Dr. Bethune. The remaining instances of the expression *jingshen* 精神 (spirit) are in the description of the conduct and practice that all Party members are encouraged to learn and emulate. This use of *jingshen* 精神 (spirit) serves to close the ranks of the inner circle and to reject all other values that are contrary to those described in the conduct of Dr. Bethune. This logic is a basic manifestation of the antipodal structure of *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad) and reflects the tendencies towards ethical dualism.

4.3.1.2 Summary

"In Memory of Norman Bethune" invokes a sense of devotion to the Chinese revolutionary cause while striving to extend the Chinese family model to one that converges around a common belief in the revolutionary cause, rather than blood ties. The logic used to redefine the Chinese family model is also evident in the use of the expressions that place Dr. Bethune on the *nei* (inside) of the antipodal structure *nei/wai* 内/外 (inside/outside). In the first paragraph, extensive use is made of four-character phrases originating from Marxist and Leninist ideology, which are positioned so that they negate the expressions of imperialist ideology. This strategy is a reflection of the conditions and preoccupations of the Party at the time. "In Memory of Norman Bethune" was written in 1939 during the height of the ideological battle within the Party in search of the 'correct' Party line. This battle culminated in the 'Yan'an Rectification Movement' from 1942 to 1944, whose influence on the revolution is evident in the later articles of the *Laosanpian*. Therefore, in addition to examining the use of rhetorical devices and structures, the analysis of the two remaining articles focuses on the expressions that mark the milestones in the search for the correct Party line.

4.3.1.3 Table 2

Index: bold and underlined = *chengyu* 成语

Good	**善**	**Repeated Keywords**		**Bad**	**恶**	**Repeated Keywords**	
English	中文	English	中文	English	中文	English	中文
Communist Party, Anti-Japanese War, He made light of travelling a thousand miles to help in the war against Japan.	共产党员 抗日战争 **不远万里**						
Martyred at his post	**以身殉职**						
The cause of liberating the Chinese people	中国人民解放事业	Spirit	精神				
Internationalism and communism	国际主义 共产主义	Spirit	精神				
Leninism, proletarian, liberation struggle, world revolution	列宁主义 无产阶级 解放斗争 世界革命			Capitalism	资本主义		
Leninism	列宁主义						
Communists	共产党员						
Proletariat	无产阶级 无产阶级			Capitalism imperialism	资本主义 帝国主义		
Internationalism,	国际主义						

democracy, patriotism, internationalism	民族主义 爱国主义 国际主义						
Devotion to others, great warm-heartedness	毫不利己 专门利人		精神				
Communist	共产党员						
				Preferring the light and shirking the heavy	拈轻怕重		
				At every turn	一事当前		
to be full of enthusiasm	满腔热满			cold, feel no warmth, indifferent, apathetic	腔热忱 冷冷清清 漠不关心 麻木不仁		
A Communist	共产党员		精神				
no one remained unmoved	无不为之						
A communist, communism	共产党员 共产主义						
Perfecting skills	精益求精						
				Change of work	见异思迁		
				Despise technical work	鄙薄技术		
Moves people	感人之深		精神				

profoundly							
Absolute selflessness	(毫无) 自私自利		精神				
Useful to the people	利于人民		精神				
Benefit/value to the people	益于人民						

4.3.1.4 Original indexed Chinese version of "In Memory of Norman Bethune"

Chengyu

Four-character phrases

纪念白求恩 (毛泽东 1939 年 12 月 21 日)

白求恩同志是加拿大共产党员，五十多岁了，为了帮助中国的抗日战争，受加拿大共产党和美国共产党的派遣，不远万里，来到中国。去年春上到延安，后来到五台山工作，不幸以身殉职。一个外国人，毫无利己的动机，把中国人民的解放事业当作他自己的事业，这是什么精神？这是国际主义精神，这是共产主义的精神，每一个中国共产党员都要学习这种精神。列宁主义认为：资本主义国家的无产阶级要拥护殖民地半殖民地人民的解放斗争，殖民地半殖民地的无产阶级要拥护资本主义国家的无产阶级的解放斗争，世界革命才能胜利。白求恩同志是实践了这一条列宁主义路线的。我们中国共产党员也要实践这一条路线。我们要和一切资本主义国家的无产阶级联合起来，要和日本的，英国的，美国的，德国的，意大利的以及一切资本主义国家的无产阶级联合起来，才能打倒帝国主义，解放我们的民族和人民，解放世界的民族和人民。这就是我们的国际主义，这就是我们用以反对狭隘民族主义和狭隘爱国主义的国际主义。

白求恩同志毫不利己专门利人的精神，表现在他对工作的极端的负责任，对同志对人民的极端的热忱。每个共产党员都要学习他。不少的人对工作不负责任，拈轻怕重，把重担子推给人家，自己挑轻的。一事当前，先替自己打算，然后再替别人打算。出了一点力就觉

得了不起，喜欢自吹，生怕人家不知道。对同志对人民不是满腔热情，而是冷冷清清，漠不关心，麻木不仁。这种人其实不是共产党员，至少不能算一个纯粹的共产党员。从前线回来的人说到白求恩，没有一个不佩服，没有一个不为他的精神所感动。晋察冀边区的军民，凡亲身受过白求恩医生的治疗和亲眼看过白求恩医生的工作的，无不为之感动。每一个共产党员，一定要学习白求恩同志的这种真正共产主义者的精神。

白求恩同志是个医生，他以医疗为职业，对技术精益求精；在整个八路军医务系统中，他的医术是很高明的。对于一班见异思迁，对于一班鄙薄技术工作以为不足道，以为无出路的人，也是一个极好的教训。

我和白求恩同志只见过一面。后来他给我来过许多信。可是因为忙，仅回过他一封信，还不知他收到没有。对于他的死，我是很悲痛的。现在大家纪念他，可见他的精神感人之深。我们大家要学习他毫无自私自利之心的精神。从这点出发，就可以变为大有利于人民的人。一个人能力有大小，但只要有这点精神，就是一个高尚的人，一个纯粹的人，一个有道德的人，一个脱离低级趣味的人，一个有益于人民的人。

4.3.2 Second Text

SERVE THE PEOPLE

September 8, 1944

Our Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies led by our Party are battalions of the revolution. These battalions of ours are wholly dedicated to the liberation of the people and work entirely in the people's interests. Comrade Zhang Side was in the ranks of these battalions.

All men must die, but death can vary in its significance. The ancient Chinese writer Sima Qian said, “Though death befalls all men alike, it may be weightier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather”. To die for the people is weightier than Mount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die for the exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a

feather. Comrade Zhang Side died for the people, and his death is indeed weightier than Mount Tai.

If we have shortcomings, we are not afraid to have them pointed out and criticized, because we serve the people. Anyone, no matter who, may point out our shortcomings. If he is right, we will correct them. If what he proposes will benefit the people, we will act upon it. The idea of 'better troops and simpler administration' was put forward by Mr. Li Ting-ming, who is not a Communist. He made a good suggestion which is of benefit to the people, and we have adopted it. If, in the interests of the people, we persist in doing what is right and correct what is wrong, our ranks will surely thrive.

We hail from all corners of the country and have joined together for a common revolutionary objective. And we need the vast majority of the people with us on the road to this objective. Today, we already lead base areas with a population of 91 million, but this is not enough; to liberate the whole nation more are needed. In times of difficulty we must not lose sight of our achievements, must see the bright future and must pluck up our courage. The Chinese people are suffering; it is our duty to save them and we must exert ourselves in struggle. Wherever there is struggle there is sacrifice, and death is a common occurrence. But we have the interests of the people and the sufferings of the great majority at heart, and when we die for the people it is a worthy death. Nevertheless, we should do our best to avoid unnecessary sacrifices. Our cadres must show concern for every soldier, and all people in the revolutionary ranks must care for each other, must love and help each other.

From now on, when anyone in our ranks who has done some useful work dies, be he soldier or cook, we should have a funeral ceremony and a memorial meeting in his honor. This should become the rule. And it should be introduced among the people as well. When someone dies in a village, let a memorial meeting be held. In this way we express our mourning for the dead and unite all the people.

4.3.2.1 Rhetorical analysis of "Serve the People"

"Serve the People" contains four units of *chengyu,* eighteen four-character phrases and seventeen repeated keywords. The text starts by introducing Zhang Side as a member of the Party and the army. In the process, Mao declares that the mission of the Revolutionary Party is for the benefit of the Chinese people. The first passage introduces two themes that are carried throughout the

text: 1) devotion and sacrifice to the Chinese revolutionary cause, and 2) unity between the Party, its members and the Chinese people. The first passage describes the revolutionary mission using the four-character phrase 解放人民 (liberate the people) and this message is complemented by the thrice repeated keyword 我们 (we or our).

The theme of devoting oneself to the Chinese revolutionary cause opens the second paragraph, with the line "All men must die, but death can vary in its significance". This sentence is complemented with the *chengyu* 重于泰山轻于鸿毛 (weightier than Taishan, lighter than a feather). This *chengyu* was written by Sima Qian (ca. 135–86 BC), who declared that he was not going to allow imprisonment and other difficulties deter him from completing the historical project he had initiated (Watson, 1958, pp. 57-67). Mao uses the *chengyu* to distinguish between good and bad deaths. A good death is identified as *wei renmin liyi* 为人民利益 (in benefit of the people) and is equated to Taishan, while a bad death is portrayed as lighter than a feather, because it serves fascism. Mao implicitly emphasizes the correctness of this categorization of death through his use of the expressions *yiyi* 意义 (meaning) and *women* 我们 (we) and by using a superlative, in stating that 他的死比泰山还要重 "his death is indeed weightier than Taishan". Taishan, which is one of the five Sacred Mountains, is among the most important ceremonial centers of China, having served as a place of worship for centuries. Given this background, the use of this *chengyu* must have influenced the reception of the text and served as a trigger for the diverse forms of capital embedded in the people's familiarity with the attributes of Taishan.

In the third paragraph, Mao addresses the theme of unity by explaining that non-Party members are also welcome to criticize the Party and if criticism has benefits for the people then the Party will change its ways. This strategy is aimed at expanding the inner circle to encompass those at the periphery of the revolution and, thus, achieving greater unity. In this sense, this passage also aims to increase the membership of the Party and the proportion of the population engaged in the mission of liberating the Chinese nation. This is witnessed in Mao's stipulation of the prerequisites for becoming a member of the ever-widening revolutionary inner circle, stating that, "If what is proposed will benefit the people, we will act upon it". The four-character phrase 人民利益 (benefiting the people) is repeated twice and reinforced by 人民服务 (serve the people) and 人民好处 (people's benefit) in the third paragraph. The statement that all suggestions and practices within the Party must adhere to the logic of the expression 人民利益 (benefiting the people), suggests that the meanings of *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad) are not open for discussion, as all

practice is interpreted in accordance with the ideals of the Party and its definitions of what is correct and incorrect.

The fourth paragraph continues on the theme of unity using the *chengyu* 五湖四海 (all corners of the country), which is extracted from a Tang dynasty *shi* 诗 (poem) by Lu Yan (829–874). The *chengyu* in the poem is derived from earlier similar versions, with the earliest being from the *Zhouli* (周礼·夏官·职方氏). In "Serve the People", this *chengyu* functions as a metaphor for the geographical space of China. Mao also uses the *chengyu* 五湖四海 in describing the magnitude of the task facing the revolutionary mission and to point out that the Party needs to recruit more members if it is to succeed in liberating the whole of the Chinese nation. Mao frames this message using the four-character phrases 努力奋斗 (exert ourselves in struggle), 中国人民 (the Chinese people) and 革命目标 (revolutionary objective). These phrases are placed in an almost organic pattern which reflects the will of connecting the Party to the people to jointly execute the Chinese revolution. The four-character phrases are, in turn, flanked by repeated keywords such as 我们 (we), 全国 (nationwide) and 全民族 (the entire nation), which serve as expressions of unity. The paragraph concludes with Mao pointing out that, "Whenever there is a struggle there is sacrifice and death is a common occurrence" and that dying for the people is a worthy death. The sentence is constructed using the word 牺牲 (sacrifice), which is emphasized using the expression 人民的利益 which is a compound of 人民 (people) and 利益 (benefit). This formation of expressions is repeated several times in the text in articulating the revolutionary mission and the reason for sacrifice. In addition to stating the reason for sacrifice, the compound expression, 人民的利益 (benefitting the people) in concert with the *chengyu* 死得其所 (dying a worthy death) serves to mitigate the reality and fear of death. Here, the goal is to exorcize death of its bad attributes and to transform it into symbolic capital. Death is historically regarded as a taboo subject in China, and therefore bad (*e* 恶). However, using the context of the Chinese revolution, Mao associates death with good (*shan* 善) and uses it as an instrument to help in the liberation of the Chinese nation and to provide the ultimate symbolic capital for the individuals involved.

The *chengyu* 死得其所 (dying a worthy death) is an excerpt from the expression 人生有死，死得其所，夫复何恨 (in life there is death, 'if' dying a worthy death, what is there to hate) extracted from the 魏书 (*Book of Wei*) by Wei Shou (written from 551 to 554). The *chengyu* 死

得其所 (dying a worthy death) closes the theme of sacrifice, which was introduced using Sima Qian's 重于泰山轻于鸿毛 (weightier than Taishan, lighter than a feather). The use of the two *chengyu* in the essay, to encourage, and legitimate the ultimate sacrifice reflects the level to which death was treated as an expected outcome for the individuals partaking in the revolution and, therefore, the emphasis on the worthiness of the ultimate sacrifice. The similarity in the manner which the *chengyu* 死得其所 (dying a worthy death) and 重于泰山轻于鸿毛 (weightier than Taishan, lighter than a feather) treat the subject of death helps make Mao's prose believable and facilitates the understanding that sacrificing oneself for the cause of the Chinese revolution constitutes a form of symbolic capital. The *chengyu* 死得其所 (dying a worthy death) ends the theme of sacrifice and is complemented by the four-character phrases 互相关心 (care for each other), 互相爱护 (love each other) and 互相帮助 (help each other). These phrases seem to mitigate the mundanity of death by repeating the necessity for care and love among the Party cadres.

Although the meanings of the above four-character phrases are the opposite of death, their repetition in expressing mutual care results in justifying the notion of 为人民而死 (dying for the people), implicitly positioning the notion of the ultimate sacrifice as a norm. The argument is based on the observation that the repeated keyword *huxiang* 互相 (each other or mutual) does not negate or weigh more than the oppositions framed by *gong/si* (private/public).

The last paragraph of "Serve the People" emphasizes the strategies that are meant to help mitigate the notion of death while continuing to justify the commitment to ultimate sacrifice by promising a funeral ceremony and memorial service for anyone who dies in service of the people. In Mao's words, this strategy is meant to 使整个人民团结 (unite all the people). Ultimately, the final paragraph combines the theme of death (bad) with that of uniting the entire Chinese population (good).

4.3.2.2 Summary

The antipodal structure 善/恶 (good/bad) is used throughout the essay "Serve the People" to define different types of death in accordance with the needs of the revolutionary cause. In this text, Mao also attempts to redefine the Chinese family model, from one based on blood ties to a set of relationships founded on a common belief. Besides expressing the reason for the Chinese revolutionary, the title, *wei renmin fuwu* ("Serve the People"), implicitly represents the hierarchy

of the old, traditional and new, public family models. In the text, the relationship between the Party and Zhang Side is that of a father and son. In this sense, the double significance of the expression *wei renmin fuwu* or "Serve the People" explicitly conveys the mission of liberating the Chinese nation, while the implicitly portraying the hierarchy inherent in the structure of the family model. This implicit reference to parent child relationship relies on the people's understanding of the Chinese cultural norms and values from which Mao extensively relies and borrows.

While "In Memory of Norman Bethune" treats the theme of the family in terms of the expanding the private traditional model into an all-inclusive and a public one, the essay "Serve the People" addresses the specific relationships and benefits of the inherent hierarchies. Father-son relationships imply mutual responsibilities. However, the way Mao expresses the benefits of this relationship reflect his reliance on the concept of *xiao* 孝 (filial piety), in which total obedience is required from the child for the relationship to function. This type of relationship developed during the Yan'an Rectification Movement of 1942–44, the last year of which coincides with the year Mao produced "Serve the People". In this sense, this text can be regarded as a reflection of the Chinese revolutionary conditions at the time. The tumultuous Yan'an Rectification Movement was the culmination of the factional power struggles that had troubled the Party since the beginning of the Long March. The end of this movement saw Mao rise to become the leader of the Party and his definition of communism took center stage (Gao, 2000). The event of the Yan'an Rectification Movement can therefore be seen as a manifestation of the antipodal structure of 善/恶 (good/bad), and all the corresponding oppositions, *gong/si* (public/private), *nei/wai* (inside/outside) and *rong/chi* (virtue/shame) found in "Serve the People".

