Minority Nations, Political Parties and Immigration

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TESI DOCTORAL UPF / 2015

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Agraïments

Escriure una tesi doctoral ha estat dur, en especial quan un creu que pot seguir el ritme dels qui s'hi dediquen a jornada completa. No seria honest apropiar-me de la cara obscura de la tesi sense reconèixer totes les persones que d'alguna manera o altra se n'han fet càrrec i han anat estirant del meu carro. Que la tesi no l'he fet sola, ni molt menys.

Al meu jefe, i supervisor, en Ricard, li dec unes quantes coses. Li dec la inspiració, i la meva formació com a doctoranda. Gràcies Ricard per haver confiat en mi. Gràcies per haver-me obert portes i per sempre haver buscat la manera de donar-me suport, inclús quan semblava impossible. Gràcies per haver sapigut 'fotre'm canya' quan calia, i treure'm també dels forats. Sempre que penso en tu recordo allò del "Dios aprieta, pero no ahoga". Gràcies per fer el GRITIM, és un privilegi.

Gràcies també als professors de l'àrea de Teoria Política per haver-me acollit. A en Ferran Requejo, en Klaus Jürgen Nagel (els meus primers i últims professors a la carrera, i culpables de la meva curiositat per la recerca) i en Camil Ungureanu. Cadascú de maneres molt diferents, m'heu donat molt suport i he après tant com he pogut de vosaltres. Vull agrair també al departament de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, i les persones que s'hi han implicat a nivell de gestió per la seva entrega.

GRITIM team. I have no words to express how happy I have been these years working with you. Sometimes I wonder how come every new researcher that joins the group is as nice as the rest. Blanca, Christina, Dirk, Eva, Francesco, Gema, Juan, Lorenzo, Zenia, thanks very much for having chosen immigration as a research topic. For your humanity, kindness and (on this, I also wonder how come) this marvelous sense of humor. I feel so lucky!

Al Departament també hi he fet bons amics a qui vull agrair el suport i la companyia. Al Pati Descobert, els Marcs i en Toni, i

l'Abel i la Tània, i en Lluís. Com un professor despistat deia un dia al veure-us passar, hi ha molt bona gent al Departament. Als meus germans de promoció, l'André, el Paolo i la Ceci: cuántos momentos de complicidad y empatía dramatizable. Lo mismo para los primeros que me acogieron al llegar: Lorena y Gerardo. Elena, igual que Jonathan, que me recibisteis en el GRITIM y me preparasteis para lo que estaba por venir. Fuisteis y sois como hermanos mayores. Y risas han sido también Pablo y Mariña. A veces olvido lo traidores que sois por haberos ido a Madrid antes de que me cansara de vosotros. Anthony, nunca terminaré de estarte agradecida, no sólo por tu amistad, sino por tu generosidad tambien.

Cantaven els Manels, 'quin plaer haver-la pogut coneixer fa molt de temps': són la Wiebke la Flora; cuando me explicaron lo que hygge significa en danés, pensé en vosotras. I Sílvia i Queralt, companyes de batalles i ordidores de plans diabòlics sempre fallits, a la Uni i fora d'ella. Gràcies a totes per estar amb mi, això no s'acaba aquí.

My thesis has also brought me to wonderful places such as Edinburgh (Scotland) and Montréal (Quebec) and to meet wonderful people working in similar fields of research. Verena, it's even funny how close you've been to me despite we've never shared a land for more than a few days. Like with Catrin, j'hâte de consturire des projects ensemble! Merci aussi à tous les gens du CRIDAQ, notamment Rémi et Etienne pour m'acueullir si bien. A Edimburg hi he deixat una part del meu cor, per les fantàstiques gents que hi he trobat. A la Universitat, David i Dani , també la Patrícia i en Braulio, amb qui tant he rigut! To Gunnar's friends, Claudia, Jorge, Miguel, Nathan, Leigh. So much kindness makes of Edinburgh my second home.

I fora de la Universitat, els meus amics íntims. Per tanta incondicionalitat, per donar-me suport inclús quan no enteníeu ben bé el que implica la guerra quali-quanti, o el drama d'estudiar quelcom que 'no existeix', i per ajudar-me a separar-me de la tesi quan m'hi anava la salut. A la Mariona. La meva amiga de l'ànima. A la Cris, l'Ester, la Meri, la Mire i la Montse, després de tants

anys. I als respectius, és clar, que ells també m'han hagut d'aguantar. També a la Sara, l'Ale, la Rosa i el Barra, pels riures, per l'empatia i pel suport també. A l'Esteve per la seva ironia i el seu pervers sentit de l'humor. També especial menció per la Marga, el Fredi i la Mar. És per tots vosaltres que Barcelona és la millor ciutat del món. Moltes gràcies als meus amics per això; per ser amics.

Al Gunnar. Perquè crec que dient santa paciència no faria mai justícia. Una parella és la que creu en l'altre, hi confia i hi dóna suport. És la que coneix, reconeix, i estima. Tu ho has fet, tot això, i més. I a vegades no sé què he fet per tenir tanta sort. Ich Liebe dich.

I finalment, els meus pares, Jordi i Maria Pilar, el meu germà Oriol i la meva cunyada, l'Anna. A la meva família, per la que ara em quedo sense paraules. Per tant, per la comprensió, pel vostre amor sincer, el vostre carinyo i per haver-me fet així, com soc. Doctora, sembla ara.

Barcelona, tardor de 2015.

Summary

The thesis is a compilation of three articles that explore the relationship between immigration and minority nations. It focuses on Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRP) through the lens of the centre periphery cleavage. Overall, the articles make contributions towards the research question *how do the main dimensions of the centre-periphery cleavage (identity, territory and economy) reflect on the SNRPs' discourses on immigration?* Each article explores one of the dimensions of the centre periphery cleavage. They analyse how identity, territorial distribution of powers and the economic context appear in the SNRPs' official discourse on immigration. Paired comparisons of different SNRPs in different contexts (Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland) are carried out using qualitative content analysis of manifestos, parliamentary debates and other party documents. The thesis provides, among other contributions, a deeper understanding of SNRPs discourses on immigration and how centre-periphery relations interfere in its construction.

Resum

La present tesi és una compilació de tres articles de recerca que exploren la relació entre la immigració i les nacions minoritàries, tot centrant-se en els Partits Nacionalistes sense Estat i Regionalistes (SNRP) des de la perspectiva del *cleavage* centre-perifèria. Orientats per la pregunta de recerca *com apareixen reflectides les principals dimensions del cleavage centre perifèria en el discurs dels SNRP sobre immigració?,* cadascun enfronta una de les dimensions amb l'objectiu de copsar com la identitat, la distribució territorial del poder, i el context econòmic apareixen en el discurs oficial dels SNRP. S'ha dut a terme comparacions aparellades de diferents SNRP de diversos contexts (Catalunya, Escòcia i Quebec) a través de l'anàlisi qualitativa del contingut de programes electorals, debats parlamentaris i altres documents. La tesi ofereix un major coneixement dels discursos dels SNRP en immigració i com les relacions centre-perifèria interfeixen en llurs construccions.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In 2011 the president of Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC),[1] Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida, expressed concern at the fact that in a county in northern Catalonia there were more newborn babies being called Mohammed than Jordi[2] (Efe 2011). This, together with other statements made against Andalusians in that same period, provoked criticisms from the entire political spectrum in Catalonia and beyond (see for example SOS Racisme 2011). Nevertheless, it does illustrate the main debate within which this thesis is framed: the arrival of immigration to stateless nations.

Kymlicka, in his book *Politics in the Vernacular,* poses the question of whether 'national minorities [are] capable of including immigrants in their self-conception, and thereby becoming themselves "multicultural" (2001: 278). This is an issue that stems from the specific challenges that arise from the arrival of immigration to stateless nations.[3] In addition to the traditional

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[1] UDC is a Christian democrat Catalan party that self-defines itself as autonomist. It stands for election in coalition with Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), the main nationalist party in Catalonia.

[2] Jordi is Catalan for George.

[3] Scholars from across different disciplines in Political Theory and Social Sciences in general have highlighted these challenges. Zapata-Barrero (2007), for

challenges that immigration brings to States,[4] where stateless nations are concerned, the inflow of foreigners can alter an already unstable equilibrium of powers between the periphery and the centre. The possibility of immigrants integrating into the majority nation can make the minority nation become a minority within its own territory, thus diminishing its legitimacy for demanding increased self-government (Bauböck 2001). Hence immigration into a stateless nation may be used as a tool or *weapon* by the State to stimulate majority (State) nationalism within the stateless nation's borders. For this same reason one might expect stateless nations to react negatively, or even reject, the arrival of newcomers. Yet scholars have recently shown that stateless nations' reaction to immigration is much more complex than straight-forward rejection (Zapata-Barrero 2009b).

A society's reaction to immigration can challenge its social cohesion, the protection of which is one of the main objectives of the State.[5] A growing concern related to the implications of this explains the increasing scholarly attention this topic has received (Castles & Miller 2003). However, academic interest has tended to focus on the State (and transnational) level, leaving aside the multi-level nature of immigration management. Yet there is a need to broaden our knowledge on immigration studies by incorporating its multi-level nature. The case of stateless nations and regions that continuously challenge the traditional nation-State is interesting since several countries have, directly or indirectly, decentralised powers that impact on the management of immigration. The decentralisation of policy areas such as education or health care are

example, reviews the works of Joseph Carens, Rainer Bauböck, and Will Kymlicka within the field of political theory. Contributors to Eve Hepburn and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (2014) do so from the perspective of Political Science.

[4] In most States, and particularly during periods of economic instability, immigration from developing countries tends to be perceived as a problem in relation to borders control and integration (Castles 2000). See Freeman (2005) for an overview of challenges currently worth examining.

[5] For a review see Cheong et al. (2007).

two examples. For Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRP) that attempt to protect regional or stateless nations' distinctiveness within multinational States, such as Vlaams Belang in Flanders, immigration has become a sensitive issue and has been brought to the top of the political agenda.

Growing fields of research, be it on extreme right-wing or mainstream parties, focus on the State-wide level and base their analyses on the perspective of the left-right cleavage, frequently forgetting the centre-periphery one. SNRP are no longer niche players, but part of the mainstream of West European (and I would say North American) party politics (Hepburn 2009a). In the field of political responses to immigration, the choice statewide parties (and/or arenas) face has received widespread attention among scholar. But the link between immigration and Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties is under-researched. This thesis aims at making a contribution to address this void.

The thesis is a compilation of three articles that examine SNRP responses to immigration. Following Hepburn's (2014) idea that the dynamics of this family of parties is clearly influenced by the centre periphery cleavage, the thesis moves away from the left-right approach to studying party politics and instead focuses on the centre-periphery dimension. To this end each article focuses in-depth on one of the three dimensions of the cleavage, previously identified by Rokkan & Urwin (1983), in turn: identity, territory, and economy.

Given that the thesis is a set of three articles, this introductory chapter aims to present the thesis contents, justification, research design and overall coherence. Firstly, it exposes the *framework* within which the research programme is designed. This will highlight the gap in the literature that grounds the thesis. Secondly, it sets and justifies the thesis *focus* on Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties and then introduces the research question. In the third section the *perspective* taken - the centre-periphery cleavage – is explained. This will also justify the core structure of the thesis.

Finally, the last section will review the methodological approach that has been taken and which is common to the three articles. In doing so, it seeks to address three key questions: what is the phenomenon under study, why is it relevant and how is it studied.

1. Framework: Bridging Immigration Studies, minority nations and political parties

Historically, literature has tended to guide immigration research towards the State level, leaving aside the multi-level nature that immigration management has.[6] One can hardly find any scholarly contribution that links immigration to political parties and minority nations. Instead, explorations between two of the three dimensions can be generally found. It is this gap in the literature that grounds the thesis. This section highlights the fields of research that contribute towards how this thesis is articulated. For the specific literature that guides the different analytical frameworks, see each specific paper and section 3.

a) Reacting to immigration: political parties stances and discourses

This field of research is clearly dominated by the study of the extreme right and anti-immigrant parties, a party family that is surrounded by conceptualization issues.[7] Its examination as a party family has been explored in-depth (Mudde 2013), as has their discourses on immigration (Swyngedouw & Ivaldi 2001; Erk 2005) especially in Europe, where most of these parties exist. Finally, the causes for the emergence and success of extreme right and anti-

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[6] See Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero (2014).

[7] There is a wide range of research that deals with "what the extreme right is". For an overview of this, see, for example Mudde (1996). Most authors tend to agree that these are anti-establishment parties and focus almost exclusively on only one issue, immigration.

immigrant parties have also been widely studied.[8] Arzheimer's contribution in 2009 tested most of the micro and macro factors that had already been examined in the literature (see for example Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Swank & Betz, 2003). Here, socioeconomic factors are shown to be of crucial importance. In this sense, harsh economic conditions (such as unemployment) paired with high levels of immigration pave the way for the so-called economic threat theory, which is used by extreme right parties (for example, the claims that 'immigrants steal our jobs'). This dimension, linked to SNRPs, has been less explored.

The effects of anti-immigrant parties on party systems have also been studied. In fact, an important line of this field of research tries to examine whether and how the contagion effect[9] takes place, especially in mainstream right wing parties (Norris 2005). Recent literature has shown that this phenomenon, in which parties tend to adopt increasingly a similar stance on immigration to that of anti-immigrant parties, not only affects the right but also the left wing (Bale et al. 2010; van Spanje 2010). Explaining mainstream political parties' positions towards immigration has also received academic attention. Against early evidence that the left-right dimension explained parties' positions towards immigration (Lahav 2004), Schain (2008) suggested that both the left and the right had (mainly economic) reasons to be for and against immigration respectively. But others have suggested that this relationship is not always true (Odmalm 2011). Indeed, some scholars have gone further to argue that issue ownership of immigration does not lie with the right alone (Alonso & Claro da Fonseca, 2011).

When studying actual positions on immigration, most researchers (see, for example, Van Der Valk, 2003; Zapata Barrero, 2009;

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[8] Interestingly, Ivarsflaten (2005) has shown that immigration is the only issue that makes these parties successful.

[9] Contagion is said to occur when a mainstream party adopts the discourse on immigration of a radical right party.

Garcés Mascareñas, Franco-Guillén, & Sanchez-Montijano, 2011; Loobuyck & Jacobs, 2011) have used a framework that is based on a basic or general distinction between an exclusive, negative or reactive stance and a more inclusive, positive or proactive stance. In-depth exploration of political discourses on immigration has focused especially on extreme right-wing anti-immigrant parties (see for example Hargreaves & Leaman, 1995) or the racist discourses elaborated by elites (Dijk 1993), rather than on the discourse of mainstream parties. However, in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, there are some studies that have sought to examine racist discourses and immigration in general, especially in France (Van Der Valk 2003; Bonnafous 1991), the United Kingdom (Reeves 1983) Germany (Thränhardt 1995) or Spain (Zapata-Barrero & van Dijk 2007). But this research has often focused on general parliamentary debates without distinguishing between different parties.

This literature provides an important basis for the thesis. That is, it provides a way of classifying discourses on immigration, and the interplay of economic conditions with reactions towards immigration. This inspires the third paper.

b) Immigration and minority nations

The normative identification of the challenges that arise from the interaction of minority nation and immigration, together with efforts to provide answer to these issues, started in the 1990s.[10] Authors such as Joseph Carens, Rainer Bauböck or Will Kymlicka, all coincide on the assumption that immigrants tended to integrate to the majority nation. This implies an additional pressure element on the process of nation-building for minority nations (Zapata-Barrero 2007). Thus, the main reaction of minority nations might be to claim more self-government on immigration management. All these

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[10] A similar idea was suggested (though not developed) by other contributions such as Connor (1984).

authors also agree that the way a minority nation reacts to this pressure (or challenge) sheds light on their self-understanding (Favell 2003). Scholars have provided three sets of discussions.

The first set of discussions is aimed at detecting the challenges that immigration poses to minority nations. In this sense, the arguments proposed basically point to the idea of *an unbalance of powers* in the territory of the minority nation (Kymlicka 2001). Essentially, this suggests that as immigrants tend to integrate into the majority nation (mainly because of a greater range of opportunities that the dominant culture is perceived to bring to newcomers) the relationship between the minority and the majority groups is altered. The latter can encourage the settlement of immigrants in the territory of the former in an effort to reduce the strength of the collective sense of distinctiveness of the minority nation, and may eventually make the minority nation a minority in its own territory. This premise inspires the thesis. The second set of debates is focused on the justification/ legitimization of cultural claims (understood as a public good) and its defence within minority nations. Such debates try to make a distinction between the nature of the demands that are posed by both groups; minority nations and immigrants (Bauböck 2001). It is suggested that while immigrants that arrive to a receiving society do not have a fundamental interest in cultural protection and are aware that, when emigrating, they have to renounce certain aspects of their cultures, this is not the case for minority nations. Moreover, while minority nations are territorially concentrated, immigrants form a dispersed group across the whole state, making it much more difficult to attend to their cultural demands in terms of resources. Finally, the existence of special obligations of the State towards minority nations on the basis of their history does not hold in the case of immigrants. The third group relates to the sort of solutions given by normative theorists. These point to the descentralisation of powers related to the control over the volume of immigrants and the terms of integration (Kymlicka, 2001). This last idea implies thinking in terms of

what the minority nation can expect from immigrants, and what immigrants can expect from the minority nation (Carens 1995).

Other conclusions derived from comparative studies focus on analysing how immigration is seen from a self-government perspective (Gagnon 2009; Zapata-Barrero 2009b; Barker 2010; Loobuyck & Jacobs 2011) or how self-government is interpreted from an immigration perspective (Bousetta 2009; Banting & Soroka 2012). In fact, the policy responses to immigration emerging from self-governing territories challenge the idea of culturally homogeneous nation-states, and also push us to other conceptualisations of "political community" and de-nationalised forms of citizenship. Gagnon (2009) explains how Quebec, through the implementation of an intercultural approach to immigrant integration, goes on transforming its national identity taking ethnic minorities' contributions into account. He argues for the need for minority nations to engage in an in-depth debate on immigrants' endorsement of their plans to build national identities in a multinational context. In fact, as Zapata-Barrero (2012) argues, in some cases the management of immigration takes place in parallel to the construction of sub-national movements and identities. Hence the (distinct) management and incorporation of immigration into the nation project becomes an unavoidable need. Bousetta (2009) discusses the logic of Belgium's multinational federalism and presents the main elements of the complex (and instable) system of minority protection for the region of Brussels-Capital. He argues that the interaction between multinational federalism and immigrant multiculturalism is not necessarily conflictive despite their potential for becoming "good enemies" (Bousetta 2009:101). The case of Scotland has been less explored (but see Kelly, 2002; Skilling, 2007; Arrighi de Casanova, 2014;) possibly due to its the low level of immigration. In the realm of public policy and power, attention must be drawn to the contributions made in the first part of Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014) devoted to multilevel governance, where the most prominent cases are analysed on the crucial questions of 'who does what'.

Moving to identity issues, Barker (2010) has studied the interplay between different conceptions of national identity and the resulting policy making for the inclusion of immigration in Quebec. She shows that the exclusionary positions that might be expected from substate nationalist actors do not appear in the federal province. Instead she shows that a broadening of the conception of the nation took place. The examination of citizenship in Quebec has been analysed from different perspectives. Blad and Couton (2009) examined Quebec's management of immigration and diversity in the promotion of cultural and political autonomy from Canada, showing how its intercultural approach to immigration has accentuated the province's distinctiveness from Canada. For the Catalan case, identity has been explored departing from the analysis of public policy and discourse, showing the importance of language for this region's construction of the nation (Gil Araujo 2007; Kleiner-Liebau 2009). The cases of Catalonia (as this thesis shows in article 1) and Quebec reveal that identity in these regions is adaptable to the context, and the relationship between immigration and the construction of the nation is not unidirectional. The case of the Basque country and Flanders also point in this direction (see Jeram, 2012, and also Jeram & Adam, 2014).[11]

These two subsections reveal the need for a deeper understanding of SNRP, how they react to immigration and develop their stances towards it. The importance given to issues related to identity and the distribution of powers also guide papers 1 and 2.

c) From sub-state units to SNRP

The previous section set out an overview of the growing body of literature that contributes towards the field of territory and immigration. However, the literature to date tends to consider stateless nations as a sole body of analysis, somehow leaving aside

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[11] Other cases, such as South Tyrol, have received some attention, but these have focused on public policy. See for example Wisthaler (2013) or Zuber (2014).

the fact that politics within these include a multiplicity of actors that are diverse and therefore can adopt different roles, and deploy different discourses or outputs.

Within this diversity of actors, SNRPs deserve special attention. They embody the mobilisation on the centre-periphery cleavage, aiming at aggregating and articulating the stateless nation's interest. As pointed out in the previous section, their importance within sub-state, but also State-wide political systems has already been established and is generally not contested. Furthermore, their relevance in party systems has allowed them to place centre-periphery relations on the top of the political agenda. Indeed in countries such as Spain or the UK these have become one of the main preoccupations of citizens. Hence, SNRPs reaction to immigration is worth examining.

Yet literature exclusively focusing on SNRP and immigration is very scarce, at least at the time of writing this thesis, and it is only very recently that scholars have begun to turn their attention to it. We have contributions on immigration in minority nations (see previous subsection) or contributions on SNRP - but immigration is not the focus of the work (see, for example, Breuning 1997). An exception is the study of Vlaams Belang (see for example Erk 2005), but the focus on the party, rather than being guided by its status as an SNRP, is due to its position as an extreme-right party. It is Eve Hepburn who has provided the first comparative work on this link in her 2009 (b) publication in which she explores the way SNRPs have approached immigration. She compares how SNRPs construct the territory and how issues of diversity and immigration inform their policy goals. She excludes from her analysis other actors such as regional governments or regional branches of state-wide parties and thus offers a clear picture of SNRP themselves. Interestingly, Hepburn showed how some parties in certain European regions adopt a pro-active and inclusive approach to immigration whilst others do not. Factors that could explain this variation are related to party ideology and competition, as well as some state-wide factors. Later, she examined indepth some of these

parties' conceptions of citizenship, which is one of the most important issues that relates both to nation-building and to immigration (Hepburn 2011). Loobuyck and Jacobs (2011) have also examined the Flemish parties with respect to the relationship between nationalism and discourse on immigration, focusing on national identity and self-government dimensions.

Finally, the second part of the edited volume by Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero published in 2014 is devoted specifically to SNRP and immigration. There are several chapters that explore diverse contexts, including Catalonia (see article 1 of the thesis) Flanders, Quebec, Bavaria, Scotland, and Italy, either in comparative perspective or as single case studies. Testing hypotheses proposed by Hepburn (2014) that follow her previous work of 2009, the chapters offer new insights into the dynamics taking place at the sub-state level. The dimensions of the centre-periphery cleavage are studied along with other political and institutional factors that have an influence on parties' stances, such as electoral systems or party polarisation over the matter. This volume therefore sets a framework of research on this topic. Nevertheless, as the editors state in their conclusions, the literature on SNRP and immigration is still in its infancy.

2. The focus on Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties: research question.

In this section I justify the focus on SNRPs and the research question: *how do the main dimensions of the centre-periphery cleavage (identity, territory and economy) reflect on the SNRPs' discourses on immigration?*

The previous section has reviewed the existing links that literature has established between immigration, political parties and stateless nations. On the one hand, scholars were initially interested in debates among political parties (mainly state-wide and extreme right parties) on immigration. In their analyses of party responses to immigration, this field of research contributed not only with

frameworks for the description of discourses towards immigration (positive-inclusive versus negative-exclusive discourses and stances) but also with an explanatory framework for these positions (left-right, contagion effects of the extreme right...). Arguably, the field of Immigration Studies is mainly focused on the State level.[12] On the other hand, some scholars linked immigration and stateless nations defining the normative contours that would later set the premises for the more empirical studies. As argued, those studies took stateless nations as wholes and their analyses focused mainly on policy responses. At the time this thesis was started, one could find a clear gap in the literature: little attention had been paid to SNRP's responses to the challenge of immigration. Responses to immigration are not only to be found in the form of policies, but also politics. Party politics, and more concretely, the set of discourses articulated as responses to immigration, have a functional dimension linking discourse to power and ideology and a normative one.[13] In this sense, discourses try to dominate the public debate, and distribute basic principles that help to legitimise perceptions (that is, public opinion) and actions (future policies) (Zapata-Barrero, 2009a). Next to research on policy-making responses, there is a need for better understanding the political discourses in the periphery. This is why this thesis focuses on SNRPs.

In order to defend the legitimacy of focusing on SNRPs and this framing of the research question it is worth taking a step back to highlight its relevance.

Miller (1995) argues that 'nation' refers to the community of people with an *aspiration* to be politically self-determining, while 'state'

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[12] For a reflection on methodological nationalism see Wimmer and Schiller (2003).

[13] There is a wide range of acadèmic work in the field of discourses, power and ideology. For an introduction see the work of Focault (1971) and, more related to immigration discourses, see the work of van Dijk (1993; 1997)

refers to the set of political institutions that nations often aspire to possess for themselves. This community of people have a shared identity, or national identity. As Miller clearly poses, there are five elements that help to distinguish this from other collective sources of personal identity. It is (1) 'a community constituted by a shared belief[14] and mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture'. The failure of certain nations to possess a State turns them into what has been labelled as stateless nations[15]. Furthermore, the existence of more than one nation within a state, turns this into a multinational state (Kymlicka 1995). In a multinational state, power will often be held and administered by one national identity who will tend to try to homogenize the state and thus assimilate the rest of nations. This is the natural action that can be expected from a Nation-State if we follow Gellner's definition of nationalism (1983).[16] According to him, 'nationalism is a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'.

The tendency of the successful nation (the one that manages to govern the State) to assimilate the rest of nations is often against the will of these. It is from this tension that the centre-periphery

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[14] This is in line with Anderson (1983), who famously described nations as imagined community.

[15] These nations have received many names and tags, ranging from national minorities to ethnonations, including regions or ethnic minorities. This paper however agree with those who use minority nations (Requejo, 2006) nations without state (Guibernau 2006) or stateless nations (Keating, 1997; Hepburn, 2009a) as they reflect the importance of power relations and territoriality, which are of relevance to the thesis.

[16] This is the simplest and clearest proposal of the various proposals that have been made. For an excellent overview see the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, which reviews the main author's proposals and positions, including Gellner, Miller or Smith. Despite not being the objective of this thesis, it is important to note that those classic authors have not always considered the difference between nation and State. See for a critique of this flaw to Smith, Guibernau (2004)

cleavage emerges (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). According to Rokkan and Urwin's work, in this relationship, the centre represents the seat of authority while the periphery is often characterised by distance, difference, and dependence with respects to the centre (1983, pp.2–3). In this sense, peripherality can exist in three domains which give the title to the authors' seminal work: *Identity, Territory and Economy*. Identity is where the stateless nation fights against assimilation to the centre's public culture and, thus, for recognition of distinctiveness. As the authors point out, its existence is a necessary condition for the emergence of the cleavage. Territory, is understood in Henders' terms (2010) and relates to the stateless nation seeking to gain increased self-government (and eventually its own State). Economy relates to the stateless nation's dependency on the State in terms of its fiscal basis, but often also in terms of production and infrastructure. This dependency often serves as a catalyst/ exacerbates mobilisation of the stateless nation against the State (Connor 1984).

