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The Dissertation Committee for Huseyin Alptekin Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Explaining Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Ethnic Incorporation and Mobilization Patterns in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, and Beyond

Committee:

Raúl Madrid, Supervisor

Catherine Boone

Zachary Elkins

Michael Findley

Benjamin Gregg

Mary Neuburger

Explaining Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Ethnic Incorporation and Mobilization Patterns in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, and Beyond

by

Huseyin Alptekin, B.A.; B.A.; M.A.; M.A.

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Dedication

to my family:

to my parents, Hatice and Vahap Alptekin, for their moral guidance and lifelong sacrifices that allowed me to further my studies

and

to my brothers, Murat and Ferhat Alptekin, who have been great examples for me

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Explaining Ethnopolitical Mobilization: Ethnic Incorporation and Mobilization Patterns in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Turkey, and Beyond

Huseyin Alptekin, Ph.D.

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Supervisor: Raúl Madrid

Why do some ethnic groups mobilize in violent ways whereas some others mobilize by using peaceful methods? And why do some ethnic groups seek integration while some others pursue separatist goals? This dissertation proposes a theoretical framework to answer these questions. It suggests that a state's ethnic incorporation policies shape both why (centripetal or centrifugal aims) and how (peaceful or violent methods) ethnic groups mobilize. It argues that (1) *consocitionalism* recognizes ethnic groups and grants a degree of political autonomy to them, yet limits individuals' political participation via non-ethnic channels of political participation; and, therefore, it leads to peaceful and moderately centrifugal ethnic mobilizations; (2) *liberal multiculturalism* recognizes ethnic groups, grants a degree of political autonomy to them, and allows individuals to participate in politics via non-ethnic channels; and, therefore, it leads to peaceful and moderately centripetal mobilizations; (3) *civic assimilationism* neither recognizes ethnic groups nor grants a degree of political autonomy to them, yet allows individuals to participate in

politics via non-ethnic channels; and therefore it leads to peaceful and centripetal mobilizations of groups which lack pre-existing ethnic mobilization; but it leads to moderately violent and centrifugal mobilizations of groups which have strong pre-existing ethnic mobilizations; and (4) *ethnocracies* neither recognize ethnic groups nor grant a degree of political autonomy to them, and they also limit individuals' political participation via non-ethnic channels. Therefore, they lead to centrifugal and violent ethnic mobilizations.

The dissertation uses a mixed method research design. The hypotheses are tested based on the *Minorities at Risk* data as well as the case studies of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus, and Kurds and the Roma in Turkey. The case studies benefit from an extensive field research in Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Turkey using original interviews with former and current guerillas, guerilla families, political activists, and politicians from each ethnic group under scrutiny and archival research on newspapers and legal documents. The findings indicate that politics of ethnic accommodation are not only an explanation for the causes of different ethnic mobilization patterns, but also a feasible remedy for ethnic disputes spanning all over the world.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Ethnic separatism and ethnic violence have been on the agenda of many countries all over the world, especially in the last few decades. Following the collapse of the Communist Bloc, policy circles, international news agencies, think-tanks, and scholars of political science all turned their attention to increasingly salient ethnic threats. Over the last two decades, numerous countries such as Yugoslavia (1991), the Soviet Union (1991), Czechoslovakia (1995), Indonesia (1999), and Sudan (2011) have lost their territorial integrity with the emergence of new countries where previous ethnic minorities have become ethnic majorities. Most of these splits followed bloody civil wars, some of which included cases of genocide; however, not all ethnic wars resulted in secession. In many cases, rebels were either defeated or ethnic conflicts became deadlocked—which, in turn, led to long cycles of violence. Some ethnic disputes led to the secession of ethnic minorities as in the case of Turks in Cyprus in 1974.[1] Other disputes led to the emergence of ethnic movements that included elements of violence in their mobilization methods but eventually adopted a more peaceful path; a case in point being the Turks in Bulgaria from 1980s to the present. Ethnic disputes can, and do, escalate into high levels of violence that endure for decades—much like the Kurds in Turkey from 1984 to 2012. But they may also dissipate. The Roma in Turkey are a good example of how ethnic cleavages may not have political salience for an extended period of time.

[1] *De facto* secession in this case.

Ethnic groups differ radically from one another in the degree to which they develop group consciousness, draw exclusive ethnic boundaries, mobilize in pursuit of political goals, seek further integration or autonomy, and use violence as a method of mobilization. The questions that linger are: under what circumstances do descent-based cultural groups transform into politically salient ethnic groups? Why do some ethnic groups mobilize in more violent ways than others? And why do some ethnic groups seek integration while others pursue separatist goals or greater autonomy? I propose a theoretical framework to answer these questions that suggests a state's policies and institutions of ethnic incorporation shape both why (centripetal or centrifugal aims) and how (peaceful, mixed, or violent methods) ethnic groups mobilize.

Intra-state conflicts account for an increasing proportion of overall violent conflicts. Moreover, ethnic disputes are responsible for most of these intra-state conflicts (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Wimmer, 2012). Nevertheless, little headway has been made in developing a comprehensive theory of ethnic politics that explains variation in ethnic consciousness, ethnic motives, and ethnic strategies. Ethnic conflict and secessionism are two interrelated problems of contemporary world politics. Secessionism often emerges as a political goal before, during, or in the aftermath of ethnic conflicts. Not all ethnic conflicts include a party with the aim of secession. Just as violence is a particular method of ethno-political mobilization, secessionism is a particular aim.

My research seeks to contribute to the literature on ethnic conflict resolution and ethnic politics by providing a novel and comprehensive explanation for the causes of different ethnic mobilization patterns that configure mobilization aims and methods. In

order to test my theory, I utilized both qualitative and quantitative methods. I not only conducted a statistical analysis of the determinants of ethno-political mobilization methods, I also carried out case studies of ethnic mobilizations by Kurds and the Roma in Turkey and ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus using a multi-method research design. During my field research in Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Turkey, I carried out eighty three interviews and conducted archival work on legal documents and newspapers.

The theory developed in this dissertation has important policy implications. It suggests how states may reduce ethnic violence and cope with the threat of territorial disintegration in the short term and remove their root causes in the long term. In a nutshell, the dissertation offers guidelines to policymakers on how to use the "right" incorporation model at the "right" time to maintain stability and peace.

After a brief discussion of my theory, I move into a conceptual section where I define and discuss the terms that are significant for the ontological basis of my theory: I conceptualize the terms *ethnicity*, *ethno-political mobilization*, *ethno-political mobilization aims and methods*, and *ethnic incorporation models*. In the subsequent section, I introduce my research design, the rationale for my case selection, and the ways I test my hypotheses. Additionally, I address the question of endogeneity before laying out the framework of the dissertation.

Conceptualizing Ethnic Groups, Ethno-political Mobilization, and Ethnic Incorporation Models

This dissertation takes ethnic groups as aggregates of individuals and uses them as the main unit of analysis.[2] The agent of the independent variable—ethnic incorporation models—is the state (or the government). My central independent variable is the ethnic incorporation model that states adopt and direct toward an ethnic group. These ethnic incorporation models may vary across ethnic groups in the same state. Ethnic groups as the agents of the dependent variable (i.e., ethno-political mobilization patterns) and the state as the agent of the independent variable (ethnic incorporation models) are macro-level entities. Acknowledging that individuals rule the state and form ethnic groups, this study explores causal mechanisms at the individual level.

In terms of the level of analysis, this study makes its causal claims at the country level (i.e., state or domestic level). As such, it does not take ethnic groups as entities transcending national boundaries, but focuses on them within individual countries. Additionally, this perspective limits the scope of the independent variable (ethnic incorporation models) within respective countries. When I refer to Turkey's Kurdish policy, I mean the policies implemented by Turkey on its own Kurdish population, not the Kurds living in Northern Iraq, Iran, or Syria.

The main focus is on ethnic (political) mobilization; hence, the terms ethnicity and mobilization should be clarified before further discussion. In order to clarify the theory laid

[2] Ethnic groups as the unit of analysis refer to the unit of the dependent variable. The dissertation has multiple units of observation (individuals, organizations, groups, and the state).

out in this chapter and throughout the dissertation, I define ethnicity, ethno-political mobilization, its aims and methods, and ethnic incorporation models in the following paragraphs.

ETHNICITY

Many scholars define ethnic groups by negation. They tend to define ethnic groups as 'unsuccessful' (Eriksen 1991, p. 265), 'smaller' or 'more pervasive' (Kellas 1991, p. 4), or 'stateless' (Oommen 1997, p. 20) nations with 'no political referent' or 'homeland' (Smith 2001, p. 12). Objectivity and subjectivity also play a large part in how we define ethnicity, but the reality is that it is a mixture of the two perspectives. While objectivism stresses inter-subjectively present, distinct characters such as a common homeland and language (Kymlicka 1995, p. 14; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein, 2007), subjectivism underscores the role of social-psychological processes such as identification and ascription (Sisk 1996, p. 13; Chirot 2009, p. 88). Following Chandra (2006), I define ethnic groups as communities that are reproduced around a belief in shared lineage, and I acknowledge that ethnic groups have changing boundaries and varying levels of individual membership.

Ethnic groups are formed around a proxy characteristic that symbolizes and represents the common lineage. I adopt Chandra and Wilkinson's (2008, p. 517) distinction between ethnic structure, which consists of the distribution of ethnic attributes in a population, and ethnic practice, which consists of the ethnic categories that are actually

activated. One can categorize ethnic structures into four: race,[3] language, religion/sect (faith) and/or caste.[4] Amongst these structure, more dominant and widely activated categories (ethnic practice) often serve as the perceived proof of common lineage.

Although individual members of ethnic groups can switch their practices, ethnic groups tend to be relatively persistent. As Barth (1969) suggests, distinct ethnic categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership. The relative persistence of ethnic groups (partly due to the members' low likelihood of 'unbecoming'[5]) is an important aspect distinguishing ethnic groups from other groups.

Hence, ethnic groups are communities that are reproduced around one or more distinct proxy attributes (race, language, faith and/or caste) that represent or symbolize a common lineage. The definition I adopt distinguishes ethnic groups from the 'semantic neighbors'. First, while *ethnic groups* are primarily social constructs around the notion of common lineage, *nations* are primarily political constructs around the notion of sovereignty. Since their necessary attributes (common lineage vs. sovereignty) are categorically distinct, neither is a sub-group of the other. Ethnic groups might be stateless nations, but not all nations are 'state-ful' ethnic groups. Hence, the term 'multi-ethnic nation' is not a contradiction in terms. Second, scholars such as Kymlicka (1995) who use

[3] Similar to ethnic structure-practice distinction, we can also distinguish between racial structure and practice. While all racial discourses rely on some sort of, and often imagined, morphological categories, some categories –mostly skin color- are chosen over others as the primary one(s).

[4] Hence, while I follow Alesina, et al. (2003) in breaking down ethnicity to sub-groups, I disagree with their sub-categorization (ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups) for two reasons: the contested and vague concept of 'ethnic' groups still remain as one of their sub-groups; and they either exclude other categories such as race or mix them with a vague notion of ethnic group.

[5] For a discussion of the impossibility of 'unbecoming', see Gil-White (1999, p. 808). Yet, he also acknowledges the possibility of 'boundary change' in the long term (1999, p. 813).

the term *national minority* do not intend to create a synonym for ethnic groups, but an antonym for *immigrant groups*. They simply imply that national minorities are non-immigrant ethnic groups. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, the union of national minorities and immigrant groups do not exhaust the overall set of ethnic groups, because one can easily think of ethnic groups which are neither minority nor immigrant, but rather constitute a settled majority. Finally, the term *cultural communities* is a broader term than ethnic groups. All ethnic groups are necessarily cultural groups, but not vice versa. Depending on the definition of culture, a variety of groups can be counted in this category.

ETHNO-POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Olzak (1983, p. 355) defines ethnic mobilization as "the process by which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends." Since this dissertation focuses on the political mobilization of ethnic groups, the definition should be narrowed further. Political mobilization for Tilly is "the process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life."[6] In order to distinguish ethno-political mobilization from its semantic neighbors, I adopt a similar, but narrower definition.

Political mobilization is defined in this study as any collective activity in pursuit of explicit political goals. Ethno-political mobilization is necessarily a collective action; an individual's protest of the government does not count. It is "political;" recreational

[6] Quoted in Barany (2002, p. 280).

activities do not count.[7] It is an activity; emotions, ideologies, or attitudes do not count. Finally, individuals might participate in mobilizations for numerous reasons ranging from social pressure to individual material interests; yet, the overall activity must have an "explicit political mission." This definition covers various activities including voting, protests, strikes, riots, and rebellions; ethno-political mobilization is when a group of people mobilizes to achieve the political goals of an ethnic group with which they identify.

It should also be noted that people who mobilize for the same ethno-political goals and use similar methods do not necessarily mobilize under the same organizational structure. We may observe loose or even nonexistent formal organizational structures; an example would be social movements. Even though some of these movements might develop spontaneously, ethno-political mobilizations are usually initiated and supported by hierarchical organizational structures such as political parties or guerilla organizations. Ethnic members might mobilize via different ethno-political organizations, and such organizations do not necessarily cooperate; they may even compete or conflict with each other (Kalyvas, 2003; Mueller, 2000).

ETHNO-POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AIMS

I distinguish between two kinds of mobilization aims: centripetal and centrifugal: mobilizations that aim at achieving group-level political autonomy[8] are termed centrifugal

[7] Some recreational activities might have an ethno-political facet, but the ethnic group members who participate in recreational activities should also satisfy other conditions such as having an explicit political mission for this activity to be counted as ethno-political mobilization.

[8] I follow Cornell's (2002, p. 248) definition of autonomy which "in a political and legal context refers to the power of social institutions to 'regulate their own affairs by enacting legal rules.'"

mobilizations. Mobilizations that do not aim at achieving group-level political autonomy are centripetal mobilizations. *Individual-level* social aims (e.g., freedom to participate in associations), cultural goals (e.g., parental discretion in children's education in religious and/or multi-lingual schools), economic aims (e.g., personal discretion over tax payments for 'particularist' services), and political goals (e.g., freedom to stand for elections) are not centrifugal for the purpose of the theory. Nor are all group-level aims centrifugal, either. For example, *group-level* social (freedoms for associational activities), cultural (e.g., inclusion of a minority faith or language in public school curriculums), and economic (e.g., group-specific tax regulations) goals are not centrifugal on their own.

We can also see gradation within the categories of centrifugal and centripetal aims, even though all group-level political autonomy aims can be labeled centrifugal. For instance, one can argue that centrifugal aims can be ordered from more to less centrifugal beginning with secession,[9] followed by ethnic confederations, ethnic federalism, special representation/quota system, and legal permission for unrestricted ethnic parties.[10] The

[9] I use secessionism and separatism interchangeably. Heraclides (1992, p. 400) defines a separatist movement "as an active political movement within an independent state that aspires to some form of territorial separatism, ranging from autonomy to independence." He distinguishes between three kinds of separatist movements: autonomy-seeking limited separatist movements, independence seeking secessionist movements, and irredentist separatist movements. In contrast, this dissertation does not focus on the question of irredentism. This dissertation sees both autonomy and independence seeking movements as centrifugal and only independence-seeking groups as separatist or secessionist (which is the highest end of centrifugal goals explored in this dissertation).

[10] I take demands of legal and non-restrictive permission for ethnic parties as a less centrifugal aim than other mentioned centrifugal aims. While traditional understandings of autonomy may not take demanding permission for ethnic parties as a centrifugal (group-level political autonomy seeking) aim, I see a necessary linkage between ethnic parties and ethnic group's political autonomy in accordance with the definition of autonomy as defined here and ethnic parties as defined by Madrid (2012, p. 6): "an organization that prioritizes the interests of a particular ethnic group" and "seeks to appeal to them as members of that ethnic group."

current position of an ethnic group how centrifugal a mobilization aim is. While secession is a more centrifugal aim for an ethnic group which already has an ethnic confederation, ethnic federalism can be seen as a centripetal aim for the same group.[11]

Some might think that group-level cultural rights lead to the 'ghettoization' of cultural minorities, and in turn, political disintegration. Therefore, they may think that demanding any kind of collective cultural (i.e., ethnic) rights should be considered centrifugal. Even if such an argument was correct with regard to the alleged path from demanding collective cultural rights to the ghettoization of the group, and finally to demanding political autonomy, I take this process as centrifugal only after the political autonomy aim becomes explicit. Therefore, as long as cultural demands do not translate into political autonomy demands, I count ethnic mobilizations pursuing group-level cultural autonomy as centripetal. Let's assume that an ethnic group mobilizes to achieve group-level cultural autonomy first and then, the group's aim shifts to political autonomy. I count only the latter phase of this mobilization as centrifugal, even if the former phase shares the same dynamics with the latter phase.

Table 1.1 helps make the distinction clear. Mobilizations that demand cultural, economic, and individual-level political rights are all centripetal. Centrifugal ethnic mobilizations aim at achieving political autonomy at the group-level: this aim might range from full political autonomy (secession) to partial political autonomy (confederation,

[11] For an example of gradations within and across dichotomous variables, see Elkins (2000).

ethnic federalism, communal autonomy, special representation, and permission for 'unprevented' ethnic parties).

ETHNO-POLITICAL MOBILIZATION METHODS

The level of violence is what distinguishes different mobilization methods. As shown in Table 1.2, I distinguish between violent (mobilizations that involve a high number of violent incidents and casualties), peaceful (mobilizations that involve few if any violent incidents and casualties), and mixed (occasionally violent) methods. I use the terms ethnic violence and ethnic rebellion interchangeably: they both represent violent forms of ethno-political mobilization.

Table 1.1 Aims of ethnic mobilizations

	Socio-cultural autonomy	*Political autonomy*
Individual-level	Centripetal	Centripetal
Group-level	Centripetal	Centrifugal

Table 1.2 Methods of ethnic mobilizations

	Low # of incidents	*High # of incidents*
High # of casualties	Mixed	Violent
Low # of casualties	Peaceful	Mixed

ETHNIC INCORPORATION MODELS

The term ethnic incorporation is often used in anthropological studies to refer to the process whereby ethnicity becomes increasingly central for group mobilization (Handelman, 1977; Eriksen, 1993). This dissertation uses the concept in a different way to refer to the set of policies adopted and implemented by the state toward an ethnic group

residing in the country.[12] I define an ethnic incorporation model as a set of institutions and policies that a state adopts vis-à-vis minority or non-dominant[13] ethnic groups. I will exclusively use the term "incorporation model," even though a wide range of terms such as citizenship types, membership models, accommodation regimes and incorporation patterns are used in the literature with very close meanings. Regarding the intension[14] of the concept, this study focuses on formal institutional factors (e.g., constitutions, laws, regulations) and policies rather than informal and attitudinal dimensions such as norms, codes of conduct, conventions, and the beliefs and emotions of the central politicians; hence, ethnic incorporation models belong to the first level of Ikenberry's (1988) three distinct levels of institutions: the specific characteristics of government institutions.[15]

Incorporation models differ in terms of their level of inclusion: some incorporation models are more inclusive than others. It is often difficult to distinguish the level of inclusion because of the discrepancy between legal regulations and actual practice. For instance, allowing ethnic minority parties to participate in elections does not mean much if there is a ten percent electoral threshold and the largest minority ethnic group composes less than ten percent of the overall population. Rather than merely relying on the constitution or the laws in a single domain, I will pay attention to the real/experienced incorporation of ethnic groups by examining all the relevant laws and regulations.

[12] For a similar use of the concept, see: Kopstein and Wittenberg (2010).
[13] I will limit my discussion over ethnic groups to those in minority, unless otherwise specified. The term minority, in this study, will be used for non-dominant ethnic groups in terms of their relations to state power.
[14] Sartori (1984, p. 78) defines intension as "the ensemble of characteristics of (included in) a concept."
[15] Ikenberry's other two levels are more overarching structures of state and a nation's normative social order.

The incorporation of minority ethnic groups may also differ between the individual and the group levels: an incorporation model may include minorities at the individual level (e.g., through equal voting rights/'one person, one vote' principle), but not at the group level (e.g., through denial of official recognition for ethnic groups). In this study, individual-level inclusion means that individuals are allowed to participate in political processes independent of the ethnic groups that they identify with and/or are ascribed to. Group inclusion means that ethnic groups are recognized by the state (typically, but not necessarily, in the constitution) and members of ethnic groups can participate in political processes through unrestricted ethnic parties, special representation (quota system), and communal autonomy (which often comes in the form of regional autonomy).

The incorporation of minority ethnic groups may differ across social, cultural, economic, and political spheres. For instance, an ethnic group may be included culturally through a multi-lingual education policy, but be prohibited from forming a political party. I will primarily focus on the political inclusion of ethnic groups in my typology because I expect political inclusion to have a stronger impact on ethnic mobilization.

The literature on the accommodation of ethnic minorities presents a variety of classifications: the debates over identity politics in contemporary political theory have identified liberal, civic-republican, ethno-cultural, and multicultural models of membership (Shachar, 2000). Soysal's (1994) distinction between corporatist, liberal, statist, and fragmental regime types is particularly important for the classification developed in this study, because it distinguishes between individual and group level inclusion. Soysal distinguishes between these incorporation patterns in terms of

organizational configuration (centralized-decentralized) and locus of action and authority (state-society). Another fruitful typology can be found in Chirot's (2009) distinction between the strategies to deal with minorities based on tolerance and intolerance on the one hand and inclusion, separation, and exclusion on the other. Brubaker's (1989; 2004) categorization of French and German types of citizenship that distinguishes between assimilationist/territorial and exclusionary/ethnic incorporation models, Weldon's (2006) collectivist-ethnic, collectivist-civic, and individualistic-civic regime types, Akturk's (2011) typology which emphasizes the importance of looking at 'expression' in addition to 'membership', Reilly's (2012) categories of consociationalism, centripetalism, and communalism, and Mylonas' (2012) categorization of assimilation, accommodation, and exclusion in distinguishing between ethnic incorporation models are all useful typologies that inform this study.

Nevertheless, the majority of existing typologies of ethnic incorporation models do not distinguish between individual- and group-level political incorporation—and do not distinguish between different forms of inclusion. Those that do, such as Soysal (1994), focus exclusively on comparing countries and overlook the differential treatment of different ethnic groups in the same country: states can and often do pursue different incorporation models for different ethnic groups. By contrast, this study examines incorporation models in 'dyads' of states and ethnic groups.

I identify four distinct models of ethnic incorporation: liberal multiculturalism, consociationalism, civic assimilationism, and ethnocracy. While these terms have been used for a long time, they have not been conceptualized in a mutually exclusive and

collectively exhaustive way to form a descriptive typology of ethnic incorporation models. As Table 1.3 indicates, these incorporation models, as re-conceptualized here, differ in terms of whether they allow only individual-level political participation (civic assimilationism), only group-level political participation (consociationalism), both individual-level and group-level political participation (liberal multiculturalism[16]), or neither individual-level nor group-level political participation (ethnocracy).

Group-level inclusion is the state's granting of genuine rights to the members of an ethnic group to participate in politics along ethnic lines—and often comes in the forms of differentiated citizenship and group autonomy. Individual-level inclusion refers to the state's granting of genuine rights to the members of an ethnic group to participate in politics across ethnic lines. For instance, a country that allows the members of an ethnic group to run and vote for elections, but bans the political activities of ethnic organizations and ethnic political parties, would be inclusive at the individual level—but exclusionary at the group level. The mirror image of this situation would be a country that compartmentalizes the political sphere along ethnic lines and restricts individuals from engaging in politics outside of their ethnic groups: this would be inclusive at the group level, but exclusionary at the individual level. Using Kymlicka's (1995) conceptualization in the context of political

[16] Multiculturalism is often used as a homonym concept in the literature, referring to (a) a state/situation of cultural diversity; (b) a theory that advocates to recognize the value of cultural diversity and to reinforce the sustainability of it; or (c) a set of institutions and policies to maintain or reinforce cultural diversity. I use the term only in this third sense, but with a political reference. While ordinary usage of the term includes social policies such as affirmative action programs in education, I limit the intension of the concept by taking political inclusion as a necessary attribute of liberal multiculturalism.

participation, the former situation imposes *internal restrictions* for ethnic groups while the latter grants *external protection* to them in the form of political autonomy.

Table 1.3 Four models of ethnic incorporation

Individual level inclusion		Group level inclusion	
		Yes	No
	Yes	Liberal multiculturalism	Civic assimilationism
	No	Consociationalism	Ethnocracy

The theory in a nutshell

These four ethnic incorporation models shape ethno-political mobilization patterns. A state's ethnic incorporation model is determined by the extent to which its policies are inclusive or exclusionary at the group and individual levels. No inclusion at all, which I refer to as ethnocracy, is expected to have the worst outcomes (i.e., it leads to the pursuit of the most centrifugal aims and the greatest use of violent methods), given the feelings of deprivation it creates. That being said, the effects of all of the ethnic incorporation models depend on the degree of pre-existing mobilization an ethnic group has achieved. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 demonstrate how each of the four ethnic incorporation models shape the ethno-political mobilization patterns.

Table 1.4 Ethnic incorporation models and their expected outcomes on ethnic mobilization for weakly mobilized groups

	Aims	Methods
Civic assimilationism	most centripetal	most peaceful
Liberal multiculturalism	↓	↓
Consociationalism		
Ethnocracy	most centrifugal	most violent

Table 1.5 Ethnic incorporation models and their expected outcomes on ethnic mobilization for highly mobilized groups

	Aims	Methods
Liberal multiculturalism	most centripetal	most peaceful
Consociationalism	↓	↓
Civic assimilationism		
Ethnocracy	most centrifugal	most violent

In Tables 1.4 and 1.5, the expected levels of "peacefulness" and "integration" are ranked separately for the two categories of pre-existing mobilization levels. The gradation for each (high and low) pre-existing mobilization level is specified with arrows. Note that the different ethnic mobilization models have similar effects on the aims and methods of mobilization. On average, highly mobilized groups are more susceptible to violent and centrifugal mobilizations.[17] Therefore, the most violent and centrifugal mobilizations are undertaken by ethnic groups with high levels of pre-existing mobilization under the

[17] This observation can be seen in the comparison of the intercepts in regression models for weaker and highly mobilized ethnic groups in Table 3.4 in Chapter Three. The high pre-existing mobilization level sample has a higher intercept partly because higher levels of pre-existing mobilization often involve more violent incidents.

ethnocratic model. For the sake of simplicity, this outcome will be called "violent" in the hypotheses listed below; for the same reason, the most-violent outcome (corresponding to ethnocracy) for Table 1.4 and the second-most-violent outcome (corresponding to civic assimilationism) for Table 1.5 will be referred to as "mixed." The rest of the outcomes will be referred to as "peaceful" despite their slightly varying rankings in terms of their expected degree of peacefulness. A similar logic can also be observed for mobilization aims as well.

A closer look at the effects of each of the four ethnic incorporation models should help one see the processes leading to expected mobilization patterns. When a state pursues group-level inclusive policies in the form of consociationalism, it, by definition, recognizes an ethnic group and grants a degree of political autonomy to it. This policy empowers a group of political elites amongst the ethnic group by granting legal authority to them over their co-ethnics. Since group-level inclusion gives elites a stake in the existing state they tend to avoid carrying out radical and risky endeavors, such as pursuing secessionist goals or engaging in violent rebellion. Elites might still seek greater autonomy, however, if they think that their privileged position might change in a foreseeable future. Or, they may at least mobilize their masses in a way that will preserve the degree of political autonomy they have and help them keep their privileged position. In this case, they can use their coercive power over their co-ethnics, provide incentives to them, and carry out propaganda activities to mobilize their co-ethnics for equally or more centrifugal (greater autonomy) goals than the degree of autonomy they already have.

Group-level inclusive policies also categorize individuals into ethnic groups. At the mass level, group-level inclusion lets co-ethnics know they belong to the same group and

their future is tied to the fate of other ascribed members of the group, given that they are subject to the same political regulations. This kind of ethnic ascription policies can foster identification with the minority ethnic group, which can result in higher levels of ethno-political awareness amongst the categorized population, increasing the number of people elites can mobilize for centrifugal mobilizations. Such policies of ethnic categorization have a greater impact on ethnic groups whose members lack strong levels of pre-existing mobilization and ethno-political awareness and may lead them to mobilize for centrifugal aims. Since group-inclusive policies do not refuse ethnic minority group members' recognition demands and do not deny their cultural and political rights, consociationalist policies also keep the sense of deprivation that co-ethnics feel at a minimum. Moreover, consociationalism makes peaceful channels of ethno-political mobilization available. Therefore, it is expected to lead to peaceful ethno-political mobilizations at both high and low levels of pre-existing mobilization.

Under liberal multiculturalism, it becomes harder for elites to effectively make propaganda and indoctrinate their "co-ethnics" given that those co-ethnics no longer depend on solely elite-dominated propaganda tools when a state includes an ethnic group at both the group and individual levels. Where the state adopts liberal multiculturalist policies, elites lose their exclusive authority to coerce or incentivize their co-ethnics. Members of minority ethnic groups can participate in politics through multi-ethnic or non-ethnic channels. Because its policies are inclusive at the group level, liberal multiculturalism can still moderately empower ethnic elites and, particularly for weakly mobilized groups, increase individuals' ethno-political awareness. By allowing cross-

cutting political activity, it moderates the centrifugal effects of such processes; therefore, it is the most effective model in terms of ensuring that highly mobilized ethnic groups remain peaceful and non-secessionist—and even quite integrated to the political center. Additionally, since recognition demands and political rights are satisfied by the state under liberal multiculturalism, it does not lead to a sense of deprivation among members of minority ethnic groups. Moreover, liberal multiculturalism keeps peaceful channels of mobilization open—which leads to peaceful mobilizations regardless of how mobilized an ethnic minority is previously. Therefore, liberal multiculturalism leads to the most peaceful and centripetal mobilization pattern for highly mobilized groups. Liberal multiculturalism also has a largely peaceful and centripetal impact on weakly mobilized groups, but since it increases ethno-political awareness and empowers ethnic elites it does not have as strong of a peaceful and centripetal impact on weakly mobilized groups as civic assimilationism.

If a minority ethnic group lacks pre-existing mobilization and a significant degree of ethno-political awareness, civic assimilationism inhibits the development of ethno-political awareness in contrast to group-level inclusive models such as consociationalism and liberal multiculturalism. By inhibiting the strengthening of ethno-political awareness and disempowering ethnic elites, civic assimilationism impedes weakly mobilized ethnic groups from mobilizing for centrifugal goals. This form of ethnic incorporation is the most effective model for ensuring that weakly mobilized ethnic groups remain peaceful and centripetal. Nevertheless, members of ethnic groups with high levels of pre-existing mobilization are unlikely to be satisfied with mere individual-level inclusion. They will typically demand group-level inclusion such as the constitutional recognition of their ethnic

group, removal of barriers for ethnic political parties to function and compete in a fair setting, and even political autonomy. The group-level exclusionary policies of civic assimilationism create a sense of relative deprivation and lead to centrifugal mobilizations for ethnic groups with high levels of pre-existing mobilization. By depriving minority ethnic group members of their group-recognition needs, civic assimilationism also leads to mixed (a combination of violent and peaceful) mobilizations at high levels of pre-existing mobilization.

Ethnocracy excludes the members of ethnic minority groups both at the individual and group levels. These exclusionary policies often backfire, leading members of these groups to develop higher degrees of ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness. This situation frequently leads to mixed (a combination of peaceful and violent) and centrifugal mobilizations at low levels of pre-existing mobilization. If the ethnic group is already mobilized, however, their mobilizations will typically become even more violent and centrifugal. This incorporation model tends to be the most conducive to violent and secessionist mobilization at both low and high pre-existing mobilization levels.

Research Design

This dissertation is a comparative analysis of the causes of ethno-political mobilization patterns of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus, and Kurds and the Roma in Turkey. I use a mixed methodology to examine the hypotheses laid out in this chapter. First, I use qualitative methods to explore how ethnic incorporation models have shaped ethno-political mobilization patterns in the four cases. Second, I test the hypotheses about

mobilization methods (ethnic rebellion) on a worldwide scale from 1990 to 2000[18] based on the *Minorities at Risk* (MAR) database, which includes data on 337 ethnic groups from 122 countries for the specified period. In order to account for the conditioning effect of pre-existing mobilization levels, the quantitative analyses are conducted on low and high pre-existing mobilization samples separately.

The qualitative analyses focus on exploring the causal mechanisms based on observations at multiple levels from individual activists to ethno-political organizations and ethnic groups. The dissertation includes four in-depth case studies informed by extensive field work, archival research, and semi-structured interviews with politicians and political activists. The case selection provides a quasi-experimental research design for the study as ethnicity and culture are held constant in the comparison of Turks in Cyprus and Bulgaria, and state-level attributes are held constant in the comparison of Kurds and the Roma in Turkey.

In Bulgaria and Cyprus, Turks constitute significant minority populations: Turkish Cypriots were eighteen percent of the Cyprus population in the period from 1960 to 1973.[19] The population of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria is estimated to be eight to ten percent.[20] The members of both groups believe in a shared lineage and they have their own mother tongue,

[18] The MAR database provides data only from 1990 to 2000 for most of the variables that I use for my regression models as shown in Table 3.4.

[19] *Sources: Census of Population and Agriculture 1961, Vol. 1, Population by Location, Race and Sex, and Demographic Report 1987, Department of Statistics and Research.* Available from http://kypros.org/Cyprus/cy_republic/demography.html, accessed 30 October 2013.

[20] According to the 1992 official census results, 9.7 percent of Bulgarian citizens identified themselves as ethnic Turks, which is equal to 822.253 people (Eminov, 1997, p. 81). This number went down to 588.318 people in the 2011 official census, which corresponds to 8.8 percent of the country population (National Statistical Institute - Republic of Bulgaria, 2011, p. 23).

which is Turkish. Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus differ from the dominant population by religion and language; while ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus are predominantly Sunni Muslim, Bulgarian and Greek Cypriot majorities are predominantly Orthodox Christian. Turks in both of these countries speak Turkish, whereas Bulgarians speak Bulgarian and Greek Cypriots speak Greek. Turks in both countries have or had ethnic settlements in scattered villages and towns in the cases of Turks in Cyprus (1960-1974) and Bulgaria (1980-2014, the present). Hence, the ethno-cultural characteristics of Turks in both countries are quite similar. This similarity enables me to control for ethno-cultural characteristics and focus on the role played by varying state institutions and policies of ethnic incorporation. Both of these cases demonstrate variation over time in terms of ethnic incorporation models and ethno-political mobilization patterns. Since Turkish Cypriots gained *de facto* self-determination via secession in 1974, the analyses for this group end in this year; Turks in Bulgaria are examined from the early 1980s until the present (April, 2014).

Since Turkey's Kurdish and Roma people live within the same political boundaries, state-level political history, and political institutions can be thought of as constant for these two ethnic groups, the Kurds and the Roma also, therefore, provide a quasi-experimental research design. These two ethnic groups are the two most comparable ethnic groups in Turkey for a number of reasons. The Kurds and the Roma are the two largest ethnic minority[21] groups in Turkey. Turkey's Kurdish population is estimated at between five and

[21] Turkey does not recognize Muslim communities as ethnic minorities in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Nevertheless, this dissertation uses the term "ethnic minority" in a sociological sense rather than in a legal sense.

twenty million people (Cornell, 2001; Baslevent, Kirmanoglu, and Senatalar, 2004; McDowall, 2004[1997]; Ozbudun and Genckaya, 2009; Tan, 2009). This means that they represent between seven and twenty-seven percent of Turkey's population although most estimates range from ten to twenty percent. Turkey's Roma population is estimated between two and five million, or three to seven percent of Turkey's population (Marsh, 2008, p. 24). To a great extent, the Kurdish and Roma populations in Turkey also share the same religion (Sunni Islam) as the majority of Turkey's population (ethnic Turks); yet, both groups have native languages other than Turkish. While the Roma speak Roma dialects, such as Rom and Dom, the Kurds speak Kurdish dialects such as Kurmanji and Zaza. Nevertheless, both languages, particularly Roma, face the threat of extinction.

In order to process trace the path of ethno-political mobilizations, I conducted twenty-three semi-structured elite interviews with Turks in Cyprus, including a former president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC),[22] two former state ministers of the TRNC, several former and current deputies of the TRNC parliament, and several former commanders of the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) in March-April 2012. I carried out twelve semi-structured elite interviews on Bulgaria's ethnic population: these included interviews with politicians from the leading ethnic Turkish political party in Bulgaria, Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), and the leader of the second-biggest ethnic Turkish political party in Bulgaria, People's Party for Freedom and Dignity (PPFD), in July 2013. I interviewed thirty-seven Kurdish leaders—including one party leader and

[22] The TRNC lacks international recognition, except by Turkey, in accordance with the UN resolutions of 541 and 550.

ten parliamentary deputies—and thirteen Roma figures—mostly social and political activists—in Turkey from December 2011 to June 2012.

Together with the archival research I carried out on relevant laws, government regulations, and newspapers, these interviews helped me measure and categorize the values of my dependent and independent variables. While acknowledging intra-ethnic heterogeneity, I categorized ethnic mobilizations in terms of their aims and methods by taking case specific circumstances into account; for instance, the Kurdish mobilization in Turkey has led to annual casualties as high as eight thousand two hundred and thirty-four, whereas the death tolls were much lower in Bulgaria and Cyprus and nonexistent in the case of the Roma. Therefore, one hundred casualties in a given year, for example, do not imply the same degree of violence across the four cases, which differ in terms of the size of the population as a whole, the size of the ethnic minority population, and numerous other factors: these four cases have different baselines, or intercepts, in terms of ethnic violence. For instance, when I refer to the Turkish mobilization in Bulgaria and Kurdish mobilization in Turkey as violent for a specific time period, this does not mean that the two cases are equally violent. Instead, it indicates that those violent periods are the most violent periods of each case in their individual historical trajectory. The most violent stage of the Turkish mobilization in Bulgaria is less violent than a "mixed" category among the Kurds in Turkey. Such case-specific considerations that take over-time variation into account help to clarify what made ethnic mobilization in a particular case more or less violent. By contrast, the quantitative section uses one single measurement that is scaled for each case in terms of the dependent variable, independent variable, and control variables; the

selection and measurement of indicators for the variables I use in my quantitative analysis are explained in Chapter Three.

I use the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database to test my hypotheses quantitatively: MAR Phase 4 is currently the most comprehensive phase of the MAR releases and includes data for three hundred and thirty-seven ethnic groups from one hundred and twenty-two countries from 1990 to 2000. The reason why I limit my quantitative analysis to this time period is that some major variables in my regression analysis are coded by the MAR for this time period only. In order to test my hypotheses with regard to the determinants of ethnic mobilization methods, I generated two OLS regression models: one for ethnic groups with low pre-existing mobilization levels, and one for ethnic groups with high pre-existing mobilization levels.

Issues of endogeneity are raised in the theory I developed in this dissertation. Do existing patterns or pre-existing levels of ethno-political mobilization affect the state's selection of particular ethnic incorporation policies? For instance, do violent and secessionist ethnic mobilizations lead states to pursue repressive ethnocratic policies? The answer is probably, yes.

One practical solution to this question of endogeneity is, as briefly mentioned in footnote eighteen of Chapter Two, to follow Archer's (1982) analytical dualism approach. I take ethnic incorporation models and pre-existing mobilization levels at time 1 and explore their interactive effect on ethno-political mobilization patterns at time 2—both in my in-depth case studies and cross-sectional time series analyses. For my qualitative case chapters, I trace the causal processes of how ethnic incorporation models affect ethno-

political mobilization patterns. This kind of process-tracing enables me to deal with the problem of endogeneity as well as equifinality.[23] I also address the problem of endogeneity in my quantitative analyses: I include one-year lagged dependent variable as a control variable in my regression model in order to provide robust estimates of the effects of ethnic incorporation models.

The reason why countries implement different ethnic incorporation policies toward different ethnic groups is conceivably affected by the past, current, and expected ethno-political mobilization patterns of ethnic groups—in addition to a great number of other factors. For example, governments care more about the demands of ethnic majorities than of ethnic minorities: this is true not only in democratic regimes, but also often in non-democratic regimes. Hence, the demands of ethnic majorities are more influential on those incorporation policies than the mobilization patterns of ethnic minorities. The Turkish government's loosening of its group-level exclusionary policies toward the Kurdish population in 2009 caused an immediate backlash from the major opposition parties and Turkish public opinion; therefore, the government once again turned to stricter group-level exclusionary policies even though these policies promised no hope for the resolution of the Kurdish question. International organizations can also play a significant role in shaping ethnic incorporation models, often leading to the weakening exclusionary incorporation policies. For instance, Turkish governments have declared and implemented multiple

[23] Equifinality refers to the principle that a given outcome can be reached in multiple ways. For a discussion of causal effects, causal mechanisms, and the problem of equifinality, see Bennett and George (1997).

inclusive reforms with regards to the Kurdish population in the hopes of gaining access to the European Union.

Finally, some countries adopt a "principled" way of treating different kinds of ethnic groups differently: two such distinctions are made between national minorities and immigrant communities,[24] and between liberal and illiberal minority groups. In terms of the former distinction, France has been a classical example of civic republicanism or what I call civic assimilationism. The French incorporation model for Arabic-speaking immigrants is quite different from the one for Corsicans, who are subject to greater group-level inclusive policies. In terms of the latter distinction, ethnic minorities with "illiberal" practices are denied political autonomy (or, group-level inclusion) in many democratic countries. They are often forced to moderate their illiberal practices or provide a fair opportunity to exit (i.e., individual-level inclusion) to their members. In so-called liberal multiculturalist countries, such as Australia and Canada, ethnic groups that embrace liberal practices are included to a greater extent than those that adopt illiberal practices (e.g., polygamy, female genital mutilation).

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

The dissertation is organized in six chapters. Chapter Two discusses existing explanations and develops a novel theory of ethno-political mobilization. I carry out my

[24] Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes national minorities from immigrant communities by their long-standing residency in their historical homelands. Nevertheless, his conclusion that national minorities seek autonomy whereas immigrant groups seek to participate to the central institutions of the country (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000, p. 18) does not easily follow this conceptual distinction.

quantitative analysis in Chapter Three: this chapter includes two regression models carried out separately for highly and weakly mobilized groups. These models explain the determinants of ethno-political mobilization methods worldwide from 1990 to 2000. This chapter also includes a detailed account of the indicators used in my regression models and their measurement. This chapter is followed by two empirical chapters that include four case studies. Chapter Four explores the causes and dynamics of ethno-political mobilization patterns of Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus. It shows how consociational (pre-1963), civic assimilationist (1963, 1968-1973), and ethnocratic (1964-1967, 1974) policies affected Turkish Cypriot ethnic mobilization from 1960 to 1974 and ended up with the *de facto* secession of Turks from Cyprus. This chapter also discusses how civic assimilationist (1975-1983), quasi-ethnocratic (1984-1989), and proto-liberal multiculturalist (1990-2014) policies have shaped Turkish mobilization in Bulgaria from the 1980s to the present. Chapter Five compares ethno-political mobilization patterns of Kurds and the Roma in Turkey from 1980 up until the present. It explores the effect of quasi-ethnocratic[25] (1980-1994) and civic assimilationist (1995-2014) policies on Kurdish mobilization. This chapter also explores the causes of Roma under-mobilization in Turkey, which are attributed to civic assimilationist policies (less severely group-level exclusionary since 2004). Chapter Six includes a summary of the argument and findings, theoretical and policy implications, and suggestions for future research on ethnic incorporation and ethno-political mobilization.

[25] I call this era quasi ethnocratic because although individual level inclusion was quite limited, it was not completely absent.

CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF ETHNO-POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: ETHNIC INCORPORATION AND MOBILIZATION

Increasingly in the post-Cold War period, ethnic conflicts make it to the top of major international news highlights. Politicians, political analysts, political science scholars, and even the average audience of international news are aware of the increasing salience of ethnic identity for politics. Even seemingly non-ethnic political conflicts are often hijacked by ethnicity. The US-led international military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan brought the question of ethnic conflict to the fore not only in these countries, but also in neighboring countries such as Pakistan in the form of heightened sectarianism (Mehsud, 2013). The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in late 2010 and reached Bahrain in less than a year is arguably the most significant political development of the last couple of years. And, it, too, has been hijacked by ethnic tensions and conflict. This is evident in tribal upheavals in eastern Libya and the fears of Berbers about persecution by the Arab majority of the country (Harding, 2012), Shia uprisings against the Sunni royal family in Bahrain (Law, 2011), Coptic demonstrations against the attacks they faced in Egypt (Aljazeera, 2011), and most brutally, the ongoing civil war in Syria where a tripartite division of the country into Alawite, Kurdish, and Sunni cantons is not unlikely (Abu Shakra, 2013; LHV news, 2013).

Despite the ongoing relevance of ethnic tensions and conflicts either in academia or in the policymaking world, there is not much agreement on what causes such ethnic disputes and how to approach ethnic tensions. States pursue different policies to deal with

their ethno-political problems. While the governments sometimes try to accommodate ethnic groups' demands, they sometimes repress and exclude ethnic minority groups with mixed results. Neither political exclusion nor inclusion produces a consistent outcome with regard to ethno-political mobilization aims and methods.

The development of opposing views on the question of ethno-political mobilization in academic circles will be discussed in this chapter. Some scholars see the seemingly inconsistent outcomes of state policies and downplay the role of political institutions in shaping ethno-political mobilizations. Others argue that state institutions and policies matter, but choose to focus on individual policies or regulations, such as the kind of electoral system or the degree of state repression. The literature is also divided in terms of the locus of agency, particularly with regard to prioritizing elite or mass dynamics. While more and more studies elaborate on causal mechanisms at the individual level whether it is at the elite or the mass level, an overwhelming majority of studies focus on the elite strategies and economic motives of ethno-political mobilizations—which overlooks the great costs of individual decisions of participating in violent conflicts.

This chapter develops a novel theory of ethno-political mobilization that connects the elite and mass dynamics, and material and norm-compliance motives of ethno-political mobilization. The theory developed in this dissertation focuses on one main explanatory factor: ethnic incorporation models. It shows how this factor affects ethnic identification, mobilization capabilities, motives of elites, and it also demonstrates how these variables, in turn, shape ethno-political mobilization aims and methods.

The theory challenges the existing explanations in two ways. First, it relies on a distinct conceptualization of state policies and institutions of ethnic incorporation. This conceptualization lets me distinguish between inclusive and exclusionary policies at the individual and group levels, and the resulting quadripartite categorization provides a more realistic and accurate depiction of the question than a linear inclusion-exclusion or recognition-repression dichotomy does. Second, in contrast to most of the literature, this study examines the interaction of ethnic incorporation models with pre-existing levels of mobilization. Since not all ethnic minority groups start from scratch in mobilizing for ethno-political goals, it is very crucial to know to what extent an ethnic group has already mobilized. This can tell us to what extent the group members have access to mobilizing structures and know-how. It can also shape their feelings of ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness, among other factors. These attributes, in turn, tell us whether group-level exclusion can become a source of feelings of deprivation and the primary motive behind ethnic unrest, particularly in violent forms.

This chapter begins with an analysis of existing explanations of ethno-political mobilization patterns. The first section also categorizes the existing literature in terms of the dependent variable, the causal mechanisms, the levels of analysis, and the question of agency. Then, it discusses existing explanations of the effect of ethnic incorporation models on ethno-political mobilization patterns, before ending with an analysis of the gaps and problems in existing literature. Following this section, I introduce my own theory and lay out my hypotheses, and round it out with some concluding remarks.