4.3.2.3 Table 3

Index: bold and underlined = *chengyu* 成语

Good	**善**	**Repeated Keywords**		**Bad**	**恶**	**Repeated Keywords**	
English	中文	English	中文	English	中文	English	中文
Liberate the people	解放人民	Liberating the people	我们 人民				
Heavy as Tai-shan	**重于泰山**	We	我们	Light as a feather	**轻于鸿毛**		
Benefit for the people	人民利益	Meaning	意义	In service of the fascists	替法西斯		
				Exploit and oppress the people	剥削人民和压迫人民		
Benefit for the people	人民利益						
Brig on criticism	批评指出	Serving the people We	为人民服务 我们				
Serve the people	为人民服务						
Better troops and simpler administration	精兵简政	Benefit for the people	人民的利益				
A non-	党外人士	We	我们				

party person							
All corners of the country	**五湖四海**	We	我们				
Revolutionary objective	革命目标	We Nationwide	我们 全国				
The Chinese people	中国人民	We The whole nation	我们 全民族				
Exert ourselves in struggle	努力奋斗	We	我们				
A worthy death	**死得其所**	Sacrifice	牺牲				
revolutionary ranks, love each other, help each other	革命队伍 互相关心 互相爱护 互相帮助	To die Mutual People Benefit	死 互相 人民 利益				
unite all the people	整个人民团结	Memorial service Unite	追悼会 团结				

4.3.2.4 Original indexed Chinese version of “Serve the People”

Chengyu

Four-character phrases

为人民服务

（毛泽东 1944 年 9 月 8 日）

我们的共产党和共产党所领导的八路军，新四军，是革命的队伍。我们这个队伍完全是为着解放人民的，是彻底地为人民的利益工作的。张思德同志就是我们这个队伍中的一个同志。

人总是要死的，但死的意义有不同。中国古时候有个文学家叫做司马迁的说过：“人固有一死，活重于泰山，或轻于鸿毛。”为人民利益而死，就比泰山还重；替法西斯卖力，替剥削人民和压迫人民的人去死，就比鸿毛还轻。张思德同志是为人民利益而死的，他的死是比泰山还要重的。

因为我们是为人民服务的，所以，我们如果有缺点，就不怕别人批评指出。不管是什么人，谁向我们指出都行。只要你说得对，我们就改正。你说的办法对人民有好处，我们就照你的办。“精兵简政”这一条意见，就是党外人士李鼎铭先生提出来的；他提得好，对人民有好处，我们就采用了。只要我们为人民的利益坚持好的，为人民的利益改正错的。我们这个队伍就一定会兴旺起来。

我们都是来自五湖四海，为了一个共同的革命目标，走到一起来了。我们还要和全国大多数人民走这一条路。我们今天已经领导着有九千一百万人口的根据地，但是还不够，还要更大些，才能取得全民族的解放。我们的同志在困难得时候，要看到成绩，要看到光明，要提高我们的勇气。中国人民正在受难，我们有责任解救他们，我们要努力奋斗。要奋斗就会有牺牲，死人的事情是经常发生的。但是我们想到人民的利益，想到大多数人民的痛苦，我们为人民而死，就是死得其所。不过，我们应当尽量地减少不必要的牺牲。我们的干部要关心每一个战士，一切革命队伍的人都要互相关心，互相爱护，互相帮助。

今后我们的队伍里，不管死了谁，不管是炊事员，是战士，只要他是做过一些有益的工作的，我们都要给他送葬，开追悼会。这要成为一个制度。这个方法也要介绍到老百姓那里去。村上的人死了，开个追悼会。用这种方法，寄托我们的哀思，使整个人民团结起来。

4.3.3 Third Text

The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains

June 11, 1945

Mao Zedong's Speech at the Seventh National Congress of the CCP

We have had a very successful congress. We have done three things. First, we have decided on the line of our Party, which is boldly to mobilize the masses and expand the people's forces so that, under the leadership of our Party, they will defeat the Japanese aggressors, liberate the whole people and build a new-democratic China. Second, we have adapted the new Party Constitution. Third, we have elected the leading body of the Party–the Central Committee. Henceforth our task is to lead the whole membership in carrying out the Party line. Ours has been a congress of victory, a congress of unity. The delegates have made excellent comments on the three reports. Many comrades have undertaken self-criticism; with unity as the objective unity, has been achieved through self-criticism. This congress is a model of unity, of self-criticism and of inner-Party democracy.

When the congress closes, many comrades will be leaving for their posts and the various war fronts. Comrades, wherever you go, you should propagate the line of the congress and, through the members of the Party, explain it to the broad masses.

Our aim in propagating the line of the congress is to build up the confidence of the whole Party and the entire people in the certain triumph of the revolution. We must first raise the political consciousness of the vanguard so that, resolute and unafraid of sacrifice, they will surmount every difficulty to win victory. But this is not enough; we must also arouse the political consciousness of the entire people so that they may willingly and gladly fight together with us for victory. We should fire the whole people with the conviction that China belongs not to the reactionaries but to the Chinese people. There is an ancient Chinese fable called "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the

Mountains". It tells of an old man who lived in northern China long, long ago and was known as the Foolish Old Man of North Mountain. His house faced south and beyond his doorway stood the two great peaks, Taihang and Wangwu, obstructing the way. He called his sons, and hoe in hand they began to dig up these mountains with great determination. Another graybeard, known as the Wise Old Man, saw them and said derisively, "How silly of you to do this! It is quite impossible for you few to dig up those two huge mountains". The Foolish Old Man replied, "When I die, my sons will carry on; when they die, there will be my grandsons, and then their sons and grandsons, and so on to infinity. High as they are, the mountains cannot grow any higher and with every bit we dig, they will be that much lower. Why can't we clear them away?" Having refuted the Wise Old Man's wrong view, he went on digging every day, unshaken in his conviction. God was moved by this, and he sent down two angels, who carried the mountains away on their backs. Today, two big mountains lie like a dead weight on the Chinese people. One is imperialism, the other is feudalism. The Chinese Communist Party has long made up its mind to dig them up. We must persevere and work unceasingly, and we, too, will touch God's heart. Our God is none other than the masses of the Chinese people. If they stand up and dig together with us, why can't these two mountains be cleared away?

Yesterday, in a talk with two Americans who were leaving for the United States, I said that the U.S. government was trying to undermine us and this would not be permitted. We oppose the U.S. government's policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists. But we must draw a distinction, firstly, between the people of the United States and their government and, secondly, within the U.S. government between the policy-makers and their subordinates. I said to these two Americans, "Tell the policy-makers in your government that we forbid you Americans to enter the Liberated Areas because your policy is to support Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists, and we have to be on our guard. You can come to the Liberated Areas if your purpose is to fight Japan, but there must first be an agreement. We will not permit you to nose around everywhere. Since Patrick J. Hurley[38] has publicly declared against co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party, why do you still want to come and prowl around in our Liberated Areas?"

[38] Patrick J. Hurley, a Republican Party politician, was appointed U.S. ambassador to China towards the end of 1944.

The U.S. government's policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists shows the brazenness of the U.S. reactionaries. But all the scheming of the reactionaries, whether Chinese or foreign, to prevent the Chinese people from achieving victory is doomed to failure. The democratic forces are the main current in the world today, while reaction is only a counter-current. The reactionary countercurrent is trying to swamp the main current of national independence and people's democracy, but it can never become the main current. Today, there are still three major contradictions in the old world, as Stalin pointed out long ago: first, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the imperialist countries; second, the contradiction between the various imperialist powers, and third, the contradiction between the colonial and semi-colonial countries and the imperialist metropolitan countries. Not only do these three contradictions continue to exist but they are becoming more acute and widespread. Because of their existence and growth, the time will come when the reactionary anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and anti-democratic counter-current still in existence today will be swept away.

At this moment two congresses are being held in China, the Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang and the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party. They have completely different aims: the aim of one is to liquidate the Communist Party and all the other democratic forces in China and thus to plunge China into darkness; the aim of the other is to overthrow Japanese imperialism and its lackeys, the Chinese feudal forces, and build a new-democratic China and thus to lead China to light. Those two lines are in conflict with each other. We firmly believe that, led by the Chinese Communist Party and guided by the line of its Seventh Congress, the Chinese people will achieve complete victory, while the Kuomintang's counter-revolutionary line will inevitably fail.

4.3.3.1 Rhetorical analysis of "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains"

"The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains" is framed around the classical allegory of the same name from the 列子 *Liezi* texts written during the Warring States period by Lie Yukou (5th Century BCE). This third text has a number of special characteristics that need to be mentioned in order to understand its role in the *Laosanpian* collection. First, the historical characteristics of the original allegory, *yugong yishan* 愚公移山, may influence how the text is interpreted. The use of a historical allegory to articulate a revolutionary mission suggests that the Chinese

revolution is a continuation of the earlier processes of rationalization that occurred with the historical trajectory of the *Liezi* from its Daoist origins during the Warring States through to the Qin dynasty banishment and the ups and downs during different periods of the Han dynasty. The *Liezi* as it is known today is summarized from the Jin Dynasty (265–420) ancient traditions where "*Tang Wen*" was one of the books containing the allegory *yugong yishan* 愚公移山 (The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains).

"The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains" also differs from the other texts of the *Laosanpian* in that it emerged flanked by two events that had a direct influence on the Chinese revolution. First, the end of the Second World War and the Japanese defeat was in sight, which represented a victory for the CCP and a further step towards achieving the revolutionary mission. Second, the text focuses on practical and detailed matters relating to the Seventh National Congress, in contrast to the previous two texts, which were articulated in the midst of calamities in the form of eulogies to departed heroes. The subject of the third text stems from a planned meeting to articulate a way forward for the revolution and assert the Party line. In all, these characteristics serve as the foundation for the rhetorical analysis of "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains".

"The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains" uses three units of *chengyu,* thirty eight four-character phrases and ten repeated keywords. Mao starts by praising the proceedings of the Seventh Congress as a model of unity and of self-criticism; with the words for model and criticism each repeated three times. The theme of unity is described using the four-character phrases, 发动群众 (mobilize the masses), 人民力量 (people's power), 全国人民 (entire people) and 民主主义 (democracy), which are placed in succession. This sequence of phrases reflects a heightened level of rationalization where the four-character phrases form part of a coherent system, rather than haphazard sloganeering. In the next sentence, Mao states that the conference has been a model of unity, self-criticism and Party democracy. Mao concludes his praise by stating that the congress was an expression of victory and unity. The second part of this first paragraph contains as interplay of the elements of *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad), where apparent evil is implicitly exorcized through the processes of self-criticism. This self-criticism reflects the permanence of the ethical dualism manifest in individuals having to criticize themselves to become part of a unit, as represented by the Party and the people. The process reflects an ethical

dualism where the only admissible effort it that which is in service of the many, that is, in serving the people.

Four-character phrases continue to be used in the third paragraph to express the structures of 全党同志 (entire Party members) and 全国人民 (entire Chinese nation), which are necessary for 我们 (our) 胜利 (victory). The prerequisites for achieving victory are elaborated using the four-character phrases 下定决心 (resolute), 不怕牺牲 (unafraid of sacrifice), 排除万难 (surmount every difficulty) and 争取胜利 (strive for victory) in an effort to raise the consciousness of 人民群众 (the greater masses) so that they will 甘心情愿 (willingly and gladly) struggle together with the Party. The expressions used in the third paragraph can be separated into two parts, each with specific messages and effects. The first part consists of the units 全党同志 (entire Party members) and 全国人民 (entire Chinese nation), which emphasize the need for unity, which is portrayed as one of the foundations for achieving victory. The second part emphasizes the theme of unity between the Party and the people as a prerequisite for continuing the struggle.

The *chengyu* 甘心情愿 (willingly and gladly) originates from the Southern Song dynasty book "Zhe Qing Zashuo Xiang Silang" by Wang Ming-qing (1127-1202) and was popularized during the Yuan dynasty in the "Dream of the Butterfly" by Guan Hanqing (1220–1300). The Yuan dynasty version from which this *chengyu* is derived reads 他便死也我甘心情愿 (even if it means death I am gladly willing). The original meaning of this *chengyu* reveals an implicit message in its use by Mao, which relates to the willingness to engage in the ultimate sacrifice. Analyzed using the antipodal structure *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad), the *chengyu* 甘心情愿 (willingly and gladly) implies exorcizing death by removing its inherent (bad) attributes for the (good) of the people. The *chengyu* as used in the third paragraph reflect the antipodal structure where good and bad form a complementary dualism for the greater good, the success of the Chinese revolution.

The articulation of the themes of unity and victory do not seem complete without the use of an element of opposition, as witnessed in the sentence stating that China belongs to the Chinese people and not to reactionaries. The opposition is emphasized by repeatedly using the expression 人民 (the people) in the four-character phrases 全国人民 (the entire people) and 中国人民 (the Chinese people), which are placed in opposition to the 反动派 (reactionary block).

In short, the repetition of expressions of either good or bad, seems to enhance their respective performative force.

Mao uses the second part of the third paragraph to predict the success of the Chinese revolution, by making direct references to the original ancient allegory *yugong yishan* 愚公移山. The message and symbolism in the allegory follow the same oppositional rhetorical patterns and repetitive style discerned in the rest of the text. The theme of opposition in the allegory is framed in relation to the impossibility and possibility of moving mountains, with the Wise Old Man (智叟) representing the former and Yu Gong (愚公) the latter. In the allegory, success is expressed more frequently than failure. The themes of good/success are depicted in the expressed reliance on the multigenerational family for the project of moving mountains. The last and ultimate representation of the link between good and success is depicted by the arrival of the angels that help with moving the mountains. In the text, Mao points out that the god that sent the angels to help Yu Gong is none other than the Chinese people. The two mountains are depicted as representing feudalism and imperialism that are blocking the progress of the Chinese people. The end of this paragraph is similar to the preceding one, in that it uses unitary four-character phrases, 全国人民 (the entire Chinese nation) and 人民大众 (masses), flanked by the repeated keyword 我们 (we) to emphasize the foundational importance of unity in the revolutionary struggle.

The fourth and fifth paragraphs present a style of argument not encountered in the other texts of the *Laosanpian,* revealing a type of rhetoric that is not only oppositional but also confrontational and detailed in its articulation of the Chinese revolutionary mission and in addressing the enemies. Mao starts by criticizing the U.S. government policy of supporting the Chinese Nationalists, the KMT and opposing the CCP, expressed in the oppositional four-character phrase 扶蒋反共 (supporting Jiang against the Communist Party). The oppositional value of this expression is inherent in the internal structure of this four-character phrase; it does not need another lexical unit or phrase to express its opposition. In this regard, the four-character phrase 扶蒋反共 (supporting Jiang against the Communist Party) is true to its origins, because it constitutes a war metaphor without any additional elements. Its nature is such that it allows only one type of interpretation and, therefore, limits any discussion, as it provides a coherent description of the conflicts with the enemies of the revolution, represented by the U.S. government and the KMT. Thus, the phrase served as a potent political performative during the revolution.

The four-character phrase 扶蒋反共 (supporting Jiang against the Communist Party) is similar to another expression that emerged at the end of the Ming dynasty, 反清复明 (restore the Ming oppose the Qing). The Ming dynasty version served as a call to arms to prevent a total defeat by the Qing. Although no direct political link between the two four-character phrases has been ascertained, the similar historical backgrounds of the expressions and their oppositional qualities are reason enough to suggest that the Chinese revolution is a continuation of the process of establishing a united and powerful nation, free of foreign aggressors.

In the same paragraph criticizing the U.S. government's support of Chinese Nationalists, represented by the KMT, another implicit oppositional pattern can be seen to be manifest in layers, rather than in a singular and direct manner. The opposition can be discerned when Mao, in criticizing the U.S. policy of supporting the KMT, repeatedly emphasizes the separation of the *meiguo renmin* 美国人民 (American people) from the *meiguo zhengfu* 美国政府 (American government). This distinction suggests that the people of the U.S are not enemies of the Communist Party or the Chinese people. However, another form of opposition can be discerned in the theme of unity, where 全国人民 (the entire Chinese nation) and 中国人民 (the Chinese people) are portrayed as intertwined and united with 全党 (the entire Party), the CCP and the revolution, while the American people are presented as separate from their government.

In the fifth paragraph, Mao predicts victory for the forces of progress and the downfall of the reactionary forces. He argues that the democratic forces are the main current of the revolution and that the reactionaries represent a counter current whose attempts to prevent the Chinese people from achieving victory are doomed to failure. In this passage, Mao uses the following four-character phrases, 反动逆流 (reactionary countercurrent), 世界潮流 (world trend), 帝国主义 (imperialism), 无产阶级 (proletariat), 中国人民 (Chinese people), 人民民主 (people's democracy) and 人民独立 (national independence) to describe the people's victory and the fall of the imperialist countries. Mao ends the passage using a compound phrase, 反劳反共民主 (opposing the workers, the Party and democracy), which describes the mission of the forces opposed to the revolution and predicts their downfall. By detailing the entities being opposed and repeating the lexical unit *fan* 反 (oppose) as a keyword, Mao amplifies both the good attributes of the progressive forces and the bad attributes of the reactionary forces. The attributes of the antipodal structure of *shan/e* 善/恶 (good/bad) are apparent in the use of the agglutinative form, which results in a repetitive, oppositional and ethical type of expression. This agglutinative

expression features several similar elements that represent the same theme, *lao* 劳, short for *laodong* 劳动 (workers); *gong* 共, short for *gongchan zhuyi* 共产主义 (communism) and *minzhu* 民主 (democracy), in opposition to only one element of the opposite category, *fan* 反 short for *fandong shili* 反动势力 (reactionary forces). This strategy of placing a variety of similar elements in opposition to a single term representative of the other tends to create a sense of hyperbole, which favors the *shan* 善 (good) over the *e* 恶 (bad). The use of this agglutinative form of expression represents yet another rhetorical device whose function is to exaggerate the inherent oppositional qualities of good and bad, while widening the oppositional distance of the expression.

In the last passage of the text, opposition is manifest in the comparison of the two Congresses and their different missions. The oppositions are constructed in the description of the two Congresses, which are represented as having 完全不同 (totally different) aims and 互相斗争 (fighting one another). The KMT Sixth National Congress is associated with the expressions 帝国主义 (imperialism) and 封建势力 (feudal forces) and liquidate, plunge, darkness and defeat in contrast to the aims of the CCP Seventh National Congress, which are to build the nation, lead the Chinese people into light and achieve victory. Furthermore the expressions depicting the aims of the CCP Seventh National Congress are all associated with 民主势力 (democratic forces). Mao concludes by asserting his 坚决相信 (firm belief) in the 中国人民 (Chinese people's) total victory under the leadership of the CCP and guide by the Seventh Congress. The manner in which the message of victory is constructed using opposites expressing the separation between the fields of light and darkness in the last paragraph follows the same patterns discerned in all three texts of the *Laosanpian.*

4.3.3.2 Summary

In the "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains", Mao structures the messages of resilience and unity by borrowing from ancient Chinese themes and rhetorical devices, especially those that use opposites. The use of *chengyu*, four-character phrases and repetition in this text is founded in the allegory which sets the tone for the rest of the essay. In this manner, the Chinese revolution is portrayed as part of an ongoing process of rationalization towards a more coherent, ordered and all-inclusive Chinese society.

