MOBILIZING FOR THE CAUSE: GRIEVANCE EVALUATIONS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

by

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DEDICATION

To Micah and Kai, who teach me something new every day.

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Abstract

The role of grievances in drawing public concern and activist support is a surprisingly understudied topic in modern social movement literature. This research is the first to parse grievances into core components to understand whether some grievances are more successful than others in evoking mobilizing, affective and cognitive reactions that can ultimately benefit social movements. I find that not all grievances are created equal when it comes to concern, support and interest in activism, and that the content of grievances can be studied in systematic ways to identify the types of grievances likely to be more powerful injustice events.

This dissertation bridges social psychology and social movements by applying concepts from Affect Control Theory (such as evaluation ratings and deflection) to grievance evaluations. To understand the differential effects of grievances, I break grievances into three basic building blocks—a Perpetrator (Actor), the act itself (Behavior), and the victim (Object). I then use measures of cultural perceptions of the goodness or badness of behaviors and identities to investigate how people react to different configurations of good or bad perpetrators, behavior and victims in injustice events. I posit that two mechanisms—concern about the wellbeing of others and desire for consistency in meanings about the world—drive reactions to the goodness or badness of elements in a grievance. I test hypotheses using an experimental design, specifically a vignette study.

I find strong support, across outcomes, that bad behavior, particularly when directed toward good victims, constitutes a form of grievance that promotes strong mobilizing, affective and cognitive reactions. I also find that the perpetrator matters for many outcomes, but that the effect of perpetrator is weaker than the effect of behavior and its target, tends to be

insignificant for measures specific to behavioral activism, and largely disappears in cases of bad behavior toward good victims. In general, bad perpetrators produce higher levels of concern and emotion than do good perpetrators. The results also show that while concerns about the wellbeing of others dominate grievance evaluations, expectations about how the world should be (and deflection from those expectations) are useful for understanding reactions to perpetrators and to injustice events involving good behavior.

The conclusions from this dissertation contribute to a number of social movement arenas, including participation, movement outcomes, framing and emotions. Further, it has the real world implications of suggesting how well particular social issues might fare in attracting public concern and activist attention. This provides insights into both the types of movements more likely to be successful as well as the types of social problems less likely to draw public attention, increasing the chances that such problems persist.

Chapter 1: Introduction

On any given day in Washington DC, protestors—sometimes in groups of hundreds of thousands, sometimes just a solitary individual—can be seen milling around the capitol, carrying signs spouting slogans like: *Fur is Cruel*; *Zero Taxes; Marry Who You Love*; *Free Palestine*; *Forward on Climate*; *End Racial Oppression*; *Protect Children Not Guns; Stop the XL Pipeline*; *Illegal Aliens are Killing America's Future*; *End U.S. Drone Wars Now*; *Stop Mass Surveillance*; *Immigration Reform Now; Abortion is the Silent Holocaust*; *Occupy D.C.; Pull the Plug on Obamacare*; *Close Guantanamo*; *Living Wage Now*; *Keep the Frack Out of My Water;* and *Stop the War on Women*. This is just a snapshot of the hundreds of issues that activists care about, from the very specific (e.g. *Protect the Dolphins of Taiji*) to themes that have appeared across generations (e.g. *War is Not the Answer*). How do we make sense of these issues? Are all issues created equal when it comes to drawing public sympathy and support?

Despite the fact that many activists would likely argue that the reason they take to the streets is because the cause propelled them to action, the role of such causes or grievances in motivating activism is largely lacking in social movement literature. While social movement scholars have done an excellent job investigating the processes of *how* people show up (or do not as is often the case) for activist events—such as the role played by personal networks, recruitment, framing, incentives and disincentives, or repression—less attention is focused on *why* people show up. Social movement studies that delve into motivations tend to skirt the issue itself, instead focusing on personal incentives, such as reputational rewards from participating or wanting to participate with friends. But what if there really is something about those dolphins of Taiji that is specifically motivating Sarah or Eli to hold up a sign and shout

slogans? How can we make sense of the hundreds of grievances that exist at any given time and start identifying whether some grievances possess an inherent advantage over others in having popular appeal as well as attracting resources and adherents?

OBJECTIVES OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation attempts to answer exactly those questions. It provides a theory for analyzing grievances that assesses how evaluations of the basic components of a grievance affect attitudes and actions. I use the term grievances to represent the different causes and issues that people might care about, focusing on the raw material or content of those issues. These may entail personal grievances for people who are members of an aggrieved group, but this also encompasses people not directly affected by the injustice who still care that the grievance be remedied.

This research contributes to social movement research on participation, framing, movement outcomes, and emotions. However, it is by no means limited to just social movements. An understanding of how grievances appeal to the public and attract resources is relevant for all types of civic engagement, including volunteer work, charitable giving and voting behaviors. As a social movement scholar, I tend to focus on and draw from this literature, but the theories developed in this dissertation are relevant to other arenas, and I hope they will be broadly applied.

I seek to identify systematic patterns in the elements of issues that make them more, or less, attractive to the public, thus affecting the number of supporters and participants willing to contribute to a cause. The popularity of any particular topic is likely to rise and fall, reflecting

fads in public opinion as well as the influence of current events. Further personal histories and idiosyncrasies will play a large role in determining what topics are appealing to a single individual. Instead of documenting personal preferences or popular trends, I turn my attention to a more general system of understanding grievances. Are there advantages and disadvantages of issues that exist in relatively durable ways? Can such strengths and weaknesses be identified across different movement types, geographies, and even historical eras? My research tries to avoid the pitfalls of specific fads or personal interests by applying knowledge about enduring, common patterns in people's perceptions to evaluations of grievances. In the past, I have used cognitive biases such as omission bias and loss aversion (Bergstrand 2014). Here I draw on measures and concepts from Affect Control Theory (ACT), an area in social psychology that measures the cultural assumptions that people hold about identities and behaviors and examines ways that individuals create events to confirm sentiments that they already have about themselves and others, and how people react to events that disconfirm these established sentiments. Specifically, I use measures that capture cultural perceptions of the "goodness" or "badness" of identities and behaviors.

To map the effects of grievances, we need to start at the beginning, with the basic components of what constitutes the content of a grievance and how people react to different configurations of those central elements. In Affect Control Theory these are *Actor Behaves* toward *Object*. From a social or environmental justice perspective, the language would be closer to *Perpetrator Behaves* toward *Victims*. By changing the goodness and badness of each component (Perpetrator, Behavior, and Victim) we can induce dramatically different

evaluations of the morality and justness of causes, emotional reactions, as well as personal willingness to take action to do something about the grievance.

In its most basic form, my argument is that people are motivated by a concern for the well-being of others, which makes them more sympathetic toward and willing to join a cause that addresses something "bad" occurring, and this effect becomes more pronounced when the "bad" behavior is directed toward something "good." Additionally, the more an issue involves something unexpected and violates a sense of "how the world is supposed to be," the greater the likelihood that people will seek to address the injustice. While the above ideas may seem like common sense, they have never been systematically studied. Indeed, the fact that they seem intuitively correct is all the more reason to test whether the content of grievances affects outcomes relevant to social movements, as it could be an important missing factor in our models on civic engagement.

In the pages that follow, I expand and develop these ideas to provide a new way of conceptualizing grievances in an effort to understand why people might care about or be willing to take action for particular types of issues but not others. I use concepts from Affect Control Theory (e.g., evaluation profiles and deflection) and also draw from literature on morality and justice to develop more specific hypotheses about how the content of grievances affects affective, cognitive and mobilizing responses. I then test and find support for my hypotheses with a vignette experiment.

In sum, my dissertation bridges social psychology and social movement literature to develop a theoretical framework for understanding grievances. This dissertation also has the real world implications of identifying how likely it is that social problems attract popular

support or social movement activity. This may offer insights into the types of movements that will be successful. At the same time, it identifies social issues less likely to draw public attention, making it more likely that such problems persist. In this manner, it can help inform why the plights of certain groups are routinely ignored by the civil and political sectors. For example, these concepts, alongside other important variables, could work to explain why issues like prisoner abuse are slow to gain public attention and political traction. Additionally, if authorities desire social change for such grievances, due to their unpopularity it may require other interventions, such as through the legal system or policy.

THE FULL PICTURE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION CHAPTERS

In the chapters that follow, I flesh out the arguments initially presented here to identify systematic patterns in the elements of issues that make them more, or less, successful in bringing about mobilizing, affective and cognitive reactions.

In Chapter 2, I examine extant social movement scholarship on grievances and discuss the importance of grievances for different areas of social movement study, including participation, movement outcomes, and framing. I also discuss how grievances are expected to affect certain reactions relevant to social movements, including mobilizing outcomes like support and interest in activism for campaigns, as well as affective and cognitive outcome such as evaluations of the strength of the grievance (whether the injustice event was morally right or wrong, just or unjust, important or unimportant), emotions (anger, disgust, sadness, surprise, and satisfaction), and perceptions of others' concern about and interest in activism.

In Chapter 3, I develop my theoretical mechanisms and hypotheses. I overview Affect Control Theory (ACT) and apply ideas developed by affect control theorists regarding the cultural expectations people hold toward identities and behaviors to grievances. I then posit that two theoretical mechanisms underlie how the goodness or badness of grievance components affect outcomes relevant to social movements. The first, wellbeing concerns, draws on literature in justice and morality and pertains to peoples' concerns about the welfare of others, placing primacy on bad acts over good acts (especially toward victims perceived as good rather than bad) in motivating concern and mobilization. The second mechanism, deflection, comes from ACT and makes predictions about how pairings of goodness/badness of grievance components in asymmetrical combinations (e.g., bad acts toward good victims, good perpetrators engaging in bad acts) which depart from cultural meanings and expectations motivate more concern and mobilization than components combined in symmetrical ways (e.g., good acts toward good victims, bad perpetrators committing bad acts). I use these two mechanisms to develop a series of hypotheses about the expected effects of perpetrator, behavior and victim (and combinations thereof) on mobilizing, affective, and cognitive outcomes.

In Chapter 4, I design an experiment (a vignette study) to test the hypotheses. For the experiment, I create two versions of an actor (good perpetrator and bad perpetrator), two versions of a behavior (good behavior and bad behavior) and two versions of an object (good victim and bad victim). These elements then are combined to create eight unique injustice events (i.e., in one version there is a good perpetrator engaging in bad behavior toward a good victim; in another, there is a bad perpetrator engaging in good behavior toward a bad victim,

and so on). Each participant reads one injustice event and answers a series of questions that measure the effects of that injustice event on affective and cognitive reactions. Participants then read about activist campaigns to address the injustice event and are asked about their support and willingness to engage in activist activities for these campaigns (i.e., mobilizing outcomes).

In Chapter 5, I analyze the results from the experiment. I conduct multiple analytic strategies—including three-way analysis of variance, components analyses, graphs, effect sizes, and qualitative comments— to evaluate support, or lack thereof, for my hypotheses. Experimental results show strong support for the wellbeing hypotheses predicting that bad behavior, particularly when directed toward good objects, is particularly adept at producing high levels of mobilizing, affective and cognitive reactions. Experimental results also offer some support for hypotheses based on deflection, particularly for the affective and cognitive outcomes. The mechanism of deflection is particularly useful for understanding the role of perpetrators in grievances. Generally, bad perpetrators bring about higher levels of concern and emotion than do good perpetrators, although good perpetrators produce larger differences in the effects of behavior and interactions between behavior and object. Deflection also helps to explain when good acts are more likely to be seen as unjust—when coming from bad perpetrators or when directed toward bad victims.

In the final chapter, I discuss the findings of this study, examining theoretical contributions as well as application to social movements. The primary conclusion is support for the premise of this dissertation—that the content of grievances can differentially affect outcomes relevant to social movements. Further, we can study the content of grievances in

systematic ways to understand powerful forms of grievances across specific causes and campaigns. In regard to the theoretical logic of the dissertation, experimental results indicate that people prioritize harm when evaluating grievances and that bad acts toward good victims are best at triggering interest in activism. In cases not involving bad acts toward good victims, the affect control theory mechanism of deflection is useful for understanding the effects of perpetrators as well as events where good acts may be viewed as problematic. I conclude with the limitations of the research as well as consideration of extensions and future research directions.

Chapter 2: Grievances and Social Movements

The goal of this dissertation is to understand how the content of grievances can differentially affect reactions like sympathetic support and willingness to engage in activism. In this chapter, I examine social movement scholarship on grievances and what it implies for the types of grievances that will best attract attention and resources. I then situate grievances in dominant spheres of study for social movement scholars—specifically differential participation, movement outcomes, and framing—and discuss how an understanding of the mobilizing effects of grievances fits into and contributes to these areas. The final section of this chapter covers the outcomes of interest in this study, looking at how grievances can affect mobilizing outcomes, as well as affective and cognitive outcomes.

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT GRIEVANCES? A LOOK AT SOCIAL MOVEMENT SCHOLARSHIP

For the most part, scholars have not turned an analytic eye toward how the content of grievances affects mobilization. That said, there are some notable exceptions, such as the role of threats and strain in social movements, how sudden or shocking grievances inspire collective action, as well as research into moral reform movements. Scholarship on framing process also suggests ways that grievances can be more or less powerful in appealing to the public and adherents.

Threats and Strain

An area in social movement scholarship on grievances, and one with a long history, examines how threats and strain give rise to social movements. Much of this research was conducted in

the mid-twentieth century, and it hypothesized that people turned to collective action when confronted with structural strains and rapid social changes (Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962). While strain theory has been thoroughly critiqued for many of its assumptions and conclusions (see McCarthy and Zald 1977), there is some modern support for the idea that certain types of structural changes and social disruptions can motivate action. In particular, grievances that are viewed as threats may have advantages in cultivating activism. Snow and colleagues (1998) explored the role of threats by examining how actual or threatened disruptions to the quotidian—the routines and attitudes of daily life—promoted collective action. There is also a body of scholarship on reactive social movements, where real or perceived declines in resources, status, or power can encourage mobilization and social movement activity (Martin and Dixon 2010; McVeigh 1999, 2009; Snow et al. 1998; Tilly 1976, 1978; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). For example, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) found that patriot/militia movements were able to capitalize on threats produced by structural social changes, such as a decline in manufacturing jobs and the family farm. Similarly, McVeigh (1999) found that in the 1920s, power devaluation in both economic and political arenas for native-born, white Protestants provided an opportunity for the Ku Klux Klan to expand. Opp (2000) looked at how discontent as an incentive to protest and resource deficits operated in a complex causal model to affect political protest. Thus, from these studies we see that threats and losses may constitute a type of grievance that is proficient at fostering sympathy and action for particular groups.

Moral Shocks and Moral Reform Movements

Another way that grievances can promote activism is when something is upsetting or stunning enough that it motivates people to seek out action. These ideas have been most thoroughly developed in James Jasper's work on moral shocks, which are situations where "an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, with or without the network of personal contacts emphasized in mobilization and process theories" (1997: 106). Such moral shocks can take the form of powerful symbols, such as dramatic animal testing photographs (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). They can also be an unexpected and alarming event that motivates mobilization, such as the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident (Walsh 1981). Opp (1988) found a shock effect with the Chernobyl reactor accident and that grievances (discontent with nuclear energy) affected social movement participation. Political or legal decisions too can act as moral shocks; for example, the *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion led to immediate and increased recruitment to the anti-abortion movement, with many activists claiming they joined the movement the very day they heard about the decision (Luker 1984). Similarly, Gould (2001) finds that the *Bowers v. Hardwick* decision denying gays the constitutional right to engage in consensual, private sexual acts served as a moral shock that prompted some gays and lesbians to engage in militant AIDS activism. Thus, extant scholarship has identified some characteristics of grievances that can promote activism, in that sudden or disturbing grievances may be particularly adept at encouraging support and action.

Additionally, some scholars have argued that understanding grievances is especially relevant for moral reform movements, which are aimed at influencing personal behavior and

definitions of morality. Examples of moral reform movements include the temperance movement (Gusfield 1955) and the anti-pornography movement (Wood and Hughes 1984). Beisel (2009) notes that while the field of social movements has focused on how organizations mobilize rather than the reasons for such mobilization, scholars of moral reform movements "cannot afford to take grievances for granted" (p. 73). For such movements, the role of principles, values, and beliefs is central to understanding support and collective action for the cause (Wood and Hughes 1984).

Framing Processes

Research on framing also suggests routes for understanding what types of grievances may be best able to appeal to everyday people and recruit adherents and resources. Collective action frames can interpret and organize experiences and beliefs in a way that serves to mobilize participants, demobilize antagonists and court support from the general public (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1988). Snow and Benford (1988) have theorized several ways that frames can attract support for movements. For example, frames that provide clear diagnoses of problems and prognostics for solutions may constitute more effective public appeals. Applying this logic to causes, some grievances may be so complicated and entrenched in society (e.g. racism, sexism) that it is difficult to pinpoint solutions and rally action. Snow and Benford also posit that frames that resonate with the everyday experiences of people will have advantages over frames that are too abstract or distant from the lives of target audiences. Thus, complex, technical issues may fail to spark interest when broached to general audiences. An issue like climate change typifies some of the difficulties that accompany complicated

grievances. As Weber and Stern (2011) point out, "fundamental attributes of climate change make it hard to understand," (p. 317), such as invisible greenhouse gases. Additionally, the authors note that people's reliance on personal experience to understand the world can fall short for this topic, e.g., trying to use local weather conditions to understand a phenomenon as comprehensive as climate change.

GRIEVANCES: IMPLICATIONS FOR MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION, STRENGTH AND FRAMING

This dissertation posits that grievances can have differential effects on the mobilization process, and specifically points to areas like recruitment and movement strength. Further, an examination of the content of grievances corresponds with existing work on framing, which has investigated how social movement actors interpret events and appeal to adherents and sympathizers. In this section, I examine how grievances fit into, and could contribute to, existing scholarship in the areas of differential participation, social movement outcomes and collective action frames.

First, a note on how the effects of grievances might be situated in the timeline of mobilizing processes. Much of this dissertation centers on when people first hear about a cause and form an initial opinion, deciding whether it is worth their support or attention. In this way, this is a study of the first step of mobilization, fitting most neatly in processes like the formation of the mobilization potential and recruitment. Indeed, social movement scholarship tends to focus on participation, so this study's emphasis on how the mobilization potential is formed provides an important contribution to the literature. Also, much like moral shocks, learning about an issue for the first time may evoke emotional reactions, such as outrage (Jasper 1997).

Relatively recent grievances may also help to inspire new movements, although it is rare for movements to form completely anew. Instead, most social movements draw on earlier social movements' tactical, organizational, and ideological tools (McAdam 1995). Social movement organizations are not isolated entities and constantly engage in the indirect or direct monitoring of other organizations, with activists borrowing and imitating tactics, slogans, frames, and ideologies (Soule 2009; Soule 1997). Tarrow (1998), in discussing how social movements build on the material of others, writes: "the symbols of revolt are not drawn like musty costumes from a cultural closet and arrayed before the public. Nor are new meanings unrolled out of whole cloth. The costumes of revolt are woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibers into collective action frames in confrontation with opponents and elites" (p. 118). Thus, even new grievances will likely gain traction best by attracting the interest of people embedded in existing mobilizing frameworks.

Given that the appeal of an issue is the first step in a long process that involves overcoming many barriers to participation, and even once there are movement participants, more obstacles to achieving actual outcomes, the power of grievances may need time to percolate through what could be a decades-long or more struggle. That said, a grievance that fails to capture the hearts and minds of either bystander supporters or dedicated activists is going to lack the base needed to fight for those much longer-term goals. Thus, this dissertation speaks to long-term effects as the eventual fruits of initial reactions.

Social Movement Participation

I posit that the content of grievances matters when it comes to understanding peoples' motivations to participate in activism for particular causes. However, the appeal of a particular grievance is just one of many factors that ultimately determine whether an individual shows up to a protest. Social movement scholars have long studied social movement participation and indeed why people participate, or not, has been a central question in the field for decades.

Early theoretical perspectives of why people participate in social movements viewed people as engaging in collective action because they were angry, deprived, or outcasts. These classical models held that there exists some form of structural strain which results in individuals' disruptive psychological states, which in turn led to social movement activity (McAdam 1999). People's potential for political violence was thought to increase if they experienced greater relative deprivation —a discrepancy between what people expect and what they are capable of achieving (Gurr 1970). Mass society theorists believed it was a lack of ties and attachments to intermediate groups and institutions that encouraged people to protest. Thus participants and non-participants could be distinguished by the amount of their integration into larger society, with socially isolated individuals feeling higher levels of anxiety and alienation, and in an attempt to escape those feelings, engaging in extremist behavior (Kornhauser 1959). In these conceptions, "Protest as a normal dimension of life, carried on by healthy people, seemed out of the question" (Jasper 1997:21).