Existing Explanations of Ethno-Political Mobilization

The question of ethnic mobilization requires examining the literatures on collective action, contentious politics, social movements, terrorism, civil wars, ethnic conflict, secessionism, and conflict resolution—as well as generic problems of social theory such as the nature of causality, levels of analysis, and the question of structure and agency.

One way of categorizing the literature(s) on ethnic mobilization is based on the dependent variable (methods and aims of ethno-political mobilization). In terms of mobilization methods, ethnic voting and parties (Van Cott, 2005; Madrid, 2012), ethnic protest and social movements (Olzak, 1983; 2011), and ethnic rebellion and conflict (Gurr T. , 1970; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2003; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010) are the major subjects of study. When considering mobilization aims, secessionism (Lustick, Miodownik, & Eidelson, 2004; Saideman, Dougherty, & Jenne, 2005) and integration (Rex & Singh, 2003; Eriksen, 2007) are the most discussed phenomena. In fact, these are two sides of the same coin.

A large number of studies explore the causes and causal mechanisms leading to these outcomes. These theories can also be classified in a number of ways. One major distinction can be made in terms of the level of analysis where the major causal factors are explored. While some of these explanatory variables are macro-level factors, others are at the meso- or micro-level. Macro-level factors are environmental as they are independent of and exogenous to the respective agent's action. At the macro level, the major explanatory factors are outside support (Jenne, 2004), ethnic fragmentation, historical facts and myths, cultural frames, structures of power (Boix, 2008), demographic attributes (e.g.,

population size and shifts, geographical concentration) (Toft, 2007), and geographical factors (e.g., terrain, distance between the ethnic heartland and the political center of the country) (Toft, 2005). Micro-level explanations are limited to individual perceptions, interpretations, expectations, emotions, needs, and motives. Bargaining-based theories can be taken as agent-centered; hence, in micro-level theories the decisions of agents are often determined (i.e., incentivized or constrained) by macro-level structures. Therefore, explanations of ethnic conflict and secessionism often rely on a mixture of macro- and micro-level of analyses. [26] Political institutions and social networks are often referred as meso-level factors because they serve as the context for the process of interaction between macro- and micro-level entities. This approach will be discussed in a greater detail in this section.[27]

A third way to categorize the literature would be by the causal mechanisms. Causal mechanisms are often explored at a lower level of analysis and the effect of the major explanatory factor on social behavior is elaborated at this lower level. These mechanisms quite often come in three forms: motives, capabilities, and ethno-political awareness.[28] The debate over greed vs. grievance is the primary subject matter of the literature on motivational mechanisms (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The prevailing explanations in the

[26] For instance, while Jenne (2004) and Wucherpfennig (2010) both develop bargaining-based theories of ethnic secessionism and ethnic conflict, Jenne focuses on strategic calculations of individuals as shaped by the availability of support from outside countries, and Wucherpfennig analyzes the strategic calculations and information problems of individuals as shaped by power distribution between the state and the ethnic minority groups.

[27] For a discussion of meso-level analyses, see Lichbach (1998, p. 403) and Jepperson and Meyer (2011, p. 60). For a discussion of meso-level analyses of ethnic mobilization, see the discussion of ethnic incorporation models and their effects in the literature on page 12.

[28] I will use ethno-political awareness as a short form for the amalgamation of three cognitive processes (i.e., ethnic identification, ethno-political consciousness, and feelings of linked fate).

literature often prioritize the greed-based elite motivations or the grievance-based mass motivations over each other in explaining the causes of ethno-political mobilizations. Examples of such mechanisms that determine people's ethno-political awareness and sense of deprivation include *elite entrepreneurship* (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972), *relative deprivation* (Gurr T. , 1970), *chosen traumas* (Volkan, 1991), and *social identity* (Tajfel, 1982). Ethno-political awareness is also shaped by the respective agents' information, perceptions, and interpretations of their own 'selves' and their capabilities—as well as by the other relevant actors' capabilities and intentions (Posen, 1993). Opportunity structures, as well as resources and mobilizing structures, are the most-discussed capability mechanisms (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996).

Some studies do not link their analyses back to an analysis of ontologically independent and temporally prior major causes; instead, they start their explanation from the latter stage of mechanisms and processes. This method of arguing can be classified as causal frameworks rather than full-fledged causal theories. These sort of explanations provide a "how" answer by explaining how the outcome appears through all, or some, of the following causal mechanisms and processes. This dissertation, by contrast, views mechanisms such as relative deprivation[29] (Gurr T. , 1970) and frameworks such as the amalgamation of opportunity structures, resources, cultural frames (McAdam, Tarrow, &

[29] Whereas relative deprivation is a mechanism, the causes of (the sense of) relative deprivation such as economic disparity or political exclusion together with this mechanism can form a full-fledged causal theory. Gurr also explores such 'causes' of relative deprivation in his own analysis. For a discussion of deprivation and fairness related explanations such as equity theory, social comparison theory, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, justice motive theory, and, particularly, relative deprivation theory, see Dubé and Guimond (1986) and Skitka and Wisneski (2012).

Tilly, 1996) as needing to be complemented by ontologically exogenous, independent, and temporally prior causal factors that shape the intensity and spread of the feelings of deprivation as well as the range of opportunities, resources, and cultural frames.

A final division of the literature(s) on ethnic mobilization can be made by looking at the question of agency: this question is often understood on philosophical grounds, as in the free will vs. determinism debate. This dissertation, by contrast, treats the question of agency in a less-substantial context and a more direct way as in the question of "who acts?" Who rebels, protests, votes, or mobilizes in any other form: individuals or groups, elites[30] or the masses? In this context, a study may explain just the aggregate outcome (e.g., the incidence of ethnic conflict) or the individual action (e.g., voting for an ethnic party or elites' ethnic outbidding[31]). The actor-based accounts often exclusively focus on either elite or mass behavior by assuming that the other kind of agency is secondary to their analyses.

In light of this framework, a major macro explanatory factor of ethno-political mobilization patterns is ethnic diversity. The classical works on ethnic conflict such as those of Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) and Horowitz (1985) saw endemic pathologies in multi-ethnic states that led to ethnic conflict, political instability, and secessionism. Some scholars argues that ethnic fragmentation was particularly pernicious because "identity conflict poses the most difficult type of conflict" (Offe, 1998, p. 120) since the members

[30] I adopt Higley and Burton's (2006) definition of elites with the difference that they focus on elites at the national level whereas I focus on elites within ethnic groups. Accordingly, elites are "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect […] political outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principal decision makers […]" (p. 7). Elites and ethnic entrepreneurs are used interchangeably in this dissertation.

[31] Ethnic outbidding is a mechanism whereby ethnicity, once politicized, necessarily radicalizes the camps due to elites' self-seeking behavior.

of a party often aimed to eliminate, isolate, or fully assimilate the other party. Such hostile attitudes require a strong sense of frustration and deeply rooted grievances. Nevertheless, such a motivational mechanism is not sufficient, alone, to transform the attitudes into action; it also requires a sense of ethno-political awareness. Individuals identify themselves with ethnic groups (ethnic identification[32]), define the interests of their own group, define "the other" with respect to the "self," and define the other as the enemy[33] that did, has, or will hurt one's own group's interests (ethno-political[34] consciousness). This chain of processes can also be heavily shaped by the ability of elites to transform individuals into an ethnic mobilization base. These mechanisms and processes of motivation, ethno-political awareness, and capabilities change over time due to the variation in a number of exogenous variables to be discussed below.

Among other explanatory factors that shape ethnic mobilization, one can list the nature of ethnicity and ethnic relations—specifically, levels of ethnic polarization and fluidity of ethnic identification (Madrid, 2009), ethnic group size (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996), and structural attributes such as the distribution of resources, power, or security between states and ethnic organizations acting on behalf of

[32] Kenny and Briner (2013, pp. 731-732) define ethnic identification as a 'pull' towards an ethnic group, which "refer[s] to instances where features of a situation led to participants experiencing an increased affinity with their ethnic group, resulting in an increased salience of their ethnic identity." Ethno-political consciousness is a step further than the sense of belongingness. It includes a sense of political awareness with more or less clear political goals and a political agenda to achieve those goals.

[33] Definition of the self and other are two interrelated processes. As Harris and Findley (2012-online version) show, individuals with stronger ethnic identification, that is a stronger attachment to their own group, are better at identifying the ethnicity of others.

[34] Hence, the term political here can be thought as Carl Schmitt's (1996 [1927]) concept of the political that draws the line between the friends and the enemy.

ethnic groups (Posen, 1993; Snyder and Jervis, 1999). Another macro exogenous factor is the socio-economic structures whose attributes change over time. For Boone (2003), the structures and relations of property, production, and political authority enable/constrain and dis-/incentivize state and regional political elites. Accordingly, "decades-long land tensions" break out into violence and fuel ethnic conflict in such cases (p. 221). Such material structural analyses see it as "misleading to cast ethnicity as a purely cultural or ideational variable" (Boone, 2003, pp. 349, n.31).

Physical proximity to the center, terrain of the ethnic heartland, and territorial concentration of the group are all macro-level factors that are argued to be mediator variables that affect ethnic mobilization via (dis-)incentivizing and enabling or constraining behavior. Territorial concentration is perhaps the most discussed one in this group of factors. According to Laitin (2007, p. 19), "the more the groups are settled in a single region of the country, the more likely they will be in rebellion against the state." Territorial concentration is also argued to be a causal factor of secessionism. For Bunce (1999, p. 139), "national minorities within a state, particularly when they are geographically compressed, are potentially secessionist".

Not all macro factors are material though: besides primordial bonds, numerous cultural, ideological, or ideational factors are argued to shape ethnic identification, political consciousness, solidarity, and, in turn, mobilization. In addition to *clash of civilizations* (Huntington, 1993) type of primordialist arguments, Smith's (1991) seminal work on national identity emphasizes the role of ethno-symbolic elements in the relations between the majority and minority communities.

Another factor that allegedly shapes ethno-political mobilization patterns is political institutions: scholars agree that state policies and institutions can play a crucial role in shaping ethno-political mobilization patterns, but they disagree about the effects of the different policies and which ones matter most. Some scholars examine the effect of regime types. Democracies, Howard (2002, p. 159) argues, encourage and support organizational activity in contrast to authoritarian regimes that do not tolerate organized groups and communist regimes that "repress all forms of autonomous nonstate activity." According to Hegre et al. (2001), civil wars, including ethnic conflicts, rarely occur where coherent democratic or authoritarian regimes are in rule, but mostly in intermediate regimes between the two mature forms of government. Tilly (2003) combines regime type and institutional capacity in arguing that collective violence is a result of low state capacity and authoritarian forms of government.

Regime type fails to explain the cases outlined in this dissertation. The first democratic constitution of Cyprus drafted in 1960 was soon followed by ethnic separatism and violence. By contrast, Bulgaria's transition to democracy in 1990 coincided with the complete rejection of the use of violent methods by the Turkish minority and their increasing desire for coexistence with ethnic Bulgarians within the same state. This is another reason why we should consider the incorporation of ethnic groups by the state in a dyadic form (as in the pairs of the state and individual ethnic groups) rather than merely focusing on state-level attributes such as regime type. Since ethnic incorporation policies vary for different ethnic groups living in the same country, such ethnic groups mobilize, if they do, for different goals using different methods. For instance, Turkey's policies against

its Kurdish and Roma people have been different; as a result, ethno-political mobilization levels, aims, and methods of these two ethnic groups have differed radically.

In a second kind of institutional and policy analysis, some scholars examine the impact of specific institutional arrangements of ethnic accommodation on ethnic mobilization. They often focus on power-sharing or decentralization, and electoral regulations.[35] Hechter observes a complex relationship between decentralization on the one hand and ethnic mobilization on the other in the ethnic politics literature. While decentralization may increase ethnic protests by providing greater resources to ethnic groups, it may moderate ethnic groups' goals; this should decrease the level of ethnic violence and separatism (Hechter, 2000, p. 10). Yet in Bulgaria, apart from the transition to democracy in 1990, neither electoral regulations nor the level of decentralization changed in the periods under scrutiny; but, ethno-political mobilization methods varied vastly in the same period. The varying levels of decentralization and electoral regulations do help explain ethnic mobilization patterns in Cyprus, but they were only one part of an ethnic incorporation model that sought to decrease the Turkish Cypriot rights. Turkey's extraordinarily high electoral threshold, which has particularly hurt pro-Kurdish political parties, its electoral system (simple proportional representation calculated by *d'Hondt* formula) and its strictly centralized government have been intact for the entire period under scrutiny in this dissertation. They therefore cannot explain variation in ethno-political

[35] For examples, see Bauböck (2000); Gorenburg (2000); Cornell (2002); Saideman, Lanoue, Campanni and Stanton (2002); Lustick, Miodownik and Eidelson (2004); Bakke and Wibbels, (2006); and Elkins and Sides (2007).

mobilization in Turkey during this period.[36] By contrast, ethnic incorporation models can explain such variation because they have attributes other than the degree of (de-)centralization and electoral system and thresholds, such as legal and financial barriers or other features that shape the opportunities of ethno-political parties. The issue of how these other dimensions of ethnic incorporation have varied in the cases of the Roma and Kurdish ethnic groups is explained in Chapter Five.

In this dissertation, I argue that the precise effect of particular institutional designs depends on the broader framework and underlying logic of ethnic accommodation within which these specific institutional designs and policies are employed. For instance, while federalism might grant political autonomy to ethnic enclaves in some cases, it might cross-cut ethnically more homogenous constituencies in others. Similarly, ethnic political parties might be constitutionally allowed to compete in elections, but their electoral success might be hindered by discriminatory electoral regimes or high electoral thresholds. The crucial question is whether a specific institutional design or policy is employed for inclusion or exclusion at the group or individual levels in the broader context of ethnic incorporation. Although there is a flourishing literature (Wimmer, 2002; Akturk, 2011; Mylonas, 2012) on such ethnic accommodation regimes, these studies tend to take ethnic accommodation policies as the dependent variable and aim at explaining the causes of particular institutional configurations of ethnic inclusion and exclusion. They also categorize those policies primarily for conceptual analyses (Soysal, 1994) or seek answers to other

[36] The reason why the state policies targeting ethno-political parties are considered as group-level policies rather than at the individual level is explained in footnote 26 of this chapter in the context of seeking greater liberties for ethno-political parties as a centrifugal (autonomy-increasing) goal.

significant questions such as the causes of national identity, political ideology, and satisfaction with democracy (Weldon, 2006). Moreover, most of the literature on the effects of ethnic accommodation policies relies on the longstanding debate between ethnic partition in the form of consociationalism as suggested by Arendt Lijphart and cross-cutting mechanisms of ethnic inclusion as advocated by Donald Horowitz.[37]Such a dichotomy does not exhaust the existing forms of ethnic accommodation and leaves a great part of ethnic politics as a mystery. This dissertation examines the effect of institutions and policies of ethnic accommodation, so-called ethnic incorporation models.

One widely discussed ethnic incorporation model is liberal multiculturalism: there is a major debate in the literature about the effects of liberal multiculturalism on ethnic mobilization. Some scholars (Kymlicka, 1995; Coleman and Higgins, 2000; Gurr T. R., 2000; Parekh, 2000; Kymlicka, 2010) argue that liberal multiculturalist policies facilitate the peaceful integration of ethnic groups, while others maintain that liberal multiculturalism is inherently harmful and destabilizing because it relies on and reinforces outmoded and rigid primordial communal divisions by "parceling out public functions to ethnic communities" (Barry, 2001, p. 89). Some people also suggest that it compartmentalizes society and creates ghettoes within it (Beiner, 1995; Miller, 1995; Barry, 2001; Schnapper, 2002; Koopmans, 2010) and leads to inefficient outcomes due to ambiguities and transaction costs involved in recognizing diversity (Fukuyama, 1994; Offe, 1998).

[37] For examples, see Horowitz (1985); Lijphart (1969; 1977); Lustick (1997); Sambanis (2000); McGarry and O'Leary (2006); Jenne (2009).

The effects of consociationalism are also the subject of debate: its proponents (Lijphart, 1969; 1977) argue that consociationalism has a good record of preventing violent conflict in deeply divided societies. It is also criticized for compartmentalizing and segregating the society by removing cross-cutting channels of integration (Dixon, 1996). This, in turn, leads to "daily irritation" and "inefficiency" (Van den Berghe, 2002, p. 438) and leaves the country in the hands of a 'cartel of ethnic elites' (Van den Berghe, 1981, p. 349). Its purported successes are questioned because of serious data limitations (Selway & Templeman, 2012) and its reliance on a single (and allegedly misidentified) case: the Netherlands (Taylor, 1992, p. 7).

Civic republicanism, which I refer to as civic assimilationism, stresses the "unifying bond" of a "shared consensus" around the constitution (Habermas, 2001, p. 775). Some advocates of "civicness" are not satisfied with merely constitutional or legal declarations, but argue for the creation of deeper attachments to the country through "deliberate attempts to draw up geographically based administrative units that cut across communal boundaries" (Barry, 2001, p. 89). Koopmans (2010) argues that countries that implement assimilationist integration policies achieve better integration levels by avoiding the segregation trap of multiculturalism. The critics of this model claim that the civic ideal of republicanism is "over-enthusiastic about citizenship" (Oenen, 2002, p. 123). The purely legal aspect of civicness does not provide an identity comparable to the political identity provided by nationality (Miller, 1995, p. 163). In contrast to the assumed divorce of the political from the ethnic, Coleman and Higgins (2000) argue that by "suppressing reference to real ethnic

inequalities and exclusions, the civic ideal actually creates a more insidious 'logic of exclusion' than the ethnic one" (p. 67).[38]

Ethnocracy is typically argued to lead to the worst political outcomes and is often associated with the oppression of ethnic minorities (Kellas, 1991; Gurr T. R., 1993; Gurr & Moore, 1997). Fein (1993) notes that state repression and political exclusion are the major sources of the most-severe violent events of the second half of the 20th century; yet, for some others (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001), repression leads to civil wars only when political institutions are not well developed. Jenne (2004) also does not see repression of ethnic minorities as sufficient for ethnic minorities to mobilize for secessionist goals. According to Jenne (2004, p. 736), in the absence of external support, minorities prefer "[majority] repression to the devastating costs of military defeat" and are "likely to accommodate the majority and endure repression."

The literature on ethnic accommodation models suffers from numerous problems: the deep disputes between "boutique" and "strong" forms of multiculturalism,[39] conventional and "progressive"[40] forms of consociationalism, and "rooted" (Viroli, 2002) and "constitutional" (Habermas, 2001) forms of republicanism make it very hard to speak of a coherent taxonomy of incorporation models. It is still unclear due to weakly developed

[38] Patten, in contrast, thinks that 'strong attachments to particular identities' are "not necessarily fragmenting if they are accompanied by an attachment to the whole as a context in which difference flourishes" (Patten, 2000, p. 204), a statement that might be seen to the critics as a contradiction in terms. Although the proponents of civic republicanism argue that the connection between civic republicanism and ethnocracy is not 'conceptual', but 'contingent' (Habermas, 1995, p. 263), for the critiques, this contingency is so deeply rooted that it is impossible to detach.

[39] For the distinction, see Fish (1997).

[40] For the distinction, see McGarry and O'Leary (2006).

causal explanations how (existing or to-be) co-ethnics[41] respond to different ethnic accommodation policies.

The broader literature on ethnic politics also suffers from numerous shortcomings. First, since the literature is quite fragmented between the "subfields" of ethnic politics; the shared dynamics of ethnic politics are often obscured. A wide range of ethnic phenomena from ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness to secessionism and ethnic conflict are, in fact, different stages and forms of ethnic mobilization. But, no one has delivered a unified theory of ethnic mobilization that integrates ethnic identification, ethno-political consciousness, motives, goals, and mobilization methods. Rather than developing full-fledged causal theories, an overwhelming majority of existing studies provide limited analytical frameworks that explain only a small part of the picture (such as the disconnected debates over the power, perception, motive, and strategy aspects of ethnic politics). Such analyses need to be complemented by efforts to explain how these aspects are determined and connected by analytically exogenous phenomena such as political institutions.[42] Incorporation models shape ethno-political mobilizations not only by constraining or enabling action after the actors' intentions are created, but also by constituting their intentions even before the action. [43] Studies of the impact of political institutions on ethnic

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41 By co-ethnics, I mean any individual who identifies herself with the respective ethnic group.

42 Political institutions are themselves historical artifacts, hence, endogenous to the social behavior. In order to deal with the problem of endogeneity, this study adopts Archer's (1982) analytical dualism approach and takes institutional incorporation and pre-existing mobilization at time 1 and elaborates their interactive effect on ethno-political mobilization patterns at time 2. For further discussion on this issue, see the research design section of Chapter One.

43 For a number of scholars, political institutions do not only constrain actions, but also play a role in the formation of intentions by shaping preferences, interests, goals, and/or objectives (Hall, 1986; 1992; 1993, p. 292; Ikenberry, 1988; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).

mobilization are often under-theorized, as they lack a full account of the causal and constitutive impacts of political institutions.

Although great progress has been made in understanding the causes and consequences of ethnic accommodation regimes (Lijphart, 1969; Horowitz, 1985), ethnic identification and consciousness (Tajfel, 1982; Dawson, 1994; Hechter, 2000), ethnic mobilization (Olzak, 1983), and ethnic conflict (Gurr T. , 1970; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2003; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010), the ethnic politics literature lacks a comprehensive theory of ethnic mobilization to integrate the fragmented puzzles of the literature. A comprehensive theory of ethnic political mobilization requires a theory of political institutions, elites, identity and collective action. Such a unified theory should also benefit from a systematic application of the theories and findings of social movements and contentious politics in the sphere of ethnic mobilization; a research agenda that has not been fulfilled in the ethnic politics literature yet. The theoretical part outlined in the next section consists of some initial steps toward such a comprehensive theoretical inquiry.

Second, most of the literature on ethnic mobilization develops micro-foundational explanations from a primarily economic point of view[44] or in the context of the opportunities and constraints with regards to state capacity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

[44] For economic explanations of ethnic behavior, see Collier (2000) and Esteban and Ray (2011). By contrast, De Vos (1983) underlines the role of emotional and irrational aspects of ethnic behavior and argues that merely economic theories of ethnic politics fail to explain the ethnic phenomena. As Corstrange (2013) argues, such economic approaches overlook the fact that people on some occasions can make identity demands even if such demands are inconsistent with their material interests. For an account of dignity, self-esteem, and recognition dimensions of social identity-based explanations and the grievances stemming from non-recognition, see Tajfel (1982), De Vos (1983), Monroe, Hankin and Van Vechten (2000), Brewer (2001), and Huddy (2001).

Therefore, such analyses fail to account for other individual-level mechanisms of ethnic mobilization such as ethnic identification, ethno-political consciousness, and a sense of linked fate[45]—as well as motivational mechanisms such as relative deprivation. By neglecting the effect of state policies on individuals' behavior, such studies suffer from a lack of understanding of the relationship between ethnic incorporation and ethnic mobilization. Although primordialism has faded away and agent-based constructivist and instrumentalist approaches have become the *lingua franca* in ethnic politics studies, micro-foundational theories still mostly rely on disconnected assumptions about the greed of elites or the irrational drives of the masses. This dissertation elaborates on both the causal (constraining or incentivizing) and constitutive (agent transforming) effects of ethnic incorporation models.[46] The overall analytical approach of the study follows Coleman's (1986; 1987) mission of connecting macro-level explanatory phenomena to macro-level social behavior via mechanisms at the micro (individual) level. In other words, this dissertation adopts micro-foundationalism as a method of theoretical inquiry in linking macro-level causes to macro-level outcomes.[47]

Finally, the ethnic politics literature tends to neglect the context of ethnic relations and fails to explore how ethnic incorporation policies interact with the pre-existing levels of ethno-political mobilization. As argued in this chapter, ethnic incorporation policies

[45] Linked fate refers to the extent to which members of a group feel that their well-being is linked to that of their co-ethnics. See Dawson (1994), Simien (2005), and Hochschild and Weaver (2007) for a discussion of linked fate.

[46] For more on the differences between causal and constitutive effects, see Wendt (1999).

[47] Such an account differs from adopting deeper philosophical and ontological accounts of methodological individualism and social atomism. For a discussion and critique of social atomism and methodological individualism, see Lukes (1968).

have varying effects on ethnic groups with different pre-existing levels of mobilization who, in turn, respond to these policies differently. It makes sense then that linear assumptions in the form of 'the more inclusion, the more moderation' oversimplify reality and perform poorly in terms of explanatory and predictive power.

Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Ethnic Mobilization Patterns

Contrary to the widely shared assumptions in the ethnic politics literature, elites do not always seek to achieve ethnic polarization via ethnic outbidding in multiethnic societies; nor do the masses always follow elite calls for secessionism and rebellion (Fearon and Laitin, 1996).[48] Furthermore, ethnic groups are not natural outgrowths of culturally homogeneous 'core' communities. Finally, once culturally formed, ethnic groups do not always become politicized. On the contrary, they typically only become politicized when a sufficient portion of their members share the same political interests, aims, and strategies. This outcome is contingent upon the level of ethno-political awareness. It is also shaped by motivational factors (e.g., individuals' deprivation-led frustration that creates an impetus for aggression) and the capabilities of elites.

The central argument of this dissertation is that a state's institutions and policies of ethnic incorporation shape the aims and methods of ethno-political mobilization. The precise impact of a state's ethnic incorporation model depends on, in part, the degree of pre-existing political mobilization of respective ethnic groups. This section discusses how

[48] According to Varshney (2003, p. 89), "for something to be manipulated by a leader when death, injury, or incarceration is a clear possibility, it must be valued as a good by a critical mass of people."

the four models of ethnic incorporation (i.e., liberal multiculturalism, consociationalism, civic assimilationism, and ethnocracy) shape ethno-political mobilization patterns. According to the theory developed in this dissertation, ethnic incorporation models categorize people into minority (via ascription) or majority (via assimilation) ethnic groups. In turn, this shapes the degree to which individuals identify with an ethnic group (ethnic identification), care about the political future of that ethnic group (ethno-political consciousness), and see their individual interests and future connected to their co-ethnics (linked fate). Incorporation models may also satisfy ethnic members' desired material interests as well as self-esteem and recognition needs or they may give them a sense of relative deprivation.[49] These outcomes, in turn, shape the aggression and secession motives of the masses.

This section also examines how ethnic incorporation models empower or disempower ethnic elites and shape their ability to effectively call for secessionist and violent mobilizations. In this sense, ethnic incorporation policies may function as an enabling factor for ethnic elites; yet, the fact that elites are able to call for secessionist and/or violent mobilization does not necessarily mean that they will. Their decisions can also be shaped by the very same cognitive and motivational factors that affect mass decisions. As shown in Figure 2.1, the theory developed in this dissertation connects social

[49] One can conceive such self-esteem and recognition needs in a very similar way to Maslow's (1943) 'esteem needs.' As he puts it, everybody has a need for self-respect and self-esteem which are partly tied to respect and recognition from others. For Maslow, "thwarting of these needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness and of helplessness. These feelings in turn give rise to either basic discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends" (p.383).

behavior to individual constituents' motives, ethno-political awareness, and capabilities—all of which are shaped by state policies of ethnic incorporation.

Figure 2.1 Causal mechanisms of ethno-political mobilization



By *motives*, I mean the desires that compel an agent to carry out an action to attain the desired goal. We can distinguish between interest-based or material motives (e.g., utility maximization whether the utility is wealth, power, or security) and value-based or norm-compliance motives (e.g., duties stemming from self-imposed moral obligations in the Kantian fashion).[50] Politically excluded and oppressed co-ethnics can mobilize to

[50] Such a distinction does not necessarily place one kind of motives as more rational than the other. Following Weber's distinction between instrumental rationality and value rationality, Varshney (2003) argues that group interests can drive individual behavior even with high costs upon the individuals themselves. Such an

achieve their material and/or self-assertive needs; they will often do so by adopting centrifugal goals and violent methods. I take ethno-political awareness (as the sum of cognitive factors) broadly to include a wide array of information, beliefs, and perceptional attributes such as the definition of the 'self' in terms of an identity or membership status. One's self-identification also leads one to define his/her moral values and material interests in different ways. The definition of such life goals forms a variety of motives that prompt agents to seek to attain those goals; therefore, motives are reasons, if not causes, of our actions to attain pre-determined goals.[51] What I mean by *capabilities* are the moral and material resources—or more simply, power—available to agents. Ethno-political awareness also affects a person's perception of one's own or one's group's (e.g., an ethnic group) capabilities as well as the intentions and capabilities of other parties (e.g., the state).

It should be emphasized that the ethno-political awareness, motives (e.g., deprivation-based frustration), and capabilities (e.g., resources and authority) of ethnic groups are not independent of each other, but interact and might be mutually reinforcing in some cases. On the one hand, empowered elites (possessing legal authority and material resources) can shape the ethno-political awareness of the masses through control of propaganda instruments (capabilities → ethno-political awareness). On the other hand, co-ethnics with higher pre-existing levels of ethno-political awareness tend to be more responsive to elite calls for ethnic mobilization (ethno-political awareness → capabilities).

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account can still be seen as rational in a minimalist sense of the term that is limited to the ends-means compatibility of actions.

[51] Scholars like Davidson (1963) attribute a causal role to motives and intentions whereas this study takes motivational and cognitive attributes as causal mechanisms and processes that are shaped by external stimuli, in this case, state policies.

Similar feedback effects can also be observed between motivational and cognitive processes. The denial of group autonomy can motivate aggression only if group autonomy is assigned a value (ethno-political awareness → motives). The resulting frustration can create greater levels of ethno-political consciousness among co-ethnics (motives → ethno-political awareness); empowered ethnic elites can more effectively inform their co-ethnics of the extent of (past, existing, or expected) state denial of their demands, and they can exacerbate the feeling of frustration among co-ethnics (capabilities → motives). Also, frustrated co-ethnics are more easily subject to elite calls for ethnic mobilization (motives → capabilities).

Hence, ethnic incorporation models can create a multiplier effect by shaping the motives, ethno-political awareness, and elite capabilities of ethnic groups. For instance, when politically awakened ethnic groups[52] are denied of their self-assertion needs in the form of political exclusion, they feel frustrated. With a little elite-entrepreneurship, this frustration can easily be transformed into a perception of the state as the primary enemy: an institution that prevents the group from achieving its goals. This sense of deprivation motivates ethnic members to demand remedies to unfair treatment—or even to seek revenge for the committed injustice. Such motives can insert centrifugal goals into the group's political agenda and violence into the group's repertoire of acceptable mobilization

[52] The more politically conscious and active co-ethnics exist in an ethnic group, the more the ethnic group is politically salient or awakened.

methods.[53] The more people have these motivational and cognitive predispositions, the more co-ethnics can be mobilized by ethnic elites.

Centrifugal and violent ethno-political mobilization requires a number of partly overlapping preconditions. First, a number of individuals must identify with an ethnic group, which is typically at least partly in response to an ethnic categorization process that is often enforced by state policies of ethnic incorporation. When the state incorporates ethnic minorities in such a way that ethnic members cannot participate in politics via non-ethnic political channels, this policy is called individual-level exclusion. Regardless of their degree of group-level inclusion or exclusion, individual-level exclusionary models (e.g., consociationalism and ethnocracy) categorize individuals into single and exclusive ethno-political units. This ascription (i.e., ethnic categorization) process leads to stronger ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness levels amongst the categorized population. Such ascription policies also trigger material interests: as the state categorizes a group of people into a political unit *vis-a-vis* the state and other ethnic groups, the ascribed members of that ethnic group develop a sense of linked fate—which is a perception of common interests (ranging from physical survival to material wellbeing) and a common future. These ideationally (ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness) and materially (linked fate) based cognitive factors create a potential source of human capital for ethnic elites. This group of co-ethnics becomes increasingly responsive to elite calls for violent

[53] For the origins of frustration-aggression hypothesis, see Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer and Sears (1939) and Rummel (1977).

and centrifugal mobilizations, more so than it would be under individual-level inclusive policies (e.g., liberal multiculturalism, civic assimilationism).

In a nutshell, group-level inclusive policies categorize individuals into ethnic groups. This ascription process is less influential when political channels are available under individual-level inclusive policies. The effect of group-level inclusion is moderated[54] by the pre-existing mobilization level. When ethnic groups are already politically awakened and have high pre-existing levels of political mobilization, ethnic categorization does not create much change because existing ethno-political organizations and movements can sustain ethnic identification and political consciousness more or less without the help of the state recognition. [55] However, when such organizations and movements are missing, group-level inclusive policies cause a significant change in the level of ethno-political awareness. Moreover, the sense of deprivation and frustration that ethnic groups feel when they are highly mobilized but their group-level inclusion demands are not addressed by the state make co-ethnics more politically consciousness. The interaction of group-level and individual-level policies with pre-existing mobilization levels leads to the ethno-political consciousness outcomes shown in Table 2.1.

While the development of ethno-political awareness among co-ethnics might lead to centrifugal mobilizations, it is unlikely that those people will use violent methods as long as the state makes available effective peaceful channels of mobilization. Members of

[54] For a discussion of moderating variables, see Baron and Kenny (1986).

[55] To use an analogy from physical science, when the same unit of force is applied on more and less massive objects respectively, the more massive object has less acceleration than the smaller object. Similarly, groups with greater pre-existing mobilization levels can be seen as more massive groups and are accelerated less by the same degree of group level inclusion.

an ethnic group conflict with the state when they feel a strong sense of deprivation: the resulting widespread sense of frustration is often, if not always, the result of a perceived injustice committed against the group. When members of an ethnic group are unjustly treated by the state, the resulting perception of deprivation and the feeling of frustration generate the primary motive for ethnic rebellion.[56]

Group-level exclusion is a significant source of political deprivation; therefore, civic assimilationist policies are expected to lead to frustration among previously highly mobilized groups, which will cause centrifugal mobilizations with sporadic, if not consistent, use of violent methods. However, the members of ethnic groups that lack a history of strong ethno-political mobilization are not expected to see these group-level exclusionary policies as a source of political deprivation; in order for an exclusionary policy to create a sense of deprivation, the object of the policy should be assigned a value by the targeted people. As Runciman (1966) notes: "a person who is 'relatively deprived' need not be objectively deprived" (pp. 10-11). Ethnic groups with weak levels of pre-existing ethno-political mobilization are not expected to be frustrated with group-level exclusion as long as other non-ethnic channels of political mobilization are genuinely available; therefore, they are not expected to pursue centrifugal goals or use violent methods of mobilization. They might even culturally assimilate into majority ethnic groups in the long run. Therefore, as shown in Table 2.1, group-level exclusion—unless coupled

[56] According to relative deprivation theories, the discrepancy between expectations and actual achievements/gains creates a sense of frustration and aggression. Violence, therefore, is a likely outcome of relative deprivation. For further discussion, see Gurr (1970).

with individual-level exclusion or implemented on a politically active ethnic group—does not make individuals feel politically deprived.

Once ethnic groups are constructed via individual-level exclusionary policies, and are discriminated against, ethnic violence becomes a likely outcome. Nevertheless, attempts at violent ethnic mobilization are often doomed to failure when in-group elites lack the ability to arm their co-ethnics or if they fail to sustain group members' commitments by incentivizing, coercing or indoctrinating them. Ethnic elites might have varying capabilities depending on many features, such as the existence of kin states or other circumstances that weaken state capacity (such as economic crises or wars on other fronts). Since it may grant or deny material resources and legal authority to ethnic elites,[57] the state is also a major determinant of elites' capabilities. As shown in 2.1, group-level inclusive policies, by definition, empower ethnic elites. When cross-cutting political channels (individual-level inclusion) are absent, elite empowerment reaches its highest level. By definition, ethnic groups that are empowered with greater resources have greater destructive capacity. Once empowered, elites might use the resources under their control to create a stronger sense of ethnic identification and ethnic consciousness. As discussed above, ethnic conflict is not a likely outcome as long as peaceful channels of political participation are available. Elites can exaggerate perceptions of discriminatory state policies towards the group, but it is extremely difficult to do so when there is no genuine

[57] Previously empowered elites can also use pre-existing know-how and networks even after being deprived of their de jure power and can mobilize their co-ethnics with their de facto power. In other words, group-level inclusion creates lagged effects on elites' mobilizing capacity.

discrimination against the group; in other words, political deprivation is a necessary condition for ethnic rebellion.

Table 2.1 integrates the preceding discussion into a single table in order to show how ethnic incorporation policies and pre-existing mobilization levels interact to create different mechanisms of ethno-political awareness, motives, and capabilities. These causal mechanisms will help the reader understand the variation in ethno-political mobilization patterns. In sum, different ethno-political mobilization patterns are driven by ethno-political awareness, the capabilities of elites to incentivize, coerce, or persuade their co-ethnics, and mass feelings of deprivation and the resulting motives to change the political status quo and even take vengeance upon the state. While all of these mechanisms shape ethno-political mobilization goals, the degree of deprivation is particularly significant for ethno-political mobilization methods. Higher levels of elite capabilities, ethno-political consciousness, and especially deprivation lead to more centrifugal demands that are, in some cases, as extreme as secession. Although elite capabilities and ethno-political consciousness play a role in the outbreak of violent mobilizations, the motivational factor of deprivation is almost a necessary condition for the use of violent mobilization methods.

Table 2.1 Explanatory variables, the moderating variable and causal mechanisms

Explanatory variables	*Moderating variable*	*Causal mechanisms*		
Incorporation model	Pre-existing mobilization level	Elite empowerment	Ethno-political awareness	Deprivation
Liberal multiculturalism	high	moderate	low	no deprivation
	low	moderate	moderate	no deprivation
Consociationalism	high	high	moderate	no deprivation
	low	high	high	no deprivation
Civic assimilationism	high	none	high	deprivation
	low	none	none	no deprivation
Ethnocracy	high	none	very high	deprivation (greatest)
	low	none	high	deprivation

Numerous factors play a role in changing the degrees of elite empowerment, ethno-political awareness, and feelings of deprivation but one factor is distinguished as the most common, direct, and strongest determinant of such mechanisms: state policies of ethnic incorporation. State institutions and policies affect ethno-political mobilization patterns by shaping the elites' and the masses' ethno-political awareness (by categorizing individuals into minority ethnic groups or assimilating them into the majority society), motives (by depriving or satisfying group members in terms of their material and self-assertive needs), and capabilities (by empowering or disempowering ethnic elites).

In light of the preceding theoretical discussion, the hypotheses of this dissertation are listed and discussed below.

Hypothesis 1a: *Consociationalism* leads to peaceful mobilizations at both low and high levels of pre-existing mobilization by making peaceful (hence, less risky) channels of mobilization available and keeping the masses' sense of deprivation at a minimum;

Hypothesis 1b: *Consociationalism* empowers ethnic elites and strengthens ethnic consciousness of the masses, particularly for weakly mobilized groups. Therefore, it leads to mildly centrifugal mobilizations in groups with low levels of pre-existing mobilization.

As defined in this chapter, the consociational incorporation model consists of group-level inclusive policies that grant political autonomy to ethnic groups and prevent individuals from participating in politics via non-ethnic political channels. Group-level inclusive policies empower ethnic elites and enable them to provide their co-ethnics with selective incentives to follow their calls for mobilization. Empowered ethnic elites can also more effectively make propaganda for ethnic mobilization.

Group inclusive policies also categorize individuals into ethnic groups.[58] This ascription process increases ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness; this, in turn, determines who "we" are and what is valuable to "us" as co-ethnics. Ethnic categorization also helps determine "our" interests together with the other co-ethnics that we are linked to. All these effects of group-inclusive policies are particularly strong under consociationalism because they are accompanied by individual-level exclusion. The outcomes of consociationalism from enhanced elite capability to increased mass ethno-political consciousness increase the likelihood of centrifugal mobilization. Nevertheless, it

[58] For an illustration of the effects of group-level inclusion, see Appendix A.

should be noted that consociationalism does not create a strong motivation to use violent methods, as it makes available peaceful methods of mobilization and satisfies ethnic members' recognition and self-assertion needs.

By providing elites with legal jurisdiction, political offices, or material resources, the group-level inclusive policies of consociationalism facilitate the emergence of ethnic parties and increase the capability of ethnic elites to mobilize the ethnic masses. This model can give elites control of government ministries, government programs, and even territorial units that produce a new power distribution and strengthen the ability of elites to mobilize their co-ethnics. As Olson (1971) suggests, large groups need selective incentives to solve their collective action problems. Ethnic elites can use both positive and negative selective incentives under consociationalism: while the former increases the benefits of participating in mobilizations, the latter increases the direct costs of not participating. The granting of greater group-level political inclusion decreases the risks of and increases the benefits of participating in ethnic mobilization, particularly regarding centrifugal aims given their more risky nature.

Group-level inclusion makes it easier for elites to provide positive selective incentives (e.g., patronage) to the members of their ethnic group to mobilize. Ethnic elites can distribute the resources under their control such as public sector jobs, promotions, and direct payments; in this way, they gain and retain individuals' support for ethno-political mobilization. Elites often need more than positive selective incentives to initiate and sustain violent mobilizations, since violent mobilizations might have costs greater than the price that ethnic elites can afford. However, the consociational incorporation model also

provides elites with a variety of coercive mechanisms that they can use to mobilize their co-ethnics. The forms of coercion might range from economic penalties—such as taking away jobs or government social services—to the physical abuse of co-ethnics, meted out by militias or territorial police. Thus, elites can force their co-ethnics to mobilize in violent ways; and they are likely to do so when they suspect that the state will abolish the consociational model and fear that their privileged positions will disappear in the near future. This incorporation model makes it easier for elites to oblige the ethnic masses to mobilize since under consociationalism, the ethnic masses do not have genuine protection from sanctions.

Group-level inclusion also enhances the ability of elites to persuade, politicize, and mobilize their co-ethnics through party rallies—or in some cases control over the media and school curriculums. Nevertheless, the fact that under consociationalism elites have more resources and greater control over the group—and can call for violent and secessionist mobilizations—does not necessarily mean that they will choose this path. As I discuss below, whether they opt to employ violence and pursue separatism depends in large part on the motives and ethno-political awareness to which both elites and the masses are subject.

Group-level inclusion grants formal recognition to ethnic groups and categorizes certain people into ethnic categories; as a result, it creates stronger ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness at the mass level. An ethnic group can gain a sense of "agency" with its ascribed members' developing perceptions of a distinct group identity

(via ethnic identification) and group interest (via linked fate).[59] Thus, group-level inclusion changes political behavior. Individuals who are classified into a group minimize intra-group differences and maximize inter-group differences (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), and favor their own group at the expense of other groups (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament, 1971). Increasing levels of ethno-political awareness broaden the ethnic base that can be mobilized by elite appeals. Due to the availability of non-violent channels to air their grievances, elites rarely call for violent mobilizations under the consociational model.

I expect that the effect of group-level inclusion depends on the pre-existing level of mobilization which can mitigate or escalate the effect of incorporation models on mobilization patterns. As Gorenburg (2000, p. 141) states, "[w]hile the institutionalization of ethnic identity may ameliorate existing ethnic conflict, the establishment of ethnic institutions in areas where such conflict is not occurring is likely to strengthen nationalist sentiment in the long run." Where ethnic groups are already highly mobilized, group-level inclusion does not typically have much of an effect on ethnic identification and consciousness. By strengthening their ethno-political awareness, group-level inclusion often has a strong effect on groups with low levels of pre-existing mobilization. In this situation, an ethnic group could turn into a much more ethnicized and politicized group than it would otherwise be.

[59] For a discussion of interest and identity in the co-determination of agency and structure, see Wendt (1999).

Hypothesis 2a*: Liberal multiculturalism,* by keeping peaceful channels of mobilization open and refraining from creating a sense of deprivation, leads to peaceful mobilizations at both low and high levels of pre-existing mobilization.

Hypothesis 2b*: Liberal multiculturalism* moderately empowers elites and, particularly for weakly mobilized groups, increases ethnic consciousness. Yet, by allowing cross-cutting political activity, it moderates the centrifugal effects of such processes.

Liberal multiculturalism consists of inclusive policies at both group and individual levels, which enable ethnic group members to participate in politics via both ethnic and non-ethnic political channels. Its group-level inclusive policies increase the ability of elites to call for centrifugal and violent mobilizations; and its recognition of and/or granting of autonomy to ethnic groups lead to stronger ethno-political consciousness among the masses. Nevertheless, these effects are moderated by the individual-level inclusive policies of liberal multiculturalism. Its policies of individual-level inclusion cross-cuts[60] mutually exclusive ethno-political categories by providing co-ethnics opportunities to participate in multi-ethnic or non-ethnic political activities together with the members of other majority or minority ethnic groups in the country. Therefore, it reinforces new forms of non-ethnic solidarity and multiplies the ethnic and political belongings of individuals. It also decreases elites' control over members of their ethnic group and reduces their ability to initiate and sustain violent and secessionist mobilizations. When group members are granted the ability to exit or act independent of their groups, ethnic elites can no longer use coercion

[60] There is a variety of arguments about the advantages of cross-cutting ethnic groups; for an electoral design approach, see Horowitz (1985) and Chandra (2005); for a civil society approach, see Varshney (2001).

effectively to mobilize the group members. Moreover, when other effective channels of mass communication are available beyond their control, those elites also lose their monopoly over propaganda tools. Where this is the case, co-ethnics tend to be less susceptible to calls for violent and secessionist mobilizations than they would be under a consociational incorporation model.

Liberal multiculturalism is the most effective of the four ethnic incorporation models in terms of eliciting peaceful and centripetal mobilizations from highly mobilized ethnic groups. It directs the existing mobilizations of highly mobilized ethnic groups into legitimate (peaceful) channels and weakens the effect of pro-violence and pro-secession propaganda. Therefore, it is expected to lead to more peaceful and centripetal mobilizations of ethnic groups with high levels of pre-existing mobilization; this is in contrast to civic assimilationism and ethnocracy that do not provide such group-level inclusive policies—and consociationalism that does not provide cross-cutting mechanisms. Yet, the picture is slightly different for weakly mobilized ethnic groups: liberal multicultural policies of group-level inclusion empower ethnic elites and increase their mobilizing capacity. It may also lead to the ethno-political awakening of such weakly mobilized groups due to optional ethnic categorization, although, it is less likely than consociationalism to do so because ethnic categorization under liberal multiculturalism is optional. The elite empowerment and ethnic categorization facets of liberal multiculturalism lead to less centripetal mobilizations of weakly mobilized groups than under a civic assimilationist model, since the latter neither empowers ethnic elites nor categorizes people into ethnic minority groups.

Hypothesis 3a*: Civic assimilationism* leads to peaceful mobilizations at low levels of pre-existing mobilization, but it leads to mixed (a combination of violent and peaceful) mobilizations at high levels of pre-existing mobilization since it creates a sense of relative deprivation amongst co-ethnics.

Hypothesis 3b*:* By inhibiting the strengthening of ethnic consciousness and disempowering ethnic elites of weakly mobilized ethnic groups, civic assimilationism impedes ethnic groups from mobilizing for centrifugal goals. Yet, its group-level exclusionary policies create a sense of relative deprivation and lead to centrifugal mobilizations for ethnic groups with high levels of pre-existing mobilization.