In reference to the revolution, the third text of the *Laosanpian* reads as a victory statement, as it addresses the internal Party structures and practices while rebuking the U.S. government's support for the KMT. Mao also expresses the theme of victory through the strategy of taking the war to the enemy gates and by repeatedly separating the U.S. government from the people.

Mao also uses this text to directly address the people, stating that the god who sent angels to help Yu Gong move the mountains did so in the context of the Chinese revolution, as the Chinese nation. This statement translates the entire essay into a declaration of independence, because equating the Chinese people with gods not only emphasizes the point that the liberation of the nation rests primarily in its own hands, but also liberates the people from the inhibitions inherent in some Chinese traditions. Referring to the Chinese people as gods also invokes taking up arms for the revolutionary cause, as the belief that people can achieve great deeds is the foundation of all revolutionary rhetoric, including that of serving the people. In conclusion "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains" represents the foundational oppositions in Chinese contemporary history, first as a statement on the resilience of *gong* 公 (public) over *si* 私 (private) but also an articulation of the multigenerational triumph of freedom over oppression.

4.3.3.3. Table 4

Index: bold and underlined = *chengyu* 成语

Good	**善**	**Repeated Keywords**		**Bad**	**恶**	**Repeated Keywords**	
English	中文	English	中文	English	中文	English	中文
Mobilize the masses, people's forces, the whole of Chinese people, New Democracy	发动群众, 人民力量, 全国人民, 新民主主义	We, The Party	我们, 党				
Leadership body	领导机关	The Party,	党,				

		The entire Party	全党				
Self-criticism	自我批评	Comrade	同志				
Self-criticism, inner- Party democracy	自我批评, 党内民主	In the Party	党内				
Posts	工作岗位						
entire Party members	全党同志	The entire Party, Comrade	全党, 同志				
Entire Chinese people	全国人民	We, Victory	我们, 胜利				
Resolute, unafraid of sacrifice, surmount every difficulty to win victory	下定决心, 不怕牺牲, 排除万难, 争取胜利						
Entire people, to be most willing	人民群众, **甘心情愿**						
Entire Chinese nation, Chinese people	全国人民, 中国人民						
The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains	**愚公移山**						
The Northern Mountain's Foolish Old Man	北山愚公						

Who Removed Mountains							
				Two mountains	两座大山		
Great grandchildren	子子孙孙						
Unshaken conviction	毫不动摇						
Spirits descended on earth	神仙下凡						
				Imperialism, feudalism	帝国主义 封建主义		
The entire masses of the Chinese people.	全国人民 人民大众						
				American government	美国政府		
				American government	美国政府 扶蒋反共		
American people	美国人民			American government	美国政府		
				American government. Support Jiang against the Communist Party	美国政府 扶蒋反共		
				To nose around	偷偷摸摸		

				everywhere			
Publicly declare, in this manner	公开宣言 既然如此						
				American government	美国政府 扶蒋反共		
Proletarian	无产阶级			Imperialism	帝国主义		
				Still exist	依然存在		
				Reactionary countercurrent	反动逆流		
				KMT Sixth National Congress	国民党的 第六次代 表大会		
CCP Seventh National Congress	共产党,第 七次代 表 大会						
Totally opposite, democratic forces	完全不同, 民主势力						
				Imperialism feudal forces	帝国主义 封建势力		
				Fighting each other	互相斗争		
Firmly believe, Chinese people	坚决相信, 中国人民						

4.3.3.4 Original indexed Chinese version of the article “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains”

Chéngyǔ

Four-character phrases

愚公移山

（毛泽东 1945 年 6 月 11 日）

我们开了一个很好的大会。我们做了三件事：第一，决定了党的路线，这就是放手发动群众，壮大人民力量，在我党的领导下，打败日本侵略者，解放全国人民，建立一个新民主主义的中国。第二，通过了新的党章。第三，选举了党的领导机关——中央委员会。今后的任务就是领导全党实现党的路线。我们开了一个胜利的大会，一个团结的大会。代表们对三个报告发表了很好的意见。许多同志作了自我批评，从团结的目标出发，经过自我批评，达到了团结。这次大会是团结的模范，是自我批评的模范，又是党内民主的模范。

大会闭幕以后，很多同志将要回到自己的工作岗位上去，将要分赴各个战场。同志们到各地去，要宣传大会的路线，并经过全党同志向人民作广泛的解释。

我们宣传大会的路线，就是要是全党和全国人民建立起一个信心，即革命一定要胜利。首先要使先锋队觉悟，(下定决心，不怕牺牲，排除万难，去争取胜利)。但这还不够，还必须使全国广大人民群众觉悟，甘心情愿和我们一起奋斗，去争取胜利。要使全国人民有这样的信心：中国是中国人民的，不是反动派的。中国古代有个寓言，叫做“愚公移山”。说的是古代有一位老人，住在华北，名叫北山愚公。他的家门南面有两座大山挡住他家的出路，一座叫做太行山，一座叫做王屋山。愚公下决心率领他的儿子们要用锄头挖去这两座大山。有个老头子名叫智叟的看了发笑，说是你们这样干未免太愚蠢了，你们父子数人要挖掉这两座大山是完全不能的。愚公回答说：我死了以后有我的儿子，儿子死了，又有孙子，子子孙孙是没有穷尽的。这两座山虽然很高，却是不会再增高了，挖一点就会少一点，为什么挖不平呢？愚公批驳了智叟的错误思想，毫不动摇，每天挖山不止。这件事感动了上帝，他就派了两个神仙下凡，把两座山背走了。现在也有两座压在中国人民头上的大山，一座叫做帝国主义，一座叫做封建主义。中国共产党早就下了决心，要挖掉这两座

山。我们一定要坚持下去，一定要不断地工作，我们也会感动上帝的。这个上帝不是别人，就是中国的人民大众。全国人民大众一齐起来和我们一道挖这两座山，有什么挖不平呢？

昨天有两个美国人要回美国去，我对他们讲了，美国政府要破坏我们，这是不允许的。我们反对美国政府扶蒋反共的政策。但是我们第一要把美国人民和他们的政府相区别。我对这两个美国人说：告诉你们美国政府中决定政策的人们，我们解放区禁止你们到那里去，因为你们的政策是扶蒋反共，我们不放心。假如你们是为了打日本，要到解放区是可以去的，但要订一个条约。倘若你们偷偷摸摸到处乱跑，那是不许可得。赫尔利已经公开宣言不同中国共产党合作，既然如此，为什么还要到我们解放区乱跑呢？
美国政府的扶蒋反共政策，说明了美国反动派的猖狂。但是一切中文反动派的阻止中国人民胜利的企图，都是注定要失败的。现在的世界潮流，民主是主流，反民主的反动只是一股逆流。目前反动派的逆流企图压倒民族独立和人民民主的主流，但反动派的逆流终究不会变为主流。现在依然如斯大林很早就说过的一样，旧世界有三大矛盾：第一个是帝国主义国家中的无产阶级和资产阶级的矛盾，第二个是帝国主义国家之间的矛盾，第三个是殖民地半殖民地国家和帝国主义宗主国之间的矛盾。这三种矛盾不但依然存在，而且发展得更尖锐了，更扩大了。由于这些矛盾的存在和发展，所以虽然有反苏反共反民主的逆流存在，但是这种反动逆流总有一天会要被克服下去。

现在中国正开着两个大会，一个是国民党的第六次代表大会，一个是共产党的第七次代表大会。两个大会有完全不同的目的：一个要消灭共产党和中国民主势力，把中国引向黑暗；一个要打倒日本帝国主义和它的走狗中国封建势力，建设一个新民主主义的中国，把中国引向光明。这两条路线在互相斗争着。我们坚决相信，中国人民将要在中国共产党领导下，在中国共产党第七次大会的路线的领导下，得到完全的胜利，而国民党的反革命路线必然要失败。

4.4.0 Summary of the analysis of the *Laosanpian*

The analysis of the *Laosanpian* has revealed three connected overarching themes. The first is that of the devotion to the Chinese revolution, where Mao uses diverse ancient rhetorical strategies and tales to exorcise the bad aspects of death for the benefit of the people and to mitigate the suffering of death. The second theme is unity, which Mao expresses by emphasizing the formation of a new type of family, one that is inclusive of everyone in the realm, with the Party playing the role of parent and the people the children. Nonetheless, the old type of family hierarchy, which uses *xiao* (filial piety) as the platform for all practice and is founded in total obedience, remains inherent in the relationships of the all-inclusive family. The theme of unity is portrayed using diverse examples from ancient China including the image of the multigenerational family, as depicted in the last text of the *Laosanpian.*

The third theme constitutes underlying message of the call for unity, that of uniting the world of the living with the netherworld. In the first text, the cadres are encouraged to emulate Dr. Bethune's selfless spirit and dedication to the revolutionary cause. In the second text, Mao promises a memorial service and funeral for all those who die for the benefit of the people as a way of achieving unity between the Party and the people. In the last text, Mao no longer uses death for teaching the living, but uses the imagery of the underworld, which he transports to the world of the living and even refers to the living as gods. In the third text, which reads as a declaration of victory and independence, Mao fuses the two worlds, thereby extending the life of the Chinese people to that of the spirits and deifying the heroes of the revolution and the Chinese nation. Here lies the power of Mao's rhetoric over that of the KMT.

The analysis of the *Laosanpian* also revealed that the themes and phrases used in the texts continue to be relevant to the people and to changing face of China, which may be taken as a reason for its success (Yan, 2000; Cf. Ji, 2004; Fewsmith, 2008). Liu (2010, p. 22) provides a basic, yet powerful account as to why the texts of the *Laosanpian* were met with success and are perhaps still relevant to this day.

> For many people, Maoism was just traditional values recast in socialist terms (as encountered in the *Laosanpian*). Mao's most popular writings among ordinary people were the "Three Old Articles", (*Laosanpian*). Many Chinese could recite them by heart, like

> chapters from a revolutionary Bible. The popularity of these three articles reveals how people perceived Maoism. Mao may have been an orthodox Marxist, as many scholars have argued, but such an academic argument probably carried little weight with ordinary Chinese who believed in Mao. The discourse simply expressed an aspiration for moral perfection. (Liu, 2010)

The use of the two traditional rhetorical devices, *chengyu* and antipodal structures has been proven to help sustain the production of value laden texts that serve as expressions for articulating the orthodox doctrine and the Chinese value system. The ideals presented in the *Laosanpian* do not deviate from the types of relationships stipulated by the traditional Chinese concept of *xiao* (filial piety), which since the revolution has served to replicate the processes of previous paradigm shifts and to adapt these to suit the conditions of the current era. The vehicle for transforming the traditional Chinese concepts that serve the Chinese revolution is discernible in the process of establishing a 'political family' as depicted in the texts of the *Laosanpian.* Lastly, the success of the texts of the *Laosanpian* is based on its congruency to the frames of reference of the Chinese people. The next chapter examines how does the logic of the *Laosanpian* translates in today's reform in the PRC by addressing the position and ongoing use of the *Laosanpian* through examining the effects of this traditional Chinese concept on the individual subject.

Chapter Five – Everyday workings of the *Laosanpian* in the reform PRC

5.0.0 Introduction

The analysis in Chapter Four provides a platform for examining the manifestation of the *Laosanpian* in reform PRC. Since their inception, the texts of the *Laosanpian* have served to articulate the reason for the revolution, define the Party line and stipulate admissible forms of behavior and practice in the PRC. Nevertheless, the *Laosanpian* has been received differently at different times since the Chinese revolution, when its authority was not challenged. Although the onset of the reform era saw the *Laosanpian* officially removed from the pedestal of power, the texts continue to serve as a guide in multiple fields of life in the current era. So far, the analysis of the *Laosanpian* has focused on theoretical themes that have formed the building blocks of the political performatives of the PRC.

This chapter examines the actual reception of the *Laosanpian* in specific fields of reform in the PRC to ascertain the purported influence of revolutionary discourse. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents the results from the data collection sessions conducted during 2011. The second part examines the continued manifestation of the ideals of the *Laosanpian* in the civil servant system in the PRC, which suited the present task as it is representative of a crossover institution with origins in the pre-reform era. Together, the two parts aim to show how Maoist discourse, in particular the *Laosanpian,* influences everyday practice in maintaining the status quo and retaining the ideals of the Yan'an era.

5.0.1 The *Laosanpian* in everyday Life

This section is based on the encounters during data collection mission coupled with the results of data analysis. It is divided into two sections in accordance with the sequence in which the data was collected. The data collection missions form the foundation for the analysis of the civil servant system, which in turn serves as a platform for examining the interplay between official and private individuals' attitudes towards the discourse that articulates the ideals of diverse fields of the PRC.

The first data collection mission was to the People's Education Publishers in Beijing during July 2010. The focus at the time was on collecting material on the use of the *Laosanpian* texts in primary level school textbooks. During this time, only a few individuals were interviewed to collect data, including statistics and the frequency of publishing, of school texts that included the *Laosanpian* texts.[39] A second more extensive trip was conducted in 2011, which covered more sectors of society, including government institutions, academic institutions, graduate students and the general public.

5.1.0 First mention of the reform in the PRC in primary school textbooks

When searching the web for further materials on the continued use of the *Laosanpian* texts, I came across the website of the People's Education Publishers (henceforth referred to as PEP) who used the texts for primary and secondary school textbook materials. I arranged for a visit for the purpose of collecting data in form of interviews and possible text materials used in the production of school textbooks. On my arrival there the staff at the PEP informed me that I could

[39] See table 5 for statistics on the *Laosanpian* texts published in school textbooks. Source: PEP, 2010.

access the statistics on the original *Laosanpian* text and its subsequent internal publication for the years 1950 to 2000. Therefore, the data since 2001 was unavailable. The staff did verbally attest though that the publication statistics for the *Laosanpian* texts had not changed and that the text "In Memory of Norman Bethune" was published in the widest range of school textbooks.

5.1.2 Short history and reception at PEP

People's Education Publishers (PEP) was established in 1950 through the Ministry for Education under the guidance of Chairman Mao. Until 1982, this institution had the sole mandate to publish educational materials in the PRC. According to the interviewed informants, the PEP still serves as the central publishing authority and is connected directly to the Ministry of Education and all other educational publishers in the PRC.

My research was further facilitated by the fact the PEP was then engaged in seeking international partners to promote Chinese language educational materials abroad (PEP Foreign Service, 2010). My visit to the PEP revealed that there has been a high level of government involvement in organizing education, especially at the primary and secondary levels, since the inception of the PRC. The institution's long history has been articulated in its program of action organized as the "Ten Sets of PEP's Publishing History", which is also representative of the government's ongoing efforts to combine culture, politics and education.[40] My visit to the PEP also provided insight into the role of politics and political texts in shaping primary and secondary education in the PRC.

5.1.3 The tour of the PEP and interviews with the staff

The interviews at the PEP were conducted in an informal style, demonstrated by the fact that on my arrival I became the interviewee rather the interviewer. After a short interview with the promise of continuing the next day, Mr. Qin showed me around the institute's exhibition hall and narrated the history of the PEP by describing the people in the portraits hanging on the walls, from the founder of the PEP to the current Minister of Education. During this time, Mr. Qin provided a detailed picture of the changing phases of the business, as portrayed in the "Ten Sets of PEP's Publishing History". A further interview was held with members from the institution's foreign department the next day who presented their work and provided sample of materials meant for international consumption. In this second interview it transpired that the PEP intended

[40] See details of the "Ten Sets of Publishing from PEP" in Appendix 2.

to keep similar standards in the format and content of the materials for foreign and local consumption. After the interviews the process of collecting the actual *Laosanpian* material as used in the school textbooks started.

5.1.4 Publication figures for the texts of the *Laosanpian* from 1950 to 2000[41]

Table 5



Table 5 illustrates the frequency in which a variety of revolutionary texts, the majority of which originate from the Yan'an revolutionary era, have been published since in school textbooks since the 1950s. The figures in the table show that the articles of the *Laosanpian* were already favored as school textbooks material before they were compiled into one collection that short to fame during the Cultural Revolution. Besides showing the general publication frequency of the Yan'an

[41] See Appendix 5 for a complete list of materials collected from the People's Education Publishers, (PEP).

materials, the data show that some texts were published more frequently and in greater volumes than others. On closer examination, the changing rates of publication can be seen to coincide with particular social movements and changes in PRC's political power.

The high frequency in the publication of "In Memory of Norman Bethune" after 1950 reveals that this individual text was more favored than other texts of the time. According to data collected by this study the tendency has not subsided to this day. The majority of the texts enjoyed a peak beginning of the 1960s only to take a dive that would last until 1978. Beginning of the 1980s saw the majority of the texts from the Yan'an era experiencing a boom which may seem contradictory as that year also marked the onset of the introduction of market economy in the PRC. The irony of the situation was also intensified by the fact that the publication of revolutionary materials that articulated ideals of a socialist society was meant for consumption at primary school level by pupils who may be future leaders of the PRC markets. The boom experienced in the publication of revolutionary texts in the 1960s may reflect the influence of the Cultural Revolution, during which time the *Laosanpian* was required reading. The sudden rise at the beginning of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s reflects the struggle between the freedom brought by the reform and opening up of the PRC and the need to sustain legitimacy through the use of revolutionary texts. This struggle intensified during the 1990s, as characterized in campaigns such as the 清除精神污染 (anti-spiritual pollution campaign). Although the publication of these texts increases in mid-2000, it does not compare to the initial levels. In all, the simple rise and fall in the publication of these revolutionary texts, including those of the *Laosanpian*, enables scholars and those interested to map the political turning points of the PRC since the 1950s to the present. The publishing data illustrated in Table 5 also reflect the education policies of each five year plan, as stipulated in the "Ten Sets" publishing history.[42]

5.1.5 Analysis of the "Ten Sets of History of PEP Publishing"

This section analysis the continued national publication of the *Laosanpian* and the plans to publish these texts among other political materials internationally in relation to the PEP's "Ten Sets" of development history. As with Table 5, the changes witnessed during each of the PEP's "Ten Sets" are reflective of the political trajectory of the PRC. This is apparent in the language that is adopted beginning with the "Fifth Set", which coincides with the onset of the reform era.

