

**The Role of Racial Climate in the Effects of Latino Immigration on the
Representation
of Latinos and African-Americans on Local School Boards**

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**The Role of Racial Climate in the Effects of Latino Immigration on the
Representation
of Latinos and African-Americans on Local School Boards**

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To Tom and Joyce Edwards

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SUMMARY

This dissertation analyzes the effects of Latino immigration on the representation of Latinos and African-Americans on local school boards and attempts to explain under what conditions Latino immigrants provoke opposition among whites. I consider two measures of representation based on representative bureaucracy—the membership of Latinos and African-Americans on school boards and bias in the responsiveness of white school board members toward these two groups. Whites as the major racial group in the U.S. have been the subject of much intergroup relations research focusing on competition for scarce resources, perceived threat and group biases (e.g., Evans and Giles, 1986; Giles and Evans, 1985, 1986; Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998), and I also focus on their racial behaviors as voters in school board elections and as school board members. I consider Latino immigration in this research because emerging evidence suggests that Latino immigration poses a growing threat to whites, leading them to shift their support from Latinos to a countervailing group, such as African-Americans (e.g., Meier and Stewart, 1991; Rocha, 2007).

First, I examine whether Latino immigration into a community affects the support of white citizens for Latino or African-American membership on school boards. Second, I examine whether white school board members also are influenced by Latino immigration in their responsiveness to Latino and African-American parents.

It is likely that the reactions of whites to Latino immigration are conditioned by their preexisting racial attitudes, so this dissertation also tests competing theories of community racial climate—group threat and group contact. I expect that racial tensions within a community should moderate the influence of Latino immigration on these two forms of Latino and African-American representation.

Overall, this dissertation expands the study of representative bureaucracy by combining past research on community racial climates with conditions influencing minority representation. In addition to examining the determinants of passive representation, this dissertation links expectations of the racial behavior of white citizens with the behavior of white school board members by considering the possibility that school board members express “discriminatory intent” (Mendez and Grose, 2014) on non-policy related matters. A better understanding of the determinants of public officials’ personal biases should help to explain the targeting of substantive policy benefits to minorities, which is the focus of much other representative bureaucracy research. While I base my analysis of school board membership on inferences of white voter behavior from aggregate election results, I directly measure white school board member responsiveness using data gathered from a novel randomized field experiment and e-mail audit design. Representative bureaucracy researchers have called for more of this type of individual-level data to help explain minority advocacy (Bradbury and Kellough, 2011).

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Extending Representative Bureaucracy Research

Representative bureaucracy theory (Meier, 1975; Mosher, 1968) argues that a government more representative of its citizens—passive representation—is more likely to produce effective policy outcomes for those citizens—active representation. Decades of research on representative bureaucracy has emphasized the match in personal traits (e.g. race) between public officials and target groups as the aspect of passive representation most likely to lead to active representation (e.g., Selden, 1997; Hinderer, 1993, 2004; Meier et al., 1991, 2001). Public officials who share physical characteristics with citizens, this perspective argues, are also likely to share values and interests, leading representatives to favor their social group in the making of public policy. Much evidence has shown the passive representation-to-active representation link to be an important policy mechanism involving bureaucratic partiality (Mosher 1967, 1968), but there are several shortcomings of this research.

First, representative bureaucracy research has tended to emphasize the extent to which citizens favor more passive representation for their own group. The conventional argument is that same-group public officials would reciprocate by providing substantive policy benefits to target groups. Within public education, school boards have been the subject of much of this research because they have been found to influence student educational outcomes both directly (e.g., students

taking advanced courses) and indirectly (e.g., hiring minority teachers) (Meier et al., 2004) in a number of important ways. School board members, despite their political status, also typically share similar values with and pursue the same minority-oriented substantive policy benefits as members of other levels of the public education hierarchy (e.g., superintendents, administrators and teachers) (Meier et al., 2004; see also Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Hinderer, 1993; Kerr and Miller, 1997; Meier and Stewart, 1991). Thus, it is not surprising that so much attention has been paid to minority group size as an important determinant of same-group representation in government generally (e.g., Grofman and Handley, 1989; Alonzie and Manganaro, 1993; Welch, 1990; Welch and Karning, 1978) and on school boards in particular (e.g., Fraga and Elis, 2009; Meier et al., 2000).

Increasingly multiracial and multiethnic locales, however, have increased the complexity of intergroup relations, prompting more intergroup conflict and cooperation. Consequently, the level of support or resistance that groups give each other for more representation in government has changed as well, leading researchers to examine more closely intergroup political coalitions. Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007), for instance, argue that changing relations between whites, African-Americans and Latinos, and more recently Latino natives and immigrants, are a result of the changing racial attitudes and the changing mix of racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. Whites appear to have shifted their support away from Latinos and toward African-Americans due, in part, to the threat posed by Latino immigration. Thus, these researchers offer changed intergroup relations within society as one explanation for political behaviors, such as voting and

intergroup coalitions, which have produced the levels of passive representation recently seen in government. It is also apparent that contrary to predictions of the “rainbow coalition” thesis (Browning et al., 1984), whites rather than other minority groups are forming intergroup coalitions and affecting the electoral success of certain minority groups (Kaufmann, 2003; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; McClain and Tauber, 2001). Thus, it has become more important for representative bureaucracy scholars to account for intergroup relations and the behavior of whites in shaping minority representation.

Second, Bradbury and Kellough (2011) argue that a more racially representative workforce does not necessarily produce government outcomes that are beneficial to minorities. Traditionally, the most commonly examined source of active representation has been partiality or bias in favor of one’s own group (Lim, 2006). The focus of representative bureaucracy researchers on the racial match between government and its citizens, however, has ignored characteristics of representatives other than their race in their willingness to serve minority interests. As Shah (2009:90) notes, “almost all studies of minority descriptive representation post-1980 suffer from a greater theoretical deficiency that results directly from the conflation of the concept of descriptive representation with its outcome.”

Following-up on research noting that passive representation is not sufficient for active representation (e.g., Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984; Gills and Betancur, 2000; Jennings, 2003), research on the “minority representative role” (Sowa and Selden, 2003; Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998) examines the non-physical traits of public officials that lead them to serve as minority advocates. The

minority representative role has been shown to mediate the passive-to-active representation relationship independent of a representative's own race, helping to explain the role of non-minority representatives within representative bureaucracy research. Lim (2006) argues that non-minorities representatives may turn against minority active representation if it is not perceived favorably. Other research has also found the behavior of non-minorities to be "constrained" by the presence of minority officials within the same agency (Hindera and Young, 1998). Little is known, however, about the conditions leading non-minority representatives to prefer one group rather than another, regardless of whether they actually elect to serve as minority advocates. Given the influence, either positive or negative, that non-minority representatives may have in the formation of active representation, it is important to better understand their racial preferences, in addition to the descriptive statistics (e.g., passive representation) of government agencies.

Third, some called for more individual-level data within representative bureaucracy research because of the difficulty in inferring minority outcomes from group level data (e.g., passive representation). Bradbury and Kellough (2011) refer to this as an "ecological fallacy," and suggest that the best way to make valid inferences of the transition from passive representation to active representation is through direct observation of public officials' behavior,

Finally, scholars have only recently begun to consider more fully the conditional nature of representative bureaucracy. As mentioned previously, emerging research suggests that minority membership in government depends on racial relations within society (e.g., Meier and Stewart, 1991; Rocha, 2007). Other

research has also argued that the transition from passive representation to active representation depends on whether demographic traits are salient or the policy issue is salient to the demographic traits common among public officials and citizens (Meier, 1993; Keiser et al., 2002; Selden, 1997). Grissom and colleagues (2009), for instance, found that in areas in which race is more salient (e.g., the South), passive representation is more likely to turn into active representation. Representative bureaucracy researchers have also begun to more fully draw from research in a number of disciplines outside public administration, including psychology, sociology and political science. It is now appreciated that within policy-making, the social environment should receive equal consideration to individuals' cognitive processes (e.g., Hammond et al., 1977; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Soss, Langbein and Metelko, 2003; Preuhs, 2006).

Given the emphasis on race in representative bureaucracy, it makes sense that representation scholars should also consider whether the racial environment moderates individuals' racial attitudes. Racial attitudes of interest to representative bureaucracy might include citizens' preferences for electing officials that they view as passively representative and the likelihood that non-minority public officials will favor certain minority groups. This dissertation also considers the importance of including racial context within studies of representative bureaucracy.

In this dissertation, I aim to further a less conventional perspective on representative bureaucracy. In particular, I consider the role of a community's racial environment in shaping the representation minorities receive in government. Whites are typically the dominant social group in many locales, so I focus on their

racial partiality in shaping two aspects of minority representation, including 1) determining the level of passive representation (e.g., minority membership in government) during elections through intergroup coalition formation and 2) the responsiveness of white representatives to certain minority groups.

Regarding minority membership in government, I extend research on school board representation by Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) that focuses on intergroup relations within society (e.g., white-Latino and white-African-American coalitions) during school board elections. Regarding governmental responsiveness, I examine the biases expressed by white school board members in their behavior toward Latino and African-American citizens. School board members who show non-policy forms of bias may also be expressing “discriminatory intent” (Mendez and Grose, 2014) and thus reveal which groups they are most likely to actively represent during policy-related behaviors.

I focus on the role of whites (e.g., white citizen voters and white school board members) in both forms of representation because increasing racial and ethnic diversity within the U.S. and research on intergroup relations have revealed whites to play an important but uncertain role in shaping intergroup coalitions. Further, I focus on the case of school board representation because school boards are suited to studies of representative bureaucracy and direct observation via survey. School board members are unique among most elected officials in that they have bureaucratic characteristics and directly affect educational outcomes for their target groups (Meier et al., 2004). In addition, the levels of minority representation on

school boards are a function of citizens' voting behaviors and racial attitudes, making their membership levels amenable to research on passive representation.

1.2 Interracial Relations in Determining Minority Representation

Minority representation in government is generally considered within the representative bureaucracy literature to be a function of racial decision-making. Minority citizens, for instance, are argued to support a more passively representative government by electing members from their same group into public office. In fact, it is well known that citizens use the demographic traits of candidates as important voting cues (Barreto, 2007) and a group's size and its associated resources are important predictors of electoral success for that group (Robinson, England and Meier, 1985).

Limited representative bureaucracy research, however, has examined the social determinants of racial attitudes which lead citizens to provide more support for passive representation or lead representatives to more closely share values with citizens. At one extreme, some have suggested that we live in a "post-racial society" (Lum, 2009), and representative bureaucracy may matter less than in the past; more moderate voices, however, have argued that racial attitudes are merely changing. Regarding the latter, intergroup dynamics unique to Latinos, coupled with the pending minority status of white Americans have made Latinos and not African-Americans the recent focus of intergroup bias research (Outten et al., 2012; Dovidio et al., 2012). Thus, it makes sense to more fully consider intergroup attitudes in

determining aspects of representative bureaucracy and, in particular, the impact of a changing racial and ethnic climate within the U.S. on racial attitudes.

Emerging research on political representation suggests that community racial contexts influence racial decision-making in important ways (e.g., Hawkesworth, 2003; Preuhs, 2006; Grissom et al., 2009). Latino immigration is an aspect of the racial context and an increasingly important one due to Latinos' emergence as the second largest minority group (Kohler and Lazarin, 2007). Anti-immigration and anti-Latino sentiment have been on the rise (Brader et al. 2008), especially when natives are confronted with cultural threats or threats to the English language (Chandler and Tsai, 2001). Thus, threats posed by Latino immigration to natives should impact natives' support for pro-immigration and pro-Latino policies as well as Latino representation.

How natives respond to Latino immigration can be understood using the concept of social distance (Bogardus 1928, 1933, 1938, 1968; Evans and Giles, 1986; Giles and Evans, 1985, 1986) and this concept is helpful in examining the link between racial contexts and individuals' behavior. Social distance is defined as the partiality of one group (e.g., whites) to another group (e.g., Latinos), typically relative to a third group (e.g., African-Americans). Groups that are more similar in terms of social, economic or cultural characteristics tend to express more kinship. Groups with less social distance between them are also more likely to engage in cooperative behaviors; groups with more social distance, on the other hand, are more likely to experience competition and conflict.

Whites have historically had lower social distance with Latinos than African-Americans and, consequently, more partiality to Latinos than African-Americans. The balance of white-Latino-African-American relations is changing, however, and is attributable, in part, to Latino immigration. Recent public attention on Latino immigrant deportation, among other immigration matters, highlights the anxiety Americans feel about Latino immigration (Pew Research Center, 2014), possibly placing greater social distance between whites and Latinos.

In this dissertation, I apply the concept of social distance to the study of two aspects of minority representation, focusing on Latinos and African-Americans. First, I examine passive representation by considering the relationship between community demographics and Latino and African-American membership on local school boards. It is likely, based on past research, that white citizens respond to their racial environment by adjusting their relative political and electoral support for Latinos and African-Americans. Then, I use the same intergroup relations model and examine the racial partiality of white school board members by measuring their responsiveness to Latino and African-American parents. While I do not examine whether white school board members actually assume a minority representative role in favor of one group or another, I consider the conditions most likely to lead them to favor a certain group—a precondition of active representation.

School board members' racial biases are testable in this research setting because parents regularly contact school board members with student- and school-related inquiries, presenting an opportunity to examine the psychological predispositions of school board members using an experimental analysis. School

board members are members of the same communities as citizens and I expect that white school board members should carry “racial baggage” (Brief et al., 2006) from the community into the workplace and have attitudes and behaviors consistent with those of white citizens.

1.3 Considering Racial Attitudes within Racial Contexts

Some research suggests that negative racial attitudes toward immigrants are the result of a single, unpleasant encounter with them (Paxton, 2006; Aizenman, 2007). Former Arizona State Representative Randy Graf, for instance, began his push against illegal immigration after observing a Spanish-speaking family using food stamps (Lelyveld, 2006). Others have questioned single encounter experiences as the source of such racial attitudes. Hopkins (2010:40) asks, “are these local encounters actually shaping attitudes, or are they merely helping Americans to express them? More generally, under what conditions do people’s local experiences influence their political attitudes?” Hopkins found that support for immigration declines in communities with a large immigrant presence, however this relationship is conditional on the salience of immigration as a national concern. In other words, broader contextual factors rather than individual encounters with immigrants are better predictors of immigration-related attitudes. As such, I also ask in this dissertation whether whites are more antagonized by Latino immigration within a community in areas where racial tolerance is expected to be low.

This dissertation develops several racial context hypotheses to help explain the local conditions that influence racial attitudes and, consequently, minority

representation in government. I draw from two well-established theories of intergroup relations—group contact theory and group threat theory—to form the basis for testing several community racial conditions which shape the racial climate, including segregation and generational competition across racial groups. In particular, I test the extent to which the racial climate conditions whites’ reactions to Latino immigration. Under conditions of low racial tolerance, such as would be anticipated in racially segregated areas or in areas with a high level of resource competition between minority youth and elderly whites, the dominant social group, typically whites, should be less tolerant of a threatening group such as Latino immigrants. Further, whites’ attitudes about Latino immigrants should influence their support for Latinos, and in cases for which less Latino representation is desired, African-Americans should experience countervailing support from whites.

1.4 Latino Immigration and Changing Racial Relations

United States Attorney General Eric Holder said, “Though race-related issues continue to occupy a significant portion of our political discussion, and though there remain many unresolved racial issues in this nation, we, average Americans, simply do not talk enough with each other about things racial” (Willow 2009). This dissertation furthers that discussion and argues that the changing racial and ethnic diversity in the U.S. necessitates a deeper exploration of the role of racial relations in the representation of minority interests. Research shows that conflict and cooperation among groups are functions of the racial and ethnic composition of communities, a growing proportion of which is made up of immigrants, leading

Brady and Finnigan (2014:17) to ask: “Does immigration undermine public support for social policy?” I expect that the same social forces that affect public support for immigration-related issues will also affect the support by public officials for the same issues.

Latino immigration plays an important role in contemporary racial relations. Americans tend to express more hostility to Latino immigrants than other ethnic immigrant groups (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). Latino immigrants are also locating in many non-traditional destinations, such as suburbs and small and mid-sized cities such as Raleigh, NC, Atlanta, GA, and Salt Lake City, UT (Singer, 2004; Frey, 2006; McConnell, 2008), increasing their exposure to natives unfamiliar with them. Latino immigration places new burdens on public services (ConPirani, 2011) and reduces the public’s support for these services (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina et al., 1999; Boheim and Mayr, 2005). Theories of racial threat generally suggest that these demographic changes will produce anti-immigrant sentiment in politics because immigrants pose new threats to the well-being of natives (e.g., Esses et al., 1998). We have already seen in hundreds of communities the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances (Fair Immigration Reform Movement, 2007) and anti-immigrant legislation, especially in states with sizeable immigrant populations (Aizenman, 2007).

Some have called for African-Americans, due to their own marginalized status, to take advantage of the growth in the Latino population and rally behind the same political goals and candidates (e.g., Browning et al., 1984; Kaufmann, 2003; Meier et al., 2004), but these “rainbow coalitions” have been rare (Browning et al.,

1984, 1990; Marschall and Ruhil, 2006, 2007). Whites, motivated in part by their declining majority status, have instead been more active in forming cooperative intergroup relations (Kaufmann, 2004; Frey, 2011), and while much research has examined white-African-American and to a lesser extent white-Latino relations, only recently have scholars begun to explore the role of Latino immigration in these intergroup relations.

Questions are arising about the political and cultural influence of growing Latino immigrant populations and the possible antagonism of whites. A few decades ago, whites expressed more favorable attitudes toward Latinos than African-Americans. Meier and Stewart (1991a) found that whites were more likely to support Latino school board candidates than African-American candidates, arguably because whites felt relatively less social distance between themselves and Latinos (Giles and Evans, 1985, 1986; Evans and Giles, 1986). More recently, however, whites have shown reduced social distance with African-Americans due, according to Rocha (2007), to factors associated with Latino immigration and, consequently, now favor more African-American than Latino political representation. This finding is supported by other research suggesting that the “rise of the Latino threat narrative” has coincided with increasingly restrictionist immigration policies in the U.S. (Massey and Pren, 2012:6) and, alarmingly, suggestions by some opinion leaders that a backlash against growing Latino political power is called for (Huntington, 2004).

1.5 Discriminatory Intent Among Representatives

Passive representation has its own advantages, such as providing legitimacy and symbolic benefits to minority groups (Mosher, 1968; Selden, 1997). Proponents contend that passive representation is a way to ensure that citizens' interests are adequately represented in society. While research has shown consistent correlations between higher percentages of minority public officials and improved policy outcomes for minority citizens (e.g., Atkins and Wilkins, 2013), the actions of representatives determine the distribution of policy benefits and costs among groups.

Representative bureaucracy researchers have noted various sources of substantive policy benefits for minorities. Kranz (1974), for instance, showed that shared values and beliefs lead to policy benefits whether or not public officials intend to or knowingly serve a particular group. Another possible source of substantive policy benefits is empathetic understanding. Minority bureaucrats who, even if they do not share their groups values and beliefs, are more likely than non-minorities to have an understanding and concern for the plight of their own group (Herbert 1974).

There are two possible role perceptions of bureaucrats which impact minority representation, one of which is racial partiality (Selden, Brudney and Kellough, 1998). Lim (2006) states that within the literature racial partiality is "the most obvious direct source...that is, bias in favor of their social group." Racial partiality is defined as bias in favor of one, typically racial or ethnic group. Partiality to a particular group is an important precondition of active representation (see also

Selden, 1997). Some have argued against racial partiality, however, suggesting instead that bureaucrats should remain impartial and observe a traditional bureaucratic role “less inclined to influence agency outputs in response to the interests of distinct segments of the population” (1998:726). Lim (2006) advocates against bureaucratic partiality, suggesting that it may lead representatives from other groups to be less restrained in their own negative biases and may also lessen the political pressure for public policies against discrimination. Stated in another way, Lim argues that bureaucratic partiality or bureaucrats pursuing “extraorganizational commitments” goes against “orderly government and the public interest” (see also Saltzstein, 1979). In this dissertation I acknowledge that partiality in the responsiveness of public officials may have costs in addition to benefits. I do not pursue this debate any further, however, than to examine whether or not racial partiality or, more directly, varying responsiveness by white public officials to different groups, appears to exist. In general, the concept of racial partiality motivates this dissertation, and I consider it in two forms: the preferences of white citizen voters for certain interracial political coalitions and the responsiveness of white school board members to members of other racial groups.

Much representative bureaucracy research, however, has ignored the role of whites in forming either passive representation or active representation. The concept of passive representation typically refers to minority representation, but Hinderer and Young (1998) also consider how African-American and white passive representation interact to produce more or less representation for minorities. As such, I focus in this dissertation on the racial behavior of non-minority

representatives because while the minority status of a representative is an important predictor of racial attitudes, non-minority representatives have also proven capable of providing selective policy benefits to minorities.

According to the “minority representative role,” both minority and non-minority public officials can assume a sense of responsibility to minorities and act as their trustee (e.g., Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998; Sowa and Selden, 2003). Sowa and Selden, for instance, found that minority and non-minority Farmer’s Home Administration administrators who assumed a minority representative role were significantly more likely to award loans to minorities. Recently, Mendez and Grose (2014) found that legislators reveal their racial preferences or “discriminatory intent” in their personal communications with constituents, possibly also exposing their support for certain discriminatory policies, such as voter identification requirements. I also consider the concept of discriminatory intent among white school board members and, in particular, whether these public officials appear predisposed to favoring one minority group over another in policy matters.

1.6 Representative Bureaucracy, Conditional on the Racial Context

Past research suggests a variety of conditions under which passive representation and active representation are most likely. As mentioned previously, research has shown that the racial context (e.g., racial group population size and white-Latino-African-American relations) is important in determining passive representation, such as the percentage of various minority groups in public office (e.g., Meier and Stewart, 1991a; Rocha, 2007). Regarding active representation,

Meier and Stewart (1991b) found that larger Latino populations in addition to more Latino school board membership affect the likelihood of hiring more Latino administrators within school districts—an outcome with more immediate benefits for minority students.

Other research has also shown the likelihood of active representation to be contextually dependent. Sowa and Selden (2003), for instance, argue that the decision-making processes of public officials are conditional on certain organizational characteristics, including discretion in their professional role. Meier (1993a) found that active representation is conditional on whether public officials receive political support. Meier and Stewart (1992) and Meier (1993b) also found conditional effects of whether public officials are street-level bureaucrats or managerial-level officials

Racial aspects of the policy environment should also affect the racial attitudes of representatives and, thus, the likelihood of active representation. Grissom and colleagues (2009), for instance, found that African-American teachers are more likely to advocate on behalf of African-Americans students in the South than in the non-South, arguably because of the history of racial conflict in the South and the greater racial salience to African-American teachers there. Preuhs (2006) also found a conditioning effect of the racial environment, but instead showed that minority state legislators were less effective in producing active representation in areas with greater racial conflict, such as is commonly found in the South. Preuhs explained this discrepancy by the fact that racially polarized political contexts appeared to reduce the willingness of members of other racial groups to form

interracial coalition partners due, in part, to the reinforcement of racial cleavages and marginalization of minority legislators in these areas. Finally, Roch and Edwards (2014) found that the likelihood that more passively representative teachers pursue rehabilitative rather than punitive disciplinary policies in Georgia public schools depends on the salience of race within the community (e.g., more segregated school districts).

1.7 Racial Climates: Group Contact Theory and Group Threat Theory

Little other evidence exists on how community racial climates influence representative bureaucracy—a surprising state of the literature especially considering the growing number of multiracial and multiethnic areas within the U.S. How Latino immigrants are received in various racial climates should help explain the representation that Latinos receive within certain policy domains such as public education.

Most research on racial attitudes attempts to explain racial tolerance with personal factors, but two key perspectives on intergroup relations—group contact theory and group threat theory—provide a basis for understanding tolerance within certain contextual environments. On the one hand, group contact theory argues that more interaction with members of other racial and ethnic groups creates a more tolerant environment by increasing familiarity with and reducing prejudice toward other groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Levin et al., 2003). Negative racial attitudes, according to this perspective, result from an inability to “rub shoulders with strangers” (Frug, 1999: 140), which sustains irrational fears of others, negative

stereotypes and parochial identities (Emerson et al., 2002; Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Dovidio et al., 2002). On the other hand, group threat theory argues that more sizeable out-groups create a less tolerant environment resulting from the competition for scarce economic, social, cultural and political resources between groups (Key, 1949; Blumer, 1958; Campbell, 1965). The increased presence of out-groups heightens intergroup threat, this perspective argues, leading to prejudice and in-group bias (Brewer, 2001) and discriminatory practices in an effort to reduce the level of threat (Esses et al., 1998, 2001).

I focus on the role of group contact and group threat within the educational system. The competition for scarce educational resources makes race and ethnicity especially salient to this policy issue, providing an appropriate venue for studying racial contexts. Further, a considerable amount of research on minority representation and representative bureaucracy has examined public education and school board representation (e.g., Meier and England, 1984; Fraga et al., 1986; Stewart et al., 1989; Meier and Stewart, 1991a, b; Polinard et al., 1990; Leal et al., 2004; Meier and Juenke, 2005; Meier et al., 2005; Rocha, 2007; Meier and Rutherford, forthcoming), which I focus on as well.

1.8 School Boards Within Representative Bureaucracy

Representative bureaucracy typically considers bureaucratic organizations; school boards, however, are usually elected bodies. Yet, school boards exist within an integrated system of “multilevel governance built upon the foundation of

representative bureaucracy” (Meier et al., 2004:31). Within local bureaucratic systems, school board members reside at the top of the hierarchy and teachers reside at the bottom of the hierarchy. School districts also have values that are shared by members at all levels within the governmental hierarchy, increasing the consistency of the behavior of individuals across all hierarchical levels. Thus, it is not surprising that school board representation has been shown to explain, both directly and indirectly, a number of educational outcomes commonly associated with representative bureaucracy (Meier et al., 2004). For the purposes of this dissertation, I also consider school board representation within the framework of representative bureaucracy but recognize there is a parallel perspective within political science. In fact, political science research uses closely related concepts, substituting “descriptive representation” for “passive representation” and “substantive representation” for “active representation” (e.g., Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Celis et al. 2008; Leal et al. 2004; Meier et al. 2005). As such, I treat school board members as bureaucratic figures within the perspective of representative bureaucracy who are also elected public officials with nonpolitical characteristics (Hess, 2002), connecting their membership levels directly to citizens’ racial preferences.

1.9 Dissertation Overview

In this dissertation, I examine the social conditions that shape the voting decisions of citizens during school board elections (e.g., passive representation) and the racial biases of school board members (e.g., responsiveness). I follow past

theoretical models of white racial behavior (e.g., Meier and Stewart, 1991a; Rocha, 2007) and, in doing so, focus on the behavior of whites. Perhaps the most obvious question is: Does Latino immigration affect electoral outcomes for Latino school board candidates? If white citizens respond negatively to Latino immigration, then white citizens may decrease their support for Latino school board candidates and increase their support for African-American candidates to counter Latino political influence. Another important question is: Do white school board members similarly respond to Latino immigration and adjust their partiality to Latino and African-American parents? Regarding both of these questions, I introduce the concept of racial climate and also ask: Does the racial climate within communities moderate the relationships between Latino immigration and minority membership on school boards—via interracial electoral coalitions—as well as the responsiveness of white school board members to Latino and African-American parents.

Pettigrew (2009) suggests that the racial attitudes developed during an interaction with one group in one setting “transfer” and influence the racial attitudes developed during an interaction with a different group in another setting. Thus, I generally expect whites in more racially tolerant areas to be less antagonized by Latino immigration. In particular, I expect areas characterized by a high level of group contact to be racially tolerant and thus whites in these areas should be less threatened by Latino immigrants. One way that researchers have examined group contact is through its association with segregation (e.g., Rocha and Espino, 2009; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Roch and Rushton, 2008). Segregation reduces the

frequency of regular interactions that improve racial attitudes (Pettogrew and Tropp, 2006; Welch et al., 2001).

I also expect areas characterized by a high level of group threat to have low racial tolerance and thus whites in these areas should be more threatened by Latino immigrants. One way that researchers have examined group threat, particularly within public education, is by linking it with generational competition (Poterba, 1997, 1998). Generational competition is the competition between different racial groups and across generations over the allocation of public sector resources; the higher the level of generational competition, the higher the level of group threat and the more antagonistic and polarized racial relations are likely to be.

Importantly, this dissertation does not attempt to establish if various racial contexts are likely to have more or less racial tolerance, as these relations have been firmly established elsewhere. Rather, this dissertation is concerned with using knowledge of the racial climate to develop expectations about whites' racial and ethnic tolerance and reactions to Latino immigrants.

I examine two aspects of minority representation. First, I expect Latino immigration to be positively associated with African-American school board membership and negatively associated with Latino membership, controlling for other important determinants of passive representation. I also expect that these relationships should be stronger in communities with low tolerance (e.g., low group contact and high group threat). Second, I expect Latino immigration to be positively associated with white school board members' responsiveness to African-American parents and negatively associated with their responsiveness to Latino parents. I also

expect that these relationships should also be stronger in communities with low tolerance.

I draw my data on the membership of Latinos and African-Americans on school boards from the 2012 National Latino Education Study. I use an original randomized field experiment and an e-mail audit design to collect data on the responsiveness of white school board members to white (control group), Latino and African-American parents. Given that school board members are elected officials, I expect racially motivated aspects of their behavior to be subtle, especially those stemming from the community racial environment. As such, I follow Hanson, Hawley and Taylor (2011) and design an experiment to assess subtle discrimination. I draw my data for the group contact and group threat variables, as well as control variables from the five-year 2008-2012 American Community Survey (ACS). In addition to controlling for socioeconomic conditions within the community and characteristics of school board structure, I control for the racial make-up of school boards that should also influence the racial behavior of school board members.

Overall, this dissertation contributes to research on representative bureaucracy by linking representative bureaucracy and individual decision-making to the community racial context. As Rocha and Hawes (2009:326) argue, studies of public policy and representative bureaucracy need to further consider multiracial and multiethnic contexts and “move beyond black-Anglo or Latino-Anglo relations to consider how multiple racial/ethnic groups interact, and how such interactions affect the lives of minority groups differently.” This dissertation extends the line of

research by Giles and Evans (1985, 1986), Meier and Stewart (1991a) and Rocha (2007) by using a broader understanding of multiracial and multiethnic relations within the community to better establish the role of social distance in representative bureaucracy. This dissertation also helps to clarify the conditions under which non-minority representatives express bias or discriminatory intent toward certain minority groups. In doing so, this dissertation applies a relatively new type of randomized field experiment design using an e-mail audit to collect data on the racial attitudes of individual school board members. Individual-level data has been called for within representative bureaucracy research (Bradbury and Kellough, 2011). Finally, this dissertation establishes a more completely specified empirical design for representative bureaucracy research by accounting for “the conditioning effects of racialized political contexts” on representative behavior (Preuhs, 2006:585).

Chapter 2 reviews the literature and pertinent theory. Chapter 3 develops theoretical arguments and research hypotheses. I discuss the data, methodology and findings for the first empirical analysis on school board membership in Chapter 4. I discuss the data, methodology and findings for the second empirical analysis on school board member responsiveness in Chapter 5. I review the conclusions and implications in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Changing Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the U.S.

The historical lack of geographic overlap between African-Americans and Latinos has, until recently, limited the ability of researchers to develop multiracial and multiethnic models of representation based on large-N comparisons across multiple localities. The Latino population has increased substantially over the past few decades, however, and Latinos are now the largest racial and ethnic group in the U.S. (Fry and Gonzales, 2008). There were 50,545,275 Latinos or Hispanics in the U.S. in 2012¹, of which a sizeable 12,978,713 or 26% were non-citizens, compared to 37,786,591 African-Americans (U.S. Census, 2012). Latinos are now also the largest minority group in public schools in nearly half of U.S. states (Fry and Gonzales, 2008).

Latinos and African-Americans have also recently become located in significant numbers in the same regions of the country, largely due to changing Latino migration patterns. African-Americans have historically concentrated in the Southeast and Latinos in the Southwest; Latino populations, however, have increased rapidly since 2000 in much of the country (U.S. Census, 2012). Latino population growth has been due predominantly to immigration, and first generation

¹ The 2012 statistics come from the 2008-12 American Community Survey (ACS), the latest survey year currently available from the U.S. Census. The ACS is a sample survey covering a 60-month period prior to and including 2012 and is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau to provide estimates of demographics between decennial censuses. In this dissertation, I use explanatory variables from 2012.

Latinos are now more numerous than second or third generation Latinos (Sueor and Passel, 2003). Latino non-citizen populations have grown especially quickly in a number of states and are now sizeable portions of the Latino population, most notably in southeastern states. Most Latinos who have most fully assimilated (e.g., gained naturalization or become bilingual or monolingual), on the other hand, continue to reside in traditional destinations such as the Southwest or established immigrant gateways (e.g., Los Angeles, New York and Miami) (Suro and Passel, 2003).

Given their growing numbers and geographically spreading and largely unassimilated population, Latino immigrants are a major contributor to the increasing racial and ethnic and cultural diversity of the U.S and a likely source of public backlash. More sizeable out-groups generally lead to a variety of negative public reactions, including declines in racial tolerance (e.g., Johnson, 2001), trust in others (e.g., Putnam, 2007) and public willingness to contribute to various public goods and services (e.g., Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). Latino immigration in particular has been a major contributor to rising nativism among Americans (Huntington, 2004). Americans' attitudes about immigration tend to be driven by the most recent and prominent migrant group (Loveman and Hofstetter, 1984a, b). As such, Latino immigrants and the threats they pose to natives are at the center of contemporary debates on race and immigration. A senator from Colorado, Ken Salazar, highlighted the importance of immigration to public sentiment when he stated: "No doubt that some of those involved in the [immigration] debate have their

position based on fear and perhaps racism because of what's happening demographically in the country" (Calabresi, 2006).

2.2 The Changing Influence of Latino Immigration on White-Latino and White-African-American Relations

The racial and ethnic composition of the U.S. is not static, and neither are the public's attitudes about race. African-Americans have historically experienced the most negative stereotypes and racial hostilities in the U.S., due in part to the legacy of racism there (Drake, 1987). Latinos, on the other hand, have suffered less prejudice (Smith and Dempsey, 1983; Wilson, 1996) and have at times even been labeled as white (Omi and Winant, 1986). Latinos and African-Americans have rarely expressed sufficient social similarities or low enough social distance to engage one another cooperatively; Latinos, however, have tended to favor whites and whites have also been more likely to favor Latinos than African-Americans (Dyer, Vedlitz and Worchel, 1989; Kaufmann, 2003, 2004, 2005). As Meier and Stewart (1991:100) state: "If the dominant Anglo group is forced to choose between Hispanic and black groups for coalition purposes...all things being equal, they will seek a coalition with Hispanics."

