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To Help in Whole or in Parts?

The Role of Construal Level in All-At-Once Versus Distributed

Philanthropy

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To Help in Whole or in Parts?

The Role of Construal Level in All-At-Once Versus Distributed

Philanthropy

by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Judee and Michael Burgoon, who have supported me unwaveringly throughout my various career and academic pursuits, and many friends and family who have always believed in me.

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There is no way to fully acknowledge the many people that have made the completion of a Ph.D. possible, but there are a few people who warrant special mention for their support along the way.

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To Help in Whole or in Parts?
The Role of Construal Level in All-At-Once Versus Distributed
Philanthropy

Erin Mikaela Burgoon, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2014

Supervisor: Marlone D. Henderson

Abstract

In the present research, I apply a construal level framework to understanding when people gravitate towards all-at-once (e.g., four hours in one day, $100 lump-sum) versus distributed (one hour a day for four days, $20 per month for 5 months) philanthropy. I argue that more abstract construals increase the weight that people place on idealistic concerns, whereas more concrete construals increase the weight that people place on pragmatic concerns, and that people expect allocating time and money in an all-at-once versus distributed manner to satisfy idealistic and pragmatic concerns to different degrees. Chapter 1 of this dissertation focuses specifically on volunteerism and compliance to specific requests (i.e., an all-at-once or a distributed request, but not both). Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated people expected all-at-once and distributed volunteerism to satisfy idealistic and pragmatic concerns, respectively. The final two studies in Chapter 1 showed that situationally induced differences (Study 3) and individual differences (Study

4) in construal level were associated with behavioral compliance to a volunteer request. Specifically, people who adopted a more abstract construal were more likely to comply with an all-at-once (versus distributed) request. Conversely, people who adopted a more concrete construal were more likely to comply with a distributed (versus all-at-once) volunteer request.

Chapter 2 explored the role of construal level in compliance with allocated monetary requests. Study 5 demonstrated that people expect all-at-once and distributed donations to satisfy idealistic and pragmatic concerns, respectively. Study 6 demonstrated that a real-world relevant manipulation of construal level influenced behavioral compliance to a donation request. Specifically, people who were led to adopt a more abstract construal were more likely to comply with an all-at-once (versus distributed) request, whereas people who were led to adopt a more concrete construal were more likely to comply with a distributed (versus all-at-once) donation request. Study 7 provided evidence that people's baseline preference is for all-at-once requests, highlighting the utility of a more concrete construal in increasing receptivity to distributed requests. Finally, although many organizations do not offer a distributed donation option, Study 8 showed that it does not necessarily hurt an organization to include it among the options. However, preliminary evidence is inconclusive as to whether offering distributed contribution option can increase the likelihood and amount that people donate in the long run.

Chapter 3 concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, as well as potential future research directions.

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CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF CONSTRUAL LEVEL IN ALL-AT-ONCE AND DISTRIBUTED VOLUNTEERISM

"*Soon we must all face the choice, between what is right and what is easy.*"

~Albus Dumbledore; Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets

Understanding when and why people engage in philanthropy has been a topic of intense interest across academic and applied domains (see Oppenheimer & Olivola, 2011). Philanthropy can take on a variety of forms, including giving money to charity, volunteering through community organizations, donating blood and bodily tissue, and every day helping (e.g., driving a wheelchair bound person to the grocery store). Further, philanthropy has economic, social, and mental health benefits for the receiver, the giver, and society at large (Anik, Aknin, Norton, & Dunn, 2011). In the present chapter I focus specifically on the volunteerism side of philanthropy.

Although people are often motivated to do good deeds, several factors can impede good intentions, such as the costs associated with volunteering (e.g., expected effort; Snyder, Omoto & Lindsay, 2004), failures of self-control (i.e., giving into short-term temptations to spend one's hard earned time on the self; Meyvis, Bennett, & Oppenheimer, 2011), and a lack of information about volunteer opportunities (Sundeen, Raskoff, & Garcia, 2007). In order to understand what might increase volunteerism, much of the research on non-monetary helping has focused on two primary concerns. First, the literature has focused on identifying situational factors that promote *spontaneous helping*, that is, giving immediate and brief assistance to a person in need (e.g., helping an elderly woman carry groceries up a flight of stairs; Darley & Latané, 1968; Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaetner, & Clark, 1991). Second, the literature has focused on understanding the motivations of *planned helpers*, that is, people who actively seek out and commit to sustained volunteerism (e.g., working at a youth crisis hotline for three hours per week over the course of many years; Benson et al., 1980; Clary et al., 1998).

Relatively little is known about what factors influence what I will refer to throughout this chapter as *allocated volunteerism* – pre-determined and finite amounts of time devoted to a particular organization or cause (e.g., 4 hours total). People can engage in allocated volunteerism in a variety of ways. For instance, a person may go door-to-door collecting canned food for four hours in one day or for one hour each day on four different days. Note that distributing a volunteer experience over the course of four days is different from sustained volunteerism in the sense that there is a finite amount of time allocated, and therefore a planned end to the experience.

Organizations sometimes have the choice between presenting an all-at-once or distributed opportunity to potential volunteers. For instance, a food bank may be equally happy to have people go door-to-door collecting food in an all-at-once or distributed fashion. It would be beneficial for organizations to know the circumstances under which certain allocation requests are most likely to garner compliance. In the present research, I explore the role construal level plays in people's decision to comply with a request to volunteer in an all-at-once or distributed fashion.

Integrated Versus Segregated Experiences

Prior studies have shown that people expect to have and actually report having positive volunteer experiences (Barraza, 2011; Taylor, & Pancer, 2007; Strahilevitz, 2011). Further, volunteerism has been shown to promote psychological and social well-being (Anik et al., 2011). Previous research on integrated (all-at-once) versus segregated (distributed) experiences, however, provides conflicting perspectives on how the positive benefits of volunteering might influence people's willingness to allocate their volunteer time in an all-at-once versus distribution fashion. I first review these different perspectives and then offer a construal level framework as a way to reconcile these divergent perspectives.

ATTRACTION TO INTEGRATED EXPERIENCES

Research in the consumer domain suggests that people should be more attracted to all-at-once volunteer experiences. Nelson and Meyvis (2008), for example, argued that when people consider whether to engage in experiences, they often rely on a decision heuristic that tells them that stopping a positive experience will decrease enjoyment and value. In fact, across a variety of experiences (e.g., listening to music, going on vacation, eating ice cream), people expect enjoyment from integrating positive experiences (Nelson & Meyvis, 2008; Nelson, Meyvis, & Galak, 2009). Further, when positive experiences are relatively low in intensity or short in duration (e.g., consuming Hershey's Kisses), people report greater pleasure from integrated experiences (e.g., eating five Hershey's Kisses in one day vs. one Hershey's Kiss per day for five days; Morewedge, Gilbert, Keysar, Berkovits & Wilson, 2007). Indeed, breaking experiences into smaller units may make each unit too small for a person to receive any hedonic benefits.

Additionally, small units may not get recorded into a person's running mental accounting system (Thaler, 1999). As a result, a person may not appreciate the cumulative effect of the smaller units. For example, a person may not log a daily $4 latte at the coffee shop in his or her mental budget and therefore may fail to realize that $100 could be saved each month by switching to a $.50 cup of home brewed coffee. In the realm of volunteering, the consequence of presenting people with the opportunity to volunteer in smaller units is that they risk going unrecorded. In such cases, the entire volunteer experience may seem less significant (Thaler, 1999). Therefore, people may be more receptive to an all-at-once volunteer request because they expect it will be more personally and prosocially valuable than a distributed experience.

ATTRACTION TO SEGREGATED EXPERIENCES

Research grounded in the resource depletion framework (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Baumeister & Tierney, 2011; see also Inzlicht & Schmeichel , 2012) supports the idea that people will be more attracted to distributed volunteerism, as all-at-once experiences are likely to require sustained effort. Such

effort can deplete cognitive, emotional, and physical resources, interfering with prosocial goal pursuits (Xu, Bègue & Bushman, 2012). By definition, distributed experiences allow people to experience breaks in between their acts of goodwill, thereby allowing them to replenish their physical resources through activities such as eating and sleeping (Gailliot et al., 2007; see also, Denson, von Hippel, Kemp, & Teo, 2010, Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2013; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008), and their mental resources by shifting attention to less demanding tasks such as television viewing (Salomon, 1984), internet browsing (Coker, 2013), and games (Anderson, 2012). From this perspective, people may be more receptive to a distributed volunteer request because they forecast it to be less effortful than an all-at-once experience.

INTEGRATION OR SEGREGATION?

Common to the various perspectives on integrating versus segregating experiences is the notion that people may expect different benefits of all-at-once and distributed volunteerism. I argue that people's willingness to allocate their volunteer time in an all-at-once or distributed fashion depends on the extent to which they focus on idealistic concerns (i.e., "how moral will this experience be?") or pragmatic concerns (i.e., "how burdensome will this experience be?"; Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). Considering that all-at-once volunteer experiences bring the entirety of the help at a single point in time, I argue that people will expect it to satisfy their idealistic concerns – doing what is morally right. For example, helping an elderly woman move into a new house all in one day brings her more immediate benefit than spreading out the moving process over several days. Therefore, people focused on idealistic concerns should expect all-at-once volunteerism to be preferable to distributed volunteerism. In contrast, distributed experiences are drawn out over a period of time, and are therefore less susceptible to resource depletion. As a result, people should expect that distributed experiences will satisfy pragmatic concerns – doing what is less burdensome. I argue that identifying the circumstances under which people consider idealistic concerns versus practical concerns will allow for clear predictions about when people are willing to volunteer. Next, I discuss why construal level should affect volunteer behavior.

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CONSTRUAL LEVEL

Objects and events must be represented at some level of construal (Förster, 2012; Smith, 1998; Reyna, 2012; Trope & Liberman, 2012; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). In the present research, I draw on construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) to generate predictions about how people's level of construal should affect their willingness to allocate volunteer time in an all-at-once versus distributed fashion. Higher-level, more abstract construals extract the overarching meaning of experiences (Schul, 1983), capture central information (McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011), and are based on stable, cross-situational properties (de Montes, Semin & Valencia, 2003). Lower-level, more concrete construals, on the other hand extract vivid details of experiences (Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985) and are based on temporary, context-specific properties (de Montes et al., 2003). To exemplify, consider the act of voting. A more abstract construal of this behavior might emphasize voting's overall purpose (e.g., partaking in democracy) or the traits it conveys (e.g., responsibility). Alternatively, a more concrete construal might emphasize voting's incidental aspects, such as how it is implemented (e.g., pressing a lever) or the specific context in which it is performed (e.g., public school).

Most germane to the present research, construal level shifts the weight that people place on idealistic versus pragmatic concerns. Idealistic concerns focus on high-level, central, cross-situational properties of particular actions (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007; Torelli & Kaikati, 2009). In other words, idealistic concerns involve the things people find to be broadly important in life such as morals and values (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). Conversely, pragmatic concerns revolve around the low-level details surrounding the process of doing particular actions (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). Consider, for example, a person who has the goal to take his family on vacation. Whether vacation would strengthen family bonds is an idealistic concern; on the other hand; whether it is feasible to save $100 a month to pay for the vacation is a pragmatic concern (e.g., Freitas, Gollwitzer & Trope, 2004).

In support of the notion that construal level shifts the weight people place on idealistic versus pragmatic concerns, Liberman and Trope (1998) demonstrated that when people think more abstractly about activities, their decisions are guided more by the desirability of achieving the end state. However, when people think more concretely, their decisions are guided more by the feasibility of the end state. More broadly, research has shown that when people think more abstractly, they are more likely to consider their actions in terms of their morals and values as opposed to context-specific information (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008; Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman & Chaiken, 2009; Torelli & Kaikati, 2009).

An emerging literature has begun to focus on the effect of construal level in the philanthropic domain. For example, taking advantage of the fact that greater psychological distance tends to elicit more abstract thinking (Trope & Liberman, 2010), Agerström and Björklund (2009a, 2009b) and Choi, Park, and Oh (2012) found that people had a stronger intention to contribute to altruistic causes in the distant (vs. near) future. Similarly, Conway and Peetz (2012) found that when people recalled moral behavior that occurred in the distant (vs. near) past or focused on their moral traits (vs. moral acts), they had a stronger intention to behave in a prosocial manner. Focusing specifically on emotional appeals, Hong and Lee (2010) demonstrated that people who construed information at a more concrete level had less favorable attitudes toward a charitable appeal that evoked mixed emotions. Focusing on the quality of persuasive messages, Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope, and Liberman (2008) measured the effectiveness of argument strength on intentions to make a charitable donation and found that people had a stronger intention to donate when stronger arguments were presented and when temporal distance matched the specificity of the donation target. Building off Fujita et al.'s work, Ein-Gar and Levontin (2013) showed that people were more willing to donate to an organization when they were psychologically distant from the population in need, but were more willing to donate to a specific person when they were psychologically closer to the person in need. Finally, Henderson and Burgoon (2013) recently demonstrated that construal level impacts the efficacy of the door-in-the-face technique in the prosocial domain.

