EXAMINING THE FORCES, CAUSES, AND ELEMENTS OF PRACTICAL DRIFT: A CASE STUDY

by

Roy H. Adams, Jr.

CLIFFORD BUTLER, DBA, Faculty Mentor and Chair

EDWARD M. GOLDBERG, DM, Committee Member

JEFF BANE, PhD, Committee Member

Barbara Butts Williams, PhD, Dean, School of Business and Technology

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Capella University

April 2014

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

Abstract

When a crisis captures the attention of a nation and the world community, the questions are always *Why did it happen* and *How did it happen*. Such an event was revealed on April 28, 2004 with a report on CBS's 60 Minute II and in an article by Seymour Hersh posted online in the New Yorker magazine April 30, 2004. The event was the detainee abuse by U.S. Army soldiers at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq. The abuse occurred between late 2003 and early 2004, and the story shook the U.S. government and the coalition partners who helped the United States bring down the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. This case study examined how the detainee abuse occurred and why the detainee abuse occurred by applying the theory of practical drift to the events in Iraq. However, the study revealed that while the abuse was conducted in Iraq the forces and causes were not confined to Iraq. The forces that contributed to the breakdown in soldier discipline in Iraq were the result of leadership and doctrinal decisions made decades earlier and governmental decisions made to fight the War on Terror. The study also identified stages of practical drift that illustrate how practical drift occurs in organizations. The case study avoided dealing with the actual events of the detainee abuse but concentrated on the elements that contributed to setting the conditions for the abuse. Practical drift in the war fighting doctrine development of the U.S. Army and the policies adopted by the U.S. administration to fight the War on Terror were causes of the detainee abuse identified in the case study. Individual behavioral traits of dismissive responsibility and deflected responsibility also contributed to practical drift and ultimately the detainee abuse.

Dedication

I started this case study because of my background. I am a retired Army Colonel who served twenty-six years on active duty. During that time, I fought in the Vietnam War and in Operation Desert Storm. My son and son-in-law are both Army officers who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. Leading soldiers was not a vocation for me but more of an avocation. I truly love soldiers and serving with them. I believe the most honorable thing that a person can do is serve alongside the great men and women who make up the United States Armed Forces. Therefore, I want to dedicate this to all those who have served, are serving, and will serve. I trust this case study will be beneficial to the honorable service you provide our nation. I salute all of you!

Acknowledgments

I want to acknowledge the lifelong support of my wife to my career and to supporting me in this effort. She has stood by my side through 30 years of service in the Army and now 14 years in the defense industry. That has required her to pick up her household and move 20 times in the 43 years we have been married. She is the love of my life and the joy to our children and grandchildren. Her support has allowed me to follow my dreams and my desire is to allow her to follow her dreams for the rest of our lives. Amy, I love you and thank you for all you have done for our family and me. I am grateful for the precious jewel I have.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Introduction to the Problem

Events that make headlines and dominate the interest of people worldwide usually result from actions by organizations or by individuals who are members of an organization. The Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, which was watched by hundreds of millions of people, revealed organizational and cultural problems within NASA (Howell, 2012). Hurricane Katrina exposed the flaws that existed in local, state, and federal agencies as they tried to respond to the disaster and meet the growing needs of the population affected by the storm (Zimmermann, 2012). Motorola invested heavily in the IRIDIUM global personal communications system it had developed in the late 1980s. In 1999 the communications system Motorola had launched one year earlier went bankrupt and defaulted on $1.5 billion in loans (Collins, 2009). Howell and Zimmermann implied all the problems and flaws that developed in the organizations were present before the event or disaster. Motorola ignored warning signs because of the big bet it was making in the Iridium technology (Collins, 2009). These events became the catalyst that exposed the problems and moved the organizational problems to the forefront. The aftermath is usually the organizational members' attempts to correct the problems that existed before the event.

Unfortunately, organizations rely on hindsight as the natural way to examine organizational problems (Manuel, 2011). Leaders try to find out what caused the

problems, place blame, and put procedures in place to prevent the problems from happening again. Organizational leaders do not have perfect foresight (Manuel, 2011) and they are usually unable to anticipate new problems or establish practices and procedures that will prevent new or equally disastrous problem.

Organizations are not living organisms. However, they do act as living organisms because the organizational members establish the policy and procedures of the organization as well as the values and culture of the organization (Pettigrew, 1979). That is why we look at organizational actions, which are really actions by members, trying to correct the exposed problems. The organizational actions reveal a deviation from the established procedures or practices, which lead to preventable disasters. This organizational phenomenon of moving away from established practices and procedures has been defined as *practical drift* (Snook, 1996).

Background of the Study

Why and how organizations become dysfunctional over time can be attributed to practical drift (Bouffard, 2013). Snook (1996) revealed the presence of practical drift in a study about the friendly fire shootdown of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters by two U.S. Air Force F-15 pilots in 1994 over the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq. Snook examined the "fundamental behavior and organizational dynamics that contributed to the shootdown" (p. 304). The grounded theory analysis resulted in a definition of *practical drift* – "the slow steady uncoupling of practice from written procedures" (p. 304).

While Snook's (1996) focus was very narrow because it only examined one organization, Operation Provide Comfort, the theory of practical drift can be examined over time within organizations that are multi-layered and multi-functional. In 2003, a

low-level military unit carried out the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq but the conditions were set by higher military organizations, multi-national organizations, and diplomatic organizations (Fay, 2004). Combined Joint Task Force–Seven (CJTF-7) was the controlling military organization in Iraq in 2003 and it was operating under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which was established as the transitional government in Iraq by a United Nations Security Council Resolution (Fay, 2004). This study expands on the theory of practical drift by identifying the causes of the detainee abuse, the forces that set the condition for the detainee abuse, and identifies the elements of practical drift that contributed to the detainee abuse.

Background

The situation within Iraq and the detainee operations was very dynamic and fluid. Many of the situations the members of the brigades found themselves in were new and unknown to them or the leaders above the brigades. The result was that failure could not be accepted and the general environmental standard was to do what needs to be done (Ricks, 2012). The preoccupation with avoiding failure did not encourage reporting or identifying failure or wrong actions. Many individuals within the detainee operations viewed their importance as great and they believed they had the authority to do what needed to be done to get the information demanded by the leaders above them (Graveline & Clemens, 2010). Respect, especially for the detainees, and trust were generally absent from the interrogation methods and treatment of detainees. There is no evidence that anyone was trying to find out if the operations at Abu Ghraib were proper or appropriate (Fay, 2004).

What caused the abuse and what should have been done to prevent it has been examined in this study. The investigative reports reveal that practical drift was happening in many layers of the United States national command authority, the CPA, CJTF-7, U.S. military organizations, and the organizations at Abu Ghraib Prison. The tight coupling of the military organizations that were so successful in Operation Iraqi Freedom became uncoupled during the occupation operations in Iraq. Forces, causes, and elements of practical drift have been identified in this study. Hopefully, this study will allow for organizations to recognize and acknowledge the practical drift in their organization and strengthen their organization.

Under the competing demands of all the organizations and the fluidity of the battlefield the detainee abuse occurred. All the investigations conducted on the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib concluded that the abuse was not organized or planned by any of the organizations. However, the abuse did occur and the actions affected all the organizations and became the dominant story coming out of Iraq for months (Taguba, 2004).

Multi-level organizational drift occurred in establishing policies, defining procedures, and effective monitoring of the low-level units by the higher organizations. When ambiguity, uncertainty, and blurred focus happen within an organization, and connected organizations, practical drift develops and the drift exploded at Abu Ghraib Prison with the detainee abuse (Department of the Army Inspector General, 2004).

Statement of the Problem

The problem addressed by this case study is why and how practical drift contributed to the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison. As procedures and policies are established, group members tend to embrace them, understand the procedures and

policies, and become proficient in the duties prescribed by the policies and procedures. Over time, members start evolving their own set of rules and regulations to meet the demand of their responsibilities (Bouffard, 2013). Unfortunately, most of the times these changes are not documented and result in the tightness of the organization becoming uncoupled as things start to fray within the organization. The ultimate result is drifting within the organization, which is usually unseen and undetected, by the members and the leaders of the organization.

This unseen drift was a causal factor in the shootdown of the two Army Black Hawk helicopters that Snook (1996) examined in the case study. The drift can be very disastrous in high reliability organizations because these organizations tend to impact great numbers of people, organizations, and even world events. High Reliability Organizations (HRO) are in fact expected to deal with complex problems and be able to effectively carry out the duties and responsibilities required to deal with complex operations and problems (Roberts, 1990). Therefore, an examination of high reliability organizations, how they function, and why when they fail, disaster follows is important (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2000).

High reliability organizations are organizations that operate in complex environments where failure can be catastrophic (Weick et al., 2000). These complex organizations are any large scale organizations of the private, public, or non-profit sectors that provide operational, administrative, and executive direction; possess at least three hierarchical levels of management; maintain formal as well as informal rules for organizing; and coordinate multi-purposed tasks for the meeting of goals (Briggs, 2011). From 1979 to the summer of 1985, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) experienced severe

power outages to 7,000 residential and commercial customers in Bakersfield, California (Lasher & La Porte, 1990). After a threat of losing the service contract, PG&E leaders set up a 180-member task force led by a key manager and solved the problem. The cost to the company was over $15 million and the effort was considered a technical and political success (Lasher & La Porte, 1990).

Most military organizations are very complex, especially those involved in combat operations, and are high reliability organizations because their failure can result in catastrophic situations as PG&E experienced. The 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade was designated the responsible unit for the Abu Ghraib detention facility and for securing and safeguarding the detainees (Fay, 2004). The 205th Military Intelligence Brigade was responsible for screening and interrogating detainees at Abu Ghraib (Fay, 2004). The structure of the brigades was formal in their military hierarchy and the responsibilities assigned to the brigades were standard military detainee and prisoner operations and intelligence gathering operations as defined in military manuals and regulations. The application of these regulations became ad hoc because of the overwhelming number of detainees, the fast pace changes the war was requiring, and the non-standard and non-military organizations both brigades were required to work with (Ricks, 2012).

All organizations are defined by what they ignore (Weick et al., 2000). The detainee operation at Abu Ghraib was a series of things ignored and the brigades' members should have been highly reliable in their duties. They were not and the failure was in what Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (2000) identified as "collective mindfulness." The organizational competence of collective mindfulness means the capacity of groups and individuals of the organization are acutely aware of significant details, they notice

errors in the making, and have the shared expertise and freedom to act on what they notice (Weick et al., 2000). It is evident that some of the five keys to mindfulness, preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and fluidity of decision making structures (Weick et al., 2000) were not developed in the brigades.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this case study was to determine if the organizational behavior theory of practical drift was a contributing factor to the detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq during 2003. It is important to understand the forces, causes, and elements of practical drift in the context of this study to identify how the phenomenon of practical drift within an organization can impact the organizational members and their actions.

Practical drift was identified by Snook in a 1996 study that revealed the uncoupling of local practices from written procedures was caused by practical drift. There have not been any additional studies conducted on the theory of practical drift and this study contributes to the body of knowledge of the theory. The study identifies the forces, causes, and elements of practical drift and also identifies the stages of practical drift.

The definition of practical drift as the slow, steady uncoupling of local practices from written procedures has been accepted by many organizational communities (Leemann, 2011). The case study is relevant to further research the theory of practical drift. Numerous examples have been identified that reference practical drift as a valid organizational behavior phenomenon (Henderson, 2013). The research has revealed practical drift as an accepted phenomenon by over ten authors and scholars. This study

will add to the body of knowledge and may generate interest in other scholars to continue the study of practical drift.

Many practitioners have referenced the theory of practical drift in their writings and in counseling services. Henderson (2013) referenced practical drift as part of the culture of organizations. Denyer (2013) stated practical drift is inevitable in human nature and in organizations. Starke (2013) pointed out how practical drift can be attributed to aviation mishaps including the Challenger disaster and Haynes, Schafer, and Carroll (2007) believed emergency response planning must recognize the impact of practical drift.

Research Questions

The research question this study examined is "How did practical drift contribute to the detainee abuse?" Additionally, the case study examined "Why did the detainee abuse occur?" While not an additional research question in the case study, the theme of "what was going on here?" is continually examined to determine what forces contributed to the detainee abuse. Since the actions at Abu Ghraib were outside the norm of standard military operations, the study exposes the contributing forces that caused the practical drift.

The strength of the case study method is its ability to examine, in-depth, a case within its real-life context (Yin, 2004). The detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison overshadowed every other element of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. If you ask anyone what is the most memorable image of the ten years in Iraq, the answer would probably be the detainee abuse pictures. This real-life event caused heads of states, senior military officers of all the coalition partners, and the news

media covering the events in Iraq to focus on it. Because of the significance of the event, a case study will be valuable to determine if practical drift can be identified as the reason for the event.

Yin (2004) wrote there are three basic steps for designing a case study. The first is to define the case being studied. This researcher has defined the case as the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq during 2003. The second step is to determine whether to do a single case study or a set of case studies. While many events in Operation Iraqi Freedom could be connected to the detainee abuse, this is only a single case study. A third step involves deciding whether or not to use theory development to help select your case(s), develop your data collection protocol, and organize your initial data analysis strategies (p. 6). This study does not develop theory but uses the case study to contribute to the knowledge of the theory of practical drift.

Significance of the Study

Many how to books, papers, and presentations have been published on what organizations should do to ensure effective operations within their organization. This research will add to that body of knowledge and continue to add to Snook's theory of the existence of practical drift.

Snook (1996) claimed practical drift is so hard to recognize because it occurs "as a result of normal people behaving in normal ways in normal organizations" (p. 15). This can be attributed to the dominant mindset of engineering thinking within most organizations.

> In the period after the Second World War, strenuous efforts were made to apply the lessons from wartime operations research to industrial companies and government agencies. In doing this, a powerful strand of systems thinking was

> developed - it would now be thought of as `hard' systems thinking - concerned broadly with engineering a system to achieve its objectives. (Checkland, 2000, p. S49)

Leaders of the U.S. Army utilized the hard systems thinking approach during the decades after the Vietnam War (Ricks, 2012).

Peter Checkland developed soft System Methodology (SSM) thinking in the late 1960s and originally was used as a modeling tool, but in later years, it has increasingly been used as a learning and meaning development tool (Williams, 2005). SSM enables a systemic learning process (Checkland, 2000) and this shift in organizational thinking will provide an organization an environment of learning and not just an environment of policies and procedures. A learning system in an organization provides an environment that recognizes change and reveals the potential need to adjust and modify procedures.

This study identifies that the two approaches to thinking are reveled in the competing approaches of General DePuy and General Cushman to educating Army officers. General DePuy adopted the hard system thinking approach and developed a system to train officers how to fight. General Cushman advocated the soft system methodology of teaching officers how to think and why they were conducting operations in the manner specified. General DePuy's methods were adopted by the Army and officers were trained how to fight during the 1980s and 1990s (Ricks, 2012).

Some managers believe standards and polices are the only way to ensure effective work among their members and ensure the effective operation of the organization (Ormsbee, p. 2). This case study revealed how the hard thinking approach does not allow for the recognition of practical drift and why an environment of soft systems

methodology thinking can allow the organization to learn and possibly avoid the disastrous result of practical drift.

Definition of Terms

The following definitions are used in this study.

Battalion. Military units with the strength of 300-800 personnel usually subordinate to a Brigade but can operate as a separate unit.

Brigade. Military units with the strength of 2000-5000 personnel organized to perform specific military operations. Brigades can be subordinate to divisions or operate separately under a Corps or CJTF.

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). A joint military operational organization established to conduct military and other than military operations. The size and complexity of the organization varies as required for the assigned task.

Company. Military units with the strength of 40-120 personnel subordinate to a battalion. Companies do not have the capability to operate outside a battalion structure.

Hard Systems Methodology (Hard Thinking). An approach to problem solution, which defines a problem, looks for solutions, and designs a model based on the solution (ICRA, n.d.). Hard systems thinkers take the world as being systemic (ICRA, n.d.).

High Reliability Organization (HRO). An organization conducting relatively error free operations over a long period of time making consistently good decisions resulting in high quality and reliability operations (Roberts, 1990).

Platoon. Military units with the strength of 15-30 personnel subordinate to a company.

Practical Drift. The slow steady uncoupling of practice from written procedures (Snook, 1996).

Soft Systems Methodology (Soft Thinking). Soft systems thinkers argue that problems will occur when hard systems thinking is applied to problem situations in which human perceptions, behavior or action seem to be dominating factors and where goals, objectives and even the interpretation of events are all problematic. A soft systems thinker experiences phenomena, including the social ones, as dynamic, chaotic, changing and unpredictable (ICRA, n.d.).

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This study was undertaken because of the void of additional research on the theory of practical drift. There are articles and writings on how practical drift affects organizations or different elements in society, but no additional studies can be found about practical drift. It is as if the theory is accepted and everyone is using it to define organizational behavior problems (Roberto, 2009). Practical drift is an excellent approach for examining organizational behavior and an examination of Snook's research and the literature that influenced his study is important to understand the principle of practical drift.

Snook (1996) identified practical drift in a case study of the shootdown of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters by two U.S. Air Force pilots in the Northern Iraq No Fly Zone in 1994. Snook (1996) defined practical drift as "the slow steady uncoupling of practice from written procedure" (p. 304). To continue with Snook's research this researcher has conducted a case study on the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq during 2004. While Snook's case study provided the awareness of practical drift, this research has identified the stages of practical drift as well as the forces, causes, and elements that affect practical drift.

This literature review discusses Snook's case study research of the friendly fire shootdown over Northern Iraq and one of the main factors that contributed to practical drift, the diffusion of responsibility. It also includes a literature review of high reliability

organizations and an examination of organizational culture. It is important to understand how all of these impacted practical drift and what it can reveal about the case study of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse.

Practical Drift

On April 14, 1994, two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters departed from Diyarbakir, Turkey to the Military Coordination Center (MCC) in Zakhu, Iraq to pick up a United Nations coalition team responsible for the humanitarian relief effort in Northern Iraq. The tragic event that followed resulted in two U.S. Air Force F-15 pilots shooting down the two helicopters and killing 26 coalition force members, which included 15 Americans. The question that Snook (1996) undertook to explain in his research is how a highly sophisticated military organization with layers of checks could allow members of the organization to misidentify other organizational members as enemy and kill them.

Snook's (1996) research strategy was "to conduct a qualitative analysis of this single explanatory embedded case study (Yin, 2004) for the purpose of building grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990)" (p. 31). He stated that he was trying to determine how and why the incident happened. Snook (1996) presented an empirical question of "How in the world could this accident happen?" which he believed clearly fits Yin's *how* criteria (p. 31). He then suggested a theoretical question of "What are the organizational and behavior conditions that resulted in such an organizational tragedy?" and that addresses Yin's *why* question (p. 31).

Snook's (1996) goal was to build grounded theory in "the contextually rich data of the real world event" (p. 32). The data sources he acquired for research included a vast amount of official government investigative reports, operational reports, criminal and

trial transcripts, media and press reports, congressional hearing transcripts, interviews, medical and psychological evaluations, technical investigations and evaluations, and intelligence reports (Snook, 1996).

This data provided Snook with the opportunity to conduct the analysis of this single embedded case. Snook (1996) contended this meets one of Yin's rationales for conducting a case study, in which the case is extreme or unique. The author added that this case could also be a revelatory one and after reviewing the study, this researcher agrees with the author.