Mancur Olson's (1965) work on free-riding (choosing to reap the benefits of public goods without contributing to any costs), with its focus on humans as rational, calculating beings, shifted the discussion of differential participation into cost or benefit terms. This

includes social incentives, such as reputational concerns, as people are less likely to free-ride if it means losing the esteem, respect and goodwill of others (Chong 1991). Thus, the presence of incentives and the absence of disincentives can encourage participation in collective action (Klandermans 1984; Oberschall 1973; Oliver 1980; Olson 1965). One sanction for movement participation comes from repression—including both repression through formal institutions, like the government, and informal repression such as sanctions through social ties—although the effectiveness of repression at deterring participation is contextually dependent (Linden and Klandermans 2006; Koopmans 1997; Opp and Roehl 1990; Smith 1996). Similarly, the concept of biographical availability refers to an individual's freedom from constraints that might increase the relative costs and risks associated with activism. People who have more personal responsibilities, such as work, a spouse or children, are expected to be less likely to participate in costly or risky activism (McAdam 1986).

An understanding of people's differing emotional responses to movements can help explain why some people are drawn into movements while others are not. In her study of anti-abortion activists, Luker (1984) finds that two-thirds of the activists are self-recruits; they independently encounter and are distressed by information on abortion and then actively seek out a political group that shares their values. People may also engage in activism due to the draw of positive emotions and experiences, such as the "pleasures of protest," which include experiencing the excitement of a crowd, a sense of community, a carnival type atmosphere, creative expression, romance, empowerment and a sense of purpose (Jasper 1997). Group identification, too, can increase activist participation (Klandermans 2002).

Social networks, in particular, have been frequently studied and are widely accepted as important to participation (for an exception see Jasper and Young 2007). Networks can affect multiple processes that influence an individual's decision to participate in a social movement, from the socialization and identity construction that creates a disposition to participate, to providing opportunities for action, to influencing the decision of whether or not to engage in activism (Passy 2001). When it comes to such network ties, having connections to people involved in social movements is important, such as the case of the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident, where previous ties to activists increased a respondent's participation in protests (Walsh and Warland 1983). But social connections outside of social movements can matter as well. For instance, Snow, Zurcher and Eckland-Olson (1980) found that the likelihood of being recruited into a movement depended on links to movement members but also on the absence of countervailing ties and commitments to people outside of the movement. McAdam (1986) found that ties to people who participated as well as to non-participants who withdrew from the activist opportunity both worked to inform whether an individual participated in high-risk activism in the Freedom Summer movement, with increased participation for those with more ties to participants. In a later study, McAdam and Paulsen (1993) again examined the role of networks in Freedom Summer and found that the effect of interpersonal ties to the movement is mediated by identity and organizational affiliation.

The personal appeal of a grievance to an individual is likely going to interact with these other important factors—such as sanctions or incentives from loved ones and identity processes—to affect ultimate participation. Consequently, we cannot predict whether any single individual will choose to protest as that person is embedded in a unique web of social

relations and pressures both for and against activism. However, by investigating whether a greater number of people might care about an issue in the first place, we then can identify a larger initial pool of potential sympathizers, which ultimately gets winnowed down to a small set of movement participants. This provides important insights into the formation of the mobilization potential. Also, if an issue is more popular, this might increase positive reinforcement from loved ones and greater reputational rewards for helping to address the grievance. Later in this chapter, I discuss in greater detail the potential outcomes that I posit grievances will affect—from attitudinal positions and emotional reactions to interest in activism.

Social Movement Strength and Outcomes

Social movement participation tends to go hand in hand with social movement outcomes as the size of a social movement can be a powerful asset when seeking social change. While I argue that grievances can aid, or hinder, social movements' efforts to recruit adherents and achieve goals, grievances are only one factor in a much longer list of established mechanisms. One important attribute of movements that can promote success is the presence of resources. Social movements require time, energy, money and other resources, and without such resources movements are less able to act on perceived injustices and grievances (McCarthy and Zald 2002). These resources can come from elite funders, but indigenous resources, such as internal networks and cultural understandings, also can be vital to movements (Morris 1981, 1984). One way, then, that grievances can matter for movements is by attracting resources. People who are particularly moved by a cause may open their checkbooks. Others may provide

infrastructure, such as a meeting space, or access to politicians and elites. Thus, the more popular a grievance, the wider net it casts in terms of appealing to potential sources of resources. That said, not all holders of resources are created equal. Attracting the attention of a millionaire is likely to generate more funds than successfully appealing to a high school student. But this speaks to the benefit of using cultural norms that are widely shared, as I do in this dissertation, to understand the mobilizing effects of grievances. Even high school students and millionaires are likely to agree that identities like rapists, murderers and child molesters are "bad," while grandparents and healers are not.

Another central factor affecting mobilization and success is the presence of political opportunities or constraints for social movements (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). By incorporating the political environment, the outcomes of social movements are no longer isolated to actions internal to the movement but are placed in a broader context. Government can create situations favorable to social movements, or can serve as a threat, deterring action. Non-state actors—such as corporations, universities, and professional associations—too can influence social movements (Jasper and Poulsen 1993). And just as grievances with more public appeal may draw more resources, grievances with a strong public backing may create a political or cultural atmosphere favorable to achieving social movement outcomes. In an analysis of existing literature, Burstein (2003) concludes that public opinion has substantial effects on public policy. This makes it likely that popular grievances may be more alluring for legislative or other types of governmental action than unpopular grievances. Corporations, too, may want to take advantage of a popular cause by offering support and action. One of the best known

examples of this is corporate marketing campaigns that involve breast cancer related causes to attract consumers (King 2004).

Social Movement Framing Processes

While extant work on framing suggests the types of grievances that may be more or less attractive, identifying the elements of grievances that increase or decrease interest in activism is also germane to framing. Bergstrand (2014) found that grievances rooted in losses as opposed to gains, and acts as opposed to omissions (failures to act), bolstered people's support for and willingness to participate in activism. Consequently, for causes that have flexibility in whether they can be couched as gains or losses, or as commissions or omissions, social movement actors can use frames that tap into loss aversion or omission bias. Here, too, conclusions from this dissertation about configurations of different identities and behaviors could be directly implemented in framing strategies. If the group suffering from a grievance consists of divorce lawyers who are also mothers, then it would benefit an activist campaign to focus on the identity of mother (viewed culturally as extremely good) as opposed to the identity of divorce lawyer (viewed culturally as slightly bad).

However, not all grievances can be framed as losses (such as a campaign to build a new youth center) and not all aggrieved groups have identities that are perceived positively in our culture. Prisoners who do not possess advanced medical degrees cannot be framed as doctors, even though doctors are seen much more positively. If a campaign is working to protect the rights of prisoners, then it can seek to develop frames using positive identities (such as identifying prisoners as family members or loved ones); however, this is likely to require more

time and resources than a social movement campaign working to protect the rights of children with cancer. In this way, the underlying grievance confers an advantage or disadvantage when it comes to public appeal, which itself can serve to facilitate or constrain framing.

This is particularly true given that other actors exist as potential sources of framing. The media, for example, can serve as a filter between the movement and the public, shaping impressions of actions and actors (McCarthy and Zald 1987). Mass media then can provide organizing and reference frames that inform how people discuss political issues (Gamson 1992). Indeed, people may learn of a grievance independent of mobilizing infrastructures, such as hearing about an issue through the media or through non-activist social ties.

Other movements, too, can develop frames about a cause. Opposing movements can be rival contenders not just for power but also in identifying issues and actors (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). This can result in framing contests as movements and countermovements vie for public opinion favorable to their cause. Consequently, if an aggrieved group consists of men who are both pastors and white supremacists, even if one campaign highlights the more positive identity of pastors there is a reasonable chance that a countermovement campaign will seize the opportunity to capitalize on the other more negative identity of white supremacists. Even within movements, "frame disputes" can emerge as actors argue over how to frame problems and solutions (Benford 1993).

How grievances are interpreted and packaged through framing processes is central to courting both adherents and the general public. But, at the same time, grievances rarely have the freedom to be framed any way that social movement actors choose. In this manner, the raw material of a cause (e.g., a loss, the nature of the aggrieved group) exerts an influence in

mobilization processes. At the same time, existing scholarship on framing and the content of grievances can be mutually informative in identifying the ways that issues and campaigns appeal to adherents and the general public.

THE EFFECTS OF GRIEVANCES: MOBILIZING, AFFECTIVE AND COGNITIVE OUTCOMES

Differences in the appeal of grievances can have effects that trickle through to a variety of potential consequences—from affecting public opinion to motivating people to join hands in protest. Of primary interest to social movements are mobilizing results, in particular whether people support activist campaigns or are willing to take action for these campaigns by participating in activities like signing petitions, attending protests, and recruiting others for the cause. However, affecting people's opinions about issues, more generally, is also important. It can be both a means to an end (e.g., getting those sympathetic people to protest) as well as end in itself (e.g., convincing people to embrace a new cultural norm). For these reasons, in addition to studying effects of grievances on mobilization, I also look at general affective and cognitive reactions to grievances like evaluations of grievance strength, emotional reactions, and assessments of others' reactions.

Mobilizing Outcomes

To understand activism, it is essential to assess what people are willing to do, or not, for specific social movement campaigns. For this reason, I look at outcomes such as general support for a campaign as well as willingness to participate in specific forms of activism, like signing a petition or attending a protest. These effects speak most directly to how grievances can motivate

mobilization.

Sympathetic Support for Social Movement Campaigns

People's reactions to issues at a general level are likely to inform whether they support activist campaigns to resolve the grievance. Kriesi, Saris and Wille (1993) found that the intensity of issue-specific attitudes can affect issue-specific mobilization potential. However, a variety of factors can affect campaign support. People may agree that a particular grievance should be rectified, but disagree with the particular tactics or goals of a movement campaign. They may question whether social movement actors are trustworthy or legitimate or whether they are appropriate or inappropriate spokespersons for the grievance. Asking people whether they support or oppose an activist campaign provides an assessment of the number of people who care about an issue and who approve of an activist campaign working on the problem. Consequently, I look at how grievances generate sympathetic support for activist campaigns by asking people if, in general, they would support or oppose a campaign directed at a specific type of grievance.

Willingness to Participate in Activism

Ultimately the success of social movements rests, at least in part, on transforming sympathy for a cause into political action and outcomes. But not everyone is willing to take action, even if they care about an issue. Some people may be unwilling to support or participate in activism in principle, preferring other actions like volunteering to bring about social change. Others may fear repercussions for engaging in activist acts. Thus, the people who are most likely to

participate in activism are those who both care about rectifying a grievance and are willing engage in activist behaviors for a campaign to act on the beliefs.

This refers to the mobilization potential—the reservoir of people who could be mobilized by a social movement, which includes people who have positive attitudes toward the movement's goals and are willing to participate in unconventional political action such as protest (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Not everyone who is part of the mobilization potential actually participates in protest; typically, only a small portion of potential participants show up. Klandermans and Oegema (1987) found that for the Dutch peace movement, not even 1 out of every 20 sympathizers ultimately participated in collective action. Therefore, it is important to understand who supports a campaign, as these sympathizers constitute the mobilization pool, a group of people primed to engage in activism for the cause. Consequently, this study contributes to an understanding of the formation of the mobilization potential, an important topic not often examined in social movement studies.

Another step toward participation involves potential participants weighing the costs and benefits of taking action, although even those whose calculations favor such action still may face additional barriers to actual attendance (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) modeled participation as a two-stage mobilization process that first involves a willingness to participate in protest and then conversion of that willingness into actual participation. They find that certain factors, like being biographically unavailable (e.g., working fulltime or being married) have strong negative effects on who is willing to protest, although they do not have direct effects on who actually protests. Thus, assessing who is willing to protest constitutes another important step in understanding political action.

Following the first step of this model, this study assesses participants' willingness to engage in a variety of forms of activism, including signing a petition, donating money, recruiting others to take action, attending a peaceful protest and attending a disruptive protest. McAdam (1986) makes the distinction between low-risk/cost and high-risk/cost activism, with cost referring to the time, money, and energy of activism while risk pertains to the anticipated dangers of activism, whether they be legal, social, physical, and so on. By gathering information on a variety of tactics, I can see how grievances affect willingness to engage in both low-cost/risk (e.g. signing a petition)[1] and high-cost/risk (e.g. attending a disruptive protest) activism.

Affective and Cognitive Outcomes

I am interested in affective and cognitive reactions both as an end goal (e.g., attitudinal transformation, public opinion) as well as potential contributing factors to behavioral activism. There are many reasons why opinions about a grievance might matter. While people often think of social movements targeting policies or corporations, many social movements prize attitudinal transformations as an important goal in itself. Movements for and against gay rights, for example, pour significant time and resources into capturing peoples' hearts and minds (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Fetner 2001). Similarly, animal rights movements emphasize worldview shifts and lifestyle changes in adherents (Herzog 1993). The temperance movement is another example of the type of movement that tries to "alter the manners, tastes, and daily habits of large numbers of people" (Gusfield 1955). Even for movements focused on policy,

[1] Signing a petition is always low cost, but it could be high risk in contentious contexts (McAdam 1986).

views toward an issue are relevant since politicians may consider public opinion when deciding whether to oppose or support legislation. Public opinion can influence what becomes public policy (Burstein 2003), and this effect of public opinion on policy can dovetail with cultural and attitudinal goals. For instance, in the gay rights movement, Lax and Phillips (2009) found that policy-specific public opinion significantly affected states' adoption of policies regarding gays and lesbians. Thus, activist campaigns can benefit from people who care about or support their issue, even if those individuals never sign a petition or show up to a rally. Further, such sympathetic bystanders may express support through activities that are not directly related to activism but still may be helpful –such as spreading awareness of an issue by discussing it with family and friends, or by engaging in other civic activities that benefit the cause, like donating, volunteering or voting.

When it comes to action, opinions matter too. People do not usually attend a protest for something they are opposed to.[2] Instead protestors are pulled from a much larger pool of people who care about an issue. It may be reasonable to assume that the larger this pool of sympathizers, the more people there are to filter through the other stages leading to activist participation, resulting in a larger number of actual participants. Therefore, it is important to understand people's opinions toward issues, as this is a crucial first step in a process that may lead to activism. Thus, affective and cognitive processes—like evaluations of the strength of the grievance, emotional reactions, or assessing whether others will care about or participate in collective action for an issue—can affect individuals' support and interest in participating in movements.

[2] There are cases where people attend protest for non-ideological reasons, such as romantic interests in protest attendees (Jasper 1997).

Evaluations of the Strength of the Grievance

How do people evaluate grievances and decide what to sympathize with or support? Some grievances may be viewed as stronger in substance than others, and here strength is conceptualized as being viewed as more immoral, unjust, and important than other issues. People have limited time and resources when it comes to addressing a social or environmental problem they find concerning. Consequently, even if an individual sympathizes with an issue, he or she may not be able to commit to taking action. Further, resources in social movements are notoriously scarce, with groups competing for donors and attention (Rucht 2009). For these reasons, the grievance has to be viewed as something important enough to address, particularly given the myriad social and environmental problems vying for support.

Perceptions of unjustness and immorality may feature prominently into calculations of what people are willing to care about or devote their time toward helping. Social movements scholars tend to "share an emphasis on the importance of a strong injustice component in the political consciousness that supports collective action" (Gamson 2013). Indeed, viewing issues through injustice frames that emphasize moral indignation is an important component to facilitating public activism (Gamson 1992). Proclamations of what is moral or immoral may also directly constitute the substance of the cause, such as moral reform movements addressing issues like prostitution and pornography (Beisel 2009). Consequently, to evaluate perceptions of the strength of the grievance, this study looks at people's impressions of the immorality, unjustness and importance of a grievance.

Emotions

Grievances may differ in the degree to which they can rouse emotions, and emotions, in turn, can affect peoples' interest in participating in collective action. Grievances that are perceived as more unjust and immoral may be better able to provoke emotions, which in turn could fuel political action. Alternatively, some scholars argue that emotion and intuition occurs first to affect moral judgments, and this then informs reasoning (Haidt 2001). This suggests there could be a feedback effect between emotions and grievance evaluations. Further, emotional reactions in bystanders, those not directly part of the movement, are also important as social movements risk alienating people if they evoke the wrong emotional reactions (Kemper 2001).

Anger can be a strong mobilizing emotion and is seen as a powerful component in injustice frames (Gamson 1992). Jasper (1997) examined moral outrage in his work on moral shocks, where an event or piece of information outrages or upsets someone to the extent that he or she seeks out political action, even in the absence of active recruitment. In another example, Nepstad and Smith (2001) described how moral outrage motivated recruitment and activism in the Central American peace movement against U.S. military and political involvement in the civil wars of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. Anger can be used strategically too, such as documenting the opposition lashing out in anger, as occurred in the civil rights movements when police were filmed beating peaceful protestors (Jasper 1998).

In the justice literature, two emotions dominate justice evaluations: guilt when receiving more than deemed just and anger when receiving less than thought just (Adams 1965; Homans 1961). To the extent that social movement issues involve justice evaluations, then, anger is likely to be a prevalent reaction. Additionally, affect control theorists have predicted that

feelings of anger also can lead to a situation being characterized as unjust (Scher and Heise 1993). This in turn could strengthen views of the event as a grievance worth addressing.

Other emotions studied in social movements include pride and shame, such as in the gay rights movement (Britt and Heise 2000), movements against child sexual abuse (Whittier 2001), and in AIDS activism (Gould 2009). Hancock (2004) examined the role of disgust and the label of "welfare queen" used in the welfare reform debates of the mid-1990s. Herzog and Golden (2009) found that animal rights activists scored higher on disgust sensitivities than people not aligned with animal-related causes, suggesting that disgust might encourage activism. Compassion and empathy can motivate prosocial behaviors like helping others (Haidt 2003; Penner et al. 2005). Compassion may be relevant for protest by fostering concern for and a desire to help others (Jasper 1998). Similarly, grief or sadness about an issue may also indicate concern for the plight of those experiencing a grievance and be linked to motivation to help those affected. Other emotions may serve to demobilize activists. For example, when repression brings about anger, this can solidify commitment to a movement; but when repression successfully evokes fear, this can discourage activism (Smith 1996).

Given existing work showing that emotions can be important to mobilization, this, this study assesses how people emotionally respond to grievances. Because participants will be reading about grievances that affect others rather than directly experiencing the grievances themselves, the experiment focuses less on self-centered emotions, such as pride and shame which are moral emotions of self-approval or self-disapproval (Jasper 2011). Instead, I ask

about several key emotional variables informed by my theoretical framework, specifically anger, satisfaction, sadness, disgust and surprise.[3]

Perceptions of Others

Perceptions can have another effect: they can shape whether people interested in activism are more likely to face social rewards or social sanctions for participating in collective action. Encouragement from close others, especially when tapping into identities salient for participants, can promote activism (McAdam 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). Social incentives, like admiration and prestige, can encourage collective action, particularly in small groups (Olson 1965). Conversely, people may experience "soft repression" for their activism, such as ridicule, stigma, and social exclusion (Linden and Klandermans 2006). Therefore people may weigh the reactions of others, either for or against, in determining the costs and benefits of participating in collective action (Oberschall 1973). Having widespread favorable views toward an issue can create an atmosphere that promotes more of the benefits and fewer of the sanctions of protesting, fostering participation. Additionally, expectations about the number of other participants and the likelihood of success of collective action can inform decisions about whether to personally participate (Klandermans 1984). Strong public support for an issue could increase potential adherents' perceptions that a critical mass or threshold will be reached to achieve campaign goals, making participation more attractive (Chwe 1999; Marwell and Oliver 1993). For these reasons, I examine how people perceive others' reactions to a grievance,

[3] Satisfaction and surprise are emotions predicted to come from the mechanism of deflection, which will be discussed more in Chapter 3.

including others' evaluations of a grievance as immoral or unjust, and others' willingness to take action for the issue.

CONCLUSION

This chapter reviews extant literature on social movement grievances and discusses how an understanding of grievances could contribute to work on differential participation, movement outcomes, and framing processes. It then offers a more specific overview of the relevance of grievances for mobilizing, affective, and cognitive outcomes, which become operationalized in the experimental portion of this study.

I argue that the content of grievances can differentially affect public support and activism, but how exactly does this happen? In the next chapter, I turn my attention to the elements of grievances that make them more, or less, powerful to affect these results. To do so, I will bridge literature from social movements and social psychology to identify systematic patterns in grievances that affect sympathy and support for a cause. More specifically, I will draw on measures and concepts from Affect Control Theory (ACT), an area in social psychology that measures the cultural assumptions that people hold about identities and behaviors and examines ways that individuals create events to confirm sentiments that they already have about the world. I use these ideas from ACT, as well as literature on justice and morality, to develop hypotheses about the types of grievances that are predicted to have the strongest mobilizing effects.