Not unexpectedly, most research on intergroup relations has focused on the more contentious relationship between whites and African-Americans. Intergroup relations research has also focused on whites in their relations with other groups because whites have typically been the dominant social and political group. In addition, the relations between the other two major groups, Latinos and African-Americans, have been relatively unchanging (McClain and Karning, 1990; McClain

and Tauber, 1998, 2001; Vaca, 2004; Dyer, Vaedlitz and Worchel, 1989; de la Garza 1997; Garcia, 2000). Scholarly interest in Latinos and white-Latino relations is increasing, however, as the U.S. becomes increasingly multiracial and multicultural, Latino presence becomes more prominent, and anti-immigrant attitudes rise.

The concept of social distance has been helpful in studying intergroup relations in multiracial and multiethnic settings, and related research suggests growing interdependence of the relations between whites, Latinos and African-Americans. The relationship between whites and African-Americans, for instance, is likely a function of the relationship between whites and Latinos. In addition, Latinos are themselves a diverse group of natives and non-natives and are composed of a growing number of first and second generation immigrants. Mindiola and colleagues (2002) found from the perspective of Latino immigrants, whites appears to be more friendly to and have lower social distance with African-Americans than Latinos, arguably because of the growing cultural differences between whites and Latino immigrants. In addition, whites were found recently to be more likely to have lower social distance with African-Americans than other groups in North Carolina counties with sizeable Latino immigrant populations than in counties with smaller Latino immigrant populations within the state (Randall and Delbridge, 2005). Other scholars have also noted a public backlash against Latinos and pro-immigration policies due to opposition to Latino immigration (e.g., Sears et al., 1999; Kaufmann, 2004), possibly favoring white-African-American relations.

As mentioned previously, social distance has also helped to inform research on the determinants of passive representation. Using data on school board

membership in 1986, Meier and Stewart (1991a) found that the size of the African-American population within a school district was positively associated with Latino membership on school boards. Under circumstances of low social distance between whites and Latinos, such as was experienced during the 1980s, whites appeared to support more Latino membership and less African-American membership on school boards. This was arguably because whites use Latino representation to mute the political influence of more socially distant and threatening African-Americans.

The relative level of social distance between whites, Latinos and African-Americans is not static, however. Using more recent school board data in 2001, Rocha (2007) found that the coalitional behavior between whites, Latinos and African-Americans during school board elections had changed. Rather than supporting Latino school board candidates, Rocha discovered that whites had shifted their support from Latinos and toward African-Americans, arguably because of factors associated with Latino immigration and the greater social distance Latino immigrants place between whites and Latinos. It appears that whites are now using African-American political representation to mute the political influence that Latino immigrants would otherwise gain with additional Latino representation.

2.3 Power Struggles: A Model of Group Threat Relations

The research by Meier and Stewart (1991a) and Rocha (2007) is founded on a large literature demonstrating that competition over scarce resources influences the political behavior and power relations of racial and ethnic groups (e.g., Bishin, Kaufmann and Stevens, 2012; Giles and Evans, 1985, 1986; see also Feagin, 1981;

Fraga, Meier and England, 1986; Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Jankowski, 1992). Giles and Evans (1985, 1986) argued that the increased social similarity between a minority group and the majority group decreases the threat that minority group poses to the majority group and, consequently, the more political support and access to public resources the minority group is likely to receive. This perspective, referred to by Giles and Evans (1986) as the “power approach to intergroup hostility,” argues that not only is intergroup hostility a function of racial differences as group theory contends, but it is also a function of the social distance between groups. If whites and Latinos have more social distance between them than do whites and African-Americans, presumably due in part to the rise in Latino immigration, then Latinos should expect greater power struggles with whites.

The study of intergroup power struggles has extended to other areas of minority politics and representation as well. Research on African-American voting behavior, for instance, has used group consciousness and white-African-American power differentials to explain African-American partisanship (e.g., Tate, 1993; Dawson, 1994). Much research on African-American political representation also suggests that at a time when African-American influence within the Democratic party was on the rise during the 1970s and 1980s, white voters were turning their support away from the Democratic party, lessening African-American political power (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt, 1989). Pertaining to Hispanic representation, Bishin, Kaufmann and Stevens (2011) found that anti-Cuban resentment is an important predictor of voting behavior by non-Cuban

Hispanics, leading them to support policies in opposition to Fidel Castro. Thus, it is important within various aspects of politics and public policy to better understand the social determinants of racial and ethnic attitudes and power relations.

I next turn to reviewing the possible role that racial contexts can play in whites' receptivity of Latino immigration.

2.4 Contextual Determinants of Racial Attitudes: Theories of Intergroup Relations

Much past research has focused on the determinants of racial attitudes—areas of research that help support the Meier and Stewart (1991a) and Rocha (2007) studies and, in this dissertation, my expectations of the role of racial context in conditioning whites' tolerance of Latino immigration. Racial attitudes and, consequently, intergroup relations, are likely to be “contextually conditioned” and, for instance, “in contexts where the threat posed by a minority group is high, the dominant group's response is predicted to be more hostile than in contexts where the threat is low” (Giles and Hertz, 1994:317).

One major area of focus in the study of racial attitudes has been the psychological and sociological roots of intergroup conflict. Group identities provide individuals with a sense of self from membership in social groups (McDermott, 2004; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and help to explain the cognitive underpinnings of group stereotypes and racial biases (Tajfel, 1969; Hamilton, 1979). When individuals interact individually or collectively with members of another group (e.g., the out-group), the evaluations of out-group members and whether prejudicial attitudes form are shaped by group identifications (Sherif, 1966; Kinder and Sears,

1981; Sears, 1988). Favorable evaluations of others are more likely when the evaluated individual is a member of one's own group (Chen and Li, 2006). Group identities, however, are malleable and group boundaries can expand to include a more diverse set of people (Gaertner et al., 1996).

Several areas of research demonstrate that group-level processes also shape racial attitudes. The urban-sociology model suggests that the social ecology influences individuals' attitudes and behaviors. The urban-sociology model redirected attention from individual-level to community-level investigations (e.g., Sampson et al., 2002; Pickett and Pearl, 2001), and helped guide race scholars to consider the role of racial contexts (e.g., community racial composition) in the formation of racial attitudes. The isolation of ethnic neighborhoods, for instance, has been shown to reduce social integration and increase social disorder (Bulmer, 1984, 1991; Bulmer et al., 1991). Various neighborhood effects, such as demographic and social integration and other demographic factors, have also been shown to affect various educational outcomes (Gephart, 1997; Ensminger et al., 1996; Duncan, 1994; Datcher, 1982). The urban sociologist, William Julius Wilson, identified racial segregation and concentrated poverty as two important social forces that impact life outcomes for individuals. Other research has also confirmed a causal link between various aspects of the social environment and public opinion (e.g., Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Soss, Langbein and Metelko, 2003).

Two group-level theories on intergroup relations—group contact theory and group threat theory—are based on group identities and expect that the racial and

ethnic composition of communities affect individuals' racial attitudes and the relations between groups. Research on these theories measure intergroup relations a number of ways (e.g., racial tolerance, hostility, intergroup trust, prejudice, etc.). Preuhs (2006), for instance, uses the concept of racial polarization to help explain the salience of race within political settings, suggesting that in areas of greater racial polarization (e.g., intergroup threat), such as is commonly found in the South, white legislators are less likely to form interracial coalitions with black legislators, thus diminishing the representation of black's interests (see also Hawkesworth, 2003). Preuhs (2006:588) states that the failure to account for the effects of racialized settings "may mask the true relationship between representation and influence when racial cleavages do not dominate the political context." Grissom and colleagues (2009) similarly base their measure of racial climate on the history of racial conflict and racial salience experienced in the South.

In this dissertation, I examine the racial climate of more local regions (e.g., school districts) than that of a U.S. region and I use the concept of racial tolerance to characterize the racial climate. Racial tolerance is a common measure within intergroup relations research. Research on racial tolerance has found that sizeable out-group size is negatively related to racial tolerance (e.g., Johnson, 2001; Quillian, 1995) and social interaction among members of different races promotes tolerance (e.g., Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Further, the initial development of racial tolerance should carry over to other intergroup relations. Pettigrew (2009) based his development of the "secondary transfer effect" model on the expectation that racial tolerance developed during interactions with one group in one setting

transfers to and promotes positive racial attitudes developed during interactions with another group in a different setting; conversely, racial intolerance developed during the primary setting can also harm racial attitudes developed during the secondary setting (see also Tausch et al., 2010; Harwood et al., 2011; Vezzali et al., 2012; McLaren, 2003).

2.4.1 Models of Racial Tolerance Contexts: Group Contact Theory and Group Threat Theory

Group contact theory and group threat theory argue that individuals draw on aspects of their social environment and their group identities to form attitudes about themselves, other groups and their own group's well-being (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998; Pettigrew, 1997). Not only do personal characteristics (e.g., education) influence individuals' racial attitudes, but group-oriented perspectives also emphasize that the social environment or racial context influences the development of racial attitudes and behaviors (Bledsoe et al., 1995; Ellison and Powers, 1994; Sigelman and Welch, 1993; Stein et al., 2000). Group contact and threat theories have established a relationship between "neighborhood social organization, including racial composition, and a broad range of psychological orientations such as alienation, anxiety, fear, suspicion of out-groups, and mistrust" (Marschall and Stolle, 2004:126; see also Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000).

These theories, however, make contradictory predictions of the direction of the relationship between racial context and intergroup relations. Group contact theory argues that contact with and exposure to members of other groups produces positive attitudes toward out-groups; group threat theory, on the other hand, argues

that the aggregate level of competition between groups produces negative attitudes toward out-groups. Next, I review in more detail group contact theory and then I turn to group threat theory.

2.4.2 Group Contact Theory: Producing a More Tolerant Climate

How can interactions with strangers or members of other groups improve the relations between groups? Group contact theory suggests that intergroup relations should be less antagonistic when more members of different racial and ethnic groups come into contact with one another. Racial isolation, on the other hand, causes “prejudice and conflict [to] grow like a disease” (Bramfield, 1946:245). First conceived by scholars in the 1940s, group contact theory became one of the dominant ways to analyze the structural determinants of racial attitudes and intergroup relations. Intergroup contact, according to this perspective, is “one of the most prominent interventions to reduce prejudice” (Tausch et al., 2010:282).

Learning about the out-group is a cognitive process and intergroup contact works through “behavioral modification” to improve relations between groups (Pettigrew, 1998). One way contact improves relations between members of different groups is through increased familiarity with other groups and, consequently, reduction in prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998). By learning about other groups through various types of acquaintanceships and friendships, individuals also learn the truth about inaccurate negative stereotypes (Amir, 1976; Emerson et al., 2002; Powers and Ellison, 1995; Sigelman and Welch, 1993) and “share experiences

which permit the interplay of character and personality,” further leading to “mutual understanding and regard” (Lett, 1945:35).

Another pathway through which intergroup contact works is provided by social psychology research, which suggests that contact also alters group identities by making more inclusive group identities (Bobo, 1988; Brewer, 1981; Dovidio and Gaertner, 1999; Gaertner et al., 1996). Without intergroup contact, individuals sustain a bias in favor of their own group. In-group bias fosters hostility toward out-group members, especially in the absence of knowledge about the out-group (Bobo, 1988). Intergroup contact, however, changes group identities and reduces in-group bias by developing a more inclusive, “superordinate identity” which promotes a more cosmopolitan view on diversity (Gaertner et al., 1996).

Other research suggests that cognitive factors such as learning are less consequential to contact than affective and emotional mediators (see Tropp and Pettigrew, 2005). Hewstone (2003) argues that emotional behavior is the major pathway through which contact affects racial attitudes. Anxiety tends to be more common during interactions between members of different groups than between members of the same group (Stephan and Stephan, 1985). Consequently, intergroup contact improves intergroup relations by modifying anxiety over out-groups. Contact reduces fear about or the anticipation of negative interactions—both promoters of intergroup anxiety—during contact settings (Plant and Devine, 2003; Shelton and Richeson, 2005). Intergroup contact reassures in-group members that the out-group is not as frightening as imagined, lessening anxiety and facilitating future contact, or, as Allport (1954:xv) states, contact reduces “fears of the

imagination.” Several studies have confirmed the relationship between real or imagined contact with out-group members and reduced intergroup anxiety (e.g., Voci and Hewstone, 2003; Turner et al., 2007; Page-Gould et al., 2008).

Past research on group contact has demonstrated several conditions under which the beneficial effects of contact are most likely. In the most famous examination of these conditions, Allport (1954) argued that contact would maximally reduce prejudice when groups have equal status and the contact setting fosters interactions that are personal and intimate. Research is generally supportive of the beneficial influences of these conditions on contact (e.g., Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Moody, 2001; Blanchard et al., 1975; Gaertner et al., 1999; Landis et al., 1984). The meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006), however, found that these conditions are not necessary, but they can enhance the contact-prejudice link. General “exposure models” have also demonstrated the benefits of casual contact without Allport’s setting conditions, typically occurring within various settings in relatively small geographic areas such as neighborhoods, communities and cities (Wessel, 2009). In fact, the famous urbanist Jane Jacobs argued that the local community context is generally an important determinant of tolerance and discrimination (see also Wirth, 1938). Overall, the evidence is very clear that increased social contact between minority and majority group members produces more favorable views toward minorities and policies directed at minorities (e.g., Ellison, Shin and Leal, 2011; Hood and Morris, 2000).

2.4.3 Intergroup Contact and Segregation as Context

Research to date on the effects of segregation on individuals has focused on social and economic outcomes (Jargowsky, 1996; Massey and Denton, 1993), educational achievement (Charles, Dinwiddie, and Massey, 2004) and safety (Massey, 1995). Less research has focused on intergroup attitudes, however contact scholars have studied segregation as well. Contact scholars have suggested among other conditions that racial segregation is “a crucial element of the context to which whites’ racial views are sensitive” (Taylor, 1998:814; see also Burr et al., 1991). Drawing from group contact theory, racial integration can increase the likelihood of beneficial forms of visibility and interaction between racial groups (e.g., Massey and Denton, 1993; Johnson, 2001). As early as the 1940s, scholars called for studies focusing on “intergroup relations in segregated and mixed areas of the same community” (Williams, 1947:91). Proponents of the Fair Housing Act (1968) argued that residential integration would help “overcome the ignorance and fears of whites” (Dubofsky, 1969:154). Further, *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) was premised on the notion that interracial interaction in a localized setting would promote racial and cultural awareness (Lockhart et al., 1996).

Residential integration is an aspect of the “lived density” within communities (Wessel, 2009) that has the capacity to promote contact settings likely to improve intergroup relations. When residents are spatially isolated, they are more likely to experience social isolation and negative out-group perceptions (Oliver and Wong, 2003). Racial proximity, on the other hand, fosters the development of personal acquaintances and intergroup friendships (e.g., Amir, 1976; Brewer and Miller,

1984; Miller, 2002; Pettigrew, 1997, 1998; Pettigrew et al., 2007) which make out-groups appear less threatening to the in-group (Rocha and Espino, 2009; Dixon et al., 2006; Charles, 2000). Many of the conditions thought to increase the benefit of contact, such as cooperative relations, intimate relations, voluntary and collaborative contact, and equal status between contact groups, are especially likely within local community settings (Schwirian et al., 1990; Barnard and Benn, 1988; Saldivar-Tanaka and Krasny, 2004; Shinet et al., 2004).

Much evidence supports the role of residential racial integration in reducing prejudice among residents (e.g., Sigelman et al., 1996; Mouw and Entwisle, 2006; Rocha and Espino, 2009). The relationship between contact and improved tolerance tends to hold even accounting for the possibility of self-selection bias². Whites who lived in integrated housing (Deutsch and Collins, 1956) and military troops who were moved to more integrated living quarters (Mandelbaum, 1952; Stouffer et al., 1949), for instance, were less prejudiced than those who remained in more segregated settings. As Rocha and Espino (2009) state in response to past research on the racial attitudes and political behavior of whites as a function of community demographics: “a shortcoming of earlier work has been the failure to account for the levels of segregation within a community.”

² Self-selection of less prejudiced people into integrated communities may bias upward the impact of integrated communities on prejudice. Much research, however, suggests that this is a minimal concern because contact effects tend to be larger than the selection bias (Pettigrew et al., 2007; Pettigrew 1997, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Powers and Ellison, 1995; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Levin et al., 2003). Further, self-selection bias is even less of a concern for group threat analyses because self-selection should bias downward the effect of group threat on prejudice. Putnam (2007) argues this is because more prejudiced people should elect to not live in racially and ethnically diverse communities.

“Interethnic propinquity” or proximity to members of other groups also has been shown to reduce out-group prejudice among residents within neighborhoods; this beneficial relationship, however, may not exist in more macro regions, such as metropolitan areas (Oliver and Wong, 2003). Within Alabama counties, Roch and Rushton (2008) found that white voter support for a 2003 referendum for a more progressive tax reform was conditional on the level of racial segregation within the county. These authors argue that white voter support for the progressive reform decreased in more segregated counties due to the lower likelihood of contact in these areas. Finally, Wagner and colleagues (2006) found that living among a greater percentage of foreigners predicted lower levels of prejudice and more positive contact with minorities.

2.4.4 Group Threat: Producing a Less Tolerant Climate

A different perspective on the structural determinants of racial attitudes questions the beneficial relationship between racial and ethnic out-group size and intergroup relations. More sizeable out-groups within certain geographic areas has been linked with reduced social cohesion and interpersonal trust (Putnam, 2007; Alesina and Ferrara, 2000), reduced racial tolerance (Johnson, 2001), a lack of cooperation (Ritzen et al., 2001), and less support for public goods and services (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999). Group threat theory links racial and ethnic diversity with negative racial attitudes through perceived intergroup threat. Compared to cultural and other diffuse aspects of the social world that have been argued to serve as socialization processes and determinants of prejudice (e.g.,

Blumer, 1958; Sears, 1988; Drake, 1987), group threat argues that “the roots of prejudice and stereotypes lie in something more tangible and concrete” (Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004:263). Scholars have found that co-location with other, sizeable racial groups produces political competition (e.g., Glaser, 1994) and still others have found that sizeable out-groups develop generalized prejudice (e.g., Taylor, 1998).

Prejudice, according to the threat perspective, is a function of the salience of the threat to one group’s status from another group, where the magnitude of the threat is associated with the local presence of the out-group (Blalock, 1967; Glaser, 1994; Quillian, 1996; Taylor, 1998). In general, intergroup threat occurs when “one group’s actions, beliefs, or characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of another group” (Riek et al., 2006:336). More specifically, intergroup threat occurs over the competition for scarce resources. Competition can occur over tangible (e.g., employment) and intangible goods (e.g., cultural status) (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967). Larger populations of out-groups, for instance, are said to present the in-group with more of a threat to its interests. Key (1949) is one of the first scholars of group threat, and found that whites in U.S. counties with larger African-American populations held more conservative political beliefs than whites residing in counties with smaller African-American populations.

The perception of threat has been argued to mediate between out-group size and racial attitudes. In other words, “objective environmental characteristics” (Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010) correlate with subjective perceptions of threat that, in turn, produce negative racial attitudes. Intergroup threat has also been found to apply even when in-group members do not perceive threats to their own-self

interest; the perception of threat posed to the in-group as a whole is sufficient to elicit anti-out-group hostilities (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Quillian, 1996; Riek et al., 2006). Intergroup threat, in turn, leads to the formation of negative racial attitudes (e.g., negative stereotypes and prejudice) by the dominant group—typically whites—to other threatening racial groups (Key, 1949; Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Olzak, 1992). In-group members are expected to respond to the expected “negative consequences” of out-group threat (Stephan and Renfro, 2002) by acting to suppress the sources of the threat with, for instance, exclusionary attitudes and prejudice (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998; Esses et al., 2001; Kluegel and Smith, 1986). Racial discrimination acts to deny “to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment” (Allport, 1954:51) and, more directly, maintains a more competitive position for the in-group (Bobo, 1999; Quillian, 1995).

There is much empirical evidence in support of group threat theory. Quillian (1996), for instance, found that the percentage of the African-American population increased anti-minority sentiment within nine U.S. regions. Taylor (1998) found that an increase in the local percentage of African-Americans increased prejudice among whites. And while most group threat research has focused on anti-African-American attitudes, some studies also demonstrate a relationship between the size of the Latino population and anti-Latino prejudice (Huddy and Sears, 1995; Stein et al., 2000). Regarding political behavior, a number of studies have found that prejudicial attitudes among non-minorities are associated with minority group size within the community (Giles and Buckner, 1993; Glaser, 1994; Tolbert and Grummel, 2003).

2.4.5 Group Threat and Generational Competition as Racial Climate

A number of studies within public economics have suggested that racial and ethnic heterogeneity based on group threat increases the conflict between groups. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), for example, found that diversity undermines the public's willingness to contribute to public good provision (see also Habyarimana et al., 2007). According to this perspective, individuals' welfare function is a function of community characteristics and there are "discriminatory community preferences" in which individuals only "care about the welfare of others within their community" (Cutler, Elmendorf and Zeckhauser, 1993:4). According to Luttmer (1997:501), individuals are most loyal to their own racial group and therefore "increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises" (see also Goldin and Katz, 1998).

Generational heterogeneity may also promote conflict by reducing the public's willingness to support public goods due to conflict over burden sharing. Poterba (1996, 1997) argues that given the aging of the U.S. population, local governments should expect "heightened generational tensions" within public education. In general, research suggests that not only is there an increasing tendency among the elderly to form united voting blocs (e.g., Binstock, 2012), but older individuals also have different preferences for public goods and services than the young which leads to lower support for public education (Koretz, 1995). Poterba (1997) found that a larger share of elderly in a state lowers public education spending, especially so when the elderly and school age population represent different racial groups. Poterba refers to this cross-generational and cross racial

group phenomenon as “generational competition.” Thus, generational competition, especially when it occurs across racial groups, should heighten the racial tensions within a community.

The next section reviews representative bureaucracy theory and lays the foundation for linking it with the racial climate scholarship by considering a model of representative bureaucracy that is contextually dependent.

2.5 Representative Bureaucracy

Kingsley (1944) argued that the demographic composition of public agencies affects public policies, beginning scholarly investigation into representative bureaucracy. The theory of representative bureaucracy argues that minority membership in government brings policy benefits to minority citizens. Minority public officials, according to this thesis, possess a clear understanding of the needs and desires of minorities (Thompson, 1976). Consequently, minority representatives, according to this perspective, are more likely than nonminority representatives to act on the behalf of minority citizens (Kingsley, 1944; Mosher, 1968; Meier, 1993). Proponents contend that representative bureaucracy is a way to represent minority interests and introduce equity in the policy process. While representative bureaucracy scholars have focused on a number of policy areas, much research has focused on public education and has demonstrated a beneficial relationship between minority representation and minority student achievement (e.g., Barajas and Pierce, 2001; Irvine, 1989; Meier, Stewart and England, 1989;

Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard, 1999, Polinard, Wrinkle and Meier, 1995; Wright, Hirlinger and England, 1998).

Within representative bureaucracy, a higher level of passive representation among representatives is said to increase the likelihood of active representation (Selden, 1997) Passive representation is the term used to describe public administrators who share certain physical characteristics with target groups (Pitkin, 1967). A synonymous concept within political science, descriptive representation, describes the level of demographic representativeness among elected officials, such as state legislators and city council members (e.g., Espino, 2003; Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Kerr and Miller, 1997; Vigil, 1997). More passively representative agencies are more likely to produce active representation (Mosher, 1968, 1982; Atkins and Wilkins, 2013). Active representation is a term used to describe the actions of administrators who advocate for the interests of certain target groups. Substantive representation (Pitkin, 1967) is the synonymous concept within political science. Underlying this passive-active relationship is the expectation that representatives who share physical traits with citizens will also share lifetime experiences, values and beliefs and ultimately will be more likely to show empathy to minorities (Kraz, 1974; Herbert, 1974; Meier, 1975; Selden, 1997; Bradbury and Kellough, 2008).

Central to representative bureaucracy is the concept of partiality (Box, 1992; Lim, 2006; Thompson, 1976). Lim (2006) suggests that partiality or a preference for serving the interests of one group over another is the “most obvious direct source” of passive representation transitioning into active representation. Bureaucratic partiality and favoritism have been generally linked with bureaucrats’ demographic

backgrounds (e.g., race); surprisingly little research exists, however, on the determinants of representative partiality other than a representatives' minority status.

Some emerging research suggests that factors other than shared physical traits, such as attitude congruence, are important in promoting the transition from passive to active representation (e.g., Bradbury and Kellough, 2008). Other research suggests a mediating link between passive representation and active representation. Selden, Brudney and Kellough (1998), for instance, found that the influence of administrators' demographic backgrounds on representative behavior are mediated by the organizational roles they assume. The passive-to-active representation transition has also been found to depend on the institutional context and policy area (Keiser et al. 2002; Lovenduski 2005), social background and socialization (Dolan 2002; Meier and Nigro 1976), policy discretion within an organization (Hinderer 1993; Keiser et al. 2002), and a sufficient percentage of minority bureaucrats in a given organization (Kanter 1977; Thompson 1976; Meier 1993).

As mentioned previously, the likelihood of minority advocacy depends on the concept of the minority representative role. Emerging research on the minority representative role, which measures the desire of public officials to advocate for minority interests, has been found to mediate bureaucrats' demographic backgrounds (Selden, 1997; Selden et al., 1998). Selden and colleagues (1998) found that while race was the strongest predictor of bureaucrats' assuming a minority representative role, both minority and non-minority bureaucrats can assume this role. Selden and colleagues (1998:737) concluded that "adherence to the minority

representative role exerts an influence on administrative behavior above and beyond race.” Sowa and Selden (2003) further found that the adoption of a minority representative role by Farmer’s Home Administration (FFA) administrators, rather than their minority status, led to a greater likelihood of active representation on behalf of minority FFA loan recipients. Bradbury and Kellough (2007) used the minority representative role concept in a local setting by examining the attitudinal congruence between black administrators and black clients and its role as a precondition for active representation. Surprisingly, little other research has explored the behavior of white public officials within representative bureaucracy. One exception is the study by Hindera and Young (1998). These authors found that the representative behavior of white public officials is influenced by passive representation of African-Americans, possibly due to a constraining effect on the racial behaviors of whites.

2.6 Representative Bureaucracy and Racial Contexts

The beneficial effects of representative bureaucracy—both passive and active forms—are to varying extents conditional on aspects of the institutional and social environment. Regarding passive representation, the previous discussions of the studies by Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) indicate that the level of minority membership in public office is conditional on the racial context (e.g., community demographic composition and social distance between whites, Latinos and African-Americans). Other studies have also shown that racial voting patterns are conditional on the racial context. Liu (2001), for instance, found that in black-

dominated contexts (e.g., majority black voting districts), the positive effect of black incumbency in biracial municipal elections in New Orleans between 1977 and 1998 on white crossover voting is greater than in balanced black-white contexts or white-dominant contexts. Liu argues that the significance of racial context for minority electoral success and the black incumbent advantage is due to the fact that white voters “in the black-dominant context may be more likely to make a strategic voting decision to get on the winning side in these elections” (586). The level of minority representation on school boards has also been found to be conditional on school district electoral characteristics, such as at-large versus ward elections (e.g., Leal, Martinez-Ebers and Meier, 2004) and partisan versus nonpartisan elections (e.g., Robinson and Dye, 1978; Rocha, 2007).

Past research demonstrates that active representation is also conditional on the racial context. In general, Meier (1993) argued that socialization shapes bureaucrats’ value preference for certain groups. Rocha and Hawes (2009), for instance, found that a larger percentage of African-American teachers within schools is associated with reduced assignment to special needs status and suspensions among African-American students, as would be anticipated by most representative bureaucracy research. Upon accounting for racial context, however, these authors found that African-American students were more likely to experience beneficial outcomes from passive representation in two types of contexts, including more racially diverse districts and districts with less disparity in income between African-Americans and whites. Rocha and Hawes state that when examining policy outcomes at low contextual units of analysis, such as the school districts, it is

apparent that “the racial and ethnic context of the pertinent jurisdiction, it seems, significantly influences minority policy outcomes” (341). Arguably, “when minority groups look similar to Anglos in terms of SES, the level of discrimination they face within the education system is reduced” (Rocha and Hawes 2009:340). Further, Grissom and colleagues (2009) found that African-American teachers in the South were more likely than African-American teachers in other regions of the U.S. to help produce better educational outcomes for African-American students, such as reduced rates of student suspensions and increased placements in gifted and talented programs. Presumably, intergroup relations are more racialized in the South due to its history of racial conflict, leading race to be more salient to teachers in their dealings with students. Finally, Roch and Edwards (2013) found that passive representation is most likely to turn into active representation for students in communities in which race is more salient (e.g., low intergroup contact), as suggested by the level of racial segregation within the community.

2.7 School Boards Within Local Bureaucratic Systems

Representative bureaucracy theory provides a useful way to study governance and the public sector (see Lynn et al., 2000). Representative bureaucracy studies have largely failed, however, to account for the interdependencies between multiple layers of government. In particular, representative bureaucracy research has the following limitations, including examining only one level of management or control (Lynn et al., 2001) or only one of either political or bureaucratic influences (Hill and Lynn, 2002), ignoring the

question of political control over the bureaucracy and the direct effect of politics on policy (Meier et al., 2004; Meier and O'Toole, 2006), and ignoring political influences all together (Lynn and Tepper, 1998).

Public education systems provide an appropriate venue for considering the multiple levels of governance within school districts, ranging from school boards at the top of the local educational hierarchy to teachers at the bottom. School board members, despite their political orientation, are expected to be capable of advocating for the interests of citizens based on representative bureaucracy for a number of reasons. School board members work within specific policy areas and are expected to develop substantive policy expertise on matters such as day-to-day operations of schools, attendance boundaries, school calendars, discipline policy, and teacher hiring and retention (Sanders, 1990; Hess, 2002; Strauss, 1999; Cavanna, 2007). These substantive responsibilities place school board members in the middle of the day-to-day operations of schools. Representative bureaucracy scholars have used similar models of passive representation among several positions within the school district hierarchy, including school board member, school administrator, and teacher (e.g., Stewart et al., 1989).

School boards have also been found to have a role in bureaucratic affairs despite being elected bodies. Unlike other elected bodies, the primary responsibility for a single policy area—elementary and secondary education—rests with a single legislative body—local school boards. School boards have been the subject of research within both political science and public administration. On the one hand, school board members are elected officials and are responsive to politics, placing

school boards firmly within political science. School boards experience political pressures to comply with No Child Left Behind, for instance, and other state mandates (Glass, 2007). On the other hand, school boards exist within bureaucratic systems and are “relatively apolitical affairs” (Hess, 2002), more so than other types of legislative bodies, placing them within public administration scholarship.

Meier and colleagues (2004) and Meier and O’Toole (2006) also argue that the question of political control over the bureaucracy has been absent from research on representative bureaucracy. Based on a theory of multilevel governance built upon representative bureaucracy, school districts exist within a closely linked system of governance, making them the “most common bureaucracies in the United States” (Meier et al., 2004:31). School districts contain political and bureaucratic entities layered within several levels of governance,. School districts are also flat organizations and the “distance between a school board member and a teacher actually delivering services is relatively small,” reducing the “transaction costs of attempting to influence the bureaucracy” (Meier and O’Toole, 2006:181).

School board members tend to share similar values and beliefs with other public officials within school districts (e.g., teachers), increasing the likelihood of comparable decision-making by school board members and other public officials (Meier et. al, 2004; see also Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Hinderer, 1993; Kerr and Miller, 1997; Meier and Stewart, 1991b). Unsurprisingly, school boards have been found to influence a wide range educational outcomes associated with other representative bureaucracy research on bureaucratic outputs and outcomes within public education (e.g., Fraga et al., 1986; Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard, 1999).

Race is also especially salient within school districts because, further making school boards important institutions for studying race and representation. Government reforms have moved school districts to include mostly at-large and nonpartisan elections, so race and diversity are more likely to be salient to voters and representatives than in single member districts (e.g., ward districts) or partisan elections in which voters identify more closely with the party of the candidates. Further, school district politics tends to be racialized (Henig et al., 1999; Orr, 1999; Portz, Stein and Jones, 1999). As school districts have desegregated from high levels during the middle twentieth century, other policies, such as education funding (Evans, Murray and Schwab 1997) and school discipline (Skiba et al., 2002), have become racialized.

Chapter 3

Integrated Theory, Models, and Hypotheses

This dissertation attempts to improve upon our understanding of representative bureaucracy by focusing on the determinants of minority representation on school boards, especially considering the increasingly multiracial and multiethnic U.S. Past research found that Latino immigration is influencing whites' relations with Latinos and African-Americans; little is known, however, about the conditions under which whites are more antagonized by Latino immigrants and what the implications might be for Latino and African-American representation. *Ceteris paribus*, Latino immigration should reduce Latino representation, especially if whites are intolerant of additional racial and ethnic diversity. High levels of racial tolerance should be most likely in communities with high levels of intergroup contact or low levels of intergroup threat. In short, the road to Latino incorporation within school districts likely depends on communities' racial climates.

I structure my arguments as follows. I develop one general model of minority representation that provides the framework for the two empirical chapters in this dissertation. First, I briefly discuss the logic behind the possible influence of Latino immigration on whites' racial attitudes toward Latinos and African-Americans. I consider racial attitudes in terms of racial partiality as has also been considered in other representative bureaucracy research (e.g., Lim, 2006), but I do so in two

specific ways: voter preferences for certain racial groups and school board member relative responsiveness to certain racial groups.

I pay close attention to the line of research on white-Latino and white-African-American coalition behavior, focusing on political power relations (Evans and Giles, 1986; Meier and Stewart 1991a, b; Rocha 2007). Second, I present the theoretical framework and hypotheses for the first empirical chapter on Latino and African-American membership on school boards. Third, I present hypotheses for the second empirical chapter on white school board member responsiveness to Latino and African-American parents. Finally, I present my expectations for how the Latino immigration-representation relationships should be conditional on racial climate conditions within the community.