This researcher's military background biased him to believe that the shootdown was the result of many individual errors. While individual errors did contribute to the incident, Snook (1996) has disputed the idea that the problem was only at the individual level. Snook systematically walked through the incident at the individual, group, and organizational levels and suggested that you cannot isolate the incident at any of these levels. The theory of practical drift is only revealed when the incident is examined cross the individual, group, and organizational levels and not "limiting ourselves to any one or even a series of isolated, within-level accounts" (Snook, 1996, p. 252).

At the individual level, Snook first examined the actions of the F-15 pilots. It is factual that the pilots did misidentify the U.S. Army Black Hawks as Iraqi Hinds, a soviet built helicopter. However, Snook pointed out that "after extensive investigations by both safety and criminal experts no charges were filed against the pilots" (Snook, 1996, p. 112). If the pilots were not grossly negligent, which would have demanded criminal charges be filed, why did the pilots misidentify the Black Hawk helicopters?

To answer this question Snook relied on Karl Weick who wrote that the key question to ask is "What was going on here?" (Weick, 1987) instead of asking, "Why did they decide to shoot?" (Snook, 1996, p.116). United States Air Force pilots are highly trained and continually practice their skills. Their training results in the pilots becoming almost programmed so they do not have to think when they encounter a situation in the air that demands action. Snook claimed the pilots were in the air for only one reason and that was to find and engage any Iraqi aircraft violating the no-fly zone.

Therefore, to answer what was going on here, these highly trained pilots were assigned a mission to ensure Iraqi aircraft did not violate the no-fly zone. Traveling at 450 knots per hour, the F-15 radar identified two unknown aircraft flying where there should not have been any aircraft flying. The actions that the pilots followed from that point were the result of their training. They notified the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft that their radar had picked up low-flying, slow-moving aircraft in the no-fly zone. The AWACS controller acknowledge the report and responded with a report "clean there" which meant the AWACS had no radar contacts in that area. The pilots then used their onboard IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system to determine if the aircraft were friendly. When they did not receive a positive electronically generated response from the aircraft that it was friendly the pilots initiated their intercept actions.

The Air Force intercept procedure required a visual fly-by to identify the helicopters. Both pilots properly executed their fly-bys and identified the aircraft as Hind helicopters not Black Hawk helicopters. Many factors contributed to the pilots visually identifying the helicopters as Hinds but the main factor was the pilots saw what they expected to see. The author claimed, "There is little doubt that what the F-15 pilots

expected to see during their visual pass influenced what they actually saw" (Snook, 1996, p. 122).

Having identified the aircraft as hostile, the F-15 pilots then maneuvered for the engagement. The lead pilot notified AWACS that they were preparing to engage and instructed his wingman to arm hot. The lead pilot engaged the trail helicopter first and then the wingman engaged the lead helicopter. Both helicopters were destroyed and 26 people on board were killed.

A Pentagon spokesperson confirmed that the Iraqis "had never violated the no-fly zone well north of the 36th parallel (Aerospace Daily, 1994: 81)" (Snook, 1996, p. 18). The author observed that no significant enemy action had been detected in the TAOR (Theater Area of Responsibility) in well over a year, the visibility was unlimited, and there was no fighting on the ground (Snook, 1996). With all this information available it would be easy to stop and declare pilot error was the cause of the incident. However, this would not have identified why this tragedy happened so the author then looked at the group and organizational factors that contributed to the incident.

To understand how the group dynamics affected the incident, the groups involved need to be described. While the U.S. Air Force F-15 sortie is one group, the actions of the pilots were previously described and are not part of the group discussion. The other two groups that were part of the incident were the Black Hawk helicopters and the AWACS aircraft. The Black Hawk helicopter crews consisted of a pilot, co-pilot, crew chief, and gunner. The AWACS was flying with a pilot, co-pilot, navigator, flight engineer, and 15 technicians and controllers.

Even though both of these groups conduct their jobs in the air, they come from vastly different cultures. Air Force pilots and planners are known for their detailed planning and execution. They fly as "an integral part of a much larger package-a virtual symphony of fighters, tankers, electronic jammers, and reconnaissance aircraft" (Snook, 1996). The author pointed out that Air Force pilots are like classical musicians that execute their schedule to a *T* (Snook, 1996). This is in contrast to the Army aviators who planned and flew the Black Hawk mission. Snook (1996) observed they "flew more like jazz musicians, guided by a general scheme, but improvising the details-creating their music real time, in response to the emerging requirements of their customers" (p. 207). Army pilots felt neglected and only tolerated by the Air Force AWACS crews and the AWACS crews viewed the Army aviators as Rambo-like rogues operating under a different set of rules (Snook, 1996).

There were also communication equipment issues with the U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters that contributed to the cause of the incident. This is discussed in the organizational section but it brings up a point about the culture of the Army aviators. Their strength, and this is from this researcher's personal experience with Army aviators in combat, is they are oriented to provide whatever support the ground soldier requires. If things do not seem right, they will find a way around it. This strength, as in this situation, became their weakness. They did not maintain positive contact with the AWACS aircraft during their mission but that did not deter them from continuing the mission. The most important thing was providing the support required to the ground unit.

After examining the actions of the individuals, Snook (1996) addressed the group level of those involved in the incident. The primary group was the AWACS crew but the

aircraft also had sub-groups within the crew. The author described the individual sub-groups and their responsibilities within the AWACS mission. Snook (1996) pointed out that U.S. Air Force, as with most militaries, have a historical emphasis on individual training and qualification (p. 160). It has always been a responsibility of the leaders of the unit that assigned members are trained as a unit. Operation Provide Comfort relied on the services to assign units and crews to meet their mission requirements. As a result, "no time was spent examining the relative 'mission readiness' of the ultimate performing unit-the crew as a real team" (Snook, 1996, p. 160).

It is important to understand that the normal rotation for members of the AWACS crew was 90 days. They were not necessarily from the same unit and they were assigned on temporary duty to fill a position they were qualified to perform. This means that the crew was a group of qualified Air Force pilots and technicians creating a highly skilled ad-hoc unit. To further complicate the mission, this was the maiden flight of this AWACS crew with six instructor personnel were flying on the mission (Snook, 1996).

These additional instructor personnel should have been an asset to the crew but that was not the case. As the engagement progressed none of the instructor personnel attempted to intervene or question the actions of the crew or the F-15 pilots. As one instructor testified during one of the crew member's court martial:

> I was on board to be an answer man to help these guys out since it was their maiden flight this trip. I was there to answer questions about recent occurrences or changes in policy or changes in interpretation that had come about since the last time that they had been in theater (Headquarters, 8th Air Force, 1995: 1023). (Snook, 1996, p. 71)

Snook argued the presence of the instructors contributed to the diffusion of responsibility of the crew because they saw the more experience personnel not intervening and

questioning any of the actions and the crew members were not inclined to intervene either.

> The sub-groups that the author identified in the AWACS were:
>
> the flight crew, responsible for the flight operations of the aircraft, and the mission crew, responsible for the command, control, surveillance, communications, electronics, and management functions, to include: the control and monitoring of assigned aircraft, sensor management, internal and external communications management, and onboard systems maintenance (Department of the Air Force, 1993: 4). (Snook, 1996, p. 69)

The flight crew's main responsibility was to ensure the aircraft was flying the designated flight pattern that enabled the mission crew to perform their duty as the airborne air traffic controllers for the No-Fly Zone. All the evidence revealed that the flight crew executed their responsibility to U.S. Air Force standards. However, the mission crew on the AWACS did not meet the expected standards.

The mission crew was further divided into three sub-groups. The equipment technician sub-group was responsible for ensuring the equipment on the AWACS was operational for the mission and during the mission to provide maintenance support as needed. The surveillance section included an Advanced Air Surveillance Technician and three Air Surveillance Technicians. Their duties were "the detection, tracking, identification, height measurement, display, telling, and recording/documenting of surveillance data (U.S. Air Force, 1993: 22)" (Snook, 1996). The third sub-group under the mission crew commander was the weapons section, which had the senior director as its leader. The senior director had three weapons directors who had specific tasks to perform during the mission. The en route controller was responsible for control of authorized aircraft approaching the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) and for conducting IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) checks of aircraft outside the TAOR. The

TAOR controller was responsible for the control of all mission aircraft within the TAOR and giving threat warning to mission aircraft when needed. The tanker controller was responsible for all tanker operations for the mission aircraft within the TAOR. As a team, the weapons section was responsible for identifying and controlling all mission aircraft that were flying in support of Operations Provide Comfort.

All of these groups had detailed instructions about how to perform their mission and how each one fit into the overall mission support of controlling the No-Fly Zone. The individuals assigned to the groups were trained to perform their designated duties and all were experienced Air Force officers and non-commissioned officers. Operation Provide Comfort had AWACS flying this mission for three years without any incident or mishap. Snook (1996) offered that the only reason as to why the incident happened was the diffusion of responsibility within the AWACS crew.

The third level Snook (1996) addressed was the organizational level. He asserted at the organizational level non-integration had become a problem for Operation Provide Comfort. This assertion is based on Secretary of Defense William Perry's summary of the incident:

> The Combined Task Force failed to integrate helicopter Operations with other air operations in the no fly zone. Consequently, on April 14, "the F-15 pilots were not made aware of the Black Hawk flight prior to take off, the Black Hawks were allowed to enter the no fly zone before the F-15s, and the aircraft were not communicating on the same radio frequencies (Perry, 1994: 1)." (Snook, 1996, p. 203)

The author draws upon the concept of differentiation and integration, as conceptualized by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) to explain why the Black Hawk helicopters were not full members of the task force (Snook, 1996). Differentiation is the

task of sub-dividing or breaking up groups and organizations into sub-groups. It is basically segmenting the organization to accomplish difficult and complex task. Snook (1996) pointed out "Whatever you divide, you have to put back together again; the more divided, the more effort required to rejoin" (p. 205).

Differentiation has three dimensions that affect the members of the groups and how they work (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). The first dimension is the orientations toward goals. Army aviators and Air Force pilots and planners approach things differently. The Army aviators prided themselves on customer service and flexibility while the Air Force personnel adhered to the tenet of detailed planning and execution. Snook (1996) observed, "Such divergent goal orientation created conflicting priorities and subsequent coordination problems" (p. 206). He further claimed the disconnect between the divergent goal orientations collided over Northern Iraq on 14 April 1994 (Snook, 1996, p. 207).

The second dimension of differentiation and integration is the "orientations toward time" (Lawrence & Lorsch, p. 20). When the Air Force pilots were questioned as to why they responded so quickly, they stated the engagement period was not rushed and when they had positivity identified the helicopters as Hinds the next step was to shoot them down (Snook, 1996). The dimension of time is different for each sub-group and while most people would consider the pilot's actions as fast, to the pilots it was normal. The author offered, "When you're flying at over 500 knots, the rest of the world seems to move at a different pace" (Snook, 1996, p.208).

The third dimension of differentiation and integration the author addressed is Lawrence and Lorsch's dimension of interpersonal orientation (Snook, 1996). This

dimension sheds light on why the AWACS crew did not intervene as the incident developed. Snook (1996) noted that fighter pilots and Army aviators "are heavy on bravado – a lot of hard work, hard play, and hard talking" (p. 208). He contrasts this with the quiet professionalism of the AWACS crewmembers that are generally considered technicians. The AWACS technicians were reluctant to intervene in the pilots and aviators execution of their duties.

When all the dimensions are considered it is understandable why the integration of Operation Provide Comfort was so difficult. "The greater the differences in cognitive and emotional orientations, the greater the integration challenge" (Snook, 1996, p. 209). Testimony by the AWACS crew revealed that they never really considered Army helicopters as their responsibility and only provided tracking as a courtesy to the Army aviators in their sector. The author observed, "Apparently Secretary Perry was right. At least from the Air Force side of the task force, Eagle Flight was not very well integrated" (Snook, 1996, p. 211).

The non-integration exposed the most prominent example of practical drift during the incident and that was the communication problems. The drift was evident in both equipment and procedural areas so it was hard to determine which had the greatest impact on the incident.

The Air Force aircraft, both the AWACS and F-15s, were equipped with the latest anti-jamming radios HAVE QUICK II. This radio is a frequency-hopping radio that changes frequency many times per second that prevents jamming from enemy equipment. When different aircraft radios are synchronized with the proper codes the radio's frequency-hopping match and pilots can communicate in normal radio transmissions. It is

just like talking on a single channel but the frequency-hopping technology is actually transmitting over different frequencies without the pilots knowing it.

The Eagle Flight Black Hawks were not equipped with the HAVE QUICK II radios. The author asserted this was due to years of separate service procurement programs which resulted in the fielding of Army and Air Force aircraft with different communications systems (Snook, 1996). The standard UHF (Ultra High Frequency) and VHF (Very High Frequency) radios were the equipment in the Black Hawk helicopters. Even though the F-15s had the UHF and VHF radios, the preferred mode of communications inside the TAOR was the secure HAVE QUICK II system. This meant that Eagle Flight could not talk to or monitor the F-15s while they were in the TAOR. If they could have been able to monitor the F-15s communications, they would have heard them preparing to engage two HIND helicopters and alerted the F-15 pilots they were in the TAOR.

Communication procedure also contributed to the drift. The Air Tasking Order (ATO) established by the Air Component Commander directed that all non-HAVE QUICK II aircraft were to operate on ATO tactical frequencies while in the TAOR. Since the Black Hawks were non-HAVE QUICK II aircraft, they should have been operating on the ATO tactical frequencies. However, they were not and this was a result of procedural drift that was allowed to develop because the Army helicopters main location in the TAOR was Zakhu, located only a few miles inside the TAOR. The Army helicopters were allowed to stay on their en route frequency when they flew to Zakhu and the AWACS crew did not enforce the ATO to require them to switch to the ATO tactical

frequencies. Usually, nothing resulted because of the drift in procedures until the fateful day of the shootdown.

As Snook illustrated in his case study, many areas contributed to the practical drift in this incident. The three levels of individual, group, and organizational all allowed drift to occur. There appeared opportunities throughout each level to correct, or at least recognize the drift. No one stepped up to make the corrections needed and that suggests that something else was in play. Snook reasoned one of the prevailing factors was diffusion of responsibility by many individuals involved in the incident. It is important to understand diffusion of responsibility and why this is such a powerful force within organizations at all levels.

Diffusion of Responsibility

As Snook (1996) did, this study has caused this researcher to question how the unit members at Abu Ghraib could allow detainee abuse to take place. Was this an isolated event or did this type of action take place throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operation? I spent 30 years in the U.S. Army and my training and gut feeling lead me to the conclusion that this was an isolated event. Even if it is an isolated event, the cause needs to be identified for future members and leaders of the armed forces so they can prevent it from reoccurring.

Research by Snook (1996) and the research on this case have revealed that one of the major factors in the action of the members of groups is the diffusion of responsibility. The diffusion of responsibility hypothesis states that antisocial behavior will occur whenever individuals are motivated to engage in socially taboo behavior and find themselves in a group of similarly motivated individuals. The mechanism by which this

antisocial behavior is produced is the spreading or diffusion of feelings of personal responsibility for the consequences of the antisocial behavior throughout the group (Mathes & Kahn, 1975).

When Lieutenant General Jones conducted his 15-6 investigation, an Army fact-finding investigation, he stated, "The primary causes of the violent and sexual abuses were relatively straight-forward — individual criminal misconduct, clearly in violation of law, policy, and doctrine and contrary to Army values" (Jones, 2004, p. 16). Soldiers, who had taken the following enlistment oath, carried out this criminal behavior.

> I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God. (Title 10, U.S. Code; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962).

After soldiers enlist, they undergo different levels of training to prepare them to become soldiers. Subject Area 1 of the Warrior Skills Level 1 Tasks is Individual Conduct and Laws of War, which states soldiers must identify, understand, and comply with the Law of War (U.S. Army, 2009). This training is then reinforced as part of the mobilization training all soldiers receive prior to their deployment to a combat theater of operations. So, the soldiers and leaders responsible for the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib were assigned to their position after they received the proper and appropriate training. They knew what was right, what was allowed, and not allowed by the Law of War and the Geneva and Hague Conventions.

Trained soldiers who had taken an oath to uphold the constitution conducted abusive acts that were termed criminal misconduct (Jones, 2004). The reason for the

action could be extreme group behavior that Brown identified in his cultural value and social comparison hypothesis. According to Brown, in some situations extreme behavior is valued, and individuals in groups compete with each other to show the most extreme behavior and thus exemplify the value (Mathes & Kahn, 1975). This could be what happened to the soldiers who had the responsibility of securing the detainees at Abu Ghraib.

The extreme behavior of detainee abuse appeared to have been valued by members of the detainee security unit and the military intelligence units that had responsibility for interrogating the detainees. As Major General Taguba stated in his investigation, interrogators actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses (Taguba, 2004). The acts against the detainees had the purpose of degrading the individuals and demoralizing them so they would cooperate with the interrogators. The acts also had the purpose of pure entertainment by certain members of the security unit, which was revealed in the Court Martial of members of the security unit.

The soldiers' actions were also categorized as seeking or enacting revenge on the detainees (Graveline & Clemens, 2010). It is recognized that conditions at Abu Ghraib were not ideal. Overcrowding, pressure to gain intelligence from the detainees, and lack of supervision allowed the soldiers to act independently (Taguba, 2004). This was coupled with the soldiers' need for acceptance within the group, which led to the extreme behavior of detainee abuse. Everyone should have known the actions were wrong but there is no evidence any responsible soldier, non-commissioned officer, officer, or non-DoD civilian assigned to Abu Ghraib tried to correct the soldiers' abusive behavior.

The theory of diffusion of responsibility appears to help answer why no one tried to stop the abuse. Latane and Darley (1968) discussed diffusion of responsibility as two types of intervention: direct and reportorial. They looked at diffusion of responsibility from an emergency situation, but their findings and definitions are also relevant to the non-actions of those at Abu Ghraib.

Direct intervention would be one of the members of the unit seeing the abuse and attempting to stop it. Taguba did identify one lieutenant who stopped an abusive act and reported it to his superiors. This appears to be the exception and not the rule at Abu Ghraib. Most of the members of the detainee security unit and other units at Abu Ghraib did not believe they had any responsibility to intervene in stopping the abuse (Taguba, 2004). The reason could be that they felt it was not their responsibility; there was diffusion of any potential blame in not taking action; or somebody else had already taken actions to correct the actions (Latane & Darley, 1968).

The same excuses can be applied to why individuals did not report the abuse. There is no information in Taguba's (2004) report regarding actions taken after the lieutenant reported the abuse. What is striking is this is the only example Taguba cited in his report. It can be expected that an organization such as the detainee security unit would not falter like this because of the training received and the honorable tradition of the U.S. Army. The training for difficult situations and the tradition that U.S. Army units emphasize to their members places them in the category of a high reliability organization (HRO). HROs establish regulations, rules, and guidelines for their members, sub-units and the organization to follow. The actions of the members of the organization confirm

that some things went wrong and my research focuses on why and how the abuse happened.

High Reliability Organizations

Effective HROs encourage the reporting of errors and regard any failure, no matter how seemingly isolated, as a signal of possible weakness elsewhere (Weick et al., 2000). HROs use those on the front line as the first line of defense in detecting errors and rely on efficient communication and use of all potential resources in an effort to obtain the big picture (Burke, Wilson, & Salas, 2005). The chain of command throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations did not encourage the reporting of errors in detainee operations and this was a significant problem (Ricks, 2012). When the standard becomes it is okay to look the other way, problems start piling up.