Civic assimilationism enables the members of ethnic groups to participate in the political system not along, but across ethnic lines. Hence, this model does not empower ethnic elites by providing them with a captive base or with special resources and legal jurisdiction; nor does this model grant recognition to ethnic groups due to its group-level exclusionary policies. Therefore, it leads members of weakly mobilized or non-mobilized ethnic groups to participate in politics via mainstream (non-ethnic) political channels, and perhaps even culturally assimilate them into the majority ethnic group. Civic assimilationist policies downplay the differences between members of different ethnic groups and hinder the formation or strengthening of ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness. It is the most effective ethnic incorporation model in terms of ensuring that weakly mobilized ethnic groups remain peaceful and non-secessionist because it tends to inhibit the formation or strengthening of ethnic consciousness. However, the members of highly mobilized ethnic groups already have high levels of ethnic identification and consciousness; therefore, they are unlikely to be satisfied with

individual-level inclusion alone and may pursue their centrifugal goals, occasionally through violent methods given that genuine opportunities for non-violent mobilization are rare, if they exist at all, under policies of group-level exclusion. In accordance with Davies' (1973) arguments, the members of such groups feel unsatisfied in terms of their substantive needs (such as self-esteem and self-actualization) as well as their instrumental needs (such as power). The feeling of frustration stemming from this sense of dissatisfaction will sometimes lead non-violent conflicts to escalate into violent conflicts.

> ***Hypotheses 4a:*** *Ethnocracy* creates a strong degree of ethnic consciousness and a sense of deprivation and, therefore, leads to mixed (a combination of peaceful and violent) mobilizations at low levels of pre-existing mobilization, and violent mobilizations at high levels of pre-existing mobilization.
>
> ***Hypotheses 4b:*** *Ethnocracy* raises levels of ethno-political awareness and feelings of deprivation, and in turn, causes ethnic minority groups to seek centrifugal goals.

The ethnocratic model deliberately excludes members of non-dominant ethnic groups from creating their own parties, forming their own interest groups, and engaging in many other forms of social and political participation; however, these policies often backfire. Rather than suppressing ethnic identities, these sweeping forms of exclusion often activate or consolidate ethnic identities and ethno-political awareness. Individuals begin to feel a stronger sense of community with their co-ethnics and a shared destiny (linked fate). When a state chooses an ethnic group as a target and excludes it both at the individual and group levels, it prevents ethnic members from participating in politics both across and along ethnic lines; therefore, it creates an "absolute" political deprivation by objective standards. The fact that an ethnic group has high levels of pre-existing mobilization

multiplies this effect by boosting the subjective belief in the group's entitlements and the perceived sense of deprivation. Moreover, high levels of ethnic identification and political consciousness among co-ethnics (as a result of high levels of pre-existing mobilization) weaken their ties to the state and erode their perception of common interests and common future with respect to the state and the majority ethnic group. Those ethnic groups often see secession as a reasonable and desired outcome. Where the ethnic groups are already mobilized, they will typically resist the ethnocratic policies with violence. However, even where they are not already mobilized, they may gradually or sporadically embrace violence as the only means to resist such draconian policies.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that four models of ethnic incorporation (liberal multiculturalism, consociationalism, civic assimilationism, and ethnocracy), by definition, include or exclude ethnic groups at the individual and group levels. Other factors being constant, such inclusive and exclusionary policies shape the goals (centripetal vs. centrifugal) and methods (peaceful vs. violent) of ethnic mobilization. Ethnic incorporation policies separate individuals into minority ethnic groups or assimilate them into the majority ethnic group. In turn, this affects the ethno-political awareness of co-ethnics by increasing or decreasing their levels of ethnic identification, ethno-political consciousness, and feelings of linked fate. Ethnic incorporation policies also satisfy or deprive ethnic groups of their political rights; high levels of deprivation motivate secessionist, and particularly, violent behavior. Ethnic incorporation models also affect the degree of power

and resources under the control of ethnic elites, thereby empowering or disempowering them. Consequently, this affects the *capabilities* that elites have to mobilize their co-ethnics. Pre-existing levels of mobilization mediate the effect of ethnic incorporation policies because ethnic groups with higher levels of pre-existing mobilization see group-level exclusionary policies as a greater source of deprivation than those lacking a recent history of strong ethno-political mobilization.

The theory developed in this dissertation has direct policy implications because it provides a blueprint for policymakers and third-party observers with regard to the accommodation of ethnic minority groups. First, this theory suggests that if group-level exclusion has not worked so far, further exclusion will make things just worse. Although this seems to be intuitive, the historical record shows that policy makers in repressive regimes have not learned their lesson yet. Ethnic tensions typically start in the political realm and ethnic minority groups turn to separatism and violence only after being neglected or repressed. The short-term military victories of state security forces over ethnic rebels often cause vicious cycles of ethnic violence in the long-run.

Second, the same kinds of policies do not work in the same way for every single ethnic minority group. Group-level inclusive policies such as granting political autonomy to ethnic minority groups may lead to the flourishing of centrifugal goals in previously politically inert ethnic groups, but the same policy can diminish the degree of ethnic violence and separatism of highly mobilized ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are both culturally and politically more dynamic than many politicians assume: they are born, flourish, shrink, die, resurrect, merge with others, split from others, intersect with others,

and so on; hence, politicians should address ethno-political demands when and where they emerge. Yet, in places where such ethno-political demands are absent, it is not a politician's job to try to resurrect politically dead ethnic groups. For the very same reason, there is no single superior ethnic incorporation model in terms of maintaining peace and political integrity in a country. As argued in this chapter, civic assimilationism works best for ensuring peaceful and centripetal mobilizations of weakly or none-mobilized ethnic groups' members. When an ethnic group is already politicized with a high degree of pre-existing ethno-political mobilization, liberal multiculturalism works better to produce peaceful and centripetal mobilizations.

CHAPTER 3: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF ETHNO-POLITICAL MOBILIZATION METHODS

Ethnic conflicts have been on the agenda of world politics and academia in the post-Cold War period as intra-state wars have exceeded inter-state wars in terms of the number of incidents, the number of casualties, and the duration of the conflicts. Various studies have analyzed the causes of ethnic conflict worldwide using quantitative research methods (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010; Dixon, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Yet, we are still far from an agreement on the reasons why ethnic conflicts emerge and escalate. Why do some ethnic groups adopt violent methods while others remain peaceful? This chapter aims at analyzing the causes of ethnic conflicts using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database (2009) for the time period from 1990 to 2000.

The goals of ethnic mobilization are also a significant concern and they are at the center of many recent and contemporary political debates and, at times, violent conflicts. Therefore, this dissertation examines both ethno-political mobilization methods and goals. Nevertheless, this particular chapter focuses only on ethnic mobilization methods due to data limitations.[61]

This chapter describes the data source and the sample; it outlines the procedure used in measuring the variables of interest; and it provides an explanation of the statistical

[61] The MAR database has one relevant variable to measure ethno-political mobilization goals: the separatism index (MAR name: SEPX) which measures presence/absence of autonomy movements for each case. Since the variable has a category called "active separatist or autonomy movement(s) in the 1980s or 1990s," it can be recoded as a dummy variable to measure ethnic separatism or autonomy seeking. Nevertheless this category takes the same value for each country-ethnic group dyad for the time frame under consideration (1990-2000). Therefore, this variable is not used in the analyses in this chapter.

methods used to analyze the data. The chapter starts with a descriptive analysis of the data that sheds light on the overall database as well as the specific time frame (1990-2000) selected for this chapter. The next section gives a detailed account of the selection and measurement of the dependent and independent variables used in the regression models. Then it analyzes the data using proportional odds ordinal regression model that is fit using ordinal logistic regression.

Description of the Data

I used the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database to test my hypotheses quantitatively. The MAR database includes data on 239 ethnic groups in 126 countries from 1940 to 2003. It takes its sample from countries with a population of at least 500,000 people. The database includes data only on ethno-national (non-state communal) groups that

> - collectively suffer, or benefit from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and/or
> - collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests (Davenport, 2003).

The fact that the database excludes ethnic groups that are not 'at risk' poses certain problems for this research; yet, due to the lack of sufficient data on ethnic groups that are not politically salient, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to find an alternative data source that is equally comprehensive.

MAR Phase 4 is currently the most comprehensive phase of the MAR releases and includes data for 191 ethnic groups in 102 countries from 1990 to 2000 for the variables I

use.[62] Although the MAR database has extensive data on ethnic minority groups, it has been criticized for not providing a consistent way to test the state's role in ethnic mobilization (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010; Hug, 2013). As Cederman et al.'s (2010) criticism shows, various studies (Gurr, 1993; Fox, 2000; Regan and Norton, 2005; Olzak, 2006) using MAR data have found insignificant or even contradictory results when examining the relationship between political discrimination, political inclusion, and ethnic rebellion.

This dissertation differs from previous studies using the MAR data in that it analyzes the effect of ethnic incorporation models on ethnic rebellion. In order to test my hypotheses, I generated two ordered logistic regression models of the determinants of ethno-political mobilization methods: one on the low mobilization sample and one on the high mobilization sample. I measured mobilization levels with a variable from the MAR database that measures protest (MAR variable name: PROT). I recoded the values from 0 to 2 as 'low' and from 3 to 5 as 'high.'[63] Then, I carried out data analyses separately for these two samples.

Measurement of the Variables

I used the ethnic rebellion variable (annual rebellion index, REB) from the MAR database to measure the dependent variable: ethno-political mobilization methods. As

[62] Since the major components of my independent variable, political status (POLSTAT) and political discrimination (POLIC), are coded by MAR from 1990 to 2000, I used this time period. Many other variables are also coded starting from 1990 in the original dataset.

[63] The original MAR coding for PROT is as follows: 'none reported' = 0, 'verbal opposition' = 1, 'symbolic resistance' = 2, 'small demonstrations' = 3, 'medium demonstrations' = 4, 'large demonstrations' = 5.

shown in Table 3.1, I recoded REB levels as follows: 'none reported' as 0; 'political banditry,' 'campaigns of terrorism,' 'local rebellion,' and 'small scale guerilla activity' as 1; 'intermediate guerilla activity' as 2; 'large-scale guerilla activity' as 3; and 'protracted civil war' as 4. The reason why I recoded political banditry, campaigns of terrorism, local rebellion, and small scale guerilla activity into the same category is that they seem to differ from each other not in terms of the degree of rebellion (violence) but categorically in terms of the 'kind' of rebellion.

Table 3.1 Recoding of REB (Annual Rebellion Index, 1985-2000)

MAR value	Original MAR coding	Recoded version
Missing Value No basis for judgment	-99 99	NA
None reported	0	0
Political banditry Campaigns of terrorism Local rebellion Small-scale guerrilla activity	1 2 3 4	1
Intermediate guerrilla activity	5	2
Large-scale guerrilla activity	6	3
Protracted civil war	7	4

In order to measure my main independent variable, the type of ethnic incorporation model, I first coded the degree of inclusion at individual and group levels and then generated four incorporation models out of these codings. I measured the degree of individual-level inclusion based on eight political discrimination (MAR variable name: POLIC) variables used by the MAR:

POLIC1: Freedom of expression
POLIC2: Freedom of movement
POLIC3: Rights in judicial proceedings
POLIC4: Restrictions on organizing
POLIC5: Restrictions on voting rights
POLIC6: Police/military recruitment
POLIC7: Civil service access
POLIC8: Access to higher office

These variables code the degree of 'restriction' from 0 to 2 in which 0 = not restricted, 1 = activity moderately restricted, and 2 = activity prohibited. For each country-ethnic group-year combination, I added up these scores and made an index that ranges from 0 to 16. Since these variables measure the degree of discrimination (or exclusion), I reversed these scores. Then, I coded the upper half (9-16) of the aggregate scores as inclusive and the lower half (0-8) as exclusionary. I interpolated the missing data with regards to the POLIC variables using the following decision rules: (a) If a country-ethnic group dyad lacked data for only one or two of the eight POLIC scores, I interpolated that missing data based on the other six or seven POLIC scores of the same year; and (b) if a country-ethnic group dyad lacked data for all the POLIC scores in a single year in the period from 1990 to 2000, I linearly interpolated the missing data based on the previous and the following years. For instance, when an ethnic group has missing data for POLIC values for the year of 1991, I interpolated POLIC values for that ethnic group's inclusion level based on 1990 and 1992 values. Such interpolation techniques did not increase the number of observations to a great extent, but slightly decreased the number of missing data.

I measured group-level inclusion based on a MAR variable that measures the political status of ethnic groups (POLSTAT). As shown in Table 3.2, I coded POLSTAT

levels of 'denied recognition,' 'restricted collectivity,' and 'no distinctive status' as exclusionary at the group level, and 'de facto recognition' and 'formal recognition' (both for *approximately half of* or a *significant minority* of a group's members) as inclusive at the group level.

Table 3.2 Recoding of political status (POLSTAT) variable

MAR value	Original MAR coding	Recoded version
Missing values *No basis for judgment* *Dominant minority*	-99 99 0	NA
Denied recognition	1	-1
Restricted collectivity by public policy that explicitly restricts the political or economic activities of group members (e.g. Chinese in Malaysia, Arabs in Israel)	7	-2
No distinctive Status	8	0
De facto recognition	2	1
Formal recognition--a significant minority of group members (e.g. rural Aborigines in Australia or resettled Indios in Guatemala)	5	2
Formal recognition--approximately half of group members	4	3
Formal recognition--the substantial majority of group members (e.g. Iraqi Kurds, French Canadians)	3	4
Nonterritorial collectivity by explicit power-sharing or consultative relationships with group representatives (e.g. Dutch Catholics, Lebanese Muslims and Maronites)	6	5

The observations that are inclusive both at the individual and group levels are coded as liberal multiculturalism; the observations that are inclusive at the individual level and exclusionary at the group level are coded as civic assimilationism; and the observations that are exclusionary at both levels are coded as ethnocracy. Consociationalism is harder to measure given that individual level inclusion (aggregate POLIC scores) involves, but is

not limited to cross-cutting political participation channels. I therefore coded the POLSTAT scores of 'nonterritorial collectivity' ("explicit power-sharing or consultative relationships with group representatives, e.g. Dutch Catholics, Lebanese Muslims and Maronites") and 'formal recognition' (for "the substantial majority of group members, e.g. Iraqi Kurds, French Canadians") as consociationalism. [64] This allowed me to distinguish consociationalism, which limits cross-cutting political participation, from liberal multiculturalism which allows cross-cutting political participation. A graphical demonstration of the data in terms of the dependent variable (ethnic rebellion/violence) and ethnic incorporation model can be seen in Tables 3.3a, 3.3b, and 3.3c.

64 See Minorities at Risk Project (2009) for a full explanation of the POLSTAT categories and scores.

Table 3.3a Ethnic incorporation models and ethnic rebellion in the entire data

	in absolute numbers						in percentages				
	0	1	2	3	4	Total	0	1	2	3	4
Liberal multiculturalism	1025	188	37	9	16	1275	80%	15%	3%	1%	1%
Civic assimilationism	302	27	6	3	20	358	84%	8%	2%	1%	6%
Consociationalism	600	246	33	34	38	951	63%	26%	3%	4%	4%
Ethnocracy	154	23	1	3	14	195	79%	12%	1%	2%	7%
Total	2081	484	77	49	88	2779	75%	17%	3%	2%	3%



Table 3.3b Ethnic incorporation and ethnic rebellion in the high mobilization sample

	0	1	2	3	4	Total	0	1	2	3	4
Liberal multiculturalism	202	65	6	3	2	278	73%	23%	2%	1%	1%
Civic assimilationism	94	10	3	3	8	118	80%	8%	3%	3%	7%
Consociationalism	115	99	9	16	8	247	47%	40%	4%	6%	3%
Ethnocracy	37	8	0	1	1	47	79%	17%	0%	2%	2%
Total	448	182	18	23	19	690	65%	26%	3%	3%	3%



Table 3.3c Ethnic incorporation and ethnic rebellion in the low mobilization sample

	0	1	2	3	4	Total	0	1	2	3	4
Liberal multiculturalism	815	123	31	6	14	989	82%	12%	3%	1%	1%
Civic assimilationism	208	17	3	0	12	240	87%	7%	1%	0%	5%
Consociationalism	483	144	24	16	30	697	70%	21%	3%	2%	4%
Ethnocracy	117	15	1	2	13	148	79%	10%	1%	1%	9%
Total	1623	299	59	24	69	2074	78%	14%	3%	1%	3%



Tables 3.3a, 3.3b, and 3.3c show that ethnic mobilizations are predominantly peaceful for both low and high mobilization levels, but particularly for the low mobilization sample. Indeed, 78 percent of the observations are in the no violence level (category 0) for the low mobilization sample while this figure goes down to 68 percent for the high mobilization sample. Overall, 75 percent of the observations are in the no violence category regardless of which mobilization level sub-group they belong to. Ethnic conflicts that reach to the highest level of civil war (category 4) are rare. For both mobilization level samples, only 3 percent of the observations are in the civil war category.

For the low mobilization sample, the highest percentage of fully peaceful (category 0) mobilizations, 87 percent, occur for ethnic groups that are subject to civic assimilationism. For this sample, the highest percentage of most violent (category 4) mobilizations, 9 percent, occur for ethnic groups that are subject to ethnocracy. By contrast, for the high mobilization sample, the highest percentage of both fully peaceful (80%) and most violent (7%) mobilizations, occur for ethnic groups that are subject to civic assimilationism. For both low and high mobilization levels, civil wars tend to occur least, only 1% of the sample, for ethnic groups that are subject to liberal multiculturalist policies. The next section goes beyond this descriptive analysis and explores the causal relationship between ethnic incorporation policies and ethno-political mobilization methods by controlling for the relevant explanatory factors.

Analysis of Data

In order to assess the associations between the degree (level) of rebellion, the dependent variable, and my independent variables, a proportional odds ordinal regression model was fit using ordinal logistic regression.[65] I implemented the same regression model on two sub-groups: the low mobilization sample and the high mobilization sample. The analyses resulted in similar estimated odds ratios for the five possible groupings of the outcome (degree of ethnic rebellion) in both models; therefore, the proportional odds assumption seems tenable.

In my analyses, I included a number of control variables, which are found significant and used widely in the ethnic politics literature as discussed in Chapter Two. As shown in Table 3.4, the control variables for the models include: a lagged dependent variable (lagged 1 year), the group's share of the country's population (MAR variable name: GPRO, which I multiplied by 100 to have it in percentages), the type of access to political power by kin groups (MAR variable name: GC11), the existence of (and belief in) a regional base for the group (MAR variable name: GC4), and economic differences between the ethnic groups and the rest of the society (MAR variable name: ECDIFXX).

I selected these variables in order to control for alternative explanations in the literature. Lagged dependent variable (ethnic rebellion) must be included in the analysis

[65] The R function for proportional odds model is *polr* from the R package *ordinal* associated with Venables and Ripley (2002). In order to assess reliability and different measures of model fit, I also ran the same model using other proportional odds ordinal regression functions using maximum likelihood estimation (i.e., *lrm* function from the R package *rms* associated with Harrell (2014) and *vglm* from the R package *VGAM* associated with Yee (2013)). All three results for the two separate models are similar and different kinds of model fit measures are reported in Table 3.4.

given that the data has a longitudinal dimension and one year's outcome can easily have an impact on the following year's outcome. Since the MAR data is panel data, an analysis without a lagged dependent variable would, mistakenly, treat values on the dependent variable for a certain year as independent from the previous year's value. As Cederman, Wimmer and Min argue, (2010, p. 95), "the probability of ethnonationalist conflict increases with the number of prior conflicts fought in the name of the same ethnic group," an argument that is also in line with Fearon and Laitin's (2003) findings on "prior war." The MAR data does not include data on the number of prior conflicts; yet, the lagged ethnic rebellion variable (REB) that is explained above is a reasonable proxy for it. The causal role of ethnic groups' population ratio to the respective countries' populations is also tested (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010)[66] and argued (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) to be a significant predictor of ethnic conflict.

My review of the theoretical literature in Chapter Two and Dixon's review of the literature (2009) on quantitative analysis of ethnic conflict both demonstrate that economic factors are thought to have a causal role in conflict. Nevertheless, the findings with regard to this factor vary depending on what dimension of economic dynamics is measured and how. In this research, I focus on the economic differences between the minority group and the dominant group in a country. I use the economic differentials index (ECDIFXX) from the MAR database for this purpose. This variable measures economic differences on a seven-category scale from -2 (most advantaged) to 4 (most disadvantaged), with 0 meaning

[66] Cederman, Wimmer, and Min's analysis (2010) found no significant relationship between this factor and ethnic conflict.

"no socially significant differences" (Davenport, 2003, p. 31). Although the variable is constructed as ordinal, I assume the seven-category ordinal scale as having interval properties and treat it as continuous in my models in order to make it easier to interpret the findings displayed in Table 3.4. Such a treatment does not violate the principle discussed in Cochran's (1954) well established opinion.

> Any set of scores gives a *valid* test, provided that they are constructed without consulting the results of the experiment. If the set of scores is poor, in that it badly distorts a numerical scale that really does underlie the ordered classification, the test will not be sensitive. The scores should therefore embody the best insight available about the way in which the classification was constructed and used (p. 436).

The statistics are now even more flexible in treating the levels of measurement as long as the different treatment is justified. As Pasta (2009, p. 1) states,

> We will refer to variables as continuous even though it is easy to argue that no variable being analyzed in a digital computer is truly continuous, as measurements are recorded with finite precision. What we really mean is that we're treating the variable as a measure of an underlying continuous or approximately continuous value and we are willing to treat the differences between values as quantitative.

The next control variable in the model is the absence or presence of an ethnic regional base. The territorial dimension of ethnic conflicts is argued to play a significant role in the emergence and strength of ethnic conflicts (Toft, 2005; Weidmann, 2009). The MAR variable for this factor is called *regional base--ancestral home* (GC4) and measures whether the ethnic group in question had a regional base which in pre-industrial times was a population center of the ancestors of today's minority population. It is a dichotomous variable with yes and no categories. The results for the ordered logistic regression models based on these variables can be seen below in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4 Ordered logistic regression analysis of worldwide ethno-political mobilization methods (ethnic rebellion), 1990-2000

	Range	Model I (low mobilization sample)			Model II (high mobilization sample)		
		Coeff.	Odds ratios	95% CI for OR	Coeff.	Odds ratios	95% CI for OR
Incorporation models:							
Consociationalism	0/1	-0.30	0.74	0.36-1.60	-1.38	0.25*	0.05-1.32
Liberal multiculturalism	0/1	-0.69	0.50*	0.24-1.09	-2.22	0.11**	0.02- 0.58
Civic assimilationism	0/1	-1.08	0.34*	0.13-0.86	-2.14	0.12**	0.02-0.67
Ethnocracy	*ref.*		*ref.*			*ref.*	
Control Variables:							
Lagged DV (1 year)	0-4	1.97	7.15***	5.73-9.02	1.70	5.50***	3.99-7.73
Group population ratio	0.04-90	0.01	1.01	0.99-1.02	-0.01	0.99	0.97-1.00
Kin groups in power							
Kin are outside the political coalitions that have ruled from 1960-1990, but are not barred from power	0/1	-0.20	0.82	0.51-1.33	-0.69	0.50	0.21-1.20
Kin have sometimes, from 1960-1990, been in the ruling coalition	0/1	-1.41	0.24***	0.11-0.50	-1.83	0.16***	0.06-0.45
Kin dominate state power	0/1	-0.35	0.71	0.42-1.19	-1.03	0.36*	0.14-0.90
Kin have no access to political power	*ref.*		*ref.*			*ref.*	
Regional base (yes)	0/1	0.70	2.02*	1.08-4.03	3.54	34.35***	5.64-709.73
Economic difference	-2-4	0.15	1.16**	1.05-1.29	0.20	1.22*	1.02-1.47
Intercepts (coefficients)							
1	0/1	-2.00			2.06		
2	0/1	-4.47			5.24		
3	0/1	-5.88			6.04		
4	0/1	-6.62			7.79		
0	*ref.*	*ref.*			*ref.*		
AIC		1118.15			517.03		
Pr(> chi2)		<0.0001			<0.0001		
LR chi^2		591.15			271.64		
Pseudo R^2		0.551			0.602		
N		970			361		

Note: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05[67]

[67] I used one-tailed t tests since my hypotheses are directional. I expect that the coefficients for my primary independent variable ethnic incorporation models will be negative (hence, the odds ratios must be between 0 and 1) when contrasted to the reference category ethnocracy. The only significant difference of this choice from the values of a two-tailed test occurred for liberal multiculturalism with the low mobilization sample (p value for two tailed test would be 0.0742) and consociationalism with the high mobilization sample (p value for two tailed test would be 0.0981).

The likelihood ratio chi-square of 591.15 with a p-value of 0.000 for Model I tell us that the model as a whole is statistically significant, as compared to the null model with no predictors. The pseudo-R-squared of 0.551 is also given in Table 3.4.

The Model I (low mobilization sample) results show that, compared to the ethnocracy group, those in civic assimilationism and liberal multiculturalism groups were more likely to be in the less severe rebellion categories after controlling for the other variables in the model, with the effect being the greatest (hence, most peaceful) in the civic assimilationism group (Wald χ^2 statistic = -2.28, p = 0.01) and then for liberal multiculturalism (Wald χ^2 statistic = -1.79 and p = 0.04). However, consociationalism was not found to have a statistically significant effect when compared to the ethnocratic incorporation model (Wald χ^2 statistic = -0.78 and p = 0.22).

Hence it can be concluded that the analyses for Model I support the hypotheses in the sense that individual-level inclusion matters more for ethnic groups in the low-mobilization sample. Accordingly, both individual-level inclusive incorporation models (civic assimilationism and liberal multiculturalism) proved to be more peaceful when contrasted to ethnocracy whereas consociationalism failed to have a statistically significant effect. Moreover, the civic assimilationist model seems to lead to the most peaceful mobilizations for groups in the low mobilization sample in the accordance with my hypotheses. In Model I, civic assimilationism, by far, has the biggest negative effect on the level of ethnic rebellion when contrasted to ethnocracy. When we look at the coefficients (in this case, ordered log odds coefficients) for Model I, it is seen that for civic assimilationism in contrast to ethnocracy, we expect a 1.08 decrease in the log odds of

being in a higher level of rebellion, when the other variables are held constant. The log odds of being in a higher level of rebellion is -0.69 for liberal multiculturalism when contrasted to ethnocracy.

It should be noted that these point estimates are statistically significant only for the contrasts including the reference group, the ethnocratic model. In order to see that civic assimilationism is really more peaceful for the low pre-existing mobilization sample in all contrasts, I also run the same regression model by changing the reference level from ethnocracy to civic assimilationism. Civic assimilationism is proven to be more peaceful than ethnocracy (ethnocracy -civic assimilationism contrast: coefficient = 1.08, Wald $\chi 2$ statistic = 2.28, p = 0.01) and consociationalism (consociationalism-civic assimilationism contrast: coefficient = 0.79, Wald $\chi 2$ statistic = 2.30, p = 0.01). Although civic assimilationism also seems to be more peaceful than liberal multiculturalism (coefficient = -0.40), this contrast is not found to be statistically significant (Wald $\chi 2$ statistic = 1.16, p = 0.12) and can be ignored. This result is no surprise because liberal multiculturalism is hypothesized to be the second most peaceful incorporation model for this mobilization level and its peacefulness level may well be close to that of civic assimilationism, the most peaceful incorporation model.

A number of control variables are also found to be statistically significant in Model I, specifically, the lagged ethnic rebellion score, kin groups in power (where kin have sometimes, from 1960-1990, been in the ruling coalition), the existence of a regional base, and economic differences.

Accordingly, a one unit increase in the previous year's ethnic rebellion score (e.g., going from 0 to 1), makes the log odds of being in a higher level of ethnic rebellion 1.97 times more likely, where all of the other variables in the model are held constant. In other words, when the past year's rebellion score increases by 1 unit, the log odds of moving from the lower rebellion levels to the highest level (or from the lowest rebellion level to the higher ones) are multiplied by 1.97. For kin groups that have sometimes, from 1960-1990, been in the ruling coalition, the log odds of having the highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion are 1.41 times lower than kin groups that have no access to political power. Other factors held constant, having a regional base increases the log odds of having the highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus the less severe degrees of rebellion by 0.70 times. For each one unit increase in ethnic economic inequality, the log odds of highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion are 0.15 times higher.

The likelihood ratio chi-square of 271.64 with a p-value of 0.000 for Model II (high pre-existing mobilization sample) tells us that the model as a whole is statistically significant, as compared to the null model with no predictors. The pseudo-R-squared is 0.602. The findings for Model II are also in line with the hypotheses for ethnic groups in the high mobilization sample.

The Model II results in Table 3.4 show that, compared to ethnocracy, liberal multiculturalist, civic assimilationist, and consociationalist ethnic incorporation models tended to prompt less severe rebellion categories after controlling for the other variables in the model, with the effect size being greatest (hence, most peaceful) in the liberal

multiculturalism group (Wald χ^2 statistic = -2.63 and p = 0.004 for liberal multiculturalism; Wald χ^2 statistic = -2.43 and p = 0.008 for civic assimilationism; Wald χ^2 statistic = 1.65 and p = 0.049 for consociationalism). Hence it can be concluded that the analyses for Model II support the hypothesis that liberal multiculturalism is the most peaceful ethnic incorporation model for highly mobilized ethnic groups in terms of the comparison of the effect sizes (in the form of log odds coefficients) with the reference group, the ethnocratic model. Ethnocracy is also found to be the most violent ethnic incorporation model in accordance with the hypotheses in Chapter Two as it has statistically significant negative effects in comparison with liberal multiculturalism, consociationalism, and civic assimilationism. Nevertheless, the ranking of civic assimilationism and consociationalism do not follow the hypothesized order. While the effect size for civic assimilationism is greater than that of consociationalism with respect to the ethnocracy as the base category, the difference in peacefulness of the two incorporation models are not found to be statistically significant when they are contrasted to each other rather than the ethnocratic model.

When we look at the log odds for Model II, it is seen that for liberal multiculturalism, the log odds of the highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion are 2.22 times lower than ethnocracy, when all the other variables are held constant. Civic assimilationism seems to be the second most peaceful incorporation model for the high mobilization sample in terms of its effect size when contrasted to ethnocracy. The log odds of the highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion outcomes are 2.14 times lower for civic assimilationism than

ethnocracy. Consociationalism seems to be the third most peaceful incorporation model for the high mobilization sample in terms of its effect size when contrasted to ethnocracy. The log odds of highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion outcomes are 1.38 times lower for consociationalism than ethnocracy. Hence, it can be concluded that ethnocracy, the reference group, leads to the most violent outcome.

It should be reemphasized that these point estimates are statistically significant only for the contrasts including the reference group, the ethnocratic model. In order to see that liberal multiculturalism is really the most peaceful incorporation model for the high mobilization sample, I ran the same regression model but changed the reference level from ethnocracy to liberal multiculturalism. Liberal multiculturalism proved to be more peaceful than ethnocracy (coefficient = 2.22, Wald $\chi 2$ statistic = 2.63, p = 0.004) and consociationalism (coefficient = 0.84, Wald $\chi 2$ statistic = 2.68, p = 0.004). Although liberal multiculturalism also seems to be more peaceful than civic assimilationism (log odds of one unit increase in violence under civic assimilationism with respect to liberal multiculturalism is 0.09), this finding is not statistically significant (Wald $\chi 2$ statistic = 0.21, p = 0.42).

A number of control variables are also statistically significant in Model II, specifically, the lagged ethnic rebellion score, kin groups in power (the second category: "kin have sometimes, from 1960-1990, been in the ruling coalition," and the third category: "kin dominate state power"), the existence of a regional base, and economic differences.

Accordingly, a one unit increase in the previous year's ethnic rebellion score (e.g., going from 0 to 1), makes the log odds of the highest degree of ethnic rebellion 1.70 times

higher than less severe degrees of rebellion. For kin groups that have sometimes, from 1960-1990, been in the ruling coalition, the log odds of the highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion are 1.83 times lower than kindred groups that have no access to political power. For kin groups that dominate state power, the log odds of the highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion are 1.03 times lower than kin groups that have no access to political power. Other factors held constant, having a regional base increases the log odds of the highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion by 3.54 times, which indicates a very strong relationship so that having a regional base seems to be almost a necessary cause of ethnic conflicts for the high mobilization sample. For a one unit increase in ethnic economic inequality, the log odds of the highest degree of ethnic rebellion versus less severe degrees of rebellion are 0.20 times higher.

Thus, my large-N analyses indicate that incorporation models are significant predictors of ethnic mobilization methods for both the low and high mobilization samples. Moreover, as shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, the order of incorporation models in terms of their impact on ethnic rebellion (when separately contrasted to the reference group ethnocracy) to a large extent supports the hypotheses in both regression models. Civic assimilationism is clearly the most peaceful incorporation model for the low-mobilization sample in terms of its effect size when contrasted to the reference category ethnocracy. Although its effects are smaller, liberal multiculturalism also appears to be the most peaceful incorporation model for low-mobilization sample in terms of its effect size when contrasted to ethnocracy.

Table 3.5, The effect of ethnic incorporation models on ethnic rebellion (from the most peaceful to the most violent) for the low mobilization sample

Expected order	Actual order^
1. Civic assimilationism	1. Civic assimilationism*
2. Liberal multiculturalism	2. Liberal multiculturalism*
3. Consociationalism	3. Consociationalism
4. Ethnocracy	4. Ethnocracy (ref.)

Table 3.6, The effect of ethnic incorporation models on ethnic rebellion (from the most peaceful to the most violent) for high the mobilization sample

Expected order	Actual order^
1. Liberal multiculturalism	1. Liberal multiculturalism *
2. Consociationalism	2. Civic assimilationism *
3. Civic assimilationism	3. Consociationalism *
4. Ethnocracy	4. Ethnocracy (ref.)

Notes: Symbol (*) indicates statistical significance in the contrasts with the reference level ethnocracy.
N.B.: The order in terms of effect sizes with respect to ethnocracy

The analyses of the MAR database demonstrate that exclusion at both the group and individual levels cannot be expected to produce any good in terms of ensuring ethnic peace. This outcome was predicted by my hypotheses as well as by the broader literature. The findings also indicate that the degree of individual-level inclusion seems to be more effective than group-level inclusion for the low mobilization sample. Individual-level inclusion (in the forms of liberal multiculturalism and civic assimilationism) proved to lead to statistically significant peaceful outcomes. That being said, following my hypotheses, it can be argued that group-level inclusion matters particularly on the high mobilization sample because both liberal multiculturalism and consociationalism proved to lead to

statistically significant peaceful outcomes for ethnic groups in this sample as shown in Model II.

Conclusion

This chapter tested the hypotheses that are outlined in Chapter Two. The hypotheses indicated that civic assimilationism is expected to be the most peaceful incorporation model for weakly mobilized groups and liberal multiculturalism is expected to be the most peaceful incorporation model for highly mobilized groups. Ethnocracy is expected to be the incorporation model that leads to the most violent mobilizations for both mobilization levels. The hypotheses also ranked the incorporation models from most peaceful to the most violent in the following orders: civic assimilationism, liberal multiculturalism, consociationalism, and ethnocracy for the low mobilization sample; and liberal multiculturalism, consociationalism, civic assimilationism, and ethnocracy for the high mobilization sample.

As shown in Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, the findings are in line with the hypotheses to a great extent with regards to the comparisons of the ranking of effect sizes when contrasted to the reference level ethnocracy. Nevertheless, I do not find statistically significant differences between all three incorporation models when contrasted to each other rather than ethnocracy. For instance, in the low mobilization sample, the most peaceful two incorporation models (civic assimilationism and liberal multiculturalism) proved to be more peaceful than consociationalism and ethnocracy. Nevertheless, liberal multiculturalism-civic assimilationism and consociationalism- ethnocracy contrasts are not

found to be statistically significant. This outcome is not surprising because the degree of peacefulness may not differ in a great extent between the most peaceful two incorporation models nor between the most violent two incorporation models. Consociationalism seems to be distinguishable from ethnocracy only in the high mobilization sample, which is again no surprise because group-level inclusion is predicted to have more peaceful effects on ethnic groups in the high mobilization sample. The most unexpected result is that civic assimilationism appears to have a peaceful impact in the high mobilization sample.

Some might think the relationship between ethnocracy as state policy and ethnic violence is endogenous--that is, ethnic violence leads states to adopt more exclusionary policies. However, my case studies in Chapters Four and Five suggest that ethnic incorporation models shape ethno-political mobilization methods, not vice versa. Moreover, the quantitative analyses in this chapter examine the effects of ethnic incorporation models on ethnic rebellion (ethnic violence) controlling for the one year lagged dependent variable (ethnic rebellion). A lagged dependent variable is included to eliminate autocorrelation in the residuals and provide robust estimates of the effects of ethnic incorporation models and other control variables in the models.[68] I also run the regressions separately for the two samples including high and low levels of mobilization separately in order to address potential endogeneity problems.

While this chapter used quantitative analyses to test the hypotheses in the world scale, it suffers from a number of weaknesses. First, while the MAR data is one of the most

[68] For a discussion on the use of lagged dependent variables, see Wilkins (n.d.).

comprehensive datasets to test my hypotheses, the data are still quite limited and enabled me to test my hypotheses only from 1990 to 2000 due to the coding period of INDINC and POLSTAT variables, which I use to measure ethnic incorporation models. Moreover, I could test only one dimension of my dependent variable, mobilization methods, in my analyses given that the data do not have annual variation for the only variable (SEPX) that could be used to measure mobilization aims. Another problem with the data is that it includes data only on the ethnic groups that are defined as 'at risk' by the MAR project. Future research on the quantitative analysis of ethnic mobilization patterns can use more recently developing data sources such as Ethnic Power Relations (EPR). Finally, the analyses provided in this chapter need more robust tests to address questions of endogeneity.

CHAPTER 4: ETHNIC INCORPORATION AND ETHNO-POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN BULGARIA (1980-2014) AND CYPRUS (1960-1974)

Why could Turkish Cypriots effectively form armed resistance against the Greek-Cypriot majority's armed forces starting from 1964? How could Turkish Cypriots form an almost monolithic ethno-political movement that could recruit almost every single adult Turkish Cypriot male during the resistance by late 1960s? We can ask another series of unresolved questions about Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority. What led ethnic Turks to organize mass protests and form resistance organizations from the mid- to late 1980s? And how could such resistance organizations transform into an integrationist and fully peaceful ethno-political party in post-communist Bulgaria? In other words, what shaped the varying aims and methods of Turkish ethno-political mobilization in Bulgaria and Cyprus?

This chapter includes a comparative analysis of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus to answer the questions based on the theory developed in Chapter Two. The chapter shows that states' ethnic incorporation policies have shaped the ethno-political mobilization patterns of ethnic Turks in these two countries in accordance with the theory laid out in Chapter Two. This chapter traces the causal processes underlying Turkish ethno-political mobilization in these two cases and puts forward a causal explanation rather than just describing co-variation. The analyses are based on data derived from original interviews,[69] archival research on legal documents and print media, and secondary sources.

[69] I conducted twelve interviews including with current and former politicians of leading ethnic Turkish political parties, activists, representatives of ethno-political organizations, and academics in Bulgaria in July 2013. I carried out twenty two interviews including with a former president and state ministers, current prime

The chapter begins with an analysis of Turkish Cypriot ethno-political mobilization in Cyprus. This section analyzes Cyprus' incorporation policies toward Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot ethno-political mobilization from independence in 1960 to the *de facto* secession of Turkish Cypriots in 1974. The section classifies the incorporation policies of the Republic of Cyprus into three incorporation models: consociationalism (1960-1963), civic assimilationism (1963, 1968-73), and ethnocracy (1964-1967 and 1974); and it process-traces the causes of the varying levels of violence and secessionism in the Turkish ethno-political organization(s) in each period.

Based on these analyses, I argue that prior to 1963 Turkish Cypriots had a high degree of ethno-political awareness that was inherited from the Ottoman *millet* system. When the Republic of Cyprus abandoned the consociational model with President Makarios' *thirteen points* declaration in 1963, widespread feelings of political deprivation emerged in Turkish Cypriot circles. Since Turkish Cypriots already had established ethnic networks and enjoyed declining but still effective elite capabilities due to the institutional legacy and Turkey's continuing support, Turkish Cypriot elites could translate the feelings of political deprivation and resulting motives to aggress and secede into action. As the state's exclusionary policies escalated to ethnocracy, feelings of deprivation and motives to aggress increased further, resulting in an increased volume of violent and secessionist rebellion. What ensured the outcome of (de facto) secession in the island was Turkey's

minister and parliamentary deputies, and former militia commanders in Northern Cyprus in March-April 2012.

military operation, which empowered and directly supported the local Turkish rebels who were already carrying out armed resistance and pursuing secession.

The second case study of this chapter focuses on Bulgaria's Turkish population from the early 1980s to the present. This section includes a descriptive analysis of Bulgaria's incorporation of the country's Turkish population over the last three decades. It classifies the incorporation policies of Bulgaria into three incorporation models: civic assimilationism (1975-1983), ethnocracy (1984-89), and proto-liberal multiculturalism (1990-2014), and it explores how the varying incorporation models in Bulgaria have affected the ethno-political mobilization patterns of ethnic Turks in the country. This section also shows how the ethnic incorporation model that Bulgaria used to incorporate ethnic Turks prior to 1975 was quite unique due to the distinctive features of communist rule in Bulgaria. Indeed, it might be most appropriately classified as a hybrid model. During the early decades of communist rule, the government granted cultural rights to ethnic Turks and incorporated them into the system via the Communist Party. During the inter-war period that preceded communist rule in Bulgaria, the government, to some extent, continued to follow the Ottoman millet system and granted group level rights to Bulgaria's Muslims (Muslim Roma, Pomaks, and Turks) most distinctively in the form of a communal court system.

This section argues that Turks had a high degree of ethnic consciousness and different forms of social and political mobilization (e.g., via the religious institutions, at the local level, or via the Communist Party apparatus) during the civic assimilationist period (1975-1983) and earlier hybrid periods; yet, they mostly refrained from more

conventional forms of ethno-political mobilization such as political rallies, protests, or rebellion. Since ethnic Turks lacked a history of well-organized political mobilization that was autonomous from the state and they did not embrace the idea of political self-determination, the group-level exclusionary policies of civic assimilationism that emerged in the mid-1970s did not initially lead them to create a mass movement to directly challenge state institutions.[70] After 1984 the regime turned to ethnocratic policies that included forced name changes, cultural degradation of ethnic Turks, and the repression of Turkish dissidents. During this period, ethnic Turks lost the opportunity to participate in politics even at the individual level unless they denied their cultural identity and fully cooperated with the regime. The lack of genuine opportunities for political participation both at the individual and group levels created unprecedented feelings of deprivation that quickly became widespread amongst the Turks. However, since Turks in Bulgaria, in contrast to Turkish Cypriots, did not have their own autonomous political elites and ethno-political networks, they lacked the ability to carry out an effective resistance. Turks could not secede from Bulgaria, but hundreds of thousands chose and/or felt forced to migrate to Turkey as an alternative form of merging with the 'motherland.' There was some violent resistance by ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, but this remained limited to a few bombing cases, and their

[70]As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the fate of Pomaks, who are thought to have difficulty in saying "who they are in any consistent terms beyond the label 'Pomak'" (Konstantinov and Alhaug, 1995, p.38) and are mostly thought of as Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Eminov, 2000, p.146), has been different. State policies to eradicate their cultural distinctions from the Bulgarian majority started earlier and were repeated more often particularly in comparison to policies toward Turkish-speaking Muslims. Nevertheless, Turkish-speaking Muslims faced assimilation campaigns too, especially with the phasing out of the teaching of Turkish in schools after 1972 (Eminov, 1997, p. 133). That being said, "the extreme anti-Turkish policies of 1984-90" took place later and "had the unintended effect of strengthening Turkish ethnic identity" (Eminov, 1997, p. 164).

relationship to the broader Turkish resistance remains unclear. When the incorporation model changed once again in 1990, this time to a more inclusionary form both at the individual and group levels, the Turks' feelings of deprivation and frustration disappeared and Turkish ethno-political mobilization shifted to an active but fully integrationist and peaceful pattern in this period.

Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus

An examination of Turkish ethnic mobilization in Cyprus provides broad support for the arguments presented in the previous chapters. Cyprus historically had high levels of ethnic mobilization. Given that religious communities were the only 'recognized' kind of cultural communities with social and political salience in the Ottoman *millet* system, Turkish and Greek Cypriot economic, social, and political developments occurred along the ethnic boundaries with little cross-cutting interaction. The *millet* system was a confessional system which compartmentalized the Ottoman society under religious authorities. People were bound to their *millets* by their religious affiliations. The head of a *millet*, usually a religious hierarch such as the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, was responsible directly to the Ottoman Sultan. As long as the authority of a *millet* demonstrated loyalty to the Sultan, that *millet* had a vast amount of autonomy to levy some special taxes, to apply some special laws within their communities, and to maintain separate legal courts pertaining to personal law under which minorities were allowed to rule themselves in cases not involving any Muslim, with fairly little interference from the Ottoman government (Karpat, 1982; 1988; İnalcık, 1991; Aydın, 1995; Kenanoğlu, 2004).

The consociationalist policies traditionally pursued by the state moderated the mobilization methods of the Turkish Cypriots for decades preceding the creation of independent Cyprus statehood, and, as a result, mobilization was mostly peaceful. However, as shown in Table 4.1, the new Cypriot state pursued more exclusionary policies beginning in late 1963 and these policies led to the radicalization of the Turkish Cypriot community and an embrace of increasingly violent methods. This radicalization calmed somewhat between 1968 and 1973 when the state moderated its policies, but the Turkish Cypriot groups adopted violent methods once again beginning in 1974 in response to a renewed wave of exclusionary and repressive state policies.

Table 4.1 Cypriot ethnic incorporation and Turkish Cypriot ethno-political mobilization (1960-1974)

Periods	*Incorporation model*	*Pre-existing mobilization*	*Ethno-political mobilization aims*	*Ethno-political mobilization means*
pre-1963	Consociationalism	high	mildly centripetal*	mixed (↓)^
1963	Civic assimilationism	high	mildly centrifugal*	mixed (↑)*
1964-1967	Ethnocracy	high	centrifugal*	violent*
1968-1973	Civic assimilationism	high	centrifugal†	mixed*
1974	Ethnocracy	high	centrifugal*	violent*

Note: Symbols (↑) and (↓) refer to a gradual rise and decline respectively.
Symbol (*) refers that the actual outcome is same as the predicted outcome
^ predicted as peaceful; † predicted as mildly centrifugal

Cyprus has never been an autonomous state, not even after its independence. Greece and Greek Cypriots and, to an even greater extent, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots often acted together. In Groom's (1980, p. 245) words, "[t]he Cypriots have never been left to get on with their own conflict." International involvement in the island politics was even

guaranteed by law with the Treaty of Guarantee signed by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom on 16 August 1960.[71] The treaty, on the basis of Article IV, gave authority to the guarantor states to interfere with the domestic politics of Cyprus under certain circumstances:

> In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.[72]

Cyprus was a cornerstone dispute of the 20th century when its domestic problems grew into a civil war and dragged two 'guarantor' states, Greece and Turkey, into plotting coups and military incursions respectively. It is true that "Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots constituted and acted as a single party both during the violent part of that conflict (1963-1974) and during the subsequent negotiation phases" (Sambanis, 1999, p. 7). Yet, a merely internationalist approach to the Cyprus conflict, does not answer the question why Turkish Cypriots turned their face to Turkey only three years after the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. Why did Turkish Cypriots not identify themselves as Cypriots, but Turks? What motives drove them to rebel against the Greek dominated state and seek the assistance of 'motherland' Turkey?