Latino immigration is purported to influence the likelihood of representation by changing the relative preferences of whites for more representation of Latino or African-American interests. First generation Latinos tend to have large socioeconomic differences with other groups due to their low levels of education and financial resources (DeSipio, 1996; Suro and Passel, 2003) and they also tend to not speak English well compared to second or third generation Latinos (Suro, 2002). In addition, while research has shown that the Latino population size is positively associated with Latino membership in local office, the relationship is weaker than for African-American representation (Leal, 2004; Meier et al., 2005; Rocha, Wrinkle and Polinard, 2005), suggesting not only a weakened Latino voter bloc due to the lack of voting rights among Latino non-citizens, but also a greater role for whites in suppressing Latino representation rather than African-American representation.

Consequently, Latino political representation should be a function of a number of societal factors including Latino immigration into a community, which should limit the support of whites for more Latino representation.

Much research has considered the relationships between whites, Latinos and African-Americans in terms of group cooperation and conflict (e.g., Gay, 2006; Kaufmann, 2003; Marschall, 2005; Vaca, 2004). As mentioned previously, Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) apply a model of intergroup relations to interracial political coalitions, expecting the likelihood of intergroup cooperation to depend on the social distance between groups. I follow Rocha (2007) and use a more recent set of data to test whether white voter support for Latino and African-American school board candidates is conditional on the size of the local Latino immigrant population. This expectation is supported by other research drawing from group threat theory which found that not only do respondents from a cross-national survey accurately relate subjective immigrant population sizes to objective immigrant population sizes, but larger perceived immigrant populations were also associated with more negative evaluations of immigration (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2008). Overall, I expect whites to have the greatest social distance with Latino immigrants and the least social distance with African-Americans (Latino natives are in the middle of this spectrum). As such, I hypothesize:

The size of the Latino immigrant population is *negatively* associated with Latino school board membership and *positively* associated with African-American school board membership.

Given the general anti-immigrant sentiment which currently pervades the U.S. and the association in citizens' minds between immigration and Latinos, I also expect the

support of white school board members for Latinos is conditional on the size of the local Latino native population, but less so than for the size of the Latino immigrant population. Even though whites may be turning against Latinos as a group, they may be expressing greater social distance with Latino immigrants than they do with Latino natives due, in part, to the social and cultural assimilation of Latino natives.

As such:

The size of the Latino native population is negatively but weakly associated with Latino school board membership and positively but weakly associated with African-American school board membership.

I next consider whether the influence of Latino immigration on whites' racial attitudes toward Latinos and African-American applies to public officials. White school board members live within the same communities as white residents and should be subject to the same racial contexts. Brief and colleagues (2005) argue that racial conflict within the community affects workers' racial attitudes and acceptance of diverse workplaces. Other research also suggests that racial contexts affect interracial relations within government (e.g., Preuhs, 2006). As such, I examine whether the support of white public officials (e.g., school board members) for Latinos or African-Americans is conditional on the size of the local Latino immigrant population. I hypothesize:

The size of the Latino immigrant population is *negatively* associated with white school board members' responsiveness to Latinos and *positively* associated with their responsiveness to African-Americans.

And further, if school board members act rationally and less based on personal biases, such as would be the case in which board members seek to build electoral

coalitions, then they may be likely to respond less negatively to the non-immigrant (and voter eligible) Latino population:

The size of the Latino native population is less negatively associated with white school board members' responsiveness to Latinos than is the case for the Latino immigrant population.

This research on both forms of minority representation can be enhanced by building on the group contact and group threat literatures because, as Hopkins (2010:41) states: "Scholars have put considerable effort into adapting contextual theories to explain attitudes toward immigration." Hanson and Hawley (2011) also refer to the demographic composition of a community as having a potentially negative and "tipping point" influence on racial attitudes. Emerging research suggests that changes in racial attitudes in response to increasing racial and ethnic diversity occur only under certain economic, political or spatial conditions (Branton and Jones, 2005; Campbell, Wong and Citrin, 2006; Gay, 2006; Oliver and Wong, 2003). The threat that Latino immigrants pose to whites should be a function of certain conditions, such as racial tolerance, within the community.

Residents should be more likely to be aware of the presence of immigrants and be opposed to their presence in communities where race and ethnicity are already salient. It is only when certain aspects of the environment are salient that issues become problems, defining "what the problem is and how to think about it" (Kinder, 1998:170). Sizeable Latino immigration may not pose a threat to residents and produce anti-immigrant backlash unless frames of reference make the ramifications of Latino immigration clear. Hopkins (2010), for instance, argues that

individuals' attitudes are a function of framing and the extent to which "attitudes toward public policies are racialized."

I extend my earlier hypotheses using the secondary transfer effect model of Pettigrew (2009) to include the moderating role of community racial climate on white voters' tolerance of Latino immigration.

Communities with more contact between groups should have more racial tolerance. In addition, communities with more intergroup threat should have less racial tolerance. I extend the previous two hypotheses and further hypothesize:

The size of the Latino immigrant population is *negatively* associated with Latino school board membership and *positively* associated with African-American school board membership, especially in communities with *low* intergroup contact or *high* intergroup threat.

The size of the Latino immigrant population is *negatively* associated with white public officials' responsiveness to Latinos and *positively* associated with their responsiveness to African-Americans, especially in communities with *low* intergroup contact or *high* intergroup threat.

I also test these hypotheses, examining the presumably weaker relationship involving the Latino native population.

Chapter 4

Analysis of Latino and African-American Membership on Local School Boards

4.1 Overview

In this chapter, I examine the effect of Latino immigration on Latino and African-American passive representation and the conditions leading Latino immigrants to provoke opposition among white citizens. Latino immigration may threaten whites, increasing the social distance between whites and Latinos and thus moving whites closer to African-Americans. If this influence of Latino immigration applies to white voters during school board elections, then it is possible that white-Latino political coalitions and consequently Latino passive representation will suffer, especially in communities in which Latino immigrants are poorly received.

I draw from two intergroup relations theories—group contact and group threat—and expect that Latino immigrants within communities with more racial tension should be more quickly labeled as threatening. I use OLS regression to test whether the racial climate moderates the influence of Latino immigration on the electoral prospects of Latino and African-American school board candidates, arguably due to the intergroup coalition behavior of white voters.

In this chapter, I am not directly testing voting behavior by racial and ethnic group directly. I instead rely on aggregate data on school board election results and use past research on social distance and an ecological perspective of intergroup relations to infer the behavior of white voters during school board elections. I first draw from research beginning with Giles and Evans (1985, 1986) and carrying

through to Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) which argues that whites are strategic in their political behavior, particularly as it relates to the social distance between them and other racial and ethnic groups. Past research has found that whites respond to threats from socially distant groups by supporting more political representation of less socially distant groups.

Considerable evidence has supported the expectation that whites as the typically major social group respond negatively to sizeable African-American populations, especially during the middle and late 20th century. Evidence focusing on Latinos, however, has been inconsistent, possibly due to whites' historically lower levels of social distance with Latinos (e.g., Tolebert and Hero, 1996; Huddy and Sears, 1995; Campbell et al. 2006; Taylor, 1998). Yet, earlier research suggesting that the Latino population is either not large enough to offer a "fair test" of the racial threat hypothesis or Latinos do not present much of a threat to whites (e.g., Taylor, 1998) may be misleading due to the rise in the Latino population and, especially, anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S.

I also expect that in a racially salient and resource constrained policy environment such as public education, white voters should also respond to the general racial climate. I rely upon a vast amount of research on group contact and group threat theories making predictions of individuals' racial attitudes and prejudice. The racial climate should shape individuals' racial tolerance, framing how Latino immigrants are received within communities.

4.2 Data

To test the model of school board membership, I use data from a national set of public school districts for the year 2012 drawn from the National Latino Education Study (NLES). The NLES is a national survey of local school districts and school boards conducted every few years since 2001 by the Project for Equity, Representation and Governance at Texas A&M³. The NLES contains information on the racial and ethnic composition of school boards and characteristics of the electoral system used to elect school board members. The NLES is a considerable improvement over other sources of school board data in terms of size and geographic diversity. The NLES is also the only recent national survey of school board representation, thus it is valuable to current multiracial and multiethnic studies of group threat and group contact. These types of studies require various racial demographic contexts and sufficiently large Latino populations (see Hempel et al., 2013). Several other researchers have used the NLES as their data source, focusing also on minority representation and representative bureaucracy (e.g., Rocha, 2007; Rocha and Hawes, 2009; Rocha and Matsubayashi, 2013; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier, 2004).

There are more than 13,000 school districts across the U.S., but the NLES restricts its sample to only those school districts with at least 5,000 enrolled students, amounting to 1,643 school districts⁴. School district enrollment is correlated with a community's social profile and larger districts tend to be urban or

³ I participated in the 2012 NLES data collection as a member of the Project for Equity, Representation and Governance at Texas A&M, headed by Kenneth Meier.

⁴ Each school district has one school board.

suburban; districts with less than 5,000 students, on the other hand, tend to be rural (Hess, 2002). Restricting the size of the school districts ensures an adequate amount of racial and ethnic diversity important to studies of the social determinants of minority representation. I also use data from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey (ACS)⁵ to create variables measuring the composition of various racial and ethnic groups (e.g., % African-American population) and variables measuring the racial climate (e.g., segregation) at the school district level that I also include in my models. I test my hypotheses using OLS regression.

I next turn to discussing my sample and the reasons for further restricting it to certain types of school districts. In general, I aim to include districts in which race should be salient to voters.

4.2.1 At-large vs. Ward School Board Elections

School board members in the U.S. gain membership in three ways, including elections by ward, elections at-large and by appointment. Historically, election reformers have advocated for at-large elections as a way to make political bodies less political (Tyack, 1974). Others, however, have suggested that at-large elections hurt the prospects of minority candidates due to such limitations as minimal campaign resources and an inability to attract the support of white voters (e.g., Bezdek et al., 2000; Davidson and Korbel, 1981; Polinard et al., 1990; Leal et al., 2004). “At-large systems thus create an additional burden for minority candidates:

⁵ Since I am examining school board membership as the dependent variable which is measured in 2012, the 2008-2012 ACS offers the most recent demographic data at a low enough geographic level (e.g., the census tract) to calculate my school district level variables.

Minority candidates must secure not only their constituency's support but also engender substantial cross-over voting from nonminority voters" (Shah, 2010:87).

The voting boundaries for wards are typically drawn along racial lines (House Report No., 109-478, 2006), making these voting wards more racially homogenous and practically ensuring high levels of minority representation (Karnig and Welch, 1982; Stewart, England and Meier, 1989). In at-large elections, on the other hand, candidates do not typically have a local, homogenous electorate, but instead are forced to campaign citywide to a more diverse electorate. At-large elections also offer white voters more racially and ethnically diverse candidates to choose from in addition to making intergroup conflict and cooperation more likely. Minority candidates in at-large elections frequently confront white majority electorates (Fraga, Meier and England, 1986) and therefore are forced along with their supporters to reach out to white voters to garner sufficient electoral support.

In this analysis, I take advantage of the need for minority candidates to secure cross-over voting from white voters in at-large elections and include in my sample only school boards using these election systems. I eliminate from my sample any school board for which either Latino or African-American school board members were elected using a ward election system. Of the 1,570 school boards responding to the NLES survey, 1,220 districts use only at-large elections (78 percent). I expect that the race of school board candidates should be more salient to voters in at-large elections than in ward elections for several reasons.

4.2.2 Nonpartisan Elections

Race should also be more salient and play a role in cross-over voting in nonpartisan elections. In nonpartisan elections, race is more likely to be a voting cue for voters because in partisan elections party identification is especially likely to drive voting decisions (Arrington and Watts, 1991; Bullock, 1984; Lieske and Hillard, 1984). A considerable amount of evidence suggests that “race-based voting is facilitated by nonpartisan elections” (Rocha, 2007:319; see also Meier and Melton, 2012; Pomper, 1966; Gordon, 1970). Thus, I further restrict the sample to nonpartisan election systems. Of the 1,570 school boards responding to the NLES survey, 1,317 districts use nonpartisan elections (84 percent).

4.2.3 Membership by Election vs. Appointment

I also include in my sample only school districts that elect their school board members. A common argument in favor of elections in the U.S. system of government is that they give the public more of a voice (Iannaccone and Lutz, 1994; Resnick, 1999; Carol et al., 1986). An advantage of studying school board elections is that there is little reason to believe that school board elections are heavily influenced by party politics and political control (Danzberger 1992, 1994; Danzberger et al. 1992). As such, school district elections are fairly accurate reflections of citizens’ interests and preferences for representation. For school boards by appointment, on the other hand, there is little evidence that those who hold the responsibility for appointing school board members (e.g., mayors)

regularly or automatically share citizens' values (Danzberger 1992, 1994; Underwood 1992).

Of the 1,570 school boards responding to the NLES survey, 1,491 districts use elections rather than appointments for all of their board members (95 percent). Upon restricting my sample to election-based systems in addition to at-large and nonpartisan election systems, I am left in my sample with 1,021 school boards (65 percent of the total sample) across the U.S.

4.3 The Geographic Unit of Analysis

The choice of a relevant geographic level for the community racial context variables is an important one because, as Oliver and Wong (2003:568) state, much research has gone into determining the “typical contextual units of analysis...appropriate as either arenas of interracial competition or as predictors of intergroup contact” (see also Oliver and Mendelberg, 2000; Quillian, 1995). In order for racial attitudes to be a function of the social environment, individuals must be able to meaningfully experience the racial climate. The racial climate is composed of a set of social conditions that reveal themselves best at only certain geographic levels (Wong, 2007).

Smaller contexts, such as neighborhoods, have been the focus of much intergroup relations research because “it is such smaller community contexts in which individuals negotiate their everyday relations and which should thus be most predictive of both social experiences and intergroup perceptions” (Schmid et al., 2008:59; see also Charles, 2003; Oliver and Menderlberg, 2000; Oliver and Wong,

2003; Quillian, 1995; Shinn and Toohey, 2003). Especially large geographic units are inappropriate units of analysis for measuring the local racial climate, these scholars argue, because larger areas, such as metropolitan regions and states, are likely to overestimate the level of diversity individuals experience on a regular basis due to a higher likelihood of sorting within larger regions (Oliver and Wong, 2003). In particular, Oliver and Wong suggest that within neighborhoods, interracial contact reduces out-group prejudice. Group contact research has generally supported this positive relationship between living in more integrated local settings (e.g., neighborhoods and cities) and improved racial attitudes (e.g., Oliver and Wong, 2003; Wagner et al., 2006).

The mechanisms of group threat have also been described as “exclusively local [and] the effect should be a function of local population shares” (Hopkins:41). Branton and Jones (2005), for instance, use the county as their unit of analysis for measuring the racial climate, but they also warn that especially small geographic units such as the zip code may not accurately capture “exposure” to environmental conditions due, in part, to high levels of segregation typical at this low geographic level. These authors argue that an individual’s exposure to the racial climate and other social conditions “outside the boundaries of a neighborhood or a zip code is not only possible, but very probable. In this sense, the zip code, census tract, or neighborhood levels may understate likely exposure to environmental conditions compared to the county level” (p. 361).

Within public education, Hero and Tolbert suggest that for certain educational outcomes (e.g., minority suspension and graduation rates) racial and

ethnic diversity are most appropriately measured at units of analysis smaller than the state, such as the school district (see also Hero, 1998). Branton and Jones (2005:361) state that areas the size of counties or school districts are “preferable to larger geographical units such as metropolitan areas because it is a more refined measure of one’s racial and ethnic context.” A number of group contact and group threat scholars have measured the racial climate using units of analysis similar to the school district (e.g., Oliver and Wong, 2003; Roch and Rushton, 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010; Wessel, 2009; Lockhart et al., 1996; Schwirian et al., 1990; Barnard and Benn, 1988; Saldivar-Tanaka and Krasny, 2004; Shinet et al., 2004; Taylor, 1998; Rocha and Hawes, 2009). School district boundaries also signal access to a particularly important public good at a geographic level coterminous with “a common definition of the neighborhood and its boundaries—a person is either inside or outside” (Schelling, 1978:155); the same cannot be said for smaller census-defined neighborhoods “because people are rarely cognizant of their boundaries” (Bischoff, 2008:189) at this small level.

Given that this dissertation examines racial behavior within public education, I also select the school district as the geographical unit of analysis for measuring community racial climate.⁶ School districts are commonly coterminous with counties in a number of states (e.g., Georgia) and typically encompass multiple neighborhoods.

⁶ Neither the ACS nor the U.S. Census provide data aggregated at the level of the school district. I used mapping software (MABLE/Geocorr12) provided by the Missouri Census Data Center at the University of Missouri to map census data at the level of the census tract to school district boundaries.

4.4 Dependent Variables

Studies of passive representation typically focus on the level of minority membership in government, so I also focus in this research on levels of minority membership, including the share of Latino school board members and the share of African-American school board members. I follow Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) who also considered the role of intergroup relations in the electoral success of Latino and African-American school board candidates and I calculate representation levels using the percentage of total school board membership by racial category of school board members.

Representation studies have shown a positive relationship between this measure of minority school board representation and substantive policy benefits for minorities even though the same relationship was not demonstrated using a parity measure (e.g., Fraga et al., 1986; Marschall, 2005; Meier and Stewart, 1991; Meier, Stewart and England, 1989; Wright, Hirlinger and England, 1998; Engstrom and McDonald, 1981). Studies using a parity measure (e.g., ratio of the proportion of minority representation to the proportion of same-group minority citizens) are fewer and have revealed a weak relationship with active representation (e.g., Browning, Marshall and Tabb, 1984).

The advantage of using membership percentage over a parity measure can be seen by example (see also Rocha, 2006). The interests of African-Americans are more likely to be represented in a district in which African-Americans represent 25 percent of the school board membership and 24 percent of the population than in a district in which they represent 10 percent of the school board membership and 9

percent of the population, even though the parity measures would suggest otherwise. Thus, the level of school board membership (e.g., membership percent) is a better reflection of minority representation levels, however it is still important to control in an analysis for minority group size within the community (Engstrom and McDonald, 1981). For practical reasons, I am also more interested in passive representation as the percentage of membership by racial group because in this analysis I am more interested in membership as a reflection of intergroup relations within society than representation as a measure of representational fairness or equity. For robustness, however, I also calculate parity representation measures as the ratio of the share of school board members to citizens by racial group within a school district (e.g., % of African-American representatives / % African-American residents).

Table 1 shows school board representation statistics within school districts in my sample. African-Americans make up a slightly higher percentage of school board membership than Latinos. On average, 6.1 percent of the membership on school boards is African-American; 5.8 percent of the membership per board is Latino. School boards range in size from 4 to 20 school board members, with, on average, 6.4 members per school board. I also show representation parity measures. Across the school districts, African-Americans are underrepresented on school boards by a factor of 1.4; Latinos are underrepresented by a factor of five.

Table 1. School Board Membership Variables for African-Americans and Latinos

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total number of school board Members	6.42	1.42	4	20
African-American				
School board members	0.42	1.08	0	9
% school board members	6.11	15.23	0	100
School board member-resident parity	0.70	2.23	0	35.41
Latino				
School board members	0.35	0.99	0	7
% school board members	5.78	16.19	0	100
School board member-resident parity	0.20	0.72	0	11.63

Source: National Latino Education Study (2012)

4.5 Independent Variables

4.5.1 Racial and Ethnic Composition

I control for a number of variables that could also explain Latino and African-American membership on school boards. The most consistent estimator of minority membership in government within the literature is minority population group size (Marschall, Ruhil and Shah, 2010; see also Alonzie and Manganaro, 1993; Welch, 1990; Welch and Karning, 1978; Leal, 2004; Meier et al., 2005; Rocha, Wrinkle and Polinard, 2005; Marschall and Ruhil 2004; Fraga, Meier and England 1986; Wright, Hirlinger and England 1998). As representative bureaucracy theory argues, minorities tend to be aware that passive representation increases their chances of receiving policy benefits so they are motivated to act to increase their

level of representation within government (Meier, Stewart and England 1989, 1991; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria, 1991).

Less well understood, however, is what motivates individuals to form intergroup relations during elections and support candidates from other social groups. As mentioned previously, “rainbow coalitions” between minority groups are rare. Whites, on the other hand, have been found to be more likely to lend their political support to other racial groups. Meier and Stewart (1991), for instance, demonstrated that whites vote for and against Latino and African-American candidates depending on the relative intergroup threats posed by these groups. Rocha (2007) provides a more recent understanding of crossover voting by illuminating white voter behavior conditional on the ethnic context and, in particular, the local presence of Latino immigrants.

I follow Rocha (2007) and construct racial and ethnic composition measures based on the population sizes within school districts of three key groups of interest in this dissertation and also because they compose the major minority groups in the U.S.: Latino citizens, Latino noncitizens and African-Americans. I separate Latinos into citizens and noncitizens because emerging research suggests whites’ immigration-related attitudes are differently influenced by the presence of Latino citizen and Latino noncitizens (see also Rocha et al., 2011). As reviewed previously, Latino noncitizens should have greater social distance between themselves and whites than do Latino citizens and whites. As such, I expect Latino immigration to create more antagonism among whites, especially when Latino immigrants are in

direct competition with whites for public resources such as is commonly the case within public education.

Most research on group contact theory and group threat theory focuses on the contemporary composition of racial and ethnic groups; there is some evidence, however, that residents might pay more attention to changes in the racial and ethnic composition of communities. Hahneman and Tversky (1979), for instance, argue that people are particularly attentive to change and others have argued that “while levels of ethnic heterogeneity might escape notice, changes are less likely to do so. Two communities that have equal numbers of immigrants today might still differ, depending on how recently those immigrants arrived” (Hopkins 2010:42; see also Bergesen and Herman, 1998; Green, Strolovitch and Wong, 1998). The evidence on how local residents respond to the recent arrival of an out-group is fairly consistent and portends additional anxiety natives should feel about the recent in-migration of socially and culturally different groups (e.g., Hopkins 2010; Horton 1995; Kruse 2005; Lassiter 2006). New residents face additional difficulties assimilating due to the extended amount of time necessary for groups to establish contact and networks with one another (Pettigrew, 1998).

Further, a challenge when studying the relationship between social environment and attitudes is self-selection into certain areas (Hopkins, 2010; Stein, Post, and Rinden, 2000). Hopkins (2010) argues that studies of the influence of racial group sizes on attitudes are less susceptible to selection bias when the population changes than when contemporary levels are considered. It is important to note, however, the considerable amount of research mentioned previously which

suggests that, especially related to segregation and group contact, self-selection is a minimal concern (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000; Sherif, 1966; Herek and Capitanio, 1996; Pettigrew, 1997; Powers and Ellison, 1995). Thus, I also consider an alternative measure of the population composition, and that is the change in the racial group sizes between 2000 and 2010.

4.5.2 Racial Climate: Group Contact and Group Threat

In this analysis, I am not only interested in whether the composition of Latino natives, Latino immigrants and African-Americans influences the representation of Latinos and African-Americans on school boards as was the case in past studies, but I am also interested in advancing our knowledge of intergroup coalitions based on the development of attitudes toward these groups. In order to do so, I follow other research suggesting that minority descriptive representation is conditional, for instance, on patterns of racial segregation (e.g., Vedlitz and Johnson, 1982). I expect that such aspects of the community should help to characterize the racial climate, a knowledge of which should be helpful in predicting individuals' tolerance of Latino immigration. Pettigrew (2009) also used the racial climate in one social setting to help predict racial attitudes in another social setting.

I measure the racial climate within communities in two ways. First, I use a measure of residential racial segregation based on group contact theory to help capture the extent to which minorities and non-minorities connect socially. I calculate segregation using the index of dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan, 1955;

White, 1983) as follows:

$$S_i = \frac{1}{2} \times \sum_k |X_k - Y_k|$$

where S_i is the level of segregation in school district i , X_k is the proportion of school district i 's non-whites living in census tract k , Y_k is the proportion of school district i 's whites living in census tract k , and N is the number of census tracts. S_i is interpreted as the proportion of a school district's white population that would need to move to a different tract within the school district to reduce segregation to zero.

Segregation is calculated at the census tract level using the dissimilarity index, which measures the balance of two groups—whites and nonwhites—across the census tracts within a school district. The segregation index's minimum value is 0 and the maximum value is .71; the mean segregation index value for the school districts is .27 (standard deviation = .11).

In districts in which whites are in the majority ($N=943$), the segregation index's minimum value is 0 and the maximum value is .71; the mean segregation index value for these districts is .26 (standard deviation = .10); in districts in which whites are in the minority ($N=78$), the segregation index's minimum value is .07 and the maximum value is .71; the mean segregation index value for these districts is .34 (standard deviation = .12).

Second, I use a measure of generational competition to capture the extent to which minorities and non-minorities experience generational competition for public resources. Past research suggests that generational competition, particularly between racial groups, occurs due to two aspects of intergroup threat, including

interracial threat to individuals' values (Sears and Kinder 1985) and generational competition across races (Poterba 1997, 1998). I follow Poterba and measure racial and generational heterogeneity as the nonwhite percentage of school age population (age 5 to 17) minus the nonwhite percentage of elderly population (age 65 and above). The generational competition index's minimum value is -.56 and the maximum value is .58; the mean generational competition index value for the school districts is .22 (standard deviation = .12). In districts in which whites are in the majority (N=943), the generational competition index's minimum value is -.56 and the maximum value is .58; the mean segregation index value for these districts is .21 (standard deviation = .12); in districts in which whites are in the minority (N=78), the generational competition index's minimum value is .00 and the maximum value is .58; the mean segregation index value for these districts is .29 (standard deviation = .15).

I also consider whether these aspects of the racial climate depend on if whites are the majority. Past research on group threat suggests that larger populations of certain out-groups (e.g., African-Americans) present a greater threat to an in-group. Research also suggests that "perceived threat is particularly salient for majority group members" (King and Wheelock, 2007:1261; see also Blalock, 1967; Tolnay, Deane and Beck, 1996). Rocha (2007), for instance, found that whites are most likely to perceive Latino immigrants as a political threat when whites are the majority. Thus, I expect the beneficial effects of intergroup contact and the harmful effects of generational competition on the racial and ethnic tolerance of whites should be greater when whites are in the majority.

4.5.3 Control Variables

I include in my analysis several other variables linked to minority membership in elected office in past research. First, research has found that one's socioeconomic status and personal resources influence political participation and the likelihood of voting (e.g., Verba et al., 1993; Verba and Nie, 1972; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1979; Meier, 1993; Alex-Assensoh, 1997). In addition, the resources of one's social group affect the ability of that group to limit the representation of other groups (Stewart, England and Meier, 1989). Thus, I control for the education level and the economic status of my racial and ethnic groups (whites, Latinos and African-Americans). I calculate education level as the percentage of each group with a college degree and I calculate economic status as the percentage of each group living in poverty. Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) use similar controls in their studies of the determinants of minority school board membership. Second, there is an additional characteristic of school boards that I expect should influence minority school board membership, and that is the number of school board member positions on a given school board.⁷ Past research suggests the importance of legislative body size for minority representation (e.g., Karnig and Welch, 1980; Trounstine and Valdini, 2008). Marschall and colleagues (2010) argue that in at-large systems in particular more district seats imply a lower plurality threshold needed to win a seat. In other words,

⁷ There are several studies which suggest that school board size is influential to minority membership, but the initial motivation for this control variable comes from feedback during a presentation of this work at The Midwest Political Science Association, 2013.

“legislative size should be positively related to the probability of overcoming the representational hurdle” (Marschall et al., 2010:112). Shah (2010) also found that legislative body size matters, but in the opposite direction. Given the weight of past research, however, I expect that minority candidates should find it easier to obtain membership on school boards with sizeable numbers of seats.

Third, I control for the size of each school district. The National Latino Education Study serves as the basis for my sample in this dissertation, which already restricts the sample to large, urban school districts. I expect, however, that there may be some variation in racial attitudes across increasingly large districts because of a variety of research showing certain racial and ethnic differences that may influence racial attitudes. On the one hand, residents in larger cities may be less tolerant of additional racial and ethnic diversity because larger cities simply already experience more urban problems, such as overcrowding, violence and traffic (Traebert et al., 2006) that may increase intergroup tensions. On the other hand, poor whites in particular are more likely to be spatially dispersed in larger cities (Amato and Zuo, 1992), possibly exposing this more vulnerable group to the group contact beneficial effects of close proximity to members of other racial and ethnic groups. It is also fairly well established within the literature that people who live in more urban areas tend to be more liberal on a number of issues and identify as more politically democratic (e.g., Holbert et al., 2003; Dyck and Hagley, 2012).

Finally, I control for geographic location (e.g., North, South, West and Midwest)⁸. In addition to the degree of historical African American underrepresentation in the South (Engstrom and McDonald, 1982), interracial and interethnic relations have been shown to vary across geographic locations (Rodriguez, 1999). Thus, it is likely that whites' relations with other groups and their propensity to engage in coalition behavior also varies by region. Latino immigration has also only recently become concentrated in the Southeast and in non-established gateways (Singer, 2004; Suro and Singer, 2002), meaning that states like Alabama, Georgia and North Carolina have experienced sizeable and fast Latino immigration yet have little experience with this population (Kochar, Suro and Tafoya, 2005). Rapid rises in a group's presence have been shown by others to have dramatic effects on attitudes toward that group. Hopkins (2010), for instance, found that in areas with fast-growing immigrant populations, residents had stronger preferences for anti-immigrant policies. It is also likely that newly arrived Latinos in non-traditional destinations have fewer social and political resources, so their appeal as a potential political coalition partner to whites should be less in these areas. Therefore, I expect that anti-immigration backlash is greater in non-traditional destinations for Latino immigrants, such as would be common in the South.

⁸ Even though some research also suggests that Latino immigrants may find assimilation easier in urban areas that are historically more tolerant of diversity than rural areas (e.g., St. Jean and Parker 1995; Herring and Amisshah 1997; Shah 2010), I already control for a school district's urban status by restricting the sample to districts with at least 5,000 students.

4.5.4 Summary Statistics of School Districts

In Table 2, I next present summary statistics for the socio-demographic characteristics of the school districts included in both the full NLES sample and the restricted sample including just nonpartisan and at-large elections. There does not appear to be any major difference between the two samples; however, a few distinctions are worth mentioning. The largest percentage point change on the two racial climate variables involves the segregation index in the South, which drops .05 units as we move from the full to the restricted sample. As for the racial group variables, most have less than a percentage point difference, except in the South again, for which there is about an eight percentage point difference in African-American group size. Ward elections have been used to improve minority representation, especially for African-Americans (Welch 1990), and a higher correlation in the South between African-American population size and the use of ward elections is likely due simply to the larger number of historically underrepresented citizens there. Importantly, there are minimal differences between the full and restricted samples in the Latino citizen and Latino noncitizen population percentages in each of the regions.

Turning now to the restricted sample, the largest concentration of school districts is in the West; the values on the racial climate variables, however, are fairly constant across the regions. We see that the difference between the region with the highest level of segregation in districts on average is the Midwest, with an average segregation index value of .28. Yet, the West, with the lowest amount of segregation in districts, scores only 0.03 segregation units lower. There is a bit more disparity in

the generational competition index across regions, with West scoring the highest at .27 and Midwest scoring the lowest at .18.

It is important to the analyses in this dissertation that there be multiracial and multiethnic diversity within the sampled school districts in order to test the role of Latino immigration in influencing white coalitional behavior. In recent years, immigrants have increasingly migrated away from traditional “gateway” major metropolitan destinations and toward second-tier metropolitan areas such as Atlanta and Las Vegas, dispersing immigrant settlement patterns across the country (Baird et al. 2008). Further, the National Latino Education Study is restricted to large, urban school districts, increasing the likelihood of demographically diverse populations. We see in Table 2 that Latinos are heavily concentrated in the West, but they do have a relatively sizeable presence in the South and Northeast as well. In addition, we see in Figure 1 that between 2000 and 2010 Latinos were migrating away from traditional gateway destinations in the West toward new destinations in the eastern half of the country, and especially within the Southeast.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of School District by Region

	Full NLES Sample				Restricted NLES Sample: Nonpartisan and At-large Elections			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
South								
Segregation index	.32	.12	0	.69	.27	.10	0	.59
Generational competition index	.22	.12	-.04	.53	.20	.13	-.04	.53
% White residents	63.93	21.87	1.3	98.6	69.34	23.43	1.28	98.2
% African-American residents	17.51	15.77	0	78.11	9.94	10.75	0	68.4
% Latino citizen residents	10.59	16.47	0	81.52	11.99	17.94	.37	81.2
% Latino noncitizen residents	3.65	4.56	0	26.14	3.99	4.89	0	24.2
# of school districts		512				245		
Northeast								
Segregation index	.28	.13	0	.71	.27	.13	0	.71
Generational competition index	.21	.14	-.06	.59	.19	.12	-.00	.55
% White residents	69.16	23.35	2.20	99.65	71.64	21.60	2.20	99.
% African-American residents	9.99	12.77	0	55.89	8.28	10.99	0	86.
% Latino citizen residents	10.04	10.53	0	55.89	8.56	8.50	0	44.
% Latino noncitizen residents	3.25	5.86	0	39.82	3.06	5.77	0	39.
# of school districts		252				139		
Midwest								
Segregation index	.29	.12	0	.71	.28	.11	0	.71
Generational competition index	.19	.11	.01	.56	.18	.11	.01	.56
% White residents	77.94	16.82	6.61	97.88	80.58	14.09	14.81	97.
% African-American residents	9.62	13.01	.05	88.16	7.52	9.87	.05	64.
% Latino citizen residents	5.21	6.29	.73	56.89	4.83	5.92	.73	56.
% Latino noncitizen residents	1.75	3.09	0	25.51	1.55	2.96	0	25.
# of school districts		360				300		
West								
Segregation index	.27	.11	0	.75	.25	.10	0	.59
Generational competition index	.29	.12	-.56	.58	.27	.11	-.56	.58
% White residents	53.86	23.65	2.82	93.10	57.22	23.23	2.82	93.
% African-American residents	3.51	3.91	0	27.20	3.31	3.66	.02	26.
% Latino citizen residents	22.94	15.47	2.37	75.25	20.30	14.49	2.37	75.
% Latino noncitizen residents	7.09	6.23	0	34.50	6.13	5.76	0	31
# of school districts		445				337		

Source: 2008-2012 American Community Survey




Figure 1. Percentage Change in Latino Population (2000 to 2010)
 Source: 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census (includes national population statistics)

4.6 The Model

The base model I use for these variables is specified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{SchoolBoardPassiveRepresentation} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{LatinoCitizen} + \beta_2 \text{LatinoNonCitizen} + \\
 & \beta_6 \text{DistrictCharacteristics} + \mu \\
 & \beta_3 \text{AfricanAmerican} + \beta_4 \text{RacialContext} + \beta_5 \text{SchoolBoardCharacteristics} +
 \end{aligned}$$

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Formula</u>
% School board membership	% of Latino or African-American membership on the school board
Latino citizen	% of Latino citizens in the school district
Latino noncitizen	% of Latino noncitizens in the school district
African American	% of African-Americans in the school district
Racial context	Segregation, Generational competition, Minority-majority school district
School board characteristic	Number of school board members
School district characteristics	White poverty %, Latino poverty %, African-American poverty %, White college %, Latino college %, African-American college %, Population size, Region (Midwest, West, Northeast, South)

I then run two models allowing me to test the conditional nature of the effects of the size of the Latino noncitizen population on Latino and African-American school board membership. I interact the % Latino noncitizen variable with the racial climate variables (segregation and generational competition) and separately include these interaction terms in the models.