[42] See appendix 2 for details on "Ten Sets of History of PEP Publishing" and the changes made in school education at each political turn of the PRC.

For instance, the opening phrase states that, "After ten years of chaos, Deng Xiaoping …"[43] The use of the expression "after ten years" is an implicit strategy to avoid any mention of the Cultural Revolution or the education system of that time. This strategy can be observed in other fields of the PRC where damages of the pre-reform era are amended without making mention of them.

It should be noted that, from the "Fifth Set" onwards, the language used in the sets becomes more inclusive and open, reflecting that the education field, at least for primary and secondary school, was no longer confined to politics, as is apparent in the PEPs first four sets. The "Tenth Set" also addresses current PRC preoccupations that date back to the year 2000, namely, the legal aspects of education, the curriculum plan and the efficiency in publishing of school materials. These new concerns which seemingly mark a paradigm shift in the running of government and society of the PRC are a reason for raising questions such as, why is the publication of the pre-reform revolutionary texts continue to be a priority not only for the present generation but also set a foundation for future generations as these are used for education at primary school level. In all, through my interviews, conversations, observations and reading at the PEP, I discerned the following information in regard to the publication of the *Laosanpian* and other educational materials.

5.1.6 Information acquired at the PEP relating to this study:[44]

1- Yes, the *Laosanpian* is as relevant today as it was 60 years ago and the texts continue to be published in primary and secondary level school textbooks.
2- Yes, the *Laosanpian* is still important for understanding Chinese history.
3- Yes, the PEP continues to act as the main organization working hand in hand with the Party in drawing up the school curriculum and publishing school textbooks.
4- Yes, although the PEP started delegating some of its duties to other publishing houses after 1982, it remains the main body when it comes to matters of policy, where it liaises with the government under the direct guidance of the Ministry of Education.
5- Yes, the PEP is expanding its activities internationally and is in the process of acquiring partners for teaching Chinese language and history in foreign countries.

[43] See "Fifth Set" of the "Ten Sets" of the PEP's development (Appendix 2).
[44] The use of the word, 'yes' in enumerating the information from the PEP is an attempt at a direct translation of the final meeting and the language used, which went as: *dui jiu shi zheiyang,* 对就是这样 "Yes, it is correct that, and yes it is correct that… and so on".

6- Yes, the PEP wishes to keep the contents of the educational materials directed for international consumption similar to those published nationally, to maintain a standardized program for teaching Chinese language and culture.

Besides indicating the PEP's intention to expand internationally, which seems to be in concert with China's global expansion, these points confirm the role and importance all parties involved in publishing school textbooks attach to the texts of the *Laosanpian.* Therefore, the *Laosanpian* does not only represent a historical moment, it also serves as a moral point that continues to guide practice in reform PRC.

5.2.0 Different shades of the *Laosanpian*

During my study, it became apparent that the texts of the *Laosanpian* continued to be published outside of primary and secondary school level textbooks. Addressing this issue required adding a second trip for the purposes of data collection. This second phase involved a range of different encounters, which are presented in the following sections according to the level of difficulty experienced, starting from the easiest the national film archive institute.

5.2.1 National Film Archive and the Beijing Media University

My inquiries into the texts of the *Laosanpian* brought in the national film institute initially resulted in blank expressions and only when I mentioned the tale *Yu Gong Yishan* "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains", did the faces of my hosts light up. Teacher Ning then addressed her colleague, stating that the tales were those of *wei renmin fuwu* "Serve the People". She gave lengthy explanations of different subjects relating to the texts, emphasizing that these days the "slogan" need not be shouted, as everybody including the youth knew what Chairman Mao meant. I did not interrupt because her narration seemed better than the answers my questions would have likely elicited. After half an hours talk, it was time for me to take a tour of the library, which held all the political films ever produced in the PRC. Teacher Ning suggested some books that might offer an insight into the PRC film industry, stating that the today's film industry had its foundations in the moral pace set by the political films of the 1960s and 70s.

After touring the library and the exhibition hall, Teacher Tan suggested that my prepared questions on the *Laosanpian* would require another session, as it was then time for tea. Teacher Ning, who was the senior of the two, suggested an interview meeting for the following day.

These interviews yielded further insights into the manner in which youth regard the texts of the *Laosanpian,* not as a religious script but as a straightforward guide to being a good person. As an example, Teacher Ning stated that the texts, *jiao women zenme zuoren* 教我们怎么做人 "they teach us how to be good persons". During this interview, which was now attended by the director of the department, the expression *wei renmin fuwu* "Serve the People" featured extensively in the informants' explications of the texts of the *Laosanpian.* The session ended with Teacher Ning pointing out that "Even today these aspirations are still a priority when we are to listen more to our leaders and understand how to put into practice *wei renmin fuwu* "serving the people" within today's market economy China". The interviews ended in good spirits, punctuated by short anecdotes from all three about learning the texts of the *Laosanpian* during their school days. In addition to organizing follow up days, Teacher Ning supplied me with a list of film materials related to the *Laosanpian* and helped separate the fairy tale versions of *Yu Gong Yishan* movies from the political ones with messages from Chairman Mao. However, I later realized that this separation was purely for production and archival purposes and that the story was successful precisely because it referred to a children's fairy tale while serving as a political idiom.

In our continued discussions with Teacher Ning, she recommended and introduced me to Professor Zhou Qingbo 周清波教授 at the Beijing National Media University (BNMU). After two days correspondence, a visit and a possible interview were agreed upon for the following week. Professor Zhou is a member of the faculty at the BNMU Film and TV department, where he works as a cultural director. He gave a short and concise interview, which provided yet another dimension to my understanding of the reverence towards political texts in the PRC.

Professor Zhou directly criticized politically sanctioned film and TV productions but praised the contents of the original political materials. He suggested that the original materials are understandable enough and should be left as they are with no attempt to revamp them, making references to the movie adaptations of *Yu Gong Yishan* and the Lei Feng story. In both institutions, I discerned a no-nonsense kind of narrative and the staff seemed to have their material ready for me when I arrived. The lack of sloganeering by the representatives of these two institutes, who deal directly with the materials used for sloganeering on a daily basis, reveals that the *Laosanpian* and other relevant political texts do not belong to a bygone era, but instead have been repositioned and systemized into a coherent tool whose force may yet be unleashed.

5.2.2 The Learn from Lei Feng Spirit Research Forum and the National Library

The Beijing data collection mission was planned to coincide with the start of Lei Feng celebration week on March 5, 2011. The celebration is arranged by the Ministry of Education in conjunction with the "Learn from the Spirit of Lei Feng Research Forum", whose actual institute is located in Shenyang in the province of Liaoning. According to information provided by one member of the forum during the event, this was the 48th celebration of Lei Feng week, which was instituted at the behest of Chairman Mao.

The Spirit of Lei Feng is celebrated every year all over the PRC, with the focus on activities for primary and secondary school pupils, political speeches and the showing of various movies on Lei Feng. I attended the opening of Lei Feng week in the early morning to avoid missing the opening ceremony, which consisted of a string of speeches filmed by a line of Central China Television cameras. Planned interviews were conducted at midday, when the festivities had subsided. These interviews provided further information on Lei Feng and the institute's research and provided insights into how the notion of "emulating the model heroes" was promoted. In particular, I learned that the project of "Learn from the Spirit of Lei Feng" was coupled with that of "Learn from the Spirit of Dr. Bethune". Accordingly, a multitude of publications on the "Spirit of Dr. Bethune" were exhibited along with the historical materials on the "Spirit of Lei Feng". Attempts at getting my hands on some of these publications led to yet another interview where I was the interviewee and I only managed to keep two cards marking the event celebrating Lei Feng's Spirit.[45]

In the limited interviews I conducted with the members of the forum, who were themselves interested in interviewing me for their own research, it transpired that their research is a sanctioned attempt at fighting for space in the midst of the alternative messages proliferating in public space. The fear of being misunderstood was made apparent in statements such as *women yao laobaixing liaojie zhenzhen de* Lei Feng, *ta de jingshen* ("Our mission is to let the people understand who is the real Lei Feng and his spirit"). This encounter with the Lei Feng Forum revealed that the central propaganda organs of the PRC seem to be aware of the rapid growth of alternative spaces with alternative messages. This awareness is also reflected in the rate at which politically sanctioned research and commemorative centers emulating revolutionary heroes are springing up everywhere.

[45] See Appendix 7.

5.2.3 Beijing Review – BRFSD

The Beijing Review was included as a target for data collecting purposes because it provided an official window into the PRC. This weekly periodical publishes all government material relating to foreign missions and press in the PRC. While the periodical has played a significant role in showing the new and open China, the face of the old PRC still looms in the background of the workings of institution. In the unfolding world of the information highway, this sometimes means that the Beijing Review is at loggerheads with itself. After all my coaxing and hours spent perusing through materials, I was told that there was an open database online for scholars and professionals to which I could register. In all, my reception at the Beijing Review suggested that I had no right to ask questions about the texts of the *Laosanpian*, which perhaps is a sign that for the older generation these texts are still loaded with unpleasant memories. It was during this phase of data collection work that the notion of insecurity among the old guard came forth, perhaps a misconception on my part. The materials I encountered at the Beijing Review focused mainly on grand celebratory events which did not directly deal with the *Laosanpian*. However, there were several articles that dealt with the contributions of foreigners in the making of the PRC, which of course made mention of Dr. Bethune. The next stop after the Beijing Review experiences was the Beijing Normal University.

5.2.4 Beijing Normal University and the Beijing Folklore Institute

The report from the Beijing Normal University was unique, for a variety of reasons. First, during my stay in Beijing I was hosted by the Department of Literature and Folklore Studies. From the first day, I received an immense amount of feedback that was relevant to my work, although access to further materials required mastering a set decorum. After a bit of trial and error, I finally seemed to fit in with the group and was invited to an event that affected the present study and my understanding of the amount of capital that was invested in the maintenance and restoration of revolutionary materials and texts. During the process of my data collection, I gradually became aware that the university setting served as a selection process for students who would be future elite citizens.

> "We are always looking and on the alert for ways of expressing correct ideas to people and this is what the *Laosanpian* manages to achieve".
>
> Beijing Normal University, Beijing. 2011

I recorded this in my first interview with my host professor, who responded to my question on

the importance of the *Laosanpian*. This was one of our many closed doors interviews, where each question from me elicited more information, most of which was irrelevant to this study. However, what came through in these interviews was a feeling of uncertainty, first on my part and then from my host. My breakthrough came when I was invited to a session at the Beijing Folklore institute, where a group of students took part in a tour of the newly refurbished establishment and attended a presentation on recently collected materials for an intangible heritage project. The presentation of the materials for this project included a section dedicated to revolutionary texts, two of which were from the *Laosanpian*, "In Memory of Norman Bethune" and the "The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains". The collection of revolutionary materials included several folksongs, including some with themes originating from the *Laosanpian.* The existence of such a large number of folk songs related to the *Laosanpian* attests to observations by Yan (2000), Landsberger (2001) and Li and Lok (1995), that because many people were illiterate during the height of the Cultural Revolution, central parts of the main texts were extracted and made into songs, which the peasants were encouraged to learn. The citation below, which is extracted from one of my closed door interviews with my host professor, indicates the religious manner with which the *Laosanpian* was regarded at the height of the Cultural Revolution:

> "We used to read the *Laosanpian* as part of our daily ritual especially during our evening meals and if there was no candle light we would hold a copy in our hands and recite the texts". (Beijing Normal University, Feb. 2011)

It was a rewarding experience to hear this recounted at a tertiary academic institution, because this was not a novel or a movie, it was real life unfolding in front of my eyes. What remained for me was to place the events that had occurred and to analyze them in relation to the *Laosanpian*.

5.2.5 Informal category – The Beijing International Youth Hostel

Interviews with the youth graduates

My last stay in Beijing was at the Beijing International Youth Hostel where I had an opportunity to interview most of the residents, both staff and lodgers. The staff comprised recent graduates and it was in line with their duties to guide foreigners and direct them to the places they needed to go in Beijing. This proved to be of great help for the study, both in relation to practical issues

and as a way of conducting research, as many an evening was spent engaging in discussions until I had the opportunity to ask my questions.

The other group that turned out to be of paramount importance to the data collection mission were the lodgers in this hostel, of whom the majority, close to 90%, were recent graduates seeking employment in various localities in Beijing. All the students interviewed were very clear on their stance and were knowledgeable of the material they used to defend their point. Although some of the rhetoric used had a nationalistic tone, it was never confrontational, nor did it prevent me from understanding the details of what was said. In short, most of the talks held at the Beijing International Hostel were highly relevant to my data collection mission. Most of the discussion was around the notions of *jingshen* 精神 (the correct type of spirit)[46] and *zuguo* 祖国 (the fatherland), and was punctuated by the phrases such, "I want to do what is best for China". For example, one graduate was offered employment after several successful interviews and when questioned on his choice of company, he answered, "the best two companies are German, but I take the Chinese offer although the pay is not as attractive, I want to do what is best for China". The youth talked about what they believed in, that is, their identities and aspirations, and that it was now their turn to take China forward. However, they did not see the need to change that which is China. The subject of the *Laosanpian* thus needed no discussion because, although far away from these youth, it constituted the China they knew.

When the opportunity availed itself I would take over these discussions by beating the same drum on the *Laosanpian*. On one such occasion, I asked how these texts were taught to the youth during their school years. The answers were straightforward as in, "you cannot separate one subject from the next because they are all part of complete knowledge". In all instances, the youth's answers reflected the use of antipodal structures, at one level limiting the game in a complementary fashion as witnessed by their placing of the *Laosanpian* in the sum of good experiences, considering that the youth regarded their education process as such. However, the answers may have been elicited by their unconscious unwillingness to extract the *Laosanpian* from their experiences of education, because they would then have to question its individual influence, meanings and perhaps even history. However, as experience in the PRC has shown, such activity is avoided at all costs.

[46] The discussion of a concise and appropriate interpretation of the notion of 'spirit' as used in the PRC and adhered to in the present study is elaborated upon in Chapter six.

5.3.0 General Findings

Among those interviewed, the graduate youth in their discussions of the *Laosanpian* or its individual tales never showed any strain or stress, even when topics of unjust government acts came up. Somehow it seemed as if the moral point of the *Laosanpian* was set in stone and that these texts had nothing to do with the government. This study discerned that the maxim "Serve the People" and other political texts seem to be embodied by individuals in society, perhaps allowing the government to rule in a stealth mode or perhaps indicating that the people have embodied the government as well.

What was learned from the process and the results of the data collection in Beijing is that the old guard is still wary of foreigners' proximity to anything deemed political in the PRC, even during the reform PRC. Some of this fear may result from a deep seated by-product of the pre-reform policing society. The other group consists of those who thrive in discussing minute details of political issues, as long as they are not framed in ideological 'king size terms' but as details relating to discipline, education, real estate and future employment, as experienced with the youth graduates and the functionaries at the film archive and media university. The last group is that which consists of proud patriots, those who are aware and speak freely of China's forward march to foreign shores as witnessed the visits to the PEP institute. What the above mentioned groups have in common, embedded in all their talks, complaints, shows of friendliness and uncertainty, was that the *Laosanpian* has a special place in their hearts and if evoked it would not fail to speak the one language it was intended for, to express the unity among the Chinese people as one family, ready to withstand any difficulties. This sense was present in all the groups encountered throughout the data collection processes.

In the final analysis, the youth interviewed during the data collection mission showed an ability to move between the lines representing the old and new messages from various types of media and in tackling subjects that were regarded as taboo during pre-reform era. It is on this point that the youth also showed they were able to present and protect their views of a continued PRC without conflicting themselves. In contrast, the old guard has a long battle ahead of unlearning the old tendencies and the process is proving difficult. The question that remains is, does the youth's ability to maneuver between the lines of the old and new messages also translate into new voices or a new style of inquiry that distances itself from the notion of ethical dualism?

5.4.0 Table 6 - Findings and the results of data analysis

Formal categories		
Academic and publishing institutions	Age groups	Attitudes
People's Education Publishers	30 to 35 years	Open and confident
Beijing Film Archive Institute	30 to 45 years	Open and confident
Beijing Media University	30 to 40 years	Open and confident
Beijing Normal University	30 to 50 years	Closed society
Beijing Review	30 to 60 years	Closed society
Informal categories		
Independent groupings	Age groups	Attitudes
Youth graduates	20 to 25 years	Open and confident
Beijing Youth Hostel	20 to 30 years	Open and confident
Norman Bethune Study group	30 to 40 years	Open and confident
General public	20 to 60 years	Open and confident

The above table illustrates the differences in age and attitudes towards revolutionary texts among different categories did not show any ideological discrepancies or conflicts. Although emotions varied among age groups when speaking of the *Laosanpian* and other revolutionary texts of the pre-reform era they were all in agreement as to the continued consumption of Maoist discourse.

5.5.0 Summary

The results of the collected data helped to show that the assumption that people are passive consumers of discourse is incorrect. In a study such as this, which aims to examine the performative force of political discourse, people's everyday reality must not be overlooked, as individuals in society always find ways to make ends meet by taking one day at a time and anticipating the next, as in, "we know what it means and we know how to get by". This is further revealed in the next section examining the recruiting mechanism of the civil servant system and the popularity for employment in the civil service.