HROs must continually look for how to improve and how to avoid problems. Complacency can easily become the norm in an HRO and rigidity, especially in the leaders, can multiple the problems developing in the organization. As Weick et al. (2000) pointed out, effective HROs tend to nurture interpersonal skills, mutual respect, and trust, and discourage hubris, stubbornness, and self-importance.

A strong character of HROs is the involvement of their leadership. The 205th MI Brigade had the responsibility for screening and interrogating detainees. However, the 800th MP Brigade had the responsibility for operating the detainment facility. Some of the interrogators were non-military and some were contractors and not United States Government employees (Jones, 2004). Therefore, the sensitivity to operations where the people in effective HROs pay close attention to the operations and see it as an enterprise wide task (Weick et al., 2000) was not present in the organizations in Iraq. This included

the lack of senior leadership presence in the prison and the oversight of the brigade soldiers responsible for detainee security. When some of the soldiers tried to bring problems to the attention of the leadership, they were instructed to do what the interrogators told them to do (Jones, 2004). Unfortunately, the interrogators' instructions were not always proper or legal.

Anticipation, in the words of the late political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, involves the "prediction and prevention of potential dangers before damage is done" (Weick et al., 2000, p.36). He defined resilience, on the other hand, as "the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest, learning to bounce back" (Weick et al., 2000, p.36). The members of the brigades did not demonstrate anticipation or resilience in their duties and responsibilities at Abu Ghraib Prison (Fay 2004). Actions taken by members of the brigades were not authorized, allowed, or proper. The junior leaders who knew about the actions could not see the potential danger the actions could cause. The senior leadership of the brigades was not familiar enough with the detainee operations that they could predict the problems and prevent them. The lack of resiliency within the organization, both members and leaders, deprived the brigades of the ability to anticipate problems and take the proper actions to correct them and prevent them in the future.

Decision-making is an important factor in any organization. HROs should to be particularly fluid in decision making because the hierarchy of their structure can work against the effectiveness of the decision making process. A rigid structure discourages decision making below the decision maker and when the lower tier member is reluctant to challenge the higher tier member defective decisions can inflate errors. These higher tier

errors tend to amplify and fuel lower tier errors because of the faulty conditions set by the higher tier error (Weick et al., 2000). It is a proven fact that the expertise lies closer to the job and effective HROs encourage that expertise to be applied to the operations and problems encountered by the organization. While some of the members and leaders at Abu Ghraib Prison may have recognized the problems, the environment was not one where they were encouraged to take action or even report the problems.

Organizational Culture

To understand the situation in Iraq, it is important that we define what an organization is and what the characteristics within the organizations are. Understanding this will allow for the appreciation of the organization as a whole, how the parts of the organization work together, and how the members the organization fit into the organization and influence the organization's actions. All of this together helps form the culture of the organization that drives how organizations function and react to problems. Schein (2004) stated "culture is both a dynamic phenomenon that surrounds us at all times, being constantly enacted and created by our interactions with others and shaped by leadership behavior, and a set of structures, routines, rules, and norms that guide and constrain behavior" (Schein, 2004, p. 1). We get a more distinct definition of culture from the World English Dictionary (2011), which states culture is the total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitutes the shared bases of social actions. The World English Dictionary (2011) further defines culture as the total range of activities and ideas of a group of people with shared traditions, which are transmitted and reinforced by members of the group. Understanding this, we will look at the organization and the elements of the organization.

Schein (2004) defined three levels of culture: artifacts, values, and assumptions. Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) added a fourth variable, symbols, to the model. While Schein's model appeared to be hierarchal in nature, Hatch saw the four variables as being equal and affecting each other through manifestation, realization, symbolization, and interpretation (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006). As all these variables work within the organization, it produces the identity of that organization. Robbins (2005) wrote "organizational culture is a system of shared meaning held by members that distinguishes the organization from other organizations" (p. 485). This identity becomes the focus and face of the organization and defines how other organizations and people interact with the organization.

Organizational culture can be a powerful element for the organization. It establishes rules, regulations, and procedures the members follow carrying out their assigned responsibilities and it hold groups together (Robbins, 2005). This is very evident in military organizations and is the basis of the traditions that they follow and the actions that they take. Schein (2004) identified 11 categories to define culture:

- observe behavior regularities when people interact;
- group norms;
- espoused values;
- formal philosophy;
- rules of the game;
- climate;
- embedded skills;
- habits of thinking, mental models, and linguistic paradigms;

- shared meanings;
- "root metaphors" are integrating symbols; and
- formal rituals and celebrations.

It is not practical to examine each one of these categories. However, some categories are important because of the impact that they have upon developing and sustaining the culture of the organization.

One of the most recognized categories of group culture is how the members of the group interact with each other. This is evident by the language they use, by the customs and traditions that they adhere to, and the rituals they employ in many different situations (Schein, 2004). All of these could be described as tenets each member will use in their daily interaction with each other and with other organizations or members of other organizations. This is best demonstrated in the culture that is found in military units around the globe. It can take the form of rank of the members, the skills members have become proficient in, and the mission or purpose that each unit or organization is assigned.

As a culture develops rules, regulations, and procedures, it will drive how each organization and its members react in different situations. The goal is to establish procedures so that the organization will be able to successfully complete the assigned task or mission. The very fact that members often internalize cultural derived norms, values, and mental models, often makes them resistant to change (Scholl, 2003). The same culture that tries to establish the procedure to deal with different situations is also the same culture that will allow the drift to develop. Strong cultures are also rigid

structures that do not want to change and do not necessarily recognize the change that is taking place internally which can lead to disaster.

A second category that follows closely along to the previous category is the embedded skills within the organization. These are the abilities regarding how to do certain things and most of the time they are unwritten rules (Schein, 2004). This is a normal attribute within the organization where the more senior person or the more experienced person is teaching or training the lesser-experienced person on their duties and responsibilities.

Organizations usually put in writing the requirements to perform a task or duty. However, the expert who has been around and working on the task is usually the person who can best train a person on how to accomplish the task. The experienced person is usually so familiar with the task that they develop new ways to be more efficient in accomplishing the task. The expert may not have recorded those efficiencies in writing but they teach them to the other members as the way to do something. When this happens, drift starts taking place and written procedures become uncoupled.

Schein (2004) has also identified a category that plays into the culture of the organization and that is the rules of the game. These are the implicit, unwritten rules for getting along in the organization; the ropes that accepted members of the organization know how to follow. While these rules of the game bring order into the organization, they also can be a hindrance in recognizing that drift is occurring or even being the catalyst for the drift. Just because an organization is functioning properly and smoothly does not mean that things are not unraveling. Society seems to hold up organizations that have a culture of efficiency, enforced standards, and recognize this as one of the strengths of the

organization. However, Collins (2009) provided a different view and pointed out that great organizations foster a productive tension between continuity and change.

NASA believed they were functioning at a standard that was not equaled by many organizations today. FEMA believed they were prepared to deal with any natural disaster that may occur in the U.S. homeland. Both of these organizations are examples of good and noble people believing that their ideas and policies were good and wise. However, both of these organizations made bad decisions leading up to the disaster that affected their organization and the United States. As Collins (2009) pointed out, "bad decisions made with good intentions are still bad decisions" (p. 148).

The category of formal philosophy is one that needs to be examined. This philosophy is the broad policies and ideological principles that guide a group's actions (Schein, 2004). The philosophies are usually highly publicized and they define the organization to the public and to other organizations that deal with them. Some call this "the way", such as the IBM way, the Army way, the HP way; you can put any organizational name in front of the word way. What this does is to separate the organization from the other organizations in which they interact. It defines an expectation on the part of the organization and other organizations it interacts with in carrying out the organization duties and goals.

The organization way sometimes causes conflict when you merge two separate organizations. This was evident when Raytheon Corporation acquired the aerospace and defense division of Hughes Aircraft Company, which is located in Tucson, Arizona. Raytheon's headquarters is located in the Boston Massachusetts area and it has a heavy New England influence in their dress code. All male employees are required to wear coat

and tie to work. In contrast, the Tucson facility that they acquired was more laid-back and casual and they did not place emphasis on a formal dress code. Once the acquisition was finalized, the corporate headquarters notified the new Raytheon Missile Systems' leadership that the male employees would be required to wear a coat and tie to work each day. This caused an uproar among the employees but the president of the Missile Systems encouraged the employees to calm down. He invited the Raytheon board of directors to visit the missile systems facility in Tucson during August. While they were in Tucson, the missile systems president took the board of directors on a walking tour of the facilities of the missile plant. After about an hour walking in August heat the Raytheon CEO told the missile systems' president, "Okay, you do not have to wear coat and tie to work, now get the buses" (Personal communication, Gooden, 2007). This demonstrates how the ideological principles of the New England corporate headquarters and the western influence in Tucson evolved into a new corporate culture. Each of the organizations was able to maintain their identity while they created a larger corporate identity.

The last of Schein's culture categories is "habits of thinking, mental models, and linguistic paradigms" (Schein, 2004, p. 15). It is easy to understand why organizations do things the way they do and develop practices and procedures that support their actions. However, this process can become very detrimental to the organization when habitual thinking prevents honest and thorough examination of problems within the organization. When an organization does things the same way and it is successful, it provides a safe place for the members to believe everything is all right (Collins, 2009). Members are taught from early entry into the organization that to be successful they need to be

supportive of the way things are done in the organization and learn how the members of the organization should think. The indoctrination of new members and the continued reinforcement of that indoctrination within the organization can lead to groupthink.

Groupthink occurs when a homogenous highly cohesive group sees themselves as part of the in-group and fails to evaluate all their alternatives and options (Oregon State, 2011). They believe in their collective wisdom and they tend to rationalize their decisions as correct and unimpeachable. Janis pointed out that groups who use groupthink have an illusion of invulnerability and they have an unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality (Moorhead, 1982). The members want to conform to the group's desires and not be the one that challenges or opposes the decisions of the group. This leads to a very comfortable position for the organizational members and provides them security in their position within the organization and confidence in the work that they perform.

Groupthink allows groups within organizations to make decisions and work on achieving the stated goals of the group and organization. The recognized problem with this approach is group members are reluctant to voice opinions that are contrary to the decision of the group for fear of social punishment from other members and preserve the unity of the group (Moorhead, 1982). Critical problem solving that can alert the group and organization of the potential problems are not considered and a culture of denial develops (Collins, 2009). The research reveals that groupthink contributed to the drift that resulted in the detainee abuse.

Public policy making has been characterized as a complex, dynamic, constantly evolving interactive and adaptive system (Geurts, n.d.). The policies directing the War on Terror from the Bush administration were developed under groupthink by the War

Council (Sands, 2008). The groupthink approach became the apparatus for the decision to invade Iraq and the top level of the Bush administration seemed to buy into the approach (Houghton, 2008). In 1996, journalist Bob Woodward described a conversation between President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell. "'Are you with me on this?' the president asked his secretary of state. 'I think I have to do this. I want you with me.' 'I'm with you, Mr. President,' Powell replied" (as cited in Houghton, 2008, p. 186).

Groupthink as an organizational behavior does not necessarily result in poor group decision-making (Callaway & Esser, 1984). The quality of the decision-making is dependent upon the decision process and the cohesiveness of the group. However, groups who consider themselves highly effective decision-makers make more risky decisions than groups who consider themselves vulnerable (Callaway & Esser, 1984). This case study has identified that groupthink provided the organizations within the study the confidence to make the decisions that led to the practical drift that resulted in the detainee abuse.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

The case study of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison addresses the how, the causes and forces of practical drift, and the why, the elements of practical drift, that resulted in the detainee abuse. It also examines the effect of diffusion of responsibility within the organizations involved in the actions at Abu Ghraib and how diffusion of responsibility contributed to practical drift. The major question of what was going on is analyzed to understand how the abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison was allowed to occur.

Research Design

This case study examines the organizational dynamic of practical drift. As detailed in Chapter 2, Snook (1996) developed the theory of practical drift in the case study of The Friendly Fire Shootdown in Northern Iraq in 1994. Snook identified drift in the local procedures the organizational members were operating under from the written procedures the organization established years earlier. The approach of this research applies the case study method to another real-life case to further test Snook's theory of practical drift.

Yin (2004) pointed out that the case study method is pertinent when research addresses either a descriptive question (what happened?) or an explanatory question (how or why did something happen?). Examining the case of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison meets Yin's descriptive and explanatory questions of when the case study method should be used. Understanding what happened and how or why it happened provides the

framework to explore the theory of practical drift and determine if practical drift is a valid organizational behavior theory.

Through case study methods, a researcher is able to go beyond the quantitative statistical results and understand the behavioral conditions through the actor's perspective (Zainal, 2007). It is important to examine the detainee abuse through the actor or actors' perspective in an attempt to understand the actions of all those involved. The detainee abuse involved multiple organizational levels of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, the Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7), the U.S. Department of Defense, and the National Command Authority of the United States. Identifying the actions or lack of actions of the actors at each level reveals what happened and why the detainee abuse occurred.

Case studies, in their true essence, explore contemporary real-life phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships (Zainal, 2007). Applying a case study method to this case provides the analysis of this real-life phenomenon and compares the relationships between the actors and the events involved in the detainee abuse. Yin (2004) states with a case study approach "you make direct observations and collect data in natural settings" (p. 2) and in this case, multiple investigative reports provide the basis for making direct observation because of the data that was collected in the natural setting.

The case study approach provides the ability to examine the difference and effects of hard thinking and soft thinking in the organizations associated with the detainee abuse. As defined, hard thinking is the general approach most organizations apply to problem solving, especially military and governmental organizations. Once the problem is

identified, a solution is defined and this usually produces a systemic model to deal with the problem. Checkland (2000) defined soft system methodology as an inquiring process (p. S15) and when applied, learning is continual in the situation. The soft thinking approach will allow for a system learning approach and could have been the foundation for preventing the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.

Setting

The detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison took place in the setting of the Iraq War that was given the name of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The war was initiated after the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States by members of Al Qaeda, the militant Islamist terrorist organization founded by Osama bin Laden. These attacks appeared to affect every American citizen and stirred up pride in many American people and anger against the Islamic religion and those who practice the religion. In addition, there was a belief that Saddam Hussein provided support to Al Qaeda (Sastry & Wiersema, 2003).

For years, the U.S. government and its allies identified Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, as a brutal dictator who oppressed his people and was a threat to peace in the region and in the world (Cannon & Fang, 2004). Anyone who opposed his removal or opposed changing the government of Iraq was viewed as an enemy of freedom and therefore an enemy of the United States. The coalition forces' governments generally expressed this opinion and the news media was the platform that provided these governments to present this idea. Whether the idea was right or wrong was not in question and most Americans appeared to accept the idea that what was happening in Iraq was good and the right thing to do.

With the success of OIF, the task that the coalition forces faced was how do you occupy Iraq and help it build a new nation. The nation building effort is, and has always proven to be, much more difficult than fighting and defeating a nation (Carson, 2003). Unforeseen elements, good and bad, become a part of the nation building and these elements cannot be ignored. Also, there has never been a good military or diplomatic doctrine developed on how to be successful in nation building. Every situation is unique and different and what worked in the Philippines, post-World War II countries, and Bosnia does not necessarily work today.

In addition, while the coalition forces were starting their nation building effort in Iraq there was still an active war being fought in Afghanistan (Bruno, 2013). The Global War on Terror was worldwide and resources were being diverted to support this effort, especially by the United States. This caused the coalition forces, led by the U.S. contingent, to draw lessons about detainee operations from all fronts of the war (Church, 2005). Unfortunately, each situation was different and should have been evaluated as a stand-alone event and not as a common event across the spectrum of the war. Some of the lessons did help develop common practices for detainee operations but the situational differences should have been recognized and accounted for in the operational practices used, especially in Iraq.

Another key factor in the setting was the rotation of units to support detainee operations. In Iraq the 372nd Military Police Company, who fought the war, was told it would be going home after the war. Instead, the unit was diverted to establish the detainee operations at Abu Ghraib Prison (Fay, 2004). This did affect the morale of the soldiers and with the Spartan living conditions they were required to endure, standards

within the organization started to erode. The eroding standards started migrating into how detainees were handled and abuse became accepted among members of the detainee operations unit (Taguba, 2004).

This case study examines what caused the abuse to develop and why the abuse happened. It is prudent to again state that a very small number of soldiers in the detainee operations unit carried out the abuse. However, even though the number of soldiers who abused the detainees was small, the conditions were allowed to develop because of many actions from the larger organizations (Department of the Army Inspector General, 2004).

Data Collection

The data collection for the case study relied on official government and non-governmental reports of investigations about the detainee abuse, articles and books written about the abuse, and interviews with former senior U.S. governmental officials who served the United States during the War on Terror. Since the release of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse photos in 2004, there have been numerous official investigations directed by the U.S. government. These investigations examine all the elements and facets of the abuse from the individuals who perpetrated the acts of abuse (Taguba, 2004), to legal counsel advice for senior leaders of the U.S. government (U.S. Department of Justice Investigations), and to Congressional inquiries into the abuse (Select Committee On Intelligence Report). Yin (2004) stated that the case study method should "illuminate a particular situation, to get a close (i.e., in-depth and first-hand) understanding of it" (p. 2). The data from all the sources used in this case study provides the in-depth, first-hand information of the forces, causes, and elements of the detainee

abuse. The analysis of this data revealed the stages of practical drift and how drift is a normal part of organizational behavior.

Table 1. List of Sources

	Report	Date
1.	Central Intelligence Agency Office of Inspector General (2004) Report: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003)	5-7-2004
2.	The Taguba (2004) Report on Treatment of Abu Ghraib Prisoners In Iraq: ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE	5-27-2004
3.	The Formica (2004) Report: Investigation on command and control questions and allegations of detainee abuse in Iraq	4-1-2004
4.	The Jones (2004) Report: AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade	8-23-2004
5.	The Schlesinger (2004) Report: Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations	8-24-2004
6.	U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report (2004): U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq	7-9-2004
7.	Department of the Army, The Inspector General (2004) Report: Detainee Operations Inspection	7-21-2004
8.	The Fay (2004) Report: Article 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade	8-25-2004
9.	Human Rights Watch (2005): Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuse of Detainees	April 2005
10.	U.S. Army (2005) Regulation 15-6: Final Report on the Investigation into FBI Allegation of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility	4-1-2005; Amended 6-9-2005
11.	The Church (2005) Report: an inquiry into detainee interrogation and incarceration, in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	3-2-2005
12.	National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 Public Law 109-163 (U.S. Congress, 2006)	1-6-2006
13.	International Committee on the Red Cross (2007) Report: On the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA Custody	2-14-2007
14.	U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility Report: A review of the FBI's involvement in and observations of defense interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Office of the Inspector General, 2008)	May 2008
15.	Physicians for Human Rights (2008): Broken Laws, Broken Lives: Medical Evidence of torture by US Personnel and Its Impact	June 2008
16.	United States District Court Western District of Washington (2008) Law Suit: Sa'adoon Ali Hameed Al-Ogaidi, Plaintiff v. Daniel E. Johnson, CACI International 1100 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201; CACI Premier Technology, Inc. 1100 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201; L-3 Services, Inc. 1320 Braddock Place, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, Defendants	6-3-2008
17.	U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility (2009) Report: Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists	7-29-2009

Table 1 lists the sources collected to conduct the case study into the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison. The sources include official United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of Justice, and Central Intelligence Agency investigation reports about the interrogation and detainment of prisoners in U.S. custody. The reports present the findings and recommendations of the investigation teams who were appointed by officials that had command or supervisory responsibility of the individuals being investigated. Other sources include U.S. Congress reports, non-governmental organizations' reports, and a United States District Court suit. The information in the reports was used to analyze what happened and how the detainee abuse occurred. The reports provided the knowledge that the single event of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison was caused by an accumulation of events from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Afghanistan, and finally in Iraq.