I use several robustness checks in my last sets of models. First, I use the representation parity measures for Latinos and African-Americans as the dependent variables. Second, I examine the local racial and ethnic composition changes over time as possible determinants of school board membership. Third, I consider whether passive representation is differently conditional on the size of Latino native populations than non-native populations. Fourth, I consider whether the role of the racial climate variables depends on whether whites are the majority.

4.7 Results

4.7.1 Primary Models: Passive representation conditional on Latino Noncitizen Group Size and the Racial Climate

I begin with Table 3 by testing my primary hypotheses that Latino passive representation suffers and African-American passive representation benefits in areas with more Latino noncitizens, presumably due, in part, to the behavior of white voters. I then test whether the possible Latino immigration-passive representation links are conditional on the racial climate (e.g., group contact and group threat). I present the results separately in each table for Latino school board membership and African-American school board membership; where possible, however, I discuss the results for Latino and African-American representation together.

First, I consider the possibility that sizeable Latino noncitizen groups, despite not having voting rights themselves, influence Latino or African-American representation. I find that the percentage of Latino noncitizens in a school district do not appear to matter for either African-American (model 1) or Latino school

board membership (model 4). The lack of a relationship with Latino passive representation makes sense, of course, due to Latino noncitizens not having voting rights. The lack of a relationship with African-American passive representation, however, is an important difference with the central finding by Rocha (2007). As mentioned previously, Rocha found that sizeable Latino immigrant groups increased African-American membership on school boards, presumably due to the greater support whites showed African-American school board candidates. A distinction between my analysis and the one of Rocha, however, is that Rocha used school board representation data from an earlier version of the NLES conducted in 2001. It is possible that attitudes toward Latino immigration in the U.S. had changed by 2012, at least in certain areas. It appears so far that, to the extent that white voters form intergroup coalitions with a countervailing group such as African-Americans, whites are not reacting negatively to Latino immigration.

As expected, I see significant relationships between co-ethnic voting blocs and passive representation. There is a significant ($p=.01$) and positive relationship between the percentage of African-Americans within a school district and the percentage of school board seats which are filled by African-Americans. The same goes for the relationship between the percentage of Latino citizens and the percentage of seats filled by Latinos. This makes sense, given the expectation that citizen voters have a stake in filling government with public officials from their own social group (see Meier et al., 2004).

Staying with models 1 and 4, I next consider the two racial climate variables by themselves (e.g., prior to their interaction with Latino immigrant group size), and

I see some noteworthy findings. It appears that African-American representation benefits in more segregated districts ($p=.01$) and is hurt in districts with higher levels of generational competition ($p=.01$). The boost that segregation gives to African-American representation seems to contradict the claim by Massey and Denton (1989) that segregation leads to a withdrawal from social and economic life, but supports past evidence on voter behavior suggesting that segregation “promotes a sense of group solidarity and facilitates the growth of indigenous political organizations, which, in turn, may lead to greater political participation” (Schlichting, Tuckel and Maisel, 1998:966). It appears, in other words, that African-American voters are mobilizing more effectively in more segregated districts. The negative effect of the group threat variable, generational competition, supports the general expectation of research on group threat. That is, the dominant group, typically whites, should act to protect its interests by strengthening in-group biases and mobilizing politically against other groups (Giles and Hertz, 1994; Giles and Buckner, 1993; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999).

When I turn in model 4 to examining Latino school board membership, I see that Latino representation does not appear to be helped by more segregated districts as is the case for African-Americans. It is possible that the relative lack of historical residential segregation of Latinos compared to African-Americans has made group resources (e.g., solidarity) and electoral structures (ward v. at-large) less crucial to their electoral success (Taebel, 1978; Karnig and Welch, 1979, Veditz and Johnson, 1982). In addition, the effect of generational competition ($p=.01$) is twice as large as in the case of African-American representation and remains

negative, which makes sense considering that within public education, Latinos likely represent a greater consumer of education resources and threat than do other groups. Crawford (2006:1) emphasizes the point when he states that “English Only policy has always been about fear.”

Among the group socioeconomic status variables, only the percentage of whites living in poverty appears to significantly affect African-American representation, and in the expected direction (positive). Verba and Nie (1972) are among a large number of scholars who have used socioeconomic resources to explain political participation, arguing, in part, that socioeconomic resources shape psychological orientations and behaviors (e.g., organizing, campaigning and contacting) conducive to voting (see also Leighley, 1995). In general, more whites who live in poverty may present less resistance to the political ambitions of other racial and ethnic groups. Regarding Latinos, greater African-American percentage in poverty ($p=.05$) and a larger percentage of educated whites ($p=.1$), on the other hand, appear to boost Latino passive representation. It is possible that poorer African-American communities have less political resources to counter more representation of other groups directly or indirectly by offering themselves as a potential coalition partner to whites. As expected, in areas of greater education among whites and presumably racial tolerance, I see a greater likelihood of minority representation among Latinos, which was not the case for African-American representation.

Interestingly, Latino representation appears to decline in majority white districts ($p=.01$). While not the case for African-Americans, whites may be

threatened by more political representation of Latinos when whites are the majority, as expected by much group threat research. This finding also appears to support the common expectation that one of the best remedies for the underrepresentation of minorities in politics is majority-minority voting districts (see Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran, 1996).

Regarding the remaining control variables, I also note that African-Americans gain representation in larger districts, which is generally supported by findings showing higher representation levels for minorities in more urban areas, possibly due to greater levels of racial conservatism among whites in more rural areas (Glaeser, 1994). Finally, African-American representation appears to benefit in all three regions outside of the South. The South, with its historical, institutional, and electoral forms of racism, is commonly a region in which African-Americans representation has differed from other regions in the country (Engstrom and McDonald, 1982; Grofman and Handley, 1989). Finally, I do not see a South/non-South distinction in Latino representation as was the case for African-American representation, possibly due to the historical racism African-Americans have experienced in the South.

I next turn to the primary focus of this analysis and examine the conditioning role of racial climate on minority representation levels. Since Latino immigration so far in the analysis does not appear to influence either Latino or African-American representation, it is possible that the role of Latino immigration has instead become more nuanced in recent years since the study by Rocha (2007). In model 2, I see that upon interacting the percentage of Latino noncitizens within a district with the level

of segregation within the district, Latino noncitizen group size is significant ($p=.01$) and positively associated with African-American representation. Latino noncitizens may in fact threaten whites as was shown by Rocha (2007), but now that threat appears to only be salient in areas with higher levels of segregation between whites and other groups. For example, in a district in which 25 percent of the population would need to transfer census tracts to reduce the level of segregation to zero (segregation = 0.25), a one percentage point rise in Latino noncitizen group share within a district actually decreases African-American share on a school board by .05 percentage points. In a district with twice the segregation (segregation = 0.5), on the other hand, a one percentage point rise in Latino noncitizen group share increases African-American share on a school board by .47 percentage points.⁹ In the model for generational competition (model 3), I see that the Latino noncitizen group size variable interacted with the generational competition variable is not significant, suggesting that whites are indifferent to Latino immigration relative to African-American passive representation even in areas of higher generational competition.

Turning to Latino passive representation in models 5 and 6, I also see evidence that Latino noncitizens may decrease Latino representation in more segregated districts ($p=.01$). This is an important new finding because in the early 2000s, whites were only actively supporting African-American representation and not suppressing Latino representation in response to Latino immigration (Rocha, 2007). In light of increasing anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S., whites appear to be responding increasingly negatively to Latino immigration, but only so in areas in

⁹ There are 28 school districts in the sample with segregation above a level of 0.5, so this value represents highly segregated districts.

which I expect the community to be characterized by low racial tolerance. Contrary to what was the case for African-American passive representation, there does appear to be a significant role ($p=.01$) for Latino representation within areas of varying generational competition. In fact, a one percentage point rise in the size of Latino noncitizens in a low generational conflict district (generational conflict = .25) appears to actually increase Latino school board membership by .40 percentage points. It is possible that, even though Latino noncitizens do not have the right to vote and should not directly influence Latino board membership, Latino citizens may recognize the potential disadvantage within schools Latino noncitizens may face in these areas and rally behind them. Group consciousness, Stokes (2003) argues, leads members of a deprived group to become more politically active (see also Miller et al., 1981; Verba and Nie, 1972). Others have also found that despite economic and social differences among members of a group, individual self-interest is best served by group benefits (Kaufmann, 2000; Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Wohl and colleagues (2010), for instance, found that salient threats to a group promote “concern about the in-group’s future vitality” and, consequently, in-group bias. In a high generational conflict district (generational conflict = .50), on the other hand, the same rise in the Latino noncitizen population has the expected effect and appears to decrease Latino school board membership by .40 percentage points. Thus, not only does the impact of Latino immigration on passive representation differ across different group contact settings, but its impact also differs based on group threat aspects of the racial climate.

Table 3. Coefficients for OLS Regression: The Effects of Group Sizes on Board %

	African-American Membership %			Latino Membership %		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
School District Residents						
African-American %	1.1*** (0.047)	1.1*** (0.047)	1.1*** (0.049)	0.0 (0.043)	-0.0 (0.043)	-0.1* (0.044)
Latino citizen %	0.0 (0.050)	0.0 (0.050)	0.0 (0.055)	0.8*** (0.046)	0.8*** (0.046)	0.7*** (0.050)
Latino noncitizen %	0.2 (0.124)	-0.5** (0.225)	0.2 (0.217)	0.1 (0.115)	0.6*** (0.207)	1.2*** (0.195)
Latino noncitizen % x Segregation		1.8*** (0.545)			-1.6*** (0.502)	
Latino noncitizen % x Generational competition			-0.1 (0.517)			-3.2*** (0.465)
Racial Climate						
Segregation	14.8*** (3.878)	5.7 (4.715)	14.9*** (3.883)	-0.4 (3.575)	7.4* (4.350)	0.6 (3.497)
Generational competition	-13.7*** (3.957)	-12.9*** (3.944)	-12.8** (5.178)	-26.7*** (3.648)	-27.4*** (3.638)	-5.9 (4.662)
Majority-white district	-0.7 (2.183)	-0.2 (2.177)	-0.7 (2.203)	-9.4*** (2.012)	-9.8*** (2.008)	-11.2*** (1.984)
Group SES						
Latino % college	-0.0 (0.047)	-0.0 (0.046)	-0.0 (0.047)	0.0 (0.043)	0.0 (0.043)	0.1** (0.042)
African-American % college	0.0 (0.032)	0.0 (0.032)	0.0 (0.032)	-0.0 (0.029)	-0.0 (0.029)	-0.0 (0.029)
White % college	0.0 (0.042)	0.0 (0.042)	0.0 (0.043)	0.1* (0.039)	0.1* (0.039)	0.0 (0.038)
Latino % poverty	-0.0 (0.044)	-0.0 (0.044)	-0.0 (0.044)	0.0 (0.041)	0.0 (0.041)	-0.0 (0.040)
African-American % poverty	0.0 (0.027)	0.0 (0.027)	0.0 (0.027)	0.1** (0.025)	0.0** (0.025)	0.0* (0.025)
White % poverty	0.3*** (0.100)	0.3*** (0.100)	0.3*** (0.101)	0.1 (0.092)	0.1 (0.092)	0.2* (0.091)
# of school board members	0.2 (0.289)	0.2 (0.288)	0.2 (0.289)	0.0 (0.267)	-0.0 (0.266)	-0.0 (0.261)
School district population size	0.0** (0.000)	0.0** (0.000)	0.0* (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)
Region						
Midwest	4.3*** (1.001)	4.3*** (0.996)	4.3*** (1.002)	1.2 (0.922)	1.2 (0.918)	1.5* (0.902)
West	5.2*** (1.093)	5.2*** (1.087)	5.2*** (1.095)	0.4 (1.007)	0.5 (1.003)	0.1 (0.986)
Northeast	6.5*** (1.314)	6.1*** (1.310)	6.5*** (1.314)	-0.3 (1.211)	-0.1 (1.209)	-0.3 (1.183)
Constant	-13.1*** (3.616)	-11.6*** (3.622)	-13.1*** (3.617)	4.6 (3.333)	3.4 (3.342)	4.7 (3.257)
Observations	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018
R-squared	0.518	0.523	0.518	0.637	0.641	0.654

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

4.7.2 Alternative Models

I next turn to an examination of several alternative models. I briefly discuss the results here, but I include the tables for these models in Appendix A

4.7.2.1 Parity Measure of Passive Representation

First, I use a parity measure of passive representation (ratio of the percentage of either Latino or African-American school board membership to their percentage of residents within the district). I see less supportive evidence of my hypotheses using the parity representation measure than was found using the absolute percentage of school board membership. This finding should not be too surprising considering much past research focusing on school board passive representation has used percentages rather than parity measures. I do, however, find using the parity measure some weak evidence that Latino immigration reduces Latino passive representation in districts with higher levels of segregation ($p=.1$) and also with higher levels of generational competition ($p=.05$). The racial climate interaction terms for African-American representation are insignificant.

4.7.2.2 Group Size Change Variables

I also see less evidence for my hypotheses using the population change variables. None of the racial climate interaction terms are significant. It also appears as though now there are several important differences in Latino representation by region, possibly due to the association between recent changes in Latino settlement patterns. Latino growth in the South is distinctive due to its size and other

characteristics, such as its quick pace despite relatively low absolute numbers (Kochhar, Suro and Tafoya, 2005). Kochhar and colleagues also suggests that the South differs from other regions due to the relatively robust growth in jobs (e.g., manufacturing and construction) that has been available to Latinos. Thus, switching to the population change variables may show significant differences in Latino representation attributable to the various regions due, in part, to the unique local circumstances surrounding the reasons for racial and ethnic group in-migration and out-migration.

4.7.2.3 Considering the Influence of Latino Citizens Rather than Latino Non-Citizens

Next, I consider whether minority representation levels are conditional on the presence of Latino citizens rather than Latino noncitizens within communities. It appears now that the Latino citizen group size does not appear to boost African-American representation in more segregated districts as was the case with Latino noncitizens. I do see that Latino citizens, similarly to was the case for Latino noncitizens, decrease Latino representation in more segregated districts and in districts with higher generational competition. It is difficult to explain why larger Latino citizen populations decrease Latino passive representation, especially considering Latino citizens have the right to vote while Latino citizens do not, except by considering the influence of other groups, possibly including whites. One possible explanation is the general power thesis hypothesis put forward by Giles and Evans (1985, 1986), Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) relied upon in this dissertation, and that is whites are recently turning not only against Latino

noncitizens in the struggle for political power within school districts, but also against Latino citizens, possibly by associating both groups with greater social distance and threat.

4.7.2.4 Whether Whites are the Majority Within the District

Finally, I next consider whether the role of racial climate depends on whether whites are the majority. In majority white districts, Latino noncitizen group size appears to increase African-American passive representation, especially in more segregated districts; in minority white districts, on the other hand, there is an opposite relationship—Latino noncitizen group size appears to decrease African-American passive representation in more segregated districts. The statistically weak ($p=.1$) but nonetheless opposite relationship in minority white districts can possibly be explained by the fact that they are less influential in determining the electoral prospects of various other groups when whites have fewer potential voters. This expectation is also supported by the fact that Latino immigration does not appear to boost African-American representation in districts with more generational competition when whites are in the minority. Also when whites are in the majority it appears, unexpectedly, that Latino immigration decreases African-American representation in districts with more generational competition ($p=.1$). While of weak statistical significance, it appears that when whites are the majority and they live in a resource threatened environment (e.g., relatively large youthful minority populations), they may be reacting against all racial and ethnic groups, and not just Latinos.

I do not see any significant interaction effects regarding Latino passive representation. There is a relatively high correlation between Latino noncitizen group size and the likelihood of a district being majority white (-.6), so it is possible that considering the models separately by majority white status hides the significant effect of Latino noncitizen group size. The somewhat curious findings involving whether whites are the majority group or not deserves additional research based on past findings suggesting that the level of group threat posed by an out-group to the in-group depends on whether the in-group is in the majority or not (Solzenberg et al., 2004). If whites are in fact influencing the electoral prospects of other groups, then African-Americans may be perceived as less of a political ally and countervailing group to Latino influence when whites are not the majority group.

4.8 Conclusion

Immigration remains a highly contested issue in the U.S., and much of the debate focuses on the “Latino threat narrative” (Chavez, 2008). Some have even argued that the Latino population “threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages” (Huntington, 2004:30). Within public education, Poterba (1995, 1996) reminds us that concerns over Latino immigration may be even more salient and acute when Latinos threaten the availability and quality of scarce resources, such as within public education. There is evidence of growing anti-immigration attitudes with Latino undercurrents focusing on English-only legislation and other ballot initiatives proposing to limit bilingual instruction (Crawford, 2006).

The current analyses help to clarify the role of Latino immigration in intergroup relations during school board elections, especially considering possibly different attitudes toward Latino immigration in different areas across the U.S. This research contributes to the growing body of evidence suggesting that the socially dominant group responds to social, cultural, economic, and political threats by seeking to suppress the threatening group's political power (Giles and Evans 1985, 1986). This research also draws from group threat and group contact theories to help form expectations of the conditions under which whites as the typically dominant group are most likely to respond negatively to Latino immigration. Based on past research, I expect that whites should turn to African-Americans as a countervailing political influence to Latino immigrant political influence.

Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) argue that whites respond to aspects of their racial environment when making voting decisions during school board elections. In this dissertation, I have begun to expand on their framework by incorporating the possible moderating influence of the broader racial climate characterized by group contact and group threat. Pettigrew (2009) similarly argues that individuals carry over their racial attitudes and prejudice developed in one setting (e.g., group contact) into a different social setting. I find support in this analysis for Pettigrew's "secondary transfer effect" expectation, particularly as it relates to how whites respond to Latino immigration in areas of varying racial tolerance. Overall, it appears that the strength of the relationship between Latino immigration and the membership of Latinos and African-Americans on school boards is conditional on the community racial climate. One possible explanation of

the boost African-Americans receive to their membership on school boards, especially in less racially tolerant areas, is that white voters seek a countervailing political ally in response to the Latino immigrant threat.

This type of analysis is becoming increasingly important in the U.S. as whites move toward no longer being the racial majority group. If whites are in fact strategically allying themselves with African-Americans in response to Latino immigration, then we may expect to continue seeing the formation of political coalitions between whites and African-Americans in other social and political arenas as well. This is a topic in need of further research.

Yet, the intergroup relations reviewed here may not generalize to the entire U.S., as has been suggested by the significant moderating influence of the racial climate variables. In particular, I find evidence suggesting that white residents of segregated school districts, where I expect lower levels of intergroup contact and consequently lower levels of racial tolerance, are more likely to respond negatively to Latino immigration. I also find that white residents of districts with high levels of generational competition, where I expect higher levels of intergroup conflict and consequently lower levels of racial tolerance, are more likely to respond negatively to Latino immigration. Thus, in more segregated school districts and in districts with more generational competition, Latino immigration seems especially likely to raise African-American passive representation and lower Latino passive representation. Overall, this analysis builds on past representative bureaucracy research by demonstrating the importance of considering various aspects of the community racial climate in determining public support for passive representation.

Chapter 5

Do White School Board Members Discriminate in their Responses to Parents, and if so, Why? Evidence from an E-mail Audit Field Experiment in U.S. School Districts

5.1 Overview

In this chapter, I examine the effect of Latino immigration on the responsiveness of white school board members to Latino and African-American parents and the conditions leading Latino immigrants to provoke opposition among these board members. Emerging research shows that individuals respond differently to others of varying race based on the racial composition of the community, especially in neighborhoods approaching a racial “tipping point” (Hanson and Hawley, 2011). Research also shows that non-minority public officials can vary in their support for active representation due, generally, to the salience of race to these officials’ perceptions of public policy (Sowa and Selden, 2003; Hinderer and Young, 1998; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Lim, 2006); little is known, however, about the social conditions under which they are most likely to do so and for which target groups. Latino immigration may threaten whites, increasing the social distance between whites and Latinos and thus moving whites closer to African-Americans. The findings in the previous chapter suggest that Latino immigration weakens white public support for Latino passive representation (e.g., minority school board membership), especially in districts with negative racial climates. In this chapter, I examine whether Latino immigrants are similarly

stigmatized in low racial tolerance communities, influencing the responsiveness of white school board members to Latino and African-American citizens.

I draw from two intergroup relations theories—group contact and group threat—and expect that Latino immigrants within communities with more racial tension should be more quickly labeled as threatening by white school board members. I conduct a randomized field experiment and e-mail audit design on a national sample of large urban school boards to gather data on the partiality (e.g., responsiveness) of white school board members to white (control group), Latino and African-American parents.¹⁰ I use OLS regression and content analysis of e-mails to test whether the racial climate moderates the influence of Latino immigration on school board member responsiveness. In addition, I focus on bias in a non-policy form of responsiveness (e.g., constituent services and communications with citizens) that should be helpful in subsequent analyses examining bias in active representation and public policies (see also Mendez and Grose, 2014).

5.2 Applying the Same Theoretical Framework as in Chapter 4 to School Board Member Responsiveness

Are white school board members more responsive to Latino or African-American parents? If so, is the difference in responsiveness explained by Latino immigration or the community's racial climate or a combination thereof? These questions are important because, according to representative bureaucracy research, differences in substantive policy benefits and costs between groups are the result of

¹⁰ I obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from Georgia State University for this experiment

representatives' personal biases (Lim, 2006). Mendez and Grose (2014), for instance, argue that the intention to discriminate in policy design or "discriminatory intent" can help explain certain public policies that negatively affect minorities, such as voter identification laws.

The present analysis attempts to identify and explain the possible existence of discriminatory intent among white school board members. I use the same social-demographic conditions as in the previous chapter's examination of voter behavior to help understand school board members' responsiveness to parents. The same intergroup-relations framework and expectations of the role of racial climate in the formation of racial attitudes should apply to school board members as well since they are members of the same communities as voters during school board elections.

I test for differences in the responses by white school board members to e-mail inquiries from Latino and African-American parents. I focus on white board members because much intergroup relations research, as discussed previously, has focused on white-Latino and white-African-American relations. In addition, whites more than other groups (e.g., African-Americans) have been shown to associate anti-immigrant attitudes with Latinos (Ha, 2010). I add to this chapter an examination of behavior toward whites as an experimental control group (in addition to their behavior toward Latinos and African-Americans as was the case in the previous chapter) and construct an audit design using e-mails from parents with purportedly white, Latino and African-American names.

Experimental audits are an improvement upon research designs that statistically measure racial discrimination by treating it as a residual after

controlling for other race-related influences on behavioral outcomes (Quillian, 2006). In experimental audits, on the other hand, auditors (e.g., the fictional parents in my study) intentionally differ according to only one characteristic (e.g., race) to help isolate possible racial discrimination among the audit subjects (e.g., school board members). In addition, audit subjects are typically not made aware of the presence of a study, especially considering racial bias tends to be subtle and is easily concealed. As such, I compose e-mails using a subject that is familiar to school board members and is also likely to prompt communication from parents. In particular, I use e-mails inquiring about moving to the district and asking about the status of the district's school boundaries. The topic of school boundaries and rezoning is a salient and contentious one among parents (Barron, 2008), leading school board members to anticipate input from their constituents on this topic.

A major advantage and methodological contribution of the analysis in this chapter is that I directly measure the behavior of school board members, which is presumably related to only the race and ethnicity of the contacting parent. In doing so, I avoid committing a possible "ecological fallacy" of making inferences from group-level data as has been the case in much representative bureaucracy research (see Bradbury and Kellough, 2011)—a possible critique of my analysis in the previous chapter which makes inferences from aggregate election results. Related specifically to the transition from passive representation to active representation, correlations between passive representation and substantive policy benefits, according to the fallacy perspective, are insufficient for demonstrating actual advocacy on the part of public officials. In the current analysis, I measure what I

believe to be the psychological predisposition (e.g., discriminatory intent) of school board members that should in turn make active representation for certain target groups more or less likely (a matter for future research).

Research suggests that group struggles for power and advantage are a function of the social distance between groups (e.g., Giles and Evans 1985, 1986) and in the case of public education, the likelihood of political coalitions between whites and either Latinos or African-Americans depends on the relative social distance of these groups to whites (Meier and Stewart, 1991; Rocha, 2007). I found evidence in the previous chapter that African-Americans gain passive representation and Latinos lose passive representation on school boards as a result of increased Latino immigration, arguably due to whites shifting their political support to a less threatening and politically countervailing group such as African-Americans (see also Rocha, 2007). I expect in the present analysis that white school board members who are less racially tolerant (e.g., those living in communities characterized by high racial tensions) should also respond more negatively to Latino immigration with increased social distance to Latinos.¹¹ I focus on Latino immigration because of the anti-immigrant and anti-Latino sentiment prevailing within the U.S., which should lead school board members to respond negatively to sizeable Latino immigration by showing more responsiveness to African-American parents and less responsiveness to Latino parents. I conduct this study during a time in the U.S. in which anti-immigrant sentiment has risen, exposing immigrants to discrimination (Kim, 2000).

¹¹ Refer to Chapters 3 and 4 for a detailed explanation of my racial climate theoretical framework and expectations of white-Latino and white-African-American intergroup relations.

As discussed in the previous chapter, I add to this power perspective on intergroup relations a consideration of the racial climate. I expect the Latino immigration-school board member responsiveness relationship to be stronger in areas with generally low racial tolerance, such as would be expected in areas characterized by low intergroup contact or high intergroup threat. In particular, I expect white school board members to respond especially negatively to Latino immigration and show more support for African-American parents and less support for Latino parents in segregated school districts (e.g., low intergroup contact) and districts with high generational competition (e.g., high intergroup threat).

5.3 Why Study Non-Policy Responsiveness?

Responsiveness to citizens is an important aim of democratic government and a focus of studies on political equality (Gilens, 2005). Research on the relationship between citizen preferences and responsiveness in public policy, however, has taken a number of forms (for a review of the literature, see Manza and Cook, 2002; Monroe and Gardner, 1987), the most prevalent of which involves an examination of “dyadic representation” or match between public opinion and public policy. This research has found that legislative voting behavior tends to reflect citizens’ preferences (e.g., Achen, 1978; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001; Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson, 1995). Other forms of research include the changes in public preferences and policies across time (e.g., Page and Shapiro, 1983), the responsiveness of policy change to the public’s desires for policy change (e.g., Monroe, 1979, 1998), and the public’s desire for more or less policy intervention

(e.g., Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2002). I focus in this analysis on dyadic representation, but instead consider the less studied form that involves non-policy behavior of representatives.

Whether representatives are responsive to citizens in non-policy forms such as constituent services (e.g., passport services, information on current and pending laws) rather than policy-related behavior (e.g., voting) is important, according to Butler and Broockman (2011), for four reasons, including: 1) the intensity of legislators' preferences or priorities, 2) the process by which citizens with access to government and/or resources and political power are inequitably distributed, 3) the perception of government responsiveness increases minority political participation rates, and 4) understanding whether representatives are in fact acting in the interest of the minority group. All of these reasons are important motivations for my study, however I place particular emphasis on the fourth reason and whether representatives are behaving in a manner consistent with the interests of certain minority groups.

Mendez and Grose (2014) examine constituent responsiveness and begin to develop a formal theory of "preference-induced responsiveness bias." They argue that "legislators are more likely to favor some groups in their constituencies over other groups when it comes to responsiveness, which we define as responding to constituent request for assistance (or more broadly, any attempt to respond to the needs of a constituent other than through policy-making or position taking)" (p. 1). Non-policy responsiveness differs from the conventional expectation that legislators are rational actors who are likely to suppress or diverge from their personal biases

in an effort to sustain electoral support. Discriminatory intent (e.g., responsiveness during personal interactions of legislators with constituents), which exposes representatives' psychological racial predispositions, can help predict the passage of discriminatory public policies. If a legislator sponsors a policy negatively targeting a certain group (e.g., Latinos), then the legislator should also "be less likely to respond to Latino constituent requests," possibly "due to personal biases the legislator may possess" (Mendez and Grose, 2014:22). I apply the concept of preference-induced responsiveness bias to a study of representative bureaucracy, forming the basis for my expectations of school board member behavior. Given that school board members directly and indirectly affect a wide variety of educational outcomes (Meier et al., 2004), it is important to better understand the possibility of discriminatory intent among them.

5.4 Studying Racial Discrimination and Biases: Audits

Racial discrimination entails practices and beliefs based on racial domination and oppression (Wilson, 1973). Quillian (2006:302) defines racial discrimination as "the difference between the treatment that a target group actually receives and the treatment they would receive if they were not members of the target group but were otherwise the same." Getting policy makers to reveal discriminatory beliefs due to their subtle forms and motivation to hide discrimination, however, has challenged researchers. This problem should be even greater among government officials and elected officials who may be motivated to suppress their personal biases and behave in a neutral manner or, as Butler and Brockman (2011:464)

claim, these actors “are often assumed to be empty vessels that adapt to their constituency in order to maximize their vote share and that constituency service does not force legislators to take unpopular positions that would alienate voters” (see also Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987).

Answering the counterfactual of what the treatment of target group members (e.g., Latinos) would have been if they had been from the same group as the test subject (e.g., whites) has traditionally relied upon statistical analyses of racial disparities in outcomes and, in particular, adjusting for non-racial factors that may explain the outcome (Quillian, 2006). Given a racial gap in certain outcomes (e.g., wages), statistical analyses attempt to control for all race-related factors that may influence the outcome, treating racial discrimination as a residual. Since knowledge and measurement of important controls is limited, Quillian argues that statistical decomposition has its limitations and is only appropriate as “a method to assess how much of a racial gap can be accounted for by measured factors rather than as a method to measure discrimination *per se*” (303).

In an effort to rely less on statistical analyses, researchers have attempted to use reports of discriminatory behaviors, either reported by target group members or perpetrators themselves. Self-reports suffer, however, from an inability to attribute certain outcomes (e.g., employment) to discrimination due commonly to overestimation of experienced discrimination and, further, racism among public officials is less explicit than it used to be. The absence of explicit racism in its historical forms, however, does not “imply that individual beliefs about racial different are no longer consequential” (Harris and Lieberman, 2013:9). The

challenge, Harris and Lieberman argue, is finding out how to uncover racial beliefs that do not manifest themselves in historically explicit forms.

Putnam (1993) is one of the first researchers to directly study the behaviors of public officials in an attempt to uncover contemporary and subtle forms of intergroup attitudes (e.g., intergroup trust and responsiveness). Researchers since Putnam have used increasingly more sophisticated field audit experimental designs to test the influence of personal characteristics on audited individuals' attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Butler and Broockman, 2011; Mendez and Grose, 2014; Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Hanson, Hawley and Taylor, 2011). Experimental control and randomized assignment are useful for studying causality and are commonly employed in field audit studies. Audit studies typically use two subjects who are similar on all observable characteristics except for one, such as race, gender, social class, or age. The subjects are presented to an individual or respondent for which possible discrimination is to be observed. The subjects are typically presented in random order and made to interact in some manner with the audited respondent. The researcher then observes whether the respondent shows differences in his or her interactions with or responses to the subjects.

Butler and Broockman (2011) perform one of several recent audit experiments examining the personal racial biases among legislators. They conducted a randomized e-mail audit by sending e-mails from putatively black or white citizens and tested whether legislators discriminate in their decisions to respond to these citizens. The e-mails sent to legislators asked for help with registering to vote. The researchers found that white legislators regardless of their

political party show similar levels of discrimination against black citizens.

Confirming the basic expectation of most representative bureaucracy research “that the race of elected officials significantly affects how well minorities are represented” (464), they also found that minority legislators discriminate in favor of black citizens by responding more frequently to them. Several other field experiments have also examined discrimination among elected officials (e.g., Bergan, 2009; Grose, Malhotra and Van Houweling, 2014; Kousser and Butler, 2014) and a few have been conducted in the private arena, including retailers (e.g., Ditlmann and Lagunes, 2014), housing market dealers (e.g., Hanson and Santas, 2013; Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Hanson, Hawley and Taylor, 2011), and employers (e.g., Bertrands and Mullainathan, 2004; Quillian, 1994).

I am aware of only one study focusing on local public officials, and that is the examination by Faller, Nathan and White (2014) of the responsiveness of local election officials. Faller and colleagues examined the information provided by local election officials in response to e-mails sent from individuals with Latino and non-Latino white names. They found that e-mails from Latinos were less likely to receive a response from the public official than were e-mails from non-Latino whites; when responses were received, the responses to Latinos were found to be of lower quality than responses to whites. Faller and colleagues do not attempt to empirically explain the social conditions leading to this discrimination; they do, however, suggest several possible mechanisms for the discrimination, including organizational rules or resources (see also Mladenka, 1981), “statistical discrimination” or rational beliefs about the value of showing more responsiveness

to Latino or non-Latino constituents (see also Altonji and Blank, 1999), and partisan-based discrimination because Latinos may be more likely to be Democrats leading Republican officials to turn away from them (see also Butler and Broockman, 2011).

I conduct the first study I am aware of testing for discriminatory intent among school board members and I also build upon studies such as the one by Faller and colleagues by introducing possible social determinants of discrimination. I focus on the behavior of white school board members because I rely on the model of intergroup relations developed by Giles and Evans (1985, 1986), Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007) suggesting that whites respond to more threatening racial groups by shifting their support (e.g., political) to less threatening groups. In addition, it is useful to study white representatives because research on representative bureaucracy has only recently begun to explore the minority representative behavior of white public officials. Several notable exceptions include research on the concept of the minority representative role (Sowa and Selden, 2003), the constraining effect of minority passive representation on the behavior of white public officials (Hindera and Young, 1998; see also Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006), and the backlash by non-minority representatives in cases in which active representation is perceived as reverse discrimination (Lim, 2006). In addition, there has been growing emphasis on the expectation that bureaucrats and representatives are generally influenced by a mix of social, political, moral and value choices (Rigby et al., 2007), making representatives' impressions of the salience of race to certain issues conditional on contextual circumstances, such as when a social

issue becomes important or has been defined as relevant to a target group (Wilkins and Keiser, 2006). As such, it is also important to consider the recent emphasis on the role of racial climate in public policy (e.g., Matsubayashi and Rocha, 2012; Rocha and Espino, 2009; Roch and Rushton, 2008; Roch and Edwards, 2013; Ha, 2010), most notably the work by Rocha and colleagues (2011) on the role of ethnic context in the formation of immigration policy preferences.