Surprisingly, very little research has examined the role construal level plays in the volunteer side of philanthropy (see Conway & Peetz, 2012, Studies 1 & 2 for the two exceptions). Moreover, very little research has examined how construal level affects people's prosocial *behavior*, as most studies have focused exclusively on intentions (see Ein-Gar & Levontin, Study 5; Henderson & Burgoon, 2013, for the exceptions). The present research aims to fill those gaps.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 1-4

As noted earlier, research has already shown that construal levels shift the weight that people place on idealistic versus pragmatic concerns (Eyal, Liberman et al., 2008; Eyal, Sagristano et al., 2009; Kivetz & Tyler, 2007; Liberman & Trope, 1998, Torelli & Kaikati, 2009). In the present research, I extend beyond this past work by arguing that as people think more abstractly, they will be more concerned with the moral rightness of a volunteer experience. Conversely, I argue that as people think more concretely, they will be more concerned with the amount of effort involved in a volunteer experience. I posit that people will expect all-at-once volunteerism to feel more morally right, whereas they will expect distributed volunteerism to feel less burdensome. Accordingly, people who adopt a more abstract construal should be more like to comply with an all-at-once (vs. distributed) request, whereas people who adopt a more concrete construal should be more likely to comply to a distributed (vs. all-at-once) request. I designed the following studies to test these hypotheses.

Study 1: Weight Given to Moral Rightness Versus Ease

Before examining the relationship between construal level and receptivity to volunteer allocation requests, I first sought to confirm that construal level shifts the weight that people place on the moral rightness and ease of volunteering. Prior research has shown that people vary in their chronic level of construal (Förster, 2012; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; also see Burgoon, Henderson, & Markman, 2013). In this study, I asked people to indicate the extent to which they

would focus on the moral rightness and ease of the experience when considering a future volunteer opportunity (writing letters to sick children in hospitals). I varied whether the experience was described in an all-at-once or distributed manner. Finally, I measured individual differences in level of construal.

I expected that a more abstract construal would be related to a greater focus on the perceived moral rightness of the volunteer experience, whereas a more concrete construal would be related to a greater focus on the pereceived ease of the volunteer experience. I did not expect the manner in which the volunteerism was described (all-at-once or distributed) to affect these relationships. By manipulating the type of volunteer experience, I could establish the independent relationship of construal level on the weight given to moral rightness and ease when considering volunteer opportunities.

METHOD

I recruited 100 participants (50 females, M_{age} = 36.08, SD_{age} = 13.09) in the U.S. from Amazon's Mechanical Turk.

Manipulation

Drawing on a measure of prosocial behavior adopted by Mogilner, Chance, and Norton (2012), I told participants that I was planning to offer an unpaid volunteer experience for Turk workers – writing letters to sick children in hospitals. Some participants read that I planned to ask volunteers to write for two hours for one day (all-at-once); the remaining participants read that I planned to ask volunteers to write for one hour a day for two days (distributed).

Measures

My primary interest was establishing a relationship between construal level and the weight that people place on idealistic versus pragmatic concerns. I operationalized those concerns by examining the weight people placed on the moral rightness versus ease of

volunteering, respectively. I asked participants how much "*whether or not it was the moral thing to do*" and "*whether or not it was an easy thing to do*" would determine whether they would participate in the volunteer experience (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). I varied the order in which the items were presented, although it did not affect the results.

Next, participants completed an established measure of individual differences in construal level, the behavior identification form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; see also Burgoon et al., 2013). I presented participants with 25 actions (e.g., making a list) along with a more abstract construal (i.e., "getting organized") and more concrete construal ("writing things down") of each action. I asked participants to select the description they personally believed best described the behavior. Responses for each behavior were scored so that preference for the more abstract and more concrete description was 0 and 1, respectively. I created a summary score of preferences across all 25 items such that a total score of 0 indicated universal preference for the more concrete descriptions and a score of 25 indicated universal preference for the more abstract descriptions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overall, participants selected slightly more of the abstract descriptions on the BIF (*M* =13.92, *SD* = 5.58). I analyzed the weight given to the moral rightness versus ease of volunteering using a mixed-model ANOVA with construal level (mean centered BIF score) and request type ("all-at-once coded" -1; "distributed" coded 1) as between-participants factors, and responses to the moral rightness versus ease questions as a within-participants factor. Results indicated a main effect of moral rightness versus ease, $F(1, 96) = 4.44, p = .02$, that was qualified by a construal level x moral rightness versus ease interaction, $F(1, 96) = 10.34, p = .002$. No other main effects or interactions emerged (all Fs < 1).

I conducted follow up comparisons on the significant interaction using separate regressions for the moral rightness versus ease questions. As expected, people who adopted a more abstract construal were more likely to focus on the moral rightness of the volunteer

experience, $\beta = .07$, $SE = .03$, $t(98) = 2.36$, $p = .02$, $d = .48$. Conversely, participants who adopted a more concrete construal were more likely to focus on the ease of the volunteer experience, $\beta = -.06$, $SE = .03$, $t(98) = 1.96$, $p = .05$, $d = .40$. Therefore, I feel confident that people's construal level influences the weight they place on the moral rightness versus ease of a volunteer experience. Having established this effect of construal level, I next explored whether people expect all-at-once and distributed volunteerism to satisfy these concerns to different degrees.

Study 2A: Anticipated Moral Rightness of Volunteerism

Previous research and Study 1 show that people who adopt a more abstract construal give greater weight to idealistic concerns. I posit that a more abstract construal therefore should foster greater agreement to an all-at-once (vs. distributed) volunteer request, because people expect these volunteer experiences to satisfy their idealistic concerns to a greater degree. In the current study, I sought to verify that people do expect all-at-once (vs. distributed) volunteer experiences will satisfy their idealistic concerns to a greater degree. Specifically, I measured whether all-at-once (vs. distributed) volunteer experiences were judged as more morally right.

METHOD

I recruited 164 participants (74 females, $M_{age} = 32.69$, $SD_{age} = 11.55$) in the U.S. using Amazon's Turk system. I told participants that some good deeds feel more morally right than others and that I was interested in their perceptions about how they would feel after accomplishing different deeds.

Measures

I presented participants with the following nine volunteer opportunities adapted from Henderson, Huang, and Chang (2012, Study 4): passing out flyers for blood donation, volunteering at a senior citizen's home, volunteering at a hospital, repairing bicycles to donate to charity, creating an anti-smoking campaign, asking people to sign a petition for clean drinking

water, volunteering at a homeless shelter, and delivering meals to people who are unable to leave their homes. I randomly presented these opportunities as either an all-at-once or distributed experience. For example, I asked some participants to consider "if you volunteered 2 hours one day helping at a homeless shelter, how would it feel?". I asked other participants to consider "if you volunteered 20 minutes a day for 6 days helping at a homeless shelter, how would it feel?". I varied the duration and number of time units across activities (see Appendix for the full list). For each activity, participants indicated on a scale "how would it feel?" (1 = less morally right than other good deeds to 7 = more morally right than other good deeds). I created a perceived moral rightness composite by averaging responses (α = .78).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

An independent samples t test on the moral rightness composite indicated that participants judged all-at-once volunteer experiences as more morally right (M = 4.45, SD = .66, n = 82) than distributed volunteer experiences (M = 4.22, SD = .80, n = 82, $t(162)$ = 2.01, p = .05, d = .33). These data lend support to my hypothesis that people expect all-at-once volunteerism to satisfy their idealistic concerns (i.e., moral rightness) to a greater degree than distributed volunteerism, and therefore should be more appealing to people who adopt a more abstract construal. It is possible that total duration and distribution duration moderates this effect. I next explored whether perceived moral rightness varied by activity using a repeated measures ANOVA with activity as within-participants factor and request as a between participants factor. Results revealed a main effect of activity, $F(8, 1216)$ = 84.47, p < .001, and the observed main effect of request (as reported above) that were qualified by an activity x request interaction, $F(8, 1216)$ = 3.30, p = .01. Given that total duration and distributed duration varied on each activity it is impossible to determine what may be driving differences. Future research should explore both as potential moderators. Next, I sought to confirm that people expect distributed volunteerism to be easier than all-at-once volunteerism.

Study 2B: Anticipated Ease of Volunteerism

Previous research and Study 1 show that people who adopt a more concrete construal give greater weight to pragmatic concerns. Because a distributed volunteer experience allows people to replenish their physical and mental resources between each unit of volunteer time, I posited that people would expect distributed (vs. all-at-once) volunteer experiences to be easier. In the current study, I measured whether distributed (vs. all-at-once) volunteer experiences were expected to be less effortful.

METHOD

I recruited 89 participants (32 females, M_{age} = 30.71, SD_{age} = 11.44) in the U.S. using Amazon's Turk system, but excluded 8 participants for participation in a previous related study. I told participants that I was interested in how people perceive various volunteer opportunities.

Measures

I presented participants with the same nine volunteer activities from Study 2A in an all-at-once (e.g., four hours on one day) or distributed (e.g., one hour a day for four days) manner (see Appendix). For each activity, participants indicated on a scale "to what extent you feel your contribution would be effortful" (1 = not at all effortful to 7 = very effortful). I created a perceived effort composite by averaging responses (α = .72).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

An independent samples t test on the pereceived effort composite indicated that participants judged distributed volunteer experiences as less effortful (M = 3.59, SD = .92, n = 38) than all-at-once volunteer experiences, (M = 4.33, SD = .80, n = 43, $t(79)$ = 3.86, p < .001, d = .87). These data lend support to my hypothesis that people expect distributed volunteerism to satisfy pragmatic concerns (i.e., ease) to a greater degree than all-at-once volunteerism, and therefore should be more appealing to people who adopt a more concrete construal. It is possible

that total duration and distribution duration moderates this effect. I next explored whether perceived effort varied by activity using a repeated measures ANOVA with activity as within-participants factor and request as a between participants factor. Results revealed a main effect of activity, $F(8, 632) = 7.24, p < .001$, and the observed main effect of request (as reported above) that were qualified by an activity x request interaction, $F(8, 1216) = 19.48, p < .001$. Given that total duration and distributed duration varied on each activity it is impossible to determine what may be driving differences. Future research should explore both as potential moderators.

Study 1 confirmed that construal level influences the weight that individuals place on the moral rightness versus ease of a volunteer experience. Studies 2A and 2B support my hypothesis that people expect all-at-once volunteer experiences to be more morally right and distributed volunteer experiences to be easier. Having established a potential link between construal level and volunteer time allocations, the remaining studies sought to confirm that relationship.

Study 3: Construal Level and Volunteer Behavior

I designed Study 3 to confirm that construal level and request type influence actual volunteer behavior: completing a survey for an undergraduate honors student. I expected that participants who were led to adopt a more abstract construal would be more likely to complete the survey in an all-at-once (vs. distributed) manner. Conversely, I expected participants who were led to adopt a more concrete construal would be more likely to complete the survey in a distributed (vs. all-at-once) manner.

METHOD

A total of 100 participants (82 females) completed the study in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. To ensure that participants did not think the prosocial request was part of the experiment, the experimenter told participants that I was collaborating with YouTube to determine whether a star system would be more popular than their current thumbs-up/thumbs-

down system for rating videos. She then explained that I wanted participants to view and rate several videos and complete surveys related to their personality. Unbeknownst to participants, the surveys involved the construal level manipulation.

Manipulations

Participants completed several filler tasks and then completed the construal level manipulation. Thinking about categories (vs. exemplars) fosters thinking at a more abstract, superordinate level, which carries over to subsequent judgments (Burgoon et al., 2013). Therefore, the experimenter presented participants with a manipulation based on this distinction (Fujita et al., 2006). Specifically, she presented participants with 36 common objects and activities (e.g., newspaper). She instructed participants in the abstract construal condition to generate their own category label for each object or activity (e.g., reading material). She instructed participants in the concrete construal condition to generate their own specific example of each object or activity (e.g., The New York Times). I calculated a construal score based on the number of objects that had a legitimate category label or example. Errors on this task suggest a lack of attention or lack of understanding the task. Although one error could be genuine mistake, two or more errors begin to indicate a pattern. To ensure my data only included participants who had fully understood and paid attention to the task, I excluded 18 participants who did not identify categories or exemplars on two or more trials.