5.6.0 The relationship between Maoist Discourse and the Civil Servant System

The civil servant system has its roots in the party cadre system of the pre-reform era, which served more as a vehicle for upward social mobility for up and coming political figures than as government managerial body. Party membership was a primary prerequisite for taking employment as a civil servant and although it is officially no longer the case since the onset of the reform policies, a closer examination reveals another reality. Why then is this study trying to show that the conditions for employment in the civil servant system are similar to those of the pre-reform era cadre system? This idea came about through my examination of the internal regulations and legislation of the civil service, which stipulate the guidelines for recruitment, practice and the aims of the current civil servant system. The question that perhaps sums up the different factors examined in this chapter is, is employment in the civil servant system motivated solely by monetary gain or does its appeal lie in the logocentric capital or whether is it the combination of these factors? Logocentric capital in this sense refers to that acquired through other means other than exchange of the monetary type such as was the pre-reform world of "politics in command" (Dittmer, 1987, p. 163).

In answering this question, this chapter examines the tendency observed in the ability of Maoist discourse to manifest in a dual mode, first as a legitimating agent of the Law and, at the same time, in creating the mitigating grounds for politically overriding the law, such as when addressing acute grassroots problems in society at the lower government level (Burns, 2010, p. 68). Another aspect examined in this chapter is the apparent popularity of the civil servant system as a place of employment. This second examination focuses on two parts of the recruitment mechanism in the civil servant system. First, the language and contents used in the entry-tests for working in the civil service. The second factor is the tendency among young

graduates and the majority of citizens to favor the civil service over other employment opportunities. In this chapter, the terms political integrity and politically correct/ness are used interchangeably, following the trend of the sources cited when referring to attitudes and relationships towards political and government office.

5.6.1 Why Reform the Civil Servant System?

The civil servant system was established by the CCP in response to the current socio-economic challenges. It is meant to replace the pre-reform cadre system, whose function was to educate Party functionaries at all levels of government for managerial and political office (Chou, 2008, p. 54). This body, which fused together Party politics and the government management system, was not suited to addressing the demands of the reform policies, where the three underlying principles of participation, transparency and accountability are supposed to take precedence over political integrity (ibid.). Recent studies examining the civil servant system of the PRC point out that political "correctness" and towing the Party line are still the preferred criteria for recruitment and general practice within the system (Chou, 2008, p. 60; Burns, 2010, pp. 60-61). However, these studies do not examine the influence of Maoist discourse in perpetuating the tendency to use "political correctness" as a criterion for recruiting and evaluating the practices within the civil servant system. This study argues that the tendency to prioritize political correctness over other merits, as observed in the practice of the civil servant system, has its foundations in the framework of values articulated in Maoist discourse, such as *xiao* 孝 (filial piety) and *zhong* 忠 loyalty, a combination which when in the hands of the Party translate into *daxiao* 大孝 (great filial piety) as mentioned in the previous chapter.

The framework of traditional Chinese concepts enables Maoist discourse to manifest as both a legitimating and a mitigating agent, which in turn gives it the ability to overturn the very same form of practice it legitimates and helps establish. The move to reposition Maoist discourse during the 1981 Revaluation of the Party's History can be seen as another manifestation of this double standard (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975-1982, pp. 151-165). This repositioning seems to have been a strategic move by the Party, as it created a space within which Maoist discourse could be criticized, while at the same time continuing to legitimate the practice of the current market reform policies (Wu, 2005). In this sense, it seems as if the repositioning of Maoist discourse has enabled it to manifest as conformity acts that balance the scales between

the pre-reform and reform practices, that is, it sustains the old political system within the new emerging social, economic and political spaces.

Three units of analysis are used to examine the civil servant system: 1) the preference for political integrity as a criterion for recruiting public servants; 2) the treatment of administrative office as a political position; and 3) the application of the family model in the running of the internal units of the civil service. These three factors are seen to be impeding the full reform of the civil servant system, as they transmit the very ills the reform policies seek to eradicate. Moreover, this study contends that these factors have created what Munro (1996, p. 7) terms an "imperial style of inquiry" within the civil service, which is only sustainable because of the traditional frames of reference embedded in Maoist discourse and Chinese linguistic features, as outlined in earlier chapters of this study.

Another stumbling block to the reform of the civil service may lie in the fact that the PRC has not yet shifted from a logocentric to an econocentric model, as per the requirements of a market economy (Apter & Saich, 1994, pp. 318-320). Accordingly, logocentric tendencies seem to continue to command more currency than econocentric concerns in dictating how the reforms take shape. The following sections examine how the conflict between the logocentric and econocentric models, the treatment of an administrative office as an official public position and the preference given to political integrity connect the civil service reforms to Maoist discourse.

5.6.2 Background of the concepts applied in this section

5.6.2.1 *Logocentric versus Econocentric model*

As with the majority of the political and everyday practices in the PRC, the practices of the civil servant system are framed by antipodal structures, in this case those represented by the opposition between the logocentric and econocentric models. The principal oppositions observed in the current practices of the civil servant system are *gong/si* 公/私 (public/private), *zhengfu/shichang* 政府/市场 (government/market), *zongjiao/shisu* 宗教/世俗 (religious/secular), *yi/li* 义/利 (righteous/gain) and *zheng/xie* 正/邪 (correct/evil).

In this study, 'logocentric' signifies politics in the driver's seat, where political orthodoxy, *gong* 公 (public), takes precedence over economic interests, *si* 私 (private). Apter and Saich (1994) use the concept of logocentrism when defining the type of ideology developed by the CCP during the Yan'an period. They state that in its "search for alternative truths", the CCP

applied a combination of techniques to rationalize and articulate what was later to be considered 'correct' language. The end result of this search became the foundation on which the revolution would be fought and won. In sum, the success of the Party's goals depended on the correct language and deviation from the correct language was tantamount to treason (ibid.). According to Apter and Saich, within the CCP, language constituted the only currency with which to purchase privileges and benefits, such as power. Therefore, the correct use of language consisted at the time the only valid capital which could then be converted to other types of benefits or simple used for the purposes of upward mobility within the Party (ibid.).

This logocentric currency, in form of political slogans, maxims and the use of 'correct' language, also functioned outside the political arenas of the newly established PRC. However, despite its persistence during the pre-reform period, the logocentric currency did not provide the tools required for the development of industry in the newly established country (ibid.). Nonetheless, this lack of success during the pre-reform period did not render the principles and messages of logocentric currency null. Rather, they seem to be enjoying more success in reform PRC in view of the influence they have in the running of the civil service.

In regard to the econocentric model, the rationale of the market economy as practiced in reform PRC would, by standard definition, translate into econocentric practice, where notions of supply and demand take precedence over all other market factors and monetary currency plays a decisive role in determining the interplay between the means of production, productive forces and the relations of production (Webb & Danaher, 2002; cf. Apter & Saich, 1994). However, this definition has shortcomings in regards to the PRC, where during the pre-reform era the means of production were in the hands of the state and the logocentric model was the de facto standard. Moreover, in the reform era, it seems that the econocentric model is still second to the logocentric, as the majority of the economic resources are still in the hands of the state (Burns, 2010).

The overlapping definitions of the market economy in the PRC are usually explained using the 'magical' term 有中国特色 (Chinese characteristics), in the hope that it may help explain the mix of logocentric and econocentric models. However, 有中国特色 (Chinese characteristics) explains neither the mix of these two models nor the workings of the civil servant system. In the next section, the 'traditional frames of reference' are used as to explain the factors that influence the practice of the civil servant system.

5.6.3 The use of the traditional family model in the running of government institutions

The traditional frames of reference that continue to manifest within the civil servant system seem to have their roots in the precepts that guide the traditional Chinese family model which stipulate total obedience and unquestioned group loyalty. The tendency of using the traditional family model in the civil servant system is reminiscent of the pre-reform cadre-system which seems to encourage and perpetuate the practice of unquestioned *zhong* 忠 (loyalty), *lishang wanglai* 礼尚往来 (courtesy demands reciprocity) and *xiao* 孝 (filial piety/total obedience). Its impact seem to deter if not prevent the duties of the unit appraisal system put in place to assess the efficiency of the public service (Burns, 2010). However, it is not clear whether the family model applied within the civil servant system is the public version referred to by Mao Zedong or that of the old traditional Chinese society as it is discerned that the lines between the ideal of an all-inclusive public family and the traditional one are blurred when it concerns reforms policy implementations as illustrated by the reasons given by diverse individuals on the preference of employment in the civil servant system elaborated below. In an attempt to elucidate the manifestation of the two family models in the civil servant system the next section examines the tendency of regarding administrative office as a political office.

5.6.4 Administrative office versus political office

The tendency to regard administrative office as a political office is examined from the perspective of linguistic pragmatic premises of the word 'civil servant' and the historical relations between education, power and public office (Chou, 2008, p. 62). The premises relating to the term civil servant are, 当官 (serving in a public office), 官员 (public servant) and 公务员 (civil servant). All three terms relate to the act of serving in public office, which in ancient China was not separate from serving as an imperial official, a position associated with glory, power and honor (ibid.). This tendency of linking administrative office with a political one seem to have never left the Chinese realm, instead it may have gained more ground during the process of engineering a new language and a model society in Yan'an and implemented as the rationale for establishing and running the PRC. In reforming the cadre-system into the civil servant system, it seems that the original traditional value 当官 (serving in public office), with its notions of honor and glory, was difficult to eradicate (Chou, 2008, p. 62). The situation was made difficult by the insistence of treating party cadres and civil servants as one and the same entity, based on the

notion that there can be no neutrality in political affiliation within the ranks of the civil servant system, as stated below:

> "Our country civil servants adhere to and reflect the party's basic line and unlike the Western civilian political neutrality". (Chen, 2001)

This study argues that this logic has its foundation in the symbolic power possessed by the Party and such seem to result, in the popularity of employment within the civil servant system (see below, Table 7). During my data collection mission, I encountered numerous cases where individuals regarded employment in the civil servant system as a public political office. For example, a woman named Zhang, who was preparing to take the civil servant exams while already in well-paid employment, stated, "now I work for an accounting company and nobody cares in my community but if I were to work as a civil servant, 就有面子 (I would have face and people will look up to me)" (China Daily, 201010/12). In the same breath she said, 宁为鸡头，不为牛后 ("I would rather be a chicken head than a bull's behind") (ibid.).

This statement is testimony to the continued combination of power and public office in China (Chou, 2008, p. 62). Public office in the PRC continues to signify honor and power, such that individuals prefer to abandon secure careers for the sake of beaming in the glory of public office, which is now regarded as an official position (Burns, 2010, p. 50). This is supported by the low status traditionally afforded to commercial undertakings in China, which may also explain the seemingly high frequency of logocentric undertakings (Apter and Saich, 1994, p. 107). It seems as if the persistence of logocentric capital and its viability in the reform PRC is the source for the popularity of employment in the civil servant system, a tendency which perpetuates the reign of political integrity over the three basic principles of the civil servant system discussed in the next section.

5.7.0 The reign of political integrity over the three basic principles of the civil servant system

The tendency of preferring political integrity as a criterion for practice in the civil servant system seems to have impeded the implementation of the reform policies. The failure to implement the three reform principles has resulted in the Civil Servant Reform Regulations (1993) and the Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (2005) being overridden. The tendency of preferring political integrity is traceable to Maoist discourse, in the running of the pre-reform cadre-system, and to the ancient Chinese tendency to learn from role models, which can be

discerned in the ideals that serve as a foundation of the Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (2005). The combination of the ancient Confucian prescription of knowledge and Maoist notions of access to power through prescribed knowledge seems to continue as a foundation for the law of the civil servant system. The next section examines the articles of this law to elucidate the factors that that tend to illustrate the influence of Maoist discourse in the practice of the civil service reforms.

5.7.1 The Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (2005)

The civil servant law is examined in relation to the following two premises: the practice of the pre-reform cadre-system and the influence of Article (4), focusing on its ability to override all other articles of the Civil Servant Law (2005). How does Maoist discourse reflect the practices of the pre-reform cadre system? How does Maoist discourse legitimate the practice of the civil service reforms? How does Maoist discourse serve as a mitigating agent that serves to override the foundational factors of the civil service reforms?

The preamble of the Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (2005) effective from January 1, 2006, states that it is formulated in accordance with the constitution for regulating the administration of civil servants and for strengthening supervision and ensuring the legitimate rights of civil servants. Article (2) elaborates on the scope of the term civil servant as referring to personnel who perform public duties according to law, who are included in the state administrative staff and whose wages and welfare are borne by state public finance. Article (3) states that the obligations, rights and administration of a civil servant shall be governed by the present law and where there are different provisions on the appointment, dismissal and supervision of leading civil servants and on the obligations, rights and administration of judges and prosecuting attorneys, such provisions shall be observed. The first three articles of the civil servant law reflect a shift from the pre-reform cadre system and a move towards more contemporary civil servant legislation. However, Article (4) of the same law brings in a twist that seems to signal a return to the pre-reform cadre system (Chan, 2007 & Suizhou, p, 390; Burns & Xiaoqi, 2010, p. 60; Chou, 2008, p. 60):

Article (4) reads as follows:

> The guidance of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong's thought and Deng Xiaoping's theory and the important thought of the "Three Represents" shall be persisted in the civil service

> system. The basic route of the preliminary stage of socialism and the cadre routes as well as the guidelines of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) shall be carried out in the civil servant system. The principle that the CPC assumes the administration of cadres shall be insisted upon.

In reaction to Article (4) of the civil servant law, Chou (2008, p. 60) states that the article obliges civil servants to follow the thought of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Deng Xiaoping and the "Three Represents". Chou then concludes that the consequences of this provision may serve as a legal basis for replacing meritocracy with Party loyalty in personnel management during political crises. Burns (2008) and Wang (2010) add that civil service management in China is embedded in a system of one party rule, where the CCP plays the leading role and persists on the principle of *dang guan ganbu* 党管干部 (placing cadres under party supervision) including civil servants. These observations reflect the influence that Article (4) has on the rest of the civil servant legislation, where the article in question serves as a directive to follow the Party line and, therefore, reflects a return to the pre-reform cadre system. Another effect of Article (4) not mentioned in the above studies is the lack of separation between the treatment of civil servants and Party cadres, whereby the rules that apply to the management of Party cadres also apply to civil servants (Chen, 2007). This is contrary to the practice in Western countries, where civil servants are politically neutral and do not show any party affiliation while practicing as civil servants. In contrast, the PRC guidelines for the civil servant system stipulate that, "Our country's civil servant system persists in the efforts of establishing economic reforms, persists to follow the principles of the reform and openness basic line".

What are the mitigating effects observed in the implementation of Article (4) in overriding the rest of the articles of the law of the civil servant system? Overriding the law has observed effects on the practices of lower levels of government, as in counties and townships. Burns (2010, p. 61) states that staffing at these levels tends to be largely politically determined. Burns further observes that appointments of this kind are important means for local Party committees to build up patronage, and thus local Party committees have a great incentive to flout the establishment plan. This building up of patronage may be a reflection of *guanxi* 关系 (relations), the kind of relationships that provide a platform for nepotism and are so common that they are viewed as the norm in various fields of society. The manner in which Articles (4) and (7) are implemented also permits flouting that is beneficial to lower level regions where the local

governments have fewer resources and cannot compete with other developed regions in following the stringent stipulation of the law. In these regions, the civil servant system may be said to be adhering to the pragmatic principle of "Serving the People" in a befitting manner in accordance to their needs rather than dogmatically following the rule of law. In these underdeveloped regions and lower levels of government, the civil servant reforms have had the threefold effects of providing employment, as evidenced by overstaffing and redundancy in the civil servant systems of these regions, establishing a grassroots government presence and creating social stability (Chou, 2008, p. 61).

Article (12) line (3) states that; "Serving the people heart and soul and being subject to the supervision of the people" 全心全意为人民服务，接受人民监督. This line features in the majority of Mao's speeches and it is standard practice to include it in works related to political and social matters in the PRC (2004). However, the practice of stipulating laws using political maxims may tend to undermine the efforts towards reform and impede the mechanisms that are meant to increase the efficiency of government management.

Appraisal mechanisms are not applicable under a system of strict political hierarchy, as witnessed in Article (13) under the title, "Civil Servant may enjoy the following rights". Line 5, of the Article (13) states that a civil servant has a right to "Putting forward criticism or suggestions on the work of leaders of the leading organ he works for"; line 6 states that a civil servant has a right of "lodging a complaint or accusation". This study argues that the practice of Article (13) is impeded by the type of hierarchy and the old family model practice observed within the ranks of the civil servant system. Furthermore, the tendency towards 对上级负责 (political loyalty to senior officers) as opposed to 对群众负责 (loyalty or answerable to the people) would impede the process of lodging complains and criticism with their seniors, who may justify their shortfalls using the dictum of "serving the people". The probable cause of such a scenario is likely to be bound in the definition of the expression 全心全意为人民服务 (Serving the People heart and soul and being subject to the supervision of the people), which still commands the irrevocable seniors correctness or "truth". It seems, therefore, that the application of the line 全心全意为人民服务 (Serving the People heart and soul and being subject to the supervision of the people) plays the role of preventing political neutrality and emphasizes the lack of separation between Party cadres and civil servants (Chen, 2008).

Article (43) emphasizes ideological and political qualifications as pre-requisites for internal promotion within the civil service in a similar manner witnessed in Articles 4, 7, 12, and 13 of the civil servant law providing an opportunity for pragmatism in the implementation of the reforms. The next section examines how individuals that work within the civil servant system relate to the observed traits of Maoist discourse and how they regard the civil servant system even before joining as public servants by examining the civil servant system recruiting mechanism, focusing on the contents of past examination papers and examination preparation materials that are popular with postgraduate students and members of the population at large.