And it is from the mobilisation on the basis of this cleavage that a party family is born (Lipset & Rokkan 1967).[17] Having received many names and tags, the terminology coined by Hepburn (2009), Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties, is the most accurate one and it is able to encompass all parties that are mobilised at the sub-state level. The thesis instrumentally follows Masseti's definition (2009, p.502) according to which 'First, they are self-

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[17] It is important to note that that recent literature has claimed that the existence of the cleavage does not necessarily impact on party systems. As Brancati (2008) argues, there are other factors that have a much greater influence, such as the role of politicians or institutional opportunities (namely political descentralisation). As the author argues, where descentralisation occurs, new regional parties are born even in places where there is not a strong centre-periphery cleavage. In this sense it is true that decentralization has strong mediation effects. However, this statement depends basically on the way the party is defined. For the author, a regional party is restricted to parties that field candidates in one region only. Massetti's definition is analytically more useful as it stresses its relationship with the centre-periphery cleavage (see third characteristic).

contained political organizations that contest elections. Secondly, they field candidates only in a particular territory (region) of the state. Thirdly, the territorial limitation of their electoral activity is a consequence of their explicit objective of defending only the identities and interests of 'their' region. Fourthly, as stated by De Winter (1998a: 204), regionalist parties' core mission is to achieve / protect / enhance "some kind of [territorial] self-government"'.

The existence of SNRPs has challenged the predictions of many scholars that there would be a fading away of territorial divides.[18] What is interesting about SNRPs is precisely what justifies the focus on them: they have succeeded in many electoral arenas in Western democracies, and also shown their capacity to survive and adapt to major challenges.[19] Their importance in terms of governance and politics goes beyond their own borders. In some cases, SNRPs have contributed to the stability of the State they are in (Bickerton & Gagnon 2011). For example, Convergència i Unió (CiU), the Catalan SNRP, was instrumental in providing stability to the government of the Popular Party in Spain in 1992, or the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy. We have also witnessed how SNRPs have challenged the State's integrity through the promotion of independence referenda. This is true in Quebec (1980 and 1995) Scotland (2014) and Catalonia (ongoing). Arguably the SNRPs, in their capacity of agents that articulate and aggregate interests (Diamond & Gunther 2001) are genuine representatives of a stateless nation. Indeed, Requejo (2006) suggests that they must exist as a condition for a territory and its population to be considered a minority nation. For these reasons, the focus on SNRPs is

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[18] For a discussion on this see Keating and McGarry (2001) and Hepburn (2009a).

[19] An example of this is can be found in the edited volume by de Winter, Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, & Lynch (2006a) where contributors analyse responses to European integration. See also the Special Issue of *Regional and Federal Studies* (ed. E. Hepburn) (2009a).

also necessary to broaden our knowledge on the effects of immigration in multilevel settings.

Having reviewed the different fields of research and justified the focus on SNRPs, it is now important to move on to synthetize the argument driving the research question.

Section 1 showed that there is a gap in the literature. In a nutshell, few efforts had been made to link Immigration Studies to stateless nations and Political Parties. There is a growing field of research analysing the interaction between immigration and stateless nations. Most authors share the same point of departure: that immigration into minority nations brings special challenges stemming from a fear of internal minoritization and its consequences. This thesis defends the necessity to focus specifically on SNRP.

The relationship between political parties and cleavages has been widely studied. Cleavage theory helps to explain the birth of party families, but also helps to understand and predict party positions on concrete issues (Marks & Wilson 2000) , especially the cross-cutting ones, such as immigration. In this sense, if one wonders about SNRP's reactions to immigration, the centre-periphery cleavage provides an explanatory framework of party stances towards immigration.[20] However, the role that this cleavage plays in structuring party positions on immigration is not unidirectional. Favell (2003) argued that the way a society manages immigration tells us a lot of how it understands itself. Inevitably the arrival of immigration obliges us to re-consider who we are, who we want to be, and where we want to go. In the case of SNRPs these questions are directly related to the centre-periphery cleavage and its dimensions: identity, territory and economy. These structure a party's response to immigration, but at the same time immigration obliges the party to reconsider these dimensions, as they need to articulate a position towards immigration (for the case of SNRPs

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[20] This is precisely one of the various contributions made by Hepburn (2014), although her framework also covers other variables that go beyond this cleavage.

this relates to the way they answer the aforementioned questions). This is precisely the relationship that this thesis aims to explore. Its objective is to offer a complementary and in-depth insight on SNRPs responses to immigration. On these grounds the research question that guides the thesis is as follows:

How do SNRPs reflect on the dimensions of the centre-periphery cleavage in their discourses on immigration?

3. A perspective on the centre-periphery cleavage: identity, territory and economy.

As stated by the critics of methodological nationalism, a shortcoming of past studies in search for evidence of the 'peripheralization' of state-wide party competition is that they did not look at party competition in regional arenas (Jeffery 2009). Moreover, these authors claim that the dynamics that are produced are different in sub-state arenas. It is often the centre-periphery cleavage that takes prominence over the left-right one (Hepburn 2014). That is why it is important to explore these dynamics through the lens of centre-periphery relations. This, as previously discussed, takes place on the basis of distance, difference and dependence. This dependence is visible in how peripheries, to differing degrees, try to protect three main boundaries from the centre's penetration; economic life, political decision making and cultural standardisation (Rokkan & Urwin 1983). Immigration, as Hepburn (2014) contends, cuts across these three dimensions. These dimensions are essential to understand how SNRPs are born, and how they perform in several aspects of political life. The way they construct their narrative is clearly intertwined with the political position they take. This section sets out an overview of these dimensions and presents the structure of the thesis.

a) Dimension 1: Identity

The realm of identity is probably the most studied in the field of nationalism (stateless or not). Identity is the core of the nation as it

is the mechanism that ensures loyalty from the members of the nation towards the State, or in this case, a State-building project. One of the key questions relating to national identity is who belongs to a nation and hence who does not.[21] What is it that makes a person French, Chilean, or Corsican? In the framework of centre-periphery relations, as Rokkan and Urwin (1983, p.66) argue, 'there are economic peripheries in Europe, but no territorial identity in the continent can be defined solely in terms of a distinctive economy'. Most scholars of territorial politics acknowledge the importance of identity and often place it as the necessary condition for successful politicisation. For example, Serrano (2013) showed that in Catalonia, where dual identity is widespread, individuals reporting an exclusively Catalan identity significantly express more support for independence.

National identity, like the nation, is a construct, and the contents given to it determines whether a nation will be more inclusive or exclusive. This is in fact the strength of the dichotomic classification of nationalisms as ethnic and civic. One groups elements that are objective and do not change greatly, while the other refers to elements that are subjective and more susceptible to change. As a construct, the nation provides several elements that can be stressed by the elites in redefining itself. Immigration, as already argued, means the arrival of individuals that do not necessarily share the elements that configure a given nation. In this sense, all stakeholders must adopt a stance towards immigration, and inevitably, this will have an effect on the definition of the nation. For example, if a given elite wishes to reject immigration, an ethnic interpretation of the nation will legitimise a restrictive policy response. This could happen in the context of a nation without State, immigration could be seen as a threat, raising fears of internal minoritization. But on the other hand, immigration can also be seen as an advantage and elites may incorporate it into their national

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[21] And similar to the construction of discourses on immigration, seting the difference between 'us' and 'them'.

project. If an elite sees immigration as an advantage, they will tend to eliminate the ethnic aspects of nationalism in order to lower the barriers for national incorporation.

This is precisely the argument made and supported in the first paper of the thesis, which focuses on the key dimension of identity. To do so, it develops an analytical framework to describe *how elements of nationalism appear in the construction of a discourse on immigration*. It is based on the study of a stateless nation, Catalonia, were issues of identity are specially salient as it has strongly hindered the making and debate over Spanish identity itself (Zapata-Barrero 2013). Departing from the traditional distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, the framework has the novelty of analysing the issue of language transversally, across the civic/ethnic dichotomy, which is criticised. The analysis of the two relevant SNRP (Convergència i Unió, CiU, and Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya, ERC) reveals a strong relationship between a party's stance on immigration and its conception of the nation.

b) Dimension 2: Territory

Following on from Miller's definitions, territoriality, referring to the organization of political space and the spatial extent of political authority (Henders, 2010), links the nation (aspiration) and the State (end). The nation's aspiration to self-govern creates tensions within a multinational states between the centre and the peripheries. In these contexts, devolution and decentralisation of power in the context of federal and quasi-federal democracies have been presented as solutions given their potential to lower tensions between the central State and the regional governments or entities. However, authors have claimed that while federalism can lower

tensions between the centre and the periphery, it may not make them disappear. This is the so-called federalism paradox.[22]

Immigration affects different spheres of political power. Some of them tend to remain entirely in the hands of the centre, namely borders and citizenship (in other words, the decision on who enters the community). Others can be spread among different levels of government, such as education, health or social services (powers that are more related to integration). In order to illustrate the issues at stake in this realm, consider the case of Catalonia as an example. As can be seen in paper 1, there have been episodes where Catalan politicians have accused the Spanish government of sending immigrants that arrived to other parts of Spain to Catalonia. In debates, Catalan politicians have argued for Catalonia to be given decision-making powers over this policy area that has traditionally exclusively belonged to the State. Despite this, the Spanish government recently issued a draft report on the Reform of Public Administration in which, among many other aspects, points to a recentralisation of immigrant integration policy. This has raised concerns among Catalan politicians.[23]

In view of the potential tensions highlighted by several scholars on immigration and stateless nations, Kymlicka proposed devolution of two types of powers (control over the volume and control over the terms of integration) as a solution (2001). One may wonder whether devolution has any effect in lowering tensions. Departing from this

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[22] For an explanation of this see Erk and Anderson (2009). For a comparative analysis see Guibernau (2006).

[23] The aim of the report was to identify administrative duplicities and elaborate proposals to eliminate them. Two sections related to immigration. Eliminating Racism and Xenophobia Observatory duplicity, and developing a "Spanish Integration Policy". In this sense, the report placed emphasis on issues such as introducing to immigrants the society of reception, in the opinion of the report; it is the Spanish society and not the municipality or the Autonomous Community. Another suggestion was to recentralize control over work permits (which was recently decentralized) by merging it with the management of residence permits (which is controlled by the central state). See CORA (2013).

paradox, the second paper aims at examining *the effects of decentralisation of immigration powers on the way SNRP portray the relationship with the centre*. To do so, the discourse on immigration of two similar SNRPs in contexts where the distribution of powers differ (Scottish National Party, SNP, and Parti Québécois, PQ) has been examined. The results confirm this so-called federalism paradox, supporting the view that rather than reducing centre-periphery conflict and tension, SNRPs in highly decentralised regions maintain a discourse of tension towards the centre.

c) Dimension 3: Economy

Secessionist movements have often been linked to economic interest.[24] This tendency to maintain that territorial conflicts are at bottom economic in impulse has been defended and even legitimised (Dietrich 2013) as it has been criticised. For example, Connor (2001) denounced a 'very common tendency to exaggerate the impact that economic factors exert upon ethno-national conflict' (p. 115) and even Rokkan and Urwin stated the fact that economic factors act, at most, to exacerbate or as catalysts for mobilisation. There is no doubt, however, that economic dependencies are at the centre of political debates in most regions in Europe, including Catalonia, Scotland, Bavaria and the north of Italy.

Unlike in the realm of territory and identity, economy is perhaps the field that is less explored in terms of its link with immigration and minority nations. This is the case despite the fact that economic features have been identified as important in studies related to explaining individuals perceptions towards immigration (Rustenbach 2010) or extreme right vote (Arzheimer 2009).

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[24] For example, in 2012 an article entitled "The Egoists hour: Debt Crisis Gives European Separatists a Boost" appeared in *Der Spiegel*. It commented on secessionist movements in the Basque Country, Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland and South Tyrol, linking their raises to the economic crisis.

However, some authors have suggested a link between the economic situation of a region and political parties' stance towards immigration (Connor 1984; Harvie 1994; Hepburn 2014), many also highlighting that an economic crisis can also have an effect. Most authors predict a negative response to immigration, especially in rich regions.

Given this gap, the third paper aims at carrying out an exploratory comparative study. It seeks to explore *whether the relative economic position of the nation within the State has an influence on the SNRP discourses towards immigration and also whether external economic shock such as the current economic crisis has any effect on it*. The paper compares the ERC and the SNP. That is, a SNRP,in a relatively rich economic region and one in a relatively poorer economic region. The article argues that the economic role of the region helps to shape the discourse of SNRPs (especially in terms of the reasons for why immigrants are attracted to the region) but does not determine the stance towards immigration. It concludes by arguing that the difference between the stances of the two parties studied stems from the migratory phase each region currently faces.

The following figure summarises the structure of the thesis and includes information, where relevant, of where the work has been published or submitted for publication.

Figure 1. Thesis structure: Dimensions, research questions and outputs

Identity

- *Research Question*: how do elements of nationalism appear in the construction of a discourse on immigration?
- Cases: CiU and ERC
- *H1: SNRP with positive stances towards immigration will tend to portray their nationalist discourse as civic*
- *H2: SNRP with negative stances towards immigration will tend to portray their nationalist discourse as ethnic*

Paper 1: Catalunya terra d'acollida: Stateless Nationalist Parties Discourses on Immigration

Presented: GNC. Humboldt University. Berlin: March 2011.

The New European Agenda for Integration: Regions, Multi-level Governance and Immigrant Integration in the EU. University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: June 2012

Published: (co-authored with R. Zapata-Barrero) in E. Hepburn and R. Zapata-Barrero (eds.) *The Politics of Immigration in Multi-level States: Governance and political parties*. Basingstoke: Palgrave/MacMillan.

Territory

- *Research Question*: how does the territorial distribution of powers affects how SNRP portray the relationship with the centre
- Cases: SNP and PQ
- H1: In minority nations with low decentralisation on immigration, SNRP will maintain a discourse portraying high conflictivity with the centre.
- H2: In minority nations with high decentralisation on immigration, SNRPs will maintain a discourse portraying lower conflictivity with the centre.

Paper 2: The multi-level politics of immigration: the case of stateless nationalist and Regionalist Parties in Scotland and Quebec

Presented: GRTIM-UPF PhD working Sessions. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Barcelona: February 2013.

Graduate network conference. European University Institute. Florence: March 2015.

Publication: submitted to peer reviewed journal

Economy

- *Research Question*: how does the relative economic position of the nation within the State influences the SNRP discourses towards immigration and whether an external economic shock has any effect.
- Cases: ERC and the SNP.
- H: Exploratory

Paper 3: Selfishness of the affluent? Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties and immigration.

Presented: UACES 43rd Annual Conference. Leeds: September 2013.

IMISCOE Annual Conference. Malmö: August 2013

Published: in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*

DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2015.1082287

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4. Methodology

Given that this thesis is a compilation of three articles, each article has its own methodological specificities. Nevertheless, all three share a common descriptive-interpretive approach (Elliot and Timulak, 2005) which rely on qualitative data and method (Qualitative content analysis, see below). This approach is especially suited when a research question is exploratory in nature and aims at disentangling how a certain phenomenon unfolds over time and assessing causal mechanisms. This is combined with qualitative paired comparisons. Often regarded as single case studies, paired comparisons offer the advantage of in-depth exploration of cases and their respective backgrounds, while at the same time allowing for the correction of generalizations obtained from single case studies. Hence they help to assess the influence of certain institutions thereby creating an intermediate step in theory building (Tarrow 2010). Scholars that take the contextual approach argue for the need of acknowledging how the characteristics of the context are significantly intertwined with what happens within an organization. This is because they consider these to be crucial in describing and explaining a certain phenomenon (see, for example, Carens, 2000; Mjøset, 2009). Paired comparisons offer the possibility of highlighting differences and similarities, which in turn help identify hypotheses (as in paper 3) or explain hypotheses derived from the literature (as in papers 1 and 2). For each paper, the selection of cases takes place with the intention of introducing a certain degree of variability (be it from the context of each case as in paper 2 and 3, or the characteristics of each case, as in paper 1) that helps confirm the hypotheses presented.

a) Selection of cases and time frame

There is however a common and invariable criterion that guides the selection of cases, which is relevance. In this sense, Sartori's criteria for party system relevance (2005) arguably offers a clear and parsimonious logic for selection. Namely, he proposes two

criteria: first, *coalition potential*, which means having the possibility of at least forming a coalition government, and second, *blackmail potential,* that is, while in the opposition, having the possibility of blackmailing the government. Next to these two criteria, a third criterion of survival for at least two full legislative periods completes the understanding of relevance adopted by this thesis.

The research question guides the selection of the wider context from which cases are selected: for the case of identity, a case is drawn from Catalonia. Here identity is a salient issue, and it offers the advantage of having a party system where two relevant SNRP with different ideological leanings exists. This also provides new grounds for the questioning of the relationship between the left-right axis in terms of party position towards immigration. The two parties selected are Convergència i Unió (CiU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a party that has been often ignored by the literature despite its important role in day-to-day Catalan politics. For the second dimension, territory, two similar SNRP were chosen but from different contexts in terms of how powers over immigration are distributed. In this paper, the two cases studied are the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Parti Québécois (PQ). For the third dimension, the economy, the same rationale was applied. Two similar SNRP in poorer and richer regions (the SNPR and the ERC) are compared. [25] The selection criteria excludes other cases within regions that are of academic and political relevance, such as the Basque Country or Flanders. Examples of these cases are the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), the different forms the Ezkerra Abertzale (Left wing separatists) has taken over the last decade, or Flemish parties in the right (Vloskunie / Nieuw Vlaams Alliantie, Vlaams Blok/Belang) the far right (Vlaams Block/Belang) or the Left (Spirit, Vlaams Progressieven, etc). Parsimony and an aim for exploring the different dimensions

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[25] Contextual information and more in-depth justifications are provided in each paper.

in an in-depth manner prioritised paired comparisons in which other parties appeared closer to the ideal types for comparison rather than the aforementioned ones, in contexts were political life was more stable during the period of analysis. Had these contexts been incorporated to the thesis and an account of new variables introduced by their respective contexts, such as political instability (in terms of violence for the former, and instability of the parties - and governance - for the latter) participation in the government of the political centre (that would in fact make it impossible for paper 2), or presence of extreme right wing parties should have been introduced. This, in its turn, would increase a difficulty to grasp the relationship between these variables and the already proposed ones and between the proposed variables and discourses on immigration on the other hand.

For the three papers a period including at least three legislative periods was selected in order to introduce the dimension of time into the analysis. A longitudinal analysis presented two advantages: first, it enables to grasp (or discard) variation within cases (in article 1), and second, to control for issues that could weaken the validity of the hypotheses proposed for each article. For example, it has been suggested that being in government or in opposition may have an effect on a party's discourses (either radicalising or moderating it) (Breunig & Luedtke 2008). Moreover, for the case of the third article it allowed for the analysis of discourse before and after an economic crisis. In order to be as up to date as possible, the legislative periods selected are the three last completed legislative periods. This also means that it incorporates times when all the SNRP studied have been in office and in opposition.

b) Sources of information: Three databases on discourses on immigration

The thesis has been carried out with the use of primary and secondary sources of information at different stages of research.

Secondary sources, consisting of academic literature, but also some institutional documents and reports, were used at the early stages of research design. This was necessary in order to construct the theoretical and analytical frameworks of each article, and in order to construct the different contexts and select the relevant cases for study. Secondary sources were also used in order to focus the collection of primary sources and to design the structure of the interviews carried out. All secondary sources used in each article are cited in their respective bibliographies.

Primary sources of information make up the bulk of the data that has been analysed in order to answer the research question. These documents constitute the official discourse of SNRP on immigration. Understanding discourse from a broad perspective as a set of articulations of interpretations of reality entails having a fuzzy limit of what is discourse and what is not. As van Dijk discusses when speaking about political discourse analysis, depending on the context and on the intention, many things can be treated as political discourse (van Dijk 1997). The thesis understands discourse to be articulated in official sources. This refers essentially to the text and talk that is articulated by politicians (professionals of politics) within a given party's organisation. This helps to capture the SNRPs main position and therefore select the sources of information. These are primary and encompass most if not all of the official political discourse at the regional level. These sources of information are taken to reflect commitment made by the SNRP on immigration issues. In this sense they reflect the party position, hence it is assumed that all party officials would take that same position. Each of them offers different advantages that are described below:

1) *Manifestos and party programmes*: Manifestos are definitive statements of party positions that enable systematic analysis over time and across cases (Leith 2008). They remain the best known documents produced by political parties (Cooke 2000). They constitute a sort of contract between the party and its voters. However, given the wide range of topics they necessarily address, they are insufficient for in-depth

analysis. Manifestos are also used, together with secondary sources, to focus the gathering of information and the design of interviews.

2) *Parliamentary debates*: Members of Parliament, due to their position as representatives, have to develop, express and defend parties' positions in the public debate, offering a more developed view of statements in manifestos. Transcripts from plenary sessions about certain immigration issues (such as immigration laws) but also general politics debates have been taken into account. Moreover, where possible, plenary debates in central State legislatures relating to Immigration Laws and any subsequent reforms have also been examined in the cases where the SNRP being studied was represented. Finally, debates in thematic commissions and written and oral questions and answers directly relating to immigration are also analysed. Parliamentary transcripts are in fact the main source of information due to their extensiveness.

3) *Semi-structured interviews*: These are used with the aim of confirming, rather than complementing, the initial findings and help to focus the analysis of the main sources of information. They are also used in order to build the different contexts and correct the analytical frameworks. They were carried out with party representatives that held posts of responsibility relating to immigration, both within the party structure and in the parliamentary group.[26] A copy of the interview guide can be found in the annex.

The documents analysed were obtained from the SNRPs' own web pages. Transcripts of debates were found in the Parliamentary web sites, all of which have advanced research engines. Debates were searched and selected based on only one criterion: being focused of immigration. A total of more than 300 documents are included in the hermeneutic units for analysis. These are organized by context (that is, a data base per Parliament).

A deeply qualitative technique such as Grounded Theory Building was not suitable given the volume of the gathered information and also the fact that there is already an important body of literature that can focus (and indeed has focused) this research. For the same reason, and because this thesis is not interested in analysing how language itself (and its use) helps to form ideology and shape power and domination, critical discourse analysis is also discarded. The technique used is Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). This is suited to the analysis of large volumes of data and preserve some advantages of quantitative content analysis without losing the latent content and context of data (Mayring 2000). The technique, which systematically guides all the steps of the research, allows the researcher to focus on selected aspects of the material (see Schreier, 2012 for a wider discussion) thus it provides a certain degree of flexibility depending on the research question. For example, paper 3 requires data-driven coding to build up the analytical framework while paper one and two do not, given that their analytical framework was derived from the literature. QCA allows analysis to be made from the data and from the theory. Hence coding frames were developed for each article. In the first two papers these were based on the analytical framework proposed by existing theory. In the third paper the coding frame was derived at inductively. Instrumental codes for capturing the time frame and thus controlling for factors such as changes in governments were also applied (thus merging analytical codes and instrumental codes into supercodes). With regards to the

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and the CRÉCQ, Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Études Québécoises et Canadiennes).

segmentation of units of analysis, for each paper this was done via thematic criterion (that is, coding was implemented when a topic related to immigration and the main category emerged). Intracoder reliability tests were applied for each chapter in order to correct the coding frames. This was done with the support of Atlas.ti software for qualitative analysis. See the papers and the annex for full description of codes.

The following figure summarises the different steps taken in the thesis.

Figure 2. Steps taken in the thesis.

Cian (primary) and golden (secondary) indicate the use of sources of information. Numbers correspond to the type of primary source used (see list above)

The remainder of the thesis contains the three articles outlined above. At the end a set of overall conclusions are presented. In that section the main findings and contributions are reviewed, and a reflection on the common patterns found across the three studies is made. Departing from the idea that nationalism needs to create a 'common enemy', the thesis essentially argues that when it comes to stateless nations, instead of choosing immigration as the common enemy, SNRPs point towards the centre. This enables newcomers to find ways to develop a sense of loyalty to the periphery. This, in turn, provides an explanation of how the so-called threat or fear of internal minoritisation is being addressed. After a reflection on the thesis' limitations the focus shifts to the avenues for further research. These revolve around further exploration of the relationship between centre and periphery in terms of immigration, and also the reaction of immigrants and their eventual incorporation into nation building projects.

5. A consideration on the concept of nation and stateless nation.

The concept of nation is as intangible as the concept of gender, god or social class. All of them have in common a difficulty in reaching an agreement on how it is to be conceptualised (and in some times, operationalised). Another problem is that many of its given conceptualisations contain a combination of definitions and causal arguments (Barrington 1997). What all of them have into common, is that they are social constructions, which despite being arguable, have consequences in real life. Because of god, because of gender, because of social class, and because of national origins, people are discriminated on a daily basis. Besides, these social constructions are institutionalised, for example, in civil associations, in churches, in political parties or in workers unions and clubs. And all these institutions lobby for the interest of groups that share any of these identities.

This thesis departs from the premise that immigration brings specific challenges to stateless nations in order to justify the examination of SNRP. By doing so, it seems to acritically assume the existence of such thing as a nation. This section aims at clarifying that despite acknowledging that (stateless) nations are as intangible concepts as the aforementioned ones, the focus of the thesis is not on these, but on their institutionalised form, namely SNRPs.

There is no doubt that the concept of nation is a social construction (or as B. Anderson noted, an imagined community, 1983). Miller's proposal of definition of the nation as well as its main features suffices as a point of departure for the present thesis. As already explained in section 2, the failure of certain nations to possess the set of institutions that conform a State, converts them into stateless nations. Due to its long tradition of political mobilisation, which prove Miller's 'aspiration to be politically self-determining', stateless nations such as the ones included in the present thesis are widely accepted as such - that is, academically[27] and politically recognised.[28] One could wonder, for example, what happens with the north of Italy or, in words of the Lega Nord (LN) the Padania. Because of its recent construction, the project remains less than compelling (Albertazzi 2006). Nevertheless, this invention can eventually evolve into a (stateless) nation if the LN's centres its discourse on this project and penetrates northern Italians imaginery (Panebianco 2010).

All contexts within which cases have been selected, Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec exhibit high levels of decentralisation, and Quebec has even the possibility of sharing the power of the centre

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[27] On this, see the work of authors such as M. Keating (1997), M. Guibernau (2006) or F. Requejo (2006)

[28] Exception must be made to the case of Catalonia, which is recognised in the Spanish Constitution as a 'nationality'.

thanks to a fully federal pact with Canada. Hence, one could well wonder whether these context can be considered 'stateless nations.'[29] But it is precisely the issue of immigration what makes more evident the distinction between nation-State and stateless nation. Its cross-sectional nature affects most areas and levels of government in a given State. Thanks to decentralisation processes it is frequent the regional and the local levels are the ones in charge of most responsibilities on immigration and immigrant integration management. This has led to even the emergence of a concept of 'regional citizenship' (Hepburn 2011). But next to this, immigration precisely affects an area that the author of this thesis is convinced that will never be decentralised by a State: borders and naturalisation. Even in Quebec, which has strong powers on immigrant selection, is not fully sovereign in answering the questions 'who enters and how many.'[30] The answer to this question is thus intimately tied to the territoriality dimension of the State and the extension of its sovereignty, as it is one of the main pillars of the borders policy. As Arendt stated (citing Preuss, 1973, 278) 'sovereignty is nowhere more absolute than in matters of emigration, naturalisation, nationality and expulsion'.

As pointed out, this thesis assumes these definitions and acknowledges its problems, to focus on SNRP. These parties successfully mobilise a shared understanding of belonging within its electorate, and use the idea of a stateless nation in order to gain votes and construct their discourses and manifestos around it. Understanding their success or failure also involves learning about how they mobilise its different elements, especially those that are in tension with the State, and/or the majority nation: identity, territory and economy.