After participants completed the construal level manipulation, the experimenter told them that they were finished with the study and that they would receive credit for their participation. The experimenter then made an all-at-once or distributed request for participation in an additional study. Specifically, she said the following to participants (distributed in parentheses):

> "I'm actually an honors student and I desperately need participants for my honors project. I can't give you subject pool credit, but is there any way that you could help me out by coming back for a two-hour survey on one day (two one-hour surveys on two different days)? If so, I can schedule a time with you right now."

To further increase participants' sense of obligation to follow through on their commitment, she then asked each person who agreed to the request for their email and sent them a confirmation of their date(s) and time(s) to return to complete the survey(s).

Measure

I measured whether participants completed the honors survey(s).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Forty-six out of 82 participants (56.1%) verbally agreed to complete the honors project. Twenty-eight out of these 46 participants actually followed through and completed the survey. I assume the drop from verbal to behavioral compliance was due to social desirability; that is, people who were disinclined to volunteer may have initially said yes to an in-person request, but then cancelled when contacted via email with a reminder for their scheduled time. I analyzed participants' likelihood of behaviorally complying using binary logistic regression, with request type (all-at-once coded 1, distributed coded -1) and construal level (more concrete coded -1, more abstract coded 1) entered as predictors. Results revealed a marginal main effect of request type ($\beta = 1.08$, $SE = .66$, $p = .10$, OR = 2.93) and no effect of construal level ($\beta = .85$, $SE = .69$, $p = .22$, OR = 2.32), and a construal level x request type interaction ($\beta = -2.08$, $SE = .90$, $p = .04$, OR = .13; see Figure 1 on the next page). As predicted, participants who were led to adopt a more abstract construal were marginally more likely volunteer in an all-at-once (vs. distributed) manner, 47.4% versus 21.1%, $\beta = 1.22$, $SE = .72$, $p = .08$, OR = 3.38. Conversely, participants who were led to adopt a more concrete construal were marginally more likely to volunteer in a distributed (vs. all-at-once) manner, 47.8% vs. 23.8%, $\beta = -1.08$, $SE = .66$, $p = .09$, OR = .34. Follow up comparisons within request conditions revealed that although there were no differences in likelihood to volunteer all-at-once between construal conditions $\beta = .85$, $SE = .69$, $p = .22$, OR = .31, participants were marginally more likely to volunteer in a distributed manner

when they were led to adopt a more concrete (vs. abstract) construal, $\beta = 1.24$, $SE = .70$, $p = .08$, $OR = 3.44$.

Figure 1. Percentage of behavioral compliance as a function of request type and manipulated construal levels (Study 3).

There are several possible reasons why I did not observe a significant difference within construal level and request conditions. First, it is possible that the low base rate of people who behaviorally complied with the volunteer request limited my ability to detect significant differences between conditions. Second, it is possible that the construal level manipulation did not shift people sufficiently away from their chronic level of construal, thereby increasing the variability within conditions. In order to explore this latter possibility, in the next study I examined whether individual differences rather than manipulated differences in construal level would interact with the type of volunteer request in determining people's volunteer behavior.

Study 4: Predictive Utility of Construal Level for Volunteer Behavior

Beyond the noise that individual differences in construal level may have introduced into the previous study, they may also have predictive utility for organizations. In this study, I first measured individual differences in construal level and then later presented participants with the all-at-once or distributed volunteer opportunity (writing letters to sick children in hospitals). I expected that people who thought in more abstract terms would be more likely to comply with an all-at-once (versus distributed) request, whereas people who thought in more concrete terms would be more likely to comply with a distributed (vs. all-at-once) request.

METHOD

I recruited 78 participants (55 females) from an introductory social psychology course at the University of Texas at Austin.

Construal Level Measure

On the first day of the semester, participants completed a series of individual differences questionnaires. Relevant to the present study, participants completed an established measure of construal level: breadth of categorization (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; see also Burgoon, et al., 2013). Participants were presented with three different lists of 39 objects each (e.g., television, latern, tent). For each list, participants were asked to list the objects that belonged in the same group, placing each object in one group. I calculated the average number of groups generated across the lists of objects ($\alpha = .84$; $M = 5.24$, $SD = 2.04$). More abstract thinking results in broader, more inclusive categories. Therefore, the generation of fewer groups indicates more abstract thinking. I inverse-scored this composite so that higher scores indicated a more abstract construal.

Personality Measure

In order to establish the discriminant validity of the construal level measure, I also measured the Big Five Personality (i.e., extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism) using the ten item personality inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann, 2003) as well as universal values (i.e., universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction) using the Schwartz values scale (Schwartz, 1992).

Manipulation

For the purposes of this study, I adapted the prosocial measure from Mogliner et al. (2012). Thirty-four days after participants completed the measures of construal level, personality, and values, participants received the following email from their instructor, which presented an opportunity to write letters to sick children in hospitals:

> "Hi class. As you may know, UT is in the midst of its Hearts of Texas Campaign. This is a great opportunity to get involved and give back to your community. I thought it would be a good idea to organize a volunteer experience for my class. I want to organize a volunteer experience where UT students can write letters to sick kids in hospitals. I have identified hospitals that would welcome this. Note, this is purely a volunteer experience and your participation will not affect your grade in any way."

Participants in the all-at-once request condition then read "Are you willing to volunteer writing sick kids for one day for 2 hours?" In contrast, participants in the distributed request condition read "Are you willing to volunteer writing sick kids for one hour a day for 2 days?". Note that I held the total amount of contribution (2 hours) constant across conditions to avoid confounding the amount of contribution requested with the type of allocation requested.

Volunteer Measure

I measured whether participants came into the lab and wrote letters to sick children ("no" coded 0; "yes" coded 1). I randomly selected twenty children from the Hugs and Hope For Sick

Children website. Participants saw a photograph and description of each child. If participants wrote any letters, I printed and mailed all of their letters to the children.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Twenty out of 78 participants (26%) came into the laboratory and wrote letters to sick children. I analyzed the likelihood of writing the letters using binary logistic regression, with request type (all-at-once coded 1, distributed coded -1) and measured construal level (mean centered average number of categories) entered as predictors. Results revealed no main effect of request type ($\beta = -.41$, $SE = .60$, $p = .50$, $OR = .67$) and a main effect of construal level ($\beta = .46$, $SE = .23$, $p = .05$, $OR = .63$), which was qualified by a request type x construal level interaction ($\beta = -.72$, $SE = .31$, $p = .02$, $OR = 2.05$; see Figure 2 on the next page). Follow-up spotlight comparisons at the end points of construal level (highest number = most abstract; lowest number = most concrete) were in line with my prediction. Spotlight comparisons at the end points allowed me to detect differences among the most abstract and concrete thinkers in the sample. More abstract thinkers were more likely to volunteer when solicited for two hours on one day (versus one hour each on two different days), $\beta = 3.01$, $SE = 1.22$, $p = .01$). Conversely, more concrete thinkers were more likely to volunteer when solicited for one hour each on two different days (versus two hours on one day) ($\beta = 3.95$, $SE = 2.03$, $p = .05$). Follow up comparisons within request conditions revealed that participants who were solicited with an all-at-once request were more likely to volunteer if they were a more abstract (vs. concrete) thinker ($\beta = -.46$, $SE = .23$, $p = .05$). However, individual differences in construal level did not predict likelihood to comply to a distributed request ($\beta = .25$, $SE = .21$, $p = .22$).

Figure 2. Predicted likelihood of volunteering as a function of request type and individual differences in construal level. Predicted values represent inverse-scored end points of the continuous level of construal variable (fewer categories = more concrete; more categories = more abstract) (Study 4).

The interaction remained significant when controlling for personality and values (all ps < .05). Further, the measure of construal level was not significantly correlated with any of the indices of personality or values (all rs < .14). Finally, none of the indices of personality or values significantly moderated the results (all ps > .14).

These data lend further behavioral support to my hypothesis that construal level influences people's likelihood of agreeing to an all-at-once or distributed volunteer request. Further, I demonstrate that individual differences in construal operate in the same way as manipulated construal. Specifically, more abstract thinkers were more likely to write to sick children when presented with an all-at-once (vs. distributed) request, whereas more concrete thinkers were more likely to write to sick children when presented with a distributed (vs. all-at-once) request.

Summary of Studies 1-4

My findings suggest that construal level affects preferences for all-at-once and distributed volunteerism by shifting the weight that people place on idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in the decision-making process. Study 1 supported previous construal level research about the weight people place on idealistic and pragmatic concerns. That is, I showed that more concrete and more abstract construals increase the weight that people place on the moral rightness and effort of volunteer experiences, respectively. Studies 2A and 2B supported the notion that people expect all-at-once volunteerism to satisfy idealistic concerns to a greater degree, whereas people expect distributed volunteering to satisfy pragmatic concerns to a greater degree. Study 3 supported a causal interpretation of the relationship between people's construal levels and their allocation of volunteer time. Finally, Study 4 demonstrated that individual differences in construal are also associated with allocation of volunteer time. That is, findings across the final two studies demonstrated that more abstract thinkers were more likely to volunteer in an all-at-once (vs. distributed) manner, whereas more concrete thinkers were more likely to volunteer in a distributed (vs. all-at-once) manner.

PREVIEW OF CHAPTER 2

Philanthropy can take on a variety of forms beyond volunteerism, including monetary loans and donations. Sometimes prosocial organizations solicit a one-time contribution (e.g., $100 to fund one child to attend YMCA summer camp). Other times they solicit a distributed contribution (e.g., a $5 per month contribution over 10 months to sustain arts and crafts activities at YMCA summer camp). Even other times, organizations give people a choice between a one-time and a distributed contribution. In the next chapter, I explore whether my findings generalize to these types of financial requests.

CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF CONSTRUAL LEVEL IN ALL-AT-ONCE AND DISTRIBUTED MONETARY DONATIONS

Within the realm of philanthropy, it would be beneficial for organizations to know whether shifts in construal level also influence attraction to all-at-once versus distributed monetary giving. Converging evidence suggests that time and money have different psychological antecedents and consequences (see Liu, 2011, for a review). For one, people mentally account for time and money differently (Okada & Hoch, 2004; Zauberman & Lynch, 2005). Although people anticipate having more time and money in the future than they do in the present, people perceive they will have a much greater amount of time than money (Okada & Hoch, 2004). Additionally, people have higher expectations for the return on a monetary versus time investment (e.g., expecting higher quality food when donating money versus time in return for a restaurant meal; Okada & Hoch, 2004). Finally, thinking about time as a resource activates a mindset related to the emotional meaning of events (Liu & Aaker, 2007), whereas thinking about money activates a mindset related to self-efficacy towards accomplishing goals (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006).

MORAL RIGHTNESS VERSUS EASE OF MONETARY DONATIONS

The body of research suggesting that time and money have different consequences does not rule out the potential effect of construal level on attraction to all-at-once versus distributed monetary donation opportunities. Recall that thinking about the moral rightness of an experience reflects attention to idealistic concerns, whereas thinking about the ease of engaging in an experience reflects a pragmatic concern. Relevant to donation contexts, previous research supports the notion that construal shifts attention to idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in decisions related to money. In the consumer domain, construal level influences whether people interpret product price information in terms of a product's quality versus the personal monetary sacrifice necessary to purchase the product (Bornemann & Homburg, 2011). Perceived quality reflects an idealistic concern about the overall value of a product, whereas monetary sacrifice

reflects a pragmatic concern about the means needed to obtain that product. Like with volunteer experiences, people deciding whether to make a charitable donation should evaluate both the whether they expect the donation to feel moral as well whether they expect the donation to be effortful given their financial resources.