Chapter 3: Affect Control Theory, Theoretical Mechanisms, and Hypotheses

The goal of this dissertation is to identify systematic patterns in the elements of issues that make them more, or less, successful in bringing about mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes. The emphasis is not on ranking the popularity of issues at any given time—which could be driven by fads—but is instead on unearthing patterns in grievances that create mobilizing advantages or disadvantages in more universal ways. In this chapter, I use ideas developed by affect control theorists about the cultural expectations people hold toward identities and behaviors to map the expected forms of powerful injustice events. At the heart of the hypotheses developed in this chapter is the idea that people are motivated by a concern for the well-being of others, which makes them more sympathetic toward and willing to join a cause that addresses something "bad" occurring, and this effect becomes more pronounced when the "bad" behavior is directed toward something "good." Additionally, the more an issue violates a sense of "how things are supposed to be," the greater people's motivation to rectify the injustice and restore their meanings about the world.

The chapter begins with an overview of Affect Control Theory (ACT) and its applicability to grievances. I then unpack the black box of how grievances affect civic outcomes by identifying and explicating two mechanisms—wellbeing concerns and deflection—that link grievances to support and activism. In the final section of the chapter, I combine the predictions generated by both wellbeing concerns and deflection to develop a series of hypotheses about the types of grievances that have an advantage in bringing about mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes.

AFFECT CONTROL THEORY: HOW IT CAN HELP US UNDERSTAND GRIEVANCES

At first glance, it might appear that what draws people to certain volunteer or activist arenas is entirely dependent on individuals' circumstances (e.g. personal preferences based on life experiences or having civically engaged friends who recruit him or her into the activity). Indeed, it would be nearly impossible to predict whether any single cause will attract the attention of any single individual. But given the culture and larger structures people are embedded in, we can predict *patterns* in what issues are likely to draw a larger audience. For example, picture a schoolteacher; do you view this person as good or bad? Now picture a murderer; do you perceive this person as good or bad? And if you asked 100 people to rate schoolteachers and murderers (or a baker or a thief or a nurse) as good or bad, how much variation would you expect to see? Even without more detailed context, people have assumptions about identities, and these are remarkably consistent, even across time and geographical areas.

Affect Control Theory (ACT) is an area in social psychology that measures these cultural assumptions that people hold about identities and behaviors. ACT centers on the basic idea that individuals create events to confirm sentiments that they already have about themselves and others and that when sentiments are not maintained then individuals reidentify themselves and others, with the result that through this process people perform the social roles that maintain society (Heise 2002). ACT draws on the work of Osgood and colleagues (1957; 1975) in developing three cross-cultural dimensions of meaning. In essence, humans react to stimuli according to three different dimensions of response: Evaluation (goodness versus badness), Potency (powerfulness versus powerlessness) and Activity (liveliness versus quietness) (Heise 2007). Some examples of words characterizing the positive side of the evaluation dimension are

nice, sweet, good, mild, happy, and clean, while words for the negative side include awful, sour, bad, harsh, sad, and dirty (Heise 2007). All three dimensions can be used to characterize how people feel about items in the abstract. For instance, when thinking of "mother," how good, powerful and lively are mothers, in general? To determine these values, ACT has conducted surveys in which respondents have assigned scores on each of these dimensions (varying from -4.3 to +4.3) to particular identities, behaviors, modifiers and settings, leading to the development of Evaluation, Potency, Activity (EPA) profiles. For example, in the United States, the identity of mother has an EPA profile of 2.8, 2.5, 1.3[4], such that mothers are seen as very good and fairly powerful and active. This EPA profile for mother taps into our "fundamental sentiments" about mothers, which are highly stable, widely shared cultural meanings. Heise (2002) describes these fundamental sentiments as "enduring affective meanings prevailing in society that allow individuals to orient quickly and automatically in different situations" (p. 18).

One might expect there to be great variation in how people assign EPA values, but in fact, cultural norms play a significant role in determination of these profiles. For instance, for the evaluation dimension, eighty percent of the variation in an individual's evaluations of items relates to norms, as compared to 20 percent of the variation captured by individual's unique experiences (Heise 2007: 14). Additionally, the evaluation dimension is stable over time; measurements taken up to 25 years apart have correlations of 0.90 or higher (Heise 2007: 15). So while sentiments are informed by individuals' personal experiences, individuals are also influenced by (and influence others via) public acts, discussions, and behaviors, including mass media, which helps to shape a shared sentiment. ACT scholars then use multiple raters,

[4] Averaged across sex; from data collected at Indiana University (Francis and Heise 2003).

typically fifty to sixty individuals, to average out the individual influences and hone in on a cultural sentiment about an identity or behavior.

That said, there are of course going to be arenas of contested meanings. Subcultures can form separate cultural sentiments, such as drug users viewing drug use as a positive act (Thomas and Heise 1995). Additionally, social movements and countermovements can engage in framing battles about whether identities should be seen positively or negatively, such as in the case of lesbian and gay rights movements and Christian anti-gay countermovements (Fetner 2001). Also, both the gay rights and black rights movements have been actively engaged in transforming identities associated with shame into identities associated with pride (Britt and Heise 2000).

There is also support that evaluation ratings share commonalities across cultures. An analysis of six cultures (United States, Canada, Japan, China, Germany, and Northern Ireland) found evidence that cultures tend to agree on what identities are relatively good or relatively bad (Heise 2002). However, cultures also hold unique meanings, and there are often gradations in the extent of how good or bad identities are rated.

While people hold abstract, fundamental sentiments about actors, behaviors, and objects, these sentiments are not always confirmed in the situations that occur in everyday life. Situational or transient impressions form in these specific events. For example, when a mother abuses a child, the transient impression of the mother no longer matches the fundamental sentiment about mothers—in this case mother would be seen more negatively on the evaluation dimension. This mismatch, or deflection, that occurs between transient impressions experienced in specific situations and one's more abstract, fundamental sentiments about

items can motivate people to take action to restore their ideas about the world. Thus, experiencing deflection could potentially be key to why people choose to engage in activism to address grievances.

To represent situational events, ACT uses the simple social event *Actor Behaves* toward *Object* or ABO event. I use this ABO event to represent a grievance, with the actor being the perpetrator of an injustice, the behavior being the action taken by the actor, and the object being the target or victim of the injustice: *Perpetrator Behaves* toward *Victim*. I then term this an "injustice event." While many causes do include all three elements, not all do. For instance, a perpetrator might be unknown, a force of nature, or overly complex to identify, leaving just the action and victims, such as the glass ceiling for women in the workplace. Conversely, we might know of a perpetrator and action, but the exact victims are unclear or poorly defined, such as a politician caught using drugs.

In this research, I only assess the evaluation component (goodness/badness) of the EPA profile. The evaluation dimension is more strongly influenced by cultural norms and is more stable over time than are the potency and activity dimensions.[5] Because I am assessing the enduring and systematic effect of the content of grievances on mobilization, the evaluation dimension is better suited as an indicator of more consistent and general trends of perception in society. Additionally, I posit that the evaluation dimension will have the strongest effect on mobilization. Many social movement campaigns explicitly try to invoke a sense of "good" and

[5] Heise (2007) reports that for potency and activity sentiments, approximately 60% of individual's variations in feelings relates to cultural norms, while 40% of variation can be attributed to unique experiences; for the evaluation dimension, 80% is cultural norms and 20% is individual's unique experiences. In regard to stability, evaluation scores have correlations of .90 or greater over time, while for potency these range between .80 and .90, and for activity the correlations range between .60 and .90 (pg 14-15). I do plan to assess the potency dimension in future studies.

"bad" in attempts to reach the general public. As Jasper (1998) notes, "Much political activity, no doubt, involves the reference to or creation of positive and negative affects toward groups, policies, and activities" (p. 402). The raw material that campaigns have to work with (e.g. whether those experiencing the grievance are nuns or prisoners) could advantage or disadvantage social movement actors when it comes to successfully portraying the targets and perpetrators of grievances as good and bad to potential movement recruits and sympathizers. This also applies to non-activist sources of information, such as the media, which may not use campaign frames when communicating information.

I predict that the goodness or badness of different elements of a grievance will interact to produce affective, cognitive, and mobilizing outcomes. But what are the processes through which these effects occur? In the next section, I propose two mechanisms through which cultural evaluations of goodness or badness in identities and behaviors operate to increase concern and support for causes: wellbeing concerns and deflection.

THEORETICAL MECHANISMS: WELLBEING CONCERNS AND DEFLECTION

Imagine you are walking down the street and you are approached by a priest, who stops you to ask, "Could you give me $2 for bus fare?" Now picture the same priest asking for bus fare, but this time he is drunk. To whom do you give money? And why would it matter? Two things are occurring in these scenarios. The first refers to changes in perceptions of goodness and badness; while priests are ranked positively on the evaluation scale, drunks are ranked negatively. I hypothesize that groups perceived as good are able to garner more support than those perceived as bad. But a second process is also affecting perceptions and decision-making.

Priests are expected to act in accordance to a higher moral standard. So a priest displaying public drunkenness is behaving in a way that goes against cultural expectations of how priests should act. This can lead to reactions of surprise, confusion, and tension. In Affect Control Theory, this is termed deflection, and because people prefer stability in their understandings of the world, they may take action, cognitively or through behavior, to minimize deflection. One route would be to redefine the situation –perhaps this is not a priest, but a college student dressed as a priest for a joke. Another route is to act, perhaps by admonishing the priest for his behavior. Because deflection can motivate people to address a situation, it has implications for participation in activism or other civic activities.

Picture again the above scenario, but this time it occurs in a dangerous neighborhood where if the priest does not get bus fare, he might get robbed or hurt. Now that his welfare is at stake, a new set of factors might influence your decision to help. For the sober priest, there is more motivation to help him get to safety. For the drunken priest, there are potentially conflicting choices at play. For some people the priority is to ensure a fellow human being, drunk or not, does not get hurt. But others are going to be displeased with the drunk, perhaps thinking that he deserves to have something bad happen to him. And those people might walk away. This example illustrates two of the mechanisms that I posit drive responses to grievances. The first is wellbeing concerns and refers to people's general concern for the welfare of others, while the second refers to violations of fundamental expectations and the resulting deflection. The concept of wellbeing concerns stems from literature on justice and morality while deflection is drawn from Affect Control Theory.

I hypothesize that characteristics of an injustice event—combinations of goodness/badness of its elements—operate through the mechanisms of wellbeing concerns and deflection to affect mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Injustice Event and Outcomes

Mechanism I: Wellbeing Concerns

The first mechanism of wellbeing concern pertains to people generally caring about the welfare, health and happiness of others, including non-human entities such as animals or the environment. The wellbeing hypotheses center around the idea that people are motivated to prevent bad actions from occurring due to the harm they can potentially cause and will, at a general level, be opposed to negative behaviors such as killing or polluting, regardless of the actor or target. The concept of wellbeing concern is not derived from Affect Control Theory and instead stems from work done on morality and justice as well as other fields. ACT, however, does recognize that positive or negative behavior in situations can significantly alter whether actors are seen as good or bad, and terms this a morality effect (Heise 2002).

Judgments of whether actions will harm or benefit others can inform people's perceptions of whether an act is immoral or constitutes an injustice. Understandably, there is a lack of consensus on what morality entails across disciplines, leading to questions such as how to even define morality (Hitlin and Stets 2009). However, scholars consistently identify harm or care as being an important element to morality. Haidt and Graham (2007), in an argument calling for an expansion of conceptions of morality, write that scholars of moral psychology and social justice agree that morality is about harms, rights, and justice. Gilligan (1977), an early proponent of "care" as a factor in moral judgments, documented the "centrality of the concepts of responsibility and care in women's constructions of the moral domain" (p. 516). For instance, she summarizes one theme as "the wish not to hurt others and the hope that in morality lies a way of solving conflicts so that no one will get hurt…" (p. 486). Stets and Carter (2006) identify caring as one of two main components to the moral identity. Lakoff (2002) too writes that the most fundamental form of morality promotes the experiential well-being of others while preventing others' experiential harm or the disruption of their well-being. Thus, while definitions of morality diverge, and other elements (like fairness/justice) also appear consistently, the concept of harm/care is widely used as a foundational element of morality.

When applied to the *Actor Behaves* toward *Object* event, wellbeing concerns are most clearly manifested in the "behavior" component. Does an action benefit or harm others? ACT surveys ask participants to rate actions as good or bad, which does not necessarily translate to harm or care. Evaluation profiles are defined more broadly as a sense of approval or disapproval following along standards such as morality, aesthetics, functionality or hedonism (Heise 2002). But in looking at one of these surveys (Francis and Heise 2003), the most highly

rated negative behaviors averaged across both men and women are: murder, kill, abuse, rape, knife, shoot, stab, mug, brutalize and victimize. Conversely, the most highly rated positive behaviors are: thank, heal, care for, rescue, propose marriage to, educate, save, help, and kiss. Here we see clear themes of "care" or "harm." All of the top negative behaviors refer to harm. The top positive behaviors show more nuance, such as expressions of love, but the idea of caring for others still dominates. Thus it is fair to say that, alongside other considerations, evaluations of whether an action harms or cares for others is likely to inform evaluations of whether an action is perceived as good or bad.

In turn, identifying behavior as harmful has real-world implications for the types of issues taken up by volunteers and activists. Haidt and Graham (2007) write:

> When the moral domain is limited by definition to two foundations (harm/welfare/care, and justice/rights/fairness), then social justice is clearly the extension of morality out to the societal level. The programs and laws that social justice activists endorse aim to maximize the welfare and rights of individuals, particularly those whom the activists believe do not receive equal treatment or full justice in their society (p. 101).

To be fair to the authors' intent, Haidt and Graham are advocating for social justice scholars to consider components of morality typically associated with conservatives, such as purity/sanctity, in their analyses. But the authors' point stands that what people perceive to be immoral translates into the types of issues they are more likely to care about and take action for in life. Thus, the fact that conservatives and liberals both consider harm/care a foundation of morality (albeit to varying extents) (Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009; Haidt and Graham 2007), speaks to the likelihood that harmful acts will be considered social injustices and that some people will mobilize to address these grievances. Mathur et al. (2010) find support for this in that people were significantly more willing to donate money and time to groups perceived as

experiencing painful situations. Consequently, groups experiencing harm will be more likely to receive support than those not being harmed. Thus, my first hypothesis derived from wellbeing concerns is that negative behavior is more powerful than positive behavior in affecting mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes.

For people most highly motivated by a desire to prevent harm, it does not matter who is on the receiving end. From this viewpoint emerge movements like those opposing the death penalty or U.S. torture: whether it is murderers or terrorists, no one deserves to be killed or tortured. But for others, the nature of recipient groups may condition outrage over harm. Johnston (1986), in a study of political corruption, finds that corruption judgments are conditioned on the nature of perpetrator and victims, specifically whether they are prominent people, ordinary citizens, or large organizations. A number of studies have found that extreme outgroups low on dimensions of warmth and competence (such as addicts and the homeless) may be perceived as less than human, including neural evidence that such groups do not cue social cognition processes that attribute a mind to the other person (Fiske 2010; Harris and Fiske 2006; Harris and Fiske 2009). The authors note that, if supported with further evidence, this could contribute to explanations of how atrocities such as hate crimes, prisoner abuse, and genocide occur against dehumanized groups of people. Indeed, Cuddy, Rock and Norton (2007) found that after Hurricane Katrina, people who dehumanized others by not inferring secondary emotions like anguish or mourning to racial outgroup victims were less likely to report intentions to volunteer for hurricane relief efforts. Thus, such dehumanization has consequences for the types of groups that people are willing to spend their time to help. Additionally, survey respondents perceived Americans' behavior toward groups viewed with

contempt (such as the homeless) as more likely to be acts of active harm and passive harm, like harassment or neglect , than behavior toward other groups (Cuddy, Fiske and Glick 2007). The respondents also believe groups viewed with contempt were less likely to receive acts of active or passive facilitation, such as helping, defending or cooperating with others.

From these examples, we see a tendency for people to accept bad behavior, as long as it is directed toward perceived outgroups. The idea that people promote favoritism for social groups that they identify with (ingroups) over groups they are not members of (outgroups) has been well-established (Brewer 1979; Tajfel et al. 1971). It is likely that such logic transfers over to whether people view a group negatively on the evaluation profile and indeed is likely to be even stronger than ingroup or outgroup bias given that in ACT surveys such groups are actively being categorized as "bad" rather than just "other." From an ACT survey (Francis and Heise 2003), the most highly rated negative identities by men and women were: rapist, child molester, wife abuser, murderer, terrorist, and serial murderer, white supremacist, racist and crook. These are of course the most extreme negative identities and are likely to be viewed as both outgroups and harmful to society. Less extreme negative identities that could potentially form groups affected by social movements might include felons, smokers, atheists, prostitutes, alcoholics, or dropouts. And, similar to Harris and Fiske's comments on dehumanization, if indeed people are ignoring harm directed at groups with negative cultural sentiments, then it is less likely that these victims will receive help when they need it, revealing an important gap in where civic activities like volunteering and activism are directed.

On the other hand, when bad behavior is directed toward "good targets" such as grandmothers or babies, we would expect people to be more outraged and willing to help. The

top ranked positive identities are: soul mate, best friend, loved one, true love, friend, saint, grandmother, God, grandparent and hero (Francis and Heise 2003). These are marked by subjective interpersonal relationships and are less applicable to social movement campaigns, as it is hard to find an aggrieved group consisting of "soul mates" (although admittedly, victims consisting of people's heroes and true loves would probably get a tremendous amount of support). Other good identities more realistically found as groups could be teachers, mothers, pastors, doctors, infants, Army reservists, students, or voters.

In sum, through the mechanism of wellbeing concern, I predict that the goodness and badness of behaviors and objects in injustice events will invoke people's concerns about and interest in helping or advocating on behalf of others. I do not develop a hypothesis regarding the Actor (Perpetrator) element because, from a well-being stance, it does not matter who is committing the act—the emphasis is on whether or not that act is causing harm and whom it is harming. Additionally, wellbeing concerns emphasize negative behaviors as spurring more action than positive behaviors; while there are movements centered on positive behaviors, this is better explained by the mechanism of deflection as the victim is not experiencing a threat to well-being. Therefore, based on the wellbeing mechanism, I hypothesize that there will be a main effect for the evaluation dimension of behavior, such that negative behaviors increase support and interest in addressing grievances. I also hypothesize that there will be an interaction effect between evaluation of the behavior and evaluation of the objects (victims), such that the strength of the effect of negative behaviors on increasing attitudinal support and willingness to take action will be stronger for positive objects.

Wellbeing Concerns Hypotheses (WH)

- WH1) Bad behavior evaluations, relative to good behavior evaluations, in an injustice context increase mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes.
- WH2) The effect of WH1 is stronger for good object evaluations than for bad object evaluations.

Mechanism II: Deflection

Given the centrality of preventing harm to judgments of injustice, one might ask, are there any mobilization efforts directed against positive acts, like caring for others? And if so, what motivates these campaigns? Deflection is a second mechanism through which the evaluation dimensions of ABO elements could affect movement sympathy and participation. Deflection pertains to both positive and negative acts and thus, unlike wellbeing concerns, does not always assume negative acts will be more powerful. Affect Control Theory predicts symmetry in expectations of evaluations of goodness and badness when it comes to behavior and actors. Good actors should engage in, and be recipients of, good acts. A proper priest should model good behavior and receive good acts in return, like charity when he needs it. On the other side, there is the expectation that bad actors will commit bad acts and that bad things should happen to them for doing so. A criminal is not expected to help an old lady cross the street; he or she is expected to steal her purse. And such criminals should not be rewarded with acts of kindness, but punished for their wrongdoings.

When identities and behaviors in situations do not match cultural expectations (e.g. a criminal handing out cupcakes or a nun robbing a bank) this can generate deflection. Deflection pertains to the idea in ACT (as well as other control theories) that people are motivated to maintain meanings in their world and when such meanings are disconfirmed this produces tension or stress that motivates action to restore meanings.[6] Because cultural meanings can become disconfirmed in specific situations, it is important to look at all three elements of the actor, behavior, object event to gauge reactions. ACT scholars have developed equations to understand the impressions that form in specific 'actor behaves toward object' events. These equations contain terms that reflect the processes that occur as people interpret events. Three important terms are those relating to stability, morality and behavior-object evaluative consistency (Heise 2002). The first, the stability term, captures the impression that regardless of what happens some of the cultural sentiment about goodness and badness remains. However, there is also a morality effect, where the nature of the behavior (e.g. did it help or hurt someone) reflects strongly on the situational impression of that actor's goodness or badness. And finally there is a consistency effect between behavior and object, where actors' violations of expectations about consistency in actions (e.g., not behaving positively toward good objects) can affect situational evaluations (in this example, the actor is seen more negatively). ACT also predicts that positive behaviors will be seen less positively when directed toward negative objects, which works to explain why some groups oppose positive acts when directed toward people they view negatively, such as opposition to providing medical care or water to migrants illegally crossing the U.S.-Mexico border.

[6] In ACT deflection is formally defined as the divergence of transient affective meaning from fundamental affective meaning on the evaluation-potency-activity dimensions summed over all entities in an action (Heise 2007).