Another alleged source of the conflict in Cyprus is the ethnic structure of the island (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972, p. 148). According to this model, the two 'given' ethnic

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[71] The Treaty was also signed by both Makarios who would be the President of the Republic of Cyprus representing Greek Cypriots and Fazıl Küçük who would be the Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus representing Turkish Cypriots on 16 August 1960. The Treaty can be viewed at: http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_guarantee.pdf (accessed December 29th, 2013).

[72] For the full text of this treaty and all other founding agreements, see Hakkı (2007).

groups on the island formed a pre-independence coalition against the colonial ruler (Britain), but the cooperation collapsed due to ethnic outbidding by elites in the post-independence period. While the 'cooperation against the colonial ruler' part of this argument is not accurate based on the empirical record since there was no significant cooperation between the Turkish and Greek settlers on the island in this period,[73] the emphasis on the role of elites deserves more elaboration. Elite-based explanations dominate the literature on the conflict in Cyprus. For Loizos (1988), the feeling of revenge in both communities on the island was produced by elite-initiated selective nationalisms. For Yakinthou (2009), the disputes of "historically conditioned elites" (p. 61) over political institutions and "[t]he lack of segmental isolation and no history of accommodation between elites" (p. 71) generated the conflict. Nevertheless such elite-based accounts seem to be excessively path-dependent and fall short of explaining the variation in violence levels. The claim that elite decisions matter for violent ethnic mobilization does not tell us what determines the elites' varying decisions and the masses' varying responses to elite appeals.

[73] As Hüseyin Angölemli, a current PM of the TRNC parliament, states, the British rule recruited Turks as the police force in order to use them in repressing the Greek rebels against the colonial rule (Author interview with Hüseyin Angölemli, Magosa, Cyprus, March 30th, 2012). Former TMT commander Orbay Kılıç also confirms this recruitment process for the special 'auxiliary' police forces (Author interview with Orbay Kılıç, Nicosia, Cyprus, March 30th, 2012).

CONSOCIATIONAL POLICIES AND MILDLY CENTRIPETAL-MIXED TURKISH CYPRIOT MOBILIZATION (PRE-1963)

In Cyprus, Muslim-Turks and Orthodox-Greeks are the two politically salient ethnic groups on the island and have formed the main political distinction up to today. The island was ruled in accordance with the Ottoman *millet* system after it was captured by the Ottoman Empire in 1572. The *millet* system incorporated religious minority communities as unitary and fixed blocs under a model that is similar to consociationalism as conceptualized in this article. Under the *millet* system, political activities took place along ethnic lines and there were no significant cross-cutting political cleavages. Bipolar ethno-political structure in Cyprus has been (re)produced by the *millet* system-like institutional designs since the end of the Ottoman rule in 1878. For linguistic and religious reasons, the Greek and Turkish schools of Cyprus had been separate before British rule and remained so during it (Bryant, 1997, p. 56). The *millet* system continued in a different form under British administration (1878-1960). As Calotychos notes, segregated village administrative councils managed and controlled community affairs separately. Specially formed Joint Councils adjudicated issues concerning both groups in this period (Calotychos, 1998, pp. 5-6).

The 1960 Constitution did not emphasize a Cypriot nation or public, instead it referred to Greek and Turkish communities. The constitution of independent Cyprus created a consociational arrangement (Lijphart, 1979, p. 513; Solomonides, 2008; Wolff, 2010, p. 7) that also fits the conventional understanding of the notion by satisfying all four requirements: executive power sharing, autonomy/self-government, proportionality, and

veto-rights.[74] Zaracostas (1980, p. 108) notes that the 1960 constitution "contained in it provisions for segregation at all levels between the Greek and Turkish communities." While the Greek community comprised "all citizens of the Republic who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church," the Turkish community comprised "all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems."[75]

The Communal Chambers that were created in accordance with the constitution shared the executive and legislative powers with the House of Representatives and the Ministries. Thus, the Republic had a dual institutional structure based on bi-communality. This duality penetrated to the local level as well. Separate municipalities were created for the Turkish inhabitants in the five largest towns of the Republic (Nicosia/Lefkoshe, Limassol, Famagusta/Gazimagusa, Larnaca, and Paphos).[76] As a result of this institutional compartmentalization based on bi-communality, pre-existing political mobilization on the island was already ethnicized by the time civic assimilationism replaced consociationalism in late 1963.

As shown in Table 4.2, the changes in the ethnic incorporation of ethnic Turks led to changes in their ethno-political mobilization. Turkish Cypriots developed their nationalism as a defensive contra-nationalism against Greek Cypriot demands for

[74] See Lijphart (1977) and McGarry and O'Leary (2006) for the conceptualization of conventional consociationalism.
[75] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Articles 2-1 and 2-2.
[76] The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Article 173-1.

unification with Greece (*enosis*) and the creation of Greek Cypriot paramilitary forces dubbed National Organization of Freedom Fighters (EOKA, *Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakoú Agónos*). The Turks soon formed their own militia organizations. The Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT, *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*) was originally formed to retaliate against the EOKA operations in 1958, two years before independence during the British colonial rule. Nevertheless, the conflict between the EOKA and the TMT peaked right after the declaration of *thirteen points* and both sides had heavy losses beginning in December 1963.

Table 4.2 Selective chronology of the Cyprus Conflict

1953-55	Founding of the EOKA.
1957-58	Founding of the TMT.
1960	Declaration of the Republic of Cyprus based on an exclusively bi-communal political regime (consociationalism).
1963	Makarios' thirteen amendments to the constitution that removed Turkish Cypriots' self-government rights (transition to civic assimilationism), an event followed by Turkish Cypriots' *December protests*.
1964	Ghettoization of and economic embargos on the Turkish communes (transition to ethnocracy), a series of battles from 1964 to 1967 (e.g., Erenköy/Kokkina battle), Turkey's air strike.
1968	Removal of blockades between Turkish enclaves (transition to civic assimilationism).
1974	Greece-backed coup and political repression during Sampson's short-term rule (transition to ethnocracy), and Turkey's military incursion and population exchange agreement in the following year.

Turkish and Greek Cypriots lived in peace and harmony until 1955 (Neokleus, 2011, p. 31). According to Loizos (1988, p. 640), there were armed conflicts before independence, particularly in 1958 due to the EOKA activities, but popular support for violent organizations diminished in the early years of independent statehood and escalated

again in the 1963-1967 period.[77] Turkish Cypriots in the pre-1963 period had the capability (due to the ethnic elites' *de jure* authority and *de facto* power), but insufficient motivation to form violent movements particularly at the mass level. Although Turkish Cypriot elites formed organizations like the TMT with the support of Turkey, full scale mobilization only became possible after 1963 when Makarios introduced his constitutional amendment plan and initiated the blockade of Turkish enclaves the next year.

CIVIC ASSIMILATIONIST POLICIES AND MILDLY CENTRIFUGAL-MIXED TURKISH CYPRIOT MOBILIZATION (1963)

The Greek Cypriot-dominated Council of Ministers passed a law bringing the separate Turkish and Greek Cypriot municipalities under unified control in 1963 (Yakinthou, 2009, p. 63). President Makarios sent his further plans for constitutional amendment to establish a civic assimilationist incorporation model as a list of thirteen points to the prime ministers of three guarantor states, Greece, Turkey, and Britain, on November 29th, 1963. Regarding the transition from consociationalism to civic assimilationism, the most crucial points of the list were:

> 1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned. [The Vice-Presidency position was previously granted to the Turkish community thereby making it a veto-player.]
> 3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.
> 5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.
> 6. Unified Municipalities to be established.

[77] Since the conflict started at the end of 1963, scholars usually refer the 1964-1967 period as the first period of war while the year 1974 is the second period of war. For such a classification, see Yakinthou, (2009, p. 2).

7. The administration of Justice to be unified.
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots [previously, the Turkish Cypriot minority was overrepresented by law].
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.[78]

These points were regarded by Turkish Cypriots "as an attack on their safeguards. Their rejection of the amendments was followed almost immediately by large-scale inter-communal violence in which up to 500 people were killed. The majority of the casualties were Turkish Cypriots" (O'Neill and Rees, 2005, pp. 80-81). Nevertheless, this conflict stemmed not only from Makarios' thirteen amendments but also from the increased tension created by the blockades of Turkish settlements that started in the next period. While the first outburst of Turkish Cypriot violence (which was limited to "revenge murders") occurred following the thirteen points case from December 21st to 31st in 1963, inter-communal violence intensified in February 1964 and continued at a high level with certain intervals due to peace talks and negotiations (Patrick, 1976).

ETHNOCRATIC POLICIES AND CENTRIFUGAL-VIOLENT TURKISH CYPRIOT MOBILIZATION (1964-67)

As Makarios' thirteen points were put into action, the sudden group-level exclusion of a highly mobilized ethnic group made both elites and the masses of the Turkish community feel politically deprived. When Makarios turned the incorporation model into

[78] These points are available from http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/13_points.html (accessed October 5th, 2013).

ethnocracy in 1964, the situation intensified got worse. Beginning in August that year, he blockaded the Turkish settlements (The Telegraph, 1964) and, hence, established an exclusionary system both at the individual and group levels. As Tesser (2013, p. 103) notes, while the two major ethnic communities in the island "often lived in separate villages and distinct quarters in the island's major towns, ethnic separation began to take a territorial shape only in 1963–1964" as many of Turkish Cypriots "moved from mixed areas to ethnically concentrated areas," and, starting from 1964, particularly to enclaves in order to ensure their security.

High levels of inherited and *de facto* ongoing control and mobilizing capacity at the elite level, and high levels of ethno-political awareness (including ethnic identification, ethno-political consciousness, and the sense of linked fate) at the mass level made the separatist and violent ethno-political mobilization quite effective on the island. In response to the systematic political exclusion, many Turks embraced the idea of secession and joined the TMT ranks. Even Mehmet Ali Talat, currently a defender of re-unification and the former president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC, *Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti*[79]) (2005-2010), acknowledges that his social circle and himself deeply desired secession and unification with Turkey at the time.[80] Alper Durduran, who is currently a deputy in the TRNC parliament and was formerly president of the unificationist New Cyprus Party (YKP), also acknowledges he voluntarily joined the armed struggle in

[79] The TRNC lacks international recognition in accordance with the UN resolutions of 541 and 550. Turkey is the only state that recognizes the TRNC as an independent state. Nevertheless, the TRNC has observant position in international organizations like the Organization of Islamic Conference.
[80] Author interview with Mehmet Ali Talat, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 2nd, 2012.

the TMT ranks as the incorporation model changed on the island. Durduran observed that "the Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was much higher than nationalism in Turkey" as he made visits to Turkey in 1960s.[81] Former TMT commander Orbay Kılıç's observation for the same time period is in line with that of Durduran. He thought the Turkish Cypriots in those years thought of themselves as "nobody outside the motherland, Turkey."[82] Hence, they not only had a sense of linked fate and solidarity with their co-ethnics in Cyprus, but also with those in the 'motherland' Turkey.

The exclusionary policies of the Cypriot state created strong feelings of deprivation. Former TMT commander Yılmaz Bora's narrative demonstrates the importance of motivation in ethno-political mobilization. Long before the TMT was founded and started recruiting its armed forces, Bora started his own resistance group with his friends.[83] Taner Etkin, the former minister of foreign affairs of TRNC, followed the same path and started a local resistance group with six of his school friends at the age of 14 by preparing handmade bombs in the school laboratory. The bombs were ineffective and while Etkin's group did not commit any significant form of violence, his activity was soon noticed by in-group elites and he was recruited by the TMT.[84] Hence, Turkish Cypriot elites —who had still well-developed ethnic networks to organize their co-ethnics due to high pre-existing ethno-political mobilization of Turkish Cypriots— could easily recruit young Turkish

[81] Author interview with Alper Durduran, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 3rd, 2012.
[82] Author interview with Orbay Kılıç, Nicosia, Cyprus, March 30th, 2012.
[83] Author interview with Yılmaz Bora, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 5th, 2012.
[84] Author's interview Taner Etkin, Nicosia, April 6th, 2012.

Cypriots who were then motivated to rebel due to ethnic exclusion policies and resulting feelings of deprivation.

Yılmaz Bora identifies the exclusion and repression of Turkish Cypriots as taking place in three stages: the foundation of the EOKA in 1955 in the colonial British period, the constitutional amendments of 1963, and the military coup and Sampson's rule in 1974.[85] The inflow of recruits to the TMT ranks peaked in the post-1963 period as the exclusionary policies led to a sense of political deprivation. For a former *Volkan*[86] and TMT member, Güner Rıfkı,[87] the TMT was much more powerful than Volkan and any other earlier resistance organization in terms of weapons and organizational capabilities. Once the majority of Turkish Cypriots sympathized with the TMT, the organization could rule out alternative channels of mobilization and suppress ethnic defectors.[88] It was Makarios who blockaded Turkish Cypriot settlements which led to the emergence of Turkish enclaves in the island. Nevertheless, "it was pressure from the Turkish Cypriot leadership rather than from the Greek Cypriots, which cemented physical divisions" (Mallinson, 2005, p. 44).

According to Durduran, "the TMT recruited all the men who can hold guns. This started as a voluntary process at the beginning, but both the TMT and the EOKA suppressed internal dissent in their respective communities. Both of them killed more people from their

[85] Author's interview with Yılmaz Bora, Nicosia, Cyprus April 5th, 2012.
[86] Volkan (1956), Dokuz Eylül (1956), and Kara Çete (1957) were other Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary groups that were found after the foundation of the EOKA, but were abolished after the TMT was founded. They were abolished and absorbed by the TMT.
[87] Author's interview with Güner Rıfkı, Nicosia, March 28th, 2012.
[88] For a discussion of ethnic defection, see Kalyvas (2008).

own communities than the opposite ethnic group."[89] Özkan Yorgancıoğlu, the current Prime Minister of the TRNC, also acknowledges that both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides handled their intra-community affairs in an undemocratic fashion. Elections were dubious and the rule was almost in a fascist discipline. Leftists like Yorgancıoğlu's associates were blocked from the elections.[90] According to Şener Levent, a former TMT member and the editor in chief of the daily *Afrika*, in the 1960s the TMT killed numerous Turkish lawyers, journalists, and union members who were affiliated with the communist Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL, *Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou*) and were critics of the TMT.

CIVIC ASSIMILATIONIST POLICIES AND CENTRIFUGAL-MIXED TURKISH CYPRIOT MOBILIZATION (1968-73)

The violence on the island in the preceding period was pulling Greece and Turkey more and more into the island's politics and a war between the two 'motherlands' was becoming more and more likely. With the intervention of US President Johnson, the tension temporarily calmed down. The situation became less severe in 1968 when Makarios removed the blockades. Although Turkish Cypriots no longer had external constraints to leave their enclaves and face Greek Cypriots in their daily lives, the conflict between the two communities ceased to exist except for some minor encounters.

[89] Author interview with Alper Durduran, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 3rd, 2012.
[90] Author interview with Özkan Yorgancıoğlu, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 2nd, 2012.

As stated, the lessening degree of exclusion toward Turkish Cypriots was outside motivated, but quickly impacted the domestic politics of the island. The inter-communal talks between Rauf Denktaş representing the Turkish Cypriot side and Glafkos Klerides representing the Greek Cypriot side started in June 1968 and continued until 1974 through the offices of the UN Secretary General (Stearns, 1992, p. 112). When the negotiations faced a deadlock in 1971, the second phase became possible only with the endorsement of the NATO allies Greece and Turkey. The uncertainty and declining Turkish Cypriot secessionist rebellion continued until Nikos Sampson's short-term rule, with the support of the Greek junta, which reestablished the ethnocratic incorporation model in 1974.

SIGNALS OF ETHNOCRACY AND CENTRIFUGAL-VIOLENT TURKISH CYPRIOT MOBILIZATION (1974)

As hypothesized, changing ethnic incorporation models in Cyprus shaped the grievances, ethno-political awareness, and capabilities of Turkish Cypriots. This led to changes in the level of violence they employed as well as the degree of secessionism they pursued. The end of the civil war in Cyprus occurred only with an inter-state war and the military invasion of Turkey. Following the coup in Greece, local military forces in the island under Greek commanders seized President Makarios' presidential palace and claimed that they had killed him (The New York Times, 2001). Following this incident, Nikos Sampson became president of Cyprus on July 15th, 1974. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş called this situation as no different from "Hitler's becoming president of Israel" (The New York Times, 2001). Güner Rıfkı, a former Volkan and then TMT

guerilla, states that Sampson was famous because of the earlier massacres that he was responsible for and, therefore, his presidency worried Turkish Cypriots. As soon as Sampson became the new president, his forces attacked not only Turks, but even more significantly Greek leftists.[91] Another former TMT guerilla and current politician Alper Durduran also acknowledges that, in fact, Sampson was harsher on Greek communists than on Turkish Cypriots. He even gave a sort of guarantee to Turkish Cypriots about their safety as he focused on repressing Greek Cypriot communists. Yet, Turkish Cypriots did not find this guarantee sincere and did not feel secure as the political status quo changed on the island.[92]

What followed were the Turkish military operation and Sampson's massacres in the Turkish villages of Aloa, Maratha, Sandallar, and Tochni on 20 July 1974 (Cassia, 2007, p. 237). Sampson said in an interview with the Greek newspaper *Eleftherotipia* on 26 February 1981 that "Had Turkey not intervened in 1974, I would not only have proclaimed *enosis* [unification with the mainland Greece] - I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus" (Stephen, 2001, p. 61).

Following the sudden shift to ethnocracy in the island, the TMT struck back with the support of Turkey. The first wave of the Turkish military operation was not heavily criticized by the international community because Turkey had declared that the goal of the operation was to restore order on the island. Yet, as seen during the second wave of the operation, the mission, in fact, had the more aggressive goal of dividing the island for an

[91] Author interview with Güner Rıfkı, Nicosia, Cyprus, March 28th, 2012.
[92] Author interview with Alper Durduran, Nicosia, Cyprus, April 3rd, 2012.

extended period of time. Turkey's endeavor was denounced by the international community. For this reason, no country other than Turkey has recognized the TRNC that was formed in the northern part of the island in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions of 541 and 550.[93] The two parts of the island came close to reunification with the Annan Plan twin referendums in 2004. While 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted for reunification, 76 percent of Greek Cypriots voted against it on the grounds that the reunification conditions were not fair from their point of view. While the Turkish Cypriots demanded a consociational arrangement in the island, the Greek Cypriot demands tended to be more in line with a civic assimilationist incorporation model. The other major issue of the dispute was with regard to the territorial boundaries of the autonomous republics.[94]

Turks in Bulgaria

The analysis of Turkish ethno-political mobilization in Bulgaria provides supportive evidence for the hypotheses developed in Chapter Two. After a relatively inclusive interwar period and a distinctive period of Communist rule post-1944, both of which were hybrid in character, the Bulgarian state implemented a civic (political)

[93] UN Resolution 541 was declared by the UN Security Council on November 18th, 1983 following the declaration of independent statehood by Turkish Cypriot authorities on November 15th, 1983. The Resolution reaffirms earlier resolutions 365 (December 13th, 1974) and 367 (March 12th, 1975) that "[r]egrets the unilateral decision of 13 February 1975 declaring that a part of the Republic of Cyprus would become a Federated Turkish State" (full texts are available from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/365 and http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/367 -accessed December 31st, 2013) and find the declaration of independence incompatible with the 1960 treaties during the founding of the Republic of Cyprus. The full text of the resolution 541 is available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541(1983) (accessed December 31st, 2013). Resolution 550 (May 11th, 1984) is in line with Resolution 541 and is available from http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/550(1984) (accessed December 31st, 2013).

[94] For a discussion of the Annan Plans and respective Turkish and Greek Cypriot perspectives on it, see Faustmann (2004), Loizides and Keskiner (2004), and Hoffmeister (2006).

assimilationist model vis-a-vis Turks from the mid-1970s to 1983. Turks lacked an ethno-political organizational structure that was autonomous from the state at that time and mostly mobilized locally in 'everyday' forms. Turks were conscious of their ethnic identity and had sympathies toward the kin state Turkey, yet specific political goals such as self-determination or political autonomy was not on their agenda. As indicated in Table 4.3, Turkish mobilization turned sporadically violent (with a moderate level of violence) once the incorporation model switched to ethnocracy in 1984. Since Turks did not have a contiguous homeland that was exclusively settled by them, secession was not a realist choice; instead, hundreds of thousands migrated to Turkey in this period, which was unprecedented in terms of its volume. Since 1990, however, the Bulgarian state has taken steps toward a liberal multiculturalist model and the Turkish community has completely abandoned violence as a method of mobilization. Moreover, a large segment of those who migrated to Turkey returned to Bulgaria after the regime change.

Table 4.3 Bulgarian ethnic incorporation and Turkish ethno-political mobilization

	Incorporation model	*Pre-existing mobilization*	*Ethno-political mobilization aims*	*Ethno-political mobilization methods*
1975-1983	Civic assimilationism	low^	centripetal*	peaceful*
1984-1989	Ethnocracy	low^	centrifugal*	mixed*
1990-2014	(Proto-)liberal multiculturalism	high	centripetal*	peaceful*

Note: The pre-1975 period was hybrid in character with both inclusive and exclusionary policies. The first three decades of the Communist era, in particular, had a distinct form of incorporating Turks into the political system.
Symbol (*) refers that the actual outcome is same as the predicted outcome
(^) During the Communist era, Turks in Bulgaria did not engage in autonomous, well-organized, or massive political mobilizations, such as riots or rebellion. Their political mobilization occurred

mostly in officially approved ways via the Communist Party branches or in overt, everyday forms of dissent hidden from the regime.

According to some scholars such as Ivanov (1999), interrupted national histories and oppression under foreign rule led to the varying forms of Bulgarian and Turkish nationalisms found in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, such historical accounts fail to explain the varying levels, aims, and methods of Turkish mobilization in the country. Other scholars see the roots of conflict in the allocation of economic resources by the state. Crawford (1998), for example, argues that the Communist regime in Bulgaria granted economic security to Turks by giving them privileges in the tobacco industry. While it is true that Turks had certain economic privileges under Communism, Crawford (1998, p. 9) underestimates the degree of ethnic violence in Bulgaria, particularly between 1984 and 1989, and classifies Bulgaria as a peaceful case.[95] Finally, still other scholars attribute ethnic mobilization in Bulgaria to the regime change from authoritarianism to democracy that occurred with the end of the Cold War. Koinova (2013), for instance, argues that the formative period at the end of the Communist era shaped the degree and duration of ethnic violence in the post-Communist era in a number of Eastern European countries including Bulgaria. Indeed, regime change was the most striking transformation regarding Bulgarian politics in the specified time period. Nevertheless, such an account cannot explain the considerable variation in ethnic mobilization during the Communist era. As we shall see,

[95] While acknowledging Turkish ethnic riots resulting in 600 deaths in 1989 in response to Zhivkov's Bulgarization attempts, Crawford (1998, p. 8) does not pay attention to sporadic violent upheavals of Turks throughout the 1980s. Therefore, she takes the events of 1989 as the "only recorded deaths related to ethnic conflict" and classifies Bulgaria as a peaceful case. In fact, the death toll during the ethnocratic policies of the Bulgarian state remains a mystery. Koinova (1999) cites casualty estimates from 100 to 5000 based on different reports.

the increasing level of violence and desire to separate from the Bulgarian state (which was expressed via emigration waves rather than territorial secession) among Bulgarian Turks was not a response to authoritarianism, but rather to ethnic exclusion which had varied during the authoritarian period.

That being said, it should be acknowledged that the Bulgarian communist regime had a distinct pattern of ethnic incorporation. It was very inclusionary at certain times, for instance from the establishment of Communist rule until 1956. For a time, the Bulgarian Communist Party even had a Turkish youth branch that aimed at modernizing and incorporating the 'idle' and predominantly rural and uneducated Turkish population into the state apparatus and spreading communist ideology amongst them. The Turkish youth branch was officially closed down in 1964.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This section discusses ethnic politics in Bulgaria with regard to the ethnic incorporation of Turks and Turkish ethno-political mobilization in a historical context. Although the focus of this chapter with regard to Turks in Bulgaria is on post-1980 politics, a brief discussion of the historical context and legacy should help the reader understand post-1980 developments better.

The Inter-war period (1918-1939)

Bulgaria emerged as an independent 'nation' in 1878 following a number of earlier rebellions and the defeat of the Ottomans by Russia. The Berlin Treaty of 1878 following the Ottoman-Russian war established the autonomous Bulgarian principality. According to

Karpat (2004, p. 426), by 1890, Bulgaria was "probably the most developed state in the Balkans, both with respect to state institutions and to national consciousness." This was largely due to the early development of a large middle class in the country, which had a national, even "nationalistic," social basis.

Bulgaria's incorporation model vis-a-vis its ethnic Turks varied to a great extent throughout the 20th century. The Ottoman legacy and the Turkish ethnic identity of the Turkish-speaking Muslim minority in Bulgaria had long been a problem for the Bulgarian state. As Neuburger notes (2004, p. 57), the state's solution to this problem, at times, included granting Bulgarian Turks a great degree of autonomy, particularly judicial autonomy especially in the interwar period. At other times, it included "seizing lands, encouraging emigration, changing place names, and in times of war, unleashing campaigns against Turco-Arabic personal names and clothes" up to 1944 (Neuburger 2004, p. 57). This era, as well as the subsequent communist period, was not monolithic but instead included a mixture of "acceptance, rejection, tolerance, and intolerance" (Neuburger, 1997, pp. 4-5).

Bulgaria, like Cyprus, inherited the *millet* system from the Ottomans. Bulgaria continued this legacy to some extent until the end of the inter-war period. The 1879 Constitution of the Principality of Bulgaria, in accordance with the *millet* system, adopted the idea of minorities as religious communities. This emphasis on religion continued after the First World War as well. From the *liberation* in 1878 to the Second World War, minority communities in Bulgaria enjoyed "the greatest freedom to exercise their ethno-cultural rights" in the form of a "legal framework and actual opportunities for the ethnic,

religious and linguistic minority press" despite facing some pressures at the same time (Kanev 1998, pp. 56-57, 65). This inter-war period, even extending back to the independence, is distinguished in the sense that the state was "relatively more tolerant" not only toward Turks, but toward all minorities from 1878 to 1945 (Neuburger, 2004, p. 19). Turko-Muslim institutions even had direct jurisdiction over all non-Pomak Muslims particularly with regard to the court system (Neuburger, 2004).

In the inter-war period, Turks in Bulgaria were quite interested in and responsive to developments in Turkey as well. The Turkish community in this period was split between the ones who supported Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's[96] secular and modernizing reforms in Turkey and the rest who were more traditional and skeptical about reforms in Turkey. The Bulgarian state supported the conservative Muslim clergy in contrast to pro-modernization Turks in this time period, especially in the late 1930s (Kanev 1998, p. 65). In this inter-war period, the Bulgarian government tended to see the Muslim masses as "inert" and "loyal" (Neuburger, 2004, p. 44), whereas those who adopted Kemal Ataturk's reformist politics faced "blatant maltreatment" (Neuburger, 2004, p. 51). In fact, pro-Kemalist cultural and educational associations such as *Turan*, *Altın Ordu*, *Alparslan* were banned in 1934 (Zhelyazkova 1998, p. 297). Bulgaria's prominent Turkish figures had critical discussions in the Turkish National Congress held in Sofia over matters such as how to identify themselves in relation to the Bulgarian majority and non-Turkish Muslim minorities (Kanev 1998, p. 61). In a nutshell, this period was relatively inclusive

[96] Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938) is the founder and the first president (1923-1938) of the Republic of Turkey. The people who follow Kemal Ataturk's doctrines are called Kemalists.

particularly at the group level although the extent of this inclusiveness did not reach the level of contemporary forms of ethno-political autonomy. Turks were not monolithic in this time period, but were undergoing political change, particularly in the case of Kemalists, in response to the developments in Bulgaria, Turkey, and the region in general.

The early Communist era (1944-1974)

Although communists dominated the Fatherland Front government of Bulgaria, a "monolithic," "one-party system" did not emerge until the end of 1947 (Crampton 1997, p. 184). Under communist rule, the Bulgarian state implemented distinct policies of "national integration," that at times were relatively inclusive and at other times were relatively exclusionary. Policies toward minorities oscillated between internationalism and nationalism, and between inclusion of ethnic, "but not religious!," identity and exclusion (Kanev 1998, p. 70).

According to Eminov (1997, p. 5), "the existence of minorities in Bulgaria was constitutionally recognized and their rights were guaranteed and protected" from 1944 to 1956, and "this was especially true for the Turkish minority". The 1947 constitution was modeled on the Leninist version of socialism (McIntyre 1988, p. 53), which had granted autonomy to national minorities in its Soviet version. Bulgaria did not take it to this level, yet still granted a wide array of cultural rights to its Turkish citizens. The constitution specified a wide array of rights and freedoms such as freedom of conscience and "experimented with some nontraditional attempts to constitutionally recognize the existence of ethnic minorities" (Koinova 2013, p. 39). Article 79 of the Constitution

recognized the existence of minorities. As a result, new Turkish schools were opened, special radio broadcasts began to broadcast in Turkish, Turkish media was supported, and a quota system was introduced to incorporate more and more Turks into the universities (Palchev 2002, p. 21). As seen in Figure 4.1, the Communist regime attempted, and to a great extent achieved, to reach out to the country's mostly rural Turkish population with political messages in their own language, Turkish.

Figure 4.1, A propaganda message in Turkish by the Bulgarian Government for Bulgarian Turks disseminated during the early Communist period

Note: The photo was taken in the Museum of Socialist Art in Sofia, Bulgaria in July 2013. The man in the front is holding the newspaper *Yeni Işık* that is printed in Turkish, and the man and the woman in the back have traditional Turkish clothes on. The text is in Turkish and can be translated to English as: "The Turkish community living in the People's Republic of Bulgaria is founding the

socialist homeland with a steady faith in the name of Dimitrov and under the guidance and command of comrade Vilko Cherchenkov."

Overall Turkish political mobilization in the early decades of the Communist era occurred through religious institutions, at the local level, or directed by the central state institutions. The decades preceding the 1970s were relatively smooth and mostly free for the expression of Turkish identity although the extent of 'freedom' was not vast given the authoritarian form of government in the country. Ethnic Turks in this period could engage in formal politics via mainstream (regime-sponsored) channels of political mobilization, mostly in the form of Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP, *Balgarska Komunisticheska Partiya*) membership but also via the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU, *Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sayuz*). In the late 1950s, the government designated special programs to prepare political cadres among Turks and other ethnic minorities (Eminov, 1997, p. 54).

One of the prominent Turkish political figures in this era was İbrahim Yalımov. Yalımov, who was the son of a Turkish mayor from the BANU, served in the Turkish branch of the Youth Department of the BCP, and chaired this branch from 1958 to 1962. The Turkish branch of the Youth Department was closed down in 1964, but Turks could engage in politics within the BCP. In this regard, the Turks' position was no different from that of the ethnic Bulgarians. The communist regime never granted group-level inclusion to Turks in the form of territorial political autonomy or the legalization of Turkish ethno-political parties; yet, according to Yalımov, the regime was not exclusionary at the individual level, but in contrast, tried hard to mobilize Turks and keep them connected to

the regime via the party. During his service as the chair of the Turkish branch in the BCP, Yalımov registered 400 Turkish students in universities in the country at a time when the Turkish populace in the country was heavily uneducated and lived in rural areas.[97]

At times, Turkish cultural rights were restrained, such as when the state banned the Quranic schools by 1947, intensified assimilation efforts toward Islam in the late 1950s (Koinova 2013, p. 39), and took steps to eliminate the Turkish literature after 1969 (Eminov, 1997, p. 134). Zhelyazkova (1998, p. 299) even argues that "in the early 1960s, the ideological preparations were undertaken for a radical change in the policy toward the Turks and Muslim Bulgarians with a view to their complete assimilation"

Moreover, due to political as well as social and economic pressures, thousands of ethnic Turks migrated to Turkey (or the Ottoman Empire prior to 1923) between the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and 1978 when the migration agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria expired and the two countries did not renew it (Koinova, 1999). Despite these poor conditions for Turks, the primary targets of the regime were the Pomak and Roma minorities rather than Turks. For instance, the forced name changes of Pomaks go back to periods preceding the Communist era. During the Balkan Wars and World War II, "Pomak names and clothes would become central targets of de-Turkification efforts," according to Neuburger (2000, pp. 189, 192). The Bulgarian government implemented harsher policies towards Pomaks than Turks. For instance, another wave of name changing campaign was initiated for Pomaks in the 1960s and more dramatically in the 1970-74 period, which, at

[97] Author interview with İbrahim Yalımov, Sofia, July 25th, 2013.

times, led to massive Pomak protests and even sporadic clashes between local Pomaks and security forces, which included military personnel who sought to carry out the campaigns of name changes (Neuburger, 2000, pp. 192-193).

CIVIC ASSIMILATIONIST POLICIES AND CENTRIPETAL-PEACEFUL TURKISH MOBILIZATION (1975-1983)

The 1970s witnessed some significant changes in world politics, which would attract Bulgarian policy makers' attention. The two problematic developments were the conflict in Cyprus culminating in Turkey's military invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974, and growing Islamism in the Middle East, particularly in Iran, Egypt, and Palestine. Bulgarian policy makers perceived such developments as signs to change their policies toward Turks. The country was already "unitary," "highly centralized in decision making," and "ethno-centric in constitutional wording" (Koinova, 2013: 34). Bulgarian political elites had long disagreements about how to approach the Turkish question; yet, these internal disputes ended with the defeat of those who advocated greater ethnocultural rights for minority groups (Kanev 1998, p. 75). The 1971 constitution was codified and implemented in such a political context.

In contrast to other federal communist Eastern European countries such as Yugoslavia where even smaller ethnic minority groups had some form of constitutional recognition, the 1971 Constitution of Bulgaria did not grant recognition to national minorities, but only referred to them as "citizens of non-Bulgarian origin" (Koinova, 2013). This was a reversal of the more inclusive nature of the 1947 Constitution.

> Citizens have the right to education. Education is secular, democratic and progressive in spirit. *National minorities* have the right to learn their mother tongue and to develop their national culture while learning the Bulgarian language that is required (1947 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 79).
>
> *Citizens of non-Bulgarian origin,* besides the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language, have the right to study and use their language (1971 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 45-7).[98]

The Communist Party authorized a special committee to develop a plan for "working with the Bulgarian Turks" in 1974 in response to the developments in Cyprus and the plan was put in force in 1975 (Palchev 2002, p. 22). The partition of Cyprus and fears of increased Turkish nationalism as well as rising global Islamism was a "red flag" for Bulgarian statesmen (Neuburger, 2004, p. 71). The heating up of the conflict in Cyprus since late 1963 had been a concern of the Bulgarian government. In response to such international developments, Bulgaria renewed a migration treaty with Turkey and approximately 130,000 Bulgarian Turks emigrated to Turkey from 1969 to 1978 (Kanev 1998, p. 73).

Hence, while the complete de-Turkification of the Pomaks was a genuine mission of the government, the Pomak case was also an experiment that allowed the Bulgarian government to see the effect that these policies might have if they were implemented on the country's Turkish population. The state did not take extreme measures to assimilate Turks at this time in contrast to Pomaks and the Roma, but Bulgaria was willing to homogenize the country by allowing and encouraging Turks in Bulgaria to migrate to

[98] The emphases are added by the author. The full text of the 1947 Constitution is available in Bulgarian at the Bulgarian Parliament website: http://parliament.bg/bg/18 (last access on April 23rd, 2014). The 1971 Constitution is also available in Bulgarian at the Bulgarian Parliament website: http://parliament.bg/bg/19 (last access on April 23rd, 2014).

Turkey after the 1968 agreement signed between Turkey and Bulgaria (Crampton 1997, p. 203).

Assimilationist policies toward Turks began to emerge with the 1971 Constitution, and intensified starting in the mid-1970s. Because the assimilationist policies toward Turks remained limited, the Turkish response was not yet as extreme as the Pomak response. Nevertheless, while they avoided challenging the state in a direct and massive way, Turks still managed to preserve their ethnic identity even under the assimilationist policies. Karpat (1990, p. 10) notes that it was a source of admiration amongst some Bulgarian intelligentsia that ethnic Turks could maintain their ethnic identity during 1970s.

ETHNOCRATIC POLICIES AND CENTRIFUGAL-MIXED TURKISH MOBILIZATION (1984-1989)

The Bulgarian ethnic incorporation model switched to ethnocracy in the winter of 1984-1985 with the introduction of the so-called Revival/Regeneration Process (*Vuzroditelskiyat Protses*) of the Bulgarian state. As the Bulgarian state was struggling with economic and social failures and public discontent was on the rise throughout the 1970s and 1980s, President Todor Zhivkov found national chauvinism and xenophobia toward the country's Turkish population to be an effective way to distract the Bulgarian population and a new source of legitimacy for his rule (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007, pp. 90-91). The Bulgarian government applied "extreme violence" in this period, a policy that was based on "scientific 'justifications' of Bulgarian nationalism" (Koinova, 1999).

The Revival process did not allow Turks to participate in politics as culturally distinct citizens and repressed the Turkish identity severely by excluding them both at group and individual levels. The primary measure of the Revival process was the forceful replacement of Turkish/Muslim names with Bulgarian names, which deprived ethnic Turks of their 'selves.' Local authorities demanded that Turks sign 'voluntary' declaration documents changing their names into Bulgarian names. Those who refused to sign the document were subject to a number of sanctions and penalties ranging from economic sanctions to sheer violence, often under the orders of the Bulgarian armed forces (Stamatov, 2000, p. 553). As Crampton (1997, p. 209) notes, "in many cases," Turks resisted the policy and faced military troops that included tanks and special red beret units, and this "was the largest military operation undertaken by the Bulgarian army since the end of the second world war." Overall, the government enacted "brutal measures" in this time period (Koinova, 2013, p. 36).

According to the Human Rights Watch report (1989), "a harsh assimilation campaign since 1984 intended to eradicate their [Turks'] cultural and religious identity" and led to "one of the worst human rights records in the Eastern bloc." This soon caused "tens of thousands of Turks" to take to the streets to protest the campaign. The protest events, in turn, led to state violence in the form of "beatings, arrests, and expulsions of Turks." As Koinova (1999, p. 11) lays out, the Turkish dissidents faced beatings, detention and arrest, and, in some cases, the Bulgarian military surrounded Turkish settlements with tanks and troops.

Other measures included prohibiting traditional Turkish clothing, particularly women's *shalvars*, promoting marriages between Turks and Bulgarians, encouraging young Bulgarian couples to migrate into Turkish concentrated regions, and forcing Muslim Turks to bury their deceased with Bulgarian civil ceremonies in common graveyards (Elchinova, 2001, pp. 57-58, 67). While repressing Turkish dissenters severely, Bulgaria also allowed ethnic Turks to migrate to Turkey as a second measure of homogenizing the country's population. The 1989 Human Rights Watch Report for Bulgaria reserved "the strongest criticism for Bulgaria's treatment of its Turkish minority."

The Turkish populace of Bulgaria lacked the ability to mobilize autonomously from the state for the most of the Communist era. The picture started to change in 1980s as the incorporation model changed from civic assimilationism to ethnocracy. Not only did the government deprive Turks of their most basic political rights, but it also committed vast human rights abuses. The Zhivkov regime killed over 100 Turks and arrested hundreds in December 1984 (Associated Press, 1986), and 1985 witnessed the first battle between the Turks of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian armed forces with over 40 casualties (Associated Press, 1985). Turkish resistance to the changing incorporation model took 'a dramatic form' in the late 1980s (Elchinova, 2001, pp. 57-58). Ethnic cleavages between Turks and Bulgarians "solidified to a degree unprecedented in previous years" and the wave of "strikes and demonstrations" was something "unheard of in the history of Bulgarian state socialism since 1945" (Stamatov, 2000, p. 553).

The grievances stemming from the ethnocratic incorporation model led the Turks to engage in violence even with the limited capacity they had. Bombings started on 30

August 1984 in Plovdiv and Varna train stations that killed one person and injured 56 in total (News Plovdiv, 2008; Palchev 2002, p. 23). Another major incident was the bombing of Bunovo train station by the Turkish National Liberation Movement that killed 7 civilians and severely injured nine people (Vesti, 2007). Another incident was the bombing of the Hotel Sliven that wounded 23 people (Palchev 2002, p. 23). Although who ordered these attacks remains the subject of debate, the Zhivkov government held the Turkish minority responsible for plotting terrorist attacks.[99] Although forty two separate Turkish resistance organizations were formed from 1986 to 1989,[100] the violent struggle was not very effective and the repression soon led thousands of Turks to flee the country and migrate to Turkey. According to Doğan (1990, p. 61), 345,960 Turks emigrated to Turkey between May, 1989 and May, 1990. Mümin İsov, a Bulgarian-Turkish academic and one-time activist, notes that if the great migration of 1989 had not occurred, a civil war would have broken out in Bulgaria.[101]

PROTO-LIBERAL MULTICULTURALIST POLICIES AND CENTRIPETAL-PEACEFUL TURKISH MOBILIZATION (1990-2014)

President Zhivkov's regime in Bulgaria fell in November 1989 and end of Communism in Bulgaria the following year opened the gates for *de facto*[102] group level

[99] According to Alexis Kalionski, a historian and political activist in the transition process of Bulgaria from authoritarianism to democracy from 1988 to 1990, the bombings could have been genuine reactions to state policies or simply provocative actions plotted by a foreign country (Author interview with Kalionski, Sofia, July 20th, 2013).

[100] Author interview with İbrahim Yalımov, Sofia, July 25th, 2013.

[101] Author interview with Mümin İsov, Sofia, July 18th, 2013.

[102] Ethnic parties are still not legal according to the Bulgarian constitution, but the MRF functions as an ethnic political party. This is the major reason why the party is labeled as a 'movement' rather than a party.

inclusion for Turks. As shown in Table 4.4., a Bulgarian Turkish party, the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF, *Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi*) registered as a legal political party on April 26th, 1990 and has been represented in the national parliament since then, even holding ministries and a deputy prime ministry position.

Table 4.4 The MRF in the Bulgarian parliament

Position	Period	Seats in the parliament	Ministries under the MRF
NA	1990	23/400	NA
In opposition	1991-1994	24/240	None
In opposition	1994-1997	15/240	None
In opposition	1997-2001	19/240	None
Coalition government with the NDSV	2001-2005	21/240	1. Agriculture and Forests 2. General (without portfolio)
Coalition government with the BSP and NDSV	2005-2009	34/240	1. Agriculture 2. Environment 3. Deputy prime minister responsible for handling natural calamities
In opposition of the GERB government	2009-2013	37/240	None
Coalition government with the BSP	2013-present	30/240	1. Labor and Social Policy 2. Environment and Water 3. Youth and Sport

Note: The BSP stands for Bulgarian Socialist Party (*Bulgarska sotsialisticheska partiya*). The GERB stands for Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (*Grazhdani za evropeysko razvitie na Balgariya*). The NDSV stands for The National Movement for Stability and Progress (*Nacionalno dviženie za stabilnost i văzhod*).
Sources: Borissov-Law (2005), Novinite (2009; 2013), The Economist (2013), Nationalia (2013).

Nevertheless, Article 52 of the Constitution, as amended in March 1990, placed restrictions on ethnic and religious political organizations. The amendment states that "[o]rganizations that endanger the sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the country and the unity of the nation, incite racial, national, ethnic or religious intolerance or violate

personal rights and freedoms, as well as fascist organizations and organizations striving to achieve their purpose through violence, are prohibited" (Human Rights Watch, 1990). Article 55.2 of the Election Law in Bulgaria prohibits the use of languages other than Bulgarian in election campaigns: "the election campaign shall be conducted in the official language." Some sources (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2005) see such restrictions as obstacles "to full political participation by persons belonging to minority communities." The Sofia city court denied registration to a parallel political party found by the MRF on August 7th, 1991 on similar grounds. The MRF itself narrowly escaped being closed down by the Constitutional Court by one vote (six to five whereas a closure decision requires seven votes) in 1992.

The current constitution[103] of the Republic of Bulgaria also has certain articles that can be interpreted in a way that excludes Bulgaria's Turkish population at the group-level. An example of this is not granting recognition to the Turkish population and constraining their ethno-political activity.

> Article 11-4: There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent seizure of state power.
>
> Article 44-2: The organization/s activity shall not be contrary to the country's sovereignty and national integrity, or the unity of the nation, nor shall it incite racial, national, ethnic or religious enmity or an encroachment on the rights and freedoms of citizens; no organization shall establish clandestine or paramilitary structures or shall seek to attain its aims through violence.

[103] Available at http://www.parliament.bg/en/const, accessed December 10th, 2013.

Nevertheless, the very same constitution is quite inclusive at the individual level. Article 54-1 states that "everyone shall have the right to avail himself of the national and universal human cultural values and to develop his own culture in accordance with his ethnic self-identification, which shall be recognized and guaranteed by the law." While Bulgaria, on the constitutional dimension alone, seems to be group-level exclusionary and individual-level inclusive (and thus would be a civic assimilationist model), it has granted more group-level inclusion in its implementation of the laws. For example, it has enabled the MRF to function as an ethno-political party.

Another novelty of the Bulgarian electoral regime is its 4 percent electoral threshold for political parties in the parliamentary elections. In contrast to its extremely high counterpart in Turkey, which is 10 percent and compels Kurdish ethnic political parties to run with independent candidates as explained in Chapter Five, this electoral threshold does not hurt the political participation of the Turkish population at the group level given the demographic data presented earlier. The other features of the Bulgarian electoral regime also do not create any direct disadvantage for Turkish political participation in the country.[104]

The MRF has been represented in the national parliament since 1990, as previously mentioned. It has held ministerial and a deputy prime ministerial position. Moreover, districts such as Kardzhali and Smolyan where Turks are in the majority have gained

[104] Political parties in Bulgaria compete for 240 seats in the unicameral national parliament. The elections are based on a proportional representation system. Each constituency is assigned between 4 to 14 seats depending on its population size in accordance with the most recent census. Parliamentarians are elected to serve for four years in the parliament.

increased administrative autonomy with greater control over managing local economic policies (Lozanova and Hajdinjak, 2006). Hence, the MRF has not only become a central political actor representing Turks, but the Turkish community has also gained greater self-government rights in regions where they are in the majority. The MRF even became part of the ruling coalition following the 2001 parliamentary elections and more recently following the parliamentary elections in May 2013. Thus, with the fall of the communist regime, a liberal multicultural incorporation model has started to emerge in Bulgaria and now Turks can participate in politics via ethnic (mostly via the MRF) and non-ethnic (mainstream) political parties.

Once the incorporation model changed in Bulgaria beginning in 1990 with the end of the communist regime, Turkish emigrants started to return to Bulgaria and the violent activities of Turkish resistance movements ceased. The underground Turkish organization, the MRF, transformed itself into a political party in 1990 and competed in the national elections. Current Turkish political mobilization in Bulgaria occurs almost entirely through the MRF to which Turks "have delegated almost unlimited rights to represent them on all levels of the legislative and executive power" (Lozanova and Hajdinjak, 2006).