5.5 Experiment Design

My audit variable of interest is the racial and ethnic group of parents who contact a school board member. E-mails allow me to construct inquiries to school board members that differ only by the apparent race and ethnicity of the sender. The problem of differential influence of other extraneous variables associated with the auditors is reduced by making the groups as similar as possible, which is easier to do in non-in-person than in-person designs. I manipulate the racial group of parents by the name used by each parent in their e-mail inquiry (e.g., e-mail address and signature). I randomly draw from a sample of names that are strongly associated with whites, Latinos or African-Americans. I use white parents as the control group to help test the differential effect of parent race and ethnicity on responsiveness. The treatment of Latino and African-American parents by white school board members can be understood by not only examining the relative treatment of Latinos and African-Americans but also by comparing the treatment of these out-groups to the school board members' own group (e.g., the counterfactual),

to which whites may also adjust the strength of their support under certain racial context conditions (e.g., in-group bias).

5.5.1 Identification of Racial Names: White, Latino and African-American

Researchers have used various sources for their race-typed audit names. Hanson and Hawley (2011) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), for instance, used Massachusetts birth certificate data from the 1970s to identify names likely to be associated with white or African-American babies. These authors used baby names from the 1970s because when their studies were conducted nearly 30 to 40 years later, the names would have been associated with the appropriate age group for the study (e.g., adult rental unit seekers). These researchers identified several common first and last names for females and males who are either white or African-American. They then randomly assigned the names to auditors. Examples of their African-American names include Darnell Johnson, Hakim Washington, Jamal Robinson, and Leroy Parker; examples of the white names include Brad Davis, Brendan Ryan, Brett Murphy, and Neil Baker. Other researchers have also argued that certain names such as Jake Mueller and DeShawn Jackson are racially distinct and identifiable to observers (e.g., Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Butler and Broockman, 2011).

I also draw my African-American and white first names from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and restrict the names to females. Audit-style experiments of racial discrimination commonly restrict their racial names to either males or females (e.g., Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Hanson, Hawley and Taylor, 2011). I also

expect that females are more likely than males to contact education officials or participate in their children's upbringing (e.g., peer experiences) and education (Updegraff et al., 2001; Nord, Brimhall and West, 1997)¹², making their inquiries more familiar than those of males to the school board members in my study.

Bertrand and Mullainathan do not provide Latino names, however, and there are few other sources of common female names by racial and ethnic group, so I created my own list while drawing from several sources.

To generate my list of common female Latino first names, I first identified a long list of names popular in two major countries of Hispanic origin, including Spain and Mexico (Lansky, 1995). I then cross-referenced these names with lists of the most frequently used Hispanic female names in five U.S. cities during the 1980s (Lavender, 1988). I then cross-referenced this list of common Hispanic female names with a list of the most popular of all first names in the U.S. in 1990 provided by the U.S. Census. I follow Bertrand and Mullainathan and also select the nine most common names from each racial group, producing a total of 27 female first names (9 white, 9 Latino and 9 African-American). As a final check of the extent to which my names are racially and ethnically typed, I submitted the names to individuals of the same group to vouch for their racial or ethnic origin (e.g., ethnic familiarity) based on their own experiences with names associated with their country of origin and/or heritage. This was especially helpful for the Latino names as individuals from several different Latin American countries affirmed the commonality of the names within their own country.

¹² Using only female names for my parents was also a common source of feedback from conference panelists and colleagues.

Identification of the surnames is more straightforward because the 2000 U.S. Census provides the most popular surnames by race and ethnicity. Surnames are less likely to change in popularity across generations so the year of the source is less germane than is the case for first names. The 2000 U.S. Census has been used by other researchers to identify racially-typed surnames (e.g., Butler and Broockman, 2011; Word et al., 2008). I select the most popular surnames by racial and ethnic category from this source and randomly assign them to the first names of the same origin. I list the names I use in my experiment in Table 4.

Table 4. Race-typed Names of Parents

White	African-American	Latino
Anne Mueller	Ebony Rivers	Juanita Juarez
Allison Schroeder	Keisha Booker	Guadalupe Velazquez
Carrie Novak	Aisha Washington	Isabel Vazquez
Emily Koch	Kenya Banks	Josefina Barajas
Jill Yoder	Lakisha Jefferson	Rosa Ibarra
Kristen Schwartz	Latonya Jackson	Lola Huerta
Laurie Krueger	Tamika Dorsey	Lucia Zavala
Meredith Schneider	Tanisha Mosley	Margarita Meza
Sarah Schmitt	Latoya Gaines	Maria Orozco

Sources: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004); U.S. Census 2000; Lavender (1988); Lansky (1995)

5.6 Selection of White School Board Members

I next turn to discussing my selection of white school board members for inclusion in my study as audited subjects. Self-identification of racial and ethnic

classification is the preferred method of racial classification (Office of Management and Budget, 1997). I am not aware of a recent national data source, however, which identifies using self-identification the race of school board members. Thus, I turned to identifying white school board members and their e-mail addresses myself. The vast majority of school districts in the U.S. have school board information on websites (e.g., school board member profiles) and at least two-thirds of boards maintain e-mail contact information, with larger districts more likely than smaller districts to maintain electronically accessible information (Hess and Meeks, 2010). Thus, I use school board websites to identify my school board members, focusing on larger districts not only because they offer sufficient racial and ethnic diversity to study racial contexts, but also because large urban districts were also the focus of the National Latino Education Study used in the previous chapter.

Observer-identification of racial and ethnic classification has been frequently used by researchers (e.g., Waters 1990, 1999; Harris and Sim, 2000; Harris, 2001; Schmitt, 2001). It is known, however, that the characteristics of the observer (e.g., race) are likely to influence the correct identification of another's race (Davis, 1991; Parker, 1999; Lent, 1970). Individuals have a higher likelihood of correctly identifying the race and ethnicity of members of their own group than members of other groups. Harris (2002), for instance, found that the probability of a match between observed and self-identified race varies by race of the observer and is highest among observers who are of the same race as the observed person.

Thus, I take advantage of own-group identification bias and implement a three-observer identification scheme that includes two Latino observers (first or

second generation U.S. resident and from different Latino American countries) and one white observer (myself).¹³ The Latino observers are most likely to correctly identify Latino school board members and the white observer is most likely to correctly identify non-Latino white board members. I use Latino rather than African-American observers because it is more problematic to distinguish Latino from non-Latino white school board members than it is to distinguish African-American from Latino or non-Latino white board members. I am interested in selecting for inclusion in my study only non-Latino white board members, so Latino and white observers are particularly helpful. Observers made determinations of all school board members' race and ethnicity based upon visual inspection of each member's photograph in addition to the possible ethnicity of the board members' names. I then compared the three observers' lists and any discrepancies were reviewed and re-examined by the three observers.

My sample of school districts comes from the NLES sample of districts used in the analysis in Chapter 4. For practical and theoretical reasons and to keep the analyses consistent, I similarly restrict the sample as I did in Chapter 4 to districts using nonpartisan elections and at-large elections. Using the restricted sample also should help to emphasize the salience of race to the board members by avoiding such politically rational behaviors as partisanship (e.g., preferring African-American constituents because they likely identify as Democrat). For robustness, however, I reproduce the analyses using the full sample of all districts regardless of partisan v.

¹³ I am grateful to the Department of Public Management and Policy at Georgia State University for financial assistance provided by a dissertation fellowship to allow me to hire the two Latino research assistants for their assistance in identifying the white school board members.

nonpartisan elections, at-large v. ward elections, or appointment v. election, while also controlling for these variables. It is possible that school board members behave with less political rationality than do voters during school board elections, lessening the need to stratify my sample in this chapter, so I consider this possibility in a set of robustness analyses.

Of the 1,570 possible school boards that are part of the full sample of the NLES, 953 school boards had school board member profiles on their websites that also included names, photographs, and e-mail addresses for their school board members and at least one white board member. Any board members who did not have either a photograph or an e-mail address were not considered for inclusion in the sample. The differences between school boards with and without identifiable board members are minimal. School boards with identifiable board members tend to, for instance, be only slightly larger (6.9 board members compared to 6.6 board members), less likely to have partisan elections (.07 percent likelihood compared to .13), and elect slightly fewer Latino and African-Americans using ward elections (.14 compared to .17 Latino board members; .32 compared to .35 African-American board members). The minimal differences between school boards having and not having identifiable board members makes sense considering the similarities that also exist within the districts (e.g., segregation index = .29 for districts with identifiable board members and also for districts with unidentifiable board members) and the fact that the NLES already limits its sample to large urban school districts. I then randomly selected one white school board member (regardless of gender) from each of the 953 school boards for inclusion in the sample.

5.7 Measuring Subtle Discrimination: The Dependent Variables

In their study of subtle discrimination in housing markets, Hanson, Hawley and Taylor (2011) detail two sample e-mail responses from the same landlord to a person inquiring into housing unit availability. In this particular example, the purportedly African-American name was Tremayne Williams and the purportedly white name was Brett Murphy. The landlord's response to Tremayne was "work ref. rental ref. name address and ssn#" and the response to Brett was "its avail give me your # and I will have my daughter show it to you." It should be apparent but subtly so that the response to Brett is more positive and welcoming. Hanson and colleagues point out that the previous literature on measuring subtle discrimination of this kind is thin, but several studies in the labor market (e.g., Levinson, 1975; Bendick et al., 1991; Bendick and Jackson, 1994) have suggested examining discrimination using content analysis, such as the incidence of positive and negative comments and words (e.g., positive salutation, thank you, please, etc.).

I follow Hanson and Hawley (2011) and Hanson, Hawley and Taylor (2011) and measure subtle discrimination using several categories of responsiveness, including response versus no response, time to response, length of response, and content of the response. I expect that board members who are more responsive will be more likely to 1) respond rather than not respond, 2) respond, if they do, in a shorter amount of time and/or on a weekend, 3) put more effort into their response, and 4) express kinder and more respectful language.

Response-versus-no response measurements are common among non-in-person audit designs and are used by Mendez and Grose (2014) to study whether

legislators respond to the e-mails of constituents of varying ethnicity. I code the response/no response dependent variable as 1 for a response from the board member and 0 for a non-response. I allowed six weeks for a school board member to respond. I calculated response time variables several ways, including 1) the number of hours to respond (minus 48 hours for the first weekend if the response extended beyond the initial weekend because all e-mails could not be sent out simultaneously), 2) whether the response is received within the first 24 hours, and 3) whether a response occurs on a weekend. Scholars have used response time as a measure of governmental responsiveness (e.g., Mladenka, 1981) and research generally shows shorter response times to be associated with higher levels of government satisfaction (e.g., Howerton, 2006; Percy, 1986; Holmes and Goodman, 2010).

I calculated the measures of board member effort several ways, including the total word count and the average length of words in the response. I expect that more informative and useful responses should have a higher word count. The average length of the words used by the board member should convey information that the school board member feels about the relative social status and/or education level of the parent.

I next turn to my consideration of the warmth of the e-mail responses. Early linguistics research examining interpersonal interactions showed that written forms of speech are more challenging to accurately measure than in-person interactions which can be measured in less subtle ways (e.g., smiling, handshake, volume of voice). Brown and Ford (1961), for instance, argued that a simple binary measure of

written language is especially useful in categorizing interpersonal relations, and that is the choice between addressing someone with the use of a first name and the use of a title with last name. The choice of address depends, these authors argue, on the relative status (e.g., social structure) of the speaker and the addressee. Using a large sample of interactions in a variety of U.S. settings, these authors found speakers tend to use the title and last name of the addressee when the individuals are unacquainted and when they are socially matched. They also found that unacquainted speakers and addressees tend to use mismatched addresses when the addressee is of lower social status than the speaker. In particular, low social status addressees were found to use a formal address but the high social status speakers tended to use the lower status addressee's first name. I construct the e-mails from parents by addressing the school board member using his or her title and last name, indicating to the school board member that the two are unacquainted and allowing the board member to express a response suggesting the parent is of either relatively high or low social status, A mismatched response (e.g., school board member's use of the parent's first name) should indicate that the board member believes he or she is of higher social status than the parent. If the school board member perceives the parent to be of higher or equal social status, on the other hand, I expect the school board member to respond using the parent's title and last name. I also calculate measures of kindness and sincerity using measures of 1) the number of positive greeting words (e.g., morning, afternoon, evening, dear) and 2) the number of positive keywords (e.g., gratefully, please, thank, exclamation punctuation mark,

have a, best, welcome). These words and their meanings are similar to those used by Hanson, Hawley and Taylor (2011).

5.8 Independent Variables

My primary independent variables of interest are, as was the case in Chapter 4, the interaction terms between the Latino noncitizen population percent and the racial climate variables (segregation and generational competition). I follow Rocha (2007) and used Latino noncitizens to capture the Latino immigrant population and Latino citizens to capture the native segment of this population. I expect that Latino citizens should have less social distance with and be less threatening to whites than are Latino noncitizens, but a larger Latino noncitizen presence should generalize attitudes toward Latinos as a whole. Based on the assumption that individuals carry racial attitudes within the community into their professional roles (see Brief et al., 2006), I also expect that white school board members should respond negatively to sizeable Latino noncitizen groups, especially in areas of low racial tolerance, such as would be the case in segregated school districts (e.g., low intergroup contact) and districts with high levels of generational competition (e.g., high intergroup threat).

I calculate segregation as the percentage of individuals from one group (whites or minorities) that would need to transfer across census tracts within a given school district in order to bring the level of segregation within the district to zero (e.g., Roch and Rushton, 2008; Roch and Edwards, 2013; Duncan and Duncan, 1955). I follow Poterba (1995, 1996) and measure racial and generational heterogeneity as the nonwhite percentage of school age population (age 5 to 17)

minus the nonwhite percentage of elderly population (age 65 and above). I also included the percentages of Latino citizens and African-American residents within the districts to test whether whites appear to respond to these groups as potential allies or competitors. I expect that whites, in general, will respond less favorably to Latino noncitizens than Latino citizens or African-Americans. If white school board members are antagonized by Latino immigration, however, then their social distance with Latinos should be greater, leading them to convey relatively more support for African-Americans.

I also included in these analyses many of the same control variables used in Chapter 4. My primary expectation in this chapter is that the same community and school district conditions will influence intergroup relations and whites' racial attitudes, so I also included my measures of poverty and educational attainment for whites, Latinos and African-Americans. I also included the number of school board members on a given school board, whether the district is majority white, district size (e.g., population), and regional variables (South, Northeast, Midwest and West).

New to the analysis, I added to the models controls for the racial composition of the school board. Some research suggests that there is an "interaction effect between black and white passive representation," possibly due to the constraining effect of minority presence on racial biases of non-minorities (Hindera and Young, 1998:664), so I also included measures of Latino and African-American passive representation (e.g., percentage of Latino school board members and percentage of African-American school board members).

Mendez and Grose (2014) suggest that political figures are “typically savvy enough not to admit” their racial biases, even if those biases directly inform their policy decisions. I expect the behavior of my white school board members to be a “hidden practice” that must be elicited in a non-policy setting, such as constituent services (e.g., personal communications with citizens). I attempt to isolate this subtle form of race-related behavior from politically rational behavior in two ways. As mentioned previously, I first restrict my sample to nonpartisan elections, at-large election systems, and non-appointed systems, continuing my aim to limit the extent to which political factors influence the expression of personal racial biases. Second, I also consider the possibility that school board members are less influenced by strategic intergroup political coalitions as was the case for white voters during school board elections, and instead construct the models without restricting the sample while also using political/election control variables.

5.9 An Alternative View: School Board Members as Minority Advocates

It is possible that rather than school board members carrying “racial baggage” (Brief et al., 2006) from the community racial context into their professional role, they will instead attempt to mute the negative social constructions of target groups which can otherwise lead to negative policy outcomes. Past research has shown how race-salient policies, such as education policy, offer numerous opportunities for public officials to actively represent citizens (Meier, 1993). Emerging research also suggests that public officials may respond to the salience of race within their community, the level of racial conflict, or negative

images of minorities within those areas to advocate on behalf of them. Grissom and colleagues (2009), for instance, found that black teachers in the South are more likely than black teachers in other regions of the country to promote positive educational outcomes for black students, arguably because of the history of racial conflict and racism within that region. Roch and Edwards (2013) also found that the salience of race within school districts also matters for the likelihood of teachers turning passive representation into active representation.

In addition, Fryer and Levitt (2004) highlight a difference between taste-based and statistical discrimination that may moderate a school board members' discriminatory responsiveness. Rather than expressing taste-based discrimination based on racial prejudice, public officials may express statistical discrimination that is rational (see also Atlonji and Blank, 1999; Becker, 1957; Butler and Broockman, 2011; Fenno, 1978). According to this perspective, school board members may engage in discrimination because it is a rational response to strategic partisan considerations and, in particular, decisions to form a reelection constituency (Fenno, 1978). White school board members may in fact perceive within the Latino community a new and underserved constituency that can form a new electoral coalition.

Thus, for various reasons, I expect as an alternative hypothesis that white school board members may attempt to mute the negative racial climates Latino immigrants are likely to encounter in segregated districts or districts with high levels of generational competition. If board members do attempt to mute the

negative racial climates, then I expect them to be more responsive to Latinos in areas in which Latino immigrants are likely to be received negatively.

5.10 The E-mails from Parents: School Boundaries

In this analysis, I aim to test the direct responses of school board members; responses that are indications of forwarding the inquiry to someone else (e.g., superintendent), on the other hand, do not offer a similar assessment of a board member's effort in responding (e.g., content) and may simply indicate that the board member does not have access to the requested information--an outcome I can not adequately test for. I also would like for the parental e-mail to not impose a search cost for the required information that would reveal itself during the first round (e.g., response to a white parent) but not during the second round (e.g., response to a Latino parent). Thus, in order to ensure that school board members already have access to the requested information, increasing their likelihood of a comprehensive response and not forwarding the inquiry to another person, I selected school district boundaries as the subject of my e-mails from parents.

In general, school board members regularly receive contact and input from parents (Hess, 2002). School board members also report that a variety of issues are of concern to them, especially in large districts (Hess, 2002). Regarding "the controversial area of school closings," more than 50 percent of large districts sought community input (Hess 2002:16). School boundaries and rezoning has normally been a very salient issue, as is suggested by a sample of news story headlines across the U.S.: "As schools grapple with crowding, prospect of rezoning angers Manhattan

parents” (New York Times, Nov 4, 2008), “High school zoning plan angers black parents” (articles.orlandosentinel.com, June 25, 1995), “Students fret about new school zones” (articles.orlandosentinel.com, April 18, 1986), and “Hundreds of parents fill Hoover High theater for elementary school rezoning presentation (AL, Sep 17, 2014). I show example e-mails used during the first and second rounds in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. I aimed to make the e-mails as substantively similar as possible while still not tipping the school board member off to a possible experiment.

Mr. <last name>,

My son will be new to your district this fall when he begins the third grade. We will be moving from outside the state and I want us to live close to his school. I am wondering if you could provide me with information on the attendance boundaries in the district to inform our selection of a school and where we choose to live. I have not been able to locate any information on this so far.

Also, since you are a member of the school board, could let me know if the board is discussing any plans to rezone the school boundaries.

Carrie Novak

Figure 2. Sample Parent E-mail (Round 1)

Ms. <last name>,

I'm making plans to move from out-of-state to your district later this summer and am interested in knowing more about school boundaries. One thing I am considering is where to live. My sons will be entering the second and third grades and it is our desire to find a house close to their school. Knowing where the boundaries fall will be helpful for this. I am hopeful that since you are a board member that you are the right person to contact. Can you please provide me with any information on school boundaries that you think would be helpful, such as a map of the boundaries and whether they likely will remain the same for the coming school years.

Thank you in advance.
Emily Koch

Figure 3. Sample Parent E-mail (Round 2)

My experimental design calls for two rounds of e-mails sent to each school board member on the same subject, although slightly differently worded. The common and salient topic of school boundaries should not raise a concern with the board members. Using a topic for which race is also salient (see Barron, 2008) also offers the benefit of possibly using the data on e-mail responses in future research which tests whether discriminatory intent among these school board members turns into a greater likelihood of passage of discriminatory policy changes (e.g. re-segregation through rezoning) (see Mendez and Grose, 2014).

Regarding the parents' e-mail addresses, I create 27 unique gmail e-mail addresses, nine for each of the racial and ethnic groups. To ensure consistency of the e-mail address format (e.g., first name.last [name@gmail.com](mailto:example@gmail.com)) I append to the e-mail address a number indicative of a likely year of the parent's birth (e.g., 1980); otherwise, it is likely that many of these e-mail addresses are already taken by other gmail account holders. The format of the e-mail addresses is, therefore, first

name.last name1980 (at) gmail.com (e.g., carrie.novak1980@gmail.com). I list all of the e-mail addresses used in my experiment in Appendix B.

5.11 Experiment Sequence

True experiments require random assignment into treatment and control conditions. Since the treatments are randomly assigned and all other aspects of the audit-style experiments other than the auditor's test variable (e.g., race) are the same, all other explanations of differences in audited subject's response are controlled for. As such, it would be possible to perform an adequate analysis using just one round of e-mails in the case of my dissertation.

Some have argued, however, that randomized within-subject comparisons offer advantages over simple randomization across subjects. Brown (1980), for instance, suggests that a design capable of comparing two treatments within a single subject and using each subject as his or her own control has appeal because all other possible explanations other than the subject's own bias are ruled out. In a two-treatment crossover experiment of this type of design, each subject has two periods of treatment (e.g., first round and second round). In a multi-treatment design, the treatments (A, B, and C) are randomly assigned to the two rounds for each subject, making in the first period approximately 33 percent of the subjects have treatment A, 33 percent have treatment B, and 33 percent have treatment C (e.g., control group). To ensure a common reference (control group, C), treatment groups A and B are then automatically assigned C in the second period and treatment group C in the first period has a 50 percent chance of receiving A or B in the second period. As

such, the distribution of assignment during the second round is: A (16.5 percent), B (16.5 percent) and C (66 percent). Several audit trials have used this type of crossover randomized control design (e.g., Planas et al., 2014).

A common concern with the interpretation of within-subject comparisons is the possible residual effects for the treatment. The receipt of a treatment (e.g., e-mail) during the first period may bias the treatment during the second period. Thus, I use a delay period of six weeks between e-mail rounds to help distinguish in the school board member's mind the first e-mail from the second e-mail. Planas and colleagues (2014) in their study of discrimination in family planning services similarly also used at least a five-week "wash out" period.

I follow a multi-treatment randomized crossover design and detail the process of my experiment in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Experiment Process

As mentioned previously, there are two general types of e-mail responses from school board members—responses either directly from school board members or inquiries that were forwarded to someone else (e.g., superintendent) along with a response. I restrict my sample to e-mail responses sent directly from the board member and without possible contamination of forwarding the e-mail to another person who is of unknown race and ethnicity. Board members may diminish their responses if they elect to or need to forward the e-mail.

5.12 The Models

The models in my analysis are similar to those in Chapter 4, so I briefly detail them here. The base model I use for these variables is specified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SchoolBoardMember Responsiveness} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{LatinoCitizen} + \beta_2 \text{LatinoNonCitizen} + \\ & \beta_3 \text{AfricanAmerican} + \beta_4 \text{RacialContext} + \beta_5 \text{SchoolBoardCharacteristics} + \\ & \beta_6 \text{DistrictCharacteristics} + \mu \end{aligned}$$

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Formula</u>
Latino citizen	% of Latino citizens in the school district
Latino noncitizen	% of Latino noncitizens in the school district
African American	% of African-Americans in the school district
Racial context	Segregation, Generational competition, Minority-majority school district
School board characteristic	Number of school board members % Latino school board membership % African-American school board membership
School district characteristics	White poverty % Latino poverty % African-American poverty % White college % Latino college % African-American college % Population size Region (Midwest, West, Northeast, South)

I then run two models allowing me to test the conditional nature of the effects of the size of the Latino noncitizen population on school board member responsiveness to, separately, white, Latino and African-American parents. I interact the % Latino noncitizen variable with the racial climate variables (segregation and

generational competition) and separately include these interaction terms in the models. Finally, I do not run a separate analysis on the round two data since the purpose of the second round is to match Latino and African-American parents with a white control group. I instead run a within-subject analysis in addition to the analysis on round 1 alone.

5.13 Results

5.13.1 Descriptive Statistics of the E-mail Responses

Overall, the response rate for the first round of responses is 64 percent, which is satisfactory compared to other similar studies—the response rate in the study of landlord responses by Hanson and Hawley (2011) was 54 percent. The majority of school board members who responded provided responses similar to the one shown in Figure 5, which is an example of an actual response.

Ms Koch,

Thank you for your inquiry regarding boundaries in the XXXXX School District. The link below will bring you to the boundary map for the district. You really can not go wrong with any elementary, middle or high school in XXXXXX. They are all high achieving, innovative, and collaborative learning environments

We recently altered boundaries due to the construction and opening of our newest elementary school, XXXXXX Elementary. During that process, those living within the half mile walk zone around each elementary school (as the crow flies) were guaranteed to stay at their neighborhood school.

The map is current and reflects the attendance areas of all six elementary schools.

I hope this information helps. Also, check out the XXXXXX School District website at XXXX School District for more detailed information.

Thank you,

XXXXXXXXXX

Figure 5. Sample response from a school board member

I list in Tables 5 and 6 summary statistics for each of the nine dependent variables characterizing the school board members' responses during the first round. In Table 5, I include the full sample of school districts; in Table 6, I include just those school districts that use non-partisan and at-large elections (as was the case for the analysis in Chapter 4) and I also eliminate from the sample any responses that did not come directly from the school board member. For instance, I remove observations of school board members who forwarded the parental e-mail to someone else, such as the superintendent. In this dissertation, I am interested in analyzing the consideration that school board members give to parents when

responding directly; decisions to forward the response to someone else, on the other hand, may indicate something other than racial bias, such as a simple inability to answer due to lack of the requested information. Thus, I include details of the full sample here as well, but I focus my discussion on the restricted sample.

Table 5. Dependent Variables: Subtle Bias, Responses in the Full Sample (First E-mail round) (N=953)

	Responses to White Parents		Responses to Latino Parents		Responses to African-American Parents	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Response/no response	.66	.47	.67	.47	.57	.50
Response duration						
Hours to respond	20.8	27.9	25.0	23.9	25.7	31.7
Within 24 hours	.45	.49	.51	.49	.36	.45
Weekend response	.07	.26	.05	.22	.06	.18
Response effort						
Word count	118.3	103.2	109.1	82.7	122.4	80.3
Average word length	5.67	.69	5.46	.80	5.52	.93
Response sincerity						
First name	.31	.47	.24	.45	.18	.39
Kind greeting words	.09	.28	.13	.31	.11	.28
Kind body words	2.28	1.94	2.09	1.56	2.58	1.79
Observation	309		332		312	

Response in the restricted sample are less than in the full sample. In particular, in the restricted sample, rates are similar for Latino parents (41 percent) and white parents (40 percent); African-American received the lowest response rate (30 percent). When they did come, responses took a similar amount of time

(approximately 20 hours), on average, to be received. Responders appear to give slightly more effort in responding to white parents, as is demonstrated by their high word count (116.2 words) compared to 108.6 words for Latino parents.

Table 6. Dependent Variables: Subtle Bias, Responses from School Board Members Only and Non-partisan and At-large Elections (First E-mail round) (N=439)

	Responses to White Parents		Responses to Latino Parents		Responses to African-American Parents	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Response/no response	0.41	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.30 [^]	0.46
Response duration						
Hours to respond	19.7	28.9	19.9	23.1	18.8	24.3
Within 24 hours	0.42	0.49	0.44	0.50	0.30 [^]	0.46
Weekend response	0.06	0.24	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.18
Response effort						
Word count	116.2	76.2	108.6	70.4	112.6	80.3
Average word length	5.51	0.40	5.46	0.86	5.48	1.03
Response sincerity						
First name	0.35	0.48	0.29	0.46	0.16 [^]	0.37
Kind greeting words	0.05	0.22	0.10 [^]	0.30	0.09	0.29
Kind body words	2.24	1.60	1.87	1.53	2.66	1.92
Observation	142		148		149	

Notes: [^] Indicates significance (white parent is the comparison group) as further described in Table 7

I next run tests to determine if there is a relationship between the dependent variables and the racial group of the parent in the first round of the experiment (Table 7). I create two racial group variables using white parents as the comparison group for each. In the first set of tests I examine the relationship between the

dependent variables and race of the parent (white versus Latino). In the second set of tests I examine the same relationships, but now considering just white and African-American parents. I run a chi-square test for the categorical dependent variables and an independent sample t-test for the interval-level variables. These initial results indicate that the board members appear to be more likely to show less responsiveness to African-American parents but not Latino parents compared to white parents in terms of: whether or not to respond, whether or not to respond within 24 hours, and whether or not to use the parent's first name rather than a more formal title of Mr./Ms. last name. It also appears likely that there is a significant relationship for board members using more kind greeting words on average in response to Latino parents than to white parents; it does not appear to be the case, however, that there is a relationship between the use of kind words and whether or not the response is to a white or African-American parent.

The weight of the evidence so far appears to show that the board members are responding less favorably to African-American than Latino parents, but whether or not this holds across various racial environments is the purpose of the remainder of this chapter.

Table 7. Statistical Tests on Responsiveness to 1) White versus Latino Parents, and 2) White versus African-American parents (Round 1)

	Responses to White Compared to Latino Parent				Responses to White Compared to African-American Parent			
	T-test		Chi-square		T-test		Chi-square	
	T	p	chi2	p	t	P	chi2	P
Response v. no Response			0.18	0.67			6.29	0.01
Response Duration								
Time to Respond	0.07	0.95			-0.19	0.85		
Within 24 Hours			0.17	0.68			4.59	0.03
Weekend			0.77	0.38			1.41	0.23
Response effort								
Word count	-0.67	0.51			-0.27	0.78		
Word length	-0.48	0.63			-0.24	0.81		
Response Sincerity								
First name			0.77	0.38			6.32	0.01
Kind greeting words	1.68	0.09			1.47	0.14		
Kind body Words	-1.5	0.13			1.39	0.17		

I next describe in Table 8 the responses received during the second round of the experiment, eliminating from the sample non-direct responses and considering only nonpartisan and at-large election districts. The overall response rates were lower in the second round at 31.6 percent and board members became more likely to forward the response during the second round to someone else. The increased

differences in the second versus the first round in the amount of time taken to respond to the different groups alerts me to the possibility that school board members may have been tipped off to the presence of a study during the second round and are overly discriminating (e.g., showing more partiality to minorities) in their responsiveness. Coupled with the lower response rate in the second round, I decided to place emphasis in my analysis on the results using only the first round of data. The randomized nature of the e-mail audit in the first round still allows me to confidently attribute possible differences in the responsiveness of the board members to racial characteristics of the parents.

Table 8. Dependent Variables: Subtle Bias, Responses Directly From School Board Members (Second E-mail round)

	Responses to White Parents		Responses to Latino Parents		Responses to African-American Parents	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Response/no response	.33	.47	.25	.44	.33	.47
Response duration						
Hours to respond	51.84	80.97	53.14	90.94	32.51	55.31
Within 24 hours	.61	.49	.68	.48	.65	.49
Weekend response	.07	.26	.11	.32	.13	.34
Response effort						
Word count	92.14	56.45	120.53	87.98	127.83	89.26
Average word length	5.63	.93	5.84	.73	5.96	1.48
Response sincerity						
First name	.31	.47	.16	.38	.30	.47
Kind greeting words	.08	.28	.16	.38	.17	.39
Kind body words	1.88	1.67	2.58	1.54	2.61	2.15
Observations	290		76		70	

I next turn to discussing the results for my multivariate analyses. I discuss only the results pertaining to the interaction terms between Latino noncitizen group size and the racial climate variables; I do not discuss in detail, however, the models examining the influence of Latino citizen group size because the results are similar

to what was seen in the previous chapter—whites generally react more negatively to Latino immigrants than they do to Latino natives. In particular, many of the same key interaction terms are significant as will be discussed below, but the magnitude of the relationship is generally smaller than is the case for Latino noncitizens. In other words, the white board members appear to be reacting to Latinos in general, but especially against the Latino immigrants among them, supporting the key finding by Rocha (2007).

5.13.2 Primary Analyses

As discussed previously, research has shown that Latino immigration may antagonize natives. Thus, I expect to see less responsiveness to Latino parents and more responsiveness to African-American parents if whites react negatively to Latino immigration by shifting their support to a countervailing group. Previous work also suggests that individuals may be more antagonized by certain out-groups upon having already experienced other negative intergroup interactions (see Pettigrew, 2009 for a review of the “secondary transfer effect”). Thus, I also expect whites to be even more antagonized by Latino immigration in areas of low intergroup contact and high intergroup threat.

In the OLS regression analysis of round one responses, I see some evidence overall that white school board members are behaving in an intergroup relations manner as expected and similar to that found in the previous chapter’s examination of white voters. I discuss in detail models for several of my measures of subtle bias and list the model results in the appendix for the others.

5.13.2.1 Response versus No Response

I first consider the results for whether school board members respond or not to e-mails from the parents. In Table 9, I separately list the results for white parents, Latino parents and African-American parents. Models 1, 4 and 7 present the base models without racial climate interaction terms, and then I separately introduce the two interaction terms. It does not appear in the base models that board members' decisions to respond depend on the racial and ethnic composition of the school district or either of the racial climate variables, except for the case of responses to African-American parents in more segregated districts ($p=.1$). School board members are more likely to respond to African-American parents but not white or Latino parents in more segregated districts, This generally supports my expectation that in today's changed racial climate, whites may express more favorable attitudes toward African-Americans than Latinos, especially when race is salient such as would be expected in more segregated districts. Several recent representative bureaucracy studies have also found that bureaucrats are sensitive to the salience of race within the community when determining whether or not to pursue active representation (e.g., Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty, 2009; Roch and Edwards; 2013), and it is possible that the board members are more responsive to African-American parents in these more racially salient areas.