In addition to the reports listed in Table 1, there have been many articles and books written about the detainee abuse. These were used to augment the in-depth analysis of the investigation reports and since the detainee abuse is so polarizing and shocking, it is recognized that the articles and books may be biased. However, that does not present a reason to preclude them from the study and "good case studies benefit from having multiple sources of evidence" (Yin, 2004, p. 9). The analytical and fact finding of the investigation reports combined with the opinion of writers who are interested in the case allows for a rich analysis of the case.

To provide additional data about the detainee abuse, interviews were conducted with former senior U.S. government officials. The officials provided revelations of the actions of many organizational leaders involved in establishing policies, developing

plans, and setting conditions that resulted in the detainee abuse. These officials have a unique view of the organizational actions and conduct which illuminated elements that either were left out of the official investigation reports or were not identified in the official investigation reports. Officials interviewed were an investigation team leader, former U.S. Army commanders, and a former staff member of the Department of the Army Staff Adjutant General. Their judgment and impressions provide collaborating evidence (Yin, 2004) to the robust observations drawn from examining the reports and investigation of the detainee abuse.

Data Analysis

Yin (2004) argued that the less experience a researcher has in conducting case studies, the more the researcher should adopt some theoretical perspectives. The theory of practical drift, identified by Snook (1996), is used in this case study to build, extend, and add to the grounded theory. Organizational drift does not happen in a vacuum but is caused by forces, both internal and external, and elements, both seen and unseen.

The case study explored what happened and why did the detainee abuse happen (Yin, 2004) and the forces and elements that contributed to the detainee abuse. By understanding these factors of this case study, it will add to the knowledge of practical drift within organizations. A critical component to the data analysis is how forces above and outside the drifting organization set the conditions and established the environment for the detainee abuse. This requires analyzing the events leading up to the abuse, what the thinking of the organizational leaders was, what unforeseen events and conditions developed, and how all of this applied the pressure on the organizations where the detainee abuse occurred.

This analysis triangulates or establishes converging lines of evidence to make the findings as robust as possible (Yin, 2004). Most of the official U.S. government reports end up with the same conclusion that a few members of the armed forces perpetrated the abuse. That appears to be accurate if the goal of the analysis is to identify the offending parties. If the goal is to identify the forces and elements that caused the abuse, attention must be given to the threads that run from and throughout the highest organization to the lowest organization. The in-depth examination of all the data provides the ability to identify the forces and elements; reveal their impact on the members and organizations; define potential causes; and provide a framework to allow organizational leaders to review their organizations for potential drift.

The analysis of the data was conducted by applying the lenses of hard thinking methodology and soft system methodology. It reveals how the abuse could have been prevented if the organizational leaders understood how a learning system could assist them in managing an organization. Hard thinking systems are rigid and inflexible while soft thinking systems are continually learning from successes and failures. The soft thinking system may not be applicable for the lowest level of the organizations but the view from the higher organizations should support the learning approach of the soft system thinking.

Credibility, Transferability, Dependability, Confirmability

Credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability are important measurements of an analysis even in the case study approach. For a study to be credible, it must be believable (Guba & Lincoln, 2001). In this case study the credibility is from the detailed investigative work performed by many recognized professionals. The

professionals are skilled and knowledgeable individuals and sometimes recognized as experts in their field. They know how to conduct investigations and in the detainee abuse case, they know how combatant detainees should be treated. In addition, they understand the political and war time environment the organizations are operating in and how detainee operations should be conducted. Also, this researcher's background, qualifications and experience in military operations covers three decades. Part of that experience includes conducting investigations on fatal accidents that revealed drift in the organizations procedures and in planning and supervising detainee operations in combat.

Transferability is the extent the study results can be transferred to other populations (Guba & Lincoln, 2001). This case study was undertaken to determine if the theory of practical drift contributed to the detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib Prison. The organizations examined included organizations for the lower detainee operations unit up to the command and policy organizations of the U.S. government. The data collected included official investigative reports, books and articles written about the events, and interviews with subject matter experts. The research of the data identified the stages of practical drift, which can be applied to any organization. When organizational leaders recognize the stage of practical drift their organization is in they can take actions to correct the drift and prevent a crisis from happening.

Dependability is the need to reflect on the context of the study and changes that may occur within the study setting (Guba & Lincoln, 2001). The examination of the official investigation reports was extensive. The reports provided a vast amount of interviews and official inquires with individuals under oath. The information obtained from the examination is dependable and reliable. The researcher appraisals of the project

is the case study can be undertaken in many different types of organizations and the forces, causes, and elements of practical drift are identified.

Confirmability in this study provides the evidence that the case study does examine and reveal the intent of the research. A case study should evaluate a descriptive question (what happened) or an explanatory question (how or why did something happen; (Yin, 2004). This case study answers both of these questions. The approach to evaluating the data has led to the identification of the stages of practical drift. The researcher has revealed any bias, beliefs, and assumptions while conducting this research. The researcher's recommendation is the grounded theory of practical drift is a part of organizational behavior and organizational leaders should be aware of its presence.

Ethical Considerations

This case study examines one of the most controversial events of the War on Terror that affected people all over the world since the event was reported in the world media. The action at Abu Ghraib Prison also became a major focus of the political environment in the United States and has been used in the political campaigns of many politicians in the U.S. Eleven soldiers were convicted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (2010) for their actions as part of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison.

The careers of senior officers and non-commissioned officers were terminated by the issuance of General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand or lower level Memorandum of Reprimand by commanders. Many of the names of these individuals are available through release of public records of the actions taken against them. Even though their names and punishments are known and available, this researcher took precautions to

avoid using the names of individuals involved in the detainee abuse. The case study is not about the abuse but if practical drift contributed to the abuse

There are circumstances that require names be used in the case study. Most of the circumstances are related to official duties of U.S. government officials such as the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and diplomatic members serving in Iraq at high-level positions. These names assist in clarifying the events surrounding the detainee abuse and how the actions, both official and non-official, set the forces in motion that contributed to the drift toward detainee abuse.

Unintended consequences are always present in actions taken by individuals. When these actions set national policy that directs the strategic military, diplomatic, and economical forces of the United States and its coalition partners the unintended consequences can be disastrous. If we desire to reap benefit out of these events we need to examine and then expose what happened, how it happened and why it happened. The result could lead to the prevention of events such as the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in the future. It could also open the dialogue beyond who is to blame for the actions but how do we prepare for a future that will continually present extreme problems to organizations.

This case study is about the application of U.S. armed forces in the defense of our nation and how practical drift developed in one area of the application of the armed forces. It would be wrong to draw lessons from the study that only applied to U.S. government or U.S. military organizations. The lessons revealed in this case study could be applied to any organization that is experiencing practical drift in their procedures.

CHAPTER 4. DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS

Introduction

Jim Collins (2009) wrote,

> Whenever people begin to confuse nobility of their cause with the goodness and wisdom of their actions – "We're good people in pursuit of a noble cause, and therefore our decisions are good and wise" – they can perhaps more easily lead themselves astray. Bad decisions made with good intentions are still bad decisions. (p. 148)

It would be easy to identify all the bad decisions made at the unit level at Abu Ghraib Prison and assign blame to the individuals at that level. However, that would be a very shallow look and a disingenuous conclusion. It would not expose the leadership failure of the operations in Iraq and how the leaders who provided the leadership were prepared for this critical time in their careers.

The data analyses reveals how decades of training and development of the leaders who planned and executed Operation Iraqi Freedom did not prepare them to execute their mission. Identifying the problems with the development of these leaders requires an examination of doctrine established after previous wars (World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Operation Desert Storm) and what actions were taken to correct the mistakes that generated the lessons learned. Many of the actions were successful but some of the more dynamic actions appear to have had an adverse impact on preparing the senior office corps, especially at the flag officer rank.

The case study exposed a behavior trait identified by MG Taguba when he briefed the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense on May 6, 2004, about his investigation of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse. Taguba (personal communication, February 16, 2012) stated, as a group they were in damage control mode by creating ambiguity to shield themselves from the controversy. He said they deflected responsibility and dismissed any responsibility for the actions taken by many of the senior leaders, both military and civilian, in the Iraqi Operations and in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse. Taguba claimed as a group they were dismissive of their responsibility and did not acknowledge that they had any part in the circumstances that allowed this action to happen. He stated their dismissive responsibility became evident when they asked him "tell us what happened" because it was as if they had not even read his report.

In "A Blaze of Glory," a historical novel about the Battle of Shiloh, Jeff Shaara (2012) wrote a fictional conversation between Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston and Kentucky politician Isham Harris. During the conversation Johnston stated, "When men's lives are the price we pay for blunders, it is best to minimize blunders" (p. 19). This principle was lost over the decades leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom by the U. S. Army officer corps. What resulted was the dismissive responsibility phenomenon that created a flag rank corps within the Army of officers, which acted as if their responsibility was to protect the General Officer Corps rather than provide the leadership the soldiers and country deserved.

To fully capture the elements of practical drift in this case study and understand how the culmination resulted in the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, the data analysis begin

at the critical event. The case study then follows the thread of practical drift back through the last 50 years to reveal how the drift started and how it progressed to Abu Ghraib.

Leadership in Iraq

The literature review established that Combined Joint Task Force – Seven (CJTF-7) operated under the authority of the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. CJTF-7 assigned the detainee operations to the 800th Military Police Brigade, which established twelve detention centers throughout Iraq (Fay, 2004). One of the detention centers was established at Abu Ghraib Prison and the 372d Military Police Company, a U.S. Army Reserve unit from Maryland, was assigned to operate the center. This unit had been told they were returning to the United States and that their mission in Iraq was over. However, their orders were rescinded and the 372d was assigned the mission at Abu Ghraib, a mission that they had not been trained for or were prepared to execute (Gourevitch, 2009).

As the demand for intelligence increased within the coalition forces and the coalition governments, units "indiscriminately detained thousands of Iraqis and shipped them off to Abu Ghraib and other detention centers, where the Army lacked sufficient guards and interrogators to hold and sort them" (Ricks, 2012). This process resulted in two very damaging problems. First, "an Army intelligence expert estimated that more than 85 percent of the detainees had no intelligence value" (Ricks, 2012) resulting in the military intelligence analyst job getting five times harder and more complicated trying to determine intelligence from made up stories. Second, among the more than ten thousand Iraqis imprisoned at the centers were hard-core insurgents and Al Qaeda terrorists and the detention centers became recruiting and training centers for the insurgents (Ricks, 2012).

Over-crowding, low morale among the 372d soldiers, deteriorating living conditions for both detainees and the U.S. soldiers, pressure to gain intelligence, and confusing lines of authority in Abu Ghraib set the conditions for the detainee abuse. Getting resources had been a real problem at Abu Ghraib. The 372d had continuously asked for better food and clothing for the detainees. All the soldiers related that they had seen some naked detainees, but their nudity had generally stemmed from a lack of supplies (Graveline & Clemens, 2010).

Adding to the confusion at Abu Ghraib was the presence of interrogators who were not under the operational control of the detainee unit's leadership. These interrogators were assigned to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, which had the assistance of other agency and contract interrogators, non-DoD personnel. The non-DoD interrogators used many of the enhanced interrogation techniques that had been used in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan. These interrogators were covered under an executive order established on the Yoo memos on the definition of torture relating to enhanced interrogation techniques and an executive order indemnified the interrogators from prosecution (Taguba personal conversation, February 16, 2012). The executive order provided the non-DoD interrogators freedom to use the enhanced interrogation techniques and the interrogators requested and got assistance from the 372d soldiers in setting the conditions for interrogation of detainees (Taguba, 2004).

The soldiers involved in the detainee abuse knew they were violating the approved techniques and procedures of interrogations (Taguba, 2004). They violated their oath, their duties, and performed in a manner that was not condoned by their chain of command in clear violation of law, policy, and doctrine and contrary to Army values

(Taguba, 2004). However, the pressure of the operation, the confusing organizational structure within the detainee center, and the conflicting implementation of the interrogation techniques caused the soldiers to perpetrate the crimes as they carried out their operational duties at Abu Ghraib Prison.

For a unit that performed well during the combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom to drift so far away from their standards and procedures and execute criminal acts as they did, had to be the result of a major error. In a 2009 study, Major Douglas Pryer, a veteran Army intelligence officer, suggested it was not a lack of resources or training that was the basic cause of the Abu Ghraib scandal; it was a lack of ethical leadership by the CJTF-7 leaders (Ricks, 2012). All of the investigation reports have declared that a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians were the primary cause of the detainee abuse (Fay, 2004). These same soldiers conducted themselves appropriately during Operation Iraqi Freedom. So how did the drift to being undisciplined occur? U.S. soldiers have endured much worse than the pressure and conditions at the detention center and not regressed to criminal activity. Major Pryer is correct when he implied that under ethical and disciplined leadership the abuse at Abu Ghraib would in all probability not have happened.

Without excusing the actions of the 372nd soldiers who conducted the abuse on the detainees, the analysis of data revealed the leadership in CJTF-7 and subordinate units in Iraq must bear the preponderance of the blame for the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse. Lessons learned is the way the U.S. Army evaluates the actions of units and personnel in the quest to identify problems, prevent mistakes in the future, and ensure success in future operations. A key factor in the lessons learned process is that the participating

individuals should examine their roles and evaluate their actions. It has been over ten years since the abuse and not one of the senior leaders of CJTF-7 has written anything to self-examine their role and responsibility in the situation. This fact supports Major Pryer's assumption that ethical leadership was lacking in CJTF-7 in 2003. The development of the interrogation policy and techniques was a factor and contributed to the drift in detainee operational execution throughout CJTF-7 leadership.

Interrogation Policy Development

Many times individuals who develop policy concentrate on the current situation and do not consider the historical character of the policy that is being developed. In 400 B. C. Sun Tzu wrote in "The Art of War" that the desired outcome of war was to subdue enemy without fighting and avoid protracted war (Boyd, 1986). The Bush Administration had a group called the War Council which included the White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Legal Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, General Counsel of the Department of Defense William Haynes, Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, and Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo. The role of the War Council was described as being to plot legal strategy in the war on terrorism (Sands, 2008). The research disclosed the War Council was engulfed in groupthink and did not survey the objectives to be fulfilled and the values implicated by their choice (Fontenot & Benson, 2013). The council members did not recognize that the United States was entering into warfare that had been around for centuries. The War Council was inside an echo chamber as it developed the policies that laid the legal foundation for the War on Terrorism: the apprehension and detention of foreign nationals, and the interrogation technique policies that established how detainees could be interrogated and treated. Dissenting opinions

were outside the echo chamber and were not allowed to influence the policy developments, which restricted information or data from outside sources (Fontenot & Benson, 2013).

The legal reviews prepared for the President, Vice President, and Secretary of Defense stated the war against terrorism is a new kind of war (Gonzales, 2002) or a new sort of conflict (Taft, 2002). While these individuals had very bright legal minds, they did not know what the character of war was or how the War on Terrorism was not a new kind of war but the kind of war Sun Tzu saw over 2,000 years ago. As a result, there was drift in thought and legal opinion that contributed to the actions at Abu Ghraib Prison.

The foundation for the enhanced interrogation techniques was the John Yoo memo, on the "Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States" dated March 14, 2003. William Woodruff, a retired Army Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer and a tenured professor at Campbell University Law School, reasoned as a legal document the Yoo memo is well researched and his conclusions are supported by the international and U.S. law cases Yoo sites in the memo (personal communications, May 11, 2013). Woodruff observed the major mistake that Yoo and the administration made was classifying the memo because there was no classified information in the memo. It was a straight legal brief that counsels prepare every day for government officials and they are open for review by the legal community. The Yoo memo was declassified in 2008 but had it not been classified at the time it was written the legal community could have reviewed it, possibly changed it, and altered the course of events that resulted in the detainee abuse.

A significant finding in the memo was that unlawful enemy combatants are not covered under the Geneva Convention. Woodruff explained that for a combatant to be covered under the Geneva Convention they must meet the criteria established under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. Specifically Article 4.1.2 defines covered combatants as members of an organization who are commanded by a person responsible for their subordinates; that they have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; that they carry arms openly; and they conduct their operations in accordance with laws and customs of war (Third Geneva Convention, 1949). The only people in Iraq who met the criteria in the Geneva Convention were the Iraq Armed Forces members who fought against the Coalition Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The thousands of individuals arrested during the occupation of Iraq were not covered under the Geneva Convention. However, the soldiers who had the responsibility for detainee operations were required to follow their orders under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (2010), the U.S. Army (2011) Operational Law Handbook, and the U.S. Army (1992) Field Manual FM 34-52. Both documents state the mistreatment of detainees is forbidden.

After the Yoo memo, the groupthink of the War Council began filtering through the organizations. Demands were made to clear the way for changes in interrogation techniques to get the information needed to prosecute the War on Terrorism. The person who was ultimately responsible for writing the new approved enhanced interrogation techniques was Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate for Joint Task Force – 170 in Guantanamo Bay (Sands, 2008). JTF – 170 was an intelligence task force established to operate Camp Delta in Guantanamo and in November 2002 it was merged with Joint Task Force – 160 to form Joint Task Force Guantanamo, JTF-GITMO. All the

detainees at Guantanamo were designated as high value targets that had great intelligence value to the United States. Many members of the administration believed that these individuals had intelligence about Al Qaeda and possible attacks on the United States and other countries Al Qaeda had targeted. In addition, the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks was coming up and Doug Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, said, "there was tremendous pressure to be seen to be getting something done" (Sands, 2008, p. 48).

One of the agencies called upon to assist in developing the enhanced interrogation techniques was the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA; U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Forces, 2008). JPRA has the mission to train members of the U.S. armed forces in tactics and techniques to resist providing information when they are captives of an enemy force. During the evaluation of the enhanced interrogation techniques, the idea was presented to determine if the JPRA could reverse engineer the tactics and techniques that JPRA uses to train U.S. armed forces personnel. On August 12, 2002, JPRA created a special program called Project 22B, which provided JPRA members portraying resisters of different skill levels and interrogators demonstrating the ability to use exploitation methods and concepts taught, as well as using authorized physical pressures (U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Forces, 2008).

This action was the result of practical drift within the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. The agency was responsible for training U.S. armed forces personnel on how they are to resist providing information to enemy forces even under torture conditions. Project 22B moved the JPRA into the area where they did not train U.S. personnel to resist but trained them in how to gain information from detainees. JPRA personnel were not trained interrogators but were recommending, training, and directing interrogators in

the practice of obtaining information. Changing the culture of the JPRA was a devastatingly bad idea and Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg's, Chief of Psychology Services at the Air Force SERE School, pointed out that detainees cannot be regarded as SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) students (U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Forces, 2008). Students are taught to resist, and detainees will say anything to get relief from the psychological effects of the enhanced interrogation techniques.

Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer, the intelligence officer for JTF -170, wrote a list of 18 enhanced interrogation techniques that were divided into three categories. Category I was characterized by two techniques, yelling and deception. If Category I did not produce results interrogators could request approval from a designated officer to use the 12 techniques in Category II aimed at humiliation and sensory deprivation. Category III techniques were reserved for the most uncooperative detainees and could only be used with the approval of the commanding general (Sands, 2008). Major General Michael Dunlavey, JTF – 170 Commander, insisted that the techniques receive legal review by Beaver. To her credit, she requested legal advice from SOUTHCOM (United States Southern Command), the higher headquarters of JTF – 170, Staff Judge Advocate Manny Superville and Captain Jane Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both lawyers refused to assist Beaver and deflected any responsibility to legally review the techniques proposed. The legal review and approval for the enhanced interrogation techniques that became U.S. policy was relegated to the least experienced lawyer in the chain. She reviewed the list of interrogation techniques and agreed that the proposed strategies do not violate applicable federal law (Sands, 2008).

When asked by Philippe Sands, author of "Torture Team," how the enhanced interrogation techniques were developed, Beaver explained the process. She stated that there was a series of brainstorming meetings, which include personnel from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), and JTF -170. These meetings resulted in the development of the 18 enhanced interrogation techniques that Beaver approved. One of the sources for interrogation techniques proved very surprising. During the interview with Sands, Beaver mentioned 24 and Jack Bauer. Jack Bauer was the main character in the Fox TV network show "24" and his method of gaining information from terrorists was torture. Beaver said the Bauer character had many friends at Guantanamo Bay and provided many ideas for torture procedures (Sands, 2008).

A fictional television program influenced the interrogation techniques developed for approval by the U.S. Secretary of Defense (Sands, 2008). Jim Haynes, General Counsel to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, approved of the techniques and authorized U.S. forces to "take the gloves off" (Sands, 2008, p. 226). All the senior legal minds in SOUTHCOM and the Department of Defense allowed a junior legal adviser at Guantanamo Bay to be influenced by this fictional television program and establish these techniques as U.S. policy. On June 17, 2008, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Forces, Beaver testified,

> I fully expected that it would be carefully reviewed by legal and policy experts at the highest levels before a decision was reached. I did not expect that my opinion, as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Judge Advocate General Corps, would be the final word on interrogation policies and practices within the Department of Defense. (U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Forces, 2008, p. 56)

All the legal experts above Beaver were deflective in their responsibility as lawyers and as sworn members of the Armed Forces. When they were confronted with a major crisis in developing U.S. policy, they failed. Their failure had a major contribution to the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.

Rumsfeld's Note

When William Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, prepared the action memo for Secretary Rumsfeld, he attached the list of the 18 counter-resistance techniques that the Commander of USSOUTHCOM forwarded from the Commander JTF-GITMO. As stated in the memo, the purpose was to gain approval to use the enhanced techniques to aid in the interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Haynes wrote that he had discussed the techniques with Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, and they all joined in his recommendation (Haynes, 2002). Rumsfeld's approval was only gained after lengthy debate among the Department of Defense leaders and the White House Staff.

In January 2002, the initial debate started about the application of the Geneva Convention to the detainees captured in Afghanistan, which were transported to Guantanamo Bay during that month. Based on the draft Yoo memo, Rumsfeld made the decision that neither Al Qaeda nor Taliban detainees were entitled to POW (Prisoner of War) status but should be treated humanely and in a manner consistent with Geneva (Sands, 2008). General Myers forwarded the decision to JTF-GITMO (Sands, 2008). However, this met resistance from U.S. State Department officials and Myers then supported the State Departments position that the detainees were covered under Geneva

and due POW status (Sands, 2008). Doug Feith and Myers discussed the issue with Rumsfeld and Feith stated,

> Obeying the Geneva Convention is not optional. The U.S. Constitution says there are two things that are the supreme law of the land – statutes and treaties. The Geneva Conventions are a treaty in force. It is as much part of the supreme law of the United States as a statute. (p.33)

When Feith told Rumsfeld it was the law that ended the conversation (Sands, 2008). Therefore, the issue had to be resolved at the highest level.

On February 7, 2002, President Bush (2002) issued a memorandum on Humane Treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees that stated both Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not covered under the Geneva POW Convention and are not due POW status. This decision was based on a 9 January 2002 memo prepared by John Yoo and Robert J. Delahunty. In their memo, they argued that all four Geneva Conventions share the same Article 2, known as Common Article 2, which states,

> In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.

High Contracting Parties are the parties who have signed an international agreement and ratified that agreement. Since neither Al Qaeda nor the Taliban had signed the Geneva Convention, they could not be considered High Contracting Parties and receive the covering of the Geneva Convention. To further support their argument, Yoo and Delahunty (2002) pointed out that the Geneva Convention requires the High Contracting Parties to enact penal legislation to punish anyone who commits or orders a grave breach. The Taliban and Al Qaeda did not have the state credentials to sign the convention or enact the required legislation.

After the issue of coverage for the detainees under the Geneva Convention was settled, the U.S. government had to decide how to interrogate the detainees. Much of the debate revolved around what was torture and what acts constituted torture. Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, submitted a memo on August 1, 2002, to the Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales. As Bybee stated in his memo, "you have asked for our Office's views regarding the standards of conduct under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of Punishment as implemented by Sections 2340-2340A of title 18 of the United States Code" (p. 1). The memo defines torture as intense pain or excruciating pain and that the definition encompasses only extreme acts (Bybee, 2002). The European Court of Human Rights supports this definition and concluded that techniques that produce intense physical and mental suffering and acute psychiatric disturbances are not sufficient intensity or cruelty to amount to torture (Bybee, 2002).

In his memo, Bybee also addressed the issue of the President's power as Commander in Chief. There was concern that United States Code Section 2340 of title 18, which defines crimes and criminal procedures, might be violated by some of the interrogation techniques authorized to be used against detainees. As Commander in Chief, the President has the constitutional power to conduct military campaigns and order the interrogation of detainee combatants (Bybee, 2002). The argument put forward by Bybee reasoned that Section 2340 would be an unconstitutional encroachment against the President's constitutional powers. He pointed out that the Supreme Court has unanimously stated that it is "the President alone who is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations" (Bybee, 2002, p. 34). Bybee further asserted that

Congress lacks authority under Article I to set the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise his authority as Commander in Chief (Bybee, 2002). Therefore, any law that encroaches on the President's authority and attempts to direct any action or prevent any action is unconstitutional. As Bybee pointed out, the Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movement on the battlefield (Bybee, 2002).

One area that the Bybee memo covered caused problems for the soldiers of the 372nd MP Company at Abu Ghraib. There was concern that an interrogation method might violate Section 2340A (Bybee, 2002). In Part V of the memo, Bybee noted that Section 2340A would be unconstitutional because the President's Commander in Chief powers allow him to determine and direct the interrogation of enemy combatants. The possibility of legal action against interrogators who use the identified techniques was still a concern. The memo acknowledged that the interrogators could possibly breach a line drawn in Section 2304 and an application of the statue was not held to be an unconstitutional infringement of the President's Commander in Chief authority (Bybee, 2002). If this situation materialized what defense would the interrogators have?

Bybee asserted that the interrogators could use the doctrine of necessity and self-defense. Necessity has been defined as conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid harm or evil to him or to another is justifiable (Bybee, 2002). He claimed self-defense or defense of another was an appropriate legal defense, not only as applied to an individual, but also to the nation as a whole (Bybee, 2002). This had the effect of indemnifying the interrogators from prosecution, especially since the interrogation techniques were used outside the territorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Soldiers however

were not protected from prosecution because they are under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (2010) and its jurisdiction is worldwide. As a result, non-DoD interrogators at Abu Ghraib could and did mistreat detainees and they were indemnified from prosecution, but the soldiers who help set the conditions for interrogation and mistreated the detainees were not indemnified.

When LTC Beaver submitted her legal review of the 18 enhanced interrogations techniques, William Haynes prepared the action memorandum for Secretary Rumsfeld's approval. Rumsfeld approved the techniques and added the following hand written note to the memo, "However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours? D.R." (Haynes, 2002, p. 1). While the note was not directive in nature, it showed the intent of the Secretary of Defense. An interrogator or soldier could reason that the Secretary of Defense believes the techniques are not severe enough so start changing them to meet the intent of the Secretary of Defense. There is no evidence that the note had any direct influence on the actions of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib, but a copy of the memo with the note was found on computers in the 372d MP Company (Taguba personal conversation, February 16, 2012). What can be argued is the leaders of the 372d did see the memo and it helped set the tone of the treatment of the detainees. The Rumsfeld (2003) memo, and specifically his note, was a contributing force to the practical drift in the unit's procedures and that drift resulted in the detainee abuse. However, the drift began a long time before the War on Terror.

The Beginning of the Drift

Major General McMaster (2013) wrote, "Our record of learning from previous experience is poor; one reason is that we apply history simplistically, or ignore it

altogether, as a result of wishful thinking that makes the future appear easier and fundamentally different from the past" (p. 1). This was true of our preparation for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The combat operations over the 1980s and 1990s concentrated the thinking within the military and national security arena that we can minimize casualties, execute operations swift and surgically, and return home triumphantly. Everything concentrated on the preparation for combat operations; the execution of the planned operations and the aftermath was excluded from operational planning. This is the diplomat's responsibility and the view was the military did not need to concern itself with the aftermath of war which left the U.S. military unprepared to successfully execute the after war mission.

The dramatic change in operational thinking and doctrine began as the U.S. concluded its long involvement in the Vietnam War. All the influential doctrine developers served many tours of duty in Vietnam and the general who had the greatest impact was General William E. DePuy. During World War II, DePuy served in the 90th Infantry Division which landed on Utah Beach in Normandy, France on June 6, 1944, and the division lost 100% of its soldiers and 150% of its officers in the first six weeks of the battle (Ricks, 2009). The undertrained and unpreparedness of the American forces at Normandy shaped DePuy's thinking about how to fight a war. As the commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam, he applied massive firepower against the 9th VC (Viet Cong) Division which operated in the area of responsibility of the 1st Infantry Division. The massive firepower approach was used because of the lessons DePuy learned during World War II, and in 1989, he stated his total focus was on the tactical battlefield and that he was deficient at the operational level (Ricks, 2009). In

1973 General DePuy assumed duties as the commanding general of the newly created U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which placed him at the forefront of doctrine development in the Army and he would use the lessons he learned to influence the development of the Army's war fighting doctrine.

As a result of the lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Romjue, 1984b), and the understanding the Army of Vietnam could not fight the Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe, DePuy and his doctrine developers revised the U.S. Army (1976) Field Manual 100-5, Operations. The new manual emphasized the critical demands of the first battle of the next war (Romjue, 1984b). The new doctrine recognized that the forces facing the U.S. Army in the next war would have as good or greater weapons' capability as the U.S. Army, and in all probability, the enemy would be in larger force. The doctrine stated the first battle of our next war could well be its last battle. Therefore, today the U.S. Army must above all else, prepare to win the first battle of the next war (Romjue, 1984b).

General DePuy took the hard thinking approach of identifying a problem, finding a solution, and developing a plan to solve the problem. DePuy solved the problem of war fighting with the 1976 publication of Field Manual 100-5 and a generation of practical how to fight tactical field manuals and training literature (Romjue, 1984a). He wanted to ensure that the U.S. Army would never be on a battlefield and not know how to fight. His initiatives did not only drive doctrine development but also drove the development of and procurement of the equipment needed to fight the first battle of the next war. The modernization of the Army included the development of equipment to equip the new force structure to fight on the modern battlefield. The big five equipment development

programs were M1 Abrams Tank, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, M247 Division Air Defense System (Sergeant York), AH-64 Attack Helicopter (Apache), and Utility Transport Tactical Aircraft System (UH-60 Black Hawk; Department of the Army, 1997).

The synergy of new doctrine and new equipment to support the doctrine positioned the Army to meet the strategic initiatives of the United States and ensured the Warsaw Pact forces would meet a peer on the battlefield if it decided to attack in Central Europe. Along with the doctrine development and equipment development, the Army established Combat Training Centers (CTC) to provide the battalion and brigade size units a realistic environment to train for the next war. The Combat Training Center program established specific places where units could go to perform force-on-force training in a field environment, under stressful and realistic simulated combat conditions, with established standards and evaluation procedures (Reeson, 2006). The CTC unit rotations, as the exercises became known, were graded by permanently stationed observer/controllers who were the trained experts on how-to-fight.

The new doctrine, the new force structure, the newly developed equipment, and the CTC rotations all fit into General DePuy's desired training approach. He wanted soldiers, and especially officers, to know how to fight on the modern battlefield. Most of the majors, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and general officers leading the units in Operation Iraqi Freedom had multiple CTC rotations. They were not only trained but they were molded in the way the Army wanted them to fight. The conflicts between the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom validated the how-to-fight approach to conducting warfare. Operations Urgent Fury (Grenada), Operation Just Cause (Panama),

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait), and Operation Provide Comfort (defense of the Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq) demonstrated that the units could accomplish their missions if the officers and non-commissioned office were trained how to fight.

However, this how-to-fight approach did not prepare the Army for the warfare they would eventually face in Iraq. The combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom was initially conventional and the U.S. forces performed exceptionally. After defeating the Iraqi Army, overthrowing the government of Iraq, and capturing Saddam Hussein, the U.S. Army did not have a plan to control Iraq or deal with the insurgency that arose. CENTCOM (Central Command), the controlling headquarters, did little post-hostilities planning. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's key principals had told General Franks, the CENTCOM Commander, to leave Phase IV (the post-Hussein-defeat phase) to us. Mr. Rumsfeld himself waved off help offered by the State Department (Cushman, 2007).

The how-to-fight mentality of the U.S. Army was now faced with a situation they had not been trained to fight. None of the how-to-fight manuals had addressed the insurgent fight. In addition, none of the previous two decades had seen a move toward thinking about warfare outside the how-to-fight approach. However, one voice challenged General DePuy about his approach to warfare.

A Different Approach That Could Have Prevented the Drift

While General DePuy was developing and shaping the Army into a force to win on the modern battlefield, there was one dissenting voice in the Army. Lieutenant General John H. Cushman had a similar Army career as General DePuy. He enlisted in the Army in 1940 and graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point

in 1944. He served in the Pacific Theater during World War II and in 1951; he transferred from the Engineer Branch to the Infantry Branch. It should be noted that neither General DePuy nor Lieutenant General Cushman served in Korea during the Korean War and the next combat duty that both generals saw after World War II was in Vietnam.

In 1963, General Cushman was assigned as Senior Advisor to the 21st Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and it was during this time that he developed his ideas of how the Vietnam War should be fought (Cushman, 2012). In 1967, he commanded the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and deployed his brigade to Vietnam where the brigade fought in Tet 1968 battles around Hue. General Cushman served another tour in Vietnam in 1970 as Senior Advisor to the Commanding General, IV Corps and Military Region 4. He assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division upon its return to Fort Campbell, Kentucky in 1972 and then was assigned as Commanding General, Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In this assignment, he was also Commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College. This is where General Cushman challenged General DePuy on his ideas of training the officer corps. He took the soft system methodology of thinking approach that emphasized a learning system in an organization that would provide an environment that recognizes change and reveals the potential need to adjust and modify procedures.

General Cushman developed his thoughts about warfare from his experience as the Senior Advisor to the 21st Division in Vietnam. He believed his tour of duty in Vietnam revealed what would work in Vietnam and what would not (Cushman, 2012). When he returned from Vietnam, and waiting to attend the Naval War College, he briefed Lieutenant General Harold K. Johnson, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for

Operations (DCSOPS) on his ideas. His message was, "The countryside is no place for American troops. They will only tear it up. They won't be able to tell friend from foe" He believed that pacification was the answer and that with U.S. advice and assistance Vietnamese troops could deal with the Viet Cong (Cushman, 2012). At the end of his briefing, General Johnson said,

> You know what we have to do to solve this problem in Vietnam? We have to build a command post down in the basement of the Pentagon where we can plot every platoon and every company and plot out the Vietnam situation in detail. (Cushman, 2012, p. 1)

Cushman (2012) said, "General, even at the 21st Division we didn't keep that kind of detail. I don't see how you can keep that kind of detail in the Pentagon" (p. 1). Johnson replied, "That's what McNamara requires" (Cushman, 2012, p. 1). As an Army Lieutenant Colonel, Cushman demonstrated the traits of strategic thinking and innovative approaches he would try to bring to the Army.

When General Cushman became Commander at Fort Leavenworth, he believed that the Army needed to raise standards and create an environment of integrity (Ricks, 2009). Part of this belief was from seeing it first hand in his assignments and part of it was from an Army War College study conducted in 1970. The Chief of Staff of the Army directed the study and its purpose was to address the professional climate of the Army, to identify any problem areas, and to formulate any corrective actions (U.S. Army War College, 1970). The study revealed, "Officers of all grades perceive a significant difference between the ideal values and the actual or operative values of the Officer Corps" (U.S. Army War College, 1970, p. iii). The study also concluded that the officers did not believe the Army was taking any actions to ensure high ideals were being practiced. One of the reasons that this study was so devastating to the senior leadership of

the Army was there was little evidence of cynicism or negativism on the part of the officers surveyed (U.S. Army War College, 1970).

General DePuy was not impressed with the Study on Military Professionalism. He stated, "The Army War College is being thrown into lots of projects which really didn't inspire me much. These projects included surveys of what made lieutenant colonels unhappy, and others which I felt stirred up more bloody problems than they solved" (Ricks, 2009, p. 343). His approach was teaching the officers how to fight was the most important thing the Army could do and everything else would fall in line.

In 1974, and then again in 1975, General Cushman convened symposiums at the Command and General Staff College on officer responsibility. He stated, "students craved discussions of basic questions such as honesty, candor, and freedom to fail" (Ricks, 2009, p. 341). Army general officers were among the guests invited to the symposium and the free-flying atmosphere at the symposium took them aback. Colonel Dandridge Malone, one of the Army's leadership experts, asserted, "It was tough, direct, and pointed and heated – and some of those generals got hurt – bad" (Ricks, 2009, p. 341). A brigadier general offered that the young officers believed that as a rule the more senior the general the more likely he compromised his integrity to achieve success (Ricks, 2009). The brigadier general further declared students believe we have "created an environment that encourages professional immorality" (p. 342).

General DePuy's approach was to train the officer corps on how to fight. General Cushman believed that was not sufficient to prepare the officer corps for service to the nation. Cushman wanted to complement the how to fight approach by teaching officers how to think (Ricks, 2009). He believed that the Vietnam War could have been won if his

approach had been taken instead of the Westmoreland/DePuy approach of massive firepower to defeat the enemy. DePuy saw only enemy on the battlefield while Cushman saw a strategic environment that included the population and diplomatic elements of war (Ricks, 2009).

DePuy knew he had critics and even stated, "They said that DePuy is going to cause a lacuna which is going to create a whole generation of idiots who all know how to clean a rifle but who don't know why we have an Army" (Ricks, 2009, p. 343). This is what happened in Iraq. All the senior leaders, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and general officers, developed the how-to-fight skill DePuy championed and they were very successful in defeating the enemy on the battlefield but they were not prepared to deal with the events after the war. The leaders in Iraq did not see that they had created a situation that needed the same type of professional officers and soldiers after the defeat of the enemy as they needed to defeat the enemy. Chaos was the war's resulting aftermath and they were not up to the challenge.

Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, the innovator of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), reasoned that, "more officers must be educated in theories and principles which will make them adaptive and innovative" (Ricks, 2009, p. 355). The first class for SAMS was the 1983-1984 school year in which 13 officers were selected to attend the class. The focus of the school was educating the officers in the art and science of warfare and the purpose of the school was to provide officers to division and corps operations planning staffs. Graduates became known as Jedi Knights throughout the Army and non-SAMS graduates considered the graduates as theorists instead of practitioners.