5.8.0 Civil Servant recruitment examinations

In the introduction to this chapter, it was stated that the civil servant system was introduced in an effort to implement the reform policies of the PRC. Viewed in this manner, the civil service serves as the engine that manages and oversees the practice of implementing the reform policies (Chou, 2008). This section starts by elaborating the definition of the term civil servant in the PRC, followed by a discussion of the pre-conditions for joining the civil servant system. The statistics of the exams since the civil servant law was promulgated are then presented, coupled with an analysis of the popularity of the civil servant examinations and career possibilities (China Daily 2010; Epoch Times 2012/06). The analysis then leads to an examination of two of the section of the civil servant system examination titled "Logic" (2011-20122) 国家公务员录用考试, (2012, p. 214-263). These sections are examined in relation to their political content and *chengyu* (four-character idioms), respectively. It is argued that the manner in which the two topics are used in the exams directly prescribes the thought patterns required for employment within the civil service.

5.9.0 Who is a civil servant in the PRC?

In defining the scope of the term civil servant in the PRC, Article (2) of the Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (2005) states:

> "The term 'civil servant' as mentioned in the present Law refers to those personnel who perform public duties according to law and have been included in the administrative staffing and whose wages and welfare are borne by the state public finance".

The scope of Article (2) is broader than that of the 1993 Provisional Regulation of State Civil

Servants. The Provisional Regulation of State Civil Servants excluded health, education and social service providers who did not work in agencies executing administrative functions (Chou, 2008, p.55). Although the reason for the change in scope of those employed in the civil service is beyond the confines of this study, the tendency or willingness to centralize all government organs under one managing body seem to reflect on the continued efforts of politicization of separate spheres of practice in reform PRC, which indicates that despite the efforts at reforming the PRC, the CCP is further strengthening its grip on power.

5.9.1 Requirements for joining the civil servant system

Article (11) of The Law of the Civil Servant System defines the criteria for those who may be employed as public servants under the section on Qualifications, Obligations and Rights as follows:

A civil servant shall meet the following requirements:

1) Is a citizen of the People's Republic of China;
2) Has reached the age of 18;
3) Upholds the Constitution of the People's Republic of China;
4) Has good ethics;
5) Being in a proper health to perform her/his functions and duties normally;
6) Having the educational level and working capacity as required by the post; and
7) Any other requirement prescribed by law.

The all-encompassing nature of Article (11) suggests a move away from the cadre system, where all public servants doubled as political activists and the basic requirement for employment was a correct political background and good political record. Moreover, the contents of Article (11) can be seen to reflect two goals; to add new blood to the Party ranks and to practice the ideals of the Chinese revolution and those stipulated in Maoist discourse.

5.9.2 Statistics of the civil servant examination candidates

The numbers of candidates taking the civil servant system examinations have been steadily growing ever since the exams were introduced. The latest figures show that from 1997 to 2009 there has been a 40% growth in the numbers of applicants (Zhong Hong, 2011; China Daily 11/12/2011). Further figures show that the number of people who actually took the exams

increased on average 17% per annum from 1997 to 2007. The increase was less in 2008 and 2009 due to global economic crisis. However, a record high number of 1.4 million applicants was reached in 2010. In relation to the 465, 000 available posts, the ratio of success in that year was one in every three examinees (China Daily, 09/01/2010). According to ChinaHR.com, on August 21 (2011), top job choice of college graduates shifted from the financial sector to governments jobs. In 2011, CCTV reported that close to one million applicants took part in the exam to compete for 20,000 government positions. This means that only 1 out of 50 applicants were selected, a four year high for the ratio of applicants to new government jobs (Epoch Times, 06/2012).

Table 7:[47]

Number of Vacancies and Applicants for Centrally-managed Civil Service Positions, 1994–2012

Year	No. of applicants (A)	No. of vacancies (B)	Ratio of A to B
1994	4,306	440	9.8
1995	6,726	490	13.7
1996	7,160	737	9.7
1997	8,850	N/A	N/A
2001	32,904	4,500	7.2
2002	62,268	4,800	13.0
2003	87,772	5,400	16.3
2004	140,184	8,000	17.5
2005	406,000	8,622	46.9
2006	535,574	12,724	42.1
2007	356,300	12,725	28.0
2008	637,344	13,278	48.0
2009	775,000	13,500	57.4
2010	927,000	14,391	59.1
2011	902,000	15,290	59.1

[47] Sources: Zhongguowang, http://big5.china.com.cn/education/zhuanti/pta/txt/2008-0/13/content_16604619.htm, accessed 23 February 2009; "Number of applicants for national civil servants exam reaches historical high", Sohu, http://learning.sohu.com/20081119/n260721601.shtml, accessed 20 December 2010.
Source for 2010–2012 figures: http://news.china.com/domestic/945/20111127/16889838.html 2011-11-29.

2012	960,000	17,941	53.1

The above statistics bear witness to the popularity of the civil servant system as a place of employment. The observation that the civil service is popular with graduates is a proof that the efforts to recruit new blood into public service have been successful (China Daily, 2010/12/11). Interviews conducted for this study show that 80 to 90% of graduates aspire to work within the civil service and would sit the requisite examinations if the opportunity presented itself. Moreover, the high level of interest among graduates for employment in the civil service does not translate into a lack of employment opportunities in other sectors of the reform PRC. The majority of the interviewed graduates expressed that they would choose the civil service as a place of employment because of stability and less work pressure compared to the newly emerging industries in the reform PRC (Epoch Times, 2012/06). This logic supports the available statistics on those sitting civil servant system exams, where the ratio is 1:1500 between available job posts and individuals applying to take the exams. The next section presents the views of some individuals who intend or who have already taken the civil servant system entry-exams.

5.9.3 Popularity of the civil servant system entry exams and public office

According to the figures from the *China Economist,* in 2009, 60% of all the administrative costs were spent on official hospitality, international tours and government vehicles and similar perks, which are classed in the government budget as the "three public expenditures" (China Economist March, 2012; Epoch Times 06/2012). This source further point out that one third of government expenditure in the PRC, the second largest economy in the world, goes towards its employees. It is small wonder then that holding office in the civil service is such a popular form of employment among people from all walks of life (ibid).

The social status afforded to individuals working in the civil servant system featured as a strong reason for seeking employment in the civil servant system. When questioned about her intention for changing employment, Wang answered that one gained more respect and although the civil service paid less salary than the private sector she did not care, because the system had enough fringe benefits (China Daily, 08/12/2010). I came across several other encounters of this kind while collecting data in Beijing and Zhejiang. Examining why highly qualified individuals

choose to leave well salaried jobs and instead opt for employment within the civil service at 2.000 Yuan per month entry-level salary (State Administration of Civil Servants, SACS, 2010) is beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, although fringe benefits and job security are undoubtedly basic reasons for popularity of the civil servant system, they do not enlighten us as to what is demanded of the candidates who sit the entry-exams. The next sections briefly examine the contents of the entry-exams to find out what is required of candidate civil servants.

5.10.0 Examination of the contents of the civil servant system exams

The contents of the civil servant system exams should shed light on the factors that influence the implementation of the reform processes. This section focuses on the three following parts from the civil servant entry-exams: "The use of *chengyu* in the exams and their increased difficulty over the years" and "Types of categories under which *chengyu* (four character idioms) are examined."

5.10.1 *Chengyu* 成语 (Four-character idioms) in civil servant system entry-exams

The treatment of *chengyu* (four-character idioms) in the entry-exams over the years reflects on the importance of this language feature in the processes of decision-making and in the affirmation of rules and regulations within the civil servant system (2012 国家公务员录用考试专业教材, pp. 263-85). In civil servant entry-exams, *chengyu* (four-character idioms) are located under the sub-section titled "Logic Assessment (ibid.)." The section on logic assessment defines *chengyu* (four-character idioms) as follows;

> 成语，它是比大而语法功能又相当于词的语言单位大多由四字组成.
> *"Chengyu* (four character idioms) are mostly composed of four characters whose function surpasses those found in other grammatical functions and then in any other forms of language units". (ibid., p. 274)

As it stands, this statement suggests that the meanings embedded in *chengyu* (four character idioms) are beyond grammatical rules and may, therefore, override other normal everyday meanings. The definition of *chengyu* (four character idioms) in Chapter Two of this study confirmed that they have the ability to defy grammatical structures and rigorous classification, because their meanings tend to rely on the premises of the tales or events of their origins (Lee,

1999, p. 43-106; Ni, 1990, p. 265-293; Wu, 1992, p. 78). If *chengyu* are able to defy grammatical structures and yet deliver full meanings, it stands to reason that 'ordinary' expressions using the rule of grammar take a secondary role in conditions where understanding *chengyu* is insisted upon as the foundation for testing knowledge. This statement is supported by the details presented in the next section of the increased use and positioning of *chengyu* 成语 (four-character idioms) in civil servant system entry-exams.

5.10.2 The use of *Chengyu* 成语 (Four-character idioms) in civil servant system entry-exams

Chengyu 成语 have traditionally been used in China as a tool for language comprehension (Ni, 1990, p. 2; Myers, 1991, p. 21-22; Lai, 1972, p. viii; Nall, 2009, p. 3-4). The tradition can be observed in the institutions that play a central role in implementing the reform policies, such as the civil servant system. The civil servant system tests the knowledge of *chengyu* 成语 in its entry examination, as a stipulated requirement for carrying out the duties of a civil servant (2012 国家公务考试, p. 274). The importance of *chengyu* 成语 for carrying out the duties of a civil servant is demonstrated by the fact that *chengyu* 成语 it currently takes up to 60% of the language comprehension section in the entry exam compared to 40% in 1991, as illustrated in Table 9 below. Moreover, in the earlier exams, the examinees were only required to recognize correct *chengyu* 成语 and fill-in the gaps in the sentences provided in the language comprehension section (ibid.). Accordingly, both the amount and the level of difficulty of *chengyu* 成语 have increased in since 2007, as illustrated by the figures in Tables 8 and 9. The details of the tests are derived from the 2012 civil servant system entry-exam materials (2012 国家公务考试, pp. 263-285).

5.10.3 Table 8

Examination topics	Fill-in spaces	Yearly allocation of *chengyu* 成语 questions		
		Year 2011	Year 2010	Year 2009
Words only	Two spaces	4	9	7
Words only	Three spaces	4	2	2

Four-character idioms	One space	2	1	3
Four-character idioms	Two space	1	1	2
Four-character idioms	Three spaces	2	0	0
Words + four-character idioms	Two spaces	6	6	4
Words + four-character idioms	Three spaces	1	1	2

Source: 2009-2011 National Civil Servant Exams –Fill-in words table (p. 260)

The figures in Table 8 show a decrease in the number of fill-in words, as opposed to an increase observed in the numbers for fill-in *chengyu* 成语. However, they also show a general increase in the testing of this phenomenon in the civil servant system.

5.10.4 Table 9

Type / Year	One space	Two spaces	Three spaces	Mixed mode	Total	percentage
2007	3	/	/	/	3	15%
2008	2	/	/	5	7	35%
2009	3	2	/	6	11	55%
2010	1	1	/	7	9	45%
2011	2	1	1	8	12	60%

Source: 2012 国家公务考试, p. 274

The figures in Table 9 show the successive increase in the testing of *chengyu* 成语 in the national civil servant examinations from 2007 to 2011. The percentage at the end of each row refers to the amount of *chengyu* examined in the language sub-section titled "Logic Assessment" (2012 国家公务员录用考试专业教材, p. 263-285).

Tables 7 and 8 show following three developments in the application of *chengyu* 成语 in the language and comprehension section of the national civil servant examination:

1- An overall increase in the quantity of *chengyu* 成语 examined in the civil servant system.
2- Greater prominence afforded to the knowledge of *chengyu* 成语 in the civil servant system examination.
3- An increase in the level of difficulty of *chengyu* 成语 examined in the civil servant system.

Source: (2012 国家公务考试, p. 274-278)

A further sign of the prominence of *chengyu* 成语 in the civil servant entry-exams is the fact the candidates are tested on their correct use and interpretation. The examinees are tested on their knowledge of the following eight categories relating to *chengyu* 成语, which tend to have high rates of misinterpretation:

1- Interpretation of *chengyu* 成语 based on the understanding of its meaning and origin.
2- The misuse of the object of *chengyu* 成语.
3- The use of superlatives (emotive color) in *chengyu* 成语.
4- Correct semantic expression of *chengyu* 成语.
5- The level of positive and negative characterization of *chengyu* 成语.
6- Correct parts of speech and syntactic functions found in *chengyu* 成语.
7- Semantic repetition as expressed in *chengyu* 成语.
8- Modest and improper use of *chengyu* 成语.

Source: (2012 国家公务考试, p. 274-278)

These categories of *chengyu* 成语 tested in the civil service system entry-exams are complemented by a separate list published in the study materials for the examinations. The list below details the pitfalls that examinees may encounter when they are tested on *chengyu* 成语 in their entry-exams:

1- Error-prone *chengyu* (four character idioms) tables 常考易错成语表.

2- A list of the present fifty Chinese idioms found in the civil servant system examination paper.

3- Specifics of the idioms applied in past examinations. 过考中成语的查特点.

4 - Elaboration on tricky questions and traps that examinees encounter in answering questions posed in the logic assessment section comprised of Chinese idioms. 常见八命题陷阱.

5- Issues to consider when candidates apply Chinese idioms in their daily work. 成语特殊题型之成语连用. Standard idioms used in conjunction to special kinds of questions in everyday practice of a civil servant.

The discussion on the testing of the national civil servant candidates' knowledge of *chengyu* 成语 has highlighted several points that are worth noting. First, emphasis is made to ensure that future civil servants understand how and where to use *chengyu* 成语. Second, the type of *chengyu* 成语 examined covers a wide range of categories, including positive and negative, and complementary and derogative as presented by Ni (1990, p. 265) and Lee (1978, pp.106-145). Although this does not mean there is a standard categorization of *chengyu* 成语, it may perhaps serve to indicate the hierarchical use of *chengyu* 成语 within formal settings, as witnessed in the case of the civil servant system.

5.10.5 Summary

The analysis of the influence of Maoist discourse within the civil servant system has revealed that Mao's thought plays a dual role in serving first to legitimate the reform of the civil servant system while at the same time mitigating pragmatic instances when the rule of law is compromised in favour of political correctness. The matter is further complicated by the observation that the very same ancient rhetorical structures that are used to support the legislation for reforming the civil servant system, which is framed in accordance with the ideals of serving the people, also serve to sustain the archaic forms of hierarchy that encourage the 'old family model'. These tendencies show that despite the government's will to reform the management system, some characteristics of the pre-reform period are still in place and continue to influence the direction of the reforms. The analysis of the processes of the civil servant system

suggests that the duality embedded in some of the political performatives allows a form of pragmatism which strictly adheres to the foundations set by the demands of the traditional family model. This study has argued so far that in the absence of sloganeering which was the main vehicle for revolutionary discourse, Maoist texts have now been transformed to suit the specialized fields that resulted from the introduction of the reform era as witnessed in the case of the civil servant system. Such realization does not answer however on how the systematized Maoist discourse is routinized among the masses and in what mode it continues to assert its authority. These questions are the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Six – Jingshen – An ultimate instrument of routinization and ethical dualism

6.0.0 Introduction

The dual role discerned in the implementation of Maoist discourse during reform PRC is not limited to the civil servant system, but extends to other fields of practice, as revealed in the findings of the presented in the previous Chapter. This manifestation is suggested to have its foundations in the traditional Chinese concepts that help construct expressions that articulate a more inclusive public family while serving to sustain practices that reflect the old family model. The second feature that enables the duality of Maoist discourse is found in the exchange of words between the public and political fields. This kind of borrowing is universal observable in various cultures when ordinary words make a 'break' and acquire new meanings that signify the ideals representative of a given real or imagined society.

The interchangeability of ordinary language and political terms is particularly high in the PRC. Because of its folky language, the contents and themes of the *Laosanpian* have experienced a higher rate of the back and forth borrowing of terms between political field and general public. The use of the political term *jingshen* exemplifies the back and forth borrowing process, where it features extensively in the contemporary discourse of the PRC and seems to be a political performative around which the attributes of *shan* 善 (good) converge in signifying the correct, admissible, normal and legal.

A similar pattern to that of *jingshen* can be observed with the title *Laosanpian*, which has been found to be manifest in two forms. For example, while in politics the expression refers to the three texts that are the subject of this study, in popular culture the expression "*Laosanpian*"

refers to that which is good, standard practice and usual. The figures below show the distribution of the two uses of the term *Laosanpian* in diverse everyday settings in the PRC.

A-	Type	Source	Period Surveyed	Original texts	Title
-	State Media	People's Daily	Jan. to Nov. 2012	47%	53%

(Source: People's daily online accessed 02 January to 11December 2012) [48]

B-	Type	Source	Period Surveyed	Original texts	Title
-	Public media	Baidu	Jan. to Nov. 2012	39%	61%

(Source: Baidu online accessed 02 January to 11December 2012) [49]

The above figures show that the state and its institutions still adhere to the original use of the term *Laosanpian.* However the term *Laosanpian* has among the general public acquired new and compact meanings and used to signify that which is standard and correct. The trajectory of the use and transformation of the term "*Laosanpian*" is relatively easy to trace as it has served as a title of the collection of Mao's three political texts and gained fame at the height of a violent social movement and as it continues to be used in socio-political and mundane settings. Another term that has shown to have ubiquitous qualities as the *Laosanpian* in the PRC politics is the *jingshen* 精神 (spirit) and the next sections will attempt to answer the questions as to how the term first transformed into a political signifier, gained popularity and how it is today used in the PRC.

6.1.0 *Jingshen* 精神 (Spirit) as an 'empty signifier'

The current meanings of *jingshen* 精神 (spirit) are not simply to define, except for the fact it stands for all that is good. The term *jingshen* can be seen to have changed from serving to

[48] See Appendix 6 for a list of the sites visited for the survey on the different uses of the *Laosanpian.* Some fields use the expression to refer to the entire text collection, while others only use the title to express meanings in diverse social and political settings. Source website:www.renmin.com

[49] See Appendix 6 for a list of the sites visited for the survey on the different uses of the *Laosanpian.* Some fields use the expression to refer to the entire text collection, while others only use the title to express meanings in diverse social and political settings. Source website:www.baidu.com

routinize political ideals to currently playing a role in systematizing the orthodox doctrine of the PRC. Because of the ubiquity of the term throughout Chinese history it can be identified as a perpetual 'empty signifier'.