People can reduce deflection by taking action, by redefining the situation, or by seeking out new interactions that will restore sentiments (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006). Typically, ACT scholars focus on how people interacting together choose actions that confirm their identities or how observers of interactions might reidentify participants to explain the situation. Heise (2002) provides the example of a doctor insulting a patient; an observer might redefine the doctor as a quack, or they might give the doctor a personality trait like self-centered or attribute a mood like hostile, or finally they might reidentify the patient as something more negative, like a bigot. All of these reidentifications would then help explain the situation.

ACT scholars tend to focus on individuals and interactions, and I extend this logic to grievances. Certainly, reidentification processes sometimes occur, and this can be detrimental to people affected by a grievance as evidenced by a tendency for people to "blame the victim" or see victims of misfortune as less good and as deserving what happens to them (e.g., the Just World phenomenon documented by Lerner 1980). However, reidentification processes can also occur for the perpetrator, moving them into a category that calls for action. For instance, Heise (2002) argues that with the Rodney King trial, police using extreme force produced so much deflection that they became redefined as bullies, vigilantes or even outlaws. It may be easier to mount a campaign against perpetrators defined as vigilantes than it is against perpetrators defined as the police.

In addition to reidentification processes, I propose deflection will have other effects. First, the stress produced by deflection should bother people, making it harder for them to ignore or turn away from an issue. Heise (2007) states that the more deflection an event produces, the stranger the event seems, and that "life is stressful when it has turned

persistently strange, unique or inconceivable" (p.62). Since people are motivated to maintain their meanings about the world, hearing about a situation that threatens those understandings should draw their attention and, ultimately, their judgments or action. In discussing ACT, Jasper (1998) provides the example that if "neighborhood" is associated with safety and quiet then residents will be motivated to fight to maintain those positive connotations. Second, just as people modify their actions to maintain identities, people may take action to maintain their cultural meanings. In the above example of the doctor insulting a patient, observers may reidentify the situation, but they might also lodge a complaint against the doctor or provide a bad review. These sanctions could force the doctor to act in a manner that matches cultural expectations, reducing the deflection. Thus, the tension that results from deflection is predicted to motivate people to care more about or to take action to address types of injustices where resolving the injustice allows situations to realign with fundamental sentiments about how the world should be.

While generally deflection is predicted to motivate concern and action, there is an important caveat: events in which impressions deviate severely from fundamental affective meanings can seem so unlikely that they are dismissed. In extreme cases, individuals may have difficulty believing the event could actually happen (Heise 2002, 2007). For instance, when Nixon initially claimed that he had nothing to do with the break-in at Watergate, most voters believed him, and he was reelected. The idea of a president being involved in burglary violates cultural expectations about how leaders should behave, and it took years, and much evidence, before he was impeached. Thus, when deflection is strong, people may view such news with suspicion, making it harder for activists to convince the public that the grievance is actually

occurring. This generation of disbelief could be a real problem if no one believes victims' accounts that what is occurring is true. In cases where the perpetrators' actions are a severe break from their image as positive role models—as seen in the priest sex abuse scandal and the rape allegations about Bill Cosby—the injustice could continue for decades without public action. For these reasons, deflection could actually slow or prevent action if enough evidence has not accumulated to overcome people's skepticism that positively-viewed perpetrators are committing harmful acts.

Unlike wellbeing concerns, deflection suggests that both negative and positive behaviors influence social movement sympathy and participation. For example, while negative behavior toward good objects is predicted to produce deflection (one should behave positively toward good objects), behaving positively toward bad objects is also predicted to produce deflection (one should treat bad objects negatively). Examples of social movements centered on good behavior would include opposition to leniency for people convicted of crimes, opposition to welfare for the poor, or opposition to giving food, water or medical care to undocumented migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border.

Additionally, the actor or perpetrator of the event can contribute to deflection. The actor's behavior is an important source of deflection if such behavior is unexpected or disconfirms the actor's identity, such as when good actors behave in a bad manner or when bad actors behave in a good manner. People sanction actors who violate norms (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006). Good actors who do not behave as they should, such as teachers abusing children, are predicted to generate deflection and, subsequently, more sympathy and participation for campaigns working to address the issue. Additionally, bad actors that behave

positively may also become a source of mobilization; for example, many charities would be reluctant to accept donations or volunteers from extremist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, even though technically these are positive acts. Since deflection creates feelings that what is occurring is strange or unusual, then people may view such apparent acts of kindness as suspect. Also, when companies who have developed a negative reputation for their actions undertake positive campaigns and action, sometimes these are met with counter-campaigns from social movement organizations who accuse them of attempting to mislead the public with "Public Relations" strategies. Indeed, for companies that have caused harm and are seen as low in warmth, such as BP after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, overt attempts to repair reputational damage and re-establish warmth can backfire, leading to more punitive judgments from perceivers (Kervyn 2014). These examples demonstrate that the actor and behavior evaluations can interact to produce deflection and mobilization, either through positive actors acting negatively or negative actors behaving positively.

Interestingly, because the effect of the actor component operates through deflection mechanisms, it is possible that good perpetrators will increase mobilization more than do bad perpetrators. This inference may not seem intuitive, but to the extent that an injustice event is viewed as something a person does not like happening (whether it is good acts toward bad objects, or bad acts toward good objects), knowing that a good actor is responsible for this unfavorable event should be more unexpected, more threatening to worldviews, and, in most cases, should increase deflection more than a bad actor. Thus, while the injustice event of criminals molesting children is certainly expected to result in public outrage due to wellbeing concerns and minor deflection, the injustice event of priests molesting children is predicted to

produce even greater public outrage, due to both wellbeing concerns and major deflection that something is incredibly wrong with how the world should be. Thus, in this manner the actor element in injustice events serves to modify the behavior-object interaction, such that positive actors strengthen the effects of negative actions toward good objects in increasing movement sympathy and a willingness to participate in action.

In sum, through deflection there is an interaction between behavior and object evaluations, such that both negative behavior toward good objects and positive behavior toward bad objects increase sympathy and a willingness to take action to address grievances. Additionally, the actor and behavior evaluations can interact to produce deflection and mobilization, either through positive actors acting negatively or negative actors behaving positively. Finally, positive actors engaging in the above interactions between behaviors and objects are expected to produce more concern and interest in taking action to rectify the grievance.

Deflection Effects Hypotheses (DH)

- DH1) Behavior and object evaluations will interact, such that bad behavior directed toward a good object or good behavior directed toward a bad object will increase mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes more than will symmetrical evaluations (e.g., good behavior toward good objects; bad behavior toward bad objects).
- DH2) The effects of DH1 will be stronger for good actors than for bad actors.
- DH3) Actor and behavior evaluations will interact, such that a good actor engaging in bad behavior or a bad actor engaging in good behavior will increase mobilizing, affective

and cognitive outcomes more than will symmetrical evaluations (e.g., good actors doing good acts; bad actors committing bad acts).

Bringing It Together: Wellbeing Concerns and Deflection

I posit that both mechanisms–wellbeing concerns and deflection—are necessary to understand the effects of the evaluation dimensions of actor, behavior and object on support for causes. For example, if only deflection were in operation then an unexpected event such as a bad actor behaving in a good manner toward a good object (e.g. Ku Klux Klan members volunteering to help nurses) would be expected to produce mobilization. However, while such an event would certainly be viewed as strange and would likely draw surprise and condemnation, it would fall short of the extensive activism likely to emerge if the nurses were being hurt instead. Conversely, using only the wellbeing concern mechanism, we would be unable to explain the host of campaigns that are directed at preventing good behavior, such as the recent case of backlash against efforts to provide teddy bears, soccer balls, food and other supplies to undocumented Central American children housed in border security detention facilities in Texas (Dionne 2014). One consequence of this research then is that it can contribute to an understanding of how the presence of wellbeing concerns and deflection in different types of social movements affect successful sympathy and action. Grievances can take many forms, and these varied actor-behavior-object combinations can be accompanied by differing levels of deflection and wellbeing concerns (see Table 1).

Table 1. Examples of *Actor-Behavior-Object* Combinations in Grievances

Actor	Behavior	Object	Deflection	Wellbeing Concerns	Example
Good	Bad	Good	High	High	Opposition to the priest sex abuse scandal
Bad	Bad	Good	Low	High	Opposition to acts of terrorism
Good	Bad	Bad	High	Medium	Opposition to U.S. policies on death penalty/torture
Bad	Bad	Bad	Low	Medium	Opposition to inter-gang violence
Bad	Good	Bad	Medium	Low	Opposition to alliances between dictators
Good	Good	Bad	Medium	Low	Opposition to charity for prisoners
Bad	Good	Good	High	Low	Opposition to donations received from groups like KKK
Good	Good	Good	Very Low	None	Not an injustice event

Deflection and wellbeing concerns operate concomitantly in grievance evaluations, and injustice events will differ in the extent to which they evoke either mechanism. For example, some events, such as those taking the form of Good Actor→Bad Behavior→Good Object produce both strong deflection as well as strong wellbeing concerns and consequently are predicted to produce some of the highest levels of social movement mobilization. Other events, such as those taking the form of Good Actors→Good Behavior→Good Object produce no concerns about well-being and very low levels of deflection and are expected to produce no social movement mobilization. These two forms have matching levels of deflection and

wellbeing concerns (both are high or both are low), but what is predicted to happen when an event produces high deflection but low wellbeing concerns, or vice versa? While I expect that both wellbeing concerns and deflection are important for understanding movement sympathy and support, based on past and existing social movements, I believe that grievances involving harmful action are the most likely to invoke mobilization, making the deflection that might emerge from positive acts a secondary concern. Therefore, in examining combinations, I prioritize wellbeing concerns over deflection in determining the amount of expected mobilization.

Because I confer more weight to wellbeing concerns than to deflection, in combining both mechanisms, I anticipate that negative behavior will be at the core of the most powerful grievances. Thus, I expect there will still be a main effect for negative behavior and simple main effects from the interaction between behavior and object on mobilizing, cognitive and affective outcomes (WH1 and WH2). I also expect that the mechanism of deflection will strengthen the impact of wellbeing concerns on mobilization. For example, deflection produced in events involving negative behavior toward positive objects will also augment mobilization (as compared to symmetrical events, like bad behavior toward bad objects), increasing the sympathy and willingness responses predicted through wellbeing concerns (DH1).

While wellbeing concerns figure prominently in acts involving negative behavior, the mechanism of deflection is essential to understanding what happens in cases of mobilization around positive behavior. First, deflection tells us that while good acts toward good objects are to be desired, good acts toward bad objects violate expectations about how bad objects should be treated. Thus, when good behavior benefits negative objects, this could be disturbing to

some people, potentially motivating activism (DH1). Second, wellbeing concerns make no prediction about the perpetrator, in which case deflection may be particularly useful for understanding what role the actor plays in grievance evaluations. Bad actors are not expected to engage in positive acts, and when this occurs it can raise tension and suspicion about what is occurring. This tension could promote activism to stop bad actors from engaging in this good behavior (DH3).

In combining the logic of wellbeing concerns and deflection, some additional processes may arise that could affect grievance evaluations. One way that people reduce deflection is through redefinition of situations. In these injustice events, people may redefine situations by interpreting the behavior differently depending on the perpetrator. Consequently, someone reading a headline "Mother harms elderly" might interpret harm to mean something like neglect while another person reading a headline "Criminal harms elderly" might interpret the harm to mean something more akin to steal from or physically harm. Even more precise words like "hit" can vary; if a teacher hits a student, perhaps one pictures a slap on the cheek, while if a murderer hits a child, one might envision a full punch. Heise (1979, 2007) discusses how identities and behaviors modify each other in actor-behavior-object events and has developed equations that incorporate changes to one element, given the other two.[7] Impressions of the goodness or badness of behavior are contingent on the nature of actors engaging in the

[7] To understand how the three ABO elements affect each other, here are the formulas from David Heise. Note that A=Actor, B=Behavior and O=Object, and the e denotes the evaluation dimension.
From Heise (2007:113): Impression-formation equations estimated only for the evaluation dimension, ignoring potency and activity effects and some interaction terms:
^Ae =-.34 + .39Ae + .41Be +.12BeOe
^Be=-.27+.12Ae+.55Be +.11BeOe
^Oe=.11+.61Oe+.05BeOe
These equations explain a substantial portion of variance in post-event transients—R^2 is .76 for actor evaluation, .81 for behavior evaluation and .87 for object evaluation.

behaviors, as well as the recipients of the behavior. Thus, bad perpetrators could make negative behavior appear worse, while good perpetrators could soften the impressions of the bad behavior. This then presents a counterargument to predictions through deflection alone, that good actors doing bad acts will provoke more mobilization. Because bad actors make the negative behavior seem even worse, it could operate through the mechanism of wellbeing concerns and harm to others, to produce greater distress about the grievance. Therefore, while it is possible that the deflection generated from good actors performing bad acts will produce stronger mobilizing effects than bad actors (as predicted in DH3), it is also possible that the reverse will occur due to more negative perceptions of harm coming from bad actors and increased concern about the wellbeing of victims. I will let the data adjudicate on this interesting issue.

In sum, because I prioritize wellbeing concerns over deflection in understanding social movement grievances, I anticipate strong support for the wellbeing concern hypotheses that bad behavior will increase sympathy and a willingness to participate in action to address grievances and this effect will be stronger when the bad behavior is directed toward good objects. However, there are two arenas that wellbeing concerns do not address well: good behavior and the role of perpetrators. For these, I expect that deflection will have a more central role in bringing about mobilizing, affective, and cognitive outcomes. For example, deflection informs us that good behavior directed at bad objects will be more upsetting than good behavior toward good objects; this could lead some individuals to protest such beneficial behavior. The mechanism of deflection also predicts that the evaluation dimension of the perpetrator (good or bad) is likely to affect mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes,

modifying the main effect of behavior as well as the simple main effects of the behavior-object interaction.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation begins with the premise that not all grievances are created equal and draws from literature in social psychology, social movements, and morality to develop a series of hypotheses that outline how differences in combinations of basic elements in injustice events can differentially affect support and mobilization. I posit that two primary mechanisms underlie how cultural evaluations of goodness or badness of identities and behaviors become translated into concern and support for activist issues: wellbeing concerns and deflection. I then make predictions about how the goodness or badness of different elements of a grievance will interact to produce affective, cognitive, and mobilizing outcomes. To test these predictions, I design an experiment that is able to parse out the main effects of each element of a grievance, as well as interaction effects, to determine if indeed these hypotheses are true. The next section discusses the experimental design, procedures and participants as well as the manipulated and dependent measures used in the experiment.

Chapter 4: Experimental Design

Grievances do not exist in a vacuum, which makes it difficult to parse out the effects of issue content from the multitude of other factors affecting social movement recruitment and success. While ultimately it is important to see if the effects of grievances hold in the messy context of real world mobilization, the first step is to see if the effects exist at all. An experimental design is the most effective method for evaluating the proposed hypotheses as it holds other factors constant, permitting the analysis of whether the content of different injustice events affects sympathy and support for social movements. Specifically, an experiment allows me to isolate and make causal inferences about the effects of the evaluation dimensions of perpetrators, behaviors and victims.

For the experiment, I use a 2x2x2 completely randomized factorial design in which the two levels (positive and negative evaluations) of each factor—actor, behavior and object—are crossed, resulting in 8 experimental conditions. That is, I have two versions of actor (good perpetrator and bad perpetrator), two versions of behavior (good behavior and bad behavior) and two versions of object (good victim and bad victim). I then combine these to create eight unique conditions, such as Good Actor Behaves Negatively toward Good Object or Bad Actor Behaves Positively toward Bad Object (see Manipulations section for more details on the specific combinations). I use a between-subjects design, in which each participant evaluates only one injustice event and then answers a series of questions that measure the effects of that injustice event on mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes.

I use a vignette study to evaluate my hypotheses. A vignette design is appropriate for this study as it can efficiently communicate information about a grievance in a standardized

way to participants. Additionally, this would not be dissimilar to how people may hear of grievances in everyday life, such as reading about issues in print or online. Many scholars in affect control theory use written instruments, typically through the presentation of sentences or longer vignettes (for example, Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin 1998).

PARTICIPANTS

Participants were recruited from undergraduate sociology classes at a large public university in the southwestern U.S. for the opportunity to earn money. The instrument—the vignette and questionnaire—was distributed to 240 participants, with 30 participants in each condition.

The participants included 142 females and 97 males.[8] The vast majority of the participants were aged 18-25 (210 participants). Most participants were White (163 participants) or Latino/a (57 participants), with 38 participants identifying as some other race or ethnicity, such as Black, American Indian or Alaska Native, or Asian or Pacific Islander (participants could select multiple races or ethnicities). In regard to political preferences, the mean for participants was 3.34 (SD=1.44), falling between "Somewhat Liberal" and "Moderate" on a seven point scale ranging from 1=Very Liberal to 7=Very Conservative.

The purpose of this study is to test the effects of different combinations of injustice events on mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes. Thus, it is to my advantage to ensure that participants are as homogenous as possible on personal characteristics and that any response differences on the dependent variables are caused by the manipulated variables and not by participant characteristics (although random assignment is the most important check on

[8] One participant did not report gender.

this by randomly sorting participants into treatment conditions to reduce the chances that manipulated variables are associated with any particular participant variable). Undergraduate participants are well suited for this purpose because they tend to have similar demographic characteristics such as age, employment status, marital status and number of children. In addition, the dictionaries of evaluation, potency and activity (EPA) profiles developed by affect control theorists are typically based on undergraduate student ratings, as are the particular evaluation profiles I am using (Francis and Heise 2003). Thus, the use of undergraduate participants in my experiment helps to ensure that the evaluation profiles of the identities and behaviors used in the vignette instruments accurately reflect the evaluation assessments of the experimental participants.

Scholars have found strong concordance in evaluation profile ratings of identities and behaviors between the United States and other counties, with correlations of about .80 or above (specifically, EPA profiles have been collected in China, Japan, Germany, Ireland and Canada) (Heise 2001). However, since the identities and behaviors used for the experimental manipulations are based on evaluation ratings collected in the United States, I included a question asking participants if they had spent the majority of their lives living in the United States. I then removed any participants who had not spent the majority of their lives in the United States as a precaution against cultural differences in evaluation ratings and replaced the data (16 cases).

PROCEDURES AND MATERIALS

The experiment took place in undergraduate classrooms where participants were handed a vignette/questionnaire packet with compensation attached ($5). Vignettes were randomly ordered to create random assignment of participants to conditions. The vignette and questionnaire took approximately 15 minutes to complete, and the participants were not allowed to talk to one another during this time.

Each vignette presents one injustice event consisting of a specified combination of the goodness and badness evaluations of actor, behavior and object (e.g., Teachers Abuse Bullies). The injustice event was a single sentence. While a longer vignette could have provided richer context for participants, adding modifiers to the actor, behavior and object terms would alter the manipulation of these elements. For example, settings (Smith-Lovin 1979, 1987), non-verbal behaviors (Rashotte 2001, 2002) and emotional displays (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1999; Tsoudis and Smith-Lovin 1998) can affect the formation of impressions. Additionally, introducing greater description of the events would have made it difficult to maintain consistency across the eight conditions, some of which involved positive behavior and others negative behavior.

After reading the vignette, participants then answered a series of questions. The first section of the questionnaire asked about their emotional reactions to the event, their evaluation of the immorality or injustice of the event, their perceptions of others' reactions to the event, and how realistic they thought the event would be in everyday life. The second section of the questionnaire was prefaced with instructions that told participants to assume that there was a real life case of the injustice event and that activist campaigns had emerged to

oppose it. This was followed by questions asking about the participant's personal willingness to support or participate in actions for the campaign as well as perceptions of others' willingness to participate in the campaign. The questionnaire then concluded with demographic questions. Participants were also asked if they thought about the behavior described in the event in abstract or specific terms and to clarify what they envisioned. The final page welcomed participants to write in additional comments, such as reactions to the injustice event, further explanation of answer choices, or general comments on the survey (see Appendix A: Research Instrument for the Experiment).

MANIPULATIONS

I operationalized the goodness and badness of actors, behaviors and objects using the evaluation dimension of EPA (Evaluation-Potency-Activity) profiles of identities and behaviors. The evaluation ratings come from a survey by Clare Francis and David R. Heise, "Mean Affective Ratings of 1,500 Concepts by Indiana University Undergraduates in 2002-3," which includes ratings of 500 identities, 500 behaviors, 300 modifiers, and 200 settings collected at Indiana University using 1027 respondents who lived in the U.S.A. at age 16 and included approximately equal numbers of males and females (Heise 2004). EPA dictionaries separate out EPA profiles by gender as past research has shown that males and females can differ in their evaluations, particularly on sexuality-related identities (Heise 2004). Because gender differences are not of theoretical interest in this study, I select identities used in my injustice events that do not have significant differences on evaluation ratings by gender in the data set. I then use sex-averaged scores for the evaluation profiles.