The SAMS graduates were to provide division and corps commanders with the planning expertise their units needed in operational warfare. They were the ones who studied the major operational campaigns in history and were to bring that knowledge to their assigned unit staffs. There were two problems with this approach. First, the year before SAMS, the officers attended the Command and General Staff College and learned DePuy's how-to-fight methods. When they reached their follow-on assignments after SAMS, the senior officers were more concerned about the modern battlefield than the historical operational art of warfare. Most of the graduates resorted to developing plans that met the urgent needs of fighting the first battle of the next war instead of critically thinking about the next war.

Second, while the SAMS graduates were assigned for two years on their respective general officer staff positions, their peers were assigned to battalion and brigade operation officer and executive officer positions. One year in SAMS and two years on staff put them three years behind their peers in critical assignments that prepared officers for command. As this realization became evident to the officer corps, SAMS lost a lot of good candidates because it was to the officer's advantage to move on to a tactical unit after Command and General Staff College instead of attending SAMS.

The one time SAMS graduates could have made a difference was Operation Iraqi Freedom. They could have looked at the history of occupation forces and recognized the requirements for the occupying force and what needed to be done. However, that does not appear to have been the case. General Sanchez never developed a formal campaign plan for the occupation of Iraq (Ricks, 2009). Sanchez and his staff continued to look at the problem through a conventional war lens and they did not develop policies to fight the

insurgents. There was no creativity, no vision, no understanding, and no critical thinking in the CJTF-7 leadership or staff. Colonel Robert Killebrew declared, "As is often the case in war, the question is not whether the troops can adapt, but whether the leaders can. The troops, as always, paid the price of educating their leaders" (Ricks, 2009, p. 420).

While Abu Ghraib detainee abuse got the publicity, the untold story in the Iraq War was the drift in professionalism among the officer corps. It happened over two decades and it saw some success during that time. The drift addressed the urgent need coming out of Vietnam of the potential war with the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. However, when the wall came down and the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact collapsed, the Army did not change their thinking or approach to warfare. The leaders of the Army just stuck to what had been successful and did not consider the possibility of warfare changing.

The Prophecy

William Strauss and Neil Howe wrote "An American Prophecy, The Fourth Turning" in 1997. In the book, they described that over the past five centuries, Anglo-American society has experienced turnings, new eras, about every two decades (Strauss & Howe, 1997). The authors identified four turnings that were repeated over the last 500 years. The turnings are

- High (the First Turning) – an upbeat era strengthening institutions and weakening individualism, when a new civic order implants and the old values regime decays.
- Awakening (the Second Turning) – a passionate era of spiritual upheaval, when the civic order comes under attack from a new values regime.

- Unraveling (the Third Turning) – a downcast era of strengthening individualism and weakening institutions, when the old civic order decays and the new values regime implants.

- Crisis (the Fourth Turning) – a decisive era of secular upheaval, when the values regime propels the replacement of the old civic order with a new one (Strauss & Howe, 1997, p. 3).

The authors identified the turnings back to the late Medieval (1435-1487) period and traced the turnings through the Millennial generations born in 1982 and later.

The Fourth Turning is the critical turning because it is the crisis period of the turnings. The Anglo-American Crises are the War of the Roses Crisis (1459-1487), the Armada Crisis (1569-1594), the Glorious Revolution Crisis (1675-1704), the American Revolution Crisis (1773-1794), the Civil War Crisis (1860-1865), and the Great Depression and World War II Crisis (1929-1946; Straus & Howe, 1997, p. 46). Each of these crisis periods are about four decades apart and generally lasted one decade. The only exception to the one-decade long period was the Civil War Crisis. The authors pointed out the Civil War was the most violent conflict ever fought on New World soil and had more casualties than all the other U.S. wars combined. Most crisis periods end with optimism, which brings on the High Turning, however the Civil War was like living through a tragedy (Strauss & Howe, 1997). The high that followed brought in the industrial era of the United States and made the divided country stronger and a more prominent player on the world stage.

The authors presented their fourth turning prophecy, which they stated would begin “sometime around the year 2005, perhaps a few years before or after” (Strauss & Howe, 1997, p. 272). One of the possible igniting events was “a global terrorist group blows up an aircraft” (Strauss & Howe, 1997, p. 273). The September 11, 2001 hijacking

of four U.S. carrier airplanes and flying them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and crashing in a field in Pennsylvania fits the fourth turning prophecy. The authors looked at history and determined the United States would enter into a crisis period equal to the Great Depression/World War II and the other crisis periods. Because the United States was involved, the whole world would be involved.

Strauss and Howe (1997) predicted the coming crisis. When it came, the crisis caught the United States Defense and Intelligence community by surprise. The intelligence community did not see the threat or potential destruction the threat could deliver. The Department of Defense was not prepared to meet the crisis except with the Cold War mentally that had dominated the decades following the Vietnam era. Through the lens of history, these two authors were able to foresee what a multitude of smart thinkers within the defense and intelligent communities could not envisage (Kean & Hamilton, 2004).

Former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gordon R. Sullivan, wrote a book in 1996, about the same time of Strauss and Howe's book, titled "Hope is Not a Method." The book was written as a leadership book in which General Sullivan described how the U.S. Army has been innovative in transforming the organization. In the forward it stated, "Today, the Army is creating new flexible organizational concepts. The Army is teaching us the role of values in a large organization. And the Army has transformed itself into a learning organization – maybe the foremost learning organization in the United States" (Sullivan & Harper, 1996, p. IX). The events of September 11, 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq disprove this statement. It is true that hope is not a method but hope was a course of action that the U.S. government (defense, intelligence, and diplomatic

organizations) practiced. They hoped history would not repeat itself and the result was we were not prepared for the crisis that has consumed the world since September 11, 2001.

Back to Abu Ghraib

As stated earlier in this case study, Snook (1996) defined practical drift as "the slow steady uncoupling of practice from written procedures" (p. 304). The initiation of this case study was to address the forces, causes, and elements of the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison by members of the U.S. Army unit responsible for detainee operations at the prison. What has been observed is the uncoupling took place over two decades. The culminating event was the detainee abuse but the drift was a slow, steady process that laid the foundation for the detainee abuse.

Snook (1996) pointed out that the uncoupling was from written procedures but that is not the case at Abu Ghraib. The 372nd Military Police Company did have written procedures as well as Army regulations on detainee operations that they attempted to follow. The soldiers were trained on the Geneva Convention responsibilities for the proper care of detainees under their control. The problem was not the drifting from these procedures but the additions to the procedures and actions they were required to perform. The Rumsfeld memo indicated that the enhanced interrogation techniques were not the final authority on what was allowed in the interrogations. The non-DoD interrogators required support setting the conditions of the interrogations. The leadership in CJTF-7 proved it was not up to the task of managing and controlling the situation after the cessation of combat operations of Operations Iraqi Freedom (Ricks, 2012).

The senior leadership of CJTF-7 was not prepared, nor did it implement proper procedures, for detainee operations (Ricks, 2012). After the abuse became evident, the

CJTF-7 leadership and the leadership in the Department of Defense were dismissive in their responsibility in acknowledging any responsibility in the actions at Abu Ghraib. They were content on laying all the blame on the small group of soldiers who actually participated in the detainee abuse. Yes, they were responsible for their actions but what led to the abuse was the drift in U.S. Army doctrine and the emphasis on how to fight instead of how to think over the preceding two decades.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This case study was initiated to examine the forces, causes, and elements of practical drift. Snook (1996) defined practical drift as "the slow steady uncoupling of practice from written procedures" (p. 304). The case study examined the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq during 2003. The researcher wanted to determine if practical drift was a factor in the detainee abuse by the soldiers of the military police company responsible for detainee operations at the prison. The research revealed that many forces, causes, and elements contributed to the abuse and the drift was not limited to the time of the Iraq War but had beginnings decades earlier.

Stages of Practical Drift

During the case study, the researcher discovered that practical drift had stages that need to be defined. Just identifying practical drift in the case study would not provide the scholarly information to validate the case study. Identifying and addressing the stages of practical drift provides a framework for future research and case studies. The researcher discovered practical drift is an organizational behavior that does not have limits on time or on boundaries. It is continually happening in organizations and needs to be recognized by the members of the organization, even when things appear to be going in the proper direction.

Between 1975 and 1997, Wang Laboratories was one of the computer industry leading companies and in 1984; Forbes magazine estimated the worth of Dr. An Wang,

the founder, to be $1.6 billion (Hevesi, 1990). In 1992, Wang Laboratories filed for bankruptcy and the company was eventually acquired by one of its competitors and now Wang is a footnote in the history of the computer industry. Everything was going great for Wang Laboratories but the founder and the management team did not foresee the coming personal computer and distributed computing wave. They continued to do what had been very successful and did not recognize the drift in the industry that would cause their downfall.

The researcher has identified the following stages in practical drift: establishment, awareness, uncoupling, and crisis. The establishment and awareness stages are predictable and organizations are generally operating in a smooth, controlled environment. Policies and procedures are established to set the organization on the appropriate path to achieve the organizational goals. The organizational members usually recognize the changing operational, economic, and culture needs and continue to refine the policies and procedures to respond to those needs. Predictability changes to unpredictability and things begin to become uncoupled, as the organizational members either do not recognize the changes needed or become so rigid in the procedures that they cannot change. Also contributing to the uncoupling are the undocumented changes that organizational members make in their duties and responsibilities. This then leads to the crisis stage, which reveals the evidence of the practical drift. Sometimes the uncoupling is caused by external driving forces both man-made and natural disasters. The crisis stage will expose the leadership failure and loss of control by the organization's managers. Coming out of the crisis stage the organization moves back into the establishment phase and the cycle begins again. Figure 1 illustrates the stages of practical drift.



Figure 1. Stages of practical drift. Adapted from a design created for an "Internal Briefing on Complexity Theory," by Matt Cieslukowski, Oct 2011, USSTRATCOM Commander's Design Team, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Permission not required.

The Establishment Stage

The establishment stage of the case study began with the doctrinal change General DePuy initiated. His emphasize on how to fight put in place rules of conducting battle for the U.S. Army combat units. In combat offensive operations, rules were established for a movement to contact, hasty attack, deliberate attack, exploitation, and pursuit (U.S. Army, 1976). For combat defensive operations, rules were established for organizing for defense and defined the defense as the covering force area, main battle area, and the rear area (U.S. Army, 1976). The rules of conducting combat operations became stern

doctrinal procedures within the Army and each officer was graded on how well they understood and performed the defined rules of the mission assigned to them.

Thinking was removed from the picture. What Army leadership emphasized was the ability of the officer to recognize the elements of the operation, apply the defined combat power to deal with the enemy, and win on the battlefield. If the officer followed the rulebook, or checklist, he will be able to apply the proper combat power at the appropriate time and place and be successful on the battlefield. The operations manual stated, "Our fighting ability will be determined by how well we train our officer" (U.S. Army, 1976, p. 3-2).

As the Army leadership embraced the how-to fight concept, the Army began moving toward establishing training centers to test the officers and leaders of Army units on their expertise in conducting combat operations. The National Training Center was established at FT Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center was established at FT Polk, Louisiana; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center was established at Hoenfels, Germany. Each center had a cadre of observer controllers that evaluated each unit's leadership on how well they performed the mission assigned to the unit. The goal was to place the unit in intensive combat scenarios that would stress the unit's leadership and systems in all the combat operations over a two-week period (Reeson, 2006). The rotation, as the training period became known, also included full scale live fire operations where every weapon system assigned to the combat units and its supporting units were tested.

Every officer in the combat arms, combat supporting arms, and service supporting arms of the Army underwent multiple rotations during the 1980s and 1990s at the combat

training centers. They were evaluated on how well they could apply the tenets of the how-to-fight manuals and synchronize the battlefield operating systems they would fight with in combat. The officers and leaders were expected to conduct home station training to prepare their units for the combat training center rotation. The rotation was the graduation exercise on how well a unit was prepared to conduct combat operations. Each rotation had many general officers and VIPs watching the unit perform, and a poor performance could be devastating to an officer's career. Therefore, leaning how to fight was very important to the officers and leaders during the 1980s and 1990s. If the officer did not follow the how to fight manuals, he or she might never be trusted to lead soldiers in combat.

The Awareness Stage

The awareness stage was a two-decade period in which officers and leaders honed their war fighting skills. The combat maneuver centers matured the officers and leaders and they developed techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) to be successful during their rotations at the combat training centers. As officers progressed in rank, they taught their subordinates the TTPs they developed so they could also be successful at the combat training centers. The how-to-fight approach to combat was tested in three combat operations.

Operations Urgent Fury

Operations Urgent Fury was conducted in October and November of 1983 to liberate the island of Grenada and re-establish the democratic government of Grenada. This was the first significant combat operation for U.S. forces since Vietnam. There were

many lessons learned by the U.S. forces during Operation Urgent Fury and the major one being the disconnection between the branches of the U.S. military forces. Issues in communications and service coordination problems resulted in the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The lessons learned were applied to the how-to-fight manuals and integrated in the combat training centers scenarios that units encountered at the training centers.

Operation Just Cause

During December 1989, the United States military conducted Operation Just Cause, the invasion of Panama. President George H. W. Bush ordered the operation in response to the provocations of the Panama Defense Forces against U.S. personnel in Panama and in the Panama Canal Zone (Phillips, 2006). Contributing to the unstable situation was the actions of the Panamanian Dictator, General Manuel Noriega, who had been indicted on drug trafficking in U.S. courts. The operation included a combat airborne assault by U.S. Army Rangers and the 82nd Airborne Division and an invasion force of over 27,000 soldiers. The success of the operation was the first major test of the how to fight concept. It was deemed a success by the U.S. military and no occupation force was needed after combat operations because the Panamanian government was still intact. The U.S. forces were able to redeploy back to the U.S. without having to plan for the post war activities in Panama.

While Operation Urgent Fury and Operation Just Cause provided opportunities to test and validate the how-to-fight concept, they could not be considered major combat operations. Most of the forces in both operations were delivered to the combat area by air and the combat operations were over in relatively short time frames. There was no

significant movement of equipment and troops by sea and the distance between the home station of the units and the combat area was not extensive. Therefore, the how to fight concept was only tested in limited engagements and for a limited time. Validation of DePuy's approach to combat training could not be confirmed with these two operations. However, that changed August 2, 1990 when the Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

Operation Desert Shield

Operation Desert Shield was ordered by President George H. W. Bush to protect the U.S. vital interest of the oil production in the Persian Gulf region. U.S. forces begin arriving in Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990 (Stewart, 2010). Since the Iraqi forces in Kuwait exceeded over 120,000 soldiers and 2,000 tanks, the predominantly light forces that had fought Operation Urgent Fury and Operation Just Cause would not be sufficient to oppose the Iraqi force in Kuwait. This threat had to be dealt with by combined armored and light forces from the U.S. and many coalition nations. The desert is vast and combat in the desert requires maneuver forces that can travel, navigate, and conduct sustainment operations over long distances. The major problem was how do you get the maneuver force to the desert?

After President Bush's decision, the staff of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed the war plans for combat operations in the Persian Gulf. The war plan directed the movement of the XVIII Airborne Corps from FT Bragg, NC to Saudi Arabia. Accompanying the XVIII Airborne Corps was its assigned units of the 82nd Airborne Division (Fort Bragg, NC), the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault; Fort Campbell, KY), and the 24th Infantry Division (Fort Stewart, GA). The 3rd Armored Cavalry

Regiment (Fort Hood, TX) and the 6th French Light Armoured Division was also assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps when they arrived in Saudi Arabia (Stewart, 2010).

The war plan also directed the VII Corps to deploy from Germany to Saudi Arabia. Accompanying the VII Corps from Germany was the 1st Armored Division and the 3rd Armored Division. The 1st Cavalry Division (Fort Hood, TX), 1st Infantry Division (Fort Riley, KS), the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Fort Bliss, TX), and the 1st (UK) Armoured Division (England) joined the VII Corps in Saudi Arabia. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force was deployed from the United States and included the 1st Marine Division and the 2nd Marine Division (Stewart, 2010). The total tonnage sealifted to Saudi Arabia from the United States and Europe exceeded 2.4 million tons, which was four times the cargo transported over the English Channel for the invasion of Europe during World War II (Naval History & Heritage, 1991). The conditions were now set to finally test and validate General DePuy's how-to-fight concept.

Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm were tailor-made to test and validate DePuy's training concept. Most of the senior commanders and leaders of the U.S. Army units participating in the Gulf War, the researcher being one, had been trained under the doctrine initiated by General DePuy. Army doctrine evolved from the Active Defense to the AirLand Battle doctrine and in the 1980s emphasis was placed on the human dimension of war. The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 Operations stated, "In the final analysis and once the force is engaged, superior combat power derives from the courage of soldiers, the excellence of their training, and the quality of their leadership" (Long, 1991, p. 56). DePuy's concept had been refined over the previous decade and now his training philosophy would be tested in major combat operations.

From August to December of 1990, the United States led coalition moved their ground and air forces to Saudi Arabia. As the equipment arrived in the ports of Saudi Arabia, coalition units moved to their designated tactical assembly area in the Saudi desert, along the border with Iraq and Kuwait. Once units had all their equipment and personnel in the tactical assembly areas, preparation for combat began. The combat training center rotations taught leaders the value of a skillfully planned attack and the value of rehearsing the attack. As Operations Officer for the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, which was attached to the 1st Armored Division, the researcher was responsible for planning the attack and planning the rehearsal schedule. The 3rd Brigade's attack would require over 5,000 soldiers and 2,000 vehicles to travel 100 kilometers north into Iraq and then travel east another 50 kilometers to the Kuwait border (U.S. Army, 1991b).

After briefing the attack plan to the subordinate units, the brigade commander directed a rigorous rehearsal plan, which was a required practice during the CTC rotations. We first prepared a 1 to 100 scale model of our battle area on the desert floor. Subordinate commander and leaders walked the attack on the sand model. A few days later we conducted a 1 to 10 scale rehearsal where the commanders and their leaders were in their combat vehicles representing their unit. This rehearsal covered 15 kilometers. We completed our rehearsals with every vehicle and every soldier in the brigade traveling 50 kilometers during the day across the desert in attack formation. When it became dark, we reversed the movement and rehearsed for a night attack over the same terrain of the day attack rehearsal (U.S. Army, 1991a).

Our brigade was not unique in preparing for the attack as all the units concentrated on rehearsing their attack. The how-to-fight doctrine and the many combat

center rotations by the commanders and leaders were bearing fruit. We knew who the enemy was, we knew where they were, and we prepared to attack and destroy the enemy. We did not conduct any planning or rehearsal for post-combat operations. Our mindset was to defeat the enemy, drive the enemy out of Kuwait, and then leave the Persian Gulf region for our home stations. Post combat operations were not considered and there was no plan to conduct any post combat operations or occupation of territory after combat.

Once the order was issued to attack, the combat operations lasted 100 hours. The speed of the attack through the Iraqi desert and the effectiveness of the weapons systems brought the surrender of the Iraqi forces and subsequent ceasefire (Scales, 1994). No occupation forces were required because the Kuwaiti government was still intact. When our combat operations concluded in southern Iraq, we began planning our movement out of Iraq and back to our home stations in either the United States or Europe (U.S. Army, 1991c). General DePuy's how-to-fight concept and training philosophy had been validated. We followed the checklist and we were very successful.