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[29] Governing institutions in the Autonomous Communities in Spain are constitutionally considered extensions of the State in the regions. Thus, on the paper, the *Generalitat* is simply a delegation of the State in Catalonia.

[30] For more on this, see paper 2, chapter 3.

Note on repetition

In this introduction an overview of the three articles that make up the thesis has been presented. The crossover between the articles may lead to repetitions being made, but every effort has been made to avoid this. Cross-referencing between papers had been made where relevant and convenient. However, as each paper is designed as a stand-alone article, there are parts (especially in the theoretical frameworks and the justification of certain choices) where repetition inevitably occurs.

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2. *CATALUNYA, TERRA D'ACOLLIDA*: STATELESS NATIONALIST PARTY DISCOURSES ON IMMIGRATION IN CATALONIA

This chapter aims to explore the interaction between minority nations and immigration through the examination of SNRP discourses in Catalonia. The starting concern is how elements of nationalism appear in the construction of a discourse on immigration. We argue that a party's stance towards immigration influences the nationalist discourse. We analyse the two SNRP in Catalonia on the basis of party documents and parliamentary debates and interviews with party representatives. A system of categories related to identity is proposed, and the findings confirm the hypothesis that those SNRP with positive stances towards immigration tend to portray their nationalist discourse as civic. With this analysis we seek also to contribute to link two debates: the nationalist theories and the debate on political discourse towards immigrants.

1. Introduction

In 1987 the *Generalitat*[1] launched the institutional campaign 'Som sis Milions' (*We are six million*). It was aimed at expressing the idea that there are no differences between being born in Catalonia or being an immigrant (País 2009). Today Catalonia has more than 7.5 million inhabitants and most of this increase is due to the arrival of immigrants from third countries. Even if migration is not a new phenomenon in Catalonia, the diversity of origins and the rapid pace in which it has taken place during the last decades are new (Franco-Guillén 2011). Furthermore, the management of immigration coincides with the rise of substate nationalist movements seeking to advance self-government and their own nation-building projects (Whithol de Wenden & Zapata-Barrero 2011). This has been acknowledged by the different governments that have ruled the *Generalitat* since the beginning of the migratory process. Efforts have been made to manage what has been mostly described as 'a challenge'. From public policies to cross-sectional plans, including a National Agreement on Immigration (PNI, 2008) and a Law for the reception of immigrants, we can say that immigration has been monitored by the Catalan government since its very inception (for an overview see Zapata-Barrero, 2012a). Furthermore, an awareness that certain discourses on immigration can lead to racist and xenophobic attitudes and thus threaten social cohesion has been present in many debates in the Catalan political arena. With the same conviction, most political parties have expressed the idea that defining an immigration policy is also deciding what kind of country Catalonia will be in the future. In this chapter we aim to explore this underlying idea, precisely through the examination of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties' (SNRP[2]) discourses on immigration.

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[1] Government of Catalonia

[2] In line with E. Hepburn's (Hepburn 2009b) discussion, we use SNRP to refer to the party family which places stress on territorial power relations.

The starting concern informing our focus is how elements of nationalism and national identity are reflected in the construction of a discourse on immigration. In particular, the objective is to explore SNRP discourses on immigration in Catalonia through the prism of one dimension of the territorial cleavage[3]: identity/culture. Our main argument is that SNRP with positive stances towards immigration tend to highlight the civic elements of the nation and downplay the ethnic ones. We start by presenting the theoretical framework, together with the methodology and justification of case studies. Next, we move on to the contextualization of the Catalan case and present our results. In the conclusion, we attempt to explain the differences, but especially the similarities that have been found between the two cases (CiU and ERC), and how this framework can also be a useful analytical tool to study other cases.

2. Theoretical framework: linking nationalist debate with political discourse on immigration

Several authors have claimed that immigration poses specific challenges to minority nations (Kymlicka 2001; Hepburn 2009b) as it raises a double fear: one from internal 'minorization', and the other from external cultural dominance or assimilation into the supra-national or state culture (Lipton 2012). In sum, it alters the equilibrium of power relations in two ways. On the one hand, immigration impacts the *external* relationship between the substate units and the state level, and on the other hand it impacts the *internal* relationship between the substate unit of government and its associated societal culture (Zapata-Barrero 2012b). Immigration entails an additional pressure in the process of distinct nation-building for minority nations (Zapata-Barrero 2009b) as immigrants tend to integrate into the majority nation. This can involve the

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[3] Although identity is the main objective, the analysis of the data reveal references to the other dimensions pointed out by Eve Hepburn in this volume, that is territory and economy. We refer to them in another section.

minority nation becoming a minority within its own territory. In fact, the management of migratory flows can be a tool for the majority nation to undermine national diversity, and according to Catalan politicians (P13:0491 for ERC and P85:60 for CiU), this has already been used by the Spanish state. These specific challenges have led authors to open different lines of research using a wide range of approaches and disciplines, from normative questions that arise from the interaction of two types of collective rights and claims to the different policy responses and effects[4] of multiple diversity[5]. Indeed, as it is already assumed by the current literature, the way that immigration is approached sheds light on the society's self-understanding.

This premise has encouraged other scholars to explore how elements of nationalism have helped to construct public policy on immigration in Quebec and Flanders (Barker 2010; Barker 2012; Loobuyck and Jacobs 2011; Adam and Jacobs 2014; Iacovino 2014; Erk 2014). Most contributions examining immigration and minority nations have equated the minority nation to 'regional' authorities as the main actors representing the nation. Political parties have hardly been taken into account, and when this has occurred (Banting & Soroka 2012; Loobuyck & Jacobs 2011; Kymlicka 2001), SNRPs have not been examined separately (with some exceptions – see Hepburn 2009b). However, SNRPs, in their capacity as agents that articulate and aggregate interests (Diamond & Gunther 2001), also represent (or at least aim to represent) the (construction of the) nation, thus deserve special attention. As 'ethnic political entrepreneurs' (de Winter & Türsan 1998), SNRPs play a central role in the re-construction of the regionalist 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991) and its subsequent claims for changing the existing centre/periphery power arrangements. These parties

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[4] See, among others, Kymlicka (2001), Baübock (2001) Labelle et al. (2012d) or Gagnon (Gagnon 2009).

[5] Multiple diversity is proposed as a suitable terminology for contexts such as Spain (Zapata-Barrero 2013)

highlight different components of substate identity in order to define the people as distinct and therefore pose the aforementioned claims. In this sense, immigration as a global phenomenon brings an important amount of diversity into communities, blurring to some extent the essence of nations depending on how they are defined by political actors. Hence, it poses a particular challenge to SNRPs in deciding whether or not, and how, to include non-nationals in their construction of a unified and distinct regional community (Hepburn 2011). As a result, SNRPs can take a more inclusive or xenophobic approach, which has direct consequences on social cohesion.

In order to explore the nationalist dimension that can be found in SNRPs' discourses on immigration, we draw on the well-known ethnic/civic distinction to classify these components. Most authors dealing with nationalism have departed from a classic distinction of these two main forms. [6] Despite the fact that Smith (1971) proposed a broader classification, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is still today the most commonly used. In general, the civic form refers to the one characterized by using a subjective definition and insists on the free will of individuals in order to determine belonging. In contrast the ethnic form uses cultural, linguistic, religious or ethnic criteria to determine a more objective membership (Lecours 2000). This distinction has also been used to assert that ethnic nationalism is illiberal, while the civic one is more liberal (see for example Ignatieff 1995). Some authors have noted that this is not always the case (Brubaker 1996), and that the categorization is not suited to account for how elements of culture intersect in the two forms (Loobuyck & Jacobs 2011). Furthermore, even if most minority nationalisms could be classified as ethnic, they are often more liberal than some statewide ones (Kymlicka 2001; Hepburn 2011; Loobuyck & Jacobs 2011).

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[6] Which became famous after the publication of Anthony Smith's *Theories of Nationalism* (1971), having as precedents Meinecke's distinction between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation,* and Kohn's work (Brubaker, 1999).

Language is a critical element within this context. As Bauböck (2001:333) suggested, 'if a national linguistic minority were to become a minority within its own province, (…) this demographic shift would undermine its power to claim regional autonomy'. Indeed, Erk and Koning (2010) have shown how language diversity influences institutional change and decentralization. Most literature using the civic–ethnic classification tends to include language within the ethnic elements of nationalism. However, as Taras (1998) acknowledged, it is when languages are politicized that the struggle for national identity begins. He explores how language policies have sought to define or reinforce national identity in different cases such as Canada, Quebec, the former Soviet Republics or the United States. This highlights the idea that language should be included within the analysis of nationalist discourses not on the side of ethnic discourse, but as a transversal element. As we will argue, the *way* language is introduced in the discourse is what distinguishes ethnic from civic nationalism.

With regards to immigration, it is true that the civic elements of the nation, and especially the voluntary dimension, make it easier for SNRP to include diversity within their discourses. By contrast, certain ethnic identifiers, such as religion or common ancestry, might make it more difficult to include diversity within the nation. Scholars dealing with immigration and minority nations have already found out how issues such as language play a central role in the Catalan or Quebec identity (Labelle 2004; Gil Araujo 2007; Blad & Couton 2009; Erk 2014), and not in others such as Scotland (Hepburn 2011; Hepburn & Rosie 2014) and it is important to see how all of these elements are articulated. In this sense, ethnic elements have a potential for excluding newcomer[7], as immigrants cannot be born in the receiving society, and they can hardly change their religion or their skin colour. Hence, we might expect that SNRP unwilling to include or accept immigrants will advance an

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[7] This was historically the case for the Basque Country and its main SNRP, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), in its foundation (Conversi 1997).

ethnic understanding of their nation. In contrast, civic elements will be more inclusive for newcomers, as fully participating in the nation would 'only' entail living within its territorial borders and respecting civic values. In sum, through the following hypotheses, we suggest that the SNRPs' stances on immigration determine the way their nationalist discourses are constructed.

In accordance with E. Hepburn's conceptual chapter in chapter 3 of this volume, we divide parties' stances on immigration into a dichotomy between positive and negative stances. In this sense, a *positive stance* refers to those parties accepting immigration and describing it as an opportunity for social cohesion or even for nation-building. Neutral statements describing immigration as a fact or a reality are also included in this stance. In contrast, a *negative stance* refers to parties which are clearly reluctant to accept the arrival of immigrants and describe it as a problem or threat to social cohesion and nation-building.

Hypothesis 1: SNRP with positive stances towards immigration will tend to portray their nationalist discourse as civic

Alternative hypothesis: SNRP with negative stances towards immigration will tend to portray their nationalist discourse as ethnic

Methodologically, we consider three main analytical dimensions or 'categories' of nationalist discourse: belonging, values and the function of language. The *first category* refers to the arguments used by political parties to determine national **belonging**. Within a civic nationalist discourse, stress will be put on the subjective willingness of its members to become part of the nation. Thus, any person living within its territorial borders and willing to belong to the nation becomes socially considered as a member of the nation. In contrast, an ethnic nationalist discourse will propose objective

elements that are beyond the person's will/ability to belong to the nation, such as common ancestry, history, religion or blood ties. The *second category* is the group of **values** that are shared by the members of the nation and that are identified to be key to social cohesion. While, civic nationalism will stress the importance of democratic values, and concretely that of equality of opportunities as well as universal human rights, ethnic nationalism will stress the importance of maintaining traditions and customs, and upholding traditional conservative values. Finally, as *a third category*, we propose the **function of language**. As we have suggested, disputing an assumption in the current debate on nationalism, we prefer to treat language transversally, across the civic/ethnic dichotomy. This is done by stressing its function within the integration process of immigrants. For instance, several authors have already noted how language, as a resource, can have the function of assuring equality of opportunities (Kymlicka and Patten, 2003). In this sense, it might well be that SNRP pose language as a matter of choice 'linked to occasions of social mobility, as a main source of motivation' (Zapata-Barrero, 2012b: 87). Concerning an ethnic nationalist discourse, language is an objective identity marker, and a precondition to be accepted within the national community (Lind, in Taras, 1998). Hence, SNRPs would present knowledge of the language as necessary for being accepted into the national community and to be considered as integrated. Table 13.1 summarizes the analytical framework.

Table 2.1. Analytical framework to confirm the hypothesis

	Positive stance on immigration	Negative stance on immigration
Categories	Civic Nationalist Discourse	Ethnic Nationalist Discourse
Belonging	Stress the subjective willingness of the people to belong to a nation	Stress objective elements that are beyond the will/ability of the people
Values	Stress the importance of maintaining shared values relating to democracy (mainly equality of opportunities) and universal human rights, for social cohesion	Stress the importance of maintaining shared values relating to tradition, religion and customs for social cohesion
Function of Language	Social function of language. Language as a means to achieve equal opportunities. Instrumental dimension of language for social mobility	Language as an objective identity marker and as a pre-condition to be accepted in the national community

Source: Own elaboration.

It is difficult to establish the direction of a causal relationship between civic/ethnic nationalism and positive/negative stances towards immigration as they most likely affect each other. Despite this endogeneity and both questions being a matter of political

choice, we argue that, as any nation is a construction or 'imagined community', it provides both civic (especially in developed democracies) and ethnic elements throughout its history and political context. Therefore, to the SNRP, it becomes a matter of decision-making, of choosing which of these elements of nationalism to adopt[8] or dismiss, and thereby to make their nationalist discourses compatible with their stances towards immigration.

3. Case selection and methodology: SNRP in Catalonia

a) Selection of cases

The unit of analysis in this chapter is the discourse of SNRPs. Following Massetti's (2009) definition, SNRPs have four characteristics. First, they are self-contained political organizations that contest elections. Secondly, they field candidates only in a particular territory (region) of the state. Thirdly, the territorial limitation of their electoral activity is a consequence of their explicit objective of defending only the identities and interests of 'their' region. Fourthly, as stated by De Winter and Türsan (1998a: 204[9]), regionalist parties' core mission is to achieve/protect/enhance 'some kind of [territorial] self-government'. We agree that a party can be considered relevant when it is so in Sartori's terms[10] and when it survives at least one term of office. Two out of the six parties[11]

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[88] See Leith and Soule (2012: 149-50) for a reflection on this

[9] Quoted in Massetti (2009).

[10] According to Sartori (2005) a political party is party-system relevant if it exhibits *blackmail potential* (the party's existence affects the party competition and the direction of the competition) or *coalition potential* (the party can be needed for a feasible coalition majority).

[11] There are currently six political parties in the Catalan Parliament: Convergència i Unió (CiU), Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya (ERC), Partit Popular de Catalunya (PPC) Iniciativa

represented in the Catalan Parliament accomplish the proposed criteria.

Table 2.2 Selection of cases and criteria

Criterion	Convergència i Unió (CiU[12])	Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya (ERC[13])
Ideology	Left-Right: Centre-right	Left-Right: Moderate left
	Centre-periphery: autonomist[14]	Centre-periphery: Secessionist
Party System relevance	Autonomous level: Two governing periods: 1980-03 and 2010 to date. Coalition potential from 2003-10.	Autonomous level: Coalition potential from 2003-10. Governing in the area of immigration from 2003 to 2010.
	State level: Support to government formation (blackmail potential) in 1993 (PSOE) and 1996 (PP)	State level: Moderate blackmail potential from 2008-12.
Survival	Yes	Yes

Source: Own elaboration

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per Catalunya – Verds (ICV) and Solidaritat Catalana (SI). Only CiU, ERC and SI respond to the definition of SNRP. However, SI is a new party that emerged in the 2010, with only four deputies, no party system relevance, and a survival still to be proved. Given that, it is not included in the sample.

[12] CiU is in fact a stable coalition of two parties: CDC (Convergència Democràtica per Catalunya) and UDC (Unió Democràtica per Catalunya) Web pages: www.ciu.cat/index.php?idioma=EN (last accessed, September 2012)

[13] Web page: http://www.esquerra.cat/language/english

[14] Interestingly, while CDC defines itself as 'sovereigntist' (referring to its autonomist goals), it contains some sectors that seek independence from Spain, UDC rather defines itself as 'catalanist' and almost rejects independence. This only holds for the period of analysis. Currently, CDC is embracing an apparently independentist position. This article was written before the anticipated elections in Catalonia on 25 November 2012, in which the president of the Generalitat and CDC, Artur Mas, has promised a Referendum for independence. One can assume that CDC is currently an independentist party.

b) Period of analysis

The analysis covers three legislative periods from 1999-2010 as summarized in Table 13.3. We begin in 2000 because it is a crucial year for the beginning of the institutionalization of immigration in Spain and Catalonia. For the case of Catalonia, the levels of immigration started increasing in 1999 (2.33 per cent) until 2010, when it represented 15 per cent of the total population. As Zapata-Barrero (2003) notes, immigration emerged as an administrative and technical issue in the 1990s, and as a political and social issue in 2000 (see also Zapata-Barrero 2012a; Zapata-Barrero 2012c).

Table 2.3 Period of analysis

Legislative period	Governing party(ies)	President
1999-2003	CiU	Jordi Pujol (CiU)
2003-6	PSC, ERC, ICV	Pasqual Maragall (PSC)
2006-10	PSC, ERC, ICV	José Montilla (PSC)

Source: Own elaboration

c) Sources of information

The analysis has been conducted through a Qualitative Content Analysis on the basis of primary and secondary sources of information. First, we have collected the manifestos and party programmes issued during the time period. Manifestos are definitive statements of party positions remaining the best-known documents produced by political parties (Cooke 2000). Second, the main parliamentary debates have been taken into account. These often reflect in a deeper way the party stances in immigration, especially when debates on concrete conflicts emerge. Finally,

semi-structured interviews have been carried out among party representatives (those in charge of immigration issues at the parliamentary and party levels) with the objective of confirming the findings. This information has been organized in a hermeneutic unit, consisting of 96 documents[15].

Table 2.4 Sources of information

Type	Source
Primary	Party Manifestos (eight)
	Party Political Programmes (eight)
	Parliamentary Debates (74)
	Interview – Party Representatives (four)

Source: Own elaboration

4. Contextualization

As Hepburn noted in her conceptual chapter, SNRP discourses on immigration are more related to the centre-periphery cleavage rather than to the left-right axis. This cleavage includes not only identity, but also the territorial and economic dimension where, as we will see, a distinct discourse is also found. In this section we review this political context as well as the debates that were held during the period of analysis while we relate to some of the hypotheses suggested by Hepburn in her conceptual chapter.

Concerning the *territorial* dimension, the demographic importance of immigration in Catalonia was highlighted in most parliamentary

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[15] All quotations have been translated from Catalan to English by the authors. Hermeneutic Unit shall be facilitated upon request. Citations are done using the Primary document number and starting line. For example, a quotation in line 113 of the first document of the Hermeneutic unit is cited as follows: (P1:113)

discourses. In this sense, all politicians tended to highlight that Catalonia is a *Land of welcome* (Terra d'acollida[16]). This expression, which frequently appears in parliamentary debates and manifestos (P9: 09888) summarizes the idea that Catalonia is a land that has received immigrants throughout its history. Indeed, without immigration, the country would currently have around 2.5 million inhabitants, compared to the current 7.5 million[17]. This idea has been present during all the legislative periods, and contrasts with Hepburn's hypothesis, according to which we should expect a negative stance towards immigration. As it is developed in the following section, both CiU and ERC have shown a rather positive stance towards immigration, frequently highlighting this aspect of 'Land of welcome'. A second issue that emerged and persisted across time is the relationship with the central government. Immigration belongs to the Spanish government as an exclusive competence[18], although the *Generalitat* started designing public policy in the early 1990s (see chapter 6 by Arrighi de Casanova in this volume). As a result, whilst the management of flows and naturalization has remained a competence of the central government, reception and integration policies have fallen into the hands of the autonomous government of Catalonia. In this context, debates took the form of general claims[19] and complaints about the

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[16] 'Acollida' expresses a concept encompassing different aspects of welcome, reception and hosting.

[17] Immigration has contributed 75 per cent to Catalonia's recent demographic growth, with the main countries of origin being Morocco (16 per cent), Romania (eight per cent) and Ecuador (six per cent). For an overview of the demographic evolution of immigration in Catalonia, see Franco-Guillén (2011).

[18] According to art. 149.1.2 of the Spanish Constitution, Immigration is a reserved matter to the Spanish government. The Constitutional Court's ruling on the Catalan Statute of Autonomy recognized the practice carried out by the Catalan Government, consisting in managing immigration through its devolved competences such as Education, Health and other social services.

[19] Both CiU and ERC have continuously posed claims for the decentralization of powers on immigration at all levels. In fact, even in the realm of naturalization, both SNRP agreed, through the signature of the PNI, that the average years for

lack of competences to manage immigration, and accusations that the central state had not used its competences to manage immigration efficiently. CiU and especially ERC have opposed the central government's policymaking on immigration. As J.M. Cleries (CiU) summarized in 2004:

> The Government of the State has failed to properly manage migration flows and border control, denying at the same time the right of Catalonia to intervene in these policies. The impediments (…) make the existence of a Catalan own policy on immigration a political priority that has been continuously claimed by CiU (P29:4100).

According to the interviewees, the relationship with the state was conflictive or tense, especially when the Spanish government (led by the Popular Party) started sending irregular migrants caught in Ceuta and Melilla to Catalonia (P13:0492). This was interpreted by both parties as a threat to Catalonia.

> …the great majority was people sent from Madrid. All of them were illegals. It was the government of the PP who was sending them. And this has happened a lot of times. You can't say it is an official policy, because no one has dared to… but it was an informal policy… (P85: 60)

This aspect relates to the hypothesis according to which the level of control over immigration determines parties' stances on this issue. Although the answer is not clear-cut, as Catalonia holds *de facto* powers on immigration, both parties have revolved around this questions several times, highlighting a discontent with the Spanish government's way of managing immigration.

With regard to the economic dimension of the territorial cleavage, the objective of social cohesion has appeared in all of the debates on immigration. First, in order to prevent the rise of racism and xenophobia, all of the parties in the Catalan Parliament have agreed to an informal pact to avoid the use of immigration for electoral purposes. In this sense, the creation of the parliamentary Committee

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naturalization should decrease, suggesting at least the intention to influence the central government.

on Immigration in 1999 (P11) contained common references to racism and xenophobia by both ERC and CiU. The agreement that immigration, with its potential of challenging social cohesion, cannot be treated in a populist way was commonly accepted by the parties over the years (P18: 1866). It is in this area where both CiU and ERC, together with the rest of the left-wing political forces in the Catalan Parliament, have had more similar discourses. Second, in the realm of economic and social integration, the demographic deficit and the growth of the economy makes Catalonia - in the view of both political parties - an attractive country to potential newcomers. Both parties viewed the need to establish mechanisms of reception and integration of newcomers in the labour market from the very beginning of the period of analysis. The fight against illegal immigration was also seen as an important issue but in this case, ERC links it to its negative effects on the individual in question as irregular immigrants can only look for jobs in the black economy, which leads to an increased precariousness of labour conditions and therefore a challenge to social cohesion. Third, immigration has also been described as an opportunity for economic growth and development in the context of globalization. As the former president of ERC, J. L. Carod-Rovira, stated in 2000: 'We have an enormous potential, splendid opportunities and we only have to take advantage (…) the weight of the tourist sector, our condition as a country receiving foreigners, our internal diversity could allow us to enforce the Language industry' (P10:4013). However, after the economic crisis, CiU revealed a concern for resources, suggesting that no more immigrants should be accepted as the labour market is currently unable to absorb them (P85:39).

Finally, with regard to the concrete debates held in the Catalan Parliament, during the first period of analysis (6th Legislative period, 1999-2003), the main debates on immigration related to the Law for the approval of measures to support Catalan returnees. The rest of the parliamentary debates dealt with questions related to socioeconomic issues, and the constitution of the first Parliamentary Committee on Immigration. We should also mention an initiative of

ERC to approve a Bill of Reception, which was refused by the Parliament. The 7th legislative period (2003-6) did not include the approval of any immigration-related laws. However, the different questions held in the plenary sessions led to important debates such as the creation of the EBE (Educative Welcome Space), relations with the Spanish state, and the linguistic integration of immigrants. Special attention has been paid to debates on the approval of the new Statute of Autonomy (2006). Finally, the 8th Legislative period (2006-10) was probably the most intense with regard to the debates on immigration. In addition to the approval of the Law on Reception, some questions related to the National Pact for Immigration (PNI) emerged. Finally, the economic crisis and integration shaped most of the questions posed in the plenary debates.

5. Testing the hypothesis: SNRP with positive stances towards immigration will tend to portray their nationalist discourse as civic

a) General discourses on immigration in Catalonia

Immigration as a phenomenon has been mainly qualified as a 'challenge' by both the CiU and ERC, but also, and especially by ERC, as an opportunity to construct a project and take advantage of diversity (P10:4013). In fact, immigration is presented in both parties' manifestos as a fact beyond the debate on whether it is desirable or not, and the discourses have been oriented towards its management, including illegal immigration. Rather than rejecting illegal immigrants, both parties have highlighted the need to manage several problems that this phenomenon raises, such as the black market economy. Furthermore, ERC goes a step forward, urging the regularization of illegal immigrants (P9:07957). In sum, we consider CiU and ERC to have had a rather positive stance towards immigration, and that this has remained equal and consistent during all the periods of study. In addition to the constant

references to Catalonia as a *Land of Welcome,* the signature of the PNI (2008) by most political forces in the Catalan Parliament, has helped to construct a shared discourse on immigration. It incorporates immigration as a part of the Catalan identity and history:

> Catalonia can be defined as a diverse society built largely through the settlement of persons from elsewhere. This process, produced in a global context and which has intensified in recent years, creates different needs, as well being a new opportunity to define the country that we will be in the future (PNI, 2008: 15).

This shared discourse on immigration does not really start at, but culminates with the signature of the PNI. The consensus on different ideas, such as the image of Catalonia as having a history of immigration, the aforementioned agreement on not using immigration as an electoral tool, and the fact that both parties have been in charge of governing migration[20] have helped the convergence of these positions. This is similar to the party consensus on immigration, and its positive association with nationalism, in Scotland (see Hepburn & Rosie, 2014 for more details). It should be noted that the general positive position towards immigration is shared by most parties in the Catalan Parliament with the exception of the PPC (right-wing regional branch of the Spanish Popular Party), which again mirrors the situation in Scotland, with the right-wing Scottish Conservatives adopting a less enthusiastic approach. In this sense, both PSC and ICV have also highlighted some of the arguments related to the history of Catalonia as a land of welcome, although their discourse is generally more related to the left-right axis rather than the centre-periphery one.

This review of the Catalan parties' stances on immigration is in line with Hepburn's hypotheses related to party polarization. In this

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[20] Both CiU (since the early 1990s) and ERC (2003-10) interviewees have acknowledged that the fact of being in government forced the party to take in-depth reflections on immigration.

sense, despite the relative importance of the anti-immigrant party Plataforma per Catalunya at the local level[21], its absence at the Catalan autonomic level, together with the fact that both CiU and ERC have failed to develop a negative stance towards immigration, confirm Hepburn's hypotheses according to which these two factors will lead to a positive stance among other parties (with the exception of the PP). With regards to party ideology, against the initial expectation, CiU as a centre-right party has maintained a positive stance towards immigration. Hence, the hypothesis only holds for the ERC.

With regards to nationalist discourse, SNRP discourses on immigration reveal that a nationalist discourse on culture and identity appears in 69 per cent of the sample. Figure 13.1 shows the results for the three categories (belonging, values and function of language) that have been explored.