As Korman İsmailov, the leader of recently formed ethnic Turkish political party, People's Party of Freedom and Dignity (PPFD, *Hürriyet ve Şeref Halk Partisi*) notes, the MRF could depict ethnic Turks who act independently of its party organization as factional elements and therefore could monopolize its rule among Bulgaria's Turkish population.[105]

[105] Author interview with Korman İsmailov, Sofia, July 18th, 2013.

İbrahim Yalımov, who was a member of the constitutional assembly that drafted the 1991 constitution, also notes that the MRF effectively used the propaganda opportunities granted by its political inclusion post-1990. The MRF was able to keep alive Bulgaria's Turkish population's fears about past exclusionary state policies and the worries about the current Bulgarian nationalist party, *Атака* (Attack). As Kalionski puts it, the MRF can effectively exploit the deep trauma that still lives on in the Turkish population of Bulgaria.[106]

While the MRF is by far the most effective Turkish organization in Bulgaria, the *Müftü's* Office, which is the leading religious institution of Bulgaria's Turkish Muslim community, is influential as well. The organization is in charge of 21 local *müftü* offices, three Islamic high schools, and one Islamic Institute of Theology. The organization also writes periodic human rights reports and presents them in the meetings of international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As a high ranking officer in the *Müftü's* Head Office notes, the MRF is quite exclusionary and has a hegemonic style in its relationship with alternative channels of mobilization in the Turkish community in Bulgaria. As the MRF has consolidated its political power in the post-1990 period, it has quite successfully eliminated alternative channels of mobilization.[107]

The MRF has been able to use the municipal and ministerial resources under its control in clientelistic ways to maintain Turkish ethno-political mobilization in the

[106] Author interview with Alexis Kalionski, Sofia, July 20th, 2013.
[107] Author interview with an anonymous officer of the Muftu's Head Office in Sofia, July 20th, 2013.

country.[108] The MRF side also implicitly agrees with the claims about its role in distributing public positions to Turks, for instance, in the police following the 2001 elections.[109] As a result of such elite initiated incentives and indoctrination, the MRF has proved to be strong in Bulgaria's electoral politics as demonstrated in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 The MRF and PPFD votes in 1990 Constitutional Assembly Election and the succeeding parliamentary elections in Bulgaria[110]

Election	MRF votes	MRF %	MRF seats	PPFD votes	PPFD %	PPFD seats	National turnout %
10 June 1990 (Constitutional Assembly Election)	491,596	8.03	23	NA	NA	NA	90.79
13 Oct. 1991	418,168	7.55	24	NA	NA	NA	83.87
18 Dec. 1994	283,094	5.44	15	NA	NA	NA	75.23
19 Apr. 1997*	323,429	9.44	19	NA	NA	NA	58.87
17 June 2001	340,395	7.45	21	NA	NA	NA	66.77
25 June 2005[111]	467,400	12.8	34	NA	NA	NA	55.8
5 July 2009	542,381	14.5	38	NA	NA	NA	60.2
12 May 2013[112]	400,466	11.31	36	57,611	1.63**	0	51.3

* The MRF entered the 1997 elections with some other small parties, Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, Green Party, Party of the Democratic Centre, New Choice, and Federation of the Bulgarian Kingdom under the name Alliance of National Salvation (ONS). The DPS is estimated to receive 7.6% on its own (Novinite, 2009) and held the 15 of the 19 seats that the alliance won (Koinova, 1999, p. 18).

** The PPFD entered the elections in an electoral alliance with The National Movement for Stability and Prosperity (Novinite, 2013).

[108] Author interview with İbrahim Yalımov, Sofia, July 25th, 2013.

[109] Author interview with former MRF deputy Ahmet Hüseyin, Sofia, July 15th, 2013.

[110] Sources: For the elections from 1990 to 2001, see Popescu and Hannavy (2002); for 2009 and 2013 elections, see http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/bulgaria.html (accessed on December 11th, 2013).

[111] For 2005 and 2009 parliamentary elections, see http://sofiaglobe.com/2013/05/16/bulgarias-elections-the-ups-and-downs/ (accessed on December 31st, 2013).

[112] http://results.cik.bg/pi2013/rezultati/index.html , (accessed on December 31st, 2013).

Table 4.5 shows the electoral mobilization of the two Turkish ethno-political parties in Bulgaria: the MRF and the PPFD[113] from the first general election of the post-communist Bulgaria up until present. In terms of electoral mobilization, the MRF was quite successful in the first free and fair elections in Bulgaria. The MRF received almost half a million votes and 8 percent of the overall votes in the country in the Constitutional Assembly Election in 1990. In the parliamentary elections of the next year, the MRF again was successful with 7.6 percent of the national votes in an election with the highest turnout rate amongst the parliamentary elections in the country's post-communist history. The Turkish population of the country almost unanimously backed the MRF in these two elections. The MRF did not take part in the government in this period, but the first democratically elected government of Bulgaria was able to come in existence with the MRF support in the parliament and lost power when the MRF withdrew its support in late 1992.

As the new Bulgarian regime embraced significantly more inclusive policies toward the political inclusion of Turks, the MRF's votes eroded in the 1994 elections with over 100 thousand lost votes because some Turks voted for non-Turkish parties in these elections. As Ilchev (2000, p. 259) notes, although the ability of the Socialists and the SDS to attract Turkish votes was "not initially spectacular," it "has become increasingly evident." Another reason for the drop in the MRF votes was the continuing (though declining) migration of ethnic Turks to Turkey. 32,000 people left Kurdzhali, the biggest Turkish settlement in the country, for Turkey just in 1992 (Ilchev, 2000, p. 246). Migration

[113] The PPFD split off from the MRF in December 2012. PPFD chairman Korman İsmailov and vice chairman Kasım Dal were both previously MRF PMs (Bugun, 2012).

declined further in subsequent years as Bulgaria became an increasingly more welcoming country for its Turkish citizens. Nevertheless, the MRF's efforts to pay attention to other minorities in Bulgaria starting in 1993 (Ilchev, 2000, p. 260) helped the party gain more and more votes from the country's Roma population.[114]

The MRF consistently increased its votes in the next four parliamentary elections in 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2009 due to a number of factors. First, the party incorporated more and more Roma votes. Second, the ability of elites to mobilize the ethnic masses (by using effective propaganda channels and providing selective incentives such as offering public jobs) increased especially in the MRF-ruled municipalities and under the MRF coalition governments for straight eight years from 2001 to 2009. The MRF could also mobilize the Turks who live outside of the country, particularly in Turkey, but still hold Bulgarian citizenship.[115] Nevertheless, the MRF lost 100 thousand votes in the 2013 elections partly due to the emergence of the new Turkish party PPFD from within the MRF, and partly due to the corruption scandals in the party and the first change in the party leadership from Ahmet Doğan to Lütfü Mestan on January 9th, 2013.

Proto-liberal multiculturalism of the 1990s and 2000s did not decrease the level of Turkish mobilization, but moderated the methods employed in this mobilization. "Thanks to the attempt to force assimilation, the prevailing part of that population began to identify itself along ethnic and national lines. Also, for the first time in probably a century, the

[114] The 2011 official census shows the Roma population as 325,343 persons (National Statistical Institute, Republic of Bulgaria, 2011), the real Roma population is estimated much higher.

[115] For instance, 98.6 percent of the 89,490 electorate who voted in Turkey supported the MRF in the 2009 elections (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2009, p. 19).

Turkish minority became emancipated" (Ivanov, 1999, p. 10). In Ivanov's (1999, p. 12) words, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria turned into a political actor that is "nonviolent and non-secessionist," mobilizing for "realistically limited, and thus defensible, minority rights." The MRF, in return, particularly strived to gain an enhanced status for the Turkish language and other 'mother tongues' (Nationalia, 2013). As Roger (2002) notes, the MRF has pursued moderate cultural demands and cooperated with the major central political actors in Bulgaria during the entire period under proto-liberal multiculturalism. It was able to become "a political party of national relevance," by "controlling ethnic extremism," and showed "a unique attempt to integrate an ethnic group into the structures of a unitary state in the conditions of painful transition" (Penev, 2001, p. 293).

While often referred to correctly as an ethno-political party, the MRF refrained from seeking any sort of regional autonomy let alone secessionism. In fact, the party is extremely reluctant to be labeled an ethnic party. For this reason, as former MRF deputy Ahmet Hüseyin explained to me in the party headquarters in Sofia, the MRF includes non-Turkish candidates in the parliamentary elections although the great majority of its votes comes from the ethnic Turkish population of the country. The party today has 36 deputies in the parliament and only 26 of them are Turks. The remaining deputies of the MRF are ethnic Bulgarians and Roma. Vezhdi Letif Rashidov, the only Turkish representative in the Bulgarian parliament now who is not in the MRF is a member of the GERB. Therefore, the Turks of Bulgaria are predominantly represented by the MRF. The MRF also rules the local municipalities in areas where Turks are in majority. For instance, the MRF today has three governors and 745 village chiefs (mukhtar) in Bulgaria. The MRF appointed local rulers

from the Turkish community when it was a member of the coalition governments from 2001 to 2009 but, according to some MRF members, those rulers were dismissed during Prime Minister Borisov's rule (2009-2013). The party also reached an agreement with the other members of the ruling coalition on having an additional 20 vice-governors out of 28 cities in the country. [116]

Hence, as shown in Table 4.3, three different ethnic incorporation models in Bulgaria have led the Turkish minority to vary its mobilization aims and methods as hypothesized in Chapter Two. While the Turkish community lacked the ability to mobilize massively and autonomously from the state under the civic assimilationist model, the Bulgarian state's ethnocratic model of the 1980's created a sense of political deprivation in the Turkish community and pushed Turks to mobilize for centrifugal aims using violent methods. Turkish political mobilization in Bulgaria is very much alive today, but lacks any trace of violence and secessionism and does not even push for territorial autonomy under the current proto-liberal multiculturalist incorporation model in Bulgaria.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed ethnic incorporation policies and ethno-political mobilization patterns of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus. The findings based on these two cases are in line with the theory and hypotheses developed in Chapter Two. As a highly mobilized ethnic group, Turkish Cypriots adopted mildly centrifugal goals and pursued

[116] Author interview with former MRF deputy Ahmet Hüseyin, Sofia, July 15th, 2013.

them with moderately violent (mixed) methods after Cyprus adopted civic assimilationist policies in 1963 and again from 1968 to 1973. When the state pursued more and more exclusionary policies under an ethnocratic incorporation model from 1964 to 1967 and in 1974, the degree of centrifugal demands and separatist violence increased. Turkish Cypriot secession, however, became possible only with Turkey's military operation.

The case of Bulgaria is also in line with my hypotheses given the available evidence. The Bulgarian state implemented varying degrees of inclusion and exclusion at the individual and group levels throughout the twentieth century. The communist rulers of Bulgaria sought to modernize and indoctrinate the Turkish minority and the easiest way to access to the Turkish community was, in addition to the religious institutions, through the schools and print media operating in the Turkish language. Hence, the communist regime had its unique way of incorporating Bulgaria's Turks and the Turkish mobilization in the era. It did not permit conventional forms of mobilization such as rallies, mass protests, or rebellion, but it allowed cultural, traditional, and religious gatherings which gave them the opportunity to share and express their Turkishness. The incorporation model gradually turned to civic assimilationism after 1975, however, and exclusion escalated after 1984. Turks in the pre-1984 period were quite centripetal and peaceful in terms of their ethno-political mobilization goals and methods although "everyday forms of resistance" [117] were taking place in the face of the Communist regime's policies. When President Zhivkov switched to ethnocratic policies starting in 1984, Turks started to embrace the idea of

[117] For a discussion of alternative forms of resistance in contrast to overt rebellions, see Scott (2008).

freeing themselves from Bulgarian rule which meant little more than repressive ethnocratic policies at the time. Nevertheless, given their limited capabilities, hundreds of thousands of them had to migrate to Turkey because territorial secession from Bulgaria would have been difficult due to the lack of a geographically compact and ethnically homogeneous Turkish territory. Bulgaria's Turks also sporadically adopted violent methods in their resistance in this ethnocratic period. When the Bulgarian regime fell and the country adopted a form of proto-liberal multiculturalism with greater inclusion both at the individual and group levels, thousands of Turks returned to Bulgaria, especially after 1992. Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria have kept their mobilization completely peaceful and centripetal up to this day.

It is worth putting the differences between Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus in perspective. Although these two cases can be seen as similar in that they share the historical legacy of the Ottoman *millet* system and they both constitute relatively large minority groups that are distinguished from the majority along religious and linguistic lines, there are three major differences between the two. First, the millet system's faith-based segregation could more easily transform into secular ethnic segregation in Cyprus. This is mostly because the island had two major ethnic groups which were called Orthodox Christians/Greek Cypriots and Muslims/Turkish Cypriots under the *millet* system and later on. Hence, the politics in the island has long been bi-polar. Nevertheless, the situation in Bulgaria was different because the Muslim *millet* included Muslim Roma and Pomaks as well as Turks.

The second difference is with regard to the historical trajectory of ethnic incorporation. Cyprus consistently preserved its bipolar, first religious and then ethnic, segregation at the institutional level from Ottoman and British rule up until 1963. By contrast, the Bulgarian incorporation model of ethnic Turks had more variation. The millet system legacy continued in the inter-war period but was abolished during the Second World War and eliminated more definitively with the modernization process of the communist regime after the war. Turkish mobilization in Bulgaria was encouraged by the Communist regime, but not as autonomous ethno-political mobilization. Instead, it was ideologically led mobilization via the Communist Party. The Bulgarian model was different from the Leninist Soviet model in that the Soviet model granted a degree of self-determination rights to ethnic groups residing within the country. The communist regime in Bulgaria, however, saw the political awakening of the Turkish population as a threat and pursued more exclusionary policies at times. This was particularly the case after the mid-1970s and culminated with intense repression after 1984.

The third difference is with regard to the determination of in-group elites. While Turkish Cypriots had always had more power to determine their own elites, the Communist regime in Bulgaria attempted to create its own Turkish elites from Sofia rather than leaving it as an intra-Turkish community matter. This last factor with regard to the distinct incorporation of the Communist rule shows us that the group-level inclusion in the form of granting collective rights (e.g., political autonomy and a degree of ethnic self-determination) was much stronger in the long-lasting consociationalist period of Cyprus.

Since political institutions are at the center of analysis here in exploring the causes of ethno-political mobilization patterns, the question of endogeneity should be addressed. What if institutions are not the cause, but themselves are affected by ethno-political mobilization patterns? In addressing this question, it should be acknowledged that political institutions are not independent of social and political interactions occurring in the society; yet, their effect can be treated as independent as I treat them in this chapter.

In order to explore their effect on ethno-political mobilization patterns, first, I examine their interaction with pre-existing mobilization levels at time 1 and see the outcome of this interaction at time 2. Such an approach enables me to see the causal story in a historical context and embrace the cumulative effect of the past in my analyses. For instance, in arguing that civic assimilationism led to mixed levels of violence in Turkish Cypriot mobilization in 1963 and from 1968 to 1973 in Cyprus, I show that its interaction with high levels of Turkish pre-existing mobilization helped lead to this outcome. The same incorporation model led to a different pattern of mobilization by Turkish Bulgarians who lacked a significant degree of pre-existing autonomous ethno-political mobilization. Turkish Cypriots had a high degree of ethno-political awareness as a result of their high levels of pre-existing mobilization and saw group-level exclusionary policies as a source of degradation and deprivation. In contrast, Turkish mobilization in Bulgaria was to a great extent peaceful and centripetal even under civic assimilationist policies because the pre-existing level of Turkish mobilization was not well organized and autonomous from the state and Turks lacked a significant degree of ethno-political awareness in the sense of seeking political autonomy. In a nutshell, policies and institutions of ethnic incorporation

did not cause different ethno-political patterns in a vacuum in these two cases, but in combination with the pre-existing level of mobilization.

While acknowledging that history is a set of embedded relationships and, therefore, yesterday's mobilization affects today's mobilization by interacting with policies and institutions of ethnic incorporation, there is more to the question of endogeneity. Central state politicians consider a variety of factors in designing ethnic incorporation policies. Their implementation of the policies are also incentivized and coerced by a variety of analytically exogenous factors. Therefore, the choices of ethnic incorporation policies in Bulgaria and Cyprus were based on broader considerations than the dynamics of the respective ethnic minority group living in the country. It is not uncommon that central politicians are suspicious of the genuine intentions of ethnic minorities. For instance, state politicians both in Cyprus and Bulgaria were worried that Turkish ethnic minorities could seek to secede and unite with the 'mainland' Turkey. Especially after Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus and the *de facto* secession of Turkish Cypriots from the Cypriot state, Bulgarian political leaders might have had an increased concern with the future of their country. As Bulgarian historian Gruev notes, President Zhivkov in Bulgaria used the claim that "Bulgaria would be the second Cyprus" in his propaganda activities to justify his policies against the Turkish minority in the country.[118]

Nevertheless, it is also common for states to use ethnic minority groups as scapegoats to distract and misguide anxious and troubled masses. For instance, when

[118] Author interview with Michail Gruev, Sofia, July 17th, 2013.

President Zhivkov decided to pursue more exclusionary policies toward Bulgaria's ethnic Turks, his main concern was "to divert public attention from the escalating socio-economic and environmental crises and the manifest moral and financial bankruptcy of his regime" (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007, p. 92). Similarly, in Cyprus, Greece-backed Greek Cypriot politicians such as Sampson and their opponents such as President Makarios found themselves in a power struggle to rule the country.[119] Therefore, both sides felt the urge to show their love of the nation and the mainland Greece by excluding Turkish Cypriots from the political sphere. Based on this and countless similar examples, I conclude that policies of ethnic incorporation, while directed toward ethnic minority groups, are often designed and implemented to distract, divert, and misguide ethnic majorities. Therefore, the intended targets of ethnic incorporation policies are often ethnic majorities rather than ethnic minority groups.

Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus are large minorities both in terms of absolute numbers and their proportion to their countries' total populations. That being said, ethnic Turks form minority populations in all Balkan countries due to the demographic legacy of the Ottoman Empire rule in the region. While ethnic Turks are currently constitutionally recognized and are granted quotas in national parliaments in some countries (e.g., Kosovo), they lack recognition or any form of affirmative action in some others (e.g., Greece). Hence, the incorporation of ethnic Turks in respective host countries and their ethno-

[119] The tension between Greece and President Makarios escalated to a degree that Greece eventually plotted a coup on July 15th, 1974 in the island in 1974 and replaced Makarios with Sampson. It is also argued that Greece was behind the attempted assassination of Makarios on March 8th, 1970 (Morley, 2010).

political mobilization patterns have varied quite significantly and deserve more scholarly attention.

CHAPTER 5: KURDISH AND ROMA ETHNO-POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN TURKEY, 1980-2014

The Kurdish question has been Turkey's most significant problem over the last four decades. Since 1984, over forty thousand people have lost their lives in the armed clashes between the Kurdish separatist guerillas and the military; hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, especially during the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. In addition, what began as a primarily Turkish problem quickly spread beyond Turkey's borders and is now considered a partly internationalized internal conflict.[120] The problem spurred Turkey to conduct cross-border military operations in Northern Iraq and in 1999 put Turkey on the verge of declaring war on Syria. The problem now threatens not only Turkey's political stability and territorial integrity, but also the stability and security of multiple countries. Despite numerous studies of what is arguably Turkey's most-pressing problem and one of the most challenging issues of the broader Middle East, the causes of Turkey's Kurdish conflict are still under-theorized. This chapter analyzes Turkey's Kurdish question from the conceptual perspective of ethno-political mobilization patterns based on the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter Two. The arguments made in this chapter explain the history of Turkey's Kurdish question, make predictions about its future, and have direct policy implications.

This chapter argues that ethnic incorporation policies in Turkey have been the strongest determinant of the variation in Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns. It

[120] For a discussion of internationalized internal conflicts, see Schindler (1982).

argues that Kurds responded to (quasi-)ethnocratic policies of individual- and group-level exclusion from 1980 to 1994 by mobilizing violently for secessionist goals. Such exclusionary policies deprived Kurds of the most basic human rights, while at the same time denying them a legal path to challenge the state's policies against them. The exclusion of Kurds (as a form of ethnic categorization) also created a stronger ethnic identification that gradually eroded the political salience of intra-group differences among Kurds (e.g., along lines of spoken dialects such as Kurmanji and Zaza, religious denominations such as Sunni and Alevi,[121] local attachments to tribes, villages, towns, etc., and political ideologies). The increasing sense of both deprivation and ethnic identification produced an unprecedented level of ethno-political consciousness among Turkey's Kurds. Additionally, it also created a mass of young Kurds in particular who could easily be recruited by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party, or *Partiya Karkeren Kürdistan*) to mobilize for secession using violent methods. Although Turkey switched from targeting its Kurdish population with quasi- ethnocratic policies toward more civic assimilationist policies in 1995,[122] variation, though limited, in the degree of group-level exclusion after 1995 has affected the mobilization aims and methods of Turkey's Kurds in this later period.

[121] The Alevi faith is a localized version of the Shia belief in Anatolia. Alevis are known as being less orthodox than the rest of Shia denominations (e.g., Caferis in Turkey). A great majority of Alevis follow different religious rituals than those of both the Sunni and Shia orders. For instance, they use *cemevleri* rather than mosques as their prayer houses, they fast in hijri Muharrem month rather than Ramadan, and they conduct *cem* rather than praying (*namaz*/*salat*) five times a day. Alevis are known for more or less egalitarian gender roles and a greater embrace of music in their prayers. The name Alevi means the follower of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Mohammad and the fourth caliph (after Abu Bakr, Omar, and Othman) of Islam (in fact, the first legitimate caliph of Islam for some Alevi and Shia followers).

[122] This was done by eliminating its exclusionary policies at the individual level, but preserving them at the group level.

This chapter contrasts the Kurdish experience with the experience of Turkey's Roma population. The Roma in Turkey, like in many other places in Eastern and Central Europe, have been an under-mobilized ethnic minority.[123] In contrast to the Kurds, the Roma lacked a strong degree of pre-existing mobilization in Turkey. Therefore, in accordance with the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two, the (civic assimilationist) policies of group-level exclusion and individual-level inclusion led to a gradual assimilation of the Roma population and hindered its motivation and capability to mobilize. Nevertheless, the quasi-recognition and minor steps toward greater group-level inclusion––such as legal facilitation of Roma organizations and fund transfers to such organizations since 2004—have changed the picture slightly, if not dramatically. These steps toward group-level inclusivity have led to the emergence of an ethnic elite group among the Roma and greater demands for group-level inclusion (i.e., less centripetal demands) by the Roma. In other words, the proto-political inclusion of the Roma has already started to lead to a political awakening of a longtime politically inert ethnic group.

The selection of the Roma and Kurdish cases in Turkey enabled me to use a quasi-experimental research design. State-level political institutions and political history are held constant in the cases of Kurds and the Roma in Turkey. Interestingly, the institutional turmoil created by Turkey's military coup of 1980 was followed by the initiation of violence and separatism in Kurdish mobilization, but had no effect on Roma mobilization.

[123] The term ethnic minority in this chapter is used in a sociological context rather than to designate a legal status. Neither Kurds nor the Roma have a legal ethnic minority status in Turkey, because Turkey does not accept any Muslim ethnic group as a minority in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. For further explanation on the subject, see Oran (2004).

Likewise, the military-backed toppling of the Erbakan-Çiller coalition government in 1997 also did not affect the Roma mobilization; this time it led to a decrease in Kurdish violence and separatism in contrast to the effect of the 1980 coup. Regime type, as a state-level factor, has been constant for the Roma and Kurdish populations of Turkey—whereas the mobilization patterns of these two ethnic groups have differed to a great extent (due to the changes in the ethnic incorporation policies implemented on specific ethnic groups).

The Kurdish and Roma populations in Turkey are the most comparable cases because they are the two biggest ethnic minorities in Turkey. They both share the same religion (Sunni Islam[124]) as the majority of Turkey's population (ethnic Turks). What distinguishes them from the majority ethnic group is language. While the Roma of Turkey speak Roma dialects such as Rom and Dom, the Kurds of Turkey speak Kurdish dialects such as Kurmanji and Zaza.[125] It should be noted that the majority of both the Roma and Kurds are (or soon will be) unable to speak their ethnic language.[126] Kurdish language has been luckier in this sense because it could be protected relatively better in Southeast Turkey. Another partial similarity between Turkey's Roma and Kurdish populations can be found in terms of their respective habitats: the Kurds outnumber the Roma substantially

[124] Both ethnic Turks and Kurds are predominantly Sunni Muslim and both have a segment of sub-groups with the Alevi faith. According to McDowall (2004[1997], p. 10), 75 percent of Kurds follow the Sunni faith and a great majority of the rest are Alevis. Turkey's Roma are predominantly Sunni and do not have a significant number of Alevis.

[125] Although the Zaza dialect differs linguistically from other Kurdish dialects and is closer to Persian, a significant portion of the speakers of the Zaza dialect as well as the speakers of other Kurdish dialects identify the Zaza dialect as being within the broader Kurdish language. McDowall (2004[1997], p. 10) relates the Zaza dialect to a northwestern group of Iranian languages and Kurmanji to the southwestern group.

[126] Tan (2009, p. 376) estimates that 60 percent of the Kurdish population in Turkey has migrated to the cities in Western Turkey. According to Tan, 90 percent of the children who were born into these immigrant families could not learn Kurdish. For such families, Kurdish has become a language spoken by parents on subjects that they do not want their children to hear.

and are a majority in a number of southeastern and eastern cities in Turkey.[127] The Roma population has no majority in any cities of Turkey, but they also have ethnic settlements in some towns in Western Turkey such as Bergama in Izmir, Sulukule (until recently), and Kuştepe in Istanbul.

As part of my field research, I visited the cities of Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Batman, and Diyarbakır in order to interview Roma and Kurdish politicians and activists. I interviewed thirty-seven Kurdish and thirteen Roma figures in Turkey from December 2011 to June 2012.

This chapter starts with an analysis of the Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in Turkey. The ethnic incorporation policies and corresponding Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns in Turkey are analyzed in this section. The next section analyzes ethnic incorporation policies and corresponding Roma ethno-political mobilization patterns in Turkey. The chapter ends with concluding remarks.

Kurdish Ethno-political Mobilization in Turkey

This section examines the varying patterns of Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in Turkey and the causes behind this variation: I argue that the ethnic incorporation model that applies to Kurds in Turkey has shifted from quasi-ethnocracy (1980-1994) to civic

[127] The Kurdish population of Turkey is estimated to be between 5 and 20 million, depending on the source –e.g., Ozbudun and Genckaya estimate 7 to 15 percent which amounts to 5 to 11 million (2009, p. 25), Baslevent, Kirmanoglu, and Senatalar cite 13 percent, which amounts to 9.6 million (2004, p. 314), Cornell estimates 12 million (2001, p. 35), Tan reports 15 million (2009, p. 34), McDowall estimates 23 percent which is 17 million (2004[1997], p. 3), and some estimates go as high as 37 million (Radikal, 2012) which is not quite realistic. The Roma population, on the other hand, is estimated to range between 2 and 5 million (Marsh, 2008, p. 24).

assimilationism (1995-2014). By this I mean that Kurdish citizens started to have genuine opportunities for political participation at the individual level in this later period, though group-level exclusion has continued. Nevertheless, there has been variation in the degree of group-level exclusion even under the civic assimilationist model: first, there was a period of lessening group-level exclusion with a gradual—yet hardly complete—removal of obstacles to Kurdish political participation at the group level (1995-2004). This was followed by a process of reversal with more strict policies of group-level exclusion (2005-2012), and then again a softening period with lessening group-level exclusion (2013-present). This variation in the incorporation models has affected Kurdish ethno-political mobilization by changing the ethnic identification,[128] ethno-political consciousness, and deprivation-based frustrations of Turkey's Kurds. As a result, the Kurdish ethno-political mobilization has followed the following patterns: violent and centrifugal (i.e., secessionist) during the period from 1984 to 1994; less violent and moderately centrifugal (i.e., Kurds seeking limited autonomy) during the period from 1995 to 2004; increasingly violent and moderately centrifugal during the period from 2005 to 2012; and finally, peaceful and even less centrifugal (i.e., less stress on autonomy seeking).

Kurdish citizens of Turkey have mobilized politically through mainstream and Kurdish ethnic or nationalist political organizations. The Kurdish nationalist political stage encompasses a variety of actors, both legal and illegal. While civil society organizations

[128] Kenny and Briner (2013, pp. 731-732) define ethnic identification as a 'pull' towards an ethnic group, which "refer[s] to instances where features of a situation led to participants experiencing an increased affinity with their ethnic group, resulting in an increased salience of their ethnic identity." Ethno-political consciousness is a step further than the sense of belongingness. It includes a sense of political awareness with more or less clear political goals and a political agenda to achieve those goals.

and political parties—such as the Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, or BDP), Participatory Democracy Party (*Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi*, or KADEP), and Rights and Liberties Party (*Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi*, or Hak-Par)—are considered to be the main legal actors, the PKK/KCK[129] represents the main illegal actor of this sphere. The PKK is not only a major actor in peripheral[130] Kurdish politics, it also occupies a crucial role at the heart of the wider Kurdish issue. After all, the Kurdish question in Turkey has two dimensions, both of which are directly related to the PKK: first, secession as a political aim; and second, violence as a method of ethnic mobilization. While the PKK announced that it had dropped its aim of achieving independent Kurdish statehood in 1999, ongoing fears of secessionism still worry Turkish policymakers. A more immediate problem within the wider framework of the Kurdish question is sustained violence. The PKK has used violence as its primary method of struggle against the Turkish state; hence, even though

[129]Although the name PKK was dropped long ago and the KCK (Union of Kurdistan Communities, or *Koma Civakên Kurdistan*) was adopted as the new name of the organization in 2007, this dissertation will use the name PKK when it refers to the organization because of its common usage in the Turkish mainstream media and in academic papers, on account of its greater familiarity to the Turkish and international general public.

[130] This study makes a conceptual distinction regarding central and peripheral Kurdish politics in Turkey to distinguish Kurdish politicians and activists in mainstream (non-Kurdish) political movements from the ones in ethno-political Kurdish movements. While 'central Kurdish politics' is the sphere in which certain policies are adopted and put into force via state-administered 'tools,' 'peripheral Kurdish politics' is the sphere in which certain political rights are claimed and demands are made. Hence, the center-periphery dichotomy developed in this chapter does not follow the center-periphery dichotomy developed by the dependency school following the studies of Gunter Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, nor does it exactly follow the classical center-periphery dichotomy that has been developed by Serif Mardin (1973) and later with a more historical perspective by Metin Heper (1980) to describe the Turkish political scene. While the former dichotomy posits an imperial relationship between a capitalist center and an 'underdeveloped' periphery (which is applied to the Kurdish question by Besikci (1969; 1990; 1992[1969]), the latter emphasizes autonomy and alienation of the political center with regard to the peripheral societal forces. Both kinds of dichotomies presuppose an inherently conflictual relationship between the center and the periphery. Although the center-periphery dichotomy developed in this dissertation shares with the center-periphery dichotomies just described an emphasis on 'power imbalance', this center-periphery dichotomy does not make any reference to alienation or an imperial relationship between the center and the periphery, nor to an inherently conflictual relationship between the two spheres.

the emergence of the Kurdish question precedes the PKK, the solution of the problem is directly tied to the future of this organization.

This section starts with a review of the existing literature on Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in Turkey. Next, it discusses the change in the ethnic incorporation models employed by Turkey across different time periods. Then, it discusses how these varying ethnic incorporation models have shaped the ethno-political mobilization patterns in each time period.

Alternative Explanations for Kurdish Ethno-political Mobilization in Turkey

The Kurdish question has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest. Researchers working on Turkey's longstanding Kurdish question stress a number of factors that have shaped the aims and methods of Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in Turkey. These factors include international factors, political repression, economic backwardness or underdevelopment, cultural assimilation, and political repression.

International factors are argued to have a significant role in the emergence and endurance of the violent and secessionist Kurdish mobilization in Turkey. On the conspiratorial side, some people, mostly in the Turkish politics and media, have argued that the PKK is nothing but a tool of foreign countries such as the United States, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Russia, Armenia, Greece, and other European countries—depending on the political views of the analysts.[131] Although such conspiracy theories are developed

[131] Such conspiracy theories are becoming less and less appealing in the mainstream media as the media has increasingly turned its attention to the domestic causes of the Kurdish problem, particularly since the early 2000s. Nevertheless, such opinions are still popular outside of the mainstream media. For example, an online news portal reports the following news from the Turkish magazine Aksiyon: "Karayilan [PKK commander]

without analytical rigor, there are some stronger analyses of the international factors affecting the PKK's mobilization aims and methods. The PKK has found shelter in neighboring countries: it trained its crew in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon under the former Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad's patronage and the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan lived in Damascus for many years. Nevertheless, Syria drew back its support from the PKK in the face of Turkey's credible threat of going to war with Syria unless it expelled the PKK forces from the country, particularly Öcalan, in 1998.[132] In addition, the PKK has long been active in Iraq. The Gulf War of 1991[133] and the emerging Kurdish rule in northern Iraq are often argued to have a significant causal role with regard to the Kurdish mobilization in Turkey (Sakallioglu, 1998, p. 73). Northern Iraq has long provided a safe haven for the PKK armed forces to seek sanctuary. The PKK members have had little difficulty crossing the Turkey-Iraq border, attacking the Turkish military posts, and then returning to their

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was not invited to the second Oslo Meeting [the peace talks between the Turkish intelligence service and the PKK that started in September, 2008], he even did not know what was spoken there. … He first nestled in Iran, made promises and sought for support. When he could not get what he wanted, then he turned to Israel and declared that he was the only leader when he was back. Fehman Huseyin, a Syrian who is known for his nickname Bahoz Erdal, replaced Karayilan. Bahoz is the only name who was agreed on by Syria, Iran, Russia, Germany, England, and Ergenekon [Tuskish gladio] affiliated circles." http://www.milletce.com/diger-resimler-diger-konular/pkkyi-kim-yonetiyor-21593.html access: March 29th, 2013.

[132] After being forced to leave Syria, Öcalan sought to take refuge in Russia and Italy. Both countries refused to turn Öcalan over to Turkey but they did not provide lasting refuge to him either. Öcalan went to Greece from Italy and then was sent to Kenya. While taking sanctuary in the Greek consulate in Nairobi, Kenya, Öcalan finally was captured and brought to Turkey in a secret operation of the Turkish intelligence service National Intelligence Organization (MIT, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*) with the assistance of the US (Weiner, 1999). For further information on Öcalan's capture, see Yetkin (2004); for further information on Öcalan's days in Italy, see Aliboni and Pioppi (2000).

[133] After its invasion of Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990, Iraq faced international condemnation and economic sanctions, and finally, a military engagement by international coalition forces formed by 34 countries under the leadership of the US. Shortly after Operation Desert Strom (January 17th – February 28th, 1991) -that ended with the victory of the coalition forces and retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait-, two no-fly zones were established in Iraq extending from the 36th parallel northwards and 33rd parallel southwards. As the Iraq military lost its control of the northern Iraq, the PKK and local Kurdish groups (primarily Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) have become the primary military forces in the region up to today. For a detailed account of the war, see Lowry (2003) and Bennett and Paletz (1994).

camps in northern Iraq located near the Qandil Mountains. The border is equally easy to cross for the Turkish military which has frequently made air strikes and less frequently has undertaken far-reaching military operations with land forces into the region. Nevertheless, the mountainous terrain of the region makes it hard for the Turkish military to control its border with Iraq and trace the PKK members. This chapter argues that such factors such as the terrain are fixed in time and cannot cause the variation in the ethno-political mobilization patterns. Even the changing political circumstances as a result of the Gulf War(s) cannot account for the changing pattern of Kurdish ethno-political mobilization on its own, because the enduring (hence, constant) Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq since 1991 cannot explain the variation in the Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns in Turkey during that period.

There is an ideational aspect of this internationalist perspective as well. Particularly, "globally powerful ideas concerning identity, difference, cultural, and human rights" (Sakallioglu, 1998, pp. 73, 75-76) have helped the Kurdish ethnic consciousness flourish and legitimized Kurdish ethno-political mobilization. The peripheral Kurdish movements could use the same discourse that was used by the European minority nationalist movements. The BDP and its predecessors could also gain the sympathies of the European leftist and liberal movements by reframing their cause in a universally appealing human rights discourse. Claudia Roth, the co-chair of the German Green Party, has been a strong supporter of the Kurdish movement in Turkey—as seen on numerous occasions such as her visit to the BDP group in the parliament (Resmi Gazete, 2011) or visits to the mayors of the BDP (CNNTurk, 2010). Roth had also acknowledged that an organization (Heinrich

Böll Stiftung Association) that is close to the Green Party provided financial aid to BDP municipalities to be used in infrastructure projects (Show Haber, 2011). Since the EU in particular—and Western countries such as the US—has leverage over Turkey's domestic political decisions, the BDP seeks international support by sending letters to the Western embassies in Turkey as seen during the KCK arrests starting in 2009 (Zaman, 2009). Such international connections and financial and/or discursive support to Turkey's Kurdish movement(s) can be thought to have a casual impact on Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns in Turkey, but not as a primary determinant of these patterns as argued in this chapter.

Developments in Iraq since the 1980s have been the most influential international factor for the Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in. The emerging Kurdish quasi-statehood in northern Iraq, a "de facto Kurdish state" as Gunter (1993) puts it—following the first Gulf War of 1991 and more strongly after the second Gulf War of 2003—has placed the ideal of Kurdish statehood firmly in the Kurdish imagination. For the first time in their history,[134] Kurds have become very close to ending their stateless nation status. The idea of an independent Kurdish statehood in northern Iraq could have planted a similar idea in Turkey's Kurds, who outnumber the Kurds of Iraq or those of any other country. Such analyses drawing attention to international factors are crucial, but not sufficient, to explain the variation in ethno-political mobilization patterns. As will be argued in this section, changing domestic policies—especially Turkey's ethnic incorporation of its

[134] Excluding semi-mythological Kurdish states of ancient and mediaeval times and the short lived Republic of Mahabad that existed from March to December 1946 in today's Iran.

Kurdish population—are the primary determinants of the Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns in Turkey.

With regard to domestic factors, it is argued that changing socio-economic structures have been crucial in determining Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns in Turkey. According to scholars, a "marked disparity" exists between the heavily Kurdish and Turkish populated regions in Turkey, which leads to the "economic marginalization" of Turkey's Kurds (Besikci I. , Dogu Mitingleri'nin Analizi (1967), 1967/1992; White, 1998, p. 139; Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci, 1999). Major socio-economic structures in the context of Turkey's Kurdish question are the distribution of land and related income, political authority, and power. The land reform and the mechanization of agriculture in parallel with the Turkish modernization process allegedly decreased the authority of feudal lords/*aghas* over Kurdish peasants by creating an urban Kurdish mass that could be mobilized (Smith, 2009, p. 8). Accordingly, urbanization and the growth of cities with Kurdish majorities led to "the societal 'Trojan Horse' that made possible a generational shift in Kurdish leadership from rural to urban, conservative to radical, elites" (Smith, 2009, pp. 29-30), which made a Kurdish mobilization that crosscuts local and feudal Kurdish cleavages possible.

Providing high standards in its service-provision could easily be seen as the key reason for the Justice and Development Party's (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) success in three consecutive parliamentary elections (2002, 2007, and 2011)—as well as municipal elections during the same period. The AKP governments have made serious economic investments in the eastern cities of Turkey. In addition to these investments—particularly

focusing on the areas of schooling, transportation, and health—the AKP government also aimed at eradicating the deprivation and underdevelopment of the Eastern and Southeastern regions. Although such measures have elevated the quality of life in the Southeast Turkey, regional economic inequality is far from being fully eradicated.

The longstanding problem of economic inequality in Turkey has been addressed by many scholars. As Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci (1999, p. 1006) note: "Kurds in Turkey are materially much worse off than the rest of the Turkish population." When compared with the figures provided by Besikci (1967/1992)—regarding the comparison of health services and schooling provision in the Eastern and Western parts of Turkey—Icduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci's (1999) work shows that the gap between the region under discussion and the rest of Turkey remained an enduring socio-economic problem from 1960s to the late 1990s. Allegedly, this situation could have led to a sense of relative deprivation among Turkey's Kurds. As Gurr (1970; 2000) notes, relative deprivation of an ethnic group can easily be translated into ethnic grievance and can lead to protests and violence. Given that many Kurds in Turkey not only experienced relative economic deprivation, but also absolute economic deprivation, the situation is quite severe and one might think that this economic disparity led Turkey's Kurds to secessionist and violent mobilization. In this case, one would also expect the gradual increase of economic wealth among Turkey's Kurds in 2000s and early 2010s to moderate their ethno-political mobilization aims and methods in a consistent manner; yet, the consistent upward trend in the economic situation of Turkey's Kurds has not led to a linear change in Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns. The mobilization methods have varied quite significantly

between peaceful and violent methods in the last three decades, even in the last few years. Although such social structural analyses can be useful for explaining the increasing mobilization of Turkey's Kurds in the long run, they fail to explain the variation in ethno-political mobilization patterns from one year to another. They also fall into the trap of ecological fallacy when comparing broad geographical regions (e.g., heavily Turkish populated regions vs. heavily Kurdish populated regions): they overlook the varying development levels amongst heavily Turkish and Kurdish populated areas[135] and varying economic situations between individuals having the same ethnicity. It makes sense then that they cannot address the mismatching mobilization patterns and urbanization levels at the local level within such broad regions.

The role of elites in raising Kurdish ethnic consciousness and driving the Kurdish mobilization has also been emphasized in the literature: Kurdish elites copied the Jacobin character of the Turkish state and its "administration and mobilization from above" in creating "a Kurdish nation from a divided and disorganized Kurdish population with linguistic (Zaza-Kurmanji), religious (Sunni-Safii-Alevi), and regional differences" (Ergil, 2000, p. 39). Cultural framing via public communication channels, claims Romano (2006, pp. 100, 160), changed the cultural toolkit of Kurds. MED TV,[136] a UK-based satellite TV

[135] For instance, Istanbul, as a heavily Turkish populated city, is far more developed than another heavily Turkish populated city such as Yozgat. Similarly, despite having significant Kurdish populations, the development levels of two southeastern cities, Gaziantep and Hakkari, are dramatically different.

[136] MED TV's license was revoked by the UK in 1999. MEDYA TV continued the mission of MED TV from Belgium and France from 1999 until the French authorities revoked its license in 2004. The bans over these TV channels were based on the belief that they incited violence and had ties with the PKK (BBCNews, 1999; Radikal, 2011). Denmark-based ROJ TV continued the mission from 2004 up to July 3rd, 2013 until its license was revoked by Denmark (Aksam, 2013).

station that broadcasted from 1995 to 1999, "probably more than any other factor, served to promote ethnic consciousness amongst Kurds today" (Romano, 2006, p. 155). The elites' role in perpetuating the conflict was also acknowledged by a former PKK commander Nizamettin Tas: the PKK commanders, according to Tas, "can sabotage any solution that they do not like. It is as simple as an attack or a landmine explosion" (Cemal, 2011, p. 153). Elites and their greed is just one half of the picture: what makes elites significant is their capability to transform grievances into action through selective incentives and indoctrination by using political rallies, political campaigns, the media, and direct training. A former PKK guerilla, Azim's story is quite striking in demonstrating elites' role in this transformation. "After a three-month training...I have become a totally different person. I, who used to get scared of blood when a chicken was slaughtered, had now a gun in my belt" (Matur, 2001, p. 53). Although elites, by definition,[137] are crucial in any organized activity, what shapes the motivation and capability of elites must be an exogenous factor; therefore, this chapter treats the role of elites in the context of causal mechanisms, but not as a causally exogenous factor.

Turkey's repression of the Kurds is often seen as a major determinant of Kurdish violent and secessionist mobilization in Turkey. A great chunk of the literature that focuses on Turkey's treatment of Kurds up to the 1990s arrives at agreement on two interrelated fundamental points: it was repeatedly declared by central political elites that Kurds do not

[137] Elites are the "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principal decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural organizations and movements in society" (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 7).

exist as a separate ethnic group; and the state acted in accordance with a principle that Kurds should not exist as a separate ethnic group. The state adopted the former ideological viewpoint in its discourse[138] and it acted in allegiance with the latter attitude in its execution of policies for decades. Furthermore, a discourse based on the former statement was used to justify policies pertaining to the latter. This twofold policy is often described as the politics of denial and destruction (*inkar ve imha siyaseti*)[139] within peripheral Kurdish circles.

There is widespread agreement, if not consensus, in academic works on Turkey's policies toward Kurds in the pre-1990s with respect to the ideological viewpoints and policies outlined above. As will be discussed below, these policies could be labeled civic assimilationist. For Smith (2009, p. 5), "newly independent Turkey embarked on an ethnically homogenizing state project." Karpat (1988) also underlines the early efforts to transmute a homogeneous Turkish nation. Yuksel (1998) calls this process "cultural assimilation." Imset (1996) claims that the Kurds were seen as a "high-risk group" and considered an agent "resisting" Turkish assimilation. McDowall (2004[1997]) also gives numerous historical examples of the assimilationist policies of Turkey—*vis a vis* the Kurds—particularly in the early decades of the republic during the construction phase of the new Turkish nation state. As Yayman lists, numerous official reports proposed

[138] For an insightful discussion of the evolution of the state discourse on Kurds, see Yegen (2007).

[139] Among the interviewees, Ahmet Türk, Altan Tan, Adil Kurt, Bayram Bozyel, Demir Celik, Mehmet Doymaz, Metin Kilavuz, Mülkiye Birtane, Özcan Erdem, and Zübeyde Zümrüt who are current or former peripheral politicians as well as Arif Arslan, Faruk Balıkçı, Murat Cicek, Necdet İpekyüz, Raci Bilici, and Şahismail Bedirhanoğlu from civil society organizations stressed the denial policies that continued for decades during the republican period. For some interviewees, these policies still continue.

assimilation for the solution of the Kurdish question during the period of single-party rule (Republican People's Party, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP rule from 1923 to 1950). Two of these reports (Özmen and Kaya reports) even employed the term "assimilation" (Yayman, 2011, p. 14). It is quite clear that the set of policies that banned cultural expressions of identity—such as speaking, performing songs, and printing in Kurdish—were applied in expectation that the Kurdish language and accompanying ethnic identity would simply fade away. Nevertheless, Turkish nationalism has become the forefather of Kurdish nationalism. Although the denial of the Kurdish identity has lessened in some periods, Barkey and Fuller (1997, p. 15) claim that "the 1980 coup's policy to exclude the previous implicit recognition of Kurdish reality on behalf of the re-articulation of homogenous national culture […] simultaneously hastened Kurdish identity formation."

The situation has become more complicated in recent times as Turkey proceeded in its accession process to the European Union and the AKP consolidated its rule in the country. In the meantime, changing domestic and international parameters have created certain changes in ethnic incorporation policies toward Kurds. In the following sections, I will demonstrate how Turkey's varying ethnic incorporation models with regard to Kurds have affected the cognition and motivation of Turkey's Kurdish population, the mobilizing capability of elites, and, as a result, Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in Turkey.

Turkey's Incorporation Model(s) of the Kurds and Kurdish Ethnopolitical Mobilization in Turkey

Turkey's incorporation model regarding its Kurdish population has been mostly civic assimilationism to one degree or another throughout the 20th century. Kurdish individuals had the right to vote and run for elections in mainstream (non-ethnic) political parties during the democratic period.[140] The 2000s provided some opening for group-level political participation with relatively greater space for Kurdish ethnic parties and organizations, but Kurdish ethnic parties, particularly the BDP, have been still subject to a number of discriminatory electoral rules in varying degrees.