The term 'empty signifier' was coined by Lévi-Strauss to explain words that have indefinite meaning, such as 'mana', 'freedom', and 'liberty'. Lévi-Strauss states that these words have meanings that are indefinable in the sense that although they cannot be defined as tangible, they come to take on larger meanings that encompass powerful feelings and values. Ernesto Laclau's study *Emancipation(s)* (1996) uses the idea of the 'empty signifier' to refer to absent social rights and values. The political term, *jingshen*, can be regarded as an empty signifier, in that while it means all that which is good, it can also mean anything that is deemed correct by the political powers. This logic points toward the manifestation of ethical dualism, where the term *jingshen* has overtime been expropriated of all negative attributions. One such example being, if one states that a certain person has *jingshen,* the uttering translates to "good spirit" which is implicit within the term. On how the term *jingshen* has come acquire such magical signification and performative force from the beginning is hard to tell but it is possible to trace its political trajectory starting with the turn of the twentieth century. A short presentation of diverse meanings of the term *jingshen* found in the Chinese lexicon is the subject of the next section.

6.2.0 Definitions of the term *jingshen* 精神

The lexical unit *jingshen* 精神 (spirit) signifies spirit, mind, essence, vigor, vitality, mind and consciousness. These definitions of *jingshen* may be used in combination with other lexical units to form compound expressions. The most commonly encountered compound terms are 精神错乱 insanity, 精神病 mental disorder, 精神鼓励 moral encouragement, 精神头儿 vigor or energy, 精神文明 spiritual civilization and 精神污染 spiritual/cultural contamination. The aforementioned *jingshen* compounds function as descriptions of the type spirit encountered as signifying either good or bad. In this study, the term *jingshen* is translated into the lexical unit (spirit) and is used in this manner when examining the development, functionality and manifestation of the term as a political performative.

6.3.0 Historical trajectory of the term *jingshen*

The term *jingshen* was used as a political term among royalists at the beginning of the 20th century (Zhou, S. and Zhou, X., 2004). The royalists used the term to oppose the invasion of values that they felt were in conflict to those of imperial China. The use of *jingshen* as a political term took a new turn in Yan'an during the Chinese revolution, where it was first used as an adjective in reference to vitality and the ability to achieve great deeds. For instance, it is used in this manner in the text "In Memory of Norman Bethune", where it is highly featured to describe good deeds. Moreover, the manner in which Mao uses the word *jingshen* in the last sentence of the article connects with other traditional Chinese concepts and ultimately strips the term of any bad attributes, as revealed in the sentence below:

> 我们大家要学习他毫无自私自利的精神。从这点出发，就可以变为大有利于人民的人。一个人能力有大小，但只要有这点精神，就是一个高尚的人，一个纯粹的人，一个道德的人，一个脱离低级趣味的人，一个有益于人民的人。
>
> We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness from him. With this spirit everyone can be very useful to the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, a man of moral integrity and above vulgar interests, a man who is of value to the people. ("In Memory of Norman Bethune")

The powers attributed to the term *jingshen* in the above excerpt signify characteristics that are beyond being described as the good and instead refer to the good as embodied, such that it becomes a sense of being. The term *jingshen* is described as resulting in a purity of the mind, moral integrity and being above vulgar interests. By attributing such values to *jingshen* within the context of Chinese culture and society, Mao directly connects the term to traditional Chinese values. The first such connection is the sense of a purified mind, which reflects the mind of a sage, which may be acquired through possessing a specific type of *jingshen*. The second connection is moral integrity *daode* 道德, which Zhu Xi (1130-1200) refers to as the basic aspect of *liangzhi* 良知 (innate knowing), an innate value that gives people the ability to differentiate between right and wrong. The third connection relates to the sense that possessing such a spirit results in a man that is beyond vulgar interests. All three connections reflect the definition of

jingshen not only as ability, but also as a state possessed by a *junzi* 君子 (gentleman) as opposed to a *xiaoren* 小人 (a lesser person). This definition is made relevant to the Chinese revolution in the last part of the above excerpt, which states, 一个有益于人民的人 (a man who is of value/benefit to the people). The use of the definition of a *junzi* 君子 (gentleman) to describe "a man who is of value to the people", first borrows from the traditional notions of *zhengqi* and *xieqi*. The former signifies possession of the ability to become a gentleman, while the latter indicates the lack of such ability (Graziani, 2009). In the above excerpt, the sentence "A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure" suggests that the spirit, which is defined as a sense of being a (superior man) 君子, is accessible to all; as was the case with Zhu Xi's *liangzhi* 良知 (innate knowledge). In the final analysis, the definition of the term *jingshen* 精神 (spirit) is exorcized of all the attributes of *xie* 邪 (evil). Therefore, in relation to the present reform era, the term is manifest as an ultimate instrument of ethical dualism.

The redefinition of the term *jingshen* in the Yan'an revolutionary era was not limited to signifying superior selfless beings serving the people, it also served as a liberatory platform for those previously ranked low in the traditional Chinese hierarchical system. The manifestation of the liberatory platform is discernible in the existence of the obligatory exegetical bonding *tiantian du* 天天读 (everyday reading sessions) whose purpose was to equip individuals with the correct type of *jingshen* 精神, that is, total devotion to the Chinese revolution. This platform which served as the core for political education for all cadres irrespective of background bundled together intellectuals, semi-illiterate, illiterates, former business people, land lords and peasants everyone to accumulate collective capital. The process of collective reading was also liberatory in the sense that "exegetical bonding," made each person feel that he or she had transcended individual limitations, had "overcome" one's deficiencies, and therefore had gained more from the collectivity than one had given up by joining the revolution (Apter, 1993, p. 208).

The liberatory aspects of the notion of *jingshen* 精神 were in its proclamation that the makings of a better man for a new China was primarily in the hands of each and every individual. The political term *jingshen* as defined during the Yan'an revolutionary era with its liberatory function was also used to legitimate the revolution and the Party. The onset of the reform of the PRC saw the term *jingshen* re-emerge as a political instrument for articulating the way forward for the dawning political era. This was witnessed at the highest political level, with Deng

Xiaoping (2004) pointing out that "we want to build the Socialist country, not only to have a high degree of material civilization, but also a high degree of spiritual civilization" (Zhou, S. and Zhou, X., 2004). In reference to the two types of spirit Deng Xiaoping repeated the phrase in various speeches; emphasizing that with "the two aspects, held firm in both hands" China will march into a glorious future (ibid.).

The use of the term *jingshen* as witnessed in "the two aspects" reflects a return to its function as a tool for systematizing the orthodox doctrine, as was the case during the dialogues between the royalists and the members of the New Culture Movement during the early twentieth century where the former argued for "spiritual civilization in the East as a relative resistance to Western material civilization" (Zhou & Zhou, 2004). The separation of the two spheres was opposed by Qu Qiubai (Qu Quibai Selected Works, 1985), who stated that the two forms of civilization were not in contradiction, as material civilization served as the foundation for spiritual civilization. When combined with the Yan'an version of the term, the re-emergence of *jingshen* in the highest political forums during the reform era has rendered it ubiquitous. This ubiquity seems to serve the process of systematizing the orthodox doctrine, as witnessed in the reform era maxim "socialist spirit with Chinese characteristics" used to legitimate the process of implementing the reform policies.

6.4.0 Types of *jingshen*

Today, *jingshen* is used as a political term and as part of everyday ordinary language in the PRC. However, the term has only one definition, the embodiment of the good, as all other opposites attributes of the term were exorcized during the Yan'an era. Just like the expression *Laosanpian, jingshen* has come to signify the personification and embodiment of correct practice, including all that is admissible in the 'political eyes of the father'.

The exorcized meanings of the political term *jingshen* (spirit) have been preserved through the "learn from heroes and models" campaigns, some of which have become standard institutions, as with "Learn from Lei Feng's Spirit", "Learn for Dr. Bethune's Spirit" and other Central Television campaigns. Through these campaign programs, the political term *jingshen* is expanded and used to qualify different entities, places and/or events, which the entire nation is then supposed to emulate, praise and learn from as part of the national patriotic (re)education rituals that translate into events of social reproduction. Viewed in this manner, *jingshen* signifies events that reincarnate the Yan'an and pre-reform social movements. The national ritualistic

events signified by the political term *jingshen* are *huiyi jingshen* 会议精神 (spirit of the Congress), *wusi jingshen* 无私精神 (selfless spirit), Yan'an *jingshen* 延安精神 (Yan'an spirit), *mofan jingshen* 模范精神 (model spirit), *difang jingshen* 地方精神 (place spirit), *dizheng jingshen* 地震 (earthquake spirit), and *wenhua wuran jingshen* 文化污染精神 (anti-cultural pollution spirit).

How does the notion of *jingshen* as manifest in today's reform PRC relate to the reevaluation of political performatives focusing on the *Laosanpian*? How does the *Laosanpian* qualify as an example of the term *jingshen*, which emerged within political circles long before the Yan'an era? At the onset of the Republic of China, popular use of the term *jingshen* had not lost its negative attributes, such as in *huai jingshen* and therefore differed from that witnessed later during the political movements of Yan'an and the PRC.

In conclusion, the political term *jingshen* is currently manifest as an instrument of ethical dualism or, in other words, as a political performative whose definition has mutated with the course of contemporary Chinese politics, such that it now serves as the ultimate expression of the orthodox doctrine. The power of the political term *jingshen* stems from the fact that its interpretations and definitions are meant to guide all forms of practice, where personal and political spaces continue to defy separation. This study concludes by stating that whatever the origins and potency of discourse or a political term, the extent of its lifespan is due to what the parties that partake in the game deem is necessary. If one of the parties disengaged from using the term, that would spell the demise of the political term *jingshen* and the orthodoxy that it represents.

Conclusions

This study of the PRC political performatives has revealed three apparent tensions. First, the *Laosanpian* may at first seem not to be representative of Maoist discourse, as other revolutionary titles are usually targeted for scholarly research. Accordingly, this study has sought to determine the features that set the texts of the *Laosanpian* apart from the rest of the *Selected works of Mao Zedong.* The lack of information on how the three texts were chosen for inclusion in the *Laosanpian* collection is possibly a topic for future studies.

A second tension that runs throughout this study is the mix of political and rhetorical analyses. The mixture of analytical approaches is reflected in the examination of the continued

patterns of power relations and language in the production and implementation of expressions that represent the Chinese value system. The political analysis focused on the demise of the old and the emergence of new social systems in relation to the paradigm shifts that have occurred throughout the history of Chinese society. The rhetorical or textual analysis examined linguistic factors such as the *chengyu* (four-character idioms) that have been responsible for the continuity of the Chinese value system. Together, these analyses revealed that the political performatives of the PRC are a product of developments that are dictated by the laws of history, where successive paradigm shifts lead at least to aspirations of increasingly inclusive social systems.

This analytical framework helped to reveal that the tendency of relying on repetition and precedence for rationalizing future social systems and practices is a particular trait of the Chinese culture. The inclination to repeat ancient customs, traditions and norms through texts that sustain the Chinese value system and political governance has been asserted by scholars of Chinese studies, who term this manifestation the "cyclical practices of Chinese culture" (Thornton, 2007). Baker (1979; p. 26) uses a rope metaphor to explain the manner in which family values are replicated in Chinese culture. In a study on the concept of *gushi xinbian* (old tales retold), Huss (2000, p. 241) concludes that in China, "eventually everything will be re-written". Furthermore, the seemingly persistent influence of the logocentric model in the implementation of the current reform policies should be understood in light of Chinese culture's tendency to persist using ancient language stocks and rhetorical modes, which not only mimic the past but also forge possible futures for the PRC.

This study further revealed that the ideals articulated in the *Laosanpian* were formulated and implemented within the framework of traditional Chinese concepts, in the form of x*iao* 孝 (filial piety) and stipulated using antipodal structures. Although these traditional concepts were re-engineered during the Chinese revolution to suit the ideals of the new social system they did not lose their central position in stipulating the guidelines for practice and personal relationships. The only observable change is the platform upon which the traditional concept of x*iao* 孝 (filial piety) manifests, where the private family has been replaced by a public family that serves as the conceptual and cultural field for including all members of society. This public family has facilitated the direct control and command of society from the centre, as represented by the Party. In addition, traditional Chinese concepts, antipodal structures and the *Laosanpian* continue to influence the production and implementation of the discourse of the reform PRC.

This study has further revealed that the maxims derived from the ideals of the *Laosanpian*, "Serve the People" 1955 to 1978, "Four Modernizations" 1978 to 1992, "Three Represents" 1992 to 2004 and "Eight Virtues and Eight Dishonors" 2004 and the present "Ecological Civilization – Beautiful China" do not cease to function with the term of office they represent. Instead, these maxims converge around one political 'empty signifier' in the form of the lexical unit *jingshen. Jingshen* is witnessed to manifest as an implicit performative that fuses together social and political meanings and spaces. A similar tendency is observed in the use of the term *Laosanpian*, which is currently widely used to refer to diverse types of mundane practices and to refer to standard occurrences. The manifestation of these two 'empty signifiers' may seem simple and not deserving of any attention, but a closer look at a tapestry that the two terms have woven reveals that they continue to act as agents in demarcating the borders between those inside and those outside the Chinese cultural matrix, as witnessed in the manifestation of the antipodal structure of *nei/wai* 内/外 (inside/outside).

This study has been affected by the lack of information detailing the reason, criterion and methods applied when collecting the three texts that make up the *Laosanpian*. This lack of information limits further discussion on linking the texts to broader events of the revolution. Except for the "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed Mountains", the rest of the *Laosanpian* texts do not link to any specific grand event or movement the pre-PRC Party history. This issue is perhaps a subject for future studies. Thus far, the available information reveals that Lin Biao initiated the collecting of the texts and recommended that they represent the core of Mao's thought. However, it is not possible to state how the lack of information on the role played by Lin Biao in naming and spreading these texts has influenced the analysis and the conclusions of this study. A study of Lin Biao's contributions in putting together the *Laosanpian* and as a propaganda genius who put Mao on a heavenly pedestal would perhaps help in providing other perspectives and interpretations of the PRC's political performatives.

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the findings of this study provide tools and information that may benefit future studies on political performatives, on how they set the scene for power dynamics in society and how individuals, in turn, engage with the texts in their own terms and not necessarily as intended by those that sanction the discourse as expressed in the dictum *shangyou zhengce, xia youduice* 上有政策，下有对策 (the government has its policies

and the people have their own measures) and sometimes expressed as 政府有政策地方有对策 (the government has its policies and localities have counter measures).[50]

The last apparent limitation is perhaps circumstantial or temporal, in that the findings and conclusions of this study have been reached at a time when the majority of people in the PRC society still have vivid memories of major social movements such as the Chinese revolution, the establishment of the PRC, the Commune production system and the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, only future studies will be able to determine whether the discerned persistence of traditional Chinese concepts, the use of *chengyu,* antipodal structures and Maoist discourse, is not simply a mirage perceived by the researcher's encounter with the reform and opening up policies of the PRC.

Lastly due to the time constraints and limitations of the research at this level, two important features pertaining to re-evaluating the PRC political performatives were not addressed. The first is the absence of heroines or female sages in the majority of revolutionary texts and in the *Laosanpian* in particular which purports through the dictum "Serve the People" to advocate for an all-inclusive social system. The absence of heroines in the texts of the *Laosanpian* is the cause for concern especially when Mao's initial political awakening addressed injustices against women as witnessed in essays such as "Miss Chao's Suicide, 1919" (Witke, 1967). The second feature that was not addressed in the present study is the acculturation of political dogmas through primary school education. The present study argues that besides the strong and persistent traditional Chinese concepts there is still a deliberate and calculated infusion of political contents into various fields of society by the state, especially in the primary education system. The acculturation process is witnessed when the school textbooks contain a political maxim such as "Eight Honours and Eight Shames" on the first page and opposite is a short story about family relationships and other basic social values. Using Bourdieu's language, such a process constitutes "double inculcation" with politics riding on social values and vice-versa. Such practice was observed in the grade 1,2,3,4 and 5 primary school textbooks and the tendency is sustained even in higher primary school materials only this time political messages are more sparsely placed all along the textbook.[51]

So, what is the state of the PRC political performatives? The implementation of the reform policies have set on processes that seek to transform the state of the PRC political

[50] A popular Chinese saying used to describe the relationship between local authorities and central government.
[51] See Appendix 8.

performatives but the resulting changes are slow and continue to rely on the foundations that were set during the onset of PRC. The foundation continuous to be viable and will continue to do so as long as the state manages to sell its rhetoric of《中华民族伟大复兴》, *'The Great national rejuvenation'*.

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高慎盈 《广告“成语新编”满纸荒唐言》，载《语文建设》1995年第6期.

李运波 《也说“谐音广告”》，载《中国广告》1996年第2期.

陈莎《广告“谐音成语”文化现象透视》，载 《修辞学习》1996年第6期.