There is a significant relationship between the group socioeconomic variables and responses. White school board members are more likely to respond to Latino parents in districts with more African-American poverty ($p=.05$) or less Latino poverty ($p=.1$). Similarly, they are more likely to respond to African-

American parents in districts with more Latino poverty ($p=.1$). These findings support the social distance concept that intergroup friendliness and alliances are more likely between more similar groups. White board members appear to be more responsive to Latino parents, for instance, in districts in which Latinos hold a higher status (e.g., economic) than do African-Americans. These findings also support the racial threat thesis expectation that intergroup antagonism is a function of the threat posed by a group to various resources. In the case of public education, whites may show more support for Latinos or African-Americans, depending on which group imposes fewer resource constraints (e.g., poverty and disadvantaged students) on the schools.

In addition, I see that the education level of whites within the community matters, but only for responses to African-American parents, providing some support for the expectation that education reduces prejudice. Research generally shows that education, in addition to other factors such as group contact, disconfirm negative out-group stereotypes and reduces prejudice (e.g., Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004), presumably due to its liberalizing effect (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). Education also raises individuals' critical thinking skills and gives them certain values that help to allow them to have more positive views of out-groups (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry, 1006). Why more education among whites does not improve responsiveness to Latino parents, however, may be answered by the unique position of Latinos within public education. Research on the group threat thesis argues that intergroup hostilities are a function of group vulnerabilities. Despite consistent research showing that anti-immigrant attitudes decline with increased education

and economic security (Wilkes et al., 2008; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996), it is possible that interethnic rivalries are magnified in schools, as is typified by the widespread and intense opposition to bilingual education (Crawford, 2007) and the resurgence of nativism when resources are scarce (Alvarez and Butterfield, 1997), minimizing the liberalizing benefit of education on racial attitudes.

Surprisingly, I do not see here any evidence that more minority passive representation influences the decision to respond to Latino or African-American parents. The limited research finding that passive representation acts to constrain the biases of non-minority representatives relates specifically to policy-related behaviors (e.g., Hinderer and Young, 1998); more research, however, is needed on the relationship between minority passive representation and the non-policy behavior of representatives which I consider in this analysis.¹⁴

¹⁴ The influence of minority passive representation on the behavior of white representatives deserves much more attention than I am able to give it in this dissertation; I did, however, run several introductory models not included in this write-up to help begin to better understand this possible phenomenon. In particular, I ran models investigating the influence of minority passive representation on the white board members' responsiveness, conditional on the two racial climate variables. I looked at this several ways, two of which include using the continuous-level board member racial composition variables as well as dummy variables for having one minority board member (Latino or African-American) and two or more minority board members. There is limited evidence that white board members may be positively influenced or at least constrained in their actions toward minority constituents, such as the case in which I find evidence that the white board members appear to use more nice words to Latino parents when more Latinos are on the board, especially in more segregated school districts. Combining the theoretical framework in this dissertation with other research looking at the likelihood of passive representation turning into active representation in communities in which race is more salient (e.g., Roch and Edwards, forthcoming) provides a basis for further investigating the conditional constraining effect of passive representation on non-minority representatives' behaviors.

The last variable of interest to consider before turning to the interaction terms is the effect of the school board size. The only significant relationship involves Latinos ($p=.01$), and it appears that the board members are less responsive to them on school boards with more members. Some research suggests that, generally, members of larger organizations report less positive exchanges among its member, such as justice and fairness (Schminke, Ambrose and Cropanzano, 2000), which could explain the negative treatment also conveyed to Latino parents. Little research, however, exists on the relationship between school board size in particular and behaviors and attitudes among board members.

There are several interesting findings upon introducing my interaction terms. First, as expected, the influence of the Latino noncitizen population on responsiveness to Latino parents is conditional on both racial climate variables, only one of which provides support for my hypotheses, however. While Latino immigration lessens the likelihood of responding to a Latino parent but only in more segregated districts ($p=.1$), Latino immigration appears to actually increase the likelihood of a response to a Latino parent in districts with more generational competition ($p=.1$). The curious finding related to generational competition may be explained by the fact that most of the research on the group contact thesis is related to the formation of racial attitudes; research on resource constraints, however, relates as much to rational behavior to diminish threatening groups as it does to personal biases (e.g., Esses, Jackson and Armstrong 1998). In other words, it may be the case that segregation is a better predictor of racial and ethnic tolerance than is generational competition. School boards may also be engaging the negative racial

climate due to generational competition, particularly as it relates to the unique constraints Latino immigration places on schools, by providing more, and not less, support for Latinos. It does appear, however, that the white school board members are also showing more responsiveness to white parents under the same condition of sizeable Latino immigrant population and high generational competition, expressing a possible strengthening of in-group bias.

Table 9. Subtle Bias Measure: Response versus No Response (First Round);
Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0	-0.1*	-0.1**	0.0	0.1**	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.1			-0.1*			-0.1	
		(0.069)			(0.064)			(0.121)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Competition			0.1*			0.2*			0.0
			(0.076)			(0.079)			(0.115)
Latino citizen %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
African-American %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Segregation	-0.6	-1.3*	-0.9	-0.2	0.2	-0.2	1.1*	1.4**	1.1*
	(0.576)	(0.772)	(0.596)	(0.421)	(0.491)	(0.417)	(0.605)	(0.717)	(0.607)
Generational competition	0.1	-0.0	-0.8	-0.1	-0.2	-0.5	0.1	0.0	-0.1
	(0.675)	(0.680)	(0.836)	(0.459)	(0.460)	(0.506)	(0.615)	(0.618)	(0.789)
White poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
African-American poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0**	0.0*	0.0**	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	0.0*	0.0	0.0*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
White college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
African-American college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0*	0.0*	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Latino college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Majority white district	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
	(0.318)	(0.318)	(0.316)	(0.252)	(0.260)	(0.250)	(0.308)	(0.309)	(0.339)
District population size	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	-0.3**	-0.3**	-0.3**
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.124)
West	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.147)
Northeast	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.180)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.206)

Table 9 (continued)

# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1***	-0.1***	-0.1***	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.028	-0.028	-0.028	-0.047	-0.047	-0.047	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034
African-American board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Latino board %	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.6	0.7	0.6	1.0**	1.1**	1.2**	-0.5	-0.6	-0.5
	(0.446)	(0.454)	(0.443)	(0.458)	(0.455)	(0.460)	(0.519)	(0.529)	(0.527)
Observations	142	142	142	148	148	148	149	149	149
R-squared	0.135	0.148	0.158	0.174	0.192	0.198	0.189	0.193	0.190

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

5.13.2.2 The Number of Hours it Takes Board Members to Respond

I next turn in Table 10 to a consideration of the time in hours it takes for a school board member to respond, if in fact he or she does. The results here are more remarkable than was the case of a simple dichotomous measure of responsiveness. I would expect this type of a difference considering the likelihood that racial bias is subtle and even though board members may choose not to discriminate in their decision whether or not to respond, they may take longer in doing so.

Focusing on the racial composition and racial climate variables, the only meaningful relationship is the decrease in the time it takes a board member to respond to a Latino parent in districts with larger Latino noncitizen populations (p=.1). Upon introducing the racial climate interaction terms, however, there is a highly significant (p=.01) and expected role of both segregation and generational competition. In districts with more segregation or more generational competition, more sizeable Latino noncitizen populations have a greater effect on increasing the time the board members take in responding to Latino parents. This is, arguably, the

key finding of this chapter. In more segregated districts I expect racial tolerance to be generally lower and race to be more salient, leading the board members to either have lower racial tolerance themselves or be more sensitive to key racial and ethnic issues (e.g., the impact of Latino immigration on public education).

Also of note is the finding that responsiveness to Latino but not African-American parents appears to be greater (e.g., shorter response time) in majority white districts. It is possible that the threat posed by Latinos within public education is greater when whites are not the majority, contrary to the other findings in the previous chapter. This different finding, however, is supported by some research showing that an out-group (e.g., Latinos) does not pose a threat to the in-group until the out-group is above 50 percent of the population (Solzenberg et al., 2004). White board members as representatives of the general public also may feel more responsibility for certain disadvantaged groups when whites are in the majority; this possibility, however, is also in need of more research as little has been conducted on this type of racial climate link with representative bureaucracy as well.

Table 10. Hours it Takes for Board Member to Respond (First Round); Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.5 (2.256)	4.5 (5.114)	5.2 (6.823)	-2.0* (1.176)	-6.9*** (1.567)	-9.6*** (2.103)	-3.3 (2.114)	-9.8 (7.502)	-2.8 (4.013)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		-12.5 (11.552)			17.0*** (4.040)			20.4 (22.607)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			-13.9 (15.819)			17.5*** (4.212)			-1.9 (12.636)
Latino citizen %	-0.3 (0.771)	-0.7 (0.855)	-0.7 (0.867)	0.7 (0.462)	0.7 (0.413)	1.0** (0.422)	0.3 (1.091)	0.4 (1.108)	0.3 (1.104)
African-American %	0.1 (1.007)	-0.2 (1.037)	-0.2 (1.057)	0.6 (0.441)	1.0** (0.407)	0.6 (0.395)	0.4 (0.566)	0.6 (0.594)	0.4 (0.594)
Segregation	-50.3 (61.296)	-6.6 (73.277)	-29.6 (65.763)	22.8 (27.274)	-48.2 (29.657)	15.4 (24.481)	-37.7 (52.878)	-84.4 (74.049)	-36.0 (54.726)
Generational competition	89.4 (69.235)	99.4 (69.751)	130.8 (83.877)	42.8 (26.659)	45.2* (23.830)	-3.0 (26.280)	52.1 (60.040)	30.1 (64.942)	59.8 (79.015)
White poverty %	-0.9 (1.089)	-1.0 (1.097)	-0.9 (1.092)	-0.0 (0.737)	-0.4 (0.663)	-0.4 (0.665)	1.7 (1.236)	1.6 (1.242)	1.7 (1.257)
African-American poverty %	-0.2 (0.427)	-0.2 (0.428)	-0.2 (0.428)	-0.1 (0.258)	0.1 (0.235)	0.1 (0.236)	0.0 (0.396)	0.1 (0.401)	0.0 (0.406)
Latino poverty %	0.4 (0.568)	0.4 (0.567)	0.3 (0.575)	0.3 (0.360)	0.3 (0.321)	0.2 (0.322)	-0.8* (0.454)	-0.8 (0.458)	-0.8* (0.459)
White college %	0.0 (0.467)	-0.0 (0.467)	-0.1 (0.500)	-0.0 (0.352)	-0.3 (0.320)	0.1 (0.318)	0.5 (0.426)	0.5 (0.427)	0.5 (0.435)
African-American college %	-0.5 (0.426)	-0.5 (0.426)	-0.4 (0.430)	0.1 (0.208)	0.0 (0.187)	-0.0 (0.190)	-0.5 (0.385)	-0.5 (0.388)	-0.5 (0.390)
Latino college %	0.5 (0.585)	0.5 (0.586)	0.6 (0.601)	0.1 (0.435)	0.3 (0.392)	-0.1 (0.391)	-0.2 (0.442)	-0.2 (0.444)	-0.2 (0.457)
Majority white district	-9.2 (33.326)	-38.2 (42.739)	-18.2 (34.925)	-34.4** (14.527)	-19.9 (13.432)	-36.2*** (13.012)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)
District population size	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)
Midwest	6.7 (12.567)	4.4 (12.734)	7.1 (12.597)	5.4 (8.964)	6.9 (8.018)	-0.6 (8.151)	-0.8 (11.566)	0.8 (11.740)	-0.8 (11.703)
West	3.7 (11.901)	1.1 (12.136)	1.7 (12.145)	-1.6 (8.878)	-0.7 (7.936)	-0.8 (7.950)	0.7 (12.907)	3.7 (13.348)	0.4 (13.251)
Northeast	-10.4 (16.414)	-9.5 (16.409)	-6.9 (16.912)	4.7 (14.487)	2.2 (12.960)	-1.4 (13.052)	-9.1 (14.836)	-9.6 (14.879)	-9.3 (15.058)
# school board members	-1.3 (3.165)	-2.0 (3.223)	-2.3 (3.354)	2.1 (3.116)	2.2 (2.785)	3.3 (2.804)	2.3 (2.593)	2.1 (2.610)	2.3 (2.624)

Table 10 (continued)

African-American board %	-0.6	-0.7	-0.6	-0.2	-0.3	-0.1	-0.4	-0.5	-0.4
	(0.427)	(0.443)	(0.434)	(0.313)	(0.280)	(0.281)	(0.296)	(0.304)	(0.300)
Latino board %	-0.1	-0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.4
	(0.469)	(0.470)	(0.482)	(0.229)	(0.211)	(0.214)	(0.570)	(0.591)	(0.579)
Constant	37.8	64.8	45.0	17.6	20.8	26.8	12.5	29.6	11.0
	(47.935)	(53.964)	(48.720)	(28.537)	(25.513)	(25.644)	(35.821)	(40.600)	(37.548)
Observations	79	79	79	86	86	86	61	61	61
R-squared	0.141	0.158	0.152	0.291	0.442	0.440	0.252	0.266	0.252

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

5.13.3 Summarizing other Responsiveness Results

I next briefly summarize the results for the other subtle discrimination measures for the restricted sample. I list the results tables in Appendix C.

I first consider whether board members respond within a reasonable period of time, such as 24 hours from the time the parent sends an inquiry. It appears here as well that the board members are less likely to respond to Latino parents in districts with more segregation ($p=.01$) and also in districts with higher generational competition ($p=.01$). There are no significant interaction effects involving African-American or white parents and it does not appear as if board members base their decision of whether or not to respond during a weekend on the racial context.

Regarding e-mail effort, there are no significant interaction effects involving Latino immigration and the racial climate. Regarding e-mail warmth, however, there are several noteworthy findings. I see that board members are more likely to use the first name rather than a more formal greeting when responding to a Latino parent, but only in response to sizeable Latino noncitizen groups in more segregated

districts ($p=.05$), supporting my hypothesis that Latinos are perceived as being associated with a lower social status in the presence of stronger anti-immigrant sentiment. There is some evidence, however, related to the use of kind words in the e-mail body of the response that board members are more responsive to Latino parents in districts with more sizeable Latino noncitizen groups and higher generational competition. This furthers my growing awareness based on the results in this chapter that board members may be responding differently in more segregated districts than they are in districts with more generational competition. This finding provides some support for the expectation that the board members may be, unconsciously or not, engaging Latinos with more effort, possibly to account for the disadvantages they likely face within the public education system (e.g., competition for public resources between elderly whites and minority youth). Roch and Edwards (2013) similarly found that the benefits of passive representation in schools become greater and are more likely to turn into active representation in districts in which race is more salient and the perception of student disadvantage becomes greater. The segregation variable is significant ($p=.05$) and negative, however, suggesting that the white school board members are less responsive to Latino parents in more segregated districts, as expected in areas with presumably low intergroup contact. In this case, the board members appear to be basing their actions on their personal racial biases developed within the racial climate of the community. There is weaker evidence that board members are also less responsive to African-American parents in more segregated districts ($p=.1$), but upon introducing the Latino noncitizen % x Segregation interaction term, the segregation

variable alone becomes insignificant and the interaction term is weakly significant ($p=.1$) and negative, suggesting that Latino immigration is hurting board member responsiveness to African-American parents as well.

Finally, regarding the warmth of the responses, there is some clear evidence that the board members are responding more favorably to white parents by using formal greetings (e.g., “Dear” or “Good morning”) in the presence of sizeable Latino immigrant groups in more segregated districts ($p=.05$); there is no such influence of this aspect of the racial context on responses to Latino or African-American parents. There is no evidence, however, of a relationship between the racial climate variables and either the use of kind words in an email or a parent’s first name or title and last name in the address.

I next turn to considering a set of alternative models that do not restrict the sample based on the election and political characteristics of the school boards. It is possible that the various electoral and political characteristics matter for the behavior of school board members for whom some may argue that they are political creatures.

5.13.3.1 Alternative Models: Full Sample with Political and Election System Controls

I consider here the same models, but instead using the full sample of school districts without limiting it partisan and at-large elections and including control variables for these characteristics in the models. I discuss in detail the response v. no response (Table 11) and time-to-response (Table 12) models, and then I just list the tables for the other related models in Appendix D.

I see several interesting differences, some of which provide more insight into the control variables. Upon introducing into the full sample control variables for districts partisan elections, at-large elections, and appointment vs. election system, I see no significant conditional effects of the racial climate variables; I do see, however, some evidence bordering on significance that white school board members are less likely to respond to Latino parents when confronted with sizeable Latino immigrant groups, but only in more racially segregated districts. I also see that among the base models, the percentage of African-American school board members on a given board has a significant and positive effect ($p=.1$) on the likelihood of a response to African-American parents. This finding provides some evidence of the role of minority passive representation in the racial behavior of non-minority representatives by, for instance, constraining racial biases (see Hinderer and Young, 1998). The fact that there are some differences between the full sample and limited models and my method of controlling for school board election system suggests that school board members are, to some extent, political actors. The fact that I see evidence of race-related behavior in both models, however, suggests that personal biases do play an important role in this form of non-policy responsiveness in addition to political rationality.

Table 11. Subtle Bias Measure: Response versus No Response (First Round); Full Sample with Controls for Partisan Elections and At-Large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0 (0.013)	-0.0 (0.023)	-0.0 (0.027)	-0.0 (0.014)	0.0 (0.025)	-0.0 (0.032)	0.0 (0.016)	0.0 (0.032)	-0.0 (0.029)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.0 (0.058)			-0.1 (0.058)			-0.1 (0.086)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.0 (0.070)			0.1 (0.074)			0.0 (0.079)
Latino citizen %	0.0 (0.006)	0.0 (0.006)	0.0 (0.007)	0.0 (0.006)	0.0 (0.006)	0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.008)	-0.0 (0.008)	-0.0 (0.008)
African-American %	0.0 (0.007)	0.0 (0.007)	0.0 (0.007)	0.0 (0.006)	0.0 (0.006)	0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.006)
Segregation	-0.4 (0.464)	-0.5 (0.608)	-0.5 (0.477)	0.1 (0.367)	0.5 (0.426)	0.1 (0.367)	0.5 (0.470)	1.0* (0.575)	0.5 (0.473)
Generational competition	0.1 (0.506)	0.1 (0.508)	-0.2 (0.671)	0.1 (0.385)	0.1 (0.385)	-0.1 (0.433)	0.4 (0.508)	0.3 (0.511)	0.3 (0.651)
White poverty %	0.0 (0.012)	0.0 (0.012)	0.0 (0.012)	0.0 (0.010)	0.0 (0.010)	0.0 (0.010)	-0.0 (0.012)	-0.0 (0.012)	-0.0 (0.012)
African-American poverty %	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	0.0 (0.003)	0.0 (0.003)	0.0 (0.003)	0.0 (0.004)	0.0 (0.004)	0.0 (0.004)
Latino poverty %	-0.0 (0.005)	-0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	0.0* (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	0.0* (0.005)
White college %	0.0* (0.004)	0.0* (0.004)	0.0* (0.004)	0.0* (0.005)	0.0* (0.005)	0.0** (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)
African-American college %	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	0.0* (0.003)	0.0** (0.003)	0.0* (0.003)	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)
Latino college %	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	-0.0* (0.005)	-0.0* (0.005)	-0.0** (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.006)
Majority white district	0.2 (0.229)	0.2 (0.230)	0.2 (0.231)	0.0 (0.171)	-0.0 (0.173)	0.0 (0.171)	0.1 (0.198)	0.0 (0.198)	0.1 (0.210)
District population size	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)
Midwest	0.0 (0.116)	0.0 (0.116)	-0.0 (0.116)	0.2 (0.107)	0.2 (0.107)	0.1 (0.107)	-0.1 (0.109)	-0.1 (0.109)	-0.1 (0.109)
West	-0.1 (0.109)	-0.1 (0.110)	-0.1 (0.109)	0.1 (0.121)	0.0 (0.120)	0.1 (0.120)	-0.0 (0.121)	-0.0 (0.121)	-0.0 (0.122)
Northeast	-0.1 (0.154)	-0.1 (0.155)	-0.1 (0.154)	-0.0 (0.141)	-0.0 (0.140)	-0.0 (0.141)	0.2 (0.167)	0.2 (0.166)	0.2 (0.168)

Table 11 (continued)

Partisan elections %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
African-American ward %	-0.170	-0.171	-0.171	-0.119	-0.119	-0.119	-0.143	-0.144	-0.144
Latino ward %	-0.073	-0.073	-0.073	-0.059	-0.058	-0.058	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051
% board members elected	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2*	0.0	0.0	0.0
# school board members	-0.069	-0.070	-0.070	-0.078	-0.078	-0.082	-0.080	-0.083	-0.081
African-American board %	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
Latino board %	-0.071	-0.071	-0.071	-0.076	-0.076	-0.076	-0.170	-0.170	-0.171
Constant	-0.1**	-0.1**	-0.2**	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Observations	-0.074	-0.074	-0.074	-0.082	-0.082	-0.082	-0.172	-0.172	-0.174
R-squared	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.3	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0
	(0.361)	(0.374)	(0.362)	(0.337)	(0.337)	(0.338)	(0.377)	(0.379)	(0.378)
	197	197	197	215	215	215	201	201	201
	0.114	0.114	0.117	0.133	0.145	0.141	0.102	0.112	0.103

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Upon considering the time it takes to respond using the full sample and partisan/election controls (Table 12), the results are fairly similar. One important distinction is the appearance of a significant effect of Latino noncitizen group size on response time to African-American parents, conditional on the level of segregation within the district. In particular, board members take longer to respond to African-American parents in districts with more sizeable Latino noncitizen groups, especially in more segregated districts. This finding for responsiveness to African-Americans is contrary to my expectation of more support for African-Americans as a countervailing influence to emerging influence of Latino immigrants. It is possible, however, that whites are generalizing their antagonism to Latino immigration more broadly than to just Latinos. Based on the concept of the secondary transfer effect,

Vezzali and Giovannini (2012) in fact showed that attitudes developed during contact with immigrants generalize to other groups, such as the disabled and homosexuals, which may be the case here with reactions to Latino immigration and responsiveness to African-American parents.

Table 12. Hours it Takes for Board Member to Respond (First Round); Full Sample with Controls for Partisan Elections and At-Large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
Latino noncitizen %	-1.5 (1.460)	-1.7 (2.744)	3.6 (4.082)	0.1 (0.960)	-4.9*** (1.538)	-6.1*** (2.040)	-2.3 (1.839)	-9.3** (3.690)	-1.7 (3.220)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.4 (7.137)			17.1*** (4.320)			21.4** (9.766)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			-13.3 (9.984)			15.2*** (4.486)			-1.9 (8.851)
Latino citizen %	-0.0 (0.565)	0.0 (0.570)	-0.3 (0.619)	0.0 (0.411)	0.1 (0.384)	0.2 (0.396)	-0.1 (0.893)	-0.1 (0.865)	-0.1 (0.911)
African-American %	0.2 (0.611)	0.2 (0.627)	-0.2 (0.664)	0.2 (0.395)	0.6 (0.380)	0.2 (0.376)	-0.0 (0.440)	0.1 (0.432)	-0.1 (0.462)
Segregation	-11.0 (45.749)	-13.1 (59.065)	15.2 (49.573)	4.5 (24.921)	-62.6** (28.780)	-3.9 (23.825)	-27.3 (40.298)	-104.3* (52.502)	-26.9 (40.667)
Generational competition	67.8 (48.469)	67.9 (48.755)	121.3* (62.700)	45.2** (22.348)	42.4** (20.857)	7.0 (24.068)	71.3 (46.753)	69.3 (45.274)	79.0 (59.314)
White poverty %	-1.1 (1.005)	-1.1 (1.025)	-1.1 (1.002)	-0.2 (0.683)	-0.6 (0.647)	-0.6 (0.664)	1.8* (1.083)	1.6 (1.052)	1.8* (1.094)
African-American poverty %	-0.1 (0.402)	-0.1 (0.404)	-0.1 (0.400)	-0.4 (0.260)	-0.1 (0.250)	-0.2 (0.251)	-0.1 (0.311)	-0.0 (0.305)	-0.1 (0.314)
Latino poverty %	0.3 (0.482)	0.3 (0.488)	0.3 (0.480)	0.1 (0.330)	0.1 (0.308)	0.1 (0.314)	-0.7 (0.414)	-0.6 (0.403)	-0.7 (0.418)
White college %	0.2 (0.408)	0.2 (0.411)	-0.0 (0.439)	-0.4 (0.293)	-0.5* (0.277)	-0.3 (0.280)	0.4 (0.356)	0.3 (0.350)	0.4 (0.362)
African-American college %	-0.5 (0.389)	-0.5 (0.395)	-0.4 (0.390)	-0.1 (0.206)	-0.1 (0.192)	-0.2 (0.198)	-0.4 (0.342)	-0.5 (0.332)	-0.4 (0.348)
Latino college %	0.3 (0.543)	0.3 (0.546)	0.5 (0.551)	0.6* (0.353)	0.7** (0.331)	0.5 (0.338)	-0.2 (0.403)	-0.2 (0.390)	-0.1 (0.423)
Majority white district	-5.1 (27.695)	-4.4 (30.048)	-5.7 (27.573)	-12.1 (11.410)	-1.5 (10.974)	-10.2 (10.861)	-31.8 (22.031)	-31.9 (21.330)	-33.3 (23.390)
District population size	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)
Midwest	6.8 (10.642)	6.9 (10.867)	6.6 (10.595)	6.8 (7.568)	7.2 (7.060)	3.1 (7.277)	-1.2 (9.674)	1.7 (9.455)	-1.2 (9.756)
West	13.2 (9.058)	13.2 (9.176)	11.1 (9.145)	-1.1 (7.973)	-0.8 (7.438)	1.0 (7.606)	-1.6 (11.013)	0.6 (10.710)	-2.2 (11.503)
Northeast	-5.5 (14.437)	-5.6 (14.559)	-2.5 (14.544)	13.7 (11.080)	13.6 (10.335)	9.1 (10.620)	-2.2 (11.600)	-1.7 (11.233)	-2.4 (11.741)

Table 12 (continued)

Partisan elections %	5.2	5.3	5.4	-1.9	-0.2	0.9	0.1	4.4	-0.1
	-16.732	-16.850	-16.657	-7.734	-7.227	-7.400	-12.360	-12.129	-12.492
African-American ward %	4.9	4.8	6.0	-1.0	-0.7	-1.3	1.3	2.5	1.2
	-6.646	-6.777	-6.672	-3.958	-3.693	-3.764	-4.074	-3.979	-4.132
Latino ward %	16.4**	16.5**	10.1	0.6	-0.4	-1.1	-13.9	-19.8	-14.3
	-7.931	-8.240	-9.204	-6.727	-6.280	-6.416	-12.678	-12.558	-12.894
% board members elected	-0.3	-0.2	-1.4	2.4	1.3	2.1	-1.2	-7.5	-1.6
	-2.715	-2.820	-2.829	-4.133	-3.865	-3.930	-12.626	-12.555	-12.851
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	-2.5	-1.8	-1.2	2.5	8.6	2.8
	0.000	0.000	0.000	-4.759	-4.442	-4.542	-12.718	-12.623	-12.929
African-American board %	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	0.1	0.1	0.2	-0.1	-0.1*	-0.1
	(0.358)	(0.363)	(0.358)	(0.271)	(0.252)	(0.260)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Latino board %	-0.3	-0.3	-0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.3
	(0.421)	(0.425)	(0.426)	(0.233)	(0.222)	(0.232)	(0.463)	(0.464)	(0.476)
Constant	23.1	22.7	19.7	29.7	38.3*	35.1	44.1	70.3**	44.4
	(40.233)	(41.022)	(40.132)	(23.114)	(21.669)	(22.033)	(33.317)	(34.401)	(33.625)
Observations	109	109	109	122	122	122	81	81	81
R-squared	0.119	0.119	0.137	0.194	0.306	0.279	0.212	0.274	0.212

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

5.13.4 Within-Subject Analyses

The question now becomes, are the same school board members responding differently to white and either Latino or African-American parents? I re-examine each of the nine dependent variables by including the second round of data with the first round in a within-subject, crossover design. Overall, I find few significant results related to the racial context. Looking first at the restricted sample, I do not see any evidence that board members' decisions to respond to a white parent but not a Latino or an African-American parent are conditional on any aspect of the racial context I consider in these analyses (Table 13). The situation is the same in the full sample not restricted by partisan/election system as shown in Table 14.

The most telling result involves the decision to respond to a white parent rather and not a minority parent when the white parent is the one to send an e-mail

during the first round. It very well may be the case that the non-findings in the combined, within-subject analysis is due to experimental bias. Unfortunately, it appears that the board members are likely being alerted to a study by the second e-mail. I further suspect knowledge of a study due to the significant relationship ($p=.01$) between receiving a response and the order in which each board member receives the e-mails from a white parent and either an African-American or Latino parent matters. I do not have enough information, however, to begin to speculate as to whether the order of the e-mails matters, other than this aspect of the experiment is obviously biasing the results. In future experimental designs using this style of e-mail audit for school board members, it may be necessary to use an e-mail subject that is either less racially charged or places fewer information demands on the board member such as would be the case for a local election official who should obviously be knowledgeable of local election laws; school board members as often part time officials may not be fully aware of the current state of and/or where to find information on school boundaries.

I also see in the within-subject analysis that board members are more likely to respond to a white parent but not a minority parent if the minority parent is African-American, thus demonstrating a general preference for Latino over African-American parents. My argument in this dissertation, however, is that Latinos may be experiencing a decline in support from whites, which was supported by the set of findings during the first round. The discrepancy in these results can possibly be accounted for by looking more closely at the particular conditions under which Latinos are likely to not receive favorable support from whites. Evidence of this was

found in the previous analyses examining just the first round of e-mails and, in particular, the conditional influence of Latino immigration on white school board members' responsiveness to Latino and African-American parents based on the racial climate.

Table 13. Within-subject Analysis of Response to a White Parent but No Response to Either an African-American or Latino Parent (Restricted Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
African-American parent	0.2*	0.2*	0.2*
	-0.100	-0.100	-0.101
White parent first-email	0.6***	0.6***	0.6***
	-0.102	-0.105	-0.103
Latino noncitizen %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.024	-0.048	-0.059
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		-0.1	
		-0.100	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.0
			-0.122
Latino citizen %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010
African-American %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009
Segregation	-0.3	0.2	-0.3
	-0.625	-0.755	-0.628
Generational competition	0.0	-0.1	-0.1
	-0.617	-0.626	-0.652
White poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
African-American poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
White college %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006
African-American college %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
Latino college %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
Majority white district	0.0	0.0	0.0
	0.000	0.000	0.000
District population size	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3
	-0.313	-0.323	-0.316

Table 13 (continued)

Midwest	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	-0.144	-0.144	-0.146
West	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.159	-0.161	-0.159
Northeast	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
	-0.191	-0.194	-0.193
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037
African-American board %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Latino board %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
Constant	0.7	0.6	0.7
	-0.528	-0.529	-0.535
Observations	110	110	110
R-squared	0.373	0.385	0.374

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 14. Within-subject Analysis of Response to a White Parent but No Response to Either an African-American or Latino Parent (Full sample with Political/Election Controls)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
African-American parent	0.2** (0.084)	0.2** (0.085)	0.2** (0.084)
White parent first-email	0.4*** (0.085)	0.4*** (0.086)	0.4*** (0.085)
Hispanic noncitizen %	-0.0 (0.017)	0.0 (0.032)	-0.1 (0.038)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		-0.0 (0.080)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.1 (0.089)
Latino citizen %	0.0 (0.007)	0.0 (0.007)	0.0 (0.007)
African-American %	-0.0 (0.007)	-0.0 (0.007)	-0.0 (0.007)
Segregation	-0.2 (0.509)	0.0 (0.637)	-0.2 (0.508)
Generational competition	-0.1 (0.481)	-0.1 (0.484)	-0.4 (0.546)
White poverty %	-0.0 (0.014)	-0.0 (0.015)	-0.0 (0.014)
African-American poverty %	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)
Latino poverty %	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.006)
White college %	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.005)
African-American college %	-0.0 (0.004)	0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)
Latino college %	-0.0 (0.005)	-0.0 (0.005)	-0.0 (0.005)
Majority white district	-0.2 (0.226)	-0.2 (0.229)	-0.2 (0.226)
District population size	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)

Table 14 (continued)

Midwest	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2*
	-0.126	-0.126	-0.127
West	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	-0.133	-0.134	-0.133
Northeast	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	-0.159	-0.161	-0.159
Partisan elections %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.145)
African-American ward %	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Latino ward %	0.0	0.0	0.1
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.092)
% board members elected	0.2	0.2	0.3
	(0.445)	(0.447)	(0.445)
# school board members	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
	(0.445)	(0.447)	(0.445)
African-American board %	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Latino board %	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.7*	0.6	0.8*
	(0.405)	(0.411)	(0.411)
Observations	154	154	154
R-squared	0.294	0.296	0.302

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

5.14 Conclusion

In general, it appears that Latino immigration weighs on the minds of white school board members, even if nonconsciously expressed as subtle discrimination. I find in this analysis that white school board members are influenced by Latino immigration and the racial climate in their responsiveness to parents of varying race and ethnicity. My findings generally support my expectation that white school board members should carry “racial baggage” (see Brief et al., 2006) into their professional role and exhibit intergroup relations similar to those anticipated in Chapter 4, and

display subtle non-policy bias in favor of certain minority groups. I also find some limited evidence of white school board members assuming a representative role in opposition to negative racial climates, particularly in areas of sizeable Latino immigrant populations and high generational competition. It is possible in these areas that the board members recognize the constraints Latinos face within the community, as suggested by the research of Poterba (1995, 1996), and aim to better educational outcomes for these disadvantaged students (see Roch and Edwards, 2013).

I find stronger evidence in this chapter that Latino immigration appears to lead white school board members in less racially tolerant communities to be in opposition to Latinos. This finding is important because, as recent other research shows, non-policy discriminatory behaviors such as responsiveness to citizens can help predict discriminatory forms of public policies (e.g., Mendez and Grose, 2014). It is possible that the non-policy forms of racial discrimination uncovered in my research may turn into discriminatory or anti-immigration policies. My research also helps to further the recent emphasis of minority representation scholars (e.g., Matsubayashi and Rocha, 2012; Roch and Rushton, 2008; Roch and Edwards, 2013) and immigration scholars (e.g., Ha, 2010) on the role of racial contexts in public policy. In addition, while it is not clear that white school board members are showing more support for African-Americans as a countervailing force to emerging Latino influence as expected by past research on intergroup relations (e.g., Rocha, 2007), there is some evidence that the board members are forming stronger in-group bias as a possible other way to retain group status.