I selected the actor, behavior and object presented in each injustice event based on its score on the evaluation dimension. I used elements with strongly positive scores to manipulate "goodness" and elements with strongly negative scores to manipulate "badness." The evaluation scores range from -4.3 (badness) to +4.3 (goodness). In the scales used for evaluation ratings, the endpoints near 4/-4 are labeled as "infinitely," 3/-3 are labeled "extremely," 2/-2 are labeled "quite," 1/-1 are labeled "slightly," and the middle point (0) is labeled "neutral" (Heise 2004).[9] Since ratings near 3 and -3 are labeled "extremely," they denote a strong sense of good or bad. Scores at the end of the spectrum are rare; in this data set, no sex- averaged score for behavior or identity was above 4 or below -4. For example, the most positive identity in the data set, "soul mate," has a score of 3.47 while the most positive behavior "thank" is 3.24 (sex-averaged scores). A realistic range for very "bad" scores is between -2.5 and -3.75, while a realistic range for very "good" scores is between +2.5 and +3.75.

In this experiment, the identity used for the good perpetrator was "Teacher" (*Evaluation Score (E)*= 2.65) and the identity for the bad perpetrator was "Murderer" (*E*=-3.63). For Behavior, the good action was "Care for" (*E*=3.18) and the bad action was "Abuse" (*E*=-3.59). For Object, the good victim was "Grandparent" (*E*=2.85) and the bad victim was "Bully" (*E*=-2.74). I use these elements in an injustice event, Perpetrator Behaves toward Victim, creating all possible combinations of good/bad elements. This 2x2x2 design results in eight conditions: Teachers abuse bullies; Teachers care for bullies; Murderers abuse bullies; Murderers care for bullies; Teachers abuse grandparents; Teachers care for grandparents; Murderers abuse

[9] However, the coding numbers are not typically shown to respondents when making ratings (Heise 2004).

grandparents; Murderers care for grandparents. Participants are only given one injustice event, so they do not know the nature of the other combinations. Identities and behaviors were selected to be on the positive side of power so as not to vary that factor for this study.

These events may seem surprising as potential social movement grievances. However, for the purpose of testing theory, it was desirable to select the strongest elements (most good or most bad) possible that still made sense in the different combinations. Thus I narrowed my selection of elements to the top 30 good and the top 30 bad identities or behaviors in the data set and used pretesting to evaluate which elements participants found the least problematic or confusing. For behavior, the choice was fairly straightforward. "Abuse" was the third highest negative behavior (the ones above it were kill and murder) and "Care for" was the third highest positive behavior (the ones above it were heal and thank) and both performed well in pretesting. For the identities (perpetrator and victim) the selection was more difficult. Most good identities were ill-suited for an activist campaign; for instance the top five are soul mate, best friend, loved one, true love and friend. Of the identities that still scored high on goodness, teachers and grandparents were selected because both represent groups of people who could conceivably be perpetrators or victims in a grievance. The top five bad identities were rapist, child molester, wife abuser, murderer, and terrorist. Other top 30 possibilities included white supremacists, racists, and criminals. However, because I was trying to keep evaluations of potency (powerful/powerless) constant, most of these identities had negative potency scores and could not be used. The top identities remaining were murderer, terrorist, serial murderer, devil, robber, bully, murderess, and gunman. I used pretesting to ultimately select murderer and bully.

DEPENDENT MEASURES

Mobilizing Outcomes

Of primary interest in this study is understanding how grievances can motivate mobilization by looking at what people are willing to do, or not, for social movement campaigns. To set the groundwork for asking about activism, the mobilizing outcome measures were prefaced by instructions that introduced an activist campaign into the vignette. These instructions read: "For this next section of the questionnaire, assume that there is a real life example of [*Injustice Event]*, and activist campaigns have emerged to OPPOSE it. You have just been approached by an activist recruiting people to take action to PREVENT [*Injustice Event*]." Following this were measures designed to tap general support for a campaign and willingness to participate in specific forms of activism (see Appendix A).

Sympathetic Support for Social Movement Campaigns evaluated how the grievances affected support for movements by asking participants if, in general, they would oppose or support activist campaigns to stop the [*Injustice Event*] (1=Strongly Oppose to 7=Strongly Support).

Willingness to Participate in Activism was measured by asking how willing participants would be to take the following actions for these campaigns to stop the [*Injustice Event*]: Sign a petition; Donate money; Recruit other people to take action; Attend a peaceful protest; and Attend a disruptive protest, like occupying a street without permission. Each action had answer choices ranging from 1=Very Unwilling to 7=Very Willing.

Affective and Cognitive Outcomes

For most social movement studies, the focus is on action, particularly protest attendance. However, affecting people's opinions and perceptions can be both a means to an end (e.g., getting those sympathetic people to protest) as well as end in itself (e.g., convincing people to embrace a new cultural norm). For these reasons, I measure three types of affective and cognitive reactions: evaluations of the strength of the grievance, emotional responses, and perceptions of others' evaluations of and support for an issue (see Appendix A).

Evaluations of the Strength of the Grievance assesses perceptions of the immorality, unjustness and importance of the injustice event. The first question asked whether the participant believed the injustice event was morally right or wrong, with answer choices ranging from 1= Very Right to 7=Very Wrong. The second asked whether the injustice event was just or unjust (1=Very Just to 7=Very Unjust); and the third asked the participant if, compared to other issues, they viewed this issue as an unimportant or an important problem (1=Very Unimportant to 7=Very Important).

Emotions were evaluated by a series of questions asking participants the extent to which, if at all, they would feel emotional reactions to the injustice event, including anger, satisfaction, sadness, and disgust. I also included a measure of surprise to assess reactions to any deflection generated by the event. Satisfaction could emerge from events with positive behavior or in cases where bad identities are being harmed. I reverse code satisfaction to match the other variables, with higher levels denoting more concern about the grievance. For the emotion variables, answer scales vary from 1=None At all to 7=Very High Levels.

Perceptions of Others was evaluated through two sets of questions. The first set captured how the participant viewed others' opinions of the grievance and consisted of two questions asking the participant whether the average American would think that the event was a) morally right or wrong (1 Very Right to 7 Very Wrong) or b) just or unjust (1 Very Just to 7 Very Unjust). These were then summed and averaged to create an Average Perception index (Cronbach's α=.95). The second set of questions assessed perceptions of others' willingness to participate in the campaign. These questions asked participants how willing they thought the average American would be to take the following actions to oppose the injustice event: Sign a petition; Donate money; Attend a peaceful protest; Recruit other people to take action for the issue; and Attend a disruptive protest, like occupying a street without permission. Each action had answer choices ranging from 1=Very Unwilling to 7=Very Willing. These actions were then summed and averaged to create an Average Participation index (Cronbach's α=.88).

Other Measures

While not of primary focus, I included several other questions to help to understand the data. One set of questions pertains to participants' willingness to engage in activism more generally and not specific to the cause presented in the vignette. Participants were asked to "Think of an actual cause, one that you really care about and that is important to you. How willing would you be to do the following actions for this cause: Sign a petition; Donate money; Attend a peaceful protest; Recruit other people to take action for the issue; and Attend a disruptive protest, like occupying a street without permission" (1 Very Unwilling to 7 Very Willing). If participants are unwilling to do an action, even for their ideal cause, then it is unlikely that they

would be willing to do it for any grievance. This could certainly be the case for something like disruptive protest, with some people ideologically opposed to or unwilling to take the risks of engaging in illegal behavior such as occupying a street without permission.

As discussed in Chapter 3, one consequence of deflection is that people find it surprising or strange and may even express disbelief if identities and behaviors are straying too far from expectations. This could have consequences for activism if people choose not to believe the injustice event is occurring. Consequently, I included two questions to assess whether people were more or less accepting of the truth of grievances. The first asked, "In everyday life, if you heard that [*Injustice Event*], would you be more likely to assume the information is true or false?" with answers on a seven point scale varying from 1=Completely True to 7=Completely False. The second question asked, "Does [*Injustice Event*] seem like something realistic or unrealistic that could happen?" with answer choices ranging from 1=Very Realistic to 7=Very Unrealistic.

I also included an open-ended question to better understand how respondents were interpreting the injustice events they read: "In thinking about the event '[*Injustice Event*]' did you envision a specific type of [*abuse/care*] or did you just think about [*abuse/care*] in a general or abstract way?"[10] with the answer choices of Specific Type, General or Abstract, and Don't Know. The majority of respondents (72.5%) thought about the behavior in abstract terms, while about a fifth (20.8%) thought of a specific activity and a small percent (6.7%) didn't know. For those who thought of a specific type of abuse or a specific type of care, there was a follow-up open-ended question asking participants to "please briefly describe what type of

[10] To clarify, only the word "care" or "abuse" appeared depending on the specific vignette.

[*abuse/care*] you envisioned."

Finally, I included an open-ended comment section at the end of the survey, prefaced by, "You are welcome to enter any additional comments here, such as more information about your reactions to the event, further explanation of your answer choices, or general comments on the survey." This provided participants the opportunity to give feedback or to elaborate on answers, and about a fifth of participants did include a comment of some kind in this section.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

To test the hypotheses of the predicted main effects and interactions, I conduct a three-way analysis of variance of the evaluation dimensions of actor, behavior and object on each of my dependent variables. I graph the interactions and compare differences in means to ascertain the direction and strength of effects. Further, to better understand these results, I also bring in qualitative data from participants' comments. In the next chapter, I discuss the results of the study in detail.

Chapter 5: Results

As discussed in Chapter 3, I predict that two theoretical mechanisms will work to explain how grievance components translate into mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes: wellbeing concerns and deflection. Wellbeing concerns center on perceptions of morality and the desire to prevent harm, while deflection pertains to cultural expectations about how actors should behave or the kinds of behaviors certain people should receive. When it comes to deflection, asymmetrical pairings of identities and acts (e.g. bad identities and good acts; good identities and bad acts) should provoke more concern and mobilization than symmetrical pairings (e.g. good identities and good acts; bad identities and bad acts). Overall, however, I believe that social movement adherents and sympathizers will prioritize the wellbeing concerns that stem from harmful behavior, making bad behavior, particularly when directed toward good objects (victims), a powerful form of grievance. But deflection, too, can expand our understanding of grievances, particularly when it comes to the role of actor (perpetrator), which wellbeing concerns make no predictions about. Similarly, the mechanism of wellbeing concerns is silent about good behavior, even though there are cases of movements that oppose good acts. Here too, deflection can help us understand the situations in which good acts become problematic for some people.

In this chapter, I turn to the results of the experiment to investigate whether the proposed hypotheses developed through wellbeing concerns and deflection are upheld or disconfirmed. I conduct a three-way analysis of variance of the evaluation dimensions of actor, behavior and object on each of my dependent variables to assess whether the predicted main effects, two-way interactions, and three-way interactions are occurring and thereby warrant

further investigation.[11] I then incorporate multiple analytic strategies—including components analyses, graphs, effect sizes, and qualitative comments— to understand the nature of these results and the extent to which the hypotheses are confirmed. While my hypotheses make the same predictions for mobilizing, affective or cognitive outcomes, the results indicate that there is somewhat of a divide between the mobilizing outcomes (particularly those involving behaviors) and the affective/cognitive outcomes. Consequently, I discuss the results by type of outcome (mobilizing outcomes first, then affective and cognitive outcomes), addressing in turn whether the wellbeing and deflection predictions are supported by the results.

MOBILIZING OUTCOMES

The first set of analyses examine whether the nature of the grievance matters for outcomes that measure the extent of mobilization for a social movement campaign: sympathetic support and willingness to participate in a variety of forms of activism—signing a petition, donating, recruiting others to activism, attending a peaceful protest and attending a disruptive protest. Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the mobilizing outcomes by experimental condition; Tables 3 and 4 report the analyses of variance on the outcomes by experimental factor. I first examine whether the results support the hypotheses based on wellbeing concerns, and then turn to the deflection hypotheses.

[11] I also ran models that included covariates such as race, age, politics, gender, and general willingness to participate in activism. None of the covariates changed the significance or direction of the actor, behavior, and object effects. Because experiments do not randomly sample (making it difficult to make inferences about demographic traits) and use random assignment, and because my theory does not make predictions involving demographic traits, I do not focus on these covariates in my analysis. With ANOVA, covariates need to be justified by the theory being tested, and covariates can increase Type I error if their selection allows for the capitalization of chance (Klockars 2010).

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Mobilizing Outcomes by Experimental Condition

	Good Actor				Bad Actor			
	Good Behavior		Bad Behavior		Good Behavior		Bad Behavior	
	Good Object	Bad Object	Good Object	Bad Object	Good Object	Bad Object	Good Object	Bad Object
Support	1.77	3.83	5.80	4.70	4.57	4.30	5.90	4.67
	(.94)	(1.46)	(.81)	(1.37)	(1.60)	(1.58)	(.89)	(.92)
Petition	3.13	4.07	5.83	4.87	4.33	4.57	5.87	5.03
	(2.35)	(1.78)	(1.42)	(1.80)	(1.95)	(1.78)	(1.36)	(1.54)
Donate	2.23	2.60	4.27	3.13	3.23	2.60	4.50	2.93
	(1.57)	(1.33)	(1.64)	(1.87)	(1.92)	(1.28)	(1.46)	(1.29)
Recruit	2.17	3.07	4.30	3.83	3.30	3.33	4.27	3.33
	(1.49)	(1.53)	(1.62)	(1.91)	(1.90)	(1.65)	(1.34)	(1.45)
P. Protest	2.43	3.10	4.33	4.00	3.30	3.17	4.57	3.50
	(1.74)	(1.40)	(1.83)	(1.98)	(1.77)	(1.46)	(1.55)	(1.43)
D. Protest	1.50	2.17	2.77	2.20	2.13	1.47	2.97	2.33
	(1.04)	(1.42)	(1.70)	(1.10)	(1.46)	(.73)	(1.40)	(1.67)

Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses

Table 3. Analysis of Variance on Sympathetic Support by Grievance Components

Source	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*
Actor (A)	41.67	27.33***	1
Behavior (B)	163.35	107.16***	1
Object (O)	1.07	.70	1
A x B	38.40	25.19***	1
A x O	22.82	14.97***	1
B x O	64.07	42.03***	1
A x B x O	18.15	11.91***	1
Residual	353.67		232

*Note: *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001*

Table 4. Analysis of Variance on Willingness to Participate in Various Forms of Activism by Grievance Components

	Petition			Donate			Recruit			Peaceful Protest			Disruptive Protest		
Source	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*
Actor (A)	13.54	4.32*	1	4.00	1.64	1	2.82	1.07	1	1.67	.61	1	.27	.15	1
Beh. (B)	113.44	36.18***	1	65.10	26.69***	1	56.07	21.32***	1	72.60	26.48***	1	33.75	18.54***	1
Obj. (O)	1.50	.48	1	33.00	13.53***	1	.82	.31	1	2.82	1.03	1	5.40	2.97	1
A x B	8.44	2.69	1	3.50	1.44	1	14.02	5.33*	1	5.40	1.97	1	.60	.33	1
A x O	1.20	.38	1	7.70	3.16	1	6.67	2.54	1	8.82	3.22	1	7.35	4.04*	1
B x O	33.00	10.53**	1	22.20	9.10**	1	20.42	7.77**	1	14.02	5.11*	1	5.40	2.97	1
A x B x O	2.60	.83	1	1.20	.49	1	.60	.23	1	.02	.01	1	6.02	3.30	1
Residual	727.43		232	565.83		232	610.00		232	636.07		232	422.40		232

*Note: *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p<.001*

Wellbeing Concerns Hypotheses: Mobilizing Outcomes

WH1: Main Effect for Behavior

The first wellbeing hypothesis predicts that bad behavior sparks more support and mobilization than good behavior in grievances. There is universal agreement across all mobilization dependent variables in support of WH1. As Tables 3 and 4 show, behavior has a significant main effect on all mobilizing outcomes, in the predicted direction (see the means in Table 2). Figure 2 visually displays the differences in means across behavior for the mobilizing variables, showing significantly higher means for bad behavior relative to good behavior. Consequently, the data indicate consistently that bad behavior is more powerful than good behavior in bringing about mobilization.

Figure 2. Mean Differences in Mobilizing Outcomes for Good and Bad Behavior



WH2: Interaction between Behavior and Object

The second wellbeing hypothesis predicts that the mobilizing effect of bad behavior over good behavior becomes stronger when directed at good objects rather than bad objects.

The analyses in Tables 3 and 4 show a significant interaction between behavior and object for all mobilizing outcomes except willingness to participate in disruptive protest, which did near significance (p=.086). To examine whether the interaction takes the form predicted in WH2, Figure 3 graphs the mean differences in mobilizing outcomes for good and bad behavior when directed toward a good victim (Fig. 3a) or a bad victim (Fig. 3b), and reports their significance. As predicted, behavior has a stronger effect when the grievance involves a victim perceived culturally as good compared to one viewed as bad; the effect of behavior is significant for more of the mobilizing outcomes, and the mean differences are greater. Some participants' comments also note the good-bad victim divide. One participant wrote, "I was bullied as a child, so seeing one get a taste of their own medicine might seem like a good way for them to see how it feels." Another participant noted that she felt "less guilty about the fact that those being 'abused' by murderers are bullies," although she did still view the event as morally unjust.

Figure 3a. Mobilizing Outcome Means for Behavior toward Good Object/Victim



Figure 3b. Mobilizing Outcome Means for Behavior toward Bad Object/Victim



Deflection Hypotheses: Mobilizing Outcomes

DH1: Behavior-Object Interaction

Like wellbeing concerns, deflection predicts a behavior-object interaction. But the logic of deflection is different and emphasizes the asymmetry of the pairing rather than concern over harm. The first deflection hypothesis predicts that behavior and object evaluations will interact, such that bad behavior directed toward a good object or good behavior directed toward a bad object will increase mobilizing outcomes more than will symmetrical evaluations (e.g., good behavior toward good objects; bad behavior toward bad objects). Thus, while it agrees with the prediction made through wellbeing concerns that good objects strengthen the effects of bad behavior, it also presents the counterpart that good behavior can have strong effects as well if it is directed toward a non-symmetrical object, i.e., bad victims.

To evaluate support for this deflection hypothesis, I analyzed differences in the effect of good or bad objects on mobilizing outcomes for good behavior separately from bad behavior. Figure 4a graphs mobilizing outcomes by object for bad behavior while Figure 4b shows mobilizing outcomes by object for good behavior. These plots indicate some support for DH1. All variables showed significantly higher levels of mobilization when bad behavior was directed toward good victims as opposed to bad victims, reflecting the pattern also predicted through wellbeing concerns. When good behavior was at play, the opposite tended to occur. However, only one of these effects is significant (for sympathetic support), and overall, the differences between bad and good objects are much weaker for good behavior than for bad behavior. Taken together, these analyses offer stronger support for the form of the behavior-object

interaction predicted by both the well-being hypothesis and deflection hypothesis (bad acts toward good victims) than the form solely predicted by the deflection hypothesis (good acts toward bad victims).

Figure 4a. Mobilizing Outcome Means for Bad Behavior toward Object/Victim



Figure 4b. Mobilizing Outcome Means for Good Behavior toward Object/Victim



DH2 and DH3: The Effect of Actor on Mobilizing Outcomes

While the mechanism of wellbeing concerns makes no predictions regarding the effects of the perpetrator, deflection indicates that non-symmetrical behavior from actors (bad acts by good perpetrators or good acts by bad perpetrators) will bring about stronger mobilizing outcomes than symmetrical behavior (DH3). Perpetrators are also predicted to affect the behavior-object interaction, resulting in a three-way interaction between actor, object and behavior (DH2). However, with the exception of sympathetic support, these hypotheses were not upheld for mobilizing outcomes. When it comes to willingness to engage in activism, the perpetrator appears to matter little; none of the willingness measures showed a significant three-way interaction and other significant effects involving the actor were uncommon (see Table 4). It would seem, then, that acts of bad behavior, particularly when directed toward good victims, are what matter most for willingness to engage in activism.

Sympathetic support for a campaign, however, is significantly affected by the goodness or badness of the perpetrator, including a main effect for actor, two-way interactions between actor-behavior and actor-object, and a three-way interaction between actor-behavior-object (see Table 3). For this outcome variable, the effects were in the direction predicted by the deflection hypotheses (see the means in Table 2). As predicted by DH3, the main effect of behavior was affected by the nature of the actor. For both good and bad actors, bad behavior increased mobilizing outcomes more than did good behavior. However, the difference in means between good and bad behavior was larger for good actors (mean difference=2.45) than for bad actors (mean difference=.85), although both differences are significant (p<.001). Also consistent with the logic of deflection, bad actors increased support for campaigns more than

good actors when either engaged in good acts (Bad Actor: *M*=4.43, *SD*=1.58; Good Actor: *M*=2.80, *SD*=1.60; *F* (1, 118)=52.50, p<.001). However, while deflection would predict that good actors would evoke more concern than bad actors for bad behavior, this effect did not occur and sympathetic support was nearly equal across the two for bad acts (Bad Actor: *M*=5.28, *SD*=1.09; Good Actor: *M*=5.25, *SD*=1.24; *F* (1, 118)=.02, *p*=.88). Additionally, for sympathetic support there was a significant three-way interaction between actor, behavior and object, with the behavior-object interaction being stronger for good actors (*F* (3, 116)=49.34, *p*<.001) than for bad actors (*F* (3, 116)=4.60, *p*=.03). Good and bad actors have relatively similar differences between good and bad objects when it comes to bad behavior. However, with good behavior, the gap between good and bad objects is much larger for good actors than for bad actors. This is a pattern seen in the affective and cognitive outcomes as well and is discussed in greater detail in that section.