A closer look in the post-1980 period shows variation over time in the political incorporation of Turkey's Kurds. As shown in Table 5.1, the civic assimilationist incorporation model shifted toward ethnocracy in the aftermath of the 1980 coup with mass arrests, torture, and losses under custody—and village evacuations. From the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, group-level exclusion diminished as the state softened its security concerns toward Kurds. Nevertheless, greater pressure on the Kurdish political organizations started to appear again, particularly from mid-2000s and continued until 2012. Another period of softening started in late 2012 and has continued up until now (May, 2014).

[140] Although there were preceding elections, the first free and fair multiparty elections were conducted in 1950. The democratic era was interrupted by military coups in the 1960-61, 1971-73, and 1980-83 periods.

Table 5.1 Turkey's ethnic incorporation policies for Kurds

Incorp. model	Group-level indicators	Individual-level indicators
1980-1994 quasi-ethnocracy	Highly exclusionary: • No constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity; • Bans over ethnic Kurdish social and political organizations; • Mass arrests and torture toward Kurdish political activists; • Severe legal and political restrictions which terminated four Kurdish ethnic parties or made them dysfunctional from 1992 to 1994.	Quasi-exclusionary: • Limiting fundamental rights and liberties under the martial (1980-1987) and extraordinary rule (1987- fading away until 2002); • Banning the public use of Kurdish language (1980-1992); • Forced village evacuations (1985-1997); • Kurds were able to vote and run for mainstream political parties in elections.
1995-2004 Civic assimilationism	Gradually decreasing exclusion: • Release of some political prisoners and a reduction in political killings (1995); • Constitutional amendments that made it harder to suspend the activities of associations, to end a parliamentarian's status of parliamentary membership, and outlaw political parties (1995); • Constitutional amendments that relatively demilitarized the National Security Council and broadened freedom of expression (2001); • Narrowing down of the Anti-Terror Law (2003); • Abolishing state security courts (2004); • No constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity; • High electoral threshold harming pro-Kurdish political parties; • Closure of one Kurdish ethnic political party (2003).	Inclusionary: • Kurds were able to vote and run for mainstream political parties in elections. • Village evacuations stopped after 1997. • Extraordinary rule abolished in 2002.
2005-2012 Civic assimilationism (hardening)	Gradually increasing exclusion: • Restrictive changes in the Anti-Terror Law (2006); • Rising political arrests, 2009-2012; • No constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity; • High electoral threshold harming pro-Kurdish political parties; • Closure or self-termination (due to pressures) of two Kurdish ethnic political parties in 2005 and 2009.	Inclusionary: • Kurds were able to vote and run for mainstream political parties in elections.
2013-2014 Civic assimilationism (softening)	Gradually decreasing exclusion: • Quasi recognition of the PKK (publicly declared negotiations with the organization and its leader); • A halt in political arrests; • The end of the isolation of the PKK leader Öcalan in prison; • High electoral threshold harming pro-Kurdish parties.	Inclusionary: • Kurds were able to vote and run for mainstream political parties in elections.

The Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in Turkey over the last three decades occurred mostly through the organizations of the PKK and the BDP (and the BDP's predecessor parties). While the former is considered an illegal terrorist organization by Turkey and international actors such as the EU and the US, the latter is a legal political party. They differ in terms of their methods (violent vs. peaceful/electoral mobilization), but they share the same aim of political status and autonomy for Kurds as a collective group. [141] Although the AKP has a broader popular base among Turkey's Kurds, the BDP and the PKK are the primary channels of Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in Turkey reaching, according to estimates, a popular base consisting of three million people. [142]

Kurds had sporadic rebellions throughout the republican era,[143] but these rebellions were often local rebellions that could not crosscut tribal and denominational cleavages within Kurds. As the leftist movements gained prominence among Turkey's youth in 1960s and 1970s, the Kurdish question became an issue related to the economic development of a peripheral society in Turkey. Kurds—first in Turkish leftist movements[144] and then separately within the Kurdish leftist movements—organized protests and performed nation-wide mobilization for the first time in Turkey's history that could crosscut tribal and

[141] The PKK renounced the aim of secession in 1999 and currently seeks political autonomy in the form of ethnic federalism.

[142] In fact, the BDP and the PKK have a mostly overlapping popular base. The BDP deputy Ahmet Türk also stated repeatedly both in public and in his interview with the author that the BDP and the PKK have the same popular base: "It is clear which community we get most of our votes from. Children of people who vote for me are 'on the mountain' [the phrase 'on the mountain' refers PKK guerillas]" (Haber7, 2006).

[143] Cagatay (2009, pp. 34-35) notes that there were 13 revolts in the early years of the Republic from 1925 to 1930. Former president of Turkey Süleyman Demirel (who also served a record seven terms as PM for over 10 years in total) called the PKK rebellion as the 29th Kurdish rebellion (Vatan, 2013).

[144] The Kurdish activists collaborated with the TIP whereby they could express their demands (Ucarlar, 2009, pp. 129-130). The TIP announced that it recognized the Kurdish identity that had been erased by the Turkish state and was closed with the 1971 coup (Colak, 2004).

denominational Kurdish cleavages. The first significant protest movements started to appear in 1960s with the Eastern Demonstrations (*Doğu Mitingleri*) organized by the Turkish Workers Party (*Türkiye İşci Partisi* - TIP). Seven demonstrations were organized in two months from September to November in 1967.[145] The main themes of the demonstrations were the underdevelopment of the eastern Anatolia that was heavily populated by the Kurds and the pressures over the Kurdish language (Tan, 2009, p. 353). Besikci (1967/1992, p. 64) notes that the demonstrations were quite crowded. The Eastern Demonstrations were followed by an explosion of leftist pro-Kurdish ethnic organizations that split from the Turkish leftist movements.[146]

Prior to the 1980 coup, some Kurdish organizations demanded federalism and few demanded secession from Turkey. Rızgari, which was founded in 1977, was a secessionist organization (Tan, 2009, p. 356)—but such demands did not have a popular base in the society. The PKK made its first violent attack against the state security forces in 1984 and has continued using violence as a method of achieving its ends in varying degrees with intermittent ceasefires, even though its aims changed over time from secession to achieving limited political autonomy.

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[145] In Diyarbakır (September 16th, 1967), Silvan (September 24th, 1967), Siverek (October 1st, 1967), Batman (October 8th, 1967), Tunceli (October 15th, 1967), Ağrı (October 22nd, 1967), and Ankara (November 19th, 1967) (Besikci I. , Dogu Mitingleri'nin Analizi (1967), 1967/1992).

[146] "*Beş Parçacılar* (1976), *Sivancılar* (1972), DDKO – Revolutionary Eastern Culture Clubs (1969), DDKD – Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (1975), TKSP – Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party (1975), Kawa (1976), *Denge Kawa* (1977), *Red Kawa* (1978), *Rizgari* (1977), *Ala Rizgari* (1979), KUK – Kurdistan National Liberationists (1978), TEKOSIN (1978), YEKBUN (1979), TSK – Kurdistan Socialist Movement (1980), and the PKK – Kurdistan Workers' Party (1978)" (Romano, 2006, p. 47).

As shown in Table 5.2, both the ethnic incorporation models and the Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns have varied in Turkey since 1980. The Kurdish ethno-political mobilization has turned secessionist and violent following the 1980 coup. Both the aims and methods of the mobilization became more moderate in the post-1995 period, as the incorporation model allowed a greater degree of individual-level inclusion. The violent conflict started to escalate again, especially after 2009, as the Turkish government pursued tougher security policies against the PKK and political pressure over the BDP. Violence has recently completely disappeared as the government started a quasi-recognition and negotiation process with the PKK and stopped the political arrest campaign against the BDP. As shown in the table, the predictions based on the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two are accurate to a great extent.

Table 5.2 Ethnic incorporation models and Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns in Turkey, 1980-2014

	Incorporation model	*Pre-existing mobilization*	*Ethno-political mobilization aims*	*Ethno-political mobilization means*
1980-1994	quasi-ethnocracy	high	centrifugal*	violent*(↑)
1995-2004	civic assimilationism (softening)	high	centrifugal^ (1995-99) moderate* (1999-2004)	mixed*(↓)
2005-2012	civic assimilationism (hardening)	high	moderate*	mixed*(↑)
2013-…	civic assimilationism (softening)	high	moderate*	peaceful^^

Notes: Symbol (*) refers that the actual outcome is same as the predicted outcome;
Symbol (↓) refers to an overall gradual decline and (↑) refers to an overall gradual rise within the given time period. Symbol (^) is predicted as moderate, symbol (^^) is predicted as mixed.

QUASI-ETHNOCRACY, 1980-1994

The military coup led by General Kenan Evren in 1980 established a quasi-ethnocratic incorporation model in Turkey. The 1982 constitution that was drafted under the military rule designed exclusionary rules that were called martial rule (*sıkıyönetim*) and extraordinary rule (*olağanüstü hal*) in accordance with the articles 119 and 122 of the constitution. These two kinds of extraordinary rules allowed the state authorities to limit, or even abolish, the fundamental rights and freedoms in accordance with Article 121 (Gozler, 2000). In fact, the martial rule was put in force in 1980 and 13 generals were appointed as martial rulers to thirteen regions before the coup constitution was drafted in 1983. The martial rule started to be abolished starting from the western parts of Turkey in 1984. All the cities remaining under the martial rule by 1986 were in the predominantly Kurdish-populated eastern and southeastern cities.[147] Extraordinary rule replaced the martial rule in 1987 and lasted until 2002.

All pro-Kurdish organizations, most of which had no affinity with violence and made no secessionist demands, were suppressed under the military rule. Thousands of Kurdish activists were imprisoned and tortured—and hundreds died under custody.[148] According to Romano (2006, p. 79), "despite its small size in the late 1970s, the PKK received the heaviest of the blows directed at Kurdish separatist organizations, having the largest number of militants arrested." According to Gunter (1988), by 1981, in a year after

[147] The martial rule ended in Bingöl, Elazığ, Tunceli and Şanlıufra in 1986, and Van, Diyarbakır, Mardin and Siirt in 1987.

[148] Cemal (2011) narrates countless torture stories –some of which ended with the deaths of the victims- throughout the early 1980s based on his interviews with the victims and their relatives.

the coup and even before the PKK started to attack Turkish security forces, over 2000 alleged PKK members were imprisoned and put on mass trial.[149] They were accused of forming "armed" groups to "annex" southeast Turkey: "The formal indictment against the 447 members claimed that PKK represented an extensive Kurdish organization determined to use any means to establish an independent Kurdistan" (Gunter, 1988, p. 395). Although the PKK was formed before the coup, it did not have a mass base at the time; nevertheless, the mass trials convicted hundreds of activists most of whom had no affiliation with the PKK and sentenced them to long periods of imprisonment. The convicts were severely mistreated in prisons.

The torture cases following the 1980 coup are countless. Diyarbakir Prison, where Kurdish activists and politicians were kept, has a symbolic significance for Turkey's Kurds. Bayram Bozyel, the leader of the Kurdish ethnic party Hak-Par, was imprisoned for 5 years in this prison following the coup; although, he explicitly rejected violence as a method of mobilization for his entire life and has always distanced himself from the PKK. As Bozyel narrates, torture was not only based on physical abuse, but had a psychological component, too. During his imprisonment, Bozyel, together with other convicts, was forced to sing "racist marches," memorize the ten-stanza Turkish anthem and sing it ten times a day in Diyarbakir Prison.[150] Nurettin Yılmaz, an independent Kurdish deputy from Mardin, was another victim of Diyarbakir Prison. Yılmaz ran for the parliamentary voting as a

[149] According to Dağı (1996, pp. 125-126), over 60.000 people -who were suspected of terrorism and illegal political activities, but not necessarily in pro-Kurdish organizations- were arrested from September 1980 to February 1983.

[150] Author interview with Bayram Bozyel, Diyarbakır, December 19th, 2011. Bozyel was the party leader at the time of the interview and was replaced by Kemal Burkay on November 4th, 2012.

presidential candidate on March 29th, 1980 and received 80 deputies' votes. He was arrested and imprisoned for three years following the coup and went through intense torture in Diyarbakır Prison (Tan, 2009, p. 388). Another exemplar of the era was Şerafettin Elçi, who served as the Minister of Settlement from 1978 to 1979 from the mainstream social democrat party CHP. Elçi was also arrested after the coup, sent to Diyarbakir Prison and tortured, and stayed there for 30 months due to a statement he made during his ministry: "There are Kurds in Turkey, and I am a Kurd too".[151] Another victim of the coup was Diyarbakir mayor Mehdi Zana whose path also passed through the Diyarbakır Prison where not only him, but also his wife, Leyla Zana, was tortured while visiting her husband. Leyla Zana, a 19-year-old, uneducated, girl with a rural background at the time, is currently a leading Kurdish politician. Torture was not an interrogation and punishment tactic only used in the 1980s, but also in the 1990s—as an overview of the interviews I conducted demonstrate.

Kurds were excluded at the individual level, while even the cultural expression of Kurdishness was banned and the Kurdish language was suppressed to an unprecedented degree. Such cultural repression, when merged with the martial and extraordinary rules in heavily Kurdish populated regions, made genuine political participation impossible for Turkey's Kurds even at the individual level. The new constitution of 1982 had articles on the equal rights and freedoms of Turkey's citizens, but as Ozbudun and Genckaya (2009, p. 22) stress: it regulated the most basic rights and liberties in "such a manner that

[151] For a brief biography of Elçi, see the daily *Radikal* (2012).

restrictions became the rule rather than the exception." The public use of the Kurdish language was banned until 1991.[152] This ban resulted in a severe hindrance not only for meaningful political participation, but also for the very basic need of self-expression for Kurdish citizens of Turkey. In 1983, as Romano (2006, p. 80) states, the government continued to change Kurdish place-names to Turkish ones and to forbid parents to name their children with Kurdish names.

Another pillar of quasi-ethnocracy in this period was village evacuations: the villages that were allegedly providing logistical support to the PKK were evacuated by the state security forces. The evacuations started with some border villages in Hakkari and Şırnak in 1985 (Keser, 2011). Under extraordinary rule, the regional governor had the authority to exercise emergency powers in the struggle with the PKK. Three thousand two hundred and eleven villages were evacuated from 1989 to 1997.[153] In some cases, gendarmerie units came to the villages and delivered an ultimatum—stating that the village men had to report as village guards and told some other villagers to leave their villages.

[152] Articles 26 and 28 of the 1982 constitution banned the use of Kurdish language. As presented by Gunter (1988, p. 399), Article 26 stated that ""No language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any written or printed documents, photograph records, magnetic or video tapes, and other media instruments used in contravention of this provision shall be confiscated." Article 28 also included a strict text on the Kurdish language: "Publications shall not be made in any language prohibited by law." The relevant law referred by the constitution was the Law on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than Turkish (Law No. 2932 of October 19th, 1983). This law banned the expression, publication and broadcasting in any language other than the first official languages of states recognized by Turkey. The target of the law was primarily Kurdish which was not the first official language in any country that Turkey recognized. The law was abolished on April 12th, 1991 and the relevant constitutional articles were abolished on October 3rd, 2001. Nevertheless, the use of Kurdish language remained heavily constrained by law up until mid-2000s (for the Turkish text of the law, see: http://sivilceyiz.wordpress.com/tag/2932-sayili-kanun/ access: April 19th, 2013).

[153] The numbers of evacuated villages: 923 from 1989 to 1993, 1800 in 1994, 175 in 1996, and 118 in 1997, source: Lawyers' Association of Diyarbakır: Regional Report, 1998, p.5 (taken from Koivunen (2002)).

The villages to be evacuated were burnt down by the military and some were attacked from the air (Middle East Report, 1996).

As a result of these policies, predominantly Kurdish-populated southeastern Turkey turned into an open prison where Kurds had very limited, if any, means of engaging in politics to express their demands. Although the situation became less severe in the years that followed, the early to mid-1990s saw a return to the state brutality in the war against the PKK terrorism.

The first softening occurred with President Turgut Özal's decree to allow publications in the Kurdish language in 1991 and the abolishment of the restrictive law 2932, which prohibited the public use of Kurdish language. Nevertheless, "no other reform in the field of cultural rights or in the legalization of Kurdish political actors" was adopted (Bozarslan, 1996). Another positive development was the representation of pro-Kurdish deputies in the parliament; although this representation did not last long and led to a series of party bans throughout 1990s.

THE BANS ON LEGAL KURDISH ETHNIC POLITICAL PARTIES

In 1990, ten Kurdish deputies resigned from the Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti* - SHP) and founded the People's Labor Party (*Halkın Emeği Partisi* - HEP)—the first ethnic Kurdish political party in Turkey's history. The party made an electoral coalition with the SHP for 1991 parliamentary elections and won 18 seats in the parliament. What seemed like a genuine political opening at the time did not last long though. The HEP was formed on June 7th, 1990 and banned by the constitutional court on

July 14th, 1993 (Milliyet, 1993). As shown in Table 5.3 below, this event was the first link in a long chain of Kurdish ethno-political party openings and bans. The second functioning Kurdish political party, Freedom and Democracy Party (*Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi* - ÖZDEP) was formed on October 19th, 1992 as a spare party to replace HEP in case of closure (Milliyet, 1992); it terminated itself with the expectation of constitutional ban on April 30th, 1993 (Iscibirligi, 2009). The next party, Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi* - DEP), had a more dramatic banning process: the parliament (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* - TBMM) removed the parliamentary immunities of DEP chairman and Diyarbakır deputy Hatip Dicle, Muş deputy Sırrı Sakık, Şırnak deputy Orhan Doğan, Diyarbakır deputy Leyla Zana, Mardin deputy Ahmet Türk, and former DEP politician and independent Şırnak deputy Mahmut Alınak on March 2nd 1994 (Milliyet, 1994)—and another DEP politician, Selim Sadak, on March 3rd, 1994 (Milliyet, 1994). Four of the deputies, including the party leader Hatip Dicle, Leyla Zana, Orhan Doğan, and Selim Sadak were put on trial and sentenced to 15 years—and stayed imprisoned for 10 years. DEP was banned by the constitutional court in June 1994. All these constitutional court bans based their decisions on the claim that those parties were the mouthpiece of the PKK (NTVMSNBC, 2009).

Kurdish political parties not only suffered from the bans of the constitutional court, they also experienced repression.[154] Seven of the DEP party headquarters were arrested in June 1993. HEP Party Assembly member Habip Kılıç was murdered in Batman on

[154] The following chronology is compiled from news portals NTVMSNBC (2009) and Bianet (2009).

September 2nd, 1993. Two days later, DEP Mardin Deputy Mehmet Sincar and Batman city headquarter (*il yöneticisi*) Metin Can were murdered. DEP party leader Yaşar Kaya was arrested the same month on September 16th, 1993. The DEP headquarters building was bombed on February 18th, 1994. The founder of HADEP and party assembly member Muhsin Melik, and his driver Mehmet Ayyıldız, were murdered in Urfa on June 2nd, 1994. HADEP party leader Murat Bozlak was injured in a shooting in 1994. The murder and injury cases that pro-Kurdish politicians and activists were subject to were less severe and fewer in the following term after 1995, but some violations continued after 1995. Bozlak and fifty party assembly members were arrested later on June 24th, 1996; later, they were sentenced by the State Security Court and imprisoned on July 4th, 1996. After over two years of imprisonment, Bozlak was arrested again on February 12th, 1998—together with secretary general Hamit Geylani, vice secretary general M. Zeynettin Önay, deputy chairman Mehmet Satan, general accountant İshak Tepe, central executive committee member Ali Rıza Yurtsever, and party assembly member Melik Aygül. A wave of police operations targeted HADEP city and town headquarters on November 19th, 1998. Three thousand two hundred fifteen people (including 270 party executives) were arrested in these operations. Over 500 party executives and members were arrested between December 6th and December 8th, 1998.

Table 5.3 Pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey

Party	Opening date	Closure date	Method of closure
HEP	June 7, 1990	July 14, 1993	Constitutional court ban
OZEP	June 25, 1992	July 2, 1992	Self-termination and joining to HEP
OZDEP	October 19, 1992	April 30, 1993	Self-termination with the expectation of banning in the ongoing constitutional court trial
DEP	May 7, 1993	June 16, 1994	Constitutional court ban
HADEP	May 11, 1994	March 13, 2003	Constitutional court ban and a 5-year long ban from politics for 46 people including the party leader Murat Bozlak (Hurriyet, 2003)
DEHAP	October 24, 1997	November 19, 2005	Self-termination and joining to DTP with the expectation of banning in the ongoing constitutional court trial
DTP	November 9, 2005	December 11, 2009	Constitutional court ban
BDP	May 2, 2008	*Functioning as of April 2014*	*No case against the party as of April 2014*

HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS ON TURKEY'S INCORPORATION OF KURDS

Various organizations—including Human Rights Watch (HRW) since 1989, Amnesty International (AI) since 1994, and the EU Commission since 1998—have published annual reports[155] to evaluate human rights conditions in Turkey, with a focus on political rights and the Kurdish question. According to the annual HRW reports (1989; 1990; 1992): "Turkey failed to comply with Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), which prohibits military and other forms of security assistance to a country that 'engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.'" The picture "grew worse during 1990" (Human Rights Watch, 1990), further "worsened considerably in 1992" (Human Rights Watch, 1993), and

[155]For HRW reports, see: http://www.hrw.org/by-issue/publications/218; for AI reports, see: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/turkey; for EU Commission reports, see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

"continued at an appalling rate in 1993" (Human Rights Watch, 1994). According to the 1994 HRW report:

> Security forces continued to shoot and kill civilians in house raids and during peaceful demonstrations; brutal torture continued to be a routine and systematic interrogation technique (fifteen people died in suspicious circumstances while in police custody); hundreds of people were assassinated in southeast Turkey and the government failed to investigate their deaths; and members of the Kurdish minority in southeast Turkey were killed, tortured, detained and forced to abandon their villages and fields. Moreover, free expression continued to be sharply restricted, as were freedom of assembly and association.

The first AU report (1994) on Turkey also underscored extrajudicial executions committed in 1993. This negative picture started to change in 1995 despite numerous barriers for both individual- and particularly group-level inclusion, a topic that will be dealt with in the following sections.

The exclusion of Kurds at group and individual levels from 1980 to 1994 deeply affected their ethnic identification and motivation (grievance-led enmity and separatism). In terms of the ethnic identification aspect, quasi-ethnocratic policies forced Kurds to belong to a single ethnic category of Kurdishness in an unintended way. A leftist person––who spoke the Zaza dialect, believed in Alevi faith, lived in a central eastern Anatolian city such as Tunceli—and a right-wing person—who spoke the Kurmanji dialect, believed in Sunni (highly likely Shafi'i) faith, lived in a southern border city such as Mardin—were subject to the same kind of discrimination. Many people who did, or did not, identify themselves as Kurds were subject to policies such as village evacuations, language ban, or arrest and torture if they were suspected of being Kurdish activists—no matter whether the claims relied on solid evidence or just mere suspicion. Hence, while the government

claimed that there were no Kurds in Turkey, its exclusionary policies assigned millions of people into this officially absent ethnic category of Kurdishness. The excluded and repressed Kurds developed a strong sense of grievance toward the state. When there was no legal way to express their resentments, many turned to the PKK to assert their grievances and frustration. Turkish citizenship ties did not mean much to the Kurdish populace under a quasi-ethnocratic ethnic incorporation model and a growing number of Kurds sought separatism as the final political solution to their problems. Facing state repression and obstacles to political participation even through mainstream (non-ethnic) political channels, an increasing number of Kurds were recruited and armed by the PKK. The recruitment process did not require great effort because of the quasi-ethnocratic policies. The deprivation and increased ethno-political awareness outlined above were sufficient for many Kurds to join the PKK voluntarily. The following section outlines this period of secessionist and violent mobilization.

SECESSIONIST AND VIOLENT MOBILIZATION, 1984-1994: THE RISE OF THE PKK

The Kurdish ethno-political mobilization was violent and centrifugal from 1984 to 1994. The main actor of the mobilization was the PKK during this time period. The PKK was founded in 1978 in a village of Urfa with a meeting of eleven young people. The group was one of many leftist and pro-Kurdish organizations of the time and soon was known as Apocus, referring to Abdullah Öcalan (Apo)—the leader of the organization (Ergil, 2000, p. 37; Brown, 1995, p. 118). The organization was secessionist and saw armed struggle as a legitimate method of mobilization. Such a marginal and small-scale organization of a few

young people has become the strongest challenge to the Turkish state in the aftermath of the 1980 coup.

The PKK published the speeches that were made in its founding congress in 1978.[156] The speeches have a very ideologically loaded leftist discourse[157] and refer to the struggle of the PKK as a struggle against imperialism. The speakers claimed that Kurdistan was divided by "capitalist-imperialists" and "colonists" and Turkey's Kurdistan became "the manger and dumping ground of the bourgeoisie." Accordingly, the primary enemies of the organization were "the representatives of the local backwardedness" (referring to Kurdish tribal chiefs and feudal lords) and "the representatives of the sovereign national bourgeoisie."[158] The primary goal of the organization in this document is stated as political independence for Kurdistan with a socialist revolution. The document also explained why the PKK decided to work separately from other Turkish leftist organizations. Kemalism[159]

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[156] For the full text, see: PKK Kuruluş Kongresi Konuşmaları (2011). The speech was given by Öcalan although his name does not appear in the document. Other names that attended the talk and are mentioned in the document are Mazlum Doğan, Şahin Dönmez, Ali Haydar Kaytan, Duran Kalkan and Cemil Bayık. Öcalan is currently in prison in Turkey, Dogan committed suicide in prison to protest the Turkish state's treatment in 1982. Dönmez was arrested in 1979, became a collaborator, and assassinated by the PKK in 1990. Kaytan, Kalkan, and Bayık are still in the leaders' cadre of the PKK (for biographies of major PKK figures, see Ma Diya (2012)).

[157] The term 'revolution' is repeated 82 times and 'imperialism' (and imperialist) 65 times throughout the document. The document repeats the terms worker 17, proletarian 10, and the class 32 times whereas the term Kurdish was repeated only twice in the singular form (*Kürt*) and three times in the plural form (*Kürtler*). While the speakers repeated Marx (including the terms Marxism and Marxist) 23 times and Lenin 8 times, they did not refer to any Kurdish historical figure by name. Speakers also used the terms socialism and socialist 152 times whereas they used nationalism in 9 occasions all in negative contexts (e.g., chauvinist nationalism, submissive nationalism, bourgeoisie nationalism). Although the document stressed the backwardness of Kurdistan in particular, it does it in connection with the salvation of the peoples of the world and the Socialist International.

[158] The original Turkish version: "Bir yandan yerel gericiliğin oradaki temsilcileri, öte yandan hakim ulus burjuvazisinin temsilcileri bize düşüncede bile yaşama hakkı tanımıyorlardı".

[159] Kemalism is the founding philosophy of the Turkish Republic that is attributed to the ideological legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881-1938), the founder and the first president (1923-1938) of the Republic of Turkey.

is "the strongest form of the dominant nation's nationalism" and it took place among the revolutionary leftist movements of Turkey in the form of social-chauvinism. The traces of Turkish nationalism among the Turkish leftist movements have led some Kurdish members to split from those organizations. The PKK's program clearly stated that the organization needed its own armed forces: "We should always keep in mind that we will be eliminated and will not have a right to live if we do not have strong armed forces behind all the activities we will pursue."

Based on its founding program, the PKK initially targeted local rivals; yet, its activities were quite small-scale before the coup. The PKK found itself in conflict with other rival Kurdish organizations and the feudal lords (*aghas*) in the region. There was no direct challenge to the Turkish state in this pre-coup period. Nine months after the coup, the PKK decided to start a violent campaign from the bases to be settled in northern Iraq in its first conference (July 15–25, 1981) (Bal and Ozkan, 2006). In its second congress (August 20-25, 1982), the PKK decided to start the guerilla activities in the fall of 1983; state officers are listed in the target list in this meeting (Bal and Ozkan, 2006). The PKK announced its manifesto from the *minaret* of a mosque in Eruh, hung a poster in the town square, and attacked a gendarme station on August 15th, 1984 (Cemal, 2011, p. 87).

Turkish military forces have been involved in a long-standing military engagement against the PKK since the organization's first attack on state security forces in Eruh, Siirt and Şemdinli, Hakkari in 1984. The military conducted operations against the PKK not only in Turkey, but also in Iraq. The first cross-border operation occurred on April 25th, 1983, a date that precedes the PKK's attack in Eruh. The most comprehensive military

operation, *Balyoz* (sledgehammer) operation, occurred in 1995 and involved the participation of 45.000 soldiers. The operation started with 35,000 soldiers and 10,000 more were added during the operation. As shown in Table 5.4, [160] the PKK attacks and related casualties continued throughout this period peaking in the mid-1990s.

Table 5.4 Casualties in Clashes with the PKK, 1984-1994

years	staff	civilians	total casualties caused by the PKK	annual % change	PKK members	Total casualties
1984	26	43	69	NA	28	97
1985	58	141	199	189	201	400
1986	51	133	184	-8	74	258
1987	71	237	308	68	95	403
1988	54	109	163	-48	123	286
1989	153	178	331	104	179	510
1990	161	204	365	11	368	733
1991	244	233	477	31	376	853
1992	629	832	1461	207	1129	2590
1993	715	1479	2194	51	3050	5244
1994	1145	992	2137	-3	2510	4647

The numbers presented in Table 5.4 demonstrate the trajectory of the level of violence. PKK-related casualties steadily increased until 1992, and tripled in this year. The HRW reports give clues about the reasons of this rise in death tolls. According to the HRW (1993) report: "the human rights situation in Turkey worsened considerably in 1992…So did assassinations by unknown assailants in southeast Turkey, including the killing of eleven journalists-with no serious efforts by the Turkish government to investigate these

[160] The data is given to the press by the General Command of Gendarmerie of Turkey (Haber3, 2010; Milliyet, 2010). The data is collected from the Turkish National Police, Turkish General Command, and the General Command of Gendarmerie. The data on staff casualties include data of the entire security personnel of Turkey.

murders. Torture continued unabated." Although the situation was not much better in earlier years, there was hope with President Özal's positive steps and the Demirel-İnönü coalition government's promises. 1993 and 1994 were the peak years in terms of death tolls with over two thousand military personnel and civilian casualties and 2500 to 3000 PKK guerillas—reaching a total number of about 5000 lost lives in both years. According to the HRW report (1995), village evacuations worsened the situation even further by displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds in these two years.

Turkey's civic assimilationist policies until 1980 had been implemented on an increasingly mobilized and organized group with a rising level of ethnic consciousness. Facing such a "conscious" and mobilized group, the quasi-ethnocracy of 1980 and early-1990s led to a widespread feeling of deprivation amongst Turkey's Kurds. The 1980 coup destroyed the relatively free political landscape of 1970s throughout which Kurds could peacefully mobilize in an organized way. The narrowing of the political landscape for a highly mobilized group like the Kurds led them into an intense mobilization process for secessionist aims via violent methods. As Ergil (2000, p. 41) notes: Kurds were not allowed to identify themselves as Kurds and the resulting frustration was expressed as victimization. "The state was seen as the source of everything negative."

The quasi-ethnocratic incorporation policies of Turkey toward Kurds created stronger ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness. As the Kurds lived under extraordinary rule in an open prison-like setting in the southeast Turkey, individual Kurds attributed these policies to the Turkish state's selective exclusion of them as a group. Group-level inclusion was absent at this time period as ethnic Kurdish organizations or

ethnic political parties were either entirely outlawed or prevented from functioning due to judicial and extrajudicial barriers. Individual-level inclusion was also quite weak at this time period—or it was quasi-inclusion at best. Kurds were permitted to run for elections from the lists of mainstream parties and vote in the elections. The pressure over the Kurdish language limited self-expression and participation in genuine political deliberations of the Kurds; moreover, the suppression of Kurdish language and identity made it impossible to demand even culturally inclusive policies in the mainstream non-Kurdish parties. Şerafettin Elçi's story in the previous section exemplifies the fate of those who expressed modest traces of Kurdishness: after all, any genuine political participation was impossible at a time when hundreds of thousands Kurds were forcefully displaced. Such discriminatory policies targeting the Kurds soon led even the youngest to think that the state was excluding a group of people who speak the same language and share the same identity. Kurdishness was the main target and the state of being the target prioritized this identity over competing ones such as religious denomination (e.g., Sunni, Shia), local dialects (e.g., Zaza, Kurmanji), or tribal connections.

The story of Kendal, a PKK guerilla shows us the linkage between the repression of the Kurdish language (in fact, Kurmanji dialect in this case) and ethnic identification (Matur 2001, p. 38). When Kendal was playing his flute in the classroom, his teacher ordered him to stop playing the song because the melody was from a local Kurdish song. Kendal thought: "how can a flute melody be in Kurdish?" As a child unaware of ethnic identity, he asked his mother: "Mom, are we Kurdish or Turkish?" And his mother's answer was "We are Kurmanji." In fact, neither Kendal nor his mother knew what a

Kurmanji was at the time. Kendal states that he started to figure out the answer to his own question at the ages of 16-17 (Matur, 2001).

As the repression of Kurdishness made this identity bolder, it also created a widely shared sense of deprivation among Kurds. A significant number of Kurds were deprived of their villages and family members due to arrests, killings by unidentified perpetrators, killings in combats, and forced displacements; and all of them were deprived of their ethnic identities and mother languages. In other words, they were deprived of their "selves." The resulting frustration and ethno-political consciousness among Turkey's Kurds gave the PKK a great opportunity to recruit more members.

Abdullah Öcalan once stated that: "I use Turkish stupidity to build a Kurdish movement. This is very important. Turkey's harsh, ignorant treatment of the Kurds has helped give birth to a greater sense of Kurdish nationalism. I use Turkish mistakes to build up my power."[161] Imset (1996) notes that "after 1989, the PKK strengthened rapidly in the region facing almost no problems in finding new recruits, weapons, or financial resources. It expanded among the people and established itself as a popular movement."

A BDP officer's story in Diyarbakir is quite striking as an example of how the policies of quasi-ethnocracy played a role in connecting the processes of ethnic identification, ethno-political consciousness, and mobilization. "I did not know that I was a Kurd until 1988. When I listened to something in Kurdish, I used to think of it as a foreign language, like English. Then, the military burned down my village when I was sixteen.

[161] Gunter's (1998) interview with Öcalan.

Many young people went up to the mountain after the incident. I also attempted to join the guerillas, but my mother stopped me. I am against violence now, but I feel obliged to rebel at the same time. Arms are the last resort."[162] Former BDP deputy mayor of Diyarbakır, Metin Klavuz, also states that Kurds were insulted as a people and over four thousand Kurdish villages were burnt down in the past; therefore, the PKK is not the cause, but the result.[163] For Hak-Par leader Bayram Bozyel, who was imprisoned for five years in the 1980s, "the state did not leave any option other than the *mountain*".[164]

In interviews with the author, seven mothers of PKK guerillas,[165] all told the stories of their children's deep grievances. Their villages were evacuated and burnt by the military; fathers or older siblings were murdered; and then they themselves, when grown up, were tortured in the 1980s and 1990s. One gives the example of her own son who has been "on the mountain" for over 18 years. The son, as a political activist college student at Mimar Sinan University in Istanbul was arrested, banned from the school, and sentenced to twelve years. Following this chain of devastating events, the son fled the country and joined the PKK. His mother attributes his son's decision to join the PKK to the fact that "he was not allowed to live in this country."

Delal Zengin, another member of the Mothers for Peace, told a similar story. Her daughter became increasingly frustrated as their village was burnt down and her son went

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[162] Author's interview, Diyarbakır, December 22nd, 2011. The interviewee asked his name to be kept confidential.

[163] Author's interview, Diyarbakır, December 21st, 2011.

[164] Author's interview, Diyarbakır, December 19th, 2011.

[165] Author's interview, Diyarbakır, December 22nd, 2011 with *Barış Anneleri* (Mothers of Peace –a civilian initiative that was formed by mothers whose children either lost their lives in the conflicts or are still massed in PKK camps in northern Iraq).

through torture. Her daughter's political activism led her to go through several detentions; finally, she was sentenced to 15 years for attending a PKK member's funeral. She preferred to leave the country rather than be taken to the prison and has been in the PKK lines for over twelve years. One would expect a mother to prioritize her children's safety over any other concern, but Zengin's statements also show the degree of her own frustration: "We were not knowledgeable on these matters and were enslaved. Our children have seen the truth. If there will be peace, then I would like my daughter to come back; but if there will be no final peace, then I do not want her to come back."

Another peace mother said that her village was also burnt down, her husband was murdered by the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight against Terrorism (*Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele* - JITEM),[166] two sons were killed in a conflict after they joined the PKK, and one son is currently in prison. It is not reasonable to expect any younger member of her family to seek violence as the only way of struggling for their goals. Violence in this time period was the only way to express one's frustration in the region as all political channels, both at individual and group levels, were closed. As people

166 The JITEM was allegedly founded as an officially non-existing organization in Turkey's struggle with the PKK. It was held responsible for the killings by unknown perpetrators in southeastern Turkey. Although the organization was allegedly terminated in April 1990, for many, it continued its operations as an undercover organization (for information on the accusations and the defense regarding the organization in recent trials, see NTVMSNBC **(**2010**)**). The Turkish courts investigated the doubts and asked the situation directly to the General Command of Gendarmerie and Turkish General Staff in 2009 (Emir, 2009). The retired generals denied the existence of the JITEM (Haberturk, 2010). In their responses to another court investigation, Turkish General Staff denied the existence of the JITEM now and in the past and the General Command of Gendarmerie declared that the JITEM was an organization to be experimented for a short time and was abandoned in 1990 (Benli, 2013). Nevertheless, the organization is no mystery to the locals of southeast Turkey. As seen in the pictures of a phonebook printed by the Governor's Office of Batman (Appendix C), the organization was still active as late as 1998 (although its operations, if any, were much fewer than the ones up until mid-1990s).

sought a way out in violence, more and more people lost their lives and the anger of their families, friends, and neighbors grew. Such losses of immediate family members lead to longstanding frustration that generates lagged effects of the ethnic incorporation models over time, perhaps spreading through a whole generation for those who have lost their most beloved ones.

While changes in incorporation models may not solve all the problems immediately, some immediate consequences are still visible. For instance, based on Brown's (1995) comments on the political atmosphere of the time, the first sign of softening in the quasi- ethnocratic incorporation model occurred in 1991 under Özal's rule. In response to Özal's language bill permitting the public use of Kurdish in everyday conversation and folklore music recordings, meetings with Iraqi Kurds, and granting of amnesty to political convicts including the former mayor of Diyarbakir Mehdi Zana, Öcalan stated that: "To tell the truth, I did not expect him [Özal] to display such courage … He has taken an important step" and continued that the PKK "might opt for a diplomatic-political solution." While moderating his view on the methods of mobilization, Öcalan also moderated his mobilization aims. He stated that the PKK no longer sought independence, just "free political expression" for Turkey's Kurds. Nevertheless, Öcalan's softening remained more rhetorical than real as he later blamed Demirel-İnönü coalition government in Turkey for not continuing Özal's commitment for the solution of the problem.[167]

[167] Brown quoted Öcalan's speeches from a number of interviews he gave in 1991.

Although Öcalan declared the first ceasefire of his organization in 1993, he broke the ceasefire soon after President Özal died the same year.

CIVIC ASSIMILATIONISM, SOFTENING PERIOD: 1995-2004

The quasi-ethnocratic incorporation model of Turkey gave way to an increasingly softening form of civic assimilationism, as the group-level exclusion became less and less severe. Turkey became inclusive at the individual level and less and less exclusionary at the group level during this time period. The 1996 HRW report[168] refers to some positive developments in Turkey, such as the release of some political prisoners, a reform on abusive law, and "a reduction in the sheer numbers of political killings." The 1997 HRW report mentions "some positive actions," but concludes that "the Turkish governments were unable to produce any substantive democratization improvements or human rights legislation."

Another novelty of this era was the occurrence of the first direct contact between a Turkish government and the PKK. Ocalan, during his trial in 1999, stated that former PM Necmettin Erbakan sent two letters to him in 1997 and asked for cessation of violent activities so that he could take positive economic and social measures to improve current circumstances (Hurriyet, 1999).

The HRW (2000) underscores "modest progress" in 1997 and 1998 in Turkey. Although the 2001 HRW report states that "almost no progress on key human rights reforms" were made in 2000, "the reform package adopted by Parliament in August 2002

[168] HRW reports discuss the human rights situation of the previous year.

was particularly far reaching" according to the EU Commission report (2002). The HRW (2003) also saw positive "substantial results" in 2002. The key issues of improvement for this report were on "improved access to legal counsel for police detainees," abolishment of the death penalty, permission for broadcasting and education in minority languages, and lifting of the state of emergency in four cities (Tunceli and Hakkari in July and Diyarbakır and Şırnak in November). The HRW (2005) notes the improving record of Turkey in human rights during 2004.

Early 2000s provided an unprecedented opening for Kurdish ethno-political activities. The National Security Council[169] was relatively demilitarized and freedom of expression was broadened with the constitutional amendments in 2001. The AKP dominated Turkish parliament narrowed down the scope of Anti-Terror Law, which had victimized peaceful activists as well as violent ones, in 2003. The parliament abolished state security courts, facilitated the formation of social organizations and associations (Associations Law, Law No 5253), and abolished the death penalty (gradually in 2001 and completely) in 2004. Given that the PKK leader Öcalan was sentenced to death at the end of his trial, this legal change was a relief in peripheral Kurdish circles. The abolition of the State Security Courts on May7th, 2004 also represented happy news for many Kurdish political activists. The constitutional changes concerning political parties and deputies (articles 69 and 84) and the judiciary system (articles 144-149, 156-157, and 159) together

[169] The National Security Council was formally an advisory council consisting of the prime minister, some ministers (e.g., ministers of defense, the interior, and foreign affairs) and high ranked military commanders. The Council was created by the post-coup 1961 Constitution (Ozbudun & Genckaya, 2009). The Council was "de facto the most powerful agency of the state" (Middle East Report, 1996).

with policies such as "zero tolerance" of ill-treatment and torture were thought to broaden the political space. According to Ozbudun and Genckaya (2009, p. 77), the 2004 changes were "revolutionary" in terms of minority rights.

Kurdish politicians and activists have made significant progress in terms of group-level political rights especially since 1999. Nevertheless, the ethnic incorporation has not reached a level that can be called "group-level inclusive." Some peripheral Kurdish demands such as local political autonomy, reduced electoral threshold,[170] bilingual official services, and primary education in Kurdish were not satisfied. Gradual improvements in both individual- and group-level inclusion, however, had repercussions on the Kurdish political mobilization. The new and increasingly moderate civic assimilationist policies resulted in a lower degree of violence and less centripetal political aims in this time period. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the gradually broadening inclusiveness in incorporation policies was not sufficient to eradicate the use of violence by the PKK.

FROM SECESSIONISM TO LIMITED AUTONOMY AND THE CEASEFIRE, 1995-2004

When the Turkish state abolished its quasi-ethnocratic incorporation model by demilitarizing the National Security Council—as well as narrowing the scope of Anti-Terror Law, abolishing state security courts and death penalty, and minimizing torture and ill treatment—the pattern of Kurdish ethno-political mobilization changed as well. The

[170] The 10% electoral threshold was established with the Law on Deputy Elections (law no: 2839) in 1983. The law has been revised regarding the implementation of the threshold, but the 10% rule has been protected until present (Turk, 2006, p. 99). In fact, the origin of the threshold was not so much about the Kurds, but to stop the political instability in the country. Nineteen governments were formed and dissolved in the 18 years preceding the 1980 coup in Turkey (Turk, 2006). Nevertheless, the Kurdish ethnic political parties have been the primary loser of this 10% threshold implementation since the coup.

numbers of lost lives decreased rapidly in 1995 and the trend continued in the following years. Although the PKK's heavy losses in the previous period in its clashes with the Turkish military forces is an important factor in this downturn (Birand, 2010), the 1995 constitutional amendments regarding the ethnic incorporation model were also crucial in moderating the frustration of Turkey's Kurdish population. The 1995 amendments made it harder for state institutions and officials to suspend the activities of associations, to end a parliamentarian's status of parliamentary membership, and outlaw political parties (Ozbudun and Genckaya, 2009, p. 39). For Ozbudun and Genckaya (2009, p. 40), the 1995 constitutional amendments "represented a significant improvement over the original text which contained vague and hard-to-define prohibitions."

Although Turkey still lacked the sufficient conditions for genuine individual- and group-level inclusion, such a trend toward greater inclusion was followed by a lower degree of PKK violence. PKK-caused casualties peaked in 1993 and 1994, but the following years had declining numbers both in terms of the number of PKK-caused casualties, as shown in Table 5.5, and in terms of the number of violent incidents. According to Ergil (2000, p. 46), the terrorist activities peaked in 1993 with 4,198 incidents. The next year had a 15.2% decrease with 3,538 incidents. The downturn continued with a 38.1% decrease in 1995, a 10.1% decline in 1996, and a 26.3% decrease in 1997.

As the political realm was providing increasing opportunities for ethnic Kurdish political organizations to function, Kurdish ethnic elites were gaining more power due to the transfer of resources and authority of governing—especially in municipalities under the

HADEP (1994-2003) and DEHAP (1997-2005) rules. The deputies of such parties also had the opportunity to translate their longstanding frustrations into parliamentary speeches. Although the presence of ethnic elites is often associated with ethnic outbidding and ethnic entrepreneurship that fosters radicalization (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Roeder, 1991; Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2000; DeVotta, 2005), this depiction is not accurate in the Kurdish case. Newly emerging Kurdish ethnic elites in Turkey owed their formal and informal power and authority to the granting of (insufficient but gradually improving) group-level inclusion. Radically centrifugal demands and tolerance of the use of violence in Kurdish mobilization was not a smart choice because radicalization would lead the government to turn to repression again. Therefore, greater elite empowerment due to the gradual increase in group-level inclusion did not translate to a radicalization in elite calls; even if ethnic elites had chosen the radical way, it would not have been an easy task to lead a secessionist and violent mobilization given the political circumstances of the time. Although group-level inclusion increased the coercive and propaganda powers of ethnic elites, it was still not an easy task for them to persuade the Kurdish masses to support secessionist goals via violent methods in a political context where the repression and exclusion of Turkey's Kurds were gradually declining. In addition, Kurds lacked political autonomy and coercive power. The propaganda influence of the ethnic elites was quite limited given the availability of non-ethnic information sources and power centers (e.g., centrally appointed governor's offices in each city had full control of the police forces and greater administrative authority).

Nevertheless, despite a decline in the number of casualties caused by the PKK, hundreds of people continued to lose their lives annually until 2000. One major reason for the death toll was the large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns of the Turkish state. Turkey conducted the most comprehensive cross-border military operations in 1994 and 1995. Five hundred and fifty-five PKK guerillas were killed just in Steel (*Çelik*) Operation in 1995 (NTVMSNBC, 2008) and such operations led to retaliation attacks by the PKK.