In line with the findings in Chapter 1, people should anticipate that different contribution allocations will differentially satisfy concerns about moral rightness and ease. Thinking about money is associated with attention to the desirability of accomplishing a goal (Vohs et al., 2006); therefore, the immediate impact that all-at-once monetary donations can have on beneficiaries should lead people to anticipate that all-at-once contributions will feel more morally right than distributed contributions. Considering that people judge both time and money to be a scarce resource (Okada & Hoch, 2004), people should anticipate distributed contributions will feel easier than all-at-once contributions in the sense that monetary resources can be replenished between donation periods through paychecks. Therefore, I predict that in the case of allocated monetary donations, more abstract construal level will increase attraction to all-at-once donation opportunities, whereas more concrete construal level will increase attraction to distributed donation opportunities.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 5-8

Extending the findings from Chapter 1, Studies 5a and 5b explore whether people anticipate all-at-once and distributed donations to be more moral and easier, respectively. Study 6 employs a real-world manipulation of construal in field setting to explore all-at-once and distributed monetary contributions to a local charitable organization. I predict that people who are led to adopt a more abstract construal will be more likely to donate all-at-once (versus in a distributed fashion). Conversely, people who are lead to adopt a more concrete construal will be more likely to distribute their donation (versus all-at-once). Although the Chapter 1 studies demonstrated the role of construal level in compliance to all-at-once and distributed requests, it was unclear to what extent construal level shifted people from their baseline preferences. In

order to more fully interpret those results, it is important to determine whether people have a baseline preference. For example, if people generally prefer all-at-once giving, the notable result is that more concrete construal increases attraction to distributed requests. On the other hand, if people generally prefer distributed giving, the notable result is that more abstract construal increases attraction to all-at-once requests. Study 7, therefore, examines whether people generally prefer one type of contribution to another. Finally, whereas distributed volunteerism opportunities are relatively common, distributed monetary donation opportunities appear to be quite rare (however, see https://rally.org/weareiam for an current example of a distributed request). To determine the prevalence of distributed donation opportunities, I selected a sample of 75 (50 national or international, 25 local distributed across 3 cities) highest rated organizations from Forbes Magazine and greatnonprofits.org. The organizations' websites revealed that only 12 (16%) offer a distributed contribution option. All organizations offered an all-at-once option (n =75 or 100%) and most offered an indefinite (i.e., sustained) monthly contribution option (n = 65 or 87%). Only one national or international organization offered a distributed option (American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee). Irrespective of construal level effects on giving, Study 8a explores whether soliciting a distributed contribution can increase the likelihood and amount that people donate to charitable organizations. Finally, Study 8b explores how often people would take advantage of the distributed contribution option when presented among the list of contribution options.

Study 5A: Anticipated Morality of Different Types of Donations

Given that people anticipate all-at-once (vs. distributed) volunteerism to feel more moral (Study 2a in Chapter 1), in this experiment I tested whether people also anticipate feeling more moral after making such donations.

METHOD

I recruited 99 participants (38 females, M_{age} = 32.20, SD_{age} = 11.24) in the U.S. using Amazon's Turk system. I told participants that I was interested in how people perceive various prosocial deeds.

Manipulation

I presented participants with the following nine donation opportunities adapted from Henderson, Huang, and Chang (2012, Study 4): donating to a homeless shelter to provide blankets and pillows, to a hospital to provide flowers for patients, to an anti-smoking campaign, to a low income after school program to buy children's books, to provide meals on wheels to people unable to leave their homes, to an organization that provides free breast cancer screenings, to a local animal rescue organization, to an organization researching a cure for Multiple Sclerosis (see Appendix). I randomly presented these opportunities as either all-at-once or distributed experiences. For example, I asked some participants to consider "if you donated $50 all at once to an organization that provides free breast cancer screenings to women". I asked other participants to consider "if you donated $10 per month for 5 months to an organization that provides free breast cancer screenings to women." For each activity, I asked participants "to what extent would your moral character improve?" (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). I created an anticipated morality composite by averaging responses (α = .91).

RESULTS

As expected, results revealed that participants anticipated that all-at-once donations would be make them feel more moral than distributed donations ($M_{all\text{-}at\text{-}once}$ = 4.05, SD = 1.78 vs. $M_{distributed}$ = 3.35, SD = 1.78; $t(97)$ =1.93, p = .05, d = .39). I next explored whether perceived morality of donating varied by activity using a repeated measures ANOVA with activity as within-participants factor and request as a between participants factor. Results revealed a main effect of activity, $F(8, 776)$ = 12.91, p < .001, and the observed main effect of request (as

reported above). However, unlike the Experiment 1A on volunteering, there was no activity x request interaction, $F(8, 776) = 2.9$, p = .92.

Study 5B: Anticipated Effort of Different Types of Donations

Given that people anticipate distributed (vs. all-at-once) volunteerism to feel more effortful (Study 2b in Chapter 1), in this experiment, I tested whether people also anticipate that distributed (vs. all-at-once) donations will feel less effortful.

METHOD

I recruited 130 participants (61 females, $M_{age} = 33.45$, $SD_{age} = 11.95$) in the U.S. using Amazon's Turk system. I told participants that I was interested in how people perceive various prosocial deeds.

Measure

I presented the same nine donation opportunities from Study 5a, but this time asked participants if they made the particular donation "how burdensome would it feel?" on a scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). I created an anticipated effort composite by averaging responses ($\alpha = .97$).

RESULTS

As expected, results revealed that participants anticipated that distributed donations would be feel less effortful than all-at-once donations ($M_{distributed} = 3.93$, $SD = 1.46$ vs. $M_{all-at-once} = 4.51$, $SD = 1.29$; $t(128) = 2.40$, $p = .02$, $d = .42$). I next explored whether perceived burden of donating varied by activity using a repeated measures ANOVA with activity as within-participants factor and request as a between participants factor. Results revealed a main effect of activity, $F(8, 1024) = 79.88$, $p < .001$, and the observed main effect of request (as reported

above). However, unlike the Experiment 1A on volunteering, there was no activity x request interaction, $F(8, 1024) = .79$, p = .59.

Having established a link between the anticipated morality and ease of all-at-once and distributed donations, respectively, I next sought to confirm that construal level influences receptivity to these different donation requests.

Study 6: Construal Level and Donation Behavior

The present study employed a real-world construal manipulation to highlight the practical utility of shifting construal level in garnering donations. I hypothesized that people who received a more abstract message would more likely to make an all-at-once (versus distributed) donation, whereas people who received a more concrete message would be more likely to make a distributed (versus all-at-once) donation.

METHOD

I recruited 200 (114 female; $M_{age} = 20.62$, $SD = 2.24$, $M_{year-in-school} = 2.96$, $SD = 2.51$) potential donors from the University of Texas at Austin. I excluded 1 participant (.5%) due to experimenter error in executing the experimental procedure and 3 participants (1.5%) who did not comply with the requested donation amount, leaving a remained sample of 196 participants. Although college students are often considered a convenience sample in psychological studies, they also constitute a demographic of interest to charitable organizations. For example, one of the top fundraising priorities for Austin Pets Alive – a local pet rescue organization – is to encourage the campus population to get involved in making donations (Kristina Jakstas, personal communication, 2013). For one, with a large student body, small individual donations can accrue to make a large financial impact. Moreover, college students are in the process of figuring what causes and organizations they support. Organizations can take advantage of one-time student donations that result from testing the charitable waters, and may be able to also recruit lifetime donors.

Manipulation

Focusing on similarities among objects and events requires attention to central, stable, and cross-situational characteristics, and therefore fosters more abstract thinking. On the other hand, focusing on differences requires attention to peripheral, situationally specific characteristics, and therefore fosters concrete thinking (Burgoon et al., 2013). Drawing on this notion, an experimenter approached potential donors on campus using a novel construal manipulation amendable to field settings. In what appeared to be "small talk", the experimenter told the participant that his or her day seemed either very similar or very different than the previous day (concrete condition in parentheses):

> "Hey, how's it going?" *(Pause for response)* "Have you ever had one of those days that's just exactly the same as (that's just completely different than) yesterday? I swear it just seems like everything that is happening is the same as (different from) yesterday!"

To ensure the manipulation does shift construal level, I recruited a separate sample of 100 participants (50 per condition) on University of Texas campus ($n = 61$) and around the city of Austin ($n = 39$). After the "small talk", participants completed the BIF (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989; see also Burgoon et al., 2013). Results revealed that participants who heard the experimenter talk about his or her day as being similar to previous days selected more abstract items ($M = 14.48$, $SD = 3.07$) than participants who heard about the experimenter having a day that was completely different from previous days ($M = 12.94$, $SD = 3.31$; $t(98) = 2.41$, $p = .02$, $d = .48$). Therefore, I am confident that the manipulation does produce meaningful shifts in construal level.

Dependent Measure

Across several studies conducted on UT campus, students donate an average of less than $5 to charitable organizations (Henderson & Burgoon, 2013, Experiment 3; Henderson et al., 2012, Experiment 3). One possibility is that participants do not carry cash, and therefore donations reflect their available resources when approached on campus or by an experimenter in

a lab setting. Another possibility is that students lack financial resources to make large donations through any medium (i.e., cash, credit card).

To reduce the likelihood of a floor effect (i.e., few or no donations) due to students' limited financial resources, I conducted a pilot study on the University of Texas campus to determine an appropriate amount of money to request from potential donors. In previous unpublished studies, I found a floor effect with $100 and $50 requests. Accordingly, I hypothesized that $20 would be a reasonable amount for students to donate to a charitable cause. Fifty students responded to the following three questions (questions 1 and 2 were counterbalanced to avoid anchoring effects):

- If someone from a campus service organization approached you asking you to donate $20 to their cause, does $20 seem (choose one):

    o   Too little

    o   Just about right

    o   Too much

- What is the maximum amount of money you would be willing to donate to a charitable organization?

- What type of organization would make you most likely to donate?

Results indicated that 35 students (70%) thought $20 was just right ($n = 33$) or too little ($n = 2$) to donate to a charitable organization. The maximum students were willing to donate ranged from $5 to $125 ($M = 25.2$, $SD = 20.5$). Of the many types of causes, most students indicated they would be most likely to donate to local, state or national (as opposed to student) organizations that were a "good cause" or "help people" in some way. Based on these results, I expected that a donation request of $20 – either all-at-once or spread over the course of 4 months – to a local children's shelter would provide sufficient variance to detect effects.

After the small talk construal manipulation, the experimenter made the following request (distributed in parentheses):

"Anyway, I'm a volunteer with the Austin Children's Shelter and we are trying to raise money for various services aimed at children and families in Austin who have suffered abuse and neglect. Would you make a donation of $20 ($5 per month for the next 4 months) to Austin Children's Shelter?"

After participants indicated whether they would donate, the experimenter gathered participant demographics (sex, age, year in school). If the participant agreed to donate, the experimenter entered payment information and donation allocation into the Austin Children's Shelter website using a smartphone, laptop or tablet. Finally, the experimenter revealed the true purpose of the donation request and obtained permission to use the data.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Fifty-five of the 196 participants (28%) donated to Austin Children's Shelter ($1100 total pledged). I measured likelihood to donate using binomial logistic regression (yes coded 1, no coded 0) with construal level (more abstract coded -1, more concrete coded 1,) and type of request (all-at-once coded -1, distributed coded 1) entered as predictors. Results revealed a marginal main effect of construal level, $\beta = .83$, $SE = .48$, $p = .08$, and a marginal main effect of request, $\beta = .83$, $SE = .48$, $p = .08$, which were qualified by a construal level x request interaction, $\beta = -1.35$, $SE = .67$, $p = .04$ (see Figure 3 on the next page). In line with my hypotheses, people who were led to adopt a more concrete construal were more likely to donate in a distributed (vs. all-at-once) fashion (34% vs. 18.4%, $\beta = .81$, $SE = .48$, $p = .08$, $OR = 2.29$). Conversely, people who were led to adopt a more abstract construal were more likely to donate in an all-at-once (vs. distributed) fashion, but this pattern was not significant (34% vs. 23.4%, $\beta = -.52$, $SE = .46$, $p = .25$, $OR = .59$). Follow up comparisons within request revealed that people were more likely to donate all-at-once when led to adopt a more abstract (vs. more concrete) construal ($\beta = .83$, $SE = .48$, $p = .08$, $OR = 2.5$. However, there were no differences in receptivity to a distributed request across construal conditions, $\beta = -.52$, $SE = .46$, $p = .25$, $OR = .59$. Finally, a 2 (construal level) x 2 (request) ANOVA on intentions to donate in the future revealed no differences across conditions (all Fs < 1.18).

Figure 3. Percentage of behavioral compliance as a function of request type and manipulated construal levels (Study 6). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the proportions.

There are several possible reasons why I did not observe a significant difference within construal level and request conditions. As in Study 3, it is possible that the low base rate of people who behaviorally complied with the donation request limited my ability to detect significant differences between conditions. Alternatively, it is possible that the construal level manipulation was too subtle to reliably shift construal, thereby increasing the variability within conditions. Even though I adjusted my sample size upward from the previous studies to account for the more subtle construal level manipulation and the additional noise induced by a field setting, it is possible that my sample was still underpowered to detect significant differences. Despite the nonsignificant findings within the follow-up comparisons, the significant interaction and overall pattern of results is consistent with the findings of Chapter 1, lending support to the robustness of the effect of construal level on philanthropic time and money allocations.