Summary for Mobilizing Outcomes

The results for mobilizing outcomes show strong support for both of the wellbeing concerns hypotheses. Bad behavior (as compared to good behavior), especially when directed at good objects (as compared to bad objects), is particularly adept at attracting sympathy and interest in activism. There is some evidence that deflection occurs as well, but the results are weak for the interest in activism measures. Good behavior directed at bad victims only significantly increases sympathetic support. And again, with the exception of sympathetic support, the perpetrator ceases to play a central role in these outcomes focused specifically on social

movement campaigns. Instead, the heart of the story lies in behavior, and the behavior-object interaction.

AFFECTIVE AND COGNITIVE OUTCOMES

In this section, I examine perceptions and emotional reactions directly held toward the injustice event, without asking about social movement campaigns. These measures are useful for understanding the effects of grievances on factors like public opinion, public support, and sympathizers who could ultimately be converted into social movement adherents. I find that for these measures, deflection has more significant influence than it did for the mobilization outcomes.

Affective and cognitive outcomes encompass variables tapping into the strength of the grievance (whether the injustice event was morally right or wrong, just or unjust, important or unimportant), emotions (anger, disgust, sadness, surprise, and satisfaction), and perceptions of others' concern about and interest in activism. Table 5 reports the means and standard deviations for these variables, and Tables 6-8 report analyses of variance for these outcomes by the experimental factors. As was the case for mobilizing outcomes, the main effect of behavior and the two-way interaction between behavior and object dominate; both are significant for almost every variable. But the perpetrator also matters for these variables. The goodness or badness of the actor has widespread main effects and frequently shows a three-way interaction with behavior and object. While less consistent, there are also a number of two-way interactions between actor-behavior and actor-object.

Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations of Affective and Cognitive Outcomes by Experimental Condition

	Good Actor				Bad Actor			
	Good Behavior		Bad Behavior		Good Behavior		Bad Behavior	
	Good Object	Bad Object	Good Object	Bad Object	Good Object	Bad Object	Good Object	Bad Object
Wrong	2.27 (1.44)	3.90 (1.45)	6.47 (.78)	4.97 (1.59)	4.63 (1.83)	4.77 (1.38)	6.63 (.72)	5.53 (1.20)
Unjust	2.40 (1.50)	3.90 (1.32)	6.27 (1.14)	4.67 (1.65)	4.27 (1.82)	4.63 (1.19)	6.33 (.84)	5.13 (1.20)
Important	2.57 (1.55)	3.90 (1.45)	4.00 (1.74)	3.80 (1.79)	3.50 (1.70)	3.37 (1.61)	4.50 (1.46)	3.47 (1.55)
Anger	1.27 (.74)	3.67 (1.63)	4.83 (1.70)	2.87 (1.68)	3.50 (2.00)	3.30 (1.95)	5.23 (1.65)	3.83 (1.62)
Disgust	1.27 (.58)	3.67 (1.58)	5.23 (1.76)	3.27 (2.02)	3.57 (1.89)	3.40 (1.87)	5.70 (1.56)	4.10 (1.77)
Satisfaction	4.10 (1.56)	1.97 (1.30)	1.43 (1.01)	2.87 (1.59)	1.50 (.97)	1.67 (1.30)	1.20 (.66)	2.17 (1.42)
Surprise	2.97 (1.70)	3.67 (1.21)	5.37 (1.52)	3.67 (1.69)	4.77 (1.78)	3.73 (1.78)	4.53 (1.83)	3.77 (1.55)
Sadness	1.90 (1.13)	3.60 (1.79)	4.63 (1.88)	2.87 (1.98)	3.20 (1.99)	2.77 (1.76)	5.57 (1.48)	3.67 (2.04)
Avg. Perceptions	2.43 (1.14)	4.77 (1.14)	6.12 (.87)	4.70 (1.49)	5.30 (1.43)	5.43 (1.14)	6.35 (.66)	4.47 (1.26)
Avg. Participation	2.39 (1.12)	3.87 (1.24)	3.87 (1.20)	3.70 (1.21)	4.28 (1.39)	4.01 (1.15)	4.29 (.93)	3.77 (1.14)

Note: Standard deviations given in parentheses. Satisfaction not reverse-coded in this table.

Table 6. Analysis of Variance on Evaluations of Strength of Grievance by Grievance Components

	Wrong			Unjust			Important		
Source	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*Df*
Actor (A)	59.00	32.61***	1	36.82	19.80***	1	1.20	.47	1
Behavior (B)	242.00	133.75***	1	194.40	104.55***	1	22.20	8.58**	1
Object (O)	2.60	1.44	1	3.27	1.76	1	.00	.00	1
A x B	23.44	12.95***	1	16.02	8.61**	1	.20	.08	1
A x O	4.54	2.51	1	2.02	1.08	1	19.84	7.67**	1
B x O	71.50	39.52***	1	81.67	43.92***	1	22.20	8.58**	1
A x B x O	13.54	7.48**	1	8.82	4.74*	1	1.50	.58	1
Residual	419.77		232	431.40		232	600.30		232

*Note: *p < .05; **p <.01; ***p <.001*

Table 7. Analysis of Variance on Emotions by Grievance Components

	Anger			Disgust			Satisfaction			Sadness			Surprise		
Source	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*Df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*
Actor (A)	39.20	14.22***	1	41.67	14.75***	1	55.10	34.59***	1	18.15	5.73*	1	4.82	1.79	1
Beh. (B)	95.00	34.47***	1	153.60	54.38***	1	9.20	5.78*	1	104.02	32.85***	1	18.15	6.73*	1
Obj. (O)	5.10	1.85	1	6.67	2.36	1	.70	.44	1	21.60	6.82**	1	29.40	10.91**	1
A x B	.94	.34	1	2.02	.71	1	14.50	9.10**	1	6.02	1.90	1	25.35	9.41**	1
A x O	15.50	5.63*	1	18.15	6.43*	1	12.60	7.91**	1	19.27	6.09*	1	2.40	.89	1
B x O	116.20	42.16***	1	126.15	44.66***	1	71.50	44.88***	1	91.27	28.83***	1	17.07	6.33*	1
A x B x O	37.60	13.64***	1	32.27	11.42***	1	28.70	18.02***	1	15.00	4.74*	1	26.67	9.89**	1
Residual	639.50		232	655.33		232	369.63		232	734.53		232	625.33		232

*Note: *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p <.001*

Table 8. Analysis of Variance on Perceptions of Others by Grievance Components

	Average Perceptions			Average Participation		
Source	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*	*MSS*	*F-Ratio*	*df*
Actor (A)	46.82	34.25***	1	23.72	17.05***	1
Behavior (B)	51.34	37.56***	1	4.24	3.05	1
Object (O)	2.60	1.91	1	1.06	.76	1
A x B	46.82	34.25***	1	8.78	6.31*	1
A x O	26.67	19.51***	1	16.35	11.76***	1
B x O	124.70	91.24***	1	13.39	9.63**	1
A x B x O	11.27	8.24**	1	7.31	5.26*	1
Residual	317.08		232	321.36		231

*Note: *p <.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001*

Wellbeing Concerns Hypotheses: Affective and Cognitive Outcomes

WH1: Main Effect for Behavior

Similar to the results for mobilizing outcomes, there is strong support among the affective and cognitive outcomes for the prediction that bad behavior arouses more concern and emotions than good behavior. As Tables 6-8 show, the main effect of behavior is significant for all outcome variables but perceptions of others' participation (which was marginally significant, at p=.082), and all effects are in the predicted direction, as the means displayed in Figure 5 show. These results indicate a strong pattern in which bad behavior brings about stronger affective and cognitive reactions than good behavior in grievances. In concert with the results from mobilizing outcomes, the first wellbeing concerns hypothesis is strongly supported.

Figure 5. Mean Differences in Affective and Cognitive Outcomes for Good and Bad Behavior



WH2: Interaction between Behavior and Object

For the affective and cognitive outcomes, there is also strong support for the second wellbeing hypothesis that the effects of bad behavior relative to good behavior become stronger when directed at good objects compared to bad objects. The two-way interaction for behavior-object is significant for all variables (see Tables 6-8) and further investigation of the components of the interaction indicates the effects are in the direction predicted by WH2.

Figures 6a and 6b report the differences in affective and cognitive outcomes for good or bad behavior when directed toward different types of victims. The graphs show that the slope is much steeper moving from good to bad behavior when good victims are involved as compared to bad victims. Further, the differences in the means across behavior for the affective and cognitive outcomes in cases of good victims are all significant, while less than half are significant in cases with bad victims. Across all outcomes—mobilizing, affective and cognitive—there is strong support for WH2 that the effects of bad behavior become stronger in the presence of good victims. Indeed, bad behavior directed toward good objects forms a core component of grievances that bring about the highest levels of sympathy and support.

Figure 6a. Affective and Cognitive Outcome Means for Behavior toward Good Object/Victim



Figure 6b. Affective and Cognitive Outcome Means for Behavior toward Bad Object/Victim



Deflection Hypotheses: Affective and Cognitive Outcomes

DH1: Behavior-Object Interaction

DH1 predicts that asymmetrical behavior and object pairings (bad behavior directed toward a good object or good behavior directed toward a bad object) will increase mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes more than will symmetrical evaluations (good-good or bad-bad pairings). These predictions match those developed under wellbeing concerns for bad behavior, but also bring good behavior into the picture by predicting that it will have stronger effects on perceptions and emotions in the presence of bad objects as compared to good objects. Some social movements oppose good acts such as charity or welfare for groups that movement adherents view negatively, so this is relevant to study.

Figure 7a graphs affective and cognitive outcomes by object for bad behavior and Figure 7b graphs these outcomes by object for good behavior. The means for every affective and cognitive variable are significantly higher when the bad behavior is directed toward a good victim as compared to a bad victim. This has been a familiar story in the experimental results. Interestingly, though, another pattern appears. For good behavior, almost all variables had significantly higher means when good behavior was directed at bad victims rather than good victims. This supports the logic of DH1 and shows that good behavior can also arouse perceptions of injustice and emotional reactions when the objects of the behavior are perceived as bad.

These interesting findings do not negate conclusions about the main effects of bad behavior though. The slopes for good behavior are attenuated compared to those involving bad

behavior toward objects, suggesting bad behavior still elicits more dramatic effects. Additionally, the total sum of differences between good and bad object means for good behavior is a little more than half the total sum of differences between good and bad object means for bad behavior.





DH3: Actor-Behavior Interaction

Before turning to how the perpetrator affects the behavior-object interaction predicted through DH1, I will first examine the other two-way interaction predicted through deflection: that the main effect of behavior is influenced by the nature of the actor (DH3). This two-way interaction between actor and behavior will also inform the discussion of the three-way actor-behavior-object interaction.

Just as DH1 predicted that asymmetry between behavior and object increases concern, DH3 predicts that non-symmetrical behavior from perpetrators (bad acts by good perpetrators or good acts by bad perpetrators) will bring about stronger affective and cognitive outcomes than symmetrical actor-behavior acts. While the two-way interaction between actor and behavior did not have the near-universal significance of behavior-object interactions, it did

matter for a number of affective and cognitive variables: Wrong, Unjust, Satisfaction (reverse-coded), Surprise, Average Perceptions and Average Participation (see Tables 6-8).

Figures 8a and 8b show how the effect of behavior is modified by the goodness or badness of the perpetrator. Compared to bad actors, good actors show significantly larger differences between good and bad acts in mean outcomes. Just as was the case in sympathetic support for campaigns, this appears to be driven largely by the fact that bad perpetrators of good acts generate greater concern than good perpetrators of good acts. For bad perpetrators, both good and bad acts are alarming, and the difference between them is small or nonexistent for many outcomes. Participants, in their comments, sometimes noted their suspicion of bad actors performing good acts. For example, one participant writes, “I pictured my grandma, who was my best friend, being ‘taken care of’ by a creepy, cold, heartless killer.” Another participant notes, “I think the care for the elderly is already very flawed so putting their well-being in the hands of murderers is a bit haunting.”

Figure 8a. Affective and Cognitive Outcome Means for Behavior by Good Actor/Perpetrator



Figure 8b. Affective and Cognitive Outcome Means for Behavior by Bad Actor/Perpetrator



Another way to analyze the actor-behavior interaction is to examine the effects of actor for each type of behavior; these comparisons are shown in Figures 9a and 9b. These graphs clarify that the real action for deflection pertains to good behavior. In the plot of outcome differences by actor for good behavior (Figure 9a), all differences are significant and in a clear direction: bad actors generate more concern than good actors when it comes to good acts. But for bad acts, (Figure 9b), whether actors are good or bad makes almost no difference; bad acts generate strong reactions regardless of the perpetrator. Thus, deflection can be useful for explaining what wellbeing concerns cannot: the conditions under which good acts can still lead to feelings of injustice.

Figure 9a. Affective and Cognitive Outcome Means for Good Behavior by Actor/Perpetrator



Figure 9b. Affective and Cognitive Outcome Means for Bad Behavior by Actor/Perpetrator



DH2: Three-way Interaction between Actor, Behavior and Object

Now we turn to the most complicated of the hypotheses and the one that puts all the pieces of the story together: the three-way interaction. Unlike mobilizing outcomes (with the exception of sympathetic support), the analyses of variance in Tables 6-8 show significant three-way interactions between actor, behavior, and object for most affective and cognitive measures. DH2 posits that the strength of the behavior-object interaction predicted through deflection will depend on the perpetrator, with good actors generating more concern than bad ones. The logic here is that in events that people disapprove of (bad acts toward good victims; good acts toward bad victims) good actors will provoke more concern due to deflection and criticism for engaging in these condemned activities.

To test whether this logic is supported, I examined the strength and significance of the behavior-object interaction when the perpetrator was good and when the perpetrator was bad. Simple effects analyses indicated that the two-way interaction was significant for all outcomes

with good actors and for some outcomes with bad actors (exceptions were satisfaction, surprise and perceptions of others' willingness to participate in activism). Figures 10a and 10b show an example of this three-way interaction for perceptions of whether the event was just or unjust; these graphs are typical of the form of the interaction in other outcomes. As the graphs show, the behavior-object interaction is stronger for good actors (F (3, 116)=38.76, p<.001) than for bad actors (F (3, 116)=9.90, p=.002) as DH2 predicts. This difference is driven largely by how good acts vary by object for the two types of perpetrators. Good perpetrators have a large gap between good behavior directed toward good or bad objects, while bad perpetrators show a smaller difference. This makes sense. Good actors committing good acts toward good objects is not even an injustice event, setting a lower baseline for differences to emerge (as happens when they perform acts that benefit bad victims). Bad actors committing good acts, however, is suspicious (as discussed in the actor-behavior interaction section) so directing those good acts toward good objects is perceived as an injustice event (e.g., people do not want murderers caring for their grandparents). This creates a higher baseline, decreasing differences with other forms of injustice events. Consequently, for affective and cognitive outcomes, there is support for the deflection hypothesis regarding the three-way interaction. This mirrors the findings for sympathetic support in the mobilizing outcomes section, which showed the same pattern in the three-way actor, behavior, and object interaction.

Figures 10 a-b. Behavior-Object Interaction by Actor for the Unjust Outcome

Figure 10a. Behavior-Object Interaction for Good Actor: Unjust



Figure 10b. Behavior-Object Interaction for Bad Actor: Unjust



Once again, we can approach this three-way interaction in a different way that contributes further to an understanding of how deflection and wellbeing concerns co-operate in the actor-behavior-object events. While DH2 predicts how the behavior-object interaction varies by actor, we can also analyze the three-way interaction by examining how the actor-behavior interaction varies by object. To do so, I conducted separate analyses of variance on the actor-behavior interaction for both good and bad objects. The results of this breakdown show a clear division. When it comes to bad objects, the actor-behavior interaction is not significant for the majority of variables (exceptions are anger, sadness, and others' perceptions), and when the interactions are significant, they lack a clear pattern (see examples

in Figures 11a-c).[12] When it comes to good objects, however, the actor-behavior interaction is strongly significant for all variables, and all variables show the same pattern: when bad behavior is directed toward good objects, the effect of perpetrator ceases to matter (see Figures 11d-f). The strong effects for bad behavior directed toward good objects support the prioritization of wellbeing concerns over deflection. However, the mechanism of wellbeing concerns does not govern injustice events that involve good behavior, and deflection can be quite useful for understanding these events. Specifically, deflection explains that good actors helping good objects will result in little concern, while bad actors aiding good objects could be seen as an injustice. Consequently, when it comes to good behavior, there are bigger outcome differences between good and bad objects for good perpetrators than there are for bad perpetrators. Thus, the results suggest that both the mechanisms of wellbeing concerns and deflection shape cognitive and affective responses to injustice events.

[12] For these figures, I selected one variable from each subset of affective and cognitive outcomes: Anger (emotions), Unjust (strength of grievance), and Average Perceptions (others' perceptions).

Figures 11a-f. Actor-Behavior Interaction for Bad Object (Upper Row: a-c) and for Good Object (Lower Row: d-f)

Figure 11a. Actor-Behavior Interaction for Bad Object: Anger



Figure 11b. Actor-Behavior Interaction for Bad Object: Unjust



Figure 11c. Actor-Behavior Interaction for Bad Object: Avg. Perceptions



Figure 11d. Actor-Behavior Interaction for Good Object: Anger



Figure 11e. Actor-Behavior Interaction for Good Object: Unjust



Figure 11f. Actor-Behavior Interaction for Good Object: Avg. Perceptions



Summary for Affective and Cognitive Outcomes

As was the case for mobilizing outcomes, the results for affective and cognitive outcomes showed significant support for the simple main effects of behavior and the behavior-object interaction predicted through wellbeing concerns. Results for the affective and cognitive outcomes also indicate support for hypotheses based on deflection, particularly when it comes to incorporating the perpetrator as well as understanding perceptions and emotions generated by good behavior. The three-way interaction with actor was significant for most affective and cognitive outcomes; components analyses revealed that while there are similarities across the type of actor for differences in bad behavior toward good and bad objects, good actors (compared to bad actors) showed a much larger difference between good and bad objects when it comes to good behavior. Further analyses of the three-way interaction reveal a clear and consistent pattern for actor-behavior interactions in the case of good objects (actor differences for good behavior but a convergence for bad behavior); however, for bad objects, there were few significant differences in the actor-behavior interaction and the relationship took multiple forms.

OTHER EFFECTS AND FURTHER EXPLANATION OF RESULTS

Across all outcome variables—mobilizing, affective, and cognitive—we see very different results for the measures of willingness to engage in activism than for the measures of sympathy or more general affective and cognitive reactions. The former are affected only by behavior and its interaction with the object, while the latter are also affected by the actor in various ways. One way to understand the results for the activism measures is that they may have set the bar

higher for what participants were willing to do. Thus, only the strongest effects—those generated by behavior and by the behavior-object interaction—carried over to these measures. A similar effect occurred for the importance of the problem, where participants were asked about the importance of the injustice event relative to other issues in the world. Given the many social and environmental problems in society, only the behavior and behavior-object interaction held sway in increasing perceptions of importance relative to other pressing issues.

But the same was not true of other affective and cognitive outcomes, which had significant main and interaction effects for perpetrators. Indeed, there were some main effects for actor and for the actor-object interaction that were not even predicted by this study. Thus, when it comes to emotional reactions, evaluations of the strength of the grievance, and perceptions of others' reactions, the perpetrator has more far-reaching effects than assumed. And generally, it is bad perpetrators who spark greater emotional and sympathetic concern. In the three-way interaction, we can see this is particularly true for good behavior coming from bad perpetrators. But even for bad behavior, bad perpetrators tend to generate slightly higher levels of concern.

One proposed mechanism for why bad actors might generate more sympathy and mobilization relative to good actors when it comes to bad behavior is that bad behavior is perceived more negatively when it comes from bad actors. Results from participants' comments shed light on this phenomenon. One question asked if participants had thought of a specific type of abuse or care in the injustice event; about 20% of participants said they did and clarified the type of abuse they envisioned. When murderers were the perpetrators, the majority of participants described physical abuse (11 cases), with a few mentioning verbal

abuse (2 cases) or emotional abuse (2 cases). However, when teachers were the perpetrators, the majority of participants described verbal abuse (6 cases), followed by emotional abuse (4 cases) and physical abuse (3 cases). Thus, the bad perpetrator primed people to think of violent acts. This is reflected in participants' comments which described teachers as engaging in behaviors like "verbal embarrassment," "talking down to or emotionally being rude to," and "verbal assault." Conversely, murderers were described as enacting "violent or malicious behavior,""beating up," and committing "physical abuse more so than emotional or psychological abuse." People expect the worst from those who are labeled negatively (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006).