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[21] In the 2011 municipal elections, the party obtained modest results, involving coalition potential in important municipalities such as l'Hospitalet de Llobregat, the second most populated city next to Barcelona, el Vendrell, situated to the south of Barcelona, and Vic, geographically at the heart of Catalonia, and symbolically the first city that introduced PxC in its city council and where its leader holds a seat.

Figure 2.1 Civic and Ethnic nationalist discourse on immigration (1999-2010)

As we can see, there is a higher proportion of civic nationalist discourse both in CiU and ERC, especially with regard to civic values. The table also shows how the civic function of language is more significant within SNRP discourses than ethnic discourses. CiU has a higher rate in the category of values, as the party has a special concern for the maintenance of traditions.

b) Belonging

The examination of Catalan SNRP discourses on immigration reveals a clear civic discourse with regard to belonging. Both parties have made references to the subjective willingness of the people to belong to the Catalan nation.

Figure 2.2 Civic and Ethnic Nationalist discourse on belonging (1999-2010)

Source: Own elaboration

While in sum CiU and ERC referred to a civic discourse on belonging 31 times, only two ethnic references were found for the case of CiU and none for the case of ERC. Most discourses were found in the third period of analysis (2006-10), which is due to the elaboration of the Reception Law during this time.

Both CiU (P21: 6235) and ERC (P40:0529) have largely repeated the sentence made famous by the first president of the Generalitat after the Francoist period, Jordi Pujol (CiU) 'És català qui viu i treballa a Catalunya i ho vol ser'[22]. This contains the essence of what has been defined as civic nationalism, expressing the voluntary incorporation of people to the nation, based on a concrete territory (Catalonia). This has been repeated in the majority of discourses of all the SNRP analyzed. Moreover, interviewees have

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[22] 'Anyone who lives and works in Catalonia, and wishes to be so, is Catalan'. This sentence was generated by the Assamblea Catalana, in 1971, taken from the texts of the socialist Rafael Campalans.

highlighted this subjective willingness to be part of the nation. For example, an ERC representative makes it clear 'when someone is living here, brings his children to school, chooses Catalonia as his place of residence, listen, then it's up to him to stop being an immigrant when he wants… (…) when he voluntarily decides to be a part of the country' (P84:12). Finally, voluntariness has been highlighted by both parties in debates related to reception and integration, where CiU (P102: 0915) and ERC stressed the fact that all steps that an immigrant can take to become integrated depend exclusively on his or her willingness to do so. As an ERC representative mentioned during the Reception Law debate: 'It is about…a totally voluntary process. This is our model: voluntary ascription in a common space of society that invites, that asks new Catalans to integrate in the society' (P67: 2380). Finally, of the two references to ethnic nationalism, these were related to the reception of Catalan returnees, as these are considered by CiU as members of the nation as long as they have Catalan ancestors (P23: 1348). Although ERC had a positive stance towards facilitating the return of descendants of Catalans abroad, its representative put an emphasis on the (unjust) circumstances of exile. No other objective conditions for belonging were found in the sample.

c) Values

References to values are the most prominent within SNRP discourses on immigration, appearing in 56 per cent of the documents analysed in this chapter. Most of CiU and ERC nationalist discourses on the category of values were civic.

Figure 2.3 Civic and Ethnic Nationalist discourse on values (1999-
2010)

Source: Own elaboration

Both parties stressed the importance of maintaining civic values in
order to secure social cohesion across the three legislative periods,
although CiU did make 25 per cent of the party's total discourse on
values ethnic statements.

While it is clear that for both parties civic (common and shared)
values are very important, in many cases, this concept remains
vague. CiU often speak about 'common traditions and civic values'
(P67: 1979), ERC uses forms such as 'values on liberties and
rights', and most statements are reduced to these broad ideas. For
example, a CiU deputy was calling on the integration of immigrants
in these terms: '… also we have to facilitate their incorporation into
a society with its own identity, and we are proud of it. Not only
because it is a Catalan identity, but also because it is linked to

peace, living together[23], civicness and loving each other' (P29: 4554). In the few cases where both parties have been more concrete, civic values refer to democratic values, gender equality, equality of opportunities, living together, respect for universal rights and laicism. This is clearly in line with the PNI, which refers to respect for universal human rights in its section 'Integration into a common public culture'. Attention has been paid to religion, as CiU, containing a Christian Democrat party, could have referred to Christianity as one of the main values[24]. Although CiU recognizes the importance of the Catholic Church and its contribution to the cultural heritage in Catalonia, it does so while highlighting increasing religious diversity in Catalonia, hence proposing a defence of religious pluralism (see manifestos 1999 and 2010) and a secular society[25]. In a similar vein, ERC defends religious diversity with an emphasis of state laicism. With regards to the ethnic nationalist discourse, CiU has sometimes put a special emphasis on the maintenance of Catalan traditions and costumes, but without specifying the meaning of these traditions. For example, as a deputy put it during one debate:

> In the realm of culture, we have to remove our complexes for once and for all. Not everything is a matter of money, even if it is very important. Catalonia has forged a culture over centuries and we have to be able to defend and preserve it. It is true that we are a result of the mixture of many people coming from different places, and cultural origins. Nobody denies that. It is the reality. In this sense, our country is like a delta which is shaped by the sediments it receives. But it is the main river's current that feeds the delta and channels the different sediments. (P35:1109)

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[23] Living together is a translation of the concept 'convivència', whose meaning relates to peaceful coexistence.

[24] Indeed, one of the main representatives of catholic conservative nationalism, Josep Torras i Bages, made famous the sentence « Catalunya serà cristiana, o no serà » (Catalonia will be christian, or will not be).

[25] In line with the discussion on the relationship between nationalist discourse and stances towards immigration, we see how an element such as the prominence of religion in CiU falls outside the discourse when tackling immigration.

Other references in this category have tended to highlight those behaviours that are unacceptable in Catalan society. Without mentioning any immigrant or religious groups, both CiU (P18: 2483) and ERC (P68: 3456) have referred to gender equality and the unacceptability of using a burka in public buildings, the latter being based on arguments of liberal democracy and gender equality. This unacceptability is therefore justified through its incompatibility with certain civic values.

d) Function of language

The role of language is key to understanding the Catalan SNRP discourses on immigration, and most discourses related to nation-building. Indeed, it has been identified by both ERC and CiU as the main identity marker of the Catalan nation. When speaking about reception, language courses are always included as part of the first right to be granted to newcomers. References to the function of language have been present in the three terms of office (especially in the second and third periods, 2003-10). Overall, both CiU and ERC have made efforts to portray language as a tool for ensuring equality of opportunities.

Figure 2.4 Civic and Ethnic Nationalist discourse on the Function of Language (1999-2010)

Source: Own elaboration

As we can see from the graph above, a predominantly civic nationalist discourse has been articulated by CiU and ERC during the three terms of office. In this direction, ERC has put more effort into highlighting the role of the Catalan language in civic terms, though an ethnic nationalist discourse has also emerged within both parties.

The two SNRP stress the fact that newcomers must learn Catalan, given the language is a part of the country's identity. As suggested in the analytical framework, we expected both parties to link this need to learn Catalan to ensure equal opportunities. CiU has put an emphasis on offering language courses to newcomers, as a tool for ensuring that they have access to all available rights and resources, and as a first step for integration. ERC goes a step further, and puts special emphasis on promoting the learning of immigrants' languages of origin in order to respect diversity and not be a tool for 'negatively globalizing, pan-statist or pan-religious policies' (P9:11049). Its 2003 manifesto summarizes these two ideas:

'Knowing the language of the reception country is a basic right of immigrants, which must be guaranteed as other rights such as health or education are guaranteed. This is because knowing Catalan has a basic role in the integration process. (…) learning Catalan not only an element of integration, but an unavoidable tool for ensuring equality of opportunities. At the same time, we also consider unavoidable the respect and reinforcement of teaching immigrants' languages of origin' (P9: 10907).

Despite this emphasis on language as the means for ensuring equality of opportunities (civic discourse), Catalan has been portrayed not only as the main identity marker of the nation by CiU and ERC, but also as a precondition for becoming incorporated into the society, which we identified as part of an ethnic discourse. This discourse has emerged in certain debates, such as the Reception Law (P67: 1801) and the failed proposal on a Charter of Reception in the first legislative period under study (P25: 4637). These ideas have always been surrounded by other civic aspects of the nation. CiU's deputy on the debate on the Reception law exemplifies this idea:

Catalonia is a *land of welcome* and this is a national characteristic. The proof is that we give in the innermost of our being, of our being as a country, that is our language and our culture, which is the country's *own* language. And you have not said it. You talk a lot of official languages, but ... there is also the *own* language and it is legally recognized. And therefore we do not want the Catalan language to be for a few. And those coming from outside ... −not you-, our language is also theirs, because we want them to be part of this People. We do not want ghettos, we want one community. Because you talk a lot about individual liberties and each one is each one. Don't we have a right to be a community too? (P67:1801).

Although overall, both parties put their emphasis on learning Catalan as a basic tool for ensuring integration and equality of opportunities, it is true that the key role that language plays in the

Catalan identity facilitates the emergence of traces of a rather ethnic discourse. In sum, learning Catalan is a right that enables immigrants to fully enjoy other rights and have access to equal opportunities, but to both parties is also a duty.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter we have analysed the Catalan SNRP nationalist discourses on immigration. We hypothesized that those SNRP with a positive stance towards immigration would tend to portray a civic nationalist discourse. We divided this discourse into three main dimensions (belonging, values and role of language) and used it as a framework to explore all manifestos, programmes and parliamentary debates produced from 1999 to 2010 by CiU and ERC.

After reflecting a positive stance towards immigration, we have shown how both parties have developed an overall civic nationalist discourse, thus confirming our hypothesis. This can be summarized as follows:

a) Subjective willingness is important to be considered a member of the Catalan society. In this sense, all parties share the belief that 'Anyone who lives and works in Catalonia, and wishes to be so, is Catalan' and that Catalonia is a land of welcome. These ideas have been present during all the periods of analysis, which explains the introductory paragraph of the National Agreement on Immigration.

b) At the level of social values, both CiU and ERC believe that Catalonia's social cohesion is built on a set of shared values consisting of respect for pluralism and diversity, equality of opportunities, universal rights and living together. These shared values collectively coincide with the CiU and ERC's open position towards immigration and the consensus achieved for the signature of the National Agreement and the approval of the Reception law, which at the same time corroborates Hepburn's hypothesis on party polarization. On some occasions CiU has expressed a rather ethnic

discourse on values; this is because CiU gives a lot of importance to traditions and costumes.

c) Finally, language is the main identity marker in Catalonia, where its knowledge is a right (and a duty) and a tool for ensuring equal access to rights and opportunities and therefore becoming fully integrated into the Catalan community. Less clearly than the two former categories, language lies between the purely civic and the purely ethnic nationalist discourse. In this sense, the fact that the Catalan language is the key identity marker of the Catalan nation makes the CiU (and ERC in four cases) view it not only as a tool for ensuring equality of opportunities, but also as a requisite for becoming integrated in certain cases. Further research should explore the willingness of newcomers to learn Catalan language in order to explore whether this affects ERC and CiU's stances, as suggested in the conceptual chapter.

Despite the fact that some ethnic traces of the nationalist discourse (especially in the case of CiU) have been found for the last two categories, we have enough evidence to confirm our hypothesis according to which SNRP with a positive stance towards immigration tend to articulate a civic nationalist discourse.

This chapter has sought to shed light not only on the Catalan case itself, but also the exploration of nationalist discourses in the context of immigration more generally. As we have seen, there are many elements that are important in the context of minority nations that would not be captured with a framework based exclusively on positive and negative stances. Therefore, we consider that this framework could be replicated in the context of other minority nations such as Quebec, Scotland or Flanders, helping us to further explore the link between minority nations, immigration and political parties.

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3. THE MULTI-LEVEL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION: THE CASE OF STATELESS NATIONALIST AND REGIONALIST PARTIES IN SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC

Devolution and decentralisation of power in the context of federal and quasi-federal democracies has often been supported and defended in terms of its potential to lower tensions between the central State and regional governments or entities. However, authors have claimed that while federalism can lower tensions, it does not make them disappear. This has been termed the federalism paradox. This paper aims at examining the effects of decentralising immigration powers on the discourse of Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRP). To do so, two similar SNRPs that operate in different contexts where the distribution of powers differs (Scottish National Party, SNP, and Parti Québécois, PQ) have been selected. Party manifestos, parliamentary debates and questions in several legislatures are analysed using Qualitative Content Analysis. This is complemented with semi-structured interviews with party representatives. The results confirm the existence of this federalism paradox, affirming that despite reducing the tone of conflictivity, SNRPs in highly decentralised regions still maintain a discourse of tension towards the centre.

1. Introduction

The arrival of immigration into Western democracies has been paired with the increase of anti-immigrant parties in Europe, and a rise in anti-immigrant prejudices among autochtonous populations. This is particularly the case in harsh economic climates where immigrants become scapegoats.[1] Since social cohesion is one of the main objectives of governments and parties (both in government and opposition), immigration management arguably becomes an important challenge for democracies. But the scale of this challenge increases in multinational democracies and more precisely, in minority nations. Indeed, literature analysing this has stressed the idea that a fear of internal minorization exists within minority nations. This is derived from the difficulty of incorporating newcomers into a nation-building project that is different from the State-level project.

In fact, early literature on minority nationalism has tended to portray it as ethnic, with an important potential for both exclusion (Ignatieff 1995) and the development of a xenophobic character (de Winter et al. 2006). This is not necessarily true, and authors have claimed that some minority nationalisms, such as the Catalan, Quebecer or Scottish ones, are often more progressive, liberal or forward-looking than some state-wide nationalisms (Keating 1996; Kymlicka 2001; Franco-Guillén & Zapata-Barrero 2014). Thus, the arrival of immigration to minority nations raises questions about its consequences that potentially differ from those in nation-States.

Research has shown that immigration alters the equilibrium of power relations and patterns in two ways. Immigration impacts on the *external* relationship between the national units and the central State, and it impacts on the *internal* relationship between the sub-

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[1] On this issue, see the literature on group conflict, and theories of group threat and economic threat. See for example (Esses et al. 1998)

state unit of government and its associated societal culture (Zapata-Barrero 2012: 223). The aim of this paper is to explore the former through the examination of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRP) [2] in Scotland and Quebec. Many contributions examining immigration and minority nations tend to equate the latter with 'regional' powers (be it legislative or executive) as the main actor embodying the nation. As shown by most recent publications,[3] this is often not enough and political parties themselves need to be taken into account. This is because it is within parties that one is able to find the genuine expression of a minority nation, which is the key for the continued existence of the centre-periphery cleavage. Moreover, SNRPs in multinational States tend to be integral parts of their respective national party systems, and often play a significant role in the stability of state governments (Bickerton and Gagnon 2011). For example, Convergència i Unió (CiU) has on various occasions provided support to state government formation in Spain.

It has been argued that the dynamics of regional party systems are often distinct from state-level party systems as the former tend to be influenced by the 'centre-periphery cleavage', which in some cases takes prominence over the left-right dimension (Hepburn 2014). Departing from the premise that this cleavage shapes SNRP discourses on immigration (see also Jeram 2012), this paper explores the territorial dimension of this cleavage, which revolves around the distribution of powers and the relations between the centre and the periphery. Thus, it explores how the distribution of

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[2] Despite the important conceptual vagueness of this party family, the terminology discussed and proposed by E. Hepburn (2009a) is used. This is because it stresses the importance of territorial power relations.

[3] Examples of this can be found in Loobuyck an Jacobs (2011) for the case of Flanders, Barker (2010) for the case of Quebec, and Hepburn (2009b) for a comparison including Bavaria, Northern Italy, Scotland and Catalonia. Part II of the recent volume edited by Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014) is devoted to political parties.

powers on immigration affects the way an SNRP portrays the relationship of the periphery with the centre. The starting hypotheses are in line with the federalism paradox, which says that decentralisation tames minority nationalist movements but does not make them disappear. Devolution and decentralisation of power in the context of federal and quasi-federal democracies has been justified in terms of its potential to lower the tensions between the central State and regional governments or entities.[4] However, some authors have also argued that devolution can offer additional mechanisms for peripheral parties to push for secession (Alonso 2012, p.1). The hypotheses are tested through the comparison of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland (United Kingdom) and the Parti Québécois (PQ) in Quebec (Canada).

After a review of the relevant literature that, in the exploration of the interaction between minority nations and immigration,[5] focuses on concrete aspects of the centre-periphery relationship, an analytical framework based on the suggested hypotheses is proposed. The methodology is then presented, followed by the contextualisation of the two cases - Quebec and Scotland. The results are then presented. In the conclusions, the argument presented in the theoretical framework is underlined in order to emphasis its potential applicability to other cases and further avenues of research are suggested.

2. Theoretical framework

Several authors have acknowledged the challenges that minority nations face with the arrival of immigration.[6] As noted in the

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[4] A very recent overview on how federalism is (or not) useful for accommodating territorial demands can be found in Requejo and Caminal (2012). For more detail on the cases of Quebec and Catalonia, see also Requejo and Gagnon (2010).

[5] A wider review of literature can be found in Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero (2014)

[6] See Zapata-Barrero (2007) for a revision of three normative perspectives.

introduction, in addition to the traditional effects that immigration has on the demography and economy of a receiving country, minority nations have to deal with what Lipton (2012) calls a double fear: a fear of internal minorization, and a fear of external cultural dominance or assimilation into the supra-national or state culture. The fear of internal minorization stems from the idea that immigrants tend to integrate into the majority nation, thus potentially making a stateless nation become a minority within its own territory. This effect would contribute to the potential of a State to assimilate the minority nation into the majority culture. This has implications that go beyond the identity dimension. Indeed, in the case of language, Bauböck acknowledges that, since cultural distinctiveness is the primary basis for claims for self-government, if a national linguistic minority were to become a minority in its own territory, this would undermine its claim for autonomy (2001: 333). Based on this potential impact that immigration can have, several authors have predicted a tendency for negative reactions towards newcomers within regions and peripheries to emerge (Conversi 1997; Connor 1984).

In light of these challenges, Kymlicka (2001) suggests increasing the powers of sub-state units in two areas. The first is control over the volume of immigration. In other words, this means letting the minority nation decide on the number of immigrants that are to be admitted within its territory. This is in order to avoid its political use by state nationalism as a "weapon against the national minority" (Kymlicka, 2001: 285). The second area refers to control over the terms of integration, which involves providing the stateless nation with competencies and resources to receive, accommodate and integrate immigrants. Were this formula is adopted, the aforementioned internal and external tensions should be reduced.

Barker (2012) has analysed how political leaders link immigration to on-going debates about governance in multi-national societies, namely Canada, Belgium and the United Kingdom. She concludes that the political salience of immigration in sub-state units is

influenced by factors such as the perceived impact of immigration or the existence of divergent views on citizenship and national identity. This goes against her initial expectation that the distribution of powers between the centre and the periphery is crucial to understanding the policies and wider approach taken in relation to immigration and integration. Yet the degree to which powers are devolved can have affect an SNRP's stances. For example, Hepburn and Rosie (2014) stated that in the case of Scotland, the low level of control over immigration had lead to a generally positive stance towards immigration. They suggested that limited control over immigration leads to low levels of contestation and polarisation over immigration.

In the case of the Basque Country, Jeram (2012) documented how the (traditionally portrayed as ethnic and closed) Basque nationalists adopted an increasingly open and positive stance towards immigration despite a lack of control over its volume. He suggested that the causal mechanism for this is that Basque nationalists adopted this stance in order to present a contrast between its priorities and those of the Spanish state,[7] which adopt a more restrictive stance towards immigration. In the cases of Catalonia and Scotland, Arrighi de Casanova (2014) explored the reactions to the lack of control over admissions policy (that is, who and how many enter the country) by minority nationalists. Despite their failure to gain control over the matter, the author argues that this could also be interpreted as a political victory due to their success in criticising the centres' immigration regimes. This is what the author calls the blame-shifting strategy. (121-4).

So, while early literature focused on the potential for immigration to be used as a tool by the majority nation, later research shows that this is not necessarily the case. Hence it suggests that in depth

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[7] Iacovino (2014) has connected this discrepancy and therefore tension to the existence of competitive nation building projects.

studies to examine how stateless nations react to immigration are relevant. To date, such research has focused on the interplay between the distribution of power and positions towards immigration. But the distribution of power can also affect the centre-periphery relationship or at least how this is portrayed. As Zapata-Barrero (2012) has argued, immigration policy can provide a clear-cut case for territorial independence if the State fails to adequately address the concerns and claims of minority nations. In fact, it may well be that a SNRP in a minority nation with insufficient power over immigration processes will use this issue to gain support for its claims for independence. If this is the case, Kymlicka's suggestion is the heart of the solution.

Devolving powers might be the solution. The decentralization of States has, in fact, been widely suggested as a means for managing multinational scenarios. Guibernau (2006) analyses how devolution (understood as political decentralization accompanied by access to significant resources) in Spain, the United Kingdom and Canada has tamed secessionism. Hence it has been a successful strategy for the accommodation of national minorities. Nevertheless, the author also shows how this same devolution has not solved or removed the tensions between the centre and the periphery, as some authors have suggested such actions would (Gagnon 2004). This is the so-called 'paradox of federalism'. As Erk and Anderson (2009) clearly write, 'in some cases, federalism does seem to work as advertised: satisfying groups that are or might be in conflict with the centre or with one another and managing diversity within a single state, all the while keeping international boundaries intact. In other cases, federalism works as feared: freezing identities, creating incentives and opportunities to pursue secession rather than other strategies and creating institutions through which secession can be pursued' (Erk & Anderson 2009, pp.195–6). In the context of immigration, and in line with Kymlicka's suggestion, one can argue that the distribution of powers over immigration is of primary importance in

order to understand the political dynamics that take place at the sub-state level.

This paper aims at exploring the paradox that revolves around the tense relationship between centres and peripheries, thus it aims to see how conflict takes place in the realm of where power lies in relation to immigration. There are several reasons why focusing on immigration is especially relevant when multinational democracies are concerned. These, as mentioned previously, are related to the specific challenges that immigration poses and the potential for politicisation within centre periphery relations that it has. So, how does the distribution of powers affect the way an SNRP portrays the relationship of the minority nation with the centre? As pointed out, Arrighi de Casanova discussed how in Scotland and Catalonia the lack of control over the volume (and the failure to achieve it) paved the way for both regional governments to make use of a blame shifting strategy. This is, blaming the centre over a matter (migration inflows control) that offers limited electoral rewards and fails to meet policy goals (2014, 124). Following this logic, one must except that where descentralisation of powers over immigration (including control over the volume, but also control over the terms of integration) is low, an SNRP will consequently have a conflictive relationship with the centre in their discourses on immigration.[8] Conversely, where descentralisation has occurred, an SNRP has less opportunities to make use of the blame-shifting strategy. Hence, as scholars on federalistm and immigration (including Kymlicka or Gagnon) would argue, descentralisation of immigration policy should reduce the portrayal of conflict in discourses on immigration. Thus, two hypotheses related to the potential for confrontation are examined. Where these to be

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[8] This paper understands discourse as a set of articulations of interpretations over a concrete matter, namely, immigration. It focuses on official discourse, understood as the set of text and talk by a party or party members in which the position is agreed by the organization.

confirmed, they would reinforce federalism as a solution to centre periphery tensions.

H_1: In minority nations with low decentralisation of powers on immigration, SNRP will tend to maintain a discourse on immigration portraying a high degree of conflict with the centre.

H_2: In minority nations with high decentralisation of powers on immigration, SNRPs will tend to maintain a discourse on immigration portraying a lower degree of conflict with the centre.

The following section presents the analytical framework and the methodology employed in order to clarify the operationalisation of the hypotheses.

3. Analytical framework and methodology

As Kymlicka (2001) suggested, two decentralisation mechanisms should be put into place to prevent the growth of the aforementioned tensions, control over the volume of immigrants and over the terms of integration. This coincides with what Joppke and Seidle's (2012) propose in their study of immigrant integration in federations. The authors explored three dimensions, selection/admission (or what Kymlicka termed control over volume), economic and social integration, and civic and political integration (control over the terms of integration). A sub-state unit where such powers have been decentralised would be classified as having high control over immigration. A region that lacks most (or all) of these powers would be considered as having low level of control over immigration.

On the realm of conflict, this is framed within center-periphery relations and expressed in terms of discursive tension portrayed by the SNRP. Given the absence of previous analytical tools, coding framework was inductively generated by preliminary readings of the data. The first reading suggested on the one hand, discourses in which politicians just dropped an idea in general terms, and on the

other hand, discourses were the politician, in a more enthusiastic tone, developed such ideas, offering a deeper understanding on the portrayed relationship. These were divided in terms of either conflict or cooperation. The latter relates to any discourse by the SNRP that describes the centre as functioning or behaviour in a neutral way, highlighting aspects of coordination and cooperation with central state authorities. The second dimension describes conflict. This can be low (characterised by general claims for more powers or better coordination made towards the central government), moderate, (where the SNRP makes statements describing conflict and may include claims that the central government acts against the regions' interests), or high (characterised by claims for independence). The following table summarises this analytical framework.

Table 3.1. Analytical framework and coding.

Dimension	Category	Code	Description
Cooperation	Normal	Normal	The SNRP describes the relationship with the centre in neutral terms..
	Cooperation	Cooperation	The SNRP describes the relationship with the centre as being cooperative and coordinated.
Conflict	Low	Claims_general	The SNRP makes general claims on the need for powers to be devolved or for better coordination with the central government on specific policy aspects.
	Moderate	Conflict Conflict_claim	The SNRP accuses the central government of bad management, or of acting against the periphery's interests, leading to a claim for greater devolved powers.[9]
	High	Claim_independence	The SNRP links immigration to a claim for independence.

Source: Own elaboration.

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[9] An initial codification of the data has identified, on the one hand, an important number of instances when general statements are made, and on the other hand, another important group where conflict was followed by constructive claims. This is why a distinction is made, and the "moderate conflict" category is introduced into the analysis.

Primary sources of information have been analysed using Qualitative Content Analysis following Mayring's (2000) scheme[10] (see below).

Selection of cases

The cases selected for the comparative study have been chosen based on the *most similar* cases rationale. This selection is recommended for exploring cases in which a relevant variable differs, while others remain similar (Seawright & Gerring 2008). In this sense, two similar SNRPs are selected from two contexts where the level of control over immigration differs. In addition to similarity, party system relevance[11] and survival across at least three legislatures are the main criteria for selection. The context of Scotland and Quebec meet these conditions, the former has low levels of control over immigration while the latter has high levels of control over immigration. In these two contexts we can find two similar SNRPs[12] that are party-system relevant. Two parties meet the proposed criterion, the SNP and Parti Quebecois.[13]

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[10] Coding has been applied to the parts of the text where reference to the relationship is made in relation to immigration. Units of coding are thematic.

[11] According to Sartori's (2005) well known definition, a political party can be considered party system relevant if it exhibits a *blackmail potential* (the party's existence affects the party competition and the direction of the competition) or *coalition potential* (the party can be needed for a feasible coalition majority).

[12] This follows Masseti's (2009) instrumental definition, which specifies four characteristics. "First, they are self-contained political organizations that contest elections. Secondly, they field candidates only in a particular territory (region) of the state. Thirdly, the territorial limitation of their electoral activity is a consequence of their explicit objective of defending only the identities and interests of 'their' region. Fourthly, as stated by De Winter and Türsan (1998a: 204), regionalist parties' core mission is to achieve/protect/enhance "some kind of [territorial] self-government". The terminology and conceptualisation belongs to Hepburn (2009a).