The success in Desert Storm reinforced DePuy's philosophy about training. Training officers and leaders how to fight will result in them being successful on the battlefield. All that the officers and leaders need to know is what to do and they can deliver the desired results. The problem with this is what happens when just defeating the enemy is not sufficient? The officers and leaders were not prepared to think about anything past winning. In addition, while the how-to-fight manuals provided the description for conducting combat operations, no emphasis was placed on post combat operations and no training was conducted on post combat operations. The mindset in the

U.S. Army was that is someone else's job. Unfortunately, the crisis turning would require more of the U.S. Army and its leaders.

The Uncoupling Stage

The awareness stage continued after the Army returned from Operation Desert Storm. The focus over the remaining years of the 1990s was modernizing the force and improving the situational awareness for the leaders on the battlefield. This started with the Battlefield Digitization concept in the early 1990s. Seacord (2000) described it as "an Army modernization effort taking advantage of revolutions in electronics and information technologies to make dramatic gains in all battlefield operating systems" (p. 2). In August of 1994, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published "TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations," which described the challenge of the future, the future strategic environment, and future land operations (U.S. Army, 1994). The Army leadership was trying to prepare the leaders and soldiers of the Army for the coming informational age that would affect the battlefield.

As the Army leadership set a path to prepare for the future, the situation during the 1990s around the world was deteriorating. The United States success in Operation Desert Storm fostered resentment throughout the Islamic world. The group leading the anti-U.S. sentiment was Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden. In 1996, bin Laden was welcomed into Afghanistan and declared a jihad or holy war against the United States. Bin Laden established training camps to train Islamic fighters and plan operations to attack the United States, western nations, and their interest around the world (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007).

The first problem to arise during the uncoupling was in 1991 in Somalia where warring factions disrupted the humanitarian food distribution and a resulting famine caused an estimated 350,000 deaths (Hogg, 2008). The United Nations sent in a peacekeeping force but the force had no impact on the warring factions or the food distribution and famine. As a result, the United States conducted Operation Restore Hope in December 1992 through May 1993 and the operation was able to restore order in Somalia and stop and relieve the effects of the famine (Stewart, 2004). The United States turned the operation over to the United Nations but the situation in Mogadishu, Somalia took a turn for the worse. During the next five months engagements between UN and Somalia insurgents continued and culminated on October 3 and 4 of 1993, with the 17 hour Battle of Mogadishu (Stewart, 2004). On October 7, President Clinton ordered the U.S. forces withdrawn from Somalia. The message that appeared to be received by Al Qaeda and its allies was the United States would turn and run when hit hard.

Before the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, terrorists bombed the World Trade Center in Manhattan on February 26, 1993. It happened a few weeks after President Clinton's swearing-in and "was a tipping point in what would become a new type of war against the evolving threat of terrorism" (McCaul, 2013, p. 1). Initially treated as a law enforcement event the U.S. defense and intelligence communities did not respond to the action. It would be another two years before a small group of U.S. personnel started hunting for Osama bin Laden (McCaul, 2013). The hunt began because of the discovery of a plot to blow up 11 planes over the Pacific Ocean bound for the United States (McCaul, 2013). As the U.S. Army continued to conduct the how-to-fight training, there did not appear to be any move by the Army community to consider possible scenarios

that would require training beyond winning on the battlefield. The Army continued to approach training as General DePuy had directed.

The campaign against the United States continued with the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996 where 19 members of the U.S. Air Force were killed (History Commons, 2013a). This event occurred after the United States and Saudi Arabia forced the Sudanese government to expel Osama bin Laden from Sudan (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). The attack was an embarrassment for the Saudi Arabian government and blame was directed toward Osama bin Laden and Iran. It was reported by U.S. intelligence sources that Osama bin Laden received a call two days after the bombing congratulating him on the bombing (History Commons, 2013a). The blame placed on Iran by the Saudi government was to deflect the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had home grown terrorists within the Kingdom. However, in 1998, Prince Nayef, and the Saudi Interior Minister, ruled out foreign involvement and stated, “The bombing was executed by Saudi hands. No foreign party had any role in it" (AP Online, 1998, p. 1).

On the eighth anniversary, August 7, 1998, of U.S. forces entering Saudi Arabia to conduct Operation Desert Shield, bombings occurred at the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. A total of 224 people were killed at the Kenya Embassy and 10 individuals were killed at the Tanzania Embassy (McKinley, 1998). While only 12 Americans were killed, most of the other deaths were local nationals employed by the U.S. Embassy in both countries. Even though the embassies are over 900 kilometers apart, the bombings were conducted almost simultaneously indicating a very detailed operational plan. The group responsible for the bombings was identified as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which

had ties to Al Qaeda. Lawrence Wright (2006), a Pulitzer Prize winning author, wrote in the “Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11,” that he concluded bin Laden’s actual goal was "to lure the United States into Afghanistan, which had long been called ‘The Graveyard of Empires’" (p. 272).

The bombings did not lure American forces into Afghanistan but President Clinton did retaliate for the bombings in August 1998 by ordering cruise missile attacks into Afghanistan and Sudan (Bennet, 1998). The codename was Operation Infinite Reach and was directed against four Islamic training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan (Sahay, 2013). The Sudanese pharmaceutical factory was identified in intelligence reports as being a chemical development facility for Osama bin Laden. However, a year later an assistant secretary for the U.S. State Department acknowledged the evidence was inadequate and they could not substantiate the connection between the factory and Osama bin Laden (Risen, 1999).

The cruise missile attacks into Afghanistan were directed at specific camps that were known to be Al Qaeda training camps. One of the training camps was run by Osama bin Laden and was a suspected meeting place for leaders of Al Qaeda and other Jihadist groups. The hope was that the attacks would result in the death of many of the leaders but that was not the case. The problem was the vastness of the camps that were attacked. Without specific intelligence on the location of the leaders in the camp the cruise missile attack was not targeted against the intended targets. At best, it caused disruption within the camps but did not do much to break the will of the Jihadist. It seemed to have the opposite effect and an emboldened bin Laden increased his stance among the Islamic

nations. He was seen as being indestructible and able to stand up to the Great Satan (Ballen, 2008).

Al Qaeda struck a direct blow at the U.S. military establishment with the attack on the USS Cole in the Yemen port of Aden on October 12, 2000 (Robinson, 2000). The Cole was in port for refueling when a small boat approached the side of the destroyer and 400-700 pounds of explosive on the boat was detonated resulting in 17 sailors being killed and another 39 sailors being wounded. This attack revealed the problem faced by the U.S. Navy rules of engagement for vessels that required guards to gain permission from the captain of the vessel before firing on small boats. Even though the guards knew the small boat was loaded with explosives, they could not fire on it without the captain's permission and before the permission could be obtained the explosives were detonated. Petty Officer Jennifer Kudrick, a sonar technician who survived the attack, expressed the frustrations with the rules of engagement. She said, "If we had shot those people, we'd have gotten in trouble for it. That's what's frustrating about it. We would have gotten in more trouble for shooting two foreigners than losing 17 American sailors" (Robinson, 2000, p. 1).

The final event in the uncoupling stage occurred on September 11, 2001. Nineteen member of the Islamic terrorist group Al Qaeda high jacked four U.S. airliners and flew two of them into the World Trade Center in Manhattan, one in to the Pentagon in Washington, and one, which was bound for either the White House or the U.S. Capitol, crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. The plane that crashed in Pennsylvania was a result of the passengers trying to fight and overcome the high jackers (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). The 9/11 events were a direct attack against the United States and as a result of Article 5

of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) treaty, is an attack against NATO. Article 5 is at the basis of the NATO fundamental principle of collective defense. It provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the attached Ally (NATO, 2005). For the first time in history, NATO invoked Article 5 on September 12, 2001 and whether Al Qaeda intended it or not, they were now at war with all of NATO.

A joint resolution of the U.S. Congress declared that the United States was at war with terror and was signed into law on October 16, 2002 by President Bush. Section 2 (a) of the resolution states

> That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. (U.S. Congress, 2001)

The U.S. Department of Defense planners began planning the proper response to the attacks and the identified enemy. Until the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government approached the terrorist attacks as a law enforcement responsibility. After 9/11, the Department of Defense was now in the lead and the Department's plan targeted the responsible individuals, the responsible organizations, and the nation states that supported and fostered the terrorist attacks.

The uncoupling stage continued when President Bush decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban government of Afghanistan when it refused to extradite Osama bin Laden (Katzman, 2013). A small force of U.S. special operations troops along with Central Intelligence Agency operatives provided support and advice to the Northern

Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces as they attacked the Taliban forces and strongholds (Katzman, 2013). On December 9, 2001 Mullah Omar, Head of the Supreme Council in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime, fled Kandahar and a Pashtun led coalition took control of the city and the Afghanistan government (Bruno, 2013).

U.S. special operations forces supporting the Northern Alliance and Pashtun forces generally conducted the military operations in Afghanistan. Even though some conventional U.S. forces were committed to Afghanistan, the majority of the U.S. conventional forces were focused on preparing for a war in Iraq. On March 20, 2003, a coalition of 248,000 U.S. soldiers, 45,000 British soldiers, 2,000 Australian soldiers, and 70,000 Kurdish militia troops attacked the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein (Carney, 2011, p. 9). Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003 ending 24 years of Saddam Hussein's control over the people of Iraq. He was eventually captured on December 13, 2003 and was hanged on December 30, 2006 after a trial in 2005 and a second one in 2006 (Newton & Scharf, 2008).

The combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq again validated General DePuy's concept of how-to-fight training. The leaders of the U.S. Army from General down to Sergeant had been trained on what to expect on the battlefield, how to plan battlefield operations, and tested many times at the combat training centers to ensure they could conduct the combat operations. They had proven themselves at the training centers and the battlefield operations showed that they were superior to any other army in the world. The battlefield actions demonstrated that the U.S. Army understands how to fight and win on the conventional battlefield and if that was all that was required then Operation Iraqi Freedom could be classified as a success. However, that was not all that was

required and the 19 days it took to defeat Saddam Hussein and his Army just opened the door to a problem the U.S. Army had not encountered since World War II, the occupation of a conquered nation.

The World War II defeated nations of Germany and Japan had populations that were submissive to the military rulers of their nations. Iraq did not have a submissive population because of the sectarian makeup of the population. The Iraq population is divided into three major sectarian groups: Shia Muslim 55%, Sunni Muslim 25%, and Kurdish 20%. After Desert Storm in 1991, a no-fly zone was established in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish population in that zone. As a result of the decade long operation, the economic environment in the Kurdish area prospered because of the protection. A no-fly zone was also established in Southern Iraq to protect the Shiite Muslim population in that zone, but the economic environment did not prosper as it did in the north (Institute Medea, n.d.).

The U.S. and coalition forces were responsible for providing protection for the population in the areas they controlled and helping the local communities to rebuild their infrastructure. During this time, the insurgency began and Al Qaeda and Iran started supporting the insurgency with trained men and explosives. Many of the occupying force leaders' policy was to arrest all suspected insurgents and criminals and send them to detention centers (Ricks, 2012). The belief was the best way to fight the insurgents was to get them off the street and out of their operating areas. One of those detention centers became the pivotal cause of the crisis stage.

The Crisis Stage

As the U.S. armed forces and coalition forces celebrated their success on the battlefield, the reality of the post-war occupation became the focus of the forces and the coalition governments. At this point in the how-to-fight training concept, all the leaders in the units would be conducting after action reviews and conducting sustainment operations within their units. However, this was not a combat training center and the situation on the ground was changing rapidly. There was a conquered nation that had no armed force, no law enforcement force, and no civilian court system. It was as if the soldiers of all the forces were in the Wild West and they had to develop their own brand of justice.

The U.S. administration did recognize that some form of government had to administer Iraq after the war. The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was established before the war and its purpose was to be the caretaker government in Iraq until the new civilian government could be installed (History Commons, 2013b). The ORHA transitioned into the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which was under the U.S. Department of Defense and the head of the CPA carried the title of U.S. Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq (Dao & Schmitt, 2003). The CPA was responsible for the governance in Iraq and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was responsible for providing the military forces in support of the CPA.

Both the CENTCOM Commanding General and the CPA Administrator reported directly to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. This meant the ultimate person responsible for rebuilding Iraq and conducting sustained combat operations rested with the Secretary of Defense who was in Washington, DC. The U.S. State Department did not

provide any of the leadership responsible for rebuilding Iraq and establishing the Iraqi government (Dao & Schmitt, 2003). Unity of command in the war theater was divided and the expertise of the diplomats within the State Department was not used as they were in post-World War II Germany. Additionally, the U.S. model for the governance of Japan was not followed as General MacArthur was designated Supreme Commander and Administrator of Japan (U. S. History.com, n.d.).

This was a major mistake by the U.S. administration but also by the U.S. military. The U.S. military must follow the directions and orders of the U.S. civilian authority but the lesson of how to conduct post-war occupation operations was in the history books. The decision not to follow the historical examples revealed that the conflict between General DePuy and Lieutenant General Cushman was valid. The leaders of Army responsible for post-war Iraq would have been better prepared for their responsibilities had the Cushman model of education and teaching the officers how to think*,* instead of just how to fight*,* had been followed. The resulting chaos cost many lives, many years, and an enormous amount of money.

The Abu Ghraib detainee abuse was the explosive crisis that revealed the problem but the uncoupling, which started years earlier, was identified in many of the investigative reports about the detainee abuse. The lack of a campaign plan by CJTF-7 allowed the commanders of areas within Iraq to determine who was to be detained and who was to be sent to detention centers. Once the detainees reached the detention center, the Church (2005) report pointed out there was an absence of any specific guidance on interrogation techniques provided to the Commanders in Iraq. The report further claimed that no evidence was found “that specific detention or interrogation lessons learned from

previous conflicts (such as those from the Balkans, or even those from earlier conflicts such as Vietnam) were incorporated into planning for operations in support of the Global War on Terror" (Church, 2005, p. 3).

The Jones Report (2004) also disclosed factors that contributed to the confusion within the operational environment within Iraq. Lieutenant General Sanchez assumed command of the U.S. Army's V Corps in June 2003. His preceding assignment was Commanding General of the 1st Armored Division, which had a total force of 15,000 solders. V Corps also transitioned to Combined Joint Task Force-Seven as Sanchez assumed command and his responsibility grew to 180,000 U.S. and Coalition forces (Jones, 2004). The mission of CJTF-7 was to provide stability and support operations to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. A Joint Manning Document was developed for CJTF-7, which identified 1400 personnel to staff CJTF-7 (Jones, 2004). When Sanchez assumed command of CJTF-7, he transitioned his 495 member V Corps staff to assume the duties of the CJT-7 staff. The resulting twelve times increase in responsibility was being met with a staff structure that was only 35% of the identified staffing needed (Jones, 2004). All the pieces were in place for a crisis and one resulted at Abu Ghraib Prison.

The Abu Ghraib detainee abuse was the crisis that revealed the drift in war fighting at the operational level and the policy making at the National Command Authority level. The bright light of success blinded all the players, both civilian and military, that had a part in the campaigns to defeat Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. The conventional fighting was over but the war was not. The situation needed critical thinkers who could look beyond the current success and see the coming conflict. The Jones Report

(2004) stated, “Leaders must be trained for certainty and educated for uncertainty. The ability to know how to think rather than what to think is critical in the future Joint Operational Environment” (p. 23). This is what caused the conflict between DePuy and Cushman. The issue is should officers and leaders be trained how to fight or how to think? The answer is they need both and it is hoped that what was revealed in this crisis will help prevent the next crisis. That will only happen if members of organizations responsible for our national security recognize that drift is taking place.

Recommendations

This case study examined the organizational behavioral theory of practical drift. Snook (1996) identified the theory in his research, which was also a case study, about the friendly fire shootdown of two U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters by two U.S. Air Force pilots in the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq in 1994. As he analyzed the data, he discovered the existence of the uncoupling of local practices from established written procedures. The devastating result was the loss of 24 lives, which Snook attributed to the practical drift within the organizations he examined.

The researcher continued the case study method and examined the possible practical drift that contributed to the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq in 2003. While the initial approach was to examine the operation in Iraq, the data led the researcher to look deeper into Army doctrine development and the training of the officers and leaders who had the responsibility for executing Operation Iraqi Freedom and the occupation of Iraq. As pointed out by the researcher, practical drift was a contributing cause of the detainee abuse; however, the causes, elements, and forces of the practical drift were experienced over the proceeding decades prior to the actual event.

The drift was evident in the doctrine development of the Army, especially the concentration on training officers instead of educating them. Drift occurred as the U.S. administration tried to opine that we were facing a new kind of threat and a new kind of war. In reality, the war the Army faced after the conventional operations in Iraq has been around for centuries and the U.S. even fought this type of enemy 40 years earlier in Vietnam. The administration's decision makers mistakenly labeled the conflict a new kind of war. The type of war was not new and the assertion that it was by members of the War Council revealed their lack of understanding of the nature of warfare.

All the investigative reports singled out the soldiers who committed the abuse as the responsible parties. The general officers who led the investigation teams appeared to avoid placing any blame on the leaders, especially other general officers, responsible for the occupation forces in Iraq. The general officers in leadership positions in Iraq accepted the assignment, which includes accepting the responsibility for the actions of those under them. If they did not provide the guidance and planning necessary to properly administer the detainee operations and properly supervise their subordinate units, then they share the blame. The research reveals that the lack of leadership at the general officer level was a contributing cause to the detainee abuse and the investigation teams should have identified this fact in their investigations.

Tom Ricks (2012) asserted that this lack of holding general officers accountable started in Vietnam. He believed that the Army leadership since Vietnam has been reluctant to remove or relieve general officers from their position because it will be seen as the system that placed them in the position is flawed. Ricks summed up his thoughts by stating, "the generals who were running the Army acted less like stewards of their

profession and more like keepers of a guild, accountable only to themselves" (p.309). Over my Army career, I witnessed this characteristic first hand. General officers had no problem removing or relieving subordinates but when it came to applying the same standard to the general officer ranks, they resisted the idea. General Cushman suggested that General Abizaid, the immediate superior to General Sanchez, was derelict in his duties by not relieving General Sanchez (Ricks, 2012). However, Sanchez was not alone and other general officers on his staff and officers in other command positions in Iraq were also derelict in their duties.

The data also revealed the existence of the four stages of practical drift: the establishment stage, the awareness stage, the uncoupling stage, and the crisis stage. There is no definitive line or separation between each stage and external forces can contribute to the practical drift. Time is not definitive either and this case study demonstrated the drift covered three decades. There may be those who argue that this is not drift but only the normal transition of an organization over time. That could be the case, but if it is, then additional research should be conducted to explain what caused the detainee abuse because it was not just bad individuals doing bad things. There was leadership failure throughout the Army and the U.S. government that contributed to the abuse. The research indicates that failure was caused by practical drift in doctrine development and in policy development and implementation.

The organizational behavior theory of practical drift does exist and organizations need to acknowledge that fact, set up procedures to recognize it, and prepare to respond appropriately to the drift. This will not be an easy task but one that organizational leaders should recognize. It will require critical thinkers who understand how to recognize the

drift, analyze the drift, learn from the drift, develop solutions for the drift, and implement the actions required to mitigate or correct the drift. Periodically conducting strategy sessions and taking actions to correct the drift will not be sufficient to address the existence of drift. Practical drift is an ever-present organizational characteristic and major adjustments do not have to occur to mitigate the drift's effect on an organization. Minor adjustments can be sufficient to correct the drift but once corrected, the drift starts again. That is why leaders must acknowledge the existence of practical drift and prepare to take the appropriate actions during each stage of practical drift to ensure the crisis stage is never reached.