Another potential reason that good perpetrators do not have stronger effects relates to the production of disbelief. Deflection can generate tension, but it can also evoke reactions of disbelief when identities stray too far from cultural expectations. To check believability, I analyzed results for a case where good actors (teachers) would strongly defy cultural expectations: bad behavior toward good objects. I asked participants whether this injustice event was a) something realistic or unrealistic that could happen and b) whether if they heard about this event in everyday life they would be more likely to assume the information is true or false. In regard to whether the event seemed realistic or unrealistic, participants on average viewed teachers abusing grandparents as "Somewhat Unrealistic" (M=5.0, SD=1.31) while they saw murderers abusing grandparents as "Somewhat Realistic" (M=3.13, SD=1.50). Further, for evaluations of being true or false, teachers abusing grandparents was viewed closest to "Somewhat False" (M=4.7, SD= 1.39) while murderers abusing grandparents was viewed closest to "Somewhat True" (M=3.27, SD=1.46). Both of these sets of results suggest that when actions

of a good actor (a teacher) do not match cultural expectations this can generate feelings of disbelief and skepticism. One participant even spoke directly to this issue in her comments when she wrote, “Part of the reason I would not take more action and feel strangely about this issue is because I don't think teachers abusing grandparents is a very likely scenario.” Simple main effects on realism for bad behavior by good actors (as compared to bad actors) also support this pattern. Good actors engaging in bad behavior was viewed as “Neither Realistic or Unrealistic” (*M*=4.23, *SD*=1.69) while bad actors committing bad acts was seen as “Somewhat Realistic” (*M*=3.47, *SD*=1.55). This disbelief could negate the tension produced by deflection if people doubt that the good perpetrators are even committing harm.

Consequently, these two processes—perceiving bad acts as more harmful when they come from bad perpetrators, and reactions of disbelief to events in which good actors had committed bad acts—could explain why there is a lack of support for deflection predictions that good actors engaging in bad behavior would increase concern and mobilization.

EFFECT SIZES OF GRIEVANCE COMPONENTS ON OUTCOMES

By looking at the significance and direction of actor, behavior and object main effects and interactions, we can understand the ways that elements of grievances can combine to affect mobilizing, cognitive and affective outcomes. But how sizable are these effects? To better understand the magnitude of effects and the explanatory power of the model, I calculated the eta-squared (η^2) for each outcome variable. Eta-squared is analogous to R-squared in regression in that it calculates the proportion of variability in the outcome accounted for by the independent variables. It is the ratio of the sum of squares for the effect divided by the total

sum of squares. Eta-squared is useful for understanding how much a particular factor or interaction affects dependent variables. Eta-squared values can be small compared to r-squared values (Fritz, Morris and Richler 2012) and as a guideline, a large effect is .14, a medium effect is .06, and a small effect is .01 (Cohen 1988).[13]

Looking over eta-squared for the overall model, we see that grievance components are explaining quite a bit of variation in some of the outcomes. For sympathetic support, perceptions of immorality and injustice, and perceptions of others' reactions, the grievance components are explaining about half the variation in the outcomes. The grievance components also account for about a third of variation in the emotion variables (with the exception of surprise), ranging from .27-.37. For the willingness to participate in activism measures, the grievance components account for smaller amounts of variation, with close to zero for disruptive protest to about a fifth of the variation for signing a petition or donating.

Turning to the specific factors and interactions, unsurprisingly behavior performs the strongest when it comes to the magnitude of its effects on outcomes. For the majority of outcomes, behavior has medium to strong effects, with the largest effects for sympathetic support for campaigns and perceptions of immorality and injustice. As expected, the behavior-object interaction also has substantial effects, with medium effects on about half the outcomes. The main effect for actor also returns medium effects for about a third of the outcomes. The remaining factors and interactions tend to have smaller effect sizes.

[13] For one-way analysis of variance.

Table 9. Effect Size (η^2) by Outcome

	Model	Actor (A)	Beh. (B)	Obj. (O)	A x B	A x O	B x O	A x B x O
Support	.50	.06	.23	.00	.05	.03	.09	.03
Petition	.19	.02	.13	.00	.01	.00	.04	.00
Donate	.19	.01	.09	.05	.00	.01	.03	.00
Recruit	.14	.00	.08	.00	.02	.01	.03	.00
PeaceProtest	.14	.00	.10	.00	.01	.01	.02	.00
DisrProtest	.02	.00	.07	.01	.00	.02	.01	.01
Wrong	.50	.07	.29	.00	.03	.01	.09	.02
Unjust	.44	.05	.25	.00	.02	.00	.11	.01
Important	.10	.00	.03	.00	.00	.03	.03	.00
Anger	.33	.04	.10	.01	.00	.02	.12	.04
Satisfaction	.34	.10	.02	.00	.03	.02	.13	.05
Surprise	.17	.01	.02	.04	.03	.00	.02	.04
Disgust	.37	.04	.15	.01	.00	.02	.12	.03
Sadness	.27	.02	.10	.02	.01	.02	.09	.01
AvgPerceptions	.49	.07	.08	.00	.07	.04	.20	.02
AvgParticipation	.19	.06	.01	.00	.02	.04	.03	.02

CONCLUSION

The central wellbeing hypotheses of this dissertation predict that bad behavior, particularly when directed toward good objects, constitutes a form of grievance that promotes strong mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes. The results of the data analyses support these main conclusions. There is almost universal concurrence across outcomes that bad behavior in grievances is viewed as more concerning than good behavior, and that this effect is augmented when the bad behavior is directed at good victims rather than bad ones. This is especially true

of most mobilizing outcomes, which returned scant results supporting the effects of perpetrator. Even for affective and cognitive outcomes, the effect of perpetrator essentially disappeared in cases of bad acts toward good victims. Thus, to understand the mobilizing power of grievances, look first at the type of behavior and the nature of the aggrieved group.

While the results strongly support the wellbeing concern hypotheses, the story does not end there. I also found some support for hypotheses predicted by deflection, particularly for the affective and cognitive outcomes. Deflection is likely strengthening the wellbeing concerns that drive mobilizing and sympathy outcomes in bad behavior-good object injustice events. Importantly, deflection can also help to elucidate good behavior. For many affective and cognitive variables, when it comes to good behavior, results show that asymmetrical actors and objects (e.g., bad perpetrators committing good acts or good acts benefiting bad objects) increase sympathy, perceptions, and emotional reactions more than do symmetrical ones. Perpetrators, too, can modify the strength of the simple main effects for behavior and the behavior-object interaction for affective and cognitive outcomes. The perpetrator even had effects not posited in the theoretical section—such as a significant main effect across multiple variables—where bad actors generated higher levels of outcomes than did good actors. Thus, the perpetrator does play a role for many outcomes, and good behavior is seen as an injustice in certain contexts.

In the next chapter, I discuss these results in greater detail and draw on examples from social movements to examine how grievance components and mechanisms like deflection and wellbeing concerns might operate in the real world.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion

Both the theoretical logic of this study and its results support the conclusion that the content of grievances produces differential effects in mobilizing, affective and cognitive outcomes. A substantial body of evidence points to behavior, and the aggrieved group it targets, as driving the storyline of what makes a powerful mobilizing form of grievance. Perpetrator, too, matters for particular outcomes. In this chapter, I discuss the results of the experimental study, providing an overview of the central findings and their implications for theory, including contributions to social movement literature. I then situate the results in real world contexts, connecting them to social movements to better understand the applications of this research. Importantly, the results from this study not only show which kinds of grievances are more likely to attract support, they also identify the types of issues and social problems that are less likely to attract popular support and activist activity, making it more likely that solutions for these causes languish and such grievances are left unaddressed. I conclude the chapter with acknowledgement of the limitations of the research and consideration of extensions and future research directions.

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Theoretical Mechanisms: Wellbeing Concerns and Deflection

The results from the experimental study show that by parsing grievances into their three main components—perpetrator, behavior, and victim—and systematically varying the goodness or

badness of each element, we can dramatically affect how concerned or emotional people become about an issue and, importantly, how willing they are to take action to address it. These grievance components are theorized to operate through two theoretical mechanisms—wellbeing concerns and deflections—and experimental results suggest that both mechanisms are at play in grievance evaluations.

The results for all outcomes indicate strong support for both of the wellbeing concerns hypotheses. Experimental results showed that events involving bad behavior were viewed as wrong and unjust, generated moderate levels of emotions, and resulted in people being somewhat willing to support a campaign opposing such behavior. Good behavior, in contrast, was viewed more neutrally on perceptions of injustice and immorality, roused low levels of emotion, and led people to be somewhat opposed to a campaign against the good act. Further, bad behavior toward good victims (whether involving a good or bad perpetrator) consistently returns the highest levels of affective, cognitive and mobilizing outcomes and has the strongest effect sizes in the study. The near universal support for the wellbeing concerns hypotheses confirms the underlying logic that people's concerns about preventing harm to others (especially good others) dominates grievance evaluations.

When it came to predictions generated through the mechanism of deflection, a split emerged between mobilizing and affective/cognitive outcomes. With the exception of sympathetic support (which is affective in nature), the mobilizing outcomes offered little backing for the deflection mechanism, with weak effects for perpetrators or other patterns predicted by deflection, such as good behavior directed at bad victims. Conversely, the affective

and cognitive results indicated more support for deflection hypotheses, providing a place for perpetrators and acts like good behavior in grievance evaluations. However, actor or its interactions had smaller effect sizes than behavior or the behavior-object interaction. Thus, it would appear that the goodness or badness of the perpetrator is less of a factor in how people evaluate injustice events than the nature of the act and its target.

The results for perpetrator are not as clear or as strong as those for behavior, but that does not mean they are uninteresting. Perpetrator was the source of two unexpected findings: a main effect for actor and a two-way actor-object interaction. This main effect for actor, which is present for sympathetic support, petition, and many affective and cognitive outcomes, shows that bad actors produce higher levels of outcomes than do good actors. As discussed in the results section, two mechanisms could explain why bad behavior is seen as worse when it comes from bad perpetrators: good actors committing bad acts generate disbelief, and bad acts coming from bad actors are viewed as more harmful. And when it comes to good behavior, once again bad perpetrators engaging in good acts seem more suspicious than good actors doing the same. Because people disliked murderers interacting with a good object, this drove a two-way actor-object interaction not predicted by theory. For bad actors, average outcome means tended to be higher for good victims (i.e., people wanted murderers to neither care for nor abuse grandparents) while for good actors, the average outcome means tended to be higher for bad objects (i.e., when teachers were caring for grandparents, this was not a problem).

Affect Control Theory and Grievances

The near universal support for the wellbeing hypotheses across the outcome variables indicates that concern for the welfare of others, particularly groups viewed as good, dominates grievance evaluations. This was predicted in my comparison of the two theoretical mechanisms in Chapter 3, where I posited that social movements place priority on preventing harm over preservation of cultural meanings. Thus, this reveals some of the limitations of extending Affect Control Theory to collective action. Social movements tend to involve strong judgments of what is right or wrong and just and unjust, a task not undertaken by ACT. ACT emphasizes the maintenance and restoration of cultural meanings, but in grievance evaluations people prioritize the welfare of others over preserving consistency in their understandings of the world. This does not mean that deflection is unimportant—the results revealed multiple ways that deflection could have effects (including the central effect of bad behavior toward good objects which is predicted by both deflection and wellbeing concerns). But the effects of deflection rarely trump wellbeing concerns. Murderers abusing grandparents is comparatively low on deflection, but overall is the strongest form of injustice event in the experiment.

It is interesting to note that the emotion variables do produce a pattern counter to this general trend. While recognizing that bad behavior toward bad objects is somewhat wrong or unjust, people feel the highest levels of satisfaction (although still relatively low) when bullies are harmed (other than the non-injustice event of teachers caring for grandparents). Here we see deflection in action, with some people seeing bullies as getting their just desserts. Perhaps this speaks to a more subtle, less conscious prejudice evoked by deflection toward bad victims

that becomes expressed emotionally. These cases of satisfaction could be an emotional response to the confirmation of meanings. ACT does allow for positive emotional reactions, such as when one is evaluated more positively than expected by self-images (Robinson and Smith-Lovin 1992).

In sum, concepts from Affect Control Theory, specifically evaluation ratings and deflection, contributed to the development of a broad, theoretical framework for understanding grievances. In turn, application of ACT to social movements suggested a new extension of ACT concepts to collective action. However, there were limitations of applying logic centered around the maintenance of meanings to cases with a strong focus on justice and morality, specifically revealing the necessity of incorporating concerns about harm and the welfare of others.

Contributions to Social Movement Theory

That differences in grievances generated significant and consistent patterns across outcomes lends strong support to the idea that not all grievances are created equal in attracting sympathizers and adherents. If, as this study finds, grievances differ in mobilizing power, then this has ramifications for multiple areas of social movement study, including participation, social movement outcomes, and framing. The outcomes of interest also are relevant to social movement literature on topics such as the mobilization potential, emotions, and threshold effects for collective action. In this section, I discuss the consequences of the results for mobilizing outcomes for social movement study, and then do the same for the affective and

cognitive outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of the relevance of this study for framing processes.

By looking at how grievances differentially affect mobilizing outcomes, this study sheds light on processes germane to movement participation. It is important to understand who supports a campaign and would be willing to engage in collective action for it, as these sympathizers make up the mobilization potential, a group of people primed to participate in a social movement. The results show that the content of grievances brings about differing levels of support and willingness to participate in activist activities on behalf of a campaign to redress a grievance. Indeed, the content of grievances explained half the variation—a substantial amount—in sympathetic support for social movement campaigns. As expected, people opposed campaigns and were unwilling to participate in action for grievances predicted to be weak, based on wellbeing concerns and deflection. Participants supported and were somewhat willing to participate in activism (with the exception of disruptive protest) for grievances that both wellbeing concerns and deflection would classify as strong. This supports the idea that although we cannot predict what issues any particular person is going to care about, we can predict patterns in what kinds of issues (and the campaigns that address them) are the most compelling. The mobilizing measures also speak most directly to social movement outcomes as they assess how well grievances might attract resources (such as donations) and new adherents (either through acts like protest or by recruiting others).

The results for the affective and cognitive outcomes matter too, in part for determining a pool of sympathizers (some of whom may filter through the other stages to activist participation) but also as an end in itself, by shaping public opinion. The content of grievances is

particularly adept at affecting people's impressions of whether an event is unjust or immoral, with behavior accounting for over a quarter of the variation in these outcomes. Perceptions of the strength of the grievance are relevant to social movement outcomes. Public opinion may create a climate favorable to other forms of action, like legislation. Sympathetic bystanders may also engage in beneficial activities for a campaign, such as spreading awareness of an issue in conversations with friends or by volunteering or voting.

Another element that can strengthen how much people care about an issue is their emotional reaction to it, and once again, we see that the content of grievances matters quite a bit for the types of issues people respond to emotionally. For example, anger and disgust ranged across events from none at all (when good actors benefited good victims) to somewhat high to high (when bad perpetrators abused good victims). Just as social movement scholarship on emotion has looked at the types of events likely to generate outrage (e.g., moral shocks), this study shows how systematic variations in grievances produce different levels of emotional responses. Further, it does so across a variety of emotional outcomes, bringing in emotions that are less often studied, such as disgust and sadness.

Finally, perceptions of others' reactions can assess whether people expect others will think an issue is unjust or immoral (creating an environment supportive of activism) or if other people will participate in action (making that action more efficacious in working toward goals). Like the other affective and cognitive outcomes, differences in the content of grievances produced differential responses in perceptions of how the average American would view or respond to the issue. This was especially true for others' perceptions, where grievance components account for almost half the variation. People expected others to agree with them

that bad acts toward good victims were wrong and unjust. However, on average, they also expected that other people would view good acts either directed toward bad objects or coming from bad perpetrators as more unjust and immoral than their own evaluations. For instance, teachers caring for bullies was rated as a little less than somewhat unjust or wrong for the average American, but rated as about neutral by participants. Murderers caring for grandparents or bullies was rated between neutral and somewhat wrong/unjust by participants, and more than somewhat wrong/unjust for the average American. Thus, participants thought that deflection from disrupted cultural meanings would matter more to the average person than to themselves. In terms of whether other people would be willing to participate in the campaign, participants rated the likelihood for most injustice events as somewhat unwilling to neutral. It would seem then, that while participants believed the average American would perceive variation in the immorality and injustice of events, they were pessimistic that the average American would be willing to do much about it.

Finally, as noted in Chapter 2, this dissertation can inform framing strategies. It suggests how the selection of good or bad identities of perpetrators and victims, as well as how acts are communicated, might elicit differential responses in the bystander public and potential adherents. Social movement actors can be creative in how they portray a cause, and how perpetrators and victims are cast can shape public debate about an issue. For example, a factor that promoted drunk driving legislation was the idea of a "killer drunk" who threatens the lives of others (Gusfield 1981). While "drunk" is already viewed as slightly bad on evaluation profile ratings, the addition of "killer" puts it on par with some of the most egregious identities. This then creates an effective label—"killer drunk"—which helps to identify drunk-driving as an

injustice worth addressing. However, as effective as framing can be, I also argue that the content of an injustice event can either constrain or assist in the development of these frames. If a social movement is attempting to protect prisoners then they will be more constrained in their ability to portray this aggrieved group in positive cultural evaluation terms than a movement attempting to protect veterans, voters, or schoolchildren. This is particularly true if the movement is vulnerable to counter-framing from the media and countermovements.

APPLICATION OF FINDINGS TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: SOME ILLUSTRATIONS

In this section, I apply the findings from this study to real world examples of grievances and social movements. These cases illustrate how different combinations of core components can bring about dramatically different responses in public support and activism. Given the primacy of the behavior-object interaction in the experimental results, I use examples of real world grievances to demonstrate how different combinations of behavior and victim (bad behavior-good victim; bad behavior-bad victim; good behavior-bad victim) manifest in different reactions from the general public and social movements. I then turn to the perpetrator and address questions like why the perpetrator might play a weaker role in social movement grievance evaluations.

Behavior and Victim Combinations and Social Movements

Bad Behavior toward a Good Victim

One of the strongest conclusions from the experimental study was that negative behavior, especially when directed toward good objects, constitutes a powerful form of grievance. When it comes to bad acts, the nature of the aggrieved group has ramifications for which social movements will be successful in appealing to audiences and attracting adherents. For example, Weed (1990) discusses how focusing on the victim's story was key to the formation of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). The founder of MADD's daughter, a 13 year old, was walking in a bicycle lane near her home in the afternoon on her way to a church carnival, when she was hit from behind by a driver with multiple prior DWI arrests. Further, the driver was out on bail from a separate hit-and-run drunk driving crash. This event was ideal for portraying the innocent, blameless victim (including the role of an offender who is perceived as "bad") which helped to justify moral indignation (Weed 1990: 462). Further, while many MADD activists have lost family members to drunk-driving, the traits of these drunk-driving victims differ from averages from national highway fatality data on drunk driving crashes: they tend to be much younger (disproportionately under the age of 19) and more female than the national data. These contribute to the idea of a young, innocent victim, resulting in more "public credibility" for activists and making these activists' "moral indignation seem more justified in the eyes of the public" (Weed 1990: 467). Thus, it would appear that while drunk-driving is seen as a harmful act, when it is directed toward a specific type of victim—child or teenage—it becomes a particularly strong motivator for activism for both MADD members and as a story to draw in

movement adherents. While "innocence" matters in this case, both child and teenagers are also seen as good identities that have positive evaluation dimensions of EPA profiles (Francis and Heise 2003). The nature of the victim, then, is used to create a more compelling story to convince people of the need for drunk-driving legislation and prevention programs. In this manner, it has implications for social movement outcomes and success.

Bad Behavior toward a Bad Victim

In the experimental study, victims culturally perceived as "bad" (i.e., bullies) did not garner as much support as victims culturally perceived as "good," (i.e., grandparents). In the real world, this phenomenon is seen starkly with identities such as criminals or terrorists. For instance, former employees at a prison in Miami-Dade County Florida have filed a complaint with the Department of Justice, alleging longstanding abuse of prisoners, including a prisoner who suffered severe burns and died after being put in a scalding-hot shower for over an hour by guards; two years later, no one had been disciplined for the incident (Brown 2014). As more systematic evidence of abuse emerges from Florida's prison system, some political action is occurring, such as a proposed bill to punish abusive guards (Klas and Lepri 2015). This is consistent with a main finding of the experimental study: harmful behavior is upsetting. However, one could imagine the public outcry if a similar event happened in a school or a hospital, instead of a prison. And that is one of the consequences of people caring more about victims whom they perceive culturally as good; victims viewed culturally as bad are not helped as quickly, if at all. Social problems involving these negatively viewed identities persist, even

when the “bad acts” directed at them are extensive and unjust. A similar occurrence is found at Guantanamo Bay, where individuals who have been cleared of all charges are on a hunger strike to protest their continued detainment (Harris 2013). Social movements to help prisoners, while in existence, tend not to be very strong. For example, a nationwide survey of protest events indicates that, of the 25 different causes for which protests were organized, the death penalty was second to last (Beyerlein et al. 2015).