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http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_25.htm ‘In Memory of Dr. Bethune’ 1939-12-21

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_02.htm ‘Reform Our Study’ 1941-05-xx

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_08.htm ‘Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art’ 1942-05-02

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_06.htm ‘Rectify the Party’s Style of Work’ 1942-02-01

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_19.htm ‘Serve the People’ 1944-09-08

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_26.htm 'The Old Man Who Moved Mountains' 1945-06-11
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/index.htm (accessed 2012.10.01).
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/index.htm (accessed 2012.10.01).
http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2012-11/17/content_2268826.htm; (accessed 2012-12-01).
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2012-11/18/nw.D110000renmrb_20121118_3-01.htm (accessed 2012-12-01).
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Appendix 1

Laosanpian Four-character Idioms and Four-Character Phrases

In Memory of Norman Bethune

Four-Character Idioms	Meanings	Origins
buyuan wanli 不远万里	to make light of traveling from afar	《孟子》
yishen xunzhi 以身殉职	to die at one's post	《孟子》
haobu liji, zhuanmen liren **毫不利己**,专门利人	to consider others before the self	《汉语成语大全》第 2 版第 601 页
manqiang rechen 满腔热忱	to be full of enthusiasm	xxx
mobu guanxin 漠不关心	to be indifferent	清.李绿园《歧路灯》第九十五回
mamu buren 麻木不仁	to be insensitive	清.文康《儿女英雄传》第二十七回
jingyi qiujing 精益求精	to aspire for more perfection	宋 .朱熹《四书集注》
jianyi siqian 见异思迁	Grass is always greener on the other side	《管子.小匡》
zisi zili 自私自利	to be selfish	明.《焚书.王龙溪先生告文》

Ordinary Four Character Phrases			
gongchan dangyuan 共产党员 member of the communist party	*kangrizhanzheng* 抗日战争 anti-Japanese War	*zhongguo renmin..* 中国人民 the Chinese people	*Jiefang shiye* 解放事业 liberation mission
goji zhuyi 国际主义 Internationalism	*gongchan zhuyi* 共产主义 Communism	*liening zhuyi* 列宁主义 Leninism	*ziben zhuyi* 资本主义 capitalism
wuchan jieji 无产阶级 the proletariat	*jiefang douzheng* 解放斗争 liberation struggle	*shi jie ge ming* 世界革命 world revolution	*gongchan dangyuan* 共产党员 member of the communist part
di guo zhu yi 帝国主义 Imperialism	*minzu zhuyi* 民族主义 democracy	*aiguo zhuyi* 爱国主义 Patriotism	*nianqing pazhong* 拈轻怕重 to pick easy jobs and shirk hard ones
yishi dangqian 一事当前 regarding the current	*lengleng qingqing* 冷冷清清 cold and cheerless	*wubu weizhi* 无不为之 all for something/somebody	*gongchan zhuyi* 共产主义 communism
ganren zhishen 感人之深 Evoking people's feelings			

Serve the People

Four-Character Idioms	Meanings	Origins
zhongyu taishan 重于泰山	to lay down one's life for a noble cause is worthwhile	汉.司马迁《报任少卿书》
qingyu hongmao 轻于鸿毛	lighter than a goose feather	汉.司马迁《报任少卿书》
wuhu sihai 五湖四海	from all corners of the country	《唐.吕岩《绝句》
side qisuo 死得其所	It is a worthy death	《魏书.张惠普传》

Ordinary Four Character Phrases			
jiefang renmin 解放人民 To free the people	*zhengge renmin* 整个人民 the whole people	*renmin liyi* 人民利益 People's interests	*bitai shanzhong* 比泰山重 Heavier than mount tai
piping zhichu 批评指出 criticize and point out	*dangwai renshi* 党外人士 non-party members	*geming mubiao* 革命目标 revolutionary goal	*zhongguo renmin* 中国人民 the Chinese people
nuli fendou 努力奋斗 make arduous effort, to fight	*Jingbing jianzheng* 精兵简政 better troops and simpler administration	*geming duiwu* 革命队伍 revolutionary ranks	*huxiang guanxin* 互相关心 care for each other
huxiang aihu 互相爱护 take good care of each other	*huxiang bangzhu* 互相帮助 assist each other	*zhengge renmin* 整个人民 the whole people	

The Foolish Old Man who Removed Mountains

Four-Character Idioms	Meanings	Origins
yugong yishan 愚公移山	How Yukong Moved the Mountains	古代寓言故事, 最早见于《列子・汤问》
ganxin qingyuan 甘心情愿	to be most willing	元. 关汉卿《蝴蝶梦》第三折
zizi sunsun 子子孙孙	generation after generation of descendants	《尚书．梓材》
toutou momo 偷偷摸摸	covertly, in a sneaky way	清．曹雪芹《红楼梦》第八十回

Ordinary Four-Character Phrases			
renmin liliang 人民力量 people's power	*quanzhuo renmin* 全国人民 the whole nation	*lingdao jiguan* 领导机关 leading body	*ziwo piping* 自我批评 Self-criticism
minzhu 党内民主 inner-party democracy	*gongzuo gangwei* 工作岗位 post of duty	*quandang tongzhi* 全党同志 all party members	*renmin qunzhong* 人民群众 the masses
xiajuexin 下定决心 make up one's mind	*bupa xisheng* 不怕牺牲 not afraid of sacrifice	*paichu wannan* 排除万难 conquer all obstacles	*zhengqu shengli* 争取胜利 strive for victory
quanguo renmin 全国人民 the whole nation	*zhongguo renmin* 中国人民 the Chinese people	*beishan yugong* 北山愚公 The northern mountain foolish old man	*haobu dongyao* 毫不动摇 unwaveringly
shenxian xiafan 神仙下凡 immortals descend to the earth	*renmin dazhong* 人民大众 the broad masses of the people	*meiguo zhengfu* 美国政府 American government	*fujing fangong* 扶蒋反共 supporting Chiang Kai-Shek against the Communists
		meiguo renmin 美国人民 the American people	*gongkai xuanyan* 公开宣言 public pledge
jiran ruci 既然如此 since it is so	*meiguo zhengfu* 美国政府 American government	*fujiang fangong* 扶蒋反共 supporting Chiang Kai-Shek against the Communists	*zongguo renmin* 中国人民 the Chinese people

shijie chaoliu 世界潮流 trend of the world	*minzu duli* 民族独立 national independence	*renmin minzhu* 人民民主 people's democracy	*diguo zhuyi* 帝国主义 Imperialism
zhongguorenmin 中国人民 the Chinese people	*wuchan jieji* 无产阶级 the proletariat	*zichan jieji* 资产阶级 the bourgeoisie	*fandong niliu* 反动逆流 counter current
wanquan butong 完全不同 totally different	*minzhu shili* 民主势力 democratic forces	*fengjian shili* 封建势力 feudal forces	*huxiang douzheng* 互相斗争 fighting each other
jianjue xiangxin 坚决相信 to firmly believe	*zhongguorenmin* 中国人民 the Chinese people	*gongchan dangyuan* 共产党员 member of the communist part	*kangrizhanzheng* 抗日战争 anti-Japanese War

Appendix 2

Overview of the PEP 10 sets of school textbooks Publications

[The first set]

In February 1951, the Government Administration Council Education Committee approved the publication Department on the "1951 Work Plan for publication". "People's Education Press began renumbering primary and secondary textbooks, and in the establishment of national primary and secondary school textbooks as a foundation for national unity."

Fall 1951, People's Education Press started revising primary and secondary school textbooks and started publishing officially. This is the first national and standardized set of newly published primary and secondary schools teaching.

[The second set]

In 1954, according to the instructions of the Government Administration Council, People's Education Press, commissioned by the Ministry of Education. The primary and secondary subject curriculum system was developed. In the fall of 1956, People's Education Press, prepared and published primary and secondary school textbooks and teaching reference books. The new system was published in gradual phases throughout the country. This is the second national and standardized set of primary and secondary schools teaching.

[The third set]

In May 1959, the Ministry of Education transmitted the CPC Central Committee Party Group resolution "on the preparation of teaching materials for primary and middle schools." According to the central authorities, the Ministry of Education was to re-write the deployment of the National People's Education Publishing House Universal materials. In the fall of 1961, People's Education Press, completed its tenth year and a new system of national supply of primary and secondary schools teaching materials began. This is the third national and standardized set of primary and secondary schools teaching.

[The fourth set]

In 1961, the central cultural and educational group met to discuss the issue of primary and secondary materials. The decision was to compile the existing materials for teaching in primary

and secondary school system which shall serve as trial material while preparing to rewrite the teaching system. In 1962 in accordance with the central spirit and the deployment of the Ministry of Education, People's Education Press, began preparing the new system for primary and secondary research materials. In autumn 1963, the first volume of new textbooks was formally distributed nationally. This is the fourth national and standardized set of primary and secondary schools teaching.

[The fifth set]
After ten years of chaos, Deng Xiaoping had just resumed work on the preparation of national reunification along with finding solutions for possible publishing of new primary and secondary school textbooks. Ministry of Education decided on a new ten years basic curriculum for primary and secondary system, with lesson plans. People's Education Press editors was appointed as the basic primary and secondary school teaching force, drawn from a group of national experts and teachers. The team composed and in place, the national primary and secondary materials work began. In the fall of 1978, the first volume of the primary and secondary textbooks was supplied nationally. This is the fifth newly published set of primary and secondary materials nationwide.

[The sixth set]
In 1981, the Ministry of Education gradually introduced and promulgated the "six-year secondary education program draft trial" and the "six-year draft plan for primary education." The People's Education Press began the preparation of a new system for primary and secondary schools. The fall of 1982, People's Education Press, began with the preparation and publication of textbooks for primary and secondary school system. This is the sixth newly published set of primary and secondary materials nationwide.

[The seventh Set]
In September 1986, commissioned by the State Education Commission, the People's Education Press and other concerned units conducted a full overhaul of the subjects in the primary and secondary school curriculum. The same year in November, the National School Textbook Examination Committee examined and approved the revised syllabus. The fall of 1987, People's Education Press, issued under the new full-time primary and secondary subject curriculum, a

comprehensive revision of primary and secondary materials. This is the seventh newly published set of primary and secondary materials nationwide.

[The eighth set]
In 1988, the State Education Commission under the "The People's Republic of China Compulsory Education Law" issued "compulsory full-time primary school, junior high school plan (draft)" and the nine-year compulsory education curriculum subjects first draft. In the fall of 1990, People's Education Press prepared school materials in the nine experiments (63 systems, 54 systems) and published the experimental materials nationwide including the autonomous regions. In March 1990, the State Education Commission issued "on the current adjustment of high school teaching program opinions", and issued new curriculum subjects. In fall 1991, the People's Education Publishing House accordingly amended and introduced the newly required high school subjects, elective teaching materials. This is the eighth set of newly published primary and secondary materials for national use.

[The ninth set]
In August 1992, the State Board of Education promulgated the National Primary and Secondary Text Commission approval of the "full-time nine-year compulsory primary school, junior high lesson plan (Trial)" and the nine-year compulsory primary and junior secondary school curriculum of 24 subjects (Trial). In the fall of 1993, the People's Education Publishing House under the new framework re-wrote the nine-year compulsory primary and junior middle school teaching subjects (system 54 and 63). After review by the State Education Commission, supply nationwide began. In 1996, the State Education Commission promulgated a new "high school lesson plan (Trial)", led by People's Education Press which commissioned the development of new high school curriculum subjects. People's Education Publishing House prepared a new high school textbook system published in 1997. After review by the State Education Commission, experiments were conducted in the three provinces; revised in all provinces by the year 2000. This is the ninth set of newly published primary and secondary materials for national use.

[The tenth set]
May 2001, the Ministry of Education issued a full-time compulsory education lesson plans and curriculum and standards (trial version). People's Education Publishing House under the new

curriculum standards, employed well-known experts in various disciplines, and a Steering Committee was set up, organized by People Education editorial researchers, universities and scientific research institutes, schools and outstanding teachers. The "three combinations" team prepared new materials with the focus to legal work. In the fall of 2001, newly published textbooks of compulsory education curriculum standard of 14 subjects were reviewed by the Ministry of Education at the national experimental zone. In 2003, the Ministry of Education re-enacted high school lesson plans and curriculum standards subjects (trial version). The People's Education Press prepared a new teaching high school subjects, after the adoption by the Ministry of Education review the experimental area in the state for the experiment. This is the tenth set of newly published primary and secondary materials for national use.

Comments

The present study was allowed to obtain materials published until the beginning of the tenth set, that is, the year 2000. The present study has not been able to obtain materials from beyond this period in accordance to legal stipulations governing the ministry of education which serves as guidelines for the People’s Education Publishing House.

Appendix 3

Laosanpian Publications				
Year	Title	Type	Publisher	Readership
1967	学习老三篇 拼音对照本	Book	中国唱片社	Public
1968/04	老三篇万岁 辅导助读物	Book	解放进文艺出版社	Military
1957	纪念白求恩 初中课本	School book	第五册第九课	Schools
2005	纪念白求恩	School book	解放军出版社	Schools
2007	白求恩在中国	Book	中国协和医科大学出版社	Public
1966/01	老三篇	Book	人民出版社	Public
1966/07	老三篇	Book	人民出版社	Public
1966/11	学习老三篇	Book	人民出版社	Public
1967/07	老三篇	Book	人民出版社	Public
1967/10	老三篇	Book	人民出版社	Public
1967/12	老三篇	Book	人民出版社	Public
1968/01	老三篇	Book	人民出版社	Public

1966/12	老三篇万岁	Book	上海文化出版社	Public
1967/09	老三篇万岁	Book	上海文化出版社	Public
1970/08	老三篇威力无穷	Book	上海人民出版社	Public
1970/11	老三篇威力无穷	Book	上海人民出版社	Public
1967/04	老三篇万岁	Music	中共第五机械工业部政治部新出版翻印	Public
1968/05	老三篇	Book	北京出版社	Public
1967/02	学习老三篇		河北人民出版社	Public

Foreign languages publications

Year	Language	Publisher	Type
1966/01	Russian	外文出版社	Book
1968	Japanese	中国唱片社	Music
1967/10	Japanese	外文出版社	Book
1967/12	Uryghr	民族出版社	Book
1968/01	Lao	外文出版社	Book
1966/12	Mongolian	民族出版社	Book
1967/03	Mongolian	民族出版社	Book
1967	English	中国唱片社	Music
1967	French	中国唱片社	Music

1967/3	Chinese English Ver.	东方红出版社	Book
1967/06	Chinese English Ver.	东方红出版社	Book

Appendix 4

Institutions visited

Institution	Department	Contact person
北京 国家图书馆	BNL	Library Card
北京师范大学	BNU Literature Dept.	Librarian
北京市单图书大厦	BX Bookshop	Sales Outlet
北京媒体大学	BMU & TV Dept.	Cultural Director
中国电影资料馆多媒	BFRAI	Propaganda secretary北京外
文出版社	BFP	Sales Outlet
Beijing Review	BRFSD	Foreign service secretary

Appendix 5

Material Collected during fieldwork

High Primary and Secondary School Textbooks

1- 品德与社会 Morality and Society
2- 语文练习 Language practice
3- 教师学用书 History Teachers' Guide Book
4- 中国现代当代史 A Modern and Contemporary History of China
5- 思想政治与经济生活 Political and Economic Life

Six central CCP policy documents of the Yenan era and publications on Lei Feng

1- 为人民服务 (1945 年)
   Serve the People
2- 愚公移山 (1944 年)
   Old man who moved mountains
3- 纪念白求恩 (1939 年)
   Remember Dr. Bethune
4- 在对文学和艺术(延安座谈会上的讲话 1942 年 5 月)

Talks at the Yenan Forum for Literature and Art

5- 整顿党的作风 (1942 年 2 月)

Rectify the Party's Style of Work

6- 改造我们的学习 (1941 年 5 月)

Reform our Study

7- 用雷锋的学习态度学习雷锋

8- 雷锋日记

Lei Feng's Diary; versions 1, 2, and 3

Appendix 6

Laosanpian Baidu online resources

Laosanpian in the People's Daily

人民网上的老三篇（2012/01/01~2012/12/11）（87/41original texts）

Economic issues (17)

http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1124/c64102-19684865.html

http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1124/c1004-19683670.html

http://fujian.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1102/c234869-17666601.html

http://expo.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1101/c243859-19464345.html

http://gx.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1101/c179464-17661540.html

http://ln.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0829/c340349-17416193.html

http://gx.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0828/c339811-17411848.html

http://ah.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0808/c227131-17333328.html

http://sd.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0725/c173840-17282078.html

http://ah.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0724/c227793-17275085.html

http://ah.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0718/c227793-17254173.html

http://gx.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0710/c339811-17226678.html

http://jx.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0704/c337345-17204979.html

http://ah.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0621/c227793-17168409.html

http://gd.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0613/c123932-17141845.html

http://gx.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0428/c338479-16990760.html

http://expo.people.com.cn/GB/58536/16816611.html

Politics (33/25original texts)

http://sd.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1207/c178278-17831546.html (original texts）

http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1124/c64102-19684865.html

http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1124/c1001-19682759.html

http://military.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1101/c172467-19468196.html (original texts）

http://hb.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1012/c194148-17573760.html (original texts）

http://zgbx.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0918/c349128-19037791.html

http://cxzy.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0907/c194302-18951159.html (original texts）

http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0817/c117092-18766607.html (original texts)

http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0726/c85037-18603438.html (original texts)

http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0716/c85037-18526529.html (original texts)

http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0704/c117092-18441971.html (original texts)

http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/0703/c49150-18434941.html (original texts)

http://sd.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0625/c178266-17176140.html (original texts)

http://fujian.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0608/c337160-17124121.html (original texts)

http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/18107521.html (original texts)

http://cxzy.people.com.cn/GB/195564/241189/242688/18015394.html (original texts)

http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/17974206.html (original texts)

http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/82288/112848/112851/17884189.html (original texts)

http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/17441225.html (original texts)

http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49165/17381399.html

http://gz.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0303/c337395-16807752.html

http://hi.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0302/c336922-16806625.html

http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/17275699.html

http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/17277013.html

http://hn.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0224/c208814-16784196.html (original texts)

http://fanfu.people.com.cn/GB/17206067.html (original texts)

http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/17000414.html (original texts)

http://fujian.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0130/c234927-16704554.html (original texts)

http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/16937911.html (original texts)

http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/16879275.html (original texts)

http://cppcc.people.com.cn/GB/34952/16855929.html (original texts)

http://hi.people.com.cn/GB//n/2012/0111/c231184-16667947.html (original texts)

http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/16827981.html (original texts)

Culture (34/14 original texts)

http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/n/2012/1208/c87228-19832123.html

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/24hour/n/2012/1204/c25408-19788640.html

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/24hour/n/2012/1125/c25408-19686957.html

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