Table 5.5 Casualties in Clashes with the PKK, 1995-2004

years	staff	civilians	total casualties caused by the PKK	annual % change	PKK members	Total casualties
1995	772	313	1085	-50[171]	4163	5248
1996	608	170	778	-29	3789	4567
1997	518	158	676	-14	7558	8234
1998	383	85	468	-31	2556	3024
1999	236	83	319	-32	1458	1777
2000	29	17	46	-86	319	365
2001	20	8	28	-40	104	132
2002	7	7	14	-50	19	33
2003	31	63	94	572	87	181
2004	75	28	103	10	122	225

As shown in Table 5.6, many of the ceasefires declared by the PKK occurred in this time period. All the PKK ceasefires followed political openings. Even short-term changes in state discourse moderated the motivation for violence. The changing accommodation policies of the late 1990s and 2000s that provided modest group-level inclusion with lessening pressure on the Kurdish organizations and parties thus led to the longest ceasefire

[171] % change from the 1994 numbers

period from 1999 to 2004. As Somer (2005, p. 120) notes, post-1999 liberalization has allowed the emergence of moderate Kurdish voices inside and outside the PKK. While the PKK did not deny the use of violence as a mobilization method, it had a more moderate position by changing its mobilization aim from secession to autonomy within Turkey in 1999.

Table 5.6 PKK ceasefires

Starting date	*Ending date*	*PKK's declared reason for starting the ceasefire*	*PKK's declared reason for ending the ceasefire*
March 20, 1993	April 15, 1993 (extended for another month until May) April 24, 1993 (first attack after the ceasefire)	Indirect calls from Turkey for a ceasefire	Reformist President Özal's death on April 17th, 1993
December 15, 1995	May 6, 1996	Broadening the ceasefire with the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) by including Turkey	Turkish military operations in northern Iraq and Turkey's assassination attempt to Öcalan on May 6th, 1996
September 1, 1998	February 15, 1999	Indirect calls from Turkey for a ceasefire	Öcalan's capture by Turkey
August 2, 1999	September 1, 2003	Öcalan's call to the PKK forces to leave Turkey	Turkey's ignorance of the ceasefire and ongoing military engagement against the PKK and the isolation of Öcalan with his lessening and shortening talks with his family and lawyers (Hurriyet, 2003).
April 13, 2009	June 1, 2010	No attack, but only self-defense to allow the AKP to continue the democratic opening process (Sol Haber, 2011)	KCK operations; arrests of the 'goodwill ambassadors'*; the ban on the DTP.
August 13, 2010	September 8, 2010	Allowing the AKP to take positive steps on Kurdish question prior to the constitutional referenda (Sol Haber, 2010)	Killing of 9 PKK members in a military operation a day before the religious Ramadan feast
March 21, 2013	current as of May 2014	Following Öcalan's message for the union of peoples and peace.	NA

*PKK sent some unarmed PKK members as 'goodwill ambassadors' to Habur border patrol on October 19th, 2009 in this period. [172]

[172] The information is gathered from Calislar (2010), CNNTurk (2010), Haberturk (2013), and pro-PKK source Kurdistan Strategic Research Center (2010).

The PKK's aims also changed in this time period as the PKK gave up the idea of having an independent Kurdish statehood. Since the PKK adopted this change in its policies after its leader Öcalan was captured and imprisoned, many people questioned the sincerity of this change in the organization's aims. Öcalan stated in his trial that national self-determination is no longer a valid argument and improving democracy without making changes in the national boundaries is a more realistic solution (Tan, 2009, p. 368). He explained his idea of democracy in Turkey as a "democratic republic" with two founding nations (Birand, 2010). The leader of the PKK, Murat Karayılan, also stated in the early 2000s in his interviews with Cemal (2011, p. 23) that "we do not want to solve this problem with violence anymore" and "we are not separatist, we do not want to disunite Turkey." This shift in the aims was not limited to the elite circle, but rather was rapidly embraced by the PKK members and sympathizers. Baran, a PKK guerilla, told Matur (2001, p. 32) in an interview that "we used to dream. We used to discuss an independent country project. Then, we noticed that we neglected the individual in the shade of mega dreams. There were giant ideals before 1999. We started to talk about life after 1999." Azad, another guerilla shared Baran's opinions: "Secession was a joke of the 1980s. It was a leftist dream and fantasy. … I would not secede from Turkey even if I could" (Matur, 2001, p. 26).

CIVIC ASSIMILATIONISM, HARDENING PERIOD: 2005-2012

The Turkish incorporation model vis-à-vis the Kurds continued to be civic assimilationism in the period from 2005 to 2012, but the group-level exclusion became increasingly more severe in this period. The changes made in the Anti-Terror Law in 2006

signaled a turn back to the aggressive operations and unfair trials of the 1990s. As group-level inclusive steps slowed down from 2005 to 2009, two opposite processes went side by side in 2009 and 2010: quasi-recognition of the Kurdish ethnicity and group level exclusion in the form of political arrest campaigns against the BDP members. Moreover, the AKP's insistence on maintaining the 10% electoral threshold for the parliamentary elections hurt its credibility with regards to its "political opening" as the political arrests of Kurdish politicians went up from 2009 to late 2012.

According to the annual HRW reports (2006; 2007), Turkey's human rights record was "mixed" in 2005 with "little progress" and the government "failed during 2006 to implement key reforms necessary to consolidate the human rights progress of the past years." Both Amnesty International (2006; 2007) and HRW (2008; 2009) reports also observed "deterioration" in human rights in the eastern and southeastern regions from 2006 to 2008 with "an intensification of speech-related prosecutions and convictions, controversial rulings by the judiciary in defiance of international human rights law, harassment of pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi* - DTP) officials and deputies, and a rise in reports of police brutality." The changes made in the Anti-Terror Law that were adopted on June 29th, 2006 in the Turkish Grand Assembly brought serious problems, particularly on the freedom of press (Article 5-6) and fair trial procedures (Articles 8-9) with regards to the terrorism-related issues.[173]

[173] For an analysis of the changes in the Anti-Terror Law, see Ayhan (2006) and Tarhanlı (2006). Full text of the law is available in Turkish at <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5532.html>, accessed October 24th, 2013.

The AKP government announced a new inclusion process called "Democratic (Kurdish) Opening" in 2009, but the EU Commission report of 2012 observed that this opening was not followed through. The AI (2009) report also points to this deterioration in the form of increasing torture and ill-treatment, prosecution of dissenting views, denial of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, excessive force to disperse demonstrations, and restricted freedom of expression and unfair trials under anti-terrorism legislation. The 2010 AI report underscores the persistence of human rights abuses, especially torture and other ill-treatment. The 2011 HRW report notes that although the government amended the constitution, "arbitrary detentions, prosecutions, and convictions under terrorism laws and for speech crimes persisted" in 2010. The EU Commission in the same year claims that "around 2,000 politicians, locally elected representatives, and human rights activists in the southeast have been detained since April 2008" due to the KCK case. According to the 2012 HRW report, "[t]he government has not prioritized human rights reforms since 2005." The AI (2012) shares the same concerns. Accordingly, the "right to freedom of expression was threatened," "protesters faced increased police violence," and "[t]housands of prosecutions brought under flawed anti-terrorism laws routinely failed fair trial standards." The EU Commission (2012, p. 7) report for the same year also notes that

> The 2009 democratic opening, aimed at addressing amongst others the Kurdish issue, was not followed through. … Increasing numbers of BDP-affiliated Kurdish politicians, locally elected mayors and members of municipal councils were detained, adversely affecting regional and local democracy.

The Turkish state renovated its security policy in the late 2000s. This new policy aimed at disconnecting the PKK from "would-be members" by isolating and severing the

"mobilization base." The police and special authority prosecutors were the main agents of this strategy. Police operations against the KCK focused on breaking the linkages between the PKK and its mobilization base in Turkey. The operations attempted to prevent the PKK from reaching, recruiting, mobilizing, and broadening its potential mass support by arresting key figures that linked the organization and its mass support at the ground level. Another aim of the operations was to stop logistical support to the PKK from Turkey.

Shortly after the National Intelligence Organization (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı* MIT) started negotiations with the PKK in Oslo, Norway in September 2008 (Aksam, 2013), mass political arrests of suspected KCK members started in 2009 and continued until late 2012. The BDP deputies and party officials interviewed by the author claim that over 5,000 (for some, up to 8,000) party members and activists were arrested from 2009 to 2012—many of whom had no affiliation with any form of violence. Another primary tool of group-level exclusion was the ongoing electoral threshold that primarily hurt the BDP in the parliamentary elections. The BDP would have won three more seats, raising its total seats up to thirty-nine in the parliamentary elections of 2011 if the threshold were 5% rather than its current level of 10%. Moreover, six BDP deputies cannot serve in the parliament due to their ongoing imprisonment. When combined with the political arrests, these factors imply a hardening civic assimilationist model in Turkey particularly starting from 2009. Overall, the author's interviews with Kurdish activists and politicians support this observation.

As Murat Çiçek, the provincial chair of The Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (*İnsan Hakları Ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği* -

MAZLUMDER) in Batman notes, the state's policy toward Kurds changed in the course of time. Since Çiçek received no complaints about torture in four years up until 2011 in contrast to earlier years, he admitted "there is some progress." He expresses his worries as well: "but we can still not mention about a full freedom of expression. Thousands of Kurdish politicians are currently in prisons".[174] Necdet İpekyüz, Diyarbakir provincial chair of another major human rights organization, Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (*Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı* - TIHV), also states that "the 1990s were much worse for Kurds," and continues, "the problem of the recent years is disproportionate use of police violence and the psychological torture due to the fears of arrest and detention." As shown in Table 5.2 and discussed extensively in the following section, this gradual and, at times, oscillating, change in the incorporation model has shaped Kurdish ethno-political mobilization patterns.

The electoral threshold was a major barrier for the group-level incorporation of the Kurdish political movement (the BDP) in this period. The BDP had to run for the 2011 parliamentary elections with independent candidates for this reason. This strategy requires quite a bit of scenario planning, which is not necessarily perfect. The problem of Turkey's electoral regime in the context of group-level exclusion can be seen in the following examples. Halil Aksoy, the only BDP independent candidate in Ağrı, received 82,996 votes. On the other hand, three AKP candidates won three parliamentary seats with only 96,525 votes in the same city. If the BDP had run with two candidates in Ağrı, it would

[174] Author's interview, Batman, December 14th, 2011.

have won one more parliamentary seat—but they did not want to risk losing Ağrı altogether. The AKP won six parliamentary seats in the parliament with 231,018 votes in Diyarbakır, whereas the BDP won five seats with 411,232 votes.[175] In fact, the BDP won six seats at first, but Turkey's Supreme Election Board annulled Hatip Dicle's election and dropped his parliamentary membership. Turan Kaya, acting president of the Supreme Election Board, justified the decision by stating that "according to the Constitution, those who are sentenced to imprisonment terms of a year or more cannot be elected as deputy. Dicle has lost his chance to become a lawmaker since he was sentenced to one year and eight months in prison" (Cumhuriyet, 2011). The decision was ironic because the Board approved Dicle's candidacy and should not have done so for the sake of consistency. If Dicle had not been approved from the very beginning, the BDP would have run with another candidate and won one more seat in the parliament. The Constitutional Court also overturned Dicle's appeal of the Board ban (Today's Zaman, 2011). In Mardin, the BDP candidates received 168,734 votes, whereas the AKP received 104,085 votes.[176] Although the BDP received 60% more votes than those of the AKP, both parties won 3 seats in the parliament: if the BDP had run as a political party rather than running with independent candidates, it would have won four seats whereas the AKP would have won only two seats.

[175] Votes received by independent Bloc candidates in Diyarbakır: Hatip Dicle: 78,220, Leyla Zana: 71,231, Altan Tan: 69,292, Şerafettin Elçi: 66,119, Nursel Aydoğan: 65,138, Emine Ayna: 61,232.

[176] Votes received by independent Bloc candidates in Mardin: Ahmet Türk: 60,023, Gürselen Yıldırım: 56,129, Erol Dora: 52,582.

Hence, the electoral threshold cost three parliamentary seats to the Bloc, leaving them with only 36 seats.[177]

In a nutshell, the increasing security measures such as political arrests and military and police operations hurt, and almost eliminated, organized Kurdish political activity in Turkey in this time period. Although the 10% electoral threshold was not new, its effect was also more severe in the 2011 parliamentary elections due to the greater underrepresentation of the BDP in this election with respect to the votes it received; hence, the group-level political participation of Turkey's Kurds was severely restricted in this period. Therefore, the incorporation model in this time period can be called a mere restrictive version of the civic assimilationism model of the preceding time period.

ESCALATING VIOLENCE, 2005-2012

Although ethnic secessionism did not escalate, ethnic violence rose from 2005 to 2012—especially after 2009. In fact, 2009 started in a good way with the Turkish government's initiation of the process publicly known as "the Kurdish opening." On the Victory Day of August 30th, 2009, the BDP officers attended the official celebrations. Diyarbakır mayor Osman Baydemir attended the ceremony and shook hands with the garrison commander, an event new to the Turkish public. The BDP mayors attended the ceremonies also in Hakkari, Iğdır, Batman, Şırnak, and Siirt. Iğdır mayor Mehmet Nuri Güneş participated in a moment of silence in front of Ataturk's statute as well. Nevertheless, this was before the Habur event and the BDP mayors stopped attending

[177] Due to the annulment of Dicle's deputy status, the BDP has 35 deputies. For the disaggregated electoral results for the 2011 parliamentary elections, see *Hurriyet* (2011).

the official ceremonies after that (Cekirge, 2011). The PKK, for the first time in its history, disarmed and sent ten of its members from its camps in northern Iraq to Turkey as "goodwill ambassadors" on October 19th, 2009. The PKK's unarmed goodwill ambassadors surrendered and 29 of them out of 34 (including ten militants) were immediately released in the Habur border patrol area on the same day. The remaining 5 PKK members were released soon after (Aksam, 2013). Nevertheless, the Turkish public was quite frustrated with the release of the PKK members and the whole event, which included the sight of one hundred thousand PKK sympathizers greeting and welcoming the unarmed PKK group in Diyarbakir (Radikal, 2009). Under the influence of harsh criticisms from the opposition parties and decreasing public support, Turkish PM Erdogan changed his soft stance on the issue by giving tough speeches and blaming the BDP and the PKK. Soon after, the released PKK members were arrested. Thirty of the surrendered PKK members were put on trial and 13 of them were arrested eight months later by January 2010 (Yeni Asir, 2010).

As Table 5.7 shows, ethno-political mobilization became increasingly violent in this time period. The incorporation model promised a change toward greater group-level inclusion with the Democratic Opening in 2009; hence, a turn toward liberal multiculturalism from civic assimilationism. Nevertheless, the KCK arrests started the very same year due to multiple factors[178] and the volume of violence escalated, starting in late 2009. This repression led to a radicalization of mobilization methods, just as it had in the

[178] In addition to the pressures from opposition parties and public opinion polls, two other major factors played a role in this policy change. One was the failure of the Habur process, and the other was Erdogan's faith in dealing with Turkey's 'terror' problem with a stronger and cooperative military under his command.

past. When the Kurdish socialists were arrested with the 1971 coup, and finally released through the general amnesty in 1974, many distanced themselves from the Turkish political left in favor of a nationalized Kurdish socialism (Ucarlar, 2009 citing from Gündoğan, 2002, p. 33). The same radicalization in terms of aims happened again when the arrests started with the 1980 coup, this time with much more violent methods. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the KCK arrests led to the radicalization of Kurdish ethno-political mobilization in terms of aims (toward more centrifugal aims, in this case greater emphasis on political autonomy) and methods (escalating ethnic violence).

With regard to the changing mobilization aims, the BDP's position and its electoral support can be examined. Given the close ties between the party and the organization, millions of Kurds voted for the BDP and sympathized with the PKK in Turkey as the electoral results show. The BDP's aims have been in parallel to those of the PKK in this time period from 2005 to 2012. The BDP placed the demand for political autonomy (or "democratic autonomy" as worded by the BDP officers) in its party by-laws in its second congress on September 4th, 2011 (Haberturk, 2011) and has followed it up to now with slight variations in its emphasis.[179]

[179] The author also observed the frustration due to the PKK casualties in the clashes with the state security forces in late December, 2011 during his field research in Diyarbakır. As the author spent time in the BDP headquarters in Diyarbakır, the PKK casualties are called as 'martyrs' by the frustrated people in the party building.

Table 5.7 Casualties in Clashes with the PKK, 2005-2014

Years	staff	civilians	total casualties caused by the PKK	annual % change	PKK members	Total casualties
2005	105	30	135	32	188	323
2006	111	38	149	11	132	281
2007	146	37	183	23	315	498
2008	171	51	222	22	696	918
2009	62	18	80	-64	65	145
2010*	92	27	119	49	137	256
2011	128	50	178	50	211	389
2012	163	42	205	15	438	643
2013	0	0	0	-100	0	0
2014 (May)	0	0	0	0	0	0

* The data from 1984 to 2009 on this and previous tables are based on the General Command of Gendarmerie of Turkey data (Milliyet, 2010). The data for 2010 and 2011 are taken from the daily *Milliyet* (2012). The data for 2012 is taken based on Turkish National Police statement on December 19th, 2012 (Haberci53, 2012). The data for 2013 and 2014 is taken from the daily *Sabah* (2014) based on the Minister of National Defense Ismet Yılmaz's statement on February 16th, 2014. I acknowledge that the numbers from February to May 2014 are based on my own estimates based on my research on the media. In his statement in February, Yılmaz stated that Turkey lost 5,347 military personnel, 1,378 village guards, 283 policemen, and 5,791 civilians in total prior to the final peace process.

At the end of the day, the Kurdish question remains a political problem. As Altan Tan rightly puts it, all unresolved social problems are political problems;[180] hence, all other incorporation domains (e.g., economic, cultural) are also tied to the political domain. What distinguishes the political domain from the other domains is the question of political representation. As Cornell (2001: 32) notes, it is startling for foreigners to discover that "Kurds' representation in the country's parliament is larger than their proportion of the population." Assuming that this information is correct (because some Kurds disagree with such statements), it still does not stop some peripheral Kurdish figures from claiming that "Kurds could be anyone, but Kurdish." As Muhsin Kızılkaya once wrote: "Kurds could not

[180] Author's interview in Ankara on February 7th, 2012.

be just one thing so far: a Kurd. And, when they become a Kurd, they could not be anything else".[181]While political autonomy is clearly demanded by the BDP, other peripheral Kurdish parties—such as KADEP and Hak-Par—also demand political autonomy, whether it is limited local autonomy or an ethnic federation. For Hak-Par leader, Bayram Bozyel, what distinguishes federalism from democratic autonomy is the former's refusal of a superior-subordinate relationship between the center and the periphery. "Federation," says Bozyel, "should be founded on an equal basis." [182] Nevertheless, peripheral demands for a "political status" to be granted to Kurds are not embraced by an overall majority of Kurds and are not part of the AKP's ethnic incorporation model for Kurds.

The problems to be caused by the increasingly more group-level exclusionary civic assimilationist policies in this period were inevitable. The Kurds were an increasingly mobilized group with high levels of pre-existing organizational capability, ethnic identification, and ethno-political consciousness. A U-turn from weakening group-level exclusion created a sense of relative deprivation among Turkey's Kurds. This sense of deprivation and resulting grievances and frustration led more and more Kurds into the PKK lines. The PKK also used this advantageous societal situation and posed a more security-credible threat to Turkey by intensifying its attacks. Since measuring mobilization aims is not as straightforward as counting the casualties in armed clashes, a closer analysis of Kurdish electoral mobilization can give us the evidence to see the broadening Kurdish mass base for centrifugal aims in this time period.

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[181] Author's translation from the original text (Stargazete, 2012).
[182] Author's interview in Diyarbakır on December 19th, 2011.

ELECTORAL MOBILIZATION IN THE 2005-2012 PERIOD

Four years before the Habur incident, PM Erdogan's Diyarbakır speech in 2005 was applauded by the great majority of the Kurdish electorate in Turkey. This change in the incorporation model, along with positive views of the AKP's performance, helped bring significant success to the AKP in 2007 parliamentary elections as shown in Table 5.8. The DTP lost roughly half a million votes (20% of its votes), primarily to the AKP from the 2002 parliamentary elections to the 2007 parliamentary elections. The DTP lost votes in every city with a significant Kurdish electorate except Hakkari, Siirt, and Şırnak—whereas the AKP gained votes (both in terms of absolute numbers and percentage) in all these cities except Siirt.[183]

[183] Siirt was an exceptional case because PM Erdogan was elected from Siirt in 2002 in a renewal election to be conducted only in this city. For a comparison of disaggregated electoral results for 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections, see Appendix B.

Table 5.8 Electoral Results for Kurdish Ethno-political Parties in Parliamentary Elections, 1995-2011

Parliamentary elections	Party	Registered voters	Valid votes	Kurdish party votes	Kurdish party votes as a % of valid votes
1995	HADEP	34,155,981	28,040,392	1,171,623	4.2%
1999	HADEP	37,495,217	31,119,242	1,482,196	4.8
2002	DEHAP	41,407,027	31,414,748	1,960,660	6.2
2007	Bin Umut Adayları (DTP)	42,799,303	34,822,907	1,338,810*	3.8*
2011	Emek, Demokrasi ve Özgurluk Bloku (BDP)	52,806,322	42,813,896	2.439.605*	5.7*

* All the data in Table 5.8 are taken from the official electoral results publication of the Turkish Statistical Institute (*Türkiye İstatistik Enstitüsü* - TEİ) (2012) except the ones with (*) symbols. Since the ethnic Kurdish parties run for 2007 and 2011 elections with independent candidates, I calculated the received votes column for those years based on the disaggregate data from daily *Hurriyet* (2011) data.[184]

[184] Since the Kurdish ethnic parties (DTP in 2007 and BDP in 2011) run for the elections as a bloc with independent candidates, I calculated these numbers based on disaggregate data by including only the Bloc candidates (One Thousand Hopes Candidates/*Bin Umut Adayları* in 2007 and Labor, Democracy and Freedom Bloc/*Emek, Demokrasi ve Özgürlük Bloku* in 2011). One major mistake in calculations of the electoral results is to include the votes received by other independent candidates that do not have any connection with the Bloc. For instance, PM Erdogan's former press consultant Akif Beki (2011) writes the number of votes received by the DTP backed independents in 2007 as 1,835,486, which is the number of votes received by all of the independent candidates. Another mistake stems from the fact that some potential voters cannot vote for the Bloc candidates. The Bloc does not run in every electoral district (The DTP-backed Bloc nominated 61 candidates in 44 cities, 48 electoral districts out of Turkey's 85 districts (Bianet, 2007). The BDP-backed Bloc nominated 61 candidates in 42 cities, 46 electoral districts (Insel, 2011). Electoral districts for the parliamentary elections are Turkey's cities except for the three biggest cities. Istanbul is divided into three districts, and Ankara and Izmir are divided into two. The number of electoral districts for parliamentary elections has not changed since December, 1999). Some analysts such as Kardam (2011) make their analyses on only 39 cities where the Kurdish ethnic parties and the blocs supported by them run for the elections (some candidates are banned from running for the election by Turkey's Supreme Election Board and the number of cities where the Bloc can run for the elections are usually fewer than the number that ethnic Kurdish parties originally nominate for). Kardam calculates the percentage of the BDP votes by taking the population of 39 cities as the whole population, which overestimates the BDP votes. Such analyses do not give us a sense of the Kurdish electoral mobilization in the national level. The Kurdish ethnic political parties do not run for elections in cities where they do not have a realistic expectation to win a seat. The cities where the Kurdish political parties do not nominate candidates are the ones where they receive (based on historical experience from 1992 to 1999 elections) a few hundred votes only. Such small numbers are negligible and do not affect the national vote share of the Kurdish ethnic parties. Therefore, it is a more accurate way to calculate the percentage of the Bloc votes out of all the valid votes on the national level even though the Bloc does not compete for elections in every electoral district.

As Table 5.8 demonstrates, the Kurdish ethnic parties steadily increased their votes in three consecutive parliamentary elections from 1995 to 2002. Since the BDP and its predecessor parties have advocated political autonomy (as their central political demand) less and less in this time period—and clearly distanced themselves from the idea of secession in 1999—the electoral results show us the change in the support for this political aim in the Kurdish electorate.

According to the electoral results, the Kurdish electorate mobilized more and more for ethnic Kurdish political parties as those parties stressed political autonomy goals less and less in this time period. Nevertheless, the trend reversed with the 2007 parliamentary elections. Although the DTP did not change its aim of (limited) political autonomy at the organizational level, the Kurdish electorate shifted to the AKP in response to the AKP's much greater ethnic inclusion at the individual level and less severe ethnic exclusion at the group level during its first term in government (2002-2007, particularly the first two years). Such policy changes diminished the sense of political deprivation in Kurdish circles and reduced their frustration with the Turkish state. After all, the AKP was a new political party at the time and did not have a baggage of ethnic repression from its past in contrast to other mainstream parties running for the 2007 election. The AKP's positive steps for diminishing ethnic exclusion gave hope to the Kurdish electorate. Nevertheless, the Kurdish electorate also responded to the AKP's hardening policies on the Kurdish question, especially exclusionary policies starting from late 2009 with the KCK arrests. Despite still winning a majority of the Kurdish electorate's votes in the 2011 elections in the southeastern and

eastern Anatolia where the majority of the electorate is Kurdish,[185] the AKP's electoral support decreased in these regions when compared to its votes in the 2007 elections.

In a nutshell, as the government softened the civic assimilationism by reducing group-level exclusion, some of the Kurdish electorate shifted from the ethnic Kurdish parties to the AKP lines as seen in the example of the 2007 elections. Kurds have voted more for the BDP as the AKP pursued harder civic assimilationist policies, which mean greater exclusion at the group level. This electoral trend shows us that a highly mobilized ethnic group adopts more centrifugal aims when it faces harder civic assimilationist policies (in this case, an incorporation model with greater group-level exclusion, but will shift toward more centripetal aims if they are incorporated through softer civic assimilationist policies (an incorporation model heading toward liberal multiculturalism by mitigating group-level exclusion).

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[185] The AKP's electoral superiority is visible in both the southeastern and eastern geographical regions of Turkey, two regions that are heavily populated by Kurds. Although some cities in these regions include significant portions of (ethnically) Turkish residents and the BDP-backed Bloc did not nominate candidates in three cities out of 23 in these two regions, the great majority of both regions is claimed to be Kurdish by Kurdish elites and organizations. The independent candidates running for the Bloc received 34% and 26% of all the valid votes in the southeastern and eastern regions respectively in the elections if each city is weighted equally. When each city is weighted based on the number of their electorate, these numbers go down to 29% and 23% respectively (For the election results, see daily *Hurriyet* (2011)). The great majority of the rest of the electorate voted for the AKP in both regions. Nevertheless, the regions are quite heterogeneous with respect to electoral choices. For instance, the AKP received 10 times more votes than the Kurdish Bloc in Adıyaman (67.4% vs. 6.5%), a Southeastern city with a significant Kurdish populace.[185] On the other hand, the Bloc candidates received about 5 times more votes than the AKP votes in another Eastern city, Hakkari (79.8% vs. 16.5%). According to BDP Hakkari deputy Adil Kurt, if the officers coming from the West are excluded, almost the entire city voted for the BDP (Author interview with Adil Kurt on February 14th, 2012). Overall, the BDP backed Bloc candidates received over 50% of the votes in four cities out of 23 in these two regions whereas the incumbent AKP achieved this ratio in 10 cities in these two regions. Nevertheless, these results do not imply a decrease in the BDP's votes. Rather, they point to the AKP's decreasing, but still ongoing dominance in the region. As Mahmut Şimşek, a current AKP politician, who was on the 'death list' of the state-backed paramilitary groups in the mid-1990s, states that "Kurds see the AKP as their biggest partner in the struggle for democracy" (Author's interview in Diyarbakır, December 16th, 2011).

Overall, the grievances stemming from a sense of political deprivation—the major motivation for violence and secessionism—were less severe among Turkey's Kurds in the 2000s than they were from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s; therefore, the levels of violence and secessionism in Kurdish ethno-political mobilization were lower in 2000s than in earlier decades. Nevertheless, violence was on the rise in the late 2000s when compared to the early to mid-2000s—as the AKP government hardened its exclusionary policies at the group level. If the AKP government had halted "preemptive" political arrests earlier, released the imprisoned BDP politicians, reduced the electoral threshold, and strengthened the authority of local municipalities, the sense of political deprivation would have declined and the level of violence and centrifugal aims of the Kurdish ethno-political mobilization might have disappeared in accordance with the theory developed in this study.

CIVIC ASSIMILATIONISM, SOFTENING PERIOD (NEGOTIATIONS AND QUASI-RECOGNITION): 2013 - PRESENT

Turkey started to have a less severe group-level exclusionary incorporation model starting from late 2012, more distinctively from 2013. The major legal change regarding the incorporation model in Turkey in 2013 is the passage of Law 6459—the Law regarding the Changes in Some Laws in the Context of Human Rights and Freedom of Expression. This legal change is more commonly known as the 4th judicial package. Before this law was put in force, many peaceful political activities could be defined as propagating for terrorist organizations. The new regulation narrowed the scope to penalize an activity by seeking the condition of "justifying, praising, and encouraging methods including force,

violence, or threat." Hence, activities that can be interpreted as propagating for a terrorist organization are decriminalized as long as those activities are not directly linked to the use of violence (Zaman, 2013). Moreover, the Law on the Fight Against Terrorism and the Turkish Penal Code were made compatible with the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence (Akyol, 2013). This change is quite significant because the arrests of thousands of BDP politicians and members in the operations against the KCK can be reversed and those people can be released based on this legal change.

In addition to the legal changes, the ethnic incorporation model took a sharp turn in 2013 as the AKP government de facto recognized the PKK as a party at the negotiation table together with the BDP. The government changed its policy of isolating the PKK leader Öcalan following a series of secret talks between the MIT and Öcalan in late 2012. Öcalan was kept in isolation in İmralı Prison starting from September 21st, 2011 and could not see even his lawyers. Government officers claimed that the coaster was broken and unable to take the lawyers to the İmralı Island where the prison is located (Zaman, 2012).

It was the common perception that the MIT–Öcalan talks represented quasi-recognition of the PKK. For the first time, the Turkish government did not deny the claims over the talks with Öcalan. Following the talks, the government's exclusionary policy toward the BDP changed as well. The BDP parliamentarians were allowed to visit Öcalan on four occasions until the summer of 2013.[186] Several AKP deputies spoke about the

186 The first commission included DTK leader and independent Mardin deputy Ahmet Türk and BDP Batman deputy Ayla Akat Ata. Turk and Ata visited Öcalan on January 3rd, 2013 (Milliyet, 2013). The second commission included BDP Parliamentary Group Deputy Chairman Pervin Buldan, BDP Istanbul deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder, and BDP Diyarbakır deputy Altan Tan. Buldan, Önder, and Tan visited Öcalan on February 23rd, 2013 (Milliyet, 2013). The BDP co-chairman Selahattin Demirtaş attended the next meeting in addition

plausibility of some BDP demands, including autonomy. AKP deputy chairman and Van deputy Hüseyin Çelik stated that "we should satisfy Kurds and persuade Turks" (Anadolu Ajansı, 2013). The AKP formed a number of commissions at the same time, which are called "the wise men" (*akil adamlar*). The commissions included public figures from a wide array of professions including academics, authors, journalists, actors, singers, and union leaders. Seven commissions were formed for each geographical region of Turkey. Each commission included nine members:[187] the primary function of these commissions was to visit different cities and meet the public all around Turkey, explain the peace process, and respond to the questions and critiques.

While the described process indicates a major change in the course of Turkey's incorporation of its Kurdish population toward greater group-level inclusion, the incorporation model is still a form of civic assimilationism for the following reasons. There

to Önder and Buldan from previous visits. Their visit occurred on March 18th, 2013 (Radikal, 2013). Finally, the fourth commission including Demirtaş, Buldan and Önder visited Öcalan on April 3rd, 2013 (Haber7, 2013).

187 Full list of the commission members were declared on April 3rd, 2013. The commissions and their members are: The Mediterranean Region: Chairman Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, deputy chairman Lale Mansur, secretaria Tarık Çelenk, other members: Kadir İnanır, Nihal Bengisu Karaca, Şükrü Karatepe, Muhsin Kızılkaya, Öztürk Türkdoğan and Hüseyin Yayman. Eastern Anatolia: chairman Can Paker, deputy chairman Sibel Eraslan, secretaria Ayhan Ogan, other members: Mahmut Arslan, Abdurrahman Dilipak, İzzettin Doğan, Abdurrahman Kurt, Zübeyde Teker and Mehmet Uçum. Aegean Region: chairman Tarhan Erdem, deputy chairman Avni Özgürel, secretaria Arzuhan Doğan Yalçındağ, other members: Vedat Ahsen Coşar, *Erol Ekici,* Hilal Kaplan, Fuat Keyman, Fehmi Koru, Baskın Oran. Southeastern Anatolia: chairman Yılmaz Ensaroğlu, deputy chairman Kezban Hatemi, secretaria Mehmet Emin Ekmen, other members: Murat Belge, Fazıl Hüsnü Erdem, Yılmaz Erdoğan, Etyen Mahçupyan, Lami Özgen and Ahmet Faruk Ünsal. Interior Anatolia: chairman Ahmet Taşgetiren, deputy chairman Beril Dedeoğlu, secretaria Cemal Uşak, other members: Vahap Coşkun, Doğu Ergil, Erol Göka, Mustafa Kumlu, Fadime Özkan and Celalettin Taş. Marmara Region: chairman Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, deputy chairman Mithat Sancar, secretaria Levent Korkut, other members: Mustafa Armağan, Ali Bayramoğlu, Ahmet Gündoğdu, Hayrettin Karaman, Hülya Koçyiğit and Yücel Sayman. Karadeniz Region: chairman Yusuf Şevki Hakyemez, deputy chairman Vedat Bilgin, secretaria Fatma Benli, other members: Şemsi Bayraktar, Kürşat Bumin, Oral Çalışlar, Orhan Gencebay, Yıldıray Oğur and Bendevi Palandöken (Dunya Bulteni, 2013).

are still many BDP politicians and members in the prisons, the 10% electoral threshold is still intact, and the BDP demands for political autonomy have not been granted yet. As Burhan Kuzu's, an AKP deputy and the chairman of TBMM Constitutional Commission, statements indicate: the AKP is not ready for another major change toward a liberal multicultural model with greater group-level inclusion. Kuzu states that the AKP is fully committed to broaden individual freedoms and rights, and collective cultural rights,[188] but

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188 Communication is a basic need for meaningful political participation. In this respect, the state policy on Kurdish language in the context of cultural rights is particularly important and should be elaborated in further detail. The Kurdish language in Turkey was neglected and even banned for many decades. "The imposition of the Turkish language became the most significant instrument of the state for creating a Turkish national identity" (Ucarlar: 2009, p.120). The AKP rule has brought the most comprehensive 'opening' toward toleration of the Kurdish language throughout the entire republican period. The first stage of this opening was the permission for private enterprises to open Kurdish language institutes. The opening of the first of these, the *Özel Urfa Kürtçe Kursu*, was permitted in accordance with the decree of the Ministry of National Education, Private Education Directorate on December 4th, 2003 (Radikal, 2003). The openings of Kurdish language institutes and departments of Kurdish language and literature in a number of universities followed as the next stage of the process. The examples include Kurdish language institutes and Kurdish language and literature departments that are opened or approved to be opened at universities such as Mardin Artuklu University, Muş Alparslan University, Bingöl University, and Tunceli University. Many other universities in the eastern and southeastern Turkey applied for permission to open departments respectively and are waiting for approval. A third major step was recorded with the opening of TRT Şeş in 2009, a state-sponsored TV channel that broadcasts in Kurdish. Even though TRT had previously started part-time broadcasting in Kurdish (in Kurmanji and Zaza dialects) as well as in other local languages in 2004, the foundation of TRT Şeş was a turning point in this respect. Nevertheless, this transition from denial to recognition of the Kurdish language seems far from satisfying all peripheral Kurdish demands. Article 42 of the Turkish constitution does not allow education in Kurdish in Turkey. "No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved." The full text of the constitution is available at:
<http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf> (last access on July 15th, 2013).
The recognition of the Kurdish language is perceived as insincere and insufficient by some in peripheral Kurdish circles. Arif Arslan, the editor in chief of local newspaper *Çağdaş*, and Raci Bilici, the current (deputy) head of Human Rights Association Diyarbakır Branch, both state that even a simple inclusive step such as allowing private Kurdish language institutes was not unproblematic. Accordingly, some language institutes were closed down for not complying with certain regulations such as a lack of fire exits and failure to satisfy regulations pertaining to proper door and window sizes. According to Arslan and Bilici (Author's interviews in Batman and Diyarbakir, respectively, on December 15th and December 22nd, 2011), even public schools in the region do not satisfy these regulations, but solely Kurdish language institutes are inspected strictly and punished. The respondents claimed that some Kurdish institutes were closed down by owners not because there was not sufficient demand as commonly argued in the mainstream media, but because of

political autonomy is not on the agenda. For Kuzu, autonomy cannot be provided because such a shift would lead to secession in the future.

It is important to see what the AKP government(s) has done so far and what can be expected from it for the future. The AKP is seen as a conservative political party for a variety of reasons. First, the party defines itself as a conservative democratic party (Akdoğan, 2006). Furthermore, its founders and leaders come from the National Outlook movement,[189] a movement known for strong Islamic commitments. The AKP's leading figures are also known for following Islamic credentials in their daily lives. The party's policies and AKP politicians' remarks on issues such abortion, gay rights, and religious

systematic bureaucratic pressures. Arslan notes that sixty thousand people met to celebrate the opening of a language institute in Batman, but the institute was closed down within six months following its opening. It would be absurd, for Arslan, to expect this institute to be closed down because of insufficient popular demand and support.

Murat Çiçek, the chair of the Batman Branch of Mazlumder (The Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People/*İnsan Hakları Ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği*), claims that it is insincere for the state to broadcast in Kurdish on a state-sponsored TV channel, TRT Şeş, but to label the same language as an 'unknown language' in trials when people defend themselves in Kurdish (Author's interview in Batman on December 14th, 2011). Demir Çelik, the BDP Muş Deputy, sees a similar inconsistency regarding central policies toward the Kurdish language. In this respect, the state presents TRT Şeş as proof of its recognition of the Kurdish language, but denies the right of using Kurdish language in the government offices, even in regions where the majority of the public speaks Kurdish as their mother tongue. Another complaint heard in the interviews is the existence of 'banned words' on TRT Şeş. Accordingly, some interviewees claim that some Kurdish words are banned and not used in TRT Şeş just because they are used in Roj TV, a satellite TV channel stationed in Denmark and accused of being the PKK's media channel by the Turkish government. Some of these words, for Mehmet Emin Aktar, have no affiliation with terror-provocation, but simple phrases such as 'weather forecast' that is coined in a particular way as 'havaname' on TRT Şeş rather than a more generally recognized popular phrase. Overall, as the AKP could perform a credible religious embrace of the Kurdish populace, its progressive steps in the use and learning of Kurdish language are not seen satisfactory in the peripheral Kurdish circles.

[189] National Outlook Movement was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1960s. The movement formed a number of political parties such as National Order Party (1970-71), National Salvation Party (1972-1981), Welfare Party (1983-1998), Virtue Party (1997-2001) and Felicity Party (2001-…). The parties preceding the Felicity Party were all banned for violating the secular character of the constitution and relevant laws. Turkish PM Erdogan served as the mayor of Istanbul from Welfare Party from 1994 to 1998. Turkey's President Abdullah Gul was a deputy from the Welfare and Virtue parties from 1991 to 2000. He also served as the deputy chairman of the Welfare Party and was the minister of state in the 54th government (June 28th, 1996-June 30th, 1997) led by the coalition of the Welfare and True Path parties. Erdogan and Gul together with many other politicians left the National Outlook Movement and have led the AKP since 2001.

education are also quite conservative.[190] The party's approach to the Kurdish question is also shaped by religious credentials. Nevertheless, the AKP is not a conservative party in many areas, but has been quite revolutionary—especially in terms of breaking the military's longstanding influence on civilian politics and transforming Turkey's "assertive secularism."[191] As one of the two major groups that have been politically excluded throughout the republican period since 1923, it is easy for Islamists to empathize with pro-Kurdish politicians and activists. They have no ideological or religious obstacles to granting greater political rights to Kurds. As a movement that highly praises the Ottoman legacy, the AKP prioritizes religion over ethnicity (in this case, language) as a marker of identity.[192] Hence, Kurds as a part of the Muslim *millet* (or *ummah*) is not "the other" from

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[190] For instance, Erdogan stated that "I see abortion the same as murder" on May 26th, 2012 (Milliyet, 2012). The AKP also opposed the BDP's proposal for constitutionalizing same-sex marriage in May 2012. AKP deputy Ulker Can opposed the proposal by stating that "It [same-sex marriage] cannot be accepted. … It is wrong for the society and our religion" (Haber7, 2012). The AKP government also passed a law in the parliament on March 29th, 2012 and added Kuran to the curriculum of secondary education institutions as a selective course (Sabah, 2012).

[191] For the transformation of the role of the military in Turkish politics, see Cook (2007). For secularism in Turkey, see Kuru (2009).

[192] The religious sphere has been a significant zone of control for the state, a tradition that goes back to the Ottoman era. While Mahmut II (1808-1839) established significant control over the religious bureaucracy (Heper, 2006, p. 86), the early republican elites implemented a full-scale transformation of the religious sphere. As the religious brotherhoods/*tariqahs* were banned in 1925 following the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the Directorate of Religious Affairs –an institution that is tied to the prime ministry- has been the only legitimate and, to a great extent, the only available institution that can teach, preach, and manage the conduct of religion. Weber defines the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 2004). In the Turkish context, the state has also claimed the monopoly of the legitimate use of religion within its territory. Religion has been also a significant tool of state policy with regard to the Kurdish question. As the state *imams* had preached the religious integrity of the entire Turkish society (99 percent to be precise, a controversial phrase that is often stated to describe the Muslim dominance of the country's population) for decades, the ongoing discourse has been transformed to emphasize much more the religious ties of brotherhood between the Turks and Kurds of Turkey during the AKP era. Known as a conservative political party, AKP has a greater credibility in its discourse with regard to the religious ties that connect Kurds to the rest of the national population.

In response to a recent embrace of the Kurdish nationalist organizations' embrace of Islam, PM Erdoğan and many other AKP members often remind the general public of the earlier emphasis of the PKK on Marxism

an Islamic point of view. Such an approach does not see Kurdishness as an enemy to be destroyed, but as a minor, negligible, or secondary issue to the religious commonality. As a result, it would not be expected that a conservative party with Islamic credentials such as the AKP would implement an ethnocratic incorporation model, but neither would we expect a full-fledged liberal multicultural incorporation model from it.

As explained above, the ethnic incorporation policies of Turkey now allow a greater degree of group-level inclusion (to be accurate, a less-severe form of group-level exclusion). Such a softening in the incorporation policies was embraced by the Kurdish periphery. The PKK declared a ceasefire on March 21st, 2013 (BBC, 2013) and announced that it would take its armed forces out of Turkey starting on May 8th, 2013 (Hasanoglu, 2013)—and has not let a single violent event occur up until now (as of May 2014). Kurdish ethno-political mobilization has started to have more centripetal aims as well. The BDP and the PKK both no longer emphasize political autonomy and they stress more democratic rights. Turkey's Kurdish question is still far from reaching a final resolution, but the recent

and Zorosastrianism. In other words, AKP leader cadre who is accused of hypocrisy (or *taqiyya*) by some Kemalists for having a secret Islamist agenda behind their 'democratic' appearance now accuses BDP's religious opening as containing 'hypocrisy' and views it as no more than a tactical maneuver. The AKP government not only developed a negative discourse with regard to the BDP's repositioning itself in terms of religion, but also took steps to prevent the policy leading to a positive rise for the BDP's standing among religious Kurdish circles. Vice-Premier Bekir Bozdağ recently announced the decision for the recruitment of 1000 *meles* (*meles/*mullas are opinion leaders in terms of religious affairs particularly in Southeastern Turkey. They play an important role in the teaching of Islamic principles and practices even though they have no formal training in Islam. They are rather trained by older *Meles* in unofficial institutions such as *madrasas*. *Meles* have played a very significant role in the religious training of Kurdish children who cannot speak Turkish.) by the Directorate of Religious Affairs. In his statement to justify this decision, Bozdağ said that "We analyzed these people. They are the people whose words are followed, who have credibility, and whose words can stop and mobilize people" (Translated by the author from the original statement in Turkish. For the original statement, see the daily *Hurriyet* (2011)). It should also be noted that the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Mehmet Görmez, rejected the claims that present '*mele* opening' is a political and security project (for Görmez's statement, see Stargazete (2012)).

developments signal further positive steps to eradicate the wave of violence that has cost thousands of lives on both sides. If the current civic assimilationist policies continue to diminish the group-level exclusion of Kurds and evolve into a liberal multiculturalist incorporation model in the near future, a peaceful and centripetal (non-secessionist in this case) Kurdish mobilization pattern is expected to replace the long-standing pattern of violent and centrifugal Kurdish mobilization in Turkey.

Roma Ethno-political Mobilization in Turkey

The causes of the under-mobilization of the Roma have long been a mystery in countries where the Roma population have represented large ethnic minority groups (Barany, 2002). Socio-economic problems such as poverty, unemployment, homelessness, illiteracy, and social discrimination have all been widespread and intensely experienced amongst Turkey's Roma population. Moreover, Turkey's Roma also lacked any sort of political recognition or group-level inclusion for many decades. Nevertheless, there seemed to be no significant protest, rebellion, or any other form of contentious politics carried out by the Roma until recently.

This section examines the varying patterns of Roma ethno-political mobilization in Turkey and the causes behind this variation. In this section, I argue that the ethnic incorporation model of the Roma in Turkey has long been civic assimilationism, as individual Roma citizens have had genuine opportunities of political participation but have been excluded from participating as a group. The civic assimilationist model has slightly changed with minor steps toward group-level inclusion since 2004. This change in the

incorporation model has affected the Roma ethno-political mobilization by moderately empowering ethnic elites and encouraging ethnic identification (e.g., encouraging individuals to identify with the Roma ethnic group by granting them official, albeit not constitutional, recognition) by the Roma population of Turkey. As a result, Roma ethno-political mobilization has increased in response to ethnic elite appeals and the increasing mass levels of ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness.

Alternative Explanations for Roma Ethno-political Mobilization in Turkey

Researchers have long drawn attention to the difficulty of explaining Roma under-mobilization not only in Turkey, but also in other European contexts (Barany, 2002). In search of an answer to explain under-mobilization by the Roma in Turkey, Kolukirik and Toktas (2007, p. 775) list a number of factors that allegedly played a role in this outcome. Accordingly, the lack of an organizational culture, historical isolation, distance from the bureaucratic center, low socio-economic status, and the resulting lack of organizational unity, all hurt the Roma population's political participation and organizational activity.

Although the Roma in Turkey has been an under-mobilized community, the limited variation in their mobilization patterns follows the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two. The Roma of Turkey did not mobilize politically until the mid-2000s. However, a new era of greater group-level inclusion (which includes greater recognition of the Roma status, resource transfers to Roma ethnic organizations, and inclusive legal changes) has created the first wave of Roma mobilization in Turkey. Yet, this change in the incorporation model has been limited and did not include the granting of political autonomy status or any similar

institutional transformation; therefore, as shown in Table 5.9, the change in the mobilization pattern has remained limited as well. The Roma, for the first time in their history in Turkey, have spoken up for their political rights in addition to their long-lasting problems in terms of education, employment, and health services. The establishment of an ethnic Roma political party is now an unlikely, but not impossible eventuality, as some interviewees[193] express interest in creating one if their underrepresentation continues in the mainstream political parties.