Good Behavior toward a Bad Victim

That bad acts arouse more concern and action than good acts is not surprising; many famous social movements, like the U.S. Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War protests, emphasized opposing negative behavior. What is more unusual, then, are the cases where good acts could be viewed as potentially unjust, such as when those good acts come from a bad perpetrator and benefit a bad object. Interestingly, participants were more likely to perceive the average American’s judgments of that type of injustice event as more morally wrong or unjust than their own personal judgments. While not as plentiful, there are examples of opposition to good or beneficial acts. When tens of thousands of unaccompanied Central American children were detained crossing the border, overwhelming facilities, and prompting questions of what to do, this set off a firestorm of debate. Glenn Beck faced criticism and backlash after he promised to provide teddy bears, soccer balls, food and other supplies to the children housed in border security detention facilities in Texas (Dionne 2014). When several buses attempted to transfer children and their parents from the overcrowded Texas facilities to

one in Murrieta, California, hundreds of angry protestors blocked the road, waving American flags and chanting slogans, forcing the buses to turn around (Hansen and Boster 2014). In both cases, providing care to the undocumented immigrants was contested. Another example is found in Guantanamo Bay; current detainees would benefit from being moved to the United States to stand trial, but there is substantial opposition to this move, even for individuals cleared of charges. In another example, jails and prisons are informally serving as psychiatric hospitals for the mentally ill, with 1.3 million people with mental illness incarcerated in state and federal jails and prisons (compared to 70,000 served in psychiatric hospitals) and a severe lack of resources for mental health treatment (Frances 2013). Pustilnik (2005) states that the criminal justice system serves as a default asylum system and that New York's Rikers Island serves as the state's largest psychiatric facility. She writes:

> Prisons and jails have taken on behemoth proportions, bloated with nonviolent and even non-offending people who in earlier times would have been treated in hospitals- we are the poorer for it and no safer. … The problem is that housing and treatment sound like 'entitlements'- while prison sounds like (and is) punishment. As a culture that prizes self-reliance, we are cautious about extending benefits and suspicious of rewarding people for what looks like bad behavior. The punishment of people with mental illnesses who act out in public might also seem to fit with a certain notion of public order and personal responsibility (Quoted in Frances 2013).

Here we see another case where care toward a negatively perceived group is opposed in favor of punishment. Further, there is little optimism that the situation will change and that adequate resources and funding will be funneled into mental health treatment. Like Guantanamo Bay, prison abuse, and standoffs in illegal immigration, these problems persist.

Perpetrator: Implications for and Application to Social Movements

The discussion of experimental results has already indicated that the results for perpetrator are more mixed than results for behavior and object. Turning to real world examples from social movements, it is easy to see why the perpetrator might constitute a more complex or nuanced element than behaviors and aggrieved groups. While identification of a perpetrator was clear in the experiment, for many injustice causes, identifying a perpetrator can be challenging. Take the example of animal rights movements focused on meat production. The emphasis of such campaigns tends to be on spreading awareness about the living conditions and harm experienced by farmed animals (i.e., the behavior and behavior-object interaction). If a campaign wanted to shift its focus to the perpetrator, who exactly would that be? There are people directly responsible for the harm, employees who slaughter cattle for instance. There are managers who run the individual operations and oversee employees. There are corporate leaders who set the guidelines for meat production for their company. There are lawmakers who regulate standards for animal cruelty. And then there are businesses and people who buy meat produced through these operations. Who is culpable; who is the perpetrator? Focusing at the corporate level, for instance, could result in the corporation claiming they adhere to state animal cruelty laws and that improving living conditions would be more expense, preventing them from remaining competitive in a marketplace where consumers only purchase the least expensive meat. Directing energy toward lawmakers might result in politicians claiming that the government is overreaching and that this would be better corrected through the marketplace, i.e., consumers only buying ethically-produced meat. It is easy to see why activist campaigns might initially sidestep the "who is to blame" component of

grievances when trying to draw in new adherents. After all, the "pull" of the grievance is the shock of seeing animals being harmed, often through visual images (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). In many cases, the target becomes individuals who can change lifestyle behaviors and consumption practices, such as becoming a vegetarian or not using products tested on animals. This is not to say that animal rights groups never target perpetrators—PETA currently has a campaign against SeaWorld, for example—just that perpetrators may be trickier to identify than harmful acts and aggrieved groups.

In addition to perpetrators being a more complex element, arguably they are also the least varied when it comes to application of cultural evaluations. People tend to think of movement activities focused on government—a million person march to the capitol or a letter-writing campaign to senators regarding an upcoming bill. And this image is accurate; the majority of protests are directed at local, state or federal government. In a nationwide survey representing over a thousand protest events, Beyerlein et al. (2015) found that about 60% were directed at local, state or federal government. The other most frequent targets were groups of people, corporations and medical facilities. In contrast, particular people, research and scientific labs, foreign governments and universities were each targeted in less than 10% of protests events. While governments receive the majority of social movement attention, defining them as "perpetrator" could be misleading. It could be that governmental actors have the means to stop an injustice (e.g., pass legislation) not necessarily that they are the only source of the injustice, as shown in the earlier example of the animal rights movement. But also, if the majority of protests are directed at government, this provides a limited number of identities that can vary in goodness or badness. Often, protests or letter writing campaigns are

targeted toward politicians (one type of identity). Contrast this with the potential nature of the aggrieved group (students, veterans, gays/lesbians, soldiers, women, immigrants, labor unions, felons, retirees, teachers, voters and so on). In cases where perpetrators are distinct (such as individual people), the results from this study are useful. But, by and large, I expect that there will be more variation in behaviors and victims (and more opportunities to apply cultural perceptions of goodness or badness), making these arenas more relevant for the conclusions from this dissertation.

Finally, even in cases where there is an easily identified perpetrator, the experimental results returned mixed results in how the actor mattered. Significant effects for perpetrator were absent for most mobilizing outcomes. And in cases where the mechanism of deflection would suggest greater distress generated by good actors relative to bad actors (like when they commit bad acts), this tended not to occur. As discussed previously, one reason underlying the lack of effects for good actors committing bad acts is that deflection also generates disbelief. In looking at real world examples, recent events involving police abuse and the subsequent protest response could indicate some of the problems stemming from disbelief from deflection to grievances. When it came to the grand jury decision not to indict the police officer who shot and killed an unarmed, black teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, half of surveyed Americans approved of the decision; but in the case of an unarmed black man, Eric Garner, dying in an alleged chokehold death by police in New York City, only one in five felt that the grand jury was correct in not indicting the police officer (Pew Research Center 2014). In the latter case there was a video clearly documenting the event. It could be that deflection produced from the event of "police murders teenager" resulted in people not believing it to be

true and looking for alternate explanations, while in the second case the stronger video evidence overruled this disbelief. Both events inspired large nationwide protests, speaking once again to how bad acts help to power mobilization.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

A common question with experimental studies pertains to their external validity—how generalizable they are to real world contexts. The focus of this dissertation is on developing theory. In many ways such theory development is highly generalizable in that the core ideas of this study are not limited to one type of campaign or movement and can be broadly applied. But it remains to be seen how well evaluations of the goodness or badness of perpetrators, behaviors, and victims hold up in natural settings. It may prove to be difficult to parse some grievances into these three components of actor, behavior and object. Some causes lack clear perpetrators, such as institutionalized racism, where it may be difficult to pinpoint exact culprits even though a culture of racism persists. Others, like climate change, may have too far-reaching of effects to identify particular aggrieved groups (although this may be less of a problem at the level of specific campaigns, such as fishermen in the Marshall Islands). Also, when it comes to movement campaigns, there are likely to be framing contests warring to define the identity of an aggrieved group. For example, in the wake of protests against governmental spending cuts, like public teachers opposing education funding cuts in Wisconsin, some tried relabeling public teachers and other public employees as the new "Welfare Queens" (Cohn 2010; Bessie 2011). Thus, while I controlled the identities used in the experiment, in the

complexity of most social settings there are likely to be ongoing contests regarding the labels and identities attached to perpetrators and victims, as well as the nature of the act.

As described in Chapter 4, I used very short one-sentence injustice events to prevent accidental introduction of new factors through additional text (e.g., modifiers and settings) and to preserve consistency across varied combinations. However, one concern might be that these events were not elaborate enough to draw in an audience and make them care enough about the issue to engage in activism. This did happen to some extent. In describing the willingness to participate in behavior outcomes, I often use the language of "more willing" in describing relative differences, but for some measures it would be more accurate to say "less unwilling." For instance, with disruptive protest, all averages across conditions ranged from very unwilling to somewhat unwilling (which is not surprising as many people oppose disruptive protest on principle). With the exception of sympathetic support and petition signing, the other activism measures tended to have averages with maximums that fell between "Neutral" and "Somewhat Willing," indicating that even in the best case scenario (typically bad actions toward good victims) people were not clamoring to participate in these activist activities. In part, this could be because most people do not engage in activism; less than 10% of the U.S. adult population has attended a protest, march, demonstration or rally in the past year (Beyerlein et al. 2015). More importantly, the hypotheses contrast the predicted effects of actor, behavior and objects (and combinations thereof) in relative terms to understand comparisons across different factors. Thus, any disinterest produced by the single sentence format and lack of details around the event is distributed across the conditions. The focus, and rightly so, is on the differences that emerge between the conditions and on the effects of one factor (or its interactions)

relative to another. Given these considerations, what is interesting is the extent to which participants did get involved in a single sentence injustice event. For the most mobilizing form of grievance in the study—murderers abuse grandparents—participants on average said they felt somewhat high to high levels of anger, disgust and sadness. Feeling high levels of emotion in response to a single sentence is pretty impressive. In today's digital age, where headlines, tweets, and facebook posts communicate news in a short format, the idea that grievances might be communicated or spread in less than a few sentences might actually be quite realistic.

For some outcomes, the content of grievances explained quite a bit of variation; for example, half of the variation in sympathetic support for a campaign to address a grievance. But how strong are the effects of grievances when combined with other factors known to affect movement support and participation, such as biographical availability and political opportunity structures? This study is able to identify that grievances have an effect on mobilization, but is unable to situate the strength of that effect alongside other established factors. An extension of this research, then, would be to evaluate the relative strength of grievances in drawing public support and action when compared to more traditional factors like movement resources and sources of repression. Additionally, it might be of interest to look at the effects of identities and acts that are only weakly positive or negative on the evaluation dimension (in contrast to the strongly positive or negative evaluation ratings used in this study) to better understand the scope of these effects.

To date, my focus has been on identifying the ways grievances could differ in appeal. This makes sense, as the first step is to see whether grievances can generate differential

mobilizing effects, if at all. But a natural extension of this work is to see if these effects become more pronounced or attenuated for different types of people. For instance, this experimental study raises the interesting question of whether good acts can be construed as an injustice. A follow-up study, preferably one with a representative sample of the population, could investigate whether perceptions of the injustice of good acts toward bad victims varies for different groups of people. In discussing social movements that opposed good acts, there was a tendency for these to be more conservative, rather than liberal, campaigns. This might be something to pursue in understanding whether personal traits affect the salience of particular grievances.

In addition to extensions of this research, I expect that there are many other unexplored ways that the content of grievances differentially affects public reactions and interest in activism. Affect Control Theory suggests one such route: evaluations of potency (powerfulness or powerlessness) of identities. Is our interest in aiding a cause partially contingent on how powerless or vulnerable the aggrieved group is perceived to be? In this study, I kept potency consistently positive, but I am conducting a follow-up study that investigates differences between aggrieved groups viewed as strongly powerful or strongly powerless.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation begins by presenting a puzzle: How can we make sense of the hundreds of grievances that exist at any given time and start identifying whether some grievances possess an inherent advantage over others in having popular appeal as well as attracting resources and adherents? This study then strives to answer that question in a systematic way: first breaking grievances into three core components—actor, behavior, object; then drawing on existing literature to develop two mechanisms—wellbeing concerns and deflection—for how those components translate into concern and interest in activism; and finally designing an experimental study to test hypotheses and then analyzing the results. The findings from this dissertation provide an insight into one way that we can understand differential effects in grievances: looking at the goodness and badness of perpetrators, behaviors and victims and combinations thereof in injustice events.

In concert with prior work investigating cognitive biases and evaluations of grievances (Bergstrand 2014), I have found support for the idea that, indeed, not all grievances are created equal when it comes to public backing and activism, and that, importantly, the content of grievances can be studied in systematic ways that illuminate the types of grievances expected to yield higher rates of concern and mobilization. This is a crucial point—rather than looking at the popularity of particular causes at a given time, this dissertation produces general blueprints of the effects of components applicable to any grievance, at any level (local campaign/international movement), at any time and in any geographic location. One just needs to know cultural evaluations of what identities and behaviors are viewed as good or bad in that

context, something that should be relatively intuitive for members of a particular culture.[14] This theoretical framework for understanding grievances is the contribution of this dissertation. But cognitive biases and goodness/badness evaluation in grievances are just the beginning—I expect there are many analytic lenses that can be applied to the content of grievances to examine what types of grievances are most powerful in attracting sympathizers and adherents. Given the multitude of directions that future research can take, it is an exciting time to study grievances.

In sum, this dissertation research contributes to social movement literature on differential participation, framing, emotions, and movement outcomes. Most importantly, it provides a theoretical framework for analyzing grievances, making it applicable to activist campaigns of all types. These findings, alongside other established social movements variables, could help to explain why people protest giving aid to undocumented migrants or why campaigns targeting hazardous waste sites located near schools may be more successful than campaigns opposing hazardous waste sites located near prisons. Thus, my dissertation introduces a new explanatory factor, grievance evaluations, that can be used to understand why people care about or are willing to take action for particular types of issues, as well as why some movements have an easier time achieving their goals than others. Investigating how grievances differentially appeal to potential sympathizers and attract resources is relevant for all types of civic engagement, including volunteer work, charitable giving and voting behaviors. Further, it has the real world implications of identifying the types of issues and social problems

[14] Of course the goodness and badness of certain identities may be in dispute or contested, which members are likely to realize as well (e.g., there are currently social movement wars around cultural perceptions of gays and lesbians). But the majority of identities we use in everyday life (e.g., doctors, bakers, nurses, rapists, librarians, mothers, robbers, etc.) are not particularly contentious.

less likely to attract support and action, such as those involving groups with negative evaluation ratings. If social change is desired for these negatively perceived groups, it may have to come from more formal apparatus (e.g., the legal system) in the absence of a groundswell of political action, public concern, or flow of aid, such as volunteering time or sending resources to the aggrieved group. Additionally, if the civil and political sectors are less willing to take action to help particular aggrieved groups, this increases the likelihood that these types of grievances persist, resulting in social cleavages and inequalities. This makes studying grievances an important and relevant pursuit, and one that has many avenues open for future exploration.

Appendix A: Example of Research Instrument for Experiment

Note: The research instruments for all eight experimental conditions were identical except for sentences and wording pertaining to the specific injustice event.

Check ✓ one answer box per question.
Please consider the following event and answer questions about it below.

"Teachers abuse bullies."

Q1 To what extent, if at all, do you feel the following emotions about teachers abusing bullies:

	None At All	*Just A Little*	*Low Levels*	*Moderate Levels*	*Somewhat High Levels*	*High Levels*	*Very High Levels*
Anger	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Satisfaction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Surprise	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Disgust	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Sadness	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Q2 Do you believe that teachers abusing bullies is morally right or wrong?

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
1 Very Right	2 Right	3 Somewhat Right	4 Neutral	5 Somewhat Wrong	6 Wrong	7 Very Wrong
MORALLY RIGHT					MORALLY WRONG	

Q3 Do you believe that if teachers abused bullies it would be just or unjust?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Just	Just	Somewhat Just	Neither Just nor Unjust	Somewhat Unjust	Unjust	Very Unjust

JUST UNJUST

Q4 Do you think the average American would think that teachers abusing bullies is morally right or wrong?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Right	Right	Somewhat Right	Neutral	Somewhat Wrong	Wrong	Very Wrong

MORALLY RIGHT MORALLY WRONG

Q5 Do you think the average American would think that teachers abusing bullies is just or unjust?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Just	Just	Somewhat Just	Neither Just nor Unjust	Somewhat Unjust	Unjust	Very Unjust

JUST UNJUST

Q6 In everyday life, if you heard that teachers were abusing bullies, would you be more likely to assume the information is true or false?

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
1 Completely True	2 Probably True	3 Somewhat True	4 Neutral	5 Somewhat False	6 Probably False	7 Completely False
TRUE						FALSE

Q7 Does teachers abusing bullies seem like something realistic or unrealistic that could happen?

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
1 Very Realistic	2 Realistic	3 Somewhat Realistic	4 Neither Realistic nor Unrealistic	5 Somewhat Unrealistic	6 Unrealistic	7 Very Unrealistic
REALISTIC						UNREALISTIC

For this next section of the questionnaire, assume that there is a real life example of teachers abusing bullies, and activist campaigns have emerged to OPPOSE it. You have just been approached by an activist recruiting people to take action to PREVENT teachers from abusing bullies.

Q8 In general, would you oppose or support these activist campaigns to STOP teachers from abusing bullies?

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
1 Strongly Oppose	2 Oppose	3 Somewhat Oppose	4 Neither Oppose nor Support	5 Somewhat Support	6 Support	7 Strongly Support

OPPOSE= DO NOT STOP teachers abusing bullies SUPPORT= STOP teachers abusing bullies

Q9 How willing would you be to take the following actions for these campaigns to STOP teachers from abusing bullies:

	Very Unwilling	*Unwilling*	*Somewhat Unwilling*	*Neutral*	*Somewhat Willing*	*Willing*	*Very Willing*
Sign a petition	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Donate money	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attend a peaceful protest	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attend a disruptive protest, like occupying a street without permission	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Q10 **How willing would you be to recruit other people to take action to prevent teachers from abusing bullies?**

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Very Unwilling	Unwilling	Somewhat Unwilling	Neutral	Somewhat Willing	Willing	Very Willing

Q11 **How willing do you think the average American would be to take the following actions to OPPOSE teachers abusing bullies:**

	Very Unwilling	*Unwilling*	*Somewhat Unwilling*	*Neutral*	*Somewhat Willing*	*Willing*	*Very Willing*
Sign a petition	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Donate money	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attend a peaceful protest	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attend a disruptive protest, like occupying a street without permission	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recruit other people to take action for the issue	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Q12 **Compared to other issues in the world, does preventing teachers from abusing bullies seem like an unimportant or important issue?**

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Very Unimportant	Unimportant	Somewhat Unimportant	Neutral	Somewhat Important	Important	Very Important

For this next section, please answer the following questions about yourself.
Remember that this survey is completely anonymous.

Q13 Please select the range that includes your age:

☐ 18-25 ☐ 26-30 ☐ 31-35 ☐ 36-40 ☐ 41-45 ☐ 46-50 ☐ 51-55 ☐ 56-60 ☐ Over 60

Q14 Sex:

☐ Female ☐ Male

Q15 Have you spent the majority of your life living in the United States?

☐ Yes ☐ No

Q16 Race or Ethnicity (check all the apply):

☐ White ☐ Black ☐ Latino/a ☐ American Indian or Alaska Native ☐ Asian or Pacific Islander ☐ Other

Q17 If you answered "Other" to Q16, please write in Race/Ethnicity: _____

Q18 **When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as:**

☐ Very Liberal ☐ Liberal ☐ Somewhat Liberal ☐ Moderate ☐ Somewhat Conservative ☐ Conservative ☐ Very Conservative

Q19 **In the 2012 presidential election, who would you have been more likely to vote for?**

☐ Barack Obama ☐ Mitt Romney ☐ Other

Q20 If you answered "Other" to Q19, please write in the name of the candidate you would have been more likely to vote for: ☐

Q21 **In thinking about the event "teachers abuse bullies," did you envision a specific type of abuse or did you just think about abuse in a general or abstract way?**

☐ Specific Type ☐ General or Abstract ☐ Don't Know

Q22 If you answered "Specific Type" to Q21, please briefly describe what type of abuse you envisioned:

☐

Q23 **Think of an actual cause, one that you really care about and is important to you. How willing would you be to do the following actions for this cause:**

	Very Unwilling	*Unwilling*	*Somewhat Unwilling*	*Neutral*	*Somewhat Willing*	*Willing*	*Very Willing*
Sign a petition	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attend a peaceful protest	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Donate money	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recruit other people to take action for the issue	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Attend a disruptive protest, like occupying a street without permission	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

You are welcome to enter any additional comments here, such as more information about your reactions to the event, further explanation of your answer choices, or general comments on the survey.

Thank you for your participation!

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