During the case study, two individual behavioral traits were identified that should be candidates for additional study. As discussed in Chapter 2, diffusion of responsibility was a contributing factor in the actions at Abu Ghraib Prison. However, there is a flip side of this coin and that is dismissive responsibility. Major General Taguba identified this behavior type when he briefed the Chief of the Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. All of them dismissed any responsibility for what happened at Abu Ghraib. The leaders of CJTF-7 also dismissed any responsibility for the detainee abuse and this is troubling. When officers take the oath of commissioning they swear to well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. The oath is taken feely and it should be the guiding principle for them throughout their career and assignments. Accepting responsibility for the organization that they lead meets the oath's requirement. Dismissing that responsibility does not.

The other behavioral trait revealed in the case study was deflection of responsibility. When Lieutenant Colonel Beaver requested assistance in reviewing the enhanced interrogation techniques she wrote for the Commander of JTF-170 in Guantanamo Bay, she did not receive any assistance. SOUTHCOM's Staff Judge Advocate Manny Superville and Captain Jane Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both deflected any responsibility in assisting her. This is also troubling because these two senior legal officers were the very individuals who should have assisted Beaver. They chose to deflect any responsibility and let her make policy decision for their respective bosses and ultimately establish U.S. policy.

The researcher recommends that additional study and clinical evaluation be conducted on dismissive responsibility and deflection of responsibility. The research should attempt to determine why dismissive responsibility and deflection of responsibility happens and what causes individuals, especially those in positions of responsibility, to dismiss or deflect their responsibility for the events or actions within their organizational responsibility. Leadership is not always a comfortable assignment but when you accept the assignment, the inherent principle is you are the responsible individual. Unfortunately, this case study has revealed that the senior leaders within the U.S. government and especially the Department of Defense dismissed and deflected their responsibility in the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq.

This case study, and Snook's (1996) case study, has been focused on military organizations in which events within the organization had devastating results. The researcher recommends case studies should be conducted on other types of organizations to evaluate the theory of practical drift. Case studies on businesses, academe, industrial,

governmental and non-governmental, and other societal organizations will add to the scholarly knowledge and help refine the theory of practical drift. Determining if practical drift is an applicable organizational behavior trait outside military organizations will expand the theory's validity and creditability.

REFERENCES

AP Online. (1998, May). Saudi official says no foreign involvement in Khobar bombing. Retrieved from http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-19725745.html

Ballen, K. (2008). Bin Laden's soft support. *Washington Monthly*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2008/0805.ballen.html

Bennet, J. (1998). U.S. cruise missiles strike Sudan and Afghan targets tied to terrorist network. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/082198attack-us.html

Bouffard, W. (2013). The practical drift contagion. Retrieved from http://puttincologneontherickshaw.com/authors-blog/the-practical-drift-contagion/

Boyd, J. (1986). Patterns of conflict. Retrieved from http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Boyd-Papers.html

Briggs, J. (2011). Improving complex organizations. *Top Impact Now*. Retrieved from http://topimpactnow.com/improving-complex-organizations.html

Bruno, G. (2013, June). U.S. war in Afghanistan. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/us-war-afghanistan/p20018?gclid=CPDhnOjh2roCFa5r7AodUD0A3g

Burke, C., Wilson, K., & Salas, E. (2005). The use of a term-based strategy for organizational transformation: Guidance for moving toward a high reliability organization. *Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science*, *6*(6), 509-530.

Bush, G. (2002, February). *Memorandum on humane treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees.* The White House. Retrieved from http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf

Bybee, J. (2002, August). *Memorandum on standards of conduct for interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340a.* U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel. Retrieved from http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf

Callaway, M., & Esser, J. (1984). Groupthink: Effects of cohesiveness and problem-solving procedures on group decision making. *Social Behavior and Personality, 12*(2), 157-164.

Cannon, A., & Fang, B. (2004). A surly Saddam's day in court. *U.S. News & World Report, 137*(1), 20.

Carney, S. (2011). *Allied participation in operations Iraqi freedom.* Fort McNair, DC. Center of Military History, U.S. Army.

Carson, J. (2003). *Nation-building, the American way.* Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College.

Checkland, P. (2000). Soft system methodology: A thirty year retrospective. *System Research and Behavioral Science, 17*, S11-S58.

Church, A. (2005, March). *Review of department of defense detention operations and detainee interrogation techniques*. Retrieved from http://www.aclu.org/images/torture/asset_upload_file625_26068.pdf

Collins, J. (2009). *How the mighty fall and why some companies never give in.* New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2007). *Profile: Osama bin Laden.* Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-leaders/profile-osama-bin-laden/p9951

Cushman, J. (2007, January). *Planning and early execution of the war in Iraq: An assessment of military participation.* Army War College. Retrieved from http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/ForArmyWarCollege.pdf

Cushman, J. (2012, February). *Reflections on Vietnam, 1964-65: Trying to get someone to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.* Foreign Policy. Retrieved from http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/09/reflections_on_vietnam_1964_65_trying_to_get_someone_to_cut_the_ho_chi_minh_trail

Dao, J., & Schmitt, E. (2003). *Aftereffects: Postwar planning; President picks a special envoy to rebuild Iraq.* Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/07/world/aftereffects-postwar-planning-president-picks-a-special-envoy-to-rebuild-iraq.html

Denyer, D. (2013). *Scott A. Snook: Theory of "practical drift."* Retrieved on 7 January 2014 from http://www.daviddenyer.com/practical-drift/

Department of the Army. (1997). Historical summary fiscal year 1997. Retrieved from http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/dahsum.html

Department of the Army Inspector General. (2004, July). *Detainee operations inspection*. Retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/ig_detainee_ops.pdf

Fay, G. (2004, August). *The Fay report*. Retrieved from http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf

Fontenot, G., & Benson, C. (2013). The conundrum of mission command. *Army*, *63*(6), 28-35.

Formica, R. (2004, June 6). *The Formica report.* Retrieved from The Joint Staff US Department of Defense: http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/061906/FormicaReport.pdf

Geurts, T. (n.d.). *Public policy making: The 21st century perspective*. Retrieved from http://www.beinformed.com/BeInformed/webdav-resource/binaries/pdf/publications/public-policy-making.pdf?webdav-id=/Be%20Informed%20Bibliotheek/0000%20WEBDAV/WebDAV%20StatContent.bixml

Gonzales, A. (2002). *Memorandum for the president.* Retrieved from http://texscience.org/reform/torture/gonzales-bush-25jan02.pdf

Gourevitch, P. (2009). The Abu Ghraib we cannot see. *New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/opinion/24gourevitch.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

Graveline, C., & Clemens, M. (2010). *The secrets of Abu Ghraib revealed: American soldiers on trial.* Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.

Guba, E., & Lincoln, Y. (2001). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In C. F. Conrad, J. G. Haworth, & L. R. Lattuca (Eds.), *Qualitative research in higher education: Expanding perspectives* (2nd ed., pp. 57-72). Boston, MA: Pearson Custom Publishing.

Hatch, M., & Cunliffe, A. (2006). *Organizational theory.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Haynes, W. (2002). *Memorandum for the secretary of defense on counter-resistance techniques.* Washington, DC: General Counsel of the Department of Defense.

Haynes, S., Schafer, W., & Carroll, J. (2007). *Leveraging and limiting practical drift in emergency response planning.* Retrieved from http://www.hicss.hawaii.edu/hicss_40/decisionbp/08_06_01.pdf

Henderson, M. (2013). *Cultures at work – 'practical drift' puts service & performance at risk.* Retrieved from http://vimeo.com/71216551

Hevesi, D. (1990). *An Wang, 70, Is dead of cancer; Inventor and maker of computers*. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/25/obituaries/an-wang-70-is-dead-of-cancer-inventor-and-maker-of-computers.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm

History Commons. (2013a). *Khobar towers are bombed*. Retrieved from http://www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=Khobar+Towers+&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go

History Commons. (2013b). *Office of reconstruction and humanity assistance (ORHA).* Retrieved from http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=office_of_reconstruction_and_humanitarian_assistance_1

Hogg, A. (2008). Timeline: Somalia, 1991-2008. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/12/timeline-somalia-1991-2008/307190/

Houghton, D. (2008). Invading and occupying Iraq: Some insights from political psychology. Peace and Conflict, 14(2), 169–192. doi:10.1080/10781910802017297

Howell, E. (2012). Challenger: Shuttle disaster that changed NASA. Space.com. Retrieved from http://www.space.com/18084-space-shuttle-challenger.html

Human Rights Watch. (2005, April). Getting away with torture? Command responsibility for the U.S. abuse of detainees. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0405.pdf

Institute Medea. (n.d.). No-fly zones in Iraq. Retrieved from http://www.medea.be/en/countries/iraq/no-fly-zones-in-iraq/

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2007, February). *ICRC on the treatment of fourteen "high value detainees" in CIA custody*. Retrieved from http://www.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf

ICRA (International Centre for Development Oriented Research in Agriculture). (n.d.). Systems thinking – approaches. Retrieved from http://www.icra-edu.org/objects/anglolearn/Systems_Thinking-Approaches.pdf

Jones, A. (2004). *The Jones report: AR 15-6 investigation of the Abu Ghraib prison and 205th military intelligence brigade*. Retrieved from http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf

Katzman, K. (2013, October). Afghanistan: Post-Taliban governance, security, and U.S. policy. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf

Kean, T., & Hamilton, L. (2004). *The 9/11 commission report.* Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

Lasher, E., & La Porte, T. (1990). Lessons from a reliability crisis. *Public Utilities Fortnightly, 125*(12), 11-15.

Latane, B., & Darley, J. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *8*, 377-383.

Lawrence, P., & Lorsch, J. (1967, June) Differentiation and integration in complex organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 12*(1), 1-47.

Leemann, J. (2011). Practical drift and writing safety rules. *ISHN.* Retrieved from http://www.ishn.com/articles/91477-practical-drift-and-writing-safety-rules

Long, J. (1991). *The evolution of U.S. army doctrine: From active defense to airland battle and beyond.* Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Manuel, M. (2011). *Maritime risk and organizational learning.* Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

Mathes, E., & Kahn, A. (1975). Diffusion of responsibility and extreme behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *31*(5), 881-886.

McCaul, M. (2013, February). The lessons of the world trade center bombings. *New York Daily News.* Retrieved from http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/lessons-world-trade-center-bombing-article-1.1272998

McKinley, J. (1998). Two U.S. embassies in east Africa bombed. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from: http://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/080898africa-bombing.html

McMaster, H. (2013). The pipe dream of easy war. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-war.html?_r=0

Moorhead, G. (1982). Groupthink: Hypothesis in need of thinking. *Group & Organizational Studies, 7*(4), 429-444.

NATO. (2005, February). *NATO and the scourge of terrorism.* Retrieved on 6 November 2013 from http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm

Naval History & Heritage. (1991) *U.S. Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.* Retrieved on 12 December 2013 from http://www.history.navy.mil/Wars/dstorm/index.html.

Newton, M., & Scharf, M. (2008). *Enemy of the state: The trial and execution of Saddam Hussein.* New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Office of Inspector General, CIA. (2004, May). *Special review: Counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities*. Retrieved from Central Intelligence Agency: http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/052708/052708_Special_Review.pdf

Office of the Inspector General, FBI. (2008, May). *A review of the FBI's involvement in and observations of defense interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq*. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0805/final.pdf

Office of Professional Responsibility, CIA. (2009, July). *Investigation into the office of legal counsel's memoranda concerning issues relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's use of enhanced interrogation techniques on suspected terrorist*. Department of Justice. Retrieved from http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf

Oregon State University. (2011). Retrieved from http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/theory/grpthink.html

Pettigrew, A. (1979). On studying organizational culture. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 24*(4), 570-581.

Phillips, C. (2006). *Operation just cause: The incursion into Panama.* Fort McNair, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History.

Physicians for Human Rights. (2008, June). *Broken laws, broken lives: Medical evidence of torture by us personnel and it impact*. Retrieved from http://brokenlives.info/?dl_id+4

Reeson, G. (2006, June). Train as you fight: The development of the U.S. Army's combat training centers. Retrieved from http://voices.yahoo.com/train-as-fight-development-us-armys-48801.html?cat=37

Ricks, T. (2009). Forgotten warrior. *Washington Monthly.* Retrieved from http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2009/0907.ricks.html

Ricks, T. (2012). *The generals: American military command from World War II to today.* New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Risen, J. (1999). Question of evidence: A special report: To bomb Sudan plant, or not. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/27/world/question-evidence-special-report-bomb-sudan-plant-not-year-later-debates-rankle.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm

Robbins, S. (2005). *Managing and organizing people.* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Roberto, M. (2009). *The art of critical decision making.* Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company.

Roberts, K. (1990). Managing high reliability organizations. *California Management Review, 32*(4), 101.

Robinson, S. (2000, November). Bombed us warship was defended by us sailors with unloaded guns. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/1374316/Bombed-US-warship-was-defended-by-sailors-with-unloaded-guns.html

Romjue, J. (1984a). From active defense to airland battle doctrine: The development of army doctrine 1973-1982. *TRADOC Historical Monograph Series 1984*. Retrieved from http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll11/id/1662/filename/1663.pdf

Romjue, J. (1984b). The evolution of the airland battle concept. *Air University Review May-June 1984.* Retrieved from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/may-jun/romjue.html

Rumsfeld, D. (2003, April). *Memorandum for the commander, US Southern Command on counter-resistance techniques in the war on terrorism*. Retrieved from http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.16.pdf

Sahay, U. (2013). Syria, signaling, and operations infinite reach. *War on the Rocks.* Retrieved from http://warontherocks.com/2013/09/syria-signaling-and-operation-infinite-reach/

Sands, P. (2008). *Torture team: Rumsfeld's memo and the betrayal of American values.* New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.

Sastry, A. & Wiersema, A. (2003). 10-year Iraq war timeline. *ABC News*. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/TheNote/10-year-iraq-war-timeline/story?id=18758663#7

Scales, R. (1994). *Certain victory: the U.S. Army in the Gulf War.* McLean, VA: Bassey's Inc.

Schein, E. (2004). *Organizational culture and leadership.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Schlesinger, J. (2004, August). *Independent panel to review DOD detention operations*. Retrieved from http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf

Scholl, R. (2003). Organizational culture. *The University of Rhode Island, Charles T. Schmidt Labor Research Center.* Retrieved from http://www.uri.edu/research/lrc/scholl/webnotes/Culture.htm

Seacord, C. (2000, April). *Digitizing the battlefield.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College.

Shaara, J. (2012). *A blaze of glory.* New York, NY: Ballantine Books.

Snook, S. (1996). *Practical drift: The friendly fire shootdown over northern Iraq* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation), Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

Starke, J. (2013). *Safety Management: Practical drift and your flight operation.* Retrieved from http://www.universalweather.com/blog/2013/02/safety-management-practical-drift-and-your-flight-operation/

Stewart, R. (2004). *The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994*. Retrieved on from http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm#intro

Stewart, R. (2010). *War in the Persian Gulf: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.* Retrieved from http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-117-1/CMH_70-117-1.pdf

Strauss, W., & Howe, N. (1997). *The fourth turning: An American prophecy.* New York, NY: Broadway Books.

Sullivan, R., & Harper, M. (1996). *Hope is not a method.* New York, NY: Broadway Books.

Taft, W. (2002). *Memorandum to the counsel to the president.* Retrieved on 27 May2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/20040608_DOC.pdf

Taguba, A. (2004, May). *The Taguba report on treatment of Abu Ghraib prisoners in Iraq*. Retrieved from http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html

Third Geneva Convention. (1949). *Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.* Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html

Uniform Code of Military Justice. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.ucmj.us/

U.S. Army. (1976). *Field manual 100-5, operations.* Department of the Army. Retrieved from http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll9/id/42

U.S. Army. (1991a). *3rd brigade 3rd infantry division operations order #10S-91.* Quaysumah, Saudi Arabia. The United States Army War College Archive, Carlisle, PA.

U.S. Army. (1991b). *3rd brigade 3rd infantry division operations order #20S-91.* Quaysumah, Saudi Arabia. The United States Army War College Archive, Carlisle, PA.

U.S. Army. (1991c). *3rd brigade 3rd infantry division operations order #46S-91.* Iraq. The United States Army War College Archive, Carlisle, PA.

U.S. Army. (1992). *Field manual 34-52, intelligence interrogation.* Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf

U.S. Army. (1994). *TRADOC pamphlet 525-5 force XXI operations.* Retrieved from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA314276&ei=WmmKUpDzEuiE2AXkh4C4Cg&usg=AFQjCNG49C6IcmnxAncs4ji3ZYy5ainWig&bvm=bv.56643336,d.b2I

U.S. Army. (2005). Army regulation 15-6: Final report on the investigation into FBI allegation of detainee abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/jul2005/d20050714report.pdf

U.S. Army. (2009). *Soldier's manual of common tasks - warrior skills level 1* (STP 21-1-SMCT). Retrieved from http://www.25idl.army.mil/commontasks.pdf

U.S. Army. (2011). *Operational law handbook.* Retrieved from http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2011.pdf

U.S. Army War College. (1970). *Study on military professionalism*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College.

U.S. Congress. (2001, September). *Joint resolution authorizing the use of force against terrorist*. Retrieved from http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/700203/posts

U.S. Congress. (2006, January). *National defense authorization act for fiscal year 2006*. Retrieved from http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/olc/docs/PL109-163.pdf

U.S. District Court Western District of Washington. (2008, June 30). *Sa'adoon Ali Hameed Al-Ogaidi, plaintiff v. CACI International, Inc. defendant.* Retrieved from http://ccrjustice.org/files/Al-Ogaidi%20Complaint.pdf

U.S. History.com. (n.d.) *Douglas MacArthur.* Retrieved from http://www.u-s-history.com /pages/h1607.html

U.S. Senate Committee on the Armed Services. (2008). *Testimony on the origins of the aggressive interrogation techniques.* Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://ww w.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Senate-Armed-Services-June-17-2008.pdf

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (2004). U.S. intelligence community's prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://web.mit.edu/simsong/www/iraqreport2-textunder.pdf

Weick, K. (1987). Organizational culture as a source of high reliability. *California Management Review, XXIX*(2), 112-127.

Weick, K., Sutcliffe, K., & Obstfeld, D. (2000). High reliability: The power of mindfulness. *Leader to Leader, Summer,* 33-38.

Williams, B. (2005). *Systems and systems thinking. Encyclopedia of evaluation*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

World English Dictionary. (2011). Retrieved from http://en.softonic.com/s/encarta-world-english-dictionary-2011-free-download

Wright, L. (2006). *The looming tower: Al Qaeda and the road to 9/11*. New York, NY: Vintage Books, Inc.

Yin, R. (2004, October). Case study methods. *COSMOS Corporation,* 1-6.

Yoo, J., & Delahunty, R. (2002, January). *Memorandum on application of treaties and laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees.* U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel.

Zainal, Z. (2007). Case study as a research method. *Jurnal Kemanusiaan, 9*(1-6). Universiti Teknologi Malaysia.

Zimmermann, K. (2012). Hurricane Katrina: Facts, damage & aftermath. *LiveScience*. Retrieved from http://www.livescience.com/22522-hurricane-katrina-facts.html