Table 5.9 Turkey's ethnic incorporation and Roma ethno-political mobilization

	Incorporation model	*Pre-existing mobilization*	*Ethno-political mobilization aims*	*Ethno-political mobilization means*
pre-2004	Civic assimilationism	Low/almost absent	centripetal*	peaceful*
2004-2014	Civic assimilationism (gradual shift toward liberal multiculturalism)	Low/almost absent	centripetal(↓)*	peaceful*

Notes: Symbol (*) refers that the actual outcome is same as the predicted outcome;
Symbol (↓) refers to an overall gradual decline.

Turkey's Incorporation Model(s) of the Roma and Romani Ethnopolitical Mobilization in Turkey

The Turkish ethnic incorporation model for its Roma population has long been civic assimilationism. Although individual Roma citizens have been granted the right to vote and participate actively in politics, the Roma populace has not been recognized as a distinct community and has not been granted any kind of collective rights. In addition, the Roma

[193] Author interviews with Abdullah Çıstır in Izmir on June 8th, 2012 and Salih Şentürk in Istanbul on June 14th, 2012.

have also faced a great deal of discrimination, especially in the societal domain as PM Erdogan acknowledged in his speech in front of twenty thousand Roma citizens in Abdi Ipekci Stadium on March 14th, 2010. Erdogan spoke to the Roma audience by stating that: "You are Rom, human beings, brothers, our Roma brothers"[194] (Bianet, 2010). Erdogan continued this speech in his meeting with his provincial chairmen on March 19th, 2010. He stated that "my Romani citizens could not even benefit from the citizenship order. If someone should be apologized to, it is my Romani citizens and I apologize to them in the name of the state" (Yazete, 2010).[195]

Prime Minister Erdogan apologized to Turkey's Roma for the long-lasting discrimination and exclusion toward them. As the young Republic of Turkey opened its doors to the inflow of Turkish, Circassian, Bosniac, and Albanian people from the Balkans and Caucasia, the immigration of Nomad Gypsies (*Çingeneler*) was prevented together with "those who do not belong to the Turkish culture." This list included anarchists, spies, and exiled citizens in accordance with the law that designates settlement and the inflow of refugees.[196] The Turkish government moderated this longstanding discrimination in December 2003 by removing the question that asks whether the applicant is a "gypsy" or not in citizenship applications. The law was replaced in 2006 with a new law[197] that

[194] The original Turkish speech was: "Sizler Rom'sunuz, insansınız, cansınız. Roman kardeşlerimsiniz."
[195] The original Turkish speech was: "Roman vatandaşım bu ülkede on yıllardır, vatandaşlık hukukundan dahi onlar istifade edememişlerdir. Eğer özür dilenmesi gereken varsa, benim roman vatandaşlarımdır ve ben onlardan devletim adına özür dilerim."
[196] The Law of Settlement passed on June 14th, 1934, Law no: 2510, Article 4. See the full text in Turkish: http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/554.html, access: September 14th, 2012.
[197] The Law of Settlement passed on September 19th, 2006, Law no: 5543. See the full text in Turkish: http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/27159.html, access: September 14th, 2012.

removed the term "gypsy." Nevertheless, a police code[198] still legally discriminates against "Gypsies with no primary occupation" defining them as "usual suspects" for many decades. Moreover, any association and organization with an emphasis on "Roma" identity faced severe legal sanctions up until 2004, as stated by multiple interviewees.[199]

Yakup Çardak founded the first Roma association in Turkey in 1996, which was banned and closed after a painful three-month period.[200] Nevertheless, such a long period of neglect and exclusion has not led Turkey's Roma populace to engage in contentious politics. Turkey's Roma people, like in many other places in Europe, have remained quiescent with little, if any, ethnic mobilization. The main reason for this under-mobilization was the implementation of individual-level inclusive and group-level exclusionary policies (civic assimilationism) on an ethnic group that lacked a significant level of pre-existing mobilization. This incorporation policy allowed the Roma to vote for mainstream Turkish parties. Due to their lower socio-economic status, Roma people could rarely find opportunities in bureaucracy, but they were not disqualified from it because, in Aksu's (2005) words: "you are no longer thought to be a gypsy if you have a necktie." Marsh and Danka (2008, p. 61) also support this observation by stating that Gypsy officers–

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198 The Ordinance regarding Police Discipline and Role in the Ceremonies and Society, and Police Stations Organization and Duties, Section 5, Article 134, A-Subparagraph 5. See the full text in Turkish: http://www.egm.gov.tr/hukuk/EMNIYET%20TESKILATINDA%20GORULEN%20IDARI%20DAVA%20KONULARI%20ILE%20BUNLARA%20ILISKIN%20MEVZUAT/MEMUR%20ISLEMLERI/POLISIN%20DISIPLINE%20MERASIM%20VE%20TOPLULUKTA%20VAZIFE.%20DAIR%20TALIMATNAME.htm, last access: September 14th, 2012.

199 As almost all the interviewees mentioned about these pressures on organizations with an ethnic Roma component in their names, Yakup Çardak was particularly suffered and went through a trial process for opening the first ethnic Roma organization in Turkey in 1996 (Author's interview with Yakup Çardak, Izmir, June 6th, 2012).

200 Author's interview, Izmir, June 6th, 2012.

–especially in the education system—who were appointed to relatively high-rank positions could "achieve their success…by passing as non-Gypsies."

The Turkish state blocked the awakening of ethno-political consciousness of the Roma by declining to support, and even by closing, ethnic Roma organizations. This process hindered the emergence of ethnic elites amongst the Roma, who could have otherwise used their coercive power and propaganda capability to mobilize their co-ethnics. The few initiators such as Çardak did not have a significant mass base to call for ethnic mobilization and were hindered by the law from reaching out to the Roma population. The Roma simply lacked ethno-political consciousness under civic assimilationism. Since there was no pre-existing, organized, political demands or widespread ethno-political consciousness, this group-level exclusion was not perceived as deprivation and did not lead to a significant degree of frustration; therefore, the Roma remained quiescent up until mid-2000s.

The Roma population has experienced a gradual political recognition during the 2000s. The EU progress reports have paid attention to the Roma issue in Turkey starting from 2001. The efforts of the Turkish Ministry of Culture to struggle with the use of pejorative and offensive discourse against the Roma were approved and encouraged by the EU Commission. However, the EU Commission did not find the laws to be sufficiently productive in its 2003 report. The 2005 report has observed "limited progress" and the 2011 and 2012 reports observed "some progress" in the situation of Roma, while emphasizing their ongoing problems with regards to their access to housing, education, health, and employment. While the removal of the 1934 Settlement Law in 2006 was a big

step toward inclusion, certain discriminatory provisions remained untouched in the Law on Movements and Residence of Aliens until January 2011. These provisions authorized the Ministry of the Interior to expel stateless and non-Turkish gypsies. At the individual level, Turkish political parties—including the governing AKP and the main opposition party CHP—nominated Roma candidates for the parliamentary elections in 2011.[201] At the group level, the Roma gained the right to open organizations with the names including the terms "Roma" and "Gypsy" in 2004.

Despite being incomplete, the quasi-political recognition of the Roma and the removal of legal obstacles motivated them to mobilize for group rights. Various Roma figures spoke up against the longstanding assimilation attempts of Turkey's Roma. Bulent Filyas, the only Turkish national among the 25 members of the Electoral Congress of World Roma Organization *Rromanipen*, states that "assimilation still continues. They are making the children to say 'we are Turk' every morning in the schools." Interestingly, Filyas also acknowledges that "the state is not just looking at us with sympathy, but also supports us."[202] Whereas the quasi-recognition of the Roma has increased ethno-political consciousness among the Roma, the legal arrangements following the EU protocols of 2004 made them capable of mobilizing. Roma-led advocacy organizations were established in five cities by the end of 2005 and the number of Roma organizations have proliferated since then. The Roma rights movement, and the ethno-political mobilization, developed rapidly during the period from 2004 to 2007 (Uzpeder, 2008).

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[201] In Izmir, The AKP nominated Cemal Bekle and the CHP nominated Özcan Purçu.
[202] Author's interview, Istanbul, June 14th, 2012.

Two Roma-led advocacy organizations and two Roma Federations were added in 2006; and several NGO projects were carried out in order to increase the capacity of Roma organizations as stated in the EU Commission report in 2006. The Roma organizations demanded full-fledged recognition after they were granted pseudo-recognition by the government for the first time in Turkish history. Turkey's under-mobilized and under-organized Roma population was politically silent for a long time despite the state's ongoing neglect and discrimination against them, but their complaints and further inclusion demands started to burgeon once the civic assimilationist model softened. Such a process also showed the real potential of the mobilization base of the Roma in Turkey. The 2004 EU report estimated the Roma population in Turkey to be five hundred thousand: this number rose to two million based on the predictions in the 2006 report, which suggests that the real Roma population in Turkey is larger than the previous estimates. One reason for this underestimation was the lack of ethnic identification among the Roma, which may change with the quasi-recognition and affirmative (fund transfers) policies of the government. The rising level of ethnic identification and ethnic consciousness could lead to growing Roma ethno-political mobilization in Turkey.

Recent examples of Roma mobilization activities are numerous. For example, Romani civil rights organizations filed a law suit in 2008 against the demolition of Roma neighborhoods in Sulukule for the "urban generation" project, which was an unprecedented mobilization for Turkey's Roma. This effort concluded with their victory in the court in

2012.[203] One month after PM Erdogan's speech to the Roma audience in March 2010, twenty-three Roma organizations from all over Turkey declared their request to join the Decade of Roma Inclusion, 2005-2015—which, at the time, included Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, and (with an observer status) Slovenia.

Ali İhsan Tunç—the popularly elected chief/*mukhtar* of the Roma-populated Atmaca Town in Izmir—critiques the Roma opening on the part of the government for not being a genuine and well-prepared reform. Another prominent Roma figure, Abdullah Çıstır—the president of the Izmir Roma Social Cooperation and Solidarity Organization––criticizes political parties for nominating Roma candidates in lower positions with no prospect of winning a seat in the parliament in 2011 elections.[204] Thus, the granting of some de facto political recognition and political inclusion—or in a nutshell, granting of some capability to the Roma—has created organized demands for greater inclusion and power; Metin Salih Şentürk, Turkey's representative in the World Roma Congress, plans to make an unofficial census to count the Roma population in Turkey and remarked: "we need a Roma party."[205]

While the Roma are starting to organize with a mass base for group-level recognition and inclusion aims for the first time in Turkey, their method has remained peaceful as hypothesized. The legal permission for Roma organizational activity in

[203] For the emergence of the Sulukule problem, see: Foggo (2007) and Yanikdag (2012).
[204] Author's interviews, Izmir, June 8th, 2012.
[205] Author's interview, Istanbul, June 14th, 2012.

response to the legal changes of 2004 and the PM Erdogan's speech to the Roma citizens in 2010 functioned as a sort of proto-recognition and inclusion of the Roma populace as a collective group. Long years of economic deprivation (along with high rates of unemployment and illiteracy) and social humiliation were not sufficient to motivate the Roma to start an ethno-political mobilization, but the fresh steps from a strict civic assimilationism toward proto-liberal multiculturalism created an immense rate of Roma mobilization with the formation of over one hundred existing Roma organizations, four regional federations, and demands for the foundation of a Roma political party by some if not all. The newly emerging Roma elites in today's Turkey have created ethnic Roma organizations, and sought to mobilize a small, but growing, mass base in order to expand their human capital and political influence.

Conclusion

This chapter has described the ethnic incorporation of Turkey's Kurdish and Roma populations and analyzed their respective ethno-political mobilization patterns: Turkey followed a quasi-ethnocratic model with regard to the Kurds from the 1980 coup to 1994; the Kurds had no group-level inclusion and had minimal individual-level inclusion during this time period. As an ethnic group with high levels of ethno-political mobilization in the preceding period (1970s), the lack of group-level inclusion created a sense of political deprivation among Turkey's Kurds. Heavy abuses of human rights and the denial of the Kurdish language and identity minimized the individual-level inclusion so that the elections did not provide a significant channel of political participation for Kurds—

especially when considering extraordinary rule in southeastern Turkey that created a prison-like social and political setting for Kurds. Such discriminatory treatment of the Kurdish-populated regions and ongoing abuses of the very basic rights of individual Kurdish citizens of Turkey increased their level of ethnic identification in response to the negative categorization by the state into an excluded group of Kurds. The rising level of ethnic identification and the grievances stemming from being deprived of their very basic political rights increased the ethnic political consciousness of Turkey's Kurds. The PKK started to use violence to seek secession from Turkey in this social and political setting and the organization had no difficulty finding sympathizers and recruiting them in this time period.

Turkey's Kurds have found a gradual improvement in individual-level inclusion with the release of some political prisoners, reforms of abusive laws, and "a reduction in the sheer numbers of political killings" (Human Rights Watch, 1996) from 1995 to 2004. Such changes enhanced the degree of individual-level inclusion that was missing in the preceding period; therefore, the incorporation model for this time period was civic assimilationist. Such an incorporation model could have led to the assimilation of an unmobilized cultural minority, but as the high levels of ethno-political mobilization in the preceding time period show, Kurds had already high levels of ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness. Their unsatisfied demands for group-level inclusion created a sense of relative political deprivation and frustration among Kurds. However, since Turkey gradually reduced the degree of group- and individual-level exclusion, the rate of

violence declined in this time period and the PKK-led Kurdish mobilization abandoned secession as a political aim in favor of seeking regional autonomy in 1999.

Although the early 2000s witnessed a great deal of political reforms, the reforms slowed down in 2005 and started to deteriorate in 2007 according to international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The KCK prosecutions starting in 2009 narrowed down the legal ethno-political mobilization paths. As such, the softening civic assimilationist trend of the previous time period was reversed in this time period and replaced by a greater degree of group-level exclusion—which increased the perception of relative deprivation and resulting feelings of frustration among Turkey's Kurds. The PKK increased the volume of violence from 2005 to 2012 and both the BDP and the PKK put greater emphasis on regional political autonomy.

The quasi-recognition of the PKK, starting with the government's negotiations with its leader in prison, has opened a new phase in the incorporation of Turkey's Kurds. The civic assimilationist model started to soften once again with a more moderate exclusion at the group level. The BDP has also found greater political space during this time period as the KCK arrests have stopped. As the sense of relative political deprivation has decreased, the frustrations of the Kurdish people have started to calm down. The PKK declared a ceasefire in this time period and showed an unprecedented will to end the use of violence. The demands declared by the PKK and the BDP have also been much more moderate in this time period. Nevertheless, the incorporation model of Turkey's Kurds is still far from a liberal multiculturalist one with the current 10% electoral threshold and the strong centralism of the government. The Kurdish question will not be fully resolved until the

Turkish government and Kurdish organizations, such as the BDP and the PKK, reach an agreement on these two key matters.

The Roma of Turkey experienced a total neglect in terms of political inclusion at the group level in the entire 20th century. There was no official recognition of the Roma people as a group, nor was there any kind of group-level rights granted to them. However, they could vote in the elections and faced no formal barrier to run for office on the lists of the mainstream (non-Roma) parties; yet, their political mobilization was almost absent during this time period. As suggested in Chapter Two, the civic assimilationist incorporation model of Turkey toward its Roma population caused neither a centripetal nor a violent mobilization because there was no prior Roma ethno-political consciousness and political mobilization at all. The civic assimilationist policies prevented the emergence of a class of Roma ethnic elites and did not encourage ethnic identification and ethno-political consciousness; therefore, this incorporation model helped maintain the political inertia of the Roma community. This picture has slightly changed since the early 2000s. PM Erdogan's 2010 speech toward the Roma, his apology in the name of the state, and his affirmative stress on Roma identity was a significant change. There have also been legal refoms to allow Roma mobilization at the group level. The bans on ethnic Roma organizations were removed enabling the Roma to mobilize without obstacles. There were also some resource transfers to Roma organizations in this time period from the governor's offices in a number of cities as well as from the EU. This process of elite empowerment (by providing resources and removing legal obstacles) led to the emergence of a small group of Roma elites. These elites opened Roma organizations, participated in international

Roma congresses and organizations, had meetings with the government representatives to list their demands, and some of them are demanding for greater political inclusion for the Roma, some even state the need for a Roma political party. Roma mobilization is definitely not secessionist in any sense of the term, but could be called less centripetal than what it used to be.

Both the Kurdish and the Roma cases support the hypotheses listed in Chapter Two, given the available evidence. Because the Kurds had a high level of pre-existing mobilization, quasi-ethnocratic incorporation policies from 1980 to 1994 caused a centrifugal and violent mobilization. Greater individual-level inclusion and even diminishing group-level exclusion from 1995 to 2004 led to a less-centrifugal and less-violent mobilization. As the group-level exclusion increased from 2005 to 2012, Kurdish violence and centrifugal demands intensified. Reduced group-level exclusion beginning in late 2012 decreased the intensity of violence and centrifugal aims of the Kurdish mobilization. The Roma mobilization also responded to the changing ethnic incorporation policies in accordance with the hypotheses. As a weakly mobilized group, the Roma remained quiescent for a long time under civic assimilationist policies. Diminishing group-level exclusion of the Roma in the 2000s has empowered Roma elites which has sparked growing (but still not sufficiently strong) ethno-political mobilization.

This chapter has policy implications for Turkey's ethnicity-related problems. Both the Kurdish and Roma mobilizations are expected to continue on peaceful grounds if the current trends (weakening group-level exclusion) in the incorporation models continue.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between the two ethnic groups since pre-existing mobilization levels are high for the Kurds and low for the Roma.

Greater group-level inclusion in the future is expected to cause the Kurdish mobilization to embrace more centripetal aims and to eschew the use of violent methods due to a reduced sense of deprivation and resulting grievances. The ethnic elites may continue to mobilize a sufficient number of Kurds through ethnic political parties, but secessionism or even limited political decentralization (that is further than what is granted by the state) will not be appealing to a majority of the Kurdish populace under a liberal multiculturalist incorporation model.

Greater group-level inclusion in the future should cause the Roma to embrace more centrifugal aims due to their increasing levels of ethnic identification and the emergence and strengthening of ethnic elites who would be capable of incentivizing and even coercing ethno-political mobilization. Nevertheless, violence is not expected in this scenario given the lack of political deprivation and resulting deep grievances among Turkey's Roma. If the government steps back from granting further group-level inclusion due to pressures from other opposition parties or the fear of losing the votes of the Turkish electorate with strong nationalist sensitivities, the expected future of the Kurdish and Romani mobilizations should be different from the given scenario above and should proceed with the hypotheses explained in Chapter Two.

The explanation and predictions given above hold with the other-conditions-being-constant assumption. It should be remembered that ethno-political mobilization is a multidimensional, multi-actor process that is affected by multiple domestic and

international factors. An unlikely, but not impossible, inter-state war in the region—or the creation of an independent Kurdish statehood across Turkey's border, perhaps on the territories to be acquired from Iraq and Syria—can easily change the dynamics of ethno-political mobilization in Turkey. That being said, I argue that a liberal multiculturalist ethnic incorporation model in Turkey is the best policy for Turkish policymakers in order to prevent another wave of secessionist and violent Kurdish ethno-political mobilization. The same model might lead Turkey's Roma to organize and mobilize further for centrifugal (or to be precise, less centripetal) goals, but it will not lead to secessionism or the use of violent methods. Future research on the causes and dynamics of Kurdish and Roma mobilizations in Turkey should take a broader look at interacting domestic and international factors that shape ethno-political mobilization. Since the Roma mobilization has recently started to emerge and is still premature in Turkey, it needs to be examined carefully in the following years.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Ethnic politics has increasing salience in the post-Cold War period all around the world (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Wimmer, 2012). Many countries have struggled with ethnic separatism and civil wars along ethnic lines since 1990. Some other countries, particularly in Western Europe and Latin America, have had a peaceful flourishing of ethnic politics, particularly in Western Europe and Latin America (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2002; Madrid, 2012). Although a great deal of research has been dedicated to understand the causes of variation in the aims and methods of ethno-political mobilization, the question remained unresolved and scholars have offered partial answers at best.

This dissertation has sought to answer the question of what shapes varying ethno-political mobilization aims and methods. It developed a comprehensive theory of ethnic mobilization, which offers answers for the question with regard to both ethno-political mobilization aims and methods. It argued that state policies and institutions of ethnic incorporation shape the aims and methods of ethno-political mobilization for ethnic minority groups. It also provided empirical evidence based on original case studies and quantitative analyses that support the hypotheses to a large extent.

This concluding chapter starts with a restatement of the research question, the main argument, and specific hypotheses. Then, it discusses empirical findings in the case studies and large-N analyses. Next, it sheds light on the broader theoretical and policy implications of the findings of this dissertation. The chapter ends with recommendations for future research and an acknowledgement of the limitations of this research.

The Theory and Hypotheses

The main question of this dissertation is what shapes ethno-political mobilization patterns. I argue that state institutions and policies of ethnic incorporation, which I call ethnic incorporation models, shape the methods and goals of ethno-political mobilization. I also argue that the effect of an incorporation model depends on the degree of pre-existing mobilization of an ethnic group, which tells us about the degree of ethno-political consciousness of an ethnic group.

In order to develop my argument, I first develop a novel way of conceptualizing ethnic incorporation models. I argue that we can conceptualize ethnic incorporation models along two dimensions: individual-level incorporation and group-level incorporation, which vary from exclusionary to inclusive treatment of ethnic minority groups. I distinguish the aims of ethno-political mobilization on a spectrum from the most centrifugal (e.g., secessionism in the most extreme case) goals to the most centripetal (undifferentiated integration) goals. By ethno-political mobilization methods, I mean how peaceful the ethnic mobilizations are.

I distinguish between individual- and group-level incorporation by adapting Kymlicka's (1995) between internal restrictions and external protection of cultural communities to the context of political participation. Accordingly, individual-level inclusion refers to the degree of political autonomy granted to the members of ethnic minority groups. Individual-level inclusion allows the members of the ethnic group to participate in politics across ethnic lines. Individual citizens can vote for mainstream (non-

ethnic) political parties and can be nominated by them for the office. Although political participation is much more difficult in non-democratic regimes, even they can vary in terms of their individual-level inclusiveness. A non-democratic government that recruits ethnic minority group members to public service positions, including high ranking positions, without regard to their ethnicity, is more individual-level inclusive than another government that does this merely along ethnic lines and discriminates against the members of an ethnic minority group.

Group-level inclusion refers to the degree of political autonomy granted to ethnic groups from the central state. A group-level inclusive country allows the members of an ethnic group to participate in politics along ethnic lines whereas a group-level exclusionary country does not allow it. In other words, group-level inclusion recognizes ethnic groups as a collectivity and grants a certain degree of self-determination to the groups. The most inclusionary form of group-level incorporation can be identical to an ethnic confederation where an ethnic group has a great degree of political autonomy and very loose connections to the central government. Ethnic federalism and autonomous regions (ethnic settlements) can also grant a similar kind of autonomy to ethnic groups. I also argue that ethnic groups that are allowed to have unrestricted and fully functioning ethno-political parties enjoy group-level inclusion. One can also find other supplementary policies or laws that shape the group-level inclusion of ethnic groups. For instance, the recognition of an ethnic group in the constitution or other laws can be seen as a sign of group-level inclusiveness as long as the actual policies of the central state do not make the law void in practice.

Based on this distinction, I call ethnic incorporation models that are inclusive both at the individual and group levels *liberal multiculturalism*, inclusive at the individual but exclusionary at the group levels as *civic assimilationism*, exclusionary at the individual but inclusive at the group levels as *consociationalism*, and exclusionary both at the individual and group levels as *ethnocracy*. Based on the conceptual framework provided above, the dissertation developed four major hypotheses with regard to the aims and methods of ethno-political mobilization:

Consociationalism leads to peaceful mobilizations at both low and high levels of pre-existing mobilization by making peaceful channels of mobilization available to members of minority ethnic groups. It also does not deprive ethnic minority group members of their political recognition and ethno-political participation demands and keep the deprivation-led frustration feelings at a minimum. *Consociationalism* also empowers ethnic elites and strengthens the ethno-political awareness of the masses, particularly for weakly mobilized groups. Such ethnic groups' members can find opportunities for developing their ethno-political awareness under the group-level inclusive policies of consociationalism. Therefore, it leads to mildly centrifugal mobilizations in groups with low levels of pre-existing mobilization.

Liberal multiculturalism, by encouraging ethnic inclusion and keeping peaceful channels of mobilization open, leads to peaceful mobilizations at both low and high levels of pre-existing mobilization. It also moderately empowers elites and, particularly for weakly mobilized groups, increases ethno-political awareness. Nevertheless, by allowing cross-cutting political activity, it decreases ethnic elites' control over their ethnic masses

and also provides opportunities for multi-ethnic or non-ethnic political participation and solidarity to emerge. Therefore, it moderates the centrifugal effects of inclusive policies at the group level.

Civic assimilationism leads to peaceful mobilizations at low levels of pre-existing mobilization, but it leads to mixed (a combination of violent and peaceful) mobilizations at high levels of pre-existing mobilization by creating a sense of relative deprivation amongst co-ethnics. By inhibiting the strengthening of ethnic consciousness and disempowering ethnic elites in weakly mobilized ethnic groups, civic assimilationism also impedes ethnic groups from mobilizing for centrifugal goals. This incorporation model is the most effective model in terms of ensuring that weakly mobilized ethnic groups remain peaceful and centripetal. Yet, its group-level exclusionary policies create a sense of relative deprivation in ethnic groups with high levels of pre-existing mobilization and leads to centrifugal mobilizations.

Ethnocracy creates a strong degree of ethnic consciousness and a sense of deprivation and, therefore, leads to mixed (a combination of peaceful and violent) mobilizations at low levels of pre-existing mobilization, and violent mobilizations at high levels of pre-existing mobilization. It also increases levels of ethno-political awareness and feelings of deprivation, and in turn, causes ethnic minority groups to pursue centrifugal goals.

These hypotheses tell us that ethnocracy deprives the members of ethnic minority groups of their most basic political rights and does this by selectively targeting the ethnic minority group in a way that increases the perception of ethnic discrimination and raises

ethno-political awareness. Ethnic group members who are subject to such policies feel less political attachment to the central state and are less likely to try to integrate with the broader political society. Since they are also willing to take greater risks given the immense costs of the status quo, they may embrace the costs of violent upheaval. They also feel greater degrees of frustration as a result of their deprivation of their most basic political rights, and, therefore, they have stronger motives to take up violent actions for their cause. Therefore, ethnocracy leads to the most violent and centrifugal mobilizations regardless of the preexisting levels of mobilization.

Liberal multiculturalism is the most effective model in terms of ensuring that highly mobilized ethnic groups remain peaceful and centripetal. Highly mobilized groups tend to have high degrees of ethno-political awareness so group-level exclusionary policies will lead to a sense of deprivation for such groups. Moreover, cross-cutting channels of political participation available under liberal multiculturalism reduce the elites' power over the members of their ethnic groups. When co-ethnics have a right to participate through non-ethnic political channels, it becomes harder for ethnic elites to control them. Elites also lose their monopoly over ethnic propaganda and indoctrination when alternative political information channels are available to the ethnic masses. Thus, liberal multiculturalism is the ideal incorporation model to ensure peaceful and centripetal mobilizations for highly mobilized groups.

Civic assimilationism is expected to lead to the most peaceful and centripetal mobilizations for weakly mobilized ethnic groups. Since such groups tend to lack ethno-political awareness, group-level exclusionary policies do not provoke feelings of

deprivation and frustration when they are applied to them. Instead, individual members of ethnic minority groups tend to be satisfied with individual-level inclusive policies alone. This incorporation model also impedes the emergence of ethnic elites with de jure authority and resources that can be used to initiate ethno-political mobilization. As a result, the members of an ethnic minority group tend to remain integrationist and peaceful in terms of their mobilization aims and methods.

Empirical Findings

This dissertation tested the hypotheses explained above using both qualitative case studies and quantitative analyses. In Chapter Three, I carried out two separate quantitative analyses of ethno-political mobilization methods for high and low mobilization samples from the Minorities at Risk database. I analyzed the data using proportional odds ordinal regression model that is fit using ordinal logistic regression. The effect sizes in the contrasts of three ethnic incorporation models with the reference category of ethnocracy are in line with the hypotheses to a great extent. For the low mobilization sample, civic assimilationism and liberal multiculturalism proved to be more peaceful than ethnocracy. The effect size of civic assimilationism is greater than that of the other incorporation models, which indicates that civic assimilationism is most likely to minimize violence by ethnic groups with low levels of mobilization. Although consociationalism also seems to be more peaceful than ethnocracy, given its coefficient, this finding was not statistically significant.

The results for the high mobilization sample also mostly in line with the hypotheses. According to the analyses, liberal multiculturalism, civic assimilationism, and consociationalism, all are more peaceful than ethnocracy. The effect size of liberal multiculturalism indicates that it is the most peaceful incorporation model. The fact that consociationalism can be distinguished from ethnocracy only in the high mobilization sample in terms of its peacefulness demonstrates that group-level inclusion has a particularly peaceful effect on highly mobilized ethnic groups.

The case studies in Chapters Four and Five employed a quasi-experimental research design. I carried out a comparative analysis of Kurds and the Roma in Turkey in Chapter Five. By comparing two comparable ethnic groups in a single country, I could control for state-level factors (e.g., population, regime type, economy, political culture). The Roma and Kurdish communities in Turkey are the most similar cases because they are the largest ethnic groups in the country. Both of them also differ from the majority ethnic group (ethnic Turks) by language while sharing the same faith (Sunni Islam) to a great extent. This chapter shows that country-level factors did not lead to a convergence in the mobilization patterns of Turkey's Roma and Kurdish communities but rather the real cause of the varying mobilization patterns of these two ethnic groups was the varying ethnic incorporation policies of the state.

As it discussed in detail in Chapter Five, Kurdish mobilization turned violent and more centrifugal following the 1980 coup, which led to the imprisonment and torture of thousands of Kurdish political activists. When individual-level exclusionary policies became more moderate after 1995 and group-level exclusionary policies started to be less

severe in two separate periods (1995-2004 and then again from December, 2012-to the present), feelings of deprivation and frustration decreased among Turkey's Kurds. As a result, Kurdish mobilization became more peaceful and less centrifugal (autonomy seeking but no longer secessionist).

Turkey's incorporation model of its Roma community varied less and, as a result, there was only limited variation in Roma mobilization in contrast to Kurdish mobilization. The Roma had traditionally had low levels of ethnic mobilization and as a consequence of the strict civic assimilationist policies they were subject to until 2004, their mobilization remained weak, peaceful, and integrationist. However, limited but incremental steps toward greater group-level inclusion since 2004 have led to an unprecedented degree of ethno-political awakening, flourishing ethnic organizations, and ethno-political activity among the Roma. This mobilization is limited and mostly centripetal, but less so than previously.

Chapter Four presents case studies of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria and Cyprus. By comparing ethnic Turks in two countries, I could control for a number of factors. Both groups differ(ed) from the ethnic majorities in their respective countries by language and faith –they both speak Turkish and practice moderate forms of Sunni Islam. They live in non-contiguous ethnic settlements, and they have ties to a historically connected kin state, which is Turkey. The analyses showed that the Turkish Cypriots had a high degree of political awareness due to centuries-long consociational arrangements on the island. When the incorporation model turned to civic assimilationism and revoked Turkish Cypriots' group-level inclusion, they started to seek secession and engaged in sporadic incidents of

violence. When individual-level inclusion for Turkish-Cypriots was abandoned between 1964 and 1967 and again in 1974 for a short period of time, their violent struggle escalated, turning a limited ethnic conflict to a civil war. In fact, the latter conflict in 1974 turned into an inter-state war with a military invasion by Turkey).

Bulgarian Turks, by contrast, had lived under civic assimilationism before 1984 and they lacked a strong sense of ethno-political awareness. Their political awakening occurred with the change in the incorporation model from civic assimilationism to ethnocracy after the initiation of the Revival Process by President Zhivkov in 1984. Turks formed underground resistance organizations and embraced violent methods sporadically in this time period. When the incorporation model turned toward greater inclusion both at the individual and group levels starting from 1990, Turkish ethno-political mobilization did not lose its strength, but have embraced fully peaceful mobilization methods and integrationist goals. Therefore, it can be concluded that empirical findings of this dissertation, both for the case studies and quantitative analyses, largely support the hypotheses.

Theoretical and Policy Implications

My research seeks to contribute to the theoretical debates on ethnic mobilization in a number of ways. First, as discussed in Chapter Two, the literature on ethnic politics is quite fragmented. Ethnic conflict (Gurr, 1970; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2003; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 2010), ethnic separatism (Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson, 2004; Saideman, Dougherty, and Jenne, 2005), ethno-political parties (Van Cott,

2005; Madrid, 2012), and ethnic mobilization (Olzak, 1983; 2011) tend to be discussed in a compartmentalized way that overlooks the bigger picture. The fragmentation is not only with regard to the subject matter under question, but also about the way it is studied. A majority of scholarly work on the subject exclusively focus on the elite or mass dynamics of ethnic politics, framed mostly in greed vs. grievances context. This dissertation aims at providing a comprehensive theory of ethnic conflict by connecting the fragmented pieces of the puzzle.

This dissertation also aims at developing a comprehensive typology of ethnic incorporation models. Although the terms consociationalism, liberal multiculturalism, consociationalism, and ethnocracy were all coined long ago, the literature lacks a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive classification of ethnic incorporation models. The existing typologies of ethnic incorporation (Brubaker 1989; Soysal, 1994; Weldon 2006; Chirot, 2009; Akturk, 2011; Mylonas, 2012; Reilly, 2012) either do not make a distinction between individual and group levels of incorporation, or they explore the problem of ethnic incorporation at the state level by overlooking the variation with regard to the incorporation of different ethnic groups in the same country.

By redefining ethnic incorporation models along the dimensions of group-level and individual-level incorporation, I aim at developing a novel and analytically helpful classification of the policies and institutions of ethnic incorporation. I also argue that countries are not consociationalist or civic assimilationist per se, but only with regard to specific ethnic groups. Hence, a country can pursue consociationalist or civic assimilationist policies for different ethnic minority groups at the same time.

By implementing this conceptualization and testing my theory on under-studied, yet significant empirical cases, I aim at contributing to the theoretical discussions on these particular research areas. The literatures on specific countries or specific ethnic minority groups tend to make historical analyses and avoid discussing the theoretical significance of specific cases. By contrast, this dissertation aims at responding to the need for further theorizing on ethnic politics in Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Turkey.

This dissertation also has important policy implications. The primary explanatory factor in this dissertation is ethnic incorporation models. In a nutshell, this dissertation argues that ethno-political mobilizations are significantly shaped by the policies that respective states adopt. Therefore, one can conclude that longstanding separatist ethnic conflicts are caused by wrong policies and, for the very same reason, the remedy lies in politics.

This dissertation, in an agreement with a broader literature, argues that ethnocracy leads to a radicalization of ethno-political mobilizations in terms of both the aims and methods of mobilization. By contrast, liberal multiculturalism (for highly mobilized groups) and civic assimilationism (for weakly mobilized groups) lead to non-secessionist and non-violent ethno-political mobilizations. Although secession may not be a bad outcome in itself, it tends to go along with political instability and violence. The findings of this dissertation thus suggest that central state politicians who want to preserve the territorial integrity and peacefulness of their country should pursue civic assimilationist policies for weakly mobilized groups (for whom ethnicity does not have a significant

degree of political salience anyway) and liberal multiculturalist policies if they are dealing with highly mobilized groups.

Limitations of the Dissertation and Recommendations for Future Research

This dissertation aims at developing clear and testable hypotheses and carrying out careful analyses based on well-defined terms and well-specified causal mechanisms; yet, it still faces a number of limitations. This section discusses these limitations and makes a number of recommendations for future research.

The major limitation of the dissertation is a general problem that social scientists struggle with: the question of endogeneity. Although I argue that ethnic incorporation models shape ethno-political mobilization patterns, it can also be argued that ethnic incorporation models are not exogenous to and independent from the phenomenon to be explained. It is no surprise that the question of endogeneity becomes particularly important for social studies because humans respond to external stimuli. The designers and operators of ethnic incorporation policies (i.e., central state politicians) are humans and they also reason about and respond to past and expected future mobilization patterns of their target populations. For this reason, it is very plausible that ethno-political mobilization patterns have an impact on ethnic incorporation models as well.

While acknowledging this reverse and to some extent mutual causality, I attempted to focus on how ethnic incorporation models shape ethnic mobilization, rather than vice versa. I adopted Archer's (1982) analytical dualism approach and focused on ethnic incorporation at time 1 and elaborated its effect on ethno-political mobilization patterns at

time 2. I carefully process traced this causal path in my case studies and used a one-year lagged dependent variable in my statistical models in order to isolate and focus on the effect of ethnic incorporation policies. Nevertheless, the question of endogeneity still needs to be addressed in future research in more robust ways and with further tests.

Another major issue is the question of generalizability. The theory outlined in this dissertation can and should be tested in different empirical contexts in addition to the four case studies of this dissertation. Due to data problems, this dissertation could use quantitative methods to test the hypotheses only in a time frame from 1990 to 2000; yet, this time period may have certain unique features that make it insufficient to prove the generalizability of my theory. Therefore, the hypotheses of this dissertation should also be tested in a longer time frame with a larger number of observations. Moreover, ethnic politics is a very dynamic research area and new cases should be incorporated into future studies on an ongoing basis.

Finally, the theories and findings of this dissertation should also be analyzed in combination with normative studies of ethnic politics in order to formulate policy recommendations. There is a growing and promising literature on the extent of cultural identity and belongingness as well as the political nature and self-expression needs of humans in the political theory literature (Spinner-Halev, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; Miller, 1995; Parekh, 2000; Gregg, 2003; Kukathas, 2007; Hooker, 2009). The legitimacy or rightfulness of ethnic incorporation policies and ethno-political mobilization aims and methods are extensively discussed in this literature. Moreover, a tolerable degree of reasonable disagreement on the extent of legitimate policies both for the central state and

ethnic minority actors is reached to some extent. Future normative research can clarify the policy implications of this dissertation.

Future research may shed light on omitted explanatory factors and neglected causal mechanisms, or may even bring in the need for different methods and new questions that need to be addressed. Indeed, future research should be as live as ethnic politics itself and should embrace all of the emerging ethno-political phenomena that need to be defined and conceptualized. The aim of this dissertation is not only to provide an explanation for existing ethno-political mobilization patterns but also to direct attention to the path of future research on ethnic politics.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: EXPECTED EFFECTS OF GROUP LEVEL INCLUSION

Table A.1. Processes that elite empowerment and ascription mechanisms of group-level inclusion activate

Cognitive and motivational / *Level*	*Interest-based*	*Value-based*
Elite-level empowerment	Selective incentives	Propaganda/indoctrination
Mass-level ascription	Linked fate	Ethnic identification & consciousness

APPENDIX B: DISAGGREGATE ELECTORAL RESULTS FOR TURKEY'S 2002 AND 2007 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Table B.1 DTP votes comparison of the 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections

City	*DEHAP 2002 votes*	*DTP Bloc 2007 votes*	*Net change*	*AKP 2002 votes*	*AKP 2007 votes*	*Net change*
Adana	79,397 (9.3)	48,736 (5.3)	-30,661 (-4.0)	229,729 (26.8)	338,122 (36.9)	108,393 (10.1)
Adıyaman	25,666 (12.0)	14,350 (6.0)	-11,316 (-6.0)	88,831 (41.4)	159,735 (65.3)	70.904 (23.9)
Ağrı	51,947 (35.1)	37,316 (22.9)	-14,631 (-12.2)	26,2190 (17.7)	103,138 (63.3)	159,052 (45.3)
Ankara	52,709 (2.4)	14,640 (0.6)	-38,069 (-1.8)	820,260 (38.1)	1,168,742 (47.5)	348,482 (9.4)
Antalya	20,971 (2.8)	13,501 (1.5)	-7,470 (-1.3)	159,733 (21.2)	306,269 (34)	146,536 (12.8)
Ardahan	9,142 (15.9)	5,176 (9.3)	-3,966 (-6.6)	6,746 (11.8)	22,713 (40.6)	15,967 (28.8)
Aydın	24,603 (5.0)	13,648 (2.5)	-10,955 (-2.5)	89,713 (18.3)	163,071 (29.2)	73.358 (10.9)
Balıkesir	10,224 (1.6)	2,775 (0.4)	-7,449 (-1.2)	213,569 (33.6)	287,441 (41.5)	73,872 (7.9)
Batman	70,027	61,694	-8,333	30,654	73,713	43,059

	(47.1)	(39.1)	(-8.0)	(20.6)	(46.4)	(25.8)
Bingöl	19,709	15,330	-4,379	28,198	78,467	50,269
	(22.2)	(13.8)	(-8.4)	(31.7)	(71.1)	(39.4)
Bitlis	30,352	18,664	-11,688	18,151	68,381	50,230
	(29.6)	(16.0)	(-13.6)	(17.7)	(58.8)	(41.1)
Bursa	23,869	9,764	-14,105	469,280	666,531	197,251
	(2.1)	(0.8)	(-1.3)	(41.3)	(50.8)	(9.5)
Diyarbakır	236,689	200,747	-35,942	67,298	191,214	123916
	(56.1)	(43.6)	(-12.5)	(16.0)	(40.9)	(24.9)
Elazığ	17,387	7,943	-9,444	102,474	154,727	52,253
	(7.1)	(2.9)	(-4.2)	(42)	(57.2)	(15.2)
Erzurum	33,291	16,878	-16,413	184,870	244,137	59,267
	(9.8)	(4.6)	(-5.2)	(54.6)	(68.3)	(13.7)
Gaziantep	38,737	20,442	-18,295	193,995	328,120	134,125
	(8.0)	(3.7)	(-4.3)	(40.0)	(59.3)	(19.3)
Hakkari	33,881	43,830	9,949	5,115	29,513	24,398
	(45.1)	(50.2)	(5.1)	(6.8)	(33.5)	(26.7)
Hatay	18,767	11,308	-7,459	261,971	353,616	91.645
	(3.4)	(1.8)	(-1.6)	(29.9)	(40.8)	(10.9)
Iğdır	20 199	17,304	-2,895	4,015	18,672	14,657
	(32.7)	(26.9)	(-5.8)	(6.50)	(28.90)	(22.40)
Istanbul	287,953	214,014	-73,939	1,943,776	2,604,343	660,567
	(5.5)	(3.7)	(-1.8)	(37.2)	(45.2)	(8.0)
Izmir	97,067	58,993	-38,074	321,865	636,826	314,961
	(5.2)	(2.8)	(-2.4)	(17.2)	(30.5)	(13.3)
Kahramanmaraş	12,830	2,590	-10,240	216,388	319,534	103,146
	(3.2)	(0.6)	(-2.6)	(53.9)	(68.0)	(14.1)
Kars	23,659	16,014	-7,645	20,831	50,819	29,988
	(19.6)	(13.0)	(-6.6)	(17.2)	(41.2)	(24.0)
Kocaeli	25,500	15,447	-10,053	277,461	370,242	92,781
	(3.9)	(2.1)	(-1.8)	(42.9)	(49.3)	(6.4)
Konya	27,941	6,348	-21,593	487,700	660,583	172,883
	(3.1)	(0.6)	(-2.5)	(54.9)	(65.3)	(10.4)
Mersin	64,844	49,077	-15,767	122,995	215,703	92,708
	(9.5)	(6.2)	(-3.2)	(18.1)	(27.2)	(9.1)
Malatya	13,344	5,283	-8,061	161,658	243,525	81,867
	(4.2)	(1.5)	(-2.7)	(50.6)	(66.7)	(16.1)
Manisa	28,296	10,342	-17,954	216,455	314,140	97,685
	(3.9)	(1.3)	(-2.6)	(30.1)	(40.9)	(10.8)
Mardin	89,113	84,021	-5,092	34,746	105,905	71,159
	(39,6)	(34.9)	(-4.7)	(15.4)	(44.1)	(28.7)
Muş	49,302	47,248	-2,054	21,876	54,295	32,419

	(38.1)	(33.7)	(-4.4)	(16.9)	(38.6)	(21.7)
Siirt	NA	23,331	NA	55,203	44,836	-10,367
		(25.5)		(84.8*)	(48.8)	(-36.0)
Tunceli	13,470	11,515	-1,955	2,759	5,204	2,445
	(32.5)	(27.1)	(-5.4)	(6.7)	(12.3)	(5.6)
Şanlıurfa	83,600	52,287	-31,313	99,331	267,525	168,194
	(19.3)	(11.8)	(-7.5)	(22.9)	(59.8)	(36.9)
Şırnak	47,567	68,198	20,631	14,512	33,179	18,667
	(45.9)	(53.6)	(7.7)	(14.0)	(26.9)	(12.9)
Van	105,520	92,443	-13,077	66,797	163,193	96,396
	(40.9)	(30.3)	(-10.6)	(25.9)	(53.2)	(27.3)
Turkey	1,960,66	1,338,81	-	10,808,22	16,327,29	5,519,06
(General)	0	0	621,85	9	1	2
	(6.2)	(3.8)	0	(34.3)	(46.6)	(12.3)
			(-2.4)			

*The AKP received 34.3% of the valid votes in Siirt in the regular election, but Fadil Akgunduz's election was annulled by Turkey's Supreme Election Board. AKP leader and current PM Erdogan's ban was removed before the renewal election in Siirt. Erdogan's presence in Siirt moved AKP votes up to almost 85% in Siirt in 2002 (2003 in this particular case) elections.

APPENDIX C: JITEM

Translation: Important Phones [Numbers] Book, Prepared by the Governor's Office of Batman, January-1998.



	Daire Tel	Ev Tel
E. Ülkü YETİŞER Hakim	213 63 62/116	212 41 64
Kemal KANBER Hakim	213 63 82/120	
Hayri DEMİR İl Seçim Kur. Bşk.	213 30 96	215 03 43
H. Nalan ARAS İlçe Seçim Kur. Bşk.	213 10 03	213 10 04
M. Şirin KURHAN İlçe Seç. Kur. Müd.	213 12 50	212 45 81
A. Rıza ÖZDEMİR Cezaevi Müdürü	213 91 42	
Mahmut YÜCEL 1 Noter	213 21 46	212 28 86
Basır ÖZLÜK II Noter	214 19 76	212 12 21

(6)

İL JANDARMA KOMUTANLIĞI

	Daire Tel	Ev Tel
İ. Hakkı MUSAOĞLU İl. Jan. Komutanı	212 96 76	213 10 08
J. Yrb. Sait ERDURAN Alay Kom. Yrd. Hrk. Şb. Müd.	212 97 71	213 10 08
İl Jandarma Hrk. Mrkz.	214 08 96	
J. Yzb. Serdar KÖKEN İl Merkez Jan. Kom.	213 10 05	
J. Bnb. Metealp YILMAZ JİTEM Grup Kom.	212 90 20	212 90 20
J.Kd.Yzb.Levent COŞKUN JİTEM Tim. Kom.	213 26 68-	213 26 68
Emir Astsubayı	212 96 76	
Santral	213 10 08	

(7)

Translation: JITEM Group Commandment & JITEM Team Commandment

Source: the author took the photos of the phonebook which was captured and kept by a local journalist in Batman, who asked his name to be kept confidential.

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