[13] For the case of Quebec, case selection can be debatable. One can argue about the inclusion of former Action démocratique du Québec (ADQ). Founded in

Table 3.2. Selection of cases rationale

Criterion ╱ SNRP	Scotland	Quebec
	Scottish National Party (SNP)	Parti Québécois (PQ)
Ideological leaning	Left-Right: Centre-left Centre-periphery: Secessionist	Left-Right: Centre-left Centre-periphery: Secessionist
Party System relevance	In government since 2007 (2007-2011 and 2011 onwards).	Three periods of government (1976-1985 and 1994-2003, 2012-2014).
Survival	Yes. Have held seats in the Holyrood Parliament since Devolution, 1999.	Yes. Have held seats in the Assemblée Nationale since 1970.

Source: Own elaboration.

1994, this conservative "autonomist" political party has attracted the attention of many scholars (see Piotte 2003; Pétry 2006; Brière 2012) given its ambiguous nature in terms of ideology. It was self-defined as an autonomist party which, although supporting the "Yes" option in the 1995 referendum, increasingly moved towards a less sovereigntist position, ending up competing over the Liberal Party's position on the centre-periphery axis. Its party system relevance is debatable, as it was held only during the period 2007-2008, where it gained the official opposition status. However, in the next election it failed to maintain its support, thus losing party system relevance. Besides, Québec Solidaire could be considered an SNRP, but it lacks of party-system relevance. Others could argue for the inclusion of the Quebec's Liberal Party (PLQ) given that it separated from the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) in 1964, and has sometimes played the nationalist card (Hepburn 2010) up to the rejection of the Charlottetown Accord. However, it has clear ties with the LPC as far as the PLQ does not run in federal elections, and PLQ voters turn to the LPC for this contest. In addition, the competition in Quebec takes place mostly between the PQ and the PLQ, and is centred on the unresolved question of Quebec's constitutional status (Tanguay, as cited in Hepburn 2010) where the PQ holds a sovereingtist stance and the PLQ a unionist stance in favour of the status quo (which is federalism).

Furthermore, Quebec and Scotland have a similar structure of party competition. This allows for variables that could otherwise interfere on findings to be controlled. Following Mair's classification (1998) both regions have had quite a closed structure of party competition for the period of analysis, meeting the three criterion of wholesale alternation in government, familiarity in the governing formulae (that is, the possible party compositions of governments does not vary) and a restricted access to government (two parties in each region have a real possibility of accessing government). Each region has a different electoral system. This could potentially be of importance since some research suggests that majoritarian systems make parties moderate their discourses in order to broaden their electoral appeal (thus maximising their probability of gaining seats), while proportional systems, with their lower barriers for entering Parliament, do not (see for example Norris 2004). Indeed, according to Erk (2014), the majoritarian system in Quebec explains that the PQ has a more inclusive stance than the SNRP in Flanders (where proportional representation is in place). However, although the Scottish electoral system (additional member system) is more proportional than the Quebecois one, research has shown that the electoral system does not play a significant role in shaping the SNP's discourse on immigration (Hepburn & Rosie 2014). Finally, both SNRPs have similar ideological leanings in both axis in two regions that present the same cleavage structure (left-right and centre-periphery) with a predominance of the centre periphery cleavage (Hepburn 2010).

Incumbency could also affect discourse. Being in government often means parties moderate their discourse, while being in opposition often tends to have the opposite effect, with parties radicalising their discourse (see Breunig & Luedtke, 2008). When in government, parties are constrained by the need to run government, provide the population with public services, and coordinate with other levels of power, while the opposition does not have such an obligation and can hence adopt a more radical discourse. In order to

control for this, the analysis covers a period of three legislatures that include periods when the selected cases have been in government and in opposition. For the PQ this covers the period 1998-2012[14] and for the SNP the period 1999-2011.

Sources of information

For this paper, party manifestos, party programmes and parliamentary debates (as well as written questions and answers) directly related to immigration issues for each case have been analysed. For the case of Scotland, the lack of devolved powers on immigration means that there are few substantial debates in the Scottish Parliament on immigration that can be analysed (with the exception of questions and motions). For this case, therefore, press releases of the SNP have also been taken into account. Semi-structured interviews have also been carried out with SNP and PQ party representatives on immigration issues. The information has been organised into two hermeneutic units, encompassing a total of 75 documents. This includes 15 manifestos and programmes, 56 Parliamentary interventions, three interviews carried out between January and September 2012 and 1 document containing SNP press releases (124).[15]

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[14] This period consists of four legislatures, although one of them lasted only from 2007-2008.

[15] For the case of Quebec, all quotations have been translated from French to English by the author. Both Hermeneutic Units and index of primary documents can be facilitated by request. Citations are done using the Hermeneutic Unit initial (S for Scotland, Q for Quebec), the Primary document number and the starting line number. All textual documents have been analysed using Atlas.ti (qualitative analysis software).

4. Contextualisation: Immigration in Scotland and Quebec

According to the Scotland Act (1998), immigration, together with nationality and asylum policy, is a reserved matter for Westminster. This means that on the paper Scotland has no powers to legislate or make policies related to immigration. This idea is clear to the SNP, and it is highlighted in manifestos, programmes, press releases and by the interviewees. However, in practice all of this refers to the first kind of power (control over the volume or number of immigrants). Scotland could still be able to exercise some *de facto* control over the 'terms of integration' as the Scottish Parliament does hold legislative power on matters that directly affects newcomers, such as education, health or social welfare.[16] The Scottish Government's project *One Scotland: Many Cultures,* which aimed to raise awareness of, and to celebrate, Scotland's cultural diversity as well as fighting against racism is a good example of this. This campaign, started by the Labour Party, was continued by the SNP. Some initiatives that introduced a degree of flexibility into Westminster's decision-making processes on immigration have also been adopted. One example is the so-called *Fresh Talent Initiative[17],* but its impact has been negligible (Skilling 2007) and Scotland remains with a very limited level of control over immigration (Barker 2012).

The desire of Scottish political actors to gain control over immigration (Barker 2012) is congruent with the relatively low numbers of immigrants in the region. In fact, until 2003, Scotland could be considered an emigration country (as net migration was

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[16] Catalonia is in a similar position to this.

[17] The Fresh Talent Initiative, 2004, was initially aimed at attracting immigrants from the rest of the UK, the Scottish diaspora, and the EU (Skilling 2007) but ended up focused on retaining foreign students with two-year extensions to their visas.

negative until that year). However, the proportion of Scotland's population that is immigrant has doubled since then, and stood at 5 per cent in 2011. In sum, despite being traditionally an emigration country, Scotland doubled its immigrant population levels in the first decade of the 21st century, a rate of increase that (to a greater extend) has also characterised the so-called new immigration countries such as Spain and Italy.

Unlike the British case, Canada has been described as having a highly decentralised immigration and integration regime (Banting 2012). The Gagnon-Tremblay-McDougall agreement, also known as the *Canada-Quebec Accord,* in force since 1991, established shared powers over immigration between Canada and Quebec.[18] On the one hand, the province holds exclusive power in terms of accommodation and integration of newcomers, and the selection of economic immigrants (ie. individuals that, unlike asylum seekers or family migrants, move for economic reasons alone). On the other hand, the central government retains the responsibly of setting admission requirements, defining immigrant categories and setting overall levels of immigration (Iacovino 2008). This situation within Canada was unique to the province of Quebec until recently, when, at the invitation of the central government, other provinces began to claim an increased say, especially in the immigrant selection process. Quebec began to recognize the full implications of being an immigration society in the 1960s, with the start of the Quiet Revolution (Juteau 2002), and began adopting regulations on this matter. Since then, special attention has been given to the link between reception, integration and the French language. Indeed, in 1977 the Quebec Parliament approved the so-called Bill 101 (Charter of the French Language), which institutionalized French as the common public language. Since the first devolution agreement on immigration in 1968, different policies have been implemented,

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[18] See Franco-Guillén (2011) for more details on the evolution of the distribution of powers between Canada and Quebec.

most of them targeting the integration of immigrants. The result has been a consolidation of a distinctive Quebecois approach to immigration and diversity management within Canada.[19] During the period 2006-2008 immigration became highly politicised. This was essentially due to the so-called reasonable accommodation crisis[20] eventually led to the Bouchard-Taylor Commission being set up.[21] This commission had a mandate to investigate Quebec's practice of 'reasonable accommodation' and to provide the government with advice on how to make sure such practices do not contravene the values of Quebec's society. Today, there are two main documents related to immigration in Quebec. Firstly, there is the Quebec immigration law (first passed in 1968 and modified several times up until July 2012), and secondly, the new immigration policy document entitled *Pour enrichir le Québec: Affirmer les valeurs communes de la société québécoise* (2008).

This high level of control over immigration is consistent with the particularities of the French-speaking province within Canada.[22] Canada in general, and Quebec in particular, are old immigration countries. Unlike stateless nations such as Catalonia, Quebec has been receiving settlers and immigrants from overseas since it was founded in the 17th century. Together with Ontario and British Columbia, Quebec has been one of the main immigrant receiving territories in Canada (Boyd & Vickers 2000). However, it was not until the 1970s, and especially after 1980s, that Canada's immigrant composition shifted from being mostly European and North American, to so-called visible minorities (Boyd and Vickers 2000; Blad & Couton 2009). However, in the case of Quebec, the

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[19] For a detailed overview of this issue see Gagnon and Iacovino (2007).

[20] For a good review see Lerroux (2010)

[21] Commission's website: www.accommodements.qc.ca [last accessed, April 2012]

[22] For an interesting discussion on decentralisation and minority language see Erk and Koning (2010).

changing origin mix of immigrants followed a different pattern from that of the rest of Canada. After the decentralization of powers on immigrant selection (culminating with the Gagnon-Tremblay-McDougall agreement in 1991), most immigrants settling in Quebec came from *Francophonie* countries (Franco-Guillén 2011). According to official data, 9.4 per cent of Quebec's population was immigrant in 1996. This proportion steadily increased over the next fifteen years, reaching 12.60 per cent in 2011 (Gouvernement du Quebec 2014).

5. Results

Before focusing on specific aspects of the discourse and testing the hypotheses, an overview of the general stance of each party is presented.

a) Overview of the stances towards immigration

Both the SNP and the PQ have adopted generally positive stances towards immigration. This supports what the existing literature has reported (Hepburn 2009b; see Hepburn & Rosie 2014 for the SNP and Erk 2014 for the PQ).

In the case of the SNP, its leader Alex Salmond, summarized this stance in 2003: "I want to start from a simple proposition - Scotland is not full up. We need more people. And if people from other countries are willing and eager to come to Scotland and make their futures here, then I say we should welcome them." (S-P12: 277). The SNP, however, does not only acknowledge the contribution that immigrants can make towards addressing a perceived demographic deficit, but also the enrichment of the Scottish culture that immigration brings. Indeed, this is clear in its 2003 manifesto: "The SNP welcomes the contribution of Scotland's ethnic minorities to our national life. (…) They helped to shape our nation and make us the people we are. The SNP therefore commends the 'One Scotland Many Cultures' campaign and, in government, we

will continue this approach to promote a tolerant and inclusive Scotland" (S-P2: 2480). In this sense, the SNP's discourse shows how a low level of control over immigration coincides with a positive stance towards it.

The PQ's official discourse reflects Quebec's consolidated immigration system. Unlike the SNP, it takes the constant arrival of immigrants for granted and constructs a discourse that goes beyond the need to attract immigrants. In addition to statements insisting that immigration is a source of enrichment for Quebec, and therefore attempting to encourage immigrants to choose to settle in Quebec (Q-P69:1919), the analysis also reveals that the party is concerned with the challenge that immigration poses to minority nations. That is, the threat that immigration can have on its nation-building project, and hence how to incorporate immigrants into this project. In line with the fact that French is one of the Quebec's main markers of identity, a concern for the *frenchification* of immigrants is expressed in parliamentary debates and is present in all manifestos and party programmes (see for example: Q-P26; Q-P34; Q-P53; Q-P57; Q-P58, Q-P71: 1025. See also Iacovino 2014). Although this concern is not linked to a discourse rejecting immigration (which the former ADQ did), the PQ is concerned that newcomers may prefer to integrate into the Anglophone community rather than the francophone one. This is hence seen as a challenge that needs to be addressed. The PQ, like the rest of parties in Quebec, has carried out an extensive reflection[23] on different

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[23] Although this is beyond the scope of this paper, the question of identity, and more importantly, the so-called common public culture is not only intensive but also enduring. Laws and Charters of Right and Values for Québec have been debated, and passed by the National Assembly. The last cabinet led by the PQ (2012-14) attempted to pass a law on these matters which led to early elections being called which the PQ subsequently lost having campaigned on this issue. Issues related to immigrant integration and respect for cultural diversity were highly salient during the so-called "reasonable accommodation crisis" (2006-

dimensions of immigration and built a relatively well developed discourse on immigration (which includes reference on positions from reception to socioeconomic and cultural integration).

## b) Relationship with the central government.

As mentioned, one of the differences between the two parties is the focus of their discourses. Across all the documents analysed, the SNP makes reference to the central government, or to its relationship with central government in 86.36 per cent of them. For the PQ the proportion decreases to 45 per cent. This is indicative of the SNPs overall discourse, which is mainly focused on claiming powers over immigration from the central government. The lack of powers over immigration clearly influences the SNP's discourse. In the case of Quebec, when references to the federal government are made, they relate to particular aspects associated to the functioning of the Canada-Quebec Accord.

The following graphs summarise the distribution of the discourse found in each case for each legislative period.[24]

2007) which triggering the so-called Bouchard-Taylor Commission (for more information on this see, for example, Leroux 2010)

[24] The third legislature in Quebec lasted for only of one year. This explains the low number of discourses found, and the distortion in the graph.

Graphs 3.1. Summary of the distribution of discourses. Scottish National Party and Parti Québécois.

Source: Own elaboration based on Atlas-ti output of codes and quotations[25]

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[25] 90 quotations were coded for the SNP, and 66 for the PQ.

We can see that both parties employed a discourse that appears to be conflictual towards the centre. Over time, general claims made towards the centre gain importance. Also, changes in discourse do not correlate with changes in government, so whether the SNRP is in office or not does not seem to affect its discourse in terms of its relationship with the centre. In both cases when the SNRP is in government, the proportion of discourses classed as normal or cooperation is negligible. Discourses claiming independence or portraying the relationship with the centre as cooperative are rare, and when they appear, they are very vague. This is true for both the SNP and the PQ. The main difference between the parties is to be found in the content of these discourses. This is explained below.

b.1. Scottish National Party

In Scotland there is a lack of in-depth discourse on immigration. No extended Parliamentary debates on this issue are celebrated in Holyrood, and emphasis is placed on the fact that immigration is not a devolved matter[26] (see for example S-P12:46, S-P18:13). However, when immigration is raised, be it in a Manifesto, Motion, Question, debate or press release, the SNP made reference to the central government in 86.36 per cent of the cases. Of these, none were related to cooperation or dialogue with the state level.

As we can see from the graph, when reference to the central State is made, the SNP took a conflictual stance or that of general claim. This confirms Hypothesis 1 according to which, in minority nations with low decentralisation on immigration, SNRPs will tend to maintain a discourse portraying high conflictivity with the centre. In

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[26] This contrasts with other cases, such as that of Catalonia where debates on immigration began in the early 1990s, when the levels of immigration where even lower than those in Scotland. This is true even given the fact that Catalonia has low levels of control over immigration (see Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero 2014).

39.76 per cent of the cases the SNP makes general claims for more control over immigration, and in 60.24 per cent of cases it portrays a relationship of conflict with the central state. In this sense, during the whole period of analysis, the SNP's discourse, where the central government is accused of not listening to Scotland's needs or acting against the interests of Scotland, revolves around two dimensions. The first of these is the economic and demographic situation of Scotland. In this sense, the SNP constantly claims that Scotland suffers from demographic decline, negatively affecting its potential for economic growth. According to SNP politicians, this could be solved with immigration. However they accuse the central state of being too focused on the needs of southern England, and of adopting increasingly restricting immigration policies. This is clearly illustrated in a speech made by Pete Wishart, MP, in 2004:

> "Scotland has the fastest falling population in Europe with many of our young people leaving the country and we need innovative solutions to address this problem. The Executive's Fresh Start initiative is little more than a toothless aspiration not a workable solution. In any case the initiative is constantly undermined by the UK immigration policy which is determined to keep talented people who would strengthen our economy out of Scotland." (S-P12:0864)

Secondly, issues related to the treatment of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants are mostly considered to be unjust and inhuman by the SNP. In this sense, the SNP laments the lack of powers over these, especially in powers relating to detention centres. On this topic, the Dungavel detention centre is the focus of most of the questions and answers, and the treatment of immigrants detained at the centre is denounced by several MPs and MSPs. The fact that children and young people were detained in the centre, according to the SNP, affected devolved powers. The fact that the Scottish government had no access to the centre meant it could not meet the responsibility it has to provide Education to those young people. This has been a matter of discussion over the years. Even in 2012 complaints on this unresolved issue were still being posed by SNP representatives: "After making great play over claims that such

detentions had ended, UK Ministers now have serious questions to answer over why youngsters are apparently still being detained at Dungavel despite their claims." (S-P12: 3340).

My hypotheses suggested that a lack of control over immigration, when raised in the context of the relationship with the central state, could form the basis on which claims for independence were justified. However, no discourse linking these elements has been found. Nevertheless some claims for independence do emerge from general claims on control over immigration. When this occurs, however, the SNP was not referencing the central State. "The efforts of the Labour-LibDem coalition to tackle racism have been hampered by the fact that control over key policy levers such as immigration, asylum, and equal opportunities are reserved to Westminster. With Independence, however, the SNP will deliver a fair immigration policy without racial bias." (S-P2: 2490).

Despite the fact that most of the discourse on immigration is constructed in general terms, some references to the lack of powers or claims for more devolution over immigration issues were followed by general complaints about the State dismissing Scotland's needs, or even acting against the region's interests. However, if we only focus on the instances where a relationship of conflict with the State is portrayed, almost 40 per cent of cases are followed by specific claims or proposed alternatives to the problems highlighted. The following citation made in 2004 illustrates this idea:

> "In this case the Home Office policy of discouraging immigration conflicts with the Scottish Executive policy of encouraging immigration so the Scottish Executive is over-ruled. That is a disgrace and once again underlines why immigration policy needs to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. We need Scottish solutions for Scottish issues not hand-me-down failed policies from London." (S-P12: 0823)

As said, few instances portraying the relationship with the State as one of cooperation are found. This could be explained in terms of the SNPs stance on immigration, which, as the party contends,

differs from that of the governing parties in Westminster. Indeed, only once did the Scottish Executive (led by the SNP) offer its full cooperation to the British government, in order to "ensure that there are alternatives to detention [centres]" (S-P12: 3198).

So, in sum, the case of the Scottish National Party reflects the prediction that a low level of control over immigration is linked with the portrayal of the relationship with the State as one of conflict. Indeed, interviews with SNP representatives confirm this finding. After explaining the aforementioned sources of conflict (treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and demographic decline), one of them concluded that "we don't think that the UK treats Scotland respectfully in a number of policies, including immigration" (S-P18:29).

b.2. Parti Québécois

In the case of Quebec, the general picture clearly differs from that of Scotland. As suggested at the beginning of this section, the proportion of instances when the discourse on immigration is linked to the relationship with the State is lower than in the case of Scotland (45 per cent of cases). This is due to the fact that in the province has a well-established discourse on immigration. While in Scotland parties have hardly started speaking about issues related to immigration, and when they do they mainly focus on the distribution of powers (or more precisely, the lack of devolution in this realm), in Quebec, which since 1991 has a high degree of decentralized powers, the discourse on immigration is much more developed. All parties have developed positions on a range of aspects related to immigration, including integration, the concept of citizenship and the *frenchification*[27] of immigrants. Because of this, when immigration is discussed, the relationship with the State does not often appear in parliamentary debates (eg. Q-P34). No mention

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[27] From French 'francisation', meaning making become French-speaker.

of this is made in some manifestos (Q-P69) or even some party programmes (Q-P73). When it does appear, the PQ takes a softer tone than that of the SNP. The proportion of discourses portraying a conflict situation with the State is lower than in the case of the SNP, and a discourse portraying cooperation and "good relations" can even be found in some cases.

General claims (38.2 per cent) and conflict (51.5 per cent) however, clearly exceed discourses portraying a cooperative relationship with the State. General claims arise from the fact that Quebec does not hold powers over all immigrant areas. It does not have powers over , for example, refugees and asylum seekers, temporary workers, and family reunification. Most of instances when claims are made, tend to be associated with these policy areas.[28] Tensions with the federal government arise in some of the processes related to the selection of immigrants in which both levels of government share responsibilities. According to the PQ, such processes become especially slow due to the delays apparently provoked by the federal government. This was illustrated by a PQ deputy in 2006: "In Quebec, the study of dossiers may be very long, but once you have accepted, do people know that this is sent to the federal government and that it takes incredibly long (to be solved)? The Canadian federal government, too, refuses to invest the necessary funds. It refuses to give Quebec money under the Cullen-Couture and Tremblay-McDougall agreement, and it refuses to invest resources itself" (Q-P14:267). Other sources of complaint by the PQ are related to issues of double taxation, and delays in resolving entry application files. Some of these complaints are followed by claims for the full transfer of powers over economic migrants (including temporary workers) or more transparency in the resolution of entry application files (Q-P77:246). Like in the case of the SNP, the PQ does not link its portrayal of their relationship with the State on

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[28] See for example, Q-P27: 0123 for temporary workers, Q-P2: 026 for family reunification and refugees.

matters related to immigration as a source to legitimize claims for independence. However, a PQ deputy, in a debate in 2000, stated that immigration could only be properly managed with a fully sovereign Quebec (Q-P24:675).

Another point of conflict raised by the PQ is the divergent views/approaches to immigrant integration. The PQ considers that Canadian multiculturalism is a "deformation" of the American Melting Pot, which entails ghettoization pressures (Q-P18:44), and a tool for 'melting' the Québécois nation. As a PQ representative argued, "Canadian multiculturalism presented the advantage of reducing the Franco-Quebecer culture to the same thing as the Indian community, not the autochthones, but immigrants coming from India, or the Chinese community (…) So, we become a cultural minority like the other minorities, so that we don't have different rights from the rest of minorities. As a consequence, any will of integrating immigrants in French became an attempt against their rights. This was such a smart calculation by Pierre Trudeau[29]" (Q-P18:44).

When the relationship with the state is raised as being conflictive, the PQ is denouncing concrete practices that are judged to go against Quebec's interest, however, this is not then followed by an alternative proposals such as claiming more power (5.7 per cent) or independence (0 per cent). When general claims are analysed, in only 2.8 per cent of cases were these linked to independence.

In some cases (10 per cent), the relationship with the State was portrayed as cooperative. Indeed, PQ representatives have acknowledged that the federal government has honoured the terms of the Canada-Quebec agreement (Q-P18: 37) and have expressed a willingness to cooperate with the federal government on immigration policy-making and the design of immigration law (Q-P23:233).

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[29] Prime Minister of Canada from 1968-1979 and 1980-1984.

To sum up, two inferences can be made from the analysis of SNP and PQ discourses on immigration. In the case of the SNP, the level of discourse related to immigration is generally low, particularly in Parliamentary debates. However, when it does appear, the discourse tends to involve the relationship with the central State, which, as expected, tends to be portrayed as tense or conflictive. This is mainly due to the lack of control Scotland has over immigration. No references to cooperation have been found. In the case of the PQ, where references to immigration in parliamentary debate, manifestos and programmes tends to be relatively high, the relationship with the State does not tend to feature so prominently in its discourse. When they do appear, they are also associated with claims against the federal government or in relation to areas of conflict. But they are not as central as in the case of the SNP. This however, is not what was initially expected. The PQ does not seem to portray the relationship with the federal government as one of cooperation.

6. Conclusion

This paper has tried to explore how the distribution of powers on immigration affects how SNRPs in Quebec and Scotland portray their relationship with the State. In other words, how the paradox of federalism is reflected in the discourses on immigration.

It has shown how low level of control over immigration coincides with a significant number of references being made to the relationship with the central State in the case of the SNP. The relationship is portrayed in terms of conflict and the party is therefore airing claims for devolution of powers in this area as well as changes in the political orientation of immigration management. Greater control over immigration matters does seem to have an effect on the number of references to the central government that are made. This can be seen in the case of the PQ. However, when the portrayal of the relationship with the central State is examined, the PQ seems to take a softer tone and to focus on highlighting

conflicts in areas where both levels of governments intervene and have some degree of power, and those where Quebec has no formal power (i.e. over refugees, temporary workers and family reunification). Furthermore, the PQ has highlighted substantial differences with the federal government in their approach to immigrant integration and cultural diversity. These are in accordance with the arguments advanced by Jeram (2012) and Arrighi (2014) that lead us to suggest that peripheries can also use immigration as a tool to confront the centre. Therefore, we can say that greater minority nation control over immigration does reduce tensions with the central State. But it does not make them disappear. This supports the arguments reviewed in the second section. Thus, the article shows that the federalism paradox is confirmed.

This paper has presented a framework for the analysis of one dimension of the centre-periphery cleavage in which immigration is shown to have an effect: the distribution of powers and the relationship between the centre and the periphery. It has analysed two cases where the decentralisation of powers related to immigration is high (Quebec) and low (Scotland) in order to explore this relationship and the SNRPs stance on immigration. From this study it is not possible to conclude that parties use the issue of immigration to justify claims for independence, as has been suggested by some scholars. There are contextual factors that can explain this. In the case of Quebec, linking independence and immigration can be politically dangerous, especially given the different incidents that have engulfed the PQ in controversy.[30] In the case of the SNP, it is true that immigration has not been as hot a topic in Scotland as it has been in the rest of the UK. And up until

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[30] An example of this occurred during the night of the 1995 referendum in which the then PQ first minister, Jacques Parizeau linked the pro-independence defeat to 'money and the ethnic vote'. Another example relates to aforementioned recent controversy over the charter of Quebec's values.

the last European elections, no anti-immigrant party managed to win any seats in Scotland. But surveys show that public opinion in Scotland does not differ that much from the rest of the UK on immigration matters.[31] The politicisation of immigration could benefit, not the SNP, but anti-immigrant parties such as UKIP.[32] Hence it seems that it may not be in the SNPs best electoral advantage to insist too much on this topic. This is particularly the case when there are other fields, such as health or welfare, where the case for independence can be pursued more effectively.

The results also show that SNRPs adopt a confrontational stance towards the centre / state approach to immigration. Immigration is therefore proven to be an issue that affects not only social cohesion but also multi-level governance. As shown, both the SNP and the PQ articulate a high degree of discrepancy between the peripheries' approach to immigration management and that of the centre. This suggests that differences in approach between the different levels of government should be explored further in order to ascertain to what extend these are connected to centre-periphery confrontation, which at the same time affects the stance towards immigration that a given SNRP adopts.

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[31] Indeed, as in the rest of the UK, a majority of Scottish citizens would suport reducing the levels of immigration, which is an issue included among the public's list of priorities. Nevertheless, the proportions are lower in Scotland than in Wales and England. See Blinder (2014).

[32] For a wider explanation on how the strategy of mainstream parties over new issues raised by niche parties affect the electoral fortunes of the latter, see the Position, Ownership and Saliency model by Meguid (2005)

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4. SELFISHNESS OF THE AFFLUENT? STATELESS NATIONALIST AND REGIONALIST PARTIES AND IMMIGRATION.