In particular, I find that white school board members take longer to respond to Latino parents in areas with more sizeable Latino noncitizen groups, especially in areas characterized by low group contact (e.g., residential racial segregation) and high group threat (e.g., generational competition). There is also some evidence that contrary to shifting their support from Latinos to African-Americans in these communities, the board members are also showing slightly less responsiveness to African-Americans. It appears as if negative racial attitudes in these social contexts may be generalizing to all groups, and not just Latinos, under some circumstances. I also find some evidence that white board members are responding more favorably to white parents as a result of anti-immigration sentiment. In particular, the board members appear to be addressing white parents in their e-mail responses with a more formal greeting, especially in segregated districts with sizeable Latino noncitizen populations; more formal greetings are likely an indicator of a perception of white parents having relatively high social status. I also see some evidence that the board members are less likely to use formal greetings when responding to Latino parents, also in areas with high Latino immigration and segregation.

One possible question about the use of the emails in this analysis is whether the educational level at which the emails are written might differently motivate the board members to respond to any of the racial groups examined here. Hanson and Hawley (2011) examined the responses of landlords to prospective tenants using a similar email audit design, but they also included low and high class (e.g., educational level) emails in addition to the racial group variable of the sender. I chose not to include such a distinction in my analysis because given that I examine

ethnic groups, and especially Latinos, it is possible that differences in education may be interpreted by the reader as differences in immigrant status. It was my objective in this analysis to have the board members make distinctions in their responsiveness based solely on racial and ethnic category. It is possible, however, that the board members may consider an educated minority parent relative to an educated white parent different from an uneducated minority parent relative to an uneducated white parent. Hanson and Hawley (2011) in fact suggests that to the extent that landlords are attempting to maximize profits based on the merit of tenants and, when faced with two highly educated individuals (one minority and one white), their responses to the tenants are less based on race than if the prospective tenants appeared to be less educated. Thus, I believe that using well composed (e.g., high education level) emails in this analysis also allows the board member the opportunity to base his or her response more on the race of the parent.

Field experimentation research of this kind is gaining in popularity among scholars attempting to demonstrate subtle forms of racial and ethnic bias in important policy areas. I contribute one of the few audits performed within public education and the first among school board members. School boards are intimately involved in the design and implementation of various education policies that have both direct and indirect effects on educational outcomes. In addition, representative bureaucracy scholars are calling for more individual level data on representative behavior that can help explain the likelihood of passive representation turning into active representation (e.g., Bradbury and Kellough, 2010).

In this analysis, I do not attempt to demonstrate active representation, but instead focus on the psychological determinants of active representation, such as the racial biases of school board members that are only likely to be revealed in subtle ways. I anticipate that the board members' expressions of subtle bias in this chapter are related to the more conscious, politically rational behaviors of white voters examined in Chapter 4.

This research provides an important extension of past group-level research on intergroup relations and the racial attitudes of whites within various racial environments, such as those characterized by group contact and group threat. In particular, I contribute some evidence to research on the "power thesis" (Giles and Evans, 1985, 1986; Rocha, 2007; Meier and Stewart, 1991) suggesting that whites react to the most socially distant and threatening racial and ethnic groups by shifting their support to a less threatening and countervailing group or opposing the more threatening grouping other ways. In my research, I provide direct evidence of the intergroup relations behavior of white school board members that was made by inference from group-level data in Chapter 4.

If white school board members are responding less favorably to Latinos in areas with sizeable Latino immigrant populations, then Latino interests may suffer, especially the most disadvantaged among them. The extent to which the type of non-policy discrimination that has been examined in this analysis influences public policy, however, is a subject for future research.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The focus of this dissertation is racial partiality and whether whites, either as citizen voters or as school board members, express racial partiality toward Latinos or African-Americans under certain contextual circumstances. I examine racial partiality within the setting of representative bureaucracy in two ways. First, I consider whether the role of racial partiality among white voters in forming interracial political coalitions and, consequently, passive representation on school boards is conditional on the racial environment. Second, I consider whether the role of racial partiality in influencing the responsiveness of school board members to parents from various racial groups is also conditional on the racial environment.

The primary question of this dissertation is thus: How does the community racial climate in school districts influence attitudes toward Latino immigration and, consequently, Latino representation within public school districts? I first examine the level of passive representation on school boards in terms of the level of Latino and African-American membership on school boards. In doing so, I consider past research on contextually-determined racial attitudes in public education (e.g., Meier and Stewart, 1991; Rocha, 2007) and whether white voters in school board elections alter their support for Latino and African-American school board candidates based on the level of Latino immigration within the community. Certain racial groups (e.g., whites) may be more threatened by groups who are more socially distant from their own group (Giles and Evans 1985, 1986), such as would be especially likely with

culturally distinct, non-native Latinos. As whites' interests are threatened, they may be more likely to shift their political support from Latinos to a politically countervailing group, such as African-Americans. That heightened anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. is on the rise, especially as it relates to Latinos (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008; Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004), provides even more basis for suspecting that whites are responding negatively to the presence of sizeable non-native Latino populations.

I examined white voter behavior by making inferences of white-Latino and white-African-American political coalitions from aggregate election results (e.g., the percentages of Latinos and African-Americans on school boards). Bradbury and Kellough (2011), however, criticize much representative bureaucracy research for making inferences of individual-level behavior from group-level data, commonly referred to as an "ecological fallacy." In order to overcome this methodological limitation, I next extended my research by making direct observations of the behavior of white school board members and, in particular, their responsiveness to white, Latino and African-American parents. I expected white school board members to exhibit the same racial attitudes as white voters during school board elections because, as Brief et al. (2006) argue, individuals carry their "racial baggage" from the community into the workplace. Given that school board members are political figures, I also expected that their racial biases would be muted, so I conducted an e-mail audit field experiment (e.g., Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Hanson, Hawley and Taylor, 2011) designed to help elicit the subtle racial biases held by school board members. An e-mail audit field experiment "can reliably document

discrimination in a fashion that is difficult to debate” (Quillian, 2006) due, in part, to randomization of other factors that may be associated with the racial behavior of the audited subjects and also due to eliciting responses of the subjects that occur during the normal course of the subjects’ daily affairs (Mendez and Grose, 2014).

Mendez and Grose (2014) refer to personal racial biases among public officials as discriminatory intent, which may help to explain the passage of certain discriminatory public policies. In this dissertation, I do not go so far as to examine the presence of active representation, but I expect that an understanding of board members’ discriminatory intent will help explain the passage of more discriminatory policies in the future. It is important to study the discriminatory intent of school board members because they are known to directly and indirectly affect various important educational outcomes within school districts (Meier et al., 2004). Little is known, however, about the role of white public officials in producing active representation. Emerging research suggests that white public officials play an important role in increasing or decreasing the net benefits of active representation (e.g., Hinderer and Young, 1998; Lim, 2006), making a better understanding of white representatives’ personal racial biases an important contribution to representative bureaucracy scholarship.

Regarding both of my empirical analyses, I did not expect whites’ reactions to Latino immigration to be consistent across the U.S. The U.S. has become increasingly multiracial and multiethnic, making it unlikely that whites’ tolerance of Latino immigration is the same across the country. Thus, I expected that white voters and white school board members should respond with greater social distance and more

antagonism to Latino immigration in communities with negative racial climates. Pettigrew (2009) argues that the racial attitudes (e.g., prejudice) developed in one setting transfer and influence the racial attitudes developed toward another group in another setting. I argued in this dissertation that certain aspects of the racial climate help to explain whites' tolerance of Latino immigration, which is an emerging and relatively new threat to whites' interests, especially within public education.

I characterized the general racial climate within school districts by drawing upon two extensively researched theories on the link between racial context and racial attitudes—group contact theory and group threat theory. These two intergroup relations theories suggest two contradictory outcomes of the racial environment based on exposure to various out-groups. On the one hand, group contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) argues that contact or proximity to members of other groups reduces ignorance and improves understanding and acceptance of disadvantaged or excluded groups. On the other hand, group threat theory (Key, 1949; Blalock, 1967) argues that the presence of sizeable out-groups threatens the dominant social, economic or cultural status of the majority group, leading to greater prejudice and in-group bias.

I expected that whites in communities with low racial and ethnic tolerance will have greater social distance with Latino immigrants and be more threatened by them. Social distance is a measure of the “degree of identification with one’s own group and perceived external threat from other groups” (Giles and Evans, 1990). In the U.S., whites have historically had greater social distance with African-Americans

than Latinos due, in part, to the legacy of slavery and racism there. The rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S., however, has positioned Latinos as the likely greater threat, thus increasing the social distance between whites and Latinos and decreasing the relative social distance between whites and African-Americans. Drawing on the concept of social distance, group contact theory, and group threat theory, I made the following primary hypothesis in this dissertation, and that is: Whites will respond more negatively to Latino immigration in communities with low racial tolerance, such as would be expected in communities characterized by low intergroup contact (e.g., residential racial segregation) and also in communities characterized by high intergroup threat (e.g., generational competition).

I expected areas with more segregation to have generally lower levels of racial and ethnic tolerance due to the lack of contact between members of various racial and ethnic groups within these areas (e.g., Dixon and Rosenbaum, 2004). I also expected areas with relatively large youthful minority populations relative to the size of the elderly white population to experience high levels of competition over public resources, especially within the area of public education (Poterba 1985, 1986). Poterba (1997) argues that “generational differences in the net benefits from publicly provided education can lead to tensions in the political processes in which education budgets are set.”

Overall, I find support for my hypotheses regarding both white voters and white school board members. I found in the first empirical analysis of passive representation on school boards that the strength of the relationship between Latino immigration and the membership of Latinos and African-Americans on

school boards is in fact conditional on the community racial climate. It appears that Latino immigration boosts African-American membership on school boards and reduces Latino representation, particularly in school districts characterized by low intergroup contact or high intergroup threat. I draw upon the social distance and power relations thesis (Giles and Evans 1985, 1986; Meier and Stewart, 1991; Rocha, 2007) to explain these relationships using the likelihood of white-Latino and white-African-American political coalitions during school board elections. It appears that white voters' greater social distance with Latinos due to sizeable Latino immigration is leading them to shift their support away from Latinos and possibly toward African-Americans. The negative reactions of whites appear to be stronger in areas in which I expect low racial tolerance, such as in areas with low intergroup contact (e.g., high racial segregation) or high intergroup threat (e.g., high generational competition).

In the second empirical analysis of white school board member responsiveness to parents, I found that white school board members appear to also be influenced by the racial climate. In particular, I found evidence that Latino immigration leads white school board members in less racially tolerant communities to be less responsive to Latino parents. I measured responsiveness using nine different measures of subtle racial bias in the e-mail responses by school board members, and I found the most clear evidence of a racial climate link using the time-to-response variable. The school board members took more time to respond to Latino parents in districts with sizeable non-native Latino populations and also in districts that had higher levels of segregation or generational

competition. I found mixed evidence, however, that whites are shifting their support toward African-American residents, possibly as a countervailing force to the threats posed by Latino immigration. I also found some limited evidence of an alternative hypothesis that white school board members are assuming a representative role in opposition to negative racial climates and climates that are likely to harm the educational outcomes of certain minority groups. If it were the case in these areas that the board members recognize the constraints Latinos face within the community, as suggested by the research of Poterba (1995, 1996), then they may aim to better the educational outcomes for these disadvantaged students (see Roch and Edwards, 2013). I also found some limited but intriguing evidence that minority passive representation on school boards constrains or generally influences the behavior of the white, non-minority board members. Based on past research suggesting this should be the case (e.g., Hinderer and Young, 1998), this is an area of immediate follow-up and extension of the current research based on available data. I suspect that with further investigation, it will be possible to better uncover whether the presence of Latinos or African-Americans on school boards affects the responsiveness of the white board members to Latino or African-American parents.

Until recently, most intergroup relations research has focused on white-African-American relations. Also up until the past decade or two, most research found that African-American but not immigrant populations produced negative out-group attitudes (e.g., Citrin et al., 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Emerging research, however, suggests that the presence of sizeable immigrant populations produce anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g., Hood and Morris, 1998; Morris, 2000). It is

possible that the earlier non-findings related to immigration were due to not distinguishing immigrants by nationality or origin (e.g., Latino, Eastern Europe). It is also possible that the non-findings are due to the recent emergence of a backlash against immigration, much of which has been targeted at Latinos (Chavez, 2001). Asian immigrants, on the other hand, have experienced more favorable public opinion and are less culturally isolated than are Latino immigrants (Alba and Nee, 2003; Huntington, 2004). In addition, Ha (2010) argues that whites but not African-Americans respond negatively to proximity with Latinos, leading to stronger anti-immigrant sentiments, and anti-immigrant sentiment varies across geographic areas in general and group threat and group contact related characteristics of these areas in particular. Thus, it is important to consider Latino immigration as a special group within intergroup relations research, distinct from other groups in the formation of anti-immigrant attitudes. My findings also suggest a necessary update to the study of Rocha (2007) based on changing attitudes toward Latino immigration and the increasingly multiracial and multiethnic contexts within many U.S. locales.

This dissertation makes three major contributions to the representative bureaucracy literature. First, I help bring to light the importance of considering the racial environment within representative bureaucracy research. Growing evidence suggests that racial diversity within society affects public policy at various levels of government (e.g., Matsubayashi and Rocha, 2012; Roch and Rushton, 2008). I extend past research on the social and racial determinants of passive representation (e.g., Meier and Stewart, 1991; Rocha, 2007) to consider more fully the racial

climate at the local level. I do so by incorporating variables constructed from much research on group contact theory and group threat theory. Ignoring racial contexts has been a major oversight of much representative bureaucracy research because not only is the U.S. becoming increasingly racially and ethnically diverse, but, “the relationship between multiracial context and public opinion on immigration may be at the core of many challenges facing ethnically diverse American society” (Ha, 2010:29).

Second, I extend my theoretically-informed expectations of white citizen behavior to test whether white school board members are similarly influenced by their racial environments. I do so based on the expectation that school board members have “discriminatory intent” (Mendez and Grose, 2014) or racial biases that may lead them to support more or less discriminatory public policies. School board members have been shown to directly and indirectly influence a variety of educational outcomes, so it is important to consider the personal biases among school board members that can make beneficial outcomes for minorities more or less likely. I focus on white school board members in particular because not only are they the subject of much intergroup relations research, but emerging representative bureaucracy research suggests that white public officials can act to influence the likelihood of active representation (Sowa and Selden, 2003; Hinderer and Young, 1998; Lim, 2006). Most research to-date has examined minority passive representation or the racial and ethnic behaviors of minority public officials, largely neglecting the role of white public officials in producing net policy outcome gains. My research also helps to provide a basis for studying the behavior of public officials

within representative bureaucracy research that takes into account the community racial context.

Third, I test my power-relations expectations (Giles and Evans, 1985, 1986) of white-Latino and white-African-American relations in the first empirical chapter by using individual level data gathered with a randomized e-mail audit field experiment, heeding the call of Bradbury and Kellough (2011) to gather more individual-level data as part of representative bureaucracy research. The e-mail audit is particularly beneficial when considering subtle forms of racial bias, which would be expected among possibly politically-minded officials such as school board members.

I anticipate that there are two possible methodological limitations of the research in this dissertation. First, I characterize the likely level of racial tolerance among residents from several socio-demographic variables, such as segregation and generational competition. I do not, however, directly survey white voters' attitudes toward Latinos and African-Americans, which of course would be a better test of my intergroup relations hypotheses. I base my expectations of whites' racial attitudes on the intergroup relations research of Meier and Stewart (1991) and Rocha (2007), and I link their research with group contact and group threat theories to make a more nuanced test of the social distance / power relations thesis of Giles and Evans (1985, 1986). I argued that considering whites more than other groups are especially likely to be antagonized by Latino immigration (Ha, 2010; Huntington, 2004), the contextually-determined racial attitudes of whites should be especially important in determining the formation of

political coalitions with Latinos or African-Americans. My second empirical chapter allows me to further test this context-racial attitudes link using individual-level data. My research provides some new support for the group contact and group threat theses within representative bureaucracy research.

A second possible limitation of this research is my interpretation of the group climate variables (segregation and generational competition), particularly as they relate to the possible problem of self-selection. If people who are more prejudiced avoid living in residentially integrated areas, then the beneficial effects of integration on racial attitudes can become inflated. A number of studies have dealt with this concern using improved survey techniques and statistical analyses (e.g., Gay, 2006; Oliver and Wong, 2003) and the consensus of much of this research is that the racial context has an important and independent effect on racial attitudes, often even stronger than that of self-selection. The same reasoning holds for my consideration of generational competition, however, if anything, threat variables should underestimate the role of the racial climate in the formation of negative racial attitudes (e.g., self-selection would lead prejudiced individuals to avoid school districts with large youthful minority populations). Putnam (2007) and Rudolph and Popp (2010) similarly discredit self-selection as the dominant explanation for the relationship between group threat and negative intergroup relations (e.g., trust) because self-selection would imply that those with low intergroup trust would choose to move to the most racially and ethnically diverse places—an unlikely occurrence.

Overall, I am able to solidly base the interpretation of my findings on an emerging area of representative bureaucracy research on school board representation and also on two well-established theories of intergroup relations—group contact theory and group threat theory. I also use an experimental method and e-mail audit design that is able to accurately measure racial biases among public officials, linking these findings of white racial bias with the inferred racial biases of white voters. I explain anti-Latino immigrant sentiment based on the expectation that whites should be less tolerant of Latino immigrant in communities already characterized by low racial tolerance, which would be expected in areas of low group contact and high group threat. In general, I find evidence that not only do white voters respond more negatively to Latino immigration in low racial tolerance school districts, but so do white school board members.

Latino immigrants are a disadvantaged group within the educational system, often needing extra resources and teaching assistance. As the anti-immigrant backlash in the U.S., shows, however, Latino immigrants already face public resistance that will be made even worse if their sizeable presence within certain communities limits their political representation and responsiveness to their concerns on public school boards. The findings in this dissertation on school board member discriminatory intent will also be useful in future research on the link between racial context and active representation, particularly as it applies to explaining the presence of discriminatory public policies.

APPENDIX A

Table 15. The Effects of Current Racial Group Sizes on School Board Membership Parity

	African-American Membership Parity			Latino Membership Parity		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
School District Residents						
African-American %	0.0 (0.010)	0.0 (0.010)	0.0 (0.010)	-0.0 (0.003)	-0.0 (0.003)	-0.0 (0.003)
Latino citizen %	0.0** (0.010)	0.0** (0.010)	0.0 (0.011)	0.0*** (0.003)	0.0** (0.003)	0.0 (0.004)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0 (0.026)	-0.0 (0.047)	0.0 (0.045)	-0.0 (0.008)	0.0 (0.015)	0.0 (0.014)
Latino noncitizen % x Segregation		-0.1 (0.113)			-0.1* (0.036)	
Latino noncitizen % x Generational competition			-0.1 (0.107)			-0.1** (0.034)
Racial Climate						
Segregation	2.3*** (0.800)	2.7*** (0.978)	2.4*** (0.800)	0.5* (0.254)	0.8** (0.310)	0.5* (0.254)
Generational competition	0.1 (0.816)	0.1 (0.818)	1.1 (1.067)	0.1 (0.259)	0.0 (0.259)	0.5 (0.338)
Majority-white district	-0.2 (0.450)	-0.2 (0.451)	-0.3 (0.454)	-0.0 (0.143)	-0.0 (0.143)	-0.1 (0.144)
Group SES						
Latino % college	0.0 (0.010)	0.0 (0.010)	0.0 (0.010)	0.0 (0.003)	0.0 (0.003)	0.0* (0.003)
African-American % college	-0.0 (0.007)	-0.0 (0.007)	-0.0 (0.007)	-0.0 (0.002)	0.0 (0.002)	0.0 (0.002)
White % college	0.0 (0.009)	0.0 (0.009)	-0.0 (0.009)	-0.0 (0.003)	-0.0 (0.003)	-0.0 (0.003)
Latino % poverty	-0.0 (0.009)	-0.0 (0.009)	-0.0 (0.009)	-0.0* (0.003)	-0.0** (0.003)	-0.0** (0.003)
African-American % poverty	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.002)	-0.0 (0.002)	-0.0 (0.002)
White % poverty	0.0* (0.021)	0.0* (0.021)	0.0* (0.021)	0.0*** (0.007)	0.0*** (0.007)	0.0*** (0.007)
# of school board members	0.1 (0.060)	0.1 (0.060)	0.1 (0.060)	-0.0 (0.019)	-0.0 (0.019)	-0.0 (0.019)
School district population size	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)
Region						
Midwest	0.3 (0.206)	0.3 (0.206)	0.3 (0.207)	0.2** (0.065)	0.2** (0.065)	0.2** (0.065)
West	0.1 (0.225)	0.1 (0.225)	0.1 (0.226)	0.1** (0.071)	0.1** (0.071)	0.1* (0.071)
Northeast	0.2 (0.271)	0.2 (0.272)	0.2 (0.271)	0.1 (0.086)	0.1 (0.086)	0.1 (0.086)
Constant	-0.7 (0.746)	-0.8 (0.751)	-0.7 (0.746)	-0.2 (0.237)	-0.3 (0.238)	-0.2 (0.236)
Observations	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018
R-squared	0.047	0.047	0.049	0.067	0.070	0.071

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses

Table 16. The Effects of Changes in Racial/Ethnic Group Sizes on Board Membership

	African-American School Board Membership			Latino School Board Membership		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
School District Residents						
African-American % change	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.004)	0.0 (0.003)	0.0 (0.003)	0.0 (0.003)
Latino citizen % change	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.006)	-0.0 (0.010)	-0.0** (0.005)	-0.0** (0.005)	-0.0 (0.008)
Latino noncitizen % change	0.0 (0.002)	-0.0 (0.005)	0.0 (0.002)	-0.0 (0.001)	-0.0 (0.004)	-0.0 (0.001)
Latino noncitizen % change x Segregation		0.0 (0.016)			0.0 (0.013)	
Latino noncitizen % change x Generational competition			0.0 (0.056)			-0.0 (0.048)
Racial Climate						
Segregation	38.4*** (4.910)	37.5*** (5.301)	38.4*** (4.912)	0.4 (4.185)	-0.1 (4.519)	0.4 (4.187)
Generational competition	14.8*** (4.169)	14.8*** (4.172)	12.6** (6.333)	-3.9 (3.554)	-4.0 (3.556)	-2.4 (5.398)
Majority-white district	-3.6* (1.981)	-3.7* (1.989)	-3.7* (1.990)	-33.6*** (1.689)	-33.6*** (1.695)	-33.5*** (1.697)
Group SES						
Latino % college	-0.0 (0.060)	-0.0 (0.060)	-0.0 (0.060)	-0.0 (0.051)	-0.0 (0.051)	-0.0 (0.051)
African-American % college	0.0 (0.042)	0.0 (0.042)	0.0 (0.042)	0.0 (0.036)	0.0 (0.036)	0.0 (0.036)
White % college	0.0 (0.055)	0.0 (0.055)	0.0 (0.055)	0.0 (0.047)	0.0 (0.047)	0.0 (0.047)
Latino % poverty	-0.0 (0.056)	-0.0 (0.056)	-0.0 (0.056)	-0.2*** (0.048)	-0.2*** (0.048)	-0.2*** (0.048)
African-American % poverty	-0.1* (0.036)	-0.1* (0.036)	-0.1* (0.036)	0.0 (0.031)	0.0 (0.031)	0.0 (0.031)
White % poverty	0.5*** (0.124)	0.5*** (0.124)	0.5*** (0.124)	0.6*** (0.105)	0.6*** (0.105)	0.6*** (0.105)
# of school board members	0.2 (0.372)	0.2 (0.372)	0.2 (0.373)	0.0 (0.317)	0.0 (0.317)	0.0 (0.318)
School district population size	0.0** (0.000)	0.0** (0.000)	0.0** (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)
Region						
Midwest	2.7** (1.299)	2.7** (1.301)	2.8** (1.304)	-1.9* (1.107)	-2.0* (1.109)	-2.0* (1.111)
West	-3.6*** (1.371)	-3.6*** (1.373)	-3.5** (1.382)	2.5** (1.169)	2.4** (1.170)	2.4** (1.178)

Table 16 (continued)

Northeast	5.4***	5.4***	5.4***	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6
	(1.704)	(1.705)	(1.706)	(1.452)	(1.453)	(1.455)
Constant	-11.0***	-10.7**	-10.5**	35.2***	35.4***	34.9***
	(4.241)	(4.306)	(4.365)	(3.615)	(3.671)	(3.721)
Observations	1,006	1,006	1,006	1,006	1,006	1,006
R-squared	0.219	0.219	0.219	0.485	0.485	0.485

Note: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses

Table 17. Passive Representation Levels conditional on Latino Citizen Group Size Rather than Latino Noncitizen Group Size

	African-American Membership %			Latino Membership %		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
School District Residents						
African-American %	1.1*** (0.047)	1.1*** (0.047)	1.1*** (0.049)	0.0 (0.043)	-0.0 (0.043)	-0.1** (0.044)
Latino citizen %	0.0 (0.050)	-0.1 (0.081)	0.0 (0.058)	0.8*** (0.046)	1.0*** (0.074)	1.0*** (0.052)
Latino noncitizen %	0.2 (0.124)	0.2 (0.125)	0.2 (0.126)	0.1 (0.115)	0.1 (0.114)	0.2* (0.113)
Latino citizen % x Segregation		0.4 (0.244)			-0.9*** (0.224)	
Latino citizen % x Generational competition			0.1 (0.207)			-1.4*** (0.186)
Racial Climate						
Segregation	14.8*** (3.878)	9.7* (5.062)	14.8*** (3.887)	-0.4 (3.575)	11.7** (4.633)	1.1 (3.488)
Generational competition	-13.7*** (3.957)	-13.5*** (3.956)	-15.0*** (5.678)	-26.7*** (3.648)	-27.2*** (3.621)	0.4 (5.095)
Majority-white district	-0.7 (2.183)	-0.1 (2.214)	-0.6 (2.214)	-9.4*** (2.012)	-10.8*** (2.027)	-11.9*** (1.987)
Group SES						
Latino % college	-0.0 (0.047)	-0.0 (0.047)	-0.0 (0.047)	0.0 (0.043)	0.0 (0.043)	0.1** (0.042)
African-American % college	0.0 (0.032)	0.0 (0.032)	0.0 (0.032)	-0.0 (0.029)	-0.0 (0.029)	-0.0 (0.028)
White % college	0.0 (0.042)	0.0 (0.042)	0.0 (0.043)	0.1* (0.039)	0.1* (0.039)	0.0 (0.039)
Latino % poverty	-0.0 (0.044)	-0.0 (0.044)	-0.0 (0.044)	0.0 (0.041)	0.0 (0.040)	-0.0 (0.040)
African-American % poverty	0.0 (0.027)	0.0 (0.027)	0.0 (0.027)	0.1** (0.025)	0.1** (0.025)	0.0 (0.025)
White % poverty	0.3*** (0.100)	0.3*** (0.100)	0.3*** (0.100)	0.1 (0.092)	0.1 (0.092)	0.1 (0.090)
# of school board members	0.2 (0.289)	0.2 (0.289)	0.2 (0.290)	0.0 (0.267)	0.0 (0.265)	-0.1 (0.260)
School district population size	0.0** (0.000)	0.0* (0.000)	0.0** (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)
Region						
Midwest	4.3*** (1.001)	4.4*** (1.000)	4.3*** (1.002)	1.2 (0.922)	1.1 (0.916)	1.5* (0.899)
West	5.2*** (1.093)	5.3*** (1.094)	5.2*** (1.093)	0.4 (1.007)	0.2 (1.001)	0.5 (0.981)
Northeast	6.5*** (1.314)	6.4*** (1.313)	6.4*** (1.314)	-0.3 (1.211)	-0.2 (1.202)	-0.2 (1.180)
Constant	-13.1*** (3.616)	-12.4*** (3.635)	-13.1*** (3.620)	4.6 (3.333)	3.1 (3.328)	5.5* (3.249)
Observations	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018	1,018
R-squared	0.518	0.519	0.518	0.637	0.643	0.656

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses

Table 18. Passive Representation Levels conditional on Latino Noncitizen Group Size within Majority White Districts

	African-American Membership %			Latino Membership %		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
School District Residents						
African-American %	1.0*** (0.053)	1.0*** (0.053)	1.0*** (0.054)	0.1 (0.037)	0.1 (0.037)	0.0 (0.038)
Latino citizen %	0.0 (0.071)	0.1 (0.071)	0.0 (0.072)	0.6*** (0.050)	0.6*** (0.050)	0.6*** (0.050)
Latino noncitizen %	0.3* (0.165)	-1.0*** (0.323)	1.0** (0.397)	-0.2** (0.115)	-0.2 (0.228)	0.2 (0.277)
Latino citizen % x Segregation		3.9*** (0.808)			-0.1 (0.570)	
Latino citizen % x Generational competition			-1.9* (0.954)			-1.1 (0.666)
Racial Climate						
Segregation	14.0*** (3.969)	0.7 (4.800)	13.1*** (3.988)	5.1* (2.766)	5.3 (3.387)	4.6* (2.781)
Generational competition	-11.8** (4.631)	-7.9* (4.649)	-7.0 (5.249)	-10.0*** (3.227)	-10.1*** (3.280)	-7.3** (3.661)
Group SES						
Latino % college	0.0 (0.045)	0.0 (0.044)	0.0 (0.046)	0.0 (0.031)	0.0 (0.031)	0.0 (0.032)
African-American % college	0.0 (0.031)	-0.0 (0.031)	0.0 (0.031)	-0.0 (0.022)	-0.0 (0.022)	-0.0 (0.022)
White % college	0.1 (0.041)	0.0 (0.041)	0.0 (0.042)	0.0* (0.029)	0.0* (0.029)	0.0 (0.029)
Latino % poverty	-0.0 (0.042)	0.0 (0.042)	-0.0 (0.042)	-0.0 (0.029)	-0.0 (0.030)	-0.0 (0.030)
African-American % poverty	0.0 (0.027)	0.0 (0.027)	0.0 (0.027)	0.0 (0.019)	0.0 (0.019)	0.0 (0.019)
White % poverty	0.3*** (0.104)	0.3*** (0.103)	0.4*** (0.104)	0.1 (0.072)	0.1 (0.073)	0.1 (0.073)
# of school board members	-0.0 (0.278)	0.1 (0.277)	-0.1 (0.278)	0.2 (0.194)	0.2 (0.195)	0.2 (0.194)
School district population size	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)	-0.0 (0.000)
Region						
Midwest	4.6*** (0.968)	4.4*** (0.957)	4.8*** (0.971)	1.0 (0.674)	1.1 (0.675)	1.2* (0.677)
West	4.5*** (1.135)	4.7*** (1.123)	4.2*** (1.144)	2.4*** (0.791)	2.4*** (0.793)	2.2*** (0.798)
Northeast	6.2*** (1.286)	5.3*** (1.285)	6.2*** (1.284)	0.1 (0.896)	0.1 (0.907)	0.1 (0.896)
Constant	-13.5*** (2.682)	-10.7*** (2.713)	-14.2*** (2.704)	-6.1*** (1.869)	-6.1*** (1.914)	-6.5*** (1.886)
Observations	940	940	940	940	940	940
R-squared	0.435	0.449	0.438	0.252	0.252	0.254

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses

Appendix B

Parental E-mail Addresses

Table 19. Parental E-mail addresses

White Parent	Latino Parent	African-American Parent
allison.schroeder1980@gmail.com	guadalupe.velazquez1980@gmail.com	aisha.washington1979@gmail.com
anne.mueller1979@gmail.com	isabel.vazquez1979@gmail.com	ebony.rivers1980@gmail.com
carrie.novak1980@gmail.com	Josefina.barajas1980@gmail.com	keisha.booker1980@gmail.com
emily.koch1980@gmail.com	juanita.juarez1980@gmail.com	kenya.banks1980@gmail.com
jill.yoder1980@gmail.com	lola.huerta1980@gmail.com	lakisha.jefferson1980@gmail.com
kristen.schwartz1980@gmail.com	lucia.zavala1979@gmail.com	latonya.jackson1980@gmail.com
laurie.krueger1980@gmail.com	margarita.meza1980@gmail.com	latoya.gaines1980@gmail.com
meredith.schneider1980@gmail.com	maria.orozco1979@gmail.com	tanisha.mosley1980@gmail.com
sara.schmitt1979@gmail.com	rosa.ibarra1980@gmail.com	tamika.dorsey1980@gmail.com

Appendix C

Restricted Sample (Other Results)

Table 20. Response from Board Member Within 24 Hours (First Round); Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)	(49)	(50)	(51)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0	0.0	0.1***	0.1***	0.1	0.2	0.1
	(0.033)	(0.074)	(0.100)	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.132)	(0.071)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.2			-0.3***			-0.4	
		(0.168)			(0.085)			(0.397)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.1			-0.2***			-0.0
			(0.231)			(0.089)			(0.222)
Latino citizen %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
African-American %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0**	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Segregation	0.4	-0.2	0.3	-0.8	0.3	-0.6	0.6	1.4	0.6
	(0.891)	(1.067)	(0.962)	(0.544)	(0.625)	(0.520)	(0.930)	(1.301)	(0.962)
Generational competition	-0.4	-0.6	-0.6	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.2	0.6	0.3
	(1.007)	(1.015)	(1.227)	(0.532)	(0.503)	(0.558)	(1.056)	(1.141)	(1.389)
White poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0**	-0.0**	-0.0**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
African-American poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Latino poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0**	0.0**	0.0**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
White college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
African-American college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Latino college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Majority white district	-0.6	-0.2	-0.6	0.6*	0.3	0.6**	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.485)	(0.622)	(0.511)	(0.290)	(0.283)	(0.276)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population size	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.179)	(0.169)	(0.173)	(0.203)	(0.206)	(0.206)
West	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.173)	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.227)	(0.235)	(0.233)
Northeast	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1

Table 20 (continued)

	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.247)	(0.289)	(0.273)	(0.277)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.265)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
African-American board %	0.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Latino board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	1.4**	1.1	1.4*	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.1*	0.8	1.0
	(0.697)	(0.786)	(0.712)	(0.570)	(0.538)	(0.545)	(0.630)	(0.713)	(0.660)
Observations	79	79	79	86	86	86	61	61	61
R-squared	0.209	0.223	0.211	0.195	0.293	0.280	0.332	0.346	0.332