Follow-up with Austin Children's Shelter

Several months after the completion of the study, I followed up with Austin Children's Shelter to inquire about whether any donors had cancelled payment. Although my experimenters did not collect identifying information, I reasoned that the amount – particularly in the distributed condition – was unique enough that most if not all of the donors during the time window of the study would be from my participants. Results from my inquiry revealed that the number of donors Austin Children's Shelter had on record was much lower than the number who donated in the study.

There are several possible reasons for the discrepancy. First, I allowed the participants to their own payment information if they preferred to maintain privacy. In some cases, the experimenter did not ultimately verify that the participant donated the amount requested. Therefore, it is possible that the participant accidently entered the wrong payment amount or faked making a payment altogether. However, my 8 experimenters verified payment information for enough participants that the numbers on Austin Children's Shelter should have still be higher than that what they reported. That is, in the distributed condition, the experiment was able to verify at least 3 more payments of $5 per month for 4 months than Austin Children's Shelter reported. The second possible reason for the discrepancy, then, is that there is an error on the side of Austin Children's Shelter. It is possible that the person scanning the database is not doing so in a manner that would account for my participants. Alternatively, the organization could have a bug in their system causing the database to not properly record donors.

Given the information verified by my experimenters, I am hesitant to conclude that participants knowingly deceived the experimenter and fake payment. No matter what the error might be – due to the experimenter, participant, or Austin Children's Shelter – I am confident that these results reflect the true effect of construal level on real donation behavior. However, to avoid this discrepancy in the future, researchers could collaborate with the organization to gain access to credit card readers that maintain participant privacy and guarantee that the participants make the payment requested by the experimenter.

Study 7: Baseline Preferences for Monetary Allocations

Studies 3, 4, and 6 demonstrated the role construal level plays in philanthropic allocation preferences. However, it is unclear to what extent the observed effects reflected a deviation from people's baseline preferences for allocating time and money. Establishing a baseline preference would not only allow for fuller interpretation of the previous studies, but also would be practically useful for organizations. If baseline allocation preferences are already aligned with the needs of an organization, shifting construal level as a means for increasing attraction to that allocation may only have minimal impact on donation behavior. Further, establishing baseline preferences across many activities that involve all-at-once or distributed allocations would shed preliminary light on whether allocation preferences generalize beyond philanthropic contexts. In this study, I presented participants with a variety of activities that could be carried out in an all-at-once or distributed fashion. I expected that allocation preferences would vary across activities, but did not have specific predictions about the direction of those preferences.

METHOD

I recruited 76 participants (58 females) from an upper division psychology course at the University of Texas at Austin.

Measures

I presented participants with 10 activities, 5 that involved allocating time and 5 that involved allocating money (see Appendix B), along with two ways the activity could be completed – either all-at-once or in distributed fashion (order counterbalanced across activities). For each activity, I asked participants to select the description that best matched how they personally would prefer to do the activity. To ensure that monetary allocation preferences were minimally influenced by preferences for allocating across other activities, I presented the monetary donation activity first. Specifically, participants read:

"Donating to a charity that provides financial assistance to families of children with blood cancer.
   a. ___$20 all at once
   b. ___$5 per month for 4 months"

After completing the allocation preferences, participants next completed the BIF (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). The BIF served to explore a potential association between individual differences in construal and allocation preferences.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Sixty-three of the 76 participants (83%) indicated that they would prefer to donate $20 all-at-once (vs. $5 per month for 4 months). Germane to Chapter 1, participants also preferred to volunteer [collecting canned food] for 4 hours on 1 day (vs. 1 hour a day for 4 days, $n = 58$). Across the remaining 8 activities, participants preferred all-at-once allocations on 2 of the activities (buying a new laptop, receiving a paycheck), distributed allocations on 5 of the activities (doing chores, spending time with a close friend, purchasing a Netflix subscription as a gift, watching television, going on vacation), and had no clear preference on 1 activity (studying for an exam). For each activity, allocation preferences were not significantly correlated with BIF (all rs < .16, and ps > .18).

These results suggest that allocation preferences are context-specific and that in the context of choosing between an all-at-once and distributed charitable donation, people prefer an all-at-once contribution. Similarly, when presented with the choice between an all-at-once and distributed volunteer experience, people prefer the all-at-once volunteer experience. Although there were no main effects of request in Studies 3, 4, and 6 to suggest that people preferred all-at-once contributions, the results of the current study present the possiblility that the observed construal by request interactions were a result of a more concrete construal shifting people's receptivity to distributed experiences. However, one caveat to consider is that experiences in the present study were hypothetical. Recall that greater psychological distance (physical, temporal, social, and hypothetical) fosters more abstract thinking (Trope & Liberman, 2010). It is possible that the hypothetical nature of the requests fostered more abstract thinking, therefore shifting

people to choose the more moral donation and volunteer options (i.e., all-at-once). Future research should further explore whether baseline preferences shift as a function of the psychological distance of particular requests.

As noted earlier, many organizations do not offer a distributed donation option. Assuming baseline preferences do not shift as a function of psychological distance, the present results might suggest that organizations are acting in line with people's preferences. However, one limitation of this study is that the donation amounts (the total amount for both options, and the duration and installment amount of the distributed option) were constrained. Based on the earlier sample of 75 nonprofits, almost all of the organizations that do offer distributed contributions do not constrain the amount and length (time) of the distribution. Returning to the mental accounting literature, it is possible that the distributed chunks in the present study were too small for people to perceive them as personally and prosocially meaningful. In fact, organizations might benefit from offering a distributed option, as it may increase how much people donate in total, their sense of commitment to the organization, and their likelihood of donating again in the future. I designed Study 8 to test these hypotheses.

Study 8: The Utility of Offering a Distributed Donation Option

Although many factors influence whether (and how much) people donate to charitable organizations, two important considerations are current financial resources and the ease of giving. Financial resources may particularly come into play when people consider an all-at-once donation, as people may only have a certain amount of money available to donate. As a result, people may donate less money than they would prefer or may not donate at all. People with fewer immediate financial resources could choose a sustained (indefinite) donation to spread their giving across many months; however, they may be hesitant to choose a contribution that requires effort to track and then cancel the automatic monthly payment. A distributed contribution may ameliorate the financial strain associated with all-at-once-giving while also eliminating the effort associated with sustained giving.

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Study 8a explored how people respond to a distributed contribution option under circumstances of forced choice (a single donation request). Although the majority of this dissertation explored situations in which an organization makes a particular request; organizations more commonly offer choice between contribution options. Accordingly, Study 8b examined contribution preferences when donors are presented choice between contribution types. Contrary to the results of Study y, I predicted in both Study 8a and 8b that given the amount and duration was unconstrained, people would be more likely to donate in a distributed (vs. all-at-once or sustained fashion) and that people would donate significantly more when making a distributed (vs. all-at-once) contribution.

METHOD

I recruited 149 participants (55 females; M_{age} = 30.97, SD = 11.73) for Study 8a and 51 participants (20 females; M_{age} = 31.76, SD = 10.95) for Study 8b from Amazon's Turk system (25 per condition for both studies). Participants were randomly assigned to Study 8a or 8b to prevent cross-participation.

Donation Request (Study 8a)

I randomly assigned participants to receive an all-at-once, distributed, or sustained donation request. I modeled the request after the Hearts of Texas Annual Charitable campaign that allows University of Texas employees to make donations to organizations of their choice through automatic payroll deductions:

> "Imagine that your state holds an annual charitable contribution campaign that allows you to make contributions through your work payroll to a local or state organization of your choice. You receive an email from your company asking whether you will participate. Please indicate how you would respond to your company."

The organization remained unnamed to reduce noise associated with prior familiarity with any particular organization. Participants in all-at-once condition saw the following options:

- o   Yes, please make a one-time donation of $__ from my payroll.
- o   No thank you. I would prefer not to donate.

Participants in the distributed condition saw the following options:

- o   Yes, please donate $__ from my payroll each month for ___ months.

- o   No thank you. I would prefer not to donate."

Participants in the sustained condition saw the following options:

- o   Yes, please donate $__ deduction my payroll each month. I know I can cancel my payment at any time.

- o   No thank you. I would prefer not to donate."

If participants chose to donate, a question appeared asking them how much they would be willing to donate (each month in the distributed and sustained conditions). I then asked participants in the distributed and sustained conditions to indicate for how many months they would (or anticipate they would) donate. I calculated a total donation by multiplying the monthly donation amount by the number of months.

Choice of Donation Options (Study 8b)

The methods of Study 8b mimicked those of Study 8a except that instead of presenting contribution requests between participants, I allowed participants to select their contribution allocation from the list of contribution allocations.

Commitment Measure

Participants in both studies completed four follow-up items (1=not at all to 7 = very) to assess whether donation choices influenced future donation intentions and perceptions of the organization: "How likely are you to donate to this organization in the future"; "How likely are you to volunteer with this organization in the future?";"How much do you like this organization?"; "To what extent do you feel a sense of connection to this organization." These items were combined to create a commitment composite score ($\alpha = .88$).

Other Measures

To assess the influence of individual differences on donation preferences, participants in both studies also completed the BIF (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) and the ten-item personality inventory (Gosling et al., 2003).

RESULTS

Study 8a

Overall, 54 participants (36.2%) elected to donate. I analyzed whether giving differed across conditions using a chi-square test for independence. Contrary to my hypotheses, giving did not differ across request conditions (all-at-once = 39.1%, distributed = 35.2%, sustained = 34.7%; χ^2 (1) = .24, p = .89). Furthermore, total amount donated did not significantly differ across request conditions, ($M_{all-at-once}$ = $21.20, SD = $74.70 vs. $M_{distributed}$ = $33.57, SD = $68.17 vs. $M_{sustained}$ = $40.29, SD = $76.60; F(1, 146) = .83, p = .44.). Follow-up analyses with BIF revealed no main effects or interactions (all ps > .15). Analyses of personality variables revealed that agreeableness positively predicted whether participants would donate, β = .29, SE = .14, p = .04, OR = 1.34, but did not significantly predict how much participants would donate, F(1,146) = .93, p = .34. No other main effects or interactions emerged with the remaining personality variables (all ps > .20).

Study 8b

Overall, 25 participants (49%) elected to donate. I compared the donation rates in Studies 8a and 8b using a chi-square test for independence. Results indicated that providing potential donors a choice (vs. making a specific request) marginally increased donation rates, χ^2 (1) = 2.56, p = .10. Of those who decided to donate, participants selected to donate all-at-once (n = 17 or 68%) significantly more often than in a distributed (n = 4 or 16%) or sustained (n = 4 or 16%) fashion, χ^2 (2)= 13.52, p = .001. It should be noted that the sample size of the distributed and sustained contribution choices are insufficient to draw reliable conclusions about differences in donation amount, therefore subsequent analyses about donation amount should be interpreted

with caution. Participants gave significantly different amounts across conditions, $F(2, 21) = 3.41$, $p = .05$. Contrary to my hypotheses, a Tukey HSD test revealed that participants who chose to donate in a distributed fashion did not donate significantly more than those who donated all-at-once ($M_{distributed} = \$141.00$, $SD = \$74.86$ vs. $M_{all\text{-}at\text{-}once} = \$53.94$, $SD = \$84.74$, $p = .67$), but participants who made a sustained contribution did donate significantly more than those who donated all-at-once ($M_{sustained} = \$325.00$, $SD = \$450.88$, $p = .04$). Regarding BIF scores, binary and multinomial logistic regressions indicated that BIF neither predicted whether people would donate or their specific donation preferences (all $ps > .22$). Unlike Study 8a, no personality variables predicted whether people would donate (all $ps > .15$). Further no personality variables were associated with the amount participants donated (all $ps > .27$).

DISCUSSION

Taken together, results from Studies 8a and 8b did not confirm my hypotheses about distributed contributions. Specifically, people were not more likely to donate when the donation request was framed as distributed (vs. all-at-once or sustained). Furthermore, those who did donate in a distributed fashion did not contribute significantly more money than those who donated in an all-at-once fashion (Study 8a). When presented a choice between contribution allocations, only a few people chose to donate in a distributed fashion; therefore, the sample size was too limited to be able draw conclusions about donation amount (8b). Despite the low numbers, it is interesting to note that some people did opt for a distributed contribution. Further, the fact that some people opted for a sustained contribution suggests that, at the very least, distributed and sustained options could co-exist on an organization's donation solicitation.