This paper examines stateless nationalist and regionalist party (SNRP) discourses on immigration through an exploration of the economic dimensions of the centre-periphery cleavage. Using qualitative document analysis, the Republican Left in Catalonia (ERC) and the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland are studied in order to see whether and how the relative economic position of a region shapes SNRP discourses on immigration. The period of analysis encompasses the last three terms of office for both parties, during which immigration and decentralisation have been very salient issues in Catalonia and Scotland. Results suggest that the relative economic situations and the economic crisis do not seem to affect general stances, which are positive in both regions. However, the economic contexts have an influence on how each party selects its main issues for debate, and the ways in which these are managed.

1. Introduction

Immigration is a central issue for stateless nations from both an academic[1] and policy perspective. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this emerging literature by examining a specific question: does the economic context affect SNRP discourses on the issue of immigration? Generally, scholars of SNRPs have paid more attention to identity and electoral strategy as factors that shape SNRP discourses on immigration (Hepburn, 2009; Jeram 2013). Economic conditions in the sub-state territory and wider state are factors that have hitherto been unexplored. As I will argue, this variable can help us better understand variation in SNRP discourses across time and space.

In the study of party politics, a significant branch of research focuses on populist radical right parties (Art 2011; Mudde 2007). Scholars have explored various topics related to these parties, such as party origins, discourses, electoral performance, voter profiles, and the effects they have on agendas and party systems (Mudde 2007). Because the radical right dramatizes the immigrant question and thus receives considerable attention, research on mainstream political parties' responses to immigration is less plentiful.[2] Mainstream political parties are crucial actors in the agenda-setting and policy-making processes related to citizenship, entry, and immigrant integration.

Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs), a party family defined by their commitment to 'sub-state territorial empowerment', have become 'permanent features of the mainstream European political landscape' (Hepburn 2009, 477-482). Their emphasis on nationalism and descentralisation is a good reason to believe that

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[1] See Kymlicka (2001) Zapata-Barrero (2009) for overviews on the theoretical and policy implications.

[2] Exceptions include Triadafilopoulous and Zaslove (2006) and Alonso and Claro (2011).

immigration will be of special importance to them. The recent volume by Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014) is the first dedicated to the links between sub-state nationalism, SNRPs and immigration. The various chapters explore the SNRP-immigration nexus, but minimal attention is afforded to whether and how economic factors shape SNRP politics.[3] Other fields of research on immigration, focused on individual attitudes or electoral studies, integrate economic variables such as employment rates and GDP into their analysis (see, e.g., Rustenbach, 2010). It is worth inquiring, therefore, as to whether economic conditions modulate how SNRPs manage the 'legitimation paradox' (see Jeram, van der Zwet, and Wisthaler this issue). To this end, an analysis of two ideologically similar SNRPs in different relative economic situations, the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland and the *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) in Catalonia is carried out.

2. SNRPs and Immigration in 'Poor' and 'Rich' Regions

There are good reasons to think that the economy is an important variable mediating the SNRP-immigration nexus. First, the link between immigration politics and the economy has been demonstrated in other subfields of research. In a study of individual perceptions towards immigration, Schneider (2008) points out that people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to subscribe to prejudices such as the idea that 'immigrants steal our jobs', known in the literature as the 'economic thread theory'. Assuming that political parties act as rational vote seekers, messaging about economic decline to justify anti-immigrant discourses can be effective in relatively poor settings. This is a primary strategy of the radical right; these parties use immigration

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[3] One exception is Hepburn and Rosie (2014).

as a scapegoat for economic or political shortcomings, elaborating common mottos such as 'our people first' (Guibernau, 2010).[4] Second, the economic dimension of secessionism has been explored extensively, demonstrating that SNRP views on secession are driven by both material and ideological factors.[5]

This does not mean that SNRPs simply map onto a right-left ideological axis when it comes to immigration. Recent literature on political parties undermines the assumption that right-wing parties are 'anti-immigrant' and left-wing parties are 'pro-immigrant' (Cochrane, 2013). According to Schain (2008), both the political left and right have reasons to support both pro- and anti-immigrant positions. The findings that ascribe issue ownership or contagion effects to the mainstream political right have recently been questioned (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2011; Odmalm, 2011). Furthermore, in a decentralized state, the centre-periphery cleavage might be more important in shaping these positions than traditional right and left ideologies (Hepburn, 2014).

The centre-periphery cleavage, as described by Rokkan and Urwin (1983), revolves around three dimensions: identity, in which the periphery tries to distinguish itself from the centre;[6] territory, in which the periphery tries to gain or protect self-government;[7] and the economy, which depends on whether the periphery is in a weaker or stronger economic position relative to the state. According to Rokkan and Urwin (1983), while distinct identity is a

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[4] This was, precisely, the main slogan of the Plataforma x Catalunya (PxC), the extreme-right party in Catalonia.

[5] Examples of this can be found in Connor (2001) on ethnonationalism, Dietrich (2013) on secession and Conversi (2014) globalization.

[6] Scholars have explored how aspects of identity construction emerge from discourses. See Hepburn (2009) and Kleiner-Liebau (2009).

[7] See Barker (2012) for an exploration of how distribution of powers affects the saliency of the immigration issue.

necessary condition, economic grievances also play a role in producing and maintaining a centre-periphery cleavage.

Indeed, Connor (1984) critically reviewed the theory of relative group deprivation, which claims that nationalist mobilisation is in fact driven by economic factors, by claiming that while economic factors may serve as a catalyst, these are not a 'cause' of sub-state nationalism. In other words, while identity formation and institution building are 'enabling conditions', economic factors are 'constraining conditions' for sub-state nationalist mobilisation (Meadwell and Martin, 1996).

The interaction between economic conditions and immigration in stateless nations has, in the first instance, a demographic component linked to the so-called fear of internal minoritization (Lipton, 2012). According to Conversi 'most cases of demographic decline are bound to generate a counter trend in the search for a political solution through either self determination or a campaign to expel immigrants' (1997, 191). Connor (1984) described how economic growth coupled with mass migration brought rejection of immigrants in the case of Switzerland.

Findings on the link between SNRP and immigration with a focus on economic aspects are unclear. Indeed, Massetti (2009, 511) suggests that 'in some cases, especially in the presence of mass immigration and in periods of economic slowdown, regionalism in this context can assume the shape of the "selfishness of the affluent'[8] expressed in terms of a resistance to sharing their wealth with others (Massetti and Sandri, 2012). This suggests that immigration can fuel further the demands for resources, self-government or independence. Yet, this 'selfishness of the affluent' might not only be expressed through a tension between the centre and the periphery, but also from the periphery towards immigrants, as

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[8] This was expressed by Harvie (1994), quoted in Massetti (2009, 194)

suggested by Connor (1984). Hepburn (2014) has proposed a related argument: SNRPs in relatively poor regions with skills shortages in the labour market are more likely to support immigration than SNRPs in regions with flourishing economies and skilled (and sufficient) labour forces. In short, SNRPs will be 'selfish' and view immigration negatively when the 'regional economy is outperforming the national economy' (Hepburn 2014, 54). In turn, we should expect SNRPs in economically underperforming regions to view immigration positively because the injection of new skills can boost economic growth. Finally, in line with what Massetti (2009) argues, an economic crisis may further exacerbate the relationship in both directions: rich regions will become even more 'selfish' and poor ones will perceive immigration as a means to economic recovery. In the following sections, I explore these arguments in the two cases, that is, I explore how the relative economic position of the nation within the state influences the SNRP's discourses on immigration.

3. Methodology

In accordance with Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014), I divide party positions towards immigration into positive/inclusive and negative/exclusive categories. The former implies that immigration is viewed as a positive phenomenon, contributing both economically and culturally to society while the challenges it entails are manageable. Neutral positions are also included in this category.[9] Negative or exclusive stances include reluctance to accept the arrival and settlement of newcomers, who are perceived

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[9] [this footnote does not appear in the Journal version] Neutral positions are considered those that deal with concrete conflicts involving immigration in which the SNRP is not highlighting positive aspects of immigration but rather defending its position from exclusive statements by other parties, or explaining how a concrete challenge has been managed. That is why it is included as inclusive discourse.

as problematic and threatening for society. Parties may even call for the expulsion of foreigners, questioning their capacity to integrate. Given the multifaceted nature of immigration, a party can adopt an inclusive stance towards one dimension of immigration, for example social rights, but an exclusive one for another, such as the number of immigrants the territory can handle. Therefore, I analytically separate the main components of the SNRP positions on immigration in the following manner:[10]

Diagnosis: the party explains and describes the phenomenon of immigration to the sub-state territory.

Flows: the party refers to the capacity/necessity of receiving immigrants in the sub-state territory, as well as to the importance of managing flows.

Labour: the party refers to immigrants' participation/contribution to the labour market. References to the informal economy and competitions for job are also included.

Rights: The party refers to the rights that shall or shall not be awarded to immigrants and whether these are conditional.

Welfare: The party refers to social benefits that shall or shall not be awarded to immigrants and whether these are conditional.

Diversity: The party refers to increasing diversity and its effects on the national culture and how to manage religious and cultural pluralism.

With regards to case selection, a paired comparison of 'most similar cases' is used. This strategy is suited for examining whether a single factor that varies across cases has an influence on the phenomenon under study. Hence, the aim is to select similar cases in terms of

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[10] These components have been inductively generated through a first open codification of the materials.

left-right ideology and party system relevance.[11] To vary the independent variable of interest—relative economic position—one SNRP from a comparatively 'poor' region within the state is chosen, and a second from a 'rich' region. For the latter the case of the *Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya* (ERC) in Catalonia is selected and for the former the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland (Massetti, 2009; Moreno, 1999). These parties share a left-wing ideological position and defend independence. In terms of their party system relevance, both the ERC and SNP have clearly shown blackmail or coalition potential in several elections and both parties have been part of governments in their respective regions.[12] This selection entails leaving aside another Catalan SNRP, *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), which was a right-wing autonomist coalition during the period of analysis. These characteristics make the case of CiU too different from the SNP. Moreover, ERC members have held the post of General Secretary on Immigration for a significant period of the timeframe under analysis and the party has been a key player in the consolidation of the 'Catalan way of immigration'. The SNRP *Solidaritat* was not chosen due to its lack of party system relevance and survival.

There is a marked variance between Catalonia and Scotland concerning their relative economic situations.[13] Scholars have tended to classify Catalonia as a 'rich' or 'bourgeois' region and Scotland as a 'poor' or 'working class' one (Massetti, 2009; Moreno, 1999).

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[11] That is, showing what Sartori (2005) called blackmail and coalition potential.

[12] ERC did so as a part of a tripartite coalition.

[13] On a global basis, one could argue that both Catalonia and Scotland are wealthy countries. However, we can also agree with Connor (1984) that the economic dimension of these peripheries is to be considered in relation to their centres. As he argues, 'it is not what it is but what people perceive as is that has political consequences' (2001, 116)

To account for the potential effects of the 2008 economic crisis, I analyse the three last legislative terms for both parties, which span before and after the onset of the crisis in both cases: for the SNP (1999-2011) and for the ERC (1999-2010). This decade was turbulent in both cases, as Scotland adjusted to the devolution agreement of 1999 and Catalonia earned new powers from the Spanish state in 2006. Moreover, immigration was first politicised during the 2000s in both cases (Hepburn 2009; Zapata-Barrero, 2003).

The data for the content analysis is mined from different sources for each party. The document database for each SNRP consists of electoral manifestos, party platforms, regional parliamentary debates and party declarations derived from the four elections that occurred in each region from 1999-2011.[14] Semi-structured interviews with party elites are used to increase the validity of the qualitative analysis.[15] These materials were analysed following Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). Units of analysis were segmented based on a thematic criterion.[16] The overall stance of each SNRP has been calculated with the following formula: 1 to 0 means an inclusive stance and 0 to -1 means an exclusive stance:[17]

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[14] 223 documents were analysed (all translation by the author). Citations included in the database are labelled 'S' for Scotland and 'C' for Catalonia followed by the number of the document and the starting line. For example: S-P2:300 signifies that the quotation can be found in the second document of the Scottish database at the 300th line.

[15] Interviews were done with two types of party members: the parliamentary representative responsible for immigration issues and the party staffers responsible for immigration issues. The interviews were carried out between March and May 2012 in Barcelona (Catalan) and Edinburgh (English) respectively.

[16] That is, coding was implemented when a topic relating immigration and any of the aforementioned components emerged, and counted as one. Sources were weighted equally except from interviews, that were coded but not counted.

[17] Discourses were counted as aggregated number of quotations.

4. Regional Economic an Migration Contexts

a) Catalonia

Catalonia is one of the richest regions in Spain and part of the 'Four Motors for Europe' with other economic powerhouse regions such as Baden-Württemberg, Rhône-Alpes and Lombardy. Catalonia is the biggest contributor to Spanish GDP (approximately 18% between 1996 and 2010)[18] and is the fourth largest autonomous community in terms of GDP per capita. It has consistently performed above the EU average. Catalonia has a large construction sector, but is not as dependent on it as are many regions in Spain; economic growth has been mainly fuelled by the service sector, industry and tourism (INE, 2005).

In recent years, Catalonia's fiscal woes have become a rallying cry for the nationalists who blame the Spanish state (Ehlers et al. 2012). Indeed, Catalonia is the region with the fourth highest fiscal deficit; in other words, public expenditure is significantly smaller than the tax revenues generated by the region for the Spanish state's general revenues.[19] Catalonia has been deeply affected by the 2008 economic crisis, with the unemployment rate reaching 23.8% from only 6% in 2007 (Idescat 2013a). Catalonia's GDP has been steadily decreasing, interrupted by a short period of recovery from 2010 to 2011 (Idescat 2013b).

Due to its economic vitality, Catalonia has attracted people from outside its borders since the eighteenth century (Conversi 1997,

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[18] Specific data can be found at INE's web page, www.ine.es.
[19] Catalonia's fiscal deficit has been estimated at between 5-10% every year since 1996 depending on the method of calculation (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009). See also Tremosa (2013) for an overview.

188). Despite its low fertility rate, Catalonia has managed to maintain its demographic growth thanks to internal and external immigration (Cabré 2008). In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the region had six million inhabitants, but in 2006 Catalonia's population surpassed seven million due to the 'Catalan system of reproduction', which is mainly based on domestic and foreign migration (Cabré 2008). In 2010, foreigners constituted 15% of the Catalan population.

Politically, the 1999-2010 period included important events that helped consolidate the '*Via Catalana d'Integració'* (Catalan Way of Integration). The Spanish Constitution bequeaths immigration competencies to Madrid, but gradually the autonomous communities have gained *de facto* competencies in immigration, especially at the integration stage due to its transversal nature (Montilla Martos 2011). The Catalan government has been legislating and executing policies related to immigrant integration since the early 1990s (Franco-Guillén 2011), most notably the institutionalization of a Catalan Secretary of Immigration in 2000 and a first Citizenship and Immigration Plan in 2005. Recently, the main political and civil stakeholders in Catalonia signed the 2008 National Pact for Immigration, which was followed by the approval of the first Reception Bill in 2010. As stated by an ERC party representative, the broad political and social consensus achieved for these two texts demonstrated a convergence in the discourses of most political forces in the Parliament with the exception of the Popular Party (PP), which has traditionally favoured stricter immigration and citizenship policies.[20]

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[20] However, while independence-seeking SNRPs tend to espouse positive stances towards immigration at the autonomous community level in Catalonia, notice must be taken that the more central parties, the socialist (PSC) and the right wing nationalist (CiU) parties exhibit variance at the local level (Garcés-Mascareñas, Franco-Guillén and Sánchez-Montijano 2012).

b) Scotland

Scotland has been consistently described as a working class region in the postwar period, even though it has an abundance of natural resources and significant oil reserves on its territory (Hechter 1975; Keating 2009). In 1970s and 80s, 'It's Scotland's oil' was a popular slogan of the SNP which aimed to convince Scots that only independence would allow Scotland to enjoy the fruits of the North Sea oil reserves. In contrast with Catalonia's diversified industry and numerous 'micro' firms (Moreno 1989), the Scottish economy has been driven by large uncompetitive heavy industries that has gradually declined (Hechter 1975). While Scotland is a rich region in global terms, its GDP per capita (excluding oil revenues) falls two points under the UK mean.[21] More importantly, Scots perceive that their economy performs poorly in relation to the rest of the UK, which is quite different than the prevalent Catalan economic grievance of being 'held back' by the Spanish state (Surridge 2006). Public expenditure per capita has been higher in Scotland than in the UK as a whole, and this perpetuates a sense of relative 'backwardness' among Scots (Johnson and Phillips 2012).[22] The economic crisis did not affect Scotland or the rest of the UK as profoundly as it did in Southern Europe; in fact, GDP growth rates have been stable since 2009 (BBC 2015). Moreover, the unemployment rate never reached double digits in Scotland, as it did in Catalonia, rising to 7.5% in 1999, decreasing to 3.9% in 2009, and increasing again to 8.5% in 2010.[23]

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[21] For an overview of these figures, as well as a discussion of the complex allocation of the oil revenues, see Johnson and Phillips (2012).

[22] There is a certain amount of confusion around the distribution of resources between the UK and Scotland. In fact, despite the belief that Scotland is a net receiver of transfers, the way oil revenues are accounted influences the final results. See Maxwell (2011).

[23] See www.ons.gov.uk/

The demographic evolution in Scotland has been noticeably different from that of Catalonia. The two regions had similar population sizes during the 1980s (approximately five million), but emigration reduced Scotland's population until 2003 when its net migration rate became positive for the first time ever.[24] Since then, Scotland's immigration rate has steadily increased, reaching 4.75% in 2010, but this statistic is quite low in relation to the UK. Due to a low fertility rate and ageing population, the current level of migration is not sufficient to level off Scotland's population decline. Demographic decline has become a preeminent concern for political actors in Scotland because of its potentially damaging consequences for the Scottish economy.

Immigration, asylum and citizenship are all competencies of Westminter. The Scottish Parliament does, however, control policy areas relating to immigrant integration, such as education, health and social services. Somewhat surprisingly, the Scottish Government has been less active than the *Generalitat* in terms of developing broad strategies and actions plans in the realm of immigration. Documents and policies of note are *One Scotland, Many Cultures* and the *Fresh Talent Initiative* in 2004, which aimed to attract skilled immigrants to Scotland, although it mainly helped foreign students remain in Scotland after their studies (Skilling 2007). Given Scotland's low proportion of immigrants, the Scottish Government and some political parties have sought to attract more immigrants to Scotland and claim more powers from Westminster rather than working with the powers it already has.[25] The tenor of debate regarding immigration in Scotland has been less controversial than in Catalonia. The two dominant parties, the SNP and Labour, have presented similar ideas about immigration, and

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[24] See http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/
[25] Catalonia started managing immigration in the early 1990s when immigrants represented less than 3% of the population, but in Scotland there has been no equivalent planning or legislation.

there was no significant change in policy when the SNP formed a majority government in 2011.[26]

5. Results

a) General stances

An overview of ERC and SNP discourses on immigration reveals two key starting points: first, both parties have a generally positive stance towards immigration; second, the issues at stake during debate differ in their respective regions. The following tables and graph illustrate these statements:

Table 4.1. SNRP's stances towards immigration (all periods)

	Diagnose	Flows	Labour	Rights	Welfare	Diversity
ERC	0,91	0,63	0,89	0,96	0,91	0,83
SNP	1	1	1	1	1	1

Source: own elaboration.

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[26] Immigration was politicized in Catalonia by 2000, even though the foreign population amounted to 2.9% of the total. This casts doubt on the argument that Scotland's relatively small immigrant population explains the political consensus.

Table 4.2. SNRP Stances towards immigration (per periods)

	Diagnose	Diversity	Flows	Labour	Rights	Welfare
ERC						
1st term of office	0,89	0,83	0,68	0,88	0,96	0,90
2nd term of office	1,00	0,82	0,68	0,91	0,95	0,94
3rd term of office	1,00	0,80	0,57	0,71	1,00	1,00
SNP						
1st term of office	1	1	1	0	1	1
2nd term of office	1	1	1	1	1	1
3rd term of office	1	1	1	1	1	1

Source: Own elaboration

We can see that both parties have remained positive about immigration over time, as seen in Table 2. The ERC scores relatively low in the areas of flows; the party accuses the Spanish state of sending illegal immigrants with 'suspicious intentions' to Catalonia and highlights the region's limited capacity to receive migrants, referring to its insufficient allotment of competencies (C-P1:10051).

Graph 4.1. References to the main compounds of stances towards immigration

Source: Own elaboration

The results demonstrate the different emphases of the parties: the ERC accentuates rights and diversity while the SNP underlines flows. This variance can be explained by the 'migratory moment' each region found itself in during the period of analysis. As described in the previous section, Catalonia presented a profile of constant attraction of migratory flows, driving the ERC's discourse to focus on other aspects such as the management of reception and integration. In contrast, Scotland's struggle to attract and retain immigrants led the SNP to insist on the management of flows.

In Catalonia, the ERC defined immigration as a structural fact, as something that has been present throughout Catalonian history. This idea, highlighted in manifestos (C-P1:09902) and debates (C-P11:0551) throughout the period of analysis, was clearly stated by the party's speaker in 2000: 'we can state without a shadow of a doubt, that immigration, and extra-communitarian immigration is a

constitutive phenomenon of the Catalan society, even an old phenomenon' (C-22:01820).

Many discourses put forth by the ERC also come with a diagnosis of the cause of global migration. The party identifies globalization and income inequality as triggering factors for migration to Catalonia, which is portrayed as a land offering opportunities to newcomers (C-P11:4167). The party frequently mentions the privileged position of the region as generating a 'call effect' for migrants (C-P1:1226). In addition, a discourse is also found which denounces the Spanish state for the lack of resources it has allocated to nullify the strain immigration has put on the Spanish welfare system (C-P10:8457).

The ERC is especially concerned with managing immigration. With respect to flows and the labour market, the focal point of discourse is Catalonia's lack of relevant competencies (C-P11:4177). Culturally, diversity is generally understood as enriching and worth preserving as long as immigrants adhere to liberal democratic values. This explains the production of legislative and political texts such as the National Pact for Immigration and the Bill of Reception. Also, access to Catalan language courses for immigrants is considered urgent by the ERC. Investment in Catalan language courses is justified by way of the centrality of the language to national belonging and the economic opportunities Catalan fluency affords newcomers.[27] Generating job opportunities for immigrants is intimately linked to the sustainability of welfare and social services; Catalonia can only absorb so many immigrants without overburdening the native population. Former president of the ERC, Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira, summarises these sentiments:

> And it is true that we cannot say we will give papers to everybody in the world. We can't because no serious country in the world can. Because we cannot grant decent living conditions to

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[27] See Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero (2014) for an in-depth discussion on this idea.

everyone in the world who wants to come, but of course more people can come. We can still give [decent living conditions] to more people, because we have a human resources deficit. And we must properly do that. We must respect those who come and they have to do the same with us. They have to agree with our laws, our democratic values and our language and culture. If Catalonia has an active intercultural recognition to living together in diversity, an effort for social equality and a positive evaluation of diversity, we have a right to ask newcomers for a commitment to cultural and linguistic 'Catalanness'. (C-P14:3417)

The SNP also displays a positive stance towards immigration in the materials analysed. SNP discourse frequently references the available 'space' for more immigrants in Scotland. First minister of Scotland and former MP Alex Salmond stated:

I want to start from a simple proposition - Scotland is not full up. We need more people. And if people from other countries are willing and eager to come to Scotland and make their futures here, then I say we should welcome them. (S-P12:0277)

Moreover, the SNP's main concerns regarding immigration differ from those of the ERC. In contrast to Catalonia, the SNP does not fret about Scotland's capacity for reception and the consequences of immigration on social service provisions; in fact, the contrary occurs: the party suggests services will improve on account of the larger tax base immigration creates.

Detention centres for immigrants and asylum seekers administrated by the UK government in Scotland have been targets of the SNP; the party considers the UK's treatment of irregular migrants and asylum seekers as unacceptable and contrary to Scotland's interest in boosting its population. Hence, the documents analysed include many claims for more Scottish powers related to asylum and visa processing. Some Scottish parliamentarians have openly argued against the UK government's deportation strategy, and in many cases the 'waste' of immigrants' skills were highlighted in their statements; for example, 'Scotland has spent centuries exporting its talented people across the world. When highly educated people like [...] want to make a life in Scotland for their families, they should

be welcomed and supported, not hounded by Home Office bureaucracy' (S-P12:2889).

While both the SNP and the ERC celebrate diversity (S-P12:2712), the SNP, unlike the ERC, does not want to oblige immigrants to adopt Scottish specific values or cultural attributes. However, the SNP is not completely neutral about how immigrants to Scotland integrate—the party expresses a desire for immigrants to feel attached to the Scottish nation rather than adopt a British identity. In debates on the Borders and Immigration Bill and citizenship tests in the House of Commons, an SNP parliamentarian Peter Wishart conveyed a serious concern about the potential consequences of suggested reforms for Scotland's interests:

> When minority communities settle in Scotland, they quickly identify with Scotland and become patriotic. In fact, some of the most patriotic Scots are from our new communities, and we take immense pride in that. (…) I ask the Minister directly and hope that he might address the question in his winding-up speech: why can we not have more national and, perhaps, regional-specific tests to secure the type of citizenship that reflects properly the communities in which people will live? There is no point in having a test that has nothing to do with the countries in which people will live (S-P10:474).

b) Economic status and discourse on immigration

The ERC's diagnosis on the economy is quite clear: immigration makes an important demographic contribution to Catalonia and may also be beneficial because immigrants take jobs that the autochthonic population does not want (C-P87:04290).

As previously mentioned, centre-periphery relations are very important to the party. Catalan politicians have claimed that the Spanish state has sent numerous irregular immigrants from the Canary Islands and Andalusia to Barcelona, which the ERC

believes is unjust and indicative of the state's malevolence towards Catalonia: [28]

> The encouragement of internal migration flows of *Sans Papiers* towards Catalonia has been stated by several NGOs working on this field. Irregular migrants from Melilla appearing all of a sudden in Catalonia, and the massive arrival of Ecuadorian tourists are just the tip of the iceberg. This suggests some sort of collusion or passivity between the State and mafias to drive irregular migrant flows towards our country (C-P11:0492).

An even more important source of centre-periphery tension is the financial consequences of irregular migration. The desire for devolved powers on migration flows and other fields related to immigration has been constant in the ERC's three legislative terms of office under study (C-P23:03789). Managing flows is perceived by the ERC as a means of targeting potential immigrants for direct legal access to Catalonia who would fill labour market gaps (C-80:0948). The ERC recognizes the large 'black' economy in Catalonia, in which immigrants have become victims of entrepreneurs who take advantage of their precarious situation. The ERC's proposed solution is to prosecute employers exploiting irregular migrants and regularize immigrants who are contributing to the economy. The ERC is in favour of committing more resources to integration because of the long-term benefits for Catalonia and the ERC petitioned the Spanish state to create an integration fund for the regions. However, this was abolished in 2010 on account of the economic crisis (C-P93:26). The party also calls for a reconfiguration of public services and more resources from the Spanish state to ensure immigrants have equal access to rights and opportunities.[29]

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[28] The analysis reveals that the other SNRP in Catalonia, CiU, has also expressed similar arguments.