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 21. Response from Board Member on a Weekend (First Round); Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0
	(0.023)	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.085)	(0.045)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		-0.1			0.1			0.1	
		(0.118)			(0.053)			(0.257)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			-0.1			-0.0			0.1
			(0.161)			(0.055)			(0.141)
Latino citizen %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
African-American %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Segregation	-0.2	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.4	-0.1	0.3	-0.1	0.1
	(0.621)	(0.748)	(0.670)	(0.319)	(0.387)	(0.322)	(0.598)	(0.842)	(0.613)
Generational competition	1.0	1.0	1.2	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	0.2	0.1	-0.3
	(0.702)	(0.712)	(0.855)	(0.312)	(0.311)	(0.346)	(0.679)	(0.739)	(0.885)
White poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
African-American poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
White college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
African-American college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Latino college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Majority white district	0.2	0.0	0.2	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.338)	(0.436)	(0.356)	(0.170)	(0.175)	(0.171)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population size	0.0*	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.131)
West	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.152)	(0.148)
Northeast	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.172)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.172)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.169)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)
African-American board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0

Table 21 (continued)

	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Latino board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	-0.5	-0.3	-0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.486)	(0.551)	(0.496)	(0.334)	(0.333)	(0.337)	(0.405)	(0.462)	(0.420)
Observations	79	79	79	86	86	86	61	61	61
R-squared	0.280	0.284	0.282	0.215	0.229	0.215	0.262	0.267	0.277

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 22. Board Member Response – Word Count (First Round); Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	10.7*	0.4	2.0	-2.1	-5.4	-11.0	1.0	25.4	12.0
	(5.477)	(12.452)	(16.633)	(3.624)	(5.416)	(7.180)	(6.780)	(23.971)	(12.711)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		25.9			11.5			-76.6	
		(28.127)			(13.968)			(72.232)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			21.4			20.7			-40.9
			(38.562)			(14.384)			(40.028)
Latino citizen %	-0.9	-0.1	-0.4	2.5*	2.5*	3.0**	-2.3	-2.9	-2.2
	(1.872)	(2.082)	(2.114)	(1.424)	(1.427)	(1.443)	(3.498)	(3.541)	(3.497)
African-American %	-0.9	-0.4	-0.5	0.4	0.7	0.4	1.3	0.7	0.8
	(2.446)	(2.526)	(2.576)	(1.360)	(1.408)	(1.349)	(1.814)	(1.899)	(1.881)
Segregation	-32.2	-122.5	-64.0	-137.1	-185.4*	-145.8*	-346.7**	-171.4	-309.5*
	(148.834)	(178.416)	(160.313)	(84.054)	(102.523)	(83.598)	(169.577)	(236.595)	(173.358)
Generational competition	-231.4	-252.1	-295.2	96.7	98.3	42.6	-3.7	79.1	159.9
	(168.111)	(169.832)	(204.469)	(82.157)	(82.379)	(89.743)	(192.545)	(207.497)	(250.298)
White poverty %	3.1	3.5	3.1	-6.5***	-6.7***	-6.9***	-5.3	-5.0	-4.8
	(2.645)	(2.671)	(2.662)	(2.272)	(2.291)	(2.270)	(3.964)	(3.969)	(3.982)
African-American poverty %	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-0.6	-0.5	-0.4	2.9**	2.7**	2.7**
	(1.037)	(1.041)	(1.043)	(0.794)	(0.813)	(0.805)	(1.270)	(1.281)	(1.285)
Latino poverty %	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.1*	2.0*	2.0*	0.3	0.1	0.3
	(1.378)	(1.380)	(1.402)	(1.108)	(1.111)	(1.100)	(1.455)	(1.463)	(1.455)
White college %	-0.5	-0.4	-0.2	-2.5**	-2.7**	-2.3**	-0.7	-0.6	-0.9
	(1.133)	(1.136)	(1.219)	(1.085)	(1.106)	(1.084)	(1.365)	(1.366)	(1.378)
African-American college %	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.2	0.1	-0.0	-0.4	-0.3	-0.4
	(1.035)	(1.037)	(1.048)	(0.642)	(0.646)	(0.648)	(1.235)	(1.240)	(1.235)
Latino college %	0.5	0.4	0.4	1.2	1.3	1.0	-0.3	-0.2	0.0
	(1.420)	(1.428)	(1.466)	(1.340)	(1.356)	(1.335)	(1.418)	(1.418)	(1.448)
Majority white district	120.7	180.9*	134.5	62.1	71.9	60.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(80.919)	(104.062)	(85.139)	(44.770)	(46.435)	(44.434)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population size	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	-17.3	-12.5	-17.9	56.7**	57.7**	49.6*	35.4	29.1	35.5
	(30.515)	(31.004)	(30.709)	(27.625)	(27.720)	(27.835)	(37.091)	(37.511)	(37.072)
West	-38.1	-32.6	-35.0	24.3	24.9	25.3	51.2	40.0	43.9
	(28.897)	(29.549)	(29.607)	(27.360)	(27.436)	(27.149)	(41.391)	(42.649)	(41.975)
Northeast	10.6	8.8	5.3	12.5	10.8	5.3	58.7	60.5	54.9
	(39.856)	(39.954)	(41.227)	(44.645)	(44.802)	(44.571)	(47.580)	(47.540)	(47.701)
# school board members	3.2	4.6	4.7	10.3	10.4	11.7	6.4	7.2	6.4

Table 22 (continued)

	(7.685)	(7.847)	(8.175)	(9.603)	(9.627)	(9.576)	(8.316)	(8.340)	(8.312)
African-American board %	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.0	0.3	0.0
	(1.036)	(1.079)	(1.057)	(0.964)	(0.969)	(0.960)	(0.950)	(0.972)	(0.950)
Latino board %	0.5	0.4	0.4	-0.3	-0.1	0.0	0.6	0.1	0.4
	(1.138)	(1.145)	(1.176)	(0.706)	(0.728)	(0.730)	(1.827)	(1.888)	(1.834)
Constant	-5.4	-61.3	-16.5	46.2	48.4	57.2	171.7	107.4	139.9
	(116.392)	(131.393)	(118.766)	(87.946)	(88.199)	(87.569)	(114.875)	(129.721)	(118.942)
Observations	79	79	79	86	86	86	61	61	61
R-squared	0.272	0.283	0.276	0.277	0.284	0.299	0.295	0.314	0.313

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 23. Board Member Response – Average Word Length (First Round);
Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0	-0.1	-0.2
	(0.030)	(0.067)	(0.089)	(0.046)	(0.069)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.305)	(0.158)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		-0.2			0.1			0.1	
		(0.152)			(0.178)			(0.920)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			-0.3			0.1			0.7
			(0.206)			(0.186)			(0.496)
Latino citizen %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.043)
African-American %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Segregation	0.2	0.8	0.6	1.1	0.6	1.1	1.3	1.2	0.6
	(0.805)	(0.963)	(0.857)	(1.073)	(1.309)	(1.081)	(2.132)	(3.015)	(2.149)
Generational competition	1.1	1.2	1.9*	0.3	0.3	0.1	-0.5	-0.5	-3.4
	(0.910)	(0.916)	(1.093)	(1.048)	(1.052)	(1.161)	(2.420)	(2.644)	(3.103)
White poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.049)
African-American poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Latino poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)
White college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0**	-0.0**	-0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
African-American college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Latino college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0**	0.0**	0.0**	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Majority white district	0.2	-0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.438)	(0.562)	(0.455)	(0.571)	(0.593)	(0.575)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population size	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	-0.6	-0.5	-0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.164)	(0.353)	(0.354)	(0.360)	(0.466)	(0.478)	(0.460)
West	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0
	(0.156)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.349)	(0.350)	(0.351)	(0.520)	(0.543)	(0.520)
Northeast	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.220)	(0.570)	(0.572)	(0.576)	(0.598)	(0.606)	(0.591)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2**	-0.2*	-0.2**
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.103)
African-American board %	0.0*	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0

Table 23 (continued)

	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Latino board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Constant	5.3***	5.7***	5.5***	6.1***	6.1***	6.1***	6.2***	6.3***	6.8***
	(0.630)	(0.709)	(0.635)	(1.122)	(1.126)	(1.133)	(1.444)	(1.653)	(1.474)
Observations	79	79	79	86	86	86	61	61	61
R-squared	0.222	0.238	0.245	0.208	0.215	0.212	0.329	0.329	0.364

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 24. Board Member Response – Use of Parent First Name (First Round);
Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	0.0	0.1	0.2*	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.036)	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.033)	(0.119)	(0.063)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		-0.2			0.2**			0.1	
		(0.185)			(0.095)			(0.359)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			-0.4			0.1			0.1
			(0.251)			(0.101)			(0.198)
Latino citizen %	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
African-American %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Segregation	0.4	1.3	1.0	0.4	-0.4	0.4	1.0	0.9	0.9
	(0.988)	(1.176)	(1.044)	(0.584)	(0.694)	(0.589)	(0.831)	(1.175)	(0.858)
Generational competition	-1.4	-1.2	-0.2	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.3
	(1.116)	(1.119)	(1.331)	(0.571)	(0.558)	(0.632)	(0.943)	(1.030)	(1.238)
White poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
African-American poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0*	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
White college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
African-American college %	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Latino college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Majority white district	0.7	0.1	0.4	-0.2	-0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.537)	(0.686)	(0.554)	(0.311)	(0.314)	(0.313)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population size	-0.0	-0.0*	-0.0**	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
	(0.203)	(0.204)	(0.200)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.196)	(0.182)	(0.186)	(0.183)
West	0.4**	0.4*	0.3*	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.192)	(0.195)	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.186)	(0.191)	(0.203)	(0.212)	(0.208)
Northeast	0.1	0.1	0.2	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.268)	(0.310)	(0.303)	(0.314)	(0.233)	(0.236)	(0.236)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
African-American board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0

Table 24 (continued)

	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Latino board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	-0.5	0.0	-0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.5	-0.4	-0.4
	(0.772)	(0.866)	(0.773)	(0.611)	(0.597)	(0.617)	(0.563)	(0.644)	(0.588)
Observations	79	79	79	86	86	86	61	61	61
R-squared	0.197	0.220	0.231	0.170	0.220	0.173	0.217	0.218	0.222

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 25. Board Member Response – Use of Kind Greeting Words (First Round);
Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
	(0.022)	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.132)	(0.070)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.0			0.1			-0.3	
		(0.113)			(0.080)			(0.397)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.1			-0.0			-0.0
			(0.153)			(0.085)			(0.221)
Latino citizen %	-0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
African-American %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Segregation	-0.4	-0.5	-0.6	-0.5	-1.0*	-0.5	-0.6	-0.0	-0.6
	(0.591)	(0.714)	(0.637)	(0.486)	(0.586)	(0.491)	(0.926)	(1.302)	(0.958)
Generational competition	1.4**	1.4**	1.1	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.7	-0.3	-0.5
	(0.668)	(0.679)	(0.812)	(0.475)	(0.471)	(0.527)	(1.052)	(1.142)	(1.384)
White poverty %	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
African-American poverty %	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Latino poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
White college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
African-American college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Latino college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Majority white district	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.321)	(0.416)	(0.338)	(0.259)	(0.265)	(0.261)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population size	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.164)	(0.203)	(0.206)	(0.205)
West	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.5**	-0.5**	-0.5**
	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.226)	(0.235)	(0.232)
Northeast	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.164)	(0.258)	(0.256)	(0.262)	(0.260)	(0.262)	(0.264)
# school board members	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)
African-American board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 25 (continued)

	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Latino board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.9
	(0.462)	(0.526)	(0.472)	(0.509)	(0.504)	(0.515)	(0.627)	(0.714)	(0.657)
Observations	79	79	79	86	86	86	61	61	61
R-squared	0.186	0.186	0.190	0.176	0.205	0.176	0.247	0.256	0.247

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 26. Board Member Response – Use of Kind Words in E-mail Body (First Round); Restricted to Districts with Nonpartisan and At-large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	0.0	-0.3	-0.3	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	0.0	0.9*	0.3
	(0.126)	(0.284)	(0.381)	(0.080)	(0.120)	(0.158)	(0.148)	(0.510)	(0.277)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		1.0			0.3			-2.8*	
		(0.641)			(0.309)			(1.538)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.9			0.5*			-1.0
			(0.883)			(0.316)			(0.871)
Latino citizen %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.076)
African-American %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Segregation	-3.0	-6.3	-4.3	-4.7**	-5.8**	-4.9***	-7.3*	-0.8	-6.3
	(3.429)	(4.064)	(3.671)	(1.859)	(2.265)	(1.837)	(3.705)	(5.038)	(3.774)
Generational competition	-2.6	-3.4	-5.3	0.8	0.9	-0.6	2.0	5.1	6.1
	(3.874)	(3.869)	(4.682)	(1.817)	(1.820)	(1.972)	(4.206)	(4.418)	(5.449)
White poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1*	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.087)
African-American poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1**	0.1**	0.1**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)
White college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)
African-American college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Latino college %	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1*	-0.1*	-0.1
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Majority white district	1.6	3.8	2.2	0.4	0.7	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(1.865)	(2.370)	(1.949)	(0.990)	(1.026)	(0.976)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
District population size	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.1	-0.1	0.1
	(0.703)	(0.706)	(0.703)	(0.611)	(0.613)	(0.612)	(0.810)	(0.799)	(0.807)
West	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.1	-0.4	-0.1
	(0.666)	(0.673)	(0.678)	(0.605)	(0.606)	(0.597)	(0.904)	(0.908)	(0.914)
Northeast	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.5	2.2**	2.3**	2.1*
	(0.918)	(0.910)	(0.944)	(0.987)	(0.990)	(0.979)	(1.039)	(1.012)	(1.039)
# school board members	-0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	-0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.187)	(0.212)	(0.213)	(0.210)	(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.181)
African-American board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0

Table 26 (continued)

	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Latino board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Constant	1.0	-1.0	0.6	1.4	1.5	1.7	4.4*	2.1	3.6
	(2.682)	(2.993)	(2.719)	(1.945)	(1.949)	(1.924)	(2.510)	(2.762)	(2.590)
Observations	79	79	79	86	86	86	61	61	61
R-squared	0.127	0.160	0.143	0.253	0.262	0.286	0.414	0.458	0.432

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

APPENDIX D

Full Sample

Table 27. Board Member Response Within 24 Hours (First Round); Full Sample

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1***	0.1**	0.0	0.2**	0.0
	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.061)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.069)	(0.061)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.0			-0.3***			-0.5**	
		(0.105)			(0.088)			(0.182)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.1			-0.2**			-0.0
			(0.148)			(0.091)			(0.167)
Latino citizen %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
African-American %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Segregation	-0.1	-0.2	-0.4	-0.5	0.5	-0.4	0.6	2.2**	0.6
	(0.676)	(0.872)	(0.736)	(0.491)	(0.585)	(0.485)	(0.760)	(0.978)	(0.767)
Generational competition	-0.3	-0.3	-0.8	-0.6	-0.5	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.716)	(0.720)	(0.931)	(0.440)	(0.424)	(0.490)	(0.881)	(0.844)	(1.119)
White poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
African-American poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0**	0.0*	0.0**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
White college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0*	0.0	-0.0*	-0.0	-0.0*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
African-American college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Latino college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Majority white district	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4
	(0.409)	(0.444)	(0.409)	(0.225)	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.415)	(0.397)	(0.441)
District population size	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0
	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.157)	(0.149)	(0.143)	(0.148)	(0.182)	(0.176)	(0.184)
West	-0.2*	-0.2*	-0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.157)	(0.151)	(0.155)	(0.208)	(0.200)	(0.217)
Northeast	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
	(0.213)	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.218)	(0.210)	(0.216)	(0.219)	(0.209)	(0.221)

Table 27 (continued)

Partisan elections %	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1
	-0.247	-0.249	-0.247	-0.152	-0.147	-0.151	-0.233	-0.226	-0.236
African-American ward %	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.098	-0.100	-0.099	-0.078	-0.075	-0.077	-0.077	-0.074	-0.078
Latino ward %	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.5**	0.3
	-0.117	-0.122	-0.137	-0.132	-0.128	-0.131	-0.239	-0.234	-0.243
% board members elected	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1
	-0.040	-0.042	-0.042	-0.081	-0.079	-0.080	-0.238	-0.234	-0.242
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.094	-0.090	-0.093	-0.240	-0.235	-0.244
African-American board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0*	0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Latino board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	1.4**	1.4**	1.5**	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.4	-0.2	0.4
	(0.594)	(0.606)	(0.596)	(0.455)	(0.440)	(0.449)	(0.628)	(0.641)	(0.634)
Observations	109	109	109	122	122	122	81	81	81
R-squared	0.180	0.180	0.188	0.122	0.194	0.159	0.267	0.341	0.267

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 28. Board Member Response on a Weekend (First Round); Full Sample with Controls for Partisan Elections and At-Large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.015)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.0			0.0			0.1	
		(0.072)			(0.057)			(0.112)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			-0.1			-0.0			0.0
			(0.101)			(0.058)			(0.098)
Latino citizen %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
African-American %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0*	0.0**	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Segregation	-0.1	-0.3	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.0
	(0.463)	(0.598)	(0.502)	(0.304)	(0.377)	(0.307)	(0.444)	(0.601)	(0.448)
Generational competition	0.2	0.2	0.7	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.4	0.4	0.3
	(0.491)	(0.493)	(0.635)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.310)	(0.515)	(0.518)	(0.653)
White poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0**	0.0*	0.0**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
African-American poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
White college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0**	0.0**	0.0**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
African-American college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Latino college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Majority white district	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.280)	(0.304)	(0.279)	(0.139)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.243)	(0.244)	(0.258)
District population size	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0*	-0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2**	0.2**	0.2**	0.0	0.1	0.0
	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.107)
West	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.127)
Northeast	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.129)

Table 28 (continued)

Partisan elections %	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
	-0.169	-0.170	-0.169	-0.094	-0.095	-0.095	-0.136	-0.139	-0.138
African-American ward %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	-0.067	-0.069	-0.068	-0.048	-0.048	-0.049	-0.045	-0.046	-0.046
Latino ward %	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	-0.080	-0.083	-0.093	-0.082	-0.082	-0.083	-0.140	-0.144	-0.142
% board members elected	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
	-0.027	-0.029	-0.029	-0.050	-0.051	-0.051	-0.139	-0.144	-0.142
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.058	-0.058	-0.059	-0.140	-0.144	-0.142
African-American board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Latino board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	-0.6	-0.7	-0.7	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.4	-0.3	-0.4
	(0.407)	(0.415)	(0.406)	(0.282)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.367)	(0.394)	(0.370)
Observations	109	109	109	122	122	122	81	81	81
R-squared	0.153	0.154	0.170	0.145	0.151	0.146	0.258	0.263	0.259

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 29. Board Member Response – Word Count (First Round); Full Sample with Controls for Partisan Elections and At-Large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	7.5**	-1.2	-10.0	-6.1**	-8.2	-14.1**	1.7	5.2	4.7
	(3.636)	(6.744)	(10.072)	(2.893)	(4.984)	(6.431)	(5.670)	(11.841)	(9.919)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		26.8			7.2			-10.5	
		(17.538)			(14.001)			(31.339)	
Latino nonciti % x Gen Cm			45.9*			19.7			-9.8
			(24.632)			(14.145)			(27.263)
Latino citizen %	-0.6	-0.5	0.6	2.8**	2.9**	3.1**	-1.1	-1.1	-0.9
	(1.408)	(1.400)	(1.527)	(1.239)	(1.245)	(1.247)	(2.752)	(2.776)	(2.806)
African-American %	0.2	0.7	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
	(1.522)	(1.541)	(1.639)	(1.191)	(1.232)	(1.185)	(1.357)	(1.386)	(1.425)
Segregation	-48.3	-187.5	-138.4	-50.7	-79.1	-61.6	-287.9**	-250.2	-286.3**
	(113.960)	(145.151)	(122.299)	(75.058)	(93.279)	(75.119)	(124.225)	(168.481)	(125.267)
Generational competition	-85.5	-83.6	-269.7*	110.3	109.2	60.7	-37.1	-36.1	2.7
	(120.734)	(119.813)	(154.684)	(67.306)	(67.598)	(75.884)	(144.123)	(145.288)	(182.707)
White poverty %	1.9	2.5	1.7	-4.2**	-4.3**	-4.8**	-2.7	-2.6	-2.6
	(2.505)	(2.519)	(2.472)	(2.058)	(2.096)	(2.093)	(3.337)	(3.377)	(3.369)
African-American poverty %	-1.6	-1.6	-1.5	-0.1	-0.0	0.1	1.8*	1.7*	1.8*
	(1.000)	(0.993)	(0.986)	(0.782)	(0.810)	(0.791)	(0.959)	(0.980)	(0.968)
Latino poverty %	1.9	1.7	2.0*	1.2	1.2	1.3	0.3	0.2	0.3
	(1.201)	(1.199)	(1.185)	(0.994)	(0.998)	(0.991)	(1.276)	(1.292)	(1.286)
White college %	-0.3	-0.1	0.5	-1.5*	-1.6*	-1.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4
	(1.015)	(1.010)	(1.083)	(0.882)	(0.896)	(0.882)	(1.099)	(1.124)	(1.115)
African-American college %	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
	(0.968)	(0.971)	(0.962)	(0.620)	(0.622)	(0.624)	(1.054)	(1.065)	(1.071)
Latino college %	0.5	0.5	-0.0	0.7	0.8	0.6	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3
	(1.352)	(1.342)	(1.360)	(1.063)	(1.071)	(1.066)	(1.242)	(1.252)	(1.304)
Majority white district	130.6*	173.0**	132.6*	-18.1	-13.6	-15.7	-49.6	-49.6	-57.7
	(68.98)	(73.84)	(68.02)	(34.36)	(35.56)	(34.24)	(67.91)	(68.45)	(72.04)
District population size	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	-18.8	-11.7	-18.0	27.8	28.0	23.0	47.6	46.2	47.6
	(26.508)	(26.704)	(26.138)	(22.793)	(22.882)	(22.942)	(29.821)	(30.341)	(30.052)
West	-38.5*	-34.4	-31.5	-2.5	-2.4	0.2	36.1	35.0	32.8
	(22.564)	(22.551)	(22.560)	(24.014)	(24.105)	(23.980)	(33.948)	(34.368)	(35.432)
Northeast	3.3	-0.6	-7.0	17.0	16.9	11.1	71.7**	71.5*	70.6*
	(35.962)	(35.777)	(35.881)	(33.370)	(33.495)	(33.484)	(35.760)	(36.048)	(36.168)
Partisan elections %	-89.4**	-86.3**	-90.0**	11.0	11.7	14.7	10.3	8.2	9.4
	(41.678)	(41.407)	(41.092)	(23.294)	(23.422)	(23.333)	(38.101)	(38.922)	(38.481)

Table 29 (continued)

African-American ward %	-0.1	-4.2	-4.0	-0.9	-0.8	-1.3	-1.1	-1.7	-1.6
	(16.554)	(16.654)	(16.460)	(11.921)	(11.968)	(11.868)	(12.558)	(12.768)	(12.729)
Latino ward %	-16.7	-9.0	5.0	-19.4	-19.9	-21.7	-40.9	-38.1	-42.8
	(19.755)	(20.249)	(22.706)	(20.261)	(20.353)	(20.229)	(39.083)	(40.301)	(39.718)
% board members elected	6.7	9.4	10.6	-15.5	-15.9	-15.8	12.1	15.2	10.2
	(6.763)	(6.930)	(6.979)	(12.448)	(12.526)	(12.391)	(38.920)	(40.289)	(39.585)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.6	20.9	22.3	-5.1	-8.1	-3.3
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(14.332)	(14.398)	(14.320)	(39.205)	(40.509)	(39.826)
African-American board %	-0.2	-0.0	-0.1	-0.7	-0.7	-0.5	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
	(0.891)	(0.892)	(0.883)	(0.815)	(0.818)	(0.818)	(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.195)
Latino board %	0.6	0.5	0.3	-0.5	-0.5	-0.2	0.5	0.4	0.4
	(1.050)	(1.043)	(1.052)	(0.702)	(0.719)	(0.733)	(1.426)	(1.489)	(1.467)
Constant	-62.4	-87.6	-50.6	110.1	113.7	117.1*	170.2	157.4	171.7
	-100.22	-100.81	(99.007)	(69.613)	(70.231)	(69.468)	-102.70	-110.39	-103.57
Observations	109	109	109	122	122	122	81	81	81
R-squared	0.262	0.282	0.291	0.205	0.207	0.221	0.295	0.297	0.297

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 30. Board Member Response – Average Word Length (First Round); Full Sample with Controls for Partisan Elections and At-Large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.064)	(0.082)	(0.074)	(0.156)	(0.130)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		-0.1			0.0			-0.0	
		(0.101)			(0.178)			(0.412)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			-0.2			0.2			-0.1
			(0.142)			(0.180)			(0.358)
Latino citizen %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)
African-American %	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Segregation	0.3	0.7	0.7	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.9
	(0.651)	(0.838)	(0.704)	(0.956)	(1.189)	(0.958)	(1.631)	(2.214)	(1.646)
Generational competition	-0.3	-0.3	0.6	-0.2	-0.2	-0.8	0.5	0.5	0.8
	(0.689)	(0.692)	(0.890)	(0.857)	(0.862)	(0.968)	(1.892)	(1.909)	(2.400)
White poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
African-American pov %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Latino poverty %	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
White college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
African-American coll %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Latino college %	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Majority white district	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.5
	(0.394)	(0.426)	(0.391)	(0.437)	(0.453)	(0.437)	(0.892)	(0.899)	(0.947)
District population size	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	-0.2	-0.3	-0.2	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.290)	(0.292)	(0.293)	(0.391)	(0.399)	(0.395)
West	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.306)	(0.307)	(0.306)	(0.446)	(0.452)	(0.465)
Northeast	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4
	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.425)	(0.427)	(0.427)	(0.469)	(0.474)	(0.475)
Partisan elections %	0.8***	0.8***	0.8***	-0.5*	-0.5*	-0.5*	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.238)	(0.239)	(0.236)	(0.297)	(0.299)	(0.298)	(0.500)	(0.511)	(0.506)
African-American ward %	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2

Table 30 (continued)

	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.151)	(0.165)	(0.168)	(0.167)
Latino ward %	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4
	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.258)	(0.259)	(0.258)	(0.513)	(0.530)	(0.522)
% board members elected	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-1.2**	-1.2**	-1.2**
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.158)	(0.511)	(0.529)	(0.520)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	1.1**	1.1*	1.1**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.515)	(0.532)	(0.523)
African-American board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Latino board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Constant	5.4***	5.4***	5.3***	5.8***	5.8***	5.9***	5.7***	5.6***	5.7***
	(0.572)	(0.582)	(0.570)	(0.886)	(0.895)	(0.886)	(1.348)	(1.451)	(1.361)
Observations	109	109	109	122	122	122	81	81	81
R-squared	0.339	0.342	0.355	0.145	0.145	0.159	0.298	0.298	0.299

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 31. Board Member Response – Use of Parent First Name (First Round); Full Sample with Controls for Partisan Elections and At-Large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	0.0	0.1***	0.1	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.066)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.062)	(0.052)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		-0.2**			0.2*			-0.1	
		(0.112)			(0.090)			(0.164)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			-0.1			-0.0			0.2
			(0.162)			(0.093)			(0.142)
Latino citizen %	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
African-American %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Segregation	-0.0	1.3	0.2	0.2	-0.4	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.4
	(0.736)	(0.925)	(0.803)	(0.488)	(0.597)	(0.493)	(0.652)	(0.880)	(0.651)
Generational competition	-1.2	-1.2	-0.7	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	-0.2
	(0.780)	(0.763)	(1.015)	(0.437)	(0.433)	(0.498)	(0.756)	(0.759)	(0.949)
White poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
African-American pov %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0**	0.0**	0.0**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
White college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
African-American coll %	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Latino college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Majority white district	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1
	(0.445)	(0.470)	(0.446)	(0.223)	(0.228)	(0.225)	(0.356)	(0.358)	(0.374)
District population size	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.172)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.150)	(0.156)	(0.158)	(0.156)
West	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0
	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.148)	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.157)	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.184)
Northeast	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.232)	(0.228)	(0.236)	(0.217)	(0.215)	(0.220)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Partisan elections %	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4*	0.3	0.4*
	(0.269)	(0.264)	(0.270)	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.200)
African-American ward %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1

Table 31 (continued)

	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Latino ward %	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.149)	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.205)	(0.211)	(0.206)
% board members elected	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.204)	(0.210)	(0.206)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.206)	(0.212)	(0.207)
African-American board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Latino board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	-0.4	-0.6	-0.4
	(0.647)	(0.642)	(0.650)	(0.452)	(0.450)	(0.456)	(0.539)	(0.577)	(0.538)
Observations	109	109	109	122	122	122	81	81	81
R-squared	0.146	0.190	0.152	0.133	0.159	0.133	0.233	0.242	0.250

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 32. Board Member Response – Use of Kind Greeting Words (First Round); Full Sample with Controls for Partisan Elections and At-Large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.0**	-0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.062)	(0.052)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.0			0.1			-0.1	
		(0.070)			(0.076)			(0.165)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.0			0.0			-0.1
			(0.099)			(0.078)			(0.144)
Latino citizen %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
African-American %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Segregation	-0.6	-0.8	-0.6	-0.2	-0.5	-0.2	-0.7	-0.3	-0.7
	(0.448)	(0.577)	(0.490)	(0.409)	(0.504)	(0.413)	(0.657)	(0.889)	(0.662)
Generational competition	1.3***	1.3***	1.2*	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-1.0	-1.0	-0.7
	(0.474)	(0.476)	(0.620)	(0.366)	(0.365)	(0.417)	(0.762)	(0.767)	(0.965)
White poverty %	0.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
African-American pov %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Latino poverty %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
White college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
African-American coll %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0**	-0.0**	-0.0**	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Latino college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Majority white district	-0.5*	-0.5	-0.5*	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.5
	(0.271)	(0.293)	(0.273)	(0.187)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.359)	(0.361)	(0.381)
District population size	0.0*	0.0*	0.0*	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.3**	-0.3**	-0.3**	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.159)
West	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.4**	-0.4**	-0.4**
	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.187)
Northeast	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.3*	-0.3*	-0.3*	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.184)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.191)
Partisan elections %	0.1	0.2	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.201)	(0.205)	(0.203)
African-American ward %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0

Table 32 (continued)

	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Latino ward %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.0	-0.1
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.091)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.207)	(0.213)	(0.210)
% board members elected	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.206)	(0.213)	(0.209)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.207)	(0.214)	(0.210)
African-American board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Latino board %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.7*	0.6	0.7*	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.3
	(0.394)	(0.400)	(0.397)	(0.379)	(0.380)	(0.382)	(0.543)	(0.583)	(0.547)
Observations	109	109	109	122	122	122	81	81	81
R-squared	0.209	0.212	0.209	0.172	0.186	0.172	0.262	0.267	0.265

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 33. Board Member Response – Use of Kind Words in E-mail Body (First Round); Full Sample with Controls for Partisan Elections and At-Large Elections

	White Parent			Latino Parent			African-American Parent		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Latino noncitizen %	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	0.0	-0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.3
	(0.078)	(0.145)	(0.219)	(0.063)	(0.108)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.287)	(0.237)
Latino noncitizen % x Seg		0.5			0.1			-0.2	
		(0.376)			(0.304)			(0.759)	
Latino noncitizen % x Gen Cm			0.2			0.6*			-0.8
			(0.536)			(0.304)			(0.652)
Latino citizen %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
African-American %	0.1	0.1*	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Segregation	-1.7	-4.2	-2.2	-2.7*	-3.2	-3.1*	-4.0	-3.3	-3.9
	(2.435)	(3.116)	(2.664)	(1.631)	(2.028)	(1.617)	(3.007)	(4.079)	(2.997)
Generational competition	-0.9	-0.9	-1.8	-0.6	-0.6	-2.1	0.8	0.8	3.9
	(2.580)	(2.572)	(3.369)	(1.462)	(1.469)	(1.633)	(3.488)	(3.518)	(4.371)
White poverty %	-0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.1*	-0.1*	-0.1**	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)
African-American pov %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Latino poverty %	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
White college %	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
African-American coll %	0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Latino college %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.1**	-0.1**	-0.1*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Majority white district	0.3	1.0	0.3	-0.9	-0.8	-0.8	-1.6	-1.6	-2.2
	(1.474)	(1.585)	(1.482)	(0.747)	(0.773)	(0.737)	(1.644)	(1.657)	(1.724)
District population size	0.0*	0.0	0.0*	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Midwest	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	0.4	0.4	0.4
	(0.566)	(0.573)	(0.569)	(0.495)	(0.497)	(0.494)	(0.722)	(0.735)	(0.719)
West	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.0
	(0.482)	(0.484)	(0.491)	(0.522)	(0.524)	(0.516)	(0.822)	(0.832)	(0.848)
Northeast	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	2.0**	2.0**	1.9**
	(0.768)	(0.768)	(0.782)	(0.725)	(0.728)	(0.721)	(0.865)	(0.873)	(0.865)
Partisan elections %	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	-0.0
	(0.891)	(0.889)	(0.895)	(0.506)	(0.509)	(0.502)	(0.922)	(0.942)	(0.921)
African-American ward %	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

Table 33 (continued)

	(0.354)	(0.358)	(0.359)	(0.259)	(0.260)	(0.255)	(0.304)	(0.309)	(0.305)
Latino ward %	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	-2.0**	-2.0**	-2.2**
	(0.422)	(0.435)	(0.495)	(0.440)	(0.442)	(0.435)	(0.946)	(0.976)	(0.950)
% board members elected	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.8	0.9	0.7
	(0.145)	(0.149)	(0.152)	(0.270)	(0.272)	(0.267)	(0.942)	(0.976)	(0.947)
# school board members	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	-0.8	-0.9	-0.7
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.311)	(0.313)	(0.308)	(0.949)	(0.981)	(0.953)
African-American board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Latino board %	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0	-0.0*	-0.0*	-0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Constant	2.0	1.6	2.1	3.4**	3.5**	3.6**	5.9**	5.7**	6.1**
	(2.142)	(2.164)	(2.156)	(1.513)	(1.527)	(1.495)	(2.486)	(2.673)	(2.478)
Observations	109	109	109	122	122	122	81	81	81
R-squared	0.163	0.178	0.164	0.157	0.158	0.189	0.316	0.317	0.333

Notes: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1; Standard errors in parentheses.

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