In Study 8a, the type of donation did not influence future sense of commitment to the organization; in Study 8b, too few participants elected distributed and sustained choices, limiting the ability to draw reliable conclusions from their data. Although agreeableness predicted whether people donated when given a specific donation request, the finding did not replicate when people were given a choice between contribution options. Across studies, no other

personality variables predicted donation behavior. Note that by orthogonally manipulating contribution request and then measuring individual differences in construal in Study 8a, I could investigate the practical utility of individual differences in construal level in targeting people with specific donation requests. Although individual differences in construal level did predict volunteer behavior in Study 4, they did not predict donation behavior in Study 8a.

There are several potential explanations for the null results across Studies 8a and 8b. First, it is possible that in a hypothetical scenario about an unnamed organization, people were less able to forecast how morally right or effortful their donations would feel. As a result, people may have not accurately predicted whether and how much they would give. Another possible explanation is that the sample population of MTurk workers is less likely than the general population to make donations. Although previous research has demonstrated that MTurk works are equally prosocial as the general population (Henderson & Burgoon, 2013), it is possible that people who are on MTurk to make extra money do not have the financial resources to make monetary donations. Finally, it is possible that psychologically, there is little difference between making a distributed or sustained contribution, as they both require an extended time period of giving. Indeed, people may see repeated contributions, even in small amounts, as signaling commitment to the organization. Further, people may find it burdensome to ensure they have available financial resources each month to make the donation payment.

Despite null findings within each study individually, results from comparing donation rates across the two studies hinted that people are more willing to donate when given a choice between contributions rather than being asked for particular type contribution. Indeed, a wide body of research supports the notion that people are happier when they have a choice between options (e.g., Gilbert et al., 2004; Kim & Drolet, 2003). I discuss potential future directions with the role of choice in donations in more detail in the General Discussion in Chapter 3.

Summary of Studies 5-8

Chapter 1 established a relationship between construal level and attraction to all-at-once versus distributed volunteerism. Chapter 2 explored whether the Chapter 1 findings extended to monetary donations. Consistent with the findings from Chapter 1, Studies 5a and 5b confirmed that people expect all-at-once donations to be more moral and distributed donations to be less burdensome. Study 6 lent behavioral support to the causal role of construal on monetary donation allocations; that is, people who were led to adopt a more abstract construal were more willing to donate all-at-once (vs. in a distributed fashion), whereas people who were led to adopt a more concrete construal were more likely to donate in a distributed fashion (vs. all-at-once). Furthermore, Study 6 demonstrated the practical utility of manipulating construal level in a real-world setting. Study 7 established that there is a baseline in giving preferences; specifically, when people are given a choice between all-at-once and distributed philanthropy, people strongly prefer to give all-at-once. Within the context of Studies 3, 4 and 6, these results suggest that a more concrete construal can increase receptivity to distributed requests. However, it is unclear whether a more abstract construal can further increase receptivity to all-at-once requests in relation to baseline preferences. Finally, having noted the how few organizations offer a distributed contribution option, Studies 8a and 8b explored whether soliciting a distributed contribution – either on its own or as a choice among all-at-once and sustained contribution options – would increase the likelihood and amount people would give. Although results of Studies 8a and 8b did not individually support my hypotheses, taken together, they suggest that offering a choice among contribution options increases likelihood of donation relative to making specific allocation requests.

CHAPTER 3: GENERAL DISCUSSION

In the current chapter, I discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings in Chapters 1 and 2, as well as future directions for research on prosocial behavior.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Prosocial Motivation

People hold both other-oriented and self-motivated reasons for engaging in philanthropy (Clary & Snyder, 1999; Clary, Snyder et al., 1998; Omoto & Snyder, 1995). In the present research, the idealistic concerns of moral rightness and pragmatic concerns about ease of donating and volunteering nicely map onto other- and self-oriented motivations. Indeed, what is morally right is likely to benefit others, whereas what is easier is likely to benefit the self. My findings imply that a more abstract construal shifts people's focus on other-oriented motives. This idea also converges nicely with construal level theory, as more abstract construals are recruited for transcending beyond the self (i.e., greater social distance; Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008; also see Fiedler, Semin, Finkenauer, & Berkel, 1995).

My findings also provide insights for the growing literature on what motivates people to engage in moral acts. Previous research has mostly explored personal and social influences on moral acts (see Doris, 2010). For instance, people are more likely to behave prosocially when people experience moral elevation, a specific emotion elicited by watching another person engage in a moral act (Cox, 2010; Thomson & Siegel, 2013; see also Haidt, 2000, 2003), when people believe the recipient of a moral act is of good character (Thomson & Siegel, 2013), and when people are motivated to be consistent with their moral self-view (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002, Reed & Aquino, 2003; Conway & Peetz, 2012). My findings suggest another antecedent to moral acts – that some moral acts *feel* more moral than others simply based on how they are carried out. Indeed, people judged the same donation or volunteer experience (e.g., writing to sick children) as more morally right when asked to do it in an all-at-once rather than distributed

fashion. The degree to which a donation or volunteer experience is judged as moral has consequences for whether people are motivated to do it. I look forward to future research that explores other ways in which the same prosocial experience can be judged as more or less moral.

Integrated Versus Segregated Experiences

Previous research suggests that sometimes people prefer to segregate positive experiences (Linville & Fischer, 1991; Morewedge et al., 2007), whereas other times they prefer to integrate positive experiences (Nelson & Meyvis, 2008; Nelson et al., 2009). Insofar as donations and volunteering are a positive experience, my data offer one way to reconcile the discrepancy in the literature by showing the moderating role construal level plays in people's willingness to integrate versus segregate donation and volunteer experiences. That is, I show that when a more abstract construal is adopted, people are more inclined to integrate their donation or volunteer experience. However, when a more concrete construal is adopted, people are more inclined to segregate their donation or volunteer experience. Therefore, the present research adds a valuable contribution to the judgment and decision-making literature.

Giving Time Versus Money

Previous research suggests that people should think about their money differently than their time (see Liu and Aaker, 2011, for a review). One of the central findings in this literature is the idea that people project greater abundance of their time (versus their) money in the future (Zauberman & Lynch, 2005). Distributed requests, by nature, have a future temporal element. Indeed, people can distribute their time and money across days, weeks, or even months (e.g., Study 5). If people perceived more abundance in their time than their money, overall compliance rates to distributed volunteer requests should have been much higher than compliance to the distributed monetary requests. However, compliance rates were fairly similar across studies (Study 3 = 35%, Study 4 = 20%, Study 5 = 28%). Therefore, it appears that there are some situations in which people forecast equal amounts of slack in their time and money.

Under what circumstances might people perceive equal slack? It is possible that college student participants were realistic about both their lack of time and money. Because the distributed experiences took place in the near (versus distant) future, students may have perceived that their available time and money would not change much over the course of the donation or volunteer period. In support of this notion, overall compliance rates across studies suggest that participants did not have the time or money to spare, either in the present (all-at-once) or the future (distributed). Another possibility is that construal level, specifically a more concrete construal focused people more on the here and now, thereby reducing any future forecasting of available time and money. Indeed, participants may have processed the distributed contributions in a more piecemeal fashion when adopting a more concrete construal, and therefore only considered their available time and money resources for the first of the distributed installments.

Another central difference between giving time and money is the social aspect. Whereas people can donate money alone in the comfort of their own home, volunteer experiences generally imply some sort of social aspect, either in interacting with other volunteers or with beneficiaries. The social aspect of philanthropic experiences may influence the perceived moral rightness and ease of the experience in ways that were not observed in the present set of studies. In fact, the volunteer experiences in Chapter 1 were not inherently social in nature: in both cases, students completed a computer-based task in a single occupancy room. It is possible that my observed effects of construal level in receptivity to all-at-once and distributed requests hinge upon people considering the moral rightness and ease of a non-social volunteer or donation experience. For instance, if many people will be volunteering alongside a person, he or she may no longer consider his or her own contribution to be highly morally right, and therefore may be less willing to engage in the activity when adopting a more abstract construal. Conversely, many people volunteering alongisde should also reduce the perceived effort of volunteering, thereby increasing the attractiveness of both all-at-once and distributed volunteering for people who

adopt a more concrete construal. Future research should determine whether the inherent socialness of the philanthropic act serves as a boundary condition for the observed effects.

As the body of literature on how people think about time and money grows, researchers should not limit their focus to differences in accounting for time and money, but also explore circumstances in which people think about them similarly. Indeed, across both the philanthropic and consumer domains, knowledge of the circumstances in which time and money are interchangeable would be practically useful for people in the business of making requests.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Predictive Utility of Construal Level

Many organizations are in the business of helping people. One of the challenges for such organizations is getting individuals to initially get involved in donating and volunteering. My findings suggest that both the type of request (all-at-once vs. distributed) and the construal level of potential donors and volunteers influence when people get involved. Non-profits likely have experience in varying the type of request, and could therefore benefit from learning how to take advantage of people's chronic level of construal to pinpoint when to the make the appropriate type of request. Given the vast amount of available Internet data about people's personality and preferences (e.g., de Montjoye, Quoidbach, Robic & Pentland, 2013), organizations could take advantage of some of the micro-targeting strategies (i.e., predictive analytics) used by marketers to identify potential donors and volunteers. For example, the language that people use on social media (e.g., blogs, Facebook, twitter) could provide a window into their chronic level of construal, thereby predicting their likely receptivity to all-at-once or distributed requests. According to the linguistic category model (Semin & Fielder, 1988), verbs convey concrete, situational actions whereas adjectives and nouns (see Carnaghi et al., 2008) convey abstract, cross-situational characteristics. Therefore, a person who uses more adjectives and nouns than

verbs may be more receptive to an all-at-once request, whereas a person who uses more verbs than nouns and adjectives may be more receptive to a distributed request.

Beyond taking advantage of individual differences in construal level, organizations could also benefit from capitalizing on the natural psychological distance of particular experiences. Based on the notion that psychological distance triggers a more abstract construal whereas psychological proximity triggers a more concrete construal, organizations may ask people to donate or volunteer in the near or distant future, in near or distant locations, or for socially similar or dissimilar beneficiaries. Therefore, the nature of the volunteer experience or donation may elicit a particular construal level, and therefore shift people's preferences for volunteering or donating in an all-at-once versus distributed way. By pinpointing the likely level of construal of potential volunteers and donors, organizations may be able to increase their success rate in recruiting volunteers while also decreasing the number of people they need to contact with requests.

Manipulating Construal Level in the Real World

Beyond taking advantage of individual differences in construal level, organizations could also benefit from knowing how to shift the mental state of potential volunteers and donors to fit particular requests (e.g., shift people into a more abstract construal when asking them to volunteer or donate all-at-once). As Study 6 demonstrated, simply engaging potential donors in a casual conversation about how the requestor was having a similar or dissimilar day from the previous days influenced whether people donated in an all-at-once or distributed fashion. Beyond focusing on similarities and differences, several methods of shifting construal level can be adapted to applied settings (for a full list of construal methods, see Burgoon, et al., 2013). For instance, people tend to think in more abstract terms about behaviors that feel more distant in time and space and in more concrete terms about behaviors that feel closer in time and space (see Trope & Liberman, 2010, for a review). Therefore, an organization could highlight how close or distant a particular volunteer experience is (e.g., "The weekend is coming really soon. It's just

around the corner. Would you be able to volunteer 2 hours on Saturday organizing donations at the local food bank?" versus "The weekend is still several days away. That's a long time away if you think about it. Would you be willing to volunteer one hour each day on Saturday and Sunday organizing donations at the local food bank?").

Construal level can also be shifted with the language of a persuasive appeal. Focusing on why (versus how) something occurs facilitates thinking at a more abstract level (Freitas et al., 2004; Strack, et al., 1985). An organization could frame a pitch about why (or how) their organization benefits others (e.g., "the food bank ensures every child has food because improper nutrition can cause irreversible cognitive and physical impairment" versus "the food bank ensures every child has food by delivering 8000 pounds of vegetables per year to local schools"; see Henderson & Burgoon, 2013, Study 3, for an example of how this manipulation can be implemented in a field setting). Drawing on the linguistic category model framework, an organization could describe itself using a greater proportion of verbs (e.g., "The blood bank *helps* the community" or adjectives ("The blood bank is *helpful* to the community") to affect people's receptivity to distributed and all-at-once requests, respectively. In sum, there are a variety of ways that organizations can promote different donation and volunteer allocations through shifting people's level of construal. Next, I offer directions for future research.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Combining Experimental Methods With Machine Learning

As mentioned above, the consumer industry currently uses large volumes of available data about people's personality, preferences, and behaviors (e.g., de Montjoye, Quoidbach, Robic & Pentland, 2013) to micro-target potential customers. Non-profit organizations could also leverage some of the analytics tools used by marketers to identify potential donors and volunteers. One possible strategy might be for organizations to use A/B testing (the industry jargon for experimentation) to manipulate what information people receive on webpages and

then track characteristics of people who are most receptive to those manipulations. To that end, organizations could manipulate construal level or psychological distance and then analyze individual level data to understand and predict what people are most receptive to particular manipulations. In contrast, another strategy organizations could adopt is using individual data on personality and preferences of potential donors to predict what information to present to a person before he or she even lands on the organization's webpage. As described in the section on predictive utility of construal level, an organization could use this strategy to pinpoint a potential donor or volunteer's likely level of construal and then match the donation request accordingly.