[29] Although it is not the main objective of this paper, it is important to note that the ERC makes frequent references to granting political rights

The party does, however, express a notable fear that immigration could foster a feeling of competition for scarce resources among the autochthonous population. This coincides with the beginning of the economic crisis and the ERC proposal to adapt public services to match the number of users in order to avoid competition over scarce resources (C-P80: 0841). Despite the fact that the analysis does not reveal significant changes in the ERC's discourses, thus questioning the 'selfishness of the affluent' hypothesis[30], the economic crisis has led to the inclusion of a new item related to the aforementioned economic thread theory. Whilst avoiding calls for expulsion or closed borders, ERC members have declared that the economic crisis will be especially harsh for newcomers (C-P55:0417) and a question on the impact of unemployment was brought before a parliamentary commission. Also, comments have been raised about preventing competition over scarce resources among persons that are most affected by the crisis. As an ERC interviewee puts it:

> Clearly there must be some sort of management, because otherwise you cannot offer all… and now, with all this unemployment, we start seeing these messages such as "our people first", and other parties could start co-opting this stance. And this is tricky, because… what means "our people"? (…) Now there are these intense budgetary cuts on health and social welfare, and this has some effects. It really can give people the impression that they are competing for the same with "the other, the different" (C-P94:011)

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and access to nationality. The party considers the Spanish nationality laws unjust.

[30] Following Masseti's suggestion (2009, 511), which referred to right wing parties, the examination of the CiU becomes especially relevant. However, in the case of CiU discourses, examples of the selfishness of the affluent have not been found at the autonomous level and in fact the Catalan government, currently governed by the coalition, has recently rejected a Spanish ban on offering health services to irregular immigrants.

For the SNP, the reversal of Scotland's demographic decline via increased immigration is prominently connected to the economy. The SNP's deputy leader said this in 2005:

> Scotland faces a number of big challenges in the years ahead. One of the biggest is our declining population and that makes it more important than ever to encourage people from other parts of the world to choose Scotland as their home (S-P12:1826).

References to the economic situation in Scotland relative to that of the UK are made in order to justify the SNP's calls for Scottish control over immigration. These proclamations sometimes accuse London of draining Scotland of 'their people and resources' (S-P12: 0973). A UK MP representing a Scottish constituency neatly summarized this discourse in 2003: 'the attitude of the UK government towards immigrants is neither compassionate nor considered. It also ignores the dramatic population crisis facing Scotland' (S-P12:282).

The SNP is less expressive than the ERC with respect to the cultural contribution of immigration. Rather, the SNP's discourse on immigration emphasizes the economic contribution of immigrants and the preference for newcomers with specific skills:

> Too many of our brightest people have to leave Scotland to succeed. We will look at ways of encouraging these people to return. We will also examine ways of encouraging skilled migrants to settle in Scotland, improving the tax base and wealth creating capacity of our economy, by building a nation where people with skills, capital and ambition can find a home (S-P2:0326).

Finally, unlike in the case of the ERC, the economic crisis does not seem to have had any effect on the SNP's discourse on immigration. Indeed, the demographic crisis is the only crisis that appears in the sources analysed. In sum, the SNP and the ERC note their perceived economic situations—Scotland as 'poor' and Catalonia as 'rich'— and relate their discourses on immigration to it, but the results show convergence rather than divergence: both parties present a positive stance towards immigration. Extant theory predicts that the ERC

should want to 'protect' its relatively strong economy and take a negative stance towards immigration, which has not been the case.

6. Conclusion

This paper has sought to explore how the economy shapes SNRP discourses on immigration. A review of the literature suggested several paths to follow. First, Connor (1984) predicted a systematic rejection by sub-state nationalists of immigration due to economic factors, pointing to the so-called 'selfishness of the affluent'. Moreover, Conversi (1997) predicted a negative reaction to immigration linked to demographic equilibrium, an idea that Hepburn (2014) later completed by adding that the relative economic position of the region can determine whether the stance towards immigration is positive (in poor regions with labour shortages) or negative (in rich regions without labour shortages). The case comparison of the ERC and the SNP was employed to explore these arguments. Does the economy have any influence on SNRP discourses towards immigration? I have argued that, indeed, the relative economic situation does matter, but the causal paths might be different than scholars have suggested previously.

ERC's discourses do not conform to theoretical expectations; that is, in a relatively rich region with a flourishing economy, a negative stance towards immigration should emerge. The ERC portrays immigration as a part of Catalonian history and an inevitable process for a modern economy. The response to immigration, then, is to protect social cohesion though ensuring adequate reception of immigrants, equal opportunities and the possibility for immigrants to learn Catalan. Also, the economic crisis does not raise negative reactions or concerns other than the need to maintain social cohesion, making sure that no individual loses his or her access to rights.

With regards to the SNP, in congruence with Hepburn (2014), and in contrast to Connor (1984) and Conversi (1997) immigrants are

seen as a potential tool for overcoming Scotland's demographic decline and labour shortages. The SNP has not evoked the economic crisis as a justification for neither positive nor negative views of immigration. The party has maintained a consistently positive stance.

Each party affords different weight to the various dimensions and themes related to immigration. For the SNP, there is much interest in increasing flows to Scotland and obtaining more competencies for Holyrood, and for the ERC, the focus is on granting equal rights, opportunities and access to welfare for immigrants. This is clearly in line with the economic situation in each region.

There are a number of conclusions that can be inferred from the data. First, the different emphases of each party stems from the 'migratory moment' currently underway in each region. While both regions have similar fertility rates, Catalan population decline has been staved off by the migratory waves of the twentieth century. Scotland, on the other hand, has had more trouble attracting immigrants and preventing emigration. Thinking counterfactually, if Scotland were receiving the same amount of immigrants as Catalonia, we could reasonably believe that the SNP would mirror the ERC's discourse. Each party acknowledges these two differing contexts, which have consequences for each region's respective economy, and some of their stances on immigration come from their understandings of this issue.

Second, the centre-periphery cleavage is also important. Both the ERC and the SNP have consistently pressed their respective states for decentralization and resources. Also, both parties are highly critical of central government policies and laws on immigration. In the case of Catalonia, the fiscal deficit is frequently mentioned and immigration is seen as a 'victim' of the 'unfair situation'. In the Scottish case, Westminster is accused of blocking economic growth by preventing newcomers from entering and settling in Scotland.

The analysis has highlighted issues that further research could tackle. First, despite the lack of consensus over whether left and right positions can explain stances on immigration, it is true that both the SNP and the ERC are (moderate) left-wing parties and their discourse is coherent with Schain's (2008) suggestion of immigrants as a source of working class support. A replication of this exercise with right wing parties in bourgeois and working class regions would be desirable. Secondly, following the idea that the SNP and the ERC are situated on the same side of a continuum of stances towards immigration, but these stances have nuances which are influenced by their migratory contexts, the idea of path-dependency emerges as a possibility for further exploration. As already suggested by Arrighi de Casanova (2012) and Jeram (2013), an SNRP may select its initial immigration stance to oppose central policies, which is then subject to 'positive feedback' as its immigration agenda becomes entangled in the nationalist narrative.

Finally, both parties make references to the incorporation of newcomers into the sub-state nation as opposed to the state nation. While SNP assumes that most immigrants in Scotland will develop a Scottish rather than British identity, for the ERC, it is not as clear and some concerns were raised. The immigrant integration trajectories in different cases—whether the predisposition is towards the sub-state or state nation—might provide a better understanding of why SNRP confront immigration in one way or another.

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5. CONCLUSION

The thesis has sought to produce new knowledge in the field that links immigration, stateless nations and political parties. I proposed to do this by focusing on SNRPs discourses on immigration and to examine it through the perspective of the centre-periphery cleavage. It has been argued that cleavages help to predict party positions on certain issues (Marks & Wilson 2000), but as I argued in the introduction, the relationship between the cleavage and the issue may not be necessarily unidirectional, especially if we are speaking about the centre-periphery cleavage, that gives birth to SNRPs. In this sense, I highlighted how, when constructing their discourses on immigration, SNRPs have had to (re)consider their positions within the dimensions of the cleavage (identity, territory and economy). This, together with the lack of research focused on SNRPs, legitimized the in-depth exploration of such discourses through the perspective of the three dimensions.

This last chapter aims to review the contributions made by each article and their implications in order to then make several reflections from the study of SNRPs discourses on immigration that could inspire further research. The chapter therefore seeks to answer two main questions: what are the thesis' contributions, and what are

the limitations and the future lines of research to build on and develop the thesis.

1. Contributions and implications

a) On the relationship between features of nationalism and discourse on immigration

The first paper aimed to tackle the first dimension, identity, by exploring how elements of nationalism appear in the construction of a discourse on immigration. It took a context where (as set out in the introduction) identity is precisely a sensitive issue. It sought to compare two SNRPs with quite different backgrounds. It hence focuses on the left-wing, republican and independentist ERC, and the moderate, right-wing coalition CiU, which includes a Christian democrat party.

The point of departure was a hypothetical relationship between supporting a civic form of nationalism and adopting a positive stance towards immigration and vice-versa. This relationship makes sense given the nature of the distinction between civic and ethnic nations. The ethnic nation, self-defined with objective markers such as blood, race or religion, is almost inherently exclusive and finds it difficult to accept people from abroad. In contrast, the civic nation with a 'subjective willingness' as the sole requisite for one to belong, is almost obliged to accept the inclusion of newcomers. The problem of this distinction is that language has traditionally been included as an aspect of ethnic nationalism. The first paper criticises this and suggests language should be classified according to the way the discourse is constructed; that is, whether knowing the language is a prerequisite for being considered part of the nation, or a tool for granting equality of opportunities. A database including all the

official discourses on immigration by CiU and ERC between 1999 and 2010 was analysed following this analytical framework.[1]

The analysis of ERC and CiU reveal that both parties deploy, in general, a rather civic conception of the nation in their discourse within an overall positive stance towards immigration. Most of the references made to the categories identified in the analytical framework (values, belonging and function of language) tend to be made within a civic nationalist view.[2] Interestingly, had language (26% of total discourses) been considered as an entirely ethnic item within a broader category of belonging (18% of total discourses), both SNRPs would have been described as portraying a more ethnic nationalist discourse. Both parties show that they have understood that immigration is 'here to stay' and thus they do not engage in questioning its desirability. The parties also acknowledge the challenges that immigration brings to Catalonia, but also set out a need to make Catalonia an attractive society. On these grounds the paper suggests that the relationship between identity and stance towards immigration is not unidirectional or straightforward, but it is more endogenous. Because the management of immigration and immigration flows is more recent than the construction of the nation, one could argue that the way a nation is constructed determines its stance towards immigration. But national identities are not fixed, but subject to change. As Guibernau (2007) suggests, in her reflection on national identity, it is not only a top down but also a bottom up process. For example, when speaking about the cultural component she argues that 'elites had to make certain concessions and incorporate a sufficient number of elements from the popular culture into what was to be designed as national culture, in order for the masses to identify and recognise the elite's

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[1] All databases are available on request form the author in hpr5 format.

[2] As reported in detail in the corresponding chapter, there are some nuances as ethnic elements also appear with more frequency within CiU's discourses.

constructed national culture as their own' (p. 18). Following this logic, if nationalists (in our case, SNRPs) acknowledge that immigration is a phenomenon that is here to stay (rather than be resisted), it makes sense to try to attract newcomers into the nationalist project. As a result, the receiving national identity should be open enough for them to develop a sense of belonging. As argued in the paper, the Catalan nation, as a construct, has both civic, and ethnic elements to it, and SNRPs have deployed those elements that are more coherent with their stance towards immigration. That is why all politicians present immigration as a part of the Catalan People's history, and prefer to insist on the subjective criterion for belonging, such as working and living in Catalonia and willing to be Catalan, rather than more ethnic elements like being Catholic[3] or having eight Catalan surnames.[4]

All things considered, this strategy has a function to play in the nation building process. Handman (1921, p.102) contended that "what lies at the bottom of nationalistic behavior is not interest in the other members of the group, but solidarity in repelling a common enemy". On these grounds, we can reasonably claim that a stateless nation has a 'common enemy' (usually the political centre). In redesigning the main defining elements of the nation in a way that newcomers can fit within the nation and therefore develop loyalty towards it, stateless nationalists are able to keep the 'common enemy' (the political centre, and more concretely in the case of Catalonia, the Spanish government) outside its own borders. At the same time, it can eventually help to reinforce already existing arguments or conflicts between the periphery and centre. For

[3] Despite the clear majority of autochtones self-qualifying as Catholics, the percentage is significantly lower in comparison to the rest of Spain. For information on the relation between religion and politics in Catalonia, see Nagel (2014) and more broadly, Requejo and Nagel (2014)

[4] Another example reporting a switch in the definition of the nation by stateless nationalists can be found in the case of the Basque country (Jeram 2012)

example, it may be used within a blame-shifting strategy as described by Arrighi de Casanova (2014). This last idea links in with the findings of paper 2, which focused on territory.

b) On the territorial distribution of powers on immigration.

In the realm of territorial distribution of powers, scholarly research has raised the so-called paradox of federalism. According to which, decentralization, due to its potential to accommodate peripheral attempts to protect distinctiveness from the centre, helps to tame secessionism. However, it creates an institutional framework (and thus, the opportunity) for secession to push ahead. Within this framework, paper two aimed at analysing whether decentralization, which scholars have tended to suggest is a solution for the potential tensions between a State and a minority nation arising from the arrival of immigrants, was indeed a solution. Thus for this paper, two similar SNRPs,[5] the Parti Québecois (PQ) and the Scottish National Party (SNP), were selected for comparison. Each is an SNRP from contexts where levels of decentralisation differ. This allows for the analysis of the level of conflict reported within their discourses. A scale for measuring this conflictivity was constructed and applied to both cases. The data covered the official discourses between 1999-2011 (for the SNP) and 1998-2012 (for the PQ). The results showed that both parties report a rather conflictive relationship with the centre, although such conflict hardly reached the extrem of using immigration as a source for justifying independence. In this sense, the paper shows that both parties argue that the issue of immigration (just as other policy issues) can only be properly managed with independence, but most discourses are focused towards more descentralisation, rather than secession. For

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[5] In terms of party system relevance and ideological positions.

the case of the PQ, which corresponds to the stateless nation with a higher level of decentralisation on immigration, conflictivity was lower than in the case of the SNP, where immigration is a reserved matter for Westminster. The close examination of the SNRPs' discourses also showed an underlying, systematic confrontation with the centre's approach to immigration.

These findings have two implications: first, it suggests that in the realm of immigration decentralization might also lower the tension with the centre, but it does not make it disappear. Immigration does not seem to alter centre-periphery relations in a noticeable way, but simply adds to the existing arguments between both sides. As Guibernau concluded when analyzing devolution in general, "there is a certain "comfort" arising from devolution, which tends to turn secessionist aims into never-ending demands for greater power and recognition" (2007 p. 57). Second, and directly related to this, and perhaps because immigration simply adds on the logic of confrontation with the centre, SNRPs tend to oppose the centre's approach to immigration. This is evident in both cases examined, but we may yet be able to say the same of the Catalan SNRPs analysed in paper one.

This behaviour brings two advantages for stateless nationalists. The first one, already detected by Arrighi de Casanova (2014), is that the constant claims for devolution of powers and the opposition to the centre's approach to immigration management acts as a *blame-shifting* strategy. This way, the central state, rather than peripheral one, tends to be blamed in the event of any unwanted effect deriving from immigration management. The second advantage is that this also reinforces the 'common enemy' discussed in the previous section. By pointing at the centre, stateless nationalists can place the 'enemy' outside the territorial borders of its nation, thus maintain a relatively cohesive 'us', that includes all individuals in the territory, versus a 'them' which acts against their interests.

c) On the economic context and the discourse on immigration.

The economic context had received less attention on the link between SNRP and immigration. This is so despite its preponderance in other branches of literature seeking to explain how labour market conditions or economic growth affect individuals' perceptions towards immigration or the electoral performance of extreme-right parties. The little literature that exists predicted minority nationalists would adopt negative stances and reactions towards immigration (Connor 1984; Conversi 1997), even leading to the coining of the term 'selfishness of the affluent'. Empirical literature suggested that the relative economic status of the stateless nation within the State could influence a SNRPs stance towards immigration (Hepburn 2014). This is the point of departure for the third paper, which seeks to analyse how the economic context helps to shape discourse on immigration. To do so, a paired comparison of two similar SNRP in different economic contexts (the ERC in Catalonia and the SNP in Scotland) was carried out. Results do not confirm the idea that in richer regions the minority nationalists adopt a negative response to immigration. This is the case even after deep economic crisis (still ongoing in Catalonia), which does not seem to have had an effect on the direction of the discourse.

However, the article shows that the economic context nuances discourses. While it does not influence the direction of the discourse (that is, acceptance or rejection of immigration), economic elements do feature in the way immigration discourses are built and impacts on the emphases that are put on each dimension of the discourse. The article argues that the differences can be explained in terms of the migratory moment each region is currently facing. It argues that if Scotland had attracted as many immigrants as Catalonia has, the SNP would probably articulate a similar discourse to the ERC.

The third paper also relates to the argument of keeping the 'common enemy' out and focused on the centre. In this case, both the ERC and the SNP are critical of the central governments' approach to immigration management from an economic perspective. The SNP accuses Westminster of blocking Scottish economic growth by hindering inflows to the country while the ERC takes the fiscal deficit to present immigration as a(nother) victim of what the party considers an unfair distribution of fiscal revenues.

d) Overall pattern

This thesis has qualitatively explored the official discourse on immigration of what one could informally call 'the usual suspects'. Together with Flanders, Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland are arguably the nations without State that have been most explored by academic research across different disciplines. However there was a lack of research on immigration issues. In addition to this, the study is necessary because of the paradigmatic nature of these case studies and their potential for transferring experiences to other nations. Moreover, one can easily argue that the case of the ERC in Catalonia has often been ignored in the study of the Catalan context where CiU has been the leading party for decades. It is important to state that these cases challenge the generalized prediction made by many scholars that the arrival of immigration may lead to a rejection of it by minority nationalists.[6] The response however is not necessarily negative and, as this thesis shows, it is much more complex and is closely linked to the dimensions of the centre-periphery cleavage.

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[6] Other scholars, as shown in this thesis, have previously challenged this assumption, see for example contributors at the edited volume by Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero (2014)

As has been suggested, the exploration of SNRPs discourses through the perspective of the centre-periphery cleavage reveals the presence of what I would like to defend as a causal mechanism, the 'common enemy' argument, for a factor which could account for predicting SNRPs stances on immigration. I return to this point later when I address potential avenues for further research.

As has been mentioned, previous contributions have defended the idea that what is common to most nationalist movements, what unites these movements, is the solidarity against a common enemy (Handman 1921; Guibernau 2007). This is the case regardless of whether the nation has a state of its own or not. After some decades of 'peace' within the borders of Western democracies, the 'common enemy' in external terms became more abstract and nationalism turned to internal enemies, often focusing on immigrants. This is the case, for example, of the Front National in France. In terms of strategy, this choice can be dangerous in the long term for stateless nationalists, as (at least, legally) most immigrants will become citizens and the formers' initial rejection can turn into a backlash against nation-building projects. Nevertheless they have an 'external common enemy', which is the political centre, especially for those nationalists that are self-placed in the extreme end of the centre-periphery cleavage. Indeed, one could wonder 'why would secessionists reject immigration to reinforce their nation-building projects if they can always blame the political centre (until they have a State of their own)?'. Let us take the scenario of Catalonia. In January 2015, Catalonia had 7,5milion inhabitants. 17% was born outside Spain. This percentage increases if it is filtered by voting age, here 19% of the population of voting age was born outside Spain - although immigrants naturalized are only 5% of the electoral census.[7] In the near future, Catalan society will inevitably

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[7] Data retrieved from Estadística del Padrón Municipal, and Censo Electoral (INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) 2015)

see an increase in its diversity of backgrounds, linked to immigration and mixed marriage. A strategy of rejection of immigration by SNRPs would gradually decrease political support for stateless nationalist claims. On the side of autochthones, while a rejection of immigration could reinforce their nationalist attachment in the short term, support for stateless nationalism would decrease in the long term as (as normative theorists predicted) *pure* Catalans who could eventually support stateless nationalism would become a minority within their own territory. In this sense it seems stateless nationalists are to gain if they instead focus on blaming the centre, and even include immigrants in Catalonia as victims of the Spanish government, rather than enemies to Catalonia's aspirations for a State. This is summarised as follows.

Table 5.1. Keeping the 'common enemy' out argument.[8]

		Support / Attachment to stateless nationalism (SN) through time.	
		Short term: Citizens have a quite homogeneous composition and can identify with both strategies	Long term: Citizens have an increasingly heterogeneous composition due to naturalisation and mixed marriage. Can hardly identify with strategy A.
SN's choice of Common enemy strategy	A) Immigration	Maintenance of support	Loss of support
	B) Political centre	Maintenance of support	Maintenance of support

Source: Own elaboration

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[8] This does not eliminate the existence of other issues such as path dependency and other contextual and institutional factors that have an influence. In other words, I do not claim that 'the common enemy' is the only aspect affecting nationalism performance, but one that should be incorporated within its study in relation to immigration.

The thesis, through the analysis of the different dimensions of the centre-periphery cleavage has shown how all the SNRPs analysed tend to focus their critiques on the centre and adapt their discourses on immigration within this parameter. Indeed, in the realm of identity, CiU and ERC tend to portray a civic national identity and, as paper 1 argues, this is done to portray a nation in which newcomers can be incorporated. In the realm of territory, both the SNP and the PQ portrayed a conflictive relationship with the centre and blamed Westminster and Ottawa for the problems arising from immigration management, even qualifying the centre's approach as 'inhumane' (SNP). Finally, in the realm of economy, paper 3 shows how discourse on immigration is not tied to the relative wealth of the region within the State in terms of its rejection of immigration. Instead it argues that the challenges of immigration are often portrayed as the result of the centre's decisions on the economy. Whether the conclusions reached in the second part of the table hold true should be part of further research. I develop this further below. Table 5.2 summarises the contributions explained above.

Table 5.2. Thesis contribution

	Theoretical contribution	Methodological contribution
Paper 1	• Critique of the traditional way of classifying ethnic and civic elements of the nation. • ERC as an underresearched case • Bi-directionality between ethnic/civic nation and discourse on immigration	• Framework for analysis on the basis of ethnic and civic elements of the nations. • Database on the official discourse of SNRP in Catalonia between 1999-2010.
Paper 2	• Evidence of the paradox of decentralisation. • Evidence on the argument on blameshifting.	• Framework of analysis for types of discursive relationship (conflict-cooperation) • Databases on the official discourse of the SNP between 1999-2011 and the PQ between 1998-2012
Paper 3	• Inductive exploration of the economic context. • Questioning of previous assumptions on the relationship between economy and discourse towards immigration • Argument on path dependency and migratory moment.	• Inductive proposal of framework for analysis on the realm of the economy. • Calculation of net positions towards immigration.
Overall	• Keeping the common enemy out argument. • In depth exploration of the three dimensions of the centre periphery cleavage emerging in discourses on immigration	

Source: Own elaboration

2. Methodological limitations and further research

Any research has its limitations, many of which are related to the methodology used, its aspirations, to lack of time, availability of information and, particularly in the case of those analyzing the content of discourses, the knowledge of language. In this section I set out some of the limitations of this thesis before turning to set out the directions that further research could take.

1. Selection of cases: CiU, ERC, SNP and the PQ are cases that were selected due to their theoretical relevance and contextual interest, but also their comparability. Other relevant cases such as the Flemish or the Basque ones have some contextual characteristics related to political stability that could interfere on the findings. The suggested criterion for each article determined the case selection. Having carried out this research, which has suggested new insights on the link between immigration and SNRPs, new cases could now be added. The case of the Basque Country, for example, has some interesting features that rival Catalonia. For example, it has more than one SNRP spread along the left-right axis, and holds a national identity that widely differs from the Spanish one, with a unique language that is not protected by any other state. Some years have passed since the *ezker abertzalea* has returned to be present in public institutions.[9] Moreover, cases where the peripheral positions of regions are less

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[9] This term refers to the radical left independentism in the Basque Country. It has been present in the public institutions under different names. Their links with the terrorist group ETA has frequently led to the incarceration of many of their members. The 'Political Parties Law' (passed in 2002), by which any political party not condemning the attacks of ETA could be illegalized, also hindered their members from continuing in politics. This means that it has been difficult for the *ezker abertzalea* to produce a longstanding position on immigration. Since the 2011 elections this has stabilized, thus making the case more interesting.

extreme (regionalism and autonomism) - such as the CSU in Bavaria or Coalición Canaria (CC) in the Canary Islands - could be interesting to examine. Finally, the framework could also be applied to cases where immigration is a matter of conflict, such as in Flanders (Vlaams Belang, but also the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie) or the North of Italy (Lega Nord).

2. Focus on official discourses: This thesis has worked with the official discourse of SNRPs. These reflect party positions. However, one could also argue that non-official discourse[10] is also relevant since it is one that is also captured by the mass media, which in turn reaches the population. It is in the mass media that comments that do not fit with the party's official line are often published and made accessible to the public. An illustration of this can be found in the case of CiU in Catalonia. In the opening to this thesis, I quoted the leader of the Christian Democrats (UDC), who contradicts CiU's official party line. Another member of the UDC, Josep Maria Vila d'Abadal, during his mandate as mayor of the city of Vic became famous due to his harsh positions towards immigration.[11] The PQ could also be problematic. For instance, the PQ leadership candidate Pierre Karl Péladeau, commented in March 2015 that immigration was hurting the movement for sovereignty but was forced to retract his comments one day later (Authier 2015). Thus, further research could examine the unofficial discourses of a party and compare it to its official position.

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[10] The thesis argues that manifestos, party programmes and Parliamentary debates reflect official discourse because their contents are agreed by the internal organisations of a given party. Un-official discourses are those deployed by individual members without agreement within the party. Examples of these are the participation of party members in the media, or their use of social networks such as Twitter or Facebook.

[11] Examples of the behaviour of CiU members at the local level during the 2011 local elections can be found in (Garcés Mascareñas et al. (2011). For the case of the Parti Québecois see Hepburn (2009)

This thesis has proposed an in-depth exploration of several cases. It did not aim at offering an encompassing explanation of why SNRPs take concrete stances on immigration, but it has checked some of the proposed explanations that have been suggested to date. In order to explore this further, the following hypotheses should form the basis for future research:

3. Secessionism, blameshifting and keeping the common enemy out: As previously discussed in this section, the underlying reflection of the papers in this thesis is that SNRPs tend to take advantage of their position of dependence from the centre on immigration issues in order to blame it. Thus, in a situation of latent social or political conflict related to immigration, the SNRP can simply oppose the centre's decisions, setting itself 'beyond responsibility' when facing the periphery's population. They can also defend a more inclusive stance towards immigration while also building the grounds for immigrants to develop more sympathy towards the SNRP. This strategy is evident in all four political parties studied in the thesis, and the common feature they share is that all of them are positioned in an extreme side of the centre-periphery cleavage.[12] Further research should thus examine whether the net position on the centre-periphery axis[13] influences the SNRPs overall stance towards immigration.

The causal mechanism underlying this argument is that in the absence of a strong anti-immigrant party, an SNRP can (at least in the short term) easily make electoral gains among the autochthones

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[12] I am aware that CiU might be a problematic case. During the period of analysis this coalition was self-defined as an autonomist party. However, the CDC started polarizing its position in 2007 when its president (and current president of the Generalitat) announced the creation of the Big House of Catalanism (Casa Gran del Catalanisme), which was supposed to pave the way towards 'the right to decide'. Today the coalition in government is trying to promote a referendum for independence.

[13] Understood as a continuum that goes from full union to full Independence.

by attacking immigration precisely on the grounds that normative theorists have set. These relate to the special challenges faced by minority nations with the arrival of immigration (that is, fear of internal minoritisation and thus general rejection). However, the experience of Quebec's referendum in 1995 reveals that even if immigration is a minority within the territory, it can have a serious influence in the final result.[14] Hence, in pursuing independence and in the need of reaching a majority non-corrected by electoral laws or district design, the SNRP is in need of incorporating immigrants in their Yes side. It is still early to draw conclusions from what happened in the Scottish independence referendum of 2014, but it seems that 4% or so of the electorate was of immigrant background and do not seem to be massively against independence (see press article, Kelbie 2014).[15] Besides, by adopting a rather secessionist stance, it is less foreseeable that an SNRP is willing to use its coalition potential[16] which in turn enables the party to adopt an adversarial stance against the central government on immigration issues.

From these reflections, several underlying questions of relevance can be noted. Firstly, if an SNRP decides that immigration needs to be incorporated into the nationalist project, how can this be done effectively? Secondly, what about immigrants themselves? What do they think about all these issues? And finally, what about centre-

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[14] Beyond the famous comment by the then first minister of the province, Jacques Parizeau on 'money and the ethnic vote', see Conley (1997). For research on how immigrants tend to vote in block, according to what the leaders of their ethnic communities recommend, at least initially, see Lavoie and Serré (2002)

[15] There is still no official data on the behaviour of immigrants in the September 2014 Scottish Referendum. At the time of writing, a study led by the University of Edinburgh's professor Ailsa Henderson on this matter has yet to be published. Press reports however suggest that the immigrant vote was split (Clegg 2014).

[16] For the case of Catalonia and Scotland, all SNRPs have won enough seats in general elections to have be potential coalition partners with the winning party.

periphery relations? These questions suggest avenues for further research.

4. Centre-periphery relations: This thesis has already tackled the issue raised by the last question. However it has done so from a party politics perspective. Immigration is clearly a multilevel policy issue and its cross-sectional nature means that some dimensions of immigration policy such as management of flows or nationality lie at hands of the central government, but others remain in hands of other levels of government (depending on the level of decentralization). Exploring what relations between different levels of government in the field of immigration is a branch of research that could make important contributions to the fields of both immigration studies and territorial politics. There is a need to research the types of relations (cooperation, confrontation) and under what conditions these take place. This, in fact, has just been proposed by Hepburn and Adam (2015). The case of Spain, and Catalonia in particular, is an example that deserves attention. This is because of its immigration profile, which is reviewed in paper one, and is characterized by the rapid pace at which immigrants arrived to the territory, and the volume of immigration it has received - that makes Catalonia today comparable to the so-called old immigration countries. Secondly, this is also because Catalonia is characterized by its leading role in intergovernmental relations and institutional design.[17] Indeed, Catalonia's first plan for managing immigration (1992) was approved two years before the first Spanish Immigration

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[17]   For example, the Statute Reform started by Catalonia triggered the reforms in the rest of autonomous communities. The reformed Catalan statute became a reference for the rest. In fact, the Valencian Community undertook Statute reform that included a final clause (the so-called Camps clause, in reference to the then president of the Valencian Generalitat) saying that any competence decentralization taking place in any other autonomous community not included in the Statute should be automatically negotiated. See commentary on the newspapers in Caparrós (2010)

plan (1994) and it was, for example, a Catalan MP that proposed the approval of a Spanish Fund for the Social Integration of Immigrants (which disappeared with the economic crisis). Moreover, the competences on immigration in Spain are distributed across the different levels of government, and in many cases the separation is not clear, hence the centre and the periphery have to share (and thus interact) many of them (Castiñeira 2009). Its study can therefore contribute to shape the model proposed by Adam and Hepburn.

5. *Immigrant incorporation into the nationalist project (a):* This thesis makes a contribution to immigration studies by incorporating the sub-state level and focusing on SNRPs. However, another limitation of the thesis is the fact that it does not tackle the immigrants themselves. One of the specific challenges that arise from the arrival of immigrants in minority nations departs from the assumption that immigrants tend to integrate into the majority nation (Zapata-Barrero 2007). Despite the power of this argument, it has been hardly tested empirically, except in the case of Quebec. In fact, Banting and Soroka compared immigrants' integration in Quebec and the rest of Canada and found that the existence of competing loyalties in Quebec prevented immigrants from developing a strong sense of belonging to Quebec, Canada, or both as compared to the rest of the Canadian provinces (2012). There is a need to study immigrants' opinions in other cases further. It would also be beneficial to study these in relation to processes of secessions in the cases where SNRPs with secessionist positions have party system relevance and thus potentially, promote independence. For the case of Catalonia, exploratory research suggests that immigrants are split in their support for independence and other models of territorial organization of the State (Franco-Guillén & Esteve Garcia, forthcoming).

6. *Immigrant incorporation to the nationalist project (b):* So far I have pointed out further research from the point of view of governments and from the point of view of immigrants, however research could also be extended to how SNRP incorporate

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immigrants into their nationalist projects. Research on immigrant incorporation into political parties[18] is on-going, but none is tackling the issue from the stateless nationalist perspective. The issue of descriptive representation[19] is crucial as a first step for immigrant incorporation into politics, and later, society. SNRPs need to think strategically in terms of their party position and discourse on immigration, but also, if they choose to be inclusive, on how to incorporate them into their ranks.

7. The attitudes of autochthones in stateless nations towards immigration: Finally, for an encompassing account of the interaction between immigration and stateless nations it is necessary to incorporate the views of the reception society towards newcomers. The knowledge we have to date is scarce, and has produced contradictory findings. For example, for the case of Catalonia, the relationship between subjective national identification (SNI)[20] and prejudices towards immigrants has been found to be positive for those who identify themselves as Catalan in some cases (Escandell & Ceobanu 2010) but not statistically significant in others (Rodon & Franco-Guillén 2014). Moreover, for the case of Scotland, the evidence tends to suggest that those who have a strong Scottish SNI have an inclusive identity overall although with some limits (Hepburn & Rosie 2014). Finally, for the case of Quebec, recent findings suggest that despite an increased

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[18] The European research project entitled *Divpol: diversity in political parties' organization and representation,* which ended in June 2014 deserves special attention. See the final report Dänke et al. (2014)

[19] Understood as the idea that a given chamber should reflect the composition of the population. This is often applied in gender studies (see, most notably, Lovenduski & Norris 1993) and increasingly in immigration studies (see for, example, Hochschild & Mollenkopf 2009)

[20] Scale derived from the so-called 'Moreno question' in which respondents have to identify their national attachments on a scale from only [region] to only [State], including dual identities.

preference for reducing the numbers of immigrants in the region, a negative perception towards immigrants does not significantly correlate to having strong Quebecker sentiments, although there is a marginal correlation when strong separatist preferences are considered (Turgeon & Bilodeau 2014).

Table 5.3. Limitations and further research

Limitations	Further Research
• Restriction of cases to SNRP in Catalonia, Scotland and Quebec	• Application of frameworks to other cases: 　• Variation in the centre-periphery cleavage 　• Variation in contexts (Basque Country, Flanders, Bavaria…)
• Analysis centered only in the official discourse	• Unofficial discourse – press.
• Mainly descriptive and exploratory	• Blameshifting and common enemy thesis • Centre-periphery positions
• Focus on SNRP's discourses	• Focus on immigrants' incorporation • Focus on intergovernmental relations
• Focus in Parties	• Focus on individuals: 　• Immigrants' views 　• Autochthones' views

Expanding our knowledge though further research along these avenues will be key in order to understand how immigration interacts with minority nationalism and movements for independence.

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ANNEX

1. Semi-structured interviews guide and interviewees

Objective	Question
Inclusion of the immigration issue in the political agenda	When does the party start thinking seriously about immigration? Follow up questions: What is the initial position? Has it changed over time?
Detection of conflicts / problems / challenges	What are the main challenges that the party has detected over the years, or that have emerged in parliamentary debates? Follow up questions: Introduce specific conflicts already detected in the other sources of information.
Proposal of solutions or demands	How has the party reacted to…? [concrete issues]
Relationship with the centre	[describe the distribution of powers between the centre and the periphery] How would you currently describe the relationship with Madrid/London/Ottawa? Follow up questions: Ruling of the Constitutional Court [Catalonia]. Economic crisis and resources. Citizenship admissions.
(Re) definition of the nation	If the party aims at sending a message to a potential newcomer about what is [nation] what should it be? Follow up question: when does an immigrant cease to be an immigrant in [nation]?
Relationship between immigration and the nation [economy, welfare, culture]	What does [nation] expect from immigrants] What can [nation] offer to immigrants? Follow up questions: modes of integration. Economic crisis and economic threat, racism and anti-discrimination.

*This structure, though common for all cases, was altered according to the party, as emphasis was put according to the main article were the interview would contribute to. However, the rest of questions

also received some attention in case the material was helpful for future research.

Interviewees

Interviewee	Date
John Finnie (Scottish National Party)	Edinburgh (Scotland) March 2012
Humza Yousaf (Scottish National Party)	Edinburgh (Scotland) March 2012
Carme Capdevila (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya)	Barcelona (Catalonia) April 2012
Pere Culell (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya)	Manresa (Catalonia) April 2012
Àngel Colom (Convergència i Unió)	Santa Coloma de Gramenet (Catalonia) April 2012
Ferran Falcó (Convergència i Unió)	Badalona (Catalonia) April 2012
Yves-François Blanchet (Parti Québécois)	Drummondville (Québec) September 2012

2. Coding structures and definitions

Figure 1. Article 1 codes summary.

Figure 2. Article 2 codes summary.

Figure 3. Article 3 codes summary.

Table 1. Paper 1. Coding definitions

Code	Description
BCCiU BCERC	Belonging, civic: Coding for each party when it expresses who belongs in civic terms, stressing subjective willingness and the fact of residing in the territory.
BECiU BEERC	Belonging, ethnic: Coding for each party when it expresses in terms of blood (ius sanguini), religion, traditions the conditions for a person to belong to the nation.
VCCiU VCERC	Values, civic: Coding for each party when exposing the shared values of the community in terms of respect for democracy, freedom and equality, as well as universal human rights.
VECiU VEERC	Values, ethnic: Coding for each party when exposing the shared values of the community in terms of respect for religion, tradition and customs.
FLCCiU FLCERC	Function of language: Social. Understood as a tool for reaching equality of opportunites, especially related to the labour market. Instrumental vision of language oriented towards the interest of immigrants.
FLECiU FLEERC	Function of language: Condition. Understood as a pre-condition for being considered / accepted as a member of the national community. Its learning is an obligation that is not linked to the labour market, but linked to the maintenance of the national culture.

Table 2. Paper 2. Coding descriptions (as in the paper)

Code	Description
Rel_coop	The SNRP describes the relationship with the centre as being cooperative and coordinated and offers itself to cooperate.
Rel_normal	The SNRP describes the relationship with the centre in neutral terms. (eg. Everything works as expected. The centre is accomplishing what was agreed)
Claims_general	The SNRP makes general claims on the need for powers to be devolved or for better coordination with the central government on specific policy aspects.
Conflict Conflict_claim	The SNRP accuses the central government of bad management, or of acting against the periphery's interests, eventually leading to concrete claims for greater devolved powers.
Claim_independence	The SNRP links immigration to a claim for independence.

Table 3. Paper 3. Coding description (as in the paper)

Code	Description	Inclusive / exclusive
_diagnose_exclusive _diagnose_inclusive	the party explains and describes the phenomenon of immigration to the territory.	E: Immigration as a problem. I: Immigration as a phenomenon, challenge, fact.
_flows_exclusive	the party refers to the capacity/necessity of	E: Expression of the limits to accept more

Code	Description	Inclusive / exclusive
_flows_inclusive	receiving immigrants to the territory, as well as to the necessity or lack thereof of managing flows.	people. Calls for closing borders / tighten the control. I: Acceptance of flows, calls for increased numbers.
_labour_exclusive _labour_inclusive	The party refers to immigrants' participation/contribution to the labour market. References to informal economies and competitions for job are also included.	E: Stress on immigrants' irregular activities. Accusations of increasing competitiveness, stealing jobs. I: Acknowledgement of immigrants contribution to the economy. Need for controlling abuse from employers.
_rights_exclusive _rights_inclusive	The party refers to the rights that shall or shall not be awarded to immigrants and whether these are conditional or not.	E: Stress the fact that rights are only given along with duties. Not all rights can be given to immigrants. I: Stresses equality of rights between natives and immigrants in all aspects.
_welfar_inclusive _welfare_exclusive	The party refers to social benefits that shall or shall not be awarded to immigrants and whether these are conditional or not	E: Prioritization of autochthones. Not all social benefits can be given to immigrants. I: Stresses equality between natives and

Code	Description	Inclusive / exclusive
		immigrants. Demands increase in public spending in order to avoid competency for scarce resources.
_diversity_exclusive _diversity_inclusive	The party refers to increasing diversity and its effects on national culture and how to manage religious and cultural pluralism.	E: Expression of cultural anxiety. Stress on the fact that certain immigrants are not willing to assimilate. Incompatibility with western values.
		I: Celebrates immigrants' contribution to national culture. Defends recognition of diversity and difference. Defends cultural rights.

3. Primary documents list (as in files)

Actual documents can be retrieved from the 3 bundles saved in electronic external memory attached. The following index shows the names of the files followed by their titles of the documents, and are displayed in order of appearance in the Primary Document list of each Hermenteutic Unit. The following example shows how to look up at documents: The first citation of the present thesis appears in the second section of paper 1 and goes as follows:

> In fact, the management of migratory flows can be a tool for the majority nation to undermine national diversity, and according to Catalan politicians (P13:0491 for ERC and P85:60 for CiU), this has already been used by the Spanish state.

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In order to check this passage, the reader must open the bundle entitled Catalonia_PD, display from the primary documents list the one entitled 'P13: Ple_6_29_recurs institucionalitat rebutjat' and go down in the text until line 0491.

a) Bundle 1: Catalonia PD

Retrieval: Archival services of the Catalan Parliament. Archival services of Convergència Democràctica. ERC webpage. Selective search in the Spanish Parliament website.

P 1: Manifesto CiU_2010

CiU (2010) *Eleccions nacionals 2010. Programa de govern.*

P 2: Manifesto CiU_2003

CiU (2003) *Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya. 2003*

P 5: Manifesto_ERC_2010

ERC (2010) *Programa electoral. Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya*

P 6: Manifesto CiU_2006

CiU (2006) *Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya. 2006*

P 7: Manifesto_CiU_1999

CiU (1999) *Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya 1999*

P 8: Manifesto_ERC_1999

ERC (1999) *Programa de govern. Aire fresc a les eleccions del Parlament de Catalunya*

P 9: Manifesto_ERC_2003

ERC (2003) *Un país actiu i equilibrat.Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya, 2003.*

P10: Ple_6_21 debat Orientacio politica general

(tram. 317-00199/06) *DSPC,* 46

al president de la Generalitat sobre un debat intern tingut a Catalunya concernent a la immigració

(tram. 317-00201/06) *DSPC*, 46

P15: Ple_6_39_aprovacio document estudi

Document de la Comissió d'Estudi sobre la Política d'Immigració a Catalunya (tram. 260-00001/06) *DSPC*, 58

P16: Ple_6_41_Debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00008/06) *DSPC,* 63

P17: Ple_6_41_Debat politica general_2

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00008/06) *DSPC, 63*

P18: Ple_6_59.2_Interpelacio_immigracio

Interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre la immigració a Catalunya (tram. 300-00974/06) *DSPC,* 89

Interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre les polítiques d'integració dels treballadors i treballadores i els residents estrangers extraordinaris (tram. 300-00140/06) *DSPC,* 89

Interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre les polítiques d'integració social dels immigrants (tram. 300-00576/06) *DSPC,* 89

Interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre la lluita contra el racisme i la xenofòbia (tram. 300-00936/06) *DSPC,* 89

P19: Ple_6_59.2_preguntes al president

Preguntes al president de la Generalitat sobre si el Govern disposa dels elements per a tractar adequadament la qüestió de la immigració a Catalunya (tram. 317-00427/06) *DSPC,* 88

Preguntes al president de la Generalitat sobre si considera que és urgent una acció més decidida del Govern en matèria d'immigració (tram. 317-00430/06) *DSPC,* 88

Preguntes al president de la Generalitat sobre els objectius del Govern en la potenciació de les polítiques d'immigració a Catalunya (tram. 317-00439/06) *DSPC,* 88

P20: Ple_6_60_Mocio subseguent interpelacio immigracio

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre la lluita contra el racisme i la xenofòbia (tram. 302-00242/06) *DSPC,* 91

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre la immigració a Catalunya (tram. 302-00244/06) *DSPC,* 91

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre les polítiques d'integració dels treballadors i els residents estrangers extracomunitaris (tram. 302-00246/06) *DSPC,* 91

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre les polítiques d'integració social dels immigrants (tram. 302-00248/06) *DSPC,* 91

P21: Ple_6_65_Debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00010/06) *DSPC,*97

P22: Ple_6_65_Debat politica general_2

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00010/06) *DSPC,*98

P23: Ple_6_69_Aprovacio llei mesures suport retornats

Proposició de llei de les mesures de suport al retorn dels ciutadans catalans i llurs descendents (tram. 202-00133/06) *DSPC,*103

P24: Ple_6_7_Aprovacio comissio estudi migr

Proposta de resolución per la qual es crea la Comissió d'Estudi sobre la Política d'Immigració a Catalunya (tram. 252-00010/06) *DSPC*,10

P25: Ple_6_73_Proposicio de llei sobre la Carta acolliment

Proposició de llei sobre la Carta d'acolliment per a les persones nouvingudes a Catalunya (presa en consideració) (tram. 202-00177/06) *DSPC*,114

P26: Ple_6_81_pregunta al president

Pregunta al president de la Generalitat sobre quina opinió té de l'evolució actual de la qüestió de la immigració (tram. 317-00585/06) *DSPC*,119

P27: Ple_7_16_mocio subseguent interpelacio pol exterior

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre política exterior (tram. 302-00011/07) *DSPC*, 8

P28: Ple_7_19_mocio subs interpel consell conflictivitat estat

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre la conflictivitat institucional amb el Govern de l'Estat (tram. 302-00020/07) *DSPC*, 10

P29: Ple_7_21_interpelacio politiques immigracio

Interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre les polítiques d'immigració (tram. 300-00402/07) *DSPC*, 10

P30: Ple_7_22_ mocio subseguent interpelacio politiques immigracio mocio normalitzacio lingüística

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre les polítiques d'immigració

(tram. 302-00033/07) *DSPC*,12

P31: Ple_7_24 interpelacio executiu dones immigrades

Interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre les dones immigrades (tram. 300-00287/07) *DSPC*,14

P32: Ple_7_25.2 pregunta presi pol immi

Pregunta al president de la Generalitat sobre les polítiques d'immigració (tram. 317-00052/07) *DSPC,*16

P33: Ple_7_25.3 mocio subseguent interpelacio dones immigrades

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre les dones immigrades (tram. 302-00044/07) *DSPC,*17

P34: Ple_7_29.1_Debat politica general.

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00001/07) *DSPC,*20

P35: Ple_7_29.2 Debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00001/07) *DSPC,*21

P36: Ple_7_29.3_Debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00001/07) *DSPC,*22

P37: Ple_7_42_pregunta conveni amb onu estudi relacio segu diversitat

Pregunta al Consell Executiu sobre el conveni signat amb les Nacions Unides per a posar en marxa a Barcelona un centre de treball que analitzi la interrelació entre la seguretat, la convivència i la diversitat cultural (tram. 310-00182/07) *DSPC,*34

P38: Ple_7_50_pregunta execucio pla immigracio

Pregunta al Consell Executiu sobre les mesures que té previstes per a l'aprovació i l'execució del Pla d'immigració (tram. 310-00373/07) *DSPC,*41

P39: Ple_7_61_pregunta distribucio fons pol immi

Pregunta al Consell Executiu sobre els criteris de distribució dels fons extraordinaris per a les polítiques d'immigració (tram. 310-00436/07) *DSPC,* 49

P40: Ple_7_68.2_Debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00004/07) *DSPC*,57

P41: Ple_7_68.3. Debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00004/07) *DSPC*,58

P42: Ple_7_7_creacio comissio immi

Proposta de resolución per la qual es crea la Comissió Permanent de Legislatura sobre Immigració (tram. 252-00006/07) *DSPC*,5

P43: Ple_7_75_mocio subseguent interpelacio inclusio escola

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre la inclusió a l'escola (tram. 302-00148/07) *DSPC,* 64

P44: Ple_7_79_mocio subseguent interpelacio reforma cpnl

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Consell Executiu sobre la reforma del Consorci per a la Normalització Lingüística (tram. 302-00160/07) *DSPC*,70

P45: Ple_7_pregunta consequencies regularitzacio

Pregunta al Consell Executiu sobre el seu balanç dels resultats i les conseqüències del darrer procés de regularització de persones immigrants a Catalunya (tram. 310-00420/07) *DSPC,* 47

P46: Ple_8_20.2_debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00002/08) *DSPC,* 28

P47: Ple_8_20.3_debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Consell Executiu (tram. 255-00002/08) *DSPC*,29

P48: Ple_8_24.2_interpelacio atur extracomunitari

Interpel·lació al Govern sobre la incidència de l'atur en la població de nacionalitat extracomunitària (tram. 300-00080/08) *DSPC,*35

P49: Ple_8_24_Pregunta govern dvd tres bessones

Pregunta al Govern sobre la intenció i els motius del Departament d'Educació per a editar el DVD *Catalonia, terra de tots. Les Tres Bessones a la Catalunya real* (tram. 310-00126/08) *DSPC,*34

P50: Ple_8_25_mocio subseguent incidencia atur extracomunit

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Govern sobre la incidència de l'atur en la població de nacionalitat extracomunitària (tram. 302-00065/08) *DSPC,* 38

P51: Ple_8_27 pregunta valoracio pla llengua i cohesio

Pregunta al Govern sobre la valoració del Pla per a la llengua i cohesió social, especialment pel que fa a les aules d'acolliment, centres acollidors i plans educatius d'entorn (tram. 310-00151/08) *DSPC,* 41

P52: Ple_8_28.2_interpel pol escolaritzacio alumnes extrangers.

Interpel·lació al Govern sobre les polítiques d'escolarització dels alumnes procedents de països estrangers (tram. 300-00101/08) *DSPC,*43

P53: Ple_8_29.2_mocio subseguent interpel escola alumnes immi

Moció subsegüent a la inter pel·lació al Govern sobre les polítiques d'escolar ització dels alumnes procedents de països estr angers (tram. 302-00082/08) *DSPC,* 44

P64: Ple_8_68_preguntes govern immi i suport munis

Pregunta al Govern sobre les actuacions de suport als municipis per a gestionar la immigració (tram. 310-00379/08) *DSPC,* 103

P65: Ple_8_73_pregunta huguet salt

Pregunta al Govern sobre les declaracions del conseller d'Innovació, Universitats i Empresa arran dels incidents ocorreguts a Salt (Gironès) (tram. 310-00401/08) *DSPC,*112

P66: Ple_8_77_pregunta retallades fons immi

Pregunta al Govern sobre les accions dutes a terme per a evitar la retallada del Fons de suport a l'acolliment i la integració d'immigrants (tram. 310-00414/08) *DSPC,*117

P67: Ple_8_78_llei acollida

Projecte de llei d'acollida de les persones immigrades i les retornades a Catalunya (tram. 200-00063/08) *DSPC,*118

P68: Ple_8_81_pregunta burka espai public

Pregunta al Govern sobre l'ús del burca als espais públics (tram. 310-00440/08) *DSPC,*124

P69: Manifesto_ERC_2006_ok

ERC (2006) *Programa electoral 2006. Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya*

P70: Manifesto_ERC_2010_ok

ERC (2010) *Programa electoral. Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya*

P71: Ple_8_40_interpelacio politica immigracio.

Interpel·lació al Govern sobre la política d'immigració (tram. 300-00143/08) *DSPC,* 56

P72: Ple_8_41.2_mocio subs interpel pol immi

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació al Govern sobre la política d'immigració (tram. 302-00119/08) *DSPC,*58

P73: Ple_8_43.2_debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Govern (tram. 255-00003/08) *DSPC,* 60

P74: Ple_8_43.3_debat politica gener

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Govern (tram. 255-00003/08) *DSPC,*61

P75: Ple_8_44.2_interpelacio ebe

Interpel·lació al Govern sobre els espais de benvinguda educativa (tram. 300-00152/08) *DSPC,* 63

P76: Ple_8_45_mocio subseguent interpelacio ebe.

Moció subsegüent a la interpel·lació del Govern sobre els espais de benvinguda educativa (tram. 302-00127/08) *DSPC,* 65

P77: Ple_8_50_pregunta govern actuacions PNI

Pregunta al Govern sobre les actuacions previstes per a l'aplicació del Pacte nacional per a la immigració (tram. 310-00280/08) *DSPC,*74

P78: Ple_8_52_pregunta presi fons immis

Pregunta al president de la Generalitat sobre la retallada dels fons per a la immigració, sobre les solucions a la crisi econòmica i sobre l'acord de finançament (tram. 317-00238/08) *DSPC,* 76

P79: Ple_8_62.2_debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Govern (tram. 255-00005/08) *DSPC,*93

P80: Ple_8_62.3_debat politica general

Debat sobre l'orientació política general del Govern (tram. 255-00005/08) *DSPC,*94

P81: CP_7_4 pla ciutadania immi.

Sessió informativa de la consellera de Benestar i Família per a presentar el Pla de ciutadania i immigració (tram. 355-00094/07) *DSPC,*187

P82: Ple_7_66.3_Estatut

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5. SNP challenge Blair on asylum and CFP, Mon, 24/06/2002
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40. Civil Service paper adds Devolution insult to injury, Mon, 15/11/2004
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46. SNP 'only party for Scots issues", Sun, 13/03/2005
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54. Scotland must be given Green Card system, Wed, 15/03/2006
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92. New immigration rules announced, Tue, 06/05/2008
93. SNP concern over seasonal worker shortage, Mon, 26/05/2008
94. SNP call for Scotland specific immigration rules, Tue, 09/09/2008
95. Time to ditch 'intrusive and expensive' ID cards, Wed, 03/12/2008
96. Labour cuts would add to unemployment total, Wed, 18/03/2009
97. Spending cuts both irrefutable and irresponsible, Thu, 26/03/2009
98. MP hails positive outcome in Salins case, Thu, 23/04/2009
99. SNP outrage over Dungavel detention, Thu, 14/05/2009

119. MSPs call for greater St Andrew's Day recognition, Wed, 30/11/2011

120. MSP appeals for ethnic organ donors, Fri, 30/12/2011

121. SNP press Westminster for answers on Dungavel, Sun, 26/02/2012

122. SNP welcome new windfarm guidance, Tue, 13/03/2012

123. Alex Salmond pledges £95m for recovery, Sat, 18/04/2009

124. Championing children's education, Sat, 20/03/2010

125. Richard Lochhead's address to SNP Conference, Sun, 17/10/2010

P13: SNP_M_W_2005.

SNP (2005) *If Scotland matters for you, make it matter in may. Manifesto.*

P14: SNP_M_W_2005i.

SNP (2005) *Our manifesto for independence.*

P15: SNP_M_W_2010g.

SNP (2010) *Elect a local champion.*

P17: W_C_D_Immigration asylum nationality act 2006 second reading.

Immigration and Nationality Act 2006

Last debate, 29 March 2006 Column 925.

P18: Finnie_MSP_SNP.

Interview. John Finnie (SNP)

P22: Humza_MSP_SNP.

Interview, Humza Yousaf (SNP)