Common to both of these strategies is the use of machine learning tools to find meaningful differences among people. In brief, machine learning is a technique that allows a computer to algorithmically extract an underlying structure from a set of data in order to understand, explain, and predict behavior (Witten & Frank, 2005). For instance, a dataset of visitors to an international relief organization website may find that the most likely people to donate in a sustained fashion are from urban areas in the South, highly-educated, conservative, and non-religious, whereas the people most likely to give all-at-once are people from rural Midwestern cities, who are highly uneducated, conservative, and spend a lot of time on Facebook. Importantly, machine learning tools are not limited to highly classifiable data such as demographics, Internet search behavior, and previous purchase (or donation) behavior. Indeed, many tools can also extract meaningful patterns from "messier" information such as text. In turn, that text can infer psychological states and traits about the writer (see, for example, Pennebaker & Chung, 2013; Pennebaker & King, 1999).

A thorough review of the different machine learning methods is beyond the scope of this dissertation; instead, I merely aim to highlight a new direction for future psychological research and practice on philanthropic engagement. Indeed, these tools can offer researchers and charitable organizations a rich picture of the people who donate and volunteer, as well as discover the persuasive appeals that are most successful in reaching those donors and volunteers.

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Resource Management

Using a resource management approach, I assumed that breaks between donation and volunteer experiences offer people a chance to replenish their physical and psychological resources, which presumably allows people to exert more effort when an experience resumes. However, one can imagine situations in which breaks between donating or volunteering drain resources. For instance, tutoring youth may require volunteer time immediately after a full workday. As a result, such experiences may be judged as highly effortful. In the case in which breaks are expected to be draining, rather than replenishing, an all-at-once experience may appear relatively easier than a distributed experience. Accordingly, it is possible that the effects demonstrated in the current set of studies would not emerge under such circumstances. Indeed, one possibility is that people might universally prefer an all-at-once experience, because they would expect it to satisfy both idealistic and pragmatic concerns.

Construal Level And The Psychology Of Choice

I next highlight two potential future directions for the roles of construal level and choice in charitable donations.

Choice Between All-At-Once and Distributed Contributions

Although Studies 7 and 8b explored monetary donations in context of choice between contribution options, in all other studies, the type of request was manipulated between participants in order to mirror settings in which organizations solicit potential volunteers with a particular need in mind. This design feature also had the benefit of avoiding possible demand effects. That is, a between-participants design minimized the likelihood that participants would not guess the hypotheses. However, as noted in my investigation of 75 national and local organizations, the vast majority of organizations give donors a choice between an all-at-once and sustained monetary contribution. I did not do a similar investigation for volunteer opportunities within organizations, but it is certainly possible that organizations have occasions to offer a

choice between all-at-once and distributed time allocations. In such situations of choice, it is possible that the effect of construal level on time and money allocation decisions will be even larger because the distinction between allocations will be even more salient. That is, when people are given an option on how to allocate their donations, people who adopt a more abstract construal will be more likely to opt for an all-at-once contribution, whereas people who adopt a more concrete construal will be more likely to opt for a distributed contribution. However, it is also possible that like in Studies 7 and 8b, people will overwhelmingly favor the all-at-once contribution no matter their level of construal. I look forward to future research that tests choice between allocations as a boundary condition of the effect of construal level on allocation preferences.

Choice Among Few Versus Many Organizations

The present research focused on situations where one organization solicits a contribution, but these single solicitations do not exist in a vacuum. That is, people constantly receive donation requests from a wide range of organizations across multiple domains of helping (e.g., cancer research, tutoring children in poor neighborhoods, animal rescue). One factor that might influence whether people are receptive to a single solicitation is the amount of money they have already donated to other good causes. For instance, a person may want to give to Feeding America, but have recently donated to his or her local food bank. Furthermore, there are many situations where multiple organizations are soliciting donations for the same cause. For example, people had the option to donate to Hurricane Sandy relief through several organizations such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army, Feeding America, and World Vision. Although people may choose to contribute to only one or two organizations, it is also plausible that people distribute their donations across many organizations.

In order to maximize their revenue, it would be beneficial for organizations to understand what influences people to allocate the entirety of their donations to just a few organizations versus distributing across many organizations. Previous research suggests that people apply a

diversification heuristic (Fox, Ratner & Lieb, 2005; Read & Loewenstein, 1995) when making charitable contributions. That is, people may prefer to diversify across many charitable organizations as opposed to giving all of their contribution to a few select organizations. People diversify as a means of risk reduction (e.g., "if one organization fails, at least I have given to others"; Baron & Szymanska, 2011) or to increase the "warm glow" (i.e., positive feeling) associated with each individual act of giving (Andreoni, 1990). However, if people want to optimize their contribution – that is, ensure that the most good is done per dollar contributed – they should donate only to the most effective and financially efficient organization among the list of possible recipients (Baron & Szymanska, 2011). Accordingly, maximizers – people who go to great lengths to ensure that they choose the best possible option among the set of alternatives – should be more likely to contribute to one or a few (versus many) organizations (Schwartz et al., 2002). In contrast, it satisficers – people who only search through the alternatives until they are sufficiently satisfied with their decision – may be more likely to apply the diversification heuristic and prefer to spread their contributions across many (vs. few) organizations.

Germane to the present dissertation, construal level may also play a role in diversification preferences. A more abstract construal fosters attention to characteristics that are similar across things (e.g., objects, events, and people), whereas a more concrete construal fosters attention to characteristics that are unique or idiosyncratic across things (Burgoon et al., 2003; Förster, 2009; Kay, 1971; Rosch et al., 1976). In the case of charitable organizations, a more abstract construal may attune people to characteristics shared by organizations (e.g., providing disaster relief, related to health care), rendering each organization equally as worthy of a donation as the next. As a result, people who adopt a more abstract construal may find it difficult to limit their donation to just one or a few organizations, and therefore spread their donation across many organizations. In contrast, a more concrete construal may attune people to differences across organizations (e.g., the Red Cross provides shelter to disaster victims whereas Feeding America provides food), facilitating selection of one or two organizations that seem the most worthy of a donation.

CONCLUSION

Returning to the opening quote from Harry Potter, when Dumbeldore warned the students of Hogwarts that soon they would have to choose between what is right and what is easy, he was referencing the fight for the greater good against a resurrected evil, Lord Voldemort. Though donations and volunteering do not necessarily involve a fight against evil, people do hold a variety of motivations for working towards the greater good. In the present dissertation, I demonstrated that allocating time and money in an all at-once versus distributed manner satisfies different motivations (what is right versus what is easy, respectively). I then demonstrated that construal level shifts whether people are attracted to donations and volunteer activities that feel right versus easy. Across both chapters, my findings imply that charitable organizations could benefit from pinpointing or manipulating level of construal to increase the likelihood that people will donate or volunteer. To that end, I offered several suggestions for how organizations might leverage construal level when making donation and volunteer requests. Next, I proposed a way for researchers and practioners to form a rich picture of the people who are most likely to get involved and help. Specifically, a combination of traditional experimental methods with machine learning analytics will allow researchers to build more complex theories regarding philanthropic engagement, and charitable organizations to increase their precision when targeting potential donors and volunteers.

Appendices

The appendices include materials from the studies presented in this dissertation. Many materials were used in multiple studies (e.g., the Behavior Identification Form was used in Studies 1, 4, 7 and 8); those materials are only presented once and are labeled by the first study in which they were used (e.g., the Behavior Identification Form is listed as belonging to Study 1). Materials include questionnaires, scripts for experimenters, and screen shots of key dependent variables collected in online studies. Appendix A includes materials from Chapter 1 and Appendix B includes materials from Chapter 2.

Behavior Identification Form (Study 1)

Any behavior can be identified in many ways. For example, one person might describe a behavior as "typing a paper," while another might describe the behavior as "pushing keys." Yet another person might describe the behavior as "expressing thoughts." We are interested in your personal preferences for how a number of different behaviors should be described. On the following pages you will find several different behaviors listed. After each behavior will be two choices of different ways in which the behavior might be identified.

Your task is to choose the identification, *a* or *b,* that best describes the behavior for you. *Simply place a check mark in the space beside the identification statement that you pick. Please mark only one alternative for each pair.* Of course, there are no right or wrong answers. People simply differ in their preferences for the different behavior descriptions, and we are interested in your personal preferences. Be sure to mark your choice for each behavior. Remember, choose the description that *you personally believe* is more appropriate in each pair.

1. Making a list
__ Getting organized
__ Writing things down

2. Reading
__ Following lines of print
__ Gaining knowledge

3. Joining the Army
__ Helping the Nation's defense
__ Signing up

4.Washing clothes
__ Removing odors from clothes
__ Putting clothes into the machine

5. Picking an apple
__ Getting something to eat
__ Pulling an apple off a branch

6. Chopping down a tree
__ Wielding an axe
__ Getting firewood

7. Measuring a room for carpeting
__ Getting ready to remodel
__ Using a yardstick

8. Cleaning the house
__ Showing one's cleanliness
__ Vacuuming the floor

9. Painting a room
__ Applying brush strokes
__ Making the room look fresh

10. Paying the rent
__ Maintaining a place to live
__ Writing a check

11. Caring for houseplants
__ Watering plants
__ Making the room look nice

12. Locking a door
__ Putting a key in the lock
__ Securing the house

13. Traveling by car
__ Following a map
__ Seeing countryside

14. Voting
__ Influencing the election
__ Marking a ballot

15. Climbing a tree
__ Getting a good view
__ Holding on to branches

16. Filling out a personality test
__ Answering questions
__ Revealing what you're like

17. Toothbrushing
__ Preventing tooth decay
__ Moving a brush around in one's mouth

18. Taking a test
__ Answering questions
__ Showing one's knowledge

19. Greeting someone
__ Saying hello
__ Showing friendliness

20. Resisting temptation
__ Saying "no"
__ Showing moral courage

21. Eating
__ Getting nutrition
__ Chewing and swallowing

22. Growing a garden
__ Planting seeds
__ Getting fresh vegetables

23. Having a cavity
__ Protecting your teeth
__ Going to the dentist

24. Talking to a child
__ Teaching a child something
__ Using simple words

25. Pushing a doorbell
__ Moving a finger
__ Seeing if someone's home

Volunteer Experience Items (Studies 2A and 2B)

Distributed Requests in Parentheses

1. If you got a call from someone from a blood donation center and that person asked you to help pass out flyers for 4 hours one day (1 hour a day for four days), how would it feel/how effortful would it be?

2. If you saw an advertisement that was soliciting volunteers to help at a homeless shelter for 2 hours one day (20 minutes a day for 6 days), how would it feel/how effortful would it be?

3. If you had the opportunity to volunteer at a hospital for 5 hours one day (1 hour a day for 5 days), how would it feel/how effortful would it be?

4. If you heard a radio station solicit volunteers to work for 7 hours one day (1 hour a day for 7 days) repairing bicycles that will be donated to charity, how likely would you be to do it?

5. If someone told you about an opportunity to deliver meals to people who are unable to leave their homes (meals on wheels) for 30 minutes one day (10 minutes a day for 3 days), how would it feel/how effortful would it be?

6. If someone asked you to volunteer at a senior citizens' home for 6 hours one day (1 hour a day for 6 days), how would it feel/how effortful would it be??

7. If someone asked you to volunteer for 80 minutes one day (10 minutes a day for 8 days) registering people to vote, how would it feel/how effortful would it be?

8. If someone asked your to volunteer for 25 minutes one day (5 minutes a day for 5 days) creating an anti-smoking campaign, how would it feel/how effortful would it be?

9. If someone asked you to give up 9 hours one day (1 hour a day for 9 days) volunteering to get people to sign a petition in favor of tougher laws to guarantee clean drinking water, how would it feel/how effortful would it be?

Personality Assessment

Please take a few minutes to fill out the following personality assessment. The following is a short and easy questionnaire that deals with getting people's opinion and perspective on the kind of things they deal with in life. Please read through the instructions carefully and answer the questions in the order that they are presented.

In this task, you will be provided with a series of words. Your task will be to write a word that you think each provided word is an example of. That is, ask yourself the question, "[Provided word] is an example of what?" and then write down the answer you come up with. For instance, if we gave you the word "POODLE," you might write down "DOG" or even "ANIMAL," as a poodle is an example of a dog or animal. Be creative and come up with the most **general** word for which the provided word is an example.

Each "example" word will be presented in one of two boxes, such as the one shown below:

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
Please write your answers in the box above the "example" word, like this:

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        │      CAR        │
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
So, you might write TRANSPORTATION, because car is an example of a type of transportation. Turn the page to begin.

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SODA	COMPUTER

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      │    SOAP     │                       │    FRUIT    │
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COIN

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RESTAURANT

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TREE

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PAINTING		BAG

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WATER		COLLEGE

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      │    GUITAR     │                    │   MOUNTAIN    │
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
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        │  SINGER   │                      │  PANTS    │
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(Concrete Condition)

Personality Assessment

Please take a few minutes to fill out the following personality assessment. The following is a short and easy questionnaire that deals with getting people's opinion and perspective on the kind of things they deal with in life. Please read through the instructions carefully and answer the questions in the order that they are presented.

In this task, you will be provided with a series of words. Your task will be to write down a word that is an example of this word. That is, ask yourself the question, "An example of [provided word] is what?" and write down the answer you come up with. For example, if we gave you the word "DOG," you might write down the word "POODLE" or even "PLUTO" (the Disney character). Be creative, and try to think of the most **specific** example of the word as you can.

Each word to be exemplified will be presented in one of two boxes, such as the one shown below:

<div style="border:2px solid black; text-align:center; font-size:2em; padding:40px;">CAR</div>

<div style="text-align:center;">↓</div>

<div style="border:2px solid black; padding:30px;"></div>

Please write the example you come up with in the box below the provided word, like this:

<div style="border:2px solid black; text-align:center; font-size:2em; padding:40px;">CAR</div>

<div style="text-align:center;">↓</div>

<div style="border:2px solid black; text-align:center; font-style:italic; padding:20px;">CORVETTE</div>

So, you might write CORVETTE, because corvette is an example of a type of car. Turn the page to begin.

SODA	COMPUTER

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SPORT

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LUNCH

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| SOAP		FRUIT
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COIN

RESTAURANT

TREE

GAME

PAINTING

BAG

WATER

COLLEGE

DANCE	CANDY
↓	↓

GUITAR	MOUNTAIN
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POSTER		SOAP OPERA
↓		↓

RIVER		MATH
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KING	WHALE

SINGER	PANTS

Breadth of Categorization (Study 4)

We'd like to take this opportunity to get a sense of how you think.

*Look at the following objects:

brush, tent, matches, camera, soap, gloves, bathing suit, shovel, fishing pole, hat, snorkel, shirts, sweater, sneakers, coat, raft, dog, boots, marshmallows, socks, blanket, flashlight, pants, sunglasses, rifle, shoes, cigarettes, rope, hot dogs, canteen, toothbrush, underwear, beer, sleeping bag, pillow insect repellant, potato chips, and ax.

We'd like you to list the items that you think belong in the same group. Please include **every** object. Additionally, place each object in only one group.
As you create each group, <u>please number each group</u> so that we can know how many groups that you come up with.

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*Look at the following objects:

desk, VCR, pets, blinds, computer, pictures, coats, answering machine, paintings, blender, refrigerator magnets, stereo, shirts, silverware, bed, musical instrument, spatula, tapestries, jewelry, plants, tables, letters, underwear, CDs, wok, telephone, posters, microwave oven, dresser, rugs, dinner plates, printer, videocassettes, pants, TV, tools, shelves, and alarm clock.

We'd like you to list the items that you think belong in the same group. Please include **every** object. Additionally, place each object in only one group.
As you create each group, please number each group so that we can know how many groups that you come up with.

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*Look at the following objects:

chairs, roller blades, sweaters, crib, candy dish, fish tank, board games, blender, bikes, coats, dumbbells, infant clothes, books, coffee maker, puzzles, plates, CDs, toaster, toys, cutlery, shoes, skis, chess set, bird cage, ties, baseball cards, picture frames, juicer, ceramic figurines, glassware, boots, dolls, clock, records, Tshirts, lamps, skateboards, and paint brushes.

We'd like you to list the items that you think belong in the same group. Please include **every** object. Additionally, place each object in only one group.
As you create each group, <u>please number each group</u> so that we can know how many groups that you come up with.

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Ten-Item Personality Inventory-(TIPI)(Study 4)

Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which <u>you agree or disagree with that statement</u>. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.

1 = Disagree strongly
2 = Disagree moderately
3 = Disagree a little
4 = Neither agree nor disagree
5 = Agree a little
6 = Agree moderately
7 = Agree strongly

<u>I see myself as:</u>

1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic.

2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome.

3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined.

4. _____ Anxious, easily upset.

5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex.

6. _____ Reserved, quiet.

7. _____ Sympathetic, warm.

8. _____ Disorganized, careless.

9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable.

10. _____ Conventional, uncreative.

APPENDIX B: MATERIALS FROM CHAPTER 2

Morality of Donation Opportunities (Study 5a)

(All at Once in parentheses)

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $10 per month for 12 months ($120 all at once) to a homeless shelter to provide blankets and pillows?

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $25 per month for 6 months ($150 all at once) to provide flowers for patients in a hospital?

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $5 per month for 7months ($35 all at once) to an anti-smoking campaign?

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $10 per month for 4 months ($40 all at once) to buy children's books for a low income after school program?

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $15 per month for 5 months ($75 all at once) to a youth soccer league to provide equipment (shoes, shin guards, balls, etc.)?

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $3 per month for 10 months ($30 all at once) to provide meals to people who are unable to leave their homes (meals on wheels)?

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $10 per month for 5 months ($50 all at once) to an organization that provides free breast cancer screenings to women?

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $1 per month for 15 months ($15 all at once) to a local animal rescue organization to provide medication to prevent kennel cough?

To what extent would your moral character improve if you donated $25 per month for 8 months ($200 all at once) to an organization researching a cure for Multiple Sclerosis (MS)?

Burden of Donation Opportunities (Study 5b)

(All at Once in parentheses)

If you donated $10 per month for 12 months ($120 all at once) to a homeless shelter to provide blankets and pillows, how burdensome would that feel?

If you donated $25 per month for 6 months ($150 all at once) to provide flowers for patients in a hospital, how burdensome would that feel?

If you donated $5 per month for 7months ($35 all at once) to an anti-smoking campaign, how burdensome would that feel?

If you donated $10 per month for 4 months ($40 all at once) to buy children's books for a low income after school program, how burdensome would that feel?

If you donated $15 per month for 5 months ($75 all at once) to a youth soccer league to provide equipment (shoes, shin guards, balls, etc.), how burdensome would that feel?

If you donated $3 per month for 10 months ($30 all at once) to provide meals to people who are unable to leave their homes (meals on wheels), how burdensome would that feel?

If you donated $10 per month for 5 months ($50 all at once) to an organization that provides free breast cancer screenings to women, how burdensome would that feel?

If you donated $1 per month for 15 months ($15 all at once) to a local animal rescue organization to provide medication to prevent kennel cough, how burdensome would that feel?

If you donated $25 per month for 8 months ($200 all at once) to an organization researching a cure for Multiple Sclerosis (MS), how burdensome would that feel?

Script for Experimenters (Study 6)

Similar (Abstract):
"Hey, how's it going?" (Pause for response) "Have you ever had one of those days that's just exactly the same as yesterday? I swear it just seems like everything that is happening is the same as yesterday!"

Dissimilar (Concrete):
"Hey, how's it going?" (Pause for response) "Have you ever had one of those days that's just completely different than yesterday? I swear it just seems like everything that is happening is different from yesterday!"

All-at-Once:
"Anyway, I'm a volunteer with the Austin Children's Shelter and we are trying to raise money for various services aimed at children and families in Austin who have suffered abuse and neglect. Would you make a donation of $20 Austin Children's Shelter? If so, I can enter your payment info directly into their website using my phone/ipad/computer."

Distributed:
"Anyway, I'm a volunteer with the Austin Children's Shelter and we are trying to raise money for various services aimed at children and families in Austin who have suffered abuse and neglect. Would you make a donation of $5 per month for the next 4 months to Austin Children's Shelter? If so, I can enter your payment info directly into their website using my phone/ipad/computer."

If yes, take their information and as you are doing it:
"Could I just ask a few questions for record keeping purposes?"

If no:
"No problem. I understand. Could I just ask you a few questions for record keeping purposes?"

The website for donations is austinchildrenshelter.org. Click donate button. For the distributed option, make sure to click the drop down menu for the donation to end in 4 months. You'll need to get some information from them like address, phone credit card.

Uncheck all the boxes that would keep them getting emails from the organization. If they feel more comfortable entering their information themselves, by all means let them do it.

Gather sex, age, year in school and likelihood to donate in the future from everyone (see question below):

"On a scale of where 1 equals not at all likely to and 7 equals very likely, how likely are you to donate to this organization in the future?"

Questionnaire for Study 7

Across many different areas of life, we often can do things all-at-once (e.g., studying for an exam for 8 hours all on one day) or in a distributed (e.g., studying for an exam for 2 hours a day for 4 days) fashion. Some people prefer to do things all at once. Others prefer to do things in a distributed way. Either preference is reasonable, as there is rarely a right or wrong way to do things.

Please read the following activities and indicate which way *you* would prefer to do each activity. Again there are no right or wrong answers; we are simply interested in your preferences.

1. Donating to a charity that provides financial assistance to families of children with blood cancer.
   a. ___$20 all at once
   b. ___$5 per month for 4 months

2. Going door-to-door collecting canned food for the local food bank.
   a. ___4 hours on one day
   b. ___1 hour a day on 4 separate days

3. Cleaning and doing chores around your house or apartment
   a. ___30 minutes a day for 3 days
   b. ___1.5 hours on one day

4. Studying for a final exam.
   a. ___1 hour a day for 5 days
   b. ___5 hours on one day

5. Buying a new laptop computer.
   a. ___$1200 all at once
   b. ___$100 a month for 12 months

6. Spending time with your best friend.
   a. ___6 hours on one day
   b. ___1 hour a day for 6 days

7. Taking a yearly vacation.

      a.   ___2 consecutive weeks

      b.   ___1 week each for 2 non-consecutive weeks

8. Receiving your paycheck each month.
      a.   ___Every Friday
      b.   ___All at once on the 1st of the month.

9. Watching 5 episodes of your favorite TV show
      a.   ___One episode per day for 5 days
      b.   ___5 episodes all at once on one day

10. Giving a friend or family member 6-month subscription to Netflix as a gift.
      a.   ___$8 per month
      b.   ___$64 all at once

What is your age? _____

What is your gender? _____

Donation Requests (Study 8a)

All-at-once condition

Imagine that your state holds an annual charitable contribution campaign that allows you to make contributions through your work payroll to a local or state <u>organization of your choice</u>. You receive an email from your company asking whether you will participate. Please indicate how you would respond to your company.

○ Yes, please make a one-time deduction of $___ from my payroll.

○ No thank you. I would prefer not to donate.

Imagine that your state holds an annual charitable contribution campaign that allows you to make contributions through your work payroll to a local or state <u>organization of your choice</u>. You receive an email from your company asking whether you will participate. Please indicate how you would respond to your company.

◯ Yes, please make a $__ deduction from my payroll each month for the next ___ months.

◯ No thank you. I would prefer not to donate.

Imagine that your state holds an annual charitable contribution campaign that allows you to make contributions through your work payroll to a local or state <u>organization of your choice</u>. You receive an email from your company asking whether you will participate. Please indicate how you would respond to your company.

◯ Yes, please make a $__ deduction from my payroll each month. I know I can cancel my monthly payment at any time.

◯ No thank you. I would prefer not to donate.

Request Choice (Study 8b)

Imagine that your state holds an annual charitable contribution campaign that allows you to make contributions through your work payroll to a local or state <u>organization of your choice</u>. You receive an email from your company asking whether you will participate. Please indicate how you would respond to your company.

○ Yes, please make a one-time deduction of $__ from my payroll.

○ Yes, please make a $__ deduction from my payroll each month for the next __ months.

○ Yes, please make a $__ deduction from my payroll each month. I know I can cancel my monthly payment at any time.

○ No thank you. I would prefer not to donate.

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